BEYOND AD HOC: THE ROLE OF INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION IN U.S. STABILIZATION EFFORTS

by

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of
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The Requirements for the Degree
of
Doctor of Philosophy
Political Science

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Date:  ____________________________  Fall Semester 2016
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA
Beyond Ad Hoc:
The Role of Inter-Organizational Collaboration in U.S. Stabilization Efforts

A Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at George Mason University

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Fall Semester 2016
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Dedication

This is dedicated to my parents, for without whose love and support this would never have happened.

This dissertation is also dedicated to all of those who have placed life and limb on the line in the multitude conflict zones around the world to restore peace and bring hope, and who strive to make a better life for the peoples of the world.
Acknowledgements

I would like to extend my deepest thanks to:

My dissertation committee, for their continuous support and feedback which has guided and improved my research.

My friends from my tour at the Department of State in Baghdad, who have encouraged my research from the beginning.

All my friends and loved ones who have provided support, offered encouragement, or just simply listened as I completed this journey.
Table of Contents

List of Tables .................................................................................................................. vii
List of Figures .................................................................................................................... ix
List of Abbreviations or Symbols ..................................................................................... x
Abstract ........................................................................................................................... iii
Chapter 1: Problem and Overview .................................................................................. 1
Chapter 2: Collaborative Governance Theory and Current Management Approach .......... 15
Chapter 3: Hypotheses, Case Selection, and Analysis Approach ........................................ 24
Chapter 4: Background and Case Study Overviews .......................................................... 33
  Iraq and Afghanistan Stabilization Background ............................................................... 33
  Common Stabilization Organizations .............................................................................. 58
Chapter 5: Collaborative Governance Theory Hypotheses Analysis ................................ 74
  Hypothesis 1: Stabilization Network Collaborative Governance Features ....................... 75
  Hypothesis 2a: Milward & Provan Typology .................................................................... 97
  Hypothesis 2b: Agranoff Typology ................................................................................. 102
  Hypothesis 3: Network Success ...................................................................................... 118
  Summary of Theory Hypotheses Findings ..................................................................... 143
Chapter 6: Stabilization Challenges Hypotheses Analysis ................................................. 145
  Hypothesis 4: Power and Capability Disparities ............................................................. 145
  Hypothesis 5a: Security .................................................................................................. 160
  Hypothesis 5b: Turnover .............................................................................................. 180
Chapter 7: Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 197
  Stabilization Networks: Perpetually Emergent Networks .............................................. 197
  No One is Managing the Stabilization Network ............................................................. 210
  Inflexible Funding, More Than Lack of Planning, Limits Collaboration ......................... 218
  Observations and Findings for Collaborative Governance Theory ............................... 221
Appendix 1: Research Methods ....................................................................................... 229
List of Tables

Table 1: Milward and Provan Typology Summary ................................................................. 22
Table 2: Iraq and Afghanistan PRT Comparison ................................................................. 43
Table 3: Common Stabilization Organizations ................................................................. 59
Table 4: Network Governance and Organization Summary ............................................ 77
Table 5: Network Coordination and Strategy Summary .................................................. 87
Table 6: Network Knowledge Management Summary .................................................... 90
Table 7: Relationships Summary ......................................................................................... 91
Table 8: Integrators and Supporters Summary .................................................................. 92
Table 9: Network Features Overall Rankings Summary .................................................. 95
Table 10: Agranoff Typology Summary .............................................................................. 103
Table 11: Agranoff Typology Collaboration Summary ..................................................... 104
Table 12: Collaboration Success Summary ....................................................................... 119
Table 13: Organizational or Agency Level of Success Summary ...................................... 120
Table 14: Network Level of Success Summary .................................................................. 130
Table 15: Collaboration Success Summary ....................................................................... 140
Table 16: Emergent Problem Solving Network Predicted Success ................................... 141
Table 17: Agranoff Typology Key Network Features and Predicted Success ..................... 141
Table 18: Predicted vs Actual Success Relative Rankings ................................................ 142
Table 19: Theory Hypothesis Findings Summary .............................................................. 143
Table 20: Resource Disparity Impacts ............................................................................... 153
Table 21: Hostile Environment Security Impacts ............................................................... 171
Table 22: Hostile Environment Turnover Impacts ............................................................. 185
Table 23: Stabilization Challenge Hypothesis Summary ................................................... 193
Table 24: Collaborative Network Features with Example Indicators ................................ 236
Table 25: Tangible Network Features Overall Rankings Summary ................................... 284
Table 26: Network Goal Congruence Rankings ................................................................. 285
Table 27: Network Governance Structures: Governing Bodies ....................................... 346
Table 28: Network Governance Structures: Working Groups, Task Forces, etc. .......... 353
Table 29: Network Governance Structures: Conferences & Workshops ....................... 366
Table 30: Network Governance Structures: Communications ......................................... 370
Table 31: Network Governance Structures: Agreements .................................................. 372
Table 32: Network Governance Structures: Meetings ...................................................... 375
Table 33: Network Governance Structure: Liaisons ......................................................... 379
Table 34: Network Management and Organization Structures Summary ....................... 385
Table 35: Coordination and Strategy: Mission, Vision, and Goal Congruence ............... 386
Table 36: Coordination & Strategy: Strategic Plans and Planning ..................................... 411
Table 37: Network Coordination: Resource Sharing .......................................................... 421
Table 38: Network Coordination and Strategy Overall Ranking ..............................................427
Table 39: Type of Information Sought .................................................................................428
Table 40: Sources of Knowledge .........................................................................................433
Table 41: Comfort Level in Sharing Information ..................................................................437
Table 42: Common Benchmarks or Metrics ......................................................................443
Table 43: Knowledge Management Summary ...................................................................445
Table 44: Trust and Comfort Levels ....................................................................................446
Table 45: Approaches and Assumptions ............................................................................454
Table 46: Training and Efforts to Promote Understanding ..................................................458
Table 47: Relationships Summary ......................................................................................462
Table 48: Integrators and Champions ..................................................................................463
Table 49: Leadership Support ...............................................................................................470
Table 50: Integrators and Supports Summary ......................................................................472
Table 51: Iraq RoL Agranoff Typology Summary .................................................................478
Table 52: Afghanistan RoL Agranoff Typology Summary .....................................................484
Table 53: Iraq Provincial Agranoff Typology Summary .......................................................492
Table 54: Afghanistan Provincial Agranoff Typology Summary .........................................507
Table 55: Mindanao Agranoff Typology Summary ..............................................................510
Table 56: South Sudan Agranoff Typology Summary ..........................................................519
Table 57: Organizational or Agency Level Success Summary .............................................520
Table 58: Network Level of Success Summary ....................................................................536
Table 59: Hypothesis 4 Relationship Building Impacts .......................................................555
Table 60: Hypothesis 4 Coordination and Strategy Impacts ..............................................559
Table 61: Hypothesis 5a Relationship Building Impacts ......................................................566
Table 62: Hypothesis 5a Knowledge Management Impacts ...............................................569
Table 63: Hypothesis 5a Other Impacts ...............................................................................574
Table 64: Hypothesis 5b Relationship Building Impacts ......................................................578
Table 65: Hypothesis 5b Knowledge Management Impacts ...............................................582
Table 66: Hypothesis 5b Coordination & Strategy Impacts ................................................584
Table 67: Hypothesis 5b Other Impacts ..............................................................................587
List of Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1: Map of Iraq and its provinces</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2: Map of Afghanistan provinces with Helmand Province highlighted</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3: The main island of Mindanao in red and outlying islands in maroon</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4: Map of South Sudan with states</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5: FM 3-07 Comprehensive and Whole of Government Approaches</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6: U.S. Embassy-Baghdad Rule of Law Organizational Chart, 2009</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 7: U.S. Embassy-Baghdad Rule of Law Organizational Chart, 2011</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 8: Map of PRT locations in Iraq, July 2007</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 9: Iraq PRTs in 2008</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 10: PRT project funding sources</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 11: Government of Iraq governance levels</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 12: U.S. civilian and military parallel rank structure</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 13: Philippines Programs and Development Partners</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 14: Non-USAID Donors by Sector</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 15: South Sudan Donors by Sector</td>
<td>334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 16: Humanitarian Cluster Organization Graphic</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 17: Rule of Law Organizations in Afghanistan</td>
<td>356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 18: Mindanao Clusters in 2011</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 19: South Sudan Humanitarian Cluster Organizations</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 20: Notional Civilian/Military Coordinating Hierarchy</td>
<td>394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 21: Notional PRT/Iraqi Provincial Coordination with the National Government</td>
<td>395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 22: PRT Integrated Command Structure</td>
<td>495</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<td>AFP</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
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<td>ANDS</td>
<td>Afghanistan National Development Strategy</td>
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<td>ANSF</td>
<td>Afghan National Security Forces</td>
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<td>ARMM</td>
<td>Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao</td>
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<td>ASGP</td>
<td>Afghanistan Subnational Governance Programme</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>AusAID</td>
<td>Australia Aid</td>
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<td>BBAs</td>
<td>Bilingual-Bicultural Advisors</td>
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<td>BCT</td>
<td>Brigade Combat Team</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>Community Action Program</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>Consolidated Appeal Process</td>
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<td>CDROLLE</td>
<td>Coordinating Director for Rule of Law and Law Enforcement</td>
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<td>CERP</td>
<td>Commander’s Emergency Response Program</td>
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<td>CfC</td>
<td>Coalitions for Change</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>CJIATF-435</td>
<td>Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force-435</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMO</td>
<td>Civil-Military Operation</td>
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<td>CMOC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Operations Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMPASS</td>
<td>Civil Military Plans and Assessments</td>
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<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Coalition Provisional Authority</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Conflict and Stabilization Operations</td>
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<td>CSP</td>
<td>Community Stabilization Program</td>
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<td>CSTC-A</td>
<td>Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan</td>
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<td>DEVAD</td>
<td>Development Advisor</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DoJ or DOJ</td>
<td>Department of Justice</td>
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<td>DST</td>
<td>District Support Team</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office</td>
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<td>ePRT</td>
<td>Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUJUST LEX-Iraq</td>
<td>European Union Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq</td>
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<td>EUPOL</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan</td>
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<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<td>FOB</td>
<td>Forward Operating Base</td>
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<td>FSAC</td>
<td>Field Support and Analysis Cell</td>
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<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal year</td>
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<td>GIRoA</td>
<td>Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan</td>
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<td>GoI</td>
<td>Government of Iraq</td>
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<td>GoP</td>
<td>Government of the Philippines</td>
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<td>GoSS</td>
<td>Government of South Sudan</td>
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<td>HAP</td>
<td>Humanitarian Action Plan</td>
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<td>ICITAP</td>
<td>International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program</td>
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<td>ICMAG</td>
<td>Integrated Civil-Military Action Group</td>
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<td>IDLG</td>
<td>Independent Directorate for Local Governance</td>
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<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<tr>
<td>INCLE</td>
<td>International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement</td>
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<td>INL</td>
<td>International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOs</td>
<td>International Organizations</td>
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<td>IPCB</td>
<td>International Police Coordination Board</td>
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<td>IROL</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Rule of Law Unit</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>JAG</td>
<td>Judge Advocate General</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGP</td>
<td>Local Governance Program</td>
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<td>IPIT</td>
<td>Interagency Planning and Implementation Team</td>
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<td>MDTF-SS</td>
<td>Multi-Donor Trust Fund for South Sudan</td>
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<td>MinCODE</td>
<td>Mindanao Caucus of Development NGO Networks</td>
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<tr>
<td>MinDA</td>
<td>Mindanao Development Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNF-I</td>
<td>Multi-National Forces-Iraq</td>
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<td>MTCDS</td>
<td>Medium-Term Capacity Development Strategy for South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NROLFSM-A</td>
<td>NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission-Afghanistan</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTM-A</td>
<td>NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIF</td>
<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPSEC</td>
<td>Operational Security</td>
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<td>PRDCs</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Development Councils</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>QRF</td>
<td>Quick Response Fund</td>
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<td>R&amp;R</td>
<td>Rest and Relaxation</td>
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<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Regional Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>RoL or ROL</td>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTI</td>
<td>Research Triangle Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCR</td>
<td>Senior Civilian Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIGAR</td>
<td>Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGIR</td>
<td>Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction</td>
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<td>SIPR</td>
<td>Secret Internet Protocol Router Network</td>
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<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army</td>
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<td>SSDP</td>
<td>South Sudan Development Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSRF</td>
<td>South Sudan Recovery Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. (or US)</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USDA</td>
<td>United States Department of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USF-I</td>
<td>United States Forces-Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USFOR-A</td>
<td>U.S. Forces-Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>USIP</td>
<td>United States Institute of Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Program/Programme</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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Abstract

BEYOND AD HOC: THE ROLE OF INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION IN U.S. STABILIZATION EFFORTS

Brett Doyle, Ph.D.

George Mason University, 2016

Director: Dr. Julianne Mahler

The U.S. has faced recurring difficulty in efforts to stabilize or mitigate conflict through political and economic support. A particular area of difficulty is collaboration among the multitude of organizations operating in modern conflict zones, contributing to inefficiencies and waste. Collaborative governance theories that address dynamic collaboration between participants, previously not applied to conflict areas, are applied to the cases of U.S. stabilization efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and South Sudan to understand collaboration difficulties. The hostile environment leads to unstable “perpetually emergent” collaboration networks that, along with other barriers, frustrates robust collaboration in conflict zones.
Chapter 1: Problem and Overview

Introduction

“[A] $40 million prison sits in the desert north of Baghdad, empty. A $165 million children's hospital goes unused in the south. A $100 million waste water treatment system in Fallujah has cost three times more than projected, yet sewage still runs through the streets…. sometimes civilian and military reconstruction efforts were poorly coordinated and overlapped…. Another problem was coordination with the Iraqis, who have complained they weren't consulted and often ended up paying to complete unfinished facilities they didn't want in the first place.”

- Reconstruction ‘boondoggles’ excerpts, from Iraq (Gamel, 2010, para. 1).

For more than a decade, attempts to bring peace and stability in the aftermath of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have dominated the foreign policy of the United States. These conflicts are most popularly known as ‘counterinsurgency’ wars, in that they were campaigns to defeat irregular military adversaries, or insurgents. However, the military action to combat and defeat insurgent foes was one part of a broader effort. In conjunction with military campaigns, the U.S. government and international community attempted to rebuild the failed governments and ravaged economies of both countries. These rebuilding efforts, known as
stabilization\(^1\) or “stability operations” in military parlance, were intended to reduce the violence that pervaded those countries.

Stabilization efforts are conducted to end or prevent the reoccurrence of violent conflict through creating the conditions for nonviolent political and economic development (United States Institute of Peace, 2009). This can include activities to reduce ongoing violence, as well as preventative efforts to forestall a resurgence of conflict. In Iraq and Afghanistan, these activities included the combined efforts of U.S. military and civilian agencies, the host government, and a multitude of other actors. Stabilization activities are often focused on developing functional government institutions at all levels, from the local to the national, and include restoring of basic services (i.e. water, health, sanitation, etc.), fostering security through the rule of law (RoL), enhancing economic development, and encouraging conflicting parties to address differences through democratic political processes.

Stabilization efforts often entail a wide range of activities in order to achieve stability goals; for example, establishing or preserving safety and security for an at risk populace; providing for the essential, immediate needs of the people; restoring basic public order and a semblance of normalcy to life; and rebuilding the institutions of government and market economy that provides the foundations for enduring peace and stability. One example of the range of activities conducted during stability operations can be seen in the account of a ‘Village Stability Operations’ team in Afghanistan (Hanlin, 2011). A single team alone is described as conducting activities such as establishing the executive ‘shura’ or legislative

\(^1\) There is no formal name for stabilization activities outside of the military. Stabilization is the term of art used in this research, as it is commonly used in U.S. military documentation and U.S. civilian organizations. Related terms exist in the field of addressing violence in conflict, and may be more commonly used by other organizations. These terms include conflict prevention (seeking to advert an outbreak of violent conflict), conflict mitigation or conflict transformation (seeking to stop violence underway), and peacebuilding.
body; building roads, schools, and medical clinics; advising the local governor on infrastructure development; providing micro-grants to local businesses; facilitating coordination between government officials; supporting the marketing and sale of agricultural products; running model farms and improving agricultural production techniques; supporting the development of dams and water conservation techniques; agricultural seed dissemination programs; and refurbishing police buildings, civic buildings, and mosques. These activities are all in addition to combat operations (or ‘kinetic operations’, in military parlance) to provide security to the local population and defeat insurgents.

In addition to U.S. wars such as in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. also undertakes stabilization efforts in conflicts in which the U.S. is not a direct military actor in, but still has a national interest in seeing resolved. In the past two decades, thousands of U.S. government personnel from more than a dozen civilian agencies have deployed to more than a dozen stabilization related efforts (United States Institute of Peace, 2009). One example is the U.S. effort to end organized violence in the Philippines, where hundreds of U.S. Special Forces troops and U.S. civilian agencies have supported Philippine efforts to stop Islamist-linked insurgent groups and promote stability. Other prior U.S. stabilization efforts include U.S. military and civilian efforts Kosovo, Somalia, and the more recent U.S. government civilian agency efforts in the newly established state of South Sudan to reduce violence and prevent further outbreaks.

However, these efforts to bring stability through political and economic means has proven at least as difficult as the military fights, if not more so. The United States’ experiences in attempting to end conflict driven violence and bring stability in Iraq and
Afghanistan entailed staggering costs in terms of resources and lives, and were plagued by coordination challenges among the actors. They involved not only a large number of different participating donor states, but even within the U.S. government there were multiple agencies and programs funded by the same agency (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2008, January). So many different international partners and U.S. government agencies were working with so many different grantees and contractors that serious questions were raised regarding how well the U.S. government and its allies were communicating with one another, coordinating their efforts, and monitoring their expenditures. In Iraq, for example, this was described as “reaching a new level of disharmony” for development assistance (Banks, 2010, p. 163). In Afghanistan, disunity between the U.S. military, the U.S. government, and among the United States and its Allies has been described as “unfortunately the norm, not the exception” (Lamb and Cinnamond, 2009, p. 8). Hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars in reconstruction assistance have been described as having been wasted, in part due to lack of coordination within U.S. forces as well as with their host nation partners.

These types of problems have not been confined to the Iraq and Afghanistan experiences, however. Since at least the days of the CORDS (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, but in common usage referred to by its acronym\(^2\)) program in Vietnam, U.S. military and civilian organizations have been criticized for not effectively conducting stability activities, particularly with regard to efficiently combining

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\(^2\) There are many examples in the cases researched where the acronym was the predominant means to referring to an organization or program. In some cases, the original words that composed the acronym were all but forgotten, or in some cases, actually dispensed with and the acronym became the full proper name of the organization. In these cases, the acronym may be used to refer to the organization.
efforts and leveraging capabilities (e.g., Komer, 1972; Jacobson, 2005). Repeatedly, each U.S. institution has arrived to conduct stabilization largely unprepared for the tasks at hand, and each has brought its own approaches, strengths, and limitations to organization for the job. The enduring nature of these problems was evidenced in the reported popularity in the halls of both Baghdad and Kabul of Robert Komer’s monograph “Bureaucracy Does its Thing” (1972), which included a detailed look at the lack of coordination and collaboration between U.S. agencies in Vietnam. Not unsurprisingly, the results have been ad hoc, improvised, and inconsistent approaches to operating in a stabilization environment.

“When There’s a War, Certain People Show Up”

This problem of coordination and cooperation has only seemed to intensify as the number of organizations engaged in stabilization increases. In the era of globalization, the U.S. is only a single player in an increasingly complex ‘maze’ of organizations addressing stability problems (United States Institute of Peace, 2009). Significant actors can include the host nation, the U.S. military, U.S. civilian agencies, other international donors, international organizations (e.g. the United Nations), and dozens or even hundreds of international and local private companies and NGOs, who are often the implementers of activities on the ground. International donor states can involve dozens of typically western countries.

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3 To give an example of the proliferation of NGOs, in the 1980's there were 280 NGOs identified as specializing in disaster relief. By 2004, that number was well over 1000 (Kent, 2004).
funding stabilization activities. International organizations such as United Nations missions, the World Bank, and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) both fund and implement projects. It also includes a host of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Red Cross, Mercy Corps, or others who generally implement funded programs or work to advance humanitarian goals. The numbers of such NGOs active in a stabilization effort can vary widely based on time and place. Many of these organizations, particularly humanitarian ones, can even be suspicious of U.S. intentions or averse to cooperating with military forces (Burke, 2014).

Due to these challenges, numerous think tanks and government agencies have conducted a multitude of studies and reviews on U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to analyze problems and potential solutions. Repeatedly, a number of management-related issues, such as coordination among actors, relationships, cooperation, and information sharing are raised as problems in U.S. stabilization efforts. Current approaches, most fully developed in military doctrine, have primarily addressed such areas as strategic planning, organizational structures, and coordination among actors (see Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-07, 2012; Joint Publication 3-07, Stability Operations, 2012, Joint Publication 3-57 on Civil-Military Operations, 2013, Field Manual 3-14, Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies, 2014). This has also lead to the development of collaboration concepts such as “unity of effort” and “a whole of government approach” gaining currency across the U.S. government. However, such attempts have not completely, and perhaps not even predominantly, resolved problems faced by those operating in stabilization environments,

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4 The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, the Rand Corporation, the United States Institute of Peace, and the U.S. Government Accountability Office all have published multiple “lessons learned” reports on Iraq and Afghanistan.
such as in Iraq, Afghanistan, an other areas, as evidenced by the continuing reports of problems and challenges.

It can be inferred that the general problems of management and coordination during stabilization efforts have substantial costs for the U.S. government. These costs can be viewed not only in terms of waste and inefficient expenditures, but in prolonging the conflict or reducing effectiveness in fostering stability. What these delays (and the degradation of effect) may mean in terms of increasing risks to U.S. personnel, as well as costs to the taxpayer for the overall operation or activity, can only be speculated. However, it seems reasonable to believe that they may be substantial.

**Stabilization Efforts as a Collaboration Problem**

The coordination and direction of U.S. stabilization efforts is complicated by the division of authority over U.S. civilian and military organizations. By law, civilian and military elements of U.S. activities must act under separate authority structures, though for the same overall policy goals. This creates parallel civilian and military command structures in the country of operation, with neither military nor civilian organizations being able to direct action from one another. This has led to situations with uncertain or ambiguous authority or responsibility for areas of activity, as well as areas of overlapping authorities.

U.S. civilian and military unification was achieved in the CORDS program. However, it is now effectively unobtainable due to legal and policy challenges and even at the time of
Vietnam it took the direct involvement of the President to achieve\(^5\).

Further, U.S. civilian organizations include over a dozen agencies, such as USAID (United States Agency for International Development), the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of State, all of which are acting under the authority of the Ambassador to the host nation (referred to as the ‘Chief of Mission’). Though they all operate under Chief of Mission authority, these civilian agencies, aside from the State Department, often have shared responsibilities to their respective leaders in Washington, DC headquarters as well as to the Ambassador (Oakley and Casey, 2007). Additionally, U.S. civilian organizations predominantly do not design and implement programs and projects directly; rather, they direct policy implementation and work through ‘implementing partners’, funded through grants and contracts, to implement programs and projects. These partners can number in the dozens or more for any given sector of activity.

Compared to U.S. civilian organizations, the U.S. military operates in relatively unified manner, through a hierarchical chain of command. Conventional military units are directly subordinate to higher-level command units. However, even this is not completely straightforward. Some military units, such as Special Operations Forces, can locally act independently of conventional military units. This can lead to multiple military units acting in an area without a unified chain of command; without sufficient coordination, these units can even undermine one another’s progress\(^6\). Further, though the military predominately

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\(^6\) Cases of U.S. Special Forces unit activities conflicting with general forces activities are well documented. It is even addressed as a priority in U.S. Army (and also adopted by the U.S. Marines) Field Manual 3-24, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, May 2014, pages 6-5 to 6-6.
directly implements its activities, it also employs a wide range of contracted support services, adding to the number of organizations in a given area of operations.

It is with this structure and lack of cohesion that the U.S. as a whole must engage and collaborate with the host nation, whose government and local organizations are typically the direct beneficiary of stabilization activities. This, too, is not necessarily a straightforward endeavor. In stabilization activities, host nation engagement takes place at multiple levels of government, spanning the national level; provincial, governance, or regional levels; and even to district, municipality, village, or other local levels. In addition, local civil society, such as indigenous professional associations, nonprofits, and private sector actors are interacted with. As anyone familiar with policy in the U.S. would understand very well, different levels of host nation national, regional, or local governments and local civil society organizations can have diverging goals -- or even competitive relationships with each other. Lower levels of government, for instance, may not agree with central authorities, or ministries may be controlled by competing political parties and not inclined to cooperate. This can be easily illustrated in the one relatively simple case of the ethnic divides in Iraq between the relatively autonomous (and would-be independent) Kurdish Regional Government and the central government in Baghdad.

Beyond these U.S. and host nation organizations, many other organizations could impact the stabilization efforts – for example, international organizations, international NGOs, or other donor states described above. To varying degrees, the goal of any of these organizations may or may not coincide with U.S. objectives. States and their organizations bring with them their own political objectives. NGOs can have interests in preserving perceptions of neutrality or in advancing humanitarian principals distinct from a given
political objectives. Further, organizations may simply prioritize different elements of the stabilization effort differently, with somewhat different understandings of the problem and tasks at hand. Stabilization activities and programs themselves, either U.S. or other donor state funded, are predominately implemented through a variety of partners and actors, with grants, contracts, and resource pooling being the norm. This creates an entire additional layer of a wide variety of implementing organizations operating in the same space. Further, with a multitude of organizations comes a proliferation of funding sources. The number of donor states and international organizations providing funding for a stabilization effort can range from the dozens to over 100 in the case of Afghanistan (Kishinchand, 2007). At a minimum, these activities would need to be coordinated to avoid duplication or competition, if not actually integrated and synchronized to mutually support shared stabilization objectives.

Together, all of these factors create a complicated and interrelated web of actors that shape the environment in which U.S. personnel are attempting to reach stabilization policy objectives. The interactions between the multitude of diverse organizations in a stabilization activity can be illustrated with a hypothetical example of a program to “reestablish a dairy industry” in an area (Attar, 2012, para. 11). In this example, the coordination that would be required with host nation organizations is described as:

“Host Nation Security Force must be able to protect the farmers and the supporting dairy networks. The legal system must be able to police and prosecute criminal activity ranging from stopping illegal irrigation canal tapping to disrupting illegal cartel or organized crime activity exploiting any aspect of the dairy supply chain. The ministries of agriculture, water resources, transportation, and others will need to
have regional offices, engineers, and specialists staffed and resourced to support and regulate the dairy industry. The ministries of electricity, rural development, and others will need to establish or repair the critical [essential service] nodes which power and support the dairy industry” (Attar, para. 11).

Thus, stabilization activities can be seen as an ‘expeditionary’ application of governance and public policy, in a context of a foreign country and amidst violent conflict. The proliferation of actors in a stabilization environment and the limitations to unity between U.S. civilian and military organizations means that U.S. organizations and managers will not be able to operate in a predominately-hierarchical environment, and will effectively have no choice but to operate and manage collaboratively. As a result, due to the non-traditional nature of stabilization activities, as well as the unique objectives and challenges that they entail, there is a need for a different approach.

The Development and Applicability of Collaborative Governance Theories

For decades, public administration and affairs scholars have been studying the implementation of domestic public policy objectives through cooperation, partnership, and collaboration. This has been developed into a body of related theories and frameworks, loosely termed ‘collaborative governance’ theories. These theories have the common approach of addressing the implementing policies through networks of participating organization, rather than through a hierarchal structure. Collaborative governance networks

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7 Also referred to as ‘networked governance’, ‘shared governance’, ‘third-party governance’, and/or ‘public management networks (PMNs)’ in the literature.
are composed of participants from governmental agencies (such as state and federal agencies), which are often central to the network, and nongovernmental agencies (such as nonprofit or even private sector organizations). The networks can include both formal structures (such as formal cooperative agreements between organizations) and informal structures (such as habits of information sharing or cooperation).

In studying collaborative governance networks, researchers seek to understand not only how the networks operate, but also how they can advance policy or governance. Their advantages include increasing access to specialized knowledge or resources across organizations to address problems, or allowing for greater responsiveness or flexibility. However, collaborative governance networks can have disadvantages, such as diverting management and resources away from home organizations to the broader network in order to support activities and build support. Given these benefits and costs, researchers further seek to explain how public managers can succeed at both managing collaborative networks as a whole across organizations and at managing their own individual organizations as a participant. Common challenges include a limited overlap or divergence of goals or priorities among network participants, as well as a diffusion of responsibility or accountability in the network (Agranoff, 2003; Goldsmith and Eggers, 2009). Researchers do this through understanding the mechanisms through which network collaboration is conducted and how public managers could best utilize them.

Many of these concepts are echoed in the efforts or findings regarding stabilization efforts, such as the “unity of effort” and “comprehensive approach” mentioned above. Given the similarities of concepts and issues, collaborative governance theories appear as a promising, comprehensive, and systematic theoretical basis for examining and understanding
stabilization activities from a public management perspective. Current collaborative governance is focused on domestic governance, and typically on local and state governments (Agranoff, 2003). However, applying collaborative governance frameworks to stabilization activities presents an intriguing area of exploration. Through an examination of modern stabilization activity cases, it should be possible to ascertain if the collaborative governance prescriptions for successful management are also applicable to stabilization activities. If so, then this would help establish a more robust theoretical framework for examining stabilization activities, which could serve to improve upon the U.S. government’s ability to conduct them.

In sum, stabilization activities have proven extremely challenging for the U.S. government. Though they may be inherently difficult, at least a part of the problem seems to be that there are incompatible and incomplete frameworks for managing within them. Though far from a solution to the challenges of stabilization on their own, such management frameworks would seem to be one piece of a larger puzzle that could help support and enable greater success with them. As illustrated above, the notion that stabilization activities should be viewed as a public policy challenge, rather than as a conventional military, diplomatic, or development problem, seems promising to explore. Further, it seems possible that stabilization activities may be best viewed as a collaborative governance arrangement, or, in other words, a Stabilization Network. Given this, the overarching research question is:

“Do stabilization activities exhibit the key network governance elements identified in collaborative governance literature as important to network success, and does their absence help account for the difficulties seen in managing in stabilization activities?”
Research Overview

The research that follows is an examination of this research question. This begins with an overview of collaborative governance theories in Chapter 2. From this overview, a framework for evaluating collaborative networks in stabilization efforts is developed, including identification of key network features and methods of evaluating collaborative success. This foundation informs the development of research hypothesis in Chapter 3, as well as the case selection. The cases studies begin in Chapter 4 with general backgrounds of the kinds of organizations observed among the case studies, as well as backgrounds on the Iraq and Afghanistan environment. This is followed by evaluating the hypotheses in chapters 5 and 6. Finally, analysis was conducted to draw general conclusions about the research question and overall observations in Chapter 7.
Chapter 2: Collaborative Governance Theory

To understand how to apply collaborative governance theories to stabilization activities, it would be useful to begin with exploring where they have been applied. Once that is understood, the relationship of collaborative governance theories to the aforementioned research questions can be developed. This begins with a definition of networks and relevant features of collaborative governance networks (derived from question B), and then followed by what types of networks have been identified (derived from question C) will be discussed. Lastly, measures of collaborative governance network success will be explored (derived from question E). Together, this will form the basis for exploring the body of research questions through case study analysis.

Prior Applications of Collaborative Governance

Many scholars have written about the evolution of a system of governance, which involved collaborations between government, non-profit, and private sector actions working in common effort toward shared objectives. Recent books by Robert Agranoff (2007), Stephen Goldsmith and William Eggers (2004), Brint Milward and Keith Provan (1995, 2000 & 2006), and Lester Salamon (2002), as well as the 2006 Public Administration Review special issue on collaboration and a 2009 book detailing collaborative networks as central collective action vehicles by Stephen Goldsmith and Donald Kettle, are among the more notable recent publications that explore relationships within and among networks in policy
implementation. These works and the developing body of collaborative governance theories all explore how the government is leveraging other actors, state and local governments, nonprofit organizations, private contractors, and others to help implement public policy. They usefully blazed new trails by adopting networks as a new unit of analysis in public administration research.

All of the above studies have concerned U.S. governments, often at the local or state levels, and the networks examined addressed domestic U.S. issues. Yet, some recent scholars have been broadening its application. Recent studies have successfully applied collaborative governance to policy development in Europe (Knill & Tosun, 2009; Parker, 2007) and to overseas development (Hudalah, Winarso, and Woltjer, 2010). Other researchers have examined the transferability of collaborative government principles to other cultures (Krueatlep, Ricucci & Suwanmala, 2010; Meuleman, 2010) and the cultural factors which may support them (Woojin & Eunjung, 2010; Klijn, Jurian, and Steijn, 2010). Moreover, in at least one case, authors have applied collaborative governance principles to international security policy development (Hollis, 2010). All of these extensions of collaborative governance theories set the stage for exploring the applicability of collaborative governance as a conceptual and managerial framework beyond the familiar realm of U.S. domestic policy and into the new frontier of stabilization activities.

**Understanding Collaborative Governance Networks**

There is no universal definition of a collaborative governance network. However, in general, they consist of multiple organizations that are legally autonomous (Milward & Provan, 2006). It should be noted that organizations are the nodes of the networks in
question here, rather than individuals. Relationships (linkages) are based on cooperation and collaboration and, in the public sector, law and funding holds them together.

The key characteristics of collaborative governance networks and their successful employment to achieve policy objects have been explored. The Agranoff (2007), Goldsmith and Kettle (2009), and Goldsmith and Eggers (2004) studies in particular explore the features that have been identified as being important to successful collaboration across organizations. There is not a fixed relationship (e.g. 1 for 1) between these features and collaboration. However, as a rule, the more collaboration that is desired across organizations in the network, the more resources will need to be directed into these features by organizations participating in the network. The particular need for a given feature varies, depending on the goals of the collaborative governance network and its composition.

While the features identified are not standardized or identical from study to study, they are generally consistent enough to allow for some generalizations. For this research, these major features from the above collaborative governance studies have been loosely grouped as:

**Coordination and Strategy:** This category refers to the mission, vision, goals, and strategic planning of the network in question (Agranoff, 2007; Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004). An important consideration is goal congruence, or the extent to which goals are shared among actors and at what points they diverge. This is also referred to as “framing” in some cases (Goldsmith and Kettle, 2009). Understanding shared and divergent goals helps shape and manages the limits of collaboration among actors. Understanding can be formal, expressed in documents or agreements, derived from informal information sharing, such as
from interpersonal relationships, or even from ‘tacit’ signaling from actions without any
direct communications (Bardach, 1998). Network membership is also an element of strategy,
as each participant brings its own resources but also attendant coordinating costs to the
network. Coordination among network participants can take bureaucratic (or horizontal),
entrepreneurial (or innovative), or community building approaches (Heranz, 2010).

**Network Governance and Organization:** This refers to the structures and
mechanisms of the network and how it organizes its activities and decision-making
(Agranoff, 2007; Goldsmith and Kettle, 2009). These include elements such as governing
bodies, chartering agreements, or other foundational agreements. These network governance
elements can range from being participatory, to single-actor led, to being separate
administrative entities (Provan and Kenis, 2008). Capabilities to manage the network, such as
liaison positions, and technical knowledge related to the network such as contracting
capacity, are included. This area also includes means of funding (i.e. contracting, grants, etc.)
Communications structures and mechanisms are important, as well.

**Knowledge Management:** A key element of networks is their ability to harness and
develop knowledge. Information, both of an expertise and of a tacit (understood but
informal or not written) nature, is of particular importance regarding the shared
understanding or view of the client or target group that the network is trying to affect
(Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004). Information sharing among members is a critical function
(Goldsmith and Kettle, 2009), as are the collection of appropriate data and performance
measures among the network actors. Another salient factor is the basis for knowledge in the
network; i.e., which actors provide what types of knowledge that the network develops and distributes (Agranoff, 2007). Self-organizational or internal knowledge is important as well, to fully access appropriate resources and to enable collaboration across an organization (Linden, 2002).

**Relationships:** Due to the collaborative nature, each network is based upon the relationships among the individual actors (Agranoff, 2007; Goldsmith and Eggars, 2004; Goldsmith and Kettle, 2009). Strengths of relationships\(^8\) play a key role in enabling the sharing of information, resources, and combined activities (Willem and Buelens, 2007). Measures of relationships include the stability of participants within networks, as relationships develop and flourish over time, and the amount of trust among network members. Lack of continuity can disrupt this process (Linden, 2002). Organizational cultural differences do play a role in terms of unstated assumptions, which can cause conflict or different interpretations of events and their solutions.

**Integrators and Supporters:** Since collaboration is not mandatory, networks require direction and the investment of energy, enthusiasm, and/or leadership. Networks, and often particular activities of networks, seem to require an integrator (sometimes called a champion) to ‘keep the ball’ moving (Agranoff, 2007; Goldsmith and Eggars, 2004). Also of importance are the presence of promoters (Agranoff, 2007), who are influential individuals in leadership positions who lend credibility and organizational importance to the network though their continuing involvement and support of the network.

\(^8\) Sometimes also termed ‘cohesion’ or ‘social capital’.
Identifying Collaborative Governance Network Success

Milward and Provan (2001) identify three levels of analysis in which to examine the success of a network. The first is the community level, which examines the impact that the network has on its target community in terms of improvements to the problem or issue being addressed by the network. The second level is that of the network as a whole. This can include examining if the network improves the efficiency of resources among members or if it allows for a greater range of services. It can also include the strength of relationships between network participants, their respective commitment to network goals, and the sophistication of network governance mechanisms. The third level of analysis is that of the individual organization. This examines the benefits to the organization for participating in the network, potentially including greater legitimacy, improved client outcomes, or access to resources. At all of these levels, the benefits derived are judged in relation to their costs at each level (e.g. to the community, for the whole network, for each organization).

The typologies of collaborative governance networks also have implications for what constitutes success. For Milward and Provan’s networks classified by purpose (2006), the authors do not expressly state indicators of success for their classifications. However, the classification by purpose itself implies that the primary measure of success would be how well they achieve their particular purpose. Thus, Service Delivery networks could be evaluated in terms of effectiveness of their services, Information Diffusion networks could be evaluated in terms of information sharing, etc. This would be analogous to the community level of analysis, above.

Agranoff’s Typology (2007) has different implications for what constitutes network success. He identifies four types of benefits. The first is personal, which is individual human
capital development. The second is agency, similar to organization level above, describe advantages to participating agencies in terms of “expanded access to information and expertise, pooling and access to additional resources, sharing risk and innovation investments, managing uncertainty, enhancing flexibility, and providing access to others’ adaptive efficiencies” (Agranoff, 2007, p. 163). Third, network processes themselves can provide benefits, in terms of facilitating collaboration that would not otherwise have a chance to occur (ranging from information sharing to decision making, depending on the means of collaboration for the network in question), addressing cross organizational problems, increasing knowledge and resource sharing across organizations, and in identifying shared solutions to joint problems. Lastly, Agranoff describes tangible network outcomes, which describe ‘products’ of the network, such as developing new knowledge for the network (e.g. from new studies, new data, etc.), and identifying new financial resources.

Collaboration Governance Network Typologies

Collaborative governance researchers have attempted to categorize the networks in which collaboration takes place. Two significant approaches to categorization have resulted. The first is categorization by the intended function or goals of the collaborative networks, and the second by the types of activities engaged in between network participants. These classifications have implications for the relative importance of the features of collaborative governance above.

**Purpose of Collaboration Based Typology.** Milward and Provan (2006) have developed a typology of four collaborative networks (with two sub-types) based on what
functions each network seeks to perform and which network features are most relevant to them. These categories are summarized below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Key Network Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Service Implementation</td>
<td>Fund a public service but do not directly implement its delivery. Within such networks, stability of membership and centralized collaboration can increase efficiency, and knowledge of production costs or resource allocation, or rationing can be particularly important.</td>
<td>Network Governance and Organization Relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Diffusion</td>
<td>Focus on the sharing of information across organization boundaries. This has implications for knowledge sharing, but also implies that the focus is on shaping understanding of a problem rather than addressing it.</td>
<td>Coordination &amp; Strategy Knowledge Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Capacity Building</td>
<td>Enable the development of greater capacity among participants to implement activities and reach their goals. Key to these networks is an understanding or 'mapping' of the organizations involved. This forms the basis for strategic planning to better integrate the participating organizations, through matching organizational connections to the degree of collaboration desired.</td>
<td>Network Governance and Organization Coordination &amp; Strategy Knowledge Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Designed Problem Solving</td>
<td>Formed to help managers set policy for a critical or emerging problem; enduring and exist prior to a problem. Predicated on well-established decision-making (or “command”) structures to mobilize and leverage network resources, and to promote institutional learning and evaluation.</td>
<td>Network Governance And Organization Knowledge Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergent Problem Solving</td>
<td>Formed to help managers set policy for a critical or emerging problem; arise in response to a need. Have elevated roles for expertise, which is required for effective rapid response; relationships, which enable rapid understanding of network partners; coordination, to enable an efficient and rapid response; and leadership, which enables reaction and the formation of cohesive response networks.</td>
<td>Coordination &amp; Strategy Relationships Supporters and Integrators (leadership)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Means of Collaboration Based Typology.** Another approach was taken by Agranoff (2003) in cataloging the types of exchanges between network participants. This resulted in a typology of collaborative networks based on a hierarchy of interaction. The levels of interaction included Informational networks, in which participants come together
exclusively to exchange agency information and any actions taken are purely voluntary; Developmental networks, in which information exchange is combined with education and member services that increase capacity to implement solutions; Outreach networks, in which participants share information, build capacities, sequence activities, pool resources and develop new implementation options; and Action networks, in which participants adopt collective courses of action.

The type of interaction among network participants has implications for the types of support and engagement required from individual organizations. As the level of interaction increases along this continuum, more sophisticated, resource intensive, and often more formal means of managing the network are required. For example, in Action networks where joint decisions are made, formal deliberative means of reaching agreement are almost always the rule and a greater degree of coherence of participant goals are required. As a network moves from information sharing to joint decision making, increases in Coordination and Strategy and Network Governance and Organization are required.
Chapter 3: Hypotheses, Cases, and Research Scope

The research and analysis of U.S. management of stabilization activities as potential collaborative governance networks, almost by necessity, takes the form of a qualitative analysis of stabilization activities cases. The universe of modern stabilization activities is not large, which would preclude a quantitative approach. Furthermore, the exploratory and theory extending nature of the research lends itself to the qualitative approach and its power in unlocking the underlying causal mechanism of phenomena.

Hypotheses

The case studies were analyzed using the following overarching research hypothesis, derived from the initial review above. They can be divided into theory based and stabilization challenges based groups. The first four hypothesis are derived from collaborative governance theory and its implications for Stabilization Networks, and the last two are derived from literature regarding challenges in Stabilization Networks.

Theory based hypotheses:

1) U.S. Stabilization Networks will exhibit such collaborative governance network features, but not in a systematic or consistent way. In other words, U.S. Stabilization Networks will function as networks, but with inconsistent collaborative features or management. Further, U.S. government managers in Stabilization Networks are not regularly
managing across organizations or managing their organization as one within a broader network; instead, their focus is on managing only their own individual organization and achieving individual organizational goals and objectives. As can be seen in the chapters above, there are some attempts at collaboration across organizations but these seem to be ad hoc and inconsistently applied.

2) The Milward and Provan (2006) and Agranoff (2003) typologies include assertions as to the relative prominence of network features seen their respective types or categories of network. Thus, with regard to the Milward and Provan (2006) and Agranoff (2003) typologies of networks (see above), U.S. Stabilization Networks will:

a. Most closely resemble Emergent Problem Solving networks in the Milward and Provan typology. As a result, knowledge management (expertise), relationships, coordination and strategy (coordination), and supporters and integrators (leadership) would be particularly important features (from the collaborative governance network features above).

b. Involve a range of collaboration activities, as described in the Agranoff typology, e.g. Informational, Developmental, Outreach (shared activity), and Action (shared decision-making) collaborations. These activities will depend on the nature of the relationship between the participating organizations (e.g. civilian and military, host nation government, NGOs, international organizations, etc.) and the U.S. As the type of collaboration moves from information sharing to joint decision making, increases in coordination and strategy and in network governance and organization are required.

3) Those Stabilization Networks that emphasize Collaborative Network features
appropriate to their typology classification (as per the Milward and Provan and Agranoff
typologies) will show more signs of successful collaboration. This is in terms of the network
and organization or agency benefit levels of evaluation, from the discussion of identifying
network success above. As the Milward and Provan and Agranoff typologies suggest
network features that are relatively more important, it stands to reason that those
Stabilization Networks which properly emphasize those features should be more successful.

Stabilization challenges hypotheses:

4) Power and relative capabilities of organizations in a Stabilization Network are
important; disparities can negatively affect management of collaboration across
organizations¹. This is most likely in terms of relationship building, as smaller organizations
can feel overwhelmed by the larger ones, and in terms of coordination and strategy, as the
difference in resources creates challenges in being able to match coordination activities
between organizations (derived from Agranoff, 2007). Power disparities are mentioned in the
literature as being a significant challenge for networks, and a similar theme is echoed in the
challenges of U.S. stabilization activities, particularly with regard to the disparity of U.S.
civilian and military resources.

5) The hostile (e.g. violent) environment negatively affects Stabilization Network
management of collaboration:

a. The need for security (physical and information security) has a ripple effect on the
ability to manage the network. This is particularly true in terms of forming

¹ See “The 800-Pound Gorilla and Stability Operations” by Major General Hunt, published in Small Wars
Journal, June 29th, 2010, for an example of how this disparity of capacities can impact planning, for example.
relationships and knowledge management across organizations, as security restrictions can create barriers to meeting and interacting with partners, as well as to what information could be shared (derived from Agranoff, 2007; Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004; and Goldsmith and Kettle, 2009).

b. The short-term nature of U.S. government tours, which result from the hostile environment and are most common in Iraq and Afghanistan, negatively impacted Stabilization Network management of collaboration. This would be expected to negatively impact relationship building, which becomes short lived and must be regularly re-established as new staff rotates in and out. Knowledge management would be impaired, due to loss of tacit and institutional knowledge, as would maintaining cohesive coordination and strategy among organizations (derived from Agranoff, 2007; Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004; and Goldsmith and Kettle, 2009).

Both the lack of security and regular turnover of staff are regularly cited as challenges for U.S. stabilization efforts, and both may have implications from a collaborative governance theoretical perspective.

**Case Studies: Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and South Sudan**

The focus of the research is on modern, post 9/11 stabilization activities for a number of reasons. First, the two most important modern stabilization activities, Iraq and Afghanistan, took place as a result of that historical event. Further, the rise of collaborative government networks as an important feature in public governance is a relatively recent development and thus most applicable to recent stabilization activities. In addition, the
proliferation of international actors in the era of international globalization suggests that stabilization activities in this era are more likely to behave as Stabilization Networks. Lastly, more recent stabilization activities are the most likely to be applicable to current stabilization activities, or any that may be undertaken in the near future. With this in mind, the cases of the Philippines and South Sudan were also selected. Together these U.S. stabilization efforts provide a range of size and scope of U.S. stabilization activities, as well as a range of U.S. military involvement.

Due to the overwhelming size and scope of the Iraq and Afghanistan cases, these cases have been sub-divided into two “mini-cases” to make them manageable. The two mini-cases were selected in terms of a particular sector or functional area of the Iraq and Afghanistan stabilization efforts (Rule of Law) and at a particular level of activity (Provincial). Broadly speaking the Rule of Law sector focuses on the “3 c’s” of cops, courts, and corrections (or police, the judiciary, and prisons). It also included the prosecutorial and defense legal sectors, and the public service provision of “access to justice.” It was further related to anti-corruption efforts and aspects of human rights governance. In the Provincial mini-cases, stabilization efforts focused at a sub-national level are examined, primarily at the provincial level of governance, but also include some efforts at a district (lower level) or municipal level. These areas are further described in their respective chapters below. The sector-based examination allows for an analysis at all levels of activity (vertical), while the Provincial levels of analysis allows for examining activities across the full sectors of activity (horizontal) at that level. The two mini-cases’ subject areas are held constant to promote cross-case analysis. Both the Rule of Law and Provincial areas of effort were widely documented and considered significant elements of the U.S. stabilization efforts in Iraq and
A brief summary of each case is presented here. These cases are fully developed in the next chapter.

**Iraq: Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Rule of Law and Provincial Cases 2003-2011.** The Operation Iraqi Freedom campaign, later renamed Operation New Dawn in 2010, was a military campaign which began on March 19, 2003, with the invasion of Iraq by a multinational force led by troops from the United States and the United Kingdom. The case study period ends with the withdrawal of U.S. military forces in December 2011 and a substantial reduction in U.S. civilian activities. The OIF case is divided into “mini-cases” in the areas of Rule of Law (RoL) and a sub-national/Provincial level case.

**Afghanistan: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Rule of Law and**
**Provincial Cases 2001-2014.** The Operation Enduring Freedom campaign in Afghanistan will also be a case study. OEF began on October 7, 2001, in response to the September 11th attacks. The case study period ends with the reduction of U.S. military forces at the end of 2014. The OEF case is also divided into “mini-cases” in the areas of Rule of Law and a sub-national/Provincial level case.

**Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines (OEF-P) 2002-2014.** The U.S. response to Abu Sayyaf and the larger Islamic based Moros insurgency was Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines. In agreement with the Philippine government, the U.S. effort in the Philippines began in January 2002 with a deployment of 1200 person advisory
force. The case period closes with the formal end of OEF-P in 2014.

The Independence of Southern Sudan 2011-2014. On July 9th, 2011, South Sudan became an independent country under the name Republic of South Sudan. The fragile new state risked conflict with its parent state of Sudan, as well as facing threats from active armed groups within its borders. For some time before and well after the separation, the United States has been active along with the international community in seeking to promote stability in South Sudan. The case begins with independence and closes at the end of 2014.

Research Methods Summary

The main sources of data, summarized here, were primarily from document review and interview. The starting point for the data collection was primary source documents, such as interviews and other types of firsthand accounts, or original government reports or even (potentially) internal documents. Secondary source documents, such as reports and other analysis and research into the respective activities, which are based off primary source materials, were reviewed as well. Information that cannot be obtained through documentation was sought through conducting interviews. Because much of collaborative governance involves tacit knowledge management or informal exchange and coordination measures (Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004), fourteen interviews were conducted to build upon the primary and secondary document research. The interviewee population included management within the Stabilization Networks and those non-managerial personnel who worked with multiple actors within the network.

Each hypothesis was initially evaluated within each case to explore how the observed
data matches up (or does not) with collaborative governance features and typologies, outlined in the literature review and data chapters above. The roles of the collaborative governance features (e.g. network governance and organization, coordination and strategy, knowledge management, relationships, and integrators and supporters) were then assessed with regard to their prominence and importance in terms of managing the Stabilization Network. The features were then ranked for prominence across the cases. Further, both the Agranoff (Informational, Developmental, Outreach, and Action) and Milward and Provan (Service Implementation, Information Diffusion, Community Capacity, and Problem Solving, Designed, and Emergent) typologies were applied to the cases. Each provided a different lens to examine the functioning of collaborative networks through, which provided additional insights and cross-evaluation. Lastly, the success of collaboration within each case was examined. After the within case evaluation, the data was evaluated across cases for a broader understanding of the relationship with collaborative governance frameworks and typologies. This was also be conducted for the hypotheses. Once the data analysis was completed, final conclusions about the hypotheses and research questions were drawn, in the broad categories of results for practitioners and results for theory.

This research was bounded by certain parameters. For purposes of this research stabilization efforts (or stabilization activities) are viewed as tasks or activities that focus primarily on diplomatic, rule of law, governance, and economic efforts. U.S. stabilization activities can occur either as part of a U.S. military activity, or without it. They also include U.S. efforts address an ongoing conflict, as well as efforts to ensure a peaceful environment after a recent conflict. In the cases of coinciding stability and military combat operations, combat and security activities are not included in the research. Humanitarian and disaster
response activities are included only if they were significantly linked to stabilization issues, such as to persons displaced by conflict, or in certain cases of combined planning efforts.

Furthermore, the relationships and network features connecting U.S. government organizations and other organizations are described in general terms across groups of organizations, rather than at an individual organization level of detail. Finally, evaluating the impact, ultimate success, or advisability of stabilization activities is beyond the scope of this research. Thus, ‘success’ when discussed in this research refers solely to the successes or failures of the network, and the benefits or costs of collaboration. For more detailed information on the research methods, see Appendix 1.
Chapter 4: Stabilization Cases

Iraq and Afghanistan Stabilization Background

“There is no effective coordination among the international community. They just don’t have the coordination that is required. One says one thing, and the other says the opposite. One says, ‘Destroy it.’ The other says, ‘Don’t.’ One says, ‘They do it.’ The other blames, ‘No, they do it.’ For all of this, we are held responsible”


The Iraq and Afghanistan mini-cases of Rule of Law and the Provincial levels will be detailed following brief overviews of the respective Iraq and Afghanistan efforts writ large, to provide overall context. In both countries, stabilization activities evolved substantially over the years and were conducted throughout the entire country.

The Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) campaign was a military campaign. It began on March 19, 2003 with the invasion of Iraq by a multinational force led by troops from the United States and the United Kingdom. The military operation reached a peak of over 100,000 U.S. troops, with a supporting civilian component numbering in the thousands. International participation was relatively limited, and few non-governmental organizations
operated in the country. In 2010, OIF was renamed Operation New Dawn\(^{10}\), as U.S. military forces drew down and agreements with the Government of Iraq reshaped the U.S. led coalition. Stabilization activities in OIF evolved substantially over the years of the campaign and were conducted throughout the entire country. Levels of violence ebbed and flowed as well, though they remained relatively high, particularly in the north and western parts of the country and in Baghdad. As the military drew, the intent was to transition military conducted stabilization activities to U.S. civilian and other international actors. The deployment of U.S. military forces and Operation New Dawn ended in December 2011.

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan began on October 7, 2001, in response to the September 11th attacks. As with the Iraq case, the stabilization aspect of the case evolved significantly over the campaign. However, there was a much larger international military contingent, and a multitude of, possibly countless, NGOs operated throughout the country. Stabilization efforts were conducted across the entirety of Afghanistan, though the regions of the south and east of the country have been significantly more violence afflicted than other regions. As in the Iraq case, the size of the military operation reached a peak of over 100,000 U.S. troops in size, with a similar corresponding civilian effort numbering in the thousands. A large international contingent was involved in Afghanistan as well, as part of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and/or as reconstruction and stabilization donor countries.

The U.S. was the overwhelmingly dominant international actor in Iraq. U.S. funding for Iraq totaled just under $62 billion by 2011, dwarfing other donor states contributions (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2013, March). In Afghanistan, the U.S.

\(^{10}\) In general, the use of the term OIF will refer to the entirety of the case study, except in cases where noted.
was also the leader, but by a less dominating margin than in Iraq. The total U.S. government assistance to Afghanistan from fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2012 was approximately $102 billion. In both cases, U.S. efforts and funds were divided along civilian and military lines. In Iraq, major civilian funds totaled on the order of $27 billion\(^{11}\), while in Afghanistan reconstruction funding appropriated to the State, USAID, and other civilian agencies totaled over $20 billion by fiscal year 2013 (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2014, January 30).

However, though the U.S. was the principal donor, a number of other states did contribute significantly. Total Non-U.S. Funding to Iraq came to $13 billion by 2011 (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2012, January). The largest donors included Japan, the European Commission, the United Kingdom, Italy, Korea, Canada, Kuwait, Spain, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Iran. In Afghanistan, over 40 international donor states and international organizations, such as the Aga Khan Network and Islamic Development Bank, contributed significant funds to stabilization in Afghanistan (Government of Afghanistan Finance Ministry, 2012). By 2011, international donor states had disbursed approximately $22 billion in assistance to Afghanistan\(^{12}\).

The organization and conduct of U.S. civilian organizations in Iraq evolved substantially, and can be broadly described in two eras:

- The Coalition Provisional Authority (commonly referred to as the CPA) was established as a transitional government under a United Nations Security Council

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\(^{11}\) The major civilian funds in Iraq were the Iraqi Reconstruction and Relief Fund ($20.54 billion) and Economic Support Fund ($4.83 billion) and the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) fund ($1.18 billion).

\(^{12}\) International donor states funded approximately 90 percent of Afghanistan’s estimated total public expenditures from 2006 to 2011, with the United States providing 64 percent of that amount (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2013).
Resolution following the invasion of Iraq by the United States. The Coalition Provisional Authority adopted a maximalist approach to reconstruction, developing plans to transform every aspect of Iraqi society, from the banking system to traffic laws. However, it was generally seen as demonstrating an inadequate understanding of the Iraq environment. The Coalition Provisional Authority was initiated on April 21, 2003, and dissolved on June 28, 2004.

- The U.S. Embassy (also known as ‘Chief of Mission’) organization succeeded the Coalition Provisional Authority after its dissolution, with overall command of all non-military U.S. efforts in Iraq.

In Afghanistan the U.S. civilians maintained an Embassy model of civilian organization. However, in 2009 the U.S. initiated a “civilian surge,” more than tripling its civilian staff\(^{13}\) to more than 1,300 by 2011 (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, November).

The U.S civilian presences ranged from the hundreds to over 1000, while the U.S. military levels were measured in the tens of thousands to over 100,000, depending on which country had the priority. Iraq was the priority until 2009, when resources, including funds and personnel, shifted to Afghanistan. The U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan were organized by command levels, beginning with the force level, then corps, division, brigade (or regiment for the U.S. Marine Corps), then battalion, company, etc. After the force and corps levels, each command typically has multiple subordinate organizations reporting to it.

\(^{13}\) These civilians include technical experts from a multitude of different U.S. Government departments and agencies, including the Department of State, USAID, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Marshals Service, Department of the Treasury, Department of Transportation, and Department of Health and Human Services Wyler, (Liana & Katzman, 2010).
For example, a corps typically has three or more divisions\textsuperscript{14} under it, which in turn typically have 3 to 5 brigades under their command, which in their turn have multiple battalions. Most stabilization activities were conducted at the brigade and battalion levels during the case study period. Stabilization activities undertaken by the military ranged from providing humanitarian assistance, road, school construction, and other infrastructure projects, to a panoply of stabilization and counterinsurgency related projects (United States Institute of Peace, 2004).

The U.S. overall military effort in Iraq was named the Multi-National Force - Iraq (MNF-I) for the bulk of the U.S. mission in Iraq\textsuperscript{15}. At the peak of OIF, as many as eight U.S. military division were operating in Iraq, divided regionally across the country. U.S. military stabilization funds included Iraq Security Forces Funding of $20.96 billion and the Commanders Emergency Response Program (commonly just CERP) that totaled $3.96 billion (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2012, January). Nearly 40 other nations contributed troops to MNF-I, with the United Kingdom (UK) being the second largest contributor. However, contributions dwindled after the initial invasion, and during the case period individual state contributions were often in the low hundreds or thousands, and with the exception of the UK were entirely withdrawn by 2010. NATO also participated in Iraq, though its role was limited to a relatively small police training effort.

U.S. military forces in Afghanistan were referred to as USFOR-A (U.S. Forces - Afghanistan). USFOR-A operated separately from an overarching NATO military coalition,

\textsuperscript{14} Beneath the corps level, military commands were typically divided along geographic lines, and military commanders were referred to as having “areas of responsibility” which indicate where their operations and authority lies. Division commands were named which cardinal direction of the country they operated in – North, South, Southwest, etc., or for the capital if station there.

\textsuperscript{15} MNF-I was the term used from 2004 to 2010, when it was renamed to USF-I (U.S. Forces Iraq) with change of the OIF campaign to Operation New Dawn.
with the U.S. mission focusing on destroying the remnants of the Taliban and al Qaeda while many NATO partners focused on more stable areas of the country. U.S. Afghanistan reconstruction funding that was administered through the military totaled $66 billion directly by fiscal year 2013 (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2014, January 30). The Commander of USFOR-A was also ‘dual-hatted’ as the NATO ISAF commander. The size of the NATO military forces under ISAF, including the United States military, ranged from an initial size of over 5,000 from 19 countries to over 130,000 personnel in 2011 (United States Institute of Peace, 2004). Fifty countries contributed forces to ISAF; though other countries were responsible for less than one third of the total force, this was still relatively greater than the international contributions in the Iraq case.

In both countries, there were a multitude of contractors and NGO (non-governmental organization) implementing partners operating on behalf of both the U.S. civilians and military. Those that received U.S. funds in the form of contracts were commonly called contractors, while those that received U.S. funds through grants or operated for civilian agencies may be referred to as implementing partners. To give an example of the size and scope of third party activities, in Iraq by the end of 2011, 88,380 contracting actions, projects, and grants were reported, with 62,161 implemented through military funding, with 53,626 through CERP alone (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2012, January). However, it was not reported how many of these contracting actions were with international partners or through local Iraqi organizations. In Afghanistan, as of the end 2013, U.S. Central Command reported 85,528 Department of Defense contractors in Afghanistan, split roughly equally among U.S., Afghan, and third-country nationals. Both U.S. military and civilian organizations used a myriad of third party
NGOs to implement their programs. For much of the time in Iraq and Afghanistan, contractor and implementing partner staff outnumbered deployed military personnel (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2013, October).


“We were sometimes our own worst enemies because we did not talk to each other and did not coordinate with each other…”


Establishment of a functioning Rule of Law (RoL)\(^\text{16}\) sectors in post-conflict Iraq and Afghanistan was seen as critical to a sustainable peace in both countries. Both efforts had commonalities that are described below.

Immediately after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, the Coalition Provisional Authority maintained authority over all legal, political, practical, economic, and security activities in Iraq. Initially, the U.S. military performed the large majority of RoL efforts. This effort transitioned to civilian led support efforts during the Embassy period and over the course of the campaign. In order to foster the rule of law, the U.S. engaged the Iraqi justice

\(^\text{16}\) Also abbreviated as “ROL.” As stated above, broadly speaking the Rule of Law sector focuses on the 3 “c” of cops, courts, and corrections, or police, the judiciary and prisons. It also included the prosecutorial and defense legal sectors, and the public service provision of “access to justice.” It was further related to anti-corruption efforts and aspects of human rights governance.
system in order to develop and implement an Iraqi-owned and accepted system. Endemic corruption, inefficient and intimidated courts, a recent history of distrusting these institutions, a general lack of concern for the human rights of detainees, and an insufficient number of trained and qualified individuals in each area made this a particularly difficult task (Ohlweiler, 2009). By 2011, the United States had obligated $2.38 billion to improve the rule of law in Iraq. The single largest source of RoL funding was through the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (commonly just “INCLE”) fund, totaling $1.18 billion by 2011 (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2012, January). The U.S. also spent about $8 billion to train, staff, and equip Iraqi police (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2011)\(^\text{17}\). Between the civilian and military efforts, at its peak there were approximately 400 lawyers active in supporting the Iraqi Rule of Law stabilization activities, with approximately 30 lawyers on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs – see below) across Iraq (Hallman, 2008).

In Afghanistan, the U.S. was the largest single nation contributor to rule of law efforts. American civilian and military key players and activities have rapidly evolved over the course of U.S. operations in Afghanistan. As such, organizational structures were described as fluid and ever changing (The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, 2011). Funding estimates varied depending on which criteria for RoL programs is used, one estimate put civilian expenditures on RoL support in Afghanistan as totaling $904 million from fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2010, rising from an estimated $7 million in fiscal year 2002 to an estimated $411 million in fiscal year 2010 (Wyler & Katzman, 2010).

In both Iraq and Afghanistan, there were common Rule of Law organizations. These

\(^{17}\) Note it is not clear how much the $8 billion and $2.38 billion dollar figures may have overlapped or not.
included U.S. civilian organizations such as the Department of Justice (DOJ), the State Departments’ International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) bureau, and USAID. Within the State Department, INL is responsible for developing policies and managing programs that strengthen law enforcement and other rule of law institutional capabilities outside the United States. The DOJ does not have the authority to conduct international programs on its own, but often received funding through INL to execute programs. The primary U.S. RoL fund in both countries was the INCLE fund. INL’s role as the primary administrator of INCLE funds that resourced most rule of law efforts gave it a central role in the program design and implementation process that complements the activities of many rule of law actors (Dempsey, 2009). Further, in both cases the U.S. military played a role. To differing degrees in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military supported police training. Additionally, U.S. military lawyers, known as Judge Advocates General (JAGs), assigned to various U.S. military battalion, brigade, divisions and higher headquarters were central to the military’s support in both cases (Wyler, & Katzman, 2010).

The range of RoL activities included digitizing the Iraqi legal code; training judges; securing court houses; building prisons; providing advice and mentoring to staff such as judges, prosecutors, and police officers; providing technical and developmental assistance to justice sector institutions and their law enforcement personnel; developing professional and transparent law enforcement institutions; supporting the protection of the judiciary,

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18 The DOJ’s overseas presence in Iraq and Afghanistan included a number of major offices and programs, such as the FBI, Drug Enforcement Agency, Marshall’s Service, the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training (commonly referred to as OPDAT), and the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (commonly referred to as ICITAP).
courthouses and at-risk prosecutors; and even providing fuel oil to for generators so courts could operate with air-conditioning and light (Clark, 2011).


In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. established civilian-military organizations to conduct stabilization activities centered at the provincial level of government across both countries. These Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were influenced by one another but were independently managed within their respective countries. This led to diverging organizational development paths. Thus, while they retained the same names and same general mission and focus, how they were organized differed substantially. For example, Iraq PRTs19 were led by a State Department civilian, while Afghan PRTs were led by a military officer. However, their having the same name can invite a false sense of similarity, so major Iraq and Afghanistan PRT similarities and differences are summarized here:

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19 PRT is the standard term used in this document. However, variants have existed in the naming of PRTs: Regional Reconstruction Teams, with responsibility for the 3 provinces in the autonomous Kurdish region; Provincial Support Teams, which were PRTs that were not able to locate with their province (no longer in existence); and Embedded PRTs (ePRTs), which were PRTs designed to operate at a district level, below that of the provincial level. They were common in Baghdad and Anbar province.
Table 2: Iraq and Afghanistan PRT Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Iraq PRTs</th>
<th>Afghanistan PRTs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>…assist Iraq’s provincial governments with developing a transparent and sustained capacity to govern, promoting increased security and RoL, promoting political and economic development, and providing provincial administration necessary to meet the basic needs of the population.</td>
<td>…set the conditions that bring more local support to the central government, further separating the local population from the insurgency, and continuing to transform the lives of the Afghan people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead</td>
<td>Civilian Team Leader, military Deputy</td>
<td>Military Team Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composition</td>
<td>Mostly civilian with 8 military staff</td>
<td>Mostly military, with 3 or 4 civilian staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Task Tailored, varied by each team</td>
<td>Standardized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>20-100 staff</td>
<td>50-100+ staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of U.S. Provincial Teams</td>
<td>12-14</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own Program Funds</td>
<td>Quick Response Funds (QRF)</td>
<td>Mostly no; very limited QRF program toward the end</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Relationship</td>
<td>Hosted and logistically supported by military partner</td>
<td>Logistically self-sufficient, attached to military organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>Fully integrated from inception</td>
<td>Only integrated toward the end of the mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Level Teams</td>
<td>Embedded PRTs (ePRTs)</td>
<td>District Support Teams (DST)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Local Level Teams</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PRTs in Iraq had access to the Quick Response Fund (QRF), jointly administered by State and USAID. The Quick Response Fund was established to provide PRTs access to a flexible means to accelerate economic, social, and civil society development within Iraqi provinces (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2009, January) and was implemented between 2007 and 2011, at a total cost of about $258.2 million\(^\text{20}\). Over time, the flexibility of the program was reduced, with greater requirements for U.S. Embassy coordination, and requirements for matching Iraqi contributions to projects as the budgetary position of the Iraqi government increased (Naland, 2011).

\(^{20}\) State Department dispersed QRF funds through micropurchases and microgrants, for projects costing up to $25,000; and grants and direct procurements were used for projects costing between $25,000 and $500,000 (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2012, October)
In addition, though the U.S. Iraq and Afghan stabilization efforts were centered at the Provincial level, in both cases civilian-military organizations were developed to engage at the lower district or municipality level as well. These efforts were more limited than the provincial level of effort, and they were not active in all districts. Further, in Afghanistan, a regional level of stabilization organization was also developed, which was not established in Iraq. Thus, the cases, though focused at the provincial level of activity, also include the more limited local/district and regional levels of activity, as well.

In both Iraq and Afghanistan, their respective governments have similar basic levels of organizations, with national governments centered in capitals, the countries divided into provincial or governorate governments, which were sub-divided into districts. They also both have national functional ministries responsible for service provision, such as Ministries of Justice, Education, etc. Both Iraq and Afghanistan had a national military, and local and national police forces that were involved in security and stabilization.
Iraq Provincial Case

“In the fall of 2004, Bruce Parmelee, a program officer in USAID’s Community Action Program, discovered a rehabilitated water-treatment plant on the outskirts of Hilla sitting idle after repairs costing $5 million. Work on the plant had been completed, but there was no effective effort to transfer the facility to local Iraqi authorities. Because the job order focused only on the facility, contractors did not connect the plant to the city’s network of water-pipes and sewers or teach Iraqi employees how to use it. Few people in Hilla even knew it existed, and the facility had already started to decay.”


Figure 1: Map of Iraq and its provinces (Source: Wikipedia)
The Iraq Provincial case examines the organizational collaboration at the sub-national levels of government in Iraq. At the sub-national level, Iraq is composed of 19 provinces, also called governorates, with three Kurdish provinces combined into the Kurdish Region. Provinces in Iraq are led by an executive governor and by a legislative Provincial Council. Provinces are further divided into 120 districts. In this case study, a general picture of sub-national coordination is developed.

The predominant, though not exclusive, case will be that of Anbar Province. Anbar Province is the largest governorate in Iraq geographically, with an estimated at 1.2 million, mostly Sunni, inhabitants. The provincial capital is Ramadi, and other important cities in the province include Fallujah and Haditha. Anbar province provides a good case for examining collaboration for a number of reasons. Anbar was one of the areas in Iraq with the largest civilian presence, with over 70 civilian staff at peak, operating through both a PRT and 3 of the 13 ePRTs (embedded PRTs) that operated in Iraq (see below). Levels of violence ebbed and flowed in Anbar, with peaks during Coalition military operations to clear out insurgents in cities such as Fallujah\(^{21}\). It also shares a common factor with the Afghan Helmand case, in that both areas saw heavy involvement from U.S. Marine units during their respective conflicts.

\(^{21}\) Anbar was considered the Sunni stronghold in Iraq, and was a base for Al Qaeda and Sunni insurgents for many periods during OIF. After the 2007 Sunni Awakening, in which a number of Sunni tribes rejected Al Qaeda and aligned themselves with the Iraqi government and coalition forces, the dynamic in Anbar changed to become relatively stable until the end of the OIF campaign in 2011.
**Afghanistan Provincial Case**

“It was an insane structure in Afghanistan. I believe now that you needed to have the battle-space owner own everything. Yes that was a hard thing ... When we were best we had clear relationships and coordinating mechanisms with the brigade combat team. You can’t solve the problem if you get organization right or perfect, but you can make it insolvable if you get the organization wrong.”

- ISAF General Officer, from an interview in The Organizational Imperative: Theory and History on Unity of Effort in Counterinsurgency Campaigns (as cited in Gleiman, 2011, p. 12)

The examination of stabilization collaboration at the sub-national level in Afghanistan consists of a general examination of sub-national stabilization organizations. By August 2011, nearly 400 U.S. civilians were serving outside Kabul, up from 67 in early 2009 (Wyler & Katzman, 2010). A largely parallel civilian and military organizational and command structure developed at the sub-national level. This chain of command was intended to equalize the civilians and their military counterparts at every level, with Senior Civilian Representatives (SCRs) at divisions; a senior civilian representative at the brigade level (SCR-B) and the civilian lead at the PRTs and District Support Teams (Fritsch, 2012). Though these parallel levels were roughly equivalent in terms of rank, they were dissimilar in terms of resources.
Helmand Province was also selected as primary case for examining sub-national collaboration. However, this is by no means an exclusive look at Helmand, and examples from other localities are used when applicable.

Helmand province was distinct in Afghanistan for a number of reasons. It is the largest Afghanistan province, with the third largest population and 14 districts. It was also the center of poppy production in Afghanistan, as well as a center of Taliban conflict. The province was under the purview of the United Kingdom in the U.S./NATO division of labor in Afghan provinces, though in the later part of the campaign U.S. marines were deployed there. The size, presence of both U.S. and United Kingdom organizations, and intensity of conflict make Helmand an excellent test case for exploring collaborative governance theories in a stabilization environment.
Afghanistan sub-national government is divided into 34 provinces and 398 districts, or Wuleswali. The Afghan national ministry directly responsible for provincial activities was the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG), established in August 2007. Nationwide, the IDLG inherited more than 10,000 employees of varying quality and abilities (Kemp, 2011, January/February). IDLG was an implementing partner\textsuperscript{22} for activities at the local level, with funding by the United States, Britain, Denmark, and France, and receiving assistance from the United Nations (Katzman, 2014, June).

\textsuperscript{22} Most notably for the District Delivery Program, which operated in at least 32 of the 407 districts of Afghanistan. The program was created to improve government presence and service delivery at the district level. U.S. funding for the program was suspended in July 2011 pending and has not been reactivated to date.
Case 5: Mindanao, Philippines Stabilization Network 2002-2014

In the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the United States initiated its wide-ranging war against terrorism. One of the earliest Al-Qaeda affiliates to be targeted by the United States was a small, violent Islamic militant group that originated in the 1979-1989 Soviet-Afghan War and operated in the jungles, hills, towns, and coastal waters of the southern Philippines, particularly in the Mindanao region. The group, Abu Sayyaf, which means Bearer of the Sword in Arabic, was engaged in sporadic clashes with the Philippines Armed Forces and perpetrated a mixture of political terrorism and banditry throughout the area (Coronel, 2007; Ramakrishna 2004). Its purported links to Al-Qaeda and its espousal of a radical, extremist form of Islam identified the Abu Sayyaf group as a vector of local terrorism and quickly raised the profile of the otherwise small group to U.S. leaders (Banlaoi, 2005). Abu Sayyaf operated in a broader environment of insurgency and violence, radical Islamic and otherwise, in Mindanao (Ringuet, 2002). The chief other violent groups are the Moro National Liberation Front, a communist rebel organization formed in the 1960s, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, which broke away from former group in 1981.
Mindanao is a relatively underdeveloped, conflict affected, and natural disaster prone region in the southern Philippines. It is home to around 20 million people. The name Mindanao refers to both the second largest and southernmost major island in the Philippines, and it is also the name of one of the three island groups in the country, consisting of the island of Mindanao and smaller outlying islands. Administratively, the central island and associated islands are covered by 6 administrative regions\textsuperscript{23}, 27 provinces, 33 cities, and numerous barangays (villages, districts, or wards). The administrative regions include the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), which was established in

\textsuperscript{23} Commonly referred to as regions IX through XIII.
1990 as a result of peace negotiations and encompasses four provinces. Despite having approximately one quarter of the country’s population, it only accounts for about a fifth of the country’s national output gross domestic product over a third of the country’s agriculture, and close to 15 percent each of the industry and service sectors (Mindanao Trust Fund, 2009). Parts of Mindanao also suffer from feudal family hostilities (rido, pagpauli, etc.) in the form of shootouts and revenge killings, which sometimes become intertwined with the larger government-insurgent conflicts and contribute to overall insecurity in the area (Señase, 2006). The region is also one of the most natural disaster prone areas of the world, with frequent earthquakes, floods, and damaging storms.

A full spectrum of development organizations, from bilateral actors to regional development banks and multilateral institutions, operate throughout the Philippines. In 2009, net official development assistance to the Philippines was $310 million, out of which donor countries provided $244 million and multilateral institutions provided $65 million. Major donors include Japan, the United States, Australia, Germany, China, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank (The World Bank, 2014). These donor states and organizations were active in Mindanao, and frequently made programs and activities there a priority (Ponyaeva, 2011).

The U.S. response to Abu Sayyaf and the larger Islamic based insurgency was expressed in Operation Enduring Freedom - Philippines (OEF-P) (Banlaoi, 2002). In

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24 The ARMM’s four provinces are Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi with Cotabato City, designated as its provisional capital. After further peace negotiations, by the end of 2014 the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao was expected to be replaced by the Bangsamoro autonomous political unit. (The World Bank, 2014)
25 Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines was part of the four part Operation Enduring Freedom, most popularly associated with U.S. operations in Afghanistan (OEF-A or commonly just OEF), which was in turn part of the broader and the U.S. Global War on Terrorism strategy.
agreement with the Philippine government, the U.S. effort in the Philippines began in January 2002 with an initial deployment of a 1,200 person advisory force designated Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P). For most of the time period, about 600 U.S. military Special Forces personnel were advising and assisting the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the Southern Philippines and Moros area strongholds of Abu Sayyaf. The United States also increased its military assistance to the Philippines26 (Hicken, 2009), and regularly deployed additional forces on a temporary or rotating basis to conduct joint training exercises with the Philippine military27. While the overall mission essentially remained unchanged, JSOTF-P efforts were refined, modified, or adapted to meet the needs, capabilities, and political enthusiasm of the Government of the Philippines (GoP), the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and/or the Philippine National Police.

By the end of the case study, with U.S. support, the Philippine government enjoyed increased successes against Abu Sayyaf and other insurgent groups in the Mindanao region. This success cumulated with 2012 and 2014 peace deals between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the government of the Philippines (Lau, 2014). With the apparent defeat of Abu Sayyaf and increase in stability in the region, the U.S. has focused its attention away from Mindanao and toward a more typical relationship with the Philippines. This has resulted in the stand down of the U.S. military element supporting stability in Mindanao, which commenced in 2014, and the redirection of U.S. civilian programs and activities away from Mindanao. The case study therefore concludes with this standing down of the U.S.

26 For example, the foreign military financing program was increased from $1.9 million to $19 million in fiscal year 2002.
27 In addition, reportedly the CIA operated Predator drones and has deployed paramilitary forces from their Special Activities Division to hunt down and kill or capture key Islamic insurgent leaders (Rufford, N., Allen-Mills, T. and Bader. B. H., 2002).
military element in Mindanao.

**Case 6: The Independence of Southern Sudan (July 2010-2014)**

In the culmination of the results of a July 2010 referendum on independence, on July 9th, 2011, South Sudan became an independent country under the name of the Republic of South Sudan. The period surrounding the election was fraught with the risk of violence. Moreover, after independence, the fragile new state soon found itself in conflict with its parent state of Sudan, as well as facing threats from active armed groups within its borders. Disputes centered on such issues as the sharing of oil revenues with Sudan, as an estimated 80 percent of the oil in both countries is from South Sudan. Further, the region of Abyei still remains at the center of an ownership dispute, which led to military conflict between the north and south in 2011. Another area of tension along the north-south border is in the area of South Kordofan, a part of Sudan, though with strong ethnic ties to the South. For some time before and well after the separation, the United States had been active, along with the international community, in seeking to promote stability in South Sudan.
In addition to northern border disputes with Sudan, the government of South Sudan has been struggling to assert control over a country roughly the size of France, brimming with arms and plagued by tribal and rebel violence that killed more than 1,000 people in 2011 alone. Displacement and mixing of populations over decades of civil war and the current influx of returning refugees and internally displaced persons has also produced...
significant tensions and frequent violence around ownership and access to rural land, which is communally owned and administered by a mix of traditional and governmental authorities. Nearly all of the major inter-communal conflicts in South Sudan can be linked either to cattle raiding and the subsequent spiral of violent retribution, or conflict among pastoralists and farmers over migration routes and access to water and pasture (The World Bank, 2013, January). Further still, the southern tip of South Sudan is part of the operating territory of the Lord's Resistance Army. The Army, which moves across the border regions of South Sudan, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic, is a predatory bandit organization known for acts of brutal violence, as well as kidnapping tens of thousands of children to serve over the years.

More recently, internal violence has flared in South Sudan. On December 15, 2013, fighting displaced more than 1,000,000 South Sudanese and killed more than 10,000, while a humanitarian crisis threatened many more. South Sudan's ruling party, the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement, and its army, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, quickly split along divisions largely unaddressed from the independence war, resulting in the formation of an army in opposition. Were it not for the intervention of Uganda and allied rebel and militia groups, the South Sudanese army would likely not have been able to hold the capital, Juba, or recapture lost territory.

Even without an atmosphere of violence, South Sudan would be one of the least developed and most challenging environments. Less than 2 percent of the primary road

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28 In one example of the internal violence, in late December 2011, some 6,000-8,000 young men from the Lou Nuer tribe, marched southward into Murle tribal lands, armed with knives and automatic weapons. They rampaged for several days, and the young fighters were even so bold as to trade shots with the South Sudanese Army. Nobody is certain how many died in the massacre that followed, but estimates range from several hundred to more than 2,000. The United Nations had reported that some 60,000 others were displaced throughout the dry savannah of the region (Gettleman, 2012).
network is paved less than a third of unpaved roads are in good condition; furthermore during the rainy season, they become impassable. Power generation and transmission networks are also sorely lacking (The World Bank, 2013, January). More than half the population lives below the national poverty line. Inequities in access to services, resources, and opportunities, when combined with the politics of exclusion and patronage, ineffective governance, and lack of transparency associated with the oil revenue, present a serious threat to physical and economic security and undermine the institutional transformation needed to secure South Sudan’s stability and legitimacy (The World Bank, 2013, January). Main humanitarian needs are food, clean water, healthcare, shelter, sanitation, hygiene, and protection, as well as coordinated response to epidemics as they arise. In addition, the country suffers regularly from seasonal floods and other natural disasters (European Union, 2014).

Attempting to foster peace and economic growth across this troubled new nation are a myriad of organizations. Dozens of donor States actively participate and contribute funds towards supporting the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), with the United States being the largest contributor. By 2012, their commitments totaled about $84.5 billion, excluding contributions to United Nations peacekeeping (The World Bank, 2012b). These donors work alongside, and often though, a number of international organizations, with the 21 agencies of the United Nations being chief among them (United Nations, 2012b). The support given to the GoSS by these groups could be provided directly to government ministries, but more often it is indirect, and delivered through other implementing organizations, such as local or international NGOs. Other significant actors in South Sudan include private sector entities, such as companies in the oil sector, and non-traditional donor
States that either play a role in the region and/or are significant investors in South Sudan. These disparate actors, including the Government of South Sudan, the donor States, the international organizations, international NGOs, local civil society, the private sector, and investing States, all have a common interest in the stabilization of South Sudan and prevention of further violence.

**Common Stabilization Organizations**

As described earlier, a wide number of organizations are or may be active during a stabilization activity. These range from the host nation, U.S. military, U.S. civilian agencies, other international donors, international organizations such as the United Nations, and dozens or even hundreds of international and local private companies and NGOs. The types of organizations common to stabilization and the case studies are briefly described below. Their general characteristics, such as common goals, activities, funding relationships, and organization are presented in order to help understanding how they interact in the case studies. Further case specific details are included in Appendix 7: Detailed Case Stabilization Organization Descriptions.

Predominately, when funds are provided for stabilization activities, they are in the form of grants to implement project activities. Generally speaking, asymmetries exist between donor and recipient organizations. Organizations that provide funds have greater human capital and technical capabilities, as well as funds. Recipient organizations may become dependent on their donors, cede decision-making power to them, or even become subordinate to them (Pishchikova, 2012). The following table breaks down the major groups of organizations in terms of funding relationships, followed by a more detailed description.
Table 3: Common Stabilization Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typically Provide Funds</th>
<th>Typically Both Receive and Provide Funds</th>
<th>Typically Receive Funds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Government - Civilian</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>International NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Government - Military</td>
<td>Other International Organizations</td>
<td>Local NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Donor States</td>
<td>Multilateral Trust Funds</td>
<td>Host Nation National Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non Traditional Donors</td>
<td></td>
<td>Host Nation Provincial &amp; Local Government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Organizations that Typically Provide Funding**

**U.S. Government Stabilization Organizations.** U.S. stabilization organizations are divided into two major groups: civilian and military. Though both organizations ultimately report to the U.S. president, within a country (or region), they are independent in terms of hierarchy and organizational structures.

**U.S. Civilians.** U.S. civilian efforts are organized around the U.S. Embassy (also known as Chief of Mission\(^{29}\)), under the Department of State. Embassies can range in size, from a few dozen staff (such as in the Mindanao and South Sudan cases) to over a thousand (as seen during the peaks of Iraq and Afghanistan). Embassies are typically divided into

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\(^{29}\) A chief of mission (COM) (normally the ambassador) is the principal officer in charge of a diplomatic facility of the United States, including any individual assigned to be temporarily in charge of such a facility. The Chief of Mission is the personal representative of the President to the country of accreditation. The Chief of Mission is responsible for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all U.S. Government executive branch employees in that country (except those under the command of a U.S. area military commander). The security of the diplomatic post is the Chief of Mission's direct responsibility.
sections, with political, economic, and public affairs sections being commonly involved in stabilization efforts. Other State Department bureaus are commonly active, such as the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL). These Bureaus often administer programs funds within their sectors of activity. Though an Ambassador is often consulted, programmatic and funding priorities are often determined by a headquarters in DC.  

Embassies not only host State Department bureaus, but other department and agency staff. Typically, there can be several such additional departments or agencies. However, during large operations, such as Iraq or Afghanistan, there can be well over a dozen departments and agencies active in an Embassy. Common departments and agencies include the Departments of Justice and Agriculture. USAID is also a prominent U.S. civilian organization in stabilization activities. While all U.S. civilian personnel serve in a country with the permission of the Ambassador, other U.S. departments and agencies are funded independently of the Embassy in country or even the State Department entirely. Thus, while the Ambassador is the head U.S. civilian in a country, and has control over who may operate in their country, they often do not directly control the funds and projects of other U.S. departments and agencies. U.S. civilian organizations predominately executed programs through grants to partners, such as international NGOs, the United Nations, or local organizations. Further, logistical support and security services were typically provided through contract support.

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30 For example in the South Sudan case, INL Washington performed almost all grant, contract, and financial management functions for that agency (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2013, May).
**U.S. Military.** The U.S military presences in these cases can range from non-existent or minimal, such as in the South Sudan case, to that of a limited role, as seen in the Mindanao case, to a prominent presence of hundreds of thousands, such as at the peaks of Iraq and Afghanistan cases. Civil Affairs personnel, who are military personnel who specialize in interacting with civilians outside the military, are a particularly engaged element of the military during stabilization activities. Another U.S. military element active in reconstruction is the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Though most other stabilization organizations worked through grants, the U.S. military was also active in contracting, and had limited means of providing grants. The U.S. military regularly employed contractors itself, frequently in areas such as personal protection, patrolling, training, facility management, and theater network management and maintenance. However, unlike most other donor organizations, the U.S. military had the internal capacity to implement a number of stabilization activities directly, such as medical training, other technical training, and civil engineer projects.

**Donor States.** Outside of the U.S., there are a number of other common, or traditional donor states, typically the European Union, the nearly 30 European Union member countries (bi-laterally), and non-European states such as Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. They were significant contributors of international assistance in all of the cases, though they played relatively larger roles in South Sudan and Mindanao. These states are common participants in donor state focused activities in general, such as workshops, conferences, joint declarations (such as the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness), etc. These states are also typically members of common international organizations, such as the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. Donor priorities are typically established through national headquarters (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013). Thus, though they all have their individual priorities and interests, they have some common basis for their approaches to providing assistance to states. As described in the case study descriptions above, they play a role in all of the case study countries, though relatively larger roles in the Mindanao and South Sudan cases.

**Non Traditional Donors.** This group includes donor states that are not considered common donor countries and typically do not participate in the agreements, meetings, and organizations that the traditional donor states do. China is a particular example of this in the South Sudan case, as are a number of regional states in that case.

**Organizations that Typically both Provide and Receive Funding**

**United Nations.** The United Nations plays an active role in the stabilization cases. The United Nations is both a donor and recipient of funds. It often serves as an aggregator of donor state funds, typically from the donor states listed above, or as a means to operate in areas not receptive to a foreign state operating. In turn, the United Nations itself often works through implementing partners (see below), both international and local. However, United Nations agencies can also directly implement funded programs. In those cases, they often have international management and technical expertise, while hiring a large percentage

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31 For example, in Afghanistan international contributors included the United States, Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
of local nationals to execute day-to-day activities. The United Nations also managed joint funds, such as basket fund to support Afghan elections (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2009). The United Nations often works in conflict settings in concert with the host nation and can even operate parallel to it to deliver services. This can enhance the speed and quality of service delivery, however, it has also been criticized as potentially weakening the institutions that host countries must rely on in the long-term (Bennett, 2013).

The United Nations was active in Iraq, with the 2003 establishment of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI). However, overall the United Nations was viewed as “coming late” to stabilization efforts, as a result of their reluctance to station staff in Iraq itself due to security issues. UNAMI had approximately 1,100 personnel, of which about 40% were international staff and 60% were local. UNAMI’s budget in 2012 was $172 million (United Nations, 2012a).

In Afghanistan, the UN established the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), which was responsible for the direction and oversight of all United Nations relief, recovery, and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, the United Nations has sought to limit its involvement and to encourage Afghans to assume

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32 When not established inside of Iraq, the United Nations and UNAMI coordinated their activities from nearby countries in the region. When active in Iraq, UNAMI was headquartered in Baghdad, with offices in Basra, Erbil, and Kirkuk and had between 1 and 3 staff members each in the provinces (United Nations, 2012a).

33 One of the main functions of UNAMA was to coordinate the humanitarian development activities of United Nations agencies and to promote aid effectiveness and good development practice (United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan, 2012).

responsibility for their own political reconciliation and economic reconstruction\textsuperscript{34}. The UNAMA presence ranged in the order of over a thousand staff, with over 300 international staff.

In Mindanao, the UN mostly operated out of Manila with few agencies active in Mindanao itself. However, by 2010 the UN presence inside Mindanao itself grew significantly, with several UN agencies opening offices and adding staff in the hundreds, including both international and local staff (Chesnutt, 2011).

Nearly all the United Nations funds and programs and specialized agencies were active in Sudan. Further, South Sudan hosted two UN peacekeeping missions: the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, with over 10,000 personnel by the end of the case period (UN Security Council, 2014, September), and the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), with over 5,000 personnel concentrated in a limited area (Peacekeeping Mission Updates, 2012).

Over a dozen United Nations agencies can be involved in a given country; in Afghanistan, for example, up to 32 programs and agencies were active in the country during the case study period (United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan, 2012). United Nations agencies have their own member state budgets, or can receive funds directly from a donor organization for a specific project. Some of the more prominent United Nations agencies in the case studies are the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and the World Food Program. Collectively, the United Nations agencies are often also referred to as the United Nations system.

\textsuperscript{34}This “light footprint” euphemism for a minimalist United Nations mission, was publicly advocated as a way to ensure space for Afghans to take the leading role in rebuilding their country, in contrast to the outsider-dominated approaches of the Kosovo and East Timor missions (United States Institute of Peace, 2004).
Nations Country Team. As an example, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was the largest UN organization operating in Afghanistan and supported stabilization programs with donor state provided funding, ranging from approximately $400 million in 2008 to over $700 million in 2013 (United Nations Development Programme, n.d.e).

**Other International Organizations.** Prominent international organizations outside of the United Nations include the World Bank group and regional development banks, regional security organizations such as the African Union in the South Sudan Case, and the European Union. Though these organizations are chartered under the United Nations, they are generally autonomous from the United Nations mission or country team in a given country, and receive funding directly from member states rather than through the United Nations.

The World Bank, and associated World Bank Group organizations, particularly the International Monetary Fund, is an active donor in many countries. In Iraq, $4.4 billion was provided for Iraq reconstruction through multilateral organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, Islamic Development Bank, International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq, an Iraq specific basket fund with 25 donor states, and the World Bank (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2012, January). However, the World Bank in particular was noted for being unwilling to station staff in Iraq, similar to the United Nations above. In Afghanistan, the World Bank was one of the largest donors, with more than $1.89 billion committed between 2002 and 2009 for emergency reconstruction, development projects, and budget support (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction,
Regional Bank groups, such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB), or the African Development Bank (also ADB), also play roles in cases within their regions. In Afghanistan the Asian Development Bank was a major donor, which between 2002 and 2013 ranked as the fourth largest donor behind the United States, the United Kingdom, and the World Bank. The Asian Development Bank provided assistance to Afghanistan’s governance, financial, and private sectors (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction [SIGAR], 2009). The International Monetary Fund also provided $120 million to Afghanistan (SIGAR, 2009). Mindanao was also a priority area for the Asian Development Bank in the Philippines, which provided both loans and grants.

**Multi-Lateral Funds.** A common mechanism for pooling funding are Multi-Lateral Trust Funds. These are most prominent in the South Sudan case, though they played a role in Mindanao and had a limited presence in Afghanistan. These funds can serve as a flexible financing tool providing predictable funds to promote greater efficiency (United Nations Development Programme, n.d.c). Such funds typically receive collective funding from a number of donor states, and are managed by the World Bank or a United Nations agency such as the United Nations Development Programme. Though closely connected to these organizations, these funds decide upon their own activities and priorities and fund their own project and conduct their own assessments. Thus, for the purposes of this research, they are treated as at least semi-autonomous organizations (World Health Organization, 2009).

Implementation, including the delivery of basic services, was mostly entrusted to various

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35 Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility loan program.
third parties, including UN agencies, and international and local national NGOs (United Nations Development Programme, n.d.d).

As stated, a number of multi-donor funds operated in South Sudan. Two of note are the South Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF-SS) and the South Sudan Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF). The South Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Fund, managed by the World Bank, supported projects in education, health, agriculture, roads, water, public financial management, law enforcement, and other sectors (The World Bank, 2013, May; World Health Organization, 2009). The MDTF-SS was supported by 15 donors, including the World Bank, who made commitments totaling $718 million. The CHF was one of the largest humanitarian pooled funds in the world, with over $200 million contributed. It was managed by the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator with support from United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and United Nations Development Programme, which served as managing agent (United Nations Development Programme, n.d.c).

Organizations that Typically Receive Funding

International NGOs. International NGOs encompass a wide variety of organizations and are generally defined as non-government organizations with international headquarters (i.e. outside of the country of program activities). They are typically thought of

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36 Examples of activities include support for the first national census, development of a new currency, integrating ex-combatants, training police, building police stations and prisons, building classrooms, providing text books, training teachers, providing access to water and sanitation, rebuilding Juba Teaching hospital, providing medical supplies to clinics and hospital, running a HIV/AIDS program, and rehabilitating roads
as non-profit organizations, though the term can include for-profit groups that have accepted contracts or grants to implement programs. They are also typically implementing partners of donor states, the United Nations, the World Bank, or other donor organizations. Sometimes they can themselves can sub-contract or work with local implementing partners. However, most often they directly implement funded programs. International NGOs often have international management and technical expertise, while hiring a large percentage of local nationals to execute day-to-day activities. The number of International NGOs operating in a given state can number in the dozens or hundreds. NGOs conduct activities and projects in practically every area imaginable.

