Global Projections of Deep-Rooted U.S. Pathologies

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Johan Galtung, born in Oslo, Norway, is one of the founders of peace and conflict studies. He is the author of more than fifty books and numerous articles in the field of peace and development, social science theory, and methodology. His latest book, *Peace by Peaceful Means*, was published this year by Sage Press. Professor Galtung is the founder of the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo, Norway (1959), and *The Journal of Peace Research* (1964).

Currently a professor at the European Peace University in Austria and at the Universität Witten/Herdecke, Dr. Galtung has taught at universities worldwide. He holds the title Honorary Professor at the Universidad de Alicante, the Freie Universität Berlin, Sichuan University, and Universität Witten/Herdecke, and the title Dr. Honoris Causa at the University of Tampere, University of Cluj, Uppsala University, Soka University, and the Universität Osnabrück.

Dr. Galtung is the recipient of the Right Livelihood Award (1987), the Norwegian Humanist Prize (1988), the Socrates Prize for Adult Education (1990), the Bajaj International Award for Promoting Gandhian Values (1993), and the Alo’ha International Award (1995).
ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

The Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia, has as its principal mission to advance the understanding and resolution of significant and persistent conflicts among individuals, communities, identity groups, and nations.

To fulfill this mission, the Institute conducts a wide range of activities and outreach. Among these are academic programs at the graduate level offering the Doctor of Philosophy and Master of Science in Conflict Resolution, clinical consultancy services offered by individual faculty, research and publications, and a very wide range of public programs and education that include ICAR’s Annual Vernon M. and Minnie I. Lynch Lecture.

ICAR’s major research interests include the study of deep-rooted conflict and its resolution; the exploration and analysis of conditions attracting parties to the negotiation table; the role of third parties in dispute resolution; and the testing of a variety of conflict intervention methods in local communities and in national and international settings.

ICAR’s Applied Practice and Theory Program (APT), draws on faculty, students, and allied practitioners to form teams to analyze and help resolve broad areas of conflict, addressing such topics as crime and violence, conflict in the schools and other community institutions, and jurisdictional conflicts within and between local governments.

Associated with ICAR are its affiliate organizations that promote and apply conflict resolution principles, including the Consortium on Peace Research, Education and Development (COPRED), an international network of more than 300 college and university peace studies programs; the National Conference on Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution (NCPCR), which maintains communication with conflict resolution professionals nationwide and conducts a biennial conference bringing them together; and the Northern Virginia Mediation Service (NVMS), which offers conflict resolution and mediation services to schools, courts, and other community institutions across Northern Virginia and the Washington metropolitan area.
FOREWORD

It gives me great pleasure to introduce ICAR's 1996 Lynch lecturer, Professor Johan Galtung, who was born in Oslo, Norway, nine years before World War II. Galtung's Norwegian birth is important; Norway's struggle for its independence from both Denmark and Sweden has given Norwegians, and Johan, a certain toughness of character and independence of spirit. Ever since the final act of secession in 1905, Norwegians have pursued their national interests through skillful internationalism. Like New Zealanders or, indeed, like citizens from all small and strategically vulnerable countries, Norwegians know what it is to articulate and promote their national politics, culture, art, literature, and music while living under the shadow of larger more powerful countries. They know the sorts of survival skills that are necessary to retain their independence and maintain equitable relationships with their neighbors and others.

It is no accident, therefore, that Norway and the other Nordic countries do so well in terms of international aid and development issues and the articulation of other global concerns. Johan has been conditioned by the "good international citizenship" of his native land, which contributes to his globalism. Among his formative experiences during the Second World War were the trauma of the German occupation and the deportation of his father to a German concentration camp. These experiences were undoubtedly influential in shaping Johan's later intellectual and political interests in war, peace, and injustice.

As a student Galtung was profoundly influenced by the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess who introduced him to the giddy world of ideas and theories and stretched his sense of what it means to be a committed intellectual. Naess encouraged him to make global sense of Gandhi (the subject of last year's Lynch Lecture). The Norwegian government helped his Gandhian endeavor by calling him to do military service and, upon his refusal to serve, by sentencing him to six months in prison as a conscientious objector. It was during this imprisonment that he finished his first book on Gandhi and dedicated himself to a lifelong commitment to understanding how to build a nonviolent world.

A true Renaissance man, Johan Galtung began his academic career in mathematics from which he developed a solid appreciation for logic and intellectual rigor. Rather than applying this to abstract physics or pure mathematics, he decided to direct his attention to the social sciences. He wrote some extremely important papers on the philosophy of the social sciences and on the logic of enquiry, all the while honing his taxonomic and theory-building skills, but he never forgot his concern to build a world where fear, injustice, and evil are replaced with trust, justice, and peaceful relationships. Very early on, he dedicated himself to the task of ensuring that peace research is as academically rigorous as any other academic discipline.
Galtung was also concerned to ensure that peace research, as a separate academic discipline, might incorporate a unique combination of solid teaching, theory, and practice. To this end, he established the Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO), the first international peace research institute in the world. He was founder and editor of The Journal of Peace Research, which remains the leading academic journal in the field, and has produced endless provocative and path-breaking essays in peace research and in the social sciences as they are more generally conceived.

In all this work Johan has been concerned to engage the issues in ways that make sense to people and, more importantly, in ways which will transform relationships and situations. From the very beginning of his work at PRIO, he has remained committed to exploring the conditions for peace by peaceful means and has not shirked from trying to define these concepts. Second, Johan, himself a sociologist, a mathematician, a self-trained economist, political scientist, and theologue, has worked to ensure that peace and conflict research is interdisciplinary. He, like the others of us working in this field, realizes that no single discipline is able to help us solve the problems posed by war, militarism, injustice, environmental disintegration, and gross violations of individual and collective rights but that this exploration has to be truly global in scope. We cannot understand how to build world peace from narrow national perspectives; multilateral transnational institutions are not optional extras but essential to our survival.

Throughout his long and active life Johan has pursued all these concerns with rigor, excitement, and boldness. Not content to do this from the safety of a university institution, he has been involved, over the years, in efforts to resolve 24 major global conflicts; to each of these dilemmas he brought sophisticated awareness of players and issues and shed light on conflicts that seemed hopeless before he began addressing them. In addition to being a peace and conflict researcher and practitioner, Johan is a strong peace advocate and peace educator, equally at home talking to political leaders as to student groups.

I cannot end this introduction without talking about Johan’s wife, Fumiko Nishimura Galtung, who has been critical in helping him think, write, and talk about the deep cultural divide between East and West (Occidental/Oriental) and western and eastern religions, or—as he calls them—the hard and the soft religions. She has challenged him to think afresh about the ways in which different cultures frame issues of war and peace; their marriage is a unique blending of East and West. It gives me very great pleasure to introduce you to Professor Johan Galtung, Renaissance thinker, pioneer peace researcher, educator, advocate, and global citizen par excellence.

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GLOBAL PROJECTIONS OF DEEP-ROOTED U.S. PATHOLOGIES*

1. A Prologue: Irrational, Violent, Foreign Policy Action

Barbara W. Tuchman, in her fine book *The March of Folly*, studies four cases of foreign policy actors—Troy in the Battle of Troy, the Renaissance Popes during the Protestant Reformation, England and the American Revolution, and the USA in Viêt Nam—and concludes that their actions cannot be described as anything but simply foolish. What they enacted worked out extremely badly. Their so-called decisions made them look foolish, if not to their contemporaries, then at least to posterity. Tuchman presents three criteria for a policy to be characterized as a “folly”:

1. *It was perceived as counterproductive in its own time;*
2. *A feasible alternative course of action was available; and*
3. *The policy was not the policy of one particular ruler only.*

Tuchman tries to recreate debates, doubts, and alternatives at the time to avoid the hindsight of our generation and is interested in policies “of a group, not an individual ruler.” In spite of critical and constructive debate, the decision-makers nonetheless went ahead with their decisions, the follies were enacted, and the policies turned against their makers. To Tuchman that seems to be the key criterion of irrationality, and the antidote is to be guided by (national) self-interest.

However, they might have been guided by that self-interest, enlightened or not, but simply made a wrong calculation of the probabilities and utilities of the outcomes. Rationality badly carried out and/or enacted does not add up to irrationality. There was a conscious thought process, pre- dicting outcomes of a chosen action, perhaps even allocating some utilities to the outcomes, egoistically or altruistically defined. That something or everything goes wrong, as often happens, is another matter (or nonrationality).
Rather, irrationality or nonrationality should be identified with and defined as that which does not pass the human ratio—the individual conscious and the collective conscious shared by a group of people (e.g., a group of decision-makers)—at all. Ratio works on facts and values, to use that overworked distinction, available to scrutiny by the human mind and used as premises for drawing conclusions. The process is, in principle, inter-subjectively communicable and reproducible, at least within a competence group that has been initiated, even anointed: a court, a guild, a national or world security council. After due deliberation, weighing capabilities, intentions, and circumstances of all kinds, the decision emerges: "put to use by reasonable men to reasonable ends." Ratio operates, at least potentially, in full daylight. Ratio presupposes reflection.

Whether conceived of as a theory of rational decision-making (taking into account only rational factors or reasons present in the decision-makers) or as a rational theory of decision-making (using only factors available to the rational researcher), this theory or approach can best be characterized by one word: naive. To take the simplest counterexamples: where is the action born out of rage or fear, pique, or lust? Out of irratio, passing no ratio at all? The approach presupposes a calm leader at his desk, much like researchers at theirs when theorizing about him.

Some recent medical research gives us a metaphor: the naive approach sees the human actor as steered by the brain in the head only, the head-brain, not by the gut-brain that is down in the guts, similar to the head-brain, but processing, generating gut feelings more than explicit facts and values. These are also reasons, individual and collective, but unacknowledged by ratio.

In this paper decision-making in the inter-state system will be analyzed as to a large extent irrational, meaning guided by motives unknown to the elites running the country. The approach will use some psychoanalytical metaphors, raising the problem of whether a paradigm developed for intra-personal processes can also be used to analyze intra-state processes, even when done with care.

Three basic reasons can be put forward. First, nations, like persons, have histories of trauma, glory, and plain routine, deposited in the memory, available to the conscious level or sedimeted in the subconscious. The sum of these individual "subconscioussnesses" is the collectively shared national subconscious. Why should that not influence decision-making, particularly in a un-national country? Second, regardless of the complexity of the country, in the interstate system it is supposed to speak and act as one person and is even referred to as an actor. Why should there not also be a place where elites think, feel, and will like one person, with a certain coherence, drawn from conscious
and subconscious levels? Guarded by secrecy because the subconscious will be drawn upon? Third, in that interstate system interaction with other coherent states will reinforce the coherence, making it systemic.

It follows that people far removed from government actors (like women, the very young, lower classes, marginal nations) may share less of the subconscious when they are engaging in intercountry interaction, e.g., in nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or in transnational corporations (TNCs). The theory is mainly for bilateral government-to-government interaction and for multi-lateral interaction in intergovernmental organizations (IGOs).

The road now to be traveled will pass through the human subconscious, individual and collective, bringing Freud and Jung into foreign policy analysis. Strong emotions and strong cognitions may exist side by side at the conscious level, producing strong volitions. But the focus here is on strong cognitions/emotions/volitions in the collective subconscious, and directly relevant to foreign policies as global projections. The "head-brain/gut-brain" interface may deepen our understanding of the physiological mechanisms but not of the concrete content.

Our concern is with factors in the individual/collective psyche that are underlying global action but not processed by ratio, for whatever reason. One such bundle of reasons may be summarized under the heading "old habits." This sounds unemotional, as if there is not much gut-brain there. But what happens if the "old habits" are not adhered to? Could that produce considerable emotion, and could that be a reason for sticking to the "old habits"? And, more important, what is the precise content of these "old habits," anyhow?

The hypothesis is that there are elements in the collective subconscious that narrow the range of global action alternatives, producing positive emotions when the action is "correct" and negative when they are not. The more distant that global action, the more important are these subconscious, nonprocessed factors. We may ask: are foreign policy elites really decision-makers, or is it rather that the "correct" decisions are elite-makers? Are decisions actually pre-made in the collective subconscious, then correctly read by elites and applauded by people who recognize them in their guts as "right," thereby reinforcing the elites?

This basic hypothesis will be used in an effort to explore a problem similar to Tuchman's folly. As mentioned, the concern is not with global action that does not work; we can all make mistakes. The concern is with global action that is:

[1] violent against parties abroad, even at risk to Self, when
[2] nonviolent alternatives are not seriously considered, and
[3] a massive elite and people consensus is produced quickly.
If actions satisfying Tuchman's criteria are "follies," what would be the appropriate term for action satisfying these three criteria? I shall call them "burps," for "bilateral, unilaterally repressed, projections," coming out of the deeper recesses of the guts of the body politic, a sudden off-loading on the human and nonhuman environment, usually not done in decent society. The term is not complimentary, nor intended to be complimentary.8

In what sense, then, is a "burp" irrational? There is a way in which violence is counterproductive, at least in the longer run, by producing dreams of revenge/revanche in the vanquished, and dreams/nightmares of exactly that revenge in the victor, mixed with sweet memories of the glories of victory; all three working synergistically to reproduce violence, sometimes even hitting the source of violence itself.9 To make the burp look productive in terms of foreign policy goals, a culture of violence, or cultural violence, legitimizing and justifying violence is needed, itself a cause and consequence of the syndrome above. But the irrationality alluded to is on the condition, not on the consequence side. The degree of rationality lies in the proportion of factors passing through the human ratio. We are not saying "rationality is good, irrationality bad," but in a culture seeing itself as rational, irrationality should certainly be explored.
2. The Collective Subconscious as Analytical Tool: The RP Complex

The theory focuses on the subconscious (or preconscious), meaning the nonarticulated, and, in the cases of the repressed, the nonarticulable, possibly together with all derivatives and reminders (secondary repression). And the theory then focuses on the collective subconscious, meaning by that a shared subconscious; meaning by that, in turn, a high level of overlap in the content (furniture, baggage, archetypes, identity) of the subconscious of the individuals making up that collectivity. The focus then moves on to the nature of the archetypes, spelling them out in some detail as hypotheses (not just saying "identity" like a mantra). That way we should get a theory, not only the form of a theory.

