Building the Capacity for Peace After Genocide: 
The Reconstruction of Formal Education in Rwanda

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science at George Mason University

By

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DEDICATION

This paper is dedicated to my supportive husband, Joel Eddy Njanga, and my encouraging mother, Mrs. Sylvia B. Bryant, for believing in me and providing unconditional support.
I would like to extend my gratitude to Dr. Sara Cobb, Director of the Institute of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, Dr. Ho-won Jeong, chair of my thesis committee, and Dr. Dennis Sandole and Dr. Kevin Avruch, members of my thesis committee, for patiently working with me throughout this process.
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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

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<tr>
<td>FAR</td>
<td>Rwandese Armed Forces</td>
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<td>INEE</td>
<td>The Interagency of Education in Emergencies</td>
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<td>IIEP</td>
<td>International Institute for Educational Planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Organization</td>
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<td>RPA</td>
<td>Rwanda Patriot Army</td>
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<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Front</td>
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ABSTRACT

BUILDING THE CAPACITY FOR PEACE AFTER GENOCIDE: THE RECONSTRUCTION OF FORMAL EDUCATION IN RWANDA

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George Mason University, 2008

Thesis Director: Dr. Ho-won Jeong

In the aftermath of a civil war or genocide, some non-governmental organizations (NGOs), peace educators, post-conflict development practitioners, and governments believe in the healing power of providing all school-age children and young people with equal access to formal education. Under these circumstances, education is perceived as a peace-building and life-saving protection mechanism. Education for all, according to advocates, can also contribute to the reconstruction of nations torn apart by identity-based conflicts. The post-genocide government of Rwanda has looked to formal education as a peace-building tool in their national reconstruction. As such, they have prioritized the rebuilding of their national education system in order to fight poverty, combat prejudice,
and, most importantly, build national unity amongst Rwanda’s three major ethnic groups in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide and civil war.

This thesis utilizes archival research and theories supported from the fields of conflict analysis and resolution and peace studies. This exploratory study presents the case in favor of the educational reconstruction process in post-genocide Rwanda, under specific conditions. Educational reconstruction is interpreted as a peace-building mechanism, due to its capacity to reach the largest number of civil society actors across conflict groups through a common human development resource—education.

The study further argues that structural reforms in the national education system can help reduce animosities, foster cooperation, ensure capacity building, and promote civil society participation between the government and civil society, and particularly amongst citizens of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa descent. It is demonstrated throughout this study that the outcome of the educational reconstruction process depends on its conditions, how it is engineered, by whom, and the availability of necessary resources.
1. Introduction

Since the colonial era, the national education system in Rwanda has been a major source of conflict between the government and civil society, as well as amongst the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa ethnic groups. Politicized by former governments, formal education has historically and intentionally been used to exclude, marginalize, and demonize school-age children and youth because of their ethnic identities. National educational policies, laws, and classroom practices have fostered social divisions. Entire ethnic groups were discriminated against and/or excluded from receiving equal access to educational opportunities because of their ethnicities. The national curriculum socialized teachers and learners to act on injurious ideologies and stereotypes about themselves and ethnic groups different from their own.

Some historians and members of civil society have argued further that teaching and learning in Rwanda helped to produce attitudes, values, and social relations that made identity-based violence a norm (Obura, 2003). Still others believe that formal education prepared perpetrators to kill in the 1994 genocide on one hand, and encouraged victims to accept the unjust conditions of their deaths. School-age children have largely been educated separately along ethnic lines or collectively under divisive terms.
In the aftermath of the 1994 genocide, the post-genocide government of Rwanda envisioned the reconstruction of the national educational system as a peace-building mechanism. Reconstructing the institution, according to this government, was the most tangible social institution to transform. Their aim was to promote national unity, eliminate the injustices of the past, and make every child - irrespective of ethnic identity - feel as if the new system were his or her own. The government selected the reconstruction of the national educational system as one of three major peace-building goals.

Among major developments, however, the government continues to search for processes, policies, and programs to build the capacity for the national educational system to foster national unity and peace-building (Obura, 2003). Though school-age children increasingly have access to formal education and the infrastructure of state schools has improved, the question of how to reconstruct an educational system free of discriminatory practices in the aftermath of genocide is a question in need of further inquiry. Investigating the answer to that question is the purpose of this exploratory study.

The Debate

Reconstructing formal education in order to foster national unity and peace and change violent relationships has become a peace-building goal for a number of governments emerging from civil war and genocide. This has occurred since the reconstruction of Germany’s national educational system in the post-World War II era. Some government leaders have conceptualized formal education as a tool to combat prejudice, promote peace, and foster democratic principles (Obura, 2003, Bird, 2003).
Parents of school-age children in conflict-affected communities have also prioritized education as a resource to bring stability and normalcy to their communities (World Bank, 2005). The World Bank (2005), the largest contributor to post-conflict educational development, has affirmed that education can be used to reduce societal violence. Dr. Betty Reardon (1997), peace education pioneer, also believes that formal education can socialize school-age children to challenge war systems. Critical pedagogy theorist Paulo Freire suggests that education is a social action tool that can empower students to transform themselves, while Anna Obura, an education planner based in Rwanda, believes it can promote social cohesion (Freire, 1970; Obura, 2003).

Though some government leaders, peace educators, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have conceptualized the reconstruction process of formal education as a peace-building tool, critics have also joined in the debate. Some have questioned the validity and timing of planning for and implementing an educational reconstruction. Other planners are concerned that drastically restructuring formal education has become a panacea that governments and teachers themselves are unprepared to handle (Sommers, 2002). Some educational planners have further questioned whether post-conflict education development projects are being imposed by planners outside of the region and without local participation, as in Kosovo, and promising an undeliverable utopia to communities (Sommers, 2002). Critics also argue that teaching peace in classrooms while ideas of intolerance and violence remain at home and in communities fosters detrimental dissonance in students.
Reconstructing a National Educational System to Foster Peace

Influenced by the fields of Conflict Analysis and Resolution and Peace Studies, this exploratory study focuses on identifying conditions, public policies and post-conflict development initiatives that will advance the peace-building goals of the national educational system in post-genocide Rwanda. This study is based on three assumptions. First, supporting Freire’s vision of formal education, schools are envisioned in this study as a socializing venue where the worldviews of students are transformed and defined. Secondly, this study adopts the position of conflict resolution theorists who assert that a post-conflict environment offers a unique opportunity to evaluate, introduce change, and reform social institutions that formally produced violent societal relations (Jeong and Bates, 2003). Thirdly, this study assumes that major structural changes to the institution of formal education – one of the most visible state services affecting all citizens – can help to improve relations between the government, civil society, and amongst ethnic groups in post-genocide Rwanda.

Units of Analysis

To develop a peace-building intervention for the post-genocide Rwanda case study, key individuals and the structure of the national educational system were selected as the units of analysis. Examples of the structure of Rwanda’s educational system include educational policies, quotas, and legislation meant to guide the management of formal education. According to Anna Obura (2003), the structure of the educational system is as important to the reconstruction process as the national curriculum reforms. As described in Chapter 2, the previous structure of the educational system in Rwanda was responsible
for systematically denying segments of the population access to education on the basis of ethnic identity. At different periods in its history, it was the structure of the national educational system that caused one segment of the population to benefit from the structure of formal education, while other segments of the population were greatly discriminated against.

The structure of the national educational system in Rwanda produced structural violence. Some conflict resolution theorists assess the experience of this violence by its role in blocking self-fulfillment, creating feelings of indignity, and producing major sources of frustration amongst individuals both benefiting and suffering from the institutional structure. Dr. John Burton (1962) posits further that violence is less likely to occur when social structures help citizens to equitably meet basic human needs and realize self-fulfilled goals. Analyzing the structure of the educational system is critical to developing a plausible, peace-building intervention that addresses the root causes and conditions of the structure of the national educational system in post-genocidal Rwanda.

Key individuals – the stakeholders of the national education system – were the second unit of analysis. Government leaders, practitioners working for international assistance organizations, local educational planners, teachers, parents, and learners were also analyzed in this study. Dr. Howon Jeong (2002), peace studies theorist, asserts that conditions of structural violence have a better chance of being overcome when individuals afflicted by it are empowered. Dr. Dennis Sandole (1999), a conflict resolution theorist, suggests that analyzing individuals is necessary in understanding the root causes of violent conflicts and social change processes. Other conflict resolution
theorists who believe individuals are a key unit of analysis agree that the structural transformation of a social institution alone is insufficient to changing violent human behavior. In this study, both the structure of formal education and individuals are marked as critical units of analyses. Changing conditions affecting both individuals and the structure of the national educational system underlie the central argument of this exploratory study.

**Research in the Field of Post-Conflict Development and Reconstruction**

While the topic of this study is relevant to conflict analysis and resolution, peace education, and post-conflict development and reconstruction, this study has revealed significant gaps in research, theory, and practice. Research regarding educational programs in refugee camps is plentiful, while less research exists on the complex process of reconstructing an educational system damaged by a civil war or genocide. According to the Buckland (2005), scholarly inquiry in the field of post-conflict development and reconstruction is often unreliable, incomplete, and underreported.

For example, limited reports and documentation exist about UNICEF’s peace education programming initiative and/or the innovative actions of government leaders and international assistance organizations in post-genocidal Rwanda. Reflective and evaluative reports tracking the work of practitioners in post-conflict environments remain scarce and difficult to access. More research and evaluation is needed to determine the effectiveness of post-conflict educational programs, teacher training programs, and post-conflict curriculum reform processes targeted for conflict-affected and out of school children and youth.
There are approximately five international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) currently leading initiatives to develop programs and interventions for educational systems affected by discriminatory policies, civil war, and/or genocide. Authors who are at the forefront of investigating and writing about post-conflict educational system reconstruction processes are primarily international education planners working for these NGOs. More preventive information is needed from state leaders, teachers, school administrators, parent associations, and students about the best practices and lessons learned in the processes of rebuilding and reconstructing a national educational system. More investigations are needed into the participatory methods useful in eliminating biases and discriminatory narratives from politicized national curriculums affected by the politics of ethnic violence. Also, more knowledge is needed regarding ways to deliver teacher training programs to new and retained teachers affected by genocide or civil war.

Limited data exists about the diverse forms of alternative educational programs targeted for difficult to reach school-age children and youth. The reconstruction of the national educational system in post-genocidal Rwanda and elsewhere requires international funding from donors. With limited resources directed at educational programming in post-conflict environments, increased advocacy is needed to raise awareness of the peace-building attributes of education in such environments. Reconstruction initiatives work best in a context of a sovereign government operating under conditions of stability and security.
Further investigation and research is also needed in the evolving field of post-conflict development and reconstruction of social institutions. As a strategy to track the achievements and lessons learned in post-conflict development and reconstruction, the World Bank, agencies of the United Nations, the Organization of Security and Cooperation, and select international assistance agencies are developing post-conflict reconstruction units. Limited access to in-depth research suggests the need for continual research on this topic.

**The Methodology of Study**

This study explored the following three questions. Which conditions of Rwanda’s national educational system produced structural violence? What actions must occur to eliminate sources of structural violence from the education system in post-genocide Rwanda? As a part of the reconstruction process, how can conditions of positive peace be integrated into the national education system in Rwanda? To explore answers to these questions, I analyzed the actions of key stakeholders in addition to the structural conditions of Rwanda’s national education system.

With the goal of increasing the connection between research, theory, and practice, I have developed an argument for this Rwanda case study using conflict resolution and peace studies theories. An archive of secondary sources were identified, collected, and reviewed from existing reports. This methodology was necessary because in-depth research and written evaluations about the reconstruction of Rwanda’s educational system are limited and in its early stages of development.
Informing this study with theory-based knowledge from the fields of conflict analysis and resolution and peace studies was instrumental in increasing the connectedness between theory, research, and practice. The following concepts and theories are relevant and useful to this study. “Post-conflict educational system reconstruction” is a term that refers to the practice of rebuilding a national educational system damaged by genocide and/or a civil war. “Structural violence,” conceptualized by Johan Galtung, is an experience where individuals face unjust social, economic, political, and cultural inequalities because of the impenetrable structure of a social institution. Building new relationships amongst communities in conflict, according to conflict resolution practitioners, ensues with the reduction of grievances and animosities emerging from structural violence.

“Positive Peace,” defined by Dr. Howon Jeong (2000), refers to a social condition that can be achieved by eliminating structural violence from social institutions and building in conditions that foster social equality, participation, empowerment, and freedom. Building positive peace is possible, according to Botes and Joeng (2003), when social institutions are restructured to creatively address the structural conditions causing inequities, indignity, and marginalization. The theory of basic human needs, as described by John Burton, relates to an individual’s basic need for identity, security, recognition, and personal development. Furthermore, if individuals are prevented from satisfying their own basic human needs, defiant behaviors against the responsible source are likely to occur.
The “contact hypothesis theory”, a theory developed by Allport (1954), Williams (1947), and Watson (1945), is also important to this study and suggests that prejudice can be decreased when conditions of equal status and cooperative interdependence are met between groups. The concept of empowerment is critical to this study as well and is defined as a process whereby people have mastery over their lives and the decisions that affect them. Conditions of empowerment are key cornerstones to achieving a national educational system that fosters positive peace in post-genocidal Rwanda.

**Operational Setting**

Reports, articles, and publications written by conflict resolution theorists, post-conflict international assistance practitioners, educational planners, international NGO agencies, government leaders, and donors also shaped the argument of this study. These secondary sources highlighted existing studies, field research, and lessons learned in post-conflict educational reconstruction processes in Rwanda and elsewhere. The following secondary sources supported this exploratory study. UNESCO published a case study highlighting the process of educational system change and reconstruction in a report entitled, “Never Again: Educational Reconstruction in Rwanda.” Obura, an educational planner who worked extensively in Rwanda before, during, and after the genocide, is the author of this case study report.

UNESCO’s International Bureau of Education published a comparative education book entitled, *Education, Conflict and Social Cohesion*. This publication examined the role, opportunities, and challenges of using national curriculum policies to promote social cohesion in post-conflict societies. The Rwanda case study was included in this
publication. UNICEF also wrote a working paper summarizing their worldwide peace education programs. UNICEF’s working paper provided a description and rationale for post-conflict peace education programming. It was one of several international organizations that initiated a peace education program in post-genocide Rwanda. Save the Children also published a tool kit entitled, “Education in Emergencies: A Tool Kit for Starting and Managing Education in Emergencies.” This kit outlines practical tips in developing and implementing educational programming in a post-civil war environment.

John Paul Lederach published a book on reconciliation in divided societies entitled, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. This book introduced reconciliation concepts and illuminated the important role of different levels of civil society participation in building an infrastructure for peace. Grace Machel, former minister of education in war-torn Mozambique, wrote a comprehensive report entitled, “The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children.” Machel raised awareness regarding the complexity of reconstructing and reforming societal institutions in a post-conflict society.

