RECRUITING WOMEN INTO THE WORLD WAR II MILITARY: THE OFFICE OF
WAR INFORMATION, ADVERTISING AND GENDER

by

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A Dissertation
Submitted to the
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of
George Mason University
in Partial Fulfillment of
The Requirements for the Degree
of
Doctor of Philosophy
History

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For Chris.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Office of War Information ................................................................. OWI
Office of Facts and Figures .............................................................. OFF
War Manpower Commission ............................................................. WMC
Aircraft Warning Service ................................................................. AWS
Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps ...................................................... WAAC
Women’s Army Corps .................................................................... WAC
Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service ....................... WAVES
Coast Guard - Spar .......................................................................... SPAR
United State Marine Corps Women’s Reserve ................................. USMCWR
Army Nurse Corps ......................................................................... ANC
Navy Nurse Corps ......................................................................... NNC
Cadet Nurse Corps ........................................................................ CNC
ABSTRACT

RECRUITING WOMEN INTO THE WORLD WAR II MILITARY: THE OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION, ADVERTISING AND GENDER

Zayna N. Bizri, Ph.D.

George Mason University, 2017

Dissertation Director: Dr. Christopher H. Hamner

This dissertation describes the process of recruiting women into the United States Armed Forces in World War II. The Office of War Information created and managed recruiting campaigns for all labor and military needs, including those for women. The advertisements produced at the beginning of the war were markedly different than those produced at war’s end. The changes in advertising reflected the changes in perceptions of women and gender, and transmitted those changes to the public. This dissertation uses internal Office of War Information Records as well as the public result of the conversation – the advertisements themselves – as primary sources. This dissertation argues that the change in advertisements reflected that content producers at the Office of War Information moved from viewing women only in the context of their relationships to men to viewing women as consumers and audiences in their own right.
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

In the early spring of 1943, Mary Brewster White had a problem. As the head of Womanpower Campaigns in the Office of War Information (OWI), she had to create campaigns that would result in the “voluntary mobilization of women to replace men, wherever necessary, in the many thousands of jobs and services which are vital to the maintenance of war production and community welfare.”¹ Women’s full participation would end the war all the sooner. Brewster White argued that if women knew that “working will speed the day [the war ends],”² they would take up war jobs to bring their men home sooner. One of the Women’s Army Corps’ (WAC) slogans was “Speed Them Back, Join the WAC!”³ As Brewster White outlined in a memo to Robert R. Perry,

¹ Brewster White addressed this memo to Robert R. Ferry. However, there was no such person in the system. The correspondence to Robert R. Ferry was for Robert R. Perry. Reviews of personnel directories, hiring correspondence, procedural flowcharts, and organizational memos show that correspondence was, in fact, mislabeled. It is indicative of the confusion at the Office of War Information that internal memos could be misaddressed for several months without comment. Perhaps what is most intriguing about the multiple misspelled and misaddressed mail is that it seems to have found its intended recipient without much fuss appearing in the written record. Memos and letters at the Office of War Information also misspelled Ken Beirn’s name as Biern, and often referred to Mary Brewster White as either Miss White or Mrs. White. In both cases, these correspondences also reached their recipient with little note. Womanpower Campaigns, attachment to memorandum from Mary Brewster White to Robert R. Perry, August 13, 1943, p. 1, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA hereafter), Record Group 208 - Records of the Office of War Information (RG 208 hereafter), NC 148 43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder. Emphasis original.

² Womanpower Campaigns, attachment to memorandum from Mary Brewster White to Robert R. Perry, August 13, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder, 3.

³ “Speed Them Back...Join the WAC,” Fact Sheet No. 147, August 26, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 43, Box 1, “Program – Womanpower WAC” folder, 1.
Deputy Director of the Radio Bureau in the OWI, the problem was that even though “women constitute[d] the largest single labor reserve”⁴ in the country, women were not responding to recruiting campaigns. In fact, “the public (particularly women) is becoming ‘hardened’ to government appeals in general.”⁵

In March 1943, women had already stepped into a multitude of jobs in industry and the government, replacing the men who had joined the military or moved onto higher paying war jobs.⁶ The four women’s military auxiliaries and three nursing corps were actively recruiting highly qualified women into their ranks. Military leaders wanted women to work in traditionally feminine jobs as well as traditionally masculine work.

Even before the Office of War Information was an official agency, staffers at government information agencies worked to convince the nation that women needed to work, and work in heavy industry, for the war effort to succeed. Herbert Little, of the Labor Division of the Office of Emergency Management, in a memo dated April 15, 1942 to Herbert Harris, of the War Manpower Commission, summarized the work he did with the OEM Publications section, which included several posters. Little’s third suggestion was to publish a “picture of a man and a woman working together at [a] war production machine. This would have a lot of heavy machinery in the background.”⁷ Little wanted that image to be a part of a larger educational campaign about women’s

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⁴ Womanpower Campaigns, attachment to memorandum from Mary Brewster White to Robert R. Perry, August 13, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder, 1. Emphasis original.

⁵ Ibid.


⁷ Herbert Little to Herbert Harris, memorandum, April 15, 1942, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 40, Box 143, “Manpower Commission” folder, 2.
place in wartime industries. “The caption would seek to give the idea that women belong in war industry, preferably something simple like ‘WORKING TOGETHER’.” While ultimately, only Little moved to the Office of War Information when it was established, their conversation indicated that he understood that more than women had to be recruited into industry; their entire communities had to be recruited as well.

The Office of War Information’s November 1942 publication, “War Jobs For Women” informed women interested in working for the government that “[t]he War Manpower Commission estimates that 4 ½ million women will be engaged in direct war work by the end of 1942, and 5 million by the end of 1943.” The booklet, built from War Manpower Commission figures, estimated that an additional five million women would be necessary in war-related industries by summer 1943. “In June 1942, there were 15 million women in the labor force. By June 1943, this number will have to be approximately 20 million.” Even with months of discussions behind the scenes, and informational publications circulating nationwide, the OWI still struggled with understanding its role and its audiences.

Mary Brewster White identified the problem clearly: “This whole unfortunate situation may be attributed to the fact that…we have not properly analyzed our audience.” The standard recruiting process was usually a basic call to patriotism,

8 Ibid.


10 Ibid.

11 Mary Brewster White to Robert R. Perry, memorandum, August 13, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder, 1.
without understanding the specific reasons women did or did not respond. Also, Brewster White argued that women in wartime were different than women in peacetime, and that as such, copywriters had to handle women’s campaigns differently. “Not only should we study the woman herself in wartime, but we should take into consideration that recruiting is more than just calling the individual to action.”12 She also pointed out that recruiting women necessarily meant selling entire communities on women in the military and heavy industry. “It’s a case of selling families, communities, and the nation at large on the necessity of women’s total participation in a very tough and ‘elusive’ war.”13

It was Brewster White’s job, as head of Womanpower Campaigns for the War Manpower Commission and the Office of War Information, to direct advertising campaigns that would recruit enough qualified women for all those jobs. Women’s recruitment was lagging, and she struggled to understand the problem. Throughout 1943, Brewster White showed her superiors that women’s recruitment required a new approach, different from the old methods.14 She argued that they had to sell women on the war, and to do that, the OWI had to prioritize Womanpower Campaigns rather than leaving them as the last phase of the process.15

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid. Emphasis original.

14 Mary Brewster White to Ken Beirn, memorandum, May 14, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder, 3-4.

15 Mary Brewster White to Robert R. Perry, memorandum, August 13, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder, 1-2; Mary Brewster White to Ken Beirn, memorandum, May 14, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder, 3-4.
Military recruiting needs pulled men from industry, just as industry’s manpower demands increased. “War Jobs For Women” also encouraged women to consider enlisting in the newly formed military auxiliaries. “Women who derive their greatest satisfaction from the feeling that they are actually working with the fighting forces may tally up their own qualifications against the requirements listed by the WAACS, WAVES, and WAFS.”¹⁶ Much of the proposed work for women in the armed forces was traditionally feminine work, like “operating switchboards, typing and clerical work…and librarian aides.”¹⁷ However, even in 1942, the Women’s Auxiliary Army Corps (WAAC) and Women Accepted for Voluntary Emergency Service (WAVES) recruited women to do work traditionally done by men.¹⁸ The WAAC searched for “drivers of automobiles

¹⁷ Ibid. 5-6.
¹⁸ Several scholars have delved into the mechanics of how certain jobs become associated with a specific gender, and how women worked to separate certain jobs from gender. Ruth Milkman discussed these processes at length regarding civilian work and women’s work in the 1940s. Maurine Weiner Greenwald argued that changes to gendered work roles began before World War I, which then accelerated the process of gender segregation. Susan Zieger was one of the few to consider women in the military as workers as well as soldiers, though she focused on World War I and the American Expeditionary Force. Zieger argued that the working-class women who constituted the majority of women serving with the AEF actively pushed against the boundaries of gender while carving out space for themselves in the military. These discussions only rarely touched on soldiering as an occupation for men and women, but it is clear from the scholarship that many considered and still consider soldiering to be largely men’s work. The current debates over women in combat arms and transgender soldiers reflect that. In the 1940s, military success required that military service be separated from gender. Women could be soldiers, sailors, and Marines, and part of the work of recruiting them was to convince women, and society at large, that it was possible. It is important to note that much of what this dissertation discusses relates only to white middle-class women. African American women and working-class women of all races were already members of the workforce, including working for the targeted middle- and upper-class women as domestics. See Ruth Milkman, *Gender at Work: The Dynamics of Job Segregation by Sex during World War II*, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987); Maurine Weiner Greenwald, *Women, War, and Work: The Impact of World War I on Women Workers in the United States*, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1979); Susan Zieger, *In Uncle Sam’s Service: Women Workers with the American Expeditionary Force, 1917-1919*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).
and repairers of their motors.” The WAVES searched for women with technical expertise, due to the “technical nature of many of the Navy positions to be filled.” The list of Navy jobs included seven different types of engineering: “aeronautical engineering…civil and electrical, mechanical and radio engineering…chemical engineering… and… ultra-high frequency engineers.”

How did the United States government convince women to take on military service, one of the most highly gendered roles in their society, while reassuring the nation that the women would remain feminine? The short answer is that the government, via the Office of War Information, recruited both the women and their communities simultaneously. How they did so, why they chose that particular approach, how and why they adjusted their methods of addressing women, and the consequences, both intentional and unintentional, of their efforts, are all part of the long answer this project will provide.

The OWI did not immediately begin the simultaneous recruiting campaigns. The process developed over several months, beginning shortly before women's auxiliaries existed. Initially, the OWI continued with the same methods advertisers used for women's products in the pre-war years. However, staff members like Mary Brewster White recognized that these methods were not drawing the necessary numbers and that the methods themselves were a part of the problem. Brewster White specifically identified

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20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.
conceptual issues, including the numbing similarity between all the campaigns directed primarily at women.

The crux of the issue was that advertisers and the OWI both failed to address women beyond their gendered social contexts – that is, their traditional gender roles that connected them to men. Both OWI leadership and mid-level advertisers only identified women as wives, mothers, sisters, daughters, or sweethearts, not as individuals separate from men. Advertisements depicted a patriarchal society, where women were basing their choices on what men wanted, and were only worthy of notice when they were connected to men. Men were ubiquitous through women's advertising.

Even advertisements that did not depict men referenced them somehow. For example, the text of an advertisement for bed linens, featuring a woman in the WAVES uniform, described how she was preparing her trousseau for after the war. The copy writer addressed the featured woman once, as Lieutenant, and then focused on the couple’s separation and her attempts to preserve hope for the future by preparing for married life and, therefore, her future as a household manager, once again viewing her through the lens of her relationship with a man. In the world advertisers created, men were not just women's primary concern – they were women's only concern.

As Brewster White and other program managers wrestled with the Womanpower Campaign's problems, the entire agency suffered through conflict within its senior leadership. OWI's Director, Elmer Davis, and Deputy Director, Archibald MacLeish, disagreed about the OWI's mission. Davis believed the OWI should be an informational

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clearinghouse only, while MacLeish believed the OWI needed to shape public opinion by interpreting government information.

In Davis’ estimation, the OWI existed to transmit government information, and never to attempt to influence popular opinion. “It is our business to inform the people of the facts as accurately as possible…we may not attempt to influence [policy] reconsideration.” MacLeish believed the OWI existed to generate support for government programs, and to whip up patriotic feeling – to be propagandists. Two days after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, MacLeish wrote to his friend, presidential speechwriter Robert Sherwood, that “[a] combination of rage and inability to hit back is one of the notorious combinations which produce frustration and defeatism…We have to give [the country] something to bite on and bite hard.” Though MacLeish left OWI in January 1943, program directors, project managers, and field agents still followed policies he had established.

The OWI’s information on recruiting needs came from industry and military requests, but the shifting plans resulted from internal conflicts. President Franklin D. Roosevelt created the OWI by combining an existing agency, the Office of Facts and Figures (OFF) with other, new bureaus, and installed a new director, Elmer Davis, with whom the head of the Office of Facts and Figures, Archibald MacLeish, had to collaborate.

23 Elmer Davis to All Staff Members, memorandum, March 17, 1943, NARA, RG 211, I6 124, Box 3, “Office of War Information 1943” folder, 1.

In late 1942 to early 1943, both government-produced informational and recruiting campaigns and commercially-produced advertising campaigns were integral parts of everyday life for American citizens. The Office of War Information was both an educational and an informational bureau, and controlled many government advertising campaigns. Posters like Figure 1, “That Was the Day,” and Figure 2, “Enlist In the WAVES,” from early 1943, were in the same vein as 1930s and early 1940s commercial advertisements. Those advertisements rarely presented or addressed women independently of their relationships with men. Figure 1, “That Was the Day I Joined,” showed a telegram from a wounded sailor to his sweetheart, the woman pictured in the poster. While only a few words were visible or even extrapolatable, enough was visible to make the point: “IN HOSP” “WOUND” “WORRY” “OK. LOVE DAN.” Figure 2, “Enlist in the WAVES” told its audience of women that doing so would “release a man to fight at sea.” Figure 3, “I’d Rather be with Them,” was a poster for the Women’s Army Corps similar to Figure 1. It showed a woman wearing a packed rucksack and a helmet, walking up a ship’s gangway. Figure 1 presented a scenario where the woman knew and was intimately connected to a particular man. In Figures 1 and 2, the representative women did not necessarily know the young men to which the poster connected them, but


27 “I’d Rather Be With Them,” NARA, RG 44, digital file 17-0791M, NARA ID 513498, Local ID 44-PA-235;
they were connected nonetheless. In both cases, though men are not in the posters, men are still vital components of the narrative.

Less than a year later advertisements aimed at women changed, as can be seen in Figure 4, “Don’t Miss Your Great Opportunity,” and Figure 5, “Will your name be there?” Later advertisements addressed women as individuals, with desires and motivations not dictated by a husband, father, or family. Figure 4, “Don’t Miss Your Great Opportunity,” showed two WAVES walking past a downtown harbor, with no reference to releasing men to fight at sea, or supporting a wounded sweetheart. The concluding text was a statement between the Navy and the audience of women: “The Navy needs you in the WAVES.” The poster asked for women specifically and told women that the Navy wanted them and their particular skills. Figure 5, “Will your name be there?” featured a WAVE and an honor roll, and asked women if they would serve their country with honor and distinction. Figure 6 simply showed a portrait of a woman in the WAC uniform under the declaration “Good Soldier.” There are no men referenced in these advertisements. Women are the target


audience of the advertisements, and the only actors, explicit or implied, in the advertisements’ images and copy.

Commercial advertisements in early 1943 rarely depicted women without a visible or implied relationship to a man. Some advertisements made women objects – prizes for men or props to promote the product. When women were the target audiences, advertisements showed them various products that would make their social lives more successful – that is, the products would help the user catch or keep a good husband. Some advertisements addressed women as household managers who disbursed a husband’s income, and clearly implied that the women did not earn the income themselves. Other advertisements specifically addressed working women, offering to hide the evidence of their work, so they would appear to be properly feminine.

Toushay Hand Lotion promised women that “pride-and-joy hands needn’t fear wartime jobs!” The copy promised women they could work in multiple capacities and still look as though they did not have to work: “[Toushay] guards against roughness and dryness – helps keep your hands sooth and pretty!” And the hand lotion would help her impress her sweetheart: “And when that ‘special man’ is home on leave, let Toushay help!”34 The target audience for this advertisement was the white working woman who wanted to hide the evidence that she worked. The primacy of women’s relationships with men manifested everywhere, even in feminine hygiene product advertisements. Kotex

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advertisements featured young women comfortably navigating everyday life, which always included successfully dating.  

Both before and during the war, Pond’s Cold Cream ran a series of advertisements titled “She’s Engaged! She’s Lovely!” that explicitly tied women’s high status to marriage. Featuring young, engaged-to-be-married women of high social status, the advertisements made the connection between the use of Pond’s Cold Cream and engagement explicit: “Anne’s lovely complexion is one of her chief charms…Yes-it’s no accident so many lovely engaged girls use Pond’s!” Prior to the war, Pond’s Cold Cream advertisements featured women leading glamorous, high-status lives, but their status depending on maintaining their beauty. The featured women’s success in finding a husband increased their already high status, and they used the advertised product to mimic the highest status of all – a married woman who did not work, and could afford to spend a significant amount of money on beauty treatments.

These advertisements ran in McCall’s Magazine and Better Homes and Gardens Magazine, both of which targeted upper middle class white women. Prior to 1943, both magazines emphasized that volunteer work was important for the war effort. Many women inferred that volunteering would be enough participation, but by 1943, that was no longer true. Mary Brewster White acknowledged that OWI was partly at fault for that


36 “She’s Engaged! She’s Lovely!” McCall’s Magazine, January 1943, 29.

37 Ibid.

38 “Both give their skin the Same Thorough Care,” McCall’s Magazine, June 1940, 35.
misconception: “Because we have built up the volunteer job as being the sign of service, we are having a harder time now getting women to face facts on what service really is.”  

In response to OWI’s push to change that conception, beginning in early 1943, other installments emphasized the featured woman’s paid war job over her high social status: “‘[My fiancé] would be surprised if he could see how mechanically exact I’m getting to be.’” Her statement implied three things: that her fiancé did not believe she was capable of doing war work, that she was not certain she would fill him in on the particulars of her job, and that she was not necessarily surprised at her own capability. The implication to the women reading the advertisement was that they should take paid war jobs, that they were perfectly capable of performing all kinds of industrial labor, and that they would be able to hide visible damage to their bodies done by industrial work.

Household appliances, home medical products, and home décor advertisements targeted women as household managers. Household managers disbursed the household income in rational ways, purchasing the most efficient, effective, and economical choice. The advertisement for General Electric’s Hotpoint Electric range offered “a wage-earning wife or a busy homemaker…outstanding *thrift, speed, cleanliness and convenience*” and that the range would “contribute most to the health and happiness of your household!” Household managers did not earn their own income, their husbands earned for the household. The women these advertisements targeted controlled the household’s income.

39 Womanpower Campaigns, attachment to memorandum from Mary Brewster White to Robert R. Perry, August 13, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder, 3.

40 “She’s Engaged! She’s Lovely!” *McCall’s Magazine*, February 1943, 33.

rather than a personal income. Once the United States entered the war and moved to mobilize its full population, the advertisements continued to show women that they could have it all, even as “having it all” encompassed more than before. “Mrs. America is stepping out for Victory! You may catch a glimpse of her…doing any of a dozen ‘extra duty’ jobs. And meanwhile the daily routine of her home runs on with perfect smoothness, for tiring, time-taking tasks of housework were turned over long ago to efficient, dependable electric servants.” The featured woman had patriotically increased her workload while maintaining her household, thereby fulfilling her primary duty as a household manager.

Until 1943, the Office of War Information served as a clearinghouse of sorts, with advertising companies, advertising clubs, and private individuals all sending potential advertisements and campaign ideas to them for approval or use. The OWI also had in-house creators who created advertisements that advanced OWI goals. However, the conflict at the highest levels of the OWI, between Director Elmer Davis and Deputy Director Archibald MacLeish, led to confusion, upheaval, and an eventual restructuring and reiteration of the OWI’s goals.

Even as Davis and MacLeish conflicted over the OWI’s overarching mission, people who worked in the middle management levels continued with their work as best they could. Initially, men made the majority of decisions about women’s advertising. Ken R. Dyke was an advertising professional from NBC Radio who took a position with the OWI to contribute to the war effort. He spent much of his time at the OWI balancing his

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desire to truly help the war effort with his preconceived notions on the rules of advertising.\textsuperscript{43} For much of 1942, men made decisions about women’s advertising without input from women. Men created campaign plans, commissioned the art, approved the copy, and sent proofs to production with little input from the women who worked in their office. Women filled clerical, secretarial, and other roles throughout the OFF and OWI, yet the vast majority of names on internal OFF and OWI memos from 1942 were those of men.\textsuperscript{44}

In the case of women’s advertising, the head of Womanpower Campaigns, Mary Brewster White, had to navigate changing policy directives from above while challenging the internal perception of womanpower. Brewster White began 1943 on loan to the OWI from the War Manpower Commission (WMC) before moving permanently to the Office of War Information in May 1943. She was a tireless advocate for her campaigns. The first operational plan for all Manpower campaigns placed Womanpower in the third phase, after they had established labor and military needs and had recruited the most preferred populations of men.\textsuperscript{45} Brewster White argued that womanpower campaigns would not be


\textsuperscript{44} I have necessarily focused on Womanpower Campaigns, and the records of Mary Brewster White and Natalie Davison at the National Archives and Records Administration. Even in those files, many of the memos directed toward Brewster White and Davison were also copied to several men. Multiple womanpower-focused memoranda and letters in the Records of the Office of War Information were exclusively between men. For example, Oveta Culp Hobby was the only woman to contact OWI about military recruiting; men contacted OWI for the other three women’s auxiliaries, despite each one having a woman director.

\textsuperscript{45} “Manpower Campaigns,” report, NARA, Record Group 211 – Records of the War Manpower Commission (RG 211 hereafter), I6 137, Box 1, “Campaigns – Manpower” folder, 5-6, 9.
completely successful as long as they remained “Phase 3” to OWI staff. She also argued that the campaign’s success depended on their ability to “‘sell’ the war to women.”

Mary Brewster White, Natalie Davison, Ken R. Dyke, and Ken Beirn were among the many middle level campaign managers in the Office of War Information who had to work on the doubly complex task of recruiting women during the power struggle between Elmer Davis and Archibald MacLeish. They began working toward recruiting women for the labor force, in both heavy industry as well as taking over the other jobs men were leaving behind. The OWI Womanpower Campaigns division took on military recruiting once Congress created the women’s auxiliaries in 1942 and 1943.

When the conflict over OWI’s mission at the highest levels settled in spring of 1943, many managers, campaign directors, and bureau heads reiterated their position. Mary Brewster White took advantage of atmosphere of restatements and made her case for Womanpower. She articulated the problems with earlier campaigns and explained how the OWI should move forward to successful recruiting campaigns. Firstly, she stated, “We have not properly analyzed our audience.” She argued forcefully against the old ways of marketing to women – “the humdrum, and almost phony, patriotic appeal...I’ll bet a reference to ‘keep guns, tanks and planes coming,’ ‘sacrifice,’ and ‘boys in fox holes’ is included in every one of them.” Women understood the need, she


47 Mary Brewster White to Robert R. Perry, memorandum, August 13, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder, 1.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.
argued, but OWI’s methods are not effective because women were “becoming ‘hardened’
to government appeals in general.” Brewster White also understood the social pressure
that women faced to not work. The OWI therefore needed to counter that social pressure.
“Not only should we study the woman herself in wartime, but we should take into
consideration that recruiting is more than just calling the individual to action. It’s a case
of selling families, communities, and the nation at large on the necessity of women’s total
participation in a very tough and ‘elusive’ war.”

By the end of 1943, the Office of War Information produced campaigns that
spoke directly to women, beyond their relationships to men. Advertisements addressed
women as people with their own thoughts and opinions, separate from their husbands and
fathers. While many advertisements still addressed women in their gendered social
context, this shift showed that advertisers could react to changes in society, and in some
cases, legitimate those changes. The OWI also advertised to entire communities,
attempting to chip away at all the social resistance to women in the military and women
in the workforce.

One of the unexamined assumptions among OWI and the Womanpower campaign
managers was the idea that soldiering was men’s work. Prevailing beliefs were that men
had fought for centuries, and they protected women. The military was a hypermasculine
environment, where men’s identities as soldiers were partly based in the idea that they

49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
were doing something exclusively manly. Yet even as the military ostensibly rejected women as recruits, their services were necessary as support staff, and even on the field of battle.\textsuperscript{52}

Soldiering is highly gendered work. Historically, men fought while women supported them, as camp followers, nurses, prostitutes, and wives. Prior to World War I, women did not join the military on an official basis; rather, they followed the Army and provided services to the men, some individually, as wives or laundresses, or collectively, as nurses or sutlers.\textsuperscript{53} The social development of the gendered labor of soldiering tied fighting and masculinity together. In the early twentieth century, facing manpower shortages, military leaders moved beyond hiring women as civilian contractors and began inducting them into the military. By the 1940s, supporters of the women's auxiliaries actively pushed to make non-combat support soldiering ungendered at least, or coded feminine labor. Colonel Ira Swift, in his Congressional testimony, declared switchboard operation and typing as women's work, claiming his enlisted soldiers currently doing the work were unable to perform it as proficiently as women.\textsuperscript{54}

The active work to remove gender as a part of soldiering helped informational campaigns by providing them with language they would not reasonably be able to claim


\textsuperscript{53} Holly A. Mayer, \textit{Belonging to the Army: Camp Followers and Community during the American Revolution}, (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1996), 1-22.

\textsuperscript{54} “Hearing before the Committee on Military Affairs, United States Senate, Seventy-Seventh Congress, Second Session on S. 2240, A Bill to Establish a Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps for Service with the Army of the United States,” \textit{Congressional Record, 77th Congress, Second Session}, February 6, 1942, 56 Stat. 278, Chap. 312, 27.
otherwise: that all war jobs were military support jobs. This rhetoric allowed people who worked in a war industry to count themselves part of the military. A vital war job did not have to be heavy industry, either. Secretaries and clerks also counted as necessary support staff. The OWI-produced short film, “Glamour Girls of 1943,” leaned heavily on the idea that anyone doing war work supported the military. “I have two sons in the Army. Now I’m in the Army, too, in a way.” However, all of these workers, from the Frigidaire Girls to the Soldiers of Supply, worked in support of combat soldiers, who were doing the true work of the war - the actual fighting.

To date, no scholar has addressed the effect the conflicts within OWI had on advertising, and their conceptual problem regarding women generally had on the materials they produced. Discussions of the recruiting materials for women focus on civilian women and volunteer work, and those of recruiting material for the military focus on men. Other historians have addressed part of the issue, but used different approaches than the one this project takes.

When scholars have addressed the process at the Office of War Information, they tended to focus on the highest echelons of power. While the director and deputy directors articulated the mission and procedures, they were not involved in the day-to-day process.

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of creating advertising campaigns. The current historiography addressed policy and the final product. This project addresses the interpretation and implementation of policy and the production process.

When scholars have addressed the result of the process – the posters and advertisements themselves – they focused more on civilian posters. Studies of advertising focus on the campaigns for civilian women: war jobs, war bonds, salvage, or rationing campaigns. They occasionally address military recruiting, and when they do, military women's recruiting is not their focus. Finally, scholars who have studied shifts in advertising take a much longer view and track large changes. Very often, these scholars focus on one type of recruiting material - posters, or one of the women's magazines, or the Radio Bureau. These types of studies necessarily missed the subtle, yet still significant, changes that happened over eight months in 1943.

This project builds on the existing scholarship that studied the bureaucratic structure and conflicts of the Office of War Information, civilian recruiting for women, and long-term changes in gendered advertising. To do so, I have drawn on multiple types of recruiting material - posters, magazine and radio advertisements, and films – that the OWI created and distributed during the war. I have also reviewed the internal files of the Office of War Information, from its inception and organization, through the upheaval of the power struggle between Davis and MacLeish, to their subtle changes in women's advertising in a concerted attempt to sell to women as individuals rather than extensions of men.
Ruth Milkman noted that during World War II, women entered male-dominated industries in particularly feminine jobs, an insight borne out in the armed forces. The discussion of gendered work rarely touches on soldiering as an occupation, though it is an important piece of the puzzle of gendered work. Women could be soldiers, sailors, and Marines, but only in certain positions. Part of the work of recruiting them was to convince women, and society at large, that women in the military, within reason, was good for the country and the war effort.

Carol Srole described how the theory of separate spheres, which argued that the two genders had specific, biologically determined, social roles to play, affected the development of gendered work. Men worked in public, outside of the home, and handled all interactions between the family and the outside world, because their biological or genetic makeup made them do so. Concurrently, women stayed in the home, as household managers and the primary parent. It is important to note that the separate spheres theory only applied to middle and upper-class families. Working class women, including women of color, worked outside the home before, during and after the war, though many still worked in appropriately “feminine” jobs, like domestic labor. And, as with any theory, when put into practice, there were many unexpected and unintended consequences. One was the gendering of work. For the most part, gendering work was unintentional. Employers hired people based on multiple factors, including assumptions

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about physical ability, labor availability, and industry-wide standards and traditions. Only a widespread upheaval in the labor pool, such as a sudden shift of men from industry to military work, could disrupt traditional gender patterns.\(^{59}\)

*The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information, 1942-1945*, by Allan Winkler, argued that Elmer Davis was the primary driving force at the Office of War Information, and that his ideas about what the agency’s mission should be shaped how the United States population viewed the war, and how her allies viewed her policies. Winkler focused on the highest echelons of the bureaucracy, and as a result, neglected the day-to-day labor happening at the middle levels of the organization. The people in those levels, including Ken R. Dyke, Mary Brewster White, Dorothy Ducas, and Natalie Davison, did the bulk of the work Elmer Davis approved. This project will consider the contributions of the middle level managers of the Office of War Information and the decisions they made.

Elmer Davis created the overarching policies for the Office of War Information. He set procedures and policies designed to clearly transmit Congressional legislation and presidential directives to the American public. Davis left the transmission method to the inner workings of the Office of War Information. Middle managers – that is, the people who oversaw individual campaigns and who controlled contact with creators – determined methods of communication and transmission. They worked to create clear campaigns that conflicted as little as possible. Given the speed at which circumstances changed in wartime, this was no small task. These managers, Mary Brewster White,

\(^{59}\) Milkman, 4.
Natalie Davison, Ken Dyke, Dorothy Ducas, and Ken Beirn, among others, directly oversaw and steered the bulk of the OWI’s wartime production.

Projects that studied the advertising campaigns addressed to women focused on civilian women, industrial labor, and issues of class and gender. Maureen Honey discussed women working in civilian jobs in *Creating Rosie the Riveter: Class, Gender, and Propaganda during World War II*. She focused on Dorothy Ducas and the Magazine Bureau specifically and addressed recruiting through the lens of class. Her focus on general interest magazines like the Saturday Evening Post led her to a different corpus of magazine advertisements. In *Beyond Rosie the Riveter: Women of World War II in American Popular Graphic Art*, Donna Knaff addressed campaigns for industrial workers, and also focused specifically on class issues. While Knaff’s work was much more recent than Honey’s, her focus on popular culture artwork and civilian advertisements by design overlooked military recruiting. Both authors addressed gender by necessity, because they discussed women’s issues, but both focused more on class, and very little on its intersection with gender.

To properly contextualize the Office of War Information’s womanpower and recruiting campaigns, I drew from the burgeoning historiography of women in the United States armed forces as well as the history of the advertising profession. Gender and advertising theory were also important aspects of the underlying theoretical structure of the study. The historiography of women in the United States military falls into three subsets: personal narratives, military histories of individual conflicts, and feminist and gender histories of women in the military. While these types of histories have provided
valuable context for this project, none address the specific question of recruiting women into the armed forces.  

Addressing the question of women’s military recruiting provided insight into assumptions about femininity and masculinity and appropriate work for women. It also helped clarify the question of what makes a soldier. One of the main slogans the OWI used was a variant of “Free a Man to Fight!” Discussed further in Chapter 3, the slogans implied that women were soldiers, but not fully. They would perform support work for the military, and came under military control and discipline, which smoothed military control of their staff, but the women were not soldiers in the same way the men were.  

Women’s military histories offered strong analyses of women after they entered the armed forces, but very little on their reasons for doing so. Women at War with America: Private Lives in a Patriotic Era, by D’Ann Campbell, was a study of the various work women did during World War II. Campbell only briefly addressed women’s reactions to the posters and mailers they received, and she did not address the Office of War Information’s role in recruiting women into the military. In The Home Front and Beyond: American Women in the 1940s, Susan M. Hartmann argued that women served in multiple roles that moved beyond the constricted traditional roles laid out for them. She briefly discussed women in the military in this context, but did not address recruiting. Further significant histories of women in the armed forces informed this project. Jeanne Holm’s two books, Women and War: An Unfinished Revolution and In Defense of a Nation: Servicewomen in World War II, were both overall histories of women in the United States military. Both were drawn from oral histories of veterans, and addressed reasons why women joined, but neither addressed the recruiting process. Crossed Currents: Navy Women in a Century of Change, by Jean Ebbert and Marie-Beth Hall, was a comprehensive history of the women of the United States Navy. This monograph provided a solid discussion of the creation and operation of the WAVES. Ebbert and Hall did not discuss the Navy Nurse Corps at any length, stating that the Nursing Corps deserved its own history, and they could not do it justice. Ebbert and Hall approached recruiting through memoirs. Many women mentioned their reasons for joining, though few discussed their reactions to the recruiting material they encountered.

Allan Berube’s seminal work, Coming Out Under Fire: The History of Gay Men and Women in World War II, addressed the issues of gender and sexuality in a military environment. Berube’s work had a different relationship with recruiting, because his subjects were people the military was ostensibly trying to avoid or disavow. Nevertheless, his work informs discussions of gender in the military to this day. Camp All-American, Hanoi Jane, and the High-and-Tight: Gender, Folklore, and Changing Military Culture was another monograph that addressed how interactions between gender and military culture change them both. Carol Burke argued that the presence of women changed military culture because it highlighted the inherent misogyny of the military, which prompted top-down changes. Bottom-up changes, according to Burke, took longer and were more difficult to initiate. Burke’s study is more focused on the shift in military culture that occurred after the full integration of women into the military and the disbanding of women’s auxiliaries in the 1950s.
Women did not receive combat training. Their status as auxiliaries provide the polite fiction that they were fully members of the military without the responsibility of combat.