As the subconscious, individual as well as collective, is subconscious (preconscious) also because it has been repressed, we would not expect these factors to be available to the human ratio on recall, easily retrieved as from a computer hard disk. To stick to that metaphor: we are dealing with the programming of that hard disk or of the computer as such, meaning that special training is needed for retrieval and reprogramming. More particularly, even highly significant archetypes may leave behind no verbal trace, neither oral, nor written/reported later by witnesses in diaries and letters, nor reflected in classified/declassified memoranda, etc. This being the case, any theory will have to be tested along its edges (W. O. Quine) since the "positively existing" (Comte) facts demanded by positivist, empiricist, behaviorist canons of research will be unavailable. More particular, historians raised on wie es eigentlich gewesen (Ranke) will have difficulties accommodating such perspectives.

The theory has to be "as if," als ob: imagine people are collectively programmed in their subconscious with a specified archetype, A, what response, R, would we then expect to stimulus S? In other words, we would need a set of explicit hypotheses as to what kinds of stimuli (plural, S) trigger what kinds of responses (R), via what set of archetypes (A) with which we furnish that "black box," the collective subconscious. Example: the S,A,R-triple

S: A transgression of our borders by foreign military action
A: Our land is sacred land, given us by God
R: Quick retaliation, out of proportion, not asking questions

has a ring of the familiar. The point is the quickness and the consensus, with no exploration of alternatives. The task is now to expand S to S, A to A, and R to R, building a set of hypotheses about what kind of S trigger what kind of R via what kind of A. But the focus is on R = global violence; the admonition being to refine that concept further to a broader set of global responses.
But why do we need A and (S,A,R)-triples; why not simply establish a set of well-tested (S,R)-pairs? If we only wanted to know what external stimuli trigger global violence in a major global actor like the USA (S,R)-pairs might do. But there were two other criteria: nonviolent alternatives are not explored, and quick consensus is obtained, also among people in general. The general theory would be that the archetypes add up to syndromes waiting to help S trigger R without any questions asked in a rational deliberation, like the automaticity of avoidance when facing a major threat, and approach when facing a delicious temptation. Afterwards there will always be time for rational processing, adding links in complex S-R chains, but not ex ante.

The theory will provide such links, conscious in the mind of the subject-researchers, subconscious in the object-actors researched upon. The researcher pretends to have an empirical basis for knowing something about the actor hidden to that actor. A physician works on that basis whenever he announces a (D,P,T)-triple (diagnosis-prognosis-therapy), so does a psychiatrist with his pills, etc., so does a psychoanalyst more limited to verbal (inter)action, with his words. So do I.

For this purpose some elementary psychological concepts and hypotheses will be made use of, at least metaphorically, here presented alphabetically, not systematically:

**Paranoia:** delusions of grandeur and persecution, but without intellectual deterioration; built into a coherent, internally consistent system on which the patient is prepared to act.

**Preconscious:** unconscious but not repressed, available for recall even if not consciously present all the time.

**Projection:** internal psychological objects in Self are projected upon and then located inside some external objects, in Other. This works particularly well, meaning comes very easily, within a dualist construction of the world (Weltanschauung, code, deep culture, cosmology) with everything bipolar: not only Self-Other, but also the many varieties of good-evil. Everybody has something they are proud of, and something they are ashamed of and try to hide, including from themselves. Dualist world constructions help them to hide it further by locating what they deny in themselves in Other, who then becomes a depository within which a variety of negative characteristics are concentrated, liberating Self from contemplating their presence in him/herself.

**Psychopathy:** The British Mental Health Act of 1959 defines it as “a persistent disorder or disability of mind (whether or not including subnormality of intelligence) which results in abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct on the part of the patient, and requires or is susceptible to medical treatment.” The psychopathology is located in the mind, it is expressed in conduct, and the therapy is in “medical treatment.”
**Reality-testing:** rests on the capacity to correct subjective impressions by reference to external facts. This may also take the form of exploring whether Other agrees with Self's definition of reality. But which Others are considered "competent?" The answer "yes" may already be written on the entrance ticket, hence the expression "yes-men."

Disagreement, in a dualist world construction, may be interpreted as being generally "against," as favoring the enemy, even as harboring "that of Satan."

**Repression:** the original impulse is repressed, rendered unconscious, in the primary version; in secondary repression this also includes derivatives of the impulse, the whole nexus. The idea is that people have impulses; some they accept, some are in the shadow land of the preconscious. But some are subconscious, and a repression/projection (RP) complex emerges. The person purifies himself through denials, protected by taboos, and the attribution of evil to Other. Self and Other become more and more threatening to each other. Psychotic and paranoid character traits emerge. Reality becomes virtual, remote, and aggression against Other and Self becomes part of the conduct repertory. Prognosis: 

*Escalation; Psychopathy/Paranoia Becoming Self-fulfilling Therapy: Consciousness, Facing Yin/Yang Reality of Self and Other*

Before concretizing this, some **caveats** may be appropriate:

— the theory is an effort to apply categories from Freudian and Jungian psychoanalysis to countries, but countries consist of diverse individuals even if they are divided into "elite" and "people." A country is not a person with state/elites being the brain, the working classes the arms and legs, and the middle classes the mesoderm; in world politics the country is one actor, talking with one voice, and domestic diversity disappears;

— the approach is not based on the psycho-history of individual rulers/leaders, trying to predict their policy behavior as projections from their inner biography. We are dealing with collective psycho-history sedimented in the shared subconscious not the autobiography of elite individuals;

— what is being presented is only one more approach/perspective on global politics, not the approach. It becomes naive, like liberal, realist, or marxist perspectives, when taken alone;

— even though we focus on collective policies and the collective subconscious, we are in no way saying that there is not also much to learn from individual and collective conscious deliberations;

— even though examples will be from global policy and the collective subconscious the approach also applies to domestic policy and private policy (e.g., in the family), and of course to the individual subconscious;
— even though the focus is on foreign policy elites, systemic concepts are also needed; societies are more than sets of individuals divided into elites and people. There are structures, deep cultures, and conduits, such as the media, the leading media being the conduits for leading people.
3. Archetypes in the Collective Subconscious: The CMT/DMA Complex

Let us now start furnishing the subconscious with two syndromes: Chosenness-Myths-Traumas and Dichotomy-Manicheism-Armageddon.

First, the CMT syndrome: Chosenness, by some transpersonal forces, such as God, Alla\'h, History; Myths about a glamorous future, often seen as a reenactment of a glamorous past; and Trauma, the horrors of the past, with shadows into the future. The syndrome character stems from the synergies among the three components: a chosen Self\textsuperscript{18} is in for shocks, often violent, with Other; the shocks are highly traumatic particularly because they may be interpreted as a loss of the divine mandate; and myths are generated by the idea of an Other-less context where that mandate may be enacted without the resistance of the philistines and the pagans who do not appreciate the rights, and indeed duties, bestowed on the Chosen ones.\textsuperscript{19}

The subconscious character of such beliefs stems partly from the fact that formulated openly as ideology, they do look, to put it mildly, a little crazy, loony—for the in-group only; a major reason why top-level meetings are often secret. But all three are taken for granted as being that which constitutes the identity of the particular nations harboring those syndromes.

The collective character stems from sharing such assumptions about the nation to the point that most people will assume that their neighbor is similarly inclined. In that they may be wrong: there is the pattern in social psychology known as "pluralistic ignorance" about where the plurality really stands, particularly on the other side of gender and class divides. CMT is probably also male more than female, and a way for patriarchy to celebrate double chosenness, both as macho males, and as chosen people.\textsuperscript{20}

CMT goes much beyond ordinary, soft nationalism. C and M together may foster a collective megalomania; narcissism, which is given its paranoid component through T. Mature reflection on the connection between CM and T will be absent, even taboo. "Nationalism" used as diagnosis is inadequate. We are dealing with very hard nationalisms indeed, being above others by transcendental mandate, in no way being one nation among others, like others.

Second, underlying these emotive CMT complexes, at a somewhat deeper level, meaning less accessible, is a shared cognitive mind-set, which may be called the DMA epistemology, for Dichotomy, Manicheism, and Armageddon. There is a deep conviction that the world can best be understood when divided into two parts, one with Self inside, one with Other; assumptions compatible with Aristotelian tertium non datur, Cartesian epistemological atomism, and with the Self-Other ingroup-outgroup gradients of soft nationalism. The dichotomy is hard, the dividing lines watertight. No \textit{yin/yang}.
Then comes the conviction that these two parts of the world are not only separate but unequal: one of them Good, the other Evil. That this in general coincides with Self and Other goes without saying, the Good-Evil gradient coinciding so well with the Self-Other distinction that there is eloquent silence both about evil aspects of Self and good aspects of Other.

And finally comes the logical conclusion of the hardest nationalisms: the tension between these two, between Good and Evil, will, by Law of Nature or Divine Order, demand a release, a confrontation between Good and Evil. If violence is the only language Evil understands, so be it.21 The Armageddon Battle is the logical conclusion; the task is to see to it that Good wins.

The CMT/DMA complex is a recipe for disaster. CMT defines valid emotions and volitions; DMA assumptions define valid cognitions; together they constitute a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The CMT syndrome alone does not engender violence. To have a feeling of being anointed for something great, to entertain myths about that something, to have been traumatized, as a cause and/or consequence of C and M was also Gandhi's lot; or the lot of the Quakers, for instance, or maybe of anything great. For greatness to ensue, a feeling of being chosen for great deeds, achievements, a feeling of being capable of greatness, may be a condition. No doubt there is an element of megalomania in this, and many geniuses probably also exhibit clearly paranoid traits. But that does not add up to violence, even massive violence.

The DMA syndrome alone does not engender violence. It is a map with two forces (God/Satan; Good/Evil) fighting for the possession of souls of individuals, nations, humanity, to the bitter end, the Armageddon, which is nothing but the end of human life, up or down, writ large for humanity as up and down. (Some go up, some go down.)

The CMT/DMA complex spells danger. Everything falls into place like a scenario. Self is chosen by God, hence Good; so Other is evidently chosen by Satan, hence Evil. That Other is the source of the traumas and stands in the way of realizing the myths. The struggle—between irreconcilable forces—can only be settled by a war; like Armageddon, a war to end all wars.

One factor has to be added: means of violence. Even the most blossoming CMT/DMA complex has a touch of the ridiculous, drawing a shrug rather than fear if not backed by a major arsenal of means of destruction. Conclusion: an arms race,22 particularly if both/all parties share these pathologies. And in the modern state system, it looks as if they do.

Let us now turn from the general to the concrete, bringing these general ideas together in an effort to make a psychogram for the United States of America as a global actor.

A. The Chosenness-Myths-Traumas Syndrome (historical)

I. CHOSENNESS (in the USA from the 17th to 18th centuries)\textsuperscript{23}
\begin{itemize}
  \item A chosen, covenanted people, under God, with rights and duties
  \item A sacred land, God’s New Canaan, transgression is a sacrilege
  \item U.S. citizens and lives of a higher kind than other peoples\textsuperscript{24}
  \item U.S. national (vital) interests are of a higher kind
  \item United States as final arbiter, the hegemons’ hegemon, the world center
\end{itemize}

II. MYTHS (coming out of the U.S. 18th to 19th centuries)
\begin{itemize}
  \item Melting pot, the United States as a multicultural/ethnic country
  \item Trinity: Judeo-Christianity/Free Market/Independence-Democracy
  \item Bringing the Trinity to pagan/unfree/non-democratic countries
  \item Manifest Destiny in North America, the Americas, the World
  \item USA is invincible/superior; God is behind/USA is right\textsuperscript{25}
\end{itemize}

III. TRAUMAS (suffered in the U.S. 19th and 20th centuries)
\begin{itemize}
  \item Immigrant traumas suffered before and after “New Beginning”
  \item Genocide/structuro-culturocide on Native Americans/Hawaiians
  \item Enslaving/commercializing/exploiting/repressing Africans
  \item War of Independence before/after Declaration of Independence
  \item The Civil War for/against Secession
  \item The Wars Not Won (in a sense Korea, Việt Nam)
\end{itemize}

B. The Dichotomy-Manicheism-Armageddon Syndrome (Biblical)
\begin{itemize}
  \item DICHOTOMY: US “two-ness” in general, us or them, for or ag’in
  \item MANICHEISM: God vs. Satan, Good vs. Evil
  \item ARMAGEDDON: Violence as the final arbiter
\end{itemize}

C. Repression-Projection Mechanisms (presumably timeless)
\begin{itemize}
  \item Repression/denial of Self’s violence; Self seen as peaceful
  \item Projection of violence on Other; denial of Other’s peacefulness
\end{itemize}

This program or code has a name: patriotism.\textsuperscript{26} At the individual level it is usually known as narcissism/paranoia and machismo.