Save the Children, the International Rescue Committee, and the Women’s Commission on Refugee Children and Youth are NGOs on the frontline of designing educational projects and processes useful in reforming educational systems affected by civil war and/or genocide. These NGOs have primarily focused on the needs of civil society actors such as teachers, learners, and community leaders.

Conflict analysis and resolution theories also informed this exploratory study. Dr. Jeong, of the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University, published a book entitled, Peace and Conflict Studies. This book summarized key
concepts supporting the study of peace and conflict analysis and resolution. Jeong is also well known for his research analyzing the relationship between social structures and violent conflict. Many of the concepts supporting this thesis derive from his research and analysis.

Dr. Dennis Sandole, also of the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University, developed a framework about conflict mapping entitled, “A Comprehensive Mapping of Conflict and Conflict Resolution: A Three Pillar Approach.” As outlined in Chapter 2, the conflict mapping framework was instrumental in charting the violent conditions of the structure of Rwanda’s national education system. Dr. Kevin Avruch, Associate Director of the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University and a cultural anthropologist, is a specialist in identity-based conflicts. His anthropological perspective and expertise on the formation and processes of identity-based conflicts are also important in the formation of this project.

Several websites host helpful information useful in this study. The Interagency Network for Education in Emergencies is a new website populated with case studies, reports, conference proceedings, and guidelines for post-conflict educational planners. The site focuses on providing guidance to educational planners leading post-conflict educational reconstruction initiatives in nations emerging from violent conflicts. The International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) is a research center and website dedicated to supporting national educational planners in planning, managing, and evaluating their educational systems. The IIEP has recently focused on providing research-based technical assistance, guidebooks, conference proceedings, and
publications to educational planners and NGOs participating in the rebuilding of educational systems emerging from civil war. All of these secondary resources and theories were identified and selected because of their support for the central argument of this thesis. They were also chosen due to the lack of robust resources available on this topic.

Content Analysis

Participation, equality, autonomy, oppression and empowerment are key concepts frequently highlighted in reports and publications about post-conflict educational reconstruction processes. A content analysis of publications and reports reveal that a state-led post-conflict educational system reconstruction process that fosters participation, equity, autonomy and empowerment on one hand, while eliminating conditions of oppression on the other, offers teachers, students and parents across ethnic fault-lines an opportunity to change their historically violent relationship with the state. It also provides people of various ethnicities the chance to come together with groups different from their own. These concepts are explored in Chapters 2-6.

Ethics Dilemma

Can structural changes to the national educational system in post-genocidal Rwanda promote national unity and change relationships in a “ground zero” environment? Can changes be implemented by key stakeholders who have been heavily traumatized by genocide and/or ethnic violence? These are a few of the ethical questions that have arisen during this study. There are also limitations to this study, inherent in the fact that the fields of peace studies, conflict analysis and resolution, education in
emergencies, and post-conflict development represent new and evolving fields. As discussed by Dr. Betty Reardon, these fields have developed analysis tools to understand violent conflict, and they continue to develop theory, research, and practice in conflict resolution processes.

The Post-Genocide Rwanda Case Study

As argued throughout this thesis, the rebuilding of the national educational system is particularly important in the national reconstruction of post-genocidal Rwanda. The conclusion of this study can inform stakeholders who are responsible for correcting and restructuring the formerly violent conditions of the institution of formal education in Rwanda and in other post-conflict environments. Visualizing the reconstruction as a peace-building process, each chapter of this study represents a component of a peace-building intervention.

Through my research, I have identified practical post-conflict reconstruction activities and initiatives likely to build the capacity of the educational sector to produce conditions of positive peace and to change relationships amongst stakeholders governing, supporting, and benefiting from the that sector. Additionally, this study identifies conditions useful in eliminating sources of injustice, marginalization, and discrimination from formal education in Rwanda. Conditions and activities, while exploratory, offer educational planners, state decision-makers, civil society actors, and international assistance organizations synthesized and increased knowledge of the approaches and practices in the post-conflict educational development field.
Following the introduction, Chapter 2 analyzes Rwanda’s national educational system and maps the conflict-producing conditions within the institution of formal education. Chapter 3 encourages the government – the leader of the reconstruction process – to change discriminatory educational policies and promote a reconstruction process that fosters civil society participation. Chapter 4 proposes roles and responsibilities for key civil society stakeholders to participate in a structural transformation process. Chapter 5 highlights important practices in reforming discriminatory elements in the national curriculum. Chapter 6 explores strategies in increasing access to education for children and youth who are out of school because of economic, ethnic, and/or social circumstances, and Chapter 7 concludes the thesis and summarizes key findings.
2. A Conflict Typology

The purpose of this chapter is to identify conditions of the national educational system in genocidal Rwanda that reinforced social imbalances between the main ethnic groups. Serving as a preliminary step in constructing a transformative post-genocidal education system intervention, a comprehensive conflict typology is necessary to provide various angles and perspectives about the source of discontent between conflict parties, demographics of the conflicting parties, and their incompatible issues and orientations (Sandole, 1999, Rubenstein, 2003, Jeong, 2000). Understanding conditions that led the educational system to promote violence and foster experiences of marginalization, exclusion, and competition can guide new reforms and help address the roots of the current problem.

Using Dr. Sandole’s three-pillar approach, this chapter maps the conflict over formal education in Rwanda. Pillar One identifies the conflict parties and their issues, objectives, and means. Pillar Two describes the underlying causes and conditions of the conflict, and Pillar Three outlines conflict resolution theories that inform the goals and strategies of this peace-building intervention. This chapter builds the case that the more knowledge known about the conflict, the better chance the reconstruction process will have to respond to its source and create conditions that will improve relations between the government and civil society.
Pillar One: The State and Civil Society

The State

In Rwanda, the government – the architect, planner, and manager of the national educational system – manipulated formal education for political means. Historians believe that from the colonial administration to the second republic, state politicians governed formal education with a hegemonic ideology that reinforced discrimination, competition, and intolerance between ethnic groups (Obura, 2003). Amid ongoing economic and political insecurities and a pending civil war, the totalitarian-style governments used the national educational system as a means to preserve their power. This was accomplished through designing educational policies that discriminated against segments of the population, writing national textbooks to dehumanize and demonize targeted ethnic groups to maintain animosity between groups, supporting a parallel school structure that polarized school-age children by ethnicity, and labeling school-age children with identification cards that targeted them for marginalization and violence.

The Colonial Administration, Issues, Objectives and Means

The colonial administration birthed the stratification of ethnic groups in Rwanda by governing society based on the disputed Hemetic theory (Obura, 2003). Although all ethnic groups in Rwanda shared a common language, culture, and religion, this theory professed that Africans who resembled tribes of Europe were the rightful masters. Members of the Tutsi population were positioned at the top of the hierarchical system and were perceived as being innately superior to the Hutu and Twa ethnic groups. Rwandans, identified as Hutu or Twa, were largely denied formal education due to their physical
attributes and involuntary membership in their ethnic group. The Hemetic theory justified measuring intellectual capacity based on physical features, advanced educational opportunities primarily to the Tutsis monocracy and population, and demonized the Hutu and Twa population as being less than human, uncivilized, and incapable of benefiting from formal education.

The Hemetic theory worldview was transmitted to governance policies, classroom pedagogy, and into the consciousness of teachers and learners (Uvin, 1999, Obura, 2003). Notions of superiority and inferiority associated with each ethnic group were taught, consciously internalized, and acted upon. The first colonial school, for example, was established specifically to educate only the sons of Tutsi chiefs (Rutayisire, Kabano, and Rubagiza, 2004). The Catholic Church, the founder of a large number of schools in Rwanda, overwhelmingly granted members of the Tutsi minority access to their schools. The colonial administration also established ethnic identification cards that were instrumental in branding every school-age child as having either a Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa identity (Rutayisire, Kabano, and Rubagiza, 2004). Children often first learned of their identities in the school setting and were treated accordingly. One’s identity dictated the quality and quantity of formal education achieved during this era.

According to historians, the educational system was one of many social institutions that denied members of the Hutu population access because of their ethnic identity. Disenfranchised members were forced to pursue educational opportunities outside of the colonial system that oppressed them. Members of the Tutsi population, however, were primarily guaranteed quality education, job security, and economic advancement (Obura,
2003). This system adversely affected the relationship between these groups and established damaging stereotypes in the consciousness of all stakeholders within the national educational system.

First Republic and Issues, Objectives, and Means

Replacing the Hemetic theory, the first republic was inspired by the Bahutu Manifesto ideology. Architects of the Bahutu Manifesto gained independence from the state and launched Rwanda’s first social revolution. Led by President Gregoire Kayibanda, a member of the Hutu ethnic group, the Bahutu Manifesto blamed the Tutsi monarchy for the oppression and marginalization of the Hutu population. It asserted that social imbalances should be corrected by advancing educational, economic, and political opportunities solely to the Hutu majority. Amid sponsoring the massacre of thousands of Tutsis and the exodus of 120,000 more into neighboring countries, the Bahutu Manifesto served as the foundation for the explicit construction of bias in educational policies, demonizing classroom practices, and violent actions against the Tutsi minority. This theory “justified” the state’s use of identity and region of birth as the criteria to enter state-run schools (Obura, 2003, Rutayisire, Kabano, and Rubagiza, 2004).

Members of the Tutsi minority and those Hutus born in the northern region of Rwanda were disproportionately denied access to formal education during the first republic. The educational system favored students who were identified as Hutu and born in the southern region of the country, the birthplace of the president. Identification cards labeled students and continued to stratify Rwandans by identity. The content of history textbooks was heavily based on the misinterpretation, stereotypes, and myths imposed by
the first republic. These textbooks were known to illuminate the Hutu struggle on the one hand and blame the Tutsi population on the other for the oppression and disadvantages of the Hutu community (Uvin, 1999, Obura, 2003).

Second Republic and their Issues, Objectives and Means

After assuming power by a coup d’état, the First Republic was replaced by a one party government made up of blood-related political leaders. The leaders who were born Hutu in the northwest region took power of the state and constructed the Hutu power ideology. This ideology explicitly blamed the Tutsi population for the historical oppression of the Hutus, the unstable economy, and the growing rebel movement festering against the state. During the Second Republic, the eradication of the Tutsi population was also coined as the solution to Rwanda’s social problems. As with the first republic, this ideology was enforced through the national educational system and arguably continued the socialization process that demonized and dehumanized the Tutsi population.

In policy, the second republic officially legalized an ethnic quota system. Under this system, educational policies and laws sanctioned the discrimination and exclusion of the Tutsi population and the Hutu population from the southern region of Rwanda. Eighty-five percent of students gained access to secondary schools based on ethnic or regional quotas, ten percent by church selection, and five percent by the ministry of education (Obura, 2003). Sixty percent of secondary school and university students educated in state schools were born in the northwest region. Modern schools were built in the northwest, while other state schools in the southern region suffered.
The Catholic Church primarily educated the Tutsis population, while state-governed schools educated most members of the Hutu group. During this republic, the government helped to finance this parallel school structure that civil society established, hence legitimizing and reinforcing the polarization of identity groups within the national education system. In other countries, like Kosovo, parallel school structures were known to breed myths, suspicion, and alienation (Buckland, 2005). This structure offers fewer opportunities for children belonging to different ethnic groups to interact in a school setting.

In the national school curriculum and classroom lesson plans, the Tutsi minority were frequently referred to as “evil,” “snakes,” and “cockroaches” (Obura, 2003). According to UNICEF, classroom lesson practices taught to school-age children of Hutu descent encouraged that they were better than their fellow Tutsi classmates. During this period, 100,000 more Tutsis fled to neighboring countries to escape persecution, while 200,000 Hutu refugees fled into Rwanda from Burundi for fear of persecution from a Tutsi-dominated government. The RFP, a Tutsi-led refugee armed movement, was also posing a threat to the government. During this period, the international community aggressively pressured the second republic to share political power and improve social conditions for the entire population, irrespective of ethnic identity.

**The Second Republic and the Genocide**

During the Second Republic, key leaders of the government were held responsible for violating the peace agreement and for inciting the 1994 genocide that resulted in the deaths of more than 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus. The national educational system
was a prime target during this government-led genocide. Sixty-five percent of schools were looted, burned, and destroyed (Obura, 2003). The Ministry of Education was decimated, and limited documentation of the national curriculum survived. Teachers (perceived as elites and outspoken members of civil society) and learners were murdered on school grounds. Teachers and students became both victims and perpetrators of the mass killings (Buckland, 2005, Obura, 2003). One third of all school-age children were either injured or witnessed the murder of a relative or friend. The infrastructure of the national education system collapsed, with the horrific slaughter of a quarter of Rwanda’s population.

Civil Society

 Teachers, students, and parents of Hutu and Tutsi descent have been in conflict with the state over the unequal distribution of educational opportunities, biased quota systems, and unfair and often violent school practices from the colonial period to the 1994 genocide. Less research is available on the Twa ethnic group. Arguably, the national educational system was an obstacle and served as a major threat to all ethnic groups in civil society at different periods throughout the country’s history. Students who were denied entry into state-run schools were often not presented with their examination scores or tangible criteria for being rejected. Learners often experienced discrimination, violence, and isolation after being publicly identified by their ethnic identities in school.

To gain entry into schools, bribes were also often used as a measure against school-age children who were marginalized by educational policies (Rutayisire, Kabano, and Rubagiza, 2004). Only limited means – aside from these bribes and private education –
existed for the marginalized to gain access to formal education. Many members of society believed that the educational policy makers – the government – were exempt from common standards of law and ignored civil society values (Rutayisire, Kabano, and Rubagiza, 2004).

**Parallel System and Issues, Objectives, and Means**

Similar to that in Kosovo and Sri Lanka, the parallel school structure in Rwanda was a primary marker of resistance against the state. During the second republic, parents primarily from the Tutsi population sought autonomy from state schools. Hence, parent associations established private schools in partnership with the Catholic Church to increase their participation and gain autonomy over their children’s formal education. According to UNICEF, despite the financial commitment of a private education, some parents who supported this structure believed that control over their children’s education shielded the children from state-sponsored experiences of marginalization and discrimination (Obura, 2003). Members of the Tutsi minority also sent their children to Catholic schools because these schools have historically supported their educational needs. The parallel structure separated school-age children on the basis of identity and offered rare opportunities to build positive social relations.

**Pillar One and Post-Genocidal Educational System Reconstruction**

Pillar One is instrumental in identifying key stakeholders impacted by and responsible for exacerbating violent social divisions through formal education. On a national level, the government was responsible for creating educational policies that systematically undermined the educational advancement of each ethnic group at different
stages in the country’s history. Political leaders used their political power to create conditions that advanced educational opportunities solely to their ethnic population at the demise of other ethnic groups.

