

NARRATING NEGATIVE PEACE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF INTELLIGENCE  
SUPPORT TO THE DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT

by

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A Dissertation  
Submitted to the  
Graduate Faculty  
of  
George Mason University  
in Partial Fulfillment of  
The Requirements for the Degree  
of  
Doctor of Philosophy  
Conflict Analysis and Resolution

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Fall Semester 2017  
George Mason University  
Fairfax, VA

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Peace Agreement

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## **DEDICATION**

This is dedicated to my family, especially Doug my tech guru, and my favorite distractions, Liam and Quinn.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

I would like to thank the many friends, relatives, and supporters who have made this happen. Special thanks to my KPW neighbors, George Mason University, the library, the faculty and staff of the School of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, my committee – Dr. Sara Cobb, Dr. Richard Rubenstein, and Dr. Andrew Bickford, and to a departed advisor who left me with great advice: “Fall in love with the research.” – Wallace Warfield.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Bosnia and Herzegovina .....	BiH
Bosnia Task Force.....	BTF
Bosnian Serb Army.....	BSA
Courses of Action .....	COA
Dayton Peace Agreement.....	DPA
Defense Intelligence Agency .....	DIA
Deputies' Committee .....	DC
Implementation Force .....	IFOR
International Conference of Former Yugoslavia .....	ICFY
National Imagery and Mapping Agency.....	NIMA
National Intelligence Council .....	NIC
National Intelligence Estimate.....	NIE
National Intelligence Officer .....	NIO
National Security Agency.....	NSA
National Security Council.....	NSC
Principals' Committee .....	PC
Republika Srpska .....	RS
Stabilization Force .....	SFOR
Weapons of Mass Destruction .....	WMD

## ABSTRACT

### NARRATING NEGATIVE PEACE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT

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George Mason University, 2017

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This study applies methods from narrative analysis to declassified intelligence documents regarding the Bosnian War of the 1990s and the Dayton Peace Agreement. An examination of themes, characters and plots demonstrated construction of four narratives about the Balkans in intelligence analysis of the conflict: Perpetual Conflict, Muslim Victimhood, Lawlessness, and Fanaticism. Narratives of difference generated an understanding of the Balkan Other resulting in a necessarily coercive approach to peacemaking. Characterizations of the conflict suggested an Orientalist perspective in analysis which may have foreshadowed a neo-Orientalist security paradigm in the post-Cold War era. Additionally, Wild West imagery in the data was suggestive of a *New Frontierism* in the justification of an expeditionary project for the United States in Bosnia.

## CHAPTER ONE: NARRATING NEGATIVE PEACE

The academic field of conflict resolution is divided on whether traditional nation–state negotiations and resulting treaties such as the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement are, in fact, “conflict resolution” in practice. Negotiation as a competitive process supports zero–sum outcomes and negative peace, and in the process, can institutionalize structural violence within societies. It is essentially coercive, most often backed by the threat of military action or economic sanction. Yet, negotiation is the conventional process for ending war. Despite their problems, peace treaty archetypes, such as Westphalia and Versailles embody the Western image of what peace making is supposed to be – a shrewdly negotiated formal agreement between elites to cease hostilities, induced through mutually hurting stalemate and the perpetual threat of violence.

In the case of Bosnia in the early 1990s, a U.S.-led coalition intervened with economic sanctions, airstrikes and shuttle diplomacy culminating in the negotiations at Dayton, Ohio in 1995. In his memoir, chief American negotiator Richard Holbrooke noted “The shape of the diplomatic landscape will usually reflect the actual balance of forces on the ground. In concrete terms, this meant that as diplomats we could not expect the Serbs to be conciliatory at the negotiating table as long as they had experienced

nothing but success on the battlefield.”<sup>1</sup> At best, this experience indicated negotiations are powerless to de-escalate conflict. At worst, it was suggestive of policy that increases military power of the weaker side escalating conflict. In this way, the negotiation process itself can contribute to the spiral<sup>2</sup> of violent conflict.

Since the 1990s, the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) has become an archetype<sup>3</sup> for U.S. intervention in modern conflict. Dayton got to “yes” and ever since has held as the model for solving intractable conflict. The DPA guaranteed constitutional equality of Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs and established the political boundaries of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), incorporating the Republika Srpska. According to Loizedes, “the property rights of the displaced are clearly entrenched in Dayton and universally enforced across the republic through direct involvement of the international community,” and though regionally uneven, the effort to reverse ethnic cleansing has been “relatively successful.”<sup>4</sup> Most importantly, the DPA contained the growing genocide of the Bosniaks. Dayton is the new Versailles. The Dayton analogy is referenced “as a potential

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<sup>1</sup> Richard C Holbrooke, *To End a War* (New York: Modern Library, 1999), 73.

<sup>2</sup> Dean Pruitt, Jeffrey Rubin, and Sung Hee Kim, *Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement*, 3 edition (Boston: McGraw-Hill Humanities/Social Sciences/Languages, 2003), 92.

<sup>3</sup> Neophytos Loizedes, *Designing Peace: Cyprus and Institutional Innovations in Divided Societies* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 118.

<sup>4</sup> Loizedes, 181.

model by Western politicians and pundits for various conflicts and sectarian violence around the globe, most recently for Syria, Ukraine and Iraq.”<sup>5</sup>

However, in the two decades since the negotiated settlement, Bosnia has failed to transition its negative peace into a positive one. According to Clark, “there is no reconciliation in present-day BiH. There is only negative peace – an absence of conflict.”<sup>6</sup> Corruption, poverty and social injustice are also the legacy of Dayton. The consociational power sharing elements of the DPA institutionalized divisions between identity groups, each with their own constitution and military. The Office of the High Representative continues to work “towards the point where Bosnia and Herzegovina is able to take full responsibility for its own affairs” (Office of the High Representative 2015). This suggests that twenty years on, effective self-governance in BiH remains elusive. Exacerbated by economic dependency and government gridlock, the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina are trapped in what Kemp called a frozen conflict.<sup>7</sup> In her research on Bosnian reconciliation, Clark recommended the replacement of the DPA with “a constitutional structure that encourages interethnic contact rather than separation.”<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Andrew Gilbert and Jasmin Mujanović, “Dayton at Twenty: Towards New Politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 15, no. 4 (October 2, 2015): 605, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2015.1130359>.

<sup>6</sup> Janine Natalya Clark, “From Negative to Positive Peace: The Case of Bosnia and Hercegovina,” *Journal of Human Rights* 8, no. 4 (November 17, 2009): 360, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14754830903332434>.

<sup>7</sup> Walter A. Kemp, “The Business of Ethnic Conflict,” *Security Dialogue* 35, no. 1 (March 1, 2004): 43–59, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010604042535>.

<sup>8</sup> Clark, “From Negative to Positive Peace,” 360.

Despite this critique, the current cohort of policy making elites, which Ambassador Samantha Power has dubbed the “Bosnia generation,”<sup>9</sup> continues to recommend the Dayton model for other conflict zones – a process of equalizing military power, coercive diplomacy, and negotiation. The fact that “Dayton” has entered our political lexicon as a simplistic short hand for successful peacemaking is highly problematic. It is imperative that we gain a deeper understanding of this historic case and the policy considerations that created Dayton, especially their shortcomings. Failure to do so will result in the continuing application of ruinous conflict interventions at the highest levels.

The recent U.S. Government declassification of intelligence documents concerning the Bosnian War and peace process provides a rare opportunity for rigorous scholarship on national decision making and conflict intervention. The *Bosnia, Intelligence, and the Clinton Presidency* collection of some 343 Balkans Task Force (BTF) documents includes intelligence reporting and estimates, minutes from National Security Council Principals and Deputies Committee meetings, and various intelligence and policy memoranda pertaining to the Bosnian conflict. These documents are the official record of the American perspective on the war. They chronicle military, economic, political and humanitarian developments in the Balkans as well as U.S. policy considerations and diplomatic initiatives.

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<sup>9</sup> Dejan Guzina and Branka Marijan, “Dayton +20: Beyond ‘Lessons Learned,’” *Peacebuilding* 5, no. 1 (January 2, 2017): 2, <https://doi.org/10.1080/21647259.2016.1264916>.

The case of intelligence support to the Bosnian peace process is particularly interesting as it highlights the challenges of a threat oriented intelligence apparatus applying its knowledge-power to conflict resolution. The type of analysis needed to support collaborative peace process is different from conventional international relations and intelligence. The threat-orientation of intelligence makes it better suited to waging war than peace. The obstacles to intelligence support of positive peacemaking in Bosnia were several and at least in part a product of intelligence institutions, tradecraft, and a highly stylized genre of writing with formal and informal discursive limits. This discourse privileges divisions over commonalities, positions over interests,<sup>10</sup> and threats over opportunities.

There are a few peculiarities to intelligence analysis that are problematic for resolving conflict. The first is the intelligence analyst's sole reliance on *facts* as empiric evidence of reality and approximate truth. The exclusion of constructionist perspectives ignores the complex roles of identity and narratives in conflict. The resulting assessments are often focused on quantifying military capabilities, economic indicators, and the status of categorical ethnic groups.

Second, the sole focus of analysis is on characterizations of the Other without consideration for the role of Self in conflict systems. Self-scrutiny is taboo in

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<sup>10</sup> *Interests* in international relations theory refer to a policy position which will grant a strategic advantage, nation-states act according to their interests. The term for conflict resolution practitioners refers to underlying human needs that need to be satisfied such as security and identity. The manifest strategy to satisfy the needs is known as *positions*.

intelligence, referred to as “politicization.”<sup>11</sup> Intelligence practitioners and scholars have struggled with this issue and the ethos of the intelligence-policy divide.

Thirdly, because intelligence has a mandate to warn the U.S. Government of global dangers, analysis is infused with a pessimism which privileges threats over opportunities. There is a “tendency of analysts to focus on worst-case scenarios, especially in the wake of the Intelligence Community being blamed for not having predicted some event or particular crisis... analysts are less likely to be criticized for producing a pessimistic appraisal than for failing to signal a crisis.”<sup>12</sup>

Of course the history of intelligence is one of warfighting, intended to support combatant commanders on the battlefield. U.S. Army intelligence doctrine<sup>13</sup> describes development of enemy Courses of Action (COAs), in which “most likely” and “most dangerous” threat activities are projected. Not only tactical, strategic intelligence uses scenario development as a Structured Analytic Technique (SAT)<sup>14</sup> of intelligence tradecraft, designed to bring rigor and integrity to analysis. The worst-case predictions of

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<sup>11</sup> Robert M. Gates, “A Message to Analysts: Guarding Against Politicization” (CIA, March 16, 1992), <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/volume-36-number-1/pdf/v36i1a01p.pdf>.

<sup>12</sup> Douglas J. MacEachin, *The Tradecraft of Analysis: Challenge and Change in the CIA* (Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 1994), 35.

<sup>13</sup> U.S. Army, “FM 34-130 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield,” July 8, 1994, <http://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm34-130.pdf>.

<sup>14</sup> Richards J. Heuer Jr. and Randolph H. Pherson, *Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis*, Spring (CQ Press College, 2010).

such “anticipatory intelligence”<sup>15</sup> attribute negative intent to all Others. Policymakers using intelligence are compelled to proactively guard against threat prophecies, often aggressively. In this way, intelligence warning can promote “ironic processes” or interactional cycles where “the very efforts that persons make to solve the problem and reduce the conflict actually anchor and perpetuate the conflict.”<sup>16</sup> This study will examine the American intelligence and policy analysis of the Bosnian conflict. Within the declassified documents are indications of how participants made sense of the conflict and what they believed their policy options were. As a whole, the analysis contained in the documents clearly supports a conventional approach to diplomacy – and coercive diplomacy – in the Realpolitik tradition.

Conflict resolution as a field of practice and theory was established in response to this tradition. John Burton, a parent of the conflict resolution field left his career in diplomacy with the Australian government to develop alternatives to traditional nation-state negotiation. His problem-solving workshops were structured to produce collaborative analysis and dialogue in unofficial channels with the goal of satisfying “basic human needs:”

The relationship between unsatisfied basic needs and human conflict in a recent discovery made primarily by sociologists studying deviant behavior, but also by some lawyers, counselors and others concerned with relations between the individual and society. It is an important discovery.

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<sup>15</sup> Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America,” 2014, [http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/2014\\_NIS\\_Publication.pdf](http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/2014_NIS_Publication.pdf).

<sup>16</sup> Sara Cobb, “Developmental Approach to Turning Points: Irony as an Ethics for Negotiation Pragmatics, A,” *Harvard Negotiation Law Review* 11 (2006): 152.

It undermines the basic assumptions in Western political philosophy that the individual, while aggressive or scarcity-ridden, can be socialized into behaviors required by elite norms, and that the social self is the only self which is important. It undermines, therefore, the notion of law and order as traditionally conceived. It suggests that deep-rooted conflict cannot be dealt with by conventional mediation, arbitration, and other implicitly coercive and nonanalytical processes.<sup>17</sup>

According to Burton, basic human needs such as security, identity, recognition, and development are not negotiable.<sup>18</sup> Yet the Westphalian Realpolitik system of international relations leverages these needs as commodities to be traded in power-based negotiations. During the Bosnian war of the early 1990s, the Bosnian-Serb mutual recognition package<sup>19</sup> was an example of such a need used as a bargaining chip in negotiation. In this case, recognition was traded for sanctions relief.

Conflict resolution theorist Richard Rubenstein, wrote that traditional process of peacemaking, which requires coercive “threats, promises and bargaining strategies”<sup>20</sup> from a position of strength, can actually exacerbate conflict. Further, “...power-based settlements rarely lead in the direction of the sort of social and cultural rebuilding that is

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<sup>17</sup> Burton, *Conflict Resolution as a Political System* (Arlington, Va: George Mason University, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, 1988), 14.

<sup>18</sup> Burton, 13.

<sup>19</sup> Chris Hill, “Diplomatic Cable: Milosevic on Bosnia Recognition” (CIA Historical Collections Division, April 12, 1995), C05960216, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>20</sup> Richard E. Rubenstein, *Reasons to Kill: Why Americans Choose War* (Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2010), 163, <https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=iL2qLkERg-gC&printsec=frontcover&pg=GBS.PR3>.

needed to permit bitterly opposed parties to reconcile and move toward positive peace.”<sup>21</sup> According to Rubenstein, what Richard Holbrooke and others at Dayton referred to as *conflict resolution*, is really *conflict settlement*.

Conflicts can be *settled* temporarily by victory on the battlefield, credible threats to use force, or power-based negotiations. But they can be *resolved* only when their causes have been identified and eliminated. For this reason, the relationship between conflict resolution and power politics is problematic and complex.<sup>22</sup>

Conflict *settlement*, the result of power-based negotiations, creates a *negative peace*<sup>23</sup> in which structural violence is present without physical violence. Violence which may be physical or psychological, intended or unintended, and direct or structural “is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations.”<sup>24</sup> Social injustice (latent conflict) needs only a triggering event to manifest in physical violence. Unequal access to health care, literacy, and economic opportunity are common examples. Bosnia’s current structural violence is indeed characterized by the unequal distribution of resources

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<sup>21</sup> Rubenstein, 163.

<sup>22</sup> Richard E. Rubenstein, *Conflict Resolution and Power Politics : Global Conflict after the Cold War : Two Lectures* (Fairfax, VA: Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, 1996), 2, [http://scar.gmu.edu/wp\\_10\\_rubenstein.pdf](http://scar.gmu.edu/wp_10_rubenstein.pdf).

<sup>23</sup> Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” *Journal of Peace Research* 6, no. 3 (January 1, 1969): 1.

<sup>24</sup> Galtung, 169.

between people, and “above all the power to decide over the distribution of resources is unevenly distributed.”<sup>25</sup>

Embedded in the negotiation process are assumptions of a “preference for conflict on the part of those involved;”<sup>26</sup> that solutions must be imposed from third parties; and “that rational people will be deterred from misbehavior by the application of sufficient force.”<sup>27</sup> However, coercion tends to elicit the opposite response: “Conflict analysts have discovered that when people's basic human needs remain unsatisfied, coercive force has little deterrent effect. People will continue to behave in ways that may seem to others irrational, antisocial, or even suicidal in order to attempt to satisfy those needs.”<sup>28</sup> Pragmatically and ethically, the conflict resolution critique of traditional Realpolitik nation-state negotiations stems from its purpose to force settlement to the detriment of long-lasting positive peace.

As a war-ending method, negotiations are part of the larger zero-sum security paradigm which still dominates our international system. Articulated in Morgenthau's realist theory of international relations,<sup>29</sup> are principles of “political realism.” In this paradigm, the nation-state is the primary actor, and imperialist states will pursue interests and power over other states. Balance of power is the harbinger of peace, negotiated

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<sup>25</sup> Galtung, 171.

<sup>26</sup> Burton, *Conflict Resolution as a Political System*, 6.

<sup>27</sup> Richard E. Rubenstein, *Conflict Resolution and Power Politics*, 7.

<sup>28</sup> Richard E. Rubenstein, 7.

<sup>29</sup> Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Thompson, and David Clinton, *Politics Among Nations*, 7 edition (Boston: McGraw-Hill Humanities/Social Sciences/Languages, 2005).

through policies of limitation. Dennis Sandole wrote on Realpolitik from a conflict resolution perspective: “realpolitik-based, zero sum/win-lose actions are practical and rational only in the narrow sense of advancing one’s own interests... at the expense of one’s opponent... Such actions are at least amoral, if not totally immoral and unethical.”<sup>30</sup>

In Realpolitik, peacemaking is necessarily coercive, backed by threat and use of force. “A ‘hurting stalemate’ then occurs, recognized as such by the parties on their own or with the assistance of a third party, they may attempt to achieve a compromise... The problem with compromises, however, is that each party has to give something up in order to get anything at all, which may set up the conditions for future conflict.”<sup>31</sup>

The use of coercion to end a war is immoral and short-sighted. But is allowing genocide to occur less immoral? Or does the use of force represent an “inadequacy of theory and process”<sup>32</sup> as Burton suggests? Sandole endeavored to reconcile this problem: “Reprehensible though even a ‘writ small’ rendering of Realpolitik may be to many of us, it is, as part of a larger, Idealpolitik-oriented package, nevertheless compatible with conflict resolution theory and practice.”<sup>33</sup> He wrote on the Organization for Security and

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<sup>30</sup> Dennis J. D. Sandole, *Peace and Security in the Postmodern World: The OSCE and Conflict Resolution* (Routledge, 2007), 62.

<sup>31</sup> Sandole, 75.

<sup>32</sup> Burton, *Conflict Resolution as a Political System*, 6.

<sup>33</sup> Dennis J. D. Sandole, “Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War Era: Dealing with Ethnic Violence in the New Europe” (Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, October 1992), 42, [http://scar.gmu.edu/wp\\_6\\_sandole.pdf](http://scar.gmu.edu/wp_6_sandole.pdf).

Cooperation in Europe: “a complex community of values seems to have been developing in the CSCE/OSCE, at least in the minds of some of its practitioners, with conflict (Realpolitik = negative peace) and cooperation (Idealpolitik = positive peace) coexisting in complex ways on various issues (or positions on issues) within a basically cooperative system...”<sup>34</sup>

This sensibility mirrors the contemporary complexity of a security paradigm in transition. The modern post-Soviet era of warfare, marked by identity conflicts in the Balkans and elsewhere suggest that the “Westphalian system of interstate relations and international law that has prevailed since the end of the barbaric Thirty Years War of 1618–48, is under assault.”<sup>35</sup> Ubiquitous low intensity conflict, Islamic fundamentalist insurgencies, and most recently, devolution movements in Scotland, Catalonia and Crimea suggest that identity may trump nation-state allegiance in much of the world. Technology enabled empowerment of individuals has “democratized” warfighting capabilities to sub-national levels. Nation-state elites no longer have the de facto monopoly on social control. Burton wrote that “Over time... there has been a continuing weakening of authoritative control. Indeed, the appearance of [the field of] conflict resolution signals the decadence of formalistic and coercive rule by elites.”<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Dennis J. D. Sandole, *Peace and Security in the Postmodern World: The OSCE and Conflict Resolution* (Routledge, 2007), 159.

<sup>35</sup> Sandole, *Peace and Security in the Postmodern World*, 2007, 54.

<sup>36</sup> Burton, *Conflict Resolution as a Political System*, 22.

The Balkan conflicts of the 1990s coincided with the wave of communist government collapse in eastern and central Europe. Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost policies in the mid-1980s empowered anti-communist movements in the USSR and beyond, ushering in a period of demonstrations, civil disobedience, and ultimately revolution across the region. Publication of banned books, new freedoms in religious life, and economic, social and electoral reforms created space for intelligentsia and popular critique of authoritarian governments. Additionally, defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan contributed to a lack of confidence in the Soviet regime. Ultimately, a failed hard-liner coup in Moscow resulted in calls for democracy and the overthrow of the Communist Party as a political hegemon.

The rise of global telecommunications and the innovation of the 24-hour news cycle fueled uprisings, raising awareness of government corruption as well as social movement ideas and tactics. In the span of two years, the USSR separated into a Commonwealth of Independent States, Soviet satellites severed their political affiliations with Moscow and Balkan nations within Yugoslavia declared independence. The very policies intended to save communism, not only ushered in its demise, they led to a chain of events which changed political geography and the strategic balance of power permanently.

The war which followed the Bosnian declaration of independence (1992–1995) was not the only violent conflict of that time, but it was certainly the most deadly. At

least 97,207 people were killed including 39,684 civilians.<sup>37</sup> Forced migrations, civilian massacres, and rape were the tactics of “ethnic cleansing,” a military policy designed to maximize Serb land acquisition. Though individuals from all three sides of the conflict (Serb, Croat, and Bosniak) have been convicted of war crimes, CIA estimated that Serbs committed 90%<sup>38</sup> of the atrocities. By 1992, Bosnia had become the “worst killing ground in Europe since World War II.”<sup>39</sup>

Why was the Bosnian conflict so particularly brutal? Two narratives of Balkan history influence academic thinking on this subject.<sup>40</sup> The first is the root of the derogatory meaning of *Balkan*, a characterization of a warlike people who have been fighting for many centuries. A “fascination with the violent ways of primal ‘Balkan’ peoples has a long lineage in a variety of ‘Western’ representations of the region in modern times,” notably Robert Kaplan’s *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History*<sup>41</sup> and Rebecca West’s *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon*.<sup>42</sup> Moreover, the Balkans are

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<sup>37</sup> Government of Norway, “The Bosnian Book of Dead,” Norway, accessed November 9, 2013, [http://www.norveska.ba/News\\_and\\_events/Society-and-Policy/rdc\\_bbd/#.Un5y2FNdApM](http://www.norveska.ba/News_and_events/Society-and-Policy/rdc_bbd/#.Un5y2FNdApM).

<sup>38</sup> DCI Interagency Balkans Task Force, “Intelligence Report Bosnia: Serb Ethnic Cleansing” (Central Intelligence Agency, December 1994), v, C00389760, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>39</sup> Holbrooke, *To End a War*, xix.

<sup>40</sup> Sumantra Bose, *Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention* (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 11.

<sup>41</sup> Bose, 11.

<sup>42</sup> Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 22.

perceived as “a toxin threatening the health of Europe”<sup>43</sup> as “these wretched and unhappy little countries in the Balkan peninsula can, and do, have quarrels that cause world wars.”<sup>44</sup> This narrative may have supported a dismissive view of the Bosnian War as a product of “ancient hatreds,”<sup>45</sup> which cast its people in pejorative terms, violent conflict as inevitable, and intervention as fruitless. Further, “...the Balkans has served as a repository of negative characteristics against which a positive and self-congratulatory image of the ‘European’ and the ‘West’ has been constructed.”<sup>46</sup>

The alternative is a narrative of romanticized harmony,<sup>47</sup> disrupted by exogenous factors. Sarajevo, a model of tolerance and inter-ethnic marriages was decimated by foreign greed. Imported evil destroyed the Old Bridge (Stari Most) at Mostar, symbolically terminating bridges between Bosnia’s people. Noel Malcom’s *Bosnia: A Short History*<sup>48</sup> and Misha Glenny’s *The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers 1804 – 1899* are treatments of history with the victim-of-outsider framings.<sup>49</sup> Of course the history of Balkans *is* one of invasion and occupation (Romans, Slavs, Ottomans, Italians, Greeks, French, Germans, UN, and finally NATO), but the

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<sup>43</sup> Misha Glenny, *The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999* (New York: Penguin Books, 2001), xxiv.

<sup>44</sup> Glenny, xxiii.

<sup>45</sup> Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 22.

<sup>46</sup> Bose, *Bosnia after Dayton*, 12.

<sup>47</sup> Bose, 13.

<sup>48</sup> Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 23.

<sup>49</sup> Bose, *Bosnia after Dayton*, 13.

importance of internal relationships and dynamics should not be ignored. Sources of conflict in the Balkans – as elsewhere – are complex. Yet the primal and harmonious narratives simplified the Bosnian war, shaped perceptions of events and provided justification for specific actions or inaction. In the case of U.S. interventionism, these narratives directly affected policy as this study will show.

The ethnic component to Bosnia's war had a story not unlike the other ethnic conflicts emerging from the communist collapse. Rulers throughout history have employed divide and conquer strategies in imposing new borders. Political boundaries which cut through identity groups were designed to redirect loyalties to the state. Combined with authoritarian restrictions on self-expression, this strategy has proven to work. In the wake of World War II, Tito ruled Yugoslavia for three and a half decades. A common narrative of Yugoslav peace is that Tito stifled ethnic conflict through dogmatic autocracy<sup>50</sup> and a "regime of fear."<sup>51</sup> At his funeral in 1980, he was hailed as "the leader whose wisdom and statesmanship had united Yugoslavia's historically antagonistic national groups in a stable fashion."<sup>52</sup>

The 20<sup>th</sup> century Balkans saw various border relocations in which nations of ethnic groups were disassociated from states. Prior to 1995, the most recent relocation

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<sup>50</sup> Aleksa Djilas, "Tito's Last Secret - How Did He Keep the Yugoslavs Together Review Essay," *Foreign Affairs* 74 (1995): 120.

<sup>51</sup> Charles R. Gallagher, *Vatican Secret Diplomacy: Joseph P. Hurley and Pope Pius XII* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 184.

<sup>52</sup> Djilas, "Tito's Last Secret - How Did He Keep the Yugoslavs Together Review Essay," 116.

began when fascist Italy and Germany placed Bosnia within the Independent State of Croatia in 1941. In cooperation with the Catholic Church,<sup>53</sup> the Ustaše implemented policies to rid the territory of Serbs, Jews, Romanis, and political opposition. Croatian Ustaše leader, Ante Pavelic, “adopted the Croat nationalist theory that regarded the Muslims of BiH as ‘Croats of the Muslim faith.’”<sup>54</sup> “The Decree on the Protection of Aryan Blood and the Honour of the Croat Nation... redefined Croats, who according to all ethnic criteria, were Slavs, as Aryans.”<sup>55</sup> The new Aryan-Croatian identity reinforced the fascist ideology through expanded territory, with assaults on non-allied out-groups, including Slavs.

Indeed, the Ustaše pogroms included tactics so ruthless – “night long orgies of murder”<sup>56</sup> – that the Wehrmacht ordered Croats to lessen their brutality as it was undermining popular support. Meanwhile, Serb communist Partisans (led by Tito) and the loyalist Chetniks entered into civil war. “The Croats alone may have murdered some 655,000 people, the greater majority Serbs. The Tito regime itself killed in cold blood some 500,000 people, mainly ‘collaborators,’ ‘anti-communists,’ rival guerrillas,

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<sup>53</sup> Menachem Shelah, “‘Christian Confrontations with the Holocaust’: The Catholic Church in Croatia, the Vatican and the Murder of the Croatian Jews,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 4, no. 3 (January 1, 1989): 323–39, <https://doi.org/10.1093/hgs/4.3.323>.

<sup>54</sup> Glenny, *The Balkans*, 494.

<sup>55</sup> Glenny, 499.

<sup>56</sup> Glenny, 490.

Ustaše, and critics.”<sup>57</sup> It was thought that memories of World War II horrors would were one of the historic causes for the renewed conflict in the 1990s.

