Negotiating Military Base-Rights with Spain, The Philippines, and Greece: Lessons Learned

by

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National Research Council
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About The Center

The Center for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University has as its principal mission to advance the understanding and resolution of significant and persistent human conflicts among individuals, groups, communities, identity groups, and nations. To fulfill this mission, the center works in four areas: academic programs, consisting of a Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) in Conflict Analysis and Resolution and a Master of Science (M.S.) in Conflict Management; research and publication; a clinical service program offered through the Conflict Clinic, Inc., center faculty, and senior associates; and public education.

Associated with the center are three major organizations that promote and apply conflict resolution principles. These are the Conflict Clinic, Inc., mentioned above; the Consortium on Peace Research, Education and Development (COPRED), a network organization; and the National Conference on Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution (NCPCR), offering conferences and workshops.

Major research interests include the study of deep-rooted conflicts and their resolution; the exploration of conditions attracting parties to the negotiation table; the role of third parties in dispute resolution; and the testing of a variety of conflict intervention methods in a range of community, national, and international settings.

Outreach to the community is accomplished through the publication of books and articles, public lectures, conferences, and special briefings on the theory and practice of conflict resolution. As part of this effort, the center’s working and occasional papers offer both the public at large and professionals in the field access to critical thinking flowing from faculty, staff, and students at the center. The papers are presented to stimulate critical consideration and discussion of important questions in the study of human conflict.
Foreword

Many observers would agree that the issue of base-rights is becoming an increasingly important aspect of foreign policy, both for the host countries and for the United States. The price of the bases goes up from one negotiation to another, the U.S. Congress is becoming more involved in the details of negotiations and agreements, and the negotiation process is unavoidably linked to host-country domestic politics--and, therefore, to the vagaries of government instabilities. For these reasons, among others, this is a domain that warrants high-level policy attention.

In this essay Druckman asks what is to be learned from three cases of base-rights negotiations. A review of the record of these cases suggests lessons of value to the practitioner and to the student of international diplomacy. These lessons can be organized in terms of context and process. By context is meant the political-military environment that surrounds and constrains the negotiations. Context includes both the relatively unique political cultures of the host countries and the United States and the broader international system within which the negotiation takes place. Process refers to the act of negotiating. In most international negotiations, this is not limited to the give-and-take between the parties or to the actions taken by them to seal an agreement. It includes also the preliminaries which are debated in unilateral and bilateral "prenegotiation" sessions. It is the interplay between these conceptions of context and process that provides an understanding of the dynamics of base-rights diplomacy.

Implied also by the distinction between context and process are two types of lessons, those that contribute to an understanding of the politics of base-rights talks and those that deal with the art of international negotiation. For base negotiations, the cases provide insights into the way that domestic politics impinges on the bilateral relationship between the parties. On the one hand, the cases have much in common: host-country expectations become increasingly similar as they gain experience in dealing with the United States. On the other hand, each host country has its own political culture which evolves over time. An understanding of that culture as it exists at the time of negotiation is important; it defines the practical limits of what host-country negotiators can accept.

With regard to the art of negotiation, the cases contribute insights into tactics and procedures used in the talks to deal with the constraints imposed by the context for negotiation. Many are similar to those used in other types of negotiations and can be appreciated in relation to a more general literature on this subject. Throughout this discussion reference will be made to the three cases: talks between the United States and Spain, the United States and the Philippines, and the United States and Greece. Each of these cases is the record of a symposium, and many of Druckman's conclusions are based on the observations of symposium participants—a number of
whom played a key role in the negotiations. In addition, he has made reference to a number of scholarly works on the negotiation process.

This is Druckman's second lessons-learned analysis of case studies of international negotiation. The first effort produced an expansive set of lessons from diverse cases—the Panama Canal talks, Zimbabwe independence, the Falkland Islands dispute, and the internal conflict in Cyprus between the Greek and Turkish communities, and is reported in Druckman's chapter in *Perspectives on Negotiations* edited by Bendahmane and McDonald. This series on base negotiations is noted more for its comparability than for its diversity. Comparability among the three cases is evident in both context and process. Such comparability allows us to derive lessons likely to be relevant to the larger class of bilateral talks between the United States and host countries over base-rights.

It is hoped that this very good paper contributes to the foundation of knowledge that supports policymaking and diplomatic practice in this important area.

Ambassador John W. McDonald, Jr.
President, Iowa Peace Institute
Negotiating Military Base Rights with Spain, the Philippines, and Greece: Lessons Learned

The Case Studies

This essay asks what can be learned from three cases of negotiations over United States military bases in foreign countries. The lessons, developed from observations made by negotiators and support staff to each of the U.S. delegations, are organized in terms of a general framework emphasizing context and process. This framework provides a structure for insights that contribute both to theory and to practice. A concluding section frames the essay by highlighting key lessons, just as the section on the background of each case frames it at the beginning.

Overview

The lessons learned are the result of symposia on three sets of negotiations concerning U.S. military bases in Spain, the Philippines, and Greece. To provide the reader with background on each case, we discuss in this section the various facilities at stake, the agreements obtained since the opening of the bases in each country, and brief descriptions of the particular negotiations highlighted by the symposia participants.

U.S. Bases in Spain. The four major U.S. military facilities in Spain are the Rota Naval Base (near Cadiz), the Torrejon Air Base (just east of Madrid), the Zaragoza Air Base (near the city of Zaragoza), and the Moron Air Base (near Seville). The use of these bases along with various support installations was authorized by six agreements signed by the two countries starting with the ten-year Pact of Madrid in 1953. The other agreements are as follows:

- 1963 Joint Declaration extending the Pact of Madrid for five years
- 1969 Interim Agreement of 15-months duration
- 1970 Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation (five-year duration)
- 1976 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (five-year duration)
- 1982 Agreement on Friendship, Defense, and Cooperation (five-year duration).

The symposia discussions concentrated on the 1976 and 1982 negotiations. In preparation for the 1975-76 talks, a Joint Declaration of Principles was issued on July 9, 1974 (Department of State release no. 291). This document consisted of ten articles that reaffirmed the “existing cooperation – based on firm friendship” between the two nations. Shortly thereafter, a U.S. delegation was assigned the task of negotiating an extension of the 1970 agreement. The first round began on November 4, 1976, in Madrid. A five-year treaty was signed on January 24, 1976, and ratified by the U.S. Senate on June 21, 1976. Between the first round and the signed treaty
were ten rounds during which various events occurred including digressions, stalemates, and dramatic breakthroughs. This progression was discussed by the negotiators and is documented by Druckman in a 1986 article appearing in the Journal of Conflict Resolution.

The 1981-82 negotiation was intended simply to renew the terms of the 1976 treaty. However, as the talks unfolded, it became clear that the Spanish negotiators were not satisfied with the earlier agreement. Now that Spain was a democracy, they argued, the new agreement had to be politically sustainable. It had to demonstrate clearly that the United States supported Spanish democracy. Spain desired a reward in the new base-rights agreement for its progress toward democracy and for the steps it had taken toward entry into NATO. While most issues were resolved by the twelfth and final round, there remained the problem of differences of opinion on the issue of aircraft transit rights. This deadlock was broken in June 1982 when both sides agreed to language recognizing the principles of sovereignty, but still protecting transit rights. Key to the Spanish agreement was an exchange of notes reflecting U.S. intent to provide $400 million in foreign military sales credits during the first year of the bilateral executive agreement. The document was signed on July 2, 1982.

U.S. Bases in the Philippines. The major U.S. military installations in the Philippines are Subic Bay Naval Base (northwest of Metro Manila), Clark Air Base (northwest of Metro Manila), John Hay Air Station (Benguet Province), a Naval Communications Station (Zambala Province), and the Wallace Air Station (La Union Province). The use of these installations was the subject of a major agreement signed in 1947 and scheduled initially to last for 99 years but amended in 1966 to a 25-year duration. Two sets of follow-on talks, one in 1979 and another in 1983, were the focus of these symposia. The 1979 agreement amended the original pact with a termination date of 1991. The 1983 negotiation was the first of a regular five-year review of the 1979 amended agreement.

The 1979 agreement codified a joint statement prepared by Vice President Mondale and President Marcos in May 1978. The statement reflected a resolution of differences between the countries on six issues: command and control of the bases, criminal jurisdiction, number of facilities, security commitment, length of the agreement, and compensation. Most of these issues were discussed in military-to-military negotiations which produced an agreement approved by Washington. Only the compensation and criminal jurisdiction issues were treated separately, and these issues became sticking points to a full settlement. They were resolved late in 1978 through the special efforts of Senator Inouye (D.-Hawaii). On compensation, Inouye educated Marcos on the realities of Congressional budgetary priorities and the limits of “good will,” leading him to reduce his demands; on the jurisdiction issue, Inouye and Marcos worked out a face-saving compromise that
satisfied Philippine concerns without amending the actual stipulations from the original pact. The final agreement was signed on January 7, 1979.

The 1983 review resulted in a memorandum of agreement consisting of seven sections addressing concerns of the Philippine government. The U.S. objective was to accommodate Philippine concerns while retaining flexibility in operating the bases. An attempt was made to adhere to the principle of unhampered military operations without forfeiting Philippine sovereignty over the bases. A relatively short two–month negotiation, conducted in private, produced a U.S. pledge of “best efforts” to pay $900 million in compensation ($475 million in economic aid, $300 million in military sales credits, and $125 million in military grants) over a five–year period. Aside from a few changes in status–of–forces regulations, the agreement is largely a reaffirmation of earlier principles in a way that makes it appear that Philippine sovereignty over these facilities has been enhanced. Although the two countries reached agreement without serious impasses, two issues have remained a source of irritation in future discussions: the U.S. administrations’ unwillingness to commit funds, preferring instead to assure the Philippine government that it will make a “best effort” to secure the agreed level of funding, and the concept of paying rent rather than entering into a broad economic and security relationship with the host country.