Though there is a wide range of International NGOs, they can be informally divided into a number of sub categories. Some NGOs are single issue focused. For example, NGOs such as Non-violent Peaceforce are exclusively conflict prevention oriented. Others, such as the BRAC37, operate in wide area of sectors, from health, agriculture, governance, etc. A key sub-group of NGOs are humanitarian NGOs, which operate according to humanitarian principles to provide relief regardless of political affiliations. Examples of these NGOs include the International Red Cross, or Doctors Without Borders. Conversely, development NGOs are generally more closely associated with a given donor state’s political objectives. An example of these include Research Triangle Institute (commonly just RTI) International or International Relief and Development (commonly just IRD), who were prominent USAID partners in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the distinction between humanitarian and development NGOs can be murky, and the terms are often used (mistakenly)

37 Formerly the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee; currently, “BRAC” does not represent an acronym.
With this diversity in types of NGOs comes a variety in the organizational goals and priorities among NGOs. NGOs have been commonly viewed as sharing commitments to common causes, such as humanitarian NGOs sharing commitments to human rights or to assisting afflicted populations, or NGOs operating within the same sectors or on the same issues, such as democratization or education development. However, they have also been described as being significantly competitive with one another, with contests over donor funds and concerns of brand management also being priorities (Polman, 2010). Further, NGOs often have priorities that diverge from those donors, host nations, or even one another. Commonly, NGOs place a higher priority on principals such as humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality (Solomon, 2012). Humanitarian NGOs in particular have been noted as expressing concerns about maintaining perceptions of impartiality between all actors in a conflict and of principled activities (as opposed to efficient), and with been seen as working to closely with a host nation or donor state, even when they are working to reduce conflict.\footnote{This has been extensively detailed in many reports, studies and articles; for examples see Burke, 2014 and Abiew, 2012.}

Several international humanitarian and development focused non-governmental organizations operated throughout Iraq, though their numbers were low when compared to many other conflicts. International NGOs were largely not present in Iraq during the Saddam Hussein regime before OIF, and with the escalation in violence beginning in 2004, many ended their incipient operations in the country. Though as violence subsided many did return, overall the numbers and participation of international NGOs that were not coalition
implementing partners remained low.

Conversely, in Afghanistan, since the U.S.-led invasion in late 2001, thousands of international NGOs have worked in Afghanistan on various projects funded by international donors, and a sizable number had a long history of activity in the country. As of February 2015, the number of registered International NGOs since 2005 was 4016, with 275 still active (The International Center for Not-For Profit Law, 25 February 2015). Another indicator of the role of NGOs is that in 2008, USAID alone had 18 NGOs or United Nations implementing partners executing its programs in Afghanistan (USAID, 2009). A multitude of international NGOs were active in Mindanao and South Sudan, as well. In the latter, well over one hundred were estimated to be active (United Nations, 2012b).

Local NGOs/Civil Society Organizations. This group encompasses the non-governmental organizations that are based in the nation hosting a stabilization activity. They are often referred to as civil society organizations; however, for the purposes of this study, they are generally referred to as local NGOs. The makeup of these groups varies widely. They can include international NGO-like organizations, focusing on economic development or humanitarian issues, single issues, or many issues. They can be religious or politically affiliated and closely aligned with a given religious or political organizations.

Organizations associated with individuals and parties that seek political power (whether through electoral politics or other means) are often in a borderline category of civil society/local NGOs. However, so long as the organizations themselves do not directly compete for political power, classifying them as part of civil society is valid (Rood, 2005).

This group can also include local educational institutions, particularly universities, or
professional associations. These organizations, however, typically have lower technical capabilities than international NGO or international organization counterparts. They are however, commonly partnered with, particularly by international NGOS.

Prior to the U.S. invasion, there were very few true local NGOs in Iraq. Aside from professional organizations, such as bar associations, etc., non-profit, or civil society organizations as seen in Western countries did not exist. Most Iraqi NGOs during the conflict were developed in response to U.S. or international donor efforts find local partners for projects, as many of the common funding mechanisms\(^{39}\) had strict limits on what could be provided to individuals or businesses compared to NGOs. As a result, by 2010, estimates of the number of NGOs (local and/or international) operating in Iraq ranged from 4,000 to 6,000, with potentially more operating in the autonomous Kurdistan region (The International Center for Not-For Profit Law, 2015)\(^{40}\).

In Afghanistan, U.S. and international donor stabilization efforts also led to a flourishing of local partner organizations. The number of registered local NGOs in Afghanistan since 2005 was 3,415 by February 2015, with 1,665 of those active. Further, there were 5,350 associations registered, which though formally not allowed to receive foreign funding, it is not clear if this restriction is enforced (The International Center for Not-For Profit Law). Though local NGOs in the Western style were relatively new developments, both countries had strong traditions of informal organizations, such as the multitude of tribal affiliations and sheiks in Iraq.

Conversely, the Philippines had a large indigenous local civil society organization

\(^{39}\) Such as CERP or the Quick Response Fund, see the Iraq Provincial case for further information below.

\(^{40}\) It is notable that by 2013, after the U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq and reduction of international funding, the total number of NGOs registered by the Iraq government had dropped to only 1800.
and/or NGO sector. Though total numbers are not available, estimates placed their numbers in the thousands nationally.\textsuperscript{41}

In South Sudan, there were an estimated 152 (United Nations) to 187 (World Food Program) local civil society groups operating, comprised of a wide range of non-governmental organizations and faith-based (church) groups (Schomerus and Allen, 2010).

**Host Nation Government (National, and Provincial, and Local).** This category of organizations comprises the government of the host nation, at multiple levels of government. In a stabilization context, stabilization organizations are often partnering with host nation ministries and security forces. Often, and in every case examined, the national levels of governments have functional ministries that act within a given sector, such as health, education, planning, etc., and can be active across the country. Host Nation security forces usually encompass national militaries and police forces.

Host Nations are also typically divided into national, provincial or district, and local levels. Though it varies from country to country, the differing levels of government can act independently of one another, similar to how the U.S. system of States and Federal governments can act independently. District and provincial governments, at least in these cases, also have their own budget and spending authorities. Local and municipality governments many not have their own budgets, or may only have small ones. Particularly in fragile and conflict state environments, these levels of government can have contentious

\textsuperscript{41} An example is the Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute, in Mindanao, providing skills, conducting research and building solidarity within the Asia-Pacific Region. It was established in the year 2000 through the collective effort of the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development, Catholic Relief Services, and Mennonite Central Committee (Rood, 2005).
relationships. For example, in Iraq, there may be a Ministry of Education that can act independently of, or even in conflict with, the local Provincial government.

During the case periods, the countries differed significantly in terms of their national financial positions. Though early on Iraq was largely dependent on outside assistance, thanks to its oil resources, it was in time able to contribute significantly to its own reconstruction and stabilization. By 2011, Iraq had contributed $107 billion in reconstruction funding, mostly in the later years. After 2008, Iraq became the single largest funder of its own reconstruction and stabilization (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2012, January). Conversely, the Afghan government was heavily dependent on international assistance for financial support. In the Mindanao case, the Philippine government itself was a major donor for projects in the region and played a very active role, while in the South Sudan case the government was largely anemic.
Chapter 5: Collaborative Governance Theory Hypotheses Analysis

The features of collaborative governance theories, the indicators of network success and the two typologies discussed in Chapter 2 provide the basis for the ‘lenses’ through which cases of U.S. stabilization activities will be examined. They have implications for, if not explicit statements about, the roles and relative importance of the features of a collaborative governance network outlined above, as well as for what constitutes a successful network. These implications, and how they may apply to the management of collaboration in stabilization activities, will be explored. Further, as can be seen through this survey of measures of collaborative governance network success, there are many levels of examination. This include the community level of analysis from Provan and Milward, the network and organizational (or agency) levels from both Provan and Milward and Agranoff as appropriate framework for evaluating collaborative governance network success.

In this section, the identified collaborative governance network features are examined and compared across the six cases. General network governance features are examined under hypotheses 1; these include the futures of Network Governance, Coordination and Strategy, Integrators and Supporters, and etc. described in Chapter 2. These features are those that crossed organizational boundaries of the identified types of organizations in the prior section, and that involved or impacted the U.S. effort in some way. The following collaborative network features and indicators of network success, described in Chapter 2, were examined and formed the basis for exploring the hypotheses and research analysis:
• Network Governance and Organization
• Coordination and Strategy
• Knowledge Management
• Relationships
• Integrators and Supporters

The results of that examination inform hypothesis 2 analysis. Finally, the indicators of network success are examined in hypothesis 3.

**Hypothesis 1** U.S. Stabilization Networks will exhibit such collaborative governance network features, but not in a systematic or consistent way. Further, U.S. government managers in Stabilization Networks are not regularly managing across organizations or managing their organization as one within a broader network; instead, their focus is on managing only their own individual organization and achieving individual organizational goals and objectives.

To test this hypothesis, the collaborative governance features in the five broad categories of Network Management and Organization Structures, Coordination and Strategy, Knowledge Management, Relationships, and Integrators and Supporters that were observed in cases are described below. They are further sub-divided into multiple sub-categories for each broad category. Each sub-category is assessed for its relative prominence (rated as very low, low, medium, high, or very high) regarding its relative degree or presence across the cases. Summary assessment for the broader categories is developed from those...
individual assessments. Criteria included number of organizational types involved or that were impacted and the scope or range of issues addressed, such as the range subject areas or geographic areas addressed. Standing governance bodies were also evaluated based on their formality, being described as formal, semi-formal, or informal. This was in terms of formal chartering, formal authorities, and regularity of their activities. Periodic events, such as meetings, conferences, and workshops were assessed in terms of frequency. Sub-categories that were degree oriented, such as degree of trust or comfort, were also assessed in terms of their respective intensity or impact. The criteria for assessment are briefly described under each sub-category and in the methods section (Appendix 1). Note that characterizations of the types of collaboration that may have resulted from these structures and the effectiveness or success of these structures are examined in later hypotheses (see Hypotheses 3 and 4 in particular).
Network Governance and Organization

Table 4: Network Governance and Organization Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Iraq RoL</th>
<th>Afghan RoL</th>
<th>Iraq Provincial</th>
<th>Afghan Provincial</th>
<th>Mindanao</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governing Bodies</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High (4)</td>
<td>Very High (5)</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working groups, Task Forces, Coordination Centers, etc.</td>
<td>High (4)</td>
<td>Very High (5)</td>
<td>Very Low (1)</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>High (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conferences or Workshops</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>Very Low (1)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>Very Low (1)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
<td>Very Low (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreements</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meetings</td>
<td>High (4)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>Very High (5)</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaisons</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>High (4)</td>
<td>Very High (5)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Ranking</td>
<td>Low (18)</td>
<td>High (22)</td>
<td>Medium (19)</td>
<td>Very High (24)</td>
<td>Medium (20)</td>
<td>Very Low (16)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The governing bodies sub-category includes those bodies that could, at least to some degree, set priorities and/or provide direction across organizational boundaries. Of these structures, the two provincial cases display the most prominent governing bodies. In both cases, U.S. and host national formal joint bodies were seen. Additionally, the Afghan case displayed a further U.S. civ-mil formal body as well. At the other end of the spectrum are Mindanao and South Sudan, which either had limited formal or informal governing structures. The Afghanistan RoL case seems to be the mid-range case, with a formal U.S. civ-mil body, and a formal but narrowly focused host national body. In the Iraq RoL case, no governing bodies were identified.
Governing body examples: In the Afghanistan RoL Case an Ambassador-rank position specifically for justice sector issues entitled the Coordinating Director of RoL and Law Enforcement, or CDROLLE, was established at Embassy Kabul to coordinate among U.S. civilian and military organizations (Wyler and Katzman, 2010). Supporting the CDROLLE was a Deputies Committee consisting of senior military and civilian representatives from all U.S. government civilian agencies and military commands involved in Afghanistan RoL. The Deputies Committee received RoL project analysis and made actionable recommendations concerning ongoing and proposed RoL initiatives (Clark, 2011).

In the Afghanistan Provincial case, in November 2008 the Integrated Civil-Military Action Group (commonly ICMAG) was formally established at the Embassy to institutionalize provincial level planning efforts (Yodsampa, 2011). In 2010, the ICMAG was re-constituted as the Civil Military Plans and Assessments Office (commonly referred to as CMPASS). At the provincial level, formally established Afghanistan Provincial Development Committees could bring PRTs, the UN, and NGOs together with the governor and tribal leaders to engage in coordinated project planning and implementation for a wide range of provincial stabilization activities (Perito, 2005).

In the Iraqi Provincial case, the U.S., in the Coalition Provisional Authority era, established joint Provincial Reconstruction Development Councils to address the full spectrum of provincial issues. The councils were a joint Iraqi-American forum established in fifteen provinces and became a forum that brought together local elected Iraqi officials and their municipal staffs, USAID and other civilian representatives, and civil affairs soldiers to collectively evaluate provincial needs and match them with available U.S. and Iraqi
resources (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2009, January).

In the Mindanao case, the Mindanao Development Authority (MinDA) was charged with the economic development of Mindanao (Ponyaeva, 2011). By the end of the case study, MinDA appeared to have assumed a lead role in coordinating assistance in the Mindanao with donor states, and with international or local NGOs.

The network governance structures and organizations examined under the Working Groups, Task Forces, Coordination Centers, and etc. sub-category are those that attempted to significantly coordinate or foster collaboration across organizational boundaries. However, these structures did not have, or were not intended to have, directive authority to set priorities across organizational types. Across the cases, there were a number of coordination structures that primarily addressed U.S. military and civilian coordination. The number and type of these structures varied widely across the cases.

The Rule of Law cases evidenced a greater number of and more formal coordination structures. A notable coordinating structure in the Iraq RoL case was that of the RoL Coordinator. Established in 2006, the Coordinator position was an Ambassador level position within the Embassy, and was responsible for overseeing all RoL activities and policies internally within the Embassy and externally with the Government of Iraq and the military (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2009). In the Afghan Rule of Law case, two notable coordinating structures were also observed. The first was the Inter-

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42 Provincial Reconstruction Development Councils were funded through both U.S. and Iraqi national government funding.
43 One of the MinDA’s key functions was to serve as a clearinghouse in that any funding entities, including international donors, organization or states, or local organizations had to go them to before implementing a project to make sure there is no overlap in activity (Mindanao Interview 1 Feb 2014).
44 It should be noted that informal coordination across organizational groups likely happened at least occasionally in many forums in the cases.
Agency Rule of Law Unit (commonly referred to as IROL), which was a joint civil-military organization formed from the combination of U.S. military and civilian RoL units and was responsible for planning, coordinating resources, and synchronizing Rule of Law efforts in Afghanistan (Afghanistan RoL Interview Nov 2013). Further, in 2010 the U.S. Military established the RoL Field Force, which had the missions to provide essential field capabilities, liaison, and security to Afghan and international civilian providers in the RoL sector, such as those at Regional Commands, PRTs, and DSTs (District Support Teams). Thus the Iraq and Afghanistan RoL cases are rated at high and very high respectively.

Though South Sudan and Mindanao had a large number of coordinating structures, many of them were not formally established. For example, in both the Mindanao and South Sudan cases, humanitarian NGOs were generally organized by the ‘cluster’ system, which establishes working groups based on subject area (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2010/2012, September). Each Cluster/sector was led by a government department and co-led by a United Nations agency or other international humanitarian actor (United Nations, 2011). Clusters typically meet monthly to share updates, identify gaps, and plan interventions. Though mostly comprised of international NGOs, the clusters brought together government representatives, United Nations agencies, particularly the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, NGOs, international organizations, and donor states. Humanitarian clusters were also organized under a Humanitarian Country Team, chaired by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2012). As a result, the Mindanao and South Sudan

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45 It was moved from U.S. to NATO ISAF command in 2011 and was renamed the NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission-Afghanistan (NROLFSM-A).
cases are rated as a medium and high, while the Afghanistan Provincial case is rated as a low due to its lower number of coordinating structures, and the Iraq Provincial case is rated very low.

Conferences or workshops were fairly consistent across the cases. Within the Iraq and Afghanistan cases, conferences, and workshops seemed to have been broadly similar, occurring frequently and included a wide range of participants and issues. Likewise within Mindanao and South Sudan, similar donor coordination meeting were held, though overall the frequency of meetings seemed lower and were narrower in focus than in the Iraq and Afghanistan cases. Thus the Iraq and Afghanistan cases are all rated at medium, which the Mindanao and South Sudan cases are rated as low.

The communications sub-category consists of communications structures, such as web portals, mailing lists, newsletters, or other means of sharing information across organizations. Under communications features, multiple portals were established in Afghanistan to help facilitate the sharing of information between civilian and military actors – including international organizations/NGOs, donor agencies, military forces and others. These impacted both mini-cases, giving those cases a medium ranking. An attempt at a portal in Mindanao earned it a low rating, while the other cases, with no observed relevant portals or communications structures, are rated at very low.

With a similarity of agreements across the cases and the near universally reported challenges and mixed results with them, little with regard to the prominence of agreements across the cases can be judged. However, it did seem that formal agreements were less prevalent in the Rule of Law mini-cases, suggesting a lower rating for those two cases. Thus, all of the other cases are ranked at a medium, while the RoL cases are ranked low.
Iraq Provincial Case: Anbar Example

How agreements could develop is illustrated in the Iraq Provincial Case Anbar example. For much of OIF, Marine units were stationed in Anbar province. The Marines made plans and agreements with each U.S civilian team, which in circa 2009, included the PRT and 3 ePRTs at Ramadi, Fallujah and Al Asad (Iraq Provincial Interview 5 Mar 14; United States Institute of Peace, 2008, December 9). This involved a Marine planning staff with the responsibility of ensuring that each side’s plans were consistent, and to help make changes to one side or the other’s plans as appropriate (Iraq Provincial Interview 5 Mar 14). The ePRTs were collocated with Marine units, which facilitated closer coordination. In effect, the military utilized the ePRTs as extensions of the civil affairs units (United States Institute of Peace, 2008, October 10). Also, the Marines made agreements with the Iraqis to address topics such as operations and maintenance agreements for completed projects. For example, if the Marines completed a school they asked the local Iraqi leaders to agree that they would use the building for the stated purpose and sustain it. The Marines also did direct contracting with Iraqis, for construction and other activities (Iraq Provincial Interview 5 Mar 14).

The success of these agreements was described as depending not only on the viability of the plan or agreement, but also on the degree to which parties were willing to spend the time and effort that was agreed to. Further, robust planning constructs, with measures of effort, performance, and progress, to include elements such as performance standards, objectives and milestones, time lines, measure of progress and efficacy (i.e. how to

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46 Though both the provincial level PRT and an ePRT were located in Ramadi, they were stationed in different parts of the area and had different military partners. The PRT was partnered with a division level unit, while the ePRT was partnered with a brigade (regiment) level unit.
know if widows were really better off, etc.), were typically not developed. In general, civilian and military partners were not willing to participate that rigorous of a planning process (Iraq Provincial Interview 5 Mar 14).

The meetings sub-category addresses events that are typically less formal and involve fewer participants than conferences, workshops, or working groups. In all of the cases, meetings with other organizations were frequently referenced. These seemed to be the primary way to establish relationships and facilitate information sharing and coordination (Mindanao Interview 1 July 2014; South Sudan Interview 19 October 2013; U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2005). Meetings seemed to be the most prevalent in the Mindanao case, earning a rating of Very High. For example, in that case a Mindanao Working Group (MWG) was established at the Embassy by the Ambassador. It served as an interagency collaborative body that planned, coordinated, monitored, and assessed U.S. engagement in the southern Philippines. The Working Group consisted of representatives from across the U.S. Mission and JSOTF-P, and served to link elements of the Philippine government and private sector more closely to the southern Philippines (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2005). They were also more pronounced in the Iraq Rule of Law case, resulting in a rating of High. Conversely, they were seen as the least pronounced in the South Sudan case, earning a ranking of Low for that case. The other cases seemed to have had a relatively moderate prevalence of meetings, with little to distinguish among them, so they are collectively rated at medium.

The liaisons sub-category refers to staff designated to improve information sharing,

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47 The Mindanao Working group was originally developed through the efforts of JSOTF-P elements working with the Deputy Chief of Mission and by mid-2011 the Working Group was essentially a steering group for the U.S.’s initiatives.
represent parent organization interests, coordinate on activities, and to develop working relationships between organizations. Liaisons were also often technical specialists, and their primary duties could be in that capacity, even as they also served a network collaboration function. For example, in the Afghanistan Provincial case, USAID, in order to provide technical advice to military counterparts, established advisors (“DEVADs,” short for development advisors) at all levels of the military structure outside of Kabul. They were frequently located part time or full time in partner organizations.

Liaisons were frequently used in U.S. civilian and military relations in the Iraq, Afghanistan, and Mindanao cases. Military staff were frequently embedded in the Embassies, and in some cases civilians were embedded at military commands (Eronen, 2008; Fritsch, 2012; Yodsampa, 2011). Moreover, the PRTs central to the provincial case studies themselves had a distinct liaison function, with activities coordination and information sharing responsibilities (Wyler and Katzman, 2010). For example, at the provincial level the Anbar PRT coordinated with the Marine Headquarters. At the district level, each ePRT, located in Ramadi, Fallujah, and Al Asad, had a military unit commanded by a Colonel, with whom they coordinated at their level on a daily basis (Iraq Provincial Interview 5 Mar 14). U.S. and international stabilization organizations also frequently liaised with host government partners. In the Mindanao case, U.S. military forces often liaised with Philippine security forces. JSOTF-P forces typically liaised at the military-brigade and police-battalion level while maintaining close relationships with subordinate units (Beaudette, 2012).

A measure beyond liaison with of individual staff was co-location, which was the establishment of entire offices or teams of personnel from different organizations in the same areas. This was particularly seen in the Mindanao and Iraq and Afghanistan Provincial
Cases. In the Iraq and Afghanistan Provincial Cases, civilian and military personnel were co-located at various levels of the military structure in the field, such as at the PRTs and in Afghanistan at the Regional Commands as well (Yodsampa, 2011). However, at the PRT level, the degree of co-location varied, with some PRTs still lacking consistent civilian representation during the earlier time frame (ca 2004-2006). U.S. military forces were also frequently co-located with Iraqi and Afghan security forces. In the Mindanao case U.S. leaders determined, in part for collaboration purposes as well as legal and practical ones\footnote{This included needing to comply with the Philippine Constitution and several U.S./Philippine bi-lateral agreements (Beaudette, 2012).}, that U.S. military forces would be co-located with Philippine units on Philippine installations.

The ePRT in Al Asad Iraq provides an example of co-location in practice. The harsh living conditions were cited as fostering mutual bonding and working relationships across both military and civilian lines. In particular, the lack of plumbing in living quarters was cited at Al Asad as a bonding factor. This was contrasted to other locations, where civilians may have had amenities, such as indoor plumbing, which military personnel did not\footnote{Civilians may have had, due to chance or design, better living quarters than military personnel of comparable rank and operated with different benefits. For example, U.S. civilian staff received about 2 months of leave annual compared to two weeks that was typically for a military tour. However, the leave and hardship pay benefits for U.S. civilians were actually consistent with United Nations standards (though not military standards) for service in conflict zones.}. These differences could lead to tension that damaged the civilian and military working relationships. To avoid these, many PRTs self-imposed restrictions on their privileges, such as limiting or prohibiting drinking. At Al Asad, there was also an effort to observe military protocols in general. The PRT leadership directed that although civilians were not necessarily subject to the same restrictions as military staff, they too would not be allowed to drink alcohol when their Army and Marine counterparts could not. The direction was also given to
respect personal communication black outs in the case of military casualties, which were implemented for a number of hours (12) to ensure that families received formal notifications (United States Institute of Peace, 2008, December 9). These efforts were cited as helping to foster cohesion between military and civilians at Al Asad, if only through removing potential causes of resentment on the part of the military.

For liaison structures, the Iraq Provincial and Afghanistan Provincial cases are rated at High and Very High, respectively. The increased prevalence of embedded civilian staff in the Afghanistan Provincial case distinguished it from the Iraq Provincial case. Both the Iraq and Afghanistan Rule of Law cases seem to be in the mid-range, with the Mindanao case, earning a Medium rating. South Sudan evidenced the lowest relative amount of liaison features, earning a Low rating.
Network Coordination and Strategy

Table 5: Network Coordination and Strategy Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Iraq RoL</th>
<th>Afghan RoL</th>
<th>Iraq Provincial</th>
<th>Afghan Provincial</th>
<th>Mindanao</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goal Congruence</td>
<td>Very High (5)</td>
<td>Very Low (1)</td>
<td>High (4)</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
<td>Very High (5)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Planning</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>Very High (5)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>High (4)</td>
<td>Very Low (1)</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource Sharing</td>
<td>Very High (5)</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
<td>High (4)</td>
<td>High (4)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>Very Low (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Ranking</td>
<td>Very High (13)</td>
<td>Low (9)</td>
<td>High (11)</td>
<td>Medium (10)</td>
<td>Low (9)</td>
<td>Very Low (6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mission, Vision, and Goal Congruence Assessment.

“It is unfortunate that the Western response combines food aid with cruise missiles.”


This sub-section examines differences in the perceived missions, vision, and goals between organization types in each of the cases. The Iraq cases both are rated highly, with the Rule of Law case observed to be at least somewhat more harmonious than the Provincial case. This is shown by the stronger U.S. civilian and military organization goal congruence in the case. A similarly strong congruence was seen in the Mindanao case, which also demonstrated a strong U.S. civilian and military goal congruence. Conversely, the Afghan cases revealed greater dis-harmony of goals, particularly between the U.S. civilian and military organizations, but also with local partners. This was especially evident in the
Afghanistan Provincial case, where disagreements were pronounced between the U.S. and humanitarian organizations. The South Sudan case revealed agreement on high-level objectives, but less agreement on lower level goals. Thus it is rated at medium.

**Strategic Planning Assessment.** In this section, the strategic plans that spanned organizational types, such as campaign plans or strategic frameworks are rated. This also includes the processes through which they were developed, when applicable. The Afghanistan RoL and Provincial cases are rated the highest among the cases. Under the ICMAG/CMPASS office, tiered plans from the national to regional or provincial levels were common, along with host national plans.

They are followed by the Iraq cases, which showed fewer plans overall, particularly with regard to nested planning. For example, in the Iraq provincial case, each PRT had a work plan that detailed PRT activities and short-term goals and coordinated and synchronized with the military’s battle space owner. The work plans were updated on a quarterly basis.

The PRTs and military partners also developed Unified Common Plans. These were agreements on goals, roles, and responsibilities between a PRT and its partnered military unit, if it had one (Doyle, 2013; and Jobson, 2010, October). Further, in most provinces, Provincial Reconstruction Development Councils comprised of Iraqi and U.S. participants, (see above) drew up prioritized lists of projects in line with national and provincial development plans. The intent was to help avoid “white elephant” projects, and to develop programs that Iraqi partners had both the interest and technical capabilities to sustain (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2009).
At the lowest end of the spectrum for this sub-category are the Mindanao and South Sudan cases, with planning limited or not observed beyond the humanitarian sphere. In the South Sudan case, the principal framework of development priorities for South Sudan was articulated in the government’s South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP). The SSDP was complemented by the Medium-Term Capacity Development Strategy for South Sudan (MTCDS) that was developed alongside it to provide a strategic framework for addressing the capacity development priorities of the SSDP (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2011). The MTCDS included sector-specific capacities, as well as core capacities needed across government.

**Resource Sharing Assessment.** This sub-category examines practices to sharing resources, such as logistics, staff, or funding, across organizations. Across the cases sharing of support type resources, particularly transportation space, was commonly seen. More variation was seen in terms of shared project or programmatic activities across organizations. These were most frequently noted in the Iraq RoL case, and also frequently noted in both the Iraq and Afghanistan Provincial Cases, resulting in high rankings. They were evidenced to a lesser degree in the Mindanao case, but still not uncommon, giving it a middle ranking. They seemed to be the least prevalent in the Afghanistan RoL case and the South Sudan case, thus these are rated the lowest accordingly.
Network Knowledge Management

Table 6: Network Knowledge Management Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Iraq RoL</th>
<th>Afghan RoL</th>
<th>Iraq Provincial</th>
<th>Afghan Provincial</th>
<th>Mindanao</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comfort Level</td>
<td>Very High (5)</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>High (4)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Benchmarks orMetrics</td>
<td>Very Low (1)</td>
<td>Very Low (1)</td>
<td>High (4)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Ranking</td>
<td>Medium (6)</td>
<td>Very Low (3)</td>
<td>High (7)</td>
<td>Medium (6)</td>
<td>Medium (6)</td>
<td>Low (5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Trust and Comfort Assessment.** This sub-category examines the degree of comfort or lack thereof in sharing information across organizations. The Iraq RoL and Mindanao cases displayed relatively high levels of trust and comfort with information sharing, and are ranked appropriately. The other cases displayed lower levels of trust and comfort, with the Afghanistan RoL cases standing out as having challenges in this area. Thus they are ranked at a medium level, with the Afghanistan RoL case receiving a low ranking.

**Common Benchmarks or Metrics Assessment.** This sub-category addresses those benchmarks or metrics that were adopted across organizational boundaries. As no common metrics or benchmarks were observed in the Iraq or Afghanistan RoL cases, they received the lowest rankings. Both South Sudan and Mindanao at least had very high-level common objectives, while Provincial cases had more operationally oriented common metrics. Thus, South Sudan and Mindanao are ranked as low, while the Iraq Provincial case is rated high for having a common U.S. civilian and military common metric. The Afghanistan Provincial case is rated medium for have some, but not standard, shared metrics.
 Relationships

Table 7: Relationships Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Iraq RoL</th>
<th>Afghan RoL</th>
<th>Iraq Provincial</th>
<th>Afghan Provincial</th>
<th>Mindanao</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust or Comfort Level</td>
<td>High (4)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>High (4)</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
<td>High (4)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training and Efforts to</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>High (4)</td>
<td>Very High (5)</td>
<td>Very Low (1)</td>
<td>Very Low (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote Understanding</td>
<td>Medium (6)</td>
<td>Medium (6)</td>
<td>Very High (8)</td>
<td>High (7)</td>
<td>Low (5)</td>
<td>Very Low (4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

 Trust or Comfort Assessment. This sub-category examines trust or comfort level across organizations, such as comfort level in sharing resources or expectations that sharing would be reciprocated. Though all of the cases did have significant relationship tensions across organizations, the Iraq RoL, Iraq Provincial, and Mindanao cases exhibited relatively high levels of trust across many types of organizations, and are all ranked highly. The Afghanistan RoL and South Sudan cases displayed more significant concerns in many areas, such as significant U.S. civilian and military tensions in the Afghanistan RoL case, or challenges with host national organizations in the South Sudan case. They are ranked at a medium level. The most severe trust or comfort challenges were seen in the Afghanistan Provincial case, having the most daunting challenges between the U.S. and NGOs as well as issues with local partners, and as a result it is ranked at low.

 Training and Efforts to Promote Understanding Assessment. This sub-category includes efforts such as training, handbook development, or other activities to
promote understanding across organizations. It is assessed on the basis of prevalence of training observed. The Afghanistan Provincial case displayed the greatest number of efforts to promote understanding in the cases, with handbooks, pre-deployment training, and specific in-country training developed to support understanding of other organizations. The Iraq Provincial case displayed almost the same level of effort, with only tailored in-country training being absent. Thus they are ranked at very high and high respectively. The Afghanistan and Iraq RoL cases displayed lower levels of effort and were ranked accordingly. Though the Afghanistan RoL case did have in-country training, the in-country training was generally shorter and less comprehensive than pre-deployment training, earning it a medium ranking. The presence of handbooks for the Iraq RoL case earned it a low ranking. No efforts were seen in the Mindanao or South Sudan cases, earning them a very low ranking.

**Integrators and Supporters**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Iraq RoL</th>
<th>Afghan RoL</th>
<th>Iraq Provincial</th>
<th>Afghan Provincial</th>
<th>Mindanao</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Integrators and Champions</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>Very Low (1)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>High (4)</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership Support</td>
<td>High (4)</td>
<td>Very Low (1)</td>
<td>High (4)</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
<td>High (4)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Ranking</td>
<td>Very High (7)</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
<td>Very High (7)</td>
<td>High (6)</td>
<td>High (6)</td>
<td>Medium (5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Integrators and Champions.** In this section, organizational or general types of supporters of collaboration are examined. In general, across cases there was the perception that there were certain people with the ability to get along (and thereby cooperate). The cases
are assessed in terms of prevalence and impact observed across organizations. Though the South Sudan and Mindanao cases both displayed a number of integrators and champions, they were generally not as well established or were limited in focus compared to those in the Iraq and Afghanistan cases. Thus they are both ranked low. Among the Iraq and Afghanistan case, the PRTs and Coordinators (and CDROLLE in Afghanistan) served as general champions of collaboration. However, the UN also had a large champion role in the Afghanistan Provincial case, earning that case a high ranking. The limited role of the UN in the Iraq cases earned them a medium ranking. Finally, the more limited coordination role for the RoL Coordinator/CDROLLE coupled with a limited UN role in the Afghanistan RoL case earns that case a very low ranking.

**Leadership Support Assessment.** In this context, leadership support means support from leaders outside of and overseeing the organizational structures that are examined in these cases. It is assessed in terms of prevalence and impacts observed across organizations. Across the Iraq, Afghanistan, and Mindanao cases, senior Embassy and military leadership were seen as instrumental in setting a collaborative example between the civilians and military elements (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2013, February). Visibility of senior leadership support for cooperation, or its absence, was noticed by staff and played a role in fostering an environment for effective collaboration. This was particularly noticeable in the RoL cases, and the Mindanao case where more of the coordination took place at the Embassy. For example, in the Mindanao case, the JSOTF-P commander stated that such an integrated effort was essential for a comprehensive approach to addressing U.S. counterterrorism goals in the Philippines (Lambert, Lewis, & Sewall,
2013). However, the effect did clearly ‘trickle down’ to the sub-national level, where senior leader support was seen as helpful to fostering collaboration (Ayres and Barnes, 2011).

Senior civilian and military leaders at the Embassy and military headquarters played a key role in setting high-level agreements and setting a cooperative tone for their sub-national organizational units. At multiple points, both civilian and military leaders directed a more cooperative approach and for subordinates to learn to work better with civilian or military partners.

For the Iraq and Afghanistan provincial cases, at the team and military unit level, in cases when a PRT Team Leader could not get along with his deputy or partnered military commander, then the military and PRTs often worked in parallel with each other (United States Institute of Peace, 2008, October 8). As noted above, particularly in the absence of broadly accepted guidance or other collaboration mechanism, the importance of personality, individual leadership style, and previously established relationships had inordinate impact. The strong and visible levels of leadership support in the Iraq and Mindanao cases, with positive cases observed, earn those cases a high ranking. The leadership support in South Sudan, without observed positive cases merits it a medium ranking. The Afghanistan Provincial case showed a mixed impact from leadership support, while the Afghanistan RoL case displayed negative examples of leadership impact, earning them low and very low rankings respectively.
Hypothesis 1 Findings

As illustrated in the review above, the cases do clearly exhibit many collaborative governance network features. Moreover, these features varied substantially from case to case, and even across organizational types within the cases. Even when similar features were established in differing cases, they often varied significantly after further review.

This can be seen in the development of Network Governance and Organization Structures and in the development of formal plans. In the Iraq and Afghanistan RoL cases, both saw the establishment of U.S. RoL coordinator-type positions. However, in the Afghan case, there was an attempt for the CDROLLE position to lead and establish overall U.S. civil-mil priorities and direct programmatic activities. The Iraq RoL Coordinator never had, nor attempted, to have this type of role. Supporting coordinating network structures were also created, but differed in each case.

Likewise, in the Iraq and Afghanistan Provincial cases, both saw the creation of PRTs. However, the PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan were very different organizations, with
little more in common than general missions and combined civ-mil participation. With Mindanao and South Sudan, collaborative governance features took the form of varying host nation and donor state coordination structures. With regard to Coordination and Strategy, different approaches were taken to planning. Iraq and Afghanistan saw differing attempts at U.S. civ-mil planning, while in Mindanao and South Sudan, different national plans were developed for the international community to fall in line with.

The trend of variation was also evidenced in less formal network features. Goal congruence varied from case to case, and even over time within each individual case. Resource sharing, though generally good in terms of support, varied significantly in term of project collaboration from case to case. Though a theme of initial distrust was evident in relationships, the nature and tone of relationships across organizations also varied widely across cases, as did which organizations were playing integrating roles or championing the network. Leadership support was generally positive, but not always so. Efforts to promote understanding were generally consistent between the U.S. civilian and military organizations, though they did have separate training activities.

Though little direct evidence could be seen regarding the role of U.S. government managers in managing across the network, much can be inferred. The many coordination challenges, instances of limited collaboration, and the description of “personality based” cooperation in all of the cases indicate that managers were at least not consistently managing across the network. Further, in many cases coordinating offices were established, which in itself suggests that there was a need to develop a network management perspective. Yet, in no case did these coordination offices have an express mission to coordinate across the entire network. The U.S. coordinators in the Iraq and Afghanistan cases focused on U.S.
civilian and military organization and the host nation, with a reduced role for other types of organizations. Further, they were limited to activities within their RoL sector, rather than across all activities. In Mindanao and South Sudan, there were Humanitarian Coordinators, but as their title suggests, they only focused on one category of organization operating in those cases.

This review does suggest that the first part of this hypothesis, that the Stabilization Networks examined in the cases did exhibit collaborative governance network features, but inconsistently so held to be largely true. Though there is less evidence for it, the second statement, that U.S. government managers were not regularly managing across organizations, also seems to hold true.

**Hypothesis 2a:** With regard to the Milward and Provan (2006) typologies of networks (see above), U.S Stabilization Networks will most closely resemble Emergent Problem Solving networks in the Milward and Provan typology. As a result, knowledge management (expertise), relationships, coordination and strategy (coordination), and supporters and integrators (leadership) would be particularly important features (from the collaborative governance network features above).

Hypothesis 2 aims to compare and contrast the observed Stabilization Networks with two standard governance network typologies. In Milward & Provan typologies, the type of results and activities undertaken by the Stabilization Networks will be examined. In the Agranoff typology, the types of collaboration that were seen across organizations will be
analyzed. Both categorizations have implications for Network Features that would be relatively more important for collaborative success. The assessment with regard to these categories will inform the analysis of Hypothesis 3, which investigates collaboration success with alignment of Network Features to these typologies.

Hypothesis 2a holds that out of the Milward & Provan network categories, U.S. Stabilization Networks will most closely resemble Emergent Problem Solving networks. These categories are summarized below:

### Table 1: Milward & Provan Network Typology Summary (repeated for reference)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Key Network Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Service Implementation</td>
<td>Fund a public service but do not directly implement its delivery. Within such networks, stability of membership and centralized collaboration can increase efficiency, and knowledge of production costs or resource allocation or rationing can be particularly important.</td>
<td>Network Governance and Organization Relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Diffusion</td>
<td>Focus on the sharing of information across organization boundaries. This has implications for knowledge sharing, but also implies that the focus is on shaping understanding of a problem rather than addressing it.</td>
<td>Coordination &amp; Strategy Knowledge Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Capacity Building</td>
<td>Enable the development of greater capacity among participants to implement activities and reach their goals. Key to these networks is an understanding or ‘mapping’ of the organizations involved. This forms the basis for strategic planning to better integrate the participating organizations, through matching organizational connections to the degree of collaboration desired.</td>
<td>Network Governance and Organization Coordination &amp; Strategy Knowledge Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Designed Problem Solving</td>
<td>Formed to help managers set policy for a critical or emerging problem; enduring, and exist prior to a problem. Predicated on well-established decision-making (or “command”) structures to mobilize and leverage network resources, and to promote institutional learning and evaluation.</td>
<td>Network Governance And Organization Knowledge Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergent Problem Solving</td>
<td>Formed to help managers set policy for a critical or emerging problem; arise in response to a need. Have elevated roles for expertise, which is required for effective rapid response; relationships, which enable rapid understanding of network partners; coordination, to enable an efficient and rapid response; and leadership, which enables reaction and the formation of cohesive response networks.</td>
<td>Coordination &amp; Strategy Relationships Supporters and Integrators (leadership)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Service Implementation.** For all of the cases, and almost by definition, service implementation plays a key role in Stabilization Networks. All of the cases were concerned with the funding and indirect (and sometimes even direct) provision of a multitude of services to a populace. Nearly every organization involved in the Stabilization Networks was part of providing some sort of service to the affected population. For example, donors in the South Sudan case have been described as primarily employing NGOs to deliver assistance to beneficiary communities (South Sudan Interview 19 October 2013), which closely resembles the Service Implementation network description. In addition to the myriad of project activities conducted, this is reflected in the universal need to understand local populace needs, as described in the Knowledge Management Feature section in Hypothesis 1. Though the efficiency of Stabilization Networks is beyond the scope of this research, there are a number of coordination failures or challenges that clearly resulted in inefficient or ineffective outcomes for local populaces receiving services. Moreover, knowledge of production costs, or, the lack of that knowledge, clearly created efficiency challenges for the Stabilization Networks. These are illustrated further in the hypotheses that follow.

**Information Diffusion.** Though information certainly played a role in the Stabilization Networks, it is clear that the focus of the networks, again almost by definition, was focused on resolving a problem rather than simply increasing understanding of one. Further, as evidenced in the Knowledge Management Network Features section, the sharing of information was not a universally shared mission area across Stabilization Organizations. In a number cases, there was even resistance to such information sharing. Thus, the Information Diffusion category does not seem to be particularly applicable to Stabilization
Networks.

**Community Capacity Building.** Across the cases, there was a general interest in increasing the capacity of members to both solve problems and provide services. A clear piece of evidence for this is the universal interest in mapping organizations and activities across the cases, as described in the Knowledge Management Features section above. However, while there was a desire to increase efficiency, in general the overall goals of the Stabilization Network remained focused on service provision or problem solving. Thus, as with the Information Diffusion Category, this does not seem to be the best fit for Stabilization Networks.

**Designed Problem Solving.** Given that a designed problem solving network is defined as existing prior to the problem, this categorization can almost be excluded for consideration with regard to Stabilization Networks. However, it is worth noting that Stabilization Networks are predicated on existing home country organizations and networks. For example, the Embassy network structures and organizations were replicated across the cases, and the U.S. military has a set organization that is applied when it deploys. Additionally, pre-existing structures were generally used by the United Nations and humanitarian sectors. Further, DC and other capital or headquarters organizations and networks already exist prior to a given Stabilization Effort. Thus, while Stabilization Efforts cannot be classified as designed themselves, many of their organizations or components have an existing organizational basis.
Emergent Problem Solving. All of the Stabilization Networks in the cases were established to address a particular need, that of addressing a violent conflict. These networks, though in many cases inheriting some pre-existing structures, did not exist beforehand. Moreover, even if existing organizational structures were adopted or imported to the Stabilization Efforts, they began interacting across organizational boundaries in new ways. Further, in a number of cases, the need for a rapid response is demonstrated across the cases. Thus Stabilization Networks do seem to generally fit the category of an Emergency Problem Solving network.

Hypothesis 2a Findings

Stabilization Networks do not fall neatly into a single Milward and Provan category. In the cases, collaborative governance in conflict areas does seem to be oriented primarily at problem solving. However, there are also significant service delivery or implementation objectives and community capacity building aspects. Thus they seem to be best characterized as a hybrid between Service Implementation Networks and Problem Solving Networks. However, they are clearly emergent in nature. As a result, Hypothesis 2a can be found to partially hold, as Stabilization Networks do seem to be most closely categorized as Emergent Problem Solving Networks, though they also have a clear Service Implementation network role as well.

From extrapolating the Designed and Emergent Problem Solving categories, key Network Features for collaboration success would be the Coordination & Strategy, Relationships and Integrators and Supporters Features, and particularly leadership support in the latter category. Further, as Network Governance and Organization Network Features
generally lend themselves to established or designed networks, these Network Features could be less important to Stabilization Networks success in collaboration. Thus in Hypothesis 3, these Network Features will be analyzed in conjunction with collaboration success.

However, the fact that these networks arise in response to specific problems and are not intended to be enduring solutions to service implementation, suggests a potential new category of collaborative governance network. Such a network would blend the emergent features of an emergent problem solving network with those of a service implementation network.

**Hypothesis 2b)** With regard to the Agranoff (2003) typologies of networks (see above), U.S Stabilization Networks will involve a range of collaboration activities, as described in the Agranoff typology (e.g. Informational, Developmental, Outreach (shared activity), and Action (shared decision-making) collaborations. These activities will depend on the nature of the relationship between the participating organizations (e.g. civilian and military, host nation government, NGOs’, international organizations, etc.) and the U.S. As the type of collaboration moves from information sharing to joint decision making, increases in coordination and strategy and in network governance and organization are required.

The Agranoff typology categorizes networks in terms of the highest order or most intensive degree of collaboration attained. The implication of this categorization is that greater resources are required to support such collaboration, particularly with regard to Network Features such as Network Governance and Organization and Coordination &
Strategy. The Agranoff categories are summarized below:

Table 10: Agranoff Typology Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Key Network Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Participants come together exclusively to exchange agency information and any actions taken are purely voluntary</td>
<td>Increasing needs for Network Governance and Organization and Coordination &amp; Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmental</td>
<td>Information exchange is combined with education and member services that increase capacity to implement solutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outreach</td>
<td>Participants share information, build capacities, sequence activities, pool resources and develop new implementation options</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action</td>
<td>Participants adopt collective courses of action</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To examine this hypothesis the highest level to which the U.S. Stabilization networks seemed to be regularly functioning at are determined with the various types of stabilization organizations. It should be noted that these are estimated averages of functionality – in all cases numerous failures that did not meet these marks, or successes that exceed them can be found. However, this assessment is intended to determine what the most common level of collaboration in the Agranoff typology was in each case.
Table 11: Agranoff Typology Collaboration Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Informational</th>
<th>Developmental</th>
<th>Outreach</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq RoL</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>U.S./Other Donor States/United Nations/NGOs</td>
<td>U.S. Civ-Mil (thwarted Action)</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.-Host Nation (qualified)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan RoL</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>U.S.-Civ-Mil (thwarted Outreach or Action)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.-Host Nation (thwarted Outreach)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>U.S./Donors/United Nations/NGOs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq Provincial</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>U.S.-Host Nation (thwarted Outreach)</td>
<td></td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Implementing Partners/NGOs</td>
<td>U.S. Civ-Mil (thwarted Action)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.-Host Nation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mindanao</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>U.S. – Other Donor States/United Nations/Host Nation</td>
<td>U.S. Civ-Mil (military desired Action)</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. Military-Host Nation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Generally Developmental across organizations (interest in Outreach seen)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Informational Networks.** Across the cases solely informational level networks were rarely seen. The only identified instance of one was seen in the Afghanistan Provincial case, between the U.S. organizations (both military and civilian) and NGOs. NGOs, particularly humanitarian NGOs, had contentious relationships with the coalition civilian and military organizations, particularly the PRTs. These issues included the preservation of the ‘humanitarian space’ that NGOs and international organizations require to operate, the blurring of identities from overlapping roles between military and humanitarian actors, the use of military personnel to provide assistance, and information sharing and coordination (Dziedzic and Seidl, 2005). The NGO and PRT/DST relationship is illustrated in a later
Afghanistan Provincial case period example from a Helmand DST. With the DST, NGOs kept their distance, though at same time they were polite. DST staff would meet them and be introduced, at local government center for example. However, engagement was generally limited to a very quick introduction and small talk. DST staff saw them, knew of them in the area, and indirectly would influence them through the Afghan officials, but never directly (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 12 May 14). Thus the level of collaboration between the U.S. and NGOs could at most be characterized as an informational network, and an indirect one at that, as collaboration was typically limited to passing information through intermediaries such as the UN or to very low visibility activities.

**Developmental Networks.** Developmental Networks were the most commonly observed level of network across the cases. This was consistently the case between the U.S. and other donor states, international and local NGOs, international organizations, NATO, and the United Nations organizations, and between those organizations collectively. Though not always smoothly functioning, information sharing occurred, as did capacity development between organizations, with sharing best practices, pooling of some resources and sometimes training or combined workshop events. Organizations also frequently coordinated to avoid duplication and to more efficiently allocate resources\(^5\) (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013). Often, the United Nations or particular donor states stood out as proponents of information sharing and capacity building collaboration (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2010). Individual senior leaders, international

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\(^5\) This was attributed to the relatively high demand for services relative to resources that it wouldn’t make sense for one donor to take a single sector.
NGOs and the humanitarian cluster system also promoted collaboration, particularly in the Mindanao and South Sudan cases (South Sudan Interview 19 October 2013; United Nations, 2014; U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2013, May).

Though common, even this level of collaboration was not universal, and exceptions did occur. In general, there was frequent information sharing, though level varied widely from project to project (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013). For example, there could still be funding turf battles. These divisions could lead to non-collaborative actions, or could dissuade donor states or the UN from sharing information. In many cases, there could be a “crowded space,” with a number of smaller organizations going after the same pools of funding. Or there could be ego clashes that could lead to actions such as purposely leaving other organizations off of invitations, or attempting to take undue credit for activities (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013).

In other cases blockages to collaboration could occur due to the inability to collaborate rather than a lack of desire to do so. This situation occurred early in the Iraq RoL case when the military initially did not track RoL activities in a way that facilitated information sharing with partners (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 24 Dec 13). Collaboration with local organizations could suffer from mistrust, with perceptions that groups may be working for their own gains or for their own political motivations (Schomerus and Allen, 2010). This could lead to avoidance of collaboration, or increased costs of verification or information gathering to obtain ‘objective’ information for partners.

The variability in collaboration can be seen in an example from the Anbar province in Iraq. Even within Anbar, U.S. military and civilian provincial organization’s views on implementing partners were mixed, and the relationships varied from location to location.
and could change over time. Some were seen positively, while others were viewed as being “abysmal” (United States Institute of Peace, 2008, September 24). This variability generally extended to collaboration with Iraqi partners as well.

The U.S. civilian and military collaboration in the Afghanistan RoL case was the sole instance of civ-mil collaboration only reaching a Developmental level. Though information could generally be exchanged, territoriality over resource and programming decisions could be extended to information control, as means of preventing outside interference. Other issues included funding, inconsistent will to collaborate, and decision making and authority issues. For example, at the Embassy in Kabul, according to individuals both in and out of the U.S. government, circa late 2005 internal U.S. coordination meetings on RoL were best characterized as shouting matches between representatives of different agencies (Thruelsen, 2010). Most strategic and tactical level cooperation was characterized as seeming to build on personal relations more than official relationships. Additionally, there was a general U.S. civilian and military clash over who was in charge or who could do what in the area of RoL. Often, a negative tone was described between U.S. civilian and military leadership (United Nations Development Programme Afghanistan, 2010). This apparently produced a chilling effect on collaboration between two organizations with similar mission and charter to coordinate RoL activities in Afghanistan (Thruelsen). These behaviors served to thwart high

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51 An example of setting a negative tone for cooperation at the senior most level was described in story of a meeting between the Commander of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan and the new U.S. Ambassador. Reportedly, in what was described as a power play, the Ambassador made the Commander wait for 20 minutes while the Ambassador completed a trivial task such as reading email. While this story cannot be verified, the fact that it is told and re-told is indicative of an air of conflict and division between two senior leaders that subordinate staff could not help but pick up on. In another example, the absence of an acting Deputy Chief of Mission’s presence at RoL meetings for a stretch of three months was seen as a tacit reduction in support for the Coordinator at the time. In all likelihood this perception was unintentional, but nonetheless it was a type of signal that staff members and lower levels of leadership picked up on (Afghanistan RoL Interview Nov 2013).
levels of collaboration at the Outreach or Action level, leaving the U.S. military and civilian collaboration at the Developmental level, at best.

Efforts to reach consistent Outreach levels of collaboration were frustrated (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 24 Dec 13) among other donor states, the UN, international organizations, NGOs, and host nation partners. This is evident in that, though donors and implementers shared similar broad goals, the implementation and means to address them can vary and were generally implemented individually. Further, despite planning efforts intended to promote collaboration, such as the South Sudan Development Plan, the issues of prioritization and sequencing were not resolved. In particular, the desire for this level of collaboration with host nation governments seemed common, though rarely achieved. Periodic high levels of collaboration did occur. One example was a Mindanao case of a strong partnership between USAID and AusAID (Australian Aid) on education programs, in which cooperation improved mutual outcomes, improved consistency, and avoided confusion (Australian Aid, Office of Development Effectiveness, 2012). However, this level of collaboration seemed to be ad hoc and broader or more systematic efforts for collaboration did not meet with success.

Potential proponents of higher levels of collaboration did not produce them consistently, through lack of either will or ability. For example, in the Afghanistan RoL case, the United Nations and designated ‘lead nations’ with mandates in the RoL area either were not resourced to enable greater collaboration or did not take an active role in it (United States Institute of Peace, 2004). This led to a number of challenges, for example, a lack of problem ownership and planning was seen as contributing directly to endemic problems in the Afghan courts (Hagerott, Umberg, and Jackson, 2010). Competing priorities among
organizations could frustrate Outreach level collaboration, particularly between host nation governments and donors. For example, in the South Sudan case a donor priority such as constitutional process may not be seen by the South Sudanese government as being as important as health or sanitation (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013). Further, funding differences and being beholden to differing donors with individual priorities and requirements were generally insurmountable when attempting this level of collaboration. As a result, collaboration at an Outreach network or shared activity level or higher remained ad hoc or limited to within select, often related groups of organizations, such as multi-donor funded organizations (i.e. Multi-Donor Trust Fund-South Sudan or European Union) and UN agencies or other international organizations52 (The World Bank, 2913, January).

One example of this can be found in the Helmand case, where by force of personality, a battalion commander was able to work closely with the U.S. and British civilians in the area. Within a month of arriving, the Helmand PRT sent a British stabilization advisor to the district from another part of the province. The battalion was also assigned a USAID representative. Both civilians, in addition to a civil affairs reservist, worked closely with the battalion commander and his Marines (Meyerle, Katt, and Gavrilis, 2010). However, this level of collaboration was seen as exceptional, and was not necessarily sustainable or replicated across the country.

**Outreach Networks.** Collaboration between U.S. civilian and military organizations, with the aforementioned exception of the Afghanistan RoL case, was generally at an

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52 In these cases, donors were often a part of each project’s decision-making and review, and even in these organizations, successful collaboration was not a given.
Outreach level by the end of the cases, even if they did not initially begin there. With some notable exceptions, the will to collaborate to a degree was present (Dempsey, 2009). Information was shared and common approaches to problems were identified, particularly through forums such as the Mindanao Working Group at the U.S. Embassy. The Mindanao Working Group also fostered sharing of travel and information gathering resources among participants (Mindanao Interview 26 May 2014). These could result in collaborative plans or program activities (Dorman, 2007; Maxwell, 2011). In the Iraq and Afghanistan cases, the prevalence of flexible funding sources seemed to enable higher levels of collaboration when the will to do so was present.

Frequently, senior leader support for collaboration was seen as sending an important signal to leaders down their respective hierarchies (Ayres and Barnes, 2011; U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2013, February; Yodsampa, April 2011). When civilian and military tensions existed, it was exacerbated by whatever relationship tensions between the civilians and military did or did not exist at the highest level (Dorman, 2007). In cases of strong collaboration, successes and credit were shared, and member's contributions were valued and respected. This is illustrated in a Helmand DST example, where there was little civ-mil competition and a culture of mutual support. The U.S. civilian and military relationship in Mindanao was also seen as particularly robust, having been maintained over years and in some instances held as model of cooperation (Maxwell, 2011).

However, a wide variation in collaboration existed in the Iraq and Afghan cases, particularly in the Provincial cases and in the early period of the cases. In cases with poor

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33 However, the Mindanao Working Group was also described as focusing on identifying and reporting on activities and travel arrangements, but not actually on how members can collaborate and implement activities together (Mindanao Interview 1 Feb 2014).
civilian and military coordination, meaningful coordination remained limited to information exchanges and briefings, rather than civilian inclusion into the decision making process. A common barrier to collaboration was insufficient internal organizational knowledge, particularly early in the cases. For example, in an Afghanistan Provincial example, there would be cases of military CERP funds being used to build a school very near a national USAID-funded school, because the USAID PRT representative didn’t know about the latter (USAID, 2006). Eventually, this led to direction to share more information in order to mitigate this issue (Yodsampa, 2011). Collaboration in practice could also be ‘personality’ dependent. Conflicts could on occasions be severe; at times, the culture clash between Iraqis and the coalition often seemed easier to deal with than the culture clash between the U.S. civilians and military.

These cases such very difficult relationships were described as “not the norm,” but they did exist (Iraq Provincial Interview 5 Mar 14). Overtime these issues were generally mitigated, if not completely resolved as mutual understanding increased and other initiatives were implemented, such as increased planning (Yodsampa, 2011). Even when initial contentious relationships existed, in many cases they were overcome and cooperative work began to be established as working relationships were built (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 23 Jan 14). Or, they could be ‘reset’ over time as military units and civilian leader tours rotated.

An example of an area of collaboration challenges was funding. The military was empowered to allocate funds through CERP, but there was not a firm requirement to coordinate with their civilian counterparts. The variety in collaboration between the U.S. civilians and military can be illustrated in the means and degree that Iraq CERP funds were
coordinated. The following excerpts were examples of different levels of PRT and military working relationships (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2013, January, p. 10):

- In Diyala province, the military gave responsibility for identifying and implementing projects to the PRT but maintained control of payment authorization. The PRT had to concur with the projects before the military would fund them.

- In Salah al-Din province, the PRT occasionally helped identify needs within the province, mainly in a few specific areas -- such as agriculture and rule of law -- but “most projects were implemented and monitored by the [military] with minimal PRT involvement.” The PRT team leader also stated that the military most often requested support in arranging meetings with local officials, as the PRTs were the primary U.S. contacts with local civic leaders, provincial council members, and prominent sheiks.

- In Anbar province, an Essential Services Cell was responsible for executing CERP projects from project identification through completion. Projects were identified in partnership with local subject matter experts and Iraq’s provincial government. The military voluntarily sought USAID concurrence on all CERP projects greater than $50,000. Moreover, the Anbar PRT, U.S. military, and USAID had signed a Unified Common Plan to acknowledge their agreement and understanding of shared mission goals. In other provinces, efforts to coordinate projects with USAID had not been as advanced.

- In Basrah province, the PRT responded that they were “not a part of any formalized process or committee on coordination.”
Similarly, attempts to address CERP coordination issues Afghanistan are illustrative. When civilian representatives did provide advice to the military at the PRTs they often were perceived of as slowing down the process (Yodsampa, 2011). To establish greater coordination, in spring 2005 the U.S. military leadership temporarily withdrew the authority of PRT commanders to allocate CERP funds when coordinating them with U.S. civilians. This requirement, however, was withdrawn after several months, with military leadership satisfied that expectation for military coordination with civilians had been firmly established. However, the coordination did not turn out to be sustainable without it, and over time it diminished (USAID, 2006). To re-address this issue, the civilian and military leadership in 2007 had to re-establish the requirement. Though the military initially complained that this slowed down operations, it came to appreciate the value of the process (Yodsampa, 2011).

In about half of the cases, the Iraq RoL, Afghanistan Provincial, and Mindanao cases, the collaborative relationship between the U.S. and the host national government could be characterized as being at an Outreach level. In the Iraq RoL case, the U.S. RoL relationship can be seen as evolving toward a stronger collaboration with the Iraq government. Early on, the U.S. was criticized for importing U.S. RoL “blueprints” and for disregarding the Iraqi environment and RoL organizations (Banks, 2010). Later in the Embassy period, collaboration improved and in general U.S. staff had positive working relationships with Iraqi counterparts. Issues remained, however, in information sharing with the Iraqi government, causing duplication and waste in terms of resources and also significant confusion on the Iraqi side (Banks). Due to these issues, the U.S. and Iraqi level of collaboration could be classified as an (qualified) Outreach network.

Despite national level complaints, in the Afghanistan Provincial case sub-national
level coordination between the U.S. and local Afghan government organizations was seen as generally good, predominately conducted through meetings and relationship development, with more formal agreements being established as needed or for particular projects. In Mindanao, the U.S. military and host national security forces generally collaborated on shared stabilization activities (Beaudette, 2012), though U.S. civilian effort and the GoP seemed to be collaborating at a Developmental network level.

**Action Networks.** In many of the cases, there was a clear desire for an Action network level of collaboration between the U.S. civilians and military (particularly by the latter). However, where U.S. civilian and military collaboration seemed to break down was at the highest level of activity of shared decision making, particularly regarding those decisions that involved directing resources. Factors such as lack of civilian access to responsive funding sources, lack of civilian personnel and capacity, and accountability and incentive systems that worked against coordination consistently constrained Action level collaboration. This was even the case in areas in which collaborative strategies, such as co-location, were practiced to reduce barriers to in-person interaction (Yodsampa, 2011). Further, though shared activities were common, a firm limit to the desire to collaborate was seen where such collaboration would put an organization’s own mission at risk. It was also not clear if U.S. civilian organizations had the discretion necessary from Washington, DC headquarters to make these kinds of decisions. As a result, predominately, U.S. civilian and military collaboration remained at an Outreach network level.

The dynamic of civilian inability to direct resources was seen in the Afghanistan Provincial case. Although in Afghanistan, the main source of civilian funding at the
provincial level and below was from USAID, the vast majority of USAID spending decisions were made in Kabul. Any changes to USAID contracts, which typically spanned multiple years, could require time consuming contract modifications with implementing partners, or even notifications to Congress. Once the work plan was established, implementing partners were seldom responsive to the individual provincial needs outside the established plan (Fritsch, 2012). As a result, when opportunities to coordinate national projects with the military emerged, USAID officers were unable to move quickly enough to do so.

Collaboration was also constrained by the budgetary funding cycles, including the time delay in obtaining funding through varying funding mechanisms. This limited the ability of the U.S.-led PRTs to align their programs to support the broader national stabilization and reconstruction strategy (USAID, 2006). The result was a go-it-alone attitude, with the military increasingly relying on CERP funds to fund their own, rather than coordinated, initiatives. The consequence was ongoing coordination failures, including negative interactive effects and wasteful duplication (Yodsampa, 2011).

An example of a frustrated attempt to establish an Action level network can be seen in the case of the Deputies Committee, under the CDROLLE. The intent of the Deputies Committee was to vet programs, share information on activities, and function as a coordinating body, with the committee chair having the final say on spending (Afghanistan RoL Interview Nov 2013). Anyone who makes budgeting decisions was to have brought them to Deputies Committee before making decisions. However, this level of coordination

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54 This excerpt summarizes the dilemma this presented for U.S. PRT staff in accessing USAID funding: “We’d have a dialogue, led by a governor, regarding prioritizing their needs. For example, they would say, ‘We need schools, so kids won’t go to madrasas in Pakistan.’ …When we’d go to USAID, they’d say, ‘That’s not part of the national strategy for Afghanistan. We’ll do that in two years.’ They were all about central government capacity. We’d say, ‘We’re bleeding here. We need a school here now, not in two years.’ So, we’d do it with CERP money…It was very frustrating” (Yodsampa, 2011, pp. 205-206).
was never achieved as many participants tried to side step it. Moreover, often U.S. civilian agency agendas and funding were controlled largely from Washington rather than Kabul, and as result civilian agencies often remained beholden to their respective funding sources (Hagerott, Umberg, and Jackson, 2010).

The CDROLLE did not have any legal authority to force compliance from participating organizations (Afghanistan RoL Interview Nov 2013). As a result, it was an informational and consultative body, despite the intention for it to be a decision making one. Despite falling short of setting joint priorities, the CDROLLE and Deputies Committee did foster lower levels of collaboration. In at least once case, this structure helped identify duplication of RoL activities between INL and USAID, which was then addressed (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2014, January).

Hypothesis 2b Findings

In general, the level of collaboration across the cases seemed to be best characterized as being at the Developmental or Outreach network level. However, the degree of collaboration under the Agranoff typology was more tightly clustered at these levels than the Hypothesis predicted. Thus, Hypothesis 2b can be held to be partially true.

In the Iraq and Afghanistan cases, there was a mismatch of planning, resource direction, and implementation between U.S. civilians and the military. This dichotomy was particularly evident in the Provincial cases, where U.S. military organizations habitually operated in the face of U.S. civilian organizations that had to rebuild a capacity to do so. This led to situations where government representatives to sub-national teams could not
formally affect the resourcing decisions of their own agency’s implementing partners, since the resource decision authority resided at the Embassy or Washington, DC level.

In reviewing the challenges in achieving Action network levels of collaboration, funding sources proved to be a barrier for collaboration, even when the motives (trust, shared goals, leadership intent) were present (see Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh, 2011). Organizations across the spectrum were primarily bound by the dictates of their funding sources. In the cases of more successful U.S. civilian and military collaboration, it was largely the case that the organization with the more flexible funding source, the U.S. military and its CERP (Commander’s Emergency Response Program) decided to support U.S. civilian objectives and began to apply resources for them. In many cases, organizations on the ground did not have the authority to align funds to other priorities. This was particularly true for the volatile Stabilization Network environment, where systemic shocks necessitate rapid reprioritization. Moreover, the relative success of the stabilization effort in Mindanao suggests that Action network level collaboration, or full integration, as seemingly desired or assumed by the military was not necessary. Complementary, Outreach levels of collaboration, though not necessarily fully integrated Action level of collaboration may be sufficient.

Thus it can be seen that formal plans and planning were of limited utility for the Action Network/shared decision-making level of collaboration when they cannot direct or affect resources. This finding is in contrast to many U.S. efforts to promote high levels of collaboration through increased planning. This is not to say that planning efforts were not useful for fostering collaboration. These efforts did seem to produce an effect, and in many cases an Outreach network level of collaboration was achieved, with organizations sharing
information, building capacities, sequencing activities, pooling resources and developing implementation options. However, planning without direction over resources was insufficient to achieve the highest levels of collaboration. The failures of the plans to produce these results appeared to have resulted in frustration with them and the collaboration process. Further, there is at least some evidence that planning in general is of limited utility, in that comprehensive rational planning is less useful in preventing error in complex environments in which stabilization networks function (Bardach, 1998). More successful collaboration and partnering could involve correct mirroring or alignment of planning, resource direction, and implementation linkages between U.S. civilians and military.

**Hypothesis 3**] Those Stabilization Networks that emphasize the Collaborative Network features appropriate to their typology classification (as per the Milward & Provan and Agranoff typologies) will show more signs of successful collaboration. This is in terms of the network, organization, or agency levels of evaluation from the collaborative governance theory discussion above.

In this hypothesis, the relationship between collaboration success and alignment with the Network Features predicted in the Milward & Provan and Agranoff typologies is examined. The descriptions of the levels of success are summarized from the collaborative governance theory chapter.
Table 12: Collaboration Success Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Success</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organization or Agency</td>
<td>This describes the benefits to the organization for participating in the network, potentially including greater legitimacy, improved client outcomes, or access to resources. It can also include expanded access to information and expertise, sharing risk and innovation investments, managing uncertainty, enhancing flexibility, and providing access to others’ adaptive efficiencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network</td>
<td>This describes improving efficiency of resources among members or allowing for a greater range of services. It can also include the strength of relationships between network participants, their respective commitment to network goals, and the sophistication of network governance mechanisms, in terms of facilitating collaboration that would not otherwise have a chance to occur (ranging from information sharing to decision making, depending on the means of collaboration for the network in question), addressing cross-organizational problems, increasing knowledge and resource sharing across organizations, and identifying shared solutions to joint problems.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After the description of network success, the success shown in the cases is compared with the features that are most appropriate to their classification in the Milward Provan and Agranoff typologies. From the Milward and Provan typology, in hypothesis 2a, the most important Network Features for success for Emergent Problem Solving networks are predicted to be Coordination & Strategy, Relationships and Integrators, and Supporters Features, and particularly leadership support in the latter category. Under the Agranoff Model, from hypothesis 2b, the most important Network Features are predicted as being Network Governance and Organization and Coordination & Strategy.

55 Note that this category examines benefits to an organization or agency themselves from collaboration. This is opposite to examining how successful an agency or organization is in achieving its mission, which is beyond the scope of this research. However, in some cases, the distinction can be subtle.
Table 13: Organizational or Agency Level of Success Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Success</th>
<th>Iraq RoL</th>
<th>Afghan RoL</th>
<th>Iraq Provincial</th>
<th>Afghan Provincial</th>
<th>Mindanao</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organizational or Agency Level</td>
<td>U.S. civ-mil successes (3)</td>
<td>U.S. host nation mixed success (2)</td>
<td>U.S. civ-mil intermittent success (1)</td>
<td>U.S. civ-mil and mixed success (2)</td>
<td>U.S. civ-mil successes (3)</td>
<td>limited collaborative success beyond resource sharing (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. host nation mixed success (2)</td>
<td>U.S.-host nation mixed success (2)</td>
<td>U.S.-host nation limited success, and instances of UN and other donor state-host nation success (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Relative Ranking: High, Low, Medium, Low, Very High, Very Low

Iraq Rule of Law (RoL) Organizational or Agency Level Success. Between U.S. civilian and military organizations, expanding resource access was common, such as cases of military CERP (Commander’s Emergency Response Program) funds being used for RoL activities. One example of collaborative U.S. civilian and military funding was the Operation Hammurabi project, which trained Iraqi justice officials in basic administrative skills and provided equipment and facilities necessary to restore justice services in the Baghdad area (Dempsey, 2009). However, combined project activity seemed to be primarily between, if not limited to, U.S. civilian and military organizations and partnerships with Iraqi organizations. U.S. Civilian and United Nations participation also enhanced legitimacy among Iraq actors.

Further, by the end of Operation Iraq Freedom, though RoL coordination increased, there were still some shortfalls. For example, by the time of withdrawal and transition, there were a number of projects that the Iraqi government, particularly the central government ministries, did not have sufficient awareness of. Coalition construction of prisons was cited...
as an example of this (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 27 Apr 14). An example of such failed project coordination was the Nasiriyah Correctional Facility, which Iraqi partners found the independently conceived project to be wildly unsustainable. The project was then redesigned in a scaled down, more sustainable manner, but with considerable delay (Hallman, 2008). The lack of consultation and dialogue also meant that Coalition projects ignored Iraqi cultural and social values. This is seen in the $65 million Baghdad Police College project, which built a basic police training facility on the site of the formerly regionally prestigious Iraqi Police Academy that engendered great pride. Even after promising to reintroduce elite training (after the basic training), project managers were seen as ignoring the Iraqi sense of the Academy as an elite institution (Banks, 2010). The initial coordination missteps described above and such continuing engagement challenges were even seen as impacting the final withdrawal agreement with Iraq.

**Afghanistan Rule of Law Organizational or Agency Level Success.** In the Afghanistan RoL case there were at least periodic successes; when cooperation worked it was described as a great asset to success and could significantly increase organization capabilities (Afghanistan RoL Interview Jan 2014). One example was Italian produced brochures and pamphlets on RoL issues, women’s rights under Afghan law for example, being reproduced by USAID and shared with other U.S. civilian and government organizations (Afghanistan RoL Interview Jan 2014). In another example in Basra, the United Kingdom, U.S., and Danish judicial advisory staff worked closely together, and reported that they had greater impact operating jointly than individually (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2005). One particular case of improved RoL outcomes from collaboration was
increasing Afghan public support for trials in the formal justice system in Kunar province (The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, 2011). This resulted from the placement of a State Department Rule of Law Coordinator at the Kunar PRT, whose engagement with local Afghan partners resulted in three corruption and murder trials that attracted widespread public and even political leader interest and engendered support.

However, there were also continuing challenges in this area. One example was U.S. military coordination on police development. While the internal chain of command was straightforward, in 2010 relations with the other actors, including the Afghan Ministry of Interior and European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan, were described as unstructured and in some cases non-existent. Most strategic and tactical level liaison seemed to build on personal relations more than official connections. With regard to coordination challenges, in 2010 the Police Commissioner stated, “[o]ne needs to be willing to be coordinated if coordination is to work”. This suggests that structures for coordinating international police-building efforts were ineffective (Thruelsen, 2010, p. 86). Though organizations’ coordination on RoL issues was seen as having greatly improved over time, observers indicated that coordination across a sector as broad and multi-faceted as RoL required ongoing upkeep and faced ongoing challenges (Wyler and Katzman, 2010).

**Iraq Provincial Organizational or Agency Level Success.** Examples of the U.S. military and civilian PRTs working at cross-purposes were numerous, often resulting in miscommunication and inefficiency, and host nation authorities were adept at playing both sides (Barber and Parker, 2008). Even with successful U.S. civilian and military collaboration, Iraqi reconstruction was seen as being hampered by the failures of the U.S. and of local
governments to get central government buy-in on their infrastructure and essential service projects. Anecdotes abounded of how the U.S. military or the PRT decided to build, for example, a school or a clinic that remained empty because the ministries of Education and Health did not fund staff and maintenance. The military was noted for often favoring projects such as roads, schools, and district centers even if these projects were not sustainable or desired by the local population, because such projects were very visible, measurable in terms of resources, and quick (Carreau, 2010). In some of the more egregious instances, the military implemented projects that the Iraqis had already budgeted for and even already constructed. While many on the U.S. side were inclined to blame the Iraqi central government for not fulfilling its responsibilities in cases of project failure, it was easy to understand the Iraqi view that the U.S. had placed an enormous financial burden on the Iraqi government without seeking its input.

When functioning properly, the PRTs led efforts to tie U.S. non-combat, or “non-kinetic” efforts to local governing institutions to ensure that stabilization efforts were conducive, to the extent possible, with these institutions’ own plans for the province. PRTs and military units (most often civil affairs staff), and sometimes other partners would work with local Iraqi NGOs on projects. For example, there was a joint ePRT and military brigade program to identify and send local Iraqi children for advanced medical treatment outside of Iraq, conducted with the assistance of a local Iraqi NGO (United States Institute of Peace, 2008, September 24). An example of a strong PRT-military partnership was the Ninewa (province) PRT, circa 2010, where the military brigade commander made it a practice to engage Iraqi provincial leadership with the PRT Team Leader present in order to present one American face to the Iraqis. During times of more intense military action, or
“counterinsurgency mode,” however, PRTs tended to play a supporting and advisory role for the military. Nonetheless, in counterinsurgency environments, the military had the unambiguous lead, and was free to ignores PRT advice if, in their judgment, security concerns trumped them. As a result, the PRTs came to play a productive role in rationalizing the reconstruction process while facilitating greater Iraqi participation and leadership (Barber and Parker, 2008).

**Example of Evolution: Anbar Province**

Early on, circa 2007, the Anbar PRT was seen as being often at loggerheads with the Marine Anbar headquarters, where there was disagreement over priorities and courses of action. PRT and military collaboration mainly consisted of the PRT contacting the brigade when they would need some sort of support (United States Institute of Peace, 2008, September 24) and there were difficulties for the PRT in obtaining support with transportation and other assets, limiting the PRT’s ability to conduct activities. The perception was that this was because it was thought that such support would help the PRT with their “competition” vis-à-vis the ePRTs (United States Institute of Peace, 2008, October 10). During this time the military favored the ePRTs, which were more closely integrated into the military mission (United States Institute of Peace, 2008, September 24).

The PRT and Marine relationship began to thaw in early 2008, with a change in command. As civilian programs and plans were developed the Marines began to cede the lead to them and conduct operations under that design (Iraq Provincial Interview 5 Mar 14). The success of U.S. efforts in the province at the time were viewed as shared between U.S. civilian, military, and, most importantly, local Iraqi partners. U.S. civilians and military
partners were described as facilitating the Iraqi improvements, through providing know-how and through coaching. In Anbar, the Marines viewed other organizations as helping them to be successful during the time they were operating. Differing capabilities of organizations were seen as complimentary across the board, weather non-Marine military or civilian (United States Institute of Peace, 2008, December 9).

**Afghanistan Provincial Organizational or Agency Level Success.** One benefit of successful U.S. military and civilian collaboration was the enabling of civilian projects though security and logistics support. In the Helmand case, one example of such collaboration was the reconstruction of the Kajaki Dam, where insurgent activity made it difficult for civilians to work in the area. The military provided the security perimeter that enabled civilian contractors to move forward and also transported supplies and parts to the construction site (Yodsampa, 2011). In another case, following publication of an article accusing U.S. soldiers of flushing Korans down a toilet in May 2005, riots erupted in Jalalabad. USAID implementing partners (contractors) provided reports to the USAID representative, which in turn were shared with military colleagues and passed to the appropriate Afghan authorities. The ability to organize and share information quickly was a key factor in bringing the situation under control (Yodsampa). In a further example a United Kingdom team of Royal Engineers worked through the DST to gain Marine Corps support for transportation to conduct technical surveys along the road, which was a requirement of the contract.

When U.S. civilians and military engaged in joint analysis and/or planning, it was directly associated with the achievement of coordinated results. It also fostered learning,
especially in terms of mutual understanding (Yodsampa, 2011). Similarly, at the brigade level when the military and their civilian advisors engaged in regular joint analysis and planning, this was cited as a key factor contributing to coordinated results. Where this was not the case, project implementation tended to be ad hoc and driven by response to higher headquarters versus local dynamics (USAID, 2006).

Further, a reoccurring criticism was the lack of local Afghan leader and community coordination by the military and PRTs, particularly early on (Katzman, 2014, January). An example was the case of a school that had been built without appropriate local coordination and instead was used as a goat barn, which was something the local community needed more than a school (Yodsampa, 2011). Lack of community participation in projects could also foster failure for both the sustainability of the project and for local community willingness to contribute to parallel or follow-on NGO projects (USAID, 2006). The U.S. military was also seen as tending to favor one faction as a collaborating partner, fostering flawed decision-making, and making the preferred local partner much more powerful than could be considered healthy for the region (Rietjens, Soeters, and Fenema, 2013). Many of these issues were addressed as steps were taken to coordinate with civilians and NGOs due to those organization’s greater expertise in and disposition toward local coordination or in many cases those coordination efforts were also extended to include local Afghans.

In successful cases of collaboration, local Afghan government partners could lead to new solutions for issues. For example, in once case collaboration with local leadership led to the development of a reintegration campaign for villagers who had low levels of insurgency involvement (Meyerle, et al., 2010). Local Afghan government partners could also gain better understanding of national level policies and funding in their areas, which was often lost at
the ground level (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 12 May 14). Some PRTs also arranged for governors to travel to Kabul to meet with embassy and government officials and donor agencies such as the World Bank. The meetings helped the governors better understand the often-complex world of international assistance, while giving donors insights from the field (Kemp, 2011, January/February).

**Mindanao Organizational/Agency Level Success.** Relationships with U.S. civilian and military organizations were described as effective, and as ensuring the integration and synchronization of activities (Lambert et al., 2013; Maxwell, 2012). One example of this cooperation was JSOTF-P transportation of educational materials and construction supplies to needy areas, and mobilizing partners in the Philippine military to build schools in areas inaccessible to USAID’s implementing partners (USAID, n.d.b). Another example of U.S. civilian and military cooperation was the Embassy Public Affairs Section support. In a specific case, the section provided assistance in managing the high-profile media coverage of an alleged rape of a Filipino woman by a U.S. marine in November 2005. The Public Affairs section also focused media attention on U.S. military community relations and medical assistance activities, contributing to a gradual diffusion of negative reporting (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2007).

With regard to other donor states, the European Commission and European Union Member States development activities complemented each other thematically, even though they were not usually designed in collaboration (European Union, 2002). In another other donor state example, there were also examples of AusAID initiatives improving the monitoring and evaluation systems of government agencies and joint donor programs
Further still, the collaborative approach exhibited by organizations such as the Bangsamoro Development Agency and Mindanao Trust Fund-Reconstruction and Development Program seemed to have been well received by their constituents and resulted in generally successful projects (The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2014).

The collaboration of the U.S. military with the Philippines seems to have increased the ability of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to address violence in Mindanao. The AFP moved from indiscriminate operations to giving significant consideration to the general population, including civilian casualties, property damage, human rights, civil-military operations, and the welfare of displaced persons. One member of the U.S. Embassy team described this transformation, stating, “They were seen as the savior of the people—it was a watershed moment for them” (Lambert et al., 2013, p. 123). The population viewed these units favorably since they demonstrate the government’s will to improve the lives of its citizens, and the resulting operations have aided the effectiveness of counterterrorism operations. This had the value of building trust among the people for Philippine military forces and providing Philippine military and intelligence access to an Abu Sayyaf influenced area (Maxwell, 2011). The change in mindset, while driven by Philippine leadership from above, was likely enabled in part by U.S. military efforts to provide tools that helped the AFP achieve those changes (Lambert et al.).

South Sudan Organizational/Agency Level Success. Though there was substantial risk sharing in the area of security, there were relatively few cases of organizational or agency level successes seen in program or project related areas. One
example, however, was the case of UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which worked closely with the United Nations Mission in South Sudan to enable it to implement the Protection of Civilians and the humanitarian support elements of its mandate (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2011). However, rather than directly improving the results of organizational efforts, in general collaboration across organizations also produced greater client results through enabling more flexible responses and more efficient uses of resources.

An example of a collaboration failure was seen in the shutdown of the South Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF-SS). Collaboration issues resulted in uneven progress on delivering the outputs sought and a tendency to deflect the resulting criticism onto others, including the World Bank as the immediate administrator of MDTF-SS (The World Bank, 2013, January). Though the trust fund undertook measures to improve collaboration, among other steps, to improve results, these efforts proved to be insufficient. In May 2013, the MDTF-SS was officially closed, though bridging grants and credits were extended56 (The World Bank, 2013, May) to ease transition or continue projects.

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56 These entailed $75 million in grants from donors administered by the World Bank supported work on three ongoing projects and an International Development Association (an arm of the World Bank) credit of $131 million to support World Bank strategic development goals.
Network Level of Success

Table 14: Network Level of Success Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network Level</th>
<th>Iraq RoL</th>
<th>Afghan RoL</th>
<th>Iraq Provincial</th>
<th>Afghan Provincial</th>
<th>Mindanao</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Limited success with diminishing but not eliminated disharmony (2) Benefits seen to access (2)</td>
<td>Mixed results – successes and setbacks (1) Limited benefits to network knowledge (2)</td>
<td>Limited success in aligning goals and realizing efficiencies (2) Benefits to expanding access, knowledge development, and improving host national governance (3)</td>
<td>Limited success (2) Benefits to expanding knowledge, and limited increases to resources (3)</td>
<td>General success (3) Benefits to the ability to change the environment (3)</td>
<td>Mixed results – collaboration challenges with the government and limited information sharing (2) Benefits seen to access (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Iraq RoL Network Level Success.** Collaboration did lead to network level success in terms of at least some expansion of the ability to work with more Iraq partners. In some cases, the civilian led PRTs RoL elements were able to work closely with otherwise disconnected Iraqi elements, or were more positively received than military staff by Iraqi partners. This was the case with the judges in Anbar circa 2008 (United States Institute of Peace, 2008, October 10). Further, international donors generally favorably regarded Embassy efforts at coordinating the international community. Coordination challenges had negative impacts for the Iraq RoL stabilization efforts. In an early example (pre 2006), U.S. support for Government of Iraq anticorruption efforts were seen as being weakened by poor coordination among the U.S. government entities involved (Special Inspector General
for Iraq Reconstruction, 2012, January). Though improvements occurred, disconnects remained evident toward the end of the case period. For example, as the military withdrawal approached (ca 2010), the Rule of Law Coordinator had not been included in any discussion or planning regarding the rule of law mission of the military’s succeeding security cooperation oriented organization (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2010). In particular, the failure to negotiate a longer term presence in Iraq was attributed at least in part to an Iraqi perception that the U.S. would never understand them (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 27 Apr 14).

**Afghanistan RoL Network Level Success.** Overall, there were a number of successes in network level areas. For example, military teams were described as routinely coordinating their efforts and information with U.S. Embassy officials and Provincial Reconstruction Teams to identify targets of opportunity (Tasikas, 2007). In another example, beginning in 2007 a commission began to meet formally to minimize Afghanistan police-prosecutor conflict and ensure collaboration, which was a long-standing issue in Afghanistan (United Nations Development Programme Afghanistan, 2010).

However, there were setbacks as well. As the course of U.S. stabilization activities in Afghanistan developed, the sheer number formal U.S. assistance projects in the justice sector expanded so significantly and without coordination that formal reviews noted that they risked “wasteful duplication and contradictory legal reform efforts” (Wyler and Katzman, 2010).

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57 However, it should be noted that coordination here is not necessarily synonymous with “obtained mutual agreement on”.
58 Additionally, U.S. funding, through far greater resourced military channels, favored the police over the civilian supported prosecutors.
Neither the IROL (the Inter-Agency Rule of Law Unit) or Deputies Committed ever achieved the desired goal of being a coordinating and central planning node. An example of a lack of overall U.S. civilian and military collaboration was a case when the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) downsized and ceased activities with an Afghan counterpart. Despite senior civilian leader objections, a group of military personnel perceived a vacuum and took over the mission, even planning to transition the activity back to the Embassy in the future (Afghanistan RoL Interview Nov 2013). Efforts were made to address collaboration issues, with limited success. As desirable as it would have been to gain full regular, systematic understanding of what everyone in Afghanistan was doing in RoL, this was seen as ultimately unattainable (Afghanistan RoL Interview Jan 2014).

Coordination and collaboration challenges were also seen more broadly across donor states and international organizations. Reviews found that there was no way to readily identify RoL funding and identify potentially duplicate programs, overlapping programs, or programs conflicting with each other (Wyler and Katzman, 2010). An example of the coordination difficulties faced by donor states can be seen in the case of the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan police reform effort. In this area alone, the European Union Police Mission had to coordinate with actors such as various Afghan government institutions, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, International Security Assistance Force, the German Police Project Team Afghanistan, Norway, France, DynCorp, NGOs, the United Arab Emirates, U.S. State Department, United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and the Afghan National Directorate of Security – all of which had individual agreements with the Afghan government (Thruelsen, 2010). Even when coordination centers were established, such as
with the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), donor states could still approach the Afghan government directly to negotiate a bilateral donation, of which the coordination center may not have been notified. Yet, when the Afghan government and the donor nation coordinated with NTM-A early in the process, the NTM-A was able to track these cases and provide assistance as necessary (U.S. Department of Defense, 2012, December).

**Iraq Provincial Network Level Success.** Though viewed as generally beneficial, the entrance of civilian organizations (e.g. PRTs) into military ‘spaces’ led missions being unsynchronized due to differing priorities (Ayres and Barnes, 2011). Military units, PRTs, and Embassy staffs had their own governance, rule of law, and development programs that may have complemented, conflicted, or duplicated one another (U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, 2008). Further, there were also a number of Iraqi organizations involved in stabilization projects, and they often had their own communication and coordination issues.

Collaboration did produce network level benefits in the Iraq Provincial case. PRTs acted to strengthen the ‘connective tissue’ between provincial governments and the central government, working through their contacts in Baghdad to pressure Iraqi RoL authorities to act to address local issues (Barber and Parker, 2008). As provincial Iraqi governments matured the PRTs were able to relax this type of support, but it was nonetheless an important early role for many PRTs. Further, the PRTs’ ‘convening power’ to bring disparate Iraqi stakeholders to the same meetings and begin coordination on issues came to be seen as one of its most valuable assets, helping to facilitate clearing bottlenecks that the Iraqis had trouble resolving on their own. Lastly, in the later stages of the conflict, Iraqi officials
exhibited a growing preference to interact with U.S. civilians rather than military members, often due to the greater perceived legitimacy of civilians or at least a reduced perception of being militarily occupied. As said by one PRT team leader who returned in 2010, “I had a number of our interlocutors tell me . . . how pleased they were with seeing the civilian side of the U.S. presence. . . . They specifically associated more interaction with U.S. government civilians with the normalization of Iraqi-U.S. relations” (Naland, 2011, p. 9).

**Afghanistan Provincial Network Level Success.** An area of network level success was of improved knowledge, fostering a better understanding of the environment or approach (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 12 May 14). For example, in the Helmand case, this benefit of collaboration was seen as absolutely contributing to success. Another example of U.S. civilian and military collaboration improving knowledge was civilian development of a shared assessment processes, which helped military units conduct improved assessments, as well as facilitate a common understanding between military units and civilian counterparts (Cote, 2009; Fritsch, 2012). However, while improved, assessments were still not completely in sync. For example, in the Helmand DST case, the PRT/DST and military partners operated on different timelines and with different objectives and measures of progress. Moreover, the Afghan government had its own set of metrics to measure progress, which were not always in sync with U.S. metrics (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 23 Jan 14).

An example of an area where collaboration produced mixed results was in the timely follow on of civilian stabilization resources after major military operations, a key interest of

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59 However, this was not a universal preference; some Iraqis could express a preference for working with military staff.
the military (Yodsampa, 2011). This could be difficult to achieve and in many military operations there were long delays between the end of hostilities and the infusion of aid. However, success was possible and in at least one instance, Operation Medusa, civilian and military coordinating led to the beginning of USAID rehabilitation and reconstruction work within two weeks of the end of hostilities (Yodsampa, 2011). Efforts to improve coordination through establishing Regional Commands and adding civilian staff to military headquarters met with limited success (Eronen, 2008; Fritsch, 2012).

Further, U.S. programs supporting local governments were not always coordinated with other international donor state programs, and vice-versa (Kemp, 2011, January/February). In addition, the concentration of national efforts on single provinces was itself referred to as a “Balkanization” of aid, since development became geographically scattered and dependent on the priorities of each donor (USAID, 2006). This resulted in ineffectiveness and uncoordinated fractures in sectors such as police, justice, and counter-narcotics (Eronen, 2008). Even as late as 2008, outside observers were finding little to no unity of effort among donor states, which was described as fighting “ten different wars” (Gleiman, 2011).

PRT projects initially often competed or conflicted with NGO projects, undermining relationships developed with Afghan communities. The evolution of improved civilian and military coordination on projects, and consistency with Afghan national priorities, particularly for CERP, mitigated many of these concerns (Perito, 2005). The PRTs were seen as increasing security for at least some aid organizations, even if there were continuing humanitarian space concerns (Katzman, 2014, January). Further, UNAMA regional offices took on the task of information exchange and coordination between PRTs and NGOs.
wanting to avoid direct contact with the military. UNAMA became a useful vehicle for much behind-the-scenes interaction, coordination, and collaboration with the military, thereby avoiding the need for direct interaction (Dziedzic and Seidl, 2005).

**Mindanao Network Level Success.** In the Mindanao stabilization effort collaborative problem solving was seen as a necessity. For example, the U.S. military assisted the Philippine military and Philippine National Police in creating a secure environment, the State Department helped create an understanding of the political dynamics that need to be dealt with to become successful, and USAID and its implementing partners worked to create programs that provided a future for the populace (Mindanao Interview 26 May 2014). One benefit of civilian and military collaboration allowed access to areas that would not have been accessible because of security restrictions (Mindanao Interview 1 July 2014 and Mindanao Interview 26 May 2014). Another example of benefit was seen in the area of addressing problems holistically, where civilian and military teaming enabled greater success in addressing issues such as lengthy and sometimes ineffective terrorist prosecutions or in addressing corruption (Lambert et al., 2013). The U.S. military and civilians also successfully mitigated local Mindanao distrust and concerns over a U.S. military presence (Maxwell, 2013; Mindanao Interview 1 Feb 2014; Swain, 2010).

However, different phases of Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines featured different degrees of U.S. civilian and military coordination, suggesting an ad hoc and

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60 However, one interesting exception was the Navy SEABEES (naval engineers). They were extremely well received by the citizens of Basilan and the SEABEE symbol was well known and respected. The reason for this is that in 1946 the U.S. Navy SEABEES came to Basilan, built a water treatment plant, and painted the SEABEE symbol on it. The water treatment plant continued to operate and the people on Basilan were grateful for the U.S. Navy's work there. (Maxwell, 2011)
personality-dependent nature of interagency teaming (Lambert et al., 2013). Variability in collaboration was also seen in specific areas such as the performance of the Mindanao Working Group (MWG) at the U.S. Embassy (Mindanao Interview 1 Feb 2014) and in the area of U.S. civilian and military collaboration in public affairs (Maxwell, 2011; U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2007/2013, February).

Beyond U.S. civilian and military organizations, overall donor coordination raised difficult issues in the Philippines, as it does in many recipient countries. Only limited progress was made toward harmonizing donor approaches by moving towards sector wide approaches (Australian Aid, Office of Development Effectiveness, 2012). A number of steps have been taken to attempt to address these issues, including the development of coordinating structures, such as the Mindanao Development Authority (MinDA) described above. There were some network level benefits to donor state collaboration efforts, such as research and publications funded by AusAID that became community reference documents for the donor community and influenced key government departments (Australian Aid, Office of Development Effectiveness, 2012).

Collaboration between non-U.S. organizations also provided benefits. Local NGOs or civil society organizations were seen as playing a bridging role between state and communities (Australian Aid, 2012, December). For example, some international NGOs, including some funded by USAID, supplied local NGOs with resources and training, which in turn allowed these local NGOs to work through local structures (e.g. clan or religious-based) to resolve local conflicts peacefully using cultural norms that put a high value on relationships (U.S. Department of State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, 2011).
U.S. and Philippine collaboration was seen as key to the overall success seen in the Mindanao case (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2007). U.S. collaboration with Philippine armed forces also led to improvements to their capabilities, increasing the Philippine armed forces’ ability to plan, conducting their own medical, dental, and veterinary civic-action and to engage their local populations (Beaudette, 2012). Additionally, acting together, the U.S. military, civilians, and Philippine government successfully diffused criticism of the U.S. efforts (Maxwell, 2011). However, U.S. military activities also attracted some sustained criticism, often concerning a lack of coordination with local communities.

**South Sudan Network Level Success.** An area of network level success in South Sudan has been coordination to efficiently distribute efforts and activities. This can be seen in the 2011 agricultural programs of USAID and the European Union. While the majority of USAID activities were to be focused in the three Equatoria States and Jonglei, the European Union was expected to concentrate in greater Bahr el Ghazal (states west of the Nile and in the northern part of South Sudan, except Unity State). Further, the European Commission activities could serve as important bridges for relief to development activities support by USAID in these areas (South Sudan Transition Strategy 2011-13, 2011). In another example of labor division, activities could be divided among organizations for major political events such as elections or the constitutional reform process. Civic education could be done by one organization, the UN Police would work on security, the National Democratic Institute may help with ballots, ballot boxes, and training kits, and others may help with other things, etc. (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013). However, when
describing the South Sudan situation and collaboration, one large development partner was quoted as noting “there are so many needs, and so many priorities that it is easy to align; the real problem is sequencing and harmonizing our support” (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2011, p. 47). In one negative example, within the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning alone there were several small and un-coordinated interventions in public financial management (USAID, 2014).

Network level successes were seen in addressing or at least mitigating collective issues such as access and transportation, though they were not fully resolved (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2011). For example, in 2013, the Coordination and Common Services Cluster helped aid agencies reach tens of thousands of violence-affected people in Jonglei (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2013, November). There were also a number of information sharing initiatives, particularly in the humanitarian response sphere, notably in the areas of increasing information about humanitarian access and local needs (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2011), as well as understanding of humanitarian activities (USAID, 2011). There were also other activities such as developing aid operations databases, such as an Aid Information Management System, whose success was unclear61 (Government of South Sudan, 2010; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2011). Further, an example of an effort to expand evaluation and shared metrics was seen in a 2013 (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2013, November; UN Office for the

61 A link to the publically accessible data base can be found here, though it was non-functional when the author checked on 8 September 2015: http://www.grss-mof.org/key-topics/aid/aid-management-system/
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs South Sudan, 2013).

One network level failure can be seen in a strained relationship between the GoSS and donor states, including the U.S., which was seen as fueling a preference in the GoSS for working with China. As captured in this statement from a South Sudanese official: “the U.S. and our other [Western] friends regularly tell us with certainty what we need. The Chinese appeared more open to talking and to hearing what we want” (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 8). Another issue was the exacerbation of tension between local groups over access to resources by pre-planned NGO interventions that did not consult local governments, were not sensitive to local issues or were engaged with ‘chiefs’ that acted as gatekeepers, rather than entry points (Schomerus and Allen, 2010).

**Hypotheses 3 Findings**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Success</th>
<th>Iraq RoL</th>
<th>Afghan RoL</th>
<th>Iraq Provincial</th>
<th>Afghan Provincial</th>
<th>Mindanao</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organizational or Agency Level</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Level</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Success Ranking</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the summary table, the highest levels of collaboration success were earned by the Mindanao case, followed by the Iraq Provincial case. The Iraq RoL and Afghanistan Provincial cases were scored in the mid-range, while the Afghanistan RoL and South Sudan cases were tied for lowest.

