EFFECTS OF NORMALIZING POLICE MILITARIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES

by

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Effects of Normalizing Police Militarization in The United States

A Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts at George Mason University

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Bachelor of Arts
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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my wife and two daughters whom I love very much. Thank you for your enduring and unwavering support and patience.
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I would like to acknowledge those who mentored me in the United States Army. You gave me a strong foundation of self-awareness, discipline, and drive that has allowed me to set and achieve goals I never would have imagined possible. I would also like to acknowledge the George Mason University Anthropology Department for polishing and tempering the foundation laid by the army, and for giving me something that can never be taken away.
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ABSTRACT

EFFECTS OF NORMALIZING POLICE MILITARIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES

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George Mason University, 2017

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This Thesis offers an analysis of the effects of normalized police militarization in the context of the post 9/11 United States. It discusses the differences between what is defined as traditional militarization and police militarization, the difficulties in how the two processes are discussed, and the modes of militarization and their effects, with specific attention to their contributions to the normalization of violence in American society. Suggestions of how these effects impact the construction of group and individual identity among police officers are offered in consideration for further research into how these effects impact identity construction among civilian community members within which police serve.
I was 17 when I joined the United States Army in 2004. I was assigned to the 163rd Military Intelligence Battalion under the 504th Military Intelligence Brigade at Fort Hood, Texas, known as “The Great Place.” While in the army, I spent almost two and a half years in Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom conducting and supporting a myriad of intelligence operations. I was 19 the first time I deployed to Iraq for 15 months and 21 the second time for 12 months. Disillusioned by the poor leadership and the operational tempo of what looked like never-ending combat deployments in my future, I decided to leave the army when my enlistment was up and utilize my GI Bill benefits. Over the next several years I was in and out of school, studying full time in Northern Virginia, working in South West Asia, or working full time while attending classes full time.

My education in anthropology has been one of the most enabling experiences of my life. It has helped me cultivate the tools necessary to unpackage the experiences that I had the honor and burden to endure while serving in the army. It was in one of the many classes I took in anthropology that gave form and definition to a phenomenon I had undergone, but was otherwise unable to analyze as a whole: militarization. Sitting next to other college students listening to then George Mason University Professor Andrew
Bickford discuss modes and processes of militarization, I thought surely these people do not understand, surely, they could not possibly know what it was like to be a soldier. Denied

Professor Bickford was a soldier in the US Army during the United States’ presence in West Germany. No doubt, seeking understanding of what becoming and being a soldier meant, of having been militarized, he, like I, was driven toward an education in anthropology to unpack these experiences and understand them.

Now opening myself to a broader discussion on militarization, I had so many questions. What is militarization, where and how does it happen, why, how is militarization being discussed, what is missing from the conversation, why does it matter? I decided to focus on a particular phenomenon that had been increasingly unfolding since the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, but even more so since events like the Boston marathon bombing in April of 2013 and police shootings across the country: the effects of normalized police militarization in The Unites States post-9/11. I found this topic fascinating for one primary reason. A state, as I will define as the governing body of a country, creates soldiers, members of a country’s armed forces, in order to serve as the projected identity of the state’s ideal self for consumption by the state’s citizens (Bickford 2011), but soldiers are also created to fight wars. The United States has a long running history of war fighting, but not since the American Civil War have they fought a foreign nation on US soil. Many of the effects of militarization, such as the normalization of violence, and harsh realities of war, are not fully realized by a large portion of the American public. When they were briefly shown to the American
public on television sets in their living room during the Vietnam Conflict, mass protests erupted and contributed to a counter culture revolution. What, then, are the effects of taking some of those modes of militarization and applying them in the United States to police forces who operate exclusively in the public eye? In this instance, consequences such as the normalization of violence are not only constantly in the public eye, many Americans find themselves participating, willfully or otherwise, in what appears to be increasing violence involving police.

**Thesis Statement**

The militarization of police in the United States since 9/11 has contributed to a normalization and expectation of violence between police officers and members of communities within which they serve, particularly amongst African-Americans. Since the 1980s, academic literature on police militarization in the United States has contributed mostly to a discussion on how police units visually and functionally change to reflect adaptations in the United States military, which has helped elucidate various modes of militarization. What has been lacking, however, is a discussion on the effects of normalized police militarization. Gaining an understanding of the effects of the normalization of these modes can provide valuable context into how populations perceive these processes and how individual and group identities are formed and reformed in response.

**Research Questions and Methods**

The questions I noticed that were either unanswered or partially answered ranged from the extremely broad and often discussed, though perhaps too general in nature, to
the extremely nuanced and difficult to form. What is militarization? What are the modes and processes of militarization? What are the differences between how militaries are formed by militarizing citizens to create soldiers whose combat actions are largely removed from the public eye and how militarizing processes are adopted by police forces whose police actions are ever present in the public eye? How are concepts like violence normalized when police forces are militarized? What are the effects? How do communities and individuals respond to this new normal?

I chose to conduct this thesis specifically through library research. I wanted to focus on primarily existing academic literature in order to understand concepts that were either not being discussed or seldom discussed. Through library research, utilizing open-source documents, and other secondary sources, I focused on the modes of police militarization that were common themes: policies that eroded the separation of police and military authorities such as the analysis offered by Balko 2013; Weber 1999; Dunlap 1999; and Kraska and Kappeler 1997 regarding the Posse Comitatus Act, intended to forbid the use of military forces to enforce domestic laws (Cornell Law School); Military style units, gear, and tactics being incorporated by police forces (Balko; Kraska and Kappler; Kopel and Blackman 1997); Historical changes in policing in the United States and how the suggested modes of militarization have altered police organizations (Walker 1984 and Weber); and How identity making processes have been influenced by police militarization (Lancaster and Hart 2015; Rantatalo; 2014, Simi, Bubolz, and Hardman 2013; and White, et al. 2010). By comparing and contrasting these themes of police militarization with such works by (Bickford 2011; Perez 2006; Turse 2008) on
“traditional” militarization, what I would define as, for the purpose of this thesis, the process by which citizens are turned into soldiers, I discovered the modes and effects of militarization analyzed by the two categories, the militarization of citizens and the militarization of police, were very different. Literature of soldier making centered on the analysis how language was altered, concepts and experiences of violence and death were normalized or the way in which trauma was dealt with, and the economic and political implications of such things as The Complex, Nick Turse’s conceptualization of the war economy, while conversations surrounding police militarization were mostly centered on military gear, tactics, and policies adopted by police forces and analysis of the frequency of police shootings and demographically who in society was disproportionately effected.

The current discussion of police militarization lacks the same substantive and analytic depth as offered by traditional militarization. While likely causally linked, the effects and foundational causes of police militarization must not be assumed to have the same consequences as traditional militarization. The effects of traditional militarization are, though not entirely, contained within military spaces within the United States and abroad, while the effects of police militarization are almost entirely within the United States.

Value to Anthropology

By undertaking the task of conducting ethnographic studies in militarized police units and the communities in which they serve, Anthropology stands to gain an understanding of the effects of normalized militarization processes and how they contribute to the identity making and remaking of groups and individuals within
American society. These effects are important to understand in order to effectively understand concept like violence and how the perception and reception of those concepts changes over time.

