The British New Towns are the most tangible expression of Ebeneezer Howard's Garden Cities concept. They are, however, far short of the ideal - integrated communities encircled by green belts, all swung round to form a constellation offering the cultural and social mobility opportunities of a metropolis. In fact, New Towns are decided exceptions. Significant UK and French governmental efforts were only able to allot 15-20% of the capital post-war population increase to New Towns. The American New Communities movement, if it may be so described, was never promoted on a European scale, and remained restricted in design, funding and constituents, a consequence of a hostile private enterprise/administrative ethic. Any additional 'green' developments in the United States are, at the moment, beyond consideration. However, there is potential interest in New-Towns-In-Town (NTIT).

NTIT is an imprecise term. Built in existing urban areas, by definition it will lack the ideologically precise lines of rural development; NTITs will always be eccentric. In barest outline, an ideal NTIT should contain, or consciously address, housing, employment opportunities, community/recreational activities, all interwoven with green to create a recognizable community. The wide variety of urban conditions prohibits further specification; flexibility is the technique, and comprehensive scope the principle.

A variety of contemporary events and issues have underlined central city development potential. Foremost among all factors is the continuing rise in energy costs, the leading statistic of a larger trend indicating the diminished availability
of natural resources. The social and economic costs of escalating inner city unemployment, and the 'return to the city' movement of a certain suburbanite sector are two other major factors. A string of ancillary arguments in favor of increased urban development appear once the need is recognized: competitive urban/suburban cost differentials due to existing urban infrastructure, cultural and social advantages, modern service sector employment opportunities, and moral pressures.

In introducing a joint hearing on 'Compact Cities: a Neglected Way of Conserving Energy', Henry Reuss, chairman of the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, outlined the consequences of sprawl and wasteful energy consumption and indicated potential Congressional initiatives:

Since World War II, our growing cities and metropolitan areas, instead of becoming more compact, have sprawled across the country... Sprawl has become one of America's notorious wasters of energy. It wastes energy by making mass transit too expensive and even unfeasible in many urbanized areas... It leaves unused much of the capacity of schools, fire stations and other urban infrastructure that still has to be maintained. It requires the duplication of this same infrastructure outside the city. In the private sector, it hastens the decay of existing commercial centers and fosters new ones far from where people live and work. To halt the massive expenditures of energy caused by sprawl, we need to divert future growth into the large inventory of empty or sparsely settled land within existing communities. This means directing growth to the right places, not halting growth. We do not applaud no-growth strategies that make housing for poor people more scarce, that increase unemployment and that exclude minorities from opportunity. NTITs are, as will be argued, an alternative to sprawl, as well as an effective method of 'targeting' urban economic development and programs.

One of the immediate challenges facing all old, industrially based, often 'frost-belt' cities, is the prevention of further civic deterioration through population migration and reduced city services. The energy restrictions, altering earlier suburban/
urban cost-benefit equations, offer a relatively auspicious opportunity for urban revitalization. Hughes and Sternlieb write, 

The development of central city alternatives to suburban allures are particularly potent in an era in which the costs of leaving the city are ever increasing. The subject of new single-family housing costs has been studied most intensively; the ratio between median-income levels and the costs of housing have degenerated over time. Even more striking is the problem of high carrying costs, both directly for the home and transportation, which are essential auxiliary for non-central city living. The opportunities for developing urban alternatives are most substantial and the competitive environment has never been more favorable. 3

The second major element stimulating interest in the central city is the need to develop employment opportunities. The inner cities have the highest rate of national unemployment, with the teenage and young adult minorities the most seriously affected. The depressed economic environment, with attendant high welfare costs, is hardly able to support and maintain even minimal standard housing, let alone allow for any leeway necessary for administrative incompetence. In a visit to Bridgeport, Connecticut, Reuss concluded, "...the principal problem about which all others revolve is the old one of jobs. You are an industrial city, an older one, and the transition to the post-industrial society has not been made."4 NTITs are superior to conventional housing projects in their explicit recognition of employment needs, as well as community and social requirements.