The 1967 language conflict was “first serious dispute between Serbs and Croats in over twenty years.”<sup>58</sup> It was a cultural identity conflict over the assertion of the Serb variant of the language as intellectual standard ignored the cultural history of the Croats. Tito’s ensuing purge of intellectuals included Franjo Tudjman<sup>59</sup> who would later become the first president of an independent Croatia.

Influence from the global civil rights movements of the late 1960s was also felt in Yugoslavia. In 1968, the Bosnian League of Communists finally recognized the Muslims as a “constituent nation of Yugoslavia (as opposed to a minority).”<sup>60</sup> The Muslim populated areas, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Sanjak region divided between Serbia and Montenegro and Kosovo were a legacy of Ottoman rule from 15<sup>th</sup> – 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. The Ottoman reign began with the victory at the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, an event that would become salient in the consciousness of Serbs. In this environment, “politicians soon discovered how easy it was to add to their popularity by appearing to defend national interests.”<sup>61</sup> Despite the perception that Tito fostered a harmonious

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<sup>57</sup> R.J. Rummel, “STATISTICS OF YUGOSLAVIA’S GENOCIDE AND MASS MURDER,” Statistics of Yugoslavia’s Democide: Estimates, Calculations, and Sources, 1997, <http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/SOD.CHAP9.HTM>.

<sup>58</sup> Glenny, *The Balkans*, 585.

<sup>59</sup> Glenny, 586.

<sup>60</sup> Glenny, 586.

<sup>61</sup> Glenny, 587.

coexistence of ethnic groups in Yugoslavia, Glenny wrote that “the true villains of this period were Tito and [Slovenian politician] Kardelj, neither of whom... welcomed reconciliation between Serb and Croats... they were playing off Zagreb against Belgrade, stirring up animosities in order to consolidate their own authority.”<sup>62</sup>

After Tito’s death in 1980, nationalist Serb, Croat, and Muslim rhetoric grew to be a normal part of the political discourse. The 1986 publication of the Serbian Academy of Sciences’ “inflammatory manifesto of Serbian nationalism” claimed that “Serbs of Kosovo faced extermination at the hands of aggressive Albanians” and that this was the biggest threat to Serbs since WWII.<sup>63</sup>

Serb politician, Slobodan Milosevic rose to power during this period. From 1987–1989, he carefully orchestrated “a campaign of nationalist hysteria,”<sup>64</sup> which famously included the “reactivation of the Serbs’ chosen trauma,”<sup>65</sup> the lost battle of Kosovo Polje, 28 June 1389. In 1989, Milosevic rescinded the autonomy of Vojvodina and Kosovo and Montenegro, giving Serbia a majority vote in the Yugoslavia’s Federal Presidency, exacerbating ethnic tensions. Croats, Bosnian Muslims, and Slovenians seeking to consolidate their majority territories resulted in declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, and Bosnia in 1992.

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<sup>62</sup> Glenny, 593.

<sup>63</sup> Glenny, 625.

<sup>64</sup> Glenny, 628.

<sup>65</sup> Vamik D. Volkan, “Transgenerational Transmissions and Chosen Traumas,” August 1998, <http://vamikvolkan.com/Transgenerational-Transmissions-and-Chosen-Traumas.php>.

In the milieu of the 1990s, the Cold War was replaced by nationalism and regional violence. The war in Bosnia which followed the disintegration of Yugoslavia was but one such conflict. From the U.S. perspective, the end of the Cold War was abrupt. The collapse of the bipolar security paradigm required U.S. leaders to rethink the strategic role of the U.S. In “Europe’s backyard,”<sup>66</sup> this conflict attracted the attention of U.S. leadership not only because of the threat to NATO allies, but because of the conflict’s particularly brutal nature. Bosnia was the first test<sup>67</sup> of Europe’s security capacity since World War II.

At a time of unprecedented European collaboration, the Balkans was falling apart. Years of negotiations on European integration, culminated in 1992 with the Maastricht Treaty, which created the European Union. When three European Community and United Nations peace initiatives failed to produce results, the world looked to its World War II savior to resolve the conflict – the United States. Domestic support for U.S. involvement was minimal, though elites knew that successful U.S. intervention in Bosnia could solidify America’s position as the world’s only superpower. It was not until media reports with images of starving concentration camp prisoners and allegations of genocide at Srebrenica surfaced that U.S. intervention in Bosnia gained momentum.

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<sup>66</sup> Holbrooke, *To End a War*.

<sup>67</sup> Ivo H Daalder, *Getting to Dayton: The Making of America’s Bosnia Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), I.

Initially, U.S. Secretary of State Baker's position was that the U.S. had "no dog" in the Bosnia fight.<sup>68</sup> National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft recounted, "The President would say to me once a week 'Tell me again what this is all about.'"<sup>69</sup> Yet, over time it became clear that the conflict was affecting U.S. relations with European allies: "The crisis in Bosnia cast a dark shadow over American foreign policy... This shattered the world's confidence in America's leadership and power."<sup>70</sup> Credibility would become a major theme for U.S. foreign policy in the Balkans. Chollet argued that the geostrategic framing of U.S. policy on Bosnia was ultimately about defining the future of U.S.-Russia relations in a post-Cold War paradigm.<sup>71</sup> Including Russia in Contact Group negotiations would later culminate in unprecedented NATO-Russia military cooperation within the Implementation Force (IFOR).

Though the war between Slovenia and Serbia was short lived (less than a month), the state of war between Croats and Serbs, Bosniaks and Serbs, and Bosniaks and Croats continued with shifting alliances until the signing of the DPA in 1995. The fluid partnerships, including periodic cooperation between Bosniaks and Croats, and Serbs and Croats added to the complexity of the conflict. There were even allegations that Milosevic and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman discussed partitioning Bosnia and

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<sup>68</sup> Derek Chollet, *Road to the Dayton Accords: A Study of American Statecraft*. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 1.

<sup>69</sup> Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 27.

<sup>70</sup> Chollet, *Road to the Dayton Accords*, 1.

<sup>71</sup> Chollet, *Road to the Dayton Accords*.

Herzegovina in 1993.<sup>72</sup> Ultimately solidifying the Croat-Bosniak coalition would become a key part of the strategy for American negotiators in 1994.

Common to all initiatives for peace was the identification of parties according to ethnicity and dividing land between them. The logic of every intervention in Bosnia was “based on reified conceptions of collective identities.”<sup>73</sup> The Carrington-Cutileiro, Vance-Owen, and Owen-Stoltenberg plans, as well as the talks at Dayton aimed to fix ethnic groups to negotiated positions on the map. This approach to peacemaking created a zero-sum game as losers were forced into minority status, to change allegiances, or to leave their homes. The legacy of this strategy – including the agreement at Dayton – is heightened anxiety regarding ethnic differences, dysfunctional governance, and international dependency. Indeed the 2013 census, which collected demographic data in preparation for EU membership was fraught with controversy and irregularities,<sup>74</sup> and threatened to reopen war wounds. An analytic failure to identify the gap between conflict party positions and underlying needs has repeatedly resulted in a competitive process of border negotiations. The result is a “disunited and dysfunctional state that is post-Dayton Bosnia.”<sup>75</sup> An obsession with ethnic geography has hindered positive peace in Bosnia.

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<sup>72</sup> The Prosecutor of the Tribunal Against Slobodan Milosevic, No. IT-02-54-T (The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia November 22, 2002).

<sup>73</sup> Bose, *Bosnia after Dayton*, 187.

<sup>74</sup> Elvira Jukic, “Bosnian NGOs Call for Boycott of Census: Balkan Insight,” October 3, 2013, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnian-ngos-call-for-census-boycott>.

<sup>75</sup> Bose, *Bosnia after Dayton*, 6.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and cascading regional instability was a surprise to the U.S. policy makers. This fact is widely regarded as an intelligence failure<sup>76 77</sup> – a failure of prediction from an enterprise of information collectors and analysts charged with the prevention of strategic surprise. Despite the institutional orientation to Soviet and communist threats, the CIA failed to predict a series of high impact events. This was a source of embarrassment for the CIA and the first modern institutional trauma in a series of intelligence failures (Indian nuclear testing, 9/11, WMD in Iraq) that have shaped intelligence discourse since.

The literature on Dayton alludes to the role of intelligence leading up to the Dayton summit. It is clear from this literature, that participants at Dayton were also undecided about its success. Holbrooke points out a number of weaknesses in the strategy and final agreement. He underestimated the significance of symbols such as leaving the Bosnian Serb entity named Republika Srpska – a “Nazi name”<sup>78</sup> – intact. The agreement permitted the three standing armies, organized by ethnicity, to remain in Bosnia.

Daalder’s *Getting to Dayton*<sup>79</sup> described the shift from nonintervention to active leadership in the negotiations. “Engagement,” a term which became associated with the Clinton administration, had become a moral obligation for the United States. In his

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<sup>76</sup> Carl Fazackerley, *The Collapse of the Soviet Union A Colossal Intelligence Failure?* (Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, 2010).

<sup>77</sup> Ofira Seliktar, *Politics, Paradigms, and Intelligence Failures: Why so Few Predicted the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2004).

<sup>78</sup> Chollet, *Road to the Dayton Accords*, xiv.

<sup>79</sup> Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*.

section on implications of Dayton, Daalder explored the administration's preference for "coercive diplomacy,"<sup>80</sup> a strategy that worked neither in Kosovo nor Iraq during Clinton's second term. Daalder briefly mentions President Clinton's requests for information from the CIA to "stimulate serious consideration of more activist U.S. policy options"<sup>81</sup> on Bosnia as well as the participation of the Central Intelligence Agency in National Security Committee meetings. In *The Road to the Dayton Accords*,<sup>82</sup> Derek Chollet saw the Bosnia negotiations as an avenue for cultivating the U.S. relationship with Russia in the post-Cold War era, as the broader meaning of the Dayton process.

Fukuyama claimed the U.S. victory over the Soviet Union in the Cold War represented the "end of history",<sup>83</sup> and that the rise of America as the sole superpower signaled acceptance of American economic liberalism and democracy as global end-state. The American national experience as reflected in the *e pluribus unum* master or hegemonic<sup>84</sup> narrative ties American identity to the nation-state. These explanations support U.S. foreign policy in the Balkans and elsewhere that is organized around the sovereign (and democratic) nation-state construct, characterized by Realpolitik principles.

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<sup>80</sup> Daalder, 179.

<sup>81</sup> Daalder, 8.

<sup>82</sup> Chollet, *Road to the Dayton Accords*.

<sup>83</sup> Francis Fukuyama, "Reflections on the End of History, Five Years Later," *History and Theory* 34, no. 2 (May 1, 1995): 27–43, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2505433>.

<sup>84</sup> Sara Cobb, *Speaking of Violence: The Politics and Poetics of Narrative in Conflict Resolution* (Oxford University Press, 2013), 87.

Is the role defense<sup>85</sup> of the nation-state system itself exacerbating conflicts globally? Will the nation-state survive this transitional period in history, and is it worth preserving? Are there alternatives for positive and (truly) democratic social control?

Burton suggests that conflict resolution is itself a political system.<sup>86</sup> In his view, it is not idealism, but political realism: “The accommodation of individual and group needs in political, social, and economic institutions is a requirement of political stability and survival.”<sup>87</sup> Conflict resolution is a system based on sophisticated and collaborative analysis of problems rather than coerced compliance with dominant rule. Such analysis requires “the study of the totality of human relationships, whether conflictual or not, for it is human motivations and values that are involved, conditioned by the totality of the environment – economic, political, social and ecological – in which these relationships are enacted.”<sup>88</sup>

Analysis is the organizing principle of conflict resolution. Simplistic understanding of conflicts produces simple – often violent – solutions. Revealing the *complexity* of human relational experience through collaborative analysis would be the primary task of a conflict resolution security paradigm.

The way we analyze a conflict directly impacts options for conflict resolution. Indeed the lens we apply to any problem shapes the approach to problem solving. The

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<sup>85</sup> Burton, *Conflict Resolution as a Political System*.

<sup>86</sup> Burton.

<sup>87</sup> Burton, 1.

<sup>88</sup> Burton, 11.

more complex our explanation, the more possibilities we have to intervene constructively, redirecting future events toward peace. The field of conflict resolution seeks to add nuance to our understanding of conflicts, the array of conflict sources and how they interact in order to reveal opportunities for resolution. Though diverse, the field generally agrees that sources of conflict are complex, positive peace is possible, and that intervention must focus on relationship building, and collaborative, non-violent analytic processes.

While diplomatic, military, economic, political and identity aspects of the Bosnian War are well studied, the biggest opportunity in these new data is an examination of the analytic framing itself. As a body, the episodes chronicled in the data collection aggregate to an epic narrative of war. The themes, characterizations, and plots of the account reveal the perspectives of participants including the narrative resources they relied on to write a new story about Bosnia.

Intelligence products are meticulously constructed stories. They describe the Other and include characterizations of foreign activities, capabilities and intentions in an assumed a competitive environment. They use facts to explain world events and inference to forecast the future. As a function of the national security industry, these stories are oriented to threat and plots of mal-intent. In intelligence analysis, the Other is cast as the antagonist in stories of risk and danger. Intelligence is narration.

As narrators, intelligence analysts make meaning of global events for the national security establishment. As this study will show, it is generated with narrative and

discursive resources of the national security apparatus oriented to political realism. For these reasons, I chose an interpretive approach to examine the data.

Though other scholars, including Roe,<sup>89</sup> Silliman,<sup>90</sup> and Allison<sup>91</sup> have used narrative analysis to investigate policy, to date there is no such scholarship on a declassified collection of this magnitude. In this data collection, there is an opportunity for in depth analysis of narrative dynamics of a historically significant case. The fact that these documents were once classified is also of interest. Cobb<sup>92</sup> and Rubenstein<sup>93</sup> have noted that politicians are well known for drawing upon various heritage and origin narratives to justify or “sell” their policies to the public. Are they also used behind closed doors? Often, what leadership state publicly is not what is debated privately.

Specifically, the structural, functional, and post structural approaches to narrative analysis offer lenses to reveal how people make meaning of real events. Though this type of analysis is typically used on the narrative interviews of individuals, the nature of intelligence and policy texts makes it a suitable object of inquiry using narrative

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<sup>89</sup> Emery M. Roe, “Narrative Analysis for the Policy Analyst: A Case Study of the 1980-1982 Medfly Controversy in California,” *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 8, no. 2 (1989): 251–73, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3323382>.

<sup>90</sup> Stephen W. Silliman, “The ‘Old West’ in the Middle East: U.S. Military Metaphors in Real and Imagined Indian Country,” *American Anthropologist* 110, no. 2 (June 1, 2008): 237–47, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-1433.2008.00029.x>.

<sup>91</sup> Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 1971.

<sup>92</sup> Sara Cobb, *Speaking of Violence: The Politics and Poetics of Narrative in Conflict Resolution* (Oxford University Press, 2013), <http://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/speaking-of-violence-sara-cobb/1117355279>.

<sup>93</sup> Richard E. Rubenstein, *Reasons to Kill* (Bloomsbury Press, 2010).

techniques. My approach will be informed by the structural, functional, and post-structural approaches.

This research asks the critical question: what stories about Bosnia did the analysts construct and what did those stories mean for U.S. policy? From this overarching question, I have derived a set of sub-questions:

What were the major themes?

How were the Conflict Parties (Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, Serbs, Croats, as well as individual actors) characterized?

What narratives, metaphors, and analogies does the analysis draw on?

What were the implicit assumptions of the analysis?

What was missing from the analysis?

These research questions drive an in depth narrative analysis of the data. This study will show that before the Dayton negotiations created a problematic peace, analysts created a problematic story about Bosnia. The themes and characters of the Bosnian narrative left few policy options for the Clinton Administration, while plots generated an inevitably coercive outcome.

Though this research is an examination of an important case – perhaps the most significant case in terms of immediate policy implications for American interventionism – it is only one case. Therefore, findings cannot be generalized into broader theory. This is perhaps the biggest limitation of the study in terms of a contribution to the academic literature. Though I will draw conclusions from the data, my goal is not theory creation.

The case is of interest on its own merits and I hope that future research will use it in conjunction with other cases toward theory construction.

My overarching goal with this dissertation is to encourage government analysts to be reflective of their work to write “better” stories. The U.S. intelligence apparatus is at a historic turning point in its development. Media leaks have raised questions about the intelligence mission, especially overreach, privacy rights, and foreign relationships. At the same time, the Intelligence Community has suggested the potential for increased inter- and intra-state conflict.<sup>94</sup> It is likely that intelligence will increasingly be tasked to support conflict interventions around the world. Writing the analysis – the stories – about conflict for policy making is a serious endeavor that can benefit from innovations from the academy and specifically the conflict resolution field. I am therefore locating this research in the intelligence studies literature; however, I hope it useful for those in other fields as well.

I will begin with a review of the relevant literature from the intelligence studies field, a relatively young field in the academy. This review will show the fine work already accomplished and identify some remaining gaps where my study can contribute to the scholarly conversation. I will discuss the debate on the role of intelligence and argue that a key role of intelligence analysis is that of narrator. Especially relevant are discussions of “truth” and the problems associated with assessing enemy intent. This is an

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<sup>94</sup> Director of National Intelligence, “Global Trends 2030,” National Intelligence Council, December 2012, 13, <http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/organization/global-trends-2030>.

ongoing problem for intelligence theorists who, like intelligence practitioners, largely operate within a positivist epistemology.

This study is the application of interpretive method to a large set of archival national security documents. I will provide a detailed description of the data. In the data and methods section, I will discuss why it is useful to do this beyond being inherently interesting. The work of Roe, Yannow, and Cobb provide justification and explanation for narrative analysis of policy texts. The method itself is based on Chatman's work on narrative structure and involved several close readings of documents, identification of themes, characters and plots and the interpretation of their meaning.

My findings are focused on intelligence narratives about the Bosnian War – the parties (people and peoples) in conflict and the facts that informed those characterizations. I will show evidence that characterizations of the Balkan Other were simplistic and derived from assumptions about the intrinsic nature of the Other. Finally, I will demonstrate how these narratives justified policy options through plot logic that informed national security elites. Lastly, I will argue that simplistic understanding of the conflict parties limited policy options to coercive intervention.

I will follow these findings with a discussion of the Balkan Other and Orientalism. I will explore the narrative resources that have historically prejudiced Western understanding of the Balkans. I will also include a brief discussion regarding narratives absent from the data.

In the reflections chapter, I will argue that characterizations of the Balkan Other contrasted with the American sense of Self. This includes a discussion of Wild West

themes referenced in the data. Lastly, a discussion of *frontierism* may help explain the expeditionary solution to the Bosnian War.

Finally, I will conclude with a warning regarding the Dayton solution as well as some thoughts for intelligence analysts who have the weighty responsibility of narrating foreign policy. I will argue for a new ethics of aesthetics and that inclusion of a conflict resolution and narrative lens is an ethical obligation for the analyst. I endeavor to bring attention to the intrinsic narrative resources we bring to analysis. As a starting point, analysts must identify and magnify opportunities for peace. The challenges are great, but I am optimistic. I will close with a summary of this research.

## CHAPTER TWO: INTELLIGENCE STUDIES LITERATURE

Intelligence studies as its own academic field, separate from international relations emerged in earnest in the 1990s, though several important intelligence scholars, including Kent,<sup>95</sup> Kendall,<sup>96</sup> Godfrey,<sup>97</sup> published much earlier. The post-Cold War era saw a surge in publication on intelligence as a unique object of research. Scholar-practitioners described and prescribed changes to intelligence organizations, missions, and targets in recognition of a destabilized world order. The field was liberated in a new era of openness and declassification under the Clinton Administration.

Definitions of *intelligence* generally agree that it is an activity associated with providing information to aid those in military and civilian leadership positions make decisions. Civilian leadership in the U.S. usually means officials of the federal government, i.e. policy makers, though intelligence is also used in other spheres (business, policing, and sports). Most often definitions reference some part or all of the

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<sup>95</sup> Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* (Princeton University Press, 1949), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt183q0qt>.

<sup>96</sup> Willmoore Kendall, "The Function of Intelligence," *World Politics* 1, no. 4 (July 1, 1949): 542–52, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2008837>.

<sup>97</sup> Drexel Godfrey, "Ethics and Intelligence," *Foreign Affairs* 56, no. 3 (April 1978): 624–42.

“intelligence cycle”<sup>98</sup> which includes requirements, collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of information. Others include operational aspects of espionage (Kent<sup>99</sup>), covert action (Treverton<sup>100</sup>), counterintelligence (Sims<sup>101</sup>), and cyberwarfare (Eom<sup>102</sup>).

Intelligence is typically conceived as an element of national power. Its role as a “force multiplier” suggests that intelligence is a capability that can compensate for weaknesses in other sources of power. The aphorism *nam et ipsa scientia potestas est* (knowledge is power) applies in the conception of intelligence as a national capability.

For the purposes of this study, I use the term “intelligence” to refer to knowledge that is produced from the systems of our national intelligence apparatus, known as the Intelligence Community, as well as the documents that contain that knowledge. Therefore, *intelligence* is not only the government sponsored, summative “thinking” about the world, it is the manifestation of that knowledge in written and briefed reports known variously as *analysis* or *products*.

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<sup>98</sup> Stephen Marrin, “Intelligence Analysis and Decision-Making: Methodological Challenges,” in *Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debates*, ed. Mark Phythian, Marrin, and Peter Gill (Taylor & Francis US, 2008), 131–50.

<sup>99</sup> Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*.

<sup>100</sup> Gregory F Treverton, *Covert Action: The Limits of Intervention in the Postwar World* (New York: Basic Books, 1987).

<sup>101</sup> Jennifer Sims, “Defending Adaptive Realism: Intelligence Theory Comes of Age,” in *Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debates*, ed. Mark Phythian, Stephen Marrin, and Peter Gill (Taylor & Francis US, 2008), 151–66.

<sup>102</sup> Jung ho Eom, “Roles and Responsibilities of Cyber Intelligence for Cyber Operations in Cyberspace,” *International Journal of Security and Its Applications* 8, no. 5 (2014): 323–32.

As this review will show, much of the scholarship from the intelligence studies field seeks to improve intelligence, especially the function of analysis. The “new analysis”<sup>103</sup> seeks “discipline.”<sup>104</sup> I will discuss how the holy grail of “truth” originating with Sherman Kent drives the research agenda. The fervor to turn analysts into scientists, though useful, is incomplete. An important role for analysts is that of narrator. As such, the field must explore ways of knowing beyond epistemological realism. A discursive perspective on the literature helps to explain the challenges of doing so. The roots of contemporary intelligence discourse can be traced to Sherman Kent.

Sherman Kent’s 1949 treatise, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* “was probably the most influential book on intelligence analysis ever written.”<sup>105</sup> It was the first major scholarship to privilege *analysis* over surveillance and espionage as the primary location of intelligence’s utility. Kent wrote that “Research has a greater importance than merely supplying the cutting edge to surveillance. It has a role entirely its own – in the service of the outgoing positive aspects of policy.”<sup>106</sup> For Kent, intelligence was “the kind of knowledge our state must possess regarding other states in order to assure itself that its cause will not suffer nor its undertakings fail because its

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<sup>103</sup> Carmen A. Medina, “The New Analysis,” in *Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations* (Georgetown University Press, 2008), 238–50.

<sup>104</sup> Rebecca Fisher and Rob Johnston, “Is Intelligence Analysis a Discipline,” in *Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations* (Georgetown University Press, 2008), 238–50.

<sup>105</sup> Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, *Strategic Intelligence for American National Security* (Princeton University Press, 1989), 4.

<sup>106</sup> Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, 155.

statesmen and soldiers plan and act in ignorance. This is the knowledge upon which we base our high-level national policy toward the other states of the world.”<sup>107</sup>

As the seminal work, much of the intelligence studies literature is a response to Kent. It is of little wonder that the intellectuals of the national security apparatus – the “pracademics” – would embrace his position. In an industry that esteemed operators and war-fighters, his work legitimized the efforts and frustrations of analysts. The new emphasis was on *how* the “raw” data of surveillance were combined, considered, and presented. For Kent, this was the source of intelligence power, not surveillance.

Kent’s work embodied “...the doctrine or school of thought institutionalized in the Central Intelligence Agency by the first generation of senior analysts.”<sup>108</sup> His legacy was established in both the professional journal, *Studies in Intelligence*, for which he successfully lobbied<sup>109</sup> and in the establishment of the Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis at CIA in 2000. His central theme – a focus on analysis – was also prescient. Though Kent wrote during the Cold War, Information Age analysts demonstrate their value by leveraging “all-source” information – to include clandestine and open sources – and in their ability to identify what is important in a sea of

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<sup>107</sup> Kent, 3.

<sup>108</sup> Roy S. Godson, ed., *Intelligence Requirements for the 1990’s: Collection, Analysis, Counterintelligence, and Covert Action* (Lexington Books, 1998), 5.

<sup>109</sup> Jack Davis, “Sherman Kent and the Profession of Intelligence Analysis,” *Kent Center Occasional Papers* 1, no. 5 (November 2002): 1, <https://www.cia.gov/library/kent-center-occasional-papers/vol1no5.htm>.

information. Considered the father of intelligence analysis, his methodological and institutional influence is still in effect today.

With *Strategic Intelligence*, Kent launched the tradition in the field to define intelligence by its failure. He illuminated analytically useful data categories (geographic, economic, political, infrastructure, social, historical, military and leadership) with the military framework of lessons learned. In cases of failure, specific details necessary to successful operations were absent from intelligence reporting. Kent seemed personally haunted by intelligence failures:

I doubt if any strategic prophet on 1 September 1939 foresaw the date of Italy's entrance into the war, the date of Germany's attack on the U.S.S.R., the date of the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor, the date of Italy's surrender. On 1 September 1939 we knew more about the situation than a year earlier, but we by no means had a perfectly clear picture of how the situation was destined to change in some of its major proportions.<sup>110</sup>

In these events, we see pure definitions of what constitutes analytic success and failure. Predicted events which came to fruition were the result of good analysis. Major events which were a surprise were failures resulting from the underdeveloped (and underfunded) mission of analysis. Kent described the analytic process as inference from fact: "... if intelligence is armed with the various kinds of [categorical] knowledge... and if it commands the welter of fact which lies behind them, intelligence ought to be able to make shrewd guesses – estimates, they are generally called."<sup>111</sup>

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<sup>110</sup> Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, 61.

<sup>111</sup> Kent, 59.

For Kent and his contemporaries, the international system was fundamentally competitive and alliances were polarized. Using the language of political realism, it is clear that Kent presumed a security paradigm in which rational nation-state sovereignties were the primary actors and that they acted in their national self-interests. Kent's perspective very much reflected the milieu in which he wrote. His metaphor of *knowledge as armament* in the quote above is indicative of his mindset.

A contemporary critique of Kent was Kendall's charge that Kent's work was

... dominated by an essentially wartime conception of the intelligence function. Most of the men who occupy the key positions learned the intelligence business during the war. They seem to have acquired a trained incapacity to put aside, more than momentarily, the intellectual habits appropriate to the conduct of hostilities (or preparation for the conduct of hostilities) against an actual or potential enemy, and to give to the distinctively peacetime functions of a governmental intelligence agency the importance they deserve.<sup>112</sup>

In the neorealist tradition, Jennifer Sims offered a theory of intelligence she called *Adaptive Realism*.<sup>113</sup> She argued that all aspects contributing to intelligence production were vital. Defining intelligence as the "collection, analysis and dissemination of information for decision-makers in a competitive enterprise,"<sup>114</sup> all intelligence activities were still located in an antagonistic setting. Aspects such as counterintelligence and deception ("manipulation") are important to the battle for information, independent of military or negotiation support.

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<sup>112</sup> Kendall, "The Function of Intelligence," 548.

<sup>113</sup> Sims, "Defending Adaptive Realism: Intelligence Theory Comes of Age."

<sup>114</sup> Sims, 154.

