FAILED STATES OR FAILED SOLUTIONS? AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF U.S. TREATMENT OF STATE FAILURE IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

by

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A Thesis
Submitted to the
Graduate Faculty
of
George Mason University
in Partial Fulfillment of
The Requirements for the Degree
of
Master of Arts
Political Science

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A Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts at George Mason University

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Spring Semester 2017
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

State Fragility Index ........................................................................................................... SFI
United Nations ................................................................................................................ UN
Official Development Assistance .................................................................................... ODA
United States .................................................................................................................. US
International Organization .............................................................................................. IO
Internally Displaced Persons .......................................................................................... IDP
Non-Governmental Organization .................................................................................... NGO
Economic Community of West African States .............................................................. ECOWAS
Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group .... ECOMOG
Revolutionary Unity Front .............................................................................................. RUF
Federal Bureau of Investigation ...................................................................................... FBI
Random Effects .............................................................................................................. RE
Fixed Effects .................................................................................................................... FE
Ordinary Least Squares Regression ................................................................................ OLS
Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program ................................. GEMAP
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy .................................................... LURD
Movement for Democracy in Liberia .......................................................................... MODEL
Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation ........................................................................ NNPC
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant ............................................................................. ISIL
Foreign Terrorist Organizations ...................................................................................... FTO
ABSTRACT

FAILED STATES OR FAILED SOLUTIONS? AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF U.S. TREATMENT OF STATE FAILURE IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

Michele Raya St-Amant, M.A.

George Mason University, 2017

Thesis Director: Dr. Eric McGlinchey

Since the end of the Cold War, the effects of state failure have plagued the international community. There are many purported solutions to state failure like financial assistance and multi-national interventions, though the success of these solutions is difficult to measure. Additionally, the empirical likelihood that the West will indeed respond to state failure is missing from state failure discourse in both the academic and policy realms. Crucially, if the West does not actually respond predictably to state failure – or at least in the ways that we should expect – then the effort devoted to finding the solution to state failure may be in danger. This project seeks to fill this critical gap in the literature by conducting one of the first mixed-methods studies of its kind. Using an original large-n dataset, I test the strength of state failure in determining the likelihood of an intervention (financial or military) by the United States. I find that state failure itself is not a good indicator of where the U.S. will respond. Secondly, I conduct a case study of Liberia and
Nigeria – two failed states that have received different treatment by the United States. I find that the important factors in determining intervention in these cases include pressure from the international community, the perceived threat of terrorism, and the failed states’ strategic position as a regional player. This study adds to a growing body of literature that is critical of the usage of the term ‘failed state,’ and also adds a flavor to the debate about whether or not the international community has a substantive effect on U.S. foreign policy. The critical empirical relationship between state failure and U.S. response may help to determine the actual success (or failure) of international responses to state failure, and can help to inform and drive efforts in the study for new solutions.
PART ONE

Introduction

On November 9, 1989 the Berlin Wall fell and ushered in a new era of global thawing. The age-old enemy of the West since the end of World War II retracted into itself, and a plethora of unique and volatile security situations seemingly sprang up around the world in the power vacuums left by the two superpowers. This sudden shift in the international security environment has required the West to develop new strategies to effectively deal with these conflicts; and rather than fighting an ideological war through proxies in the developing world, the former proxies themselves have become the locus of the security concern for the Western world.

One cannot begin to accurately paint a picture of the post-Cold War international security environment without inevitably coming across the phenomenon of the ‘failed state.’ Beginning in the early 1990s the term ‘failed state’ quickly became a universal label used by the academic, policy and media professionals to describe the human suffering, violence and lawlessness in diverse places like Somalia and Afghanistan. Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner coined the term in their 1992 article “Saving Failed States,” which was initially used to argue that across the world “a disturbing new
phenomenon is emerging: the failed nation-state, utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community.”

The terrorist attacks on September 11th 2001 only served to heighten the West’s concern over state failure. After 9/11 failed states were no longer viewed as isolated global pockets of humanitarian, legal, governance, stability, and security failures; but rather, as critical antithetical Westphalian state-phenomena capable of fostering and producing potentially de-stabilizing globalized security concerns. Policy-makers, academics, and independent think tanks leapt on the opportunity to promote different versions of state-building initiatives that can include a range of things like military interventions, pseudo-protectorates, and financial assistance programs. However, the application of these solutions in the real world has been far from easy, or equal. As many critics have pointed out, particular failed states appear to receive a full spectrum of ‘treatment,’ whereas others of equal objective ‘failure’ are all but ignored.

To illustrate this briefly in table 1 below, we can consider the most critically failed states according to the Center for Systemic Peace’s State Fragility Index (SFI). Of the 20 most critically failed states that have averaged SFI scores within 5 points below the highest averaged SFI score (23) between 1995 and 2014, the United States launched a

---

4 From this dataset, the variable coded as ‘sfi’ (state fragility index) was used, which is the composite sum of security effectiveness, political effectiveness, economic effectiveness, social effectiveness, security legitimacy, political legitimacy, economic legitimacy, and social legitimacy. This variable is scored on a scale of 0-25, where 0 indicates the least fragile state, and 25 indicates the most fragile. For a complete codebook and description of the data, please see the following: Marshall, M., & Cole, B. (2014). State Fragility Index and Matrix 2014 [Codebook]. Center for Systemic Peace. Retrieved from http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/SFImatrix2014c.pdf
military intervention in only 11, and provided an average of $381.33 million more in Official Development Assistance (ODA) to those countries that it intervened in (this exercise will be expanded on and justified in the sections below).

Table 1 Demonstration of Research Puzzle (1995-2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Avg. SFI</th>
<th>Avg. ODA Received (in U.S. millions)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No U.S. Military Intervention</td>
<td>Angola, Burundi, Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Myanmar, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Sudan (9)</td>
<td>19.89</td>
<td>92.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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It is this puzzling observation demonstrated in table 1 above that provides the platform of inquiry for this study. Therefore, this study seeks to answer the following questions: Does state failure itself determine where the West will intervene? If not, why are otherwise objectively equally ‘failed’ states treated much differently by the West in terms of intervention policies? And further, what factors lead to or inhibit the United States to intervene in failing states? In order to explore this puzzle I will utilize a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. In Part One of this study I will address these questions with a large-n quantitative analysis designed to identify key variables of interest with statistically significant relationships with an increased likelihood of an intervention by the U.S. In Part Two, I further address these questions with a qualitative case study of Liberia and Nigeria, informed by the variables identified in the quantitative analysis to highlight causal stories and mechanisms. In short, the
argument I make here is that the U.S. does not intervene based on the degree of state failure in-and-of-itself, despite political rhetoric to the contrary. Rather, there are other variables like high levels of terrorism, refugees, and a pre-existing international presence and pressure that make the U.S. more likely to intervene in failed states. The purpose of this study is not to advocate for any particular type of response to state failure, but rather, to investigate what type of responses are more or less likely based on various conditional variables.

This study will be structured as follows: I first will begin by conceptualizing state failure, and demonstrate that there is indeed a statistically significant difference in U.S. treatment of otherwise equally failed states. Then, I will conduct a review of the relevant literature on state failure, which will set the stage for the hypotheses that will guide the rest of the project. After the hypotheses have been stated and justified, I will conduct a quantitative analysis to test these hypotheses using various regression techniques in order to identify important variables of interest. Once these variables have been identified, I will conduct a qualitative analysis of Liberia (a country that has experienced a U.S. intervention), and Nigeria (a country that has not experienced a U.S. intervention) in order to point to causal stories and mechanisms that are not illuminated in the quantitative analysis. Finally, I will conclude with a reiteration of the important findings of this study, and will provide suggestions and considerations for future research, as well as outline the limitations and policy relevance of this research.
Conceptualization and Variation of the Dependent Variable

This section seeks to accomplish two primary goals that will help set the stage for the rest of this project. First, I will conceptualize two key terms: the sovereign territorial state and the failed state. Once these terms are conceptualized, I will expand on the brief demonstration in the Introduction section of the variation in the United States’ treatment of failed states, and will establish that there is a statistically significant difference in this treatment.

Conceptualizing the Modern Territorial State

To fully understand what state failure is, we must understand and conceptualize what it is not. The theoretical antithesis to the failed state is the sovereign territorial state. One of the most pre-dominant functional definitions in social science research is the Weberian one: a “state is a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”5 In line with this definition and according to international law, a state must have control over a pre-defined territory and population, must be able to enter into diplomatic relations with other states in the international system, and also must be able to provide an adequate supply of public goods for its populace.6

The notion of modern territorial states as ‘sovereign’ entities is a concept that was developed during the codification of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 after the end of the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648). This watershed Treaty legitimized the principle known today as sovereignty: states should be free from outside interference from other states,

and should have full and legitimate control over their own defined territories. In the modern international political system, to be sovereign a state must be recognized by other fellow sovereign states in the international community, which affords them an array of opportunities: sovereign states can subsequently enter into alliances, coalitions, and trade with one another; sovereign states can enter into agreements to solve collective problems; and inevitably, sovereign states can also engage in conflict with one another.

Although the principle of sovereignty defines the nature of the international system today, it also carries its fair share of logistical problems. According to Derek Croxton, the issue of sovereignty is that “no piece of paper can ever establish exclusive authority in a given territory; only administrative practice can do that.” Thus, state sovereignty is merely an idealistic assumption about what the nature of the international system ought look like. At most this guiding principle can merely suggest that states “ought to have exclusive territorial authority,” though in practice this may not hold true.

The irony of the Peace of Westphalia is that it occurred following one of the bloodiest wars in European history. Indeed, few scholars dispute the fact that the history of the evolution of the modern territorial state is “dripping with blood.” Sovereignty as a guiding principle is the direct result of bloody wars fought over the course of centuries, “rather than of some natural truth about the community.” Many scholars who study the growth of the state outside of Europe point to a significant lack of conflict as a primary

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7 For more on state sovereignty, see James, A. (1999). The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Sovereignty, Political Studies 47, 3, 467-473.
9 Ibid.
10 Brooks (2005), 1171.
reason why state formation has been so difficult in the developing world. Joel Migdal in
his book *Strong Societies and Weak States* points to the misguided idealization of the
modern state as the ‘end-all-be-all’ enactor of societal transformation.\(^{12}\) He critiques this
idealistic optimism and notes that the potential of states is not boundless, and that by
‘taking the state for granted’ and setting unrealistic expectations of the state’s ability to
establish the ‘rules of the game,’ we have inevitably set many states up for failure.

**Conceptualizing State Failure**

In the early 1990s the term ‘failed state’ emerged “as an ad hoc conceptual
response to what seemed to be new sorts of armed conflicts and problems in the wake of
the Cold War.”\(^{13}\) The post-Cold War world was “no longer a zone of competition
between definite ideological zone regimes in the capitalist First and communist Second
World,” but rather, “the so-called Second and Third Worlds are now fragmented, drifting
apart as far more contradictory continents of mediatized ‘rogue states.’”\(^{14}\) The end of the
Cold War brought about a host of new and unique global challenges, termed loosely as
the ‘grey-area phenomena.’\(^{15}\) However, these problems did not just crop up overnight,
but rather had been festering underneath layers of superpower conflict for decades.

During the Cold War “the games of bloc building and containment construction
masked sites of state failure within ideological alliances, military assistance and


\(^{13}\) Call, C. T. (June 1, 2011). Beyond the ‘failed State’: Toward Conceptual Alternatives. *European Journal of International Relations*


\(^{15}\) For more on the grey-area phenomena see Calk, P. (1997). *Grey-Area Phenomena in Southeast Asia: Piracy, Drug Trafficking and
Political Terrorism*. Australian National University.
economic aid of the competing zone-regimes.”

At the end of the Cold War during the global retreat, many weak regimes in the ideological war zones of the world like Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America were “revealed as the house of cards they had been all along.” The term ‘failed state’ emerged within this context as a way to refer to these global sinkholes.

Major definitions of the ‘failed state’ presume that it takes an antithetical form of the Westphalian territorial state discussed above. According to Robert Rotberg the ‘failed state’ is one that has lost control over the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence, is no longer able to promote peace or stability, no longer has control over its territory, and is unable to provide public goods and services. Failed states are also unable to maintain basic living standards such as providing food and water, have very unequal wealth distributions, suffers from high levels of corruption, have little or no democratic norms and practices, have little to no organic civil society, have very small, underequipped, or largely incapable security forces, and have little to no political legitimacy.

**Variation in Treatment of State Failure**

State failure has drawn the attention of many experts in the fields of international state building and stabilization. It has become a major security concern for the U.S., and has even been cited in the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy as a larger threat than traditional rival states. As a result of its predominance, four distinct frameworks or

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17 Brooks, (2005), 1168.
lenses for assessing and solving the problem of state failure have developed. The first and most influential framework views failed states as “sick patients that can be revived” through routine state-building initiatives; the second framework regards shared-sovereignty and long-term commitments by the international community as a potential solution to failed states; the third framework considers territorial restructuring as a productive alternative to the first and second frameworks; and the fourth views failed states as an inevitable result of a larger “failed global project” (these frameworks are described in more detail in the literature review).

Each of these frameworks, more-or-less, prescribes a relatively uniform solution: ramping-up state-building efforts and thus increasing state-capacity, though the means to this end may differ. Similarly, the general implication of each framework is that the West must in some way respond to and treat state failure. Ideally, this treatment is assumed to be more or less equivalent based on the gradient scale of state failure. In other words, as the level of state failure increases then the likelihood of a response by the U.S. (militarily, financially, and legally) should theoretically also increase. Yet curiously, observers of the U.S.’s treatment of failed states prove to be far less than uniform. Therefore, this section is devoted not only to establishing the variation on the dependent variable (U.S. treatment), but also simultaneously seeks to address the first question.

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22 Ibid, 1055.
23 Ibid, 1062.
24 Ibid, 1064.
26 Call (June 1, 2011), 304; and Brooks (2005).
raised in the introduction section: does state failure itself determine where the West will intervene?

To set the stage for the rest of this study, we must empirically demonstrate that there is indeed a palpable variation in the two most common types of treatment of failed states: military intervention and financial assistance. To do this, three primary data sources will be used: the Center for Systemic Peace’s State Fragility Index (SFI) will be used to compare the likeness between degrees of state failure;\(^{27}\) the Congressional Research Service report R42738, “Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2015” by Barbara Salazar Torreon will be used to determine whether or not there was a U.S. military intervention;\(^{28}\) the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Official Development Assistance (ODA) disbursements will be used to compare the amount of development aid the U.S. gives to failed states;\(^{29}\) and finally the World Bank’s data on population statistics will be used to control for population size.\(^{30}\)

The SFI annually ranks 167 countries between 1995 and 2014 with populations larger than 500,000 on a scale of 0-25 (0 is the least fragile, and 25 is the most fragile). In this demonstration, each annual score for every country in the dataset between 1995 and

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\(^{27}\) This measure was chosen because it is one of the longest running indexes of state fragility publicly available (with data available between 1995 and 2014), and because ‘foreign military intervention’ is not a variable already calculated into the overall score (which is the case for other similar indexes). From this dataset, the variable coded as ‘sfi’ (state fragility index) was used, which is the composite sum of security effectiveness, political effectiveness, economic effectiveness, social effectiveness, security legitimacy, political legitimacy, economic legitimacy, and social legitimacy. This variable is scored on a scale of 0-25, where 0 indicates the least fragile state, and 25 indicates the most fragile. For a complete codebook and description of the data, please see the following: Marshall & Cole (2014).


2014 is averaged to produce a single score. The SFI uses a classification system with a margin of five points on the 0-25 scale. Therefore, scores between 20-25 are considered “extremely” fragile, 15-20 are considered ‘very fragile,’ and so on. This demonstration will use a similar mechanism to select only the most fragile states. Thus, all countries with averaged scores within five points below the highest averaged score will be included. Afghanistan has the highest averaged SFI score between 1995 and 2014 at 23, meaning that all countries with average scores within 5 points below 23 will be included. To this end, the 5-point cut-off ensures that only the most critically fragile countries are examined, and it is precisely these countries we expect should to receive a relatively equal degree of response by the U.S. according to the four frameworks discussed above.

To demonstrate variation in treatment, countries will be put into dichotomous groups according to whether or not the U.S. Armed Forces were deployed there between 1995 and 2014. To determine a U.S. Armed Forces deployment I will use the “Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad 1798-2015” report by Barbara Torreon. This report is one of the most complete surveys of U.S. military deployments abroad “in situations of military conflict or potential conflict or for other than normal peacetime purposes.” The presence or absence of a U.S. military deployment between 1995 and 2014 will be marked simply as “yes,” indicating there were one or more deployments during the time period (regardless of the number per year), or “no,” indicating there were no deployments at all. This operationalization includes all instances of:

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It should be noted that this survey does not include covert actions, or those prolonged instances where U.S. troops have been stationed abroad since World War II, or for participation “in mutual security organizations, base agreements, or routine military assistance or operations.” Torreon, B. (2015). Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2015. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf.
(1) conducting war (e.g., after a declaration of war);

(2) conducting counterterrorism operations;

(3) responding to humanitarian crises;

(5) providing combat assistance to local and regional allies;

(4) responding to a UN Security Council Resolution or to a UN Operation (excluding peacekeeping operations in which the U.S.’s role is limited only to delivering supplies, as in the case of Sierra Leone in 2000); and/or

(5) the deployment of the U.S. Air Force for the purpose of repeated and sustained air strikes.

This operationalization excludes instances of deployment where the U.S. Armed Forces were use for the primary and explicit purpose of:

(1) protecting and enhancing security of U.S. embassies abroad;

(2) evacuating U.S. private citizens, government employees, or select foreign nationals;

(3) aiding or supporting UN Peacekeeping operations in which the U.S.’s role is limited to delivering supplies (as in the case of Sierra Leone in 2000);

(4) a U.S. Air Force deployment by request of an ally for the primary and explicit purpose of providing airlift support in a strictly non-combat role (as in the case of Burundi and the Central African Republic in 2013); and/or

(5) a U.S. Air Force deployment to conduct a single, isolated air strike (as in the case of Sudan in 1998).

The scope of operationalization is broad enough to include a wide variety of reasons for U.S. Armed Forces deployment, yet narrow enough not to include instances where forces are deployed for the purpose of only preserving limited U.S. property and personnel interests. This operationalization should paint a broad-stroked, yet definitively clear illustration of when and where the U.S. deploys in regards to the level of state failure.

The average level of ODA (or, Official Development Assistance) received by each of the most fragile countries will also be included. Where the deployment of Armed
Forces may be limited to the presence of an acute crisis (such as a natural disaster, or a sudden outbreak of disease or war), the level of ODA that the U.S. appropriates should reflect a more sustained and lower risk campaign of ‘treatment.’ James Miskel argues similarly that the “costs, risks and responsibilities are dramatically lower” for financial and diplomatic action rather than military action, because the cost of military action is much more visible to the public.\textsuperscript{32} As a control for the level of ODA received, population size for each country is included because it is presumable that states with significantly larger populations will also require a larger sum of ODA. Therefore, if one group receives significantly more ODA than the other, we should also observe that the group receiving more ODA also has a significantly larger population. The observations are produced in \textit{table 2} below.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|l|l|}
\hline
Country (1995-2014) & U.S. Deployment & Avg. SFI Score & Avg. ODA Received from the U.S. (in U.S. millions)\textsuperscript{33} & Avg. Population\textsuperscript{34} \\
\hline
Afghanistan & Yes & 23 & 1,296.43 & 23,778,553 \\
Central African Republic & Yes & 18 & 15.05 & 4,045,502 \\
Ethiopia & Yes & 20 & 399.99 & 761,189,19 \\
Iraq & Yes & 20 & 2,122.94 & 26,988,832 \\
Liberia & Yes & 20 & 86.37 & 3,290,115 \\
Niger & Yes & 18 & 38.38 & 1,359,775 \\
Rwanda & Yes & 20 & 83.25 & 8,856,834 \\
Somalia & Yes & 23 & 84.84 & 8,371,281 \\
South Sudan & Yes & 21 & 529.4 & 11,448,539 \\
Uganda & Yes & 18 & 217.68 & 28,138,064 \\
Angola & No & 19 & 57.27 & 17,965,066 \\
Burundi & No & 20 & 38.9 & 8,067,505 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Demonstration of the Variation on the Dependent Variable}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{33}\textsuperscript{Rounded to the nearest ten-thousandth.}
\textsuperscript{34}\textsuperscript{If the average resulted in a decimal, it was rounded down to the nearest whole number.}
From the results of the *table 2* above, we can see that between 1995 and 2014 the U.S. military was deployed once or multiple times in 11 different countries, and was not deployed in the other 9. This variation cannot be explained by an apparent difference in state fragility, because the averaged state fragility scores for both the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ deployment row at the bottom of the table are very similar (20 and 19.89, respectively).

In terms of the ODA received from the U.S., there is an apparent difference in the averages at the bottom two rows of the table (an average of $474.23 million received for the ‘yes’ deploy group, and an average of $92.9 million received for the ‘no’ deploy group). This variation in ODA cannot be explained by an apparent difference in population, because the countries in the ‘yes’ deploy group tend to have slightly smaller average populations than the countries in the ‘no’ deploy group.

To determine whether or not these differences are statistically significant, we conduct both an independent samples *t*-test and a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) test. The results are produced in *table 3* and *table 4* below.