**Thesis Overview**

In Chapter 1 I will present the literature review conducted on police militarization and more extensively analyze, categorically, how it is discussed. In Chapter 2 I will analyze what I have defined for the purpose of this thesis as traditional militarization. I will examine the ways in which literary works study the modes and effects of traditional militarization in order to better contrast and compare how police militarization is discussed. In Chapter 3 I will examine the effects of police militarization and offer an analysis of how concepts like violence and trauma are normalized in public spaces. In Chapter 4 I will examine how identity making process are studied in military and police spaces and suggest how the effects of normalized violence and trauma effect these processes among individuals and groups inside police and community spaces. Finally, in Chapter 5, I will summarize the aims and goals of the thesis, a succinct analysis of the effects of normalized police militarization processes, and suggest how anthropology should move forward in studying this phenomenon.
LITERATURE REVIEW

The militarization of civilian law enforcement in the United States has become the center of much academic, political, and public discourse in the 21st century. At present, this widely and deeply debated issue reverberates within the mainstream American consciousness, primarily, because many are divided on the causes of this perceived militarization. Some authors discuss the driving force of the militarization of law enforcement in the United States from a perspective of utility; the use of military gear, tactics, and training (Kappeler and Kraska 1997; Balko 2013). Others engage in dialogue rooted in the belief that the cause of militarization is a response on behalf of policy intertwining law enforcement and military functions (Weber 1999; Dunlap 1999). A final important perspective discussed in this review is how the creation, recreation, interpretation, and projection of military and law enforcement identities impact militarizing processes (Lancaster and Hart 2015; Rantatalo; 2014, Simi, Bubolz, and Hardman 2013; and White, et al. 2010). While much has been studied and written focused on the modes of police militarization, little has been written on the effects of the new normal of militarized police in American society.

Structural and Functional Modes

Kappeler and Kraska (1997;2015) have vehemently argued that an ongoing and persistent militarization of civilian law enforcement in the United States is underway.
Their analysis is centered around the creations of Police Paramilitary Units (PPU), semi-militarized police forces who operate with non-traditional police tactics and military style clothing and weapons. In their analysis of cities in the United States with a population of 50,000 or more citizens, Kraska and Kappeler (1997) revealed that the function of PPUs has shifted from serving in their initially conceived roles of serving high risk warrants and responding to criminal engagements which normal uniformed officers were not designed to, to serving more common warrants and conducting city patrols: in essence, performing the functions of regular uniformed police. According to Kraska and Kappeler (1997) the normalization of these units in mainstream policing presents a direct link between PPUs and the United States military (6) and reflects the aggressive turn many law enforcement agencies are assuming behind the rhetoric of community and problem-oriented policing reforms. By analyzing the “ideological filter encased within the war metaphor” Kraska and Kappeler (1997:6) aim to demonstrate how a set of beliefs and values that stress the use of force and domination as appropriate means to solve problems and gain political power, while glorifying the tools to accomplish this. Their linguistic analysis is perhaps the most vital aspect of their work. A suggestion that the normalized functions of PPUs is, in and of itself, militarization, does not suffice. Furthermore, their analysis of statistical data, specifically the relative growth of PPUs since inception is devoid of context. Although Kappeler and Kraska (1997:7) suggest that PPUs as a whole are on the rise since the 1970s, they do not address the relational growth between total numbers the escalations in crime percentage or population growth. Additionally, the emphasis on wearing military Battle Dress Uniforms (BDU) and a self-identification with
elitism on behalf of law enforcement officers (Kappeler and Kraska 1997:11) is counterintuitive to a functional perspective, as this analysis neglects the physical utility and functionalism, the durability, multi pocket storage, and comfort of such a uniform, as a reason one would prefer to wear this style of clothing.

The most specific analysis of how military gear, training, and tactics fuel this process of militarization is presented by Weber (1999) who suggests that over the past 20 years, Congress has encouraged the military to provide equipment and training to law enforcement, spawning a culture of paramilitarism in American law enforcement and that the sharing of training and technology between the military and police is producing a shared mindset (2). Weber analyzes two aspects of the militarization of police forces: first, the American tradition of civil-military separation is breaking down as Congress assigns more and more law enforcement responsibilities to the armed forces; and second, state and local police officers are increasingly emulating the war-fighting tactics of soldiers. Weber gives a brief history of the relationship between military and civilian law enforcement, presenting a growth in military job roles functioning as police or assisting police alongside the advent of congressional policies that encourage military aid to law enforcement, ultimately concluding that, like den Heyer Grath (2014), this process of militarization and the use of military gear is a matter of professionalization. A point of consideration seldom discussed in the analysis of military style gear, is the increase in military style weaponry available on the open market to the criminal element in America, and how the use of military gear by law enforcement escalates in relation to this.
The Inevitability Thesis

Kraska and Kappeler (2015) defend their earlier study from a critique levied by den Heyer Garth (2014) who suggests their earlier analysis has been widely misused. den Heyer Garth (2014) critiques this earlier study, suggesting the perceived militarization of law enforcement is merely a normal, if not natural, process of professionalization on behalf of career conscience law enforcement agencies. Largely critical of the analytical thought process of Kappeler and Kraska (1997), den Heyer Garth’s piece falls short. His analysis is further muddled by the retort by Kraska and Kappeler (2015) who find it less than convincing that the rise of Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) is natural, inherently efficient, or the result of any historical process that could justify an ‘inevitability thesis’ suggested by den Heyer Garth. Kraska and Kappeler (2015) effectively disarm den Heyer Garth’s (2014) notion that the militarization of law enforcement is normal or natural professional development, largely because he offers little evidence to support his claim, but in critiquing his analysis, Kraska and Kappeler open themselves to sharp criticism. Their response to den Heyer Garth’s article is an analysis of crime rates. Kraska and Kappeler (2015) suggest that crime rates were on the down swing during the inception of SWAT in the 1960s; however, and analysis of crime rates relative to population presents a consistent crime rate in the 1960s with the 1930s-1980s, leaving little footing for the authors to argue with.

Historical Erosion of the Separation between Police and Military

Kopel and Blackman (1997) analyze the role of civilian law enforcement during the siege on the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas. Starting with an historical
analysis of the role of military in law enforcement activities since the late 19th century, Kopel and Blackman suggest that the spirit and intent of the Posse Comitatus Act, which makes the use of the military in a law enforcement capacity without the approval of the Congress of the President of the United States a crime, has largely been perverted. This erosion of separation between the United States military and civilian law enforcement is perhaps one of the most widely discussed aspects of civilian police militarization (Balko 2013; Dunlap 1999; Kopel and Blackman 1997; and Weber 1999). Offering for analysis the FBI Hostage Rescue Team (HRT), trained by U.S. Army Delta Force, the premiere counter terrorist military unit in the world, Kopel and Blackman analyze how their equipment, training, and general attitude as a result of a perception of being elite (11) degrades their ability to perform their duties in keeping with a sensible approach to policing. Kopel and Blackman’s analysis of how group think, when a collection of highly intelligent individuals make a worse decision as a whole than they would individually (13), is the more persuasive argument in the article pertaining to the authors suggestion of how elite and highly trained units could make such poor decisions as a team. The analysis of the HRT at Waco is analogous to Marry Shelly’s Frankenstein, as seen in the HRTs complete disregard of for the on-site military unit’s tactical advice in how to proceed, which Koel and Blackman suggest is indicative of the FBIs falsifying of warrant information. The authors suggest that the tactics used by the FBI were counterintuitive to the justification of the raid; the presence of meth labs in the compound, but that tying the warrant to drug use was necessary to authorize military support. Kopel and Blackman’s suggestions on how to deal with this phenomenon of militarization through a shift in
policy are perhaps the most useful; tighten loop holes present in the Posse Comitatus Act, restrict availability of military equipment and training to law enforcement, and make foreign warfare treaties signed by the United States government applicable to federal law enforcement in domestic actions (22), but further calls for the restriction of military gear by Kopel and Blackman, such as prohibiting the use of face masks during raids, fail to consider the practical functions of such tactics and equipment; protecting police officers identity.