The bulk of the literature analyses NTIT development to the advantage of lower-income groups. There are, however, theoretically three NTIT possibilities: construction for the benefit of the lower-income sector; mixed class development; relatively well-to-do enclaves. The last approach is the least acceptable, though Albert Robinson offers a partial defence,

An alternative means of developing (NTITs) would be to drop the requirement for low-income housing within the new town itself, and turn the new town into a high-income residential area, charging an economic rent for housing and full-cost pricing for other services, including community services. This might yield a net surplus of rental and tax revenue
which could then be used to subsidize other activities of more direct benefit to low-income groups. (my emphasis) 6

This alternative will not be examined further as its benefit to the lower-economic groups is questionable, it symbolizes the already marked income disparity in major cities, and it is politically infeasible.

Mixed development, while the most attractive option, is difficult to implement under central city conditions, where the vast majority of the population is in the lower-income bracket. In existing mixed neighborhoods economically integrated development is eminently desirable, but in the inner cities the priorities of NTITs should be the promotion of general economic improvement, rather than the projection of ideal social patterns. Harvey Perloff, the major academic proponent of NTITs, writes that "...the central city should, in general, be approached in terms of its own dynamism, rather than in terms of stability and neatness associated with middle class living." 7 Jack Underhill of HUD's New Communities Administration, views NTITs as "staging areas for minorities, an opportunity for the non-pathological poor to get up and out." 8

Before describing Roosevelt Island and South Bronx development and revitalization, it would be useful to place these efforts in perspective by noting the difficulties of past housing and economic development programs. Major reasons for failure include: the limited administrative and financial impact of government programs; ineffective land planning and cursory evaluation; insufficient incentives; the expense of urban land and complicated real estate problems; the negative effects of a deteriorating urban environment; difficulties with community participation, relations and activities.

The private enterprise ethic is dominant in America. Although its freedom to 'rationalize economically' has been restrained by recent government regulations, in comparison with equivalently developed nations, American business has the most liberal setting for it operations. Urban planning and land allocation on a regulatory/mandatory basis, rather than through
incentives, is primitive. On a local, state or federal level, land planning remains restricted to independent objectives.

Public resources are limited in relation to the diversity and difficulty of urban economic development patterns. For example, "the Eastman Kodak company alone typically spends more each year on capital improvements in one community, Monroe county, New York, than does the federal government nationally on one of the principal urban economic incentive programs, the Urban Development Action Grant Program (UDAG)." Furthermore, most available urban economic development funds are incentives, and "...financial incentives alone have limited effects." Economic development programs are often administered by the same governmental units regulating commerce and industry, and the two responsibilities may be contradictory.

Governmental inefficiency in coordinating and administering programs is an additional handicap. A HUD occasional paper notes,

Most urban areas do not have a single government responsible for the administration of all public services; rather they have a multiplicity of government entities, each of which serves a relatively narrow function. The proliferation of such entities has resulted in increased administrative fragmentation, decreased administrative coordination, an overall, a decline in administrative efficiency. This inefficiency has, in turn, been a factor in the emergence of urban fiscal imbalance. 11

No administrative re-organization can dispell personnel incompetence, such as the Mayor of Bridgeport describes, "I have found time and again that the people in Washington would be interested in helping us solve a particular problem only to encounter a narrow and sometimes arbitrary interpretation when I talk to the local federal person." 12

Coordination difficulties and funding inadequacies were well-represented in the surplus lands, 'Model Cities' program disintegration. Martha Derthick lists as major elements contributing to its failure: communication gaps between the cities and HUD's central office; the fed's limited ability to promote programs due to dependence on local officials; municipal authority reluctance to act in the face of specific, intense opposition;
the preference of city officials for development yielding higher tax revenue than low-cost housing; inadequate subsidies; the program's failure to incorporate the funding of transportation, education and other public services associated with housing development within its purview. Many of these problems are expressly addressed in NTIT design and scope.