A genealogy has been indicated for the 21 constituent archetypes, starting with timeless mechanisms of repression and projection. As peace is conceived of as a virtue, and violence as a vice, the latter is denied in Self and the former in Other. With the priorities reversed RP mechanisms would also have been reversed; with yin/yang perspectives\textsuperscript{27} realism might prevail. The mechanisms
serve to organize the universe, and will work with extra ease if that universe is already seen as Self/Other dualist (dichotomous and manichean) settings for repression/projection.

The Pilgrim Fathers of the Plymouth Colony, Massachusetts Bay (Mayflower, 1620), were partly (35 of 102) Select Puritans, reading the Bible and the Chosen People/Promised Land archetypes as if they were written for them. As there was no Canaan on the Eastern side of the Mediterranean, the Jews evidently had not made it (Reverend Cotton). The other chosenness archetypes can be seen as logical satellites, as variations on the theme of U.S. exceptionalism.\(^{28}\)

A covenanted country got started under the real founder, John Winthrop I, of what later became the United States of America (from 1630). The colonists who founded Jamestown, Virginia, earlier (1609) seem to have been more ordinary colonizers,\(^{29}\) less burdened by Puritan chosenness. The Quakers, who under William Penn established the "Holy Experiment" in Pennsylvania (1681), also labored under blossoming CMT-complexes, but chosen for peace (George Fox was the first conscientious objector, to Cromwell's armies, in 1651), without the DMA part. However, there is little doubt as to what was dominant and what was recessive. It was John Winthrop (I, II, and III), and then Roger Williams and William Penn.

The following centuries created myths as a mix of facts and foibles, reality and virtual reality, not attempted disentangled here. The themes are well-known; they all give more content to the chosenness, more flesh on the bones; in a sense they flow from the chosenness. If you are chosen, in a promised land, how can you be someone else's colony, even if (or precisely because) that was where most early immigrants came from? Later others came, well traumatized, blended in a melting pot that obviously had an Anglo-Saxon, even WASP lining, filled with chosenness. Over time the ideology solidified as Judeo-Christianity (the hyphen came later, and serves to marginalize Islam among the Abrahamic religions, and also all other religions); Free Market and Enterprise (meaning the freedom to create property and to use property to create more property); Independence and Democracy (meaning free choice among alternatives, by secret ballot).

The Trinity gains significance through negation: countries that are Muslim or entertain other faiths including professing atheism or being pagan; countries with other economic systems including professing socialism or being economically primitive-traditional; countries with other political systems, including professing authoritarianism or being politically primitive-traditional. They are all out. One of the three may qualify for the position as the Evil Other, the ground being prepared by that almost timeless syndrome in the subconscious, the DMA.
From that notion flows missionary commands to bring the Judeo-Christian faith, Free Markets, and Democracy to others, starting with the pagans and the primitive/traditional, going on to the more recalcitrant, with one Armageddon after the other, emerging invincible. A drama, indeed.

This mighty crusade could not, and cannot, be enacted without encountering resistance, as others might be of a (very) different opinion. Those who came to the shores of America were already traumatized, by political repression or economic exploitation, sometimes also direct violence. They had been persecuted and/or steeped in misery. All of them had horror stories from Europe’s countless upheavals produced by contradictions between genders, generations, castes/classes, nations, and countries with the emerging State and emerging Capital. Those who left were neither clergy nor aristocracy, but common people with their women, true believers, with ressentiment. They fought each other like hell, including intense labor-management violence, but above all the Civil War.

And they inflicted unfathomable sufferings on Africans, Native Americans, and Hawaiians—the Blacks, Reds, and Browns. The traumas are still felt as lasting “post-traumatic stress disorder.” But here the reverse trauma suffered by evil-doers is also in focus, the mix of guilt of having inflicted mega-violence on Other and the nightmarish fear that “one day they will come back and do the same to us as we did to them.” The exemplar would be Nat Turner’s slave revolt in 1831, with 70+ rebels killing 59 whites.

The War of Independence and the Civil War constitute an interesting combination. Struggle for independence/freedom for the country and democracy for the people, from illegitimate rule (engendering the trauma of being attacked by one’s own kind, the British) is right; secession from legitimate rule is wrong and has to be repressed. Thus it was wrong of Britain to use force against the USA, but right of the North to do the same against the South (according to the victorious North, that is).

For illustration, let us now try some recent media articulations, and then make a point. Chosenness requires its articulation, but not too often; that precious sentiment should not be trivialized. A statement made in late August 1995 by Colin Powell, at that time still a possible presidential candidate, may cross that fine line. According to a report from the New York Times Service, “he got a round of applause by declaring that America had been established by divine providence to lead the world.” Whatever has been established by divine providence should not be taken lightly; moreover, such statements are exclusive, applying only to America not to “America, like to any other country.” The statement may be interpreted not only as a license to lead the world, but as a duty to do so “with all necessary means.”
One small example of what this projection onto the center of the world stage means, again from the New York Times Service, is the description of O.J. Simpson as "the most famous defendant who ever lived." Some people might have thought that Jesus Christ was a good candidate for that position, at least in the Christian world, perhaps with Alfred Dreyfus as another candidate in the last 100 years. But they both suffer from a major shortcoming—they are neither Americans nor contemporary—narrowing "who ever lived" in space and time.

How the USA, as center of the world, treats even friendly countries, was revealed in Austria in January 1996. The USA had planned using nuclear land mines in Salzburg, Austria, on top of having maintained 79 secret weapon depots after Austria had been declared a neutral country in 1955. The U.S. ambassador had to apologize to the Austrian heads of state and government—a sensation in Austria that was not reflected in U.S. media.

But in what sense, if any, is this pathological? And is it deep-rooted? A top military person taps what he knows is a reservoir of positive feelings, the basic national myth, and reaps applause; some status is needed to invoke God; Colin Powell has that status. A journalist is so taken in by the O.J. case that the commentary gets a little out of hand. The USA, a superpower, behaves like one, depositing arms wherever they may come handy against another superpower, probably with the connivance of some local military and politicians. What else is new, what's the issue? Apart from U.S. reaction if others had behaved that way? The issue is not concrete action; no one was hurt. The issue is the absence of reaction, protest. Such examples of verbal and physical action might one day add up to something quite significant: a U.S. C-in-C thinks he has God's mandate, the USA is the only center in the world, Salzburg is undermined; the kind of material out of which a quick consensus can be made.

If we now return to the definition of a psychopathology as "a persistent disorder or disability of mind—which results in abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct"—then the ultimate criterion, aggression, is placed on the consequence side, to be explored in Sections 6 and 7. But there is also a criterion on the condition side: persistent disorder. The image of the world carried by the CMT/DMA/RP complex is that of a narcissistic paranoid. If found in an individual, measures would be taken, more so if the disorder is truly persistent. That diagnosis rests on three pillars: a persistent disorder in the subconscious, the failure to recognize this and do something, and massive aggression. How are they linked together?
5. Linking Deep-Rooted Pathologies and Global Projections

A foreign policy "situation" looms on the horizon, anything from an ongoing world war to the distant rumbling in the innards of a country half a globe away. However faint the signals they are caught by the key global radars of the U.S. intelligence, the national security machinery: the CIA, NSA, DIA, and NRC. The amount of information must be absolutely overwhelming; the information overload alone would in and by itself be one good reason for leaving much of the processing to the gut-brain rather than to the poor head-brain with its (presumably) higher capacity for differentiation, reflection, and nonritualized response. These are the stimuli coming in; some of them are passed on to the media, which also have their own sensors, and from there to the general public which also, particularly through the rapid build-up of the international civil society, has its own sensors. Each stimulus is held up against the archetypes and checked for consonance versus dissonance, or simply OK/not OK in a process that is only partly rational (passing through ratio), partly irrational (not passing through ratio, but through irratio). This means:

— positive feelings if a myth is reinforced or a trauma weakened;
— negative feelings if a myth is weakened or a trauma reinforced;
— the source of negative feelings is perceived as an evil Other;
— negative feelings mobilize the rights and duties of the Chosen;
— there is readiness for violence; Armageddon is on the horizon.

If countervailing forces are weak, there is release into action as violence. And that violence feeds into the RP complex, is rationalized, denied, and then projected onto any other Other. There is no assumption that this process is linear. But a flow diagram may nevertheless be useful as a model of one way in which these processes may be linked together, as a (S,A,R)-chain:

![Figure 1. Global Projections of Deep-Rooted Pathologies: A Model](image-url)
The stimuli are held up against myth and trauma, archetypes at two levels: as first order comparison of element recognition, and as second order comparison of pattern recognition. At the first level elements are identical (Black/Red = Black/Red), at the second level patterns are identical (Palestinians:Israel = Blacks/Reds:USA). The assumption is that the human mind-body interface is capable of perceiving not only elements but also their relations, without consciously formulating these relations. We are perfectly capable of sensing danger when driving, even when that danger relates to another car we hear about over the radio.

No rational processing has been assumed, only an immediate recognition, as by the proverbial “instinct.” The assumption is that the comparison releases feelings that activate comparison with the dichotomy and manicheism archetypes to see whether the stimuli can be attributed to either of the camps in a deeply polarized mind. The reverse is also possible: the stimuli could be held up against DM first. The specification in MT terms comes later, more in line with the genealogy of the archetypes.

However that may be, we assume that the gut-brain has by now done the basic mapping of stimuli on deep emotions and cognitions. Then follows the deep volition out of which concrete action may ensue, with the rider that the volition may already be there in advance, nourished by an RP complex in search of cognitions coming out of the comparisons, and emotions coming out of the cognitions—in search of a tension demanding adequate release.

If some Other has been identified as part of “us,” positively chosen, and the emotions are friendly, then we would expect acts of inclusion to reinforce the stimuli: if stimuli are pleasant, encourage more. Certificates as “best ally” and general blessings may be issued. If some Other has been identified as part of “them,” negatively chosen, and the emotions are hostile, then we would expect acts of exclusion to reduce the stimuli: if stimuli are unpleasant, discourage them.

What has just been said can also serve as an elementary theory of individual perception, and of collective perception by the mass media. Pleasant stimuli may be encouraged by giving them voice and unpleasant stimuli discouraged by silencing them, by marginalizing Other; a profoundly violent act, but social rather than biological. But it may also be that Other can only be neglected at considerable risk to Self. Elimination of Other from Thought and Speech is insufficient, elimination as Actor is called for. Exclusion could then take the form of physical isolation, like diplomatic and economic boycotts. Or war. Or holocaust, extermination.

In this process there is no search for nonviolent alternatives as the conclusion is apodictic, in need of no verification. If sufficient parts of the population, and the media, are programmed the same way, consensus comes quickly. What
happens is essentially a projection, a collective reading of collective history, meaning U.S. history, on the world. Where else should "history tells us..." come from? What else would be the source of collective memories if not exactly the (very) short history, the national narrative, of the United States of America, some of which we attempted to capture in Section 4?

The three following factors flow into this way of privileging U.S. history:

— its immigrants hail from many parts of the world; references and feelings must be hitched onto a least common denominator, and that is U.S. history (the way displaced Cubans do in Florida);

— the general knowledge of geography, history and world culture is particularly low in the USA (partly because of the overfocus on that least common denominator), and also crude as to the USA;

— nobody will deny the salience, pre-eminence and predominance, sheer weight of the USA in world society after World War II, making the USA stand out as a logical reference point for many.

So I make the USA into a person, equipped with a head-brain, a gut-brain, and a collective subconscious that feels and shouts danger when the head-brain reports recognition of the first or second orders (isomorphism)? That is by and large the idea, and it presupposes a socialization process whereby the same readings of the national narrative and the same values have been internalized in vast segments of the population, at least in the between one-third and one-half who exercise their right to vote. But there is no assumption to the effect that the head-brain is in the elite and the gut-brain in the people. To the contrary: recruitment to elite positions is probably mainly for those who are patriotically programmed. Let us see what they come up with.
6. Global Projections I: The USA and Global Violence

Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-1945, prepared by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, includes 168 cases (not counting wars of conquest against Native Americans) bringing the total to date (early 1996) well above 200, probably around 210. Over a time span of about 200 years the average is a little more than one “use” per year. Whereas the first 52 years saw 39 such “uses,” the next 50 years witnessed 65, and the following 50 years more than 70, a clear increase. The USA always “won”, except in Viet Nam and Korea (stalemate). How the fourth half-century will end we still do not know.

To develop a comparative perspective on this, the impressive documentation in George F. Kohn’s Dictionary of Wars was used to calculate a War Participation Index (WPI), based on the number of wars in which the country had been involved, divided by the number of years between the publication of the book (1985) and the year of the first war. The index is problematic and should, like all such indices, be taken cum grano salis. There are the usual difficulties of defining a war (does the definition imply governmental participation on all, some, one, or no sides; where is the line in terms of casualties between a skirmish and a war, etc.) No distinctions, dear to belligerents, are made between offensive and defensive, just and unjust warfare, in the national interest or not. A war is a war.

The United States of America emerges as a clear No. 1. The index penalizes countries with a short history and much warfare in that period, and rewards countries that have spread their belligerent activity over more centuries, even millennia.

The Top and Bottom 10 on the War Participation Index are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WPI TOP 10</th>
<th>WPI BOTTOM 10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. United States of America</td>
<td>.3040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Israel (1947-1985)</td>
<td>.1842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Ottoman Empire and Turkey</td>
<td>.1552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. England and Great Britain</td>
<td>.1277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. South Africa</td>
<td>.1165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Central America</td>
<td>.1132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Russia and Soviet Union</td>
<td>.0983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. France</td>
<td>.0915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Ethiopia</td>
<td>.0847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Spain</td>
<td>.0835</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The leading position of the USA is sufficiently robust to survive a number of modifications of the index, and is also compatible with the findings of Istvan Kende after 1945 (top 4: USA, Israel, Great Britain and France).  

