UNDERSTANDING THE LONGSTANDING CONFLICT BETWEEN THE
BANYAMULENGE AND "INDIGENOUS" TRIBES IN EASTERN DRC: WHY DO
NEIGHBORS STRUGGLE TO COEXIST?

by

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A dissertation
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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to each member of my family, especially my wife Brigitte Londoni and son Mael Londoni. My family always encouraged me to go the extra mile and work hard. I am grateful to God for his unconditional support.
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This study wouldn’t take place without the participation of members of the Bafuliru and Bavira (known as Bavibafuliru by this study) and Banyamulenge communities. I sincerely thank members of these communities for accepting to be interviewed. I am eternally grateful for the insights participants provided to make this research a success. Their responses informed the creation of a model that can be used to reduce tensions and manage conflict in Uvira.

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ABSTRACT

UNDERSTANDING THE LONGSTANDING CONFLICT BETWEEN THE BANYAMULENGE AND 'INDIGENOUS' TRIBES IN EASTERN DRC: WHY DO NEIGHBORS STRUGGLE TO COEXIST?

Bernard J. Lononi, PhD

George Mason University, 2017

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Literature provides widespread support that intergroup contact (Pettigrew 1997, Davies, et al. 2011) and intergroup empathy (Mazziotta, et al. 2014) play a positive role in improving relations and fostering coexistence. The case I explored in Uvira, of Eastern DRC in 2016 clearly contrasts evidence from existing literature that links intergroup contact and empathy with positive intergroup relations. This research focused on understanding intergroup struggle to coexist peacefully. I used the case study inquiry strategy interviewing 40 individuals (20 from each community) in order to generate in-depth understanding of the complex issues surrounding the Uvira conflict and provide more insights into the gaps that exist for this studied case (Crowe et al. 2011, 1). This research found that both intergroup contact and empathy between the Banyamulenge, Bavira and Bafuliru (Bavibafuliru) have had little effects in fostering coexistence. Research participants stated that contacts between members of these communities are superficial, ironic and hypocritical. Participants also indicated that empathic feelings
expressed by members of each group toward the other are insincere, ironic and hypocrirical. They cited that members of these groups continue to see each other as enemies, lacking trust, and express hatred and disdain for one another. I used a framework to analyze the role that other concepts such legitimacy, power, trust, forgiveness, common identity, tolerance, interdependency, and social boundaries play in this conflict to facilitate or impede peaceful coexistence. I also developed a contact model to be used to mitigate conflict in the area. This research found that the uncertain status (citizenship issue) of the Banyamulenge and their access to power - that is viewed by their neighboring ethnic groups as illegitimate - were ones of the main challenges for peace efforts in Uvira. Factors hindering or that could facilitate coexistence are discussed; also discussed include the contributions and limitations of the research, implications of the results and recommendations for future research as well as the author's reflection on the conflict. I gained not only a better understanding of what contributes to the lack of coexistence in this area, but also developed insights into similar phenomena occurring in other parts of the world, especially the Great Lakes Region of Africa, where issues of coexistence have been studied and clear answers continue to be searched.
Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION: SETTING THE CONTEXT FOR UVIRA CONFLICT

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Since armed violence erupted in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) during the 1996 first civil war, and the 1998 second civil war, communities in eastern DRC, particularly in the Uvira territory or the Plaine de la Ruzizi (Ruzizi plains) in general – who were major actors in the war have since been at odds with each other. The wars put rival communities against one another in Uvira and escalated ethnic tensions between the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru. The Banyamulenge are a Tutsi pastoralist community that lives in the mountain area of Uvira territory in South Kivu Province; they migrated to the eastern DRC from Rwanda. Though the exact date of their arrival is contested, many historians have documented that a large part of the Banyamulenge arrived before the colonial era, that's before 1885 (Stearns et Al 2013, 11). However, their neighboring communities have categorically rejected their Congolese citizenship, stating that the Banyamulenge are recent immigrants (Stearns et Al 2013, 11).

The Bavira and the Bafuliru, whom in this research I call Bavibafuliru, see themselves as Congolese indigenous communities unlike the Banyamulenge that they treat as of foreign origin. The 1996 war known as the First Congo War (ICRtoP 2016), which was viewed as an invasion of the DRC by Rwandan-backed insurgent coalition
became also known as "the Banyamulenge rebellion" (Stearns et Al 2013, 12). By 1996, the anti-Banyamulenge sentiment grew in the territory of Uvira and harassment of members of this group by the Bavira and Bafuliru became common (Vlassenroot, 2013). Rivalries between members of these groups grew further to the extent that coexistence between them became quite challenging. Many Bavibafuliru say that the Banyamulenge are foreigners from Rwanda (Vlassenroot 2013). The Bavibafuliru blame the Banyamulenge for purposely having supported the Rwandan invasion of the eastern DRC by enrolling Banyamulenge youth to join the war alongside Rwandan troops. In the years following the wars, the Bavibafuliru created self-defense groups or militias known as Mai Mai to fight the Rwandan invasion and the Banyamulenge who they viewed as Rwandan backers.

As demons of wars started to dissipate, especially following the election of Joseph Kabila as the country's first democratically-elected president in 2006, the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru started to make some efforts to put their past behind them. They have demonstrated their intention once again to improve their relations and engage in peaceful coexistence. However, there have been some significant challenges in rebuilding the already broken relationships between members of these rival communities.

I carried out a research in 2011 for my master's thesis investigating rivalries between the neighboring ethnic groups in Uvira. In this research, I found that the two sides have been involved in some forms of contact at the local, political and social levels with the aim of addressing their problems. Local and international organizations have facilitated dialogue between communal leaders and members of the Banyamulenge and
Bavibafuliru to manage conflicts between the communities include among others Search for Common Ground (SFCG) and the Washington DC-based organization, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars also known as the Wilson Center, Africa Program. The findings also showed that the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru expressed empathy for one another – understanding the pain of the other – over the bitter past they have experienced during the wars. Though inter-groups killings took place, members of these communities expressed that they were eager to engage in the reconciliation process to heal their past conflict wounds.

Meanwhile, few studies have been carried out to explain why these groups have been unable to peacefully coexist in Uvira, even though their members have expressed the desire to do so. This study sought to explore the gaps in existing literature; some researches support the idea that intergroup contact and empathy contribute to improving intergroup relations. I investigated an alternative explanation as to why neighbors in Uvira struggle or continue to face challenges to coexist peacefully. I showed how intergroup contact and empathy alone are insufficient to foster true coexistence.

1.2 Research problem statement

Literature provides widespread support contending that contact – meaning face-to-face interaction by members of adversary groups – promotes positive attitudes and reduces groups’ prejudice (Davies, et al. 2011, 332, Pettigrew 1997). Also, the literature supports the idea that intergroup empathy leads to positive intergroup relationships (Mazziotta, et al. 2014; Batson and Ahmad 2011, Stephan & Finlay 1999). Researchers have claimed
that contact plays an important role in groups' relations as it increases the groups’
prosocial behavior (Koschate, et al. 2012). However, coexistence also includes
recognition of the legitimacy of the other (Hornsey, et al. 2003). Although Pettigrew and
others outlined factors important for successful intergroup relations such as contact, their
concept did not include legitimacy - a factor that is crucial in facilitating coexistence in a
place like Uvira. Legitimacy is important for peaceful coexistence because when
acceptance of the other group as a legitimate party takes place, members of the hostile
group may begin to consider the other as legitimate and exist together (Weiner 1998, 15).
Without the acceptance of the other as a legitimate member of society, achieving
coexistence may be unlikely.

The theoretical problem stated above reflects the case of the eastern DRC/Uvira
conflict. In the case of Uvira, members of the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge have
engaged in some forms of interactions (contact) and have verbally expressed empathy for
one another (sympathizing with the other's pain and showing compassion for one
another), but continue to struggle to coexist peacefully. In clear terms, members of these
communities have verbally expressed empathy for one another, but this is not apparent in
their day-to-day interaction. The behavior they exhibit toward one another is
incompatible with the empathic feelings they verbally express. This discrepancy led this
research to question whether contact and empathy alone are effective factors in building
intergroup relations.

Peacebuilders have been interested in the case of the eastern DRC. Some
international peacebuilding organizations, including SFCG and the Wilson Center
deployed conflict resolution intervenors to help rival groups mend their differences while promoting the sense of unity and cohabitation. The Wilson Center uses the term leadership cohesion program for its eastern DRC project. It brings together leaders from the various rival groups with the aim of helping them to coexist by encouraging them to cooperate and stop competing against one another (Wilson Center 2008). The Wilson Center's philosophy is that once you get leaders of these various groups in a room through workshops and other activities, these leaders will start to understand each other. As leaders, they will play an influential role in promoting the notion of coexistence within their respective communities encouraging members of their community to coexist with members of the rival groups (Wilson Center 2008). On the other hand, Search for Common Ground has used cultural events to bring members of the community together (SFCG 2015). Other local groups and NGOs have also been involved in peacebuilding work facilitating dialogue and helping communities heal their wounds of wars.

Why is it that despite all the work that facilitates contacts between the rival groups, little has happened to enable members of these groups to coexist peacefully? Has intergroup contact improved relations between groups? Does intergroup empathy lead to improving positive relations between groups with a bitter past? These questions were the focus of this research as I articulated an alternative explanation as to why intergroup empathy and contacts alone are not enough to foster coexistence between groups that had a bitter past. Is it possible that for rival groups to achieve a milestone in fostering coexistence, one group must first accept the other as a legitimate partner? Perhaps, the
fact of not accepting the legitimacy of the other when trying to resolve differences, may make it difficult for members of groups to have positive reactions toward one another. It may be that no matter how much contacts they each have and how much empathy members of one group can express toward the other, if one group is considered illegitimate, the illegitimacy issue could become salient and perhaps supersedes the feeling of empathy and all positive feelings enhanced during contacts made by groups' members. This means that when a group sees the other as illegitimate, the perception of illegitimacy exacerbates negative reactions from the other, especially when relations among the groups are already unstable (Halabi, et al. 2012, 295).

This research uses Daniel Bar-Tal's definition of coexistence. According to Bar-Tal, coexistence refers to:

"the conditions that serve as the fundamental prerequisites for the evolvement of advanced harmonious intergroup relations. It refers to the very recognition in the right of the other group to exist peacefully with its differences and to the acceptance of the other group as a legitimate and an equal partner with whom disagreements have to be resolved in nonviolent ways" (Bar-Tal 2004, 256).

Borrowing from Bar-Tal, this research operationalized coexistence as different groups living together in harmonious ways and accepting members of the neighboring group as legitimate members of the society, while recognizing their right to exist peacefully side by side with oneself. Struggling to peacefully coexist, therefore, means in this usage, not recognizing the peaceful existence of members of the neighboring group, while also not living in harmony with them and accepting their legitimacy. Here, the groups continue to undermine each other, with in-group members showing hostility against members of the out-group.
1.3 Purpose of study

This study focused on understanding intergroup struggle to coexist peacefully in the territory of Uvira, South Kivu Province of DRC. Specifically, it aimed to find out why members of the rival ethnic groups in Uvira have had contacts and have expressed empathy for one another, but then continue to face challenges to coexist peacefully. In other terms, the study explored if intergroup contact and empathy actually improve relations between groups to the point of fostering coexistence. The study tested if intergroup contact and empathy lead to improving positive relations and facilitating peaceful coexistence between groups with an acrimonious past.

The research assumed that – despite the presence of intergroup contact and empathy – the continued lack of sincere positive cooperation (constructive engagement) - between the different community members and the inability of one group to accept the legitimacy (citizenship) of the other, could worsen their relationships and ultimately hinder their ability to peacefully coexist. The assumption goes further stipulating that if the rival groups do not have common goals for the future – that is to say, one group does not recognize the right of its neighbor to exist peacefully regardless of their differences – the groups' efforts to mend their past will likely have little impact in building intergroup relations.

1.4 Research questions
1. What are the necessary conditions that facilitate positive outcomes of contact in the search for building positive intergroup relations?

2. When does intergroup empathy fail to contribute to the improvement of groups' relations?

3. What factors contribute to the process of breaking intergroup social boundaries in order to promote peaceful coexistence?

1.5 Research objectives

The objectives of the study are to:

- Examine the role of intergroup contact and empathy in improving relations in communities that have experienced a violent past.

- Analyze the best practices to foster peaceful coexistence among rival groups while bridging the gap in literature on this subject matter.

- Examine the extent to which acceptance of the legitimacy of the other, positive cooperation, interdependency, and common goals can have on improving relations and facilitating intergroup coexistence.

1.6 Significance of the study

The eastern DRC has a long history of conflict since what has come to be known as the 1996 first Congo war (ICRtoP 2016). I gained not only a better understanding of what contributes to the lack of coexistence in this area, but also developed insights into similar
phenomena occurring in other parts of the world, especially the Great Lakes Region of Africa where issues of coexistence continue to generate interests among researchers.

The DRC case clearly contrasts evidence from existing literature that links intergroup contact and empathy with positive intergroup relations. Though there is widespread support showing that intergroup contact contributes to the improvement of intergroup relations, there is little research explaining why groups that experienced violent conflicts may face challenges improving their relations in places where intergroup contact is present. The same can be said for empathy. In addition, no current studies have explored the contact hypothesis or intergroup empathy theory in the Uvira conflict situation. Most studies have looked at the eastern DRC as a whole, and not specifically Uvira. This research is one of a kind that devoted energy to explore the contact and empathy theories just for Uvira, and examined the conflict between the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru. The research therefore explored why these groups struggle to coexist peacefully despite intergroup contact and their verbal expressions of mutual empathy.

Building on the literature of social identity theories and social psychology, I used theoretical approaches to explain intergroup attitudes, behaviors and relationships. In doing so, I used a framework to analyze the role that contact, empathy, legitimacy, power, trust, interdependency, and other social identity phenomena play in understanding the causes of longstanding antagonism between rival ethnic groups in Uvira. My research addressed the gaps found in existing literature providing an explanation that clarifies why intergroup contact and empathy alone could be insufficient to predict improvement in intergroup relations.
In addition, few studies have been carried out to explain why the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge in Uvira of eastern DRC have been unable to peacefully coexist. I identified whether previous events experienced by members of the intergroup continue to contribute to the longstanding antagonism (rivalry), or whether social boundaries (social distances) that exist between the communities have a negative impact on improving their relationships.

Furthermore, most existing research on coexistence, especially for the eastern DRC has focused on exploring issues that promote social harmony as a way of fostering coexistence. Researchers point out that local conflicts in Uvira have been driven by land dispute and traditional power (Autesserre 2006, Vlassenroot 2013), ethnic frictions and violent killings (Stearns et AL 2013), economic competition (Raeymaekers and Vlassenroot 2004) and political issues (Rukundwa 2004). However, few scholars tackling the eastern DRC conflicts have paid attention to the notion of coexistence that involves accepting the legitimacy of the other and power imbalance – two factors that play an important role in groups' coexistence in Uvira. Vlassenroot finds that in order to get a better understanding of the present DRC conflict, the issue of citizenship needs some specific attention. The citizenship issue he says "has to be understood as one of the main challenges of future peace efforts" (Vlassenroot 2002). Therefore, this research took a different approach, further exploring other avenues, including whether failure to legitimize the other – that is, the Bavibafuliru questioning the legitimacy (citizenship) of Banyamulenge for not being their fellow countrymen (Congolese) – hinders peaceful coexistence between these groups.
I also explored the issue of power imbalance and territorial dispute examining if disputes among these groups over power and land in the Hauts Plateaux of Uvira contribute at large to the longstanding antagonism between the groups, making it difficult for them to coexist. Moreover, is there something else that hinders coexistence in this part of the DRC? Using theme analysis, this research provides the most compelling argument as to what leads to the continued antagonism between the two groups. I explains why groups struggle to coexist while also providing a framework to be used to foster coexistence between these communities.

Given that the verbal expression of empathy and willingness to reconcile is incompatible with the behavior exhibited by group members, is it possible that what members of these groups say is not what they actually mean? I suspected that there was something standing between these communities, stopping them from really verbalizing what they feel for one another. This research uncovered what that "something" is and how it is hindering coexistence in Uvira. It may be that, regardless of what they say (their expressions of empathy and willingness to reconcile), the Banyamulenge and Bavibafiluru have not so far wished to coexist. For the reason expressed previously, in terms of improving intergroup relations, I explored if intergroup cooperation (constructive engagement), interdependency, shared identity, especially legitimacy of the other and power balance – were promoted at the top level (leadership) and the bottom level (general populace) to break possible boundaries existing between the communities, if yesterday's antagonists could become allies.
Based on the research findings, I also provided clear recommendation(s) for improving intergroup relationships between members of the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge. These recommendations are articulated in the form of providing a new framework for fostering coexistence among groups. Is it possible to make these communities change their attitudes regarding one another so that they behave in such a way that true coexistence could take place as they desire? If so, what would it take to get there? I integrated all the theories that I explored and provided a model for prescription in order to promote coexistence among groups in Uvira. Contact and empathy are widely viewed as positive factors for improving groups' relations, however, the DRC case does not so far support the claim. This research treated contact and empathy as factors having less positive impact on building intergroup relations.

The prescriptive model I developed considers elements that impede peaceful coexistence, such as absence of trust, impermeable boundaries, intergroup prejudice, and stereotyped other as well as the factors that contribute or lead to peaceful coexistence such as legitimacy of the other, power balance, interdependency, and common/shared identity. Connecting impediments and positive contributors for coexistence helped me provide a model that can be used for managing the conflict in communities I studied, as the model suggests an alternative framework for improving intergroup relations. It is the pursuit of the exploration of a new framework that includes legitimacy of the other as a form of fostering coexistence that informs this research.

1.7 Scope of the study
The study was conducted in Uvira, eastern DRC. Uvira is a DRC border town located approximately 25 km (15 miles) west of Bujumbura, Burundi. What is different about this research site than other places of eastern DRC? In other terms, why Uvira? The eastern DRC South Kivu Province where Uvira is located is so vast; it comprises several towns and villages. Considering the whole South Kivu Province as the research site could be problematic and unrealistic for this research, as this type of site (South Kivu) could not meet the research objectives. Although the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge live in other places of South Kivu Province than Uvira, it is in Uvira where we find a large population representative of both (the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge).

Historically, it is in the territory of Uvira where Mulenge is located – an area to which both the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge claim ownership. Although it is a majority of Banyamulenge who live in Mulenge, the Bavibafuliru charge that the Banyamulenge are foreigners who came from Rwanda and just happen to live in Mulenge as occupiers. The Bavibafuliru say that they are indigenous, while Banyamulenge are foreign occupiers of their ancestral land. Each of these groups has claimed Mulenge as its own, creating antagonism over the territorial dispute.

In addition, it is in Uvira that the first 1996 DRC war of liberation was born. Killings took place on both sides (Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge), and those memories of war rivalry remain, even to this day in Uvira. Furthermore, politically, there is a stronger sense of tensions between the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru in Uvira. Despite the fact that both of these groups live in Uvira territory, members of the Banyamulenge ethnic group have been seeking for more political representation; the Banyamulenge have
been seeking to have a local administration of their own in Uvira, particularly in the area of Bijombo despite the resistance they face from the Bavibafuliru. The Bavibafuliru continue to claim that Banyamulenge are foreigners from Rwanda and must not get any local administration.

Also, historically, the Bavibafuliru and the Banyamulenge lived together side by side for decades prior to the 1996 liberation war. Although there were some issues dividing them related to land dispute including the issue of citizenship of the Banyamulenge even before the eruption of an open armed conflict between members of the two communities, Stearns et al. (2013) indicate that "these tensions were in part fed by cultural differences." However, events quickly deteriorated during the 1996 war of liberation led by the late President Laurent Desire Kabila. Conflicts escalated between the two communities after the Banyamulenge joined Kabila's rebellion that was mainly supported by Rwanda. Rwanda had sent a delegation to Mulenge in the Hauts Plateaux in July 1996 to persuade the Banyamulenge to join a military operation to stop the Zairian national army from attacking the Banyamulenge community (Vlassenroot 2013). The Banyamulenge's backing of Kabila's rebellion and that of Rwandan foreign troops had angered the Bavibafuliru who charged that the Banyamulenge were helping their Rwandan brothers to seize by force the DRC, then Zaire. The Bavibafuliru reinforced the notion that Banyamulenge were foreigners, stating that they supported the foreign invasion of Zaire.

Due to the bitter past described above, Uvira has seen and continues to see conflicts between the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru. Some argue that the
Banyamulenge moved to the eastern DRC as refugees from Rwanda following the conflict between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda in the early 1960s (Kadari, Katchelewa and Ntendetchi 1996). Different data shows that Tutsi migration from Rwanda to the eastern DRC has occurred over different times. The Groupe Milima led by the Banyamulenge in Uvira, in South Kivu province, documented the arrival of Tutsi populations in eastern DRC dating to the time of Yuhi Gahindiro from 1746-1802 (Kadari, Katchelewa and Ntendetchi 1996). Other documents have shown the migration of Tutsi populations dating back to 1885, an event they trace back to the partition of Africa at the Berlin round table as the border of Congo Leopold II and Rwanda-Urundi changed (Kadari, Katchelewa and Ntendetchi, 1996).

This study did not investigate the specific time period or the arrival date of the Tutsi population in eastern DRC, but paid particular attention to the Tutsi population commonly known as Banyamulenge, who migrated to the eastern DRC and settled in South Kivu province in the Uvira, Fizi and Mwenga zones, areas respectively inhabited by Bafuliru, Bavira, Babembe and Balega. My research is limited to the pastoralist Tutsi populations living in Hauts Plateaus of the Uvira zone where they settled in a territory commonly called “Mulenge”. Considering this area to be their new home, the new Tutsi settlers opted to be called Banyamulenge as a way of being differentiated from other tribes that live in the region. Banyamulenge is literally translated as “the inhabitants of Mulenge”. This name was quickly contested by the Bavibafuliru, who consider themselves to be the indigenous people of Mulenge territory. Some Bavibafuliru referred to the Banyamulenge as “Banyarwanda”, meaning “people of Rwandan origin”.

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This study uses the term Banyamulenge in reference to eastern DRC Tutsis. Note that different people in the DRC have used, and continue to use different names to identify members of the Tutsi community living in Uvira. It is for the same reason that this research also uses the term Bavibafuliru to refer to the populations of the Bafuliru and Bavira tribes combined.

The Bavibafuliru claimed that the area that the Banyamulenge occupied when they first settled in eastern DRC was a piece of land found in their territory. As years passed by, Banyamulenge settled down in the plateaux and other parts of Uvira territory to live side by side with the Bavibafuliru. Although these two groups started to live together, the Bavibafuliru considered the Banyamulenge not to be part of them. It is viewed as a case of “us versus them.” Several times, even during the time I carried out my 2011 research in Uvira, some Bavibafuliru charged that the Banyamulenge were foreigners. They indicated that the Banyamulenge kept their traditions as they moved to the DRC from Rwanda and refused to assimilate while continuing to speak a “foreign language” – Kinyarwanda, which is an official language spoken in Rwanda. The Bavibafuliru wanted the Banyamulenge to embrace their culture and traditions. On the other hand, the Banyamulenge claimed that they were Congolese like any other tribe of eastern DRC, but they indicated that they are marginalized by other tribes surrounding them given their minority status.

1.8 Summary
For many researchers and peace builders, the eastern DRC conflict, particularly that in Uvira, remains a mystery. Many have sought to understand the causes of this conflict, especially articulating the reasons why years have gone by since the war erupted in 1996 without finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Although literature provides widespread support that intergroup contact promotes positive attitudes, which lead to positive relations (Pettigrew 1997), and that intergroup empathy leads to positive intergroup relationships (Mazziotta, et al. 2014), the case of the eastern DRC does not support these evidences.

The Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru have expressed empathy for one another and have been in contact. These communities have expressed a desire to put their past behind them, but their wish has not been acted upon. Why is it that, despite all the efforts to improve relations between the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru, little has happened to enable them to coexist peacefully? This unfortunate reality prompted this research to investigate if intergroup contact improves relations between groups while fostering coexistence among them, and whether intergroup empathy really leads to improving positive relations between previously hostile groups.

As this study focused on understanding intergroups' struggle to coexist peacefully in Uvira, the following three questions guided my analysis and discussion: 1) What are the necessary conditions that facilitate positive outcomes of contact in the search for building positive intergroup relations? 2) When does intergroup empathy fail to contribute to the improvement of groups' relations? 3) What factors contribute to the process of breaking intergroup social boundaries to promote peaceful coexistence?
Scholars considering the eastern DRC conflict provided some good insights to this research regarding the causes of the conflict, but many have not paid full attention to the notion of coexistence that involves legitimacy of the other and groups' power imbalance. This research therefore took a different approach exploring whether the failure by the Bavibafuliru to accept the legitimacy (citizenship) of Banyamulenge is the primary factor that hinders peaceful coexistence between these groups. The next chapter covers the research theoretical framework (literature review).
Chapter 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

THEORIES OF CONTACT, EMPATHY, LEGITIMACY, POWER, AND SOCIAL IDENTITY

2.1 THE ISSUES

The question of group-based identities and inter-group behavior in relationship to how groups build or break up relations is of interest to social anthropologists, political scientists, sociologists, and social psychologists. The fundamental question is why do people choose or choose not to peacefully coexist? What drive them to build relations or break them? How do they actually behave toward one another in times of peace and war?

Intergroup relations have been studied because of the complex problems this phenomenon continues to pose in many societies today. Societies that are composed of two or more different groups may experience conflicts. Before we move further, we need to understand what we mean by the term 'conflict'. Groups manifest hostility against one another, while showing love and support to members of a group they belong to. This can lead to social disintegration and possible separation. Conflict has been defined and perceived in different forms. Groups sometimes appear to have differences in their perceived divergence of interests (Pruitt and Kim 2004, 6) or perhaps conflicts are rooted in a denial of basic human needs such as identity, recognition, security or personal
development (Burton 1993, 63). Others like Herbert Kelman stipulate that conflict involving groups can be a process driven by collective needs and fear (Rothbart 2009). Johan Galtung articulated that the deprivation of human needs creates either physical or structural violence (Galtung 1969, 170).

As I indicated in chapter I, this research uses Daniel Bar-Tal’s definition of coexistence, which includes the acceptance of others as legitimate members of the society while recognizing their right to exist peacefully with their differences (Bar-Tal 2004, 256). This section covers several conflict concepts and perspectives showing how conflicts affect intergroup coexistence.

### 2.1.1 Intergroup conflict and coexistence

When a conflict arises between groups, especially that involving violence, it affects how individuals in these groups interact with each other or simply how they coexist. Competition between groups may favor cooperation within in-group while at the same time bringing social tensions that lead to the deterioration of social relations within groups (di Sorrentino et al. 2012, 445). Therefore, perceptions that arise in intergroup relations can either be positive or negative. Holding negative perceptions about members of the outgroup can affect intergroup behaviors and the way in-group and outgroup members interact. For instance, in her book *History Education and Social Identity*, Korostelina (2013) indicates that if ingroup bias develops, it can be one of "the prominent factors that lead not only to attribute negative characteristics to an outgroup but also to deny some human features" (Korostelina, 2013, 32). The author says that members of the
ingroup tend to attribute the human essence to other members of their group, but reject the sense of human qualities for members of the outgroup (Korostelina 2013, 32). Therefore, groups’ differences in values and beliefs also lead to negativities against the outgroup (Korostelina 2013, 35).

Daniel Rothbart and Korostelina state that even communities living in peace with their neighbors can still exhibit a multiplicity of identities such as nationality, religion, region, city, professional union, and local community (Rothbart and Korostelina, 30). The authors say that some of these identities are interconnected and can become mutually strengthened; they see that these peaceful communities can live with negativities about those they consider to be outsiders by denigrating them or accusing them of immorality (Rothbart and Korostelina, 30). If communities living together in apparent peace can exhibit such behavior, how about those who are in open conflict? It is common for parties in conflict to exhibit a wide range of identity differences by showing hostility toward one another. Rothbart and Korostelina conclude that several factors influence the unfavorable perception that in-groups can hold against outgroups. These factors include the need for differentiation as people develop in-group loyalties to a community or an ethnic minority by stressing minor differences they have with another or other outside groups within the wider society (Rothbart and Korostelina, 30). To achieve positive social identity, people use favorable social comparisons; in-group members tend to denigrate members of the out-group (Tajfel, 1986), potentially prolonging or exacerbating their conflict. Certain stereotypes, biases and prejudices therefore shape in-group identity (Rothbart and Korostelina, 30).
Inequality also leads to negative estimation of members of the out-group. Whether the inequality is on the economic or political front, minority groups or groups with low status normally "experience a strong sense of collective self and more in-group homogeneity (Rothbart and Korostelina, 30). This can lead them to find ways to protect themselves from those that they perceive to be detrimental for group's survival. The fear of losing what they have may make outgroups members become more protective; their frustrating life experience could also lead them to reject integration or reconciling with in-group members. Relative deprivation, an inequality concept by Gurr stipulates that when a group feels that it is deprived of something that others enjoy, the group can rebel, especially in cases involving of minority groups who feel discriminated against. They rebel because they think the deprivation is unjust (Pettigrew 2011 et al., 278). For this reason, Gurr (1994) writes that ethnic groups that feel they are treated unequally feel bitter and seek to change their condition. The author says that these groups begin their action for change with peaceful political protests but if their concerns are unresolved, the conflict can escalate into guerrilla or civil wars. Others see relative deprivation in a different form when the notion refers to disproportionate injustices affecting minorities. For instance, they say that poverty that affect minorities disproportionally relative to their counterpart groups can produce grievances and unrest (Olzak and Shanahan 1996, 940). Racial unrest can erupt when there is a wide racial gap in income, occupation, education; other factors include preconditions structures that block access to minority groups to gain political power (Olzak and Shanahan 1996, 941).
Furthermore, in identity-based conflict, members exhibit favoritism for those within their group (in-group members) while showing hostility for the outgroup members. This behavior leads to intergroup confrontation that can be disastrous for communities as seen in the model outlined by Korostelina below.
FOUR C MODEL OF IDENTITY-BASED CONFLICT

Comparison, competition, confrontation and counteraction

Comparison
(We-They perception and favorable intergroup comparison)

Competition
(Instrumental conflicts of interest among counterpoised interactive communities)

Confrontation
(The ideologization of social identities; transformation of conflicts of interest into moral confrontations between the virtuous Us and the demonized Other)

Counteraction
(Unbalanced collective axiology that leads to discrimination, violence, genocide)

Figure 1: Four C model of identity-based conflict: Source: (Korostelina 2007, 147)
The above model shows how groups involved in conflict may compare one another using their differences as a tool for conflict; the differentiations alone may be a drive for competition. When the competition is wide enough and precipitates divisions, it can lead to groups’ confrontation. The confrontation may necessitate counteraction leading to discrimination of one group by the other or systematic elimination of members of the outgroup (genocide).

Conflict also involves territorial dispute; cases involving territorial dimensions lead to potential conflict when parties in conflict both claim legitimacy of ownership over a piece of land. According to Fuhrmann and Tir: “The practical problem, however, is that the ethnic group’s homeland often overlaps with the homeland of one or more neighboring groups (Fuhrmann and Tir 2009, 5). The groups see little room for compromising over this land; it is not something that they think can be divided, shared, or substituted for (Fuhrmann and Tir 2009, 5). In such situations, minority groups clash; Fuhrmann realizes that maintaining the identity is a sensitive issue for the minority groups living on land over which another group has sovereignty (Fuhrmann and Tir 2009, 5). Such situations potentially bring into question the group's "ability to freely and in perpetuity express their identity" (Fuhrmann and Tir 2009, 5). In some cases involving violent conflicts, Crocker et al. 2007 say that people in society emerging from conflict care less to be reconciled with those who killed, tortured, or maimed their families and friends.

Others believe that the potential issues that lead to intractability in internal rivalries include resources, values, power, social identity, inequalities, or basic human
needs (Pence 2003, 3). Therefore, Ramsbotham et al. indicate that war can end, but the issues that fueled a particular conflict can persist, making permanent resolution harder to achieve (Ramsbotham et al. 2008, 159). They say that “the root causes of conflict may persist without either war or peace settlement doing anything to address them…. it is quite possible that … efforts to end war may not resolve the underlying conflict” (Ramsbotham et al. 2008, 159). Junne and Verkoren agree with Ramsbotham et al. as they argue that there are few truly post-conflict situations that end conflict altogether (Junne and Verkoren 2001, 1). They write that “conflicts become more or less violent, more or less manifest or latent, but they seldom stop altogether” (Junne and Verkoren 2001, 1). Also, Sisk argues that though ethnic conflicts may contract and become at some point less violent, he believes that during the time of transition, ethnic relations can deteriorate into intractable warfare and individuals in conflict can become very intolerable and very violent (Sisk 2008, 21-23). However, the author argues that, in order for the ethnic conflict to de-escalate, there is a necessity for parties to be willing to avoid mutual damaging violence (Sisk 2008, 21-23).

The above relates to what Azar defines as 'protracted social conflicts'; Azar argues that "protracted conflicts are hostile interactions which extend over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of open warfare fluctuating in frequency and intensity" (Azar et al. 1978, 50). He goes further stating that protracted conflicts "are conflict situations in which the stakes are very high – the conflicts involve whole societies and act as agents for defining the scope of national identity and social solidarity" (Azar et al. 1978, 50). The authors contend that these kinds of conflicts may "exhibit some breakpoints during
which there is a cessation of overt violence, they linger on in time and have no
distinguishable point of termination" (Azar et al. 1978, 50). However, they say that "it is
only in the long run that they will "end" by cooling off, transforming or withering away;
one cannot expect these conflicts to be terminated by explicit decision" (Azar et al. 1978,
50). The authors end by articulating that:

Protracted conflicts are not specific events or even clusters of events at a point in
time; they are processes…. social-ethnic conflicts tend to be protracted conflicts
which exhibit a strong capacity to grow in terms of the number of involved actors
and sub-actors and in terms of goals, objectives and types of grievances that
sustain the conflict setting (Azar et al. 1978, 50).

Azar's protracted social conflicts' theory makes sense for the Uvira conflict
situation. This conflict has been around for a while; it has intensified since 1996 when the
conflict turned into war and since then, bringing the two sides together has been very
challenging. The author had well-articulated phenomena that surround social conflicts
and that become the causes for longstanding antagonism. I am in line with Azar's
argument that stipulates protracted social conflicts are processes rather than specific
events. When groups seriously engage in the process of resolving or managing their
conflict, it may take time and a resolution may only be possible if the parties show
willingness to fully cooperate. This may include, especially in places like Uvira,
accepting the legitimacy of the other or pursuing some forms of common goals to build a
new future.

On the other hand, Christopher Mitchell explores this dimension further,
acknowledging that “much writing about the nature of protracted social conflicts revolves
around the idea of scarcity”(Mitchell 2005, 6). The author states that in this situation,
parties indulge in conflict over some good that is in limited supply which both perceive they cannot simultaneously own, possess or enjoy – a piece of territory, a material resource such as oil (Mitchell 2005, 6). Therefore, Charles Tilly believes that parties in conflict, which have differences in solving their problems, can create boundaries and intergroup hostility among themselves (Tilly 2005, 89). The created boundaries may by any means become problematic in improving relations among groups.

Other scholars have explored the notion of political and economic factors in social conflicts. Azar and Moon for instance articulated the notion of 'structural inequality'; they said this phenomenon is a result of "political inequality, economic stratification and ideological dominance by one social group over another" (Azar and Moon 1986, 395-396). Here, the authors see problems whereby there is an asymmetric distribution of political power among groups forming a society where the state apparatus is dominated by one class or one group (Azar and Moon 1986, 395-396). They indicate that this differential access to political power unfortunately leads to "economic disparities in income, wealth, and status"; access to political and economic power favors only one group over the other (Azar and Moon 1986, 395-396). The inequality system one way or another becomes a drive of conflicts and problematic for intergroup relations. In her book, "Alliance formation in civil wars", Christia also finds that warring groups are driven by getting some forms of power. These warring parties can form alliances or splits depending on where their interest lies (Christia 2012, 239).

David Malone and Jake Sherman stated that the International Peace Academy (IPA) also looked at the issues of conflict political economy and concluded that in
conflict, it is difficult to separate economic factors from political factors (Croker et al. 2008, 647). The IPA research concludes that "conflict may not be about greed and grievances but a combination of greed and grievances"(Croker et al 2008, 647). The IPA project clearly shows that "the existence of grievances, whether economic, political, or social, appears to be the most persuasive motivation for conflict"(Croker et al 2008, 647). However, the IPA project indicates that the primary political motivations for conflict can then change into economic agendas including: pillaging, seizing of the land and controlling trade"(Croker et al 2008, 647). These economic motivations "appear more significant in sustaining and transforming conflict than in causing it" (Croker et al 2008, 647).

The discussion above clearly show that complex issues/factors lead to conflict such as power, land dispute, inequalities, religious intolerance, discrimination, lack of basic human needs, ethnic tensions, grievances and political exclusiveness among others. There are conflict situations where a combination of these factors may manifest, thus requiring scholars to be creative and flexible in analyzing conflicts. For example, this may require considering multiple lenses when identifying the real causes of conflict. This is to say that identity, including ethnicity, race, or nationality, is not the only factor that can contribute to conflict, but structures that are in place in societies such as inequality seen between members of a society and systematic discrimination of a minority group by a majority or vice versa can also become causes of conflicts. The next section articulates some intervention strategies to addressing intergroup conflicts.
2.1.2 Intergroup conflict resolution

I discussed above how intergroup conflicts affect groups' coexistence. When conflict arises, parties may express their desire to resolve their problems. However, while the causes are a function of interrelated factors, the resolution of such issues requires specific attention to the complex issues surrounding each particular conflict. In terms of intervention, and other means to resolving conflicts, different explanations for intergroup conflicts lead to different intervention strategies. Van Segbroeck et al. contend that "reciprocation towards groups open a window of opportunity for cooperation to thrive" (Van Segbroeck 2012, 1). The authors state that the reciprocation leads groups to engage in coordination and coexistence (Van Segbroeck 2012, 1). Ramsbotham et al. articulate the idea of “Cosmopolitan Conflict Resolution” (Ramsbotham et al. 2008, 250). In their idea, they propose a new comprehensive approach to resolve conflicts, acknowledging the complexity of conflicts that societies continue to experience today. From that complexity, they suggest that there is a necessity to develop “new doctrines of intervention and new understanding of peace and security” (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall 2008, 250). Their approach to resolving new waves of conflict includes more coordinated and cooperative methods that promote collective mechanisms of handling conflict together at both local and global levels for the interest of the world community (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall 2008, 250). The “Cosmopolitan Conflict Resolution” approach is related to Fisher's Interactive Conflict Resolution theory. Fisher's theory encourages all parties to be involved in resolving conflict and find a solution to it
together. He says parties must voluntarily deal with their differences in a respectful and cooperative manner working toward outcomes that are mutually beneficial and self-sustaining over the long term (Fisher 2008).

Other scholars argue that parties in conflict must seek to reconcile in order to leave their past behind them. Lederack (2002) argues that the place where truth, mercy, justice and peace meet, the outcome will be reconciliation. According to him, conflict will never be resolved without truth. That's when mercy comes to play to show compassion to others, forgive and accept them in order to begin a new start (Lederack 2002, 28). However, the practical problem with the notion of truth is that it is multi-dimensional. Truth is often contested, especially in a conflict situation where violence is involved and each group feels that the other was directly or indirectly responsible for its suffering. Therefore, multiple interpretations of truth may emerge with members of various groups presenting competing narratives. For instance, Hutchison (2005) says that in South Africa, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was faced with the dilemma of addressing truth as multiple personal narratives were shaped for reasons that people had different experiences, memories of grievances in the same conflict (Hutchison 2005, 354). The author writes that when it comes to truth, memories can be constructed, reconstructed, framed and reframed (Hutchison 2005, 354). I later discuss about truth in depth when I introduce the notion of trust.

Lederack also says that only where there is a pervasive feeling of respect and security, unity, and harmony, can peace begin to take root (Lederack 2002, 28). However, reconciliation is not always easy to achieve. Hoffmann (2005), Conley &
O’Barr (1998) argue that power differences among parties can have effect into conflict resolution between those who possess great power and those who have none. For instance, Hoffmann (2005) raises the concern that informal dispute resolution tends to be more advantageous to parties who have great power than the one who have less or none. The influence of power can also be seen in asymmetric conflicts in which one party is believed to be more powerful than the other.

Tensions between groups could also be fueled by what a system offers to them or by the injustice found in their societies. Warfield and Schoeny developed the idea of integrating systems maintenance with social justice. This is when parties are encouraged to reconsider relationships between them by fixing what is not working in the system, and also by accommodating social justice within it (Schoeny and Warfield 2000, 255). In other words, antagonists’ “positions, interests and needs are to be integrated so they can have a common, inclusive solution that addresses the concerns of all parties and have outcomes that are acceptable by both” (Schoeny and Warfield 2000, 255). Incorporating social justice in many societies experiencing conflicts or who have experienced conflicts may pose some significant challenges. When trying to accommodate social justice within an unjust system as suggested by Schoeny and Warfield, issues may arise between those advocating for justice vs those wanting forgiveness (Hutchison 2005, 361). In addition, justice may mean different things to different people and, if not taken within its true sense, the search for justice can have negative impact when a party seeking justice is not satisfied with the outcome, whether because justice was not served or impunity continues.
to be the only game in town. Such situations could exacerbate conflict rather than fixing it.

Furthermore, in a system where a group feels discriminated against such as the eastern DRC case where the Banyamulenge claim not to have the right to administer their local territory, accommodating the social justice within the system may require some sacrifice. The sacrifice may require that the neighboring groups to the Banyamulenge be willing to give up some of their power to create some power balance in the community. The change in boundaries could occur in increasing equality when the groups can accommodate one another so each feels equal to the other. The establishment of equal status can create a sense of satisfaction on the part of the previously stereotyped or discriminated group.

2.1.3 Theoretical framework

In this chapter, I lay out a theoretical framework for understanding the relationship between the theories that I use such as contact, empathy, legitimacy, power, trust, truth and social identity and their impact on the long-lasting conflict in Uvira. Understanding the relationship between these theories helps this research to explain the conflict dynamics and come up with an explanation as to why rival groups struggle to coexist in Uvira and what it may take to improve their relations.

I use the framework to analyze the role these theories play in the Uvira conflict and how they contribute to the analysis of the main research question. Has intergroup contact improved relations between groups? Does intergroup empathy lead to improving
positive relations between groups with a bitter past? The literature review begins by examining the "contact hypothesis" and its effects in building positive intergroup relations. The reason for exploring the contact hypothesis is to show how members of these groups have achieved some forms of face to face contact through their process of working toward addressing their differences. The contact has happened in many aspects, such as leaders of both groups engaging in discussions through workshops, or members of the rival group having a few face-to-face encounters or interactions. Contact has been proven to be effective in building groups' relations. The literature also explores the role empathy plays in intergroup coexistence. There is widespread support in the literature demonstrating that intergroup empathy is a positive contributor for the improvement of intergroup relations. This research addresses the limitations of existing literature about the role of contact and empathy play in improving groups' relations.

Next, the idea of coexistence also includes legitimacy of the other and acceptance of a power balance between the conflicting parties. The struggle to coexist can be connected to the unwillingness by one group to accept the legitimacy of the other. It can also be the resentment felt by one group which may see the other not being ready to guarantee it some power. Thus, exploring the notions of power imbalance and legitimacy are of high importance here. It has been demonstrated that when one group has more power than the other, a belief emerges that it is only when the more powerful group gives up some of its power – thereby creating a power balance – that the less powerful entity will have a chance to improve its current powerlessness situation (Smith and Berg 1987, 198). The same is regarded for legitimacy; accepting members of the other group as
legitimate members of the society can lead in-group members to be willing to agree to coexist with out-group members. When the acceptance and recognition of the other takes place, in-group members may start to grant to alien other the right to exist; meaning that they may choose "to exist together" (Weiner 1998, 15).

The chapter then moves on discussing truth and trust, the two dimensions that are also crucial in facilitating coexistence. If groups don't trust each other, it may be difficult if not impossible for them to achieve a peaceful resolution to address their conflict. The same is true for truth; in order for trust to take shape, there is a degree of truth that in-group and out-group members must tell each other. Otherwise, if one group believes the other is suspicious and planning for something behind its back or hiding something, intergroup trust could be at stake.

I also cover some social identity theories, particularly the notion of social boundaries. Rival groups can show hostility for one another; the hostility they exhibit may activate fear, feelings of enmity, and a sense of threat coming from the other. Therefore, to deal with the unexpected threat, groups may establish social and physical barriers creating distances and sometimes total separation between them. With the presence of social boundaries, coexistence may become hard to achieve. I explore components of intergroup boundaries, as well as the mechanisms of boundary change for improving intergroup relations. I then move to discuss cognitive and emotional theories, tools for creating coexistence and end with a model that I propose to foster groups' coexistence. The model combines both moderators and impeders of coexistence. The
review I outlined above identified research areas that motivated me to carry out this research; they were pursued as such.

2.2 THEORY OF CONTACT

When rival groups or groups which are involved in some types of conflicts try to work out their differences, a question may arise as to how they can repair their past to ameliorate their relations. Social scientists as well as psychologists have suggested that contact between the stereotyped groups can help individuals mend their past and improve broken relations. I explore in this section the role that contact plays in building intergroup relations as well as its limitations. The contact definition for this research borrows from Pettigrew and Tropp who define intergroup contact "as actual face-to-face interaction between members of clearly defined groups" (Pettigrew and Troop 2006, 754). For instance, contact for this research is not defined as proximity between members of groups. The study was rather interested in exploring the concept of direct interaction that may take place between members of the rival groups.

2.2.1 Contact hypothesis

How do we promote the building of intergroup relations when conflicts become protracted and somehow harder to terminate? The contact theory has been explored by researchers in a variety of ways as it has been suggested that contact facilitates the building of intergroup relations. The contact hypothesis which was first developed by
Gordon Allport in 1954 (Scarberry et al. 1997, 1291) has demonstrated that positive contact (interaction) between members of adversary groups leads to positive attitudes by reducing intergroup prejudice (Davies et al. 2011, 332). Therefore Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) argue that it is useful to engage parties who lack interaction between themselves; they suggest that the more contacts with representatives of an outgroup a person has, the more positive his or her attitudes toward the outgroup will be. Several theorists who have explored the contact theory suggest that after in-group members enter into contact with members of a negatively stereotyped group, in-group members' attitudes are going to improve toward outgroup members (Scarberry et al. 1997, 1292).

Exploring the contact hypothesis, Welker, Richard, Baker & Aron (2014) also see the importance of developing compassionate love toward outgroups. Meanwhile, Koschate, Oethinger, Kuchenbrandt & Van Dick (2012) say that intergroup contact, which they view as "close personal contact," has proven to advance intergroup relations, chiefly reducing negative attitudes and emotions toward outgroup members. The authors go further, claiming that contact is important in groups' relations in the sense that it "increases intergroup prosocial behavior" (Koschate et al. 2012). Others who have tested the contact hypothesis through field or laboratory experiments have found strong support for "the causal relations between contact and improved intergroup relations" (Vezzali et al. 2010, 475). The authors say that the "quality and quantity of contact" actually improve intergroup evaluations and stereotypes (Vezzali et al. 2010, 475). These experiments included testing the impact contact may have in the improvement of relations in schools, in segregated housing units, between people of different races or ethnic backgrounds,
between immigrants and those considered citizens of a country. Contact was also tested at workplaces and many other cases including conflict zones. Fisher’s Interactive Conflict Resolution theory also encourages all parties in a conflict to be involved in resolving their dispute and find a solution together. He says parties must voluntarily deal with their differences in a respectful and cooperative manner, working toward outcomes that are mutually beneficial and self-sustaining over the long term (Fisher 2008).

In their writing of recent advances of contact theory, Pettigrew, and Tropp have made it clear that there is no doubt if contact promotes improvement of intergroup relations. They make a case for contact in their meta-analysis test of intergroup contact theory as they researched into 713 independent samples from 515 studies, including those that are published and unpublished (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006, 751). In this meta-analysis, the authors find that intergroup contact reduces intergroup prejudice; they say that 94 percent of the samples they used in the meta-analysis really show an inverse relationship between contact and prejudice (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006, 757). They state that the meta-analytic findings show contact theory does not only apply to racial and ethnic groups, but also embrace other types of groups (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006, 768).

However, despite the strong support for contact and the role it plays in building intergroup relations; there are some scholars who have expressed reservation for the theory due to conflicting conclusions that have emerged about the likely effect of intergroup contact (Pettigrew and Tropp 2016, 752).

This dichotomy has led skeptics to question whether contact actually leads to promoting intergroup relations as it has been widely claimed (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006,
For instance, Vezzali et al. 2010 state that despite extensive evidence of the role contact plays, the contact hypothesis has some limitations (Vezzali et al. 2010, 463). First, "it is not clear if the direction of causality is from contact to improved intergroup attitudes or, in contrast, from initial intergroup attitude to subsequent contact" (Vezzali et al. 2010, 463). Second, "although the contact effects ideally should not differ between groups, there is evidence suggesting that intergroup contact is more effective for majority than minority group members" (Vezzali et al. 2010, 463). Third, the contact hypothesis "does not specify the processes involved in the improvement of intergroup relations" (Vezzali et al. 2010, 463).

The next paragraphs look into conditions in which contact can be a positive or negative mediator in reducing prejudice while building intergroup relations. If contact between groups' members can promote positive attitudes and reduce intergroup prejudice, at what point does intergroup contact facilitate or fall short in building intergroup relationships?

### 2.2.2 Positive factors of contact

Allport emphasized what he called "optimal conditions" for contact to lead to the development of positive intergroup relations. He argued that for contact to facilitate positive intergroup attitudes, certain conditions must be met. That is, when coming into contact, groups must have equal status in the conflict situation, a high degree of cooperation, common goals and institutional support or support of authorities in term of law and customs (Tropp and Pettigrew 2005, 952; Pettigrew et al. 2011, 273). According
to Allport, if these conditions are not met, contact will have less impact or will unlikely have its most positive effects in improved intergroup prejudice. Therefore, contact would reduce prejudice "when two groups share similar status, interest, and tasks and when the situation fosters personal, intimate intergroup contact" (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006, 751-752).

Other see cross-group friendships as positive in intergroup contact; they argue that close cross-group interactions, especially close interactions of friendships, lead to "highly positive intergroup attitudes" (Davies et al. 2011, 333). They claim that friendship has "special importance," as it involves contact over time – often in situations that facilitate improved attitudes for one another (Davies, et al. 2011, 333).

Perspective-taking in contact situation is also viewed as a positive factor in reducing prejudice and stereotypes. Perspective taking is commonly referred as seeing/viewing the world in the eye of the other. The rationale behind the notion of perspective-taking is that if one can only view what the other person has been going through or facing, one can begin to understand the other person and have a positive attitude toward that individual by simply taking that person's perspective. Scholars find that perspective-taking may lead individuals to increase their willingness to engage in intergroup contact (Wang et al. 2014, 2). The authors point two reasons for this willingness to engage with others. First, they say that "perspective-taking's effects result from a cognitive merging of self and other mental representations" (Wang et al. 2014, 2). This means that during the process of perspective-taking, "the self is applied to the other and this self-other overlap mediates decreased stereotyping and increased helping." The
reason why this happens is because those taking the perspective of the others (perspective-takers) see more of themselves in other people, and this ultimately creates a room for the perspective-takers to approach other individuals (Wang et al. 2014, 2). Psychological literature find that "people are more willing to help those who belong to their own groups than to an out-group" (Bilewicz 2009, 2779). However, research on perspective-taking suggests that some types of in-group favoritism disappear when people take perspective of the other group (Bilewicz 2009, 2779).

The second reason is that perspective-taking "reduces negative, prejudicial evaluations of the target and target group" (Wang et al. 2014, 2). Researchers have found that perspective-taking combat" automatic expressions of racial bias" and facilitate favorable interracial contact (Todd et al. 2011, 1039). Typically, prejudice may hinder members of a group to initiate contact with out-group members. Therefore, since perspective-taking helps decrease prejudice in individuals, the reduced prejudice should increase people's willingness to engage in contact with stereotyped individuals (Wang et al. 2014, 2). However, the authors emphasize that, for perspective-taking to facilitate intergroup contact effectively, it should not be limited to the target but should encompass the target group more broadly (Wang et al. 2014, 2). When one takes the perspective of the target, it is likely to increase the willingness for one to also engage in contact with that target's stereotyped group (Wang et al. 2014, 2).