Current federal policy promotes enhanced local autonomy by dispensing Community Development Block grants (CDB), which in practice favor public works and housing rehabilitation rather than long term development. The capital requirements of cities are so extensive, that authorities prefer to use the grants to fund 'safe' projects and invest in relatively stable neighborhoods. Private investment linked to public commitments - leveraging - requires extensive, secure government support, which is not the function of CDB grants. F.D. Rich, whose company invested in Stamford and Bridgeport, Connecticut, and Baltimore, Maryland, notes,

Now the rebuilding of cities is a very complicated matter...if I do get involved again in an urban renewal project we will only look at those projects that have long-term commitments from the public side, whether they be local, state, or federal, and not short-term commitments - we over the last few years have seen the federal government now slip into a community development program, which is a short range program. It is not one which will induce the private enterprise sector and its lenders, the insurance companies and banks of the country, to make long commitments of 30 to 35 years when all they can see is the short-term commitment of some 2 to 3 years.

Local officials (save a few in major cities), beset by financial and political difficulties, do not devote much attention to long-term planning and programming. The administrative mechanism is not geared for the considered development essential for such efforts.

Today, local redevelopment planning and programming are almost non-existent. The administrative organizations through which local redevelopment powers are exercised are dormant in most communities. Long-term financial arrangements for carrying out redevelopment activities do not exist. Many of the most able 'public entrepreneurs' have left local government, as programs shifted from an emphasis on
redevelopment and development to an emphasis on public works and housing rehabilitation. 15

Complex urban real estate problems, exacerbated by escalating crime rates and school integration tensions, deter corporations and developers from urban re-development. Without regional land-use policies, migration is easier than urban re-integration. A Bridgeport savings bank chairman comments, "...as long as the green pastures are there and unless there is some, either through environmental controls or otherwise, some restrictions on land use, there is no way you can persuade the big office units to come into downtown. It is very, very exceptional when they do." 16 Furthermore, municipal policy in many cities actually promotes corporate escape. A survey of the 500 largest manufacturing and 300 non-manufacturing corporations lists as major dis-incentives for urban investment: restrictive land use controls; a tendency to shift the taxation burden onto business; health, safety and environmental regulations; high site costs. 17 Additional problems for urban industry are traffic congestion, a shortage of off-street loading and parking space, and a prevalence of multi-story plants which do not adjust easily to modern production techniques.

Lastly, a reluctance to extensively examine the social and community aspects of housing projects, both in terms of construction and evaluation, has been a strong contributing factor in many housing project failures. Community involvement is theoretically appreciated by all planners and developers - planning for people - but it is a difficult concept to turn into practice. Decision-making by committee is almost a synonym for inactivity, and the problem is extrapolated in the major cities. Catanese and Farmer, after interviewing the principal planners in seven large cities, concluded,

The question of citizen participation in the city planning process is a dilemma. Everyone of the planners we talked with gave whole-hearted support to citizen participation in the planning process. Yet to some that meant holding a public hearing on plans and little else. To others it meant dealing more directly with elected officials since they were responsible for the citizen's
welfare... We suspect that the problem has deep roots in American democracy and has reached unprecedented complexity in modern cities. However, the design of practicable community participation is essential for successful development, and the final section will present some possibilities.

The objectives and conditions of the Roosevelt Island and South Bronx development are obviously distinct. The preservation of an attractive island setting while constructing a truly multi-mix residential community with efficient transportation links to Manhattan, the major source of employment, are different obligations than the pressing need to promote employment and the prevention of further decay in the South Bronx. While the scale and premises of both developments make them unique, the techniques and difficulties are of value for understanding new approaches to urban development.
The limitations of the NTIT label are most evident when applied to the South Bronx revitalization/re-building effort. All the definitional components of NTITs are included in the South Bronx development plan, but hardly correspond to the NTIT image. Labels are certainly signs, not formulas, and NTIT is a vague one. Nomenclature aside, the South Bronx revitalization strategy with its comprehensive orientation, is a decided shift away from conventional redevelopment patterns.