In the win-lose information war, Sims' ideas derive from game theory. Sims' goal was "to explain how directed information acquisition affects the outcomes of competitions in general and national security contests in particular."<sup>115</sup> Intelligence organizations are not just producing information to enable their national commanders and policy elites. They are engaged in their own competition with the intelligence organizations of other nations.

*Decision Advantage* is a key concept in Sims' theory:

Presumably one can identify the critical decision moments for strategy such as the battle of Midway during World War II and, within that battle, key decisions that could have changed the outcome. At those junctures, one must ask which side has better instruments for collection, transition, anticipation, and leveraging and whether they were geared toward support of the decision-makers... What matters is the relative intelligence capability of states.<sup>116</sup>

This *relative capability* hypothesis is suggestive of an information arms race in the realist tradition and includes not only gaining "good" information for the friendly side, but feeding "bad" information to the enemy. Scholars from intelligence studies and other fields (Denning,<sup>117</sup> Kamalipour and Snow,<sup>118</sup> Galvan,<sup>119</sup> Shedd,<sup>120</sup> Alpher<sup>121</sup>) have

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<sup>115</sup> Sims, 159.

<sup>116</sup> Sims, 163.

<sup>117</sup> Dorothy Elizabeth Robling Denning, *Information Warfare and Security* (ACM Press, 1999).

<sup>118</sup> Yahya R. Kamalipour and Nancy Snow, *War, Media, and Propaganda: A Global Perspective* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004).

<sup>119</sup> Brian Galvan, *Information Age Warfare , Measures Countermeasures Deployment*, 1st ed. (Tideshift Media Inc., 2014).

discussed the “weaponization” of information. The research is vast spanning deception, propaganda, psychological operations, media, electronic and cyber warfare, and political rhetoric.

A most pragmatic use of the relative capability frame has been in requesting additional authorities and funding from Congress as Director of National Intelligence McConnell did in 2008: “Our job is to create a decision advantage to the leaders of our country. By decision advantage, we mean the ability to prevent strategic surprise, understand emerging threats and track known threats, while adapting to the changing world.”<sup>122</sup> As advocacy for intelligence, this simple phrase is rhetorically effective. Defunding intelligence would create disadvantage that may be blamed for the next intelligence failure. It also orients the mission to supporting decision makers, which members of congress are. The subtext is “funding for intelligence is funding your own success.” The enormous growth of the U.S. intelligence apparatus – military and civilian – since 9/11 supports Sims’ theory in which, similar to Kent’s, role defense<sup>123</sup> is embedded.

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<sup>120</sup> Juliette Shedd, “Is All News Good News: Media Coverage of Terrorism” (George Mason University, 2013).

<sup>121</sup> David Alpher, “U.S. Extremists — and Language like Trump’s — Are More Dangerous than Foreign Ones,” *Washington Post*, June 2, 2016, sec. PostEverything, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/06/02/u-s-extremists-and-language-like-trumps-are-more-dangerous-than-foreign-ones/>.

<sup>122</sup> Michael J. McConnell, “DNI Authorities Hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence” (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, February 14, 2008), 2, [www.DNI.gov](http://www.DNI.gov).

<sup>123</sup> Burton, *Conflict Resolution as a Political System*.

In a departure from Kent, Sims suggests “success is achieved less by finding ‘truth’ or perfect accuracy, than by gaining better information for one’s own side than is available to the opponent at crucial moments in the competition.”<sup>124</sup> But what does she mean by better? The advantage of information can only be measured by mission success or failure – therefore the responsibility in the “loss of advantage”<sup>125</sup> lies at least in part with the decision maker herself.

Both Kent and Sims avoid epistemological location. Though admittedly occupied with the activity of knowledge making, Kent explicitly dismissed the question of epistemology. Gentry noted in 1993 that “issues like empiricism and epistemology are not topics of significant concern by analysts or reviewers” themselves.<sup>126</sup> However it is with high confidence, we can judge that the perspectives Kent and Sims are in keeping with those of positivism. Whether they discuss successful analysis as “getting it right” or “better information,” their orientation is to a truth that can be known. However there are inherent complications with what Kent referred to as “estimative-speculative”<sup>127</sup> knowledge production. Other scholars of intelligence have looked at the intelligence epistemology problem specifically.

The post-9/11 era, saw a surge in intelligence studies publications searching for ways to improve intelligence, analysis, and the warning function in particular. In the new

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<sup>124</sup> Sims, “Defending Adaptive Realism: Intelligence Theory Comes of Age,” 154.

<sup>125</sup> Sims, 154.

<sup>126</sup> John A. Gentry, *Lost Promise* (University Press Of America, 1993), 223.

<sup>127</sup> Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*.

line of inquiry, Patrick Walsh wrote “there are difficulties in conceptualizing what intelligence is meant to do and therefore what is ‘knowable’ from the intelligence enterprise. Can we explain events, trends and behavior or can we only interpret/understand these from the security environment?”<sup>128</sup> These questions interrogate knowledge itself. What is it possible to know? Woodrow Kuhns asked the fundamental questions, “Is intelligence closer to science or pseudoscience?”<sup>129</sup> The framing of this question implies that a scientific intelligence analysis is the goal. Ideally, an intelligence forecast, like one made in science, should be a “rational prediction that is based on grounds whose merits are discernible prior to the event.”<sup>130</sup>

The key difficulty of intelligence analysis is in predicting the future. Kent himself wrote “On the theory that the consumers of intelligence are interested in things of the past, present, and future, I have adopted the element of time as the element of overruling importance.”<sup>131</sup> Indeed, the field is still struggling with the paradox of a mission to anticipate a future which may be inherently unknowable.

Some scholars have suggested that intelligence give up the “forecasting” mission as either unattainable or unwanted. Sims bemoaned the “faulty assumption that

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<sup>128</sup> Patrick F Walsh, *Intelligence and Intelligence Analysis* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2011), 295.

<sup>129</sup> Woodrow Kuhns, “Intelligence Failures: Forecasting and the Lessons of Epistemology,” in *Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence*, ed. Richard K. Betts and Thomas Mahnken, annotated edition (Taylor & Francis, 2007), 80.

<sup>130</sup> Kuhns, 85.

<sup>131</sup> Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, 8.

intelligence is essentially about divining the unknowable as opposed to illuminating the battlefield. Intelligence is not prophesy.”<sup>132</sup> In this, intelligence is absolved from the sins of predictive failure. Intelligence is the convenient scapegoat for decision makers with whom, ultimately the responsibility for foreign policy lies.

Roger Hilsman’s interviews revealed that individually, most consumers of intelligence “were opposed either entirely or in part to having intelligence analysts responsible for estimating and warning. Intelligence was to provide the facts, and the policy makers were to interpret them.”<sup>133</sup> Yet collectively, it is clear that decision makers assume a future oriented analytic responsibility in the Intelligence Community.

Near future events are easier to predict. The “indicators and warning” (I&W) mission maintains an inventory of observable steps an adversary must take in order to launch an offensive, including the monitoring of adversary troop and weapons movement and communications. For example, the jamming of communications constitutes an indicator of impending attack. For a time after 9/11, the role of warner-in-chief was institutionalized with a National Intelligence Officer for Warning. Maybe due to crying wolf or the curse of Cassandra, the position was dissolved, though the network of “watch centers” remains as well as their information sharing mandate. Kent’s warning about warning:

The substantive problem may emerge as a result of the reflections of a man employed to do nothing but anticipate problems. In actual fact, the intelligence business employs all too few of such men. But suppose there

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<sup>132</sup> Sims, “Defending Adaptive Realism: Intelligence Theory Comes of Age,” 162.

<sup>133</sup> Kuhns, “Intelligence Failures: Forecasting and the Lessons of Epistemology,” 95.

are such men; their job is to ask themselves the hard, the searching, and the significant question and keep passing it on to professional staff. An intelligence operation should be bedeviled by such questions, and a substantial part of its work program should be concerned with getting answers. A Pearl Harbor disaster is to be ascribed in no small measure to the absence of some unpleasant and insistent person, who, knowing of the growing animus of Japan, kept asking when is the attack coming, where is it coming, and how is it coming?<sup>134</sup>

To address *far* future events, forecasting analysis typically involves the creation of multiple scenarios. According to scholar-practitioner Douglas MacEachin who wrote in the early 1990s, estimates should involve the generation of alternative probable and possible scenarios, their logical conclusions and the “factors that drive the differences.”<sup>135</sup> An estimate that forecasts only one outcome is “unsuccessful.”<sup>136</sup> To this method, analysts should provide a measure of probability. According to Smith:

Sophisticated estimating... ought always to be something more than bald prediction. A good paper on a complicated subject should describe the trends and forces at work, identify the contingent factors or variables which might affect developments, and present a few alternative possibilities for the future, usually with some judgments as to the relative likelihood of one or another outcome.<sup>137</sup>

Doctrinally, intelligence analysis must include a most-likely and a worst-case scenario.

According to MacEachin, worst-case scenarios garner more attention. There is a “tendency of analysts to focus on worst-case scenarios, especially in the wake of the Intelligence Community being blamed for not having predicted some event or particular

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<sup>134</sup> Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, 159.

<sup>135</sup> MacEachin, *The Tradecraft of Analysis*, 17.

<sup>136</sup> Kuhns, “Intelligence Failures: Forecasting and the Lessons of Epistemology,” 97.

<sup>137</sup> Kuhns, 97.

crisis... analysts are less likely to be criticized for producing a pessimistic appraisal than for failing to signal a crisis.”<sup>138</sup> The worst-case scenario is one of disaster and conflict. Such prophecies may unintentionally be fulfilled through friendly military or political action. Michael Handel identified this paradox in the 1980s. The danger of “worst-case analysis”<sup>139</sup> is that

... one party might mobilize prematurely, which could prompt an identical move by the other, and then result in preemption and war that no one wanted. (Reciprocal fear of surprise attack played an important role in the loss of control over mobilization and counter-mobilization before the First World War; the almost simultaneous German and British invasions of Norway; and the 1967 Six Day War).<sup>140</sup>

The opposite effect may also occur: the future so perilous and inevitable, there is no sense in risking political or military credibility on an event we cannot control. Though the logical probability of the doomsday scenario may be lower – significantly lower – than the most-likely scenario, its inclusion imbues the entire analytic product with fear and negativity.

Similar to Kuhns, James Bruce offered an epistemological argument for the adoption of scientific methods in intelligence analysis, “rigorous procedures to ensure

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<sup>138</sup> MacEachin, *The Tradecraft of Analysis*, 35.

<sup>139</sup> Michael I. Handel, “Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 7, no. 3 (September 1984): 21, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402398408437190>.

<sup>140</sup> Handel, 22.

that data are collected and analyzed in the most objective manner possible.”<sup>141</sup> As a “knowledge-building activity,”<sup>142</sup> he suggested that an understanding of epistemology is essential. He wrote on the principal ways of knowing – authority, habit of thought, rationalism, empiricism, and science. Of these he wrote that only scientific inquiry has the ability “to produce sound understanding of reliable knowledge. As a way of knowing, it combines the best attributes of rationalism and empiricism but adds an array of internal procedures that enable it to check itself.”<sup>143</sup>

The use of historical precedent for intelligence has “proven a reliable – if lazy – way of knowing: The odds generally favor predictions that say tomorrow will look pretty much like today. But this way of knowing inhibits anticipating discontinuity, so major warning failures can be the result.”<sup>144</sup> In the same way, inductive rationalism is problematic. According to Bruce, this is the “dominant choice of reasoning in intelligence analysis,” its roots “traceable to Sherman Kent.”<sup>145</sup> Intelligence is a “fundamentally empirical enterprise,” the analyst “awash with empirical data.”<sup>146</sup> However the quantity of data presents its own challenges and as Bruce notes, not all data are reliable. The

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<sup>141</sup> James B. Bruce, “Making Analysis More Reliable: Why Epistemology Matters to Intelligence,” in *Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations* (Georgetown University Press, 2008), 178.

<sup>142</sup> Bruce, 171.

<sup>143</sup> Bruce, 177.

<sup>144</sup> Bruce, 174.

<sup>145</sup> Bruce, 175.

<sup>146</sup> Bruce, 177.

informant codenamed “Curveball” who fabricated information regarding Iraqi WMD is a prime example.

Bruce demonstrated the fallibility of other types of knowledge production with an examination of the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi WMD commission findings. The faulty knowledge regarding Saddam Hussein’s (non-existent) weapons program was the result of applying the lesser forms of knowledge production.

Interestingly, in his descriptions, the only mode of knowing which included multiple stories of analytic failure (Japan, Iran, and the Soviet Union) is “habit of thought.”

Defined as “prejudice in individuals and conventional wisdom in groups,”<sup>147</sup> CIA Deputy Director Miscik blamed the faulty estimate on Iraqi WMD on “inherited assumptions.”<sup>148</sup>

Like Kuhns and Bruce, much of the newer literature on intelligence studies seeks to add rigor and objectivity to intelligence through scientific methods including those from psychology,<sup>149</sup> statistical methods,<sup>150</sup> and most recently, social science.<sup>151</sup> Faulting various cognitive and methodological biases, the literature seeks to improve intelligence analysis. Stephen Marrin provides an explanation for the scientific evolution:

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<sup>147</sup> Bruce, 173.

<sup>148</sup> Bruce, 181.

<sup>149</sup> Richards J. Heuer Jr., *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, 2nd ed. (Pherson Associates, 2007).

<sup>150</sup> Nicholas Schweitzer, “Bayesian Analysis: Estimating the Probability of Middle East Conflict,” in *Quantitative Approaches to Political Intelligence: The CIA Experience*, ed. Richards J. Heuer (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979).

<sup>151</sup> Aaron Frank, “Computational Social Science and Intelligence Analysis,” *Intelligence and National Security* 32, no. 5 (July 29, 2017): 579–99, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2017.1310968>.

In the intelligence context, conventional understandings of the meaning of politicization is that it is a corruption of the objectivity of intelligence system, either through the intentional manipulation of the intelligence process by decision-makers who want the information and analysis to support a particular policy option, or through the actions of intelligence analysts who provide the decision-makers with the information they want to hear.<sup>152</sup>

The ethics of analytic techne (tradecraft or doctrine) are associated with truth and “speaking truth to power.” The turn to science is a search for object truth, epistemological realism. Intelligence analysis as it is practiced has indeed become more scientific since Kent.

In her article *Positivism, Post-Positivism, and Intelligence Analysis*, Mary Manjikian responds to the trend of bringing methodology from the sciences to bear on the intelligence problem, suggesting a disconnect between the direction of intelligence scholarship and the rest of the academe:

Intriguing, however, is the fact that the United States Intelligence Community seems to be moving towards the embrace of a belief in positivist social science at the same time the academic communities of historians, political scientists, psychologists, and even “hard scientists” like geneticists seem to be moving away from positivism.<sup>153</sup>

As a post-structuralist, Manjikian built on concepts from Foucault and Saussure, arguing there is neither “pure knowledge” nor “value-free ‘truths.’”<sup>154</sup> All knowledge is

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<sup>152</sup> Marrin, “Intelligence Analysis and Decision-Making: Methodological Challenges,” 135.

<sup>153</sup> Mary Manjikian, “Positivism, Post-Positivism, and Intelligence Analysis,” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 26, no. 3 (2013): 565, <https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2013.758002>.

<sup>154</sup> Manjikian, 566.

constructed and a product of the language we have available, cultural values, and power relationships. Therefore “every step”<sup>155</sup> of the intelligence process is politicized. It is within constructivist epistemology we will identify ways to overcome analytic bias.

Specifically, Manjikian provides a critique on the research of Stephen Marrin<sup>156</sup> and Gregory Treverton<sup>157</sup> who look to the medical profession for standards in “neutral” diagnostics. Manjikian demonstrates the politics of illness through its deconstruction. The corollary in intelligence analysis is the diagnosis of a “failed state” or “terrorist affiliate.” This knowledge is a product of expectations the analyst brings to their work, which also constitutes a kind of cognitive bias. The idea that intelligence analysts as “merely neutral observers who collect and analyze ‘facts’ about a situation”<sup>158</sup> is simplistic. As political scientist Stephanie Lawson notes, “facts do not speak for themselves. They are made to speak in different ways by different people located in varying positions of power and influence and with particular agendas and projects.”<sup>159</sup>

Intelligence analysts must likewise be careful of imposing a narrative upon the data, and thereby leading it to fit a certain framework. And just like doctors, analysts must be aware of any prejudices or judgments which they

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<sup>155</sup> Manjikian, 566.

<sup>156</sup> Stephen Marrin, “Improving Intelligence Analysis by Looking to the Medical Profession,” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 18, no. 4 (Winter -2006 2005): 707–29.

<sup>157</sup> Gregory F. Treverton, *Intelligence for an Age of Terror*, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2009).

<sup>158</sup> Manjikian, “Positivism, Post-Positivism, and Intelligence Analysis,” 571.

<sup>159</sup> Manjikian, 575.

might bring to their analysis – including any preconceived notions of preexisting causal structures.<sup>160</sup>

In this, Manjikian opens the door to a crucial way of knowing. Manjikian assumes the “controversial position that perhaps the quest for a value-free, neutral Intelligence Community whose goal is to identify the “truth” about a situation is ultimately a fruitless endeavor.”<sup>161</sup> Intelligence studies researchers have largely avoided constructivist epistemology. This stems not only from the perception that fact is the source of all scientific thought which is apolitical, but also in response to tightly enforced institutional norms of intelligence practice entrenched in larger military and government systems which rely on Realpolitik to interface with the world.

Though Manjikian described and deconstructed the power structures of the medical profession, she stopped short of describing the nested power structures in which intelligence analysts are imbedded. Nor did she describe the implications of these constraints for national security. It is clear that a relationship exists between positivist analysis, the hierarchical power structures in which analysis occurs, and the still dominant political realist (neo-realist) conception of zero-sum security. These aspects are mutually reinforcing, creating a discourse in which attention to post-positivist strategies is devalued if not impossible. The Foucauldian “regime of truth” begins with intelligence analysts who construct knowledge.

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<sup>160</sup> Manjikian, 574.

<sup>161</sup> Manjikian, 568.

The problem with the new science-ism is not that it seeks to add knowledge through positivist means. Facts are useful. The problem is the fetishizing of science to the exclusion of constructivist epistemology. In inferential analysis, *something* is always constructed, even if derived from fact. Bruce referred to “habit of thought” and “inherited assumptions” as the source of multiple intelligence failures. These are essentially narratives – stories with themes, characters and plots – that are retold and rewritten. In the retelling, they take on a life of their own and reinforce the politics of the culture and institutions which produced them.

The impulse of the intelligence studies field has been to view narrative as a cognitive problem to obliterate – the pathology of biased analysis. This solution ignores the reality that narrative is always present. The ability to voice alternative narratives in the face of a dominant political and epistemological discourse is also a skill that needs development. It is in estimative scenario building that the role of narrator is most explicit. But the phenomenon is broader than that as this research will show. The field needs to acknowledge, embrace, study and use narrative to better the craft of intelligence analysis. This research endeavors to contribute to this critical need.

## CHAPTER THREE: DATA AND METHOD

### Data

The recent U.S. Government declassification of intelligence documents concerning the Bosnian War and peace process provides a rare opportunity for rigorous scholarship on national decision making and conflict intervention. The *Bosnia, Intelligence, and the Clinton Presidency* collection of some 343 Balkans Task Force (BTF) documents includes intelligence reporting and estimates, minutes from National Security Council Principals and Deputies Committee meetings, and various intelligence and policy memoranda pertaining to the Bosnian conflict. These documents are the official record of the American perspective on the war. They chronicle military, economic, political and humanitarian developments in the Balkans as well as U.S. policy considerations and diplomatic initiatives.

A lack of data has hindered research on intelligence analysis and its contribution to foreign policy. Due to national security concerns and the protection of intelligence sources and methods, analytic products and policy related documents typically remain classified for at least 25 years and often longer. As a result, this primary analytic medium for informing and executing U.S. foreign policy is understudied in the academe. The declassification of these documents allows for examination of intelligence products in an open forum. They are particularly interesting texts for conflict resolution scholars as they

reveal details of U.S. policy making considerations surrounding the Dayton Peace Agreement. In this section, I will describe the declassified collection documents including their historic significance, authorship, format, thematic content, and finally, their relevance to scholarship.

The collection consists of 343 declassified documents (2,061 pages) related to the Bosnian War, diplomacy and the negotiations in Dayton, Ohio and the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) in the 1990s. Document dates range from October 1990 - May 1996. The majority of the documents were produced during the 1992-1995 Bosnian War, particularly in 1995, the year in which the Dayton Agreement was signed.

The collection contains Summaries of Conclusions from National Security Council (NSC) meetings where senior foreign policy officials deliberated and made decisions regarding the Bosnian conflict, CIA memoranda pertaining to those meetings, key intelligence assessments, and selected materials from the State Department, White House, Department of Defense, and William J. Clinton Presidential Library.

On October 1, 2013, the William J. Clinton Presidential Library in Little Rock, Arkansas hosted a symposium to introduce the collection. Several high-ranking government officials from the Clinton Administration who had created U.S. policy on Bosnia in the early 1990's were present. Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA Dr. John Gannon opened the symposium with his perspectives on the success of the CIA's Balkan Task Force (BTF) construct as a model for complex intelligence problem solving, and an institutional way forward in the post-Cold War era. The BTF was established on June 12,

1992, with a directive to include officers from CIA, DIA, NSA and “possibly other Community Agencies as well.” The mission of the task force:

- To centralize and coordinate development and implementation of a collection strategy and tasking.
- To centralize and coordinate the Community’s sanctions monitoring effort in support of UN Security Resolution 757.
- To coordinate general military intelligence support to US policy and contingency planning and tactical intelligence support.<sup>162</sup>

The task force was located at CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia and comprised Balkan political, economic, and military analysts as well as a support staff. The goal of the new task force construct was to reorient intelligence to policy making needs and customer service: “We knew the complexity of the issues in the Balkans were virtually unprecedented in most of our experience. This was going to be a tough row to hoe. So we wanted to simplify the relationship with the policy community.”<sup>163</sup>

The task force model has since become standard practice for the Intelligence Community, as well as the military, particularly since 9/11. In a vocation of secrecy, it was highly unusual for working-level personnel from different agencies to collaborate, or even know who else was working on their problem from a different angle. Ultimately, the BTF included CIA, NSA, DIA, NIMA and military partners, who could consolidate intelligence collection and analysis.

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<sup>162</sup> CIA, “Memorandum for DI Executive Officers: Establishment of the Interagency Balkan Task Force” (CIA Historical Collections Division, June 12, 1992), C05916692, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>163</sup> Clinton Presidential Center, *Bosnia, Intelligence, and the Clinton Presidency*, 2013, <http://vimeo.com/75959093>.

A highlight of the declassification event symposium was the panel discussion of high-ranking officials from the Clinton Administration. Moderated by Nancy Soderberg, Deputy National Security Advisor to President Clinton, the panel included former Ambassador to the UN (and Secretary of State) Madeleine Albright; former National Security Advisor to President Clinton Sandy Berger; former National Security Advisor to Vice President Gore Leon Feurth, and General Wesley Clark, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Director of Strategic Plans and Policy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Major themes from the panel included the tragedy at Srebrenica, U.S. leadership, the joining of force and diplomacy, U.S. policies on sanctions, embargoes and airstrikes, the relationship between policy and intelligence, feckless Europe, obstructionist Russia, and strong personalities of key players such as Milosevic.

Former President Clinton gave the keynote address, putting U.S. intervention in Bosnia in a global and historic context: “When you’re President, everything happens at once... 1995 was a big year.”<sup>164</sup> Clinton went on to describe the challenges he faced as president, which included the end of the Cold War, U.S. involvement in Haiti, ceasefire in Northern Ireland, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin, aid to Mexico, aid to Russia to pay salaries of nuclear scientists, and the Oklahoma City bombing.<sup>165</sup> “We didn’t even have a meeting on Rwanda” Clinton said with regret, “We missed it.”<sup>166</sup>

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<sup>164</sup> Clinton Presidential Center.

<sup>165</sup> Clinton Presidential Center.

<sup>166</sup> Clinton Presidential Center.

Clinton also used the opportunity to talk about the role of intelligence in global security. Surprisingly, he credited the tradecraft of both Soviet and American intelligence with preventing nuclear annihilation. Both sides were experts in determining the others' intentions.

...the Russians were better off if the spies in the Cold War were really good. Because that way we knew their intentions and we knew they didn't mean to launch a nuclear weapon at us. And we were better off if the Russian spies were really good because that way they knew we didn't intend to blow them off the face of the earth. Now that was hard to convince anyone whose life was on the line working for the CIA or the KGB that it was a good thing if the other side was good at what they did.<sup>167</sup>

In the future, Clinton suggested the utility of intelligence will be in parsing mass quantities of information and identifying what is important globally.

The release of the Bosnia, *Bosnia, Intelligence, and the Clinton Presidency* collection was truly an historic event. The declassification effort marked “the youngest historical collection ever released in the CIA Historical Review Program’s (HRP) 20-year existence.”<sup>168</sup> The Bosnia symposium was the first time a U.S. president participated in a declassification event. A proponent of declassification, in 1995 President Clinton, signed Executive Order 12958 which outlined requirements for declassification. The order stated “Protecting information critical to our Nation's security remains a priority. In recent years, however, dramatic changes have altered, although not eliminated, the national

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<sup>167</sup> Clinton Presidential Center.

<sup>168</sup> The Clinton Foundation, “Bosnia, Intelligence, and the Clinton Presidency,” Clinton Presidential Center, October 1, 2013, <https://www.clintonfoundation.org/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

security threats that we confront. These changes provide a greater opportunity to emphasize our commitment to open Government.”<sup>169</sup>

Accordingly, Clinton highlighted the importance of declassification in his keynote speech:

We have to be very careful not to create an edifice of importance that blocks us from the empowerment of ordinary citizens in a democracy. We needed a bunch of this stuff to be secret while we were making the decisions, but after it was over, it’s a good thing to let scholars and unvarnished unbiased examiners look at these things... As soon as the danger has passed, we ought to give to [the public] the information so they can figure out whether we did the right thing with it or not, and what we could do better in the future... This is a big deal.<sup>170</sup>

The *Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency* documents include two broad categories of records: intelligence products and policy documents. In practice, the line between policy debate and intelligence is often blurred. The following is a description of the types of documents, loosely arranged according to the two categories.

National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) are the most comprehensive of the intelligence analytic products. These long research pieces vary in length, typically 20 – 70 pages, and do a “deep dive” into a strategic issue of national security concern. NIEs are produced by the National Intelligence Council (NIC), the leading subject matter experts on regional issues, who organize the efforts of multiple intelligence analysts from the various agencies of the Intelligence Community. NIEs include key judgments, analysis, maps, other graphics, and often annexes. Because of their length and depth,

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<sup>169</sup> William J. Clinton, “Executive Order 12958 Classified National Security Information,” April 17, 1995, 1, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/clinton/eo12958.html>.

<sup>170</sup> Clinton Presidential Center, *Bosnia, Intelligence, and the Clinton Presidency*.

NIEs are not generated frequently and typically forecast events six months or more into the future. The *Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency* collection spans seven years, but only contains seven NIEs:

- Yugoslavia Transformed (October 1990)
- A Broadening Balkan Crisis: Can It Be Managed? (April 1992)
- Prospects for Bosnia (May 1993 updated October 1993)
- Combatant Forces in the Former Yugoslavia (July 1993)
- Croatia: When Will Fighting Resume? (July 1993)
- Serbia: A Troubled Year of Consolidation Ahead (January 1994)
- Prospects for Bosnia and Herzegovina Over the Next 18 Months (May 1996)

NIEs are perhaps the most important analytic products of the collection. They capture the holistic thinking of the Intelligence Community's top experts and serve as background information for analysts working on shorter term pieces. They shape the strategic thinking on national security issues.

Four Special Estimates (SE) were issued in 1994:

- Ending U.S. Compliance with the Bosnian Arms Embargo: Military and Political Implications (August 1994)
- Strict Enforcement of the Exclusion Zones: Military and Political Implications (September 1994)
- Multilateral Lifting of the Arms Embargo on Bosnia: Political and Military Implications (November 1994)
- Prospects for UNPROFOR Withdrawal from Bosnia (December 1994)

These Special Estimates were also produced by the National Intelligence Council. They address strategic concerns, but the documents are relatively short, one to six pages in length. Whereas NIEs are broad-based, the SEs answered specific strategic questions asked by policymakers.

