Conflicts Resolution in the Post-Cold War Era: Dealing with Ethnic Violence in the New Europe

Dennis J.D. Sandole

Working Paper No. 6

October 1992

Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution

George Mason University
CONTENTS

About the Author i
About the Working Paper i
Foreword ii
Abstract iii
Introduction 1

A Point of Departure: The Post-Cold War Zeitgeist
According to Fukuyama 2-4

Ethnic Conflict in Eastern Europe and the (former)
Soviet Union 4-8

Ethnic Conflict: Toward Explanation and Action 8-17
(a) Basic Terms 8-10
(b) Basic Human Needs, Frustration and Ethnic Conflict 10-13
(c) Conflict Resolution and "Provention" 13-15
(d) The Internal-External Conflict Nexus 15-17

The New Europe: Toward a Post-Cold War Peace and
Security System 17-35
(a) The Paris CSCE Summit 17-25
(b) The Opportunity (and Need!) for a Track-2
Complement to Track-1 25-30
(c) Post-Paris CSCE Developments: Helsinki and
Beyond! 30-35

A Peace and Security System in Europe: Prospects
and Prescriptions 36-47

Conclusion 47-51

References 52-63
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

DENNIS J.D. SANDOLE, (Ph.D in Politics, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, Scotland, 1979) is Associate Professor of Conflict Resolution and International Relations at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (ICAR), George Mason University (1981- ).

A founding member of ICAR, his publications include Conflict Management and Problem Solving: Interpersonal to International Applications (New York University Press and Frances Pinter, 1987), coedited with Ingrid Sandole-Staroste; and Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application (Manchester University Press, 1993), coedited with Hugo van der Merwe. He is presently completing The Genesis of War: Mapping and Modelling of Complex Conflict Processes (Lynne Rienner Publishers).

He was a William C. Foster Fellow (Visiting Scholar), at the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) (1989-1990), which included his serving as a member of the U.S. Delegation to the (then 35-nation) Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) in Vienna. He was recently awarded a NATO Research Fellowship (1992-1993), to examine the role of a "reinvented" NATO in shaping the post-Cold War peace and security environment in Europe.

ABOUT THE WORKING PAPER

This is a revised version of a paper prepared originally for presentation at the First Conference of the European Peace Research Association (EuPRA), University of Florence, Italy, 8-10 November 1991. Presented during the summer executive seminar on "International Relations and Ethnic Tension," at the Institute of World Affairs, Salisbury, Connecticut, 13 August 1992.
FOREWORD

This timely paper by Dr. Sandole is part of a continuing project at the Institute intended to analyse and recommend remedies for the resurgence of overt and violent conflict in Eastern Europe. It takes the form of a consideration of the manner in which the "security problematique" for Europe as a whole has changed as a result of the end of the confrontation there between the USSR and the USA, and how this has become a matter of coping with conflicts that are internal or transnational, arising from long suppressed ethnic rivalries. Such conflicts have not been wholly unknown in Western Europe since 1945 - Alto Adige, Catalonia, the Basque country, Northern Ireland - but since the ending of Soviet control in Eastern Europe and the development of the idea of a "common European home" the world has become all too familiar with the management and mismanagement of conflicts between Croats and Serbs, Russians and Lithuanians, Czechs and Slovaks, Georgians and Ossetians. In these, and many more, ethnicity and the search for ethnic identity and security play major roles.

The central political question has thus become whether those institutions established in the dying years of the "Cold War" can be adapted rapidly, and resourced adequately enough to play a successful role, first in conflict reduction, then in conflict resolution and finally in conflict transformation. Furthermore, can new political and economic structures, perhaps along the lines of those pioneered within the EC since the 1950's, be established to anticipate and to prevent [what John Burton insists upon calling provention] violent conflicts in future?

These are the main themes tackled in this paper. They are large and important themes, not merely for Europe but for all regions of the world where ethnic divisions make nonsense of the term "the nation state" and where the provision of new ideas and successful models are vital if we are to avoid a reversion to a war of all against all in the name of "self" determination. Dennis Sandole's paper is a more than useful contribution to this vital discussion about processes for conflict reduction and resolution, and about structures for conflict prevention.

Christopher Mitchell
Director
Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution
ABSTRACT

This article explores five questions, concerning: (1) causes and conditions of violent ethnic conflict in post-Cold War Europe; (2) some of the likely consequences of the continuation of these conflicts; (3) why existing institutions and processes, especially those associated with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), have not been effective in either preventing or otherwise dealing with these conflicts; (4) how the CSCE institutions and processes could be made more effective; and (5) what else can, or should, be done to deal with these manifestations of the "New World Disorder" in Europe.

A major conclusion of the study is that *integrated systems of conflict resolution networks* are required to deal with these conflicts, to dampen whatever "multiplier-effect" dynamics might be operative, and thereby prevent the conflicts from "spilling over" to, and adversely affecting peace and security in, other parts of Europe and elsewhere.

Such networks should be comprised of the new and evolving ("track-1") CSCE mechanisms (e.g., the *Conflict Prevention Centre; Procedure for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes; Human Dimension Mechanism; and High Commissioner for National Minorities*) and integrated with corresponding *nongovernmental* ("track-2") mechanisms of conflict resolution (e.g., those associated with the *Helsinki Citizens Assembly and Partners for Democratic Change*).

Such networks should also include *new forms of peacekeeping* for separating "warring factions" in "out-of-control" spirals, but only as a *necessary condition* of more "positive-peace"-oriented efforts to deal with the underlying causes and conditions of violent ethnic conflict.
Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War Era: Dealing with Ethnic Violence in the New Europe

INTRODUCTION

During 24 March-8 July 1992, the fourth review meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) took place in Helsinki, capped by a summit meeting during 9-10 July, to build further upon previous CSCE meetings to "institutionalize" the CSCE and contribute to post-Cold War developments in (a) security, (b) economics and environmental, and (c) humanitarian areas, including the development of new mechanisms for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, peacekeeping, and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Also during March-July 1992, the Yugoslavian war, which had been raging between Serbia and Croatia since June 1991, resulting in some 10,000 deaths, spilled over from Croatia into Bosnia-Hercegovina, resulting in, as of this writing (September 1992), perhaps as many as 50,000 fatalities, mostly Slavic Muslims, plus in excess of two million refugees, indeed, a refugee problem unlike anything seen in Europe since World War II (Battiata, 30 July 1992; CSCE Helsinki '92, July 1992:12; Maass, 3 August 1992).

Clearly, the new and evolving CSCE institutions for dealing with conflict in post-Cold War Europe have not facilitated either the prevention or the resolution of the Yugoslavian wars or of any of the other ethnic conflicts which have reemerged, simultaneous to, and/or in the wake of, the ending of the Cold War.

This article explores five questions:

(1) What are some of the likely causes and conditions of violent expressions of ethnic conflict in Europe, especially the brutal wars in the former Yugoslavia?
What are some of the likely consequences of the continuation of these violent ethnic conflicts?

Why have existing institutions and processes, especially those associated with the CSCE, proven to be ineffective in either preventing or otherwise dealing with the violent manifestations of these conflicts?

How can these institutions and processes be made more effective in dealing with these conflicts? And

What else can, or should, be done to deal with these manifestations of the "New World Disorder" in Europe?

A POINT OF DEPARTURE: THE POST-COLD WAR ZEITGEIST ACCORDING TO FUKUYAMA

Provoking intense debate a few years ago, Francis Fukuyama (1989:4) argued that:

What we may be missing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: ... the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.

Fukuyama argued further that the "end of history" means, "the growing 'Common Marketization' of international relations, and the diminution of the likelihood of large-scale conflict between states" (1989:18; emphasis added):

This does not by any means imply the end of international conflict per se. For the world at that point would be divided between a part that was historical and a part that
was post-historical. Conflict between states still in history, and between those states and those at the end of history, would still be possible. *There would still be a high and perhaps rising level of ethnic and nationalist violence*, since those are impulses incompletely played out, even in parts of the post-historical world. Palestinians and Kurds, Sikhs and Tamils, Irish Catholics and Walloons, Armenians and Azeris, will continue to have their unresolved grievances. This implies that *terrorism and wars of national liberation will continue to be an important item on the international agenda.* But *large-scale conflict must involve large states still caught in the grip of history, and they are what appear to be passing from the scene.*

Hence, history may be dead or dying for *East-West* relations, but it is very much alive in Ireland, Spain, Cyprus, Romania, the "former" Yugoslavia and Soviet Union, and elsewhere in the world. Indeed, there were, during 1990, in excess of 100 armed conflicts raging around the world, with conflicts involving at least 1000 battle-related fatalities taking place in 31 locations (see Lindgren, et al., 1990; Lindgren, 1991; Carter, 1991, 1992).

Fukuyama’s argument is a complex one: In his conclusion (1989:18), he argues that "The end of history will be a very sad time" and that "Such nostalgia ... will continue to fuel competition and conflict even in the post-historical world for some time to come." In effect, the constellation of factors making for a reduction of large-scale, ideologically-based conflict between large states will clash with, and perhaps be overwhelmed by, a longing for such conflicts. What this means, quite simply, is that history may not end.

But history might not "end" for another reason as well: Although ideological tensions between East and West are clearly diminishing, Fukuyama seems to overlook the "spillover"
potential of the ethnic and other conflicts that he admits will continue to occur. For instance, the ethnic conflicts and nationalist sentiments resurrected in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, as a (perhaps paradoxical) "spinoff" of improvements in East-West relations, may severely affect European security: they could undermine further democratization and reform in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and ultimately sabotage the development of a new East-West Peace and Security Commons -- a post-Cold War, trans-Atlantic/pan-European peace and security system.