The top 5 on the present list have all at some time seen themselves as chosen by Yahweh/God/Alla'h; they are countries deeply imprinted by the Abrahamic religions. The common text is in the Kitab, in the Torah/Old Testament/Qur'an. How a Chosen People shall behave is very clearly indicated in the Bible (which, incidentally, reports about 700 massacres, 100 of them ordained by God), as in Deuteronomy 20:16-20:

16. But of the cities of these people, which the Lord thy God doth give thee for an inheritance, thou shalt save alive nothing that breatheth...  
17. But thou shalt utterly destroy them...  
19. When thou shalt besiege a city a long time, in making war against it to take it, thou shalt not destroy the trees thereof by forcing an axe against them: for thou mayest eat of them, and thou shalt not cut them down (for the tree of the field is man’s life) to employ them in a siege.  
20. Only the trees which thou knowest that they be not trees for meat, thou shalt destroy and cut them down; and thou shalt build bulwarks against the city that maketh war with thee, until it be subdued.

Not only a manual for warfare, but for total war.  

How this works in practice can be seen by two examples:

"Cherokee women and children," Calloway writes, relying on a British report written more than half a century later, "were butchered in cold blood and burned alive." Small children of the Iroquois League were murdered, according to the recollection of a boastful veteran a decade after the event, which Calloway also quotes, "by running them through with bayonets and holding them up to see how they would twist and turn..." "The structure of Iriquois social organization was destroyed—by forced migrations that drove into huddled refugee camps scattered remnants of disparate peoples who thereby lost their identity...."

Or, a more recent case: "Tanks pulling plows moved alongside trenches, firing into the Iraqi soldiers inside the trenches as the plows covered them with great mounds of sand. Thousands were buried, dead, wounded or alive. U.S. forces fired on Iraqi soldiers after the Iraqis had raised white flags of surrender. The navy commander who gave the order to fire was not punished."

But how about the use of violence outside the war context? Coleman McCarthy deplores that ARDIS, the Association (of former CIA agents) for Responsible Dissent, "estimating that at least six million people have died as a consequence of U.S. covert operations since World War II," does not go "beyond
the banning of covert operations to abolishing the CIA altogether?" Again, even if this figure were inflated and should it have to be halved, in the light of a public scrutiny of all the activities reported by William Blum we are still dealing with mega-violence. The problem here is how the American public will try to cope with mega-violence of that magnitude; beyond taboos. The obvious answer would be by massive use of denial, repression, and projection. The mass media will fail to report, some scholars will be called in to rationalize the undeniable (as self-defense, as justified, as being in the national interest), and that which cannot be rationalized will be attributed to others and relegated to the deeper recesses of the mind in the collective subconscious, joining the archetypes as baggage.

[1] The Nuclear Genocide on Hiroshima/Nagasaki

On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of these nuclear city genocides a debate about the motive for using the bomb sprouted not only in the USA, but all over the world. Two major motives stood out in the debate: to force a Japanese capitulation so as to save GI lives and to establish U.S. world hegemony in general, and over the Soviet Union in particular. These arguments no doubt played a role in the real debate, as contrasting discourses.\(^{52}\)

But Joseph Rotblat, the Nobel Prize winner, left Los Alamos when it was clear that the weapon would not be used defensively against Germany. His decision had been taken already by fall 1944. A September 18, 1944, record of talks between Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Britain in Hyde Park, New York, stated that the two men agreed that "when a 'bomb' is finally available, it might perhaps, after mature consideration, be used against the Japanese."\(^{53}\)

At that time there was no strong reason to believe that Japan would outlast Germany, nor that the Red Army would beat the West to Berlin.

An alternative hypothesis, based on A1,2,3 takes better account of the facts.\(^{54}\) Non-white Japan had committed an act worse than war in bombing Pearl Harbor: sacrilege. By having her Queen overthrown in 1893 in a military coup with U.S. Marines, by being annexed in 1898 and admitted to the union as the 50th state in 1959, Hawa‘i had been incorporated into the rest of the USA as sacred land. Revenge is for lesser powers, for a nation so close to God the name for revenge is punishment—from above, like the sparks from God's fingers. The populations of the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were both of minor military significance; however, as recipients of the ultimate punishment, they were ideal.\(^{55}\)

Both Dwight D. Eisenhower, the U.S. Army General, William D. Leahy, U.S. Navy Admiral and Chief of Staff to the President, and Henry H. Arnold of the U.S. Army Air Force were against the use of the bomb.\(^{56}\) So why then, with top military opposing, were so few others opposing the decision openly at the time? The answer here would be in terms of compatibility with the archetypes; not only A2, but also A1 (giving the USA a certain right and duty to act in this world in the place of God, if not also as God\(^{57}\)), A3 (the yellow race!), A5, A7, A9, A10, A17-19, and A20-21. After the capitulation came A8-9, bringing the message to the militarily beaten former enemy, incorporating them in the general Manifest Destiny scheme for the world, the same way as for Germany, later on in the former Soviet Union (starting with an incredible amount of Bibles), proving not only that the enemy was wrong, but that the USA is right. The
ultimate victory is not only unconditional surrender on the battlefield but the
impregnation of the beaten enemy with your own sociocultural code after
surrender.  

In the act of punishment we find as usual a mix of elements. First comes
revenge. But that had already been done, like the raids on Tokyo, starting with
Doolittle on April 18, 1942. Then comes incapacitation, individual prevention.
But that had also been done: Japan was in ruins, with only 1% of the U.S. GNP.
Then comes general prevention, the warning to others, including Japanese who
might continue fighting, and the Soviets. But on top of that comes justice,
regardless of the other three factors. It has to be awesome, divine. And so it
was. No such sacrilege has occurred ever since. And also no use of the bomb,
the ultimate weapon being reserved for that ultimate crime.

[2] The Cold War

The hostile reaction to the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the Soviet
Union of 1922 is the clear outcome of A7.61 Communism was not only anticleri-
cal but professed “scientific atheism”; not only anticapitalist, it professed state
planning of the economy; communists were not only antidemocratic, they
professed the dictatorship of the proletariat. They sinned on all three counts not
only with their acts but also with their words, certainly also in their thoughts.

But the hostility did not take on bellicose forms until after the World War
II gigantic enactment of the DMA syndrome. Just as after the Cold War the
position as Satan (“Evil Empire”) was vacant, calling in one more pillar from
general psychology: Gestalt theory.63 If the DMA syndrome is firmly internal-
ized and there is no adversary worthy of the position as Evil (because he is
beaten or insufficiently evil), then something is missing. Even if there is no
conscious search, there is an urge to fill the hole, like the famous completion of
the gestalt of a circle.

The search was successful. A21 endowed the Soviet Union with even
more aggressiveness than it possessed: the intent to invade, unprovoked, at least
Western Europe, potentially the whole world; also projecting A9 on the enemy.
A better theory of the Soviet Union would probably have been to take seriously
their own theory: all communists have to do is to wait until the capitalist world
collapses due to its own inner contradictions. The result we know: a Cold War at
the brink of Armageddon, but averted because of the collapse of the Soviet
Union due to its inner contradictions. A new DMA vacancy. And now a new
search, tentatively filled with “Muslim fundamentalism.”

[3] The Korean and Viet Nam Wars

No doubt extreme U.S. belligerence, killing in the millions, in both wars,
can partly be explained the U.S. way: to stop or stem communist expansion.
But just as Red Army expansion in Eastern Europe had other explanations (with
the exception of Poland, the countries had all been on the Axis side), what happened in Korea and Việt Nam could also be explained as efforts to unite countries that had been tormented and divided by colonialism and Cold War tensions. Actually, the USA was and is not necessarily against unification; in fact, unification from the North was what the U.S. Civil War was all about. But it had to be on Yankee, or U.S. premises, meaning industrial/capitalist/democratic in 1861-1865 (not agricultural/slaving/feudal), and agricultural/capitalist in 1961-1975 (not industrial/socialist)—A5.8,9,10,17-19,21.

However, something new happened. The USA turned out not to be invincible. It withdrew from Saigon on April 30, 1975, and North Korea is still around, contrary to A10, creating the trauma of A16. Of course, everything possible was then initiated to subvert socialist Viet Nam and North Korea. But that is ratio, how about irratio?

The 1968 protest generation threw out both chosenness and myths and wanted to reconstruct the USA from scratch. In addition, they turned RP around and saw the USA as profoundly violent, and Viêt Nam as peaceful; no yin/yang there! But how about DMA? The USA as usual acted according to the DMA script; being beaten, she now adopted a victim role, counting and recounting losses, focussing on the MIAs, and still does. But these are holding tactics. Economically/ecologically USA won in Viêt Nam, and the country changed its system. The struggle with North Korea is still on; like the communists, the USA is hoping for a collapse.

[4] The Policy Toward Racist South Africa and Zionist Israel

The United States of America has as of late seen the handwriting on the wall and engaged in more progressive policies toward Black Africans and the Palestinians. But they certainly supported the racist regime in South Africa, and still basically support the Zionist regime in Israel in resisting a two-state solution. One basic reason for that policy was an overwhelming second-order recognition, by isomorphism: White U.S.: Reds/Blacks = Boers: Blacks = Israelis: Palestinians. Even the mandate from God/Yahweh was the same. Deuteronomy 20:16-20 was practiced to the letter. These were also covenanted nations, the Calvinist Boers of 1652, Cromwell’s people in Ireland in 1649, and the Zionists of this century, using their pacts with the Almighty to practice blatant colonialism, with solid elements of extermination in all cases. To betray them was/is to betray oneself.

God’s mandate is at stake. It has been withdrawn from the Boers in South Africa and is in doubt in Israel/Palestine. How would U.S. elites react if the Reds, Blacks, and Browns of America should rise as one person, pointing to South Africa and Israel as precedents and claim their rights? Of course, the U.S. elites can switch the discourse from race and culture to democracy, having exterminated enough Reds and Browns, and not imported enough Blacks, to be
able to convert natives and slaves into "minorities." One day, like Israel, they may have to redraw some borders.71 But in addition to A1.9, at stake are also A12-13: "one day they may treat us like we treated them." The fears of Boers and Israelis were shared deep down in the guts of the USA; the U.S. North being more afraid of Reds,72 the U.S. South of Blacks. South Africa and Israel are therefore eagerly watched not only for their own sake but for their U.S. implications.


After the shootdown of two small U.S. aircraft by Cuban jets on January 15, 1996, an OpEd letter appeared in The Washington Post: "What's all the fuss about? Can there be the slightest doubt what American pilots would do if Cuban planes entered airspace repeatedly without permission, flying over U.S. cities, arrogantly dropping things—whether leaflets or anything else? Do Americans forget their own Navy shot down a commercial airliner with 300 civilians aboard during the Iran-Iraq war when it was incorrectly perceived as a possible threat? And this act involved no American territory."73

The author is, of course, right, and yet he is missing the point completely in his effort to equate Cuban action with that of the USA. The USA is a chosen, covenanted country by or, at least, under God (the latter preposition is slightly more modest). Cuba is not chosen at all, or if chosen then by Satan; not only the Satan of communism but the Satan of the uppitiness, the failure to comply and conform, demonstrated amply by Fidel Castro after he and his men marched into La Habana on January 8, 1959, challenging most of the chosenness and myth archetypes and mobilizing the DMA and RP syndromes fully. The rest of the story is a consistent chain of U.S. efforts to destabilize the socialist regime, including assassination attempts. So far all in vain.

What would have been a rational, mature policy? Probably to admit that Castro and his people had made a couple of points, to apologize for U.S. domination of Cuba since the so-called Spanish-American War of 1898, to enter into a constructive dialogue, even offering some assistance in the efforts to construct a society in a country devastated by economic imperialism, all the time insisting on human rights in general and democracy in particular. But that was not the road traveled. Instead the USA embarked upon 40 years as slaves of their own collective subconscious,74 to the detriment of everybody concerned.


Clearly, with as many as 76 of the 168 "instances of use of United States Armed Forces abroad"75 (often little more than showing the flag), occurring in Latin America, the reason is not only geographical closeness but also economic, as seen from the famous "Political Update" by Chase Bank on January 13, 1995: "While Chiapas, in our opinion, does not pose a fundamental threat to Mexican
political stability, it is perceived to be so by many in the investment community. The government will need to eliminate the Zapatistas to demonstrate their effective control of the national territory and of security policy.\textsuperscript{76}

But this is ratio at work, very conscious and explicit. Underlying this is above all A9, the manifest destiny\textsuperscript{77} to bring American theology/ideology to others, and A8. North America soon proved too small after the task had been done; the world was still too big\textsuperscript{78}. Latin America was to be the testing ground. The Monroe Doctrine of 1823, with its remarkable clause that the Americas were "henceforth not to be considered as subjects for further colonization by any European powers," cleared the ground further south after Great Britain had been defeated in the War of 1812.\textsuperscript{79} The experiment had to succeed: only when proven successful near home could the product become a world export,\textsuperscript{80} like today under the heading of "globalization."

But, in addition to this, comes, as for the South Africa and Israel policies, A12 and A13. If there is something to the thesis that some of U.S. foreign policy can best be understood in terms of these traumas, then intervention should be particularly frequent in countries with a heavy Black or Red population, like Cuba, Panama,\textsuperscript{81} or Bolivia. In fact, this applies to all 76 cases except 4 (3 instances in Uruguay, i in Chile), indicating strongly that more than simple economic interests are at stake.