No NIEs or SEs on the Balkans were produced in 1995, the year of the negotiations at Dayton, though many other products were. Intelligence Memoranda, Intelligence Reports, and Intelligence Assessments are medium-length (ten pages or less) analytic pieces that may include maps and other graphics. They were published at least weekly and often had a very specific focus or answered policy makers' questions. Examples include "Compliance with the London Accords" (4 March 1993) and "Serb Objectives After Srebrenica" (13 July 1995). The largest memorandum is 40 pages, dated 28 December 1992, from the National Intelligence Council responding to questions from the Clinton Administration's transition team.

Situation Updates are the most tactical product the CIA produced. These were published at least twice daily at 0700 EDT and 1600 EDT and largely reported on the status of military activity, negotiations, current events and other actors in the region. Also tactical in nature are four cables sent from U.S. diplomats. Though these are considered "raw" intelligence reporting, they do contain analysis from the diplomats themselves. These are reports from the field which comment on proximity talks with conflict parties.

Policy documents include discussion summaries for various NSC meetings, assignments for policy execution, and official correspondence between national security policy elites. The majority of these documents are records of Principals and Deputies

Committee (PC and DC) meetings, the primary discussion forums within the National Security Council apparatus. Though the President is technically the Chair of the PC, during the Bosnian war, Tony Lake usually chaired the meetings, and Samuel “Sandy” Berger usually chaired the DC. In attendance were representatives from the Office of the Vice President, Department of State, Department of Defense, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Management and Budget, Central Intelligence Agency, Joint Chief of Staff, White House Staff, and National Security Council. Leon Feurth from the Office of the Vice President attended most meetings and became known as the “king of sanctions.”<sup>171</sup> Other notable participants included Madeleine Albright, Warren Christopher, William Perry, General John Shalikashvili, Joseph Nye, Colonel Nelson Drew, and Alexander Vershbow. From the CIA, Doug MacEachin, John Deutch, and Admiral William Studeman, represented the Intelligence Community.

Summaries of two meetings, the PCs on Bosnia on February 5, 1993 and April 23, 1994 are written in transcript form and specific comments are attributable to individuals. All other accounts of PC and DC meetings are captured in a memorandum or Summary of Conclusions (SOC). These documents are the primary mechanism for communicating U.S. foreign policy within the government. SOC’s are relatively short documents, typically one to three pages that capture key discussion points and decisions made in PC and DC meetings. SOC’s are the official record of U.S. foreign policy and are highly classified with limited distribution. The format of a SOC is standardized, listing the type of meeting (PC or DC), the date, location (typically the White House Situation

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<sup>171</sup> Clinton Presidential Center.

Room), time, subject, and list of participants. The body of the SOC contains agenda item headings with summaries of decisions on each topic. Often, these summaries include tasking for further action, including research questions for the CIA. In the declassified collection, the first NSC meeting on the Former Yugoslavia was a PC that took place on January 28, 1993 and the final was a DC meeting on December 20, 1995.

In addition, there are several memoranda from National Security Advisor Tony Lake addressed to President Clinton recommending specific actions in Bosnia as discussed in the PC. There are three memoranda from Madeleine Albright to the National Security Advisor emphasizing the need for U.S. leadership and action in Bosnia. There is also one letter from Radovan Karadzic, former President of the Republika Srpska, addressed to President Clinton, accepting the terms of the Dayton Agreement, dated December 2, 1995.

The data include four policy review documents. Presidential Review Directive/NSC-1, "U.S. Policy Regarding the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia," was signed on President Clinton's third day in office on January 22, 1993. This highlights the priority the Balkans had in the Administration's agenda, recalling Clinton's campaign commitment to exercise U.S. leadership region. Other reviews came with the realization that specific policies were ineffective. One example is the review on June 7, 1995 which recalled "Bob Frasure [U.S. diplomat] for consultations, given the lack of progress on the mutual recognition plan."<sup>172</sup>

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<sup>172</sup> Anthony Lake, "Memorandum for the President: Principals' Review of Bosnia Policy" (CIA Historical Collections Division, June 7, 1995), 1, C06031036, Bosnia, Intelligence

The major themes of both intelligence and policy documents are the arms control regimes, embargoes, sanctions, “mutual recognition package”, strategy and status of negotiations, characterizations of parties in conflict as well as Europeans and Russians. Discussions of major events such as war crimes at Srebrenica and the siege of Sarajevo are turning points in U.S. policy. Much attention is given to how U.S. actions and inactions will be perceived by parties in conflict, other stakeholders (Europe and Russia), and as a reflection of U.S. credibility and global leadership. The substantive content of the documents is the focus of my analysis and I will provide more detail in the Chapter on findings.

The initial declassification on October 1, 2013 included 343 documents (2061 pages) though due to a U.S. government shutdown, most documents were not made publically available until February of 2014. Through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request in 2014, I acquired 182 additional documents. I received 930 pages of declassified intelligence on Bosnia, though approximately 100 of those pages duplicated material that CIA had already released through the declassification event in 2013. Most of the new documents are weekly reports generated by CIA’s Balkans Task Force, and I speculate they did not meet the threshold of strategic relevance to be included in the declassification event. However, these documents reveal more details regarding analytic framing of the war. I am therefore including them in my research as they are relevant to narrative perspective on the case.

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and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

A constraint of this study is that there are data missing from the collection. There are several sizable redactions in the documents and at least one significant period of time unaccounted for in the collection (surrounding the massacre at Srebrenica). It is largely apparent what is missing. Where appropriate, I noted this in the findings chapters. My impression of the documents is that the declassification process observed the letter and spirit of FOIA law and that the majority of existing documentation relating to intelligence and U.S. policy deliberations during the Bosnian War is now publically available.

### **Method**

While diplomatic, military, economic, political and identity aspects of the Bosnian War are well studied, the biggest opportunity in the newly released intelligence and policy documents is an examination of how participants viewed the war, peacemaking and their role in it. As a body, the episodes chronicled in the *Bosnia, Intelligence, and the Clinton Presidency* collection of documents aggregate to an epic narrative of war. The characterizations, plots and themes of the account reveal the perspectives of participants including the narrative resources they rely on to write a new story about Bosnia. Intelligence products are meticulously constructed stories. They explain world events through a threat lens based on inference from fact. Stories develop around the actions of antagonists and project future plot developments as progressions of current narrative. Intelligence is meaning making of global events for the national security establishment. For these reasons, I chose an interpretive approach to examine the data, specifically narrative analysis.

Narrative researchers have borrowed ideas about narrative structure from literary studies and socio-linguistics.”<sup>173</sup> Structural approaches to narrative were developed by Labov and Waletzky,<sup>174</sup> Griemas,<sup>175</sup> and Lakoff and Johnson<sup>176</sup> to categorize narratives by their component parts. This analysis leverages concepts from semantics, the branch of linguistics concerned with meaning making. Labov’s event structure of narrative<sup>177</sup> divides stories into abstract, orientation, temporal organization of the complicating action, evaluation, and validation sections. Sequencing of reported events reveals the narrator’s “theory of causality,”<sup>178</sup> while evaluation and validation sections enhance narrator credibility.<sup>179</sup> Griemas furthered narrative scholarship with the actantial model.<sup>180</sup> Actants are structural roles assigned to characters in a narrative which allow them to fulfill a need in the story plot. The narrator may assign six archetypical roles

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<sup>173</sup> Jane Elliott, *Using Narrative in Social Research: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*, 1st ed. (Sage Publications Ltd, 2005), 37.

<sup>174</sup> William Labov and Joshua Waletzky, “Narrative Analysis: Oral Versions of Personal Experience,” in *Essays on the Verbal and Visual Arts Proceedings of the 1966 Annual Spring Meeting.*, ed. June Helm (Seattle: Distributed by the University of Washington Press, 1967).

<sup>175</sup> Algirdas Julien Greimas, *Structural Semantics: An Attempt at a Method* (University of Nebraska Press, 1984).

<sup>176</sup> George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, 2nd edition (University of Chicago Press, 2008).

<sup>177</sup> William Labov, “Uncovering the Event Structure of Narrative,” in *Georgetown Round Table* (Georgetown University, 2001), <http://www.ling.upenn.edu/~wlabov/uesn.pdf>.

<sup>178</sup> Labov, 6.

<sup>179</sup> Labov, 3.

<sup>180</sup> Greimas, *Structural Semantics*.

along three oppositional axes. Axes of desire, power, and transmission embody the relationships between object and subject, helper and opponent, and sender and receiver respectively. Lakoff and Johnson provide scholarship on metaphors, with particular focus on the unconscious metaphors people use which shape meaning making. Such implicit metaphors are often embodied<sup>181</sup> originating in our experiences in the physical world. “Balance of power,” “Nation as person,” and “economic health,” are examples of embodied metaphors.<sup>182</sup>

A functional approach to narrative explores how narratives work to assign “rights, duties and obligations.”<sup>183</sup> According to positioning theory, positions are by definition, relational<sup>184</sup> and describe a kind of implicit or explicit power differential between parties in a relationship, which is manifest in hierarchy of designated roles. It follows that power is also relational and demonstrated by the ability to influence or control the Other through dominant positioning. This power hierarchy is what makes positions in a relational system inherently political.

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<sup>181</sup> George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Philosophy In The Flesh* (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 535.

<sup>182</sup> Lakoff and Johnson, 534.

<sup>183</sup> Rom Harré and Luk Van Langenhove, *Positioning Theory: Moral Contexts of International Action*, 1 edition (Oxford ; Malden, Mass: Wiley-Blackwell, 1998), 1.

<sup>184</sup> Harré and Langenhove, 1.

Post-structural approaches to narrative include analysis of power, colonization, and marginalization. Nelson's "Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair"<sup>185</sup> looked at how imposed narratives contribute to identity construction. Cobb's "critical narrative" theory suggested that narrative aesthetics are essential for conflict resolution through construction of "better-formed stories."<sup>186</sup> While each approach emphasizes different aspects of narrative, all are focused on the story as the key mechanism of meaning making.

With my specific goal of bringing interpretive methods to the field of intelligence studies, Dvora Yanow provides a useful point of departure for qualitative, constructivist approaches to policy research in *Conducting Interpretive Policy Analysis* (2000). Such approaches can increase our ways of knowing and bring reflexivity to analysis. The examination of symbolic language, objects and acts in policy analysis is useful in understanding the frames of policy courses of action. This is a break from conventional practice in analyzing policy.

Traditional approaches to policy analysis – using the tools of microeconomics, decision analysis, and others – are conducted under the assumptions of positivist-informed science: that it is not only necessary but also actually possible, to make objective, value-free assessments of a policy from a point external to it. When policy language is examined, for example, a comparison is often made between the words of

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<sup>185</sup> Hilde Lindemann Nelson, *Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair* (Cornell University Press, 2001).

<sup>186</sup> Cobb, *Speaking of Violence*, 2013.

legislation and the projected or implemented actions in the field, under the assumption that policy words can and should have univocal, unambiguous meanings that can and should be channeled to and directly apperceived by implementers and policy-relevant publics.<sup>187</sup>

The study of symbols and metaphors reveal how policy participants make sense of their task. According to Yanow, a symbol is a concrete representation of something else, usually an abstraction that is historically and culturally specific.<sup>188</sup> Symbols also produce collective identity. Hunter wrote that “Symbols serve to unite those who share their meanings, while setting them apart from other people or groups who do not. Knowing these names, traditions, and other symbols is itself important as a symbol of membership in the nation, community, organization, or group. ‘Not to know them is not to belong.’<sup>189</sup>

Yanow defined metaphor “the juxtaposition of two superficially unlike elements (in technical terms, the “vehicle” or source and the “focus”) in a single context, where the separately understood meanings of both interact to create a new perception of the focus of the metaphor (and sometimes of the vehicle as well). Subjected to analysis, the surface unlikeness yields to a set of characteristics found in both metaphoric vehicle and focus.”<sup>190</sup> Lakoff and Johnson wrote on primary and complex metaphors as embodied

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<sup>187</sup> Dvora Yanow, *Conducting Interpretive Policy Analysis* (2455 Teller Road, Thousand Oaks California 91320 United States of America: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2000), 5, <http://srmo.sagepub.com/view/conducting-interpretive-policy-analysis/SAGE.xml>.

<sup>188</sup> Yanow, 14.

<sup>189</sup> Yanow, 14.

<sup>190</sup> Yanow, 42.

through experience in the world.<sup>191</sup> Challenging the notion that metaphor is “a matter of words, not thought,”<sup>192</sup> metaphor is fundamental to cognitive process: “Metaphor is not a harmless exercise in naming. It is one of the principal means by which we understand our experience and reason on the basis of that understanding. To the extent that we act on our reasoning, metaphor plays a role in the creation of reality, Lakoff and Johnson.<sup>193</sup>

As with symbols, complex metaphor use requires a shared understanding that is locally specific. “Local knowledge,”<sup>194</sup> knowledge that is context specific is necessary in both the creation of policy and its analysis. It is a task not only of constructivism, but *constructionism* in which meaning is created in community. Through interpretation, we endeavor to understand meanings metaphors and symbols hold, “their moral (belief), cognitive (value), and affective (feeling) bases.”<sup>195</sup> The concept of local knowledge implies a “lack of universality and eternity” which “stands in marked contrast to positivist notions of the certainty of knowledge.”<sup>196</sup>

Interpretive analysis involves the identification of metaphors and categories of meaning. The analysis of categories “helps identify the architecture of the argument that underlies a policy issue and that, while often not discussed explicitly in policy debates,

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<sup>191</sup> Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy In The Flesh*, 73.

<sup>192</sup> Lakoff and Johnson, 119.

<sup>193</sup> Yanow, *Conducting Interpretive Policy Analysis*, 43.

<sup>194</sup> Yanow, *Conducting Interpretive Policy Analysis*.

<sup>195</sup> Yanow, 16.

<sup>196</sup> Yanow, 17.

nevertheless is part of policy-relevant publics' sense-making. These meanings are carried in the tacit knowledge shared within and among interpretive communities, which is embodied in the category structures."<sup>197</sup> Narrative approaches to policy analysis are relatively new. "Narratives relate things that are understood to have happened; they are fashioned out of all sorts of experiences. In their telling – their engagement and enactment – they also become, themselves, sources of meaning, even when their storied nature is neither explicit nor, at times, recognized."<sup>198</sup>

Emery Roe advocated for narrative analysis of policy: "irrespective of whether or not storytelling is part of policy analysis, policy analysis should be broadened to include systematic ways of analyzing such storytelling. Stories are a fact of life for practicing policy analysts and some form of narrative analysis should be available to these practitioners."<sup>199</sup> While Roe's work primarily focused on a post-structural form of analysis to narratives of environmental policy, he encouraged narrative analysis for all forms of policy texts, including budgets. He argued

Budget texts are increasingly fictional. National budgets are notorious for trying, by way of figures and statistics, to simplify, quantify, and commodify into commensurable units a reality that revolts against such reductionism. The fictional character of national budgets also derives from areas other than this inherent problem of using numbers on the page to refer to things out there.<sup>200</sup>

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<sup>197</sup> Yanow, 56.

<sup>198</sup> Yanow, 58.

<sup>199</sup> Emery Roe, *Narrative Policy Analysis: Theory and Practice* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), 253.

<sup>200</sup> Roe, 3.

Even budgets tell a story. They are authored – and *authorized* – by public servants.

Roe suggested that narrative policy analysis is most useful in “highly uncertain and complex policy issues whose truth-value cannot be ascertained and about which the only thing practicing policy analysts know are the stories policy makers use in articulating these issues.”<sup>201</sup> Its utility is in identifying “the larger story that the issue’s different stories ‘tell’ when they are considered together.”<sup>202</sup> An important aspect in this type of analysis is recognizing the self-replicating power that stories have. Particularly in contentious or uncertain policymaking, stories are difficult to change:

Stories commonly used in describing and analyzing policy issues are a force in themselves, and must be considered explicitly in assessing policy options. Further, these stories (called policy narratives in the book) often resist change or modification even in the presence of contradicting empirical data, because they continue to underwrite and stabilize the assumptions for decision making in the face of high uncertainty, complexity, and polarization.<sup>203</sup>

Roe’s approach to narrative analysis seeks to identify four types of narratives in policy texts. For Roe, *nonstories*, *counterstories*, *metanarratives*, and *stories* have structural definitions. A *story* has the classic form with a beginning, middle and end, originally described by Aristotle. *Nonstories* include intertextual feedback loops with no initial or terminal event and *counterstories* are identified through asymmetry with *stories*.

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<sup>201</sup> Roe, “Narrative Analysis for the Policy Analyst,” 251.

<sup>202</sup> Emery M. Roe, “Applied Narrative Analysis: The Tangency of Literary Criticism, Social Science and Policy Analysis,” *New Literary History* 23, no. 3 (1992): 560, <https://doi.org/10.2307/469220>.

<sup>203</sup> Roe, *Narrative Policy Analysis*, xix.

The *metanarrative* is “the candidate for a new policy narrative that underwrites and stabilizes the assumptions for decision making on an issue whose current policy narratives are so conflicting as to paralyze decision making.”<sup>204</sup> Policy intervention is the construction of metanarrative. Roe’s purpose was not simply academic. His purpose was to overcome narrative barriers to policymaking.

Similarly, Sara Cobb’s work on narrative highlights a practitioner perspective. Her research is oriented to structural and power dynamics of conflict narratives: conflicts are “a function of the stories that are told, retold, and foretold about the conflict.”<sup>205</sup> As structure, Cobb considered Chatman’s three dimensions of narrative:<sup>206</sup> theme, character, and plot. For Cobb, the temporal aspect of character and theme employment is the most significant as plot sequence drives the theory of causality, the logic of meaning making. “Thin” narrative is generated through a simple storyline, which is “‘simple’ across its three dimensions: plot, characters, and themes.”<sup>207</sup> Thin narratives become *conflict narratives* when they terminate “in a set of negative outcomes that are the direct result of the actions of the Other.”<sup>208</sup> Building on the work of Labov, Cobb said that *narrative* is a

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<sup>204</sup> Roe, xxi.

<sup>205</sup> Cobb, *Speaking of Violence*, 2013, 3.

<sup>206</sup> Seymour Chatman, *Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film*, Revised edition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980).

<sup>207</sup> Cobb, *Speaking of Violence*, 2013, 80.

<sup>208</sup> Cobb, 80.

story with an evaluative point.<sup>209</sup> Evaluation is revealed through irony, the moment of reflexivity when a protagonist recognizes her own contribution to tragedy in the conflict narrative.

Cobb offered a critical perspective on narrative, indicating that narratives of power and domination are hidden. *Narrative violence* is suppression of alternative narratives to a *state of exception*: “Separated from narrative, people do not have access to the production of meaning; as a result, neither protest nor politics is possible.”<sup>210</sup> For Cobb, “institutionalized narrative violence can be recognized as a function of the primordial exclusion: racism.”<sup>211</sup> Identification of conflict and “muted” narratives is necessary to conflict resolution but not sufficient. “Better-formed stories”<sup>212</sup> must be written with complexity and attention to aesthetics. They include intricate plots, textured characters, and the production of an ironic Self.<sup>213</sup>

In *Story and Discourse*, Chatman wrote that a narrative is “whole”<sup>214</sup> because of its constituted elements. For Chatman, narrative was a sequential composite of events (plot) and existents – characters and setting. Chatman defined a character as a “paradigm

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<sup>209</sup> Sara Cobb, “Speaking of Violence: The Politics and Poetics of Narrative in Conflict Resolution,” Oxford University Press, Oxford Scholarship Online, June 20, 2013, 35, <http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199826209.001.0001/acprof-9780199826209>.

<sup>210</sup> Cobb, *Speaking of Violence*, 2013, 27.

<sup>211</sup> Cobb, 30.

<sup>212</sup> Cobb, 223.

<sup>213</sup> Cobb, 259.

<sup>214</sup> Chatman, *Story and Discourse*, 21.

of traits” forming “a relatively stable or abiding personal quality.”<sup>215</sup> In plot, the sequencing of events creates a causal link. “A narrative without a plot is a logical impossibility.”<sup>216</sup> The structure of the story conveys meaning.

Eagleton’s *Literary Theory: An Introduction* explored the possibilities and problems with hermeneutics, the interpretation of literary texts. He asked important questions regarding validity that continue to “plague modern literary theory:”

How relevant to this meaning is the author's intention? Can we hope to understand works which are culturally and historically alien to us? Is “objective” understanding possible, or is all understanding relative to our own historical situation? There is, as we shall see, a good deal more at stake in these issues than 'literary interpretation' alone.<sup>217</sup>

For the answer, Eagleton looks to hermeneuticist Hirsch. Though various interpretations of texts are possible, Hirsch said that analysis should respect “the general conventions and ways of seeing which would have governed the author's meanings at the time of writing.”<sup>218</sup> In this way, Hirsch established interpretive norms to avoid what Eagleton called “critical anarchy” and “relativist rot.”<sup>219</sup>

My research will be conducted in four stages. The method will examine the data using Chatman’s three narrative dimensions of theme, character, and plot.<sup>220</sup> The process

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<sup>215</sup> Chatman, 126.

<sup>216</sup> Chatman, 47.

<sup>217</sup> Terry Eagleton, *Literary Theory: An Introduction*, 57, accessed November 29, 2017, <http://archive.org/details/LiteraryTheoryAnIntroduction>.

<sup>218</sup> Terry Eagleton, 58.

<sup>219</sup> Terry Eagleton, 59.

<sup>220</sup> Chatman, *Story and Discourse*.

described below will enable a thorough analysis of narratives in the data and structure the findings. In the construction of final categorical narratives, I will be mindful of my interpretation in full awareness of what the authors intended.

The first stage of analysis involves several close readings of the texts. In this initial step, I will record my observations in a process of “open coding”<sup>221</sup> with attention to the three dimensions of themes, characters, and plot. Open coding will include comments regarding the use of imagery, metaphors, and historical and cultural references as well as summary statements. References to historical events and cultural allusions will require comparison with secondary sources. Notation will also include narrative elements such as protagonist, antagonist, hero, irony, evaluation and genre.

The second step will be the identification and labeling of narrative themes, characters and plots in the data. Labels will emerge from the data during open coding. They will include terminology from the text itself as well as the language of narratology and the three dimensions of theme, character, and plot.

Table 1. Three Dimensions of a Narrative

Themes	major and minor subjects, events, references, ideas, motifs
Characters	roles, traits, descriptions, attributes
Plot	sequence of events, causation, evaluation, irony

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<sup>221</sup> Carla Willig, *Introducing Qualitative Research in Psychology: Adventures in Theory and Method* (McGraw-Hill, 2008), 58.

The third stage of analysis will be the grouping of related narrative dimensions into clusters. I will consider the occurrence of common or similar themes, characters and plots to indicate narrative association. Clusters will be sufficiently distinct from each other to be significant. I will consider the clusters in the larger context of the data to ensure their meaning is consistent with the original intended meaning of the narrator.

Finally, I will depict narrative dimension clusters as categorical narratives that encompass related matter from the narrative dimensions in the data. I will provide summary tables of the structured narrative components, followed by evidence from the data that illustrates each categorical narrative. Detailed citations of the data will be provided. Additionally, I will endeavor to identify evaluative moments of irony in the narratives. Findings will answer critical questions: what stories about Bosnia did the analysts construct and what did those stories mean for U.S. policy?

I will follow these findings with a discussion of meaning making in their larger historical and discursive context. In particular, I will interpret descriptions of the parties in conflict – how the Balkan Other is characterized – in relationship to the American. I will follow this discussion with a “reflections” chapter which includes insights beyond the narrative dimensions approach to analysis.

## CHAPTER FOUR FINDINGS: NARRATIVES ABOUT THE BALKANS

Several close readings and analysis of the theme, character and plot in the *Bosnia, Intelligence, and the Clinton Presidency* data revealed that intelligence analysts and policymakers alike generated four foundational narratives about the Balkans. Narratives were used to understand and explain the Bosnian conflict and to prescribe policy solutions for American intervention. Narratives were also used to justify analytic and policy positions. Narratives were both explicit and implicit.

Explicit narratives named the narrative resources<sup>222</sup> they relied on or were qualified with a methodological explanation. Many examples<sup>223 224 225 226 227</sup> of explicit

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<sup>222</sup> Director of Central Intelligence, “NIE 15-90 Yugoslavia Transformed” (Central Intelligence Agency, October 18, 1990), *Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency*, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>223</sup> DCI Interagency Balkans Task Force, “Intelligence Report Sarajevo: Serbs More Likely to Flee Than Fight” (CIA Historical Collections Division, December 19, 1995), C05917484, *Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency*, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>224</sup> DCI Interagency Balkans Task Force, “Joint Intelligence Report Bosnia: Potential Challenges to the IFOR” (Central Intelligence Agency, October 1995), 2, C05917464, *Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency*, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>225</sup> DCI Interagency Balkans Task Force, “Intelligence Memorandum Resolving Sector East: By Pen or Sword” (CIA Historical Collections Division, October 12, 1995), C05962065, *Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency*, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

narratives include a reference to “scenarios.” In one example,<sup>228</sup> the “Factions” policy forecasting model was applied and included in the intelligence memorandum.

Implicit narratives were the product of assumed knowledge in which themes, characters, and plots combined to create narratives that were not acknowledged as such in the data. Examples of implicit narratives included topics such as the humanitarian crisis,<sup>229</sup> war crimes,<sup>230</sup> sanctions,<sup>231</sup> and crisis management.<sup>232 233</sup>

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<sup>226</sup> Don Kerrick, “Note For: Tony Lake Dayton SITREP #6; November 10, 1995, 1:30am” (CIA Historical Collections Division, November 10, 1995), C06031052, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>227</sup> Anthony Lake, “Memorandum for the President Bosnia Next Steps” (CIA Historical Collections Division, July 19, 1994), C06031038, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>228</sup> CIA Office of European Analysis, “Intelligence Memorandum Greater Serbia: A Balkan Troublemaker for the 1990s” (CIA Historical Collections Division, January 27, 1993), C05916703, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>229</sup> CIA Office of European Analysis, “Intelligence Memorandum The Humanitarian Situation in Bosnia: Problems and Outlook” (CIA Historical Collections Division, August 19, 1992), C05916696, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>230</sup> DCI Interagency Balkans Task Force, “Intelligence Report: Mass Graves in the Former Yugoslavia” (Central Intelligence Agency, October 6, 1995), C05962068, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>231</sup> Leon Feurth, “Sanctions Papers for 8/28 DC” (CIA Historical Collections Division, August 28, 1995), C05956142, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>232</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, “Bosnia-Herzegovina: On the Edge of the Abyss,” October 18, 1990, NIE 15-90, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

Through a combination of the three dimensions of narrative (theme, character, and plot) I interpreted the data to contain four narratives of Balkans. These narratives are discrete. Each narrative had specific uses. However, the narratives were also combined in interesting ways to support policy arguments. I will discuss each narrative and describe how each was used as well as how they were used jointly to explain the conflict and rationalize policy options. In these findings I present excerpts from the data as exemplars. All quotes within the findings chapters are from the data.

### **The Perpetual Conflict Narrative**

The first narrative in the data is that of Balkans as a location of a war loving people for traditional violent conflict. This narrative relied on a violent history of the Balkans as evidence to suggest that a penchant for war is part of Balkan identity. The volatility of the region and BiH specifically is a product of ethnic geography. Predictions infer the logical plot conclusion that war is inevitable and an outside military force will be needed separate parties to conflict – an enforcement of peace.

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<sup>233</sup> Director of Central Intelligence, “NIE 29/15-92 A Broadening Balkan Crisis: Can It Be Managed?” (CIA Historical Collections Division, April 23, 1992), C05918534, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

Table 2. Three Dimensions of the Perpetual Conflict Narrative

Themes	violent history, natural state, tradition, territory, proximity, map, ethnic divide, enforcement, air strikes, clash, paramilitary
Characters	warrior, guerilla, terrorist
Plot	The nature of the parties is conflict-oriented. The Balkans is, has always been, and will be in conflict. An outsider must divide the parties to contain the violence.

