

**Institute for Conflict Analysis
and Resolution**

Occasional Paper 12

**Conceptions of World Order:
Building Peace in the
Third Millennium**

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Tenth Annual Vernon M. and Minnie I.
Lynch Lecture on Conflict Resolution

April 23, 1997

ICAR publications, which are available to academic institutions and to the public, are listed in this booklet. They include curriculum guides, books, papers, and reports on topics of interest to the field, and the Institute's Annual Vernon M. and Minnie I. Lynch Lectures.

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ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

The Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia, has as its principal mission to advance the understanding and resolution of significant and persistent conflicts among individuals, communities, identity groups, and nations.

In the fulfillment of this mission, the Institute conducts a wide range of programs and outreach. Among these are its graduate programs offering the Doctorate and Master of Science in Conflict Resolution, clinical consultancy services offered by individual faculty, and public programs and education that include the Institute's Annual Vernon M. and Minnie I. Lynch Lectures.

The Institute's major research interests include the study of conflict and its resolution, the exploration and analysis of conditions attracting parties in conflict to the negotiation table, the role of third parties in dispute resolution, and the application of conflict resolution methodologies in local, national, and international settings. The Institute's Applied Practice and Theory Program (APT) develops teams of faculty, students, and allied practitioners to analyze and address topics such as crime and violence, conflict in schools and other community institutions, and jurisdictional conflicts between local agencies of government.

Associated with the Institute are affiliate organizations, including the Consortium on Peace Research, Education, and Development (COPRED), an international network of more than 300 college and university peace studies programs; the National Conference on Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution (NCPCR), which conducts a biennial conference and maintains communication with conflict resolution professionals nationwide; and the Northern Virginia Mediation Service (NVMS), which offers conflict resolution and mediation services and training to schools, courts, and local agencies and practitioners in communities across Northern Virginia and the Washington metropolitan area.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Born in 1911 in Lozovaya, Russia, and an officer in the United States Army Air Force from 1942 to 1946, Dr. Anatol Rapoport is among the founders of the field of peace and conflict studies. Dr. Rapoport is a professor of mathematical biology, psychology, and peace and conflict studies; a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences; a member of the American Mathematical Society, the Society for Mathematical Biology, the International Society for General Semantics (president 1953-1955), the Society for General Systems Research (president 1965-1966), the Canadian Peace Research Association (president 1972-1975), and Science for Peace (president 1984-1986). Dr. Rapoport has taught at the Illinois Institute of Technology (1946-1947), the University of Chicago (1947-1954), the University of Michigan (1955-1970), the Institut für Höhere Studien, Vienna (1980-1984), and the University of Toronto (1984-1986), and has been a guest professor at the University of Warsaw, the University of Hiroshima, the Technical University of Denmark, the Institut für Höhere Studien, the Wissenschaftszentrum of Berlin, the University of Mannheim, the University of Munich, and the University of Bern.

Dr. Rapoport has been awarded honorary degrees by the University of Western Michigan, the University of Toronto, the Royal Military College of Canada, and the University of Bern. He is editor of *General Systems*, an associate editor of the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *Behavioral Science*, *ETC*, and *A Review of General Semantics*, and a member of the editorial boards of ten other journals. He is the editor of several volumes and translations and the author of more than 400 journal articles, ten encyclopedia entries, forty chapters contributed to books, and of many books, including *Science and the Goals of Man* (1950), *Operational Philosophy* (1953), *Fights, Games and Debates* (1960), *Strategy and Conscience* (1964), *Prisoner's Dilemma* (with A.M. Chammah) (1965), *Two Person Game Theory* (1966), *N-Person Game Theory* (1970), *The Big Two* (1971), *Conflict in Man-Made Environment* (1974), *Semantics* (1974), *The 2x2 Game* (with M. Geyer and D. Gordon) (1976), *Mathematische Methoden in den Socialwissenschaften* (1983), *Mathematical Methods in the Social and Behavioral Sciences* (1984), *General System Theory* (1986), *The Origins of Violence* (1989), *Decision Theory and Decision Behavior* (1989), *Canada and the World* (with Anthony Rapoport) (1992), *Peace, an Idea Whose Time Has Come* (1993), *Gewisheiten und Zweifel* (1994).

INTRODUCTION

It is a very great pleasure to welcome Dr. Anatol Rapoport to George Mason University to deliver the Tenth Annual Vernon M. and Minnie I. Lynch Lecture, "Conceptions of World Order: Building Peace in the Third Millennium," in this, the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution's Fifteenth Anniversary Year.