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35 The SFI divides Sudan into three separate observations: Sudan pre-2011, North Sudan post-2011, and South Sudan post-2011. In this demonstration the average SFI scores for Sudan pre-2011 and North Sudan post-2011 were combined because it was South Sudan that was granted independence from the North. Additionally, Sudan pre-2011 in the year 1998 was subject to a single isolated U.S. airstrike campaign on camps and installations considered at the time to be used by Osama bin Laden. However, the combined pre- and post-2011 Sudan are coded as not having a U.S.-military deployment because this incidence was a single, isolated one and not a repeated airstrike campaign that is present in other countries like Iraq or Afghanistan.
Table 3 Results of Independent Samples $t$-test by Group (yes, no deployment)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SFI (yes)</th>
<th>SFI (no)</th>
<th>ODA (yes)</th>
<th>ODA (no)</th>
<th>Population (yes)</th>
<th>Population (no)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>20.36</td>
<td>19.89</td>
<td>474.23</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>3.04E+07</td>
<td>2.26E+07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Error</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>198.67</td>
<td>42.08</td>
<td>1.46E+07</td>
<td>7227602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>658.92</td>
<td>126.23</td>
<td>4.37E+07</td>
<td>2.40E+07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$t$ and degrees of</td>
<td>$t = -0.59$; $df = 18$</td>
<td>$t = -1.7$; $df = 18$</td>
<td>$t = 0.50$; $df = 18$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>freedom ($df$)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFI Results</td>
<td>Pr($T &lt; t$) = 0.2808</td>
<td>Pr($</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>$) = 0.5617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA Results</td>
<td>Pr($T &lt; t$) = 0.0529</td>
<td>Pr($</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>$) = 0.1058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Results</td>
<td>Pr($T &lt; t$) = 0.6895</td>
<td>Pr($</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>&gt;</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>$) = 0.6209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_0$: difference</td>
<td>One-Tailed (mean difference &lt; 0)</td>
<td>Two-Tailed</td>
<td>One-Tailed (mean difference &gt; 0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in means = 0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 Results of Two-Sample Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test by Group (yes, no deployment)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SFI (yes)</th>
<th>SFI (no)</th>
<th>ODA (yes)</th>
<th>ODA (no)</th>
<th>Population (yes)</th>
<th>Population (no)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank Sum</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected</td>
<td>115.5</td>
<td>94.5</td>
<td>115.5</td>
<td>94.5</td>
<td>115.5</td>
<td>94.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted Variance</td>
<td>166.22</td>
<td>173.25</td>
<td>173.25</td>
<td>173.25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$z$ score</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-2.09</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFI Results</td>
<td>Prob &gt; $</td>
<td>z</td>
<td>$ = 0.6141</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA Results</td>
<td>Prob &gt; $</td>
<td>z</td>
<td>$ = 0.0367*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Results</td>
<td>Prob &gt; $</td>
<td>z</td>
<td>$ = 0.8494</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$H_0$: the difference between underlying distributions = 0

* significant at $p < 0.05$

Both of the tests above are used in order to determine if there is a statistically significant difference in the dependent variables (SFI score, ODA received, and population size)
between the means of the two groups (yes, or no deploy). From the results of t-test in table 3 we can conclude that there are no statistically significant differences in the SFI score means, the mean ODA received, and the population means between the yes and no deployment groups (meaning the difference in the means is equal to zero). The results of the WMW test, for the most part, also echo the results of the t-test: there is no statistically significant difference between the underlying distributions of the two groups for SFI scores and population (the difference in the underlying distributions is not equal to zero). Importantly, the result of the WMW test contradicts the t-test and indicates a statistically significant difference in the level of ODA received. Because of data considerations explained in the Appendix Section 1a, we can conclude that the results of the WMW test are more appropriate for this particular dataset. Therefore, there is a statistically significant difference between the two groups in the amount of ODA that the U.S. gives to otherwise equally failed states. Because the results of the t-test and the WMW test complement one another for the other variables (SFI score and population), we need not conduct a lengthy review of the distribution of the data here. However, for the curious reader, this can be found in the Appendix Section 1b.

This demonstration brings about some curious results that are contradictory to the implications of the four frameworks of the study of failed states, as well as U.S. political rhetoric on the danger of state failure. First, the level of state failure does not seem to accurately indicate where the U.S. will, or will not deploy troops. Second, the level of ODA that the U.S. gives to equally failed states is quite different, and this difference cannot be explained by a difference in the size of the population. Using the means in
table 2, we can determine that those countries where the U.S. has deployed also tend to receive significantly more ODA than those countries where the U.S. has not deployed. Therefore, we have preliminarily answered the first question: *does state failure itself determine where the West will intervene?* I have found the answer here to be no. The other two questions remain: *why does the U.S. treat otherwise equally failed states differently?* And, *what conditions do predict an intervention by the West, and why?*

**Literature Review**

In this section I will review the relevant body of major literature concerning failed states. State failure has already been conceptualized in the section above, so to avoid redundancy, this section will focus on the major intellectual debates concerning its conceptualization, the various frameworks and lenses through which state failure is studied, and the main purported solutions to state failure. I will conclude this section with a brief discussion of the gaps within the literature, and how this study seeks to fill that gap.

**Major Debates and Criticism of State Failure**

As stated in the sections above, most major definitions of the ‘failed state’ presume that it takes an antithetical form of the Westphalian territorial state, and has a variety of different indicators. Many scholars have critiqued the definition of state failure due to the plethora of conditions and indicators, which make it hard to identify and measure reliably. Critics have pointed out that experts on state failure treat the definition like a buffet table, which leads to a conflicting dialogue of scholars using a jumble of
different conceptualizations to characterize the same issue. According to Natasha Ezrow and Erica Frantz, this produces “confusion over the causes and consequences of state failure… in turn muddling the solutions identified to address it.”

Recently, scholars have attempted to address this critique by producing a more accurate and narrow conceptualization with a new array of gradations of state failure that include ‘weak states,’ ‘failed states,’ and ‘collapsed states.’ The best defined of the three is the ‘collapsed state,’ which is defined as a body of territory that has no central governing power, no institutions, and no public services. Due to its specificity there are only a handful of cases that actually qualify as a ‘collapsed state,’ like Somalia and Yugoslavia. The other two gradations, however, are perhaps equally ill defined. ‘Weak states’ can include a broad continuum of states that perform poorly. Weak states can suffer from a broad array of issues including ethnic, religious, and communal tensions; high crime rates; poor or deteriorating infrastructural development; a declining quality or severely limited provision of public goods; and corruption. Meanwhile, the ‘failed state’ suffers from many of the very same issues: ethnic, religious, and inter-communal violence, criminal activity, factionalization, civil unrest, poor border control, drug and arms trafficking, and little public goods. The difference between the two – scholars argue – is the degree of severity of each indicator, though few (if any) have been able to produce a numerical cut-off or range.

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37 Ezrow, N., & Frantz, E. (September 2013). Revisiting the Concept of the Failed State: Bringing the State Back in. Third World Quarterly, 34, 8, 1324.
38 Rotberg (2003), chapter 1.
39 Helman & Ratner (August 7, 2002), 8; Rotberg (August 7, 2002), 128-130; and Zartman (1995), 5.
The problem is that the ‘weak state’ cannot easily be differentiated from the ‘failed state.’ At what point does a weak state become a failed state and vice versa? Charles Call argues that the term is a ‘useless liability’ and should be abandoned. Another common critique is that the terms conflate “states as diverse as Colombia, Malawi, Somalia, Iraq, Haiti and Tajikistan… even though these countries drastically differ in terms of security, capacity and legitimacy.”

**Frameworks and Solutions to the Failed State**

In the post-Cold War era the ‘failed state’ has become a major challenge for the international community. Both government officials and scholars argue that state failure can lead to the outbreak of violence and illicit economic activities, the formulation of shadow states, and even fosters the presence of terrorist groups. The solution to state failure, which often includes intervention of some kind, has in large part been inspired by the liberal peace thesis. Proponents of this theory argue that underdevelopment is the root of conflict in failed states, and thus through the promotion of development and democratization via military and financial intervention, peace and stability can commence.

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42 Brooks (2005), 1162.
Although the *liberal peace thesis* advocates for a general increase in state-capacity, the process of carrying out such a broad solution has been much more complicated. Undoubtedly, to reverse state failure the general capacity of the state must increase, but there is no consensus for how this should take place. As I will discuss later on, the *liberal peace thesis* has been used as a model to justify various types of interventions in failed states, but it fails to capture a rationale for the apparent variation in treatment of failed states identified in the sections above. Instead, it assumes that intervention and treatment will occur, but cannot explain the dramatic variation in this treatment. For now, I shall identify the four schools of thought that are, by-and-large, informed by the *liberal peace thesis* and deal directly with the issue of how state capacity should increase through the process of intervention.46 Doing so will help us understand why the variation in treatment is so striking and understudied, based on the implicit assumptions of these four schools of thought.

*Framework 1*

The first school of thought is also the most influential one, and most closely lines up with maintaining the status quo.47 Proponents argue that the modern territorial state is “suitable and achievable for all parts of the world,” and generally failed states are believed to be ‘revivable.’48 How this ‘revival’ should be conducted is the subject of an ongoing debate. As a result, proponents are caught between two mainstream solutions concerning whether bolstering state-capacity should be an externally or internally driven

46 Kraxberger (September 2007), 1055-71.
48 Ibid.
process, and if there is an appropriate sequence for the institutional reform process.\textsuperscript{49} Some argue that local actors on the ground should steer the reconstruction process because they are privy to specialty knowledge of the state. Others argue that external actors should steer the reconstruction process because internal actors do not have the resources necessary to stymie the issues that cause and perpetuate state failure in the first place.

This school of thought has had its fair share of critics, especially from scholars who study regime-transitions. Implicit is the idea (informed by the \textit{liberal peace thesis}) that an increase in state capacity will help initiate a transition \textit{toward} a particular regime-type, particularly democracy. Scholars like Leonard Wantchekon argue something very similar to this: a rational-choice model is present in states at the end of civil wars that leads to a transition to democracy.\textsuperscript{50} This line of thought can also be observed tangibly in the hastiness by which elections are held after Western state building projects in failed states, like in Iraq and Afghanistan. Thomas Carothers cautions against this rushed optimism, noting that the apparent global trend of regime-change toward democracy in the so-called \textquote{third-wave}\textsuperscript{51} is a flawed assumption that does not hold true in empirical observations.\textsuperscript{52} Rather, he argues that regimes can transition toward autocracy almost as easily as they can toward democracy.

\textit{Framework 2}

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.
The second school of thought, like the first, is also optimistic about the potential for failed states to be reversed following treatment, but admits that the process of doing so will be a much more lengthy and costly one.53 According to Stephen Krasner and Francis Fukuyama, solving the problem of state failure will inevitably require long-term financial and military commitments in the form of ‘shared-sovereignty’ agreements, or ‘neo-trusteeships.’54 Krasner describes ‘shared sovereignty’ agreements as involving “the creation of institutions for governing specific areas within a state, areas over which external and internal actors voluntarily share authority.”55 Therefore, this school of thought – perhaps more obviously than the first – prescribes direct and intensive intervention by the West.

The second school of thought also actively attempts to address some of the ‘democratic transition’ critiques made against the first. The institutional levers of the state can be tested and observed as functional in a longer-term commitment, and this can help promote a more successful turnover of the state from international keepers to local actors. Many scholars argue that this is the primary benefit of longer-term commitments. For example, Stephen Ellis argues that in order to achieve real and measurable gains (particularly in Africa), “the international community must start thinking about how to help African states in more than just three- to five-year increments… International actors should be prepared to spend ten years or longer on Africa’s hardest cases.”56

53 Kraxberger (September 2007), 1062.
55 Krasner (January 2005), 76.
One of the most prominent critiques leveled against this solution is the question of how external intervention can be removed without prompting a subsequent state collapse. For example, if external intervention is the main driver of increased state-capacity, in the long run how will locals maintain that capacity once external support has been withdrawn? Fukuyama argues that although significant external intervention is a necessary factor in reversing state failure, the process of gradually turning over the state to local actors to maximize local ownership is an equally important component in maintaining the longevity of state capacity.

Framework 3

The third school of thought purports a somewhat radical deviation from the status quo of the modern state-system. Proponents argue that the root of state failure can be pinpointed to the colonial construction of state-geography. Jeffrey Herbst argues that when many African states gained independence in the 1960s, the European-drawn borders and weak colonial administrative cores were retained for the purposes of maintaining international legitimacy through recognition via the United Nations. In the first few decades of independence this was not a dire because the U.S. and the Soviet Union propped up many African states in various proxy wars. However, after the end of the Cold War these states simply reverted back “into whatever it was that they had always been.”

Another factor Herbst points to is the lack of violent conflict in Africa, as opposed to the surplus of it in Europe. Charles Tilly notes this exceptionally violent history in his

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58 Brooks (2005), 1174.
book *Coercion, Capital and European States*. Accordingly, as the number of states dwindled over the centuries the relative size and violent war tactics of each surviving state increased enormously.\(^{59}\) States unable to field large enough armies (and finance those armies) were weeded out, and as a result, only relatively strong, rich, and defendable states emerged victorious in Europe by the time the Treaty of Westphalia was signed.

The solution to state failure according to Herbst is to redraw the international borders – preferably done by Africans themselves.\(^{60}\) Proponents point to the success of Somaliland – the unrecognized northwest region of the failed state Somalia – that has “developed a reasonably effective government… [and] possesses legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens, and exercises authority over its people and territory…”\(^{61}\) Somaliland lacks the “final requirement for statehood,” which is international recognition via the United Nations.\(^{62}\) Regardless, for this solution to be successful, international actors particularly in the West must be willing to lead, collaborate and provide support to African states in this effort.

*Framework 4*

The fourth school of thought traces a similar strain of historical logic as the third. However, according to this school of thought the problem of state failure is a systemic one that cannot be solved because state failure is an inevitable outcome of a larger failed global project of the modern territorial state system. Christopher Clapham, one of the

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61 Kraxberger (September 2007), 1064.
62 Ibid.
most prominent proponents of this line of thinking, agrees with Herbst that “the poorer and the more scattered the population… the greater the relative costs of statehood become, until a point is reached at which the extraction of resources outweighs any benefits that can be provided.”63 Yet ultimately Clapham does not see territorial restructuring as a viable solution because he views modern statehood as incompatible with particular regions of the world.

Similarly, in his book The Art of Not Being Governed, James C. Scott tracks the evolution of the state in Southeast Asia and argues that there are some people who have systematically tried to avoid incorporation into the state because they view it as a fundamental encroachment on their way of life.64 Clapham echoes this, pointing to the high social costs that are incurred in modern statehood:

“[the state] demands from its subject populations a readiness to obey and to be regulated, which they may not willingly accept, particularly when states are imposed on people whose social values are difficult to reconcile with the level of regimentation that states require; societies long accustomed to statehood acquire habits of obedience and forms of social discipline which are not readily replicated in parts of the world where statehood is a recent and external imposition.”65

Proponents of the fourth school of thought argue that the first three are inevitably bound for failure because of the fundamental inability of the modern-state system to be applied in particular regions of the world. Despite his view that the modern state system is bound for failure, Clapham does not discuss an alternative solution, which has been the main point of criticism. Even if the modern state system is inevitably bound for failure in these regions of the world, it is also clear that they should not remain as vacuums, or ‘stateless zones.’

65 Clapham (2002), 778.
**Gaps in the Literature**

Much attention in the last two-and-a-half decades has been devoted to solving the problem of state failure, and much of this has been done in the form of both case studies and large quantitative analyses. Generally, the underlying assumption of most of the existing literature is that the West will, in some way, respond to state failure. As a result, little research has been devoted to assessing whether or not the West indeed responds to state failure at all. Thus, the empirical link between the level of state failure and the likelihood and type of a Western response is generally unknown, and by taking a Western response for granted many of the debates described above may be all for naught.

Similarly, even if an empirical link does exist, it does not necessarily mean that the West is behaving in ways that have been suggested by experts.

Thus far, the international community has been unsuccessful in curtailing or preventing state failure from happening. By assessing the relationship between state failure and Western response, rather than taking this response for granted, novel solutions to state failure can potentially be formulated. Thus, this research is poised to contribute in a unique way to the state failure literature in that it seeks to establish the relationship (if any) between the level of state failure and the likelihood, type, scale, and scope of Western response.

**Hypotheses**

In this section I will identify a number of hypotheses that will be tested both in the quantitative and qualitative analyses to follow. For each hypothesis I will briefly explain the relevant literature and rationale for why this hypothesis might be plausible, and will
then identify what observable implications might be present if this hypothesis is indeed true.

**Economic Development Hypothesis**

The United States successfully became the world’s sole superpower at the end of the Cold War, and thus began devising a new international strategy to maintain its status and promote the spread of liberal democracy. One thing was clear – international aid would play an important role in the post-Cold War world, just as it had during the Cold War. However, *how* this aid was allocated would be reformed drastically in the early years of the 1990s.

After the international retreat of the two superpowers from proxies around the world, the flow of resources to these states had to be reconsidered. Without the direct support of either the U.S. or the Soviet Union, many weak states began to unravel and collapse, and were subsequently “were revealed as the house of cards they had been all along.”66 Indeed, during the Cold War international aid was an effective tool used to reward allies and to punish those ‘bad performers,’ usually of the opposing ideological bloc.67 Within the logic of a bipolar world this calculus worked quite well. In a multipolar world, however, this calculus drew heavy criticism from those who argued that the dividing the world into two camps was no longer beneficial.68 These critics, inspired by

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66 Brooks (2005), 1168.
68 Ibid.
the liberal peace thesis, argued that underdevelopment leads to conflict, and only by increased state capacity and democratization can this conflict be stymied.\footnote{For more on the liberal peace thesis see Owen (Fall 1994), 87-125; Maoz & Russett (September 1993), 624-638; Gartzke (2007), 166-191; and Copeland (Spring 1996), 5-41.}

International aid institutions used this model to begin awarding aid not only to those ‘good’ performers, but also to incentivize the ‘bad’ performers to develop, and incidentally, the term ‘failed state’ became an effective way to identify ‘bad’ performers. As a result of this in 2001 two units called The Fragile State and the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction unit framed a new initiative to target international aid toward those countries “suffering from the effects of war, violence, and political disruption.”\footnote{Engberg-Pedersen et al. (2008), 10.} The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) also began to publish its own reports on failed and fragile states in 2005, which monitored the flow of ODA “specifically to a group of states affected by fragility…”\footnote{Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). State Fragility Report. Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/states-of-fragility-report-series.htm}

It is clear that international development aid is an important component of the treatment of state failure. Proponents of the first school of thought described in the literature review, especially those that argue for a more hands-off approach, would most likely agree that international aid should play a primary role in reviving failed states. Because the focus of this particular study is on the U.S.’s treatment of state failure, this hypothesis will thus focus on the disbursement of U.S. ODA. Therefore, if the economic-development hypothesis is correct, we should expect to observe that the amount of U.S. ODA disbursed has a positive relationship with the level of state failure. In other words, as state failure increases, so should the amount of ODA disbursed.\footnote{International aid institutions used this model to begin awarding aid not only to those ‘good’ performers, but also to incentivize the ‘bad’ performers to develop, and incidentally, the term ‘failed state’ became an effective way to identify ‘bad’ performers. As a result of this in 2001 two units called The Fragile State and the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction unit framed a new initiative to target international aid toward those countries “suffering from the effects of war, violence, and political disruption.” The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) also began to publish its own reports on failed and fragile states in 2005, which monitored the flow of ODA “specifically to a group of states affected by fragility…”}
H1: The U.S. will give more ODA to countries that are more critically failed.

**Four Frameworks Hypothesis**
As discussed above the four schools of thought purport different solutions to the same problem of state failure, though the overarching implication is that the West will, in some way, respond. This hypothesis will deal primarily with a military response to state failure, which is the type of intervention advocated for particularly in the first and second frameworks. The international community has largely ignored the solutions advocated for by the third framework, so this hypothesis will address the likelihood of a U.S. military intervention. It is hypothesized that the scale and scope of military intervention should increase relative to the level of state failure. As such, if the *four frameworks hypothesis* is correct, we should expect to see that a U.S. use of military force has a positive relationship with the level of state failure. Although this hypothesis has already been preliminarily tested in the section above, it was done with a limited number of observations. Therefore, it is important to include this hypothesis within a larger- to truly see the effect, if any.

H2: The scope and scale of the U.S. use of force will increase with the level of state failure

**International Pressure and Presence Hypothesis**
There is a push and pull argument within the literature about the extent to which international forces and pressures have a substantive and observable effect on the policy decisions of autonomous and sovereign states, specifically on the U.S. According to the realist-statist approach, international conditions and environment (namely the balance of
power) do indeed have an effect on the policy outcomes of states. For example, American Cold War decisions, particularly about military strategy, were a response to the international balance of power by increasing defense spending and building up weapons stockpiles. Additionally, much research has found that Congress has a smaller impact on the strategic programs of U.S. military procurement than the executive branch does, meaning that if the U.S. president perceives significant pressure or changes in the environment, a substantive policy change or posturing is likely to follow.

Similarly, Christopher Cook argues that the variation in American humanitarian intervention policy stems from the relative strength and pressure of international organizations (IOs) in setting the policy agenda. By being a member of IOs like the United Nations, this shifts American foreign policy priorities and preferences through shared norms of membership, and therefore alters the American foreign policy agenda. The difference in intervention policy (which can range from no intervention to a full long-term military commitment) is a direct result of the degree of member consensus of the IO that international crises should be solved through humanitarian interventions.