The natural state of the Balkan Other as a warrior character appeared in the data from the chronological beginning of analysis in the 1990 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) “Yugoslavia Transformed.” The estimate opens with the following quote from satirist P.G. Woodhouse:

How's the weather, Jeeves?  
 Exceptionally clement, sir.  
 Anything in the papers?  
 Some slight friction threatening in the Balkans, sir.  
 Otherwise, nothing.  
 P. G. Wodehouse *The Inimitable Jeeves*, 1928.<sup>234</sup>

Though seemingly an obscure quote for an intelligence estimate, this quote was a revealing demonstration of a narrative resourced for its mocking tone. The reference was to McIlvaine, Sherby, and Heineman’s *P.G. Wodehouse: A Comprehensive Bibliography and Checklist* which was published in 1990. The wry humor compares a Balkans conflict escalation to the weather. It suggested that “friction” was part of the natural Balkan

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<sup>234</sup> Director of Central Intelligence, “NIE 15-90 Yugoslavia Transformed,” 9.

landscape, beyond human control. This quote was chosen to demonstrate the normalcy and inevitability of conflict in the Balkans which the estimate proceeded to forecast. The analysis was dismissive of the root causes of any specific historical conflict and assumed an inherent inclination of the land and its people toward “friction.” The source of the conflict was ostensibly a defect of the people themselves, a people whose preference was to be at war. The predilection for conflict is a derogatory narrative about the Balkan Other. Associated themes, characterizations and plots appeared throughout the data.

The above NIE warned, that “Yugoslavia will cease to function as a federal state within one year, and will probably dissolve within two. Economic reform will not stave off the breakup.” It also projected that “There is little the United States and its European allies can do to preserve Yugoslav unity.”<sup>235</sup> The estimation of events communicated a sense of inevitability to the conflict and no role for the U.S. or Europe. This narrative forecast an inescapable destiny derived from history:

Bosnia-Hercegovina is at the center of every Yugoslav doomsday scenario. It was Yugoslavia's killing ground in World War II, with Croatian Ustaše and Muslim guerrillas battling Communist Partisans and Serbian Chetniks in a vicious three-cornered struggle. It has escaped major violence during the latest conflict, in large part because memories of past bloodletting are still fresh enough to serve as a deterrent.<sup>236</sup>

The plot logic in the data suggested that animosity of the conflict parties was the cause – not the result – of conflict. Therefore analysis to identify grievances or root causes of conflict was not pursued. UNPROFOR Sector Southwest Commander A.P. Ridgeway captured this dominant perception of the Balkans when he said, “They

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<sup>235</sup> Director of Central Intelligence, iii.

<sup>236</sup> Director of Central Intelligence, 2.

(Bosnian Croats and Muslims) started fighting for no good reason, they stopped fighting for no good reason, and there's no good reason now for them not to start fighting again."<sup>237</sup> Of course there were many "reasons," but a lack of analysis on what those were suggests that either analysts attributed conflict to a kind of cultural defect, or it did not matter because it would not impact decision making.

The cultural defect argument was strong in the use of the word "tradition." In several instances, the data connote that war was not only historic; it was also part of Balkans culture. For example, the title box on a 1913 political map of the Treaty of Bucharest was labeled, "A Balkan Tradition: Instability, Entangling Alliances, and War."<sup>238</sup> In another example, intelligence analysts expected "that Bosnia, Yugoslavia's traditional killing ground will continue to be an open sore, greatly complicating the enforcement of any agreement."<sup>239</sup> The data suggested that repetitive violent ritual is somehow a product of collective impetus derived from traditional values.

The data demonstrated that a violent history was used as proof of violent identity. The 1990 NIE refers to "historically antagonistic religious and cultural identifications" as

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<sup>237</sup> DCI Interagency Balkans Task Force, "Intelligence Memorandum Muslim-Croat Federation: More than a Cease-Fire?" (CIA Historical Collections Division, November 22, 1994), 2, C05917055, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>238</sup> Director of Central Intelligence, "NIE 29/15-92 A Broadening Balkan Crisis: Can It Be Managed?," 8.

<sup>239</sup> DCI Interagency Balkans Task Force, "Assessing the Military Provisions of the Vance-Owen Plan for Bosnia" (CIA, March 3, 1993), 7, C05916761, Freedom of Information Act.

the root causes of the Slovenian and Croatian push for independence.<sup>240</sup> Essentially, the analysis was that the Balkans of the 1990s was antagonistic because the Balkans of the past was antagonistic. The 1992 NIE, “A Broadening Balkan Crisis: Can It Be Managed?” included a picture of a WWI Serbian Soldier. The caption read, "It's 'back to the future' in the Serb-Croat civil war. Grizzled Serbian volunteer militiaman resembles his fore fathers from Balkan Wars, World War I."<sup>241</sup> In this instance, the picture reinforced the image of the natural state of a Serb combatant, casually smoking a cigarette while holding a weapon. The reference, “Back to the Future,” was to a popular comedy science fiction film released in 1985 and suggested that violent history in the Balkans was repeating itself.

In the Clinton Administration’s first National Security Council meeting on Bosnia, Secretary of State Warren Christopher argued:

We should make an all out effort to persuade and convince the parties rather than impose a settlement. On the other hand, we are not talking about an agreement among three Church groups in California. This is the Balkans. It is not realistic to think that we can do without enforcement, even of a good agreement. To give an air of reality to our position, we have to say that the US will assist in carrying out the enforcement, in conjunction with the UN and NATO.<sup>242</sup>

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell agreed:

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<sup>240</sup> Director of Central Intelligence, “NIE 15-90 Yugoslavia Transformed,” 6.

<sup>241</sup> Director of Central Intelligence, “NIE 29/15-92 A Broadening Balkan Crisis: Can It Be Managed?,” 1.

<sup>242</sup> Daniel W. Wagner, “Memorandum for the Record Principals Committee Meeting on ‘Yugoslavia,’ February 3, 1993” (CIA Historical Collections Division, February 4, 1993), C06001412, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

The nature of a Bosnian agreement will require ground forces. We can punish from the air but not enforce from the air. If there is a reasonably good agreement, even by Balkan standards, the casualties would be acceptable. None of the parties would take on a US/NATO force. There would be snipers, road blocks, ambushes, and the like but it would not be a big deal. It will be expensive. We might luck out and be able to flood the country with troops for a time and then get out.<sup>243</sup>

The phrase “even by Balkans standards” provided a characterization of the conflict parties that suggested these were a people incapable of peace. The contrast to “Church groups in California” suggests a moral inferiority, a character flaw in the Balkan Other. This had clear implications for policy when the U.S. intervened.

The volatility of the Balkans was attributed to the cohabitation of ethnic groups. “Bosnia-Herzegovina represents the greatest threat of bringing the fundamental ethnic division in Yugoslavia – that between Serbs and Croats – into large-scale communal violence. This republic's ethnic mix of Muslims (more than 40 percent), Serbs (32 percent), and Croats (18 percent) has always been potentially dangerous.”<sup>244</sup> In this statement, “always” contributed to the sense of normalcy for a people innately oriented to violent conflict. Analysis was decorated with imagery of volatility, including references to “the bubbling Balkans cauldron”<sup>245</sup> and “The Balkan Powder Keg.”<sup>246</sup> This imagery is

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<sup>243</sup> Wagner, 2.

<sup>244</sup> Director of Central Intelligence, “NIE 15-90 Yugoslavia Transformed,” 3.

<sup>245</sup> Director of Central Intelligence, 6.

<sup>246</sup> Director of Central Intelligence, “NIE 29/15-92 A Broadening Balkan Crisis: Can It Be Managed?,” 1.

in direct contrast to the American Melting Pot master narrative which conveys value in diversity, again suggestive of a moral inferiority in the Balkan Other.

Analysis of the population was focused on ethnic geography. The initial estimate of the data collection included an annex which succinctly defined and quantified “The Peoples of Yugoslavia.”<sup>247</sup> The chart of ethnic groups was accompanied by a map of ethnic majorities in Yugoslav provinces. Definitions of *Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Muslims, Albanians, and Hungarians* were categorical and discrete, though it was noted that the Muslims “are almost all ethnic Slavs.”<sup>248</sup> This analysis solidified divisions between identity groups and assumed that the close physical proximity of these groups was the underlying reason for war. Later in the data collection, this analysis was applied to inventories<sup>249</sup> of “who owned what,” the major economic infrastructure including mining facilities, factories, and industrial centers that produced civilian goods. Ultimately, analysis was focused on the percentages of land each group held.<sup>250</sup>

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<sup>247</sup> Director of Central Intelligence, “NIE 15-90 Yugoslavia Transformed,” 13.

<sup>248</sup> Director of Central Intelligence, 13.

<sup>249</sup> CIA Office of Resources, Trade, and Technology, “Intelligence Memorandum Bosnia and Herzegovina: Economic Resource Implications of the Vance-Owen Plan” (CIA Historical Collections Division, April 12, 1993), C05916869, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency.

<sup>250</sup> “Minutes Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, February 5, 1993” (CIA Historical Collections Division, February 5, 1993), C06031020, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

Analysis of the conflict identified the close proximity of distinct ethnic groups as its root cause. The logical conclusion was that to end the war, Bosnia must have a geographic solution. According to intelligence analysis, “Some agencies maintain no settlement is possible without redrawing borders, shifting populations, and guaranteeing minority rights.”<sup>251</sup> The plot logic followed that if ethnic geography was the source of conflict, then conflict resolution would necessitate a reorganization of the map.

UN Special Envoy Cyrus Vance and EC Lord David Owen proposed iterative versions of a new map which came to be known as the “Vance-Owen Plan.” The 1993 Intelligence Memorandum “Bosnia and Herzegovina: Economic Resource Implications of the Vance-Plan” recognized some difficulties with their plan:

The Vance-Owen Plan would not only establish an unequal allocation of Bosnia’s economic assets but also create a geographic configuration that would challenge the economic viability of the three groups of provinces. The patch-work mosaic of provinces would almost certainly complicate the establishment of economic relationships within Bosnia and with neighboring states. The isolation of the Muslim provinces would be especially problematic, and several Serb provinces would also be geographically isolated.<sup>252</sup>

In this statement, analysts recognized that the proposed map was not pragmatic. It created logistics issues which may be insurmountable. However, rather than abandon the map as a foundation for peace, a strategy formed to impose a new map with the help of a NATO-sponsored military coalition.

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<sup>251</sup> Director of Central Intelligence, “NIE 29/15-92 A Broadening Balkan Crisis: Can It Be Managed?,” 5.

<sup>252</sup> CIA Office of Resources, Trade, and Technology, “Intelligence Memorandum Bosnia and Herzegovina: Economic Resource Implications of the Vance-Owen Plan,” 5.

Under the heading “Political Realities,” talking points for a Nation Security Council (NSC) Principals Committee (PC) meeting argued that “Bosnia’s deep ethnic divisions and the conflicting goals of the three factions make the long-term survival of a Bosnian state – even one as decentralized as proposed by Vance-Owen – highly unlikely without the continuing support of a large, well-armed international force.”<sup>253</sup> The judgement was that a negotiated agreement would not stand on its own merit and that some level of military action would be necessary: “Enforcing an agreement will not depend on the provisions of the accord, which the three factions and numerous bands of irregulars and bandits will violate, but rather the willingness of the international community to deploy quickly and sustain indefinitely a large peacekeeping force.”<sup>254</sup>

Further, intelligence analysis argued that any force would need to be well-armed and ready for combat. This would not be the typical “blue helmet” deployment:

UN forces probably would need liberal rules of engagement to deter attacks by irregular forces. UN forces would need to be highly mobile – with armored vehicles and helicopters – and have heavy defensive equipment – such as anti-armor weapons and possibly air cover – to monitor and defend against attacks on safehavens.<sup>255</sup>

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<sup>253</sup> DCI Interagency Balkans Task Force, “Talking Points for Principals Meeting” (CIA, April 17, 1993), 1, C05916872, Freedom of Information Act.

<sup>254</sup> DCI Interagency Balkans Task Force, “Intelligence Report UN Sanctions Against Belgrade: Still Biting despite Waning Enforcement” (Central Intelligence Agency, February 17, 1993), 1, C05916737, Enforcing a Bosnian Peace Settlement, Freedom of Information Act.

<sup>255</sup> DCI Interagency Balkans Task Force, “Intelligence Report Establish Safe Havens Around Srebrenica and Other Bosnian Cities With the Use of Western Military Forces” (Central Intelligence Agency, March 23, 1993), 1, C0591806, Freedom of Information Act, Freedom of Information Act.

Vice President Al Gore was critical of the Vance-Owen Plan but optimistic for an agreement. Minutes of an NSC meeting recorded him saying,

If there truly is an agreement, the requirements of enforcement are minimal. The current Vance/Owen plan would need to be not only enforced but imposed. Then we would have the worst of both worlds. Vance/Owen has a terrible map, and would require lots of American blood and treasure. We do not need to bring to the table a willingness to commit forces.<sup>256</sup>

In this discussion, a moment of irony was evident in the approach to peacemaking. If proximity talks and negotiations truly resulted in an “agreement,” then enforcement should not be necessary. However the map as the focus of peacemaking was not abandoned. The Vance-Owen map was later discarded in favor of a map produced by the American led Contact Group. Land was to be distributed between the Bosnia-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska in the proportion of 51:49. Border negotiations at Dayton were based on this new map.

Intelligence analysts speculated that any involvement from the West would be prolonged.

As to the nature of a settlement, some Intelligence Community agencies maintain that negotiated and internationally supervised border changes and population transfers within Yugoslavia will be required. Other agencies hold that negotiated border and population shifts are generally unworkable and will result in additional violence, economic dislocation, and violations of minority and individual human rights. The Community agrees, however, that either approach would leave in place powerful, potentially violent irredentist forces and require long-term international management.<sup>257</sup>

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<sup>256</sup> “Minutes Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, February 5, 1993,” 5.

<sup>257</sup> Director of Central Intelligence, “NIE 29/15-92 A Broadening Balkan Crisis: Can It Be Managed?,” iii.

The Clinton Administration's transition team consulted the CIA with questions about Bosnia before taking office. In response to the question, "What is the minimum outcome needed for a viable Bosnia?" CIA responded that "most intelligence agencies believe the Western governments would have to take the following steps: Large-scale international military intervention... Lengthy occupation... possible defeat of the Serbian forces."<sup>258</sup>

The prognosis for Bosnia was grim. However a failure to do *something* had larger implications for the United States than just the Balkans:

There is virtually no chance of a real negotiated settlement that leads to interethnic peace. There are, however, two attainable goals: to reduce the likelihood of spillover and the level of ethnic violence. The first is achievable through concerted international application of sanctions; the second would require introduction of outside combat-ready forces with a long-term commitment. Greater US engagement increases the risk that US forces could become involved in the fighting. However, failure to act or to achieve a positive outcome would have a negative impact on the US security role in Europe.<sup>259</sup>

In this logic we see our irony – the people of Bosnia are pejoratively characterized as warriors. To counter them, the West must arm and deploy an occupation force. Policy options became more specific than this, however the fundamental portrayal of a people whose natural status was at war framed all policy considerations moving forward.

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<sup>258</sup> David Cohen, "Memorandum Responses to Transition Team Questions on the Balkans" (CIA Historical Collections Division, December 28, 1992), 38, C06002393, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>259</sup> Director of Central Intelligence, "NIE 29/15-92 A Broadening Balkan Crisis: Can It Be Managed?," v.

### The Muslim Victimhood Narrative

This narrative was employed in analysis of humanitarian needs and war crimes.

The dominant portrayal of Bosnians as victims cast them as innocents in need of responsible and capable outside intervention to counter Serb and Croat aggression. Muslims were powerless, targets of atrocities and suffered neglect at the hands of their own leadership. Characterizations of Muslims as victims had the effect of denying their agency. The plot logic suggested Muslims must rely on the heroes of the West to arm and defend them to end the war.

The characterization of Muslims as victims is interesting in that it is indirect contrast to the first narrative of Perpetual Conflict in which all parties were cast as natural warriors. There are few descriptions of Serb and Croat victimhood in the data. Those present name Croat on Serb and Serb on Croat violence almost exclusively.

Table 3. Three Dimensions of the Muslim Victimhood Narrative

Themes	Fear, pain, rape, ethnic cleansing, mass graves, innocence, harmony, justice, blame, aid, safe havens, refugees, Sarajevo, Mostar, enclaves, exodus
Characters	Bosniaks, Muslims, victims, innocent, proxy, “women and children,” “underdog,” “countryfolk,” “peasants”
Plot	The Muslims are victims of Serb and Croat malevolence. They are defenseless and must be armed and protected by outsiders.

Depictions of Muslims as victims were used in intelligence updates on the Balkans humanitarian situation. In these portrayals, the people were characterized as harmonious, simple peasants. Symbols of bridges and Sarajevo itself were used as themes of accord. The 1992 intelligence memorandum “The Humanitarian Situation in Bosnia: Problems and Outlook”<sup>260</sup> is the best example from the data that illustrates the Muslim Victimhood narrative.

The memorandum provided estimated statistics on displaced persons, refugees, and casualties. For survivors and those remaining in place, descriptions of humanitarian situation by major city (Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Tuzla, and Goradze) included population census and the degree of access to food, water, electricity, medical services, and movement. In Goradze for example, it was only “possible for individuals to walk in and out of the city, but only under sniper attack.”<sup>261</sup> Analysis blamed Serbs for the violence:

The pattern of destruction is different elsewhere. In Mostar and Gorazde, the effort to destroy buildings has been directed almost exclusively at housing areas; central cities are as yet only lightly scarred. In Mostar, where 70-80 percent of houses are destroyed and where 45-60 percent of government and industrial buildings are damaged or destroyed, the destruction was apparently the result of house-to-house incendiaries, with few signs of shelling. The same is true of Gorazde, where reported house-to-house fighting and accurate targeting has left a path of systematic destruction that has become characteristic of the Serbian “ethnic cleansing” campaign.<sup>262</sup>

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<sup>260</sup> CIA Office of European Analysis, “Intelligence Memorandum The Humanitarian Situation in Bosnia: Problems and Outlook.”

<sup>261</sup> CIA Office of European Analysis, 4.

<sup>262</sup> CIA Office of European Analysis, 3.

As a foil to war, this memorandum referenced a history of peaceful co-existence in Sarajevo. “Once Tito's showplaces of ethnic harmony, Sarajevo, Mostar, and Gorazde have become the principal urban venues of terror campaigns that threaten to destroy civil society and inflict famine and disease on a large population.”<sup>263</sup> The harmony theme supported the characterization of Muslims as innocents.

The plot logic of Muslim Victimhood suggested the U.S. should provide humanitarian aid to the Muslims. U.S. airdrops of over eastern Bosnia began on March 5, 1993 despite General Colin Powell’s assertion that air drops “are gimmicky and would look like a gimmick. They are not a serious way of delivering supplies. We would not look good just dropping medicines out of a C-130 and not knowing what happens to them. They could turn up on the black market.”<sup>264</sup> The data show that this in fact occurred; intelligence reported “relief supplies appearing on the thriving black market.”<sup>265</sup>

Population movements were repeatedly described with the word “exodus.” This word is not only descriptive; it evokes the biblical story of Exodus in the Old Testament. This colored migrations with Judeo-Christian sensibility and was suggestive of a moral obligation to deliver victims to a promised land. “Fighting will continue to send Bosnian countryfolk into the already-crowded cities, placing further pressure on urban resources.

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<sup>263</sup> CIA Office of European Analysis, 1.

<sup>264</sup> “Minutes Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, February 5, 1993,” 3.

<sup>265</sup> CIA Office of European Analysis, “Intelligence Memorandum The Humanitarian Situation in Bosnia: Problems and Outlook,” 4.

If the current exodus continues, about 30,000 to 40,000 per week will be displaced. Worsening conditions in winter are likely to send thousands more into Croatia, looking for housing and relief.”<sup>266</sup> This victim framing was also suggestive of intervention policy beyond tactical relief aid. Madeleine Albright was the most vocal protector of Muslim victims in policy debate and said, “If we say we would never impose a settlement, we are blessing ethnic cleansing.”<sup>267</sup>

Now well documented, descriptions of ethnic cleansing in the data were reported as unconfirmed. The reporting was also heavily redacted in the data set. We can speculate that the large sections of missing data are personal stories of atrocities from those who witnessed them. These accounts remain classified, probably to protect privacy and to protect individuals from retribution. General descriptions in the data of ethnic cleansing strategy emphasized the targeting of civilians.

Imagery of Muslim Victimhood includes descriptions and medical facilities that are “medieval” as well as accounts of the discovery of mass graves. One BTF report described the location of mass graves in “Brcko, Bosnia. Multiple mass graves of a large number of bodies of Muslim prisoners from the Brcko-Luka detention camps reportedly are located near a meat packing plant, according to alleged eyewitnesses, some of whom

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<sup>266</sup> CIA Office of European Analysis, 2.

<sup>267</sup> “Minutes Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, February 5, 1993,” 1.

claim they were forced to help bury the bodies.”<sup>268</sup> Finding evidence of mass graves would become an important mission for intelligence following the war.

Establishing the existence of mass graves in the former Yugoslavia could aid ongoing efforts by the UN War Crimes Tribunal to prosecute war crimes suspects by substantiating reported atrocities that the suspects allegedly took part in or ordered. The existence of mass graves may prove to be especially valuable in trials of military commanders by proving that atrocities were committed in areas under their command.<sup>269</sup>

Intelligence analysis of who was “more to blame.”<sup>270</sup> <sup>271</sup> By mid-August 1994, intelligence analysis included statistics on casualties:

According to the most conservative estimate, just over 9,000 people have been killed in the fighting in Bosnia and Hercegovina since early April. These deaths, reported in a Bosnian Government survey based on incomplete data, occurred at a weekly average of about 500 and included 1,200 children. Of the 39,500 serious injuries reported in the same period, about 25 percent occurred to children... estimated that 80 percent of the victims were ethnic Muslims, while... 70 percent of the killed and wounded were civilians.<sup>272</sup>

These statistics became evidence in support of the narrative of Muslim Victimhood.

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<sup>268</sup> DCI Interagency Balkans Task Force, “Intelligence Report: Mass Graves in the Former Yugoslavia,” 3.

<sup>269</sup> DCI Interagency Balkans Task Force, 4.

<sup>270</sup> DCI Interagency Balkans Task Force, “Intelligence Report Bosnia: Serb Ethnic Cleansing.”

<sup>271</sup> Director of Central Intelligence, “NIE 93-22 Prospects for Bosnia” (CIA Historical Collections Division, May 1993), 1, C05621707, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>272</sup> CIA Office of European Analysis, “Intelligence Memorandum The Humanitarian Situation in Bosnia: Problems and Outlook,” 7.

Policy considerations included discussions of how to seek justice for Muslim victims. Intelligence reports identified perpetrators and attempted to determine whether systematic ethnic cleansing could be tied to leadership in Pale and Belgrade. The simultaneous implementation of similar ethnic cleansing tactics in different cities suggested that ethnic cleansing policy was well coordinated and ordered by Serb leadership. However, finding conclusive evidence was a challenge.

Documents that have surfaced in the West purporting to be evidence of Belgrade's direction of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia have proved spurious and virtually impossible to authenticate. The individuals offering such "evidence" often appear to have dubious or self-serving motives and unsavory backgrounds. In addition, the possibility exists that Serbia's rivals in the region – or Serbs trying to spoil the chain of evidence for potential war crimes trials – have fabricated this "evidence."<sup>273</sup>

According to a 1994 intelligence report, "Evidence indicates that ethnic Serb forces have carried out at least 90 percent of the destruction, displacement, and loss of life associated with ethnic cleansing."<sup>274</sup> However, not all agreed:

COL Mike Koerner, former air advisor to UNPROFOR/Sarajevo commander Morillon, provided a first-hand account of the military and humanitarian situation in Bosnia. Koerner stated firmly and repeatedly that the Muslims, Croats, and Serbs are equally guilty of attacks and atrocities, and that agreements they sign are equally unreliable. He described Muslim mortar attacks on Sarajevo airport that wounded several French Legionnaires. Focusing on eastern Bosnia, he explained that sources of reliable information there are few and far between.<sup>275</sup>

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<sup>273</sup> DCI Interagency Balkans Task Force, "Intelligence Report Bosnia: Serb Ethnic Cleansing," 13.

<sup>274</sup> DCI Interagency Balkans Task Force, v.

<sup>275</sup> Norman Schindler, "Memorandum for the Record Principals' Committee Meeting on February 19, 1993" (CIA Historical Collections Division, February 19, 1993), 1, C05916739, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

The data show that a sense of victimhood was expressed by all parties in the conflict. Land became a symbol of victimhood and those who had died on specific battlefields were martyrs tied to earth. General Mladic, military commander of the RS “said in a press interview that borders are drawn in blood and that the Serbs’ goal remains the unification of all Serb territories in Bosnia and Croatia. He reinforced this point with the Dutch UNPROFOR commander in Srebrenica after his forces overran the enclave in July.”<sup>276</sup>

Included in the data is a letter to President Clinton, from RS leader Radovan Karadzic who expressed similar sentiment:

I want to inform you that the Republic of Srpska accepts the Dayton Agreement and that it will assist in its implementation. As you are no doubt aware, however, the Dayton Agreement has, in the case of the city of Sarajevo, already proved dangerously destabilizing. At the stroke of a pen, 150,000 Serbs now living in the wider region of Sarajevo have found themselves facing the prospect of life under the Muslim regime. Needless to say, they do not face this prospect with equanimity. During the war they have repulsed thirty-four Muslim offensives in Sarajevo. If they were to leave, they would be leaving behind the graves of those who have died for Serb Sarajevo, and not just their properties and land.<sup>277</sup>

In this we see another irony of warfare. Combatants fought for land that is not necessarily important to them historically or strategically, except as a bargaining chip in map-based negotiations. Territory was only captured because the other side wanted it for

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<sup>276</sup> DCI Interagency Balkans Task Force, “Intelligence Report Milosevic, Karadzic, Mladic: Serbs More United” (CIA Historical Collections Division, September 5, 1995), 5, C05961549, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>277</sup> Dr. Radovan Karadzic, “Letter to Mr. Bill Clinton” (U.S. Department of State, December 2, 1995), 1, C05962602, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency.

themselves. However, in the conduct of warfare, this land became saturated with meaning. It developed importance because blood was spilt on it. The land as blood metaphor made map based negotiations emotionally-charged. Land forfeited in negotiated compromise reinforced a sense of victimhood and resentment, potentially setting the conditions for the next conflict. Ultimately, the negotiation process was retraumatizing, not just for the loss of land and people killed, but a loss of agency in the sense of victimhood.

At various moments in the data, analysis focused on descriptions of the impacts of war on Muslim children. These references were used to support a perception of victimhood for the Muslim population writ large. The 1992 intelligence memorandum, “The Humanitarian Situation in Bosnia: Problems and Outlook” used images of children in this way. In Bihac, “people in the city are desperate for food; seeing emaciated children in the hospital.”<sup>278</sup> Analysis stated, that the situation in Goradze appeared “catastrophic,” noting that ten percent of the population was children.<sup>279</sup>

In the plot of the Muslim Victimhood narrative, the Clinton Administration considered defending Muslims in a policy called “lift and strike.”<sup>280</sup> This entailed lifting

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<sup>278</sup> CIA Office of European Analysis, “Intelligence Memorandum The Humanitarian Situation in Bosnia: Problems and Outlook,” 20.

<sup>279</sup> CIA Office of European Analysis, “Intelligence Memorandum The Humanitarian Situation in Bosnia: Problems and Outlook.”

