A STUDY OF RIVALRY BETWEEN NEIGHBORING ETHNIC GROUPS IN EASTERN DRC: IS CO-EXISTENCE POSSIBLE AFTER YEARS OF POLARIZATION FOLLOWING THE 1996 WAR?

by

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A Study of Rivalry between Neighboring Ethnic Groups in Eastern DRC: Is Co-existence Possible after Years of Polarization Following the 1996 War?

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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to each member of my family especially my Mom for her support and care since my very young age. My family always encouraged me to go the extra mile and work hard. I truly appreciate that each one of you worked with me all the way to achieving the best.
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Runyerera B. Londoni, MS

George Mason University, 2011

Thesis Director: Dr. Leslie Dwyer

This study explored the perceptions, differences, and narratives that the Bavibafuliru, and the Eastern DRC Tutsis communities living in the eastern DRC hold about the rivalry between them. The study also went further exploring the perceptions and narratives of the diaspora of the Bavibafuliru on the same issue. It was my hope to understand each group’s perceptions and narratives in order to have a clearer picture of how my study would approach a framework for a proper intervention to resolve the conflict or manage tensions between the Bavibafuliru and Eastern DRC Tutsis communities.

Historically, the Bavibafuliru and the Eastern DRC Tutsis lived together side by side for decades, though there were some issues dividing them related to land dispute and appropriation. However, events that took place especially the 1996 war of liberation led by the late President Laurent Desire Kabila escalated the conflict between the two
communities after the Eastern DRC Tutsis were accused of joining hands with Kabila’s rebellion movement that was supported by foreign troops from Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi. My study explored not only rivalries between the two communities but was more interested in finding if co-existence between the two people was possible especially following the level of hatred and polarization that was seen following the 1996 war. The study used social, and identity theories to make sense of the conflict dynamics between the Bavibafuliru and the Eastern DRC Tutsis.

Through my interviews and the questionnaires that I distributed, the study found that some hypothesis including conflict theoretical perspectives from scholars were confirmed while others were disconfirmed given the reality and uniqueness of the case that explained the dynamics of the rivalries between the Bavibafuliru and the Eastern DRC Tutsi. The social and identity theories that I used helped me in coming up with some preliminary recommendations and possible explanations of theories and intervention strategies that could address the ongoing internal conflict between the two communities if and only if they are well followed. My study found that both communities have expressed concerns of issues related to the citizenship, land or territorial appropriation, killings and power. The study also acknowledged the major differences in perception between participants living in homeland vs. those in the diaspora. The Major finding in the study was that the Bavibafuliru from the diaspora were less interested in co-existing with the Eastern DRC Tutsis while Bavibafuliru living in the eastern DRC were open for a new beginning, a new world of cooperation, co-existence and expressed
the sense of embracing forgiveness. Reconciling the perceptions of the Bavibafuliru form the diaspora and those living in the homeland with regard to co-existence and recognition of the Eastern DRC Tutsis as members of their society was very challenging. I hope to conduct part two of this study to explore more issues and understanding that would help develop a framework unique to the case that could lead the two communities to create a common national identity, which will help them live in peace and harmony as they used to before the 1996 liberation war.
I am going to study the internal rivalry between the Bavibafuliru and the Eastern DRC Tutsis. As “rivalry” is the core concept that I am looking at, it is important to define the term from the outset. Here I will borrow a definition by DeRouen and Bercovitch (2008) as they began to theorize conflict resolution in enduring conflict rivalries. Two main points are important for their definition. They identify time and repeated conflict to be the core areas of rivalries. DeRouen and Bercovitch stipulated that “Rivalries are not short-lived competitions; instead, they last for long periods” (Morey 2009, p.5). Therefore, as per DeRouen and Bercovitch, rivalry in this study is defined as the repeatedly setting off of two sides through competition that leads to feelings of enmity and mistrust (Morey 2009, p.5).

Intergroup relations have been studied in most past research because of the complex problems this phenomenon continues to pose in many societies today. Societies that are composed of two or more different groups tend to experience conflicts. The different groups manifest hostility against one another, while showing love and support to members of a particular group they belong to. This can lead to social disintegration and possible separation. These groups sometimes appear to have differences in their
perceived divergence of interests (Pruitt and Kim 2004, p. 6) or perhaps conflicts are rooted in a denial of basic human needs such as identity, recognition, security or personal development (Burton 1993, p. 63). Others like Herbert Kelman believe that conflict involving groups can be a process driven by collective needs and fear (Rothbart 2009). Johan Galtung articulated that the deprivation of human needs creates either physical or structural violence (Galtung 1969, p. 170).

However, different explanations for intergroup conflicts also lead to different intervention strategies. I will provide further explanation of the differences in intergroup conflicts and their intervention in the literature review. Former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali suggests that “at different times and in diverse contexts, a variety of sequential response mechanisms and functions are needed to promote the resolution of conflict” (Lederach 2002, p. 20). Therefore, Lederach acknowledges that “in many instances, it is only possible to understand the dynamics and roots of a conflict” (Lederach 2002, p. 20) in order to use the appropriate approach to solve it. This study will also seek to understand the root causes and other dynamics of conflict between the Bavibafuliru and the Eastern DRC Tutsis in order to develop a framework for an intervention suitable for this conflict.

1.2 Purpose of the Study

This study intends to explore the perceptions, differences, and narratives that the Bavibafuliru and the Eastern DRC Tutsis living in the eastern DRC hold about the rivalry between them. I will also explore the views of the diaspora of these two groups. The
study will identify what the Bavibafuliru and Eastern DRC Tutsis understand to be the problem between them. It is my hope that after understanding each group’s perceptions and narratives, I can have a better picture of how to study the approach for a proper intervention to resolve the current conflict and manage tensions between the Bavibafuliru and Eastern DRC Tutsis. I will also look at how the narratives between the two communities emerged and how they have shifted with time.

Why should I explore the views of the diaspora of these groups rather than just limiting my study to the populations living in the eastern DRC? The first reason for this choice is motivated by the fact that most studies conducted in the eastern DRC in the past that are related to this topic have had individuals living in the eastern Congo as participants. Therefore, including the diaspora could address the deficiencies of past studies in the eastern DRC, which overlooked the participation of the diaspora whose voices haven’t been heard and whose perceptions about this conflict haven’t been explored. The diaspora plays an important role in the sense that it still has connection to the homeland and influences issues politically. It is my contention that if I don’t involve the diaspora in this study, I would miss perspectives that are important in comprehending the different narratives about this conflict.

This study is planning to address not only the lack of not having inclusive understanding and explanations from the diversity that makes up these groups, but also will look at the narratives from the diaspora group to see what its adds to the existing literature.
Individuals in the diaspora who participated in this study are those who have either been affected by the conflict or lived in the eastern DRC before or after the conflict erupted between the parties in 1996. Some have family members, relatives, neighbors or friends who either have been directly or indirectly affected by the prolonged period of conflict.
CHAPTER 2
COUNTRY BACKGROUND RELATIVELY TO CONFLICT

The Democratic Republic of Congo Map

Source: US Department of State Website

2.1 General information

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is Africa's third largest country; its capital city is Kinshasa. Formerly known as Zaire, the DRC is rich in resources, including diamonds, cobalt, gold and uranium. The DRC is part of Africa's Great Lakes Region, which also includes Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. The country's diverse
population represents more than 200 ethnic groups. Eighty percent of the population is Bantu, while the others come from the Kongo, Luba and Mongo peoples. French is the official language, but Kikongo, Lingala, Swahili and Tshiluba are widely spoken.

The DRC has seen violent conflicts since the beginning of the war of liberation in 1996 led former President Laurent Desire Kabila. The signing of the 2003 Pretoria agreement between belligerents opened the door for further dialogue and reduced some hostilities among armed groups operating mainly in the volatile eastern part of the country. The threat of violent fighting decreased since President Joseph Kabila won the first democratic election in 2006. However, the eastern regions of the country, particularly the south and north Kivu, Maniema, and Mwenga remain insecure due to ongoing attacks, ambushes and fighting between various ethnic Mai Mai, other rebel groups and the country’s armed forces of the DRC (FARDC). The DRC unstable socio-economic and political conditions continue to increase tensions and unrest among the populations. Though the 2006 election was a milestone on a long road to restore the state's authority, peace and economic recovery; however, serious security challenges remain and tensions among the communities in the eastern and western parts of the countries persist.

2.2 The volatile eastern DRC

The government has failed to improve security conditions and resolve local conflicts in some parts of the country, especially in the eastern, northeastern and the west provinces. There have been some security improvements in certain cities in the east, such
as Bukavu, Goma, Ituri and in towns along the Burundian boarder, including Uvira and Fizi. However, the DRC continues to rely heavily on the United Nations Mission for the Stabilization of Congo (MONUSCO) to provide security to the populations. Tensions among the communities in the eastern DRC also continue to pose serious divisions that are not wealthy for the future of the country. The causes of violence are both local and national. Some of the issues like land tenure, citizenship and ethnic hatred continue to fuel militia recruitment and tensions.

In the east, the government signed separate agreements with the long time rebel movements, the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), a predominately Tutsi group that was led by general Laurent Nkunda. The CNDP and other armed groups accepted an invitation to be integrated into the FARDC, national police and local governments. Nkunda was then arrested in January 2009 in Rwanda where he was put in custody after the government invited Rwandan soldiers to root out the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) combatants. The FDLR is a predominantly Hutu rebel group operating in the eastern provinces. The FDLR are still operating in North and South Kivu and continue to use towns in the eastern DRC, including Masisi, Rutshur, Kanyabayonga, and Shabunda territories, as safe heavens to launch attacks on villages. Several of pro-government Mai-Mai militiamen and separate revolutionary Mai Mai movements are also active in the eastern region; they pose a threat to local residents.

The eastern region of the DRC also continues to experience sporadic fighting between the FARDC and Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) rebel group, the FDLR and the Mai Mai factions. The LRA continue to launch attacks on villages and
abduct civilians. Both the FDLR and LRA and Mai Mai have established bases in the eastern provinces of the DRC and continue to cause insecurity in the area. DRC, along with Rwanda and Uganda, have initiated joint military operations against LRA forces. Meanwhile, the issue of resolving local conflicts among the communities hasn’t been given the attention it deserves. The country has seen some setbacks on this issue as we continue to witness the non-involvement of the local, provincial and national leaders to address the local conflicts among communities. This is why I am going to study conflicts that continue to take place between neighboring ethnic groups in the eastern DRC, in particular between the Bavuliiru, and Bavira, two tribe which believes to be among of the indigenous groups of the eastern DRC and Tutsi migrants commonly called by some Banyamulenge or Rwandophones by others (Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), The Foreign & commonwealth Office-UK, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade & the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs).

2.3 Case Study Conflict Background

The eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has seen and continues to see conflicts between Tutsi populations and other tribes living in this part of the country. These Tutsi populations moved to the eastern DRC as refugees from Rwanda following the conflict between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda in the early 1960s (Kadari, Katchelewa and Ntendetchi, 1996). Different data shows that Tutsi migration from Rwanda to the eastern DRC has occurred over different times. The Groupe Milima in Uvira, in South
Kivu province, documented the arrival of Tutsi populations in eastern DRC dating to the time of Yuhi Gahindiro from 1746-1802 (Kadari, Katchelewa and Ntendetchi 1996). Other documents have shown the migration of Tutsi populations dating back to 1885, an event they trace back to the partition of Africa at the Berlin round table as the border of Congo Leopold II and Rwanda-Urundi changed (Kadari, Katchelewa and Ntendetchi, 1996).