ETHNIC CONFLICT IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE (FORMER) SOVIET UNION

The revolutionary changes that have been taking place in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and in East-West relations generally, have led to the thawing of long-suppressed ethnic conflicts and nationalist sentiments which had been frozen-in-place by nearly fifty years of Cold War. In Eastern Europe, for example, there have been tensions between Bulgarians and ethnic Turks in Bulgaria; and between Czechs and Slovaks in Czechoslovakia, leading, in the latter case, to a renaming of the country (the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic) and since the general elections of 5 June 1992, to accelerated disintegration of the state into its Czech and Slovak components. There have been violent clashes between ethnic Hungarians and Romanians in Transylvania (Romania). And civil war has broken out between Serbs, Croats, and Slavic Muslims in the former Yugoslavia. (For some background to these and other conflicts, see Borden, et al., 1992; Deak, 1990; Dragnich and Todorovich, 1984; Job, 15 March 1992; Kuzmanic and Truger, 1992; Lukic, 1992; USIP, May 1990; USIP, June 1992a, June 1992b.)
In the former Soviet Union, there have been violent clashes between, for example, (a) Abkhazians and Georgians; (b) Armenians and Azerbaijanis; (c) Kirghizis and Uzbeks; (d) Meskhetis and Uzbeks; (e) Ossetians and Georgians; and (f) ethnic Romanians and ethnic Russians: all against the background of the complete dissolution of the country into the now independent Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) and, after the abortive coup of 19-21 August 1991, the "Commonwealth of Independent States" (CIS) (inclusive of all the remaining former Soviet republics with the exception of Georgia), plus rising tensions between Russia and Ukraine over, among other things, the "ownership" of the Black Sea Fleet. (For some background, see Cox, 25-31 May 1991; Dillon, 1990; Glynn, 1989; Goldman, 1990; Karklins, 1986; Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1990; and Walker, 1991.)

Within Eastern Europe, the wars in the former Yugoslavia have been the major "spillover" danger. Approximately one year before Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence from the Yugoslav central state (on 25 June 1991), the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP, May 1990:26) reported:

Although problems in Romania, Bulgaria, and even ... Albania would probably prevent Yugoslavia's neighbors from taking immediate advantage of its slide toward dissolution, it is not impossible that the Balkans will revert to the confusion of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries over the next three to five years. Should foreign adventurism become useful to neighboring governments and should the Yugoslavs lose the ability to police [their] borders, a struggle could ensue among Serbs, Albanians, Bulgarians and even Greeks over the Southern regions of the Yugoslav state. While the Serbs are focused on problems there, the Romanians could make further trouble by stirring up their
brothers in Banat, and the Hungarians could do the same in Voivodina in the North (emphasis added).

Some observers of developments in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, have commented on the "Balkanization" of the area: a return to a pre-1939 (or even pre-1914) tribal condition. "Balkanization," however, really poses a problem with regard to the continuing disintegration of the former Soviet Union where, for instance, fighting between ethnic Romanians and ethnic Russians in Moldava has spilled over to Romania and to Russia (Erlanger, 22 June 1992), and fighting between Armenians and Azeris in Nagorno-Karabakh, the Armenian enclave in Azerbaijan, has spilled over to Turkey and Russia, with the Russians threatening that Turkish intervention on the side of the Azeris could bring about World War III (Shapiro, 10 June 1992).

The rise in ethnic conflicts and nationalist sentiments in the former Soviet Union could be used by rightist critics of Mikhail Gorbachev's successors as a pretext for staging further coups. According to former Soviet foreign minister (and current Georgian leader) Eduard Shevardnadze, "The threat from the right is still there and it could intensify" (cited in Remnick, 22 September 1991) -- a sentiment with which Gorbachev's main successor, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, agrees, (see Drozdiak, 7 February 1992). In the event, critics could continue to blame the country's problems, including ethnic conflicts, on "outside agitation," thereby perhaps resurrecting the Cold War as a way to restore their power base and leadership roles (see Dobbs, 19 August 1992).

There is a precedent: Approximately two months before the abortive coup of 19-21 August 1991, in which he had participated, the then head of the KGB, Vladimir Kryuchkov,
accused a "hostile West," specifically the CIA, of "using any pretext to destroy the Soviet Union": "in recent times," he said, the CIA had been "working on plans for optimizing hostile activities aimed at the breakup of Soviet society and disorganization of the socialist economy" (cited in Schmemann, 25 June 1991). One year after the coup, in an open letter to Russian President Yeltsin, Kryuchkov wrote: "History will hold responsible for the fate of the Soviet Union not those who made an attempt to save it, but those who ruined our powerful and united motherland" (Dobbs, 19 August 1992).

Mikhail Gorbachev, who had been criticized within (and without) the Soviet Union for failing to see what was coming, namely the abortive coup, was clearly aware of the internal problems that were emboldening potential plotters. At the Paris CSCE Summit in November, 1990, for example, he said:

Militant nationalism and mindless separatism can easily bring conflict and enmity, Balkanization and even, what is worse, the Lebanonization of different regions. Both could put a brake on European cooperation and contradict the European process (cited in Apple, 20 November 1990; emphasis added).

Against this background, it may not be too surprising that some observers (e.g., Robert Hunter [1989]) have remarked that, "we have more chance of [a European] war now than we have had during the last 30 years." Some have even lamented the passing of the Cold War and the "stability" associated with it (see U.S. Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger's earlier sentiments in this regard, cited in Tarnoff, 19 September 1989; also see John Mearsheimer, 1990a, 1990b).

Other commentators, while noting that "there may be more crises rooted in ethnic
conflicts than we've seen in years," nevertheless feel that, "in most cases it won't matter to [the United States] that much" (Michael Mandelbaum, cited in Goshko, 14 July 1991). As Richard Ullman (1991:144-145), in apparent agreement with Fukuyama, puts it:

Violent conflicts will certainly occur. ... [but] they will be sufficiently confined so that they will be very unlikely to escalate across the threshold of war among the major European powers.

My own view is that the resurrection of ethnic and other conflicts in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe must be taken seriously, for at least two reasons. The first concerns the potential for spillover across contiguous borders, within a given political entity or between it and neighboring states, which may be associated with "scapegoating" (unconscious or otherwise) or external intervention.

The second concerns a more tacit form of spillover, associated with diffusion through "demonstration-" and "bandwagon-effects." Any increase in ethnic and other conflicts, by creating the "right" climate, could generate a frustration-aggression multiplier-effect: violent responses to frustrated self-determination in one part of the world could exacerbate or stimulate similar developments elsewhere; in effect, "pollute" the human decisionmaking environment at all levels, where the resort to "lethal conflict management" (including terrorism, governmental and otherwise) becomes more thinkable and therefore, "do-able."

ETHNIC CONFLICT: TOWARD EXPLANATION AND ACTION

Basic Terms

The general phenomenon being addressed here is conflict, which has been defined
elsewhere (Sandole, 1980, 1986) as "a dynamic phenomenon, ... a manifest conflict process (MCP), comprised of phases of initiation, escalation, controlled maintenance, abatement, and termination/resolution." More specifically, an MCP is: "a situation in which at least two actors, or their representatives, try to pursue their perceptions of mutually incompatible goals by undermining, directly or indirectly, the goal-seeking capability of one another."

We are concerned here specifically with conflict involving ethnic groups, each of whose members share commonalities of history, tradition, language, worldview, perhaps race and religion, and an ingroup identity which includes "the other" (outgroup) as hostile: as "out to get them." (For some of the literature dealing explicitly with ethnic conflict and conflict resolution, see Boucher, et al., 1987; Enloe, 1973; Groom, 1986; Heraclides, 1989, 1991; Horowitz, 1985; Montville, 1990a.)

There is nothing inherently wrong with conflict itself. As John Burton (1972:137-138) put it some time ago:

Conflict ... is an essential creative element in human relationships. It is the means to change, the means by which our social values of welfare, security, justice and opportunities for personal development can be achieved. The existence of a flow of conflict is the only guarantee that the aspirations of society will be attained. Indeed, conflict... is to be enjoyed.

My concern is with the choices people make about how to deal with conflict: whether by competitive or cooperative means (see Deutsch, 1973). Specifically, I am concerned with the escalation of MCPs into what I call aggressive manifest conflict processes (AMCPs):

situations in which at least two actors, or their representatives, try to pursue their
perceptions of mutually incompatible goals by physically damaging or destroying the
property and high-value symbols of one another; and/or psychologically or physically
injuring, destroying, or otherwise forcibly eliminating one another.

What does theory and research tell us about the transition from MCP to AMCP?

Basic Human Needs, Frustration and Ethnic Conflict

In addition to disagreement, the above definition of MCP includes parties’ "attempts to
undermine one another," to "win," or at least, not to "lose." This means that each must do
something about, or to the other to prevent it from winning. As suggested by Anatol
Rapoport's (1960) classic work, this undermining can be achieved by one or some
combination of three modes: "Fights, Games, [or] Debates." Debates involve attempts to
convert the opponent or some important third party; games involve attempts to outwit the
opponent; and fights (the equivalent of AMCPs) involve attempts to destroy the opponent.

It does not matter how the parties attempt to undermine one another because fights,
games, and debates all involve various degrees of frustration. "To undermine one's opponent
is to prevent him/her/them from achieving their objective. And the closer the process of
undermining is to a fight, the more intense should be the frustration" (Sandole, 1986:119-120). Without getting into the 50-year-old debate surrounding the classic work on
the frustration-aggression theory of John Dollard, et al (1939), we can hypothesize that "the
more intense the frustration, the more likely it is that some kind of experience or expression
of aggression will occur -- whether internal or external, physical or verbal, direct or indirect"
(Sandole, 1986:120-121; emphasis added):
This is not to imply, as perhaps others have done, that frustration is a necessary and/or sufficient cause of aggression. It is to say, however, that frustration may play a role as a contributory condition. And the more of it there is, both in terms of frequency and intensity, the more likely it is to play that role.

But what is it that is being frustrated that can cause conflict to be expressed violently? James Chowning Davies (1962, 1973, 1986) makes an explicit theoretical connection between the frustration-aggression theory of Dollard, et al., and his (Davies') modification of Abraham Maslow's (1987) "hierarchy of needs." For Davies, the frustration of substantive (physical, social-affectional, self-esteem, and self-actualization) or implemental needs (security, knowledge, and power), can convert MCPs into AMCPs: "Violence ... is produced when certain innate needs or demands are deeply frustrated" (Davies, 1973: 251).