Anatol Rapoport, along with four previous Lynch Lecturers, John Burton, Kenneth and Elise Boulding, and Johan Galtung, can quite justifiably claim to be a founding parent of peace and conflict studies. Dr. Rapoport's work on decision making, game theory, and the interpersonal sources of competition and cooperation remain classics in the field. His work has spawned a number of experimental studies and has framed the field for a whole generation of scholars.

One of the reasons that Dr. Rapoport has been so influential is his unique combination of passion and intellect—born into a secular Jewish family in the Ukraine, he was taught by his parents the aesthetic and ethical values that have shaped his life. His parents encouraged him (first in Russia and later in North America) to follow his aspirations, first into music and then into mathematics. When Anatol was 14 years old, his father arranged for him to meet Rachmaninov. This set him on the musical path that he followed in Vienna and later in the United States. His discomfort with music entrepreneurship and the competition associated with getting work and concerts led him to study at the University of Chicago where he received his Ph.D. in biological mathematics on December 5, 1941. When Pearl Harbor was bombed the following weekend, he enlisted in the United States Army Air Force on December 8, 1941. His war experience took him to Montgomery, Alabama, and from there to Alaska to be liaison with the Russian Airforce, and then on to the Bangladeshi part of India to support the Allies' airlift into China over the Hump.

After the war, Professor Rapoport returned to teaching. In addition to pursuing his interests in biological mathematics, he had developed his own unique philosophy of science and social science—a combination of logical positivism, experimental empiricism, and empathetic understanding. At breakfast today, as he and I talked about Max Weber, Anatol told me of a translation error that he had discovered when reading Weber's *Theory of Social Action*; the translator had misplaced letters and translated "*verstehen*" as "emphatic" rather than "empathetic understanding." Rapoport has not made that type of mistake; his studies have been informed throughout by a strong desire to understand others on their own terms and in a way that makes sense of the deeper principles

that unify the human species. His movement into psychology flows from his concern with the significance of the effect of *a priori* beliefs on action and on ways that psychological and socio-economic realities combine to determine what is and what is not possible.

Lynch Lecturer Kenneth Boulding was fond of saying, "If it exists, it is possible," and "Nothing fails like success." Anatol Rapoport has dedicated his life to pushing the implications of both these statements, by enlarging the realm of the possible, and by identifying the attitudinal traps that confine people individually and collectively. A secular humanist, he has lived a scholarly life dedicated to the realization of the higher values in music, mathematics, and creative peacemaking. Not for him a woolly-minded commitment to peace and the nonviolent resolution of conflict, his goal has been to establish a true *science* of peace, in which people's deepest aspirations will combine with knowledge and wisdom to ensure that they do not delude themselves—or, worse, enter into wars—because of fuzzy thinking, misperception, or slavish commitment to false ideology.

Anatol's life work as a scholar has been committed to providing people with the skills needed to understand the distorting effects of power and the positive and negative roles of system dynamics. He is equally at home with strategic analysts or peace researchers, although, in relation to the former, he would prefer that their strategic analysis be based on a desire for win-win solutions and best-case rather than worst-case assumptions.

To all these endeavors Anatol brings a renaissance mind capable of making creative and exciting connections and unifying links between a variety of discourses and peoples. His work has been dedicated to clarifying areas of both certainty and doubt, i.e., to becoming doubtful about the certainties and certain about the doubts. His mission has been to clarify what is true, good, and beautiful and how these contribute to peaceful relations and human evolution.

It gives me great pleasure to present to you Dr. Anatol Rapoport.

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George Mason University
Fairfax, Virginia
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Address by
Dr. Anatol Rapoport

CONCEPTIONS OF WORLD ORDER: BUILDING PEACE IN THE THIRD MILLENNIUM

As the term “world order” implies, conceptions of it involve a conception of “the world” and a conception of “order.” Both have undergone changes throughout history. Initially, “the world” was understood to be the known world, that is, a region in which the inhabitants were able to communicate or interact. To the Greeks and the Romans, for example, “the world” was essentially the lands around the Mediterranean. For several centuries after the dissolution of the Roman Empire, the world of Europeans was essentially Europe exclusive of Russia. Only after the voyages of discovery was this concept extended to include the entire planet.