Thus, it is hypothesized that the U.S. will be more likely to use force where there is IO presence and pressure. If this hypothesis is true, we should expect to see that the United States is more likely to use military force and intervene in countries where there

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already exists a United Nations Peacekeeping Mission (the UN is chosen here as it is the largest, most comprehensive, and arguably most powerful IO).

H₃: The U.S. will be more likely to use force where there is already an international presence.

**The Hegemonic Hypothesis**

Despite its prominence, the term ‘failed state’ has a relatively short etymological history. In 1992 the term was introduced into mainstream political science rhetoric with Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner’s article “Saving Failed States.”⁷⁵ Though the article itself draws on a longer historical process of state decay and collapse, the term itself is a post-Cold War phenomenon. Using the Brigham Young University (BYU) Corpus Database we can create a visual representation of the number of times the term has been used over the last 200 years. For a complete description of how this data was compiled and organized, see Appendix section 2a.⁷⁶

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As demonstrated in figure 1 above, the term ‘failed state’ was never used prior to the 20th century, and only began to spike usage during the 1990s. To some this is peculiar, and many critics have questioned the motives behind this puzzling post-Cold War spike. As a result, many skeptics have argued that the term is merely a Western tool designed to maintain hegemony in an “attempt by state powers to describe reality in accordance with their foreign policy priorities.”

In the beginning of the 1990s the term was mostly used in a narrow sense to describe unique cases like Somalia and Yugoslavia, where “the national state ceased to function altogether.” Over time the term underwent a process of universalization, and as a result, diverse countries where the state was still functioning (albeit poorly) like

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77 Grimm et al. (February 2014), 198.
78 Helman & Ratner (1992), 3.
Colombia, Haiti, and Rwanda also began to be described as failed states. As a result of this, critics have pointed to the term’s fluidity and the ability to be “easily manipulated to suit political agendas.” Critics have argued that it can quite easily be used to label almost any poorly functioning state to justify “all forms of intervention by the ‘core’ democratic countries.” Critics also argue that military interventions are evidence of an aggressive hegemonic strategy, because it broadens the range of “acceptable policy responses” to countries that do not conform to the Western liberal democratic order.

If the _hegemonic hypothesis_ is true, we should expect to observe that U.S. military interventions do not have a positive relationship with the level of state failure. Rather, we should observe that military interventions have a positive relationship with other strategic-related variables like terrorism, refugees (which places a strain on international partners), and the amount of oil that a country exports to the U.S.

H₄: The likelihood of a U.S. military intervention will have a positive relationship with states of strategic importance rather than state failure itself.

**The R2P Hypothesis**

In 2005 the international community committed to an initiative known as R2P (Responsibility to Protect), which the UN defines as a global norm designed “to prevent and halt genocide and mass atrocities.” Therefore, this provides an alternative to the _hegemonic hypothesis_ above. Although the degree of salience of this global norm is

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79 Call (June 1, 2011), 305.
80 Ezrow & Frantz (September 2013), 1492.
81 Grimm et al. (February 2014), 200.
contested, the fact remains that it a unique post-Cold War era global norm. Thus, because the international community’s alleged commitment to this new norm, it can be argued that the U.S. is not reacting to state failure itself, but rather, to the humanitarian outcomes of state failure.

State failure, as discussed in the literature review, is a level of government effectiveness and state capacity that can be measured in different ways. Generally, many indicators of state failure directly measure various degrees of human suffering and violence, which nestle within the R2P categories of commitment. Helman and Ratner describe that state failure entails “violence and widespread human rights violations…” Similarly, Matthew Krain argues that “genocides and politicides are almost always a consequence of State Failure.” Therefore, if the R2P hypothesis is correct, we should expect to observe that the likelihood of a U.S. military response does not have a positive relationship with the level of state failure, but instead to the human cost of state failure such as high numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs), volatile and unstable consumer markets, a large number of conflict-related deaths, and a large presence of humanitarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

H₅: The U.S. will be more likely to intervene in states with high levels of human suffering

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84 Helman & Ratner (1992), 8.

Data

In order to test these hypotheses I have compiled a large and original panel dataset of 159 countries between 1995-2014 from various publicly available data sources. A full list and justification of these countries can be found in the Appendix Section 3a. The unit of analysis is the country year, and various statistical techniques and models will be used to test each hypothesis listed above, which will be outlined in further detail in the subsequent Research Design section.

The primary dependent variable – U.S. ‘treatment’ of state failure – is operationalized in two ways: (1) the net ODA that the U.S. gives to each country per year, and (2) whether or not the U.S. deployed its Armed Forces outside of normal peacetime operations to each country per year. The latter of the two will be broken down further by the relative size of deployment. This will be done using a number of different datasets: (1) Barbara Torreon’s Congressional Research Service report R42738 “Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2015” will be used to determine whether or not the U.S. deployed Armed Forces to each of the 159 countries between 1995 and 2014,86 (2) the size of this deployment will be measured using both Tim Kane’s “Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950-2005” dataset, and the Department of Defense’s September reports of the annual “Military and Civilian Personnel by Service/Agency by State/Country” from 2006-2014.87 Using these resources, five dependent variables will test the size of the U.S. use of force:

---

**DV\textsubscript{1}:** This is a broad dichotomous variable that simply indicates whether or not the U.S. Armed Forces deployed regardless of the size, type, or purpose of the deployment.

**DV\textsubscript{2}:** This is a dichotomous variable that indicates where there was a subdued use of force, defined as a deployment of less than 1,000 troops. This variable can include airstrikes, counterterror operations, non-combat advisors, and responses to humanitarian disasters. A rationale for this scope condition can be found in the Appendix Section 3b.

**DV\textsubscript{3}:** This is a variation on DV\textsubscript{2} above, and excludes instances where the U.S. military is deployed specifically for the purposes of evacuating U.S. personnel, or enhancing security at a U.S. embassy or other U.S. properties abroad.

**DV\textsubscript{4}:** This is a dichotomous variable that indicates a moderate use of force, defined as a deployment of between 1,000 and 5,000 troops. A rationale for this scope condition can be found in the Appendix Section 3c.

**DV\textsubscript{5}:** This is a dichotomous variable that indicates a major use of force, defined as the deployment of over 5,000 troops. A rationale for this scope condition can be found in the Appendix Section 3d.

The descriptive statistics of the dependent variables are listed in table 5 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5 Dependent Variables Descriptive Statistics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Raw troop deployment numbers will not be used in the regression models because the U.S. regularly has thousands of troops stationed at various large bases around the world (Japan, Spain, Germany, Portugal etc.), but a deployment of troops to these bases is not considered to be outside of normal peacetime operations.
Next, I will outline the independent variables.

**IV₁**: State fragility will be measured using the Center for Systemic Peace’s State Fragility Index. This index is used because it does not calculate foreign intervention into the overall score. State fragility is measured on a scale from 0-25, where 0 is the least fragile and 25 is the most.

**IV₂**: Population size per country per year from the World Bank will be included as a control variable. This variable is logged to correct for non-normality issues.

**IV₃**: The annual percentage change in consumer inflation retrieved from The World Bank. This variable will be used to test the R2P hypothesis.

**IV₄**: Each country’s military spending per year as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) will be included as a control variable, retrieved from The World Bank.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Obs.</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Smallest</th>
<th>Largest</th>
<th>% of 0</th>
<th>% of 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ODA (oda)</td>
<td>3,180</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>302.07</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11,227.79</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of Force (uof)</td>
<td>3,180</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>95.91%</td>
<td>4.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subdued Use of Force (+ exclusions) (subex)</td>
<td>3,180</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>97.8%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subdued Use of Force (sub)</td>
<td>3,180</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>97.11%</td>
<td>2.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate Use of Force (mod)</td>
<td>3,180</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>99.5%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Use of Force (maj)</td>
<td>3,180</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>99.09%</td>
<td>0.91%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=3,180; Groups=159

---

90 This variable captures the annual percentage change in the level of inflation measured by the consumer price index, which reflects the cost for the average consumer to purchase a basket of goods or services. The World Bank, Data. Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) [Dataset and codebook]. Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG?view=chart
IV₅: The number of military and civilian deaths per country and year as a direct result of conflict between two warring parties retrieved from The World Bank.⁹² This variable will be used to test the R2P hypothesis.

IV₆: The number of terrorist attacks per country and year retrieved from The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism’s (START) Global Terrorism Database (GTD).⁹³ This variable will be used to test the hegemonic hypothesis.

IV₇: U.S. imports of crude oil measured in units of 1,000 barrels from each country per year, retrieved from the U.S. Energy Information Administration.⁹⁴ This variable will be used to test the hegemonic hypothesis.

IV₈: A dummy variable indicating there was at least 1 internally displaced person per country per year retrieved from The World Bank.⁹⁵ This variable will be used to test the R2P hypothesis.

IV₉: The number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) present in each country by the month of December of each year, retrieved from InterAction. This can include NGOs that deal with anything from human rights, education,

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⁹³ This variable is a count variable, meaning that it records each incident of a terrorist attack. The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Global Terrorism Database [Dataset and codebook]. Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/


⁹⁵ This variable is a combination of the low and high estimates of IDPs from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, and published by the World Bank. Because of missing data, this variable is coded as a 1 if there was at least one IDP in either the low or the high estimate (or both), and a 0 if there was not at least 1 IDP in either of the estimates. The World Bank, Data. "Internally displaced persons (number, high estimate)" [Dataset and codebook]. Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/VC.IDP.TOTL.HE?view=chart; and The World Bank, Data. "Internally displaced persons (number, low estimate)" [Dataset and codebook]. Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/VC.IDP.TOTL.LE?view=chart
religious, or agricultural organizations, to medical and humanitarian assistance.\textsuperscript{96}

This variable will be used to test the \textit{R2P hypothesis}.

\textit{IV}_{10}: A dichotomous variable indicating the presence (or not) of a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in each country per year, retrieved from the United Nations.\textsuperscript{97} This variable will be used to test the \textit{international pressure and presence hypothesis}.

\textit{IV}_{10}: The number of refugees by the country or territory of origin in units of 1,000 refugees per year, retrieved from The World Bank.\textsuperscript{98} This variable will be used to test the \textit{hegemonic hypothesis}.

The descriptive statistics of these variables are listed in \textit{table 6} below.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Independent Variables Descriptive Statistics & & & & & & & \\
\hline
Variable Name & Obs. & Mean & Std. Dev. & Smallest & Largest & % of 0 & % of 1 \\
\hline
State Fragility Score (sfi) & 3,180 & 9.51 & 6.59 & 0 & 25 & N/A & N/A \\
Log of Population (lpop) & 3,180 & 0.99 & 0.66 & -0.44 & 3.13 & N/A & N/A \\
Consumer Index Inflation (infl) & 3,180 & 30.01 & 596.51 & -35.84 & 24,411.0 & N/A & N/A \\
Military Expenditure (mexp) & 3,180 & 2.12 & 4.49 & 0 & 39.61 & N/A & N/A \\
Number of Battle-Related Deaths (death) & 3,180 & 238.09 & 1,801.91 & 0 & 57,839 & N/A & N/A \\
Number of Terror Attacks (terror) & 3,180 & 25.49 & 145.82 & 0 & 3,925 & N/A & N/A \\
Number of Oil Barrels Imported to U.S. (oil) & 3,180 & 25.46 & 100.04 & 0 & 1,236,45 & N/A & N/A \\
At least 1 IDP Present (idp) & 3,180 & N/A & N/A & 0 & 1 & 71.23\% & 28.77\% \\
Number of NGOs Present (ngo) & 3,180 & 3.03 & 6.35 & 0 & 90 & N/A & N/A \\
Presence of UN Peacekeeping Mission (un) & 3,180 & N/A & N/A & 0 & 1 & 90.75\% & 9.25\% \\
Number of Refugees (refug) & 3,180 & 63.54 & 268.43 & 0 & 3,887.49 & N/A & N/A \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{96} InterAction. \textit{NGO Aid Map} [Dataset]. Retrieved from https://ngoaidmap.org/p/analysis


Research Design and Methodology
In order to test the hypotheses, I will utilize the following statistical analyses:

1. The dataset here is a panel (or longitudinal) dataset, which necessarily lends itself to time-series analysis. As is custom in many time-series analyses, researchers often use both a Fixed Effects (FE) model and a Random Effects (RE) model to compare the goodness of fit of each for the data. However, one of the caveats of the FE model is that it drops all time-constant observations, and due to the time-constant nature of the data here, the usefulness of a FE model is very limited. Therefore, only a RE model is feasible, which does not drop time-constant variables. Additional regression techniques will be used to compare and check the goodness of fit of the RE model, detailed directly below.

2. For each dependent variable 3 different regression models will be used. To test the ODA dependent variable, which is a continuous variable, a regular robust ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, a pooled robust OLS regression, and a robust RE OLS regression will be used. For the use of force dependent variables, which are dichotomous, a logistic regression, a pooled logistic regression, and a robust RE logistic regression will be used. By using multiple versions of the same regression model we can compare the results in the absence of a FE model.

The first dependent variable that I will test is the *oda* dependent variable. Model 1 is a simple robust OLS regression, Model 2 is a robust Pooled OLS regression, and Model 3
is a robust Random Effects OLS regression. The coefficients for each model are produced in *table 7* below.

**Table 7 Coefficient Results for DV, ODA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Fragility Score</td>
<td>1.820551</td>
<td>1.820551</td>
<td>2.437067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>.4939252</td>
<td>.4939252</td>
<td>3.937321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>.0045978**</td>
<td>.0045978**</td>
<td>.0044943**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Expenditure</td>
<td>.4975409</td>
<td>.4975409</td>
<td>3.720373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td>-.0049182</td>
<td>-.0049182</td>
<td>-.0029861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>.4870962**</td>
<td>.4870962**</td>
<td>.3180265**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>.1160987</td>
<td>.1160987</td>
<td>.1474031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>35.23815*</td>
<td>35.23815</td>
<td>44.93121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>6.768731**</td>
<td>6.768731**</td>
<td>6.9626**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Mission</td>
<td>-11.85188</td>
<td>-11.85188</td>
<td>-46.20523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>.3450247**</td>
<td>.3450247**</td>
<td>.3151379**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cons</td>
<td>-22.86987</td>
<td>-22.86987</td>
<td>-86.20966</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* statistically sig. at 95% CI  
** statistically sig. at 99% CI  
N = 3,180; Groups = 159

From the results of *table 7* above, state fragility is not a good indicator of how much ODA the U.S. allocates in all three of the models. Countries with higher levels of inflation, terrorism, NGOs, and refugees appear to receive more ODA according to the three models. We can be confident in these results because there are no significant discrepancies between any of the three different models.

Next, we will examine the various Use of Force dependent variables that are detailed in the sections above. For each of these variables, Model 1 is a simple robust logistic regression, Model 2 is a robust pooled logistic regression, and Model 3 is a RE logistic regression. To test the goodness of fit the percent of correctly classified
observations are produced at the bottom of the columns for Models 1 and 2. The coefficients are produced in tables 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 below.

Table 8 Coefficient Results for DV$_1$ Use of Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Fragility Score</td>
<td>.0955861**</td>
<td>.0955861*</td>
<td>.1971605**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>-.2529597**</td>
<td>-.2529597*</td>
<td>-.1625517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>-.0008168</td>
<td>-.0008168</td>
<td>-.0003852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Expenditure</td>
<td>.0140039</td>
<td>.0140039</td>
<td>.088816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td>-.0001152**</td>
<td>-.0001152**</td>
<td>-.0000629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>.0017486**</td>
<td>.0017486</td>
<td>.0019224**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>.0009247</td>
<td>.0009247</td>
<td>.0013198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>.2171909</td>
<td>.2171909</td>
<td>.2320138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>.0231501*</td>
<td>.0231501</td>
<td>.019705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Mission</td>
<td>1.24185**</td>
<td>1.24185*</td>
<td>1.059544**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>.001581**</td>
<td>.001581**</td>
<td>.0009863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>-1.073586</td>
<td>-1.073586</td>
<td>-5.422696</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* statistically sig. at 95% CI
** statistically sig. at 99% CI
N = 3,180; Groups = 159
Prob Chi2 < 0.05
Correct Classification: 96.32%
Rho = .5501454

Table 9 Coefficient Results for DV$_1$ Subdued Use of Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Fragility Score</td>
<td>.1333909**</td>
<td>.1333909**</td>
<td>.1883954**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>-.1622736*</td>
<td>-.1622736</td>
<td>-.1096586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>-.0007178</td>
<td>-.0007178</td>
<td>-.0005174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Expenditure</td>
<td>.0331934</td>
<td>.0331934</td>
<td>.0338223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td>-.0000473</td>
<td>-.0000473</td>
<td>-.0000253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>.0011189**</td>
<td>.0011189*</td>
<td>.0009033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>-.0006225</td>
<td>-.0006225</td>
<td>-.0007572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>-.0046956</td>
<td>-.0046956</td>
<td>-.0519541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>.0299773*</td>
<td>.0299773</td>
<td>.0294413*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Mission</td>
<td>1.041423**</td>
<td>1.041423</td>
<td>1.008651**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>-.0001963</td>
<td>-.0001963</td>
<td>-.0005647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>-2.962498</td>
<td>-2.962498</td>
<td>-5.590745</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* statistically sig. at 95% CI
** statistically sig. at 99% CI
N = 3,180; Groups = 159
Prob Chi2 < 0.05
Correct Classification: 97.08%
Rho = .4516066
### Table 10 Coefficient Results for DV4 Subdued Use of Force (exclusions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Fragility Score</td>
<td>0.100534**</td>
<td>0.100534*</td>
<td>0.1391924**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>-1.570935</td>
<td>-1.570935</td>
<td>-0.0106225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>-0.0006207</td>
<td>-0.0006207</td>
<td>-0.000375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Expenditure</td>
<td>0.0536002</td>
<td>0.0536002</td>
<td>0.0102075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td>-0.0001668</td>
<td>-0.0001668</td>
<td>-0.0001681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>0.0014941**</td>
<td>0.0014941*</td>
<td>0.0013996*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>0.004313</td>
<td>0.004313</td>
<td>0.0006711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>0.0862102</td>
<td>0.0862102</td>
<td>0.0539988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>0.0364174**</td>
<td>0.0364174*</td>
<td>0.0394018*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Mission</td>
<td>1.342344**</td>
<td>1.342344*</td>
<td>1.998979**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>-0.0002168</td>
<td>-0.0002168</td>
<td>-0.0001289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>-3.111398</td>
<td>-3.111398</td>
<td>-7.938631</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* statistically sig. at 95% CI
** statistically sig. at 99% CI

N = 3,180; Groups = 159

Prob Chi2 < 0.05
Correct Classification: 97.74%

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Fragility Score</td>
<td>0.0133631</td>
<td>0.0133631</td>
<td>0.0415917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>-0.4084592</td>
<td>-0.4084592</td>
<td>-0.4737125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>-0.0092143</td>
<td>-0.092143</td>
<td>-0.0013959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Expenditure</td>
<td>-0.047151</td>
<td>-0.047151</td>
<td>-0.0820648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td>-0.0001558</td>
<td>-0.0001558</td>
<td>-0.0001121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>-0.0010769</td>
<td>-0.0010769</td>
<td>-0.0014634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>-15.18798</td>
<td>-15.18798</td>
<td>-14.91503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>0.309161</td>
<td>0.309161</td>
<td>0.542612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>0.018143</td>
<td>0.018143</td>
<td>0.016283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Mission</td>
<td>2.762863**</td>
<td>2.762863**</td>
<td>2.282046**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>0.0017094**</td>
<td>0.0017094**</td>
<td>0.0018994**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>0.1904422</td>
<td>0.1904422</td>
<td>-7.19286</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* statistically sig. at 95% CI
** statistically sig. at 99% CI

N = 3,180; Groups = 159

Prob Chi2 < 0.05
Correct Classification: 97.74%

### Table 11 Coefficient Results for DV5 Moderate Use of Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Fragility Score</td>
<td>-0.0200626</td>
<td>-0.0200626</td>
<td>0.2257527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>-0.2469376*</td>
<td>-0.2469376</td>
<td>-0.0854559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>-0.000637</td>
<td>-0.000637</td>
<td>-0.000748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Expenditure</td>
<td>-0.5117771**</td>
<td>-0.5117771</td>
<td>-0.0818391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td>-0.0001628*</td>
<td>-0.0001628</td>
<td>-0.000702</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* statistically sig. at 95% CI
** statistically sig. at 99% CI

N = 3,180; Groups = 159

Prob Chi2 < 0.05
Correct Classification: 99.50%
From the results in table 8 above, state fragility is a good indicator of where the U.S. will deploy a broad use of military force according to all three models. High levels of terrorism and the presence of a UN peacekeeping mission are also good indicators of where the U.S. will deploy a broad use of force. Moreover, countries with larger populations are less likely to experience a broad U.S. use of force, in addition to those countries with higher levels of conflict-related deaths; and finally, more refugees appear to increase the likelihood that the U.S. will use broad force.

From the results in table 9 above, we can see that the higher the level of state fragility has a statistically significant relationship with an increased likelihood that the U.S. will use subdued force in all three models. In addition to this, larger NGO presence, and the presence of a UN peacekeeping mission also appear to increase the likelihood of a subdued use of force. Terrorism has a statistically significant relationship with an increased likelihood of a subdued use of force, but only in models 1 and 2.