John Burton (1979, 1990a, 1990b) hypothesizes a link between frustration and basic needs for identity as well as for security and other goals (e.g., recognition, autonomy, dignity, and bonding):

Human needs theory argues ... that there are certain ontological and genetic needs that will be pursued, and that socialization processes, if not compatible with such human needs, far from socializing, will lead to frustrations, and to disturbed and anti-social personal and group behaviors. Individuals cannot be socialized into behaviors that destroy their identity and other need goals and, therefore, must react against environments that do this. ... Behaviors that are a response to frustration of such human needs will often seem aggressive and counterproductive, but they are understandable in this context (Burton, 1990a:33-34; emphasis added).
Burton's emphasis on identity (and his use of the concept identity group) renders his framework particularly relevant to "conflicts in multi-ethnic societies [which] account for most of the protracted violent conflicts in the world society" (ibid:137; emphasis added). In this regard, Don Podesta (8 June 1987), in his analysis of ethnic and religious conflict in 25 countries during 1987, has found that "These simmering conflicts [are] rooted in the most basic forms of human identity," reflecting "the need to assert group identity" (emphasis added), and originating in one particular emotion: a fear of group extinction.

Apropos "group extinction," Ted Robert Gurr and James Scarritt (1989) have determined that there are at least 261 minority groups at risk in 99 countries. Gurr's work with Barbara Harff (1988) on state repression of outgroups, indicates that there have been 44 instances of genocide and politicide in all world regions since 1945, with estimated casualties ranging between 7 to 16 million people: "at least as many who died in all international and civil wars in the [same] period" (ibid:359). And Rudolph Rummel (1987:28) tells us that, "the worldwide risk of being killed by one's own government because of one's race, ethnic group, politics, etc., is more than three times greater than the risk of war."

Clearly, "Genocides and politicides are brutal efforts to maintain the security of one's 'identity group' at the total expense of other groups" (Sandole, 1990:63; emphasis added). Given this association between ethnic conflict and the "fear of group extinction," it is not surprising that:

So far there has been no solution to any major multi-cultural or multi-ethnic conflict.

Ethnic and cultural conflicts persist and either become an on-going part of a
social-political system, or erupt, leading to violence and the destruction of the system. (Burton, 1990a:138).

(The wars in the former Yugoslavia are a major test case for validating these hypotheses.)

**Conflict Resolution and "Provention"**

We are discussing *ontological* "needs" -- imperatives which transcend culture, personality, time, and situation. Everyone (including other forms of life) has "needs" in some sense -- they are requisite to survival: of self, identity group, and species. Hence, there is an important *biological* element here (see Burton and Sandole, 1986; Sandole, 1990). (What *is* influenced by culture, personality, time, and situation are the ways in which people seek to express and to meet their needs [see Avruch and Black, 1987; Burton and Sandole, 1987; Avruch, Black, and Scimmeca, 1991].) No matter what barriers they may encounter, people will aspire to meet their needs, one way or another, even to the extent that they may be defined by others as "deviant," even as *criminal* (e.g., terrorist).

Minority groups are, with respect to majority groups, often in a condition conceptualized by Johan Galtung (1969) as "structural violence": situations of disadvantaged access to the resources of political, legal, educational, economic, and other systems typically enjoyed by the mainstream (e.g., as is the case with those who suffer from institutionalized racism within, and imperialism across, societies).

Structural violence is not always perceived by minorities, in which case, the "false consciousness" or "happy slave" phenomenon will be operative. However, if or when structural violence *is* perceived, "rank disequilibrium" (Galtung, 1964) and/or "relative
deprivation" (Gurr, 1970), or some other experience of "felt dissonance" may result. In the event, minorities may attempt, within the mainstream, to fulfill their needs for identity, security, recognition, and other objectives, but without success. Subsequently, via frustration-aggression-based escalation, they may "explode" their way into mainstream consciousness.

When violence does occur, there may be a "law-and-order" response in the short-run: State authorities may feel that they must respond forcefully to prevent loss of life, destruction to property, and the like. This may lead (perhaps, only temporarily) to negative peace: the absence of hostilities (Galtung, 1969). This is not, however, conflict resolution: a durable agreement that deals, to the satisfaction of all concerned, with the issues that lead to the violence.

Accordingly, for practical, and not "only" ethical reasons, the parties should move toward positive peace: the absence of structural violence, and pursuit of social justice for all concerned, which means facilitating the access of minorities into the mainstream from which previously they were systematically excluded.

Incorporating minorities into the mainstream may initially involve bringing people "to the table" to enter into a dialogue, e.g., to negotiate a cease-fire or otherwise agree to stop killing each other (negative peace), in order to reverse the insidious dynamic of the negative self-fulfilling prophecy (NSFP) which otherwise fuels and sustains action-reaction conflict spirals (see Sandole, 1984, 1986, 1987). The parties can then begin to collaboratively pursue social justice (positive peace) which will, in the long run, require change in the political, legal, educational, economic, and/or other structures and processes that would otherwise
continue to reflect and maintain the structural violence. This is the meaning of Burton's *provention*: "prevention of an undesired event by removing its causes, and by creating conditions in which it cannot occur" (1990a:233); in effect, *promoting* "conditions that create cooperative relationships" (ibid:3).

A fundamental problem, however, is that political elites, in pursuit of their own needs for identity, security, and the like -- what Burton (1979:73 and Ch. 7) calls *role defense* -- tend to resist efforts to empower minorities, usually because they (and not surprisingly, the minorities as well) see the world through *Realpolitik*, confrontational, power-based, zero-sum (win-lose) lenses:

In practice the most violent role defense situations are where there are no acknowledged processes for change: [in such cases] a power confrontation seems inevitable. While demands are made for change on those occupying authoritative roles, they are not accompanied by any recognition of the *legitimate human needs* of those to be displaced (ibid:144; emphasis added).

The Internal-External Conflict Nexus

Georg Simmel (1955) and Louis Coser (1956), among others, have argued that conflict with outgroups has the *function* of unifying and integrating each of the conflicting ingroups, to the extent that political elites have been known to follow Simmel's (1955:98) advice to *invent enemies* if none otherwise existed, in order to prevent or "nip in the bud" internal disarray and disintegration, thereby defending and preserving their "roles."

That conflict with the "outside" can have "internal" value seems to be generic, applying
to all systems levels, including the intrapsychic. Recalling the needs-conflict linkage and our earlier comment that a "hostile other" seems to be a major component of the identities of those involved in ethnic conflict, Vamik Volkan (1985, 1988) has argued that there is a need for enemies as well as allies, fulfillment of which is requisite to the development of one's sense of identity:

people actually use and "need" enemies as external stabilizers of their sense of identity and inner control. [Hence, they] sometimes have a psychological investment in the continuation of a given conflict (Montville, 1988:ix; emphasis added).

In order to have a healthy sense of self, therefore, we may "need" to know, not only who we are not, but who is against us; indeed, who is trying to kill us. (Might this be one reason why the bonding experienced in war represents, for some, such an unprecedented high point; perhaps a unique fulfillment of their self-actualization needs?)

A major hypothesis of this study is: As the liberation and democratization of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union continue, the needs for identity, recognition, autonomy, dignity, bonding, and security of those pursuing change will intensify, exacerbating ongoing, or creating new conflicts with others who, given their own role defense, will want to maintain the current, or re-establish an earlier, status quo.

In view of the historic connection (and not only in repressive systems) between intra- and international conflict, plus the possibility of external intervention on behalf of ethnic "kin" and of "multiplier-effect contagion," there are disturbing implications for European security of increases in ethnic and other conflicts in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union: Unless conflicts within ethnically divided societies are dealt with meaningfully for all
concerned, they could exacerbate ongoing, or lead to new conflicts between the affected states and their neighbors, as well as exacerbate or lead to similar conflicts elsewhere.

Are we stuck with a violent conflict-prone system? Must the Cold War be re-invented to "put Humpty Dumpty (bipolar 'stability') back together again"? (Perhaps this is already happening to some extent, given the "post-Cold War" collision between U.S. and Russian submarines near Murmansk [see Lancaster, 19 February 1992] and a classified Pentagon study that, up to 1999, "casts Russia as the gravest potential threat to U.S. vital interests" [Gellman, 20 February 1992:A1]).

THE NEW EUROPE: TOWARD A POST-COLD WAR PEACE AND SECURITY SYSTEM

The Paris CSCE Summit

Part and parcel of the dramatic changes that have been taking place in Europe are developments which constitute explicit efforts to guarantee the ending of the Cold War and to "plug" the Hobbesian "black hole" of international anarchy, at least in Europe. These developments include the Paris Summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which met 19-21 November 1990, plus the products of that summit and subsequent developments.

The Paris CSCE Summit took place against the background of escalating crises in the former Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf. One of its products was the (U.S.) criterion-event for holding the Summit: the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). This treaty, hailed as "the most ambitious arms control agreement ever concluded" (ACDA, 16 November 1990:1), limits each of the former Cold War blocs (NATO and the
[now defunct] Warsaw Treaty Organization [WTO]) to equal numbers of tanks (20,000), armored combat vehicles (30,000), artillery (20,000), combat aircraft (6,800), and attack helicopters (2,000). The effective verification of reductions to these levels, plus "detailed information exchanges, on-site inspection, challenge inspection, and on-site monitoring of destruction ... of the military capability to be reduced," are major parts of the CFE Treaty (ibid., emphasis added). Ambassador Jonathan Dean, former chief U.S. negotiator at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks which preceded CFE, defines the CFE Treaty as "the definitive end of the surprise attack option" (cited in Leopold, 19 November 1990).