As stated in the Milward and Provan typology, in hypothesis 2a, the most important
Network Features for success for Emergent Problem Solving networks are predicted to be Coordination & Strategy, Relationships, and Integrators and Supporters Features. If the hypothesis holds, the networks with the most prominent key features should display the most success. A predicted ranking of success can be determined by aggregating the scoring for the rankings in the three categories:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 16: Emergent Problem Solving Network Predicted Success</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coordination and Strategy</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very High (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrators and Supporters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milward &amp; Provan Predicted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Success Ranking</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The same can be done for the Agranoff typologies. From hypothesis 2b, the most important Network Features are predicted as being Network Governance and Organization and Coordination & Strategy:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 17: Agranoff Typology Key Network Features and Predicted Success</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Network Management and Organization Structures</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coordination and Strategy</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agranoff Predicted Success Ranking</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

62 The second way also tabulated the values for the Leadership Support sub-category from the Integrators and Supports to provide emphasis.
The predicted success rankings for each of the typologies can then be compared with the assessed success rankings from the cases:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 18: Predicted vs Actual Success Relative Rankings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq RoL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milward &amp; Provan Predicted Success Ranking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agranoff Predicted Success Ranking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual Success Ranking</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen, the predicted success rankings from the typologies only loosely corresponded to the success seen at the organizational or agency level. In only one case, the Iraq Provincial case, did the predicted rankings match the actual rankings. The predicted success for the Mindanao cases is nearly the opposite of what was predicted by the theories, and the other cases are generally mismatched as well. As can be seen, neither method fared well in predicting relative collaborative success at the Network level. Both only accurately match with the Iraq Provincial case, and strongly mismatch with the Iraq RoL and Mindanao cases. The Milward and Provan typology does a bit better than the Agranoff typology in matching with the Afghanistan RoL ranking. However, this part of the hypothesis can be said to generally not hold for either approach.
Summary of Collaborative Governance Theory Hypotheses Findings

The findings of the collaborative governance theory derived hypotheses are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypotheses</th>
<th>Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) U.S. Stabilization Networks will exhibit such collaborative governance network features, but not in a systematic or consistent way.</td>
<td>True</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2a) With regard to the Milward and Provan (2006) typology of networks, U.S Stabilization Networks will most closely resemble Emergent Problem Solving networks in the Milward and Provan typology.</td>
<td>Mostly True; Stabilization Networks do seem to be most closely categorized as Emergent Problem Solving Networks, though they also have a clear Service Implementation network role as well.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2b) With regard to the Agranoff (2003) typology of networks (see above), U.S. Stabilization Networks will involve a range of collaboration activities, as described in the Agranoff typology (e.g. Informational, Developmental, Outreach (shared activity), and Action (shared decision-making) collaborations.</td>
<td>Mostly True; however only one instance of an informational network, and no instances of action networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Those Stabilization Networks that emphasize the Collaborative Network features appropriate to their typology classification (as per the Milward &amp; Provan and Agranoff typologies) will show more signs of successful collaboration. This is in terms of the network and organization or agency levels of evaluation, from the discussion of identifying network success above.</td>
<td>False; very loose to no correlation with network success</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As shown in the summary chart above, U.S. Stabilization Networks do seem to exhibit collaborative network governance features and seem to be generally classifiable under the common governance network typologies. However, the theory does not seem to do well in explaining the success or failure of collaborations for these networks. As seen in hypothesis 3, there was a loose to no correlation between the prominence of network features and organizational/agency or network level collaboration success. These findings suggest than factors other than the prominence of network features as identified in the
Milward and Provan and Agranoff network typologies would be needed to explain variance in the success of stabilization networks.

This suggests that alternate reasons for collaborative success or failure should be explored. As described in the introduction, numerous reports have described common challenges in stabilization efforts. These are often due to the environment of disparities of resources among organizations and from insecurity. These possible alternate environmental reasons for Stabilization Network failure or success will be explored in the Stabilization Challenges chapter that follows.
Chapter 6: Stabilization Challenges Hypotheses

In this chapter, the final hypotheses will be examined. These hypotheses have been derived from challenges commonly reported in Stabilization Networks and will explore the unique factors of networks in Stabilization environments.

**Hypothesis 4)** Power and relative capabilities of organizations in a Stabilization Network are important; disparities can negatively affect management of collaboration across organizations. This is most likely in terms of relationship building, as smaller organizations can feel overwhelmed by the larger ones, and in terms of coordination and strategy, as the difference in resources creates challenges in being able to match coordination activities between organizations.

Across the cases, resource and capability disparities were manifested across a variety of stabilization organizations. A pronounced and well-documented disparity was seen between the U.S. civilian organizations and the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan. In both countries the U.S. civilian mission was much smaller in terms of personnel compared to the military and further they faced staffing issues in even achieving relatively modest staffing levels compared to the military. For example, in 2005 the INL section of the Embassy in Iraq was approximately 3 persons (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2005). Overall, larger military presences could, and did, dominate civilian activities. Further,
other disparities were seen, particularly between the host national governments or local organizations and with U.S. or international donors. The impacts of these disparities with regard to relationships and coordination and strategy are explored in this hypothesis.

Civilian staffing was hampered by a number of factors. The chief factor was the vastly smaller size of the civilian organizations in general compared to the military. For example, the Department of State has approximately 40,000 staff covering the globe, whereas the U.S. military’s manpower approaches one million persons. Further, the work was highly demanding, the situation dangerous, and living conditions Spartan. These issues presented recruiting challenges that needed to be overcome to attract civilian staff who served on a strictly voluntary basis. Whereas the military could compel deployment of staff, civilian staff generally had the option to refuse or simply quit. Furthermore, personnel processing itself took months. The situation was perhaps best encapsulated by a Baghdad saying, “the day someone arrives, you better have someone else in the pipeline.” This was particularly true since civilian staff, unlike the military, could leave before their replacement arrived (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2005, p. 37). Thus, quality and levels of staffing were a never-ending problem.

The civilian and military disparities only increased outside of the national capitals. Whereas the military was organized and equipped to deploy to virtually any environment and control large sections of territory, U.S. civilian organizations were predominantly oriented to develop and serve at national Embassies, perhaps supported by a handful of regional offices. The lack of ability to support a robust infrastructure across a country and austere service conditions led to greater staffing challenges and limited civilian staff presences. As a result, although interagency guidance gave U.S. civilians the lead on governance and reconstruction,
at the sub-national level, the military vastly outnumbered the civilian personnel, often by a factor of 100 or more. Further, because of staff shortages, the State Department, USAID, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture were generally able to put only a few representatives, or even just a single one, on each PRT or regional command in Afghanistan. For example, the division level Marine Expeditionary Force stationed in Ramadi, the capital city of Anbar province in Iraq, had thousands of personnel and it was seen as overshadowing the U.S. civilian presence that numbered in the dozens.

At the provincial level with increased resource disparities, the people, resources, and culture were predominantly military (USAID, 2006). Civilian experts were sent to the provincial locations without any administrative, logistical or security assets. As a result, civilians became dependent on the services of the military component, which made them vulnerable to being overruled by military priorities and hindered their opportunities to meet local counterparts. For example, without a dedicated vehicle and security guards, civilian representatives could be restricted or effectively prohibited in their movements and their ability to engage local officials or NGOs, or to travel to projects (Dorman, 2007; U.S. Army Center for Law and Military Operations, 2011). These capacity differentials were further compounded by the military’s drive for short-term, if not immediate, impacts in order to prevent attacks and resulting casualties that were contrasted by the U.S. civilian’s longer term, if not generational, development and governance goals (Fritsch, 2012). Levels of support could vary, depending on the local military resources available, the priority the local

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63 In the case of the district level embedded PRTS (ePRTs) this level of support was actually a conscious planning factor, as it was the only feasible means of rapidly standing up teams.

64 This tension was captured in the comment that “a USAID rep could say with a straight face that it would be 300 years before they see the results they are looking for; conversely the military side wanted results in 3 months or 3 days... (Afghanistan RoI Interview Nov 2013).
commander placed on supporting the PRT mission, and the rapport between civilian and military leader (Caples, 2009). For example, one Iraq PRT veteran described his tour as starting with three military provided movement teams, then just one with the arrival of a new unit (Iraq Provincial Interview 17 Sep 13). Military resourcing of PRT movements became an increasing issue as the military began withdrawing from Iraq, reducing available assets65 (Dorman).

Early on, many civilian positions in the providences were often unfilled or instead filled by U.S. military service-members. In the startup phase many civilian slots even remained vacant, and some PRTs did not have even one civilian on a consistent basis (Yodsampa, 2011). Where this occurred, the military took the lead in reconstruction and political engagement by default. In fact, until late 2008, many “civilian” personnel were actually military reservists, serving in uniform. Additionally, once civilian positions were filled, they were often filled by staff hired from outside sources. Such outside staff, often contractors or “3161s” (temporary U.S. government civilian hires), were recruited for technical knowledge, but often they did not have knowledge of their home organizations. They were often unfamiliar with the procedures, chain of command, and culture of the agencies for which they worked (Dorman, 2007).

Military project funding also far exceeded civilian project funds in Iraq and Afghanistan. As one Iraqi ePRT veteran put it, “The Army had resources that are orders of magnitude beyond what the State Department could bring to bear.” Defense Department CERP money typically funded projects costing up to $500,000 and, in rare cases, up to $1,000,000.

65 Though not directly security related, no discussion of transportation in Iraq would be complete without mentioning the frequent sandstorms, which prohibited travel for days at a time. This could cause a reset to the onerous secure travel process, or strand staff in travel locations for periods as long as week.
$2,000,000, with high-level military approval. In sharp contrast, most State Department project money came through the Quick Reaction Fund (QRF), which covered projects costing up to $25,000 and then $200,000 with higher civilian approval. QRF money was initially easy for PRTs to access, but the process later became slower and more bureaucratic. Given the disparity between military and civilian project funding, some ePRTs focused on, as one ePRT veteran put it, “helping [the military] spend money better and making projects more sensible.” These funding discrepancies further limited the relative capacity of civilians to conduct stabilization activities (Eronen, 2008). It is worth noting that in the other military case of Mindanao, the U.S. military did not have its own stabilization funds.

Although civilians were often functionally dependent on military support, the military enjoyed relative freedom of action. The disparity of funding and resources allowed the military to function independently if it chose to. If the military’s vision of how resources might best be used fit with the PRT’s vision, then cooperation was easy. On the other hand, if the military thought it could do something the civilians didn’t thing would work -- or the military didn’t think that the civilian priorities were important--then the military could chose not to cooperate (Dorman, 2007). Further, as the military was able to operate on a day-to-day basis without PRT or other civilian support, PRT cooperation could be delayed and the military could continue to act until it was obtained later, if needed (Iraq Provincial Interview 5 Mar 14).

Also across the cases, host national partners had a relative capacity disparity compared to international partners. Though these were seen across the cases, they were significantly pronounced in the Afghanistan and South Sudan cases. Partner governments in the cases often lacked the capacity to provide services without outside assistance. As with the
U.S. civilian and military organizations, these issues were compounded the further one
moved away from capitals. What technical expertise that was resident in partner nations
naturally gravitated toward the relatively safe and more rewarding capitals. Further, staff
could refuse to serve in violent areas, where government officials faced the threat of death.
Or they could flee in the face of threats, or were even killed. Yet the locally resident civil
officials were the best and brightest leaders of their social groups and were respected for it.
These partners would get things done, but in their own way, a way different from that of the
coalition or international donors (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 12 May 14).

In Iraq, such deficits in technical capabilities were compounded by the relative
inexperience of the provincial and local Iraqi leaders. The war created an almost entirely new
political class with little experience in governing. Many were appointees who owed their
posts to political patronage but had little idea about what they were doing (Afghanistan
Provincial Interview 12 May 14). Provincial governments in particular, however, matured by
the end of the conflict and found that direct U.S. assistance was no longer necessary to
adequately function. Further, as the Iraqi budget and budgeting system matured, Iraqis themselves began to fund the larger part of their own reconstruction.

In Afghanistan, the country had a relative technical expertise and human capital
deficit overall, and these were severely pronounced at sub-national levels. Afghan
government organizations outside of the capital were often understaffed and had
substantially less technically capable staff than international counterparts (Katzman, 2014,
June). For example, Afghanistan lacked the human capital to fill all governor slots adequately,
and Kabul had severe challenges in finding good candidates willing to work in difficult and
dangerous provinces. In some cases, governors had to stay on longer than they wished or to
the point of exhaustion. Weak or absent staff support and the lack of facilities or security for the governors’ families made the situation worse. This issue could also be exacerbated if donor projects created inflated salaries, drawing people away from their farms, teachers away from schools, and doctors away from clinics (Meyerle, et al., 2010). As a result, in Afghanistan the lack of trained civil servants was one of the greatest challenges to achieving adequate local governance (Kemp, 2011, January/February). However, at the national level, it was less clear if this was due to a lack of capacity or lack of shared goals that ultimately inhibited progress (Eikenberry, 2013).

In the South Sudan case, lack of organic capacity led the government to rely heavily on NGOs, funded through international assistance, for service delivery (The World Bank, 2013, January). As a result, aid organizations provided the vast majority of relief in emergencies (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2013, November). In the Mindanao case, although the Philippines had a relatively strong and capable central government, local institutions in Mindanao also suffered a relative capacity disparity with international partners. The organizational readiness and absorptive capacity of different government agencies in the Philippines could vary (Australian Aid, Office of Development Effectiveness, 2012). The local capacity disparities could limit program activities. For example, with regard to efforts to build the capacity of the Philippine military, JSOTF-P tried to remain within the realistic boundaries of what would be sustainable. If medical training was conducted, U.S. medics ensured they used only what Philippine medics had at their disposal (Mindanao Interview 26 May 2014).

U.S., UN, donor state, and international NGO partnerships with local NGOs by were also challenged by asymmetric power relations across the cases. Donors and
International NGOs came with funds and greater technical capacity, particularly in terms of understanding development theories, and program management and design (Cohen, 2013). Local NGOs were often lacking in capabilities as well, even though they were sought out as stabilization partners due to their perceived legitimacy and knowledge of the local environments. These issues were particularly pronounced in the Mindanao and South Sudan cases. They were evident in the Afghanistan and Iraq cases, though there was a reduced local NGO presence in those countries, particularly in Iraq.

Local NGOs were often willing to do the work but could not deliver fully. A common issue was that there were small or limited resource NGOs that were willing to work with donors but that could not fully comply once a project was implemented. They could submit proposals and projects that read well but upon checking about staffing or structure they could not actually execute. For example, in the Mindanao case, there were only a few local NGOs who had capacity to work with the U.S. or international donors. Further, when local NGOs were implementing projects, some report components could be missing or there were delays in providing required reports (Mindanao Interview 1 Feb 2014). There were often issues with how qualified the local organization was in handling bookkeeping to receive funding (Cohen, 2013). There were even occasional conflicts between donors over mishandling of funds, though it was not clear if this was due solely to improper controls or to corruption (Mindanao Interview 1 Feb 2014). NGOs with good track records could be few and far between. Although civilian staff made efforts to develop local Iraqi NGO capabilities, there was nobody assigned for the specific job of NGO capability development.

66 In the Mindanao case, Educational institutions were seen as better partners, as they had more personal and were more stable than NGOs.
Resource Disparity Impacts

Table 20: Resource Disparity Impacts

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<tr>
<th>Relationship Building</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Low staffing resources led to U.S. civilian credibility challenges due to reliance of outside staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Greater access to territory and funds led to U.S. military having partnering advantages</td>
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<td>• Low resource host nations suffered from “fatigue” and could face partnering disadvantages</td>
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<th>Coordination and Strategy</th>
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<tr>
<td>• U.S. civ-mil disparities fueled mission and goals divergence</td>
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<td>- U.S. civilian co-option concern</td>
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<td>- U.S. civilian challenges in interacting with military decision making processes</td>
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<tr>
<td>- U.S. military desire to move more rapidly than civilians</td>
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<td>• Some organizations slower than others, e.g. U.S. civilians, local NGOs, etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Increased resource and coordination challenges in working at sub-national levels</td>
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<td>• Low host nation capability could undermine confidence and potential partner organizations</td>
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**Relationship Building.** U.S. civilians, with lower personnel resources, could find their credibility with partners impacted as a result. In some cases there was a lack of consistent or experienced civilian representation or there could be a reliance on outside short-term or contract hires (USAID, 2006). The lack of experience limited their ability to reach back into their own organizations to get the information, project funding, and support they required (Yodsampa, 2011). Further, the practice of hiring outside staff to fill immediate staffing needs also resulted in personnel with limited understanding of their own organizations and how to obtain support and information (Fritsch, 2012; USAID, 2006). The initial staffing issues also created problems with contractors being hired to oversee other contractors (Dempsey, 2009), which was mitigated through increasing direct hired staff for
supervision.

Such issues could negatively impact U.S. military partner perceptions of U.S. civilian suitability and subsequently their desire to partner. Additionally, reliance on contract staff could also limit relationships with local partners, since their lack of official U.S. standing could create barriers to forming relationships with counterparts (Dempsey, 2009). However, at locations with relatively senior and consistent representation, civilians were able to gain influence, engaging in joint analysis and decision making with their military counterparts (Yodsampa, 2011). Further, a lack of relative disparities was often correlated with more positive collaborative relationships. The times and places in which the military gave civilians a warmer welcome were often those with a smaller military presence as the potential benefit of U.S. civilian participation was more readily apparent (Iraq Provincial Interview 17 Sep 13).

Conversely, the U.S. military typically enjoyed host national relationship building advantages due to its increased resources. The military’s greater presence in the Iraq, Afghanistan, and Mindanao cases could give it an advantage in identifying partners for engagement, at least until U.S. civilian presences had caught up (Duggan, 2012). In some cases, the access to greater funding resources could have meant that local partners would favor military partners over civilian ones (Naland, 2011). Where it was absent, in Mindanao, U.S. military forces believed that influence and relationship building with the Philippine government was limited by a lack of funding resources (Lambert et al., 2013).

Host national partners were cited as feeling overwhelmed and confused by the myriad of programs and foreign personnel that they were required to deal with (U.S. Army Center for Law and Military Operations, 2011). This was often referred to as a type of fatigue, such as “donor fatigue” or “reform fatigue.” Limits to host national capacities could
also lead to a preference for working with other organizations, such as UN agencies (Australian Aid, 2012, December).

**Coordination and Strategy.** For U.S. civilians, disparate capacities fostered civilian concerns of co-option over cooperation. It was the view of at least some that the civilian staff who did well at the PRTs that they did so by embracing the military and acting as staff to the commander. Some civilians at PRTs felt that they were outnumbered, out-resourced, and alone. As a result, many civilians resisted the idea of integration or advocated for limits to collaboration (Fritsch, 2012). Concern about co-option was not unfounded. In a situation where the vast majority of the team was comprised of military personnel and most of the resources came from the military, it became very easy for a PRT commander to feel the unit’s focus and projects should be military in nature (Hernandorena, 2007).

Disparities in staff size could also make it difficult for civilians to fully participate in military decision-making processes. For example, an ePRT leader contrasted his twelve-member team with the much larger brigade and noted that “because of the staffing imbalances in different sections,” his team found it difficult to keep up with the brigade’s “round-the-clock meetings” (Naland, 2011, pp. 4-5). In at least one Afghan case, a deficit of human resources affected USAID’s ability to partner with the military’s ambitious agenda for a given province. Or in the Mindanao case, individuals could have additional duties beyond Mindanao or civilian and military issues, which could limit the time and energy spent on sharing information or supporting cooperation (Mindanao Interview 26 May 2014). In general, the Embassy staff was overworked, if not overwhelmed (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2005).
An imbalance of resources created tension between civilian and military relationships, and though the State Department and civilian efforts were the ‘lead’ for reconstruction activities in policy, in practice the military funded the bulk of the effort (Dorman, 2007). This situation undermined the perception of civilians as being an effective lead for reconstruction by military partners and fostered frustration. The sentiment was captured in the quote, “When you say the State Department is in the lead [for reconstruction], and for every one dollar that the Army brings, the State Department brings a penny, any competent observer will tell you that the biggest bank book is actually in the lead.” Further, sometimes military personnel arrived with the mindset that the civilians weren’t doing enough; and they had to ‘rescue’ the mission or else all would fail (Afghanistan RoL Interview Nov 2013).

This disparity and different philosophies regarding the pace of stabilization activities could also create situations in which military counterparts could both do more and wanted to move more rapidly than civilian partners. In fact, the abundance of resources itself could even have fostered an impulse to apply those resources, even when a slower (perhaps more long-term or methodical) approach was a viable or even better alternative (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 23 Jan 14). Staffing disparities could lead to overabundant and underutilized staffs, who often began to search for something to do. This was most commonly noted with the overall larger military staffs. This created a periodic phenomenon of people (often military) showing up in RoL asking “How can we help you?” The reality, however, was that they created more work without the necessary core expertise.

Some organizations, such as the UN, international organizations, and even donor states were perceived as needing more time for clearance and working internal bureaucracies
in order to get things done than NGOs, limiting their responsiveness (South Sudan Interview 19 October 2013). Such organizations were seen as moving more slowly than other organizations due to bureaucratic delays, rather than due to resourcing issues (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 24 Dec 13). For instance, the World Bank underestimated the efforts and timing for mobilization of operational staff and facilities and did not invest in full and early staffing, leading to delays (The World Bank, 2013, January). Another issue was that working with sub-national levels of government was more labor intensive for donors than a top-down approach via the central government, as there were potentially many more stakeholders with whom to engage. This could have limited their ability or will to engage with sub-national partners. It also opened the door to inconsistency in dealing with multiple partners (Australian Aid, Office of Development Effectiveness, 2012).

Host nations often had difficulty in meeting international community expectations for progress and resource investment (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013). Host nations faced a number of challenges that reduced their capabilities, such as internal divisions or coordination issues, episodes of conflict, impacts of political patronage, low capacity to implement projects or services, and budget reductions (United Nations Development Programme, n.d.c). This undermined donor confidence in their host national partners.

In addition, host nations writ large could face low capacity challenges across a sector or the whole country, limiting the pool of viable potential partner organizations, such as local NGOs (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2013, May). This limited the ability of donors to identify partners and led to cases where donors were attempting to develop the ability of local partners themselves while also engaging them in
projects or programs (South Sudan Transition Strategy 2011-13, 2011).

**Hypothesis 4 Findings**

As the cases illustrate, a number of collaboration challenges were attributed to disparities in capabilities. In the U.S. civilian and military cases, their relationships were negatively affected by civilian concerns of co-option or being overwhelmed by military partners. Lack of civilian support capacities could create situations of practical dependence on military partners. Disparities also negatively impacted coordination and strategy, as they fueled diverging views of who was “in the lead” between civilian and military organizations. Further, host nations were relatively low resourced organizations, and were regularly described as feeling “donor fatigue” or being overwhelmed by the number of organizations and programs they were being asked to engage with. This certainly supports the hypothesis that coordination and strategy would be stressed in situations of resource disparity.

Where relative abundances in resources or capacity existed, not only did they enable organizations to act independently, but they seemed to create their own internal drive to execute them. This was clearly seen in the behavior of the U.S. military in the Iraq and Afghanistan cases, but was also evidenced in the Mindanao and South Sudan cases with international donors and the UN feeling pressure to bypass slower host nation government organizations. Further, most of the cases of bottom-up collaboration, which were prevalent, seemed to be fueled by local scarcity of resources, such as transportation and logistics. Thus much of the local resource sharing collaboration could be seen in terms of a ‘push’ from local resource scarcity, while increasing organizational autonomy as resources increase can been seen as a ‘pull’ from having access to greater resources than partners were willing or
able to utilize. Further, though problems seemed to be ascribed to capacities (i.e. overabundant staffs), they could more directly be attributed to differences in perspective on timelines and a disparity between technical expertise and manpower. It other words, the source of the problem wasn’t the sheer number of staff so much as it was the staff’s lack of technical expertise.

Much of the civilian expertise was focused on improving military execution of projects and coordination with partners, in addition to managing its own efforts and developing Iraqi capabilities. Overall, the imbalance of personnel, funds, and development and reconstruction expertise created a situation in which the civilians were building the capacity of the military to run development programs instead of focusing on building the capacity of the Iraqi provincial governments (Kelly, 2009).

In addition to disparities resulting from manpower or physical resources, significant relationship and coordination & strategy challenges were seen due to disparities in technical capabilities. Particularly in the Provincial cases, civilian and military disparities in project execution and the perceived suitability of civilian staff, were substantial issues. These led to misunderstandings, differing assessments, lack of trust, and diverging goals. In these cases, the technical gap on the part of the military relative to the civilians was almost as wide as the personnel and resource gap on the civilians’ side was to the military. In many ways, the Iraq and Afghanistan provincial cases can be characterized as the story of civilians desperately trying to teach the military how to do development. This is in tandem with the story of civilian organizations -- which are contract management organizations -- desperately trying to develop sub-national capabilities that they had formerly shed to match the military. Thus,
given the cases, this hypothesis is seen to hold largely true.

**Hypothesis 5a)** The hostile (e.g. violence) environment negatively affects Stabilization Network management of collaboration. The need for security (physical and information security) has a ripple effect on the ability to manage the network. This is particularly true in terms of forming relationships and knowledge management across organizations, as security restrictions can create barriers to meeting and interacting with partners, as well as to what information could be shared.

In addition to risks to personnel or partners and potentially dramatically increased costs of security, across the cases hostile security environments posed a number of problems that continually hindered the collaboration efforts (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2009). Programs were hindered because staff could not always access the area (Mindanao Interview 1 Feb 2014). Operations were disrupted by the escalations in violence or crises, reducing presence in rural locations (United Nations, 2014). Further, some organizations adopted a safety-first, procedurally heavy approach in a fragile environment (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2013, May). However, these were not seen as being effective, as the risks were innate to the project environment. The results were primarily seen as delays that increased the likelihood of project failure (The World Bank, 2013, January). These security challenges affected all organizations, from U.S. to other international and even local Afghan or military organizations. The extent of these challenges and the impacts they had for collaboration are explored below.

Iraq and Afghanistan generally saw the greatest amount of violence across the cases.
However, the levels of violence were also highly localized and changed over time. For example, in Iraq, some areas experienced generally lower levels of violence, such as the Shia south, compared to the hotbed of violence in Anbar and on Sunni-Shia and Kurdish fault lines. Some areas, most notably, the Kurdish Regional Government area, remained virtually unaffected by the violence in the rest of the country. This stability was to the degree that military troops were not station in Kurdistan, though U.S. civilians operated there. The degree of violence also changed over time, peaking in Iraq in 2008, then receding thereafter until the military withdrawal. However, though overall violence may have been declining, political changes could change the security situation locally. Consequently, once relatively peaceful areas such as the Sunni shrine areas of Karbala and Najaf saw increases in violence even while violence was declining nationally.

In a very general sense, in the Iraq and Afghan cases, the impact of security could be felt that “nothing was easy” and activities seemed to take as much as 2 or 3 times as long to accomplish as they might elsewhere (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 27 Apr 14). Though there were doubtless a number of reasons for this, such as having to work through interpreters or low logistical support, security challenges were a key part. Security challenges were seen as creating rippling inefficiencies, including rapid turnover, staffing gaps, frequent trips abroad, and an inability to attract and retain staff (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2005).

The pervasive risk of violence meant that U.S. government organizations generally had to operate from secured compounds, often U.S. military compounds or the Embassies...

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67 Security measures could comprise as much as 80 or even 90 percent of a project's cost. This was in addition to the obvious human toll for death and injury sustained during the conflict.
themselves. The simple fact that staff had to be housed in a secure facility itself limited options for locations where they could reside, sometimes forcing their organizations to be located a substantial distance from their counterparts, particularly local counterparts. Even then there was still a risk of rockets and mortars, which occurred frequently if not daily in some cases. Rockets, mortars, and other means of “indirect fire” were a regular threat inside bases. As violence ebbed and flowed, it could significantly impact living conditions in even “secure” facilities. This is described by the following circa 2007 account from Basra in southern Iraq: “We have been sleeping in our offices for months. In the spring we had a rocket attack once in six weeks. Now, we’ve had 129 rockets and mortars over the wall in October, 104 in November, 134 for December, and 18 today alone…. We are in a war zone, where you cannot walk around at dark without your Kevlar and helmet on and where all the staff can differentiate between a rocket, mortar and RPG [rocket propelled grenade], with no formal training” (Gastaldo, in Dorman, 2007, p. 32).

Outside of the compounds, there was a risk of attack through roadside bombs (improvised explosive devices or IEDs) and small arms fire. For example, in Helmand and parts of Kandahar, the insurgents used IEDs to prevent coalition troops from interacting with the people. The aim was to make movement so dangerous that coalition forces would no longer patrol far from their bases, effectively ceding control over the population to the Taliban (Meyerle, et al., 2010). Personnel also faced kidnapping risks. At times of elevated risk, all travel outside of secure compounds could be restricted, often with little to no notice (Afghanistan RoL Interview Nov 2013). In Iraq, U.S. civilians often employed local staff, who in a security context could provide a “security barometer”; if their local staff were concerned, then civilians wouldn’t go to areas or attend meetings. In worst cases,
organizations were forced to leave the area, or were consigned to the relative security of fortified compounds. Such situations resulted in little access to the population and, in turn, little knowledge about what was happening outside the base (Meyerle, et al., 2010). Even when travel was allowed, the security environment raised challenges in arranging it, and additional risks associated with travel made it a non-trivial task that had to be carefully considered. As a result, movement security was one of the biggest issues.

At military locations, most trips to meetings, or movement “outside the wire” required at least three vehicles with armed personnel. It also required back-up emergency response, availability of medical facilities, and corresponding coordination time to arrange the travel and security elements. The assets available for travel could be limited too – their availability varied from location to location, and with the size of local military units that rotated in (Iraq Provincial Interview 17 Sep 13). Helicopter or airplane transport was available, though it was comparatively highly limited in availability and also required advance planning, and was generally used for longer distance transportation, such as to the capital or major facilities, rather than for conducting short distance movements between bases and town. Unarmed civilian PRT members wore body armor and helmets while in transit but, especially after 2008, often removed them before walking into their Iraqi counterparts’ offices for meetings. Security briefings before outings addressed such issues as where to find the first aid kit and extra tourniquets.

As a result, event local transportation could be limited or even prohibited during times of high threat. Though the U.S. military had the greatest access and resources, even it at times faced access restraints on account of security. Certain areas could also be generally off-limits, due to threats. Further, considerable security and logistics planning had to go into
meetings outside secure bases, often requiring several days advance notice. Leaving the FOB (forward operating base) became a ‘mission’ that had to be planned in advance (Fritsch, 2012). Travel required open-ended departure times (for security reasons), as well as elaborate advance planning and risk assessments (Hallman, 2008). This meant that requests had to be submitted with ample warning, a process that limited flexibility and hampered impromptu meetings (Duggan, 2012). The limits to travel was captured in the sentiments that “500 meters could be the same as 50 miles” depending on the situation (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 12 May 14). This was true if the meeting was to outside partners, or simply to travel to another military base or Embassy, which still required traversing less secure or dangerous areas.

U.S. civilians in Iraq or Afghanistan, when not hosted on military facilities, often utilized their own transportation security. This was typically in the form of “armored suburban” convoys, with contracted security personnel. Though this was a less overtly military approach, the U.S. civilian security was often seen as less flexible, more rigid, and more risk averse than the military provision of movement security68 (Duggan, 2012; Barber and Parker, 2008; United States Institute of Peace, 2008, April 29). Overall, the civilian security offices often had higher standard for declaring an area secure (Duggan). However, it should be noted that armored civilian vehicles were significantly more vulnerable to attack than military vehicles. For their part, civilian security experts had reservations about the military approach to transportation security. Military personnel were seen as having the dual

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68 In the Iraq, somewhat ironically, as security improved some PRTs with military transports began to voice a desire to have lower-profile civilian transportation options available to them, while Iraq PRTs with civilian security often voiced a desire for the more flexible military provided security. A few locations had both options available to them.
role of protecting civilians and also engaging the enemy. Also, military movement teams had less security transport experience and less training for it than civilian or contracted security experts (Dorman, 2007).

The use of contracted security personnel was not without its own drawbacks. In Iraq, there were incidents with civilian security personnel that caused Iraqi deaths, including alleged killings of innocent Iraqis. These incidents damaged U.S. relations with local Iraqi citizens and officials and, as the war continued, greater accountability and oversight measures were required to avoid them (Duggan, 2012). Further, in Iraq, when the U.S.-Iraqi Strategic Framework Agreement was signed in late 2008, U.S. civilian personnel traveling with an American military escort had to receive either an additional Iraqi Police or Iraqi Army escort, which further complicated coordination processes. The involvement of Iraqi security services was seen as more of a challenge for civilian organizations, as their working relationship with these Iraqi organizations was not as well established as the U.S. military’s (Duggan).

The difficulties in obtaining transport to insecure areas in Iraq and Afghanistan also often led to limiting meeting locations to known safe areas or to U.S. facilities. For example, in Iraq the relative security of the Kurdistan and Baghdad areas tended to channel conference or training programs to them (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 27 Apr 14). Meetings could even be moved out of country when security required; for example, international donor group meetings were frequently held outside of Iraq (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2005). Meetings could be held at military bases in the area -- if any -- or at other more secure locations, such as international NGO facilities. However, inviting local partners to meet on bases or at civilian facilities was often impossible due to strict
security procedures and screening for non-U.S. government personnel. Further, entrance processing and security procedures could create situations where potential visitors would be forced to remain outside, visible and exposed, while waiting to enter for extended periods. As a result, many Iraqi partners refused to meet on military or civilian facilities altogether. Despite these conditions, U.S. staff frequently found ways to interact with their Iraqi counterparts (Dorman, 2007). In Iraq, some PRTs even established meeting spaces as part of their projects with local Iraqis to mitigate the security problem. It was also not uncommon for PRT staff to be effectively stationed as “satellite offices” that were typically on smaller military facilities that were closer to the areas in which the PRT staff had to work.

International NGOs frequently adapted in ways similar to the U.S. and NATO approaches. Bunkering down was one strategy, with aid workers retreating into fortified compounds and travelling less, and when they did travel, moving in unmarked vehicles. Among NGOs, becoming invisible was seen as the best guarantee of security. In Afghanistan, signboards, once the trademark of NGOs, were taken down, and most stopped calling attention to themselves or even openly identifying themselves outside Kabul. International staff travel was radically limited, which effectively transferred risk to local Afghan staff and to those Afghan communities who assumed the responsibility for guaranteeing NGO safety in the field. The increasingly remote-control engagement with their programs had negative implications for the quality of supervision, monitoring, and accountability. It also had cost in terms of NGOs’ relationships with communities, fostering divides (Goodhand, 2013).

Instability and violence also wreaked havoc on host national partners. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, government members were often targets for assassination (Afghanistan
RoL Interview Jan 2014), frequently for their cooperation with Americans⁶⁹. In some cases, high threats could lead host national officials to abandon or refuse to operate in an area. For example, at one time the Anbar province was so unstable that the provincial council had to meet in Baghdad instead of the provincial capital Ramadi (Anita, 2009). For many, cooperating with Americans, either with coalition operations of PRTs, meant a constant fear of death, injury, and loss for their families. Even working on a project as innocuous as picking up garbage could create risks, as these projects were associated with the U.S. (United States Institute of Peace, 2008, April 29). The security risks necessitated precautions to minimize the risks of working together. For example, most Iraqis who cooperated with the Baghdad PRT did not tell their families they did. Further, U.S. personnel avoid calling them on the phone, and, when it was necessary, they talked in code (Anita). Understandably, these risks could substantially limit the number of local partners who wanted to engage or to directly work with Americans.

In Mindanao and South Sudan, though the violence was generally not as intense as in Iraq or Afghanistan, the effects of violence were pervasively felt. In South Sudan violence ebbed and flowed during the period of the case study. Risks to personnel included active combat, looting of aid supplies, attacks on and harassment of aid workers, mines and unexploded ordnance, and bureaucratic impediments on road, river, and air travel imposed by conflict parties (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013; UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2013, November; UN Security Council, 2013/2014, ⁶⁹ For example, in Iraq nearly 50 judges had been assassinated by 2008, along with an unaccounted number of lawyers. House bombings, kidnapping, and assassination attempts were common. The chief judge at the al-Rusafa Appellate District Court kept bullets fired at his office stacked in his ashtray (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2009).
March/2015). Throughout the duration of the case study, Mindanao was a high-risk area and security issues could disrupt or destroy progress (Mindanao Interview 1 Feb 2014). Persons were cautioned not to travel there through security advisories, and kidnappings were a risk to personnel (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2007). Exacerbating the security issues were the general lack of reliable transportation infrastructure and weather travel disruptions; in South Sudan, during the wet season, around 60 per cent of the country is cut off from road travel and Mindanao was plagued with frequent flooding and unpredictable weather.

In South Sudan aid workers and international organizations faced particular risks of harassment, such as commandeering of assets and diversion of aid in parts of the country (European Union, 15 Dec 2014). Violence against humanitarian workers, assets, and premises -- especially theft and looting -- was a major challenge (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013). Economically motivated attacks on aid convoys threatened humanitarian activities, particularly during the dry season when roads were accessible. Active hostilities created periods of acute access constraints, including the suspension of humanitarian activities and withdrawal of aid workers (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2013, November). Authorities could inflict regular incidents of arrest and detention,

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70 Examples of security incidents in South Sudan include:
- Many of the compounds of aid agencies, including nearly all humanitarian premises and warehouses in Bor, Bentiu, and Malakal were looted by armed actors from both sides as well as criminal elements.
- Three aid workers were killed and in January 106 aid workers were prevented from relocating from Yirol in Lakes State to Juba for safety.
- More than 75 humanitarian vehicles were commandeered or stolen.
- Seven humanitarian staff members were detained for approximately two weeks when they landed at Juba International Airport in December coming from an opposition-controlled area.
- In several cases, civil authorities or security forces imposed bureaucratic impediments on humanitarian operations and proceeded to take actions against aid workers perceived to be non-compliant, including expulsion and temporary detention.
- A NGO’s compound was commandeered by GoSS security forces and assets seized.
arbitrary or illegal taxation, and interference into human resource and administrative policies on NGOs or other organizations (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2013, November). Security forces were also known to seize assets. In some cases, these incidents were due to lack of training and standardization of military & security forces (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013). Petty crime was a risk too, particularly in the urban capital area. The operations of many organizations were limited by this insecurity, though despite the challenges NGOs and United Nations agencies reached millions of people in need (United Nations, 2014).

In contrast with the Iraq and Afghanistan examples, where travel and access was often achieved through military support, U.S. civilian and international organizations in Mindanao or South Sudan were more likely to be denied access to entire regions in conflict (Mindanao Interview 1 Feb 2014). This involved both travel restrictions and evacuations of deployed staff (United Nations Development Programme, n.d.c). For example, travel to Mindanao was highly scrutinized for U.S. civilian personnel and required approval from the Embassy security office (Mindanao Interview 1 Feb 2014). In another example, in areas where the threat of violence was strong United Nations organizations simply did not operate. In South Sudan, armed groups cut off access to regions at various times, and escalations in rebel activities, the re-laying of landmines, persisting indiscipline by the national army (the SPLA), and incidents of interference or obstructionism by local authorities could all prevent access to regions by stabilization organizations (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2011). Security restrictions were also described as creating very cumbersome systems or even preventing access to permissive areas on many
occasions (Mindanao Interview 1 July 2015; South Sudan Interview 19 October 2013; and South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013). Perceived risks could potentially dissuade staff from even considering travel to risky areas (Mindanao Interview 1 Feb 2014). Even military organizations, such as the United Nations Mission in South Sudan in South Sudan, could be prohibited by armed actors from travelling to certain areas (International Crisis Group, 2014). In Mindanao, even the U.S. military had to operate under strict restrictions early on to any movement outside of bases to minimize risks to U.S. personnel. This proved a persistent problem and eventually a kind of blanket permission was received for U.S. military advisors to deploy with Philippine forces on a less onerous basis (Swain, 2010).

The security environment created general hazards for even local staff as well as outsiders in trying to work (Mindanao Interview 1 Feb 2014). For example, the possibility of NGOs volunteering their services in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao was complicated by the area’s reputation for instability and difficult access to remote areas. There were also several instances in which USAID implementing partners themselves had to reschedule their trips to certain locations due to spikes in kidnappings (Mindanao Interview 26 May 2014). This was true in South Sudan as well, where deployments of local staff were curtailed by ethnic tensions and targeting, as well as intimidation and harassment (UN Security Council, 2014, November). International NGOs could also lose local staff who became unable to work in certain locations (United Nations, 2014). Further, in Mindanao, U.S. civilians could work through the U.S. military presence for temporary security and

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71 For example, in the relatively violence free area of Juba in South Sudan, Safety precautions advised included being street smart, to not walk outside after dusk or formal curfews, and in the case of U.S. Embassy staff, they were only allowed to drive in armored vehicles. U.S. Embassy staff also had to negotiate permission with their security office to travel to risky areas. U.S. Embassy travel also required providing 48-hour notice to the security office, which inhibited their ability to travel on short notice, for activities such as following up a recent event.
transportation, as well as for acting on their behalf. For example, USAID personnel regularly utilized U.S. military lodging on the Philippine military bases (Mindanao Interview 26 May 2014).

**Hostile Environment Security Impacts**

| Relationship Building | • Challenges to access and engage partners  
|                       | • Reliance on intermediaries  
|                       | • Delays in forming relationships |
| Knowledge Management  | • Administrative burdens to access outside information from classified military networks  
|                       | • Limiting NGO perceived benefit of collaboration with the U.S.  
|                       | • Security risks limiting willingness to share |
| Other                | • Limited or no oversight and accountability  
|                       | • Military support to oversight and accountability  
|                       | • Rapid changes to priorities  
|                       | • Additional coordination requirements  
|                       | • Increased disconnects between local, national, and home country levels |

**Relationship Building.** In Iraq and Afghanistan, in many cases the “tyranny of distance,” either due to actual physical distance or to the need to plan and have access to security assets for transportation, limited or prevented in-person meetings (Fritsch, 2012). One effect of this was that travel could be limited or rationed to team leaders or to “relationship owners.” For example, a PRT agricultural expert might be the relationship owner with the senior Afghan agricultural line minister, and would report back to the PRT on meetings (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 12 May 14). Even with transportation available, the challenges and risks of travel frequently deterred travel and reduced it from
what it might have been otherwise. Further, the channeling of meetings and events to relatively more secure capitals perpetuated a sense that the U.S. efforts was unilateral or focused only on a capital-to-capital basis (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2005). Coordination could be further hampered by limited stakeholder attendance and the limited overall frequency of meetings in high threat environments (United Nations Development Programme Afghanistan, 2010; U.S. Army Center for Law and Military Operations, 2011). Difficulties and restrictions in arranging travel to engage with key partners, such as local Afghans, could rise to the level that staff questioned the utility of their mission and presence (Afghanistan RoL Interview Jan 2014).

The security situations in Mindanao and South Sudan overall resulted in a limitation or denial of direct access to partners, and fostered a reliance on intermediaries to reach hostile areas. Disruption of direct contact with local partners could last for periods of several weeks or potentially longer (South Sudan Interview 19 October 2013). A frequent means of mitigation was through working with local NGOs or the hiring of local staff by international NGOs (Chesnutt, 2011). Organizations such as the United Nations could to a large extent, rely on coordination with local NGOs that had greater access to perilous areas and could move more freely.

The high profile of U.S. military security details also deterred local partners and international NGOs from wanting to meet. Local partners could be afraid that a procession of armored “Humvees” or Mine Resistant Armored Vehicles with armed personnel could make it appear that they were cooperating with a military operation (Duggan, 2012). This was particularly daunting for U.S. civilian personnel whose partners might have been open to meeting in different circumstances. Further, arriving at a meeting in combat vehicles
escorted by heavily armed soldiers was off-putting to local officials (Naland, 2011), or was seen as changing the way in which civilian visitors were viewed by local Iraqi counterparts. This was particularly true in areas not used to high profile visits, such as rural areas in Iraq that were accessed, often for the first time, as violence declined in 2009. Though actually having in-person engagement with partners could be limited, when it did occur, the security environment wasn't seen as impacting the nature of meetings and communications (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 24 Dec 13).

Overall, security made it more costly (in terms time and energy) and more difficult to communicate, making it harder to build relationships, and fostered a reliance on indirect coordination. Conversely, relatively secure environments allowed building personal relationships and trust with locals. In some of the best cases, military forces provided such security, and civilian personnel, international organizations, and NGOs formed strong working relationships with Afghan partners.

**Knowledge Management.** Security had a number of impacts on knowledge management. This could be in terms of barriers to sharing information, affecting what information was sought out, or direct impacts to communications. For example, cell phones could be of limited or no functionality as cell towers were targeted by insurgents or they were blown down by the military to prevent cell phones being used as triggers for IED (improvised explosive device) attacks (United States Institute of Peace, 2008, April 29).
U.S. military organizations normally communicated on a classified network\textsuperscript{72}. Though information on a classified network was not by itself necessarily classified, these networks could not be accessed by people outside the system or send or receive information from the “open” internet. Not all U.S. civilian agencies in working in Iraq normally obtained security clearances for all of their staff, and uncleared staff could not access these networks. Military networks also didn’t have access to contact and organizational information that was resident on home organization internal networks. Routinely operating on classified networks also enabled over-classification, or the over use of restrictive U.S. government security markings (Afghanistan RoL Interview Nov 2013). Over-classification limited sharing, particularly for documentation. Over-classification could even prevent information sharing with military partners, such as the United Kingdom, and NATO. This was a particularly acute problem for partners who did not have access to classified networks, such as the host national governments.

One example of how this dynamic could work is seen in the case of an Afghan provided list of judges. Members of the military would want to place it on a classified portal, to protect the information. In a hostile environment such as Afghanistan, lists of names of government officials could easily become “target lists” in the wrong hands, particularly in the case of judges who were regularly targeted. However, the information was provided by Afghans and needed to be shared with other Afghans, yet labeling something classified would preclude such sharing, even it was originally provided by the Afghans themselves. Still, it needed to be safeguarded somehow. Further, there were no classified computers in Afghan judiciary, so they physically couldn’t access classified material even if it could have been

\textsuperscript{72} The Secret Internet Protocol Router Network, or most commonly just referred to by its acronym “SIPR.”
shared. The issue between what needed to be safeguarded was a continual challenge (Afghanistan RoL Interview Nov 2013).

NGOs and International Organizations, typically not authorized for U.S. security clearances, found the classification rules to be particularly frustrating. For example, it was common for USAID to issue contracts on an unclassified basis. This often enabled greater employment of local Iraqi staff or non-U.S. nationals. However, as a result, U.S. civilian contractors could find themselves unable to fully access information from military partners, who frequently classified sensitive information. In at least one case, although the contracting partner was required to meet with the PRT, they were not allowed access to the military base that hosted them due to clearance issues. Alternative meeting spaces had to be identified and the contract was eventually modified to include senior staff with security clearances (United States Institute of Peace, 2008, October 8). This issue contributed to perceptions by NGOs that the benefits compared to the risks of cooperating with military and government civilian personnel appeared to be meager, and thus opt to operate independently (Dziedzic and Seidl, 2005). This was noted as occurring in the Afghanistan Provincial case in particular, but may have occurred in other cases.

The willingness to sharing information was impacted by the security environment as well. Organizations could be resistant to sharing information due to concerns that it could place their projects or staff at risk. In the Iraq Provincial case, this was seen in of the USAID implementing partners. Area PRT staff often had had little idea of what the USAID partners, did — whom they trained, what the training consisted of, and etc. The implementers cited security concerns as the reason for not being forthcoming about activities. This was the case even though the PRT’s and USAID partner’s missions were
complimentary, or in a general way identical (Barber and Parker, 2008). This was despite
nearly all PRTs having had USAID program officers whose jobs were, in part, to monitor
the performance of these national programs in their provinces. However, some USAID
officers on the PRTs had little insight into national USAID programs, often due to the
aforementioned security issues. As it a result, the development work done as part of
USAID’s national programs and the work done by the PRTs ran on largely parallel tracks for
much, if not all, of the conflict (Barber and Parker, 2008).

**Other Impacts.** The security environment meant staff could not always travel to
projects for site visits or to verify information coming from implementing partners. U.S. site-
visits could even turn the project into a target. For example, in Fallujah, the insurgency
affected that ePRT’s ability to monitor the progress of its projects: “…if Americans started
showing up at a project it highlights (that) this guy is working with Americans, and (he)
becomes a higher target…” As a result in-person observation could be abandoned in favor
of phone or email oversight, third-party local partners could become relied upon, or
oversight was just not conducted. In some instances there were some areas that were so
insecure that even local national personnel would not go there³³ (Anita, 2009, pp. 13-14).

Across the cases one of the military’s key strengths was a field presence in areas that
might have been too dangerous for civilian organizations, particularly so for the U.S. military
and its pronounced presences in Iraq and Afghanistan (U.S. Army Center for Law and

³³ However, there was at least one positive view in the case of Afghanistan that limitations on travel and
interactions prevented a “micro-managing” or provision of too much support to partners, allowing the
Afghans to govern themselves. This was particularly relevant during the later years of the cases when transition
to local authorities was the priority.
Military Operations, 2011) and UN peacekeeping efforts in South Sudan (UN Security Council, 2014, September). The U.S. military helped provide or facilitate oversight for areas it had better access to (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 23 Jan 14; Malkasian and Meyerle, 2009). However, as U.S. military forces drew down in Iraq and Afghanistan, these resources and the field presence became more limited.

In many cases, hostile environments greatly affected strategic priorities. Spikes in violence could rapidly undermine plans and derail efforts at stabilization. One early example captured the potentially extreme changes that could be driven by security concerns: “What a rapid change in just five days, from preparing to launch a broad new array of programs aimed at operating government, improving communication and public input, to living hunkered down in a military base, contemplating evacuation” (Cravens, 2014b, para. 11). In a South Sudan example, in response to the 2014 crisis, the European Union and United Nations Development Programme rapidly changed their strategies to reflect the new environment and needs, establishing new priorities and redirecting resources (European Union, 15 Dec 2014; United Nations Development Programme, n.d.c). As security deteriorated, the focus often shifted away from stabilization to defeating the enemy, as military or host national counterparts, rather understandably, were not interested in stabilization activities when areas were being heavily targeted by insurgents. This made it difficult to affect stabilization changes at all (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 23 Jan 14). The security environment also created an additional coordination requirement for humanitarian organizations to maintain regular contact with the parties to the conflict to manage access.

While some level of differing perspective is natural, the difficulties of travel and
communication seemed to foster disconnects between the field, Embassy/Baghdad, and Washington, DC headquarters levels in civilian organizations. These challenges could leave civilian members feeling cut off from their home agencies. Such “disconnected” civilian members sometimes began to drive their own agendas rather than acting in accordance with guidance or strategy provided from above. One State Department officer who served at an Iraqi PRT described it: “I felt like I was completely left off the face of the earth when trying to work with Baghdad and Washington” (Dorman, 2007, pp. 33-34).

**Hypothesis 5a Findings**

Security-related challenges to travel and communications delayed or outright prevented the development of relationships. This was particularly important in collaborative governance, as principled engagement, or contacts over time, particularly face-to-face interactions, were key in situations where conflict between participants are high or goals and objectives were not clearly aligned (Emerson et al., 2011). Moreover, the hostile environment created risks for collaboration and fostered an atmosphere of heightened tension and distrust that created barriers. While organizations generally did overcome trust barriers, the barriers did delay the creation of working relationships. Security risks to persons could result in their exiting the Stabilization network, either to avoid risks or through hostile actions.

Knowledge management was less severely impacted by security restrictions. Though some information could not be shared or security restrictions created impediments to sharing, organizations generally found workable solutions. These mitigation efforts, however, presumably created administrated and manpower burdens in transferring information between systems and created complexity in managing knowledge. However, as with the case
with Afghanistan NGOs, in some cases it was reported that organizations self-selected out of collaboration at least in part due to challenges in information sharing. It is likely that organizational collaboration was significantly inhibited by knowledge management challenges. These information sharing challenges highlight the value of balancing a need to share with security concerns in order to foster efficient network functioning.

Notable reoccurring security related issues that were not accounted for in the hypothesis were also seen. One was the negative impact on accountability and oversight. Insecurity created a toxic environment for accountability of partner projects and activities. In the cases, the challenges with travel and communications substantially limited oversight and accountability of partner organizations. Thus, monitoring progress or ensuring overall network success became increasingly difficult. This was a significant impact to network collaboration that was not identified by collaborative governance theories. Another issue not anticipated in the theory was the impacts to planning efforts, and by extension to coordination and strategy network features. The ebb and flow of violence was directly attributed to planning disruptions in the Iraq provincial case, and the impacts of it can be inferred other cases such as Mindanao and South Sudan. Thus, this hypothesis can be found to be true, but with additional impacts to coordination and strategy from network disruptions and to oversight of network partners.

While the effectiveness of stability efforts themselves are beyond the scope of this research, it merits at least noting the negative impacts the lack of oversight had to activities. Quality control was spotty at best, and widespread anecdotal accounts describe large-scale corruption (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2013, May; Malkasian and Meyerle, 2009). Lack of oversight fostered project failures such as schools or roads
being built being ruined within a matter of months due to poor construction (Dorman, 2007).

**Hypothesis 5b** The hostile (e.g. violent) environment negatively affects Stabilization Network management of collaboration. The short-term nature of U.S. government tours, which result from the hostile environment and are most common in Iraq and Afghanistan, negatively impacted Stabilization Network management of collaboration. This would be expected to negatively impact relationship building, which becomes short lived and must be regularly re-established as new staff rotates in and out. Knowledge management would be impaired, due to loss of tacit and institutional knowledge, as would maintaining cohesive coordination and strategy among organizations.

Staff turnover was seen as a challenging issue that spanned all cases. Due to hostile and austere working environments, personnel -- particularly international personnel -- typically only resided in a country for a year or less. The impacts of this instability in staffing on collaboration are explored in the cases below.

In the Iraq and Afghanistan case, there were commonalities between U.S. military and U.S. civilian tour durations, as these groups were all deployed by the same underlying system to each area. Military tours were also similar in the Mindanao case. Though one year was the most common duration, organizational practices could differ and there were plenty of exceptions (Fritsch, 2012). Six month tours were not unknown, and tour lengths could range from as little as three months to 18 months (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2005; Fritsch, 2012). Further, U.S. Civilian staff and NGO or contracting
staff could, and occasionally did, elect to stay longer. However, the turnover situation was characterized by some with the saying “that the only people around for the long haul are the bad guys and the contractors” (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 24 Sep 13).

Additionally, U.S. civilian tours, and most international staff tours, were interspersed with trips out of country for rest and relaxation (R&R). These trips typically amounted to approximately two months out of country, though they could be longer for international staff (United States Institute of Peace, 2008, September 24). Conversely, U.S. military personnel were usually granted a single two week trip during their tours. Needless to say, repeated three to four week long absences were seen as significantly interrupting momentum (Naland, 2011). Improperly timed trips of staff involved in the same function area, or of leadership personnel, could further hinder operations and even lead to a need re-learn upon the return of staff. Further, different groups maintained different rotation cycles. There was also some variation between the U.S. civilian and military tours. Military units rotated as a group, while civilians and most international actors rotated individually (United States Institute of Peace, 2008, September 24). In some relatively rare but significant cases, these rotations could coincide, resulting in a tremendous loss of knowledge and relationships, as well as a need to redevelop means of cooperation (Meyerle, et al., 2010).

In addition, U.S. civilian tour rotations gaps in Iraq and Afghanistan were compounded by regular staffing gaps (United States Institute of Peace, 2008, September 24). The hiring process was typically four to six months long, and thus gaps could result if staff departed unexpectedly. Civilian staff could (and sometimes did) quit or were dismissed for poor service, resulting in a staffing gap of several months. In numerous cases, key positions, such as that of rule of law adviser, went unfilled for six or more months as civilian agencies
struggled to fill the job, often after a current employee unexpectedly resigned or was fired (Naland, 2011). Turnover and staffing gap issues were even more pronounced at smaller teams, which often did not have enough staff to mitigate them.

In the Mindanao and South Sudan cases, the pace of tour rotations was somewhat lower. Though in Mindanao, military tours could be six months or a year, U.S. Embassy staff normally stayed for normal tour duration 2-3 years as they were based in the relatively stable capital, Manila. Other international organization tours could vary from one year to several years, depending on the organization (Mindanao Interview 1 July 2015). In South Sudan, U.S. civilians shared the one-year tour practices seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. Most other donor states had two year tours or longer (South Sudan Interview 19 October 2013). NGOs and United Nations organization staff could vary widely, from tours of only a few months to effectively living in the country; a few individuals had been there for 20 years while others may only be there for 2 months or even for 5 days consultancies. For example, a consulting project could be 6 or 8 months in duration (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013).

Further, United Nations staff were also seen as having relatively high turnover (South Sudan Interview 19 October 2013). Frequent trips out of the country, either for rest and recuperation, or for illness, were also disruptive, as in the Iraq and Afghanistan cases. The United Nations was cited as having a particularly high rate of out of country trips (described as practically monthly) (South Sudan Interview 19 October 2013).

Host nation counterparts, though not bound to the frequent rotations that U.S. and international personnel maintained, still could often leave positions, either from threats or

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74 One year has become a standard for U.S. State Department tours for “unaccompanied” tours, in which families are not included, typically for security reasons.
acts of violence or through normal turn over, such as after elections (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 27 Apr 14; Meyerle, et al., 2010). For example, many Iraqi government positions were based on political patronage and personal power, which could shift from one group to another resulting in wholesale replacements of staff (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2005). In the Iraq and Afghanistan cases, many, if not a majority, of local employees, could apply for special immigrant visas to the United States after a year. This increased the personnel turnover for the category of staff which in other circumstances would be expected to have the greatest longevity in a position, and was particularly noted as being prevalent in Afghanistan. South Sudanese officials were also noted as changing frequently, particularly at the local levels. This was due in part to changes made during South Sudan’s gaining of independence, and from elections. However, officials were also changing due to frequent transfers and resignations (United Nations Development, n.d.c). Staff turnover was particularly impactful to international NGOs, who could lose the capability to respond effectively when local staff turned over (United Nations, 2014). Though generally remaining longer than U.S. and international staff, the flux of local leaders and staff did contribute to the overall impermanence of personnel and relationships. As above, changes in these personnel could coincide with scheduled U.S. rotations, exacerbating negative results for an area.

Efforts were made to increase continuity across rotations, however there were not systems in place to ensure continuity across rotations at all levels (Yodsampa, 2011). The U.S. military did have an established system for handling staff rotations (Relief-in-Place/Transition-of-Authority, or more commonly referred to right seat, left seat transitions) in order to mitigate knowledge loss on rotations, with incoming and outgoing staff typically
overlapping for about two weeks. However, regardless of how in depth this turnover was, there was still always a transition period within the first month or two of the new unit’s arrival (Mindanao Interview 26 May 2014). In addition, in the Mindanao case, the U.S. military established the persistent rotation of forces into the Philippines. This led to the development of regional experts and fostered strong Filipino-American relationships (Beaudette, 2012). This effort was described as being critical to fostering a long-term perspective. Further, it was noted that this disruption from tours in Iraq or Afghanistan was reduced over time because many military and civilian officers were serving multiple tours (Kemp, 2011, September/October).

U.S. civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan also attempted to establish their own procedures. These included establishing portals or making systematic effort to store information in shared drives, or establishing overlap policies similar to the military’s (Afghanistan RoL Interview Nov 2013; Naland, 2011). Civilians also began to make attempts to reach out to incoming military organizations to establish communications and information sharing before their arrival in country (Tasikas, 2007), or to communicate and begin building relationships remotely before arriving to the area of conflict (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 12 May 14). However, it was unclear how consistently applied or successful in mitigating the problem these efforts were.

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75 In Iraq, though there was a policy on requiring overlap between departing and incumbent civilian staff, this was not always achievable. Further, particularly with staffing shortages, deploying staff could be re-directed from one location to another on short notice, invalidating any prior communication and information sharing they may have been doing.
Hostile Environment Turnover Impacts

Table 22: Hostile Environment Turnover Impacts

| Relationship Building | • Continually rebuilding relationships  
|                       | • Loss of productivity  
|                       | • Local partners gaining advantage across staff changes  
|                       | • Dependence on longer duration host national partners and local staff  
| Knowledge Management   | • Loss of institutional knowledge  
|                       | • Productivity loss to re-learning  
|                       | • Limitations to assessing trends  
| Coordination & Strategy| • Variability creating difficulties in fostering mutual understanding  
|                       | • Instability in priorities  
|                       | • “Bouncing from crisis to crisis” approach  
|                       | • Negative signals to local partners  
| Other                 | • Undermining sustainable change  
|                       | • Reduced interested in host national capacity building  

**Relationship Building.** With each rotation, U.S. civilian and military interlocutors essentially had to start from scratch in developing new relationships (Barber and Parker, 2008). Between U.S. civilian and military tour rotations, and less frequent though not uncommon changes in local national interlocutors, regular relationship forming was exhausting. For example, shortly after Independence, there was a re-shuffle of personnel in South Sudan line ministries and relationships had to be re-established. In another example, in an Iraq PRT case, the manner in which troops were deployed and rotated caused the PRT representatives to spend substantial amounts of time briefing incoming U.S. military brigades on the status of programs and projects being implemented in the province.

An example of how this dynamic played out can be seen in the civil-military relationship of three Marine and Army unit rotations in Anbar, circa 2008-2009. The Marine
Regional Command 5 was seen as strongly supporting the civilian activity. However, Marine Regional Command 8 was seen as “old school” and didn’t understand the civilian role. It took 2 to 3 months (of their 6 month tours) to cement a working relationship between the civilians and military. The following military command, the Army’s 82nd AAB had studied civilian activities and as such was strongly supportive with little needed “spin up” time (Iraq Provincial Interview 17 Sep 13).

This effort was particularly critical for working with local partners. Across the cases local relationships were paramount to their respective culture and critical to collaboration (Iraq Provincial Interview 17 Sep 13; U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2005). On top of being a drain on energy, re-developing relationships took time and became a constant drag on which the pace of stabilization efforts could be conducted. The relatively rapid turnover disrupted staff influence and the impeded their ability to steer groups toward consensus as staff needed to continually redevelop strong working relationships with host national partners (Tasikas, 2007).

Regular relationship forming was exhausting for local partners, as well as international staff (Iraq Provincial Interview 17 Sep 13). Iraqi officials commonly suffered from “interlocutor fatigue”, where a number of U.S. civilian and military officials — a major, a colonel, a PRT team leader, a USAID representative, a USAID implementing partner — would all meet with the same Iraqi leaders (U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, 2008). Tour rotations also exacerbated this issue, increasing the frequency of such meetings. For example, in some areas, the local Afghans saw 10-15 military units cycle through (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 12 May 14). One example of the difficulties this could create was seen in Khost province in Afghanistan. There the battalion commander
and provincial reconstruction team commander built strong relationships with the governor and other officials, and their subordinate officers built similar relationships with other officials across the province. Popular support for the U.S. grew in Khost and violence dropped off. Yet, when the battalion left and a new group of officers came in, relationships frayed. Insurgents exploited the situation with a surge in attacks, and the progress achieved quickly disappeared.

Another related issue was that local partners tended to stay the same people, and learned manipulate or ‘game’ the coalition due to the dearth of continuity. Crafty partners could learn how to find ways to get the projects they wanted, and to shape personal benefits like type of vehicle they were provided (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 27 Apr 14). For example, Afghans would use turn over to gain advantages (e.g. resources or perceived power). While this was not typically excessive, it was a common tendency in the Afghan environment that created challenges. Similarly, those staff who remained in situ for longer periods, (predominately civilians or local nationals) could develop a great amount of autonomy as well as local expertise. There were cases noted where such staff became effectively independent from higher-level direction (Afghanistan RoL Interview Jan 2014).

**Knowledge Management.** In both Iraq and Afghanistan, with the predominately annual staff rotation periods, institutional memory was a problem. With every turnover there was a loss, sometimes steep, of institutional knowledge (Iraq Provincial Interview 5 Mar 14). As a result, institutional memory was described as scattershot and a tendency to repeat mistakes was seen and sometimes project efforts or initiatives had to start all over again (Afghanistan RoL Interview Nov 2013; U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector
General, 2005). Staff were commonly described as needing two or three months to gain a working knowledge of their environments (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 12 May 14). Said an ePRT team leader, “Much of my time was spent learning what was going on. By the time I felt fully functional I had to leave” (Naland, 2011, p. 5). This was described as a pattern of learning the job for the first 3 to 4 months, working for 4 months, and then checking out (preparing to depart) (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013; Yodsampa, 2011).

The frequent staff rotations and high turnover have created challenges in analyzing and interpret performance data for programs (U.S Government Accountability Office, 2014). Turnover hindered the ability to understand and address issues with impacts longer than the typical tour cycles, particularly in the case of six month or other shorter than one year tours (Afghanistan RoL Interview Nov 2013). An example of this was seen in the area of metrics. In at least once case, it was said that by the time personnel were experienced enough to understand that they needed improvement, it was time for the new personnel to arrive and begin to re-learn this same fact. The ability to assess project or activity outcomes, which could take several months or years to manifest, was no doubt severely impacted as well.

**Coordination and Strategy.** Tour rotations could also lead to high variability, both in terms of quality of performance, and in what actual tasks or duties were performed, with new staff making their own new agendas and setting new priorities, programs, or activities instead of reviewing past activities (Afghanistan RoL Interview Jan 2014 and Mindanao Interview 1 Feb 2014). Tour rotations also created difficulties in developing mutual
understanding regarding mission, goals, and vision across organizational boundaries as relationships were re-established. One staff member conveyed that it could take about six months before civilian and military counterparts were using a common language. For example, at a Helmand DST (District Support Team), when a new civil affairs representative would come onboard, it would take about 1-2 months to truly build their understanding and support for the DST concept (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 23 Jan 14).

Leadership turnover was seen as particularly detrimental. This was seen frequently in U.S. military unit rotations, where incoming military leaders made fundamental changes to their predecessors’ policies and priorities (Kemp, 2011, September/October; and Naland, 2011). Projects could be stopped for weeks or months as the new commander decided priorities and the military familiarized itself with the area (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2013, January). This could go so far as effectively ignoring the previous unit’s work and effectively starting over or even reversing progress (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 24 Sep 13 and Afghanistan Provincial Interview 23 Jan 14). A common story would be the arrival of a new military unit, with an imperative to “do something” during their one year or six month tour (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 27 Apr 14). The unit was often unaware of the work that had already been done, and regularly repeated mistakes that had been made in the past. Multiple changes in leadership could also lead to instability in vision and direction, and lead to less focused and inefficient efforts. For example, some PRTs were hampered by high turnover in leadership, due to staff rotations and organizational changes. In at least one case, a single ePRT was reported to have had five interim leaders in six months (Naland, 2011).
As a result this instability in roles, mission, vision, and goals, there was a tendency to bounce from one crisis to another (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2005). Such radical shifts in focus from one unit to the next sent mixed messages to the population, often signaling a lack of determination and commitment that U.S. efforts would be sustained (Meyerle et al., 2010). Frequent rotations also resulted in ineffective management of locally employed staff, causing them to take less initiative due to shifting priorities (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2013, May). Among the cases, much of the dysfunction in the Iraq RoL sector (at a minimum) was attributed to this dynamic (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 24 Dec 13). The inability to understand changes or progress over time also likely frustrated the development of long-term priorities and goals. At a minimum, this would foster a void in long-term priorities that could allow for other kinds of priorities, such as short-term individual donor state political goals, individual organizational or institutional agendas, or personal goals, to elevate in precedence.

**Other Impacts.** Tour rotations also undermined efforts to create sustainable changes. Frequent rotations of civilian and military leaders and the lack of systems to ensure that incoming leaders would build on the foundations already in place could stymie or set back these efforts. Further, frequent rotations prevented senior leaders from developing the understanding of on-the-ground realities and the urgent necessity for changes (Yodsampa, 2011). Without senior leader support, profound organizational changes could not be developed, and only minor or marginal organizational changes could be effected by leaders on the ground in the provinces and districts. This was seen in the Afghanistan RoL and the Iraq Provincial cases (see the Afghanistan RoL Mission, Vision and Goal Congruence
section, above), with the need to reestablish agreements between partners, particularly the U.S. civilians and military, which could at least be in part attributed to the frequency of tour rotations. Further, in a Mindanao case, plans to address a collaboration concern were reset with the arrival of a new Ambassador and the establishment of new priorities (Mindanao Interview 1 Feb 2014).

Instability in local government staff created disincentives for government capacity building, particularly in the South Sudan case. The high turnover of staff in state and local government resulted in weak institutional memory, thus necessitating continued and costly ‘capacity building’ with few tangible programming results (Schomerus and Allen, 2010). Further, when skills did transfer, staff frequently resigned for higher paying positions, either within the government at a higher level or for (sometimes dramatically) higher paying internationally funded jobs; this itself was a factor why the capacity of the government was quite weak (Bennett, 2013; South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013). An international NGO staff member explained it as: “Government have [sic] a high staff turnover so when you build their capacity, they leave or immediately become managers leaving no lower and middle rung administrators” (Schomerus and Allen, 2010, p. 95). This created an aversion to investing in capacity development of local partners.

**Hypothesis 5b Findings**

Overall, the hypothesis seems to have held true for the expected detrimental impacts to Relationships, Knowledge Management and Coordination and Strategy. Further, it is worth noting that significant turnover of staff, particularly international staff, negatively impacted the capacity organizations in general.
relationships was less pronounced in the Mindanao and South Sudan cases, where the tour rotation was less frequent. Lack of continuity disrupted relationships, and they had to be regularly reestablished and adjusted for within the networks (Linden, 2002). In addition, in Iraq and Afghanistan cases, frequent turnover was seen as creating volatility in agreements between parties, an element of Network Governance and Structures. As units and leaders transitioned, prior agreements had to be re-established or were discarded. This occurred in cases when they were not formally adopted through both parties’ hierarchies or chains of command.

Upon examination, two distinct types of continuity issues in the U.S. effort were observed. For the U.S. Civilian effort, with individual rotations, substantial impacts to all three Network Governance Features (Relationships, Knowledge Management, and Coordination and Strategy) were seen. The military, with unit level rotations and a transition process, seemed to mitigate some of the Knowledge Management issues. However, even in the military process, issues with Relationships and Coordination and Strategy remained. This was particularly true in reestablishing project priorities with new units, which seemed to be more severe than in the civilian case. This suggests that U.S. civilians in unaccompanied tours would benefit from a formal transition process, and that the military in a stabilization environment should look at better addressing project and agreement continuity issues as part of their process.

Further, additional impacts and interplays are suggested from the hypothesis findings. In the Iraq Provincial case, the lack of U.S. civilian capacity to staff positions exacerbated the issues associated with turnover. Continuity of personnel gaps were extended as a result of staffing difficulties, which increased institutional knowledge loss in particular.
In the South Sudan case, the high turnover of local staff and Government of South Sudan personnel reduced the interest in longer term ‘capacity building’ activities. This implied a preference to utilize more effective short-term partners, such as international NGOs and United Nations agencies as implementing partners, rather than building up a longer-term local South Sudanese capability. While not directly related to a Governance Network Feature, this dynamic would clearly have an impact on the long-term success of the Stabilization Network and/or development objectives in South Sudan.

**Stabilization Challenges Hypotheses Summary**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypotheses</th>
<th>Findings</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>4) Power and relative capabilities of organizations in a Stabilization Network are important; disparities can negatively affect management of collaboration across organizations. This is most likely in terms of relationship building, as smaller organizations can feel overwhelmed by the larger ones, and in terms of coordination and strategy, as the difference in resources creates challenges in being able to match coordination activities between organizations.</td>
<td>True</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5a) The need for security (physical and information security) has a ripple effect on the ability to manage the network. This is particularly true in terms of forming relationships and knowledge management across organizations, as security restrictions can create barriers to meeting and interacting with partners, as well as to what information could be shared.</td>
<td>True</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5b) The short-term nature of U.S. government tours, which result from the hostile environment and are most common in Iraq and Afghanistan, negatively impacted Stabilization Network management of collaboration. This would be expected to negatively impact relationship building, which becomes short lived and must be regularly re-established as new staff rotates in and out. Knowledge management would be impaired, due to loss of tacit and institutional knowledge, as would maintaining cohesive coordination and strategy among organizations.</td>
<td>True</td>
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In reviewing the Hypotheses 5a and 5b findings, it becomes clear that there was an interrelation between the impact of hostile security environments and tour rotations. To begin with, poor security was the driver of the short tour durations and staffing instability.
Staff instability necessitated adjustments if not re-establishment of collaborative patterns. Adjustments between collaborating organizations could have impacts that organizations across the network would need to adjust to. This created a ripple effect, as organizations generally all faced staffing disruptions in a compressed amount of time (Bardach, 1998). Simultaneously, security needs created challenges and delays to relationship development and knowledge management, both of which were substantially affected by tour rotations. These factors made it more difficult for organizations to adjust to the changes fostered by staff instability. Further, the hostile environment created volatility in coordination and strategy, as changes in violence levels and political crises forced rapid priority changes, adding to the challenges above.

This instability can be explained in terms of internal and external shocks to network functioning. Many, though not all of these shocks, can be attributed to the hostile environments that stability networks operate in, as well as a vicious circle of security and turnover interrelated challenges. The insecure environment acts as an engine of disruption, preventing the development of stable, higher functioning collaborative governance networks. The pressures of internal and external shocks to the networks prevent either stable bottom-up organizing or top-down organizing:

- Internal shocks: failures of projects, changes of staff and leadership, changes of priorities, addition or subtraction of network members, divergent goals, funding changes, and

- External shocks: escalation of violence and political crises, political changes, changing donor nation priorities, unpredictable actions/mishaps.
Internal shocks are those that occurred within the bounds of the stabilization network – project failures, changes of staff or organizational participation, changing of priorities by participating organizations, disputes over goals, funding or other resource level changes, etc. The internal shocks appeared to be particularly detrimental to working level or ‘bottom-up’ efforts to improve network functioning, as they often created volatility at an individual or organizational level. Moreover, many of the internal shocks seemed to have ripple effects up and down the hierarchies of organizations. Discord at the leadership levels reduced incentives and created a ‘space’ for those who did not want to collaborate to avoid doing so. From the bottom-up, working level divergent goals that led to resistance to collaboration activities, such as information sharing, limited the ability of donor organizations to “map” activities, develop common understandings, and ultimately establish shared priorities.

The external shocks were particularly detrimental to senior level or ‘top-down’ efforts to improve collaboration across organizations, as they impacted the whole of the network activities and highest-level priorities. Across the cases, events external to the stabilization network, such as changes in violence levels, outbreaks of crisis, elections, or changes in popular opinions in donor countries could greatly impact the stabilization network. These factors also contributed to limitations in the success of collaboration, as described in hypothesis 3. These external shocks often necessitated a wholesale change in strategy or priorities. For example, in the South Sudan case, several crises necessitated major changes across organizations. In a network context, this caused a cascading effect of organizations needing to rapidly re-prioritize, then to adapt to all of the other participating organizations’ reprioritizations.
This vicious circle of insecurity and staff volatility was doubtless a driver of many of the collaboration challenges seen in the cases. It seems to offer a more robust explanation for the difficulties seen in collaboration than the collaborative governance theory approach does alone. The implications of this continual instability will be further explored below.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

In review of the cases and hypotheses, it is clear that U.S. stabilization activities exhibit substantial collaborative governance network features. In each case, U.S. civilian and military actors were operating in situations with common strategic goals but also with ambiguous or overlapping authorities and responsibilities between organizations. Further, across the spectrum of organizations, a range of competing priorities and goals was seen. Numerous attempts were made to improve collaboration between organizations, but these were generally of limited or short-lived success. However, collaborative governance theories did not seem to be able to explain collaboration success across the cases.

Conversely, the environmental factors did seem to explain many of the collaboration challenges. In particular, they seemed to explain the lack of stability in stabilization networks and difficulties that were experienced in producing sustained collaboration. They also explained challenges to collaboration that arose from the inability to conduct sufficient oversight. The implications of the findings above are explored below, both for managers of stabilization networks and followed by implications for collaborative governance theory.

Stabilization Networks: Perpetually Emergent Networks

The striking instability of Stabilization Networks was seen across the cases, over time and across a range of network features. Instability or disruption was seen in Network
Structures and Governance, Coordination and Strategy, Relationships, and Knowledge Management, in particular. This is consistent with an Emergency Problem Solving network. However, the Milward and Provan theory holds that Emergent Problem Solving networks should mature into Problem Solving networks over time. Though network features and overall collaboration generally improved in U.S. Stabilization Networks, at no point did the networks themselves ‘stabilize’ during the course of the cases. Given that the cases span several years or even more than a decade, this suggests that a time scale for Stabilization Network maturation would be in the order of decades, if ever. Thus, effectively, Stabilization Networks can be described as perpetually ‘emergent’.

Further, the instability of the stabilization networks likely frustrated the development of network features that could have provided for greater stability. Organizational changes can take well over a year or two to see through, including negotiations between organizations, and waiting to impact budget cycles (Bardach, 1998). More complex changes or policy changes can take three years or more. Frequent tour rotations likely limited the ability of managers to identify the necessary developments as well as make and solidify the agreements necessary to support greater collaboration. This is most clearly evidenced in the cases in the study where agreements between organizations to support collaboration were made and then collapsed with staff turnover, such as the CDROLLE in the Afghanistan RoL case. In some cases, organizational agreements were developed, abandoned, and then reestablished.

This has greater implications for collaboration in Stabilization Networks when taken together with the Agranoff typology’s assertion that greater levels of collaboration require greater and more formal network management features. The establishment of more formal
network features would generally take longer than the duration of agreements between organizations would naturally be sustainable in stabilization environments. Thus, the dilemma becomes two-fold, in that new partners must re-establish relationships but also re-understand the issues and mutually agreed solutions that were to be addressed through the establishment of formal network structures. As with any network, more formal mechanisms are needed to enable higher levels of collaboration, but the environment itself works against it.

Through understanding the dynamics of the perpetually emergent stabilization network, conclusions can be drawn about the causes of their challenges in a Network Governance context. With this examination, the network features that seemed particularly negatively impacted in Stabilization Networks by these shocks can be used as a starting point to suggest means of mitigating the challenges. Further, the examination of collaborative governance in the stabilization context provides an opportunity to review the body of theory that comprises Network Governance theory as it used here. Through applying the theory to this new environment across these cases, new insights for the theory of collaborative governance can be gleaned. Both of these are discussed in two sections below, with observations and recommendations for stabilization practice for managers and practitioners in Stabilization Networks and for collaborative governance theory.

**Managing Organizations in Perpetual Emergence.** For managers, a key implication of perpetual emergence would be that fostering collaboration is an enduring management responsibility. To start with, managers should build strategies to develop trust among partners who do not already have strong cultures of collaboration (for example see
Linden, 2002, p. 64). This would involve understanding limits to trust among organizations, including rivalries, conflicts, resentments, competing priorities, etc. Further, maintaining and reestablishing relationships is an ongoing effort in a stabilization effort. This is almost certain to transcend individual “relationship holders” as staff transitions. Thus, efforts should be made to preserve them across rotations.

A corollary to the need ensure that trust is established among partners is that programs and program activities need to address potential perceptions of donors fostering dissent (Australian Aid, Office of Development Effectiveness, 2012). This should occur in the design stages of any activities or interventions.

As described in the integrators and supporters network features examination, leadership could play a key signaling role in fostering collaboration across boundaries. In stabilization efforts, this should be an expressed responsibility of leadership. In many cases, it is an implied role for leaders or managers. However, due to the importance of the role of leadership in emergent problem solving networks, establishing and demonstrating collaborative relationships with all partners should be a clear responsibility for leaders.

Managers should be prepared to build such cooperative relationships to deal with the many common issues seen in Stabilization Networks. In particular, issues of transportation, logistical support, security, access to locales and local persons, accountability and oversight of projects, and access to information were common areas of collaborative effort. Many of these issues are taken for granted outside of Stabilization Network environments.

Further, managers should understand and recognize the degrees of collaboration that may be sought across organizations. This would include identifying how much collaboration is possible across sets of organizations, due to divergent goals or inflexibility.
of resources. To enable this, managers should identify key players without whom progress cannot be achieved, as well as understand their positions on collaboration. Managers should also understand limits to collaboration that may result from inflexibilities or incompatibilities in funding sources.

**Mitigating Information Sharing Challenges.** The hostile environment and security restrictions lead to restrictions on information. Information sharing is a key building block to collaboration, and is the starting point for establishing relationships, setting common priorities, and the further steps necessary for higher order collaboration. Given the hostile nature of the environment, concern or restrictions on information are justified. However, information must still be shared to enable collaboration. Further, the availability and rate at which information can be accessed has implications for the overall efficiency of a collaborative network. Thus, restrictions to information sharing, i.e. a “need to know,” should be balanced with a “need to share” to enable partner success across the network.

As described above, the security restrictions in place created barriers to accessing information, as well as at least providing a nominal barrier to the speed at which it could be accessed or discovered. While stabilization organizations described the hassles of information sharing as manageable, it is likely that there were significant impacts that resulted. For example, humanitarian NGOs self-selected away from partnering with security conscious U.S. government organizations, in part due to the limited information exchange and associated barriers.

Further, particularly considering the limited degree of trust observed among organizations in stabilization environments, pre-approval or requirements to share
appropriate information may further enhance collaborative network performance. In a low trust environment, managers with the discretion to do so, may decide to withhold information from suspect partners. Or, they may simply not feel empowered to share, rather than actively withhold. Moreover, security restrictions on sharing information can easily be leveraged to avoid information flow or can have a chilling effect on benign information sharing.

**Information Sharing Recommendation 1:** To support collaboration, appropriate information sharing should be encouraged, or, even required. Information management for stabilization environments should take into account what information should be shared with partner organizations. Risks to staff or activities should be taken into account regarding what information to protect. However, information that possesses no or minimal risk and is useful to other organizations should be shared widely. From the review above, common types of information that was regularly sought out by participant organizations included:

- Common risks or threats
- Organizations acting in the physical or functional areas
- Roles and responsibilities of participants
- How resources could be leveraged
- What are the host nation needs, particularly locally
- What can local partners sustain
These kinds of information could start the basis for an information sharing or dissemination plan for a stabilization effort. The “need to share” could be enabled in several ways. These include donor requirements for implementing partners to report information to appropriate lead countries or secretariats. It could also be promoted through shared planning processes, such as information management annexes in National Development Strategies or U.S. Joint Campaign Plans. Further, it could be institutionalized through organization training in doctrine. This latter is particularly relevant, as military systems were not designed to promote information sharing with outside partners.

**Information Sharing Recommendation 2:** In addition to considering what information needs to be shared or protected, due consideration should be provided to how information that needs to be shared can be. For example, information stored on U.S. secured computer networks frequently had to be manually shared (i.e. downloaded to physical media and transported by hand) with non-U.S. partners. In other cases, databases were not well used or were not sustained after their initial start-up project ended. Properly secured, enduring, and accessible repositories of knowledge should be considered, such as the information sharing portal in Afghanistan. Further, proponents of these repositories should also be considered.

Ideally, these considerations will be planned for well before organizations begin operations in a stabilization environment. If trusted and enduring information portals are established, then their use can be regularized and habituated though the means described to enable the “need to share”, as above in Recommendation 5a.
Mitigating Accountability and Oversight Problems Cut Across Organizational Boundaries. As detailed under Hypothesis 5a above, accountability and oversight is a particular difficulty in a stabilization environment. It is clear that the challenges to oversight and accountability created barriers to progress, elevated costs, and created greater risks to success. As with local partner capacity development, this was a problem across stabilization organizations. Likewise, this suggests a collective element to any approach to address the issue.

Accountability and Oversight Recommendation 1: Accountability and oversight functions organic to the host country should be a capacity that is developed like any other. Though this would include the ability of the host government to monitor and enforce laws, this capacity would also expand beyond that. It could further include developing an active media, responsive political leaders, or watchdog civil society groups, professional associations, etc. to develop accountability within a fragile state. Such local organizations could partner with the host government, UN, or donor states directly, as appropriate to the stabilization environment.

Further, developing accountability and oversight capability for the network should be considered as an express area of effort or sector. This could take the form of funding oversight programs for the network, serving as a matchmaker to enable more efficient oversight, or discovering ways to leverage organizations with greater access.

Existing oversight agencies, such as the Special Inspector Generals for Iraq (SIGIR)
or Afghan (SIGAR) Reconstruction could take on these functions. Or it could be a lead country activity, established as a ‘cluster’ collective effort, or assigned to a United Nations mission or “conflict secretariat” (see above). This body could serve as a proponent to develop oversight and accountability capabilities across the network, developing new capabilities, managing programs to deliver capability to the network, and/or working among organizations to promote efficiencies.

**Accountability and Oversight Recommendation 2:** As seen in the cases, the military or other security forces, frequently had greater freedom of movement. Stabilization partner organizations were aware of this and frequently enlisted their assistance in oversight activities. However, this was conducted on an informal, ad hoc basis. To facilitate greater network efficiency, this potential role for security forces or other organizations operating with greater access in a stabilization environment should be considered, and where possible leveraged to support accountability and oversight for those organizations with less access. Formal agreements could be established between stabilization organizations to enable this. Moreover, this role could be added to the chartering authorizations of UN security forces, and to the plans for U.S. or other military organizations. However, in the former case, due care should be taken to not jeopardize the humanitarian or peacekeeping role of the UN security force due to the often perceived political nature of stabilization interventions.

**Accountability and Oversight Recommendation 3:** In most non-stabilization development or collaborative governance environments, a certain level of accountability and oversight for programmatic activities is assumed. However, in many cases, in the stabilization
cases examined here, projects and activities were continued without sufficient oversight. In other cases, they were dropped or abandoned as staff, units, or organizations changed. This led to a number of program challenges and outright failures. To avoid this in the future, steps should be taken to ensure proper project and program accountability and oversight. One measure would be to establish minimum acceptable standards for accountability and oversight requirements in hostile environments. For example, if a funder or trusted agent cannot physically observe a project, then the project may need to be suspended or dropped. These could include common expectations for degrees of oversight, recommend best practices when there are oversight challenges, and accountability measures for monitoring and managing projects in the face of high turnover rates.

**Accountability and Oversight Recommendation 4:** While in many cases the costs of additional physical security that hostile stabilization environments necessitated were well stated, the increased costs to accountability and oversight were not as visible. While there is a general sense that accountability and oversight were limited, there was no accounting for the increased transportation costs, security costs, or project risks that barriers to accountability and oversight created. In an insecure and weak civil society/media environment, characteristics of failed states, resource providers will have a greater burden in this area. These hidden or unarticulated costs should be more clearly analyzed and accounted for in organizational budgets. Further, they should be planned for and anticipated during any future stabilization efforts. Lastly, to the extent possible, the increased costs and risks of oversight and accountability barriers to collaborative governance in hostile environments should be clearly communicated to policy makers when considering future stabilization
efforts.

**Mitigating Instability from Turnover.** As described in hypothesis 5b, turnover and continuity were particular challenges for Stabilization Networks. Staff and organizational discontinuity impaired stabilization network functioning in terms of knowledge management, coordination and strategy, relationships, and even network governance and organization. Lack of continuity led to disruption in collaboration, particularly that which was not routinized or habituated by organizations. Collaborative efforts had to be regularly adjusted, if not re-established, as staff, and particularly leaders, transitioned. While the obvious solution is to enforce longer tours, this is not practical for a variety of reasons, such as risks of death or injury, the stress the environment takes, and barriers to staff recruitment and retention. Longer tours alone would also not address issues of organizational discontinuity, or the problems with host national staff turnover (through seeking personal opportunities or security risks). However, a number of ways to mitigate turnover-related challenges present themselves.

**Instability from Turnover Recommendation 1:** Organizations with personnel or unit tours should establish a formal transition process. This would be particularly applicable to the U.S. civilians in unaccompanied tours. Such a formal process should include not only self-organizational knowledge, but should include bridging relationships with local partners and the communication of tacit local network knowledge as described in the knowledge management section above.
**Instability from Turnover Recommendation 2:** As seen in the cases and explored in Hypothesis 5b, leadership transitions and the resulting resetting of priorities had a negative effect on the performance of the stabilization network. While there is no doubt that given the fluidity of the complex and hostile stabilization environment a measure of flexibility is required, there are real consequences to unfettered or unnecessary changes. Thus, it seems like some oversight or limits to the changes enacted due to leadership changes should be developed, with respect to the need for flexibility. At a minimum, mechanisms should be established to develop and track organizational priorities, as well as their changes, as leaders transition.

**Instability from Turnover Recommendation 2a:** In particular, shared priorities between organizations are of concern in a stabilization network environment. There were numerous cases in the examples of leadership changes resulting in the dissolution of or need to reestablish organizational agreements. This degraded network efficiency and provided barriers to further collaboration. As a result, shared priorities, and agreements that articulate them should be paid special attention. Shared priorities between organizations should be re-affirmed, or changed as needed, as a matter of course during leadership transitions. This can be done through an agreement process or planning process, such as the Unified Common Plan between U.S. civilians and military organizations in the Iraq Provincial case. Further, at a minimum, they should be tracked by higher headquarters, with notifications of their approval, dissolution, or other changes. Higher headquarters may even want to establish justification or review processes for their abrogation, in order to support stabilization network success.
**Instability from Turnover Recommendation 2b:** While in many cases, a significant barrier to collaboration was the rigidity of nationally or even home country managed projects, unfettered discretion in project direction was also an issue. This was seen in the cases of those projects that were locally managed, such as in the PRT or U.S. military managed CERP funds in the Iraq and Afghanistan Provincial cases. Frequently during leadership transitions in these situations, programs were added, dropped, or changed as priorities changed. This led to inefficiencies, program failure, and collaboration challenges with partners, who were often caught unaware by the changes. Thus, measures to monitor and even moderate project changes should be considered by higher headquarters when project decisions are delegated to field locations. For example, in the case of the U.S. military’s formal transition process, it could be extended to include a formal process to re-affirm, modify, or cease projects as leaders transition. Such a process could include justifications, as well as analysis of impacts to stabilization partners. Or, another approach could be to require an agreement with a receiving caretaker to transition projects when organizations, staff, or units are transitioning.

**Instability from Turnover Recommendation 3:** In many of the cases, staff hired from outside of home organizations were brought in to mitigate staffing problems. However, often times such outside staff had limited ability to understand home organization processes, procedures, and practices, as well as access the resources and non-local expertise of said home organizations. This limited their potential effectiveness. Organizations should recognize these challenges in bringing in outside staff. Appropriate training and assistance aids should be included to ensure that incoming outside staff would be able to fully
understand how to apply the resources of the home organization as well as access resident home organization expertise.

**No One is Managing the Stabilization Network**

A second overall observation across the cases is that no organization is “in charge” of many stabilization activities, or is regularly and systematically managing the effort across organizational boundaries. This is evident in a dearth of overarching conflict oriented collaborative governance network structures or governance. Lack of stability and established network structures for managing conflict and stabilization networks also suggests insufficient organization for managing collaboratively and too much focus on crisis response, rather than holistic approaches to Stabilization across the network and over time. As a result, organizations are forced to address stabilization specific issues on an ad hoc basis.

This is in contrast to the management in most other areas. For example, functional areas or sectors of activity generally have a ‘lead’ country or organization, such as State Department’s INL being the lead for Rule of Law in Iraq and Afghanistan. Or there is working group, or ‘cluster’ body, for specific issues in addition to a lead country. There may even be a formal secretariat for general issues, such as the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Activities. These leads, working groups, or offices serve a number of collaboration network functions, often serving as repositories for information, facilitating information sharing and best practices, promoting the development of functional area capacity among organizations, or more. They can also serve as a link to other functional areas. Such elements can often become a key node from which increased collaboration can develop.
The lack of stabilization or conflict specific network management proponent body or organization made it far more difficult to assess the impacts and challenges of conflicts across the network organizations. Moreover, it enabled inconsistent approaches, as well as the instability of network development with the changes in organizational leadership. There were also a number of cross-organizational issues, such as local capacity building and competitive pressures among organizational participants, which were difficult to address independently.

**Stabilization Network Level Management Recommendation 1a:** As explored above, conflict situations created their own set of collaboration challenges. Though it is not precisely a functional area, conflict should be given the same level of attention as other areas. This would involve some sort of proponent for those issues which arise as a result of the conflict that are not already addressed by other proponents. These new network structures should take steps to mitigate network challenges described below, in areas such as knowledge management, relationships, coordination and strategy, and oversight and accountability. Some specific activities or products these structures should provide would be promoting donor coordination, serving as a repository and proponent for assessments, facilitating new organization and staff arrivals, promoting the use of stabilization related knowledge or best practices and tools across the network, and promoting local organizational capacity in support of the overall network. This would include promoting the use of needs and conflict assessments to inform stabilization programs and activities, as well as the promotion of conflict mitigation best practices across organizations. The structures should also support the development of mutual understanding and/or guidance on the roles of organizations.
participating in the Stabilization Network.

The exact form this could take could vary significantly. A natural fit would be to explore the ‘lead’ country (or UN organization) and cluster like structure models. This establishment should include a set of collaborative, network enabling responsibilities. A lead organization should most often be a United Nations organization or, as in the Iraq and Afghan cases, a donor state. The lead should staff and organize to support their lead responsibilities. The conflict cluster mechanism could take on issues such as those addressed here, as well as support outreach across the Stabilization network. This approach would have the benefits of being relatively low cost, as well as flexible. However, it may not be able to have as great of an impact in terms of collaboration, and may not be sufficient to enable higher levels of collaboration (such as Outreach or Action network activities in the Agranoff typology).

Another model would be the development of a secretariat function for conflict, analogous to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) role. In this approach, a modular secretariat could be established. The secretariat could serve many of the same functions as the OCHA office, as applied to conflict related issues. However, attaching such a function wholesale to the existing United Nations mission construct or to the existing OCHA office would be problematic. As the case of Mindanao illustrates, there may not be a formal United Nations mission for all conflict areas. Further, conflict is inherently political, and such a function as conflict management may not nest well in the OCHA, which often needs an unassailable perception of neutrality to succeed at its mission. Thus the secretariat would need to be applied flexibly, either as its own body or attached within an existing office, such as United Nations mission or to a United Nations special
envoy’s office, depending on the circumstances, political concerns, and host nation receptivity.

**Stabilization Network Level Management Recommendation 1b:** A corollary to this observation is that when conflict oriented positions or leaders are established, they should explicitly have coordination and collaboration responsibilities. There were a number of examples in the cases of conflict oriented roles either not having coordination responsibilities or not acting on them. Any country taking lead role or establishing new positions to address conflict should incorporate a coordination and collaboration proponency role into them.

**Stabilization Network Level Management Recommendation 2:** As discussed above, Stabilization Networks exist in a state of Perpetual Emergence, with organizational reforms taking longer to identify and implement than leadership is able to manage. One way of mitigating this would be to establish a proponent for organization reforms for Stabilization efforts. This could involve any new Stabilization Network structures as identified above. It should also involve an office or structure in donor nations. These structures could provide proponency for longer-term organizational changes, track the history and need for such changes, and help foster continuity in their implementation by leaders in the field.

**Local Capacity Problems Cut Across Organizational Boundaries.** Local organization’s lack of technical capacity seems to be particularly acute in stabilization
environments, almost by “fragile state” definition. Often, the local organizations have the most situational and historical knowledge but also have the least technical capacity. Though the lack of capacity can be more general, technical capacity deficits related to Stabilization Networks can frequently include basic abilities, such as literacy, or more managerial oriented skills, such as project or program design and financial management.