From the results of table 10 above, higher levels of state fragility have a statistically significant relationship with U.S. use subdued use of force (with exclusions). In addition to this, high levels of terrorism, NGOs, and the presence of a UN
peacekeeping mission also appear to increase the likelihood of a subdued use of force (with exclusions).

From the results of table 11 above, we find that state fragility does not have a statistically significant relationship with where the U.S. will deploy a moderate use of force. Instead, the presence of a UN peacekeeping mission and large numbers of refugees do appear to have a statistically significant relationship with an increased likelihood of a U.S. moderate use of force.

From the results in table 12 above, similarly to table 11 we see that state fragility is not a good indicator of where the U.S. will deploy major force. Instead, other variables like high levels of terrorism, refugees, IDPs, and to a lesser degree high U.S. imports of oil from the country do have a statistically significant relationship with an increased likelihood that the U.S. will deploy major force.

**Results**

For DV$_1$ – ODA disbursement – we reject the *economic development hypothesis* (H$_1$): the level of state failure does not have a statistically significant and positive relationship with the amount of ODA the U.S. disburses. High levels of consumer inflation, terrorism, NGOs, and refugees do have a statistically significant and positive relationship with the disbursement of ODA. Thus, this provides support for the *hegemonic* (H$_4$) and *R2P hypotheses* (H$_5$).

For DV$_2$ – a broad use of force – the results provide support for the *four frameworks hypothesis* and the *international pressure and presence hypothesis* (H$_2$ and H$_3$): state failure and the presence of a UN peacekeeping mission do have a statistically
significant and positive relationship with a U.S. use military force. This also provides some partial support for the hegemonic hypothesis (H₄): high levels of terrorism have a positive and statistically significant relationship with an increased likelihood of a broad use of force. Finally, this variable also provides some partial support for the R2P hypothesis (H₅): a high number of conflict deaths have a statistically significant and positive relationship with an increased use of force.

For both DV₃ and DV₄ – the subdued use of force (with and without exclusions) – the results provide support for the four frameworks hypothesis and the international pressure and presence hypothesis (H₂ and H₃): state failure and the presence of a UN peacekeeping mission have a statistically significant and positive relationship with an increased likelihood of subdued force (with and without exclusions). These results also provide some partial support to the hegemonic hypothesis (H₄) and R2P hypothesis (H₅): high levels of terrorism and NGOs have a statistically significant and positive relationship with where the U.S. will use subdued force (with and without exclusions).

For DV₅ – a moderate use of force – the results do not provide support for the four frameworks hypothesis (H₂), but do provide support for the international pressure and presence hypothesis (H₃): the level of state failure does not have a statistically significant and positive relationship with where the U.S. will use moderate force, but rather, the presence of a UN peacekeeping mission does. These results provide some partial support to the hegemonic hypothesis (H₄): higher numbers of refugees have a statistically significant and positive relationship with a U.S. use of moderate force.
For $DV_6$ – a major use of force – the results do not provide support for the *four frameworks hypotheses* or the *international pressure and presence hypothesis* ($H_2$ and $H_3$): state fragility and the presence of a UN peacekeeping mission do not have a statistically significant and positive relationship with where the U.S. will use major force. However, the results do provide some partial support to the *hegemonic hypothesis* ($H_4$) and the *R2P hypothesis* ($H_5$): terrorism, higher exports of oil to the U.S., high levels of IDPs and refugees do have a statistically significant and positive relationship with an increased likelihood that the U.S. will deploy major force.

**Conclusions of Part One**

As described in the sections earlier, state failure has become a critical issue that has consumed the minds of academics and policymakers for the last two-and-a-half decades. However, from the analysis above I have demonstrated that state failure in-and-of-itself does not appear to be a good indicator of where the U.S. will intervene militarily (except in smaller interventions), or where the U.S. will give ODA. Rather, I have attempted to demonstrate through various statistical tests and analyses that there are alternative variables like terrorism, refugees, and the presence of UN peacekeeping missions that appear to affect the likelihood of U.S. assistance more significantly than state failure does. Although illuminating, the analysis thus far has failed to address a critical question that this project has set out to answer: if state failure is a stated foreign policy priority and threat, *how and why* do these other variables influence the decision to send assistance more significantly than state failure itself? In other words, *how and why* does the U.S. prioritize alternative variables over state failure itself when deciding where
to send assistance? It is this causal mechanism that Part Two of this project addresses through the careful study of two cases: Nigeria and Liberia.
PART TWO

Case Selection Criteria

When choosing the cases to be studied in this project, it makes the most sense analytically to choose two countries that were used to frame the research question at the very beginning: the dichotomy between Western treatment or non-treatment of the most critically failed countries according to the State Failure Index between the years 1995 and 2014 (see table 1). Not only does this narrow the field of potential cases down to a mere 20, but it also limits the potential cases to only the most critically failed within a given time-frame. To control for unseen variables in terms of geography, the two cases will be chosen from the same continent. In effect, this limits the selection of the pairs of “yes” and “no” intervention cases to the sub-Saharan African countries: the Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Liberia, Niger, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola, Burundi, Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Sudan.

To further control for geographic and economic variables, the cases will only be chosen from the same sub-Saharan region (West, central, East, or Southern Africa) and from those countries that are part of the same regional organizations formally recognized by the African Union (AU). A list of all these organizations can be found in the Appendix Section 4a. Because there has to be one “yes” intervention case and one “no” intervention case, and because the two cases not only have to be part of the same regional
organization, but also have to be located in the same United Nations geo-scheme region of sub-Saharan Africa (Western, central, Eastern, and Southern Africa) this further limits the possible choices.

Another important factor to control for in selecting the cases for this study are the domestic factors within each country. Liberia (intervention) and Nigeria (nonintervention), for example, are not only both located within Western Africa, but are both members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Further, both have a long history of brutal civil wars, repeated coup d’etats, human rights violations, and both rely heavily on a very corrupted patron-client network system to govern. In terms of the quantitative analysis above, there are some important differences and similarities between Liberia and Nigeria. To illustrate these important variables prior to the case studies, data on relevant variables found to be statistically significant in the quantitative analysis are included for both Liberia and Nigeria in table 13 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberia (intervention)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>$86.37 million</td>
<td>3,290,115</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0.7 incidents</td>
<td>9.55 barrels</td>
<td>248,968.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria (no intervention)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>$226.06 million</td>
<td>139,756,858</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>111.1 incidents</td>
<td>284,381 barrels</td>
<td>17,769.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From table 13 above, we can note a few interesting points. First, though Liberia and Nigeria are separated by whether or not there was a U.S. military intervention, the
average degree of state failure is not so different (20 and 19, respectively). Second, Liberia receives much less ODA from the U.S. than Nigeria, though this could probably be due to the vast difference in the size of the population. In support of the international pressure and presence hypothesis, Liberia was the subject of a UN peacekeeping mission, but Nigeria was not. The average number of terrorist attacks per year provides an interesting caveat because, as we would expect from the quantitative analysis, Nigeria would undergo an intervention due to its high level of terrorism compared to Liberia. However, as I will discuss in the case studies below, there are some important caveats to this particular variable that concern the perceived level of threat, which can help explain this apparent contradictory evidence. Similarly, Nigeria exports far more oil than Liberia does, and according to the quantitative analysis this might indicate an increased likelihood of intervention. However, I will demonstrate through the case study why, despite this, we do not see an intervention. And finally, in support of the hegemonic hypothesis, we see a massive amount of refugees from Liberia compared to a relatively smaller number from Nigeria, given the relative size of the population.

Further similarities include the two country’s location along the coast of the North Atlantic Ocean, which can control for Western geo-political strategy considerations. Both countries have a bulging youth population, with 61.2% of the population in Liberia under the age of 24 as of 2016, and Nigeria similarly at 62.27%. Both have similarly poor infant and maternal mortality rates which point to poor healthcare provision and access, with Liberia ranking 15th (2016) and 8th (2010) worst in the world respectively, and

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Nigeria ranking at 10\textsuperscript{th} (2016) and 11\textsuperscript{th} (2010) worst in the world respectively.\textsuperscript{100}

Educational resources and access to education seem to be similarly poor in both countries, though slightly better in Nigeria with a literate population of 59.6\% of the total, and Liberia at 47.6\% (2015).\textsuperscript{101}

These similarities provide mechanisms that can control for potentially unknown or untested variables. However, it is also important to point to the differences between the countries, which will lead us into a discussion of the primary causal mechanisms under investigation here. First, it should be noted that although both countries are divided along religious lines between large Christian and Muslim populations, the division in Nigeria is much more pronounced. Liberia has a national religious division of about 12\% Muslim and about 85\% Christian.\textsuperscript{102} In Nigeria 50\% of the population identifies as Muslim and 40\% as Christian.\textsuperscript{103} Nigeria also has around 250 ethnic groups, whereas Liberia only has around 16.\textsuperscript{104}

Another critical difference between Liberia and Nigeria is oil. Liberia exports mainly iron ore, rubber, gold and timber, and relies heavily on foreign assistance; although in the recent past it has encouraged the exploration for oil off the coast. On the other hand, Nigeria – the largest economy in Africa – is richly endowed with oil resources in its southern territories, and has reaped the benefits (and perils) of the so-called ‘oil curse’ since the 1970s.\textsuperscript{105}

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid, Liberia.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid, Nigeria.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid.
Another key difference to note is the regional leadership role and foreign policies of each country. As the most populous country and largest economy in Africa, Nigeria plays a critical role in mediating regional conflicts, leading and providing the bulk of resources and troops in regional peacekeeping efforts, and has been a critical U.S. partner in the so-called war on terror. Liberia, although poised to lead Africa during the 1960s, has made hardly the same international impact as Nigeria, despite its historically close relationship with the U.S. Finally, Liberia has been the subject of many regional and UN peacekeeping missions, all of which Nigeria has supplied a large number of troops for; meanwhile despite similar conditions at home, Nigeria has never been the subject of a regional or UN peacekeeping mission.

**Causal Mechanism Identification**

There are several causal mechanisms at work that help explain the intervention in Liberia but not in Nigeria. However, there is one important factor that produced the *environment* for intervention in Liberia, but not in Nigeria: the (in)ability to maintain patron-client networks, which has led to divergent paths of (in)stability. This will be detailed briefly below.

*Liberia:* The Liberian government has consistently relied on patron-client networks to maintain control of the country since its establishment in the early 19th century. After the collapse of Liberia’s trade and agricultural sectors in the mid-20th century, the Liberian government came to rely almost exclusively on U.S. foreign assistance during the Cold War to support and enrich patron-client networks. The end of the Cold War spelled the end of this foreign assistance, and without a viable financial
alternative (like oil), patron-client networks collapsed, as well as the Liberian state. This breakdown led to two exceptionally brutal civil wars between 1990 and 2003. Despite the carnage, the U.S. refused to intervene during the first 13 years after the collapse of the state. It was only after the United Nations placed immense public pressure on the United States to do so and guaranteed a joint intervention force, and after clear links of Liberia’s aid to international terrorist groups like al Qaeda were established that the United States had a change of heart about intervention. Therefore, much in line with the results of the quantitative analysis, it was not state failure itself that led the United States to intervene, but alternative variables.

*Nigeria:* The Nigerian government has been able to maintain patron-client networks post-Cold War, and thus has been able to fortify its leadership position in Western Africa. Meanwhile, because patron-client networks have produced a semblance of stability to the outside world, this has allowed the Nigerian government to ignore similar domestic issues and human rights violations that have been cited by the U.S. and the UN as the very reason for intervention in Liberia. Because patron-client networks have managed to create a very delicate balance based on clients’ willingness to cooperate *just enough* to hold Nigeria together, it has become a key partner of West in maintaining peace and stability in Western Africa. Due to the reluctance of the West to rock the boat in Nigeria and produce any instability, Nigeria has never been the subject of a UN mission (but rather, in fact, has contributed to many), nor has the UN or the U.S. ever publicly shamed Nigeria for its human rights abuses, like it has with Liberia. Furthermore, despite Boko Haram’s existence in Northern Nigeria, the group’s domestic
focus makes it a non-threat to the West and therefore has not prompted an intervention, despite the high number of attacks.

**Neopatrimonialism in Africa**

To understand why the state collapsed in Liberia but not in Nigeria, we must first conceptualize neopatrimonialism and establish how this informal mode of governance shapes state capacity, which is what this section sets out to do. By understanding the structural importance of neopatrimonialism in Africa, we can understand why state collapse was imminent in Liberia, which creates a puzzle as to why the U.S. did not intervene.

Neopatrimonial rule and patron-client networks are not novel in Liberia and Nigeria, let alone in Western and sub-Saharan Africa. Both countries, for the most part, operate within this mode of governance. In fact, many scholars have argued that these mechanisms of rule, embedded in the so-called “ancien régime,” have a direct influence on the contemporary political changes that occur in the majority of African states today.¹⁰⁶ Unlike Latin America, which has a distinctly corporatist regime legacy, contemporary African countries are marked by the perseverance of neopatrimonial regimes and informal institutions, and many scholars have gone so far as to argue that this form of rule not only continues to influence modern-day governance but indeed defines it.¹⁰⁷

Neopatrimonialism – the contemporary version of classical patrimonialism – is defined as exhibiting a chief executive that maintains his authority “through personal

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patronage, rather than through ideology or law.”

Leaders within this system acquire and maintain loyalty by awarding public officials (known generally as clients) with rewards like personal favors, money, and political appointments in return for their allegiance and mobilization of political support. As a result, the occupation of power positions and bureaucratic offices becomes less for the purpose of performing public service duties, but rather to climb the social and fiscal ladder, and thus the line between public and private business becomes a blurred one.

It is often the case in this type of rule that the living standards of the general population suffer due to the narrowed usage of public funds. Because the bulk of goods and benefits are funneled to a select few corrupt individuals, little remains to fund public goods like healthcare, education, and other public services. As a result generalized poverty, underdevelopment, and poor living conditions can become the norm in this kind of system. The end-result of this clientelist structure for the state and political processes are twofold. First, political power becomes less impersonal and abstract, and becomes more focused on “personal power.” And second, politics “becomes a kind of business,” due to the fact that political relationships and status are the primary points of access “to economic resources.”

In relation to the topic under discussion here – state failure – the neopatrimonialist regime-types of Nigeria and Liberia provide an interesting and novel framework for

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110 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
attempting to gauge international intervention. Scholars like Robin Theobald have argued that “some of the new states are, properly speaking, not states at all; rather, they are virtually the private instruments of those powerful enough to rule.”113 The implications of this form of rule for political transitions, state-capacity, and the provision of foreign assistance must not be understated. Because of the highly personalized network of rule, and thus the fragility that necessarily accompanies these personal connections, this produces an environment that is extremely variable, volatile, and unpredictable.114 In other words, the outward semblance of domestic stability provided by neopatrimonialism may in fact be just as fragile as the personal relationships that define it, and the instability of the resources that finance it. As Joel Migdal writes in State in Society, the state functions on two arenas: the world arena and the arena of the domestic society; and where one of the pillars may seem functional, the other is riddled with cracks.115 Thus, we must keep this factor in mind when examining the role that this particular regime setting and unpredictability plays in the American decision whether or not to provide assistance.

**Liberia**

The case of Liberia is a particularly illuminating example because it lends itself to analysis via the division of time periods, which can serve as a type of control mechanism. In the first time period (1821-1989), the U.S. played a facilitative and supportive role to the Liberian government, despite the state’s clear weakness, human rights abuses, and

poor democratic track record. During this time period, the U.S. was less concerned with the reality of state-weakness and possibility of total state collapse in Liberia, and more concerned with Liberia’s utility in the geo-strategic competition in Africa during the Cold War. 1989 serves as a critical juncture because it was during this year that the U.S. halted foreign financial assistance to Liberia due to the end of the Cold War, which directly led to the collapse of patron-client networks and the Liberian state. During the second time-period (1990-2003), the U.S.’s lack of involvement despite the total collapse of the Liberian state and a violent civil war illuminate what has been found in the quantitative analysis – state failure in and-of itself is not a critical factor that can help us understand when and where the U.S. will intervene. In the third time period (2003 – present), despite the fact that Liberia for the most part had free and fair democratic elections and had settled into a period of relative peace following the end of the civil wars, we begin to see an increase in direct involvement by the U.S. This involvement is a direct function of the national security threat of al Qaeda in Liberia, and international pressure from the UN to intervene. If indeed the U.S. was intervening for the purpose of reversing state failure, we should have observed a more direct response during the 1990s when the state completely collapsed. However, as we will see in the case study below, the U.S. ignores the state collapse of Liberia and instead only intervenes 13 years after this occurred when it was in American interests to do so.

To understand the collapse of the Liberian state, we must first understand the institutional mechanisms that led to its collapse: the dependence on patron-client networks. In the first part of this case study, I will explore and highlight the important
legacy of neopatrimonialism in Liberia, and how this has led to a reliance on rule through patron-client networks (1821-1989). This is crucial to understand why the Liberian state collapsed after 1989. Following this, I will discuss how the end of foreign financial assistance from the U.S. directly led to the collapse of these patron-client networks and thus the state. In the second part of this case study, I will discuss Liberia’s total state collapse in the 1990s in the backdrop of the U.S.’s reluctance to become directly involved. And finally, I will discuss the factors that eventually led to the direct involvement of the U.S. in Liberia, informed directly from the quantitative analysis conducted above.

**Liberia Part 1: Legacy of Patrimonial Rule in Liberia**

In 1821 Liberia was founded by freed U.S. slaves, and with the help of the U.S., the new settlers moved to enslave the indigenous Liberian population, creating a system of “proprietary control.”¹¹⁶ Because of European trade demands at the time, the bulk of the decision-making power in the state went to those merchants located along coastal lands engaged in trading activities.¹¹⁷ These proprietors would define the particular grain of patrimonial rule in Liberia, one where “a few merchants who operated through networks of relatives, apprentices, and clients” exercised the dominant voice and prerogative in the new Liberian state.¹¹⁸ The early dominance of the coast would set the stage for the dominance of Monrovia as a patron over the rest of Liberia.

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¹¹⁷ Ibid.
¹¹⁸ Ibid.
Although the roles of these coastal merchants would change by the end of the nineteenth century, their status as the elite class did not. Rather than directly control the trading posts, these merchants sought to expand their authority over the indigenous communities through an increased state bureaucratic machine, which would serve as a source of property and labor appropriation.\textsuperscript{119} It was in this way that the formal bureaucratic machine of early Liberia became fused with informal patrimonial structures and rules of governance.

Aside from the state-codification of patrimonial linkages and networks into the bureaucratic machine, the indigenous population also had a long history of patrimonial networks of social organization. The largest ethno-linguistic group in Liberia – the Mande – perceive their society “largely as patrilineages or lineage segments,” where a fundamental founding ancestor constitutes the “core lineage,” and thus acts as the primary source of authority in social organization.\textsuperscript{120} Therefore, authority, prestige and privilege (including land ownership) are derived from the relationship – real or fictitious – to this core lineage.\textsuperscript{121} Additionally, a number of indigenous political confederations were built upon the consolidation of a number of related ethno-linguistic groups, ruled via indirect patrimonial linkages. One of the largest was the confederation controlled by Sao Boso, a Mandingo who previously worked as a British trade agent on the coast.\textsuperscript{122} Sao Boso managed to consolidate a number of related ethno-linguistic groups in an area called Bopolu, usurp authority, and used trusted warriors to establish chiefdom over other

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid, 8-9.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid, 66-67.
areas in the region. Because of Sao Boso’s skills as a trader, Bopolu quickly became “the largest and most important trading center” in the region, and he used these fiscal rewards to establish an extensive and entrenched form of indirect rule over his confederation.\(^\text{123}\) It was these same well-established networks controlled by strongmen that the Liberian government borrowed and utilized in establishing its own system of indirect rule later on.

In consolidating the Liberian state, the new Liberian government moved to consolidate its territory by negotiating concessions and treaties between the settler Liberian authorities and warring indigenous communities and confederations. In doing so, the new Liberian state sought less to directly control these regions, and more to “establish a role… as arbiter and guarantor of peace and stability.”\(^\text{124}\) However, this meant that the new Liberian state cemented its limited ability to directly influence and reach many regions of its territory outside of mediation between local strongmen. Moreover, aside from the coast, it took the Liberian government (with the assistance of the United States)\(^\text{125}\) many years to begin to infiltrate the northwestern Mandingo-controlled regions of the country.

The constitutional convention of 1847 prepared and signed a constitution that gave “sweeping powers” to the president within the unitary state-system, and provided little opportunity for public participation in political decision-making.\(^\text{126}\) By the turn of the century the Liberian economy transformed from a dependence on mercantile trade to one that relied on “corporate taxes, royalties, and profit-sharing,” and the president

\(^{123}\) Ibid, 67.
\(^{124}\) Ibid, 83.
\(^{125}\) In some instances, the United States would send direct military assistance to threaten and subdue unruly indigenous communities and force them into a settlement, as was the case in 1876 when the United States sent the warship *Alaska* to Cape Palmas on the request of the Liberian government (ibid, 136).
\(^{126}\) Ibid, 94.
became the primary source of patronage, which included “property rights in labor, land, and natural resources that were consigned by the state to foreign concessionaires and a few local proprietors.”