**U.S. Bases in Greece.** The major U.S. bases in Greece are the Souda Bay Complex (a port and an airfield on the island of Crete), the Iraklion Air Station (on the island of Crete), the Hellenikon Air Base (in Athens), and the Nea Makri Communications Station (on Marathon Bay, northeast of Athens). The major agreement allowing the U.S. to use these facilities was signed in 1953 as the Military Facilities Agreement intended to remain in force as long as the NATO treaty existed. Changes in Greek perceptions of the United States in the 1960s led to demands by the Greek military and, later, civilian administrations for extensive modifications in the terms of the 1953 agreement. The first attempt to renegotiate the terms resulted in a four–year defense pact initialed in 1977 but not signed officially by the governments. The second attempt in 1983 produced the five–year Agreement on Defense and Economic Cooperation. These two renegotiations were the subject of the symposia discussions.

The 1977 negotiations were difficult. The main stumbling block, and primary cause of the impasse, was the Greek perception of a disparity between the deal with Turkey and the deal that the U.S. proposed for them. A special meeting between the Greek foreign minister and Secretary Kissinger was needed to resolve this impasse. The result was a letter that committed the United States to opposing actively any attempt by either Turkey or Greece to settle Aegean issues by other than peaceful means, as well as additional military and economic assistance to Greece. The additional commitments approached the desired seven–to–ten ratio favored by the Greeks for assistance to Greece and Turkey, respectively. Having satisfied their major
concern, the negotiators initialed an agreement in July of 1977. However, this agreement was never signed officially by the two governments.

The long negotiations leading to the 1983 agreement were also difficult. The Greek negotiators insisted on explicit commitments of aid from the United States and a demand that the U.S. pay rent for the bases. Specifically, they demanded that the level of aid be 70% of aid given by the U.S. to the Turks and that this figure be an integral part of the agreement, with the implication that without such a commitment the Greek government did not have to abide by the agreement. Without Congressional approval, the U.S. negotiators could not promise specific levels of aid; nor were they willing to agree to the concept of rent. These sticking points could only be resolved by a special meeting between Secretary Shultz and the Greek prime minister. The understandings reached at that meeting made the 1983 agreement possible. Among other things, the agreement set up a joint commission to oversee its terms. This mechanism has worked well and has served to inject optimism in the prospects for better relations between the nations.

Symposia Participants

The lessons are based primarily on data provided by the symposia participants. By including negotiators and support staff with different roles and experiences within the setting of a particular series of talks, we can sketch a more complete picture of influences on the process of negotiating. Although the actual texts of the presentations are not reproduced here, quotes are often included to identify the source for particular arguments. To give the reader background for the quotations and citations, a listing of the speakers, along with roles or positions and topics addressed, is presented in chronological order within each case in the Appendix.

Themes

The three cases have parallel chronologies. Dramatic renegotiations of base—rights during the 1970s and 1980s were preceded by a legacy of twenty years during which the United States was permitted considerable latitude in the operation of the bases. Each symposium case began with a recounting of this history, which serves as background for lessons on the context of negotiation (see Appendix). Among the themes identified are an intertwining of political and military issues, an ambivalent relationship between each host country and the United States, and various structural and cultural asymmetries, including differences in the importance ascribed to the negotiations. Along with internal domestic politics and external events, these factors are the contextual influences on the negotiating process. Focusing more directly on the process, we also learn about procedures and tactics used to craft an acceptable agreement. These processes are understood best through the lens of a rough sequence proceeding from actions taken to set the stage, the give—and—take, and the end game where the agreement is drafted. The actions include decisions taken on team
concessions, formats, impasse resolution strategies, and postures for extracting concessions from the other team. The lessons learned should apply as well to other base-right talks not examined in these symposia. Most notable perhaps is the relationship between power asymmetries and interdependence between the countries. The U.S. advantage in power is offset to some extent both by the need to maintain a relationship with the host countries and by a lack of attractive alternative locations for the bases. Realizing this, the weaker parties can attempt to manipulate the parameters of the agreement, and they do this in similar ways from case to case. They insist on payments in the form of rent rather than assistance, they link the military issues to broader political concerns, they cite other base-right agreements as evidence for "unfair" treatment, and they offer their friendship in return for significant material concessions. Responding to these demands, the United States has developed an approach to seek acceptable appropriations from which the executive offers its "best efforts" strategy. The strategy used by the negotiating teams is the problem of base-right agreements in which the executive offers its "best efforts" strategies to resolve the impasse. The strategy is based on a year-by-year basis, and the executive will not jeopardize the benefit of the base rights agreement. The strategy has been favorably received by the United States, although the price has gone up and will undoubtedly continue to do so in the years to come.

Strategies used in these symposia are generally organized according to a broad scheme which emphasizes context and process.
Northern Europe, Japan, or Korea." The key difference is the defense role played by the two types of countries; for the former, the bases are used largely for transit rights, a sensitive concern of the host countries; in the latter countries, the bases are considered part of a larger alliance structure whose arrangements are not subject to periodic renegotiations. Other issues are managed but not resolved. The distinction between rent and assistance is a source of host–country irritation that lingers. Further discussion is inevitable, as is further discussion of the U.S. position on "best efforts." Less certain in both these debates is the outcome. At stake is the future of base–rights arrangements.

These periodic renegotiations are benchmarks in an extended process to revise earlier agreements. Each of the cases presents a somewhat different pattern in this respect, arranged, perhaps, on a continuum from gradual evolution (the Philippines) to abrupt change (Greece). U.S. control over its bases in the Philippines gradually eroded between 1947 and 1979. Constraints placed on the United States by Philippine negotiators include prior consultation on deployment of long–range missiles (1959), Philippine control over criminal jurisdiction (1965), a reduced term of the base agreement (1966), and consultations before making operational use of the bases (1979). Spain's attention to issues not addressed in previous negotiations worked to its advantage: the 1976 agreement improved its position over 1970, and the 1982 agreement took into account perceived inequities in the 1976 treaty negotiated at the end of the Franco regime. The history of U.S.–Greek relations makes apparent the changes in Greek perceptions of the United States through the 1960s and 1970s.

These changes did not impact on the base agreement, however, until the late 1970s: the provisions of the 1953 text served as the basis for a U.S. presence "pending new agreements" which did not occur until 1983. Greek negotiators took advantage of this situation. They used the earlier "lopsided" agreement as proof of concessions, demanding U.S. concessions in return. Similar tactics were employed by the Philippine and Spanish delegations. Both used presumed past inequities as reasons for demanding significant U.S. concessions. Such tactics are discussed below in the section on give and take.

The legacy of earlier agreements refers both to outcomes and processes. Outcomes are recorded in the texts of agreements. Processes are only occasionally documented. Without a written record, negotiators must reconstruct history from memory. This can work either to their advantage or disadvantage. For example, without a record, precedents are difficult to establish; so too are claims of earlier concessions difficult to refute. On balance, however, a record of negotiation interactions is useful. For the new negotiator, it provides a background that prepares him or her for the job. For the scholar, it is the "data" that elucidates negotiation processes as they occur in situ.
More broadly, the discussion in this section illustrates the argument that base-rights are more than simply extension negotiations. They are about political relationships as well, a point that is worth keeping in mind as we search the materials for lessons learned. The task begins with a first lesson suggested by the above discussion:

*Consider a base-rights negotiation as part of a continuous process of revising earlier agreements: the legacy is a framework against which alternative proposals are evaluated and adjusted; it is also a record which can be used to advantage by one or the other delegation, for example, to extract concessions from the other party.*

**Structural and Cultural Asymmetries**

Asymmetries are defining features of base-rights negotiations. Along one dimension, the talks are a microcosm of small power–great power relationships. Along another, they are influenced by large differences in political culture between the countries. Both are sources of tension that aggravate the negotiation process. Neither can be understood simply in terms of relationships between national attributes (power, national interests) and outcomes (agreements that favor the nation with great power). The impacts of these contextual factors on negotiating processes are complex.

The difference in strength between the United States and the host countries is probably the most apparent structural asymmetry in base-rights talks. Studies by Hopmann and his colleagues have shown how these factors may influence negotiations. Impacts were found in three analyses of arms-control negotiations in the 1960s and 1970s: a cleavage between the nuclear and non-nuclear nations in the Seabeds denuclearization talks, superpower domination over their blocs and the nonaligned nations in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and asymmetrical influence exerted by the superpowers in the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament. Only by banding together in coalitions could the weaker countries make some gains in each of these forums. Missing in these cases, however, is the one factor that can offset power discrepancies in dramatic ways—a relationship of interdependence between the parties.

An increasing trend in the late 1970s and 1980s toward interdependence in international relations has served to blur the lines between strong and weak nations. Weaker nations can gain leverage by exploiting the mutuality of interests between themselves and their more powerful counterparts. Interdependence has afforded small powers added room for maneuverability; they can advance their interests through negotiation, as we observe in the cases considered here. Construed as asymmetrical bargaining under conditions of interdependence, base rights talks illustrate the maxim that, all too often, “less is more.” In each of the cases, base rights are traded by the host–country for U.S. concessions in such other areas as NATO membership, economic assistance, or educational grants. An “old” world in which national
attributes received primary attention has given way to a “new” world in which bargaining strategies are highlighted.

Host-country bargaining leverage derives from U.S. dependence on the location of the bases. For the United States, the current location of the bases serves their global geopolitical strategy; the problem for U.S. negotiators is the lack of a better alternative, or, in the language of Fisher and Ury, a better alternative to the negotiated agreement (BATNA). This fact alone makes them vulnerable to the more limited, but important, host–country objectives, namely, a bilateral mutual defense treaty for Spain, protection against the insurgents for the Philippines, and the Greek obsession with the threat from Turkey.