Within civil society, teachers and students sustained state-imposed inequities, discrimination, and separatism practices in the classroom. Civil society further exacerbated the identity divide in the school setting by developing a parallel school structure that legitimized separate and unequal education. Pillar One informs architects of Rwanda’s post-genocidal education system reconstruction process by showing that educational policy makers, teachers, parents, and learners should be active participants in transforming themselves and the structure of the national education system they created and implemented.

**Pillar Two: Causes and Conditions**

At many different periods of history, the national educational system violated the basic human needs of Rwanda’s main three ethnic groups and created conditions of structural violence. Such conditions created an experience that violated the basic human rights of individuals, demonized the value of ethnic groups, blocked opportunities for self-fulfillment in state schools, legalized unequal educational opportunities based on ethnicity, and produced general feelings of second class citizenry. Ethnic identity rather than academic achievement guaranteed access to formal education. Ethnic groups victimized by this type of structure had limited capacities and opportunities to change the conditions they perceived to be oppressive, unjustifiable, and unfair.

*Social Structure, Violence, and Social Divisions*
Buckland (2005) suggests that social institutions affected by structural violence often undermine the cohesion between the government and civil society and/or among all ethnic groups. Conflict resolution theorists expand on this impact by asserting that individuals, whose need for autonomy, recognition, and security are threatened by such a social institution, are likely to engage in aggressive behavior against it (Rubenstein, 2003, Jeong, 2000). Theorists have also researched that violent behavior is likely to be provoked by victims who perceive they are unjustifiably being denied opportunities enjoyed by the mainstream (Sandole, 2003, Botes, 2003). All of these factors are relevant in this Rwanda case study and help to explain how conditions of formal education have promoted and encouraged exclusion, discrimination, and violent behavior.

Social Structure, Perceptions, and Social Divisions

Historians suggest that political ideologies transmitted into the national educational system encouraged in-group solidarity, illuminated differences between ethnic groups, and fostered inter-group violence in Rwanda. Arguably, these ideologies also ingrained negative perceptions, stereotypes, and myths about the “other” into the national consciousness. The government’s integration of the Hemetic, Bahutu Manifesto, and Hutu Power theories into the national curriculum, educational policies, and classroom practices injured members of each of Rwanda’s ethnic groups. Myths and stereotypes inoculated into history education lessons, for instance, glorified one group while demeaning another (Rutayisire, Kabano, and Rubagiza, 2004).

Interviews with learners from the Hutu community revealed their struggles to dismiss colonial stereotypes that classified their ethnic group as being innately inferior to
the Tutsi population (Rutayisire, Kabano, and Rubagiza, 2004, Obura, 2003). School-age children of Tutsi descent often believed that the Hutu community thought of their group as “creatures” rather than humans. Being dehumanized, classified as inferior, and/or labeled as the ethnic group responsible for the historical degradation of a fellow ethnic group in educational documents is likely to generate negative emotions, suspicion, frustration, and mistrust on the part of students. These psychological and inter-psychic perceptions naturally fuel violent conflicts and social divisions.

John Paul Lederach (1999), a practitioner of post-conflict reconciliation processes, purports that today’s conflicts begin in the mindset of individuals. Tamra Pearson d’Estrée’s (2003) research further suggests that negative psychological emotions are also likely to reduce contact and empathy and make violent behavior against targeted individuals acceptable and justifiable. Sandole (1999) illuminates the importance of dealing with negative perceptions, emotions, and ingrained stereotypes in individuals brutalized by civil war and/or genocide as a prerequisite to other conflict resolution practices. He also asserts that, without an inter-psychic intervention, such practices may fail, or the conflict may proliferate into the next generation. These theories raise awareness of the impact of perceptions, myths, and stereotypes in producing and responding to Rwanda’s conflict over formal education.

**Pillar Two and the Post-Genocidal Education System Reconstruction Process**

Pillar Two is critical in outlining the conditions of the national educational system that caused frustration, created negative perceptions and emotions, and generated incompatible interests amongst Rwanda’s ethnic groups. The direct and structural
violence embedded in the institution of formal education is likely to be minimized when problematic conditions change. Thus, creating an educational system reconstruction process that eliminates conditions of direct and structural violence and instead builds accountability, inclusion, equality, and participation will protect the basic human needs of all Rwandans.

**Pillar Three: The Peace-Building Approach to Reconstruction**

Pillar Three, outlined in subsequent chapters of this thesis, describes approaches to conflict resolution. Dr. Johannes Botes (2003) recommends that interventions should be deliberate in changing the causes and conditions underlying the conflict. Dr. Dennis Sandole (1999) suggests that any conflict resolution design should capture the complexity of the conflict and seek to resolve issues occurring at different levels of society. Successfully dealing with deeply rooted causes and conditions can be achieved, according to Jeong, by identifying the actors and coordinating activities. Furthermore, Lederach (1999) assesses the effectiveness of a conflict resolution approach by its ability to be implemented, owned, and sustained by the key stakeholders involved in the conflict.

In post-genocidal Rwanda, this conflict typology can serve as the basis for selecting educational policies, reconstruction activities, and other initiatives designed to eliminate the conditions of structural violence from the national educational system. This conflict mapping approach is also useful in identifying stakeholders who would be instrumental in participating in the post-genocidal education system reconstruction process. Mapping this conflict raises awareness of the challenges and the opportunities.
3. Political Leadership, Will and Commitment

This chapter focuses on the important role the post-genocidal government of Rwanda has in spearheading educational system change. The government of Rwanda, the national manager of formal education, is mandated with the responsibility of delivering educational services to its citizens. As noted in Chapter 2, from colonial rule to the time of the Second Republic, Rwanda’s government used this responsibility to discriminate against certain citizens and provide unequal access to formal education. Educational policies and legislation were established to propel opportunities for only one of three ethnic groups. National laws, policies, and practices were enacted within a highly centralized state that offered limited opportunities for civil society members to participate in the management of formal education.

In post-genocidal Rwanda, the new government is a critical leader in the reconstruction process of the national educational system. This leadership role offers many benefits. According to Peter Buckland (2005), leadership over post-conflict reconstruction processes provides a government with an opportunity to demonstrate its intent to work in the public interest, its capacity to fairly deliver educational services to all identity groups, and its commitment to change. The International Institute for Educational Planning (2004) supports this argument by citing the importance of states
emerging from civil wars to demonstrate resolve through transparent governance and policy change. Obura (2003) suggests further that, in post-genocide Rwanda, every child and parent must perceive that their educational needs are a concern of the state government.

Leading the reconstruction of a national educational system decimated by genocide, however, represents a major challenge for any government. In Rwanda, the new political leadership represented the winning side of a civil war. New visions and laws had to be enacted in the context of major losses, both financially and in terms of human resources (Obura, 2003). Teachers, students, and parents had been traumatized, emerging from exile internally displaced and as former ex-combatants. Civil society, a stakeholder in the educational system reconstruction process, remained polarized along conflict lines.

This chapter argues that the new government of post-genocide Rwanda has an opportunity to legitimize itself and build new relations with civil society through leading the reconstruction process of the educational system. In pursuit of this goal, the new government must develop a compelling vision, direct necessary resources to new policy goals, display visible signs of educational system change, and build a societal consensus with civil society stakeholders. This chapter builds the case by highlighting relevant theories from the field of conflict analysis and resolution, as well as best practices and lessons learned from fieldwork.

**Political Leadership and Will**

Strong national political leadership and will in post-conflict Rwanda, Mozambique, and El Salvador have been instrumental in promoting national visions, policy changes,
and, in some cases, attracting resources from international donors during the reconstruction process of their national educational systems. Political will is defined by Pauline Rose and Martin Greeley (2006) as a commitment led by politicians to direct political resources to key policy goals. With limited capacities, the new government of Rwanda set an example by accelerating the pace of educational change within three months of the end of the genocide (Obura, 2003).

In contrast, limited political leadership within post-civil war Bosnia and Kosovo contributed to major impediments to their post-conflict educational reconstruction processes (Sommers, 2003). In these regions of the former Yugoslavia, interim international authorities took leadership over the reconstruction process without proper consultation from national and local political authorities. The interim international authorities consequently faced resistance and a lack of participation from civil society members (Buckland, 2005). The pace of educational system change often depends on the level of political leadership and will from state leaders.

**Political Will and a National Vision**

Articulating a compelling national vision for the post-genocidal national educational system is an important government-led action. Developing a national vision that outlines desirable changes to the structure of formal education has the potential to influence key stakeholders to look beyond past atrocities and imagine a new educational system for their society. According to Lederach (1999), a compelling vision communicated by the government can create an opportunity for civil society to communicate about the conflict and its resolution. Other conflict resolution practitioners suggest that altruistic visions,
images, and utopias can inspire social action and provide mental pictures for positive alternatives (Jeong, 2003, D’estree, 2003, Reardon, 1997). Conflict resolution theorist Marie Dugan asserts that an inspiring vision for system change can articulate a future vastly different from the past, while Reardon (1997) purports that powerful visions professed in post-conflict environments can define social norms and guide the behaviors of stakeholders.

Aligned with this concept, the new government of post-genocidal Rwanda envisioned the reconstruction of formal education as an opportunity to change areas of it that had caused ethnic imbalances, suffering, and exclusion. According to UNESCO (2005), the Ministry of Education believed formal education to be an instrument capable of building a culture of peace, instilling non-violent values, and promoting justice, tolerance, and human rights. The government also publicly articulated formal education as a system in place to promote national unity, reconciliation, and healing. Common attributes that bind Rwandans (such as language, history, and the values of unity, solidarity, and courage) were highlighted. The government’s vision was targeted to empower every citizen – irrespective of ethnic identity – to participate in the elimination of destructive errors of the former system. Arguably, this vision set the tone for negotiating a new relationship between the government and civil society stakeholders.

Promoting a compelling national vision for the reconstruction process of the educational system, if shared, may mobilize support from within civil society, contributing to government legitimacy. Otherwise, politicized national visions for social change are likely to be left unsustainable and in support of the status quo (Jeong, 2002).
All Rwandans are represented in the new government’s vision. This vision was supported by some, and criticized by others who perceived this approach as lacking support from civil society and derived without appropriate consultation (Obura, 2003). According to Africa Action (Web site, 2005), an advocacy organization based in Washington, DC, the decision to minimize ethnic differences by the post-genocidal government of Rwanda impeded dialogues between civil society members of Hutu and Tutsi descent. In contrast, the lack of a shared vision between interim international authorities, local political leaders, and civil society in post-civil war Kosovo, resulted in substantial delays of laudable and well-funded educational reconstruction plans (Sommers, 2004). In fact, competing nationalist visions flourished at the regional level, and many local educators withdrew from the reconstruction process in Kosovo.

Jeong (2002) responds to this issue by asserting that peace-building goals should be based on mutual understanding and a shared vision between government and civil society. Imposing visions for change without support from key stakeholders can breed resistance irrespective of the well-intentions of the leadership or the peace-building goal(s) itself. Visioning, in cooperation with stakeholders, is a long-term conflict resolution tool that is likely to be successful if led from within the country.

**Political Will, Policy Development, and Resource Allocation**

Political will is also a requirement for the development of transformative national policies that respond to the causes and conditions of the conflict over formal education. New post-genocide educational policies established in Rwanda set an example for post-civil war educational system reconstruction processes elsewhere. The new government
replaced discriminatory policies with new ones that prioritized providing equal access to
education for every school-age citizen. Trilingual language policies were established to
accommodate English-speaking children who were formerly exiled in neighboring
Anglophone countries. Destructive elements of the national curriculum were removed
from textbooks and other curricular materials.

Political Will, Policy Development, and Resources

Apart from intent, laudable educational policies require financial commitment,
adequate expenditure appropriations, budget execution, and good governance.
Implementing new transformative policies depends on political will and the capacity of
the government to direct financial resources toward policy goals. However, new
ministries of education emerging from genocide or civil war, as is the case in Rwanda,
often have limited access to domestic revenue. Limited access to national revenue was an
obstacle for the new government of Rwanda and caused delays in the implementation of
new educational policies.

New governments, however, with strong political wills to transform educational
policies, often attract external support from the international community. While
governments are building their capacities to deliver post-conflict educational services,
external support can provide interim alternatives. The Interagency of Education in
Emergencies (INEE) recommends that new ministries of education with weak human and
financial resources use their political leadership to request support from international
NGOs and multi-lateral donors. Buckland (2005) asserts that NGOs are more likely to
support government-led national education policies with evidence of strong political wills and long-term policy plans.

International assistance provided to post-genocide Rwanda, as well as post-civil war Mozambique, built the capacity of these financially strapped nations to meet several promised policy goals in the early reconstruction period. Support from UNICEF in Rwanda, for example, funded teachers’ salaries and provided food rations to teachers as a recruitment strategy (Obura, 2003). In Mozambique, the World Bank provided resources to the post-civil war state budget to fund a decentralization educational management program. In both contexts, international funds were made available to support home-grown visions. International resources directed toward state-led ventures, in some cases, have also proven to advance new transformative educational policies directed at civil society.

*Political Will, Global Partnerships, and Coordination*

Strong political leadership, will, and coordination are critical to synergizing new national educational policies with activities sponsored by international NGOs. Coordination between these entities can facilitate communication and agreements on top policy goals and prevent replication (Sommers, 2004). When reconstruction activities are coordinated, confusion lessens, and teachers and students are likely to participate in similar activities nationwide. Some experts suggest that coordinating initiatives between the government and international NGOs should be a priority.

However, the relationship between post-conflict governments and international NGOs and donors challenges coordination needs. Though UNICEF successfully resourced the
national campaign to open schools in Rwanda, for example, the overall lack of consultation, coordination, and communication with other international NGOs resulted in the expulsion of thirty-eight organizations (Obura, 2003). International NGOs often unintentionally competed with government-led priorities, and in turn, undermined the government’s capacity to meet locally-driven policy goals. Perceptions and experience from the field suggest that international NGOs have faced challenges in trusting and working directly with new governments. The lack of political will, commitment, and capacity are commonly-cited concerns (Sommers, 2002). Despite these challenges, though, collaboration between governments and international NGOs and donors are likely to further advance new and reformed educational policy goals.

**Leading an Educational System Reconstruction Process**

*Early Peace Dividends*

Under state leadership, national educational authorities must visibly initiate signs that the educational system reconstruction process has begun. These visible signs are often referenced as early peace dividends (IIEP, 2006). Visible signs can demonstrate the government’s commitment and capacity to implement laudable educational policy goals. Grace Machel (1996), former Minister of Education in Mozambique, has asserted that quick impact projects are bridges that transition the educational systems from the emergency phase to the long-term development phase. Restarting learning as quickly as possible, provides incentives to recruit teachers and learners, and demonstrates symbolic reforms.