Another product of the Paris Summit was the Joint Declaration in which the 16 members of NATO and six members of the WTO solemnly pledged that they were "no longer adversaries," but instead, determined to "build new partnerships and extend to each other the hand of friendship." They reaffirmed their commitment to the principles of the CSCE Helsinki Final Act (1 August 1975) and pledged to "refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any State, [and] from seeking to change existing borders by threat or use of force" (Joint Declaration, 19 November 1990; emphasis added).

In an apparent attempt to neutralize the "prisoner's" (Rapoport, 1960) and "security dilemmas" (Herz, 1959), whereby states in the Realpolitik frame tend to counterproductively pursue their security interests at the expense of one another, the signatories to the Joint Declaration also agreed to recognize that "the security of each of their countries is inextricably linked to the security of all the States participating in the [CSCE]" (ibid.,
emphasis added). In effect, they declared that a "paradigm shift" (Kuhn, 1970) was underway in East-West and European inter-state relations, from zero-sum, competitive, and toward positive-sum, cooperative approaches to problem solving and conflict resolution (as is exemplified by the newly created North Atlantic Cooperation Council [NACC], initiated by NATO during its Rome Summit [7-8 November 1991] to facilitate consultations and cooperation among the former Cold War adversaries regarding their "common security" [see below]). They also pledged to "work together to strengthen the CSCE process."

The Document of the Vienna Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) (CSBMs Vienna Document, 17 November 1990), which was issued right before the Paris Summit, contributes further to the confidence-building process begun during the initial meetings of the CSCE in 1973-75 and improved upon during the Stockholm Conference on CSBMs and Disarmament in Europe (see the Stockholm Document, 19 September 1986). In addition to prior notifications of major military activities, invitations to observe military activities, and on-site inspection of military activities from air, ground, or both, with no right of refusal, the CSBM Vienna Document calls for:

(a) development of a communications network throughout the CSCE (which, with the inclusion of Albania and the three Baltic states [Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia], plus 12 remaining former Soviet republics, and three former Yugoslavian republics [Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia], now consists of 52 participating states);

(b) a mechanism for consultation and cooperation regarding unusual military activities;

(c) cooperation regarding hazardous incidents of a military nature;

(d) visits to combat air bases to observe routine activities;
(e) information exchange on military forces, infrastructure upgrading, and military budgets;

(f) on-site *evaluation* of information on forces and upgrading (which is distinct from on-site *inspection*); and

(g) an annual implementation assessment meeting.

CSBMs provide the former Cold War adversaries with, in effect, further "opportunities [to test and] to falsify their worst-case assumptions about each other" (Sandole, 1991:10, emphasis added).

The remaining, and in some ways, most important development associated with the Paris CSCE Summit is the *Charter of Paris for a New Europe* which, on behalf of all (then 34) CSCE participating states, formally brought the Cold War to an end: "The era of confrontation and division of Europe has ended. We declare that henceforth our relations will be founded on respect and co-operation" (Charter of Paris, 21 November 1990:13).

The above elements of the Paris CSCE Summit are among the beginnings of a *post-Cold War, trans-Atlantic/pan-European peace and security system*. The Charter also went further in this direction by taking initial steps to "institutionalize" the CSCE which, until the Paris Summit, had been a "process" with no fixed address, secretariat, or regularly scheduled meetings. Hence, the Charter calls for regular meetings of CSCE heads of state or government during CSCE follow-up meetings (approximately once every two years); and for meetings of CSCE foreign ministers, in the form of the newly created Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, to take place at least once each year. To prepare the meetings of the Council (including reviewing current issues and making recommendations), the Charter
created a Committee of Senior Officials (CSO), which would also implement the Council's decisions.

In addition, the Charter established: (a) a CSCE Secretariat in Prague; (b) an Office for Free Elections in Warsaw (subsequently renamed the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights [ODIHR]); and (c) a Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) in Vienna. (A CSCE Parliamentary Assembly was established later, in April 1991 [see CSCE Digest, April 1991].)

At the time, the most (personally) fascinating and promising of these developments, from a conflict resolution point of view, was the Conflict Prevention Centre. The CPC was tasked initially to provide support for the implementation of a number of the CSBMs listed above: (a) annual exchange of military information; (b) consultation and cooperation regarding unusual military activities; (c) communications network; (d) cooperation regarding hazardous incidents of a military nature; and (e) the annual implementation assessment meetings.

Left open was the possibility that the CPC might constitute a forum for dispute settlement. In this regard, the Charter affirmed the commitment of the participating states, not only to prevent conflicts, but to define and seek "appropriate mechanisms for the resolution of any disputes which may arise" (Charter of Paris:18). In this connection, it mentioned the opportunity provided by the CSCE experts meeting scheduled to meet in Valletta, Malta, 15 January-8 February 1991, whose objective was to create a mechanism for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

The Valletta meeting took place and established the "CSCE Procedure for Peaceful
Settlement of Disputes" (Valletta Report, 8 February 1991). It did not, however, assign the Procedure to the Conflict Prevention Centre. That task was left to the first meeting of the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, which took place in Berlin, 19-20 June 1991. Among other things (accepting Albania into the CSCE and adopting a mechanism for consultation and cooperation regarding emergency situations), it designated the CPC as the "nominating institution" for the CSCE Procedure; i.e., for any given dispute, the CPC director could preside over the creation, but not the functioning, of a "CSCE Dispute Settlement Mechanism." In effect, the Berlin meeting of the Council provided the CPC with a conflict-resolution supplement to its original (and still primary) crisis-prevention/management function.

The Charter also affirms "that the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities will be protected and that persons belonging to national minorities have the right freely to express, preserve and develop that identity without any discrimination and in full equality before the law" (Charter of Paris:14, emphasis added). The signatories also expressed their "determination to combat all forms of racial and ethnic hatred, anti-semitism, xenophobia and discrimination against anyone as well as persecution on religious and ideological grounds" (ibid:17), a concern which (especially in view of certain "right-extremist" developments in Austria, France, Germany and elsewhere) led to the CSCE Experts Meeting on National Minorities in Geneva, 1-19 July 1991, "to hold a thorough discussion on the issue of national minorities and of the rights of persons belonging to them" (Charter of Paris, Supplementary Document:21; Geneva Report, 19 July 1991).

The Paris CSCE Summit, Valletta CSCE meeting on peaceful settlement of disputes,
and Geneva CSCE meeting on national minorities are relevant contributions to the creation of an infrastructure supportive of problem-solving approaches to conflict resolution in Europe. Their potential for cooperative conflict resolution has not been realized, however, because of, in addition to the resolution-inhibiting aspects of the conflicts themselves, two characteristics of the CSCE and its new developments:

(1) *Timing:* At the time of the Geneva meeting on national minorities, the first round of the Yugoslavian wars had begun. Given this temporal overlap between attempted institution building and resurrected ethnic conflict, the new CSCE institutions and processes never had a chance. They were not sufficiently developed to be up to the task: they were -- and basically still are -- "too" new. And

(2) *Jurisdiction:* The more important reason for "failure," however, is that the CSCE exists against the background of the sovereignty-protecting tradition of international law. The CSCE Procedure for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, for example, has an "exceptions clause" (Valletta Report:11): any party to a dispute can prevent the establishment or continuation of a CSCE Dispute Settlement Mechanism if the "dispute raises issues concerning its territorial integrity, or national defence, title to sovereignty over land territory, or competing claims with regard to the jurisdiction over other areas." Quite simply, any party to a conflict can effectively *veto* the process of peaceful settlement, if it decides that its sovereignty will be jeopardized by the process.

The sovereignty-protecting tradition of international law has become a source of concern (and debate) because, while it condones active protest (and war) against *international* outrages, it does not do so against *intranational* ones. (Consider, for example, the
difference between the U.S. and other Western responses to [a] Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and to [b] Saddam Hussein's persecution of Iraqi Kurds and Shiites [and others], including his earlier use of poison gas against the Kurds. As Rummel [1987:28] maintains, "it is a sad fact of recent decades that tens and hundreds of thousands of people can be killed by governments with hardly an international murmur, while a war killing several thousand people can cause an immediate world outcry and global reaction."

The United Nations Security Council has responded to this anomalous aspect of international law by declaring, for example, in April and September 1991, that an "ostensibly internal matter" (i.e., the Kurdish crisis in Iraq following the Persian Gulf War and the Serbo-Croatian war in Croatia, respectively) "constitutes a threat to international peace and security" (NYT, 14 April 1991; Goshko, 26 September 1991). These (and other) Security Council "deviations from the norm" might portend eventual far-reaching changes in international law. Such is certainly the objective of Sir Brian Urquhart (17 April 1991), former UN Under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs, who has argued that "National sovereignty[, which] is almost everywhere in retreat[, should] become a thing of the past"; also that the UN Security Council should, under Article 43 of the Charter, be able "to deploy an international force quickly in [any] situation where the cycle of violence could not be broken except by firm intervention" (Urquhart, 29 December 1991).

Pending such changes in international law, however, the CSCE will remain basically concerned with relations between states, while many of the ethnic (and other) conflicts in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (and elsewhere within the CSCE) are about relations within states. This potentially "fatal flaw" has been a major challenge facing the
"architects" of the post-Cold War peace and security system in Europe.

The Opportunity (and Need!) for a Track-2 Complement to Track-1

Although, strictly speaking, the CSCE Procedure for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes was not applicable to the ethnic conflicts within the former Yugoslavia, that fact did not preclude the CSCE from attempting to deal with the situation.

As mentioned earlier, the very first meeting of the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, which met in Berlin, June 1991, accepted Albania as a CSCE participating state and designated the Conflict Prevention Centre as the nominating institution for the CSCE Procedure for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes. In addition, the Council adopted a mechanism for consultation and cooperation regarding emergency situations. When the mechanism is invoked, the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) may be requested to hold an emergency meeting to consider the situation in question.