A second lesson summarizes the implications of the interplay between differences in power and interdependence:

- Develop viable alternatives to a base–rights agreement. Alternatives enhance bargaining leverage for both countries: the United States is less vulnerable to host–country objectives, and the host–countries are less vulnerable to U.S. exercise of power and control.

Structural asymmetries are only part of the story. Other differences between the parties are illuminated by the cases include those due to culture and approach, as well as to domestic factors. Together, they can be considered stylistic aspects of the parties, i.e., those factors that intrude on the process apart from substantive positions taken on issues. Examples abound. A few of the more prominent themes are the following:

- **Approach.** Cummings contrasts the broad, principled approach taken by the U.S. delegation with Spain’s emphasis on details; Norton compares the aggressive approach taken by the Philippine delegation with the defensive or reactive approach of the U.S negotiators.

- **Team Composition.** Planty describes differences in continuity between the Spanish and the U.S. delegations while Lord emphasizes differences in experience favoring the Spanish; Norton and De Bobes comment on differences between the U.S. and Philippine delegations in size and status, both favoring the Philippines.

- **Domestic politics.** Cummings, noting that the talks were much more visible in Spain than in the United States, observes a difference in sensitivity of the Spanish and U.S. delegations to public opinion; similarly, Kovner notes that in Greece “the base negotiations rivaled the soccer season for media attention.”

- **Stakes.** Spain and Greece used their respective negotiating opportunities as tests of the bilateral relationship while, as Barringer notes, the U.S. emphasis on “their wide-ranging political interests” in relation to the Philippine bases created the impression that there was more at stake for them than for their host–country counterparts.
Negotiating Military Base Rights

Whether tactical or real, all of these differences are intrusive. They are sources of aggravation that interfere with substantive issues.

While documenting the asymmetries, the cases do not distinguish the temporary from the more enduring approaches or objectives. Nor do they permit a precise assessment of how these asymmetries affect the negotiating process. Much of what we see in negotiation consists of tactical moves; bargaining tactics are the subject of many studies published in behavioral science journals. Some of what we see, however, reflects the more enduring cultural traditions referred to in the literature on international negotiation as predilections or as imperatives of the political system. These traditions are the elements that provide continuity from one negotiation to another. Knowing their behavioral manifestations has implications for planning: tactics can be countered in the short term; imperatives can be managed but not manipulated in the short term. Such behavioral manifestations have implications also for understanding the impact of cultural asymmetries.

Guidance for judging impacts can be found in the more general literature on bargaining. A number of studies provide evidence of the effects of culture on bargaining behavior. An example is an experiment showing large differences among the cultures sampled (India, Argentina, and the United States) on a variety of indices of competitive behavior and in expressions of world views. Bargaining behavior was explained in terms of the more general orientations toward the world. Insights can be found also in the more interpretive work by Young and others on clashing negotiating styles. He explains the prolonged talks between the People's Republic of China and the United States between 1953 and 1967 in terms of a preference by U.S. negotiators for a "convergent" style (concern for tactics, emphasis on technical remedies and small gains on the way toward agreement) versus a preference by PRC negotiators for an adversarial style (a tough, offensive posture and an unwillingness to consider smaller issues in a stepwise progression toward a resolution). However, there is a lack of documentation from the base-rights arena. Methodologies that can be used either to chart trends for influences on the process or to encourage negotiators to focus explicitly on issues and priorities are a high priority for analysts of negotiation.

A third lesson is suggested by the discussion on cultural or stylistic asymmetries:

Distinguish the temporary and tactical from the more enduring aspects of style or approach to negotiation: the former are moves to be dealt with in the short term while the latter are constraints to be managed over the long term.

External Influences

From one perspective, negotiation is just another setting for playing the game of international politics. It is a microcosm of international relations where parallel interactions or cross-linkages among many types of diplomatic activities occur, each influencing the other. Another perspective treats negotiation as a special type of
interaction among a small group of national representatives. It is a relatively self-contained system subject to the influence of outside events.

The difference between the perspective of the policy analyst and negotiation analyst is instructive. The policy analyst is interested in how a particular negotiation fits in a broadly-conceived foreign policy. For the negotiation analyst, the key issue is how events impinge on the negotiation process and vice versa. Adopting the perspective of the negotiation analyst, I view external events as influences on the process of negotiation. While there is much to be learned about the broader international system from a policy perspective, the emphasis here is primarily on internal negotiating dynamics and the way these processes are driven by external influences of the international system.

Defining external influences, however, presents a two-fold problem. First, what is meant by external? The distinction between exogenous and endogenous factors is relevant. Sometimes this distinction is clear, as when we examine the effects of public opinion (exogenous) or cultural asymmetries/team composition (endogeneous) on negotiating tactics. At other times the distinction is blurred, as when we try to determine whether the U.S. Senate or the U.S. embassy is an outside influence on the process or a key player in the process. Some clarification may be obtained by considering external influences in terms of their distance from the process. For example, a contrast can be drawn between such proximal influences as the death of Franco in Spain, time pressures due to elections in Greece, and the relationship between the sitting U.S. ambassador and the Greek prime minister, on the one hand, and such distal influences as the closing of Wheelus Air Base in Libya, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, and NATO decision-making, on the other. Also relevant are the distinctions between domestic and international influences, and between specific events and the more-elusive international atmosphere. Contrast a change of government in the host country (a domestic influence) with a regime change in an allied country (an international influence), and a decision to test nuclear weapons by a less-developed country in the Eastern bloc (a specific event) versus a cooling of détente between East and West (a change in the international atmosphere). Particularly conspicuous in the cases covered in this paper is the way one base-rights negotiation is influenced by others taking place at the same time. Regarded in terms of our categories as a distal international event, this type of influence is discussed below.

The second definitional problem concerns what is being influenced. This can be understood in terms of direct or indirect effects. Direct effects are events that influence the calculus of the threefold choice, namely, to continue negotiating, abandon negotiations, or reach an agreement. My analysis of the 1975–1976 Spain talks illustrates how these effects can drive the process toward agreement. In the early stages, NATO decision-making and a general cooling of détente conspired to encourage the Spanish delegation to continue talking. Later, during the end game, two factors served to alter Spain’s calculations concerning the desirability of an agreement:
the impending death of Franco and Europe's reaction to the political executions in Spain. These factors were seen as turning points in the negotiation. The former kept the talks on track; the latter forced a reevaluation of the consequences of deadlock. Moreover, an agreement was also in the best interests of the United States. The loss in 1969 of Wheelus Air Base in Libya increased the value placed by the United States on the bases in Spain.

Other examples illustrate the direct role of external factors in driving the process away from agreement. Congressional intrusion occurred in several ways in the talks with Spain: in vetoing the possibility of a mutual defense treaty; on the House's prerogative regarding appropriations; in a commitment to "best efforts"; in the phasing out of military assistance programs; and, generally, in the Senate's feeling that "they ought to have a greater say in matters such as the major base negotiations."

Aggravating factors in the Philippine and Greek talks were the often-cited comparisons made by the host-country delegations to other base-rights talks. The Philippine negotiators insisted on a package at least as lucrative as those negotiated with Greece and Turkey. Greek negotiators were very sensitive to any agreement reached between Turkey and the United States. Indeed, with regard to the Greek talks, it was a specific external event that determined the tone of later rounds—the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Equally dramatic were the effects of domestic politics in Greece. Collins notes how the upcoming election placed extreme time pressure on the delegation in the 1981-1982 rounds, resulting in deadlock. And Jones comments on the negative effects of media intrusion. In his words, "Media negotiation is not negotiation. If a negotiator is to have flexibility, the positions must stay confidential." We noted earlier that the base-rights talks rivaled the soccer season for attention in Greece.

Indirect effects are events that influence the bilateral relationship and hence impinge on the negotiating process. While important, these present us with a difficult analytical problem. On the one hand, each of the host countries views the talks as tests of the bilateral relationship. On the other hand, it is difficult to separate broad concerns about the relationship from the narrower issues of rights and obligations in operating the bases. However, the cases can be used to illustrate how a change in the relationship may jeopardize an agreement.

Two events resulted in a reevaluation by Spain of its role in the European community and suddenly put a new face on Spain's relationship with the United States: the 1975–1976 talks were held hostage to NATO decisions on the admission of Spain while the 1981–1982 rounds were damaged at the last moment by a change in Spain's government. In the Philippines, upcoming elections in the United States led Marcos to recalculate the benefits of striking a deal in the 1976 rounds; he decided to try for a better deal after the elections. Only one year earlier he had extracted concessions from an American government weakened by events in Vietnam. The talks with Greece in 1981–1982 were a culmination of years of difficult negotiations.
A decade of negotiations to revise the 1953 agreement was conducted in an atmosphere of Greek suspicion regarding U.S.-Turkey relations and of American anxiety about Greece’s vacillation on NATO membership.

The effects mentioned above are more suggestive than conclusive. The case materials are better suited for illustrating effects than for determining with any precision the relationship between external factors, direct or indirect, and negotiating behaviors. That entails careful coding of events and processes, as well as statistical analysis. Several studies, conducted in the context of arms-control talks, have used coding and statistics to document the way in which external factors may affect negotiating processes. One type of response by negotiators is referred to as reflective: for example, increased accusations made by Soviet leaders was followed by increased accusations made by the Soviet negotiators in such settings as the test-ban talks, the talks on mutual and balanced force reductions, and strategic arms limitation talks. Another response is referred to as reactive: for example, increased cooperation expressed by Soviet leaders is followed by an increase in commitments (tough postures) by the U.S. negotiators. This evidence supports the claim made in this paper that external factors are important influences on negotiation. It also contributes to strategic planning by helping negotiators anticipate reactions likely to be made by opposing delegates under certain circumstances.