Other histories of women in the World War II military focused on the women after they were already in the armed forces, and spent little time on recruitment. While many memoirists explained why they had joined, their stories only make up a fraction of the existing story of women in World War II.

The history of advertising, including the history of advertising in wartime and in World War II specifically, and the history of advertising through the Office of War Information were all necessary components of the historiography. The rules and norms of advertising changed during the war years, as both corporate and government advertisers scrambled to keep up with the rapidly changing world around them. Program managers, department heads, and content creators all worked to increase women in the workforce and the military through their campaigns. To successfully communicate with their target audiences – that is, women – OWI staffers learned that they needed to change the way they perceived women. Pressure from the auxiliaries to recruit more women combined with pressures from within, and from the Womanpower Campaigns department in particular, led advertisers to adjust their perceptions and, therefore, their campaigns. Women Marines were normal, if rare, and the Cadet Nurse Corps encouraged high school students to put off marriage in favor of higher education. Advertising and marketing
theories after World War II are different than they were before, and that is a result of the rapid and sometimes drastic changes of those years.\textsuperscript{61}

This project focuses on the place where the day-to-day work of the Office of War Information - the middle levels of the Bureau of Campaigns, Womanpower Campaigns, Outdoor Advertising, Bureau of Books and Magazines, and the Radio Bureau. The

\textsuperscript{61} In \textit{Advertising as Communication}, Gillian Dyer addressed World War II era advertising, but focused on civilian advertising and representations of women in those images, rather than on images speaking directly to women. In \textit{Manipulating Images: World War II Mobilization of Women Through Magazine Advertising}, Tawnya J. Adkins Covert argued that advertisers produced new images for women designed to show women how they could be, and employers that women were capable. The same argument might be made for the recruiting posters, theoretically speaking, though the primary source material is less solid. Further, Adkins Covert only addresses civilian posters, and does not address the military recruiting corpus.

Mordecai Lee addressed the issue of when public information becomes propaganda in \textit{Promoting the War Effort: Robert Horton and Federal Propaganda, 1938-1946}. Lee argued that the change happened when, instead of neutrally offering information, content creators presented information with an intent to persuade. However, Lee did not adequately address the issue of who decided when information was neutral or persuasive. Further, he also did not adequately address the difference between wartime and peacetime information. Lee discussed the Office of War Information, but kept his analysis to the highest echelons of power, and did not address the people involved in the process of creating campaigns.

In \textit{War Posters: Weapons of Mass Communication}, James Aulich argued that propaganda posters were the best method for the government to get information to the public quickly and clearly. Posters did not require literacy, could convey complex ideas to large groups quickly, and were easily translatable into multiple formats. Posters utilized common tropes to communicate ideas, so much so that some ideas became closely associated with specific images, creating a visual shorthand. Aulich focused on Great Britain’s propaganda office, and is useful as a comparative study. In \textit{Radio Goes To War: The Cultural Politics of Propaganda during World War II}, Gerd Horten argued that radio advertising during World War II helped push the rise of consumer culture in the United States. While ostensibly a public, patriotic campaign, radio advertising was also commercialized. Ad men’s role was less obvious than in World War I, which assuaged audiences’ distrust of perceived propaganda. However, the more open structure allowed ad men and non-government officials more leeway in creating campaigns. Horten identified a major problem with the Office of War Information – that there were too many leaders and not enough followers. I qualify that statement – there are too many leaders at the bureau chief level, and very little control coming from above that level. This, combined with the outsourcing of ideas and campaign material production, resulted in less control by the OWI than many perceived. Horten studied largely radio advertisements, and only briefly discussed print advertising campaigns. This project dovetails with Horten’s to some degree. In \textit{The Hollywood Propaganda of World War II}, Robert Fyne argued that movies developed along specific pathways dictated by the Office of War Information. The OWI directed production to increase recruiting, and in at least the case of “So Proudly We Hail,” military recruiters waited in the lobby so that audiences would pass them after seeing the movie. Fyne focused more on the connection between Hollywood and the Office of War Information, and did not discuss print advertising beyond movie posters for specific films.
directors and program managers of these bureaus translated Davis and MacLeish’s interpretations of governmental and presidential policy into campaigns with themes, slogans, goals, and, eventually, advertisements. The highest levels of the bureaucracy, the Director and Assistant Directors, were not involved in the day-to-day operation of the agency. To understand the process of the changes that happened over the course of 1943, one must follow the operations of the place where those changes happened.

The posters and magazine advertisements required a close reading of the copy, or the text, as well as the images themselves. Advertisements were public, needed to be immediately legible to a broad audience, and needed to stand out from other, competing claims on the audience’s attention. However, advertisements also often had secondary, more subtle messages that reflected the creator’s assumptions or existing social norms. For example, Figure 7, “Proud – I’ll Say!” showed a man holding his daughter’s official WAVES portrait. The man’s lined face and kindly expression, the street scene behind him, complete with identifiable pieces of Americana, evoked a sense of homeliness, comfort, and peace. The man could be any woman’s father, and the WAVE could be any man’s daughter. The only text on the poster was the title, “Proud – I’ll say” and the statement “Join the WAVES.” At first blush, this advertisement did two things at once: it openly asked women to join the Navy and showed them that their parents would be proud of them. However, the poster also subtly reassured parents that they could be proud of their daughters in uniform, despite the strangeness of women in the military. The poster also implied that military service for women was a reason for familial pride. Extra layers

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of meaning in the posters enhanced each message individually. The fact that this poster used a father rather than a mother also implied that the important family member to convince was a man. Taken together, the multi-layered messages revealed creators’ assumptions about what the public valued, what information people had, and what work advertisers would have to do to achieve their ends.

The chaos of the OWI’s first months included a striking amount of staff turnover. To fully understand tonal changes and shifting subtexts of the OWI’s internal communication, this dissertation carefully tracks people through their careers, as agencies loaned staff to each other, and as people left for different opportunities in the midst of campaign preparation. For example, Mary Brewster White began 1943 as a member of the War Manpower Commission’s staff, though she was working far more closely with Ken Beirn at the Office of War Information. She became a member of the OWI on May 20, 1943. Ken Beirn joined the Office of War Information in October 1942, as a new hire for the growing agency. Alternatively, Ken R. Dyke had been a staff member of the Office of Facts and Figures, and came over to the OWI with Archibald MacLeish after the inclusion of the OFF in the OWI. Dyke left the OWI in early 1943, around the same time MacLeish did, while Brewster White and Biern stayed with the agency.

Brewster White’s status change had an immediate effect on her communication style and content. While still with the War Manpower Commission, Brewster White maintained a gentler, more conciliatory tone in her communications with OWI. Her letters and memos presented concerns, and she offered solutions for Dyke and, later,

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Biern to consider, though she never assigned blame to the OWI. Even her last communication on the Womanpower Campaigns before her transfer, dated May 14, 1943, wondered at why the campaigns were not as successful as they should have been, and presented issues and solutions for someone else’s final approval and implementation. Three months after her transfer, Brewster White sent a memo that clearly, and quite forcefully, stated both the problems with Womanpower Campaigns and their sources, thereby placing the blame for the first time. Further, beginning in August 1943, Brewster White demanded, rather than requested, changes. Armed with her new permanent status at the OWI, Brewster White dropped the veneer of gentle persuasion. She marshalled all the data she could muster, including progress reports, program evaluations, proposed timetables for existing campaigns, and sent her superiors a comprehensive description of both the issues of the past several months and an organized action plan to implement her solutions for those issues.

Comparing internal OWI and OFF communications with the advertising materials they produced revealed the effects of the conflict between Elmer Davis and Archibald MacLeish. The resulting shakeup in staff and a reiteration of the OWI’s mission to inform the American public affected the type of material produced significantly. The comparison further shows that campaign leads like Mary Brewster White took steps to increase the success of their campaigns by addressing content creators’ existing assumptions about women and their motivations. The OWI’s advertisements changed over the course of 1943 in response to both sets of pressures.
This dissertation uses the conflict at the Office of War Information as the central timeline. As each chapter discusses the OWI structure and political maneuvering, it also discusses how the people of OWI perceived and addressed women audiences. As OWI shifted and changed with resignations and new hires, so did representations of women in the materials OWI produced.

Chapter Two discusses the creation of the OWI and the main actors. President Franklin D. Roosevelt tapped Elmer Davis, a prominent journalist, to head the new organization. The new agency included the prior information bureau, the Office of Facts and Figures, and its director, Archibald MacLeish. MacLeish lost his political position as an agency director in the reorganization. The chapter argues that MacLeish and Davis had similar, though subtly conflicting visions for the Office of War Information’s direction and mission, and their conflict over high policy had repercussions for the organization and the material they produced.

Chapter Three covers the creation of women’s auxiliaries and the state of women-oriented advertising in the pre-war years. Prior to the war, advertisements framed their audiences in gendered social contexts. That is, creators only imagined women in connection with men. Advertisers produced content that presumed the female viewing audience made all their choices based on what the men in their life wanted. Advertisers sold products to wives, to mothers, to daughters, to sweethearts, and to sisters, but very rarely to women.

Chapter Four covers the events leading up to the conflict and the developing divisions. The conflict between Davis and MacLeish began before the OWI’s creation.
MacLeish, a famed poet and serving as the Librarian of Congress, wanted his agency, the Office of Facts and Figures, to take a more active role in curating government information, while still providing as much information as possible. He hoped the new organization would help with that. Davis, on the other hand, believed the OWI needed to control information more carefully than the OFF. Davis believed that the OWI should only present information, and let the public draw the necessary conclusions. The disconnect between the two men, and the conflict between those two views, led to conflicting instructions and procedures for the agency. The resulting confusion in the halls of the OWI reflected in the confusing and conflicting advertisements they produced.

Chapter Five explains the power struggle itself, and the immediate resolution. While the conflict between Davis and MacLeish was important in shaping OWI’s mission and official procedures, it had a much smaller effect at the middle management level, though Davis had to reiterate his position multiple times after MacLeish’s departure.

Chapter Six covers the aftermath of the conflict, and the resulting shifts in policy and production throughout the OWI. The people who continued producing material throughout the high-level conflict continued their work after it ended. The middle managers, the department heads, the campaign leads, and the liaisons with commercial and government agencies all continued their work. Davis’ moves to refocus the OWI on informational campaigns only resulted in changes in procedure and the content they produced, as departments reassessed the pre-conflict studies and plans for creating advertisements.
Chapter Seven analyzes the records from the summer of 1943 as the remaining staff found their footing and restructured their campaigns. The power struggle faded to the background as people in the Womanpower Campaigns division struggled with their recruiting advertisements. Mary Brewster White presented her findings from multiple visits around the country. She also argued more forcefully for a deliberate change in how advertisements addressed women. She deliberately challenged the idea that women existed only in gendered social contexts, and pushed for direct advertisements to women as individuals, not as extensions of men. The changes she argued so strongly for showed visibly in the content produced in the latter part of 1943. By the end of 1943, advertisements addressed individual women, offering them the same incentives as men, and assumed that women were equally as patriotic as men and just as willing to serve.

Even as Elmer Davis and Archibald MacLeish struggled over the direction and mission of the Office of War Information, another, more intimate struggle took place within Womanpower Campaigns. The struggle to see women beyond their relationships to men, to understand women outside of their gendered social roles, and to speak to them as individuals, rather than as offshoots of men, was part of a longer, overarching challenge to the way advertisers and recruiters conceptualized women. As Mary Brewster White said, “It’s quite an assignment, methinks.”

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64 Mary Brewster White to Robert R. Perry, Memorandum, August 13, 1943, NARA, RG 208 NC-148, E-43, Box 1, “Program Manpower” folder, 3.
CHAPTER TWO: TALK AND TEETH: THE TRANSITION FROM THE OFFICE OF FACTS AND FIGURES TO THE OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION

In November 1942, the Office of War Information Bureau of Campaigns and the War Manpower Commission circulated their plans “for a campaign to condition the minds of men, women and even children to the changes and sacrifices which such a vast program entails, and to promote willing cooperation.”\(^{65}\) The campaign plan addressed a multitude of concerns about local and national campaigns, job-hopping, training for new workers, and how to tailor campaigns to various media, including radio, magazines, newspapers, and movies. The campaign plan placed recruiting women in Phase #3 of the plan, along with “a drive to stimulate transfers from non-war to war jobs,” “a drive to recruit part-time farm help,” and a campaign to “get workers to ‘stay on the job’ and avoid unnecessary absenteeism.”\(^{66}\) Recruiting women was, at best, a back-burner issue, and at worst, barely considered at all.

The United States government and military leadership attempted to collaborate on both the creation and staffing of the newly created women’s services.\(^{67}\) The branches


\(^{66}\) Ibid. 9.

\(^{67}\) Other historians, like D’Ann Campbell, Mattie E. Treadwell, Doris Weatherford, Mary T. Sarnecky, Jean Ebbert and Mary-Beth Hall, and Jeanne Holm, have covered the creation of the various women’s auxiliaries, though few address recruiting in great detail.
themselves handled recruiting in the first months of the auxiliaries’ existence, either by the auxiliary or the branch’s Public Relations or Procurement Divisions. The November Manpower Campaign Plan did not address the thorny problem of recruiting women into the military. It focused on recruiting men for war work, and barely considered women, much less the issues of recruiting women into the armed forces.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt considered and planned for wartime government informational control well before the United States’ involvement in World War II. He issued Executive Order 8922 on October 24, 1941, creating the Office of Facts and Figures six weeks before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Strained relations between Japan and the United States meant that many anticipated war, and even attacks on Pearl Harbor, but few believed the harbor itself would be attacked. Even so, both military and civilian leaders prepared for the threat of war, watching both German and Japanese advances. The United States government did not have an equivalent position to Joseph Goebbels’ as Propaganda Minister. Archibald MacLeish, poet and Librarian of Congress, and Robert Sherwood, playwright and presidential speechwriter, both worked to create the first American propaganda agency.

MacLeish spent the first six weeks of directorship organizing the new agency, and, in his estimation, the attack on Pearl Harbor made OFF’s role even more important.

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On December 9, 1941, he wrote to Robert Sherwood, both as a friend and as a presidential speechwriter. He recognized that an immediate military response was unlikely: “Let’s assume that offensive action on our part is now unlikely in the near future.” But he also realized that unless the government provided a useful outlet for people’s emotional responses, it would turn into “frustration and defeatism,” something the government could not afford. His idea of shaping public opinion through information dissemination came through in his suggestions for President Roosevelt’s next speech. “What we have to then is to give the country a substitute for offensive action.” He made several points about American manufacturing capability and the American public’s psychology, and offered ways to present that information most favorably for government purposes. “The loss we suffered at Pearl Harbor was a heavy loss. For any other country it might have been a disaster. But for this country, with its tremendous productive capacity, it was not a disastrous loss.” “Let’s assure them – and let’s give them the President’s assurance in explicit terms – that the American navy, if it was caught napping once, won’t be caught napping again.” These statements reflected accurate facts with a positive spin – an aggressive optimism, colored with rage, but already focused on victory.

Prior to the OWI, Roosevelt created the Office of Facts and Figures (OFF) to “formulate programs designed to facilitate a widespread and accurate understanding of the status and progress of the national defense effort and of the defense politics and activities of the Government; and advise with the several departments and agencies of the Government concerning the dissemination of such defense information,” and appointed

71 Archibald MacLeish to Robert Sherwood, 9 December 1941, found in Winnick, Letters of Archibald MacLeish, 307-308.
Archibald MacLeish its first director. The OFF was part of the Office for Emergency Management in the Executive Office of the President, and also “[made] available…such information and data as [the Director] may deem necessary to facilitate the most coherent and comprehensive presentation to the Nation of the facts and figures of national defense.”

Archibald MacLeish’s directorship helped shape OFF’s policies and procedures, while cleaving to its stated task of “dissemination of factual information to the citizens of the country on the progress of the defense effort and on the defense policies and activities of the Government.” While the OFF had some funding to “employ necessary personnel and make provision for the necessary supplies, facilities, and services,” the initial organization did not include a section for campaign direction, content creation, or even a cohesive set of policies and procedures. MacLeish’s beliefs about propaganda’s role in wartime information shaped both OFF policy and procedure and his conflict with Elmer Davis at the OWI.

The newly created governmental information agency, the Office of War Information (OWI), took over military recruiting piecemeal over the winter of 1942 to 1943. President Franklin D. Roosevelt created the OWI “[i]n recognition of the American people and of all other peoples opposing the Axis aggressors to be truthfully informed

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73 Ibid.

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid.
about the common war effort…”76 with Executive Order 9182, on June 13, 1942. The Office of War Information was built from the Office of Facts and Figures, the Office of Government Reports, the Foreign Information Service, Outpost, Publications, and Pictorial Branches of the Coordinator of Information’s office, and the Division of Information of the Office for Emergency Management.77 Following the merger, new OWI divisions included the Bureau of Graphics, the Books and Magazine Bureau, and the Bureau of Campaigns.78

The OWI’s primary function was to “[f]ormulate and carry out, though the use of press, radio, motion picture, and other facilities, information programs designed to facilitate the development of an informed and intelligent understanding, at home and abroad, of the status and progress of the war effort and of the war policies, activities, and aims of the Government.”79 Another function was to “[r]eview, clear, and approve all proposed radio and motion picture programs sponsored by Federal departments and agencies; and serve as the central point of clearance and contact for the radio broadcasting and motion-picture industries, respectively, in their relationships with Federal departments and agencies covering such Government programs.”80 The federal government was now in advertising business.

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid.


The Office of War Information’s first director was Elmer Davis. Davis, a journalist and radio commentator wholeheartedly accepted the OWI’s mission as laid out in the Executive Order. As Director, Davis reported directly to President Roosevelt and had the power to implement the OWI’s stated functions as he saw fit.81 As Director, Davis had a surprising level of authority and power. He not only created policy for the OWI, several of his policies affected other agencies, and they were obligated to comply with OWI instructions: “The Director is authorized to issue such directives concerning war information as he may deem necessary …and such directives shall be binding upon the several Federal departments and agencies.”82 Further, Davis had the authority to determine what information required OWI approval: “He may establish by regulation the types and classes of informational programs and releases which shall require clearance and approval by his office prior to dissemination.”83 This power was balanced by the directive that Davis “and the Director of Censorship shall collaborate in the performance of their respective function for the purpose of facilitating the prompt and full dissemination of all available information which will not give aid to the enemy.”84 Finally, Davis had the authority to recreate the OWI as he saw fit, removing inefficient or ineffective bureaus: “The Director may require the curtailment or elimination of any

80 Ibid.

81 Winkler, Politics of Propaganda, 1-20.


83 Ibid.

84 Ibid.
Federal information service, program, or release which he deems to be wasteful or not directly related to the prosecution of the war effort.”

The Office of War Information was a dual pathed organization, with an International Branch and a Domestic Branch. In addition to Davis’ collaboration with the Director of Censorship, he also worked with the Defense Communications Board, to “facilitate[e] the broadcast of war information to the peoples abroad.” The Domestic Branch had control over the Bureau of Books and Magazines (combined in the reorganization from two separate divisions into one), the Outdoor Section, which exclusively developed outdoor advertisements, or billboards, the Bureau of Graphics, and the Bureau of Campaigns. The initial structure of the Committee on War Information included a group of writers, researchers, and artists to produce campaigns. However, their staff was housed separately from the decision makers in Operations, Intelligence, and Government Liaison offices. The Bureau of Magazines dealt with those periodicals, and the Bureau of Newspapers covered daily publications. The Foreign Language Division of the Office of Facts and Figures, tasked with liaising with foreign language periodicals in the United States, moved to the Office of War Information in the reorganization. The Bureau of Campaigns created the major advertising efforts and informational programs for the Office of War Information.

85 Ibid.

86 Ibid. While the operations of the International Bureau constituted a significant portion of the OWI’s activities, they are beyond the scope of this project.

Archibald MacLeish was the Director of the Office of Fact and Figures, with all the duties and privileges outlined in Executive Order 8922 listed above.88 MacLeish was already a celebrated American poet and serving as the Librarian of Congress in 1941. The OFF, with MacLeish at its head, existed for roughly seven months. In that time period, MacLeish recruited OFF staff who eventually made the transition to OWI, understood the need to tap into public opinion and emotion, and recognized that a successful informational bureau would be barely noticed by the public.89

MacLeish struggled with his agency’s role in the government – the OFF was mainly an advisory body and mouthpiece for the government. They had no control over what information was disseminated to the American public, only that it was. The OFF was not a content creating agency and as such, was often as much in the dark about events as the rest of the nation. Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, MacLeish and the rest of the OFF had the same information as everyone else in the United States – that which had been released for radio news broadcasts.90

The OWI’s creation addressed many of the issues the OFF had faced. The new agency had authority the old one did not. The OWI also included several other competing agencies. MacLeish became the Assistant Director of the Office of War Information,


89 Archibald MacLeish to Grace Tully, 4 December 1941, 306; Archibald MacLeish to Robert Sherwood, 9 December 1941, 307-308; Archibald MacLeish to Felix Frankfurter, 9 April 1942, 311-313. All found in Winnick, Letters of Archibald MacLeish.

90 Donaldson, Archibald MacLeish, 350-351.
subordinate to Elmer Davis. 91 One of his duties was ostensibly to create a cohesive policy, but Davis maintained control and created what MacLeish referred to as “high policy.” 92 Despite his high position, MacLeish again found himself defanged.

MacLeish accepted a new position at the Office of War Information in the reorganization. He still believed that first the OFF and then the OWI had a responsibility to maintaining morale. In letter to James Allen, Assistant Director of the Domestic Branch, written after he left the OWI, MacLeish tried to explain what the OFF had tried to do, and what he felt the OWI should continue to do: “Papers as good as the Washington Post sneered at us for concerning ourselves with the ‘morale’ of the people – as though the morale of a great nation in time of war were a matter of no concern – or as though the only people entitled to concern themselves with questions of that kind were the boys who made a living out of selling papers.” 93 MacLeish’s ideas about what information the American public should hear, and how they should hear it, conflicted with those of Elmer Davis. The resultant power struggle had profound effects on the middle managers of the Office of War Information.

Immediately following the reorganization, leadership had to create new policies and procedures and then implement them. The Bureau of Intelligence organized the initial studies of war information control and created the first sets of procedures used by the Office of War Information, including decisions about what informational and

91 Organizational Chart for Committee on War Information, 1942, NARA, RG 208, NC-148, 3B, Box 2, “Advertising Div. Corres. 1942” folder.

92 Donaldson, Archibald MacLeish, 362.

93 Archibald MacLeish to James Allen, 12 October 1943, found in Winnick, Letters of Archibald MacLeish, 319.
advertising campaigns would be created. At the same level of the organization, that is, equal to but independent of the Bureau of Intelligence, was the Bureau of Operations, which included the Advertising Division. Separate from both the Bureau of Intelligence and Operations was the Bureau of Production, where the creation process happened. In this organizational structure, the development process was slow and awkward. As such, the organizational chart noted some initial program assignments as well. For example, Allen Grover, Archibald MacLeish’s man from the beginning of the OFF’s tenure, handled the initial Army and Navy programs.94

A handwritten flow chart of the Office of Facts and Figures operations proposed a process to include the new Office of War Information in their production. This flow chart showed the main sources of ideas and the process of getting those ideas into production. Idea sources were listed as “OFF Campaign Coordinator,” “Plans for action suggested by intelligence report,” “new ideas from outside,” and “campaign plans from other govt departments.” The four inputs covered all possible sources, and broke down government-sourced ideas into two different categories. This showed the variety of ideas, input, sources, and commentary the Office of Facts and Figures had to deal with. Each source stream would send ideas to the plan board, which then went to a campaign coordinator. Here, if the idea was tentatively approved, additional work was done: additional research, checking with the Bureau of Intelligence, and then finally preparing a plan of action. The plan had to allow for multiple methods of deployment: “Including use, wherever possible

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and advisable of all above channels.” The plan was then resubmitted to the Plan Board for approval, and only then would it be sent to the Office of War Information for final review and approval.\footnote{Flow Chart OFF Operations,” draft, 1942, NARA, RG 208, NC-148 3B, Box 2, “Advertising Div. Corres. 1942” folder.}

The undated flow chart indicated the struggles facing the newly formed bureaucracy. Even when streamlined, the convoluted process still required that planners account for ten separate methods of campaign deployment. The planning board was involved twice in the process, first to decide if an idea was worth researching, and secondly to decide if the proposed method was worth spending more time and funds.

Several memos that reiterating policies and procedures circulated in the summer of 1943. Mary Brewster White sent a memo dated June 22, 1943, to Robert H. Perry, outlining the clearance process for Womanpower campaigns. “In the preparation of material for the Womanpower Program it has been necessary to clear with the following agencies in order to avoid conflicting statements, encroachment upon policy, and general confusion…”\footnote{Mary Brewster White to Robert H. Perry, “Clearance of WOMANPOWER Material,” June 22, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder.} The following list of thirteen agencies including the War Department, Women’s Bureau of the Department of Labor, the War Production board, and the Office of Education. Certain publications, including speeches, had to be cleared through the Office of Price Administration.\footnote{Ibid.} The memo laid bare the complexity of OWI procedures.

OWI procedures were necessarily complicated, even without the added confusion of the mid-1943 power struggle. The highest levels had a clear hierarchy, from Director
down to Assistant Director, down to the Planning Board. However, the middle levels, those that reported to directly to the Planning Board, had to coordinate the day-to-day function of the OWI. The Bureaus of Intelligence, Operations, and Campaigns, were all at the same level and had equal authority. The Bureau of Campaigns created a wide variety of campaigns. Some were straightforward, like “War Production.” Others explained international politics, such as those under the headings “United Nations” and “The Enemy.” Finally, some campaigns, like “The Issues” and “Sacrifice” had to solidify abstract ideas into something comprehensible to the wide American audience. The Bureau of Campaigns also housed a Writers’ Bureau and a Research Division to create the content. However, they did not control distribution. The Bureau of Operations controlled campaign transmission and distribution, with subordinate departments for Radio, Press, Magazines, Motion Pictures, Advertising, and Trade Press.  

Another undated procedural flow chart, another attempt to clarify the process, showed the confusion about the new organization’s mission and process. The chart tracks the process using a central box tree, with the questions on the left and the process to answer the questions on the right. From top to bottom, the central box tree sections are “Facts about the Public,” “Facts about Govt. Activities,” “Policy on Information and Promotion,” “Co-Ordination Priorities and Allocation,” “Planning,” and “Execution.”

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99 The undated procedural flow chart is filed immediately after “Flow Chart OFF Operations” referenced in the prior paragraph, though it is not attached. The flow chart also references early issues for the OWI, including priorities, planning schema, and general policies and procedures. Therefore, I roughly estimated its date to the middle of 1942, as first the OWI was proposed, and then the OFF transformed into the OWI, and the process and mission needed clarification.
The first two “facts” sections were to take place early in the process, during an information gathering phase. The middle two covered the bureaucratic procedure, and the final two covered the production of the final product.\textsuperscript{100}

For example, the first section, “Facts about the Public,” was the fact-finding and market research phase of the process. According to the procedural chart, the Bureau of Intelligence would conduct “Research – Surveys – Polls” to determine public opinion and consciousness and to plot a general “path for plans and action.” The third section, “Policy on Information and Promotion,” included the question, “Have events changed policies?” The response was “Establishment of broad policies on propaganda, information, education, co-ordination, contracts with business and public” – which would not necessarily answer the question about policy changes. The fifth section, “Planning,” was finally where balancing the needs of different programs came into effect. The final section was “Execution,” the point in the procedure where the materials were created.\textsuperscript{101}

Even with the multiple attempts to clarify the organizational structure and to clarify the communication channels, difficulties from the chaotic birth and subsequent reorganization of wartime informational offices led to crossed wires and unclear communication. A particularly large blunder in March 1942 involved department heads and an external organization, the Advertising Council.\textsuperscript{102} A member of the Bureau of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{100} Procedural Flow Chart, draft, 1942, RG 208, NC-148 3B, Box 2, “Advertising Div. Corres. 1942” folder.
\item \textsuperscript{101} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{102} The Advertising Council was a group of advertising executives who collated information and statistics on the advertising industry and provided contacts to the Office of Facts and Figures and later the Office of War Information. The chairman of the Advertising Council, Miller McClintock, had an active and cordial correspondence with both Allen Grover and Ken R. Dyke.
\end{itemize}
Intelligence, Eugene Katz, sent a request to multiple advertising agencies in New York City, requesting “studies dealing with readership and expenditures for various media.” That sort of information fell under the aegis of the Advertising Council, and several of the men he contacted were members. Dr. Miller McClintock, the chairman of the Advertising Council, contacted Allen Grover at the Office of Facts and Figures for clarification.

While this may seem to be a small infraction, it had the potential to create distrust, along with the confusion it already created. McClintock noted that the members were confused, because the Advertising Council had been organized specifically to “have a channel through which information of this kind could be handled.” When McClintock wrote to Allen Grover on March 23, he hoped to alleviate the confusion caused by the March 17 letters. Grover’s rapid response of March 25 expressed not only the desire to maintain a good relationship with the Advertising Council and McClintock, but also the lack of communication within his organization. Katz had not known about the Advertising Council, though he had since been updated on the proper communication channels. Grover closed with the comment that no one was at fault for the lack of knowledge, but the exchange illuminated the confused communications at the Office of Facts and Figures.

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103 Organizational Chart for proposed Office of War Information, draft, 1942, NARA, RG 208, NC-148 3B, Box 2, “Advertising Division Advertising Copy” folder.


Another indicator of the confusion at the newly forming Office of War Information was an office-wide memo sent by William B. Lewis, Assistant Director of the Bureau of Operations on May 22, 1942, following discussion of a separate incident involving the War Department. Director Archibald MacLeish “emphasized the long-standing policy of the OFF that conversations and negotiations with other departments of Government take place through the deputies assigned to such departments.”

Communication between departments was to be through official channels only, and the ad hoc, personalized negotiation style of the commercial advertising men conflicted with the structure of the bureaucracy.

Early on, the Office of Facts and Figures’ main function was to disseminate information about the war effort. To do so effectively, they created a list of Six War Information Objectives that they would relate to all coming campaigns. The first official distribution of the Six War Information Objectives was with the Radio War Guide, Number One, released April 27, 1942. In several cases, Ken R. Dyke would forward the Radio War Guide to interested magazine and newspaper editors, as the guide for them was still in production in April 1942. The Radio War Guide was a poster for display in program managers’ offices as a quick memory aid.

President Roosevelt outlined his plans for prosecuting and winning the oncoming war in his State of the Union address on January 6, 1942. Just one month after the attack

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on Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt argued that the attack had been part of a larger plan between the Nazis and the Japanese, to “stun us – to terrify us to such an extent that we would divert our industrial and military strength to the Pacific area, or even to our own continental defense.” Roosevelt went on to deny the power of the attack, and spoke of how the United Nations would work together to defeat fascism. He declared the Axis powers were enemies of democracy and freedom, and outlined the so-called “Four Freedoms” that continued to resonate: “Freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear everywhere in the world.”

The OWI worked on materials based on the Four Freedoms, including pamphlets and artwork, most famously by Norman Rockwell. They also built the speech’s themes into their Radio Advertising Guide, calling them the Six War Information Objectives.

Roosevelt’s speech laid out the method the United States would use to win the war. These objectives were the basis for the Six War Information Objectives, and the Radio Advertising Guide referenced the 1942 State of the Union address, in which Roosevelt first explained the objectives.

1. THE ISSUES. - What we are fighting for ... why we fight.
2. THE ENEMY. - The nature of our adversary... Whom we fight.


109 MacLeish attempted to turn the Four Freedoms into a pamphlet written by leading American philosophers in each of the fields. The end result was “a collection of abstractions,” and did not perform well. Donaldson, Archibald MacLeish, 352-353. Norman Rockwell remembered his “Four Freedoms” experience with the OFF negatively, stating that they had not seemed to want his artwork, despite his already impressive resume as the nation’s premier illustrator. He completed his series without official sanction, and they were published as cover art for the Saturday Evening Post. See Maureen Hart Hennessey, “The Four Freedoms,” in Norman Rockwell: Pictures for the American People, Maureen Hart Hennessey and Anne Knutson, eds. (New York: Harry N. Abrams, Inc., 1999), 95-102.
3. THE UNITED NATIONS AND PEOPLES. - *Our brothers-in-arms...With whom we are allied in fighting.*

4. WORK AND PRODUCTION. - *The war at home...How each of us can fight.*

5. SACRIFICE. - *What we must give up to win the fight.*

6. THE FIGHTING FORCES. - *The job of the fighting man at the front.*

The Six War Information Objectives informed many decisions made at all levels of production, from the Planning Board to the artists. However, the Six Information Objectives, while useful as an initial concept, were too inflexible to continue to be useful over long periods of time. Eventually, the Six War Information Objectives became Seven, then returned to Six, though the new list placed the objectives in a different order.

War Information Objectives One, Three, Four, and Five remained constant throughout the tenure of the OFF and the OWI, even as they changed places on the list. Despite the fluctuation, the constant themes of sacrifice, reasons to fight, the need to maintain high production numbers, and support for our Allies were all present in both the internal documented conversation and the public recruiting material.

The OWI Bureau of Campaigns had the most control over women’s recruitment campaigns. The Bureau chiefs, directors, and program managers’ primary goals were to get women into the armed services without alienating the women or the wider society. They did not set out to change gender roles, social constructions of femininity and masculinity, or to weaken the gendering of work. Yet all of those were results of the advertising campaigns they constructed.

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Though all branches explicitly stated that they were not in competition with each other, in fact, all the groups were vying for recruits from a very small pool of highly qualified women. For example, the Navy created their women’s auxiliary, the WAVES, in response to the burgeoning manpower crisis. They needed a recruiting campaign that would entice highly qualified women to their ranks, away from the competing WAAC. The “Joint Army-Navy Agreement on Recruiting Women for the Women’s Reserve of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard,” (Joint Army-Navy Agreement) dated September 16, 1943, gave all recruiting for women’s military groups to the OWI. The agreement made the WAAC, WAVES, United States Coast Guard Women’s Reserve (SPAR), and the United States Marine Corps Women’s Reserves (USMCWR) officially part of Womanpower Campaigns. The Army Nurse Corps (ANC) and Navy Nurse Corps (NNC) had separate recruiting programs, but the Cadet Nurse Corps (CNC) was always under OWI control.  