The South Bronx has been widely publicized as an example of urban decay and social disintegration. Covering an area of 13,000 acres, or 20 sq. miles, the South Bronx is divided into six community Board districts. One third of the current population is on welfare, and despite a 20% resident decline from 1970, welfare claims fell by only 3%. Accurate local unemployment figures are unavailable, but by all accounts they are substantially higher than the city average. In 1970, the latest available figures, the median annual income of full-time, year-round workers was $5,500, significantly below the Bureau of Labor Statistics New York regional classification of $7,183 as representing a low standard of living. 100,000 to 150,000 workers might have been identified as 'low income' at that time, and the numbers have undoubtedly increased, as reflected in the rise of welfare recipients and city wide unemployment. The major problem in the South Bronx is unemployment. The South Bronx Development Office (SBDO) notes,

...the root cause of the malaise which overtook the residents of the South Bronx is the continuing depression-level unemployment. Unemployment led in turn to much higher welfare rolls, for which eligibility standards are fixed by the State and Federal governments, to endemic alienation among the young, to widespread perception of failure in the education system and to increasing amounts of serious crimes. The low average income of the residents is at the heart of what we have come to describe as the problem of the South Bronx. 19
The deterioration of the South Bronx is relatively recent, for it has only been in the past fifteen years that the population declined drastically. Community Board #5, for example, which recorded the highest welfare dependency in 1978, was not even a designated poverty area in 1967. The liberal post-war federal home mortgage policy, extensive road construction, and a rapid growth economy stimulated urban emigration. The current depressed, relatively depopulated conditions of the South Bronx are a tattered testament to the achievements of the earlier migration.

In one sense, we must understand that the movement out of the South Bronx is a great American success story. A large working-class population, mainly white, moved out to what was almost universally regarded as a better way of life. The national government, in an economic climate of expansion and sustained prosperity contributed importantly to this dramatic migration. 20

The increase in minorities, the deterioration of housing stock, commercial and industrial activity, educational services, and the rise in inner-city crime are all part of a well-documented cycle in post-war urban development. While the South Bronx is unique in the scale of decay and devastation, similar conditions exist in many major cities.

Mayor Koch formally organized the South Bronx Development Office and appointed Edward J. Logue director in September, 1978. Its effective commencement was April 1, 1979 when $4 million in funding ($2 million from the federal government, $1.5 million from the state, and $.5 million from the city through services in kind) was made available to hire staff and consultants to draw up the development plan and Early Action projects. The SEDO, which is directly responsible to the Mayor, is also advised by the South Bronx Policy Group, consisting of the Chairman of the City Planning Commission and a selection of deputy mayors and city administration directors. Under the funding terms, the SEDO was instructed to present within 120 days a draft report detailing preliminary approaches in five areas: economic development; manpower; housing; human services; Parks, Recreation and other services. A formal plan is due
by July 1, 1980 and Early Action Projects must have cleared all administrative processing by that date. A further requirement held that the office should track certain federal programs in the South Bronx of interest to the White House staff.

The South Bronx development plan, formulated and coordinated by the SBDO, is an explicit attempt to approach the multi-faceted problems of the South Bronx in a flexible, regenerative fashion — "not a single program effort but a comprehensive one" — indeed, much of the plan's scope comes from local participation and initiative.

SBDO has assumed from the start that the residents of the South Bronx should be an integral part of the process of making plans for the revitalization of their home community. This will not be one of those efforts, not uncommon years ago, where some scheme from on high is imposed with no input from those who know the needs and problems intimately from their own personal experience. 21

The principle of promoting rather than imposing development has evoked the statement, "...where there are strengths, to build on those strengths; where there are viable neighborhoods, to revitalize those neighborhoods; where there has been abandonment, to clear and spruce up the areas of disintegration to begin the process of creating a new environment." 22

Early Action projects are the office's response to local and government community expectations for signs of commitment and action. These projects are expressly designed to employ more efficiently, in areas of high priority need, the funding and programs already available, and relatively little new money is required. If the projects are successful, an empirical rationale for additional funding is established, and the plan's maturation aided by 'test' results.*

Early Action Projects might be compared with test borings which are made on building sites before architects draw up their final plans... Although each Early Action Project is planned to serve a specific need in its own right, the central purpose of the SBDO is to develop an approach that has hitherto been lacking in the South Bronx - a comprehensive program for revitalization which fits into an overall South Bronx plan. 23