Another lesson is suggested by the discussion in this section:

Take into account events that occur outside the negotiation, in domestic and international politics. Whether close to or distant from the negotiation process, these events can produce many types of effects. Some effects are direct, serving to alter the evaluation of benefits of an agreement. Other effects are indirect, exerting their influence through changes in the bilateral relationship. Careful monitoring can help negotiators anticipate changes in the posture or approach taken by the other side.

This lesson concludes our discussion of contextual factors. We now turn to a discussion of negotiation processes and attempt to derive lessons about its several parts.

**Negotiation Processes**

International negotiation is a process. Clues as to the nature of the final settlement are contained in the process. What is acceptable is a function of what is possible, and this is demonstrated in the act of negotiation. That act can be viewed sequentially, as evolving stages. It can also be viewed as a larger process which includes the decision to negotiate and the selection of a team, location, and format. Both perspectives are covered here, beginning with a consideration of issues of team composition and proceeding in sequence with discussions of setting the stage, the
give-and-take, and the end game. Lessons learned are stated as suggestions on how base-rights negotiators can deal with problems that arise in each of these stages.

**Team Composition**

The cases illustrate the importance of team composition in several ways. These include the comparability of the two delegations, coordination and divisions of labor among the delegates within the teams, the selection of a chief negotiator, and continuity, including experience of delegates in similar previous negotiations, throughout the talks.

**Comparable Delegations.** The problem of comparable delegations is evident in the contrast between the Spanish (1975–1976) and Philippine (1975–1979) talks. Ambassador McCloskey made a careful attempt to assemble a U.S. delegation that paralleled the Spanish team. No such effort was made by the chief U.S. negotiator in the Philippine talks. Two discrepancies in particular were apparent—status and size. Status asymmetries are often treated as symbolic problems which may have practical consequences. For the Philippines, the inequalities were viewed as a reaffirmation of existing differences in power and resources between the countries. Referring to the U.S. delegation as a “junior varsity team,” Philippine journalists inferred that the United States was not giving the talks proper attention. One consequence of these discrepancies is to raise issues that must be treated at higher political levels in the United States or to develop back channels where the “real” negotiating gets done. The problem of difference in size of delegations may also be treated as symbolic; but, it is more clearly operational if key expertise is not assigned to the team. The important role played by legal experts was noted in the context of the Greek talks (1982–1983). Such areas as the wording of agreements and the consequences of different types of agreements require specialists. Without them a delegation is placed at a disadvantage and may even be exploited.

The discussion on comparable delegations suggests the following lesson:

> Delegations should be matched as closely as possible in terms of status of delegates, size, and expertise. If the U.S. delegation is lower in status than the delegation of the host-country, questions will be raised about the extent to which the talks are taken seriously by the United States. Differences in staffing can give the more adequately-staffed delegation a competitive advantage.

**Coordination.** An ideal base-rights delegation would be balanced across the services and between the executive departments concerned. Day-to-day operations would be coordinated between the departments and between the team and the embassy. This ideal was largely realized in the 1982–1983 talks with Greece. It has rarely been achieved elsewhere: delays or impasses in the Philippine, Greek, and Spanish negotiations were due to failures to resolve the issues of coordination. Internal divisions on a delegation also make it vulnerable to exploitation by the other side,
especially when the differences are exposed during the formal talks. For example, the military agreement could be held hostage to the resolution of larger political issues. Understanding the military-political split within the U.S. delegation, the Spanish team appealed to the political sensitivities of the Washington-based negotiators on the U.S. delegation. This tactic was effective in the early rounds of the 1975–1976 talks.

Divided delegations can, however, use their divisions to advantage. The differences in objective or perspective can be turned into a carefully orchestrated division of labor. By creating a framework within which both political and military priorities are considered, the chief negotiator can create a mediational role for the State Department (political) delegates; they “mediate” between their own and the other team’s military representatives. By assigning roles to both embassy and Washington-based delegates, the chief negotiator can create the well-known negotiating tactic referred to as a “good guy–bad guy” routine: strong demands made by the “bad guy” (Washington) are moderated somewhat by the softer demands made by the “good guy” (embassy).

Stearns’s role in the 1982–1983 Greek talks illustrates ways by which a chief negotiator or his deputy can help achieve the goal of coordination, for example, by stopping at relevant military commands before arriving at the negotiating site, by creating inter-agency working groups, and reducing the need for internal negotiations by tactical communications to Washington. Implied here is the importance of the role of the chief negotiator, a topic we turn to next.

A lesson suggested by the discussion above is as follows:

*Divisions within delegations can lead to problems or be used to advantage: on the one hand, unresolved internal differences cause delays and make a delegation vulnerable to exploitation; on the other hand, the internal differences can be molded into a division of labor used tactically for inducing concessions from the other side.*

**Chief Negotiator.** The chief negotiator operates at the boundary between negotiations within his own delegation and negotiations with the other side. He must balance the competing demands made from both directions. To do this effectively entails a certain sensitivity to both national and host country politics. Depending upon the experience and proclivities of the chief negotiator, one or the other of these “sensitivities” is likely to be emphasized. This issue is treated in all the cases as a choice between a Washington-based ambassador—at-large or a sitting ambassador. Reasons are given in favor of each choice depending on the circumstances.

Advantages of a Washington-based chief negotiator are illustrated by the 1975–1976 talks with Spain, the only case to result in a treaty. McCloskey’s relationship with Congress and his understanding of both military and political interests were helpful in moving the agreement with Spain through the treaty process. His attempts to keep key congressional players informed on a regular basis during the talks
facilitated later efforts to convey to them the implications of the agreement. A Washington-based chief negotiator may also be more effective in dealing with the other side: he is not constrained by the ambivalence of a dual role (negotiator and sitting ambassador), nor does he have responsibilities for implementing the agreement. However, this was not the case for the Spanish talks, which were characterized by many crises during their long course. A sitting ambassador may in fact be better at orchestrating negotiations with the other side.

A sitting ambassador usually develops both a deeper appreciation for the political culture of the host country and a relationship with its head of state. These understandings are likely to serve him well in periods of domestic upheaval and change. His central role in the negotiation may also facilitate implementation—that is to say, implementation may be easier for “insiders” than for “outsiders”. Several of the cases provide examples of adroit communication and tactical sensitivity by the sitting ambassador. Even when he is not the chief negotiator, the sitting ambassador can make significant contributions, as McCloskey notes with respect to the role of Ambassador Wells Stabler in the 1975–1976 talks with Spain.

The two roles of the chief negotiator are clearly complementary, but one or the other is more important in terms of time and effort depending on the particular case. Since both roles are needed, a division of labor may be appropriate. Such a division was achieved in the successful 1982–1983 Greek talks. The coordination achieved, as documented by Beach, may be a model for other base-rights negotiations. It also makes clear the necessary parts of the negotiation process: namely, to define a terrain for governments and a structuring of issues, on the one hand, and to resolve disagreements between governments through bargaining on the other.

The discussion on choice of a chief negotiator suggests the following lessons:

(1) A delegation should include the complementary vantage points of a Washington-based ambassador-at-large and a sitting (embassy) ambassador. A division of labor between these roles would contribute to better relations with Congress and the executive branch, on the one hand, and to a more penetrating understanding of host-country priorities on the other. (2) Negotiations which are technically complex and/or intended to produce a treaty would benefit from a Washington-based chief negotiator. (3) Negotiations that occur during domestic crises would benefit from having a sitting ambassador as chief negotiator.

Continuity and Experience. The Washington-based negotiator often brings to the job limited experience with base-rights issues. McCloskey's description of his background for the Spanish base negotiations (1975–1976) illustrates this point. The larger issue is the importance of team continuity or an institutional memory of what had happened before, either in previous negotiations or earlier in the same conference. This issue is discussed in two of the cases, Spain (1975–1976) and the Philippines (1976).
Continuity in a delegation between negotiations means that the delegates will have the advantage of being familiar with the issues and players, but they may also be less dispassionate or biased. One way of preserving the dual advantages of familiarity and "objectivity" is to maintain a carefully-prepared written record of the earlier proceedings. The United States' experience with record-keeping has been uneven: contrast the 1970 (little material) with the 1975–1976 Spanish talks (a record of the plenary discussions). Even carefully kept records, however, may not solve the problem of asymmetries in experience between the U.S. and host-country delegations; host-country delegations usually have more experience, especially the military delegates. This problem may also cut two ways. On the one hand, the U.S. delegates must play "catch up", giving the host country an advantage. On the other hand, the less-experienced delegation may also be less predictable and, therefore, may make it hard for the host country team to plan its strategy in advance.

The issue of team continuity applies also to changes made within a single negotiation. For example, continuity makes it easier to build on earlier progress, but sometimes a break in continuity releases a government from previously-stated commitments and gives the negotiations a fresh start. However, these pros and cons may depend on the type of negotiation. Long political negotiations, as in the case studies of the Panama Canal, Zimbabwe, Cyprus, and the Falklands, may well benefit from periodic changes of delegates. Relatively short technical negotiations, such as base-rights, are less likely to benefit from change, except when team legitimacy or competence is in question.

The various dimensions of team continuity discussed above can be summarized by three lessons:

1. Continuity of delegations between negotiations can be either advantageous or disadvantageous. Experienced negotiators bring with them familiarity with the issues and players, but they may also bring a biased view, based on previous encounters, that does not apply to the new situation.
2. Continuity of delegates within a negotiation is likely to be beneficial for base-rights talks (relatively short, technical negotiations). Changes may be more beneficial in longer talks when a government needs to release itself from previously-stated commitments.
3. Asymmetries in experience between delegations may be either harmful or helpful. On the one hand, a lack of experience can be exploited by the more-experienced delegation; on the other hand, it may make the team less predictable, causing the more-experienced team to revise its initial strategy.