However, it is not clear that capacity building is anyone’s “job.” NGOs and donor agencies are primarily focused on executing their programs. In some cases, the United Nations is looked to for host government capacity building, but it is not always clear that it is their role or function. This is an issue, as donor state and international organizations/NGOs are looking for capable local partners but frequently have limited options or can’t find them. Further, low capacity local organizational partners can limit progress of network activities. In many cases, particularly in the Mindanao and South Sudan cases, this leads donors to sometimes favor the United Nations or international NGOs over local organization partners. Limited local organizational partnering can reduce overall network understanding of the local environment, creating knowledge development requirements, as well as delay strategic success of the network.

One cause for this issue is that in many cases, developing local organizational capacity creates a free-rider problem. Organizations that are investing in another organization’s technical capacity can find the developed staff being “poached”, or otherwise seeking better opportunities. Further, high local turn over, often precipitated by the violence in a Stabilization Networks environment, can reduce the payoff for capacity building for a single organization undertaking it. This creates a disincentive to conduct technical capacity building and suggests it is a collective action issue.
**Mitigating Local Capacity Issues Recommendation**: Partner capacity in a conflict environment should be examined as a community, or Stabilization Network, problem. Developing network-wide local organization partner capacity in Stabilization Networks should be a lead country role, a ‘cluster’, or part of a secretariat’s roles, such as the United Nations mission or UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. This could also be a responsibility area for a potential conflict proponent, as described in Practice Recommendation 1.

This proponent should develop a network-wide understanding of technical capacity needs for local organizational partners, to include type of technical knowledge and scale. This proponent could encourage project funders to consider explicit capacity building goals as precursors or as part of program objectives, build network capacities to develop technically capable local organizations through sharing best practices, find efficiencies across organizational activities (and reduce any inefficiencies), or manage projects or programs designed to support the network through local organizational partner technical capacity. Such a community approach could be supported through individual donor efforts or, for a specialized funding source, such as a common fund. This could be similar to the South Sudan Capacity Building Trust Fund, but more expansive in nature.

**Competitive Incentives can Undermine Collaboration.** Competitive forces among donors and implementers can undermine motivations and drivers for collaboration. These collaboration “anti-bodies” were seen at the donor state level and with implementing partners. Both are driven by the individual priorities and goals of the Stabilization Network organizations.
Though donor states often share broad strategic goals, there are not typically shared objectives at the program level. Donor states can have their own priorities for a variety of reasons, such as prestige, needing to demonstrate a result for domestic constituencies, economic interests, etc. Such program priorities were not typically directly opposed, and may even be complementary at times. However, the situation of competing tactical donor state priorities sets the stage for program inefficiencies.

Such inefficiencies can be seen at the implementation level, among their implementation partners. For implementing partners, objectives are largely driven by donors, and being responsive to donors compels a divergence in program objectives across implementers. Resource sharing may occur for specific activities when they are complimentary, but each program has its own version of the particular results it is intended for. Thus, sharing of resources with other organizations may place a particular donor state’s objective at risk. In many cases implementing partners are not willing to share resources, or lack the discretion to do so.

Further, implementing organizations can compete for funds, which results in a structural disincentive to collaborate. Though there is resource sharing once projects are underway, credit and ‘branding’ can be contested as commodities that will enable future funding victories. Additionally, information sharing or other collaborative activities may be restricted to prevent disadvantages, or preserve advantages in the pursuit of funding. These competitive pressures can rapidly limit or undermine collaboration at the program implementation level.
Mitigating Competitive Incentives Recommendation 1: To mitigate these counter-collaborative pressures, donor states, and implementing organizations should consider establishing counter-balancing mechanisms or incentives to support collaboration in conflict areas. Donors could adopt common mechanisms to support collaboration. This could include common standards required for grants or contracts regarding collaboration expectations, or asking that proposals include descriptions of how potential implementers intend to collaborate. Reporting requirements for implementation partners regarding collaboration could be established. This reporting could include both collaboration that occurred and roadblocks or failures in collaboration. Donors could also mitigate the impacts of competing program priorities through established frameworks for common program objectives in a sector, functional area, or region.

Mitigating Competitive Incentives Recommendation 2: To mitigate the funding pressures, protocols could be established for general collaboration expectations among implementing partners. These could include best practices for collaboration, when collaboration should be expected, and minimum standards for collaboration. The protocols could be generally applicable to all international development or humanitarian environments, but should address conflict specific issues such as those described herein. These protocols could be adopted organically among the implementing partner community, or mandated through collective donor state requirements. Once adopted, such protocols should enable collaboration through fostering a shared set of expectations and by empowering implementation partner managers to facilitate collaboration or, at a minimum, allay fears that collaboration would not be supported by leadership. Such concerns alone can frustrate
Inflexible Funding, More Than Lack of Planning, Limits Collaboration

Across the cases, there was a frustrated desire for greater degrees of collaboration. This was particularly the case between U.S. civilian and military organizations, who sought an Action network level of collaboration, under the Agranoff typology, with shared understanding and decision making to address problems. As seen in the Agranoff typology discussion (Hypothesis 2b), funding sources proved to be a barrier for collaboration, even when the motives (trust, shared goals, leadership intent) were present (see Emerson et al., 2011).

One specific observation on U.S. civilian and military collaboration was the limitations of planning. Increased U.S. civilian and military planning has frequently been looked at to enhance collaboration in stabilization networks. However, while planning could enable an Outreach network level of collaboration, it could not fully enable the desired Action network level of collaboration when organizations had limited control of funding resources. The inability to directly control funding resources, particularly among the U.S. civilian organizations, to support inter-organizational plans limited them substantially. Overall, the high-level strategic documents described in the planning section, above, did not bring about the level of synchronization or integration that might be desired.

Mitigating Planning Limitations Recommendation 1: Both the level of collaboration desired and the authority to direct resources should be a consideration for planning efforts. Once that is determined, the planning should include the organizations and
appropriate levels to achieve the desired impact, in both terms of shared approaches and priorities, and direction of resources. For example, in the U.S. civilian and military cases, this would likely involve planning both at the country level and in Washington, DC. This would likely involve the development of working groups, planning bodies, and secretariats to mirror planning activities undertaken in the host nation. In a sub-national context, this could include involving implementation partners who are managing resources in planning bodies. For example, in a future PRT construct, it may be useful to consider mandating liaisons or embedding local implementing partner staff onto the teams in order to establish direct lines of communication with implementing organizations.

**Mitigating Planning Limitations Recommendation 2a:** One practice seen in the cases was at least as successful as integrated planning: regular joint or combined presentations to senior leaders for review of projects and activities. For example, in the Iraq and Afghanistan cases, there were examples of combined civilian and military briefings to senior leadership. Such presentations could be to either a civilian or military senior leader, or even both. This process did seem to foster at least an Outreach network level of collaboration among partners. Though not without costs in terms of manpower and leadership attention, this practice of senior level review required fewer resources than integrated planning and seemed to produce similar collaboration results. Thus, as a less resource intensive, but still effective means to support collaboration across organizations, joint or combined reporting for senior leadership should be considered. This review should ideally be concurrently or conducted jointly by all organizational leaders, and should take place at as high a level and as frequently as is feasible.
Mitigating Inflexibility in Funding Recommendation 2b: Shared funding mechanisms\textsuperscript{77}, i.e. pooled civilian and military funds, or funds which require both U.S. civilian and military approach, should be explored as a means to facilitate (or necessitate) high level collaboration between U.S. civilians and military. In theory, such shared funds would resolve the inflexibility issues by being co-directed. Further, through co-direction, they would require some measure of agreement on priorities.

Mitigating Inflexibility in Funding Recommendation 3: U.S. conflict-oriented funds, such as any future Quick Response Funds, or CERP, should be designed to mitigate resource inflexibilities (for example, see Linden, 2002, p. 194). This could include being responsive to country and/or sub-national planning and priorities. They could also enable collaboration, through bridging gaps in conventional funding areas, such as in synchronizing timing or functional areas not normally covered (particularly development of local partner capacity development). Ideally, as per Practice Recommendation 3b, they would foster collaboration through being dual-keyed, or pooled funds. If these conflict oriented funds are effectively replacing a non-conflict fund, such as the case of CERP being employed “where civilians are not operating,” then they should be as consistent with U.S. civilian and/or international best practices as is practical to promote collaboration and transferability. This consistency of practice should include both the activities themselves and the oversight and evaluation of the funds.

\textsuperscript{77} An example of one such “dual-key” fund is the Department of State managed Global Security Contingency Fund, which funded primarily by the Defense Department with State Department contributions.
Observations and Findings for Collaborative Governance Theory

Just as the examination of U.S. Stabilization Networks across the cases yielded insights on the organizational and network management of them, they also fostered findings for collaborative governance theory itself. In particular, the findings from the stabilization challenges have implications for collaborative governance theory. These are explored here, with recommendations for potential future research. If future research affirms their validity, they may be incorporated into future collaborative governance theories, typologies, and logic models.

Theory Observation 1: Develop Accountability and Oversight as Network Elements. As important a role as accountability and oversight played in explaining collaborative governance challenges in Stabilization Networks was, its absence in the body of collaborative governance theory is notable. As seen in the hostile environment discussion (Hypothesis 5a), insecurity is a toxic environment for the oversight and accountability of partners and of network service provision. Collaborative governance theory itself notes that networks can create greater opportunities for corruption, and entail their own oversight mechanisms and approaches. These issues manifested in the case studies in a number of ways. One way was that in a patronage society, corruption complaints were often actually complaints about someone else’s corruption cutting into theirs. Another way was in staff behavior. In many cases, deployed staff were able to pick and choose (and argue and fight for locally) their preferred activities, independent of any strategic direction. This was also seen in the phenomenon of ‘long-term’ staff who were effectively functionally independent of their higher headquarters.
In the western world, this has led to the development of parallel “accountability networks,” which tie in efforts of groups such as the media, civil society, elected officials’ response to constituents’ complaints, etc. to support government accountability. By and large, these accountability network mechanisms were absent in stabilization environments. The stabilization networks themselves began to develop their own oversight and accountably networks to mitigate these issues. This included efforts to leverage trusted agents and to gain access to areas through security forces, among others. Additionally, entire new organizations were created, such as the Special Inspectors for Iraq (SIGIR) and Afghan (SIGAR) Reconstruction. These accountability organizations, in turn, established their own coalitions, or accountability networks, to attempt to foster oversight and accountability. In Afghanistan, twelve U.S. and Afghan organizations were present or established to address oversight and accountability in some manner. The increases to collaboration challenges, costs, and risks to success that resulted from the absence of oversight and accountability were clearly seen in the cases.

The case studies suggest that accountability and oversight should be considered an element of collaborative governance networks and in the theory. This could include examining accountability as part of network features. Or, it could be considered as an environmental variable for networks. The impact on how the network functions, organizes and governs due to the nature and means of accountability that it operates in could be

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78 These included SIGAR; the International Contract Corruption Task Force; Task Force 2010; Afghanistan Threat Finance Cell; Defense Criminal Investigative Service; Department of Defense; Department of Homeland Security; Department of State Office of Inspector General; Major Procurement Fraud Unit; U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division Command; Naval Criminal Investigative Service; U.S. Navy; Office of Special Investigations; U.S. Air Force; Regional Security Office, Department of State; and the U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Inspector General. (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2009 and 2010)
explored as well. Understanding the role of accountability and oversight as part of a collaborative governance network could help to improve understanding of collaboration challenges or costs, as well enable better management within them.

*Theory Observation 2: Explore the Assumption of Trust.* Collaborative theory seems to imply or assumes a starting point of mutual trust, and trust is described as being key to successful working relationships (Linden, 2002). However, starting with the discussion on relationships in Hypothesis 1 and evidenced throughout the cases, such trust can be limited or nonexistent in stabilization networks. Many organizational relationships exhibited varying degrees of distrust, particularly initially, which needed to be overcome. Collaboration challenges were further exacerbated when roles and responsibilities were unclear in an atmosphere of low-trust or distrust. However, collaborative governance theory does not frequently examine the building of trust or overcoming of distrust.

Moreover, collaborative governance theories seem to focus on the “pull” factors for collaboration: why potential network participants may want to collaborate. In the cases, it seems to be at least as much the case that organizations felt at least as much compelled to collaborate rather than actively seeking it out. In other words, the organizations were “pushed” to collaborate. Push versus pull factors for collaboration, and how they may impact a network’s functioning, are not greatly explored in collaborative governance theory. For example, organizations that are reluctantly collaborating may be “going through the motions,” rather than actively supporting network goals (Linden, 2002).

The motivations for collaboration, including initial levels of trust and push or pull factors for collaboration, could be further explored. Difference in such starting conditions
could have impacts in network development or functioning. It is possible that typologies of trust, or push and pull factors, could be developed to frame network understanding. Further, better understanding these starting conditions could help develop better recommendations for network managers. In addition, strategies that account for the slow development of trust should be developed. Moreover, a low trust or distrust starting point as well as the concept of push motivations for collaboration, rather than pull motivations, suggests that study on negative collaboration, or network participation to subvert outcomes, either of the network or a competing organization, could be a potential area of study. Analysis of apparent or false network participation could be a very interesting area, though potentially methodologically challenging.

**Theory Observation 3: Expand the Concept of Network Stability.** Network governance theory describes network stability largely in terms of participant duration, such as organizations exiting or entering the network. However, as illustrated in the turnover discussion (Hypothesis 5b), other factors can affect network stability. Turnover of individual personnel, turnover of leaders, and changes to funding all had network stability impacts. Current collaborative governance theories do not address these factors in detail. Furthermore, current collaborative governance theories do not address in detail the mechanisms through which instability creates challenges in networks. In the case studies, it appeared that network instability had a compound effect, in that as staff turnover, changing priority, and funding changes accelerated, the internal shocks to network stability appeared to exhibit ripple effects. More and more network participants had to expend more and more resources to keep up with the adjustments. While current collaborative governance theories
describe instability as a negative shock to networks, it does not provide significant detail on how or why.

The concept of network stability could be expanded to include elements such as staff, leadership, or even funding changes as an element of network stability. These sub-elements could be the basis for an expanded typology of network stability. They could be further examined for impacts to network stability and efficiency in other settings. Additionally, the mechanisms through which instability negatively affect network efficiency could be explored. Through such an examination, it is possible that greater insight to the mechanism of network resilience could be better understood, potentially allowing for better management decisions to mitigate stability related network shocks. It is possible that more longitudinal studies of networks could provide additional insights into how these mechanisms unfold over time.

**Theory Observation 4: Explore Network Technical Capacities.** Within collaborative governance theories, organizational or network capacity, is generally described in terms of resources, such as personnel or funding. However, technical capacity was shown to be important in the discussion on resource disparities (Hypothesis 4). In the theory, technical ability of network participants is a characteristic, often discussed in terms of an additive network feature. For example, a network participant’s technical ability in an area is frequently described as being able to enable problem solving or new solutions for a network. However, such a technical ability is not well examined in terms of capacity, or degree of actual or potential ability to perform.

In all cases, network challenges were produced by differences in technical capacity.
This was seen in the case of the U.S. military and civilians, and between international donors and local organizations. Technical capabilities of organizations seemed to be a key differential, with impacts to collaboration, particularly in regard to relationships and knowledge management. While it is not clear that impact of technical capability disparities were as great as those of personnel or funding disparities, it is clear that they were also important. Current collaborative governance theories do not examine technical capabilities in great detail.

As a result, technical capacities should be examined as part of organizational and network capacity examinations, along with more traditional or visible disparities such as personnel and funding. For example, differences in capacities between network participants may be more completely described in terms of deficiencies of the right personnel, rather than just as personnel limits. Such an examination could provide a greater understanding of relationship or knowledge management issues within networks. It could also potentially enable better decision making by network managers.

**Theory Observation 5: Developing an Emergent Service Provision Network Model.** As was explored in the Milward and Provan typology discussion (Hypothesis 2a), stabilization organizations seemed to have service provision network features, as well as emergent problem solving network features, in the Milward and Provan typology. The service provision aspect was frequently more pronounced in the humanitarian response organizations. This is likely because, while stabilization organizations are concerned with addressing a problem (violence), humanitarian organizations are focused on responding to population needs through service provision, employing NGOs to deliver assistance directly
to beneficiary communities (South Sudan Interview 19 October 2013). While this is consistent with the service provision network category, humanitarian organizations typically do this in response to emergent crisis. This suggests that they may be classified as emergent service provision networks.

The collaborative efforts of humanitarian groups to respond to crisis may be researched as a possible emergent service provision network. As with the other Milward and Provan categories, the salient features of these networks may be determined.

Final Thoughts

As stated in the beginning of this work, stabilization plays a critical role in the foreign policy of the United States, and can be expected to continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Even without large military presences, the U.S., along with the international community, can be seen attempting to play a stabilizing role in number of places. At the time of this writing, this would include places such as Yemen, Syria, Nigeria, as well as continuing efforts in the case study countries.

Collaboration plays a pivotal role in these stabilization efforts, and this research has attempted to demonstrate the extent to which that is true. As has been stated, collaboration itself cannot deliver stabilization success, but lack of collaboration can ensure failures. Many of the limits and challenges, as well as successes, of collaboration in U.S. stabilization efforts have been detailed in this research. Understanding the factors at an organization level which can either promote or hinder collaboration can enable greater success and avoid failures, weather at the individual project level or for the entire conflict. These findings build upon the work already done by numerous lessons learned papers, reports and doctrine
development in area of stabilization efforts. Through the frameworks of collaborative governance theory, the findings advance a more holistic understanding of the challenges of collaboration in Stabilization Networks.

Understanding U.S. stabilization activities from a collaborative governance perspective, or as a stabilization network, provides a theoretical basis for understanding how to manage within stabilization activities. Further, it sets the foundation for developing the organizational network as a new unit of analysis for managers. This conceptual ‘tool’ should improve understanding of stabilization activities and provide managers an improved conceptual framework for how to view them. This could include raising awareness of the need to manage across organizations as a participant of a network, in addition to managing an organization within them. This also includes establishing reasonable expectations of success and challenges in stabilization environments, as well as means to assess how achieve and mitigate them, respectively.

However, understanding alone is, again, necessary but not sufficient. U.S. managers should be armed with the tools to address Stabilization Network challenges. For the findings of this research to have practical impact, they must be translated into knowledge and resources for managers and organizations acting in Stabilization Networks. This could include incorporation into the U.S. military doctrine that was initially reviewed, as well as into organization training programs, and lessons learned literature. They must also be translated into appropriate organizational structures to support collaboration. Once incorporated in these and/or other means, the findings of this research may lead to improved efficiency and, ideally, success in mitigating conflict and bringing stability to violence afflicted peoples in the world.
Appendix 1: Research Methods

Research Question

Stabilization activities have proven extremely challenging for the U.S. government. Though they may be inherently difficult, at least a part of the problem seems to be that there are incompatible and incomplete frameworks for managing within them. Though far from a solution to the challenges of stabilization on their own, such management frameworks would seem to be one piece of a larger puzzle that could help support and enable greater success with them.

Given this, the overarching research question is:

Do stabilization activities exhibit the key network governance elements identified in collaborative governance literature as important to network success, and does their absence help account for the difficulties seen in managing in stabilization activities?

The following questions, derived from the overarching question, formed the basis of the research:

A. What are the U.S. government practices for managing multi (or cross) organization collaboration in stabilization activities and do they resemble collaborative governance networks?

A.1. What is the current U.S. government guidance or ‘doctrine’ for managing multi-organizational collaboration in stabilization activities?

A.2. How does the U.S. government guidance compare to collaborative
governance theories?

B. Do U.S. stabilization activities exhibit features of collaborative governance networks identified in the literature as important for their success?

C. If they do, what kinds of collaborative governance networks do they exhibit? What is missing in stabilization activities?

D. Does U.S. government collaboration differ in stabilization activities from domestic settings and, if so, how and why?

E. How well do U.S. government collaboration practices match with those suggested by collaborative governance theories?

   E.1. Is there a positive relationship between matching collaborative governance theories and U.S. government success at collaboration?

F. Finally, what improvements to the management of U.S. Stabilization Networks are suggested by collaborative governance theories?

   F.2. In turn, are there any improvements or expansions to collaborative governance frameworks suggested by the study of stabilization activities?

The intent of this research is to improve understanding of how U.S. government managers approach and manage within these complex and often difficult operations. This in turn would serve to inform development of our national capabilities to successfully conduct them. Given the magnitude of the national effort in terms of blood and treasure it has taken to conduct them, as well as the regional and geo-political ramifications, this research would be a significant contribution to national and even international security. The results of this
inquiry will ideally not only inform policy decisions on future activities, but will provide value for current efforts in places such as Syria, Afghanistan or South Sudan.

Further, while the focus of the research is on bettering U.S. government understanding of how to manage within stabilization activities, the research should also refine and potentially even extend the general body of collaborative governance theories. Stabilization activities are unique in the arena of collaborative governance research by virtue of being conducted in hostile (violent) environments. They are also unique in that they provide a group of cases with similar desired outcomes that, so far, has not existed among collaborative governance case studies. Thus, the results of this research could be utilized to extend the general universe of collaborative governance cases and related theory development, and enable cross comparisons. Such cross comparisons could provide a window into the value and role of collaborative government mechanisms.

Research Scope

This research was bounded by the following parameters regarding specificity of the research, boundaries of what is included as stabilization activities, and limits regarding the evaluation of success or advisability of stabilization activities.

The intent of the research was to be able to describe in general terms the relationships and network features connecting U.S. government organizations and other organizations, broken down into major categories of organizational types. Thus, the level of detail is limited; comprehensive data on every individual organizational relationship is not be necessary. However, enough data to make general statements about relationships with predominant categories of organization (such as civilian, military, host nation, international
organization, other states, NGOs, etc.) should be obtained.

Though no formal definition exists, for purposes of this research stabilization efforts (or stabilization activities) are to be viewed as “the missions, tasks, and activities conducted by the U.S. government, with or without the military, for the purposes of maintaining or reestablishing a safe and secure environment, providing essential governmental services, allowing emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and providing humanitarian relief.” Thus, U.S. stabilization activities can occur either as part of a U.S. military activity, or without it. They also include U.S. efforts to address an ongoing conflict as well as efforts to ensure a peaceful environment after a recent conflict.

Further, stabilization activities are often conducted in tandem with counterinsurgency or other security operations. For the purposes of this study, in the cases of coinciding stability and security operations, only the elements of the operations that focus primarily on diplomatic, rule of law, governance, and economic efforts are viewed as part of the stabilization activities. Further, stabilization activities are also occurring in areas of humanitarian operations, to address health and wellbeing issues such as diseases (HIV, malaria, etc.) or malnutrition. They could also occur to provide aid after natural disasters. These types of activity that were not directly linked to conflict were excluded from the cases. The humanitarian responses were included if they were significantly linked to stabilization issues, such as to persons displaced by conflict or in certain cases of combined planning efforts.

Evaluating the impact of stabilization activities is beyond the scope of this research. The “success” of many of these efforts in terms of achieving stability objectives will be a subject of historical debate for many years to come. This is in no small part due to the
complicated causation underlying successes or failures, disagreement on what constitutes success, and the highly limited availability of data about the impact of programs and projects in stabilization activities. Thus, while successes or failures of the network and the benefits of collaboration are examined, the ultimate impact of programs or activities, as well as their cumulative success in establishing stabilization are outside the scope of this research. For example, the benefits to providing a service or activities from collaboration were examined, rather than assessing if the activity was ultimately successful. As a result, evaluating the community level of impact (from Provan and Milward’s measures of success, 2001), as per the above discussion of identifying network success, is beyond the scope of this research. Additionally, as stated above, the personal level of network success (in Agranoff’s measures of success, 2003) is beyond the scope of this research.

Further, questions about whether these stabilization activities are advisable or good policy decisions is also beyond the scope of this research. They were be examined in terms of activities that have happened, are happening, and will continue to take place, rather than attempting to develop a normative evaluation about them.

**Case Selection**

All of the cases were selected in terms of significance and the ability to test the above hypotheses and explore the research questions:

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79 The violence of a conflict area typically precludes substantial data collection on the impacts of programs and activities.
**Significance:** Iraq and Afghanistan represent the largest and most significant recent U.S. government stabilization activities. In both countries, the U.S. military operation reached a peak of over 100,000 U.S. troops, with a supporting civilian component numbering in the thousands, and billions in reconstruction spending. Together, they were the U.S.’s largest efforts at rebuilding a foreign country since the end of the Second World War (Cravens, 2014c).

**Hypothesis 1, Features, Hypothesis 2a and 2b, Typologies, and Hypothesis 3,**

**Collaborative Success:** Each of the cases were evaluated in terms of the collaborative governance features, the Milward and Provan and Agranoff typologies, and the relative degree of success in collaboration.

**Hypothesis 4, Disparity in Power and Resources:** The selected cases cover a wide range of disparity between organizations. Both Iraq and Afghanistan had a tremendous U.S. military presence, which dwarfed the civilian elements and other actors, including the Iraqi and Afghan governments. The Philippines case seems to have had a more balanced mix of U.S. and civilian actors, and was more balanced compared to the resources of the government of the Philippines. In South Sudan, the U.S. military was only minimally present, and again overall balance of resources seems to be more even between organizations.

**Hypothesis 5a, Security:** The cases selected range in violence levels from high, in terms of both U.S. military and local civilian casualties, in Iraq and Afghanistan, to lesser in the
Philippines, and to low in South Sudan, with corresponding higher or lower security restrictions. Levels of violence ebbed and flowed across time and location in Iraq and Afghanistan, though they remained relatively high. This was particularly true in the north and western parts of Iraq, and in Baghdad. In Afghanistan, the regions of the south and east of the country were significantly more affected by violence.

**Hypothesis 5b, Short Tours:** U.S. government and many international actor tours in Iraq and Afghanistan were characterized by shorter one-year tours, while South Sudan and the Philippines had a larger element of longer term, multiple year stays for personnel.

**Case Study Data**

To build a network ‘map’, the organizations participating in the stabilization activity were identified. The network mapping began with U.S. government (civilian and/or military) organizations, and expanded to include other organizations that they work with, such as host nation organizations, International organizations, other nations, NGOs, private organizations, and any others. Then the relationships of the organizations with the U.S. government were examined, to include funding mechanisms, such as grants and contracts, as well as the internal relationships between U.S. government organizations (such as between civilian and military organizations). This process attempted to identify both formal relationship and informal partnerships. The former was initially identified from a review of published sources, such as strategic plans, agreements, major studies, etc. Informal relationships were identified through a mix of document review and discussions with
network participants. See below for a further discussion of data sources. This developed the Stabilization Network map, centered on the U.S. government and its relationships across organizations, and between civilian and military organizational lines.

Once this map was developed and the organizations that comprise the network determined, data regarding the features or characteristics of the network was collected and categorized. As a starting point, the following table outlines the collaborative governance factors and what indicators were examined during the research. The indicators were derived from the collaborative network factors identified in the literature review, with additions derived from the hypotheses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network Governance &amp; Organization (Network Structures, Network Capacity, Communications):</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Governing bodies, standing working groups or task forces, chartering &amp; foundational documents, decision making rules, funding mechanisms, sanctions and incentives</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Liaisons between network actors</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Structures in place to facilitate or improve means, frequency and type of communications - formal and informal, e.g. meetings, email, conferences, websites, newsletters, project reports, etc.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Coordination &amp; Strategy (Planning, Goal Congruence, Membership)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Mission/vision/objective statements or elements from other documents, strategic plans &amp; planning bodies; statements of interviewees</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Cross comparison of individual actors’ goals from mission/vision &amp; strategic plan sources, characterizations from interviewees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Statements of membership intent, expansions of participating actors, characterizations from interviewees</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Resource sharing</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Knowledge Management (Single View of the activity, Info &amp; Knowledge Sharing, Data &amp; Benchmarks, Knowledge Base):</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Shared information on objectives and problems from documents such as reports and interviewee characterizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Frequency and content of information exchanges -- expert and tacit, e.g. meetings, email, conferences, websites, newsletters, project reports, etc. to be derived from document and interviewee characterizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Types and frequency of data collected and benchmarks that were established, e.g. in reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sources of expert and tacit knowledge within the networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The impact of security and short duration tours</td>
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</table>

80 This approach is loosely based off the approaches described in Agranoff 2003, Agranoff 2007, and Milward and Provan 2006.
### Relationships (Stability, Trust, Cultural Understanding):
- Duration of participation of individuals and actors in the network -- from documentary sources and interviewee characterizations
- Interviewee characterizations of items such as comfort level in sharing information and sharing resources, expectations that sharing would be reciprocated, etc. supported by any documentary sources
- Interviewee characterizations of items such as mutual understanding or conflict over differing approaches and assumptions, training and efforts to promote cultural understanding among actors, etc. supported by any documentary sources
- The impact of security and short duration tours

### Integrators and Supporters (Integrators/Champions, Promoters):
- Degree of presence or absence of integrator or champion of the network and/or network activities -- derived from interviewee characterizations, e.g. who was the driving force behind the organization or particular activity, etc. supported by any documentary sources
- Presence or support of influential outside actors for the network -- to be determined from interviewee characterizations and published statements of political leaders where possible

### Indicators of Network Success, Organizational or Agency Level:
- Resource sharing or avoidance of duplication
- Expanded access to information and expertise, pooling and access to additional resources
- Enhanced legitimacy
- Improved Outcomes for organization ‘clients’
- Risk sharing and management of uncertainty
- Innovation investments, enhancing flexibility, and access to others’ adaptive efficiencies

### Indicators of Network Success, Network Level:
- Collaboration that would not otherwise have a chance to occur (ranging from information sharing to decision making, depending on the means of collaboration for the network in question)
- Cross-organizational problems addressed
- Increased knowledge and resource sharing across organizations
- Shared solutions to joint problems

### Indicators of Network Success, Tangible Network Outcomes
- New knowledge for the network (e.g. from new studies, new data, etc.)
- New financial resources identified
- New plans, policies, or programs that could enhance existing efforts or be entirely new activities to reach network goals
- Products or services that enhance overall public sector capacities, such as through new training, conferences, publications, or resource efficiencies

### Data Sources and Access

The sources of data were primarily from document review and interview. The starting point for the data collection was primary source documents, such as interviews and other types of firsthand accounts, or original government reports or even (potentially)
internal documents. Secondary source documents, such as reports and other analysis and research into the respective activities, which are based off primary source materials, were reviewed, as well. Information that cannot be obtained through documentation was sought through conducting interviews.

**Documentation.** The Iraq and Afghanistan stabilization activities were very well documented – to the point that sorting through the available documentary information was challenging in its own right. Numerous first person interviews are available through public and U.S. government sources on Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, regular government reports and audits were produced on these major activities. Additional sources of information could be news articles, websites, etc., as well as news articles and other documents. Stabilization activities in the Philippines and South Sudan are less well documented. Some information does exist on agency websites, in U.S. government publications, and through media articles and think tank reports.

Documentation was particularly useful in building the network map, and for providing an initial understanding of relationships between organizations. It described many formal network governance and organization features, as well as formal coordination and strategy development. Interviews, articles, and lessons learned reports also provided additional information on the relationships between organizations, knowledge management and integrators and supporters – particularly in an informal capacity. In all cases, primary sources were preferred.

**Interviews.** Because much of collaborative governance involves tacit knowledge
management or informal exchange and coordination measures (Goldsmith and Eggers 2004), 14 interviews were conducted to build upon the primary and secondary document research. The interviewee population included all levels of management within the Stabilization Networks, as well as non-managerial personnel who worked with multiple actors within the network. Interview subjects were mostly U.S. government personnel, as the analysis is focused on the U.S. government perspective of the network. For the cases with a U.S. military presence, at least one member of the U.S. military was interviewed. U.S. government civilian personnel were interviewed in all cases. In the Mindanao and South Sudan cases, personnel with United Nations and NGO experience were also included. In some cases, interviews yielded results that could be used in multiple cases, such as staff that had experience in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

A general set of questions is attached (at Appendix 2). Interviews were conducted after Human Subjects Research Board (HRSB) review and approval. Please see the draft informed consent letter for further information (at Appendix 3).

**Data Analysis**

Each hypothesis was initially evaluated within each case. The data was analyzed within each case, to see how the observed data matches up (or does not) with collaborative governance features and typologies, as outlined in the literature review and data sections above. The roles of the collaborative governance features (e.g. network governance and organization, coordination and strategy, knowledge management, relationships, and integrators and supporters) were assessed with regard to their prominence and importance in terms of managing the Stabilization Network. The network typologies that were applied are
Agranoff’s (Informational, Developmental, Outreach, and Action) and Milward and Provan’s (Service Implementation, Information Diffusion, Community Capacity, and Problem Solving [Designed and Emergent]). The role of the hypothesized environmental features (violence, with increased security and shorter tours) and the characteristics of the Stabilization Networks (size, diversity, and power and resource disparities) was be explored. Lastly, the success of collaboration within each case was examined.

As per the data collection and scoping section above, this analysis was a general characterization in terms of categories of organization types (e.g., civilian, military, host nation, NGO, etc.). These general characterizations were exemplified with anecdotal details as appropriate and available. This allowed for characterizing the importance of inter-organizational relationships for U.S. government managers and how they impact management.

After evaluation within each case, the data were evaluated across cases for a broader understanding of the relationship with collaborative governance frameworks and typologies. This involved a relative ranking of the network features by sub-category. This ranking though subjective, was intended to be defensible and explainable. To this end, criteria were established for the ranking of each sub-category. Criteria included number of organizational types involved or that were impacted and the scope or range of issues addressed, such as the range subject areas or geographic areas addressed. Standing governance bodies were also evaluated based on their formality, with each being described as formal, semi-formal, or informal. This was in terms of formal chartering, formal authorities, and regularity of their activities. Periodic events, such as meetings, conferences, and workshops were assessed in terms of frequency. Sub-categories that were degree oriented, such as degree of trust or
comfort, were also assessed in terms of their respective intensity or impact. The specific criteria for each sub-category were included in their respective descriptions. Each sub-category was then assigned a ranking of very low, low, medium, high, or very high. Case rankings at the category level were then determined through assigning a 1 to 5 value for reach sub-category ranking and simply adding them. The scoring was then used to assign the same rankings to the category of network features.

This was an iterative process, seeking to identify trends across cases that related to the theories and frameworks being tested. Once the data analysis was complete, final conclusions about the hypotheses and research questions were drawn. The analysis included the description of a Stabilization Network as a new network type. In addition, from this analysis management suggestions for Stabilization Networks were developed, as part of the conclusion of the research. Lastly, analysis of the cases in terms of existing collaborative governance theory was conducted.
Appendix 2: Interview Questions

Derived from the collaborative governance literature review, research questions, and hypotheses.

General Network Questions:

- Which organizations (civilian, military, international, IO, NGO, host nation, etc.) are involved in the Stabilization Networks?

- How do the roles played by organizations in networks differ, and how are they similar?
  - What are the ranges of roles that networks play in different programs?

- How did the capacities of network organizations compare?
  - What was the division of ‘labor’ or specialization like?

Coordination & Strategy:

- How do organizations map and work with the various networks and actors within them relevant to their objectives?
  - How often were strategic mechanisms employed in the network?
  - What ‘gaps’ were there in common goals and strategies?
  - How do officials insure that goals are met? What kind of guidance is provided?
· What reports are required from network members? How is evaluation handled?

· Did the length of tours have an impact on common vision and goals? If so, how?

Network Governance & Organization:

· What structures existed to deal with network relationships? To resolve disputes for example?

  · Where there foundational documents for the network or sub-elements?

  · What resources are required to support the network, such as liaison officers, etc.?

  · What are the major management capacities actors must have to work with networks to achieve objectives?

  · What are the key management skills that organizations must have to work effectively within networks?

Knowledge Management:

· What kinds of information are required to be shared among organizations of the Stabilization Networks?

  · What are the means of information transmission?

  · What, if any, knowledge transfer or policies have been initiated to support information sharing between network actors?

· Who provides knowledge and of what character is it?
- How often is information shared?

- What difficulties are there in sharing information? Was or how much was security a problem? How often is needed information available but not sharable?

- What kinds of performance measures have been developed? How useful were they?

- Did the length of tours impact knowledge retention and/or management? If so, how?

Relationships:

- How do U.S. government officials interact with the broad range of non-U.S. government organizations? Can you characterize the relationships?

- How well do organizations understand one another?
  - What differences in assumptions or perceptions inhibit collaboration? How often does this occur?
  - Are measures established to mitigate them?
  - Are these differences organizational or institutional in nature?
  - How did security and violence impact relationship development?

- When do organizations choose not to share information?
  - How comfortable are actors with sharing information or relying upon other network actors?

- Did the length of tours impact relationships? If so, how?
Integrators and Supporters:

- Is there an overall ‘lead’ organization for the network or sub-elements? Which actors are ‘lead’ organizations?
  - Are there clear leaders on sub-elements of the network, or for specific programs? Are they different?

- Who provides political support to the organization? Does it endure or did it dissipate? What happened after that?

Indicators of Success:

- Did collaboration with other organizations lead to:
  - Resource sharing or avoidance of duplication of efforts?
  - Expanded access to information and expertise, pooling and access to additional resources?
  - Enhanced legitimacy?
  - Improved Outcomes for organization ‘clients’?
  - Risk sharing and management of uncertainty?
  - Innovation investments, enhancing flexibility, and access to others’ adaptive efficiencies?
  - Collaboration that would not otherwise have a chance to occur (ranging from information sharing to decision making, depending on the means of collaboration for the network in question)?
  - Addressing cross-organizational problems?
- Increased knowledge and resource sharing across organizations?
- Shared solutions to joint problems?
- Development of new knowledge for the network (e.g. from new studies, new data, etc.)?
- Identification of new financial resources identified?
- New plans, policies, or programs that could enhance existing efforts or be entirely new activities to reach network goals?
- Products or services that enhance overall public sector capacities, such as through new training, conferences, publications, or resource efficiencies?
Appendix 3: Informed Consent Form

INFORMED CONSENT FORM

RESEARCH PROCEDURES
This research is being conducted to explore the role of collaborative networks in U.S. stability operations. If you agree to participate, you will be asked to agree to an interview of approximately 45 minutes duration.

RISKS
There are no foreseeable risks for participating in this research.

BENEFITS
There are no direct benefits to you as a participant other than to further research in the area of stability operations. If successful, the research may in due course lead to improvement in civilian and military policies and doctrine to conduct stability operations.

CONFIDENTIALITY
The interviews in this study will be confidential. Written interview notes will not identify the interviewee. The researchers will keep a separate code sheet linking interview notes to interviewees, which will be kept in a secure location. A similar procedure will be used for taped interviews. Interview notes and tapes will not be identified by name unless express permission is given. Interviewees will not be quoted by name.

PARTICIPATION
Your participation is voluntary, and you may withdraw from the study at any time and for any reason. If you decide not to participate or if you withdraw from the study, there is no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. There are no costs to you or any other party.

CONTACT
This research is being conducted by Brett Doyle from the Department of Public and International Affairs at George Mason University. He may be reached at 571-309-1713 for questions or to report a research-related problem. His advisor is Dr. Julianne Mahler, 703-993-1414. You may contact the George Mason University Office of Research Subject Protections at 703-993-4121 if you have questions or comments regarding your rights as a participant in the research.

This research has been reviewed according to George Mason University procedures governing your participation in this research.
CONSENT
I have read this form and agree to participate in this study (for nonexempt research projects, include this statement and a place for the participant's signature and the date of signature).

__________________________
Name

__________________________
Date of Signature

Version date:
Appendix 4: Further Collaborative Governance Theory

Collaborative governance, in the form of new structures involving many organizations or participants operating in networks, became one of means to try to approach some of society’s “wicked problems” (O’Toole, 1997) that could not be handled by dividing them into simple, isolated pieces. As problems become increasingly complex or “wicked,” the need for specialized information increases and, as a result, any single actor, including government agencies, finds itself with only part of the information or resources required to address issues and implement its policy objectives. In response, organizations formed collaborative relationships, or networks, in which they work interdependently to exchange information and/or jointly formulate and implement policies and programs that are usually designed for action through their respective organizations (Agranoff, 2003).

Collaborative Governance Benefits and Costs

Researchers (many of whom who are cited in this section) have observed that collaborative governance networks can provide a number of advantages over the ‘traditional’ model of a hierarchical government as the single provider of public services. Their advantages are most clearly seen in terms of enhancing integration of specialized knowledge and resources across organizations to solve problems. They also can allow for increased specialization among network participants. Further, they can potentially foster innovations and their spread by linking a variety of actors who may approach problems differently, rather
than there being just a single actor with a single approach. Networks can also allow for
greater responsiveness and flexibility in responding to problems compared to traditional
governmental approaches, as participants often have greater autonomy to respond, quicker
decision making processes, and fewer ‘red tape’ bureaucratic hurdles to overcome
(Goldsmith and Eggers, 2009).

Yet, collaborative governance networks are not without their costs and may not
always be as effective hierarchical structures. Costs can range from diversions of leadership
or management attention toward the broader network and away from the home
organizational attention. They can also include needing to mobilizing support across
organizations, or manage other organizational participation levels (Rethemeyer, 2007).
Network functioning can further require organizations to commit staff time or funding.

Given the potential for benefits, but as well as for costs, researchers have found that public
managers often must balance the requirements of network participation and resource
sharing with ensuring the achievement of their own organizational goals.

**Collaborative Governance Challenges and Recommendations**

Researchers have further identified a number of challenges to successfully managing
in a collaborative network. A key challenge to successful collaboration is the divergence of
individual organizational goals among the network participants. Often individual
organizations only partly share goals across organizations, and there is almost always a
tension between achieving individual organizational objectives versus the collective
objectives of the network. This is particularly true when supporting network goals means
the diversion of resources away from achieving individual organizational goals. As a result,
maintaining goal congruence (or cohesion) is a constant challenge in collaborative
governance networks, and demands significant leadership and organization effort (Agranoff,
2003; Goldsmith and Eggers, 2009).

Other challenges can include diffusion of responsibility, and by extension
accountability, among participants. Such diffusion can make both assigning responsibility for
outcomes and the monitoring of progress towards those outcomes difficult. Information
sharing and coordination of activities among members may need to be managed as well, to
avoid inefficient use of resources (Goldsmith and Eggers, 2009). Differentials in capacity
among organization members or the division of scarce resources among participants could be
a problem. Capacity mismatches may mean that some organizations may not be able to
move as quickly or as effectively as other members (Agranoff, 2007). This could force the
more capable organizations to balance between slowing down, expending their own
resources to bolster the less able organizations, or not participating in the network. Further,
collaborative governance networks can face challenges as their participants enter and exit
them more frequently. Such participant instability can exacerbate all of the above network
challenges, requiring them to be continually re-addressed (Goldsmith and Eggers, 2009).

Researchers have further explored collaboration challenges in terms of internal
shocks, originating within a member organization, and external shocks, which arise from the
greater environment that a network operates in (Carboni and Milward, 2012). These shocks
disrupt or impair network performance, through systemic risks. Systemic risk, also known as
critical dependencies, describe a type scenario in which a multitude of interdependent actors
face collective failure if one or a cluster of individual actors fail. A network’s resilience is
defined by its robustness, or ability to keep functioning in the face of shocks, and by its
ability to rebound, or transform itself over time. Network rebound may involve a period of non-functionality or reduced functioning of the overall system during the transformational process.

Given the potential challenges, collaborative governance researches have sought to understand and explain how public managers could leverage their benefits and overcome challenges. To do this, collaborative governance researchers have developed sophisticated theories and frameworks for conceptualizing of management activities in a network. Collaborative governance frameworks describe the general elements and relationships among those elements of multi-organizational networks centered on a public organization (or public policy). Through these, researchers have identified major mechanisms, or features, through which successful collaboration is conducted in these networks. Examples of these features include the bureaucratic structures for organizing and governing the network, the strength of relationships and levels of trust between participants, and shared understanding of both problems and solutions among participants. Building on these network features, researchers have made efforts to categorize collaborative governance networks. These categories not only help to describe collaborative governance network, but also help to derive insights into which network mechanisms may be more important in facilitating successful collaborations and under which circumstances.

From this developing, systematic understanding, researchers have derived recommendations on skills and approaches to collaboration and problem solving within collaborative governance networks. Though not entirely new, these skills and approaches

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81 See Ostrom, in Sabatier, *Theories of the Policy Process*, 2007, for more on the roles of frameworks and theories in research.
differ in emphasis from those normally relied upon in a traditional, hierarchical management environment. A key concept to success is the notion of managing both the network itself, across the body of participating organizations, and as an organization participating within a network. To do this, managers need to have a greater understanding of other participating organizations capabilities, goals, and views. Other important managerial distinctions include the greater role of consensus based leadership and conflict resolution skills, and communication skills (Agranoff 2003 and Goldsmith and Eggers 2004). As a result of this theory-based inquiry, researchers have systematically described collaborative multi-organizational networks and how collaboration can be achieved. Moreover, they have developed a basis for managing both the network as a whole and for public organizations within them.

**Logic Model**

Additionally, researchers (Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh, 2011) have proposed a logic model framework for collaborative governance networks. Such a model captures many of the above factors of collaboration, and places them in a relational context to one another. The logic model describes drivers of collaboration, such as leadership motivation, consequential incentives, and interdependence. The model then describes collaborative dynamics. This begins with the means through which participants engage (principled engagement), which begins at a discovery level, or basic information sharing and understanding, and progresses to a joint determination stage, at which shared decisions are made. Participant shared motivations form the next part of the model, which encompass issues such as trust, legitimacy, and shared understanding. The collaborative dynamics in the
model are completed with a capacity for joint action, which includes factors such as resources, knowledge, leadership, and intuitional or procedural arrangements. The model then describes the varying outputs of collaboration, ranging from new policy or rules, endorsements, enacting new practices, marshalling resources, staff, monitoring compliance, and evaluating results. The model then ends with the collaborative outcomes, which also vary, but will involve changing broader environmental contexts. The model accounts for the environmental context as it applies to the network as the system context.
Appendix 5: Military Doctrine Review

For the most part, outside of the military, the U.S. government does not develop doctrine or similar detailed operational guidance. As a result, the most developed articulation of stabilization activities within the U.S. government is expressed in military doctrine. Present guidance, codified in the Army Doctrine Resource Publication (Army Doctrine Reference Publication) 3-07, Stability (2012) and in Joint Publication, 3-07, Stability Operations (2011), describes two major concepts of collaboration. Those concepts are of a “Whole of Government Approach” and a “Comprehensive Approach” (U.S. Army and Joint Forces Command). Though presented in a military document, these concepts are widely socialized within the U.S. government and can be seen as the general U.S. government approach. They are explored here as a starting point from which to launch an inquiry into U.S. government management practices in stabilization activities and to begin to develop what a collaborative governance analysis might suggest may be missing or improved.

The Whole of Government Concept

Within Army Doctrine Resource Publication 3-07 (referred to simply as Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-07), The Whole of Government Approach refers to integrating the efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States government to

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82 Other military doctrine mentions the Whole of Government and Comprehensive Approaches, such as the Joint Publication 3-24 on Counterinsurgency. However, these documents generally only briefly address them and/or refer readers to the documents analyzed here.
work in collaboration to achieve “Unity of Effort” toward a shared goal. Such unity of effort is described as enabling a balance of resources, capabilities, and activities that can reinforce progress made by one of the instruments of national power (i.e. military, diplomatic, economic, etc.) while also supporting success among the others. Success is said to depend upon the ability of civilians and military forces to plan jointly and respond quickly and effectively to dynamic situations, which requires both the willingness and ability to share resources among U.S. government agencies and organizations while working toward a common goal (p. 1-4).

Ensuring such cooperative behavior is stated to require time and resources, and can occur as regular meetings, formal agreements, assignment of coordinators or liaison staff, or

Figure 5: FM 3-07 Comprehensive and Whole of Government Approaches. The military is represented in the inner most circle, with hierarchical control. The middle ring represents the USG as a whole, with an assumed goal of collaboration. The outer ring represents all actors in a Stabilization Operation environment, with an assumed goal of cooperation (Headquarters Department of the Army, 2008, FM 3-07, Stability Operations, p. 1-5).
even developing common communication or information technology platforms, integrated plans, or joint secretariats. The doctrine further states successful whole-of-government approach requires that all actors are represented, integrated, and actively involved in the process. They must also develop and maintain a shared understanding of the situation and problem, strive for unity of effort toward achieving a common goal, integrate and synchronize capabilities and activities. The doctrine states that they must collectively determine the resources, capabilities, and activities necessary to achieve their goals and allocate resources to ensure continuation of information sharing, common understanding, and integrated efforts.

Further, the Army Doctrine Reference Publication calls for leaders to maintain strong working relationships enable collaboration and sharing, based upon mutual trust and shared goals. The doctrine states that all actors involved in unified action will integrate with the operation from the onset of planning, and that together they complete detailed analyses of the situation and operational environments, develop integrated courses of action, and continuously assess the situation. Moreover, the doctrine states that a coherent whole-of-government approach requires early and high-level participation of national, civilian, and military participants. This approach necessitates active collaboration and dialogue with a wide range of actors, which the doctrines lists as including nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations, the host-nation government, and the private sector (p. 1-4). The doctrine also states that leaders foster unity of effort with civilian actors by applying the concepts of agreed to authorities, assigned support relationships, joint planning, and structure and mechanisms to execute them. A clear delineation and understanding of the formal lines of authority is stated to enhance unity of effort (p. 2-6).
The primary challenges in the doctrine for the whole of government approach are stated as being “differing organizational capacities, perspectives, approaches, and decision-making processes between civilian agencies and military forces.” Further, the doctrine states that U.S. agencies often arrive with differing unstated assumptions or interpretations of events and solutions (p. 1-4).

Army Field Manual 3-24 (2014) further adds to the Whole of Government concept the notion of shifting lead responsibilities between the military and civilian, and/or between local authorities. It states military leaders must be prepared to assume local leadership for efforts where civilian lead is unavailable or cannot access the area. It further states that U.S. land forces must recognize the legal authority of the Chief of Mission in the country, which is normally the State Department Ambassador (p. 1-12).

**Extending the Whole of Government: A Comprehensive Approach**

The Comprehensive Approach extends the Whole of Government Approach to include, to the extent possible, non-U.S. government actors, including intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities to achieve Unity of Effort toward a shared goal with the U.S. agencies. The Comprehensive Approach is stated to be “built from the cooperative spirit” and “unity of effort through extensive cooperation and coordination to forge a shared understanding of a common goal” (p. 1-4). Integration and collaboration is not always possible, and may vary significantly depending on the overlap, or lack thereof, of each actor’s goals and priorities. This level of collaboration is cited as being a more nuanced, cooperative effort than a truly integrated interagency approach that is described in the Whole of Government concept. The doctrine holds that
the capabilities of disparate actors are leveraged to achieve broad conflict transformation goals and sustainable peace. Reaching this goal is described as being in the best interest of the participating actors, and is the motivating factor among participations for collaborating in the Comprehensive Approach concept (p. 1-5).

The doctrine calls for leaders to apply inclusive actions that include coordination, consensus building, cooperation, collaboration, comprise, consultation, and deconfliction\(^3\) among stakeholders. Further, the successful elements of the Whole of Government Approach are summarized in the doctrine as having the following underlying tenants:

- Accommodating the concerns and contributions of all participants.
- Fostering a shared understanding of the situation and problem to be resolved.
- Unity of purpose to focus cooperative effort toward achieving a common goal.
- Cooperation, which reinforces institutional familiarity, trust, and transparency through sharing information (p. 1-5).

The Comprehensive Approach is noted as being difficult to sustain but still critical to achieving success. Gaining this unity of effort is stated to take sustained effort. Further, an authoritative, military approach is stated as often counterproductive in developing effective inter-organizational relationships and in reaching mission accomplishment (p. 1-5). The doctrine points out a particularly challenging area for the Comprehensive Approach, in that some organizations, particularly humanitarian actors or certain non-governmental organizations, may need to retain independence of action and to maintain perceptions of their neutrality by local populations in order to achieve their missions. Achieving cooperative

\(^3\) "Deconflict" is a predominately military term of art use to describe the process of avoiding overlap, redundancy, competing, and/or conflicting activities.
effort while realizing these seeming conflicting goals is noted as a challenge (p. 1-6).

Army Field Manual 3-24, Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies (2014) further adds to the Comprehensive Approach concept. It calls upon commander to work to understand the objectives and priorities of each organization. It also highlights the relationship between the U.S. military and host nation military as being particularly critical (p. 1-13). The doctrine specifically notes that maintaining unity of effort is particularly important during transitions, especially when the transition is between organizations of different capabilities and capacities. It states that relationships tend to break down during transitions and that ego and unhealthy competition are often the greatest impediments to achieving an effective transition. It further calls for commanders to set the tone for their forces to accomplish effective physical and contextual transitions. Transition execution, ostensibly based upon the aforementioned positive relationships, is stated to impact the success of the military mission and risks for an incoming new unit (7-11). However, the doctrine here is brief, and doesn’t explain why differences between organizations may matter, or how to avoid or mitigate ego and undue competition in action.

Prior to these recent publications, an additional factor of bureaucratic cultural differences between U.S. civilian and military participants (see Field Manual 3-07, U.S. Army, 2008 and Joint Publication 3-08 Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, United States Joint Forces Command, 2011)\(^4\) was frequently described.

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\(^4\) The bureaucratic cultural differences between the military and other organizations have been examined numerous times. One of the most widely known examples is the ‘classic’ *Defense is from Mars, State is from Venus*, authored by Col. Rickey L. Rife at the Army War College, 1998. In addition formal research into the subject has been conducted into the issue, an example being ”Humanitarian and Military Organizational Cultures and the Challenges of Contemporary Complex Emergencies” a dissertation by James L. Narel, authored in 2007.
Organizational Culture and Coordination

Although Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-07 and Field Manual 3-24 provide the most developed discussion of the Whole of Government and Comprehensive Approaches, additional doctrine for related aspects exists across many disparate manuals. Some of these publications are directly referenced, while others are only mentioned in passing. In particular, these include the network factors of networked governance, coordination, and relationships, which are consistently mentioned in the description of the two approaches, are more extensively addressed in other documents. They are predominately discussed in Joint Publication (Joint Publication) 3-57 on Civil-Military Operations (2013), and from Joint Publication 3-08 Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations (2011), respectively (United States Joint Forces Command). How this military doctrine suggests managing in regard to these two major issues in Stability Operations serves as the basis for further comparison with a collaborative governance perspective. Through such an analysis, the limitations of the current Approaches to management can be illuminated.

Network Governance. Structures for governance and the resources required to maintain them are not systematically addressed in the current stability operations doctrine. Structures are briefly addressed in Field Manual 3-24 (2014). In the doctrine, coordination is described as taking place through “appropriate decision making structures” at the higher headquarters and lower, tactical military unit levels to coordinate and resolve issues. The

85 For example, they are found in the discussions of the Whole of Government and Comprehensive Approaches in Field Manual and Joint Publication 3-07 on Stability Operations, Field Manual, and Joint Publication 3-24 on Counterinsurgency.
Doctrine calls for coordination meetings to ensure integration of civilians with military and host-nation plans, and the establishment at the headquarters level of interagency coordination groups. The doctrine states that these groups provide information and interagency perspective to commanders, and that they share and integrate information and assist with synchronization of activities (p. 1-14). They may consist of representatives from civilian agencies (State Department, USAID (United States Agency for International Development), DOJ (Department of Justice), etc.), military components, multinational military units, and host-nation agencies (p. 9-9). Further, the doctrine states that coordinating structures be established at each political level of the host-nation government. These structures are to provide forums for sharing information, conducting coordination and liaison, and ensuring an effective and efficient division of labor (p. 1-14).

Joint Publication 3-57 (United States Joint Forces Command, 2013) contains further detail on organizing structures. A high-level structure that is described in the doctrine is the J-9\textsuperscript{86} Civil Military Operations (CMO) Directorate. This directorate would be part of a Joint Task Force headquarters, which is typically the highest level of military command in a country. The doctrines state that the J-9 coordinates with a variety of organizations that have their own agendas and objectives to enable collaborative planning. The J-9 is also supposed to provide a conduit for information sharing, coordinating support requests and activities, compiling and analyzing relevant information, and performing analysis that supports the commander’s assessment. J-9 staff coordinating functions are stated to include

\textsuperscript{86}U.S. military command staffs are designated by a letter/number designation. The letters indicate what level or service the directorate is at, i.e. J for Joint, G or S for Army, N for Navy, etc. The numbers are standard across all of the services, and indicate the functional area of the directorate, i.e. 1 for personnel, 2 for intelligence, 5 for plans, 9 for civil-military affairs, etc.
providing liaison as needed to interagency partners, NGOs, international non-governmental organizations, and other joint task forces, supporting transition operations (terminated, transferred to follow-on forces, or transitioned to U.S. government departments and agencies, or international non-governmental organizations) as required, providing expertise and support to the joint interagency coordination group or joint interagency task force if either is part of the joint staff (p. II-15).

If the coordinating requirement grows beyond what a headquarters can handle, a Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force may be established. This organization would have many of the same roles as the J-9 directorate, with greater capability. Some additional roles specified in the doctrine include providing direction of military host nation advisory, assessment, planning, and other assistance activities by joint U.S. forces, plan and conducting joint and combined civil-military operations training exercises, identifying host-nation civil support, relief, or funding requirements for transmission to U.S. military or government organizations (Joint Publication 3-57, United States Joint Forces Command, 2013, p. II-17).

Two other structures are also described with more detail in Joint Publication 3-57 (United States Joint Forces Command, 2013). A Joint Interagency Coordination Group is described as an interagency staff group that establishes working relationships between civilian and military operational planners and enables long-term and crisis action planning, with links back to their parent civilian agencies to help synchronize joint task force operations with the efforts of interagency partners.
The other structure is a Civil-Military Operations Center\textsuperscript{87}, or CMOC. While a Joint Interagency Coordination Group is a high-level group, a CMOC is described as being stood up at any level of activity. CMOCs are intended to enhance interorganizational coordination between the military with various interagency, host nation government, multinational, civilian, and NGO (non-governmental organization) organizations (pp. V-6 – V-7). The doctrine states that they do this through facilitating collaborative civil-military efforts with other U.S. government departments and agencies, NGOs, international non-governmental organizations, and local national organizations. Civil Affairs personnel, who are military personnel who specialize in interacting with civilians outside the military, are designated as forming the nucleus of the CMOC (pp. II-8). CMOCs can also include representatives from other military units or organizations, military liaisons from other military partners, U.S. civilian interagency participants, host or partner nations, or even from private sector, NGO, or international organizations (p. II-20).

A number of functions for a CMOC are described in the doctrine (figure II-8, p. II-21):

- Provide nonmilitary agencies with a focal point for activities and matters that are civilian related.
- Coordinate relief efforts with U.S. or multinational commands, United Nations, host nation, and other nonmilitary agencies.
- Assist in the transfer of humanitarian responsibility to nonmilitary agencies.

\textsuperscript{87} Joint Publication 3-57 (2013) also describes Humanitarian Operations Centers (HOCs) and Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Centers (HACCs) as coordinating structures specific to humanitarian disaster response (p. 2-17).
• Facilitate and coordinate activities of the joint force, other on-scene agencies, and higher echelons in the military chain of command.

• Receive, validate, coordinate, and monitor requests from humanitarian organizations for routine and emergency military support.

• Coordinate the response to requests for military support with Service components.

• Coordinate requests to nonmilitary agencies for their support.

• Coordinate with the disaster assistance response team deployed by the U.S. Agency for International Development/Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance.

• Convene ad hoc mission planning groups to address complex military missions that support nonmilitary requirements, such as convoy escort, and management and security of dislocated civilian camps and feeding centers.

• Convene follow-on assessment groups.

Additional functions not listed in the table but mentioned in the doctrine include CMOCs providing direct functional specialist support to host nation or foreign partner ministries. They can also consolidate civil information, conduct content management, and coordinate civil data sharing. The doctrine states that CMOCs can also provide a joint force forum for organizations that want to maintain their neutrality; the doctrine further states that many of these organizations consider the CMOC as a venue for stakeholder discussions, but not a stakeholder decision-making forum (p. II-20). CMOCs can serve as an avenue to coordinate on political issues (pp. II-20 – II-21). Beyond being a means of communicating support requests to the military, no reason is provided as to why other actors would be
motivated to coordinate with a CMOC, and even the benefit to requesting support is itself implied and not fully stated.

Civil Military Teams are also described in Joint Publication 3-57 (2013). A civil-military team is stated to help stabilize a province, district, state, or locality through its combined diplomatic, informational, military, and economic capabilities. It combines representatives from interagency (and perhaps multinational) partners into a cohesive unit. Examples of civil-military teaming are listed as include the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) which were used in Iraq and in Afghanistan. PRTs are described as having a coordinating role in terms of reconstruction planning role with interorganizational partners, as part of many reconstruction or stabilization roles (pp. II-22 – II-23).

Joint Publication 3-57 (United States Joint Forces Command, 2013) describes other actor coordination as well. The standard U.S. framework for coordinating in a State, the Country Team, is described. Further, a U.S. interagency Crisis Response Center is mentioned (p. II-22). With regard to the United Nations, a standard United Nations humanitarian coordination center is identified, and it as described as having a coordination role for the host nation, U.S. Embassy, and NGOs (p. V-8). The doctrine states that a military commander may need a direct channel to either to resident United Nations leadership, and that the military’s deployment order should establish arrangements between the joint force and United Nations forces (p. II-26). No coordinating relationship with the military is mentioned, however (p. V-8). Humanitarian NGO coordination is also describe, as occurring by sector such as by health or food. The doctrine states that the military should contact local NGO sector representatives to identify links to the larger NGO community, and to coordinate with humanitarian organizations in the most open forum possible (p. V-8).
Other needs, such as integrated planning are touched upon in the various doctrine publications. However, when addressed it is in a very directive and perfunctory way. The value of planning is assumed – no statement of the direct benefits of plan, or the costs of a planning process, are discussed. Moreover, both partner involvement in a planning process and capability to meaningfully conduct one, namely the U.S. interagency and host nation, is assumed. A thorough examination of what formal and informal structures might be necessary or useful to enable the functioning of the network is not present. Some systematic thought on this issue, perhaps in terms of matching network functional needs with suggested forms of network governance, would be of value.

Coordination. In Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-07 (2012), a major means to achieving Unity of Effort in Stability Operations doctrine is described as coordination between actors. Coordination is dealt with extensively in doctrine manual Joint Publication 3-08 (2011), where it is described as the “process of organizing a complex enterprise in which numerous organizations are involved and bring their contributions together to form a coherent or efficient whole” and “implies formal structures, relationships, and processes” (p. 1-6).

The doctrine calls for coordinating the activities of military forces, civilian agencies, international non-governmental organizations, such as the United Nations (UN) or Red Cross, non-governmental organizations (NGO), regional organizations, and activities of various host nation actors. The doctrine holds that successful coordination enables building international support, conserving resources, and conducting operations that efficiently achieve shared goals. This coordination can simply result in avoidance of duplicative,
competing, or even conflicting efforts (referred to as ‘deconfliction’ in military and government parlance) between multiple activities. Further, it can result in the leveraging resources that could both be provided and shared between actors. It is cautioned that some loss of organizational freedom of action is often necessary to attain full cooperation, but not to the point of compromising the authority, roles, or core competencies of individual actors. The doctrine does indicate that a challenge to this approach is recognizing what resources are available and how to work together to effectively apply them.

Joint Publication 3-57 (United States Joint Forces Command, 2013) Adds that unity of effort can only be achieved through “close, continuous interagency and interdepartmental coordination and cooperation.” This is described as being necessary to overcome confusion over objectives, inadequate structure or procedures, and bureaucratic and personal limitations (p. V-3). It lays out considerations for effective cooperation in that organizational differences may cause challenges. Difference between the U.S. forces and other U.S. government departments and agencies can complicate finding an appropriate counterpart. Differences within U.S. government departments and agencies, in terms of goals, decision-making processes, policies, processes, and procedures can raise coordination challenges. Another significant difficulty is noted as being deterring a primary or lead agency for a given interagency activity. Further, field coordinators may not be vested to speak for parent departments, agencies, or organizations (pp. V-4 – V-5). The common United Nations coordination role with humanitarian actors is mentioned as well (p. V-7). It also does state that U.S. military and interagency partners should incorporate the private sector, used here in the broad sense of any non-public organization, perspectives in plans and strategy (p. V-9).

Field Manual 3-24 (U.S. Army, 2014) also addresses coordination. The doctrine states
that coordination efforts should include key participants from the outset, and that military commanders should build civilian organization participation into their planning processes.

Echoing the discussion of the challenges of achieving unity of effort with NGOs in Comprehensive Approach concept, the doctrine on coordination states that it may be difficult or impossible with NGOs, for largely the same reasons. Coordination is also described as a leader (commander) responsibility (p. 1-14).

The doctrine seems to focus on coordination as an objective rather than as a dynamic set of activities. Moreover, it does not provide much direction on the mechanics of how to accomplish it, mirroring the prior description of relationships. While some parameters are provided for how to approach coordinating with non-military organizations, even these are often described in terms of objectives, rather than as processes. For example, the manual is filled with statements such as “develop and implement an information sharing strategy” or “incorporate, support, and participate in interagency planning processes” with no discussion of how to actually do those things (p. II-10). Much of the doctrine focuses on descriptions of coordinating bodies or organizations, particularly internal military coordinating bodies. This is true even for the section titled conducting coordination. Moreover, most of these descriptions focus on U.S. interagency elements. Underlying the manual’s descriptions of coordination is an implication that either a means of coordination already exists, particularly in the case of U.S. agencies, or that one will be figured out, in the case other organizations such as NGOs or international organizations.

This is contrasted by collaborative governance approach, which purposefully and robustly examines the approaches and actions by managers to foster collaboration. This can be seen in many of the network features above. Elements of collaboration, such as shared
motivations or goals, sharing information, or leadership and support, are viewed as part of a collaborative approach or strategy. A clear example of this is seen in the collaborative governance logic model (Emerson et al., 2011). The latter begins with examining drivers of collaboration, and steps by which organizations decide to engage in collaboration. It then builds to share motivations between organizations. Only then does the model move into examining joint activities across organizations. The military doctrinal approach seems to assume away much of the precedents to organizational collaboration.

Collaborative governance theories further provide a different perspective on role of coordination than the process described in military doctrine. From the collaborative governance perspective, coordination is an activity that furthers the development of common goals and strategy (Goldsmith and Eggers 2004, and Agranoff 2007). Understanding where and when goals converge or diverge is seen as key to success in operating in a collaborative network. This understanding can be formal, derived from informal information sharing, or even from ‘tacit’ signaling from actions, without any direct communications (Bardach, 1998). Coordination and the common goals it engenders are closely linked to a common strategy among network participants, and collaborative decision-making and action. Moreover, collaborative governance researchers spend a great deal of effort documenting and elaborating upon the mechanisms through which the benefits of coordination could be achieved. Collaborative governance researchers regularly derive recommendations on additional skills and approaches to collaboration and problem solving.

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88 A full discussion of this is beyond the scope of this analysis, but an idea of it can be seen in some of the major works in Collaborative Governance theory, such as Governing by Network (Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004), Unlocking the Power of Networks (Goldsmith and Kettle, 2007), Inside Collaborative Networks: Ten Insights for Managers (Agranoff, 2006) and Managing Within Networks (Agranoff, 2007).
in networks from their research and theories.

In comparison, the military doctrine approach does not discuss coordination in terms of developing shared goals between the groups. Though differing goals among coordinating organizations are mentioned as a potential goal, and challenge to be overcome, it does not directly address how common goals can be developed across the range of potential partner organization. Questions such as how or why resources, or even just information, would be shared between participants are not examined. From a collaborative governance view, these would be some of the most important questions that would require understanding.

Further, even if actors agree on a common problem and goals, it is not always the case that participants in a network see the same benefits to contributing to a common effort. The factors which may prevent or limit resources or information sharing between organizations -- such as limited shared goals, lack of trust, concern over autonomy or legitimacy -- should be included in any examination on how to achieve success in stability operations doctrine.

One exception to this lack of attention to common goals and strategy is that in both Field Manual 3-07 and Joint Publication 3-08 do call for a common understanding of the problem and the tasks at hand is called for, which is a precursor to a common strategy and shared goals. However, the discussion of common understanding and tasks is only a cursory mentioning of them as an end state. Moreover, the manuals do not go any further than saying these things should be accomplished. Any supporting details, such as how a common understanding or planning may be achieved, or what results would be desired from them, are not discussed.
Finally, the doctrinal discussion of coordination continues with the theme of activities taking place in static or unchanging environment. Stabilization activities pose not only shifting operational environments, but also typically changing actors and activities. An example of this was the withdrawal of the United Nations after the 2003 bombing in Baghdad and subsequent re-entry of the United Nations into Iraq. A more complete approach, as prescribed by collaborative governance theories, would include a dynamic model of coordination that takes into account changing membership, and even an entrepreneurial approach to the deliberate expansion of membership to add capabilities or to address shortfalls.

**Relationships and “Organizational Culture.”** The descriptions of relationships in the doctrine, often addressed indirectly if at all, are presented as a static ‘end state’. For example, the doctrine often states that Unity of Effort is necessary for the Whole of Government Approach to be successful. This presents a sense of the relationship as being an objective. Furthermore, it does not even begin to describe how to develop a these relationships. The doctrine does call for trust-based relationships to be developed in some cases, but what that means is or how to develop one is only implied, not explicitly spelled out. A collaborative governance approach would view something like a Unity of Effort relationship as a developing and evolving activity, which needs to be nurtured and maintained.

As mentioned above, there is a history of identifying bureaucratic differences between civilian and military organizations as a challenge to collaboration. This is identified in the prior version of Stability Operations doctrine (Field Manual 3-07, U.S. Army, 2008).
and in the prior Joint Publication 3-57 on Civil-Military Operations (United States Joint Forces Command, 2008) doctrine. The term “differing organizational cultures” in these documents is applied primarily to describe differences between military and U.S. civilian agency cultures. According to the doctrine, this is based on the idea that interpersonal relationships between military and non-military actors are difficult and fraught with conflicts and misunderstanding. Therefore, the doctrine states, understanding organizational cultural differences is described as essential to enabling cooperation and collaboration between actors in stability operations doctrine.

The doctrine states that each organization brings a unique culture and philosophy to the operation at hand (Joint Publication 3-57, United States Joint Forces Command, 2008, p. IV-3). Humanitarian and military actors are noted for having particularly different institutional ways of thinking and cultures, reflected in how they organize to achieve their respective tasks (Joint Publication-3-57, United States Joint Forces Command, 2008, p. II-33). Conversely, the military itself is addressed as a monolithic organizational culture. Although while the military Services (Army, Navy, and Air Force) and particularly military branches and units have their own sub-cultures, due to U.S. military common cultural norms, procedures, and hierarchical structure (Joint Publication 3-57, United States Joint Forces Command, 2008, p. IV-8), they are considered as having a functionally similar cultural identity compared to civilian and other outside groups. These differences are characterized as the origin of barriers to mutual understanding and coordination or collaboration between the military and other, particularly U.S. civilian, organizations.

However, organizational culture itself does not wholly explain the full range of interactions and difficulties in fostering working relationships. From a collaborative
governance perspective, actors have a wide range of other differences including motivations, objectives, resources, levels of trust and capabilities (Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004). Although it is certainly an aspect of interpersonal relations, looking at organizational culture alone narrows the focus to just those professional attitudes and assumptions that may be different, rather than viewing the interaction between actors as a relationship. Additionally, one of the pitfalls of cultural comparisons is a tendency to focus too much on surface differences that may seem unique or strange, to the point of distracting attention from salient but less visible working assumptions (Rainey, 2007). Indeed, one might say that the doctrinal management approach puts “the cart before the horse,” in focusing attention towards the organizational cultural differences rather than on relationship building. Despite more current doctrine not discussing bureaucratic cultural differences directly, it is likely that this ‘surface’ understanding is still prevalent. Beyond just omitting a reference to the bureaucratic cultural difference, going even further to directly address this common perception and the pitfalls of these views in the doctrine could help better prepare implementers for their collaboration efforts.

Expanding the concept of organizational cultural differences beyond what is discussed in the doctrine to that of a holistic relationship brings into play concepts such as development and management of relationships. This more accurately illuminates the interpersonal relationships of actors as an ongoing activity, and thus requiring continuing effort to nurture. In military Stability Operations doctrine, this sense of ongoing effort is

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89 A classic example of this type of cultural misreading would be the misguided attempts of American managers to copy Japanese companies in the 1980’s. Often the visible signs of Japanese business culture were appropriated, such as the customs of starting the day by a group singing of the corporate anthem, or group calisthenics. However, the cultural attitudes of workers towards their company that made such behavior successful in Japan were deeply embedded and not transferable. Thus when American workers were directed to copy this Japanese cultural behaviors, it was met with incredulity.
largely absent.

Other Identifiable Gaps

Beyond the challenges of organizational culture, coordination, and strategy, other limitations with the current Stability Operations doctrinal approach can be seen when compared with a collaborative governance framework.

Integrators and Supporters. This area is only barely touched upon in the doctrine. A supporter role is described for commanders, who are described in Field Manual 3-24 (U.S. Army, 2014) as being responsible for coordinating the activities of military forces and cooperative nonmilitary organizations. Commander support is also stated to ensure coordination, establishes liaison (formal and informal), and shares information (p. 1-14). However, no details are provided about what this entails, or the types of skills that may be required to be successful in these tasks.

Moreover, while a diverse range of network actors are described little distinction beyond the reservations NGOs may have in collaborating with the military is made with regard to how active a participant or supporter they may be (pp. 1-13 – 1-14, 1-18). While this may be an important point, other actors are likely to have their own limits to collaboration, either as result of lack of desire or lack of capability to do so. At a minimum, some examination of differing levels of participation should likely be addressed. Further, the U.S. government approach would likely benefit from some exploration of the roles of a network integrators and supporters for U.S. government participants. The role of an integrator is different from that of normal U.S. government ‘lead’, particularly in comparison
with the strict hierarchical military norms of leadership. Additionally, the value of obtaining outside supporters should be reviewed as well.

**Knowledge Management.** Though mentioned in general and in detail in sporadic or incidental manner (Field Manual 3-24, U.S. Army, 2014), this network element is also not systematically addressed by stability operations doctrine. Joint Publication 3-57 (United States Joint Forces Command, 2013) does mention some details about information sharing. Its purpose is described as being to build common understanding of challenges and potential solutions, and as being achieved through proper management of the information and people, processes, and technology (p. III-12). The Joint Publication further states that communications architectures should provide for interoperable and compatible systems to support the exchange of information among all participants, as direct communications between partners facilitates coordination and decision making (p. III-13). Information sharing stated to require strict adherence to foreign disclosure guidelines, but also knowledge of security classification guides and information security policy and procedures to ensure classified and controlled unclassified information is safeguarded. The doctrine states that the military’s information management plan must provide explicit guidance for all forms of information and sharing. In addition, it is noted that sharing and receiving intelligence information is one of the most difficult aspects of information sharing (p. III-12).

Further details are provided in Joint Publication 3-57 (United States Joint Forces Command, 2013) in the cases of sharing between the military and NGOs and the private sector (i.e. any non-public organization, inclusive of NGOs). NGOs are stated as sometimes voluntarily sharing information about local and regional affairs and civilian attitudes, which
can help meet military information needs. Such exchanges are said to be enhanced by collegial relations. However, NGOs are further described as likely unwilling to take place in explicit intelligence gathering activities, so such collection of information should be a secondary function of other activities (pp. V-8 – V-9). NGOs desire for information from U.S. forces is described as information on hazards such as mine locations and hostile areas. Related, private sector communications is described “one of the best ways to unify military and public/private partnerships and best practices to improve internal security and promote stability operations in the operational area” and again threat information is detailed as information that is useful to share (p. V-9).

As seen above, most of the discussion on information sharing focuses on how the military can benefit or leverage other actors to meet their own information needs. A more thorough review of what type of information needs to be shared with whom, and what mechanisms need to be in place in order to do this seems like it would be of value (Willem & Buelens, 2007). In a conflict environment, this issue can be very complicated, with organizational and national restrictions on what information can be shared. The security concerns of the hostile environment also complicate information sharing, as it at once creates an imperative to restrict access to information of use to hostile actors, as well as creates a need to share information with network partners who need such information to help with their own security.

Summary – Insufficient Frameworks

As seen in the review, U.S. military doctrine describes objectives and structures for collaboration, but it does not provide much guidance for means for managers or leaders to
achieve these objectives. Such a systematic framework for how to manage within stabilization activities does not exist in current U.S. military doctrine. This is evidenced through the fragmented and incomplete application of the Whole of Government and Comprehensive Approaches, and their related management concepts, in comparison with collaborative governance theories. The two approaches are not systematically developed across the range of management activities, and a can be seen as ‘appendices’ added to the top of the standard, hierarchical managerial framework of the military. The piecemeal nature of the approach is further underscored by the dispersal of management concepts related to collaboration across multiple volumes of doctrine itself. This is indicative of the lack of a unifying concept that would clearly tie the management elements together.

Additionally, the two approaches are articulated as goals or objectives with very little attention paid to the mechanisms by which they could be reached or implemented. A potential manager in a stabilization activity is given little practical advice or ‘how to’ instruction on how to achieve them. Moreover, a framework for systematically evaluating what kinds and to what level collaboration between different actors may be optimal is not provided. Although a number of network structures are described, even these are not well defined or are described as situational dependent. This echoes the common critique of stabilization activities of being unprepared or relying on ad hoc solutions to the many problems that arise. Another observation is that the Approaches and their related concepts are also discussed in largely static terms, and often as a terminal or ‘end states’, as opposed to potentially dynamic activities. This could leave managers unprepared to address changes that may occur in the stabilization activity environment, which are often seen as complex and rapidly evolving.
These observations of the U.S. doctrine stand in contrast to the well-developed frameworks of collaborative governance theories. Collaborative governance frameworks are a comprehensive and systematic basis for management within collaborative networks. They follow this by developing the managerial mechanisms or means through which to achieve results. Further, they directly address the managing in a collaborative network as dynamic, changing processes.

Thus, as can be seen by this initial analysis of formal doctrine, the U.S. government management approach to stabilization activities seems to be being developed incompletely upon the existing, hierarchically based management approach. The development of a suitable conceptual framework for managing within stabilization activities could greatly improve the U.S. government’s ability to operate within them. Thus, there is great potential for the application of collaborative governance frameworks to U.S. operations in stabilization activities. This is demonstrated further in the case studies, which clearly describe the complex and dynamic nature of collaborative governance management. Further, they demonstrate the need to have a more nuanced and sophisticated approach to viewing collaborative management in this environment.

In general, these attempts seem to have been applied over existing traditional and hierarchical approaches to activities carried out by the major organs of U.S. foreign policy, such as military operations, diplomatic actions, and development programs. However, stabilization activities are unlike conventional military operations in which the defeat of enemy forces is the top priority. They are also not like standard diplomatic activities, which focus on a nation-state-to-nation-state level of interactions. Nor are they like traditional development activities, which seek to improve economic or social conditions over the course
of several years, decades, or even generations. Thus, it is not surprising that such approaches have not completely resolved the difficulties.
Appendix 6: Network Features as Size and Organization Differences Increase

The following hypothesis was explored as part of the initial research into stabilization networks. However, it was not found to be a useful line of inquiry and it is reproduced here as a record.

**Hypothesis:** Stabilization activities will exhibit greater collaborative governance network features (e.g. Coordination & Strategy, Network Governance & Organization, Knowledge Management, Relationships, and Integrators & Supporters) as:

a. The size of the stabilization activity, in terms of the number of organizations (and likely corresponding dollars and numbers of personnel) increase (derived from Milward and Provan 2006).

b. The differences between organizations increases, in terms of shared or differing mutual understanding (or familiarity) between organizations, and agreement or disagreement on goals and/or roles (or ‘lanes of operation’) increases (derived from Agranoff 2007 and Benson 1975).

**Hypothesis a.** Stabilization activities will exhibit greater collaborative governance network features (e.g. Coordination & Strategy, Network Governance & Organization, Knowledge Management, Relationships, and Integrators & Supporters) as the size of the stabilization activity, in terms of the number of organizations (and likely corresponding dollars and
numbers of personnel) increase (derived from Milward and Provan 2006).

Table 9: Network Features Overall Rankings Summary (repeated)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Iraq RoL</th>
<th>Afghan RoL</th>
<th>Iraq Provincial</th>
<th>Afghan Provincial</th>
<th>Mindanao</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Network Management and Organization Structures</td>
<td>Low (18)</td>
<td>High (22)</td>
<td>Medium (19)</td>
<td>Very High (24)</td>
<td>Medium (20)</td>
<td>Very Low (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination and Strategy</td>
<td>Very High (13)</td>
<td>Low (9)</td>
<td>High (11)</td>
<td>Medium (10)</td>
<td>Low (9)</td>
<td>Very Low (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge Management</td>
<td>Medium (6)</td>
<td>Very Low (3)</td>
<td>High (7)</td>
<td>Medium (6)</td>
<td>Medium (6)</td>
<td>Low (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationships</td>
<td>Very High (7)</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
<td>Very High (7)</td>
<td>High (6)</td>
<td>High (6)</td>
<td>Medium (5)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Integrators and Supporters</td>
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</table>

Though the Iraq and Afghanistan mini-cases cover only parts of the overall efforts, a general reading of the hypothesis would suggest that Iraq and Afghanistan overall should exhibit greater collective governance features. However, given the ranges of the prominence of the network features across the cases, clear trends are difficult to establish regarding the prominence of network features relative to the personnel and resources of the stabilization efforts in the cases. Yet, some patterns do emerge upon analysis.

During the courses of the Iraq and Afghanistan cases, within case analysis shows that many network features were developed as resources in personal increased, most notably after the respective Iraq and Afghanistan ‘surges’ (2006 and 2009). This is most clearly seen in the presence of PRTs, expansion to district level teams, and network features such as Rule of Law coordinators, and sector or province level specific conferences, coordinating structures, etc. in the Iraq and Afghanistan cases. This can be contrasted with their absences in the Mindanao and South Sudan cases. Though size of the stabilization efforts does not
seem to be the sole contributor to the emergence of network features (time and experience seemed to play a role as well), they are clearly correlated.

Across the cases, some patterns can be seen as well. South Sudan, one of the smallest cases in terms of personnel and resources, ranks lowest in Network Management and Organization Structures and in Coordination & Strategy. It ranks no higher than mid-range for the other Network Factors. Mindanao, also scores at the lower end for Network Management and Organization Structures and in Coordination & Strategy, with mid-range and low rankings. It does however, rank more highly for least tangible Network Features, such as Relationships and Integrators and Supporters. Further, though they were uneven, the highest rankings for Network Management and Organization Structures and in Coordination & Strategy reside within the Iraq and Afghanistan mini-cases. Less tangible Network Features were somewhat more spread across the cases, but the highest ratings and the lowest rating found in the Iraq and Afghanistan mini-case.

Thus, the hypothesis can be said to generally hold, but not consistently at all times. This finding also seems be consistent with the hypothesis one finding that Network Features are inconsistently applied in U.S. Stabilization efforts. The findings also suggest that it may be a more accurate statement that tangible Network Features will increase as stabilization network features increase. To explore this, the network feature categories were reviewed to exclude non-tangible sub-components. This led to the removal of the Integrators & Champions and Relationships categories. Knowledge Management was reduced to only the metrics sub-category, and goal congruence was removed from the Coordination and Strategy category. Network Management and Organizations Structures were unchanged. They were then re-tabulated, and the results can be seen in the table below:
As can be seen, this version of the network features had a general, though not completely consistent pattern of higher rating for the larger stabilization efforts. Aside from the Iraq Rule of Law (RoL) case, the greatest prominence of Network Management and Organization Structures was seen in the larger Iraq and Afghanistan cases. The Coordination and Strategy features, once goal congruence was removed, also consistently display the highest ratings for the larger efforts. Knowledge Management, when reduced to common metrics or benchmarks, was uneven. However, the RoL cases, which received low rates, had particular challenges with establishing metrics or benchmarks in general. If they are omitted, then even this category of tangible network features generally holds. Thus, it can be said that this hypothesis seems to hold very well if modified to limit it to tangible network features.
Hypothesis b. Stabilization activities will exhibit greater collaborative governance network features (e.g. Coordination & Strategy, Network Governance & Organization, Knowledge Management, Relationships, and Integrators & Supporters) as the differences between organizations increases, in terms of shared or differing mutual understanding (or familiarity) between organizations, and agreement or disagreement on goals and/or roles (or 'lanes of operation’) increases (derived from Agranoff 2007 and Benson 1975).

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</tr>
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<td>Integrators and Supporters</td>
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<td>Low (2)</td>
<td>Very High (7)</td>
<td>High (6)</td>
<td>High (6)</td>
<td>Medium (5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 26: Network Goal Congruence Rankings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal Congruence</th>
<th>Iraq RoL</th>
<th>Afghan RoL</th>
<th>Iraq Provincial</th>
<th>Afghan Provincial</th>
<th>Mindanao</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very High (5)</td>
<td>Very Low (1)</td>
<td>High (4)</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
<td>Very High (5)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This hypothesis holds that as understanding and goals across groups decrease, Network Features will increase, exhibiting a negative correlation, ostensibly as ways to bridge the divides. The Network sub-Feature of mission, vision, and goal congruence generally measures the degree of closeness or gap in this regard. Thus a comparison of that sub-
Feature with the overall Network Features should help test the hypothesis.

The lowest goal congruence rankings were evidenced in the Afghanistan mini-cases, in the Rule of Law case and Provincial cases respectively. As per Hypothesis 2a above, the Iraq and Afghanistan cases were found to generally exhibit greater Network Features overall. However, the Afghanistan RoL case exhibits generally lower scores in all categories other than Network Management and Organization Structures. The Afghanistan Provincial case is rated as high in three out of five Network Feature categories. Conversely, the cases with the highest congruence ranking, the Iraq mini-cases and the Mindanao case, all scored highly in the areas of Relationships and Integrators and Supporters, and in the mid to high range for Knowledge Management. However, they have mixed scoring, ranging from low to high, in the other categories. The medium ranked case of South Sudan was ranked in the medium to low categories across the Network Features. Thus, overall, this hypothesis does not seem to hold across all cases and all Network Features.

In fact, with the Relationships and Integrators and Supporters, there seems to be a strong positive correlation, in all cases aside from the Afghanistan Provincial case. There seems to also be a loose positive correlation across the Coordination and Strategy and Knowledge Management Network Features as well, again, with a single exception case, that of Mindanao. However, there does seem to a loose negative correlation between Network Management and Organization Structures and Goal Congruence across the cases. Thus, after a review of the rankings, hypothesis 2b does not hold generally, and can only be seen holding at all with regard to Network Management and Organization Structures Network Features.
Appendix 7: Detailed Case Stabilization Organization Descriptions

Case 1: Iraq Rule of Law Stabilization Network, 2003-2011

**U. S. Civilian Organizations.** The Embassy RoL section developed and administered educational, advisory, and operational programs to promote a sustainable system of justice. U.S. RoL components trained Iraqi law enforcement personnel in investigative techniques and helped construct and administer prisons that meet international standards. In carrying out its responsibilities, RoL component organizations meet regularly with members of the Iraqi Higher Judicial Council, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of the Interior. RoL offices also oversaw federal law enforcement in operational matters concerning, for example, prosecutions under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (U.S. Department of State, 2012).

Both the State Department International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau (INL) and the Justice Department were key members of the Embassy RoL section. The Justice Department was actively engaged in supporting the overall U.S. Government mission in Iraq since May 2003. However, initial practice in Iraq was that rule of law programs were overseen by Foreign Service officers from INL, and actual advisor duties were performed by attorneys contracted by INL. This began to change in as DOJ deployed more staff to Iraq and from 2007 and until at least the end of 2011, rule of law activities in Iraq were primarily
directed by Justice Department assistant U.S. attorneys detailed to Iraq (Dempsey, 2009). By 2008 there were 19 DOJ lawyers in the country, four at the embassy and 15 on PRTs (Caples, 2009) offered advice on broad policy, detainee and contractor liability issues (Hallman, 2008). By the end of 2011, more than 200 Justice Department employees and contract personnel were still serving throughout Iraq (U.S. Department of Justice, 2012). For its part, initially in 2003, INL was assigned initial responsibility for the Iraqi police training program and funded it, with DOJ support. However, program responsibility was transferred to the Department of Defense in 2004 due to the Iraq security situation, the scale of the task, and the need to ensure unity of command and effort (Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2011). Otherwise, INL in Iraq was active in many areas, either directly, or through its role as administrator of rule of law funds.

Other significant U.S. civilian RoL organizations include USAID and PRT Baghdad. In 2010, USAID had established one major RoL program\(^90\) that provided grants to support the growth of Iraqi organizations that provided legal assistance to disadvantaged populations. The initial funding for this project was allocated at $43.7 million\(^91\) for the first three years. Additionally, the Baghdad PRT assume notable national Iraqi RoL role in areas in which other U.S. RoL actors were not active, including education of Iraqi legal staff, working with law schools, juvenile justice, and the Iraqi Bar Association (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 24 Dec 13).

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\(^{90}\) The Iraq Access to Justice project, which was initiated in October 2010.

\(^{91}\) Through the Economic Support Fund (ESF).
U.S. Military Organizations. Although primarily engaged in conventional military operations in Iraq, U.S. military and other coalition forces (Multi-National Force - Iraq) also assumed a major role in advancing rule of law (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2005). Activities ranged from training and equipping police and prison guards, providing basic training in computer skills to staff in the criminal justice system, a working with the prison system to establish operational rules and best practices (Banks, 2010; Jobson, 2010, September), constructing prisons, rebuilding courthouses, and bar association facilities. The U.S. military in Iraq also provided over 300 transition teams with over 200 advisors to bolster Iraqi Ministry of Interior capacity for areas such as improving
budgeting and procurement, resource management, training, logistics, and infrastructure processes. Additionally, through the Commanders Emergency Response Program (commonly referred to as CERP), numerous individual Rule of Law activities were funded through literally thousands of projects. CERP disbursements (which totaled $325 million by 2005 alone) well exceeded other funds available for non-bricks-and-mortar projects related to rule of law. Further, U.S. military Judge Advocates helped plan for RoL reforms, and in the early stages of reconstruction in Iraq, they oversaw the Iraqi justice system (U.S. Army Center for Law and Military Operations, 2011). By 2008 as initial RoL support shifted to civilian lead, the priority for them and the military writ large became detainees: where to keep them, how to prosecute them, and later, how to move as many as possible to Iraqi custody. In same time frame, there were about 350 military lawyers in Iraq (Hallman, 2008).

**Other Donor States.** International donors, such as the United Kingdom, the European Union, Denmark, Spain, France, and other countries provided assistance to support Iraqi RoL. The British had overall military control of Basra province until 2007 and led the PRT there until 2010. They took an active lead in all aspects of rule of law, with a United Kingdom (UK) and Danish specialist stationed there, and provided police training and improved the functions and conditions of prisons and courthouses. The United Kingdom also assisted in developing and formulating a national forensics strategy for Iraq, and with Sweden, funded training for judges, worked with the Iraqi Bar Association, and supported Iraq correctional service (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2005). The European Union Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq, better known as

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92 Denmark also sponsored a one-day conference on criminal justice
EUJUST LEX-Iraq, was established to provide training, advice, and mentoring to contribute to the establishment of a professional Iraqi criminal justice system. It began operations in July 2005 (European Union, 2012), based in Brussels for security reasons. However, EUJUST LEX-Iraq fully moved its operations inside of Iraq by the spring of 2011 (Folke Bernadotte Academy, 2012).

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO’s role in Iraq was limited to the NATO Training Mission, which was a contingent of approximately 150 personnel (60 of whom were U.S.) involved in training the Iraqi army and police force.

The United Nations. During the course of the stabilization effort, United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) worked with Iraqi ministries, judicial institutions, and civil society on other RoL related efforts, such as the 2005 constitution and constitutional review, legislation development, strengthening democratic institutions, human rights promotion, and supporting elections (United Nations, 2012a). These efforts were integrated into the Embassy, as much of the legal work takes place in the context of political negotiations.

International NGOs. A number of international NGOs were active in the RoL sector, generally with U.S., United Nations or other donor state funding. Some example of these included the United States Institute of Peace, DePaul's International Human Rights Law Institute, the American Bar Association, and the National Democratic Institute, each working on various, sometimes related, aspects of the Iraq RoL sector (United States...

**Government of Iraq (GoI).** The major elements of the Iraqi government that were related to RoL activities were the Ministry of Interior (police and prisons) and Ministry of Justice (courts) (Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2011). During the occupation, the Coalition Provisional Authority, following the U.S. model, separated the Iraqi court system from the Iraq Ministry of Justice through the creation of the Higher Juridical Council, which cause resentment from the Ministry (Banks, 2010). This and other changes could lead to internal tension and conflict in the Iraqi RoL system.\(^{93}\)

**Case 2: The Afghanistan Rule of Law Sector, 2001-2014**

**U.S. Civilians Organizations.** In the U.S. Embassy, the Rule of Law Coordinator and then Coordinating Director for Rule of Law and Law Enforcement (CDROLLE) positions were established as the lead U.S. representative for RoL policy in Afghanistan (Clark, 2011). As an example of funding levels, from fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2007, the State Department’s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau (INL) and USAID spent $110.4 million on RoL programs. Further the Department of Defense provided INL with $300 million to $400 million annually for police training. In addition, in the same time frame, INL spent $48 million on corrections programs and $10 million on

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\(^{93}\) In another example, when the law was changed to divest Ministry of Interior of control over detention centers and vested that power in the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Interior refused to relinquish control.
counternarcotics justice programs (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2008).

Within this section, INL directed and oversaw, in conjunction with its State Department headquarters in Washington, the use of the second-largest source of U.S. assistance funding for Afghanistan. By 2011 their staff comprised 44 U.S. and 17 Afghan employees who oversee the work of 2,500 contractors that implement INL programs in counter-narcotics, police training, justice sector reform, and corrections reform. INL has both formal and informal justice programs (Clark, 2011). INL worked with the Afghan Ministry of Justice, Supreme Court, and Attorney General’s Office. The Justice Department also participated. In addition to the types of activates described above, the DOJ, with INL funding, took an active role in assistance to the Afghan Criminal Justice Task Force and the Attorney General’s Office’s anticorruption efforts and in establishing an Afghan capacity to interdict drugs (Clark, 2011; U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2008).

Additionally, USAID had the U.S. government lead in civil and commercial law, and was the primary conduit for U.S. government assistance to the Afghan Supreme Court. It also funded two RoL stabilization programs, one that addressed increasing the capacity of the justice sector, access to justice and public demand for rule of law, and one that focused on re-establishing traditional dispute-resolution councils (shuras) in recently stabilized areas (Clark, 2011). Other U.S. government agencies that were involved in RoL-related programming and policymaking in Afghanistan included the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Criminal Investigative Division, The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs of the State
Department, the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance and the Asia Bureau of USAID, and the Department of the Treasury (Clark; Wyler & Katzman, 2010).