\textbf{[7] Noriega-Hussein-Aidid}

These three persons have one thing in common: they have once been allies, even clients, of the USA in the fight against Nicaragua of the Sandinistas, the Iran of Khomeini, and the Somalia of Siyad Barre. One of them, Manuel Antonio Noriega, is at present in Miami’s Metropolitan Correctional Center where he has prisoner of war status under the Geneva Conventions.\textsuperscript{82} A considerable amount of energy has been spent by the USA to assassinate Saddam Hussein and, during the Somalia campaign, to capture Mohammed Aidid.

Leaving aside the problem of U.S. adjudication over nationals of other countries in general and politicians in particular,\textsuperscript{83} including what looks like execution, the deeper problem is what crimes these people had committed, seen from the collective subconscious. Again, no protests have been heard except from the tiny voices of the United States left; what happens is taken note of as normal and natural. But why should it be normal and natural?

Here is one interpretation: because these people were once parts of a corpus mysticum (A1+A9), their crimes, being uppity and turning politically against the USA, are that of a heretic, not of a pagan nonbeliever. The pagan can be excused for his lack of faith, even for his rejection since he never was sufficiently close to the Light to sense it clearly, deeply. The heretic cannot be excused: he had seen the Light, yet turned his back to it and entered, even re-entered, the land of Darkness.\textsuperscript{84} It is interesting to compare these three cases
with two other leaders who are even more uppity yet were never invaded by the USA (but they came close): Fidel Castro and Muammar al-Qaddafi. Whatever else can be said about them, U.S. clients they were not.

[8] The Gulf War

Of course, some economic interests were involved; Iraq was after all a major oil supplier and, with Kuwait as “the 19th province,” might have become the major world supplier. In no way excusing Saddam’s brutal aggression on Kuwait, his demands after the Iraq-Iran war, prodded into action by USA/CIA, were not unreasonable (oil prices, currencies, the oil fields under the Iraq-Kuwait border) and could have been negotiated, some of them perhaps even adjudicated. But nonviolent alternatives were not explored and the consensus to move in and kill came quickly. But much more important is a combination of A17-A19, DMA: Cold War over, position as Evil vacant, impeccable credentials including possession of weapons of mass destruction; A16: “Kicking the Vietnam syndrome now and forever,” also disproving in action the accusation that Bush is a wimp; A7: Iraq as a socialist welfare state in the Third/Arab worlds; A1+A9: Corpus Mysticum: Once a client, always a client.

The miracle would have been if the war had not taken place. Of course, the USA, or the “U.S.-led coalition,” legitimated by Security Council Resolution 678 (“with all necessary means”), won by ousting Iraq from Kuwait. But did Saddam Hussein ever believe that Iraq could stand up militarily? Or did he fight a different war with more important values than victory at stake: honor, dignity, courage; proving to himself, the Iraqis, the Arab world, the world, that Iraq does not buckle under pressure but stands up against an overwhelming power? Iraq probably had another code in her collective subconscious, and Saddam won his war like Bush won his, sensitizing us to the danger of cultural projection.

[9] The UN Policy

The U.S. policy toward the United Nations has a ring of the obvious. If, by A1, the USA is the Chosen people and country (by God or at least under God, to use again the more modest proposition in the Oath of Allegiance), then there is little space between God and the USA. More particularly, if the UN should be above the USA, a possible implication would be that something on earth looks as if it has been chosen above the USA, which would mean either that the USA no longer enjoys MCN (Most Chosen Nation) status, or that a sacrilege has been committed by an impostor who does not understand the order of things. Both interpretations are intolerable, against A1, A9, demanding quick and decisive action.

First, there is the possibility of using the UN the way it was intended to be used, as an instrument for the big power victors of World War II, the permanent Security Council members with the veto (backed by Article 12 in the UN.
Charter); more particularly the Western allies (with the two most frequently used
UN languages, also capable of commanding majorities); and even more particularly, the USA (site of the San Francisco Conference and the New York Head-
quarters, and control through the 25% assessment). The USA can steer, even
cripple the UN, by using the logic of U.S. Senate: U.S. foreign policy = USA:  
UN policy, refusing to allocate funds.\textsuperscript{87}

Second, by leaving the UN if it does not behave, as it left UNESCO
purportedly because of its stand in favor of state-run media.\textsuperscript{88} This is basically
also the position taken when the USA refuses to commit combat troops in any
military action unless they are under U.S. command. In short, the archetypes are
enacted. The UN is dethroned.

[10] The Bosnia/Yugoslavia Policy

Srpska/Bosnia/Yugoslavia, like Chechnya/Russia/Soviet Union, activate
both the glory of the Independence of A7 and the trauma of the Secession of
A15. Bosnia is permitted to secede from Yugoslavia and Russia from the Soviet
Union, but Srpska not from Bosnia, and Chechnya (probably) not from a Russia
admonished to stop violence, but not to let Chechnya go.

Why this difference? With ratio logic there is not much difference,
especially not if the self-determination doctrine is invoked. But from the point of
view of irratio, they are very different. The USA became independent in a
liberation struggle against illegitimate power (a monarchy that broke the “no
taxation without representation” rule), whereas the South (starting with South
Carolina in 1860) seceded against legitimate rule, according to the victorious
North. The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, still being communist in the U.S.
perception, were both illegitimate; Bosnia and Russia, recognized by the
“international community,” embracing the Trinity (or so the USA believes),
highly legitimate. Bosnia and Russia struggled for independence; Srpska and
Chechnya seceded.

But, in addition to that, A6 was at stake: the idea of the multicultural/
ethnic society. Russia and, more so, Bosnia are seen by the USA as multiethnic,
meaning that a basic myth about the USA is being tested in both countries. If
multiculturalism prevails or at least survives, so does the USA; a failure may
signal an impending doom for the USA.\textsuperscript{89} The simple and brief history of the
United States—from 1609-1620 or 1776, well or badly understood—is projected
onto countries with supercomplex histories laboring under another logic and
used for one more global projection.\textsuperscript{90}

To facilitate some reflections, consider this overview:
Table 1. GLOBAL PROJECTION OF DEEP-ROOTED PATHOLOGIES: OVERVIEW

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The atom bomb
The Cold War
Việt Nam, Korea
South Africa, Israel
The Cuba policy
Latin America policy
Noriega
Hussein
Aldid
The Gulf War
The UN policy
The Bosnia policy
# Yes
A "Yes" stands for the use of that particular archetype to explain or account for that particular policy; a "No" for its non-use because it is seen as having little or no significance. The number of "Yes's" appear in the right margin of the table, as a crude indicator of the salience/centrality of that archetype.

Some comments can be made on the basis of this overview.

First, there are many "Yes's" in the Table, for the simple reason that we are dealing with archetypes. We assume them to be present all the time and that most foreign policy situations are so rich in their composition that most archetypes are activated in the sense that something is recognized. This is particularly true for the deeper lying archetypes, the timeless factors of repression on projection and the cultural DMA syndrome: we expect them to have something to contribute all the time to the global projections.

Second, four other archetypes belonging to the Chosenness syndrome are also assumed to be generally relevant: chosen people, U.S. lives and U.S. interests being of a higher kind, and the USA as the final arbiter. The USA as a sacred land, however, is only invoked when that land is really threatened. The prime example is Pearl Harbor, but there are also South Africa/Israel as covenanted countries by way of isomorphism (South Africa being less salient as there are few Boers in the USA), and everything involving Latin America, often described as "backyard." when we define the region as second class sacred land by Manifest Destiny. And then UN policy: the UN itself is on sacred land, and can be ejected if it fails to behave.

Third, A6, the melting pot, is invoked only once, in connection with the Bosnia policy. And A11 only twice, as trauma energy to draw upon in ground battles against Satan, in the Korea/Viet Nam wars, and the Gulf War. A land war in Japan might have attained the same character; the land war in Western Europe definitely not.
8. Prognosis: the USA and the Future of Global Violence

The prognosis is, of course, rather dim. If this rather heavy baggage remains unprocessed, then the USA will continue processing stimuli via the archetypes and release the tensions accumulated in ever more global violence.91 Being a democracy, she will celebrate the consensus enjoyed with no reflection on how it is obtained. Needless to say, this will be exacerbated by politicians, media, and public relations firms with knowledge and/or intuitions in this field, plucking on the strings of the collective subconscious as a Ronald Reagan was able to do so masterly, the “Great Communicator’s” formula.

The problem with this particular S-A-R chain is that one day the victims of U.S. action, and they are numerous (including those inside the country), may unite. The chain also carries considerable economic (opportunity) costs in an economy with considerable flaws. Stimuli there will always be; A1-A21 will be touched more or less by most foreign policy situations. The USA is to be pitied—no small task to be condemned to labor under the burden of this code.92

Sooner or later, the USA will go the same way as imperial constructions resting on the same or similar archetypes before it—decline and fall.93 As resources dwindle the country will cling to military power, ever more capital-, technology-, and management-intensive. The sources of legitimation of the use of force will gradually erode and with that the mystique. The rest is silence. The USA is driven by this complex of syndromes towards its own extinction. Unless, that is, the Buchanans win out, if what they want is to keep the whole baggage except one item: the compulsion to intervene all over. “Isolation,” not “global responsibility.” The world, however, wants the USA to join, but as an equal partner!
9. Therapy: But There Must Be Some Other Way?

At least seven general answers flow from this theory of a world where so many of the 200 state and 2,000 nation-actors are paranoid and/or megalomaniac narcissists with weapons (in other words, bullies):94

[1] Curing states/nations of deep-rooted pathologies. Lift national narratives into the daylight exposing and critiquing them, building on yin/yang realism rather than DMA: more easily said, than done.

[2] Emphasizing peace-oriented archetypes. Each nation has values like respect for life/humanity/world/human rights that could be propagated and sedimented among the deep codes as archetypes.

[3] Disarmament. If bullies they are, then at least without weapons, even without armies (about 30, mainly small, countries).95

[4] Subdivide states/nations into smaller actors. The hypothesis would be that a world of 2,000 smaller bullies is better than one with 200 bigger bullies, let alone a world with 20 superbullies ("regional actors," "Beyond the Nation-State.")96

[5] Giving state-power to less gut-brain-damaged nations. The most frequently mentioned peace-nation is women, usually excluded from the foreign and defense ministries. But we do not know how traumas suffered by women and nondominant nations will be acted out.

[6] More multinational states. Less able to speak with one voice, they may speak less or neutralize each other (Switzerland).

[7] Paying less attention to the state/nation system and more to the other world actors. People's organizations (NGOs) for peace, human rights, development, environment, and women do not have arms and have not been around long enough to accumulate narratives with myths and traumas. Even profit-greedy TNCs, low on irratio, may be better than many states/nations in a world of very many voices.

However, wanting something more U.S.-specific, I am reminded of the old question: how many psychoanalysts are needed to change a bulb? The answer is not the usual 26 (one to hold the bulb and 25 to turn the house around), but none at all: the bulb first has to want to change itself. Does the USA really want to change itself?

They did in connection with the Civil War/War Between the States, with Americans involved on both sides. The job done after the war, still on, is interesting when viewed as an experiment in healing. Processing and reprocessing of the history of the Civil War is a major publishing industry, not to mention Cable TV and the book clubs. Of course, the process is Talmudic, no final answer: the process is the answer, like the crop from fall 1995, where, incidentally, William Tecumseh Sherman comes out in a somewhat better light.97
The major point is never to silence history with taboos, as Yugoslavia did under Tito. The trauma must have been terrible here in Virginia, a cradle of the American Revolution, with young George Mason hanging out in the taverns of Williamsburg, working on the Virginia Constitution (not to mention the U.S. Constitution which he refused to sign because of its compromise on slavery and other issues), his Virginia Declaration of Rights becoming the basis for the Bill of Rights. And yet the Civil War, whether we see it as the “War of Re却tion” or the “War between the States,” was fought mainly in Virginia, from the Union disaster at Bull Run-Manassas to the Southern Apocalypsis at Appomattox on April 9. Nobody can claim that the Civil War has been brushed under the carpet; had it been, the consequences would have been catastrophic. Traumas are not forgotten, they are only repressed. The Civil War would have continued underneath, much more than it has.

Another strategy, often mentioned, is to give the parties a transcendent goal. But when we see what came out of the Civil War, the imperial USA at the end of the 19th century, some doubts arise. The four tribes from the British Isles that invaded these Native American lands, so well described by David H. Fischer in Albion’s Seed, divided the task among them. The Puritans from East Anglia, the nucleus of the Yankees, set the course, both as brahmins and vaishiyah; the gentlemen in Virginia, from Devon, took up the military tasks and became the kshatriyah of the new system; the English, Scottish, Irish riff-raff, settling in the Appalachians and other places, harboring enormous traumas, became the foot-folk, the shudras; the Red/Black/Brown, the pariahs; and the Quakers from the Midlands, settling in Pennsylvania, became the opposition—for peace—and still are. The solution to the trauma of the Civil War was to inflict traumas on the other, but, from now on, cooperatively.

But how about other U.S. traumas—the Reds, Blacks, and Browns? Of major significance would be to recognize the traumas. Take the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum as a point of departure. There are reactions to this magnificent museum, one of them being that it obviously should have been built in Berlin. But there are also counterarguments to that position, more or less reasonable. One would be that the ultimate judgment for this enormity rests with the USA in general and its capital, Washington, D.C., in particular, as the final world arbiter (A5). Another might be that we all carry part of the guilt and the responsibility and want a world where this does not happen. A part of that guilt is linked to the nonaction of all Allied forces until Auschwitz, the major symbol, was finally liberated by the Red Army.