Walker (1984) previously addressed what he calls the use and misuse of history in discussing police policy. Walker fantastically analyses the false historical assumptions of an honored past time of policing in America. Walker believes there is no available older respected tradition of policing to restore (76) and suggests that historical research in policing is limited due to the lack of recorded evidence denoting the public attitude and perception toward police prior to the 1950s (82) and that what is available speaks to police a tool of politicians and ward bosses to intimidate businesses and voters, hardly an honored past time. Walker’s most intriguing insight in his article is his analysis of how shifting police practices, responding to the advent of technology, specifically the police patrol car and the telephone, created a barrier, physically and metaphorically, that separated police from the communities they serve. Walker calls for a return to informal policing, allowing one to be drunk in public, but not violent or passed out in the street, which is on the surface a call to common sense policing, but this gray area decision making puts the authority in the hands of the officer and does not really address
overarching police policies, allowing still for a disproportionate application of perceived justice.

**Policy Driven Militarization**

Another perspective of militarization is that the phenomenon of civilian law enforcement militarization is policy driven. The War on Drugs, one of the most heavily critiques American domestic and foreign policies ever, is at the center of this debate. Tied back into the previous and brief discussion of the Posse Comitatus Act, the War on Drugs, and all that it is, has almost single handedly been the catalyst that perpetuated the erosion of the divide between civilian law enforcement and the military. Those at the center of this discussion (Balko 2013; Weber 1999; Dunlap 1999; and Kraska and Kappeler 1997) all agree that the United States government has perverted the original intention of the Posse Comitatus Act. Balko’s book does a tremendous job at addressing any reservations an American conservative would have at condemning the militarization of law enforcement. Balko presents a chronological analysis of the militarization of American law enforcement policy and practices. He begins by discussing the Framers’ intentions for the second, third, and fourth amendments to the American Constitution, and more importantly, why those amendments were so important at that time; British soldiers were used in the colonies to enforce law against colonists. Balko then proceeds to explain how the firm separation between military and police were slowly broken down in the 20th century, reaching its most rapid pace during the war on drugs, which he blames for the militarization of police fueled by state sponsored perpetuation of irrational fear and panic over drug use and distorted crime rates. It is an effective argument if taken
to investigate how police forces have escalated their tactics and how policy has eroded the intention of the constitution, but only in a general way. What he claims as evidence of militarization ranges from the startling purchase of Armored Personnel Carriers (APC) to the perhaps benign purchasing of military style uniforms. Like many works on militarization, Balko’s book is devoid of actual police officers and soldiers speaking of them in an ambiguous and mystified manner.

Dunlap’s (1999) analysis addresses military policy as opposed to civilian law enforcement policy. This perspective is interesting as it breaks away from previous discussions on policy. If one accepts that police policy is responsible for the militarization of civilian law enforcement agencies, and those policies directed military cooperation, training, and gear to be available for those law enforcement units, then it is reasonable for Dunlap to observe policies that feed into the military end of this relationship. Dunlap’s essay reviews the historical use of the armed forces in a police capacity, discusses the growth of that role in the 80s and 90s, and forecasts an expansion of that role in the near future due to the emerging threat of “catastrophic terrorism”.

Dunlap discusses how military units have been used in police capacities with varying degrees of failure in West Germany and the Baltics. Paramount to his analysis, Dunlap argues that the differences in police and military doctrines make the two doctrines incompatible with one another and states that switching a functional entity between the two roles results in failure.

*Military Police*
A useful analysis of military policing policy is presented by Bronson (2002). This analysis of historical military policing policies elucidates the policing mentality of the American military policy makers. Bronson analyzes how the policies of the United States to use its military forces to serve in a police capacity during sustainment operation in Afghanistan have contributed to the country’s instability (123). Bronson’s conclusion revolves around the assertion that failure of US military and civilian leaders to recognize a security conscious national building plan necessary in Afghanistan, combined with mismatching of resources and requirements has caused US failings in securing Afghanistan (2002:125). Bronson suggests the US failed to develop nation-building policies in part because of a Cold War era mentality. Leaders historically focused on the deployment of massive equipment in European theater and not small plans operations such as instability pacification and civilian out-reach. Bronson suggests that the United States’ post World War II experience with constabulary forces in Germany and Japan should have urged great caution in using the military for operations other than war (128). While some specifically created constabulary forces did well after the Second World War, those units performed horribly when converted back into their originally intended combat roles while conducting operations during the Korean War. Bronson’s indirect conclusion is that soldiers are ill suited for performing both soldier and policing functions, perhaps ever, in their career as a soldier.
TRADITIONAL MILITARIZATION

It is important to separate traditional militarization from police militarization for the purpose of this thesis. According to Enloe (2000) “militarization is the step-by-step process by which something becomes controlled by, dependent on, or derives its value from the military as an institution or militaristic criteria” (91), thus implying anything likely can be militarized. But it is helpful to sparse out the difference between how something may be militarized for the purpose of direct war fighting and how something may leverage military iconography, values, or control to a specific end other than war fighting. In order to compare and contrast the effects of normalized police militarization, I will present an analysis of the processes and effects of traditional militarization.

In Bickford’s 2011 analysis of militarization in Eastern Germany, he assesses “The primary goal of militarization is to constantly think about and prepare for war and defense, to create an atmosphere in which soldier-citizens worry about the safety of the state” (Bickford 2011:62). Some of the aspects of militarization which he analyzed are: the reasons for and the end state of the process of militarization, the construction of the desired product of militarization, who is and who is not targeted by the process, how and why various groups are targeted in the manner they are, and the socioeconomic and cultural impact militarization has on the state’s population. The task of militarization is not easy. In general, it seems that a state must tackle a fundamental roadblock: How to
get citizens to join a military and possibly fight in a war all while getting soldiers and the citizens to believe this to be a just cause, or at the very least, to allow it to happen?

**An Anthropological Approach**

An anthropological approach to the relationship between militarization, war, and culture is trying to identify and explain the relationships between different groups of people involved in militarization and various war making processes. In order to do this, anthropologists study a variety of sociocultural dynamics present in a society before, during, and after a time span of militarization and war. Anthropologists study cultural values that are present before a time span of militarization and war in order to see what cultural values, attitudes, and beliefs different groups of people have before their state starts a process of militarization.

**State Sponsored Values**

One way in which militarization is accomplished, as shown by Bickford’s (2011) account of the military other in Eastern Germany, is with a very systematic and careful process of targeting potential soldiers by giving them ideal forms of masculinity to strive for. In *Fallen Elites*, Bickford discussed how the ideal soldier as defined by the state is one that defends the nation against attack, defends their women and children, and fights alongside their countrymen. In response, scholars and journalists analyze gender identity in a society before militarization to understand how a state uses those ideas during militarization. Bickford also identifies how children in East Germany were targeted when he explains that many were given math homework with artillery calculations, grammar
books with soldiers explaining vocabulary definitions, and how children were constantly pressured to commit to military service and often interviewed by military members and school administrators. Studying this area of militarization shows how the state is targeting the most malleable minds at the earliest of ages to instill desired ideals held by the state for a supportive population and recruitment of future soldiers.