However, not everyone agrees on the effect perspective-taking may have in facilitating intergroup contact. Perspective-taking in intergroup contact can also backfire (Paluck 2010, 1172; Vorauer, Martens and Sasaki 2009, 811). Researchers have found
that intergroup contact helps reduce prejudice (Wang et al. 2014, 1), but perspective taking leads "lower prejudice individuals to treat an outgroup member less positively than they do when they adopt alternative mindsets" (Vorauer, Martens and Sasaki 2009, 811). In some cases, when intergroup members enter into contact, mutual suspicion may be higher. In these cases, contact can exacerbate prejudice and their underlying conflict than ameliorate it (Wang et al. 2014, 2). Therefore, groups may only want to increase contact when their members believe that it will not make the situation worse (Wang et al. 2014, 2). Perspective taking can therefore have negative effects on lower prejudice individuals' behavior during intergroup contact. The reason for this is that when "lower prejudice individuals take an outgroup member's perspective, they may be overly comfortable in the assumption that they will be viewed positively" (Vorauer, Martens and Sasaki 2009, 825). Perspective taking may generate misunderstanding in cases where the perspectives being taken are superficial, meaning if they lack detailed views of the target (Paluck 2010, 1173). Thus, "lower prejudice individuals need to exert more effort to clearly communicate their positive feelings to outgroup members" (Vorauer, Martens and Sasaki 2009, 825) to avoid exacerbating prejudice or being misunderstood.

In addition, perspective taking may require individuals to imagine being another person. However, the practical problem with this is that in a conflict situation, "the imagine-other perspective may require individuals to imagine themselves as the "enemy," which can backfire among individuals who strongly identify with their side" (Paluck 2010, 1173). Is it possible for someone to take a perspective to imagine oneself as a killer, a perpetrator of some hostilities or the enemy? This angle of perspective taking
may require more attention for further research. Furthermore, the effect of perspective-taking in improving intergroup relations or facilitating intergroup contact is also limited by the power relations between members of the groups (Bilewicz 2009, 2780). It has been found that "people possessing higher power are much less willing to take the perspective of the out-group" (Bilewicz 2009, 2780). More importantly, people with higher power are less willing take another individual's perspective; they "are less accurate in determining others' emotional expression" (Bilewicz 2009, 2780). I discuss in the next section negative factors of contact.

2.2.3 Negative factors of contact

Not all contacts build intergroup relations; it has been found that negative contacts can produce negative outcomes in intergroup relations. Literature of contact theory indicates that some contact situations can actually produce enhanced prejudice; however, "such negative intergroup contact has received less research attention" (Pettigrew et al. 2011, 277). The authors say that the notion of negative contact involves situations where members feel threatened, and mostly enter into contact without having chosen to do so (Pettigrew et al. 2011, 277). Negative contact occurs in situations where intergroup competition is present or groups are are involved in conflict (Pettigrew et al. 2011, 277). When contact is non-voluntary or threatening, it can create anxiety; in such situations, researchers believe stressful contacts will only worsen intergroup relations (Pettigrew et al. 2011, 277). Other scholars have found that "negative intergroup contact makes group
membership salient" (Paolini 2010, 1724). The author states that when negative contact occurs, it makes members of the groups more aware of their respective group membership, causing high category salience; this is the reason explaining why intergroup conflict endures (Paolini 2010, 1723).

Another negative factor of contact consists of intergroup anxiety. When in-group members don't know what to expect from their interaction with outgroup members, they become anxious and develop a sense of fear to engage outsiders. Therefore, intergroup anxiety is defined as "a type of anxiety that people experience when anticipating or engaging in intergroup interaction" (Stephan 2014, 240). It is only restricted to intergroup contexts and is different from social anxiety (Stephan 2014, 240). The status of intergroup anxiety engenders the feelings of threat and uncertainty that people experience in situations of intergroup interactions. These feelings grow as people do not know how they should act when they enter into contact with members of another group. They don't know how they will be perceived or whether they will be accepted (Stephan 2014; 240-241).

However, to counter intergroup anxiety, more positive contact outcomes are needed so as to reduce the perceived anxiety (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006, 767). Studies have shown that reducing the negative feelings of anxiety and threat from the other is an effective way by which intergroup contact diminishes prejudice (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006, 767). Negative intergroup contact is more influential in shaping outgroup attitudes than positive intergroup contact. However, to address the issue of intergroup negative contact, the frequency of positive contact experience must be promoted. If that happens,
these frequent positive contacts unquestionably outnumber the negative contact's frequency (Graf et al. 2014, 543).

Let me discuss in length the effect of intergroup anxiety; Stephan discusses effects that intergroup anxiety has on three domains of variables such as affective, behavioral and cognitive (Stephan 2014, 245). He recognizes that there are four categories of intergroup anxiety antecedents that may manifest in intergroup interactions. These include personality traits and personal characteristics, attitude and related cognitions, personal experience as well as situational factors (Stephan 2014, 243-245).

1. Cognitive consequences: Intergroup anxiety can activate sentiments of consistent intergroup cognitions such as negative attitudes, negative believes and stereotypes about outgroup members. Biased perceptions about the outgroup can also be activated; these negative cognitions may have far reaching consequences going as far as devaluing members of the outgroup, a move that makes them feel anxious (Stephan 2014, 246). In addition, intergroup anxiety also influences cognition by reducing cognitive resources. For instance, at the time of intergroup interactions, instead of engaging in real dialogue, some people may spend their energy being vigilant about the outgroup rather than focusing on the interaction. They may give special attention and thought in warring about the negative expectations they have about members of the outgroup (Stephan 2014, 246).

2. Affective and emotional consequences: Consistent of negative emotions such as anger, dread, embarrassment, fear, frustration, humiliation, guilt, threat or hatred characterize intergroup anxiety and will have negative effects (Stephan 2014, 246). Status of differences between the in-group and outgroup may make members of the high
status feel guilty and members of the low status feel resentful when intergroup conflict creates intergroup anxiety during intergroup dialogue (Stephan 2014, 247).

3 Behavioral consequences: Negative expectations that characterize intergroup anxiety make in-group members to respond negatively to outgroup members. That includes having negative facial expressions of disapproval or annoyance, expressing general awkwardness, avoiding members of the other group or not being open with members of the outgroup (Stephan 2014, 247). Therefore, these kinds of negative behaviors exhibited toward members of the out-group - that are caused by intergroup anxiety – are likely to create self-fulfilling prophecies. This means members of the out-group could respond with negative behaviors that fulfill the negative expectations of in-group members (Stephan 2014, 247). Here is where in-group members may actually reinforce thoughts of negative stereotypes they have about outgroup members.

Other negative contact factors that impede intergroup interaction may include collective threat, mistrust, and lack of forgiveness (Pettigrew et al. 2011, 275). The last two are explored later in a different section. However, I address collective threat in this section. When a particular threat arises, which affects the collectivity (the group), members of the group are eager to ensure their survival at any cost. When a threat is perceived at the group level, members of the group may choose to fight even if the group is a weaker actor in conflict (Shestererinina 2016, 411). Therefore, groups may frame a threat with competing narratives based on shared understanding of conflict, history and identity. These groups may assess where the interests of the group are and act upon to protect these interests (Shestererinina 2016, 417). This may lead people to act or behave
in a certain way when there is a presence of an outgroup threat. Researchers find that "social identity and outgroup threat change the interpretation of physical features that signal the presence of another mind" (Hackel, Looser, and Bavel 2014, 15). The authors state that group motivations can influence mind perception in such that "in daily life, people may more readily perceive minds and mental states of in-group members, which could have profound consequences for perspective-taking and empathy" (Hackel, Looser, and Bavel 2014, 15). However, the authors indicate that "motivations stemming from out-group threat can reverse this pattern, heightening the motivation of perceivers to understand the intentions of out-group members" (Hackel, Looser, and Bavel 2014, 23).

Also, collective threat can be perceived in a different way; it can be seen as "the fear that an ingroup member's behavior might reinforce a negative stereotype of one's group" (Cohen and Garcia 2005, 566). This means that what one member of a stereotyped group does could affect the whole group so that in an intergroup contact setting, out-group members may associate a sin of a particular member with the whole group. For this reason, people engaged in contact may be worried that their own behavior could be used by out-group members to "lend credence to a negative stereotype about their group…, they also worry that the behavior of fellow group members could be used in this way" (Cohen and Garcia 2005, 579). I discuss in the next section some critics of the contact theory.

2.2. 4 Critics of contact
In their review of recent advances in intergroup contact theory, Pettigrew and Tropp (2011) highlight some thoughts raised by critics of the theory. The authors write that some critics of the contact theory seem not to understand it as "they mistakenly believe that intergroup contact theory simply predicts positive outcomes under all conditions" (Pettigrew et al. 2011, 277). For the authors, in addition to Allport's optimal conditions – previously discussed in this chapter – that predict when intergroup contact is likely to have most positive outcomes – they indicate that later research has found additional moderators for effective contact. These positive contact effects include enhanced empathy, perspective taking, outgroup knowledge, job, attainment and satisfaction, intergroup trust, reduced anxiety, and perception of outgroup variability (Pettigrew et al. 2011 275). However, in most part, they say "prejudice is likely to be diminished when intergroup contact is not superficial and group salience is sufficiently high" (Pettigrew et al. 2011, 276). In other words, for contact to have some positive effects (outcomes), the encounter between rival groups must be real and positive. Continued revised contact hypothesis has brought some more contributions finding that intergroup contact reduces bias and conflict.

For instance, the Canadian political scientist, Forbes, argued in 1997 and 2004 that intergroup contact often reduce prejudice at the individual level but stipulated that it fails to do so at the interpersonal level. Forbes indicated that contact can cure individual prejudice but cannot resolve group conflict (Pettigrew et al. 2011, 277). Responding to Forbes, social psychologists argue that "if reductions in prejudice generalize broadly
from intergroup contact, the group level of analysis is necessarily involved" (Pettigrew et al. 2011, 277).

Pettigrew et al. (2011) also acknowledge that many other critics of the contact theories come from countries that have experienced severe or rampant ethnic conflicts in the past such as Northern Island and South Africa. These critics raise two points in what they consider to be the role of intergroup contact to decrease intergroup tensions. They first state that "separation is an effective means of reducing intergroup conflict" (Pettigrew et al. 2011, 277). To this point, Pettigrew et al. (2011) argue that separation restricts intergroup contact; meaning that separation does not meet the condition for contact theory. But on top of that, the authors argue that walls and segregation have failed in many places to bring people together (Pettigrew et al. 2011, 278). Secondly, these critics focus their attention on the establishment of effective intergroup contact after centuries of intergroup conflict (Pettigrew et al. 2011, 278). The authors say that though this critic is well-taken, the argument however raises a different issue "that intergroup contact theory was not initially designed to address"(Pettigrew et al. 2011, 278). They suggest that future research on intergroup contact should pay attention to this issue. Future research must expand the theory to "include how to bring past adversaries together in optima contact situations" (Pettigrew et al. 2011, 278). This is exactly what this research did; exploring the most effective intergroup contact that should take place in Uvira between the long-time rivals who bring to the table their heavy baggage.

Finally, other critics have acknowledged that intergroup contact reduces prejudice, but at the same time see this process as dangerous charging that it may delay
social changes that the less powerful party needs (Pettigrew et al. 2011, 278). These critics are concerned that by reducing the prejudice of the weaker party; the last won't be willing to initiate conflict needed to enhance social progress as it may become difficult to revolt against the new friends (Pettigrew et al. 2011, 278). The authors argue that not all social changes require people to engage in conflict to resolve their problems (Pettigrew et al. 2011, 278). Due to the many issues, some researchers have raised with the intergroup contact theory, other scholars have suggested alternatives to supplement the work contact can do to facilitate coexistence. Below are some ideas from those suggesting to go beyond just contact.

2.2.5 Looking beyond mere contact

2.2.5.1 Groups' interdependence

When contact may not address the underlying issues of coexistence, some scholars have looked elsewhere for solutions. Recent advances of the conflict theory suggest that "simple contact between groups is not sufficient to improve intergroup relations" (Gaertner, Dovidio, and Bachman 1996, 272). For instance, Brown (2003) emphasizes groups' interdependence in increasing cooperation among intergroup members. He differentiates between positive independence and negative interdependence. The author demonstrates that in positive interdependence – where group members need one another to achieve a particular goal – cooperation is necessary between members (Brown 2003, 38). Under this situation (of interdependence), people are motivated to cooperate with
one another, help one another, and possibly even like each other when all members of the
group work toward achieving one goal together (Brown 2003, 38).

On the other hand, Brown indicates that in negative interdependence – where
there are no apparent incentives for cooperation in achieving a common goal – people are
motivated to compete, and have no desire or ambition to work together. To Brown's
credit, Allport's optimal condition that also include group's cooperation, may not be
enough to reduce prejudice in places where groups may exhibit negative interdependence.
Allport did not provide another remedy to address concerns where groups may have
negative cooperation. His notion of cooperation did not include group's interdependence
as Brown articulated. Therefore, Brown (2003) stipulates that positive interdependence
increases groups' cooperation more than negative interdependence does (Brown 2003,
38).

Brewer also states that experimental researches on contact theory acknowledge
that some form of cooperative interdependence – when seeking common 'superordinate
goals' – lead to the reduction of intergroup conflict and prejudice (Brewer 1996, 291).
The idea was tested using social psychological experiments in situations of two
previously segregated work group, work team composed of students from two different
faculty as well as in situation where artificial social categorizations were created (Brewer
1996, 293-295). However, the author also notes that cases related to the rise of 'ethno-
nationalistic' movements throughout the world have encountered difficulties in
preventing the emergence or reemergence of intergroup conflicts, despite the shared
interests and cooperative interdependence exhibited or seen among competing groups (Brewer 1996, 291).

Given what is seen in cases that challenge the adequacy of existing prevailing social psychological behavior and accounts for contact theory, Brewer therefore suggests that to resolve these international complex cases, integrated models characterized by "cross-cutting roles and social categories" are needed (Brewer 1996, 297). Three models are discussed by Brewer (1996) that include: Decategorization also known as the personalization model, Recategorization known as the common ingroup identity model, and Subcategorization known as the distinct social identity model.

1. **Decategorization:** Given that categorization is the depersonalization of outgroup members, Brewer suggests that during contact setting, intergroup interaction be restructured to the extent of reducing the salience of category distinctions to promote opportunities where by the ingroup members get to know outgroup members as individuals (Brewer 1996, 293). The reason for this is that status differences make people aware of category membership. Therefore, even in cases where contact is pleasant or without conflict, status differences are likely to reinforce ingroup favoritism and biases rather than reducing them (Brewer 1996, 293).

2. **Recategorization:** This model is based on assumptions that ingroup biases are difficult to overcome when distinctions between ingroup and outgroup members are highly salient (Brewer 1996, 293). This model therefore suggests that in contact, reduction of category salience is vital as the contact situation is restructured to focus on the superordinate
category, which is composed of ingroup and outgroup in a single social group (Brewer 1996, 293).

3. **Subcategorization**: This model is based on the idea that positive social identity in its distinctive form must be capitalized upon during intergroup contact (Brewer 1996, 295). Brewer (1996) suggests that the contact setting be structured in a way that members of the different groups have "distinct, but complementary roles to contribute toward achieving common goals" (Brewer 1996, 295). When groups' contact experiences are found to be cooperative and pleasant, effects are likely to generalize to attitudes toward the outgroup as a whole. This is the case given that contact setting is experienced as an intergroup encounter rather than interpersonal one (Brewer 1996, 294). The goal here is to alter aspects of intergroup encounter that have negative interdependence between the groups. This means that when changing negative interdependence to positive, associated category-based evaluations could also change (Brewer 1996, 294). Though already mentioned above by Brewer, the next section will discuss Gaertner's common intergroup identity in much more details.

3.2.5.2 *Common ingroup identity to reduce intergroup bias*

Furthermore, Gaertner also raises concerns of persistent problems in identifying intervention strategies that promote positive intergroup attitudes and behaviors in studies of social conflicts. He realizes that the more cognitive and motivational processes related
to issues such as group prejudice, discrimination, or racism are discovered, the more pessimistic people become about developing strategies needed to promote positive intergroup relations (Gaertner, Dovidio, and Bachman 1996, 272). However, in dealing with these complex issues, Gaertner proposes a model of common ingroup identity in which an intersection is found between in-group and out-group members. In this model, Gaertner suggests that "intergroup bias and conflict be reduced by factors that transform members’ cognitive representations of the memberships from two groups to one more inclusive social identity" (Gaertner, Dovidio, and Bachman 1996, 271).

For this, the author says that:

A common ingroup identity extends or redirects the cognitive and motivational processes that produce positive feelings toward ingroup members to former outgroup members. It is proposed that the prerequisite features specified by the contact Hypothesis (Allport, 1954; Cook, 1985), such as equal status between the memberships, cooperative interdependence, opportunity for self-revealing interactions and egalitarian norms, successfully reduce bias, in part, because they help transform members' perceptions of the memberships from “Us” and “Them” to a more inclusive “We” (Gaertner, Dovidio, and Bachman 1996, 271).

The fundamental idea of the common ingroup identity, according to Gaertner and others is that today's interracial behaviors tend to be driven by pro-ingroup biases. This happens to the extent that the racial biases of some individuals may be driven by their inability to expand their circle of inclusion as they consider underlying differences seen between ingroup and outgroup members (Gaertner, Dovidio, and Bachman 1996, 273). Therefore, the authors suggest strategies "that expand the inclusiveness of one's ingroup to include people who would otherwise be regarded as outgroup members." Doing this, they conclude "may have beneficial consequences for promoting more positive intergroup attitudes and behaviors" (Gaertner, Dovidio, and Bachman 1996, 273).
Gaertner provides the basis for the creation of common ingroup identity between in-group and out-group members. In his concept, a dual identity is created; Gaertner emphasizes on the creation of a new identity between intergroup members (Korostelina 2007, 202). This process allows in-group and out-group members to create one new umbrella group with two subgroups that operate side by side as a team (Korostelina, 2007, 202). In a dual identity setting, creating the sense of a new identity is significant. However, the process allows each group to reflect membership in its own subgroup in order to try to create a positive balance of differences and similarities where all members of the new group will have positive attitudes and positive stereotypes toward the other (Korostelina 2007, 203). The reason for allowing each group to have membership in its own subgroup is because it "would be undesirable or impossible for people to relinquish their ethnic or racial subgroup identities" (Gaertner, Dovidio, and Bachman 1996, 271). Thus, in the common ingroup identity model, it is important to minimize category differences by creating a new inclusive group identity. This new inclusive identity possesses a superordinate category which is made salient and in which members are more likely to think of themselves as "one unit" of two different subgroups rather than two separate groups (Brewer 1996, 194).
Brewer suggests some directions for future research in intergroup contact. She states that although it is rather large leap of generalization to go from small laboratory groups to political or other structures in large-states, the results of social psychological experiments manipulating social category in a laboratory setting could have potentially useful implications for how complex and larger groups manage their conflicts (Brewer 1996, 300-301). However, the author says that there are reasons to believe that the translation of findings from basic laboratory research to application in real-world settings still requires additional research and theory (Brewer 1996, 300-301). This is exactly what this research of Uvira was about. It provides an alternative explanation as to how groups experiencing longtime tense conflict could engage in effective contact that facilitate durable coexistence. Brewer realizes that much of the debate in the world in current political atmosphere is over the question whether multicultural societies must choose between
assimilating or keep separate their people as a primary method of interethnic relations (Brewer 1996, 302). Talking of the three above models that she articulated, Brewer states that the decategorization and recategorization models represent different forms of assimilationist philosophy, while the subcategorization model represents a separatist philosophy (Brewer 1996, 302). The author then concludes that:

All three models assume that superordinate groups, subgroups and individuals constitute a nested hierarchy, and that a choice must be made among identification needs at the three levels. Getting away from this hierarchical conceptualization may suggest ways in which the three levels of identity may be orthogonal and cross-cutting, rather than mutually exclusive. Such a reconceptualization at the cognitive level may eventually find parallels in political structures that could promote stable intergroup cooperation (Brewer 1996, 302).

In this research, I argued that mere contacts between members of different groups alone cannot be enough to improve intergroup relationships among communities with bitter conflict or who have experience violent conflict in the past. People who have experienced bitter conflicts, especially conflicts in which killings of community members are involved, may have deep wounds needing to be healed. As a result, a mere intergroup contact may not address altogether the issue of rebuilding relations. As for the case of eastern DRC, there are some forms of interaction between members of the rival groups, but less interaction is seen among these groups. Given the issues surrounding the conflict, such as the problem of not accepting the legitimacy of one group (the Banyamulenge), could contacts that members of each group have with the other lead to positive changes, including improving relations?
2.2.6 Summary

This section considered the role that intergroup contact plays in fostering coexistence. I discussed some facilitators of coexistence from Allport's optimal conditions that include groups' high cooperation, having equal status in conflict situation, common goals and institutional support to other moderators such as reduction of intergroup anxiety, increased trust and embracing perspective taking to reduce prejudice (Vorauer 2009). In all of this, much of the discussion was centered on the notion of positive vs negative contact. Although social psychologists have provided evidence that intergroup contact improve intergroup relations, some researchers admit that not all contact is effective in moderating reduction of intergroup prejudice and bias.

In their review of recent advances in intergroup contact theory, Pettigrew et al. (2011) charge that some critics of the contact theory seem not to understand it as "they mistakenly believe that intergroup contact theory simply predicts positive outcomes under all conditions" (Pettigrew et al. 2011). The authors in most part indicate that reduction of prejudice is likely to take place when intergroup contact is not superficial and group salience is sufficiently high (Pettigrew et al. 2011). Critics of contact theory have looked elsewhere for solution to promote intergroup relations. Some scholars such as Brown (2003) and Brewer (1996) have advocated for groups' interdependency. They say that when rival groups can begin to cooperate by depending on each other with the aim of reaching common goals, they are likely to begin to understand each other and befriend each other, a process which could lead to long run contact that may ultimately be beneficial to improving relations. Gaertner (1996) also calls for common ingroup identity
where in-group and out-group members create one new group with two subgroups that operate side by side as a team. In most parts, the contact theory has been tested in laboratory experiments and there are calls to conduct more research to see if results from social psychological experiment could have implications on real-world conflict situations where protagonists have been in longtime ethnic, racial or political conflicts. This research answers this concern. The next section covers the theory of empathy.

2.3 THEORY OF EMPATHY

When members of rival groups are at odds with one another or face serious issues to peacefully coexist – whether the underlying issues are about their race, religion, ethnicity or political tensions – scholars are left with questions wondering how intergroup members can overcome fear or mistrust they exhibit toward one another. For instance, what will it take to improve ingroup and outgroup relationship to facilitate cooperation among groups that are divided along ethnic, racial or religious line? Scholars have pointed to intergroup empathy as a remedy to help at-conflict parties to rebuild their relations. They say that enhanced intergroup empathy is one of the positive contact effects (Pettigrew et al. 2011, 275). Social psychologists have given much attention to the idea that empathy can be used to improve intergroup attitudes and relations (Batson and Ahmad 2009, 141). They state that a key to improving intergroup relations "lie through interpersonal processes that lead individual members of different groups to understand, appreciate, and feel for one another" (Batson and Ahmad 2009, 142). That empathy is apparently important in improving relations.
This section explores the various concepts or forms of empathy and understand how they affect intergroup relations as well their limitations. However, I'm not going to argue or delve into the debate regarding which type or another of these forms is real or true empathy; this is not the focus of my research.

First, it is important to know what empathy means for this study. I borrow from Stephan and Finlay who defines empathy as sympathizing with the other's pain, or showing compassion for one another by "taking the perspective of another person" (Stephan & Finlay 1999, 730). On top of the notion of taking the perspective of the other person, empathy also include identifying commonalities through shared feelings (Batson and Ahmad 2009, 141). This research also uses the term “reconciliation” as a process of building positive intergroup relationships for groups with a history of conflict (Mazziotta, et al. 2014, 43).

2.3.1 Four forms of empathy

When surveying the intergroup relation literature, Batson and Ahmad discovered that empathy has been applied to four psychological states and divided into two categories including cognitive/perceptual states and affective/emotional states"(Batson and Ahmad 2009, 144-145). They stated that, though the effects of the four states have most often been considered at the interpersonal level, when an individual encounters another in distress, the effects of these four empathy states are considered at the intergroup level (Batson and Ahmad 2011, 148). This is especially the case "when the person in distress is
a member of a stigmatized out-group, or when two groups are in conflict" (Batson and Ahmad 2009, 148).

Two of these four states refer to forms of perspective taking that include:

1. Imagine-self perspective: here it is about "imagining how one would think and fell in out-group member' situation" (Batson and Ahmad 2009, 143).

2. Imagine-other perspective: this is bout "imagining how an out-group member thinks and feels"(Batson and Ahmad 2009, 143).

3. The remaining two other states refer to forms of emotional response that include:

4. Emotion matching: here the tendency is "feeling as an out-group member feels (Batson and Ahmad 2009, 144).

5. Empathic concern: this is about "feeling for an out-group member" (Batson and Ahmad 2009, 144). The four psychological states are summarized in the table below.

I appreciate Batson and Ahmad's view on this topic, as they make a salient point when they differentiate forms of empathy that they say may mean different things and have different impacts on intergroup interaction. Whether empathy is viewed as cognitive, emotional or compassionate, all these types need to be proven to be contributing to improving intergroup relations. Though I did not delve into the debate regarding the role types of empathy may play; it is noteworthy that the definition of empathy used in this research tends toward compassionate empathy, meaning adversaries sympathizing with the other's pain by showing compassion for the other.
Four Psychological States for Empathy in the Intergroup Relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Psychological State</th>
<th>What the State</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive/perceptual states</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Imagine – self perspective</td>
<td>Imagining how one would think and feel in another’s situation or “shoes.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Imagine – other perspective</td>
<td>Imagining how another person thinks or feels given his/her situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affective/emotional states</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Emotion matching</td>
<td>Feeling as another person feels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Empathic concern</td>
<td>Feeling for another person who is in need.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Table 1: Four psychological states of empathy:  
Source: (Batson and Ahmad 2009, 144)

Group relationships tend to be at stake when disintegration occurs. Can increasing ingroup members' consciousness of their feelings and behavior toward members of the outside group (Weiner 1998, 518) really work? First, there is widespread support showing that empathy that members of one group (ingroup) feel about others (outgroup) can lead to positive intergroup relationships (Weiner 1998, 518). The concept of intergroup empathy is of paramount importance in this research. I indicated early that the Banyamulene and Bavibafuliru have all expressed empathic feelings for one another about their past violent experience but still have struggled to peacefully coexist. The drivers facilitating coexistence and those hindering are explored. When does intergroup empathy fail to contribute to the improvement of groups' relations? There is little research explaining why improvement of intergroup relations fails in places where intergroup empathy is present among adversaries. Why do members of rival groups face challenges
to build positive relationships even after expressing empathetic feelings? There is no single answer to this question, but this research sheds more lights over the issue in the analysis and discussion chapters.

2.3.2 Support for and strengths of empathy in improving relations

Researches identify several reasons why empathy works, but have also addressed the limitations it has on improving relations. I expand on where empathy works under this section and articulate the limitations under the section titled weaknesses of empathy. Most importantly, scholars have found that the forms of empathy work effectively at the interpersonal level. Though researchers also have supported the idea that empathy works at intergroup level, they realize it is more challenging at this level due to the complexity of issues surrounding intergroup conflicts (Batson and Ahmad 2009, 148). Empathy may in some instances, especially at the interpersonal level, facilitate some positive attitudes between people. It is therefore believed that when one person encounters another person who is in pain or suffering, if that person empathizes with the other in distress, the effect will be positive, even though the two people are in conflict (Batson and Ahmad 2009, 148).

Scholars contend that intergroup empathy is a predictor of more positive intergroup attitudes and intergroup behaviors while increasing the willingness to engage in cross-group contact (Mazziotta, et al. 2014, 45). Scholars have demonstrated that there are strengths of empathy when it comes to facilitating coexistence. They argue that empathy at least increases the willingness to engage in cross-group contact. When one
exhibits empathic feelings, one can show some willingness to reach out to others (Mazziotta, et al., 2014).

Also, empathy promotes intergroup cooperation, while others have argued that it contributes to rebuilding positive intergroup relations after violent intergroup conflicts (Mazziotta, et al. 2014, 45). Stephan and Finlay also discuss the role of empathy in improving intergroup relations. They show that one can use training to increase levels of empathy (Stephan & Finlay 1999). The authors argue that empathy can be used to mediate changes in prejudice (Stephan & Finlay, 1999). Eisenberg et al. (2010) also agree that empathy is a likely contributor to other-oriented pro-social behavior. Empathy, they say, hinders aggression and antisocial behavior while playing a role in the quality of intergroup relationships (Eisenberg, et al. 2010).

In the same way, increased empathy is viewed as facilitating positive attitudes and pro-social behavior toward members of the outgroup (Cikara, et al. 2011). Others see that in intergroup conflict, empathy is considered as a pro-social emotional response that restores social relations with an outgroup (Čehajić, et al. 2009, 716). The authors say that research conducted in a post-conflict setting has shown that empathy is very important for increasing willingness and readiness to forgive a group for previous perceived transgressions (Čehajić, et al. 2009, 716). Willingness and readiness are two important reconciliatory processes. The ability and willingness to try to understand groups affected by their plight and suffering "generate conditions for sustainable and effective intergroup reconciliation" (Čehajić, et al. 2009, 716). Therefore, reminders of in-group perpetrators' responsibility for past wrongdoings and victim dehumanization are seen as predictors of
empathy felt for the victim group (Čehajić, et al. 2009, 716-717). The goal of reminding the perpetrators of their victims' dehumanization is to make members of the in-group stop demonizing the people they view as enemies or stop making them seem less human, so they can start to treat them humanely. The belief is that "if one does not acknowledge in-group responsibility for past wrongdoings, there is no psychological basis to experience any emotional reaction on the basis of in-group moral violations" (Čehajić, et al. 2009, 716). However, there have been arguments against the role in-group responsibility plays as a predictor of empathy felt for the victim group; I discuss this in the session where I cover weaknesses of empathy.

Arie Nadler and Ido Liviatan (2006) also demonstrate the effects of an adversary's expression of empathy in intergroup reconciliation. They explore the effects of empathy expression by in-group members in conflict setting, in which members of the outgroup assume responsibility for causing the suffering to others. This process, the authors say, encourages outgroup members to express willingness for reconciliation (Nadler and Liviatan 2006). They say that positive expressions of empathy by members of the adversary group will have positive effects on reconciliation. However, the authors indicate that, in order for reconciliation to occur, there must be some level of trust in the outside group (Nadler and Liviatan 2006). This is important for this research – it is certain that though members of rival groups express empathy for one another in order for empathic feelings to have positive outcomes, there is need to demonstrate that members of these groups trust one another. Trust can play a role in validating or evaluating if the empathic feelings are sincere.
The works discussed above clearly show that there is widespread support for the role that empathy plays in improving intergroup relations. However, it is crucial to question whether the presence of empathy seen in ingroup members always affects the facilitation of changes in relationship with members of the outside group. Here, I do not argue against the findings that scholars have provided about the role of empathy in improvement of relationship among adversaries. Those findings are valid for the types of conflicts the scholars studied. However, it is important to stress that there are cases in which empathy fails to improve intergroup relations in post-conflict or ongoing conflict situations, especially at the intergroup level. I discuss this in the next section.

2.3.3 Weaknesses of empathy in facilitating coexistence

Although there is wide support for empathy in improving intergroup relations, other scholars have also shown that empathy may fail to improve intergroup relations in some conflict settings. This constitutes the weaknesses of empathy in fostering coexistence. The weakness of the role empathy can play is seen at the intergroup level (Batson and Ahmad 2009, 148). When we think of empathy at the intergroup level, Batson and Ahmad claim that two problems may immediately emerge. First, people from rival groups frequently come with heavy baggage of issues. Groups may have a history of disdain, mistrust, and most importantly, they may be still involved in an outright conflict (Batson and Ahmad 2009). Empathy therefore requires one to be "other-oriented" and deal with the sensitivity and the plight of the other (Batson and Ahmad 2009, 148). Given
a horrific past or history, asking for other-oriented sensitivity may be asking for too much from groups that have a history of disdain or mistrust (Batson and Ahmad 2009, 148).

Second, the problem of adopting empathy at the intergroup level is that taking the perspective of a group or to share that group’s feelings may pose some significant challenges (Batson and Ahmad, 2009). Given that one imagines oneself, that is "imagining how one would think and feel in another’s situation" (Batson and Ahmad 2009, 148), under such circumstances is it even possible to take a perspective of a group or feel for a group? (Batson and Ahmad 2009, 148). To underscore the second concern, Batson and Ahmad state that "when an individual in need is one of a group of individuals with similar needs, both empathy and willingness to help are diminished"(Batson and Ahmad 2009, 148). Therefore, empathy shows some weaknesses in fostering coexistence in such a situation, as it has fewer beneficial effects when members of the group have a bitter past.

In addition, when talking of empathy at intergroup level, there is an understanding that people are often motivated to show primary empathy to individuals of their own group (Cikara, et al. 2011). This is to say that, though people are often motivated to deal with the suffering of others, when the target (individual to be helped) is an outgroup member, people may exhibit powerful motivations not to care about the suffering of the other or to help others (Cikara, et al. 2011). Therefore, it is believed that failures of empathy are especially likely if a sufferer is socially distant. Distant in space, time, or kinship; or belongs to a different racial, political, cultural, or social group. In cases where the targets are outgroup members, empathic responses are rare and fragile (Cikara,
et al., 2011). In this situation, studies showed empathy can lead to a stronger effect on developing intentions to help when the person trying to help and the target (person to be helped) belonged to the same cultural group than when the person to be helped belonged to different groups (Stürmer, et al. 2006).

Also, Čehajić, et al. talked about how taking intergroup responsibility as an empathic behavior plays a role in rebuilding relations. However, the authors identified that there are also defenses against the role intergroup responsibility may play when expressing empathy. They state that "people are more likely to refuse incorporation of negative elements into their group's collective identity in order to maintain a positive group (self) image and/or inhibit potential emotional distress" (Čehajić, et al. 2009, 717). For the reason stated above, the authors indicate that members of a group might actually engage in denial of their group's negative behavior or legitimization of the in-group action. They can simply claim that what happened in the past is the responsibility of other in-group members and that current in-group members are not responsible for the horrible things that happened to the victim group (Čehajić, et al. 2009, 717). Furthermore, it is common for members of the perpetrator groups to also claim that they, and not the victim groups, have suffered the most (Čehajić, et al. 2009, 717).

Most importantly, the authors stipulate that victim dehumanization is a negative predictor of empathy. The authors claim that in conflict situations where victims are dehumanized – meaning they are stripped of human qualities – members who identity with the perpetrator group are less likely to express compassion for the victim group (Čehajić, et al. 2009, 717). To put it in other terms, "feelings of empathy felt for victims
can be undermined when the victim group is perceived as less human" (Čehajić, et al. 2009, 717). Recognizing or considering members of the other group as human beings who have hopes and concerns might be "a prerequisite for perceiving and being moved by others' pain and suffering (Čehajić, et al. 2009, 717).

There is also ironic impact of empathy when it comes to intergroup interaction (Vorauer and Sasaki, 2008). Empathy with outgroup members might be not beneficial, but instead actually harmful, especially when involving intergroup interaction (Vorauer and Sasaki 2008, 191). For instance, Vorauer and Sasaki (2008) argue that many experimental investigations of empathy in intergroup contexts "have not involved direct personal contact with out-group members" (Vorauer and Sasaki 2008, 191). They say that what happens most of the times with these experiments is participants are exposed to instances of discrimination or other negative events experienced by members of the outgroup. The participants are then asked to imagine how they feel about the instances to which they have been exposed. In this concept, attitudes toward the outgroup as a whole are assessed by the participants (Vorauer and Sasaki 2008, 191). This means that "individuals are not placed in an interaction situation in which there is the potential for evaluation by out-group members" (Vorauer and Sasaki 2008, 191). Therefore, when individuals adopt an empathic stance at the time of intergroup interaction, the generalization processes that cause the usually positive effects of empathy on attitudes are disrupted; in these circumstances, defensive reactions arise, instead (Vorauer and Sasaki 2008, 192). All of the above show the weaknesses of empathy in fostering coexistence.
Given the complexity of issues surrounding groups in post-conflict countries, I suspected that intergroup empathy alone could be insufficient to predict improvement in intergroup relations. Researchers should look beyond just intergroup empathy as a predictor in improving relations between groups. They must focus on other mediators that can positively contribute to coexistence, such as encouraging intergroup cooperation (Brewer, 1996), groups' interdependence (Brewer, 1996; Brown, 2003) and shared identity (Korostelina, 2007; Gaertner, 1996), that are of paramount importance in fostering coexistence. I address these themes in the analysis and discussion chapters. Also, I make a case for ironic empathy in the discussion chapter. There was great evidence from this research's data collection showing that Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge expression of empathy for one another is not sincere, possibly explaining why empathy is not evidenced as a predictor of improving relations in the case of Uvira.

2.3.4 Summary
This section examined the role that empathy plays in intergroup coexistence. Although researchers provide widespread evidence of the role that empathy plays in improving intergroup relations, there is yet little research explaining why improvement of intergroup relations fails in places where intergroup empathy is present among adversaries. We learned that there are strengths and weaknesses for empathy in facilitating coexistence. One of the strengths is that empathy can increase the willingness to engage in cross-group contact. But most literature points that empathy works better at the interpersonal level than at the intergroup level. The weakness of empathy can be seen when groups have a
history of disdain or mistrust, limiting the impact empathy may have in building relations. Also, expressed empathy by members of rival groups can be ironic, thus having little effect in fostering coexistence. It is important to point out that literature shows that empathy does not work better at the intergroup level, in part due to the complexity of issues and baggage that people come with in conflict settings where members have a bitter past.

Though intergroup contact may reduce prejudice between members of rival groups, there are cases where challenges may arise and intergroup empathy fails to fostering coexistence as it is the case of eastern DRC. In the case of Uvira, eastern DRC, improvement of intergroup relations is not in evidence though members of the rival groups have expressed empathy for one another. I address this issue in the analysis section and answer the following questions: When does intergroup empathy fail to contribute to the improvement of groups' relations? Why do members of rival groups struggle to build positive relationships even after expressing empathetic feelings? I discuss the theories of legitimacy and power in the next section.

2.4 THEORIES OF LEGITIMACY AND POWER

2.4.1 LEGITIMACY

2.4.1.1 Definition of legitimacy

Coexistence also includes acceptance of legitimacy of the other. If ingroup members see outgroup members as illegitimate members of the society, how would this perception affect their relations? Could it play a role in facilitating or hindering coexistence during
encounters? The notion of legitimacy makes sense to this research given the conflict
dynamics of Uvira where the social status of one group is perceived as illegitimate. The
Banyamulenge are called foreigners by neighboring groups (Bavibafuliru). To go further,
I must define the true meaning of legitimacy for this research. Legitimacy is "the belief
that authorities, institutions, and social arrangements are appropriate, proper, and just"
(Tyler 2006, 376). The author goes further stating that legitimation refers to "the
characteristic of being legitimized by being placed within a framework through which
something is viewed as right and proper" (Tyler 2006, 376). With this notion, "a set of
beliefs can explain or make sense of a social system in ways that provide a rationale for
the appropriateness or reasonableness of differences in authority, power, status, or
wealth" (Tyler 2006, 376). In practicality, legitimacy involves a claim and a claimant
and a recipient who can either accept or reject that claim based on the premise that the
claim is just or improper (Kelman 2001, 55).

Some have referred to legitimacy as an organizational or institutional
phenomenon. Maurer in 1971 stated that legitimation is a "process whereby an
organization justifies to a peer or superordinate system its right to exist" (Suchman 1995, 574). Legitimacy is “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions” (Suchman 1995, 574). Psychologists French and Raven view legitimacy "as social influence induced by feelings of “should,” “ought to” or “has a right to,” i.e., by appeals to an “internalized norm or value” (Tyler 2006, 376). They go further stating that legitimacy "is an additional form of power that enables authorities to
shape the behavior of others distinct from their control over incentives or sanctions" (Tyler 2006, 376). Hurd writes legitimacy "is the perception that one “ought to obey” another (Tyler 2006, 376).

Weber refers to legitimacy as domination; he acknowledges that authority is legitimate for those who are subject to it. Therefore, in its true structural meaning, Weber conceives that structural legitimacy "reflects traditional authority, based on the longstanding designation of certain types of actors as worthy of exercising certain types of power" (Suchman 1995, 580). Reflecting legitimacy in the lenses of a system, especial in the political arena, Kelman refers to legitimacy in this notion as "the moral basis of the system’s authority: its perceived right to make demands on its members and to expect their loyalty" (Kelman 2006, 15). The author goes further stating that to be sentimentally attached to the system means "to perceive it as legitimate and entitled to the population’s loyalty because it represents them and reflects their identity; to be instrumentally attached to the system means to accord legitimacy and loyalty to it because it meets the needs and interests of the population"(Kelman 2006, 15).

This research was more concerned about the notion of legitimacy that includes the recognition of status of a group and sought to define it as such. In the case of this research, the group seeks the right to be recognized as a legitimate entity that must be viewed as right or proper in the eyes of others. Therefore, this research builds on Tyler's notion of legitimation that he views as "the characteristic of being legitimized by being placed within a framework through which something is viewed as right and proper" (Tyler 2006, 376).
2.4.1.2 Legitimation vs delegitimisation

I have discussed above about the notion of legitimacy and the process of legitimization. Unlike the process of legitimation of a group, which includes the group being legitimized and its existence considered as proper, delegitimisation includes the rejection of the group as improper as well as using negative connotations against the group to dehumanize it while excluding it. Bar-Tal (2007) conceives that delegitimisation of the other is among one of the psychological factors that is a detrimental force to resolving any conflict peacefully (Bar-Tal 2007, 111). According to the author, delegitimisation refers to "stereotypes with extremely negative connotations that is used to describe a specific case of group categorization… it is based on extremely negative outgroup characterization and aimed at denying the other group’s humanity" (Bar-Tal 2007, 111).

The notion also includes systematic exclusion of a group or groups from the sphere of human groups. This exclusion is viewed as acceptable within the limits of social norms or values. The excluded groups are perceived as violating human norms or values; thus their exclusion from society is justifiable as a moral action (Bar-Tal 2007, 111). In giving more sense to the notion, Bar-Tal says that delegitimisation "is a type of moral exclusion,…which leads individuals or groups ‘outside the boundary in which moral values, rules, and considerations of fairness apply….those who are morally excluded are perceived as non-entities, expendable, or undeserving; consequently, harming them appears acceptable, appropriate, or just’" (Bar-Tal 2007, 111). The author says that delegitimisation typically emerges in violent conflicts that are seen as intractable (Bar-Tal 2007, 111).
2.4.1. 3 Types of delegitimization

Bar-Tal suggests that the most common used characteristics for delegitimization include out-casting, dehumanization, group comparison, negative trait characterization and political labeling (Bar-Tal 2007, 113).

1 Dehumanization: this process involves labeling a group as nonhuman using subhuman connotations against the group such as primitive, animals, uncivilized savages or use superhuman negative descriptions such as devils, demons or monsters. (Bar-Tal 2007, 113).

2 Trait characterization: This is the attribution of specific negative traits to a group and its members. These traits are normally considered unacceptable in a particular society. This may include calling members of a group idiots, aggressors or parasites (Bar-Tal 2007, 113).

3 Out-casting: In this process, the rival is categorized into groups that are always perceived as violators of social norms. This may include the use of connotations such as thieves, murderers, maniacs, psychopaths or terrorists (Bar-Tal 2007, 113). The reasons for labeling the other with these connotations is that under normal circumstances, society most of the times excludes such violators from its system and often places them in controlled institutions (Bar-Tal 2007, 113).

4 Political labeling: This is characterizing the adversary with some negative political groups which are often rejected by the values of the actual delegitimizing group. These
include calling the adversary communists, colonialists, fascists, imperialists, Nazis, or Zionists (Bar-Tal 2007, 113).

5 Group comparison: This is trying to delegitimize the group by labeling it with a name of a group that is viewed as an example of negativity such as “Vandals” or “Huns” (Bar-Tal 2007, 113). The other form of delegitimization is the labeling of the rival group as "enemy." This connotation is used to define the outgroup as severe threat; this leads to exhibit confrontational or hostile attitude toward the outgroup (Bar-Tal 2007, 113). There are several reasons why ingroup members would choose to delegitimize outgroup members. These include the need to justify violence against the delegitimized group, to reflect a shared reality for outgroup members, to try to differentiate ingroup and outgroup members while create a sense of superiority for the delegitimizing group, and to motivate the delegitimizing group to take action against the delegitimized group (Bar-Tal 2007, 113).

2.4.1.4 Importance of legitimacy

Whether it is at an organizational, group, or state level, people seek to be legitimized because illegitimate entities are likely to be rejected or lack any form of support. Tyler (2006) clearly articulates this dilemma. He says that being legitimate is important "to the success of authorities, institutions, and institutional arrangements since it is difficult to exert influence over others based solely upon the possession and use of power" (Tyler 2006, 375). Legitimacy "enhances both the stability and the comprehensibility of organizational activities" (Suchman 1995, 574). Zelditch and Walker conceive that
“every authority system tries to cultivate a belief in its legitimacy” (Tyler 2006, 377). The reasons for this is because for authorities to perform effectively, "those in power must convince everyone else that they “deserve” to rule and make decisions that influence the quality of everyone’s lives" (Tyler 2006, 377). The author goes further stating that it is not only important to rule using power but he says "authorities benefit from having legitimacy and find governance easier and more effective when a feeling that they are entitled to rule is widespread within the population" (Tyler 2006, 377). Legitimacy actually affects how people act toward organizations and how they understand them. (Suchman 1995, 574). Meyer and Rowan writes that organizations that lack "acceptable legitimated accounts of their activities" are likely to be perceived as unnecessary (Suchman 1995, 574). People perceive legitimate organizations as more worthy, meaningful, predictable, and most importantly more trustworthy (Suchman 1995, 574).

In terms of social structural conditions, when there is instability in the status relations among groups, the groups may exhibit diminished positive perceptions in promoting positive intergroup relations. (Halabi, et al. 2012, 295). Intergroup members' reactions to one another are influenced by the members' views about whether the status of one group is legitimate or illegitimate (Tyler 2006, 385). This means that when a group sees the other as illegitimate, the perception of illegitimacy exacerbates negative reactions from the other, especially when relations among the groups are already unstable (Halabi, et al. 2012, 295).

Also, in intergroup relations, legitimacy of the other matters because it represents a more social psychological interpretation as members of groups see their relations with
When the acceptance and recognition of the other takes place, ingroup members may start to grant to alien others the right to exist; meaning that they may accept the idea of "existing together" (Weiner 1998, 15).

However, accepting the other does not just happen haphazardly; it does not occur by serendipity, but it is an evolving process. Some scholars indicate that acceptance emerges in intimacy when members of the rejected group disclose themselves and the rejecting group is willing to connect with them (Smith and Berg 1997, 120). The self-disclosure facilitates the development and maintenance of friendships between groups (Thomsen 2012, 161). The paradox of intimacy, then, translates into the following: "acceptance of self depends on acceptance of others; and acceptance of others depends on acceptance of self" (Smith and Berg, 1997, 125). This includes the process of understanding oneself while at the same time understanding others. It also means connecting with oneself while also connecting with others (Smith and Berg 1997, 125). I discuss power in the next section.

2.4.2 POWER

Power is an important element in conflict resolution, and like legitimacy, it is referred differently depending on where it is used. Most importantly, coexistence also includes the acceptance of power balance between groups. This section explores the various concepts, sources, nature of power and dynamics its plays in conflict.
2.4.2.1 Power as domination and control

Power is the ability to shape the gains and losses of others either by threatening or using coercion to deter undesired behavior or by promising rewards to promote desired behavior (Tyler 2006, 376). Consequently, in the concept of social interactions, power provides a means to shape behavior to the extent that “The strong do what they will, the weak endure what they must” (Tyler 2006, 376). Power is present when there is an influencing agent and a person exposed to influence (Kelman 2006, 4-5). It is perceived that the source of power is based largely on control of means, attractiveness and credibility. When it comes to control of means, power will enable the holder to supply or withhold materials or resources on which the target depends. In terms of attractiveness, there are qualities that continue to make the influencing agent desirable by the influenced people while expertness and trustworthiness represent the credibility of authority (Kelman 2006, 4-5).

Other scholars viewing power as domination conceive that power is “the capacity to influence people’s attitudes, beliefs and behavior and that influence is based on the control of resources valued or desired by others” (Turner 2005, 2). Those exposed to influence depend upon the influencing agent to meet their needs (Turner 2005, 2). Social power is “the capacity to control the behavior of others, directly or indirectly, through action by groups of people, which action impinges on other groups of people” (Sharp 1973, 7).

2.4.2.2 Power as decision making
Wright Mills (1956) finds that power is the ability of the elite to make decisions. Those possessing power can use it to influence others. People are influenced by others as they believe decisions made and the rules put in place by the leader are right and should be followed (Tyler 2006, 376). Robert Dahl (1961) finds that with power, the elite not only has the ability to make decisions, but can also prevent them from being made. Bachrach and Baratz (1962) argue that power is not only the capacity to make decisions but it also includes the ability to prevent decision from being made.

2.4.2.3 Power as legitimacy

Power and legitimacy may go hand in hand; when an authority is legitimate, he/she can project power and others will show willingness to obey orders from that authority. People can even allow legitimate authority to define boundaries of what must be considered as appropriate behavior (Tyler 2006, 376). People are not influenced simply because someone possesses or uses power over them. Those possessing power may face challenges in shaping the behavior of the groups or influencing them if they don't have legitimacy among the groups' members. This means to say that regardless of whether someone possesses power, that someone has legitimacy if people view his/her authority as proper and that someone can only influence them if they view him/her as legitimate (Tyler 2006, 393).

2.4.2.4 Power and conflict
Major research on warfare in decentralized societies suggest that warfare is a result of imbalances of power (Wiessner 2006, 165). The author also see that warfare in many societies is largely about "retaliation to establish a balance of power with allies and enemies so that intergroup social and economic exchange can flow" (Wiessner 2006, 165). Other contend that though conflict resolution depends largely on power balance and interest-based settlement, it must go beyond this by addressing both parties' basic needs and fears (Kelman 2006, 22). Conflict is likely to occur if power is more imbalanced among adversaries (Herbst, Konrad, and Morath 2016, 1). The authors state that "the likelihood of conflict and the nature of peaceful settlements is affected by an increased asymmetry of fighting power in the conflict that emerges when the players fail to reach a peaceful agreement" (Herbst, Konrad, and Morath 2016, 1). Changes in the conflict dynamics will require "a rebalancing of power in the relationship by which all those involved recognize one another in new ways" (Lederach 2002, 65). This new recognition may increase the voice and participation of members of the weaker party in addressing their basic needs and could legitimate their concerns (Lederach 2002, 65).

Even after conflict has occurred as a result of power imbalance, when trying to resolve the underlying conflict issues "the parties' power positions are especially important since each party wants to influence the outcome in its favor" (Twomey 1978, 146). Others find that shared power in decision making is an important feature of effective collaboration between members of groups, but members’ experiences of decision-making in intergroup interaction is limited (Walden, Javdani, and Allen 2014, 854). However, to achieve power sharing among members, there is a necessity to use
constructive conflict resolution strategies through councils to facilitate better outcomes in collaborative settings (Walden, Javdani, and Allen 2014, 854).

When groups have differences in values and ideologies, and these lead to conflict, especially over whose values or ideologies are to be subordinated to the other, the intergroup relations can be transformed into a power struggle (Smith and Berg 1987, 196). When one group has more power than the other, a belief emerges that it is only when the more powerful group gives up some of its power – creating a power balance – that the less powerful will have a chance to improve its current powerlessness situation (Smith and Berg 1987, 198). The practical problems arise when the powerless group raises the concerns of power imbalance. The powerful group sees this as an attempt to seduce it "into giving away or letting go its well-deserved, hard-earned position" (Smith and Berg 1987, 198). Therefore, the powerful group sees the attempt to force it to give away some of its power as a threat and an insult that must be rejected and resisted altogether (Smith and Berg 1987, 198). This confrontational situation over power struggle can lead to an intense polarization, setting the relations among the groups in a permanent form of conflict (Smith and Berg 1987, 198) and can by itself become a factor discouraging rival groups from coexisting.

As stated early, legitimacy and power play a major role in conflict and conflict resolution. This research explored the two notions and they are discussed in the analysis section, especially the implications they have in hindering coexistence among the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru in Uvira.
2.4.2.5 Summary

This section analyzed the role that legitimacy and power play in intergroup coexistence. Coexistence also includes legitimacy of the other and power balance between conflicting parties. As rival groups engage in resolving issues opposing or dividing them, some very serious concerns may arise if one group sees the other as illegitimate during the interaction process. The perception of illegitimacy could exacerbate negative reactions from the other (Halabi, et al. 2012, 295), and may threaten the very process the groups are engaged in to try mend their differences. In short, any group engaging the other in dialogue may want to feel legitimate in the eye of the adversary. Otherwise, the ingroup may capitalize on the status of the delegitimized group to try impose its will and perhaps show the other that it has more power and legitimacy over it to the extent of dominating or controlling the other. The situation can lead to one group delegitimizing the other by dehumanizing it, attributing some negative trait characterization or out-casting it as a way of deliberately excluding its members from social norms. This is why parties in conflict see the importance of being legitimized. People or groups seek to be legitimized because illegitimate groups or organizations are likely to be rejected or lack any form of support (Tyler 2006).