<sup>280</sup> Douglas J. MacEachin, “Memorandum for the Record Deputies’ Committee Meeting on Bosnia Serb Sanctions, 9 February 1994” (CIA Historical Collections Division, February 14, 1994), 1, C05915988, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

the arms embargo to promote Muslim military capability. The U.S. would then support Muslims with airstrikes. An overt arming of the Muslims was rejected: “The risk an expanded conflict would pose to their forces on the ground has always been one of the major European objections to lift and strike.”<sup>281</sup> Additionally, NIC analysis assessed that “A UN Security Council decision to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia would intensify the fighting and would not lead to early termination of the conflict.”<sup>282</sup> NATO airstrikes on Serb targets began in 1993 with Operation DENY FLIGHT, followed by DELIBERATE FORCE. A U.S. sponsored train and equip “military stabilization” package for Muslims went into effect later after the DPA was signed.

The Muslim Victimhood narrative was indicative of a one-sided American policy in the conflict. In recognition of this favoritism, a memorandum from CIA to the new Clinton Administration raised the concern of a simplistic “black and white”<sup>283</sup> understanding of the conflict.

As you prepare for meetings this week regarding the Balkan problem and its “solutions,” we believe it is important to sensitize the new policy-making team to the growing danger of Russian alienation from a Western policy toward Serbia. US policy deliberations, as mentioned in the latest NSC tasking may focus heavily on “stopping Serbian aggression” or “rolling back Serbian conquests.” As Russian centrist deputy Evigeniy

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<sup>281</sup> MacEachin, 2.

<sup>282</sup> Director of Central Intelligence, “National Intelligence Council Memorandum Lifting the Arms Embargo: Impact on the War in Bosnia” (CIA, May 13, 1994), 1, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>283</sup> Roger Z. George and George Kolt, “Memorandum Serbia and the Russia Problem” (CIA Historical Collections Division, January 25, 1993), C05916701, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

Kozhokin told us late last week, such an approach, targeted solely at Serbia, will widen the differences.<sup>284</sup>

Further, the memorandum suggested, “we may find the best course will be one that tries to orchestrate our respective influence with the warring parties -- taking advantage of Russian ties to Serbs -- rather than allowing these historical relations to work against an effective international response.”<sup>285</sup> In this communication to the White House, we see both a realization of policy imbalance and an attempt to complicate the Muslim Victimhood narrative. No response to this memorandum was evidenced in the data.

The data showed that when President Clinton arrived in office, his first national security policy review was on Bosnia. “Punitive action against Serbia” and “efforts to establish a war crimes tribunal and to identify and bring criminals to justice” were priority actions for the president.<sup>286</sup> “Justice for Bosnia”<sup>287</sup> was a new American objective in the Balkans. Air strikes and sanctions would be linked to punitive justice, though

Only the US seems to favor retaining linkage between cooperation on war crimes and the relaxation of sanctions. The Principals agreed to revise the US position and to insist only that there must be some progress on war crimes before Belgrade can receive funds from international financial institutions and similar benefits. While all deplored the war crimes, the

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<sup>284</sup> George and Kolt, 1.

<sup>285</sup> George and Kolt, 1.

<sup>286</sup> Anthony Lake, “Presidential Review Directive/NSC-1 U.S. Policy Regarding the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia” (CIA Historical Collections Division, January 22, 1993), C06031019, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>287</sup> Ray Converse, “Memorandum for the Record Deputies’ Committee Meeting on 22 February 1995” (CIA Historical Collections Division, March 7, 1995), 2, C05955861, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

Principals generally felt that linkage with sanctions could impede a settlement which was the more important goal. In addition, the tribunal will be issuing indictments this fall which could be interpreted as making progress on war crimes. However, the US will still seek some boilerplate language involving complying with Security Council resolutions which would implicitly mention war crimes.<sup>288</sup>

Madeleine Albright argued for the war crimes tribunal from the early days of the new administration: “I continue to believe that keeping the Tribunal as a condition for the ‘outer wall’ of sanctions is the right thing to do. The victims of atrocities deserve justice. Removing persons who would foment violence will reduce causes of future conflict. Finally, the Tribunal is one aspect of our Balkans policy that has received consistent public and congressional praise.”<sup>289</sup>

Intelligence analysis suggested justice may also be attained through territorial tradeoffs: “The parties might also consider swapping the two enclaves for traditionally ethnic Serb land in central Bosnia, especially if such a trade increased their share of republic to over 51 percent. Such a swap’s chances for success would increase if it could be publically portrayed as a means for helping to redress ethnic cleansing.”<sup>290</sup> The justice

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<sup>288</sup> Ray Converse, “Memorandum for the Record Principals’ Committee Meeting on 12 August 1994” (CIA Historical Collections Division, August 12, 1994), 2, C05916165, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>289</sup> Madeline K. Albright, “Memorandum for Anthony Lake” (CIA Historical Collections Division, May 25, 1995), 1, Declassified June 6, 2013 US Department of State Case No. O-2013-07795 Doc No. C05358138, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>290</sup> CIA Balkans Task Force, “Bosnian Peace Talks: Negotiating the Sticking Points” (CIA Historical Collections Division, February 1, 1995), 3, C05955839, Bosnia,

mission for intelligence included investigations of ethnic cleansing allegations, finding evidence of mass graves and eventually locating individuals accused of war crimes. The pursuit of justice, primarily punitive in Bosnia granted the U.S. a moral authority to take a leadership of intervention in Bosnia and contributed to its credibility in global events.

### **The Lawlessness Narrative**

The Lawlessness narrative of the Balkans included reports of shady dealings, corruption and pervasive organized crime as evidence of backward economic environment as well as untrustworthy people. Data describing Economic, humanitarian, and military assessments in intelligence analysis all described a robust black market during the Bosnian war. Though analysis in the data acknowledged the role of sanctions played in exacerbating the conflict, the Lawlessness narrative developed more broadly to suggest a perception that criminality was a cause of conflict rather than the result. The assumptions of Balkans Lawlessness was a point of departure for a plot logic advocating for outside enforcement of the new order agreed to at Dayton.

Table 4. Three Dimensions of the Lawlessness Narrative

Themes	black market economy, embargo, sanctions, backward, corruption, credibility, trust, guilt, “punitive measures,” “security vacuum,” enforcement, “consequence package,” war crimes, tribunal
Characters	criminals, mafia, “henchmen”
Plot	The Balkans is lawless. An outsider must impose order on the chaos and punish the criminals.

UN sanctions implemented in 1992 contributed to the devaluation of soft Yugoslav currency and economic turmoil.

... persistently high inflation – at least 100 percent annually – and widespread unemployment continue to plague the economy. The Serbian Trade Minister estimated this summer that UN sanctions have thrown half the labor force out of work, according to Belgrade press accounts. While many of the unemployed probably augment their jobless benefits by working in the black and grey markets, living standards for most Serbians have plummeted.<sup>291</sup>

In this environment, criminal activity became necessary for many to meet their most basic needs. One intelligence report on the humanitarian situation in Sarajevo stated

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<sup>291</sup> DCI Interagency Balkans Task Force, “Intelligence Memorandum Serbia’s Milosevic: In the Driver’s Seat” (CIA Historical Collections Division, October 26, 1995), 6, C05917470, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

that “Relief supplies [were] appearing on the thriving black market. In Muslim areas, security forces are well provisioned; civilians short on food.”<sup>292</sup>

Criminal activity was rampant in the military domain: “... all of the warring parties have managed to get weapons even with an arms embargo through friendly countries or via the gray/black arms market.”<sup>293</sup> While Serbia and Croatia were well armed, the UN arms embargo in place since 1991 was thought to have a disproportionate effect on Muslims. “The success of the embargo in denying armaments to Bosnian Government forces stems from their geographic isolation: they are surrounded by Serbs and Croats,” however, “Malaysia and Iran have smuggled in limited amounts of ordnance and munition components.”<sup>294</sup>

Characterizations in the data depicted Milosevic, Karadzic, Mladic, Tudjman, and Izetbegovic and as cunning, untrustworthy, and deceitful. “... none of the parties can be trusted to act in good faith.”<sup>295</sup> These attributes delegitimized conflict parties, complicating the conduct of diplomacy, particularly the negotiations at Dayton. Analysis showed that Croat and Serb leadership allegedly were personally benefitting from a

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<sup>292</sup> CIA Office of European Analysis, “Intelligence Memorandum The Humanitarian Situation in Bosnia: Problems and Outlook,” 4.

<sup>293</sup> Deputy Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force, “Memorandum for Deputy Director for Intelligence: Deputies’ Committee Meeting, 20 Sept., 1430-1600, The White House Situation Room” (CIA Historical Collections Division, September 21, 1995), 5, C05961575, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>294</sup> Director of Central Intelligence, “National Intelligence Council Memorandum Lifting the Arms Embargo: Impact on the War in Bosnia,” 2.

<sup>295</sup> Director of Central Intelligence, “NIE 93-22 Prospects for Bosnia,” 2.

chaotic economic environment. Some were “involved in war profiteering and black-market arms sales.”<sup>296</sup>

Serbian President Milosevic was considered the most corrupt. The data showed that Milosevic was regarded as a kind of mafia boss of a vast criminal enterprise.

According to intelligence analysis, Milosevic

turned a blind eye to the MUP's [Ministry of Internal Affairs] reported involvement in black marketeering and its close ties to organized crime. US diplomats report, for example, that MUP customs officials deliberately overlook the contraband and drug-smuggling activities of gangs in exchange for organized crime assistance in making back-channel hard currency transactions for the Serbian Government.<sup>297</sup>

FRY Customs Director Kertes was described as a “longtime Milosevic henchman.”<sup>298</sup>

Milosevic’s shifting view on the Greater Serbia project was evidence of his deceitful nature. Intelligence anticipated a Serb counteroffensive in Krajina. When it did not come, intelligence analysis judged, “Milosevic’s inaction during the recent Krajina fighting demonstrates his very high threshold for a setback to ‘Greater Serbia.’”<sup>299</sup>

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<sup>296</sup> DCI Interagency Balkans Task Force, “Intelligence Report Croatia: Tomislav Mercep’s Role in Atrocities” (Central Intelligence Agency, October 19, 1995), 2, C00974925, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>297</sup> DCI Interagency Balkans Task Force, “Intelligence Memorandum Serbia’s Milosevic: In the Driver’s Seat,” 4.

<sup>298</sup> DCI Interagency Balkans Task Force, “Intelligence Report Belgrade’s Support for the Bosnian Serb Army: Apparently Ongoing” (Central Intelligence Agency, November 14, 1995), 2, C05962539, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>299</sup> DCI Interagency Balkans Task Force, “Intelligence Memorandum Serbia’s Milosevic: In the Driver’s Seat,” 2.

Further, “Milosevic has decided, apparently correctly, that his sanctions and war-weary constituency have tired of the sacrifice required to unite all Serbs in one state.”<sup>300</sup>

Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic is carefully controlling the tone and direction of domestic political debate as he continues steering towards a negotiated settlement of the Bosnian conflict and away from the strident nationalist rhetoric that marked his policy in the early 1990s. Indeed, so skillful has Milosevic been at reversing the public's former consensus for "Greater Serbia" that the recent military setbacks in the Krajina and western Bosnia have sparked neither an outpouring of ultranationalism nor even a serious public questioning of his peace policy.<sup>301</sup>

At Dayton, the lack of trust between all parties and negotiators created tremendous uncertainty. According to Holbrooke, “Izetbegovic would take the prize for the most unreasonable and uncooperative at the table – and maybe the least trustworthy for the months ahead.”<sup>302</sup> A colorful story from a Dayton report cast the parties in a classic American mobster film:

In scene reminiscent of the Godfather, two families (don Sloba and outcast Bosnian Serbs, don Izy and Federation) held truly remarkable six-hour map marathon. Despite hours of heated, yet civil exchanges, absolutely nothing was agreed. Astonishingly, at one moment parties would be glaring across table, screaming, while, at another moment minutes later they could be seen smiling and joking together over refreshments. Nevertheless, not clear Sarajevo solvable. Completely different views. During day, U.S. tabled "special district" proposal. Bosnians presented

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<sup>300</sup> DCI Interagency Balkans Task Force, 2.

<sup>301</sup> DCI Interagency Balkans Task Force, 2.

<sup>302</sup> John C. Gannon, “Principles’ Committee Meeting on Bosnia November 22 1995” (CIA Historical Collections Division, November 27, 1995), 3, C05962556, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

country-wide 60% map proposal rejected by Serbs. Serbs agreed to present map Thursday. Saga continues<sup>303</sup>

UN sanctions and the arms embargo created conditions which contributed to a rise in criminal activity. Ironically, this reinforced the perception of the population and leadership as criminal and untrustworthy. The data show that the Americans felt they could not trust any of the parties to adhere to DPA principles. The plot logic followed that peace and a new governance structure would need to be imposed and enforced. The NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) began its mission immediately after the signing of the DPA. It was followed by a decade of Stabilization Force (SFOR) occupation, and finally by the European Union Force (EUFOR) which is still operating in BiH as of 2017.

### **The Fanaticism Narrative**

The data showed that American analysis viewed the Balkans as a place of irrational fanaticism. This was an important aspect in American diplomacy and specific policy decisions regarding the peace process. The portrayal of leadership as ultranationalists was especially salient at Dayton in the exclusion of Bosnian Serb leadership who it American participants believed could not be reasoned with.

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<sup>303</sup> Don Kerrick, “Note For: Tony Lake Dayton SITREP #5; November 9, 1995, 2:00am” (CIA Historical Collections Division, November 9, 1995), 1, C06031051, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

Table 5. Three Dimensions of the Fanatic Narrative

Themes	medieval, crusade, Greater Serbia, Greater Croatia,
Characters	intransigents, radicals, “hot heads,” ultranationalists, “true believers”
Plot	The conflict parties are irrational fanatics. An outsider must bring reason to the conflict.

Character attributes included radicalism, irrational intransigence, and instability described as “drama” and “outbursts” throughout the data. From a September 1995 meeting with Milosevic, a diplomatic cable reported:

MILOSEVIC RAISES THE BOMBING FREQUENTLY AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO PROGRESS AND SOMETHING THAT COULD MAKE PALE MORE INTRANSIGENT. AT THE SAME TIME, HE HAS YET TO INVEST THIS ISSUE WITH THE SAME DEGREE OF EMOTION OR HIGH RHETORIC THAT MARKS HIS MOODS ON, SAY, KARADIC’S CRAZINESS, SANCTIONS RELIEF, OR THE FUTURE ABALKAN ECONMIC ZONE. HIS HIGHLY THEATRICAL (AND FREQUENT) TRIPS UPSTAIRS TO TELEPHONE MLADIC – AND LAST NIGHT, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN OUR PRESENCE (HE SAAID) KARADJIC – ARE NOT SIMPLY THEATER; HIS FRUSTRATION WITH MLADIC IS GROWNING VISIBLY AND HE NOW FREELY ADMITS THAT THE GENERAL, WHOM I BELIEVE HE’S SCARED OF, IS A MAJOR OBSTACLE TO HIS GOALS AS WELL AS OURS.<sup>304</sup>

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<sup>304</sup> Richard Holbrooke, “Diplomatic Cable: Belgrade Talks” (CIA Historical Collections Division, September 4, 1995), 2, C05961548, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

Radicalism was problematic for the diplomacy of Realpolitik which was predicated on “rational” action. In identifying radicals, analysis focused on determining which of the leadership believed their own nationalist narratives and which were simply leveraging them to secure popularity and power. Who were the true believers?

All radicalism had religious overtones, but most was not fundamentally religious. In fact, a serious point of discussion toward the end of the war was how to get the Iranians out of Sarajevo for fear Iranian influence would convert a largely secular population to religious extremists. This was a security issue for American personnel who would deploy with IFOR. It was feared that remaining mujahedin would target them in terror attacks. U.S. concern was that there was “... no reassurance from Izetbegovic that he intends to eliminate the official Iranian presence, or the Sunni extremist groups in Bosnia. Moreover, the dispersion of foreign mujahedin units into Bosnian army formations suggests that he does not intend to expel the bulk of the mujahedin presence.”<sup>305</sup> However, Izetbegovic’s affinity toward Iran was a pragmatic not religious one:

Bosnia has an ongoing reason for preserving Iran's presence; in October, Tehran pledged \$47 million for Bosnian arms procurement. This commitment to Bosnia coming after three years of support when no other country was meeting Bosnia's defense needs has engendered a strong sympathy for Iran among officials close to Izetbegovic, including Army chief of staff Delic.<sup>306</sup>

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<sup>305</sup> Ray Converse, “Memorandum Principals’ Committee Meeting, 4 Dec. 1430-1600, The White House Situation Room” (CIA Historical Collections Division, December 4, 1995), C05962598, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>306</sup> Converse.

Of the leadership, Tudjman was the only one to cite religious justification for the war. “Tudjman has invoked both publicly and privately Croatia's mission as the eastern bulwark of Christendom against Islam and Slavic Orthodoxy and its role in ‘civilizing’ the Bosnians.”<sup>307</sup> Tudjman’s zealotry was at least partially rooted in his Christian beliefs.

Intelligence analysis judged that belief in the destiny of a Greater Serbia was mixed for Serb leaders. As noted above, Milosevic was assessed as using the narrative for his own political gains, not because of personal conviction. Intelligence assessed that Karadzic “like many Serbs, is infused with a strong sense of victimhood” however, “Despite his identification with Serb martyrdom, there is no reporting to indicate that Karadzic is prepared to go down for the cause.”<sup>308</sup> In fact, analysts raised the point that consolidation of RS into a Greater Serbia would diminish Karadzic’s role and there was no doubt that “Karadzic enjoys the limelight.”<sup>309</sup> Mladic was seen as the “truest believer” often stating “that he will not surrender ground for which his forces ‘have shed blood.’”<sup>310</sup> Intelligence assessed that Mladic’s radicalism made him the most intransigent and therefore the least amenable to negotiation.

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<sup>307</sup> DCI Interagency Balkans Task Force, “Intelligence Memorandum President Tudjman Stacks the Elections” (CIA Historical Collections Division, October 20, 1995), 5, C05917468, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>308</sup> DCI Interagency Balkans Task Force, “Intelligence Report Milosevic, Karadzic, Mladic: Serbs More United.”

<sup>309</sup> DCI Interagency Balkans Task Force, 3.

<sup>310</sup> DCI Interagency Balkans Task Force, 4.

*Intransigent* was a word commonly used to describe all parties to conflict throughout the data. This characterization communicated that reasoned discussion with Balkan leadership was impossible. The source of intransigence was varied however. An intelligence response to the Clinton Administration's transition team explained:

... it may be possible to reach a negotiated settlement in which the three major communities – Muslim, Croat, and Serb – can agree to co-exist in some sort of federal arrangement which could be politically and economically viable with a far smaller degree of foreign military intervention and involvement. The main obstacle to such an outcome is Serb intransigence, fueled by the belief that the Serbs basically have won the conflict and the international community is unwilling to intervene to alter the situation on the ground. INR believes some level of outside intervention would be required to alter the present balance of forces, and it would not be small.<sup>311</sup>

According to this assessment, the Serbs were intransigent because they were winning with war and had no incentive to negotiate. However Iranian covert arms sales to the Muslims eventually shifted the military balance, changing the Serb calculus.

Though Mladic was the *de facto* leader<sup>312</sup> of the Bosnian Serbs, his intransigence was rooted in radical martyrdom and was the least open to negotiation. He was therefore a poor candidate to bargain for settlement. Thus the U.S. used Milosevic as a proxy for Mladic (and Karadzic) in the Dayton process. It was a risk to rely on Milosevic for RS compliance. In one of the final Principals' Committee meetings before Dayton, President Clinton asked, "Can Milosevic deliver the Bosnian Serb leadership?" The pentagon

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<sup>311</sup> David Cohen, "Memorandum Responses to Transition Team Questions on the Balkans," 40.

<sup>312</sup> DCI Interagency Balkans Task Force, "Intelligence Report Milosevic, Karadzic, Mladic: Serbs More United," 4.

explained, “the US would demand statements from Bosnian Serb leaders (when designated by Milosevic) supporting the peace plan (with military annex) and guaranteeing safety of IFOR including US forces.”<sup>313</sup> Mladic and Karadzic were excluded and their acceptance of DPA terms would come later.

At Dayton, the data records the unpredictability of the Balkans leadership. Opinions within the U.S. government differed on what to expect. “Holbrooke presents the Bosnian Serbs as the tough sell, and downplays the difficulties of bringing the Bosnian government into the agreement. Balkan Task Force analysis is the reverse – Bosnian Serbs are ready to deal and Bosnian government will be the problem. BTF will continue to track and report.”<sup>314</sup>

By all accounts, the negotiations at Dayton were frenzied: “Hectic pace on all fronts. Tudjman hosted dinner last night for his two amigos (Izy, Slobo) at officers club. Remain amazed at their ability to turn on charm socially while spouting venom in negotiations. Izy inability to bring his delegation to united position threatens Dayton success.”<sup>315</sup> “Two amigos” was a reference to a popular Western parody film, *The Three Amigos* (1986). Casting the men in this movie suggested there were absurd antics at

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<sup>313</sup> Gannon, “Principles’ Committee Meeting on Bosnia November 22 1995,” 1.

<sup>314</sup> D.C. Blair, “Principles’ Committee Meeting on Bosnia August 22 1995” (CIA Historical Collections Division, August 23, 1995), 1, C05956138, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>315</sup> Don Kerrick, “Note For: Tony Lake Dayton SITREP #9; November 14, 1995, 1:10am” (CIA Historical Collections Division, November 14, 1995), 1, C06031056, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

Dayton. Other depictions included accounts that "... the Deputies will discuss the appropriate military-to-military contacts with Croatia, given their Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, character regarding offensives in Bosnia and Croatia"<sup>316</sup> and "Eastern Slavonia talks continue but it is impossible to tell whether today's events foreshadow breakthrough when Christopher arrives or are simply SLOBO-DRAMA."<sup>317</sup>

At Dayton, the RS delegates were excluded from the talks and were not signatories to the agreement. The "Milosevic Strategy" was a choice by the American negotiating team who believed Mladic would never sign an agreement and did not want to legitimize RS with a seat at the Dayton table. However, the subordination of Pale to Belgrade created pressure in the uncertainty that Milosevic could speak for Karadzic and Mladic and guarantee their compliance with the agreement. Ironically, this played to RS advantage in the final version of the map which favored Serb tactical positions. Conspicuously absent from the data is any mention that Bosnian Prime Minister Sacirbey resigned in the middle of the Dayton negotiations leaving Izetbegovic to make concessions. White House discussions following Dayton were captured in the data. Participants, including the DPA critics agreed to tone down the description of the new map as a "'ratification' of ethnic cleansing."<sup>318</sup>

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<sup>316</sup> Deputy Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force, "Memorandum for Deputy Director for Intelligence: Deputies' Committee Meeting, 20 Sept., 1430-1600, The White House Situation Room," 1.

<sup>317</sup> Kerrick, "Note For: Tony Lake Dayton SITREP #6; November 10, 1995, 1:30am," 1.

<sup>318</sup> A. Vershbow, "Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee" (CIA Historical Collections Division, December 5, 1995), 5, C05962599,

In summary, four essential narrative of the Balkans framed the analysis of the conflict and policy options. Narratives of Perpetual Conflict, Muslim Victimhood, Lawlessness, and Fanaticism each suggested plot logic for U.S. intervention. In the discussion, I will discuss how these narratives created a distorted perception of the Balkan Other. The meaning ascribed to the Balkans is consistent with Said's concept of Orientalism.

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Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency,  
<http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

## CHAPTER FIVE DISCUSSION: THE BALKAN OTHER

### Narrative Resources in Constructing the Balkan Other

My findings showed four narratives (Perpetual Conflict, Muslim Victimhood, Lawlessness, and Fanaticism) generated in the intelligence analysis of the Bosnian War. American perceptions of conflict parties were simplistic and largely based on assumptions of intrinsic character flaw. What is the basis of these perceptions? Scholars have explored the historical and literary sources of narratives about the Balkans which have impacted Western thinking.

In *Imagining the Balkans* (1997), Maria Todorova described the negative connotation of the word *Balkan*. The modern interpretation of *Balkan*, and its derivation *Balkanization* is one of political disorder and disintegration. The abstraction of the term to other geographic and metaphoric contexts demonstrates “internalized unfavorable narratives.”<sup>319</sup> According to Todorova, the term was “coined at the end of World War I to describe the ethnic and political fragmentation that followed the breakup of the Ottoman Empire”<sup>320</sup> and first appeared in the *New York Times* in 1918. Ironically, the 20th

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<sup>319</sup> Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (Cary, NC, USA: Oxford University Press, USA, 2009), 36, <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/alltitles/docDetail.action?docID=10288288>.

<sup>320</sup> Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, 33.

century history of south-eastern Europe was dominated by Yugoslavia, “whose creation was, technically speaking, the reverse of balkanization.”<sup>321</sup>

Todorova argued that the history of pejorative meaning of Balkan began with texts from ancient Greece, which depicted the “antagonism between the civilized and barbarians” the “cultured South and the barbarous North.”<sup>322</sup> In ancient Greek texts, the people of the Balkans possess “passion but not love,” they are “coarse and ruthless” Thracians.<sup>323</sup> In his *History of the Peloponnesian War*, Thucydides described the brutality of the northern tribes as well as corrupt practices of bribery. He wrote:

The Thracians bursting into Mycalessus sacked the houses and temples, and butchered the inhabitants, sparing neither youth nor age, but killing all they fell in with, one after the other, children and women, and even beasts of burden, and whatever other living creatures they saw; the Thracian race, like the bloodiest of the barbarians, being even more so when it has nothing to fear. Everywhere confusion reigned and death in all its shapes; and in particular they attacked a boys’ school, the largest that there was in the place, into which the children had just gone, and massacred them all. In short, the disaster falling upon the whole town was unsurpassed in magnitude, and unapproached by any in suddenness and in horror.<sup>324</sup>

According to Todorova, the negative connotation of *Balkan* persisted into the 20<sup>th</sup> century, permeating American political and literary discourse. Chicago Daily News correspondent Paul Mowrer used *Balkanization* to mean “the creation of a region of hopelessly mixed races, of a medley of small states with more or less backward

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<sup>321</sup> Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, 33.

<sup>322</sup> Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, 11.

<sup>323</sup> Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, 40.

<sup>324</sup> Thucydides, “The History of the Peloponnesian War, by Thucydides 431 BC,” trans. Richard Cravley, Project Gutenberg, February 7, 2013, [http://www.gutenberg.org/files/7142/7142-h/7142-h.htm#link2H\\_4\\_0027](http://www.gutenberg.org/files/7142/7142-h/7142-h.htm#link2H_4_0027).

populations, economically and financially weak, covetous, intriguing, afraid, a continual prey to the machinations of the great powers, and to the violent promptings of their own passions.”<sup>325</sup> Todorova noted the use of the term in Steinbeck’s *Travels with Charlie*<sup>326</sup> to describe the disparity in gasoline tax between American states. For Todorova, the abstraction of the term to other geographic contexts suggested that the pejorative meaning has been internalized.

In the case of Bosnian War in the 1990s, my findings are consistent with Todorova’s arguments. Intelligence narratives indicated that analysts came to their task with preconceived impressions of the Balkans. In particular, the characterizations of warriors, criminals and fanatics are aligned with those of historic narrative resources. It is possible that two other sources of Balkans exoticism would have influenced analysis of the Bosnian War – the literary genres of spy novels and travelogue.

Andrew Hammond explored images of the Balkans during the Cold War in the medium of British spy novels. According to Hammond, British thrillers portrayed the Balkans as a region of adventure, danger, espionage, mystery and ambiguity. Popular culture literature after World War II was infused with “archetypal symbols of Cold War tyranny: a callous police, a tyrannized crowd, and an omniscient Soviet-led dictatorship.”<sup>327</sup> In particular, spy novels depicted a region of intrigue – sites where

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<sup>325</sup> Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, 34.

<sup>326</sup> Todorova, 36.

<sup>327</sup> Andrew Hammond, ed., *The Balkans and the West: Constructing the European Other, 1945-2003*, New edition (Aldershot, Hampshire, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub Ltd, 2004), 50.