Unlike the conception of “the world,” which has irreversibly broadened, various conceptions of “order” co-exist today. While all have in common some idea of social control, the *modes* of control that underlie the different conceptions of a world order differ radically. Three modes of social control succinctly described by Kenneth Boulding are “threat,” “trade,” and “love.” “Threat” or coercion is the prevailing mode of control in totalitarian or authoritarian societies in which people are motivated to behave as the authorities desire by the threat of punishment meted out for disobedience. “Trade” or exchange is the mode of control applied in relations among equals and is the basic mode of control in so-called “democratic,” predominantly capitalist societies. Unlike threat, embodied in a declaration such as, “If you don’t do as I say, I will punish you,” an exchange implies reciprocal commitments: “If you will do this for me, I will do that for you.” People work not because they are threatened with whipping if they don’t, but because they are paid.

The third, “love,” is a term usually excluded from the lexicon of the social scientist because its sentimental connotations are deemed to be out of place in scientific discourse. Indeed, Boulding himself eventually replaced the term by “integration,” a term with no sentimental or romantic connotations,

meaning essentially the same as “love” as the word is used in Boulding’s description of modes of social control. A society based on “love,” in this technical sense, is characterized by an expanded range of public goods. A public good is, by definition, something that is accessible to everyone in society regardless of ability to pay, simply because everyone is entitled to it. For example, children are fed and protected not because they can threaten those who neglect them and not because they can pay, but simply because they are children. It is that example that probably suggested the term “love” to Boulding. However, in a more general context, public goods are not generated by affection toward others in a society. Instead, in people-oriented social systems, they are generated by a policy of respect for *human rights*. Members of the society receive them not because they can pay for them and not because they can threaten with reprisals if they are deprived of them, but simply because they are members of the society. Integration was at one time projected as the dominant mode of social control in an idealized communist society.

Corresponding to the three modes of social control are three types of world order. Corresponding to the threat system is a world order based on *hegemony*. Corresponding to the trade system is a world order based on *balance of power*, at times coupled with so-called *collective security*. Corresponding to the love system is a world order based on *common security*, an idea quite different from that of collective security. While all three of these different conceptions of order work to shore up a society against violence generated by anarchy, i.e., the absence of any system of control of human behavior, they do so in different ways. A threat system uses intimidation; a trade system uses distribution of rewards; an integrated system uses induced identification of self with others.

A clear example of a world order based on hegemony was the Roman Empire. The last centuries of its existence were marked by what is called, sometimes nostalgically, *pax Romana*; peace in the empire’s conquered regions was kept by military monopoly. In later times analogous terms were used to describe the hegemony of Great Britain over its vast imperial domains, *pax Britannica*, and, more recently, with reference to the geopolitical aspirations of the United States after World War II, *pax Americana*. Social order was maintained by one central power through the implied threat of annihilation.

The conception of a world order based on collective security has an interesting history. One example, dating from the fifteenth century, is the attempt by King George of Bohemia to unify Europe in 1464. In the preamble of *The Universal Peace Organization of King George of Bohemia: A Fifteenth Century Plan for World Peace*¹, the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences’ 1964 publication marking the 500th anniversary of King George’s project, we read:

“In the name of our Lord Jesus Christ...Let this be known to one and all for all eternity. We learn from the writings of ancient historians that Christianity once flourished and was blessed with men and goods, spreading far and wide, that it held in its womb one hundred and seventeen rich kingdoms, that it also brought forth so many people that for a long time it held a large part of pagandom including the Holy Sepulchre; in those days there was no nation in the world which would have dared to challenge Christian rule. But we all know how lacerated it is today, how broken, impoverished, and deprived of all its former brilliance and splendor it is. For not long ago Christendom passed through such a change that if any of the ancient kings, princes, or notables were to rise from the dead and visit the Christian countries, he would not recognize his own land...”

The proposed treaty contained specific provisions for establishing a permanent peace in Europe. It continues:

“...In order to facilitate the suppression of dissidence and wars, the very thought of which pains those who have to experience them, and in order to strengthen peace among others faithful to Christ who are not parties to the present covenant, we hereby provide and order that if discord or war should occur between other Christian princes and magnates who are not included in our fraternity, our below described assembly shall dispatch in our name and at our mutual expense envoys whose task will be to restore concert between the parties to dispute...”