The same is applied to power; research has found that power imbalance between groups is problematic in the sense that the less powerful party may have few or no leverage during negotiations or when trying to claim its rights to be treated as legitimate entity in the society. Also, when an authority is legitimate, he/she can project power, encouraging others to show willingness to obey his/her orders. Legitimate authorities can
influence decision making and their decision is likely to be accepted unlike authorities who are viewed as illegitimate. Legitimacy and power are inseparable; they are present and complement each other. I discuss trust and truth in the next section.

2.5 TRUST AND TRUTH

2.5.1 TRUST

Building trust between in-group and outgroup members, especially in the post conflict setting can be a complex exercise. Trust is critical in fostering coexistence; some scholars suggest that without it peacebuilding is impossible (Kappmeier 2016, 134). A lack of trust between groups in a conflict situation can prevent them from reconciling; lack of trust pushes groups toward conflict (Kappmeier 2016, 134). Trust is defined as “one party’s willingness to risk increasing his or her vulnerability to another whose behavior is beyond one’s control” (Kappmeier 2016, 134). Xin, Xin and Lin writes that trust refers to the "willingness to make oneself vulnerable to another person combined with the hope or expectations of positive outcomes (Xin, Xin and Lin 2015, 428). The authors go further indicating that "trust enables people to live together, cooperate with each other and coordinate efforts and behaviors; it contributes to smooth social functioning" (Xin, Xin and Lin 2015, 428). Therefore, it is very important to "maintain high levels of trust among individuals and groups" (Xin, Xin and Lin 2015, 428). This could help in building intergroup relations.

Trust affects how groups interact and behave with one another. The evolutionary game theory suggests that it has become human being's best strategy for individuals to
favor people who are like themselves. This leads most people to have a default position in which they put their trust only in people like themselves, a phenomenon called particularized trust (Uslaner 2012, 5). With the notion of particularized trust, people tend to be reluctant to put faith in (trust) others who are different from them (Uslaner 2012, 5). There is a general view that contact between people of different backgrounds leads to trust. This means that people learn to trust each other through daily interactions, but trust can only be developed through continued encounters with concrete individuals whom we have come to know for a period of time (Uslaner 2012, 6).

Another form of trust includes "altruistic trust" or "moralistic trust"; in this form, people believe that we ought to trust most people as we are better off taking the risk to trust strangers including those who don't look or think like us (Uslaner 2012, 6). Unlike in particularized trust – where trust is only restricted to people like ourselves – generalized trust is different in its concept as in this form, there is widespread belief that "most people can be trusted" (Uslaner 2012, 6).

However, some scholars have found that in most social settings, especially in segregated societies, individuals turn away from people who are different from themselves because they fear that increasing diversity actually threatens social cohesion (Uslaner 2012, 6). In segregated societies, segregation, especially inequality leads to low level of trust, especially among minority groups (Uslaner 2012, 10). Others argue that "When people live apart from one another, they will not develop the sort of bridging ties that promote tolerance and trust. Living in integrated communities is not sufficient to boost trust: you must also have friends of different backgrounds" (Uslaner 2012, 72).
Furthermore, Kappmeier writes that researchers have used multidimensional approach to operationalize trust but states that there is still a lack of shared understanding about what shapes trust in intergroup conflict; he cites trust as being multidimensional (Kappmeier 2016, 134). No single dimension constructs trust; dichotomy exists where to agree on which dimensions actually constitute trust (Kappmeier 2016, 134). The author suggests that his work presenting two qualitative studies sheds some light over the issue. He articulates seven superordinate dimensions constituting trust that include competency, compassion, compatibility, collaboration, integrity, predictability, and security (Kappmeier 2016, 134). The seven dimensions he says are broad enough to be used to measure trust; these dimensions each have subthemes (Kappmeier 2016, 144).

1 Competence as superordinate dimension of trust: The author says that competence include three subthemes:

(a) Ability - "how things are done."
(b) Capability to follow through - "if a group can deliver upon an agreement."
(c) Knowledge accuracy = "the depth of an outgroup’s knowledge regarding specific facts about the conflict and the ingroup."

Knowledge is perceived as important in this dimension; when one believes that "the outgroup does not possess correct or unbiased information, the trust in this group will be diminished" (Kappmeier 2016, 140).

2 Integrity as superordinate dimension of trust: Integrity comprises four subthemes:

(a) Honesty - "how honest the outgroup is perceived to be."
(b) Good intention - "the perception that the outgroup acts with or holds good intentions."

(c) Promise fulfillment - "the perception that the outgroup will fulfill given promises."

(d) Moral code - "the perception that the behavior of the outgroup is based on a moral code." (Kappmeier 2016, 141).

3 Predictability as superordinate dimension of trust: Predictability comprises two subthemes:

(a) Consistency - "the perception that the outgroup appears stable over time."

(b) Authenticity - "the perception that the outgroup’s behavior is persistent in different situations."

Consistency stipulates that "trust in the outgroup is inhibited by the perception that their behavior appears to be unstable over time. (Kappmeier 2016, 141).

4 Compatibility as superordinate dimension of trust: Compatibility comprises two subthemes:

(a) Perceived communality - "the perception that the outgroup shares values, background, and so forth."

(b) Emotional accessibility - "the perception that the groups can relate on an emotional level" (Kappmeier 2016, 141).

Both subthemes facilitate trust through "familiarity, comparability, and reducing the feeling of being estranged from each other" (Kappmeier 2016, 141).
5 Compassion as superordinate dimension of trust: Compassion comprises four subthemes:

(a) Fairness - "how fair and equally the outgroup treats one’s group."

(b) Benevolence - "the outgroup’s concern for one’s overall welfare".

(c) Empathy whether the outgroup members can “put themselves in someone else’s shoes”

(d) Discreetness - "the outgroup’s propensity to keep shared secrets" (Kappmeier 2016, 141.

6 Collaboration as superordinate dimension of trust: Collaboration comprises four subthemes: (a) Access - "the other group is physically available."

(b) Receptivity - "contributions of the ingroup are heard and considered by the outgroup."

(c) Openness with information - "the outgroup willingly shares crucial information with the ingroup."

(d) Cooperation - "the outgroup has a cooperative attitude within the interaction" (Kappmeier 2016, 142).

Collaboration-based trust is facilitated through “access,” or physical one on one contact between groups. Trust can be developed when there is a constant exchange between in-group and out-group; however, research finds that contact alone does not build trust") (Kappmeier 2016, 142).
Kappmeier (2006) writes that "the quality of interaction actually impacts the trust relationship. If contact is not shaped by receptivity, the willingness to listen to each other, then the trust relationship is negatively impacted" (Kappmeier 2016, 142).

7 Security as superordinate dimension of trust: Security plays a crucial role when it comes to the notion of trust, especially in the context of violent conflicts. The out-group can be perceived a threat to the physical safety or the identity of the in-group, or perhaps the in-group perceives that the outgroup has a hidden agenda and does not know what it may be planning next (Kappmeier 2016, 142-146).

Trust plays a very important role in intergroup conflict's dynamics. Therefore, in a conflict situation, in order to be trusted by others, one must be truthful and forthcoming. Not revealing necessary information that is regarded as crucial for the other to consider trusting you, could jeopardize the whole trust relationship between rival groups and may ultimately affect intergroup relations outcomes (whether to trust the other). I cover truth and mercy in the next section.

2.5.2 TRUTH and MERCY
In society where violent conflicts disintegrate people based on different ethnic, racial, religious or cultural backgrounds, truth can be used as a vehicle to bring about healing and reconciliation. The concepts or images of truth include "honesty, revelation, clarity, open accountability, and vulnerability" (Lederack 2002 28). Conflict will never be resolved without the person of truth. However, truth alone is not enough to resolving conflict; it is accompanied by mercy. The concepts of mercy or its images include
"compassion, forgiveness, acceptance, and a new start" (Lederack 2002, 28). Without the person of mercy, healthy relationships would not take place between conflict parties. The same is true for compassion and forgiveness; if these two are not present, healing and restoration are impossible (Lederack, 2002, 28). Therefore, truth refers to "the longing for acknowledgment of wrong and the validation of painful loss and experiences, but it is coupled with mercy, which articulates the need for acceptance, letting it go and a new beginning" (Lederack, 2002, 29). Truth is "the production of knowledge of the past" and has been considered as prerequisite for trust-building and mediator for reconciliation (Gutman 2011, 62).

The basic principle for initiating truth and reconciliation efforts is to facilitate political change based on the idea of "coming to terms with the difficult past." Under this model, unraveling knowledge is produced in the form of ‘document-based truth’ or ‘experience-based truth’ of a violent past. This happens "in an act of public witnessing "sometimes assisted by material and legal restitution; truth leads to recognition and acknowledgment of the victims’ suffering" (Gutman 2011, 63). The purpose of the truth telling process is to bring about healing, facilitate reconciliation and political stability while hoping to stop cycles of "violence and revenge." Conflict intervenors and conflict parties participating in the process hope that at the end of the exercise, past mass violence can end and be left behind while picturing a better present and future (Gutman 2011, 63). However, how can this goal be achieved?

Truth and reconciliation efforts do not always produce the rosy picture it is originally intended to produce. Though conflict parties wish truth telling would transform
their societies from violent conflict to non-violent resolution, there are also challenges on multiple fronts to make this dream a reality. We need to realize that during truth telling process, in-group and out-group members may have unrealistic expectations, and to some extent may prefer different outcomes. Some may "define themselves and their claims in terms of recognition of past suffering and loss and look to the establishment of truth and reconciliation commissions" (Gutman 2011, 63). Others may want "modalities of transitional justice, to grant symbolic or material reparations to victims" (Gutman 2011, 63). Therefore, several contradictions and narratives may emerge. "Who tells whose story to whom … illustrate some problematic aspects of a one-sided attempt to create a shared past for the future"(Gutman 2011, 70). This can lead to a dilemma for trying to define who the perpetrators or the victims are. The dilemma of uncertainty about what we must know about truth is articulated by Michel Foucault (1977) who states that there are several discourses about what is to be considered as truth. The thinker says that truth is "the ensemble of rules according to which the true and the false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true" (317). The thinker goes further stating that truth "is not a matter of a battle "on behalf "of the truth but of a battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays" (317). Foucault sees a clear link between truth and power that he calls a "regime of truth" where truth is understood as a system. It is linked in "a circular relation with systems of power that produce and sustain it" (317). Therefore, Foucault contends that "it is necessary to think of the political problems of intellectuals not in terms of "science" and "ideology" but in terms of "truth" and "power."" (317). Foucault then argues that "detaching the power of truth from the forms
of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present” (317) must be the way to dealing with truth.

For instance, in the case of truth and reconciliation model used as a strategy to resolve conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, the process consisted of meetings between Jews-Israelis and Palestinians. However, these gatherings were criticized by scholars and peace activists for "reproducing the power asymmetries between the two sides, bypassing any serious discussion of participants’ very different narratives of 1948, and avoiding the issue of accountability, to focus instead on psychological issues such as breaking stereotypes (Gutman 2011, 63). Another problem that manifested was that some individuals such as the memory activists’ groups concentrated on building trust "not through consensus building, but rather, through narratives that acknowledge conflicting histories and ideas while also promoting self-criticism of national narratives and of fixed identities" (Gutman 2011, 63).

The practical problem is that the truth and reconciliation model broke down for the Israelis and Palestinians. The general assumption for the model was to emphasize "the links between knowing the other’s past, to recognizing her suffering and loss, and to taking responsibility" but this process was contested as these very best links were interrupted at every stage from the facts being told (Gutman 2011, 64). The author says that "each side brings a different chain of facts and quarrels over what is considered legitimate evidence, to acknowledgment and recognition of the other side’s loss and suffering (Gutman 2011, 64). There is not always a will to take responsibility for the suffering of others. For instance, each side may have its own share of suffering during the
war (Gutman 2011, 64), and settling on the accountability part may in this circumstance become problematic as each group may accuse the other of being responsible for its suffering.

Truth and reconciliation can take different forms or can take shape through different aspects or models. I discussed above the model for knowledge production and acknowledgement and taking responsibility (accountability) for past atrocities. Another model takes an institutional form – the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, also commonly known as TRC. This form consists of two forms that include "public hearings and a report" (Gutman 2011, 61). A third form consists of "a transnational human rights-oriented discourse for coming to terms with a difficult or contested past" (Gutman 2011, 61). The first two have been well researched around the world; this is the reason why I briefly discuss TRC below.

The TRC, which is viewed as the institutional form of the truth and reconciliation, promotes public witnessing of the transition of the difficult past to a more reconciled and stable peaceful society (Gutman 2011, 61). The TRC consists of collecting voices and detailed experiences through public hearings that are constrained in legal language with the aim of providing the bottom-up account of the "lived experience" (Gutman 2011, 65). On the contrary, the report produces the top-down account using scientific legal knowledge. However, for this model, only one version of the past must be recognized because the state asserts its "authority and control" over the report (Gutman 2011, 65).

In some cases, the TRC has been mandated by respective governments or agencies to "investigate and make findings about acts and patterns of violence and gross
human rights violations that took place during a specified period of time," however in places like South Africa, the TRC "was mandated to go beyond truth-finding to promote national unity and reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which transcends the conflict and divisions of the past" (Hutchison 2005, 356). TRC Chairman, Bishop Desmond Tutu had argued that the commission had a greater task than providing justice; he stated that it was there "to listen to the unknown victims … and to provide a forum for the exposure of their experience" (Hutchison 2005, 356). In this platform, the commission engaged "victims and perpetrators in an empathetic manner, to promote a message of repentance and forgiveness, and to gain credibility in a range of communities" (Hutchison 2005, 356).

The practical problem with Tutu's approach is that repentance and forgiveness are not always easy to achieve in post-conflict societies. Lederack (2002) reminds us that without compassion and forgiveness, healing and restoration are impossible. To Lederack's point, victims of war sometimes want to see those who committed atrocities in their lives to be brought to justice. Like the case of former Yugoslavia, most victims were advocating for suspected war criminals – regardless of their ethnicity (Croats or Muslims) to be arrested and tried for crimes they have committed during the war (Stover 2007, 110). The victims said the trials of the perpetrators were important because they would have enabled "the truth to come out and provide a forum where suffering of victims can be heard and acknowledged" (Stover 2007, 110). The victims did not want to forget about bringing war crimes to justice and move on just for a sake of peace. Here is how they viewed the situation: "People who didn't suffer certain things, may be they can forget."
But for people who've really suffered, it will be hard" (Stover 2007, 114). They said that they had two solutions: "either we tell the truth, present it as it happened, and punish the guilty, or we have a final winner, and that will mean more bloodshed" (Stover 2007, 110).

The TRC, like the accountability model I explored early, has also been criticized. The TRC which is responsible for knowledge production and documentation though public hearings and a final report, raises significant concerns for some people. Both public hearings and the final report each produces different findings of truth and reconciliation (Gutman 2011, 65). For instance, others have argued that the TRC in South Africa failed (Hutchison 2005, 356) as it did little to provide justice to the victims of apartheid, leaving some sense of resentment among the victims. The TRC, they said, failed as "It inevitably had to negotiate consensus in order to define a history, a memory, in order to define a new nation" (Hutchison 2005, 356).

The relationship between truth and justice is critical in some post-conflict settings. Some may prefer one outcome over other, living some to wonder if truth actually plays a role leading to reconciliation or that it is justice, which plays that role as stated in the paragraph below about the South Africa TRC:

If its (TRC) interest in truth is linked only to amnesty and compensation, then it will have chosen not truth, but justice. If it sees truth as the widest possible contemplation of people’s perceptions, stories, myths and experiences, it will have chosen to restore memory and foster a new humanity, and perhaps this is justice in its deepest sense ((Hutchison 2005, 356).

Does truth telling lead to reconciliation; what kind of truth does the in-group want to hear from the out-group and vice-versa? I discuss social identity theories in the next section to
understand intergroup interaction and challenges in fostering coexistence in post-conflict cases.

2.6 SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORIES

Social identify theorists provide a basis for the understanding of how people relate to each other in society and how they behave toward one another. I present below an overview of some theories of social identity that form the theoretical bases for understanding and analyzing the identity-based conflict in Uvira. Ethnicity, land issue and other social differences are present among the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge in Uvira; there are actual social categories around which these groups tend to define themselves. I use these social identity theories in the discussion chapter to help explain inter-group processes, behaviors and attitudes and groups' dynamics. These theories specifically look at why individuals develop a sense of membership and belonging to a group while discriminating or rejecting members of the neighboring group. Or else, why a group may show love for ingroup members while exhibiting hostility toward out-group members. Social identity theories provide evidence that psychological factors or material factors, may be the root cause of inequity, injustice, and conflict.

2.6.1 Definition

Social identity is “the feeling of belonging to a social group, a strong connection with social category, and an important part of the mind that affects our social perception and behavior” (Korostelina 2007, 15). Others define social identity as “that part of an
individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel 1981, 255). Social identity derives from group membership and social identity processes and may have real implications for the behavior of groups (Brown 2000, 311). Part of people's identity (self-concept) is determined by group affiliations to the extent that individuals show preference to viewing ingroup members positively rather than negatively (Brown 2000, 312). Turner and Tajfel also suggest that "we assess our own group's worth by comparing it with other groups". The result of these comparisons is crucial to individuals as it indirectly contributes to 'people's self-esteem' (Brown 2000, 311).

2.6.2 Social identity formation

2.6.2.1 Social categorization theory: self-categorization and optimal distinctiveness

Groups define themselves in opposition to one another creating the "us" and "them" divide. These groups show some forms of distinctiveness comparing each other. With this in mind, a sense of superiority and inferiority may manifest and intergroup stereotypes and prejudices may become present. Scholars who have written on group processes and social categories conceive that relations between groups can be explained from an analysis of the social interaction or cognition processes (Tajfel (1981, 131). Brown (2000) writes that we rely on categories in our loves as we possess some characteristics in common with each other but also have some attributes that differentiate us. Categories
are based on similarities and differences (Brown 2000, 265). Categorization is a "cognitive construction in which individuals are classified according to some common properties and treated as essentially equivalent representations of the general category" (Brewer 199, 292).

The social categorization theory rests on two premises that include:

1 Tajfel realizes that "Individuals organize their understanding of the social world on the basis of categorical distinctions that transform continuous variables into discrete classes" (Brewer 199, 292). Therefore, "categorization has the effect of minimizing perceived differences within categories and accentuating intercategory differences" (Brewer 199, 292).

2 Since some specific individuals are themselves members of some social categories and not others, social categorization creates the ingroup-outgroup (we-they) distinctions (Brewer 199, 292). The author indicates that the two premises provide a framework in conceptualizing any social situation whereby the ingroup-outgroup categorization is made salient (Brewer 199, 292).

The social categorization theory represents a basic intergroup schema that possesses some very unique characteristic features such as:

**1 The intergroup accentuation principle:** this feature stipulates that "assimilation within category boundaries and contrast between categories such that all members of the ingroup are perceived to be more similar to the self than members of the outgroup" (Brewer 199, 292).
2 **Ingroup favoritism principle:** the feature states that "positive affect (trust, liking) is selectively generalized to fellow ingroup members but not outgroup members" (Brewer 199, 292).

3 **The social competition principle:** This feature indicates that "intergroup social comparison is associated with perceived negative interdependence between the ingroup and the outgroup" (Brewer 199, 292).

3.6.2.2 **Self-categorization theory**

Self-categorization theory refers to a theory of interpersonal and intergroup behavior where self-concept is central but fluctuates between personal and social identities. This means that when individuals' personal identity is salient, people see themselves as distinct individuals and focus on individual characteristics. On the other end, when a social identity is salient, individuals see themselves in similarity with other members of the social in-group, and their focus shifts from personal to in-group characteristics (Wyer 2010, 452). Self-categorization theory therefore explains group phenomena including social influence in the form of social identity processes. The theory stipulates that "people conform to positions perceived as normative for (stereotypical of) their group precisely because, in reflecting the agreement of similar others, such positions provide subjectively valid evidence about the external world" (Hogg, Turner and Davidson 1990, 79). This means that the theory explains group polarization in a way that defines one's own group in contrast to other groups within a specific social context (Hogg, Turner and Davidson 1990, 77).
Wyer writes that research on self-categorization has demonstrated that people are persuaded by messages they get from in-group members than by messages from the out-group (Wyer 2010, 452). This reflects the idea that "under conditions which render an ingroup psychologically salient, people conform to the ingroup norm" (Hogg, Turner and Davidson 1990, 79). In terms of self-categorization, the defining features of a group, its norms and stereotypes characterize the ingroup's qualities, but at the same time distinguish the ingroup from other groups, ultimately maximizing differences between ingroups and outgroups. Therefore, "the actual position of the ingroup norm is a tradeoff between minimization of intragroup differences and maximization of intergroup differences" (Hogg, Turner and Davidson 1990, 80).

Self-categorization is a conformity phenomenon in which "individuals who identify with a group conform through the process of self-categorization to the local norm which best represents the group (Hogg, Turner and Davidson 1990, 80). This means that "whether the ingroup norm is polarized or not depends on the social comparative context within which the ingroup defines itself" (Hogg, Turner and Davidson 1990, 80). Consequently, "ingroup confronted by a risky outgroup will polarize toward caution, an ingroup confronted by a cautious outgroup will polarize toward risk, and an ingroup in the middle of the social frame of reference, confronted by both risky and cautious outgroups, will not polarize but will converge on its pretest mean (Hogg, Turner and Davidson 1990, 80).

2.6.2.3 Optimal distinctiveness
Brewer writes that optimal distinctiveness posits that "social identity is derived from two opposing motivational systems that govern the relations between self-concept and membership in social groups" (Brewer 1996, 296). Therefore, optimal distinctiveness focuses primarily on how individual motives impact someone and how it can navigate one's group memberships (Slotter, Duffy and Gardener 2014, 72). Brewer identifies that the motives driven by optimal distinctiveness theory represent opposing systems as they are activated by the same categorization function. When one motive is satisfied, the other is more likely to be activated (Brewer 1996, 296). The theory reflects a belief that "the first motivational construct is a need for assimilation and inclusion, a desire for belonginess that motivates immersion in social groups. The second is a need for differentiation from others that operates in opposition to the need for immersion" (Brewer 1996, 296).

Optimal distinctiveness theory suggests that individuals must reconcile two competing motivations, that is: "the motivation to feel affiliated with their group and similar to other group members and the motivation to feel independent and distinct from others within their group" (Slotter, Duffy and Gardener 2014, 72). According to the optimal distinctiveness model, "as inclusiveness increases, the need for inclusion is satisfied, but the need for differentiation is activated; conversely, as inclusiveness decreases, the differentiation need is reduced, but the need for assimilation is activated" (Brewer 1996, 296).
The practical problem is that "individuals are anxious and dissatisfied with either too much distinctiveness (uniqueness) or too much inclusiveness" (Brewer 1996, 296). Most importantly, in the model of optimal distinctiveness, both motivational needs are activated as a result of social categorization. It is conceived that "Persons can be categorized (by self or others) into categories that vary in the level of inclusiveness, ranging from categorization at the level of the unique individual to categorization at the level of the entire human species" (Brewer 1996, 296). According to the optimal distinctiveness model, "social identification will be maximized when social category boundaries are clearly defined enough to insure both inclusion and exclusion" (Brewer 1996, 296). It is conceived that "Only distinctive social categorizations, where ingroup membership is secure and differentiation from outgroups is unambiguous, can achieve the necessary balance between opposing social motives and engage intense group loyalty and attachment" (Brewer 1996, 296). With positive distinctiveness, people define themselves in terms of the in-group and not as the individual; this kind of salience of social identity can lead to a belief in the supremacy of goals and values of the in-group over personal goals and values to the extent that people may be ready to ignore conflicts they face within the group in situations of threat to in-group and ready themselves to unite against out-groups (Korostelina 2007, p. 73). These relations between groups are shaped by the social boundary and its permeability. I explore the theory of social boundaries in the next section.

2. 6. 3 Theories of social boundaries (Tilly)
The study of boundaries in social life has interested many in social sciences. Tilly (2005) identifies that "social boundaries interrupt, divide, circumscribe, or segregate distributions of populations or activity within social fields" (Tilly 2005, 133). Social boundaries may be implicit and are essential in forming categories (Swarts 2011, 456). The author writes that social boundaries preserve "inequality among groups defined by class, race, gender, sexual orientation, and other distinctions associated with unequal status, resources, and opportunities" (Swarts 2011, 456). For instance, research on culture and collective identity in social movement organizations show that social movements distinguish between insiders ("us") and outsiders ("them"). This differentiation often leads movements such as those of stigmatized identity groups to turn the tables on outsiders (Swarts 2011, 456).

According to Tilly, what creates boundaries between clusters of population includes interruptions, divisions that may occur between the parties, or pure segregation that one group may feel coming from the other (Tilly 2005, 132). This means that social interaction between groups is organized around "the formation, transformation, activation, and suppression of social boundaries;" these are perceived as steps of boundary change (Tilly 2005, 132). Tilly therefore writes that under these circumstances the "Us-Them boundaries" becomes a concern. The author subscribes to the beliefs that the Us-Them social boundary change can happen at a small scale – that is at an interpersonal level where "interpersonal dialogue" takes place – at the medium scale – where "rivalry within organizations" is seen – and at large scale that can lead to a horrible outcome such as genocide (Tilly 2005, 132). Boundary change happens at different levels
and different ways; Tilly (2005) specifies that this noticeable distinction must be highlighted. He states that there are clusters of mechanisms that precipitate boundary change. These are different from those that constitute boundary change and that are responsible for producing its direct effects (Tilly 2005, 132).

Tilly includes citizenship in his notion of boundary; he contends that citizenship is "a fundamental process of boundary drawing, inclusion, and exclusion" (Tilly 2005, 174). It is this notion of boundary that makes more sense in this study, though other aspects already discussed above or that I explore below also have significant implications for the study of Uvira conflict. The conflict between the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru exhibit some dynamics of which one group (the Banyamulenge) see their citizenship rights and commitment to Congo statehood questioned by their rival tribes with the Banyamulenge feeling that they are deliberately being excluded from the Congolese society. Tilly writes that "we must understand citizenship not as a sentiment or a cluster of beliefs but as an organized set of social ties: rights and obligations connecting people who fall under the power of particular state with agents of that state" (Tilly 2005, 173). The author stipulates that "In citizenship, those rights and obligations apply broadly to whole categories of persons rather than varying from one individual to the next" (Tilly 2005, 173).

2. 6. 3.1 Tilly's eight compelling arguments about boundaries formation and change

Tilly underscores the eight points below to illustrate the boundaries' phenomena; the points are listed as articulated by the author.
1 The creation, activation, and transformation of social boundaries – boundary change for short – belong to a crucial, general social process depending on similar mechanisms over a wide variety of circumstances.

2 When a social boundary comes into being, it includes not only a dividing line but also relations on each side of the line, relations across the line, and shared stories about those relations.

3 Public politics invariably involves creation, activation, and transformation of visible us-them boundaries, as well as reversal of those processes: destruction, deactivation, or restoration of us-them boundaries.

4 Political actors including government always acquire investments in us-them boundaries and/or programs for their alteration.

5 Every act of political inclusion consists of creating, activating, or transforming an us-them boundary, and thus inevitably twins with an act of political exclusion.

6 Indeed, political boundaries often first come into being as defense of insiders against presumably threatening outsiders.

7 The process by which political boundaries change define the conditions, if any, under which individuals and groups can then cross the boundaries in either direction, hence who will next be the included and excluded.

8 The principles apply notably to citizenship, a fundamental process of boundary drawing, inclusion, and exclusion across much of the world over the last two centuries (Tilly 2005, 173-174).

2.6.3.2 Why worry about citizenship boundary?

Countries establish constitutions that basically set rights and obligations for those who are regarded as citizens of the country. Therefore, citizenship by itself become an impermeable boundary between those who are regarded as citizens – having rights and obligations to the country – and the noncitizens – who are deprived of certain rights and
obligations. Though some rights and obligations may apply to everyone, very specific ones only apply to citizens alone (Tilly 2005, 194). For instance, the authors indicate that "Almost all constitutions define a special subset of citizens who are eligible for high public offices" (Tilly 2005, 193). The author goes further writing that in practice "all states compromise citizenship significantly in two ways: " first the state distinguishes "among categories and degrees of citizenship that imply different rights, obligations and relations to authorities" (Tilly 2005, 192). Second, the state advertises as general rights and obligations "arrangements that actually differ significantly in their applicability to various segments of the state's subject population" (Tilly 2005, 192). Thus Tilly states that citizenship will likely continue to be one of the forms of boundaries in today's world. He contends citizenship continues to be contested even in well-established parliamentarian democracies such as Ecuador, Indonesia, Israel and Nigeria (Tilly 2005, 198). Consequently, the author states that "without broad, relatively equal, binding, well-protected citizenship, however, democracy will flourish nowhere" (Tilly 2005, 198). Tilly expresses concerns that citizenship will likely continue to be an issue as today's poorer countries may continue to face challenges in their efforts to craft new forms of citizenship (Tilly 2005, 198).

2.6.3.3 Mechanisms of social boundaries

As far as the mechanisms of social boundaries are concerned, Tilly says that there are some mechanisms that cause or precipitate boundary change, and others that constitute
the boundary change (Tilly 2005, 135). These mechanisms of boundary change can happen individually or in combination with others (Tilly 2005, 135). Therefore, for Tilly, mechanisms that cause boundary change include "encounter, imposition, borrowing, conversation, and incentive shift" (Tilly 2005, 135-136). Mechanisms that constitute boundary change include "inscription, erasure, activation, deactivation, site transfer, and relocation" (Tilly 2005, 135-136). I discuss each mechanism and state the ones that are more useful for this research.

I begin with a diagram below on causal relations in social boundary mechanisms.
Mechanisms of social boundaries and effects

2.6.3.3.1 Mechanisms precipitating boundary change

*Encounter:* When members of two separate groups – with no previous connection – or who were indirectly linked groups, enter into a social space and begin interacting, they somehow form a social boundary during the contact setting. These groups manifest
their distinctiveness at their encounter with insider-outsider boundary taking shape. The practical problem in this mechanism Tilly says is that in some cases, members of truly unconnected networks rarely interact. Under such circumstances, absolutely pure cases of boundary change through contact hardly occur (Tilly 2005, 138-139). However, the author writes that with the combination of other causal mechanisms, contact plays a significant role in boundary change. He goes further stating that as interaction intensifies over time between clusters of groups that had no previous connections, boundaries between these become more salient and when the interaction decreases, boundaries becomes less salient (Tilly 2005, 138-139).

**Imposition:** In this mechanism, authorities may draw lines where they did not exist in the past distinguishing between members of a society. For instance, they may distinguish between citizens and foreigners, Christians from those with no religious affiliations. In doing so, the imposition of social norms frequently produce boundary change as authorities put in place new systems of top-down control. (Tilly 2005, 139). In addition, imposition may also occur in a much smaller scale or for a short period of time. Though authorities who impose these kinds of boundaries may later terminate them, the rescinded mechanisms may leave traces of its existence in the society to the extent that even when authorities no longer back the boundaries, they will still have some asymmetrical effects (Tilly 2005, 139).

**Borrowing:** People creating new organizations embrace some forms of distinctions that are already visible in other organizations. So by repeating the hurting or damaging distinctions, borrowing indirectly encourages inequality between members of
different social categories. For instance, those creating organizations such as schools, banks or armies embrace established models in recruiting using categories such as gender, race, ethnicity, or religion. Though these organizations are not responsible for the invention of the boundary in question, they are actually implanting the already existing boundary into a new location.

**Conversation:** This includes ordinary talks among previously unlinked groups but are taken to further steps of wide range of interactions. Using a broad meaning, conversation in this form is a setting where exchanges of information modify relations among groups continuously but bit by bit. The shared information may include words, symbols, actions, reactions, and expressions of emotions (Tilly 2005, 140). Though conversation has many other effects, it is regarded as boundary-causing mechanism; however, the boundary change occurs incrementally at a small or large scale. The change takes place bit by bit as previously unconnected groups engage in fruitful conversation that changes their relations (Tilly 2005, 140). Tilly's description of conversation can be regarded by others involved in peace efforts as intergroup dialogue.

**Incentive shift:** Groups participating in boundary processes may be rewarded or punished as they pursue within-boundary relations or cross-boundary relations. In the process, group members may receive cooperation from other individuals found on the same side of a boundary or receive threats from those across the boundary. This means that changes in boundary-maintaining incentives most often cause boundary change (Tilly 2005, 140). As people engage in cooperative exercise, especially in dangerous circumstances, they can signal some fear or defection that could easily escalate into mood
of panic or self-protection. Under such circumstances, increases in guarantees that the other group will meet its commitments with regard to the bargaining will likely increase incentives within in-group members; however, decreases in guarantees will ultimately reduce incentives for cooperation (Tilly 2005, 140).

2.6.3.3.2 Mechanisms constituting boundary changes

The following are mechanisms constituting boundary change:

**Inscription-Erasure:** Inscription mechanism increases elements of social boundaries that include "distinctive social relations on either side of an intermediate zone, distinctive relations across that zone, and, on each side, shared representations of that zone itself" (Tilly 2005, 143). Basically, inscription differentiates "social relations on either side more sharply from each other" while Erasure reverses or erases any of the changes that take place (Tilly 2005, 143). In other words, inscription increases "social relations and representations that comprises a particular boundary" while Erasure eliminates them (Tilly 2005, 143).

**Activation-Deactivation:** Individuals in society live with social boundaries that can be activated or deactivated at different levels. Therefore, activation of social boundary refers to the boundary becoming salient as an organizer of social relations while deactivations refers to the actual decline of the boundary's salience (Tilly 2005, 143-144).
**Site transfer:** In this mechanism, the boundary is maintained but shifts the locations of people and social sites. This means that people can transfer across boundaries without erasing the actual boundaries. For instance, in religious conversion, people can move from one side of boundaries to the other without erasing them.

**Relocation:** This mechanism is a combination of two or more mechanisms that constitute boundary change. When this combination occurs, it may lead to the deactivation of a particular boundary while activating the other. An example for this could be that at a work place, gender divisions may go away when work divisions become more salient (Tilly 2005, 146).

Tilly then conclude by writing that boundary change causes some very serious consequences in social interaction settings. Boundary changes he says "facilitates or inhibits exploitation of one category by another …. It facilitates or inhibits mobilization in the forms of social movements or popular rebellions … it strongly affects the likelihood, intensity, scale, and form of collective violence" (Tilly 2005, 146-147).

The exploration of boundary creation or transformation interests this research to a greater extent. Most importantly, the encounter, conversation, incentive shift, and borrowing mechanisms that precipitate boundary change are of particular interest to this research knowing that the two important themes of this research are contact and empathy. Also, there is still room to create incentives for both groups to commit to peace while also enabling authorities to change course on policies of the past that have not been beneficial to encourage coexistence in Uvira. How do we encourage the process of breaking intergroup social boundaries in order to promote peaceful coexistence? Groups
may establish social boundaries creating distances, and to some degree leading to complete separation of rival groups' members. The presence of social boundaries between groups may make coexistence hard to achieve. Consequently, in internal rivalries or conflicts, groups also tend to take positions based on their self-interests. For instance, cases involving territorial claims, lead to potential conflict, especially when the parties in conflict each have legitimate claims on the disputed land, as in the case of eastern DRC where the Bafivafuliru and Banyamulenge both claim legitimacy over the disputed territory of Mulenge. In such a situation, rival groups may establish some boundaries and show no commitment to cooperate in resolving their differences over the disputed territory. In other terms, the boundaries between these groups remain intact and don't move.

Researchers that cover conflicts involving territorial disputes see that the practical problem with these types of conflict settings is that "the ethnic group’s homeland often overlaps with the homeland of one or more neighboring groups" (Fuhrmann & Tir 2009, 310-311). The authors say that under such circumstances "the groups see little room for compromise over this land; it is not something that can be divided, shared, or substituted for with another piece of territory" (Fuhrmann and Tir 2009, 310-311). In these types of conflicts, minority and majority groups clash. Therefore, Fuhrmann and Tir (2009), for instance, believe that “maintaining the identity is a sensitive issue for minority groups living on land over which another group has sovereignty; such situations potentially bring into question the groups’ ability to freely and in perpetuity express their identity” (Fuhrmann and Tir 2009, 310). The authors further state that the minority group found in
such a situation only "wants sovereign control over what it sees as its homeland territory, because the land is the protector and ultimate expression of its identity" (Fuhrmann and Tir 2009, 310).

Also, Gurr (1994) explores the notion of communal contenders when analyzing some types of ethnic conflicts. The author writes that communal contenders are ethnic groups that are particularly concerned about seeking to share political power in governments rather than demanding autonomy or independence. However, Gurr (1994) states that a communal group that demands secession could be asked to join a government coalition. The author then indicates that two strategies may be of interest in such situation including persuading communal leaders to accept sharing of power with government elite, or else the group may be granted some form of regional autonomy in a federal political system. Gurr (1994) also stresses that there are cases where ethnic minorities actually coexist amicably with others within states' established boundaries. The author argues that if peaceful relations then prevails for long period of time among people, then the identity separating the ethnic groups could eventually weaken.

Daniel Serwer and Patricia Thomson (2007) have also demonstrated that people in society emerging from conflict care little to be reconciled with those who killed, tortured, or maimed their families and friends. Lederack addresses the above claim with a different approach. Unlike Serwer and Thomson, Lederack believes that reconciliation can happen no matter what the circumstances. Reconciliation, he says “represents a place, the point of encounter where concerns about both the past and the future can meet…opportunity must therefore be given for the people to look forward and envision
their shared future” (Lederack 2002, 27). He adds that “reconciliation is not pursued by seeking innovative ways to disengage or minimize the conflicting group’s affiliations, but instead is built on mechanisms that engage the sides of a conflict with each other as humans-in-relationship” (Lederack 2002, 26). Yet, it is crucial to note the process of engaging people to build their relations after having experienced a bitter past is not a simple task as Lederack would envision or like to see. In most complex conflict situations, as in the eastern DRC, the breaking of social boundaries between intergroup members has proven thus far to be challenging.

Korostelina’s insights on the issue of intergroup boundaries also add more light to the debate. Korostelina indicates that a threat to intergroup boundaries is also a source of negative perception of members of outgroups (Korostelina, 2013, 33). The author indicates that if social borders between ingroup and outgroup members are shaky, people of each group will likely be ready to defend the "distinctiveness" of their own group when they are concerned about the group’s future. In this situation, group members show collective emotional responses to defend themselves (Korostelina 2013, 32). In the case of the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru in Uvira, they have taken up arms against one another, each group defending what it believes is dear to it, and that’s the territory of Mulenge, which each claims ownership.

2.6.4 Challenges for Us-Them Boundaries
Parties in conflict that have differences in solving their problems can create social boundaries. Again, such positioning seen between conflict parties makes it harder to break already established social boundaries unless a more proactive sense of intervention is put in place to help communities deal with their differences to end hostility against one another. However, breaking the existing groups’ social boundaries to facilitate intergroup coexistence poses some significant challenges in some cases, especially in post-conflict areas. More scholarly investigation is needed in this area. For instance, how intergroup empathy can play a role in improving intergroup relations in places where social boundaries are wider remains to be seen.

Given what is said about the formation, transformation, activation or suppression of social boundaries, Tilly asks a set of puzzling questions regarding social boundary change. Why and how do boundaries that at some points appear to matter little or at all for social life, suddenly become salient bases of interaction to an extent that people who live peacefully with some differences today begin killing across the same boundary tomorrow? (Tilly 2005, 132-133). In the case of Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge, why is it that before the 1996 war, the two groups lived peacefully with some differences began to kill one another post-1996? Tilly goes further asking why and how do unbreakable boundaries suddenly become irrelevant or less salient? How do divisions between “us” and “them” change to a point that yesterday's enemies become today's allies and vice versa? (Tilly 2005, 132-133). I found these puzzling questions logical and interesting, as they speak to what I am investigating on intergroup coexistence, especially the last puzzle, which must answer how divisions (social boundaries) between groups can
change so that yesterday's enemies become allies. In other words, how can we encourage coexistence to take place in places where conflicts have broken the social fabric? This goes back to the fundamental question I posed; how do we encourage the process of breaking intergroup social boundaries in order to promote peaceful coexistence? This research sheds more light on this puzzle in the discussion chapter.

3.6.5 Summary

This section looked into the role that social identity and boundaries play in group processes. I discussed how groups' social categorization whether seen in the eye of self-categorization or distinctiveness help us understand how rival groups relate to one another. In this process, in-group and outgroup dynamics materialize. In self-categorization, both personal and group identity may become salient. When individuals' personal identity is salient, people see themselves as distinct individuals and focus on individual characteristics. On the other end, when a social identity is salient, individuals see themselves in similarity with other members of the social in-group, and their focus shifts from personal to in-group characteristics (Wyer 2010, 452). Also, intergroup relations are affected by the processes of favorable comparison and competition to the extent that people favor in-group and show love to in-group members while disassociating with outgroup members by exhibiting hostility against them. In other terms, social categorization can also take the form of distinctiveness where in-group members compare themselves with outgroup members. Here two opposing motivational
systems arise; therefore, optimal distinctiveness theory suggests that individuals must reconcile the two competing motivations, that is: "the motivation to feel affiliated with their group and similar to other group members and the motivation to feel independent and distinct from others within their group" (Slotter, Duffy and Gardener 2014, 72). Here, when inclusiveness increases, the need for inclusion is satisfied, however the need for differentiation is immediately activated. When inclusiveness decreases, the need for differentiation is reduced, therefore activating the need for assimilation (Brewer 1996, 296).

I also looked at the effects of social boundaries; groups establish social boundaries that separate them ultimately making coexistence hard to achieve. Tilly articulated some questions among others incluing how do divisions between groups change to a point that yesterday's enemies become today's or tomorrow's allies? In my view, if boundaries between groups remain intact and cannot be transformed or suppressed to facilitate coexistence among adversaries, I suspect that a mere presence of intergroup encounter or conversation (two of the mechanisms causing boundary change) will probably do little to bring the separated people together. People may be willing to enter into contact and have a conversation, but if they do not, for instance, establish trust among themselves or tear down previously unbreakable boundaries (citizenship boundary) to transform their bitter relations, the border issues separating or isolating them may continue to exist and hinder coexistence. In cases such as these, a mere expression of intergroup empathy or engaging on intergroup contact may have less effects to bring true coexistence between the adversaries. Expressing intergroup empathy
and willingness to reconcile is one thing, but acting on that willingness to resolve groups' past differences is another. This is why mechanisms such as positive encounters – with less intergroup anxiety –, sustainable conversation of fruitful engagement and incentive shift where there are guarantees that the other group will honor its commitment to rebuilding relations, may very well reflect complex issues related to legitimacy of the other, power and cooperation. Next, I will discuss other cognitive and emotional theories.

2. 7 COGNITIVE AND EMOTIONAL THEORIES (COGNITIVE FACTORS)

3.7.1 Congruence/incongruence

What does past bitter conflict-driven animosity between adversaries tell us about the difficulty to coexist? I have indicated earlier that groups' contact and expression of mutual empathy and willingness to reconcile is one thing, but acting on that willingness to resolving groups' past differences is another. Groups' collective past may explain their present and their future. Fernald's congruence and incongruence concept can speak to this concept. The author stipulates that under certain conditions in which a person is raised, experiences may not be incorporated into the self-concept of the individual. There is a time that, even in the adult life, experiences can be resisted or completely ignored (Fernald 2008, 192). Fernald says that when there are minor discrepancies between a positive self-concept and the daily experience, a person experiences 'congruence.' Under this condition, the person experiences some harmony in life and sees a sense of integration (Fernald 2008, 192).
On the contrary, when the discrepancy is large or a self-concept is negative, the person experiences 'incongruence’. Here, the person's self-concept remains closed to the experience (Fernald 2008, 192). Possibly, a self-concept is also at odds with an experience, and there appears in this condition to be no sense of integration (Fernald 2008, 192). Fernald says that incongruence is the result of what occurred early in life (Fernald 2008, 214).

Fernald's notion of incongruence can also help us understand the behavior displayed by the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge. Members of the two communities express the willingness to address their differences, but their expressions do not match their day-to-day, real-life experience, as they struggle to establish peaceful coexistence. The members of these two communities interact less even if they express empathy for one another. Did the early life experience – such as bitter competition between members of the two communities allow the development of negative stereotypes for one another and lead members of the groups to a lack of desire to coexist? Also, are there intergroup social boundaries that prohibit the rival groups' members from fully integrating the new sense of affection that they express now in their search for coexistence? Does the desire to build relations not manifest because the members’ new concept about expression of empathy is at odds with their early life experience (a high level of hatred seen in the past?). Maybe it means, as Fernald said, that there is a large discrepancy between the positive self-concept and early life experience. It translates into something like this: Yes, we want to reconcile, but – sorry – we still remember what you did to us. Does the early life experience play a bigger role in the
behavior exhibited between members of the two groups today? Has this phenomenon led members of the two communities not to be open in to full integration because their self-concepts remain closed to their experience?

2.7.2 Frustration-aggression and relative deprivation theories

2.7.2.1 Frustration-aggression

When separation is seen and possible social boundaries are created, individual groups' collision may emerge and members of the in-group could try to deal with a threat they perceive to be facing and that comes from the other (outgroup). The frustration-aggression theory can also be used to describe some forms of the past and hostile attitude seen between the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru. The frustration-aggression theory can help us understand the behavior exhibited by members of the two different groups. This theory stipulates that when people are frustrated about a situation they believe is hindering them from obtaining their rights, justice, or the goal they want to achieve, the frustrated individuals are likely to engage in aggressive behavior to accomplish that particular goal (Bordens 2001, 414). In other terms, the theory entails that when one needs something, but one's ability to get that something is blocked by the other, the situation can produce or create an emotional state that can lead to aggression (Bordens 2001, 414). Biological theories also argue that people behave aggressively because it is adaptive for them to do so, enabling them to protect their genes by ensuring their survival (Crisp and Turner 2007, 226).
Is it because members of one group (Banyamulenge) are still frustrated with the way members of an outgroup treat them (see them as foreigners) that they somehow struggle to coexist? Does ingroup frustration continue to play a role in the behavior of ingroup members, so they become reluctant to rebuild their relations with members of the neighboring group even though they all openly express willingness to end their differences? Though the notion of frustration-aggression theory can help us understand, for instance, the intergroup behavior, other concepts can be examined here such as relative deprivation theory to further explore the reasons why these communities act the way they do. It is possible that the phenomenon related to intergroup relations—especially when competition exists—may also explain the behavior of these rival groups.

2.7.2.2 Relative deprivation

This is a perception in which one group or clusters of groups within a society feel that they are being deprived of something that the neighboring groups around them enjoy. Pettigrew et al. (2011) write that during intergroup contact, the sense of relative deprivation can be activated by the minority group when they learn during the contact setting of something that the majority possesses, but that it is itself being denied. The minority always feels that this deprivation is unjust and must end. This sense of group relative deprivation revolts the deprived party who in turn may embark on a protest for change (Pettigrew 2011 et al., 278). Therefore, relative deprivation is referred "as a judgment that one or one’s ingroup is disadvantaged compared to a relevant referent, and
that this judgment invokes feelings of anger, resentment, and entitlement" (Smith and Pettigrew 2015, 2).

Four basic components of relative deprivation manifest themselves during this process. This means that people who experience relative deprivation a) make cognitive comparisons, b) make cognitive appraisal that they or their ingroup are disadvantaged, c) perceive these disadvantage as unfair, and d) they feel bitter about these unfair and undeserved disadvantages (Smith and Pettigrew 2015, 2). The authors indicate that if any of these four requirements is not met, then relative deprivation is not taking place (Smith and Pettigrew 2015, 2). Thus, relative deprivation brings "a subjective state that shapes emotions, cognitions, and behavior (Smith and Pettigrew 2015, 2).

Other scholars articulate the notion of relative deprivation to differentiate the degree of effects it may have. They say that "people protest and rebel against their condition not when they are deprived in an absolute sense but when they "feel" deprived relative to some comparison persons or groups" (Guimond and Dube-Simard 1983, 526). The authors distinguish between personal and group deprivation; they call personal deprivation 'egoistic deprivation' as they see in this type of deprivation some forms of personal discontent that happens when a person compares his/her own situation to that of other individuals who may be from in-group or out-group. They call the group deprivation 'fraternal deprivation'; in this type, the discontent is experienced at the group level. It is a social discontent which takes place when a person compares her group's situation to that of the neighboring group (Guimond and Dube-Simard 1983, 526). The authors conclude that researchers who have been critical of the effect that relative
deprivations have in groups’ relations have primarily looked at the egoistic deprivation. They conclude that fraternal deprivation, which mostly arise from unfavorable intergroup comparison should be able to be linked to militants’ attitude and behavior. (Guimond and Dube-Simard 1983, 526).

Smith and Pettigrew make similar claims in their paper titled Advances in Relative Deprivation Theory and Research. In there, they examine seven papers that researched the theory. They found much support for the distinctiveness of relative deprivation between what they called individual relative deprivation and group relative deprivation. For individual relative deprivation, they write that the individual compares oneself as a unique person and another, while in group relative deprivation, the comparison is between one's ingroup and another (Smith and Pettigrew 2015, 2). They state that both forms of relative deprivation lead to a variety of outcomes from "collective action, prejudice, and felt grievance to political conservatism, perceived well-being and satisfaction with the government" (Smith and Pettigrew 2015, 2).

In addition, scholars such as Ted Robert Gurr who developed the theory of collective violence based on relative deprivation have abandoned it or modified the theory from its original concept following some negative results of empirical tests over the theory. These now contend that relative deprivation could no longer be considered the primary cause of collective violence, but they acknowledge that it may be a significant contributing factor under certain circumstances (Brush 1996, 524). The author states that the theory of collective violence based on relative deprivation has been replaced by other hypotheses such as "the capacity of dissidents to mobilize resources for action against the
regime and their rational of strategy to achieve a specific goal under particular social circumstances" (Brush 1996, 524). Guimond and Dube-Simard (1983) as well as Smith and Pettigrew's position on the theory of relative deprivation makes more sense for this research. Their distinction of egoistic (individual) versus fraternal (group) deprivation can also be tested in this study given the dynamics of Uvira conflict where one group, the Banyamulenge as a whole feels deprived of the citizenship rights that they believe they are entitled to. I next discuss appraisal theory which like relative deprivation, creates emotional state.

2.7.3 Appraisal theory

As noted before, cases involving territorial claims lead to potential conflict, especially when the parties in conflict each have legitimate claims on the disputed land, such as is the case between the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru who contest the area of Mulenge in Uvira. For this reasons, I further ask an additional question: Does a feeling of emotional connection to the land hinder cooperation when one group is denied land it believes it has right to? The appraisal theory by Bar-Tal can also speak to the conflict dynamics for the case of the eastern DRC.

As with the incongruence concept, the appraisal theory complements the frustration-aggression theory for the case of eastern DRC in the sense that the theory speaks about the role of emotion in conflict situations and how emotion can influence group collective beliefs and attitudes, as well as behaviors with regard to war or peace (Bar-Tal 2011, 87).
In this theory, Bar-Tal argues that "emotional sentiments and emotions contribute to the formation of specific attitudinal and behavioral responses to conflict related event" (Bar-Tal 2011, 87). The author adds that "the process begins with the occurrence of a new event and/or appearance of new information related to the conflict and/or the recollection of past conflict related event" (Bar-Tal 2011, 87). This means that group members' emotional reactions depend not on the specific characteristics of the event that produces itself, but rather on the way the members interpret and evaluate what is happening to them. As in frustration-aggression theory, members react to a stimulus, and they can interpret the situation in a way that fits with the group collective narratives (Bar-Tal 2011, 87). I sense that when in-group members bind together to protect their identity or deal with a threat they see coming from the outgroup, in-group members’ protection mechanisms may have an impact on how they seek to build positive relationships with outgroup members as they enter into contact with them.

Does past bitter conflict hinder the prospect for reconciliation and coexistence? Bar-Tal’s appraisal theory makes perfect sense for this research, as it speaks about the role of emotion in conflict situations and how emotion can influence group collective beliefs, attitudes, and also behaviors with regard to war or peace (Bar-Tal 2011, 87). Is the expression of intergroup empathy and willingness to reconcile between the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge just emotional but mean nothing about these groups' willingness to coexist? Is it possible that these groups are reacting to their bitter past and hostility so that, despite the fact that they express empathy for one another and willingness to reconcile, they in fact have no interest in or intention in coexisting? I shed
more light on these issues in the discussion chapter. The study provides a clear explanation about what hinders coexistence between the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge and also builds a case of what it takes to actually facilitate coexistence between these groups. I discuss tools for creating coexistence in the next section.

2.8 TOOLS FOR CREATING COEXISTENCE

2.8.1 Education as a tool for creating peaceful coexistence

If contact alone may not address the ongoing issues or facilitate better relations among groups, what other steps should be needed to foster coexistence? Some scholars, like Korostelina, suggest that more is needed such as getting the parties engaged in a variety of activities in order to reduce prejudice, stereotypes, and biases against one another (Korostelina 2007, 201). These activities include but are not limited to creating equal status among the two communities, allowing cooperative intergroup interaction or dialogue, and creating opportunity for personal acquaintances among group members (Korostelina 2007, 201).