This study is not investigating the time or year Tutsi populations arrived in eastern DRC, but will pay particular attention to the Tutsi populations who migrated to the eastern DRC as refugees from Rwanda and who settled in South Kivu province in the Uvira, Fizi and Mwenga zones, areas inhabited by Bafuliiru, Bavira, Babembe and Balega respectively. My research will be limited to the pastoralist Tutsi populations living in the Mitumba mountains (plateaus) in the Uvira zone where they settled in a territory commonly called “Mulenge”. Considering this area to be their new home, the new Tutsi settlers opted to be called Banyamulenge as a way to be referred to and to be identified among other tribes that live in the region. Banyamulenge is literally translated as “the inhabitants of Mulenge”. This name was quickly contested by the Bafuliiru and Bavira who consider themselves to be the indigenous people of Mulenge territory. Some Bafuliiru and Bavira referred to the Banyamulenge as “Banyarwanda” meaning “people of Rwandan origin”.

This paper will use the term **Eastern DRC Tutsis** in reference to “Banyamulenge” for the simple reason of addressing researcher bias. As different people in the DRC have used and continue to use different names to identify this group, I try to
stay away from controversies that might discredit the credibility of this study; therefore, I chose a different name as a way to stay neutral in my research and focus on only exploring issues that are important to understanding the trends and dimensions of conflicts between the parties in question. I will also use the term Bavibafuliru to refer to the populations of the Bafuliiru and Bavira tribes combined.

The Bavibafuliru claimed that the area that Eastern DRC Tutsis occupied when they first settled in eastern DRC was a piece of land found in their territory. As years passed by, Eastern DRC Tutsis settled down in the plateaus to live side by side with the Bavibafuliru. Though these two groups started to live together, the Bavibafuliru considered Eastern DRC Tutsis not to be part of them. It was viewed as a case of “us versus them”. Several times, the Bavibafuliru charged that Eastern DRC Tutsis were foreigners indicating that they kept their traditions and refused to assimilate while continuing to speak a “foreign language” – Kinyarwanda, which is an official language spoken in Rwanda. The Bavibafuliru wanted the Eastern DRC Tutsis to embrace their culture and traditions. On the other hand, the Eastern DRC Tutsis claimed they were Congolese like any other tribe living in the region, but they indicate that they are marginalized by other tribes surrounding them given their minority status.

I remember when I was still young living in the eastern DRC, events of different magnitudes took place in the 1990s between the Bavibafuliru and Eastern DRC Tutsis as tensions between the two groups flared. Small sporadic clashes and acts of vengeance and sabotage started to occur. Mutual accusations started to surface with one group accusing the other of mistreatment. The issue became a matter of concern between the two groups
and misunderstanding between them grew in intensity. Continued mistrust led to more conflicts that escalated tensions between the groups, causing hatred and anger on both sides. On one hand, frustrations continued to grow among the Bavibafuliru about the presence of Eastern DRC Tutsis in what they called their territory, on the other hand, the Eastern DRC Tutsis also continued to evoke the issue of their safety, citing threats posed by other tribes to their security, particularly from the Bavibafuliru. Identity issues related to nationality, land appropriation, and self-determination, including political problems between these two groups, erupted during the 1990s.

In 1996, Eastern DRC Tutsis threw their support to the rebel movement, supported by Rwandan troops, to overthrow former President Mubutu Sese Seko’s regime in Kinshasa. This also contributed to the escalation of the conflict between Eastern DRC Tutsis and Bavibafuliru. Eastern DRC Tutsis supported the rebel group AFDL, which was led by the then rebel leader, Laurent Desire Kabila (The Independent 1996). AFDL is a French acronym for Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-Zaire or Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire. Thereafter, the Tutsi populations in Eastern Congo were told by the leadership in Kinshasa to leave the area or else die (The Independent 1996). Fighting along side the Rwandan, Ugandan, and Burundian armies, Eastern DRC Tutsis launched attacks on South Kivu and in the territory of the Bavibafuliru in Kiliba and Uvira and the rest of the “Plaine de la Ruzizi”. To counteract to the presence of foreign troops in the eastern DRC, the Bavibafuliru joined a resistance force of Mai Mai militants, a group of south-Kivu Congolese fighters composed mostly of youths who were armed with
machetes and firearms, to defend against what they described an invasion of foreigners.

The conflict between the Bavibafuliru and the Eastern DRC Tutsis intensified, as the Eastern DRC Tutsis were accused of supporting foreign troops that had invaded the DRC. The Bavibafuliru fought the Eastern DRC Tutsis through the help of militias, particularly the Mai Mai. Violence soared and killings took place as each community tried to defend its people.

Eastern DRC Tutsis claimed to have been fighting for their survival. The Bavibafuliru on the other hand charged that Eastern DRC Tutsis – through the intervention of Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi – wanted to annex the eastern DRC to Rwanda. The Eastern DRC Tutsis denied those allegations, claiming that the aim of the rebel organization appeared to be Zaire's national regeneration, not the annexation of eastern Zaire to a greater Tutsi homeland within Rwanda, as President Mobutu and his government had alleged (The Independent, 1996). Under late President Mubutu Sese Seko, the DRC was called Zaire; the name changed when Laurent Desire Kabila overthrew Mobutu in 1997. From this stand point, the Eastern DRC Tutsis and the Bavibafuliru became polarized, and divisions within these communities became extreme. The AFDL marched into Kinshasa in May 1997. Eastern DRC Tutsis – who had thrown their support to AFDL alongside Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda – took control of the eastern DRC under Kabila’s regime. Acts of vengeance and sabotage took place then. As Eastern DRC Tutsis continued to fight alongside Rwandan troops, the Bavibafuliru continued to reiterate and reinforced their position that the Eastern DRC Tutsis were not Congolese, but Rwandans. Bavibafuliru charged that Eastern DRC Tutsis had closely
collaborated with the Rwandan army to kill DRC civilian populations. These groups became adversaries and coexistence between them has become a matter of concern. This paper will explore issues surrounding these two communities in eastern DRC in order to understand the narratives, perceptions and differences that each one holds about the ongoing conflict between them. I hope that the findings of my study could be used to carry out further research in the future to study possible strategies for helping the parties in question to co-exist once again after years of mistrust and polarization, and go back to live side by side as they used to before.
CHAPTER 3
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY EXPLANATION

Why are group conflicts difficult to resolve? There is no single answer to this question, but it is important to look at causes and issues surrounding the nature of conflicts in order to understand their complexity. Group relationships tend to be at stake when disintegration occurs. Coleman believes that the potential issues that lead to intractability in internal rivalries include resources, values, power, social identity, inequalities or basic human needs (Pence 2003, p.3). It is in the same angle that Brown (1996) argues that strength of the internal conflict lies in identifying conditions that promote violence (Pence 2003, p.4). Walter agrees with Coleman and aligns himself with Brown on what can lead to internal conflict. His theory focuses on the incentives that are present for individuals to re-join a rebel group, a necessary condition for renewing hostilities. He argues that:

These incentives have little to do with the past conflict. Instead, dissatisfaction with one’s current situation and the inability to do anything peacefully to produce change drives citizens to pick up arms. If citizens are well-off and/or have the ability to change government policies, they will be much less likely to rejoin the struggle, regardless of how the last conflict ended. In this view, people care more about their current situation than events of the past (Morey 2009, p.3)

Adding to what has been said about group relations, Joseph Sherman for instance, concludes through his analysis of the issue of ethnic rivalry in Liberia that “the problem
of ethnicity in Liberia is linked with the question of competing loyalties” (Sherman 2006, p.2). He thinks that in order to have the best approach to deal with group rivalries in Liberia and improve their relationships, “There is a need in post-war Liberia to develop educational and cultural programs at the grassroots level through which ethnic and cultural diversities can be appreciated and integrated into national unity” (Sherman 2006, p.2). Sherman’ argument leads me to tie his analysis to the current situation in the eastern DRC between the Bavibafuliru and the Eastern DRC Tutsis. It is clear that people there now live in a post-war era but conflicts between groups persist. Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall believe that war can come to a close but issues that fueled a particular war can persist, making conflict termination harder to achieve. “The root causes of conflict may persist without either war or peace settlement doing anything to address them…. it is quite possible that … efforts to end war may not resolve the underlying conflict” (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall 2008, p.159). Daniel Rothbart and Karina Korostelina on the other hand see that communities and their neighbors exhibit a multiplicity of identities such as nationality, religion, region, city, professional union, and local community (Rothbart and Korostelina, p. 30).

In internal rivalries or conflicts, groups also tend to take positions based on their self interests. For instance, cases involving territorial claims lead to potential conflict, especially when the parties in conflict each have legitimizing claims on the disputed land. “The practical problem, however, is that the ethnic group’s homeland often overlaps with the homeland of one or more neighboring groups…The groups see little room for compromise over this land; it is not something that can be divided, shared, or substituted
for with” (Fuhrmann and Tir 2009, p. 5). Under this scenario minority and majority groups clash; therefore, Matthew Fuhrmann believes that “maintaining the identity is a sensitive issue for minority groups living on land over which another group has sovereignty; such situations potentially bring into question the groups’ ability to freely and in perpetuity express their identity” (Fuhrmann and Tir 2009, p. 5). Therefore, Charles Tilly believes that parties in conflict, which have differences in solving their problems, can create boundaries and intergroup hostility among themselves (Tilly 2005, p.g 89).

Christopher Mitchell explores this dimension further, acknowledging that “Much writing about the nature of protracted social conflicts revolves around the idea of scarcity… Parties indulge in conflict over some good that is in limited supply which both perceive they cannot simultaneously own, possess or enjoy – a piece of territory, a material resource such as oil, a dominating position which increases ‘security’, roles that present the opportunity of making binding decisions for others” (Mitchell 2005, p.6).

Values and morality matter when it comes to conflicts driven by parties’ rivalries. Conflict leads sometimes to the death of hundreds, thousands or millions in societies where conflicts take place. Societies facing mass atrocities and crimes committed by one party to the other have had trouble debating over the notion of finding peace vs. forgiveness, or seeking peace Vs. Justice. In terms of intervention and possible solutions or outcomes, different explanations for intergroup conflicts lead to different intervention strategies. John Paul Lederack provides us with a conceptual framework which might be applicable to healing rivalry. Many have opted to have reconciliation in post-war reconstruction, and have advocated for truth and forgiveness in the post-conflict period. The notion of transitional
justice, for instance, has been developed to try to respond to widespread violations of human rights by recognizing what victims have experienced during times of human rights violations and promote peace, reconciliation and democracy (International Center for Transitional Justice).

But reconciliation and the process of seeking truth are discussed in different dimensions and different explanations have elaborated different solutions. Daniel Serwer and Patricia Thomson have demonstrated that people in society emerging from conflict care less to be reconciled with those who killed, tortured, or maimed their families and friends (Crocker, Chester, Hampson & Aall 2007, p. 376). Lederack addresses this with a different approach. Unlike Serwer and Thomson, Lederack believes that reconciliation can happen no matter what the circumstances. Reconciliation, he says “represents a place, the point of encounter where concerns about both the past and the future can meet…Opportunity must therefore be given for the people to look forward and envision their shared future” (Lederack 2002, p. 27). He adds that “reconciliation is not pursued by seeking innovative ways to disengage or minimize the conflicting group’s affiliations, but instead is built on mechanisms that engage the sides of a conflict with each other as humans-in-relationship” (Lederack 2002, p. 26).