*Restart Learning*
Restarting learning in the aftermath of a genocide is a visible action that can build normalcy, create safe and supervised spaces, and deflect forms of exploitation against school-age children. It also offers opportunities for the new government to extend educational services to children formally excluded from the national educational system. Save the Children (2003) suggests that children with special needs can be carefully observed by teachers. Marc Sommers (2002) asserts that the resumption of learning should take precedence over the construction of school buildings. Emergency education experts posit that the sooner a child enters structured learning environments, the sooner the child will recover from the impact of genocide. Other advocates assert that restarting education is a civil society basic need, one that if met, can enhance government legitimacy.

The restart of learning in post-genocidal Rwanda, for example, was launched through a national campaign. Regional leaders, equipped with the knowledge of local realities, joined national political leaders in deciding on and announcing school opening dates. National radios, public speeches, and personalized visits from political leaders articulated the opening of primary and secondary schools. The involvement of regional leaders in each province was critical in influencing the opinions of parents and learners at the grassroots level. Consequently, mobilized parents and caregivers returned their school-age children to formal education. Lederach (2001) asserts that regional leaders are the civil society stakeholders most likely to sustain a peace-building process. Examples from post-genocidal Rwanda reveal that political leadership on the national and regional level was the key component in building trust at the grassroots level.
Restarting Learning with Incentives

Restarting education largely requires the participation of teachers. As outlined in Chapter 4, providing incentives to existing teachers and/or individuals interested in teaching have been employed in various post-conflict environments (Buckland, 2005). In Rwanda, sixty percent of teachers from the national educational sector were either killed in the 1994 genocide or fled in exile to neighboring countries. Rebuilding the teacher workforce became a priority. As such, the new government allocated kick-off salary payments and food rations to teachers as incentives (Obura, 2003). Providing new teacher training sessions and access to usable learning supplies have also raised the morale of teachers, advanced the restart of learning in a ground zero environment, and begun the process of rebuilding relations. Chapter 4 provides further details on strategies to sustain the participation of teachers in post-genocidal environments.

Symbolic Measures

Symbolic measures led by new governments emerging from genocide or civil war often serve as nation building tools that signal a stark contrast with the previous regime. The post-genocidal state of Rwanda supported this theory. Only months after the genocide, ethnic quotas instituted by the First and Second republic were abolished. Classifying teachers and learners by ethnic identity became illegal. The national curriculum was publicly repudiated. Some bias content was removed from national textbooks and curricular materials. History education was eliminated from the national curriculum in its entirety. New admission procedures into primary, secondary, and tertiary schools admitted students based upon merit rather than ethnic or regional affiliations. According
to Obura (2003), the drastic and revolutionary policy reforms led by the post-genocidal government placed formal education into a new political context.

Restarting learning and initiating symbolic measures of educational system change must be visible. These visible impact initiatives are effective primarily when implemented during the early reconstruction period. This is when the level of civil society trust in new political leadership is low, but hope and high expectations for change are high. Initiating visible and symbolic signals is also helpful while state capacity builds, and a civil society consensus is generated (Rose and Greeley, 2006, World Bank, 2005). Overall, visible peace dividends emerging from educational system reconstruction processes signal change, incite hope, and communicate the priorities of the government. All of these factors contribute toward building the confidence of civil society and mending broken relations.

**Building a Societal Consensus**

Political leadership and will is necessary to foster a consensus with civil society stakeholders such as teachers, parents, learners, and the community – the major implementers of new post-genocide educational policies at the grassroots level. The outcome of reconstruction policies and activities are often more relevant, effective, and sustainable with the inclusion of civil society perspectives. Seeking broad consultation offers post-conflict governments opportunities to promote new educational policies, change perceptions, identify peace blocs, and build cooperative relations with civil society members (Tawil and Harley, 2004). Conflict resolution theorists suggest that stakeholders are likely to participate in a process for social change if they respect the
rules, values, norms, and principles for that change (Jeong, 2002). Furthermore, when stakeholders share these conditions, there is a lesser chance for conflicts to occur. Timing of the consensus building processes, as recommended by the World Bank, should be initiated at a period when the capacity of the government is low, and the anxiety within civil society is high.

**Consensus Building with the Civil Society Stakeholders**

Elements of post-genocide educational system change and reconstruction are contentious and are likely to cause conflicts. It is in any post-conflict government’s best interest to develop processes to consult with key civil society stakeholders. In Rwanda, the national curriculum, language policies, and new pedagogical approaches remain sensitive areas which require consultation and participatory decision making processes. While the new government of Rwanda established mechanisms to consult with teachers, parents, and community leaders in certain areas, some highly sensitive and politicized decisions were decided upon with limited civil society consultation (Obura, 2003). The elimination of history education from all national curriculum plans, for example, has been protested by local and international historians (Obura, 2003). The introduction of new teaching approaches caused frustration for classroom teachers (IRC, 2007). Retained and newly recruited teachers were largely overburdened, ill-prepared, and in disagreement over new policy changes.

Providing opportunities for civil society to share perspectives restores dignity and communicates the importance of civil society’s needs and viewpoints. (Save the Children, 2007, IRC, 2007). Teachers become motivated when their perspectives are
integrated into the decision making processes. Teaching performance and classroom learning experiences can improve this way. Innovations in teaching approaches and content reforms have also been more accepted when curriculum reforms are gradually integrated into the national curriculum (Obura, 2003). Public consultations, national conferences, town and village meetings, and time-specific task forces, for example, have been effective in building a consensus over key issues in post-conflict zones in Eritrea and South Africa.

**Conclusion**

The new government has a leading responsibility in the reconstruction process of the educational system in post-genocide Rwanda. To gain the confidence of civil society, legitimacy, and support, the government must continue to assert its political will for change through a democratic style of governance. An educational system reconstruction process, envisioned to change the conditions of formal education that excluded segments of the population, and caused violent divisions, must empower civil society stakeholders to trust in the policy design and implementation process. Promoting compelling visions, visibly and quickly signaling change, and fostering consensus building processes encourages civil society participation (Howon, 2002). Participation from civil society stakeholders is necessary to implement and sustain reconstruction activities. Further details about civil society participation will be detailed in the following chapter.
4. Participation

State leadership, capacity, and political will alone are insufficient to reconstruct a national educational system free of structural violence in post-genocidal Rwanda. The sustenance of innovative and radical educational system reforms also depends on the participation of non-state stakeholders, including teachers, learners, parents, community citizens, and international NGOs. Connecting the development of social structures with human interaction, Johannes Botes (2003) asserts that individuals must assume responsibility for the social structures responsible for producing conflict or fostering conflict resolution, while Jeong (2002) cautions that former adversaries must participate in the structural reform process in order to bring stability. This chapter focuses on conditions that will support the participation, well-being, and basic human needs of key non-state stakeholders.

This chapter holds that under a prescribed set of conditions, the participation of these stakeholders can advance intended peace-building goals for the national educational system in post-genocidal Rwanda. To develop this chapter, the researcher identified the roles, benefits, and challenges of non-state stakeholder participation on one hand, and the conditions required to sustain their participation on the other. Lessons learned in post-genocidal Rwanda, and other post-conflict development processes primarily inform this chapter.
International Assistance

International NGOs, multi-lateral and bilateral donors, and United Nations (UN) agencies are important international stakeholders in Rwanda’s post-genocide reconstruction process. These international stakeholders have the potential to serve as resourceful, third-party peace-builders. The international community also has a key role in supporting both state and civil society participation. At best, international assistance can promote cooperative interactions, build trust, and improve communications between the new state and civil society stakeholders when trust and capacity is low (Lederach, 1999). International assistance can transfer technical skills to frontline teachers, school-age youth, and community-led school committees, as they cope with strained capacity and new post-conflict needs. Multi-lateral and bilateral donors can temporarily finance state-led decentralization programs that offer civil society stakeholders opportunities to govern their own schools. According to Sommers (2004), providing international assistance to educational systems affected by genocide is a practical peacemaking enterprise that humanitarians should readily use.

At worst, international assistance can launch programs without an understanding of local realities. These can prove incompatible with state-led reconstruction plans (Machel, 1996, Jeong, 2003). In some cases, international assistance has caused new states and civil society stakeholders to depend on temporary and unsustainable resources. International NGOs may launch educational projects that meet politically influenced interests of their donors over state or civil society needs (Sommers, 2004). Highlighting the unintended consequences of international assistance, Machel (1996) asserts further
that international NGOs can exacerbate conflicts and threaten local conflict resolution responses.

*International NGOs and Post-Genocidal Rwanda*

In post-genocidal Rwanda, the role of international assistance organizations, agencies, and donors as peace-builders has not been fully realized, in spite of sizeable financial contributions (Obura, 2003). While international assistance greatly supported the emergency education phase, competing priorities and a lack of consultation caused conflicts during the reconstruction and development phase. The delivery of emergency education teaching and learning kits, jointly sponsored by UNESCO and UNICEF, were successful in restarting education, but disagreements occurred over its long-term purpose and name. International assistance directed 1.4 billion dollars to emergency educational programs in refugee camps hosting primarily Rwandese of Hutu descent in Tanzania and Eastern Congo (UNICEF, 2000). While less international resources, attention, and support were directed at state-led reconstruction plans and schools supporting children and youth of Tutsi, Twa and Hutu descent within Rwanda. Plans to integrate UN-sponsored peace education programs into the national curriculum were designed and implemented but not sustained. Overall, national and civil society stakeholders cited an overall lack of control over the decisions taken by the international assistance community (Sommers, 2004).

*International Assistance and Peace-building*

Though international NGOs and United Nations agencies are better prepared to meet post-genocide emergency educational needs, international assistance stakeholders
have a responsibility and a role as peace-builders. To support this goal, the transfer of resources from the international assistance community to the affected educational sector should be compatible with state-led priorities. International assistance practices must maximize opportunities for the state and civil society stakeholders to best use their financial, human, and technical resources (International Save the Children Alliance, 2007). The international assistance community should also advocate for reconstruction programs that support the formerly marginalized, reduce exclusion, and promote civil society participation (Rahim and Holland, May 2006). These conditions are outlined in greater detail below.

**Serving as Team-Players**

It is critical for international NGOs and United Nations agencies to communicate, consult, and coordinate with state and civil society stakeholders as team players (Sommers, 2004). These stakeholders should be perceived as legitimate and knowledgeable human resources rather than merely recipients of international aid. State, regional, and local stakeholders are resources that can appropriately inform post-conflict educational programs. Teachers, front-line stakeholders in educational system reconstruction processes, are often aware of daily issues affecting school-age children (IRC, 2007).

Regional leaders, particularly, can be resourceful in connecting international assistance organizations to state and civil society stakeholders alike. Referenced as middle-range leaders by Lederach (1999), regional leaders are identified as prominent individuals who are well respected within a specific institution, geographic region, and/or
identity group. In Rwanda and Mozambique, middle-range leaders were instrumental in integrating school-age children and youth into the post-genocide and civil war educational system (Obura, 2003). In Rwanda, school-age children largely returned to post-genocide state schools because of the trust and community-level relationships garnered by regional leaders. In post-civil war Mozambique, for instance, traditional healers worked with international NGOs to return child soldiers to their schools, families, and the greater community.

The work of international assistance organizations and agencies in post-genocidal environments should demonstrate inclusiveness and receptivity. Negative perceptions toward state and civil society stakeholders can foster incompatible relationships and difficult working conditions (International Save the Children Alliance, 2007). In practice, some international NGOs often avoid collaborating with the state for varied reasons (Sommers, 2004). Some perceive that working with the state impedes access to civil society across regions and/or ethnic groups. Other NGOs have characterized new states as being weak in capacity, inefficient, and causes for major delays. In some cases, NGOs have perceived new states simply as parties to violent conflict. Lessons from Rwanda, Sudan, Kosovo, and Afghanistan prove that international NGOs who fail to work respectfully and collaboratively with new states and civil society stakeholders have often been expelled, denied access to desired regions, and/or blocked from civil society (Sommers, 2004). Respecting state and civil society stakeholders as team players increases the chance that educational interventions will be accepted and received favorably (Rahim and Holland, 2006).
Competition, Conflicting Priorities and Post Conflict Development

Competing priorities amongst international NGOs, bilateral and multilateral donors, and the state are conditions that must be overcome and/or minimized. First, international NGOs are primarily accountable to the interests and priorities of their foreign donors (Sommers, 2004). Donors rather than the state set priorities for the NGOs they fund. In most cases, these donors decide on the type and timing of educational reconstruction programs (International Save the Children Alliance, 2007). As in post-genocidal Rwanda, donor priorities often clash with state-led educational system reconstruction goals. To minimize importing international priorities incompatible with state-led initiatives, donors need to increase their awareness and linkages to locally-driven, peace-building priorities.

Second, scarcity in donor funding, in some cases, has generated a culture of competition amongst international NGOs working in the educational sector. According to Marc Sommers (2004), funding competition often disables opportunities for NGOs to collaborate over like-minded projects. Large-scale advocacy is also necessary to challenge donors to increase developmental and humanitarian aid for post-conflict educational programming.

Presumably, increased availability of donor funding and synergized priorities respectfully and collaboratively negotiated between international NGOs, UN agencies, donors and the state could assist in curtailing harmful competition. International assistance in post-civil war Mozambique, El Salvador, and Timor Leste are excellent examples. In each context, a strong partnership and an understanding of common interests among international, state, and civil society stakeholders enabled these war-torn
educational sectors to reform, thereby making available educational opportunities to sectors of society formerly excluded from formal education.

*Training as a Peace Dividend*

International assistance organizations and agencies must invest in planning and implementing technical training programs from the outset of the educational system reconstruction process. Serving as a peace dividend in post-conflict environments, training offers many benefits (Sommers, 2004). Transferring necessary technical skills to state and civil society stakeholders is a condition that promotes ownership. For example, in Northern Ireland, skills training programs offered across conflict lines enabled civil society stakeholders to commit to participating in conflict resolution projects (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000). Capacity building initiatives led by international NGOs also signals a focus on long-term visions and planning rather than internationally-led, “quick fix” approaches (Sommers, 2004).

Investing in training programs also maximizes the financial contributions of the international assistance community. Transferred technical skills can be replicated and sustained in the minds of state and civil society members. Training new and returning teachers in school management, curricular development, and participatory pedagogical methods are common training needs (UNESCO, 2006). International NGOs and United Nations agencies become peace-builders by supporting conditions that equip state and civil society stakeholders with the skills and information needed to strengthen their capacities to participate and sustain educational system reconstruction plans.