Adding to what has been said about intergroup relations, Joseph Sherman also concludes through his analysis of a study he conducted for Liberia that the issue of ethnic rivalry can be linked with the question of "competing loyalties" (Sherman 2006, 2). The author stipulates that the best approach to dealing with group rivalries and improving their relationships, is to develop educational and cultural programs at the grassroots level
through which ethnic and cultural diversities can be appreciated and integrated into national unity (Sherman 2006, 2). For instance, history provides in-group members with the narratives that tell them who they are, from where they came, and where their futures lie (Korostelina 2013). Thus, the assumption for those supporting education models to fostering coexistence, stipulates that when one has sufficient information and facts about the outside group, the fact of simply having to know the other better could reduce prejudice, stereotypes, and intergroup tensions. Learning true facts about the other may make one experience a change of heart about the other (Weiner, 1998). This is why those involved in helping societies rebuild their social fabric after experiencing conflict, have opted for a variety of education programs such as education for coexistence in order to help rival groups deal with their bitter past and improve their relations.

Education for coexistence refers to "the process through which society members are supposed to acquire the beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors that are in line with the ideas of coexistence" (Bar-Tal, 2004, 261), such as teaching people to live together in harmony without violence while accepting the legitimacy of the other to exist in peace. Education for coexistence is most of the time a process of societal change; it is typically implemented for members of the society who have lived with differences or who hold ideas that contradict the principles of coexistence (Bar-Tal 2004).

Scholars have also demonstrated that education programs put in place to foster coexistence or peace pay off and contribute to facilitating improvement of intergroup relations. Education for coexistence, they charge, plays an important role in social change in places where people hold psychological attitudes that sometimes support conflict,
discrimination, exploitation, or racism (Bar-Tal, 2004). Social education can help change the existing rapport and facilitate a new state of intergroup relations (Bar-Tal 2004, 261). Breaking the cycle of conflict escalation and ameliorating relationships between adversaries requires a very comprehensive intervention. A conflict education program or curriculum that teaches about the conflict dynamics and constructive conflict resolution skills can facilitate the behavior and attitude change among worrying groups (Desivilya, 2004). The educational models also make sense for this research as efforts have been made in eastern DRC through mass media programs meant to generate discussions encouraging listeners on both sides of the conflict to consider tolerant opinion and outgroup perspectives just for the purpose of managing and reducing conflict (Paluck 2010, 1170). This paper discusses later about intergroup tolerance and acceptance.

2.8.1.1. Education for coexistence using school and societal approach

Differentiating between education for coexistence using a narrow school approach and a broad societal approach is crucial (Bar-Tal, 2004). The school approach focuses on education for coexistence within the school institutions; school systems are viewed as major agents of socialization but have limitations, as they cannot reach the whole society in promoting coexistence ideas (Bar-Tal, 2004). Therefore, the societal approach of education for coexistence is highly important. It does not limit itself to the school system, but looks into changing the psychological attitude of society at large because "a major societal change requires the participation of political, societal, and cultural institutions;
mass communication; leadership; and elites" (Bar-Tal 2004, 264). For instance, the mass media approach in eastern DRC is an example of education for coexistence using social approach.

Also, groups have collective narratives in conflict; they also have perceived histories, beliefs, own image and those of their adversaries. When the conflict parties are taught about issues, education can ultimately play an equally central role in fostering coexistence (Desivilya, 2004). Peace education also deals with groups' collective narratives, including deeply rooted historical memories and societal beliefs (Kupermintz and Salomon, 2005). Here adversaries are called upon to join peace education programs; they have incompatible and opposing priorities and agendas, including perceptions that must be taken into consideration. Using group processes through education programs can surmount the difficulties and establish some common ground (Kupermintz and Salomon, 2005).

2.8.1.2 Strengths and weaknesses of peace education

Do education programs help foster coexistence or facilitate peace? Though some have argued that they do, not everyone agrees about what education programs can do. Education programs such as peace coexistence present some strengths and weaknesses in creating social change. As far as the strength of peace education is concerned in a conflict setting, groups have different narratives, interpretations of facts, perceived histories, and beliefs. Therefore, education programs can at least provide the basis for understanding
the issues dividing members of the society. Though it could happen in some circumstances that education programs may not affect any social change, however, learning facts about the other is crucial (Weiner, 1998).

Misinformation about the other can create confusion and increase intergroup tensions. The opportunities for learning can make some difference, especially in that it can help members of the society shape their minds and acquire skills to deal with their differences (Chayes and Minow, 2003). If you can educate young people to respect others, to understand the significance of hatred, to avoid stereotyping others, to be equipped with tools to resolve disputes and differences, or to become peacemakers, hope can rise to prevent future violence (Chayes and Minow, 2003). Education for coexistence that teaches conflict resolution to young people is essential for strengthening their skills in resolving conflicts and promoting inclusive ideas of community in order to deal with ethnic and nationalistic indoctrination (Chayes and Minow 2003).

In addition, history education, for instance can create a culture of peace by not only promoting a much more tolerant and humane nation, but also promoting the values of peace, equality, and justice, while at the same time encouraging intergroup collective actions and social roles that lead to forgiveness and reconciliation (Korostelina, 2013). History education is valuable and bears positive effects when it facilitates transformation of intergroup perceptions and changes ingroup and outgroup behavior when legitimizing power structures that exist among the groups, and allows the mobilization of collective actions to take place (Korostelina, 2013).
There are also some weaknesses in what education programs can do in creating peaceful coexistence. For instance, Bar-Tal (2004) indicates that when negative relations among conflict parties are based on a group's ethnocentrism – a group’s central beliefs lies on its own superiority while seeing the other as inferior – education for coexistence may play a major role in changing the nature of the relations in this case. However, he stipulates that when negative relations come from intergroup conflict – conflicts that erupt because of opposing goals and interests between groups, especially over economy, religion, resources, values or territory – education for coexistence’s sake has less influence (Bar-Tal, 2004). The reason is that some conflicts may become intractable and last for years. They may become intense and violent, leading to profound animosity between groups or members of the society (Bar-Tal, 2004).

According to Bar-Tal, education programs may have less impact on promoting coexistence under these circumstances. Regarding intractable conflicts, it is believed that specific change needed by those using peace education cannot be achieved in places where antagonistic political events take place (Kupermintz and Salomon, 2005). Therefore, groups' motivation to participate, for example, in coexistence education may be influenced by the ongoing political climate. If the conflict is intractable and the polarization between community members intensifies, society members can experience conflict escalation, halting the desire to join coexistence programs addressing intergroup differences (Desivilya, 2004). History education in intractable conflicts can also impede coexistence or culture of peace. In some cases, history education can increase the acceptance of values, beliefs, and norms of in-group members by only promoting the
glories and self-esteem of the ingroup (Korostelina, 2013). History education can also increase acceptances of specific values of group members belonging to a particular culture (Korostelina, 2013). This imposition of ingroup values, beliefs, and norms can upset outgroup members and impede coexistence altogether. Furthermore, history education can justify very specific forms of intergroup relations by painting the history of relations between different social groups justifying the existing of social hierarchies as good, though it shows contradiction in value systems among ethnic, gender, racial, and religious groups (Korostelina, 2013). In such circumstances, the culture of peace will be far from being reached. I cover intergroup tolerance and acceptance in the next section.

2.8.2 Tolerance as tool to create peaceful coexistence

I discussed about Gaertner, Dovidio, and Bachman (1996) notion of common ingroup identity, a process, which creates a subordinate group, including in the circle outgroup members with the intent to cooperate on common goals. However, such inclusion will not take place if for instance a group does not tolerate the other. Therefore, on top of teaching coexistence, peace, and conflict, others also encourage promoting tolerance as a positive means to create peaceful coexistence. They argue that tolerance teaches members of society to live together with those with whom they have different cultural, religious beliefs or practices (Zembylas, 2011). Tolerance is the respect of difference one has with the other (Zembylas 2011, 387). Toleration is good for allowing groups to embrace coexistence, because it teaches members of the groups how to live together with those
they have differences, whether those differences are seen along lines of religion or cultural beliefs and practices (Zembylas 2011, 387). Tolerance "is conceptualized as either a lack of inclusion of both groups in a higher order category or as the representation of the inclusive category in such a way as to also include the other group and designate it as normative" (Wenzel and Mummendey 1999, 158).

The assumption is that when you promote tolerance so members of the society respect and accept their differences, you ultimately create coexistence and peace (Zembylas, 2011). Furthermore, tolerance and toleration as respect also play a big role in the groups' readiness for coexistence. Tolerance takes place when groups enter into contact but under conditions of proximate equality and interdependent goals (Hodson, et al.1994, 1,536). When one tolerates, one does not only accept the difference seen in the other for the sake of peace, but also does not interfere with the other who is different from him/her; while at the same time recognizing that others have rights, even though they previously did not exercise those rights (Zembylas 2011, 387). This research looks more toward the above elements of tolerance; the concept in which tolerance include accepting the other as they are by not interfering with their difference but also legitimize their rights, which were not previously exercised.

When considering social transformation, the question of how different social groups may live positively together and develop positive relationships with each other deserves more attention. The concept of tolerance and plurality that promote positive qualities of relationships must be studied with care. It should not be misunderstood that lack of social discrimination automatically means tolerance is present; the reason for this
is that prosocial behavior cannot be simply interpreted as lack of aggressive behavior (Wenzel and Mummendey 1999, 158).

At what point can we see tolerance is taking shape between groups? This will have to do with how groups deal with their differences. If the group's difference "is judged to be nonnormative and inferior, devaluation, discrimination, and hostility are likely response toward the outgroup. Judging the outgroup's difference to be normative as or positive leads to acceptance and appreciation of this group" (Wenzel and Mummendey 1999, 158). Therefore, tolerance may be possible if the ingroup accepts insurmountable differences of the outgroup (Wenzel and Mummendey 1999, 171).

Others write about tolerance in relation to ethnicity and minority groups. Ethnic tolerance or intolerance refers to whether "citizens support or oppose the rights of and civil liberties for ethnic minorities (Peter and Thomsen 2012, 163). Gibson for instance defines a tolerant citizen as "one who would not support unreasonable or discriminatory governmental restrictions on the rights of groups to participate in politics "(Peter and Thomsen 2012, 163-164). Gibson says to tolerate "is to allow" (Peter and Thomsen 2012, 163). Gibson addresses the rights if groups to participate in politics in his view about tolerance but others see that when dealing with ethnic minorities in today's world, the concept of tolerance must be extended to other complex issues such as the right to be different from the majority group on matters related to religion or culture or the right to social benefits (Peter and Thomsen 2012, 163).

Research supports the idea that contact leads to mutual acceptance between groups, but the contact-tolerance relationship is possible under conditions where self-
disclosure and symbolic threat must be dealt with (Peter and Thomsen 2012, 163). This means that self-disclosure and symbolic threat are facilitators of tolerance. Self-disclosure is a process of voluntary information exchange between in-group and outgroup members; however the information must be personal and intimate (Peter and Thomsen 2012, 162). The level of self-disclosure is important in terms of depth and breadth. For instance, "intimate information about marriage and political opinions is considered higher levels of disclosure than information about one’s music or clothing preferences. Self-disclosure breadth concerns the amount of time spent on taking about oneself" (Peter and Thomsen 2012, 163). It is important to stress that mutual self-disclosure is key element for mediating friendship; that is crucial for relations improvement (Peter and Thomsen 2012, 162). On the contrary, symbolic threat is viewed as "fear of harmful consequences which often are non-tangible" (Peter and Thomsen 2012, 163). In the concept of symbolic threat, the in-group always fears that if allowed to be included as members of the society, the out-group will undermine its cultural values that defines its collective identity and perhaps its self-image (Peter and Thomsen 2012, 163). So in order for tolerance to take place there must be mutual disclosure of personal and intimate information and the elimination or reduction of the symbolic threat. External threat brings anxiety in in-group, which responds by protecting itself from out-groups perceived to be source of the threat (Peter and Thomsen 2012, 163).
2.9 CONTACT MODEL FOR PEACE COEXISTENCE

Contact has been identified as mediator for improving intergroup relations. This research hypothesis states that a lack of cooperation between the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge could continue to be problematic for coexistence. It states that despite the presence of intergroup contact and empathy – the continued lack of sincere positive cooperation between the different groups and the inability of one group to accept the legitimacy (citizenship) of the other, may continue to worsen their relationships and ultimately hinder their ability to peacefully coexist. The assumption goes further stipulating that if the rival groups do not have common goals for the future – that's is one group does not recognize the right of its neighboring group to exist peacefully regardless of their differences – the groups' efforts to mend their past will likely have little impacts in building intergroup relations.

It is also crucial to indicate that as one group sees the other as illegitimate, if there continues to be is a lack of groups' interdependence and shared identity, building intergroup relations on coexistence bases could be challenging. For this research, I build on Brewer, Gaertner and Korostelina's ideas of intervention strategies addressing difficulties in improving groups' relations in complex situations. However, because different conflict situations require different prescription or intervention strategies, I provided a much more integrated framework unique to the case I investigated to filling in the gap of existing literature on contact and the role it plays in intergroup relations. Based on these discoveries from the research findings and literature, I developed a model which shows how negative factors of contact such as impermeable boundaries, absence of trust,
stereotyped other and intergroup prejudice, could create a negative atmosphere that may lead groups to engage in unwanted contact. These negative factors perhaps could also lead to superficial contact and groups may develop intergroup anxiety while making their collective threat salient in such a way that this atmosphere leads to negative contact ultimately leading to negative outcomes of intergroup coexistence. To remediate this situation, the presence of positive factors of contact would then be needed to offset the previous negative factors. In the new model, positive factors included groups’ interdependence and common in-group identity, legitimacy, power balance and forgiveness. The model stipulated that the presence of these positive factors of contact would create an atmosphere that could lead groups to begin to have high degree of cooperation, enhanced intergroup empathy, working on common goals, develop cross-group friendship, feel the sense of having equal status, perspective-taking accounts begin to make sense for the other and perhaps government support/institutional support can now begin to be accepted by all parties.

When there is a sense among intergroup members who begin to believe that without the other, they cannot succeed, it is only then that members of rival groups become motivated to cooperate. Most importantly, when members begin to realize that they share something special together, belong together to a great nation, and share common beliefs, they start to feel the sense of national unity that some scholars identify as creation of national identity (Korostelina 2007; Gaertner 1996). I propose the model below that is used to provide an explanation of current and future relations of the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge. Carrying out one factor—say for instance, cooperation—
while leaving out another, such as groups' interdependency or common identity, may not accomplish the required level for building the much-needed relations. This model will be used to understand what is needed to manage the conflict between the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru, and show the prescription for improving their relations that is key for coexistence.
Contact Model

Negative Contact:
- Superficial encounter
- Unwanted encounter
- Intergroup anxiety
- Collective Threat

Positive contact:
- High degree cooperation
- Equal status
- Common goals
- Cross-group friendship
- Perspective-taking
- Enhanced empathy
- Institutional support

Negative factors of contact:
- Absence of trust
- Impermeable boundaries
- Stereotyped other
- Intergroup prejudice

Positive factors of contact:
- Interdependency
- Common identity
- Legitimacy
- Power balance
- Truth
- Tolerance
- Forgiveness

Coexistence

Negative outcomes

Positive outcomes

Figure 4: Effects of contact
2.10 SUMMARY

This chapter covered the theoretical framework explaining the role that contact and empathy play in building intergroup relations. Scholars have suggested that both contact and empathy are effective in facilitating the improvement of intergroup relations; however some studies also found evidence of less or negative effects of contact or empathy in fostering peaceful coexistences. For instance, the contact theory stipulates that the more contacts in-group members have with members of the outgroup group, the better they begin to understand each other. In doing so, the encounters allow them to reduce their levels of prejudice and stereotypes. However, based on the findings of this research, I argue that mere contact is not enough to facilitate peaceful coexistence. Despite the fact that some contacts have taken place between the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru, little is known as to why they have not improved their relations. I recommends that researchers look beyond contact when investigating factors mediating intergroup relations. More investigation is needed to explore the effects of intergroup contact and empathy and their impact in building intergroup relations. I discussed what other scholars have suggested in this area including for instance exploring the notion of groups' interdependence, common identity, and common goals.

To understand the dynamics behind this dichotomy, I explored a variety of other theories, especially factors stated to be positive or negative in fostering coexistence that include legitimacy, power, trust, truth, identity, social boundary, and tolerance including tools encouraging coexistence such as peace education, education for coexistence and tolerance. Exploring both factors and tools that facilitate and hinder coexistence, inspired
this research to propose the above model that can be used in Uvira and other parts of the world, especially the Great Lakes Region of Africa, experiencing similar conflict dynamics – to manage conflicts. The model addresses the gaps found in the existing literature regarding the role contact and empathy plays in facilitating coexistence. I discuss Uvira conflict background in the next chapter.
Chapter 3

UVIRA CONFLICT BACKGROUND

3.1 The issue of Banyamulenge citizenship

The issue regarding the citizenship of the Banyamulenge remains a hot topic in the DRC as of the time this research was conducted in 2016. Though the Banyamulenge claim the right of the Congolese citizenship – citing that they are citizens like other tribes living in eastern DRC – their attempt continues to be contested by other indigenous neighboring ethnic groups who call them foreigners from Rwanda (Saibel 2012, 4). The issue of citizenship for the Banyamulenge can be traced back from the time they migrated to the DRC from Rwanda. The time period of the Banyamulenge migration to the eastern DRC is somehow also controversial as different accounts have been stated.

Some scholars have traced back their arrival in 1885 at the time of the partition of Africa at the Berlin conference (Kadari, Katchelewa and Ntendetchi 1996). Deng writes that the Banyarwanda who are of Rwandan Hutu and Tutsi descent arrived in eastern DRC during the colonial period, when the DRC was called Congo Free State and was administered by King Leopold II of Belgium (Saibel 2012, 3). The Banyamulenge are a sub-group of Banyarwanda but who are of Tutsi origin and who at various point in history settled in DRC South Kivu Province (Saibel 2012, 3), particularly in Mulenge territory located in Uvira district. After migrating to the then Free Congo State during the colonial period, "the Banyarwanda were granted land in the Congo Free State from the
Belgians, who did not see them as ‘foreign natives’, since Rwanda was also a Belgian colony” (Saibel 2012, 3).

Others have indicated that a group of Banyamulenge came to the eastern DRC in the 1960's as they ran from the turmoil in Rwanda (Saibel 2012, 3). As the Banyamulenge seek to be accepted and legitimized as citizens of the DRC, their struggle however has come with high price. Tensions have been high between the Banyamulenge and the Bavibafuliru for decades sometimes taking the form of violent conflict between these groups. This identity conflict has taken other dimensions that also include land despite/land conflict between the Banyamulenge and the Bavibafuliru. As the Banyamulenge settled in the 'Hauts Plateaux' area of Uvira territory that also include Mulenge following their migration from Rwanda, the other indigenous tribes claimed the territory of Mulenge belongs to them and that the Banyamulenge – who they consider to be foreigners – are simply occupying the land and have no rights to claim ownership of it (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2004).

The name "Banyamulenge" was adopted in early 1970s (Rukundwa 2004, 370). During this period following decolonization, an influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees from Rwanda (Banyarwanda) and Burundi (Barundi) arrived in eastern DRC running from political conflicts in their respective countries (Saibel 2012, 4). The Tutsi population from Rwanda who claimed to have been arrived in the DRC before the colonization period wanted to distinguish themselves from the new comers by calling themselves Banyamulenge (meaning those originating from Mulenge) (Saibel 2012, 4). The reason why this particular Tutsi population (which is also a sub-group of
Banyarwanda) wanted to differentiate themselves from the new refugees was to set a tone reaffirming that they were not foreigners compared to other Banyarwanda refugees who have just arrived. They claimed that Belgian colonizers did not see them as foreign natives; thus, they too must also have the rights to Congolese citizenship like everybody else.

But the indigenous tribes quickly rejected the name Banyamulenge claiming that the move was strategic for the Tutsi population to claim the local land of Mulenge (Saibel 2012, 4). On the other end, scholars have also pointed out that "the Banyamulenge may have been intentionally distinguishing themselves in order to escape their history of originating in Rwanda during the political upheaval that forced them to flee the country when they were subject to the royal court in Rwanda" (Saibel 2012, 4).

3.2 Government's role in delegitimizing Banyamulenge

The trouble for the citizenship issue for the Banyamulenge is complicated by the lack of clarity of the country's law, which does not clearly define the status of the Banyamulenge. This has left members of the Banyamulenge community in limbo as they endlessly pursue to be legalized as citizens of the DRC. Late President Mobutu Sese Seko who ruled the country under the name of Zaire from November 24, 1965 until he was deposed by Laurent Desire Kabila's rebellion supported by Rwanda and the Banyamulenge on May 17, 1997 (Saibel 2012, 5), declared by decree in 1971 that all people from Rwanda and Burundi - known as Banyarwanda and Barundi - and who were
present on the Congolese soil from June 30, 1960 when the country achieved independence from Belgium were citizens of Congo (then Zaire) (Saibel 2012, 5). Mobutu granted citizenship to the Banyamulenge and other Banyarwanda during that time in appreciation for the help they gave to his administration during the Katanga secession uprising, whose movement spread to Kivu under the Simba rebellion (Check 2011, 3).

However, Mobutu changed course in 1981 when he revoked the policy and law he himself had initiated, scraping the nationality of the Banyarwanda and Barundi (Check 2011, 3). In fact, though Mobutu announced in 1971 that individuals of Rwandan and Burundian decent had right to the Congolese citizenship, the policy was not enforced by local and national leaders (Saibel 2012). At this point, the Banyamulenge were uncertain of their fate in the country and their status remained unclear, but what was certain is that the Banyamulenge knew they were not welcome in the DRC as members of neighboring ethnic groups including the Bavibafuriru continued to reject the idea that they be treated as other Congolese nationals or granted Congolese citizenship.

As Mobutu did little to implement the 1971 citizenship decree, the Banyamulenge's anger against him grew and members of their communities detested his administration (Check 2011, 3). Meanwhile, the 2004 law on citizenship that put in place mechanisms for naturalization, did not make it easy for the Banyamulenge to be granted automatic citizenship. For someone to be naturalized, multiple degree of oversight take place including, a ministerial review and a presidential decree. The naturalization process itself is cumbersome, complicating approvals as the law stipulates no one can be
naturalized if they have supported foreign governments against the Congolese nation. Most people saw in this limitation a way to block Banyamulenge from seeking to be naturalized as many will be accused at the time of filing their application for having supported the Rwandan invasion.

3.3 Country opens up to multi-party system

In 1990, opposition groups pushed for political reforms and Mobuto conceded by allowing Zaire to adopt a multi-party system. This democratization process generated high expectations from Zairians who were demanding changes to occur as they were unhappy about how the country was governed since it achieved independence in 1960. The Banyamulenge also seized this opportunity to push for self-recognition by continuing to demand their rights for citizenship. Unfortunately, the new system did not benefit the Banyamulenge who continued to be marginalized by the state and other indigenous Congolese ethnic groups. Some local politicians in the Uvira area started to mobilize support from their constituencies to reject any idea issuing citizenship to the Banyamulenge. These politicians knew for sure that there was little to no appetite for such policy from the indigenous tribes and they capitalized on the issue to score political points. Members of the Banyamulenge community were banned from participating in the Conference Nationale Souveraine (Sovereign National Conference) in 1991 which brought together all political and ethnic groups from various parts of the country to discuss matters of national interests and ways to establish a new order for the country,
which was hoping to have a new beginning. The decision to alienate the Banyamulenge from this very important event, was a clear signal that nothing significant was yet in the pipeline that guaranteed them if they would soon be granted citizenship. Therefore, anti-Mobutu sentiments were seen among the ranks of the Banyamulenge (Check 2011, 2).

Disappointed by this development, the Banyamulenge lost hope, but did not just fold their hands. They kept fighting for what they believed was their rights for self-determination. They actually took up arms against the Mobutu regime to have their voices heard when they joined the rebellion movement in 1996 (Check 2011, 2), in what came to be known as the first Congo war (ICRtoP 2016), a movement that overthrew Mobutu.

3.4 First Congo war and its implication on ethnic divisions
In the summer of 1996, armed violence erupted in the Uvira area of eastern DRC as tensions flared between the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge. What was believed to be an internal problem between these two groups was elevated to a national dimension. The Banyamulenge have just joined a national movement, a rebellion led by late President Laurent Desire Kabila (who was the rebel leader at that time) (Check 2011, 5). Information came through the ears of the Bavibafuliru that Rwanda had sent a delegation in the Hauts Plateaus, in particular in Mulenge to urge the Banyamulenge to fight alongside its troops to get rid of Mobutu (Vlassenroot 2002, 509). Out of desperation from the situation they were already leaving in - being discriminated against by other
tribes and denied any rights of statehood, the Banyamulenge welcomed Rwandan proposal and sent their youth to Rwanda for military training and come back well-equipped to fight the war. The entire rebellion against Mobutu was made of Banyamulenge and troops from Rwanda (Check 2011, 5)

As Rwandan troops invaded the eastern DRC from the Uvira area supported by the Banyamulenge youth, thousands of residents in the territory were displaced and sought refuge to the neighboring Fizi territory also known as Bubembe and other went as far as reaching the Barega (Balega) territory of Mwenga but also Kalemì in the former Katanga Province as "the conflict has begun to spread to the southern region (Vlassenroot 2002, 508). Most others escaped the fighting by seeking refuge to Burundi and Tanzania and Zambia. The Banyamulenge's act, joining a foreign invasion of the DRC under Rwandan command, angered the other indigenous DRC tribes, particularly the Bavibafuliru. In response, the Bavibafuliru formed self-militia groups, dubbed Mai Mai, in an effort to push back the Banyamulenge rebellion. Killings of unarmed civilians took place on both side; the Bavibafiliru Mai Mai militias were targeting the civilian Banyamulenge in their villages (Vlassenroot 2002, 508) and the Banyamulenge attacked the Bavibafuliru in retaliation. The tit-for tat killings exacerbated divisions among these rival groups in Uvira and tensions grew exponentially. Uvira turned into an area of insecurity following the beginning of the 1996 war. Violent incidents involving the harassment of the Banyamulenge by soldiers of the Congolese army and indigenous militias become common (Vlassenroot, 2002, 508).
The Banyamulenge rebellion with their Rwandan troop backers captured more territories in eastern DRC, with the fall of large cities such as Bukavu, South Kivu and Goma, North Kivu and Kisangani, Oriental Province as DRC government soldiers became overwhelmed. It became clear that the Banyamulenge were determined to march into the capital Kinshasa. They seized one town after the other defeating the DRC army from the eastern part, to the south, west until they captured Kinshasa in May 1997. During the rebellion, the Banyamulenge rose to power taking all strategic positions in Uvira and other districts they occupied (Stearns 2013, 21). The ascension of the Banyamulenge as they rose to positions of authority sparked considerable resentment among the local tribes (Stearns 2013, 21) including the Bavibafuliru who saw the Banyamulenge's control of the many areas in South Kivu including Uvira as a threat and resisted to be led by those they accuse of being foreigners. The legitimacy of the Banyamulenge to rule over the Bavibafuliru was challenged.

3.5 The 1998 Second War: The Banyamulenge drop support for Kabila

After the coming to power of Laurent Desire Kabila in May 17, 1997, the Banyamulenge hoped that Kabila who they helped topple Mobutu, was going to expedite their issue of citizenship they have so longed for. The Banyamulenge who rose to power expected to influence Kabila as many obtained senior advisory positions in various ministries, including prominent Munyamulenge Bizima Karaha, who was elevated to the rank of Foreign Minister, Jonas Sebatunzi as state prosecutor and Mutabazi Muntu, head of the
However, Kabila turned his back on the Banyamulenge and Rwandans who played a major role in the rebellion that ended the rule of the most notorious and feared leader, Mobutu. Kabila did not honor an important promise he made to grant Banyamulenge citizenship for the job they did and the role they played backing his military advance and helping him get access to power (Check 2011, 5). Kabila angered his Rwandan and Banyamulenge backers as the leader began to consolidate power around him and ignore his former allies altogether. Stearns states that tensions started to rise between the Banyamulenge and their Rwandan backers as the Banyamulenge began to realize that their close association with Rwanda had backed fire and affected their claim to Congolese citizenship (Stearns 2013, 21). On the other hand, "most Banyamulenge community realized that their association with Kigali had resulted in a greater rejection of their community by other Congolese and there was no option other than distancing themselves from the Rwandan authorities" (Vlassenroot 2002, 510).

In Kinshasa, Kabila had called Rwandan troops mercenaries and ordered that they return back to Rwanda or be expelled by force (Vlassenroot 2002, 511). James Kabarebe, a Rwandan army official who was Kabila's army chief of staff was suspected by the president of plotting to assassinate him. Kabarebe was replaced by Kabila's brother-in-law Celestin Kifwa (Weiss 2001, 70). By July 29, 1998, all Rwandan troops stationed in Kinshasa flew back to Kigali, Rwanda.
Kabila's rhetoric against his former allies created more trouble as residents in the capital took matters in their own hands and began to hunt down people of Rwandan origin (Tutsi). As international TV channels covered terrifying images of Tutsis (Rwandans and Banyamulenge alike) apprehended and burned alive in the capital, many Tutsi families started to fear for their lives and began to leave the city (Weiss 2001, 70).

The problem didn't end there; for the second time, the Banyamulenge backed again by Rwanda and Uganda started a second war from the eastern part. When Kabila expelled Rwandan troops from the DRC in July 1998, the Banyamulenge leaders quickly realized that the safety of their community was in jeopardy. The leaders travelled to Kigali for discussion over how the security of Banyamulenge community would be guaranteed. They wanted to come up with a strategy so that if attacked by other DRC tribes, they will know how to defend themselves (Vlassenroot 2002, 511). The stakes were too high for the Banyamulenge as they realized that the growing anti-Banyamulenge sentiment over their backing of Rwanda during the first war would be detrimental for their own safety. On August, 2, 1998, a second rebellion now against Kabila formed; the rebellion was seen as a second Banyamulenge revolt, though the planning of the rebellion came from Kigali (Vlassenroot 2002, 511) with Rwanda trying to express its discontent about Kabila and this time want to topple a former ally. From the perspective of the Bavibafuliru, the Banyamulenge's support of another war backed by Rwanda was an indication that the Banyamulenge were helping their Rwandan brothers to conquer the DRC, an act that further put more doubt in minds of the Bavibafuliru over whether the Banyamulenge were really Congolese as they claimed.
This time, the rebellion of 1998 only succeeded to take control of few cities, especially in eastern part. Rebels did not succeed to carry out a countrywide crusade as they did in the first war that brought Kabila to power. Kabila had called upon his friends, from other African nations to repel the second Rwandan invasion. His African peers responded positively. Soldiers from Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe came to the aid of Kabila and succeeded to stop any advance of rebels toward the capital Kinshasa though half of the country was already under control of Banyamulenge rebels backed by Rwanda and Uganda (BBC 2001). A plan by Rwanda to overthrow Kabila failed with the backing of Kabila by his African counterparts but in the eastern provinces armed conflicts escalated between those supporting and opposing Kabila (Weiss 2001, 71) that also included the Banyamulenge fighting with the Bavibafurî.

It was only in 1999 that the United Nations (UN) deployed blue helmet peacekeepers to preserve peace and demanded the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the DRC. A ceasefire agreement was reached in July 1999 in Lusaka, Zambia (Rogier 2003, 26). The signing of the Lusaka agreement was brokered as all parties had reached a stalemate: rebels (that included the Banyamulenge) backed by Rwanda and Uganda could not succeed to topple Laurent Desire Kabila. Kinshasa at the same time was unable to push rebels out of the DRC (Rogier 2003, 26). However fighting by militia groups including those supporting the Banyamulenge and Bavibafurî continued despite the ceasefire accord. Kabila refused to engage in further negotiations with rebels disregarding terms agreed upon in Lusaka talks - that called on him to dialogue - as long as the DRC remained under foreign occupation (Rogier 2003, 28). The former leader
demanded that all "aggressors" withdraw from the country constantly citing UN resolution 1304 (2001) which required that Rwanda and Uganda pull their troops without delay (Rogier 2003, 28).

3.6 Signing of peace accord to end war

Following the assassination of Laurent Desire Kabila on January 16, 2001 by his bodyguard (The Guardian 2001) at the presidential palace in Kinshasa, his son Joseph Kabila who replaced him chose to embark on a new approach different from his father when it came to dealing with armed groups. Joseph initiated talks with Rwanda including rebel and militia groups. In July 2002 Rwanda and the DRC signed an agreement in Pretoria, South Africa in which Rwanda agreed to withdraw its troops from eastern DRC in 90 days provided that the DRC disarms the Rwandan Hutu militia Interahamwe (also known as Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) (The Guardian 2002, USIP 2002).

Prior to that, on April 19, 2002, a peace agreement was reached in Sun City, South Africa between Kinshasa and rebels calling upon all rebel groups to lay down their weapons (Lacey 2002). It was only on December 17, 2002 that all parties to the conflict - DRC government, RCD-Goma, RCD-ML, RDC-N, MLC, and the various Mayi Mayi militias - signed the "Global and All-Inclusive Agreement" to allow a transition period of two years to take place that was to be led by Joseph Kabila (Rogier 2003, 35). During
this time period, a government of national unity was formed. Rebels and militia leaders were given jobs at the national and local governments as it was stipulated in the agreement. Kabila shared power with four vice presidents two of whom were from main rebel groups, including Azarias Ruberwa, a Munyamulenge from RCD-Goma. A timeline for democratic elections was also set (Rogier 2003, 35). The agreement also called on the reintegration of rebel fighters into the DRC armed forces. Unfortunately, politicians who were not satisfied with the posts they were given in government and those who got nothing at all, rearmed and continued to take up arms against the government of Joseph Kabila.

3.7 Proliferation of ethnic militia groups brings more tensions

Dissatisfaction grew among rebel leaders and their supporters as they started to blame the government of Kabila for not honoring promises made during the signing of the 2002 peace accord. Those who raised concerns about the accord started to defect from the army with some returning in the bush to fight the government they once have been part of. Other opportunist politicians began to enter into the business of creating militias as they saw that this way was paying off. They realized that creating a militia group was the only way the government would listen to them and engage them in negotiations. This caused the proliferation of armed groups in DRC with the government in Kinshasa being unable to root them out of the country.
By 2004, clashes erupted in Uvira once again between government forces and Banyamulenge militias forcing many of the civilian Banyamulenge to leave the area and seek refuge into neighboring Burundi (Autesserre 2006, 18). Anti-Banyamulenge sentiment was seen exponentially among the indigenous population (Bavibafuliru) and local politicians in Uvira used the ethnic card to drive the Banyamulenge out of Uvira (Autesserre 2006, 18). As peace was slowly returning around the end of the same year, the Banyamulenge opted for a return to Uvira from their Burundi refugee camps, but their return was viewed by many Bavibafuliru politicians as a threat to the territory of Uvira. Many indigenous tribes were opposed to the return of the Banyamulenge, though the vast majority ended up returning to Uvira while other decided to stay in Burundi for over a year fearing to go back (Autesserre 2006, 18).

The Banyamulenge who fled from Uvira in early 2004 vacated their high positions and nice homes they acquired during the 1996 and 1998 wars; the indigenous population (Bavibafuliru) took over the homes and jobs left by the Banyamulenge and refused to give them back when the Banyamulenge returned to Uvira in late 2004 (Autesserre 2006, 18). Violent incidents targeting the Banyamulenge occurred during their return. After at least 160 Banyamulenge refugees were killed in an attack by armed men in a refugee camp in Gatumba (an area of Burundi bordering the DRC), hundreds of Banyamulenge decided to return to Uvira but were met with resistance as the first group of Banyamulenge returnees entered Uvira; they were stoned by an angry mob (Autesserre 2006, 18).
The Tutsi population including the Banyamulenge continued to claim that they were treated unfairly compared to other Congolese and feared for their lives. Tutsi high-ranking officers who were in national army started to demand more from the government. They challenged the government urging authorities to protect the Tutsi population living in eastern DRC from being attacked by members of other tribes. A Tutsi general, Laurent Nkunda and hundreds of his troops who had joined the DRC national army in 2003 as a result of the 2002 peace agreement, defected from the army and retreated in the bush in 2004 after forming his new rebel group (Pickert 2008). Kunda expressed differences with Kinshasa over policies regarding the protection of Tutsi population. The general said he was fighting the Rwandan Hutu rebels who were operating in eastern DRC and whom he accused of attacking civilians of Tutsi origin (Pickert 2008).

Nkunda launched an insurgency under the banner of the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) and temporarily took control of North Kivu Provincial capital Goma in 2007. He claimed that his action was meant to protect the Banyamulenge and members of the Tutsi community from being exterminated. That did not stop most Congolese in the eastern part from accusing Nkunda of launching a proxy war for Rwanda. Thereafter, the government signed an agreement in 2009 with Nkunda and his CNDP to bring about peace. However, Nkunda was arrested during a joint DRC-Rwanda military operation and fled to Rwanda where he resides until now as of 2017. Many residents in eastern DRC accused Nkunda of evading justice over war crimes citing that he had returned to his native country, Rwanda where he belonged.
3.8 Impact of wars on intergroup coexistence

The wars and the proliferation of the armed groups from both sides created tensions among the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge. Despite the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement in 2003, conflicts in eastern DRC have not ceased (Paluck 2010, 1173), even at the time of the writing of this dissertation in 2017. Ethnic militias continue to fight each and the national army; they kill, displace civilians, a situation that establishes a regime of hostility among the many ethnic groups in the region (Paluck 2010, 1173). The killings that took place, the mistrust that was instilled during the wars had exacerbated tensions hurting relations among these rival groups. The stereotypes that emerged on both sides were dangerous for any reconciliation process to actually manifest itself. Members of the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge blamed each other for what had happened to them and each group labeled the other as being responsible for the atrocities and pain inflicted during the wars. The mistrust, the land issue, ethnic tensions and most importantly the problem of Banyamulenge's citizenship had rendered coexistence between these groups quite difficult despite the fact that members of these communities have been engaged in some forms of community healings.

Local and international organizations have been involved in helping these communities to foster coexistence after they have experienced a bitter past. Organizations such as Search for Common Ground (SFCG) have been involved in supporting peacebuilding programs such as radio talk shows to facilitate dialogue between community members and encourage them to take a more peaceful approach to build
relations (SFCG 2006). However, despite all these efforts, the building of intergroup relations in eastern DRC and in places like Uvira still far from being achieved. This is the reason why this research looked into exploring why peaceful coexistence among the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru has stalled despite the willingness of these groups to try to put their past behind them.

The contacts they have engaged in and the verbal empathy they expressed for each other about their past, has done little to facilitate true coexistence. I certainly believed there was something else to be explained as to why this is happening and that's what this study explored. I discuss in the next section scholars' arguments about the issues of the Uvira conflict.

3.9 Scholarly arguments and approach on Uvira conflict

Scholars, policy makers, and conflict interveners have provided a multitude of explanations about the causes of the Uvira conflict between the Banyamulenge and the Bavibafuliru and some have prescribed what they believe to be remedies to resolving this conflict. It is my hope that this research sheds more light on providing the alternative explanation as to why the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru have been unable to peacefully coexist in the Uvira territory.

There has been little research looking into the concept of legitimacy of the other in the Uvira case; most writers have primarily demonstrated that the local conflicts in Uvira has been driven by land dispute between the ethnic groups (here the Banyamulenge
and Bavibafuliru) and the search for political power for those feeling excluded from political participation. Others have pointed to the issue of citizenship for the Banyamulenge and bad governance from the local but especially the central government.

3.9.1 Land and ethnic issues

The Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru each claim ownership of Uvira's Mulenge area. Koen Vlassenroot from the Rift Value Institutes specializing in eastern DRC conflict points that local conflict in eastern DRC and the Uvira area in particular are the result of land, political and power issues. The author argues that since the end of the DRC second war (1998-2003), regional destabilization has decreased but indicates that local conflicts have been violent with opportunist politicians fuelling them; he cites the continued struggle over land and power sharing issues (Vlassenroot 2013, 8). Before the first war (1996-1997) erupted in the eastern DRC, there was a fierce conflict between the Banyarwanda (in this research Banyamulenge) and autochthonous population (Raeymaekers and Vlassenroot 2004, 217). The reason for the ethnic conflict they say was a result of "unequal access and entitlement to the arable and grazing land (Raeymaekers and Vlassenroot 2004, 217). They state that studies on the eastern DRC conflict has focused at least on four specific issues that include "problem of land acquisition and access to resources", the "problem of economic competition", the "problem of political competition" and what they call the "issue of social transformation
… affecting relations between and within communities" (Raeymaekers and Vlassenroot 2004, 16).

Furthermore, Jason Stearns et al. indicate that the Banyamulenge's neighbors have rejected their citizenship due to ethnic tensions; he states that "underlying these ethnic tensions is competition for local power, as well as dispute over land use and the seasonal movement of cattle herds (Stearns et al. 2013, 11). Meanwhile, Saibel writes that access to land became part of the dynamics of conflict in the Kivu of eastern DRC. The author stipulates that the land claim of the Banyamulenge has been complicated by the connection they have to the land; they have a firm belief that they belong there (Saibel 2012, 172-173). The democratization process of 1990 brought about intense political competition increasing ethnic divisions, especially that local political leaders used identity politics as a way to mobilize their bases (Vlassenroot 2013, 9). For this reason, Vlassenroot says that in Uvira and other parts of eastern DRC such as Fizi, armed mobilization mostly targeted the Banyamulenge (Vlassenroot 2013, 9). Also, others suggest that ethnic friction has caused the conflict in eastern DRC (Raeymaekers and Vlassenroot 2004, 16).

3.9.2 Power issues

Séverine Autesserre for instance has demonstrated that after a national and regional settlement was reached in 2002 for the eastern DRC conflict, "some local conflicts over land and political power increasingly became self-sustaining and
autonomous from the national and regional tracks" (Autesserre 206, 1). Autesserre went further acknowledging that there was a problem for minority status of the Rwandophone – in this study (Banyamulenge) – stating this could jeopardize regional and national peace. However, she argues somehow that this is not the primary concern for the conflict. For her, the Banyamulenge status carries local stakes and that before the war (in 1996), the Banyamulenge problem was rooted in what she describes as local conflicts over land and traditional power (Autesserre 2006, 17). Just following the independence, in 1960, a series of events pushed the Banyamulenge to seek to gain political power, however they were faced with resistance and discrimination from other neighboring ethnic groups, and this pattern continues up to this day (Stearns et AL 2013, 11).

Like Autesserre, SL Rukundwa from the University of Pretoria, South Africa stipulates that one of the problems of conflict in Uvira is that Banyamulenge lacks traditional representation; they are administratively represented by other neighbouring ethnic groups (Rukundwa 2004, 282). The author argues that the Banyamulenge’s relationship with other neighboring ethnic groups was good until politics came into play (Rukundwa 2004, 282). He believes that the politics of exclusion - that's not giving Banyamulenge political representation also contributes to the conflict between this community and its neighbours (Rukundwa 2004, 281). The author goes even further including another dimension of the conflict; he states that cultural differences between the Banyamulenge and their neighbors has not made matter easy for the Banyamulenge. He raises concerns as to why researchers have only been focusing on political
motivations of the conflict while not covering the cultural aspects. Rukundwa explains that the Banyamulenge have a cultural way for living that is different from their neighbors (Rukundwa 2004, 869), an issue that separates the members of these rival groups.

3.9.3 Citizenship issue

Scholarly data shows that the issue of legitimacy of the Banyamulenge is crucial for the Uvira case. Vlassenroot states that the Banyamulenge's claims to political participation not only had an effect toughening the boundaries between different groups, but that political actors have manipulated ethnicity to cover their own political agenda (Vlassenroot 2002, 499-501). But the author says that the uncertain status of the Banyamulenge "is but one result of clashing notions of identity (identity based on ethnicity versus identity based on residence)" (Vlassenroot 2002, 501). For this reason, Vlassenroot writes that in order to get a better understanding of the present DRC conflict, the issue of citizenship needs some specific attention. The citizenship issue he says "has to be understood as one of the main challenges of future peace efforts" (Vlassenroot 2002, 501). This research paid particular attention to the issue of the citizenship of the Banyamulenge, and also found that it is one of the major concerns hindering peace in Uvira. Only 26 percent of Congolese considered the Banyamulenge to be Congolese, according to an opinion poll collected nationwide in 2002 (Stearns et al. 2013, 11). In
fact, the citizenship issue of the Banyamulenge dates back from the time the DRC achieved independence from Belgium.

Sadiki Koko, from the department of politics, University of Johannesburg agrees with Vlassenroot. The author says that the DRC has been grappling with the question of citizenship of the Banyarwanda and Kirundi speaking populations since the country achieved independence in 1960. Members of these groups settled in the eastern part at different historical periods (Koko 2013, 41). Instead of resolving the citizenship issues for the Banyarwanda, all DRC administrations have based their response to the issue on "short political expediencies as directed by the balance of forces within the country, the Kivu area and Great Lakes region at a particular juncture” (Koko 2013, 41).

The lack of addressing the nationality issue of the Banyarwanda by different regimes that ruled over the DRC has "contributed to turning the question of the citizenship of the Banyarwanda into a stumbling block to peaceful co-existence and human and state security, especially in the Kivu region” (Koko 2013, 72-73). Lars-Christopher Huening concludes that the period going from 1990 to 1996 saw "manifestations and transformations of anti-Rwandophone discourse in the DRC, up to the present day” (Huening 2013, 28). The Rwandophone issue has come to dominate DRC's political discourse and has accelerated the polarization of the group's identities (Huening 2013, 28). As such, I strongly argue that the issue of legitimacy of the Rwandophone also called Banyarwanda or Banyamulenge deserves close attention, and this study just did that.
The arguments made by the above scholars as to what constitute the causes of conflict in eastern DRC are also confirmed by the findings of this research, including that I carried out in Uvira in 2011 where I tried to understand the major issues surrounding the conflict. Research participants from both sides expressed concerns that the conflict dividing communities in this part of the world were driven by issues related to citizenship, land or territorial appropriation, killings, and power.

### 3.10 Overview of 2011 Uvira research and findings

My 2011 study in Uvira explored differences, narratives and perceptions that the Bavibafuliru, and the Banyamulenge communities held about each other. In the 2011 research, I referred to the Banyamulenge as Eastern DRC Tutsi but used the name Bavibafuliru as I did in this current research. I used that term eastern DRC Tutsi for the Banyamulenge to stay away of any controversy as a researcher in part because my investigation then also explored connotations used by various groups in labeling or naming the Banyamulenge. I wanted to know why one group would choose to use a specific name over the other when labeling the Banyamulenge. The study also went further exploring the perceptions and narratives of the diaspora of the Bavibafuliru on the same issue. I hoped to understand each group’ perceptions and narratives in order to have a clearer picture of what the major issues were between the groups and possibly create a framework for a proper intervention to manage the conflict between these groups.
Having learned about the major issues and concerns, I was left with a puzzle that I envisioned to resolve and that informed this dissertation research. This is the reason why I investigated the question why the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru in Uvira have been unable to peacefully coexist despite the fact that they have engaged in some forms of contact and expressed empathy for one another.

### 3.10.1 2011 research findings

During the 2011 master's thesis research, I compared interviews data to a number of theoretical frameworks concerning social, ethnic, and identity conflicts to explain the group dynamics over rivalries between the Bavibafuliru and the Banyamulenge. The sample was composed of 20 participants (9 from the diaspora and 11 in the field). I interviewed refugees across the border on the Burundian side and community leaders from the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge sides in the Uvira area. After discovering the findings I arrived at, I then realized that a more comprehensive study was needed to better understand why members of these groups were struggling to coexist despite their claims for wanting to reconcile. This research has paid specific attention to this question.

My 2011 study found several common themes in both communities. Both groups expressed concerns over issues related to citizenship, land or territorial appropriation, killings, and power. As I explore the issue of rivalry between the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge, I find that all the participants in that study were in agreement that there exists enmity between them. Participants' responses confirmed my own initial approach
to the problem, which was that rivalries between the communities were problematic. I believed enmity was of concern and I tried to understand the major reason (s) behind that enmity so that I could comprehend the dynamics of the conflict.

I involved the diaspora Bavibafuliru who prior to living abroad, lived in Uvira of eastern Congo or “Plaine de la Ruzizi” - the area where the conflict I am studying takes place. Then I also involved the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge who were residents of Uvira during the time the research was carried out. One of the limitations of the 2011 study was that I fell short in the sampling because I did not include the Banyamulenge living in the diaspora to participate in the study; this was for reasons beyond my control. I was lucky enough to identify an online network of diaspora Bavibafuliru but unfortunately did not manage to have access to such diaspora social network for the Banyamulenge. To make things clear, this new research did not involve members of the diaspora from either community. The study was limited solely to participants living in Uvira. Below is the summary of most important themes to retain from the 2011 study:

The Bavibafuliru participants, especially those in the diaspora expressed resentment against the Banyamulenge, stating that the Banyamulenge were foreigners. On the contrary members of the Banyamulenge community in Uvira had a different view about the nationality issue. The Banyamulenge affirmed that they also are Congolese citizens, rejecting claims from Bavibafuliru that they are foreigners. As this finding shows, there is discrepancy in the narratives and perceptions of the groups about the
citizenship issue of the Banyamulenge and that, by itself, constitutes a problem for conflict resolution.

Some Bavibafuliru indicated that land is not an issue; they said that they just don't want the Banyamulenge to claim that Mulenge - a territory considered to be Bavibafuliru's - belongs to them. Most Banyamulenge also stated that land was not a problem, but said they only need autonomy and a local administration of their own, the same as all other neighboring tribes. But when you go further asking about whether they want to live together in Mulenge, then you get a different response from both sides. The majority was against the idea of living together in Mulenge, in particular the diaspora Bavibafuliru. Though I should also mention that a small number of them support the idea. Their response clearly showed that land is indeed a problem, though participants seemed to soften their language over the issue or down played the severity of the land issue altogether.

When it comes to perceptions of what coexistence means for them, both groups view it in terms of rivals living side by side in harmony. However, members of these groups have been living side by side for years but continue to face problems in peacefully coexisting. This is the case because their view of coexistence lacks one core element – that is the necessity of accepting the legitimacy of the other group. Any definition of coexistence that does not include recognition of the legitimacy of the other group in Uvira is somehow incomplete. Both the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru view coexistence in term of proximity; as long as they live next to one another, even though they have few interactions, they see that as coexistence. But coexistence is not only about
proximity, it also includes the acceptance of the legitimacy of the other or power balance as this research asserts.

3.10.2 Theory explanation of the 2011 research

The findings of that study suggested that participants were in agreement that there was rivalry between Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge. As “rivalry” was the core concept that I was looking at, it was important to define the term from the outset. I borrowed a definition by DeRouen and Bercovitch (2008) as they began to theorize conflict resolution in enduring conflict rivalries. Two main points are important for their definition. They identify time and repeated conflict to be the core areas of rivalries. DeRouen and Bercovitch stipulated that “Rivalries are not short-lived competitions; instead, they last for long periods” (Morey 2009, 5). Therefore, as per DeRouen and Bercovitch, rivalry in that study was defined as the repeatedly setting off of two sides through competition that leads to feelings of enmity and mistrust (Morey 2009, 5).

In regards to the driving factor of the conflict in Uvira, my exploration found participants from both groups overwhelmingly indicated that intergroup killings were in fact the driving factor that fueled the conflict at a different level. This perception was emotional in nature on both sides. Part of this is because when violent conflicts lead to mass killings, people feel that they lose their loved ones whom they obviously value most and cannot easily forget events that they experienced. In cases involving violent conflicts,
Crocker et al. 2007 say that people in society emerging from conflict care less to be reconciled with those who killed, tortured, or maimed their families and friends. However, moving beyond this most immediate cause, it seems clear that before the killings occurred, there were issues that divided these two groups and in fact that led to the intergroup violence.

The in-group/out-group dynamics was literally seen in the 2011 study. The Banyamulenge were viewed by the Bavibafuliru as foreign, not native of the country. Therefore, the dynamic was as follows: The Bavibafuliru viewed the Banyamulenge as occupiers of their land (Mulenge). The next thing that happened here is that the Bavibafuliru claimed the land in which the Banyamulenge live, and wanted to have control over it is theirs and treated the Banyamulenge as pure “occupiers.” Bavibafuliru fear of losing Mulenge (the territory in which the Banyamulenge live) makes them to insist that Mulenge does not belong to the Banyamulenge. This fact was seen in the denial of Bavibafuliru of the diaspora to recognize the name “Banyamulenge,” itself which literally translated as inhabitants of Mulenge or people originating from Mulenge. They charged that the name was a fabrication and no such people exist in the eastern DRC.