As far as identity conflict is concerned, engaging parties in creating, for instance, common national identity, is important. The social psychology contact theory of Pettigrew and Tropp (Korostelina 2007, p. 201) is useful to engage parties, which lack interaction between them. Pettigrew and Tropp suggest in the contact theory that “the more contacts with representatives of an outgroup a person has, the more positive his or
her attitudes toward the outgroup will be (Korostelina 2007, p. 201). But I will have to indicate that contacts alone between members of different groups will not be enough to create a common identity improving intergroup relationships among communities that do not often interact. Korostelina states that, there will be a need to get the parties engaged in a variety of activities in order to reduce prejudice, stereotypes, and biases against one another (Korostelina 2007, p.201). These activities include but are not limited to creating equal status among the two communities, allowing cooperative intergroup interaction or dialogue, and creating opportunity for personal acquaintances among group members (Korostelina 2007, p. 201).

The place where truth, mercy, justice and peace meet the outcome will be reconciliation. In a society where there are tensions, ethnic or group hatred caused by intense polarization, the concept of truth must contain honesty, revelation, clarity, open accountability, and vulnerability. Conflict will never be resolved without truth; however, truth alone is not enough. That’s when mercy comes to play to show compassion to others, forgive and accept them in order to begin a new start (Lederack 2002, p. 28). Without mercy, healthy relationships with parties in conflict are not possible. The same is true for compassion and forgiveness; if these two are not present, healing and restoration are impossible. Lederack also says that only where there is a pervasive feeling of respect and security, well being, unity, and harmony can peace take root (Lederack 2002, p. 28).

Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall articulated the idea of “Cosmopolitan Conflict Resolution.” They proposed a new comprehensive approach to resolve conflicts.
around the world. They acknowledge the complexity of the conflicts we continue to see today and from that complexity suggest there is a necessity to develop “new doctrines of intervention and new understanding of ‘peace and security’” (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall 2008, p. 250). Their approach to resolving new waves of conflict includes more coordinated and cooperative methods that promote collective mechanisms of handling conflict together at both local and global levels for the interest of the world community.

The “Cosmopolitan Conflict Resolution” approach is related to Fisher’s Interactive Conflict Resolution theory. Fisher’s theory encourages all parties to be involved in resolving conflict and find a solution to it together. Parties must voluntarily deal with their differences in a respectful and cooperative manner working toward outcomes that are mutually beneficial and self-sustaining over the long term (Fisher 2008).

For example, according to Tajfel (1984) “many ethnic minorities and their members who disagree with their low status prefer assimilation with the majority instead of redefining their identity… They choose membership in the highest status outgroup and use social mobility as a way of improving social identity (Korostelina 2007, p. 136).

Tensions between groups could also be fueled by what a present system offers to them or by the injustice found in their societies. Warfield and Schoeny developed the idea of integrating systems maintenance with social justice. This is when parties are encouraged to reconsider relationships between them by fixing what is not working in the systems and also accommodating social justice within it (Schoeny and Warfield 2000, p. 255). In other words, parties’ positions, interests and needs are to be integrated so they
can have a common, inclusive solution that addresses the concerns of all parties and have outcomes that are acceptable by both. This literature review will guide me during the analysis of my study findings to interpret data and make sense of it particularly providing the best explanation of the conflict between the Bavibafuriru and the Eastern DRC Tutsis.

3.1 Theory Explanation

When reporting the findings of this study, I will tie the research back to theories and intervention strategies to provide a framework of possible explanations for the rivalry between the Bavibafuriru and Eastern DRC Tutsis. In this case, I will test or verify these theories to reflect on their confirmation or disconfirmation by the results of the study and will examine hypotheses or questions derived from them (Creswell 2009, p. 55).

Empirical evidence exists that supports the conclusion that increased violence caused by internal rivalries also leads to longer or sometimes shorter conflict duration (Derouen 2009, p.2). A framework based on different theoretical and intervention explanations will provide me with a solid base to carry out part two of this study after exploring my first findings.

I will apply broader approaches looking at intergroup conflict resolution as a means to examine the intractability of this conflict. However, I will also look at analyses that do not just view the intractability of group conflicts purely on the basis of ethnic hatred, deprivation or cultural perspectives but also look at multiplicity of identities such as nationality, territory, professional union, and local community. Furthermore, I will examine how rivalries between two groups can influence the resistance of one group
toward another, which might ultimately lead to a longer duration of conflict, while
competition also continues to be manifested. It is difficult though to know for sure or
predict the motivations that are behind the rivalry between the Bavibafuliru and the
Eastern DRC Tutsis unless one understands the different concepts, perceptions and
narratives that will come out of the analysis of our findings. Therefore, this study will
look at different approaches of past research that bring into perceptive the notion of new
relationship that is needed between polarized groups.
CHAPTER 4
CASE STUDY RESEARCH DESIGN

4.1 Overview

Social identity and intergroup theories should help me to explain the dynamics of the conflict between the Bavibafuliru and Eastern DRC Tutsis. This study will use sequential qualitative design employing the case study research method because I will use theories that will explain the relationship between independents and dependent variables. Thus, I will use theoretical approaches which provide an overall orientation to shape the types of questions I will pose, and to provide me with guidance about how to collect data and how it will be analyzed (Creswell 2009, p. 63). As I need to explain the correlations between variables based on the theoretical perspectives, an exploratory research method will be used for this study coupling it with the explanatory method during the analysis of data.

Therefore, I will use both the exploratory and explanatory research strategies to make sense of the relevant causal factors. This will help me to test the viability of this study and to determine identity issues pertaining to the social, cultural or political factors that are causing the rivalry that continues to prolong the conflict between the Bavibafuliru and the Eastern DRC Tutsis. The research tactics that this study will use are interviews and questionnaires. The sampling frame for interviews is made of individuals
that I had face-to-face contact with when I traveled to the region. Questionnaires were used for those in the diaspora that I could not physically have direct conversation with. However, on top of using these two tactics, I will triangulate by elaborating my findings with other data from journals’ archives, online materials and local newspapers that provide literature about this issue.

Finally, the data analysis method will be one that provides a framework of possible explanations of theories and intervention strategies to comprehend the rivalry between the Bavibafuliru and Eastern DRC Tutsis. I first gathered data from participants and then read through materials to identify the general themes identified by the participants (Creswell 2009, p. 184). My analysis is based on data collection, and then I articulated my analysis using the information supplied by participants.

As far as the analysis part goes, I began to interpret data, and then wrote a report using narrative methodology to tell the participants’ stories and see how much sense the issues I explored made sense for them. As interviews and questionnaires were constructed under categories according to possible causes of the rivalry and possible solutions to it, I provided explanations of the conflict dynamics using categories of questions I identified for the study. I therefore, positioned these categories within theories and intervention strategies that defined my framework. I explained respondents’ views from the interconnection of these categories.

4.2 Unit of Analysis
The purpose of this study is to explore the perceptions, differences and narratives that the Bavibafuriru and the Eastern DRC Tutsis living in the eastern DRC and the diaspora hold about the rivalry between them. The study will identify the Bavibafuriru and Eastern DRC Tutsis’ understanding of the problem. The unit of analysis of this study will be individuals who have directly or indirectly been affected by the conflict between the Bavibafuriru and Eastern DRC Tutsis. These individuals lived and survived the conflict. It is my hope that after the analysis of data from respondents and reading through their experience using different hypotheses, I will be able to propose a cause-effect relationship of the rivalries between the two communities.

4.3 Data Collection and Sampling

The primary data collection method for this study will be interviews and questionnaires. I traveled to Bujumbura, Burundi (Dec. 25, 2010− Jan. 14, 2011), where I carried out interviews with both Bavibafuriru and Eastern DRC Tutsi refugees. Bujumbura is about 25 km (16 miles) west of Uvira, a town located in the eastern DRC where most of the Bavibafuriru and Eastern DRC Tutsis reside. I interviewed refugees, leaders of both communities and ordinary people. Questionnaires were also sent to all participants who voluntarily chose to contribute to this study in the diaspora. These questionnaires were sent to a sampling of Bavibafuriru who voluntarily accepted to participate in the study using their online networks. I first sent a request to participate in the study with a clear explanation of the purpose of the study, and asked those interested in the study to directly contact me. This communication was via e-mails. Participants live
in the diaspora specifically in the US, Canada, Australia, Continental Europe and in some African countries other than the DRC. They are members of Uvira Yahoo group on the internet.

Thus, in summarizing my data collection procedures, the target population was the diaspora communities; the sampling frame was made up of participants who are members of the Bavibafuliru. I did not find an online network of Eastern DRC Tutsis, but this will be taken care of during the second phase of this study. I was looking for a sample that was going to be very representative across sexes and age. But I was quite disappointed that not that many women both in the diaspora and on the ground participated in the study. This gap will be addressed in the second phase of the study where I will plan to have enough time to spend on the ground for additional field research. The sample was made up of 20 individuals with 11 on the ground and 9 from the diaspora. Their age range was between 18 and 75. I understand the difficulties of languages spoken by these groups. I conducted interviews not in tribal local languages but rather in the language that both groups use in common. French and Swahili are widely spoken among these two groups and were the two languages that I used for interviews. However, I used only English for the questionnaires; I will explain my choice further in the coming paragraphs.

Only individuals with knowledge of one of the two languages could participate in the study. Given the duration of time I spend in the region, I did not want to arrange for interpreters who could help translate questions from the local languages into English or French. Due to time constraints, the process of translating materials from tribal languages
to English could have taken me longer than the actual time I had. Thus, I chose to only use French and Swahili – the two languages I am fluent in. I also acknowledge the difficulties in translating materials from one language to another. It is clear that errors might occur. After collecting interviews in French and Swahili, I translated the manuscripts into English. Errors might have occurred when translating materials from these two languages into English as I am not a professional translator. But I am certain the content provided by respondents remained the same despite errors that might have been caused by difficulties in translation. I am fluent in both French and Swahili; this helped in avoiding dangerous errors.

As far as the diaspora goes, though most people on the online network can speak French, Swahili and other local Eastern DRC tribal local languages, questionnaires were designed only in English to make things easier for me. Translating materials from these other languages into English could be time consuming especially given the limited time I had to complete this assignment. The fact that I had to translate interview manuscripts from French and Swahili to English for the people on the ground (eastern DRC) who could not speak English, it was then difficult to have this double work of administering the questionnaire in French and English. To minimize this problem, as I am not a professional translator, I found it of paramount importance to keep English as the only and only language to use for the diaspora sample. I therefore realized that the diaspora sample was not very representative as well. There are diverse people who speak different other languages than English who did not participate in the study. I feel that some people
who might have wanted to participate in the study were left out because of the language selection barriers.

I developed closed and open-ended questions. This helped me have an in-depth understanding about the subject matter as I collected necessary information on various issues based on the flexibility that was provided. The closed and open-ended questions were useful in analyzing questions in a very sophisticated way, looking at the similarities and divergences that each respondent offered for each question. Respondents were not restricted in terms of the length of their answers. They were allowed to go either direction and were free to speak their minds as much as they wished when responding to questions. This being said, some answers were shorter while others were longer. To make it easier for respondents, I made all the questions simple and easy to understand to avoid any misinterpretation of questions.