Comments by the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences on the document, published in 1964, are noteworthy. The academy writes:

“The most prominent place is occupied by proposals whose purpose was to exclude war from human society. This purpose is openly and exclusively followed in the first eight articles, that is, the whole of the first third of the project; these articles contain very detailed and complete regulations designed to eliminate wars, to settle disputes between states peacefully, and to punish those who disturb peace. War against the Turks is not mentioned once...”

“Mankind of the fifteenth century was shown prospects of a world without wars in which even the apparently insurmountable antagonism between the Christians and Moslems appeared to be replaceable by a situation for which we can hardly find a more fitting,

modern-day term than 'peaceful co-existence.' This is clearly indicated in the final part of Article 13, which expressly envisages the possibility of peace between Christendom and the Turks."

Doubtless, the academy's republication of the document was motivated at least in part by its supposed advocacy of "peaceful co-existence," which in 1964 was a favorite buzzword of the Soviets, just as "mutual assured destruction" was of the United States. The reference to Article 13 of the proposed treaty, however, is misleading. That article states: "we...pledge and swear to our Lord Jesus Christ, to his most glorious mother, the Virgin Mary, and to the Holy Catholic Church, that we shall defend and protect the Christian religion and all its oppressed faithful against the vilest prince of the Turks...and we shall not cease to pursue the enemy, if our assembly deems it expedient, until he is driven out of Christian territory or until it is jointly resolved to conclude peace, which may be done only if the security of neighboring Christian states is deemed ensured." In other words, rather stringent conditions were set as the prerequisites of peace with the Turks. The arrangement proposed by King George reflected a perception of a common enemy, the fast-growing Turkish empire—Constantinople had been captured only 11 years previously. Historically, alliances of social and political units were most commonly formed for the same purpose. Families joined together to form clans to meet the threat of other clans. Clans joined to form tribes; tribes to form chiefdoms, then states. All of these regularly formed alliances were aimed against rival alliances.

The notion of balance of power arose later in the wake of the Thirty Years' War. While that cataclysm is often interpreted as a religious war between Catholics and Protestants, it is noteworthy that France, a Catholic country, participated on the side of the Protestants. The crucial issue, it seems, was not a rivalry of theologies (or of ideologies, as we would say today) but a struggle for power. Protestant monarchs mobilized against the hegemonical system established in the Middle Ages by the Church—a threat system based on the widespread fear of eternal damnation and only partially on military potential. Louis XIII of France, a Catholic monarch, seems to have valued power ahead of salvation, anticipating the famous declaration, "L'État, c'est moi!" In 1648 the Treaty of Westphalia reflected the victory of the balance of power conception of world order, whereby power was consolidated by the state in the person of the monarch.

Eighteenth-century Europe was characterized by a chronic struggle for power. Most states were more or less absolute monarchies and power was conceived as the range of authority of a dynasty. Witness the predominance of dynastic issues in the so-called "cabinet wars" of the eighteenth century: the War of the Spanish Succession, the War of the Austrian Succession, the War of

the Bavarian Succession, and the War of the Polish Succession. In 1795 German philosopher Immanuel Kant published his famous essay on perpetual peace, in which he argued that war would die as an institution if monarchies became republics, for without monarchs there would be no struggle for power (which at that time was thought to be embodied in dynastic hegemony). Ironically, his essay appeared in print as war was already raging between the newly established French republic and allied European monarchies.

The so-called French Revolutionary Wars merged with the so-called Napoleonic Wars, with Napoleon trying to unify Europe by force of arms, again against a common enemy, namely, England. Napoleon did succeed in unifying Europe, which, unfortunately for him, was not on his side against England but against him; it was not England but Imperial France that was cast in the role of the common enemy. The victory of the allies in the Napoleonic Wars was a victory of the balance of power system against a hegemonical world order. The notion of collective security arose in the wake of that victory—the common enemy was no longer a designated state or alliance; instead, it was the perceived threat to a world order based on monarchical power. At the Congress of Vienna in 1815, all the major European powers, including France, where monarchy had been restored, joined in a "universal" alliance aimed at suppressing revolution, wherever it might break out.

Soon, however, that system, broke down. One of the reasons for the breakdown appears to be the transformation of nationalism from a revolutionary to a reactionary force. Nationalism, along with patriotism, its nurturing sentiment, arose in Europe in the framework of the French Revolutionary Wars. Another contributing factor was the replacement of standing armies by conscription. The eighteenth-century European soldier was trained to be an automaton. In a typical battle of that time, the infantry often formed a hollow square with its soldiers facing outward and firing on commands barked by officers stationed inside the square. A soldier's job was to execute these commands by rigid, jerky movements, learned in close order drill. Indoctrination such as is practiced today with the view of instilling strong motivation was not part of the soldier's training. Length of service was typically 25 years; in war the soldier often did not know whom he was fighting, let alone why.