*See appendix 1 for Early Action Project summary
While the principles of flexibility, cooperation and efficient use of existing resources are defensible on their own merits, they are required in a period of growing disfavor with 'big government' programs, budget reductions and an impending recession. Herman Badillo, deputy mayor, proposed the old technique of expensive construction projects to re-build the South Bronx and fill the _yarda vacia_ (empty lot) of Charlotte Street, the rubble where President Carter stood in 1977 to affirm his support for South Bronx development. Badillo sketched a $1.5 billion development plan, $32.5 million of which to pay for a 732 unit housing project on Charlotte Street as emblematic of a new government commitment to the South Bronx. On February 8, 1979 the Charlotte Street project was defeated 7 to 4 by the City Board of Estimate, and Badillo resigned later in the year. The Board's rejection reflected the majority's opinion that excessive money was allotted to one borough, the federal funding commitment vague, and the location ill-conceived - a continuation of the failed 'worst area first' policy of the Model Cities program. In appraising the SBDO's projected plan of regional coordination on a wide variety of fronts with moderate funding, a New York Times editorial stated, "...the enormous investment of moral and financial capital he (Badillo) seeks for the South Bronx now seems politically impossible. Mr. Logue's modest and coolly realistic appraisal may be the beginning of Bronx wisdom - and achievement at last."

The major objective of the South Bronx development plan is the creation of employment opportunities. Employment generation has been hampered by a low to unskilled workforce, restricted public assistance for economic development, expensive security costs, difficulties in acquiring private finance, and a skewed transportation system.

In 1970 over 40% of the South Bronx population was 18 years or younger, compared with a city-wide 28%. Only 40% of the 24-34 year old population had completed high school, and with the increase in welfare claimants it is only likely that the statistics have become more unfavorable. The existing manpower training programs help only one out of ten who need training. The city's economic assistance plan, before jarred by
The fiscal crisis, was inadequate for development requirements. "...until recently, public assistance programs in economic development were modest, low priority and bound up in considerable red tape. Part of the response to the City's fiscal crisis was to enlarge economic development programs, give them a higher priority. Red tape is still a problem."25

The high incidence of crime and violence requires expensive security precautions, reducing the competitive capability of local firms. A reporter, preparing an article on Charlotte Street, wrote that, "in five weeks of research for this story, during which I mingled daily with the residents, I was shot at while driving my car, robbed of $15 and once, while standing at the corner of Jennings Street and Southern Boulevard, punched in the face without any warning or provocation."26 Such conditions make it difficult to attract new business into the area, a reason for the SBDO's emphasis on local business expansion and assistance. As the area has declined, private lending institutions have become increasingly reluctant to finance business development, an understandable response given the lack of demonstrated public economic development aid. And finally, "an unpublicized problem has been identified in the SBDO's early work with industrial firms: transportation facilities for workers to concentration of jobs are poor."27 The public transportation system was designed as a 'vertical feed' to Manhattan, and there are inadequate cross-Bronx subway and bus lines. The time consuming transit, sometimes engaging two to three bus transfers, further hampers South Bronx business.

The South Bronx does have development potential in its large labor pool, its location (better access to interstate roads and freight rail connections as the only borough on the continent), an improving assistance network, and public attention stemming from the President's visit. The SBDO proposes to develop these assets through a program of investment incentives consisting of: administrative expedition; real-estate consolidation through government acquisition; appropriate land disposition practices; 'out-reach' to local firms. The office will act as a 'one stop' center for coordination and analysis, but not for
program implementation.

The incentive program recognizes that "...the likelihood of influencing industrial decisions (and therefore of influencing the creation of a large number of jobs for the South Bronx) is greater in dealing with firms residing in the South Bronx than it is by dealing with firms which might seek the South Bronx location in the future." Furthermore, as the most important long-range problem for many South Bronx firms is the identification of cost-efficient space for expansion, the dearth of usable, modern space has compelled many firms to leave. The office plans to provide suitable real-estate by arranging the construction of single-storey plants with off-street parking and adequate security measures. The accumulation of land for this purpose would "...be in the hands of the government or a quasi-government entity so that disposition of that land to the industrial user may be made with dispatch." The method of land assembly is under study, whether by conventional UDC purchase and let agreements or other arrangements. An additional proposal under investigation is the establishment of a foreign trade zone, to reduce the final assembly costs of imported parts and material.