**Militarization in the United States is intended to facilitate war efforts by a state.** Militarization is used in order to persuade a state population that war is an acceptable course of action for a particular set of problems, or at the very least, to tolerate the state’s decision to go to war. Militarization is also an effective tool to facilitate recruitment of civilians into armed service for the state. All of these things are done in preparation for war and continued during war to maintain some sort of equilibrium between the state’s desire to have supportive citizens and recruit soldiers and the harsh realities of war, to include war crimes, death, and gruesome injuries inflicted on and by the states military, many of which are often hidden from the larger population. Militarization shows a state’s citizenry the path to war, but ultimately the public must decide whether or not to walk that path, or at the very least, not stop their fellow citizens and state from walking down that path. Militarization is nourishment for the seed of war, but not always the seed itself. According to the Central Intelligence Agency (2014), over 120 million men and women between the ages of 16 and 49 are fit for military service in the United States. According to National Public Radio (2011), fewer than 2.3 million people were serving in the United States armed forces as of March 2011. Less than two percent of the population fit for military service actually serves, yet they are exposed to many of the exact same
recruitment tactics, marketing campaigns, and other forms of militarization as every other citizen.

Citizens are targeted for recruitment through advertisements and recruiting campaigns that draw on preexisting cultural values and ideas like traditional gender roles in the household (Perez 2006) and ideas of masculinity and nationhood (Bickford 2011). Turse (2008) argues that even the movement of material goods and human capital facilitate militarization by promoting the state’s desired consumption of specific goods and messages in media that are conducive to the hegemony being promoted. Militarization aimed at creating a supportive or obedient civilian population includes such things as military honor guards at the openings of professional sporting events, military sponsorship of professional sporting events as is the case with NASCAR as Turse points out, and generalized support campaigns and organizations like the United Service Organizations and “Support the Troops” slogans and merchandize sold in the United States. In the cult classic, Starship Trooper’s, comically, yet intriguing, the idea of the soldier citizens is explored in a future world where high-school students are encouraged to become citizens of what would otherwise be “their” country, by joining the military and fighting in the great bug war to save humanity (Christopher Van Pelt 1997). The idea that only military members and veterans are citizens is an intriguing thought, implying that if soldiers are the state, the only way become a citizens of the state is to literally become the state. In a world such as that, are there really free citizens of the state, or just the state and not the state?
Other areas analyzed are the sociocultural and economic conditions of certain citizen groups targeted with financial incentive for joining the military. Perez (2006) says the state targets the urban poor “through promises of economically secure futures for impoverished and working-class families, and with assurances that values such as discipline, loyalty, and tenacity will translate into better youth, families, personal success, and secure economic futures” (54). Turse (2008) discusses how militarization is directed at the population to promote support or tolerance for the state’s military operations when he mentions the defeated attempted removal of the F-22 Raptor program because of the number of jobs created by the program (28). By creating thousands and thousands of jobs in communities in dozens of states, civilians depend on defense contractors for their livelihood, which ensures tolerance if not outright support for increased government spending in military campaigns around the world.

Turse (2008) discusses the “revolving door” by giving an example of how people rise in the corporate sector and enter the government for a short time enacting various programs and policies to benefit various corporations only to return to a corporation some years later at a higher level (26). Turse analyzes the movement of material goods produced in support of military operations when he gives examples such as Oakley boots, wasteful spending on luxuries for government personnel to include leather brief cases and first-class airline tickets, and the employment of companies like Starbucks at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and the movement of commercial products such as iPods to Iraq. All of this directs the suggestive positive economic effects of militarization toward those in power and the wealthy members of the United States, while offering little in terms of
economic benefits to citizens and soldiers, who receive mostly the negative effects of militarization such as Post Traumatic Stress and mental and physical wounds of war fighting and experiencing the loss of loved ones and friends fighting in the war.

The Soldier

Having defined militarization and how citizens are targeted either for transformation into soldiers or active or inactive participants in the militarization of life and material consumption within society, I will analyze the primary product of militarization: the soldier. There are many different types and definitions of soldiers. An anthropologist would receive a wide range of answer if they asked this question in most societies, either with or without conventional armies. Concerning militarization, a soldier, a professional member of the state’s armed forces, is produced by the state and as such the ideals of a soldier as created by the state can be examined. If we are to examine what a solider is, professional service member of a state’s military, then according to Bickford (2011) “The soldier is the personification, the sign, the representation of the state; its arm, its agent of violence, the tip of the spear, the means by which the state comes into being, is maintained, and continues to be” (3). A state is an intangible entity, a collective idea and structure that governs because citizens allow it to. A soldier is the physical manifestation of the state, according to the state, in this case, the United States. From that perspective, then, a soldier embodies all of the virtues and values the US wishes to represent itself as having to other states, and perhaps more importantly, to American citizens.
Bickford (2011) says that to generals and politicians, soldiers are imaginary beings, mythic creatures. To civilians, soldiers are heroes, protectors, cowards, and/or criminals. And to soldiers themselves they are strong virtuous men, conquerors with a “job” to do (23). These varying perceptions in the United States likely are the results of various social constructs that different groups of people in a society build and accept. These social constructions are the results of movies, advertisements, recruitment campaigns, media coverage, both foreign and domestic filtered by various political agendas, video games, personal experiences, and secondhand accounts. It is important to examine the various social constructs of soldiers and how they are defined by different groups of people because it allows an observer to examine how particular groups of people feel about their state, if we are to agree the soldier is the state’s corporeal manifestation. Just as importantly, what the state is trying to say about itself and what it wants, expects, and even demands from its citizens can further be analyzed when breaking down the state’s constructions of the soldier.

When states recruit citizens for military service, they typically call on prewar cultural values that are idealized by the citizens of the state. Bickford (2011) explained how ideas of masculinity were used by the East German state to recruit soldiers; Perez (2006) shows how military recruiters target Latina youth in poor urban areas and how financial security incentives offered by the military play into female Latinas’ roles in supporting the traditional household. Even though military service is portrayed through militarization as being supportive of pre-existing cultural and class values, which are often already a product of hegemony, Perez (2006) also shows how militarization can
adapt with changing individual ideals while still supporting traditional cultural ones. In the case concerning the recruitment of Latina youth in poor urban areas, Perez (2006) shows that the recruitment based on financial incentive and Latina youths’ traditional role in supporting the household also supports more contemporary desires for female Latina youths to break away from traditional roles of being stuck in the house while still providing the traditional role of supporting the family.

**Language in Media**

When dissecting these foundations that are present in a soldier, which are visible through various recruitment videos, films, and military participation at sporting events to name a few accessible interactions between soldiers and civilians, citizens can see how the state tugs on the most highly desired cultural attributes of various groups of people and construct soldiers from that. By deconstructing that message, citizens can see how the state views the citizenry and what values they want in both the public and in their soldiers. But in American society, the military is all around us, we use military terminology in politics when we reference the War on Poverty, the War on Drugs, even the laughable War on Christmas.

In Stanley Kubrick’s (1964) film *Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb*, a comedic political satire about the United States during the Cold-War in which the United States attempts to recall a nuclear first strike against the Soviet Union, Kubrick discusses the dangers inherent in an inability to see and think outside of a military language of violence and death. In *Dr. Strangelove*, Kubrick shows a scene where Dr. Strangelove is discussing the number of casualties the United States will
avoid and also sustain because of a nuclear strike and how going underground can mitigate the losses. The problem with this thinking is twofold. Tens of millions of lives seems beyond the realm of human comprehension, at least in so much as to be able to emotionally feel what it would be like to lose that many people. Additionally, the language limits options. The language of striking and mitigating losses traps the listener. A listener is made to choose between twenty million lives lost or a hundred million lives lost. Naturally most would choose to lose twenty million over a hundred million, but the option of zero lives lost is not even discussed. When constrained to a scenario where a decision maker can save eighty million lives, it seems likely they would jump to that decision immediately without considering other options. This language manipulation doesn’t just affect policy makers, but also civilian populations as well.