Bavibafuliru in the diaspora feared that if they accepted the name Banyamulenge, it will be interpreted as legitimizing the Tutsi community of eastern DRC as the owners of the land (Mulenge). Therefore, Bavibafuliru in the diaspora exhibited resistance toward accepting the name Banyamulenge, for fear of this would precipitate their losing of what they consider their birth right (Mulenge).
The above attitude from the diaspora Bavibafuliru is consistent with Fuhrmann and Tir’s claims. They claim that cases involving territorial dimensions lead to potential conflict when both parties claim legitimacy of ownership over a piece of land. According to Fuhrmann and Tir: “The practical problem, however, is that the ethnic group’s homeland often overlaps with the homeland of one or more neighboring groups…The groups see little room for compromise over this land; it is not something that can be divided, shared, or substituted for with” (Fuhrmann and Tir 2009, 5). Furhrmann and Tir’s argument took me to the next step of this discussion. When I asked in 2011 Bavibafuliru participants if there we willing to share their territory with Banyamulenge, the majority of the diaspora Bavibafuliru participants said they were not willing though early they have said land was not an issue. The demonization of one group by another was thereby demonstrated. Bavibafuliru participants from the diaspora did not agree that it is right to call the astern DRC Tutsis “Banyamulenge.” Participants claim that Mulenge is Bavibafuliru territory; they viewed Banyamulenge as foreigners or “Banyarwanda” (Rwandans). It is also important to mention that at least some diaspora Bavibafuliru participants were able to envision Banyamulenge living on Bavibafuliru territory, though still they seemed resistant to calling the Eastern DRC Tutsis “Banyamulenge.”

3.11 Applicability of four C model of identity-based conflict for Uvira

I presented the four C model of identity-based conflict in chapter 2. Karina Korostelina defines the Four Cs as comparison, competition, confrontation, and counteraction
(Korostelina 2007, 147). I illustrate its applicability in this section to understand some of the conflict dynamics between the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge discussed by scholars above and based on my own discovered during the 2011 research in Uvira.

With regard to comparison, both Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge used in-group favoritism or loyalty and out-group hostility as they compared each other. For instance, the indigenous DRC groups such as the Bavibafuliru view themselves as “true Congolese” when comparing themselves with the Banyamulenge, whom they labeled as “foreigners.” The attitude of “we are better than them” or "we have all the rights, they don't" is seen among the Bavibafuliru. The "us-versus-them" concept clearly manifests itself between the two groups with one group saying “We are the Congolese, they are the foreigners.” This comparison has allowed one group (Bavibafuliru) to believe it has a legitimate right to own a land of “Mulenge” in the DRC while seeing the other group (Banyamulenge) as foreign occupiers who have no rights whatsoever over the land.

The idea of competition, “the second C” is also manifesting in how the members of these groups frame the conflict, particularly with regard to who has right to the land. Each group claims ownership of Mulenge territory and each shows interest in ruling over it while showing loyalty to it. This divergence in perceived interests led to the "third C – that is, confrontation. Korostelina believes that at this stage, each group asserts the universal truth of their own core values. The “ideologization of social identities” as both groups legitimize their claims over the disputed territory leads to what Korostelina calls “transforming conflicts of interest into moral confrontations between the virtuous Us and the demonized Other” (Korostelina 2007, 147). Some of the Bavibafuliru certainly
display the characteristic of seeing themselves as a virtuous Us as opposed to a
demonized other “Banyamulenge”. The Bavibafuliru said “We the Congolese must own
this land, which belongs to our ancestors and to our country” while demonizing the
Banyamulenge as foreign invaders whose origin is from Rwanda and who must be
deprived from owning the land that belongs to the DRC. Bavibafuliru then go a step
further with an attitude that can be read as suggesting that Banyamulenge should go and
find land in their own country, Rwanda.

As the conflict of interests moves into a moral confrontation, it then takes on the
final dimension of the "fourth C" known as counteraction. This is where both parties
want to keep their position and not surrender or compromise by evoking a sense of
urgency to provide security for in-group members. This moral stage may exhibit changes
in collective axiology; the implication of collective axiology can be devastating. A
collective axiology is a system in which one may see value commitments defining actions
that must be prohibited and which ones must necessarily be pursued. Changes in
collective axiology can occur when groups begin to shape their perceptions of actions and
start to evaluate the other; once they evaluate what the other may be planning or doing,
then they define boundaries on the basis of in-group/out-group membership (Rothbart
and Korostelina 2006, 4). It is at this stage that you see one group, in this case, minority
Banyamulenge, being discriminated against by the majority, Bavibafuliru. This
discrimination reaches a tipping point, until the Banyamulenge can no longer take it but
use violence to express their frustration against the Bavibafuliru and to protect
themselves from the other. This violence is counteracted by the Bavibafuliru with more
violence. The tit for tat lead to killings between the groups. Korostelina (2007) suggests this dynamic could even lead to genocide – the extermination of members of one group so the other group can stay alone at peace without facing any competition from members of the out-group.

3.12 Study of coexistence in Uvira: Challenges of peacebuilding programs

Despite the official end the signing of the major peace accord in 2003, ethnic groups continued to show hostility against one another and have faced significant challenges to put their past behind them. Local and international organizations have since been involved in peacebuilding efforts in eastern DRC and Uvira in particular. Organizations such as Search for Common Ground (SFCG), the International Medical Corps, Academic Institutions such as the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health and many others, have been engaged in helping groups to foster coexistence by changing individual attitudes and behaviors toward one another. These organizations use educational tools such popular music, youth events, Community Theater and radio soap operas to help rival groups mend their differences (International Medical Corps). For instance, International Medical Corps engages men, women and youth to raise awareness of the issues affecting them. It identifies opinion leaders such as community and religious leaders, and teachers engaging them as catalysts to facilitate the promotion of positive behaviors through discussions, debates, music and other activities including TV and radio that bring people together (International Medical Corps).
SFCG, known locally in DRC as Centre Lokole began its work in DRC in 2001 to support the inter-Congolese dialogue (SFCG 2006). This is the time period where militias and the DRC government were engaged in talks to end the war in eastern part. Since then, the organization has expanded its operations in eastern DRC using a wide range of peacebuilding tools to sustain peace. It has used media programing and training in many of the country's national languages including French, Lingala and Swahili/Kiswahili to increase people's knowledge about conflicts surrounding them (SFCG 2006). The organization has used these peacebuilding programs in eastern DRC to reduce violent conflict by enabling divided communities affected by wars to rebuild trust and healthy relations (SFCG 2006). The organization says it has particularly used mass media, especially radio as a key tool to raising awareness and facilitate discussions among groups in a country that lacks basic infrastructure (SFCG 2006).

3.13. Programs reducing tensions and sustaining peace

On top of its mass media program, SFCG has also used cross-border dialogues in eastern DRC enabling members of rival communities to interact. It has consolidated peace through mediation programs between divided communities as well as supporting awareness-raising campaigns (SFCG 2006). The organization suggests that encouraging groups to transform their conflict without using violence is beneficial for their future. Examples of peacebuilding programs include *Jirani ni Ndungu* ("My Neighbor, My Brother" or “my neighbor is my brother”), a weekly soap opera broadcast in the local
Swahili language that discusses conflicts in people's daily lives and teaches them ways to resolve them peacefully. Other programs include *Tukutane Tena* "Let's all Meet Again", highlighting ways in which groups can resolve conflicts without violence. To diffuse controversy and rumors and tensions, SFCG has used a magazine program published in French and called *En Parler, C'est Agir* ("To Talk about it is to Act") (SFCG 2006). In the next section, I discuss a field experiment in Uvira meant to understand the impact of media programs in promoting peace and coexistence.

### 3.13.1 Field experiment on conflict reduction in Uvira

Mass media programs have previously been used in conflict settings to generate discussion among groups experiencing, or with experience of conflicts. This is done with the aim of helping parties reduce or manage their conflicts. Elizabeth Levy Paluck ran a year-long field experiment in the eastern DRC in 2007 testing the impact of media programs - a radio talk show and radio soap opera program (Paluck 2010, 1170). The talk show programs was designed to promote discussions among listeners over intergroup conflict and cooperation. It encouraged listeners to take a stand with tolerant opinions, while considering perspective taking approaches (Paluck 2010, 1170). On the contrary, the radio soap opera was designed to promote extended intergroup contacts among listeners. Here people could only listen to the radio program that promoted intergroup contact but listeners were not urged to engage in discussions like it was the case for the talk show listeners (Paluck 2010, 1170).
In the radio soap opera program, Paluck presented listeners with fictional stories from fictional ethnic groups that corresponded to the eastern DRC's ethnic groups. Doing so, allowed listeners to identify with some characters in the program as in-group members (Paluck 2010, 1172). Characters in the radio soap opera fictional stories formed cross-ethnic alliances and friendships. The researcher arranged this setting as a teaching tool for listeners to appreciate that rival groups can create alliances and build friendship. The researcher was inspired by previous studies that utilized radio program fictional stories to facilitate extended intergroup contact, and also expected similar results to be reproduced in eastern DRC experiment. She expected "listeners to experience the fictional ingroup characters' cross-ethnic friendships as a form of extended contact (Paluck 2010, 1172).

In the talk show program, people listened to the same content of the soap opera but the talk show took a further step asking listeners "to discuss instances of intergroup cooperation and dialogue among the characters" (Paluck 2010, 1172). In this scenario, the researcher used the "imagine-self" perspective taking by asking listeners "to imagine themselves in the situations of the fictional outgroup characters" hoping the process would enhance the effect of extended contact (Paluck 2010, 1172). The researcher also hoped that "imagining the self in characters' situations would make outgroup arguments appear more valid"; a technique used as a way to encourage depolarization (Paluck 2010, 1172).
3.13. 2 Fictional story of soap opera

*The baseline radio soap opera* titled in Swahili Kumbuka Kesho (Think of Tomorrow) was set in a fictional town of the name of Bugo. This town was plagued by rampant political corruption, income inequality, and members of the many of ethnic groups living the community were experiencing conflicts. The story begins with a politician practicing ethnic favoritism taking over the Bugo's market. The politician withheld public funds meant to stop the spread of cholera outbreak, but frustrated citizens rose up against the politician's move and violence broke out as the cholera outbreak deteriorated.

The soap opera's characters emphasized reduction of conflict through cooperation of community members. In the story, two youth from different ethnic groups (Sisilia and Akili) came together and build a peace coalition in their efforts to reduce the already rising tensions in Bugo (Paluck 2010, 1173).

*Talk show:* It encouraged listeners to discuss about the soap opera characters and events that unfolded on all sides of Bugo's conflict. The show host encouraged perspective taking from listeners and asked them to take tolerant views. Because the DRC faces infrastructure problems, the show host asked questions about topics from the opera episode and urged listeners to send letters in (rather than making phone calls). Listeners had to describe discussions they engaged in with others about the underlying topics. The host encouraged face-to-face interactions among the talk listeners asking them to provide opinions by imagining what they would do in the situation of the many characters from
the soap opera (imagine self-perspective). The host reminded listeners of a particular scene from the radio soap opera and asked listeners for their judgments in terms of envisioning what they could actually do if they were in a particular character's situation (Paluck 2010, 1173).

3.13. 3 Example of a scene in the soap opera and listener's account

Akili is happy that his father hired a Maka (member of a different fictional ethnic group) to work at his butcher shop with Akili. The show host then asked, do you think Akili's father was right to recruit a Maka merchant? Do you think the action of Akili's father would change relations among people at the market? What would you do if you were Akili's father?

The host asked listeners to include everyone's contribution and encouraged them to choose different discussion partners each week. After receiving the letters, the host would select those responding to previous week (weeks) questions and read them to the audience. Only positive letters (those that took an anti-conflict stance) were read on the air.

I find the researcher's strategy airing only positive letters from listeners to be somehow deceiving. This strategy can have far reaching consequences and can back fire as listeners who provided negative accounts may feel disrespected on cheated on. As it is believed, talk shows can have a negative results when listeners "feel confused, or angry or depressed at the end" (Howard and Rolt 2006, 14). This is why the negativist listeners
may even perhaps accuse the researcher of manipulating people's perceptions if they hear not their side of the story aired on the radio. In other words, I have strong beliefs that in peacebuilding process, all stories (accounts) must be presented and heard so people at conflict understand the dynamics of the conflict they are faced with. Providing one side of the story while withholding the other can be misleading. However, I understand that the researcher in this case wanted to encourage intergroup contact and not heighten the conflict.

3.13. 4 Challenges getting listeners' letters in

Major challenges surfaced in collecting listeners' letters; as I described early, listeners had to send their letters to the show host rather than calling in during the program broadcasting. The reason for this is that the DRC land line telephone system (service) is nonexistent in most people's households. On top of the difficulty getting people to call in, the issue of getting the letters in the hands of the show host brought some more complication. The eastern region and the country as a whole does not have postal service; meaning that listeners had to find their own way to have their letters reach their destination. The listeners either hand-delivered their letters to the station or passed them through various channels using other people or transport trucks to deliver the letters to the talk show host (Paluck 2010, 1143). Due this this difficulty, the researcher received an average of about 75 letters per month across the regions where the talk show aired (Paluck 2010, 1174). The volume of letters where nowhere near the size of the talk show
audience. Therefore, because of this challenge and the non-representative nature of the letter sample for the entire radio program show's audience, the researcher could not draw inferences about the listeners' reactions (Paluck 2010, 1174).

Figure 5. Random assignment of talk show and soap opera radio programs in Eastern DRC. Circles and stars indicate the city-based origins of the broadcasts including Uvira.
3.13. 5 Study results

Unlike listeners who were only exposed to the soap opera, the researcher found that talk show listeners discussed more among themselves but were also more intolerant about members of the outgroup, more mindful of grievances, and less likely to help members of the dislike community (Paluck 2010, 1170).

- **1 Interpersonal discussion: promotion of intergroup contact**

The researcher found that talk show listeners discussed the soap opera at significantly higher rates compared to the soap opera only listeners (Paluck 2010, 1176). Also, urban listeners were more likely to engage in discussion about the show than rural listeners but discussion mostly took place with in-group members rather than out-group members, more specifically with adult family members and children (Paluck 2010, 1176-1177). Talk show listeners reported that their discussions were more contentious than that of soap opera only listeners (Paluck 2010, 1177). The results stated above confirm conflict theories that suggest in-group members are likely to trust other in-group members than outgroup members. They also shows that contact alone cannot resolve broken intergroup relations. Therefore, more than contact is needed to bring about true peaceful coexistence; this research demonstrates that in the discussion chapter.

- **2 Attitudinal outcomes: Perspective taking and tolerance**
Paluck writes that "the talk show did not affect tolerance of outgroups in general. However, "exposure to the talk show was associated with less tolerance for disliked groups" (Paluck 2010, 1177). Talks show listeners were significantly more likely to say that "they would not want members of their dislike group to join their community associations" (Paluck 2010, 1177). They also claim that "peace would not come to DRC if their disliked group continued to live there" (Paluck 2010, 1177). Some listeners of the talk show in Uvira identified Banyamulenge as their disliked group. For instance when it came to test the ability of in-group members to aid outgroup members, the researchers asked "is there a particular group to whom you would feel uncomfortable giving the salt?" Some of the listeners responded that they would feel uncomfortable giving salt to the Banyamulenge (Paluck 2010, 1177). (This is one of the groups in my study whose citizenship is still questioned by its neighboring groups).

- **3 Behavior: helping the outgroup**

The researcher handed to participants of the experiment a 2 kg bag of salt because it is a valued item in this part of the country (Paluck 2010, 1177). At some point during the soap opera, listeners were asked whether they would give part of the salt to members of the disliked groups. As the results show, talk show listeners were less likely to help members of the dislike community. When one of the participants was asked if he should give part of his salt to the dislike group, he replied "I would rather throw this bag of salt in the toilet than let Nkunda's men [a former militia leader] have it" (Paluck 2010, 1179). Another positive participant stated that "I'll give, despite the fact they have stolen all from
us. Perhaps this gift will change them" (Paluck 2010, 1179). You can see the "us-them"
group comparison in this participant's answer. The next section discusses the good and
bad of talk shows in promoting improvement of intergroup relations.

3.13. 6 The “good and bad” of peacebuilding talk show programs

Talk shows "can consist of invited guests insisting on their facts and their positions, and
arguing about the truth. Or it can consist of the presenter encouraging random callers to
express themselves on what they have heard on the programme, or on a particular issue"
(Howard and Rolt 2006, 14). Talk shows can have both positive and negative effect when
used to promote peaceful coexistence. Most importantly, as far as talk shows are
concerned "it is the impact of the programme on the listeners which matters most, not the
status of the guests or the personality of the presenter" (Howard and Rolt 2006, 14). The
authors write that "What is important is how the listeners are affected by what they hear.
If listeners are engaged, and become interested and even excited by what they hear, that
is one measure of success" (Howard and Rolt 2006, 14). Talk shows become even more
interesting when listeners gained new information, or new understanding and "possibly
new confidence in the potential for a positive outcome to the conflict being discussed"
(Howard and Rolt 2006, 14). Talk shows can also have a negative outcome; the negative
impact for a talk show can occur when listeners "feel confused, or angry or depressed at
the end" (Howard and Rolt 2006, 14).
3.13.7 The impact of talk shows on conflict transformation

Talk show can hinder or help transform conflict dynamics (Howard and Rolt 2006, 14) as they are part of process. Hosts can open up and widen the debate because that could be considered as crucial steps in resolving a violent conflict (Howard and Rolt 2006, 14). The authors said that "Successful talk shows can demonstrate that conflict can be managed, at least between protagonists on the programme"(Howard and Rolt 2006, 14). They acknowledge that "In the short term, no single radio programme can resolve a war, or even a low-level conflict, or make protagonists do what they are not already half-convinced to do. But in the long term, over months and years, a good talk show can help change the atmosphere within which a conflict occurs"(Howard and Rolt 2006, 14).

The authors write that a talk show "can subtly alter the thinking of a large number of people so that they are less likely to support or engage in violent acts. It can make them more likely to recognize and appreciate common interests and more likely to trust each other (Howard and Rolt 2006, 14). They say talk show can achieve this kind of milestone "By enabling its audience to counter the ideas of the warmongers, a good talk show will help its audience to imagine ways in which peace is possible" (Howard and Rolt 2006, 14).

3.13.8 The role of talk shows in escalating conflict
Talk shows may become very complex processes; people may exhibit differing perceptions of the truth or they may unpredictably show emotions during the course of the show (Howard and Rolt 2006, 14) affecting the outcome of what the show may want to achieve. Complicating matters more is that talk shows are presented to an audience; external factors also may have a negative effect on the show, especially if there is a political climate, which may or may not be in favor of such talk show activities. For that reason, the show may present some problems possibly deviating from its primary mission – for encouraging dialogue – for fear of the regime's reaction; all of this may create confusion (Howard and Rolt 2006, 14).

3.14 Summary

This chapter covered the conflict background for Uvira and discussed what researchers have written on this conflict. Based on accounts provided above, I find that it is important to investigate an alternative explanation as far as coexistence between the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge are concerned. Surveying what scholars discussed on the topic, I argue that the fact of not legitimizing the Banyamulenge as Congolese citizens is the heart of the problem for the conflict in Uvira and perhaps the major issue hindering peaceful coexistence in the area. The Banyamulenge do not feel the sense of belonging to the nation and Uvira where they live; they are likely going to continue seeking to be recognized as Congolese and may be ready to use all means including violence to achieve their goal. Ultimately, the more rejected the Banyamulenge feel the less likely they are to
engage in productive talks with the neighboring groups and the less likely the neighboring groups to the Banyamulenge will be willing to sit down with the people they believe are foreigners. However, I would like to emphasize that though recognizing the legitimacy of the Banyamulenge must be the first step toward improving relations between them and their neighbors, that fact alone is not enough to foster peaceful coexistence.

For the same reasons why I argued that intergroup contact and empathy alone could be insufficient to predict improvement in intergroup relations, I would also argue that the fact of legitimizing the Banyamulenge alone will not make all the difference needed to facilitate coexistence among the rival groups. I argue that it will take a combination of factors to actually make a big impact. This is the reason why this study explored other avenues such intergroup cooperation (positive interaction), intergroup interdependency and shared identity – especially legitimizing the other to came up with a contact model that may be used to foster coexistence. If these other avenues were to be promoted at the top level (leadership) and the bottom level (general populace) – to break possible boundaries existing between the communities – perhaps yesterday's antagonists could become allies.
Chapter 4

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1 RESEARCH DESIGN

This research used qualitative method of inquiry; it employed a case study as an inquiry strategy of the conflicts in the district of Uvira, eastern DRC. It used in-depth interviews of selected participants and triangulated with published research on the subject matter. As this research explains the role of intergroup contact and empathy in fostering coexistence, it involved an exploration of the experiences and perceptions of participants to make sense (explain) of their stories.

4.1.1 Epistemological perspective

I used the constructivist approach for this research because this paradigm stipulates that “knowledge is socially constructed” (Mertens 2014, 16) by people who are engaged in the process of research. Using this approach, researchers are encouraged “to attempt to understand the complex world of lived experience from the point of view of those who live it” (Mertens 2014, 16). Social constructivist theorists identity research "as discovering meaning and understanding through the researcher’s active involvement of the construction of meaning… the paradigm provides ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions for researchers to interpret the world " (Kim 2014, 539). The
author contend that the constructivist approach must create "collaborative and dialectical relations between the researcher and the research participants" (Kim 2014, 538). Therefore, constructivists' inquiry requires that both researcher and participants adopt a position of mutuality between them during the research process (Mills, Bonner, and Francis 2006, 8).

Epistemologically, constructivists believe that "it is impossible to separate the inquirer from the inquired into. It is precisely their interaction that creates the data that will emerge from the inquiry" (Mills, Bonner, and Francis 2006, 9). In the true sense, the constructivist grounded theory emphasizes on "the interactive relationship between researcher and participants in the research process and in doing so brings the centrality of the researcher as author to the methodological forefront" (Mills, Bonner, and Francis 2006, 9). Thus, the researcher reflects upon her/his assumptions by increasing her/his awareness of listening to and analyzing the stories of participants as openly as possible (Mills, Bonner, and Francis 2006, 9). The choice of social constructivism is appropriate for this research design because the purpose of the study is to use the experiences and perceptions of participants to explore how people in Uvira construct their meanings of the role that contact, empathy and social identity play in intergroup coexistence.

The constructivist approach also provides the reader with "a sense of the analytical lenses through which the researcher gazes at the data" (Mills, Bonner, and Francis 2006, 9). Therefore, the constructivist approach requires:
1. "The creation of a sense of reciprocity between participants and the researcher in the construction of meaning and, ultimately, a theory that is grounded in the participants’ and researcher’s experiences" (Mills, Bonner, and Francis 2006, 9).

2. "The establishment of relationships with participants that explicate power imbalances and attempts to modify these imbalances" (Mills, Bonner, and Francis 2006, 9).

3. "Clarification of the position the author takes in the text, the relevance of biography and how one renders participants’ stories into theory through writing" (Mills, Bonner, and Francis 2006, 9).

During the process of interaction, it is vital that the researcher and participant give and take from each other. It is here where the area of interest is explored and becomes clear. Constructivists believe that interview is the "site for the construction of knowledge, and clearly the researcher and informant produce this knowledge together" (Mills, Bonner, and Francis 2006, 9). As knowledge is constructed, the data that was generated through interview needs to reveal "depth, feeling and reflexive thought" (Mills, Bonner, and Francis 2006, 9). However, in order to make the dialogue mutually meaningful during interviews "the researcher needs to engage with participants through a willingness to understand a participant’s response in the context of the interview as a whole. This understanding develops through the open interchange between participant and researcher" (Mills, Bonner, and Francis 2006, 10).

4.1.2 Role of reflection in constructivism
Constructivist grounded theorists acknowledge that "researchers bring with them underlying assumptions that can be framed ontologically, epistemologically and with respect to the area of study" (Mills, Bonner, and Francis 2006, 10). This means that these assumptions must be tested or validated by the researcher throughout the research process. In addition, researchers have selves and some already pre-established images. They can show passion for the area of their research that may become problematic in the sense that the passion may have the potential "to blind the researcher to aspects of data, or at the very least, to construct filters through which we view data" (Mills, Bonner, and Francis 2006, 10). For the reason stated above, researchers need to examine where they are in relation to their area of interest "in order to make the necessary meaningful linkages between the personal and emotional on the one hand, and the stringent intellectual operations to come on the other" (Mills, Bonner, and Francis 2006, 10). This personal interrogation seeks to "uncover underlying assumptions and make them explicit both to the researcher and, in time, to the readers of his or her study" (Mills, Bonner, and Francis 2006, 10).

For instance, Charmaz and Mitchell challenged researchers "who are attempting to explore the meanings of others’ experiences to consider their own voice in the final product" (Mills, Bonner, and Francis 2006, 11). Here, voice refer to "the animus of storytelling, the manifestation of an author’s will, intent, and feeling" (Mills, Bonner, and Francis 2006, 11). While animus "is not the content of stories, but the ways authors present themselves within them" (Mills, Bonner, and Francis 2006, 11). Even though the
researcher’s animus is "an expression of the author within the final text, the form it takes is an outcome of the author’s position on his or her personal biography, his or her ability to render through writing the multiple constructions of the participants and the relationship between the participants and themselves" (Mills, Bonner, and Francis 2006, 11). This means that although the researcher's voice in the written text is of paramount importance, "positioning the researcher as the participants’ partner in the research process, rather than as an objective analyst of subjects’ experiences, is vital to developing a constructivist grounded theory design" (Mills, Bonner, and Francis 2006, 11). To end this section, I must say that constructivist grounded theory does not aim "to provide full individual accounts as evidence; rather, it seeks to move a theoretically sensitive analysis of participants’ stories onto a higher plane while still retaining a clear connection to the data from which it was derived" (Mills, Bonner, and Francis 2006, 11).

I stated early that the choice of social constructivism is appropriate for this research for reasons that this research uses the experiences and perceptions of participants to explore how they construct their meanings of the conflict surrounding them. It was my hope to understand each group’s perceptions over the issues dividing them in order to have a clearer picture of the reason(s) behind the difficulty of the groups to peacefully coexist. In doing so, I used theories that explained how members of two groups understand contact, empathy, and coexistence utilizing explanatory research strategies to make sense of the relevant causal factors for longstanding antagonism and struggle for coexistence between the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge. Thus, I used theoretical approaches which provide an overall orientation that shape how the research was conducted, and provided
me with guidance about how I collected data (interview, and document reviews) and how it was analyzed (Creswell 2009, 63). The next section discusses the case study.

4.2 CASE STUDY AND CASE SELECTION

4.2.1 Case study

I discuss here what a case study approach entails in a case study research. Crowe et al. (2011) write that a case study is "a research approach that is used to generate an in-depth, multi-faceted understanding of a complex issue in its real-life context" (Crowe et al. 2011, 1). The authors go further stating that a case study approach normally offers more insights into the gaps that exist for the studied case. It also offers insights about why one implementation strategy may be chosen over another (Crowe et al. 2011, 4). Other contend that a case study "focuses intensively on a single case" and that the chosen case "is regarded as emblematic of a larger population of cases, a case of something" (Elman, Gerring and Mahoney 2016, 375).

Furthermore, a case study refers to "empirical inquiries of single cases that are contextually unique and usually address a problem or an intervention of interest to the researcher’s professional practice" (Harland 2014, 1114). The results of the investigated case firstly benefit the researcher who undertook the project, but can then be used by others who find new learning and knowledge in the study (Harland 2014, 1114). Yin (1984, 2003) says that in a case study, researchers observe a natural phenomenon, which exists in a set of data. The researchers do so by examining a small geographical area or
small number of subjects of their interest. Yin says that case studies are used to "explain, describe or explore events or phenomena in the everyday contexts in which they occur" (Crowe et al. 2011, 4).

Case studies can "help to understand and explain causal links and pathways resulting from a new policy initiative or service development" (Crowe et al. 2011, 4). Unlike experiment designs which test hypotheses by deliberately manipulating the environment, case study approaches capture information on a more explanatory way to answer the "how, what, and why questions" (Crowe et al. 2011, 4). In addition, there is an assumption that case study is only a qualitative method; however, case study can also utilize quantitative method of inquiry (Harland 2014, 1117).

Meanwhile, Stake characterized three main types of case study that include 'intrinsic, instrumental and collective.' Intrinsic case study is conducted to learn about a unique phenomenon; there "The researcher should define the uniqueness of the phenomenon, which distinguishes it from all others" (Crowe et al. 2011, 1-2). Instrumental case study utilizes a particular case to learn about an issue or phenomenon. Finally, a collective case study is about "studying multiple cases simultaneously or sequentially in an attempt to generate a still broader appreciation of a particular issue" (Crowe et al. 2011, 2)

4.2.2 How case studies are conducted
Even when undertaking a case study research, researchers must be cognizant of taking necessary stages involving research activity. These include the definition of the case and its selection, collecting and analyzing data, as well as interpreting it while reporting the final product (findings) to the readers (Crowe et al. 2011, 5).

**Case definition:** When defining a case succinctly, researchers need to formulate research question(s) that are informed by the existing literature. Researchers must clarify the nature and beginning and end time covered by the case study. They must also clarify "the relevant social group, organization or geographic area of interest to the investigator, the types of evidence to be collected and priorities for data collection and analysis" (Crowe et al. 2011, 5).

**Case selection:** Selecting a case to study requires some thoughtful reflection as it is an important part for making the research successful. Case selection "plays a pivotal role in case study research" (Elman, Gerring and Mahoney 2016, 378). Crowe write that "a case is selected not because it is representative of other cases, but because of its uniqueness, which is of genuine interest to the researchers" (Crowe et al. 2011, 5). Researchers must be mindful that a selected case study site must be accessible to them; the researcher should be allowed access to participants or organizations who constitute "a chosen unit of analysis for the study"(Crowe et al. 2011, 6). In other terms, the selected case "need to be not only interesting but also hospitable to the inquiry if they are to be informative and answer the research question (Crowe et al. 2011, 6). This is important because quality case research, like all other research "require imagination, and
creativity… It must bring the reader as close as possible to the experience being described and provide conceptual insight” (Harland 2014, 1114).

**Collecting data:** In order to have an in-depth understanding of a case, researchers often rely on collecting multiple sources of evidence in a case study approach to be viewed as multi-method research (Harland 2014, 1117). For instance, in a qualitative technique, researchers may use interviews, focus groups and observations or in a quantitative technique, they may use questionnaires, audits and other routinely collected data (Crowe et al. 2011, 6). This triangulation (use of multiple sources of data) is believed to be a better way to increase the internal validity of the study – the "extent to which the method is appropriate to answer the research question" (Crowe et al. 2011, 6).

**Analyzing, interpreting and reporting data:** After collecting valuable data, a researcher then needs to make sense of the information. This sense-making/meaning-making process requires the interpretation of a wide range of sources of data (Crowe et al. 2011, 6-7). The process of analysis involves the repeated reviewing and sorting of the voluminous data that is at the researcher's disposal. Here, the data then needs to be organized and coded so that the key issues from the literature and collected dataset be easily retrieved in the future (Crowe et al. 2011, 7). Finally, when reporting the research findings, the investigator must provide the reader with sufficient contextual information helping the reader to understand the processes that he/she followed and how she/he reached the conclusions (Crowe et al. 2011, 7). This means that the report must reflect "a situation and the analysis aligned with the methodology so the reader feels comfortable
with the integrity of the claims being made. In other words, be clear about where the knowledge comes from” (Harland 2014, 1114).

4.2.3 Uvira case selection and definition

As stated above, case selection is pivotal for the research (Elman, Gerring and Mahoney 2016, 378); it must be selected because of its uniqueness and must be interesting so as to be able to answer the research question (Crowe et al. 2011, 5-6). The uniqueness and importance of Uvira as a case selection is discussed below.

The sampling frame was made up of members of the Bavibafurulu and Banyamulenge living in the Uvira territory. Uvira is a DRC border town located approximately 25 km (15 miles) west of Bujumbura, Burundi. What is different about this research site than other places in eastern DRC? In other terms, why Uvira? The eastern DRC South Kivu Province is so vast, it comprises several towns and villages. Considering the whole South Kivu Province as the research site could be problematic and unrealistic for this research, as this type of site (South Kivu) could not meet the research objectives. Though the Bavibafurulu and Banyamulenge live in other places of South Kivu Province than Uvira, it is in Uvira where we find a large population representative of both the Bavibafurulu and Banyamulenge. Historically, it is in the territory of Uvira where Mulenge is located – an area to which both the Bavibafurulu and Banyamulenge claim ownership. Though it is a majority of Banyamulenge who live in Mulenge, the
Bavibafuliru charge that the Banyamulenge are foreigners who came from Rwanda and just happen to live in Mulenge as occupiers.

The Bavibafuliru say that they are indigenous, while Banyamulenge are foreign occupiers of their ancestral land. Each of these groups has claimed Mulenge as its own, creating antagonism over the territorial dispute. It is in Uvira that the first 1996 DRC war of liberation was born. Members of these rival communities have been involved in this war in different capacity, with one group supporting the government of DRC (Bavibafuliru), while the other supported foreign troops (Banyamulenge) who invaded the country in 1996. Killings took place on both sides, and those memories of war rivalry remain, even to this day in Uvira. Compared to other sites of South Kivu Province, Uvira is unique because of its geographic location and the dynamics of conflict mechanisms as described above. This is why this site interested me more than other parts of the province.

In addition, politically, there is a stronger sense of political tension between the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru in Uvira than in other parts of eastern DRC. Despite the fact that both of these groups live in Uvira territory, members of the Banyamulenge ethnic group have been claiming of not having local chieftaincy representation. The Bavibafuliru continue to claim that Banyamulenge are foreigners from Rwanda and must not get any political representation either at the local level or national level. Political infighting between these groups has put them at odds with each other. Economically, however, members of these groups always need each other. They share the same markets and exchange goods and services.
Culturally, there are differences in how each group sees the other when it comes to food, dress, or business customs. Cultural differences do sometimes create a sense of separation between these groups, with each group clinging to its culture and not wanting to embrace the other group's ways. Though these groups live in the same territory (Uvira), they speak different ethnic languages that create differences among the groups. The Bavibafuliru speak Kifuliru while the Banyamulenge speak Kinyarwanda – the national language of Rwanda. All these dynamics make Uvira a more remarkable site than other places in eastern DRC to explore the group dynamics between the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru and the causes of longstanding antagonism between the two peoples that impede coexistence among them. Because many Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge live in Uvira, it was easy for me to find a sample that was representative of both groups.

4.3 RESEARCH METHODS

I used multiple data collection strategies including conducting interviews and reviewing scholarly published works. First, I used semi-structure interviews via Skype and phone. Interview questions were constructed under categories according to possible causes of failure for coexistence and possible solutions to encourage intergroup relations. I positioned these categories within existing theories and intervention strategies defined by my proposed framework model. I explained respondents' views from the interconnection of these categories. Second, on top of using interviews, I triangulated by elaborating my analysis with other data from published materials covering the Uvira conflict. These
writings have analyzed and documented the historical, political, cultural, local and national power dynamics influencing the conflicts. Coupled with the participants' stories, this research builds on some of the scholarly research carried out in Uvira by deepening the understanding of inter-group conflict and provide an explanation as to why rival groups face challenges to peacefully coexist. This research contributes to the body of knowledge on the conflicts in Uvira.

I conducted interviews not in tribal local languages, but rather in French, a language that both groups use in common. French and Swahili are widely spoken among members of these two groups. Though I am fluent in both languages, I only used French for the purpose of having high quality data in terms of translating the interview from French to English. Unlike French, which is widely spoken by all, the Swahili spoken in DRC is different from that spoken in east Africa. Different groups speak a different Swahili dialect. This could have required me to have different methods of transcribing interview from DRC Swahili to English, thus becoming time consuming.

Using interview strategies in addressing the kind of “why” question I had for this research allowed me to gather data from participants without any kind of restriction or reservation. As I also used open-ended questions, this allowed participants to speak on issues in length, allowing me to really get more out of the participants. The strength of interviews is that I was still rephrasing questions without losing their original meaning if a participant did not get the sense of the original question. Using, for instance, questionnaires for this research would limit my ability to gather lengthy answers.
4.3.1 Phone interviews

4.3.1.1 Advantages of phone interviews

Cost- and time-effective: A telephone interview costs less expensive (Suttle 2016) as the researcher reaches participants in less time, especially for researches that are to take place in a far-reaching geographic area as it was the case for Uvira. Telephone interview reduces international and local travel time and expenses. Telephone interview also allows the investigator to contact populations that might be difficult to reach, especially due to limitation in accessing dangerous or politically sensitive sites (Opdenakker 2006). Also, there are sometimes personal issues that are very sensitive and that subjects may be reluctant to discuss in a face-to-face setting with an interviewer but feel comfortable to disclose on telephone (Opdenakker 2006).

4.3.1.2 Disadvantages of phone interviews

Reductions in social cues: in the phone interview, the interviewer does not see the interviewee; therefore the interviewer cannot see the reaction of the interviewee, especially when body language is to be used as a "source of extra information" (Opdenakker 2006). In face-to-face interview, the "interviewer and interviewee can directly react to what the other says (Opdenakker 2006) but can't do that on telephone interview. To remediate this problem, I used Skype for those with access to a computer at
home or with internet connection on their phone, as well as imo phone application as these platforms have both audio and video capabilities. The video allows the researcher to see the participant as if you were in the same room similar to face-to-face interview.

Also, in telephone interview, the investigator has no control of the space in which the interview will take place. In other terms, "the interviewer has no view on the situation in which the interviewee is situated" and cannot therefore "create a good interview ambiance" (Opdenakker 2006). The deal with this situation, I asked that participants be in a room at home or another safe place where no one will listen to our conversation. This was necessary for the participants' privacy and confidentiality.

4.3.2 Skype interviews

4.3.2.1 Advantages of Skype interviews

To date, little research has considered Skype as a data collection tool, but it is beneficial when flexibility is needed, especially when challenges arise if researchers cannot physically access the research fields for one reason or another as it was my case (security reasons). For individuals worrying about the cost for conducting a research, use of Skype is very inexpensive (Given 2008; Exe Digital PhD, 2012). In addition, Skype is geographically flexible and less time-intensive (Given 2008). It can be effectively used as online interview tool when a researcher and participants are at a distant geographic region. With its instant messaging function, Skype provides a useful tool for managing data collection and sharing information (Given 2008) between the researcher and the
subjects. For individuals wanting to record interviews, Skype provides an ease of "audio-recording capability with researchers being able to easily record computer-to-computer and computer to telephone conversations" (Given 2008). I did not record the interviews, but rather took note as participants talked.

4.3.2.2 Disadvantages of Skype interviews

There are also a number of challenges to consider when using Skype as an online tool to collect research data. Given says that "there may be time lags in the conversation, which can break the flow of an interview" (Given 2008). If using computer-to-computer communication, problems could suddenly surface with microphone and/or headset (Exe Digital PhD 2012). This may make both the researcher and subject at ease if the microphone or headset needs to be readjusted over and over again. Unlike in a face-to-face interview setting where a researcher and subject are on a same time zone, use of Skype for long distance locations requires accommodating time zones (Exe Digital PhD 2012), as the researchers and subjects must find a time that is convenient for both. Scheduling may become a problem if you have hundreds of interviews to conduct. In addition, in audio-only mode, Skype may present some challenges as non-verbal communication is lost. On top of that, technology can fail, resulting in disconnection problems or loss of data (Given 2008).

4.4 SAMPLING
Forty (40) people participated in the study and the sample was very representative across gender and age; their age range between 18 and 85. This sample selection is appropriate for the purpose of this study. As the sample was made of 40 people; 20 members from each group were interviewed. In this research 20 individuals from the Banyamulenge community and 20 others from the Bavibafuliru community were interviewed. Men and women were equality represented (10 women and 10 men in each community).

The choice for the participants/subjects was very important to make this research successful. I used purposive sampling because I focused on particular characteristics of the general population of Uvira. Only the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru living in Uvira were of interest to me in this research. I did not pay attention to other DRC tribes living in Uvira, as most people from other tribes who live in Uvira are very few. They either came there to seek a job or are in the territory for other personal reasons, but their origin is not Uvira. I chose these two groups for reason I stated above; exploring them rather than other groups living in Uvira enabled me to answer my research questions. Only individuals with direct connection to the territory of Uvira (they were born or grew up there) belonging to the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru ethnic groups participated in the research. These individuals have directly or indirectly been affected by the conflict between the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge. Here I mean these participants have been themselves affected by the conflict generated in Uvira or someone they know belonging to these two groups was affected by the conflict.

Having this particular restricted sample was the best way to get at the data that I needed to answer my research question. I identified a first group of people who have
strong ties with the area of Mulenge (live in Mulenge or have lived in Mulenge, which is also within Uvira territory) – a disputed territory – to which both the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru claim ownership. The second group of people was composed of individuals who have no direct ties with Mulenge, but live in Uvira territory. In doing so, I tried to find out whether there was difference in perspectives among members of these rival groups between those who have personal connection to Mulenge versus those who have none.

By understanding the causes of failed coexistence in Uvira where members of Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru have had contacts and had expressed empathy and willingness to reconcile, I hoped to gain not only a better understanding of what contributes to the lack of coexistence this area, but also insights into similar phenomenon occurring in other parts of the DRC, and world, in particular the Great Lakes Region of Africa (DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania) where issues of coexistence have been studied and few answers have been provided.

4.5 STUDY PROCEDURES, RECRUITMENT, AND CONSENT

4.5.1 Study procedures

I conducted semi-structural interviews in French via Skype and by phone and translated all data back to English. I could not personally travel to the field to conduct face-to-face interview due to security concerns that were identified in Bujumbura, Burundi during the initial time of launching my investigation. I was supposed to have my headquarters in
Bujumbura – traveling back and forth between Bujumbura and Uvira to conduct the interviews. However, due to the inability of accessing the research site because of the security concerns, I requested permission from the dissertation chair to conduct the interviews with selected subjects via Skype, for those who had access to Skype. Subjects were also reached by phone; some users had WhatsApp and imo applications where calls are made for free; imo has video capability. The request was also approved by the George Mason Institutional Review Board (IRB). Interview questions were constructed under categories according to possible causes of failure for coexistence and possible solutions to encourage intergroup relations. Each interview lasted for about 1 hour.

4.5.2. Recruitment

The subjects (participants) included local elected officials, customary and civil society organizations' leaders and academics who were chosen to provide their expert knowledge. They were represented across gender. Being from the region (I was born and grew up in Uvira), I utilized my existing personal network, as well as contacts acquired while conducting research in this region in 2011, to recruit subjects. My network is composed of people from the two communities I studied.

4.5.3 Consent

The consent process took place verbally because the interviews were conducted via Skype and by telephone. Therefore, a waiver of signature was requested from the IRB. I
conducted the consent process by reading the content of the consent to the subject prior to the interview. After the consent was read to the subject, s/he had to verbally accept that s/he agrees to all that has been indicated and discussed in the consent and that s/he voluntarily chose to participate in the study. Should the subject not agree with any information provided to him/her in the consent, s/he had to automatically be disqualified from taking part in the study. I encountered no case of disqualification; all subjects agreed to the consent. I provided subjects with clear information about the research project. The information also encompassed an explanation of the purposes of the research, including how much time will be needed for their participation so they can make an informed and voluntary decision whether to participate in the study. Subjects were informed that there were no risks associated with their participation in the study, nor were there any benefits to them for participating in the study other than to further research in understanding the failure of intergroup coexistence.

Subjects were informed that all personal data provided for this study will be confidential. No participants' names were disclosed in the study; when a reference from the interview was made during the analysis, I used pseudonyms to make my points or explain patterns. Finally, subjects were told that their participation was voluntary, and that if they refuse to participate in the study, there will be no penalty against them. I also made it clear to subjects that they could withdraw from the study at any time without them facing any penalty for their decision.

4.6 DATA ANALYSIS
I used theme analysis method to provide a framework of possible explanations to lay out the causes of struggle for coexistence, while also providing a remedy to get to true peaceful coexistence. After gathering data from participants, I then read through materials to identify the general themes that arose from participants' stories (Creswell 2009, 184). As my central focus for this study was to explore issues related to challenges of coexistence, rather than just explain participants’ views using theories, the theme analysis approach allowed me to group common themes together, helping this research to get a sense of how members of the two communities describe their conflict and how they themselves make sense of the conflict dynamics surrounding them. The method allowed me to comprehend the sense-making of the conflict as understood by each community; I identify similarities and differences expressed by participants.

Note that the interviews were constructed under categories according to possible causes of challenges to coexist and possible prescription for coexistence. This allowed me to provide a clear explanation about the difficulty for coexistence using the categories and the themes I identified, given that I positioned these categories within theories and interventions strategies that defined my framework. Theme analysis was critical in explaining collected data from the interconnection of these categories.

4.7 DATA VALIDITY

The critical public is always concerned about the validity of research findings, especially when difficulties are created for researchers during the process of data collection due to
barriers they may face with the spoken language in the research field (Twinn 1996, 418). Researchers have gone to places where they have no knowledge of the local language and end up relying on translators to collect data, raising some issues of data reliability and validity. To address this issue, I conducted interviews not in the tribal language spoken by each community I studied, but instead used French, which members of the two groups all speak in common. I am fluent in this language and used no translator to transcribe date, but translated the interviews myself.

There are also issues of translation that arise in quantitative research, especially issues regarding the influence translation may have on the findings of the research (Twinn 1996, 418). I translated the manuscripts from French to English. In many instances, translation errors may occur, especially when it comes to managing data when "no equivalent word exists in the local language and influences "the grammatical style on the analysis" (Twinn 1996, 418). From my previous experience translating research materials, I have dealt with the issue of the lack of existential equivalent words. When no equivalent word for English exists in the local language, I deliberately explain the meaning with various words. For instance if the term coexistence does not exist in French, I give the meaning to the word. Fortunately, French is a rich language unlike many of the African traditional or local dialects (languages). I found no difficulty in finding French meaning of key terms I used in the research. Though, I am not a professional translator, I am very well equipped to translate documents from French to English. I have taken jobs in my life time in which translating documents was one of job descriptions, including when I was at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars (Africa program). At my current job with iJET International, I use French on a daily basis when monitoring world events and translate material from French to English any time when I am needed. Given this past and present experience, I translated the research transcripts alone to maximize the reliability of the research.

In addition, the validity and reliability issues are raised about the significance of the conceptual framework of the research design and sampling (Twinn 1996, 418). This is the reason why the choice of participants was very important to make this research successful. I have indicated that only individuals with direct connection to the territory of Uvira participated in the research. These individuals have directly or indirectly been affected by the conflict between the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge. The subjects (participants) were composed of individuals with the knowledge of the major conflict issues for Uvira including local elected officials, customary and civil society organizations' leaders and academics. Having this particular restricted simple was the best way to get at the data that I needed to answer my research questions. Also, I used two methods for collecting data including interviews and published works covering the Uvira conflict. The use of multiple sources of data (triangulation) is believed to be a better way to increase the internal validity of the study (Crowe et al. 2011, 6).

4.8 RESEARCH OBJECTIVITY
To avoid researcher bias, research objectivity has to be addressed. Therefore, analytical categories/themes that were identified by this research were developed and used as
described by me. This research used precise operational definitions for key words and used precise rules and procedures for coding data to also meet research reliability discussed above (Kolbe, 1991 245). I used detailed rules and procedures as a way to seek to reduce the researcher's subjective biases (Kolbe 1991, 245). This is be very well expanded under research analysis.

4.9 ETHICS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Uvira can be regarded as a sensitive area given what has transpired between rival communities. Sometimes the limitation can be seen in the entry mode chosen by the researcher (de Laine 2000). For sensitivity, rather than positioning myself as an outsider, I kept the insider position. This way, I was viewed as one with legitimate access and someone able to gain acceptance by the subjects (de Laine 2000).

In addition, in the eye of a critical audience, there may appear some ethical dilemmas from readers who may raise concerns for seeing me investigating my own community. Some may be concerned about the moral choices researchers may face when acting in own community. They could wonder how I can move beyond conflicts that may arise between my own self-interest and the pursuit of truth (Colomb and Joseph Williams 2008). I acknowledge objections and reservations that some in the public may have about my choice. However, I have investigated these communities in the past, and have kept the integrity of not mixing personal interest and that of looking for the truth. As a researcher, I stayed true to the study and only focused on exploring the issues of the investigation with the hope of trying to get close to the truth and understand the challenges of
coexistence between members of communities being investigated. To address the concerns readers may have, I made sure that I explain to my critics why my research should change their understanding of their beliefs on this subject matter. This means, I had examined my own understanding and interests and the responsibility to the readers in order to convince them to change their own beliefs (Colomb and Joseph Williams 2008).

Again, for ethical issues, I also indicated the limitations of this case study; I respected sources and acknowledge investigations that went against my results, while also acknowledging the limits of my certainty (Colomb and Joseph Williams 2008). With due respect to those critics who expressed doubts about me investigating my own community, I ensured I did not provide any personal opinion(s) about the investigation of this study in the analysis or discussion; separate feelings from professionalism. It is important to note that I have taken positions giving my views critiquing or backing scholarly work done by other researchers on the subject matter I studied. However, my analysis is solely based on data that I collected and findings, triangulating that with scholarly literature of the subject matter I studied. Nowhere in my analysis did I refer to personal opinions but only used facts from the findings. However, I gave my take away of the investigation in the conclusion chapter. Not to mention that I was not one of the subjects in this study; therefore, what I think is irrelevant to this research. To put nicely, if I had all the personal answers about this study and Uvira conflicts in general, I wouldn't embark on another pursuit of truth by carrying out this research. I am clear about where the knowledge of this research comes from (Harland 2014, 1114).
In addition, for the use of Skype, ethical and technical issues were managed to ensure that subjects’ rights were respected. In an audio-only mode, it may become difficult to control the setting or environment in which the subject is found (i.e. the study may require that the subject be in a comfortable and private location during the interview) but if the subject intentionally chooses to break this code of conduct, the researcher may not be able to figure it out. I provided the reader with sufficient contextual information helping her/him to understand the processes and how I reached the research conclusions (Crowe et al. 2011, 7).

4.10 PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY

I protected the privacy of the participants and confidentiality of data obtained. No identifiable information was collected; all subjects were assigned pseudonyms. Also, I store the data at my home in a secure area keeping all documents password-protected while shredding any papers containing notes of items I took down. The data will be stored for at least five years after the study ends. Copies of all records will also be stored at a Mason property in the principal investigator's office; the documents will be password-protected.
Chapter 5
DATA ANALYSIS

5.1 DATA ORGANIZATION

This study uses theme analysis method to make sense of the participants' interview question responses; I have organized data around these responses. The interview questions were constructed under categories according to possible causes of the groups' challenges to coexist and possible solutions that facilitate coexistence. Participants’ responses were transcribed into a Microsoft Word document, with data organized in columns and rows. Rows 1-40 represent the participants; these were given “pseudo” names (S1-S40), as I interviewed 40 participants. Columns 2-10 represent the 9 interview questions. I transcribed data handling one question at a time; this method allowed me to select common themes emerging from participants' responses when reading materials for each question. The responses were then keyed into a matrix using Microsoft Excel. These responses were categorized under two groups: participants belonging to the Banyamulenge and those of the Bavibafuliru. This strategy allows the matrix to compare and contrast participants' responses and make sense of the differences and similarities in perspectives in participants’ views.

The reason for using the matrix is that some questions were very explicit in provoking participants to provide 'Yes' or 'No' answers while at the same time asking
them to elaborate their responses as to why they hold one position over the other. In other words, I explored why the respondents agreed or disagreed with a particular concept stated in the question. For instance, to understand participants' views about the role contact may play in ameliorating intergroup relations, I asked the following question: “How would you describe the contact between the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge?” Participants' responses varied, with some stating that the interaction was “bad,” others saying it was “good” or “somehow good,” but they provided a justification for a position that they took. Another example is the following question: “Do you think more contacts between members of the two group can improve their relations and why?” Similarly, participants were split in their responses; some thoughts that more contacts could actually improve relations between the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge, while others disagreed. However, even here, the respondents were instructed to say why they articulate one position over the other. All other questions took this direction; I cover them later and show participants' responses using real numbers and percentages to explain the findings in clear and concise terms. This strategy is meaningful for the next chapter (discussion), which comes after this, and where I provide compelling explanations of the findings.

The framing of the questions was based on the assumption that the presence of intergroup contact and empathy – a lack of positive cooperation between the groups and the inability of one group to accept the legitimacy (citizenship) of the other – may hinder their ability to coexist peacefully. The assumption also stipulated that if the rival groups do not have common goals for the future and rely on one another (interdependence), the groups' efforts to address their differences would be null. When I asked participants how
they view contact between the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge, the majority of the participants said the contact is bad, contradicting what they previously believed about the role of contact discussed in the first question. The data show that 85% of Bavibafuliru (17 out 20) stated that contacts between them and the Banyamulenge were bad; 10% (2 out of 20) of Bavibafuliru indicated the encounters were good; while 5% (1 out 20) said contacts were somehow good.

Conversely, only 50% percent of the Banyamulenge (10 out of 20) said contacts between them and the Bavibafuliru were bad; 30% (6 out of 20) indicated the contacts were good; while 20% (4 out of 20) stated the encounters were somehow good. This means that 67.5% of all participants (27 out of 40) believed contacts between the two rival groups are actually bad, 20% (8 out 40) stated that contacts were good; while only 12.5% (5 out 40) thought more contacts were somehow good. For example, the following was voiced by a Muvimufuliru participant: "There are no good contacts between us; it is all about irony. More contacts will not improve our relations because we will always remember the killings perpetrated by the Banyamulenge" (S13). Another Muvimufuliru said this: "Relations aren't good. More contacts will not lead to improvement of relations because the two groups are hypocrites; there is need to be honest with one another" (S11). A Munyamulenge who expressed doubt in the role contact could play given the ongoing circumstances said the following: "Contacts aren't good between us; and more contacts need to be accompanied by other actions if they are to bring peace. It is hard because people continue to talk about the past and that's all they
know about; they don't want to move on" (S10). The data for whether contact is good or bad in Uvira are summarized in the chart below.