By the end of World War II, Monrovia had successfully become the proprietor of political power, using “the personalization of governmental authority,” rather than the rule of law or ideology, as its main tactic of control. These early legacies of patrimonialism would come to define the rule of the Liberian state, and would come to define the relative instability of the state during economic hardships.

**Strengthening Patrimonial Legacies in the 20th Century**

By the turn of the century, the Liberian government was teetering on the brink of bankruptcy and most of Liberia’s trade market had collapsed and was owned and operated by European powers. In order to salvage its authority, the Liberian government secured a major role as a European trade facilitator and “collected customs duties and head money on labor recruits… [which] constituted the major sources of income for settler families. Thus… the government itself became the major economic enterprise…” Still, the government’s domestic debt was spiraling out of control, and in 1912 the U.S. granted a loan package designed to relieve Liberia of its creditors and stimulate the floundering economy. This loan was one of the first major financial packages that the U.S. would give to Liberia in the 20th century, marking the beginning of Liberian reliance on U.S. foreign assistance.

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127 Ibid, 9.
128 Ibid, 10.
129 Ibid, 173.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid, 181.
During the first decade of the 20th century the British and French threatened to intervene if the Liberian government could not subdue communal disputes that threatened trade and colonial rule. Liberian President Arthur Barclay took to task on this, bolstering the principles of indirect and patrimonial rule. President Barclay cemented the legitimacy of indirect rulers (chiefs) who he handpicked himself, ensuring indigenous communities “would be controlled by the ruling lineages,” and would be “supported by and “encouraged to work” with the government.”

To do this, Barclay divided Liberia into districts based on ethnic population patterns to ensure the authority of local strongmen would not be challenged. To incentivize these strongmen both to remain loyal and mobilize their districts, chiefs received a 10% commission of all taxes collected within the district.

Every president after Barclay faced an increasingly dire financial situation as well as an increasingly resistant indigenous population that, rightfully, felt excluded from the spoils of the government. To prevent an indigenous uprising, the structure of the chiefdoms were subsequently altered in order to strip the chiefs of their independence and centralize more authority into the hands of the president. This culminated in a provision in 1914 that called for an election for the purposes of “the amalgamation of clans into chiefdoms to be headed by a paramount chief… designed to provide the government greater opportunities for manipulating the selection process.” In doing so, the government could more easily dictate the financial fortunes of some districts, but also

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132 Ibid, 198.
133 Ibid.
134 Ibid, 199.
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid.
diminished the legitimacy of the chiefs in the eyes of the indigenous communities. The result for Liberian political organization fortified a “complex system of patron-client relationships… with the Americo-Liberians at the top.”

Despite the financial woes in the early 20th century, Liberia emerged after the Second World War with a re-energized economy due to its role as an Atlantic military base. The United States’ strategic interests in Liberia provided incentives to develop the Port of Monrovia and the Liberian international airport, and the 1942 Defense Areas Agreement granted the U.S. the right to “build, operate, and protect certain military installations in Liberia,” which opened the door for massive foreign financial aid to flow into Liberia’s coffers. Additionally, the presence of the American Firestone Natural Rubber Company beginning in the 1930s provided “a major impetus to the development of Liberia’s road network,” as well as to develop Liberia’s only major medical centers. These foreign investments coupled with an increased global demand for iron ore promised to bring economic prosperity to Liberia.

In 1944 Liberia selected William Tubman as president, who for the first time came from a settlement outside of Montserrado and Grand Bassa (where all previous presidents had come from). Tubman proved to be a promising president: he granted suffrage to women, expanded indigenous citizenship and voting rights, called for increased national unification, promoted principles of equality and justice, expanded education, and founded the first university in Liberia. Yet, Tubman was powerless to do these things if it were not for the maintenance of “enormous personal patronage

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137 Bøås (October 2001), 703.
138 Sawyer (1992), 277.
139 Ibid, 251.
network[s]” built during previous administrations and funded through foreign financial assistance and the global demand for iron ore.\textsuperscript{140}

The 1940s-1970s in Liberia proved to be some of the best years in terms of economic prosperity. However, the economic growth and penetrating patron-client networks that combined to lift Liberia out of poverty and hardship also proved to be the very factors that would gradually “erode the insecure foundation of Tubman’s proprietorship.”\textsuperscript{141} Much of what eventually undid Liberia’s economic growth can be attributed to the substantive differences between the legal authorities granted to the Liberian government on paper, and the actual legal authority exercised by the government in practice. Undoubtedly, the most important branch of government in the 20th century was that of the executive, although on paper the judicial and legislative were supposed to be equally as powerful. Yet, even the president operated within serious legal constraints and conditions that were vested in the legacy of informal nongovernment institutions and clientelist relationships.

As a relative outsider, Tubman’s presidency meant those groups who had been left out for decades finally felt a sense of representation, but this also alienated the Monrovian elite and indigenous intelligentsia that had benefited from the previous arrangement. When Tubman pushed through a constitutional amendment that would allow the president “to succeed himself for an unlimited number of terms of four years,” the old elite establishment formed a political party to contest Tubman in both the 1951

\textsuperscript{140} Ibid, 209.
\textsuperscript{141} Sawyer (1992), 209.
and 1955 elections.\textsuperscript{142} Tubman not only barred the party’s candidates from appearing on the ballot, but also “charged its leaders with sedition, and disbanded it.”\textsuperscript{143} After an assassination attempt by the opposition, Tubman initiated a massive and violent military crackdown of the opposition. The crackdown was so violent that it took more than two decades of recovery before another opposition campaign was attempted.\textsuperscript{144}

After the failed opposition attempt of 1955, Tubman reverted into a tightly knit circle of his own cronies and trusted client networks. He established branches of a secret police network, complete with personal informants that reported “directly to the executive mansion.”\textsuperscript{145} Countless human rights violations occurred and a virtual reign of terror engulfed Liberia by the time Tubman died in office in 1971. Although the old Monrovia elites and indigenous intelligentsia were disaffected, “Tubman’s consolidation of personal authority” was made possible only through the presidential-patronage networks he had forged earlier using foreign aid, iron ore, rubber, and timber concessions.\textsuperscript{146} Accordingly, Tubman’s reign of terror after the 1955 opposition attempt was rarely challenged because the president had corruptly positioned himself as “the ultimate source of individual livelihood.”\textsuperscript{147}

During the 1960s, the economic growth and stability that defined the Tubman presidency began to deteriorate precipitously due to the decline in world market prices of timber, rubber, and iron ore. By 1971 when the next president William Tolbert came to office, the economy was in a state of decline. With little financial rewards available to

\textsuperscript{142} Ibid, 281.
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid, 282.
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid, 283-4.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid, 285.
clients, many new political parties and organizations were established.\textsuperscript{148} Seeing no other alternative, Tolbert sought to ‘de-Tubmanize’ the office of the presidency by getting rid of the Tubman-era patron-client networks and security apparatus.\textsuperscript{149} In place of the personal patron-client networks, he sought to establish a robust and rational bureaucracy, which was “bitterly resented by the old guard.”\textsuperscript{150} This dynamic demonstrates the push-and-pull between the expansion of legitimate bureaucracy and state-levers, and the patron-client networks on which the Liberian state had been built.

In 1973 the domestic situation had still failed to improve and citizens began to resent Tolbert after a few scandals where he shielded his family and cronies from punishment after numerous public scandals involving the misuse of federal funds came to light.\textsuperscript{151} Pressured, Tolbert “assumed emergency powers” and the security forces expanded once again.\textsuperscript{152} In reality, Tolbert’s promise for a renewed Liberia were about as shallow as Tubman’s had been. In removing the monopoly that Tubman’s cronies had over Liberian industries, Tolbert simply replaced them with his own. This culminated in the rice riots of 1979, when 200 demonstrators were killed by the Liberian military for protesting against a massive hike in the price of rice that would directly benefit the pockets of Tolbert’s cronies in the industry.\textsuperscript{153} After shutting down the riot, the Liberian military subsequently began to loot and vandalize shops around Monrovia, leading the public to wonder whether Tolbert truly had authority over the military forces. The suspicions concerning the loyalty of the Liberian military were realized in April 1980.

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid, 287.
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid, 298.
\textsuperscript{151} Bøås (October 2001), 704.
\textsuperscript{152} Sawyer (1992), 291.
\textsuperscript{153} Ibid, 291-2.
when more than a dozen privates and military officers led by Sergeant Samuel K. Doe staged a coup d’etat and killed President Tolbert.

Samuel Doe came to power with the promise that he and his military officers were “acting in the interests of the disenfranchised: the rural and urban poor, [and] the “tribal” people who had been excluded from real power for the previous 130 years.”154 However, rivalries within the military junta stemming from a struggle for power rooted in ethnic competition threatened to undo Doe’s hold on Liberia. Quickly after usurping power and suspending the constitution, General Thomas Quiwonkpa – an ethnic Gio – had a falling out with Doe, who was of the competing Krahn ethnic group.155 Two close allies of Quiwonkpa, Charles Taylor and Prince Johnson, fled the country and went into exile in the United States, while others took refuge in the neighboring Cote d’Ivoire. Ironically, Taylor was a former patronage client of Doe who had been selectively singled out and accused of embezzlement in 1985.156 A paranoid Doe had begun to purge the military as well as the civilian public of those he accused of having wavering loyalties.157 All political activities, like the formation of political parties, were made illegal. To further curtail disaffection and promote loyalty, Doe borrowed heavily in order to raise military and public service salaries by 150% and nearly 100% respectively.158

For a few years Doe’s rule was plagued by a series of internal disagreements about the exact nature of the government to follow, and the Liberian public’s pluralist and inclusive calls eventually led Doe to find “a comfortable ally among those

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155 Bøås (October 2001), 709.
157 Sawyer (1992), 293.
158 Ibid.
professionals and former politicians who sought personal fortune at any cost. Many had been junior officials in the Tubman and Tolbert governments. Some had even been on the fringes of Tubman’s elaborate patronage network that had penetrated deep into urban and rural communities.\cite{159} As a result, any hope for the expansion of legitimate governance was overshadowed by the entrenched nature of the patron-client networks that functioned to maintain stability in Liberia.

A failed attempt to collectivize farms led to the near total collapse of the agricultural sector by 1984, and Doe’s uncontrolled borrowing dug the country into deep external debt exceeding $1 billion. This collapse led to a near total reliance on foreign assistance, primarily from the U.S. Clients, desperate to maintain their position in the patronage system and fearing a military crackdown, became complicit bystanders and facilitators in the violent military rule that engulfed Liberia during the early 1980s. The public in turn began to call for a full return to civilian rule. Shrewdly, Doe staged a constitutional reform process beginning in 1981 that consulted the public through hearings and debates. In reality, the new constitution of 1984 was not much different from the previous one, and was quietly altered in ways “to suit the specific political ambitions of Doe” and facilitate ethnic-based patronage networks to benefit the Krahn.\cite{160}

Under pressure from creditors in the U.S. and Europe, and with the help of members of Liberia’s old patronage network, Doe transformed his image from that of a military regime to a civilian regime just in time for the elections of 1985. Political parties were legalized a year prior to the elections, but Doe had staffed the election commission

\cite{159} Ibid, 295.
\cite{160} Ibid, 297.
with members of his own party, altered the rules of the system in his favor, and imprisoned many opposition leaders. The election of 1985 occurred seamlessly and resulted in a win for Doe, even winning a “free and fair” stamp by the Reagan Administration State Department, though international election observers accused Doe of heavily rigging it in his favor and intimidating his opponents.\textsuperscript{161}

For the remainder of the decade Doe continued to pursue his rivals who repeatedly attempted to unseat him, and became increasingly enveloped within a small community of loyal Krahn members. Though Doe was not an ideal democratic leader or reflection of U.S. ideals abroad, American officials only “privately voice[d] criticism” of him, and continued to use Liberia to host “an emergency military base and communications facilities” during the Cold War competition with the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{162} By the end of the decade, Liberia was the only sub-Saharan African country to grant “landing and refueling rights for military aircraft and ships on 24-hour notice” to the U.S.\textsuperscript{163} Liberia also hosted one of eight U.S.-controlled navigational stations in the world that “emits low-frequency signals that guide ships and aircraft in the Atlantic,” including the critical American nuclear submarine fleet.\textsuperscript{164} During 1980s alone the U.S. gave about $500 million in aid to Liberia, “making it the largest per capita American aid recipient in Africa.”\textsuperscript{165}

In the absence of alternative economic means due to the collapse of trade and the agricultural industries, foreign aid formed “the glue that held together Doe’s patronage

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Moran (2006), 9.}
\footnote{Krauss (1990, June 12).}
\footnote{Ibid.}
\footnote{Ibid.}
\end{footnotes}
network,” and whether the U.S. had intended it or not, this dependence would seal the fate of the collapse of the Liberian state.\textsuperscript{166}

**Liberia Part 2: The End of Patron-Client Networks and the Collapse of the Liberian State**

It was the unexpected end of the Cold War and the “nearly total cutoff” of U.S. aid to Liberia in 1989 that provided the final nail in the coffin of the patron-client networks that provided at least a fleeting semblance of stability for over 100 years. The end of foreign assistance placed the Liberian state which was “already plagued by chronic political, economic, and administrative problems” on a one-way street to total collapse.\textsuperscript{167} On Christmas Eve of the same year, Charles Taylor led a 150-man invasion of Liberia, and in the absence of patronage rewards “few of Doe’s associates saw any personal advantage in defending the regime. In fact, many state officials saw Taylor’s invasion as a chance to strike out on their own while Doe was preoccupied with the rebel threat.”\textsuperscript{168} Liberia broke into chaos as dozens of new militias led by former Liberian strongmen formed virtually overnight, each vying for a piece of the Liberian pie. Prince Johnson’s rebel group, which had split ranks from Taylor, managed to capture President Doe in Monrovia and kill him in 1990.

Some African scholars have pointed to the end of the Cold War, the withdrawal of foreign support and the end of ‘negative sovereignty’ as a good thing.\textsuperscript{169} According to this line of argument, the end of foreign aid forces rulers of African states to either reform and build legitimate bureaucracies and institutions, or “suffer the fatal

\textsuperscript{166} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{168} Ibid.
consequences of their weak and misguided rule” by continuing to support their patron-client networks. However, in the case of Liberia this reform process was severely curtailed due to the outbreak of two civil wars that would destroy what was left of the decrepit Liberian institutions and bureaucracy. In the absence of foreign assistance, the Liberian state had no other legitimate economic industries to fall back on, and so was inept at competing against rebel groups who financed their soldiers through illicit means.

The civil war that engulfed Liberia in the 1990s was one of the most brutal ever witnessed in Western Africa, let alone the world. The exploitation of child soldiers, cannibalism of children and other war victims, torture and other human rights abuses were common practices by the rebels. Many warlords went by pseudonyms, like ‘General bin Laden,’ both to strike fear in their enemies as well as shield their identities from international human rights organizations. This made holding human rights abusers accountable following the war extremely difficult, and as a result many former warlords who practiced cannibalism and other heinous crimes still walk free in Liberia today. It is the U.S.’s absence during this carnage and violence within the context of total state collapse that is so striking about this period of Liberian history.

In the summer of 1990, countries in Western Africa began to fear that the conflict in Liberia might spread. Of particular concern was Sierra Leone, which faced similarly decaying patron-client networks due to the withdrawal of international financial support. Nigeria also had legitimate security concerns over the Liberian conflict because of its own exclusive patron-client networks. In an effort to curtail the conflict, a joint military

170 Ibid.
intervention force composed of member nations of the Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was sent to place Liberia under Nigerian leadership. As a leader in West Africa, Nigeria shouldered the majority of the burden, providing around 80% of the troops, though the U.S. provided Nigeria with some diplomatic and financial support.\textsuperscript{171} Although the primary goal was to establish a cease-fire and maintain peace, troops were engaged in active combat for much of the time. A number of peace conferences were held, but an agreement between all parties always remained out of reach.

The most powerful of the various rebel groups was Taylor’s. As a former client of President Doe, Taylor had acquired skills at “controlling and cultivating sources of foreign exchange,” which in turn “allowed him to arm his soldiers and conquer areas with easily exploitable resources.”\textsuperscript{172} Taylor did this primarily by exploiting the fears of foreign mining firms concerned with their ability to maintain access to resources throughout the war. One was the British African Mining Consortium, Ltd., which paid Taylor around $10 million a month “for permission to ship stockpiled ore on an existing railroad.”\textsuperscript{173} Taylor also secured a similar deal with a French timber company, and in fact Liberia became France’s “third-largest supplier of tropical timber in 1991.”\textsuperscript{174} Though Taylor controlled over 90% of the territory in Liberia, he had an upper-hand over the

\textsuperscript{171} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{172} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{173} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{174} Ibid, 213.
Monrovian government in that he did not “have to assume any of the approximately $3.5 billion of debt that the previous regime had run up with its international creditors.”

The fear of violence spreading was realized in 1991 when fighting broke out between Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) guerillas and the Sierra Leonean army. Over the course of the year, Taylor and his men had managed to become key players and movers of illicit diamonds from Sierra Leone into Liberia and elsewhere, but his involvement was never explicitly known until overt conflict began between the two groups. In order to secure his interests in the lucrative ‘blood diamond’ trade, Taylor backed an invasion of Sierra Leone led by a former army corporal Foday Sankoh and his group the Revolutionary Unity Front (RUF) in April 1991. In doing so, Taylor “recognized Sankoh as “governor” of Sierra Leone and used the war to remove Mandingos and corrupt Sierra Leone officials from the lucrative transborder trade.”

Taylor’s efforts in Sierra Leone would have lasting traumatic effects for regional security, turning one-third of the entire Sierra Leonean population into refugees.

The Liberian civil war became a competition between the decrepit state and ECOMOG on one hand, and local rebel groups for control over limited resources to compete with Taylor. ECOMOG troops formed alliances with local rivals of Taylor, exploiting local resources and in some cases taking some resources for themselves. ECOMOG troops, who were often underpaid and poorly treated, began to rob Liberia of its fixed assets like railroads, mining equipment and other public utilities in order to sell

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176 Reno (May 1996), 213.
177 Ibid.
178 Ibid.
179 Ibid.
them abroad.\textsuperscript{180} With the country’s assets stripped, this in turn forced Taylor to double down on his investments in the Sierra Leonean diamond trade and promoted increased violence there. Because ambitious or disloyal personnel could easily exploit the ‘blood diamond’ trade, Taylor had to keep a tight leash on his territories, and defended highways and other transport routes fiercely from ECOMOG troops, creating a stalemate.

As the civil war dragged on with no real hope for peace or compromise, many in the international community began to criticize the U.S.’s subdued role in Liberia and its support of corrupt Nigerian ECOMOG troops that contributed to dismantling Liberia’s fixed assets. The U.S. in turn pointed to the disastrous results of the 1992 intervention in Somalia and its preoccupation with the invasion of Iraq as culpable considerations for hesitation.\textsuperscript{181} Rather than direct involvement, it was believed by many in Washington at the time that Nigeria could bring Liberia’s civil war to a peaceful solution. Unfortunately the very presence of ECOMOG troops, regardless of support from the U.S., served only to prolong the war because much of the fighting was done in defense of maintaining the status quo and a continuation of a regime with those loyal to Doe. Moreover, ECOMOG troops had installed Amos Sawyer, a Western educated Americo-Liberian, as interim president. Many critics of Sawyer – especially Taylor – viewed this as simply a “puppet government” supported by ECOMOG and the United States.\textsuperscript{182}

In September 1993, a United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) was authorized to enter Liberia, led by various African countries including Tanzania,
Namibia, Egypt and Kenya.\textsuperscript{183} Interestingly, a number of Western countries including Austria, Belgium, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden all contributed military personnel to the mission.\textsuperscript{184} The United States is notably absent from this mission, most likely due to the financial and diplomatic support the U.S. had been funneling to Nigeria through ECOMOG. In 1994 Taylor presented information allegedly leaked from the U.S. State Department, which illustrated discomfort and inter-agency conflict over ECOMOG’s handling of Liberia, especially concerning Nigerian troops’ corrupt role as commercial exploiters.\textsuperscript{185} Taylor used this to argue that ECOMOG was indeed an “invasion force,” and pointed to U.S. ambiguity toward the Liberian crisis as proof.\textsuperscript{186}

While it is true that there were many in Washington that felt uncomfortable with the way the Nigerian government handled the crisis, it is also true that Washington – preferring not to get bogged down in the Liberian crisis – never wavered in its public support of Nigeria, either.

In September of 1995 the United States’ faith in Nigeria was rewarded when warring factions came together in Nigeria to sign the Abuja Peace Accord. At the time, this was hailed as a success not only for Liberia, but also for Nigeria as a rising power in West Africa and a loyal ally to the U.S. in brokering peace and stability. ECOMOG troops and UNOMIL observers continued to monitor the peace in Liberia, however a few months later in April 1996 fighting broke out again. Several more cease-fires brokered by

\textsuperscript{184} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{185} Waugh (October 2011), 191; and Reno (March 1995), 115.
\textsuperscript{186} Ibid.
the Nigerian government were required before the fighting halted, and Liberia finally moved toward elections in the summer of 1997.