Setting the Stage: Timing, Sites, and Formats

The stage is set when a site is chosen and a format is established. The base-rights negotiators make evident that these are tactical choices with implications
for the course of the deliberations. The first tactical choice is deciding when to negotiate.

**Timing.** Base–rights negotiators have limited control over scheduling because renegotiations occur in planned cycles. However, their governments can initiate a review of the bilateral security arrangements at any time. Such a request was made by Marcos in 1975, just after the United States had departed from Vietnam. Viewed by our commentators as a tactic, the request was apparently designed to exploit a more powerful opponent’s vulnerability. Negotiating from strength, Marcos was ready to seek accommodations from the United States on the large issue of sovereignty. Other nations followed suit; this same issue was raised forcefully by Spain in the base–rights talks of 1975–1976. Another opportunity for leverage was provided earlier to Spain: the loss of Wheelus Air Base in Libya quickly brought the United States back to the table in the 1970 talks.

Just how effective these tactics are is not clear. They may be neutralized by internal problems within the host country. Temporary U.S. vulnerability would seem to be offset by more permanent host–country problems of stability, and the United States has benefited from these circumstances (note in particular the impact of Franco’s death on the 1976 agreement). This interpretation reinforces a conclusion reached in the first volume of case–study analyses, namely, that the international atmosphere influences decisions to negotiate to the extent that the parties recognize and take advantage of the developments.17

**Selection of Site.** The selection of a site is important for many negotiations. Sensitive political talks often benefit from isolation (Contadora Island for the Panama Canal talks), neutrality (Geneva or Vienna for superpower arms–control talks), or a location rich in symbolism (Lancaster House was for the talks on Zimbabwe independence).18 Although not seen as a major issue, location is a concern of base–rights negotiators. The issue is drawn in each case as a choice between Washington or the host–country capital (a neutral or isolated site was not raised in these cases). Each option was chosen in at least one case: Washington in the 1970 talks with Spain; host–country capital in the Philippines in the 1977 negotiation, in Greece in 1982, and in Spain in 1982; and alternation between the two in Spain in 1975–1976. Advantages and disadvantages for both delegations can be cited for each decision.

The convenience of Washington for the U.S. delegation is offset somewhat by possible distractions for delegates with other responsibilities. Communication problems caused by distance from government offices may be compensated for by the foreign delegation’s access to the State Department, especially if the foreign minister plays an active role in the talks, as was the case in the 1970 negotiations with Spain. The convenience of the host–country capital for its delegation may be offset by the visibility of the negotiation within the country or by intrusions by the local press, which may become virtually a “third party,” as has occurred in both the Philippines and in
Greece. Similarly for the U.S. delegation, disadvantages are balanced by some advantages: inconveniences caused by distance, traveling, and a need to abide by host–country customs (note the 5 P.M. meetings in Madrid) versus fewer bureaucratic distractions and a symbolism that could work to its advantage, namely, a recognition by the "buyer" that it is asking for the use of facilities located in a sovereign country.

An implication of this discussion is that alternation is best. Alternating between capital cities offers to both delegations the advantages of each location while balancing the disadvantages evenly. One disclaimer from this view however is a possible disruption in routine caused by the need to travel between rounds. This too can work both ways: a sense of continuity is important when progress is being made; a break in the action is called for when the delegations are at an impasse. Unfortunately we do not have evidence to support or contradict these claims. Difficult negotiations characterized cases both where alternation was used (for example, the 1975–1976 negotiations with Spain) and those held in the host country (for example, the 1977 negotiations with the Philippines and the 1981 talks with Greece). Yet another option is a neutral location. However, this choice would cancel special advantages for one or the other delegation, while not eliminating the problems of travel and distance from bureaucracies. So, until we have more experience with the various formats, the issue remains unresolved. Such lack of resolution is reflected also in the lesson learned.

There are no clear guidelines for choosing a location; each alternative has advantages and disadvantages for both delegations. A choice of location should be made in the context of the circumstances surrounding a particular case.

Format. Issues of format are discussed in each of the cases. Key themes suggested are that both informality and procedural flexibility are desirable. Informality reduces the constraints imposed by official positions. Procedural flexibility allows a chief negotiator to select an option suited to the circumstances of the case. It also allows the process to continue when progress toward a settlement is stalled. The various formats may be functional for different purposes. The importance of privacy was evident in the 1982 Philippine talks: it reduced the vulnerability of the delegates to outside pressures by keeping a lid on sensitive divisions within the host country's delegation. The same negotiations also benefited from holding planned meetings, whether or not serious business was on the agenda: the non–substantive sessions were used as opportunities for the delegates to get to know one another. All the cases illustrate the importance of small working groups in which technical issues and other items can be explored informally ad referendum. Yet despite these advantages of informality there is a place for the more formal plenaries, which can be used to frame the deliberations at the beginning (a ceremonial function) and at the end when agreements are being certified. They also provide a useful format for raising difficult issues to a higher political level, as illustrated in the 1982 talks with Spain.
A lesson learned about negotiating format is the following:

Procedural flexibility increases a negotiator's options: working groups allow for informal exploration of technical issues; private sessions protect against exposing sensitive issues; and plenaries can serve to endorse agreements arrived at in less-formal discussions, as well as to provide a ceremonial function that unites both delegations in a common purpose.

Give-and-Take: Procedures and Tactics for Resolving Issues

The dual goals of negotiation are to get an agreement and to get a "good" agreement. Decisions about procedures, such as timing for raising issues, the structuring of the discussions, and ways of dealing with the bureaucracies represented by the delegates, seem to have implications for progress toward an agreement. Decisions about tactics such as opening moves and concession-making ploys are intended to keep a negotiating team from being exploited. The plausible consequences of employing these tactics are developed more fully in the technical literature on bargaining. (Indeed, further insights into both procedures and tactics can be found in that literature as illustrated by the references cited below.)

Procedures. The case discussions call attention to a variety of procedures designed to move the negotiations through the difficult issues toward an acceptable agreement. These involve proper timing, avoiding impasses, and maintaining flexibility and address such questions as the following: When should contentious issues be raised? When should the details be addressed? When should alternative channels be sought? Are different formats worth exploring? How can a negotiating team adjust to changed circumstances?

The cases provide examples where difficult issues were raised early and where they were postponed until a later time. Lord notes the increasing confrontation as "essential differences were addressed" early (round three) in the 1981–1982 talks with Spain. De Bobes and Fortune comment on the desirability of postponing contentious issues for later consideration, as was done in the Philippines talks in both the 1977–1979 rounds and in the 1983 review. The 1983 Philippines agreement was built piece by piece, from the "bottom up". An implication of these examples is that early confrontations produce impasses that threaten the talks. This implication is supported by Fisher's idea of fractionating issues: small conflicts are easier to resolve than large ones, and the early resolutions provide evidence of progress necessary to sustain the process. Another danger, noted by Lord in the Spanish context, is that controversial proposals made early may have to be retracted later; retractions are likely to lead to impasses. There are however some exceptions. Early confrontation of large issues can serve to clarify the differences between the two sides and to flesh out the steps needed to resolve them, as may have occurred in the 1981–1982 Spanish rounds. It
also may prevent an end-game crisis caused by submerging the major items of contention.  

A related problem concerns the many details that are part of a negotiating package. De Bobes notes that the 1979 Philippine talks were bogged down at the end with many details not considered earlier. Such a problem can be avoided by assigning these issues to working groups assembled during the early rounds. But, it may not be this simple. Zartman’s two-stage theory of negotiation suggests that teams are not prepared to deal with the details until a broad framework or formula is developed. While bargaining over the details may well be a process reserved for later stages, it is also the case that many agreements do not depend on resolving all issues.

Timing seems to affect the likelihood of impasses but plays a smaller role in the resolution of an impasse once it has occurred. At this time other procedures are considered. The most popular procedure for resolving impasses is to shift the talks to a higher political level. Examples of this come from both the Spanish and Philippine cases. Visits by Secretary of State Kissinger and President Ford broke a deadlock in round six of the 1975–1976 talks on the Spanish bases, and meetings between Kissinger and Foreign Minister Cortina produced a framework agreement in round ten; the “super-plenary” session chaired by Secretary of State Haig and the Spanish foreign minister resolved key issues late in the 1982 talks; and in the Philippines, the consultations between President Carter and Mrs. Marcos produced a needed breakthrough in 1977, and the 1978 discussions between Senator Inouye and President Marcos were an important turning point. Each of these meetings was effective in moving the talks forward. The high-level talks served to turn a crisis into an opportunity.

Another option for resolving an impasse is to use the back channel developed between the embassy ambassador and the host-country prime minister. If such a relationship exists it can be properly exploited for resolving sticking points, as was observed during the 1982–1983 Greek talks. Also illustrated is the lesson that it pays to keep the host-country head of state involved in the process, especially if he is the person who must “sign off” on any agreement reached.

Procedural flexibility is illustrated in a number of ways in the different cases. Lord discusses the “two-track” approach used in the 1981–1982 Spanish talks; draft agreements were written on the basis of two scenarios, Spain with or without NATO membership. Fortune illuminates the strategy of piecing together an agreement with the Philippines without needing to seek bureaucratic clearances for each step. And Newsom highlights the importance of flexible instructions to allow a team to take advantage of new developments. Each of these procedures is intended as part of an overall strategy where objectives guide actions but do not constrain a team from adjusting to changed circumstances.

The discussion on procedures suggests several lessons:
(1) Contentious issues cannot be ignored. Timing is important: addressing them too early risks an impasse; postponing them until the end jeopardizes the agreement. (2) Details cannot be ignored. Timing the discussion of these issues is important: raising them for discussion too early may be premature and may sidetrack the negotiation; saving them until the end could detract from the essential task of drafting the agreement. (3) Impasses can be resolved or converted into opportunities by shifting the talks to a higher political level, such as meetings between foreign ministers or heads of state.