Initially Afghanistan RoL programs were mainly implemented at the national level in Kabul. However, a number of steps were taken on extending the reach of RoL sector support efforts at the provincial and district levels, particularly after the 2009 announcement of a “civilian uplift.” Subsequently the State Department and USAID deployed RoL staff into multiple areas across Afghanistan, though not in all provinces or districts. This included specialists at regional platforms of the U.S. Embassy (normally co-located with U.S. military Regional Command headquarters), at a Brigade Task Force Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) office, at a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), or at a District Support Team (DST) working with Afghan district government officials (see the Afghanistan Provincial case below, for more details on these teams). At the sub-national level over a dozen Rule of Law Coordinators were deployed to PRTs and military task forces. They advised on projects, developed relationships with and provided mentorship assistance to local Afghanistan RoL actors, and coordinated on RoL activities (Wyler & Katzman, 2010). PRTs in Afghanistan historically played a limited role in RoL though over time increased their participation in RoL programming, particularly among those under U.S. command (as opposed to those operated by other partner nations). In addition, INL and USAID had an extensive network of U.S. and Afghan staff and contractors working at regional centers and in other locations at provincial level throughout the country. Many of these RoL specialists worked closely with military counterparts (U.S. Army Center for Law and Military Operations, 2011).
**U.S. Military Organizations.** U.S. Military assistance to Afghanistan’s RoL sector was provided in the form of training, mentoring, equipping, and infrastructure building. U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) often handled tasks that were less politically palatable to NATO countries, such as detention operations, prison operations, and many activities related to counter-narcotics. The U.S. military provided training to the Afghan National Police as well as the Afghan National Army. It also played an important role in the counternarcotics effort, and military Judge Advocate General officers have worked with civilian as well as military courts. There has been no way to determine what the many different elements of Department of Defense (some under direct Department of Defense command, some under NATO), were spending specifically on RoL (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2008). Department of Defense RoL efforts were funded through the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) and the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, among other sources (Wyler, & Katzman, 2010).

The main RoL command in the U.S. military (subordinate to USFOR-A) was the Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force-435 (CJIATF-435). Stood up in 2009 in parallel to the CDROLLE position in the U.S. Embassy, CJIATF-435 conducted and supported detention, corrections for Afghan insurgents, and supported development of Afghan investigative, prosecutorial, and judicial capabilities, and biometrics operations. CJIATF-435 partnered with a number of Afghan, U.S. civilian, and NATO partners\(^4\) (U.S. Forces Afghanistan, 2013). CJIATF-435 was a follow-on to Combined Joint Task Force-82, which focused on detention operations (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction,

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U.S. Contractors and Implementing Partners. Exact figures of private sector contractor or implementing partner participation in RoL efforts is not available, but by one estimate, by 2007, there were hundreds of direct-hire and contract staff engaged in different aspects of the loosely defined RoL initiative as part of the U.S. civilian and military initiatives in Afghanistan (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2008). The United Nations and other international donors all also implemented programs through contractors and implementing partners.

Other Donor States. There were a multitude of international donors who provided substantial financial contributions to RoL work in Afghanistan, with pledges from international donors totaling $165 million in July 2007. Germany played a major role in supporting the Afghan police\(^9\) as well as working in other RoL areas (Thruelsen, 2010). Other significant donor states included the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, Italy, France, and the European Union. A major European Union program was the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL), which worked for sustainable and effective civil policing and is active at the Central, Regional and Provincial levels but with limited District level engagement. In January 2011 there were 293 international staff from 23 European Union Member States and other countries (U.S. Army Center for Law and Military Operations, 2011). Additionally, as with U.S.-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs),

\(^9\) Germany also supported lawyer training, legal awareness campaigns, and provided advice and assistance to Afghan Ministry of Justice managed district offices.
many of the other international donor state led PRTs conducted RoL-related programs. The United Kingdom in Helmand, for example, played a leading role in improving conditions and officer training at detention centers and prisons, supporting prosecutors and courts, and improving and extending detention and prison facilities. In addition to bilateral efforts, there were ad hoc multilateral efforts as well⁹⁶ (Clark, 2011).

**NATO.** Though the U.S. military had the lead in detention operations and issues, NATO forces under the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) had a number of RoL related missions. A key mission was the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) and its U.S.-led companion command Combined Security Transition (CSTC-A) that supported the Afghan military and national police (Clark, 2011). Initially they engaged in limited RoL efforts. Later in the case study (ca 2010), as plans for U.S. military withdrawal and transition developed, NTM-A and CSTC-A incorporated RoL as a major element in their plan for building the institutional capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces (U.S. Army Center for Law and Military Operations, 2011). For these efforts there were over 850 staff working to build professional and institutional capacity within the Ministry of Interior. ISAF also had other RoL missions, such as transitioning security and detention operations to Afghanistan, overseeing counter corruption efforts of the military coalition.

**The United Nations.** The United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA), and its supporting UN agencies, such as the UN Development Programme

⁹⁶ An example was the 2010 to 2012 Justice and Human Rights in Afghanistan Project, managed by the United Nations Development Programme, and funded by the European Union, Canada, Norway, and Switzerland with a budget of some $37 million.
(UNDP) and UN Office on Drugs and Crime, had a mandate to improve governance and the rule of law including transitional justice, budget execution and corruption, counter-narcotics support, countering human rights abuses), implementing RoL activities from the national to local levels\textsuperscript{97} (Clark, 2011).

**Multi-Donor Trust Funds.** Two main RoL related Trust Funds were established in the Afghanistan RoL sector, The Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan and Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow. Both were established by UNAMA and UNDP\textsuperscript{98}. The former was established in 2002 at the request of GIRoA and UNAMA to pay Afghan national police salaries and build the capacity of the Ministry of Interior. The latter was commissioned to support the Afghan Independent Electoral Commission in holding elections, though creating a basket fund to manage the donor contributions. Both funds provided funds directly to the Afghan government, with UN governance (Clark, 2011). The United States contributed $143.1 million to the electoral fund and other international contributors included Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. By 2012 donor states had contributed nearly $2.56 billion to the Law and Order Trust Fund, of which $892.74 million came from the U.S. (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2012). Additionally, a Justice Sector Reform Project was funded by the

\textsuperscript{97} A significant program was the Peace Through Justice program that brought together UNAMA, United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Children's Fund, United Nations Development Fund for Women, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to implement support for improving access to justice at the district level.

\textsuperscript{98} Additionally, in 2007 NATO established an Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust fund, which although focuses primarily on the Afghan military, also provided funds to support Afghan police or other security institutions.
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund⁹⁹, and managed by the World Bank (Clark).

**International Non-Governmental Organizations.** A number of Afghan and international NGOs were active in the RoL field, especially in training and advisory work. Main international NGOs included: Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law; International Legal Foundation; International Development Law Organization; and United States Institute of Peace (Clark, 2011).

**The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA).** There were a number of Afghan ministries and executive agencies involved in the provision of RoL. These were the Ministry of Justice, with responsibility for prisons and supervising the courts¹⁰⁰, the Supreme Court with responsibility for judges, an Attorney General’s Office with responsibility for prosecutors, a National Directorate of Security, with responsibility for investigation of internal and external national security threats and terrorism, the Ministry of the Interior, with responsibility for the police, including the Afghan National Police, and an Afghan Anti-Corruption Tribunal, with special justice personnel and purview to combat corruption (U.S. Army Center for Law and Military Operations, 2011). The departments were independent of each other, while the Supreme Court, in particular, is constitutionally independent of the executive, similar to the American concept of judicial independence. This division of responsibility between independent departments introduced the potential

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⁹⁹ The World Bank managed the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, to which thirty international donors had contributed nearly $7 billion by 2013. The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund was the largest contributor to the Afghan budget (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2014, January).

¹⁰⁰ Other responsibilities included the Huqooq (the local “face of Afghan formal justice) and legislative review.
for bureaucratic frictions and misunderstandings among potentially competing government bureaucracies—again similar to the American concept of bureaucratic infighting.

**Case 3: Iraq Provincial Stabilization 2003-2010**

**U.S. Civilian Organizations.** The U.S. civilian effort produced a number of provincial stabilization organizations. The initial sub-national civilian presence in Iraq was initially expressed in Local Governance Teams, under the Coalition Provisional Authority. These were teams of civilian experts delegated to regional and provincial teams. Each of the teams had a Provincial Team Leader and Operations Officer and had other expatriate experts on staff, though their numbers varied. Further, each provincial Local Governance Team employed about 100 Iraqis in technical, support and security roles. However, increasing violence in Iraq forced the withdrawal of the expat staff from the Local Governance Teams and the teams were soon abandoned (Cravens, 2014b).

**Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).** Inaugurated in November 2005, the Iraq PRTs were charted to “assist Iraq’s provincial governments with developing a transparent and sustained capacity to govern, promoting increased security and RoL, promoting political and economic development, and providing provincial administration necessary to meet the basic needs of the population” (U.S. Army Center for Law and Military Operations, 2011, p. 230). Iraqi PRTs were expected to build the capacity of Iraqi government officials, foster development, promote the RoL, and promote reconciliation among different factions of the provincial populations. The goal was to create areas where
provincial governments would have political space to operate and violent extremists could be brought under control. At the height of the program, there were 18 PRTs, 12 of which were co-located with U.S. military units (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2008). One PRT was Italian led, and two other teams were initially United Kingdom and South Korean led, though they transitioned to American teams in 2008 and 2010 respectively. Iraq’s Provincial Reconstruction Team program concluded operations during the late summer of 2011.

Figure 8: Map of PRT locations in Iraq, July 2007 (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2007, Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Expansion in Iraq (SIGIR-07-014), p. 2)

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101 On a personal note, the author, who worked at the Office of Provincial Affairs in Baghdad (2008-2009) feels that the count should have been 16 PRTs in Iraq, not 18. The Kurdistan Regional Reconstruction Team (RRT) had purview over the 3 Kurdish provinces in northern Iraq. Embassy leadership counted this as 3 teams, however it was the author’s view that since there was only 1 team leader for the RRT, it should be counted as 1, not 3.
Iraqi PRT sizes varied significantly depending on the needs of each province and the team leader’s vision. A PRT team may have had up to 100 members, including approximately 30 locally employed staff (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2007). However, most teams had total membership in the dozens. Each U.S. PRT was led by a senior State Department Foreign Service Officer and they were primarily comprised of civilian staff with contract support staff. The U.S. military also contributed staff, including the team Deputy and several support staff for the 15 PRTs located on military facilities, and contracted staff. Military civil affairs units and Army Corps of Engineer personnel also worked closely with PRTs throughout Iraq. In the field, U.S. military forces provided logistic and security support to PRTs hosted on military facilities. For those PRTs that resided on civilian locations (Regional Embassy Offices), State Department supported them and security was provided through private international contractors (U.S. Army Center for Law and Military Operations, 2011).

102 Initially Iraq PRTs were managed by the Embassy under the National Coordination Team office. This was replaced by the Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) in 2007. The Office of Provincial Affairs coordinated PRT activities and provided administrative support for all PRT civilians. The U.S. military (Multi-National Forces-Iraq) also provided a handful of military officers to OPA to help with planning and coordination (Hunt, 2010).
103 This included State Department staff, U.S. civilian experts (term limited civilian staff “3161s” or less frequently USAID contract staff), and DOJ, USDA and USAID representative.
104 The State Department provided contract staff as translators and interpreters, and local contract staff who lived outside of military facilities and acted at interlocutors for the teams.
105 These were bilingual-bicultural advisors (BBAs), who were Iraqi born expatriations often holding U.S. citizenship hired on a military contract (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2007).
PRTs in Iraq had two sources of programmatic funding available, the Quick Response Fund (QRF), jointly administered by State and USAID, and the State Department’s Provincial Reconstruction Development Council program. The Quick Response Fund was established to provide PRTs access to a flexibly means to accelerate economic, social, and civil society development within Iraqi provinces and was implemented between 2007 and 2011, at a total cost of about $258.2 million\(^\text{106}\) (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2009, January). Overtime, the flexibility of the program was reduced, with greater requirements for Embassy coordination, and requirements for

\(^{106}\) State Department dispersed QRF funds through micropurchases and microgrants, for projects costing up to $25,000; and grants and direct procurements were used for projects costing between $25,000 and $500,000 (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2012, October 26).
matching Iraqi contributions to projects as the budgetary position of the Iraqi government increased (Naland, 2011). The Provincial Reconstruction Development Council fund paid for small-scale infrastructure projects at the provincial level. Projects received approval from the Embassy and were executed by the Army Corps of Engineers. In fiscal year 2006 $315 million in Economic Support Funds was allocated for the Provincial Reconstruction Development Council program, increasing in $720 million in fiscal year 2007, and declining to $160 million in fiscal year 2008 (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2007). PRTs coordinated with other U.S.-funded programs, including USAID’ programs and the military CERP funding (see below).

Figure 10: PRT project funding sources (Caples, M., 2009, Developing Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq: Case Study in (Delayed) Interagency Coordination, U.S. Army War College, p. 10)
Embedded PRTs (ePRTs)\textsuperscript{107}. In 2007, the Embassy established embedded PRTs (ePRTs), which focused on Iraq’s lower-level district governments, while the original PRTs worked predominately with provincial governments. The 13 ePRTs were partnered and co-located\textsuperscript{108} with partner military units (U.S. Army Center for Law and Military Operations, 2011). ePRTs were generally much smaller than regular PRTs, with a staff in the order of a dozen or so\textsuperscript{109}. The brigade combat teams and ePRTs were intended to work cooperatively as a team, receiving guidance from both the Ambassador and the Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander. The partner military unit provided security and logistical support for the ePRT and the military took the lead on issues related to security and movement while the ePRT team leader bore primary responsibility for engaging with the local government, particularly with respect to political, economic, and development issues. The ePRTs were closed in August 2010, as part of the U.S. drawdown and eventually withdrawal in Iraq.

USAID. In Iraq, USAID ran a number of programs that were active throughout the country’s provinces\textsuperscript{110}. These included the Local Governance Program (or simply LGP), which built Iraqi government capacity and provided management skills training at provincial

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\textsuperscript{107} When used in this document, the term “PRT” refers to all Iraq PRTs, when PRTs and ePRTs are being talked about separately, the distinction will be denoted.

\textsuperscript{108} Partner brigade combat teams provided the ePRTs with security, life support, and operational support.

\textsuperscript{109} There were four core members: a team leader, senior development specialist, civil affairs officer, and a bilingual-bicultural adviser, with staffing enhanced with other experts when requested by the team leader. Bilingual-bicultural advisors were English speaking expatriate Iraq natives hired from the United States or third countries to serve as cultural experts in Iraq.

\textsuperscript{110} USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives was also active in Iraq provinces until 2006, with just under $40 million in grants oriented toward developing local governance capabilities (Boyle, 2006).
locations\textsuperscript{111}. LGP was allocated $90 million in fiscal year 2007 and $54 million in fiscal year 2008\textsuperscript{112} (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2008). The Community Action Program (CAP) provided small amounts of reconstruction funding as a catalyst for local capacity-building initiatives\textsuperscript{113}; in fiscal year 2007 the CAP was allocated $70 million and about $105 million in fiscal year 2008\textsuperscript{114}. Additionally, the Community Stabilization Program (CSP) operated through Iraqi intermediaries with little visible association with U.S. civilian or military forces\textsuperscript{115}; CSP was allocated $544 million by 2009 (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2009, January; U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2008).

**U.S. Military Organizations.** In Iraq, U.S. military stabilization activities were predominately conducted through local military units, such as Army brigade combat teams or Marine Regiments. The foremost source of project funds in Iraq came from the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP). CERP was established by the Coalition Provisional Authority in July 2003 to provide U.S. military commanders to support urgent, small-scale projects that local governments could sustain, that generally cost less than $25,000, and that provided employment. Among other things, CERP funds were used to: build schools, health clinics, roads, and sewers; pay condolence payments; support economic development; purchase equipment; and perform civic cleanup (Special Inspector General for

\textsuperscript{111}LGP was USAID’s earliest program and was implemented by the NGO RTI International. LGP eventually grew to employ almost 3,000 personnel, not only making it the single largest instance of U.S. foreign development assistance since the Marshall Plan but also the single biggest employer of Iraqis outside of the Iraqi government (Cravens, 2014a).
\textsuperscript{112}From Economic Support Funds.
\textsuperscript{113}Unlike other USAID funded activities in Iraq, the CAP required local Iraqis to contribute to projects.
\textsuperscript{114}Also from Economic Support Funds.
\textsuperscript{115}Initiated in 2005, the CSP focused on reducing the incentives for young men to participate in sectarian violence and insurgent activities.
Iraq Reconstruction, 2013, January). While there were some limits to the purposes for which CERP funds were used, access to CERP funds was relatively easy (Caples, 2009). The USA Army Corps of Engineers\textsuperscript{116} was also active across Iraq with funding totaling $21 billion by 2010 (McMullen, 2010). They focused on infrastructure construction and repair in sectors such as oil, electrical, water, security, health, and education, and also supported capacity development.

**Other Donor States.** Outside of the U.S., the only other donor states that were generally active at the provincial or local levels were those that maintained their own PRTs (South Korea, Italy, and the United Kingdom). These international PRTs acted in the place of the U.S. PRTs in their respective provinces.

**Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).** Most NGOs active in Iraq were U.S. implementing partners, either international like RTI (Research Triangle Institute) International, or a multitude of local Iraqi NGOs.

**Government of Iraq (GoI).** Each Iraqi province is divided into districts, termed qadas and nahiyas. These are irregularly defined and only loosely tied to populations, and similarly sized provinces or qadas could have differing numbers of qadas and nahiyas, respectively (Mingus, 2012). Local Iraqi authorities at the district and municipal levels were a new level of governance for Iraq, as opposed to entrenched leadership in provincial capitals (Iraq Provincial Interview 17 Sep 13). Most funds flowed through provincial capitals in the

\textsuperscript{116} Organized under the Gulf Region Division.
provinces. The Iraqi government also employed functional line ministries throughout the Provinces, such as water ministries, oil ministries, etc. These were responsible for implementing central government directed plans in their respective areas of purview.


U.S. Stabilization Organizations. Beneath the Embassy and military U.S. Forces-Afghanistan headquarters, Afghanistan was divided into Regional Commands (RCs). These spanned multiple Afghan provinces and had anywhere from one to 13 provincial reconstruction teams under them. The U.S. was primarily involved with regional commands South (RC-S), Southwest (RC-SW), East (RC-E), and West (RC-W). By August 2011 nearly 400 were U.S. civilians were serving outside Kabul, up from 67 in early 2009 (Wyler & Katzman, 2010). A largely parallel civilian and military organizational and command structure developed at the sub-national level. This chain of command was intended to
equalize the civilians and their military counterparts at every level within the PRT structure. In this organization structure, the Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) was equal rank to the U.S. Army division’s commanding officer (General); the SCR-B (senior civilian representative at the brigade level) was the equivalent to the brigade combat team commander; the civilian lead at the PRT level held the corresponding rank of Army Lt. Colonel or Naval/Air Force Captain of the PRT Commander; and the District Support Team Lead had the same rank as its military counterpart, an Army captain (Fritsch, 2012). Though these parallel levels were roughly equivalent in terms of rank, they were dissimilar in terms of resources.

![Figure 12: U.S. civilian and military parallel rank structure (Fritsch, J., 2012, Understanding U.S. Civil-Military Cooperation in the U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, p. 19)](image)

**Afghan Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).** After the fall of the Taliban large parts of Afghanistan were too unsafe for non-military reconstruction and stabilization actors to operate. In response, the PRT concept was developed and first used by the U.S.
armed forces in 2002. By 2011, Afghanistan PRTs operated in most of Afghanistan’s 34, with twelve led by the United States and 13 by the Coalition (the general term for U.S., NATO, and other ally military forces) partners (Fritsch, 2012). The PRTs were intended to help create lasting security and stability, to expand the influence of the government outside Kabul through local institutions, and to support reconstruction (Wilkes, 2008). They were also intended as a temporary bridging solution until the Afghan government and the normal development actors (United Nations, international organizations, and NGOs) would be able to do their work and assume their responsibilities (Netherlands Defense Staff, Doctrine Division, 2008). However, they, and the insecurity that prompted their creation, remained until the withdrawal of military forces from Afghanistan at the end of 2014 (Katzman, 2014, January).

All Afghan PRTs fell under the broad authority of ISAF, and received general guidance through the Afghan National Development Strategy. Provincial Reconstruction Teams operated under tactical control to their U.S. military ‘battlespace’ task force, which was usually a brigade combat team (U.S. Army Center for Law and Military Operations, 2011). U.S. PRTs were commanded by a military officer and composed almost entirely of military personnel. They typically consisted of 50-100 personnel, but at least one as large of 250 personnel was reported (Knoke, 2013). Typically Afghan PRTs only had 3 or 4 U.S. civilian members, though this increased over time. Civilian PRT staff may have been from the State Department, USAID, or U.S. Department of Agriculture and later on, included a RoL advisor (Clark, 2011; Wyler & Katzman, 2010). An Afghan representing the Ministry of

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117 U.S. military staff included Army civil affairs teams, a military police unit, a psychological operations unit, an explosive ordnance/demining unit, an intelligence team, medics, a force protection unit, and administrative and support personnel.
Interior could also have been part of the team. U.S. PRTs were usually co-located on a military base with military combat units operating in the same area (or battlespace in military parlance) (U.S. Army Center for Law and Military Operations, 2011). Because of this, and because U.S. teams were mostly located areas experiencing the most intense conflict, the civilians were technically embedded under military leadership. As a result, military culture and needs tended to dominate over civilian (Fritsch, 2012; Kemp, 2011, September/October). However, beginning in 2008, partly in response to Afghan national government criticism, efforts were made to ‘civilianize’ U.S.-run PRTs by granting a larger role for civilian experts (Katzman, 2014, January).

U.S. PRTs conducted an extremely wide range of activities in practice, functioning in almost any sector or area of reconstruction or stabilization (Clark, 2011). The PRT assistance and capacity building projects could include building roads, providing access to clean water, setting up the infrastructure for schools, health clinics and hospitals, establishing democratic institutions, and assisting with agricultural needs (Fritsch, 2012). They had two sources of project funding, the Commander’s Emergency Response Fund (CERP), and USAID funding. The Afghanistan CERP program was launched in 2004, and was modeled on the Iraq CERP program. PRT Commanders were authorized to approve the use of up to $25,000 in CERP funds for the rapid implementation of small-scale projects (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2005). CERP projects were often largely determined by tactical needs to obtain the support of the populace (Yodsampa, 2011). CERP gave U.S. military commanders the ability to spend money quickly on small projects without much

118 Non-U.S. PRTs also had some access to CERP, but their funding primarily came from their home governments.
bureaucratic processing. Larger projects required approval of the PRTs’ higher headquarters, but this generally has rapid approval. As a result, CERP did have the checks of other U.S. funding streams. U.S. PRTs also had access to the USAID local governance and community development fund through their USAID representative. This money did not compare to CERP in size and the approval process was comparatively lengthy. The local governance and community development fund comprised but 7 percent of all USAID project money in Afghanistan in 2007. Most Afghan PRT funding came from CERP after its inception.

**District Support Teams.** Below the PRT were the District Support Teams (DSTs). Approximately three to four district support teams report to a PRT and as many as 40 were planned (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, April). Whereas the PRT works primarily with the governors of the provincial governments, the DSTs work more with the sub-governors of the smaller, village governments. Similar to the PRT, there were three civilian leads from the State Department, USAID, and USDA (the Department of Agriculture). Their military counterpart was typically a captain or major, lower ranks than the PRT and brigade commanders. The civilian leads reported to their respective leads in the PRT, and their military counterpart reported up through the military structure (Fritsch, 2012). District Support Teams were also closed by the end of 2014 as part of the U.S. drawdown in Afghanistan (Katzman, 2014, January).

**Other U.S. Sub-National Organizations.** There were a number of other U.S. organizations active at the sub-national level. These included agribusiness development teams (or ADTs), as farming was the primary source of employment in many areas (Meyerle,
Katt, and Gavrilis, 2010). They were established in 2008 and frequently worked with PRTs or DSTs operating in the same areas. In addition, both INL and USAID had an extensive network of U.S. and Afghan staff and contractors working at regional centers and in other locations at provincial level throughout the country (United Nations Development Programme, 2014; U.S. Army Center for Law and Military Operations, 2011).

**Other Donor States.** Other sub-national level international donors include the United Kingdom, Norway, Netherlands, Canadians and Germany, primarily through their respective PRTs and programs mentioned elsewhere. At the sub-national level, international donor assistance was generally focused on their own provinces and, though not insignificant, was typically substantially smaller than U.S. assistance\(^{119}\) (Eronen, 2008). In Helmand Province, the United Kingdom was the main international donor outside of the U.S. An example of their programming was the Strengthening Provincial Administration and Delivery program, which provided up to £20 million from 2011 to 2015 in Helmand, Bamyan, and Uruzgan provinces to strengthen the local Afghan government. Denmark co-funded the project with a further £5.2 million, and the United Kingdom has employed Adam Smith International, a United Kingdom professional services business, as their technical assistance team\(^{120}\) (United Nations Development Programme, 2014). The United Kingdom also deployed a military stabilization support group in late 2010, with

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\(^{119}\) Examples include Dutch support of €24.5 million to Uruzgan in 2007, mostly external to their PRT, Canadian assistance of up to $20 million to Kandahar, and United Kingdom assistance to Helmand totaling up to £20 million (approximately $40 million) per year.

\(^{120}\) This included developing the capacity of line ministries at provincial levels to undertake planning, budgeting, and delivery of services.
approximately 50 military personnel that provided stabilization and assisted in providing services to local Afghans (Meyerle, et al., 2010; UK Ministry of Defense, 2011).

**The United Nations.** Though primarily a national level organization, the United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA) maintained field offices. These peaked at 23 and declined to 13 in 2014 with NATO military reductions. These office engaged on a daily basis with communities and officials at the provincial and district levels, including in areas where the Mission did not have a permanent presence. UNAMA provided support for more than 40 visits outside Kabul carried out by the diplomatic community in 2013. UNAMA maintained logistical partnerships with PRTs and NATO military forces, which were made evident as they reduced and UNAMA staff faced challenges with access to assets such as regional airfields, and emergency medical care and safe havens (The UN General Assembly, 2014).

An example of UN programming was the Afghanistan Subnational Governance Programme (ASGP), administered through the United Nations Development Programme. Established in 2010, ASGP was a capacity development program that supported more effective, sustainable, and inclusive subnational governance among the Independent Directorate for Local Governance, Provincial Governors Offices and District Governors Offices, all 34 Provincial Councils and 19 selected municipalities. Major program donors include Australia, Denmark, Estonia, European Commission, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. ASGP funding ranged from just under $13 million in 2011 to $21 million in 2013. ASGP partnerships included the government of Afghanistan, UNAMA and United Nations agencies, civil society, donors,
and project implementers (United Nations Development Programme, 2014).

**International NGOs.** International NGOs were active at the provincial level as implementing partners. Examples include the Asia Foundation, which had operated the USAID Performance Based Governance Fund, and with the National Democratic Institute, which had supported Provincial Councils with training, support for constituency outreach activities, prioritizing programs, monitoring expenses, and assistance with interaction between the Provincial Councils and their colleagues in parliament and other central government bodies (National Democratic Institute, 2013).

**Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA).** The Afghan government has a system of provincial, district, municipality, and village governance. The provincial level administration consists of presidentially appointed Provincial Governors, with considerable formal and informal powers and elected Provincial Councils with advisory, monitoring and conflict resolution roles. Other provincial level government entities include Provincial Line Departments (or Line Ministries), with basic service delivery responsibility in key sectors (health; education etc.), and Provincial Development Committees, with limited coordinating and planning functions. The district level is comprised of District Offices of some central ministries with limited functional responsibilities and District Governors, appointed by the President, with a relatively limited formal role. The municipal level is comprised of municipal administrations led by mayors, appointed by the President, with functional and service-delivery responsibility mainly for urban services. Lastly, the village
level, which has different systems in different areas, has local infrastructure development and some administrative functions (The World Bank, 2007).

The Afghan national ministry directly responsible for provincial activities was the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG), established in August 2007. It succeeded the Ministry of Interior, which had acquired a reputation for corruption and inefficiency. Nationwide, the IDLG inherited more than 10,000 employees of varying quality and abilities (Kemp, 2011, January/February). IDLG was an implementing partner for activities at the local level, with funding by the United States, Britain, Denmark, and France. The IDLG also received assistance from the U.N. Development Program (Katzman, 2014, June).

**Case 5: Mindanao, Philippines Stabilization Network 2002-2014**

**U.S. Stabilization Organizations.** U.S. stabilization efforts in Mindanao were initiated and conducted. Since 2001, the Philippines has been one of the largest recipients of U.S. foreign assistance in Southeast Asia, including both military and development aid. Over half of U.S. assistance to the country has supported development programs in Muslim areas of Mindanao and Sulu, with the aim of reducing the economic and political conditions that make radical or extremist ideologies and activities attractive. Major U.S. assistance programs include strengthening the rule of law, streamlining the process of obtaining business permits, improving government services, expanding access to health care, and bolstering the Philippine military’s capacity to patrol and govern the country’s maritime domain. Total U.S. foreign assistance to the Philippines was $132 million in 2008, dipping slightly to $124
million in 2009, then grew to $189 million in 2014. This assistance spanned the range of economic, governance, and rule of law development, health and nutrition, and military assistance (Lum, 2012; Lum and Dolven, 2014).

**U.S. Civilian Organizations.** The U.S. Mission, which (circa 2013) was composed of 16 agencies, was active in the Philippines, with assistance to Mindanao implemented through the Embassy in Manila (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2013, February). In general, U.S. implementing partners were funded through a mix of contracts and grand (Lum, 2012). Within the U.S. Mission, USAID was highly active in Mindanao for much of the case study period, with programs focused on strengthening peace in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, promoting good governance, increasing economic opportunities, protecting the environment, strengthening health services, and improving access to education. Further, a number of activities were implemented to strengthen local governance capacity to provide improved services and enhance the participation of civil society organizations in development planning (USAID, n.d.a). In fiscal year 2007, $145 million in grant aid in the Philippines was provided, primarily administered by USAID (USAID, 2008). During the peak of the U.S. effort to bring stability to Mindanao, USAID was directing as much as 60 percent of its total assistance to Mindanao. However, with the shift of priorities away from stabilization after the signing of the 2012 peace agreement,

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121 The most visible USAID project in Mindanao was the Growth with Equity in Mindanao (GEM) Program, designed to promote economic growth through infrastructure development, workforce preparation, business growth, governance improvement, and former combatant reintegration (Ponyaeva, 2011). This program also provided logistical and coordination support on behalf of personnel under Chief of Mission authority (Mindanao Interview 26 May 2014). The Louis Berger Group has implemented several iterations of the GEM program in Mindanao (Krisko, 2011).

122 This figure includes military security and development assistance.
USAID’s program turned from 60 percent focused on Mindanao to less than 10 percent by 2013, with economic growth and education growing in its place (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2013, February).

Other Embassy offices and organizations had programs and activities focused on Mindanao. The State Department’s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement bureau was active in the Mindanao, with projects in community policing; criminal investigation techniques; transnational crime; maritime police and police development (Lum, 2012). In another example, one office worked with Philippine NGOs in areas such as capacity building, provided through grants, and which included lectures, seminars, and/or training and on empowering women to assert legal rights on issues such as abuse by partners (Mindanao Interview 1 Feb 2014). Other offices and organizations include the Peace Corps123, and the Public Affairs section124 (Mindanao Interview 1 Feb 2014; USAID, n.d.b).

**U.S. Military Organizations.** In a stabilization context, joint civil military operations was a key line JSOTF-P of effort in which the U.S. military and Philippine armed forces (AFP) worked together to foster stability through humanitarian and civil assistance projects in the southern Philippines (Maxwell, 2011; Rogers, 2004). The effort evolved over time and involved very close coordination among Philippine and U.S. military, USAID, the Philippine government and both Philippine and U.S. NGOs. Projects were focused on Abu Sayyaf influenced areas where Philippine security forces did not normally operate.

123 The Peace Corps was active in Mindanao, and brought together volunteers and teachers from Mindanao to improve English skills and conduct cross-cultural, person-to-person exchanges under an agreement with USAID.
124 The Public Affairs section supported English language learning, educational advising, cultural programs, and information about the U.S.
Assistance projects were predominately focused in the areas of humanitarian relief, medical, dental\textsuperscript{125}, veterinary and infrastructure assistance such as the construction of schools, the diging of wells, repairing roads, and even improving a city’s water treatment plant and airport. Small-scale projects in remote areas were conducted by the Philippine and U.S. militaries to maintain contact with the local population (Krisko, 2011; Maxwell, 2011). These projects could be conducted in conjunction with local NGOs or local governments\textsuperscript{126} (Swain, 2010). JSOTF-P also engaged in a modest effort\textsuperscript{127} to support the expansion the police role in the Mindanao region. An effective police force was seen as a key missing component in defeating violent extremists operating in under-governed spaces\textsuperscript{128} in the southern Philippines (Petit, 2011). One key difference between the Philippine effort and the military efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan was that the military was never authorized funds under the Commander’s Emergency Response Program. Instead JSOTF-P had to rely on peacetime humanitarian assistance processes (Maxwell, 2013).

**Other Donor States.** A multitude of other donor states were active in Mindanao\textsuperscript{129} (Mindanao Interview 1 Feb 2014). Japan also prioritized socio-economic assistance to

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\textsuperscript{125}Examples of these efforts included the U.S. and Pilipino military forces delivery of free medical and dental care to over 20,000 recipients in Mindanao in 2008.

\textsuperscript{126}For example, at one point JSOTF-P worked with the Christian Children’s Fund to provide medical care to the populace. In another case, the military built roads, enhanced an airstrip and local port facilities, and established pure water sources for villages without them. This was done with the approval of local Philippine military and national authorities, and through Civil Affairs personnel interface with local government and the community.

\textsuperscript{127}The program had fewer than 25 U.S. personnel directly involved with it 2011, though with many more in general support roles. Activities that comprised this effort included professional development training, supporting evidence collection and use, and increasing warrants and prosecutions terrorism and acts of violence.

\textsuperscript{128}Strengthening the criminal-justice system was also intended to reduce extra-judicial killings and restore confidence in the government’s security abilities.

\textsuperscript{129}For example, the United Kingdom Voluntary Service Overseas organization, akin to the U.S. Peace Corps, was active in Mindanao.
Mindanao, supporting development and loans for school construction (USAID, n.d.b). Canada supported social and rural development in Mindanao, private sector development and good governance. Other states that have been involved in Mindanao have included Spain, South Korea, Finland, Germany, and the Netherlands (European Union, 2002; Landingin, 2010; Mindanao Interview 1 Feb 2014). Support generally provided with grants to NGO/civil society organizations, or could be pooled into multi-lateral funds (European Union, Delegation of the European Union to the Philippines, n.d.).

Mindanao received particular attention from the European Union (EU) and Australia. The EU focused on rural development including water supply, coastal resources management including fisheries, environmental conservation, health, and support to vulnerable groups including indigenous people and children at risk (European Union, 2002). This encompassed EU bilateral activities130, and support through the multi-donor Mindanao Trust Fund (see below) for community-based development projects, with the EU being the largest donor (European Union, Delegation of the European Union to the Philippines, n.d.) Australia’s focused approximately half of its bilateral aid program ($129 million in 2012-13) in Mindanao in the years running up to 2012. Australia, through AusAID (Australia Aid), supported political participation by communities and institutions, and enhancement of basic services, particularly education, and livelihoods in conflict-affected communities131 (Australian Embassy Manila, 2013 and Australia Aid, 2012, December). Australia further

130 The EU funded national budget support in the health sector, as well as a specific programme for indigenous communities in Mindanao. EU also provided development assistance to displaced populations to rebuild and strengthen their livelihoods, with a 2013 contribution of €8 million. Also, since 2007 the European Union promoted and supported the politically negotiated settlement of the conflict in Southern Mindanao and following implementation and monitoring the Agreement.

131 Other AusAID Australian Government activity of relevance was the “Strengthening Grassroots Interfaith Dialogue and Understanding,” and there were also various Australian Defence cooperation programs, and some police activities (Australia Aid, 2012, December).
pledged $85 million over six years (beginning in 2012) to help rebuild education in Mindanao after decades of conflict in the southern Philippines.\textsuperscript{132}


**Non-Traditional Donors.** In 2007, China rose to become the fourth biggest development lender in the Philippines, with $1.1 billion in loans, primarily for infrastructure

\textsuperscript{132} Later Australian activities in Mindanao also included programs specifically tailored to address selected drivers of conflict some national programs with reach into Mindanao, and some assistance through multilateral partners (e.g. Mindanao Trust Fund). Australia also assisted local non-government organizations, such as the Catholic Relief Services, and Center for Humanitarian Dialogue that worked to reduce violent conflict in Mindanao.
development (Landingin, 2010; USAID, 2009, January). Though active in Mindanao, it is not clear, however, how much of this assistance was focused on the Mindanao region. Malaysia has also been involved in the Mindanao area, supporting activities such as an International Monitoring Team to counter violence (Mindanao Interview 1 Feb 2014).

The United Nations. When the conflict in Mindanao reignited in August 2008, there were few United Nations agencies on the ground. With the exception of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children’s Fund, and the World Food Programme, which had countrywide programs in place prior to the conflict, most other United Nations agencies operated out of Manila at the time. By 2010, the United Nations presence in Cotabato in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao has grown significantly with several UN agencies opening offices (Chesnutt, 2011). For example, in Mindanao, by 2015 UNDP’s staff totaled approximately 139, with 94 of those being service contracts, 36 full time staff, and 9 volunteers. UNDP supported a number of stabilization related activities, such as supporting national and local government efforts return or resettle displaced families, and supporting human rights, rule of law, and accountability in governance. It also supported disaster preparedness and recovery activities in the natural disaster prone region (United Nations Development Programme, n.d.a/n.d.b).

133 By 2010 these included the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the UN Population Fund, the World Health Organization; the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations Development Programme, and the Food and Agriculture Organization.
Other International Organizations. The World Bank had a number of activities focused in Mindanao to provide income, improve food security and support agriculture\textsuperscript{134}, promote economic and social recovery of conflict areas\textsuperscript{135}, promote governance, support community identified and designed projects, and to promote literacy and numeracy\textsuperscript{136} (The World Bank, n.d.a, n.d.b, n.d.c, n.d.d, and 2013, April). Work Bank programs could range from $30 to $90 million in funding. World Bank partners included the ARMM (Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao) regional government and villages, municipalities and provinces in the Autonomous Region, local NGOs such as MinLand and the Bangsamoro Development Agency, international NGOs, and other foreign development agencies, particularly the Japanese International Cooperation Agency, which provided parallel financing to the project. Further, the International Bank for Reconstruction and development of the World Bank Group has provided $64 million to support community development assistance, strategic regional infrastructure, and institutional strengthening and governance in Mindanao (The World Bank, 2013, April).

Mindanao was also a priority area for the Asian Development Bank in the Philippines, active in Mindanao since 1969, which provides both loans and grants\textsuperscript{137}. The Asian Development Bank’s Mindanao operations focused on increasing access to infrastructure in rural areas; promoting agrarian reforms and rural growth; improving human capital, particularly through investments in qualitative education; and supporting peace initiatives, capacity building, and governance. As of May 2010, approximately $260.5 million

\textsuperscript{134} The Mindanao Rural Development Project.
\textsuperscript{135} The Multi Donor Facility for Mindanao Reconstruction and Development Project for the Philippines.
\textsuperscript{136} The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Social Fund Project.
\textsuperscript{137} Mindanao was a recipient of Asian Development Bank’s lending and non-lending products—either exclusive to Mindanao or as part of broader geographical coverage that has included investments in Mindanao.
worth of Mindanao exclusive loans were completed in since the beginning of the case study and 2010, and a further $515.5 million of loans with investments in the area were completed. At the time of this review, there were $350.4 million worth of ongoing Projects with Investments in Mindanao (and other parts of the country) ongoing as of 2010 (Mangaha, 2010). The Asian Development Bank worked with a broad range of civil society organizations, such as NGOs, community-based organizations, labor unions, research institutes, and foundations. As a rule, the Asian Development Bank worked through the Government of the Philippines in supporting NGOs. For instance, NGOs were involved in implementing projects under the Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction (Asian Development Bank, 2012).

**Multi-Donor Trust Funds.** The Mindanao Trust Fund was a mechanism for development partners to pool resources and to coordinate their support for peace and development in the conflict-affected areas of Mindanao. The Bangsamoro Development Agency was the main partner for the program, with support and technical assistance from international NGOs, local NGOs, and the UN (Bangsamoro Development Agency, Mindanao Trust Fund for Reconstruction and Development Program (MTF-RDP and The World Bank, 2014). Since its establishment, the Mindanao Trust Fund has supported activities such as the Joint Needs Assessment of 2005, economic and social recovery in conflict-affected areas, community-driven projects, local economic development, and regional development planning. Donors include Australia, (via AusAID), New Zealand, Canadian, Sweden, USAID, the World Bank, the European Union, and other key counterparts included the local national Philippine government offices or units (The

**International Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).** Many international NGOs were or have been active in Mindanao during the case period. Some of these include Action Contre la Faim, the International Contact Group, Oxfam, Save the Children, and Médecins Sans Frontières (known as Doctors Without Borders in English), International Alert, and Catholic Relief Services. Nonviolent Peaceforce and the Norwegian Refugee Council opened offices in 2010 (United Nations, 2011). Furthermore, an International Monitoring Team, led by Malaysia, was widely recognized as having contributed significantly to lowering the instances of violence in the region (Chesnutt, 2011).

**Local Civil Society/NGOs.** The Philippines had a large local civil society organization and/or NGO sector. Though total numbers are not available, during one response to a World Bank competition for a one year grant in the early 2000’s, almost 1,800 entries were received, higher than in any country in which the contest had been previously held. These ranged from religiously affiliated, particularly with the Catholic Church, to politically affiliated NGOs, primarily from the left, and educational institutions (Mindanao Interview 1 Feb 2014, Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute, n.d.; Rood, 2005). These organizations could advocate for peace, provide technical assistance, support conflict management, and sponsor conferences, workshops, or publications (Rood). Local NGOs could be partners with international NGOs, international organizations, or even donor states directly. For example, the U.S. Embassy worked with Ateneo de Manila University, a national university with a Mindanao branch to run a U.S. scholarship program (Mindanao Interview 1
Feb 2014). Doubtless due to the large number of organizations, a number of umbrella local NGO/civil society organizations (“networks of networks”) developed with dozens or hundreds of participating organizations, such as MinCODE\(^{138}\) and others (Rood). However, by 2012 there were signs that the NGO community may have peaked or declined in numbers as small and donor funding dependent NGOs closed (Australian Aid, Office of Development Effectiveness, 2012).

**Government of the Philippines (GoP).** One of the distinguishing aspects of the Philippines as a stabilization environment was the presence of a fully functioning government and existing legal framework relative to counter-terrorism operations. For example, the GoP itself was the 2\(^{nd}\) largest donor of humanitarian assistance in Mindanao (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2012, May). In addition to the administrative units described above, GoP line ministries are functional at the lower levels in their respective areas of authority, such as health, water, education, etc. In the case of the Philippines, responsibility for counter terrorist and counter insurgency operations was divided between the military and police; the police have primacy for most terrorism responses while the military maintains responsibility for counterinsurgency. The intent however, was that eventually, there should be a complete transition of internal security responsibility to the police, allowing for a more streamlined military that focused on territorial defense (Beaudette, 2012).

\(^{138}\) For example MinCODE (the Mindanao Caucus of Development NGO Networks) had over 500 members. MinCODE itself was a participant in a broader grouping named Kusog Mindanaw, which brought together MinCODE and the Mindanao Business Council, the Confederation of Mindanao Governors and City Mayors, and the Mindanao Lawmakers Association.
The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The AFP participated in rather visible partnership with American military forces in Mindanao. The AFP also engaged with the USAID at the battalion, brigade, and division levels, mainly in order to discuss security issues and village infrastructure projects that can help improve economic development opportunities and increase regional commerce (Krisko, 2011). In more severe situations, some AFP units, working with local NGOs, helped provide services to communities without functioning local governments or to build the capacity of local governments that were struggling (U.S. Department of State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, 2011). However, it was likely that little AFP assistance proceeded without American (or other military or humanitarian donor) design, funding, and implementation (Krisko, 2011). The GoP also created Joint Task Force Zamboanga-Basilan to align the efforts of the AFP and Philippine National Police. The model leveraged the warrant arrest power of the Philippine National Police against violent extremists and local lawless elements while employing AFP soldiers to augment their security posture on operations (Beaudette, 2012).

The Private Sector. Many, though not all, local Mindanao business and business associations frequently attempted to build better relations among communities and address the roots of the conflict by building inter-ethnic linkages and improving economic conditions in conflict-affected areas, as well as improving the general climate for business (Rood, 2005). Activities included policy advocacy, raising concerns to government attention, publicizing the costs of conflict, efforts to hire and train people from marginalized groups, or even holding dialogues to help workers from different backgrounds understand each other's culture (U.S. Department of State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization,
Further, international investors, such as Dole and Del Monte, used their social responsibility programs to work with communities to address issues of poverty, impacting local communities beyond the direct economic benefit of the jobs they brought.

**Case Study 6: The Independence of Southern Sudan (July 2010-2014)**

**U.S. Stabilization Organizations.** The U.S. has been the leading donor state in South Sudan. In fiscal year 2012, USAID and the State Department alone provided South Sudan with over $240 million in humanitarian assistance. Total U.S. foreign assistance was at $395.4 million in 2011, peaking at over $619.6 million in 2012, then declining to $280.6 million by 2014. As of 2012, this assistance was mainly provided through 17 international NGOs and 8 international organizations, mostly United Nations agencies. Some assistance was provided directly to local South Sudanese partners, for example, the Embassy Public Affairs Office supports programs that demonstrate cultural sensitivity and showcase culture in the United States in the best light, often initiated through grants to local partners. The U.S. Embassy itself had 57 U.S. direct-hire employees in 2013 (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2013, May).

Within the U.S. mission, a number of organizations play a significant role. The level of U.S. government attention to Sudan and South Sudan led to the establishment of a Special Envoy to address both countries. The Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan communicates national U.S. policy to Embassy Juba and oversees programs funded at more than $10 million annually. USAID was also active, operating in a wide range of sector, such as agriculture and food security, democracy, human rights and governance, economic growth
and trade, education, environment, global health, water, conflict mitigation, and was also one of the largest supporters of elections in South Sudan (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013; USAID, n.d.c). USAID programs were implemented through international NGOs, such as a $75 million program on inclusive political processes implemented by AECOM\textsuperscript{139} or through local NGOs or civil society, though in some cases suitable local partners were rare or unavailable (USAID, 2011).

The International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau (INL) had a number of Rule of Law focused programs in South Sudan and impacted nearly every aspect of the sector. These included a $29 million program supporting police development. Other INL funded activities included supporting the judiciary, lawyers, the University of Juba school of law, juvenile justice, the women’s bar association, a national prison services training academy, conflict resolution support, and providing police and corrections advisors. INL partners included Norway, the United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Police, and the international NGOs the International Development Law Organization, United States Institute of Peace, and Pact, Inc. (U.S. Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2013).

In the lead up to independence in March 2010 and until 2012, the Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) Bureau supported embassy Juba with several staff deployed to conflict-affected states and in a Field Support and Analysis Cell, or FSAC. The staff had access to very limited project funds, of up to several hundred dollars per project. Partners included many different NGOs\textsuperscript{140} and international organizations, including UN

\textsuperscript{139} Note AECOM is the full name, not an abbreviation.

\textsuperscript{140} These included the Carter Center, Human Rights Watch, and Pact.
organizations. They also worked very closely with the United Kingdom and Canada (U.S. Department of State Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, 2013). Other U.S. agencies also played smaller but significant roles, providing programmatic and technical assistance.

The U.S. military played an extremely limited role in South Sudan and was minuscule in comparison to the other cases. A handful of U.S. officers were assigned to the United Nations peacekeeping operations in the country, and 100 U.S. military personal were assigned to assist in combating the Lord's Resistance Army in the region. However, the latter personnel were only periodically active in the southern area of the country. There was also the Defense Attaché, who was the normal conduit for U.S. military engagement with a host country or for coordination with an Embassy Country Team, and additional advisors (South Sudan Interview 1 December 2010).

Other Donor States. Other Donor States have played a major role in South Sudan over the span of the case study time. There were a high number of donor missions in South Sudan, and a large number of organizations were active in stabilization activities. For example, in 2010 alone 155 external missions, excluding United Nations missions, visited South Sudan and met with government officials\(^{141}\) (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2011). By 2012 their commitments totaled about $S4.5 billion, excluding assessed $4 billion in contributions to United Nations peacekeeping, though only about 80% of the commitments were actually expended for the most recent years. The greatest volume of development expenditures was in the areas of primary health, basic education,

\(^{141}\) Of these, only eight (4%) of the visits were coordinated with other development partners.
infrastructure, and rural development. Funding modalities varied, with 19 percent of donor funding allocated to pooled funds through 2011. With the closing of the largest pooled fund in 2013, most assistance was expected to be bilateral (The World Bank, 2012a). Donor states typically partnered with NGOs, the UN, other donor states, the government, and local NGOs (European Commission December, 2014).

The United Kingdom was the second largest bilateral donor in South Sudan after the USA, approximately $150 million per year budgeted for South Sudan (United Kingdom Department for International Development, 2012). The United Kingdom, through its Department for International Development (DFID), supported better governance and security, health, and education. DFID was also the primary contributor to the United Nations-managed Common Humanitarian Fund, which funded short-duration emergency projects (USAID, 2011). DFID worked through a number of partners in South Sudan, including pooled funding mechanisms such as the Health Pooled Fund, support to United Nations agencies, the European Union, the World Bank, working directly with NGOs and a number of private sector partners. DFID also worked closely with other donors, particularly the Troika (Norway, United Kingdom, and the U.S.) in which the United Kingdom took the lead on anti-corruption (United Kingdom Department for International Development, 2013).

Other significant Donor states included France, Germany, Japan, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, the European Union, and Denmark (European Commission, 2014; Norad, 2012; South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013; USAID, 2011). Donor states were largely self-organized, dividing up ‘lead’ roles among themselves; for example Canada was seen as focusing more on humanitarian assistance, while the United Kingdom was more
active in conflict prevention and stabilization (South Sudan Interview 1 December 2010). Other donors focused on specific sectors of activity, such as food, nutrition, or education (USAID, 2011). The following charts describe donor state contributions:

![Figure 14: Non-USAID Donors by Sector (United States Agency for International Development, 2011, South Sudan Transition Strategy 2011-13, p. 69)](image-url)
### Bilateral Donors

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<th>Accountability</th>
<th>Economic Functions</th>
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<th>Health</th>
<th>Infrastructure</th>
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### Multilateral Organizations

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<th>Accountability</th>
<th>Economic Functions</th>
<th>Education</th>
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### Multilateral Organizations:

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<th>Social &amp; Humanitarian</th>
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<td>South Sudan Recovery Fund</td>
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**Key:**
- 2011 Commitments: less than US$5m: X
- 2011 Commitments: in excess of US$5m: X

**Source:** Tables and figure above are adapted from the *South Sudan Donor Book*, Ministry of Finance.

Figure 15: South Sudan Donors by Sector (The World Bank, January 2013, International Development Association and International Finance Corporation Interim Strategy Note (fiscal year 2013-2014) for the Republic of South Sudan, p. 39)

**Non-Traditional Donor States.** The South Sudan picture would not be complete without mention of non-traditional donor states. China, in particular was a notable international presence in South Sudan. China was the biggest foreign investor in South
Sudanese oil and its largest buyer, and was also interested in infrastructure. China was also an important supporter both in political and material terms for United Nations peacekeeping in Sudan since the early 2000s, with continued troop contributions, totaling 350 (International Crisis Group, 2012). South Sudan’s neighbors were also active in stabilization, with Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan supporting an Intergovernmental Authority on Development (or IGAD) - led conflict mediation process (International Crisis Group, 2012). IGAD is the regional organization in the Horn of Africa. Rwanda was a significant troop contributor to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, and Ethiopia was the sole contributor to the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA). Other countries that supported South Sudan included Uganda, Egypt, Kenya (the largest provider of technical advisors to the South Sudanese government), Libya, and Saudi Arabia (International Crisis Group, 2012; South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013; USAID, 2011).

**The United Nations.** Nearly all the United Nations funds, programs, and specialized agencies were active in South Sudan (World Health Organization, 2009). The United Nations also had the mandate in to take the lead in support for elections, though donors such as USAID provided most of the funding support (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013). Other international organizations active in South Sudan include the World Health Organization, which leads the health and nutrition sector and the World Food Program (World Food Program, 2012b; World Health Organization, 2012b). UN agencies

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142 The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is an eight-country trade bloc in Africa. It includes governments from the Horn of Africa, Nile Valley, and the African Great Lakes. They had an active role in the mediation efforts for South Sudan.

143 Egypt provides technical assistance in the area of health care services.
worked with a wide variety of organizations\textsuperscript{144} including the Government of Southern Sudan, United Nations agencies, and NGOs (World Health Organization, 2009/2012a).

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was long active in South Sudan and had 88 direct hire staff in 2013 (United Nations Development Programme, n.d.c). UNDP was active in a wide range of areas such as civil service capacity building, social protection, public financial management, security sector support, conflict prevention and mitigation, reintegration of ex-combatants, access to justice, elections support, constitutional review, crisis response, and justice sector capacity (United Nations Development Programme, n.d.c; South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013). UNDP issued grants to civil society groups\textsuperscript{145} and works directly with all levels (local, provincial, and national) of the South Sudanese government (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013). UNDP South Sudan receives funding from a wide range of bi-and multilateral donors, including the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Norway, Japan, the U.S., Denmark, Canada, the European Union, and African Development Bank, as well as global funds and trust funds, such as the South Sudan Trust Fund. Other UNDP partners include international NGOs\textsuperscript{146} (United Nations Development Programme, n.d.c)

\textsuperscript{144} For example, the partners of the World Health Organization in South Sudan were listed as: Australian Agency for International Development; Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation; Canadian International Development Agency; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; Central Emergency Response Fund, United Nations; Department for International Development, United Kingdom; European Commission; Fondation Sanofi Espoir; GAVI Alliance; Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria; KNCV Tuberculosis Foundation; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark; Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland; Multi-Donor Trust Fund, South Sudan; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; USAID; and Rotary International.

\textsuperscript{145} An example of an UNDP program was the 50 million Euro Post-conflict Community Based Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme, which was intended to “jump start” to the agriculture sector and provide support at county/locality levels. This was established by the European Commission, managed by UNDP and was implemented by a consortium of nongovernmental organizations (World Health Organization, 2009).

\textsuperscript{146} For example, for election support, UNDP coordinated with a range of other organizations, such as USAID, Canada, International Development Law Organization, and smaller organizations like Humanity United from San Francisco.
The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) played a significant role in South Sudan. The office identified humanitarian emergencies and supported the government and humanitarian organizations response. OCHA operated in the capital and through a network of sub-offices, including locations in vulnerable states, and further deployed teams to crisis areas in places where it does not have a regular presence. OCHA's funding and donors in 2014 included, Canada, the European Commission, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States, totaling $2,946,660. OCHA worked with a host of partners – government and local authorities, humanitarian focal points for thematic areas, known as clusters, non-governmental and international organizations and United Nations humanitarian agencies (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, n.d.d).
United Nations Peacekeeping Missions. South Sudan hosted two UN peacekeeping missions. In 2005, the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMISS) was established to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between Sudan and South Sudan and continued supporting peace consolidation, governance, economic development (World Health Organization, 2009). By August 2012 UNMISS was comprised of 6,633 personnel and by the end of the case period study, the total actual strength stood at 10,509 military personnel (United Nations Mission in Sudan, 2011; UN Security Council, 2014, September). The UNMISS mandate includes support for the GoSS in the areas of peace consolidation, conflict prevention and mitigation, fostering state
building and economic development after independence: Another peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), was also active (International Peacekeeping, 2012). Though similar in nature to UNMISS, the effort was generally confined to more geographically limited, though highly contested Abyei area. In 2014, UNISFA consisted of 5,326 military personnel, 50 police personnel, and appropriate civilian support (United Nations UNISFA: United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei).

**Other International Organizations.** The World Bank was active in South Sudan, with eleven active projects funded from the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for South Sudan and three projects funded from the South Sudan Transitional Trust Fund in 2012 (The World Bank, 2012). Activities focused on developing local service delivery capacities, support for livelihoods targeting gender, youth, and vulnerable groups, including ex-combatants; and improving connectivity through a core network of roads and trade (The World Bank, 2013, January). Other World Bank activities include providing technical assistance, organizing donors’ conferences, and along with the African Development Bank (USAID, 2012).

Other international organizations active in South Sudan include the International Finance Corporation, which supports private-public partnerships with the government (USAID, 2012; The World Bank, 2013, January). The African Union provided advice on border disputes, supported agriculture development, supported peace agreement implementation, collaborated with the United Nations Mission in South Sudan to mobilize

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147 UNISFA was established in response to a 2011 agreement to demilitarize the Abyei region and was tasked with supporting humanitarian delivery and access; monitoring human rights; support a process of border normalization, providing security for oil infrastructure; and, protecting United Nations personnel and material, and civilians under imminent threat.
national and international support, and facilitated the work of fact-finding missions (African Union, 2012; Sudan Tribune, 2012; USAID, 2012). Further, the African Development Bank also provided technical assistance, promoted peace and conducted analytical work to address development challenges (African Development Bank, 2012). African Development Bank activities included providing training for government officials in planning and budgeting, funding studies, surveys and seminars to support government planning, and supporting public sector capacity to improve service delivery.

**Multi-Donor Trust Funds.** A number of Multi-Donor Funds operate in South Sudan. Many of these were established prior to independence, or were outgrowths of Sudan based funds. In 2009 the government and some donor states agreed on a rough division of labor among several of the funds. They were generally focused at the national government level (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2011). These funds were managed in a variety of ways and involve joint planning, government participation in steering and implementation, and seconded national staff operating donor financial management systems. Implementation, including the delivery of basic services, was mostly entrusted to various third parties, including UN agencies, and international and local national NGOs (United Nations Development Programme, n.d.d). In some of areas (i.e. Sector Working Groups), such as the health group, the activities of partners were mapped but not in all cases.

The South Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF-SS) was set up to provide longer-term funds to facilitate effective donor co-ordination and harmonization. The MDTF-SS supported projects in education, health, agriculture, roads, water, public financial
management, law enforcement and other sectors\(^{148}\) (The World Bank, 2013, May; World Health Organization, 2009). The World Bank was the managing agent while United Nations, the government, and non-governmental actors implemented MDTF-SS funded projects. The MDTF-SS was supported by 15 donors, including the World Bank, who made commitments totaling $718 million. However, the MDTF-SS faced performance challenges\(^{149}\) resulting in donors deciding that putting a majority of their funds in one mechanism was not optimal and therefore in some cases did not provide their planned funds to the MDTF-SS (Schomerus and Allen, 2010). In May 2013, the MDTF-SS was officially closed, though a bridging grant of $75 million from donors, and administered by the World Bank, supported work on three ongoing projects and a $131 million was extended to support World Bank development goals for South Sudan.

The South Sudan Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) was set up in early 2012 to address acute and urgent humanitarian needs in the country. It managed by the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator with support from United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which served as managing agent. By 2013, donors contributed over $200 million, making it one of the largest humanitarian pooled funds in the world (United Nations Development Programme, n.d.c). Donors included the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Australia, Denmark, Ireland, Belgium, Switzerland, and Germany (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, n.d.c; UN Office for the Coordination

\(^{148}\) Examples of activities include support for the first national census, development of a new currency, integrating ex-combatants, training police, building police stations and prisons, building classrooms, providing textbooks, training teachers, providing access to water and sanitation, rebuilding Juba Teaching hospital, providing medical supplies to clinics and hospital, running a HIV/AIDs program, and rehabilitating roads.

\(^{149}\) Notably with prospective NGO implementing partners finding its procedures to be a barrier to accessing timely funds for basic service delivery. Reportedly improvements were made.
of Humanitarian Affairs South Sudan, 2013). It also has an Advisory Board comprised of donors, NGOs (local and international) and United Nations agencies to ensure decisions reflect views across the humanitarian community. In 2013, UNDP disbursed funds to 167 projects implemented by over 60 NGO and UN agency partners. UNDP also conducted a series of capacity building workshops in close coordination with the CHF Technical Secretariat and has been providing need-based and ad-hoc support to partners on financial reporting and other procedures (United Nations Development Programme, n.d.c). Funds were used for supplies, humanitarian activities within community, providing support to households, and enabling support services such as transportation (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, n.d.a).

Other significant stabilization related\textsuperscript{150} funds included the South Sudan Recovery Fund, which was targeted at the state level, and the Capacity Building Trust Fund, which supported the government. Established in 2008 the South Sudan Recovery Fund focused on extending the state’s authority into insecure areas through large-scale infrastructure projects that aim to stabilize communities through conflict mitigation projects. The fund was under the overall authority of a steering committee chaired by the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) and co-chaired by the United Nations Deputy Resident Coordinator and was administered by the World Bank. The United Nations Development Programme also has a coordination and administration role. An example of South Sudan Recovery Fund state level activities were the State Stabilization Programmes which aim to restore post-conflict socio-economic and security infrastructure, revive the local economy and generate employment in

\textsuperscript{150} Health specific Multi-Donor Trust Funds were also active in South Sudan, including the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations (GAVI Alliance), and the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria Sudan.
the states by increasing security and reducing the level of conflict. The State Stabilization Programmes were coordinated by UNDP under United Nations Joint Programming and in close collaboration with the designated counterparts in state governments as well as participating United Nations agencies, namely the United Nations Office for Project Services and the World Food Program. As the coordinating agency, UNDP was responsible for oversight, coordination and monitoring as well as providing technical support to the state government (United Nations Development Programme, n.d.c). The Capacity Building Trust Fund supported the government capacity to manage human, organizational, and financial resources effectively, and was funded from independence through 2014 with $48 million (The World Bank, 2013, January).

**International Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).** Both donor states and international organizations worked primarily through international NGOs. Estimates of their numbers ranged from 141 by the United Nations and 155 by the World Food Program in 2012 (United Nations, 2012b; World Food Program, 2012c). Moreover, by the end of 2014, some 150 international NGOs were registered with the South Sudan NGO Forum (United Nations, 2014). NGOs implemented programs ranging in size from the tens of thousands of dollars impacting one or few communities, to multi-million dollar programs spread across the country. International NGOs, along with United Nations agencies, provided the majority, and sometimes nearly all, of front-line and basic services in South Sudan, particularly in remote and conflict-prone areas. For example, within the health sector

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151 Some notable NGOs active in South Sudan include the United States Institute of Peace, Concordis International, Rotary International, The National Endowment for Democracy, and Pact Inc.
there were more than 130 health partners in addition to the GoSS Ministry of Health providing primary health care, providing an estimated 90% of all health services (United Nations, 2012b).

**Local Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).** Local, indigenous, South Sudanese civil society groups, were often partners of international NGOs, or less frequently of the international organizations or donors states directly. There were an estimated 152 (United Nations) to 187 (World Food Program) local civil society groups operating in South Sudan in 2012, which were comprised of wide range of non-governmental organizations and faith-based (churches) groups (Schomerus and Allen, 2010). Examples of these organizations included the Councils of Traditional Leaders, which hosted workshops to bring together chiefs over 60 traditional non-state systems of justice to share information and discuss issues with the members’ formal justice sector and representatives of Sudanese civil society groups (United States Institute of Peace, 2012b). Though Christians made up 3-5 only percent of the total population, Christian church groups were active organizations often providing local services in areas such as health care, food security and nutrition, in education, and in peace advocacy (Catholic Diocese of Torit, 2012, Global Ministries, 2012, The United Methodist Church Global Ministries, South Sudan, and World Council of Churches, 2012). Support to local NGOs was seen as essential as way to ensure longer-term continuity of action (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2013, November).
**Government of South Sudan.** The government of South Sudan can be broadly divided into two sections. The first is the national government, with its collection of national level ministries. The second is the state level government. There are 10 states in South Sudan, each with their own governors, typically representative of the local tribes and ethnic groups present (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2011). In conflict-affected areas or locations with high concentrations of displaced people basic services were almost exclusively provided by humanitarian organizations (United Nations, 2014).

The main security organizations in South Sudan are the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), which began as a guerilla movement in 1983, and the National Police. The discipline and technical capability in both organizations have been problematic, to say the least (Jok, 2013). South Sudanese security force issues range from conducting assassination attempts or attack on rivals within the security forces, random shootings at night, breaking into homes, stripping vehicles of their license plates, and teaming up with criminals to terrorize entire neighborhoods. The lack of discipline and training shows in how law enforcement and security was carried out, and often tribal conflicts were exacerbated by, the SPLA’s response to them (and South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013). The SPLA was known for looting property, engaging in physical abuse, and taking sides in the tribal conflicts they were expected to break up. Furthermore, the SPLA became a source of arms for these tribal feuds, as some personnel sell their firearms to warring factions.
Appendix 8: Detailed Network Feature Observations

Network Governance & Organization

Network Governance Structures: Governing Bodies. These Network Management features include those bodies that could, at least to some degree, set priorities and/or provide direction across organizational boundaries. Assessment for relative ranking for this category is based on the formality of the body, and composition in terms of how many organizational groups it encompasses (i.e. U.S. civilian, U.S. military, other donor states, NGOs, etc.) scope of the purview of the body (i.e. broad, narrow, limited to certain organizations only, etc.).

Table 27: Network Governance Structures: Governing Bodies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Iraq RoL</th>
<th>Afghan RoL</th>
<th>Iraq Provincial</th>
<th>Afghan Provincial</th>
<th>Mindanao</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governing Bodies</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Semi-Formal U.S. civ-mil body</td>
<td>Formal U.S. and host nation joint body</td>
<td>Formal U.S. civ-mil body</td>
<td>Formal host national body</td>
<td>Informal and semi-formal limited participation donor State bodies (one with the U.S.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Relative Ranking</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
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Within the U.S. government efforts across the cases, a number of attempts to
provide direction and set priorities across organizational boundaries were seen. In the Afghanistan RoL Case, from July 2010 to July 2013, an Ambassador-rank position specifically for justice sector issues entitled the Coordinating Director of RoL and Law Enforcement was established at Embassy Kabul, to coordinate across the rule of law, justice sector, and law enforcement areas among U.S. civilian and military organizations (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2014, January; and Wyler & Katzman, 2010). Coordination primarily focuses on policy level issues but also includes coordination between agencies on their specific justice sector programs. The CDROLLE was supported by a Deputies Committee consisting of military and civilian Senior Executive or Flag Officer (equivalent to a military General Officer) representatives from all U.S. government civilian agencies and military commands involved in Afghanistan RoL. The Deputies Committee received RoL project analysis and made actionable recommendations concerning ongoing and proposed RoL project initiatives (Afghanistan RoL Interview Nov 2013 and Clark, 2011). This new structure resulted from an agreement between the U.S. Ambassador and the U.S. Forces-Afghanistan/NATO International Security Force Commander and was established through formal challenges a series of State Department cables (Wyler & Katzman, 2010).

The CDROLLE replaced a Rule of Law Counselor position, which was organizationally lower within the Embassy. Established in early 2006, the RoL Counselor position was briefly initially filled by an Ambassador ranked staff member, but thereafter the position was not filled at an Ambassador rank. The RoL coordinator was intended to be the

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152 In 2013, the CDROLLE was dissolved and parts of its functions were merged with the Embassy’s Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Assistance to form a new, larger U.S. Embassy Coordination Directorate.
lead voice and source of RoL information, communication, and guidance of the U.S. government in Afghanistan—both in international donor meetings dealing with RoL matters and with Afghan government officials on matters with judicial sector implications.

At the provincial levels, in the Afghanistan Provincial case, in November 2008 the Integrated Civil-Military Action Group (commonly ICMAG) was formally established\(^{153}\) at the Embassy to institutionalize provincial level planning efforts (see planning, below) (Yodsampa, 2011). In 2010, the ICMAG was re-constituted as the Civil Military Plans and Assessments Office (CMPASS). An Executive Working Group, chaired by the Deputy Chief of Mission\(^{154}\) with senior U.S. military, U.S. civilian and NATO representatives\(^{155}\), sat above the offices and identified questions for senior leadership attention. Both the ICMAG/CMPASS offices and the Executive Working Group operated by consensus. This governing body was formal, was comprised of the U.S. civilian and military organizations, and covered the full spectrum of Provincial activities.

Beyond structures intended to provide direction between U.S. organizations, the U.S. established or participated in a number of joint organizations with host national or other international partners. In the Iraqi Provincial case, the U.S., in the Coalition Provisional Authority era, established joint Provincial Reconstruction Development Councils (PRDCs) to address the full spectrum of provincial issues. The PRDCs were a joint Iraqi-American forum established in fifteen provinces and became a forum that brought together local elected Iraqi officials and their municipal staffs, USAID and other civilian representatives,

\(^{153}\) Initially staffed on a part-time basis, by spring 2009 it had become a full-time office, including several civilian and military staff.

\(^{154}\) The Deputy Chief of Mission is the second in charge to the Ambassador (formally the Chief of Mission).

\(^{155}\) Executive Working Group initially met every six weeks and subsequently expanded to every three weeks.
and civil affairs soldiers to collectively evaluate provincial needs and match them with available U.S. and Iraqi resources. PRDCs were funded both through U.S. means, including military Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) and USAID funds, and through Iraqi national government funding. For example, in 2005, they collectively received $241 million in U.S. funding (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2009, January).

In the Afghanistan Provincial case, a PRT Executive Steering Committee was formally established in 2005 at the national level to provide perspectives and guidelines for all current and future stabilization measures in the PRT context (Eronen, 2008; Jakobsen, 2005). It was headed by senior members the Afghan government, and participants included senior representatives from U.S. civilian and military organizations, NATO, the United Nations and representatives of PRT contributing donor states. It met monthly for strategic level consultations, and was supported by two working groups, one focusing on PRT best practices, civil-military relations and the other on NGOs issues. The latter included additional NGO participants. One output of the committee was a terms of reference for all PRTs operating in Afghanistan to minimize the differences in operational styles between U.S. and non-U.S. PRTs). At the provincial level, formally established Afghanistan Provincial Development Committees could bring PRTs, the UN, and NGOs together with the governor and tribal leaders to engage in coordinated project planning and implementation for a wide range of provincial stabilization activities (Perito, 2005).

In South Sudan case, the U.S. participated in a coordinating group known as the Troika. It was comprised by the U.S., the United Kingdom, and Norway as a policy coordination forum. Largely informal, the group met as needed to discuss policy matters
among the three donor states, share information, and support peace processes.

Governing bodies that did not directly involve the U.S. were also established in the cases. In one example from the Afghanistan RoL case, the Afghanistan government established its own RoL related\textsuperscript{156} structures, namely the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) (U.S. Army Center for Law and Military Operations, 2011). It was formally established in 2007 to act as the main international body for coordinating police-related international organizations within the greater Rule of Law sphere. The IPCB and its Secretariat worked closely with all international actors and the Ministry of Interior on the Afghan National Police reform efforts. With NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan’s 2009 assumption of the lead role in police development reduced the IPCB’s influence significantly (United States Institute of Peace, 2014).

In the Mindanao case, the Philippine government established three formal organizations to manage assistance across the spectrum of stabilization activities. The Mindanao Development Council was created in 1992 to coordinate development in Mindanao and formulate and implement policies and programs (Asian Development Bank, 2002). The ARMM Social Fund for Peace and Development, was another agency created in 2002, and had a similar goal of fostering sustainable development in Mindanao. Later, the Mindanao Development Authority (MinDA) established as another agency that was charged with the economic development of Mindanao (Ponyaeva, 2011). By the end of the case study, MinDA appeared to have assumed a lead role in coordinating assistance in the

\textsuperscript{156} There was also the Joint Afghanistan-NATO Inteqal (Dari and Pashto for “transition”) Board, which supported the Afghan government and the ISAF coalition to collaboratively define how security transition proceeded. Rule of law figured prominently in this effort.
Mindanao with donor states, and international or local NGOs. One of the MinDA’s key functions was to serve as a clearinghouse for funding entities, including international donors, organization or states, or local organizations, which had to go them to before implementing a project to make sure there was no overlap in activities (Mindanao Interview 1 Feb 2014).

Lastly, in the South Sudan case, another donor group, the Joint Donor Team, was established in 2006. It was comprised of the donor states of the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Canada, with a staff and leadership structure that incorporated all six States (Joint Donor Team, 2012b). The main task of the semi-formal Joint Donor Team was to oversee the use of the multi-donor funds to which the Joint Donor partners have contributed to. This included the Multi Donor Trust Fund administered by the World Bank and the Capacity Building Trust Fund administered by the Joint Donor Team. The Joint Donor Team also provided technical advice and analysis to the GoSS on development issues (Joint Donor Team, 2012a).

Of these structures, the two provincial cases display the most prominent governing bodies in terms of the criteria of formality, broadness of composition, and the scope of their purview. In both cases, U.S. and host national formal joint bodies were seen. Additionally, the Afghan case displayed a further U.S. civ-mil formal body as well. At the other end of the spectrum were Mindanao and South Sudan which either had limited formal or informal governing structures. The Afghanistan RoL case seems to be the mid-range case, with a formal U.S. civ-mil body, and a formal but narrowly focused host national body. In the Iraq RoL case, no governing bodies were identified.
Network Governance Structures: Working Groups, Task Forces, Coordination

Centers, etc. The network governance structures and organizations examined in this category are those that attempted to significantly coordinate or foster collaboration across organizational boundaries\(^{157}\). However, these structures did not, or were not intended to have, directive authority or to set priorities across organizational types. Assessment for relative ranking for this category is based on the formality of the body, and composition in terms of how many organizational groups it encompasses (i.e. U.S. civilian, U.S. military, other donor states, NGOs, etc.) scope of the purview of the body (i.e. broad, narrow, limited to certain organizations only, etc.).

\(^{157}\) It should be noted that informal coordination across organizational groups likely happened at least occasionally in many forums in the cases.
Across the cases, there were a number of coordination structures that primarily addressed U.S. military and civilian coordination. In the Iraq Rule of Law case, two formal U.S. civilian and military coordinating structures were observed. U.S. civilian rule of law activities and their coordination were primarily centered in the Rule of Law section of the U.S. Embassy. The section began as a Rule of Law Task Force in 2005, with an overall RoL

| Table 28: Network Governance Structures: Working Groups, Task Forces, etc. |
|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
|                  | Iraq RoL         | Afghan RoL       | Iraq Provincial  | Afghan Provincial| Mindanao         | South Sudan      |
| Working Groups,  | Two formal U.S.  | Two formal U.S.  | One formal U.S.  | Two local and one| One semi-formal  | Informal USAID   |
| Task Forces,     | civ-mil and local| civ-mil          | civ-mil, host    | regional formal  | U.S. civ-mil    | coordination     |
| Coordination     | structures       | structures       | national, and    | U.S. civ-mil,    | structure        | with partners,   |
| Centers, etc.    | Two formal U.S.  | Two formal       | local structure  | host national and| Two formal       | varying across   |
|                  | and international| structures and one|                  | local organization| GoP led structures|
|                  | and international| informal high level|                | structures       | Two formal       | sectors          |
|                  | joint structures | UN structures    |                  |                  | UN led humanitarian structures |
|                  |                   | One formal        |                  |                  | GoP/UN/or international NGO led humanitarian structures |
|                  |                   | structure NATO    |                  |                  |                  |                 |
|                  |                   | with a limited    |                  |                  |                  |                 |
|                  |                   | focus (police only)|                |                  |                  |                 |
| Relative         | High             | Very High        | Very Low         | Low              | Medium           | High             |
| Ranking          |                   |                   |                   |                  |                  |                  |
Coordinator established in 2006, and whose authority was increased in 2007. The Coordinator position was an Ambassador level position within the Embassy, and was responsible for overseeing all RoL activities and policies internally within the Embassy and externally with the Government of Iraq and the military (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2009; U.S. Department of State, 2012). The Coordinator promoted justice in Iraq and worked to ensure that RoL programs were consistent with the Embassy's overall plan (U.S. Army Center for Law and Military Operations, 2011). The Coordinator was also senior advisor to Iraq's Ministry of Interior (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2005). Another U.S. civilian and military structure that was established was the Interagency Rule of Law Coordinating Center. This was a U.S. civilian and military coordinating body, comprised of working groups geared to various subject matters, which mirrored the Joint Campaign Plan Lines of Operations (see planning below). With the withdrawal of the military in 2011, both the Iraq Rule of Law Coordinator position\textsuperscript{158} and the Interagency Rule of Law Coordinating Center were discontinued (U.S. Army Center for Law and Military Operations, 2011).

In the Afghan Rule of Law case, two formal U.S. civilian and military coordinating structures were observed. Organized under the Afghan RoL Deputies Committee at the Embassy (see above), the Inter-Agency Rule of Law Unit (commonly referred to as IROL) was a joint civil-military organization\textsuperscript{159} responsible for planning, coordinating resources, and

\textsuperscript{158} In mid-2011 the RoL coordinator position was succeed by the Assistant Chief of Mission, which assumed a coordination function for law enforcement and RoL assistance programs. Supervision of DOJ personnel in Iraq was assumed by the Justice Attaché. A Law Enforcement Working Group, chaired by the Deputy Chief of Mission, was also established as a coordinating body by this time.

\textsuperscript{159} IROL was formed through a merger of the prior Interagency Planning and Implementation Team (commonly referred to as IPIT) and the Rule of Law Office at U.S. Embassy Kabul, combining CJTF-435(Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-435) and Embassy RoL units.
synchronizing Rule of Law efforts in Afghanistan (Afghanistan RoL Interview Nov 2013). Further, the U.S. Military established the NATO Rule of Law Field Support Mission-Afghanistan (NROLFSM-A) in 2011. The NROLFSM-A had the missions to provide essential field capabilities, liaison, and security to Afghan and international civilian providers in the RoL sector, such as those at Regional Commands, PRTs, and DSTs. With the U.S. military drawdown, NROLFSM-A was deactivated on September 30, 2013.

160 The NROLFSM-A was under the direct command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). It evolved from the RoL Field Force, which was established in 2010 as a subordinate command under CJIAW-435 (Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-435).
In the Iraq Provincial case, beyond the Iraq PRTs themselves, no further provincial or other sub-national coordinating structures were identified in the case. However, the PRTs themselves were formal coordinating structures, interfacing between the U.S. civilian, military, the host national government and other local organizations.
Conversely, in the Afghanistan Provincial case, two formally established coordinating mechanisms at the local and regional level, interfacing between the U.S. civilian, military, the host national government and other local organizations were observed, beyond the aforementioned PRTs. The Regional Commands themselves were established in 2006 to help bridge the PRTs and ISAF Headquarters\(^\text{161}\) (Eronen, 2008). In the provinces, U.S. PRTs often ran a PRT Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC, as further described in Appendix 5), which coordinated activities with the United Nations and NGOs (U.S. Army Center for Law and Military Operations, 2011).

In the Mindanao case, a Mindanao Working Group (MWG) was established at the Embassy by the Ambassador. It served as an interagency collaborative body that planned, coordinated, monitored, and assessed U.S. engagement in the southern Philippines. The Working Group consisted of representatives from across the U.S. Mission and JSOTF-P, and served to link elements of the GOP and private sector more closely to the southern Philippines (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2013, February). The Mindanao Working group was originally developed through the efforts of JSOTF-P elements working with the Deputy Chief of Mission and by mid-2011 the Working Group was essentially a steering group for the U.S.’s initiatives. Though well established, the Working Group was less formal than other structures in that participation was voluntary, and no resources were directly assigned to it.

In South Sudan, USAID’s stabilization activities were coordinated through a variety of mechanisms, including intra- through a technical level-working group composed of donors and other implementing agencies in Juba, as well as at a more senior level, through a

\(^{161}\) ISAF Headquarters also added military and civilian staff to better engage and support the PRTs.
steering committee\textsuperscript{162}. These mechanism varied from sector to sector, ranging from USAID leading coordinating bodies, USAID partnering with others to lead bodies, or merely just participating (USAID, 2011). Thus the U.S. originated coordination in the South Sudan case can be seen as situationally dependent, or informal.

The U.S. also participated in two formal jointly established coordinating structures that were established in the Iraq RoL case, toward the end of the case period. In 2010, international partners, including U.S. representatives formed the Rule of Law International Policy Committee to coordinate RoL efforts in Iraq. In 2011, leadership of the Committee was assumed by the United Nations, with several issue-oriented working groups created to provide more detailed coordination in areas such as extraditions, mutual legal assistance, juvenile justice, and trafficking in persons (U.S. Army Center for Law and Military Operations, 2011). Further, the U.S. and the Government of Iraq established a Joint Coordination Committee for Law Enforcement and Judicial Cooperation in 2011 under the auspices of the U.S.-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement. This was a forum for the heads and representatives of the principal Iraq and U.S. law enforcement and rule of law ministries and agencies to discuss areas of cooperation and particular challenges that required collaboration (U.S. Department of Justice, April 2011).

In the South Sudan case, the USA, along with the five other largest donors (United

\textsuperscript{162} Some examples of sector coordination were: Health and Education. USAID played a lead role in establishing formal donor coordination structures in the health and education sectors. Agriculture. USAID led an agricultural donor committee and participated in a GOSS-led Agriculture and Natural Resource Management Working Group. Work related to road construction was coordinated though a United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs-led committee. Conflict Mitigation. USAID’s Sudanese counterparts for this objective included the Ministry of Peace and governors and other state-level officials; county commissioners and other local officials, and traditional authorities.
Nations, European Commission, United Kingdom, Norway, and the World Bank) met regularly, and informally, as the G6 grouping. Its main focus was the identification of key strategic issues that it needs to address with GoSS (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2011).

Non-U.S. established coordinating structures were also observed in the cases. In the Afghanistan RoL case, United Nations established structures included regional offices that frequently assisted other organizations in gaining situational awareness and in coordinating RoL development efforts (U.S. Army Center for Law and Military Operations, 2011). Starting in 2008, the UN also established the Provincial Justice Coordination Mechanism program in seven in major population centers outside Kabul (Wyler & Katzman, 2010). The UN (through UNAMA) also led a Rule of Law Board of Donors, which was the main international coordination meeting. However, the Board of Donors did not meet on a regular basis. NATO also led a coordinating structure in the Afghanistan RoL case. Under ISAF, the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) performed a tracking, coordinating and support role for international donations to the Afghan National Army as well as the Afghan National Police (U.S. Department of Defense, 2012, December). Thus in the Afghanistan RoL case the UN established two formal structures and one informal high-level structures and NATO established a formal structure with a limited focus.

In the Mindanao case, non-U.S. established structures included two formal Philippine government led structures with broad purviews, and three humanitarian focused structures, with two formal UN led humanitarian structures and a system GoP (Government of the

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163 These were established by the United Nations Development Programme and UNAMA, and funded by the United States, Canada, Italy, and Germany.
Philippines)/UN/or international NGO led humanitarian structures. The government of the Philippines led the semi-formal Mindanao Working Group (separate from the U.S. Embassy Mindanao Working Group) as the primary mechanism of the Government for facilitating policy dialogue among stakeholders on the country’s development agenda\(^{164}\) (Philippines Development Forum, 2012). This Working Group facilitated information exchange between the GoP and donor states to discuss coordination and areas of collaboration and shared security concerns. However, it was not designed to act as an implementing body or have power over any development bodies existing in the area (Mindanao Development Authority, 2012). The GoP also typically convened regular meetings to update donors on the latest developments and provided a forum for the exchange of information through Program Management Offices\(^{165}\) (USAID, n.d.b).

The UN, through the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Mindanao also established coordinating structures within the humanitarian sphere. This included chairing and acting as a secretariat for the Mindanao Humanitarian Team, a forum where United Nations agencies, and all international NGOs and national NGOs operating in conflict-affected provinces of Mindanao regularly met\(^{166}\) to discuss relevant humanitarian issues and actions, reach consensus on joint inter-cluster planning, situation analysis, policy advocacy, and coordination of humanitarian action (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2010/2012, September). OCHA also chaired a supporting Mindanao

\(^{164}\) This was established as the regional appendage of the Philippines Development Forum.

\(^{166}\) The Mindanao Humanitarian Team convened monthly or every two weeks, or even more frequently in times of crisis.
Technical Working Group\textsuperscript{167} to ensure regular interaction and improve inter-cluster coordination for preparedness activities and response to natural disasters and emergencies, which included addressing the humanitarian consequences of conflict. The Technical Working Group consisted of key humanitarian partners with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs co-chairing the group with the government of the Philippines (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2012, September). Further, Mindanao humanitarian NGOs were generally organized by the ‘cluster’ system\textsuperscript{168}, which establishes working groups based on subject area (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2010). Each Cluster/sector was led by a government department and co-led by a United Nations agency or other international humanitarian actor. Clusters typically meet monthly to share updates, identify gaps, and plan interventions (United Nations, 2011).

\textsuperscript{167} The Mindanao group was the outgrowth of a successful prior national level effort in 2011.

\textsuperscript{168} The GoP formally instituted the cluster approach in May 2007.
In the South Sudan case, there were two UN led formal structures as well as two formal humanitarian coordination efforts. The UN, with the World Bank, co-chaired an Inter Donor Coordination Forum that brought together all development partners members, including non-traditional partners. Its focus was ensuring that essential systems were in place at independence and supporting a common understanding of the macroeconomic situation (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2011). Further a joint coordination mechanism was established to bring together the UN Mission in South Sudan and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development to share information and coordinate the provision of logistical support to the teams and joint patrols. The UN, through the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, also chaired the Humanitarian

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster/Sector</th>
<th>Government Lead</th>
<th>MHT Lead</th>
<th>Support Agencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Coordination</td>
<td>TMS-ARMM RDRRMC</td>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>UNHCR, CFSI, MTB, KFI, ACF, Oxfam, NRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>J-GCGH</td>
<td>UNDSS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Coordination and</td>
<td>DSWD</td>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>UNHCR, CFSI, MTB, KFI, ACF, Oxfam, NRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ACF, CFSI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>DSWD</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>UNFPA, Save the Children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>DoH</td>
<td>WHO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>DoH-ARMM</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>WHO, IOM, Oxfam, ACF, MTB, KFI, ASDSW, DILG, DPWH, IPHO, RHU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td></td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>IOM, UNICEF, OCHA, WFP, UNFPA, KFI, MTB, CFSI, MSF, Save the Children, MinHRAC, NRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>DAF-ARMM/DA</td>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>WFP, UNDP, ILO, UN-HABITAT, Provincial Local Government Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Recovery and</td>
<td>DSWD (livelihoods and</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>OCD, FAO, WFP, UNHCR, OCHA, IOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livelihoods</td>
<td>non-food items)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>DepEd</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>CFSI, DSWD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nutrition</td>
<td>DoH</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Save the Children, ACF, MTB, MYROI, CFSI, MTB, WHO, WFP, OCHA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>OCD NDRRMC</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Country Team and its supporting Inter-Cluster Working Group, which consisted of cluster leads from United Nations agencies and international NGOs heading the South Sudan clusters (United Nations, 2014; UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2012). Further, as the sub-national level, State Coordination Teams, under the leadership of the United Nations Resident Coordinator’s Office, met regularly in each of the 10 states of South Sudan. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (in states with a presence) also facilitated inter-humanitarian cluster coordination and co-chaired the State Humanitarian Coordination Forum with the Government’s South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2012).

Beyond the UN, the GoSS itself also hosted a number of formal network coordination structures between the government and development partners:

- High-Level Partnership Forum, which met on an annual basis, and focused on policy issues of interest to both groups. It was chaired by the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning and consisted of all key GoSS Ministers and State Governors.
- Quarterly Government-Donor Forums, which served as the central mechanism for coordination and information exchange between the GoSS and development partners on topics of interest (e.g. budget execution, international aid initiatives).
- Inter-Ministerial Appraisal Committee, which managed all government budgetary and financial issues, including flows of donor aid. The committee reviewed and approved overall donor country strategies, sectoral aid financing strategies, and major aid operations (over $10 million) to ensure assistance was in line with its stated
priorities and partnership principles.

- Sector Working Groups were the main forum for sector-level planning and budgeting. Formed in 2006, they were made up of all spending agencies in a sector as well as development partners in that sector, with a ‘lead donor’ being established for each sector. The groups met bi-annually in June and July, and consisted of both government budget holders and donor states (Government of South Sudan, 2010).

The GoSS also established an Aid Coordination and Management Unit\(^\text{169}\) (African Development Bank, 2012). Further, as was seen in Mindanao, humanitarian efforts in South Sudan were organized through the semi-formal cluster system (South Sudan Interview 19 October 2013). Though mostly comprised of international NGOs, the clusters brought together government representatives, United Nations agencies, particularly the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, NGOs, and international organizations and donors states. They had mechanisms to operate at both the national level and throughout the 10 states of South Sudan (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2012). The clusters or their elements collaborated regularly with GoSS ministries and local authorities. Roles and responsibilities of the clusters varied widely, often depending on the needs of the group and interests of the co-chairs\(^\text{170}\). The humanitarian cluster system could be replicated, at least informally, in other, non-humanitarian sectors. For example, at one point UNDP headed the cluster system for elections and the constitution and there was a conflict cluster (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013).

\(^{169}\) Within the government’s Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning.

\(^{170}\) Each had their own rules of engagements, common understandings, email threads or newsletters, etc. Food Security for example, was very active and met every week.
As can be seen, the number and type of coordinating structures varied widely across the cases in terms of the criteria of formality, breadth of composition, and the scope of their purview. Though South Sudan and Mindanao had a large number of coordinating structures, many of these were not formally established. Further, those cases had a broader focus than the narrower Iraq and Afghanistan mini-cases. Within the mini-cases, the Rule of Law cases evidenced a greater number and more formal coordination structures. Thus the Iraq and Afghanistan RoL cases are rated at high and very high respectively. The Mindanao and South Sudan cases are rated as a medium and high, while the Afghanistan Provincial case is rated as a low due to its lower number of coordinating structures.

structures, and the Iraq Provincial case is rated very low.

**Network Governance Structures: Conferences & Workshops.** This category addresses formal meetings for discussion, typically of specific topics. Workshops are typically more ‘working level’ oriented and tied to producing specific deliverables that result from the sessions, but that is not a fixed requirement. They are assessed in terms of frequency, scope or range of issues addressed, and range of participants across organizations.

Table 29: Network Governance Structures: Conferences & Workshops

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Iraq RoL</th>
<th>Afghan RoL</th>
<th>Iraq Provincial</th>
<th>Afghan Provincial</th>
<th>Mindanao</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conferences or Workshops</td>
<td>Various national &amp; regional conferences</td>
<td>Various national &amp; regional conferences</td>
<td>Various regional or sector conferences</td>
<td>Various regional or sector conferences</td>
<td>Donors conferences</td>
<td>Donors conferences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Ranking</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Across the case studies a similar range of conferences and workshops were held, and could be regular (often quarterly or annual) events, single events, or part of a short series of events. These were typically sector or area based, and often included informational exchanges. These exchanges included updates of organizational activity, strategic direction, and sharing of best practices. Senior leaders were frequently involved in these events, if only for opening remarks (Stump, 2010). A by no means exhaustive list of examples is described below from the cases. The relative prominence of the conferences and workshops is developed through assessing the range of participation, frequency, and broadness or
narrowness of the issues and areas covered by them across a given case.

In the Iraq RoL and Afghanistan RoL cases, there were a number of topically or regional based conferences (for example, see U.S. Central Command Public Affairs Office, 2009, and Blackanthem Military News, 2010). These conferences typically included U.S. civilian, U.S. military and Iraqi or Afghan government participants, or sponsors (Jobson, 2010, October). They could also include international donors or the United Nations. In Afghanistan, they also often included ISAF (NATO) participants (International Security Assistance Force, 2011). Topics could be regionally oriented with RoL elements or on specific RoL topics (Raney, 2009). Events were frequently hosted in capitals and local or regional events could be held in their respective areas (Afghanistan RoL Interview Jan 2014). In Iraq, due to the security situation, they could also be held in locations out of Iraq, or in the relatively safe areas of Baghdad or Kurdistan (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 27 Apr 14 and American Bar Association, 2007). However, events outside of Iraq could additionally involve participants from the region around Iraq, often for best practices sharing.

Similarly, in both the Iraq and Afghanistan provincial cases there were numerous or even routine provincial or regional conferences aimed at supporting stabilization objectives. These were often sponsored by the PRT or U.S. military units in the area and convened locally (Hughes, 2004; Iraq Transition Assistance Office Information Management Unit, 2009). These were often organized along functional lines to coordinate between U.S. and local Iraq or Afghan leaders or significant actors, or they could be held to coordinate between U.S. military and civilian organizations. For example one Afghan PRT and a partner

\[171\] In Helmand province example, there were routine conferences. There were a variety of ways to participate: in person through travel, talking over the phone or voice over the internet (i.e. Skype), or to teleconference.
Brigade hosted regional governors’ conferences that brought together governors, their staffs, Kabul-based officials, and provincial security officials to discuss security and development issues. There were also provincial or PRT focused conferences held at the national level in the capitals (Eronen, 2008).

In the Mindanao case, there were regular donor meetings, such as the Consultative Group Meetings, co-organized by the World Bank and the government of the Philippines for coordinating among the international donor community. These meetings addressed sectoral and thematic topics to facilitate an exchange of views on issues of common interest and co-ordination (European Union, 2002). Other donor meetings included the Mindanao donor group organized by Canada and the UN, and the Agrarian Reform donor group initiated by the UN and the GoP. The United Nations also periodically convened coordination meetings, attended by donor states and organizations such as the World Bank (United Nations, 2014). These activities aim at harmonizing donor inputs and exchanging information on donor activities. There were also at least some implementation-oriented workshops, such as the 2013 Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao contingency planning workshop. The workshop was conducted in collaboration with the Mindanao Humanitarian Team and the GoP for government and humanitarian organizations to plan for both natural disaster and armed conflict (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2013, June/July).

In the South Sudan case, periodic donor’s conferences were also held on an intermittent basis. An example of this was the 15 August 2012 Economic Conference on South Sudan, which included participation from the U.K., Norway, European Union, the United Nations Development Programme and United Nations Mission in South Sudan, the
World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the African Development Bank (U.S. Department of State, 2012, August). Another example was a 2012 sector-based conference on agriculture and food security, sponsored by the U.S., European Union, and South Sudan Ministry of Agriculture (USAID, 2012). There were also periodic Governor’s Forums, established by the GoSS that provided the opportunity for South Sudanese state Governors for the GoSS to share information on activities and developments in crucial areas such as finance, health, and education (United Nations, 2010). Donor partners, the UN, and NGOs often participated in the forums as well (Republic of South Sudan Office of the President, 2012).

Workshops were fairly consistent across the cases in terms of the criteria of frequently, breadth of composition, and the scope of their purview. Within the Iraq and Afghanistan cases, conferences, and workshops seemed to be broadly similar, occurring frequently and included a wide range of participants and issues. Likewise within Mindanao and South Sudan, similar donor coordination meeting were held, though overall the frequency of meetings seemed less and narrower in focus than in the Iraq and Afghanistan cases. Thus the Iraq and Afghanistan cases are all rated at medium, which the Mindanao and South Sudan cases are rated as low.