We use military terminology when describing many non-military things: One of the most intricate skits of military language Americans use in describing football games was often a part of many stand-up specials presented by comedian and philosopher George Carlin:

*In football the object is for the quarterback, also known as the field general, to be on target with his aerial assault, riddling the defense by hitting his receivers with deadly accuracy in spite of the blitz, even if he has to use shotgun. With short bullet passes and long bombs, he marches his troops into enemy territory, balancing this aerial assault with a sustained ground attack that punches holes in the forward wall of the enemy's defensive line (1988).*
Pre-existing values are then compared and contrasted with the projected values the state manifests in soldiers and pushes onto the civilian population. One popular state influenced value that is studied consists of ideas pertaining to masculinity. Bickford (2011) discusses how ideas of masculinity are represented in ideal soldiers enhanced by the East German state and projected onto the state’s citizens. This hegemonic process allows a collective sense of what a “Man” is to emerge among the citizens and for men in East Germany to compare themselves and other men to, either accepting or rejecting these state-defined values. Accepting these ideas, for whatever reason, may require an individual man to drastically change their outward appearance and public dialogue, while rejecting these ideas may result in an individual man being ostracized from different groups of people in East Germany.

For soldiers in war, accepting some of these ideas can result in committing acts, maybe even war crimes, which they may disagree with, but are otherwise compelled to perform. Browning (1992) describes the actions of a German police battalion in Poland during World War II and discusses how some individual soldiers either refused to be involved in the massacre at Jozefow or who had participated initially and later decided not to continue, as well as the outrage of at least one officer when one of his men refused to participate. This study offers an example of what happens when soldiers decide to reject, not necessarily direct orders, but reject state ideas about what being a “good” soldier and following orders means. The consequences of actions like these can range from reassignment to death and nearly anything imaginable in between. Instances of state led repercussion for refusal to adhere to state ideas once militarized, specifically once in
the military, can show how “noble” state altered cultural values of masculinity and nationality and defense of family and native soil become mandates with specific expectation that if not met can result in severe consequence. It breaks down any illusion of a kind governing state that wants its citizens to be all they can be and shows the rule of an iron fist.

Observing values created or exploited by the state then allows anthropologists to study how well the pre-militarization and prewar values synthesize with the ones projected by the state during militarization and war. Much of this allows anthropologists, and the observant citizen, to look at how the state understands its citizenry and how the state wishes to reinforce cultural values that are conducive to their war making processes. Equally opportune then is the analysis of post war state and cultural values. A generation of citizens militarized to one end often finds itself being governed by a state that has drastically changed its dialogue with its citizens. Those earlier accepted values can often times be downright counter-productive to the state’s new agenda creating a sense of abandonment and alienation between an earlier era’s citizens and the state. The analysis of post war cultural values held by the citizens can also serve as a lesson to the state to see how effective their militarization efforts were, and how to shift efforts to more effective processes while discontinuing or refining less effective processes. Watchful anthropologists can preempt such attempts and try and engage the public in a manner that will hopefully make them a little more alert and aware about processes of militarization.
Militarization as a Commodity

The military has a strong presence in the day-to-day lives of many Americans, but mostly because the corporations we consume from often work on military contracts. Turse (2008) lays down an argument that “The Complex,” an endlessly tangled network between all things military and all things corporate with the citizenry existing entirely somewhere in the middle, is present in everyday life because it has invaded everyday life. I would argue that a more accurate statement would be American corporations have invaded the everyday life of the military. The end result for the public population amounts to the same, but the semantics point to different driving forces between the interactions of the military and corporate sectors. However, regardless of how the military enters our daily lives, there is a tremendous amount of influence wielded by the military and its major purpose is to make war more palatable, if not desirable, of the citizens of the state.

The military is present, Turse explains, in our everyday life because corporations we consume from work with the Department of Defense from time to time, offering for example Oakley boots designed for the military (68) which also supply the public with various items. Contrary to popular belief, such boots were not ordered by the military as they were not even authorized for wear with army combat uniforms when they were first designed, but rather they were designed for the military by Oakley in hopes of landing further sales from the Department of Defense. The difference here is minimal as Oakley still achieved their intention. The only thing that really matter is that Oakley can say they were designed for the military and military aficionados and other soldiers will snatch
them off the shelves because as Turse explains “Oakley trades on a badass rep” of cool looking and sounding gear (2008:70).

While many companies design military gear targeting soldiers, the truth is that in accordance with AR 670-1, the army regulation for “Wear and Appearance of Army Uniform and Insignia,” and various ALARACT, “All Army Activities” memos sent out to give quick guidance and regulation, logos are entirely unauthorized on gear worn by soldiers, to include backpacks, footwear, and sunglasses. Some things are not enforced such as a small “O” discreetly placed on a pair of M frame Oakley glass or a Nike swoosh on a pair of running shoes so soldiers can and do wear them, but they are purchased via their own expenses the majority of the time. Not one piece of Oakley gear is standard issue. Various military units may choose to use their funds to buy such products, which is an indicator of marketing success on the part of Oakley, not defense contracting.

The real success of gear marketed as “designed for the military” is the “cool guy” factor that makes non-combat soldiers and military enthusiasts want to purchase such items typically because SOF, special operation forces, will buy this gear and others too can be just like them. “Better” soldiers have brand name gear, or so many think, but such gear is usually nice and pristine right from the Post Exchange worn by soldiers who will never go on patrol. Regardless of the circumstances the military has indeed affected consumerism of Oakley products and has the added benefit of creating the wardrobe of a “cool” soldier.
A military commodity chain is the linked activities associated with the procurement, production, and distribution of military goods and services provided to a consumer. Turse (2008) describes a few of these commodity chains when he breaks down the military-academic complex, military-petroleum complex, the hilarious and far stretched military-doughnut complex, and the military-corporate-conference complex. Each of these different complexes produces widely varying yet complimentary commodities for military purposes, whether they be desired ways of thinking, specific material goods for sale and distribution, or personnel conditioned for service in one fashion or another at various levels in a given, or multiple, military commodity chains.

The F22 Raptor program is a good example of a military commodity chain. From facilitating jobs in procurement of actual raw resources to making the various parts of the F22 by tens of thousands of people in over a thousand sites in 42 states (Turse 2008:29), to training and maintenance of the plane and its various parts, the F22 program has created an ideological commodity consumed by employees who are dependent on these types of programs for their way of life; defense spending is good. The fighter jet itself, a physical commodity, is sold by a civilian corporation to the department of defense which is then in turn used for various reasons, one of which being armed conflict in order to procure other material or ideological resources. With hundreds of millions of dollars at stake riding on the success, or failure, of these programs a certain environment is developed that creates, or is only inhabitable, by individuals who can facilitate the success of the various links in the supply chain, resulting in a certain human capital as a result. Shown here is the production of dependence on military industry, the financial
incentives from material sales and desired consumption of material goods produced, and actual human capital to perpetuate the success of the commodity chain.

The F22 jet program serves as an example of one of many different military commodity chains. It is important to understand these chains for several reasons. The first being that the majority of military funding, at least in the United States, is procured through citizen taxes, product sales, fees, and loans the government takes out (Gertler 2013:2). A responsible citizenry should be aware of the flow of monetary resources used in these commodity chains for moral and ethical concerns and a responsible government should make that information available to its citizens. Secondly, the procurement and consumption of material resources should be tracked and monitored by civilian organizations and the public to understand how military commodity chains are acquiring the resources they need in order to produce their goods. Thirdly, monitoring the movement of powerful individuals in and around these military commodity chains can help identify unethical business practices. The most important reason to look at military commodity chains is to see military contracts for what they are; a way for corporations to enact high dollar projects that would have been unrealistic if they were pitched to the shallow pockets of individual citizens, but are now ultra-successful money makers when those shallow pockets are combined into the governments pockets.