**Teachers**
Teachers – critical human resources – are frontline stakeholders working at the grassroots level in Rwanda’s post-genocide educational system reconstruction process. The participation of teachers determines the availability and quality of a child’s post-genocide education (International Rescue Committee, 2007). In Rwanda, new and retained teachers who had survived or participated in the genocide became responsible for promoting and demonstrating new values of national unity, respect for human rights, tolerance, and common citizenry at the school level (Tawil and Harley, 2004). Teachers were held accountable by the government to implement new national educational policies and, in some cases, curricular innovations imported from the international assistance community. Teachers, recognized as the elite during the pre-genocide era, were expected to manage large numbers of students affected by genocide as well as themselves.

Though teachers play a major role in implementing reconstruction visions and reforms, difficult post-genocidal teaching and learning conditions have caused teacher burn-out, absenteeism, and turnover rates in Rwanda. According to Obura (2003), low salaries caused some qualified teachers to seek other employment opportunities. Large classrooms, pressing student needs, insufficient learning supplies, and unsafe teaching conditions caused teacher burn-out in other cases.

The 1994 genocide also tragically reduced the number of qualified teachers, while generating a supply of new teachers with limited experience. Fostering an imbalance of school quality along the urban/rural fault line, ninety percent of teachers were qualified and certified to teach in the capital of Rwanda during the early reconstruction period.
(Obura, 2003). Only twenty-five percent of teachers held similar qualifications in rural regions during the same period.

Moreover, according to Sommers (2004) and Obura (2003), state priorities to expand access to education may have outweighed capacity building opportunities for teachers. Large scale delivery of expensive teaching and learning kits arguably may have also diverted international resources from supporting wide-ranging pre-service and in-service teacher training programs. Additionally, international NGOs and state-led teacher training programs were uncoordinated and sporadic. All of these factors affected teacher participation and the capacity for these frontline stakeholders to meet high expectations.

**Conditions for Teacher Participation**

As a component of Rwanda’s post-genocide educational system reconstruction process, IIEP (2006) asserts that state and educational planners should develop conditions that will recruit and retain teachers. Providing useful incentives can promote accountability, meet basic needs, and reward these frontline stakeholders for their participation. Securing these incentives in a challenging post-genocidal environment requires state and international support.

**Supporting Teacher Training Programs**

Rapidly providing pre-service and in-service teacher training programs is an important non-monetary incentive. UNESCO identifies the provision of teacher training programs as a critical intervention in an education system change process. According to the IRC (2007), the development and launch of teacher training programs have served as peace dividends for civil society stakeholders.

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Teacher training programs should be conducted with an understanding of the conflict dynamics as well as the professional needs of the teacher workforce. Programs designed to upgrade the skills of new and returning teachers should be identity-sensitive and equitable across conflict lines (Obura, 2003, UNESCO, 2006). The IRC (2007) recommends that assessments should inform the design of such programs. Amid challenging conditions, these assessments should be conducted prior to program implementation to ensure relevancy to the needs of the genocide-affected teacher workforce.

Obura (2003) asserts further that teacher training programs should be coordinated and aligned with new national curricular reforms and certification requirements. In post-civil war Kosovo, for example, the Canadian International Development Agency successfully coordinated a nationwide teacher training program on behalf of all NGOs and in partnership with the new state (Sommers, 2004). In this case, new and retained teachers participated in the same curriculum-training program across the country.

Supporting Financial Incentives

A reliable and sustainable teacher compensation system – a financial incentive – has stabilized teacher workforces in multiple post-genocide and post-civil war environments. In Rwanda, a one-time salary stipend sponsored by UNICEF helped to overcome major teacher shortages and enabled schools nationwide to resume learning. In Sierra Leone and Liberia, for example, reliable teacher salaries secured high participation and retention rates (IRC, 2007). Though teacher salaries are one of the most expensive
costs affecting any post-conflict educational sector, UNESCO (2006) asserts that average to high salaries will garner teacher effectiveness, accountability, and high performance.

In contrast, low, frequently withheld, and/or irregular salaries have encouraged teacher turnover, absenteeism, and low quality teaching in various post-civil war and post-genocide environments (UNESCO, 2006, IRC, 2007, Sommers, 2004). To help teachers meet their basic needs, food rations, housing shelters, and transportation are alternative financial incentives. Lessons reveal that teachers who are unable to meet their own basic human needs and those of their families will often leave the teaching profession in search of better employment opportunities. To protect teaching and learning standards and reconstruction visions, the state and international NGOs must prioritize developing a fair compensation system for teachers.

*Changing Teaching and Learning Conditions*

According to UNESCO (2006), safe teaching and learning environments supplied with equipment, supplies, and materials are also critical to meeting the basic needs of teachers. The physical environment of a learning space supports the physical, mental, and emotional self-esteem of teachers and students. Reardon (1997) asserts further that the physical environment of a school and/or classroom affects the perceptions of teachers and students alike. Poor sanitation facilities, a lack of safe drinking water, and structural damages to a large number of schools negatively affected teacher attendance in post-genocidal Rwanda (Obura, 2003).

*Dialogues and Consultations*
As referenced in Chapter 3, teachers need to be empowered to participate in grassroots decision-making over issues that directly affect them. As frontline stakeholders, teachers gain ownership over reconstruction activities when their knowledge constructively informs policy decisions. The IRC (2007) asserts further that the government should institutionalize dialogue mechanisms that enable teachers to voice their opinions. It also recommends integrating relevant teacher recommendations into the decision-making process. The post-genocidal government should accept lobbying, advocacy, and monitoring programs that enable teachers to illuminate their needs and concerns. In post-civil war El Salvador, for instance, the new government was effective in involving teacher organizations and associations in local school management decisions. In Kosovo, teacher strikes motivated the new government to involve teacher unions and teacher associations in decision making plans.

Youth

Youth, representing half of the total population in post-genocidal Rwanda, are the youngest stakeholders in the educational system reconstruction process. At the grassroots level, youth participation has helped dispel commonly experienced feelings of exclusion, marginalization, and alienation (Buckland, 2005, Save the Children, 2003, Machel, 1996, Nelson-Richard, 2006). Respect and consideration of youth perspectives in educational reconstruction projects has restored feelings of empowerment, dignity, and confidence to many in this age group. Youth involvement has also promoted responsibility over reconstruction priorities. In other cases, the engagement of youth has enhanced their influence within the larger community. Multi-generational and multi-stakeholder
participation in the physical reconstruction of schools in post-civil war Sierra Leone and Liberia, for example, produced successful outcomes (International Rescue Committee, 2007).

Status of Youth in Post-Genocide Rwanda

As referenced in Chapter 2, hundreds of thousands of survivors lost one or both parents as a result of the genocide (Obura, 2003). Youth survivors were handicapped, orphaned, and witness to the murder of a loved one. The new government imprisoned 5,000 genocide perpetrators under the age of 18. Former child soldiers and young refugees returned from exile. Since the genocide, out-of-school youth, in other cases, have been exploited for labor and property by trusted adults (Human Rights Watch, 2003). Participation in Ingando Solidarity Camps is largely the extent of youth involvement in reconstruction projects (Obura, 2003). Under specific conditions, it is reasonable to assume that youth participation in reconstruction activities can intervene in the challenges they face, and assist with the reform of their national educational system.

Supporting Youth Participation

According to the IRC (2007), young people are driven to participate in post-conflict educational system reconstruction projects when they understand the rules and perceive that their opinions will be assimilated into project plans. Local educational planners who integrate youth participation from the planning to implementation phases must commit to act upon youth recommendations. To ensure that reconstruction priorities respond to student needs, Lederach (1999) recommends forging frequent contact between new
government educational officials, trusted adults in the community, and youth stakeholders.

At the grassroots level, local education planners should also engage youth in projects that strengthen their critical thinking skills as well as promote their capacities to contribute positively toward educational system change (INEE, 2004). Successful projects have included youth in assessing, monitoring, and evaluating post-conflict educational reconstruction projects. Integrating youth into educational projects provides a positive alternative to post-genocidal activities that provide a false sense of empowerment.

**The Community**

Parents and community citizens are important and influential stakeholders in Rwanda’s post-genocide educational system reconstruction process. In varied ways, the new government, teachers, and students collectively need community support. Buckland (2005) asserts that local communities can uniquely contribute to post-conflict reconstruction processes. Save the Children (2003) affirms further that communities can contribute local supplies, manage school buildings, serve meals to teachers, and perform administrative functions. Community groups can assess and monitor the educational needs of the community and ensure that local culture and traditions are respected (INEE, 2004). Students also have a better chance of accessing state schools with community support. In post-genocidal Rwanda, for example, new parent committees and district-level education advisory committees involving community citizens, parents, and local
educational officials mobilized resources, rebuilt schools, and advised newly recruited teachers (UNICEF, 2000, Obura, 2003).

Community participation offers benefits to the community itself (Save the Children, 2003). Involvement from community members can assist in inciting hope in the future and healing psychological wounds. Participatory processes in school initiatives have helped parents and citizens struggling to rebuild their lives in a post-conflict zone to develop a sense of efficacy, routine, and normalcy (UNESCO, 2006). Involving communities in educational management committees has assisted in building new relations between the government and the schools it governs. In other cases, parental involvement has reduced skepticism of state reforms and legitimacy. Because the reestablishment of schooling is a common value that Rwandese across conflict lines share, the educational system reconstruction process offers opportunities for parents and community citizens, in conflict, to forge new relations, through the process of participation (UNESCO, 2006).

*The Community as Peace-Builders*

Jeong (2000) asserts that local communities can be peace-builders. State-led decentralization plans that effectively delegate resources and daily school management responsibilities locally empower parents and community citizens with the right to respond and impact the quality of their children’s schools. The following conditions have enabled willing parents and community citizens to provide support to local schools and reconstruction priorities (Rahim and Holland, 2006, Buckland, 2005).

*Supporting Community Participation*
Community education committees, parent education groups, and parent-teacher associations are common venues from which communities have participated in the management of local schools in post-conflict environments. State and local educational planners should select community representatives through a democratic selection process (UNESCO, 2006). Lederach (1999) recommends for peace-building planners to identify individuals who are interested in participating in the reconstruction process as peacemakers. Save the Children (2003) recommends that individuals who have been formally marginalized represent potential partners for change. Lessons from the field recommend that parents and community citizens should first be invited to participate in school committees and parent-teacher associations on a voluntary basis. With an understanding of group dynamics, one could expect incentives for community participation to increase at a gradual pace (IIEP, 2003).

Integrating community-inspired solutions in local school management plans is likely to increase community support and ownership over reconstruction goals and priorities (Rahim and Holland, 2006). State and local educational planners should collaborate to ensure a consensus and compatible agendas. Civil society stakeholders are often attracted to community engagement processes when offers are demonstrated in a spirit of inclusiveness, receptivity, and are reflective of universal principles of human rights (UNICEF, 2000). In a climate of trauma and distrust, as in post-genocidal Rwanda, parent and community figures may cooperate more when they perceive their stakes in the decision-making process (Buckland, 2005). To prevent incompatible agendas from
flourishing, as in the school decentralization processes in Kosovo, collaborative
interfacing between the government and the community is necessary (UNESCO, 2006).

Training programs and financial resources should be provided by the new
government and/or international NGOs to strengthen the capacity of community-based
school committees. Initiating capacity building programs is a condition that will also
empower community-led actions. UNESCO (2000) also recommends defining
community authority, mobilizing existing resources and knowledge within the
community, and guaranteeing financial support. In post-civil war El Salvador and
Mozambique, the consistent delivery of technical and financial resources to community-
led school committees ensured accountability and effective performance. Supporting the
community in its role as school peace-builder will indirectly support teachers, learners,
and school buildings in fulfilling their roles in the educational system reconstruction
process.

Conclusion

This chapter provided examples of how the post-genocide educational system
reconstruction process can promote participation among citizens. Participation is a goal
of positive peace. Achieving the goal of positive peace is relevant to post-genocidal
Rwanda because civil society stakeholders were largely marginalized from participating
in state governance and school management. Participating in a post-genocide educational
system reconstruction process provides “the means” for willing civil society stakeholders
to engage in reconstruction activities deemed important at the community level.
Participation promotes ownership and responsibility. It offers opportunities for identity
groups in historical conflict to form new community linkages. At the national level, enabling civil society stakeholders to participate by devising democratic styles of governance, participatory mechanisms, and being attentive to their basic human needs decreases potential future conflicts (Office of the OSCE High Commissioners, 2001).

Conditions that disable key stakeholders from participating typically have adverse affects. Denial of participation may produce educational policy spoilers. Perceptions and feelings of exclusion may develop. Uneven involvement of stakeholders from a specific identity group may produce grievances and incompatible relationships. Conditions that discourage civil society participation repress commonly felt post-conflict needs for ownership and control over one’s life (Jeong, 2000).

The government and the international assistance community - powerful decision-makers - must support conditions that enable teachers, youth, and citizens of the community alike to participate and realize their role in the process of social change. Civil society stakeholders across identity lines need equal access to these conditions. Second, government and international assistance stakeholders bear the responsibility of identifying civil society partners who will serve as cooperative peace-builders. Third, civil society stakeholders must have their varied basic human needs met, in order to retain their participation. The post-genocide educational system reconstruction process in Rwanda can advance with these conditions in place.
5. Curriculum Change

The post-genocide government of Rwanda determined that the mission of the national education system, among other goals, is to develop citizens who are free from all forms of discrimination (IIEP-UNESCO, 2006). To meet this mission, reforming violent elements of the national curriculum, known as “the heart of the educational system,” is critical to instilling classrooms with new values, skills, and awareness. The importance of curriculum reform in post-genocide Rwanda cannot be understated as textbook content, teaching methods, and classroom practices – the key components of a national curriculum – have a direct impact in changing the consciousness and behaviors of teachers and students.

Post-conflict curriculum reform processes have been used in the past to build peace across identity conflict lines in countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina, Guatemala, Lebanon, Mozambique, Northern Ireland, and Sri Lanka. Buckland (2005) asserts that post-conflict curriculum reform processes can foster mutual understanding, while the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (2001) empowers post-civil war curriculum reform processes to protect the identities and culture of national minorities.

Understanding the power of curriculum reform, the new government of post-genocide Rwanda repudiated the previous curriculum and devised a new approach.
History education was eliminated for its bias and stereotypical content. English language education was introduced to accommodate formerly exiled students, while the intention to imbue curricular subjects with an ideology of national unity symbolically assumed center stage. All of these decisions and others were employed to position the post-genocide national curriculum in a new political context.

Despite laudable goals, the government’s approach to curriculum policy reform has faced challenges and critiques. Critics describe the government’s approach as repressive and authoritarian (Hodgkin, 2007, Rutayisire, Kabano, and Rubagiza, 2004). Teachers have felt ill-prepared to translate new curriculum policies into practice. Meanwhile, the reintegration of history education into the national curriculum remains a highly contested issue between the government and civil society stakeholders in Rwanda.