But the major problem is whether the museum liberates Germans from coming to grips with their direct guilt and responsibility, and in not pulling themselves together to make their own holocaust museum. And that brings us straight to the key question: does the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum also
liberate Americans from coming to grips with their own holocausts on their own territory, against Native Americans, African Americans, and Hawaiians, the Red, the Black, and the Brown Holocausts, so well documented by David E. Stannard in his excellent *American Holocaust*? This is the road the USA sooner or later will have to travel—painful, given recent debates about arts and museum exhibitions (the Smithsonian even caved in to the veterans). There is ample space in central Washington, for instance, to the east of the Washington Monument, in the neighborhood of the Holocaust Memorial Museum, for at least two more for the Red and the Black Holocaust (the Hawaiian holocaust museum would be better located in Honolulu).103

Why is this so important? The first answer has been given: because silence and even taboos never work. Such enormities do not disappear by themselves. The second answer might be in terms of a catharsis through reliving. But the third, fourth, and fifth answers are more forward-looking and more important—as a living memorial of why it is so important to identify the factors that brought about the holocaust and asking how future holocausts can be avoided. For that purpose any idea to the effect that there is only one holocaust (ours), that it is unique and could only have occurred once (there and then), is antihuman. History informs us otherwise. Washington, D.C., would make an enormous contribution to humanity by providing that opportunity for deeper understanding.

But how about the massive U.S. violence all over the world? Let us now call in Freud's Super Ego, Ego, and Id, which are essentially a secularized reading of the general occidental vision of the human being as a battlefield between opposed and not too unequal forces, God/Good and Satan/Evil, by Freud renamed Super Ego and Id. In a Judeo-Christian nation, the ultimate source of morality and good/bad conscience would be Yahweh/God; in the U.S. archetypes expanded by adding two secular elements, Free Market/Enterprise and Independence/Democracy (Satan presumably standing for a weak or strong negation of that trinity).

Through internalization in the individual subconscious, and collective sharing, the archetypes attain almost Id-character, protected by strong positive and negative feelings when consonance or dissonance is reported to the gut-brain. Since collective and thereby also large parts of individual identity, which we assume to be a basic human need104, are hitched onto the archetypes, the emotions engendered should be equally strong as those engendered by the drives for food and sex. We are dealing with strong and often dark forces indeed.

But could the Super Ego not be called upon to steer it all? The problem with U.S. patriotism is that God has already been co-opted (A1, A2) and so has Yahweh through the hyphen in Judeo-Christianity (A7). To steer away from global violence an alternative source of morality has to be found; the moral
Super Ego being more, not less, violent than the body Id. That source exists if soft Judaism, soft Christianity, and soft humanism could be internalized. "soft" meaning gentle, basically nonviolent. But these are counter-trend, not mainstream, in the USA. And any reference to Alla'h or Buddha would meet with suspicion about their level of U.S. patriotism.

Thus, it looks as if ratio and consequence analyses with probabilities and utilities of outcomes have to be invoked somewhere, anywhere, everywhere in the flow of Figure 1. The process has to become [1] more conscious and [2] ratio, not only irratio processes should be less secret, more collectively shared. But the problems with that approach are also numerous.

First, we would generally assume ratio to be weaker than irratio because it is less based on emotions, more on cognitions. The gut-brain has more of a hold on human beings than the head-brain, and even more so when a little glance left, right, ahead, and behind will convince both brains that others share the same emotions. This is a reason why elites prefer to make decisions behind closed doors so that the public does not see how little thinking actually takes place. Their gut-brains carry them away, and that of course may also apply to the single decision-maker. The truth about "decision-making" is too shocking.

Second, elite ratio may already have been aligned with their irratio through selective recruitment and clearance. It is hard to believe that anyone in a leading position in the "intelligence-national security community" would process stimuli through ratio into responses significantly different from what has already been decided by irratio. The shared gut-brain is good for consensus-making; individual head-brain differences look small.

Third, most of U.S. international relations (IR) studies and security studies can be seen as rationalization of the patriotic code; as variations on the theme that the world interest is best served when all nations pursue their own national interests, and particularly when the USA does so. Hence, to invoke national or "vital" interest does not help if it coincides with the patriotic code. And that concept, when undefined, excludes nothing.

The whole problem can best be understood by invoking cognitive dissonance theory, which actually is a cognitive-emotional theory. At the center is Ego; some of "us" have been attacked by some of "them." By no stretch of imagination can national security or economic interests be invoked; however, emotions are strong and dictate strong negative action against the common enemy. Sharp analysis dictates no action; ratio and irratio are in conflict with each other. It all depends on relative strength, indicating that national interests may have a restraining effect when limited to material, explicit arguments. However, when clear definitions are used, one interpretation would be that emotions are not very strong because insufficient numbers of insufficiently
important archetypes have been triggered by the foreign policy stimuli. And if emotions are strong, then the word “national interest” will reinforce those emotions.

Does that mean, in turn, that the USA is condemned to continue slaving under the iron gut grip of those archetypes? Yes, as long as they are not challenged, according to this theory. And they are not challenged as long as their function is not clearly understood. And that function will never be understood unless Americans start taking these problems seriously. There will be many other ways of doing so than have been indicated here, but if anything is in the U.S. self-interest, it is to be liberated from this burden of follies and “burps.”

And that makes U.S. peace and conflict resolution studies that do not deal with the most belligerent and violent country in the world, USA, [1] intellectually seriously flawed, [2] an outcome of serious ideological bias, or [3] an outcome of moral cowardice lest funding or standing be lost. The three categories do not exclude each other. An American Dilemma. Actually, a world dilemma.
10. An Epilogue

Even though the examples here are taken from U.S. global policy behavior, the approach is not limited to the USA. It can be applied to any country or group, past, present, and future, in world and social systems, and more meaningfully so the more power those countries or groups project onto the global stage. But the specifications of the archetypes will vary from case to case; they are hypothetical constructs, to be modified if they fail to account for excessively violent or generally aggressive global behavior.

The USA is very powerful in terms of ideas, carrots and sticks (normative, contractual, and coercive power), so pathogenic baggage becomes even more easily translatable into pathological behavior. But U.S. global behavior has also many positive, peace-producing, and peace-reproducing aspects. In the collective subconscious, there is also baggage that is not pathological, evidenced by U.S. readiness to help the needy all over the world.110 This is very evident in the thousands of Americans in the NGOs, coded with nonviolent ideas and compassion, with capacity for hard work, not for bucks and bangs.

But doesn’t the present approach suffer from the shortcoming of much psychoanalysis: revealing bad, questionable motives behind all action, good, questionable or bad, but less able to identify good motives behind any kind of action? The tendency is to reveal and debunk good motives as rationalization. True, but the fact still remains that the USA simply is excessively violent, as are other countries and other nations as a world waking up after the Cold War is now learning. So maybe the simple conclusion is this: the time has come for a deep analysis, possibly a debunking, of most national narratives as they impact on the global scene, not only that of the USA.
ENDNOTES

* I would like to express my gratitude to Kevin Clements for suggesting the theme for this Lynch Lecture, and to him and Chris Mitchell for inviting me as Bryant Wedge Visiting Professor for the spring semester 1996 at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia. A special vote of thanks to the students in my class "Advanced Topics in Peace and Conflict Theory," and to Kevin Clements, Chris Mitchell, Richard E. Rubenstein, and Finn Tschudi for very useful comments. Although critical of U.S. foreign policy, this exercise is written in a true spirit of friendship. The true friend is the one who loves and also criticizes, and then helps to construct and reconstruct. Single-minded praise is not the path traveled by a true friend, but by the beggar waiting for a handout. USA, be ready for your friends. You have only some illusions to lose.

1 The March of Folly, From Troy to Vietnam (New York: Knopf, 1984).
2 Visitors today to the ruins of Troy (in Turkey, near the Dardanelles, on the Asian side) will find a model of the famous wooden horse, and can judge for themselves the wisdom of letting such a thing within their walls. In the other three cases a little patience, flexibility, willingness to listen, and real dialogue might have come a far way. But then we might have had neither economic growth and individualizing democracy as we know them (if we accept that both are related to the world view of Protestantism), nor the end of the beginning of the USA, nor the (possible? probable?) beginning of the end of the USA.
4 Ibid.
5 The discourses, the intellectual frameworks for these facts and values are already in the border-land between the conscious and the subconscious, available only to those with some training in discourse identification.
6 Joseph Campbell, in his Foreword to The Masks of God: Primitive Mythology, quoted by Barbara Tuchman on the title page of her book. Campbell goes on to say "or by madmen to nonsense and disaster." How about "reasonable men" enacting "nonsense and disaster," and the fourth possibility, the "madmen" using their reason for "reasonable ends"?
7 See "There's a 'Brain' Behind Gut Feelings," International Herald Tribune, 25 January 1996, p. 10, and "Kommandos aus dem Bauch," Der Spiegel, 10/1996, pp. 210-13. According to this approach, by Professor Michael Gershon of the Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center in New York, and Dr. David Wingate at the University of London and the Royal London Hospital, the body has two brains. The two are interconnected, when one gets upset so does the other. The gut-brain is essential for body feelings of misery and happiness.
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(heartburn, a feeling of asphyxiation, diarrhea, “butterflies,” feeling high, etc.) as opposed to the corresponding thought and speech, “I feel miserable,” “I am so happy.”

8 Of course, “burp” is at or beyond the margin of social science terminology. But why not call a spade a spade? The point has been made that if instead of “cholesterol” and “deposits” or “plaques” we said “blood sewage” and “dirt” the motivation to do something about it might increase. If instead of saying “emphysema” we said “lung destruction,” more smokers might give up their habit. To the objection that such terminology smacks of advocacy and is not “objective” the counterargument would be that Latin-inspired terminology, poor in connotations, may make us acquiesce where we should act, and that nonaction is not more objective than action.

9 To mention one obvious mechanism among many producing the very high level of domestic violence in the USA: people watch U.S. military action abroad, for instance in the Gulf War, and draw the conclusion that violence is not only frequent, to the point of being normal, but engaged in by the good guys against the bad guys. Or, the point so eloquently made by Dave Grossman in *On Killing* (New York: Little, Brown, 1995): the US military were worried about the low percentage of GIs who actually fired their arms (like 20%), lowered their resistance against violence by having them watch violent movies and engage in interactive video games, etc., and the percentage became very high (like 90%). The troublesome aspect of the story is that these movies and video games are now generally available to the U.S. public. The story also turns Freud upside down: Id is relatively peaceful and reacts against the act of killing with the language of the gut-brain; a violent Super Ego has to be mobilized to kill those “primitive” non-killing impulses.

10 The “sacredness” of the land may also derive from the syllogism “Property is sacred,” “This land is our property,” *ergo* “This land is sacred.” in addition to origin myths like the New England Covenant, and the myths about the New Canaan which they referred to as a wilderness (similar to Israel’s empty land hypothesis).

11 Moreover, there is also the philosophical objection to the behaviorist S,R black box hypothesis: dehumanized, mechanistic approaches to human beings. Inside that black box are cognitions, emotions and volitions; conscious and subconscious. Our focus is on how subconscious cognitions, embedded in strong emotions, generate volitions that may be enacted when suitable rationales are found.

12 Charles Rycroft, *A Critical Dictionary of Psychoanalysis* (London: Penguin, 1972) has been used and been found very useful.
13 Charles Osgood, in his research on the semantic differential found good-evil(bad), strong-weak and active-passive to be central dimensions in the construction of perceptions; and projections are among them.

14 The absence of the parallel expression, “yes-woman,” may be seen as a great compliment to women and not only as one more sign of their marginalization.

15 As an example, the very frequently used term “anti-American,” meaning “you say that simply because you are generally anti-American, hence it is not worth listening to.” Another expression with the same function is “are you part of the problem or part of the solution,” dividing the world neatly in two parts. Like the distinction between “good and bad team players.”

16 In the case of the USA, the Unabomber and the Oklahoma City bombing come to mind as these are individual articulations of collective, political processes as opposed to individualistic suicides.

17 However, there is the interesting theory that the perspective developed here and that of leader psycho-history intersect in a theory of who becomes leaders: people whose individual psycho-history (some would say psycho-pathology) is similar to the collective psycho-history. Ideally the leader should be an embodiment of the glories and traumas of the nation.

18 Thus, the archetypes of Chosen People combined with the Promised Land archetype (Genesis 15:17 and Genesis 17:7-14, also see Deuteronomy 34:1-12 for more precise borders), combined with the arrogance of Deuteronomy 7:6 (“a special people . . above all people that are on the face of the earth”) would easily lead to some problems with neighbors, especially if in addition there was an admonition to eradicate them (Genesis 15:17, in conjunction with Deuteronomy 20:10-20).

19 The reader will probably, like this author, think both of the Germans (and not only the Nazis) in Hitler’s Germany, and of the Israelis in Israel. Both have been convinced that there was room for only one chosen people on their land.

20 They may simply assume that their “womenfolk” share their assumptions, only to wake up one day finding that the women take neither the chosen gender, nor the chosen nation, archetypes for granted and have developed considerable consciousness about why.

21 Of course, by the logic of repression-projection, it is the Self who attributes this monoglot disposition to Other who does not understand any other language than violence, fully inarticulate when it comes to nonviolence, for instance.