British intelligence and Soviet spies would exchange information. Murder, ruthlessness, betrayal, martial law, corruption, and black marketeering are emphasized in the literature. These themes reinforced the primitive character of the Balkans and its “cultural impoverishment.”<sup>328</sup>

Hammond suggested the negative imagery of Yugoslavia in British thrillers was an extension of anti-Soviet discourse writ large – a demonization of the communist political economy. He argued:

... the Eastern bloc is a space defined by negatives. With the landscape again reduced to a few strategic motifs, the writer dwells on the absence of exactly that plenitude, or ‘essence,’ that characterizes the ‘post scarcity’ West: specifically, the elements of leisure, commerce and consumer wealth, whose lack is perceived as inimical, even destructive to human life... The consumerism of the West may be criticized, and set up as a mirror to the deficiencies of communism, but it is still the norm against which South-East Europe is perceived, gauged and finally found wanting.<sup>329</sup>

Cold War ideology, pervasive in all areas of American cultural life, reinforced negative narratives in the denigration of the Balkans. The popular British thriller genre of the post-World War II era sustained a long tradition of unfavorable portrayals.

It is interesting to note that President Clinton reportedly read Gerlald Seymore’s *The Heart of Danger* (1995) set in early 1990s Croatia.<sup>330</sup> One review described this British spy novel as “an arresting narrative of physical adventure, geopolitical intrigue,

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<sup>328</sup> Hammond, 53.

<sup>329</sup> Hammond.

<sup>330</sup> Michael T. Kaufman, “The Dangers of Letting a President Read,” *The New York Times*, May 22, 1999, sec. Books, <https://www.nytimes.com/1999/05/22/books/the-dangers-of-letting-a-president-read.html>.

and moral ambiguity in a savagely tribal world where ancient enmities have swamped the rule of law.”<sup>331</sup> There is no direct evidence in the data that intelligence analysts read spy novels. However, the pervasive Balkans setting in fictional stories of Cold War espionage is indicative of a larger cultural sensibility of that the Balkans was a place of intrigue.

Cynthia Simmons denounced travelogue as the primary influence on Western misunderstanding of conflict in former Yugoslavia. In particular, two books - *Rebecca West's Black Lamb and Grey Falcon* (1941) and Robert Kaplan's *Balkan Ghosts* (1993) had disproportionate impact on U.S. foreign policy in the early 1990s. Simmons wrote that these books “had immense impact on the understanding of and subsequent policy creation in the region. In relatively peaceful times, their generalizations and misrepresentations failed to promote true understanding. In times of war, they affected policies that resulted in human rights disasters.”<sup>332</sup>

Simmons argued convincingly that genre confusion regarding these works made their reductionist assumptions especially damaging through “potentially harmful stereotyping.”<sup>333</sup> According to Simmons, the flaw in these books was that they were fiction posing as history. In the case of West's book, genre confusion stemmed not only from substantive historic descriptions, but also the format of the book which included a bibliography and index. In *Balkan Odyssey* (1996), David Owen noted that he was

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<sup>331</sup> “The Heart of Danger by Gerald Seymour | Kirkus Reviews,” Kirkus, November 1, 1995, [www.kirkusreviews.com/book-reviews/gerald-seymour/the-heart-of-danger](http://www.kirkusreviews.com/book-reviews/gerald-seymour/the-heart-of-danger).

<sup>332</sup> Cynthia Simmons, “Baedeker Barbarism: Rebecca West's *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon* and Robert Kaplan's *Balkan Ghosts*,” *Human Rights Review* 2, no. 1 (2000): 109.

<sup>333</sup> Simmons, 109.

rereading Rebecca West as he considered whether or not to take up the role of peace mediator in the former Yugoslavia. President Clinton is known to have read *Balkan Ghosts*. Reeves claimed the book had a direct impact on the President's thinking. According to Reeves, Clinton said, "it says that we can't succeed doing anything in that society. They've been killing each other for thousands of years and they're going to keep doing it."<sup>334</sup>

Narrative resources from historical texts as well as 20<sup>th</sup> century literature embraced and perpetuated undesirable characterizations of the Balkan Other. According to Todorova, Hammond and Simmons, pejorative narratives were pervasive in the political and cultural milieu of intelligence analysts in the 1990s. The Othering of the Balkans can be considered a type of Orientalism. As a phenomenon, Orientalism dates to ancient times but has found new life in post-Cold War security. The following section will illustrate some of Orientalism's key aspects.

### **Orientalism**

Edward W. Said's *Orientalism* describes the scope and structures of Orientalism as well as the transition from British and French to American hegemony in international relations. "Orientalism" as a concept is a way of imagining the Other, distorted to emphasize differences. It is tied to colonialism and the reasoning that explained the necessity of imperialism beyond economic interest. Though we can frame Orientalism as

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<sup>334</sup> "Stories of Bill: Interview with Richard Reeves, Author of Running in Place a book about Clinton's first year in office," Frontline, October 8, 1996, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline//shows/choice/bill/reeves.html>.

a political justification for colonization, the understanding of “the Oriental” predates European colonial world order. Depictions of the exotic imagery, tropes and motifs of the East have occurred in art, music and literature of the West since medieval times. According to Said, ““Oriental” was canonical... employed by Chaucer and Mandeville, by Shakespeare, Dryden, Pope, and Byron. It designated Asia or the East, geographically, morally, culturally.”<sup>335</sup> As a phenomenon, Orientalism is evidenced in both cultural-artistic and political pursuits. It is essentially a “technology of Othering.”<sup>336</sup>

Said’s explanation of Orientalism was based on the connection between knowledge and power. In *Orientalism*, Said narrated the story of Foreign Secretary James Arthur Balfour’s 1910 call for the British occupation of Egypt. In his speech to parliament, Balfour said, “We know the civilization of Egypt better than we know the civilization of any other country. We know it further back; we know it more intimately; we know more about it.”<sup>337</sup> This logic suggested that England knew Egypt better than Egypt knew itself. The knowledge obliged England to occupy Egypt for the sake of Egyptians:

England knows Egypt; Egypt is what England knows; England knows that Egypt cannot have self-government; England confirms that by occupying Egypt; for the Egyptians, Egypt is what England has occupied and now governs; foreign occupation therefore becomes “the very basis” of

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<sup>335</sup> Said, *Orientalism*, 25th anniversary ed., 1994, 63.

<sup>336</sup> Carmen Birkle, “Orientalisms in ‘Fin-de-Siècle’ America,” *Amerikastudien / American Studies* 51, no. 3 (2006): 323.

<sup>337</sup> Said, *Orientalism*, 64.

contemporary Egyptian civilization; Egypt requires, indeed insists upon, British occupation.<sup>338</sup>

This reasoning combines concepts of power and knowledge directly.

“Expertise” is the rationale for domination of Egypt:

Knowledge means rising above immediacy, beyond self, into the foreign and distant. The object of such knowledge is a “fact” which, if it develops, changes, or otherwise transforms itself in the way that civilizations frequently do, nevertheless is fundamentally, even ontologically stable. To have such knowledge of such a thing is to dominate it, to have authority over it. And authority here means for “us” to deny autonomy to “it” – the Oriental country – since we know it and it exists, in a sense, as we know it.<sup>339</sup>

This example demonstrates an unusually explicit link between knowledge and power concepts, a link that is often hidden.<sup>340</sup>

In the case of Bosnia, knowledge of the Other justified a power-based, coercive approach to ending the war, followed by a regime of enforcement. While the knowledge-power connection is less explicit in the data, it is clear that knowledge of the Balkan Other – an assumed knowledge – resulted in American power projection. This knowledge was born of and reinforced a discourse of orientalism, the distorted view of the Balkan Other who was incapable of rationality. This discourse limited options of conflict intervention to coercive means.

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<sup>338</sup> Said, 66.

<sup>339</sup> Said, 64.

<sup>340</sup> Martin Kilduff and Mihaela Kelemen, “Deconstructing Discourse,” in *The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Discourse*, ed. David Grant et al., 1 edition (London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2004), 263.

According to Said, Balfour spoke on behalf of the “civilized West”: “As a rhetorical performance Balfour’s speech is significant for the way in which he plays the part of, and represents, a variety of characters.”<sup>341</sup> Balfour and his colleague, the English envoy to Egypt Lord Cromer, used several terms to describe the Orientals, always in opposition to the strength of Western civilization: “The Oriental is irrational, depraved (fallen), childlike, ‘different’; thus the European is rational, virtuous, mature, ‘normal.’”<sup>342</sup> As this research on the intelligence analysis of the Bosnian War has shown, U.S. intelligence analysts developed similar constructs of the Balkan Other. For example, assumptions of Balkan irrationality are evidenced in the Fanaticism narrative discussed above. Said’s “childlike” characterization is evidenced in the intelligence narrative of Muslim Victimhood.

For the Orientalist, the understanding of Self and Other in the Oriental-European relationship was necessarily one of domination. Said argued that “Egypt was not just another colony: it was the vindication of Western imperialism; it was, until its annexation by England, an almost academic example of Oriental backwardness; it was to become the triumph of English knowledge and power.”<sup>343</sup>

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<sup>341</sup> Said, *Orientalism*, 66.

<sup>342</sup> Said, 72.

<sup>343</sup> Said, 66.

According to Birkle, a resurgence of political Orientalism in fin de siècle America manifest in a preoccupation with race which had domestic and foreign consequences.<sup>344</sup> The 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act was the first such law to deny entry and citizenship on racial grounds.<sup>345</sup> The Orientalist movement coincided with the development of ethnography as a subdiscipline in anthropology which sought to study “exotic cultures.”<sup>346</sup> America saw parallel trends in Orientalist literature and art. Notably, Rudyard Kipling’s poem “White Man’s Burden” advocated<sup>347</sup> for the U.S. occupation of the Philippines in 1898.

In his critique of Said, Bryce notes that an absence of Ottoman Empire in Said’s bipolar argument. “The material presence of the Ottoman state, in the Arabic-speaking lands, but also crucially, and for a longer period, much of south-east Europe and Anatolia, highlights long-standing Oriental geopolitical and cultural agency in the face of unidirectional narratives of western encroachment.”<sup>348</sup> This is a fair criticism and adds to the complexity of historical reality over perception. However, the mechanisms of

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<sup>344</sup> Birkle, “Orientalisms in ‘Fin-de-Siècle’ America.”

<sup>345</sup> Lee, Erika. *At America’s Gates: Chinese Immigration during the Exclusion Era, 1882-1943*, New edition (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003).

<sup>346</sup> Birkle, “Orientalisms in ‘Fin-de-Siècle’ America,” 323.

<sup>347</sup> Patrick Brantlinger, “Kipling’s ‘The White Man’s Burden’ and Its Afterlives,” *English Literature in Transition, 1880-1920* 50, no. 2 (January 30, 2007): 172–91, <https://doi.org/10.1353/elt.2007.0017>.

<sup>348</sup> Derek Bryce, “The Absence of Ottoman, Islamic Europe in Edward W. Said’s Orientalism,” *Theory, Culture & Society* 30, no. 1 (January 1, 2013): 99, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276412456562>.

Orientalism as an Othering device are still valid and evident in the American post-Cold War foreign and domestic security constructs.

In the modern era, Said has critiqued the analysis of American diplomats as Orientalist. Henry Kissinger offered the Newtonian revolution<sup>349</sup> and derivative technologies as proof of Western superior intellect and rationality. Retired Bureau of Intelligence and Research officer, Harold Glidden published a “psychological portrait of over 100 million people, considered for a period of 1,300 years” that was “the apogee of Orientalist confidence.”<sup>350</sup>

In 1990, George H.W. Bush Administration advisor Bernard Lewis published his article “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” which included the phrase “Clash of Civilizations” before the 1993 publication of Huntington’s famous article and later book by the same name. The motif of “Muslim Rage” was revived in Newsweek’s 2012 cover piece “Muslim Rage” after a violent response to the “Innocence of Muslims” movie release on YouTube. The Newsweek article elicited an overwhelming Twitter response<sup>351</sup> in parodies of #muslimrage.

Huntington’s 1993 Foreign Policy article *Clash of Civilizations?* launched a new era of post-Cold War neo-Orientalism. Huntington argued, “The fault lines between

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<sup>349</sup> Said, *Orientalism*, 79.

<sup>350</sup> Said, 81.

<sup>351</sup> “‘Muslim Rage’ Explodes On Twitter, But In A Funny Way (Yes, Really),” NPR.org, accessed December 3, 2017, <https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2012/09/17/161315765/muslim-rage-explodes-on-twitter-but-in-a-funny-way-yes-really>.

civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.”<sup>352</sup> According to Huntington, increased interaction between culturally different people in a shrinking world was the cause of conflict. “*Clash*” was published in the moment of the Balkan’s War and global destabilization, the collapse of the bipolar security paradigm.

In the Bosnian War case, a neo-Orientalist perspective provided a framework for American policy elites to understand and respond to global events occurring outside of their accustomed Realist security paradigm. Intelligence narratives and their characterizations of the Balkan Other fit a renewed Orientalist discourse in American politics. The narratives intelligence analysts and the American foreign policy response in Dayton foreshadowed the new East-West dichotomy of the Global War on Terror in the 2000s.

For the United States, a new ethnic framing of security, which began in Bosnia, has hardened since 9/11. According to Tuastad, “imaginaries of ‘terrorism’ and ‘Arab mind’ backwardness can be seen as closely connected: the latter explains the former as irrational – violence thus becomes the product of backward cultures.”<sup>353</sup> The peak of the ethnic security in practice was evidenced in the U.S. military’s “creation and deployment of ‘Human Terrain Teams,’”<sup>354</sup> and the mapping of ethnic geography in Iraq and

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<sup>352</sup> Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1993): 22, <https://doi.org/10.2307/20045621>.

<sup>353</sup> Dag Tuastad, “Neo-Orientalism and the New Barbarism Thesis: Aspects of Symbolic Violence in the Middle East Conflict(S),” *Third World Quarterly* 24, no. 4 (2003): 591.

<sup>354</sup> Andrew Bickford, “Report from the Field: Skin-in-Solutions: Militarizing Medicine and Militarizing Culture in the United States Military,” *North American Dialogue* 11, no. 1 (April 1, 2008): 5, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1556-4819.2008.00002.x>.

Afghanistan. Bickford argued that the co-option of anthropology for military purpose – its use “as a weapon in counterinsurgency operations” was “directly at odds with the AAA [American Anthropological Association] code of ethics.”<sup>355</sup> The entrenched Orientalism in intelligence analysis is equally problematic. As Said wrote, “the nexus of knowledge and power creating ‘the Oriental’ and in a sense obliterating him as a human being is... not for me an exclusively academic matter.”<sup>356</sup>

In summary, an American neo-Orientalist analytic lens on the Bosnian War generated intelligence narratives that distorted the Balkan Other. Perpetual Violence, Muslim Victimhood, Lawlessness, and Fanaticism narratives revealed a derogatory perception of the Balkan Other. The plot logics of these narratives led to American conflict intervention that was necessarily coercive. The process which led to Dayton as well as DPA implementation assumed an irreconcilable circumstance in the Balkans. As a result, the institutional divisions acquired at Dayton froze conflict in the Balkans and launched a new post-Cold War era in American security framed by ethnic identity and Orientalism.

Intelligence narratives precluded alternative, collaborative approaches to peacemaking. If prevailing intelligence narratives were problematic, what were the other possibilities for narrative production? The following is a discussion of narratives that were explicitly raised and dismissed in the data. Each was an opportunity for reframing analysis of the conflict.

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<sup>355</sup> Bickford, 5.

<sup>356</sup> Said, *Orientalism*, 59.

## Absent Narratives

Absent narratives were suggested in the data when individuals challenged the plot logic of inertial events. These moments of self-realization were openings for the production of Cobb's "ironic Self."<sup>357</sup> One instance of unfulfilled challenge to dominant narrative described above in Vice President Gore's questioning of the meaning of *agreement*. There are three other significant such moments evidenced in the data.

Two National Intelligence Officers, the NIO for Europe and the NIO for Russia and Eurasia coauthored a memorandum to the Acting Director of Central Intelligence during the first week of President Clinton's Administration. Appropriately raising their concerns through their chain of command, they cautioned against Russian alienation in a one-sided approach to the "Balkan problem."<sup>358</sup> The memorandum highlighted Russian "empathy for Serbia:"

The government and moderate politicians recognize that the Serbs are committing abominable actions. They also want Russian policy to remain in synch with that of the West. They feel, however, that the West is painting the situation in black and white terms, rather than recognizing that all warring parties must share some of the blame – a view which also is held by the Intelligence Community.<sup>359</sup>

The memorandum suggested "a strategy that tries to enlist Russian influence with Serbs, along with other Western partners who have influence with Croatia and the Bosnian

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<sup>357</sup> Cobb, "Speaking of Violence: The Politics and Poetics of Narrative in Conflict Resolution."

<sup>358</sup> George and Kolt, "Memorandum Serbia and the Russia Problem," 1.

<sup>359</sup> George and Kolt, 3.

Muslims, is more likely to be successful than one that simply punishes those who are judged as the guilty.”<sup>360</sup>

In addition to indicating the U.S. perspective on the war was simplistic, the expression “black and white,” quite literally described the American historic experience with ethnic divide. Internalized narratives regarding race and ethnicity as discrete categories defined American understanding of the Balkan Other. The data showed explicit quantified “census-ing” of Balkan ethnic groups.

In another challenge to dominant narratives, the CIA hosted an academic conference which took place September 30 - October 1, 1993, *The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict to National and International Order in the 1990s: Geographic perspectives*. The papers presented at this conference were included in the *Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency* data. This conference gathered geographers and anthropologists with ethnic conflict expertise, in recognition that ethnic conflict was a global phenomenon in the post-Cold War era, not just a Balkans issue. Generally, the report reflected concerns from academia regarding the ethnic map as a solution to violent conflict. Dr. Stanley Brunn, from University of Kentucky asked “Are We Prisoners of Our Maps?”<sup>361</sup> Dr. Alexander Murphy, from the University of Oregon cautioned

...plans that have been articulated for the division of Bosnian territory into monoethnic regions fail to take into consideration several fundamental

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<sup>360</sup> George and Kolt, 1.

<sup>361</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, “The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict to National and International Order in the 1990s: Geographic Perspectives,” Conference Report, October 1995, 187, C00123268, *Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency*, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

territorial and ethnic realities – one of which is that, for all the usefulness of the generalized ethnic map of the country, it hides as much as it reveals... It is not a reflection of underlying patterns of territorial ideology, nor of functional patterns of interaction before the 1989 civil war. It is in fact, not even really... possible to create monoethnic territories in that region. This implies the need for a different kind of strategy to conflict resolution.<sup>362</sup>

Though internal questions were raised regarding the American policy strategy in Bosnia, there is no evidence that these narrative challenges gained traction. It would seem that alternative approaches to peace were “muted,”<sup>363</sup> the dissenters reabsorbed “into the empire’s gravitational field.”<sup>364</sup>

A final absent narrative in the data is the one for peace. The data showed that Intelligence analysts assessed there was no one among the conflict parties advocating for peace.

Bosnian Government: Bosnian leaders firmly believe that they can regain territory from the Bosnian Serbs and preserve the concept of a unified Bosnia within its internationally recognized boundaries only by military pressure. They are increasingly confident of their own military capabilities and see the tide swinging in their favor as they look out several years. There is no significant politically organized opposition within the Muslim community to this vision. The Bosnian Croats are largely satisfied with the territory they now control and take their guidance from Zagreb, not Sarajevo. The Herzegovinian hardliners leading the Bosnian Croats ultimately hope to be integrated into a Greater Croatia, a vision that Tudjman does not discourage.

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<sup>362</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, 23.

<sup>363</sup> Cobb, “Speaking of Violence: The Politics and Poetics of Narrative in Conflict Resolution.”

<sup>364</sup> Richard E. Rubenstein, “Conflict Resolution in an Age of Empire,” in *Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution*, ed. Dennis J. D. Sandole et al. (London ; New York: Routledge, 2009), 504, <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/georgemason/docDetail.action?docID=10258292>.

There is no significant peace faction in the Croatian leadership...There is no significant peace faction in Knin... There is no significant peace party in Serbia.<sup>365</sup>

Essentially, intelligence judged that peace narratives were absent. This is in keeping with previous assessments that characterized the Balkan Other as “a warrior” in perpetual conflict. It is difficult to imagine that there were no potential sponsors for peace anywhere in the Balkans. In this, American policy should revisit the concept of “leveling the playing field,” and opt for promoting a narrative balance of power rather than a military one. This would involve the identification, magnification and replication of peace narratives through any means possible.

Gramsci wrote, “The starting-point of critical elaboration is the consciousness of what one really is, and is ‘knowing thyself’ as a product of the historical process to date, which has deposited in you an infinity of traces, without leaving an inventory.”<sup>366</sup> The following chapter reflects on the production of Self in opposition to the Balkan Other. In addition to narrative production regarding the Balkans, the data showed intelligence analysts and policy makers repeatedly referenced American heritage narratives. Imagery and metaphors evoked the Wild West and suggest the reimagining of the Balkans as a *frontier*. I will begin these reflections with a brief discussion of the work on Self and Other from the academic literature.

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<sup>365</sup> DCI Interagency Balkans Task Force, “Intelligence Memorandum The Balkans: The Next Three Months” (CIA Historical Collections Division, February 23, 1995), 1, C05955868, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>366</sup> Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, 25th anniversary ed., 1994, 57.

## CHAPTER SIX REFLECTIONS: THE NEW FRONTIERISM

### Self and Other

Tajfel wrote on the social psychological aspects of intergroup behavior. He defined social identity as “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the emotional significance attached to that membership.”<sup>367</sup> As such, the notion of Self is not individually produced. It is relational, a function of social group affinity.

Tajfel argued that four concepts of intergroup relations are connected: social categorization, social identity, social comparison and psychological distinctiveness.<sup>368</sup> Social categorization is the process of locating Self in society. “The characteristics of one’s group as a whole (such as its status, its richness or poverty, its skin colour or its ability to reach its aims) achieve most of their significance in relation to perceived differences from other groups and the value connotation of these differences.”<sup>369</sup> For Tajfel, the need for difference (psychological distinctiveness) drives social comparison.

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<sup>367</sup> Henri Tajfel, *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations* (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 69.

<sup>368</sup> Tajfel, 69.

<sup>369</sup> Tajfel, 71.

Tajfel related social identity to security. He argued “one can distinguish between ‘secure’ and ‘insecure’ social identity. A completely secure social identity would imply a relationship between to (or more) groups in which a change in the texture of psychological distinctiveness between them is not *conceivable*.”<sup>370</sup> Social identity “security” for Tajfel is a product of a (relatively) stable social order. It follows that the social production of an intensely differentiated Self is emphasized in moments of insecurity.

For American intelligence analysts who spent their careers identifying Self with their national security role in opposition to the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union’s collapse may indeed have been “inconceivable.” The Intelligence Community’s failure to anticipate this event, even as unlikely, may indicate the essentially human preference for stable social order. In this case, Self and Other was manifest in a simple bipolar order of American-Soviet differentiation, the cornerstone of Cold War international relations realist theory. For those analysts in the business of security, the threat generated from the up-ended global social order in the 1990s produced a new need for differentiation – the reinforcement of Self through opposition to the Balkan Other.

In *Writing Security*, Campbell highlighted the bipolarity of normal/pathological which naturalizes Self and estranges Others.<sup>371</sup> He wrote about the “moral space” of identity: “Foreign Policy, understood as one of the practices that contingently constructs

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<sup>370</sup> Tajfel, 77.

<sup>371</sup> David Campbell, *Writing Security : United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis, MN, USA: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 89, <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/alltitles/docDetail.action?docID=10159576>.

through stylized and regulated performances the identity of the state in whose name it operates, is more obviously dependent on discourses of fear and danger.”<sup>372</sup> For Campbell, the very circumstance of writing for security distorted images of the Other. Intelligence analysis comprises its own threat-oriented genre of writing. Campbell argued,

the social space of inside/outside is both made possible by and helps constitute a moral space of superior/inferior, which can be animated in terms of any number of figurations of higher/lower. For example, in delineating the domain of the rational, ordered polity from the dangerous, anarchic world in which it was situated, Hobbes did more than draw a boundary: he enumerated the character of each realm by arguing that the former was the residence of good, sane, sober, modest, and civilized people, while the latter was populated by evil, mad, drunk, arrogant, and savage characters.<sup>373</sup>

Intelligence narratives of the Balkans in the 1990s support Campbell’s assertions. As the case of Bosnia shows, narratives of the Balkan Other amplified negative attributes. As a genre, security writing for peace is problematic.

For Bruner “Self-making is a narrative art.”<sup>374</sup> He argued that we “constantly construct and reconstruct a self to meet the needs of the situations we encounter, and do so with the guidance of our memories of the past and our hopes and fears for the future.”<sup>375</sup> In this, Bruner adds a temporal component to our understanding of Self-

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<sup>372</sup> Campbell, 73.

<sup>373</sup> Campbell, 73.

<sup>374</sup> Jerome Bruner, “Self-Making Narratives,” in *Autobiographical Memory and the Construction of A Narrative Self: Developmental and Cultural Perspectives*, ed. Robyn Fivush and Catherine A. Haden, 1 edition (Mahwah, N.J: Psychology Press, 2003), 138.

<sup>375</sup> Bruner, 138.

production, adding that past memories and future expectations also build our sense of Self. Self-making is a cumulative<sup>376</sup> activity based on experiences but also our perceptions of those experiences. In Bruner, we find that the Self is not only constructed socially but internally from memory. The Self “relies on selective remembering to adjust the past to the demands of the present and the anticipated future.”<sup>377</sup>

It is clear how the intelligence analysis regarding the Bosnian War and Dayton constructed the Balkan Other. But how did it construct Self? It is an oddity of intelligence analysis that Self is doctrinally suppressed from intelligence narratives. Because policy is thought to be the politicians’ domain, Self-reflexivity is muted. As I discussed above, the politicization of intelligence has been blamed for more than one intelligence failure. If Self and Other are generated in tandem, where is the analytic Self?

### **The Wild West?**

A comprehensive review of the data revealed a current of Wild West metaphors and cultural references interspersed throughout the body of the documents. Intelligence analysts and policymakers alike evoked the American West to explain, defend, and persuade fellow analysts of their positions on Bosnian War developments. Wild West narrative resources appeared in both subtle and explicit depictions of Bosnian conflict data.

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<sup>376</sup> Bruner, 138.

<sup>377</sup> Bruner, 140.

“The West” as intended in the data referred to the United States and European countries in opposition to the Balkans “East.” However, another interpretation of “West” is possible. “*Western* intervention,” may suggest a redramatization of American heritage narratives in the Balkans.

References in the data compared the Balkans War to the American Wild West. One such intelligence report from November 1995 described how “a ‘wild west’ atmosphere has prevailed in Sector East for some time.”<sup>378</sup> In reference to a popular Western parody, A Dayton Situation Report recounted, “Tudjman hosted dinner last night for his *two amigos* (Izy, Sloba) at officers club.”<sup>379</sup> Interestingly, the Bosnian War data collection included prominent horse idioms. The intelligence assessment from September 18, 1995 was titled *Croatia: Riding High, Riding Roughshod*.<sup>380</sup> In reference to an upcoming negotiation in New York, the NSC Deputies’ Committee discussed that “there will be heavy pressure on the Muslims to sign, but – barring an imposed solution – they will hold out for ‘the cavalry.’”<sup>381</sup>

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<sup>378</sup> CIA Balkans Task Force, “Security Environment Facing International Forces in Sector East” (CIA Historical Collections Division, November 14, 1995), 2, C05962536, Freedom of Information Act.

<sup>379</sup> Kerrick, “Note For: Tony Lake Dayton SITREP #9; November 14, 1995, 1:10am,” 1.

<sup>380</sup> CIA Balkans Task Force, “Croatia: Riding High, Riding Roughshod” (CIA Historical Collections Division, September 18, 1995), 1, C05961592, Freedom of Information Act.

<sup>381</sup> Daniel W. Wagner, “Memorandum for the Record Deputies’ Committee Meeting on March 1, 1993” (CIA Historical Collections Division, March 1, 1993), 2, C059167, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

Other aspects of Bosnian war story were only analogous to the Wild West. For example, the atmosphere of lawlessness described in my findings was consistent with a Wild West setting, but there is no evidence that analysts had the American West in mind. However, a significant motif associated with the Wild West is worth detailing because of its pervasiveness in the explicit framing of the peacemaking process. The following section describes the use of poker metaphors in negotiation strategy.