These lessons suggest a more general proposition:

**Proc[edural flexibility increases a negotiator's options and allows the team to adjust to changed circumstances.**

**Tactics.** Each of the case discussions provides a window on tactics used by one team to elicit concessions from the other. Many of these are familiar to students of bargaining and have names that catch the popular imagination, for example, bargaining chips, disarming moves, commitment tactics, face-saving, and the various ploys referred to as gamesmanship; others have technical names such as positioning strategies, casuistry, firm but flexible postures, and resolving the boundary-role conflict.

Two kinds of positioning strategies contrasted in the bargaining literature are maximalist and equitable. Maximalist positioning entails asking for more than a negotiator thinks he or she is likely to attain. Equitable positioning consists of taking a stand considered fair to all parties. An example of maximalist positioning occurred when the Spanish delegation took the initiative early in the 1982 talks by presenting drafts of the entire treaty, including the basic treaty, supplementary agreements, and annexes. According to Lord, "it became clear that the Spaniards wanted ... complete control over U.S. bases in Spain." Ramberg's study of the Seabed Arms Control Negotiations highlights the disadvantages of maximalist moves: they waste time, discourage needed concessions, and run the risk of jeopardizing the talks. Both Moscow's and Washington's employment of this strategy "failed either directly or indirectly to move target parties ... and resulted in several months of expenditure of time that could have been avoided." In the Spanish talks it led, in the third round, to increasing confrontation as large differences between the delegations were addressed. (See the earlier discussion on the consequences of addressing large issues early.)

The clearest example of equitable positioning occurred during the 1983 rounds of the Greek talks. Beach credits the agreement to a U.S. posture that acknowledged and accommodated Greek concerns. The U.S. delegation was flexible and its positions reflected agreed goals that could be realized. Ramberg’s study endorses this strategy. He observes that the agreements obtained were due to the “parties maintaining a firm commitment to equitable positions.” In both cases (Greek base rights and Seabeds),
However, the equitable positioning followed earlier problems caused by the reluctance of both sides to alter their demands. Each side in the 1981 Greek talks presented its own draft, refusing to work from the other's text or from an amalgamation of the two documents. The Greek team, in particular, rejected the idea of a bracketed text due to an apparent desire to convey that the negotiations were being conducted in the framework of the Greek text. Similarly in the Seabeds talks, early problems were caused by Moscow's reluctance to move from its opening position on verification and by Washington's commitment to its position on the "three-mile clause." The firmness illustrated by these examples reflected a commitment to maximalist positions. Firm commitment to equitable positions may well have moved the talks forward. A lesson suggested by this discussion is the following.

Avoid maximalist positioning. Negotiations are less likely to be jeopardized when parties offer fair proposals, even when they are firmly committed to these "fair" positions.

The impact of a strategy depends on how the other team reacts. Maximalist positioning by one team often encourages the same stance by the other team in order to protect itself from being exploited. A deadlock results. Another response designed to avoid exploitation is illustrated by Spain's reaction to the U.S. offer of "best efforts" on defense support. In return the Spaniards offered to employ, in effect, their "best efforts" in the use of training facilities. The tactic used by Spain was to counter a vague proposal in one area, where the United States had control, with a vague proposal in another area where control was on their side. By remaining firm on its position, Spain avoided being trapped into an uncertain deal. Lack of movement by both sides, however, served to perpetuate the impasse.

Ambiguity is a large part of any successful negotiation as Ambassador Stearns noted about the 1975–1977 talks with Greece. It can be used tactically to avoid making premature commitments and to preserve options. It is not, however, necessarily a good strategy for communicating progress to or for seeking instructions from the bureaucracy. Stearns refers to this as "a dichotomy between what we were trying to do in Athens...and what we could convince Washington to go along with." Precise communications have the advantage of reducing the chance of internal conflict arising from alternative interpretations of a proposed agreement. Illustrated here is the dilemma of the boundary role occupied by a negotiating team, namely, to deal at the same time with the conflicting expectations of the other team and with its own bureaucratic constituents. The many strategies that can be used to resolve this problem are discussed in the labor–management context by Walton and McKersie. Examples include persuading principals to revise their expectations, misrepresenting the actual achievements, and tacit bargaining as a way of explaining to the opponent that his actions are not to be taken seriously.
In certain circumstances a team can use information tactically to extract concessions from the opponent. In all three base negotiation cases the host country recognized that the United States was vulnerable to comparisons with other base-rights talks and demanded that it be given (at least) the same treatment accorded to other countries. Cummings notes how the Spanish team studied all other base agreements to get the best deal on each issue, Norton and Newsom comment on how the Philippines delegation made invidious comparisons among the various U.S. installations in an attempt to increase the assistance package, and Stearns emphasizes the importance to Greece of parallel agreements made between the United States and Turkey, noting in particular their insistence on maintaining the well-known seven to 10 ratio of assistance. The parallel base-rights agreements are standards for comparison analogous to “going rates in the industry” for labor-management negotiators. Like going rates, the information is difficult to refute and can be used tactically to extract concessions from the “company” or, in this case, the U.S. government. Unlike going rates, however, the United States retains control over other agreements and can avoid being exploited by careful coordination of the various negotiations.

An even more effective tactic perhaps is to refer to earlier agreements as “proof” of concessions. The earlier agreements are used as “evidence” to support arguments that “we” cannot concede further, placing the burden of concession-making on the opponent. Referred to in the literature as commitment tactics, this approach, which called attention repeatedly to the asymmetry of the 1953 agreement in favor of the United States, was used by Greece. Aggravated by a deteriorating bilateral relationship, the unsuccessful rounds in the late 1970s and early 1980s were held hostage to Greek claims that they deserved a better return in exchange for previous arrangements. Turning the argument around, Greece also assigned earlier proposals made by the United States the status of agreements. The Greeks, claiming that a retraction would be in bad faith, attempted to hold the U.S. delegation to proposals made in earlier rounds. These tactics probably work best when the target has few alternatives to a negotiated agreement.

The clever tactician can extract concessions from the opponents either by releasing them from previous commitments or by holding them to those commitments. The former is managed by creating the perception that concessions should not be viewed as compromises of larger principles or precedents. The latter is orchestrated by creating the perception that proposals made are regarded as firm offers that serve as points of departure for further bargaining. Both tactics were employed by Greece, along with more subtle variants on this theme. Greek demands for U.S. concessions were treated, according to Kovner, as a “test” of U.S. friendship. Implied here is a trade of tangible benefits for intangible rewards. This “art of casuistry”, as it is referred to by Schelling, is the means used by parties who receive benefits—in this case Greece—to create perceptions of benefits for non-receivers—the United States. Greece’s offer of friendship, and its concern for the political relationship between the
countries, is the *perceived* benefit exchanged for the *received* benefits in the form of military hardware and Greek control of the use of the bases. Ironically, however, in the end it was Greece, not the United States, that was willing to forego tangible items for less tangible political advantages.

But not all tactics produce the desired effects. Some may actually backfire. For example, poor coordination between bureaucratic decision making and negotiating strategy undermined the effective use of bargaining chips to extract desired concessions from the Greek delegation. The issue of home porting was used by Stearns as a negotiating card to be cashed in for valuable Greek concessions. Crossed signals destroyed the plan: just as Stearns was promoting its value in the negotiation, policymakers in Washington made a unilateral decision to drop the request. More generally, delegations often attempt to create the impression that they prepared very carefully, and exhaustively, for the upcoming rounds. Rather than achieving the desired effect of intimidation (and conveying the message that they will not be exploited), this ploy may serve to motivate negotiators on the opposing delegation to prepare with considerable care. One result is a team more thoroughly prepared than their "clever" counterparts. Another is a slowed pace caused by a felt need to educate the other team as they go along.

Sometimes an extra effort is needed to insure coordination among the various agencies represented on the delegation. Ambassador Bartholomew's visits to the U.S. military commands in Europe were designed to disarm potential criticism from military delegates. His plan was to avoid the sorts of internal divisions that occurred in the earlier talks with Spain. The result was enhanced team cohesion and a workable division of labor that contributed to the success of the 1982-1983 rounds with Greece.

Several lessons are suggested by the discussion in this section on tactics.

1. **Preserve negotiating options by avoiding premature commitments to proposals made in the formal negotiations.**
2. **Information can be used tactically to extract concessions from an opponent.** Agreements reached in parallel negotiations serve as standards for comparison; concessions made earlier can be used as evidence for shifting the burden of concession-making to the opponent.
3. **Coordinate parallel base-rights negotiations and agreements.** Careful coordination can protect the delegation from pressure tactics deriving from invidious comparisons made by the host country.
4. **Ensure that decisions made by policymaking agencies are coordinated with proposals made and tactics employed by the negotiating team.** Lack of communication between the bureaucracy and team can result in retractions, premature commitments, and impasses.

**The End Game: Procedures and Tactics for Sealing the Agreement**

Base-rights negotiators must pay special attention to the end game, to closing the deal or sealing the agreement. Care must be taken to insure that the momentum
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gained is not lost due to mistakes made at the end. The time-sensitive nature of base-rights talks creates a decision dilemma where negotiators are faced with a threefold choice: to agree, to continue negotiating, or to abandon the talks.

The strong end effects often observed of a rush to agreement are due to an appraisal that both sides lose in the case of a prolonged negotiation. Ikle argues more generally that this is likely to occur in extension negotiations. But this occurs usually after a period of agonizing over the wording of the agreement, a task which may be further aggravated by non-resolved issues or details not considered earlier.