**Network Governance Structures: Communications.** This sub-category consists of communications structures, such as web portals, mailing lists, newsletters, or other means of sharing information across organizations in an area. Assessment is based on the frequency or prevalence, scope of the content, and number of organizations impacted across the cases.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Iraq RoL</th>
<th>Afghanistan RoL</th>
<th>Iraq Provincial</th>
<th>Afghanistan Provincial</th>
<th>Mindanao</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>None observed</td>
<td>General information sharing portals</td>
<td>None observed</td>
<td>General information sharing portals</td>
<td>European commission member portal</td>
<td>None observed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Ranking</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A number of communications structures were observed in the Afghanistan and Mindanao cases. In Afghanistan, information sharing portals were developed to share information across organizations. Often these portals were not sector or provincial level specific, but could contain relevant information. Notable in the Afghanistan RoL case were the NATO CimicWeb and the U.S. HarmonieWeb. CimicWeb was established after 2008 to help facilitate the sharing of information between civilian and military actors – including international organizations/NGOs, donor agencies, military forces and others. The site contained updates on Afghan activities and efforts, including the RoL sector. HarmonieWeb was a similar U.S. effort that could allow for access by partner organizations. In the Afghanistan Provincial case, as with the Rule of Law case, a number of web portals and resources were established that, often among other things, supported sub-national level activities, including United Nations and ISAF portals.\(^{172}\)

Further, in the Afghanistan RoL and Provincial cases, mailing lists and reports were also frequently circulated. The RoL Field Force developed an internal weekly activities round up with tips, this included what other organizations were doing. The Field Force also attempted to develop a standard agreement or procedure for reporting on activities between

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\(^{172}\) An example portal was Kabul Process website (http://www.thekabulprocess.gov.af/), which provided information about national government and its current programs, organization, and funding. National level issues were laid out, and could be applied to the provincial and district levels (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 12 May 14).
the Field Force and IROL. There were also other email lists, such as an Embassy (likely IROL) email list distributed by an individual with a weekly roundup, and circulated to as big of a target audience as possible (Afghanistan RoL Interview Jan 2014). In the Provincial case, the ISAF headquarters distributed a bulletin called ISAF PRT Weekly, presenting a collection of news sent in by PRT civilian officers (Eronen, 2008). In the Helmand province example, the Regional Command and the PRT managed several sites that contained stability and development information. At the district level, the DSTs managed files and information on their local computer accounts or locally provided shared drives and SharePoint (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 12 May 14).

In the Mindanao case one example of a communications structure was seen in the European Commission (EC) establishment of a web site with extensive details on EC projects in the Philippines (European Union, 2002). However, most European Commission States only included partial information on their co-operation activities with the Philippines.

In terms of the assessment criteria of frequency, scope of content, and number of organizations impacted, given that multiple portals were established in Afghanistan, which impacted both mini-cases, those cases are rated at a medium ranking. The attempt at a portal in Mindanao earns it a low rating, while for the other cases, with no observed relevant portals or communications structures, are rated at very low.

**Network Governance Structures: Agreements.** This sub-category consists of chartering or foundational agreements, formal agreements, and informal agreements that were observed or characterized in the cases. Their overall frequency or prevalence is assessed across the cases.
Table 31: Network Governance Structures: Agreements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreements</th>
<th>Iraq RoL</th>
<th>Afghan RoL</th>
<th>Iraq Provincial</th>
<th>Afghan Provincial</th>
<th>Mindanao</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Informal with stabilization</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
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<td>Formal U.S. civ-mil</td>
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<td>Formal bilateral agreements</td>
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<td>international organizations</td>
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<td>Formal agreements with</td>
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Chartering or foundational documents were rarely observed in the case studies. The U.S. civilian-military PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan were something of an exception, as these efforts were guided by formal agreements between the U.S. civilian organizations and military. For example, in Iraq, the U.S. Embassy’s Office of Provincial Assistance (OPA) established agreements with the military to better coordinate military and civilian efforts (Hunt, 2010). This delineated the support MNC–I would provide OPA as “lead U.S. government agency for civil capacity development in Iraq,” providing a “civil capacity common operating picture, shared expectations, synchronized guidance, and prioritized U.S. resources.” It further enabled the subordinate military units and PRT civil capacity efforts by defining how each would develop related plans at its respective level (Baylor, Burington, and Goehring, 2013, p. 142).

Across the cases, formal agreements such as memorandums of understanding or agreement were employed to formalize partnerships or relationships when they were established.
In the Helmand example from the Afghanistan Provincial case, there were Memorandums of Agreement between U.S. civilian agencies and the U.S. Marine Corps regarding what services/support the Marines would provide such as transport, protection, food, etc. (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 23 Jan 14). Similarly, the U.S. had a Memorandum of Agreement with the British outlining DST relationships where there was a British presence. In South Sudan, USAID used formal Joint Donor statements as a means of formalizing agreements between donors (USAID, 2011). In addition, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) usually created cost-sharing agreements with the GoSS, as well as with participating donors. These agreements often included a relationship definitions and expectations, often with a dollar amount listed. They also established any governance, such as any steering committees, etc. (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013).

Formal agreements were also often part of starting projects on behalf of the host nation (Iraq RoL Interview 27 Apr 14). For example, in the Mindanao case, U.S. Embassy sections typically signed Memorandums of Understanding with implementing partners that received grants (Mindanao Interview 1 Feb 2014). Such agreements typically involved key deliverables (The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2014), or guarantees that the project will be properly maintained by the receiving organization. Donor states or international organizations also established bilateral agreements with host government, often at more strategic level (Asian Development Bank, 2014).

The most common types of agreements among stabilization organizations were typically informal ‘hand shake’ or gentleman’s agreements. Particularly in the Iraq RoL case, there were not many formal agreements among stabilization organizations. These were based on working relationships and on personalities. However, even in this case larger partnerships
with between Coalition partners could still be codified in formal agreements (Iraq RoL Interview 27 Apr 14). Even the formal agreements could be reliant on informal agreements or relationships for implementation. The most common way to overcome these types of shortfalls was by building strong interpersonal relationships. When those did not exist however, coordination sometimes was difficult (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 23 Jan 14).

For example, in the Afghanistan RoL case Helmand example, there was not always clear delineation between British Stabilization Advisor responsibilities and U.S. Political Officer responsibilities. Additionally, there was also not a clear chain of command between civilians and military members on the DSTs. A formal Memorandum of Understanding only called for ‘cooperation’, which was at times not a firm enough direction in that the Marine Civil Affairs officers on the DSTs were not formally required to listen to the DST lead. Thus they could and would take an action that ran counter to overall DST goals. Moreover, the Special Forces maintained their own agreements with the Afghan government and the Marines that were not always transparent to civilian staff. In particular, the requirements of the Special Forces to obtain information in the governance and development sectors that civilians also were involved in could cause counter-productive meetings and duplication of effort.

Given the similarity of agreements across the cases and the near universally reported challenges and mixed results with them, little with regard to the prominence of agreements across the cases can be judged. However, in terms of the assessment criteria of frequency, it did seem that formal agreements were less prevalent in the Rule of Law mini-cases, suggesting a lower rating for those two cases. Thus, all of the other cases are ranked at a medium, while the RoL cases are ranked low.
Network Governance Structures: Meetings. This sub-category addresses meetings, which are typically less formal and involve fewer participants than conferences, workshops, or working groups. In all of the cases, meetings with other organizations were frequently referenced. These seemed to be the primary way to establish relationships and facilitate information sharing and coordination (Mindanao Interview 1 July 2014; South Sudan Interview 19 October 2013; U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2005). Meetings were assessed in terms of frequency, scope of issues or physical areas covered and by the variety of participants.

All stabilization organizations held meetings regularly with key partners, often on a weekly or monthly basis, and less frequently with other partners (European Union, 2002; Iraq Rule of Law Interview 24 Dec 13; U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General).
General, 2005). In some cases, meetings could be increased in frequency around special events, such as elections, or even daily in frequency depending on the need and logistical demands of holding meetings (Clark, 2011; South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013). Meetings could be in person, or through phone conversations or video conferencing. Meeting participants could include partners acting across a given sector or a geographic area, or as a means to link across levels of activity, such as linking higher (or often national level) management or across levels of local to national government\textsuperscript{173}, and/or donors, technical and field level staff or implementing partners, as well as local partners (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2013, February; USAID, n.d.b; Mindanao Interview 1 Feb 2014). They could also involve updates on activities, setting of priorities, resolve or prevent conflicts between organizations, identifying new or otherwise available resources or opportunities, and sharing lessons or best practices (Jakobsen, 2005; South Sudan Interview 19 October 2013). Once established, regular meetings, and shared distribution lists, were seen as the best method for maintaining relationships (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 23 Jan 14).

Meetings were often convened or increased a means to avoid or to respond to coordination deficiencies among partners. Particularly in these cases, they were seen as a means to ensure compatibility of goals and strategy between organizations. For example, in response to coordination concerns, in the Afghanistan RoL case, senior military RoL general met at least four times a week with the Ambassador, as well as engaged in daily phone calls. Another general officer actively participated in the mission's rule-of-law task force and

\textsuperscript{173} For example, in Mindanao JSOTF-P members also attended a weekly general AFP national headquarters meeting, as well as attend similar meetings at both regional headquarters in the southern Philippines (Beaudette, 2012)
earlier during a staffing gap stepped in as the de facto rule-of-law coordination (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2005). In the Mindanao case, there was a standing weekly meeting with senior representatives from JSOTF-P to ensure that the Ambassador was able to vet all planned operations in advance and to deconflict, where necessary, any proposed JSOTF-P activities that might have run counter to U.S. policy goals for this country. This approach was mirrored at working level in many of the Embassy meetings and a working group composed of government personnel from the U.S. and other allies as well (Lambert, Lewis, & Sewall, 2013). This provided an open line of communication between JSOTF-P and other organizations and allowed the entities to schedule additional meetings if necessary (Mindanao Interview 26 May 2014). While the time spent in meetings in Mindanao was seen as being considerable, the investment was seen as worthwhile and avoided missteps in the field (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2007).

Meetings with host national partners were often challenging to convene. Overall, the general pace of meetings and in person contacts between advisors and U.S. counterparts was put at a couple of times a week, if they would receive them that often. Meetings with local partners were often ‘managed’ by senior leaders or staff responsible for relationships, often within a given sector of activity. For example, in the Iraq Provincial Case example of Anbar, in an Anbar ePRT most of the engagements with local leaders were conducted at the senior level of the ePRT (United States Institute of Peace, 2008, September 24b).

The patterns of meetings with can be seen in Afghanistan Provincial Case example of Helmand. They were a common means of supporting coordination with partners was establishment of regular meetings. In at least one Helmand DST, daily meeting were held
with any other organizations\textsuperscript{174} operating in the areas of governance and development (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 23 Jan 14). The intent of the meetings was to maintain awareness of activities and to identify potential areas of collaboration. Some meetings were required to be routinely scheduled weekly (e.g. governor engagement). Others were scheduled as needed (e.g. changes made to assignments of key positions such as a new police chief). While yet others were scheduled around events (e.g. elections process), or were scheduled based on projects.

Meetings were also key to establishing relationships with local partners in Helmand. In one example, at least once a week a U.S. battalion held a high-profile community outreach shura to discuss major district issues and concerns. The shuras typically involved the battalion commander, district governor, district administrator, USAID representative, and the British stabilization advisor. Part of the intent was to demonstrate a united front among partners. In another case outside of Helmand, PRTs, the maneuver battalion, and U.S. Special Forces met weekly with the governor to coordinate initiatives and responses to problems (Meyerle, et al., 2010). Moreover, in Helmand, civilian and military staff met regularly met with both community leaders and at community councils\textsuperscript{175}. The meetings facilitated community council oversight and influence on local governance. Also, not directly, but through day to day operations, the civilian and military PRT/DST staff met with local security forces as well (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 12 May 14).

\textsuperscript{174} This included U.S. military Civil Affairs, Special Forces, psychological operations (PSYOPS), Information Operations/Fires (military planning elements), the Company Commander, and the Agricultural Development Team members, and Rule of Law Field Officers.

\textsuperscript{175} The topics in these Helmand meetings covered a wide range of issues, and included security and security force development, reintegration of adversaries, political discussions, governance discussions, rule of law, food and health, infrastructure and development, women’s rights, education, communication and media strategies, economic value chain development, and more.
With the assessment criteria of frequency, content, and variety of participants, meetings seemed to be the most prevalent in the Mindanao case, earning a rating of Very High. They were also more pronounced in the Iraq Rule of Law case, resulting in a rating of High. Conversely, they were seen as the least pronounced in the South Sudan case, earning a ranking of Low for that case. The other cases seemed to have a relatively moderately prevalence of meetings, with little to distinguish among them, so they are collectively rated at medium.

**Network Governance Structure: Liaisons.** In the context of this research, liaisons refer to staff designated to improve information sharing, represent parent organization interests, coordinate on activities, and to develop working relationships between organizations. They are frequently located part time or full time in partner organizations. This sub-category is assessed in terms of frequency of liaisons, the scope of their activities, and the number of organizations impacted.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Iraq RoL</th>
<th>Afghan RoL</th>
<th>Iraq Provincial</th>
<th>Afghan Provincial</th>
<th>Mindanao</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liaisons</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Provincial civ-mil teams</td>
<td>Provincial civ-mil teams</td>
<td>U.S. civ-mil liaisons</td>
<td>Embedded staff in GoSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaison roles</td>
<td>Provincial RoL coordinators</td>
<td>Provincial RoL coordinators</td>
<td>Civilian embedded staff</td>
<td>Co-location as a strategy</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Ranking</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
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</table>

Liaisons were frequently used in U.S. civilian and military relations in the Iraq.
Afghanistan, and Mindanao cases. Military staff were frequently embedded in the Embassies, and in some cases civilians were embedded at military commands176 (Eronen, 2008; Fritsch, 2012; Yodsampa, 2011). Liaisons were also often technical specialists, and their primary duties could be in that capacity, even as they also served a network collaboration function. For example, in the Afghanistan Provincial case, USAID, in order to provide technical advice177 to military counterparts, established advisors (“DEVADs,” short for development advisors) at all levels of the military structure outside of Kabul (Yodsampa). Liaison staff could even be senior in rank, such as in the Mindanao case where the deputy U.S. military commander and other senior staff were assigned to the Embassy. Liaison staff typically attended meetings, could be involved in planning (Lambert, et al., 2013). Liaison staff support was often supported by formal agreements, such as MOAs (Mindanao Interview 26 May 2014).

Moreover, the PRTs central to the provincial case studies themselves had a distinct liaison function, with activities coordination and information sharing responsibilities (Wyler and Katzman, 2010). Within the PRTs military and civilian staff exchanged information and synchronized projects178. For example, at the provincial level the Anbar PRT coordinated with the marine headquarters. At the district level, each ePRT, located in Ramadi179, Fallujah and Al Asad, had a military unit with whom they coordinated at their level on a daily basis.

176 For example, in the Afghanistan Provincial case, the Senior Civilian Representatives (SCRs) were created, one for each of the regional commands and the ISAF Headquarters added military and civilian staff to engage and support the PRTs.
177 Examples of DEVAD advice included how to deliver supplies to internally displaced persons without causing unintentional harm or second order effects and how to increase the potential for local economic opportunities from infrastructure projects.
178 At the PRT level, coordination was generally organized along functional lines, such as RoL groups, economics, education, etc. Typically groups would meet once a weekly basis.
179 Though both the provincial level PRT and an ePRT were located in Ramadi, they were stationed in different parts of the area and had different military partners. The PRT was partnered with a division level, while the ePRT was partnered with a brigade level unit.
U.S. and international stabilization organizations also frequently liaised with host government partners. In the Mindanao case, U.S. military forces often liaised with Philippine security forces. JSOTF-P forces typically liaised at the military-brigade and police-battalion level while maintaining close relationships with subordinate units (Beaudette, 2012). Further, across the cases the United States or the United Nations embedded staff in the host nation’s government. Though serving as embedded advisors, these staff no doubt also served a liaison function. For example, in South Sudan, there have been hundreds of foreign staff ostensibly 'advising' the government but effectively running whole departments of government (Bennett, 2013). One example was the health cluster (see clusters above) being co-located in the Ministry of Health (South Sudan Interview 19 October 2013).

As with meetings, establishing liaisons was seen as a means of preventing or responding to coordination deficiencies. For example, in the Afghanistan RoL case there were concerns about how the U.S. civilians and U.S. military managed its coordination with the Afghanistan government in the RoL Sector, as there was a long history of lack of cooperation between the Afghan police and the prosecutors and the U.S. funding, through far greater resourced military channels favored the police over the civilian supported prosecutor. One of the responses to this was for an U.S. civilian INL contractor to have one of its staff working as a liaison with the military to assure mutual awareness of police-prosecutor issues (United Nations Development Programme Afghanistan, 2010). However, success with liaisons varied for a number of reasons. In some cases, conflict attributed to personality differences dominated. This was in part due to lack of professional incentive and accountability systems conducive to coordination between civilian and military organizations.
This allowed for individual attitudes of civilians and military, positive as well as negative, to drive information sharing and joint analysis and planning (Yodsampa, 2011).

**Co-Location as a Coordination Solution.** A measure beyond liaison with of individual staff was co-location, which was the establishment of entire offices or teams of personnel from different organizations in the same areas. This was particularly seen in the Mindanao and Iraq and Afghanistan Provincial Cases. In the Iraq and Afghanistan Provincial Cases, civilian and military were co-located at various levels of the military structure in the field, such as at the PRTs and in Afghanistan at the Regional Commands as well (Yodsampa, 2011). However, at the PRT level, the degree of co-location varied, with some PRTs still lacking consistent civilian representation during the earlier time frame (ca 2004-2006). U.S. military forces were also frequently co-located with Iraqi and Afghan security forces. In the Mindanao case U.S. leaders determined, in part for collaboration purposes as well as legal and practical ones\(^{180}\), that U.S. military forces would be co-located with Philippine units on Philippine installations (Beaudette, 2012). As a result, all U.S. forces were integrated with military and police units in tactical outposts at the invitation of the Philippine Armed Forces Commanders. U.S. military forces lived, ate, trained, and worked with their Philippine security-force counterparts, and have done so since 2001 (Australian Aid, Office of Development Effectiveness, 2012).

Co-location was seen as contributing to coordination and problem solving, and as a potential solution to civil-military coordination issues in Iraq and Afghanistan. Through

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\(^{180}\) In addition to being critical to the conduct of the mission, this was necessary in order to comply with the Philippine Constitution and several U.S./Philippine bi-lateral agreements. Further, in the Philippines, the only bases and outposts were Philippine.
close proximity, working next to each other, having direct physical access for communication, operating and moving together, improved relationships and information sharing were enabled, if not necessitated (Yodsampa, 2011). In this process, daily in-person interaction was seen as building up relationships and credibility or trust. For example, in a case of U.S. civilian and military co-location Afghanistan, it contributed to enhanced appreciation of development principles on the part of the military. In turn civilians gained better understanding of military culture and priorities. This resulted in significantly enhanced mutual respect and trust. Through improved information sharing and relationships\footnote{Close association between civilians and the military sharing the same difficulty living conditions and hostile environment frequently resulted in PRT members expressing admiration for their military counterparts. Said one, “Being embedded, we were living and working like the military, which gave me a new appreciation for the work they do and the lives they lead.” It was also even suggested that both the shared difficult living and working conditions faced in Iraq helped contribute to eventual cohesion between the civilian and military overall (Dorman, 2007, p. 28).}, a common understanding of issues could be developed which allowed for development of coordinated solutions and activities (Meyerle, et al., 2010; Yodsampa). This could be particularly important in hostile environments, where challenges to travel and communications could greatly limit contact, even when only short distances were involved (see below in Hypotheses 5 for more on hostile environment impacts). As such, co-location greatly reduced the transaction costs of information sharing and relationship building.

However, much of benefit of co-location still hinged on personal relationships and credibility. While most examples of co-located results were positive, co-location sometimes generated more conflict that coordination. Many argued that personality was the distinguishing factor. Beneath the stories of personality clashes there often were structural problems, such as lack of guidance or oversight (Yodsampa).

The ePRT in Al Asad in Anbar province, Iraq provides an example of co-location in
practice. The harsh living conditions were cited as fostering mutual bonding and working relationships across both military and civilian lines. In particular, the lack of plumbing in living quarters was cited at Al Asad as bonding factor. This was contrasted to other locations, where civilians may have had amenities, such as indoor plumbing, which military personnel did not\textsuperscript{182}. These differences could lead to tension that damaged the civilian and military working relationships. To avoid these, many PRTs self-imposed restrictions on their privileges, such as limited or prohibiting drinking. At Al Asad, there was also an effort to observe military protocols in general. The PRT leadership directed that although civilians were not necessarily subject to the same restrictions as military staff, that they too would not be allowed to drink alcohol when their Army and Marine counterparts could not\textsuperscript{183}. The direction was also given to respect personal communication black outs in the case of military casualties, which were implemented for a number of hours (12) to ensure that families received formal notifications (United States Institute of Peace, 2008, December 9). These efforts were cited as helping to foster cohesion between military and civilians at Al Asad, if only through removing potential causes of resentment on the part of the military.

With the assessment criteria of frequency, scope of activities, and the number of organizations impacted, given the prevalence co-location at the provincial levels, the Iraq Provincial and Afghanistan Provincial cases are rated at High and Very High respectively.

\textsuperscript{182} Civilians may have had, due to chance or design, better living quarters than military personnel of comparable rank and operated with different benefits. For example, U.S. civilian staff received about 2 months of leave annual compared to two weeks that was typically for a military tour. (However, the leave and hardship pay benefits for U.S. civilians were actually consistent with UN standards for service in conflict zones.)

\textsuperscript{183} Some also chafed at the fact that civilians were allowed to drink alcohol in Iraq while military personnel were not. Alcohol consumption for the U.S. military in Iraq was prohibited by military instructions (“General Order 1”). U.S. Civilians, since they did not fall under the military, were not covered by this restriction. However, U.S. civilians were not necessarily armed, and those who had authorization to carry firearms (i.e. security, law enforcement professionals) had their own restrictions on consuming alcohol.
The increased prevalence of embedded civilian staff in the Afghanistan Provincial case distinguished it from the Iraq Provincial case. Both the Iraq and Afghanistan Rule of Law cases seem to be in the mid-range, with the Mindanao case, earning a Medium rating. South Sudan evidenced the lowest relative amount of liaison features, earning a Low rating.

**Network Management and Organization Structures Summary**

The sub-rankings, when collectively considered, provide the following overall rankings for the Network Management and Organizations category for the cases:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Iraq RoL</th>
<th>Afghan RoL</th>
<th>Iraq Provincial</th>
<th>Afghan Provincial</th>
<th>Mindanao</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governing Bodies</td>
<td>Very Low (1)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>High (4)</td>
<td>Very High (5)</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working groups, Task Forces, Coordination Centers, etc.</td>
<td>High (4)</td>
<td>Very High (5)</td>
<td>Very Low (1)</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>High (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conferences or Workshops</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>Very Low (1)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>Very Low (1)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
<td>Very Low (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreements</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meetings</td>
<td>High (4)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>Very High (5)</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaisons</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>High (4)</td>
<td>Very High (5)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Ranking</td>
<td>Low (18)</td>
<td>High (22)</td>
<td>Medium (19)</td>
<td>Very High (24)</td>
<td>Medium (20)</td>
<td>Very Low (16)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Network Coordination and Strategy

**Coordination and Strategy: Mission, Vision, and Goal Congruence.** This subsection examines differences in the perceived missions, vision, and goals between organizations types in each of the cases. The prominence of goal congruence is assessed and assigned a relative ranking across the cases, in terms of the degree of harmony or disharmony among organizations.

Table 35: Coordination and Strategy: Mission, Vision, and Goal Congruence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Iraq RoL</th>
<th>Afghan RoL</th>
<th>Iraq Provincial</th>
<th>Afghan Provincial</th>
<th>Mindanao</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission, Vision, and Goal Congruence</td>
<td>U.S. civ-mil harmony by the end of the case</td>
<td>U.S. civ-mil discord; differences regarding authority and roles and wide variation at provincial levels</td>
<td>General, though not universal, U.S. civ-mil harmony by the end of the case</td>
<td>General, though not universal, U.S. civ-mil working relationships by the end of the case</td>
<td>General U.S. civ-mil harmony</td>
<td>General harmony on high level objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differences between Embassy and DC headquarters</td>
<td>U.S. and Afghan discord over corruption/patronage</td>
<td>U.S.-Iraqi partner discord over corruption/patronage</td>
<td>U.S.-Iraqi partner discord over corruption/patronage</td>
<td>U.S.-Afghan partner discord over corruption/patronage</td>
<td>U.S.-GoP strategic agreement</td>
<td>U.S.-Donor States general agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Iraqi conflicts challenges</td>
<td>Internal Iraqi government conflicts challenges</td>
<td>Internal Iraqi government conflicts challenges</td>
<td>Internal Afghan government conflicts challenges</td>
<td>Internal Afghan government conflicts challenges</td>
<td>GoP limits with Donor States, Local to National, United Nations</td>
<td>GoSS and Donor priorities can diverge regarding short versus long term approaches</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relative Ranking</th>
<th>Very High</th>
<th>Very Low</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Very High</th>
<th>Medium</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

386
It is worth noting that at the time that RoL cases began, neither the U.S. military, State Department or USAID had a common definition of Rule of Law. The military described key RoL tasks, but lacked an overall definition, and the State Department and USAID’s definitions were inconsistent. However, by 2011 all three organizations had effectively adopted the United Nations definition, with minor changes between them. Differing home office views on RoL no doubt helped set the stage for coordination issues in the field as seen in the cases.

**Iraq Rule of Law Mission, Vision, and Goal Congruence.** As described, there were a large number of agencies and funding streams involved in Iraq rule-of-law effort (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2005). Tensions and disorder existed between the various justice programs and disconnects existed between the military, the Embassy, and between civilian organizations. Though functioning under the general RoL sector, the major U.S. RoL organizations each had distinct purposes. The military was operated outside the Chief of Mission’s (Embassy) authority, and further was focused on detainees, while the U.S. civilian organizations had different priorities. However, these organizations were often competing for the same resources, with little if any coordination between them. Ultimately none were willing to cooperate if it would lessen their ability to get own mission done (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 24 Dec 13). There were also turf battles.

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184 This was: “The rule of law refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness, and procedural and legal transparency.”
over areas of purview; in at least one case military commander in charge of detention operations attempted to expand the military role in to areas of civilian lead (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 27 Apr 14).

Sub-national coordination also occurred in the RoL arena (United States Institute of Peace, 2008, September 24b). Military commanders, through CERP funds, developed RoL related projects beginning from an early stage in the post-conflict period (ca 2004) (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2005). Civilian staff routinely partnered with military counterparts and often noted the value of collaboration (Dempsey, 2009). However, civ-mil coordination was hampered by internal military coordination issues as there was little coordination amongst the various military units involved in their local programs. This was mitigated in part through third parties sharing information, such as the Justice Integration Project, an INL funded RoL knowledge management project\(^ {185} \), which interacted with both civilian and military organizations (Banks, 2010).

There was a significant divergence between Embassy perceptions and those of leadership in Washington in regard to what was achievable, how well the Iraqis would receive reforms and western ideas, and how successful democratic transition would be. Washington leadership was more optimistic than the Embassy in those areas, particularly so during the Coalition Provisional Authority and Bush Administration era. This disconnect complicated Embassy efforts to address Iraqi concerns. For example, many judicial projects focused on computerizing records, or sharing western ideas of justice. However, the most pressing concern was actually security and the risk of people being killed doing their jobs (Iraq Rule

\(^ {185} \) The Iraq Justice Integration Project involved development of integration policies and procedures and a criminal defendant tracking system.
of Law Interview 27 Apr 14). Additionally, there were differences in timelines for results with Iraq partners, with Washington headquarters being described as wanting quick results, the military with limited patience, but all still in contrast to the Iraqi pace of movement, which was much slower (United States Institute of Peace, 2008, October 10).

Coordination challenges across organizational boundaries were further complicated by competition among stabilization groups, such as the U.S. civilian rivalry between INL and DOJ, and through internal Government of Iraq rivalry between the Ministries of Justice and the Interior.

**Afghanistan RoL Mission, Vision, and Goal Congruence.** In the Afghanistan RoL case, there was a general disagreement between the U.S. civilian and military efforts about who could give direction in the stability and by extension, RoL arena. U.S. civilians referenced Presidential policy documents that stated that civilians had the overall lead for stabilization activities. However, the military held that in a counterinsurgency there were three stages, clear, hold, and build and RoL (along with a wide range of other stabilization and reconstruction activities) was part of the build stage. State said it was in charge while the military was looking at counterinsurgency doctrine and saying they were in charge.

However, there was an interpretation on the military side that RoL Coordinator and/or Ambassador was in only charge of policy – not the whole effort or for programmatic direction or resource allocation. The generation of military leadership following those that had made the initial civilian-military agreement outlined above, which

186 This was National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, dated 7 December 2005.
was codified in State Department cables, did not accept the agreement and found out ways to get around it or ignore it. At least one senior military officer was stated as say that “they had read the cables, but they don’t take orders from cables, he takes orders from OPORDS (Operational Orders) and there were no OPORDS on this issue.” Military orders, and in particular OPORDS, are the official means by which military units are tasked from military plans for programmatic direction and resource allocation. This was exacerbated at various times by civilian and U.S. military leadership having contentious working and/or interpersonal relationships at different periods during the Afghan effort (Afghanistan RoL Interview Nov 2013).

There were also times when organizations differed as to the nature of their RoL mission and as to what it actually encompassed. One example of this difference between organizations was an attempt by the Embassy RoL section to expand police protection to Afghan judges and prosecutors heading to remote and insecure areas. They often faced a serious threat to their lives in such environments and were unwilling to live and work there without protection. However, the NATO organization with the charter and funding for resourcing the Afghan police saw its own mission area as solely counterinsurgency focused and viewed the threat to judges as primarily criminal in origin. Thus the NATO organization and the Embassy could not come to agreement on how to resolve the issue. Exacerbating this was that RoL organizations were characterized as in a state of flux – boundaries were being driven by personalities or situation – not by any sort of master plan or strategy (Afghanistan RoL Interview Nov 2013). For example, CJIATF-435 (Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-435) at one point expanded into a broader RoL area from focusing on detainee operations, then back again with the rotation of that command’s leadership. As a
result, coordination between all the disparate RoL bodies, organizations, and programs mentioned was difficult to attain (Clark, 2011).

Outside of Kabul, RoL sector goal congruence varied substantially from area to area. In terms of roles and responsibilities in the RoL sector, they varied from locality to locality and there was no consistency countrywide. Something that was one organization’s role or function in one Provence may not be in the next Province. This variety in roles and responsibilities seem to be based on individual decisions. An interviewee reported that there were stories about how it depended on which individual was there – “when so and so was here he would do it, but now he doesn’t so no one does” (Afghanistan RoL Interview Jan 2014). This was in part possible because of the lack of clear roles and responsibilities in strategic documents, guidance, or agreements. It was also facilitated by the multitude of agreements that had existed at various times and had been replaced or otherwise supplanted. This enabled staff to in effect pick and choose which agreement or document they preferred to justify their roles.

Unsurprisingly, the degree of agreement on shared goals and boundaries of organizational purview also varied from locality to locality. There were disagreements over which organizations had purview over a given area in some of the provinces and in others there weren’t. Organizations and staff on the ground found ways to come to agreement on these issues, or disagreements generally continued. There was a varying degree of friction between organizations over these issues in many, though not all areas (Afghanistan RoL Interview Jan 2014). For example, in the RC-East (Regional Command-East) area, there was the case of a USAID civilian RoL representative and the military Judge Advocate General officer who had disagreements on the direction to take in supporting RoL in the area. This
limited their cooperation substantially, and led to independent efforts or even conflicting ideas and guidance about how to move forward in the RoL arena (Afghanistan RoL Interview Jan 2014). Fostering agreement was easier when dealing with like organizations, such as between U.S. military to U.S. military units\(^{187}\) and developing working agreements between differing organizations, such as between U.S. military and U.S. civilian or NATO military partners.

In regard Afghan partners, for their part, while seemingly eager to embrace RoL, they have been confused by the variety of programs implemented specifically by the State Department International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau (INL), USAID, and the U.S. military units in Afghanistan (Wyler and Katzman, 2010). There was also a divide in goals between the U.S. and international donors and GIRQoA. A key assumption of counterinsurgency was that the Afghan government was trying to do the right thing—however, experience demonstrated they were often basically predatory officials. Civilians were a little savvier to that then the military; a quote from form Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry summarizes this sentiment: “Americans tend to see Afghan political institutions as nonexistent or immature and therefore as requiring creation or further development. The traditional power brokers in and allied with the Karzai administration see matters differently. They consistently oppose foreign efforts to create transparent, rule-bound Afghan institutions because such projects threaten to undermine their political domination and economic banditry” (Eikenberry, 2013, para. 22).

\(^{187}\) As with across organizations, coordination between higher and lower levels within an organization was also said to be facilitated by informal relationships.
Iraq Provincial Mission, Vision, and Goal Congruence. In the beginning, coordination in the provincial regions faced particular challenges during the Coalition Provisional Authority timeframe. Because of its gradual expansion into the provinces, most of the Coalition Provisional Authority’s staff arrived after the military and USAID contractors had established relationships with their Iraqi counterparts. This led to confusion over roles and responsibilities that made for a mix of government employees, contractors, and troops whose plans and programs often worked at cross-purposes (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2009). During the era of PRTs, challenges still remained.

Exacerbating coordination challenges was the initial vagueness of the goals of the PRT program. A House Armed Services Committee 2008 report described it as “nor are there agreed [upon] objectives, delineation of authority and responsibility between the civilian and military personnel plans, or job descriptions” (p. 15). To help address these problems, the State Department and Multi-National Force - Iraq developed joint provincial strategy, released in August of 2008. The Multi-National Force-Iraq and the Embassy subsequently agreed to a Joint Campaign Plan to build Iraq’s civil capacity in governance, economics, RoL, and political reconciliation. However, throughout the conflict, military leaders from brigade commander on down to team or squad leader didn’t always understand what civilians were there to do and how to leverage their abilities and resources. In turn, it was also noted that the State Department may not have always done the best job of conveying the civilian’s purpose to military partners (Naland, 2011). Additionally, according to at least one observer, though there was a lot of talk about Unity of Effort in practice agreements were in effect ‘rationally bounded’ or oversimplified in order to produce local agreement. However, the goal divergence remained at the strategic level and while the
simplified agreements could meet immediate goals, they did not produce success for these larger objectives (Iraq Provincial Interview 5 Mar 14). Further, the progress obtained in aligning civilian and military goals was not always uniformly positive. In the case of ePRTs, the shift of the military focus from counterinsurgency to building capacity and training Iraqi security forces, with the full input and concurrence of the U.S. civilian community, as the conflict evolved may have resulted in ePRTs becoming less relevant\textsuperscript{188} to meeting military goals (Naland).

![Diagram](https://example.com/diagram.png)

Figure 20: Notional Civilian/Military Coordinating Hierarchy (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2007, Iraq Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Handbook, p. 16)

\textsuperscript{188} It is worth noting that the most scathing public criticisms of the Iraq PRT program came from ePRT members (Blake Stone’s “Blind Ambition, who served on an ePRT in 2009, and Peter Van Buren’s We Meant Well, who served in 2009-10).
With regard to working with Iraqi partners, U.S. staff frequently complained that their counterparts were motivated more by graft and the division of spoils than by any expressed interest in long-term development. For example, the amount they would charge for goods or services was often inflated, sometimes several times over. This was in part a
result of the history of political patronage in Iraq and the environment of highly factionalized political competition—in which every group sought its own narrow advantage. Even when self-interest wasn’t an issue, the ability to deliver resources or benefits to Iraqi counterparts was often the gateway to collaboration with them. As one ePRT member put it, “No money, no influence” (Naland, 2011, p. 11). The norm appeared to be that most Iraqi counterparts saw the U.S. primarily as a source of money and projects, or as a means of squeezing more funds out of Baghdad. As one PRT official put it, “We are essentially bribing them to listen to us” (Barber and Parker, 2008, p. 7). In areas where U.S. spending had been particularly heavy, locals had impossibly high expectations and a sense of entitlement about what the U.S. should have been providing for them (Barber and Parker).

The environment permitted this sort of self-interested behavior, however, as in a sense the “job” of the U.S. government civilians and military was to spend money (e.g. fund stabilization activities).

Divergences also existed between the Iraqi Provincial and National levels of government. This was for a variety of reasons: many officials were new and inexperienced, the Provincial Councils were not historically empowered in Iraq and political and personality differences often inhibited effective coordination. Even when the Iraqis were well coordinated at the provincial level the central government did not act due to miscommunication, incompetence, corruption, or for political reasons, to release money to the provinces or take needed administrative actions (Barber and Parker, 2008).

**Afghanistan Provincial Mission, Vision, and Goal Congruence.** Early on, U.S. civilian and military PRT members on both sides lacked clear guidance. Some civilians
received limited instruction from their agencies, which was later pieced together with knowledge gleaned from their PRT’s Commander and other PRT members (Fritsch, 2012). For example, in at least one case, the role of the State department representative was described as “just keep things from blowing up”\(^{189}\) (Yodsampa, 2011, p. 160). Or, they were expected to perform a different function, one that did not match their areas of expertise (Fritsch). The problem of absent guidance was exacerbated by inconsistent understandings of military and civilian roles and responsibilities at the PRTs. For example, initially, PRT officers didn’t know how to fully utilize the presence of USAID field officers. For their part, the USAID field officers didn’t understand their supporting role as part of the PRT staff. However, in cases where roles were made clear the relationship was dramatically improved (Yodsampa). It was in this context that the clarification of roles and responsibilities across organizations and PRTs took place.

Absent an established concept of operations and a clear set of guidelines for civil-military interaction, PRT commanders and civilians had to improvise\(^{190}\). Without an interagency pre-agreement on individual roles, missions, and job descriptions, military officers and civilian agency personnel had different, sometimes competing, mandates. A common example of this was the common divergence in thinking about stabilization projects. In this regard, civilians were typically more focused on such concepts as development, sustainability, local ownership (e.g. building an education system instead of just building a school). Conversely, the military typically saw USAID representatives as seeking big projects to fix things for the long-term, while the unit commanders were looking

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\(^{189}\) However, lack of guidance could allow wide latitude for action on the part on provincial personnel.  
\(^{190}\) The mismatch in human and material resources between the civilian and military staffs exacerbated the problem. See Hypothesis 4 for further information.
for things that can provide immediate results and show progress to the people immediately, so they can gain the confidence of the people. The military viewed these short-term projects as a way to ensure Afghan cooperation to hand over insurgents, report improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and provide any information leading to the killing or capture of Al Qaeda and Taliban operatives (Fritsch, 2012; Yodsampa, 2011).

As a result, it took substantial time and trial and error to achieve a common understanding of mission priorities. Unless such a common understanding could be obtained, there could be stark differences in priorities and approaches at the provincial and local levels between civilian and military organizations. This fostered the development of civilian military stovepipes of activity and reporting, and lack of agreement at the PRTs caused ongoing coordination failures (Yodsampa, 2011). In cases without a shared understanding of respective roles and responsibilities, individual experience, skills, and leadership style, personality played a disproportionate role in determining the direction of PRT activities (USAID, 2006).

Most PRTs eventually arrived at workable accommodations, but not without inevitable tensions arising from disagreements over priorities. The most effective PRTs were those where the military and civilian elements fused into a close-knit and mutually supportive team (Perito, 2005). Where PRTs did manage to achieve coordinated results191, a shared understanding of roles and responsibilities was a key factor (Yodsampa, 2011). This can be seen in the Afghanistan Provincial Case example of Helmand. By 2012 organizations on the PRT and DSTs had individual guidance on roles and activities, but by and large there

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191 It was noted how prior training in collaborative and consensus-building processes, most commonly found in civilian (particularly USAID) personnel, contributed to coordinated results at the PRT level.
was not a formalized agreement for statement for the PRTs and DSTs collectively. This allowed for flexibility of personnel management to adjust to the situation and capabilities of individual staff. The civilian team members tended to self-organize on the DSTs and PRTs, ‘falling into place’. For example, the USAID rep would focus on development, the political advisors would work on talking and coaching local government staff, while a military officer would focus on governance and administration, and liaison with the military unit, etc. One factor that was identified in supporting this arrangement was that there was no shortage of work or activities to undertake, which helped to mitigate or prevent any potential competition or territoriality over a limited set of activities (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 12 May 14).

Discord was also evident between the national and provincial levels in terms of initially contradictory strategies that had a destructive impact on the legitimacy and viability of the Afghan government. While the U.S. State Department was actively supporting the central government, U.S. military and the intelligence services actively supported the warlords in areas where they supplanted central government influence. Although this dysfunction was addressed through ‘harmonized’ U.S. policy that focuses support on central government, the damage was done in fostering the development of consolidated power-bases for regional warlords at the expense of the Afghan government (Save the Children, 2004).

With regard to contractors and implementing partners, a further structural incentive challenge to sub-national coordination with implementing partners was also identified, that of contractor profit being derived from headquarters (typically in Kabul or internationally located) activities. Contractors were seen as making profits and profit margins from work
they could conduct from headquarters locations, such as project design, costing, bringing their home office people out field locations, or sending work back to the home office. As a result, there was resistance to delegating rapid decision-making authority to staff on the ground on the part of contractors, since it was perceived to hurt contractor ability to generate profits. Efforts to create programs that were flexible and responsive at a local level were resisted “tooth and nail” by contracting partners (Yodsampa, 2011).

Local Afghan implementing partners presented additional problems. They were often contracted to conduct activities such as the construction of wells, police stations, bridges, canals, or irrigation works. Issues of patronage and corruption were common. Recipients of funding could become local powerbrokers who tended to use their influence to enrich themselves and their fellow tribe or group, often at the expense of rival factions. For example, local leaders would inflate prices and steer funds and work to their supporters. It was also important to consider the unintended consequences of using reconstruction funds. Giving projects to one faction and not another could cause resentment and breed more violence (Meyerle et al., 2010). Mechanisms were often found to address these issues, but they were regular challenges that had to be met and could take new staff by surprise (Rietjens, Soeters, and Fenema, 2013).

Humanitarian organizations had a number of objections, both in principal and practical, to the military’s newfound role in delivering assistance. This was particularly pronounced in the Afghanistan Cases, where interaction between the U.S. military and humanitarian NGOs was most frequent. A fundamental point of contention was an in-principle opposition on the part of many humanitarian organizations to a structural association with military entities (Save the Children, 2004). Humanitarian organizations seek
to alleviate suffering without regard for the aid recipient’s affiliation in a conflict, and while also maximizing longer-term prospects. When military units in combat against insurgencies provided ‘humanitarian-type’ relief, it was typically associated with tactical or political objectives, such as to cultivate popular support and reduce attacks (Dziedzic and Seidl, 2005). A more practical concern voiced by humanitarian organizations was about the need for a clear distinction between humanitarian and military roles. NGOs argued that the aura of neutrality that relief workers relied on for their personal safety, and in turn conduct relief activities, would be compromised if local people were unable to differentiate between foreign civilian and military actors192 (Flavin, 2004). Humanitarian NGOs were also concerned that bringing relief operations within the realm of military actors confuses beneficiaries and local citizens, and in some cases could cause fear amongst an already traumatized people (Save the Children, 2004).

Goals and mission harmony with local Afghan leaders and communities could be problematic. Local Afghans could be collaborating with enemy forces, either out of genuine support for them or due to intimidation. The latter could be dealt with by successfully establishing security in an area. Or local Afghan communities as a whole could be ambivalent or could have even seen the coalition forces or Afghan security forces as the source of danger. In some areas, particularly more remote ones, Taliban influence was relatively benign; violent struggles for control between insurgents and coalition troops posed a greater threat (Meyerle, et al., 2010). Goal and mission harmony with Afghan ministries was also a concern. In particular, the Independent Directorate for Local Governance began demanding

192 Humanitarian NGOs particularly objected to instances of military organizations wearing civilian clothing, which happened in early episodes in Afghanistan.
a say in how provincial reconstruction teams, battalions, and brigade staffs related to local
governments, and asked that Kabul be informed of coalition interactions with provincial
officials (Kemp, 2011, January/February). However, overall the idea of a strong steering and
coordination attempt by an Afghan authority that would divert PRTs from donor nation
priorities was not met by enthusiasm by international donors (Gauster, 2008).

Further, self-interest or corruption of Afghan officials was a re-occurring theme. For
example, local Afghan leaders close to the Coalition could use their relationships to pass
false information naming rivals as Taliban. This resulted in instances of Coalition units
killing prominent local leaders whose commitment to the insurgency was uncertain, which
created powerful enemies and no doubt caused more harm than doing nothing at all
(Meyerle, et al., 2010). Afghan leaders could also use their relationships with coalition forces
to enrich themselves or their family, tribe or political group at the expense of the general
population. General association with corrupt Afghan leaders undermined the credibility of
coalition forces with the local populace (Kemp, 2011, January/February).

Despite these challenges, trust and working relationships could be established at least
in some cases. One means was through shared patrols with Afghan military and police.
Communication with the locals and with key leaders was also important, and such outreach
could often take place during the shared patrols (Meyerle, et al., 2010). An example from
Helmand is illustrative. In Helmand, the Marines partnered with Afghan military and police
forces at the lowest level. They ate, lived, and patrolled side-by-side with Afghan police and
planned most operations together. Upon arrival, one Marine likened the Afghan National
Police to the “Mexican Federales” because they only behaved when closely monitored, and
might smoke hashish or carry away a farmer’s chicken. However, by the end of the Marine’s
deployment, the professionalism of the Afghan National Police was increased, and some even tried to mirror the Marines’ appearance by cutting their hair in Marine fashion. The Marine Company also learned how to work with local militias to navigate the terrain, identify insurgent safe houses, and avoid IEDs (improvised explosive devices). Still, the Marines understood enough about local politics to realize that their guides had interests of their own, and so could not be completely trusted. For instance, local militiamen proved extremely effective tactically, but taking their side against the restive local clans threatened to further inflame the valley and strengthen the Taliban politically (Meyerle, et al.).

Goal divergences existed between Afghan national and local governments as well. Though localities had their own governing bodies, it was the central government ministries in the provincial capitals that actually implemented national programs. Further, once established, the Independent Directorate for Local Governance took a much more vigorous approach to managing local governance than the Ministry of Interior had, and began to assert itself as the supervisors of local officials (Kemp, 2011, January/February). Not surprisingly, local officials often disagreed with the Kabul ministry representatives on priorities and implementation (Katzman, 2014, June). In addition, many governors had conflicts or rivalries with other officials in their province, some of whom reported directly to superiors in Kabul, not to the governors (Kemp, 2011, January/February).

**Mindanao Mission, Vision, and Goal Congruence.** Aid was delivered to Mindanao by a multiplicity of actors and in a variety of ways. Donor coordination efforts were particularly important in Mindanao, where many partners seek to introduce innovative interventions to complex challenges (United Nations, 2004). However, though almost all
development partners in Mindanao were seen as sharing a common view regarding the root cause of the conflict, their priorities were seen as varying in accordance with their policy on Mindanao or their interests (Kudo and Yoshimura, 2008). For its part, the Philippine government matched the multiplicity of donors in Mindanao with a multiplicity of government agencies in charge of economic development (Ponyaeva, 2011). For example, all of three of the government-established organizations, Mindanao Development Council, Mindanao Development Authority (MinDA) and the ARMM Social Fund for Peace and Development had the same functions in theory; however, it was not clear how they cooperated, delegated their responsibilities, and/or competed for funding.

In the Mindanao case, the overall objectives of the civilian and military were seen as complementary. A corollary of JSOTF-P's mission was their support role as a component of the Ambassador's 'America-in-3D' initiative focusing on diplomacy, development and defense (Beaudette, 2011). From a military perspective, OE F-P would ideally, have been an integrated interagency effort, pulling in different aspects of national power to best effect (Lambert, et al., 2013). To this end, JSOTF-P had a unique mission statement that provides an overview of the entire mission and the foundation for operations: “JSOTF-P, in coordination with the U.S. Country Team, builds capacity and strengthens the Republic of the Philippines security forces to defeat selected terrorist organizations in order to protect RP and U.S. citizens and interest from terrorist attack while preserving RP sovereignty.” The mission statement further recognized that JSOTF-P must be integrated with the Country Team (Maxwell, 2011, p. 11).

For the Embassy’s part, one of the highest priorities for Embassy Manila was to prevent and respond to terrorism. The Embassy worked closely with JSOTF-P. By merging
U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) development assistance activities and military civic action programs, the Ambassador has given new impetus to the effort to stabilization efforts in Mindanao (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2007). However, the differing legal authorities between civilians (under U.S. Code Title 22 Security Assistance) and the military (under Title 10 Military Operations) still resulted in challenges in manners which training advisory assistance to operations could be conducted. These were eventually overcome with clear execution orders delineating not only authorities but also processes and responsibilities. Still, many peacetime regulations persisted, resulting in lost opportunities for, among other things, the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance (Maxwell, 2013).

The U.S. and international donors shared a broad agreement on goals with regard to Mindanao. Australia, Canada, the European Commission, and various European Union member states had an emphasis on Mindanao, corruption, and governance that complemented U.S. government priorities (USAID, 2009, January). The U.S. government maintained an active dialogue with the International Monetary Fund on macroeconomic, monetary, and fiscal issues. The U.S. Mission also worked in careful unison with numerous donors active in the education arena (USAID, n.d.b).

Further, the U.S. Embassy sections worked according to the priorities of the GoP (Government of the Philippines), which were formally articulated in the Embassy strategic plan (i.e. the Mission Strategic Resource Plan). The Embassy plan was aligned with GoP priorities in Mindanao, as well as with State Department and U.S. leadership goals (Mindanao Interview 1 Feb 2014). This was often codified in strategic agreements, such as a 2011 Partnership for Growth agreement, and USAID’s Country Development Cooperation
Strategy (USAID, Philippines Country n.d.b). Embassy projects typically had to reference these strategic documents (Mindanao Interview 1 Feb 2014). With regard to the U.S. military, the military and the Philippines formulated an integrated plan that included military training, provision of equipment, and the creation of a new bilateral defense consultative mechanism. Further, the JSOTF-P mission statement and planning emphasized the critical importance of national sovereignty (Maxwell, 2012).

Working with local partners could be complicated, as local NGOs were often seen as fractured or competing amongst themselves (Rood, 2005). Different movements had different political goals; one group may have believed in reform of the current system, while another may have advocated for complete replacement. Or another may have sought an ethnonationalist solution to Muslim problems, while another sought an Islamic solution. Another issue was the potential capture of civil society organizations by politicians wanting seeking advantage. Naturally, NGOs sympathetic to these varying goals had varying reasons for cooperating with or criticizing the government (and each other). This required donors to develop an understanding of the overall operating environment for civil society. This was especially important in conflict-affected communities (Australian Aid, Office of Development Effectiveness, 2012). In addition, all could elicit the hostility of security forces because they were outside the mainstream of traditional Philippine politics. These divisions, as well as separation from “normal” politics, made it difficult to influence government policy.

The Government of the Philippines itself had a strong influence on stabilization organizations, and was able to influence or limit their goals. For example, while the United Nations had a presence in the Philippines for many years, this role was consciously limited to
humanitarian work, not involving negotiations, ceasefires, or peacekeeping. The Philippine government allowed the UN a certain degree of involvement in dealing with the humanitarian aspects of the Mindanao conflict, while keeping the organization completely out of the peace process, and security activities. Although some United Nations representatives argued that further international awareness of the dispute would help with project funding, the United Nations had little interest in ‘internationalizing’ the conflict (Chesnutt, 2011). Additionally, the Philippine government reportedly also exerted pressure on international organization and international NGOs to conform to its macro-political objectives, deriving from the power of government to grant or deny access for international organizations to a trouble spot like Mindanao. Complicating matters even further, bureaucratic limitations were not only enforced by the central government in Manila, but also by regional bodies in Mindanao (Chesnutt, 2011). These priorities shifted as Philippine governments did, and international assistance, as funneled through these organizations, was shifted accordingly. This was seen as tying into issues of self-interest or corruption, as when money went to a specific area it went to local political bosses (Mindanao Interview 1 Feb 2014).

With regard to regional and national Philippine government goal convergence, a fundamental disagreement seemed to exist between the national government -- which wished to keep the peace and development process local -- and representatives of Moro civil society in Mindanao, who called for further international action. It is unclear what source of national government reluctance was, though some speculated that it was a fear of “losing face” or from central government desires to ensure that programs and activities were

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193 This approach could charitably be viewed as a political survival mechanism.
undertaken in accord with their priorities (Chesnutt, 2011). This local distrust extended to the Philippine national security forces, and steps, in concert with U.S. military support, were made to address this issue. Additionally, perceptions of corruption, however, were an issue as well (Lambert, et al., 2013).

South Sudan Mission, Vision, and Goal Congruence. Within the U.S. Embassy, there was confusion between the roles and priorities between the Special Envoy, the Chief of Mission/Ambassador, and other Washington, DC offices (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2013, May). Further, internal divisions or confusion between the State and national governments of South Sudan was common. In 2011, one senior GoSS official noted candidly “unfortunately the government does not speak with one voice at any level” (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2011, p. 54). However, overall, across stabilization organizations, there was perceived to be a strong sense of solidarity; though turf battles may have occurred there was a sense of pulling together and that shared a common reason to help build the country. For example, the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute had strong working relationships in South Sudan, which is not always the case in other countries. This sense of common cause took place in an environment of high expectations, as the local populace was eager to see results, which, however, were slow in coming or not being delivered at all (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013).

Among donor states stabilization organizations have similar high-level objectives. The United Nations and most donors were generally supporting a peaceful, secure, and democratic South Sudan, or high-level economic development goals. The differences were
seen in how organizations approach the goals and implement activities (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013). A key strategy and vision related issue has been inadequate donor attention to conflict. This was attributed to the widely held but incorrect donor state notion that “lack of development was in itself a cause of conflict,” and that development per se, particularly in the form of untargeted service delivery, would therefore help contain violence (The World Bank, 2013, January). This, in turn, shaped donor priorities and strategies. However a consensus has been emerging among development partners on the critical importance of addressing the conflict dimension more directly. Further, differing specific interests have made it difficult to maintain a regional approach among South Sudan’s supporting regional neighbors194 (International Crisis Group, 2014).

Though a number of development partners, especially the larger ones, had publicly stated their commitment to a long-term development in South Sudan. However, these commitments to long-term engagement were not necessarily reflected in forward budget planning and contractual commitments. This was due in part to the short-term nature of much of the funding as well as the cyclical nature of programming. Many implementing partners felt that the short-term funding did not serve South Sudan well (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2011). An additional tension was a frequent pressure to deliver services on the ground while knowing that the expansion of state capacities to deliver such services themselves can take years (Bennett, 2013).

194 For example Uganda has given Juba direct military support, both to defend and to retake territory and forces associated with Ugandan supported Sudanese armed groups have also intervened alongside other regional non-state armed groups that reportedly support the government.
**Mission, Vision, and Goal Congruence Assessment.** With the assessment criteria of degree of harmony or disharmony among organizations, given the relatively low levels of discord between organizations, the Iraq cases both are rated highly, with the Rule of Law case observed to be at least somewhat more harmonious than the Provincial case. This is shown by the stronger U.S. civilian and military organization goal congruence in the case. A similarly strong congruence was seen in the Mindanao case, which also demonstrated a strong U.S. civilian and military goal congruence. Conversely, the Afghan cases revealed greater dis-harmony of goals, particularly between the U.S. civilian and military organizations, but also with local partners. This was particularly evident in the Provincial case, where disagreements were pronounced between the U.S. and humanitarian organizations. The South Sudan case revealed agreement on high-level objectives, but less agreement on lower level goals. Thus it is rated at medium.

**Coordination & Strategy: Strategic Plans and Planning.** In this section, the strategic plans that spanned organizational types, such as campaign plans or strategic frameworks are described. This also includes the processes through which they were developed, when applicable. The strategic planning is then assessed in terms of the formality of the body, and composition in terms of how many organizational groups participated in it (i.e. U.S. civilian, U.S. military, other donor states, NGOs, etc.) scope of the purview of the planning (i.e. broad, narrow, limited to certain organizations only, etc.).
Iraq and Afghanistan General Strategy and Planning. Both sets of the “mini-cases” of Rule of Law and Provincial stabilization took place under larger countrywide strategies in plans in both countries. These are summarized briefly here for context.

In Iraq, two capstone strategic documents were developed. In 2007 the U.S. Embassy and Multi-National Force - Iraq developed a Joint Campaign Plan as a top-level strategic planning document within the U.S. civilian and military missions. The Joint Campaign Plan outlined strategic priorities, described risks, and integrated goals along four lines of operation: political, economic/energy, rule of law, and security. The plan also described a baseline and common framework, and high-level end-states, and assessment metrics (Scholtes, 2011). This plan and its updates provided overall direction for the U.S. civilian and military organizations until the military withdrawal. Later, in 2008 a civilian oriented U.S.-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement was adopted that guided overall U.S. political, economic, cultural, and security ties with Iraq.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Relative Ranking</th>
<th>Iraq RoL</th>
<th>Afghan RoL</th>
<th>Iraq Provincial</th>
<th>Afghan Provincial</th>
<th>Mindanao</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. civ-mil national plans</td>
<td>U.S.-Iraqi project lists</td>
<td>Afghan national “work plan”</td>
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<td>UN and donor plans informed by national strategies</td>
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<td>Some regional U.S. civ-mil RoL plans</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
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In Afghanistan, international donors early on recognized the importance of working together in Afghanistan, as evidenced by the rapid calling of the December 2001 Bonn Conference, and the division of sectoral responsibilities among lead nations. Further, in 2008 the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) was became the capstone strategic document for stabilization efforts. The ANDS had three main pillars of security, governance, rule of law and human rights and economic and social development. The ANDS further consists of a variety of plans for different sectors such as agriculture, education, health, water, etc. to include RoL, which is discussed below. Another major Afghan strategic development document was the National Priority Programs document, which was function as master development plan in set goals and conditions that the Afghan government was supposed to be working for. It was a joint agreement between the United Nations in partnership with the Afghan government. As in Iraq, the U.S. military and civilians has their own plans. The overarching strategic document for the U.S. effort in Afghanistan was the 2009 U.S. Embassy and ISAF/ U.S. Forces-Afghanistan published Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan, which was intended to replicate the similar Iraq planning. The goal in developing the plan was to provide clear guidance how the military, diplomatic, and development organization in Afghanistan should work cooperatively in the effort to secure and stabilize the country (U.S. Army Center for Law and Military Operations, 2011).

195 Both were updated in the 2010 “Priority and Implementation Plan 2010-2013.”
196 The Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan was revised in 2011 and 2014. Also, in 2010, the State Department also issued the Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy, with 9 key initiatives for the region.
Iraq RoL Strategic Planning. Before 2009, strategic U.S. civilian RoL guidance was outlined in an INL RoL framework. The document, which was informally blessed by Embassy leadership at the time, was not a fully coordinated policy statement approved by the Ambassador and Washington decision makers. The framework informed U.S. civilian and military strategy for RoL, which was within a RoL annex to the 2007 Joint Campaign Plan (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2005). In response to coordination challenges and criticism, including a 2007 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Audit, the Embassy developed a 2009 RoL Strategic Action Plan (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2008). Flowing from the Joint Campaign Plan, the RoL Plan organized efforts into six RoL categories, with lead responsibilities split between INL and the Justice Department. In early 2010, the updated Joint Campaign Plan shifted the lead for RoL efforts from the military to the RoL Coordinator with substantial support by the military (U.S. Army Center for Law and Military Operations, 2011). Additionally, there was also a RoL plan & strategy specifically for the Kurdistan Regional Government that was published. It grew out of many agreements between the U.S. and Kurdish Ministries (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 24 Dec 13).

Afghanistan RoL Strategic Planning. Until 2006 there was no overarching plan or strategy for U.S. RoL efforts in Afghanistan. The first RoL strategic plan was drafted in the summer of 2006, and included a vision, key participants, opportunities and threats, and key detailed initiatives required to succeed in Afghanistan. Further it included a desired end state and described the resources necessary to reform the Afghan justice system (Tasikas, 2007). A
successor U.S. strategic RoL plan was the November 2010\textsuperscript{197} U.S. Government Rule of Law Strategy for Afghanistan, adopted by the U.S. Embassy (The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, U.S. Army, Center for Law and Military Operations, 2011). This document was the result of several years of effort to develop a plan that was acceptable to all stakeholders and that would be approved by the organizational headquarters in Washington\textsuperscript{198}. This national strategy was also written to support the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and its subordinate Afghanistan RoL plans (see below) (U.S. Army Center for Law and Military Operations, 2011). Further, as of August 2013, a Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction report stated that a draft update of the strategy was undergoing interagency review in Kabul and there was no specific timeline for its completion (2014, January).

The U.S. and coalition military commands in Afghanistan varied on how they addressed RoL. Some had considered or issued plans for RoL efforts within their areas of responsibility, with the number increased as time progressed. For example, Regional Command East beginning in 2008 placed a Rule of Law Annex in its campaign plan, and was followed by Regional Command-South in 2010. These annexes were informed by both the Afghanistan RoL plans and U.S. Embassy RoL plans after they were published, and they acknowledged U.S. civilian and international community as the leads in the RoL arena, with and military efforts in support. Further ISAF seriously considered issuing RoL plans and/or RoL planning and reporting guidance during 2010 and 2011 as well (U.S. Army Center for

\textsuperscript{197} This plan was referenced as a 2009 plan in the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, January 2014, \textit{Support for Afghanistan’s Justice Sector: State Department Programs Need Better Management and Stronger Oversight}.  
\textsuperscript{198} Anti-corruption efforts were largely outside of the scope of these RoL plans. A 2010 anti-corruption strategy was drafted but never finalized. Though the draft strategy was referenced and provided some utility, U.S. anti-corruption efforts did not have a definitive overarching strategic document.
Afghan national RoL planning was developed the National Justice Sector Strategy, which was under the overarching Afghanistan National Development Strategy, and its supporting National Justice Program plan. The National Justice Program was the fundamental document used by the international donor community to explain the development of the RoL in Afghanistan over a five year time frame. It established an end state, defined performance indicators, and outlined methods for monitoring and evaluation. The responsibility for oversight was shared between a Program Oversight Committee and a Board of Donors. The document reflected an almost herculean effort to gain consensus amongst the Afghan and international RoL community stakeholders, including the U.S., other donor states199, NGOs, the World Bank, and UN agencies. Additionally, RoL related strategy was further developed under one of the Afghan National Priority Programs (U.S. Army Center for Law and Military Operations, 2011). There was also a multi-lateral anti-corruption agreement in development that, as of late 2012, was never finalized (Afghanistan RoL Interview Nov 2013).

**Iraq Provincial Strategic Planning.** Each PRT had a work plan that detailed PRT activities and short-term goals and coordinated and synchronized with the military’s battle space owner. They were updated on a quarterly basis. The PRTs and military partners also developed Unified Common Plans. These were agreements on goals, roles, and responsibilities between the PRT and its partnered military unit, if it had one (Doyle, 2013; Jobson, 2010, October). The military developed subordinate plans from the Joint Campaign

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199 These included the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, and Canada.
Plan, down to the provincial or even district level. Further, in most provinces, Provincial Reconstruction Development Councils comprised of Iraqi and U.S. participants, (see above) drew up prioritized lists of projects in line with national and provincial development plans. The intent was to help avoid “white elephant” projects, and to develop programs that Iraqi partners had both the interest and technical capabilities to sustain (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2009, January).

**Afghanistan Provincial Planning.** Overall, Afghanistan provincial planning was nested under the Afghan National Development Strategy and the Afghan national development programs (Eronen, 2008). An early effort at planning was seen in a 2-page civilian-military Strategic Directive (ca 2005-2007) outlined and directed coordination between the civilian and military chains of command. In 2007, the Department of State led planning processes at each of the U.S. PRTs, which resulted in the first joint civil-military plan reflecting agreed goals and strategy (Yodsampa, 2011). Before this process, strategic civil-military plans that had been developed were intended to cover the whole gamut of operations but they were not systematically translated for use at PRTs or brigade levels. However, these new provincial plans did not have a national plan to nest under, which limited their effectiveness. To develop these plans and to institutionalize this civ-mil planning, in 2008 the ICMAG was established at the Embassy and developed a planning process. The ICMAG also led to spin-off co-located planning teams at the Regional Commands (Yodsampa). Also, in 2008, the Afghan government developed the Five Year

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200 The planning effort was further institutionalized through including the planning process and plan implementation as part of the performance evaluations for State Department PRT representatives.
Strategic Work Plan, which laid out a blueprint for local governance and described areas where donors could provide financial and technical assistance (Kemp, 2011, January/February).

By 2008 the dominant general approach to coordination at the Afghanistan PRTs had become the "Whole of Government Approach" (see Chapter 1). Accompanied by terms such as ‘the 3Ds’, describing diplomacy, development and defense, this approach became predominant U.S. PRT organizational concept in Afghanistan and was adopted by other donor states. The approach was reflective of wider policy changes in major donor nations’ approaches to fragile states. The whole-of-government idea sought national policy coherence and emerged as an answer to new global and local realities of the security and development environment. It also reflected an awareness that success on the ground necessitated greater institutional integration in the donor capital. For example, some critics noted that poor strategic coordination in Rome seriously undermined the Italian PRT in Herat (Eronen, 2008).

**Mindanao Strategic Planning.** In the Mindanao case, though there were national level plans, there were few plans for the region that formally involved multiple groups of stabilization organizations (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2011). One exception was the 2010 Humanitarian Action Plan for Conflict-Affected Provinces of Mindanao (HAP), which was the result of an inter-organizational planning process and a one-day workshop conducted in August 2010. Organization engaged in formulating the
document were the UN, the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), representatives from international humanitarian organizations active in Mindanao, and key local NGOs. The HAP outlined strategic objectives for the year 2011, and outlined objectives for eight related humanitarian clusters (Chesnutt, 2011). Further, an implicit purpose of the HAP was to minimize the risks of competition among humanitarian organizations. The HAP was intended to be reviewed bi-monthly, however humanitarian emergencies in 2011 resulted in priorities shifting to emergency response. In early 2012 steps were taken to reactivate the contingency planning process, with a view to covering both natural disasters and conflicts, in all areas of Mindanao. This resulted in a 2012 Mindanao Contingency Plan (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2012, May).

The HAP itself was updated in Jan 2013 under the leadership of Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Again, this was the result of a one day workshop, led by the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator, and with over 110 representatives from organizations such as local and national governments, local and international NGOs, UN, and other humanitarian partners. The 2013 HAP was also built upon the results of a 2012 needs analysis for Mindanao, conducted by the Mindanao Humanitarian Team together with Philippine government line ministries (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2012, September).

**South Sudan Strategic Planning.** The principal framework of development priorities for South Sudan was articulated in the government’s South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP), which was launched shortly after independence and extended until at least

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201 Eight United Nations agencies were involved in developing the HAP.
2016 (United Nations Development Programme, n.d.c). The SSDP laid out a broad vision\textsuperscript{202} and identified the country’s many needs (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2011). However it did not identify priorities in the face of huge development needs, nor was it grounded in a clear expenditure framework (The World Bank, 2013, January). The United Nations, including Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the humanitarian clusters, and other humanitarian actors participated in its development (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2011). The SSDP was complemented by the Medium-Term Capacity Development Strategy for South Sudan (MTCDS), which was developed alongside it to provide a strategic framework for addressing the capacity development priorities of the SSDP (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2011). The MTCDS included sector-specific capacities, as well as core capacities needed across government. MTCDS also outlined the core principles and modalities that should be followed by both national and international actors to ensure the coherence and within the SSDP framework (The World Bank, 2013, January).

Further, in response to shortcomings in partner support, the GoSS developed an Aid Strategy in August 2011 as part of the SSDP. The Aid Strategy called for donors to assist with developing government systems and procedures and to channeling funds (including budget support for local-level development and improved public financial management) through government systems. The strategy also included a new aid management structure, with new working groups co-chaired by lead donors, a mechanism for high level political dialogue, more effective aid monitoring, better inclusion of donor states into the aid

\textsuperscript{202} A driver for the development of the SSDP was the South Sudanese government desire for donors and their implementing partners align themselves behind its long-term priorities, whilst retaining their flexibility to respond in potentially unpredictable circumstances.
coordination process, a more formal division of labor, and guidance on how to bring assistance into the government’s budget (African Development Bank, 2012).

The SSDP formed the basis for other organizations strategic planning. For example, the United Nations agencies operating in South Sudan formulated their own plan, the United Nations Development Assistance Framework, which aligned UN agencies’ programs with the objectives of the South Sudan Development Plan. The Framework was approved in 2012 and similar to the SSDP, had been extended to mid-2016. The Framework informed UN agency strategic planning (United Nations Development Programme, n.d.c).

The humanitarian sector has been active in planning as well. A Humanitarian Action Planning process was piloted in 2010 and included the completion of needs assessment and analysis at the county level, using standardized indicators. This effort informed the 2012 South Sudan Consolidated Appeal Process, which is an annual humanitarian sector planning process (see above). There was also humanitarian contingency planning, which for example was done extensively in preparation for the independence referendum and achievement of independence in July 2011 (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2011). Additionally, the respective humanitarian Cluster Working Groups formulate cluster strategy and response plans. The clusters coordinate their response at central and state levels (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2012).

**Strategic Planning Assessment.** With the assessment criteria of formality, breadth of organizational group participation, and scope of purview, based on the formality of plans and their scope, the Afghanistan RoL and Provincial cases rate the highest among the cases. Tiered plans from the national to regional or provincial levels were common, along with host
national plans. They are followed by the Iraq cases, which showed fewer plans overall, and particularly with regard to nested planning. At the lowest end of the spectrum for this sub-category are the Mindanao and South Sudan cases, with planning limited or not observed beyond the humanitarian sphere.

**Network Coordination: Resource Sharing.** This sub-category examines practices to sharing resources, such as logistical, staff, or funding, across organizations. The cases are assessed on the basis if the prevalence and types of sharing observed in the cases.

<table>
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<th>Table 37: Network Coordination: Resource Sharing</th>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq RoL</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resource Sharing</td>
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<tr>
<td>All cases: shared transport space and support resources across organizations</td>
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<td>Relative Ranking</td>
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Though combined or synchronized programmatic activities seemed to be a challenge, there was an overall strong habit of sharing resources such as transport, logistics support, or even staff with other organizations. In general, organizations, particularly military organizations shared transport and security resources (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 24 Dec 13) or provided logistical sustainment for hosted guest organizations or even security
and emergency medical support. This logistical sharing also could extend to partnering with or between outside organizations, such as U.S. military units being hosted and partnering with NATO member state PRTs, or the United Nations being hosted or partnering with the U.S. or other donor states, or with or between UN agencies, donor states, and implementing partners. Support occurred on mutually agreeable projects if goals and objectives were shared. Sharing primarily depended upon personal relationships or headquarters level agreements. Staff time could be loaned, depending on arrangements. Or organizations could team up on a report or to launch an initiative (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013).

Sharing space on trips was frequently observed across the cases. For example, in the Afghanistan RoL case, USAID and INL had their own aircraft and were liberal allowing organizations that shared their goals using them as well (Afghanistan RoL Interview Nov 2013). In the South Sudan case, the limited resource environment was seen as making collaborate and imperative as the situation on the ground demands it from a resource perspective (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013). This was evidenced in an example where Common Humanitarian Fund funding allowed the United Nations Department of Safety and Security to provide air support to aid agencies’ response to humanitarian crises in areas where access by road was a major challenge (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs South Sudan, 2013). In another South Sudan example, the U.S. State Department and UN Development Program shared seats on its flights to remote locations. In addition, NGOs were also typically glad to share rides because it saved them resources that they could put to their programs instead of transportation (South Sudan Interview 19 October 2013). UNDP also shared flights with other organizations when space was available (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013). Though ride sharing occurred fairly often,
sharing the vehicles themselves was much rarer (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013).

Barriers could exist to transportation sharing, however. In the Mindanao case, restrictive procedures were in place on the U.S. military regarding military flights with AFP leaders, which reduced opportunities to partner203 (Lambert, et al., 2013).

Security was another area of resource sharing, typically by military forces supporting non-military organizations. In South Sudan, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) assets and personnel were utilized to support humanitarian agencies in safely delivering humanitarian assistance, supporting the relocation of internally displaced persons and enhancing community engagement. UNMISS provided force protection for the delivery of humanitarian assistance through river access and for humanitarian aircraft at key airstrips. UNMISS military personnel secured airstrips for relocation flights for staff of United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations. UNMISS military also provided protection to facilitate relief operations in the towns and refugee camps. The UNMISS military component, in close cooperation with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, encouraged liaison, coordination, and even joint planning of its activities with humanitarian actors (UN Security Council, 2014, September).

Other security related areas of collaboration included mine clearance and ordinance removal activities frequently being coordinated in support of other organizations efforts to provide aid or projects. In one case, in Unity State, UNMISS cleared and destroyed explosive remnants of war near an airstrip that served during the rainy season as the sole logistics point for aid deliveries to internally displaced persons in a UNMISS protection site. Survey and clearance of roads allowed for the more efficient transport of aid (UN Security Council,

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203 This included prior coordination and U.S. military four-star approval.
The United Nations, through its Department for Safety and Security, was also able to assist with community safety and security issues. The UN had a plane, which was used to conduct security risk, airstrip and road assessments, and aerial assessments for fire safety and prevention. Support was also provided for medical and casualty evacuations, and support to high-level field visits. The plane was available within thirty minutes within request for evacuations. The project also supported information gathering to provide comprehensive security analysis to the humanitarian community (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs South Sudan, 2013).

Sharing was particularly strong between U.S. organizations, including between U.S. military and civilian organizations, where such sharing, with a few notable exceptions, was the norm. In the Mindanao case, U.S. civilians and the military often shared travel assets or partnered on different activities. An example of cost sharing would be one office taking care of food, others, say USAID and JSOTF-P, would take care of other transportation cost (Mindanao Interview 1 Feb 2014). Sometimes cost sharing or logistics support would be part of formal agreements, such as MOAs. Further, JSOTF-P had a policy to share air transpiration on a space available basis so long as their travel is mutually supportive of JSOTF-P objectives and the request was submitted according to procedures (Mindanao Interview 26 May 2014). Due to civilian security requirements, JSOTF-P bore the burden of security support.

Logistical resource sharing was particularly pronounced in the cases of the PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan. In general, logistical resource sharing was the norm between civilian and military organizations on a PRT. The military provided basic life support that enabled
each agency’s mission. This could include base operations, providing meals, housing, water, vehicles and transportation, vehicle maintenance, other security and medical support (Parker, 2007). Staff sharing, in terms of working on combined efforts, also took place. In the Iraq Provincial Case, resource sharing between the civilians and military was formalized for some operating costs of PRTs that were collocated with military units\textsuperscript{204}. The estimated total of this reimbursement was $21.1 million fiscal year 2008 (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2008). In the Afghanistan Provincial case Helmand example, logistical sharing was described in terms of being neighborly (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 12 May 14).

There were combined projects and activities, though it was less frequent and more challenging to achieve. Collaboration on projects was generally limited, due to differences in funding and accountability to donors. One example of program collaboration was seen in the Iraq RoL case, the training of prison guards involved a mixture of military police, detention experts from industry, and others (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 27 Apr 14). In the Mindanao and South Sudan Cases, there wasn’t regular cost sharing outside of the Embassy. Shared activities with international donor state counterparts generally involved information sharing or perhaps sharing of staff time. For example, in Mindanao, the U.S. Embassy would invite international donor partners to attend Ramadan and Iftars (traditional Muslim breaking of the fasts after sun down) events (Mindanao Interview 1 Feb 2014). Further, humanitarian organizations were known to share supplies in emergency situations (South Sudan Interview 19 October 2013). Local partner contributions, either from the host

\textsuperscript{204} The reimbursements covered military support for such items as facilities, logistics, basic utilities, lodging, food, water, and sanitation; however, they did not cover the costs of PRT security and transportation provided by the military. One wrinkle to this reimbursement program was that resources were expended by the military units in Iraq, and the reimbursement was conducted at the Departmental level. Thus funds reimbursed may have been given to the Defense Department, but were not returned to the unit providing them. This mismatch of funding levels could have a chilling effect on the willingness to either ask for or provide support.
national government, or NGOs were frequently limited to the provision of a venue or of staff labor (Mindanao Interview 1 Feb 2014).

Project and activity cooperation was more common in the Iraq and Afghanistan Provincial Cases. At the sub-national level, a number of civilian RoL activities were funded through the military CERP program. One common means of project cooperation were cases when the military provided funding, while USAID provided in-house expertise to direct and monitor construction. Or civilian and military funding streams could be used in a complimentary manner, such as in one example in which USAID built roads in the lower end of the Panchir Valley, while the Panchir PRT used the CERP funds to build roads in the upper end of the valley. Or the military could build roads, and USAID could establish schools and clinics along it (Yodsampa, 2011). In the Helmand case funding was described as being less frequently share on projects than other resources may be, and not universally. Some groups were seen as having closer civ-mil working relationships, while others were seen as “doing their own thing” (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 23 Jan 14).

Resource Sharing Assessment. With the assessment criteria of frequency and type of sharing, across the cases sharing of support type resources, particularly transportation space, was commonly seen. More variation was seen in terms of shared project or programmatic activities across organizations. These were most frequently noted in the Iraq RoL case, and also frequently noted in both the Iraq and Afghanistan Provincial Cases, resulting in high rankings. They were evidenced to a lesser degree in the Mindanao case, but still not uncommon, giving it a middle ranking. They seemed to be the least prevalent in the Afghanistan RoL case and the South Sudan case, thus they are rated the lowest accordingly.
Network Coordination and Strategy Overall Ranking

The sub-rankings, when collectively considered, provide the following overall rankings for the Network Coordination and Strategy category for the cases:

Table 38: Network Coordination and Strategy Overall Ranking

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<th>Iraq RoL</th>
<th>Afghan RoL</th>
<th>Iraq Provincial</th>
<th>Afghan Provincial</th>
<th>Mindanao</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goal Congruence</strong></td>
<td>Very High (5)</td>
<td>Very Low (1)</td>
<td>High (4)</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
<td>Very High (5)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic Planning</strong></td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>Very High (5)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>High (4)</td>
<td>Very Low (1)</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resource Sharing</strong></td>
<td>Very High (5)</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
<td>High (4)</td>
<td>High (4)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>Very Low (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall Ranking</strong></td>
<td>Very High (13)</td>
<td>Low (9)</td>
<td>High (11)</td>
<td>Medium (10)</td>
<td>Low (9)</td>
<td>Very Low (6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Network Knowledge Management

This category begins with describing the types of information sought out in the cases and the most frequent sources of information. Then the comfort level in sharing information across organizations and the prevalence of any metrics or benchmarks that were common across organizations is examined.
Type of Information Sought

Table 39: Type of Information Sought

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Information</th>
<th>Iraq RoL</th>
<th>Afghan RoL</th>
<th>Iraq Provincial</th>
<th>Afghan Provincial</th>
<th>Mindanao</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mapping and Gapping</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Local organizational and local needs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-knowledge</td>
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<tr>
<td>Discoverability of information sources</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-knowledge</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. civ-mil understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-knowledge</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. civ-mil understanding</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Across the cases, the kind of information termed “mapping and gapping” was sought out by stabilization organizations. Often there was no formal documentation about which organizations were operating in a given area, and who was doing what evolved and changed. Frequently organizations resorted to developing their own internal ‘maps’ of activities and organizations.

Knowledge of what other stabilization organizations were doing was valued for enabling understanding what they could contribute and for avoiding duplicative activities. In the complex donor and technical assistance environment there could not be coordination or cooperation on programmatic initiatives if there was not a shared situational awareness of roles, responsibilities, assets, objectives, etc. (Clark, 2011). This was of particular interest as new organizations arrived (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 24 Dec 13). In the RoL cases, there was a particular interest in knowledge of other RoL organizations and their activities. In the Provincial cases, there was express interest in knowledge of what national-level programs

\[205\] Note that a relative ranking across cases is not applied here, as this category is not appropriate for rating in that manner.
may be operating in a given province or district (Fritsch, 2012). Further, for military organizations, there was also a pragmatic need to avoid conflict between the delivery of humanitarian assistance and combat activities in the same area. From a military perspective, knowing where friendly or non-combatants facilities were located, such NGOs and the United Nations, was important to avoid unintentional targeting and minimizing damage to civilian infrastructure and cultural and religious sites (Dziedzic and Seidl, 2005). Further, knowledge about organization’s movements and locations enhanced the military’s ability to provide effective security assistance in times of need.

There was also a continual need for information about the capabilities of local counterparts and on the needs local beneficiaries of assistance, particularly for areas outside of capital areas (Afghanistan RoL Interview Jan 2014; United Nations Development Programme Afghanistan, 2010). This could involve determining what problems local areas faced (South Sudan Interview 19 October 2013). In fact, it was noted that while the priority for information gathering was often on other U.S. and international donor activities, this information was perhaps actually the most important (Afghanistan RoL Interview Jan 2014). Complimentary to understanding local problems or needs was knowledge of any progress in addressing those needs. Progress assessments were common in the cases, either to establish baselines or gauge impacts of program activities. The need for information about areas outside of the capitals could even extend to the host government. In the Iraq RoL case, the immature Iraqi government at first did not have sufficient capacity to collect information on its provinces and this information was provided by the U.S. RoL sector, for example to help them identify where they needed courthouse or judges (Ayres and Barnes, 2011).
Organizations that resided outside of the capital areas had their own knowledge needs. This often included knowledge of local risks or insurgent threats, local customs or sensitivities, and understanding of local political and government structures. For example to perform their functions effectively, humanitarian organizations need to know about changes to the security situation, locations where unexploded ordnance might be encountered, and major population movements precipitated by combat operations, information which in large part could be provided by local military organizations (Dziedzic and Seidl, 2005). Further stabilization organizations could provide their local government partners with help understanding national programs and how funding was allocated in their areas. This type of information could easily be lost by the time projects or funds reach local governments.

Further, self-organizational knowledge was important. In some cases staff could have limited ability to understand or access their own organizations resources (Yodsampa, 2011). This was highlighted in Iraq RoL case with the challenges the military initially faced in understanding its own RoL projects conducted through CERP. In addition, there were challenges from contracted or staff hired from outside agencies in having sufficient self-organizational understanding to access agency resources and off-site subject matter expertise. This was particularly acute in the Iraq and Afghanistan cases, where civilian agencies faced difficulties in staffing positions, particularly those outside of the capital areas. As a result many civilian staff members were hired from the outside directly for a position,
and lacked familiarity with their own agencies. Further, as priorities shifted, obtaining information from higher headquarters, such as PRTs and Regional Platforms could increase in difficulty, limiting field staff’s ability to get information for things like program details, timelines, and other guidance (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 23 Jan 14). This lack of internal knowledge hindered collaboration with other organizations, through being unable to access resources or understand how they could benefit partners, as well as undermining credibility with partners (Fritsch, 2012).

Knowledge and understanding of frequent partners was also desired. Particularly in the Iraq and Afghanistan case, a need was seen for greater understanding between civilian and military partner organizations. For example, military and civilian partners could have differing interpretations of what was said due to different understandings of terms. Civilian and military organizations also needed education on each other’s roles and approaches to activities, as described above (Yodsampa, 2011). This knowledge of partners also extended to local partners. Often information such as understanding local actors, for information such as personality abstracts, political affiliation, assessments of corruption and trustworthiness, etc., for local counterparts was sought by stabilization organizations (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 27 Apr 14). Further, insufficient cultural understanding and of the local partners environment could lead to seeing the problem from a U.S. or international lens, which could result in improper understanding and assessment of problems in Iraq (United States Institute of Peace, 2008, October 10).

Footnote: This outside hiring could occur through a number of means. The general categories of staff of this time were “traditional contractors”, who were employed through a third party, “personnel service contractors”, who functioned largely as government staff but were administratively handled through a third party, and term limited government staff, known as “3161s” for the hiring authority that authorized them. They were distinct in that they were not career civil servants, and were often referred to as “contractors”, despite being directly hired and working for the government.
An example of the knowledge building can be seen in a Helmand DST case:

- Individual staff members typically spent their first two or three months establishing knowledge of their respective network.

- The DST learned the relationships between Afghan civilian and security officials from the district, provincial, and national government levels, which had a profound effect on influence, power, funding, resources, and success at the local level.

- The DST assessed the local population’s perspective of local governance and competence.

- The DST tracked implementation of developing or established legislation along with international community oversight for stabilization efforts.

- Last, the DST assessed the district’s progress against NATO civilian and military established measures of performance and effectiveness (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 12 May 14).
**Sources of Knowledge**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources of Knowledge</th>
<th>Iraq RoL</th>
<th>Afghan RoL</th>
<th>Iraq Provincial</th>
<th>Afghan Provincial</th>
<th>Mindanao</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Numerous sources, a common need to “discover” them Direct placement of staff or staff visits Local populations Needs assessments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In general, the discrete sources of information could be numerous, and understanding who and where to go to get information was in and of itself a learning process. There were significant key documents, like District Stability Plans, PRT plans, or Military Plans. Aside from such key documents, the biggest information stores could be meeting minutes or documents stored on desktops and email systems (Afghanistan RoL Interview Nov 2013 and Mindanao Interview 1 Feb 2014). Further, organizations did generally report on activities in their own hierarchies and implementing partners were typically required to provide reports to donors, such as monthly or quarterly updates; progress reports; activity report snapshots, etc. (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013; UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2011; U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2013, May). However, there was generally not reliable or consistent outside reporting. Though there were typically a number of email distribution lists and portals, and databases on activities were even attempted, no single source of

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207 Note that a relative ranking across cases is not applied here, as this category is not appropriate for rating in that manner.

208 For example, in the case of the U.S. Embassy Mindanao Working Group, meeting results were stored on an Embassy network shared drive; these records were referenced for guidance, particularly as new staff arrived.
information was complete (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2011). Instead, information had to be obtained from sources from multiple organizations (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 12 May 14). As a result, information was often seen as needing to be discovered. As one staff person described it, there was a wealth of information, but not all in one place (Afghanistan RoL Interview Jan 2014).

It was also necessary to tap into the tacit knowledge of the incumbents that were working in a country (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 12 May 14). In general, this information and broader information sharing was done through word of mouth. Information could also be shared at meetings, working groups, conferences, through coordinators and/or liaisons (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2012). Such information exchanges were often based on a give and take relationship. Further verifying information could be challenge in many cases. This was particularly acute in the South Sudan case. Obtaining reliable answers on delays, for example, could be a challenge (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013). In cases of conflict, reliable information on casualties (accurate numbers were difficult to obtain) and the intensity the conflict was sought after (South Sudan Interview 19 October 2013).

A common means of obtaining knowledge was the direct placement of staff on a local area. This was the norm for military organizations, but also conducted by civilian organizations. This was most clearly seen in the cases of the PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, several other examples abounded, such as Afghanistan RoL cases example of the Provincial Justice Coordination mechanism, which placed RoL coordinators in provincial

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209 For example, in the South Sudan case there was a tendency for rumors to spread very quickly during a crisis or emergency, and the first field reporting was sometimes able to quell rumors before they became damaging.
locations (United Nations Development Programme Afghanistan, 2010). In the South Sudan case, there was a U.S. civilian effort to deploy staff to conflict afflicted areas (South Sudan Interview 19 October 2013). Locally deployed staff were often seen as one of the best sources of information on political, economic, and social developments in areas outside of the capitals (USAID, 2006). This is illustrated in the Mindanao case, where the military was deployed in hostile areas and U.S. civilians were not, they were seen as having the monopoly on relationships within Mindanao and were looked to JSOTF-P for situational awareness and understanding of dynamics and atmospherics (Mindanao Interview 26 May 2014). Locally deployed staff produced firsthand information that was seen as more reliable than the second hand may need to be relied upon otherwise. They could also develop suggestions to inform higher headquarters policies, programs and approaches, facilitate short-term visits of other staff or leaders, and engage in shared information with other organizations in the area. However, deploying staff to these areas subjected them to risk and typically necessitated high levels of security. Staff could be reluctant to spend long periods in austere and hostile areas, and the costs of proving for their security could be prohibitive.

Short of deploying staff to remote locations, short-term or site visits were also seen as a means of obtaining knowledge. This was far more pronounced among non-military organizations, as military forces were often deployed directly to areas of hostilities. However, even these measures were limited by transportation resources, security risks, and in some cases, the willingness of staff to endure risks (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2013, May). Information that was collected on these short-term visits was typically

210 As an example, in the South Sudan case INL performed site visits as regularly as transportation arrangements permitted.
shared among other offices or agencies of an organization. For example, in the Mindanao case, the Embassy Political section didn’t have the budget to travel, and regularly asked for info about Mindanao, or for help in setting up meetings, from staff who did travel there (Mindanao Interview 1 Feb 2014). Information about travel and trips was frequently shared to facilitate pooling of resources and information sharing (Mindanao Interview 26 May 2014).

The ultimate source of the needs and priorities of local populations was ultimately the local governments, organizations, and people in the area. For example, in the Mindanao case the Philippine security forces were seen as tremendously capable in their understanding of local issues, challenges and relationships (Beaudette, 2011). When accessible, these groups were sought out as sources of information that was seen as critical for success. They were interacted with through staff on location, particularly through the PRTs and military forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Mindanao, through visits, and through other means such as even surveys. Local partners were looked to for the local expertise, assessing feasibility of projects, knowledge of the culture knowledge of the context, and also understanding of needs (Maxwell, 2011). Local partners contributed local knowledge to enable a more context-specific approach to the response to the needs of their people. They were also looked to (and evaluated for) their capacity to deliver (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2012, September). In other cases, the inclusion of local knowledge into project activities was even formalized, through means such as “community driven” approaches that systematically involved local stakeholders in the development of priorities and activities (The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2014; and The World Bank, 2013, April). Local communities and leaders could often provide information
on local risks, combatant threat, local customs, and sensitivities, and on local political institutions (Flavin, 2004).

Frequently seen across the cases were attempts to conduct “needs assessments” to obtain knowledge of local populations. For example, in the Mindanao case, the U.S., the Mindanao Trust Fund (in 2005), the United Nations as part of its humanitarian planning effort (in 2012) all conducted major needs assessments. Needs assessments were also frequently conducted in South Sudan. These assessments were typically used to inform major projects or even lines of activity, and could be also be used to establish baseline information (Maxwell, 2011). However, it did not seem as those that assessments were used widely beyond the sponsoring organizations.

**Comfort Level in Sharing Information.** This sub-category examines the degree of comfort or lack thereof in sharing information across organizations. It is then assessed on the degree of comfort or resistance observed in the cases.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 41: Comfort Level in Sharing Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq RoL</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comfort Level</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Relative Ranking</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Information sharing across organizations occurred across the cases. However, it was more challenging or faced differing limits depending on the case. Two of the cases with high comfort levels in sharing information were the Iraq RoL and Mindanao cases. In both cases, broadly speaking sharing information was understood to be expected and there was no perceived value to holding it back (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 27 Apr 14). In the Iraq RoL case, information sharing was assisted by the professionalism of U.S. RoL staff, and there was deference to them as professionals in the Rule of Law area. In Mindanao, U.S. civilian and military information sharing was seen as enhancing the overall U.S. mission. Further, direct coordination and information sharing was promoted by USAID between its implementing partners and the U.S. military, provided USAID leadership was aware of it (Mindanao Interview 26 May 2014).

Across the cases, a number of barriers presented themselves to sharing information. In many cases, requests for information could be met with distrust. This was seen in the Afghanistan RoL case, where requests about even basic activities could have prompted a suspicious “Who’s asking? Why do you care? We report to through these channels” first response. Initial reluctance to share information was seen as being sometimes prompted by a fear of embarrassment or having progress or results questioned or criticized (Afghanistan RoL Interview Nov 2013). Sharing information about internal debates or divisions, or implementation challenges, or other potentially negative information was also seen as something that could be used to the detriment of the person or organization. However, basic information requests were rarely denied and such initial reservations could typically be
overcome through personal engagement, particularly once the reasons why the information was sought and how it would be used were understood.

Though most information sharing was benign, even one or occasional bad experiences with sharing would be sufficient to foster such a suspicious atmosphere (Afghanistan RoL Interview Nov 2013). The repercussions could be unintentional, for example, if information was passed through another organization incompletely or without appropriate context. This concern was expressed in the South Sudan case, in which donor states could be reluctant to share too much information with NGO partners, lest they might exploit or spin provided information to justify their own projects or advocating for their positions. In contrast, other donor state partners were seen as being more reliable in handling information appropriately, given that they all had similar Embassy driven protocols (South Sudan Interview 19 October 2013).

Or it could be intentional, with information provided being used to question programs or leadership (Afghanistan RoL Interview Nov 2013). For example, obtaining information about project or program delays in the South Sudan case was seen as difficult (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013). In a politically charged environment like those found in stabilization activities, such risks of information sharing could arise not only from competitive or confrontations organizations within the network, but also from political opponents outside of it. One response to avoid unwanted information sharing was to provide an overabundance of non-useful or very basic information to avoid sharing potentially more sensitive information (Afghanistan RoL Interview Nov 2013).

Information sharing could be hindered due to concerns over potential damage to relationships with key partners. In the South Sudan case, the United Nations and donor
states could be reluctant to release reports or information that was too critical of the
government, for fear of damaging their relations. For example, the United Nations might
withhold release of written reports for fear of being seen as too accusatorial with the South
Sudanese government (South Sudan Interview 19 October 2013). In Mindanao, public
release of information was similarly reduced due to internal vetting protocols (Mindanao
Interview 1 Feb 2014). Internal vetting and release processes could cause significant delays.
Sometimes this could be overcome through informal channels, such as in person or over the
phone verbal sharing, however. NGOs were seen as having an easier time in releasing
information (South Sudan Interview 19 October 2013).

Different organizational approaches could hinder information sharing. In the
Afghanistan Provincial case, the U.S. civilian and military initial had difficulty in sharing this
information. Between the U.S. military, State Department, and USAID, they organized
information geographically, by levels of government, or by functional sectors of activity (i.e.
health, sanitation, etc.) respectively (Yodsampa, 2011). To address these issues, initiatives to
map all development activities were undertaken for a considerable period, but the
information was still not easily accessed by field staff for at least the better part of
stabilization activities in Afghanistan (USAID, 2006). For example, though USAID had the
most reconstruction projects across Afghanistan, until 2010, a central database listing all of
these projects was lacking, and when it was established, it was only for two provinces
(Fritsch, 2012). Procurement sensitivities on issues such as planned staff hiring, new
contracts, etc. could also limit information sharing. Further, in the South Sudan case, donor
“soft” verbal decisions (i.e. spoken but not formalized decisions) on new activities would not
be shared until the decisions were formally finalized (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013).

NGOs, for their part, faced a regular issue of U.S. civilians and military organizations desiring to leverage implementing partner contacts and local staff resources for greater information. Implementing partners, particularly with large local staffs, could access areas U.S. government personnel could not, and could sometimes have access to groups or persons that would not knowingly work or communicate with the U.S. government. Such information could be highly sought out by the U.S. military and civilians. In some cases, U.S. staff could assert that because U.S. implementing partners were employees of a government funded project they (such as PRT) could direct them. However, as described earlier, NGO implementing partners were obligated to fulfill the terms of their grant or contract and could only be directed by the U.S. office that held it. Moreover, for the implementing partner this created the risk of being perceived as too close the U.S. (or other donor), and compromise access to the local population, perceived independence, and increasing the risk of becoming a target itself (United States Institute of Peace, 2008, October 8). In Iraq and Afghanistan, NGOs specifically were wary of being perceived as annexed ‘force multipliers’ to the military due to funding links to PRT lead nations (Eronen, 2008).

Local cultural views on information sharing could be challenging. In Mindanao there was a ‘culture of silence’, which prevented information from being divulged by locals to United Nations agencies or other outsiders, particularly on taboo issues such as gender-based violence and child trafficking (Chesnutt, 2011). Further, information itself could be seen as a commodity. In the Afghan cases for example, one way in which a local individual

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211 This tension was described as a classic NGO and government conflict.
could distinguish themselves was by obtaining information first. This was presumably as sign of political or social capital. This led to an environment of competition over who could access information or who would be the first to have it. The local Afghan tendency to view information as a commodity slowed down information sharing and led to the greater amounts of resources to obtaining, such as necessitating staff time and transportation resources to attend further meetings, etc. Collaborative efforts could be undermined by this requirement (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 23 Jan 14).