The emergency mechanism was first invoked in early July 1991, in response to the crisis in Yugoslavia. Meeting in Prague, 3-4 July, the CSO repeated the appeal of the Consultative Committee of the Conflict Prevention Centre, underlying the "importance of an immediate and complete cessation of hostilities by all parties concerned" (CPC, 1 July 1991; Focus in Vienna, July 1991:6-7). It also offered "its assistance in order to help restore peace in the area," for example, by sending "observers to Yugoslavia, in consultation and agreement with Yugoslav authorities" (CSO, 3 July 1991; Focus in Vienna, ibid.). (The European Community, whose 12 members are CSCE participating states, was able to send cease-fire observers [at least five of whom have been "killed in action"] into both Slovenia
and Croatia.) The CSO also "offered to make available, upon the invitation of Yugoslavia, a mission of good offices to facilitate the political dialogue among the parties concerned" (CSO, 4 July 1991, emphasis added; Focus in Vienna, ibid.). A subsequent meeting of the CSO in Prague, 8-9 August 1991, reiterated this offer (as well as produced an agreement to "expand the EC observer mission to Croatia, to increase its size and to include personnel from other CSCE states" [CSCE Digest, Summer 1991:4]). (More recent CSO responses to the Yugoslav crisis include barring the "rump Yugoslavia" [comprised of Serbia and Montenegro] from attending the CSCE Summit in Helsinki, 9-10 July 1992; see below.)

"Good offices" are part of the CSCE Procedure for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes. The CSO could have drawn, and still could, upon the resources of the Conflict Prevention Centre, the CSCE Procedure, and other resources (in the region and elsewhere) to assist in setting up a second track, problem-solving workshop for the Croatians, Serbians, Slavic Muslims, and others involved in the Yugoslavian crisis.

"Second-track diplomacy" is a term coined by diplomat Joseph Montville to refer to unofficial, nongovernmental efforts to get a constructive dialogue going between conflicting parties, often in situations where government officials (at the track I level) have failed to do so (see Montville and Davidson, 1981-82; Montville, 1990a; Volkan, Montville, and Julius, 1991a&b). Montville's fellow diplomat and track-2 advocate, Ambassador John McDonald (McDonald and Bendahmane, 1987), has, with Louise Diamond, generated additional "tracks" relevant to problem-solving conflict resolution (Diamond and McDonald, June 1991).

*Problem solving conflict resolution, plus facilitated conflict resolution and analytical*
problem solving, are terms associated with the work of one of the pioneers in the field of conflict resolution, John Burton (see Burton, 1969, 1979, 1987, 1990a; Burton and Dukes, 1990a&b). Herbert Kelman, one of Burton's long-time colleagues, has developed from this tradition an interactive problem-solving process which he has applied primarily to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (see Kelman, 1972, 1979, 1986, 1990). (Also see Mitchell, 1981, 1992; and Fisher, 1972, 1980, 1991.)

Track-2 (or "multi-track") processes could be used in the short run to avert or to reduce and terminate hostilities, depending upon conditions on the ground; and in the middle to long term, to facilitate constructive management and collaborative solving of problems underlying potentially or actually violent conflict situations.

In either case, parties to conflicts would have to invite practitioners such as Burton, Fisher, Kelman, McDonald, Mitchell, Montville, or others, to assist them in establishing and maintaining the appropriate processes, one objective being to complement and to link up with appropriate track-1 processes, such as the United Nations' and European Community's efforts to mediate in the Yugoslavian crisis.

If practitioners such as Burton, et al., are "too" reflective of "outsider" status (which in some situations might be an advantage), then recourse could be made to those more on the "inside." For example, in the last few years, centers for conflict resolution training and practice have been established in Russia, Poland, Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, and Bulgaria; i.e., the:

(a) Center for Conflict Management and Theory, Moscow State University;

(b) Center on Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, University of Warsaw;
(c) Conflict Resolution Center for Training and Research, Universities of Economics and Eotvos Lorand, in Budapest;

(d) Centers on Conflict Prevention and Resolution at Comenius University, in Bratislava and at Charles University, in Prague; and the


According to Zbigniew Czwartosz (1991), Director of the Center on Negotiation and Conflict Resolution in Warsaw, these centers are "working in collaboration with [American colleagues] to develop ... program[s] of regional cooperation [across] Eastern European countries," and to create "cadre[s] of professionals who are proficient in the skills of negotiation and mediation to facilitate the introduction of negotiation and conflict resolution processes into [those societies]." Although focusing primarily on "environmental, educational, and labor management problems confronting ... institutions" in those societies, these "cadres" could clearly include practitioners relevant to other categories as well (e.g., ethnic conflict).

Indeed, Partners for Democratic Change, which played a major role in establishing the above centers, has opened an office in Warsaw, Poland "to initiate Regional Ethnic and Educational Programs and advance greater Center-to-Center training and interaction" (Partners for Democratic Change, 1992a:4; emphasis added):

Building on work that Partners' President Raymond Shonholtz initiated as an American delegate to the [CSCE Experts Meeting on National Minorities, held in Geneva, 1-19 July 1991], Partners developed a Regional Conciliation Program for ethnic
issues and conflicts. The Program involves the development in Poland, Hungry,
Czecho-Slovakia and Bulgaria of local conciliation commissions designed as preventative
and early intervention mechanisms for addressing ethnic conflict and promoting
cross-cultural communication. Commissions along Poland's Belarus, Czech, and
German borders serve as the initial models (emphasis added). (Also see Partners for
Democratic Change, 1992b and 1992c. For a critical review of the activities of Partners
and others, see Rubenstein, 1992.)

Paralleling the work of Partners for Democratic Change, is the Helsinki Citizens
Assembly (HCA). Established in Prague in 1990, the HCA is a major example of Diamond
and McDonald's Multitrack Diplomacy (1991); its objectives are, among others, nonviolent
conflict resolution, plus the pursuit and maintenance of citizens' rights, including the rights
of minorities, all within the context of the promises implicit in the CSCE Charter of Paris
for a New Europe. Indeed, the HCA is the track-2 (or "multi-track") complement to the
track-1 CSCE (see HCA, 1990).

One of the outcomes of the Second General Assembly of the HCA, in Bratislava, 27-29
March 1992, was the proposal for "The creation of a network of centers for conflict resolution
in order to share information, coordinate work and foster the establishment of new conflict
resolution projects and centers" (HCA, 1992; emphasis added). A major result of Bratislava
is that "the HCA is now engaged in four concrete projects aimed at conflict resolution," in
the Balkans, the Transcaucuses, Britain and Ireland, and Romania and Moldova.

In effect, the number of possible "insider" practitioners of problem-solving conflict
resolution is growing. Their names, as well as those of possible "outsiders," could be
included in the register of qualified candidates maintained by the Conflict Prevention Centre which, again, is the nominating institution for the CSCE Procedure for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes. Through the "good offices" of the CSCE, European Community, or United Nations, these practitioners could be made available to conflicting parties.

**Post-Paris CSCE Developments: Helsinki and Beyond!**

Shortly after the abortive Soviet coup of 19-21 August 1991, the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE took place, 10 September-4 October 1991, contributing further to the development of the evolving *human dimension mechanism* (HDM):

[The Moscow meeting] provided that a state could request a panel to be formed from a *list of experts* nominated by participating States to serve as a *good-offices* mission by investigating the human dimension problem of concern and taking whatever actions it thought desirable to *further dialogue* and a *resolution of the problem*. If that panel is not successful, or if a state refuses to invite a panel onto its territory after it was requested to do so by another state, the mechanism provides for further, mandatory steps, more intrusive and confrontational. A state may then be forced to receive a *rapporteur mission* if six participating States support its creation for *fact-finding*, and, in extraordinary cases, to do so immediately if 10 participating States agree.

The ODIHR [the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights] is tasked with maintaining the *list of experts* nominated by participating States (CSCE Commission, February 1992:27; emphasis added).
Accordingly, the ODIHR as well as the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) is now empowered to maintain lists of experts, thereby opening the door to further possibilities for track-2 complementing, and working with, track-1. Action was also taken to undermine, to some extent, "sacrosanct national sovereignty."

Also in this regard, during 30-31 January 1992, the CSCE Council of Foreign Ministers met in Prague. One of the decisions it took was to establish the possibility of consensus-minus-one decisionmaking in cases of egregious violations of CSCE principles and commitments (CSCE Commission, February 1992:22). Specifically, in cases of "clear, gross and uncorrected violations" of CSCE commitments, the CSCE Council of Foreign Ministers or CSO could take "appropriate action," even, if necessary, "in the absence of the consent of the State concerned." But this particular assault on "sacrosanct national sovereignty" went only so far, as, "Such actions would consist of political declarations or other political steps to apply outside the territory of the State concerned" (Prague CSCE ["Prague Document"], 1992:4; emphasis added). (The "consensus-minus-one" procedure was used by the CSO at the end of the 4th review conference of the CSCE in Helsinki, on 8 July 1992, to bar Yugoslavia [which now consists only of Serbia and Montenegro] from attending the CSCE Summit, 9-10 July.)

The Prague meeting of the Council also regularized the activities of the Conflict Prevention Centre by providing its Consultative Committee (which is comprised of representatives from all 52 participating states) with the task of holding, during its monthly meetings, "consultations on political-military issues of concern to the participating states" (ibid:24).
(The CPC Consultative Committee, in its role "as a forum for consultation and cooperation in conflict prevention ... has the authority to initiate and ... execute fact-finding and monitor missions in connection with [the] Mechanism for Consultation and Cooperation as regards Unusual Military Activities" [ibid:6].)

By the time the fourth Review Conference of the CSCE convened in Helsinki, a package of additional CSBMs had been produced -- the *Vienna 1992 Document on CSBMs*, adopted by consensus on 4 March 1992, inclusive of new provisions on, among others, information exchange, notification, constraints on the size of military exercises, and inspections (see CSBMs Document Vienna 1992). Also, an *Open Skies Treaty* had been concluded on 21 March 1992, permitting overflights of the territories of the twenty-four signatory states (covering the area from Vancouver to Vladivostock), thereby providing additional (and "equal") opportunities for testing and falsifying worst-case assumptions. The stage was set for more to come, including further possibilities for track-1/track-2 collaboration.