Since reforming the national curriculum in post-genocide Rwanda is a very sensitive and politicized reconstruction activity that draws debate and conflict, major curriculum decisions should be instituted through an inclusive and participatory process. This chapter is aligned with the INEE’s (2004) position that reforming a national curriculum requires a sensitive process of negotiation between the state and civil society. Through a participatory approach, as discussed in this chapter, the process and outcome of curriculum change is likely to support peace-building within classrooms. This chapter is supported by theories and recommendations from peace educators, critical pedagogy theorists, and post-conflict development practitioners.

The Need for a Participatory Approach
According to the International Institute for Educational Planning (2006), a post-conflict environment offers opportunities to reform problematic areas of a national curriculum. Through a participatory approach in particular, policy-makers can devise curriculum reforms based on civil society’s needs and perspectives (Hodgkin, 2007, UNESCO, 2006). Select civil society stakeholders representing different identity groups and viewpoints, need the opportunity to review contested curriculum content, pose questions, and provide input to policy-makers (IIEP, 2006, Hodgkin, 2007, UNESCO, 2006). A participatory approach empowers civil society stakeholders to lend their multiple perspectives to important decisions formerly denied to them. Public dialogues, forums, roundtables, or council meetings also offer state and civil society stakeholders a chance to exchange concerns, dispel misconceptions, and build a greater understanding of major reforms. The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (2001), also in favor, suggests that imaginative and flexible solutions to contested curriculum issues often derive from a participatory decision making process. Tawil and Harley (2004) asserted that the larger the social dialogue, the more connected stakeholders will be to their revised national curriculum.

Textbook Content Reform

Since teachers and students are exposed to textbooks on a daily basis, changing textbook content is as important as the development of new curriculum reform policies (Harley and Tawil, 2004). Post-conflict textbook reforms often generate difficult questions over who has the right to make changes to the text and narratives written in the books (Tawil and Harley, 2004). According to the IIEP (2006), curriculum review
committees consisting of experts, parents, teachers, and learners from different genders, cultures, ethnicities, and political affiliations can help the state respond to these questions. Second, developing criteria, mutually agreed upon by a curriculum review committee, is also critical in identifying the distinction between curriculum content that is socially acceptable and that which is conflict-generating, as perceived by specific identity groups. In post-genocidal Rwanda, participatory strategies are necessary to resolve contested reforms in history and language education.

Reforming History Education

The government’s current policy and approach to history education is widely contested (Hodgkin, 2007). When and how to reform history education without generating conflicts between identity groups are key policy questions in search of an answer. Civil society stakeholders remain divided over the debate (Hodgkin, 2007). Some critics disagree with the government’s ban on history education. Other critics feel marginalized by the government’s monopoly over creating and promoting one dominant ideology of history in the public sphere. Those in support of the state believe that the reintroduction of history education will generate taboo discussions about ethnic categories. Others believe that reintroducing it is an opportunity to reconcile with the violent past. Overall, however, reports from civil society stakeholders cite a readiness to participate in a history education debate (Rutayisire, Kabano, and Rubagiza, 2004).

Reforming history education through a participatory approach in Rwanda is meant to respond to the conflicts and address contentious content. The process of rewriting history education can help reshape the historical awareness and national identities of students of
Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa descent. Reshaping the consciousness of individuals affected by violent conflicts, according to Dr. Dennis Sandole (1999), is necessary to prevent violent conflicts from expanding past the current group. As violent state politics largely shaped history education and transmitted bias, national ideologies, and demonizing images into the consciousness of students from the colonial period to the second republic, constructing history education in post-genocidal Rwanda requires an alternative approach to the former.

The approach to reforming history education is an important political process. Elizabeth Cole (2006), a researcher in post-conflict history education, has observed that participatory dialogues can help to address the violent memories and narratives printed in textbooks. Rewriting history education narratives in a form acceptable to a post-genocide civil society requires the inclusion of multiple points of view about events rather than a single narrative enforced by the state (USIP, 2006, Cole, 2006, Hodgkin, 2006). According to the United States Institute of Peace (2006) and Cole (2006), history education teachers need to be involved in aspects of the content reform process. If teaching history is perceived as bringing danger or discomfort, teachers are likely not to use reformed history textbooks (Cole, 2006). As in Northern Ireland, for example, some teachers developed their own alternative history materials to avoid teaching controversial text in the classroom.

According to the United States of Institute of Peace (2006) and Cole (2006), history education teachers need to be involved in all aspects of the content reform process. If teaching history is perceived as bringing danger or discomfort, teachers are likely not to
use reformed history textbooks (Cole, 2006). As in Northern Ireland, for example, some teachers developed their own alternative history materials to avoid teaching controversial text in the classroom. Rewriting history education narratives also requires a challenging search for narratives that protect the marginalized and build a common ground between perpetrators and victims. Based on research, Cole (2006) recommends that the post-conflict reform of history education content be inclusive of narratives about marginalized identity groups, the suffering of all social groups. New history education curricular plans should exclude demonizing text about specific identity groups. State and civil society stakeholders should also agree on the time frame to reintroduce history education reforms. Under these conditions, reforms are likely to promote the peace-building mission of the educational sector while affecting the consciousness of history education learners.

*Examples of Reintroducing History Education*

The following examples underpin the peace-building impact of reintroducing history education in an alternative form in a post-conflict environment. In post-World War II Germany, for example, the recognition of the Nazi-led genocide in secondary school history textbooks clearly separated the new state from the Nazi era. Arguably, Germany’s recognition of state-led atrocities in textbooks signaled a commitment for social change and a departure from the former status quo. In Spain, the inclusion of narratives about victims of former President Franco’s dictatorship in history textbooks for the first time functioned to publicly commemorate unknown victims (Coles, 2006).
In post-civil war Guatemala, the introduction of the truth and historical commission reports in supplementary textbook materials offered students opportunities to publicly discuss the taboos of their civil war. In Guatemala and Spain, the inclusion of state victims in textbooks affirmed the identities and history of a segment of the population formerly denied by the state. In contrast, Japan’s lack of acknowledgement of its role in World War II in history education textbooks in Japan, arguably, is one of several factors that have contributed to low levels of trust between that country and China and South Korea, in particular. Parallels to the Rwanda context in these examples are critical to understanding the importance of reintroducing history education on one hand, and the peace-building impact of curriculum reform decisions on the other.

*A Third Party Approach*

A third party approach to reforming history education can mediate in contentious curriculum content debates. International NGOs and/or academia experts, serving as outsider third parties, have used problem solving workshops to engage state and civil society stakeholders in analyzing disputed history education narratives (Durham, 2004). According to Dr. Chris Mitchell, a problem solving workshop expert, a third party intervention prioritizes engaging participants in analyzing the conflict. Third party facilitators can reframe the perceptions and positions of each group to increase mutual understanding. The USIP (2006) also asserts that outsiders can pose questions that challenge the current thinking and help insiders to reassess their positions. These conflict resolution techniques are useful in changing perceptions, defusing tension, and analyzing the causes, conditions, and resolutions of a conflict over history education content.
Unofficial history projects led by third parties have also brokered history education stalemates in post-genocidal Rwanda, Israel, and the Balkans (Cole, 2006, USIP, 2006). In Rwanda, the Human Rights Center from the University of California convened a series of workshops and working groups that empowered state officials, local NGOs, curriculum designers, and teacher trainers to rethink the teaching and learning of history education. This intervention unofficially brokered the stalemate and encouraged safe discussions about Rwanda’s history during the workshop.

In Israel, a university historian hosted groups of Palestinian and Israeli teachers for the purpose of raising awareness of the other’s historical perspective and narrative. In the U.S., Purdue University brought together multi-ethnic teams of historians and social scientists to research the contested and consensual perspectives of history in the former Republic of Yugoslavia. Each unofficial project fostered collaborative and participatory discussions and reintroduced history education into divided, post-conflict societies. Translating discussions to state-level history education policies and textbook content underlies these projects.

**Language Education Policy**

The peace-building role of language education policy is relevant to post-genocide Rwanda. The return of thousands of Tutsi minorities from exile in neighboring Anglophone countries created linguistic diversity and necessitated a response from the government to accommodate this new linguistic-identity group. State decision-makers introduced new language education policies to achieve three peace-building goals (Obura, 2003). First, English was introduced as a language of instruction in secondary
Second, with the goal to create a trilingual society, the government enforced second language teaching in English and French. And in practice, English medium and French medium schools were created to offer parents a choice of whether to educate their children in English or French medium schools.

Bush and Staellei (2000), post-conflict educational system researchers, assert that it is difficult to oppress children who learn the major languages, cultures and histories of their society. Theories from peace educators and post-conflict educational system researchers support the State of Rwanda’s theory that language education can promote peace between the government and civil society and amongst identity groups in conflict. According to the OSCE High Commissioner in Europe (2001), new language educational policies recognize the linguistic needs of a formerly marginalized and minority populations. Recognizing the linguistic needs of these groups, according to the OSCE High Commissioner, supports their self-esteem, pride, and identity.

New language policies in post-genocidal Rwanda also enabled the English-speaking minority to transition smoothly to state schools earning this minority group equal access to educational opportunities within the country of their ancestry. Bush and Saltarelli (2000) also suggest that introducing languages of the minority group to the majority population strengthens tolerance and multiculturalism. Kip Cates (1999), ESL peace educator, believes also that bilingualism is constructive in building better understanding and communication among diverse identity groups in conflict. Knowledge of languages spoken widely by citizens of a society, according to Cates, empowers citizens to use their language skills to assert and protect their interests and cultures.
The Policy Debate

While new language policies in post-genocidal Rwanda accommodate both the English-speaking minority and the French-speaking majority in State schools, the government’s approach to supporting new linguistic needs of the formerly exiled Tutsi minority has raised concerns for certain segments of the population (Obura, 2003). Literature reports cite that Rwandese students from Anglophone and Francophone communities are being educated separately depending on their preferred choice of language instruction (Rutayisire, Kabano, and Rubagiza, 2004). At the grassroots level, some learners have complained that linguistic groups in Rwanda are socializing exclusively and organizing themselves into new social groups. Others have cited mistrust between the two linguistic groups. From a conflict resolution perspective, language differences can potentially minimize historical ethnic differences.

A Participatory Approach

In post-genocidal Rwanda, new and reformed curricular content requires the support of teaching methods that encourage participation and empowerment. The approach to delivering curriculum content in schools is as important the curriculum textbook reforms. Teaching methods largely formulate the relationship between and among teachers and learners in classrooms. Whether learners absorb the knowledge, skills, and attitudes prescribed in the reformed curriculum greatly depends on the teaching and learning methods employed by teachers (Rutayisire, Kabano, Rubagiza, 2004). Illuminating this importance, the USIP (2006) recommends for policy-makers and
curriculum review committees to reform teaching methods, particularly in resource-challenged contexts, prior to revising curricular content.

**Teaching Methods**

Teachers need alternative teaching methods in post-genocidal Rwanda to prepare the next generation of learners with skills, learning experiences, and knowledge supportive of national unity. From the pre-colonial period to the 1994 genocide, teaching methods and classroom practices reinforced societal inequalities amongst learners of Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa descent (Rutayisire, Kabano, Rubagiza, 2004, Obura, 2003). The classroom experience, historically exam-oriented and teacher-centered, separated students by identity and limited inter-ethnic interactions. The drill and rote learning style, focused on memorization and board note-taking, limited student’s participation in their own learning. According to Obura (2003), teaching equity begins with the relationship between teacher and student.

Paulo Freire, the founder of critical pedagogy theory, suggests that traditional, authoritarian styles of teaching can disempower students by silencing their opinions, provoking feelings of powerlessness, and domesticating their minds. Critical educational theorists, in support of Freire’s theory, also assert that the dominant ideology about specific identity groups is delivered through language, teaching methods, and classroom practices of the teacher. In addition to curriculum textbooks, it is non-verbal messages on the part of teachers that shape the attitudes and interaction between learners. Reforming curriculum content without changing certain teaching methods would be a threat to the mission of the post-genocide curriculum in the long-term.
**Critical Pedagogy**

Critical pedagogy, a participatory approach to teaching curriculum content, is a recommended teaching method. According to Freire, critical pedagogy empowers students to develop their own critical thinking skills through facilitated classroom discussions and dialogues. This participatory style of teaching can build a learner’s ability to examine his or her own personal beliefs, values, assumptions, and stereotypes about society. Learners of critical pedagogy methods gain the skills necessary to deconstruct dominant beliefs deemed oppressive to one’s self, social group, or others. Encouraging critical thinking skills in learners, according to the USIP (2006), supports democratic values. According to Freire, peace educators, and critical educational theorists, participatory teaching methods aimed at transforming the hierarchy of instruction into horizontal relationships can encourage learners to participate in their learning and build new teacher-learner relationships.

Developing critical thinking skills is very relevant to classrooms in post-genocidal Rwanda. Such skills have a potentially vital role in helping learners discern bias interpretations and stereotypes written in contested history textbooks. Critical thinking skills, gained from participatory teaching methods, can encourage students to creatively analyze multiple and opposing points of view about their history. According to Falk Pinger (1999), these skills also enable students to determine their own interpretation of history. Based on interviews and reports conducted in Rwanda, teachers and historians are interested in students learning critical thinking skills, decision making, and open-mindedness in the classroom (Obura, 2003, Rutayisire, Kabano, Rubagiza, 2004).
judgment of the government’s genocidal ideology and politics is one of several factors
given responsibility for civil society’s participation in the 1994 genocide.

Participatory Learning Activities and New Student Relationships

Cooperative learning, a participatory approach, promotes teamwork, shared
community, and interethnic interactions (Walker-Keleher, 2006, Harley and Tawil, 2004,
Jacob and Cates, 1999). According to Kip Cates (1999), cooperative learning activities
are influential in building perceptions of inter-group interdependence, decreasing
prejudice, and promoting collective learning goals. The contact theory hypothesis,
founded by Allport (1950s), is the foundation of the latter theory. Under perceived
conditions of equal status and shared goals, Allport’s research suggests that individuals
can reduce their existing stereotypes, prejudices, and negative expectations through
ongoing contact. According to this theory, interethnic relationships formed in the
classroom can transcend into the community and larger society. This participatory
learning activity is pertinent to state schools educating learners of Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa
descent in the same classroom.

Teaching and Learning Resources

Introducing participatory teaching methods and learning activities into a
traditional, exam-oriented classroom places teachers at risk and challenges the traditional
hierarchical relationship between teachers and students (IIEP, 2006). As referenced in
Chapter 4, teachers need support. In post-genocidal Rwanda, the implementation of new
curriculum reforms faced challenges. Goals to integrate peace education programs into
the national curriculum did not occur because of a lack of technical assistance and
financial support (Obura, 2003). The trilingual language policy faced delays because of the limited number of teachers qualified to teach English as a medium of instruction or as a second language. Three years after the genocide, large number of schools remained without textbooks. Teachers have also cited limited access to teaching materials (Rutayisire, Kabano, Rubagiza, 2004). Without wide-scale training in a timely manner, teachers will face difficulties in translating new curriculum reform policies, decisions, and innovations into classroom practices.