Evaluating and tracing military commodity chains allows for the monitoring of fiscal, moral, and ethical concerns that anyone may have in the procurement, production, and distribution of military goods, which are ultimately intended to aid, in some fashion, warfare. For the citizen that is against various implements of war, viewing military
commodity chains will also allow them to see what corporations they may consume from are also affiliated with defense contracting and military spending. Analyzing these various chains can open a civilian’s eyes to military consumption. As Turse (2008) puts it, “The Complex thrives on the very obliviousness of the civilian population to its existence to the world it has made so much its own. But if you look closely it can suddenly come into focus and be seen almost everywhere” (271).

The truly troubling thing about militarization is not necessarily the direct and immediate impact it plays in forming or changing a state’s military and population. Wars, as terrible as they are, dissolve far sooner than the real product of militarization: an entire generation conditioned to think and act in a manner that may no longer be conducive to the state’s goals, creating alienation and discontent in an entire group of people for several decades. Militarization is aimed at resolving a problem that is present in a geopolitical landscape with an ever-increasing rate of change, but the ideology imprinted on the citizens and soldiers created by a specific era of militarization often lasts far longer than the state’s need for that way of thinking. In fact, one generation’s way of thinking as a result of the militarization of yesteryears can often be downright counterintuitive to their same state’s new desired way of thinking.

Having presented an analysis of traditional militarization, some of the effects of those processes, and how they are discussed in academic literature, I will now move forward with an analysis on the effects of police militarization.
THE NORMALIZATION OF POLICE MILITARIZATION

Today in the United States, images of police officers wearing military styled clothing, weapons, vehicles, and tactics are somewhat routine in news media. In April 2013, during the Boston Marathon in Boston, MA, two Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) were detonated near the finish line of the race, which led to the deaths of three and the wounding of hundreds more. On April 19, 2013, after Boston police identify the suspects involved, hundreds of law enforcement officers go door to door on 20 streets looking for the suspects (CNN 2017) while dressed in military clothing and outfitted with military style weapons and equipment to include up-armored vehicles, all in efforts to catch two people. Rather than as a matter of a prudent tactical response, this show of force serves a strategic purpose: to reassure citizens that we have the physical and technological might to fight for and defend the city and perhaps to dissuade other would-be terrorists from conducting similar attacks. In August of 2014, Michael Brown, an African-American male, was shot by white Ferguson Missouri police officer Darren Wilson, triggering a national fixation on the incident and a discussion on police force in the black communities in the United States. The following November, after a grand jury acquitted Officer Wilson, violent riots and protestors of the decision were met with heavily armed police officers complete with armored vehicles and snipers (BBC 2014). In April 2015, after the death of Freddy Grey in Baltimore police custody, riots broke out
in the city to protests excessive police force. Again, protestors were met with heavily equipped police officers and armored vehicles (The New York Times 2015).

**Normalized Violence**

The terrorist attack in Boston and the protests and riots in Ferguson and Baltimore were national spectacles, exhausting the coverage capabilities of national cable outlets such as FOX News, MSNBC, and CNN as well as consuming a great deal of public dialogue on social media spaces such as Facebook and Twitter, but were certainly not all treated the same in public conversations. In the case of the Boston Bombing, America had a unifying element during the response by police: Heavily outfitted police were responding to terrorists who planted bombs intending to kill as many people as possible. 11 years into the Global War on Terror, this kind of heavy may have seemed a bit more acceptable. However, police responses to the riots in Ferguson, Missouri and Baltimore, Maryland were seen by many as overreactions and an oppressive response to protestors demanding justice, causing a division between those seeking justice in what they considered wrongful deaths of black men at the hands of police and those who considered the police response necessary to quell violent riots. Enter Black Lives Matter/Blue Lived Matter.

Black Lives Matter is a chapter-based member-led national movement, primarily thought not exclusively, in African-American communities who are protesting and spreading awareness of the unjust treatment of African-Americans at the hands of law enforcement and to a larger extent the American justice system. The organization has defined its role as a response to deliberate and rampant violence inflicted upon them by
the state (Black Lives Matter). Black Lives Matter was loosely formed in response to the February 2012 shooting of Trayvon Martin, an African American teenager, who was killed by George Zimmerman, a Hispanic man patrolling a neighborhood as a neighborhood watch member. Zimmerman confronted Martin, who he believed to be mischievous, a physical altercation ensued and Zimmerman shot and killed Martin (The New York Times 2012). National protests ensued, though not were met with the kind of police might as those in Ferguson and Baltimore.

Blue Lives Matter is a somewhat more amorphous response to Black Lives Matter, mostly in defense of police officers and American citizens who feel police officers are doing their jobs and don’t want reputations of police officers to be spoiled by a few bad apples. Its “structure” consists mostly of hashtags on twitter, t-shirts, wrist bands, and bumper stickers, though there is a 401 (c) listed as Blue Lives Matter Carter NYC, that postures itself as “the official Blue Lives Matter as seen on FOX News” (Blue Lives Matter NYC). Statistical social media analysis outside the scope of this thesis is required to better gauge public perception and support of the two groups, but I offer the following analysis.

If American citizens and organizations such as Black Lives Matter feel that deliberate and rampant violence is being inflicted on African-American communities by the state, alarming statistical evidence must exist. An examination of the number of officer involved shootings yields what can understandably be considered useless data, since government organizations, private organizations, and activist groups cannot agree on the data collected by police shootings. “From 2000 to 2014, the FBI reported
an average of 390 justifiable homicides by police each year, with a very slight (but erratic) upward trend” (The Foundation for Economic Education 2016). But this information is voluntarily reported by law enforcement organizations. Estimates from other news outlets and activist organization estimate anywhere from triple to quadruple those numbers, and that still doesn’t account for what is not reported (The Foundation for Economic Education). Let’s take this to the extreme. If we consider even quadruple the FBI average from 2000 to 2014, 1560 people would have been killed by police officers. Let’s say for maximum argument, that every single person killed by the police was an African-American male, of which there are about 21 million (United States Census Bureau 2016). This concludes that .00007 percent of African American males have, on an annual average, been killed by the police. Accounting for the facts that every victim of a police shooting is not an African American male, or whether the shooting is justified or not, the percentage of police shootings against the population falls exponentially farther.

The difference between unfair targeting and treatment and being the victim of police violence must not be conflated for the purpose of this thesis, though the two can be related. The above analysis is to discuss the likelihood of being the victim of police violence, specifically fatal use of force, and not how one is targeted or treated in the justice system. While there may certainly be an argument for unfair police targeting in African-American communities and even unfair treatment in the American justice system, any inflammatory ideas of African-Americans targeted for execution by police in the United States must be dispelled.
Rhetoric in police and Blue Lives Matter-esque circles mirror those of the above, often discussing how police are under attack by armed thugs. In July 2016, Micah Xavier Johnson, an African-American male and United States Army veteran, shot and killed 5 Dallas, Texas police officers in response to what he perceived were unjust police shootings of African-Americans (CNN 2016). But police need not feel under attack for the sake of being a police officer. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) 51 law enforcement officers in the United States were killed in the line of duty in 2014. When compared to the more than 900,000 sworn law enforcement officers in the United States, as suggested by the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund (2017) police officers suggestively have a .00005 percent chance of being killed in the line of duty. Relatively the same as an African-American male has of being killed by a police officer, in the extreme example above. Both parties have a great chance of being killed in a car collision, which accounted for over 30,000 deaths each year since 2014 (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 2016). It should be noted that African-American uneasiness with police is nothing new, especially when compared to White American perceptions of police.