Questions were constructed under categories according to possible causes and possible solutions. Given that I also wanted to address the problem, and because I wanted to explore the possibility that the problem might not fit any existing models, I integrated a plurality of approaches in a bid to address the actual problem this study is exploring. Questions came from the perspective of the intractability of group identity conflicts in the basis of ethnic hatred, deprivation, cultural perspective and multiplicity of other identity such as nationality, professional union, local community, territory, and political dynamics.

4.4 Strengths and Weaknesses of Design and Data Collection
4.4.1 Design strengths

When analyzing respondents’ understanding of the problem, I couldn’t think of any better design method than an exploratory case study approach. Unlike in fixed design, where independent and dependent variables are known, in this study, independent and dependent variables were identified and manipulated especially when looking for possible solutions. Therefore, exploring respondents’ views could help in determining variables to be used later in the process of finding possible solutions to the conflict. Also, due to the fact that I was trying to know the unknown, exploratory and explanatory case study design methods provided me with a framework to better understand the problem of the conflict between the Bavifuliru and the Eastern DRC Tutsis.

4.4.2 Design weaknesses

The problem I was exploring might not fit existing models. Therefore, integrating a plurality of approaches was needed. Also, because case studies do not provide similar generalizations for all situations, for this particular study, I was probably in some instances carried away by the answers provided by the respondents. In cases where respondents might be hiding their feelings or didn’t want to respond directly to the questions that I posed, then the results or the findings might be misinterpreted, leaving room for misrepresenting the true picture of the problem.

4.4.3 Data collection strengths
I deliberately chose questionnaires and interviews out of other methods given that questionnaire techniques have the flexibility to choose the topics the research intends to addresses. Given time constraints and that traveling to different countries to meet with the Bwitafuliulu diaspora could have cost me a lot of money, I chose the internet questionnaires because they were not time consuming and were not expensive. As I was trying to explore the perception that respondents held about the conflict in the eastern DRC, I found out that questionnaires were good for measuring respondents’ attitudes and tone. Also, using internet questionnaires allowed the participants to respond within the time frame allocated to them and this happened at their own convenience without any pressure from someone that they might feel is grilling them with questions. The respondent here is not under pressure because no one is watching, especially if it happens that he/she is hesitant to respond to a question in the presence of a researcher. Internet questionnaires gave respondents the time they needed to think and to write answers down at their convenience.

The strength of interviews was that I was able to hear the stories face to face. There was room for me to rephrase questions if they seemed too complex for respondents. I could see the physical and emotional response from the respondents.

4.4.4 Data collection weaknesses

The primary weakness is that I heavily relied on self-reported data only. To address this issue, I analyzed the respondents’ answers with other data collected from journals’ archives, online materials and local newspapers. Questionnaires were only in English, the
Bavibafuliru non-English speakers were excluded even though they would have been willing to participate in the study. Participation in the study ultimately became weak and was not representative across all demographics. Only Bavibafuliru from the diaspora participated in the questionnaires. It would be better to also have had Eastern DRC Tutsis from diaspora communities participate, to hear their perceptions and narratives compared to the Eastern DRC Tutsis whom I interviewed on the ground. Also, some open-ended questions were problematic in the sense that some respondents did not have the same concepts or meaning of certain terms such as “coexistence” and “sharing territory.” They responded to such questions according to their understandings of the terms, which did not always match my own. As for interviews, because they were conducted in French and Swahili, I had to translate the manuscripts for each question. I probably missed certain points because I did not record the interviews but was rather taking notes as the interviewees answered questions. The training in note taking that I acquired at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Africa program helped me in minimizing errors in note taking during interviews.
CHAPTER 5
DATA ANALYSIS I

My data analysis method provides a framework of possible explanations and intervention strategies to comprehend the rivalry between the Bavibafuliru and Eastern DRC Tutsis. I gathered data from participants, which was analyzed to identify the general themes identified by the participants (Creswell 2009, p. 184). My analysis was based on data I collected and I articulated this analysis from the information supplied by participants.

I began to interpret my data and wrote my report using narrative methodology to tell participants’ stories. As my central focus for this study was to explore issues surrounding the conflict rather than just explain participants’ views using theories, the narrative method was best suited for this project. Those stories from participants became the objects of my study as I focused on how each member of the two communities understood the conflict, how the issues explored made sense for them. Narrative, unlike other methodologies, allowed me as a researcher to comprehend the sense-making of each community and how their stories construct their identities.

As questionnaires and interviews were constructed under categories according to possible causes of the rivalry and possible solutions, I provided the explanation using categories looking into the questions I asked. I therefore positioned these categories
within theories and interventions strategies that defined my framework. Then I explained respondents’ ideas from the interconnection of these categories. To protect the identity of individuals who participated in this study, I used letters from P1 to P9 to refer to all our participants from the Bavibafuliru living in the diaspora, D1 to D6 identifying Bavibafuliru living in eastern Congo and F1 to F5 identifying Eastern DRC Tutsis living in the Eastern Congo. Given the time I spent collecting data from respondents through interviews or questionnaires, I could not get the high number of people I envisioned before I started the study. However, I am quite convinced that the data I collected from this small sample will give us a clearer picture of the conflict taking place between the Bavibafuliru and Eastern DRC Tutsis in eastern Congo.

5.1 Bavibafuliru from the Diaspora

5.1.2 Possible Causes of the Conflict

5.1.2.1 Driving factor of the conflict between the Bavibafuliru and Eastern DRC Tutsis

Bavibafuliru participants from the diaspora had mixed feelings about what drives the conflict between the two groups. Among diaspora Bavibafuliru, six participants were in agreement that the driving factor of the conflict is the killing of civilians by Eastern DRC Tutsis against the Bavibafuliru. Of the three remaining diaspora Bavibafuliru, two believed that the driving factor is political in nature, while the other believed that the ambiguity of the Eastern DRC Tutsis’ citizenship is the problem.

For instance, a participant framed his view as follows: “The driving factor is that Tutsi lie, cheat and kill native Congolese, especially Bavibafuliru, and Babembe in order to
obtain Congolese citizenship” (P1). Another said: “Those Tutsi from Rwanda invaded the DRC and started to kill innocent people including local clergies, pastors and looted everything we had” (P3).

With regard to politics driving the conflict, this is what P6 had to say: “These conflicts cannot be solved if political leaders are not yet in a position to address facts of these issues as political ones. But it is not a crisis of identity; it will require a responsible leader who knows how to address the issue of conflict resolution strategy especially that the problem is already been identified as a political one” (P6). P7 agreed with P6, framing it this way: “I think the conflict is political, they do this for their personal interests, their own business” (P7).

There was a feeling from one participant that the name “Eastern DRC Tutsi” connotation was a fabrication, and that the name did not make any sense to him. This is how he raised it: “There never exists this kind of people or tribe called DRC Tutsis. There exist the Tutsi refugees that came from Rwanda and were received and welcomed by the Congolese people. Now as you can see this is the first conflict we have; foreigners calling themselves DRC Tutsis or some of you researchers in writing stories like these you also support this nonexistent name. You are adding oil onto the fire” (P5).

5.1.2.2 Ethnic hatred: Enmity and mistrust between the Bavibafuliru and the Eastern DRC Tutsi

Almost all diaspora Bavibafuliru participants were in agreement that a feeling of enmity exists between the Bavibafuliru and Eastern DRC Tutsis, although one participant
disagreed. Eight of nine found that the feeling of enmity between the Bavibafuliru and the Eastern DRC Tutsis is a matter of concern. With regard to the relationship between these two groups, the following is what participants think: “There is a feeling of enmity because those Tutsi Rwandese have killed and are still killing innocent Bavibafuliru” (P3). Another participant stated that “native” Bavibafuliru have no support from “superpowers” adding that: “Tutsis came with their fellow citizens from Rwanda with guns to kill and destroy everything and they continue taking land from the natives and kicking them outside their own country. They kick natives out of the land of their ancestral and fathers because natives are powerless and are not backed by superpowers than they are” (P11).

To understand how the level of enmity has taken another dimension, one has to listen to what P4 had to say: “Bavibafuliru no longer trust Tutsis as honest and peaceful people…In any event, some people compare Tutsis to snakes that bite human beings’ heels. Moderate ones say they are rats; they bite while blowing at the wound of a person, but one only notices when the damage is done” (P4).

With regard to what respondents described as hospitality that the Bavibafuliru demonstrated to the Eastern DRC Tutsis, one participant framed his views as follows: “Bavibafuliru feel like Tutsis are not grateful to them for having been warmly welcomed when they arrived in Uvira as refugees when they lived in Mulenge Refugee Camp under the UNHCR protection until 1964, the time when Congolese rebellion started.” (P1). However, one participant had a different opinion, according to this participant: “DRC
Tutsis are quiet and peaceful people but many authorities used their non-integration into Bavibafuliru society to create conflict between us” (P7).

5.1.2.3 Territory: Is territorial dispute a concern between the Bavibafuliru and Eastern DRC Tutsis? Is the presence of eastern DRC Tutsis in Mulenge a problem?

When asked this question, almost all diaspora Bavibafuliru participants, eight of nine, acknowledged that territorial disputes are not a major concern. Some participants claimed that the Bavibafuliru and Eastern DRC Tutsi have been living together for years. Only one participant said territorial disputes are a problem between these two groups. However, there is agreement among all participants that Mulenge, the area in which the Eastern DRC Tutsi live, is Bavibafuliru land and all stated that it does not belong to the Eastern DRC Tutsis. Nine of nine Bavibafuliru participants from the diaspora claimed that the land is theirs not Eastern DRC Tutsi’s. This seems to indicate that although diaspora Bavibafuliru say land is not an issue, they nevertheless feel themselves attached to their land and believe it has been occupied by outsiders, or strangers.

When responding to the question related to territorial dispute, one participant said this: “Mulenge village belongs to Bavibafuliru and will never belong to Tutsi from Rwanda. So claiming Mulenge is a treachery and they (Tutsis) know it” (P3). While another respondent framed his views as follows: “Once again there is no Tutsi in Mulenge, not even one you can come across even today and will show you that there never be Tutsi in
Mulenge or Banyamulenge, they never, never, never exist. This is the factor of the conflict” (P5).

The one participant who recognized there was territorial dispute mentioned this:

“bafuliiru of bashale clan lived in Mulenge before the arrival of Tutsis from Rwanda; the hospitality of the Bafuliiru caused the problem. Tutsis were accepted to live in the bafuliiru land during their suffering, and then took advantage of this to call themselves banyamulenge as natives of this area. This is high treason and plot against the Bafuliiru” (P2).

5.1.2.4 Identity: Social identity related to citizenship

Given that the status of Eastern DRC Tutsis is viewed by the Bavibafuliru in different ways, we asked diaspora Bavibafuliru to tell us their views about the issue of citizenship. We understood that these were sensitive questions, but we wanted to get the bottom of the issue so we could really understand the true causes of the rivalry between these communities. We gave participants five choices. Three are commonly used by Bavibafuliru and other people in the DRC and elsewhere. The following are the choices we picked: a) Banyamulenge, b) Banyarwanda, c) Foreigners. Because one group in this study was named “Eastern DRC Tutsis,” we suggested d) Congo Easterners, and finally e) None of the above. We found that eight of nine participants identified the Eastern DRC Tutsi as Banyarwanda. This means that they view Eastern DRC Tutsis as Rwandans; or in other words people with “Rwandan origin.” The other remaining participant said that Eastern DRC Tutsis were Banyarwanda and Foreigners. This means that all diaspora
Bavibafuliru participants viewed the Eastern DRC Tutsis as Rwandans. P1 framed his answer as follows, adding comment to a closed question: “Your Eastern DRC Tutsis can be called Tutsis from Congo by having a legal status or being a citizen of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Somalia, Kenya etc original” (P10). Two other Bavibafuliru respondents form the diaspora also added comments on this closed question, saying: “Banyarwanda meaning native of Rwanda” (P1) and “they are Banyarwanda, foreigners, they will never be anything else” (P5).