Therefore, the effectiveness of critical pedagogy, cooperative learning methods, and other curriculum innovations depends on whether teachers have the skills, time, and interest (Hodgkin, 2007, IIEP, 2006). Educational system reconstruction planners assert that teachers need access to teaching and learning materials and new teaching methods as quickly as possible to ensure their preparedness (Obura, 2003, IIEP, 2006). Amid the political process of revising state textbooks, supplementary and alternative materials can also help teachers initiate innovations and respond to contentious subjects in the classroom (Cole, 2006, OSCE High Commissioner, 2001).

Obura (2003) also recommends for policy-makers to decrease subject listings to provide teachers with the space and time to learn and deliver reform innovations. Save the Children (2003) supports the integration of new teaching and learning content and methods but warns curriculum policy-makers to build from acceptable and approved areas of the pre-war curriculum. Additionally, sustaining curriculum reform changes at the grassroots level requires increased financing and technical assistance. Given limited
access to these resources, teachers are likely to disengage from new curriculum reforms (Obura, 2003, IIEP, 2006).

**Conclusion**

The reform of the national curriculum in post-genocidal Rwanda must demonstrate new alternatives to the former. The curriculum reform process should offer teachers, learners, and parents a chance to participate in the reform process. For example, an inclusive and participatory approach to reforming elements of history education offers the chance to re-humanize the Tutsi minority in history education textbooks and reshape the historical awareness and national identity of all learners in the long-term. The critical pedagogy approach to teaching and learning offers learners a chance to assess key issues with a critical thought process. Cooperative learning opens possibilities to build new relationships with learners from different identity groups. All of these participatory factors, along with political will, time, and resources, are useful in building the peace-building capacities of a school community made up of learners and teachers historically divided by identity, civil war, and genocide.
6. Inclusion

The 1994 genocide and civil war produced vulnerable groups of school-age children and youth in Rwanda. Orphans, child-headed households, teenage mothers, children of genocide perpetrators, and demobilized child soldiers are vulnerable and have been largely excluded from formal education. Though the post-genocide educational system reconstruction process is designed to educate every school-age child regardless of ethnicity or regional affiliation, these groups of school-age children and youth are being denied their right to education as a result of socio-economic conditions.

If education is projected as a peace-building tool in post-genocide Rwanda, according to Obura (2003), every child must have the opportunity to receive an education. To prevent the development of new groups of citizens who feel marginalized and excluded at the hands of the government, out-of-school children and youth need access to forms of education in post-genocide Rwanda. Developing educational interventions designed to accommodate their special needs, as argued further in this chapter, builds on conditions of positive peace, equity, and human dignity.

This chapter raises awareness of the vulnerable groups of children and youth who are out of school and/or at risk of being excluded. It also recommends tested educational interventions and strategies useful in expanding education services to these children and
youth. Alleviating perceptions of marginalization, exclusion, and second class citizenry through targeted educational programming is the underlying purpose of this section.

**Education for All in Post-Genocidal Rwanda**

The genocide’s impact on the state and civil society has diminished the chances for the most vulnerable groups of school-age children to be integrated into the post-genocide educational system in Rwanda. Similar to post-conflict environments elsewhere, survival is the priority (Sommers, 2002). At the national level, frequent leadership changes, budget constraints, and departmental reconstruction have hampered the government’s capacity to rapidly respond. At the civil society level, families in need of income for food and shelter often depend on the labors of their children to survive. Out-of-school children and youth in post-conflict environments are often physically difficult to find. Despite these challenges and obstacles, the following benefits and risks relay the importance of ensuring that every child is included in a form of education.

**Peace-Building Benefits of Education**

Expanding education to out-of-school children and youth offers significant benefits. Emergency education planners describe formal education as a tool for reintegrating marginalized children and youth into post-conflict societies (International Rescue Committee (2007). Educational policies, focused on reaching the most vulnerable groups of children and youth support the stability of a post-conflict society. Field reports from post-civil war Liberia and Sierra Leone suggest that formal education supports the well-being of a conflict-affected child or youth. According to Id21 Insights (2005), a publication focused on international development policy research, access to formal
education can help to alleviate war-related distress and become a type of psycho-social intervention for child survivors of war. Both reports and articles written by Save the Children (2006) cite education as a form of protection from exploitation, military recruitment, and physical harm. While the Dakar Framework for Action (2000), a state-led international commitment to achieve education for all in targeted countries, refers to education as a resource to support human dignity and sustainable development.

*Risks of Unequal Educational Opportunities*

Vulnerable groups of school-age children and youth who are excluded from the post-genocide national educational system are at risk (Triplehorn, 2003, Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Youth, 2002, Sommers, 2004). Socioeconomic conditions, exacerbated by the genocide and civil war, have caused these groups of children and youth to face social alienation, a reduction in quality of life, and a blockage of self-realized goals. Children and youth who are out of school take longer to heal from genocide-related trauma. According to UNESCO (2006), these children and youth are often subjected to prostitution, criminal gang activity, unsafe working conditions, and anti-social actions. Especially in post-genocidal Rwanda, school-age children and youth in the most vulnerable positions in society are often forced to work rather than attend school.

Since research findings assessed by the Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Youth (2002) identify formal education as a top priority for conflict-affected families, the denial of this priority in post-genocide Rwanda is likely to become a source of dissatisfaction, powerlessness, and social inferiority for those affected. Educational
policies aimed for social change and national unity may also generate high expectations. If these expectations are perceived as being unmet or a cause of frustration for children and youth not in school, feelings of relative deprivation may occur. According to Jeong (2000), the presence of relative deprivation at the conscious level is defined as a gap between expectations and actual life conditions. In many cases, this mental state, combined with other factors, can lead to social unrest. Exposure to the latter conditions is detrimental to the well-being of these children and youth and the long-term peace of post-genocidal Rwanda.

Children and Youth Not in School

The civil nature of Rwanda’s 1994 genocide and civil war directly affected the lives of thousands of children and youth. Countless school-age survivors witnessed the murder of a parent or a close relative, experienced displacement, participated in the frontline of war, and/or have been in exile in neighboring countries. One in four children at the primary school level remains out of school because of conflict-related conditions (Obura, 2003). As of 2003, 94% of youth have been unable to access any form of secondary education.

Because of these conditions, many children and youth in post-genocidal Rwanda have missed segments of their education, fallen behind their designated grades in school, or have never been formally educated while in exile. According to Triplehorn (2003), children and youth in some cases are likely not to complete their education if they fall behind their peers in school. To develop appropriate educational interventions for children and youth not in school, it is critical to understand their backgrounds, special
needs, and living conditions. The following description raises awareness of the plight of groups of school-age children and youth that the post-genocidal education system reconstruction process in Rwanda struggles to reach.

*Orphans*

According to Human Rights Watch (2003), the 1994 genocide in Rwanda created more than 400,000 orphans. This group of children survived a government-led campaign targeted at eradicating their ethnic group. Known as one of the most vulnerable populations in the world, many of Rwanda’s orphans lost both parents and, in some cases, witnessed their murders. While extended family members have largely integrated orphans into their family structures, orphans are most likely not selected to attend school. In many cases, they are exploited for their labor and/or property (Human Rights Watch, 2003). Without additional financial support from caregivers, orphans are often not given the opportunity to attend school.

*Child-Headed Households*

Identified as children affected by the “double-edged sword,” over 60,000 children and youth in post-genocide Rwanda are heading households alone (Obura, 2003). Under the age of 21, this group of school-age children and youth survived the 1994 genocide, lost both parents, and are now responsible for the basic needs of themselves and their siblings. According to findings from a sample of interviews, some who are heading households perceive a sense of social inferiority toward other children and youth who are supported by their extended families (Obura, 2003).
Similar to orphans, this group is also known to have lost the property and assets belonging to parents at the hands of a trusted adult. For protection, according to UNICEF, self-sufficiency has served as the means to avoid exploitation. Economic circumstances and adult responsibilities are obstacles barring these children and youth from access to formal education (Obura, 2003). According to Human Rights Watch (2003), more than 90 percent of child-headed householders in post-genocide Rwanda have limited access to both education and housing.

Children of Genocide Perpetrators

With limited national attention, children and youth of genocide perpetrators are also a vulnerable group in post-genocidal Rwanda (Human Rights Watch, 2003). Fathers of this group are mostly imprisoned for participating in the atrocities. Wives and children of genocide perpetrators often work both to care for themselves and their incarcerated loved ones. This group of children and youth are known to be ostracized by their communities due to their association with their incarcerated parents. With a targeted focus on genocide survivors, government assistance policies and programs often overlook children of genocide prisoners (Human Rights Watch, 2003). According to Save the Children (2006), access to formal education can help protect children who have been isolated from their communities.

Demobilized Child Soldiers

Child soldiers, who participated in the 1994 genocide and armed movements against the state of Rwanda from the pre- to post-genocidal period, have faced difficulties integrating into the educational system (Obura, 2003). A child solider, as defined by
UNICEF, are individuals under the age of 18 who have fought in armed forces. Known as foot soldiers in the Interahamwe-led genocide, primarily undereducated youth were recruited into this armed militia group. Approximately 5,000 child soldiers participated in the Rwanda Patriot Army (RPA), a Uganda-based armed movement consisting of Tutsi-Rwandese refugees. Of the 5,000 child soldiers in the RPA, 2,600 were under the age of fifteen (Human Rights Watch, 2003). Child soldiers were also conscripted into the Forces Armees Rwandese (FAR), a Congo-based armed opposition led by Hutu-Rwandese refugees during the post-genocidal era.

As in the Interahamwe, the RPA, and the FAR, adults largely manipulated and enticed children into child soldiery through the promise of food, shelter, and material wealth (IIEP-UNESCO, 2006). Child soldiers in each case have committed extreme acts of violence and/or were exposed to sexual abuse. According to the IIEP (2006), demobilized child soldiers commonly experience feelings of alienation and isolation and struggle to remain in school.

**Teenage Mothers and Girls**

The 1994 Rwanda genocide produced a significant population of teenage mothers who gave birth as a result of rape. UNICEF (2005) estimates that over twenty-five thousand females over the age of 12 were raped or sexually abused. With the responsibility of motherhood, these mothers are mostly not in school and serving in new adult roles. According to the Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children (2002), teenage mothers often miss school to meet new social expectations. Increased
family and adult responsibilities, and experiences of being ostracized have largely prevented mothers from attending school in Rwanda.

Youth of Secondary Education Age

The limited number of secondary education schools and teachers available at this educational level has marginalized youth between the ages of 10 to 24 from accessing a formal education in post-genocidal Rwanda (Sommers, 2002). Secondary education-related expenses have deterred some caregivers from sending their children and dependents to school. Educational programs sponsored by international NGOs have given priority to primary education over secondary education.

A lack of access to secondary education poses risks. Literacy levels learned in primary school are often difficult to sustain without access to secondary education. As access to secondary education and higher levels of education are equated with future employment and income, out-of-school youth have a diminished chance of realizing their economic potential.

Partners for Change

Developing national policies, financial assistance programs, and alternative education programs for marginalized and out-of-school children and youth requires a multi-partnership approach. Based on post-conflict educational programming elsewhere, the collaboration of policy-makers, local teacher-parent associations, and international NGOs and donors have helped to overcome these barriers. Pertinent to post-genocidal Rwanda, multi-sector partnerships can assist the government in areas where capacity is low.

The State’s Role
According to Carol Triplehorn (2003), a post-conflict education planner, the institution of formal education is one of the few tools that a government can use to integrate young people into society. Understanding the influence of education, post-conflict education planners and the Dakar Framework for Action (2000) commonly encourage post-conflict states to develop national policies, legislation, and programs that strive to include the previously marginalized population. Policies are recommended to reflect the government’s political commitment and will and to bring attention to the special needs and conditions of marginalized children and youth. As economic circumstances and competing social roles are the primary barriers to education for all in post-Rwanda, grants, fee-waivers, subsidies, and reductions in the cost of learning materials can offset household costs. In addition to this, increasing the number of trained teachers can help to resource and expand educational programs to under-served areas.

Funding for Education for All in Post-Genocidal Rwanda

According to Save the Children (2007), the marginalized are the first to be affected when resources are scarce. National funding for creative and innovative educational programs for out-of-school children and youth is critical. Funding must be adequate and predictable to fulfill policy developments in post-genocide Rwanda. For example, the national grant program, established to assist genocide survivors with their school fees, lacked adequate funding to help the thousands of genocide survivors who needed financial assistance (Obura, 2003). Although the new State of Rwanda allocated 20 percent of its national budget toward education, needs continue to outweigh existing resources.
When funding is low, government collaboration with the private sector can be useful in expanding education to areas out of the state’s reach. Assisted schools managed by the Catholic Church and the private sector, for example, have successfully increased the number of secondary education schools available in post-genocide Rwanda. Assisted schools have joined the new government in offering grants and subsidies to youth at the secondary education level. The government has also supported the expansion of assisted schools by funding their teachers’ salaries.

International aid can also support educational policies, assistance programs, and incentives necessary to reach out-of-school children and youth. Funding from international donors, NGOs, and United Nations agencies can assist in building the capacity of the new government through direct aid (Save the Children, 2007). Innovative mechanisms of disbursing resources may increase chances that international resources reach the intended beneficiaries. In post-civil war Liberia, for example, the International Rescue Committee (2005) partnered with the new government to successfully distribute learning materials to the neediest children and youth. Lastly, highlighting the importance of timing, international actors who are working with new governments should allocate their financial interventions before the conflict ends, if possible (Save the Children, 2007). Relevant to post-genocidal Rwanda, international funding must also be diversified to focus on educational programming at the secondary level.

The Community

Educational policies, programs, and incentives aimed at expanding education to vulnerable, out-of-school children and youth need civil society participation. As
referenced in Chapter 4, civil society, traditional supporters of post-conflict education, can develop sustainable strategies to integrate these children and youth into formal or alternative education programs (Human Rights Watch, 2003). The International Rescue Committee (2005) and Save the Children (2007), leading NGOs in post-conflict education programming, recommend for parent associations, community groups, and/or learners to help identify and assess the needs of children who are marginalized and/or excluded from formal education.