The Decision Dilemma. A failure to resolve all issues, notably the most contentious ones, means that negotiators must choose between available agreements, which may not be optimal, and the best alternative to a negotiated agreement, which may not be desirable. This choice is placed in bold relief by a deadline that is the date when the previous agreement terminates (the United States no longer has rights to operate bases in the host country). It can be forced on one team by the other through delay tactics as was evident in the 1981 Spanish negotiations. Spain’s unwillingness to begin negotiations was interpreted as a delay tactic intended to put pressure on the United States. And it seemed to work: the United States lost its “negotiating edge” and suffered a casualty in the resignation of its chief negotiator. The new U.S. representative, the resident ambassador, countered this tactic by insisting on an extension of the treaty termination date. By refusing to negotiate on Spanish timelines—by holding tough—he was able to get Spain to agree to an eight-month extension.

Some consequences of attempting to meet the host-country’s deadlines are illustrated by Collins’s description of the 1980–1981 round of talks with the Greeks. Domestic pressures on the Greek government caused its delegation to press for an early favorable agreement. Therefore, the U.S. delegation was confronted with a decision dilemma: cooperate with the Greeks by signing an agreement or create ill-will with them by refusing to be pressured into an agreement prematurely. Caught in a very difficult situation, the U.S. team chose to cooperate in an unsuccessful attempt to meet the Greek deadline. This choice produced a chaotic negotiation process with both teams working around the clock, neither having the time to reflect on the implications of an agreement reached in this manner. In this case, they were saved by the gun. Having failed to conclude a bad agreement, the teams met again in 1982 for a better organized and less pressured set of rounds that resulted in a successful arrangement.

Other difficulties during the end game are exposed in these cases. One is the problem of letting details accumulate for “later” resolution. Another is the problem, discussed earlier, of putting off the discussion of contentious issues. Both problems discussed by De Bobes in the context of the 1979 Philippine talks entailed last-minute maneuvering that could have been avoided by confronting the issues at an earlier
stage. They can also be handled by not linking an agreement to a resolution of all issues or by "kicking" them up to a higher political level as was done in the 1982 Spanish talks and in the 1982–1983 Greek talks.31

Yet another tactic was used to resolve the final issues in the successful 1983 Greek talks. Greece's insistence for a U.S. commitment on aid was satisfied not by a specific commitment but by a letter that summarized an understanding reached with the U.S. secretary of state. The letter provided a legal explanation of why the United States could not specify aid levels and gave the Greek delegation an excuse to drop its demand. Two purposes were served: the Greeks could retract their demand without appearing weak; and the talks were not jeopardized in the end game.

More generally, the problem for a negotiator (and analyst) is to distinguish between tactical rhetoric and real interests. Much of the inflammatory rhetoric seen in each of the cases was due to a difference of approach: the United States, arguing for an updating of the previous agreement, treated base rights as an extension negotiation, while the host countries, arguing for a changed political relationship, treated it as an innovation or redistribution negotiation. In the end, however, the host countries dropped their demands. Apparently they did not want to risk the losses that would result from a U.S. withdrawal. For this reason it may pay to focus attention on deeds, not words. The strong rhetoric used by each of the host countries in these cases may well be more a tactic to extract concessions than an ultimatum to close the bases.

Lessons suggested by the discussion in this section are as follows:

(1) Avoid being confronted by a decision dilemma. Unresolved issues in the face of a deadline lead to hasty actions without proper consideration of available options. (2) Avoid postponing details and contentious issues. An accumulation of large and small issues at the end jeopardizes the agreement. (3) Pay more attention to actions than to rhetoric. Tough rhetoric is often used as a tactic for extracting concessions, not an ultimatum to abandon the negotiations.

Wording of the Agreement. If words are less important than actions during the process of negotiating, they are not less important when the agreement is being drafted. The distinction is between words as tactical devices and as reflections of real interests. Although this distinction is difficult to make during the earlier stages of a negotiation, it may be seen more clearly during the end game when a text is being composed. Several examples are provided by these cases. The concern in each instance is about obligations implied by a particular term. In Spain and the Philippines it was about "best efforts" language; in the Philippine talks it was the distinction between rent and assistance; and in the Greek talks it was the meaning of the word "terminates."

Perhaps the most difficult problem for base-rights negotiators is the ambiguity of "best efforts" language. It jeopardized the Spanish and Philippines agreements and has been a lingering source of dissatisfaction for those countries ever since. Spanish acceptance of this language came only after it was clear that the U.S. delegation had
no decision latitude on the issue. This experience also served as a precedent for the talks in which the Philippine delegation reluctantly accepted the language borrowed from the Spanish text. At issue here is the actual commitment of funds. A related issue deals with control over how the funds will be spent. This surfaced as a dispute in both the Philippine and Greek talks over whether the compensation was to be called rent or assistance. In the case of the Philippines, the issue was resolved by separating the bases from the "mutuality of interests served by military and economic assistance." In the Greek case, various alternatives to a flat fee were contrived: Kovner notes "payments of another kind...political declarations of support for Greek interests or an improvement of the seven to 10 ratio." Even more enlightening was the debate between Greece and the United States over the word "terminable." The difference between "can be terminated" (U.S. preference) and "is terminated" (Greek preference) is a difference in interests, the former leaving the door open for continuation, the latter closing the door to automatic renewal. Here, the resolution favored the Greek preference for wording but the U.S. preference for meaning. Placed in context, this phrase conveys the message that the agreement does not terminate unless written notification is given.

These examples call attention to the special contributions made by lawyers on the delegation. Some situations call for added precision; others for ambiguity. This applies also to problems of mutual interest to the delegations. Language can provide a cosmetic solution to political needs that must be satisfied to get an agreement. In some circumstances added precision is required; in the Spanish context, issues of sovereignty and status of forces were resolved through language, even though the documents had no operational significance. Other problems call for ambiguity. This was recognized in the Spanish context as a need to "devise a linguistic formula" to prevent domestic or bureaucratic complications. In the Philippines, it was recognized in the distinction between a treaty and an executive agreement, the former requiring broad interpretations in order to appeal to diverse audiences.32 Behind the words, however, are perhaps more essential contributions made by the lawyers. They provide needed advice on matters relating to international law, including U.S. legal issues and implications of the differences between treaties and executive agreements. And they can employ their conflict-resolution skills in the role of facilitator, as Levitt notes in the context of the successful 1982-1983 Greek talks.

Words are construed as instruments used to satisfy the needs of diverse constituencies and audiences with stakes in the agreement. Those stake holders can also be a problem during the drafting process. Fortune illustrates the competing claims within the Philippine government over allocating funds to be committed under the "best efforts" arrangement. These claims further complicate the decision dilemma by expanding the range of considerations to be entertained. One consequence is to slow the end game process; another is to create last-minute crises that jeopardize the agreement. To avoid these consequences, it is necessary to keep the claimants at a
distance during the drafting process. Isolated settings help, but the point is to ensure that all members of the delegations treat the emerging drafts with confidentiality, as was the case in the 1982 Philippine talks. A document which is presented as a fait accompli goes a long way toward disarming the critics.

Lessons suggested by the discussion in this section on wording of the agreement are as follows:

1. Do not underestimate the value of words as instruments of conflict resolution. Language can be used to satisfy those political needs that must be satisfied in order to get an agreement; for some problems this entails added precision, for others ambiguity. (2) Avoid outside pressures during the process of drafting the agreement. Isolated settings help. So, too, does a consensus among the delegates that the draft texts will be treated as confidential.

Sustaining the Agreement: Problems of Implementation

A base-rights agreement spells out the rights and obligations that govern the operation of U.S. bases located in a foreign country. It does not solve all the issues surrounding the negotiations. These issues are part of the larger political context discussed in earlier sections. They are, on the one hand, broad issues concerning the relationship between the countries and, on the other, more focused concerns about implementation. Issues of relationship are long-term concerns that persevere. Issues regarding implementation are matters to be dealt with in the short term, between negotiations. The implications for lessons learned are discussed in this section. Newsom's observations on the common elements of base-rights negotiations suggest that the parties have a mutual interest in maintaining the arrangement: the United States does not have a better alternative location and the host countries derive benefits they would prefer to retain. Yet there are uncertainties on both sides. Each renegotiation is an opportunity for the host country to introduce new demands and for the United States to reevaluate its policies in response to changed conditions. Host-country demands have included dramatic increases in the price (especially Spain and the Philippines), a stronger recognition of the host country's need for sovereignty in matters of jurisdiction, more control over decisions to allocate funds received from the United States (note the use of the term rent rather than assistance), and an increased concern about the vulnerability of the bases in potential East-West confrontations. Prospects for changed conditions include continued domestic instability in the Philippines, a change in Spain's role in the European Community and in relation to NATO, and further turmoil in the tempestuous relationship between Greece and Turkey. Always looming over the horizon in each of these countries is a possible change of regime; Marcos's avowed commitment to a U.S. presence has not been endorsed with equal vigor by President Aquino. Added to these uncertainties is Brown's observation that "nationalism will be the dominant motif of the next five years." In light of these developments, the current U.S. position that "best efforts" is
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all it can offer needs to be closely examined. Not only is it a major source of insecurity for the host countries, it is a factor that could unravel the bilateral condominium currently enjoyed by both countries.

Given these uncertainties, how can a nation craft policies that would prevent arrangements and relationships from being destroyed? Some possibilities are suggested. Most generally both the United States and the host countries must adjust to changed circumstances with sensitivity to the psychological and political implications of those changes. Three types of adjustments are needed concerning the bilateral relationship, the nature of the agreement, and the U.S. Congress.

With regard to the relationship, Bork notes the importance of a decision to go for a treaty in the 1975–1976 talks with Spain. This served to create a more intimate relationship between the countries at a time when the talks were at an impasse. But issues of relationship should be separated from the details of a base-rights agreement; raising them in the context of discussions over rights and obligations only serves to delay the process, as it did during the 1975–1976 talks with Spain. These larger issues can be handled in a back channel such as private discussions between the ambassador-in-residence and the prime minister. Recognizing the leader's special need for a U.S. presence, the ambassador can reinforce the bilateral relationship simply by staying in touch on a regular basis. Evidence for the effectiveness of this action is provided by Stearns's account of his role in the 1982–1983 talks with Greece.