5.1.3 Possible solutions

5.1.3.1 Addressing the healing of ethnic hatred

When I asked diaspora Bavibafuliru participants what can be done to address enmity between the Bavibafuliru and the Eastern DRC Tutsis, responses were mixed with participants splitting in their answers. Five of nine believed that currently, there is no need for healing between the two communities because the Eastern DRC Tutsis are Rwandans. Three other participants suggested that Eastern DRC Tutsis should apologize if they want healing to take place. Among those three participants, two want to see some forms of talks with a responsible government and the other participant had a different view. This participant wanted the Bavibafuliru to accept the identity of the Eastern DRC Tutsis as Congolese.

Here is what diaspora Bavibafuliru participants who opposed any healing had to say about ethnic hatred: “Tutsis came to be considered as enemies by Bavibafuliru after
arrogantly throwing away or tearing Congolese ID Cards, going back to Rwanda, their motherland following Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) Army’s victory over the former government of Habyarimana. They then came back to the DRC, armed to killed innocent people they disliked. They did not only killed Bavibafuliru, but Congolese people in general.” P1 added other points saying that: “We felt betrayed by the same people we have welcomed to our country, the people we treated like brothers. Rather than a mere difference to be healed, they really committed a felony; there is nothing to be healed here” (P1). In the same vein, another participant said: “Those Tutsis have to accept the crimes that they have committed against people in the eastern Congo. Stop treachery and accept that they are Rwandese” (P3). One participant on the contrary sees enmity with a different eye. This respondent stated that: “I mostly tend to negate the statement saying that Bavibafuliru are enemies of the Tutsis Banyarwanda. The latter consider Bavibafuliru as idiots (Bichuchu). Now that they know that indeed indigenous are not idiots, they (Eastern DRC Tutsis) are getting rid of any person who opposes their agenda” (P4).

On the other hand, the Bavibafuliru of the diaspora who see the importance of the healing process between the two communities, believe that the Eastern DRC Tutsis should apologize, and engage in reconciliation or talks.

Here is how one participant framed his views: “We have to bring these two parties to reconciliation. They will never reach to reconciliation unless we are given the time to mobilize through trainings and awareness of civics. We should have the notion of respect of human rights, and to accept the principles of conflict resolution which are: accepting
one’s responsibility in the worse situation the country is facing today. Also people should be ready to apologize frankly and sincerely and to accept to co-exist…Coexistence is important; accepting each other and being governed by the same constitution. We all must submit under the same law where there is no big person and a small one. All have to be equal under the law” (P2).

Another participant said this “People indeed should not be manipulated by politicians, if Rwandans want to live in peace and harmony in Uvira with both Bavibafuliru, they should apologize for the crime caused to the Bavibafuliru. Also, they must remain Rwandans not change overnight their identity for political gains. Example in South Africa, we have Indian-South Africans, they never called themselves anything else than accepting that they are Indians. South Africa is also inhabited by Basutu from Lesotho, Batswana from Botswana, Baswati from Swaziland…they live in South Africa like any other South African keeping they names? Why Rwandans have to change their name and nature in Congo???” (P9).

As to government participation in the reconciliation process, another participant stated his views as follows: “This process should start from the top by addressing the issue when bringing all the facts about Tutsis on the table since Congolese people deserve the truth about Tutsis. However, the only person in the country that I think can help us to reconcile is a responsible President. There is need for a leadership which can bring the issue down to the people of Congo so we can all discuss it; that’s a government that will bring laws, justice and equality to all people of Congo” (P6). As far as accepting the identity of others, including the Eastern DRC Tutsis, P7 framed the issue as follows: “We
have to accept other people’s identity; this is good for multiculturalism. Multiple identities are advantage of the region” (P7).

5.1.3.2 Addressing coexistence

I asked diaspora Bavibafuliru participants what they think can be done to bring the Bavibafuliru and the Eastern DRC Tutsis together if coexistence continues to be a serious matter of concern. Almost all participants were not opposed to coexistence between the two communities. It is only a matter of trying to find out what is needed to bring about true coexistence among these communities. There was agreement among all participants that coexistence was possible but certain conditions were imposed. The notions of justice versus peace came up frequently. The majority of diaspora Bavibafuliru viewed justice as more important than having what most described as an “unrealistic” peace or reconciliation process. Five participants expressed their views that they want to see justice be done first before anything can happen. The next three participants believed coexistence is okay only if the Easters DRC Tutsis accept that they are Rwandans. The last and the ninth participant suggested that in order for the two communities to coexist, there is need for reconciliation or some form of dialogue between the two groups.

Diaspora Bavibafuliru who emphasized the concept of justice, echoed the following sentiments: “At best, co-existence can be done only by telling the truth, and
only true facts to have justice for everyone. For example, how would American people like their government to deal with illegal immigrants in order to make things right?” (P1). Another participant suggested that justice be done but through reconciliation procedures; here is how he framed his views: “The South African model of Truth and Reconciliation could be a model to try with our people. However, as there is doubt of dishonesty, I do not think that the forced forgiveness that the commission will impose Tutsis to demand to Bavibafurui would be genuine. It is also assuring if there might be a tribunal set to deal with cases of gross human rights abuses, economic crimes and crimes against humanity. This will define the new era, where the culture of democracy and human rights will pave the way for reconciliation as impunity will be ended” (P4).

Another participant expressed justice in the form of government involvement. “First of all the law of the Congo should be able to guarantee justice by instituting laws and policies that will challenge impunity. No one or tribal, ethnic or government can be above the law; it is imperative to set up the law or policies that are based on democratic principles. We are all judged by the law when we are wrong and in every conflict where there is wrongdoing, I thing the democratic law has to deal with it. It will be very difficult if government will forsake its responsibility and think ordinary people will take care of all the problems” (P6).

The diaspora Bavibafurui who suggested that Eastern DRC Tutsis must accept that they are Rwandans before coexistence can take place had different opinions. Here is how one participant put it: “Tutsis must know that they can live in Uvira until Jesus comes; for
one condition, to acknowledge that there are Rwandans. We don’t care if they call
themselves Congolese or Rwandan Congolese, but we don’t want them to call themselves
banyamulenge” (P5).

As far as reconciliation goes to address the issue of coexistence, P7 had framed
the issue this way: “Tutsi need to create their own traditional local system, (not political
authority) for leading peace by basic method in local area or village. e.g create a platform
of dialogue between bagingi (for the Bavibafuliru) and bachingandahe (for the
banyarwanda)” (P7). Note that “Bangingi” are traditional elders of the Bavibafuliru who
deal with community dispute resolution while ‘bachingandahe’ are also traditional
leaders for Eastern DRC Tutsis who engage in dispute resolution in their communities.
Another participant said this with regard to the same issue: “It is only and only through
negotiation and dialogue toward reconciliation that we can get more light. Let us give
them some religious teachings, and then one will recognize how to value his neighbor
rather than himself” (P2).

I linked the question addressing coexistence by asking diaspora Bavibafuliru
participants their views about forgiveness between the Bavibafuliru and Eastern DRC
Tutsis. We did not define to participants what we meant by “forgiveness,” but asked them
if the Eastern DRC Tutsis asked for forgiveness, who do they think would have to initiate
this process. We gave them five choices: a) National leaders, b) Local leaders, c)
Ordinary individuals, d) Church leaders, and e) None of the above.
Two participants of nine agreed that national leaders would have to initiate the forgiveness process, two others thought it is important to have local leaders get involved; one said ordinary individuals should do it, and another acknowledged that church leaders have a role to play in the process. Three other participants indicated none of the choices we provided were legitimate figures to initiate the process, and said none of these individuals should do it. It is clear that the diaspora Bavibafuliru participants were widely divided over who should be the initiator of forgiveness. This leads me to believe that the issue of forgiveness is complex and needs thorough examination and clear consideration before a process is put in place. This could become another area of concern, as there is no clear indication what people really want done regarding the issue of forgiveness. For the second phase of this study, I will try to more clearly explain to the respondents what I mean by forgiveness and seek to understand what forgiveness means for them. Then ask people what they think about the diversity of opinions from participants about the issue of forgiveness.

5.1.3.3 Addressing the concern of sharing territory

After reconciliation or forgiveness takes place, groups attempt to coexist once again. I asked diaspora Bavibafuliru participants whether they were willing to share their territory with the Eastern DRC Tutsis assuming that at least some form of living together would take place after reconciliation and forgiveness. Again, I did not define what I meant by “sharing territory,” I wanted to explore the concept and how participants understood this topic. It is clear from the responses that participants had different
understandings of “sharing territory.” Six participants expressed that they did not want to share their territory with the Eastern DRC Tutsis, while three others did not see this as a problem. P1 said this when asked if he wanted to share his territory with the Eastern DRC Tutsis: “My answer is no! There is no citizen anywhere who would like to share his territory with illegal immigrants particularly after the latter have raped, tortured, killed my fellow innocent citizens and caused the country to be occupied by foreign troops to the detriment of native citizens.” One can see in the reaction of P1 a person who is viewing the other group as evil, an enemy to be destroyed. Those (Eastern DRC Tutsis) who have “killed my fellow innocent citizens” according to P1 are our enemies, they are bad people; P1 however in my understanding sees members of his own community (Bavibafuliru) as good people.

P3 also said this when we asked him if he was willing to share his territory with Eastern DRC Tutsis: “No, because they did not want to share territory with me by exterminating my family, my people and by looting my goods and destroying my properties. No cohabitation without justice.” P4 added: “Sharing, NO! But, I agree that every world citizen has the right to reside where he/she wants provided he/she is allowed by the law to do so. I am not opposed to the Tutsis to live and work in Uvira but they should be banned from exercising political activities and to some administrative positions that should be rightfully allocated to Bavibafuliru.” P4’s answer brought up very important issues of power. In a way, P4 was saying he did not want people from the out-group to be leading those of the in-group. Bavibafuliru should lead themselves. P5 said: “Sharing what with who? No, No, No, We are peaceful, pacific community in Uvira.
Anyone is welcomed to Uvira, but not with ambitions like that of our friends Tutsis who occupied our land, and want to rule over us by calling themselves names that do not exist.” P5 see Eastern DRC Tutsis as occupiers of Bavibafuliru land.