### Table 2. Contact responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Contact</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Somehow Good</th>
<th>Bad</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bavibafuriru</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banyamulenge</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Participants</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>67.5%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Types of contact in Uvira](image)

**Figure 6: Contact responses in Uvira**

Although participants from both groups claimed that more contacts could help them improve relations, they realized that current interactions between the Bavibafuriru and Banyamulenge are superficial, ironic, and hypocritical; these are the three major sub-
themes that emerged from the interviews on contact. Participants said that the two groups continue to see each other as enemies, and see ups and downs in current encounters. They say that contact between members of these communities increases during peaceful time – defined as when there are no killings orchestrated by militia from both groups. However, as soon as killings occur (one group is accused of attacking a village or specific area predominantly inhabited by members of the other group), tensions again increase, leading to a diminishment of contacts between the two groups. I discuss each of the sub-themes below.

5.1.1 Superficial contact

Participants acknowledge that current contacts are not working very well for the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge to address their differences. Some claim that they see fewer interactions taking place between members of these groups. Participants stated that contact is not manifesting between the two groups because they live in isolation. They characterize some neighborhoods as predominantly Bavibafuliru and others as predominantly Banyamulenge. Some participants said that, even in mixed neighborhoods of Uvira where there is a significant presence of members of the two communities, few contacts take place between these communities. Other participants view the rapprochement between the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru as genuine. They have seen some changes in attitudes toward one another but acknowledge that some reservation still exists on both sides to fully engage the other toward better cooperation.
Some participants attributed this lack of engagement to the past; they cited factors such as killings that have occurred, affecting these communities. They said that any time they remember these killings, they feel less compelled to engage with those whom they accuse of having killed members of their group or perhaps even some close friends or relatives. For instance, a Munyamulenge participant said the following: "Sometimes we live in good relations; then when killings occur, people begin pointing fingers at Banyamulenge, but I believe more contacts can improve our relations despite the discrimination based on citizenship that we face every day" (S14).

Some Bavibafuliru participants said that, although they would want to engage the Banyamulenge, they have a feeling that the Banyamulenge are not open reciprocally. They blame members of this community for keeping some secrets to themselves while not wanting to share with members of other tribes, but rather gravitate around those who share their appearance. The Banyamulenge participants also charged that the Bavibafuliru continue to distance themselves from them. The Banyamulenge say that the Bavibafuliru treat them as foreigners, but they consider themselves Congolese and do not see themselves as Rwandans, as Bavibafuliru have always claimed. A Muvimufuliru said the following: "Contacts exist but are superficial; we are not open to each other, there is something that we hide from one another. If there are no contacts, it is difficult to improve our relations" (S32). In sum, participants from the two groups expressed feelings that each group continues to see the other as an enemy. They do not trust each other, and thus are not motivated to embrace the “enemy” from the other side. The encounters between them are seen as superficial, rather than real.
5.1.2 Hypocritical and ironic contact

Participants were in agreement from both sides that current contacts are not helping them build relations; they view the existing contacts as fake. Some participants call these contacts hypocritical, while others described them as ironic. The participants expressed concerns that there is a lack of credibility about the ongoing encounters because they think members of the communities are not honest with one another. There is a sense of dishonesty that manifests in their interactions, where members do not show each other their true “face” or intentions. Participants think these members can show one face today and another tomorrow. Participants think the manifestation of sarcasm in these contacts is a result of the rejection one group experiences from the other. They think that, although one group does not accept the other as members of the society, members of the rejecting group hide their feeling to the rejected group when they are in contact. The rejecting group, on the other hand, show that everything is as normal as possible, despite the fact that its members may be holding something back about the other group.

At the same time, participants also think that the rejected group plays the same game and does not show that it is hurt when rejected, but act as if everything is okay when entering in contact with the rejecting group. This, according to participants, has led to a situation where members of the communities do not tell each other the truth about the feelings that they have for each other. They fake every encounter, and to remediate this situation, participants think accepting one another must boost the morale of the rival
groups, and they believe that what comes out of this acceptance may facilitate the building of new relations.

Here is what a Muvimufuliru member said about this situation: "The ongoing contacts are distrustful; we are reserved toward one another; we must accept each other in order for our relations to improve" (S30). In addition, a Munyamulenge member commented the following about the situation: "There is need for honesty in all exchanges between the two groups because what we are seeing now is a game of hypocrisy" (S29). Another Muvimufuliru said this: "Contact between the two groups can be viewed in terms of hospitality; Banyamulenge came to Uvira as refugees, and are welcome as such. I believe if the contacts are not hypocritical, they can help improve our relations, because it can lead to friendship and intermingling of our people" (S27).

There are differences in perceptions about contact that members of the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge expressed. The Bavibafuliru, who label the Banyamulenge as foreigners, expressed concerns that current contacts between the two groups are poor. They have little faith that current contacts can actually produce positive outcomes in fostering coexistence. However, the Banyamulenge, who want to be accepted by others, have a different perspective. Although some Banyamulenge were very disappointed with the way current encounters take place, they expressed some optimism about the process. They stated that, if the others (the Bavibafuliru) would show some willingness to cooperate, current contacts – though they are not producing positive effects now – could improve relations if the Bavibafuliru changed their hearts and
accepted them as legitimate members of the society. In the next section, I address factors that participants said could help in improving relations during healthy encounters.

**5.2 GOING BEYOND CONTACT**

**5.2.1 FACTORS AND TOOLS HELPING TO BUILD STRONG RELATIONS**

In question number 6, I asked the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru participants to tell me what else they thought they need to do to build strong relationships beside having been in contact with one another. The findings show some very common sub-themes that emerged from participants. The participants stated that the groups must forget about their past and forgive each other, but that the forgiveness that is spoken must be sincere. The most dominating theme expressed by many participants was the notion of encouraging intermarriage between the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge. Participants articulated their thoughts on this subject that they think must carefully be taken into consideration. Other sub-themes included acceptance, tolerance, love, and frank collaboration. Finally, sharing of power and land, as well as government intervention to promote peace, were also evoked.

**5.2.1.1 Forgiveness**

Participants realize that the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge have a terrible past due to the experiences of wars they both endured. As participants stated early, killings took place in these communities, with each group accusing the other of being the perpetrators of hostilities, while seeing members of their own community as victims. Participants
indicated that in order for true peaceful coexistence to take place, members of both communities must let the experience go (forget about the horrible things that happened) and move on in another direction where forgiveness is seen as the way to reconciliation. This way, they say, they can learn how to live together in harmony. For instance, a Munyamulenge member said the following about this issue: "We must forget about the past and think about the future; this way, we can forgive one another and live in peace with each other like we used to" (S4).

Forgiving the other also means accepting members of the outgroup to the extent that, if the outgroup was treated as inferior or inhuman compared to the in-group members, the in-group will cease to make outgroup feel as such. Participants here see the importance for mutual acceptance; they say that, without this acceptance, it will be impossible to move on. I cover the notion of acceptance later when I discuss one of the major themes (identity-based conflict). You will hear participants' voices about this subject matter under that section.

5.2.1.2 Intermarriage

The issue of intermarriage was a popular sub-theme; 18 participants out 40 talked about it compared to 9 participants who identified the concept of collaboration, or 7 participants who mentioned tolerance and 6 who raised the issue of forgiveness. This means that 45% of the total participants discussed the issue of intermarriage, 22.5% mentioned collaboration, 17.5 raised tolerance, and only 15% mentioned forgiveness. Participants gave the issue of intermarriage more significance, as they stated that members of each
group gravitate to their own group and rarely cross the border to find wives or husbands from outgroup members. They said that the Banyamulenge tend to marry other Banyamulenge, and Bavibafuliru tend to marry other Bavibafuliru. Participants see this issue as an obstacle when it comes to reaching out to people of the other group. They say that when you intermarry, you actually promote peace. This is how one participant put it: "We must encourage intermarriage, because it will be difficult for the two groups to engage in violence [if] they see each other as family. You can't kill people from the other tribe when you know they have your sister or your brother married from that tribe" (S15). Another participant said, "There is a need to encourage intermarriage to occur in Uvira; this way the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru must learn how to live together in harmony, where no group can hurt the other" (S13). The chart below summarizes the findings on factors listed by participants as facilitators for building relations.

Table 3. Participants' choices on factors to rebuild relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-themes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intermarriage</td>
<td>45.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forgiveness</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.2.1.3 Tolerance and Love

This sub-theme also was evoked, with some participants expressing exasperation as to why people would not want to love or tolerate others. It is particularly noteworthy that Banyamulenge participants were very surprised to find that some people in Uvira continue to consider them foreigners and do not want to show love and compassion toward members of their community. The Banyamulenge participants insisted that they are Congolese just like members of the other neighboring tribes, but they are disturbed that, even now, some neighbors do not want to recognize them as such. This is what a Munyamulenge said to me: "Part of the problem is that some people on that side don't tolerate the Banyamulenge. It is unbelievable that no matter how much we say that we are
proud of being Congolese, the others continue to be suspicious of us and call us all sorts of names, including foreigners (S39).

Meanwhile, some Bavibafuliru who discussed about the issue of tolerance also agreed that some Bavibafuliru are not tolerant toward the Banyamulenge, whom they view as Rwandans, rather than Congolese. As one Muvumufuliru stated, "Tolerance is important, and that includes carrying out awareness campaigns for Bavibafuliru to accept that the state has already granted the Banyamulenge citizenship" (S22). Participants say that tolerance and love can promote a peaceful environment, with members of each group becoming ready to accept each other's differences, including each other's culture.

5.2.1.4 Power-sharing and Government Intervention

Few participants discussed the issue of power-sharing for question number 6 until they responded to question number 8, in which I cover the notion of political power sharing. Mostly, the Banyamulenge participants brought up the issue of power in this question, for reasons that they say are crucial for them. The Banyamulenge very well recognized that members of their community occupy high-ranking positions at the local and national levels, including in government, police, and military, but they say that their process for seeking either political or traditional power continues to be challenged by some Bavibafuliru. As a Munyamulenge said:

Sharing power and local administration is important for us as Banyamulenge; our uncles continue to resist any attempt for us to lead our people. I think each tribe has a local chief, or a chief of a village, and why not the Banyamulenge? (S35).
Note that the term "uncle" is commonly used by the Banyamulenge to refer to Bavibafurulu as a way other people from other places use the term our brothers or our sisters to refer to outgroup members. Some participants blamed the central government for not doing enough to intervene and serve as a guarantor of the Constitution, which grants them citizenship. One Munyamulenge stated that, "the government must intervene and promote peace between the two communities; it has been silence for so long" (S21). I discuss the power issue later as one of the major themes; you will be able to hear participants' voices in that section regarding this subject.

5.2.1.5 Collaboration

The collaboration sub-theme also scored higher following the notion of intermarriage. Participants were concerned that there is no sincere collaboration between members of the two groups. The participants said that each group looks after its own people; they also indicated that members of the two groups often do not talk to members of the other group. Participants say that the lack of collaboration is not allowing them to find common ground to address their differences. Respondent S14 articulated his view on the matter in this way: "We don't have a lot in common, so to promote collaboration among us can help deal with the many issues that can't be solved by one group. No single tribe will be able to resolve this conflict if they can't collaborate with other tribes; it is only then that we can do things together for our future."
5.2.2 OVERVIEW OF INTERDEPENDENCY IN BUILDING RELATIONS

I asked participants in question number 9 whether they thought that if the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru depended on each in addressing community problems they could improve their relations. I asked them to justify their position of whether they agreed or disagreed. This question was important for this research, as I made an assumption that the rival groups’ lacking common goals for the future and not relying on one another (interdependence) was problematic to fostering coexistence. The findings reveal that participants from both sides were in agreement that interdependency, if encouraged to take shape between these two rival groups, could improve their relations. The data show that 100% of Banyamulenge (20 out 20) stated that if the Bavibafuliru and they depended on one another, it would likely ameliorate the state of their relations. In contrast, 70% of the Bavibafuliru (14 out 20) acknowledged that interdependency could increase relations between their group and the Banyamulenge. This means 85% of all participants (34 out of 40) agreed that, if members if the two groups depended on one another, their relations could change for the better. The difference in opinions for this theme shows that the Banyamulenge participants believe more heavily in relying on each other for a better future; however, as some Bavibafuliru have stated that the Banyamulenge are foreigners, they see little incentive to rely on those whom they do not perceive to be their countrymen.

Several sub-themes emerged from respondents in the area of promoting intergroup dependency. Participants said that interdependency can encourage people to seek common interests, work together, consolidate mutual respect, engage in commercial
exchanges, have extended contacts, and develop friendship. The chart below summarizes the findings on the notion of interdependency.

**Table 4. Participants' responses on interdependency**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Interdependence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Banyamulenge</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bavibafuliru</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Participants</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 8: Participants' desired aspirations for interdependence**

5.2.2.1 *Working together*
Participants indicated that the conflict in Uvira still centers on internal divisions, and that these splits have slowed the process for addressing the groups' differences. Participants stated that when members of these communities begin to rely on one another and achieve enhanced interdependence, they may develop some close relations that allow them to work together to deal with their long-lasting conflict. One participant said the following: "Yes, we need to work together so that we can begin to feel empathy for one another. This will allow us to interchange our goods, services and cultures to the extent that, when one group has a problem, the other will see that problem as its own as well; that's how people begin to build strong relations" (S9). Another stated this: "Yes, relying on each other should be a priority in this conflict because the solution to their problem won't come from one camp; they need to work together to address their differences" (S3). Still another said: "If the two groups work together depending on each other, certainly, new relationships can be formed over time" (S10).

5.2.2.2 Extended contacts and commercial exchanges

Participants raised concerns that few contacts – if any – for some people ever take place between the communities that very much need to interact frequently to resolve issues that divide them. The participants said that if members of these communities depend on each other, increased contacts will likely take place due to frequent interactions among people. Some participants suggested that, as each group specializes in a specific sector of the economy (the Bavibafuliru farm the land, and Banyamulenge are cattle owners), the extended contacts that may develop as a result of every community depending on the
other could bring about an atmosphere that could encourage mutual commercial exchanges – something they say does not happen often, as each group harbors disdain for the other. Here is what a participant stated: "The more they interact with one another, especially doing commercial exchanges, the better coexistence takes shape and the better they respect each other" (S8). Another said:

In living together, these two communities have a lot to do in common. They can engage in commercial and agricultural exchanges. The Banyamulenge, who are pastoralists can supply milk to the Bavibafuliru, and Bavibafuliru who are farmers can supply food to the Banyamulenge. With these exchanges, new relationships can be formed (S6).

5.2.2.3 Common interest

The participants were also concerned that there is pervasive selfishness occurring in Uvira between the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru. They said that each group wants to pursue its own agenda without involving the other. Some participants charged that the lack of unity and the fact that one group continues to call the other “foreign” makes it difficult for them to share. Therefore, the participants believe that if people from one group begin to gain interest in what the other group is doing, then they can actually begin to develop common interests. Here is how one participant put it: "Interests count in everything; if one group depends on the other, there are certain relations that can be created, and that will help these groups to live together peacefully. No one group will be able to live without the support of the other" (S5). Another stated that: "They are going to work toward common goals; the problem of one group will be the other's problem and the success of one group, will be the success of the other" (S20).
5.2.2.4 Mutual respect and development of friendship

Some participants said that those who have disdain for others, could begin to respect them if they started to share something in common. Some participants stated that any new contacts, if they were true and sincere, could promote self-respect and respect for the new people one just happened to get to know. Most importantly, participants said the new contacts that were encouraged through interdependence would be a driving factor for developing the new friendships needed to work in a very sincere and open way without fearing the other, as all become brothers and sisters. One participant said that, "There should be development in Uvira; there is a need for the two groups to make efforts to rely on one another. When they need one another, there will be a lot of contacts that will take place, and friendship will be created in those relations" (S11). Another indicated that, "Depending on one another will allow them to build relations and new friendship that will help them be strong once again" (S21).

5.3 OVERVIEW OF EMPATHY IN BUILDING RELATIONS

Given the Uvira conflict situation, I wanted to test this concept of empathy and find out what impact it has in ameliorating relations between groups in ongoing conflict setting. I asked participants in interview question number 2 whether they thought empathy expressed by members of the two groups for one another could help them improve their relations. Then I followed with the sub-question seeking to understand whether they
thought the empathetic reaction they have for one another was sincere, and asked them to justify their position.

The participants had negative views about the impact empathy would have in ameliorating their relations. Only 40% (8 out 20) Bavibafuliru participants agreed that empathy expressed between them and Banyamulenge could help improve their relations, and only if it is true and sincere empathy. However, 60% (12 out of 20) said empathic feelings expressed by members of these group cannot ameliorate relations, citing issues of trust. On the Banyamulenge's side, only 35 percent of the Banyamulenge (7 out 20) said empathy could help build relations; here, too, they said it could only be effective if it is true expressed empathy, while 65% percent stated empathy could have little impact on improved relations. This means that 62.5% of all participants (25 out 40) said empathy could have no impact in improving relations, while 37.5 (15 out 40) agreed it could have impact.

On the subject of whether the empathic feeling expressed by these members are sincere, only 5% of the Bavibafuliru (1 out 20) believed that the expressed empathy was sincere, compared to 95% of the Bavibafuliru, who said the expressed empathy by members of these groups was insincere. Also, 20% percent of Banyamulenge (4 out 20) stated that the empathic feeling expressed by the two groups were sincere, compared to 80 percent (16 our 20), who claimed that the expressed empathy was insincere. This means that 87.5% of all participants (35 out 40) agreed that the empathic feeling between the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru was insincere, compared to 12.5% (5 out 40) participants, who believed the expression of empathy between the two groups was
sincere. The chart below summarizes the participants' reported effects of empathy in Uvira. The sub-theme that emerged from participants' responses include ironic and hypocritical empathy.

Table 5. Effect of empathy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect of Empathy</th>
<th>Positive effect</th>
<th>Negative effect</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Banyamulenge</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
<td>65.0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bavibafuliru</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Participants</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 9: Effects of empathy in Uvira

5.3.1 Hypocritical and ironic empathy
Similar to the results for the role contact plays in Uvira in mediating the building of relations, two sub-themes emerged for the role empathy plays in intergroup relations. Participants described the expressed empathy between the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru as hypocritical and ironic. Participants indicated that, for the most part, expressed empathy between the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru is not sincere. It is not coming from the bottom of the individual’s heart, but instead it is something that is expressed to please the other while meaning absolutely nothing. Participants said that, with the exception of some isolated cases, empathic feelings between members of the two groups often do not manifest. Participants stated that, given the experiences each group went through during the wars of eastern DRC, empathy is sometimes expressed between the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru for fear of not hurting the other's feelings, but in the true sense, they say the sincerity of those feelings is questionable. A participant put it like this: "The manifested empathy is driven by some fear; there is a lot of disinformation and manipulation; some show empathy because they want to please the other side but they don't mean it" (S2). A Munyamulenge said that, "The empathy is not sincere; it is hypocritical and can't help them improve relations, as they see each other as enemies and continue to call Banyamulenge foreigners" (S10). The chart below summarizes participants' reported level of sincerity of expressed empathic feelings.
Table 6. Levels of sincerity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Sincerity</th>
<th>Sincere</th>
<th>Insincere</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Banyamulenge</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bavibafuliru</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total participants</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>87.5%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 10: Levels of sincerity of empathic feelings in Uvira

Reasons that participants stated hypocritical and ironic empathy is expressed between the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge include the continuing hatred, enmity, and disdain between the two groups. As one participant said, "Empathy between the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru is not sincere; when they live together, they show some kinds of empathy, but the behaviors they exhibit toward one another show that there isn't any true empathy among them" (S5). Another participant put it like this: "Empathy can
help improve relations but in the case of Uvira it is not sincere. These people kill each other and then they go cry together for deceased victims in act of hypocrisy" (S13).

Another revealed that "Empathy expressed by the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge is not sincere and can't help improve their elations. They just pretend to love one another because they live in the same neighborhood or on the same street, but in their heart, they hide something from each other" (S26). With the views expressed above, one can tell how severe the feelings of animosity remain in Uvira. Some participants even said to me that it may take God himself to resolve the conflict there. I discuss in the next section participants' views of what they think is hindering coexistence in Uvira and what they think can encourage or foster coexistence among the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge.

5.4 OVERVIEW OF COEXISTENCE IN UVIRA

5.4.1 ISSUES OF COEXISTENCE

Realizing from my 2011 research in Uvira that there were issues of coexistence between the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru, in this new research I wanted to make sense of what real problems are actually hindering coexistence between the two groups. Therefore, in interview question number 3, I asked participants what they thought was (were) the reason(s) why there is no positive coexistence between the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge. I asked them to identity the major problem(s) and tell me why they thought it was so. The issue of the Banyamulenge's identity (citizenship) was mentioned more times than other issues. At least 27 out of 40 participants indicated the citizenship of the Banyamulenge is always raised as a concern by the Bavibafuliru. Other sub-themes
that were cited include land issues; 13 people out of 40 mentioned land dispute as one of the major problems; killings that occurred during the wars also arose (10 out of 40 mentioned this). Additional sub-themes that came up included communal tensions over cattle grazing (Banyamulenge cattle destroy Bavibafuliru farms, fueling tensions between these communities); lack of trust and political interference was an additional topic (local politicians fuel the conflict). The summary of findings related to the question of coexistence is shown below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Killings</th>
<th>Trust</th>
<th>Politics</th>
<th>Cattle issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total participants</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banyamulenge</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bavibafuliru</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I would like to draw particular attention to the three issues that scored higher than the others; these include citizenship, land, and killings. The chart below shows participants’ responses by percentages. On the issue of citizenship, 18 Bavibafuliru participants (66.7%) out 27 of the total participants who brought up the issue of citizenship indicated that the issue of the Banyamulenge citizenship is a concern. However, only 9 Banyamulenge participants (33.3%) out of the 27 said that Bavibafuliru continue to refuse accepting that they are also Congolese. This difference clearly shows that Bavibafuliru participants have more concerns with the Banyamulenge citizenship than the Banyamulenge. According to the Banyamulenge view, it is mainly the Bavibafuliru who see their citizenship as an issue. The Banyamulenge think citizenship should not be a divisive issue because, they, like the Bavibafuliru, are also Congolese.
As for the land, 10 Bavibafuliru participants (76.9%) out of the total participants who brought up the issue of land indicated that land dispute concerns them. On the Banyamulenge side, 3 participants (23.1%) out of the 13 said that land is a concern. Here, as in the case of citizenship, more Bavibafuliru emphasized the land issue than Banyamulenge. The reason for this is clear in that the Bavibafuliru charge that the Banyamulenge occupy their territory.

As far as killings are concerned, 7 Bavibafuliru participants (70%) out of the total participants who brought up the issue of killings indicated that killings coming from the other side are a problem for them. Among Banyamulenge participants, 3 (30%) out of the 10 said that killings continue to be a concern.

Table 8. Differences in opinion over coexistence issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Killings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Banyamulenge</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bavibafuliru</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>76.9%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 12: Differences in opinion over coexistence issues

5.4.1.1 Banyamulenge citizenship issue

More participants identified the issues of Banyamulenge citizenship as one of the major reasons why there is no positive coexistence between the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru. Some Bavibafuliru participants stated that Banyamulenge are “foreigners.” One Muvimufuliru said that "Lack of coexistence is political in nature; but the big issue is the nationality of the Banyamulenge, who the Bavibafuliru consider foreigners" (S7). Another said this: "The Banyamulenge neglect the Bavibafuliru and consider themselves superior. Bavibafuliru consider Banyamulenge as foreigners and cannot be led by them" (S18). Another Muvimufuliru stated, "We suspect Banyamulenge are Rwandans because of their language; the Banyamulenge think they are superior, and they lack the spirit of coexistence (S28). Note that the Banyamulenge speak Kinyarwanda, the official
language of Rwanda, while the Bavibafuliru speak Kifuliru and Kivira, which they view as indigenous languages. Some Bavibafuliru said that the Banyamulenge must continue to be treated as second-class citizens, as they belong to Rwanda. However, this citizenship issue, according to the Banyamulenge participants, continues to frustrate members of their community. The Banyamulenge participants indicated that, despite the fact that the issue of citizenship of the Banyamulenge was addressed in the 2006 Constitution, some Bavibafuliru continue to call them foreigners, refusing to accept that they are Congolese. A Munyamulenge said, "Lack of cohabitation is due to the non-acceptance of Banyamulenge as Congolese though the law granted us nationality" (S11).

5.4.1.2 Land issue and communal tensions over grazing

Both the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge participants also identified the land issue as a problem hindering coexistence between them. The Bavibafuliru stated that the Banyamulenge are occupiers of their land; they stated that members of the Banyamulenge community came to Uvira as refugees and must not begin to claim land that does not belong to them. On the other hand, the Banyamulenge indicated Mulenge is a territory where the vast majority of members of their community live. They stated that the area is not a piece of land that they bought from the Bavibafuliru but said they have been living there since their arrival. Therefore, the Banyamulenge contended that, although the land by definition does not belong to them as the Bavibafuliru claim, they at least have the right to live there, given that this is the territory that they consider home. They say that they know no other place than Mulenge; they stated that they were born there, their
children were born there and that they are proud of belonging to the territory. A Muvimufuliru said that "There are two big issues, land and identity: For land, the Bavibafuliru say the Banyamulenge occupy their land, and for identity the Bavibafuliru call Banyamulenge Rwandans" (S5). Another Munyamulenge stated that, "Land issue is the cause of non-coexistence in Uvira. The Bavibafuliru say that we the Banyamulenge occupy their land, while they know our children were born in Mulenge; and they don't know Rwanda, where we are always reminded we belong to" (S35).

Another major problem related to land is related to grazing. Note here that the Banyamulenge are cattle owners (breeders); they produce milk and supply of meat in the area of Uvira. Bavibafuliru, on the other hand, are mostly farmers, producers of basic food such as cassava and rice. The Bavibafuliru accuse the Banyamulenge of land abuse such as heavy grazing; they state that the Banyamulenge's cattle destroy their farms. The Bavibafuliru said that the Banyamulenge practice unauthorized grazing in their areas, disproportionately destroying their land. The Banyamulenge participants stated that this issue continues to fuel tensions between community members from both sides. A Muvimufulitu said that, "The two groups always keep bad memories of what happened to them in the past; the rejection by Bavibafuliru of the nationality given to Banyamulenge; land issue as Bavibafuliru say Banyamulenge's cattle destroy their farms" (S9). But a Munayamulenge said the following: "The major problems are related to issues that were fueled by wars; also there are other issues between the farmers who are Bavibafuliru and cattle owners who are Banyamulenge in many villages" (S22). Another Munyamulenge
stated that "The problems are economic; the Banyamulenge have cattle but have no land for grazing but Bavibafuliru have land but lack cattle" (S25).

5.4.1.3 Wars and killings

Both groups discussed the killings that took place during the past wars. In particular, some Bavibafuliru participants stated that Banyamulenge are 'killers'; the Bavibafuliru linked the killings with the invasion of the DRC by Rwanda; they stated that the Banyamulenge were killing Bavibafuliru to dominate. Some Bavibafuliru participants even justified the killings of Banyamulenge by the Bavibafuliru militia groups, commonly called Mai Mai, insisting that the killings of Banyamulenge by Bavibafuliru would not take place if the Banyamulenge did not support Rwandan wars. The Banyamulenge participants stated that the Bavibafuliru continue to accuse them of murders and atrocities that took place during the wars, but said that the Bavibafuliru fail to recognize that killings were carried out by members of both groups.

A Munyamulenge said this: "The Bavibafuliru see us as Rwandans since the wars that took place; they say we supported the wars. Also, during the war, many people from the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru communities died, but I hear all the time people calling us killers; it is heartbreaking" (S19). Also, a Muvimufuliru stated the following: "The problem is that Banyamulenge are considered by others as foreigners; issues of land as well wars supported by Banyamulenge such as Mutebuzi and Laurent NKunda, who killed innocent people, cannot be ignored" (S20). Mutebuzi and Laurent NKunda are militia leaders from the Tutsi community of DRC, who were viewed by Bavibafuliru as
backers of Rwandan wars. Another Muvimufulitu expressed his view as follows: "Coexistence is impossible because of killings that took place; the Mayi Mayi wouldn't exist today if it wasn't about the behaviors of Banyamulenge" (S27). Mayi Mayi are militiamen from the Bavibafuliru community.

The memories of war remain alive in both groups' minds; participants acknowledged that these memories of past killings constitute one of the major challenges to bringing about reconciliation between these communities. Here is how one participant put it: "Banyamulenge are criminals; they kill without mercy; they speak a language of Rwanda and like to dominate others" (S32). Another said the following "Due to wars that occurred in the past, the two groups can't stand one another; this has led to the nonacceptance of us, the Banyamulenge, by other tribes, even though the Constitution granted us citizenship" (S34).

5.4.1.4 Lack of trust

Some Bavibafuliru participants indicated that they cannot trust the Banyamulenge because of what happened during the wars; they said that Banyamulenge will continue to support Rwanda over the DRC. Some Bavibafuliru suggested that the Banyamulenge should not be trusted because they speak Kinyarwanda, an indication that these Bavibafuliru say shows the Banyamulenge still feel more connected to Rwanda than to the DRC. One participant said the following:

The Banyamulenge are spies, look how they occupy all these high-ranking positions in the army; do you know why? They want to share intelligence with
their Rwandan brothers, and that is why the Congolese army always loses wars against Rwanda; their brothers Banyamulenge send them all the war strategies and intelligence (S33).

5.4.1.5 Political interference

Politics was discussed by participants as another frequently unmentioned but palpable topic. In particular, the Banyamulenge participants stated that Bavibafuriru's political leaders have used identity cards to fuel conflicts in Uvira. The Banyamulenge participants said that, to seek votes, the Bavibafuriru politicians go as far as labeling Banyamulenge as foreigners from Rwanda to get support from voters who align themselves with these beliefs. The Banyamulenge participants said that, quite often when the country gets near election season, the issue of Banyamulenge citizenship surfaces and increases tensions between community members, who sometimes begin anew to view each other as enemies. One participant said, "The issue of coexistence is political in nature; the politicians fuel the conflict all the time to achieve their political agenda" (S15).

5.4.2 WAYS TO ADDRESS ISSUES OF COEXISTENCE

It would not be a good idea simply to ask participants to tell me what they thought the major issues of coexistence were in Uvira without asking them what they thought was (were) the way(s) forward to address their differences. Since interview question number 3 looked into exploring what participants thought were the reasons why there is no positive coexistence between the Bavibafuriru and Banyamulenge, I then asked participants in
interview question number 5 to tell me what they thought should be done to facilitate/encourage coexistence in Uvira. The following sub-themes emerged in participants' responses. Participants said that there was a need to carry out educative awareness campaigns; 20 people out of 40 cited awareness as one of the solutions to addressing the conflict. Other participants said acceptance of the Banyamulenge by neighboring groups is crucial; 9 people out 40 stated the issue of acceptance of the other. Additional participants indicated that coexistence activities must be promoted to bring people together; 8 people out 40 identified this as a better way to get out of the conflict. Also, 7 participants said the government must be involved in resolving the conflict. Others cited more contacts, mutual respect, and discouraging politicians from continuing to fuel conflicts. I show differences in areas that scored higher, such as awareness, acceptance, coexistence activities, and government involvement. Out of 20 participants who cited awareness, 14 were Banyamulenge and 6 Bavibafuliru. Out of 9 participants who advocated acceptance of the Banyamulenge, 6 were Banyamulenge and 3 Bavibafuliru. As for coexistence activities, out of 8 participants, 5 were Banyamulenge and 3 Bavibafuliru. Finally, out of 7 participants who stated government involvement, 5 were Banyamulenge and 2 Bavibafuliru. These differences in the findings show that, in all the ways advocated by participants to address coexistence, more Banyamulenge were inclined to call for more action. This is due to the fact that they are the ones who felt left out and unaccepted by the others. Therefore, the Banyamulenge feel the need to be more engaged in looking for solutions, compared to the Bavibafuliru, who see themselves as indigenous and have nothing to lose (in terms of citizenship) if no solution is found.
5.4.2.1 Educational awareness campaigns

Most participants viewed awareness campaigns as a positive factor to facilitate coexistence. They said campaigns can take the forms of debate, workshops, and community gatherings. The participants stated that the awareness campaigns should focus on promoting acceptance of the Banyamulenge by other tribes, forgiveness, and peaceful coexistence. Mostly, Banyamulenge participants stated that carrying out awareness campaigns about acceptance of Banyamulenge is important because a lack of acceptance of members of their community by other tribes is the major problem in Uvira. One participant said the following: "It is important to raise awareness in communities about the status of Banyamulenge so that uneducated people are aware that the Constitution has granted them citizenship" (S5). "Carry awareness about the status of the Banyamulenge so other tribes accept them as Congolese" (S10). Another participant said this, "Educate communities that the citizenship of the Banyamulenge is not tied to a language they speak (Kinyarwanda) or tribe, but the law must be respected and people must accept that Banyamulenge are Congolese like others" (S3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coexistence Ways</th>
<th>Awareness</th>
<th>Acceptance</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Government involvement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total participants</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banyamulenge</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bavibafuriru</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.4.2.2 Acceptance of Banyamulenge

The acceptance issue of the Banyamulenge by Bavibafuliru continued to surface everywhere during the interviews. The Banyamulenge participants were more concerned than the Bavibafuliru that the nonacceptance of members of their community has sparked continuing tensions. They Banyamulenge said that without the acceptance by other tribes of members of the Banyamulenge community, peace is hard to achieve in Uvira. Some participants stated that everything must begin with acceptance, and then all other things can follow. With acceptance, the participants said talks between the two groups will be possible and that will allow these groups to find a durable solution to their differences. As one participant stated, "The first thing is to accept each other through the granting of citizenship to Banyamulenge and stop the politicization of the community's status" (S26).
Another participant said, "Mutual acceptance is needed; NGOs and the government must get involved in helping rebuild our city and country in general" (S23).

5.4.2.3 Carrying out of intergroup coexistence activities

As stated in the beginning when we discussed intergroup contact, participants expressed their views that, for people to create friendship and get to know one another better in the communities where they live together, there is a need to create room for people to carry out activities that encourage coexistence of the two groups. Some participants advocated job opportunities, where members of the two communities would be in direct contact. The participants said that it is crucial for members of both groups to engage in some form of mutual activity that can help alleviate poverty in their communities. Other participants cited community development as a way to encourage the carrying out of mutual activities. One participant stated the following: "In addition to supporting awareness about accepting the Banyamulenge, we must also put in place projects and activities facilitating coexistence. This way, collaboration will increase among us, and we can certainly develop our territory together" (S9). Another said this:

In order to improve our relations, we need to encourage interethnic jobs so that when we work together we can get to know each other better. We carry out activities together at the work place and also outside of the work place such as bringing our families and friends together to make change in our society (S8).

5.4.2.4 Government involvement in resolving conflict
Some participants claimed that the role of government in resolving conflicts in Uvira is limited. They want the government to make more efforts by getting involved at all levels of society. Some participants said that the government has resources, and if it wants to make a difference, it must show commitment to the issue. In particular, the Banyamulenge participants blamed the government for failing to play a constructive role in the conflict; they challenged the government to take a public stand and let the people of the DRC know where its stands on the issue of Banyamulenge citizenship. The Banyamulenge said that the government's silence has made some people in the country believe that the government is against the community or does not want to legalize its members.

The Banyamulenge participants said all of this is happening despite the fact that President Joseph Kabila’s government approved the Constitution in 2006 granting the Banyamulenge citizenship. A Munyamulenge participant said, "The government must be involved in helping [address] the ongoing conflicts; it has the power to do so but there is a lack of willingness because of the nature of politics in Congo" (S4). Another Munyamulenge stated that "This issue of the Banyamulenge citizenship has already been resolved by the Constitution; we are Congolese" (S5). Another participants said that "People must carry out awareness but also urge the government to adopt a clear bill which has no ambiguity granting citizenship to the Banyamulenge (S12).

5.5 OVERVIEW OF IDENTITY-BASED CONFLICT

5.5.1 The Banyamulenge citizenship status
From the findings presented in main themes already covered above, the issue of the Banyamulenge citizenship was brought over and over again. I was interested, in particular, to know what participants thought about the current status of the Banyamulenge in Uvira, and the country, in general. I then asked them in interview question 4, “Given that the status of the Banyamulenge is viewed by different people in different ways here in Uvira, what is your perception about their status?” In other terms, what position do they have in society and why? This was my way of trying to differentiate what people say and what they actually believe to be their ultimate truth.

The findings show that all Banyamulenge participants – 20 out of 20 (100%) – stated that the Banyamulenge are Congolese, like members of other tribes surrounding them.

However, the findings show a different picture from the Bavibafuliru; 11 Bavibafuliru participants out 20 (55%) said the Banyamulenge were foreigners. Only 9 Bavibafuliru participants (45%) indicated that the Banyamulenge were Congolese, but with a foreign connotation. This means that, even after recognizing that the Banyamulenge were Congolese – citing the granting of citizenship to the Banyamulenge by constitutional means – the 9 Bavibafuliru participants were still convinced that the Banyamulenge were from Rwanda. That is to say, they only accepted that the Banyamulenge are Congolese because the Constitution granted them citizenship in reality, they viewed them as Rwandans. In the words of one participant, "The law has granted the Banyamulenge citizenship, but due to socio-ethnic problems here in Uvira, they are viewed as Rwandans (foreigners)" (S4). Another said, "In my opinion, no matter
what status has been granted to the Banyamulenge by the Constitution or institutions, they are viewed as foreigners and enemies” (S8).

I discuss the meaning of these findings over the Banyamulenge citizenship in Chapter 6 (the discussion chapter). However, I should point out here to shed some light for readers that the findings show that there is a clear distinction between acceptance of the Banyamulenge as citizens of the Congolese nation versus acceptance of them as legitimate members of the society. This difference is again seen in the next section. But before I get to that, the chart below shows the findings of what participants thought of the status of Banyamulenge in Uvira.

Table 10. Perceptions of Banyamulenge status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceptions</th>
<th>Congolese</th>
<th>Foreigners</th>
<th>Congolese with foreign connotation</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Banyamulenge</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bavibafuliru</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.5.2 The Banyamulenge and acceptance by others

This research had assumed that the nonacceptance of Banyamulenge in Uvira by Bavibafuliru was hindering coexistence. Therefore, to test this assumption, I asked participants in interview question number 7 whether they thought accepting all people, including the Banyamulenge, as citizens of Congo, could help improve relationships in Uvira. I asked participants if they answer yes or no, to say why. In doing so, this research hoped to evaluate the role acceptance of the other, or legitimizing the other, could play in the conflict in Uvira. The findings show that there was widespread support among participants, demonstrating the positive effect acceptance of the other may have in building relations. All 20 out of 20 Banyamulenge participants (100%) agreed that the
acceptance of the Banyamulenge by Bavibafuliru would be a positive sign toward rebuilding the ongoing broken relations.

Conversely, 14 participants out of 20 Bavibafuliru (70%) also agreed that accepting the Banyamulenge as Congolese would actually lead to improved relations. However, 6 Bavibafuliru participants (30%) indicated that acceptance of the Banyamulenge would change nothing in building relations between the two communities. These results are enumerated in the chart below.

Table 11. Participants believing accepting Banyamulenge as positive sign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acceptance</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Banyamulenge</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bavibafuliru</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Does accepting Banyamulenge build relations in Uvira?
Some participants stated that acceptance of the Banyamulenge could have positive outcomes in building relations and bring peace to Uvira as is evident in examples illustrated below. These participants indicated that because the citizenship of the Banyamulenge is a major problem in the struggle, if they were accepted by other tribes, it could put an end to the enduring conflict. Other participants said that acceptance will allow them to work together to transform Uvira into a more peaceful area and develop sense of friendship that has never been seen before. As one participant said, "Yes, the acceptance of the Banyamulenge will be a big deal because the Bavibafuliru will then see the Banyamulenge as their countrymen and not as foreigners. This can allow frank collaboration between the former enemies" (S9). Another said this: "Yes acceptance of Banyamulenge means Banyamulenge will never be considered as foreigners; we can now have one vision for development and durable peace" (S10).

On the other hand, they were those who believed acceptance of the Banyamulenge by the Bavibafuliru will not make any difference whatsoever. These participants stated that much has happened in the past, especially during the wars, and that simple acceptance will not erase the numerous other issues dividing the two communities. They stated that the past had some very serious issues to be resolved, and each group must show commitment to bring about durable peace, rather than having what they consider 'a fake acceptance.' One participant said this about this issue: "No,
acceptance won't take us anywhere; that won't be a solution because it does not matter if the Banyamulenge are accepted, other tribes always see them as foreigners" (S8).

Another participant stated, "No, first, there will be need for a change of mentality; Banyamulenge must detach themselves from Rwanda if they want peace" (S30), while another said this: "No, that's not a solution; the nationality of Banyamulenge is not a problem; the problem is Banyamulenge themselves; they are killers" (S27).

5.6 OVERVIEW OF ROLE OF POWER

Coexistence also includes the notion of power balance; I was more interested in understanding the dynamics that power balance or imbalance play in the conflict in Uvira. Therefore, I asked participants to tell me whether they thought providing equal rights for political participation to the Banyamulenge will improve or inflame tensions between members of the two groups, and why they hold their position. Most participants did not link the ongoing tensions in Uvira to the rights of the Banyamulenge to participate in politics. The findings of this research disconfirmed my own assumption that power imbalance was problematic for fostering coexistence. Rather than power imbalance, the participants raised the issue of legitimacy of power instead. Participants from both camps stated that Banyamulenge are already occupying high-ranking positions in the local and central governments, including the army.

However, what the finding did show in this research is that the Bavibafuliru are more concerned that the political power Banyamulenge possess has not been achieved through the fruits of their labor; rather, the Bavibafuliru perceive that the Banyamulenge
have gotten access to power through the use of force. In other terms, the Bavibafuliru indicated that the Banyamulenge are in power today in government and elsewhere not because they deserve to be in those positions, but because they imposed themselves into those positions. Despite the fact that more than 50 percent of the Bavibafuliru said that the participation of the Banyamulenge in politics is not the source of tensions, some Bavibafuliru participants questioned the legitimacy of the Banyamulenges’ political power. They indicated that foreigners cannot rule over legal national citizens.

The research findings show that 18 out 20 Banyamulenge participants (90%) were in agreement that their participation in politics does not inflame tensions in Uvira, compared to 65% of the Bavibafuliru (13 out 20), who also believed so. Only 2 out 20 Banyamulenge participants (10%) indicated that their participation does actually increase tensions between them and the Bavibafuliru. In addition, only 7 out 20 Bavibafuliru participants (35%) stated that the Banyamulenges’ participation in politics constitute a source of tensions in Uvira. This means that 31 out of 40 participants (77.5%) believed political power granted to the Banyamulenge is not increasing tensions, while only 9 participants out 40 (22.5 %) said it increases tensions. The findings over the role of power are outlined in the chart below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role of power</th>
<th>Increase</th>
<th>Does not increase</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Banyamulenge</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>90.0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bavibafuliru</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
<td>65.0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total participants</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
<td>77.5%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12. Role of power in increasing or decreasing tensions in Uvira
5.6.1 Political power not increasing tensions

Participants were clear that rights to political power for the Banyamulenge is not a problem. Some Bavibafuliru went further, suggesting that the problem is something else, including the issue of the Banyamulenges’ citizenship. Banyamulenge who claimed that this is not a problem stated that their right to participate in politics has already been guaranteed by the country's Constitution. They say that those who continue to reject their right to political participation are either unfamiliar with the country's laws or just want to express their hatred against members of this community. Here is what one participant stated about the issue: "No, political participation of the Banyamulenge cannot increase
tensions; the proof is that the Banyamulenge are already occupying posts in government, including the vice presidency, in the past. The problem is elsewhere, their identity and land issue seem to be the major problems. They participated in wars, this is the reason why they don't get along with the others" (S1). Another participant said, "No, Banyamulenges’ political participation won't increase any tensions; they are already senators and ministers. There is instead a need to resolve the issue of coexistence. The Banyamulenge must recognize themselves as Congolese and stop playing the double agent or showing double side of double nationality, wanting to be Congolese and Rwandans at the same time" (S7).

5.6.2 Political power inflaming tensions

Participants who expressed concerns about the participation of the Banyamulenge in politics said that it can increase tensions. Typically, these participants cited the lack of acceptance of Banyamulenge by other tribes surrounding them. They say that, despite the fact that the Banyamulenge hold power in many layers of the government or army, they will still be rejected, as long as they are treated as foreigners. One participant indicated that, "Giving rights to the Banyamulenge to participate in politics can increase tensions; first they are considered as minority, there are trouble makers, assassins and foreigners (Rwandans)" (S13). Another said this: "Yes, the Banyamulenge participation in politics can increase tensions. As long as the Banyamulenge are not accepted as Congolese, assuring them equal rights to participate in politics can be problematic because they will still continue to be viewed by others as foreigners" (S11). The above statements show
that there are still divisions in Uvira regarding the status of the Banyamulenge. This issue of the legitimacy of the Banyamulenge occupies the main row in this research, and it shall be discussed as such in the next chapter.

5. 7 SUMMARY

This chapter covered data analysis; it looked into the research findings and provided readers with the big picture of the overall results. The purpose of the research was to identify problems that are behind the lack of positive coexistence between the Banyamulenge and the Bavibafuliru in Uvira, eastern DRC. As far as problems of coexistence are concerned, participants pointed to several sub-themes that are major problems for failure to facilitate coexistence. The participants cited the citizenship of the Banyamulenge, land and grazing issues, killings, trust, and politics. They also acknowledged that, to address the issue of coexistence in Uvira, certain criteria must be met. They suggested that educational awareness campaigns be carried out. Participants also paid particular attention to the idea that Bavibafuliru must accept the Banyamulenge and legitimize them as citizens of the DRC if there is to be peace in the area. Other proposals included carrying out intergroup coexistence activities and encouraging the government to get involved in the resolution of the conflict.

I also looked into the role that intergroup contact and empathy play in improving intergroup relations in Uvira. Participants agreed that more contacts between the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge could help improve their relations and facilitate better coexistence among members of these communities, if the contacts are sincere and true.
When I asked participants to describe the ongoing contacts in Uvira, the vast majority stated that the encounters were bad. They indicated that the reasons why ongoing contacts are not creating positive outcomes is that the contacts are superficial, hypocritical, and ironic. Participants said similar things when it came to the expression of intergroup empathy in Uvira. They said that the empathic feelings expressed by members of one group toward the other are ironic and hypocritical, and that these are negatively affecting groups’ relations, rather than building them. Participants stated that besides just engaging in mere contacts, the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge need to forgive one another, start to practice intermarriage, promote tolerance and love, share power, engage in truthful collaboration, and encourage government to intervene. In addition, when it comes to the issue of interdependency, participants found it crucial for the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru to start relying on one another. Participants said that the only way these groups can achieve this goal is by working together, engaging in extended contacts, and facilitate commercial exchanges. These groups said they must also promote common interests and mutual respect, and find ways to develop new friendship.

Finally I looked into the issue of identity-based conflict (acceptance of the Banyamulenge by others) and the role of power balance in the conflict of Uvira. The findings show that all Banyamulenge participants stated that the Banyamulenge are Congolese, like members of other tribes surrounding them. However, the majority of Bavibafuliru participants said that the Banyamulenge were foreigners. Those Bavibafuliru who said the Banyamulenge were Congolese – citing the granting of citizenship to the Banyamulenge by constitutional means – were still convinced that the
Banyamulenge were Rwandans. By this, they meant that they only accept that the Banyamulenge are Congolese because the Constitution granted them citizenship, although in reality they view the Banyamulenge as foreigners.

As for power, most participants did not link the ongoing tensions in Uvira to the rights of the Banyamulenge to participate in politics. However, the findings did show that the Bavibafuliru are more concerned that the Banyamulenge gained access to power through the use of force. This means that Bavibafuliru believe that the Banyamulenge are in power today not because they deserve it, but because they imposed themselves by grabbing power. I discuss the major findings in the next chapter.
Chapter 6
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

In this chapter, I discuss the research findings in the theoretical framework of the model presented in the Chapter 2. I use the findings – theories that I explored in this research and the model I created – to provide the best explanation of the Uvira conflict. In particular, I address the reason why the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru have faced challenges in peacefully coexisting. Research on the eastern DRC conflict has provided multiple explanations about the causes of the Uvira conflict. Scholars and writers have indicated that the conflict is driven by several factors, including land dispute, the search for political power by the group who perceive exclusion from political participation, bad governance, as well as the citizenship issue of the Banyamulenge. These past research contributions were valuable to this research. However, this research took a further step shedding more light on the alternative explanation of why the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru have been unable to peacefully coexist in the Uvira territory.

While all the above-noted factors identified as influencing conflict in Uvira have been widely evidenced by researchers, there has been little research to date into the concept of legitimacy to try to understand further the reasons behind the challenges of coexistence. For instance, while many researchers have identified the issue of the contested Banyamulenge citizenship as a cause of the conflict in Uvira, some have not
been able to explore further the concept of acceptance of the legitimizing of the other to understand the different dynamics surrounding the so-called 'citizenship of the Banyamulenge.' As my research has found, a clear distinction must be made between acceptance of the Banyamulenge as citizens of the Congolese (DRC) nation by constitution versus their acceptance as legitimate members of the society of Uvira or Kivu Province in general. Most researcher have focused on the first condition, which limits their focus on the nationality issue (Banyamulenge must be recognized as Congolese), rather than paying attention to whether people see the nationality of the Banyamulenge or their access to power as legitimate. Although the Banyamulenge claim that the DRC’s Constitution has granted them citizenship, some Bavibafuliru do not recognized the country's move to lawfully legalize the Banyamulenge, but instead reject the citizenship outright of the Banyamulenge and continue to claim that they are foreigners (Rwandans), questioning the legitimacy of their nationality. I explain this difference more when I discuss the notion of “acceptance of Banyamulenge” later.

This chapter answers the research questions that I posed in chapter 1:

1. What are the necessary conditions that facilitate positive outcomes of contact in the search for building positive intergroup relations?
2. When does intergroup empathy fail to contribute to the improvement of groups' relations?
3. What factors contribute to the process of breaking intergroup social boundaries in order to promote peaceful coexistence?
The purpose of this research, then, is to examine the role of intergroup contact and empathy in improving relations in cases where parties have experienced violent conflicts such as in Uvira. It also analyzes best practices to foster peaceful coexistence among rival groups, while bridging the gap in literature on this subject. Finally, it examines the extent to which legitimacy of the other, positive cooperation, interdependency, and common ingroup identity can have on improving relations in facilitating intergroup coexistence. This research then explores ways peaceful coexistence can be achieved by groups, and how this study can contribute to conflict analysis and resolution theory in other cases of coexistence.

6.1 FINDINGS ON INTERGROUP CONTACT IN UVIRA

Literature provides widespread support that intergroup contact mediates the building of intergroup relations (Pettigrew 2011, Davies et al. 2011, Scarberry et al. 1997). However, the findings of the Uvira conflict case clearly contrast evidence from existing literature that links intergroup contact with positive intergroup relations. On the surface, the findings show that people in Uvira have very positive views about the role contact can play in building relations in this part of the country that has experienced violent conflict. The research found that 95% of Banyamulenge participants said that contact can have positive effects in building relations between them and the Bavibafuliru. Similarly, 90% of the Bavibafuliru stated that contact can be helpful in facilitating improvement of relations between them and the Banyamulenge. However, both the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge said contact had positive effect only when encounters are 'sincere'. In their
discussions, participants said that more contacts may help them accept each other and could lead to more collaboration while tolerating each other. A participant said the following: "Current contacts are a little better, but more contacts could help address our problems, especially if we can come to accept one another one day" (S21).

The views expressed above are consistent with what scholars have found in most laboratory and field experiments over the role of contact in building relations. It is consistent with the belief that contact is a positive mediator for fostering coexistence. Scholars who have researched the effects of contact in building relations suggest that after in-group members enter into contact with members of a negatively stereotyped group, in-group members' attitudes ameliorate toward outgroup members (Scarberry et al. 1997, 1292). However, when we practically apply the scholars' findings, including that of this study, to the real problems of post-conflict societies, the positive role that contact plays is often not as clear-cut. The practical problem is demonstrated by this research finding. When I asked participants to describe the kind of contacts taking place in Uvira, they had a different perspective. In their evaluation of current contacts between the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru in Uvira, participants said the contact is bad (poor); 85% of Bavibafuliru stated the encounters between them and the Banyamulenge were bad, while 50% of the Banyamulenge said that contact between them and the Bavibafuliru is bad. In total, 67.5% participants indicated that contacts are bad in Uvira.