22 To the argument that an arms race is the logical, rational outcome of perceived threats and the struggle for a balance of power, not in the sense of equality but in the sense of superiority (a “positive balance”) the answer would
be: yes, this is the way ratio will try to come to grips with what irratio dictates as enactment of the CMT/DMA complex, being prepared for Armageddon. The problem is that the evil forces also prepare for that battle, hence the vicious cycles.

23 The themes under this heading are essentially East Anglia-Puritan-New England-Yankee themes, so the general hypothesis is that their ethos overpowered the other tribes from England so brilliantly analyzed in Albion’s Seed: the Pennsylvania Quakers from the Midlands, the Virginia Gentlemen from Devonshire, and the common people from the English-Scottish-Irish border regions in the Appalachians. Maybe it took a Civil War to wipe out the influence of the Virginian Founding Fathers (no Mothers)?

24 Thus, the “noble savages” of early Puritan thinking became “Children of Satan,” and Rev. Cotton Mather, minister of Boston, started sending the Indians small-pox infested blankets.

25 This includes the emphasis on winning the Cold War, not only being one party witnessing the other party collapse/implode. A good effect (breakdown of the Soviet Empire) has to have its cause in the good party, the USA, e.g., by forcing them into an arms race they could ill afford, or a technological race they could not win. But winning in a war goes beyond merely defeating the enemy; there should also be an element of changing the enemy. If Russia should backtrack into socialism the winners in this sense would be defeated; hence the obvious prediction that the USA will do anything possible to prevent a Communist party victory in the presidential elections in Russia 16 June 1996.

26 Some might feel that “chauvinism” or “jingoism” would be more appropriate terms. But in the U.S. case conscious affirmation of such points passes for patriotism. Of course, such syndromes do not apply only to nations and countries, but also, for instance, to gender (“male chauvinism”), race (indeed), class; maybe also to generation; in short to all the fault-lines in human society.

27 In other words, also seeing the evil in Self and the good in Other, not being limited to the good in Self and the evil in Other. And in addition the good in whatever is evil and the evil in whatever is good, and so on, ad inf.

28 I once witnessed a debate between two U.S. presidential candidates, George Bush and Michael Dukakis (July 1988), where Bush pointed at his opponent without looking at him, saying approximately the following: “And he believes the United States of America is an ordinary country somewhere on the UN roll call list between Albania and Zimbabwe. Whereas I tell you, this is a most exceptional country....” Like William Jefferson Clinton, on the occasion of that major U.S. use of violence against Self, the Oklahoma bombing 19 April 1995, referring to Lincoln’s words about the USA as the last, best hope for humankind.
29 Meaning grabbing land, cheating and stealing, killing if necessary, but maybe less in the name of God. Their myth may have been more El Dorado, hoping for gold in North America, eventually settling for tobacco, cotton and slaves (using them for buying and selling, not only for labor).

30 The homologue of the Rapture being, of course, the visa and subsequent emigration to the USA.

31 The archetype would be the "bomb-throwing anarchist." I am indebted to R. Rubenstein for this important point; see his *Comrade Valentine* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1994) for deep insights in anarchism and bomb-throwing.

32 PTSD. This point is very well made by Asha M. George, M.S.P.H., in a paper *Sovereignty Starts in the State of Mind, not in the State of Hawai‘i*, Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i, Dept. of Political Science, spring 1995.

33 Nat Turner was a Native American bondsman. After the revolt was suppressed, education, movement, and assembly of slaves were forbidden. No doubt reading and writing could challenge the system of slavery. But it also challenged something more basic: the dogma that Blacks were incapable of acquiring such skills, being illiterate as a race, not as a person or a nation. The dogma of white superiority was at stake. Peter Kolchin, in *American Slavery 1619-1877* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993; p. 156) makes the very important observation that the slaves did not succeed as did the Haitian insurrection, initiated in 1804 by Toussaint l’Ouverture, or to some extent the Russian massive peasant wars. "The waves of repression that followed each insurrection, conspiracy, and rumored conspiracy simply reinforced what was obvious to most slaves: under existing conditions, armed revolt was folly." *(ibid.)* But the successful revolt of the underdog might have liberated the oppressors from some of their trauma. The successful repression comes at a very high psychological price. The brutal repression of all efforts by the Reds and the Blacks and the Browns set the pattern for the glory of being invincible, and the trauma of revenge, some day.

34 *International Herald Tribune*, August 31, 1995; in other words rather recent, not a 19th-century quote.


37 For a discussion of some of these measures and their possible application to the collective disorders, see my *Peace By Peaceful Means* (London, New York, New Delhi: SAGE, 1996. Part IV, Chapter 5).

38 The report by the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community covers 13 organizations, and the four major ones are the *Central Intelligence Agency* ($3.1 billion, 17,000 employees), the *National Security Agency* ($3.7 billion, 38,000 employees), the *Defense Intelli-
gence Agency ($2 billion, 19,000 employees), and the National Reconnaissance Office ($6.2 billion, 1,000 employees). (The Washington Post, March 12, 1996, p. A12). For these four alone this adds up to $15 billion and 75,000 employees; considerable numbers (all of this in relative peacetime). Added to this are the contract personnel. There may also be undisclosed agencies, and then there is, of course, the regular diplomatic machinery of the USA, bilateral and multilateral, including the problem of what kinds of professions are used as cover for espionage abroad (for journalism, see The Washington Post, February 21, 1996; for U.S. clergy, February 22; for the U.S. Peace Corps, March 2).

39 The general formula would be \( X:Y = U:V \), \( X \) relates to \( Y \) in the same way as \( U \) relates to \( V \). Higher levels of recognition are conceivable, like the \( \{ X, Y, U, V \} \) relation above is similar to a relation \( \{ M, N, O, P \} \); but then perhaps not without passing through \textit{ratio}. The gut brain may not be very operational at that level of cognitive abstraction.

40 William Blum, in Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1995), lists 55 cases of U.S. interventionism around the world after World War II; a question being to what extent this is “Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad.” Anyhow, \( 168 + 55 = 223 \), a lower estimate being 210.


42 It should be noted that this index includes “Indian Wars” (the British invaded the continent, they did not just come to “settle”), but only a fraction of the often minor “uses” of the military mentioned above.

43 I am indebted to Ms. Elwyn Clements for assistance with the index.

44 This would take in thousands of years of history, not only since the rebirth of Israel. Egypt and Syria also have very long histories, hence their WPI would be low.


46 It is worth noting that this is not the writings of some marginal sect, often referred to as “fundamentalist” also because it is marginal, but a key quote from a major book in the mainstream religions in the Occidental world.


48 Blum, in \textit{Killing Hope}, p. 334.

Actually, John Stockwell of that group told the present author (in a private conversation June 1988) that the number was too low, and that six and a quarter million would have been more accurate. A reading of the 55 post World War II cases in William Blum's silenced book *Killing Hope* makes this credible.

The enormous interest in the USA in the Nazi holocaust on Jews, the atrocities of the Soviet Union and of Communist China could also be seen in this perspective. Not that the focus on these three regimes as violent is not warranted. But it also serves to deflect attention away from the holocausts carried out by the USA, on people of Red, Black, Brown, and Yellow skin color. White against White (Nazis against Jews, Bolsheviks against others including their own) is serious; so is the US Civil War (how could it have happened —). Yellow against Yellow shows what kind of people they are; so do the many accounts of Black against Black wars in Africa and Red against Red in the Americas. The denial of the holocaust by U.S. Whites against Red, Black and Brown has to be protected with taboos. David E. Stannard is among the few who as a scholar raises the issue, in the sense of breaking such taboos; see his “Uniqueness as Denial: The Politics of Genocide Scholarship,” in Alan S. Rosenbaum, ed., *Is the Holocaust Unique?* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 163-208.

As a part of the second argument is also the idea that Japan should capitulate to the USA and not to the Soviet Union, and U.S. weapons, not the Red Army, should be seen as the cause for that capitulation. Gar Alperowitz, in his monumental *The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, and the Architecture of an American Myth* (New York: Knopf, 1995) finds that key Cabinet members found the exploration of the future position of the Japanese Emperor the better road to bring about a surrender and the end of the war. Alperowitz sees James F. Byrnes, the new Secretary of State (after Stettinius) as the person who ultimately persuaded Truman to drop the bomb, using both arguments. At no point in the 847 pages is there any hint of the hypothesis forwarded here, compatible with the point that the collective subconscious does not leave traces that would figure as data for an historian (which, of course, is no proof of my hypothesis!).


Reference is made to the archetypes A1-A21 in Section 4 above. I apologize to reader who will have to keep a finger on that page in what follows; spelling out the archetypes each time take too much space!

The 1942 internment of all Japanese-Americans residing in the Western United States can probably be understood in the same light. Irratio demanded revenge and punishment right after Pearl Harbor; but the technology for hitting the perpetrator, Japan, and in a major way, was not yet available. The second best is to hit Americans of Japanese descent in the USA, possibly scaring
other countries, but above all giving other Americans a sense that some preliminary justice has been done. *Ratio*, however, would not be satisfied with this logic since they as a collectivity were not behind Pearl Harbor. Hence, *ratio* would do what *ratio* does, rationalize, invoking security threats. And, as usual, with a grain of truth. For an analysis of the high and idealistic expectations the Japanese had when they came to the USA in the 19th century, see Philip Grant & Kyoko Nozaki, "Japanese Dreams, American Nightmares," *Kyoto Journal*, No. 28, 1995, pp. 25-34.

56 Quoted on the jacket of Alperovitz' book.

57 The very high U.S. rate of capital punishment, after the Supreme Court invalidated all death penalty laws in 1972 and capital punishment was reinstated in 1976, fits into this picture. The execution is divine punishment if only He who makes life is entitled to take life. The more Christian or Muslim the country and the stronger the covenant, the more legitimacy to draw upon for executions. At the coming rate of 100 per year (but not after mid-December, the Christmas holiday season is out) the rate is "about what South Africa did during apartheid" (*USA TODAY*, December 29, 1995; apartheid South Africa being another covenanted country). "Until recently, Russians used the death penalty about 20 times more often (proportionately) than Americans. But as judicial execution becomes commoner in the United States, it is disappearing in Russia: the number of Russians executed has fallen from 76 in 1990 to three in 1993." (*The Economist*, April 29, 1995). Of course, both supporters and opponents use *ratio* arguments: death penalty does/does not deter.

58 Rape may serve as a metaphor: the ultimate victory over the beaten army is to sow your own seeds in his women; not only beating Other into submission to accept Self but to become a Self, or at last a second-class Self.

59 As Oppenheimer pointed out in his famous statement after the first test, referring to Hindu deities.

60 This is also a reason for the coincidence between being veto power in the Security Council and declared nuclear powers: we are not like ordinary countries. And a reason why nuclear disarmament is highly unlikely unless some other ultimate weapon is found for them.

61 However, there was also an element of All: the rampant fear of the working class, given the U.S. history of consistently bad labor-management relations. The U.S. working class might get ideas.

62 However, by the summer of 1918, some 13,000 American troops participated in the 16 nation strong intervention against the Bolsheviks, with World War I still going on; indicating an early change of priorities as to who was seen as the real enemy of the West: the communists and the working class, not the German army and the Kaiser/nobility/Junkers.

64 Put a person with a pen in front of a circle where a small segment is missing and watch what happens.... This hypothesis can be seen as a corollary of second order recognition, \( X:Y = U:V \), with \( V \) missing: \( \text{USA}_{1941-1945}: \text{Axis Powers} = \text{USA}_{1945} \).

65 And Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations, with the additional thesis of a Muslim-Confucian alliance that would create an Other more worthy of the position as a major threat to Self.

66 This, of course, is a major point in Robert S. McNamara’s *In Retrospect, The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam*, (New York: Random House, 1995). In an interview with two reviewers (Carol Brightman and Michael Uhl, “Bombing for the Hell of It,” *The Nation*, June 12, 1995, pp. 822-825), McNamara refers to the Vietnam policy as “the theology of containment...a theology accepted almost with no debate”[p. 822]. And he goes on: “Our misjudgments of friend and foe alike reflected our profound ignorance of the history, culture, and politics of the people in the area.—We looked on Ho Chi Minh as an associate of Stalin and a believer in Khrushchev, whereas I think he was probably an Asian Tito” [p. 823]. Of course, since the war was guided by a gut-brain not very good at such fine distinctions—“commies,” “Charlie,” “gooks” would be closer to gut-brain articulations. To believe that it was mainly due to the purge of more knowledgeable “China-hands” in the State Department is naive: *Irratio* would have had its way such minor obstacles notwithstanding. And the theological, or apodictic, thinking he refers to is typical of a *ratio* that has capitulated to *irratio*.

67 A better term, but (characteristically?) missing in English would have been “supervert” when coming from above; subversion having something subterranean about it.

68 Of course, the Rambo movies tried to turn this around again, this time with Rambo “the triumphant individual” singlehandedly not only beating “the mob at the gates,” the communists in Vietnam, but also “the rot at the top” (White House, Congress, Pentagon) to use the figures of thought from Robert B. Reich’s “Four Morality Tales,” Chapter I in *Tales of a New America* (New York: Random House, 1987). But how about the fourth figure, “the benevolent community?” The movie audience, of course: when I saw the movie in New Jersey, the Star Spangled Banner appeared at the end, the audience got up and sang the national anthem.