This reinforces the notion that people who feel threatened by members of an out-group, a group that they do not belong to, are more likely to respond with aggression and violence to members of that out-group. P2 on the contrary said this: “Myself, I am ready hundred percent to share my territory with Eastern DRC Tutsis on condition they stay where they are, stay on the portion of land they have been given since long time ago. They must and cease to extend their borders to their neighbors’ land. They must remain where they are and not trying to forge and change the history of my country. The administrative map left by the Belgians our colonialists must remain with no change, no transformation. Second, demand the Tutsis to remove in mind the notion of International Conference of Berlin. And third, is it Congo only which has problem of Land? The Tutsis must also take off the name ‘Banyamulenge,’ they are not Banyamulenge; Mulenge is not their land and they must confess that this is the way they are trying to get our land in dishonesty. To tell you the truth there is no clan among Tutsis which can start with ‘banya.’ Banya is the way we Congolese refer our people with. They should find another name.” Not surprisingly, P2 brought up the issue of the border or boundaries between the territories separating the Bavibafuliru and Eastern DRC Tutsis. It is though curious to see that P2 is willing to share his territory with Eastern DRC Tutsis but does not want to be a neighbor to them. P2 wants to see some clear demarcation area between the two communities. Most of the time groups involved in conflicts are likely to create
boundaries between them. P6 agreed with P2 that Eastern DRC Tutsis could share Bavibafuliru territory: “Yes, I will be more than willing to share my territory with others provided our constitution justifies that through laws.” P7 also expressed a willingness to share territory with Eastern DRC Tutsis: “Yes, we always live together though there are problems; I don’t see why I shouldn’t live with them.”

5.1.3.4 Addressing the issue of community and professional leadership

As I asked diaspora Bavibafuliru participants if they want to share their territory with the neighbor group, I was curious to see if the Bavibafuliru and eastern DRC Tutsis would be willing to be ruled under a unified authority or would prefer different structures for the different communities. Interesting enough, the diaspora Bavibafuliru all agreed that the two communities should be ruled under one authority. Most importantly, some Bavibafuliru would prefer that they rule over the Banyamulenge. This is why P1 for instance sees the necessity for having one and only authority and not two. He found our question raising the issue of one ruler or two rulers to be irrelevant stating that these two communities do not have the same status. For P1, the Bavibafuliru are Congolese and the eastern DRC Tutsis are Rwandans. He questions the idea of having one authority insofar as these two groups have different legal statuses according to him. He even asked: “Under how many authorities should illegal immigrants and US citizens be ruled?” His
point was that under the local DRC system, foreigners and national citizens must not have the same privilege or the same rights.

P2 likewise strongly agreed that these two communities should be ruled under one authority but did not provide any explanation why he believed so. P4 agreed with P2 and P1 that these two groups should be ruled under a single authority and said they should be administered by the local leadership. Also, P5 agreed that the two communities must be ruled under one authority. He indicated that even if the Eastern DRC Tutsis are foreigners or whatever else, they must and should abide by the rules and regulations of the DRC and of the territory they live in, that is the territory of Uvira. P6 also agrees with the others that the two groups should be ruled under one authority, however that authority must bring sustainable peace he said. He added that there must be a democratically decided system of authority. It could be federalism or something else but everyone should be equal before the law. P7 concurs with the previous participants and does not want the two groups to be ruled by different authorities. P7 said that particular arrangements could be viewed as balkanization, identifying this as a European and American idea. P7 did not want to see any solution being reached by outsiders. Foreigners should not tell the people of eastern DRC what to do. According to P7, people are responsible for solving their own trouble without any foreign intervention or solution.

Remember that the majority of diaspora Bavibafuliru participants do not want to share their territory with the Eastern DRC Tutsis, but want to have the two communities led by one authority, preferably a Bavibafuliru authority. This conflicting desires lead me to the following conclusions. Diaspora Bavibafuliru participants believe that though the
Eastern DRC Tutsis live in Mulenge, Bavibafuliru should nevertheless rule over Eastern DRC Tutsis because the Bavibafuliru have a legitimate claim over the land, while the Eastern DRC Tutsis are just occupiers of that land, they just live there, but the land belongs to someone else (Bavibafuliru). Therefore, according to the Bavibafuliru participants from the diaspora, there is a necessity for the Bavibafuliru to lead the Eastern DRC Tutsis.
6.1 Bavibafuliru Living in Eastern Congo

6.1.2 Possible Causes of the Conflict

6.1.2.1 Driving factor of the conflict between the Bavibafuliru and Eastern DRC Tutsis

Bavibafuliru participants living in the eastern Congo appeared to have some major differences with the diaspora Bavibafuliru over what they see is the driving factor of the conflict between them and the Eastern DRC Tutsis. D1 said that “the major factor of the conflict is due to the fact that the Bavibafuliru do not want the Eastern DRC Tutsis to occupy their land” D1. Recall that data from diaspora Bavibafuliru indicated that some considered Eastern DRC Tutsis as illegally occupying their land. D1 stated that “the Bavibafuliru allege that the Eastern DRC Tutsis have killed them during the war” D1. D2 indicated this instead “the driving factor of the conflict between these communities is linked to the immigration problem. The Eastern DRC Tutsis were first citizens of Rwanda. When they arrived in the DRC, they settled in the mountainous area and wanted to own the land they were living in, which of course belongs to the Bavibafuliru. Given this situation, the Bavibafuliru continue to remind the Eastern DRC Tutsis that they not
allowed to grab by force a piece of land that did not belong to them” D2. D2 continued further saying said that “the Bavibafuriru considered Eastern DRC Tutsis as foreigners from Rwanda and some continue to believe even today that they are foreigners and that they should go back to Rwanda” D2.

The claims by D2 reinforce beliefs that we found among diaspora Bavibafuriru. Most believed the DRC Eastern Tutsis are foreigners of Rwandan origin. D2 continued to state that “the Eastern DRC Tutsis practice of calling themselves Banyamulenge angered Bavibafuriru, because they thought it was inappropriate for the Eastern DRC Tutsis to give themselves a name that they took after an area that belong to the Bavibafuriru” D2. D2 said that this really caused the eruption of the conflict between the two communities – in other words, the conflict started over a name of a people.

6.1.2.2 Ethnic hatred: Feelings of enmity and mistrust between the Bavibafuriru and the Eastern DRC Tutsis

Again, like the diaspora Bavibafuriru, in-country Bavibafuriru admitted that feelings of enmity exist between the Bavibafuriru and the Eastern DRC Tutsis. D1 said that “Eastern DRC Tutsis want to occupy the land of the Bavibafuriru and impose this attempt to impose their will in an area that belongs to the Bavibafuriru is what has caused the enmity” D1. Therefore, the Bavibafuriru “killed the Banyamulenge and hatred took another dimension between the communities; members of the two tribes killed each other” D1. D1 went further “I remember when some Bavibafuriru Mai Mai militias killed
the eastern DRC Tutsis and cut their heads while putting them on an array and walked with the strangled head in the streets” D1. D2 said that “hate became a matter of concern when the war started in eastern Congo. The war started in the Bavibafuliru area, and they accused the Eastern DRC Tutsis of killing their innocent populations” D2. D2 said “you know when there is war people lose their family members, their belongings, houses. Some become refugees and with that hate spark all over the people affected by the conflicts” D2. Again killings are mentioned over and over by both diaspora and Bavibafuliru participants. Scholars have argued that people who experience killings are unlikely to forgive or reconcile with the perpetrators of the killings. For instance Daniel Serwer and Patricia Thomson believe that “many in society emerging from conflict care little to be reconciled with those who killed, tortured, or maimed their families and friends or who tolerated or supported the cruelty” (Crocker, Chester, Hampson & Aall 2007, p. 376).

6.1.2.3 Territory: Is territorial dispute a concern between the Bavibafuliru and Eastern DRC Tutsis? Is the presence of Eastern DRC Tutsis in Mulenge a problem?

I asked in-country Bavibafuliru if the presence of Eastern DRC Tutsis in Mulenge was a concern or if there was any territorial dispute. D1 said that “yes it was a problem because the majority of people who live in Mulenge are Eastern DRC Tutsis and this does not make the Bavibafuliru happy. The Bavibafuliru have major concerns about that but have nothing to do about it because the Eastern DRC Tutsis are the ones who
continue to live there”. D1

D2 agreed that territorial disputes are a problem. Here is what D2 said regarding the land issue: “The Eastern DRC Tutsis are cattle owners, they have cattle while the Bavibafuliru are farmers; they cultivate land.” D2 said that “there are times when Eastern DRC Tutsis’ cattle destroy Bavibafuliru farms and this creates conflict between them. But he said that the conflict is mostly about the land’s occupation, and not if people want to live together in the same territory, I am certain they can live together” D2. Again, claims by D2 reinforce the idea found among diaspora Bavibafuliru who believe that Eastern DRC Tutsis occupy their land and whose concern is that Eastern DRC Tutsis do not call Mulenge their land or consider it their territory.

6.1.2.4 Identity: Social identity related to citizenship

Given that the status of the Eastern DRC Tutsis in Congo is viewed by the Bavibafuliru in different ways, I asked Bavibafuliru respondents living in the eastern Congo to tell me their views about the issue of the citizenship status of the Eastern DRC Tutsis. I gave them 5 choices to pick from a) Banyamulenge, b) Banyarwanda, c) Foreigners, d) Congo Easterners, e) None of the above. D1 said that “the Eastern DRC Tutsis are Banyamulenge Congolese because they have been living in Mulenge for decades” D1. D2 like F1 also said that “Eastern DRC Tutsis are Banyamulenge Congolese because they have lived in Congo for half a century” D2. These views differ sharply from those expressed by diaspora Bavibafuliru. All of the diaspora Bavibafuliru
said that Eastern DRC Tutsis were Rwandans or foreigners. We will explore these differences in the next chapter under discussion with regards to the citizenship or identity of the Eastern DRC Tutsis.

6.1.3 Possible solutions

6.13.1 Addressing the healing for Ethnic hatred

When I asked in-country Bavibafuliru what can be done to address the enmity between Bavibafuliru and Eastern DRC Tutsis, D1 said that “Eastern DRC Tutsis must accept to live with other tribes in Mulenge because they are isolated from the rest of the people. They choose to live just by themselves” D1. D2 said that “in order to bring the two communities together, people from both sides must forget what happened in the past and all the atrocities that took place. Then, they can sit together and discuss all the problems that separate them; discuss all the issues that divide them” D2. Again, we can see the difference in views between the Bavibafuliru participants from the diaspora and the Bavibafuliru living in eastern Congo. At the same time as in-country Bavibafuliru are advocating for reconciliation, the majority of diaspora Bavibafuliru participants see no reason to talk about healing. They say that you cannot find healing with foreigners. Also, other Bavibafuliru participants from the diaspora posed some condition before healing can take place. They want the Eastern DRC Tutsis to apologize first before healing can occur. Only one participant from the diaspora admitted that healing was necessary.
6.1.3.2 Addressing coexistence

I asked in-country Bavibafuliru what they think can be done to bring the Bavibafuliru and the Eastern DRC Tutsis together if coexistence continues to be a serious matter of concern. D1 stated that “sharing power between the Bavibafuliru and the Eastern DRC Tutsis could really address some of the problems. This power-sharing must be at the local, regional and national level” D1. D2 said “to resolve the issue of coexistence is easy. All you need to do is to ask the Eastern DRC Tutsis to show some patriotism to the DRC and forget about Rwanda” D2. D2 continued saying that “the Eastern DRC Tutsis value Rwanda more than the DRC that welcomed them when they were in trouble. Now it is time for them to show us that they like the DRC” D2.

Coexistence also seemed achievable in the view of diaspora Bavibafuliru, but what differs is what each understands what coexistence should look like.