In contrast, the French soldier of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars was a recruit. There was no time to turn him into an automaton, and there was no need to do so since he was strongly motivated to fight. At first he fought for the achievements of the Revolution, then for France embodied in the person of Napoleon. The inculcation of nationalism and patriotism "took" and soon it infected all Europe. Nationalism retained its revolutionary flavor until the last decades of the century. It was manifested, for example, in the Italian *risorgimento*, a movement aimed at unifying Italy in the struggle against

Hapsburg domination. Another example is the revolt against Austria by Hungarian nationalists in 1849; that movement was suppressed by Russia, a belated discharge of responsibility to the Holy Alliance established at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The Polish revolt against Russia in 1830 was also led by revolutionary nationalists. It is interesting to recall that in Germany nationalism was at first regarded as what we would call today a "left wing" rather than a "right wing" orientation. A group of liberal German intellectuals meeting in Frankfurt in 1848 demanded unification of Germany along with democratic reforms including constitutions, thus irritating the assorted kings, princes, and princelings of the crazy quilt that was called Germany at that time.

It was in response to the rise of internationally oriented socialist labor movements in Europe that nationalist and patriotic sentiments were co-opted by the political right. These sentiments became the ideological basis of a world order based on absolute sovereignty of the nation state and the rationale of a so-called "balance of power." The six "great powers" of Europe of the late nineteenth century were Great Britain, France, the Russian Empire, the German Empire, Italy, and the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. The "balance of power" was supposed to be maintained by the alliance of the first three, counterweighted by the alliance of the other three. Although eventually Italy switched sides, the alliances still held when World War I broke out, which casts doubt on the peace-keeping potential of "balance of power," the forerunner of "deterrence," which was to dominate twentieth-century conceptions of world order during the forty-odd years of the Cold War.

It is interesting to speculate why "balance of power" was taken so seriously by Europeans as a principle of maintaining a stable world order. I believe that it had something to do with the impression made by Darwin's theory of evolution on the liberal bourgeoisie who, in the wake of the French Revolution, supplanted the aristocracy as the dominant social class. The principle of "survival of the fittest" nurtures both the rationale of universal perpetual competition as the driving force of "progress," and the ideology of the military caste. German General F. von Bernhardi wrote on the very eve of World War I:

"The struggle for existence is the life of Nature, the basis of all healthy development. All existing things show themselves to be the result of contending forces. So it is in the life of man. The struggle is not merely a destructive but a life-giving principle."²

Bernhardi goes on to cite Claus Wagner, author of *Der Krieg als Schaffendes Weltprinzip (War as a Creative Universal Principle)*:

"The natural law to which all laws of nature can be reduced is the law of struggle. All intrasocial property, all thoughts, inventions, and institutions, as indeed in the social system itself, are a result of intrasocial struggle, in which one survives and another is cast out...The internal development of the intrasocial struggle is man's daily work—the struggle of thoughts, wishes, sciences, activities. The outward development, the supersocial struggle is the sanguinary struggle of nations—war. In what does the creative power of the struggle consist? In growth and decay, in the victory of one factor and defeat of the other. The struggle is the creator since it eliminates."³

We see in this glorification of violence an echo of the Hobbesian view of human nature—the war of every one against every one—which is the way the military caste and their ideological hangers on interpreted the "struggle for existence, survival of the fittest" principle. Thomas Hobbes, however, did not share the bloodthirsty enthusiasm of the militarists; he supposed that if such struggle were allowed to continue, everyone would perish. The remedy he proposed was hegemony—the surrender of individual liberty to an absolute monarch who would protect the life of the individual by total control over his activity—his solution was the imposition of a threat system on organized society.

The liberal bourgeoisie, however, except for those directly engaged in the burgeoning arms industry, had little use for violence and threat. Their god was trade, profits, accumulation of capital; their conception of the struggle for existence and survival of the fittest was business competition, unfettered and ruthless but not bloody. So the idea of "balance of power" appealed to them as a means of restraining the drum beaters and trumpet blowers. It was supposed that "balance of power" would diminish the possibility of easy victory and so inhibit war. Well, it didn't—the very efforts to establish "balance of power," or to restore it after it was disturbed, led to a feverish arms race, which exploded in the four-year butchery of World War I.