But this does not ease the tension. 58 percent of Americans feel the police are under attack (Rasmussen Reports 2015), African-American communities feel threatened by police. An analysis of a 2014 CBS News poll by the Roper Center at Cornell University on the use of military equipment by local police suggests that African-Americans are two to three times more critical of the issue (Roper Center n.d.)
This perceived normalized violence, perhaps brought on by the influx of militarized police forces and imagery in American media has caused a divisive reality rooted in a somewhat unreality of events. Fortunately, the FBI has started a pilot program for 2017 with the goal of studying and accounting for police involved shootings (USA Today 2016). Hopefully a centralized and standardized reporting mechanism will yield a more accurate set of data with which to move the conversation into a productive direction.

**The Warrior Mentality**

An analysis of how police identities are sometimes formed is necessary in order to suggest ways in which a normalization of violence through police militarization effects the creation of these identities. Lancaster and Hart (2015) Rantatalo (2014), Simi, Bubolz, and Hardman (2013), and White, et al. (2010), are among those who have engaged researching how police identities take form. White, et al. (2010) begin by conducting a study on the how a police recruit begins to understand and conceptualize their identity as a police officer, by conducting a follow up study on the motivations of recruits to join the police force. This follow up study was designed to explore how the former recruits now officers viewed their earlier motivations, six years later. White et al. ultimately conclude that officers who expressed lower commitment to policing profession during recruitment and training expressed higher job dissatisfaction rates six years later. The conclusions are interested and on the surface plausible. It is reasonable for one to assume that if one has a lower commitment to an effort in one’s life that they are more likely to be dissatisfied while engaged in that effort. But this study is problematic, White
et al. admit that their study suffered from several limitations, most of important of which were an 18% response rate from the officer and the method used to survey the officers, a self-respondent survey always subject to the possibility of lies, embellishments, and inaccurate recollections when surveying for historical data. Those limitations do not make this study useless; however, but should be seen as a call for more research into recruit motivations and how recruits reflect on their future identity as a police officer.

In connection with this perspective of understanding how a recruit conceptualizes their would-be identity post training, Simi, Bubolz, and Hardman (2013) analyze the relationship between military experience, identity discrepancies, and involuntary role exit; discussing how those characteristics of one’s military service influence a shift from Far Right Extremism to Far Right Terrorism, non-violent to violent action. Identity is the meaning one attaches to the social roles one enacts and the social positions one occupies (Simi, Bubolz, and Hardman 2013:657). A discontinuity of identity manifests when one’s conception of one’s identity is suddenly and drastically altered. Here Simi, Bubolz, and Hardman discuss involuntary role exit. By analyzing case studies of individual service members who were kicked out of the military, an involuntary role exit, usually due to behavior related to Far Right Extremism, Simi, Bubolz, and Hardman suggest that a misconception or miscalculation of identity on behalf of the individual coupled with involuntary role exit acts as a catalyst triggering the shift from Far Right Extremism to Far Right Terrorism. It is a phenomenon all too familiar. A 17 year old 120 pound army recruit, having been inundated with Call of Duty videogames, movies involving military heroism and acts of valor, and bombarded with Special Forces recruiting commercials,
arrives at his local recruiting station with dreams of kicking ass and taking names. When the perception a recruit has of a soldier’s identity meets the hard tip of an Army Drill Sergeant’s round and brown campaign cover, recruits usually realize that somewhere along the way, they made a big mistake. But such is the normal response to the shock and awe of United States Army Basic Combat Training. Many soldiers even out as their enlistment goes on and some do in fact go on to serve in various capacities in special operations. But there are those that become disgruntled when the perception of their self-identity is nowhere near that of what they thought or want it to be. When they cannot cut the mustard and toe the line, some spiral down and implode or explode. Those entering military service with Far Right Extremist views, according to Simi, Bubolz, and Hardman (2013) often internalize that disappointment and then externalize it by projecting it onto the fuel of their already extremist views, usually a minority demographic blamed for “society’s problems”, in the view of the extremist, in a violent manner completing the transition from Far Right Extremism to Far Right Terrorism.

Simi, Bubolz, and Hardman’s (2013) theory, in my experience, is perhaps the most insightful and accurate analysis of military reasons for joining the military. Many recruits enlist for many reasons, but not one has an accurate perception of what it means to be a soldier, and nothing can prepare them for this realization through experience. These Far Right Extremists would not discover this realization that they are no super trooper in a gradual manner, but rather, the realization manifests to the individual at the exact speed with which a drill sergeant buries their boot in the recruit’s ass. This study was conducted largely because Far Right Extremists disproportionately have military
service, so a strong correlation was already present, and while this study is limited to this narrow phenomenon of involuntary role exit and discontinuity of identity, the study begs for more research on identity formation and perception experienced by service members before, during, and after service.

As previously seen in the research of Simi, Bubolz, and Hardman (2013), identity plays a big role in understanding how and why police officers and soldiers do the things they do. But these identities are not formed within just the military and police recruiting and training systems and respective workplaces. Outside of this structure, police and soldiers are the subject of much debate and discourse in the news, movies, music, entertainment, etc. The general concept of a soldier or police officer is present in many aspects of American life and can be observed almost anywhere. Rantatalo (2014) conducts a case study of a police unit and explores what roles media representations of the unit play in serving police officers’ narrative ‘identity work’ relative to their work and their organization. The article draws on an analysis of newspaper articles about the police unit and interviews with police officers working within the unit. Rantatalo (2014) suggests that positive depictions of the unit enhanced officers’ sense of identity, while contradictory depictions spurred rejection of said depictions and spurred self-enhancing effects (13). This study is useful in discussing how depictions of individuals serving in high profile public service roles, perhaps limited to roles of inherent danger, e.g. soldiers, police, firemen, etc, respond to media portrayals of their occupation and service.

Lancaster and Hart (2015) seek to explore the functioning of military identity, specifically, how military veterans identify with their military identity. In order to do this,
Lancaster and Hart created the Warrior Identity Scale to examine an aspect of post deployment functioning using online surveys with veterans. Veterans symptomatic of PTSD expressed higher scores of interconnectedness and seeing the military as a family (85). Results support the importance of military identity in functioning and suggest there are long term effects of deployment on personal identity (86). The research methods and analysis are sound, but can be used only to make very general and limited claims. Lancaster and Hart most importantly imply that in order to understand the functions of military identity, a ground level individual understanding needs to be developed, and the most effective tool anthropologists have to achieve such a thing, is ethnography.

Many engaged in the dialogue concerned with the militarization of civilian law enforcement have focused on historical analysis and statistical data. While historical documentation and statically analysis are relevant data sets, these authors speak of militarization without speaking of those whose roles, or the individuals themselves, that are being militarized.

One such anthropologist making great strides in this endeavor is Beatrice Jauregui. Jauregui’s (2015) participant observation of two experimental US Army programs provide great insight into how United States army policy is understood projected at the individual level. The Army Experience Center (ACE) and the Army’s Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness (CSF2) training, seeks to answer how age-old military concepts of heroism, honor, pride, duty, and sacrifice in war have become projected through some new characteristics of the ideal Soldier and expressed to the public: technological superiority, psychology buoyancy in the face of incessant strife, and
social savior faire in combat (Jauregui 2015:450). Jauregui’s aims are to posit a new understanding of the relationship between military and civil lifeworlds, and to push the anthropological study of imperialism generally – and the American global power projections specifically – in different and productive directions (2015:451). She criticizes concept of American dominance as a unilinear process consisting of militarization and market expansionism, insisting such a view ignores the complexities of American military action (Jauregui 2015:452). Jauregui (2015) thus turns to an historical analysis of American military humanism and how an understanding of that application reveals the ways in which concepts such as family, community, opportunity, and education are mobilized together to form a progressive humanism that disseminates an American vision of “world fitness” (475). Her analysis of the overlap of military and civilian worlds and how the military understanding of the two as both separate and intertwined social spheres facilitates military policy and the production, reproduction, and projection of military identity, is refreshing. The programs the Jauregui chose to observe; however, is limited in this respect. These programs are specifically aimed at “changing [civilian] perceptions” of the American military experience. An analysis of this is limited in understanding how the military sees itself, as there are many mitigating factors of this “experience” the military has chosen to relay to the public.