The Helsinki CSCE met during 24 March-8 July 1992, concluding with a two-day summit during 9-10 July and a declaration which reflected the call of the NATO Rome Summit, during 7-8 November 1991, to improve CSCE conflict prevention and crisis management mechanisms (see NATO Rome Summit, 1991). The Helsinki CSCE created, for instance, a *High Commissioner for National Minorities* (HCM) which, using the resources of the Warsaw-based Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), would have two functions: (1) *early warning* and (2) *early action*, to be performed

at the earliest possible stage in regard to tensions involving national minority issues
which have not yet developed beyond an early warning stage, but, in the judgement of
the Commissioner, have the potential to develop into a conflict within the CSCE area,
affecting peace, stability or relations between participating States (CSCE Helsinki

At the early warning level, the HCM would collect and assess information concerning
minority issues, "from any source, including the media and nongovernmental organizations"
(ibid:11), which could include data such as those generated by Gurr and Scarritt’s (1989)
"Minorities at Risk" project. Also at this stage, the HCM could visit any CSCE state and
"communicate in person ... with parties directly concerned to obtain first-hand information
about the situation," e.g., the "role of the parties directly concerned, the nature of the
tensions and recent developments ... and ... the potential consequences for peace and
stability within the CSCE area" (ibid:8-9).

If the HCM were to determine "that there [was] a prima facie risk of potential conflict ...
he/she [could then] issue an early warning, which [would] be communicated promptly ...
to the CSO" (ibid:9).

Part of the HCM's early action function might be "to enter into further contact and
closer consultation with the parties concerned with a view to possible solutions, according
to a mandate to be decided by the CSO" (ibid).

Suggestive of further track-2 opportunities to complement and work with track-1, the
HCM may consult up to three experts "with relevant expertise in specific matters" (ibid:13),
e.g., Burton, Fisher, Mitchell, Montville, etc. Such persons would "be selected by the
[HCM] with the assistance of the ODIHR [Office for Democratic Institutions and Human
Once it receives an early warning from the HCM, the CSO may also "seek independent advice and counsel from relevant experts, [as well as from] institutions, and international organizations" (ibid:16).

As part of the enhanced and new early warning, conflict prevention, and crisis management functions of the CSCE coming out of Helsinki, the CSO may receive "early warnings" from other sources in addition to the HCM:

(a) any state directly involved in a dispute;
(b) a group of eleven states not directly involved in the dispute;
(c) the Consultative Committee of the CPC as specified by the Prague meeting of the Council (see above);
(d) the Consultative Committee of the CPC in connection with the Mechanism for Consultation and Cooperation regarding Unusual Military Activities; and
(e) the Human Dimension Mechanism or the Valletta CSCE Procedure for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (ibid:16).

Once an "early warning" comes to its attention, the CSO, acting on behalf of the Council of Foreign Ministers, would have "overall CSCE responsibility for managing [any] crisis with a view to its resolution":

It may, inter alia, decide to set up a framework for a negotiated settlement, or to dispatch a rapporteur or fact-finding mission. The CSO may also initiate or promote the exercise of good offices, mediation or conciliation" (ibid:16-17; emphasis added).

The Helsinki conference also provided for the possibility of CSCE peacekeeping
operations (see below): a radical development stimulated by the escalation of violent ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia and former Soviet Union. Taken together with the new and enhanced conflict prevention and crisis management mechanisms -- plus references to "social justice," "basic human needs," and (reflecting Burton's "provention") "the CSCE [as] crucial to our efforts to forestall aggression and violence by addressing the root causes of problems" (CSCE Helsinki Document, 1992 ["Helsinki Summit Declaration"];2,5,6; emphasis added) -- the CSCE appears to have concluded that an integrated peace and security system in the post-Cold War era will require elements of both negative and positive peace.

Specifically with regard to the latter, the CSCE participating states decided at Helsinki to convene a meeting at Geneva, during 12-23 October 1992, to deal with the peaceful settlement of disputes -- e.g., the creation of a CSCE Conciliation and Arbitration Court, enhancing the Valletta Mechanism, and establishing "a CSCE procedure for conciliation, including directed conciliation, for which proposals were submitted" at Helsinki (CSCE Helsinki Document, 1992 ["Helsinki Decisions"];24).

The Geneva 1992 conference and subsequent meetings dealing with new mechanisms of conflict prevention/resolution, represent major opportunities for track-2 to complement and work with track-1: for the Burtons, Kelmans, Fishers, Mitchells, and others to do what Shonholtz did at the CSCE meeting on national minorities in July 1991 --- become a member of the U.S. (or any other appropriate CSCE) delegation and, from that vantage point, attempt to shape events.
A PEACE AND SECURITY SYSTEM IN EUROPE:
PROSPECTS AND PRESCRIPTIONS

By the end of the Helsinki conference, problems with the CFE Treaty resulting from the breakup of the Soviet Union into the three Baltic states, 11 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Georgia, had been resolved, with the relevant successor states (i.e., Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine) accepting a redistribution of the obligations incurred by the former USSR. Also, as of this writing (September 1992), all but Belarus have ratified the CFE which has provisionally come into force. And the followup to the CFE negotiations, the CFE-1A talks, dealing with personal limitations, concluded on 10 July 1992, with the following agreement:

the US will be allowed to station 250,000 troops in Europe, Russia 1,450,000, Ukraine 450,000, Germany 345,000, France 325,000, Britain 260,000, Poland 75,000, Hungary 100,000, and Czechoslovakia 140,000 (CSCE Helsinki '92, July 1992:6):

more than enough to facilitate future CSCE peacekeeping operations.

Finally at Helsinki, the CSCE participating states decided to continue the momentum generated, in part, by the CSBMs and CFE negotiations, by combining them into one set of negotiations: the CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation, which began in Vienna, 22 September 1992 (see ibid:29-40).

All of these (track-1) agreements on confidence- and security-building measures (Vienna CSBMs 1990 and 1992; Open Skies Treaty), conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE and CFE 1-A) and other aspects of arms control/reduction (e.g., the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty [START] and efforts toward a worldwide ban on chemical weapons), and subsequent initiatives by Presidents Bush, Gorbachev, and Yeltsin (e.g., to reduce Russian-U.S.
long-range nuclear weapons by approximately two-thirds, by the year 2003), plus efforts to institutionalize the CSCE process (e.g., the *Conflict Prevention Centre; Procedure for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes; Human Dimension Mechanism; High Commissioner for National Minorities*), are part of the overall "paradigm shift" (see Burton and Sandole, 1986) from confrontation to cooperation and *common security*. However, although they do go some way toward "plugging" the Hobbesian "black hole" of international anarchy, their potential for future success is being held hostage by the prospect of ethnic (and other) conflicts spilling over into the international domain.

How should we -- conflict analysts, conflict resolution theorists and practitioners, peace researchers, policymakers, and "concerned others" -- respond to these aspects of the "New World Disorder"?

In the short to middle term, the United Nations (e.g., Cyrus Vance, who brokered the cease-fire which led to the arrival of some 14,000 UN peacekeeping forces in Croatia) and the European Community (e.g., Lord Carrington and Lord Owen, who have been attempting to mediate in the Yugoslav crisis) should continue to play a third-party role in the Yugoslavian and other European conflicts. Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev, who mediated a (thus far, unsuccessful) agreement between Armenians and Azerbaijanis on Nagorno-Karabakh, plus others (e.g., Eduard Shevardnadze, Vaclav Havel) should, together with the UN, offer their "good offices" to the parties involved in the Armenian-Azeri war and in other conflicts within and between the remaining republics of the former Soviet Union (e.g., between ethnic Romanians and Russians in Moldava, Abkhazians and Georgians in Georgia, South
Ossetians and Georgians in Georgia, Georgia and Russia [which includes North Ossetia], Russia and Ukraine) and between them and others (e.g., Russia and the three Baltic States, Romania, and Turkey).

In the longer term, on the assumption that increases in standards of living will undermine some of the factors that encourage the violent expression of ethnic and other conflicts, Europe should, despite recent concerns and crises over European integration (see Levinson, et al., 28 September 1992), pursue the further development of a "common economic space," for East as well as West: e.g., the agreement of 22 October 1991 between the EC and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) to create a 19-nation "European Economic Area, the world's biggest and wealthiest single market [380 million population], when it takes effect on January 1, 1993" (Drozdiak, 23 October 1991):

[This] agreement breaking down the barriers between the remaining economic blocs in Western Europe also is expected to accelerate the process of eventually incorporating the impoverished new democracies in the eastern part of the continent ....

Jacques Delors, the president of the EC's executive commission, said recently that the Community may include as many as 30 member states in the future (emphasis added).

Also in the longer term, the CSCE should encourage further development of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). Created at the NATO Rome Summit of 7-8 November 1991, to facilitate consultations and cooperation among the former Cold War adversaries in security matters (see NATO Rome Summit, 1991), NACC is a concretization of sentiments expressed in the Joint Declaration which came out of the Paris CSCE Summit of 19-21 1990 (see above) and, in general, of the paradigm shift from national to common
Ossetians and Georgians in Georgia, Georgia and Russia [which includes North Ossetia],
Russia and Ukraine) and between them and others (e.g., Russia and the three Baltic States,
Romania, and Turkey).

In the longer term, on the assumption that increases in standards of living will
undermine some of the factors that encourage the violent expression of ethnic and other
conflicts, Europe should, despite recent concerns and crises over European integration (see
Levinson, et al., 28 September 1992), pursue the further development of a "common
economic space," for East as well as West: e.g., the agreement of 22 October 1991 between
the EC and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) to create a 19-nation "European
Economic Area, the world's biggest and wealthiest single market [380 million population],
when it takes effect on January 1, 1993" (Drozdiak, 23 October 1991):

[This] agreement breaking down the barriers between the remaining economic blocs in
Western Europe also is expected to accelerate the process of eventually incorporating the
impoverished new democracies in the eastern part of the continent ....

Jacques Delors, the president of the EC's executive commission, said recently that the
Community may include as many as 30 member states in the future (emphasis added).