Prior to the Joint Army-Navy Agreement, the OWI and the different branches handled recruiting. Missions overlapped, which caused confusion on both sides. The OWI worked primarily on WAVES campaigns and both civilian and military nurse recruiting, though they did also produce WAAC materials. The OWI did not produce much material for SPAR or the USMCWR prior to the Joint Army-Navy Agreement.

The Chief Advertising Liaison, Ken R. Dyke, a former ad man with NBC, found his OFF job “most stimulating and the problems involved are of course so much more

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111 Joint Army-Navy Agreement of Recruiting of Women for the Women’s Reserve of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard; 16 September 1943, NARA, RG 208, Materials for Information Campaigns, 4/1/1943-10/31/1943, NC 148 43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder.
important than those which any of us have ever had personal contact with, that each day is bound to be exciting and unusually interesting.”

He set out to create campaigns that would resonate with women that would still bring them into traditionally male work. Many industries only hired men to work on the factory floor, largely out of traditions that reinforced hiring managers’ perceptions that women were incapable of heavy industrial labor. The resulting campaigns presented an expanded view of what work women could do and women could be. Another of the main jobs of the Womanpower Campaign was to convince the nation that women were as equally able as men to perform masculine-coded jobs.

The OWI still perceived women as exclusively tied to men at this early juncture. The women they addressed were housewives and mothers living in communities that expected those women to remain housewives and mothers. When they recognized that social pressure was a problem, that women were staying home because of fears of what the neighbors or their menfolk would think, the OWI adjusted their focus to include addressing those fears. Question and answer sheets, fact sheets, and sample copy sent to advertisement creators all hammered on the fact that it was now socially acceptable for women to work. In fact, it would soon be socially unacceptable to not work: neighbors would judge a woman without small children for not joining the workforce. This play to get women into the workforce was also a play to convince the nation that working


113 Milkmans, *Gender at Work*, 3-4.

women were vital, necessary, patriotic, and would soon be normal. The play to change how Americans perceived gendered work resulted in the change in gendered expectations.\textsuperscript{115}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{115} Supplement (A) to the US Government Campaign on Manpower, Covering Womanpower, February 3, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC-148 E-43, Box 1, “Program Manpower” folder, 5.}
CHAPTER THREE: FREE A MAN TO FIGHT: WOMEN’S AUXILIARIES AND WOMEN’S CAMPAIGNS

In April 1943, the Office of War Information circulated a recruiting poster for the WAVES titled “There’s a Man-Size job for you in Your Navy.” (Figure 8) The poster featured a young woman in the WAVES uniform foregrounded before a depiction of a sea-based battle between airplanes and a ship. There was little else to the poster – no description of what the “man-size” jobs would entail, or even what they were, just an exhortation to “Enlist in the WAVES!”116 This direct appeal to patriotism fell in line with appeals to men. The poster also showed the key problem facing Womanpower campaigns in particular, and advertising aimed at women in general: advertisers still conceptualized women in their gendered social context – as daughters, sweethearts, wives and mothers, rather than as individuals. The Navy recast traditionally men’s jobs as women’s work, but only due to the emergency.

In fact, women were already performing men’s work in the Navy and Army, even before Congress passed the laws creating the WAVES117 and WAAC118 in 1942. Admiral


117 An Act To expedite the war effort by releasing officers and men for duty at sea and their replacement by women in the shore establishment of the Navy, and for other purposes, Public Law 77-689, US Statutes at Large, 77 (1942), 730-731.
Randall Jacobs testified before the House Committee on Naval Affairs on April 15, 1942, and argued that women could easily take over many naval jobs, allowing the men filling them to serve at sea, thereby resolving the existing manpower shortage and preventing a worse one from developing. “The duties contemplated include…crypt-analysis work…photographic interpretation, statistical work, and so forth, now being performed by junior officers and enlisted men in the various ratings…The shortage [of seagoing men], while serious now, promises to become acute as the naval expansion program continues. It is considered vital that all possible steps be taken, at the earliest practicable time, to remedy this situation.”

Military leadership explicitly and repeatedly argued for women in the military despite politicians’ reservations. At the House hearings on June 24, 1942, Missouri Representative Joseph B. Shannon asked “Does pulchritude enter into this in any way?…Is this a movement to get beautiful girls…?“ While this is one of the more egregious examples, many simply did not comprehend that women were both capable and desirable workers. To these men, the only reason to have women in the armed forces was...

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119 “Hearings on H.R. 6807 to Establish a Women’s Auxiliary Reserve in the Navy, and for Other Purposes (Mr. Maas),” Congressional Record, 77th Congress, Second Session, June 24, 1942, House Proceedings, Volume 88, Part 4, 3037.

120 Ibid.

forces was as decoration. Military service was so thoroughly tied to masculinity, through years of tradition as well as years of active connection, that the idea of women in uniform was nearly incomprehensible.\textsuperscript{122} Congressmen and Senators both asked for repeated assurances that women would be appropriately employed – not sent overseas, or put on shore patrol, or assigned to a seagoing ship.\textsuperscript{123}

The idea that women were both capable and desirable as service members surprised more than just politicians. In 1940, women volunteered their time for military purposes. Colonel Ira J. Swift referenced the Aircraft Warning Service (AWS), where women volunteers tracked aircraft and flight paths. However, these women were not under military control, and, as volunteers, were inherently unreliable. A volunteer, Swift argued, could and did drop her volunteer commitments first when her other obligations increased. Swift did not wish to disparage the women volunteers; to the contrary, he stated repeatedly that he wished he could have more women working for him because they did such high-quality work.\textsuperscript{124} The Women's Army Auxiliary Corps and other women's auxiliaries neatly solved the military's manpower and control problems.

\textsuperscript{122} The connection of American manhood to military service dates back to the Revolutionary War. See Mayer, \textit{Belonging to the Army}, 52-53.

\textsuperscript{123} “Hearings before the Committee on Naval Affairs, United States Senate, Seventy-Seventh Congress, Second Session on S. 2527, A Bill to Expedite the War Effort by Releasing Officers and Men for Duty at Sea and Their Replacement by Women in the Shore Establishment of the Navy, and for Other Purposes,” Congressional Record, 77\textsuperscript{th} Congress, Second Session, May 19 and June 23, 1942, Bill Number 77 S. 2527, 13, 33-39.

\textsuperscript{124} “Hearings on H.R. 6807 to Establish a Women’s Auxiliary Reserve in the Navy, and for Other Purposes (Mr. Maas),” Congressional Record, 77th Congress, Second Session, June 24, 1942, House Proceedings, Volume 88, Part 4, 3037.
Women joined auxiliaries, not the branch itself. This distinction seemed to be one of semantics, but in fact created a maze of different regulations and chains of command that proved tricky to navigate. Auxiliaries were organizations adjacent to the main branch. Auxiliaries were, by definition, extra. Some of the branches conceived their women's auxiliaries as reserve units, others as contractors with specific skills. The Marines specifically designated their women as reserves - the United States Marine Corps Women's Reserve. The Army and Navy Nurse Corps both treated the women as contractors with specialized skills, with separate command structures, different ranking systems, and most significant to the women, different – that is, lower – pay rates.

To be *with* the military was different than being *in* the military. People in the military were subject to military discipline and structure. In the case of the AWS, the volunteers were sedentary and could not be transferred according to military needs. Putting those women into the military meant that they could move them to less well-staffed areas, including locations where they were unable to attract any volunteers. Assistant Chief of Staff of Staff of the Army General J. H. Hilldring testified before Congress that “*[t]he remoteness of some of our posts is another consideration…[At] one post…a narrow strip of water separates the garrison from the mainland…we have been unable to get a sufficient number of civilians to commute to this post…[so] enlisted men are…doing the…[jobs]…that should be done…by women.”

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125 “Hearing before the Committee on Military Affairs, United States Senate, Seventy-Seventh Congress, Second Session on S. 2240, A Bill to Establish a Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps for Service with the Army of the United States,” Congressional Record, 77th Congress, Second Session, February 6, 1942, 56 Stat. 278, Chap. 312, 27.
People in the military received different benefits than people with the military, and in particular, men and women had different pay scales. Women in the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps earned less than enlisted men of similar rank in the Army.\footnote{Jeanne Holm, \textit{Women in the Military: An Unfinished Revolution}, (Novato: Presidio Press, 1982), 24.}

WAACs' complaints about the pay disparity sparked a chain reaction. First, despite claims that the Navy and Army would not compete for the same women, the Navy advertised equal pay for men and women in their auxiliary, the WAVES. In response to the drop-off in WAAC enlistments and the Navy's pay oriented campaigns, Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall directed the pay disparity be rectified before too many women were lost to the WAVES.\footnote{Mattie E. Treadwell, \textit{United States Army in World War II Special Studies: The Women's Army Corps}, (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1954), 230-234.}

Women with the military rather than in it spawned a number of questions. Were they soldiers, sailors, or Marines? If not, what were they? They wore the uniform and were subject to military discipline, just as the men were. Once their service was over, were they veterans? Did they deserve the same benefits the men received? Given the large number of support soldiers needed in World War II, even beyond the roles filled by women, experience in combat could not be the measure. In fact, there were several instances of military women serving overseas, and even women in combat zones.

Nurses, in both the Army and Navy Nurse Corps, were serving in Manila when the Japanese invaded in December 1941. Many evacuated to first Bataan, and then Corregedor, and continued to treat their patients in extreme conditions. Japanese forces captured several women at the fall of Corregedor, and those nurses became prisoners of
war. Field hospitals and aid station were well within combat zones throughout the European theater, and nurses served in most of those locations. "Hell's Half-Acre" in Anzio, Italy, the highly bombarded beachhead of the Italian invasion, included a field hospital staffed with Army nurses. Nurses arrived in combat zones shortly after the combat troops. For instance, Army Nurse Corps nurses landed in France on June 10, 1944, only four days after the Normandy invasion. 128

WACs served in support roles, in airfields, motor pools, as switchboard operators, supply clerks, and several other roles, closely following the invasion forces in Normandy, Italy, and Africa. 129 Notably, an entire unit of African American WACs served in Europe as mail clerks. The 6888th moved from England to France, through several mail facilities. In each they found several years’ worth of backlogged mail. They regularly cleared the facilities of backlogs in considerably less than the time allotted, sometimes in half the time. 130 Recruiting material featured WACs in exotic locations, including in the European and Pacific theaters. The "WACS are Going Places" series featured women in Guinea and France, interacting with other soldiers and locals alike. Recruiting material for both the Army and Navy used travel opportunities to entice potential new recruits.

Clearly, women went where men went, though military rules ostensibly excluded women from combat (locations of field hospitals notwithstanding). Women, therefore, did not receive any weapons training. However, depending on their assigned job, they

129 Yellin, Our Mother’s War, 121-132
might have received training about war material. Women Marines worked as parachute riggers, air traffic controllers, and trainers, among their more traditionally feminine clerical work. A Life Magazine article from March 27, 1944 showed the women working in multiple jobs. Notably, one image featured a woman Marine teaching a classroom full of Marine trainees how to dismantle and repair a machine gun. The teacher, PFC Josephine Rice, also “[taught] actual firing of aircraft machine guns.”

Many in the military and OWI never seemed to recognize the conflicts and confusion resulting from women with the military, rather than in the military. Or at least, they never interrogated odd little quirks in their recruiting material that resulted from those conflicts.

The most interesting case is the slogan "Be a Marine...Free a Marine to Fight." A variant of the Army’s “Free a Man to Fight” and the Navy and Coast Guard’s “Release a Man to Fight at Sea” slogans, it appears straightforward: women will become Marines so that men Marines can fight. However, the gendered qualifiers on “Marine” are implied, not stated, and that causes other questions. If the women were Marines, and were called Marines, as Commandant Holcomb said, then there should be no remarkable difference between them and the men. In fact, the Marine Corps, through Holcomb's efforts, remained exclusively male and white for as long as possible. Holcomb believed that inducting women or African Americans of any gender would damage the Corps. Holcomb argued that the Marine Corps was the most elite outfit of the armed forces, and including women and African Americans would cause them to lose that distinction.

131 “Woman Marines,” Life Magazine, March 27, 1944, 81-86. Image on page 82.
Holcomb believed the timeworn truths about African Americans' abilities in combat, as well as those about women's ability to handle extreme stress. In particular, Holcomb believed that women, as nurturers, should be protected so they could be proper wives to his Marines.\footnote{David L. Ulbrich, \textit{Preparing for Victory: Thomas Holcomb and the Making of the Modern Marine Corps, 1936-1943}, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2011), 164-168.}

Holcomb aside, the idea that there were some Marines who fought and some who did not was common and unsurprising. Viewers of these advertisements understood that women would not receive weapons training, and that they would perform office work. Initial advertisements focused on the respectable women's work the women would do as clerks, typists, accountants, and as assistants to men with more training. The Navy, when searching for seven different types of engineers, still emphasized the non-combat nature of those jobs. Women who held degrees in a male-coded job like engineering would still work in the relative safety of a laboratory. The Navy avoided confusion between a laboratory-based engineer and a combat engineer because Naval combat engineers were Seabees. The Army, who did not have a separate designation for combat engineers, placed them under the aegis of the Army Ground Forces, and recruited WACs with "college educations" to that particular group.

The issues of \textit{with} versus \textit{in} were quite difficult for the Army. Initially, the Women's Auxiliary Army Corps functioned somewhat like a reserve unit and somewhat as a corporate contractor. The WAAC had its own command structure that did not use military terminology. The Director, equivalent to a major, headed the organization, followed by a First, Second, and Third Officer, equivalent to captain, first lieutenant, and
second lieutenant, respectively. While the positions loosely corresponded to recognized military ranks, the fact remained that none of these women other than Director Oveta Culp Hobby had a military rank. The lack of military rank meant that the Army did not have to pay the women the same wages as men in the regular army of similar rank. This led to discontent among the women, and also led to potential recruits opting to join a different, better paying, branch.

Even worse, the women's auxiliaries were uniquely vulnerable. For example, the WAACs constructed their initial recruiting drive in such a way that emphasized their respectability and propriety, as well as that of the work they would do. Despite working with the Army, these young women were not rough soldiers, and would be protected from those courageous yet unrefined young men. To that end, Colonel Ruth Cheney Streeter of the Women Marines used stories of her own sons in the military as proof that she was a good, patriotic mother who would be as vigilant with her recruits' reputations as their own parents. In essence, the leaders of the new auxiliaries presented themselves as standing in loco parentis for the young women who joined. The leaders of the nursing corps already had a history of unimpeachable propriety, despite their connection to the military. The Army and Navy Nurse Corps both had nearly forty years of publicity supporting their propriety, along with the national mythos of nurses as selfless Angels of

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134 Treadwell, *Women’s Army Corps*, 121-125.

the Battlefield. The Nursing Corps had to contend with different issues during World War II that also stemmed from their status with the Army and Navy, rather than in them. Along with the issues of unequal pay and unequal rank structures, nurses also faced a military structure that refused to acknowledge that nursing was not gendered – that men could be nurses just as much as women could be soldiers or sailors.

General Marshall sent a representative, Brigadier General J. H. Hilldring, Assistant Chief of Staff, with a letter to the Senate Committee on Military Affairs hearing on February 6, 1942, to argue for a women’s auxiliary. Marshall presented the issue as one of military necessity. “[T]his proposed organization would provide a sound and practicable method for meeting military requirements…There are innumerable duties now being performed by soldiers that actually can be done better by women…The efficient use of women for noncombatant service with the Army requires systematic organization and training of this personnel under military supervision and control.”\textsuperscript{136}

Army Colonel Ira Swift argued that women were both equally patriotic and equally motivated to serve their country as men were. When testifying at the February 6, 1942 Senate Committee on Military Affairs hearing, Swift stated that “There are a great many women in the country that are willing and eager to perform the numerous duties for which they are well qualified, and the Army can use these women to great advantage.”\textsuperscript{137}

\textsuperscript{136} “Hearing before the Committee on Military Affairs, United States Senate, Seventy-Seventh Congress, Second Session on S. 2240, A Bill to Establish a Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps for Service with the Army of the United States,” Congressional Record, 77\textsuperscript{th} Congress, Second Session, February 6, 1942, 56 Stat. 278, Chap. 312, 26.

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid. 16.
Congress authorized the WAAC first, and the WAVES hearings showed that both Naval authorities and Congress recognized that they could produce a more effective women’s reserve. California Senator Hiram W. Johnson questioned Admiral Jacobs about the difference between the proposed WAVES bill and the recently passed WAAC bill. The main differences, according to Jacobs, were that “[the women] are subject to the same control as any officer or man in the Navy. Under the Army bill there are certain exceptions.” Later, Jacobs reiterated, “They will be enlisted the same as the men.”

Part of the WAVES’ creation process reflected an adjustment based on the WAAC’s limitations. However, few of those perceived failures had to do with the pool of potential recruits. All the groups were angling for the same group of young, healthy, respectable, educated, and trainable young women. The competition over the limited pool of applicants was a problem the advertisers and campaign managers had to sort out on their own.

The Army Nurse Corps and the Navy Nurse Corps were both created before World War I, and recruited graduate nurses – women who had just completed nursing school – and civilian nurses. But both corps faced a unique issue among women’s military organizations – how to address the issue of qualified men wanting to use their civilian training in the military. Despite popular perceptions that all nurses were women and that any man in a medical profession was a physician, men trained as nurses from the

138 “Hearings before the Committee on Naval Affairs, United States Senate, Seventy-Seventh Congress, Second Session on S. 2527, A Bill to Expedite the War Effort by Releasing Officers and Men for Duty at Sea and Their Replacement by Women in the Shore Establishment of the Navy, and for Other Purposes,” Congressional Record, 77th Congress, Second Session, May 19 and June 23, 1942, Bill Number 77 S. 2527, 11.

139 Ibid. 12.
beginning of nursing schools. During World War I, both corps were small enough that it was barely an issue. However, World War II’s massive manpower drain meant that the ANC and NNC were chronically understaffed – at least, as far as white women went.

Men who were nursing students, graduate nurses, or registered nurses were all directed to request billets as pharmacists’ mates in the Navy, and in the Medical Corps in the Army. Enrollment centers and draft boards did not refer these men to the Army or Navy Nurse Corps because both the Army and Navy designated them as women’s corps. As a result, the military chronically mismanaged and underutilized men’s nursing skills, especially the Army.140

For example, the Army Medical Corps assigned male nurses as orderlies in hospitals, to work as manual laborers under the supervision of nurses and doctors. Understandably, these men resented their incorrect assignments and the lack of respect for their skills. In many cases, male nurses resented having to take orders from women nurses who, in the civilian world, were their equals.141 The nurses’ ambiguous military status and the problems with relative rank compounded the problems of authority and due military respect.

Relative rank was a fiction created in the early years of the Army and Navy Nurse Corps to preserve military hierarchy and discipline. The Army Nurse Corps had to balance medical needs with professional status. Though nurses required extensive


141 Men without credentials, assigned as untrained orderlies to the Army Medical Corps, also resented taking orders from women nurses, due to sexist ideas about women’s authority and gendered social structures.
training and then continuing education, they were in many ways treated as little better than manual laborers and charwomen. Early Army nurses even went on strike to protest their poor treatment.\textsuperscript{142} Though those nurses lost their battle, the longer war for proper rank and pay continued. Advocates argued that without proper military rank and status within the army, the women were unable to direct enlisted orderlies properly. Many nurses reported experiencing insubordination from orderlies and disrespect from doctors.

The Army and Navy Nurse Corps’ issues stemmed from their status \textit{with} the military, rather than \textit{in} it. Nurses worked alongside the military structure without the ability to fully access the benefits. Because there was no place for women in the military, many argued against providing any rank to nurses, leaving them and their military status in limbo. By World War II, their post-secondary education placed them at the same educational level as officers in the women’s auxiliaries. Nurses obtained “relative rank,” and with it, the ability to give commands to enlisted orderlies, higher pay, and access to some military benefits. However, both military leadership and professional associations held nurses to different standards than the rest of the military. Further, legally speaking, nursing corps were separate from the military, rather than a distinct corps within the military structure. As the increasing number of women in the other auxiliaries clearly displayed women’s capability, the increase of wounded soldiers requiring long term care exposed the negative effect relative rank had on nurse retention. The Army Nurse Corps took steps to offer other benefits to its nurses to entice them to stay, and to encourage

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{142} Sarnecky, 64-66.}
new women to enlist, but relative rank remained in place during the war, and continued to cause problems.\textsuperscript{143}

The issue of relative rank, and whether or not nurses were fully in the military, was one that both the Army and the Navy needed to address. Until they did, the clear disparity in rank and pay harmed their ability to attract graduate nurses. This, in part, led to multiple proposals of a nurses’ draft, and what eventually became the Cadet Nurse Corps. The Cadet Nurse Corps was a student corps. Recruits were high school students and early-career nursing students (all women) who pledged to serve in a specific capacity, including military corps, government hospitals, and factory nurses in war industries, for the duration of the war once they graduated.\textsuperscript{144} From the Office of War Information’s perspective, the Cadet Nurse Corps was the most ambitious and most successful recruiting campaign of the war. The recruiting campaign’s goal was 150,000 cadet nurses by 1945. By the final accounting in October 1945, 181,750 women had joined the Cadet Nurse Corps. The Cadet Nurse Corps had both the highest target number and the largest actual complement by the end of World War II.\textsuperscript{145}

The Cadet Nurse Corps’ campaign also fell under Mary Brewster White’s Womanpower campaigns. She focused on the necessity of recruiting a very specific and well-defined group of women. Her assessments of the wartime campaigns were among

\textsuperscript{143} Sarnecky, 142-148.

\textsuperscript{144} Mary Brewster White to Clifford Sutter, August 11, 1943, memorandum, Appendix “A,” “ORIGIN, ADMINISTRATION, AND STANDARDS: United States Cadet Nurse Corps,” NARA, RB 208, NC 148 43, Box 1, “Program” folder, 1.

\textsuperscript{145} James R. Brackett, Senior Deputy Director, Domestic Branch, to Mr. J. Merrick, Executive Director, Domestic Branch, Memorandum, October 4, 1945, NARA, RG 208, NC-148 6A, Box 4, “Campaigns: General” folder, 1.
the most insightful, and she was able to adjust campaigns for the Cadet Nurse Corps over time. Despite Brewster White’s best efforts, the Cadet Nurse Corps’ institutional blind spots were beyond her control. The CNC also refused to accept men as student nurses.\textsuperscript{146}

Early in the Cadet Nurse Corps campaign, in the late summer of 1943, Mary Brewster White sent some information on to Clifford Sutter, an OWI program manager, who would shortly take over other women’s military recruiting. Brewster White had reviewed the proposed campaign at Sutter’s request, and returned her findings in the August 11, 1943 memorandum. She condensed the appendices containing additional information, thereby streamlining the campaign from the beginning. Her reduced appendices included a basic description of the Cadet Nurse Corps and its mission and several pages of figures on recruiting goals and necessary womanpower. She also included “Promotional Suggestions” for both national and local campaigns. Appendix B contained most of the suggestions concerning National Programs, and Appendix C covered suggestions for how local leaders could tie into the national campaigns.\textsuperscript{147}

Most of her suggestions focused on putting the information in front of audiences wherever and whenever possible. For example, the section “\textit{Motion Pictures}” focused mainly on news reels, and Brewster White admonished that “[e]ffort must be made to secure news reel cooperation whenever any outstanding national event in connection with

\textsuperscript{146} Sarnecky, 271.

the United States Student Nurse Corps takes place.”  

The section “Magazines” argued that the OWI should use the long lead time needed to obtain advertising space in a monthly periodical. “It takes three years to turn out a nurse. Therefore, there should be no let-up in magazine stress which glamorizes the nurses' contribution and discuss the future and security of the nursing profession.”

By January 1944, the Cadet Nurse Corps, along with the Army and Navy Nurse Corps, were part of the OWI’s overall military women’s recruiting campaigns, and featured in the “Join Up” advertisement along with the four service branches’ auxiliaries.

“Join Up” ran in *The Ladies’ Home Journal, Good Housekeeping,* and *Women’s Day,* thereby targeting multiple audiences, for several months in 1943 and 1944. A two-page chart detailing all the relevant information for each of the women’s military services, “Join Up? Where Do You Fit?” squarely addressed women considering military service. The spread showed all seven women’s auxiliaries for which OWI produced content. The spread clearly outlined educational requirements, age limits, marital and family status rules, training loads, pay, and the type of work women could expect in each service. The 1944 version included information on whether an enlisted woman could become an officer.

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149 Ibid.

150 I did not find “Join Up? Where Do You Fit?” in either *McCall’s Magazine* or *Better Homes and Gardens Magazine,* both Seven Sisters women’s magazines for an upper class or wealthy audience.

The other major problem facing the Army and Navy Nurse Corps was more widespread. Like every other women’s auxiliary, they both refused to admit qualified African American women. The military’s lack of racial integration and failure to acknowledge that women of color also wished to join the military were both tied to leadership’s inability to conceptualize their groups as anything other than white and single-gendered. The Navy Nurse Corps repeatedly told African American women who wrote in expressing a desire to enlist that there were no positions available to them. Even as demand for nurses rose in the late 1930s, the Navy Nurse Corps officially told African American women there were “no duties in which [they] would be happy or adaptable.” The Army inducted African American women, but only in segregated units, relegated to menial tasks, just as the men’s units were. The Marine Corps avoided inducting African Americans of either gender for as long as possible, only doing so when forced to by the President.

However, the exploding staffing needs of military hospitals led the Army Nurse Corps to accept sixty African American nurses in July 1942, who they then assigned to the hospital at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. The Navy Nurse Corps continued to refuse to admit African American women or men, even when a *Life Magazine* recruiting piece, dated January 5, 1942, used a Navy nurse as the cover model. The caption of a portrait of a Navy nurse in dress whites read “Wanted: 50,000 Nurses.” The article discussed how

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152 Sterner, 84.
153 Sterner, 95.
155 Sterner, p. 122.
nurses’ aides were trained to fill in the care gaps in the Army, Navy, and civilian sectors caused by the wartime shortage.\textsuperscript{156} The disconnect is remarkable.

The WAVES and WAC both eventually accepted African American women, largely to achieve their desired numbers. However, there were no African American women in any of the advertisements in the mainstream magazines reviewed.\textsuperscript{157} Occasionally, an African American man appeared, though usually in a supporting role. The images of African American women found in many of the magazines were photographs of women being profiled in the connected article. President Harry Truman’s Executive Order 9981, of July 26, 1948, forcibly integrated the armed forces.\textsuperscript{158} The Women’s Armed Services Integration Act of 1948 incorporated women into all the armed forces: “An act to establish the Women’s Army Corps in the Regular Army, to authorize the enlistment and appointment of women in the Regular Air Force, Regular Navy and Marine Corps, and in the Reserve components of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and for other purposes.”\textsuperscript{159}

The failure of military leadership to accept African Americans in their women’s reserves and their insistence on maintaining segregation despite the extra cost and space requirements, speaks to the ingrained prejudices of many leaders. The failure of the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{156} \textit{Life Magazine}, January 5, 1942, Cover. Vol. 12, No. 1; “Aides Relieve,” 32-33.
\item \textsuperscript{157} The mainstream magazines reviewed were the Seven Sisters magazines: \textit{The Ladies Home Journal}, \textit{Redbook}, \textit{Good Housekeeping}, \textit{Woman’s Day}, \textit{Family Circle}, \textit{McCall’s Magazine}, and \textit{Better Homes and Gardens Magazine}.
\item \textsuperscript{158} Harry S Truman, Executive Order 9981, July 26, 1948, “Establishing the President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Forces,” found at The Truman Library. \url{https://www.trumanlibrary.org/9981a.htm} accessed December 3, 2017.
\item \textsuperscript{159} \textit{Women’s Armed Services Integration Act of 1948}, Public Law 80-625, June 12, 1948.
\end{itemize}
Nurse Corps to admit men to their ranks also showed their inability to recognize the full diversity of the nation. The extremes gender and racial coding produced in military structures had long lasting effects in their flexibility and expansibility.

The WAAC had to overcome institutional and public resistance to the idea of women in the Army. The Navy and the Marine Corps benefited from the WAAC’s initial work, and content producers in the armed forces and in the OWI both learned from the missteps of 1942. Further, the Navy had its own history of enlisting women, and a powerful proponent of a Women’s Reserve in Admiral King. The Navy’s goal was to recruit women who had already decided to join the military into naval ranks. They also had specific requirements – the Navy wanted women who had some education, who were willing and able to be trained in uniquely naval matters. This requirement informed much of the recruiting materials produced for women. The Navy’s reputation as a service for those who wanted to better their situation and see the world also played a role in the development.

As the newest of the women’s auxiliaries, the United States Marine Corps Women’s Reserve (USMCWR) could build on the work the WAAC and WAVES had already done. The Marine Corps Women’s Reserve was to be the smallest of the women’s auxiliaries, and therefore needed to differentiate itself from the rest of the field. The Marine Corps Public Relations Division focused their efforts on recruiting women who had already decided to join, and just needed to choose which service branch.

The Marine Corps’ reputation as the most elite and toughest outfit in the military was the foundation of their World War II recruiting campaign. Even still, the material
only addressed women in connection with men, referring to Marines as “your men.” An early recruiting booklet told women: “The Marines have written their fame indelibly on history’s pages – from the halls of Montezuma to the jungles of Guadalcanal. Taught to be tough…trained for combat…they can’t do it chained to a flat top desk…Bear the burden of warfare shoulder to shoulder with your men…join the forces that have led the fight on every front…free a fighting man for a front-line fox-hole.”160

Holcomb, despite his own reservations, made it clear that the women were as much Marines as the men in an interview for Life Magazine. “‘They are Marines. They don’t have a nickname and don’t need one. They get their basic training in a Marine atmosphere at a Marine post. They inherit the traditions of the Marines. They are Marines.’”161 This, despite the issues inherent in their main slogan, “Be a Marine…Free a Marine to Fight.”

USMCWR recruiting material reflected the ideal that women full members of the service, though the text still highlighted the question of true manhood and Marinehood. “Perhaps you’ll be a Radio Control Tower Operator…It’s a man’s job now – but you’re the girl to do it…Perhaps you’ll be a fingerprint expert, keeping tabs on America’s finest fighting men. The [women] Marines on the opposite page have already taken over from combat Marines. But there’s still room for you.”162 The women were invited to join the Marines to help the men. Most of the material referenced men, implicitly and explicitly.


161 “Women Marines,” Life Magazine, March 27, 1944, 81-84.

162 “United States Marine Corps Women’s Reserve,” Booklet, August 9, 1943, Marine Corps University, History Division, Women Marines Collection, “Women Marines – Publications (1 of 3)” folder, 6.
Despite the rhetoric, the higher physical standards for women Marines than other auxiliaries, and women’s immediate access to the same rank and pay scales as men, women in the USMCWR were still offshoots of men.

The most effective tactics were local projects – radio and newspaper stories. Posters and magazine advertisements were less effective and the USMCWR abandoned them, and did not return to them until after the Joint Army-Navy Agreement transferred the heavy lifting of production to the OWI. Newspaper and radio advertisements were tied into visits from recruiters, and if possible, a woman Marine from that particular area: “When field trips are made to small towns, it is essential to have advance publicity and to have the recruiting party stay long enough to cash in on it…it has been found more successful to have a party stay in a town several days…rather than to have it go once a month and stay only one day.”

Local and family connections were powerful recruiting tools. Many women were unable to enlist in their preferred branch because their spouse was in the branch already. Some women enlisted in a different branch because their preferred branch had reached their limit for the region. Dorcas Cavett wanted to join the Marine Corps because her brothers and uncles had been Marines. Cavett enlisted February 16, 1943, three days after the official creation of the women Marines, and became the first woman Marine in Nebraska. On her way to work the next day, she passed a recruiting poster aimed at men, admonishing them to join the Marine Corps: “I noticed a new poster on a huge billboard.

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163 “History of the Marine Corps Women’s Reserve: A Critical Analysis of its Development and Operation, 1943-1945 and Supplementary Chapter on Demobilization,” Marine Corps Archives and Special Collections, Quantico, VA, Ruth Cheney Streeter Collection, PC 137 Box 1, “History of the MCWR &tc.” folder, 94.
A Marine was pointing his finger at me and saying, ‘Be a Marine!’ ‘Thanks, I am one!’ I shouted at the poster.” The USMCWR wanted to build on the work the WAAC and OWI had already done to convince communities that military service was a good choice for young women who wanted to do their part for the war effort.

Advertisements worked to encourage patriotism by referencing what advertisers believed viewers valued most. Advertisements for men emphasized service, adventure, glory, and education. Advertisements for women emphasized supporting their family, helping men in the armed forces, and helping end the war sooner, to bring everyone home again. Even when encouraging patriotic feeling, advertisements for women focused on their connection to men.

The OWI initially handled creating and administering recruiting campaigns aimed at women through the Womanpower Campaigns bureau, along with rationing, industrial recruiting, and rubber saving campaigns. Aside from OWI director Elmer Davis, no one coordinated the efforts into a cohesive, pre-planned whole in the first part of 1943. Directorship of the campaigns changed several times, and the OWI underwent multiple reorganizations, first as the Office of Facts and Figures, and then the Office of War Information. Multiple bureaus ran Womanpower campaigns, though by 1942, Mary Brewster White had control of at least the WAVES campaign. Following the “Joint Army-Navy Agreement on Recruiting of Women for the Women’s Reserve of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard,” all recruitment for military auxiliaries transferred to the OWI to prevent duplicate work. Davis directed all the heads of the women’s

auxiliaries to contact Program Manager Clifford Sutter when they wrote to Davis after signing the Agreement.\footnote{Elmer Davis to Admiral Randall Jacobs, USN, September 15, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC-148 43, Box 1, “Programs – Womanpower - WAVE” folder.} Sutter had to coordinate existing campaigns that were providing conflicting messages. However, the Joint Army-Navy Agreement was signed in September 1943, after the dust had settled at the OWI, and Mary Brewster White had created and was in the process of implementing a cohesive campaign plan. This made Sutter’s task much simpler, though still not an easy task.