Another of Jauregui’s (2013) ethnographic field works yields a unique philosophical perspective on ethical considerations that may be limiting anthropological fieldwork with law enforcement agencies. Jauregui discusses the epistemologies of violence, specifically, the epistemology of police violence as understood by an observing
anthropologist (125). Her primary focus is on how one conducts participant-observation with interlocutors who engage in violence on a routine basis and still maintains professional ethical standards. While Jauregi’s work is predominantly limited to Northern India, her reflexive analysis of her role in conducting ethnography with police forces and observing police violence is extremely insightful as few ethnographies on police violence have discussed the ethical role of the ethnographer. Her ultimate conclusion is that anthropologists who conduct participant-observation with police forces are already complicit with some forms of state violence (Jauregui 2013:126). Jauregui’s inclusion of seldom discussed police functions, evidence logging, administrative details, investigative work, is seldom discussed in other works on police violence, demonstrating again that ethnographic work brings to the forefront the individual agency and diversity present in police work. This abundance of seldom discussed aspects of policing and police identity will add to the call for more ethnographic fieldwork in order to better understand police identities and how concepts such as violence are normalized through militarization processes.

Some of the most meaningful ethnographic work available on police militarization in the United States has largely been spearheaded by Dr. Peter B Kraska, Professor in the School of Justice Studies at Eastern Kentucky University, who has been conducting ethnographic research on PPUs and the changing roles of police forces in the United States since the early 1990s. Kraska (1996) concludes his analysis on police identity in once such ethnographic field study of police units by stating “The identities of the se paramilitary police offices are clearly a product of a cultural environment,
idealized during the Reagan-Bush era which actively promotes the notion that a “man’s” worth increases in proportion to his ability to be a warrior” (425). It is important to note that Presidents Reagan and Bush were presidents who fostered the War on Drugs, which as discussed earlier largely eroded the separation between police and military forces, perhaps creating a competing identity amongst police offices we were working more closely with actual soldiers.

Although of limited yet specific value to this thesis, Bohm, Rothermund, and Kirchkamp (2013) present research on the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect, in essence, a phenomenon where interindividual cooperation is higher than intergroup cooperation. Most explanations for the discontinuity assume maximum personal outcome given group members are less identifiable for non-cooperative behavior in an anonymous group context, making self-interest behavior more likely (Bohm, Rothermund, and Kirchkamp 2003:43). An alternative approach to explain the phenomenon is by means of group-level motivations. Accordingly, the motivation to maximize the own group’s outcome may be (at least partly) responsible for the interindividual–intergroup discontinuity effect. An experiment showed cooperation with an opponent group was smaller when an individual group member expected that his or her decision was made public to other group members than in a situation when the decision was private (Bohm, Rothermund, and Kirchkamp 2003:47). This analysis is useful because it suggests that social categorization itself, devoid of the incentives and motivations of individuals and groups may be sufficient to spur group competitiveness creating a discontinuity effect.
This research is interesting to consider in relation to how police officers, as individuals and as a group, may interact with community members, as individuals and as a group.

For the scope of this thesis, this phenomenon suggests that individual police officers and individual community members are more likely to cooperate toward a common goal than a police organization and a community, as separate wholes, and that individual members are not likely to reach out to the “other” group if the individuals actions are made known to the groups to which they belong. This is problematic at a very deep level. If a police officer, as an individual, cannot express that maybe another police officer who shot an unarmed man 9 times in the back did the wrong thing simply because it’s an unpopular and deviant opinion within their police organization, the only way a police organization likely can break with an accepted normalization of violence is to do so as a whole. Likewise, a community group will experience the same difficulty if a community member cannot express that maybe someone trying to take a police officer’s firearm should be expected to be shot simply because it is an unpopular and deviant opinion within their community group. What if these deviated opinions that do not align with one of the loudest two sides of polarized rhetoric we are bombarded with on cable news and social media? What if more police empathize with African-American community members who feel threatened and targeted because of the actions of a few bad police officers. What if most African-American community members empathize with police officers who feel targeted or rebuked because of violent “outside” agitators at police brutality protests or criminals targeting police officers?
In order to effectively propose answers to these questions, extensive ethnographic work would be needed in order to understand more about how the effects of normalized police militarization effect identity construction of community members served by what are perceived as militarized police.
CONCLUSION

In this thesis I have outlined a working separation between what I have defined as traditional militarization and police militarization, how they are discussed, and how the effects of police militarization normalize violence in police forces and American communities, concluding with an analysis on how that fact may impact identity formation among police officers and communities in the United States. I have sought to better define traditional militarization and police militarization and how they are discussed in efforts to highlight their dissimilarities, hopefully presenting the idea that while related, the militarization of police, by its very nature, is a different enough process that warrants extensive ethnographic research. No longer can anthropologists assume police militarization is as much of a subset of traditional militarization that we need only to focus mostly on what is immediately observable, e.g. weapons, clothing, vehicles, etc. Future work in this area should revolve around what military training police forces are receiving, how police policies impact the training and how the training impacts police policies, and how military training is received by police officers who are also combat military veterans or still serve in a reserve capacity. An analysis of similar police units in who receive and do not receive military training compared to use of force incidents would be insightful into how military training impacts some police officers’ decision to use various kinds of force.
I doubt that most police officers, or even a large number of them, want to think of themselves as soldiers on a domestic battlefield. Ethnographic field work and analysis on an individual level could help elucidate the effects and consequences of normalized militarization, allowing a productive dialogue with which communities and police forces can develop a symbiotic and trusting relationship.

In this multifaceted dialogue concerning the militarization of civilian law enforcement, many have focused on the military style gear, tactics, and training that civilian law enforcement receives. Others have discussed how government policy, such as federal laws implemented during the War on Drugs like laws making available to civilian law enforcement military gear, weapons, and training. While some have taken to observing identity formation as understood by police officers, not many have focused on how community identities change in response to these modes of militarization, and fewer still have paid attention to the effects of the normalization of these processes play on the identity formation of police or community members.

The militarization of law enforcement in the United States is an issue I am deeply troubled by. I don’t subscribe to the hallmark “if you haven’t done anything wrong then you don’t have anything to worry about”. Such silence and inaction are how citizens are dominated by encroaching state powers. I believe a separation between police and military forces is essential as they have two very different roles. Military forces wage war, police forces keep the peace. I am not concerned with military iconography and imagery in every day policing, but what I am concerned with is how this topic is discussed in popular dialogue, how information is anonymously shared on mass media
platforms, often as disinformation or misinformation, preventing more meaningful conversations on identity as a force of escalating tensions between police and communities.
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BIOGRAPHY

Cogan Culver served in the United States Army from 2004 to 2010 as an intelligence analyst and was the Non Commissioned Officer in Charge of his battalion’s intelligence section. He spent over three years in South West Asia in support of the Global War on Terror conducting analysis and mission planning in support of Counter-IED operations and human targeting and collection operations. Cogan received his Bachelor of Arts in Anthropology from George Mason University in 2014. He completed his Master of Arts in Anthropology at George Mason University in 2017, where he focused his research on militarization and military identity.