The South Bronx is not a 'wasteland' with extended tracks of desolation. The vacant land and buildings are scattered throughout the six community Boards. Even if extensive funding was available, it would simply be uneconomic to 'bulldoze and build'. The SBDO has responded to funding restrictions by promoting a policy of neighborhood maintenance and support, coupled with judicious planning to assure that well-located and accessible sites for industry are not compromised by housing development.

SEDO is proposing a policy approach aimed at channeling public investment toward those places where it will have a maximum effect on its own and also leverage the largest possible participation by the private sector. Rather than sweeping Section 8 new construction on cleared sites, the effort will be to upgrade and rehabilitate existing buildings, still occupied by families, before the chain of deterioration, abandonment and demolition gets out of hand.
A policy of stabilization directed at the neighborhood and block level, with extensive community participation, will enable the available funding to be spread further than if a new building program was adopted. Section 8 public housing construction funds will be used to the extent they are available, but the emphasis is on neighborhood stabilization through moderate rehabilitation.

Housing policy in the South Bronx, therefore, should concern itself with stabilization on a block and neighborhood level much more than has been the case in recent years. Housing programs treating various conditions should be administered so that entire blocks or neighborhoods may be simultaneously. 31

Home ownership will be supported as an incentive for residential and community improvement. The South Bronx currently has the lowest proportion of home owners than any other urban area in the United States. The SBDO is examining a variety of funding schemes, drawing on several federal programs underutilized in the city, to enable more extensive home ownership. The draft report is critical of irresponsible 'limited partners', the new class of owners attracted by the tax shelter provisions of federal subsidized housing legislation. SBDO will seek to encourage community organizations to take a greater role in tenant selection and management, to promote both local employment and improved maintenance.

Notwithstanding the commitment to use moderate rehabilitation funding for neighborhood revival in a wide selection of 'target neighborhoods', the SBDO has chosen the Grand Concourse as an example of the development technique on the basis of its promising characteristics. It is the office's 'top priority housing program'. The Concourse is a readily identifiable neighborhood, isolated from the surrounding area by its height and a network of transverse roads that route traffic underneath the boulevard. Its high visibility makes it symbolic of a new commitment to the South Bronx, and a more effective emblem than Charlotte Street on account of its size and promise.

The Concourse contains some of the best older housing
stock in the city, including 31 Art Deco buildings. Elevator apartment buildings, which are in a superior state of repair, represent two-thirds of all dwelling units. 'Gut' rehabilitation is not necessary, making the buildings ideal candidates for moderate subsidies. The remaining third are walk-ups, requiring immediate attention if decay is not to spread to the better quality buildings.

Among the residential neighborhoods of the South Bronx which are promising targets for stabilization and revitalization, none is a more exciting challenge than the Grand Concourse. The boulevard is a genuine housing opportunity in a City where deterioration too often outpaces ambitious renewal efforts. The key task is to identify a scheme — within existing law and housing programs — to finance rehabilitation in a way that will enable existing tenants to pay the rents necessary to carry the restored buildings.

The financing proposals for this development emphasize 'moderate rehabilitation and a mortgage insurance program to attract private financing to the area once again'. Advised by a non-profit housing assistance corporation, Advisory Services for Better Housing (ASEH, inc.), the SBDO has identified a number of financial alternatives using various combinations of mortgage insurance, federal and city loans, CDBG or UDAG funds, rent subsidies and tax incentives, reflecting its intention to employ to the best advantage existing programs. Without detailing the several schemes examined by the office, the preferred option is a federally insured conventional loan, interest reduction supplements and J-51 tax exemption/abatement. This scheme offers the possibility of extensive private leveraging, administrative flexibility, and minimal rent increases. Walk-ups would be renovated under a Section 8 moderate rehabilitation subsidy contract with Section230 mortgage insurance. Further clarification of the financing techniques will have to wait the final report.