Natalie Davison helped gain some control, but as a project manager, not a bureau head. In mid-1943, Davison joined the Bureau of Magazines, which became the Bureau of Books and Magazines. She controlled advertisement placement in magazines and newspapers. Under her control, the magazine ad campaigns became more organized and cohesive, more focused on both the audience and the campaign’s needs.

Magazines were a powerful tool in the OWI’s arsenal. Newspapers circulated at least once a day and were sources of immediate information. Posters were a long-term strategy, displayable on a wall for months at a time, if necessary. Magazines filled the gap between the two, reaching over 110,000,000 subscribers a month. Magazines specialized their content to cultivate a loyal audience, and in many cases, they were more careful consumers of the magazine than other media. Also, magazine publishers expected their readers to lend their weekly and monthly issues to others, or to pass an issue or a
collection of issues along a chain of readers, thus increasing readership. Magazines were therefore a prime location for both advertisements and articles.  

The Magazine Section provided magazine publishers with a Monthly Magazine War Guide that explained what sort of material the OWI wanted, as well as providing special material for publication. The Magazine War Guides were the clearinghouse for a magazine editor’s war needs. They even had collections of background material and suggestions for pulp magazines – magazines that printed single-issue or serialized fiction, and had a circulation of close to thirty million.

Magazines were one of the primary transmitters of culture in the early part of the twentieth century. Women’s magazines were a significant type of specialty magazines, conveying ideas about fashion, careers, personal lives, homemaking, and politics. While women’s magazines were a specific periodical genre, there was not a corresponding market for men’s magazines at the time. McCall’s Magazine, Better Homes and Gardens Magazine, The Ladies’ Home Journal, Good Housekeeping, Women’s Day, Family Circle, and Redbook were and are collectively known as the Seven Sisters. In the 1940s, all seven published for various audiences of white women.

While ostensibly marketed to married white women who were homemakers, based on the advertisements, the actual audience included their teenage daughters and

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166 “Magazine Section – Statement of Purpose,” NARA, RG 208, NC-148 E-6A, Box 1, “Book and Magazine Bureau (Domestic)” folder, 1.

167 Ibid. 1-2.

young unmarried women who hoped to marry and become homemakers someday.\footnote{Walker, Women’s Magazines 1940-1960, 2-4.} The Ladies’ Home Journal, Redbook, and Good Housekeeping were aimed at middle class women, while McCall’s Magazine and Better Homes and Gardens Magazine targeted upper middle class and upper-class women. Women’s Day and Family Circle were marketed to working class and lower middle-class women. In all cases, the target audiences were white. There was no nationally-circulated periodical for African American women until Essence began circulation in 1970. Ebony began publication in 1944, as an African-American counterpoint to Life Magazine, but even then, the advertisements targeted white audiences, and even featured white models. The Seven Sisters magazines did not consider African American women part of the target audience, and, in fact, they actively excluded them from their pages.\footnote{Walker, Women’s Magazines 1940-1960, 7.}

The OWI did not separate military recruiting from the general womanpower campaigns. Mary Brewster White, in charge of the Womanpower Campaigns in the Bureau of Campaigns, was clear in her reports. She argued that women were necessary in industry and the military and that recruiting campaigns for those women had to be tightly focused to prevent unnecessary competition and overlap. She pushed her colleagues and superiors to organize separate campaigns, to leave the larger issue of industry to national campaigns, and the more selective issue of recruiting women into the military to local
campaigns.\textsuperscript{171} This argument marched with the November 1942 report “Manpower Campaigns,” which emphasized the “Localness of the problem.”\textsuperscript{172}

Brewster White suggested multiple types of local events designed to entice women into the armed forces. The WAACs, WAVES, and USMCWR all scheduled large numbers of local speeches and radio advertising. For example, Major Ruth Cheney Streeter of the United States Marine Corps Women’s Reserve (USMCWR) spent “her first six weeks of duty…ma[king] a tour of the country in the interests of the Women’s Reserve.”\textsuperscript{173} The recruiting officers were selected for their personality and looks, and were occasionally used as the model for the posters.\textsuperscript{174} Even when events were advertised nationwide, or recruiting advertisements appeared in nationally circulating publications, the directions were local: interested women were instructed to see their local recruiting board, or to visit their local employment service office.

The method and style of recruiting events changed, but the central message did not. The central message for women, their husbands, their families and their communities, coming from the War Manpower Commission and the Office of War Information was that women were joining the workforce because the jobs needed to be done and that women could do them. To pretend otherwise was to ignore the truth and

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{171} Mary Brewster White to Robert R. Perry, Memorandum, August 13, 1943, NARA, RG 208 NC-148, E-43, Box 1, “Program Manpower” folder, 1-2.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{172} “Manpower Campaigns,” November 21, 1942, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 40, Box 143, “Manpower” folder, 3.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{173} “Progress of the Marine Corps Women’s Reserve,” April 15, 1943, History Division, Marine Corps University, Women Marines collection, “Reserves (1 of 3)” folder, Subsection “Reports,” 2.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{174} Richard Ziesing, Jr. to Ken R. Dyke, letter, September 17, 1942, NARA, RG 208, NC-148, E-39, Box 141, “Magazines” folder.}
harm the war effort and the nation. Those who felt that the United States would lose something fundamental by sending women to work were causing the nation to lose something even more important – the ability to finish the war, the ability to win the war, and even the American way of life.\textsuperscript{175}

The Bureau of Campaigns, headed by Natalie Davison, focused on developing new informational campaigns. The staff of the Bureau of Campaigns proposed and managed campaigns, hired artists, tracked drafts, and adjusted the official messages as necessary throughout the process. Initially, other Bureau heads were her equals, producing the information that she coordinated. As the war progressed, the OWI structure streamlined so that the Bureau of Campaigns produced a master plan that other divisions used to create their materials.\textsuperscript{176}

OWI's poster distribution methodology was based on a master list of independent, chain, and direct retail businesses.\textsuperscript{177} President Roosevelt designated the Boy Scouts of America Official Dispatch Bearers for the Office of War Information.\textsuperscript{178} The Advance Bulletin of New Posters for September 1943 included instructions for distribution through the Troop Service Area plan. Troops were organized under local Boy Scout

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{175} "Consumer’s Pledge," \textit{McCall’s Magazine}, February 1942, 16-17. The “Consumer’s Pledge” ran multiple months in \textit{McCall’s Magazine}.
\item \textsuperscript{176} Committee of War Information Organizational Chart, August 1942, NARA, RG 208, NC-148 E-3B, Box 2, “Advertising Div. Correspondence 1942” folder; Office of War Information Domestic Branch Organizational Chart, August 25, 1944, NARA, RG 208, NC-148 E-6A, Box 1, “Book and Magazine Bureau (Domestic)” folder.
\item \textsuperscript{177} “United States Summary – Types of Retail Business (independent, chain, direct), NARA, RG 208, NC-148 E-39, Box 140, “Graphics” folder.
\item \textsuperscript{178} Elmer Davis to Secretary of the Retail Merchant Association, letter, form letter to be personalized for each locality attached, NARA, RG 208, NC-148 E-1, Box 5, “Programs 1944” folder.
\end{itemize}
Councils, and then each Troop would have a specific area of responsibility within their Council area, which was then divided further: “Boy Scout Councils are divided into Districts. Districts are divided into Service Areas. Troops have been assigned the responsibilities of these Service areas.” The Service Area Plan suggested that each Scout have his own individual area, to ensure complete poster coverage of any given area.  

While the Bureau of Campaigns oversaw the larger campaigns, smaller bureaus and branches within the OWI created the posters and advertisements themselves. The Graphics Division oversaw artist contracts and payment, and tracked artist updates. In one case, an artist, Crookwell, was unable to complete the poster and they returned his preliminary sketch to him. His particular womanpower poster assignment was then placed on indefinite hold due to lack of funds.  

Mary Brewster White, manager of Women’s Campaigns in the Office of Program Coordination, of Office of War Information, traveled around the country in the spring and summer of 1943, meeting with regional offices and studying the efficacy of the advertising campaigns. Her area of responsibility, womanpower, covered recruiting women to war production industries, civilian jobs that were necessary to keep society functioning, and the Armed Forces. By August 1943, Brewster White identified the major problems that were harming the campaign and proposed solutions.  


Mary Brewster White’s memos helped create the focused advertisements of 1943 and 1944.

The resulting posters and advertisements still exhorted women to take part in the war effort both through traditionally feminine tasks as well as traditionally masculine ones. The efforts to make industrial work and military service legible to all women, the advertisements equated male-coded work with female-coded tasks, and emphasized how working and military women were pretty and feminine, and still wore makeup on the job. Women were still pretty and still concerned with dating, and with bringing young men home from war. Masculine jobs were recoded feminine, or the feminine aspects emphasized, in order to attract women to the job. For example, the short film “Glamour Girls of 1943” compared stamping metal pieces for airplane components to cutting a dress pattern.

The problem, according to Brewster White, was that the advertising campaigns were too general, and were not reaching women the way they needed to. So many similar campaigns made it difficult to differentiate between them. And because so many conservation campaigns targeted women as homemakers, the call for women to go to work was either lost or misinterpreted. Brewster White argued that the Bureau of Campaigns had erred in a fundamental way when creating women’s campaigns: they failed to understand that women’s concerns went beyond the individual. Women’s campaigns needed to not only sell to women, they had to sell to potential employers,

182 Ibid. 3.

183 “Glamour Girls of 1943,” 1:00-1:05.
husbands, and entire communities. Brewster White clearly identified, in 1943, that the way advertisers viewed women had to change for their campaigns to be effective. She firmly stated that “the ultimate goal…is to associate in the minds of the public, the words ‘woman’ and ‘work’ just as firmly as the words ‘man’ and ‘fight’ are associated.”

Brewster White argued that the OWI needed to have a more nuanced understanding of women, though she herself still often placed women in their gendered social contexts. She argued that because women did not make decisions without considering their larger community, the campaigns needed to address the questions of women, their menfolk, and employers. Included in her report was a list of questions each group would have, and the appropriate answers to include in advertising copy. Brewster White, in her capacity as director of women’s campaigns, prioritized the questions and answers for the September Womanpower Campaign. She argued that thorough explanations would help remove social disapproval.

In separating women into their own category, Brewster White required that artists and copy-writers address women outside the context of their relationships with men. She created three categories of sub-campaigns: two for men and one for women. Advertisements would address women individually, and two separate categories of advertisements would address women’s relationships with men, as husbands and as employers.

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184 Mary Brewster White to Robert R. Perry, Memorandum, August 13, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 E-43, Box 1, “Program Manpower” folder, 1.

185 Ibid. 4.
Brewster White identified several issues in the 1942 campaign. The problem of presenting volunteer work as a sufficient contribution to the war effort from women was particularly crucial to recruiting women to work: “Because we have built up the volunteer job as being the sign of service, we are having a harder time now getting women to face facts on what service really is.” She anticipated resistance from women, and included two pages of answers to anticipated questions. One concern that appeared regularly was that of social pressure and deviating from the norm. Stated as “what will the neighbors think?” these questions were ultimately about propriety and proper place. Brewster White’s suggested response for ad men was to argue that eventually, so many women would be working that the neighbors would think it odd when a woman did not have a war-related job. For the husbands’ version of the question, the suggested response was that the neighbors would recognize that their household was a properly patriotic one, “because the main reason for working is not to make money, but to help shorten the war.”

Brewster White also identified the issue of the second shift. She considered it the employer’s duty to recognize that women would be working two jobs, one for pay and one in the home, and that to keep the women workers happy and healthy, the employer should be sure to allow adequate time for women to do housework. Brewster

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186 Ibid. 6.

187 The so-called second shift is the housework and childcare work done after a full day’s paid labor, largely done by women. The term comes from the sociological study of two-job families of the same name. Arlie Hochschild, *The Second Shift* (New York: Penguin Group, 1989).

188 Womanpower Campaigns, report attached to Brewster White to Perry memo dated August 13, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC-148 E-43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder, 7.
White addressed husbands’ housework-related objections to women working as well. Her response bluntly stated that husbands had equal responsibility for managing a household in wartime: “It may be a bit of a shock, but YOU are going to have to help!” Further, this would be in no way emasculating; rather, it was patriotic – everyone did their fair share, even when it was an unusual or non-traditional task. “Millions of men have worked this out…the idea is to help, not to hinder the war program, and if your wife is strong and able and willing to work, you should not prevent her from doing her share.”

Brewster White developed several pamphlets for women interested in war work, and she also created sections for their menfolk. The February 19, 1943 draft of “List of Resistances and Answers,” answered several questions gleaned from a survey of men about their concerns about their wives working. “Resistance No. 4” asked “How is my home going to be run with my wife employed?” The draft response was conciliatory and comforting: “You may have to form some new habits. True, it won’t be as pleasant as it was, but war is never pleasant. Millions of husbands with working wives have found that, once the change is made, a household routine can be set up that works.” The tone of the August 1943 response draft was remarkably different from the February 1943 version, though the message remained the same. The tone of this and the other Responses in the draft reflected the changing attitudes toward women and men in the OWI.

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189 Ibid. 6.
190 Ibid.
191 List of Resistances and Answers, attached to memorandum from Alger Sale to Barry Nuit, February 19, 1943, NARA, RG 211, I6 137, Box 2, “Office – Interoffice Memo’s” folder, 1.
In August 1943, Brewster White drove the OWI to consider men and women separately. In the same report, responses to women’s questions (drawn from the same set of surveys) were patriotic, encouraging, and reassuring. The resistance – “I’ve never worked before. I don’t think I can do it.” – had an informative and reassuring answer: “Experience is not necessary. Work is seldom as hard as your own household routine.”

Brewster White’s suggestions broached other fraught topics as well, including equal pay. She recommended that women workers receive equal pay for equal work. Her reason was that women who were paid less would be dissatisfied to the point of “rebellion and turnover” – that failing to pay equally would hurt the war effort and delay victory. Yet she also presented work to women as their patriotic duty, rather than something they would do strictly for pay: “Q. ‘I don’t need the money.’ A. We’re not fighting the war for money. It’s getting the job done that counts. If you don’t want the money, invest it in war bonds and do your country a double service.”

The issues of over-generalized advertising campaigns specifically hurt military recruiting. Because military physical standards were much higher than those for office work or even industry, and given their age, marital, educational, and character requirements, the military’s recruiting pool was tiny compared to that of industry. Brewster White proposed focused programs, ones based in local actions rather than broad, nationwide campaigns. In fact, the sort of programs she suggested were already

192 Ibid. 5.
193 Ibid. 8.
194 Ibid. 6.
widely used by the Marine Corps Women’s Reserve and the WAVES. The
WAAC/WAC, being a much larger organization, with much higher recruitment needs,
still required a nationwide campaign. As a result, the majority of national women’s
military recruiting advertisements, such as magazine ads, were for the Army, some were
for the Navy, and very few were for the Marines.\textsuperscript{195}

These changes to the advertising structure were almost immediately apparent.
OWI resources shifted to the large-scale requests, mainly from the Army and WAAC.
The few requests they had for the Navy were more generic, and nothing other than the
original two sets of artwork were created for the Marine Corps. However, when Richard
Ziesing, Jr., of the Curtis Publishing Company, which produced the \textit{Ladies’ Home
Journal}, offered to forward portraits of WAAC and WAVES officers that were to be
magazine covers, Ken Dyke immediately accepted the offer.\textsuperscript{196}

The Army magazine campaigns and their partnership with Beechnut Gum was an
intriguing example of a corporate-government partnership. Beechnut Gum advertised in
\textit{Women’s Day} and \textit{Family Circle}, the two Seven Sisters magazines marketed to working
class women. Prior to 1943, Beechnut Gum’s advertisements spoke to young women
working in shops and in offices, who worked hard and had little money to spare.
Beechnut Gum presented its product as an inexpensive pick-me-up.\textsuperscript{197}

\textsuperscript{195} Mary Brewster White to Robert R. Perry, memorandum August 13, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 E-43,
Box 1, “Program Manpower” folder, 2.

\textsuperscript{196} Richard Ziesing, Jr. to Ken R. Dyke, letter, September 17, 1942, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 E-39, Box 141,
“Magazines” folder.

\textsuperscript{197} “More Pleasure for Office Workers,” Beechnut Gum advertisement, \textit{Women’s Day}, September 1942, 57.
The advertisements changed to incorporate WAAC recruitment into product promotion. Beechnut Gum ran a series of WAAC recruiting advertisements tailored for women who were already working. These ads were practical, providing the most relevant information to the readers of Women’s Day and Family Circle – training opportunities, leave policies, and, later, the changing marriage policies.198

The OWI also utilized psychology. Ken R. Dyke, the Chief Liaison Officer of the Advertising Division, received a report on the use of psychologists and psychiatrists to assist in boosting the public opinion of the United Nations, Great Britain, and Russia in the public’s mind. Lieutenant Barry Bingham met with Dr. John Appel on June 12, 1942, and forwarded his thoughts to Dyke. Bingham requested Appel and his group to produce reports that “[g]ive us an analysis of the reasons why these people feel the way they do…[and]…[g]ive us a detailed report on the effectiveness of the treatment.”199 Appel’s explanations of the psychology of enemies and allies impressed Bingham so much he attached Appel’s initial reports to the memo.

The two reports together shed light on some of the decisions the leadership of the Office of War Information made in 1942 and early 1943. Appel concluded that the bare facts would be enough to stimulate anger towards and fear of the Axis Powers, and support for the British and Soviets. He further concluded that attempting to induce a specific emotional reaction by only providing specific information, or attempting to direct

198 “And your leaves and furloughs together!” Family Circle, July 21, 1944, Volume 25, Number 3, 10.

public opinion with decrees rather than facts would cause American audiences to resent the source of the material. Appel proposed presenting facts without interpretation. This challenged Archibald MacLeish’s mission for the Office of Facts and Figures, but corresponded with Elmer Davis’ mission for the Office of War Information.

Appel identified the connection between belief and behavior in the first report, “......That the Axis is Our Enemy.” “Feeling supplies the energy for behavior, a man will not act unless he feels. An enemy is a person one fears and is angry at, either because he has harmed one, is harming or threatens to harm. For the average American, the important belief, therefore, is not that the Axis is his enemy, but that the Axis has harmed him, is harming him and threatens to harm him. If he believes this, he will fear and be angry at the Axis.”

Appel also noted that the best way to stimulate the idea of the harmful nature of the Axis was to use information that the Office of Facts and Figures already had. Simple, basic facts about the death toll among Soviet and British forces, the loss of materiel, and their continued fight would go a long way to creating feeling against the Axis. To stimulate fear, the idea that the Soviets were “keeping three and a half million German troops busy,” was qualified with the question, “What else would they be doing otherwise?” In a similar vein, Appel noted that the British were “keeping the Tirpitz bottled up…What would the Luftwaffe be doing if it were not busy fighting the R.A.F.”

Appel even went so far as to lay out similarities to the Soviets and British that would be helpful in garnering support. Soviets were similar because they liked

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201 Ibid. 2.
machines and movies, appreciated cleverness, and had admired U. S. designed planes and tanks.202 The British were similar because they were courageous fighters, but Appel’s main tactic was to again emphasize the number of British dead.203

In the companion piece, “……That Russia and Britain are our Allies,” Appel first defined an ally as "…someone who has helped us, who is helping us[,] who can help us and who is willing to help us.” In Appel’s definition, an ally could also be someone we were helping. He noted three reasons for accepting the help: “because we like the person or because we need help or for an ideal.”204

Appel noted that simply stating what they wanted the public to believe would be ineffective because “though the average American wants to be told what to do he resents being told what to think.” Appel advised that the campaign present figures, the hard numbers that news agencies already reported, and let the viewers of the campaign decide for themselves what they believed. Because of the belief that American citizens resented a so-called hard sell, Appel recommended letting the “pertinent” facts speak for themselves, leading the public to decide for themselves that the Soviets and the British were our allies.205

A few weeks later, Dr. Appel forwarded the full drafts of his studies on the nature of emotions, and his analysis of their utility in advertising. His papers on anger and fear explored the nature of emotion, how emotion was stimulated, and what the outward

202 Ibid. 2.
203 Ibid. 3.
205 Ibid. 2.
manifestation of that emotion looked like. In the section titled “Fear,” Appel argued that fear was motivated by a perceived threat of harm: when an individual perceived potential harm to themselves, their survival, their family, or their social position, they experienced fear.²⁰⁶

Appel further argued in the chapter titled “Anger” that when harm had been done to an individual, their family, survival or social position, they experienced anger. In his final analysis, Appel stated that while anger would be an effective motivator, it would be difficult to base an entire advertising campaign on it. Anger, according to Appel, was the desire to do harm to another. Whatever motivated that desire made no difference – Appel went so far as to describe it as “the desire to kill.”²⁰⁷

Appel argued that guilt was an emotion based in fear and caused by the threat of harm. He felt that this, too, was unsustainable as an advertising tool. Appel believed that both fear and anger had their places in the ad man’s toolbox, but that to rely on either one exclusively would result in the audience tuning out the messages.

In late 1941, the National Advisory Council on Government Posters of the Graphics Division of the Office of Facts and Figures commissioned Young & Rubicam, Inc., to study Canadian war posters, in an attempt to understand government advertising’s impact on a civilian population. The final report, “How to Make Posters that Will Help Win the War,” argued that successful posters had two key components: that they held an


emotional appeal and that the image was a photograph or drawn from one.\textsuperscript{208} Canada had already been at war for two years as a member of the British Dominion, and the surveyors were able to draw some early conclusions on poster efficacy based on a survey administered in Toronto, Canada from March 16, 1942 to April 1, 1942, and interviewed men and women of all income levels.\textsuperscript{209} Study participants were asked if they recognized posters from photographs, what the poster meant to them, and if they liked the poster.

Unsurprisingly, the study concluded that the most effective war posters appeal to the emotions. Further, effective posters had large, immediately legible images that easily and clearly conveyed a message or story. The more photo-realistic the image, the more powerful the poster. All-text posters and symbolic or abstract posters were unremarkable at best, and off-putting at worst. Humorous posters failed across the board, both as too abstract and too unserious for a wartime appeal.\textsuperscript{210}

One such emotional poster was a war bonds poster, featuring a pretty young mother holding a baby, as two ghostly clawed hands reach for them. Each hand has the symbol of one of Canada’s main enemies – the Nazi swastika and the Japanese rising sun. Study participants strongly responded to the emotional appeal. “It gets at your heart as soon as you see it.” “It makes you think of the helpless mothers and children you must protect.” “Anybody would want to protect this mother and child.”\textsuperscript{211} These responses


\textsuperscript{209} Ibid. 2-3.

\textsuperscript{210} Ibid. 6.
clearly show the visceral reaction many had to the image of a mother and child threatened by Axis powers.

Another sample war bonds poster featured a wounded soldier. According to the report’s authors, “The bloody bandage around his head dramatizes his need for planes, guns, tanks, and ammunition so he can keep on fighting. His peril makes people see that they must buy Victory Bonds, and by appealing to the emotions, this poster moves people as an appeal to reason alone never could.” The connection between the injured infantryman and the need for planes might be a longer reach than his need for ammunition, but by the time this poster went into circulation, Victory Bonds as a source of funding for war material was common knowledge. The study participants also clearly made that connection, as shown by the responses shared in the report: “The distressed look on that guy’s face would make anybody buy a bond.” “A poster like this gives you the fighting spirit. It makes you want to buy.” “It’s a war scene, and actually it’s the only reason we buy bonds, to win the war.”

The type of imagery was also important. People responded more positively to photographs or photo-realistic illustrations than they did to abstract imagery or cartoons. A war bonds poster featured General A. G. L. McNaughton, Commander of Canadian Army Overseas. The study authors equated his status to General Douglas MacArthur in the United States. The poster features McNaughton and an appeal to honor, exhorting the viewer to “ Honour your pledge” to support the military and buy war bonds regularly.

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211 Ibid. 7.

212 Ibid. 8.
Responses to this poster indicated that a recognizable face drew people in, more than a general image, and especially more than an abstract. “McNaughton’s face is so well known to all of us that this makes a personal appeal.” “He is a great example of a soldier. He makes you think of war, and makes you want to help.” “You just have to support him, a man like that.” “I like the strength behind it. That’s what McNaughton stands for, strength.”

Abstract and symbolic posters did not perform well in the Canadian study. Abstract posters confused respondents, which meant the posters were too subtle to be widely legible. “I don’t understand this poster.” “It’s something about the last war. That’s all I know.” “I don’t get it. Does it mean freedom?” In some cases, an entirely wrong message was inferred from the abstract and symbolic posters. Responses to a poster featuring a white elephant, as an exhortation to not purchase anything unnecessary (a white elephant), included: “Do not buy liquor, or you will see pink elephants.” “If you don’t need a Victory bond, don’t buy it. I guess it means poor people do not need to buy Victory Bonds.” “The elephant represents India.”

One particular comment, in response to the soldier war bonds poster, expressed the response wartime advertisers were trying to elicit: “It shows the way a soldier suffers,

\[213\text{ Ibid. 9.}
\[214\text{ Ibid. 10.}
\[215\text{ Ibid. 11.}
\[216\text{ Ibid.}
and it makes me want to help.” Wartime advertising was designed to encourage the people to respond, to get them involved, and to get them involved productively. The study showed that advertising had to be clear, to the point, emotional, and relatable. To that end, photographs and photo-realistic illustrations were most relatable, and the humorous and abstract designs were the least.

Purely emotional appeals were the by far the most effective, leading the authors to the final conclusion that all posters should include emotional appeals. In the final reiteration of conclusions, the report writers outlined the two questions that anyone who selected posters should ask. The first was “Does the poster appeal to the emotions?” The second question was “Is the poster a literal picture in photographic detail?” The corpus of posters and advertisements produced in the next few years by the Office of Facts and Figures and the Office of War Information show that these questions were well in the minds of the Planning Board, the Bureau of Campaigns, and the artists themselves.

These two points became foundational ideals of the OWI’s advertising production teams, and are clearly visible in the finished products. Many posters referenced in later chapters include photographs or images drawn from photographs. More abstract images are rare, and when they appear, are part of a powerful emotional appeal. Cartoons and jokes are largely absent from the corpus. Overall, the posters are largely earnest and straightforward in their pleas. However, the unintended result of those pleas is significant. These posters reflected more than study parameters and the War Information

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217 Ibid. 8.

218 Ibid. 16.
Objectives, they also reflected advertisers’ ideas about women and what would elicit the desired response from women. Based on the recruiting material they produced, advertisers at the OWI believed that the only way to convince women to join the military was to put it into the context of supporting the men in their lives and that women would not join the armed forces without community support that the OWI needed to encourage.

The Army faced the challenges of both recruiting women to their branch as well as those of convincing the American public that the Army was a desirable and appropriate employer for young women. The Army produced patriotic appeals with some common themes Appel and the Canadian study identified as most important and impactful: love of country, participation in the war effort, making a direct contribution, and ending the war sooner. The Navy followed suit, but also built on the Army’s work convincing families and communities that women should enlist in the military.

All groups used a variant of the “Free a Man to Fight” slogan. The WAVES and Coast Guard-SPAR both exhorted women to “Release a Man to Fight at Sea”219 and the USMCWR specifically recruited women that would “Be a Marine – Free a Marine to Fight.”220 The WAAC/WAC reserved the specific phrase for pamphlets and articles, and instead told women they were as equally welcome in the Army as men were. The slogans

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220 “Be a Marine..Free a Marine to Fight,” NARA, RG 44, digital file 17-0792M, NARA ID 513678, Local ID 44-PA-236A.
“This is my war, too!”221 and “Do Your Part – Join the WAAC!”222 emphasized that the Army believed that women had a particular and unique role to play as soldiers.

The phrase “Free a Man to Fight” and its variants expressed gender roles and expectations at the time. First, it was clear that the job of fighting was for men. Everyone understood that men did the fighting. The question implicit in all variants of the slogan was what women could do to free men to fight. WAAC advertisements addressed another underlying assumption of “Free a Man to Fight” – that men wanted to fight and were eager to be relieved. An April 1943 WAAC recruiting advertisement, written from the perspective of a woman about to complete basic training, emphasized that while she was enjoying learning and participating in the war effort, she was there to do a specific job: “we came here bent on serious duty.” The women were going to “tak[e] over from soldiers who’ve been biting their nails at desk jobs, and now have their chance to punch Hitler in the nose!”223

The Office of War Information’s early days were filled with confusion. Old ideas changed to accommodate governmental needs and desires for the war effort. When ad men like Ken R. Dyke joined the new bureau, they brought their old ways of advertising to and for women. Even as their mission changed over the few years of their existence, the middle level of OWI management – bureau heads, campaign heads, and program managers like Mary Brewster White, Natalie Davison, and Clifford Sutter – continued to

221 “This is My War Too!” NARA, RG 44, digital file 17-0787M, NARA ID 515724, Local ID 44-PA2029.


223 “This is the Life...and I love it!” McCall’s Magazine, April 1943, 137.
experiment with new modes of advertising. They used both their tried and true methods
as well as the new studies provided at the beginning of the war, often with mixed results.
The early leadership of the OWI only considered women in terms of their relationships to
men, as wives, mothers, daughters, sisters, and sweethearts. The newly forming women’s
auxiliaries presented a new problem for the OWI and especially the middle managers
who created the content. With little information and less direction, advertisers had to
consider what might drive a woman to join the military. They had to think about women
as patriots and citizens, not just as wives and mothers. They had to conceptualize women
who wanted to earn higher wages, or learn a marketable skill, or serve their country with
no other motivations. For the first time, advertisers had to consider women as individuals,
outside of their presumed relationships with men.
Elmer Davis and Archibald MacLeish both believed that government control of information was necessary, even desirable, but they had different ideas about the American public’s ability to use the information the government provided. Davis believed that people were capable of extrapolating what the government wanted and needed from the unvarnished truth. Davis equated propaganda with the Nazis and Joseph Goebbels’ work, and assiduously avoided even the implication that the OWI dealt in propaganda. MacLeish believed that people were good-hearted but needed guidance to the correct tangible response to emotional appeals. MacLeish did not think outright propaganda, similar to what the government produced in World War I, was necessary or desirable, though he understood its power. MacLeish wanted to release as much information as possible in such a way that the public reached the conclusion the government desired. In both cases, they thought the American people deserved to know as much as possible, though their ideas of what was possible differed. These differences were the root of the conflict at the Office of War Information in late 1942 to early 1943.

Elmer Davis, journalist, radio announcer, and Director of the Office of War Information, believed that the OWI was primarily a mouthpiece for government policy – that they were an educational organization, at bottom. He believed that the OWI did not work for the President, nor for Congress, but for the American people: “We work for
130,000,000 people, as an instrument of the government they have chosen. It is not our function to make government policy, but to help the people understand what it is, and why.” In Davis’ estimation, the OWI was a funnel, collecting information and dispensing it as needed. He considered explanations of government policies part of the OWI’s purpose, but also believed those explanations should be limited to basic clarification. To Davis, putting the information in a particular context to emphasize a specific aspect of the program or issue was beyond the OWI’s purview.

Archibald MacLeish, poet, Librarian of Congress, former Director of the Office of Facts and Figures, and Associate Director of the Office of War Information, believed that the OWI should contextualize the information they transmitted to the American public, and they should provide as much information as possible, barring only military sensitive information. MacLeish believed that if the American public understood the war, and had all the information, they would wholeheartedly support the United States’ participation, and would do their best for the war effort. Many, including his literary contemporaries and government colleagues, considered MacLeish a propagandist, with all the negative connotations and terrible reputation rising from the government’s abuse of propaganda in the previous war.

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224 Elmer Davis to All Staff Members, memorandum, March 17, 1943, NARA, RG 211, I6 124, Box 3, “Office of War Information 1943” folder, 1.


Roughly half a year after the Office of War Information took over many of the duties of the Office of Facts and Figures, the main conflict within OWI was still one of purpose. The quiet conflict between Davis and MacLeish affected the policy, the procedures, and the content in the materials produced and processed through OWI facilities over the course of 1943.

The new agency almost immediately came under attack from Republican Congressmen, who painted it a mouthpiece for President Roosevelt and designed merely to get him re-elected.\(^{227}\) Davis decried the Congressional accusations in a memo dated March 17, 1943, while still preparing the staff for them to continue. In this memo, he explicitly stated the OWI’s status as an apolitical organization: “OWI can no more be concerned with politics than can the Army or the Navy…We must take care that the utility of this Office as an instrument to that end is not inspired by any action of ours, whatever injury to it may be attempted by others.”\(^{228}\) Davis understood that to perform its task, the OWI needed to be independent of political concerns.

The Congressional attack came to a head in late 1943, when, during budgetary negotiations, the OWI’s budget was slashed so dramatically the majority of its remaining in-house content creating branches had to be shut down.\(^{229}\) In addition to the Congressional attacks, the in-house content creating branches faced challenges from within the OWI.


\(^{228}\) Elmer Davis to All Staff Members, memorandum, March 17, 1943, NARA, RG 211, I6 124, Box 3, “Office of War Information 1943” folder, 1.

The top-level power struggle filtered down the hierarchy, affecting the work of people in Washington and nationwide. For example, Mary Brewster White, Program Manager of Womanpower Campaigns, in the Bureau of Campaigns, part of the Domestic Branch of the Office of War Information, was too far down the hierarchy to have an impact on Congressional infighting or even the conflicts at the directorship level of the Office of War Information. Brewster White had three points of contact over the course of 1943: Robert R. Perry, Ken R. Dyke, and Ken Beirn. These men all reported to Gardner J. Cowles, the Deputy Director of the Domestic Branch. Cowles himself reported to Archibald MacLeish, Assistant Director of the Office of War Information, who then reported to Elmer Davis, Director of the Office of War Information. Brewster White had no direct line to the Director’s office. Her concerns were much more immediate, and in the grand scheme of things, she and other program managers were the moving forces at the Office of War Information.

OWI’s proposed organization had the director and assistant director above the planning board, and then the various bureau heads reported to the planning board. The bureaus were further divided into smaller, more focused divisions. An early version of the structure placed even more levels between program managers and planners, with two levels of assistant directors to Archibald MacLeish. Books, Magazines, Radio, and Outdoor Advertising were all equal, but were at the lowest level of both organizational
The final organizational structure was simpler than the proposed plan, but still placed multiple bureaucratic levels between content producers and policy makers.