**Trust and Comfort Assessment.** In terms of the assessment criteria of degree of comfort or resistance in sharing information, the Iraq RoL cases and Mindanao cases displayed relatively high levels of trust and comfort with information sharing, and are ranked appropriately. The other cases displayed lower levels of trust and comfort, with the Afghanistan RoL cases standing out as having challenges in this area. Thus they are ranked at a medium level, with the Afghanistan RoL case receiving a low ranking.

**Common Benchmarks or Metrics.** This sub-category addresses those benchmarks or metrics that were adopted across organizational boundaries. They are then assessed in terms of prevalence across the cases.
Table 42: Common Benchmarks or Metrics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Iraq RoL</th>
<th>Afghan RoL</th>
<th>Iraq Provincial</th>
<th>Afghan Provincial</th>
<th>Mindanao</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Common Benchmarks or Metrics</td>
<td>No common metrics</td>
<td>No common metrics</td>
<td>Maturity Model; subjective and varied</td>
<td>A variety of subjective or limited metrics</td>
<td>High guiding benchmarks, not not operational</td>
<td>High guiding benchmarks, not operational Failed attempt at common election targets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Ranking</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By and large, common benchmarks or metrics were not established across organizations, and organizations developed their own benchmarks and metrics (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013). In some cases, such as the RoL cases, commonly agreed to metrics were not available in general (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 27 Apr 14). The development of common metrics to assess progress was complicated by a lack of clear definition of what the RoL areas encompassed and what, exactly, described success. For some, that entailed hard to define characteristics of a working legal system, while for others, such as the military, success was often defined in terms of when they were able to transition responsibility over to a civilian or an Afghan counterpart and withdraw.

In the Provincial cases, there were common assessment tools adopted between U.S. civilian and military organizations. This was a universal mandate in Iraq and in Afghanistan the practice grew overtime (Doyle, 2013; Fritsch, 2012). The Afghanistan provincial metrics were also used by some international partners. However, these metrics were often subjective, and inconsistently developed.
Established metrics and assessments were also not without issues. Often, measurements were subjective and used for things were beyond the control of a given organization (for example a district could have a corrupt governor and police chief). There was also some bias and incentive to have a good assessment. Metrics were seen as particularly useful for new staff, to facilitate learning. However, more experienced staff often came to see the limits of existing metrics in measuring real progress (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 12 May 14).

**Common Benchmarks or Metrics Assessment.** In regard to the assessment criteria of prevalence across the cases, as no common metrics or benchmarks were observed in the Iraq or Afghanistan RoL cases, they received the lowest rankings. Both South Sudan and Mindanao had very high-level common objectives at least, while Provincial cases had more operationally oriented common metrics. Thus, South Sudan and Mindanao are ranked as low, while the Iraq Provincial case is rated high for having a common U.S. civilian and military common metric. The Afghanistan Provincial case is rated medium for have some, but not standard, shared metrics.
Knowledge Management Summary

Below is the aggregate ranking of the knowledge management network feature sub-categories, and resultant overall relative ranking for this category.

Table 43: Knowledge Management Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Iraq RoL</th>
<th>Afghan RoL</th>
<th>Iraq Provincial</th>
<th>Afghan Provincial</th>
<th>Mindanao</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comfort level</td>
<td>Very High (5)</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>High (4)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Benchmarks</td>
<td>Very Low (1)</td>
<td>Very Low (1)</td>
<td>High (4)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or Metrics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Ranking</td>
<td>Medium (6)</td>
<td>Very Low (3)</td>
<td>High (7)</td>
<td>Medium (6)</td>
<td>Medium (6)</td>
<td>Low (5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Relationships

Trust and Comfort Levels. There were a number of relationship tensions that presented challenges for collaboration among stabilization organizations. Frequently, projects and activities were developed in an atmosphere of multiple projects impacting similar functional and/or geographic areas. They are ranked in terms of degree or trust or severity of tensions across the cases.
### Table 44: Trust and Comfort Levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Iraq RoL</th>
<th>Afghan RoL</th>
<th>Iraq Provincial</th>
<th>Afghan Provincial</th>
<th>Mindanao</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust or Comfort Level</td>
<td>U.S. civ-mil tensions/ civil concerns over loss of control</td>
<td>U.S. civ-mil initial mistrust/ ongoing tensions</td>
<td>U.S. civ-mil high initial tensions</td>
<td>U.S. civ-mil positive relationships</td>
<td>U.S. and donor state initial suspicion from locals</td>
<td>Donor state concerns over GoSS commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. oversight and reliability concerns with NGO partners</td>
<td>U.S.-NGO mixed relationships / tensions on leveraging for access</td>
<td>U.S. and United Nations initially chilly</td>
<td>U.S. and donor state initial suspicion from locals</td>
<td>Donor State trust in United Nations competence</td>
<td>Donor state tensions over local NGO capability and credibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Initial U.S. exclusion of Iraqis; later top-down inclusion, with positive individual working relationships</td>
<td>U.S.-Iraq challenges on culture, military optic</td>
<td>U.S. and Afghan tension/ seen as competing structures</td>
<td>Donor State issues with NGO; intra NGO competition for funds, co-option by local interests</td>
<td>Donor State concerns with NGO; intra NGO competition for funds, co-option by local interests</td>
<td>United Nations varied tensions with the GoSS from tense to positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. and Afghan tensions</td>
<td>U.S. and local Afghan tensions</td>
<td>U.S. and local Afghan tensions</td>
<td>U.S. and local Afghan tensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Ranking</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**U.S. Civilian and Military Trust and Comfort Levels.** A common issue in the Iraq and Afghanistan cases was an initial mistrust between the military and civilians in terms of both the willingness and the ability of each to carry out its obligations. The sometimes significant shortcomings of the State Department effort - uneven leadership, hit-or-miss staffing, and inadequate funding negatively affected how the military viewed and cooperated with civilians. The trust could also hinder cooperation on the civilian side. In particular, there
were some civilian perceptions that the military was all about “breaking down doors,” possessing a “shoot-em-up mentality” (Dorman, 2007). In one Iraq Provincial Case example, “the PRT leaders were hesitant to share information about their ideas for new projects for fear that the military would start stealing them, claim credit for them, or upset delicate relationships with Iraqi civic and business leader” (Duggan, 2012, p. 70). In some case, U.S. military commanders often showed a preference to working with military staff over civilian-clothed U.S. counterparts. In those cases where civilians and the military lacked trust, the civilians could be sidelined while the military drove the stabilization effort. Predominantly, the U.S. civilian and military relationships were stronger in the Iraq RoL case, and apparently strongest in the Mindanao case, where fewer of these issues were observed. One example of a way of fostering relationships among organizations was finding common requirements to use in building strong working relationships.

Frequently, when trust was lacking, a pattern would develop where during the duration of their tours a positive working relationship would be developed between civilian and military staff, and information sharing increased (Duggan, 2012). Finding areas of common need was key to making this happen (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 23 Jan 14). For example, a Helmand DST staff member found that a means to begin forging strong working relationships with local Special Forces was to assist them in engaging with local Afghan tribal leaders where they shared mutual interest.

In addition to initial trust issues, general tensions existed between civilians and military regarding ownership of the civilian mission in the Iraq and Afghanistan cases. The civilians could see the military as trying to usurp the PRT or civilian role, and the military saw itself as having no choice but to do so because it was convinced the civilians would not
be able to produce either the numbers or caliber of participants required (Caples, 2009).

Particularly in the Afghanistan Provincial Case, civilians could frequently feel that they were ultimately subject to the military’s dominance and their commanders’ willingness to provide expertise, intelligence, and transportation. In general, there was less conflict if civilians just accepted the military way of doing business (Fritsch, 2012). This tension was exacerbated by the limited or even complete lack of guidance on the civilian and military stabilization missions and individual roles in Iraq and Afghanistan. One additional aspect to the civil-mil relationship was that though many of the State Department and other civilians had prior military experience, it did not reduce civil-military tensions. On the contrary, some of the harshest criticisms of the military personnel on PRTs appeared to come from civilians with prior military service (Hernandorena, 2007).

Civilians did have better relationships with different categories of military personnel. Some civilians stated they preferred working with the Reservists and Guardsmen over regular, full-time Army personnel because the former understood civilian sector jobs. These non-career troops held jobs such as attorneys, public administrators, and teachers and may have had first-hand knowledge of expertise the PRT was trying to instill within the Afghan population. Civilians also preferred working with Special Forces for the same reason (Fritsch, 2012).

Collaboration was affected by within group tensions for both civilians and the military. Tensions between civilian agencies were cited as hindrances to broader collaboration. In particular, the uneasy relationship between State Department and USAID was listed as the most common civilian tension that hampered cooperation. On the military side, in Afghanistan a common tension was seen as between the PRT Commander and the
military unit commander between ‘turf’ and each other’s areas of activity (Fritsch, 2012)\textsuperscript{212}.

Furthermore, there could be parallel civil affairs teams between PRTs, maneuver units and Special Forces units which could be a source of conflict due to overlapping or redundant roles and different perceived levels of preparation and expertise. However, in many cases respective roles were clearer and cooperation was the norm (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 23 Jan 14).

\textbf{NGO-Related Trust and Comfort Levels.} There were oversight and expertise issues with NGO implementing partners and contracted staff across the cases. The quality of staff was seen as varying widely. Further, contractors were often described as primarily ‘checking boxes’ as in being more interested in completing the contract then producing the results desired by the principals). This may not have been entirely the fault of the contractor or the implementing partner, particularly if they were simply executing the contract as it was presented (Jones, 2010).

There were also reliability issues with contractors and implementing partners, with NGOs overstating their capabilities or misrepresenting the local conditions or needs. For example, in the Iraqi RoL Case, many NGOs claimed knowledge of the Iraqi justice system but their claims to comprehension and expertise proved on examination to be unfounded, as were certain assertions by program staff about the low level of knowledge possessed by

\textsuperscript{212} Conflict could be exacerbated by perceptions that the PRT forces were not “real” soldiers, in that they were not combat troops but chartered to protect civilians and Afghans. Further, PRTs were often commanded by Navy and Air Force officers, which created tensions with Army and Marine maneuver unit commanders, who may have doubted the relevance or experience levels of these services in ground operations in the land-locked country.
Iraqi staff\textsuperscript{213} (Banks, 2010). Additionally, in the Iraq and Afghanistan cases, some contracted projects were never completed, either due to corruption or incompetence on the part of the partner. However, this could also occurred when a sponsoring organizations or individual rotated out before the project was completed, and the project was either forgotten or effectively abandoned by the successor. Further, there were always issues regarding competition for grants among NGOs. NGOs were always looking for fund from local and international donors and this sometimes creates a lot of conflict, i.e. backstabbing or mudslinging (Mindanao Interview 1 Feb 2014). At the same time, NGOs also had to be concerned with their local credibility, which could be compromised with local governments and with the public through donor funding or an otherwise perceived too close relationship with international sponsors (Australian Aid, Office of Development Effectiveness, 2012).

For their part, NGOs in general also had concerns about the military’s capability to implement assistance activities. Military forces were seen as lacking expertise to assess needs of populations, and to design and implement sustainable projects that can provide long-term benefit. Short-term gains enjoyed by the military may have longer-term costs, which would be borne by local people and governments. For example, digging a borehole could provide quick impacts for military, but there would be enduring maintenance requirements, and conflicts could arise due to unclear ownership (Save the Children, 2004). There were also concerns that military-run humanitarian activities fell outside usual NGO accountability.

\textsuperscript{213} For example, project staff working at the Police Training College claimed police were illiterate and therefore never maintained any records. It was said police used only scraps of paper to record important details. However, at least one advisor found upon investigation that there was a record keeping system in place within the justice system including some 220,000 records in the Police Criminal Records Branch.
mechanisms – such as sector co-ordination structures; monitoring formats and open reporting; and respect for international standards.

**Local Partner-related Trust and Comfort Levels.** As stated above, almost by definition, the local host governments in stabilization cases were seen as less capable partners. This could foster a tension between favoring international implementers, such as the U.S. military, international NGOs, or the United Nations, who could produce rapid, more reliable results. In the South Sudan case, for international NGOs and organizations there was a trade-off between provision of quality services and building capacity of the government of South Sudan and local organizations. However, much of a trade-off that was acceptable depended on each Donor’s own strategies and some international NGOs were reluctant to work with government institutions, particularly on lower level, as they were perceived to be an impediment to programming. This in turn, however, could undermine both the perceived legitimacy of host nation partners and their capabilities. For example, in the Mindanao case, the United Nations was seen as capable but less preferable than working through national institutions (e.g. the Philippine Red Cross) (Australian Aid, 2012, December). Further, an unsurprising challenge to developing relationships was the cultural divide. For example, some U.S. representatives were noted as have had issues interfacing with the local Iraqi culture, which hampered relations (Iraq Provincial Interview 17 Sep 13).

Moreover, in general, the U.S. military reported fostering strong working relationships with their military counterparts. However, the military retained strong relationships with its Iraqi security forces partners. For example, the U.S. military relationship with Iraqi military partners was often described as strong, as “… [sharing] a professional
camaraderie that is very conducive to good relations between the two organizations” (Duggan, 2012, p. 74). In the Mindanao case, relationships with the AFP and other local partner forces were positive and successful for years due to the long-standing history between the Philippine and United States Militaries (Mindanao Interview 26 May 2014).

Distrust of outsiders was common across the cases. In the Mindanao case, suspicion of foreigners was a challenge for staff in Mindanao and could create challenges for projects and programs.\(^{214}\) (Australian Aid, Office of Development Effectiveness, 2012; Cohen, 2013). In the Iraq, Afghanistan, and Mindanao cases, distrust of national, or even of provincial governments was common, labeling them as “a bunch of thieves,” or as “imperial Manila”, in a Mindanao example. These were frequently seen by locals as one-sided relationships, or even predatory. They were also often perceived as funneling resources to political supports, power bases, or simply to themselves. Furthermore, in the Mindanao case, this distrust was extended to some foreign business interests. There was a concern, particularly on the part of the local business community, that some investors took advantage of the national and local governments’ unequal enforcement of laws to exploit Mindanao’s extensive natural resource wealth (U.S. Department of State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, 2011).

Due to staffing shortages, there was a problem with contractors being hired to oversee other contractors. Further, legal advisors hired from outside the DOJ (and/or INL), who although were lawyers, did not always have the needed criminal or prosecution expertise. Further, their lack of official U.S. standing could create barriers to forming relationships with Iraqi judiciary and prosecutorial counterparts, and they often lacked the

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\(^{214}\) For example, it was noted that Programs needed to address in their design stage the potential perceptions of donors fostering dissent.
understanding and relationships to take advantage of broader DOJ and U.S. justice community reach back capabilities (Dempsey, 2009). The former issue was mitigated through increasing direct hired staff for supervision, and the latter was addressed with the expansion of DOJ staff in Iraq.

**Trust or Comfort Assessment.** With the assessment criteria of degree or trust or severity of tensions across the cases, though all of the cases did have significant relationship tensions across organizations, the Iraq RoL, Iraq Provincial, and Mindanao cases exhibited relatively high levels of trust across many types of organizations, and are all ranked highly. The Afghanistan RoL and South Sudan cases displayed more significant concerns in many areas, such as significant U.S. civilian and military tensions in the Afghanistan RoL case, or challenges with host national organizations in the South Sudan case. They are ranked at a medium level. The most severe trust or comfort challenges were seen in the Afghanistan Provincial case, with the most daunting challenges between the U.S. and NGOs and issues with local partners, and is ranked at low.
Approaches and Assumptions

Table 45: Approaches and Assumptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approaches and Assumptions</th>
<th>Iraq RoL</th>
<th>Afghan RoL</th>
<th>Iraq Provincial</th>
<th>Afghan Provincial</th>
<th>Mindanao</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. civ-mil timelines differences</td>
<td>U.S. civ-mil differing leadership styles</td>
<td>U.S. civ-mil timelines differences</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Ranking</td>
<td>No applicable differences across cases</td>
<td></td>
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In the cases with U.S. civilians and military organizations, a number of different perspectives about timelines or mandates to achieve effects in shorter or longer time periods were observed. Interpretation of time was a major fault line: this tension was captured in the comment that “a USAID rep could say with a straight face that it would be 300 years before they see the results they are looking for; conversely the military side wanted results in 3 months or 3 days… (Afghanistan RoL Interview Nov 2013). Military timelines for results were seen as short, if not immediate, in order to prevent attacks and resulting casualties (Dorman, 2007). The military typically had a time horizon of a year or less for project or activity results, usually benchmarked to the length of the unit’s tour. Military projects tended to focus on the ‘quick win’ with visible indices of ‘progress,’ such as schools, health clinics, and road improvements. The Army focused on “bright and shiny objects” and things that lent themselves to media coverage and “information operations effects” (Stone, 2012). Conversely, civilian time horizons, particularly the long-term development focused agencies such as USAID, were often seen as spanning years or even decades, such as building up local an Iraqi capacity so that they could take over activities when the U.S. withdrew.
These different time horizons sometimes led to problems, such as cases where a civilian might be trying to teach a local Iraqi official how to conduct an activity on their own, while the military may start doing it for them, in order to achieve more immediate results. Differences in time horizons could also complicate coming to a shared understanding of how to address problems, and for priorities in how to direct resources. For example, most USAID project money came through nationwide programs that were designed to be implemented over years to produce a long-term, sustainable effect. The military did not always understand why such funding could not be used for short-term, quick effect projects.

Said one ePRT veteran, “You need to look at any project in terms of one to three years, [but the military forces] want a quick win on their deployment cycle, and they’re looking at weeks, maybe months. So, in that sense, we could be at loggerheads” (Naland, 2011, p. 11).

An example of this was seen in the Afghanistan RoL case, when an arriving U.S. military CJTF-82 command, circa 2010, determined, before its arrival in Afghanistan, that RoL was to be one of its civil affairs priorities. Each task force commander was committed to implementing a RoL program during the time of the deployment. This placed pressure on the commanders and their staff legal officers to initiate RoL efforts, such as training programs for Afghan justice officials. Those training programs were not always been coordinated with the other RoL actors, either in the U.S. government or the government of Afghanistan. This was due, in part, to the fact that the task force implementers were not aware of other programs or, if aware, did not understand the reasons for the comparatively slower pace of the civilian programs or the sensitivities of the host country participants and other international donors. Civilian and military RoL officials began to meet to improve this situation, but some tensions remained. The task force commanders were under pressure to
implement programs and obtain visible results during the span of their deployment, and because they work independently, their units can execute programs quickly. Their need to act rapidly and their tendency to operate unilaterally conflicted with the efforts of the U.S. mission, the government of Afghanistan, and the international community. This was at a time when the parties had just recently agreed on the need to plan and execute programs under a common strategy after several years of uncoordinated, sometimes unsustainable, or redundant RoL projects (United Nations Development Programme Afghanistan, 2010).

Another reason for conflict between civilians and the military was an apparent military mindset of needing to make these things happen. The military seemed to believe that it needed to fix social issues or the population would start fighting or people wouldn’t support the government. There was a prevalent major assumption that social problems were related to insurgency at hand, one which civilian agencies did not share. For example, civilians noted that RoL is terrible in many places, but the same type of insurgencies did not develop in these places as seen in Afghanistan (Afghanistan RoL Interview Nov 2013). However, this became a main justification for the military to bypass civilian organizations. The scenario developed that State was in charge but could not or would not do something, and thus the military needed to go in and fix it. This was one point in the source of the conflict – the military thinking they would lose the conflict if they didn’t fix social problems.

Further, with a strict hierarchical rank structure, the military was accustomed to a directive style of leadership. Conversely, civilians were used to working under “consensus-based” leadership. Differences in this style led to tensions in interactions, captured in the observation by one civilian that the military “doesn’t understand the difference between working ‘with’ and working ‘for’ someone” (Barber and Parker, 2008, p. 21). This difference
could be extended to how each conducted decision making. Civilians, notably the State Department, were cited as being less inclined to directly oppose things and as being more inclined to passively resist doing something. This was in part attributed to State Department civilians being trained diplomats and avoiding direct conflict as essential to that art. However, from a military perspective it led to a lack of efficacy in some important ways, which produced a lot of frustration. Military personnel, conversely, would just argue it out (Iraq Provincial Interview 5 Mar 14).

This tension was no doubt exacerbated by the military view that military commanders were the ‘battle space owners’ (United States Institute of Peace, 2008, September 24). While not intended to describe inflexibility on the military’s part, this term of art did foster perceptions that the military commander expected to be in charge of everything in their area of responsibility. In a similar vein, the military was noted for valuing strength and judging civilian personnel on this basis. The military was said to be quick to judge someone how may have been hesitant or awkward, say from just arriving on base. Persons so judged were likely to be perceived as threats to the success of the military mission, and the military would “marginalize” them (Iraq Provincial Interview 17 Sep 13). As a result, such a negative reaction on the part of the military could lead to issues in providing support to civilians: “…if they decided they didn’t like you, you would not get in the vehicle and you would not get a pad or a pen or a computer” (Naland, 2011, p. 9).

Research has found that another aspect of the civilian-military collaboration challenge was that civilian and military personnel in Afghanistan had differing views on what integration meant. For civilians, it could range from simple cooperation, to full inclusion or co-option by their military partners. Conversely, the military did not make a distinction
between cooperation and integration. It was assumed that integration was the goal, and that cooperation would naturally occur (Fritsch, 2012).

In all of the cases with U.S. civilian and military organizations, differences in timelines and approaches were seen. Further, in the Iraq and Afghanistan cases where U.S. civilians and military organizations shared command of each other’s staff, similar leadership differences were described. Given that these differences were seen consistently across the cases with U.S. military and civilian organizations, they are not applicable in the cases where they were partially or not observed, no significant rankings can be made across cases.

**Training and Efforts to Promote Understanding**

This sub-category includes efforts such as training, handbook development, or other activities to promote understanding across organizations. It is assessed on the basis of prevalence of training observed. Across the cases, only U.S. military and civilian training or other efforts were identified.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training and Efforts to Promote Cultural Understanding</th>
<th>Iraq RoL</th>
<th>Afghan RoL</th>
<th>Iraq Provincial</th>
<th>Afghan Provincial</th>
<th>Mindanao</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relative Ranking</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
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</table>

458
Handbooks\textsuperscript{215}. As civilian and military organizations operated in a shared environment, the military began to codify best practices and lessons in a number of documents, including doctrine documents and field manuals (United States Institute of Peace, 2008, October 8). In the Provincial cases, as a response to the need to further explain and provide guidance for PRT activities, a number of PRT oriented handbooks were developed. For example, in October 2006, the ISAF PRT Handbook was developed, which guided the establishment and running of a PRT. Also, in 2011, the U.S. published its own PRT-brigade combat team Unity of Effort Reference Guide. Military guidance also increasingly recognized that strong coordination with Iraqi leaders was critical to the successful handover, transition, and sustainment of projects, and updates to handbooks such as the June 2007 Money As A Weapon System (MAWS) handbook reflected this (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2013, January). However, these documents were informational in nature, not directive and the coordination and other best practices they identified were not necessarily fully followed by PRTs on the ground (Westerman, 2008).

Further, these handbooks were not tied into a formal military planning process, and it was often difficult for the military to interpret and use the information. In the Rule of Law cases, a Rule of Law Handbook was produced by the military that detailed military and civilian RoL organizations for both areas, as well as insight to the local environments.

\textsuperscript{215} In addition to those listed here, the United States Institute of Peace in 2007 did develop a short brochure for military and NGO interactions, the “Guidelines for Relations Between US Armed Forces and NGHOs in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments”. However, it was not referenced during the research for the cases, and was not formally adopted by military or NGOs.
Training. In both the Iraq and Afghanistan Provincial cases, some type of combined pre-deployment training was developed, in part to address the challenges addressed elsewhere\(^{216}\). For Iraq provincial activities, the State Department developed a mandatory five day Iraq PRT training program at the State Department's Foreign Service Institute in Washington, DC\(^{217}\). Military participation was initially very limited, though by the end of the PRT program this was expanded so that a number of military personnel who were expected to interact with PRTs also participated in the training (Caples, 2009).

For Afghanistan, heightened awareness of coordination issues and a demand from Congress that civilian personnel assigned to serve in Afghanistan receive civilian-military coordination training led to joint civil-military pre-deployment training (USAID, 2006; Yodsampa, 2011). By 2009, the training evolved into the “Interagency Afghanistan Integrated Civilian-Military Pre-Deployment Training Course.” The course was developed collaboratively, with input from State Department, USAID, USDA, and other government representatives. Students from these agencies attended along with deploying soldiers. It provided training on working within the civilian-military interagency contexts of PRTs and DSTs, such as taking convoys to meetings with Afghan officials, responding to security threats against bases, and sharing information and ideas on projects and activities (U.S. Army Center for Law and Military Operations, 2011).

In addition to the pre-deployment training, in-country training was available in the

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\(^{216}\) In both cases, PRTs were formed in theater, and tours were not synchronized with partner military units. Thus combining training with civilian military partners that were actually going to work together in country was a challenge, and often these classes combined staff who while both able to share understanding of their respective organizations, were not going to serve directly together.

\(^{217}\) The Iraq PRT Course was in addition to a five day Iraq Familiarization Course and a five day counter-threat course.
Afghan cases. Most applicable to the Afghanistan Provincial case, a Counterinsurgency Training Center was establishing in Kabul to help orientate new civilians and soldiers to their varied roles and responsibilities, to include PRT duties (Fritsch, 2012). Staff could attend training there as they arrived or shortly into their tours. In the Afghanistan RoL the Field Force/NROLFSM-A developed a RoL Field Support Officer Academy, which was a course developed over time to provide the basics of what other organizations were doing in the RoL sector. Approximately one third of the participants were from outside organizations: civilian, other military, foreign, and NGO (Afghanistan RoL Interview Jan 2014).

**Training and Efforts to Promote Understanding Assessment.** In terms of the assessment criteria of prevalence of training observed, the Afghanistan Provincial case displayed the greatest number of efforts to promote understanding in the cases, with handbooks, pre-deployment training, and specific in-country training developed to support understanding of other organizations. The Iraq Provincial case was displayed almost the same level of effort, with only tailored in-country training being absent. Thus they are ranked at very high and high respectively. The Afghanistan and Iraq RoL cases displayed lower levels of effort and were ranked accordingly. Though the Afghanistan RoL case did have in-country training, in-country training was generally shorter and less comprehensive than pre-deployment training, earning it a medium ranking. The presence of handbooks for the Iraq RoL case earned it a low ranking. No efforts were seen in the Mindanao or South Sudan cases, earning them a very low ranking.

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218 In the Iraq cases, though there was in-country training, it was often focused on improving specific technical skills of new staff, rather than fostering understanding across organizations.
Relationships Summary

Below is the aggregate ranking of the relationships network feature sub-categories, and resultant overall relative ranking for this category.

Table 47: Relationships Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Iraq RoL</th>
<th>Afghan RoL</th>
<th>Iraq Provincial</th>
<th>Afghan Provincial</th>
<th>Mindanao</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust or Comfort Level</td>
<td>High (4)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>High (4)</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
<td>High (4)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training and Efforts to Promote Cultural Understanding</td>
<td>Low (2)</td>
<td>Medium (3)</td>
<td>High (4)</td>
<td>Very High (5)</td>
<td>Very Low (1)</td>
<td>Very Low (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Ranking</td>
<td>Medium (6)</td>
<td>Medium (6)</td>
<td>Very High (8)</td>
<td>High (7)</td>
<td>Low (5)</td>
<td>Very Low (4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Integrators and Supporters

**Integrators and Champions.** In this sub-section, organizational or general types of supporters of collaboration are examined. In general, across cases there was the perception that there were certain people with the ability to get along (and thereby cooperate). They are assessed in terms of prevalence and impact observed across organizations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Integrator or Champion</th>
<th>Iraq RoL</th>
<th>Afghan RoL</th>
<th>Iraq Provincial</th>
<th>Afghan Provincial</th>
<th>Mindanao</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Integrator or Champion</td>
<td>U.S. civ-mil and host nation champion</td>
<td>U.S. civ-mil champion</td>
<td>U.S. civ-mil and host nation champions</td>
<td>U.S. civ-mil and host nation champions</td>
<td>Donor state champion</td>
<td>U.S. champions broad but for a limited time or areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UN limited role</td>
<td>UN limited role</td>
<td>UN limited role</td>
<td>UN as a champion</td>
<td>International Organization champion</td>
<td>Donor State champion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lead country system not effective</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Humanitarian clusters &amp; NGOs</td>
<td>UN champions for some areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Humanitarian clusters &amp; NGOs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relative Ranking</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Very Low</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Low</th>
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</table>

**U.S. Integrators and Champions.** As described above, in the Iraq RoL case, the RoL Coordinator was established as a senior civilian leader to promote coordination in the RoL sector (U.S. Army Center for Law and Military Operations, 2011). The Coordinator was established to be neutral party with knowledge of the gamut of rule-of-law matters. This official also brokered peace between INL and DOJ (see above) (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, Oct 2005). In carrying out this work, RoL Coordinator coordinated with the military and others on the interagency team (U.S. Department of State, 2012). In addition, the RoL Coordinator worked closely with members of the Iraqi judiciary and the relevant law enforcement institutions (the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice), to ensure collaboration and cooperation in the reconstitution of essential law enforcement and security institutions throughout the Republic of Iraq (U.S. Department of Justice, 2012). Regular coordination meetings also occurred, for example there was a monthly International RoL meeting, hosted by the United Kingdom, U.S., or others. These
meetings were primarily informational, with participants sharing their own activities but not leading to further integration with others. However, though the RoL Coordinator’s office was seen as instrumental in facilitating cooperation among organizations, it lacked the authority to compel it. Moreover, the political will in the Embassy to compel collaboration between organizations, particularly in the often contentious INL and DOJ relationships was seen as lacking (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 24 Dec 13).

Similarly, in the Afghanistan RoL Case, the U.S. Embassy’s Rule of Law Coordinator, and later CDROLLE, was intended to be an authoritative “honest broker” in the RoL arena. The initial RoL Coordinator had substantial experience as a DOJ prosecutor and held positions in a number of U.S. agencies, such as the National Security Council, the Treasury Department, and INL at the Department of State. He was reported as having defused tensions between agencies, improved the information flow within the U.S. government RoL community. One of the strengths of this Coordinator was his perceived neutrality. Non-State agencies indicated that a coordinator with no line authority over any agency or program was seen as an honest broker in representing them and reporting to the front office. Many of these agencies’ officers stated that the incumbent RoL coordinator was a fair conveyer of their opinions in solving policy disagreements. Later RoL Coordinator positions were filled by regular Foreign Service officers. Having career State Department leadership raised questions about the role of the coordinator as honest broker among the different offices with RoL programs (United Nations Development Programme Afghanistan, 2010).

In both the Iraq and Afghanistan cases, the PRTs and their leaders could be seen as collaboration champions. PRTs served as platforms to reach out to local leaders and functioned as neutral sites for dispute resolution. For example, in Afghanistan, PRT Ghazni
engaged as a neutral party/honest broker between the various tribes in that province. The teams and brigades also served as forums for coordination within the U.S. government interagency community. For example, in the Afghan Nangarhar Province in 2008, the team coordinated counternarcotics efforts between the military, USAID, the State Department’s Bureau, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and other players before further coordination with the Afghan government (although in this case much work was also done at the brigade level) (Kemp, 2011, September/October). Further, in the Iraq Provincial Case, the Office of Provincial Affairs, the headquarters for the PRT program in Iraq, could generally be seen as a champion of coordination for the provincial level in Iraq. The office originated a number of coordinating mechanisms, co-hosted regular PRT senior leader conferences, and promoted collaboration with local Iraqi and United Nations partners.

Additionally, across the Iraq and Afghanistan cases particular individuals were also seen instrumental to facilitating cooperation. In at least one case, the talents of military officer who also had civilian assistant U.S. attorney experience was seen as valuable in being able to bridge civilian and military organizations to foster mutual understanding and collaboration (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 27 Apr 14). Further, the converse was illustrated in the Afghanistan RoL case, were although there were a lot of great senior leaders in the Afghan RoL sector, there was a perception that a fraction of senior officials – both military and civilian – seemed to have had lost touch with basic getting along skills or ability. This smaller percentage of challenging leaders could create problems that seemed to be out of proportion to their numbers, due to their control over budget, resources, and their authorities. In some cases, such as the U.S. civilian and military RoL divide, disputes that resonated throughout organizational levels were seen as originating through disagreements at
the senior levels. Such disagreements at the leadership level were seen as inhibiting cooperation as the working level as well (Afghanistan RoL Interview Nov 2013).

In the South Sudan case, the Field Support and Analysis Cell (FSAC) broadly supported collaboration. The field staff engaged with local communities and leaders, and provided information and analysis on the local situation. FSAC staff developed reports and analysis based on the field staff reports, and coordinated through United Nations meetings with organizations interested in conflict coordination. FSAC staff attended weekly United Nations protection cluster (see Network Governance Structures below) meetings in partnership with USAID, as conflict and humanitarian issues often overlapped. In addition, the FSAC lead served as a chair for a conflict prevention working group. The FSAC personnel also made a point of sharing transport resources, and coordinating with conflict partners to extent possible. However, the FSAC only operated for approximately 2 years (South Sudan Interview 19 October 2013). USAID also supported collaboration, particularly in certain sectors. In the South Sudan health sector, USAID took the lead role, and also closely coordinated with other major donors to South Sudan, particularly in the food and agriculture sector (USAID, 2011).

United Nations Integrators and Champions. In the Iraq RoL the UN played a very limited role in supporting collaboration. Initially after the occupation of Iraq, unlike in many other conflicts, such as Afghanistan, there was no overarching United Nations-organized coordination of RoL tasks among donor nations. Given the initial absence of United Nations assistance and other substantial international presence, the task of post-conflict operations, including RoL, fell almost exclusively to the United States. However, by
2010, international presence and assistance in Iraq RoL had increased substantially. The UN played a similarly limited role in the Iraq Provincial case as well.

Conversely, for RoL in Afghanistan the United Nations had the charter to be in the lead. The United Nations had a coordination committee and, technically, could have been more directive at any time. However, they did not give direction, and UNAMA had few people working RoL. UNAMA, the United Nations lead element, reportedly had a similar problem that the U.S. Embassy RoL section had with getting other United Nations offices to share information and take direction. This underscored the general difficulty with coordination in Afghanistan. Similarly, in the Afghanistan Provincial case, at least initially, UNAMA coordination activities at the sub-national level included working with NGOs and the local Afghan government, as well as inviting PRTs to planning workshops and other conferences. UNAMA area coordinators or staff in a local area could act as moderators between the U.S. and local NGOs. In some places, the U.S. military even agreed to vet projects through the United Nations to obtain their and NGO inputs. PRT staff could also be invited to attend local United Nations or NGO meetings as well (Flavin, 2004).

In the Mindanao and South Sudan cases, the United Nations was a significant supporter of collaboration. In Mindanao, the UN system was well placed to help identify information gaps and to ensure that quality and relevant information reaches key players — from high-level decision-makers to the general public (United Nations, 2004). This was echoed in the South Sudan case, where the United Nations, often through the Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs\textsuperscript{219}, was supportive of sharing, particularly of verbal information and sharing logistical resources (South Sudan Interview 19 October 2013; UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2011). The United Nations was also a good broker in South Sudan because they chaired the cluster meetings, had good relationships with the NGOs, who often they funded, as well as the Embassies and other donors (South Sudan Interview 19 October 2013). Further, as of 2012, United Nations agencies showed strong commitment to the cluster approach and have managed to mobilize bilateral resources for cluster coordination, whereas NGO co-leads operated on a voluntary basis (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs South Sudan, 2013).

**Other Integrators and Champions.** Particularly in the Afghan, Mindanao, and South Sudan cases, as the number and role of other donor states grew, they could provide an integrating or champion function. In the Afghanistan RoL case, Italy was designated as a “lead nation,” and Germany has played a particularly active role with the Afghan police (United States Institute of Peace, 2004). International organizations or donor states could take on convening roles, facilitating or supporting collaboration among organizations. In the South Sudan case, the Joint Donor Team conducted activities included briefing visiting diplomatic missions and assisting visitors, leading health sector donor coordination, and assisting with refugee camp coordination/management. In Mindanao, the World Bank was a co-chair of the Philippine Development Forum, and in this role convenes a number of

\textsuperscript{219} For example, in South Sudan, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) operated as the chief and most authoritative source of access information for humanitarian partners. OCHA ensured that national NGOs were more informed about access, and worked closely with government partners to promote their understanding of access and role as interlocutors with other government branches.
forums to promote collaboration, including regular meetings and working groups (The World Bank, 2014). Further in the Mindanao case, Australia, through AUSAid, developed an informal but widely accepted coordinating position within the donor community for Mindanao. This involved a supporting collaboration focused projects and activities\textsuperscript{220}, strong cooperative approach to issues, and fostering close working relationships and complimentary strategies with other organizations, such as the World Bank (Australian Aid, 2012, December).

In the Mindanao and South Sudan cases, international NGOs frequently co-chaired humanitarian clusters. Further, there were examples of NGOs, both international and national, stepping up to co-lead clusters during difficult periods (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2012, September). NGOs had flexibility to share resources when needed in emergencies (South Sudan Interview 19 October 2013).

**Integrators and Champions Assessment.** Given the assessment criteria of prevalence and impact observed across organizations, though the South Sudan and Mindanao cases both displayed a number of integrators and champions, they were generally not as well established or limited in focus compared to those in the Iraq and Afghanistan cases. Thus they are both ranked low. Among the Iraq and Afghanistan case, the PRTs and Coordinators (and CDROLLE in Afghanistan) served as general champions of collaboration. However, the UN also had a large champion role in the Afghanistan

\textsuperscript{220} An example of this support was the Coalitions for Change (CfC), established by AusAID and the Asia Foundation, which supported civil society, the private sector, and government in multi-stakeholder coalitions and networks. The CfC undertook research, analysis, capacity development, and other activities to support these groups. The CfC had 78 local partners across the Philippines, and was funded for $2.775M in 2012.
Provincial case, earning that case a high ranking. The limited role of the UN in the Iraq cases earned them a medium ranking. Finally, the more limited coordination role for the RoL Coordinator/CDROLLE coupled with a limited UN role in the Afghanistan RoL case earns that case a very low ranking.

**Leadership Support.** In this context, leadership support means support from leaders outside of and overseeing the organizational structures that are examined in these cases\(^\text{221}\). It is assessed in terms of prevalence and impacts observed across organizations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leadership Support</th>
<th>Iraq RoL</th>
<th>Afghan RoL</th>
<th>Iraq Provincial</th>
<th>Afghan Provincial</th>
<th>Mindanao</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive leadership examples</td>
<td>U.S. civ-mil promoted collaboration</td>
<td>U.S. civ-mil mixed impact</td>
<td>U.S. civ-mil negative impact</td>
<td>Positive leadership examples</td>
<td>Positive leadership examples</td>
<td>U.S. civ-mil promoted collaboration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative leadership examples</td>
<td>U.S. civ-mil mixed impact</td>
<td>Positive leadership examples</td>
<td>U.S. civ-mil mixed impact</td>
<td>Positive leadership examples</td>
<td>U.S. civ-mil promoted collaboration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Relative Ranking | High | Very Low | High | Low | High | Medium |

Across the Iraq, Afghanistan, and Mindanao cases, senior Embassy and military leadership were seen as instrumental in setting a collaborative example between the civilians and military elements (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2013, Feb). Visibility of Front office (Embassy leadership) and senior leadership support for cooperation, or its absence, was noticed by staff and played a role in fostering an

\(^{221}\) For example Rule of Law coordinators, which were the leaders within organizations in the case studies, are covered above. However, in the same case, the Chief of Mission for the Embassy, who was the superior of the Rule of Law Coordinator, is addressed in this section.
environment for effective collaboration. This was particularly noticeable in the RoL cases, and the Mindanao case where more of the coordination took place at the Embassy. For example, in the Mindanao case, the JSOTF-P commander stated that such an integrated effort was essential for a comprehensive approach to addressing U.S. counterterrorism goals in the Philippines (Lambert, et al., 2013). However, the effect did clearly ‘trickle down’ to the sub-national level, where senior leader support was seen as helpful to fostering collaboration (Ayres and Barnes, 2011). Senior civilian and military leaders at the Embassy and military headquarters played a key role in setting high-level agreements and setting a cooperative tone for their sub-national organizational units. At multiple points, both civilian and military leaders directed a more cooperative approach and for subordinates to learn to work better with civilian or military partners.

For the Iraq and Afghanistan provincial cases, at the team and military unit level, in cases when a PRT Team Leader could not get along with his deputy or partnered military commander, then the military and PRTs often worked in parallel with each other (United States Institute of Peace, 2008, October 8). As noted above, particularly in the absence of broadly accepted guidance or other collaboration mechanism, the importance of personality, individual leadership style, and previously established relationships had inordinate influence on collaboration.

**Leadership Support Assessment.** In terms of the assessment criteria of prevalence and impacts observed across organizations, the strong and visible levels of leadership support in the Iraq and Mindanao cases, with positive cases observed, earn those cases a high ranking. The leadership support in South Sudan, without observed positive
cases merits it a medium ranking. The Afghanistan Provincial case showed a mixed impact from leadership support, while the Afghanistan RoL case displayed negative examples of leadership impact, earning them the low and very low rankings respectively.

**Integrators and Supports Summary**

Below is the aggregate ranking of the Integrators and Champions network feature sub-categories, and resultant overall relative ranking for this category.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 50: Integrators and Supports Summary</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Integrator or Champion</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Leadership Support</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall Ranking</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 9: Detailed Hypothesis 2b Agranoff Typology Observations

Hypothesis 2b) With regard to the Agranoff (2003) typologies of networks (see above), U.S Stabilization Networks will involve a range of collaboration activities, as described in the Agranoff typology (e.g. Informational, Developmental, Outreach (shared activity), and Action (shared decision-making) collaborations. These activities will depend on the nature of the relationship between the participating organizations (e.g. civilian and military, host nation government, NGOs’, international organizations, etc.) and the U.S. As the type of collaboration moves from information sharing to joint decision making, increases in coordination and strategy and in network governance and organization are required.

Iraq RoL

In terms of the Agranoff typology, the stabilization network from the U.S. perspective seemed to be a mostly functional Outreach network between U.S. civilian and military organizations. With some notable exceptions, such as the INL-DOJ relationship, the will to collaborate to a degree was present (Dempsey, 2009). As discussed above, information was shared and common approaches to problems were identified, typically through plans or program activities. The U.S. civilian and military relationship was seen as benefiting from strong leaders. Ambassador Crocker (U.S. Ambassador to Iraq 2007-2009) was particularly strong in this regard, and other civilian and military leaders were also positively regarded in this light as well. In general, U.S. military leadership was seen as
acknowledging civilian leadership in stabilization issues (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 27 Apr 14). This was seen as helping to prevent conflicts and challenges between civilian and military organization, and further, it was perceive that had the U.S. military not presented such an image it would have been damaging to the relationship. Further, civilian staff outside of Baghdad provided linkages between the national level rule of law strategy and the operations by U.S. military components.

However, though generally positive, U.S. civilian and military RoL relationships did have some tensions and could vary from location to location, and from unit or staff rotations. Some civilians had trouble interfacing with the military environment. Further, military officers also expressed frustration at the lack of planning expertise among the civilian staff (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2005). Some strongly supported civilian efforts, but other military organizations struggled to accept the civilian role. This could lead having to spend time to establish working relationships (Iraq Provincial Interview 17 Sep 13). Overall, where U.S. civilian and military collaboration seemed to break down was at the highest level of activity of shared decision making, particularly regarding those decisions that involved directing resources (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 24 Dec 13).

Though shared activities were common, a firm limit to the desire to collaborate was seen where such collaboration would put an organization’s own mission at risk. It was also not clear if civilian organizations had the discretion necessary from Washington, DC headquarters to make these kinds of decisions. Thus though there seemed to be a desire to reach an Action network level of activity among participants, these were unsuccessful.

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222 For example, while meetings were common, overall, these were primarily information sharing in nature, they typically did not lead to collaborative results such as shared activities or joint decision-making.
More broadly the U.S. Stabilization Network in the Iraq RoL sector functioned as a Developmental with donor state, international organization, and United Nations partners. Though not smoothly functioning, information sharing occurred, as did capacity development between organizations, as seen in the sections above. Blockages to lower level collaboration tended to occur due to the inability to do so, such as limited military self-knowledge of RoL activities hindering information sharing, rather than conscious effort to not cooperate. Higher-level attempts a collaboration were generally unsuccessful. In particular, the UN, which in many countries has a considerable coordination role, had limited role in Iraq. Instead, the U.S. usually led coordination efforts. The United Nations did try to create plans and strategies, however they were generally unsuccessful due to insufficient will from other RoL organizations to see them completed (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 24 Dec 13).

With regard to host nation partners, the U.S. RoL relationship can be seen as evolving from its inception during the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) period. The CPA was criticized for importing U.S. RoL ‘blueprints’ and for disregarding the Iraqi environment and RoL organizations (Banks, 2010). In interactions with the bureaucracy in the justice sector, military units and civil organizations did not foster relations with their counterparts in government and made little effort to secure Iraqi buy in. They even denied Iraqi involvement in decision-making in areas of activity like information technology despite senior Iraqi staff having high skill levels in many areas. Meetings involving Iraqis and non-Iraqis were often conducted entirely in English or, if interpreters were provided, non-Iraqi participants often revealed irritation at the slow pace of dialogue where time had to be allowed to translation. Iraqi’s attending such meetings often adopted the role of silent
observers. In powerful Ministries like the Ministry of Interior, senior staff began to raise objections to projects where no consultation had occurred. The response by Coalition members was that the Iraqi’s were again demonstrating their lack of gratitude.

Later in the Embassy period, collaboration improved. In general, U.S. staff had positive working relationships with Iraqi counterparts. Areas of particularly strong relationships included working with the Iraqi judiciary to return women of juvenile detainees. In the RoL sector, the professional relationships between practicing U.S. lawyers, often civilians from the PRTs, and Iraqi counterparts were seen as beneficial to establishing positive working relationships and bridging any differences (United States Institute of Peace, 2008, October 10). There were also strong positive relationships with Iraqi forensics organizations, as these were purely technical expert exchanges on both sides. In some cases, however, lack of trust on the results of collaboration with Iraqis slowed it down. With regard to the transition of detainees to Iraqi custody, there were concerns on the coalition’s part, particularly in Washington, about the fairness of trials and severity of punishments that might be implemented. However, these concerns were eventually overcome (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 27 Apr 14).

However, though coordination and communication regularly took place with senior Iraqi leaders, U.S. RoL organizations sector were criticized for how it took place. RoL organizations were seen as taking a “top-down” approach in that they interacted with Iraqi government counterparts in a hierarchical manner that excluded Iraqi middle management and line staff from project design and implementation. Overall, this top-down strategy

\[223\] For example, DOJ’s exclusivity in communication meant that it interacted with the Chief Justice and the Minister for Justice and seldom, if ever, sought to consult beneath that level.
assumed that project planning and implementation would follow as a matter of course. Further Iraq RoL projects were developed in an atmosphere of a high level of tension and disorder amongst the actors responsible for those projects that continually constrained progress; an overall lack of coordination and organization in the process of reconstructing justice; and the absence of an appropriate working relationship between the occupiers and the occupied (Banks, 2010).

Further, information sharing with the Iraqi government to deconflict activities was a regular challenge. Iraqi projects were initiated without the knowledge the U.S. stabilization organizations, and as a result, multiple contracts and projects covered identical activities. For example, there were three projects to introduce a national identity card, and three projects designing police forms. In the absence of coordination and planning most project groups were unaware of the existence of others groups working on the similar projects. This caused duplication and waste in terms of resources but was also a source of significant confusion on the Iraqi side. One way this was addressed was in agreements with implementing partners. These agreements, such as statements of work, recognized other donors and agencies as also promoting rule of law and pointed out that ‘it will be important to remain aware of the activities of these actors and to coordinate with them (Banks, 2010).

Due to these issues, the overall level of collaboration between the U.S. and the Iraqi host government can be seen as at least Developmental, as there was (though imperfect) regular information sharing and capacity development of partners that was prevalent. There were some -- though reportedly criticized -- attempts to involve Iraqi partners in activities and efforts to address problems. Therefore, the U.S. and Iraqi level of collaboration could be classified as an (qualified) Outreach network.
Table 51: Iraq RoL Agranoff Typology Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Informational</th>
<th>Developmental</th>
<th>Outreach</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq RoL</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>U.S./Donors/United Nations/NGOs</td>
<td>U.S. Civ-Mil (thwarted Action)</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.-Host Nation (qualified)</td>
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**Afghanistan RoL**

The Afghanistan RoL case faced challenges in many areas, and these challenges can be seen across the Stabilization network. Beginning with U.S. civilian and military collaboration, a number of factors seemed to limit collaboration. Information sharing itself was a challenge. In some cases, information collection and sharing became and organizational mandate. It was part of the mission of both IROL (the Inter-Agency Rule of Law Unit) office and RoL Field Force to collect RoL of information, and both organizations attempting to become clearinghouses for it, though they met with limited success. There was even a study commissioned on the issue (Afghanistan RoL Interview Jan 2014). In some cases requests for information themselves could be seen as a threat and result in conflict between organizations. As a result, organizations interested in collecting general RoL information, such as the RoL Field Force and IROL, could face significant challenges in doing so. However, as described above, information could generally be exchanged.

Other issues included funding, inconsistent will to collaborate, decision-making and authority issues. At the embassy in Kabul, according to individuals both in and out of the U.S. government, by late 2005, internal U.S. coordination meetings on RoL were best

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Note credit stealing for efforts was not seen as an issue or source of reluctance to sharing information, at least not on a general or common basis.
characterized as shouting matches between representatives of different agencies. Most strategic and tactical level liaison was characterized as seeming to build on personal relations more than official connections. For example, it was remarked during an interview in Kandahar, “[t]here are no official communications structures. It is all about personal relations, and this has to be solved if unity is to be achieved” (Thruelsen, 2010, p. 86). Despite these challenges, positive working relationships could be developed. Additionally, there was a general U.S. civilian and military clash over who was in charge or who could do what in the area of RoL. Often, a negative tone was described between U.S. civilian and military leadership (United Nations Development Programme Afghanistan, 2010). A specific point of disconnect was discord between the leadership of the Embassy RoL section and the RoL Field Force, as outlined above. Both said they were in charge (Afghanistan RoL Interview Nov 2013). This apparently produced a chilling effect on collaboration between two organizations with similar mission and charter to coordinate RoL activities in Afghanistan (Thruelsen).

However, a number of examples of strong working relationships could be found at the sub-national level in RoL not already mentioned above include a strong U.S. military and UK PRT collaboration in Helmand Province (Afghanistan RoL Interview Jan 2014); U.S., German, and Dutch cooperation in Kunduz. In Helmand Province, the United Kingdom PRT had a strong (“amazing”) working relationship with their partner Marine Corps stability operations cells, and later with RoL Field Force staff. Sharing was the norm and no disagreements over roles or authority were evidenced. In Kunduz the U.S. military RoL Field Force worked well with their German counterparts, to the degree of that they would share missions together. A counter example, however, was the case of another Field Force group
that had a difficult relationship with its U.S. partnered brigade. The RoL Field Force relied upon partnered organizations for logistics support, based upon an agreement (often a Memorandum of Understanding) and in return, the Field Force would help with stability operations and the RoL mission. However, for this particular brigade RoL was not a priority issue and the Field Force team often found itself without transportation. This developed to the point that the Field Force even questioned its mission in the province. The situation was largely resolved when the brigade’s headquarters directed it to make RoL support a priority activity. Both of these situations were based on informal relationships, and if teams or partners rotated out (or otherwise changed), they could change as well. This is a particularly striking example as partnerships between U.S. military units were usually the least contentious (Afghanistan RoL Interview Jan 2014).

Further, the reluctance to share information could have extended to include information on internal programmatic information and joint decisions on budgeting when authority or purview was in dispute. In the case of the CDROLLE and Deputies Committee, information sharing wasn’t well defined in originating Cables and this absence could be taken advantage of by organizations who did not want to comply with their oversight or coordination. Territoriality over resource and programming decisions could be extended to information control, as means of preventing outside interference.

An example of setting a negative tone for cooperation at the senior most level was described in story of a meeting between the Commander of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan and the new U.S. Ambassador. Reportedly, in what was described as a power play, the Ambassador made the Commander wait for 20 minutes while the Ambassador completed a trivial task such as reading email. While this story cannot be verified, the fact that it was told and re-told is indicative of an air of conflict and division between two senior leaders that subordinate staff could not help but pick up on. In another example, the absence of an acting DCM’s presence at RoL meetings for a stretch of three months was seen as a tacit reduction in support for the Coordinator at the time. In all likelihood this perception was unintentional, but nonetheless it was a type of signal that staff members and lower levels of leadership picked up on.
(Afghanistan RoL Interview Nov 2013). These behaviors severed to thwart high levels of collaboration at the Outreach or Action level.

This is seen in the case of the Deputies Committee, under the CDROLLE. The intent of the Deputies Committee was to vet programs, and share information on activities, with the chair having the final say on spending, and was to function as a coordinating body (Afghanistan RoL Interview Nov 2013). Anyone who makes budgeting decisions was to have brought them to Deputies Committee before making decisions. However, it never achieved this level of coordination as many participants tried to side step it. Moreover, often U.S. civilian agency agendas and funding was controlled largely from Washington rather than Kabul, and as result civilian agencies often remained beholden to their respective funding sources (Hagerott, Umberg, Thomas, and Jackson, 2010). The CDROLLE did not have any legal authority to force compliance from participating organizations (Afghanistan RoL Interview Nov 2013). As a result, it was an informational and consultative body, despite the intention for it to be a decision making one. Despite falling short of setting joint priorities, the CDROLLE and Deputies committee did foster lower levels of collaboration. In at least once case, this structure helped identify duplication of RoL activities between INL and USAID, which was then addressed (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2014, January).

Collaboration was also limited more broadly across the Stabilization network, with donors, the UN, and other partners. For RoL in Afghanistan the United Nations had the charter to be in the lead. The United Nations had a coordination committee and could have been more directive. However, they did not give direction, and UNAMA had few people working RoL. UNAMA, the United Nations lead element, reportedly had a similar problem
that the U.S. Embassy RoL section had with getting other United Nations offices to share information and take direction. Further, in the RoL sector, Italy has been designated as a ‘lead nation’, and Germany has played a particularly active role with the Afghan police. However, according to a United Institute of Peace review, it the lead nation approach did not work effectively to energize reform, bridge differences among the Afghan institutions, and coordinated donors in the RoL sector, and resulted in ‘drift’ (United States Institute of Peace, 2004). For example, meetings between the donors were described as meetings of lawyers, each with a specific brief that allowed no flexibility and with no interest in sharing information (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2008). This led to a number of challenges, for example, a lack of problem ownership and planning was seen as contributing directly to the endemic problems in the Afghan courts (Hagerott, Umberg, Thomas, and Jackson, 2010). The international community took steps to improve coordination, as Italy and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan established an International Coordination Group for Justice Reform to bring donors together at formal meetings (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2008).

This is illustrated in the case of coordination of international support to the Afghan National Police. More than thirty-seven different international donors had been involved in supporting Afghan National Police development alone, with most of them also contributing nations to NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, and/or the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL). Under the Afghanistan RoL plans and frameworks the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) was established to represent key actors with the overall strategy of formulating and coordinating responsibility. Major multilateral and international organizations involved in
Afghan National Police support included the U.S., the European Union, UNAMA, NATO, and Germany. In addition, several individual countries acted through bilaterally. The multilateral agreements and frameworks lacked enforceability, and were frequently undercut bilateral agreements. Bilateral agreements often reflected the specific national agendas of the countries involved, only a few of which who were willing to be subject to multilateral oversight or control. This left many actors driven by individual strategies, even when involved in the same project. This also increased the overall coordination burden, in terms of time, manpower, developing sufficient working relationships, and in terms of frustration, to achieve coordination with the multiplicity of initiatives. Overall, the degree to which the IPCB succeeded varied greatly depending on several factors, including the strength of the leadership assigned to its implementing arm, the IPCB Secretariat.

Some other specific examples of how this manifested included a Norwegian Project for Support of the Police in Afghanistan, an independent bilateral program coordinated with EUPOL; DynCorp was using training manuals that it would not share with other actors; the former Blackwater private security company was mentoring the Afghan Border Police; France was to contribute gendarmes for police training, but they would be subject to ISAF and not EUPOL oversight; and ISAF was establishing a NATO Training Mission for Afghanistan (NTM-A) to develop both the Afghan army and police under the ISAF commander. Lastly, all the tactical-level Police Mentor Teams mostly followed their national training standards, not harmonized ones (Thruelsen, 2010).

Overall, the high-level strategic documents described in the planning section, above, did not bring about level of synchronization or integration that might be desired. Efforts to reach Outreach or high levels of collaboration were frustrated. However, despite challenges,
meetings and exchanges were held which allowed for information sharing, and sharing of best practices between organizations. Some also involved a measure of training activities (The UN General Assembly, 2013; Wyler and Katzman, 2010). Thus the stabilization efforts in the Afghanistan RoL case can be best categorized as Developmental in the Agranoff typology.

Table 52: Afghanistan RoL Agranoff Typology Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghanistan RoL</th>
<th>Informational</th>
<th>Developmental</th>
<th>Outreach</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>U.S. Civ-Mil (thwarted Outreach or Action)</td>
<td>U.S.-Host Nation (thwarted Outreach)</td>
<td>U.S./Donors/United Nations/NGOs</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Iraq Provincial**

U.S. civilian and military collaboration certainly aspired to be at the Action network levels. However, reaching this level was the exception, and in most circumstances, the level of collaboration spanned the lower tiers of the Agranoff typology, or did not occur at all. A wide variation in network features and collaboration existed across the provincial areas in Iraq and throughout the duration of the case study. This unevenness manifested in a number of ways. One example was the utilization of civil-affairs personnel, who were a natural bridge between the military and civilian organizations. In general, military commanders simply were unwilling to give up their civil affairs soldiers for the PRTs entirely. Instead, a variety of fixes were implemented. For example, in Kirkuk the civil affairs Company was "on
call." In Hilla, the civil affairs company devoted a planning team to the PRT. In Mosul, most of the civil affairs company was available to the PRT, but the PRT mission was simply one of several they had to perform (Caples, 2009).

Further, trust was seen as highly variable. As noted above, the military had significant reservations about the competency and capabilities of civilian counterparts. In at least some cases, there was the perception that though competent in their own areas of expertise, civilians were the “wrong people for the jobs.” This was particularly noted in regard to State Department staff, who were seen as strategic and diplomatic operators. This expertise and approach was seen as being at odds with the tactical and project-oriented work that was necessary in the provinces²²⁶ (Iraq Provincial Interview 5 Mar 14). In addition, military personnel were dubious at what they saw as the State Department’s inability to perform simple management functions and the number of clearly incompetent civilians (in their judgment) brought in to work on the PRTs (Barber and Parker, 2008). Civilians, in turn, could also have a wide range of trust with military partners. In one case of civilian distrust of the military, it was noted that the civilian running a program to provide assistance to Iraqi widows PRT for the widow program didn’t want to empower the military people to participate, to the degree that they preferred to jeopardize the success of the program than cooperate with the military. These cases such difficult relationships were described as not the norm, but they did exist (Iraq Provincial Interview 5 Mar 14).

Resource sharing in practice could be dependent on relationships or “personality” based. Supportive military leadership could result in full support of civilian partners. Lack of

²²⁶ In turn, USAID staff were often seen as being more mission oriented and directly linked to project funding and expertise, and thus better suited to activities in the provinces than State Department staff.
support, or conflict between civilian and military leaders could result in the withholding of
military support. In one case, it was described that a civilian team “… sat motionless for six
weeks because the military withheld movement support due to personality conflicts between
the unit commander and ePRT leadership” (Naland, 2011, pp. 8-9). However, the shared will
and mechanisms to ensure the highest level of collaboration (network governance and
organization and coordination and strategy features) did not seem to be sufficient to ensure
it across military units and civilian PRTs.

PRTs generally also attempted to manage the various funds active in their areas. In
each case of funding, the particular agency controlling the funds has its own agenda, both
for use of the funds and politically, and each has its peculiar administrative requirements for
accessing and accounting for the funds. The PRT was often left in the middle, both trying to
access project funds and attempting to coordinate with the various agencies to ensure the
best use of funds in the PRTs' areas of responsibility (Caples, 2009).

Variation in U.S. Civilian and Military Coordination: The CERP

(Commander’s Emergency Response Program) Example: Though it was flexible and
responsive, coordination with other partners, such as the PRTS, USAID, and Government
of Iraq happened too infrequently. As early as 2005, a Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction report found that military coordination with civilians with regard to CERP
varied widely. As a result, and despite some early improvements, the Special Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction concluded that “the lack of formal coordination with State
Department and USAID of the CERP with other U.S. reconstruction programs and funds
potentially limited the effectiveness of some CERP projects, particularly large construction
projects” (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2013, January, p. 10). During the course of the war, military guidance covering CERP, “Money as a Weapons System”, was updated to support greater coordination. For example, A fiscal year 2011 update emphasized that regardless of cost, the military must coordinate every CERP project with PRTs, USAID, or NGOs as appropriate, to ensure maximum combination of effort and minimal conflict between competing programs (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2013, January).

Efforts to enhance weak coordination to ensure that CERP projects were appropriately designed and implemented and met key criteria including a requirement that they be sustainable, continued throughout the stabilization effort (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2013, January). As of January 2008, some major military commands indicated they had, on their own initiative, developed local policies and procedures to address the transition and sustainment issues; but others had not. However, though doctrine and best practices held that commanders in Iraq coordinate reconstruction efforts and determine project needs with the civilian and Iraqi partners to gain the greatest effect, this was not binding on military leaders. As late as 2010, a Department of Defense review of CERP found that coordination still needed to be improved. Further, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s July 2011 report found that coordination did not consistently involve USAID and similarly varied widely (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2013, January).

As a result, PRT involvement during Operation Iraqi Freedom in the CERP process varied widely from location to location and as military partners rotated even after the release of that guidance. The military itself noted that emphasis on planning for the transfer and
sustainment of completed projects varied from project to project and among the major subordinate commands responsible for executing CERP. Involvement in military planning could range from being virtually non-existent, to sporadic individual project vetting, and to full-fledged identification, planning, and implementation. PRT representatives that were deeply involved in the CERP process stated that the military relied on them, in part, because of frequent military unit rotations, reduced troop presence, limited subject-matter expertise, and little experience in managing development-type projects (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2013, January).

The following excerpts were examples of different levels of PRT and military working relationships (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2013, January, p. 10):

- In Diyala province, the military gave responsibility for identifying and implementing projects to the PRT but maintained control of payment authorization. The PRT had to concur with the projects before the military would fund them.

- In Salah al-Din province, the PRT occasionally helped identify needs within the province, mainly in a few specific areas -- such as agriculture and rule of law -- but “most projects were implemented and monitored by the [military] with minimal PRT involvement.” The PRT team leader also stated that the military most often requested support in arranging meetings with local officials, as the PRTs were primary U.S. contacts with local civic leaders, provincial council members, and prominent sheiks.

- In Anbar province, an Essential Services Cell was responsible for executing CERP
projects from project identification through completion. Projects were identified in partnership with local subject matter experts and Iraq’s provincial government. The military voluntarily sought USAID concurrence on all CERP projects greater than $50,000. Moreover, the Anbar PRT, U.S. military, and USAID had signed a Unified Common Plan to acknowledge their agreement and understanding of shared mission goals. In other provinces, efforts to coordinate projects with USAID had not been as advanced.

- In Basrah province, the PRT responded that they were “not a part of any formalized process or committee on coordination.”

Nevertheless, CERP generally functioned for brigades, PRTs, and Provincial Reconstruction Development Councils as an essential bridge to bringing real gains in essential services and quality of life to Iraqis (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2009, January).

A counter-balance to this variability was the strong relationship displayed by the MNFI commander General Petraeus and the Chief of Mission Ambassador Crocker, who were seen to be completely in sync (Ayres and Barnes, 2011). This was seen as sending an important signal to leaders down their respective hierarchies. When civilian and military tensions existed, it was exacerbated by whatever relationship tensions between the civilians and military did or did not have at the highest level (Dorman, 2007). This was echoed in lower level leader support. In an Anbar case, there was strong leadership support that helped set a tone for collaboration. At least one military general officer came to the PRT to meet weekly with the PRT leader to be briefed on activities (Iraq Provincial Interview 5 Mar 14).

This sort of engagement was seen as a definitive sign of support for civilian and military
collaboration.

In general, the civilian and military organizations within the PRTs effectively worked together (Dorman, 2007). The prevalence of flexible funding sources (CERP and the Quick Response Fund) seemed to enable higher levels of collaboration. However, conflicts could on occasions be severe; at times, the culture clash between Iraqis and the coalition often seemed easier to deal with than the culture clash between the State and Defense Departments. However, even when contentious relationships existed, in many cases they were overcome and cooperative work began to be established. Or they could be ‘reset’ over time as military units and civilian leader tours rotated. By the end of conflict, collaboration did seem to be on average at an Outreach level, however.

In a number of cases, positive PRT and military relationships were fostered only when the PRT adopted a subordinate status to their military counterparts. This was often a result of the military’s preponderance of forces and the imperative of establishing security. Adopting a junior posture to the military could at times prove a successful strategy to gain influence overall. At least one PRT adopted this strategy. Through providing advice -- even including strenuous critiques of proposed military activities -- but ultimately supporting them, trust could be established between the PRT and the military. As a result, a measure of influence was gained and the military deferred to civilian judgment more often than they would have otherwise. Further, given the military’s numerical superiority and PRTs logistic dependence, it was argued that PRTs would ultimately fail if they were territorial and did not defer sufficiently to military counterparts. The advice for PRTs to engage with military

\[\text{Many ePRTs appeared to be directed more by the unit with which they were embedded than the civilian leader. On the other hand, some ePRTs reportedly operated with only loose links to their military unit.}\]
partners not as equals, but as subordinates, was even promulgated in a 2008 United States Institute of Peace report on Iraq PRTs (Barber and Parker, 2008). For more on this, see the section on Hypothesis 4, Capability Disparities.

Similarly, collaboration with implementing partners was mixed, generally remaining at a Developmental network level at best. There could be strong relationships between the U.S. military and civilians in an area and poor or effectively non-existent relationships in others. For example, for one USAID implementing partner, IRD (International Relief & Development), there was a strong working relationship with the military in Anbar. The military commander there saw a benefit of having IRD in their area and as a result, the military partnered with them. However, in other areas, the relationship was described as the military regarding IRD as more of a hindrance than anything else (United States Institute of Peace, 2008, September 24).

An example from the Anbar province itself illustrates the wide variety of views on implementing partners. Even within Anbar, views on USAID implementing partners were mixed, and the relationships varied from location to location. Some were seen positively, while others were viewed as being “abysmal” (United States Institute of Peace, 2008, September 24). In some cases, the implementing partners could be suffering from staffing challenges similar to those faces by civilians and had uneven staffing as a result (United States Institute of Peace, 2008, October 10). Relationships could fall into a mid-range, and they also evolved. For example, one Anbar team’s relationship with a USAID NGO implementer (RTI) was described as hit or miss. They were seen as having starting slowly, and with a lot of promises that they took a long time to deliver on. However, in time they did make good on those promises, and the products they delivered were seen as good by the
Similarly, with regard to Iraqi partners, collaboration aspired to reach the Outreach level, but often fell short or did not occur. Collaboration with other partners, mainly USAID implementing partners, aspired to be at the Developmental or Outreach network level, but was also inconsistent.

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<th>Informational</th>
<th>Developmental</th>
<th>Outreach</th>
<th>Action</th>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq Provincial</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>U.S.-Host Nation (thwarted Outreach)</td>
<td>U.S. Civ-Mil (thwarted Action)</td>
<td>NA</td>
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|                | NA            | Implementing Partners/NGOs      |          |        |

**Afghanistan Provincial**

At the sub-national levels, the degree to which U.S. civilian and military organization collaborated varied significantly and increased over time. In cases with poor civilian and military coordination, meaningful coordination remained limited to information exchanges and briefings, rather than civilian inclusion into the decision making process. Conversely, in cases of strong collaboration, the result was described as “unity of effort.” This is illustrated in a Helmand DST example. At the DST there was little civ-mil competition and a culture of mutual support. Successes and credit were shared, and member’s contributions were valued and respected (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 12 May 14).

An early example of the desired level of U.S. civilian and military collaboration was found in the Jalalabad PRT. At least during the late 2004 to 2006 time frame, the PRT was cited as an example of civilian and military coordination. This was achieved through
mechanisms such as biweekly meetings focused on sharing information, particularly on upcoming activities. The meetings created a shared awareness that reduced conflicts and redundancies, especially those involving security and transportation, and identified resource and support needs. These meetings included all the components of the military operating in the area and provided a forum for input from civilians in all upcoming military activities. This allowed for greater coordination between military civil affairs, military Special Forces, and civilian activities. The Jalalabad PRT also initiated a weekly project nomination process, at which everyone on the PRT could vote on the nomination of projects for CERP funds. Later, (ca 2006) the process was expanded so that the PRT and military could vet projects with the local provincial coordination council and so that USAID could nest local programs with national programs in Kabul. Also by the 2006 time frame, the civilian members of the PRT became to be seen as the “PRT Executive Team,” with substantial purview and authority in their area of expertise. However, formal final decision-making authority still resided with the military commander, though with consideration of civilian inputs (Yodsampa, 2011).

The Jalalabad PRT system was subsequently adopted by other PRTs as a “board of directors” approach, with State, USAID, and the military commander, and potentially other leaders and key staff developing plans together (Fritsch, 2012). A similar approach was known as a “Command Group model” where each agency was a co-equal partner. This model allowed the PRT to develop and implement one comprehensive provincial stability strategy, while also coordinating his or her agency’s larger mission in the area (Parker, 2007). These approaches spread over time. It should be noted however, that Jalalabad PRT enjoyed several factors working in its favor, including a strong civilian presence, a relatively secure
and permissive environment in which it operated, and strong provincial Afghan leadership, which was repeatedly cited as a major factor in the overall effectiveness of development efforts there (Yodsampa, 2011).

Despite the positive early example, a number of barriers to collaboration were seen throughout the case. A common barrier to collaboration was insufficient internal organizational knowledge. For example, many U.S. civilian PRT representatives indicated that they did not have reliable access to information about national projects in their province. Even most USAID projects were not connected to the PRTs (Fritsch, 2012). As a result, there would be cases of CERP funds being used to build a school very near a USAID-funded school, because the USAID PRT representative didn’t know about the latter. The inability to provide comprehensive information about U.S. activities to PRT and regional commanders undermined civilian credibility and limited the ability to integrate PRT activities with national programs (USAID, 2006). Eventually, this led to direction for USAID headquarters in Kabul to share more information with USAID field representatives to mitigate this issue, including developing lists of programs in a province and organizing information so that it was easily received by the military (Yodsampa, 2011).
Further, the initial efforts to establish combined civilian and military planning efforts faced challenges. When the ICMAG was first established at the embassy, there was significant bureaucratic resistance. Both State Department and USAID were concerned that the office would use their position to advance certain institutional interests over others. However, once the actual PRT support plans were developed, Embassy acceptance became wider (Yodsampa, 2011). Over time, the process increased civilians’ appreciation of the benefits of formal, multilevel planning, which until then had been primarily the domain of
the military. The military’s support for the ICMAG planning process also increased. Both civilian (USAID and State) and military participants began to see positive results as the planning cycles continued. Further evidence of impact was seen in increasing senior leader participation at meetings. Turnover of staff also helped in this case, as newly arrived staff were more accepting of the already present ICMAG office then staff who had been present during its establishment. Overall the ICMAG process fostered mutual understanding. In turn, this strengthened the joint analysis and planning process. As the process continued, several State Department officials noted an increased commitment to joint decision making on the part of both civilians and the military (Yodsampa).

Collaboration regarding funding was a challenge as well. The military was empowered to allocate funds through CERP, but there was not a firm requirement to coordinate with their civilian counterparts. There were few incentives to take the time necessary to incorporate development expertise – expertise the military lacked – into decision-making and even fewer incentives to engage in rigorous joint analysis and planning. Exacerbating the situation was the practice of basing part of the of performance evaluation the military PRT Commander upon how much money he or she spent on reconstruction activities, at least until the later phase of the conflict (Fritsch, 2012). This created an incentive to spend larger amounts of money in as quickly as possible. The speed of spending was compounded by the lack of PRT military personnel experience in counterinsurgency and stabilization activities, particularly during the early years (Yodsampa, 2011). As result, from a civilian perspective, the military was spending money and initiating projects without understanding the development implications. The empowerment of the military without
accountability and incentive systems conducive to coordination was seen as leading to serious errors at many PRTs.

When civilian representatives did provide advice to the military at the PRTs they often were perceived of as slowing down the process. The military’s general attitude was summarized as “we are fighting a war. Everyone else, get out of our way” (Yodsampa, 2011). At many PRTs, civilians and military were unable to bridge this difference. The result was a go-it-alone attitude, with the military increasingly relying on CERP funds to fund their own, rather than coordinated, initiatives (Yodsampa). This could lead to cases of project ‘fratricide’, or activates that conflicted with one another. An example was the case of a civilian farm enterprise project that was intended to be sustainable. However, the local military unilaterally offered to give out 154,000 tons of wheat seed, which undermined any private institution development (Fritsch, 2012).

Civilian funding also faced challenges. In Afghanistan, the main source of civilian funding at the provincial level and below was from USAID. However, from the start, the vast majority of USAID spending decisions were made in Kabul, where certified contracting officers resided, rather than by representatives on the PRTs. USAID representatives on the PRTs lacked the certification to contract all but a handful of low cost projects. This was because Congress enforced more stringent accountability upon USAID funds than CERP funds and that the overall USAID strategy was focused on strengthening the Afghan central government, prioritizing it over the provincial and district governments (Malkasian and Meyerle, 2009). Further, as described above, even if USAID had been empowered to coordinate at the PRTs, the military did not have an accountability or incentive systems that
fostered coordination. As a result, USAID officers at the PRTs had neither formal decision-making authority nor direct access to resources (Yodsampa, 2011).

Creating a further challenge to accessing USAID funding were hurdles to integrating or adapting nationally directed programs, even though the program activities could be taking place across Afghanistan. Changes to USAID contracts could require time consuming contract modifications with implementing partners, or even notifications to Congress. Further, most national programs were executed according to national Afghan strategies and contractors were responsible for meeting performance based work plans. Once the work plan was established, implementing partners were seldom responsive to the individual provincial needs outside this plan, nor to PRT schedules that were often driven by local needs and priorities (Fritsch, 2012). The local USAID representatives were even often unable to even talk to the contractors, who correctly saw their government oversight chain of command going directly to Kabul (Yodsampa, 2011). As a result, when opportunities to coordinate national projects with the military emerged, USAID officers were unable to move quickly enough to do so\textsuperscript{228} (Yodsampa). This limited the ability of the U.S.-led PRTs to align their programs to support the broader national stabilization and reconstruction strategy (USAID, June 2006).

As a result of USAIDs relatively restricted and in accessible funding compared to CERP, particularly in the early years, the USAID representative at the PRT was more an advisor and facilitator but had no control of any resources. The disparity of empowerment

\textsuperscript{228} This excerpt summarizes the dilemma this presented for U.S. PRT staff in accessing USAID funding: “We’d have a dialogue, led by a governor, regarding prioritizing their needs. For example, they would say, “We need schools, so kids won’t go to madrasas in Pakistan.” …When we’d go to USAID, they’d say, “That’s not part of the national strategy for Afghanistan. We’ll do that in two years.” They were all about central government capacity. We’d say, “We’re bleeding here. We need a school here now, not in two years.” So, we’d do it with CERP money…It was very frustrating.”
made coordinated results unlikely. Even where civilians and military at the PRTs agreed on goals and strategies, they often were unable to leverage or complement USAID’s national efforts. It also caused tensions in the working relationship. The military often didn’t understand the constraints under which USAID operated, leading to misunderstanding (Yodsampa, 2011). The consequence was ongoing coordination failures, including negative interactive effects and wasteful duplication (Yodsampa).

Attempts were made to address this issue. In spring 2005, the military leadership temporarily withdrew the authority of PRT commanders to allocate CERP funds. Instead, they were required to coordinate funding proposals with civilians and send them for approval. Civilian organizations made complementary efforts during this time, such as USAID placing representatives a military headquarters and regional commands to further facilitate coordination (see DEVADs, above). This requirement, however, was withdrawn in several months, with military leadership satisfied that expectation for military coordination with civilians had been firmly established. However, the coordination did not turn out to be sustainable without it, and over time it diminished (USAID, June 2006). To re-address this issue, the civilian and military leadership in 2007 developed a new Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) that directed the military to both consult with USAID representatives on CERP projects and to learn from their development expertise. The FRAGO was also intended to ensure that CERP activities took into account local Afghanistan Provincial Development Plans, which were developed with USAID involvement (Yodsampa, 2011). Though the military initially complained that this slowed down operations, it came to appreciate the value of the process (Yodsampa).
There was increased awareness over time within USAID that their PRT representatives (Field Program Officers) needed to be empowered due to these issues. Early steps, however, such as USAID’s 2003 Quick Impact Program and the 2006 Local Governance and Community Development Program, both funding mechanisms intended to increase USAID’s ability to respond quickly, proved to not be flexible or responsive enough (Yodsampa, 2011). By 2009, to further address the problem, USAID field program officers at the PRTs were authorized to spend approximately $25,000 without approval. The increased empowerment enabled USAID PRT representatives to better coordinate with their military counterparts. Also, a specialized USAID office with extremely rapid funding authorities, the Office of Transition Initiatives, became active in Afghanistan (Yodsampa).

Still further complicating civil-military coordination were Special Forces and other U.S. government agencies operations outside of the command of either the PRT or military commander (Forsyth, 2011). Independent Special Forces operations in particular were regularly cited as examples of this early on in Afghanistan. Special Force elements typically pursued their own goals, which were often only partially understood by conventional military commanders even at higher echelons (Gleiman, 2011). This led at times to coordination challenges. An example of how this could work comes from a Helmand description of a case. In at least one instance, the Helmand PRT had been working to establish good relationships with a given community, and effort that was ruined by separate Special Forces combat activities in or near that community (Yodsampa, 2011).

However, if relationships were built, information sharing and coordination could change from a poor to a close partnership (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 23 Jan 14). Moreover, there were always activities that could not be accounted for which impacted
coordination and operations. For example, a case in the latter part of 2007 where Marines were attacked in a market, returned fire, and killed numerous civilians. Not surprisingly, this event created many problems for military unit and the PRT with the local community (Yodsampa, 2011).

Senior leadership signals about the value of civilian, particularly USAID, expertise, was seen as fostering more positive attitudes and receptivity from military leaders at lower levels (Yodsampa, 2011). There were a number of examples of specific senior leader actions to support sub-national collaboration. At one point a senior military commander directed PRT leaders to brief him quarterly on, among other things, how civilians were contributing to projects. Further, he encouraged the briefings to be presented jointly with partners (Yodsampa). Another later time frame (ca 2010-11) military senior leader action that promoted cooperation was to clearly tie leader promotions²²⁹ (one star general to two star in this case) to a small group of skills sets and success in areas that depended on civilian collaboration, such as reconstruction and stabilization. This substantially incentivized military senior leaders to seek successful interaction with civilian counterparts, if they wanted to be promoted (Yodsampa). In an example of civilian leadership influence, leadership responded to civilian resistance to participating in ICMAG deliberate planning. When directed to participate, State representatives at the PRTs resisted, yet they were told that they had to do it by State Department leadership (Yodsampa).

The effects of an absence of senior leadership involvement and shifting priorities can be seen in the case of Helmand, as interest in the provinces and districts waned toward

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²²⁹ This contrast to the general trend that to the extent that there was a change in incentives within the military, it was not formally incorporated into promotional precepts.
the end of the Afghan case. For the DST it became more and more difficult to obtain clear guidance from higher headquarters, and when it was lacking the DST was forced to either stop action or make up an approach thought best to fit the situation. In terms of collaboration, as the DST effort ended and the PRT and provincial activities approached sunset, there was not the will among the Regional Platform and PRT leadership to fight turf battles or support recommendations for improving information sharing and clarifying roles and responsibilities (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 23 Jan 14).

However, the operationalizing of guidance into action was limited, and seen as being constrained by the military and civilian bureaucracy. For example USAID’s lack of rapid and responsive funding caused some civilians and military to view USAID as incompetent. This was compounded by the staffing difficulties that led to the deployment of sometimes inexperienced USAID contractors and direct hires (Fritsch, 2012). Collaboration was also constrained by the budgetary funding cycles, including the time delay obtaining funding through varying funding mechanisms (Yodsampa, 2011). This had significant impact to the collaborative relationship.

There was an evolution of structures in terms of coordination and strategy and in network governance to try to achieve collaboration results. It was most evident between U.S. civilian and military organizations as they were attempted to reach an Action (joint decision-making level) of collaboration. However, factors such as lack of civilian access to responsive funding sources, lack of civilian personnel and capacity, and accountability and incentive systems that worked against coordination consistently constrained higher-level collaboration. This was even the case in areas in which collaborative strategies, such as co-location, were practiced to reduce barriers to in-person interaction. They were not sufficient to produce
consistent results (Yodsampa, 2011). As a result, predominately, U.S. civilian and military collaboration remained at an Outreach network level.

With other donors, NATO, and the United Nations, there were attempts to reach shared capacity development and activity sharing levels. In the beginning of the Afghanistan case, the relationship among the coalition forces, the United Nations, and the NGOs was described as chilly at the operational and managerial levels, but accommodations occurred at the tactical level. Because the Coalition was considered a belligerent, the United Nations was especially reluctant to associate with the U.S. military until it determined the attitudes of the Afghans (Flavin, 2004). However, sub-national level coordination between the U.S. and such organizations was eventually seen as generally good, predominately conducted through meetings and relationships development, with more formal agreements being established as needed or for particular projects. However, at no time were the networks performing consistently well at their intended shared activities, and generally the stabilizations organizations collaborated at Developmental network level.

Collaboration with NATO military partners, particularly the UK, could reach an Outreach network level. One example of this can be found in the Helmand case, where by force of personality, a battalion commander was able to work closely with the U.S. and British civilians in the area. Within a month of arriving, the Helmand PRT sent a British stabilization advisor to the district from another part of the province. The battalion was also assigned a USAID representative. Both civilians, in addition to a civil affairs reservist, worked closely with the battalion commander and his Marines (Meyerle, et al., 2010).

NGOs, particularly humanitarian NGOs, had contentious relationships with the coalition civilian and military organizations, particularly the PRTs. These issues included the
preservation of the ‘humanitarian space’ that nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations require to operate, blurring of identities from overlapping roles between military and humanitarian actors, the use of military personnel to provide assistance, and information sharing and coordination (Dziedzic and Seidl, 2005). As a result, NGOs, particularly humanitarian NGOs, were typically operating at an informational only level with the Coalition, and indirectly at that.

U.S. PRTs were a special attractor of NGO criticisms from the very start. Even the way the PRT concept was announced was found to be offensive by many in the international organization and NGO community, as military had not consulted with civilian agencies in advance. Further, the military gave the initial impression they would now be in charge of coordination, as if this were the military’s solution to their inability to coordinate (Dziedzic and Seidl, 2005). PRTs in particular were accused of contributing to the ambiguity between humanitarian and military roles when troops wearing the same uniforms were seen fighting insurgents and building clinics. However, according to the PRTs themselves, local Afghans were able to distinguish between the different roles of combat soldiers and PRT members (Save the Children, 2004). Relations with NGOs became strained, and many refused to have direct contact with PRTs, fearing retaliation from insurgents. This fear grew as attacks on aid workers increased and the security environment eroded in the spring of 2005. This rose to the point that when one humanitarian NGO, Médecins Sans Frontières, withdrew from Afghanistan, claiming that the presence of a PRT in its area of operations contributed to a deadly attack on its personnel. Rising casualties caused NGOs to argue that PRTs should concentrate on the military’s primary duty, which was establishing a safe and secure environment.
These concerns led to the rejection of formal or standing means of coordination and collocation of staff or facilities between NGOs and United Nations and coalition forces were in favor of an ad hoc approach. Many NGO representatives remained wary of public interaction with PRTs, and limited their contact to indirect or electronic communication (Perito, 2005). Further, it was not uncommon for International and NGO organizations to resist sharing specific information about their own activities (Dziedzic and Seidl, 2005).

However, over time most NGOs came to regard PRTs as a fact of life and adjusted to their presence (Perito). Eventually, most PRTs indicated they have had increasingly constructive relations with the majority of NGO field representatives in their area. Yet there were reportedly still instances when information sharing and coordination were limited at best (Dziedzic and Seidl).

The NGO and PRT/DST relationship is illustrated in a later Afghanistan Provincial case period example from a Helmand DST. With the DST, NGOs kept their distance, though at same time they were polite. DST staff would meet them and be introduced, at local government center for example. However, engagement was generally limited to a very quick introduction and small talk. DST staff saw them, knew of them in the area, and indirectly would influence them through the Afghan officials, though never directly. This influence could take the form of a hint to the governor – for example saying that it would be a good idea if the NGOs worked in a particular area because it hadn’t received much attention from anyone affiliated from the government (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 12 May 14). Thus the level of collaboration between the U.S. and NGOs could at most be characterized as an informational network, and an indirect one at that, as collaboration was typically limited to passing information through intermediaries such as the UN or to very
low visibility activities.

The national Afghan government had a number of tensions in their relationship with sub-national stabilization organizations, such as NGOs and particularly the PRTs (Gauster, 2008; Perito, 2005). The Afghan government held that NGOs’ malfeasance, rather than scarce international resources, was responsible for the overall slow pace of development. Further, NGO representatives were accused of misusing development funds to purchase expensive vehicles, take vacations, and (in Afghan terms) live luxurious lifestyles. Veteran civilian relief workers rejected these accusations. With regard to the PRTs, the Afghan government complained that they prevented the Afghan government from expanding its own responsibilities and capacity at the local level; describing them as “parallel governing structures” (Knoke, 2013). Afghan and World Bank reports also recommended their downscaling and withdrawing to more secure areas (Eronen, 2008). To address this criticism, from 2008 through 2012 some donor countries enhanced the civilian component of the PRTs and tried to change their image from military institutions. However, subsequent international agreements (i.e. the Tokyo Framework) largely endorsed Afghan complaints by calling for the PRTs to be transferred to Afghan control (Katzman, 2014, January). However, sub-national level coordination between the U.S. and local Afghan government organizations was seen as generally good, predominately conducted through meetings and relationship development, with more formal agreements being established as needed or for particular projects. For example, military judge advocates (JAGs) were described as meeting with governors and provisional justice sector officials to assess their concerns and priorities in rule of law reform on a regular basis. Thus in the Afghanistan Provincial case, the collaboration between the U.S. stabilization organizations and the Afghan government can
be characterized at an Outreach network level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Informational</th>
<th>Developmental</th>
<th>Outreach</th>
<th>Action</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>U.S.-Host Nation</td>
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<td>NA</td>
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**Mindanao**

In Mindanao, U.S. military and civilian collaboration ranged from exchanging information on the situation in Mindanao, to approving combined activities, such as military psychological operations products that supported the State Department’s Rewards for Justice program\(^{230}\) (Maxwell, 2011). Information was shared and coordination on activities and achievement of shared objectives across multiple organizations occurred, particularly through forums such as the Mindanao Working Group at the U.S. Embassy. The Mindanao Working Group also fostered sharing of travel and information gathering resources among participants (Mindanao Interview 26 May 2014). Overall, the relationship between the U.S. military and civilians was generally described as one that was strong and unique. Yet even with an integrated U.S. Country Team effort in 2011, civilian and military staff lacked a shared understanding or appreciation of a common plan or coordinated approach within the team\(^{231}\). From at least the JSOTF-P perspective, it would have been a welcome development. For example, despite USAID priorities having a strong focus on the southern Philippines,

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\(^{230}\) The Rewards for Justice program offered financial incentives for information leading to the arrest or conviction of wanted terrorists.

\(^{231}\) It was not clear whether a more conscious counterterrorism approach could be agreed upon across the U.S. Government or would be accepted by the Philippine government.
JSOTF-P members noted that it was hard to see any impact from that development. Military officials perceived development work as being conducted to “better the lives of people in the Philippines” instead of “make development work [to] reinforce [U.S.] interests” (Lambert, et al, 2013, p. 130).

Visible leadership support supported collaboration. For example, the Ambassador in circa 2013 was seen as providing excellent leadership, with interagency and intersection collaboration and cooperation evident throughout the mission. His motto, “One Mission, One Team,” was seen as working. Senior leader attendance at interagency meetings and time and energy devoted to interagency partnering was noticed by Embassy staff (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2007/2013, February) JSOTF-P itself, including its commanders, conducted a wide range of partnering activities both with the Embassy and local Philippine partners (Lambert, et al., 2013). The Deputy Commander of JSOTF-P maintained a presence in the Embassy and was the lead for most embassy relationships. Civil Affairs was the primary point of contact to USAID (Mindanao Interview 26 May 2014).

This relationship was established over the years between the U.S. military and civilians. Initially, when the JSOTF-P was established, the Ambassador and the Country Team welcomed the permanent JSOTF-P liaison elements that were an essential element for coordinating and approving myriad actions. Whenever there were security issues in the Philippines, the military would deploy liaison elements to augment embassy military support (Maxwell, 2011). As a result, U.S. Civilians and Military seemed to have a successful Outreach network, as seen by the successful planning and collaboration efforts, with some disrupted periods. However, it is clear that the military was seeking an Action network, and perhaps
achieved that level of collaboration with its Philippine military counterparts, if not civilians.

More broadly, there seemed to be a donor state, UN, and international organization Developmental network generally operating in Mindanao, with information sharing and at least limited capacity development activities among organizations. The UN agencies, NGOs, the Mindanao government, and donor states regularly coordinate and share information. For example, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Mindanao regularly facilitated coordination and communication with the local government and the humanitarian community (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2010). The UN, host government, and NGOs worked through the cluster system to design response plans and review project proposals of cluster members. A further example of donor state collaboration can be seen between a USAID education project in Mindanao (Education Quality and Access for Learning and Livelihood Skills or EQuALLS) and its constructive relationships with AusAID education projects

232 (Australia Aid, 2012, October). Many times the staff of the two projects cooperated and coordinated to improve outcomes, ensure consistency of approach, and avoid confusion for Filipino educators (Australian Aid, Office of Development Effectiveness, 2012). However, this level of collaboration seemed to be ad hoc and broader or more systematic efforts for collaboration did not meet with success. One such effort was an AusAID push for collective government and donor approaches to analysis and operational frameworks. These efforts were largely unsuccessful during the case period (Australian Aid, 2012, December).

The U.S. military and local and national and security forces generally collaborated at

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232 These were the BEAM and STRIVE programs. BEAM worked across all schools in the regions in which it works as well as with teacher training institutes and in conjunction with the Department of Education. STRIVE worked more intensively with all schools in selected districts within regions.
and Outreach level, with shared stabilization activities. JSOTF-P worked over the years to establish relationships with members of the local and national government and security forces (Beaudette, 2012). The U.S. civilian effort and the GoP seemed to be collaborating at least at a Developmental network level. Further, the stabilization effort in Mindanao seemed to be successful overall. This success suggests that full integration, as seemingly desired or assumed by the military was not necessary. Complementary (Outreach level), though not necessarily fully integrated (Action) level of collaboration may be sufficient.

Table 55: Mindanao Agranoff Typology Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Informational</th>
<th>Developmental</th>
<th>Outreach</th>
<th>Action</th>
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<td>U.S.-Host Nation</td>
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South Sudan

In South Sudan, an aid coordination architecture has evolved, particularly among the humanitarian assistant providers. However, overall, the aid architecture in South Sudan was described as overly complex and inefficient. While it promoted information sharing, it was not well suited to coordination or joint problem-solving (Outreach or Action levels of collaboration).

The U.S. Stabilization network in South Sudan functioned mostly as a Developmental Network in the Agranoff typology. In general, there was frequent information sharing, though level varied widely from project to project (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013). Best practices and collective capabilities were also increased.
through workshops, conferences, and ad hoc means. It is interesting to note that though U.S. was the single largest donor, it did not seem to play a prominent role in collaborative governance networks (South Sudan Interview 1 December 2010). The U.S. Ambassador was seen as working closely with leaders from other organizations, particularly the United Nations and other donor states such as the United Kingdom, Norway and Canada (South Sudan Interview 19 October 2013; U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2013, May).

Overall, the varying organizations strove to compliment and not duplicate efforts, and do this through regular meetings and day-to-day communications. However, collaboration such as Shared activities (Outreach Networks) outside of logistics support were rare, and even logistics support seemed to be relationship based or ad hoc. As a result, collaboration was generally limited to coordination of activities rather than shared projects or activities. Differing budgets and the need to report to differing donors or organizational headquarters limited combined action (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013). For example, despite the many bodies engaged in co-ordination, there were few protocols in place to prepare joint assessments, analysis, and planning. Arrangements were informal. Only 16% of analytic reports were jointly prepared and only 13% of technical co-operation was coordinated between development partners. In another example, the office of the Special Envoy was cited as not routinely coordinating its plans with USAID, other agencies in Washington, and Embassy Juba before implementing them. This, coupled with confusion over the role and priorities between the Special Envoy and other U.S. civilian leaders fostered concerns of duplication or inefficiencies. Although efforts were made to improve the flow of information, as of 2013 embassy staff members still did not have ready access to all
program status reports. Further, though highly limited in presence, coordination between the U.S. military and U.S. civilians could still be a challenge, as the military approached Embassy Juba directly on policy matters, bypassing the Washington, DC National Security Staff-chaired coordination process (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2013, May). The desire to deconflict and improve efficiencies, often expressed in planning effort, suggested at least a modest interest in achieving an Outreach Network level of activity. However, funding differences and being beholden to differing donors with individual priorities and requirements were generally insurmountable when attempting this level of collaboration.

Generally, collaboration between donor states, the UN, and international organizations was also at the Developmental network level. Groups were seen as operating in the spirit of sharing and collaboration and staffs built working relationships (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013). In general, donors and partners divided activities by sector or by state and coordinated to avoid duplication and to more efficiently allocate resources (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013). In the humanitarian community, the Humanitarian Country Team provided strategic direction for the overall humanitarian operation in South Sudan and engages to mobilize political and financial support to help address needs (United Nations, 2014). However, organizations did not seem to adopt shared solutions to joint problems (Outreach or Action level). This was evident in that though donors and implementers share similar broad goals, the implementation and means to address them can vary and were generally implemented individually.

233 This was attributed to the relatively high demand for services relative to resources that it wouldn’t make sense for one donor to take a single sector.
Knowledge Management Project Example: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Crisis and Recovery Mapping and Analysis

An example of information sharing to support coordination in the South Sudan case can be seen in the Crisis and Recovery Mapping and Analysis project. This UNDP sponsored project worked to conduct state and community-level participatory mapping and analysis, and works collaboratively with all United Nations agencies, international NGOs and local South Sudanese counterparts to systematically identify, geo-reference, digitize and consolidate existing baseline information relevant for recovery and development activities. Further, through the establishment of an information management platform, it helped provide a common platform for information management that facilitates the identification of critical data correlations and the display of potential inter-linkages among crosscutting threats and risks. Complementing this effort, an Information Management Working Group was also established in Khartoum, Darfur, and Juba—the first of its kind at country level. This group developed a formal information-sharing platform and provides all recovery and development actors with a common basic package of available and relevant information for their individual analysis, planning and programming efforts (United Nations Development Programme, 2012).