The League of Nations was, in a way, a revival of the Bohemian king's covenant of 1464. The "world" was still Europe—the people of what we now call the Third World did not count, and the two major powers outside of Europe, the United States and Japan, had little use for "balance of power" as a guarantee of security. They aspired to hegemony in their respective spheres of influence, the former in the Western Hemisphere, the latter in East Asia and the Pacific. The members of the League of Nations still invoked the image of a common enemy, but now it was no longer a designated enemy, as Turkey was in the fifteenth century, but a hypothetical "aggressor," whom all the "peace-loving" states were expected to chastise and bring to heel. As we know, this scheme died stillborn when Mussolini started his much-publicized program of

restoring the Roman Empire by attacking with his tanks and planes the Ethiopian tribesmen armed with spears. The “peace-loving” powers could not even agree on cutting off Mussolini’s oil supply. Nor could they agree on a way of stopping Hitler’s program of “unifying” Europe under German hegemony. The carnage of World War II followed.

The United Nations, still in existence, represents an attempt to establish a world order in which preservation of peace is a primary instead of a secondary concern. Unlike the League of Nations, United Nations membership is universal; any collection of people calling itself a country (some 170 such groups have been recognized as such) can belong and be accorded formally equal status in the General Assembly. The result is that people who had no voice at all on the world stage before World War II can now have a voice. Another difference between the old League of Nations and the United Nations is that, along with the commitment to collective security, both the idea of hegemony (now supposed to be exercised by the five recognized nuclear powers) and the idea of *common security* (which I will presently define) are imbedded in it. Actually, these two ideas are incompatible—unless one of them survives, while the other withers and dies, the United Nations will be probably dissolved. The preamble to the United Nations Charter says:

“We, the people of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm our faith in the fundamental human rights of men and women, and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained...have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish this aim.”

Is this latest attempt to unify humankind still inspired by fear or hatred of a common enemy, a modern version of the “vilest Prince of the Turks,” against whom the King of Bohemia attempted to unify the Christian princes? Yes—in it are passing references to “suppressing acts of aggression,” and wars were sanctioned by the Security Council against North Korea in 1950 and against Iraq in 1990 on this ground; however, the marked difference between this effort and previous ones was the stress laid on *establishing conditions* of lasting peace. Even more crucial is the recognition that these conditions are not only necessary for eliminating war from human affairs but are also totally interdependent. Four of these conditions were recently named or implied in various resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations:

1. Disarmament;
2. Environmental protection;

3. Human rights;

4. Social justice.

To effect or protect any of the four, *global effort* must be established, and this implies ultimately limitation of national sovereignty, the Holy Grail of international relations since the Treaty of Westphalia at the end of the Thirty Years’ War in 1648. It is not possible to solve global problems without limiting national sovereignty. Disarmament is meaningless unless it is total and universal and does what it is supposed to do—namely, remove the scourge of war. Global environmental problems know no national boundaries; no one can escape global change of climate or the pollution of the oceans and the atmosphere. Violation of any individual’s human rights entails a disregard for everyone’s human rights. Finally, social justice must be universal.

Pursuing the goal of *common security* (as distinguished from the “collective security” envisaged by the Bohemian king and by the League of Nations) entails the recognition of the undissolvable interdependence of these human problems. Since no person, no nation, can be secure unless all are secure, problems cannot be attacked separately. Consider the tight connection between disarmament and the degradation of the environment. Ordinarily, one associates degradation of land with depletion of soil nutrients, increase of salinity, or desertification. I am not referring now to these; the particular form of degradation I refer to is the withdrawal from cultivation of millions of hectares of arable land because of antipersonnel land mines left over from past wars, which make tilling the land like playing Russian roulette. Or the low-flying war planes over Labrador that scare the moose on which First Nations people depend for their livelihood, and the radioactive wastes, a by-product of the nuclear war industry, that will continue to degrade our home in space for thousands of years.