**The United States’ Change of Heart**

The elections of 1997 were “the nearest thing to a free election” the country had seen in its recent history, and Charles Taylor became the president of Liberia.\(^{187}\)

Although the elections had been mostly free, the U.S. and other Western powers were rightfully wary of Taylor. As a former warlord, his activities during the war – especially in Sierra Leone – made him a contentious figure. By the time of the election, an undeniable and well-established link between Taylor and the Libyan government had also come to light, which led the U.S. to brand Taylor and his men as “undesirable interlocutors.”\(^{188}\) Meanwhile in Lofa County, which borders Sierra Leone and Guinea, former rivals of Taylor, “encouraged by the labeling of Taylor’s Liberia as a ‘rogue state’ by the USA,” began to mount a major offensive.\(^{189}\) The former Liberian Ambassador to the U.S., Rachel Gbenyon-Diggs, noted that she believed it was the United States’ ability to influence “all other actors not to cooperate with Taylor’s Liberia” that contributed significantly to the regime’s eventual downfall.

From the beginning of his presidency, Taylor struggled to stabilize the cash-strapped Liberia. The U.S. had coordinated heavy international sanctions on Liberia and placed strict travel bans on top Liberian officials connected with Taylor. In 1997, facing a growing offensive from his rivals at home and the beginning of the second civil war, Taylor “doled out timber and mining concessions and pocketed the cash or used it to arm

\(^{187}\) Bøås (October 2001), 713.
\(^{188}\) Waugh (October 2011), 290.
\(^{189}\) Ibid.
militia and new paramilitary forces.” In 2000, Taylor’s regime suffered another major blowback when the UN branded it “the main external supporter of the RUF” in Sierra Leone, and more sanctions were imposed.

In 2001 a few months after the terrorist attacks on September 11th, reports began to surface linking Taylor’s involvement with the RUF in the illegal Sierra Leone diamond trade and al Qaeda’s Osama bin Laden. According to intelligence officials in both the United States and Europe, bin Laden had “reaped millions of dollars in the past three years from the illicit sale of diamonds mined by rebels in Sierra Leone.” The connection allegedly began in the fall of 1998, when Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah who was described by the FBI as a “top bin Laden advisor” who “helped plan a number of Al Qaeda’s attacks,” visited Monrovia and was flown in a Liberian military helicopter to the border of Sierra Leone to meet with senior RUF commanders to conduct business.

From this point forward, there was repeated contact between Monrovia and key leaders in al Qaeda directly linked to bin Laden himself. Not only did these reports allege that Taylor helped to finance al Qaeda, they also alleged that Taylor was harboring and shielding al Qaeda operatives in Liberia and elsewhere. It was at this point, fearing Liberia and Sierra Leone might further turn into a safe haven for al Qaeda, that the U.S. “began a concerted campaign to oust Taylor.”

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191 Bøås (October 2001), 713.
193 Ibid.
194 Ibid.
195 Ibid.
198 Ibid.
Throughout the second civil war, the U.S. quietly supported Taylor’s rivals and repeatedly urged Taylor to talk with them, to which Taylor vehemently dismissed as a blatant disregard by Washington for the democratically elected president of Liberia. Two rebel groups known as the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) posed the greatest threat to Taylor’s regime, and by the early 2000s “had gained control over two-thirds of the country and were threatening to seize the capital.”\textsuperscript{198} It has been documented that the LURD were actually supported quite heavily by the U.S. For example, the secretary-general of LURD, Joe Gballah, has stated that the objective was to “get Taylor out of power… [and] put in place a power base that… [would] be in the interests of America.”\textsuperscript{199}

On the 4\textsuperscript{th} of June 2003, American chief prosecutor David Crane of the UN-backed Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) unsealed an indictment charging Taylor of war crimes committed in Sierra Leone, as well as harboring al Qaeda operatives wanted by the U.S.\textsuperscript{200} A warrant for his arrest was made and dispatched to Interpol. At the time of the dispatch, Taylor was in Accra, Ghana, attending the Accra Peace conference, at which he announced “he would step down by the end of his mandate in January 2004.”\textsuperscript{201} After he made his announcement, Taylor was whisked away on board a plane headed back to Liberia, avoiding arrest. The same day, the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia reportedly

encouraged Liberian Vice President Moses Blah to take power while Taylor was away, to which Taylor responded by promptly arresting him the same day.\textsuperscript{202}

About two weeks later on June 17\textsuperscript{th} the Defense Minister for Liberia and the rebel groups involved in the civil war signed the Accra peace agreement mandating an immediate ceasefire and the deployment of international monitors.\textsuperscript{203} Once the news of the peace agreement was released to the public Taylor warned he would not comply until the indictment was dropped.\textsuperscript{204} Facing the threat of increasing violence and the possibility of a breach in the cease-fire agreement, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan made several public statements during a weekend emergency UN meeting about Liberia, pressuring and shaming the United States to intervene. He hammered the fact that “the U.S. has special responsibility for the country;” later adding “there are lots of expectations that the U.S. may be prepared to lead this force… Of course, that is a sovereign decision for them to take, but all eyes are on them.”\textsuperscript{205} After all, other Western countries had already set a leading example on this: the United Kingdom had deployed troops to settle the conflict in Sierra Leone in 2000, and the French had deployed troops to Cote d’Ivoire in 2002.

During a July 3\textsuperscript{rd} press conference, the U.S. finally took a public stance on the Liberian crisis when President Bush announced: “Mr. Taylor must go. A condition for any progress in Liberia is his removal.”\textsuperscript{206} Five days later, Congress “adopted a resolution the supported the cease-fire signed on 17 June,” and called for the U.S. to take a lead role

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\textsuperscript{202} Hahn (Sept. 2014), 34.
\textsuperscript{203} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{204} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{206} Hahn (Sept. 2014), 35.
\end{flushright}
“to help guide the Ceasefire Agreement and subsequent peace agreement, political transitions and establishment of a sustainable democracy with good governance, and economic reconstruction process,” including “creating and deploying an international stabilization force to Liberia.”

On the 14th of July, President George W. Bush met with Kofi Annan to discuss Liberia, following Annan’s public pleas to the United States to take a more active role. In the meeting, President Bush told Annan that the U.S. would “participate with the troops,” but that there must also “be U.N. presence, quickly into Liberia.”

After the meeting Kofi Annan promptly informed Taylor that he was on 72-hour notice to evacuate Liberia in order to avoid military action from the UN and the U.S., to which Taylor refused.

On the 1st of August, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1497 which authorized a multi-national force to enter Liberia “to support the implementation of the 17 June 2003 ceasefire agreement.” After being pressured by the U.S., on August 7th Nigeria offered asylum to Taylor in return for his resignation from office in Liberia. On August 11th the office of the president was subsequently turned over to Moses Blah, whom the U.S. had previously supported. Shortly following Taylor’s resignation and his departure to Nigeria, a U.S. military force of approximately 4,350 military personnel entered Liberia and took control of the government.

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210 Hahn (September 2014), 36.

Though the outcomes of interventions are not necessarily the focus of this study, it is interesting to note that this intervention transformed Liberia into a “de facto external takeover of the Liberian state,” where Western policy-makers “began reconstruction of Liberian state systems based on the neoliberal economic model. The security sector came under direct control of the USG [United States Government], and external experts were deployed in a number of ministries at strategic control points.”

The Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP) was established in 2005 for the purpose of combatting the systemic corruption in the Liberian political system. The transitional government in Liberia at the time was forced to accept the terms of GEMAP and thus it has remained impossible for the current President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf to renegotiate the terms of agreement. While proponents of GEMAP have noted that the program has curbed spending (because financial institutions in Liberia now need a co-signatory – a Western appointed ‘expert’ – for all public-expenditure processes), improved the level of fiscal transparency, and raised federal revenue enormously since implementation, critics of GEMAP have argued that all the program has done is create a dependency on Western guidance and supervision for governance.

**Summary of Factors**

Why did the United States decide to take an active stance in 2003 while stretched by a war in Iraq, despite using the same excuse to remain an indirect player in the 1990s and early 2000s? There are several factors that help to explain the temporality of this

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213 Bøås & Jennings (December 1, 2007), 475–85.
decision that are both illuminated in the quantitative analysis conducted in Part One, as well as the case study conducted here. First, it cannot be emphasized enough that the collapse of patron-client networks provided the environment for these factors to take root. Thus the collapse of these networks provided a necessary pre-condition for intervention, but not a sufficient one. Had the patron-client networks continued to exist, it is quite possible that Liberia would not have experienced either of its two civil wars, and thus would not provide any of the impetus for the U.S. to intervene at all. The factors that provided the sufficient conditions for intervention will be highlighted and summarized in no particular order below.

1) Pressure from the International Community

The first was the intense public pressure that UN Secretary General Kofi Annan put on the U.S. to intervene. As indicated in the quantitative analysis, the presence of a UN mission appears to increase the statistical likelihood of an intervention by the U.S. However, the quantitative analysis is narrow in that it only captures where a UN Mission is active, and does not capture pressure from the UN itself. This case study has served to illuminate both. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan put immense pressure on the United States to take direct action in Liberia, preferably in the form of a military intervention. When President George W. Bush agreed and announced compliance with this wish, he also called for the UN to intervene along with American troops. These two factors serve to both bolster the results of the quantitative analysis conducted in Part One, but also serve to expand on those results.

Matthews (2003, July 1); and Farley (2003, July 1).
Another variable indicated in the quantitative analysis as increasing the likelihood of an intervention are high levels of refugees. During the extreme violence and anarchy of the two civil wars between 1990 and 2003, 7,254,306 refugees left Liberia – this means that during this time span, nearly twice as many people as current 2015 population estimates fled the country (2015 World Bank estimates of the Liberian population is 4,503,438 million people). This high level of refugees almost certainly influenced the international community and the UN to pressure the U.S. to intervene, because the UN and neighboring countries had been in charge of establishing refugee camps and bearing this immense financial burden. Therefore, this case study provides more support for the international pressure and presence hypothesis.

2) State-Sponsorship of Terrorism

In the 1990s reports of Taylor’s illicit diamond trade activities in Sierra Leone through the RUF began to surface, and despite the evidence of massive human rights abuses, the U.S. did little to condemn or combat his actions. As mentioned earlier, officials in Washington often used the military disaster in Somalia, as well as their involvement elsewhere in Iraq as a reason to not over-stretch American forces. In the early 2000s, coinciding with President Bush’s global War on Terror, evidence began to mount linking Taylor’s activities in Sierra Leone to al Qaeda. This culminated to a peak two months prior to the U.S.’s intervention when David Crane – an American prosecutor for the Special Court on Sierra Leone – unsealed documents explicitly indicting Taylor of these crimes and his connections to al Qaeda. It was at this point, despite involvement in

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a war in Iraq, that the U.S. took direct action to remove Taylor. Taylor would go on to be the first former head of state to be found guilty of war crimes by an international court since the Nuremberg trials after World War II.217

This particular finding complements and expands on the results of the quantitative analysis in the sections above. Although terrorist attacks were not being committed within Liberia (which is what the quantitative analysis measures), the fact that Charles Taylor was substantively supporting al Qaeda during the War on Terror provided the impetus for the United States to intervene, remove Taylor, and take control of the Liberian state. Therefore, this finding provides some partial support for the *hegemonic hypothesis*.

Concluding Liberia

To conclude I will summarize the main findings of each of the time periods. In the first time period (1821-1989) I have attempted to establish through historical analysis *how* the Liberian state came to be so reliant on patron-client networks and U.S. foreign assistance. As I have discussed, the U.S. played a supportive and permissive role to the Liberian government, and made no attempts to exact reform in Liberia. The U.S. supported the country’s un-democratic practices, and often remained silent during its human rights abuses. During this time period, the U.S. was less concerned with state failure, and more concerned with Cold War competition in Africa.

During the second time-period (1990-2003) I have attempted to demonstrate *why* the Liberian state collapsed, and have also demonstrated the lack of U.S. involvement

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despite this fact. This illuminates what has been found in the quantitative analysis – state failure in-and-of itself is not a critical factor that can help us understand when and where the U.S. will intervene in the developing world. In some ways the Liberian crisis was relatively easy to ignore: U.S. assets in the country were far less important after the Cold War ended, the Nigerian government had an existential stake in stemming the violence to prevent a similar crisis domestically, and Liberia’s role in West Africa had been dwarfed both by Nigeria and by its economic dependence on the U.S.

Rather, it is during the third time period (2003-present), despite the fact that Liberia for the most part had free and fair democratic elections and had settled into a period of relative peace, that we begin to see an increase in direct involvement by the U.S. This involvement is a direct function of the national security threat of al Qaeda and immense international pressure to intervene, rather than a function of state failure. If indeed the U.S. was intervening for the purpose of reversing state failure, we should have observed a more direct response during the 1990s when the state completely collapsed.

**Nigeria**

Nigeria is different from Liberia in that it has not experienced a critical juncture and collapse of patron-client networks like Liberia did in 1989. Rather, Nigeria has experienced stability in terms of preserving its patron-client networks, which in turn provides a semblance of stability in the country (at least to outside observers). In contrast to Liberia, the Nigerian case does not easily lend itself to division into time periods. Rather, topics of discussion will serve to organize this case. In part one, I will begin with a discussion of the importance of patrimonial legacies in formulating the modern
Nigerian state, just as I have done with the Liberian case. It is important here to understand how and why patron-client networks function to preserve stability in Nigeria, and how this has contributed to the lack of involvement by the U.S. Then, I will discuss how these patrimonial legacies manifest in terms of oil wealth and corruption in the development of the Nigerian state post-independence, and how these factors have fared during the transition from military to civilian rule.

In part two, I will discuss a variety of different factors with no apparent temporal order. First, I will discuss the importance of the Niger Delta for oil wealth and how the U.S. has played a rather permissive role in the corruption that exists there. Then, I will discuss the issue of terrorism in Boko Haram and will analyze the reasons why – contrary to the findings in the quantitative analysis – the U.S. has not intervened in Nigeria. And finally, I will devote a broad section to discussing the close bilateral relations between the U.S. and Nigeria, and the ways in which the U.S. has ignored very similar patterns of abuse and state decay in Nigeria as what happened in Liberia.

**Nigeria Part 1: The Legacy of Patrimonial Rule in Nigeria**

Nigeria, like Liberia, has a long and entrenched history of patrimonialism as the de-facto informal mode of governance. As early as the seventeenth century, the British established trading pacts with local middlemen primarily of the Ijaw ethnic group located along the Gulf of Guinea. The British Empire did not create any permanent settlements in the area until the 1861 annexation of Lagos and the adjacent Yorubaland, when instability in the region threatened to damage the Empire’s commercial interests. This was the first piece of territory in what would eventually become Nigeria. The second piece was
captured in 1878 when Berlin officially recognized British occupation of the Oil Rivers, “then the center of palm oil and now Nigeria’s petroleum patch.” The third piece of territory was captured when the British defeated Sultan Sokoto in the early 20th century, who ruled through a complex and indirect system of emirs in the central and Northern regions of the country.

Until the near end of the colonial period, the British Empire did not create any formal institutions to rule Nigeria aside from the coercion of the army, and the modes of governance were very different between the North and the South of Nigeria. Lagos, the Oil Rivers and Yorubaland received the greatest amount of Western influence and became predominantly Christian. However, due to shortages of personnel, Westminster preferred to rule through “native institutions and personalities as much as possible,” which meant doling out rewards and incentives to local strongmen known in Nigeria as ogas, which translates to “big men.” In the predominantly Muslim North, the British ruled indirectly by exploiting the indigenous emirate system left over by the Caliphate of Sultan Sokoto, meanwhile discouraging Southern Christian missionaries, traders and mechanics from settling in the North. Because these cultural diffusion activities were curtailed, Western school systems, technological development, hospitals, and Western political thought only penetrated the Northern regions of Nigeria very late in the colonial era, allowing the region to perpetuate its “premodern backwardness.”

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219 Ibid.
220 Ibid.
221 Ibid.
to entrench pre-established networks of patrimonialism in the North, which would later limit the central government’s ability to expand legitimate rule over the population.

Nigeria has the largest number of ethnic groups “of any state in Africa.”222 By the turn of the twentieth century the British adopted the model of federalism as a way to better govern Nigeria’s multiethnic regions. Three main regions were created: the North, the East and the West. Lagos “enjoyed special state separate from the regions” as the commercial and political capital of the country.223 Each region was dominated and ruled by the largest ethnic group: the Hausa-Fulani in the North, the Igbo in the East, and the Yoruba in the West. Unfortunately, this federated structure of ethnic rule had “the unintended consequence of ratifying the preeminence of the three big ethnic groups at the expense of numerous minority tribes,” and the regions, rather than the nation, “became the theater of politics.”224

In the 1950s, while still a colony of Britain, Nigeria began to export oil and gas commercially. A decade later on October 1st 1960, Nigerian declared independence and began the process of formulating a new independent government. In the final constitutional arrangement, the federated system designed by the British Empire was legitimized which served to exacerbate the cultural and ethnic differences between the Northern regions and the rest of Nigeria, and Nnamdi Azikiwe became Nigeria’s first president in 1963.225

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222 Ibid.
223 Ibid.
224 Ibid.
225 Ibid.
The cleavages codified in the first constitution led to a 3-year civil war between 1967-1970 as a result of “unresolved ethnic rivalries combined with competition for spoils that the new system could not contain.”\textsuperscript{226} The civil war also unleashed a systemic campaign against Igbos and Christian settlers in North, who came to be seen as entangled in the disparate policies that targeted the North. After the brutal suppression of a secessionist region known Biafra, the Nigerian government transformed into a military dictatorship bent on preserving national unity at all costs. A series of military coups would follow one another until finally the three regions established by the British Empire were dissolved and replaced with a multi-state system held together by a complex system of patronage networks. It was believed that the increase in states would “give discrete peoples a sense of self-governance and local autonomy so that the process of national integration can proceed without threatening the cultural framework of personal identity.”\textsuperscript{227} On paper, “Nigeria would be a federal entity providing equal access for all to educational opportunities and public-sector employment,” as well as equal access to the financial benefit reaped from natural resources like oil.\textsuperscript{228} In reality however, “day-to-day politics remained ethnically and regionally based,” fortifying the informal patron-client networks of “big men” that the British Empire had relied on.\textsuperscript{229}

**Oil, Neopatrimonialism and Corruption After Independence**

Many experts on Nigeria have noted “the same people [have] run Nigeria by the same kleptocratic rules since the end of the Biafra war, when enormous revenue from oil

\textsuperscript{226} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{228} Campbell (2013), “Un Peu d’Histoire”
\textsuperscript{229} Ibid.
started seriously to distort traditional governance relationships.”230 Because the British Empire relied on existing patrimonial networks to rule indirectly, this has translated into the modern-day structure of governance and thus accounts for the unchallenged rule of Nigeria’s traditional ogas. The Nigerian government continues this colonial legacy and is “circumscribed by weak institutions of government,” where real power is exercised “through patron-client networks without much reference to the formal structures of governance or the Nigerian people.”231 As a result, political leadership “became parochial with the overriding consideration for personal survival rather than national development.”232

Much like the role that international financial assistance played in Liberia, revenue from oil has quickly “become the glue that holds Nigeria together.”233 Oil is the primary motivating factor for the ogas – regardless of ethnic or religious affiliation – to “preserve the federation,” which has allowed the federal government to systematically ignore domestic issues.234 Because oil is produced in the South, the federal government has engaged in a systematic campaign to defund alternative economic sectors to force potentially unruly states to become dependent on the dispersion of federal oil wealth for survival.

Though neopatrimonialism is not necessarily linked with corruption, the rise of oil wealth during the militarization of the Nigerian government after independence has served to corrupt these networks, and “elite maneuvering and bargaining have become

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230 Campbell (2013), Who Runs Nigeria?
231 Ibid.
233 Campbell (2013), The Niger Delta.
234 Ibid.
nonstop to access ever-greater amounts of power based on oil wealth.”

Through their powerful position during the corrupt military rule, many senior officers and loyal *ogas* became extremely wealthy. In the meantime, the Nigerian social classes grew more bottom-heavy, which “paradoxically strengthened the system because it cemented their reliance on patronage networks for survival.”

Though the cost to the ordinary Nigerian may be high in terms of the corruption and dysfunction that accompanies patronage networks, the Nigerian government is tied to the system because “it holds together the Nigerian political elites and, by extension, the state… there has been no repeat of the civil war.”

Patron-client networks in Nigeria are perhaps more complex and engrained than those in Liberia because of the federated nature of governance. In Liberia the president holds most of the power by being the sole provider of pork to his network of clients, and there is a clear link between the president and clients. In contrast, though Nigeria’s president is indeed the so-called ‘head patron’ of the country, the client networks are far more decentralized. For example, the president of Nigeria has the ability to dole out oil concessions to the states, which goes to the state legislature and into the hands of the state-governor, but the trail does not end there. State governors have their own complex network of clients that depend on his discretion for their pork and power. According to many Nigerians, the state-level governments are far more corrupt and outwardly violent than the federal government because it is the governors who have the ability to determine

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235 Campbell (2013), Who Runs Nigeria?
236 Ibid.
237 Ibid.
“who represents their state in the National Assembly and in the president’s cabinet.”

Therefore, the point of access to patronage begins and remains mostly at the local level because state-governors have the ability to restrict and determine who gets access to the ‘head patron.’

At the federal level, changes in government always carry the risk of destabilization due to the winner-take-all nature of Nigerian political culture. Each president – whether it is civilian or military – fostered particular relationships with their clients. Because of this, any major shake-up in the government can have dire reverberating consequences for clients of the previous system, and securing access to resources through the patron-client networks can literally be a matter of life or death. Because oil wealth has become such an exclusive club it has created increasingly violent inter-elite competition. Political positions at both the state and local level, especially during governmental transition, have become so lucrative that ogas hire gangs and militias of unemployed youth in order to intimidate or assassinate rival ogas. In return, ogas guarantee the youth a percentage of the oil wealth once in power.