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Humanitarian Coordinator stood out as proponents of coordination in the humanitarian arena (United Nations Development Programme, n.d.c). The United Nations’ Humanitarian

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234 UNDP had also been planning and operating closely with the United Nations Mission in South Sudan in areas where there was intersection between the mission mandate and the UNDP programme, notably in the areas of disarmament, conflict prevention, community security, rule of law, and governance processes such as the constitutional process in South Sudan.
Coordinator led the humanitarian community with a focus on strategic guidance to humanitarian action, advocacy for humanitarian principles and resource mobilization. OCHA also supported the Humanitarian Coordinator, worked closely with the Humanitarian Country Team, and facilitated the implementation of the humanitarian response plan, engaging with authorities and humanitarian partners at the sub national level principally (United Nations, 2014). OCHA maintained three databases to deliver a suite of information products and supports management of the common humanitarian funds (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, n.d.d). OCHA monitored the humanitarian response and provided support on issues that relate to humanitarian access or funding shortfalls that hamper relief delivery (United Nations, 2014). OCHA deployed teams to support field coordination to respond to crises (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, n.d.d). OCHA also worked closely with the Government of South Sudan’s Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management and its operational arm, the South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, to boost humanitarian coordination and policy capacity at state and central level (USAID, 2011). With the Protection Cluster and other partners, OCHA liaised on an operational level with the United Nations Mission in South Sudan. It also helped the Humanitarian Coordinator to represent humanitarian concerns through the development of the Integrated Strategic Framework (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2011).

Despite planning efforts intended to promote collaboration, such as the South Sudan Development Plan, the issues of prioritization and sequencing were not resolved. As a result, collaboration at a sequenced (Outreach network) or shared activity level or higher remained ad hoc or limited to multi-donor funded organizations, such as the Multi-Donor Trust Fund-
South Sudan, and UN agencies or other international organizations\textsuperscript{235} (United Nations Development Programme, n.d.c). For example, a number of South Sudanese line ministries embarked on “sector strategic planning” processes alongside the national level South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP) process, with timelines of the various processes overlapping but not clearly feeding into one another. Further, the donor states noted that the government’s commitment to the SSDP was not yet clear and questioned whether that it would lead to a change in allocations to reflect needs and priorities. Efforts to improve upon the situation included developing draft planning guidelines for the SSDP process and a 2011 Aid Strategy. However, as late as 2013 these had not led to significant changes in the aid coordination process or outcomes (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2011). Yet there was still donor state interest in improved collaboration (The World Bank, 2013, January).

Even within multi-donor organizations, successful collaboration was not a given. In the South Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Fund case, as difficulties and delays materialized, stakeholders perceived objectives differently or lost sight of some. Donor alignment and coordination became dysfunctional and discordant, thus defeating a major purpose of multi-donor trust funds – harmonization. In response, the Work Bank, which administered the fund, adopted a strategic approach to better explain roles and responsibilities within the fund and the outcomes being achieved by the fund (The World Bank, 2013, January).

Collaboration with and among the international NGO community was similarly limited to the Developmental network level. Much of the collaboration was facilitated through the humanitarian cluster system. Humanitarian coordination between the UN, host

\textsuperscript{235} In these cases, donors were often a part of each project’s decision-making and review structure.
government, and NGOs includes information sharing and efforts to prevent duplication of
efforts and support efficient allocation of resources\textsuperscript{236} (United Nations, 2014). The cluster
coordination system also formulates operational priorities for support and monitors
progress. An example of this was the World Food Program providing logistical support
functions to the humanitarian communities. This supports the Logistics ‘cluster’ (see below)
with coordination and information sharing activities, as well as the development of common
priorities for logistical projects among the participants (World Food Program, 2012a).

However, within the NGO community, collaboration varied. For example, though
democracy and governance organizations collaborated closely, there could still be funding
turf battles. These divisions could lead to non-collaborative actions or dissuade donor states
or the UN from sharing information. In many cases, there could be a “crowded space,” with
a number of smaller organizations going after same pools of funding. Or there could be ego
clashes. When these situations occurred, there could be cases of actions, such as purposely
leaving other organizations off of invitations, or attempting to take undue credit for
activities. There were no formal NGO conflict mechanisms or arbitration systems; conflict
resolution was done through relationships. If conflicts were severe, they would be addressed
at the headquarters-to-headquarters level (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013). Despite
this overall discord, several international NGOs served in a lead coordinating position for
their respective humanitarian clusters (United Nations, 2014).

Again, the level of collaboration between the Government of South Sudan (GoSS)
and other partners was generally at a Developmental network level. For example, the UN,

\textsuperscript{236} For example, rapid response operations were coordinated to complement the work done in locations where
aid agencies had a more sustained presence.
through UNDP, works to build GoSS capacity at the national, state, and county levels and collaborates with them on planning, agenda development, etc. (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013). Barriers to greater collaboration included competing priorities within the GoSS and between the GoSS and donor states. For example the constitutional process may not be seen by the GoSS as being as important as health or sanitation237 (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013). Donors wanted to see an investment to demonstrate that the government was vested and committed, and this was usually financial. When GoSS doesn’t contribute financially, such as not paying rent for facilities, it impedes donor capacity building (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013). However, the GoSS often faced severe financial strains, including oil revenue shortfalls, which made financial contributions difficult on their part. These factors resulted in donors’ perceptions and criticisms that the government was not serious, often negatively affecting fund raising. For their part, GoSS partners felt that too much support had been given to uncoordinated short-term capacity building, with not enough attention given to longer-term professional development, support for universities and technical schools.

With regard to collaboration with local South Sudanese NGOs, it appeared to be at a highly strained Developmental network level. Although there was a clear recognition of the Sudanese local civil society groups’ role in development, tension in the partnership between local civil society organizations and international NGOs existed. International NGOs could often avoid working with local organizations due to concerns that money was misappropriated money for their own gains. Further, there were concerns held by

237 Another example of this would be a case in which a particular GoSS leader did not believe in the need for civic education, yet the UNDP partner had a mandate to promote and execute it.
international NGOs that local NGOs had politically motivated links that may compromise their operating principles of neutrality and partiality. The combination of mistrust of South Sudan local NGOs with their perceived lack of organizational capacity meant that donors often fund international NGOs directly, or in the attempt to “build local civil society’s capacity” while limiting potential “risks”, provided local NGOs with funding through international NGOs. As a result, many local NGOs felt that they were unequal partners in the development of their own country. Moore (2009) discusses how local NGOs were eager for international NGOs to engage with them as equal partners albeit in the form of capacity building. International NGOs and the government often reduced the risks of working with local NGOs by carrying out capacity assessments of local organizations or by assessing the local context. However, the political will and funds needed for these time consuming activities were often lacking (Schomerus and Allen, 2010).

Ethno-sectarian divisions between local NGOs and the GoSS further complicated collaboration efforts. Broadly speaking, the parallel structures of local NGOs and the government were divided along educational, ethnic, and geographical lines with each side having had a very different experience of the war and a different sense of entitlement from the peace. Government officials tended to be individuals who remained in the south during the war, often fought in the South Sudanese Army\(^{238}\), or have a very close affiliation with it. In many cases, education – both in English or Arabic – was sacrificed for fighting. Conversely, NGOs tended to employ Sudanese with good English and a solid education (Schomerus and Allen, 2010). There was also a divide between those South Sudanese who physically fought in the liberation struggle and seemed to feel a sense of entitlement to

\(^{238}\) Formally the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army or SPLA
government privileges, and those who had contributed to the struggle in a variety of other ways and now feel excluded because they did not fight (Jok, 2011).

Table 56: South Sudan Agranoff Typology Summary

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<th>Informational</th>
<th>Developmental</th>
<th>Outreach</th>
<th>Action</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Generally Developmental across organizations (interest in Outreach seen)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 10: Detailed Hypothesis 3 Network Success Observations

Organizational or Agency Level Success

Table 57: Organizational or Agency Level Success Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Success</th>
<th>Iraq RoL</th>
<th>Afghan RoL</th>
<th>Iraq Provincial</th>
<th>Afghan Provincial</th>
<th>Mindanao</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organizational or Agency</td>
<td>U.S. civ-mil successes</td>
<td>U.S. civ-mil intermittent success (1)</td>
<td>U.S. civ-mil mixed success (2)</td>
<td>U.S. civ-mil and mixed success (2)</td>
<td>U.S. civ-mil successes (3)</td>
<td>limited collaborative success beyond resource sharing (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>U.S.-host nation mixed success (2)</td>
<td>U.S.-host nation mixed success (2)</td>
<td>U.S.-host nation limited success, and instances of UN and other donor state-host nation success (1)</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

| Relative Ranking         | High                      | Low                       | Medium          | Low                | Very High         | Very Low                    |

Iraq Rule of Law (RoL) Organizational or Agency Level Success. A number of instances of organizational success were noted above. Between U.S. civilian and military organizations, resource sharing was common, even among projects, such as military funding, civilian implemented activities. Resource access was expanded, such as cases of military CERP (Commander’s Emergency Response Program) funds being used for RoL activities. Civilian and United Nations participation enhanced legitimacy among Iraq actors. However, combined project activity seemed to be primarily between, if not limited, to U.S. civilian and military organizations, and partnerships with Iraqi organizations.
One additional example was the Operation Hammurabi project. Initiated by Multi-National Division – Baghdad after the cessation of general hostilities in 2004, the operation established a program through which Iraqi justice officials were trained in basic administrative skills. The program also provided equipment and facilities necessary to restore justice services in the Baghdad area. Operation Hammurabi was conducted in partnership with INL using a combination of civilian funding and Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds (Dempsey, 2009).

Conversely, an example of such failed project coordination was the Nasiriyah Correctional Facility. Originally planned as a fully modern facility, the final design was then presented to Iraqi partners who found the independently conceived project to be wildly unsustainable. The project was then redesigned in a scaled down, more sustainable manner, but with considerable delay (Hallman, 2008). The lack of consultation and dialogue also meant that Coalition projects ignored Iraqi cultural and social values. This is seen in another example of insensitivity to Iraqi desires was the $65 million Baghdad Police College project. Iraqis complained that this basic police training college had been constructed on the site of the former regionally prestigious Iraqi Police Academy. In response, the project managers contended they would reintroduce the Academy curriculum after completing all necessary basic training thus ignoring the Iraqi sense of the Academy as an elite institution that engendered great pride. The Iraqis viewed this as insensitivity to the changed meaning of the facility with the replacement of their prestigious College with a basic training facility (Banks, 2010).

By the end of Operation Iraq Freedom, though RoI coordination increased, there were still some shortfalls. For example, by the time of withdrawal and transition, there were
a number of projects that the Iraqi government, particularly the central government ministries, did not have sufficient awareness of. Coalition construction of prisons was cited as an example of this (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 27 Apr 14). The initial coordination missteps and continuing engagement challenges were even seen as impacting the final withdrawal agreement with Iraq.

**Afghanistan Rule of Law Organizational or Agency Level Success.** As mentioned in the descriptions above, the attempts at coordination and collaboration did result in resource sharing and at least periodic success improving program outcomes, providing access to additional resources, enhancing legitimacy, and improve outcomes for the recipients of support. When cooperation worked it was described as a great asset to success and could substantially increase organization capabilities (Afghanistan RoL Interview Jan 2014). One example in the RoL sector was the sharing of Italian produced brochures and pamphlets on RoL issues—women’s rights under Afghan law for example. USAID reproduced them to share with other U.S. civilian and government organizations, such as the Rule of Law Field Force, and they were reproducible by an organization themselves if needed (Afghanistan RoL Interview Jan 2014). In another example in Basra, the United Kingdom, U.S., and Danish judicial advisory staff worked closely together, and reported that they had greater impact operating jointly than individually (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2005).

One particular case of improved RoL support outcomes from the implementation of a collaborative governance feature can be seen in the Kunar Province PRT. The PRT at one point enjoyed particular success in developing RoL, as result of the placement of a
dedicated civilian State Department Rule of Law Coordinator. This individual reached out to the Afghan prosecutors and judges at the provincial level in a process of mentoring and encouraging the local officials. The fruits of this engagement were three trials involving allegations of corruption and murder. The first trial attracted relatively little public interest, but this changed over the course of the trials. The third trial was conducted before a packed public gallery and was televised. Even the Provincial Governor attended and—very significantly as an acknowledgement of the independent status of the judiciary and the trial—observed from the body of the courthouse. This effort had the broader impact of increasing interest from the Afghan public an acceptance of, and support for, trials in the formal justice system (The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, 2011).

However, there were also continuing challenges in this area. One example was U.S. military coordination on police development in particular was criticized. While the internal chain of command was straightforward, in 2010 relations with the other actors, including the Afghan Ministry of Interior and European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan, were described as unstructured and in some cases non-existent. Most strategic and tactical level liaison seemed to build on personal relations more than official connections. With regard to coordination challenges, in 2010 the Police Commissioner stated, “[o]ne needs to be willing to be coordinated if coordination is to work”. This suggests that structures for coordination international police-building efforts were ineffective (Thruelsen, 2010, p. 86). Though organizations coordination on RoL issues was seen as greatly improved over time, observers indicate that coordination across a sector as broad and multi-faceted as RoL required ongoing upkeep and faced ongoing challenges (Wyler and Katzman, 2010).
Iraq Provincial Organizational or Agency Level Success. The coordination between civilian and military organizations and with Iraqi partners could vary from location to location, and was often described as “personality” based. When there was a sound relationship between the PRT and the military, the military deferred to the PRT; when the relationship was poor, the two entities developed parallel relationships with their Iraqi counterparts, often resulting in miscommunication and inefficiency (Barber and Parker, 2008). Examples of military and PRTs working at cross-purposes were numerous – and host nation authorities were adept at playing both sides. Problems in civ-mil coordination at the provincial level could take forms such as military commanders who speaking of support to PRTs and civilian efforts, but still concentrated only on the kinetic fight (Kelly, 2009). Further, there were cases of military officers with little or no political experience who attempted to advise provincial councils and other politicians on how to govern a province. On the other hand there were some State Department civilians who mistrusted the military (Hunt, 2010).

When functioning properly, the PRTs led efforts to tie U.S. non-combat, or “non-kinetic” efforts to local governing institutions such as Iraqi provincial councils, sub-provincial qadas, and nahiyas (districts and municipalities) and to the Iraqi ministries. This was intended to ensure that stabilization efforts were conducive, to the extent possible, with these institutions’ own plans for the province. PRTs and military units (most often civil affairs staff), and sometimes other partners would work with local Iraqi NGOs on projects. For example, there was joint ePRT and military brigade program to identify and send local Iraqi children for advanced medical treatment outside of Iraq, conducted with the assistance of a local Iraqi NGO (United States Institute of Peace, 2008, September 24). An example of
a strong PRT-military partnership was the Ninewa (province) PRT, circa 2010, where the military brigade commander made it a practice to engage Iraqi provincial leadership with PRT Team Leader present in order to present one American face to the Iraqis. During times of more intense military action, or ‘counterinsurgency mode’, however, PRTs tended to play a supporting and advisory role for the military. PRTs often advised the military on how to undertake counterinsurgency in a manner conducive to long-term development and stability. Nonetheless, in counterinsurgency environments, the military had the unambiguous lead, and was free to ignore PRT advice if, in their judgment, security concerns trumped them (Barber and Parker, 2008).

Even with successful U.S. civilian and military collaboration, Iraqi reconstruction was seen as being hampered by the failures of the U.S. and of local governments to get central government buy-in on their infrastructure and essential service projects. Anecdotes abounded of how the U.S. military or the PRT decided to build, for example, a school or a clinic that remained empty because the ministries of Education and Health did not fund staff and maintenance. The military was noted for often favoring projects such as roads, schools, and district centers even if these projects were not sustainable or desired by the local population, because such projects were very visible, measurable in terms of resources, and quick. This was important to commanders so they could show progress during their tours (Carreau, 2010). In some of the more egregious instances, the military implemented projects that the Iraqis had already budgeted for and even already constructed. While many on the U.S. side were inclined to blame the Iraqi central government for not fulfilling its responsibilities in cases of project failure, it was easy to understand the Iraqi view that the U.S. has placed an enormous financial burden on the Iraqi government without seeking its
input. Iraqi officials rightly believed that they should have decided the locations of schools and clinics, keeping in mind their other national commitments, funding constraints and long-term objectives. As a result, the PRTs came to play a productive role in rationalizing the reconstruction process while facilitating greater Iraqi participation and leadership (Barber and Parker, 2008).

Overall, in the Iraq Provincial case there was a clear development of increasing collaboration and the development of Network Governance Structures. Though progress was seen, collaboration at the levels desired by the U.S. government was never fully achieved.

**Example of Evolution: Anbar.** Earlier in the war, the military was already doing governance, RoL, and other civilian led activities by the time civilian organizations were stood up in the province. Thus, early on, circa 2007, there was a more contentious support relationship between the PRTs, ePRTs and the military. The Anbar PRT was seen as being often at loggerheads with the Marine headquarters, where there was disagreement over priorities and courses of action. It was a challenge for the two sides to reach agreement on what ought to get done. Thus PRT and military collaboration mainly consisted of the PRT contacting the brigade when they would need some sort of support; such as if the military was going on a mission that they wanted to go on also (United States Institute of Peace, 2008, September 24). In this environment, there were difficulties for the PRT in obtaining support with transportation and other assets, limiting the PRT’s ability to conduct activities. The perception was that this was because it was thought that such support would help the PRT with their “competition” vis-à-vis the ePRTs (United States Institute of Peace, 2008, October 10).
During this time the military favored the ePRTs, which were more closely integrated into the military mission. The work conducted by the ePRTs to establish governance, improve economic conditions, to on basic reconstruction was seen as complimentary with the military security mission. In some cases, the relationship benefited from both the ePRTs and their partner military organizations being stood up at the same, affording an opportunity to develop missions and roles in collaboration. The ePRTs and military partners were also co-located and the ePRTs were unable to function without military support. This meant that not only were personnel sharing living areas (i.e. sleeping and eating in the same facilities), they shared meeting and work spaces, and relied upon the military for transportation. This greatly facilitated, if not necessitated, a close working relationship (United States Institute of Peace, 2008, September 24).

The PRT and Marine relationship began to thaw in early 2008, with a change in command. By 2009 military logistics support writ large was coordinated and the PRTs and the Marines had a close working relationship. As civilian programs and plans were developed the Marines began to cede the lead to them and conduct operations under that design. This developed to the point that Marine civ-mil projects were sent to the PRT for approval (Iraq Provincial Interview 5 Mar 14). The success of U.S. efforts in the province at the time were viewed as shared between U.S. civilian, military, and, most importantly, local Iraqi partners. The U.S. partners were described as facilitating the Iraqi improvements, through providing know-how and through coaching. In Anbar, the Marines viewed other organizations as helping them to be successful during the time they were operating. Differing capabilities of organizations were seen as complimentary across the board, weather non-Marine military or civilian (United States Institute of Peace, 2008, December).
**Afghanistan Provincial Organizational or Agency Level Success.** Overall, where PRT commanders worked closely with the civilian and military members, the PRT developed a common vision and sense of aligned purpose. In the best coordinated PRTs, a working group met regularly to refine the PRT reconstruction strategy and approve and designate funding for all PRT projects. Where this was not the case, project implementation tended to be ad hoc and driven by response to higher headquarters versus local dynamics (USAID, 2006). When PRTs engaged in joint analysis and/or planning, it was directly associated with the achievement of coordinated results. It also fostered learning, especially in terms of mutual understanding (Yodsampa, 2011). Similarly, at the brigade level when the military and their civilian advisors engaged in regular joint analysis and planning, this was cited as a key factor contributing to coordinated results.

Collaborative approaches to projects included cases when the military could enable civilian projects though security and logistics support. In the Helmand case, one example of such collaboration was the reconstruction of the Kajaki Dam, which had the potential to generate needed power but required extensive repairs and reconstruction. Insurgent activity made it difficult for civilians to work in area, so the military provided the security perimeter that enabled civilian contractors to move forward. The military also transported supplies and parts to the construction site (Yodsampa, 2011). In another case, the Jalalabad PRT was early on frequently cited as having achieved coordinated results. Their success can be seen in their coordinated crisis response in May 2005. Following publication of an article accusing U.S. soldiers of flushing Korans down a toilet, riots erupted in Jalalabad. Civilian and military
colleagues quickly organized a response. USAID implementing partners (contractors) provided reports to the USAID representative, which in turn was shared with military colleagues and passed to the appropriate Afghan authorities. The ability to organize and share information quickly was a key factor in bringing the situation under control (Yodsampa). In further example a United Kingdom team of Royal Engineers worked through the DST to gain Marine Corps support for transportation to conduct technical surveys along the road, which was a requirement of the contract.

With regard to collaboration with the host nation, a reoccurring criticism was the lack of local Afghan leader and community coordination by the military and PRTs, particularly early on. A civilian view was that military coordination with local Afghans was often a “checking the box” exercise (Katzman, 2014, January). An example was the case of a school that had been built without appropriate local coordination and instead was used as a goat barn, which was something the local community needed more than a school (Yodsampa, 2011). Lack of community participation in projects could also foster failure for both the sustainability of the project and for local community willingness to contribute to parallel or follow-on NGO projects (USAID, 2006). Further the U.S. military was seen as tending to favor one faction as a collaborating partner, at the expense of other potential partners (tribes, political factions). Such a preferred partner strategy was adopted for different reasons, such as safety and confidentiality, or it may have been the easiest or most efficient means to implement activities. However, it was safe to presume that such an approach could foster frustration, resentment, and anger among those not invited to take part in the partnership. Preferred partner favoritism also fostered flawed decision-making
and made the preferred local partner much more powerful than could be considered healthy for the region (Rietjens et al., 2013).

Steps to coordinate with civilians and NGOs (see below) generally helped to mitigate local Afghan coordination issues due to those organization’s greater expertise in and disposition toward local coordination. Moreover, often many of the coordination efforts include civilians were also extended to include formal mechanisms to coordinate with local Afghans. In successful cases of collaboration, local Afghan government partners could lead to new solutions for issues. For example, in one case establishing regular meetings to foster collaboration with local leadership led to the development a reintegration campaign for villagers who had low levels of insurgency involvement (Meyerle, et al., 2010). Local Afghan government partners could also gain better understanding of national level policies and funding in their areas, which was often lost at the ground level (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 12 May 14). At PRTs with strong local coordination, the PRT commanders coordinated proposals for reconstruction projects through government officials and district-level shuras (Malkasian and Meyerle, 2009). Some PRTs also arranged for governors to travel to Kabul to meet with embassy and government officials and donor agencies such as the World Bank. The meetings helped the governors better understand the often-complex world of international assistance, while giving donors insights from the field (Kemp, 2011, January/February).

International partners also had instances collaboration successes. One example of collaboration was UN Afghanistan Subnational Governance Programme (ASGP) and Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) working with the Afghan Ministry of Finance to train provincial and municipal officials in finance and procurement. The

530
ASGP also engaged with donors and program implementers on issues of project design, best practice, and turnover in case of programs closing in their area. For example, ASGP and ASGP-supported personnel provided inputs into USAID provincial and municipal programming, into IDLG and United Kingdom reviews of the Strengthening Provincial Administration and Delivery project (United Nations Development Programme, 2014), and coordinated during the closure of USAID and National Democratic Institute provincial level programs. In another example of organizational level success not addressed above, there was a cooperative effort between the British and the Afghan government that resulted in a plan for clearing, holding, and subsequent rebuilding a town before planned combat operations began (Meyerle, et al., 2010).

**Mindanao Organizational/Agency Level Success.** Relationships with USAID, the Political-Military section of the embassy, the military attaches, the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, the legal attaché, and the intelligence organizations were described as effective. These relationships ensured integration and synchronization of activities and ensure that JSOTF-P (Joint Special Forces Task Force-Philippines) supported the Ambassador’s Mission Strategic Plan (Maxwell, 2012). In addition, weekly Country Team meetings and JSOTF-P’s full-time liaison in the Embassy were helpful in integrating JSOTF-P efforts into the overall Country Team plan (Lambert et al, 2013). One example of this cooperation was JSOTF-P transportation of educational materials and construction supplies to needy areas, and mobilizing partners in the Philippine military to build schools in areas inaccessible to USAID’s implementing partners (USAID, n.d.b). Another example of U.S. civilian and military cooperation was the Embassy Public Affairs Section support. In a
specific case, the section provided assistance in managing the high-profile media coverage of an alleged rape of a Filipino woman by a U.S. marine in November 2005. The Public Affairs section also focused media attention on U.S. military community relations and medical assistance activities, contributing to a gradual diffusion of negative reporting (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2007).

With regard to other donor states, the European Commission (EC) and European Union Member States development activities complemented each other thematically, even though they were not usually designed in collaboration. One practical co-funding effort was tried between the EC and Germany for a conflict area rehabilitation project in Mindanao. However, the effort could not succeed given the different procedures to be applied by the donors. NGO projects were an area where co-funding was frequent, as the EC co-financing budget line requires the European proponent NGO to secure a part of funding from other sources than the EC. This often meant funding from the government of the European country where the NGO was based (European Union, 2002).

In another other donor state example, positive feedback was expressed from Philippine Government partners about the monitoring and evaluation capacity they have developed through association with AusAID (e.g. in relation to the Philippines–Australia Human Resource Development Facility). There were also examples of AusAID initiatives improving the monitoring and evaluation systems of government agencies and joint donor programs (Australian Aid, Office of Development Effectiveness, 2012). Further still, the collaborative approach exhibited by organizations such as the Bangsamoro Development Agency and Mindanao Trust Fund-Reconstruction and Development Program seemed to be well received by their constituents and result in generally successful projects (The
The collaboration with the U.S. military with the Philippines seems to have increased the ability of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to address violence in Mindanao. By the end of the decade, the Philippine forces, particularly the AFP, had developed a different approach to dealing with terrorist groups. The AFP moved from indiscriminate operations to giving significant consideration to the general population, including civilian casualties, property damage, human rights, civil-military operations, and the welfare of displaced persons. This change of approach was illustrated in 2008 when Moro Islamic Liberation Front resorted to violence after a Supreme Court ruling that threw out the proposed terms of a negotiated peace accord. The AFP responded with restraint and consideration of the population, establishing camps for displaced persons, and providing food and water. The response from the population was positive, and the AFP was seen as protectors of the population, building trust that aided their overall campaign. One member of the U.S. Embassy team described this transformation, stating, “They were seen as the savior of the people—it was a watershed moment for them.” This and other instances gradually showed the AFP that, as one officer noted, “Constraint is a weapons system” that can be effective in countering terrorist groups. The change in mindset, while driven by Philippine leadership from above, was likely enabled in part by U.S. military efforts to provide tools that helped the AFP achieve those changes (Lambert et al, 2013, p. 122-3 and p. 126).

Another example of organizational level success was the concerted effort of the Philippine military to address local Mindanao distrust of national security forces, with U.S. military support. To address this issue, the Philippine military committed to a larger role for
civil-military operations in its overall approach, a role that JSOTF-P has encouraged. The population viewed these units favorably since they demonstrate the government’s will to improve the lives of its citizens, and the resulting operations have aided the effectiveness of counterterrorism operations. This had the value of building trust among the people for Philippine military forces and providing Philippine military and intelligence access to an Abu Sayyaf influenced area (Maxwell, 2011).

**South Sudan Organizational/Agency Level Success.** A number of collaboration successes were mentioned in the sections above, including resource sharing, expanding access to information, and additional resources. This included risk sharing in the area of security. However, there were relatively few cases of organizational or agency level successes seen in program or project related areas. One example, however, was the case of UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has also working closely with the United Nations Mission in South Sudan to enable it to implement the Protection of Civilians and the humanitarian support elements of its mandate (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2011). However, rather than directly improving the results of organizational efforts, in general, collaboration across organizations also produced greater client results through enabling more flexible responses and more efficient uses of resources.

An example of a collaboration failure was seen in the shutdown of the South Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF-SS). MDTF-SS’s mandate was based on presumptions about the political process, and GoS’s capacity to address development challenges. In practice, compelling political priorities severely limited the time senior Ministers and officials spent on development issues. This intermittent engagement at senior level has translated into
delays in decision-making on, and in implementation of, developmental activities. The result was two-fold: uneven progress on delivering the outputs sought; and a tendency to deflect the resulting criticism onto others, including the World Bank as the immediate administrator of MDTF-SS (The World Bank, 2013, January). Though the trust fund undertook measures to improve collaboration, among other steps to improve results. These efforts included ensuring contact between Bank staff and local counterparts to share information and build trust, increase engagement, increased oversight, and a willingness to be creative within the rules in helping GoSS meet World Bank fiduciary requirements. However, it proved to be insufficient and in May 2013, the MDTF-SS was officially closed, though a bridging grants and credits were extended239 (The World Bank, 2013, May).

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239 These entailed $75 million in grants from donors administered by the World Bank supported work on three ongoing projects and an International Development Association (an arm of the World Bank) credit of $131 million to support World Bank strategic development goals.
Network Level of Success

Table 58: Network Level of Success Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network Level</th>
<th>Iraq RoL</th>
<th>Afghan RoL</th>
<th>Iraq Provincial</th>
<th>Afghan Provincial</th>
<th>Mindanao</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
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<td>General</td>
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| Relative Ranking | Low | Very Low | High | High | Very High | Low |

Iraq RoL Network Level Success. Though reduced over time, coordination challenges had negative impacts for the Iraq RoL stabilization efforts. For example, early U.S. (pre 2006) support for Government of Iraq anticorruption efforts were seen as being weakened by poor coordination among the U.S. government entities involved (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2012, January). However, international donors generally regarded Embassy efforts at coordinating the international community favorably. Even toward the end of the operation, disconnects existed. For example, as the military withdrawal approached (ca 2010), the Rule of Law Coordinator had not been included in any discussion or planning regarding the rule of law mission of the military’s succeeding security cooperation oriented organization (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2010).
In particular, the failure to negotiate a longer term presence in Iraq was attributed at least in part to an Iraqi perception that the U.S. would never understand them (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 27 Apr 14).

Yet, collaboration did lead to success at the network level in at least some expansion of the ability to work with more Iraq partners. In some case, the civilian led PRTs RoL elements were able to work closely with otherwise disconnected Iraqi elements, or were more positively received than military staff by Iraqi partners. This was the case with the judges in Anbar circa 2008 (United States Institute of Peace, 2008, October 10).

**Afghanistan RoL Network Level Success.** So many different international partners and U.S. government agencies were working with so many different grantees and contractors that by as early as 2004 serious questions were raised regarding how well the U.S. government and its allies were communicating with one another, coordinating their efforts, and monitoring their expenditures. As the course of U.S. stabilization activities in Afghanistan developed, the sheer number formal U.S. assistance projects in the justice sector expanded so significantly and without coordination that formal reviews noted that they risked “wasteful duplication and contradictory legal reform efforts” (Wyler and Katzman, 2010, p. 21).

Overall, there were a number of successes in cross-organizational issues such as RoL or anti-corruption progress. For example, military teams were described as routinely coordinating their efforts and information with U.S. Embassy officials and Provincial
Reconstruction Teams to identify targets of opportunity (Tasikas, 2007). There were also cases of collaboration to address network-wide issues. In one example, beginning in 2007 a commission began to meet formally to minimize Afghanistan police-prosecutor conflict and ensure collaboration, which was a long-standing issue in Afghanistan (United Nations Development Programme Afghanistan, 2010). In addition, a U.S. civilian INL contractor was to have one of its staff working as a liaison with the military to assure mutual awareness of police-prosecutor issues.

However, there were setbacks as well. For example, neither the IROL (the Inter-Agency Rule of Law Unit) or Deputies Committed never obtained its desired goal of being coordinating and central planning node. An example of the lack of overall U.S. civilian and military collaboration was a case when the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) downsized and ceased activities with an Afghan counterpart. A group of military personnel perceived a vacuum and wanted to take over the mission. Moreover, even then they wanted to transition what they were going to build over to the Embassy after they left. The Embassy RoL Ambassador said no to this effort, but that wasn’t enough to stop it. Further, as mentioned above in the CDROLLE and Deputies Committee descriptions, there were substantial divisions between DC headquarters and the Embassy and resident civilian agencies (the field) regarding where final authority resided. This dynamic was exemplified in another case when a version of a new draft RoL strategy, being drafted in IROL, was directed to be approved in DC, which could take up to a year, before it could be circulated to Afghanistan field staff for feedback (Afghanistan RoL Interview Nov 2013).

240 However, it should be noted that coordination here is not necessarily synonymous with “obtained mutual agreement on.”
Coordination and collaboration challenges were also seen more broadly across donor states and international organizations. RoL Funding was split among several U.S. government agencies, the United Nations, other bilateral donors, and a variety of NGOs with no one place where all funds spent specifically on RoL could be identified. Reviews found that there was no way to readily identify RoL funding and identify potentially duplicate programs, overlapping programs, or programs conflicting with each other (Wyler and Katzman, 2010).

An example of the coordination difficulties faced by donor states can be seen in the case of the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan police reform effort. Since 2001, the United States, Germany, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the European Union Police Mission Afghanistan (EUPOL) and others have been helping to rebuild the police force and reform associated government institutions. As a result, in this area alone, EUPOL had to coordinate with actors such as various Afghan government institutions, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, ISAF, the German Police Project Team Afghanistan, Norway, France, DynCorp, NGOs, the United Arab Emirates, U.S. State Department, United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and the Afghan National Directorate of Security – all of which had individual agreements with the Afghan government. All these actors and bilateral agreements created coordination challenges in the area of supporting the Afghan police (Thruelsen, 2010). The proliferation of U.S. and international organizations in this single area was indicative of the scale of coordination challenges in Afghanistan. Even when coordination centers were established, such as with the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), donor states could approach the Afghan government directly to negotiate a bilateral donation, of which said
coordination center may not be notified. Yet, when the Afghan government and the donor nation coordinated with NTM-A early in the process, the NTM-A was able to track these cases and provide assistance as necessary (U.S. Department of Defense, 2012, December).

Efforts were made to address collaboration issues, with limited success. For example, with regard to addressing information sharing challenges, the RoL Field Force developed an internal weekly activities round up with tips, this included what other organizations were doing. The Field Force also attempted to develop a standard agreement or procedure for reporting on activities between the Field Force and IROL. Further the RoL Field Force supported a week long course provided a broad overview of what other organizations were doing in RoL. Though it was developed for internal staff development, approximately 1/3 of the participation was from outside organizations, including other U.S. civilian and military organization, foreign and NGO participants. However, as desirable as it would be to gain full regular, systematic understanding of what everyone in Afghanistan was doing in RoL, this was seen as ultimately unattainable (Afghanistan RoL Interview Jan 2014).

**Iraq Provincial Network Level Success.** Provincial or local coordination was often a challenge. Military units, PRTs, and Embassy staffs had their own governance, rule of law, and development programs that may have complemented, conflicted, or duplicated one another (U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, 2008). Though viewed as generally beneficial, the entrance of civilian organizations (e.g. PRTs) into military “spaces” led missions being unsynchronized due to differing priorities. Civilians would be working on laudable economic and political goals, but the military was focused on basic stability and security (Ayres and Barnes, 2011). For example, the State Department was
interested in advancing cause of democracy, whereas the Marines focused on defeating Al Qaeda. However, according to at least one observer, though there was a lot of talk about Unity of Effort in practice agreements were in effect “rationally bounded” or oversimplified in order to produce local agreement. However, the goal divergence remained at the strategic level and while the simplified agreements could meet immediate goals, they did not produce success for these larger objectives (Iraq Provincial Interview 5 Mar 14). Further, there were also a number of Iraqi organizations involved stabilization projects, who often had their own communication and coordination issues.

In the later stages of the conflict, Iraqi officials exhibited a growing preference to interact with U.S. civilians rather than military members, often due to the greater perceived legitimacy of civilians or at least a reduced perception of being militarily occupied. As the conflict progressed, many Iraqis felt a growing fatigue at seeing heavily armed U.S. military members walking into their offices, and increasingly favored PRT civilians as the public face of American engagement. As one PRT team leader who returned in 2010, “I had a number of our interlocutors tell me . . . how pleased they were with seeing the civilian side of the U.S. presence. . . . They specifically associated more interaction with U.S. government civilians with the normalization of Iraqi-U.S. relations” (Naland, Oct 2011, p. 9).

A success in collaboration between the U.S. civilians and military was cooperation on a metric for assessing provincial stabilization. Though numerous organizations collected their own metrics, the main tool for shared metrics between the U.S. military and civilians in Iraq was the Maturity Model. The Maturity Model was a quarterly, subjective evaluation of a

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241 Though this was not a universal preference. Some Iraqis could express a preference to working with military staff over civilian-clothed U.S. counterparts.
provinces’ performance in five areas: rule of law, governance, reconciliation, political development and economics (Doyle, 2013). In developing their assessment, the PRTs drew both from the broader Unified Common Plan and especially from the Provincial Development Strategy, the development blueprint created by their Iraqi counterparts (Barber and Parker, 2008). PRTs and partnered military units varied on how they developed this report. Though initially this was a U.S. civilian assessment developed along with a complimentary military assessment, it was eventually adopted by the U.S. military as well.

One role the PRTs came to play in Iraq was to help strengthen the “connective tissue” between provincial governments and the central government. In these situations, the PRT encouraged and mentored its Iraqi counterparts to take their case to Baghdad themselves, often supplementing the effort with pressure from the PRT through the Embassy. For example, Rule of Law officers on some PRTs had complained that Iraq’s Chief Justice had been slow to fill judicial positions and had otherwise impeded the progress of RoL development in Iraq. In such cases, the PRT, through its contacts in Baghdad, pressured Iraqi judicial authorities to act (Barber and Parker, 2008). Eventually as provincial Iraqi governments matured, the PRTs could relax this type of support, but it was nonetheless an important early role for many PRTs. Further, the PRTs’ ‘convening power’ to bring disparate Iraqi stakeholders to the same meetings and begin coordination on issues came to be seen as one of its most valuable assets and an essential part of the effort to improve governing capacity and budget execution. Through this, the PRTs helped facilitate

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242 These were broken down into detailed subsets.
243 The Maturity Model was initially cross-references with a military quantitative assessment of provincial progress. However, the figures the military assessment was based on were questionable at best, and in many cases it was the PRTs themselves providing the inputs to these assessments. For these and other cross-referencing issues, the military assessment was dropped in favor of the civilian Maturity Model.
clearing bottlenecks that the Iraqis had trouble resolving on their own. In this, the PRT acted as a trusted third party, mediated disputes, and coaxed Iraqi led projects along when they stalled.

**Afghanistan Provincial Network Level Success.** Initially in terms of cooperation and integration, Afghan PRTs struggled in numerous areas. Civilian State and USAID reps (those civilian agencies present during this time) were not seen as integrated with the military in the PRTs, and generally viewed akin to “guests” of the PRT they were assigned to (Yodsampa, 2011). An example of an area where collaboration produced mixed results was in the timely follow on of civilian stabilization resources after major military operations, a key interest of the military. This could be difficult to achieve and in many military operations were long delays between the end of hostilities and the infusion of aid. However, success was possible and in at least one instance, Operation Medusa, civilian and military coordinating led to the beginning of USAID rehabilitation and reconstruction work within two weeks of the end of hostilities (Yodsampa).

Many network governance bodies or features were established to help address such issues. The Regional Commands were established in 2006 to help bridge the PRTs and ISAF Headquarters, resulting in governance and development-related reporting increasing and greater incorporation of civilian expertise into the ISAF command structure. ISAF Headquarters was also reinforced with additional military and civilian staff to better engage and support the PRTs (Eronen, 2008). However, this met with limited success. Moreover, the apparent rigidity of the Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) decision-making process hindered any sense of team or unity as the SCRs earned the reputation of “little Caesars”, in
being too territorial over their jurisdiction (Fritsch, 2012). Another effort was the ICMAG planning process, described above. As it proceeded, it resulted in agreement on goals and strategy in a number of critical areas. Visible results included a number of civ-mil plans and strategies: the Nangahar implementation plan, the border implementation plan, the Torkham Gate strategy, and the Kyber Pass strategy. It also resulted in civ-mil guidance given out for first time in an integrated way from Kabul (Yodsampa, 2011).

Further benefits were realized as mutual organizational understanding increased over time. For example, the military developed a more widespread understanding that while it (the military) would have a plan for each area it operated in, USAID only developed national level plans. This sort of organizational understanding could foster more realistic expectations and understandings about how to coordinate with other organizations. Civilian and military organizations also improved their understanding of how complement each other’s goals and objectives. The military could provide USAID security and access, and they in turn could help figure out how to do some things that provided immediate results. In some cases, USAID helped not just with expertise, but also in finding resources. This organizational understanding and resulting coordination was also described as being arrived at through trial and error in general.

An area of network level success was of improved knowledge. Outside organizations, particularly U.S. civilians were seen as expanding access to expertise and knowledge. Bringing in other experts fostered a better understanding of the environment or approach (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 12 May 14). For example, in the Helmand case, this benefit of collaboration was seen as absolutely contributing to success. Another example of U.S. civilian and military collaboration improving knowledge was the development of a
shared assessment process, which initially varied from area to area and often did not include detailed analysis of results. This led to the USAID developed Tactical Conflict Assessment, which was intended to be a non-expert usable data collection tool which could both identify causal factors and allow for assessments of program and activity impacts in addressing them (Cote, 2009). A further shared assessment tool was USAID’s District Stability Framework, which provided a means to assess instability and Afghan needs, develop activities to address them, and monitor impacts. By 2011, the Framework was used by the U.S. government, most military units, and some international partners to assess the impact of security and aid initiatives (Fritsch, 2012). This civilian effort helped military units conduct improved assessments, as well as facilitate a common understanding between military units and civilian counterparts. However, while improved, assessments were still not completely in synch. For example, in the Helmand DST case, the PRT/DST objectives were about minimizing risks to transition from Coalition to Afghan lead, while the military operated on different timelines and with different objectives and measures of progress. Moreover, the Afghan government had its own set of metrics to measure progress, which were not always in synch with U.S. metrics (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 23 Jan 14).

Collaboration with donor states also faced problems. U.S. programs supporting local governments were not always coordinated with other international donor state programs, and vice-versa. This was in part due to the limited presence of international donors in many of the border provinces (Kemp, 2011, January/February). Also, the concentration of national efforts on single provinces was itself referred to as a “Balkanization” of aid, since development became geographically scattered and dependent on the priorities of each donor (USAID, 2006). This resulted in ineffectiveness and uncoordinated fractures in sectors such
as police, justice and counter-narcotics (Eronen, 2008). Even as late as 2008, outside
observers were finding little to no unity of effort among donor states, which was described
as fighting “ten different wars” (Gleiman, 2011).

There were also number of coordination issues between Coalition stabilization
efforts and those of NGOs. PRT projects often competed or conflicted with NGO projects,
derundermining relationships developed with Afghan communities. The evolution of improved
civilian and military coordination on projects, and consistency with Afghan national
priorities, particularly for CERP, mitigated many of these concerns (Perito, 2005). Further,
coalition stabilization projects were more often reserved for insecure areas where NGOs
could not operate. In secure areas, PRTs turned their attention to infrastructure projects,
such as roads and bridges that were beyond the interest and capacity of private agencies. The
PRTs were seen as increasing security for at least some aid organizations, even if there were
continuing humanitarian space concerns (Katzman, 2014, January).

Although many NGOs took advantage of the ability to coordinate with the PRTs,
others preferred to go it alone and avoid any contact with the military. As a result, UNAMA
regional offices took on the task of information exchange and coordination between PRTs
and NGOs wanting to avoid direct contact with the military. UNAMA became a useful
vehicle for much behind-the-scenes interaction, coordination, and collaboration with the
military, thereby avoiding the need for direct interaction (Dziedzic and Seidl, 2005). In
general, military representatives could be invited to attend United Nations humanitarian
coordination meetings on specific agenda items of concern, and United Nations liaisons
could participate in coordination meetings hosted at military facilities for the purposes of
information sharing and facilitation.
Mindanao Network Level Success. In the Mindanao stabilization effort, it was commonly held that no one organization could effectively influence change without others, and collaborative problem solving was seen as a necessity. For example, the U.S. military assisted the Philippine military and Philippine National Police in creating a secure environment, the State Department helped create an understanding of the political dynamics that need to be dealt with to become successful, and USAID and its implementing partners worked to create programs that provide a future for the populace (Mindanao Interview 26 May 2014). This collaborative approach produced a number of benefits.

One benefit of civilian and military collaboration allowed access to areas that would not be accessible because of security restrictions (Mindanao Interview 1 July 2014). The ability for JSOTF-P to achieve its security objectives prepared the way for civilians, particularly USAID, to continue their developmental objectives (Mindanao Interview 26 May 2014). Another example of benefit was seen in the area of justice system reform, where the process to prosecute terrorists was lengthy and sometimes ineffective. To improve this process, JSOTF-P pursued a team effort with the Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) program. Further, through the Mindanao Working Group within the U.S. Embassy, U.S. efforts started to move toward a holistic approach police corruption in Mindanao, which was beyond the scope of the ICITAP program alone (Lambert et al., 2013). The U.S. military and civilians also successful mitigated local Mindanao distrust and concerns over a U.S. military presence. Memory of the colonial legacy generally required sensitivity (Swain, 2010) and the Muslim population particularly generally detested the idea of a U.S. military presence (Mindanao Interview 1 Feb 2014). Local and national opposition press worked hard to discredit Philippine and U.S.
military cooperation\textsuperscript{244}. Effective diplomacy by the U.S. Country Team countered these allegations, and over time demonstrated actions of the U.S. military, including program activities, eventually allayed these fears (Maxwell, 2013).

However, different phases of Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines featured different degree of U.S. civilian and military coordination, suggesting an ad hoc and personality-dependent nature of interagency teaming. Integration was reported by both military and Department of State elements to be strong between 2002 and 2007 and between 2010 and 2011. While it is not clear why interagency teaming was not as strong in the years between these two periods, it was suggested that changes in senior leadership may be a cause (Lambert et al., 2013). The variability in collaboration was also seen in the performance of the Mindanao Working Group (MWG) at the U.S. Embassy. Changes in Embassy were seen as impacting the direction of the MWG, with its strategic focus changed with new leadership. In addition, continuity between past activities of the MWG and current issues was challenged by staff rotations (Mindanao Interview 1 Feb 2014). Another further example area of inconsistent civilian and military coordination was that of public affairs, which in a 2007 report was cited as being strong but in a 2013 report was described as sporadic (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2007/2013, February). Close liaison and coordination was seen as critical to ensure that all representatives of the U.S. government were speaking with one voice when dealing with counterparts and the press and its absence was seen as creating the potential for public perception problems (Maxwell, 2013).

\textsuperscript{244} However, one interesting exception was the Navy SEABEES (naval engineers). They were extremely well received by the citizens of Basilan and the SEABEE symbol was well known and respected. The reason for this is that in 1946 the U.S. Navy SEABEES came to Basilan, built a water treatment plant, and painted the SEABEE symbol on it. The water treatment plant continued to operate and the people on Basilan were grateful for the U.S. Navy's work there. (Maxwell, 2011)
Beyond U.S. civilian and military organizations, overall donor coordination raised difficult issues in the Philippines as it does in many recipient countries. On the donor side, interest in coordination was varied, and there was evidence of unhelpful donor rivalry or disinterest in coordination. Only limited progress was made toward harmonizing donor approaches by moving towards sector wide approaches (Australian Aid, Office of Development Effectiveness, 2012). Further, while general agreements among assistance institutions existed, programs and projects were prepared on a project-by-project basis per assistance institution and with minimal coordination between and among project managers during implementation (Mindanao Development Authority, 2012). Additionally, in its earliest stages, the United Nations involvement in Mindanao was chastised for lacking coordination with other local actors and NGOs. However, according to observers from the governmental and NGO communities, the United Nations system was “learning” and experiencing “less waste and better coordination” (Chesnutt, 2011).

A number of steps have been taken to attempt to address these issues, including the development of coordinating structures, such as the Mindanao Development Authority (MinDA) described above. Furthermore, both the government and the international community agreed that meetings such as the Sector Working Groups helped with the alignment of their priorities, and most development partners have also expressed the view that they wish to build on the process to develop sector approaches (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2011). There were some network level benefits to donor state collaboration efforts, such as research and publications funded by AusAID that became community reference documents for the donor community and influenced key
Collaboration between non-U.S. organizations also provided benefits. Local NGOs or civil society organizations were seen as playing a bridging role between state and communities (Australian Aid, 2012, December). For example, some international NGOs, including some funded by USAID, supplied local NGOs with resources and training, which in turn allowed these local NGOs to work through local structures (e.g. clan or religious-based) to resolve local conflicts peacefully using cultural norms that put a high value on relationships (U.S. Department of State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, 2011).

U.S. and Philippine collaboration was seen as key to the overall success seen in the Mindanao case (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2007). An example of the importance of the combined U.S. and Philippine civil-military operations can be seen in a statement by a Moro Islamic Liberation Front leader saying that “civil-military operations is [sic] more lethal than brute force” (Maxwell, 2011, p. 16). This led the group to begin its own form of civil-military operations in attempt to maintain popular support. U.S. collaboration with Philippine armed forces also led to improvements to their capabilities, increasing the Philippine armed forces’ ability to plan, conducting their own medical, dental, and veterinary civic-action and to engage their local populations (Beaudette, 2012).
Additionally, acting together, the U.S. military, civilians, and Philippine government successfully diffused criticism of the U.S. efforts, even as mistakes were made as military personnel tried to balance security and force protection with protection of the mission. However, in these cases, coordinated efforts among the Philippine military and government, the U.S. Country Team, and the JSOTF-P were usually effective in diffusing the situation (Maxwell, 2011).
However, U.S. military activities also attracted some sustained criticism, often concerning a lack of coordination with local communities. Further, despite widespread appreciation for the short-term benefits of the U.S. presence, in 2006, residents question its top-down, militarized approach and apparent favoritism. Villages with powerful local patrons were seen as receiving multiple visits, while others were bypassed. Bureaucratic and force protection, particularly version to risk of U.S. causalities in a “non-combat” situation, issues were seen as being partly to blame (International Crisis Group, 2008).

**South Sudan Network Level Success.** An area of network level success in South Sudan has been coordination to efficiently distribute efforts and activities. This can be seen in the 2011 agricultural programs of USAID and the European Union. While the majority of USAID activities were to be focused in the three Equatoria States and Jonglei, the European Union was expected to concentrate in greater Bahr el Ghazal (states west of the Nile and in the northern part of South Sudan, except Unity State). Further, the European Commission activities could serve as important bridges for relief to development activities support by USAID in these areas (USAID, 2011). In another example of labor division, activities could be divided amount organizations for major political events such as elections or the constitutional reform process. Civic education could be done by one organization, the UN Police would work on security, National Democratic Institute may help with ballots, ballot boxes, training kits, others may help with other things, and etc. (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013). However, when describing the South Sudan situation and collaboration, one large development partner was quoted as noting “there are so many needs, and so many priorities that it is easy to align; the real problem is sequencing and harmonizing our
support” (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2011, p. 47). In one example, within the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning alone were several small and un-coordinated interventions in public financial management (USAID, 2011).

Network level successes were seen in addressing or at least such mitigating collective issues as access and transportation issues, though they were not fully resolved. In South Sudan, access to regions in need of humanitarian assistance has been a challenge due to violence levels and disagreements between armed parties. In response, access ‘compacts’ - between humanitarian partners and the Government of South Sudan and rebel groups respectively – were drafted, along with implementation and dissemination plans. Access principles were also written into a draft NGO bill and a monthly government-partner forum established in Juba to discuss access and other key humanitarian policies on an ongoing basis (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2011). In another example, in 2013, the Coordination and Common Services Cluster helped aid agencies reach tens of thousands of violence-affected people in Jonglei (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2013, November).

There were also a number of information sharing initiatives, particularly in the humanitarian response sphere, notably in the areas of increasing information about humanitarian access and local needs (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2011), and understanding of humanitarian activities (USAID, 2011). These were attributed to efforts of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which undertook activities such as expanding outreach for the humanitarian community by establishing contact with or facilitating monthly meetings with remote NGOs to gather information and to share a more comprehensive picture. There
were also other activities such as developing aid operations databases, such as an Aid Information Management System, whose success was unclear\textsuperscript{245} (Government of South Sudan, 2010). Hosted by the GoSS, development partners were asked to update the information and report any new projects (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2011). Further, an example of an effort to expand shared metrics was seen in 2013, with the South Sudan Common Humanitarian Fund providing eight monitoring specialists to key humanitarian clusters, which strengthening monitoring and reporting systems through CHF-funded projects and improved understanding the efficiency of aid delivery (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs South Sudan, 2013). This support was planned be progressively expanded to cover the full humanitarian planning process and to build the monitoring capacity of local organizations (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2013, November).

However, there were a number of network level issues. One network level failure can be seen between a strained GoSS and donor state relationship that was seen as fueling a preference in the GoSS for working with China. Chinese support was attractive because it was cost-effective or came with fewer demands on governance or human rights. China was also better regarded as a partner, as captured in this statement from a South Sudanese official: “the U.S. and our other [Western] friends regularly tell us with certainty what we need. The Chinese appeared more open to talking and to hearing what we want” (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 8). Another issue was the exacerbation of tension between local groups over access to resources by pre-planned NGO interventions that did

\textsuperscript{245} A link to the publically accessible data base can be found here, though it was non-functional when the author checked on 8 September 2015: http://www.grss-mof.org/key-topics/aid/aid-management-system/
not consult local governments, were not sensitive to local issues or engaged with ‘chiefs’ that
act as gatekeepers, rather than entry points (Schomerus and Allen, 2010).
Appendix 11: Detailed Hypothesis 4 Resource Disparity Impact

Observations

**Hypothesis 4)** Power and relative capabilities of organizations in a Stabilization Network are important; disparities can negatively affect management of collaboration across organizations. This is most likely in terms of relationship building, as smaller organizations can feel overwhelmed by the larger ones, and in terms of coordination and strategy, as the difference in resources creates challenges in being able to match coordination activities between organizations.

**Relationship Building Impacts**

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<tr>
<th>Relationship Building Impacts</th>
<th>Iraq RoL</th>
<th>Afghan RoL</th>
<th>Iraq Provincial</th>
<th>Afghan Provincial</th>
<th>Mindanao</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
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<tr>
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Table 59: Hypothesis 4 Relationship Building Impacts
**Iraq RoL.** Iraqi partners were cited as feeling overwhelmed and confused by the myriad of programs and foreign personnel that they were required to deal with (U.S. Army Center for Law and Military Operations, 2011). Initial reliance on contract staff, due to staffing shortages, could limit relationships with Iraqi partners since their lack of official U.S. standing could create barriers to forming relationships with Iraqi judiciary and prosecutorial counterparts. Further they often lacked the understanding and relationships to take advantage of broader DOJ and U.S. justice community subject matter expertise (Dempsey, 2009). Further, legal advisors hired from outside the DOJ (and/or INL), who although were lawyers, did not always have the needed criminal or prosecution expertise. These issues were generally addressed with the expansion of DOJ staff in Iraq.

**Afghanistan RoL.** In terms of relations with the host nation, U.S. organizations tended to see Afghan political institutions as nonexistent or immature and therefore requiring further development. They certainly lacked resources at the district or sub-national levels, in terms of funding, staff, technical knowledge, etc. However, at the national level, it was less clear if this was due to a lack of capacity or of shared goals that ultimately inhibited progress (Eikenberry, September/October 2013).

**Iraq Provincial.** The military’s presence throughout the country’s 18 provinces gave it a vast amount of situational awareness that enabled it to identify and target influential Iraqis around the country, information that was not readily available following years of U.S.-Iraqi diplomatic silence. According to Ambassador Schmierer, these capabilities meant that at least initially the military had better means for direct engagement with the Iraqis (Duggan,
Relative lack of funding also negatively impacted civilian standing with local Iraqi counterparts. Additional civilian funding was seen at a likely means of increasing influence with local Iraqi leaders and residents (Naland, 2011). In some cases, the access to greater funding resources could have meant that local Iraqi partners would favor military partners over civilian ones. Lack of relative disparities was often correlated with more positive collaborative relationships. The times and places in which the military gave civilians a warmer welcome were often those with a smaller military presence. With a smaller presence and corresponding military capability, civilians were more immediately recognized by the military as valuable additions to stabilization activities. For example, the ePRT in the west of Anbar had an easier time being seen as an enabler to the lighter military presence out there. This became increasingly the case as the military withdrew in Iraq (Iraq Provincial Interview 17 Sep 13).

**Afghanistan Provincial.** In some cases there was a lack of consistent or experienced civilian representation at PRTs. While USAID, State Department, and Department of Agriculture were eventually able to staff most positions, many civilian representatives lacked the experience to function as leaders on the PRT or were short-term volunteers (USAID, 2006). At most PRTs, particularly early on, civilians were younger and less experienced than their military counterparts. Most PRT military commanders had 16–20 years of experience prior to PRT command. The lack of experience not only affected interactions and relationship within the PRTs but also limited their ability to reach back into their own organizations to get the information, project funding, and support they required (Yodsampa, 2011). Further, the practice of hiring outside staff to fill immediate staffing
needs, such as through contractors and term limited staff described above, also resulted in personnel with limited understanding of their own organizations and how to obtain support and information (Fritsch, 2012; USAID, 2006). Steps were taken to improve civilian staffing at PRTs, though it is not clear that the problem was ever fully resolved.

**Mindanao.** U.S. military forces believed that influence and relationships building with the GoP was limited by a lack of funding resources. For example, the need for a low level of discretionary funding was an early lesson in Iraq and Afghanistan, which had been addressed by providing military forces with Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds to aid them in influencing the population and local leaders. The U.S. military lacked such a mechanism in Mindanao, however (Lambert et al., 2013). The GoP itself was seen as feeling “reform fatigue”, which created setbacks. The organizational readiness and absorptive capacity of different government agencies in the Philippines could vary (Australian Aid, Office of Development Effectiveness, 2012). Limits to GoP capacities also spurred the view that it was necessary to work with United Nations Agencies for the large scale responses. In addition to the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Children’s Fund and others provided implementation capacity in conflict areas (Australian Aid, 2012, December).

**South Sudan.** The sheer number of missions and the time required from GoSS left little time, space and human resources for independent policy and decision-making (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2011). For example, hundreds of donor state visits could be made in a single year, predominately un-coordinated with
other donors. This alone could create a burden on relatively weak national level government institutions. These factors served to delay implementation of projects (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013).

**Coordination and Strategy Impacts**

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<th>Coordination and Strategy Impacts</th>
<th>Iraq RoL</th>
<th>Afghan RoL</th>
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<tr>
<td>Co-option concern</td>
<td>Military mission creep</td>
<td>Significant impact from U.S. mil lack of technical capability</td>
<td>Lead roles &amp; co-option issues</td>
<td>U.S. civilian challenges in keeping up with U.S. military planning due to low capacity</td>
<td>Lead roles &amp; co-option issues</td>
<td>U.S. military desired to go faster than civilians could some times.</td>
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<td>Reliance on NGOs as implementers</td>
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<td>Disagreement over who had the “job” of building GoSS capacity</td>
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**Iraq RoL Coordination and Strategy Impacts.** Lack of civilian resources could also foster fears of being co-opted by larger military partners. In general, the Embassy staff was overworked if not overwhelmed (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2005). Over time, particularly during the ‘civilian surge’ of 2007, civilian staffing numbers increased. The initial staffing issues also created problems with contractors being hired to oversee other contractors, which was mitigated through increasing direct hired staff.
for supervision (Dempsey, 2009). Overall the primary driver of RoL activities and collaboration was seen as organizational missions and particular priorities. For example, the United Nations was seen as moving more slowly than other organizations, but due to bureaucratic delays, this was not due to capacity issues (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 24 Dec 13).

**Afghanistan RoL Coordination and Strategy Impacts.** In the Afghanistan RoL case, there were cases of overabundant and underutilized staffs. This was most commonly noted with the overall larger military staffs. As a result, this could foster an expansionary mindset, and RoL was seen as an attractive area to enter. This mindset could also be partly attributed to internal organizational pressures in the military, as not doing anything was a sure way to not get promoted. This created a periodic phenomenon of people (often military) showing up in RoL asking “How can we help you?” The reality, however, was that they created more work without the necessary core expertise. There were helicopter pilots, for example, who had been pushed into an assessments or Rule of law advisor roles. Further, sometimes these personnel arrived with the mindset that the civilians weren’t doing enough; and they had to “rescue” the rule of law mission or else all would fail (Afghanistan RoL Interview Nov 2013). Overall, though problems seemed to be ascribed to capacities (i.e. overabundant staffs) could more directly be attributed to differences in perspective on timelines and a disparity between technical expertise and manpower. It other words, the source of the problem wasn’t the sheer number of staff so much as it was the staff’s lack of technical expertise that was ultimately the issue.
Iraq Provincial Coordination and Strategy Impacts. An imbalance of resources created tension between civilian and military relationships, and though the State Department and civilian efforts were the ‘lead’ for reconstruction activities in policy, in practice the military funded the bulk of the effort (Dorman, 2007). This situation undermined the perception of civilians as being an effective lead for reconstruction by military partners and fostered frustration. The sentiment was captured in the quote, “When you say the State Department is in the lead [for reconstruction], and for every one dollar that the Army brings, the State Department brings a penny, any competent observer will tell you that the biggest bank book is actually in the lead” (Naland, 2011, p. 8). Disparities in staff size could also make it difficult for civilians to fully integrate into military processes. For example, an ePRT leader contrasted his twelve-member team with the much larger brigade and noted that “because of the staffing imbalances in different sections,” his team found it difficult to keep up with the brigade’s “round-the-clock meetings” (Naland, pp. 4-5).

Conversely, as illustrated in many sections above, the military lacked technical expertise in stabilization project and program management. Much of the civilian expertise was focused on improving military execution of projects and coordination with partners, in addition to managing its own efforts and developing Iraqi capabilities. Overall, the imbalance of personnel, funds, and development and reconstruction expertise created a situation in which the civilians were building the capacity of the military to run development programs instead of focusing on building the capacity of the Iraqi provincial governments (Kelly, 2009).
Afghanistan Provincial Coordination and Strategy Impacts. Differential capacities fostered civilian concerns of co-option over cooperation. It was the view of at least some that the civilian staff who did well at the PRTs that they did so by embracing the military and acting as staff to the commander. Some civilians at PRTs felt that they were outnumbered, out-resourced, and alone. As a result, many civilians resisted the idea of integration or advocated for limits to collaboration (Fritsch, 2012). Concern about co-option was not unfounded. Until the latter part of the campaign, when the ‘civilianization’ effort was made, a military officer always commanded U.S. PRTs (Hernandorena, 2007). The combination of a lack of mission guidance and the predominance of military staffing created a situation in which personalities played a disproportionate role, especially that of the PRT commander, in determining the direction of PRT efforts. Military dominance was reinforced by the ever present force protection and security concerns, and by the co-location of several PRTs with combat (maneuver in military parlance) military units (USAID, 2006). In a situation where the vast majority of the team was comprised of military personnel, and most of the resources came from the military, it became very easy for a PRT commander to feel the unit’s focus and projects should be military in nature (Hernandorena).

The lack of civilian capacity could create insurmountable barriers to successful collaboration. In at least once case, a deficit of human resources affected USAID’s ability to partner in the military’s ambitious agenda for a given province. USAID offers were acting "not necessarily out of belligerence, but they couldn’t make decisions on that amount of money. They were highly understaffed and USAID felt like a ‘besieged organization’” (Yodsampa, 2011, p. 293). This disparity and different philosophies regarding the pace of stabilization activities could also create situations in which military counterparts could both
do more and wanted to move more rapidly than civilian partners. In fact, the abundance of resources itself could even have fostered an impulse to apply those resources, even when a slower (perhaps more long-term or methodical) approach was a viable or even better alternative (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 23 Jan 14). There were, of course, exceptions. Several PRTs had strong, consistent civilian representation, and when this was the case, it was repeatedly cited as a key factor contributing to coordinated results. At PRTs with relatively senior, consistent USAID representation, including the Jalalabad PRT, civilians were able to gain influence, engaging in joint analysis and decision making with their military counterparts. At others, however, the profound power disparity undermined coordination (Yodsampa).

**Mindanao Coordination and Strategy Impacts.** U.S. civilian funding vehicles were generally seen as slower and as less responsive than military funding, even without CERP. Differences in execution time also stemmed primarily from funding sources. For instance, USAID and JSOTF-P worked out of two different lines of funding. USAID allocated funds for 5 year contracted/grant programs but had quick reaction funding for things such as humanitarian assistance and disaster response, as well as a generally efficient staffing process for them. On the other hand, JSOTF-P funding was required to remain flexible due to the dynamic environment, but contracts often took a significant amount of time to gain approval since they were approved by outside military headquarters in Hawaii (Mindanao Interview 26 May 2014). Differences in funding sources and timelines for project approvals also hindered collaboration between civilian offices, such as between the Public Affairs section and USAID (Mindanao Interview 1 Feb 2014). There were also limits to U.S.
civilians and military sharing, which could enable further collaboration due to resource constraints on the part of otherwise willing partners. Individuals could have additional duties beyond Mindanao or civilian and military issues, which could limit the time and energy spent on sharing information or supporting cooperation (Mindanao Interview 26 May 2014).

Another issue was that working with sub-national levels of government was more labor intensive for donors than a top-down approach via the central government as there were potentially many more stakeholders with whom to engage. This could have limited their ability or will to engage with sub-national partners. It also opened the door to inconsistency in dealing with multiple partners (Australian Aid, Office of Development Effectiveness, 2012).

South Sudan Coordination and Strategy Impacts. In general the international community had a number of high expectations for shorter timelines and greater results than could be achieved in South Sudan (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013). South Sudan faced a number of challenges that reduced its capabilities, from being a new country, episodes of conflict, impacts of political patronage, illiteracy among assembly members, low capacity to implement projects or services, and also faced budget reductions (United Nations Development Programme, n.d.c). However, donors have generally overestimated government capacity to provide services and had an uneven record in building capability in the GoSS (The World Bank, 2013, January). For example, a civil service skill building projects have found it far more difficult than anticipated to transfer skills from Horne of Africa (Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia) mentors to GoSS civil servants (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013). Further, internal divisions or confusion between the State and
national governments of South Sudan was common. In 2011, one senior GoSS official noted candidly, “unfortunately the government does not speak with one voice at any level” (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2011, p. 54). This results in delays to programs and activities and the lack of approval of key documents and processes also creates uncertainty for some partners (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development).

In addition to the GoSS, other organizations faced capacity challenges. In some sectors, such as in the agriculture and food area or cultural affairs (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2013, May), a lack of local associations, NGOs, and other nongovernment partners could be challenging. This limited the ability of donors to work through a wide array of local partners and led to cases where donors were attempting to build capacity or develop, local partners themselves while also engaging them in projects or programs (USAID, 2011). Additionally, the United Nations and international organizations were perceived as needing more time for clearance and working internal bureaucracies in order to get things done than NGOs, limiting their responsiveness (South Sudan Interview 19 October 2013). For instance, the World Bank underestimated the efforts and timing for mobilization of operational staff and facilities and did not invest in full and early staffing, leading to delays (The World Bank, 2013, January). Further, though the UN and many NGOs believed that building GoSS capacity should largely lie with the United Nations, the UN did not operate at the local levels. As a result, other NGOs felt that although they might not have the resources they had the responsibility to build the county level government staff simply because the United Nations was not present (Schomerus and Allen, 2010).
Appendix 12: Detailed Hypothesis 5 Security and Turnover Impact

Observations

**Hypothesis 5a)** The hostile (e.g. violent) environment negatively affects Stabilization Network management of collaboration. The need for security (physical and information security) has a ripple effect on the ability to manage the network. This is particularly true in terms of forming relationships and knowledge management across organizations, as security restrictions can create barriers to meeting and interacting with partners, as well as to what information could be shared.

**Relationship Building Impacts**

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<th>Relationship Building Impacts</th>
<th>Iraq RoL</th>
<th>Afghan RoL</th>
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<th>Mindanao</th>
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<tr>
<td>Challenges to meetings and communications</td>
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<td>Delays in forming relationships</td>
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**Iraq and Afghanistan Relationship Impacts.** In many cases, the “tyranny of distance,” either due to actual physical distance or to the need to plan and have access to security assets for transportation, limited or even prevented in-person meetings (Fritsch, 2012). One effect of this was that travel could be limited or rationed to team leaders or to
‘relationship owners’. For example, a PRT agricultural expert might be the relationship owner with the senior Afghan agricultural line minister, and would report back to the PRT on meetings (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 12 May 14). Even with transportation available, the challenges and risks of travel frequently deterred travel and reduced it from what it might have been otherwise. Further, the channeling of meetings and events to relatively more secure capitals perpetuated a sense that the U.S. efforts was unilateral or focused only on a capital-to-capital basis (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2005). Coordination could be further hampered by limited stakeholder attendance and the limited overall frequency of meetings in high threat environments (United Nations Development Programme Afghanistan, 2010; U.S. Army Center for Law and Military Operations, 2011). Difficulties and restrictions in arranging travel to engage with key partners, such as local Afghans, could rise to the level that staff questioned the utility of their mission and presence (Afghanistan RoL Interview Jan 2014).

The high profile of U.S. military security details also deterred local partners and international NGOs from wanting to meet. Local partners could be afraid that a procession of armored “Humvees” or Mine Resistant Armored Vehicles with armed personnel could make it appear that they were cooperating with a military operation (Duggan, 2012). This was particularly daunting for U.S. civilian personnel whose partners might have been open to meeting in different circumstances. Further, arriving at a meeting in combat vehicles escorted by heavily armed soldiers was off-putting to local officials (Naland, 2011), or was seen as changing the way in which civilian visitors were viewed by local Iraqi counterparts. This was particularly true in areas not used to high profile visits, such as rural areas in Iraq that were accessed, often for the first time, as violence declined in 2009.
Though actually having in-person engagement with partners could be limited, when it did occur, the security environment wasn’t seen as impacting the nature of meetings and communications (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 24 Dec 13). Overall, security served limited face to face communication, which presented challenges and delays for developing and maintaining constructive working relationships. Conversely, relatively secure environments allowed building personal relationships and trust with locals. This could even develop to the point of overnight or longer stays outside of the protection of military compounds (Meyerle, et al., 2010). In some of the best cases, military forces provided such security, and civilian personnel, international organizations, and NGOs formed strong working relationships with Afghan partners. Further, in some instances, relationships benefitted from sharing the secure facilities with key partners, such as U.S. and NATO civilian, military co-location (see co-location, above). In one example in Helmand, a DST (District Support Team) benefited because they Afghan government center was co-located with FOB (forward operating base); they could walk over with minimal security (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 12 May 14).

**Mindanao and South Sudan Relationship Impacts.** The security situations in Mindanao and the South Sudan overall resulted in a limitation or denial of direct access to partners, and fostered a reliance on intermediaries to reach hostile areas. Disruption of direct contact with local partners could last for periods of several weeks or potentially longer (South Sudan Interview 19 October 2013). A frequent means of mitigation was through working with local NGOs or the hiring of local staff by international NGOs (Chesnutt, 2011). Organizations such as the United Nations could to a large extent, rely on coordination with local NGOs, which had greater access to perilous areas and could move
more freely. Though the reactions to the volatile security situation differ, the results to relationship building were similar, in that they fostered delays to forming working relationships among stabilization organizations. Overall, security made it more costly (in terms time and energy) and more difficult to communicate. The resulting communications difficulties made it harder to build relationships and fostered reliance on indirect coordination.

**Knowledge Management Impacts**

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<th>Knowledge Management</th>
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<td>Burdens to access outside information from military networks</td>
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<td>Information sharing restrictions and burdens, particularly associated with the military</td>
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<td>Risks limiting sharing</td>
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<td>NGOs opting out of collaboration with U.S.</td>
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Security had a number of impacts on knowledge management. This could be in terms of barriers to sharing information, affecting what information was sought out, or direct impacts to communications. For example, cell phones could be of limited or no functionality as they were targeted by insurgents or they were blown down by the military to prevent cell phones being used as triggers for IED (improvised explosive device) attacks (United States Institute of Peace, 2008, April). As seen in the Knowledge Management section above, security risks also created a demand for knowledge of operational risks and risk assessments. For example, in the South Sudan case there was particular demand for ad-
hoc assessments to support access negotiations and take advantage of windows of opportunity to deliver critical humanitarian assistance (United Nations, 2014).

U.S. military organizations normally communicated on a classified network. Though information on a classified network was not by itself necessarily classified, these networks could not be accessed by people outside the system or send or receive information from the ‘open’ internet. In the Iraq and Afghanistan cases, military installations could have limited access to unclassified communications or to the ‘open’ internet. As a result, in some cases PRT staff at military locations had onerous administrative burdens or restrictions to their access (United States Institute of Peace, 2008, April). Further, military networks didn’t have access to contact and organizational information that was resident on home organization internal networks. In response, PRTs sometimes funded their own wireless network access to supplement the military system. As the military typically operated on the classified network, much unclassified information was also stored and transmitted on this network. As this was a secure network that only staff with security clearances could access, this created administrative hurdles to sharing the information, even if it was not itself actually classified.

Routinely operating on classified networks also enabled over-classification, or the over use of restrictive U.S. government security markings (Afghanistan RoL Interview Nov 2013). Military and civilian staff that operated in classified environments were also seen as being risk averse to an “OPSEC (operational security) violation”, or unapproved release of classified information. This resulted in a tendency to over classify information to avoid this risk. Over-classification limited sharing, particularly for documentation. Over-classification could even prevent information sharing with military partners, such as the United Kingdom, NATO, or even host nations. This was a particularly acute problem when trying to work with
partners who did not have access to classified networks, such as the Afghans, or NGOs. Additionally, other administrative markings, though not classifications themselves, could limit their sharing outside of government networks. For example, the administratively marked documents, though not classified and even not on a classified network, couldn’t be sent to personal email addresses, which some counterparts on the PRT and Afghans would use in lieu of a viable official internet system.

One example of how this dynamic could work is seen in the case of an Afghan provided list of judges. Members of the military would want to place it on a classified portal, to protect the information. In a hostile environment such as Afghanistan, lists of names of government officials could easily become “target lists” in the wrong hands, particularly in the case of judges who were regularly targeted. However, the information was provided by Afghans and needed to be shared with other Afghans, and labeling something classified would preclude such sharing, even it was originally provided by the Afghans themselves. Yet it needed to be safeguarded. Further, there were no classified computers in Afghan judiciary, so they physically couldn’t access classified material even if it could be shared. The issue between what needed to be safeguarded was a continual challenge (Afghanistan RoL Interview Nov 2013).

Further, not all civilian agencies in working in Iraq normally obtained security clearances for all of their staff. NGOs and International Organization, typically not authorized for U.S. security clearances, found the classification rules to be particularly frustrating. In such cases conversations had to be limited, staff without clearances removed or uninvited, or moved from written to verbal communication (Mindanao Interview 1 Feb 2014). In some cases, it was just not possible to have a meaningful conversation with un-
cleared U.S. staff on a given topic. This contributed to perceptions by NGOs that the benefits compared to the risks of cooperating with military and government civilian personnel appeared to be meager, and thus opt to operate independently (Dziedzic and Seidl, 2005). This was noted as occurring in the Afghanistan Provincial case in particular, but may have occurred in other cases. Operating in the security environment often presented a learning curve for U.S. civilians who were not used to such restrictions as well.

For example, it was common for USAID to issue contracts on an unclassified basis. This often enabled greater employment of local Iraqi staff or non-U.S. nationals. However, as a result, U.S. civilian contractors could find themselves unable to fully access information from military partners, who frequently classified sensitive information. In at least one case, although the contracting partner was required to meet with the PRT, they were not allowed access to the military base that hosted them due to clearance issues. Alternative meeting spaces were identified and the contract was eventually modified to include senior staff with security clearances (United States Institute of Peace, 2008, October 8).

Overall, though classification and over-classification created information sharing related burdens and hassles, it was a manageable problem, at least for those organizations who did partner with the U.S. This was seen as particularly true in case for stabilization activities, as the most relevant information was usually not classified (when classified correctly) (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 12 May 14). Documents could be created as ‘releasable’ data on a need to know basis (Mindanao Interview 26 May 2014). Another way of mitigating classification issues was to use separate communication channels from official U.S. government systems for communication with Iraqis and presumably other non-U.S. partners (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 27 Apr 14). Or, for documents that needed to
be shared, such as plans, efforts were made to keep them from being classified or to separate out the classified sections so that the rest of the plan could be shared more easily (South Sudan Interview 1 December 2013). Verbal communication could be used to monitor what was said or work around the issue. These mitigation efforts, however, presumably created administrated and manpower burdens in transferring information between systems and created complexity in managing knowledge.

Beyond the administrative barriers created through classification, the willingness to sharing information was impacted by the security environment as well. Organizations could be resistant to sharing information due to concerns that it could place their projects or staff at risk. In the Iraq Provincial case, this was seen in of the USAID implementing partners. Area PRT staff often had had little idea of what the USAID partners, did — whom they trained, what the training consisted of, and etc. The implementers cited security concerns as the reason for not being forthcoming about activities. This was even the case though the PRT’s and missions complimentary, or in a general way identical (Barber and Parker, 2008). This was despite nearly all PRTs having had USAID program officers whose jobs were, in part, to monitor the performance of these national programs in their provinces. However, some USAID officers on the PRTs had little insight into national USAID programs, often due to the aforementioned security issues. As it a result, the development work done as part of USAID’s national programs and that done by the PRTs ran on largely parallel tracks for much, if not all, of the conflict (Barber and Parker).
Other Impacts

Table 63: Hypothesis 5a Other Impacts

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<th>Iraq RoL</th>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oversight and accountability impacts</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Planning disruptions</td>
<td>Planning disruptions</td>
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Oversight and Accountability Impacts. The security environment meant staff could not always travel to projects for site visits or to verify information coming from implementing partners. U.S. site visits could even turn the project into a target. For example, in Fallujah, the insurgency affected that ePRT’s ability to monitor the progress of its projects – “…if Americans started showing up at a project it highlights (that) this guy is working with Americans, and (he) becomes a higher target…” Further, in some cases, in-person observation was abandoned in favor of phone or email oversight, or just not conducted. A result of this was the reliance on local partners to conduct oversight and inspections on U.S. projects (Anita, 2009, pp. 13-14). For example, in Afghanistan, USAID rarely conducted on-site inspections of its projects using its own personnel. Instead, it hired Afghan nationals to visit project sites. Some Afghanistan PRT members and military officers stated that USAID’s practice of subcontracting quality control resulted in poor construction and corruption by local contractors. At best, because of their reliance on third parties, USAID lacked a full picture of the status, quality, and location of projects. In some instances, there were some areas that were so insecure that even Afghan national personnel would not go to.
Across the cases, one of the military’s key strengths was a field presence in areas that might be too dangerous for civilian organizations, particularly so for the U.S. military and its pronounced presences in Iraq and Afghanistan (U.S. Army Center for Law and Military Operations, 2011). U.S. organizations leveraged this access to help conduct oversight on partners and projects. For example, to help address the USAID oversight issue in Afghanistan, in person monitoring for certain projects was delegated to the local PRT (Malkasian and Meyerle, 2009). The U.S. military also helped provide or facilitate oversight for areas it had better access to (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 23 Jan 14). However, as U.S. military forces drew down in Iraq and Afghanistan, these resources and field presence became more limited. Oversight support was not strictly limited to the U.S. military. In the South Sudan case, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan forces supported monitoring and verification for select partners as well (UN Security Council, 2014, September).

While the effectiveness of stability efforts themselves are beyond the scope of this research, it merits at least noting the negative impacts the lack of oversight had to activities. Quality control was spotty at best, and widespread anecdotal accounts describe large-scale corruption (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2013, May). For example, in Afghanistan the most common were tales of tribal elders absconding with money meant for the community’s project. In some cases, money was even suspected to have gone to insurgents (Malkasian and Meyerle, 2009). Lack of oversight fostered project failures such as schools or roads being built being ruined within a matter of months due to poor construction (Dorman, 2007). The inability to conduct meaningful oversight could necessitate decisions on accepting the resulting risks of no direct monitoring (Australian Aid, Office of Development Effectiveness, 2012). However, there was at least one positive view
in the case of Afghanistan that limitations on travel and interactions prevented a ‘micro-managing’ or provision of too much support to partners, allowing the Afghans to govern themselves. This was particularly relevant during the later years of the cases when transition to local authorities was the priority.

**Coordination & Strategy Impacts.** In many cases, hostile environments greatly affected coordination and strategy. A common area of impact was too strategic planning. Spikes in violence could rapidly undermine plans and derail efforts at stabilization. One early example captured the potentially extreme changes that could be driven by security concerns: “What a rapid change in just five days, from preparing to launch a broad new array of programs aimed at operating government, improving communication and public input, to living hunkered down in a military base, contemplating evacuation” (Cravens, 2014c, para 11). Similar impacts were seen in Mindanao and South Sudan, with rapid outbreaks of violence or political crises necessitating rapid readjustment of overall priorities in frequently, unpredictable manners. For example, in response to the 2014 crisis in South Sudan, the European Union and United Nations Development Programme rapidly changed their strategies to reflect the new environment and needs, establishing new priorities and re-directing resources (European Union, 2014; United Nations Development Programme, n.d.c). The also created an additional coordination requirement for humanitarian organizations to maintain regular contact with the parties to the conflict to manage access. Moreover, as security deteriorated, the focus often shifted away from stabilization to defeating the enemy, particularly in the Iraq or Afghanistan cases. Military or host national counterparts, rather understandably, were not interested in stabilization activities when areas
were being heavily targeted by insurgents. This made it difficult to affect stabilization changes at all (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 23 Jan 14).

The hostile environments created complications for goal congruence, particularly regarding disconnects between the field, Embassy/Baghdad, and Washington, DC headquarters levels in civilian organizations. While some level of differing perspective is natural, the difficulties of travel and communication in Iraq seemed to increase them. Security concerns, weather conditions, and limited secure transportation resources could greatly limit travel to and from home office locations in capitals. That, compounded with often limited communications, could leave civilian members feeling cut off from their home agencies. Such ‘disconnected’ civilian members sometimes began to drive their own agendas rather than acting in accordance with guidance or strategy provided from above. One State Department officer who served at an Iraqi PRT described it: “I felt like I was completely left off the face of the earth when trying to work with Baghdad and Washington” (Dorman, 2007, pp. 33-34).
Hypothesis 5b) The hostile (e.g. violent) environment negatively affects Stabilization Network management of collaboration. The short-term nature of U.S. government tours, which result from the hostile environment and are most common in Iraq and Afghanistan, negatively impacted Stabilization Network management of collaboration. This would be expected to negatively impact relationship building, which becomes short lived and must be regularly re-established as new staff rotates in and out. Knowledge management would be impaired, due to loss of tacit and institutional knowledge, as would maintaining cohesive coordination and strategy among organizations.

Relationship Building Impacts

Table 64: Hypothesis 5b Relationship Building Impacts

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<tr>
<th>Relationship Building Impacts</th>
<th>Iraq RoL</th>
<th>Afghan RoL</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Continually rebuilding relationships; international and local staff turn over</td>
<td>Loss of productivity due to extended periods of relationship building needed to establish working relationships</td>
<td>Challenges in maintain relationships, particularly for U.S. military with shorter tours</td>
<td>Continually rebuilding relationships; international and local staff turn over</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Information dependence on longer duration staff, particularly local staff</td>
<td>Iraqi partner “fatigue”</td>
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With each rotation, U.S. civilian and military interlocutors essentially had to start from scratch in developing new relationships (Barber and Parker, 2008). Between U.S. civilian and military tour rotations, and less frequent though not uncommon changes in local national interlocutors, regular relationship forming was exhausting. Relationships had to be
regularly re-established by rotating personnel. For example, shortly after Independence, there was a re-shuffle of personnel in South Sudan line ministries; and relationships had to be re-established. In another example, in an Iraq PRT case, the manner in which troops were deployed and rotated caused the PRT representatives to spend substantial amounts of time briefing incoming U.S. military brigades on the status of programs and projects being implemented in the province.

An example of how this dynamic played out can be seen in the civil-military relationship of three Marine and Army unit rotations in Anbar, circa 2008-2009. The Marine Regional Command 5 was seen as strongly supporting the civilian activity. However, Marine Regional Command 8 was seen as “old school” and didn’t understand the civilian role. It took 2 to 3 months (of their 6 month tours) to cement a working relationship between the civilians and military. The following military command, the Army’s 82nd AAB had studied civilian activities and as such were strongly supportive with little needed ‘spin up’ time (Iraq Provincial Interview 17 Sep 13).

This effort was particularly critical for working with local partners. Across the cases local relationships were paramount their respective culture and critical to collaboration (Iraq Provincial Interview 17 Sep 13; U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2005). As trust was built up over time through repeated personal interaction, the arrival of each new staff member reset the trust level and thus the relationship. On top of being a drain on energy, re-developing relationships took time and became a constant drag on which the pace of stabilization efforts could be conducted. Shorter, six month tours in particular, did not allow for a lot of time to foster the necessary relationships. For example, in the Afghanistan context -- and commonly the case in many Muslim countries --personal
relationships and trust are prized for deal making. The relatively rapid turnover disrupted staff influence and the impeded their ability to steer groups toward consensus as staff need to continually redevelop strong working relationships with Afghan partners. This was true to a lesser degree with other organizational partners as well (Tasikas, 2007). With turnover, it was often necessary to re-forged agreements with the new parties as acceptance of prior agreements was not a given.

Regular relationship forming was exhausting for local partners as well as international staff (Iraq Provincial Interview 17 Sep 13). Iraqi officials commonly suffered from ‘interlocutor fatigue’, where a number of U.S. civilian and military officials — a major, a colonel, a PRT team leader, a USAID representative, a USAID implementing partner — would all meet with the same Iraqi leaders (U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, 2008). Tour rotations also exacerbated this issue, increasing the frequency of such meetings. Similarly, relationships between coalition forces and local Afghans suffered every time units rotated out and new ones took their place. In some areas, the local Afghans saw 10-15 military units cycle through, each a blank slate. At the same time, Afghan parties cited as being very patient. They would be very courteous about ‘new’ U.S. or international partner ideas that they had heard numerous times before. They would have to start over just as rotating military units had to, building relationships and upon the successes of the last person/unit as much as possible (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 12 May 14).

One example of the difficulties this could create was seen in Khost province. There the battalion commander and provincial reconstruction team commander built strong relationships with the governor and other officials and their subordinate officers built similar relationships with other officials across the province. Popular support for the U.S. grew in
Khost and violence dropped off. Yet, when the battalion left and a new group of officers came in, relationships frayed. Insurgents exploited the situation with a surge in attacks, and the progress achieved quickly disappeared. Another example of this was the case of U.S. Special Forces teams in Kandahar. Gains made in Kandahar in 2003 were wiped out in 2004 by new units that focused on kill and capture missions and allowed relationships with local people to falter. Such radical shifts in focus from one unit to the next sent mixed messages to the population. They signaled a lack of determination and commitment that U.S. efforts would not be sustained. As a result, local people began to hedge their bets and collaborate with the Taliban (Meyerle, et al., 2010).

Another related issue was that local partners tended to stay the same people, and learned manipulate or ‘game’ the coalition due to the dearth of continuity. Crafty partners could learn how to find ways to get the projects the wanted, and to shape personal benefits like type of vehicle he was provided (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 27 Apr 14). For example, Afghans would use turn over to gain advantages (e.g. resources or perceived power). While this was not typically excessive, it was a common tendency in the Afghan environment that created challenges. Similarly, those staff who remained in situ for longer periods, (predominately civilian or local nationals) could develop a great amount of autonomy as well as local expertise. There were cases noted where such staff became effectively independent from higher-level direction (Afghanistan RoL Interview Jan 2014).
Knowledge Management Impacts

Table 65: Hypothesis 5b Knowledge Management Impacts

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<th>Knowledge Management</th>
<th>Iraq RoL</th>
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<td>Loss of institutional knowledge</td>
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<td>Productivity loss to re-learning</td>
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<td>Limitations to assessing trends</td>
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<td>Limitations to assessing trends</td>
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In both Iraq and Afghanistan, with the predominately annual staff rotation periods, institutional memory was a problem. With every turnover there was a loss of institutional knowledge. As a result, institutional memory was described as scattershot and a tendency to repeat mistakes was seen and sometimes projects effort or initiatives had to start all over again (Afghanistan RoL Interview Nov 2013; U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2005). For newly arriving staff, there was an overall reduced emphasis on institutional memory and more emphasis for gathering new information independently. Staff were seen as being always forward looking, and not relying on what historical information was available. Further, staff were commonly described as needing two or three months to gain a working knowledge of their environments and establish working relationships with local partners (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 12 May 14). The turnover process led to a cycle of learning and then departing. Said an ePRT team leader, “Much of my time was spent learning what was going on. By the time I felt fully functional I had to leave” (Naland, 2011, p. 5). There could be a steep drop off in intuitional knowledge when staff rotated (Iraq Provincial Interview 5 Mar 14).
The frequent staff rotations and high turnover have created challenges in analyzing and interpreting performance data for programs (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2014). Turnover hindered the ability to understand and address issues with impacts longer than the typical tour cycles. The short tours limited the time period during which staff had to learn about their environments and gain practical experience, particularly in the case of six month or other shorter than 1 year tours (Afghanistan RoL Interview Nov 2013). This was described as a pattern of learning the job for the first 3 to 4 months, working for 4 months, and then checking out (preparing to depart) (South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013; Yodsampa, 2011). An example of this was seen in the area of metrics. In at least one case, it was said that by the time personnel were experienced enough to understand that they needed improvement, it was time for the new personnel to arrive and begin to re-learn this same fact. A further example was seen in the need to re-issue CERP (Commander’s Emergency Response Program) collaboration directives. The ability to assess project or activity outcomes, which could take several months or years to manifest, was no doubt severely impacted as well. This was particularly the case without regular or standard use of outcome metrics. This impact was most pronounced in the Afghanistan cases, however, it is reasonable to infer similar impacts in all of the cases.
Coordination & Strategy Impacts

Table 66: Hypothesis 5b Coordination & Strategy Impacts

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<th>Iraq RoL</th>
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<tr>
<td>Coordination &amp; Strategy</td>
<td>Instability in mission, goal and vision congruence</td>
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Turnover significantly hindered developing clarity of roles and responsibilities. Tour rotations could also lead to high variability, both in terms of quality of performance, and in what actual tasks or duties were performed (Afghanistan RoL Interview Jan 2014). For example, the Working Group was seen as being personality driven in terms of issues it addressed as staff rotated. In one case, a former head of the Mindanao Working Group would get opinions from all participants and create an agenda that included a collected plan or way forward. However, his replacement was seen as focusing on security issues that were of interest to him and his office. With the change in focus, the discussion on other issues was reduced, resulting in declining Working Group participation, dropping from approximately 30 attendees on average to approximately 10-15 attendees during normal meetings, except with offices felt compelled to attend. Lack of institutional memory was seen as part of the reason for variability across tours, with new staff making their own new agendas, and setting new priorities, programs, or activities instead of reviewing past activities (Mindanao Interview 1 Feb 2014).

This was particularly acute in Iraq and Afghanistan Provincial cases, where staff numbers were lower in the more remote locations. With staff numbers sometimes as low as a few or one person in a sector, a change in performance or tasks was dramatically
noticeable. Multiple changes in leadership could also lead to instability vision and direction, and lead to less focused and inefficient efforts. For example, some PRTs were hampered by high turnover in leadership, due to staff rotations and to organizational changes. In at one case, a single ePRT was reported to have had five interim leaders in six months (Naland, 2011). Further, in a Mindanao case, plans to address a collaboration concern were reset with arrival a new Ambassador and the establishment of new priorities (Mindanao Interview 1 Feb 2014). Instability in priorities was seen as undermining collaborative structures and processes.

Tour rotations distinctly impacted military units with regard to mission, vision, and goals. Frequently, incoming military leaders made fundamental changes to their predecessor’s policies and priorities (Kemp, 2011, September/October). This could go so far as to effectively ignoring the previous units work and effectively starting over (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 24 Sep 13). Further, when entire units were replaced, projects could be stopped for weeks or months as the new commander decided priorities and the military familiarized itself with the area (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2013, January). As described above, changes in military leadership could often lead to discontinuity in stabilization activities (Naland, 2011). A common story would be the arrival of a new military unit, with an imperative to “do something” during their one year or six month tour (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 27 Apr 14). The unit was often unaware of to the work that had already been done, and regularly repeated mistakes that had been made in the past. This led to many counterproductive meetings and efforts being implemented. Eventually they would come to ‘understand’ the environment and their and their partner’s roles in it. Sometimes regular turnover of units coupled with a lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities
from our higher headquarters resulted in slow or even reverses in progress (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 23 Jan 14).

In general, tour rotations created difficulties in developing mutual understanding regarding mission, goals, and vision across organizational boundaries. One staff member conveyed that it could take about six months before civilian and military counterparts were using a common language. For example, at a Helmand DST (District Support Team), when a new civil affairs representative would come onboard, it would take about 1-2 months to truly build their understanding and support for the DST concept (Afghanistan Provincial Interview 23 Jan 14). Frequent rotations also result in ineffective management of locally employed staff, causing them to take less initiative due to shifting priorities (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2013, May). As a result this instability in roles, mission, vision, and goals, there was a tendency to bounce from one crisis to another (U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, 2005). Leadership turnover was seen as particularly detrimental. Among the cases, much of the dysfunction in the Iraq RoL sector (at a minimum) was attributed to this dynamic (Iraq Rule of Law Interview 24 Dec 13).
Other Impacts

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<th>South Sudan</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Undermining</td>
<td>Undermining</td>
<td>Undermining</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Reduced interested in GoSS capacity building</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>sustainable change</td>
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Tour rotations also undermined efforts to create sustainable changes. Frequent rotations of civilian and military leaders and the lack of systems to ensure that incoming leaders would build on the foundations already in place could stymie or set back these efforts. Further, frequent rotations prevented senior leaders from developing the understanding of on-the-ground realities and the urgent necessity for changes (Yodsampa, 2011). Without senior leader support, profound organizational changes could not be developed, and only minor or marginal organizational changes could be effected by leaders on the ground in the provinces and districts. This was seen in the Afghanistan RoL and the Iraq Provincial cases (see the Afghanistan RoL Mission, Vision and Goal Congruence section, above), with the need to reestablish agreements between partners, particularly the U.S. civilians and military, which could at least be in part attributed to the frequency of tour rotations.

In the South Sudan case, instability in local government staff created disincentives for government capacity building. The high turnover of staff in state and local government resulted in weak institutional memory, thus necessitating continued and costly ‘capacity building’ with few tangible programming results (Schomerus and Allen, 2010). Further, when
skills did transfer, staff frequently resigned for higher paying positions, either within the government at a higher level or for (sometimes dramatically) higher paying internationally funded jobs; this itself was a factor why the capacity of the government quite weak (Bennett, 2013; South Sudan Interview 27 October 2013). An international NGO staff member explained is as: “Government have [sic] a high staff turnover so when you build their capacity, they leave or immediately become managers leaving no lower and middle rung administrators” (Schomerus and Allen, p. 95). This created an aversion to investing in capacity development of local partners.
References


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608


Biography

Brett Doyle has spent over a decade and a half of providing national security research, analysis, and assessment for the government, primarily for the Department of Defense and State Department. These were in a research, analysis, and evaluation capacity. Some of his career highlights have included supporting the stand up of a DoD research center, developing State Department monitoring and evaluation processes and participating in U.S. delegations to Russia and the United Nations. He was particularly honored to receive a meritorious honor award for sustained excellent service at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad. He holds a Master’s degree from the Monterey Institute of International Studies in International Policy and is a PhD candidate in political science at George Mason University, with graduation expected in December 2016.