OWI-produced advertisements changed markedly between March and September 1943. Advertisements produced between January and March 1943 addressed women in gendered social contexts. These advertisements showed women pretty uniforms, fun leisure activities in between training to replace a young man, and the satisfaction that she was helping end the war sooner, which would bring her own young man home faster. This perception of women was a version of the targeted woman in other advertisements — the household manager, the husband-hunter, or the pretty girl everyone watched.

Advertisements produced from August to October 1943 addressed women individually, without presuming they had any relationships to men. These advertisements showed women that were just like men — patriotic, invested in protecting their country, eager to do their part for the war effort, and interested in gaining skills or using existing ones to do so. The featured women still had relationships with men, and those relationships were sometimes depicted, but those relationships were additional information, not the only story.

At the end of 1943, advertisements treated women as a target audience with the same impulses and emotions as a target audience of men. Advertisements spoke to women who were equally as patriotic as men, and who had the same motivations as men. The change in how content producers understood women, partly due to the efforts of the

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branch leaders, and partly due to the efforts of women within OWI, manifested in the change in the advertisements published over the course of 1943 and 1944.

The OWI produced original content in its early days, despite Davis’ conviction that the OWI was primarily an educational institution, and not a content creation agency. As discussed in Chapter 3, Ken R. Dyke, Chief Liaison Officer, received psychologist Dr. John Appel’s studies of the emotional process from fear to anger, and how an advertiser might harness that emotion.231 Appel articulated motivational emotions such as “Fear,” “Anger,” and “Anxiety,” and described the stimuli behind the emotions.232 The Young & Rubicam, Inc. study of Canadian posters, “How To Make Posters That Will Help Win The War,” used existing posters already in circulation and a focus group to provide examples of successful posters and the reasons why they were successful.233 Some of the project managers at OWI, including Mary Brewster White, referenced the sources in their correspondence and encouraged their staffs to keep the findings in mind.234

Even as the Office of War Information actively recruited women into the armed forces, private advertisers used the military imagery associated with them to sell

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products. As the Office of War Information allocated advertising space, corporations found that they could gain the advertising space they desired by donating it for government use. The Second Revenue Act of 1940, passed on October 8, 1940, taxed war-related corporate profits earned each year over a certain amount, as an attempt to boost government revenues. If the company reinvested the “excess profits,” such as in advertising campaigns, they were exempt from taxation.\textsuperscript{235} The resulting fight in Congress to cap the amount business could reinvest in advertising led to proposed new legislation, HR 10720, or the Advertising Tax Bill, and a lobbying campaign against it. One of the unexpected consequences was a rise in corporate donations of advertising space for government purposes.\textsuperscript{236}

As discussed in Chapter 2, the Office of War Information was keenly aware that advertisements with a high emotional impact were more memorable to the viewing audience. Both the Young & Rubicam, Inc. study of Canadian posters, “How To Make Posters That Will Help Win The War,”\textsuperscript{237} and Dr. John Appel’s psychological studies\textsuperscript{238} showed the importance of emotional impact. Full page advertisements that allowed for

\textsuperscript{235} The Second Revenue Act of 1940, October 8, 1940, Public Law 76-801, 54 Stat. 974, 76 HR 10413, Chapter 757, 974.


both images and text used the space to tell full short stories designed to stimulate emotions.

Leaders of OFF and OWI drew their staffs from a variety of advertisers and media producing companies. Ken R. Dyke came to the OFF from NBC Radio, and MacLeish hired Allen Grover away from Time, Inc. Ad men, fresh from Madison Avenue, continued using the same methods they had been prior to taking government positions. Early OFF and OWI advertisements addressed women in gendered social contexts: as wives, sweethearts, daughters and mothers. The “Consumer’s Pledge for Total Defense” used the rhetoric of full mobilization to equate homemaking to serving in the military: “Although the scrupulous observance of your responsibilities as housewives may not seem a dramatic means of expressing your will to serve, be certain of this: your men – your sons, your husbands, your sweethearts – are only as secure as you can make them.” Variants of this advertisement ran multiple months in several magazines in early 1943. Other content equated war work to housework to emphasize how simple it was: “Instead of baking cakes, this woman is cooking gears to reduce the tension in the gears after use.”

Military recruiting advertisements began where all women’s mobilization advertisements of World War II began – first by explaining the labor shortage to the audience, and then clearly and carefully leading the audience to the conclusion that

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women needed to fill the gaps. Even as advertisements depicted women taking war-related work as early as 1941, these women were volunteers, working with the Volunteer Services and the American Red Cross.\footnote{“More Pep! The Call of a Nation,” Tea Growers Association advertisement, \textit{Good Housekeeping Magazine}, February 1941, 155.}

The Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) had the additional problem of convincing the American public that women in the military were necessary, practical, and desirable. Despite the long history of women working with the United States military, many members of the public had forgotten their service. As discussed in Chapter 3, women’s status \textit{with} the military, rather than \textit{in} it, often left the general public confused about women’s roles. The negative rumors that swirled about the WAAC in 1943, discussed later in the chapter, were evidence of people’s confusion and discomfort with the idea of women as a part of the armed forces, whether as reservists, auxiliaries, or contractors. The first advertisements for the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps focused on showing that women could fill necessary military roles, and showing the Corps itself.\footnote{“Calling WAAC...” NARA, RG 44, digital file 17-1134M, NARA ID 514016, Local ID 44-PA-537; “Attention, Women!” NARA, RG 44, digital file 17-1010M, NARA ID 513892, Local ID 44-PA-433.}

An early poster from late 1942 did all of this with a few words and basic illustrations that recalled specific imagery. A soldier in the upper left corner called on his radio: ““Calling WAAC...”” A WAAC wearing a radio headset and seated at a typewriter, received the call and typed the radiogram: “TO ALL QUALIFIED WOMEN – EVERYWHERE, ALL STATES, USA – MEET TOTAL WAR WITH YOUR TOTAL

\footnote{“Calling WAAC...” NARA, RG 44, digital file 17-1134M, NARA ID 514016, Local ID 44-PA-537.}
EFFORT...JOIN THE WAAC.” The bottom of the poster provided the basic recruiting information: “Apply at any U. S. Army Recruiting and Induction Station.” The poster was dramatic, emphatic, and struck emotional chords, as per the guidelines set out by the Office of War Information.

Early advertisements reflected the belief that women were just as patriotic as men, though they still subtly referenced men. One poster featured a WAAC pointing at a Blue Star flag given to families with a son in the service. “I’m in this war too!” (Figure 9) declared that women were soldiers along with men.

When the OWI knew of a specific need, they could tailor the advertisements. For example, an advertisement from the March 1943 issue of McCall’s Magazine combined the image from one of the earliest WAAC posters with an urgent request for linguists. The advertisement, “America has her heroines,” referred to Clara Barton’s work as a nurse and to the story of Molly Pitcher, both women who helped the war effort in specifically gendered ways. Molly Pitcher brought water to cool her husband’s artillery piece, and took over his position there when he was killed in battle, and Clara Barton was a nurse and the founder of the American Red Cross. Both of these women filled traditionally feminine roles of nurturing and supporting the men who did the fighting. Even though Molly Pitcher’s story involved her taking her husband’s position and firing

245 Ibid.


247 “I’m in this war too!” NARA, RG 44, digital file 17-1738M, NARA ID 514606, Local ID 44-PA-1079.

248 “America has her heroines,” McCall’s Magazine, March 1943, 131.
the artillery piece, she still filled a gendered role as a wife and helpmeet in all things. Molly Pitcher’s story tied directly to a later part of the advertisement, which told the reader they would support the fighting forces by “releasing soldiers needed on the fighting fronts.”249 The advertisement targeted women with special skills, especially those with some college education or were multi-lingual. “If you speak and write Spanish, Portuguese, Chinese, Japanese, Russian, French, German or Italian – see the Army Recruiting Office right away. You’re very much needed in the WAAC.”250 This direct appeal was both urgent and gentle. The phrasing “You’re very much needed in the WAAC” was a gentle encouragement in the face of multiple exhortations for everyone to participate in the war effort. This early advertisement appealed to women’s patriotism, willingness to serve, and perceptions of themselves as capable and skilled. Advertisements for everything from bed linens, to castor oil, to toilet tissue, to cookware, portrayed women as efficient and capable homemakers, and caring mothers.

Though this particular advertisement searched for linguists, it also listed the various jobs women would do in the WAAC. Based on the early legislation, including Colonel Ira J. Swift’s testimony before Congress, the list included both traditionally feminine work as well as work traditionally men’s work or military work. Traditionally female-coded work in the military included jobs like cooks, laundry workers, stewardesses, typists, and telephone operators.251 The traditionally male-coded work

249 Ibid.

250 Ibid.

251 Congressional Record, 77th Session, 1941-1942, 20 January 1942, 11.
included jobs like pharmacists, telegraph operators, mechanics, accountants, and drivers. Much of the Marine Corps Women’s Reserve (USMCWR) recruiting material particularly emphasized aviation.

Given that all United States armed services were racially segregated in 1943, it is important to note that the advertisement specifically welcomed non-white women: “Enrollment is open to women citizens of good repute, strong, intelligent 21 to 44, inclusive, regardless of race, color, or creed – with equal opportunity for Officer Candidate School.”252 The specific mention of “equal opportunity for Officer Candidate School” also showed that the WAAC, at least, would not require white officers for segregated units.253

Finally, the last two sentences of “America has her heroines” offered two different appeals: another patriotic appeal and a nod to the economic concerns facing potential recruits. “Pay is now equal to soldiers’ pay. Serve your country and protect your future in the WAAC – apply at nearest U. S. Army Recruiting Station.”254 These two simple statements reflected the changes that had already occurred in the newly formed group. Less than a year since the WAAC’s inception, women complained that they were not paid equally for doing the same work, nor were they eligible for advancement the way the men were. The WAAC suffered from issues regarding relative rank, as did the

252 “America has her heroines,” McCall’s Magazine, March 1943, 131.

253 The OWI also recruited African Americans for multiple campaigns, including industry for men and women and men’s military recruiting. The OWI files are held by the National Archives and Records Administration, and deserve a thorough and dedicated review by a future scholar.

254 “America has her heroines,” McCall’s Magazine, March 1943, 131.
Army Nurse Corps, though the Army Nurse Corps’ issues stemmed from concerns about women in command of men.255

The Army Recruiting Service, which handled the majority of men’s recruiting, hired Young & Rubicom, Inc. to handle the WAAC recruiting effort in 1942, and appointed Major Harold A. Edlund to helm the women’s recruiting program. Major Edlund was an advertising executive in civilian life, and brought his skills to bear on the problem of low enlistment. His initial project included a poll to discover why women were not enlisting, though most of the senior staff believed that it was because women simply did not grasp how much the WAAC needed them. The poll revealed that women did know, and that a variety of reasons prevented them from enlisting. The new campaigns of early 1943 reflected the results of the poll, addressing the fears and reluctance of potential enlistees.256 The Office of War Information did not make use of Edlund’s findings, instead relying on Dr. John Appel’s psychological studies and the Canadian study “How to Make Posters that Will Help Win the War,” as discussed in Chapter 2.257

Young & Rubicam, Inc. produced some of the advertisements and forwarded them to the OWI for production, and OWI creators produced others entirely in-house. Edlund’s efforts included Madison Avenue staples, featuring the glamorous jobs, and never showing women in unflattering fatigues, or doing things like driving trucks.

255 Sarnecky, 142-144.

256 Treadwell, The Women’s Army Corps, 186-188.

257 There is little information in the OWI records regarding Edlund’s study, though many of the advertisements met his recommended parameters. Whether or not this was deliberate is unclear.
Several quotes used focused on the uniforms or how the enlistees were having fun. The backlash from veteran WAACs was enough to force another reevaluation of the campaign.\textsuperscript{258}

In 1943, a series of rumors that smeared the reputations of the women confounded the WAAC leadership and drove recruitment down. The rumors were largely sexual in nature. Many whispered that many WAACs were not soldiers, but prostitutes, recruited specifically to serve Army officers. These rumors incorporated the class divisions within the Army as well, because the rumors specified that the women were for officers only, and no enlisted men would have access to them. Still others said that the WAAC distributed contraceptives to the women every day. A group of rumors developed around the women who were not supposedly prostitutes, but who had fallen on their own, sent home in disgrace, pregnant with illegitimate children.\textsuperscript{259} Another prominent set of rumors directly contradicted those that said the women were all having sex, paid or unpaid, with men. These rumors said that the WAAC’s ranks were filled with lesbians who were determined to corrupt innocent, respectable young women into their deviant ways.\textsuperscript{260} Presumably, the lesbians were not the ones who were pregnant because they were officers’ concubines.

\textsuperscript{258} Treadwell, \textit{The Women’s Army Corps}, 188.


The rumor campaign damaged recruitment so much the Federal Bureau of Investigation opened an investigation to determine if Nazi sympathizers had started the rumors to discredit the American war effort. Natalie E. Davison, Assistant Program Manager of Labor and Civilian Warfare, Bureau of Magazines, Domestic Branch of the Office of War Information, commissioned several articles designed to counter the rumors. However, the recruiting advertisements avoided the controversy. Advertisements continued to emphasize the wholesomeness of the WAC, and the good moral character of the women who enlisted.  

The rumor campaign also coincided with the WAAC’s conversion to the Women’s Army Corps. The resulting loss of a quarter of their original strength came at the most inopportune point in the WAC’s tenure. Major Jessie P. Rice took control of WAC advertising campaigns. Even as Major Rice refocused WAC advertising, she made use of OWI facilities. Rice’s changes marched with the changes happening within the Office of War Information, and the Joint-Army Navy Agreement outlined their new relationship clearly. 

Hildegarde Fillmore wrote several articles on the women’s auxiliaries for *McCall’s Magazine* throughout the war. Her article, “WAACS!” worked both as an enticement to enlist as well as a defense against the accusations against the WAAC. The article focused on Georgia Hudler, a stenographer, who “work[ed] right next to army

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261 These advertisements will be discussed later in the chapter. They appeared in *McCall’s Magazine* (1943), *Good Housekeeping Magazine* (1943), and as posters. See National Archives and Records Administration RG 24, Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division.

262 Joint Army-Navy Agreement of Recruiting of Women for the Women’s Reserve of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard; 16 September 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder.
Fillmore did not address Hudler’s specific reasons for joining, instead focusing on her experiences in the Army. Women in Hudler’s unit performed tasks usually done by men, including “work in the Motor Pool, driving nontactical cars, servicing them, even making repairs…they help run the Recreation Center, Post Office, even Police Headquarters!” According to Fillmore, “The only complaint made about them by Col. Charles K. Nulsen, Commanding Officer of the Post of Fort Sam Houston, is this: ‘There aren’t nearly enough of them!’”

Fillmore addressed the key question facing all the women’s auxiliaries: maintaining women’s femininity while in uniform. “Does her job spoil a girl’s natural individuality, take away from her femininity? Well, watch the crowded stag-line at one of their own dances, or look at the bulletin board, crammed with invitations to nearby functions, and you have your answer.” This and the next three paragraphs highlighted both the women’s desirability as dates as well as their home making skills, reminding readers that women who served in the WAAC would still fit into their gendered social context when the war was over. “In addition to jobs and dates, however, they do all their own housekeeping with a minimum of fuss and commotion. Georgia Hudler confided that their Company’s high moment came when a visiting General cited them for the most perfectly ordered barracks ever visited on inspection!”


264 Ibid.

265 Ibid.

266 Ibid.
The article did not include specific recruiting information. But according to Fillmore, the women were “thrilled, first, because they have been set apart from other women in war service to relieve a man for combat duty. But they are stimulated, too, by the training that continues even after they’ve taken their basic training.” Hulder herself made the best argument for joining the WAAC: “This training brings out the best in a girl…We are always discovering new things we can do ourselves, either because we get a chance at new jobs or because our officers keep an eye out for special talents. It is an exciting business, being a WAAC.” To a patriotic and ambitious young woman, the WAAC sounded like an adventurous and exciting way to serve her country and gain an education at the same time.

One of the later WAAC advertisements, found in the April 1943 issue of *McCall’s Magazine*, focused on the benefits recruits would experience. This shift in focus to what the women would gain from enlistment reflected the struggle at the Office of War Information. In late 1943, Mary Brewster White, Program Manager for Womanpower Campaigns, was clear that women responded to the same things that men did, and did not require additional enticements about romance, marriage benefits, the stylish uniforms, or beauty salons on base. This advertisement reflected the “humdrum, and almost phony” advertisements that were falling on deaf ears.

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267 Ibid.

268 Ibid.

269 Ibid.

The advertisement, titled “This is the Life…and I love it!” showed a scene of women gathered in a barracks’ common area, participating in various leisure activities. In the foreground, a woman played the piano while others sang along. In the background women played table tennis, a woman took a book off a bookshelf, and a group of women appeared to be comfortably chatting. The copy of the advertisement did not directly reference the image but instead emphasized the relationships between the women, as well as their patriotic desire to take part in the war effort. The narrator addressed the reader directly, as though they were having a conversation, or as if she had written a letter to the reader. “You know the reason – you’ve felt it yourself – a deep need to do something about this war, a feeling I had to give in to before I could find peace of mind.”\(^{271}\) Despite the statement that “Frankly, it’s the most fun I’ve had in years,”\(^{272}\) the narrator also described her common purpose with her fellow enlistees: “There’s something about every one of them – a light in their eye and an unspoken sense of purpose that – well, it’s fine.”\(^{273}\)

The remainder of the copy described their activities and ended with a reference to the WAAC’s purpose, relieving soldiers for combat duty: “Companies will be formed and sent into the field, taking over from soldiers who’ve been biting their nails at desk jobs!”\(^{274}\) The advertisement copy focused on leisure and personal relationships, rather

\(^{271}\) “This is the Life...And I Love It!” advertisement, *McCall’s Magazine*, April 1943, 137.

\(^{272}\) Ibid.

\(^{273}\) Ibid.

\(^{274}\) Ibid.
than the work WAACs would do, but also acknowledged the WAAC’s ultimate purpose: to relieve men for combat duty.

In June 1943, the last of the WAAC ads ran, as the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps transitioned to the Women’s Army Corps.\textsuperscript{275} The last few advertisements featuring WAACs still focused on explaining a WAAC’s job, the benefits, and encouraging women to join a wholesome and respectable organization.

Recruiting worked similarly for the Naval women’s auxiliary, Women Accepted for Voluntary Emergency Service (WAVES). Congress passed the WAVES legislation a few weeks after the WAAC, and used the work the WAAC had already done while improving their own message.\textsuperscript{276} Much of General Marshall’s concerns about the WAAC’s pay disparities were due to the clear message that WAVES earned the same amount of money as a sailor of the same rank.\textsuperscript{277}

Early WAVES posters focused on information, advertising that the Navy was searching for new recruits – in particular, educated women. Because the WAAC posters were already informing the public about the women’s groups, the WAVES started actively recruiting specifically for themselves almost immediately.

The Navy’s Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS) created and distributed early WAVES posters. One poster featured an illustration of a serious young woman in a

\textsuperscript{275} Edith Nourse Rogers introduced the reorganization bill to Congress in January 1943, at the behest of Director Hobby. The bill passed at the end of June 1943, and President Roosevelt signed it into law on 1 July, 1943. See Treadwell, \textit{The Women’s Army Corps}, 120-121, 219-221.

\textsuperscript{276} An Act To expedite the war effort by releasing officers and men for duty at sea and their replacement by women in the shore establishment of the Navy, and for other purposes, Public Law 77-689, 56 Stat. 730, Chapter 538, July 30, 1942, 730-731.

\textsuperscript{277} Treadwell, \textit{The Women’s Army Corps}, 230-234.
WAVES uniform, wearing a headset and manning a telegraph machine. The slogan “It’s a woman’s war too!” exposed advertisers’ assumptions about warriors. Men were warriors, the only ones who fought, and soldiering and manhood were so closely tied to each other that women had to explicitly claim space for themselves. In the case of this advertisement, BUPERS claimed the space on women’s behalf, then used the poster to invite women into the Navy. By explicitly claiming the war for women, the slogan was one piece of the process that normalized women in the military.

The patriotic appeal “Join the WAVES / Your country needs you now.” was generic, but the image was not. Telegraph and radio operators were high on the Navy’s list of urgent needs. While civilian women were more likely to be employed as telephone operators, telegraphy and radio operation were similar enough in military work that the Navy often lumped them together.

A poster from January 1943 showed all the same information as the WAAC posters, and featured the WAVES uniforms. A woman saluted the viewer, wearing her WAVES uniform. The text surrounding the image was equally simple: “Enlist in the WAVES / Release a man to fight at sea.” (Figure 2) The only difference between this and similar WAAC posters is the name of the branch and the addition of the words “at sea,” and the poster did the same work as the WAAC ones. And again, this poster connected women to men – this time, the men they were releasing to fight at sea.

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278 “It’s a Woman’s War, Too!” Library of Congress, Prints and Photos Division, LC-USZ62-60974.

The Navy signed the “Joint Army-Navy Agreement on Recruiting Women for the Women’s Reserve of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard” in September 1943, which gave them access to OWI facilities, though they only used them for mass production. All of the 1943 WAVES posters were created by BUPERS, and some were distributed through OWI channels.

“There’s a Man-Size Job for you in Your Navy” (Figure 6) debuted in April 1943. The bottom caption was basic and direct: “Enlist in the WAVES / Apply to your nearest Navy Recruiting Station or Office of Naval Officer Procurement.” This poster was a straightforward appeal to patriotism. Again, this poster connected women to men, and this time included the implication that jobs for men and women had different “sizes.” Whether audiences perceived this implication as negative or positive is unknown.

In July 1943, BUPERS addressed familial reluctance with a poster titled “Proud – I’ll say!” (Figure 5) This poster featured an older man, holding a framed official portrait of his daughter in the WAVES. Here, women were addressed as daughters, as men were addressed as fathers. This poster was in a similar vein as “I’m Proud of My TWO Soldiers.” (Figure 10) The parents in these two posters looked happy and pleased, designed to be characters with whom viewers could identify. The two posters reflected repeated admonitions within the OWI that women’s war work and military service needed to be “sold” to the American public, and that education on womanpower was part

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of OWI’s mission. The posters presented proud parents, who understood their children – their daughters – were doing important and necessary work for the war. These posters presented the happy parents as exemplars of all-American families and communities, and directly challenged the rumors of pregnant women sent home in shame. Further, “Proud – I’ll Say!” was produced in July 1943, in the midst of the changes to OWI procedures and campaign briefs, and showed the real potential of those proposed changes.

Later advertisements explained more nuanced information – benefits, training, pay, and all the other inducements that went beyond “doing one’s bit” for the war effort. These advertisements appeared in Good Housekeeping, McCall’s, Family Circle, and Women’s Day starting in early 1943. By the end of 1943, the OWI had completely phased out the clumsier advertisements from the first few months of the year.

Ken R. Dyke circulated a memo, “Objectives and Proposed Operations Plan for Advertising Division,” dated May 14, 1942 in which he argued that advertising was a valuable tool in the government’s arsenal, a way to influence people into supporting government policy. Dyke expressed the same ideas that Archibald MacLeish held, though he avoided the term “propaganda,” and used the word “advertising” instead. Dyke argued that “[a]dvertising has been a major motivating factor in influencing our people’s

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282 Mary Brewster White to Ken Beirn, Report on the Denver Conference, May 14, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder, 3-4; Mary Brewster White to Robert R. Perry, memorandum, August 13, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder, 1.


284 When Dyke wrote this memo, his section was still part of the Office of Facts and Figures, but it transferred to the Office of War Information following the reorganization.
habits, actions and thinking in times of peace. Properly directed along the same lines of orderly procedure which govern its successful commercial uses, it can and will become a major factor in carrying out the government’s wartime objectives.”

Dyke believed that the OWI could harness advertising’s potential to convince target audiences to cooperate with government aims, even though he did not fully understand how it worked. Few in the advertising industry or the OWI used any sort of systematic research to understand how and why advertising worked. In fact, the advertising studies consumers recognize today developed during and after World War II, in part due to this systemic lack of knowledge.

While many of Dyke’s superiors in the bureaucracy already supported using advertising to further government aims, Dyke believed the biggest problem was that “most of them seem to be completely unaware of the simple facts which govern an orderly harnessing of this potential asset.”

Dyke addressed both the use of government themes in regular corporate advertising as well as campaigns created specifically for the government. Dyke observed that “[p]otentially every advertisement, poster, radio program, or printed piece issued by every advertiser in the country could be a vehicle for a government message…every magazine and newspaper could donate space in every issue for government use...”

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287 Ibid.

288 Ibid. 2-3.
Radio stations were already donating airtime to the government for war messages, and Dyke believed that print publications would do the same. To Dyke, the most important point was not the space, but harnessing advertising’s fundamental function. “We must remember (an easy thing for enthusiastic government agencies to forget!) that a manufacturer’s advertising is designed to sell his product.” Advertisements sold a product or an idea to bring revenue into the company’s coffers. If an advertisement was to also carry a government message, it needed to do so in such a way that also sold the product. “Willing as he may be to contribute part of his space or radio time to government inspired messages – and to furnish the vehicle for these ‘rider’ – they must be designed not to interfere with the effectiveness of the advertiser’s own selling story. There must be a natural, unforced ‘marriage of ideas’ between the advertising message and the government ‘rider.’”

The resulting hybrid advertisements varied in their adherence to OWI goals and requirements. For example, a Kleenex advertisement for facial tissues depicted a WAAC using their product. A pretty woman daintily creased a tissue, above the text: “War Blonde!” The text quoted from a letter from a WAAC, “H.H., 5th Co., 1st Reg., Fort Des Moines, Ia.” She wrote: “Neatness is a WAAC essential. So, I carry folded Kleenex Tissues in my uniform pocket to wipe off shoes after marching...to save hankies!” This letter was not a spontaneous missive, but rather a requested submission. The same advertisement offered a twenty-five dollar war savings bond to any correspondent whose

289 Ibid. 3.

290 Ibid.
letter they published as advertising. “Write how the use of Kleenex Tissues saves you money and helps win the war.”\textsuperscript{291} The paid testimonials still promoted the products, while tying them in with a government aim – in this case, increasing the WAAC’s visibility by including an “illustration on war effort subjects.”\textsuperscript{292}

The Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps, as created in 1942, was a unit with the army, but not in it. Along with the issues discussed in Chapter 3, their ambiguous status caused confusion over where and when they would be deployed, and under whose authority. The Director, Oveta Culp Hobby, considered herself equal to other Corps commanders, but the WAAC’s organizational legislation severely curtailed her authority. Other members of the Army’s command structure made the final decisions about policy, and Hobby was merely a figurehead. When people came to Hobby for help in her capacity as Director of the WAAC, she often lacked the authority to assist them. These issues of command structure, authority, pay and promotional opportunities all created a great deal of confusion and unnecessary bureaucracy and red tape. The advocates for women in the military returned to their work, and proposed a reorganization of the corps.

On July 1, 1943, the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) became the Women’s Army Corps (WAC). The women who were in the WAAC had the opportunity to re-enlist in the new WAC or to leave the Army, even though they had enlisted for the duration. The new corps was fully a part of the Army, under the same command structure, with the same discipline, pay and advancement structure. When offered the

\textsuperscript{291} Kleenex advertisement, \textit{McCall’s Magazine}, February 1943, 116. Emphasis original.

option, approximately three-quarters of the WAAC opted to re-enlist at the same rank in the new WAC.\footnote{Bellafaire, \textit{The Women's Army Corps}, paragraph 1.}

While this new structure and membership in the Army alleviated some of the issues facing the women, it did not solve all the problems, and in some cases, created new ones. Suddenly, the men of the army faced an unfamiliar group whom they were instructed to accept as equals. Stories abound of WAC enlisted women arriving at the door of their new postings at the same time as a male officer. Military protocol demanded that enlisted held the door for officers. Social protocol demanded that men held the door for women. Enlisted memoirist, Clarice F. Pollard, recalled her class on proper military etiquette, when the issue of what an enlisted WAAC should do when she reached a door at the same time as a male officer. A student asked, “Should \textit{we} open the door for \textit{him} – or he for us?” The instructor replied “‘if he wants to open the door, let him!’”\footnote{Clarice F. Pollard, \textit{Laugh, Cry and Remember: The Journal of a G. I. Lady}, (Phoenix: Journeys Press, 1991), 42.} Even military protocols could not always override social conditioning about good manners.

The transition from WAAC to WAC coincided with upheaval at the OWI. Unable to reconcile their different views of what the OWI could be, Archibald MacLeish left the agency early in the year, citing, in part, his need to focus on his post as Librarian of Congress.\footnote{Donaldson, \textit{Archibald MacLeish}, 364.} MacLeish had spent his few months under Elmer Davis arguing for a more constructed message to the American public. MacLeish felt that the OWI and the government could not fully trust the American public to come to the correct conclusions.
and actions. Therefore, part of the OWI’s mission was to shape and direct public responses to advertisements. Interestingly, MacLeish also wanted the OWI to provide more information to the public than Davis did. Again, MacLeish did not completely trust the public to draw the appropriate conclusion, but he felt that the public would notice they were not receiving adequate information and would resent the government for it, much as they resented the government for the propaganda efforts of World War I.296

MacLeish’s departure prompted personnel changes, many at the highest level. The changes and confusion manifested in the middle levels, where the day-to-day work took place. Ken R. Dyke left the agency, but Ken Beirn remained. Beirn was a more remote supervisor, trusting his subordinates to identify and then resolve whatever issues they found. Mary Brewster White, who had been on loan to the OWI for the Womanpower Campaigns from the War Manpower Commission in the first part of 1943, permanently joined the OWI staff.

Mary Brewster White’s memos provided evidence of the confusion at OWI. Her memorandum to Robert R. Perry dated June 22, 1943 outlined the process her department underwent to clear information for use. “In the preparation of material for the Womanpower Program it has been necessary to clear with the following agencies in order to avoid conflicting statements, encroachment upon policy, and general confusion:”297 Included on the list were the War Manpower Commission, the War and Navy Departments, the War Production Board, the Women’s Bureau and Children’s Bureau in

296 Donaldson, Archibald MacLeish, 348-353.
297 Mary Brewster White to Robert R. Perry, memorandum, June 22, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder.
the Department of Labor, the Office of Civilian Defense, the Red Cross, the Department of Agriculture, the War Food Administration, and the Office of Education, among others. This list of offices, bureaus, and agencies, some governmental, some not, was not exhaustive. Her final note stated that “In specialized material, such as pamphlets, speeches, etc., it is also frequently necessary to clear with the Office of Price Administration.”  

She also attached a list titled “Estimated Womanpower Needs,” which estimated that the various military branches, war industries, volunteer organizations, and the nursing profession would require over 2.7 million women during the war.  

The estimate was based on early 1943 projections, and had no estimate for the four-month-old United States Marine Corps Women’s Reserve. Further, the estimates for graduate and student nurses, 42,000 and 65,000, respectively, were significantly lower than the actual numbers needed. By 1944, the Army Nurse Corps alone had a strength of over 42,000. These estimates outlined a serious challenge to the abilities, structures, and conceptual skills of the OWI staff, as they faced an uphill battle to encourage enough women to take part in government programs.

In the early part of 1943, the Office of War Information faced two separate issues. First, content producers and advertisers produced material for women in their gendered social contexts – their existing social connection to men. Advertisers continued as they had in the 1930s, producing content that targeted the household manager or the husband-

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298 Ibid.

299 Estimated Womanpower Needs, attachment to memorandum, Mary Brewster White to Robert R. Perry, June 22, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder.

300 Sarnecky, 270.
hunting single woman, and did not consider a more varied or nuanced understanding of women, despite working with women every day in the OFF and OWI. Advertisers failed to address women who had separate and independent motivations for their actions, up to and including enlisting in the military. Initially, many at the OWI did not recognize this as a problem; in fact, many could not explain why their recruiting advertisements to women were failing to produce the necessary enlistments.

The second, and most stressful, issue was the conflict over what the Office of War Information’s mission should have been. Elmer Davis, the Director, believed that the OWI’s mission was to clarify and explain government polices to the public. Archibald MacLeish, Deputy Director, believed that the OWI’s mission included influencing opinion through judicious contextualization and information presentation. Both agreed that people needed the information, but Davis had more confidence that the American public would be able to draw the desired conclusions than MacLeish did. The conflict impacted all aspects of the OWI’s operation, some more than others. At the middle management level, that of bureau heads and program managers, circumstances forced individuals to choose a side and make decisions based on that choice. Ken R. Dyke, Ken Beirn, Robert R. Perry, Mary Brewster White, and Natalie Davison all worked to produce content, direct information, and work within the confusion to produce a coherent message for the rest of the nation.
CHAPTER FIVE: TUG-O-WAR: THE CONFLICT MANIFESTS IN MIDDLE MANAGEMENT

When Archibald MacLeish left the Office of War Information, the middle managers bore the brunt of the conflict through conflicting directives and procedures, often leaving them to navigate the confusion as best they could. People like Mary Brewster White, Natalie Davison and Ken Beirn were left to make judgment calls based on outdated information and directives, all while meeting the government’s ever-shifting informational campaign needs. The highest levels of this struggle, between Davis and MacLeish and their respective camps, have been documented elsewhere. 301

Davis and MacLeish’s conflict manifested in three significant ways: conflicts over what the ultimate purpose of the content ought to be, who would create the content, and the type of content they authorized. As discussed in Chapter 4, MacLeish believed that the OWI needed to properly deploy it in the upcoming conflict, while Davis believed the OWI’s purpose was no more, and no less, than educating the American public on government policies. 302 These conflicts began while MacLeish was still Director of the Office of Facts and Figures. As these three conflicts played out at the OWI’s highest

301 Allan M. Winkler’s The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information 1942-1945 focused on the fight between the Office of War Information and Congress, and on Davis’ perspective on the internal OWI conflicts between himself and MacLeish. Scott Donaldson’s biography, Archibald MacLeish: An American Life detailed MacLeish’s experiences and perspectives.

levels, the program managers and bureau heads at the middle level adjusted as best they could.

As head of the Office of Facts and Figures, MacLeish had often received personal encouragement and support from President Roosevelt. Following the merger of OFF into OWI, Roosevelt offered less clear support to MacLeish, and by the end of 1942, seemed to back Davis exclusively in OWI’s internal conflicts. “[Roosevelt’s] penchant for conflicting appointments…allowed him to play off his assistants against one another.” MacLeish spent the last portion of 1942 pushing for more florid copy, designed to elicit emotional responses from the audience. He argued that propaganda had many beneficial uses, and that the OWI would benefit from a more propagandistic approach. When he began at the OFF, he was enthusiastic about the possibilities of not just influencing public opinion about the war, but also about rehabilitating propaganda’s image in the public eye.