Participants identified the types of contacts taking place as insincere, superficial, ironic and hypocritical. These findings of the Uvira conflict are consistent with the research that has found some conflict situations where contact has produced negative
effects or outcomes. Although there is widespread support for the role played by contact in ameliorating intergroup relations, research has also shown that not all contacts build intergroup relations. Scholars have found that some forms of contacts are perceived as negative; these types of contact, unfortunately, can produce negative outcomes even when groups desire to build their relations. Negative contact occurs in situations where intergroup competition is present or involving intergroup conflict (Pettigrew et al. 2011, 277). In the next section, I discuss the significance of the findings on the contact.

6.1.1 Significance of contact findings

Participants identified that current and past contacts in Uvira are not sincere, and that they are superficial, ironic, and hypocritical. Participants called the ongoing contacts superficial because they are not working well. They see that, although members of these communities have engaged in some forms of contact, still there are some reservation on both sides to fully engage in developing strong relations that will lead to full cooperation. In the better sense, contacts – although they occur – are not doing enough to promote peaceful coexistence. On the other hand, the participants also felt that the current contacts are ironic and hypocritical, meaning that the encounters that do occur are inauthentic. Members of one community come into contact with members of the neighboring community, but they are not honest with one another about what they want from each other. The sarcasm seen in these encounters shows that members of the rival communities are not revealing themselves to the extent of building relations. The participants' responses show that each group is suspicious of the contact undertaken by the other in its
search for peaceful resolution. Research has found that when intergroup members enter into contact while intergroup suspicion is high, the contact is more likely to exacerbate prejudice and its underlying conflict than ameliorate it (Wang et al. 2014, 2). Therefore, scholars insist that groups may want to increase contact only when their members are in a mindset that will not ironically exacerbate prejudice (Wang et al. 2014, 2). This phenomenon can be summarized in what one participant said: "There is need for honesty in all exchanges between the two groups because what we are seeing now is a game of hypocrisy" (S29).

As in the case of Uvira, competition between the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuriru remains high, especially over claims of the territory of Mulenge, over which each group claims ownership. Each group believes it is the rightful inhabitant of Mulenge, and disagreement over who must control what has led to confrontations between these two groups. One participant stated the following: "Land issue is the cause of non-coexistence in Uvira. The Bavibafuriru say that we the Banyamulenge occupy their land while they know that our children were born in Mulenge and they don't know Rwanda where we are always reminded we belong to" (S35). Therefore, the continuance of conflict and lack of engagement in positive contacts may have to do with the fact that the competition between the Bavibafuriru and Banyamulenge leads to a situation where each group compares itself to the other, making the group's membership salient, and whereby in-group members value other members belonging to their group while sometimes becoming hostile to the outgroup. In these negative contacts, a favorable comparison occurs where in-group members express love for other in-group members while
maintaining negative stereotypes, as well as biases they held before the encounter, about outgroup members. Conflict research finds that competition between groups may favor cooperation within in-group while at the same time bringing social tensions that lead to the deterioration of social relations within groups (di Sorrentino et al. 2012, 445). Such situation could complicate relations and reduce the effectiveness of any contact that groups may engage in, as it is the case of Uvira. This is consistent with past research on contact; scholars have found that "negative intergroup contact makes group membership salient" (Paolini 2010, 1724); when negative contact occurs, it makes members of the groups more aware of their respective group membership, causing high category salience; under such circumstances, scholars say intergroup conflict may endures forever (Paolini 2010, 1723). In fact, negative intergroup contact has received less attention among researchers (Pettigrew et al. 2011, 277). This is the reason why I carried out this research; to understand the phenomenon occurring in these types of conflict situations.

The findings clearly demonstrate that, in Uvira, people are still engaged in some forms of negative contact. Participants stated that in most parts, the contacts are not sincere; they are ironic and hypocritical. As the model I developed in Chapter 2 puts it, the types of contacts that continue to occur in Uvira are superficial; they are not real, as groups engage in contact without the intention of addressing their conflicts and fostering coexistence; rather, they enter into contact for the sake of appearing to be engaging one another. I describe these types of contact as “unwanted contact.” This means that these negative contacts between the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru are a result of some negative factors of contact that manifest in their everyday life. These include the absence
of trust between the two groups, the stereotypes that one group uses against the other, and comparing one’s own group with the outside group in ways such as delegitimizing the other by labeling the rival group an "enemy" or "killer." As participants indicated, the killings that occurred in the past must be forgiven so the two groups can move on to another positive chapter. Another negative factor is the longstanding, impermeable boundary of citizenship. Members of one group see themselves as indigenous, original, and nationals of the DRC (Bavibafuliru), while labeling the other as foreign (Banyamulenge) who cannot be allowed to enter the circle of citizens of the DRC. To the Bavibafuliru, the Banyamulenge should be kept out of the circle and made to retain their foreign status. If unchanged or not improved, these issues will likely continue to hindering coexistence in Uvira, as their salience is very high. These negative factors affect each group at different level, thus showing some differences in their perception of contact that have been taking place between them. For instance, when it comes to the citizenship issue, the Banyamulenge’s perception of contact is that they would like to see more encounters occurring between them and the Bavibafuliru hoping that the other will be willing to accept them. On the other hand, the Bavibafuliru have little motivation to engage the Banyamulenge, as they view them as foreigners. This difference can be seen in the percentage of respondents to the question asking them to describe the types of contact occurring between the two groups. Eighty-five percent of Bavibafuliru stated the encounters between them and the Banyamulenge were bad, while only 50% of the Banyamulenge said that contact between them and the Bavibafuliru is bad.
To remediate to the negative contacts taking place now in Uvira that are blocking the fostering of coexistence, positive contact and positive factors of contact must be activated for peaceful coexistence to take shape. This means the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge must cease engaging in superficial contact, and begin to embrace a high degree of cooperative interdependence. As there is lack of trust between members of the two groups, they should pursue cross-group friendship. Scholars have found that cross-group friendship is positive in intergroup contact; they argue that close cross-group interactions, especially the close interactions of friendships, lead to "highly positive intergroup attitudes" (Davies et al. 2011, 333). They give close attention to friendship because they claim that friendship has "special importance," as it involves contact over time and in many situations that facilitates improved attitudes for one another (Davies, et al. 2011, 333). As intergroup empathy has been portrayed as ironic and hypocritical, only when true empathy is enhanced between Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge can perspective-taking accounts expressed by members of these groups begin to make sense for them. One group (the Bavibafuliru) labels the other (Banyamulenge) as foreign; until there is an establishment of equal status, where no group feels dehumanized or deprived of rights such as citizenship, can the two groups begin to engage in some form of common goals to build a new future.

6.2 FINDINGS ON FACTORS LEADING TO NEGATIVE CONTACT

6.2.1 Factors leading to negative contacts in Uvira
Why is it that contacts between the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge are not producing positive outcomes? As one participant said to me when I asked about why contact is not working well in Uvira "il n'y a pas de fumée sans feu" (there is no smoke without fire). As this expression implies, there is (are) cause(s) why the encounters are not working well in Uvira. Interview question number 3 gives us some of the answers. As demonstrated in chapter 3, I asked participants what they thought was (were) the reason(s) why the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge continue to face challenges to coexist. The participants identified several factors including the citizenship issue of the Banyamulenge. The Bavibafuliru call the Banyamulenge foreigners, meaning that the Banyamulenge are stereotyped as foreigners, although they themselves claim to be Congolese citizens like other neighboring tribes. During the interview, 66.7% of the Bavibafuliru stated that the citizenship issue of the Banyamulenge was a problem underlying the Uvira conflict, while 33.3% of the Banyamulenge participants agreed. Other factors cited by participants included the land issue, killings that took place during the wars, lack of trust among rival members, politics, and in particular, grazing rights. To put things in perspective, 76.9% of the Bavibafuliru said that land issue was a concern in the Uvira conflict, while 23.1% of the Banyamulenge thought the same. With regard to killings perpetrated during the war, 70% of the Bavibafuliru thought these have hindered coexistence, while 30% of the Banyamulenge said the same thing.

Cases involving territorial dimensions, such as that in the Uvira conflict, where land is an issue, lead to potential conflict when the parties both claim legitimate ownership over a tract of land. In these conflict settings, one group’s homeland often
overlaps with the homeland of the other neighboring group(s) (Fuhrmann and Tir 2009, 5). Therefore, the groups see little room for compromise over this land; it is not something that they think can be divided, shared, or substituted for (Fuhrmann and Tir 2009, 5). This is clearly demonstrated in the Uvira conflict. In the Mulenge territory, the Bavibafuliru claim that the Banyamulenge occupy their land, while the Banyamulenge believe they have the right to live in Mulenge, a land they view symbolically as connecting them to a great sense of belonging to this area.

As for killings taking place in Uvira, Crocker et al. (2007) say that people in society emerging from conflict care less to be reconciled with those who killed, tortured, or maimed their families and friends. As stated by one participant, "Coexistence is impossible because of killings that took place; the Mayi Mayi wouldn't exist today if it wasn't about the behaviors of Banyamulenge" (S27). Lack of trust was also evoked as one of the factors hindering coexistence. Trust is critical in fostering coexistence or during intergroup interactions. Trust "enables people to live together, cooperate with each other and coordinate efforts and behaviors; it contributes to smooth social functioning" (Xin, Xin and Lin 2015, 428). Because trust plays an important part in groups' cooperation or simply in living together, it is very important to "maintain high levels of trust among individuals and groups" (Xin, Xin and Lin 2015, 428); the groups are working toward building intergroup relations. Some scholars suggest that, without trust, peacebuilding is impossible (Kappmeier 2016, 134). They say that a lack of trust between groups in a conflict situation can prevent the groups from reconciling, or may even push the groups toward more conflict (Kappmeier 2016, 134). As indicated by one participant during the
interview, "Though acceptance of Banyamulenge as Congolese citizens can help ameliorate our relations, we must first trust each other" (S22). Another stated that "the reason why there is no coexistence is because we don't trust each other" (S23).

As discussed above, factors such as land issues, killings, and lack of trust are negative factors that can hinder coexistence. These issues were validly raised by participants; although some may argue that these issues are not the primary factors influencing negative outcomes of contacts or simply not contributing to the lack of coexistence in Uvira, I would say that particular attention must be paid to these issues, given the weight that they carry in this conflict. I argue here that these factors may in one way or another be critical if they are the causes of negative contact between the groups wanting to build relations. I say this because past research has shown that negative contact may have negative impacts in fostering intergroup coexistence. Researchers suggest that negative factors that contribute to negative contact must be countered by some positive contact; accordingly, this research address the first research question: What are the necessary conditions that ensure positive outcomes of contact in the search for building positive intergroup relations?

6.3 FINDINGS ON FACTORS LEADING TO POSITIVE CONTACT

6.3.1 Conditions facilitating positive contact

The father of the contact hypothesis, Allport, articulated conditions that he found were optimally important for contact to lead to development of positive intergroup relations. These conditions include equal status, a high degree of cooperation, common goals, and
the support of authorities, also known as institutional support. These conditions, he said, must be met; otherwise, contact will have less impact in improving intergroup prejudice (Tropp and Pettigrew 2005, 952; Pettigrew et al. 2011, 273). As described in its original form by Allport, I also tried to understand the conditions that participants thought would be necessary to facilitate the building of intergroup relations, using contact.

I must remain fair to Allport in my critique of the contact hypothesis when applying it to the case of Uvira. I should note that Allport's initial concept of the role that contact plays in improving groups' relations did not include complex cases where groups experienced centuries of intergroup conflict (Pettigrew et al. 2011, 278). In other words, Allport's contact hypothesis was limited to cases of interracial tensions, especially issues of segregation, where the minority group (blacks) in places like the United States have felt compelled to fight the system to change the status quo. Allport's studies have then been looking into conditions that must be met for contact to ameliorate interracial relations. Since Allport's work, the contact hypothesis has expanded its reach and has been studied in post-conflict situations. Also since then, scholars have suggested that research on intergroup contact additionally address issues that expand the theory to include cases where adversaries can be brought together using contact settings (Pettigrew et al. 2011, 278). This is exactly what the research herein did; the main intention was to understand conditions that would be viewed as effective for intergroup contact to facilitate improvement of relations in Uvira between long-time rivals – the Banyamulenge and the Bavibafuliru. To that end, I shall say that, since Allport's theory was expanded also to look at cases involving violent conflicts, research has found
additional moderators for effective contact. These positive contact effects include enhanced empathy, perspective taking, outgroup knowledge, job attainment and satisfaction, intergroup trust, reduced anxiety, and perception of outgroup variability (Pettigrew et al. 2011 275).

For the case of the Uvira conflict, specific conditions were identified by participants in what they thought must be included as a way (or ways) to improve existing contacts and that could lead to improved relations in the area. I asked participants to tell me what else they thought they need to do to build strong relationships beside having been in contact with one another. Among the participants, 45% of them discussed the issue of intermarriage, 22.5% mentioned collaboration, 17.5% raised the issue of tolerance, and only 15% stated forgiveness. Other indicated that power sharing and government intervention are needed. Furthermore, when I asked participants also in question 5 what they thought would be a better way (s) to facilitate or encourage coexistence, they cited several other factors, including educational awareness for peace, acceptance of the other (Banyamulenge), carrying out common intergroup coexistence activities, and encouraging government involvement in resolving conflict. Some of the conditions expressed above by participants are consistent with the literature when it comes to seeking to engage groups to peacefully coexist.

6.3.1.1 Tolerance

For instance, scholars encourage the promotion of tolerance as a means of fostering peaceful coexistence. They argue that tolerance teaches members of society to live
together with those with whom they have different culture, religious beliefs, or practices (Zembylas, 2011). The assumption is that, when one promotes tolerance between conflict parties in a society, members of the groups who are in conflict will begin to respect and accept their differences. Through this mutual respect, peaceful coexistence can be reached (Zembylas, 2011). The reason for this is that tolerance and toleration as respect play a large role in the groups' readiness for coexistence. When one tolerates, one not only accepts the difference seen in the other for the sake of peace, but also does not interfere with the other who is different from him/her; at the same time, he recognizes that others have rights, even though they previously did not exercise those rights (Zembylas 2011, 387). This is critical for the case of Uvira, as some Bavibafuliru continue to reject the idea that the Banyamulenge are citizens of the DRC.

The above literature that links tolerance and toleration to readiness for coexistence shows that some Bavibafuliru are not yet ready to coexist with the Banyamulenge, whom they continue to accuse of being foreigners. Some Bavibafuliru find it hard to accept the differences between themselves and the Banyamulenge for the sake of peace. Despite the Banyamulenges’ claim that the Constitution has granted them citizenship, some Bavibafuliru still do not recognize that the Banyamulenge must actually have rights to the Congolese citizenship. This lack of tolerance has exacerbated tensions between the two groups, potentially affecting their relations and the way they interact with one another. As such, it is important that the notion of tolerance be given attention for the Uvira conflict. It may be that, peaceful coexistence will not occur until the Bavibafuliru begin to tolerate the Banyamulenge; it is then that they can also begin to
accept them as members of the society. Also, until the Bavibafuliru begin to realize that the Banyamulenge are different and those differences must be respected and accepted as such, peaceful coexistence will not take shape. Without accepting and respecting differences with the other, coexistence between the two groups may continue to suffer, because nonacceptance of the differences with the other may lead to unwillingness to cooperate with each or engage the other in true dialogue or pursue forms of encounters (positive interaction) that may facilitate building of intergroup relations.

6.3.1.2 Acceptance

Similarly, research supports the idea that contact leads to mutual acceptance between groups. This research included in its definition of coexistence, "the acceptance of the other group as a legitimate and an equal partner" (Bar-Tal 2004, 256). Thus, coexistence in this research also includes legitimacy of the other (Hornsey, et al. 2003). Legitimacy is important for peaceful coexistence because when acceptance of the other group as a legitimate party takes place, members of hostile groups may begin to consider the other as members of society and can exist together (Weiner 1998, 15). I cover this issue at length when I discuss the notion of acceptance of the Banyamulenge later in this chapter. However, I should mention in passing that, as the findings of this research show, the issue of legitimacy of the Banyamulenge is crucial for peaceful coexistence to take shape in Uvira. More and more participants from both groups indicated that this issue is a concern for peace; therefore, more attention must be given to the issue of legitimacy if progress is to take place in fostering coexistence in Uvira.
6.3.1.3 Forgiveness

Forgiveness is crucial for groups' reconciliation. Negative contact factors that impede intergroup interaction may include collective threat, mistrust, and lack of forgiveness (Pettigrew et al. 2011, 275). If compassion and forgiveness are not present when conflict parties are working on addressing their differences, healing and restoration are impossible (Lederack, 2002, 28). Forgiveness is important after intergroup conflicts whether we are talking about interpersonal, or intergroup conflicts. Forgiveness requires that an individual or members of a group willingly abandon their "right to resentment, negative judgement, and indifferent behavior" toward the one(s) who have unjustly hurt them (Van Tongeren et al. 2013, 81).

In places devastated by internal civil strife or violent conflicts such as Uvira, prolonged dispute between groups may arise, pitting groups against one another. The practical problem is that, even when hostilities stop among these groups, distrust, resentment, and antagonism between members of the groups in conflict may remain high (Van Tongeren et al. 2013, 81). Therefore, researchers have suggested that forgiveness could be a means to reducing the negative effects of the some of the problems/issues listed above (Van Tongeren et al. 2013, 81). But how can forgiveness occur between groups with a bitter past? Is it even possible for a victimized group to accept forgiveness from the offending group? What kind of mechanisms are involved in achieving such a goal? Some researchers have identified facilitators of intergroup forgiveness – including
affective predictors such as empathy, negative emotions, and collective guilt – but also cognitive predictors such as trust, perceived victimhood, and amends made by the offending group (Van Tongeren et al. 2013, 82-85). Let me discuss some predictors of forgiveness that are part of this research and any impact they may have on fostering forgiveness in Uvira.

**6.3.1.3.1 Empathy**

Empathy is viewed as a factor that can promote intergroup forgiveness, because empathy translates emotional experiences. Empathy brings other-oriented emotions, as one may feel the pain of the other. It has been proven that these kinds of emotional experiences may generate compassion and warmth (Van Tongeren et al. 2013, 82). However, research has also found that in the context of intergroup conflicts, especially those involving groups with deep divergences, empathy may be difficult to foster (Van Tongeren et al. 2013, 82). In these circumstances, the link between empathy and intergroup forgiveness could be weak or perhaps nonexistent (Van Tongeren et al. 2013, 82). The literature is consistent with the findings of this study. Participants in Uvira indicated that empathy exhibited by both groups toward one another was ironic and hypocritical. Participants stated that the empathic feelings expressed by the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru are not coming from the bottom of their hearts. This is to say that empathy, though it has been perceived as a mediator of intergroup forgiveness, has failed to be generated through forgiveness in places like Uvira. I discuss the findings for empathy later and can return to this conversation for more insights.
6.3.1.3.2 Collective guilt

Collective guilt is a process whereby the perpetrating or offending group acknowledges the harm it did to the victimized group and implicitly says that it will not carry out the harm again. In other terms, members of a group admit or feel responsibility for misdeeds committed by other members of their group, hoping that the expressed guilt will facilitate reparation (Van Tongeren et al. 2013, 83). Collective guilt in Uvira could have been expressed though the empathic feelings, but given that empathy is viewed by participants as negative, any expression of collective guilt by one group toward the other can also be interpreted by members of the other group as ironic, unless the empathic feeling and contacts between these groups begin to be considered by members of each group as sincere.

6.3.1.3.3 Negative emotions

As far as negative emotions are concerned, research states that anger can be problematic in achieving intergroup forgiveness, and that for forgiveness to occur between people, more should be done to reduce the perceived anger. Also, fear is one of the emotional states that may manifest from members of a group oppressed by the neighboring group. That said, fear must dissipate for intergroup forgiveness to occur (Van Tongeren et al. 2013, 83). Fear is present among the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru in Uvira; each
group is suspicious of the other not knowing what the other may be planning next. As one participant stated: "There are no good contacts between the two groups as each fears the other" (S36). This state of fear in Uvira is expressed in the sense that every group watches the other's behavior, as each believes that the other may strike any time. The uncertainty of not knowing what the other is up to or what the other is preparing to do next, creates some group anxiety, and that anxiety may hold parties back, discouraging them from fully engaging in pursuing peaceful coexistence. As in lack of true empathy, negative emotions, especially about the past experiences such as killings, continue to play a role in the enduring of conflict in Uvira. The reduction of negative emotions, too, though believed to be a mediator for forgiveness, is not manifesting in Uvira. This lack in reduction of negative feelings may continue to hinder the ability of the two groups to foster coexistence. The model I developed supports this notion; group anxiety is viewed as a component of negative contact that ultimately creates negative outcomes for peaceful coexistence.

6.3.1.3.4 Trust

Research also states that trust mediates intergroup forgiveness; but the literature has also found that forgiveness is more difficult to achieve when victimized group members do not trust the offending or perpetrating group (Van Tongeren et al. 2013, 83). Making the matter worse is the idea that trust after intense intergroup conflicts can only manifest after intergroup forgiveness has been reached, and the parties/groups have overcome their negative emotions about past experiences (Van Tongeren et al. 2013, 83). If trust is
present, it can have positive effects in fostering forgiveness. However, as described in the session where I discussed factors leading to negative contacts in Uvira, distrust was listed by participants among the factors they believed were not facilitating peaceful coexistence.

Both intergroup empathy, collective guilt, reduction of negative emotions and trust are viewed by researchers as mediators of intergroup forgiveness, however, as these are absent in the Uvira conflict, it is fair to say that they may not be viewed as facilitators of forgiveness in the Uvira conflict. This is proven by the fact that forgiveness has not manifested among the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge, according to participants. Participants listed forgiveness among the factors they thought should help build relations among them in Uvira. Participants said that the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge have had a terrible past due to the experiences of wars they both endured. They indicated that, for true peaceful coexistence to take place, members of both communities must let it go (forget about the horrible things that happened) and forgive past atrocities. For instance, a Munyamulenge said, "We must forget about the past and think about the future; this way, we can forgive one another and live in peace with each other like we used to" (S4).

6.3.1.4 Awareness campaigns/peace education

Most participants viewed awareness campaigns as a vehicle that can be used to promote coexistence. Twenty participants out of 40 (14 Banyamulenge and 6 Bavibafuliru) called for campaigns awareness across Uvira. They particularly said that these campaigns may
take different forms such as public gatherings, workshops, or debates focusing on promoting acceptance of the Banyamulenge by other tribes, including educating people on forgiveness and peaceful coexistence. One participant stated the following: "Educate communities that the citizenship of the Banyamulenge is not tied to a language they speak (Kinyarwanda) or tribe, but the law must be respected and people must accept that Banyamulenge are Congolese like others" (S3). The views expressed by participants about coexistence or peace education are consistent with peace education literature. The assumption about peace/coexistence education goes as follows: When one acquires sufficient information and facts about the outside group during peace education, the fact of simply having to know the other better could reduce prejudice, stereotypes, and intergroup tensions. Learning true facts about the other may make one experience a change of heart about the other (Weiner, 1998).

It is believed that education for coexistence plays an important role in social change in places where people hold psychological attitudes that sometimes support conflict, discrimination, exploitation, or racism (Bar-Tal, 2004). Scholars have found that social education can help change the existing rapport and facilitate a new state of intergroup relations (Bar-Tal 2004, 261). Others have stated that, in some cases, providing an education of the groups’ history can be vital to setting the record straight about peoples’ past. The reason for this, they say, is that groups have collective, shared narratives in conflict; they also have perceived histories, beliefs, their own image, and those of their adversaries. As in the case of the Uvira conflict; the Banyamulenge and the Bavibafuliru have differing narratives of what has occurred in eastern DRC and
particularly what happened during the wars. Additionally, they have different beliefs and perceived histories about who the Banyamulenge are, when they arrived in the DRC, what their current status is, and other challenges on multiple issues. Therefore, scholars believe that when the conflict parties are taught about issues, education can ultimately play an equally central role in fostering coexistence (Desivilya, 2004). Peace education can make a difference, especially in places like Uvira, where there are divergences of narratives and histories, because such programs can deal with groups' collective narratives, including deeply rooted historical memories and societal beliefs (Kupermintz and Salomon, 2005). In these types of educational activities, adversaries are called upon to join peace education programs so that their incompatible and opposing views can be dealt with to establish some common ground (Kupermintz and Salomon, 2005).

Though the above-described literature gives a positive picture of education for coexistence and the role it plays in building relations, it is noteworthy that that many of these education programs have already taken place in Uvira. Organizations such as Search for Common Ground and others have used mass media, theater, dance, and music festivals to educate the population of Uvira and surrounding districts about coexistence and the need to embrace peace while abandoning use of violence against one another. Though these programs such as music festivals and radio programs draw thousands of participants and listeners, so far they have not reached the goal of unifying the people of Uvira – in particular the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru – for reasons that many of the organizations promoting peace/coexistence education either still need to find alternative approaches, or because the areas where they interact are overwhelmed by the magnitude
of the conflict. The reason why I say this is that there are also some weaknesses in what peace education programs can do in creating peaceful coexistence. Most importantly, the conflict in Uvira is simply viewed as intractable; it has occurred for such a long period, and the people there have developed ingrained narratives and histories about the conflict that they pass on from generation to generation. Some of the narratives circulating among members of both groups may be unfounded and without basis. Therefore, misinformation about the other can create confusion and increase intergroup tensions (Chayes and Minow, 2003). Some of the peace education programs in Uvira should perhaps focus on encouraging the rival groups to reject misinformation, allowing communities to reach common ground about their past, rather than just calling for people to tolerate or accept one another.

In addition, conflicts like the one in Uvira with land dispute dimensions are complicated to the point that people may believe what they choose about the dispute over the land, and they may not want to hear any other view that is different from what they have already chosen. Scholars have found that when negative relations come from intergroup conflict – conflicts that erupt because of opposing goals and interests between groups, especially over economy, religion, resources, values or territory – education for coexistence’s sake has less influence (Bar-Tal, 2004). These types of conflicts may become intense and violent, leading to profound animosity between groups or members of the society (Bar-Tal, 2004). According to Bar-Tal, education programs may have less impact on promoting coexistence under these circumstances. The reason for this, especially in history education is that history education can also increase acceptances of
specific values of group members belonging to a particular culture (Korostelina, 2013). This imposition of ingroup values, beliefs, and norms can upset outgroup members and impede coexistence altogether. For instance, the Bavibafuliru accuse the Banyamulenge of imposing their culture and what they call “domination of superiority” on them; this is something that the Bavibafuliru do not appreciate. The Bavibafuliru charge that the Banyamulenge impose themselves on every angle of society. One participant stated the following: "The lack of coexistence was due to the fact that Banyamulenge imposed their domination on Bavibafuliru, creating hatred" (S8). Another said this: "The issue here in Uvira is the dominance of the Banyamulenge, which has been imposed in the past. This wound must be healed, and other issues will be resolved by themselves" (S39). This clearly shows that there are deep-rooted issues that need to be taken care of and that peace or coexistence education may not be able to resolve those problems without such remediation.

6.4 CONCLUSION ON CONTACT: ANSWERING RESEARCH QUESTION 1

In Uvira, participants described the current contacts as insincere, ironic, and hypocritical; thus they thought conditions discussed above such as tolerance, acceptance, forgiveness, peace education, and trust must be present for contacts to actually make a difference and bring about positive outcomes. This is consistent with the findings of research carried out in other parts of the world. Researchers have found that prejudice is likely to be diminished in places where intergroup contact is not superficial (Pettigrew et al. 2011, 276). In other words, for contact to have positive effects (outcomes), the encounter
between rival groups must be positive. This is the reason that I suggested in the contact model I developed in Chapter 2 – borrowing from past research of other scholars and based on the findings of this current research – focusing on positive factors of contact that will lead to positive contact and ultimately facilitate positive coexistence outcomes. The model also shows that negative factors can lead to negative contact and produce negative coexistence outcomes.

According to the model, negative factors of contact include absence of trust, stereotyping of other, or impermeable boundaries. Thus, the occurrence of negative contact may include some forms of superficial and unwanted contact, intergroup anxiety, collective threat, and in-group prejudice. As far as positive factors of contact are concerned, they include interdependence, common identity, legitimacy, power balance, truth, and forgiveness. Occurrence of positive contact will require some forms of high degree cooperation, equal status, common goals, cross-group friendship, perspective-taking, and enhanced empathy. In the case of the Uvira conflict, the citizenship issue of the Banyamulenge (nonacceptance of this group), the land issue, the killings, lack of trust, political concerns, and cattle grazing issues are all viewed as negative factors that could lead to negative contact and hinder coexistence or facilitating negative outcomes of contact. Also, the extended contacts through collaboration, accepting the Banyamulenge as legitimate members of the society, and forgiving and tolerating one another promoting interethnic marriage (intermarriage), carrying out educational awareness for peace, carrying out common intergroup coexistence activities, and encouraging government
involvement in resolving conflict are regarded as positive factors that could lead to positive contact and facilitation of a positive outcome of coexistence.

Thus, to respond to the research question, based on the research findings, the necessary conditions that ensure positive outcomes of contact in the search for building positive intergroup relations include the following: the contact must be sincere, groups must be willing to have a high-level degree of cooperation, and the groups must tolerate one another, while legitimizing the other. Members of the groups must be truthful toward the other, develop enhanced empathy when empathy is absent, initiate cross-group friendship, seek some common goals or interests, and depend on one another. This list of conditions mediating intergroup relations can be modified, amended, or subtracted from to meet the criterion of a specific case being studied. It should not be treated as a final remedy for all types of conflicts, but rather a guideline from where to begin a conversation as to how to handle contact situations in the many cases where violent conflicts occur. I have listed enhanced empathy, acceptance, and dependence on each other as conditions to facilitate coexistence, I discuss their findings in the next sections.

**6.5 FINDINGS ON INTERGROUP EMPATHY**

Scholars have pointed to intergroup empathy as a remedy to help at-conflict parties to rebuild their relations. They say that enhanced intergroup empathy is one of the positive contact effects (Pettigrew et al. 2011, 275). With particular interest, social psychologists have given much attention to the idea that empathy can be used to improve intergroup attitudes and relations (Batson and Ahmad 2009, 141). Empathy is viewed as facilitating
positive attitudes and pro-social behavior toward members of the outgroup (Cikara, et al.
2011). Others see that in intergroup conflict, empathy is considered as a pro-social
emotional response that restores social relations with an outgroup (Čehajić, et al. 2009,
716). During the 2011 research that I conducted in Uvira trying to understand the causes
of conflict in this area, individuals who participated in the study expressed empathy
toward outgroup members, especially feeling the pain of what outgroup members
endured during the wars, while showing compassion for the other. Given that there is
widespread support for the role that empathy may play in improving intergroup relations,
I asked participants in this research in interview question number 2 – whether they
thought empathy expressed by members of the two groups for one another could help
them improve their relations. Then I followed with the sub-question seeking to
understand whether they thought the empathetic reaction they have for one another was
sincere, and asked them to justify their position.

The findings show that the majority of participants believed the empathic feelings
expressed by members of both groups had negative effects on improving relations;
meaning the expressed empathic feelings do not actually translate into improving
relations between the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru. By category, 65% of the
Banyamulenge stated that the effects of empathy in building relations was negative,
compared to 35% of them, who said the effects were positive. Similarly, 60% of the
Bavibafuliru said that the effects of empathy were negative in fostering intergroup
relations, compared to 40 percent who indicated that the effects were positive.
As for the sincerity of the expressed empathic feelings, the findings show far worse support for empathy. Among the Bavibafuliru, 95% stated that the empathic feelings expressed by the Banyamulenge toward them were insincere, while only 5% of the Bavibafuliru participants admitted that the expressed empathy was sincere. Similarly, 80% of the Banyamulenge indicated that the empathic feelings expressed by the Bavibafuliru were not sincere compared to 20% who said the expressed empathy was sincere. The above findings for the Uvira conflict clearly contrast the widespread existing literature on the role empathy plays in improving intergroup relations. These findings show that the problem of intergroup empathy is complex and perhaps multi-dimensional; therefore, it necessitates more in-depth research, especially for conflict situations involving intergroup violence.

Why is that, that despite the empathic feelings expressed by one group toward the other, these sentiments are not leading to improvement of intergroup relations in Uvira? One reason for this challenge can be expressed by the findings of this research. It is possible that the answer is in the empathic feelings being described by participants as ironic and hypocritical; this explains why empathy is not evidenced as a predictor of improving relations in Uvira. For instance, a Munyamulenge said that: "The empathy is not sincere; it is hypocritical and can't help them improve relations as they see each other as enemies and continue to call Banyamulenge foreigners" (S10). However, there are other possible explanations from existing literature.

Scholars have found that empathy works effectively at the interpersonal level. Although they realize that empathy can also work at intergroup level, they state that it is
more challenging at this level due to the complexity of issues surrounding intergroup conflicts (Batson and Ahmad 2009, 148). Researchers state that two problems may immediately emerge when we think of empathy at the intergroup level. First, people from rival groups frequently come with heavy baggage of issues; groups may have a history of disdain, and mistrust; and most importantly, they may be still involved in an outright conflict (Batson and Ahmad 2009, 148). In these types of conflict situations, as in Uvira, empathy therefore requires one to be "other-oriented" and deal with the sensitivity and the plight of the other (Batson and Ahmad 2009, 148). Given a horrific past or history, scholars say that asking for other-oriented sensitivity may be asking too much from groups that have a history of disdain or mistrust (Batson and Ahmad 2009, 148). For instance, for a group in Uvira that had accused the other of killing in-group members, is asking this group with a history of mistrust of or disdain for the out-group to be other-oriented asking too much? Perhaps the group that has a history of disdain for the other may not even be willing to accept the expressed empathy from the out-group, as it may view these kinds of empathic feelings as simply irony, as participants stated during the interview about the empathic feelings between the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru.

Other problem of adopting empathy at the intergroup level is that members of the groups would have to take the perspective of an out-group or to share that group’s feelings; this, according to researchers, may pose some significant challenges (Batson and Ahmad, 2009). Given that this requires "imagining how one would think and feel in another’s situation" (Batson and Ahmad 2009, 148), under such circumstances, is it even possible to take a perspective of a group or feel for a group? (Batson and Ahmad 2009,
For instance, as far as perspective-taking is concerned, Elizabeth Levy Paluck ran a year-long field experiment in the eastern DRC in 2007 testing the impact of media programs – a radio talk show that was designed to promote discussions among listeners over intergroup conflict and cooperation. It encouraged listeners to take a stand with tolerant opinions, while considering perspective-taking approaches (Paluck 2010, 1170). The results showed that, despite the fact that listeners were encouraged to consider perspective-taking approaches during their encounters, their exposure to taking the perspective of members of the out-group did not make them tolerant toward disliked groups. Instead, they showed even less tolerance for disliked groups (Paluck 2010, 1177). Despite the fact that they took the perspective of members of the rival group, talk show listeners were significantly more likely to say that "they would not want members of their dislike group to join their community associations" (Paluck 2010, 1177).

The above findings of Paluck's study is consistent with the findings of my research; the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru have expressed deep issues of mistrust, and their history of killings have made it hard for these groups to forgive one another. Participants described the expressed empathy between the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru as hypocritical and ironic. They stated that, given the experiences that each group went through during the wars of eastern DRC, empathy is expressed sometimes between the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru for fear of not hurting the other's feelings, but in the true sense, the sincerity of those feelings is questionable.
6.5.1 CONCLUSION ON EMPATHY: ANSWERING RESEARCH QUESTION 2

Despite there being widespread support demonstrating that empathy is a mediator of intergroup relations, there is little research explaining why improvement of intergroup relations can face challenges in places where intergroup empathy is present among adversaries. This thirst for scholarship prompted me to pursue this topic for the Uvira conflict where members of rival groups have expressed empathy for one another over what they have experienced in the past, but those empathic feelings have not helped transformed or improved relations in the area. This leads me to conclude this section by addressing the research question number 2: When does intergroup empathy fail to contribute to the improvement of groups' relations?

After surveying literature on intergroup empathy and the role it plays in facilitating intergroup relations, and taking into account the findings of the Uvira research over this topic, I can conclude that empathy has less effect in building intergroup relations in conflict situations where groups are still involved in an open conflict. Under this situation, tensions may still be high over conflict issues to the extent that expressed empathy of one group toward the other may be disregarded or unwelcome due to the complex issues that may still be driving the conflict and need to be addressed first. Also, empathy may have less impact in conflicts where members of the groups experienced violence such as intergroup killings, especially if members of the victimized group are not yet willing to forgive the past wrongdoing of the offending group. Finally, empathy
may also have less effect in conflicts where groups exhibit a history of disdain and mistrust (Batson and Ahmad 2009, 148). In these types of conflicts, members of groups may still be feeling the bitterness and suffering of past atrocities to the extent that they may not be open to reconciling with people who have caused them harm. In the end, it may only take enhanced intergroup empathy to have positive contact effects and building intergroup relations (Pettigrew et al. 2011, 275). However, how to accomplish the enhanced empathy in post-violent conflict situations or open conflicts remains unknown to researchers. What it may take to enhance empathy in post-conflict situations or situations of open conflict should be a topic of future research investigations.

6.6 FINDINGS ON LEGITIMACY

6.6.1 Citizenship status of the Banyamulenge

The issue of the Banyamulenge citizenship continues to be a disputed matter in Uvira and the country in general. The Banyamulenge citizenship has not only been contested by its neighboring ethnic groups such as the Bavibafuriru, but it has become a national issue. The DRC has been grappling with the question of citizenship of the Banyarwanda and Kirundi-speaking populations since the country achieved independence in 1960 (Koko 2013, 41). Note that the Banyarwanda is also a term used to refer the Banyamulenge. For some scholars, different regimes’ lack of attention to the nationality issue of the Banyarwanda in the DRC has "contributed to turning the question of the citizenship of
the Banyarwanda into a stumbling block to peaceful co-existence and human and state security, especially in the Kivu region” (Koko 2013, 72-73).

Given that the issue of the Banyamulenge citizenship emerged as a matter of special concern to many researchers and the residents of Uvira, in particular, I was interested in knowing what participants thought about the current status of the Banyamulenge in Uvira and the country in general. I asked them in interview question 4, given that the status of the Banyamulenge is viewed by different people in different ways here in Uvira, what is your perception about their status? The question was an open ended and not a survey where a researcher provides participants with a list of multiple choices. The findings show that participants gravitated toward discussing the citizenship of the Banyamulenge, even though my question very explicitly did not include the term citizenship status of the Banyamulenge in the actual interview question. This phenomenon indicated to me how seriously this issue of citizenship of the Banyamulenge is for both groups. The findings show that all Banyamulenge (100%) stated that the Banyamulenge are citizens of the DRC. On the contrary, the findings show a different picture from the Bavibafuliru: 55% of the Bavibafuliru said that the Banyamulenge were foreigners, and 45% indicated that the Banyamulenge were Congolese but with a foreign connotation. This means that no single Muvimufuliru participant indicated that that the Banyamulenge are simply Congolese. Those who recognized that the Banyamulenge were Congolese added some other reasons why they thought so, such as citing the granting of citizenship to the Banyamulenge by constitutional means. Despite that these 45% of Bavibafuliru said that the Banyamulenge were Congolese, they were still
convinced that the Banyamulenge were from Rwanda. In other words, they only accepted that the Banyamulenge were Congolese because the Constitution granted them citizenship; in reality, they viewed them as Rwandans.

The above findings are consistent with past research on this issue; only 26 percent of Congolese considered the Banyamulenge to be Congolese, according to an opinion poll collected nationwide in 2002 (Stearns et al. 2013, 11). This means 74% of people nationwide believed the Banyamulenge were foreigners. Also, scholarly data show that the issue of legitimacy of the Banyamulenge is crucial for the Uvira case. Vlassenroot states that the Banyamulenge's claims to political participation had an effect on toughening the boundaries between different groups; the author says that the uncertain status of the Banyamulenge "is but one result of clashing notions of identity (identity based on ethnicity versus identity based on residence)" (Vlassenroot 2002, 499-501). For this reason, Vlassenroot writes that, to get a better understanding of the present DRC conflict, the issue of citizenship needs some specific attention. The citizenship issue he says "has to be understood as one of the main challenges of future peace efforts" (Vlassenroot 2002, 501).

Based on the findings of this research, I align myself, with Vlassenroot’s assessment that the citizenship issue of the Banyamulenge has to be considered as one of the main challenges facing people in eastern DRC conflict, particularly in Uvira. Participants raised the citizenship issue of the Banyamulenge in almost all questions that were posed to them. The seriousness of this issue can be seen by the findings. All Banyamulenge (100%) stated that the Banyamulenge are citizens of the DRC, but their
counterparts the Bavibafuliru objected to this claim. Fifty-five percent of the Bavibafuliru said that the Banyamulenge were foreigners and 45% indicated that the Banyamulenge were Congolese but with a foreign connotation. In other terms, if it were not for the Constitution granting citizenship to the Banyamulenge, the other 45% of Bavibafuliru participants could simply call the Banyamulenge Rwandans or foreigners. In fact, they stated that the Bavibafuliru are still viewed by others as foreigners, despite the country's move to lawfully legalize the Banyamulenge.

Based on the research findings, I consider legitimacy connected to citizenship of the Banyamulenge to be a primary issue hindering coexistence in Uvira. The nonacceptance of the Banyamulenge as citizens of the DRC could one way or another lead to the Bavibafuliru to actually not want to engage in building relations or addressing issues of conflict with people that they believe are foreigners. The Bavibafuliru may, for instance, say: “What is the point of reconciling with foreigners who do not belong to this country?” That would be seen as an attitude exhibited by the Bavibafuliru toward the Banyamulenge, although the issue is more complex than the Bavibafuliru simply saying the Banyamulenge are foreigners and that they do not want to have anything to do with them.

Not paying attention to the Banyamulenge citizenship issue, especially in term of them not being viewed also as legitimate members of the society, will likely continue to be a struggle for any future peace efforts. This means that the citizenship issue should be considered as the cornerstone of this conflict; viewing it otherwise would be a mistake. For instance, Tilly includes citizenship in his notion of boundary; he contends that
citizenship is "a fundamental process of boundary drawing, inclusion, and exclusion" (Tilly 2005, 174). Why do we have to pay attention to citizenship? In most cases, countries establish constitutions that basically set rights and obligations for those who are regarded as citizens of the country. Consequently, citizenship by itself becomes an impermeable boundary between those who are regarded as citizens – who have rights and obligations to the country – and the noncitizens – who are deprived of certain rights and obligations. Although some rights and obligations may apply to everyone, very specific ones only apply to citizens alone (Tilly 2005, 194). In some conflict situations, such that of Uvira, the citizenship boundary may become impermeable to the extent that those seeing themselves as citizens may want only others they view as legitimate citizens to be part of their tent or circle, and noncitizens to be kicked out of the circle. In a situation such as that of Uvira, the Banyamulenge who also claim the DRC citizenship will not be accepted in the circle of the Bavibafuliru unless the Bavibafuliru accept and respect the legitimacy of the Banyamulenge, regardless of differences seen between the two groups. This has proven not to be the case thus far, because identity-based conflicts are complex and deserve particularly close attention in finding resolutions.

To conclude this section, I would like to reiterate that the issue of the Banyamulenge citizenship is unique given the dynamics surrounding it. It is not only that the citizenship of the Banyamulenge is contested at the national level, but other tribes such as the Bavibafuliru do not view them as legitimate members of their society at the local level. Tilly states that citizenship will likely continue to be one of the forms of boundaries in today's world. He contends that citizenship continues to be contested even
in well-established, parliamentarian democracies such as Ecuador, Indonesia, Israel and Nigeria (Tilly 2005, 198). Consequently, the author states that "without broad, relatively equal, binding, well-protected citizenship, however, democracy will flourish nowhere" (Tilly 2005, 198). Tilly also expresses concerns that citizenship will likely continue to be an issue as today's poorer countries may continue to face challenges in their efforts to craft new forms of citizenship (Tilly 2005, 198). Therefore, I worry that if this issue of Banyamulenge citizenship does not get close attention, other mediators that can be pursued such as tolerance, trust, forgiveness, inter-ethnic marriages, and interdependence are unlikely to play a positive role in fostering coexistence in the Uvira conflict. In the case of the constitutional crisis over citizenship, the government, which can impose or change laws, could play a crucial role in resolving the constitutional crisis. Such was the recommendation of the Banyamulenge participants who said that government intervention in resolving the conflict was needed in the DRC. They believe the government has the authority to make this change happen. The Banyamulenge participants said that government indifference over the issue could be seen as lack of support by authorities for their cause to seek full recognition. I discuss the government role and other mechanisms precipitating boundary changes when I later discuss social boundaries in the concept of Uvira.

6.6.2 Acceptance of the Banyamulenge as citizens vs members of society
The assumption for this research also stipulated that the nonacceptance of Banyamulenge in Uvira was hindering coexistence between the rival groups. I tested this assumption by asking participants in interview question number 7 whether they thought accepting all people, including the Banyamulenge, as citizens of Congo, can help improved relationships in Uvira. My assumption was confirmed to be true for this point. Participants indicated that because the citizenship of the Banyamulenge is a major problem in the conflict, if the Banyamulenge were accepted by other tribes, it could put an end to the enduring conflict. Depending on the respondent, 100% of the Banyamulenge indicated that acceptance of the Banyamulenge by its neighboring tribes (Bavibafuliru) will certainly be a major factor in improvement of relations. Also, 70% of the Bavibafuliru also acknowledged that, if the Bavibafuliru were accepted, the move could help build new relations in Uvira. The views expressed by participants above, comparing acceptance of the other with building of intergroup relations, are consistent with the literature on legitimacy. Scholars state that legitimacy is important for peaceful coexistence because accepting members of the other group as legitimate members of the society can lead in-group members to be willing to agree to coexist with out-group members; when the acceptance and recognition of the other takes place, in-group members may start to grant to an alien other the right to exist; meaning that they may choose "to exist together" (Weiner 1998, 15).

It is important to indicate that intergroup members' reactions to one another are influenced by the members' views about whether the status of one group is legitimate or illegitimate (Tyler 2006, 385). This means that when a group sees the other as
illegitimate, the perception of illegitimacy exacerbates negative reactions from the other, especially when relations among the groups are already unstable (Halabi et al. 2012, 295). Why does this occur? Because in intergroup relations, legitimacy of the other matters, as it represents a more social psychological interpretation, as members of groups see their relations with one another as "acceptable or unacceptable, good or bad" (Hornsey et al. 2003, 216). Whether it is at an organizational, group, or state level, people seek to be legitimized because illegitimate entities are likely to be rejected or lack any form of support (Tyler 2006).

However, the fact of the matter is that the question of the acceptance of the Banyamulenge was explored only as a possibility; views expressed by participants were only wishful thinking. The question asked what participants thought would happen if the Banyamulenge were to be accepted. Their answers were not a reflection of the Banyamulenge being accepted or that they will be accepted by others, because as we saw in the previous section where I covered the citizenship status of the Banyamulenge, one can clearly see that most Bavibafiru participants did consider the Banyamulenge as foreigners. As described by 30% of Bavibafiru regarding the acceptance of the Banyamulenge, they believed acceptance of the Banyamulenge by the Bavibafiru will not make any difference whatsoever. These participants stated that a lot has happened in the past, especially during the wars, and that a simple acceptance will not end all other issues dividing the two communities. One participant said of this issue, "No, acceptance won't take us anywhere; that won't be a solution because it does not matter if the Banyamulenge are accepted, other tribes always see them as foreigners" (S8).
For this reason, the issue here is not what participants think would happen if the acceptance occurred; rather, the issue is whether participants, especially the Bavibafuliru, think they can actually accept the legitimacy of the Banyamulenge. The results of other subject matter, such as citizenship, contact, empathy already discussed above do not support the assertion that the Bavibafuliru were ready to accept the Banyamulenge as Congolese citizen. What will it take then for the Bavibafuliru to reach that point? I discuss some possible resolutions when I explore ways of breaking boundaries to building intergroup relations in the next section. But I also share some ideas by scholars that it may take for groups to accept each other after a bitter past. Accepting the other does not just happen haphazardly; scholars say that it is an evolving process. Some scholars indicate that acceptance emerges in intimacy when members of the rejected group disclose themselves and the rejecting group is willing to connect with them (Smith and Berg 1997, 120). The self-disclosure facilitates the development and maintenance of friendships between groups (Thomsen 2012, 161). The paradox of intimacy, then, translates into the following: "Acceptance of self depends on acceptance of others; and acceptance of others depends on acceptance of self" (Smith and Berg, 1997, 125). This will include the process of understanding oneself, while at the same time understanding others; it also means connecting with oneself while also connecting with others (Smith and Berg 1997, 125). Unfortunately, this is not happening in Uvira; friendship or intimacy where groups are willing to connect with each other is absent in Uvira, possibly explaining why the acceptance of the other is not taking place yet. Instead of engaging one another in a more collaborative way, the encounters occurring between the
Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru are superfluous, ironic, and hypocritical. These kinds of contacts are not producing positive outcomes of coexistence.

What is the way forward then for acceptance to take place in Uvira? Although research supports the idea that contact leads to mutual acceptance between groups, same research contends that the contact-tolerance relationship is possible under conditions where self-disclosure and symbolic threat are dealt with (Peter and Thomsen 2012, 163). It is important to stress that mutual self-disclosure is a key element for mediating friendship; that is crucial for relations improvement (Peter and Thomsen 2012, 162). This means that there is need for mutual self-disclosure to take place between the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru for their encounters to facilitate tolerance and acceptance. Also, it is not just about one group disclosing their information to the other; they all must show commitment to be willing to share at a great deal. Despite self-disclosure being a process of voluntary information exchange between in-group and outgroup members, it remains vital that the information being disclosed be personal and intimate to make a difference (Peter and Thomsen 2012, 162). This means the level of self-disclosure must be taken seriously between the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru in terms of depth and breadth as self-disclosure concerns the amount of time spent on taking about oneself” (Peter and Thomsen 2012, 163).

To end this section I must reiterate that the findings show that there is a clear distinction between acceptance of the Banyamulenge as citizens of the Congolese nation, versus acceptance of them as legitimate members of the society at the local level. To address the citizenship issue of the Banyamulenge may require two processes. First, it is
important that the Banyamulenge be accepted as legal citizens of the country (despite their being by law citizens of the Congo); that is, other Congolese tribes must be willing to accept the differences they have with the Banyamulenge over the nationality issue. This may require the indigenous tribes to stop considering the Banyamulenge as citizens of Rwanda but be willing to embrace them as Congolese. How to change the impermeable citizenship boundaries to permeable may require more investigations from scholars. Second, there is need to accept the Banyamulenge as legitimate members of the society in Uvira and other territories where they live in eastern DRC, due to the land dispute issues. Despite the Banyamulenges’ claim that the DRC Constitution having granted them citizenship, the people living around them, including the Bavibafuliru, care less about the state legality, but they see the Banyamulenge as illegitimate members of the society as they accuse them of illegally occupying their land. These distinctions must also be made clear by researchers; most scholars have solely focused on the legal citizenship issue, ignoring the local social legality.

6.6.3 Acceptance of power of the Banyamulenge

Coexistence also includes the notion of power balance; major research on warfare in decentralized societies suggests that warfare is a result of imbalances of power (Wiessner 2006, 165). Researchers contend that conflict is likely to occur if power is imbalanced among adversaries (Herbst, Konrad, and Morath 2016, 1). The authors state that "the likelihood of conflict and the nature of peaceful settlements is affected by an increased
asymmetry of fighting power in the conflict that emerges when the players fail to reach a peaceful agreement” (Herbst, Konrad, and Morath 2016, 1). Therefore, I sought to understand power dynamics between the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge and the role they play in the conflict in Uvira. For this reason, I asked participants whether they thought providing equal rights for political participation to the Banyamulenge will improve or inflame tensions between them and the Bavibafuliru. The findings show that 90% of the Banyamulenge did not think that their participation in politics could increase tensions in Uvira compared to only 10% of the Banyamulenge who thought their involvement in politics could actually enflame tensions between them and the Bavibafuliru. Also, 65% percent of the Bavibafuliru stated that allowing Banyamulenge to participate in politics was not going to increase tension and only 35% of them thought the participation of the Banyamulenge in politics was a problem that could inflame tensions. This means that 75.5% of the total participants did not link the participation of the Banyamulenge in politics could spark tensions in Uvira compared to 22.5% who did think their involvement in politics was a concern.

There are real differences in opinion, as shown by the findings; more Banyamulenge did not think that their participation in politics was a problem. This is viewed in the sense that members of this group are actually the ones seeking acceptance from others, explaining why they have a more favorable opinion about their rights to participate in politics. However, despite the fact that more than 50% of the Bavibafuliru also indicated that the participation of the Banyamulenge in politics is not leading the two groups to take up arms against one another, they were more concerned that the political
power that Banyamulenge possess was not achieved through the fruits of their labor. They charged that Banyamulenge got access to power through the use of force. The Bavibafuliru participants questioned the legitimacy of the Banyamulenge's political power, explaining why their opinion about the participation of the Banyamulenge in politics was less favorable, compared to the opinion of the Banyamulenge.