The key problem with regard to the agreement is its duration. More frequent crises occur for short-duration agreements. Host countries (and the United States) simply have more opportunities to attempt to upset existing arrangements and institutions. Longer-term agreements (e.g., ten-year treaties) would reduce the frequency with which new demands are made. It would also give both countries more time to develop principles and policies apart from the pressures of implementation. However, whether the agreements are of short or long duration, it is essential to develop clear language about renegotiation provisions. The dispute over the word "terminable" in the 1982–1983 talks with Greece illustrates that either party can become a victim of its choice of words. Indeed, this is a delicate process requiring close attention to be sure that no stone is left unturned.

Brown and others comment on the increasing involvement of the U.S. Senate in the negotiation process. This can be a two-edged sword: on the one hand, it may facilitate ratification or acceptance of the agreement; on the other hand, it introduces additional opinions complicating an already-complicated process, as has already been mentioned in the earlier discussion on tactics for resolving the negotiator's boundary-role dilemma. The delegation's challenge is to keep the senators in the game while fostering a bipartisan consensus on policy and tactics. Most important in
Conclusions

In a recent issue of the American Scientist, Keith Stewart Thomson commented with regard to horsemanship, "I have also discovered empirically that, as with so many things that science has made clear, it is a lot easier in theory than in practice." This observation would seem to apply also to the study and practice of negotiation. It is useful to ask, once again, whether the lessons drawn from these base negotiation case studies can be regarded as advice to practitioners. The case in favor turns on the status of the lessons; they are insights recovered from past experience stated as prescriptions or guidelines for action. The case against hinges on the method used to elicit the lessons and on the limited "data base." The lessons summarize observations made in hindsight, are based on only a few cases, and may highlight the exceptional rather than the typical experience. Ultimately, the issue can only be settled in practice. Do the lessons alert the practitioner to pitfalls? Do they serve as an aid to planning? Meanwhile, we can make some preliminary determinations.

Four types of lessons were identified as being particularly useful by a practitioner-expert who participated in the symposia. These include the insights reached about delegations, procedures, tactics, and the use of language. Some examples follow.

* Delegations. The negotiation process benefits from delegations matched closely in terms of status, size, and expertise. Delegations to a base-rights negotiation benefit from continuity of team members.

* Procedural flexibility. Flexibility increases a negotiator's options with respect to structure or format (working groups, informal sessions, plenaries) and to changed circumstances (timing discussion of issues, dealing with impasses).

* Tactical advice. (1) Avoid making premature commitments to proposals. (2) Ensure coordination of decisions made by policymaking agencies with proposals and tactics used by the negotiating team. (3) Do not confuse rhetoric with actions; distinguish between statements used (by own or other team) as tactics to extract concessions and those used to convey policies or decisions.

* The value of words. Language plays an important role in resolving political differences that prevent attaining an agreement.

These lessons have in common the element of control over decisions and operations. Each is an aspect of the process that can be manipulated by policymakers and diplomats: selection of delegates, choice of procedures and language, orchestration of tactics. Advice given in these areas can be acted on in an expedient fashion, although desirable consequences depend on skillful execution. More problematic, of course, are suggestions made about processes over which delegates have less control. Many of our lessons are "easier in theory than in practice." Negotiators' control over outside events and negotiating crises is clearly limited. So too is their ability to prevent the accumulation of unresolved issues and details in the end game. Many
circumstances require adjustment, and appropriate adjustments are the result of careful monitoring of developments as they unfold through the course of the talks. Monitoring is also important to insure coordination among the various agencies with a stake in the outcome, as well as among the parallel base-rights talks being conducted by the United States. Preventive medicine is desirable, and our lessons are in that tradition. Sometimes, however, it is too late and we must treat the illness (a negotiating crisis) before the patient dies (no agreement).

This study is part of a continuing agenda of examination for lessons learned. Some of these may be general, transcending the contexts in which they were discovered, while others may be more clearly rooted in the particular settings of those cases. Following is a brief synopsis of insights generated by this study.

* Context. (1) Base-rights negotiators must deal with the legacy of earlier talks; that legacy is a framework against which new agreements are evaluated. (2) Base-rights negotiators have the advantage of long experience for distinguishing between the temporary and enduring aspects of negotiating style. (3) Although many international negotiations highlight the importance of external events, the base-rights cases call attention to the difference between direct and indirect effects from these events.

* Team composition. Advantages and disadvantages are found for team continuity and change, although continuity is seen to be more beneficial for short, technical negotiations like base rights; the issue of matching delegations is raised in the base-rights context where there are sensitivities about big power–small power asymmetries.

* Formats. Advantages are found for flexible formats (moving among working groups, private sessions, and plenaries); location is a less sensitive issue for base-rights talks than for other negotiations, although the importance of isolation during the end game is emphasized.

* Tactics and procedures. These cases highlight the importance of early moves, of preventing contentious issues and details from accumulating, and of developing credible alternatives to negotiated agreements; attention is given to the issue of timing and to the tactical use of parallel negotiations in the base-rights cases.

* The end game. New insights were developed from the base-rights cases. These include the tactical use of rhetoric, the decision dilemma in the face of a deadline, and the special role played by language in resolving political differences.

* Sustaining the agreement. These cases emphasize different actions to avoid jeopardizing the agreement: clarity in provisions, Senate support, and a good relationship between the sitting ambassador and the prime minister.

More generally, we have learned that negotiations are conditioned by an interplay between context and process. The one or the other receives more attention depending on the specific case. Context is highlighted for cases rooted in international diplomacy, like the Panama Canal, the Falklands/Malvinas, or Cyprus. Process is
emphasized in cases like base rights where the bilateral relationship is adjusted through periodic negotiations.

As was noted earlier, base-rights negotiation is becoming an increasingly important domain in the policy and diplomatic communities. This paper is presented as a contribution to that domain. Two questions however remain unanswered. Can we distinguish between lessons that apply to negotiation in general and those that apply only to specific contexts? Can we distinguish between those that are useful primarily in theory and those that are useful in practice? Answers to both these questions await further studies. The lessons accumulated to date must be refined in a continuing analytical exercise. We can compare the lessons against new insights recovered from other cases or treat them as hypotheses to be evaluated in a more rigorous fashion. Both types of exercises would contribute to judgments of relevance, whether this is defined in terms of general versus specific applicability or as theory versus practice.
Notes

(1) D. B. Bendahmane and J. W. McDonald, Jr., Perspectives on Negotiation: Four Case Studies and Interpretations (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, 1986).

(2) See, for example, the International Studies Quarterly.


(13) See the review of these studies in D. Druckman, "Social Psychology and International Negotiations."


(16) D. Druckman, Four Cases of Conflict Management: Lessons Learned," in Perspectives on Negotiations, pp. 270-271.

(17) Ibid., p. 275.

(18) Ibid., pp. 276-279.


(22) See pp. 282-283 in D. Druckman, "Four Cases of Conflict Management" for a discussion of this point.

(23) See ibid., pp. 281-282, for other examples of alternative negotiating formats which allow the process to continue when progress toward an agreement is stalled.


(25) Ibid., p. 91.


(28) Ibid.

(29) Ikle, How Nations Negotiate.
(30) Ibid.


(32) See also, ibid, p. 283.

(33) Iké, How Nations Negotiate.

(30) Ibid.


(32) See also, ibid p. 283.

(33) Iklé, *How Nations Negotiate*.

Appendix
Symposia Participants by Case

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<td>Chief Negotiator for the 1976 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Spain and Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations</td>
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<td>Donald J. Flanty</td>
<td>Department of State representative on the negotiating team—1982 Agreement on Friendship, Defense, and Cooperation with Spain</td>
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<td>Norman C. Lord</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff representative on the negotiating team for the 1982 Agreement on Friendship, Defense, and Cooperation with Spain</td>
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<td>Patrick M. Norton</td>
<td>Legal Adviser to delegation to the Philippines, 1975-1977</td>
<td>Preliminary Negotiations for the 1979 Agreement</td>
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<td>Rick De Bobes</td>
<td>Member of delegation to the Philippines, 1975-1979 and head of the</td>
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<td>David Newsom</td>
<td>Member of delegation to the Philippines, 1975-1979 and head of the</td>
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<td>Jacob W. Uilva</td>
<td>Analyst of the 1975-1978 Philippine negotiations and Vice President</td>
<td>Turning Point: An Analysis</td>
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<td>of Decision Science Consortium, Inc.</td>
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<td>John F. Maineo</td>
<td>Director of Office of Philippine negotiations and Vice President of Decision</td>
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<td>Warren H. Adam</td>
<td>U.S. Navy Judge Advocate specializing in the negotiation and implementation of</td>
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<td>status-of-forces agreements</td>
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<td>Terence J. Fortune</td>
<td>Assistant Legal Adviser for East Asian Affairs, Department of State, involved in</td>
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<td>Philip E. Bartinger</td>
<td>Defense Adviser in 1976 Philippines negotiations</td>
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<td>Fred Brown</td>
<td>Member of the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and advisor on East</td>
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<td>Milton Kovner</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Mission to the U.S. Embassy in Athens</td>
<td>The 1981 Negotiations</td>
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<td>Dwight W. Beach</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff representative to the 1981-1983 negotiations with Greece</td>
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<td>Dwight W. Beach</td>
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<td>David T. Jonge</td>
<td>Executive Assistant to Chief Negotiator, 1982-1983 negotiations; Principal Officer in charge of Greek Affairs, Department of State</td>
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<td>Phillip E. Barringer</td>
<td>Director of Foreign Military Rights Affairs in International Security Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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