While intentions do not certify achievement, community participation is to be a major element in the development plan. On the day Logue was appointed SBDO director, he met with the Council of Community organizations (Co-Co), a supra-community board composed of the six district managers to affirm his commitment to local organizations, a position reflected in the report:
Even the casual observer is struck by the proliferation of active and involved community agencies, most of them small and underfinanced, but many with impressive records of accomplishment. The vigor and verve of its indigenous community agencies is perhaps its most precious resource. A developmental approach that ignores the strong local efforts already in place would be doomed to failure. 33

The local organizations provide ideas as well as offering avenues for policy dissemination. For example, the SBDO manpower policy is to expressly link manpower training to all phases of redevelopment - economic, housing and general services. The community agencies are a readily identifiable and sympathetic conduit for such programs. Indeed, their services can be expanded to help overcome some of the stratification in human service programs, by acting as advocates for residents. The SBDO is planning the difficult task of promoting human service flexibility,

The central perspective of the South Bronx revitalization effort toward human services should be derived from a deep commitment to decentralization of service programs... The rigidities and inefficiencies of the New York service system are in marked contrast to the simplicity and humaneness so often encountered in social service systems abroad. 34

Human services decentralization is an ambitious goal, contingent on a number of factors beyond the immediate influence of the office -- such as the federal government. Much of the humaneness of the European system stems from its greater funding; generosity is a very humane trait. As it seems unlikely that significantly increased funding will be made available - all indications are in the opposite direction - the office will have to examine ways to re-arrange the bureaucratic funnels and ladders, without the lubricant of additional monies.

For the short-term, the most visible aspect of the SBDO plan will be its clean-up and green-up program. 'Proposed as an intensive project operated through community development organizations and local business', the program would entail the removal of rubbish and debris, the sealing of abandoned buildings fit for redevelopment, and the seeding of cleared areas. The fields would be under community management, and could be used as playing fields, community gardens, parks - whatever the communities
decided. Although the clean-up/green-up program is an interim measure designed to boost morale, many of the fields would be integrated into future housing programs and industrial parks, to provide a relief from the pervasive concrete.

It is patently premature to evaluate the results of the SUDO plan. Its success, as indicated in the report, will depend on effective community cooperation, active business participation and a continuing federal commitment. The bald fact that there is no alternative, given the current political and economic climate, further defuses potential criticism.

Notwithstanding these critical limitations, there are several points worth noting. Firstly, the plan is evolutionary by design; there is no idealized image of the final result. Needs are addressed in a flexible, integrated fashion - their very flexibility precludes prediction. And this is a beneficial policy, for the failure of past policies is only too apparent in the streets of the South Bronx. Secondly, its perspective is short term. There are too many variables to even encourage a long-term approach, aside from the statement of principles. The practical focus of the SUDO is the efficient use of available funds, with additional funding sought on a performance basis. Thirdly, the plan is not exclusive; every potentially viable neighborhood is aided. This is contrary to a policy of 'planned shrinkage', a program of "incentives to resettle people in stronger neighborhoods of the city and even outside it, where jobs exist." Such a program would be politically difficult, prohibitively expensive if conducted on an adequate scale, avoids educational and training requirements, and is 'awkward' for both the depleted and host community. Fourthly, conventional industrial development is encouraged, with training programs to support local business expansion. While all the trends indicate a migration of these industries out of the northeast, there is no immediate, short-term alternative to most effectively raise income levels and provide employment. Service sector educational requirements bar employment of workers with the low education levels prevalent in the South Bronx. Furthermore, service sector firms simply will not move
into the South Bronx. And finally, the plan places a premium on the brokerage quality of its leadership. The office does not have funds of its own to disburse, and is dependent on the cooperation of agencies and departments, with their own bureaucratic logic and momentum. The streamlining and decentralization proposed for the human services, for example, is a direct threat to administrative employment in the city and federal social service agencies. Legislative and administrative amendments to those agencies are a sensitive political issue, and the SEDO is only an advocate for change. Ed Logue is committed to 'salvaging' his reputation after the UDC difficulties, though he does not have the support of a powerful patron, Governor Rockefeller, or large funding grants which he enjoyed in the expansive early days of the UDC. It would be unwise, however, to prejudge his, or the plan's, prospects.