This research made the assumption that power imbalance between the Banyamulenge and the Bavibafuliru was also a factor hindering coexistence. Although there is some truth in my assumptions, this research findings to some extent disconfirmed other parts of my own assumptions over the role that power plays in Uvira conflict. Most participants did not link the ongoing tensions in Uvira to the rights of the Banyamulenge to participate in politics. Participants from both camps stated that Banyamulenge are already occupying high-ranking position in the local and central governments including the army and local police. On the contrary, the findings show that the Bavibafuliru are more concerned that the political power that Banyamulenge possess was not achieved through merit, but instead they said the Banyamulenge got access to power through the use of force. They view the power of the Banyamulenge as illegitimate; in other term, the Bavibafuliru indicated that the Banyamulenge are in power today in government and elsewhere not because they deserve to be in those positions, but because they imposed themselves into those positions.

Participants who expressed concerns about the participation of the Banyamulenge in politics said that it can increase tensions, citing the lack of acceptance of Banyamulenge by other tribes surrounding them. They say that, despite the fact that the
Banyamulenge hold power in many parts of local and central government including in the army and the police, they will still be rejected as long as they are treated as foreigners. One participant said the following: "Yes, the Banyamulenge’s participation in politics can increase tensions. As long as the Banyamulenge are not accepted as Congolese, assuring them equal rights to participate in politics can be problematic because they will still continue to be viewed by others as foreigners" (S11).

The views expressed by participants about the illegitimacy of power in Uvira is consistent with literature on power. Whether it is at an organizational, group, or state level, people seek to be legitimized because illegitimate entities are likely to be rejected or lack any form of support. Being legitimate is important "to the success of authorities, institutions, and institutional arrangements since it is difficult to exert influence over others based solely upon the possession and use of power" (Tyler 2006, 375). This is the situation seen in Uvira where the Bavibafuliru state that Banyamulenge took power by force. They claim that they do not deserve to hold any position in government or army because they are foreigners. This explains why the Bavibafuliru reject the power of the Banyamulenge as illegitimate. It is important that “every authority system tries to cultivate a belief in its legitimacy” (Tyler 2006, 377). The reason for this is so that authorities can perform effectively; "those in power must convince everyone else that they “deserve” to rule and make decisions that influence the quality of everyone’s lives" (Tyler 2006, 377). The author goes further, stating that it is not only important to rule using power, but, he says "authorities benefit from having legitimacy and find governance easier and more effective when a feeling that they are entitled to rule is
widespread within the population" (Tyler 2006, 377). The findings of the Uvira research show that some Bavibafuriru are not convinced that the Banyamulenge deserve to rule them; they stated that they cannot be ruled by foreigners. As the Bavibafuriru see that Banyamulenge's power is illegitimate, they may continue to resist it and, most importantly, disregard the Banyamulenge's authority. This is because legitimacy actually affects how people act toward organizations and how they understand them (Suchman 1995, 574). Scholars state that organizations that lack "acceptable legitimated accounts of their activities" are likely to be perceived as unnecessary (Suchman 1995, 574). People perceive legitimate organizations as more worthy, meaningful, predictable, and most importantly, more trustworthy (Suchman 1995, 574).

6.6.3.1 Conclusion on power

This research findings show that some Bavibafuriru continue to view power projected by the Banyamulenge in Uvira in the form of domination and control by foreigners; thus they see the Banyamulenge's power as illegitimate. Literature shows that power can take the form of domination. Power is" the ability to shape the gains and losses of others, either by threatening or using coercion to deter undesired behavior, or by promising rewards to promote desired behavior (Tyler 2006, 376). Power provides a means to shape behavior to the extent that “the strong do what they will, the weak endure what they must” (Tyler 2006, 376).
Therefore, when an authority is legitimate, he/she can project power, and others will show willingness to obey orders from that authority. In Uvira, this reality of domination is challenged, as some Bavibafuliru continue to reject the legitimacy of the power of the Banyamulenge who they accuse of taking power by force. People are not influenced simply because someone possesses or uses power over them. In places like Uvira, those possessing power – in this case the Banyamulenge – may face challenges in shaping the behavior of the group(s) or influencing them (Bavibafuliru) if they do not have legitimacy among the groups' members. This is to say that, regardless of whether someone possesses power, that someone has legitimacy if people view his/her authority as proper, and someone can only influence people if they view him/her as legitimate (Tyler 2006, 393). Thus, because the Bavibafuliru view the authority of the Banyamulenge as improper, the Bavibafuliru will continue to regard the Banyamulenge as not having legitimacy over them. The Banyamulenge may continue to face challenges to influence the Bavibafuliru, as the latter will have no interest in being influenced by those they call foreigners despite the fact that they possess power. This issue of illegitimacy of power of the Banyamulenge, if not addressed, is likely to have continuing effect on relations between the Banyamulenge and the Bavibafuliru.

6.7 ROLE OF SOCIAL BOUNDARIES

In conflict situations, groups define themselves in opposition to one another creating an "us" and "them" divide. As groups come to know the existence of each other, they may
begin to characterize themselves under categories. It is quite common for these groups to possess some characteristics in common but also to have some attributes that differentiate them. Therefore, the presence of categories is based on similarities and differences (Brown 2000, 265). This means that conflict groups may create boundaries in different forms; the boundaries may be barriers or social distances, or may take a form of exclusion. As the conflict situation changes, it is possible that boundaries may also change for better or for worse. This means that social interaction between groups is organized around "the formation, transformation, activation, and suppression of social boundaries" (Tilly 2005, 132). These are perceived as steps of boundary change.

Once boundaries are formed between groups, breaking or suppressing them to facilitate intergroup coexistence may pose some significant challenges in some cases, especially in post-conflict situations. Regarding boundary changes, Tilly, for instance, asks a set of puzzling questions that became of interest for this research. The author queries why boundaries that at some point appear to seem to matter little or at all for social life, suddenly become salient bases of interaction to the extent that people who lived peacefully with small differences today begin killing across the same boundary tomorrow? (Tilly 2005, 132-133). In the case of the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge, why is it that before the first 1996 war, the two groups lived peacefully with some differences but only to begin to kill one another post-1996? What changed for these groups to have created sudden boundaries? Tilly goes further, asking why and how do unbreakable boundaries suddenly become irrelevant or less salient? How do divisions between “us” and “them” change to the point that yesterday's enemies become today's
allies and vice versa? (Tilly 2005, 132-133). In other words, how can we encourage coexistence to take place in places where conflicts have broken the social fabric? This goes back to the fundamental third question for this search; how do we encourage the process of breaking intergroup social boundaries to promote peaceful coexistence? I discuss some mechanisms that Tilly has found precipitate boundary changes and explore their implications for the Uvira conflict. I will then conclude with other mediators of coexistence that I found useful for this conflict.

6.7.1 Encounter

When members of two groups - with no previous connection - or who were indirectly linked groups, enter a social space and begin interacting, they can form some social boundaries during the contact setting (Tilly 2005, 138). Some distinctiveness can be seen during the encounters, with insider-outsider boundary taking shape. Similar to other literature, Tilly also states that encounter, or in other terms contact, has some limitations in changing boundaries. He states that in some specific cases, members of truly unconnected networks rarely interact. For this reason, he finds that "absolutely pure cases of boundary change through contact hardly ever occur" (Tilly 2005, 138-139). The arguments made by Tilly are consistent with the Uvira research findings. Participants stated that the encounters taking place between the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge are insincere, ironic, and hypocritical. In other words, true encounters are rare in Uvira, thus being unable to facilitate the building of intergroup relations. To remediate this issue of superfluous encounter, Tilly also suggests that a combination of other causal mechanisms
be pursued for contact to play a significant role in boundary change. This may require what I have discussed earlier, including allowing groups to enter into positive contact. During positive contact, interaction intensifies over time between groups that had no previous connection, leading boundaries between these to become more salient (Tilly 2005, 138-139).

6.7.2 Imposition

In this mechanism, authorities may draw lines where they did not exist in the past distinguishing between members of a society. For instance, they may distinguish between citizens and foreigners, or Christians from those with no religious affiliations. However, Tilly states that imposition most of the time produces boundary changes, as authorities may put in place new systems of top-down control. (Tilly 2005, 139). What Tilly means here is that authorities who impose these boundaries can terminate them. Tilly's assertion is consistent with the Uvira conflict findings. For instance, the Banyamulenge who see their rights to citizenship contested by the Bavibafuliru, suggested that government intervention should be one of the forms to address conflict in Uvira. Based on Tilly's concept of imposition, the Banyamulenge may say that, since the government has previously created the citizenship boundary crisis, it has the ability to fix the mess by passing unambiguous, strong legislation that fully grants citizenship to the Banyamulenge. The government must then enforce the law through some form of control, where violators of the passed law must be punished.
The Banyamulenge would argue that, because the government is the guarantor of the law, it must work hard to make sure people accept and respect the decision it made to fully grant them citizenship. The Banyamulenge see that the failure of the government to pass and enforce new laws constitutes an indirect silence denying them their rights of citizenship. Tilly identifies a serious problem with already established boundary. The author writes that, once boundary is established, regardless of whether it is later rescinded, it leaves traces of its existence in the society, to the extent that even when authorities no longer back the boundaries, they will still have some asymmetrical effects (Tilly 2005, 139). This is exactly what has happened in Uvira, as well; the previous governments had not officially recognized the citizenship of the Banyamulenge. Though President Joseph Kabila’s government had included a clause in the 2006 revised Constitution that recognized the identity of the citizenship of the Banyamulenge, the previous laws that did not officially recognize the Banyamulenge as citizens of the DRC have already left some traces to the extent that, even though the current government may say that it recognizes the citizenship of the Banyamulenge, those opposing the Banyamulenge citizenship care less about the change in the policies or laws put in place by the new government, and stick with the past.

6.7.3 Borrowing

People creating new organizations embrace some forms of distinctions that are already visible in other organizations. By repeating the hurting or damaging distinctions,
borrowing indirectly encourages inequality between members of different social categories. For instance, those creating organizations such as schools, banks, or armies embrace established models in recruiting, using categories such as gender, race, ethnicity, or religion. Though these organizations are not responsible for the invention of the boundary in question, they are actually transplanting the already existing boundary into a new location. Tilly suggests that, in borrowing mechanism, new organizations don't need "to produce categorical inequality for massive and durable inequality to result from their intervention" (Tilly 2005, 139). As explained above, in borrowing, boundaries seen in some places are reproduced in other different places. For instance, the issues of ethnic discrimination seen in Rwanda between the minority Tutsi and the majority Hutu was transplanted to eastern DRC with the arrival of both Rwandan Hutu and Tutsi refugees. Tutsis and Hutus who had some already established boundaries in Rwanda, moved to the eastern DRC with their boundaries, and their issues continued to be felt in the DRC. The Banyamulenge continued to be discriminated against by other tribes, including the Bavibafuliru, due to their Rwandan origin and Tutsi ethnicity.

6.7.4 Conversation

This includes ordinary talks among previously unlinked groups but is taken to further steps of wide range of interactions. Conversation in this form is a setting where exchange of information between people or groups modify relations among them continuously, but bit by bit (Tilly 2005, 140). The shared information may include words, symbols,
actions, reactions, and expressions of emotions (Tilly 2005, 140). In a true sense, the
core concept of conversation that Tilly describes here is that the contact model I developed in
Chapter 2 may describe as positive contact. Contact is described as that in which there is
cross-group friendship that leads the conflict groups to begin to cooperate. Like contact,
Tilly also says that conversation may be regarded as boundary-causing mechanism when
during their interaction members of groups alter their relations, creating distinctiveness
rather than togetherness (Tilly 2005, 140). However, conversation that may facilitate
boundary change occurs incrementally at a small or large scale. The change takes place
bit by bit, as previously unconnected groups engage in fruitful conversation that change
their relations (Tilly 2005, 140). Tilly's description of conversation can be regarded by
others as intergroup dialogue. A dialogue is sincere and not superficial and can lead to
improving relations. When I asked whether the acceptance of all tribes including the
Banyamulenge would ameliorate relations in Uvira, one participant said the following:
"No; who has to accept the other? Uvira needs true dialogue and not just acceptance"
(S7). Another participant in question 5 said this: "Trust one another and encourage
mutual acceptance; tell each other the truth by engaging in constructive dialogue" (S30).

6.7.5 Incentive shift

Groups participating in boundary processes may be rewarded or punished as they pursue
within-boundary relations or cross-boundary relations. In the process, group members
may receive cooperation from other individuals found on the same side of a boundary or
receive threats from those across the boundary. This means that changes in boundary-maintaining incentives most often cause boundary change (Tilly 2005, 140). As people engage in cooperative exercise, especially in dangerous circumstances, they can signal some fear or defection that could easily escalate into a mood of panic or self-protection. Under such circumstances, increases in guarantees that the other group will meet its commitments with regard to the bargaining will likely increase incentives among in-group members; however, decreases in guarantees will ultimately reduce incentives for cooperation (Tilly 2005, 140). In the case of Uvira, there is issue with contact between the two groups; these groups have not shown their true intentions to fully engage in constructive cooperation. It is possible that if each group sees the opportunity to fully engage in dialogue with the other and guarantees the other that it will not back off the dialogue until a resolution is found? those types of guarantees can bring more incentives for each group to be determined to cooperate with the other. Unless they are guarantees that each group will be committed to address its differences with the other, one group or both may still hesitate to engage if they do not know the true intentions of the other. This is when group anxiety emerges as a result of the negative types of contact. I discuss other mechanisms that can be seen as facilitators of boundary changes below, such as common in-group identity.

6.7.6 Summary of interdependence findings
Scholars who have been critical of the role played by contact in building relations have suggested that contact be combined with other factors for it to facilitate positive outcomes of coexistence. Researchers have found that interdependence – meaning members of rival groups begin to rely on one – can ameliorate intergroup relations. I wanted to find out what participants thought of this concept; I asked them in question number 9 whether they thought if the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru depended on each other in addressing community problems, they could begin to improve their relations. This question was important for this research, as I made an assumption that a lack of the rival groups to not have common goals for the future and rely on one another (interdependence) was problematic to fostering coexistence. The research findings reveal that participants from both sides supported the idea that if interdependency is pursued by the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru, it could improve their relations. The data show that 100% of Banyamulenge stated that if the Bavibafuliru and they depended on one another, they would likely begin to ameliorate their relations. Also, 70% of the Bavibafuliru acknowledged that interdependency could increase relations between them and Banyamulenge. This means 85% of all participants agreed that if members of the two groups depended on one another, their relations could change for better. Participants said that interdependency can encourage people to seek common interests, work together, consolidate mutual respect, engage in commercial exchanges, have extended contacts, and develop friendship.

The views expressed above by participants are consistent with existing literature on this subject matter. For instance, Brown (2003) emphasizes groups' interdependence in
increasing cooperation among intergroup members. He differentiates between positive and negative interdependence. In positive interdependence – where group members need one another to achieve a task or a particular goal – cooperation becomes necessary and much needed between members (Brown 2003, 38). Under this situation (of interdependence), people are motivated to cooperate with one another, help one another, and possibly even like each other when all members of the group work toward achieving one goal together (Brown 2003, 38). There is currently lack of cooperation between the Banyamulenge and the Bavibafuliru, and this lack of cooperation has proven to be problematic for ongoing encounters to facilitate coexistence in Uvira. If and only if members of the two communities can begin to rely on each other, practicing things such as engaging in commercial exchanges, having extended contact, and building new friendship as they suggested during the interviews, it is possible that these kinds of interactions may lead to some positive outcomes.

There is also negative interdependence; this occurs where there seem to be no incentives for cooperation or achieving a common goal. In negative interdependence, people are motivated to compete and have no desire or ambition to work together. Therefore, Brown (2003) stipulates that positive interdependence increases groups' cooperation more than negative interdependence does (Brown 2003, 38). In the case of Uvira, positive interdependence is needed more if relations are to be transformed for the better.

6.7.7 Common in-group identity
Another mechanism of boundary change may include common in-group identity. The critical problem that the findings of this research identified is the rejecting of the Banyamulenge by other tribes surrounding them, including the Bavibafuliru. The rejection is primarily due to the Banyamulenge being viewed by others as foreigners. Gaertner's model of common in-group identity may provide some relief to this problem of acceptance of the Banyamulenge, especially given that I indicated earlier that the acceptance of the Banyamulenge is viewed in two forms. One, they must be accepted as nationals of the DRC; but two, they must also be accepted as members of the local society, given that the neighboring tribes accuse them of occupying their territory.

The reason why I suggest Gaertner's model of common ingroup identity to be of interest in the Uvira conflict is that this model proposes an intersection between in-group and out-group members (Gaertner, Dovidio, and Bachman 1996, 271). In this model, Gaertner suggests that "intergroup bias and conflict be reduced by factors that transform members’ cognitive representations of the memberships from two groups to one more inclusive social identity" (Gaertner, Dovidio, and Bachman 1996, 271). This means that a common identity is formed producing positive feelings by ingroup members toward outgroup members. During the process of formation of the new common identity, there is chance that members may feel that they operate at equal status, they establish cooperative interdependence, they have the opportunity to engage in self-revealing interactions and find that egalitarian norms are established (Gaertner, Dovidio, and Bachman 1996, 271). These processes may successfully reduce bias, transforming members' perceptions about
each other from "Us" and "Them" to become a more inclusive "We" (Gaertner, Dovidio, and Bachman 1996, 271).

What is crucial about the common identity model is that today's interracial behavior tends to be driven by pro-ingroup biases to the extent that the racial biases of some individuals may be driven by their inability to expand their circle of inclusion as they consider underlying differences seen between ingroup and outgroup members. (Gaertner, Dovidio, and Bachman 1996, 273). This is the problem that is actually taking place in Uvira, where we see the indigenous tribes of eastern DRC, including the Bavibafuliru, being unable to expand their circle to include the Banyamulenge, due to differences that they raise, including that of national-foreign differences. To remediate to this kind of the Uvira conflict, Gaertner suggests strategies that "expand the inclusiveness of one's ingroup to include people who would otherwise be regarded as outgroup members"; doing this, Gaertner and the others conclude, "may have beneficial consequences for promoting more positive intergroup attitudes and behaviors"(Gaertner, Dovidio, and Bachman 1996, 273).

Here is how Gaertner's model can function in Uvira: The model provides the basis for the creation of common ingroup identity between in-group and out-group members. In his concept, a dual identity is created, emphasizing the creation of a new national identity between intergroup members (Korostelina 2007, 202). This process allows in-group and out-group members to create one new umbrella group with two subgroups that operate side by side as a team (Korostelina, 2007, 202). In a dual national identity setting, creating the sense of a new identity is significant; however, the process allows each group
to reflect membership in its own subgroup to try to create a positive balance of differences and similarities, where all members of the new group will have positive attitudes and positive stereotypes toward the other (Korostelina 2007, 203). The reason for allowing each group to have membership in its own subgroup is that it "would be undesirable or impossible for people to relinquish their ethnic or racial subgroup identities" (Gaertner, Dovidio, and Bachman 1996, 271). Thus, in the common ingroup identity model, it is important to minimize category differences by creating a new inclusive group identity that possesses a superordinate category made salient and in which members are more likely to think of themselves as "one unit" of two different subgroups, rather than two separate groups (Brewer 1996, 194). Creating this national common identity will allow the Banyamulenge and the Bavibafuliru to be in one umbrella group, but at the same time, each group will still reflect membership in its own subgroup to create positive balances of differences and similarities, such as culture and customs.
To end this section, I take the opportunity to answer the research question number 3. What factors contribute to the process of breaking intergroup social boundaries to promote peaceful coexistence? Based on the survey of literature I reviewed and this research's findings, I propose the following factors must be considered as necessary to suppressing existing boundaries that may hinder coexistence in post-conflict or open conflict situations. These factors include search for cooperative interdependence, creation of common ingroup identity that put groups at equal status, government intervention, effective intergroup conversation, and deployment of incentive shift.

6.8 OVERVIEW OF SOME MAJOR PERSPECTIVES AND OPINIONS AMONG THE TWO GROUPS
6.8.1 Contact

The Banyamulenge's perception of contact is that they would like to see more encounters occurring between them and the Bavibafuliru, hoping that the other will be willing to accept them. On the other hand, the Bavibafuliru have little appetite to engage the Banyamulenge, as they view them as foreigners.

6.8.2 Power

Banyamulenge have a more favorable opinion about their rights to participate in politics. However, despite the fact that more than 50% of the Bavibafuliru also indicated that the participation of the Banyamulenge in politics is not leading the two groups to take up arms against one another, they were more concerned that the political power that Banyamulenge possess has not been achieved through the fruits of their labor. They charged that Banyamulenge got access to power through the use of force. The Bavibafuliru participants questioned the legitimacy of the Banyamulenge's political power, explaining why their opinion about the participation of the Banyamulenge in politics was less favorable compared to the opinion of the Banyamulenge.

6.8.3 Acceptance of the Banyamulenge

One hundred percent of the Banyamulenge participants believed that their acceptance will improve relations, while only 70% of the Bavibafuliru believed so. The difference in opinion is due to the Banyamulenge’s quest to be accepted, while the Bavibafuliru who reject the citizenship of the Banyamulenge have nothing to lose if the acceptance of the
Banyamulenge does not materialize. The Banyamulenge participants indicated that because their citizenship issue is a major problem in the conflict, if they were accepted by other tribes, it could put an end to the enduring conflict. As for the Bavibafuliru participants, they stated that a lot has happened in the past, especially during the wars, and that a simple acceptance will not end all issues dividing the two communities.

### 6.8.4 Citizenship

The findings show that all Banyamulenge (100%) stated that the Banyamulenge are citizens of the DRC. By contrast, the findings show a different picture from the Bavibafuliru: 55% of the Bavibafuliru said that the Banyamulenge were foreigners, and 45% indicated that the Banyamulenge were Congolese but with a foreign connotation. This means that no single Muvimufuliru participant indicated that that the Banyamulenge are simply Congolese. Those who recognized that the Banyamulenge were Congolese added some other reasons why they thought so, such as citing the granting of citizenship to the Banyamulenge by constitutional means. Despite that these 45% of Bavibafuliru said that the Banyamulenge were Congolese, they were still convinced that the Banyamulenge were from Rwanda; they only accepted that the Banyamulenge are Congolese because the Constitution granted them citizenship, but in reality they view them as Rwandans.

### 6.9 SUMMARY
In this chapter, I discuss the research findings and make sense of them. I use the findings, theories that I explored in this research, and the model I created to provide the best explanation of the Uvira conflict, in particular why the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru have faced challenges to coexist peacefully. This research has found that, while many researchers have pointed to the issue of the contested Banyamulenge citizenship as one of the causes of the conflict in Uvira, they have not been able to delve into the concept of legitimacy of the other to understand the different dynamics surrounding the so-called citizenship of the Banyamulenge. This research made a clear distinction between the acceptance of the Banyamulenge as citizens of the Congo versus their acceptance as legitimate members of the society where they live with other neighboring groups, including the Bavibafuliru. Most researchers have focused on the first one, limiting their attention to the nationality issue (Banyamulenge must be recognized as Congolese) rather than paying attention to whether people see the nationality of the Banyamulenge or their access to power as legitimate (Banyamulenge must first be accepted as legitimate members of the society). Researchers in future studies for Uvira should consider paying attention to this difference, as it may help distinguishing the national versus local issues.

The purpose of this research then was to examine the role of intergroup contact and empathy in improving relations in cases where parties have experienced violent conflicts, such as in Uvira. It also analyzed the best practices to foster peaceful coexistence among rival groups while bridging the gap in literature on this subject matter. Finally, it examined the extent to which legitimacy of the other, positive cooperation, interdependence, and common ingroup identity can have on improving relations and in
facilitating intergroup coexistence. This research then explores ways peaceful coexistence can be achieved by groups and how this study can contribute to conflict analysis and resolution theory on cases related to the notion of coexistence.

This chapter answers the research questions that I posed in Chapter 1:

1. What are the necessary conditions that facilitate positive outcomes of contact in the search for building positive intergroup relations?

2. When does intergroup empathy fail to contribute to the improvement of groups’ relations?

3. What factors contribute to the process of breaking intergroup social boundaries in order to promote peaceful coexistence?
It was my intention to create a contact model in Chapter 2 that combined both positive and negative factors of contact and shows how they are interconnected. In this model, positive factors lead to producing positive contact and ultimately facilitating
positive outcomes of coexistence, while negative factors of contact produce negative contact, mediating negative outcomes of coexistence. I describe below what works and what does not work in the model.

If groups engage in negative contact as described by participants, the encounter is unlikely to improve relations between the groups. Based on this research finding, if negative factors such as lack of trust are seen, the boundaries remain impermeable (the citizenship issue of the Banyamulenge), and negative stereotypes such as believing the others are killers, murders, foreigners, including other prejudices, are present; these factors are likely to lead to negative contacts, as described by participants who said the encounters between the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge were superficial, ironic, or hypocritical. These, including other such issues such collective threat, can also create intergroup anxiety.

To counter these negative factors that led to negative contact, positive contact must then take shape. This means that the positive contacts phenomenon can take shape between the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru as a result of some positive factors of contact that must be manifested in their everyday life. These positive factors may include members of these groups beginning to rely on each other (interdependence), telling truth to one another about the past so forgiveness be fostered, and tolerating one another to the point that one group (the Bavibafuliru) can accept the legitimacy of the other (the Banyamulenge). The legitimacy here does not only mean that the citizenship of the Banyamulenge must be accepted and respected regardless of their difference, but they must also be recognized as legitimate members of the society in Uvira and South Kivu
Province; the power held by them must also be seen as legitimate. It is only then that these groups can feel the need of enhancing new common identity, where the group that was previously kicked out of the citizenship circle may now feel welcomed back in. When these positive factors are present, the findings of this research show that groups may begin to cooperate, want to pursue some common goals and interest, and feel equal while respecting each other. They may develop some cross-group friendship while enhanced empathy translates into feeling compassion for the other, and, most importantly, as participants stated, government intervention may also be crucial (institutional support) to accompany the peace process and make the population accept each other. I lay out the major contribution of this research in the conclusion chapter.
Chapter 7
CONCLUSION

7.1 RESEARCH PROJECT

This study sought to understand challenges facing the Banyamulenge and the Bavibafuliru to peacefully coexist in the territory of Uvira, South Kivu Province of DRC. Specifically, I was interested in ascertaining why these two rival ethnic groups have had some forms of contact while also experiencing intergroup empathy, yet struggle to peacefully coexist. It was my intention to test whether intergroup contact and empathy lead to improving positive relations and facilitating peaceful coexistence between groups with a tense history and explore additional factors that contribute to peaceful coexistence.

The study was conducted in Uvira, a DRC border town located approximately 25 km (15 miles) west of Bujumbura, Burundi. My method included interviewing 40 Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru participants. I triangulated by elaborating my analysis with other data from published materials covering the Uvira conflict. These writings have analyzed and documented the historical, political, cultural, local, and national power dynamics influencing the conflicts. For this reason, I used a framework to analyze the role theories that play in the Uvira conflict and how they contribute to the analysis of the main research question. Has intergroup contact improved relations between groups? Does
intergroup empathy lead to improving positive relations between groups with a tense history?

I used the theme analysis method to provide a framework of possible explanations for the causes of struggle for coexistence in Uvira. I also developed a model that combined both positive and negative factors of contact and showed how they were interconnected; this model shows how negative contact leads to negative outcomes of coexistence, while positive contact leads the positive outcomes. The study sought to answer the following questions:

1. What are the necessary conditions that facilitate positive outcomes of contact in the search for building positive intergroup relations?
2. When does intergroup empathy fail to contribute to the improvement of groups' relations?
3. What factors contribute to the process of breaking intergroup social boundaries in order to promote peaceful coexistence?

The researcher's personal experience of having been born and lived in the area where the study took place, along with prior research interest he conducted in this volatile area of the eastern DRC, informed the choice of the case study. Before addressing the main findings, I would like to provide below a survey of how chapters were organized.

Chapter 1 set the stage for addressing the research question, explaining the research purpose, objectives, significance, and scope of the study. The following is how I framed the objectives of the study:
• Examine the role of intergroup contact and empathy in improving relations in communities that have experienced a violent past.

• Analyze the best practices to foster peaceful coexistence among rival groups while bridging the gap in literature on this subject matter.

• Examine the extent to which acceptance of the legitimacy of the other, positive cooperation, interdependence, and common goals can have on improving relations and facilitating intergroup coexistence.

Chapter 2 covered the theoretical framework explaining the role that contact and empathy play in building intergroup relations. To understand the dynamics behind this dichotomy, I explored a variety of other theories, especially factors stated to be positive or negative in fostering coexistence that include legitimacy, power, trust, truth, identity, social boundary, and tolerance, including tools encouraging coexistence such as peace education, education for coexistence, and tolerance. Exploring factors and tools that facilitate and hinder coexistence inspired this research to propose a model that can be used in Uvira to manage the area’s conflicts. The model addresses the gaps found in the existing literature regarding the role contact and empathy play in facilitating coexistence. I later explain what those gaps are.

Chapter 3 described the conflict background for Uvira and discussed what researchers have written on this conflict. I found that it was important to investigate alternative explanations to better clarify the challenges that the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge face in fostering coexistence.
Chapter 4 covered my research methodology, which used the qualitative method of inquiry, employing a case study as an inquiry strategy of the conflicts in the district of Uvira. My methodology used in-depth interviews of selected participants and triangulated with published research on the subject matter. As this research explains the role of intergroup contact and empathy in fostering coexistence, it involved an exploration of the experiences and perceptions of participants to make sense (explain) of their stories.

Chapter 5 covered data analysis; it looked into the research findings and provided readers with the big picture of the overall results. The purpose of the research was to identify problems behind the lack of positive coexistence between the Banyamulenge and the Bavibafuliru in Uvira. I analyzed the role of contact and empathy in the Uvira conflict and considered the role of interdependency and power play in this conflict. Further, I researched what participants thought were better ways to resolving the underlying conflicts in Uvira.

Chapter 6 discussed and analyzed the research findings. I used the findings, theories explored in this research, and the model I created to provide the best explanation of the Uvira conflict, particularly why the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru have faced challenges to peaceful coexistence.

7.2 MAIN RESEARCH FINDINGS
7.2.1 Contact

The research revealed that 95% of the Banyamulenge participants said that contact can have positive effects in building relations between them and the Bavibafuliru. Similarly, 90% of the Bavibafuliru stated that contact can be helpful in improving relations between them and the Banyamulenge. However, both the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge credited contact with positive effect only when they say encounters are 'sincere.' Participants agreed that more contacts may help them accept each other and could lead to more collaboration while tolerating one another.

Participants in the study claimed the current contact that takes place between the Banyamulenge and the Bavibafuliru is bad (poor); 85% of Bavibafuliru stated the encounters between them and the Banyamulenge were bad, while 50% of the Banyamulenge also agreed. These numbers bring a total of 67.5% participants who indicated that interactions are bad in Uvira. Though participants from both groups claimed that more contact can help them improve relations, they also divulged that current interactions between the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge are superficial, ironic, and hypocritical.

7.2.2 Empathy

The findings show that the majority of participants believed empathic feelings expressed by members of both groups had negative effects on improving relations; meaning the expressed empathic feelings do not actually translate into improving relations between the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru. Sixty-five percent of the Banyamulenge stated that
the effects of empathy in building relations was negative. Similarly, 60% of the Bavibafuliru said that the effects of empathy was negative in fostering intergroup relations.

When it comes to the sincerity of the expressed empathic feelings, participants claimed feelings expressed by the Banyamulenge and the Bavibafulitu were ironic and hypocritical. The findings show much less support for empathy; 95% of the Bavibafuliru stated that sentiments expressed by the Banyamulenge toward them were insincere. Similarly, 80% of the Banyamulenge indicated that the feelings expressed by the Bavibafuliru were insincere.

7.2.3 Coexistence

7.2.3.1 Factors leading to negative contact

The participants identified several factors that they said led to negative contact between the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru, including the citizenship issue of the Banyamulenge. Approximately 66.7% of the Bavibafuliru stated that the citizenship issue of the Banyamulenge was a problem for the Uvira conflict, while 33.3% of the Banyamulenge participants also thought so. Participants also cited other factors, including land conflicts, wartime killings, lack of trust among rival members, politics, and grazing rights. About 76.9% of the Bavibafuliru said that the land issue was a concern within the Uvira conflict, while 23.1% of the Banyamulenge agreed. In regards to killings perpetrated during the war, 70% of the Bavibafuliru thought these have contributed to hindering coexistence, while 30% of the Banyamulenge said similarly.
7.2.3.2 Factors leading to positive contact

Participants identified several factors that they said could lead to positive contact between the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru. Among the participants, 45% believed intermarriage (inter-ethnic marriage) could improve relations, 22.5% thought collaboration between members of the two groups could ease tensions, 17.5% said tolerance was essential to sold the conflict, and only 15% stated forgiveness was important. Others indicated that power sharing and government intervention would be needed to facilitate better contact.

Furthermore, when participants were asked what they thought would be a better way to facilitate or encourage coexistence, they cited several other factors, including: educational awareness for peace, acceptance of the other (Banyamulenge), carrying out common intergroup coexistence activities, and encourage government involvement in resolving conflict.

7.2.4 Legitimacy

The findings show that the legitimacy of the citizenship of the Banyamulenge was a serious problem for the neighboring group, Bavibafuliru. The findings show that all Banyamulenge (100%) believe their people are citizens of the DRC. On the contrary, the findings show a different picture from the Bavibafuliru: 55% of the Bavibafuliru said that the Banyamulenge were foreigners, and 45% indicated that the Banyamulenge were Congolese but with a foreign connotation. Despite the fact that 45% of Bavibafuliru said
that the Banyamulenge were Congolese, they were still convinced that the Banyamulenge were from Rwanda. Such sentiments mean the Bavibafuliru only accept that the Banyamuelenge are Congolese because the constitution granted them citizenship, but in truth, they view them as Rwandans.

The findings also show that there is a clear distinction between acceptance of the Banyamulenge as citizens of the Congolese nation rather than acceptance of them as legitimate members of the local society. Though some Bavibafuliru admitted that the Banyamuelenge were citizens of the DRC because the constitution has granted them citizenship, they were uncomfortable accepting the Banyamulenge as members of the Uvira society, given that they view the group as occupiers of their land and purely foreigners on the basis of land issues.

### 7.2.5 Power

The findings show that 90% of the Banyamulenge did not think that their participation in politics could increase tensions in Uvira. Further, 65% of the Bavibafuliru stated that allowing Banyamulenge to participate in politics would not increase tensions. Therefore, 75.5% of the total participants did not link the participation of the Banyamulenge in politics to tensions in Uvira, compared to 22.5% who did think their involvement in politics was a concern. However, despite the fact that more than 50% of the Bavibafuliru also indicated that the participation of the Banyamulenge in politics would not lead the two groups to take up arms against one another, they were more concerned that the political power that Banyamulenge possess was illegitimate. They charged that
Banyamulenge got access to power through the use of force, this leading the Bavibafuliru participants to question the legitimacy of the Banyamulenge's political power.

7.2.6 Interdependency

The findings show that 100% of Banyamulenge stated that if they and the Bavibafuliru depend on one another, they will likely begin to ameliorate their relations. Further, 70% of the Bavibafuliru acknowledged that interdependency can increase relations between them and Banyamulenge. This means 85% of all participants agreed that if members of the groups depended on one another, their relationship could improve. Participants said that interdependency can encourage people to seek common interests, work together, consolidate mutual respect, engage in commercial exchanges, maintain extended contact, and develop friendship.

7.2.7 Significance of the findings

The purpose of the study was to determine factors and mechanisms that can facilitate peaceful coexistence in violent conflict settings. The Uvira case provides some answers to this question; it shows that a conflict can be transformed from being negative and heavy to becoming positive and light. Research revealed positive factors such as trust, forgiveness, power balance, legitimacy of the other, or common in-group identity that can create an atmosphere conducive to positive contact and coexistence outcomes. However, these factors are interconnected, so addressing one factor while leaving the others intact would not necessarily achieve the goal of improving relations. The salient ingroup
identity and unsettled power balance contribute to the lack of trust that solidify social boundaries between two groups and decrease acceptance of legitimacy of the other and willingness for forgiveness. As these factors interact with one another, they must all be pursued simultaneously in order for the model to be effective and efficient in producing desired results. Otherwise, addressing, for instance, the issue of power balance without bringing the groups to trust or forgive one another may partially resolve some issues; however, while the conflict could diminish in intensity, some of the dynamics could likely remain unresolved, protracting the conflict to an indefinite length.

To articulate the importance of interconnectivity of these factors, I must illustrate some specifics about the process I undertook in creating the model. The model went through several phases and modifications, especially after discovering the findings of my research. The final model resulted in a completely different product from the original version.

In the original model I created before extensive research, I sought to integrate factors that may impede coexistence, such as illegitimacy of the other, lack of trust, social boundaries, power imbalance and emotional, cognitive and motivational factors with other factors that contribute or lead to coexistence such as legitimacy of the other, constructive engagement and cooperation, promotion of interdependence and common/shared identity. This model also listed intergroup contact and intergroup empathy as less positive mediators (not enough) for improving intergroup relations. For this reason, the model framed that negative factors, intergroup contact, and empathy were unlikely to facilitate intergroup relations. However, I credited the positive factors of the
model as the ones likely to lead to improvement of intergroup relations. I developed the original model working with my research assumptions and preliminary scholarly literature on coexistence. As such, I initially thought connecting impediments and positive contributors for coexistence will be beneficial to providing a model that could be used to manage the conflict in communities of Uvira and help them improve their relations.

Conversely, the version of the final model that was informed by the research findings took a different approach. First, I learned the notion of positive contact versus negative contact. In the original model, I made the assumption that all forms of contact were likely going to have less impact on improving intergroup relations. This supposition was misinformed and did not change until I found literature that provided different accounts on contact. Also, I relied on the research findings, which, according to participants' accounts, indicated that sincere (not hypocritical) contact could lead to improvement of relations between the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuriru. Second, the original model also stipulated that intergroup empathy was possibly going to have less impact in improving intergroup relations. The model was also modified for this mediator when the research findings pointed that sincere empathy - that is, non-ironic and non-hypocritical empathy - could lead to improving relations between the Banyamulenge and the Bavibafuriru. The participants' accounts on intergroup empathy were backed by further works I found that stated enhanced empathy could actually facilitate intergroup relations.
Based on these discoveries from research and written sources, I developed a model that showed how negative factors of contact, such as impermeable boundaries, absence of trust, stereotyped other, and intergroup prejudice, could create a negative atmosphere that may lead groups to engage in unwanted contact. These negative factors could also lead to superficial contact, and groups may develop intergroup anxiety while making their collective threat salient in such a way that this atmosphere leads to negative contact, ultimately leading to negative outcomes of intergroup coexistence. To remediate this situation, the presence of positive factors of contact would then be needed to offset the previous negative factors. In the new model, positive factors included groups’ interdependence and common in-group identity, legitimacy, power balance, and forgiveness. The model stipulated that the presence of these positive factors of contact would create an atmosphere that could lead groups to have a high degree of cooperation, enhanced intergroup empathy, common goals, cross-group friendship, and a sense of equality. With these changes, perspective-taking accounts could begin to make sense for the other and government support/institutional support could then begin to be accepted by all parties.

The transformation from the original to the final model was a gradual development that took into consideration the specificities of the Uvira conflicts. As this model was developed to meet the needs to address the Uvira conflict specifically, it cannot be generalized. However, if modified based on other needs, it can prove helpful in other places where the issue of intergroup coexistence stalls.
7.3 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS: GAPS IN EXISTING LITERATURE

Research on the eastern DRC conflict has provided multiple explanations about the causes of the Uvira conflict. Scholars and writers have indicated that the conflict has been driven by several factors, including land disputes, the search for political power, economic competition, bad governance, and the issue of citizenship of the Banyamulenge. First, this research provided further information to provide an alternative explanation as to why the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuriru have been unable to peacefully coexist in the Uvira territory. While all factors identified as influencing conflict in Uvira have been widely evidenced by researchers, there has been little research to date focusing on the concept of legitimacy to understand further the reasons behind the struggle of coexistence.

While many researchers have highlighted the issue of the contested Banyamulenge citizenship to be one of the causes of the conflict in Uvira, they have not been able to explore the concept of legitimacy of the other, as this research did, to understand the different dynamics surrounding the citizenship issue of the Banyamulenge. Most existing research on coexistence, especially for the eastern DRC, has focused on exploring issues that promote social harmony or people living peacefully side by side as a way to foster coexistence. As this research has shown, a clear distinction must be made between acceptance of the Banyamulenge as citizens of the Congolese (DRC) nation versus their general acceptance as legitimate members of the local society of Uvira or Kivu Province. Most researchers have focused on the first concept, which
limits attention to the nationality issue rather than paying attention to whether people see the nationality of the Banyamulenge or their access to power as legitimate.

Second, no current studies have explored the contact hypothesis or intergroup empathy theory in the Uvira conflict situation. Most studies have looked at the eastern DRC as a whole and not specifically Uvira. This research is one of a kind that devoted energy to explore the contact and empathy theories just for the case of Uvira looking into the conflict between the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru. My research addresses the gaps found in existing literature on providing an explanation as to why intergroup contact or empathy alone could be insufficient to predict improvement in intergroup relations. The Uvira case clearly contrasts evidence from existing literature that links intergroup contact and empathy with positive intergroup relations. It suggests that, on top of encouraging positive contact to take place, other factors, such as groups' interdependency, creation of common in-group identity, legitimacy of the other, power balance, tolerance, and forgiveness must be considered in the search for improvement of intergroup relations. The research indicated that if these are achieved, groups may begin to cooperate, establish common goals for the future, create cross-group friendships, achieve enhanced empathy, and perhaps gain the support of the government.

7.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Uvira can be regarded as a sensitive area, given what has transpired between rival communities over years of intergroup conflict. I had originally envisioned using observation as one of the triangulation methods for gathering data, as I wanted to
personally observe how the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru interacted with one another to evaluate the types of contact in which they engage. I was also expecting such research to truly understand first-hand the expressed empathic feelings between the two groups. However, due to circumstances beyond my control, I could not travel to Uvira, but rather carried out the interviews through phone calls and webcam application Skype. The limitations seen on the entry mode (phone and Skype interviews) did not allow me to get a good sense of the subjects' interactions. However, I do believe responses by participants were satisfactory and provided me with the clear picture of the types of contact and empathy taking place in Uvira, despite my lack of personal observation.

The Uvira conflict has its specificity that sets it apart from other similar situations; the conflict dynamics there are unique to the city. Enmity and rivalries between the Banyamulenge and the Bavibafuliru had drawn the groups into violent confrontation. Intergroup killings, territorial disputes, and the citizenship crisis are among such specificities. For this reason, the findings of the Uvira conflict that informed the model I created could not be automatically applied to other regions of the DRC or other countries. Cases are always unique to some degree; though a type of conflict could have some similarities with other types of situations, there are often at least some differences in the conflict dynamics. Therefore, my findings and the model I created could not be generalized into an overarching resource. However, they can serve as repertoire for future research on specific cases.
7.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE

The findings of this study prove to have some implications for the work that practitioners carry out in Uvira or eastern DRC in general. This remains true whether one is talking about analyzing or trying to resolve the underlying issues of the Uvira conflict.

7.5.1 Analysis

This study found that there is a clear distinction between acceptance of the Banyamulenge as citizens of the Congolese nation versus acceptance of them as legitimate members of the society. Most practitioners advocating for a resolution of the Banyamulenge citizenship have focused on the first concept, granting citizenship to the Banyamulenge. The second concept that this research has found should be beneficial to practitioners as they work on helping the two groups build relations. This new nuance in the conflict dynamics must be an additional insight helping practitioners separate issues at national and local levels as they formulate intervention strategies.

The findings of this research should also give practitioners more insight on the role that contact and empathy plays in building relations. These discoveries should give researchers and practitioners alike reasons to reconsider before they advocate for intergroup contact or empathy as the way to building relations. As this research exposes the difficulty of intergroup contact and empathy in fostering coexistence, this should allow practitioners to consider alternatives and other intervention strategies. Borrowing the analysis from this research would thus be useful in advocating for exploring whether
interdependency between the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru is a better strategy to facilitate the building of relations, along with the creation of common in-group identity.

### 7.5.2 Conflict resolution

The contact model I developed should be tested by practitioners and other researchers in their work in Uvira. The specifics that the model provides on negative and positive contact are useful and must be explored, as this research found the varying forms of contact led to different intergroup coexistence outcomes. People involved in peace work in Uvira will need to have a better understanding of these types of contact to better fully understand the situation; they also need to understand the heightened difficulty the issue of citizenship of the Banyamulenge and their legitimacy pose. Despite the fact that some Bavibafuliru have denounced the citizenship of the Banyamulenge, they also do not recognize the legitimacy of the power of the Banyamulenge in the territory of Uvira; as such, interventions should help enhance the process of legitimization of the other and challenge existing perceptions of power.

### 7.6 Future Research Directions

Contact has been regarded as a mediator to building intergroup relations; however, as other studies have shown, including in Uvira, contact between groups may be superficial, unwanted, or caustic. Future research, especially in post-violent conflict situations, must focus on finding mechanisms needed to diffuse superficial or unwanted contact between groups. Though this research provided some clues on what it may take to create a positive
atmosphere for interaction, more studies are needed to understand what may actually motivate groups to find incentives to shift from being uncooperative to cooperative. In other terms, under what conditions will in-group members find acceptable the guarantees from outgroup members in order to shift directions and engage in cooperative peaceful resolution of underlying issues?

Furthermore, this research found that it may only take enhanced intergroup empathy to have positive contact effects and build intergroup relations (Pettigrew et al. 2011, 275). However, the way in which to establish enhanced intergroup empathy in post-violent conflict situations or open conflicts remains unknown to researchers. Therefore, future studies in Uvira, other parts of the eastern DRC, and other places where this topic is relevant should closely study conditions needed to enhance empathy in post-conflict circumstances or situation of open conflict. Such investigations may require some rigor, since, as we learned from the Uvira case, expressed intergroup empathic feelings may be caustic or insincere.

### 7.7 RESEARCHER'S REFLECTION ON THE UVIRA CONFLICT

Having been born in the locality of Kiliba, Uvira territory -where this study took place- I experienced the conflict between the Banyamulenge and Bavibafuliru first hand both during peace and war times. Animosities have developed throughout the years that have pit communities in this part of eastern DRC against each other. At time, I wondered many years ago whether there will ever be a way out of this longstanding conflict that has put
suffering in the lives of many people of Uvira. Some people lost their loved ones; others lost their belongings and property as a direct result of the conflict. More people continue to see an uncertain future in front of them as the conflict persists and continues to destroy the social fabric. As participants of this research indicated, the killings that took place between these groups, the mistrust that has cemented the hearts of many, the name calling -whether it about dehumanizing or delegitimizing the other- have made some people in the area to lose hope that peace is possible to achieve. I was among those who were left with puzzles as to why members of these communities have been struggling to address their differences to once again live peacefully with one another and leave their past behind them. Today, I can say that I have put these worries behind me as I believe that a true and durable peace can be achieved if people work together to confront the challenges they face on multiple fronts to end their conflict.

The previously unanswered questions about the inability to find peace in Uvira or eastern DRC as a whole, were my real motivations to pursue my graduate studies in conflict analysis and resolution. I am glad I chose this path as I found that the rigor of training I received from the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, equipped me with the knowledge needed to carry out cutting edge research understanding causes of violent conflicts and finding strategies to sustain durable peace. It is in this angle that I am happy to share my take away (lesson learned) from this investigation, and my reflection on the ongoing conflict, providing some strategies that can be utilized to manage the Uvira conflict.
Lesson 1: Don't expect others to resolve your problems; you must be the first agent for change. No one should be more interested in finding a resolution to the Uvira conflict than the people of Uvira themselves. This research clearly showed that the Uvira conflict can find a peaceful resolution if the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge show some commitments to address their differences. The third party outsider - that I refer as others - can be instrumental in facilitating better understanding of the processes to achieve peace, but the decision to actually seek peace is the responsibility of both the Bavibafuliru and Banyamulenge. No matter how much others are engaged to help you, the communities of Uvira must take the first step to engage each other in talks. They must understand that their contribution is necessary to achieve peace. Showing commitments that you are 100 percent in the game, may motivate members of the other group to reciprocate and commit more efforts as well. This means, commitments must be seen from both sides, but must be accompanied by some implementation mechanisms by establishing a joint committee to monitor progress toward peace and bring parties back on track if violations occur.

Lesson 2: Don't be discouraged by the negativity and events that may seem deceptive or otherwise heartbroken; keep pushing hard. There is no easy road or solution to get to peace; finding peace demands resiliency, especially in places like Uvira where the conflict dynamics demonstrate specificities that are uncommon. This investigation found that the uncertain status of the Banyamuelenge (their citizenship issue) is viewed as a major challenge toward achieving peaceful coexistence in Uvira. Other tribes, including the Bavibafuliru have had difficulties to accept the legitimacy of the Banyamulenge,
especially given the historical perspectives that each group expresses about the other.

However, in order for peace to take place in these communities, the impermeable citizenship boundary must be teared down. Members of these communities must come to the realization that they are destined to live together. For this reason, they must either choose to live peacefully or face interminable protracted conflict. I would rather choose peace for the sake of bettering society and limit the damage that the conflict has caused so far. For this reason, these communities must all learn to tolerate one another, accept one another and forgive the other by putting their dark past behind them. They must stop using violence killing one another; the killings continue to exacerbate tensions among the communities and hinder their ability to forgive one another. There is a better way to address the group's differences, that's engaging in positive intercommunity dialogue.

**Lesson 3**: Don't just try to solve immediate problems, but rather look for long-term solutions. Finding durable peace must be the primary goal for these communities if they need to see positive outcomes to end or manage the ongoing conflict. Mistrust and enmity seen between members of these communities must be addressed. Achieving intergroup trust requires paying special attention to each other. If members of these groups need to change the behavior of members of the neighboring group, they must first begin by changing their attitude toward the other. This means stopping stereotyping the other, refrain from using name calling and avoid dehumanizing the other but rather treat members of the other group as human beings the same way you would like to be treated. Doing this may help reduce the anxiety that each group may be feeling about the other.
Participants in the study stated that members of each community don't like to share with members of the other community. This behavior could be the result of the superficial contacts seen among the groups. Members of these groups don't need to fear each other but rather they must try to get to know the other better while being open to engage in fruitful conversation. They must treat each other as equal partners in the search for peace; this may allow some forms of cooperation to develop and that may lead to long-term friendship. They must rely on one another, be there for the other when the other needs help, be compassionate, and must resist bigotry and bad influence from those pushing them toward conflict.

**Lesson 4**: Elites in Kinshasa and at the local level must cease to use the eastern Uvira conflict as a political tool to manipulate supporters for votes; they must instead be part of the solution. Instead of preaching hatred to their constituency, they must preach peace and call upon communities to work together to address their underlying problems while rejecting violence. Members of the two communities must realize that they have the power to change the behavior of those politicians who have the intention to use them to achieve their political agenda regardless of whether their actions are detrimental to the communities. Communities must challenge dishonest politicians by seeking to embrace the path for intercommunity dialogue and shame those who want them to engage in violence against one another.

**Lesson 5**: These communities must never go back to the past; they should fight the temptation of inside or outside force that can be pushing them to doubt their own decision
to embark on a peace journey. In all conflicts, spoilers always try to derail the peace process by either interjecting their own agenda that may be against peace. The Uvira conflict has experienced the spoiler phenomenon both foreign and domestic. It is no secret that Rwanda has been cited in the past for interfering in the eastern DRC conflict, and the Banyamulenge have in particular been accused of strengthening ties with Kigali. On the other end, the Bavibafuliru have been distracted by politicians and influential diaspora community who encourage them to reject peaceful resolutions to the conflict. These communities must disassociate themselves from these internal and external force in order to preserve peace. They must know that violence never resolve any problem, but rather destroys lives and the future. If you need peace and change, you must act to make that change; otherwise, peace and change will never take place.

I hope the findings of this research will give more insight for future researchers on the issue of intergroup coexistence, especially in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. While intergroup coexistence has been studied in this region, especially in countries like Burundi and Rwanda, little progress has been made to comprehend some of the complex issues hindering the process of building intergroup relations. It is my hope that readers, especially peacebuilders, will find these discoveries inspiring for their own work in the field.
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CURRICULUM VITAE

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At the time Bernard received his Ph.D., he served as an Intelligence Manager for Africa at iJET International, a leading risk assessment and management firm based in Annapolis, Maryland. Prior to that, he was an intelligence Analyst on the Africa desk with the same organization. He covers many of Africa subject matters; his main responsibilities include monitoring operational threats and early warming indicators while publishing intelligence of incidents such as terrorism, civil unrest, crime and kidnapping, conflict and geopolitical developments. Before joining iJET, Bernard was a staff intern at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Africa Program (Washington DC). Bernard interned at the American Embassy public Affairs Section, Harare Zimbabwe (2004-2005) where he was selected to join the Unites States Student Achievers Program (USAP) to study in the US. He obtained his advanced Diploma in Computer Science and Business Studies from the Association of Computer Professionals, London (The school was based in Harare, Zimbabwe). He also received his Business Marketing and Public Relations Certification from the London Chamber of Commerce Institute.