Archibald MacLeish moved to an Assistant Director position in the new Office of War Information in June 1942. As an Assistant Director, he had less control than he did at OFF. He needed to work within Davis’ policies, which were based on a different understanding of OWI’s mission than his. He continued to push for in-house content production by the Writers’ Bureau, though not in the same manner as during World War I. MacLeish believed that the Writers’ Bureau would have lists of writers and artists to

303 Donaldson, Archibald MacLeish, 357.
304 Winkler, Politics of Propaganda, 69.
305 Winkler, Politics of Propaganda, 48-56.
whom they could assign projects. Some would have workspace in the OWI facility in Washington, D. C., and others would remain in their home cities. In MacLeish’s view, OWI would direct all the content creation while allowing the content producers some flexibility and autonomy.\(^{306}\)

Gardner Cowles, Director of Domestic Operations, part of the Domestic Branch of the OWI, disagreed. He believed that content creators should be sub-contracted to save money. He solicited and accepted content produced by unaffiliated artists, writers, and advertising companies.\(^{307}\) To do so, Cowles worked through the Advertising Council, an advisory group of advertising executives based in New York City. An internal OWI memorandum, “Planning and Production of Government Information Campaigns,” outlined the Advertising Council’s role, along with that of the Bureau of Campaigns. Defined as “a non-profit corporation composed of advertising and merchandising specialists,” the Advertising Council was “a voluntary war-time organization established by the Advertising Industry to mobilize the forces of advertising to aid in the effective conducting of war information campaigns and programs. In this capacity, the Advertising Council has been officially recognized by the Office of War Information as the major point of liaison with the Advertising Industry.”\(^{308}\)

Another way the OWI solicited advertisers was through the “War Guide for Advertisers,” a regular publication for advertising professionals. The publication was “an


attempt to present government informational needs and desires in such a way that they
will have a more widespread handling by advertisers in both the retail and national fields.
It will be the official connecting link between the advertising industry and the
government, as represented by the Bureau of Campaigns."

The OWI produced the War Advertising Guide throughout the war to communicate government programs and
advertising needs to content producers around the country.

The Advertising Council and the Bureau of Campaigns produced a status report
on January 1, 1943. Published as the power struggle came to a head, the report reflected
the effects of the conflicting mandates. Many of the descriptions used the words
“explain,” “acquaint,” and “create an understanding,” in keeping with Davis’ belief that
the OWI’s mission was one of explanation and education. However, other descriptions
used phrasing like “urge,” “promote,” and “persuade,” which reflected MacLeish’s belief
that the OWI should shape American public opinion.

Davis communicated his policy several times in the first few months of the OWI’s
existence, which caused conflict with MacLeish. Faced with little direction or oversight,
the apparent loss of presidential support, and an increasingly complicated set of priorities
and missions, MacLeish first offered to resign his position a few months after OWI
absorbed OFF. Davis refused, and the confusion continued, until MacLeish finally
resigned from OWI at the end of January 1943, to devote all his attention to his work as

NARA, RG 208, NC 148 39, Box 140, “Campaigns” folder, 3.

310 “Status of Campaigns as of January 1, 1943,” report, January 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 39, Box 140,
“Campaigns” folder.
However, resolving the confusion that developed and intensified in those seven months (between OWI’s absorption of OFF in June 1942 and MacLeish’s resignation in January 1943) extended well into the summer of 1943. Over the next several months Davis’ office produced a variety of internal communication reiterating that the OWI was an informational agency only.

An all-hands memo from Elmer Davis, dated March 17, 1943, was an early attempt to stem the confusion within OWI. Davis stated his belief that the OWI was an information clearinghouse unequivocally: “It is not our function to make government policy, but to help the people understand what it is, and why.”

Davis was concerned with not just repairing the damage the internal conflict inflicted, but also with Congressional interference. “Lately this Office, although its staff and leadership include people of diverse political opinion, has been accused of partisan political activity. For this accusation no evidence has been adduced except one article in one issue of one periodical, intended for distribution only to foreign peoples. However, such attacks may be expected to continue until the election of 1944.”

Davis also clarified the official OWI position on propaganda. He differentiated between foreign and domestic roles. “In domestic affairs…it is our function to explain [a] policy as set forth by the agency to which the Congress or the President has entrusted its execution…When a policy presently in operation is under Congressional reconsideration,

311 Donaldson, Archibald MacLeish, 363-365; Winkler, Politics of Propaganda, 42.


313 Ibid.
we may not attempt to influence that reconsideration, but we are required…to be guided by the existent policy until it is altered.” Davis further argued that because policy could only be set by Congress and the President, “OWI can no more be concerned with politics than can the Army or the Navy.”

He had a more nuanced understanding of the role the OWI played in foreign publications. “It is the business of our Overseas Branch, besides its direct cooperation with military and naval authorities in theaters of operations, to give trustworthy news to foreign nations, to impress them with both the power of the United States and the justice of our national policies; to convince them that we are going to win, and that our victory will be a good thing for the world.” Though Davis argued that the OWI was an agency that would only transmit information, this point indicated that he understood that part of their mandate was to present information in a way that benefited the United States’ policy and war effort. “Our sole function is to contribute to the winning of the war.” All efforts in the OWI needed to be focused on victory.

Mary Brewster White, the head of the Womanpower Campaigns, framed her work at OWI as education for the public. Her memoranda and reports from various meetings over the course of 1943 reflected that belief, and she often reiterated it in specific terms. She rarely addressed the issues of who produced content, but she firmly believed the OWI should educate the public. She began 1943, while still officially on loan from the

314 Ibid.
315 Ibid.
316 Ibid.
317 Ibid.
War Manpower Commission, gently proposing educational programs to her superiors. By August 1943, she was officially part of the Office of War Information structure, much less gentle in tone, and a great deal more pointed in her arguments for educational programs and campaigns.

Brewster White attended a conference of program managers and field representatives in Denver, and submitted a report to Ken Beirn, in the Office of Program Coordination, dated May 14, 1943. She outlined what she felt OWI’s successes and failures were in 1942-1943 in her report. This report reflected the widespread damage the internal power struggle caused throughout the agency.

Brewster White repeatedly noted when field agents were in the dark about some of the procedures and policies of the Office of War Information. She brought up the Retail War Campaigns Committee function, or lack thereof, as an example. “Only Cleveland, Detroit, [and] Atlanta report action of any kind. In some cases, our regional representatives have contacted the executive secretaries of local retail associations or chambers of commerce, only to find they had never heard of the program nor received any material. Specifically, this happened in Des Moines, Minneapolis, and St. Paul.”

Further, she emphasized the shortfall in her own area of interest: “The California retailers are not even remotely interested in promoting Womanpower.” This lack of support posed a serious problem to women’s recruitment, and one that Brewster White was determined to remedy.


Ibid.
Further, Brewster White identified the same problem Ken Dyke did in late 1942 – the government had to cater to corporate interests when those corporations donated advertising space. Brewster White focused on the representatives from retail stores that she had met with in Denver. “Everyone agreed that retail cooperation was necessary to doing an educational job, but apparently the program has not yet been made sufficiently important to the retailer.” Brewster White pushed for more official involvement: “there will have to be some organizational tightening up at the Central Committee, and OWI should probably take an even more active part.” Here, Brewster White reiterated her point that womanpower campaigns needed to be more significant to OWI in order for them to be more significant to partners outside the agency.

Brewster White also understood that the OWI needed to meet women as women, through their own social and communication networks, separate from men. The OWI needed to move beyond the boundaries of the gendered social contexts that made women wives, daughters, mothers, and sweethearts only. Brewster White hoped to connect with women on their own turf: “Mrs. America can be quietly guided, directed and sold through her own favorite channels.” Brewster White also proposed that home economists, all women, were potentially useful mouthpieces for OWI campaigns. While home economists still connected with women as household managers, Brewster White recognized that women had their own social systems and networks that the OWI could

320 Ibid. 2.
321 Ibid.
322 Ibid.
use to its advantage. “[Home economists] have very little to sell except good-will these days, but they never fail to draw large crowds of women to their lectures. I propose that some sort of program on streamlined housekeeping, food rationing, etc. be set up…”

Brewster White hoped to utilize existing connections among women, and to tap into existing women’s communities to boost womanpower campaigns. All of the networks she hoped to access were women-only spaces, places where women were more than someone’s wife or mother.

Brewster White also articulated the major institutional concept at the root of the problems facing the Womanpower campaign. “There was evidence of misunderstanding in our regional meetings, and pathetically little had been done to prepare women for the part they must play in this war. The reason for this is that Womanpower is still (consciously or unconsciously) ‘Phase 3’ of the over-all Manpower program.” The idea that Womanpower was “Phase 3” of the Manpower campaign came from a proposed Manpower Copy Policy from November 1942. The Bureau of Campaigns staff produced the report specifically for Drew Dudley, a project manager. The proposed plan focused on the “localness” of the problem – that manpower shortages were fundamentally local issues to resolve, rather than national, and that national campaigns had to support local ones. Phase One would emphasize the “localness,” and Phase Two would focus on convincing skilled workers to transfer out of low-priority work to high-priority war

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323 Ibid.
324 Ibid. 4.
work. Phase Three would address supplementary labor pools, one of which was women. The focus of the plan was “to simplify, to select from all our important messages those which are most important to the largest number of people.” Six months later, Womanpower campaigns had expanded to include military recruiting, recruiting and training for industrial jobs, and recruiting for farm workers, along with salvage and home-based savings campaigns. To Mary Brewster White, the idea that women’s campaigns were supplementary, and less important than men’s, was no longer tenable, and was actively harming women’s recruitment campaigns. Brewster White pointed out that government field agents generally failed to understand the human problem facing the OWI. “Almost to a man they have lost the ‘human interest’ angle, in spite of the fact that the greater part of them are former newspaper men.” Field agents failed to understand their audience as people, and failed to separate women from their traditional gender roles.

This failing was common throughout the Office of War Information and had been a problem in the Office of Facts and Figures. To the men of the OWI and OFF, women existed as wives, sweethearts, daughters, and mothers. Women were archetypes and objects used to sell to others. Women were consumers on behalf of their families, in which case they were practical, frugal, and merely the functional arm of the family

325 Bureau of Campaigns staff, Manpower Copy Policy, November 1942, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 40, Box 143, “Manpower” folder, 6-9.

326 Ibid. 10.


328 Ibid. 2.
economy. Or women were single, and exclusively focused on finding themselves a husband, and made all their purchasing decisions based on that end goal. Neither of these constructions allowed the OWI to sell to women as American citizens, as people with career ambitions outside of finding a husband, or as people who wanted to serve their country.

Even as she brought up advertisers’ conceptual problems, she “realize[d] that OWI is not really supposed to do more than guide and coordinate the news flowing from various Government agencies and supervise the releases.”329 Her solution to spend more OWI resources “explaining it and in ‘selling’ it,”330 was not necessarily a part of OWI’s mandate, but “[b]ecause this program is ultimately concerned with human problems, rights, and responsibilities,”331 she believed it was necessary.

Brewster White’s observations struck at the heart of confusion – the conflict over OWI’s mission. She agreed with Davis overall, but understood that there were moments where a propagandist’s approach was necessary. While the field agents were journalists, and should, at least in Brewster White’s estimation, have been able to locate and highlight the real human pathos caused by the war, they failed to translate it into successful OWI campaigns.

329 Ibid. 3.
330 Ibid.
331 Ibid.
CHAPTER SIX: INDEPENDENT WOMEN? THE OWI’S PERCEPTION PROBLEM

The Office of War Information had a conceptual problem built into its structure. To them, women only existed in the context of a relationship to a man. People at the OWI believed that women only responded to advertisements that addressed them as household managers, mothers, wives, sisters, and daughters. This perception problem was subtle and infused every aspect of the Womanpower campaigns. It was an entirely different problem than the internal conflict over the OWI’s mission. Ad men, program managers, and content creators’ perceptions of women interfered with their ability to produce effective advertisements. For their campaigns to succeed, the people of the OWI needed to convince women to step beyond their traditional roles. To do that, they had to speak directly to women as individuals rather than extensions of men.

The 1943 Office of War Information conflict boiled down to propaganda versus education. MacLeish resigned from OWI after seven months, in January 1943, but the effects of his policies lasted long after his departure. The changes in OWI policy resulting from the conflict were clearly visible in the magazine advertisements published throughout 1943 and 1944. In addition, creators’ perception problems continued to complicate womanpower campaigns.

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332 The design, production, and distribution process for advertisements was much faster than that for articles. Most magazine publishers accepted advertisements up until approximately a week before
An early 1943 advertisement illustrated the perception problem at OWI. The full-page advertisement had an illustration of a pretty woman in coveralls changing a tire on a Jeep. The advertisement, titled “My Jim would be proud of me!” included a paragraph written from the woman’s point of view. (Figure 11) The image of the woman in coveralls was powerful, and immediately addressed, as was the main reason for recruiting women for the military: “This isn’t the pretty frock I wore the day he went away. But knowing how deeply he feels about all-out war – to win quickly and for keeps – I had to get in somehow. There’s no more direct way of helping than in the WAAC. My small part frees a man for the front.”

This woman enlisted in the WAAC to help bring her Jim home sooner. There was no indication she had any reason to enlist that did not have to do with her Jim. Whatever patriotic feelings drove her to enlist were based in her relationship to a man. Her only aspiration was to “be as good a soldier as my Jim.”

Later, the advertisement told readers “It isn’t easy to give up a good-paying job or leave a comfortable home to don a uniform. Yet many women are doing it, and glorying in it.”

Women enjoyed the experience, the education, and the service, and the copy allowed that there were “women who simply believe their greatest contribution is this direct one to the

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334 Ibid.

335 Ibid.
Army,” though those women made up a small section of the women listed.\textsuperscript{336} Even with the other reasons listed in the copy, the advertisement implied that the main reason women joined the Army was to bring their “husbands, sons, brothers, and sweethearts in combat” home sooner.\textsuperscript{337}

The OWI and women’s auxiliaries recognized that recruitment numbers were not as high as they wanted and in the WAAC’s case, enlistments had plateaued. Part of the issue was the smear campaign of sexual rumors discussed in Chapter 4. While many were quick to blame the leveling numbers on the rumors, some recognized that there was more at work. WAAC Director Oveta Culp Hobby believed that a new approach was indicated. While that was true, her proposed new method of shaming women into joining the military once again tied women to men – this time to soldiers killed in action.\textsuperscript{338} Hobby would have agreed with Mary Brewster White’s assessment that the audience for these advertisements had become accustomed to the common appeals.\textsuperscript{339} Convincing the rest of the OWI to change how they addressed women was another challenge altogether.

Over the summer of 1943, as the dust settled from the OWI conflict, advertisements remained fundamentally the same, with little variation between publications. However, the Bureau of Magazines issued new information to magazines for publication throughout the summer. For example, \textit{McCall’s Magazine} had a section

\textsuperscript{336} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{337} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{338} Treadwell, \textit{The Women’s Army Corps}, 232.

\textsuperscript{339} Mary Brewster White to Robert R. Perry, memorandum, August 13, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder, 1.
called “Washington Newsletter” which collated all the information from the various agencies into one space. Items ranged from instructions on how to extend the life of one’s girdle or rayon stockings, to explanations of which vegetables to grow to save insecticides, to advice on how to plan a vacation that would not strain transportation resources, to information on the latest commodity subject to rationing. While most of the items focused on how homemakers could help the war effort, the “Washington Newsletter” included the Bureau of Magazines’ information on the women’s military groups.

In the May 1943 issue, the “Washington Newsletter” performed double duty when it included information on the WAACs. The WAACs were still recovering from the vicious rumors discussed in Chapter 4, and OWI had entered a period of damage control. The OWI response to the rumor campaign was to produce more articles, rather than advertisements. The advertising section in the Bureau of Graphics was more concerned with internal politics than with external. Therefore, it fell to the Bureau of Magazines, under Natalie Davison, to do the damage control.

The “Washington Newsletter” item included general information, in the lines of explaining the work that WAACs did, and their value to the Army and the overall war effort. “The WAACS are releasing soldiers for combat duty at the ratio of one WAAC to one and a half soldiers. It isn’t that the WAACS are 50% more efficient, though they are undeniably good. For one thing, WAACS don’t have to spend the time in combat training that soldiers must take out of their regular jobs. Besides, in clerical work, for example,
many WAACS have had more pre-war experience than the men they are replacing.” In the face of the smear campaign, confusion on women’s roles, and fears that women would be sent into combat, this tiny item, and others like it over the summer of 1943, had been designed to assuage fears about the value and role of women in the military.

A piece in *McCall’s Magazine*’s June 1943 issue exemplified how OWI and the WAAC addressed the multiple concerns. The two-page spread “WAACS,” by Hildegarde Fillmore, included a short article on a few WAACs, surrounded by pictures of WAACs working and relaxing. The article emphasized both how vital the women were to the war effort, and that the women were respectable, everyday people. The combination showed both necessary war work as well as leisure activities, and matched with the stories in the article’s body. The imagery of the article skirted the edges of Major Edlund’s WAAC recruiting program (discussed in Chapter 4) while still technically meeting the requirements.

The article pictured WAACs at work, in the mess hall, at mail call, at drill, and playing table tennis in the dayroom. They were also depicted marching in formation and wearing bathing suits at the base swimming pool. Not all images were so wholesome. The largest image was of a WAAC lounging in a canoe while a soldier paddled, and another, smaller image, showed a WAAC singing in the shower while draped in the shower curtain.341


Fillmore addressed another key question facing all the women’s auxiliaries: maintaining women’s femininity while they were in uniform. She addressed presumed fears about women becoming unfeminine by emphasizing their desirability to men. Men clamored for the women as dance partners at WAAC dances and as guests at multiple functions through the community bulletin board. In the images, women were clearly engaged in both dating activities with young men, and activities that emphasized their physical femininity, either singly or in groups of women. Other images showcased the women’s respectability through their performance of appropriately wholesome leisure and work. Fillmore emphasized the women’s connections to men, including potential connections. The women were in high demand as dance partners and as dates, partly because they were a small number of women in an almost exclusively male environment.

“Choose your job from 239 types of Army work,” a WAC poster from early 1944, emphasized the educational opportunities available. (Figure 12) “Choose your job…” used photographs of WAACs on the job, using actual photographs as the Canadian study, “How to Make Posters That Will Help Win the War,” discussed in Chapter 2, recommended.

343 Meyer, Creating G. I. Jane, 133-134.
The OWI conducted a survey of WACs to better define their recruiting campaigns in January 1944, the first time they did so. Prior to the 1944 survey, only Major Edlund’s command, in late 1942, had surveyed WAACs with an eye to improving recruitment. Edlund wanted to avoid showing women performing strenuous labor or appearing unattractive in the images, and he included activities that involved women not wearing their stylish uniforms. However, Director Hobby wanted a more aggressive approach to recruiting following the summer of rumors. She pushed for a poster design that explicitly shamed women who failed to join the WAC. Published September 20, 1943, the poster was one of the last not produced in OWI facilities or distributed through their channels.

Called the “dead soldiers” poster, it featured crosses on mounded earth, one with a GI’s helmet on top of it. (Figure 13) Above the central image, the copy exhorted “Women! They can’t do any more – but you can;” and below the image, the copy read “Join the WAC; Apply at nearest U.S. Army Recruiting Station.” The poster was in the same vein as the famous World War I poster, “The Question He Dreads,” where a little

346 Mary Keeler to James Brackett, memorandum, December 23, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 1, Box 6, “Programs – 6 Recruiting 1943-1945” folder; James Brackett to Oveta Culp Hobby, letter, January 3, 1944, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 1, Box 6, “Programs – 6 Recruiting 1943-1945” folder.
347 Treadwell, The Women’s Army Corps, 232.
349 “Joint Army-Navy Agreement on Recruiting Women for the Women’s Reserve of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard,” Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal and Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, September 16, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder; Oveta Culp Hobby to Elmer Davis, letter, September 15, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 1, Box 6, “Programs – 6 Recruiting 1943-1945” folder.
350 “They Can’t Do Any More,” NARA, RG 44, digital file 19-0168M, NARA ID 516713, Local ID 44-PA-2446. This poster was colloquially called the “dead soldiers” poster.
girl asks her father, “Daddy, what did you do in the war?” The “dead soldiers” poster also connected women to men. This time, however, the only connection between the audience of women and the soldiers referenced in the posters was that they were all citizens of the same nation, fighting the same enemy. The women the poster addressed were not yet performing labor on behalf of men. Instead, the poster demanded women take up labor on behalf of dead men they did not know, forcing women in to a new, but nonetheless gendered, relationship with men who were only abstractions to them. The OWI had avoided engendering shame in their audiences, instead focusing on anger and fear, which fueled anger. Appel’s studies emphasized that certain emotions prompted action, and “How to Make Posters That Will Help Win the War” showed that audiences responded to images of people more than anything else.\(^{351}\) The public responded to the poster with disgust, and the city of Boston banned the advertisement version.\(^{352}\)

In February 1944, the first poster series for the Women’s Army Corps that was created entirely after the power struggle ended, and after Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal and Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson signed the “Joint Army-Navy Agreement on Recruiting Women for the Women’s Reserve of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard,” premiered. Titled “Woman’s Place in war!” the poster series showed WACs performing various military jobs. The posters were basic and simple,

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\(^{352}\) Treadwell, The Women’s Army Corps, 232.
falling into the same vein as posters produced earlier in the war. Each poster featured a photograph or illustration of a WAC doing the work, with a caption identifying the job and the branch of the Army. The bottom section of each poster showed the WAC insignia, Pallas Athena, and the branch’s insignia, and the copy “The Army of the United States has 239 kinds of jobs for women.”

The selected jobs varied, but were largely non-traditional jobs for women. “Chemical Laboratory Assistant” and “Photographic Laboratory Technician,” were both traditionally feminine jobs, assisting a professional. Combat photography might have made people believe that “Photographer” would be a man’s job in the military, and this poster showed that there were other roles for photographers in the Army. “Cartographer,” “Modelmaker,” “Topographic Draftsman,” and “Weather Observer” fell under another category – jobs that few people realized were necessary

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354 “Chemical Laboratory Assistant,” “Woman’s Place in War!” series, NARA, RG 44, digital file 17-0815M, NARA ID 513701, Local ID 44-PA-259A.
355 “Photographic Laboratory Technician,” “Woman’s Place in War!” series, NARA, RG 44, digital file 17-0816M, NARA ID 513702, Local ID 44-PA-259B.
356 “Photographer,” “Woman’s Place in War!” series, NARA, RG 44, digital file 17-0820M, NARA ID 513706, Local ID 44-PA-259F.
357 “Cartographer,” “Woman’s Place in War!” series, NARA, RG 44, digital file 17-0818M, NARA ID 513704, Local ID 44-PA-259D.
358 “Model Maker,” “Woman’s Place in War!” series, NARA, RG 44, digital file 17-0819M, NARA ID 513705, Local ID 44-PA-259E.
359 “Topographic Draftsman,” “Woman’s Place in War!” series, NARA, RG 44, digital file 17-0821M, NARA ID 513707, Local ID 44-PA-260A.
to the war effort, but were not necessarily considered men’s work. In this sense, these posters were more about the possibilities available in the Army, rather than about convincing society at large that women were capable of performing military work.\textsuperscript{361}

The “Woman’s Place In War!” series exemplified the later OWI posters’ ability to address women separately from men. Husbands, brothers, and sweethearts were entirely absent from all the posters. The posters informed women of the educational opportunities available to them while they served their nation. Men did not appear in the poster series. WACs worked at a wide variety of highly technical positions, requiring a level of education that the Army promised to provide. The title of the series directly challenged the gendered perception of women that suffused advertisements of the 1930s – that woman’s place was in the home, not in the workforce, and that woman’s greatest role was that of housewife and mother. Further, these advertisements presumed that women who were not wives and mothers held achieving that status as their greatest goal, and addressed women as husband-hunters. In this series, the OWI spoke directly to women, independent of their relationships to men, for the first time.

In 1944, the OWI produced recruiting posters for the WAC that featured real women and their experiences in the WAC. Women who worked as stenographers, or translators, women who traveled to Europe with the WAC, college educated women who made use of their education in the Army, and average women who just wanted to do their part were all featured in the series. These series, again, followed the dictates of “How to Make Posters that Will Help Win the War” by using photographs of WACs, and when

\textsuperscript{361} Mary Brewster White to Robert F. Perry, memorandum, August 13, 1948, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder, 2-3.
those were unavailable, using realistic illustrations with which audiences were more easily able to relate.  

One series, “WACS are Going Places!” featured women in locations around the United States and in Europe. This series focused more on the women interacting with new people, visiting landmarks around the United States, and shopping in new cities, rather than on their jobs. “WACS are Going Places!” showed women that even when working as clerks and typists, they would still experience a wider world than their hometowns. For example, one of the posters, produced at the end of 1944, featured WACS at work as supply clerks in newly-liberated French territory, unloading trucks in Naples, Italy, and arriving at their new assignment in New Guinea. (Figure 15) The captions for each image emphasized the work the WACs would do. “Wacs overseas are doing vitally important work in the movement of supplies for our fighting forces.” “The helmeted figure of a Wac is a familiar sight in every part of the world. The Wacs receive the highest compliment their brothers in arms can pay who say: ‘Good soldier, the Wac,’” “The pleased expression on the faces of their fellow GI’s assures the first shipment of Wacs to reach [New Guinea] that they are welcome…these Wacs were soon busy with their new work.” The only relationships women had with men in this poster were professional, as fellow soldiers or as representatives of the United States armed forces.

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The “WACs With…” series showcased the women’s work. This series connected the WACs to the men they replaced or helped. Women featured in one set of these posters did office work, as clerks, shopkeepers, and quartermaster’s assistants. Other posters showed them performing non-traditionally feminine work, working in the Transportation Corps, performing manual labor, working in aviation as trainers and mechanics, and as cartographers and pharmacists. Each of the posters highlighted a section of the Army that utilized WACs, as they searched for qualified workers.\textsuperscript{365}

A few of these posters acknowledged that some women decided to join the WAC to bring their own menfolk home. “WACs with the Army Ground Forces” featured the staff working at the replacement depot at Fort George G. Meade, in Maryland. (Figure 16) The work at Fort Meade was traditionally feminine clerical work, and the three featured WACs worked as a declassification specialist, a supply clerk, and the commanding general’s secretary. Of the three women, the poster emphasized only one’s relationship to a man. “[Sergeant Irene Cerio] enlisted in the WAC when her husband went into service. She reasoned wisely that the American way to speed him back – was to join the WAC!”\textsuperscript{366} The poster emphasized the vital work the other two featured women did for the Army as a whole, and did not describe them as wives, daughters, or sisters. It described them exclusively as WACs.

\textsuperscript{364} “WACS Are Going Places!” Overseas, NARA, RG 44, digital file 18-1364M, NARA ID 515990, Local ID 44-PA-2282A.


\textsuperscript{366} “WACs with the Army Ground Forces,” NARA, RG 44, digital file 18-1369M, NARA ID 515995, Local ID 44-PA-2283B.
The “College Women in the WAC” series was more limited, though no less a part of the overall campaign. All the armed forces actively recruited women with advanced degrees or with some college experience, more so than women with only a high school education, as candidates for the more complicated jobs. Several positions required advanced training from anyone who would fill them. Each poster featured three women. One featured a linguist, Helen Maragos, who “fill[ed] a vital need at the Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Okla., where she translates maps, charts, and lectures into Spanish and Portuguese for Brazilian officers who are studying there.”367 The same poster also featured artist Evelyn Shultz, who “work[ed] as a draftsman in preparing restricted training slides.”368 (Figure 17)

The third woman, Evelyn Cooper, had not yet completed her degree when she joined the WAC. The poster did not highlight Cooper’s degree and future plans, as it did for the other women. “Private Evelyn Cooper…attended Mt. Holyoke College. Her college training enables her to conduct important medical experiments under official supervision at the School of Aviation Medicine with the AAF at Randolph Field, Texas. Aviation, having its own special medical problems, affords a new and interesting field of endeavor for college women in the WAC.”369

The Army sought educated women to train as officers and to work in more technical positions. When Colonel Ira Swift testified before Congress in support of the

367 “College Women With the WAC,” NARA, RG 44, digital file 18-1367M, NARA ID 55993, Local ID 44-PA-2283.

368 Ibid.

369 Ibid.
WAAC bill, he listed largely clerical and other traditional women’s work as examples of the work women would do. He also testified that the Army “prefer[red], initially, to have [women] volunteer in the skills in which they are trained.” Senator Schwartz asked about technical training for women: “[W]e have of course in the Army now schools where the men are educated and qualified for that kind of [technical] work, and I was just wondering whether there would be an opportunity for women to get into such schools and acquire some additional training which might be of great service to us.”\textsuperscript{370} While Swift believed that there were no current plans for technical schools for women, he said “I do not know whether the War Department will develop schools for the training of women along mechanical lines. That is something to be developed as the need appears.”\textsuperscript{371} By late 1943, the number of possible jobs for women had risen to 239, and the WAC posters trumpeted that number widely. The Army had established WAC training schools for multiple technical and mechanical skills, and widely advertised not only the available education, but that the knowledge and skills would easily transfer to the civilian world after the war.

The WACs increasing duties required aggressive recruiting that spoke to the same emotions and motivation in women as Army recruiting did in men: patriotism, a desire for adventure, a desire to participate in the war effort as directly as possible, and a desire for education and training that could translate to the civilian world. The “WACS are

\textsuperscript{370} “Hearing before the Committee on Military Affairs, United States Senate, Seventy-Seven Congress, Second Session on S. 2240, A Bill to Establish a Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps for Service with the Army of the United States,” Congressional Record, 77\textsuperscript{th} Congress, Second Session, February 6, 1942, 56 Stat. 278, Chap. 312, 15.

\textsuperscript{371} Ibid.
“Going Places!” “College Women in the WAC” and “WACs with…” series all addressed those impulses. When the posters addressed the WACs relationships with men, the relationships were only one of many pieces of information about the women, and were never the most important piece.

These poster series framed WACs as soldiers first, though their femininity was always a consideration. The American public was forcibly reminded that women in uniform were indisputably in harm’s way, combat restrictions notwithstanding. The military installations in the Philippines included hospitals, and when the Japanese attacked in December 1941, nurses were on duty there. Nurses continued to work at their stations, even as the Japanese advanced. When the American forces fell back to Bataan and Corregedor, nurses evacuated to Corregedor with their patients and continued to provide treatment. Many nurses were successfully evacuated from behind the failing American lines, but when the final collapse came, over fifty American nurses were captured with their patients.\textsuperscript{372} When the prisoners of war were liberated in February 1945, they were lauded as heroines. The OWI, Army, and Navy leadership immediately recognized the power of their stories, and immediately put them on display in multiple events: ceremonies to welcome them home and to award citations, parades, and interviews and photograph sessions with newspapers. The OWI used their stories as fodder to entice women to join the war effort.\textsuperscript{373} In this, the OWI recognized women as fully part of the military – no longer with the military, but in it. Unfortunately, the

\textsuperscript{372} Elizabeth M. Norman, \textit{We Band of Angels: The Untold Story of American Nurses Trapped on Bataan by the Japanese}, (New York: Pocket Books, 1999), 111.

\textsuperscript{373} Norman, \textit{We Band of Angels}, 219-223.
military’s embrace was short-lived, and women soon went back to their pervious status as contractors or reservists, and not really in the military.

By late 1943, project managers and bureau heads like Mary Brewster White had determined that women knew there was a need for them in the military, but they did not join for many reasons. Brewster White had also believed that women would join if they knew that military leadership would value their contributions.\(^{374}\) She argued that they had to “sell women on the war,”\(^{375}\) and that task including selling the nation the idea that women were a vital component of the war effort.

Recruiting worked similarly for the naval women’s auxiliary, Women Accepted for Voluntary Emergency Service (WAVES). The WAVES, created a few months after the WAAC, capitalized on the work the WAAC had already done, while improving their message.\(^{376}\) Much of the Army’s concerns about pay, visible in their sudden emphasis on equal pay for equal ranks in early 1943, stemmed from the clear message that WAVES earned the same amount of money as a sailor of the same rank.

Early posters focused on information, advertising that the WAVES existed and were looking for new recruits. Because the WAAC posters already addressed the issue of informing the public about the women’s groups, the WAVES started actively recruiting specifically for themselves almost immediately.

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\(^{374}\) Mary Brewster White to Robert F. Perry, memorandum, August 13, 1948, NARA, RG 208, NC 148, 43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder, 1-2.

\(^{375}\) Ibid. 1.

\(^{376}\) An Act To expedite the war effort by releasing officers and men for duty at sea and their replacement by women in the shore establishment of the Navy, and for other purposes, Public Law 77-689, 56 Stat. 730, Chapter 538, July 30, 1942, 730-731.
Early Navy posters connected women to their men, including several that explicitly told women to enlist to release a man to fight at sea, or to enlist to bring their own menfolk home sooner. Following the shift at the OWI and the Joint Army-Navy Agreement, Navy posters changed to show women the opportunities awaiting them. Early 1943 advertisements that emphasized equal pay and training opportunities were usually those produced by BUPERS. By late 1943 and early 1944, the OWI was also producing advertisements that spoke to women directly.

“On the Same Team” was published September 2, 1943. “Earn a Navy Rating” was published September 13, 1943. Both were published by BUPERS before the “Joint Army-Navy Agreement on Recruiting Women for the Women’s Reserve of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard,” and was therefore produced and distributed entirely by the Navy, with little to no input from the OWI. The other posters discussed were produced earlier in the year. The OWI produced magazine and radio advertisements for the WAVES but were at most minimally involved in the poster process.