Diaspora Bavibafuliru participants for instance pose certain conditions for the coexistence to take place such as the Eastern DRC Tutsis must not claim that the territory of Mulenge is theirs. Some also want to Eastern DRC Tutsis to apologize first before any coexistence can occur. Unlike their counterparts from the diaspora, the Bavibafuliru living in the eastern Congo suggest solutions such as power-sharing between the two communities or the pledge of allegiance to the DRC by the Eastern DRC Tutsis.

6.1.3.3 Addressing the concern of sharing territory

I asked Bavibafuliru participants living in the eastern DRC whether they were willing to share their territory with the Eastern DRC Tutsis. Like for the other
participants, we did not define what we meant by sharing territory. We wanted to see how participants understood and viewed that question. D1 said that “the Eastern DRC Tutsis have been living alone in Mulenge for a long time and that it is time for them to live together with the Bavibafuliru so that all the conflicts can be addressed together” D1. D2 said that “it is vital to share the territory because for now we must change our mentality of always calling the Eastern DRC Tutsis foreigners; I think this must change. If a people have the right to live where they wants that okay but that people must respect the life conditions of area where they live” D2. Even for this point of sharing territory there is a huge disparity between the diapora and those living in-country. The majority of the Bavibafuliru participants from the diaspora did not want to share their territory with Eastern DRC Tutsis in contrast with those who live in-country who see the necessity of living together while sharing the same space.

6.1.3.4 Addressing the issue of community and professional leadership

As I asked in-country Bavibafuliru participants whether they would like that live under one authority or have different structures for the individual communities. D1 said that” the Eastern DRC Tutsis must have their chief who must lead or rule them.” Like D1, D2 also agreed that the Eastern DRC Tutsis need to have their own leader. D2 stated that “it could be better if the Eastern DRC Tutsis are also ruled by their own chief.” Regarding the notion of leadership and how these communities must be governed, there is a major difference again in views between the diaspora and those living in-country. All of the diaspora Bavibafuliru participants believe that the two communities must be ruled under one authority, and obviously the Bavibafuliru must rule the Eastern DRC Tutsis.
However, the majority of Bavibafuliru participants living in-country see the necessity of having each community be led by its own people. Unlike folks in the diaspora, those in-country agree that the Eastern DRC Tutsis should also have their own traditional chief or leader.
Eastern DRC Tutsis that participated in this project all lived in the eastern Congo. These in-country Eastern DRC Tutsis had almost the same narrative about what was the driving factor of the conflict between them and the Bavibafuriru. When I asked F1 what was the driving factor of the conflict between the Bavibafuriru and the Eastern DRC Tutsis, he stated that “the issue of identity was the primary problem”. F1 said that “the Bavibafuriru do not recognize Eastern DRC Tutsis as Congolese although Eastern DRC Tutsis want to confirm themselves as Congolese.” F1 went further, saying that: “Our fathers were born in the DRC, why can other tribes mistake us with the Burundians and Rwandans?” F1 also realized that “there were some other secondary problems such as land possession or dispute, problems of power and economic distribution”. But, as the response from F1 indicates, one could automatically realize that the issues of citizenship and land/territory have been common themes raised by all of the participants of this study.
Respondent F2 said this: “The driving factor of the conflict is complex because there is a lot in it. First of all, there is an economic aspect of things. The Eastern DRC Tutsis were considered by the Bavibafulitu to be rich and were envied by other tribes. The Bavibafuliru also wanted the wealth and desired to be rich as the Eastern DRC Tutsis who are the cattle owners.” F2 went on to say that “the other problem is political: Most Bavifuliru and the Eastern DRC Tutsis did not have a decent education. Therefore, politicians who had some education could easily manipulate the populations for their own interests” F2. F3 sees the driving factors of the conflict between the two communities are multiples. F3 sees bad governance by the DRC government as the major problem. According to F3, “if there were some regulations imposed by the government with regard to land in the country, there would not be any issue related to land dispute between our communities” F3. F3 said that “if the government properly intervened and took measures to work with the Bavibafuliru on the issue they would not have any problem.” For F3, “the DRC has enough space to accommodate each and every community; therefore if there were government regulations on land, people would not resort to violence” F3.

F3 sees wealth and access to economic advantages as a second set of issues driving the conflict. F3 said that “Eastern DRC Tutsis were economically advantaged over Bavibafuliru before 1960. This created some envy on the part of the Bavibafuliru who wanted to become like Eastern DRC Tutsis; the economic disparities created conflicts among us as well.” Third, F3 said that” the Eastern DRC Tutsis occupied the haut plateaus, but these haut plateaus were administered by the Bamis (kings) of the Bavibafuliru”. F3 says that “the issue was exploited by politicians who in turn started to
use the presence of the Eastern DRC Tutsis in the plateaus as something they politically benefited from by inciting hatred.” With regards to this, F3 said “the Eastern DRC Tutsis started to look for some kind of autonomous administration but were stopped and blocked by Bavibafuruliru politicians.”

7.1.1.3 Ethnic hatred: Feeling of enmity and mistrust between Bavibafuruliru and Eastern DRC Tutsis

Almost all the eastern DRC Tutsis participants living in the eastern DRC agreed that the feeling of enmity exists between the Bavibafuruliru and the Eastern DRC Tutsis, like all other prior participants. F1 said this about hatred that exists between the two communities: “Hate is manifested because there was a violent conflict between the Bavibafuruliru and the Eastern DRC Tutsis. Eastern DRC Tutsis and the Bavibafuruliru have killed each other. Therefore, this led to ethnic divisions, which intensified hate between us.” F1 continued by saying that “there was also loss of property, assets, and people’s livelihood such as cows. This also contributed to hate of one toward the other that we see between people.” F3 also indicated that “hatred exists between the Eastern DRC Tutsis and the Bavibafuruliru; members of the two communities have killed one another. People continue to have memories of their loved ones who died or disappeared”. F3 also said that “hate is also accompanied by jealousy. However, hate between our communities can end if there were credible authorities to help resolve the problems”. Claims by the Eastern DRC Tutsis regarding killings between the communities, reinforces the same idea
identified by Bavibafuliru participants, who identified the killing of civilians to be the driving factor of the conflict between the Bavibafuliru and Eastern DRC Tutsis.

Here is what F2 said about ethnic hatred: “Hate is there because there is politics of divisions among the two communities. Leaders from each tribe try to demonize the other. We have seen politicians who devise and manipulate the people with words. For instance, some leaders seeking office on the Bavibafuliru side have asked people in their constituency to vote for them promising that once elected they will send back the Eastern DRC Tutsis to Rwanda.” F2 said that “this is used as another way to rich out to voters. Today even educated people lack the sense of being skeptical but act negatively against the Eastern DRC Tutsis without any distinction.”

7.1.1.4 Territory: Is territorial dispute a concern between the Bavibafuliru and Eastern DRC Tutsis? Is the presence of eastern DRC Tutsis in Mulenge a problem?

When asked this question, F1 said that the presence of the eastern DRC Tutsis in Mulenge is not a problem: “I know that the land belongs to the Bavibafuliru. There were some territories that were partitioned and it is in those territories that the eastern DRC Tutsis live. However, the Bavira claim that Bijombo is their land, the Bafuliiru also say that they cannot give up Rurambo and Mulenge because these territories where eastern DRC Tutsis live in belong to them.” F1 continued further “You also have the Babembe who claim Minembwe to be their land. Despite all these claims, the presence of the Eastern DRC Tutsis in these territories does not happen to be the major concern though
there is still some conflict related to land”. F1 said that “What the Bavibafuliru want is that the eastern DRC Tutsis live in their territories but they must depend on them. The Bavibafuliru say that they must control the eastern DRC Tutsis.” F3 said that “the presence of Eastern DRC Tutsis in Mulenge was not a problem, but the issue was politicized by the Bavibafuliru politicians who continue to manipulate the populations for their own interests.

These claims from F3 go hand in hand with what we discovered from the Bavibafuliru participants in the diaspora. Remember the Bavibafuliru participants from the diaspora said that the presence of the Eastern DRC Tutsis in Mulenge was not a problem. But when asked if they would prefer to be ruled under one authority, diaspora Bavibafuliru wanted one authority but that authority must be under the control of the Bavibafuliru because they believe the Eastern DRC Tutsis occupy their land, meaning that they live in their territory.

F2 also agrees with F1 that territorial dispute happens but is not the most important issue. F2 said that “the land issue does not appear to be the problem: Whoever has the money can buy a property in Mulenge.” However, F2 said that: “I also acknowledge that there are some problems with land in some parts like in the Bashalamba territory in the Fizi area of the Babembe.”

7.1.1.5 Identity: Social identity related to citizenship

Given that the status of the Eastern DRC Tutsis in Congo is viewed by the Bavibafuliru in different ways, I asked Eastern DRC Tutsis respondents living in the
eastern Congo to tell me their views regarding the citizenship of the Eastern DRC Tutsis. We gave them 5 choices; three are commonly used by people in the DRC and elsewhere. The following are the choices I picked: a) Banyamulenge, b) Banyarwanda, c) Foreigners, d) Congo Easterners, and finally e) None of the above. F1 said that “the Eastern DRC Tutsis are Banyamulenge Congolese”. F2 like F1 also said that “Eastern DRC Tutsis are Banyamulenge Congolese”. He added saying that “it is not up to the Eastern DRC Tutsis to say who they want to be called but history can tell itself that they are Congolese.” F3 also said this about this issue of citizenship: “Eastern DRC Tutsis are to be called Banyamulenge, period.” We are Banyamulenge Congolese; that means Banyamulenge as a tribe and Congolese as our citizenship. The Bavibafuliru must know that no matter what. We are Banyamulenge and that will never change whether they like it or not. I repeat it again; the identity of Banyamulenge will never change.” F3 added that “The Bavibafuliru are engaged in a battle that is not necessary; they will never win this battle, we are just Banyamulenge and that is it.”

This is where there are major disparities between the Eastern DRC Tutsis and especially the diaspora Bavibafuliru participants who view them as foreigners and say that they are Rwandans. It is clear that the Eastern DRC Tutsis however view themselves as Congolese like any other tribe living in the Congo. We will again explore this issue of citizenship in our discussion going deeper analyzing each side’s claims.

7.1.2 Possible solutions

7.1.2.1 Addressing the healing of ethnic hatred
When I asked Eastern DRC Tutsis living in the DRC what can be done to address enmity between the Bavibafuliru and the Eastern DRC Tutsis, here is what F1 said: “The hate in the present time does not appear to be the major problem. Now we have a political problem. The Eastern DRC Tutsis want also to have a territory, a circumscription. If this happens it means when the Eastern DRC have their territory, they can elect their representatives to the senate and parliament.” F1 stated that “What the Eastern DRC Tutsis want is autonomy; they want that the territory they live in now be recognized as an autonomous area to them although they live in the territory of Bavibafuliru. The Eastern DRC Tutsis must have their own territory so that they can be represented locally, at the provincial level, and at the national level. That’s what I think could reduce tensions.” F2 said that “to address the issue of hate it is necessary to initiate talks between members of the two communities; I mean the Eastern DRC Tutsis and the Bavibafuliru. I only see talks to be the only way that can get us out of these problems.”
F3 said that to address the problem of hate, there will be need to have good governance: “I know people don’t want us to be called Banyamulenge, but that’s what we are. Whatever what happens, whatever what the Bavibafuliru do, they will never get rid of that name. If the issue of governance is addressed, that means people are ruled by good leaders, the problem we are facing now can be addressed. But today everyone does what one wants because they are no rulers to lead the people.”