### **A Poker Game**

In reference to diplomacy, negotiation, and military action, the data revealed continued use of game and sports metaphors. American policy strategy was frequently referred to as a “game plan,”<sup>382</sup> final negotiations as “endgame strategy,”<sup>383</sup> and diplomatic pressure as a “full court press.”<sup>384</sup> Military strategy was “leveling the playing field,”<sup>385</sup> “linebacker-type”<sup>386</sup> campaigns, and military order of battle was a

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<sup>382</sup> National Security Council, “Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee” (CIA Historical Collections Division, August 28, 1995), 3, C05956141, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>383</sup> Sandy Berger, “Memorandum for Madeline Albright Subject: Bosnia Strategy” (CIA Historical Collections Division, July 20, 1995), 1, C05960733, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>384</sup> Ray Converse, “Memorandum for the Record Subject: Report on Deputies Committee Meeting January 11, 1995” (CIA Historical Collections Division, January 18, 1995), 3, C05955818, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>385</sup> Berger, “Memorandum for Madeline Albright Subject: Bosnia Strategy,” 3.

“scorecard.”<sup>387</sup> Map negotiations at Dayton were even suggestive of video games in the use of “Powerscene, the extraordinary high-tech, highly classified system we have here courtesy the Defense Mapping Agency.”<sup>388</sup> Overwhelmingly, the type of game most referenced in explaining all aspects of the Bosnian was not a game of skill, but a game of chance – a card game – specifically poker, a game very much in keeping with *Western* intervention.

The poker metaphor was employed not only for the Dayton negotiations themselves, but in the proximity talks (shuttle diplomacy) leading to Dayton, and in assessments of leadership intentions and military capabilities. The negotiation table was a poker table; horse trades of bargaining chips were less the rational action of Realpolitik, but more like gambling, fraught with risk, uncertainty and luck. All participants – parties in conflict and Contact Group partners – were considered “players.”<sup>389</sup> Territory,

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<sup>386</sup> Chief, DCI Balkans Task Force, “Memorandum Principals’ Committee Meeting on Bosnia, 5 September 1995” (CIA Historical Collections Division, September 4, 1995), 2, C05961541, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>387</sup> DCI Interagency Balkans Task Force, “Intelligence Memorandum Bosnian Croat Military Forces: Holding Their Ground” (CIA, September 14, 1993), 2, C05916911, Freedom of Information Act.

<sup>388</sup> Richard Holbrooke, “Closure or Close-down: The Situation as of 2 AM” (CIA Historical Collections Division, November 17, 1995), 2, C06031059, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>389</sup> CIA Office of European Analysis, “Intelligence Memorandum Greater Serbia: A Balkan Troublemaker for the 1990s,” 3.

hostages, civilians, sanctions, and mutual recognition were “bargaining chips,”<sup>390</sup> items of value that measured relative success in the game.

Many descriptions of negotiation explicitly used the terminology of card play. For example, Dayton negotiations were imagined as successive rounds of poker in which participants gambled that they held the stronger hand: “An American map went to Milosevic immediately thereafter, preceded only by a meeting with Tadjman, who usually holds the aces in this game.”<sup>391</sup> The diplomatic equivalent of folding was revealed in an incident when Washington recalled diplomat Bob Frasure from Belgrade for consultations “given the lack of progress on the mutual recognition plan and Milosevic’s attempts to up the ante.”<sup>392</sup>

Bringing parties to the table became an exercise in assuring parties they could win at least some rounds of negotiation. The BTF reported, “Bosnian Government leaders appear unsure of the strength of their negotiating hand and are concerned that international pressure may force them to concede too much in talks.”<sup>393</sup> At various points

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<sup>390</sup> National Security Council, “Bosnia: Strategic Choices” (CIA Historical Collections Division, May 17, 1995), 2, C05960880, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>391</sup> Kerrick, “Note For: Tony Lake Dayton SITREP #9; November 14, 1995, 1:10am,” 4.

<sup>392</sup> Lake, “Memorandum for the President: Principals’ Review of Bosnia Policy,” 1.

<sup>393</sup> DCI Interagency Balkans Task Force, “Intelligence Report The Bosnian Government: Divisions Show Confusion in Peace Negotiations” (Central Intelligence Agency, September 27, 1995), 1, C0591567, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

in diplomacy, participants played the “economic card”<sup>394</sup>, the “nationalist card,”<sup>395</sup> and a “tough card.”<sup>396</sup> Before Dayton, CIA judged that French intentions to directly negotiate with Pale Serb could “create strains with the Bosnian Government and undercut... efforts to play the Milosevic card.”<sup>397</sup>

Uncertainty was expressed with card game references. For example, an NSC discussion referred to the issue of Sector East in Croatia as a “wild card”<sup>398</sup> in proximity talks. Similarly, CIA assessed that “Bosnian Serb military commander Mladic is a wild card; although generally a Milosevic ally, he will not readily follow orders to give up territory for the sake of an agreement.”<sup>399</sup> In the summer of 1995, there were

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<sup>394</sup> Kerrick, “Note For: Tony Lake Dayton SITREP #9; November 14, 1995, 1:10am,” 1.

<sup>395</sup> DCI Interagency Balkans Task Force, “Intelligence Report: Balkan Conflict Spillover Unlikely in Near Term” (Central Intelligence Agency, December 21, 1995), 1, C05962616, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>396</sup> Ray Converse, “Memorandum for the Record Deputies’ Committee Meeting on 27 April 1995” (CIA Historical Collections Division, May 5, 1995), 1, C05960251, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>397</sup> CIA, “Foreign Policy Group Meeting on Bosnia” (Central Intelligence Agency, June 21, 1995), 1, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>398</sup> Ray Converse, “Memorandum for Associate Deputy Director of Intelligence for Military Affairs: Deputies’ Committee Meeting, 24 October, Time: 0700” (CIA Historical Collections Division, October 23, 1995), 2, C05962112, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>399</sup> Director of Central Intelligence, “NIE 93-22 Prospects for Bosnia,” 4.

disagreements as to whether the French were “bluffing or serious about withdrawing their UNPROFOR troops if no agreement was forthcoming.”<sup>400</sup>

With regards to the U.S. playing its own hand, the question of U.S. *credibility* was a frequent theme throughout the data. Credibility for the United States at the world’s poker table was associated with achieving a peace agreement in Bosnia. Madeleine Albright said, “our Administration’s stewardship of foreign policy will be measured – fairly or unfairly – by our response to this issue.”<sup>401</sup> Credibility within the Balkans was equated to military force: “The maintenance of a credible NATO military threat will continue to restrain the Bosnian Serbs, who want to avoid direct military engagement with the West.”<sup>402</sup> In the spring of 1995, diplomacy was unproductive. The absence of progress was attributed to a lack of credibility in American military resolve:

Principals discussed ways to restore UN and NATO credibility in order to deter new Bosnian Serb military attacks on the eastern enclaves and other areas. They agreed that the Interagency Working Group should look at the possibility of using NATO air power against Serb air defense sites around Bihac, both to enable the U.S. and NATO to conduct humanitarian air drops in that region and to discourage Serb efforts to strangle Srebrenica and other safe areas.<sup>403</sup>

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<sup>400</sup> CIA, “Foreign Policy Group Meeting on Bosnia,” 1.

<sup>401</sup> Madeline K. Albright, “Memorandum for the National Security Advisor” (CIA Historical Collections Division, August 3, 1995), 2, Declassified March 3, 2009 US Department of State Case ID 200705000, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>402</sup> National Intelligence Council, “Special Estimate Strict Enforcement of Exclusion Zones: Military and Political Implications” (CIA Historical Collections Division, September 20, 1994), 1, C05916191, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>403</sup> National Security Council, “Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee” (CIA Historical Collections Division, March 17, 1995), 2,

In the aftermath of the Srebrenica genocide, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Madeleine Albright wrote to National Security Advisor, Tony Lake: “We should actively pursue a peace settlement now. Recent actions by NATO, as well as the military credibility inherent in the rapid reaction force have given UNPROFOR a small window of credibility.”<sup>404</sup> During proximity talks, U.S. negotiator Richard Holbrooke all but called in air support for his negotiations:

A RESUMPTION OF THE BOMBING TONIGHT IS AN ESSENTIAL COMPONENT OF OUR NEGOTIATING STRATEGY – WE RECOGNIZE – AND INDEED I WILL CONTINUE TO ASSERT PUBLICLY – THAT THE BOMBING WAS NOT DESIGNED FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT HAS, RATHER, A NECESSARY RESPONSE TO THE OUTRAGEOUS ATTACK IN SARAJEVO. BUT ITS VALUE IN BOTH BELGRADE AND SARAJEVO IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY CLEAR.<sup>405</sup>

The credible use of force became credibility at the negotiation table. In the Bosnian poker game, the U.S. did not bluff.

The metaphor of a card game was used throughout the data. The data suggested that participants conceptualized settlement of the Bosnian conflict as game of chance, bolstered by credibility in military force. As one OSD paper from the data assessed,

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C05955918, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency,  
<http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>404</sup> Albright, “Memorandum for the National Security Advisor,” 3.

<sup>405</sup> Holbrooke, “Diplomatic Cable: Belgrade Talks,” 2.

“Anything short of a robust force able to meet all contingencies would be a calculated gamble.”<sup>406</sup>

The continuous reinforcement of negotiation as poker metaphor was consistent with a Wild West setting for the Bosnian War. However, the evidence for a total reimagining of the Balkans as the Wild West falls short. In constructing the Self, the data correlate more to American exceptionalism – a product of frontier – than a literal re-enactment of American heritage. Frontierism may explain the expeditionary solution to conflict in the Balkans.

### **The New Frontierism**

In the *Road to the Dayton Accords* (2005), David Chollet wrote that the geostrategic framing of U.S. policy on Bosnia was ultimately about defining the future of U.S.-Russia relations in a post-Cold War paradigm.<sup>407</sup> Including Russia in the Contact Group negotiations culminated in unprecedented NATO-Russia military cooperation within the Implementation Force (IFOR). The Balkans was the final frontier of the Cold War.

Scholars on the American West have written on the importance of *frontierism* in the American consciousness. Historians trace the concept to Frederick Jackson Turner’s

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<sup>406</sup> T. Longstreth, “Implementing a Peace Agreement in Eastern Slavonia,” November 16, 1995, 2, C05962541, Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bosnia-intelligence-and-clinton-presidency>.

<sup>407</sup> Chollet, *Road to the Dayton Accords*.

late nineteenth century conference paper, *The Significance of the Frontier in American History*. Turner wrote:

The peculiarity of American institutions is, the fact that they have been compelled to adapt themselves to the changes of an expanding people – to the changes involved in crossing a continent, in winning a wilderness, and in developing at each area of this progress out of the primitive economic and political conditions of the frontier into the complexity of city life.<sup>408</sup>

For Turner, *frontier* represented freedom in its truest form. It represented the power of individual meritocracy. According to Turner's frontier thesis, the challenges of wilderness necessitated a brave and industrious people endowed with self-sufficiency, fortitude and ingenuity. American exceptionalism is a product of frontier. Turner also wrote on the shifting boundaries of the American frontier which began with unexplored territory beyond the Virginia Tidewater and Daniel Boone's adventures with the Indians. For Turner, the closing of the frontier in the late nineteenth century created a crisis in the very soul of America.<sup>409</sup>

Faragher wrote that Turner's presentation at the American Historical Association conference in Chicago in 1893 was "the moment when 'Frontier' became primarily a term of ideological rather than geographical reference."<sup>410</sup> Faragher and Milner wrote that the frontier dominated discussions in American studies scholarship for the first half of the

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<sup>408</sup> Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Frontier in American History* (Charleston, NC: BiblioBazaar, 2008), 7.

<sup>409</sup> Turner, *The Frontier in American History*.

<sup>410</sup> Mark Faragher, "The Myth of the Frontier: Progress or Lost Freedom," *History Now*, The Journal of The Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History, August 9, 2012, 106, <http://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/art-music-and-film/essays/myth-frontier-progress-or-lost-freedom>.

twentieth century replacing the Revolutionary and Civil Wars as the unifying event of American identity.<sup>411</sup>

By making Indians the foil for its story of progress, the frontier plot made conquest seem natural, commonsensical, inevitable. But to say this is only to affirm the narrative's power. In countless versions both before and after it acquired its classic Turnerian form, this story of frontier struggle and progress remains among the oldest and most familiar narratives of American history. In its ability to turn ordinary people into heroes and to present a conflict-ridden invasion as an epic march toward enlightened democratic nationhood, it perfectly fulfilled the ideological needs of its late-nineteenth-century moment.<sup>412</sup>

In *Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth* (1950) Henry Nash

Smith suggested the Abrahamic narrative was a major source of frontier theory's appeal:

“The master symbol of the garden embraced a cluster of metaphors expressing fecundity, growth, increase, and blissful labor in the earth, all centering about the heroic figure of the idealized frontier farmer armed with that supreme agrarian weapon, the sacred plow.”<sup>413</sup> Through Turner, we experienced the taming of the West as a process of purification, “...a beneficent power emanating from nature is shown creating an agrarian utopia in the West. The myth of the garden is constructed before our eyes.”<sup>414</sup>

Richard Slotkin wrote on frontier revivalism during the Cold War in *Gunfighter*

*Nation: The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth-Century America* (1992). JFK campaigned

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<sup>411</sup> John Mack Faragher and Clyde A. Milner, “The Frontier Trail: Rethinking Turner and Reimagining the American West,” ed. William Cronon et al., *The American Historical Review* 98, no. 1 (1993): 106, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2166384>.

<sup>412</sup> Faragher and Milner, 116.

<sup>413</sup> Henry Nash Smith, *Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth*, Revised ed. edition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 123.

<sup>414</sup> Smith, 255.

on a “New Frontier” platform, tapping a “vein of latent ideological power.”<sup>415</sup> For Slotkin,

The Frontier was a complexly resonant symbol, a vivid and memorable set of hero-tales – each a model of successful and morally justifying action on the stage of historical conflict... its central purpose was to summon the nation as a whole to undertake (or at least support) a *heroic* engagement in the ‘long twilight struggle’ against Communism and the social and economic injustices that foster it. The symbolism of a “New Frontier” set terms in which the administration would seek public consent and participation in its counterinsurgency “mission” in Southeast Asia and the Caribbean.<sup>416</sup>

American West historian, Patricia Nelson Limerick critiqued Turner in *Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American West* (1987) and *Trails toward a New Western History* (1991) reexamining the Western history through the lens of global colonization. She argued that Turner’s self-congratulatory descriptions of frontier launched a prolonged era of denial:

... to most twentieth-century Americans, the legacy of slavery was serious business, while the legacy of conquest was not. Southern historians successfully fought through the aura of moonlight and magnolias, and established slavery, emancipation, and black/white relations as major issues in American history... Conquest took another route into national memory. In the popular imagination, the reality of conquest dissolved into stereotypes of noble savages and noble pioneers struggling quaintly in the wilderness. These adventures seemed to have no bearing on the complex realities of twentieth-century America... The subject of slavery was the domain for serious scholars and the occasion for sober national reflection; the subject of conquest was the domain of mass entertainment and the occasion for lighthearted national escapism.<sup>417</sup>

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<sup>415</sup> Richard Slotkin, *Gunfighter Nation: The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth-Century America* (University of Oklahoma Press, 1992).

<sup>416</sup> Slotkin.

<sup>417</sup> Patricia Nelson Limerick, *The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American West*, Reprint edition (W. W. Norton & Company, 2011), 18.

In the post 9/11 era, anthropologist Stephen Silliman's article *The "Old West" in the Middle East: U.S. Military Metaphors in Real and Imagined Indian Country* (2008), examined the "role of the 'Indian Country' heritage metaphor in U.S. military activities in the Middle East from a critical anthropological perspective."<sup>418</sup> The article described the proliferation of the *Indian Country* metaphor among American military personnel deployed in war zones and traced the term's history and application in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan wars. According to Silliman

Summoning the "Indian wars" of the 19th century in the U.S. West as malleable symbolic parallels to the current war in Iraq serves to offer combat lessons in guerilla warfare while reinscribing epic stories of U.S. military imperialism and renarrating uncritically the struggles and conflicts of Native Americans, past and present, through the lens of contemporary perspectives on terrorism.<sup>419</sup>

Silliman wrote that invoked narratives are not typically derived from historically accurate or researched accounts. He pointed out that "... similar conflict settings could be mobilized just as easily for the same purpose. Yet research suggests that they are not. Those who utter such metaphors concern themselves not with historical details and accuracy but, rather, draw on them for emotive and assumed meanings."<sup>420</sup>

*In Reasons to Kill* (2010), Richard Rubenstein wrote on the "frontier killer hypothesis" and traced our propensity to approve of war making back to the heritage of colonial settlement and continental expansion. Rubenstein asked the question:

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<sup>418</sup> Silliman, "The 'Old West' in the Middle East," 237.

<sup>419</sup> Silliman, 237.

<sup>420</sup> Silliman, 242.

Does this cultural heritage still play a role in our thinking? Again, the answer is ‘Yes, but ...’ We do continue to reproduce narratives and images derived from the white settlers’ frontier experience – but American attitudes toward violence and nonviolence cannot be explained merely by invoking the spirit of Davy Crockett. Our thinking is more complex and interesting than that.<sup>421</sup>

Though Rubenstein was writing on war, his “reasons to kill” were validated in the justifications for coercive diplomacy Bosnia. Rubenstein’s “Humanitarian Duty,” as a justification was also in apparent in the Bosnian War intelligence data as “A moral duty to rescue oppressed people when they are helpless to resist atrocious violations of their human rights.”<sup>422</sup> In the case of Bosnia, the data showed that policymakers and intelligence analysts deployed alternating characterizations of culpable warriors and innocent victims to defend their policy choices. As Rubenstein noted, “Our particular brand of civil religion is often said to include the belief in America as a chosen nation with a mandate to spread the blessings of democracy, Christianity, capitalism, scientific thinking, political freedom, and civilized order throughout the world.”<sup>423</sup>

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<sup>421</sup> Rubenstein, *Reasons to Kill*, 2010, 17.

<sup>422</sup> Rubenstein, 33.

<sup>423</sup> Rubenstein, 38.

## CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION

### Prophesy

Sims wrote “Intelligence is not prophesy.”<sup>424</sup> In reality the role of the modern intelligence analysts in government decision making and warfighting is very much the same as that of the ancient oracle and seer. Though all-seeing technology has replaced the gods, and beltway traffic is the new arduous journey for consultation, the roles for intelligence of advisor and forecaster to the polis remain the same. The job continues its association with the dark elements of society and often warns of catastrophe.

Much of what we know about ancient Greek consultation of oracles is a combination of history, legend, and drama. However scholarship on the subject suggests that most historic and quasi-historic accounts of oracular response were not “riddles, horoscopes, qualifications and generics,” they were “straight-forward and mundane”<sup>425</sup> answers to the questions of elites with access to the oracle. On the battlefield, military divination, “seercraft” of *hiera* and *sphagi* was to “appear to be objectively valid” and had “aspects of an exact science.”<sup>426</sup> As with modern intelligence, predictions were

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<sup>424</sup> Sims, “Defending Adaptive Realism: Intelligence Theory Comes of Age,” 162.

<sup>425</sup> Joseph Eddy Fontenrose, *The Delphic Oracle: Its Responses and Operations with a Catalogue of Responses* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981).

<sup>426</sup> Michael Attyah Flower, *The Seer in Ancient Greece*, 1st ed. (University of California Press, 2007), 154, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctt1pp4k4>.

informed with situational strategic awareness but were not infallible: “although a general might turn to his seer for advice, it was up to him to decide when and how often his seer would sacrifice [animal extispicy]. And no matter what the results of those sacrifices were, the ultimate decision of when and where to attack resided with the general.”<sup>427</sup>

Modern intelligence products – estimates, forecasting, and warning – are narrated prophesies for our time.

Prophecy, irony, and revelation are integral parts of narrative. In our present episodic moments, it can be difficult to perceive narrative plot-logic in real time.

Historians and authors of fiction have an advantage.

The stories which served as the material of Tragedy were, all of them, fixed in their main outlines and in their outcome. So if the inevitability of the latter is, as it were, stressed by pointing out that a given oracle has been fulfilled, the oracle or the prophecy would always seem to bear some resemblance to a *vaticinium ex eventu* [hindsight bias], to the same extent as the oracles in Herodotus, which bear on events belonging already to the past, to history.<sup>428</sup>

To detect larger narratives, the intelligence analyst must have a heightened awareness of Self and situation. This reflexivity is learned and developed through practice.

### **Revelation: Analysis as Intervention**

The history of intelligence is in supporting the warfighter. This combined with a mandate to warn the government of global dangers has infused intelligence with a pessimism which privileges threats over opportunities. Intelligence analysis is not only

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<sup>427</sup> Flower, 155.

<sup>428</sup> J. C. Kamerbeek, “Prophecy and Tragedy,” *Mnemosyne* 18 (1965): 30.

*operating* in a “competitive enterprise,”<sup>429</sup> it is *creating* a competitive environment through narratives of threat prophesy. In the Bosnian War, intelligence production was reproduction of conflict narratives. As my findings showed, several narratives of the Balkan Other were ironic justifications for coercive diplomacy and American expedition. Coercive intervention in the Bosnian War reinforced analysis and Orientalist perceptions of the Balkan Other. In this way, prophesies were self-fulfilling. The ironic American Self never materialized.

Institutional norms of intelligence prevent this reflexivity. In the case of Bosnia, an epistemological realism in analysis reified identity groups into discrete fighting factions, precluding possibilities for peace beyond ethnic division, and tying specific – and simplistic – ethnic characters to defined territory. The limitations of the BTF intelligence which grew from an institutional imperative to warn were not an adequate foundation for peace process, which must both arise from, as well as foster, optimism. Relying on violent history to determine the trajectory of future events generated a prophesy of violence which was ultimately self-fulfilling – first in the reticence to intervene and then in coercive intervention.

A productive conflict intervention requires deep analysis of the conflict. Collaborative, lasting solutions are not possible without understanding individual, societal, international, and global causes, as conflicts are nested<sup>430</sup> within these various

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<sup>429</sup> Sims, “Defending Adaptive Realism: Intelligence Theory Comes of Age,” 154.

<sup>430</sup> Maire Dugan, “Imaging the Future: A Tool for Conflict Resolution,” in *Peacebuilding: A Field Guide*, ed. Luc Reyckler and Thania Paffenholz (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001).

strata. Analysis must complicate the parties to understand their stories without reproducing violence and without imposition of outsider storylines. Only with this knowledge can intervention stimulate acknowledgement of the Other's experience as legitimate. The way we analyze the conflict determines possibilities for intervention – the interpretation of the cause of conflict directly impacts the solution.

### **Aesthetics as Ethics**

The work on intelligence ethics has come a long way since the “don't get caught”<sup>431</sup> ethos of the 1960s and 70s. Much of the research in this area has focused on the manner in which raw intelligence is collected. Topics have included the Vietnam era infiltration of the student left (COINTELPRO), the post-9/11 era “enhanced interrogation techniques,” and most recently the mass collection of electronic data as a fundamental invasion of privacy.

The ethics of analysis have focused on “truth” and methodological transparency in what is known to be fact and what is forecasted inference. Analytic integrity is predicated on the epistemological realist perception that a truth is knowable and analysis – even estimative analysis – must do its best to capture and present that truth. The reverence for truth is enshrined in the inscription of “And Ye Shall Know the Truth and the Truth Shall Make You Free – John VIII:XXXII” in CIA's marble entry way. A related ethical concern has been the politicization of intelligence, intentionally or subconsciously relaying a tainted truth.

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<sup>431</sup> Godfrey, “Ethics and Intelligence,” 629.

From a constructivist perspective, all analysis is inherently political. The choices of which facts to include, the tone of the texts and the story narrated cannot escape the structures of power in which analysts are embedded. However, the dichotomy between truth and narrative is false. Truth is also part of narrative, though as this research shows, narrative is much more than truth. Intelligence analysts are not only truth tellers; they are the original authors – the narrators – of foreign policy. Gergen wrote

If one's professional work is inevitably political, as constructionists reason, then the academician is furnished a new and inspiring telos. Rather than generating knowledge that may or may not be used by those making decisions for the society – as the pure scientists envisioned their goal – the knowledge generating process becomes itself a means of creating the good society.<sup>432</sup>

To the ethos of intelligence analysis, we must add an “ethics of aesthetics.”<sup>433</sup>

This includes plot thickening, complicated characters, and attention to the larger storylines of analysis. It means reflexivity and production of the ironic Self. A new aesthetic would also include identification and magnification of muted narratives and peace narratives within conflict settings. Maybe most importantly, an ethic of aesthetics is attention to the dynamics of power which prevent conflict narratives from evolving into “better-formed stories.”<sup>434</sup>

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<sup>432</sup> Cobb, *Speaking of Violence*, 2013, 141.

<sup>433</sup> Cobb, *Speaking of Violence*, 2013.

<sup>434</sup> Cobb.

## **A Better Peace**

As noted in the first chapter, Dayton is still widely regarded as a success story of American foreign policy, commonly referenced as a model for U.S. foreign policy in other conflict zones. The lesson learned on the utility of coercive diplomacy was the wrong one. The Realpolitik process of Dayton and the implementation of the DPA reinforced assumptions of racial incompatibility which persist even now, “despite nearly two decades of argument that sectarian violence and politics in BiH is largely the result of violence and a cultivated atmosphere of fear, not its cause.”<sup>435</sup> Structural violence is the continuing legacy of the DPA, while the underlying causes of the Bosnian War of the 1990s have not been addressed. As this study has shown, Dayton as an archetype for peacemaking is highly problematic.

The story of Dayton was authored with narrative resources of intelligence analysis. Attention to the aesthetics of narrative can help analysts to write stories more conducive to peace making. The challenges of doing so are admittedly daunting and involve questioning the dominant discourses of foreign policy, diplomacy and intelligence itself. In particular the study of intelligence must evolve to include more perspectives. Concepts from other conversations in the academy, especially the field of conflict resolution can help. I am optimistic as new voices are emerging for an inclusive research agenda.

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<sup>435</sup> Gilbert and Mujanović, “Dayton at Twenty,” 606.

## Summary

The data from the *Bosnia, Intelligence and the Clinton Presidency* declassification event provided a rare opportunity to examine the record on American foreign policy making during the Bosnian War of the 1990s. An interpretive and narrative approach to data analysis resulted in the identification of four essential narratives: Perpetual Conflict, Muslim Victimhood, Lawlessness and Fanaticism. Intelligence analysts relied on a long history of narrative resources which perpetuated a pejorative understanding of *Balkan*. Simplistic characterizations justified a coercive approach to peacemaking, institutionalizing ethnic divisions in the imposition of a new map at Dayton.

An Orientalist perspective in analysis distorted characterizations of the Balkan Other. An East-West framing of the Bosnian conflict may have foreshadowed a neo-Orientalist security paradigm in the post-Cold War environment. *Frontierism* as a core concept in American identity may explain the expeditionary solution to the Bosnian War at the final frontier of the Cold War.

Intelligence as a discipline and academic field must give attention to constructivist epistemology. Reflexivity in analysis and a new analytic ethic of aesthetics will better serve peace process through the production of complex characters and plot thickening. Intelligence analysts are narrators of foreign policy stories.

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Rhian McCoy received her Bachelor of Arts in Russian Literature and Bachelor of Music in classical performance from Oberlin College in Ohio in 1995, and her Master of Arts in International Relations with a concentration in Conflict Resolution from St. Mary's University in Texas in 2000. She was an Intelligence Officer in the U.S. Army and a Presidential Management Fellow with the Army Intelligence and Security Command (US INSCOM). She is a national security consultant and frequent lecturer on conflict and security in the Washington DC area. She lives in Fairfax, Virginia with her husband Doug, son Liam, and daughter Quinn.