“Don’t miss your great opportunity” is a prime example of the shift in how the OWI perceived women. Released in July 1944, the poster taps into the Navy’s traditional reputation for world travel. Two WAVES in dress whites walk before a cityscape and a bustling harbor filled with warships. The tagline, “The Navy Needs you

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in the WAVES,” identified the relationship between women and the Navy as the primary one, rather than a woman’s relationship with a man.\textsuperscript{380}

Another poster from October 1944 played on women’s patriotism and desire to actively contribute to the war effort, both aspects of the late 1943 shift in the OWI’s perceptions of women. Titled “Will your name be there?” the poster depicted a WAVES member passing a sign, the WAVES Honor Roll, that listed several women’s names. (Figure 5) The poster offered women something more than the others – not just service, not just gaining an education, but a chance for glory.\textsuperscript{381} Advertisements that offered glory as an enticement for enlistment were almost exclusively directed at men. The creators of this poster believed that women were just as susceptible to that sort of offer, and just as eager to cover themselves in military glory. This poster appealed to women’s vanity, but a different kind of vanity than was usually found in advertisements for women. Rather than beauty, this poster addressed its audience of women the same way it would have addressed a group of young men hungry for glory. This poster did not reference men at all to serve as women’s motivations. The women on the Honor Roll had earned their glory and honor by themselves, and the women who enlisted in the WAVES could earn their own glory as well.

The differences between the images produced before and after the OWI conflict show how it affected production at the OWI. For example, the advertisements produced


by the OWI for the WAAC before the shakeup rarely removed women from the context of their relationships to men. Whether referencing the men the WAACs replaced, as in “This is the Life…” or their husbands, brothers, and sweethearts, as in “My Jim would be proud of me!” early 1943 content creators did not address women as independent actors.382

After the dust settled from the OWI conflict and the deliberate smear campaign against the WAC, (Colonel Streeter’s “dead soldiers” poster notwithstanding), the WAC posters focused on the work women actually did in the WAC. The “College Women in the WAC” series showed women using their advanced degrees and college education to do complex and vital war work.383 The “WACs are Going Places” series showed WACs traveling the world for their work, and only rarely referenced their relationships with men.384 Early 1943 posters rarely separated women from their menfolk, which revealed that content creators could not conceptualize women separate from the men in their lives. Late 1943 and 1944 posters reflected a more nuanced and truthful understanding of women. The women in the WAC posters at the end of 1943 and into 1944 were realistically independent women. The difference between early 1943 posters and late 1943 posters is subtle, but it is significant.

382 “This is the life….” WAAC advertisement, *McCall’s Magazine*, April 1943, 137; “My Jim would be proud of me!” WAAC advertisement, *McCall’s Magazine*, February 1943, 133.


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CHAPTER SEVEN: “QUITE AN ASSIGNMENT, METHINKS.” A COHESIVE CAMPAIGN PLAN AT LAST

Mary Brewster White spent the first half of 1943 gently nudging her superiors at the War Manpower Commission and the Office of War Information about the issues of the Womanpower Campaigns. As the year progressed from spring to summer, she moved to permanent status at the Office of War Information, her tone became more frank, and her growing frustration grew clear. By August 1943, her patience had clearly run out (though her professionalism never did), and she addressed the campaign’s problems – and her superiors – with brutal clarity borne out of the frustration caused by months of repeating her assessments and suggestions. With the new authority brought by her permanent status within the Office of War Information, she created a new Womanpower campaign plan for September. She then spent her energy dragging both her superiors and the content creators toward a new way of addressing women – to move beyond their gendered ideas that had them addressing women as extensions of men, and to address women as individuals.

By the spring of 1943, women’s recruiting was a problem area at the Office of War Information. While recruiting numbers stabilized for the Women Marines, numbers were dropping for the Women’s Army Corps. By August 1943, the OWI had initiated several War Bond Drives, and they considered multiple campaigns successful. Yet women’s recruiting seemed stalled. Over the course of 1943, Mary Brewster White
circulated several memos that brought up the problems with women’s campaigns and offered solutions.

Beginning with her May 14, 1943 report on the Denver conference, Brewster White argued that the OWI was failing in its main task, per Elmer Davis: they failed to educated employers on the value of employing women. Further, many employers still preferred men, but only required a small number for a limited number of specific occupations. “Employers are asking for men for two-thirds of these jobs, but there are only 800 which can not be done by women, and employers have indicated they will take ‘anything’ rather than nothing.”385 Part of the OWI’s task needed to be educating employers in what work women could do, and in educating women in both what war jobs were, and where they would find them.

Brewster White argued that Womanpower needed more institutional support from the Washington office. “[T]he whole country desperately need[s] clarification and education on just what ‘Womanpower’ means. There was evidence of misunderstanding in our regional meetings, and pathetically little has been done to prepare women for the part they must play in this war. The reason for this is that Womanpower is still (consciously or unconsciously) ‘Phase 3’ of the over-all Manpower program.”386

Brewster White argued that OWI had to prioritize Womanpower campaigns and move beyond the original parameters of the November 1942 plan. Employers needed to be

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385 Mary Brewster White to Ken Biern, memorandum and Denver Conference Report, May 14, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148, 43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder, 4.

386 Ibid. Emphasis original.
enthusiastic about employing women, rather than grudgingly accepting them as poor substitutes for men.

Brewster White based her statements on OWI’s stated Manpower Policy. The November 1942 plan devoted several pages to various Manpower campaigns. Womanpower campaigns were on page eight of ten, and the page only had four bullet points. The policy addressed women in the opening pages, but rarely returned to women’s issues or campaigns after that point: “Manpower affects all the people – 103 million of them - all our men and women over 14 years of age.”\(^{387}\) The Manpower Copy Policy was partly developed from OFF policies, and partly from OWI objectives. Program managers sent multiple versions between themselves for several weeks before they settled on the November version.\(^{388}\)

Brewster White also referenced the Office of War Information’s overall function, as stated by Elmer Davis in his March 17, 1943 memorandum, “OWI and Government Policy.” The all-hands memo reiterated OWI policy in the wake of Archibald MacLeish’s January 1943 resignation. Davis stated the general policy of the OWI: “It is not our function to make government policy, but to help the people understand what it is, and why... Our sole function is to contribute to the winning of the war.”\(^{389}\) He further clarified the roles of both branches. The Domestic Branch’s function was “to explain [Congressional or Executive] policy as set forth by the agency to which the Congress or

\(^{387}\) “Manpower Copy Policy,” November 1942, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 40, Box 143, “Manpower” folder, 1.

\(^{388}\) While this may be an artifact of their history as advertisers, the opening pages of the internal Manpower Copy Policy read like the advertisements they were producing.

the President as entrusted its execution...When a policy presently in operation is under Congressional reconsideration, we may not attempt to influence that consideration, but we are required, as are all agencies, to be guided by the existent policy until it is altered." To Mary Brewster White, this explanation meant that the OWI needed to educate the American public on the need and utility of women in the workforce and armed services. Her belief that the OWI was dramatically failing at these two basic duties was palpable throughout her report on the Denver Conference.

Brewster White explained that some employers were already enthusiastic about employing women, and the OWI therefore needed to capitalize on that eagerness immediately. “I spent some time with Phillip Wrigley and Arthur Meyerhoff discussing womanpower. Mr. Wrigley is most anxious to help us make women more ‘work minded’ in general. He is tremendously interested in the necessary civilian job. The Meyerhoff shop is very busy working up a program to submit to OWI as soon as possible on ‘Women at Work.’” This report, sent six days before her official transfer from WMC to OWI, showed that she was willing to use whatever tool that came to hand, including name-dropping well-known, influential supporters.

Brewster White outlined clearance procedures for Womanpower campaigns for staff and affiliated agencies in June 1943, but OWI’s procedures were still confusing to many in the fall of 1943. Davis wrote directly to Paul V. McKnutt, Chairman of the War


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Manpower Commission, on September 10, 1943. McKnutt and the War Manpower Commission worked most closely with the OWI on manpower and womanpower campaigns, including the recruiting campaigns for women into the armed forces when they loaned Mary Brewster White to the OWI. In his letter, Davis clarified the both the OWI’s mission and the President’s support. “This Agency’s facilities for the clearance of speeches and other public documents have been set up to help Government officials present to the public sound, consistent statements which will reflect the position of the Government as a whole. This procedure is in accord with requests made by the President.”

Davis was concerned that several requests from the WMC had been late, or had fallen outside of established procedure. He reiterated that “in routine cases, we like to have at least two days for clearance,” and the WMC had to submit articles to OWI before the WMC placed them in a publication or on the radio. Davis closed the letter in a conciliatory manner, but made his motive and OWI’s purpose clear again: “Generally speaking, this office has had excellent cooperation from all concerned, but the few cases in which difficulties have occurred have been cases of considerable importance…Active cooperation in this effort should benefit the Government’s program for keeping the public well informed on the progress of the war.”

James R. Brackett, one of Davis’ deputies, followed up with McKnutt in a letter dated September 16, 1943, which included an overview of OWI’s activities. Brackett’s

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393 Ibid.

394 Ibid.
letter was conciliatory and informative, and included a great deal of information on OWI’s campaigns. Brackett acknowledged that OWI procedures were sometimes esoteric and their process Byzantine. “We find that OWI’s activities sometimes seem to be pretty much of a mystery to the agencies we try to help in their information problems.” Brackett enclosed a report on OWI’s campaigns of the prior week, August 30 to September 6. The letter included basic information, examples of successful campaigns, and the various methods government agencies could use to spread their messages.

Brackett made the point that information needed to be repurposed depending on the audience. “For example, in material for newspapers it is necessary to recast the information in such form that it will be attractive to different groups of readers. Information is thus reprocessed for labor press, rural press, foreign language press, women’s pages and the like.” This letter, coming as Mary Brewster White’s new woman-centered Womanpower campaigns started, showed OWI’s newfound understanding of women as a separate audience. Recognizing women outside the usual gendered social context, or as a distinct audience with specific motivations and agency, was Brewster White’s top priority, and this letter showed her efforts were finally having an impact in the OWI.

The OWI’s complex structure led to repeat of the issues noted in Chapter 3, and in June 1943, confusion over military recruiting campaigns required another memo clarifying communication channels. Robert Huse complained to Gardner S. Cowles, Jr,

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396 Ibid.
Director of Domestic Operations at OWI, that the lack of a coherent policy was damaging the multiple sets of parameters for armed services recruiting campaigns. “The lack of a single unified government policy…has been responsible for considerable confusion in the field.” The lack of a cohesive policy meant that some worked from old directives, others still used outdated information, and the poor structure led to confusion. Huse outlined several instances of conflicts between military recruiting and industrial recruiting. “The most ridiculous aspect of the situation is that OWI, following directives of the regional War Manpower Commission offices, has denied clearance of radio recruiting material in certain critical areas only to see the same appeals widely used in display advertising and other media.”

Despite constant reassurances to the contrary by the OWI and the women’s auxiliaries, including by Mary Brewster White herself, industry and all the armed services were in direct competition with each other over a small pool of educated women. The competition for qualified women led to deliberate obstruction by many recruiters. “Army and Navy recruiting officers refuse to recognize either the authority of WMC over recruitment or OWI over radio clearance. In the Minnesota-North Dakota area the officer in charge of naval recruiting instructed his aides to ignore OWI and solicit time on the air directly from station and sponsors so that recruitment would not be


398 Ibid.

399 Mary Brewster White to Robert R. Perry, memorandum, August 13, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder, 2.
retarded.”\textsuperscript{400} Military recruiting committed the most egregious violations as they competed intensely for the few available women. For example, “In Indiana…the WAAC Fifth Service Command deliberately scheduled WAAC recruiting drives in critical areas after being advised that WMC had ruled against the recruiting.”\textsuperscript{401} The easiest way to stop the violation of OWI policy was to reiterate and clarify that policy as often as possible. Cowles forwarded Huse’s memo to James F. Byrnes, Director of the Office of War Mobilization, one of the agencies with which the OWI had to coordinate policy, and referenced several meetings wherein people requested the OWI clarify policy.

Cowles reasserted OWI’s primacy in all policy decisions while acknowledging the situation’s complexity and constant confusion. “I have been informed of…[the] request for a memorandum setting forth the position of the Office of War Information on the recruiting activities which have produced the current dispute between the armed services and the War Manpower Commission.” Cowles immediately identified the problem as the “present lack of a single, agreed-on policy covering…special recruiting.” He also reiterated that the Office of War Information did not set policy; rather, the OWI merely transmitted information: “While our interest is primarily one on the information level, we cannot ignore the fact that the different information policies of the three agencies would seem to reflect different administrative policies, which, at times, actively

\textsuperscript{400} Robert Huse to Gardner S. Cowles, Jr., memorandum, “Confusion on Recruitment,” June 14, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC-148 1, Box 6, “Programs - 6 Recruiting 1943-1945” folder.

\textsuperscript{401} Ibid.
interfere with one another.” Cowles argued that to prevent confusion, all the agencies in question should collaborate to create a cohesive policy to which all would be bound. He further argued that “the policy formulated should include the requirement that the Office of War Information will, in accordance with its existing authority, under Executive Order of June 13, 1942, be required to clear all such informational material for consistency with the overall policy statement, in the field as well as in Washington.” That is, based on the President’s instruction, the OWI was the ultimate authority on information clearance and distribution.

Cowles further referenced Huse’s memorandum as evidence of unacceptable confusion in the field, and therefore evidence for the OWI to have final authority over women’s recruiting programs. Cowles’ letter, though presented as a request, reasserted the OWI’s control and its primacy among the information and education agencies. In a few short months, Huse and the OWI would get their unified policy, at least as far as women were concerned.

Mary Brewster White expressed her own confusion to her superiors in her report on the Denver Conference, dated May 14, 1943. In that report, Brewster White pointed out that womanpower campaigns were still low-priority in OWI. Several of the industry leaders and potential employers she met with in Denver were “anxious” to hire women, though they did not always appreciate the full potential of hiring women. “Employers

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402 Gardner J. Cowles, Jr. to James F. Byrnes, June 14, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC-148 1, Box 6, “Programs - 6 Recruiting 1943-1945” folder, 1.

403 Ibid. 1-2. Emphasis added.

were asking for men for two-thirds of these [open] jobs, but there are only 800 which can not be done by women.”

To Mary Brewster White, the solution was obvious: recast womanpower campaigns as higher priorities in OWI circles.

By August 1943, Brewster White articulated that Womanpower moved far beyond convincing women to work in factory jobs and that the Office of War Information should focus on first properly defining womanpower much more broadly. They could then educate the public on that wider definition. “[O]ne of our first jobs, therefore, is to make it quite clear to the public that ‘womanpower’ means the voluntary mobilization of women to replace men, wherever necessary, in the many thousands of jobs and services which are vital to the maintenance of war production and community welfare.”

Brewster White argued that the nation simply could not afford to ignore “the fact that women constitute the largest single labor reserve” available because they were squeamish about employing women in heavy labor. Brewster White had little time for those who argued that women, as a demographic, were incapable of certain work. “It is as simple, and as obvious, as the fact that the job, whatever it is – picking tomatoes, running a machine, driving a bus, teaching a child arithmetic – has to be done. Sex, as such, does not enter into the picture. The only question is who can do it – who has the health, the time, the ability? The cold, unrefutable, logical answer is ‘women.’”

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407 Ibid. Emphasis original.
Not only did advertisers need to overcome their own, internalized reluctance to consider women their audience, they also had to convince the rest of the nation that women performing traditional men’s work “should not be regarded as the appalling phenomenon of nature that, by and large, it has been to date.” In fact, they had to convince the nation that it was not just acceptable, but desirable, and normal. Brewster White’s words allowed no space for men’s discomfort; instead, she bludgeoned the memo’s recipients with the OWI’s responsibility to educate and inform the public about government programs and requirements.

Mary Brewster White continued to push her superiors to prioritize and clarify womanpower campaigns throughout the summer of 1943. By February 1943, all branches of the military had established women’s auxiliaries, and recruitment was in full swing. The WAAC transitioned to part of the Army, and became the Women’s Army Corps (WAC) in June 1943. The United State Marine Corps Women’s Reserve had created their own brochures for distribution by their traveling recruiting officers that emphasized patriotism and service, just as they had in men’s recruiting material. In this climate of rapid change, Brewster White and her staff attempted to make sense of the various Womanpower Campaigns under her purview.

Womanpower Campaigns staffer Stephen Fitzgerald sent a memo to Philip Broughton, Mary Brewster White, Drew Dudley, Robert Perry, Ken Beirn, Charles

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408 Ibid.

Levitt, and Frederic J. Wile, dated June 17, 1943. Fitzgerald laid out the chaos. The department had “about 10 different campaigns in one form or another relating to womanpower.”\textsuperscript{410} Several of the campaigns were military, and all project leads wanted their access to OWI facilities prioritized over the others’. “The Army wants facilities to recruit WAACS; Navy wants WAVES; Coast Guard wants SPARS; Marines want Marines. Federal Security wants graduate nurses and student nurses. The Manpower Commission wants 2,000,000 women for essential civilian jobs; Manpower wants food processors some of them women.”\textsuperscript{411} Yet none of these campaigns were completed, or even had proposed schedules. The competition reduced efficiency, even though Fitzgerald tactfully refused to blame anyone for the chaos. “So far as I know, no one of these campaigns yet has a completely solid program book or time-table. Some of us think, therefore, that it might be well to reduce this number of separate campaigns to one overall campaign.”\textsuperscript{412} Fitzgerald suggested they call a meeting to discuss streamlining the process.

The following week, Mary Brewster White forwarded the timetable for Womanpower campaigns to Ken Beirn. She advised that there was room for more releases in August, which she called “a far more important ‘build-up’ month than July.”\textsuperscript{413} The attached time table showed only “Community story – Labor, Negro, Rural

\textsuperscript{410} Steven Fitzgerald to Philip Broughton et. al, June 17, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder.

\textsuperscript{411} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{412} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{413} Ibid.
Press” for release in August. June and July were filled with the types of stories outlined as Steps 1 and 2 in the November 1942 “Manpower Copy Policy:” local stories, designed to reach the largest possible audiences, focused on finding local solutions to nationwide problems. September’s schedule included network allocations – that is, time donated to the government by the network itself – and national campaigns like newsreels, short films, and motion pictures. The films, produced by the Bureau of Motion Pictures, were designed to be nationally distributed to supplement existing, local programs.

September releases included “Glamour Girls of 1943,” a short film produced by the OWI to entice women to war work by showing feminine women performing heavy industrial labor. (The notable exception to this formula was a brief highlight of shipyards, where “husky women do the same jobs as men. Tough, rugged work, that they toss off like veterans.” This departure was notable for both its uniqueness and for its brevity.) The short film expressed the confusion in OWI about how to market the war to women. The film used testimonials to explain why women entered war work. Each of the women who explained why she took a war job used her menfolk as her reason. “I have two sons in the Army. Now I’m in the Army, too, in a way.” “I wanted to bring my Dad home

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414 Ibid.

415 Bureau of Campaigns staff, Manpower Copy Policy, November 1942, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 40, Box 143, “Manpower” folder, 6-9.

416 Mary Brewster White to Ken Beirn, “OWI WOMANPOWER PROGRAM SCHEDULE, Office of Program Coordination,” June 22, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder.


418 Ibid. 3:03-3:10.
sooner. He’s in Greenland.”

“Because my husband’s in the Navy, and I want to do a job that means more than working in a department store.”

The women depicted in the film worked in war industries, building airplanes, in glassworks, and welding, among other jobs. Women were also working in military contexts, including as flight instructors for new pilots. The film showed women filling multiple jobs: civilian, military, industrial, and agricultural. The film even referenced the women who served in World War I, both in the military and in civilian work, calling them “the Glamour Girls of the last war.”

In a later report, Brewster White identified this glamorization of women workers as a major problem in recruiting. Women in heavy industry were novelties, jokes, or anger-inducing. “A woman welder, working alongside men, in what was heretofore believed to be one of the most highly skilled jobs, was greeted with incredulity, with derision, with envy, with amusement.”

Heavy industrial work was high-skill labor, and manufacturers hired men for those jobs. By the 1940s, the gendered tradition that high-skill industrial labor was men’s work had solidified, to the point where many believed women were unable to manage it. When manufacturers hired women, the coverage focused on their femininity. “Every unfortunate ‘woman’s angle’ was played up – her pants, her effect upon her male co-

419 Ibid. 3:11-3:13.

420 Ibid. 3:14-3:20.

421 Ibid. 8:01-8:09.

422 “Womanpower Campaigns,” addendum to memorandum, Mary Brewster White to Robert R. Perry, August 13, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148, 43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder, 2.
workers, her hard times at home, her grease-smudged nose, her wildly flowing hair.”

Very little of the coverage explained why women took industrial jobs, and largely described the women in terms of their effects on the men workers at the plant.

This perception of women workers led to insultingly frivolous coverage that ignored the reasons women took industrial jobs. “Then there was an immediate attempt to ‘glamorize’ the woman war worker. The only thing she was interested in was getting on with the job and collecting her fat and regular paycheck.” By focusing only on the gendered perceptions of why women would take industrial work, reporters and OWI field agents missed vital information that would help their campaigns.

Finally, Brewster White identified a major problem in news coverage of women war workers: the abnormally high standards of work, morality, and respectability for women who moved outside of their traditional roles. “The only thing the public was interested in was hearing more of this phenomenal creature – and in criticising [sic] her when she didn’t measure up to superhuman standards of production, morals, and loyalty to a job that got harder as the publicity increased.” The women’s military auxiliaries had higher standards for their women than their men as well. Women had to be more educated, have fewer external social connections, and had to maintain a respectable image throughout their tenure. Any failure of the women to live up to the impossibly high standards reflected poorly on their chosen branches, and had wide ranging consequences.

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423 Ibid.
424 Ibid.
425 Ibid.
“Glamour Girls of 1943” also addressed men’s concerns about women working, going through variations of the “Resistances and Answers” Mary Brewster White had complied and circulated at the OWI. Posters and short advertisements could not address all the issues, so the filmmakers addressed men’s concerns in the film. Actors voiced the concerns men had expressed about working women: “If my wife worked, people would think I can’t support her,” “Who will take care of my home?” and “What happens after the war? Women will have all the jobs.” The script gaily sailed past those concerns by reminding men that women had joined the military and taken over men’s jobs in the last war, too, and totally failed to answer the question of possible post war job shortages.

The film script did not even pretend to address other possible concerns of men, and did not mention rising concerns about women losing their femininity in the military and heavy industrial jobs. Instead, the narrator cordially compared all the work women did to household tasks, thereby reinserting them into existing gendered social contexts. “Instead of cutting out dresses, this woman stamps out the patterns of airplane parts.”

“Instead of baking cakes, this woman is cooking gears to reduce the tension in the gears

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426 List of Resistances and Answers, attached to memorandum from Alger Sale to Barry Nuit, February 19, 1943, NARA, RG 211, I6 137, Box 2, “Office – Interoffice Memo’s” folder, 1; Womanpower Campaigns, report attached to Brewster White to Perry memo dated August 13, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC-148 E-43, Box 1, "Programs Manpower" folder, 6.

427 “Glamour Girls of 1943,” 7:45-7:58.

428 Ibid. 8:10-8:20.

429 Ibid. 1:02-1:10.
after use.” Women “are taking to welding as if the welding rod were a needle and the metal a length of cloth to be sewn.” “A woman can operate this drill press as easily as a juice extractor in her own kitchen.” Despite the hyperfeminine analogies for specific jobs, the filmmakers showed women in their work clothes, performing the labor, as if to emphasize that the labor itself was not inherently unfeminine.

This film showed the conflicting stories of why women consumed products, and the conflicting ideas of the “women’s” audience for advertisements. In several places, the film spoke to women as home managers, as people whose primary function was to manage the private side of the family life. In others, the filmmakers spoke to women as patriots who wanted to serve their country as best they could, regardless of gender. The eight minute and forty-five second film devoted over two minutes (nearly 25% of its advertising space) to explaining how United States Employment Service workers would place them where they were best suited, and that they would receive training as needed. The narrator emphasized that department stores and other civilian jobs still needed women to fill them, in order to keep society and the civilian world functioning as men went to war. Other so-called “war related” jobs were that of elevator operator, bus driver, milk delivery, and farm labor. Even then, the scriptwriters could not avoid diminishing language, calling women girls – “office buildings use girls to run the

430 Ibid. 1:26-1:29.

431 Ibid. 4:47-4:55.

432 Ibid. 5:09-5:12.

433 Ibid. 3:31-5:37.

434 Ibid. 6:09-6:38.
elevators”—or expressing surprise at women’s ability to perform traditionally masculine work—“they handle man-sized tractors on the vast farms of the middle west.” “Glamour Girls of 1943” typified the issues the OWI faced when advertising to women, addressing them outside the context of their relationships to men, and understanding them as a consumer audience.

By August 1943, Mary Brewster White’s frustration with the state of women’s recruiting campaigns was palpable in her communication. She opened her August 13, 1943 memo to Robert R. Perry: “I have expressed myself forcibly on the subject of coordination of government appeals, especially as they relate to women.” Her position as Program Manager of Womanpower Campaigns in the Office of War Information finally gave her enough authority to voice her objections. However, the transfer from the War Manpower Commission did not bring her into regular contact with the higher levels of management.

Brewster White recognized that Womanpower campaigns were still low priority programs in the Office of War Information. She believed that they were unable to convince women of the urgency of the situation because the OWI did not adequately understand women as a consumer audience. She also argued that the OWI’s inability to deal with women constructively was making the situation worse. “It is little wonder that our exhortations to women to turn their lives upside down fall on deaf ears if we employ

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435 Ibid. 6:21-6:23.
436 Ibid. 6:33-6:37.
437 Mary Brewster White to Robert R. Perry, memorandum, August 13, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder.
the same techniques and copy approach – sound trucks, movie stars, and passionate meaningless hysteria – that we do to raise money.”  She argued that reusing the war bonds campaigns for other womanpower campaigns would fail because the audience’s familiarity with those tactics made the new campaigns seem “humdrum, and almost phony.” Further, war bonds campaigns had a different goal than women’s recruiting, so the material needed to be different. But Brewster White noted that there was “an appalling similarity among them,” and predicted that most would have some “reference to ‘keep guns, tanks, and planes coming,’ ‘sacrifice,’ and ‘boys in fox holes’…included in every one of them.” She was right, at least in the case of advertisements produced before the spring of 1943.

The OWI programs had become boilerplates, using the same techniques and phrasing across all media aimed at women. Failure to differentiate between the various programs, and failure to prioritize the women’s campaigns, meant that audiences understood all the programs with the same level of urgency and as the same type of appeal. As a result, women could not recognize the most urgent appeals, and even when they did, the campaigns had lost their impact. “The public (particularly women) is becoming ‘hardened’ to government appeals in general.”

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438 Mary Brewster White to Robert R. Perry, memorandum, August 13, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder, 1.

439 Ibid.

440 Ibid.

441 Ibid.
Brewster White described the early media coverage of women in industry in the first of several addenda to her memo to Robert R. Perry. Writers glamorized women war workers, and peppered them with questions about their clothing, their hair, how the men felt about them as co-workers, and how they managed their work-life balance, all of which distracted them and their coworkers. Even as more women took industrial jobs, employers became more reluctant to hire women: “Many employers are not willing to hire women because they have heard of the ‘complications’ they cause.”

Further, men resented the women as coworkers, not because women were incapable, but because of the breathlessly amazed media coverage. The issues in media coverage compounded the social and interpersonal issues that prevented women from taking war industry jobs.

By late 1943, project managers and bureau heads like Mary Brewster White had determined that women knew there was a need for them in the military, but they did not join for many reasons. Brewster White also believed that women would join if they knew that employers and their communities would value their contributions. She argued that they had to “sell women on the war,” which included selling the nation the idea that women were a vital component of the war effort. To do so, Brewster White knew that the OWI had to treat women as the savvy consumers they were, rather than as extensions of their husbands and families. Women recognized that the advertisements were

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442 “Womanpower Campaigns,” addendum to memorandum, Mary Brewster White to Robert R. Perry, August 13, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder, 2.

443 Ibid.


445 Ibid. 1.
formulaic at best – “almost phony” in Mary Brewster White’s words – and that the copy writers were not addressing them as individuals, but as wives, sweethearts, daughters, and mothers. Individual women did not feel their personal contribution were necessary, or that their smaller, individuated contributions were enough, because the advertisements did not address them as independent individuals.

Brewster White argued against the boiler plate type of advertisements the OWI had been producing up to that point. She noted that because they had no overall information program for women, women’s campaigns were scattered and disorganized. “We have no broad background information program of our own into which the various recruiting appeals may be intelligently fitted.” As a result, women did not understand why they were necessary for the war effort. None of the multiple programs clearly stated that the government, employers, or the military needed and wanted women as workers.

“Women’s recruiting programs fall into six general categories: Armed Forces, war industry, civilian jobs, cadet nurses, graduate nurses, and farm. Let us bring up some real evidence in a broad background program as to the need (which is the first thing a woman must be sold on) and then let us proceed to specify each woman’s part.” The OWI did not attempt to study military women specifically until 1944.

446 Ibid.
447 Ibid. 2.
448 Ibid.
449 James Brackett to Oveta Culp Hobby, letter, January 3, 1944, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 1, Box 6, “Programs – 6 Recruiting 1943-1945” folder.
The OWI had no hard evidence that showed women why and where they were needed, by whom, and in what capacity. The lack of information led to the basic, general, uninformative advertisements that were currently in use, and currently failing. “We have made no real effort to explain why there must be so many demands, nor have we made any attempt to simplify the situation by designating who should do what.”\textsuperscript{450} The lack of background information led to the recruiting campaigns targeting the same group of women, when in fact there were specific needs for each group. An overarching plan would clarify who was eligible for what program and what kind of women each campaign targeted. “You will find that the woman who is eligible for the cadet nurse, is not eligible for a Wave; that the woman who is eligible for laundry work, is not necessarily eligible for war plant work, etc.”\textsuperscript{451}

Brewster White placed the blame for the poor response at OWI’s feet: “We just haven’t pulled the whole mess together – and we can.”\textsuperscript{452} She also argued that once women understood the government considered them vital to the war effort in multiple capacities, they would join. The OWI’s goal had to be to communicate with an individual woman, so that she understood not just that the government needed women in general, but that she, in particular, was vital to the war effort. Brewster White further argued that if women fully mobilized, that movement would further motivate the rest of the nation to total participation. “It is important to remember than not only are we asking women

\textsuperscript{450} Mary Brewster White to Robert R. Perry, memorandum, August 13, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder, 2. Emphasis original

\textsuperscript{451} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{452} Ibid.
themselves to contribute in terms of action, but that if they are genuinely appealed to and convinced that the need is so great that they themselves are needed, they will not act as a tremendous influence in bringing about the desired goals of all government programs.”

Brewster White believed that women would respond to advertisements that spoke to them as individuals, agents, and citizens.

Brewster White stayed with the concept of the local solution to a nationwide problem. She used the example of the “absurd competition” between the WAVES and the War Manpower Commission, who were ostensibly both trying to recruit from the same pool of women. Brewster White dismantled that misconception sharply by arguing that the high recruiting standards for the WAVES and their small quota meant they were looking for a specific group of women: “The Navy has very specific requirements…Only 94,000 are needed and all must be of the ‘better type’…Industry is nowhere near as particular and needs millions more women.” She then explained the Navy could easily recruit the relatively small number of women they needed, even from areas experiencing severe labor shortages, without intruding upon the flashier, louder War Manpower Commission recruiting activities. “Let the Navy go after the women whom they want in the only manner that will appeal to same – small meetings in schools, clubs, universities, churches, social gatherings – using attractive recruiting officers (male and female).”

453 Ibid.
454 Ibid.
455 Ibid.
456 Ibid.
These tactics emphasized the local quality of WAVES recruiting, even more so than industrial recruiting.

Brewster White further argued that without a fuller understanding of women’s recruiting programs, without the background informational campaign, the OWI would inadvertently convince women that they could consider themselves fully involved with simple actions like signing pledges, which “provides an alibi, and surveys have proved recently that women will cling to any small spark of hope, and kid themselves into believing that they are participating 100%.”

Earlier campaigns left the impression that women could minimally disrupt their lives and still consider themselves fully participating. Brewster White believed that women needed to perform more concrete work for the war effort, and that the OWI needed to change their campaigns to reflect that need. “It is extremely important for all OWI Program Managers to study the basic appeal and general copy theme urging women to more fundamental action than action on ‘automatic’ or ‘contributory’ programs.”

Finally, she also argued the OWI had inadvertently convinced women that volunteer jobs were the pinnacle of service. As a result, women prioritized volunteer work over war work, and they were not moving into the more vital jobs. “Because we have built up the volunteer job as being the sign of service, we are having a harder time now getting women to face facts on what service really is.”

457 Ibid. 3.
458 Ibid.
459 Ibid.
She closed with a reiteration of the OWI’s mission, a statement that matched fully with Davis’ conceptualization of the bureau: “Our job is to explain and reassure – not just to recruit[,] appeal, urge, exhort, declaim, and announce. That is, if we are really interested in getting women to act. It’s quite an assignment, methinks.”

Brewster White included several addenda to her August 13, 1943 memorandum. In them, she laid out the problems with OWI’s treatment of women, her proposed remedies, and hard data based on surveys of employers, women, and the communities around them. This collection of data presented in August 1943 was, shockingly, the first time the Office of War Information had systematically attempted to understand women’s motivations, preferences, and needs in the workplace, and to understand community reactions to them.

One of her first requirements was that employers respect women as workers. Even as the OWI seemed unable to separate women from their relationships with men, so did employers. Her new program would begin in September 1943, and one of the program’s major goals was to add another layer to the existing gendered social contexts at work in American society: “The ultimate goal of the September Campaign is to associate in the minds of the public, the words ‘woman’ and ‘work’ just as firmly as the words ‘man’ and fight.” Brewster White also acknowledged that the OWI needed to overcome resistance from men and from employers as they emphasized that women were workers equal to

460 Ibid.


men, so that women would find it easier to take the first step out of their traditional roles and into the necessary war work. “It is essential that she not be made to buck deep resistances, and two of these we can very definitely help her with.—(1) her husband, (2) the employer.” Five pages of answers to common questions from women, their husbands, and employers followed that introductory statement.

In keeping with Brewster White’s admonition to “sell” the war to women and their communities, she titled her first section “Selling the Woman.” Several of the question were basic and informational, and addressed common fears women had. “Q. ‘If I take a war job, my husband will be drafted sooner.’ A. The fact that a woman takes a war job does not, in itself, affect her husband’s draft status.” “Q. ‘What will the neighbors think?’ A. Eventually the neighbors are going to think it very strange if you are not working. They’ll be working too. In fact, any strong, able-bodied woman who is not completely occupied with a job and a home – is going to be considered a ‘slacker’ just as much as the man who avoids the draft.” These statements normalized women working and reassured women that they would not stand out when they began to work. In fact, these statements created the specter of potential social pressure if women did not work; the responses told women that soon their communities would expect every able woman to work and would harshly judge those who did not.