Civil society-led assessments can raise awareness of specific educational needs and determine the barriers preventing out-of-school children and youth from accessing education. In post-civil war Kosovo, for example, the IRC (2005) sponsored a project that enabled school committees led by parents and community leaders to identify and register out-of-school girls residing in remote villages. In Nepal, Save the Children (2007) led a project that enabled families organized into education committees to identify both the conditions for out-of-school children and youth and also the plausible solutions. Research gathered from these community-driven assessments have encouraged local schools to adopt new school fee policies. Assessment reports, in other cases, have motivated families to cover the school fees for additional children.

**Advocacy**

Advocacy is also an important tool for increasing awareness of the educational needs and circumstances of vulnerable groups of conflict-affected children and out-of-school youth (Save the Children, 2007). Advocacy campaigns can transform negative stigmas and societal attitudes against vulnerable groups of at the community level (Sommers,
2002, Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children, 2002). The approach to changing stigmas and attitudes, as defined by the IIEP (2006), is to promote a worldview that perceives every child as potentially able to earn an education.

In other cases, as in post-civil war southern Sudan, for instance, successful advocacy campaigns funded by Save the Children encouraged school directors and teachers to dismiss their expulsion policy for those learners unable to pay school fees. Learners themselves have also developed creative songs, dramas, and dialogues that advocate for the right to educate marginalized and out-of-school children and youth. Governments, civil society, and international NGOs can each participate in advocacy campaigns that voice the rights of the excluded and marginalized.

**Alternative Approaches to Education**

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the impact of the genocide changed lives, social roles, and the educational needs of school-age children and youth in post-genocide Rwanda. Despite challenging conditions, however, children and youth affected by genocide and war have historically remained resilient and interested in excelling in school (Sommers, 2002). Approaches and forms of education must also change and be diversified. To promote the social integration of out-of-school children and youth, it is recommended for new governments and international NGOs to host formal, non-formal, and informal learning opportunities (The Dakar Framework, 2000). Educational programs should aim to prepare children and youth with the skills, resources, and knowledge needed to build their potentials. Program designs should also work to build
positive relationships between youth and adults and amongst children and youth of
diverse backgrounds and circumstances (Triplehorn, 2005).

Alternative educational programs are helpful in responding to specific learning
needs and special conditions affecting learners. These options have provided out-of-
school children with the experience of inclusion and a space to transition into more
formalized educational opportunities (Save the Children, 2007). Such programs should
aim to protect the marginalized cognitively, psychologically, socially, and physically
(Sommers, 2002, Save the Children, 2007). Otherwise, negative experiences will affect
desired recruitment and retention goals. Emergency education planners also note that
alternative educational programs work best when programming is flexible, accessible,
and innovative.

Accelerated Learning Programs

Accelerated learning programs are forms of educational programming helpful in
integrating and engaging older, out-of-school children and youth into formal education
(IIEP, 2006, Save the Children, 2007). Commonly led by the new government and
international NGOs, such programs enable older children who missed segments of their
primary education to complete their studies at an accelerated pace (Save the Children,
2007). Using formal or non-formal educational methods, this program of study teaches
skills and knowledge to learners through a condensed curriculum (IIEP, 2006). Children
who are older than 10 years qualify. Underlying this program is the theory that children
over this age have the cognitive ability to learn faster than primary school-age children
(Triplehorn, 2005).
Implemented in post-civil war southern Sudan, Uganda, Liberia, and Rwanda, learning conditions established for accelerated educational programs are tailored to learners’ needs (Sinclair, 2002). These programs are known to motivate learners in structured learning activities while also enabling them to meet work-related responsibilities and roles (Save the Children, 2007). To accommodate new teenage mothers, child care is often offered. In post-genocidal Rwanda, accelerated educational programs are free of charge, and learners are exempt from purchasing school uniforms.

Non-Formal and Informal Education

Non-formal and informal education programs, diverse in style, can offer opportunities for out-of-school children and youth to participate in learning activities that rebuild their confidence and social skills. As Yolande Miller-Grandvaux of the U.S. Agency for International Development noted, informal education can be a valuable educational tool in states emerging from civil wars (Interaction’s Monday Development, 2008). Some non-formal and informal educational programs focused on improving the reading and writing of learners help to prepare them for the transition to formal education. In Columbia and Haiti, for example, non-formal and informal educational programs offered out-of-school children afflicted by post conflict-related issues with a structured venue to participate in sports, music, reading, and creative arts (Save the Children, 2007).

Distance learning and vocational training are other forms of alternative education. Using technology and the internet, distance education programs have delivered educational programs to children and youth who are displaced in insecure, conflict prone areas (Triplehorn, 2005). According to Sommers (2002), these programs have reached
girls barred from attending school because of new, post-conflict-related social responsibilities. By equipping youth with training in specific industries, vocational training has mainstreamed former child soldiers into state education, as in Sierra Leone and Liberia (Women’s Commission for Children and Youth, 2002).

Conclusion

Social and economic conditions exacerbated by the genocide and subsequent civil wars in Rwanda are limiting groups of school-age children and youth from receiving educations. Ensuring that children and youth in the most vulnerable conditions receive access to a form of free, indiscriminate education supports their basic needs, human rights, and development. Inclusion of out-of-school children and youth contributes to equity and peace. Access to education can enable formerly marginalized children and youth to achieve the knowledge, skills, and values they need to potentially improve their conditions in Rwanda. In support of post-conflict educational planners, formal education and alternative educational programs can also offer escapes from exploitation and social alienation. Without such programs, advocacy campaigns, and multi-sector support, economic and social conditions will determine who will be given access to forms of education in Rwanda, a detriment to the peace-building goals of the post-genocide educational system reconstruction process.
7. A Peace-Building Intervention for the Educational Sector

Can the reconstruction process of formal education help to build national unity, combat prejudice, and foster positive relationships between the state and civil society and amongst the three ethnic groups formerly at war in post-genocidal Rwanda? With the window of opportunity offered by the reconstruction period and the new political climate, the answer is yes, under specific conditions. From Chapter 2 to 6, this exploratory study outlined strategic processes aimed at changing violent structural conditions of the national educational system. It also highlighted conditions for building new relationships between the state, civil society, and individuals of different ethnic backgrounds in Rwanda.

Reconstructing the institution of formal education with peace-building as a focus requires a meaningful and deliberate process aimed at social change. To reduce grievances and build conditions for new relationships to flourish, the reconstruction of the national education system must include a process that develops a new governance style, reforms discriminatory educational policies and quotas, builds the capacity of human resources, develops conflict-sensitive educational programs, and most importantly, includes civil society stakeholders in the process. Each key point is summarized below.
Multi-Stakeholder Participation

Findings from the archival setting emphasized the importance of multi-stakeholder participation and partnership. The strengths of stakeholders from different levels of society are needed to design, implement, manage, and evaluate post-genocide educational policies and projects (IRC, 2007, Lederach, 1999). Flexibility, responsiveness, and imagination are key characteristics stakeholders need to imbue. A coordination of priorities, resources, and educational programming maximizes benefits. Designed as an intervention, the educational system reconstruction process should also be pointed to fostering direct contact between stakeholders of diverse identities and identifying interdependent goals that adversaries can collectively pursue.

The State: Change from a National Leader

Reforms to a genocide-affected educational system can flourish with a state deemed legitimate, trustworthy, and accountable in the mindset of civil society (IRC, 2007). To gain the trust of civil society, change needs to be demonstrated and observable. A new state that adopts a participatory, democratic style of governing in place of a repressive and authoritarian style is likely to change civil society perceptions. New governance rules can also set new standards for behavior at the community level (Howon, 2000). Civil society will accept the rules, guidelines, and process of governance when they perceive their interdependence and mutual benefits. Democratic governance styles offer opportunities for civil society to participate in the reconstruction of their educational system. When civil society stakeholders perceive a stake in the decision-making process, democratic values are demonstrated.
As observed in Chapter 2, state governance over formal education in post-genocide Rwanda was authoritarian since the colonial period. Limited opportunities were available for civil society members to participate in decision-making processes related to the national curriculum, school governance, quota policies, and teaching and learning methods. Therefore, the development of participatory processes or consultative bodies that channel communication between government decision makers and civil society can also improve the legitimacy and credibility of the state (Jeong, 2000). Dialogues that enable these adversaries to exchange views and express concerns can build trust and minimize misperceptions and mutual suspicion.

The development of participatory processes demonstrates the state’s willingness to receive feedback, and civil society’s interest in participating in the educational policy-development and implementation processes (The OSCE High Commissioner, 2001). If the formerly marginalized perceive that their input is considered by state and their identities protected by educational policies and programs, the chance of conflicts against the state are minimized. Reconstructing and reforming national curriculum policies and textbooks through consultations with middle level leaders representing identity groups from opposing sides can also serve as a means for new states and civil society members to reformulate a shared national identity (Tawil and Harley, 2004). Rewriting history education through a third party-facilitated participatory process, for example, can forge new relations, integrate minority views, and encompass the inclusion of multiple history narratives. Local school governance, curriculum reform, and the integration of out-of-
school children and youth into educational programs, among others, are also examples of reconstruction activities in need of a participatory process and civil society consultation.

The new state’s intention for positive peace can also be demonstrated through policy change, development, and implementation. Providing equal access to educational opportunities for school-age children fulfills a basic human right to public education. Under structural conditions of equality, as purported by the contact theory, the integration and forging of new linkages amongst school-age children and youth from diverse identity groups and economic circumstances is likely. Setting several examples, as outlined throughout this thesis, the new state of Rwanda abolished discriminatory quotas, banned identity cards, and advised schools nationwide to admit any school-age child regardless of ethnic identity or region of birth into state schools. To promote tolerance and acceptance of marginalized identity groups, government leaders also publicly removed inflammatory and demonizing text from national textbooks.

Civil Society: Participation from the Grassroots

To replace former experiences of exclusion and marginalization, the participation of civil society in the institution-building process and the reform of the post-genocide national educational system have direct benefits for civil society. Their participation, according to the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (2001), is a cornerstone of democracy. Civil society participation fulfills the rights of beneficiaries of the educational system to intervene and affect decisions aimed to benefit them (IRC, 2007). Participation can help individuals emerging from genocide and civil war to restore their dignity and self-reliance through sharing their voices.
Participation in local post-genocide educational projects, in some cases, can empower conflict-affected, school-age children and their families to focus on the future rather than only on their daily survival. Involving civil society actors from the middle and grassroots levels of society in educational programming promotes ownership and sustainability. Encouraging civil society participation can empower individuals to become a part of the peace-building mechanism (IRC, 2007). Such participation can influence educational programming by communicating the group’s educational needs and concerns. Identifying local educational needs is particularly important because the success of reconstruction projects and initiatives greatly depends on the analysis of the subjective experiences of the beneficiaries of the educational sector.

The International Community

International nongovernmental agencies, organizations, and donors are important third party interveners in Rwanda’s post-genocide educational system reconstruction process. When the technical and financial capacity of the state is low, as in post-genocide Rwanda, international assistance is critical in channeling resources and technical expertise to the state and civil society stakeholders (Howon, 2003). When focused on community-based development, international NGOs can build cooperation and trust between the state and civil society adversaries and amongst civil society groups in conflict. The transfer of international aid can play a role in building the capacity and legitimacy of the new state to fulfill national policies promised to civil society members.

Because of the temporary role of international assistance in post-conflict environments, programs and international aid should focus on supporting stakeholders in
their role of designing, implementing, and sustaining policies, programs, and projects. International assistance must be intentional in supporting communities on both sides of the conflict to address key issues. Imposed educational programs, policies, and initiatives, driven by international NGOs and inconsistent with the new state and civil society guidelines, can produce unintended consequences in some cases in post-genocide Rwanda.

Program development and implementation processes, facilitated by international NGOs, can encourage communities to communicate and work together across conflict lines in order to identify common educational needs and coordinate local educational projects. Imposed educational programs, policies, and initiatives, driven by international NGOs and out of line with the new state and civil society, can produce unintended consequences, as in some cases in post-genocidal Rwanda. Reforming educational policies, devising participatory processes, and supporting locally driven educational projects offer minimum guarantees for implementation unless capacity building initiatives are integrated into the post-genocide educational system reconstruction process. As indicated in Chapter 2, the 1994 genocide decimated approximately a quarter of the total population of Rwanda. The majority of the trained and skilled teachers and school administrators – the frontline stakeholders of the national educational system – were either killed or fled in exile. Recruiting, retaining, and training teachers became a priority for the new state.

Research findings from Save the Children and the IRC overwhelmingly suggest that capacity building in the form of teacher trainings and curriculum development should
be mainstreamed into all post-genocide educational interventions. Local school administrators and teachers, emerging from genocide, need access to technical assistance and resources to support their local roles in transforming national policies into school governance and classroom practice (IRC, 2007, Jeong, 2003). Capacity building training, when strategically designed, can increase the capacity for local educational reconstruction projects to survive and thrive.

Pedagogy and curriculum development training sessions, offered collectively to teachers of Hutu and Tutsi descent, foster opportunities for inter-communal and community-based collaboration and coordination (Jeong, 2000). When technical capacity is low at the grassroots level, capacity building programs can increase the potential for individuals to participate in reconstruction projects. Capacity building training and utilizing local human resources can replace perceptions of powerlessness with sentiments of empowerment.

**Conflict Sensitive and Inclusive Educational Programs, Projects and Policies**

Post-genocide educational policies, programs, and projects should be conflict-sensitive and inclusive. Because of the history of discrimination and marginalization, every school-age child should feel included in the national educational system regardless of ethnic identity or economic circumstance in post-genocide Rwanda. Marginalized groups, formerly denied access to formal education, can become integrated into their community through policies and programs enabling access to formal education. According to Jeong (2003), development programs targeted to benefit all ethnic groups
can build trust and new relations, enabling groups historically in conflict to work toward common goals.

The IIEP suggests that state and local educational planners should also be cognizant of groups of school-age children who are not attending school and/or parents and local leaders who are absent from local decision-making processes. Understanding which groups of children are gaining greater access to educational benefits and/or opportunities over others is critical to identifying the special needs and circumstances of the marginalized. As noted in Chapter 6, the most vulnerable groups of school-age children and youth need access to alternative education programs and interventions that meet their special needs and circumstances. While developing post-genocide educational programs targeted to reach the most vulnerable and marginalized groups of school-age children is critical, the IRC (2007) warns that inequity in benefits between minority and majority populations can cause resentment.

**Peace-building and the National Educational System**

Peace-building through the post-conflict reconstruction of the educational sector in post-genocidal Rwanda is a powerful process with the capacity to transform relationships formerly in conflict and a public institution once in contempt. As Lederarch (1999) suggests, however, peace-building processes need people, labor, materials, coordination, resources, and sustenance measures. Democratic governance, civil society participation, international assistance partners, intentional educational projects, and capacity development are the necessary resources. These resources will play an important
role in promoting equality, empowerment, autonomy, and participation through the educational reconstruction process – all factors of positive peace.
REFERENCES
REFERENCES


CURRICULUM VITAE

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