Also in the longer term, the CSCE should encourage further development of the North
Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). Created at the NATO Rome Summit of 7-8
November 1991, to facilitate consultations and cooperation among the former Cold War
adversaries in security matters (see NATO Rome Summit, 1991), NACC is a concretization
of sentiments expressed in the Joint Declaration which came out of the Paris CSCE Summit
of 19-21 1990 (see above) and, in general, of the paradigm shift from national to common
security. Within the context of the Forum for Security Cooperation emerging from Helsinki, NACC could facilitate the development of an envisaged code of conduct to govern the mutual security relations of the CSCE participating states (Helsinki Document 1992 ["Helsinki Decisions"]:39).

At present, NACC is comprised of the 16 members of NATO; the 5 Eastern European former members of the WTO; Albania; the 3 Baltic states; plus Russia and the 11 remaining former Soviet republics, for a total of 37 members (plus one observer: Finland). Given that NATO is the current, major embodiment of "Basket One" (Security) of the Helsinki Final Act, and that it is in the process of "reinventing" itself, perhaps with NACC as one of its incarnations, then

NATO represents ... an existing [and evolving] basis for a post-Cold War, trans-Atlantic/pan-European security system, or for short, a new European security system (NESS) ... In effect, NATO/NACC may become NESS, inclusive of conflict-resolving as well as peacekeeping mechanisms, all within the context of the CSCE (Sandole, 1992b:33; emphasis added).

A major objective of a new European peace and security system would be to deal effectively with ethnic and other conflicts involving protracted violations of basic human needs, within as well as between states, that could otherwise plunge East-West in general, Europe in particular, back to the Realpolitik "Stone Age."

Such a system should involve vertical as well as horizontal integration; in the case of the former, an integrated system of conflict prevention/management/resolution networks, operating, for instance, at the local, "nearly local" (centers in neighboring societies), regional
(mechanisms associated with the EC/WEU [Western European Union], CIS, NATO/NACC, CSCE), and global (UN) levels, with track 2 (e.g., the network of conflict resolution centers developed by Partners for Democratic Change, and/or that associated with the multi-track Helsinki Citizens Assembly) complementing track 1 processes whenever possible. This would be one way to further facilitate Europe’s transition from what Anatol Rapoport (1974) terms an "exogenous" into an "endogenous" conflict environment (ibid:175):

*Endogenous* conflicts are ... those wherein the conflicting systems are parts of a larger system that has its own mechanisms for ... controlling or resolving conflict [vs. *exogenous* conflicts, where there are no such mechanisms].

Needless to say, "it takes two to tango." No problem-solving activity, whether track 1 or track 2, is going to be established and implemented for any conflict situation unless the conflicting parties allow it to happen. For instance, despite the (15th) cease-fire in Croatia (brokered by Cyrus Vance and which, by and large, has held [see Horne, 18 August 1992]), the Serbs and Croats seem more inclined to continue and to escalate their slaughter of each other than to solve, alone or with the assistance of others, the problems underlying their destructive war. Hence, the brutal spillover of their war into Bosnia-Hercegovina, with its near-genocidal consequences for Slavic Muslims.

Accordingly, for a new European peace and security system to succeed, it should include some element of *horizontal integration*, i.e., some degree of *Realpolitik*, but only for those still "in history," and only as part of a larger whole consisting largely of *Idealpolitik* measures and processes, to move to, but then beyond *negative*, and toward *positive* peace. This means that track-1, armed peacekeeping forces, representing the UN, the CSCE, and/or at least

-40-
something approaching a "representative sample" of the NACC, might, under very clear conditions, enter a war zone to effect and/or enforce a negative peace, as a necessary precondition for moving toward positive peace.

Such "clear conditions" should include the attempted imposition by one party of a genocidal "final solution" on another (see Scheffer [1992], Gardner [1992a], and Helman [1992]). In the event, the objectives of the peacekeeping operation would not include a "Balkan Storm," the bombing of civilian centers, and the killing of tens of thousands in order to "win," or to "impose solutions," or -- what is, in any case, impossible, -- to "solve" (through military means) the conflict, but (a) to prevent genocide, (b) permit international relief operations to get through to threatened populations, and (c) to separate the warring factions in order to afford them a "cooling-off" opportunity, as a necessary (but obviously not sufficient) condition of collaborative resolution of the conflict which they have been expressing through violent means.

What would it take, just to achieve "negative peace" in former Yugoslavia? According to Brian Urquhart (29 December 1991):

At the moment, the U.N. has basically two military options. The first is traditional peacekeeping -- that is, forces that can only be deployed after a cease-fire is in place, that are accepted by the parties to the conflict and that may only use force in self-defense [as is the case with the UN peacekeeping force in Croatia]. The second option is a large-scale collective enforcement action like that in Korea in 1950 or, under Chapter VII of the Charter, in Kuwait in 1991 -- both under the leadership of the United States.
A third category of international military operation is needed, somewhere between peacekeeping and large-scale enforcement. It would be intended to put an end to random violence and to provide a reasonable degree of peace and order so that humanitarian relief work could go forward and a conciliation process could commence. The forces involved would be relatively small, representatively international and would not have military objectives as such. But, unlike [traditional] peacekeeping forces, such troops would be required to take, initially at least, certain combat risks in bringing the violence under control. They would essentially be armed police actions (emphasis added).

"The aim [of the third option]," Urquhart tells us, "would be to enable the Security Council [under Article 43 of the Charter] to deploy an international force quickly in a situation where the cycle of violence could not be broken except by firm intervention. Such a situation now exists in Somalia and ... in Yugoslavia" (ibid., emphasis added).

Urquhart is not alone in giving voice to the "third option" (see, for instance, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali [1992] and former multilateral peacekeeper Major General Indar Rikhye [1992], plus Richard Gardner [1992b] and Joseph Lorenz [1992]). There are, in any case, problems implicit in the prescription, one of which is that violence, no matter how justifiable on humanitarian and other grounds, may serve merely to stimulate further violence. For this and other reasons, many of us in the conflict resolution community, who are, in any case, committed to nonviolent alternatives to the traditional means associated with Realpolitik, would have difficulties with the proposition.

Reprehensible though even a "writ small" rendering of Realpolitik may be to many of us,
it is, *as part of a larger, Idealpolitik-oriented package*, nevertheless compatible with conflict resolution theory and practice. In Fisher and Keashly's (1991) "contingency model of third party intervention," for example:

the overall strategy ... is to intervene with the *appropriate third party method* at the *appropriate time* in order to *de-escalate* the conflict .... This is potentially accomplished by initially matching a particular intervention to a specific stage and then by combining further interventions, if necessary, in appropriate sequences, to further de-escalate the conflict (ibid:36; emphasis added).

At the fourth and final stage of conflict escalation in Fisher and Keashly's model, "destruction," the corresponding appropriate intervention is *peacekeeping*. At this stage:

the conflict has escalated to the point where the parties *attempt to destroy each other*....

The third party strategy of choice at this point is that of peace-keeping, a *power intervention* designed to assist in the *separation of the parties* and the *control of the violence*. ... When the interaction between the parties can be stabilized and some initial commitment to *joint effort* can be obtained, the path is cleared for *other third party interventions* [e.g., collaborative problem-solving conflict resolution]" (ibid:39; emphasis added).

Urquhart makes a strong case for his prescription, which constitutes almost a new kind of *Realism*:

The unraveling of national sovereignty seems to be a feature of the post-cold war period. In more and more situations, *only firm and even-handed intervention from the outside* is likely to put an end to *self-perpetuating* bloodshed and the progressive ruin
of once peaceful societies.

Can the United Nations do something to meet this challenge? Or must the world continue to stand by and watch the carnage on television? (ibid; emphasis added).

Again, we are discussing new forms of peacekeeping operations as necessary interventions into situations where conflicts as start-up condition(s) have escalated into conflicts-as-process, with "quasi-deterministic" lives of their own, where the combatants, in negatively self-fulfilling fashion, endeavour to impose violent solutions on one another. That notwithstanding, unless Urquhart's option for "negative peace" establishes the conditions for "positive peace," leading to resolution of the conflicts which have been violently pursued, a UN peacekeeping operation might constitute merely a holding operation which could collapse "back into history" at any time.

The 52 CSCE participating states did not, at their fourth review conference in Helsinki, opt for Urquhart's prescription: Two of the conditions necessary for CSCE peacekeeping (which could include the "resources and possible experience and expertise of ... the EC, NATO and the WEU, ... [and] the peacekeeping mechanism of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS]") are that "the parties directly concerned" must consent to a peacekeeping operation, and "an effective and durable cease-fire" must first be in place (CSCE Helsinki Document, 1992 ["Helsinki Decisions"];19-20, 23).

Perhaps Yugoslavia must first go (further than it has) the way of Lebanon, before (a) mutually destructive attrition sets in, bringing the wars to a grinding halt; (b) a "Greater Serbia" is established, causing Belgrade to push for a negotiated agreement (and acceptance of a military fait accompli); or (c) some international actor(s) decides to put a "cap" on the
seemingly never-ending, "conflict-as-process." (Hence, Gorbachev's warning against "Lebanonization.")

Lewis Coser (1956), in his reformulation of Georg Simmel (1955), provides some insight into the motivations of the participants in the Yugoslav crisis, especially the federalist Serbs: Conflict consists in a test of power between antagonistic parties. Accommodation between them is possible only if each is aware of the relative strength of both parties. However, paradoxical as it may seem, such knowledge can most frequently be attained only through conflict, since other mechanisms for testing the respective strengths of antagonists seem to be unavailable.

Consequently, struggle may be an important way to avoid conditions of disequilibrium by modifying the basis for power relations (Coser, 1956:137).

Apropos "less lethal conflict management" (e.g., mediation or arbitration), Coser tells us that such "efforts ... encounter the difficulty that the assessment of the actual power relations between the contenders can hardly be made before their relative power has been established through struggle." Hence, according to this (Realpolitik) line of reasoning, the "trial by ordeal," the killing, must continue (hence, the violation of multiple, successive cease-fires) until "exact knowledge as to comparative strength" has been achieved (ibid:135-136).