The result of this intense intra-elite competition is the expansion of state-sponsored violence, which is hardly ever held accountable by the federal government. In many cases, the federal government will simply ignore reports of violence at the state-level because patronage clients are usually in some way involved. This has only served to permanently link corruption, violence and intimidation to Nigerian political culture in the minds of the majority of Nigerians who were already distrustful of the government.

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238 Ibid.
239 Ibid.
Furthermore, unlike in early Liberia, *ogas* have little incentive to redistribute the wealth they receive from the federal government. There are no tax advantages to the *ogas* for redistribution of federal oil wealth, nor is there any formal infrastructure to carry out the process should an *oga* even want to.\(^{240}\)

The impact of this dependence on oil wealth has been especially destructive for Northern Nigerians. Until the 1970s, the North primarily exported groundnuts and cotton, but when the Nigerian military government began to use oil wealth as a means of enriching patron-client networks, federal investments in agricultural and transportation sectors declined rapidly. Though in theory the states have a considerable amount of legal autonomy from the federal government, the rapid rise in oil wealth enticed the Northern *ogas* to all but abandon agricultural and transportation infrastructure “in favor of the oil economy.”\(^{241}\) With no other alternative, the North has become the most impoverished region in Nigeria, and one of the most impoverished regions in all of West Africa.

The disparate situation between the North and the South caused by oil and corrupt patronage networks is stark. For example, as of 2007 there existed only one medical facility that practiced Western medical standards in Nigeria, and it was located in the South in Lagos.\(^{242}\) Further, the medical facility mostly treats oil company workers, who often live in luxurious guarded fortresses built in the middle of Nigerian slums. Western-style education is difficult to come by for the Southern poor, and virtually non-existent for Nigerians in the North save for a few elite families. Rather, most students in the North study at un-regulated Islamic schools that only focus on memorization of the Qur’an,

\(^{240}\) Campbell (2013), *Who Runs Nigeria?*

\(^{241}\) Campbell (2013), *If Nigeria Is So Rich, Why Are Nigerians So Poor?*

\(^{242}\) Ibid.
resulting in almost non-existent job prospects upon graduation.243 The high levels of unemployed youth in the North has led to the proliferation of “religio-criminal gangs,” which make money by raiding churches, restaurants, and other establishments in the North deemed un-Islamic.244 Despite these disparate conditions, the U.S. and other Western powers have rarely criticized the Nigerian government and, in fact, continue to act in permissive ways that allow the Nigerian government to continue on its destructive path.

Transition to Civilian Rule, and the Persistence of Corruption

In 1979, military rule in Nigeria briefly came to an end when elections produced a civilian administration under President Shehu Shagari. However, Shagari’s administration was extremely corrupt, and it took only 6 years before another military coup occurred and replaced the civilian government. In 1993, General Sani Abacha took power and would rule until his mysterious death in office in 1998.245 Abacha’s rule – though he enjoyed support from the U.S. in the ECOMOG mission in Liberia – was characterized by gross human rights abuses and high levels of corruption, and thus severely degraded the public’s trust in military governance. Abacha was suspicious of outsiders, and “surrounded himself with only very trusted loyalists and clients.”246 Moreover, Abacha came to be extremely unpopular both with the public and with the military because he focused on accumulating massive wealth for himself, his family

243 Ibid.
244 Ibid.
245 Toward the end of Abacha’s rule he began to move toward extending his term – something of a taboo in Nigerian political culture. It has been rumored by many that this move threatened the national unity of Nigeria and some clients orchestrated his murder, though the cause of Abacha’s death has been officially ruled as a result of a heart condition.
members and a few close clients, rather than sharing the wealth with high-ranking
military officers as previous military regimes had. In 1999 following Abacha’s death,
Olusegun Obasanjo was elected president after branding himself a civilian leader –
though he had taken power in a military coup two decades prior. Obasanjo’s election was
marred with blatant rigging by the military, though many in the West applauded it as a
step away from military rule.

Obasanjo’s election marked a permanent return to civilian rule in Nigeria and a
new system of electoral rules designed to maintain the balance between the North and the
South, though the new electoral system was characterized by widespread fraud and
intimidation. Accordingly, a process called ‘zoning’ dictated whom and when
presidential candidates from either the North or the South could run by taking turns. No
two presidents in a row could be from either the North or the South, but rather, the office
of the president had to rotate after each term ended. This process was designed to ensure
that elite competition between the North and the South did not boil over into civil war
like it did post-independence. According to these new rules, a Northern president must
follow Obasanjo, a Southerner. Although designed to maintain national unity, this
electoral system is clearly marred with flaws. The most obvious is that by dictating the
temporal order of presidential power, this curtails the path toward free and fair
democratic elections where candidates win based on the proportion or the percentage of
votes, rather than on pre-determined geographic origin. Despite this, the U.S. has never
publicly commented on the issue, most likely because it has created a sense of stability to
outside observers, all the while undermining the tenets of liberal democracy.
With Obasanjo’s election also came a ‘new and improved’ constitution under the
his government, called the Fourth Republic. However, the new constitution was
implemented by the military without any popular referendum – another blow to liberal
democracy. The new government under Obasanjo purported theoretically equal branches
of government, and much like Liberia, the executive branch holds considerably more
power than the other two branches. Additionally, the Fourth Republic’s constitution
cemented how oil wealth would be distributed amongst the states. In total, all the
Nigerian states and local government authorities (LGAs) would receive a little less than
half of Nigeria’s oil and gas revenue according to “a complicated formula administrated
through the federal government.” The Southern states that produced the oil would
receive a special bonus, leaving the Northern regions considerably more impoverished
and desperate.

Although the Fourth Republic’s constitution was implemented un-democratically,
and President Obasanjo was elected in the midst of un-democratic activities, Nigeria’s
‘transition’ was uncritically welcomed abroad as a “fundamental break with the
discredited military past,” especially by the U.S. who viewed Nigeria as a key partner in
the West African region. Many observers have argued that the international
community, “especially the United Kingdom and the United States…. [have] fooled
themselves into believing that the return of civilian government in 1999 signaled a break
with the past.” Despite the promises of high oil market prices and a rising national
income, Nigerians for the most part – and particularly those in the North – have

247 Campbell (2013), If Nigeria Is So Rich, Why Are Nigerians So Poor?
248 Ibid.
249 Campbell (2013), Who Runs Nigeria?
“remained powerless and voiceless” and extremely impoverished, as Nigeria’s ogas continue to pocket the majority of the federal government’s oil concessions.250

Obasanjo also engaged in activities designed to please the West and maintain good relations, specifically with the U.S. Obasanjo was well aware that Washington had concerns over the human rights abuses committed under former President Abacha, who had begun the mission in Liberia with ECOMOG in the early 1990s. To prevent Washington’s perspective of Nigeria from souring further, Obasanjo pursued a number of staged domestic activities designed to publicly assail corruption and assuage any doubts in Washington that supporting Nigeria was in their own interests.251 However, these activities – like holding anticorruption trials and co-founding Transparency International – were public shows aimed at the West, rather than comprehensive anti-corruption policies, because “to do what Nigerian reformers and the international community want would compromise or destroy the system” of patron-client networks that Obasanjo himself based the power and legitimacy of his presidency on.252 Many critics in the U.S. pointed out that these activities were essentially meaningless, but officials in Washington have yet to make that point themselves and have continued to public provide support and approval to Nigeria.

Despite Obasanjo’s authoritarianism at home in Nigeria, he ironically became a leading figure in the fight for regional peace and democracy in West Africa and became “a reliable partner of the Bush administration on African regional issues,” including the

250 Campbell (2013), If Nigeria Is So Rich, Why Are Nigerians So Poor?
251 Campbell (2013), Who Runs Nigeria?
252 Ibid.
War on Terror.\textsuperscript{253} Many observers abroad, especially in the U.S., even went so far as to make the bold claim that Obasanjo “had the potential to fill Nelson Mandela’s shoes as Africa’s preeminent statesman.”\textsuperscript{254} For officials in Washington looking to avoid getting tied up in Africa, Obasanjo seemed like an ideal ally who not only managed to bring the conflict in Liberia to a successful end and gave Charles Taylor asylum in Nigeria, but also led and brokered a peace deal between the government in Khartoum and rebel groups in the Darfur crisis.\textsuperscript{255} Though Obasanjo did next to nothing concerning the domestic problems like corruption, violence, and poverty, this was only a secondary consideration for officials in Washington who viewed the relative stability of the country as an asset to U.S. interests in the region.

At the end of his two-term limit in 2007, Obasanjo reluctantly relinquished his power after a failed attempt to amend the constitution’s two-term limit. However, before leaving he managed to handpick both the president and the vice-president for the subsequent administration, a Northern Muslim named Umaru Musa Yar’Adua for president and a Southern Christian named Goodluck Jonathan for vice president. As with previous elections, voting was more of a ritual than a meaningful democratic exercise, and the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) declared a win for the pair. However, these two picks would have reverberating consequences for Nigeria’s already divided country in the near future.

Yar’Adua was a governor of the Katsina state in the North of Nigeria, which fulfilled the zoning requirement and assuaged some of the elite anger in the North

\textsuperscript{253} Campbell (2013), A President for Life?
\textsuperscript{254} Ibid; also see Herskovits, J. (July/August 2007). Nigeria’s Rigged Democracy. \textit{Foreign Affairs}, 86, 4, 116-17.
\textsuperscript{255} Campbell (2013), A President for Life?
following Obasanjo’s presidency. However, Yar’Adua was not necessarily popular in his own home state, and his patronage networks hardly extended beyond his own tangible realm of control. Furthermore, Yar’Adua was in very poor health and his shy style of governance quickly created a power crisis in the executive office. In 2009, Yar’Adua’s health made a turn for the worst and he was hospitalized in Saudi Arabia while on a visit. Although the circumstances of his hospitalization remain unclear, Yar’Adua did not contact his government in Nigeria at all during his hospital stay, and to avoid civil unrest Jonathan assumed presidential authority in his absence.\(^{256}\)

In 2010, Yar’Adua returned to Nigeria unannounced and 300 presidential guard troops were deployed throughout Abuja to maintain order and remove Jonathan from the presidential office.\(^{257}\) A standoff between Yar’Adua and Jonathan ensued, though eventually Yar’Adua issued a statement that due to his ailing health Jonathan would “oversee affairs of state.”\(^{258}\) A few months later, Yar’Adua died and Jonathan made a full transition into the office of the president. Jonathan was expected by the North to step down and allow another Northerner to become president at the end of Yar’Adua’s term in 2011, in line with the zoning agreement. Jonathan announced that he would run for president in 2011, and the shocked Northern elite scrambled to find a viable alternative that could compete with Jonathan’s popularity.

Despite the North’s best efforts, the cards were stacked in Jonathan’s favor. Observers of the 2011 election have reported that Jonathan’s supporters intimidated Northern opponents, stuffed ballots, appealed to ethnic and religious divisions, and also

\(^{256}\) Campbell (2013), The Breakdown of the Nigerian Political System.  
\(^{257}\) Ibid.  
\(^{258}\) Ibid.
engaged in bribery through large cash prizes via his access to the government’s oil resources.\textsuperscript{259} Nevertheless, the international community easily accepted the results of the election not only for the fact that Jonathan was a staunch pro-American candidate, but also because the elections were – at the very least – slightly better than the 2007 elections.

The 2011 elections officially ended the zoning agreement that had pacified Northern elites since the end of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. As a result, violence increased tremendously in the North, especially from the terrorist group known as Boko Haram, which used the injustice of the 2011 election as a recruiting device for young disaffected youth. Despite these developments, as discussed previously, the U.S. still maintained its position as a staunch supporter of the Nigerian government with limited criticism for its human rights abuses and corrupt practices.

\textbf{Nigeria Part 2: Oil and the Niger Delta}

The Niger Delta is located in the South of Nigeria, and is the country’s richest and most diverse ecological system. It is also the location of the country’s oil reserves. International companies have been drilling in joint venture contracts with the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) since the 1950s, and some of the largest include Shell, Exxon Mobil, Chevron, and Total.\textsuperscript{260} Despite the economic richness of the region, few residents of the Niger Delta have seen any benefit at all from the oil industry. Like those Northern Nigerians, the majority of the population in the South is extremely poor, and there is a large population of unemployed youth. \textit{Ogas} and local authorities in the

\textsuperscript{259} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{260} Campbell (2013), The Niger Delta.
Niger Delta have full control over political offices and often do not even conduct local elections. For example, in the 2003 and 2007 elections, ogas in the Niger Delta did not conduct any polling because they “simply rigged themselves into office.”\textsuperscript{261} The corruption of local authorities coupled with the destruction of the local environment by international oil firms with little financial benefit to residents has led many residents to take up arms against oil installations.

In the first decade of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century a massive insurrection in the Niger Delta took place. Oil installations and pipelines were attacked, hijacked, bunkered, siphoned, or shut down, and oil workers were captured and held for ransom. According to some estimates, at the height of the insurgency in 2009, bunkered oil was as high as 2.2 million barrels per day (bpd) of the estimated 3 million bpd production capacity.\textsuperscript{262} In general the federal government has done little to curb the violence in the Niger Delta, largely because local officials and ogas tend to be involved in the illicit oil transactions in some way.\textsuperscript{263} Rather than address the problem, President Obasanjo often dismissed the insurrection as having any political motives at all, claiming that the violence was a result of “criminals,” “underdevelopment,” and “ethnic strife.”\textsuperscript{264} The Southern oil producing states, and especially the region of the Niger Delta, provide a prime example of what William Reno identifies as a paradoxical strategy of weakening “state institutions and the law enforcement capabilities needed for controlling associates and subordinates, so instead

\textsuperscript{261} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{263} Campbell (2013), The Niger Delta.
\textsuperscript{264} Ibid.
rulers manipulate markets to manage their clients.”  In this way, the Nigerian federal government “permit[s] loyal associates access to economic opportunities such as transactions in illicit goods. Laws and regulations are enforced unevenly, to target independent operators and exempt political favourites.”

Since the insurgency began in the early 2000s, the international community has been extremely slow to condemn or pressure the Nigerian government to curb it. This is because most of the criminal activity has occurred against smaller international oil firms, rather than large companies like Shell, Exxon Mobil or Chevron. The United States and European countries have invested heavily in building large guarded compounds to protect oil workers from abduction, and also heavily guard their offshore oil installations and pipelines. This has resulted in little interruption in the Western oil business in the Delta, despite the difficulties that smaller firms have faced. The blissful unawareness of the larger Western oil companies of the violence, for the most part, worked out in favor of the Nigerian government in covering up elite involvement in criminal oil enterprises. For example, a Western military or police intervention in the Niger Delta “would risk exposing its complicity” in the corruption and violence that has become rampant in the region.

During the peak of the insurrection in 2009, however, international oil companies began to miss their quotas and began to pressure the Nigerian government to crack down on the violence in the Niger Delta. Rather than risk a violent and costly conflict between militants and the Nigerian security forces, the government granted amnesty to over

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266 Ibid.
267 Campbell (2013), The Niger Delta.
30,000 rebels to hand over their weapons and return hijacked pipelines. As incentive, each person who agreed to the amnesty would receive around 65,000 naira each month. Because many militiamen view the acceptance of amnesty as a ‘sell-out,’ the Nigerian government has had to guarantee the safety of some 30,000 people in luxurious homes complete with permanently stationed police officers. Though expensive, the Nigerian government views the amnesty program as a small price to pay for the un-fettered continuation of oil wealth and the prevention of U.S. forces from entering the Niger Delta and discovering its complicity in the violence.

Though successful at curbing the violence and improving oil production, the amnesty program has failed to address the domestic problems and grievances that caused the insurgency in the first place. Many residents feel as though they do not reap any of the benefits of oil wealth, meanwhile they bear the heavy environmental burden of its extraction. Though in theory the Southern oil-producing states receive an extra financial kickback from the federal government, local Nigerians rarely ever see this money because corrupt ogas and local politicians simply pocket it. Oil spills have destroyed local communities, drinking water is often contaminated with petrochemicals, medical facilities are reserved for oil company workers, and slums have been bulldozed to make way for oil company facilities and housing units, which often resemble fortresses amidst the throngs of slums.

Local Nigerians also believe – and rightly so – that the government is in many ways complicit with the violence that characterizes the Niger Delta. For example, in the

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269 Fagbadebo (2007), 33.
270 Ibid; and Campbell (2013), The Niger Delta.
summer of 2007 two militias headed by rival ogas, Ateke Tom and Soboma George, clashed violently in the streets of Port Harcourt, resulting in a number of civilian casualties.271 According to a Human Rights Watch report that followed: “The clashes between the groups primarily represented a violent competition for access to illegal patronage doled out by public officials in the state government.”272 Though security forces eventually quelled the fighting, no one was held accountable for the violence or the casualties. Despite these troubling reports, international oil firms have continued to collaborate unabashedly with the local and federal government officials that are in part responsible for the violence, and have even made plans to expand their current operations in Nigeria.273 The Nigerian government has also continued to provide heavy police and military security to major international oil firms, meanwhile ignoring public massacres of civilians as a direct result of elite competition for oil wealth.

Though critics have called on the international community, and especially the U.S., to take a stand against the continued violence and corruption that occurs in Nigeria and especially in the Niger Delta, there is little benefit to the West to do so. Nigeria has managed to find a delicate equilibrium, one where domestic grievances are stifled just enough for the government to maintain its power position vis-à-vis oil wealth and patron-client networks. The West – and especially the U.S. – not only relies on Nigeria’s oil as a potential alternative to Middle Eastern oil, but also on Abuja’s critical leadership role in West Africa, “especially fielding UN peacekeepers.”274 If the Nigerian government’s

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271 Ibid.
274 Ibid.
corruption were exposed, and if it were pressured to crack down on oil wealth that drives violent and corrupt local officials and ogas, the patron-client system might collapse, and if “that dries up, so will Nigerian international peacekeeping.”

**Terrorism in Nigeria**

As discussed above Nigeria’s geography is divided along religious lines. The South is predominantly Christian, the Middle Belt is a healthy mix of Christian and Muslim, and the North is predominantly Muslim. Because of the federal government’s dismissive treatment of the North since independence, the region has suffered immensely on all fronts. Western methods of healthcare, education, and legal systems are virtually non-existent and poverty is rampant. Additionally, as an act of defiance toward the predominantly Christian federal government, sharia law was reinstated in the North in 2000 after decades of hiatus. These factors, mixed with a large uneducated and unemployed youth population have created a toxic and violent environment ripe for criminal and radical behavior.

Many Nigerians in the North are increasingly frustrated with what they believe to be un-Islamic behavior by the local religious establishment, who are often part of the large network of patronage clients. Meanwhile, the religious establishment diverts the blame to the federal government, accusing it of being anti-Islamic due to its close relations with the West and the breach of the zoning agreement in 2011. Many experts on Boko Haram – the Islamic extremist terrorist group that operates in Northern Nigeria – view the group’s formation in 2002 as just one component of a larger wave of Saudi-style

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275 Ibid.
276 Campbell (2013), Faith.
Islamic reform in Northern Nigeria aimed at eliminating “indigenous African elements as well as Western influence.” Despite the anti-Western rhetoric that is often spouted by Nigerian religious figures like those in Boko Haram, the “primary focus of their opposition is the secular government in Abuja.”

Despite the group’s alleged pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in 2015, Boko Haram is and remains for all intents-and-purposes a homegrown terrorist organization with homegrown grievances. Established in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf as a splinter out of the so-called Nigerian Taliban, the group remained relatively elusive and opaque with a decentralized structure for the first few years of its existence. Boko Haram’s foot soldiers are drawn mostly from the North’s unemployed and under-educated youth population, who are easily radicalized and feel a common sense of anger toward the local Islamic establishment. As a result, Boko Haram maintained “few organizing principles beyond hatred for Nigeria’s political economy and the Abuja government.”

The Nigerian government has repeatedly downplayed the threat that Boko Haram poses, labeling the group an “inchoate, grassroots rebellion.” Meanwhile, Nigerian security forces have repeatedly and brutally suppressed Boko Haram, which has only led to further radicalization and marginalization. After a repeated campaign of crackdowns and the death of Yusuf, survivors were forced underground and into the fringes of society. However, Obasanjo’s authoritarianism at home and then the perceived injustice

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277 Ibid.
278 Ibid.
280 Campbell (2013), Boko Haram.
281 Ibid.
of the 2011 elections provided a ripe and hostile environment for Boko Haram to make a return to the public eye and begin actively recruiting again.