It is of special significance that we put social justice on the global agenda. If social justice means anything at all, it refers to some aspect of equality. For example, “equality before the law” means that in case of confrontation between people, or between a person and the state, the decision of the issue depends on the merits of the case, not on the identity of the plaintiff or the defendant. Another aspect of equality refers to equal access to public goods; social progress can be defined as broadening the scope of public goods. Practically everywhere they exist, both fire protection and police protection are public goods; a fire department doesn’t ask for the number of your credit card when you ask them to put out a fire in your house nor does it send you a bill for putting it out. In the most advanced societies, by the definition of progress I have offered, education (at least to some level) and medical care are also public goods. And practically everywhere one has access to air; even the most ardent worshippers of the free market have not yet thought of a way to privatize the

atmosphere so as to make breathable air a matter of supply and demand. In short, equal accessibility to public goods is a vital sign of social equality and, by implication, of social justice.

Social justice, as a goal urged by the United Nations, refers to the striving for equality between entire peoples, i.e., a global attack on global poverty. Such an attack cannot be launched without radically changing the current trade patterns and financial arrangements between the affluent and the impoverished nations. It cannot be launched without expressly disavowing national policies of the sort proposed shortly after World War II by advisor to the United States government George F. Kennan, who was the first to formulate the so-called containment strategy that dominated U.S. foreign policy for almost a half century. He advised:

... we have about 50% of the world's wealth, but only about 6.3% of its population. In this situation we cannot fail to be the object of envy and resentment. Our real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to maintain this position of disparity without detriment to our national security... We need not deceive ourselves that we can afford...the luxury of altruism... We should cease to talk about...unreal objectives such as human rights, the rising of living standards and democratization. The day is not far off when we are going to deal in straight power concepts. ⁴

Here you see the connections between disarmament, human rights, and social justice clearly spelled out. The preservation of the disparity between the United States and the Third World is obviously incompatible with disarmament, if we are to continue to think in terms of power concepts. If its privileged position in access to resources is to be preserved, as Kennan once proposed, disarmament becomes unthinkable for the United States. Disarmament would also bring a halt to the arms trade, which has been a major channel for the flow of resources from the Third World to the First.

If the disparities are to be maintained, human rights and democratization are unreal objectives. Even degradation of the environment, though not explicitly mentioned, is connected with this kind of national policy. For instance, the imposition of one-crop agriculture on impoverished countries often results ultimately in desertification. Clearly, Kennan's recommendations to the makers of U.S. foreign policy were based on an aspiration to hegemony. This aspiration was reflected in the Monroe Doctrine with its claim of hegemony in the Western Hemisphere and in earlier pronouncements. For example, in 1789 Jeremiah Morse, a Congregational minister in Boston, wrote in a book on geography (anticipating the geopolitics of a later day):

"...it is well known that empire has been travelling from east to west. Probably her last and broadest peak will be America...the largest empire that ever existed." ⁵

Commodore Perry, who "opened up" Japan by training the guns of his battleship on the city of Yokohama, wrote:

"It is self-evident that the course of coming events will ere long make it necessary for the United States to extend its jurisdiction beyond the limits of the western continent, and I assume the responsibility of urging the expedience of establishing a foothold in this quarter of the globe as a measure of positive necessity for the establishment of maritime rights in the east." ⁶

The same concept of world order was expressed in religious instead of geopolitical terms by a U.S. senator after victory over Spain in 1898.

"We will not repudiate our duty... We will not abandon our opportunity in the Orient. We will not renounce our part in the mission of our race, trustee under God, of the civilization of the world... We will move forward to our work...with gratitude...and thanksgiving to Almighty God that He has marked us as His chosen people, henceforth to lead in the regeneration of the world. Our largest trade henceforth will be with Asia. The Pacific is our ocean. The Power that rules the Pacific...is the Power that rules the world. And with the Philippines, that power is and will forever be the American Republic." ⁷

This hegemonic conception of a world order appears to have been predominant in the thinking of the American power elite. However, during the Cold War, the balance of power model was also prominent among more sober geopoliticians. Great hopes were laid on so-called "deterrence," a way of preventing a war of total destruction by threatening total destruction, through investing in a monstrous doomsday machine, which admittedly can perform its function only if it is never used. There were also attempts to justify a multi-polar world, as a successor to the bipolar one, involving unimpeded proliferation of nuclear weapons. Some argued that such a world would be "more stable" than a bipolar one, invoking an analogy from theoretical mechanics. In one respect, the advocates of hegemony (assuming the responsibility of being a world policeman) and the partisans of the classical balance-of-power world order are of one mind; both energetically castigate the idea of common security as it is implied in the formulation of global imperatives by the United Nations.