There is some evidence that the second of the above options may be at hand: that the federalist Serbs may have achieved their goal of creating a "Greater Serbia," and "that further fighting or harassment of other ethnic groups would further alienate world opinion and no longer serve their interests. Instead, they may press for an agreement" (Lewis, 14

This objective, however, may not be shared by Bosnian Serbs, and probably not by many Croatians and Slavic Muslims as well. Indeed, there is evidence of "an apparent power struggle between local Serb officials ... and [Bosnian Serb leader Radovan] Karadzic" (Battiata, 26 September 1992); in effect, "local [Serb] commanders [are] operating independently of central control" (Harden, 27 September 1992:A43).

As Adam Curle (1971:23) puts it: "Once the killing begins, bitterness and anger burn deeply into the human spirit, often precluding real accord for generations." Such is especially the case in situations of mutual victimhood, where each of the parties has experienced from "the Other," some sense of confirmation of its fear of group extinction: "the higher the level of victimhood felt by aggrieved groups, the harder it is to get the conflict resolved. A situation is particularly difficult if both [or all] ethnic groups in [a particular] conflict feel victimized" (Montville, 1990b:537; emphasis added).

For all parties in the Yugoslavian wars, but especially the federalist Serbs, "role defense" appears to be in full swing. According to Burton (1979:144):

Where the rules of role change are well defined, where role change can take place without the loss of needs of security and recognition, ... , there is likely to be readier acceptance of change. Where, on the other hand, there are no accepted processes, no expectations that security and recognition will be accorded, then the position is perceived as a win-lose one evoking the strongest possible resistances (emphasis added).

Under the circumstances, for the Croatians and Slavic Muslims:

There is little point, ... in attempting to conciliate the top dog [Serbia] in an unbalanced
relationship. ... Conciliation and bargaining are of very little use in revolutionary situations, or in situations that cannot be changed without a revolutionary adjustment of relationships (Curle, 1971:24; emphasis added).

For Croats and Slavic Muslims, "less lethal conflict management" (e.g., conciliation, mediation) would probably "lead only to a false solution in which the conflict is obscured and the underdogs are fobbed off with some illusion of improvement or concession" (ibid). And here, Curle makes explicit a dilemma within the conflict resolution community: "Yet much peace research has been devoted to techniques for applying them [the 'less lethal' means] more efficiently" (ibid). (For different views on the empowerment of "underdogs," see Laue and Cormick [1978] and Colosi [1987].)

In any case, "barring outside intervention on the scale of Tanzania in Uganda or Syria in Lebanon, the violence [in former Yugoslavia] will probably continue until [barring mutual attrition] a radical new power relationship ... has been achieved" (Sandole, 1992a:34).

CONCLUSION

This article set out to explore five questions, the first of which was: What are some of the likely causes and conditions of violent expressions of ethnic conflict in Europe, especially the brutal wars in former Yugoslavia? I have mentioned some possible examples of "conflict-as-startup conditions" (e.g., frustrated basic needs for [among others] identity, esteem, and security, often experienced as victimhood and fear of group extinction; one response to which is role defence-based aggression), plus "conflict-as-process" which, via the negative rendition of the self-fulfilling prophecy (NSFP), tends toward self-perpetuating conflict spirals.
Once a manifest conflict process (MCP) has escalated, via competitive means, to an aggressive MCP (a "fight"), it no longer matters what the "startup conditions" were because then, the conflict is being kept alive by its own dynamics (Eigendynamik). Under the circumstances, according to Anatol Rapoport (1974:133), "when the behavior of large systems seems to be determined by quasi-mechanical interactions that do not reflect any goals or purposes, not even of the system ... problems arise" (emphasis added).

One of these problems is, what can or should be done without making matters worse? Is Brian Urquhart (29 December 1991) right in his assessment that Yugoslavia (as well as Somalia) is a "situation where the cycle of violence [cannot] be broken except by firm intervention"? (emphasis added.) If so, then, clearly, Fisher and Keashly's "contingency model" makes sense, as does the application of the new kind of peacekeeping envisaged by Urquhart, Boutros-Ghali, Rikhye and others, as a negative-peace-oriented necessary condition of positive peace. But still, the problem remains: how to apply Realpolitik, even as part of an overall Idealpolitik strategy, without further exacerbating an already violent conflict? (One is reminded of the police officer who, upon arriving at a scene in which a husband is physically assaulting his wife, decides to physically separate the "warring parties," initially to spare the woman further harm but also as a necessary condition of other interventions, perhaps designed in part to improve the husband-wife relationship, only to have the two gang up on him as the "common enemy.")

Another problem is, even if "negative peace" can be achieved, other interventions designed to improve the relationship (reconciliation, conflict resolution) in order to move toward "positive peace" may not be possible, at least not in the foreseeable future. In the
case of the Yugoslav wars, according to combat veteran David Hackworth (14 September 1992), "viewed from almost any angle, [it] makes no sense at all. ... This is indiscriminate violence and mindless slaughter. ... After fighting like this, the only thing sure to survive is hatred" (emphasis added).

The second question was: What are some of the likely consequences of the continuation of these violent ethnic conflicts? In this regard, the potential is developing further for current and future "Yugoslavias" to overwhelm the conceptual, moral, and physical sensibilities and limits of Europeans and others with the images and realities of genocide, concentration camps and a refugee problem unlike anything seen in Europe since World War II, plus to spill over to other areas (e.g., Macedonia, Kosovo), neighboring countries (e.g., Albania, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece), plus, in general, to contaminate, at all levels, the human decisionmaking environment, making violent means for dealing with conflict more rather than less likely. It is precisely this latter point that seems to have evaded the considerations of those who claim that Yugoslavia, Nagorno-Karabakh (and elsewhere, e.g., Somalia) do not affect or otherwise concern the national interests of the U.S. or other Western states.

The third question considered was: Why have existing institutions and processes, especially those associated with the CSCE, proven to be ineffective in either preventing or otherwise dealing with the violent manifestations of these conflicts? Although the establishment of processes for "role change" (Burton) in potentially "revolutionary situations" (Curle), involving potential "conditions of disequilibria" (Coser/Simmel), is part of what the CSCE should be about in post-Cold War Europe, thus far, it has not been able to deal
effectively with Bosnia-Hercogovina, Nagorno-Karabakh and elsewhere. The Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC); Procedure for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (the Valletta Mechanism); the Human Dimension Mechanism (HDM); and the High Commissioner for National Minorities (HCM) are, along with the new CSCE peacekeeping provision, all on the right track but *alone*, in the absence of (a) *new approaches* to peacekeeping and (b) integration with corresponding track-2 mechanisms, they are still "too new," too "respectful of traditional state sovereignty," and too reflective of "top down" to be of any use in dealing with the crises in former Yugoslavia and elsewhere.

The fourth and fifth questions were: How can these institutions and processes be made more effective in dealing with these conflicts? And: What else can, or should, be done to deal with these manifestations of the "New World Disorder" in Europe? Quite simply, the challenge now facing peace researchers, conflict analysts and conflict resolution theorists and practitioners is to take seriously Curle's critique of the status-quo (*structural violence*-maintaining) orientation of aspects of the conflict resolution community -- but, at the same time, to respond positively and vigorously to USIP President Samuel Lewis' (1992) challenge for *theorists to help policymakers better understand and deal with the post-Cold War world* ("the policy world needs you!") -- and to join with policymakers, activists, and concerned citizens in designing appropriate *models of (vertically and horizontally) integrated systems of conflict resolution networks*, for former Yugoslavia, Nagorno-Karabakh and elsewhere, all against the background of improved (fair and just) economic conditions for the citizens of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

And (or *especially*) for those of us who are skeptical about the motives of national
governments (see Rubenstein, 1992), this is even more reason to respond to the Lewis challenge, to, in effect, invoke John Burton's (1991) "consultative role of the professional in conflict resolution," to assist policymakers in identifying, designing, and implementing policies facilitative of conflict *provention*.

Policymakers, of course, would have to be more receptive to track-2 than they have in the past. In this regard, such integrated systems of conflict resolution networks should take advantage of the enhanced potential, emerging from Helsinki, for interaction between the CSCE and nongovernmental actors (see CSCE Helsinki Document 1992 ['"Helsinki Decisions"'], Ch. IV), to strive for the *synergistic integration* of improved track 1 (e.g., the new and evolving CSCE mechanisms) with track 2 (e.g., the centers established in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union by Partners for Democratic Change, plus the conflict resolution centers and projects established by the Helsinki Citizens Assembly).

Perhaps this is one "wave of the future" -- bringing citizens and governments together in creative, innovative ways (with the former influencing the latter, "from below") to contribute to the creation of a "New World Order" that is truly "beyond history": one that does not threaten the developing world with confirmation of its developing perception, reinforced by the massive Iraqi casualties of the Gulf War and the slaughter of Muslims in Bosnia-Hercegovina, that the "New World Order" means nothing more than the replacement of East-West by North-South as the dominant axis of international conflict (clearly, the subject of another article!).
References


-53-


*CSCE Digest, 1991a.* "CSCE Parliament established at Madrid Meeting." Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (U.S. Congress), vol. 14, no. 3, April, p. 3.

*CSCE Digest, 1991b.* "CSCE attempts to stop fighting and bloodshed." Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (U.S. Congress), vol. 14, no. 6, Summer, p. 4.


CSO, 1991a. "Urgent Appeal for a Ceasefire." Issued by the CSCE Committee of Senior Officials, Prague, 3 July.

CSO, 1991b. "Offer of a CSCE Good Offices Mission to Yugoslavia." Issued by the CSCE Committee of Senior Officials, Prague, 4 July.


*Focus in Vienna, 1992.* no. 27, March.


-56-


McDonald, John W., Jr., and Diane B. Bendahmane, eds., 1987. Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Service Institute, Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC.