For the majority of its existence, Boko Haram has mainly targeted those Nigerian Muslims in the local religious establishment with links to Abuja. This increased especially after the 2011 elections when Boko Haram accused many in the Northern elite of selling-out to Jonathan. Because of the group’s focus on local Northern issues, attacks in the South of Nigeria where oil fields are located have remained rare. Aside from some rhetoric on both sides, there have been few substantive links between international jihadist groups like al Qaeda and Boko Haram, and the Nigerian government has always cooperated with Western anti-terror initiatives. It is true that Osama bin Laden had at some point taken an interest in Northern Nigeria, but little evidence of a substantive link has been found like in the Liberian case.282

Because of the homegrown nature of Boko Haram, the U.S. has disregarded it as a threat for almost the entirety of the group’s existence. For example, the U.S. only reluctantly placed Boko Haram on the list of foreign terrorist organizations (FTO) in November of 2013 after immense pressure from Congress more than 10 years after the group was founded, and 4 years after the group’s massive insurrection in 2009.283 Placing terrorist groups on the list of FTO’s opens up important legal avenues and tools for combatting the activity of terrorist groups, like making it illegal for U.S. entities to enter

business agreements with groups and cutting off U.S. financial aid to those entities that are associated with or supporting the groups.\(^\text{284}\)

Despite this recent development, the U.S.’s commitment to substantively combatting Boko Haram has remained small, if not virtually non-existent. In 2015, the Institute for Economics and Peace published the Global Terrorism Index which found that Boko Haram was the most lethal terrorist organization in the world in 2014, surpassing even ISIL.\(^\text{285}\) Additionally, in 2014 Boko Haram publicly abducted more than 250 school-aged girls, meanwhile President Barack Obama’s administration engaged in a Twitter hashtag war rather than directly with the group. More than a month after the abductions, the U.S. finally sent 80 reconnaissance troops to Chad to help find the girls, but never authorized them to enter Nigeria, preferring to maintain an indirect and hands-off approach. The international community has been equally slow to condemn Boko Haram and combat it. For example the UN Security Council added Boko Haram to its sanctions list only a month after the girls were abducted.\(^\text{286}\) The Nigerian government similarly has continually refused to address the underlying causes of the group’s rise, but rather, has chosen to address the group as a security threat, often by instating a heavy security presence that often resorts to brutal and extra-legal methods of taming the chaos. The overarching problem, however, is “the fact that Boko Haram operations continued largely to be in the North meant that much of Nigeria could simply ignore it.”\(^\text{287}\)

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\(^\text{284}\) Ibid.


\(^\text{287}\) Campbell (2013), Boko Haram.
The demonstrated lethality of Boko Haram and the U.S.’s relative inaction in combatting it is a direct function of the fact that Boko Haram overwhelmingly targets local rather than international actors. Unlike in the case of Liberia where al Qaeda was involved in the post-9/11 environment, Boko Haram has never reached that type of perceived threat-level to the U.S., and thus combatting it is not in the U.S.’s interests. Additionally, because of the geographic exclusivity of the group’s operation, both Nigeria and the international community have the privilege to ignore the problem, suppressing it with violence rather than addressing the root societal problems that fuel it.

Summary of Factors
There are several factors that explain why the U.S. has not intervened in Nigeria despite troubling domestic conditions that point to state failure and possibly an impending state collapse. First, it is important to remember that the critical difference between the case of Liberia and Nigeria is the maintenance of patron-client networks in Nigeria, but not in Liberia. As mentioned in the Liberian case study, the collapse of these networks provided a necessary pre-condition for intervention, but not a sufficient one. Nigeria, on the other hand, has not experienced a collapse of these networks, though it does experience some additional factors (like terrorism) that have not resulted in an intervention. These factors will be outlined in no particular order below.

1) Nigeria as a Critical Ally
Nigeria has been a critical partner to the U.S. in many different ways. It has managed to handle regional conflict issues like the Liberian civil war and the Darfur crisis, freeing the U.S. to pursue alternative interests elsewhere; it has cooperated heavily
with the U.S. in the war against terror; and it also provides a viable alternative to reduce American dependence on the Middle East for oil. Nigeria’s domestic issues like violence in the Niger Delta and the disaffection of the North and Boko Haram have rarely threatened the U.S.’s interests in the region, and in the rare instance that it has, the Nigerian government has handled the issue swiftly, though in a way that has caused great concern for many human rights organizations.

2) No International Pressure to Intervene

In contrast to the case of Liberia, Nigeria has also never been the subject of a UN peacekeeping mission, and in fact, Nigeria often acts as the primary provider of troops and supplies to a majority of peacekeeping missions in the region. Therefore, the international community is in a way dependent on Nigeria for regional peacekeeping, and therefore has not provided any impetus or pressure for the U.S. to intervene like it did in the case of Liberia.

Furthermore, Nigeria also lacks the massive amount of refugees that were present in Liberia. For example, between 1990-2003, there were only 79,825 Nigerian refugees (compared to over 7 million Liberian refugees in the same time period). The relatively low number of refugees is not necessarily a reflection of better conditions in Nigeria. In fact, Nigerians suffer in many of the same ways as Liberians do in terms of state-sponsored violence, corruption, and poverty. Rather, this low number of refugees can most likely be attributed to the fact that regional prospects for Nigerians are not that much better than their domestic prospects. For example, unless refugees have the resources to travel much further than Western Africa or Central Africa, the only available
prospects include other failed states like Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, the Central African Republic and Burkina Faso to name a few. As the richest and most powerful country in the region, Nigerians likely do not have much to gain by leaving Nigeria for another regional country, and without resources to go further than Western or Central Africa, Nigerians likely settle by staying in their current condition.

3) The Non-Threat of Boko Haram

The fact that the U.S. has paid little attention to Boko Haram – the most lethal terrorist organization in the world – is a clear indication of the American recognition that the group is primarily a domestic, rather than an international threat. The distinction between the Nigeria and Liberia in the case of terrorism is an interesting one. According to the results of the quantitative analysis, we should expect to see an increased likelihood of an intervention where there are more terrorist attacks. The case of Liberia highlighted a shortcoming in the quantitative analysis in that the variable only captures actual events of terrorism in each country, but does not capture state-sponsorship of terrorism. Nigeria highlights an alternate shortcoming of the quantitative analysis in that the variable may capture actual events of terrorism, but it does not capture the level of perceived threat that each group poses to the West. These two additional variables – state-sponsorship and perceived threat posed to the West – are therefore critical variables to include in further research.
**Concluding Nigeria**

The factor that has allowed Nigeria to enjoy its relatively un-touched status despite its severe shortcomings at home is the permissive and stabilizing environment produced by the patron-client networks. Like Liberia, Nigeria has a long history of a culture of rule by “big men,” or *ogas*. This political culture was reinforced by the British Empire during colonization, and further cemented during the post-independence struggle for unity. However, unlike Liberia where we saw a total collapse of the state after these networks dried up, Nigeria has managed to maintain these networks through the massive influx of oil wealth that occurred in the 1970s, providing the impetus to buy the loyalty of *ogas* and ensure the continuation of national unity. Nigeria’s *ogas* have managed to create a system where they cooperate *just enough* to keep the country together and their pockets lined, but this comes at the expense of the everyday Nigerian citizen, who continues to suffer through poverty, high levels of crime and violence, and poor prospects for the future. The U.S. is aware of these domestic failures but has little incentive to pressure the Nigerian government to reform itself. Doing so might risk the collapse of the patronage networks that hold the country together, and another crisis like the one that ensued in Liberia might occur.

**Concluding the Case Studies: Comparing Liberia and Nigeria**

Nigeria is not immune to suffering a similar outcome to what Liberia experienced in 1989. The so-called ‘oil curse’ and its repercussions are always a looming threat to the stability of Nigerian politics.  

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288 Ross (2013).
funding did to Liberia. In many ways Nigeria today is very similar to Liberia in the 1980s: it relies heavily on patron-client networks to stabilize the country, but has a very inchoate and rigged political arena of which the population no longer identifies as legitimate. According to some scholars, Nigeria is experiencing the direct precursor to total state collapse: state decay. State decay is characterized as “a process of deterioration of the civil and political liberties and the material wellbeing of the citizenry.”\footnote{Bah (September 2012), 72.} As a result, this process “leads to political, economic, and social grievances fueling political violence and the inability of the state to fulfill its basic political, economic, and social responsibilities,” and the state transforms “into an oppressive political force and an impediment to economic and social development.”\footnote{Ibid, 72-74.} From the discussion above, Nigeria indeed exhibits many of these symptoms, which is comparable to Liberia in the 1980s.

If Nigeria continues to rely solely on oil wealth to fund the activities of the state, the potential for collapse is not a question of if it will happen, but when? As long as Nigeria refuses to reform and reorganize the economy as it has by defunding alternative sectors, the potential for collapse will always loom imminently on the horizon. This poses a problem not only for West Africa, but also for the U.S. and the larger international community. Nigeria – in many ways – is the glue that has held the region together for nearly a quarter-century. Although the root problems of state decay, corruption and violence in countries like Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire and Liberia have not necessarily been fixed or addressed by Nigeria, it has managed to provide a type of fragile balance in the region, like it has managed to find the right balance domestically in dealing with the
Nigeria has shouldered the brunt of the majority of peacekeeping operations in the region, has been a critical partner to the Bush and Obama administrations in the war against terror, and has even assisted in de-escalating situations outside of the West African region. However, if the stated goal of the international community is to prevent more situations like the Liberian crisis from arising, then turning a blind eye to the issues that manifest in Nigeria only contributes to the problem.

Liberia was a case of ‘ignore-now-act-later’ politics by the U.S. and the West more generally. More than 250,000 Liberians were killed and millions more fled the country before the U.S. became involved nearly 13 years after the conflict began, and only when the perfect storm of state-sponsored terror and international pressure brewed did the U.S. react. On the other hand, a similar crisis in Nigeria – the most populous and arguably most powerful country on the entire continent – would be extremely difficult for the U.S. to ignore.

Unfortunately, a similar ‘ignore-now-act-later’ sentiment already exists in U.S. relations with Nigeria, exemplified by the Washington’s ability to turn a blind eye to conditions in Nigeria that almost exactly mirror pre-collapse conditions in Liberia. For example, in 2005 the National Intelligence Council (NIC), an advisory agent to the United States government, published a report called “Mapping Sub-Saharan Africa’s Future.”291 One of the conclusions of the conference report described “Nigeria as a failed state, dragging down a large part of the West African region.”292 When news of what was written in the report reached Obasanjo, he sent copies to the Nigerian Senate, which

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292 Ibid, 2.
resulted in a media fiasco. Accordingly, “Senators, the media, and many ordinary Nigerian citizens were hurt and offended that the United States” harbored such a view of Nigeria, and Nigerian politicians began a series of formal visits to the U.S. Embassy to clear up the matter. In response, the U.S. embassy repeatedly assured the Nigerian government that the NIC conference report did not reflect the sentiments of the U.S. government, and that the organization played only an advisory role rather than a definitive policy role in U.S. decision-making.

This type of permissive and apologetic sentiment prevents the U.S. and the West from being proactive about state failure and collapse, and reduces policies and assistance to a merely reactive role. Rather than preventing state failure itself, the U.S. responds only when it has occurred. The media fiasco over the NIC report and the U.S.’s scramble to pick up the pieces so as to not offend their West African ally are just one example of the Washington’s overt willingness to brush evidence of state failure under the rug when it is suitable to do so.

Conclusion
Through various methodological lenses, this study has attempted to address the following questions: Does state failure itself determine where the West will intervene? If not, why are otherwise objectively equally ‘failed’ states treated much differently by the West in terms of intervention policies? And further, what factors lead to or inhibit the United States to intervene in failing states? In Part One, I addressed the first and second question by examining the most critically failed states and found that U.S. does not treat

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293 Campbell (2013), Washington and Abuja.
these otherwise objectively equally ‘failed’ states uniformly – neither through military interventions nor through the amount of Official Development Assistance (ODA) given, despite controlling for population size. This finding was further verified through the large-\(n\) quantitative analysis because the state failure variable was not statistically significant in determining where the U.S. would intervene except in the instances of subdued force, and was not statistically significant in determining where the U.S. allocates ODA. In terms of the third question, I demonstrated in the quantitative analysis that other variables like high levels of terrorism, refugees, and an international presence through NGOs and UN Missions are statistically significant indicators that increase the likelihood of an intervention by the U.S.

In Part Two I addressed the same questions but through a qualitative case study of Liberia and Nigeria. Because both countries qualified as critically failed and were included in the original demonstration at the beginning of this paper, and because both have many similarities beyond state failure that can control for unforeseen variables (like being within the same geographic region, being a part of the same regional economic groups, and relying on patron-client networks), they provide an ideal scenario for comparison. The critical difference between the two cases is that in Liberia patron-client networks fell apart in the early 1990s, which led to the total collapse of the state; but in Nigeria patron-client networks have been maintained through oil wealth and have provided a degree of stability to outside observers.

I have demonstrated that in the case of Liberia, state failure and collapse in-and-of-itself was not a factor that led to U.S. intervention. If this were the case then the U.S.
would have intervened in 1990, 13 years earlier than it actually did. Rather, this case study supported and expanded on what was found in the quantitative analysis: international pressure and presence, coupled with state-sponsorship of terrorism were the main sufficient ingredients that led to the intervention by the United States. This points to an overlooked variable in the quantitative analysis – state-sponsorship of terrorism.

In the case of Nigeria, other important variables that both support and expand on the results of the quantitative analysis were found. Though Nigeria suffers from many of the same domestic issues that Liberia suffers from, it is a critical regional ally to the West in both regional peacekeeping efforts as well as counter-terror operations, there has never been international presence or pressure to intervene in Nigeria (probably due to the fact that Nigeria is the bulk provider of many international peacekeeping efforts), and despite the high levels of terrorism, Boko Haram is not viewed as an existential threat to the West. This case study illuminated two more overlooked variables in the quantitative analysis: the regional leadership status of the state, and the perceived degree of threat of terrorist organizations.

**Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research**

As with any research, there are many limitations to the findings here. The first is the limited number of variables used to measure state fragility. As discussed above, only one measure (the State Fragility Index) was used because it is one of the only indexes that does not pre-calculate foreign intervention (the DV) into the overall score. However, using only one index inevitably allows for biases to creep into the findings. Therefore,
future research should look into alternative indexes to establish the validity of the results here, or perhaps into building an original index for the purposes of this study.

Another major limitation concerning the quantitative analysis is the fact that I was limited to only use a Random Effects regression without the Fixed Effects regression. Although I tried to control for any potential problems that might arise with this by using alternative regressions in conjunction with the RE, there are inevitably some problems with this. The first is that in a number of the RE regressions conducted, rho is over 50%, which might indicate that the RE model is not necessarily the best or most appropriate fit for the data used here. Although this is somewhat inevitable given the data restrictions discussed above, this should be taken into account when examining the results and validity of the data analysis here.

As was found in the qualitative case study section, there are a number of overlooked variables that should be included in the quantitative analysis in future research: state-sponsorship of terrorism, the perceived threat of terrorist organizations, regional alliances and leadership, and international pressure. The qualitative analysis also illuminated institutional factors like a reliance on patron-client that may play a role in determining failure and the likelihood of intervention, and should be included as a key variable in future quantitative and qualitative analyses. Others like the presence of a critical international trade route dummy variable, a U.S. Presidential Administration dummy variable, and a distinction between Western use of combat force and non-combat presence should be included in future research, as well.
The qualitative analysis conducted here should also be revised and renewed in future research. Specifically, the comparison drawn here between Nigeria and Liberia – though interesting – is perhaps not the best one. A better duo might include Nigeria as the non-intervention case, and another intervention case with similar domestic dynamics like high terrorism, rule through patron-client networks, and regional prominence, if such a case exists. An alternative duo might include Liberia as the intervention case, and another non-intervention country with similar domestic dynamics (rule through patron-client networks that collapsed), if one indeed exists. By comparing two countries with similar historical trajectories but divergent experiences with international intervention, this could better pinpoint the exact causal mechanisms that may have partly eluded us here. However, the two case studies here provide an analytical platform to do just that.

**Important Takeaways and Policy Relevance**

Although this study covers relatively new ground in attempting to determine where and when the U.S. will intervene in cases of state failure, it has also illuminated some important preliminary factors that have immediate policy relevance. The most obvious implication is that international pressure on the United States *does appear to work*. Although there is a fundamental debate in the literature about how well international and alliance pressures work in curtailing or directing U.S. foreign policymaking, this study has demonstrated that in the case of state failure, international pressure to intervene does appear to produce results, as we saw in the case of Liberia.

This is a potentially powerful tool for the international community and for policymakers, because although the U.S. does not appear to factor state failure itself into
its intervention decision-making, it has been demonstrated here that international pressure can in some cases force the U.S. to intervene and assist where it otherwise would prefer not to. However, more work must be conducted to determine if this pressure works as a stand-alone factor, or if this pressure must be used in conjunction with other factors. By understanding that the U.S. may not necessarily respond to state failure itself, policymakers advocating for hands-on solutions can therefore look to the factors indicated in this study to put pressure on the U.S. to intervene.

Determining where, when, and why the United States and the West intervenes in failed states is an important first step in revising current state failure policies and procedures. Since the term was developed after the end of the Cold War, one cannot think of many examples of successful state-building efforts that have effectively reversed state failure in the long-term. Although Liberia today is better off than it was in the 1990s, critics have pointed out that this stability is dependent on continued support and guidance from the U.S. Similar to the 1980s, if this support is withdrawn Liberia could once again devolve into chaos. Nigeria is an alternative scenario in that it has managed to find a balance within its own failure, without devolving into chaos like Liberia did. However, as I have pointed out in the case study analysis, Nigeria is potentially one oil-market crash away from collapsing in the same way that Liberia did in 1989. Therefore, it is important to illuminate the factors that lead to or inhibit intervention, in order for the international community to legislate practically and proactively, rather than waiting hopelessly for others to intervene and allowing these countries to teeter on the brink and eventually collapse like Liberia did.
APPENDIX

Section 1a: In order to determine which of the two tests is more appropriate for the ODA variable we must consider the two tests’ assumptions about the distribution of the data. A t-test assumes that the data is normally distributed, and a WMW test does not make any assumptions about the distribution of the data. Using measures of skewness (the degree of direction asymmetry of the data) and kurtosis (the measure of heaviness of the two tails of the data), we can get a better idea of the data’s distribution. As a reference, data is considered to have a symmetric distribution if it has a skewness of 0, and normally distributed if it has a kurtosis of 3. The data used here for the variable ODA has a skewness of 2.58 and a kurtosis of 8.92. Therefore, we can conclude that the distribution of the ODA variable is not symmetric or normally distributed, and thus the results of the WMW are more valid for this particular dataset.

Section 1b: SFI skewness and kurtosis: 0.48, and 2.08; Population skewness and kurtosis: 2.21, and 7.73.

Section 2b: The BYU Corpus database uses Google Books to allow the user to search specific word(s) or term(s), from a Google Books database of 155 billion words. The word(s) are identified as ‘counts’ within the Google Books database, and are presented as
the number of times the word(s) was used per a specified time period. To account for and address non-relevant matches, the following inclusion criteria had to be met: (1) the book/report/dissertation/article must use the exact phrase in question in the correct context, and if the context cannot be readily determined within the metadata it is not included; (2) the book/report/dissertation/article must be written in English for the context to be determined; (3) the use of the identified term must be visible within the source, and if it is not, the title or summary of the source must explicitly, without uncertainty about the context of usage, use the term in question; (4) if the book/report/dissertation/article explicitly cites a source that uses the term in the correct context (even if the source itself may not mention the term itself) it is still drawing from resources that explicitly use the term and therefore it is included; (5) each book/report/dissertation/article that uses or cites the term may only be counted once, regardless of how many times the source uses the term.

Section 3a: This list of 159 countries is drawn from the Center for Systemic Peace’s State Fragility Index (FSI). All countries that did not have data for the full period of between 1995-2014 were excluded, as well as countries that gained independence during this time period. The United States and North Korea are excluded. Sudan and North Sudan are combined into one entry.

The list of countries used in the dataset is as follows in alphabetical order:

A: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, and Azerbaijan
B: Bahrain, Belgium, Benin, Burkina Faso, Bhutan, Belarus, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Burundi, and Bulgaria
C: Cambodia, Canada, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, and Czech Republic
D: Denmark, Djibouti, Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Dominican Republic
E: Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, El Salvador, and Ethiopia
F: Finland, Fiji, and France
G: Gabon, the Gambia, Ghana, Germany, Guinea-Bissau, Greece, Georgia, Guatemala, Guinea, and Guyana
H: Haiti, Honduras, and Hungary
I: India, Indonesia, Ireland, Iran, Iraq, Israel, and Italy
J: Jamaica, Jordan, and Japan
K: Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan
L: Laos, Latvia, Liberia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Lithuania, and Luxembourg
M: Mauritania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Malawi, Mexico, Moldova, Mali, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, and Mozambique
N: Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Niger, Norway, and the Netherlands
O: Oman
P: Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Poland, and Portugal
Q: Qatar
R: Romania, Russia, Rwanda,
S: South Korea, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, and Syria
T: Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and Turkey
U: United Arab Emirates, Uganda, United Kingdom, Ukraine, Uruguay, and Uzbekistan
V: Venezuela, and Vietnam
Y: Yemen
Z: Zambia, and Zimbabwe

Section 3c: A moderate use of force between 1,000-5,000 troops captures brigades, which can range between 3,000-5,000 troops, and is the smallest self-sufficient U.S. Army organization. Moderate use of force also captures a regimental unit (only used in the U.S. Marine Corps), which usually consists of five battalions, or about 2,000 troops. For more please see Moran (2006, October 26).

Section 3d: A major use of force captures the deployment of troops over 5,000, which is the size needed to establish a divisional headquarters, the second smallest self-sufficient organization of the U.S. Army. Deployments over 5,000 in size also capture the corps, which is the largest tactical unit deployment within the U.S. Army. For more please see Moran (2006, October 26).

Section 4a: These organizations include the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
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BIOGRAPHY

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