463 Ibid.
464 Ibid.
465 Ibid. 5.
466 Ibid.
The answers also addressed the issue of defining war work. One of Brewster White’s main concerns was that OWI was defining women’s war work too narrowly, and, as a result, the nation was as well. Because the OWI was the source of information and education, their definition had to be broad enough to address the nation’s full employment needs. Therefore, her response to the question “‘Just what is a war job for a woman?’” included expected answers like “a job in a war factory, a job in an absolutely necessary civilian service like driving a bus or a truck, working in a laundry, a cafeteria, a hotel, a grocery store,” before moving to more unconventional answers, including “being a nurse, a teacher, working for a railroad, at an airport, in a lumber camp, on a farm, in a canning or a meat-packing plant, a bank, a public utility, the telephone company, running an elevator, being a messenger and so on.” Several of these jobs listed above were also featured in the short film “Glamour Girls of 1943,” slated for nationwide release on September 6, 1943.

The section of questions titled “Selling the Employer” revealed some of Mary Brewster White’s own assumptions about women in the workplace. The section addressed concerns employers had about women’s abilities, necessary accommodations like women’s restrooms, as well as debunking common stereotypes about women in the workplace. Brewster White knew that without addressing the stereotypes that led to

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467 Ibid. 5-6.
468 Ibid.
469 Ibid.
470 OWI Womanpower Program Schedule, June – September 1943, Sept. 6 section, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder.
hostile working environments, women would not continue to work in vital war jobs.

“[O]nly half the battle is hiring women. The other – and really more important half – is keeping them.” She provided a list of “employer suggestions” for OWI to emphasize in its campaigns. One of them addressed the physical space: “Check your facilities. Adequate restrooms, locker space, first aid, special attention to good lighting, even temperature.” Another suggestion recognized that women workers would need an advocate at higher levels: “If you have never hired women before, the first step is to hire a woman Personnel Director. This can save you many a headache both at the planning and recruitment stages.” Given Mary Brewster White’s constant struggles on behalf of women workers, women’s recruiting programs, and against the negative stereotypes prevalent in early campaign materials, this recommendation was particularly apt.

Suggestions that addressed stereotypes also addressed how the OWI could inadvertently help spread them. For example, one suggestion, based in the reality that women were more likely to work less desirable shifts, instructed employers to offer women time off for household management errands like shopping and visiting the ration board. “Give women time off (at your expense) to do their shopping and to get hair washed, visit ration board, etc. (this is especially necessary where women work on off-

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472 Ibid. 7.

473 Ibid.
hour shifts due to men’s seniority rights.).” This suggestion also subtly reinforced that working women were still household managers, working the second shift.

The suggestion about childcare indirectly referenced women’s other gendered, unpaid labor. Employers who had previously only employed men had never considered the problem of appropriate care for children of different ages. “Check your local child care facilities and help your women employees solve this major problem satisfactorily.” This, combined with the earlier comments about child care options, also offered OWI writers the opportunity to dovetail the two sides together, making multifaceted appeals in one advertisement.

However, clumsy writing from the OWI could easily, though inadvertently, reinforce existing stereotypes. Brewster White made it clear that, as educators, they needed to be aware of both what they explicitly wrote and what they implied in their copy. “OWI writers note: Do not suggest that employers put in nurseries, beauty parlors, post-office branches, etc. After all, their main job is production, but urge them to instigate a community campaign which will improve shopping hours, provide child care centers, and pool the interest and funds of all local manufacturers.”

Women also wanted employers and communities to respect them in the workplace as contributors to the war effort in any capacity. While they did not necessarily state that in so many words, many of the questions that Mary Brewster White addressed obliquely

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474 Ibid.
475 Ibid.
476 Ibid. 8.
referenced feelings of being outsiders. Questions like “‘I’ve never worked before. I don’t think I can do it.’” “‘What will the neighbors think?’” and “‘Do you really need me?’” all reveal anxieties about capability, respectability, and inferiority.  

Brewster White addressed those fears in her proposed responses to the questions, and she also addressed them with employers. “‘Equal pay for equal work’ is an absolute ‘must.’ Nothing in the world but rebellion and turnover can result from any deviation from this principle.” “Upgrade [promote] women with the same regularity as men.” “Make adequate arrangements to train new workers.” These suggestions all required employers to treat women as equally valued and respected as the men, and the training would address feelings of inferiority.

Some of the other suggestions were simply ways to make the workplace more hospitable to men and women both: “Serve a good hot meal.” “Give plenty of well-spaced rest periods.” “Urge regular physical examinations with your company doctor.” While several of these had additional statements that were gender-specific, these were merely good employment practices in wartime.

Brewster White understood that the OWI had a vital role to play, especially since there were still places where, in August 1943, people needed convincing that women working in male-coded jobs was a vital part of the war effort. “It may seem extraordinary that employers still have to be ‘sold,’ but it is doubtful whether the need will even stop

477 Ibid. 5.
478 Ibid. 8.
479 Ibid. 7.
with the next two million recruits!" She argued that the OWI should always consider employer education a priority, even as people grew accustomed to women in war jobs. She reiterated the key points of future campaign materials, creating a cohesive, executable plan for Womanpower campaigns for the first time since OWI’s establishment.

The points Brewster White clearly enumerated in her plan were visible in late 1943 materials. “The war cannot be won without a lot more *men* fighting – and a lot more *women* working.” “A war job is any job that helps bring Victory sooner. Five times as many women are needed for civilian jobs as for factory jobs.” “It is your duty to take a war job if you are physically – and domestically – able to do so.” “It is entirely natural for women to work, especially in wartime.” “Whatever job you take on will probably be no harder than the one you did at home. And certainly no job is as hard as the *man’s* job on the fighting front.”[481] Brewster White articulated the slogan for the last part of 1943: “THE MORE WOMEN AT WORK…THE SOONER WE’LL WIN!”[482]

Brewster White was aware that the OWI would face many issues in the coming months. There would be months when employers hired fewer women. Many women would be unable to overcome social pressure to not work for pay. There would also be months where Womanpower campaigns for each of the six subsections would conflict with each other. However, she was adamant that despite setbacks, the OWI needed to

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480 Ibid. 8.
481 Ibid. 8-9.
482 Ibid. 9.
continue to advertise and support women’s employment in war industry, civilian jobs, and
the military. Women were in the workforce to stay, Brewster White knew that, and she did her level best to convince her superiors that OWI needed to continue to support Womanpower campaigns. “ONE DEEP, POIGNANT FACT STANDS OUT…THE STEADY ABSORPTION OF WOMEN INTO THE LABOR MARKET IS GOING ON… IT IS NUMERICALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO WIN THE WAR, AND EARN THE PEACE, WITHOUT THE COMPLETE PARTICIPATION OF MILLIONS MORE AMERICAN WOMEN.”\footnote{483}

Mary Brewster White and her staff understood that they needed to work to support the armed forces specifically, though they were unable to focus exclusively on those recruiting efforts. In December 1942, with the WAAC, WAVES, and two of the three nursing corps already established and recruiting, the OWI estimated that the military would need less than 50,000 women in the next year to fill their womanpower requirements. However, SPAR, the Coast Guard women’s auxiliary, established November 23, 1942, was just beginning its recruitment efforts. The United States Marine Corps Women’s Reserve, officially established February 13, 1943, would begin active recruitment soon. With the addition of these two new military auxiliaries, and with the July 1943 establishment of the Cadet Nurse Corps, OWI estimated that all the armed forces together would want 200,000 women by December 1943.\footnote{484}

\footnote{483} Ibid. 11. Emphasis original.

\footnote{484} “Manpower Estimates Classified by Sex,” Appendix A, addendum to memorandum, Mary Brewster White to Robert R. Perry, August 13, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder, 1.
“The Joint Army-Navy Agreement on Recruiting of Women for the Women’s Reserve of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard” outlined the gentlemen’s agreement between armed forces recruiting and industrial recruiting, though the agreement did not address existing conflicts between services. Signed September 16, 1943, by both Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, the Joint Army-Navy Agreement delineated interactions between the armed forces and the OWI and between the armed forces and the War Manpower Commission, and which group was responsible for specific tasks or campaigns.485

The agreement explicitly stated that the armed forces would not compete with industry for available womanpower. They would conduct national campaigns, but would not accept any “woman who is engaged, or who has been engaged within sixty (60) days of her application for enlistment, in any of the essential occupations listed in the Joint Agreement of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy...shall be enlisted in such Women’s Reserve without securing written release from her employer or from the United States Employment Service.”486

Mary Brewster White also noted in August 1943 that the armed forces necessarily drew from a smaller pool of candidates than industry did, and that the OWI needed to adjust their campaigns to reflect that. “[T]he woman who is eligible for the cadet nurse, is

485 Joint Army-Navy Agreement of Recruiting of Women for the Women’s Reserve of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard; 16 September 1943, NARA, RG 208, Materials for Information Campaigns, 4/1/1943-10/31/1943, NC 148 43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder.

486 Ibid.
not eligible for a Wave; that the woman who is eligible for laundry work, is not necessarily eligible for war plant work, etc.”

The Joint-Army Navy Agreement also defined women’s recruitment procedures. “As soon as material [for such national projects] becomes available, copies will be furnished to the Office of War Information and the War Manpower Commission.”

Because the Office of War Information maintained oversight of local campaigns and all advertising space allotments, “[a]n exchange of information concerning the general plan of local campaigns will be maintained in the regional area between the responsible armed forces officials and the representatives of the Office of War Information.”

The Joint Army-Navy Agreement drew jurisdictional lines firmly in an attempt to end the jurisdictional turf wars Brewster White mentioned in her Denver Conference Report in May 1943. “No intensive, localized recruiting campaign for such personnel shall be conducted in labor areas designated by the War Manpower Commission as critical area #1 or #2 except in cooperation with the War Manpower Commission. Where this cooperation cannot be effected locally by mutual agreement between the officials

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488 Joint Army-Navy Agreement of Recruiting of Women for the Women’s Reserve of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard; 16 September 1943, NARA, RG 208, Materials for Information Campaigns, 4/1/1943-10/31/1943, NC 148 43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder.

489 Ibid.

490 Mary Brewster White to Ken Beirn, Report on the Denver Conference, May 14, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder, 2; Mary Brewster White to Robert R. Perry, memorandum, August 13, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder, 1.
concerned, a decision will be reached at the national level." If the field agents could not agree on a cohesive campaign, the OWI, WMC, and military branch would coordinate a solution at their level. The field agents could continue to work in the small scale without having to parse federal regulations and integrate their efforts into a nationwide campaign.

Even before the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy signed the Joint Army-Navy Agreement, the leaders of women’s auxiliaries contacted the Office of War Information, requesting use of their facilities and resources. Colonel Oveta Culp Hobby, Rear Admiral Randall Jacobs, Captain Ellis Reed-Hill, and Lieutenant Colonel George van der Hoef all requested the use of facilities and assistance with recruiting campaigns in general. Assistant Chief of Staff of the Army M.G. White forwarded the Joint Army-Navy Agreement to the Office of War Information on September 21, 1943. Assistant Chief of Staff M.G. White hoped that the Joint Army-Navy Agreement would clear up confusion in field agencies. He stated that “the adjutant General is preparing operating instructions for the field agencies of the Army in accordance with these agreements…It is understood that you will issue similar instructions to your field agencies.” The referenced instructions required close coordination of efforts, with long

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491 Joint Army-Navy Agreement of Recruiting of Women for the Women’s Reserve of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard; 16 September 1943, NARA, RG 208, Materials for Information Campaigns, 4/1/1943-10/31/1943, NC 148 43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder.

492 Letter from LCOL George van der Hoef to Elmer Davis, September 30, 1943; Letter from COL Oveta Culp Hobby to Elmer Davis, September 15, 1943, and Letter from RADM Randall Jacobs to Elmer Davis, September 10, 1943, all found in NARA, RG 208, NC 148 E-1, Box 6, “Programs – 6 Recruiting 1943-1945” folder.
preparation times to prevent campaign overlap. Military leadership had already noted the confusion at the Office of War Information and were trying to mitigate the worst of the damage.

The adoption of the Joint Army-Navy Agreement created confusion - or rather, the pending adoption of the Joint Army-Navy Agreement did so. Because time was so short, women’s auxiliary leaders contacted the Office of War Information well before the Joint Army-Navy Agreement arrived, and even before the Secretaries of War and the Navy signed it. On September 10, 1943, Rear Admiral Randall Jacobs wrote directly to Elmer Davis. He asked to use the OWI facilities for WAVES recruitment, which would shortly be officially outlined in the Joint-Army Navy Agreement: “It will be greatly appreciated if the Bureau of Naval Personnel may utilize the facilities of the Office of War Information through your Office of Program Coordination in connection with our WAVE recruitment program.” Jacobs did not reference the Joint Army-Navy Agreement in his letter, but instead wrote of discussions between Navy and OWI representatives. “Several members of this Bureau have had preliminary discussions with your representatives, and we feel that your office can be of invaluable assistance to us in increasing our number of WAVE enlistments.”

Oveta Culp Hobby, Director of the Women’s Army Corps, also wrote to Elmer Davis, though she did not directly request use of the Office of War Information’s

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493 M. G. White to Stephen E. Fitzgerald, Assistant Director, Domestic Branch, letter, September 21, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder.

494 Randall Jacobs to Elmer Davis, letter, September 10, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 1, Box 6, “Programs – 6 Recruiting 1943-1945” folder.
facilities. Her September 15, 1943 letter was much more of a thank you letter for previous collaboration: “I have been greatly impressed with the many facilities made available to the armed services by the Office of War Information….OWI has been extremely helpful to the Women’s Army Corps and only recently has set up a three weeks’ radio campaign.” Hobby also noted that while the OWI had produced recruiting campaigns for the WAC in the past, “the Women’s Army Corps has a common problem with all women’s service elements in obtaining sufficient members to meet our needs.”

Hobby only addressed the future after she thanked Davis for the OWI’s assistance in multiple campaigns. She brought up the possibility of future collaborations on recruiting campaigns. “I am of the opinion that if the OWI were to be given the green light in preparing an over-all recruiting program at some future date, the results would be highly beneficial.”

In a letter dated September 24, 1943, Captain Ellis Reed-Hill also contacted Elmer Davis. As of July 1943, the Coast Guard had taken over all recruiting for SPARs from the Navy, though they were still covered under the Joint Army-Navy Agreement because they were part of the Navy Department. Reed-Hill made two specific requests as per the Joint Army-Navy Agreement. First, he “requested that the facilities of the Office of War Information, particularly in the radio field, be utilized unreservedly for the

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495 Oveta Culp Hobby to Elmer Davis, letter, September 15, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 1, Box 6, “Programs – 6 Recruiting 1943-1945” folder.

496 Ibid.

497 Ibid.
promotion of the first anniversary week of Coast Guard Spars, to be observed on a
nation-wide scale.” The anniversary celebration provided an excellent starting point for
more general campaigns about the Coast Guard SPAR, and lent itself to positive stories
about the group. Second, he “requested that after consideration of factual material to be
presented, recommendations be made by members of your staff for integration of the
Office of War Information facilities with U. S. Coast Guard Spar recruiting
promotion.”

That is, Reed-Hill asked for collaborations between SPAR and OWI to
begin as soon as possible, with an eye to improving the campaigns, and, by extension,
increase the number of women joining SPAR. Reed-Hill recognized that the Coast Guard
had very little experience in recruiting and would need help both to make up the slack
and to take full advantage of their upcoming birthday week.

Lieutenant Colonel George Van der Hoef, Acting Director of Public Relations,
United States Marine Corps, contacted Elmer Davis in a letter dated September 30, 1943.
Van der Hoef first outlined the existing recruiting programs, both national and local.
USMCWR recruiting campaigns tried to “tell the complete story of the Women
Marines.”

The USMCWR also had local campaigns, administered “by each of our four
Marine Corps Procurement Divisions, with central control exercised by Marine Corps
Headquarters in these localities.”

Because the Marine Corps did not “have any money

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498 Ellis Reed-Hill to Elmer Davis, letter, September 24, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 1, Box 6, “Programs –
6 Recruiting 1943-1945” folder.

499 George van der Hoef to Elmer Davis, letter, September 30, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 1, Box 6,

500 Ibid.
allocated for paid advertising,”\(^{501}\) they needed OWI assistance in creating and producing recruiting campaigns. Van der Hoef then requested both use of OWI facilities, as per the Joint Army-Navy Agreement, and the assistance of OWI staff in creating new campaigns, to ameliorate the Marine Corps’ budgetary issues. “During the months of January and February 1944, the Marine Corps desires to carry on an intense national recruiting campaign for women Marines, and we would like to have the cooperation and utilize the facilities of the Office of War Information in placing Marine Corps material, so as to disseminate as large a volume of material as possible to the public.”\(^{502}\)

In each case, Davis replied to provide them with the name of the program manager, Clifford Sutter, and the Deputy Director for Manpower, James R. Brackett. Davis noted that time constraints limited access to the OWI’s facilities, but he was enthusiastic about the opportunity.\(^{503}\) However, as Director, Davis had little to do with the programs once they began. Sutter worked with Mary Brewster White on the military recruitment campaigns because they were Womanpower Campaigns. Because Womanpower Campaigns already handled Army, Navy, and Cadet Nurse Corps recruiting, the Joint Army-Navy Agreement gave OWI a measure of control over every women’s recruiting campaign for the armed forces.

\(^{501}\) Ibid.  
\(^{502}\) Ibid.  
\(^{503}\) Elmer Davis to Randall Jacobs, letter, September 16, 1943, Elmer Davis to Oveta Culp Hobby, letter, September 23, 1943, Elmer Davis to Ellis Reed-Hill, letter, September 30, 1943, and Elmer Davis to George T. van der Hoef, letter, October 4, 1943, all found in NARA, RG 208, NC 148 1, Box 6, “Programs – 6 Recruiting 1943-1945” folder.
OWI staffer Mary Keeler asked Deputy Director James Brackett to request recruiting, enlistment, resignation, and current strength numbers from the WAC, “[i]n order to prepare a plan for a program to recruit WACS.”\(^\text{504}\) Both Keeler and Brackett explicitly stated that the information would be kept confidential by the OWI. Brackett forwarded Keeler’s request to Colonel Oveta Culp Hobby.\(^\text{505}\) Along with statistical information, Brackett also requested “A copy of recruiting plans for 1944 – including the service breakdowns – ASF, Air and Ground. This should include their newspaper schedule.”\(^\text{506}\) Brackett explained that they “need the data in order to develop the most effective appeals and to estimate the problem as accurately as possible.”\(^\text{507}\) The January 1944 request was the first systematic analysis of women’s recruitment into one of the service branches.

The new agreement helped create a cohesive recruiting plan specifically for women’s military auxiliaries. The OWI no longer had to struggle with conflicting information and directives, and the auxiliaries now had access to the experienced advertisers on the OWI’s staff. The OWI no longer created content in a vacuum. The directions provided by the auxiliaries, combined with the OWI’s newly revised perception of women separate from their connections to men led to more cohesive recruiting plans. The agreement and resulting collaboration ended the confusion at the

\(^{504}\) Mary Keeler to James Brackett, memorandum, WAC, December 23, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 1, Box 6, “Programs – 6 Recruiting 1943-1945” folder, 1.

\(^{505}\) James Brackett to Oveta Culp Hobby, letter, January 3, 1944, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 1, Box 6, “Programs – 6 Recruiting 1943-1945” folder.

\(^{506}\) Ibid.

\(^{507}\) Ibid.
Office of War Information over how to address women, how to convince them to join the military, and how to do it in such a way that women would respond.

The later part of 1943 saw a wide variety of changes at the Office of War Information. The OWI took control of all women’s military recruitment and Mary Brewster White’s Womanpower Campaigns division articulated a cohesive campaign plan. In August 1943, Brewster White argued for systematic analyses of women’s campaigns, what was working and what was failing. By the end of the year, Womanpower staff like Mary Keeler approached military recruitment scientifically, making use of hard data. And finally, after months of progressively more intense challenges from Mary Brewster White, the Office of War Information began to address its perception problem and began to address women beyond the context of their connections to men.
CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION

By the end of 1943, Mary Brewster White had identified the problems facing women’s recruiting campaigns, articulated possible solutions, and implemented a few of them. Women needed to be sold on the war, and their communities needed to be sold on their participation. But more than that – women needed to be addressed independently of men. Advertisers and content creators changed their approach, addressing women as individuals, and moved beyond the usual gendered social contexts. The results were obvious in the late part of 1943 and the early part of 1944.

Prior to the war, and into the early years of the war, advertisers addressed women in specific ways and in gendered social contexts – as wives, mothers, daughters, and sweethearts. While this was sometimes effective, given the product being sold – diapers, for example – in many other cases it was inappropriate and incongruous. This was particularly the case for women’s military recruiting.

Mary Brewster White spent several months in 1943 first gently, then more firmly, pushing her superiors at the Office of War Information toward better recruiting practices. Brewster White argued that women had to be sold on the war, just as they had to be sold on any other product. The OWI overused their common methods for appealing to women, and therefore those methods had lost impact. When the OWI addressed women as homemakers, wives, or sweethearts who only wanted to bring their men home sooner,
rather than as patriots or as people who wanted adventure or education, the advertisements’ impact reduced further. Brewster White received an unexpected boost to her arguments in the form of an internal Office of War Information conflict.

The Office of War Information was the second World War II era federal agency for information control. The first, the Office of Facts and Figures, was an information clearinghouse without the authority to access necessary information. The American public clamored for information that the Office of Facts and Figures either did not have or was not authorized to release. After seven months of frustration, President Roosevelt folded the Office of Facts and Figures into the newly created Office of War Information and gave the new organization real teeth to control information. The OWI became the arbiter of inter-agency disputes over policy and what would be released.

In the transition, the former Director of the Office of Facts and Figures, Archibald MacLeish, became the Assistant Director of the Office of War Information under Director Elmer Davis, and lost much of his political power. The transition also meant the new agency needed to solidify policy. MacLeish had preferred to provide more information than less, and to present the information in such a way as to convince the public of the righteousness of the American cause. He was not afraid of the word “propaganda,” but he refused to consider using fabrications or exaggerations, or “bunk.”\(^{508}\) Davis, a journalist and radio announcer, believed that too much information could be a problem, and also believed that the OWI’s main function needed to be education rather than exhortation. Conflict between the two was unavoidable. MacLeish

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\(^{508}\) Donaldson, Archibald MacLeish, 349-350.
stayed at the OWI for seven months, resigning in January 1943. By then, confusion over policy and mission was widespread throughout the agency.

Davis reiterated OWI policy in March 1943, and the official policy dovetailed nicely with what Mary Brewster White was trying to communicate for Womanpower Campaigns. Both Davis and Brewster White believed the OWI’s primary function was to educate the nation, rather than convince them. Her new programs and campaigns were built around that idea. Her three-pronged approach to Womanpower Campaigns was firmly grounded in educating the public on the need for women to work.

Brewster White argued that the OWI’s basic issue was that they “[had] not properly analyzed [their] audience.”509 Further, Womanpower Campaigns were still suffering from the fallout of the power struggle, and the resulting higgledy-piggledy campaign structure caused a great deal of unnecessary confusion. “We have no broad background information program of our own into which the various recruiting appeals maybe intelligently fitted.”510 Her three-part plan, based on countering “resistances” to women working, addressed the serious difficulties advertisers had with gendered social contexts. Women were not interchangeable parts, who would respond to the same types of campaigns over and over again. Brewster White identified several common tactics campaigns used, and argued that the overuse of those tactics numbed the audience to their pleas.

509 Mary Brewster White to Robert R. Perry, memorandum, August 13, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder, 1.

510 Ibid. 2.
It is little wonder our exhortations to women to turn their lives upside down fall on deaf ears if we employ the same techniques and copy approach – sound trucks, movie stars, and passionate meaningless hysteria – that we do to raise money. Furthermore, the delivery of these messages via radio is identical with the toneless reminder or frantic appeal not to go pleasure driving.⁵¹¹

Brewster White pushed her superiors and her staff to create a new form of campaign, one that began in September 1943. The new September plan used the three resistances concurrently to recruit women: resistances of women, of husbands, and of employers. It was firmly grounded in the understanding that the OWI needed to sell the war, and full participation, to women directly:

The September Womanpower Campaign…is largely an ‘awareness’ campaign, designated to forcefully point out…that a ‘war job’ for a woman is not just a factory job, but any job which helps bring Victory sooner…The ultimate goal of the September Campaign is to associate in the minds of the public, the words ‘woman’ and ‘work’ just as firmly as the words ‘man’ and ‘fight’ are associated.⁵¹²

Despite the lack of a larger plan, or even a stable organizational structure, the OWI ran a successfully coordinated series of campaigns from a collection of unrelated, equal departments and bureaus in the summer of 1943. The September Womanpower Campaign, in conjunction with the Joint Army-Navy Agreement, signed and implemented in September 1943, provided much needed cohesion and structure to women’s recruiting programs, both military and civilian. In October 1945, the OWI’s Domestic Branch produced a report summarizing the major recruiting and salvage campaigns.

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⁵¹¹ Ibid. 1.

The report addressed each campaign, even the ones that readers might have considered failures. The Navy Nurse Corps campaign was quite successful: “The job of bringing corp[s] strength up to 11,500 was accomplished with a minimum of effort to the entire satisfaction of the Navy Department.” The Cadet Nurse Corps campaign was an intense and praiseworthy effort: “A total of 181,750 young women were induced to go into training for nursing profession during a three-year period. This was an intensive program and one of the utmost importance to supply an unending number of nurses for the military or essential civilian services.” The report also noted where they failed to meet recruiting goals, as they did with the WAC: “This was a consistently active program and Wac strength was brought up to a total of 94,000 against an authorized quota of 100,000 women for service with the U. S. Army.”

The changes were not complete. After the power struggle and Mary Brewster White’s new guidelines and campaign policy for Womanpower, the OWI still produced posters that placed women in their gendered social context. A Coast Guard poster from late 1944 showed that the old ways still produced results. “Make a Date with Uncle Sam,” featured a young woman in a SPAR uniform on Uncle Sam’s arm. (Figure 20) Uncle Sam was drawn in an easily recognizable style, with a white beard and hair,

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513 James R. Brackett, Senior Deputy Director, Domestic Branch, to Mr. J. Merrick, Executive Director, Domestic Branch, Memorandum, October 4, 1945, NARA, RG 208, NC 148, 6A, Box 4, “Campaigns: General” folder, 1.

514 Ibid.

515 Ibid. 2.

516 “Make a Date with Uncle Sam,” NARA, RG 44, digital file 17-0778M, NARA ID 513664, Local ID 44-PA-222.
wearing a blue suit, red bow tie, and star spangled top hat. The woman in this poster had signed up to serve her country. Conflating her service with a “date” with the human embodiment of the nation led to some troubling and confusing implications. Clearly, the Office of War Information, and advertisers in general, had a long way to go in the way they perceived and addressed women.

No one at the Office of War Information intended to bring widespread change to the gendered social contexts so familiar to the American public. Mary Brewster White, Natalie Davison, Ken Beirn, and their colleagues wanted to create successful, coherent campaigns. To accomplish that small goal, they studied earlier campaigns, met with industry leaders and potential employers, and, finally, in 1943 and 1944, asked women what kind of campaign would appeal to them.517

The process of developing more effective campaigns led content creators away from the same old styles and tropes – away from the doting mother, the charming teenager who wrote to her brother faithfully, the girl he left behind, the single gal on the hunt for a husband, or the wife maintaining her household in scarcity while still fulfilling her marital duties. Campaigns began to feature working women with specialized training enlisting in the WAVES,518 college students bringing their education to bear on their

517 “Womanpower Campaigns,” addendum to memorandum, Mary Brewster White to Robert R. Perry, August 13, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148, 43, Box 1, “Programs Manpower” folder, 4; Mary Keeler to James Brackett, memorandum, December 23, 1943, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 1, Box 6, “Programs – 6 Recruiting 1943-1945” folder; James Brackett to Oveta Culp Hobby, letter, January 3, 1944, NARA, RG 208, NC 148 1, Box 6, “Programs – 6 Recruiting 1943-1945” folder.

WAC jobs, military nurses working at the front, and women of all social classes using existing skills or learning new ones to work in war industries. These advertisements rarely mentioned women’s relationships to men. If they did, the men were the ones WACs, WAVES, Marines, and SPARs returned home sooner through their participation, or the ones they replaced. As these advertisements addressed women beyond their traditional gendered social contexts, they created new ones.

By 1944, OWI advertisements told their audiences that the American public expected all women to have some kind of war job. They also told women that they were capable of many things beyond their traditional roles – working heavy machinery, rigging parachutes for paratroopers and aviators, teaching new pilots how to fly in Link trainers, and working as air traffic controllers. Military women moved well beyond the original legislation for stenographers, typists, and clerks. By late 1943, the WAC advertised two hundred thirty-nine possible jobs for women, working throughout the
Army, restricted only from combat arms.\textsuperscript{525} Post-war legislation, including the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act of 1948, ensured women’s place in the United States regular military.\textsuperscript{526} The women’s auxiliaries continued as reserves until the 1950s, when they fully integrated into the regular services. The end of the auxiliaries meant the end of separate command structures, but not the end of women in the United States military.

\textsuperscript{525} “Improve your skill – or learn a new one – in a vital Army job,” NARA, RG 44, digital file 17-1745M, NARA ID 514613, Local ID 44-PA-1086.

\textsuperscript{526} Women’s Armed Services Integration Act of 1948, Public Law 80-625, June 12, 1948.
APPENDIX

Figure 1: That Was the Day I Joined (p. 9)
Figure 2: Enlist in the WAVES (p. 9)
Figure 3: I’d Rather Be With Them (p. 9)
Figure 4: Don’t Miss Your Great Opportunity (p. 10)
Figure 4: Will Your Name Be There? (p. 10)
Figure 6: Good Soldier (p. 10)
Figure 7: Proud – I’ll Say! (p. 27)
Figure 8: There's a Man-Size Job for You in Your Navy (p. 53)
Figure 10: I'm proud of my two soldiers (p. 118)
This isn’t the pretty frack I wore the day he went away. But knowing how deeply he feels about all-out war—to win quickly and for keeps—I had to get in somehow. There’s no more direct way of helping them in the W.A.C. My small part frees a man for the front. I only hope I’ll be as good a soldier as Jim.

This satisfaction of personal participation in America’s great struggle is not the least of many reasons why the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps is attracting a gallant, sturdy group of women patriots. It isn’t easy to give up a good-paying job or leave a comfortable home to don a uniform. Yet many women are doing it, and glorying in it. Women who have husbands, sons, brothers, and sweethearts in uniform; and women who simply believe their greatest contribution is this direct one to the Army.

If you have not yet found your most effective, satisfying post in our fight for freedom, consider this new woman’s army. Many of the jobs which the WAAC will be called upon to do, wherever American soldiers are fighting or training, offer experience which will be valuable in post-war life. Just a few of the openings in the WAAC include: bookkeepers, camera technicians, cashiers, clerical workers of all kinds, cooks and bakers, draftsmen, drivers, messengers, musicians, radio operators and repairmen, statisticians, stenographers, telephone operators and typists. Pay is equal to soldiers’ pay.

Every auxiliary has equal opportunity to compete for selection for officer training in this rapidly expanding corps, regardless of race, creed or color. You need only be strong, intelligent, a citizen, aged 21 to 44, inclusive, and eager! Do you rate for Uncle Sam—join the WAAC.

Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps

U.S. Army
Recruiting and Induction Service

Visit your nearest U.S. Army Recruiting Station or write to:
"The Commanding General," of the Service Command nearest you:
First Service Command
Second Service Command
Third Service Command
Fourth Service Command
Fifth Service Command
Sixth Service Command
Seventh Service Command
Eighth Service Command

Or write to:
Appointment and Induction Branch, O.F., A.A.G.O., Washington, D.C.
Choose your job
from 239 types of
Army work

Choose your branch of service
Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces
or Army Service Forces

Choose your station
in the Service Command
where you enlist

JOIN THE WAC NOW!
GET FULL DETAILS AT U.S. ARMY RECRUITING STATION

OR — ASK POSTMASTER FOR FREE POST CARD AND MAIL IT TODAY
Figure 13: They Can't Do Any More (p. 144)
Figure 14: Woman's Place in War - Cartographer (p. 146)
Figure 16: WACS with the Army Ground Force (p. 149)
PRIVATE HELEN NARAGOS of Norman, Okla., received her B.S. degree in languages at Wesley University, Oklahoma City. Today, her specialized training fills a vital need at the Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Okla., where she translates maps drawn in Arabic, Chinese, and Portuguese for Brazilian officers who are receiving there. Her portrait plans include returning to graduate work when she will participate in studies for her M.S. degree.

CAPTAIN EVELYN SHEELER, Engineer of fine arts, pursues her degree to work with the Women's Army Corps at Fort Riley, Kansas. Wayne University in her alma mater and Detroit, Michigan, in the Kansas. Corporal Sheller's talent is shown in her talent in illustrating technical training aids used graphically in instruction. She also devotes time to oil and water-color painting in her downtime, which affords her a new and interesting field of endeavor for college women in the WAC.

PRIVATE EVELYN COOPER of South Carolina was an outstanding student at Hartwick College. Her college training qualifies her to conduct important medical experiments under official supervision at the School of Aviation Medicine with the AAF at Randolph Field, Texas. Aviation, having its own special medical problems, affords a new and interesting field of endeavor for college women in the WAC.

WOMEN'S ARMY CORPS * ARMY OF UNITED STATES
Figure 18: On the Same Team (p. 154)
Figure 19: Earn a Navy Rating (p. 154)
Figure 20: Make a Date with Uncle Sam (p. 202)
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Ruth Cheney Streeter Personal Papers Collection, held by Marine Corps Library Special Collections and Archives, Marine Corps University, Quantico, Virginia.
Women Marines Collection, held by Marine Corps University History Division, Quantico, Virginia.
BIOGRAPHY

Zayna N. Bizri received her Bachelor of Arts from West Chester University in 1999. She received her Master of Arts in History from George Mason University in 2010. She is currently a history instructor at Northern Virginia Community College and George Mason University. She lives with her husband, four cats, and an entirely reasonable number of books, comics, and video games.