In his *Foreign Affairs* article, "Saving the U.N.," U.S. Senator Jesse A. Helms writes:

“As it currently operates, the United Nations does not deserve continued American support...[it] is being transformed from an institution of sovereign nations into a quasisovereign entity in itself. The transformation represents an obvious threat to U.S. national interests ...This situation is untenable.

“The United Nations was originally created to help nation-states facilitate the peaceful resolution of international disputes. However, the United Nations has moved from facilitating diplomacy among nation-states to supplanting them altogether...Boutros Ghali has said as much. In his *Agenda for Peace*, he declared...‘The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty...has passed. Its theory has never matched reality...’

“Such thinking is in step with the nearly global movement toward greater centralization of political power...This process must be stopped...United Nations reform is much more than saving money. It is about preventing unelected bureaucrats from acquiring ever greater powers at the expense of elected national leaders. It is about restoring the legitimacy of the nation-state...the U.N. bureaucracy mistakenly believes that caring for the needs of all the world’s people is...its job...There must be a termination of unnecessary committees and conferences...In addition to wasteful conferences like the Beijing women’s summit...the United Nations continually sponsors workshops, expert consultations, technical consultations, and panel discussions...Most of these can be terminated at a savings of millions of dollars...

“The time has come for the United States to deliver an ultimatum: either the United Nations reforms, quickly and dramatically, or the United States will end its participation...Withholding U.S. contributions has not worked. In 1986 Congress passed the Kassebaum-Solomon bill, which said to the United Nations in clear and unmistakable terms, reform or die. The time has come for it to do one or the other.”⁸

As Kennan wrote, in a classified document, “the time has come to deal in straight power concepts.” It seems that the champions of conventional geopolitical wisdom (alias *realpolitik*) have shown their hand.

As recently as the sixteenth century, Europeans thought the world had only a century or two until Judgment Day. On the eve of the second (our) millennium, the end was widely expected to come immediately. Now, on the threshold of a third millennium, the end of the world is not expected to be

ushered in by a trumpet blast and the rising of the dead—in our time, we have a more realistic picture of the end, foreshadowed in the gruesome massacres of our century and magnified a million times by the products of an increasingly sophisticated scientific establishment; and, ironically, it is also to science that many of us look to find the way to avoid it.

Knowledge generated by science is ordinarily thought of as an arsenal of techniques that created the undreamed of technology of our age with its vast potential for both good and evil, e.g., the knowledge that created modern medicine that has doubled the human life span. Many now place their hopes on the generation of a body of knowledge that would forestall conflicts or facilitate conflict resolution and so prevent the disasters associated with war. In my opinion, this will not suffice because war is not merely an extreme variety of a quarrel, nor an extreme expression of enmity as develops from the attitudes generated by ethnic prejudice, nor strife about how to divide a pie, like conflicts between labor and management. War is an institution that has evolved through human history and in the process of this evolution has adapted itself to a large variety of social environments. It is like an organism having a life of its own and effective defense mechanisms against attempts to put an end to its existence. Knowledge of how to destroy this organism will require more than the discovery and development of techniques.

At the close of World War II, at the time the United Nations came into being, Albert Einstein warned that humanity is headed for disaster unless the people responsible for present policies change their way of thinking. The four global goals inspired by the ideals expressed in the Preamble to the United Nations Charter spell out the sort of change in our way of thinking that is imperative if we are to live through the next millennium. These goals have essentially dispensed with a human common enemy as the prime motivation for integration of small units into larger ones.

While the notion of the common enemy still exists in global thinking, the enemy is no longer human. The enemy of disarmament is not a person, such as “the vilest Prince of the Turks,” nor a conglomerate of persons, such as an ethnic group or a nation; the common enemy is the war system itself with its vast infrastructure of supporting institutions. These institutions can be destroyed and dismantled without harming a single person. The common enemy of environmental protection is not human; it is an ideology that puts imperatives of power ahead of the obligation to bequeath a livable home in space to our children. The common enemy of human rights is not “somebody”; it is outmoded habits of thinking that split humanity into “us” and “them.” Finally, the enemy of social justice is the existing system of trade and finance that puts security of profits ahead of the welfare of human populations.

Changes in our ways of thinking, which Einstein regarded as prerequisites to the preservation and integration of humanity, are already gathering momentum. It remains to us to mobilize the collective will to put the new thinking to work.

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