69 This point is very well made by Tom Engelhardt in his *The End of Victory Culture, Cold War America and the Disillusioning of a Generation* (New York: Basic Books, 1995), particularly in Chapter III. 9, “Ambush at Kamikaze
Pass (II). Apart from the much too optimistic title, the (silenced) book is probably one of the most important books written about U.S. "global projections," a mirror not only for a generation but for the USA; more than sufficiently good to be silenced to death.

70 See Donald Harman Akenson, God's Peoples, Covenant and Land in South Africa, Israel, and Ulster (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992). With the theme the present author certainly has no quarrel; I only wish this Harvard Ph.D. had included the USA in the study.

71 It should be noted that the September 13, 1993, accords are about mutual recognition of Israel and the PLO (not Palestine) and autonomy for a Palestinian authority (not independence). So far no external border has to be redrawn. But few people would doubt that this is going to happen sooner or later; the isomorphism being sufficiently clear for U.S. gut feelings to spell worry.

72 General William Tecumseh Sherman, the Union general of March on Savannah fame, turned against the Native Americans after the Civil War (he was U.S. Army Commander from 1869 to 1884). But then there is also the more ambiguous George Crook, of whom it can be said that he killed so many Native Americans that in the end he became their friend.


74 There are so many archetypes involved here, but particularly important is probably A9, Manifest Destiny. Latin America, having been chosen by The Chosen Country, is also chosen; to reject that relation is to reject the very basis of U.S. legitimacy, hence worse than political dissent: heresy. If an Eastern European country goes socialist that is already bad; if a country in the Western Hemisphere does so much more than politics and economics is at stake.

75 The proportion is actually increasing over time: by the time 50% of the instances had occurred, only 41% of the instances in Latin America had taken place.

76 Quoted from Ken Silverstein and Alexander Cockburn, "The Killers and the Killing." The Nation, March 6, 1995, pp. 306-311. This is the style of the 1990s: no US troops are asked to do anything, "The (Mexican) government will need to eliminate the Zapatistas." And so they tried to do, in various ways.

77 For an excellent analysis, see Frederick Merk, Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History (New York: Random House, 1963).

78 Although, as Schwarz (op.cit., p. 64) points out, there were voices boasting that "Mexico glitters in our Eyes—the world is all we wait for."

79 How the Monroe Doctrine is compatible with the British seizure of the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas is another question.

80 U.S. imperialism seems to have gone through five phases:
- the invasion and conquest of Native American lands, killing about 10 million over a period of 300 years (1600-1900), eliminating perhaps 300 Native American nations;
- the expansion into “the Americas,” culminating with the conquest of Cuba and Puerto Rico in the Spanish-American War of 1898;
- the expansion into the Pacific riding on the Spanish-American War, conquering the Philippines (including a possible genocide on more than half a million of the native Tagalog people) and then Guam, Samoa and Hawai’i, the McKinley wave;
- the expansion to a set of pacts and treaties, alliance and base agreements initiated during World War II and completed during the Cold War;
- the possible expansion to former socialist countries and some Muslim non-Arab countries. This last point is played up in an Op.Ed. in The New York Times, January 2, 1996, by Jacob Heilbrunn and Michael Lind, “The Third American Empire” (the “first empire” is the second and third phase above, and the third empire is the fourth phase above; as usual, U.S. authors omit the first phase).

81 The elimination of people in the El Chorillo quarter in Panama City in connection with the December 1989 invasion can probably be seen in this light: fear of left wing Blacks. As pointed out by Andrew Hacker (“The Crackdown on African-Americans,” The Nation, July 10, 1995): “So “black crime” is not mainly about taking money or articles of value, or even about demands at gunpoint. For white Americans it represents racial revenge, as if each robbery—or rape—is part of an ongoing insurrection. It is the same fear slave owners had of being slaughtered in their beds.”

82 The same judge who sentenced him to 40 years after a jury found him guilty of drug trafficking, William M. Hoeveler, not unsurprisingly, refused to grant a new trial despite allegations that a witness testifying against him, Ricardo Bilonick, was bribed by a Cali drug cartel to the tune of $1.25 million to testify against him (the case is still in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, decision possibly next year). See The Washington Post, March 28, 1996, and The Nation, December 4, 1995.

83 The problem of extension of U.S. law abroad is seen most clearly in the idea of adjudicating cases of third parties using property confiscated by the Castro regime in Cuba. Another small but interesting example is a poster that can be observed at U.S. airports: “The Secretary of Transportation has determined that (name of the foreign airport) does not administer and maintain effective security measures.” Would not the UN organization ICAO in Montreal have been a more appropriate agency to determine the security of non-U.S. airports?
84 In the theology of the Crusades this type of argument was important, making it easier to kill Muslims, knowledgeable of Christ yet denying that he was God’s son, than pagans.

85 For some reason everybody seems to be on a first name basis with Saddam Hussein, but not with heads of state of anyone of his neighbors, nor with his arch-enemy George (Bush, who incidentally “didn’t think Saddam would last,” Honolulu Advertiser, January 15, 1996, Bush “felt a military defeat would lead to Saddam’s downfall”). I stick to the first name tradition.

86 As was to be expected, women were less supportive of the war preparation to start with, but eventually they also came around. The consensus was certainly built with the help of Hill & Knowlton, see Covert Action Quarterly, No. 44, Spring 1993. The number killed has been estimated by the IPPNW at 310,000; 180,000 civilians and 130,000 military. The number of U.S. soldiers killed and wounded will not be known for a long time because of the slow working of the after-effects of the radiation, toxins, or what not they were exposed to (such as poison gas from Iraqi storages hit by the USA).

87 One of the most used themes by Patrick Buchanan in his campaign in early 1996 for the Democratic Party primaries was to fight any tendency of the UN to become a world government. This is, of course, also a major theme by the militias, not thereby equating one with the other, only to indicate that this is a logical consequence of A1 enjoying a broad consensus including, probably, most mainstream Republicans.

88 Another theory, nonattributable but communicated to the present author by a UNESCO ambassador, was US anger at the publications by the Division for Disarmament and Peace Education, publishing information according to which the USA did not look very peace-loving.

89 “The foreign policy community’s anxiety springs from convictions like those expressed by Warren Zimmermann, the former ambassador to Yugoslavia, when he declared that the war in Bosnia had baleful implications for the United States” because what is at stake there is “the values of the melting pot,” quoted from Benjamin Schwartz, “The Diversity Myth: America’s Leading Export,” The Atlantic Monthly, May 1995, pp. 57-67 (the quote is from p. 67.) A case of irratio having been conquered by ratio? Certainly not. No rational person will ever argue that the USA, after having exterminated one way or the other about 10 million Native Americans during the three centuries (1600-1900), is a “multinational/cultural” society. Nor is it a melting pot for the immigrants, except if one adds to that metaphor a lining of the melting pot with WASP values so solid that they all come out unicultural, talking only English with various U.S. accents. And nobody with a minimum knowledge of Yugoslav history would ever argue that all of Bosnia is multicultural except when they are
forced to be so, under the Ottomans, the Habsburgs, the Nazis, the Titoists, and now under IMFOR, the U.S.-led implementation force (of the U.S-dominated Dayton agreement.) Two grossly wrong statements do not add up to one right.

90 If this interpretation is correct, it is also highly unlikely that Saddam Hussein will be ousted by his own people, as Bush believed, for the war. He did what politicians often do, he made the collective subconscious his individual conscious, and then enacted it. There may be other reasons, however.

91 And each act of violence adds to the burden of repression and projection, making it ever more difficult for U.S. citizens to protest: to negate violence today looks like negating the whole history of the USA, violence presumably being as American as apple pie. To oppose that violence (as distinct from denying it) becomes treason, even high treason, one more factor making violence self-sustaining.

92 The metaphor of the "slave" has been used several times: he who is so steered by the subconscious is no longer free. For a person, or a country to be free, insight into the forces steering him is the first condition ("freedom = insight in necessity"); the second condition being sufficient strength to liberate oneself from these forces (freedom as insight in sufficiency).


94 In IR theory this is usually referred to as the anarchic character of the world system, meaning by that a deficit of Rule of Law (laws + institutions + sanctions). Without denying that the focus here is more on the inner make-up of the actors, and how they became that way, among other reasons because violence creates traumas, which in turn leads to more violence.

95 The famous Article 9 in the Japanese Constitution, outlawing war, could serve as a good model; and the less famous Article 6 in the Constitution of the Spanish Republic of 1931: "Spain renounces war as an instrument of national policy."

96 The title of a book about cooperation in Western Europe. At no point does the author entertain the rather obvious hypothesis that what is beyond the nation-state may be the super-nation/state.

97 See The New York Review of Books, December 21, 1995, pp. 10-16, for a review of four books. An interesting point linking the anti-secession and anti-slavery stands of the North is found in a letter from General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck in Washington to General Ulysses S. Grant: "Every slave withdrawn from the enemy is the equivalent of a white man put hors de combat..." In other words, take the slaves away from them and the rebels can be conquered because they can no longer fight.
98 One famous U.S. mechanism is expressed in the sayings, “if you don’t like America, leave America,” “America, love it or leave it,” meaning by that “good riddance so we do not have to hear what you have to say, such things are not spoken aloud anyhow.”

99 The darkest day in Norwegian history was the Nazi attack on April 9, 1940. We Norwegians also have a trauma and we process it the same way: an enormous production of literature on all aspects of World War II and the occupation, succeeding quite well in normalizing our relation to Germany.


101 In this sense Columbus was prescient: he had discovered India, with a clear division of labor between these varnas.

102 New York: Oxford University Press. 1992. Stannard has also written Before the Horror (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1989) documenting the tremendous reduction in the numbers of the Hawaiians after the “contact,” the euphemism for the white man’s arrival.

103 The Yellow Holocaust Museum, for the victims of the atomic bombs, is in Hiroshima. Of course there should also be one in Washington, D.C., but the ambulant Soka Gakkai International exhibition of the effects of nuclear weapons was denied access (the permanent exhibition is in Yohohama).

104 See Johan Galtung, “Basic Needs,” in Lederer, Katrin, et al., ed., Human Needs, Königstein, 1980. The work was actually done in the early 1970s, and the outcome was a theory based on four needs classes: survival, well-being, freedom, and identity—the first two more somatic, the last two more mental. A basic thesis is the rejection of any hierarchy among them.

105 This, of course, is a point of departure for the psychology of crowds, or mass psychology, but particularly under the conditions that the emotions are mutually visible. A simple reasons why dictators and other demagogues make use of mass rallies, and why dictators are equally afraid of public assembly not under their control (as in Budapest, October 1956).

106 As a serendipity of this exploration: this may be used toward explaining the many failures of the CIA to predict major events during the Cold War, including the Berlin Wall of 1961 and the Cuban crisis of 1962. Let us focus on the failure to predict the Sputnik and the end of the Cold War, and hypothesize that at the top of such organizations would be persons with a collective subconscious of the type postulated particularly well internalized. Their subordinates, young Ph.D.s from elite universities many of them, collect and analyze the data premises for the conclusion that the Soviet Union has the capability to launch a satellite. That conclusion would be rejected if the mind-set containing the following syllogism is sufficiently well embedded:

- the Soviet Union, being communist, is incapable of creativity, it can only acquire new technology through espionage and theft;
Lynch Lecture on Conflict Resolution

- the United States, being the United States, is creative, but even we do not have that capability; hence, there is nothing for the Soviets to steal. Ergo, they do not have a rocket/satellite capability.

Evidently, what is at work here is A10, and with it an underestimation of other countries that are very different.

For the possible End of the Cold War the following mind-set could be postulated:

- communism is capable of repressing any opposition;
- communism will only yield to free world violence;
- outside violence is unlikely; ergo
- communism will last for a long time/will last forever.

Evidently, what is at work here is a combination of A17 dichotomies and A21 projection. The world is seen dichotomously:

- violence versus acquiescence, blocking for insights about nonviolence;
- communism versus the free world, blocking for insights about Eastern European peoples;
- outside force versus stability, blocking for insights about inner erosion.

As a consequence, the possibility of nonviolent opposition by the people, and not only the dissidents, was disregarded, along with inner erosion. Together these three factors were fundamental.

107 This also seems to apply to most of U.S. peace and conflict resolution studies, equally unable or unwilling to factor into the equations the nature, role, structure and function of the key actor in the world system, the USA.

108 This, of course, is similar to the view of economics as variations on the theme that the common interest is best served when everybody pursues his/her individual interest.

109 The first point in the Weinberger Doctrine reads "The United States should not commit forces to combat unless our vital interests are at stake." The other points include capability and motivation to win, clearly defined political and military objectives, the support of Congress and the American people, and "the commitment of U.S. troops should be a last resort." Without a definition of "vital interests" this says almost nothing, but with the definition of "vital interests" the hands of the elites may be tied as they will be held against their words. However, would definition in terms of threat to security and economic interests not help, and is that not what is intended? The problem is that the Patriots are in a sense right, anything that weakens the will to fight may weaken the fight when there is no other way out. Patriotic sentiments must be upheld. And then there is always the old argument about "whose economic interests." Imagine U.S. investment abroad is threatened and ultimately withdrawn. The
interests of those on top of some corporations may be at stake, but if a withdrawal to the USA increases employment at home, whose interests are served? However this may be, the three arguments remain.

110 Thus, I refuse to see Marshall Aid merely as reaction-formation in the psychological sense, meaning that an unacceptable impulse is mastered not by projecting it on Other, but by going to the other extreme, engaging in positive, but exaggerated behavior. By saying so there is no denial that there is something to the ratio argument that Marshall Aid was also an act of empire-building, an exercise in anti-communism, with a solid basis in irratio.
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