7.1.2.2 Addressing coexistence
I asked Eastern DRC Tutsis participants living in the eastern Congo what they think can be done to bring the Bavibafuliru and the Eastern DRC Tutsis together if coexistence continues to be a serious matter of concern. Here is what F1 said about this issue: “Today Eastern DRC Tutsis and the Bavibafuliru coexist peacefully except for the extremists. In general these two communities live at peace today. If the issue of autonomy for the Eastern DRC Tutsis is addressed, it could resolve the problems.” F1 continued by saying that “the strategy that should be used in order to push through autonomy to the Eastern DRC Tutsis is a campaign to mobilize Bavibafuliru to accept that autonomy. If that is not done, then the issue of autonomy could be complicated to solve.”

F2 said that “coexistence is necessary but there is need for a strong leadership: If there are leaders who are willing to work for the interests of the communities, thing can turn better. Leaders must be in a position to mobilize their people on both sides and convince them that talks must be held to address their differences at the local, provincial and national level.” F3 sees that the issue of coexistence is manipulated. He said that: “The hatred that we see today exists because like I mentioned before, there are no regulations in our society. If each and every one of us had rights we could have respected one another. But that is not the case; some are discriminated against. First of all let resolve the issue of bad governance of our people, then we will resolve this issue easily.”

7.1.2.3 Addressing the concern of sharing territory
I asked Eastern DRC Tutsi participants living in the eastern Congo if they were willing to share their territory with the Bavibafuliru. Again, I did not define what I meant by “sharing territory,” but wanted to explore how participants understood this topic. Here is what F1 said: “There is no problem to live in the same territory with the Bavibafuliru, but it is also important and necessary that the Eastern DRC Tutsis also have their territory.” F2 agreed with F1 on this issue. F2 said that “the Eastern DRC Tutsis and the Bavibafuliru presently live together side by side, saying: The biggest threat that we continue to face is the politicians.” F3 said also said that “there was no problem of sharing the territory with others. But F3 mentioned that “the Eastern DRC Tutsis do not have a territory: In the haut plateaus where we live, they are other tribes who also live there. I mean the Bavibafuliru live there too. In what concerns sharing a territory, the Congolese law allows each citizen to live in any place they wish within the country’s boundaries. Therefore, there is no problem to share a territory with other tribes. It is their land because the Banyamulenge do not have a territory.”

F3 added that “what is problematic with the issue of territory is that when our children are born, they are not registered because we don’t have an administration where we live. Even marriages in the haut plateaus are not registered. The only marriages that are recognized there are religious weddings.” F3 said that “the only marriages that are recognized in the haut plateaus are those that are religious and those who go to Uvira to get registered. How logical is that? We have to travel kilometers away just to have our children registered.” F3’s claims show that he recognizes that the territory Eastern DRC Tutsis live in is the land of the Bavibafuliru but at the same time also wants some kinds
of autonomy too. This is one of the concerns that diaspora Bavibafuliru participants raised repeatedly. We shall also address this issue in our discussion later.

7.1.2.4 Addressing the issue of community and professional leadership

I was curious to understand if the Eastern DRC Tutsis participants would prefer to be ruled through a single authority or have different structures for each community. The reason for this is that I remember when I lived in the region before the 1996 war started, the issue of who should rule over Mulenge was brought up all the time by leaders in the Uvira zone where I used to stay, especially the other side of Kiliba. Because I was very young, I did not understand why people would fight over who should rule what. It was with that memory of my childhood that I wanted now to understand issues related to the rule of a territory. Here is what F1 said: “I understand that centralization of power is important. Though the Eastern DRC Tutsis and the Bavibafuliru must be ruled under one authority at the provincial level, each community must have its autonomous territory led by its people.” F1 continued saying that “if the central government in Kinshasa gets involved in the issue of the Eastern DRC Tutsis autonomy, it can be done: However, the problem is that Kinshasa does not invest its time in this problem. Kinshasa does not do anything about it.” Regarding this issue, F2 said: “It all depends on the size of the area we are talking about. For instance, in order for the Eastern DRC Tutsis to travel from the ‘Haut Plateaus’, the upper plateaus where they live to go to Uvira in the Bavibafuliru area to deal with administrative issues or papers, there is a distance of about 200 km (124
miles).” F2 said that “the Eastern DRC Tutsis need some kind of own administration too. Can you imagine that a kid who is born in Mulenge must go to Uvira to get registered?

This shows that the Eastern DRC Tutsis must have their own administration that can help them deal with local issues that they face in their everyday life instead of turning toward the administration that is far from where they live.” F2 went further “I don’t mind if those running the administration in the in the Eastern DRC Tutsis territory are from other tribes. They can for sure be from other tribes but an established administration for the Eastern DRC Tutsis is necessary.” F3 says that “being ruled by one authority is not the issue; but said that all depends on how much space is available and the number of people who live in that territory: If there is a big concentration of people in one area and there is a territory that is not used why not use the area which is inhabited?” F3 continued by suggesting that “if an authority living in one territory has no access to the neighboring territory, there should be some mechanism allowing the territory which has no authority to also have an authority: That’s the case of the eastern DRC Tutsis; they should also have an authority who must administer the area they live in.”
8.1 Overview
In this chapter, I will compare my data to a number of theoretical frameworks concerning social, ethnic, and identity conflicts to explain the group dynamics of the rivalries between the Bavibafuliru and the Eastern DRC Tutsis. I will then suggest some preliminary recommendations regarding theoretical approaches and intervention strategies that address the ongoing internal conflict between the two communities. These preliminary recommendations are based on the current data I have collected; a more comprehensive framework for intervention will be the focus of the second phase of the study. My study found several recurrent themes in both communities. It is my belief that addressing the social identity issues must be of paramount importance in dealing with the ongoing conflict.

Both groups have expressed concerns over issues related to citizenship, land or territorial appropriation, killings, and power. As I explore the issue of rivalry between the Bavibafuliru and Eastern DRC Tutsis, I find that all the participants in this study were in agreement that there exists enmity between them. Without this conclusion from participants, my study would have been probably invalid or even unnecessary. The participants’ answers confirmed my own initial approach to the problem, which was that
rivalries between the communities were a problem. I believed enmity was of concern and I tried to understand the reason behind that enmity so that I could comprehend the dynamics of the conflict.

I involved the diaspora Bavibafuliru and the Bavibafuliru living in the eastern Congo in the “plaine de la Ruzizi” - the area where the conflict I am studying takes place. Then I also involved the Eastern DRC Tutsis who also live in the same area. One of the limitations of this study is that I fell short in sampling because I did not find the Eastern DRC Tutsis living in the diaspora to participate in the study. I was lucky enough to identify an online network of diaspora Bavibafuliru but unfortunately did not manage to have access to such a diaspora social network for the Eastern DRC Tutsis. This is going to be done in future research that I will carry out as part two of this project.

8.2 Theory explanation

The findings of this study suggest that participants were in agreement that there was rivalry between Bavibafuliru and Eastern DRC Tutsis. As I defined rivalry at the beginning, it involves enmity, mistrust, and competition that creates conflict between communities. In regards to the driving factor of this conflict, my exploration found participants from both groups overwhelmingly indicated that killings were in fact the driving factor that fueled the conflict. I understand that this perception was emotional in nature on both sides. Part of this is because when killings get involved in a conflict, people feel that they lose their loved ones whom they obviously value most. However,
moving beyond this most immediate cause, it seems clear that before the killings occurred, there were issues that divided these two groups and in fact lead to the violence.

The in-group/out-group dynamics in this study are explained by the fact that one groups (the Eastern DRC Tutsis) is viewed by the other (Bavibafuliru) as foreign, not native of the country. These “foreigners” are seen as living on a land of another group. Therefore, the dynamic is as follows: The Bavibafuliru view Eastern DRC Tutsis as occupiers of their land. The next thing that happens here is that the Bavibafuliru claim the land in which the Eastern DRC Tutsis live, and want to have control over it, for fear that if they do not, the “occupiers” will someday usurp their claims to the land. Bavibafuliru fear of losing Mulenge (the territory in which they Eastern DRC Tutsis live) makes them to insist that Mulenge does not belong to Eastern DRC Tutsis. This fact can be seen in the denial of Bavibafuliru in the diaspora to recognize the name of Eastern DRC Tutsis as “Banyamulenge,” which literally translated as inhabitants Mulenge.

Bavibafuliru in the diaspora fear that if they accept the name Banyamulenge for Eastern DRC Tutsis, it will be interpreted as legitimizing Eastern DRC Tutsis as the owners of the land (Mulenge). Therefore, Bavibafuliru in the diaspora exhibit resistance toward accepting the name Banyamulenge, for fear of this would precipitate their losing of what they consider their birth right (Mulenge).

The above attitude from the diaspora Bavibafuliru is consistent with Fuhrmann and Tir’s claims. They claim that cases involving territorial dimensions lead to potential conflict when both parties claim legitimacy of ownership over a piece of land. According to Fuhrmann and Tir: “The practical problem, however, is that the ethnic group’s
homeland often overlaps with the homeland of one or more neighboring groups…The
groups see little room for compromise over this land; it is not something that can be
divided, shared, or substituted for with” (Fuhrmann and Tir 2009, p. 5). Furhman and
Tir’s argument takes me to the next step of this discussion. When I asked participants if
there we willing to share their territory with Eastern DRC Tutsis, the majority of the
diaspora Bavibafuliru participants said they were not willing. The demonization of one
group by another was thereby demonstrated. Bavibafuliru participants from the diaspora
do not agree that it is right to call Eastern DRC Tutsis “Banyamulenge.” Participants
claim that Mulenge is Bavibafuliru territory; they view Eastern DRC Tutsis as foreigners
or “Banyarwanda.” It is also important to mention that at least some diaspora
Bavibafuliru participants were able to envision Eastern DRC Tutsis live on Bavibafuliru
territory, though they still seem resistant to calling Eastern DRC Tutsis “Banyamulenge.”

8.3 Four C Model of Identity-Based Conflict

Before I go further in analyzing the conflict between the Bavibafuliru and the
Eastern DRC Tutsis, I can summarize what I have explored so far using the Four C model
of identity-based conflict to explain the dynamics of the conflict as seen and understood
by the diaspora Bavibafuliru. Karina Korostelina defines the Four Cs as comparison,
competition, confrontation, and counteraction (Korostelina 2007, p. 147).
FOUR C MODEL OF IDENTITY-BASED CONFLICT

Figure 1: Diagram showing the four C model of identity-based conflict:

Source: (Korostelina 2007, p. 147)
The Four Cs can be found throughout my analysis of the conflict. With regard to comparison, one can clearly see that both Bavibafuliru and Eastern DRC Tutsis use in-group favoritism and out-group hostility to compare members. For instance, diaspora Bavibafuliru view themselves as “true Congolese” when comparing themselves with Eastern DRC Tutsis, whom they label as “foreigners.” The attitude of “we are better than them” is seen among the Bavibafuliru. The us-versus-them concept clearly manifests itself between the two groups with one group saying “We are the Congolese, they are the foreigners.” This comparison has allowed one group (Bavibafuliru) to believe it has a legitimate right to own a land- “Mulenge” in the DRC while seeing the other group (Eastern DRC Tutsis) as foreign occupiers who have no rights whatsoever over the land.

The idea of competition, “the second C” is also found in how the participants of this study framed the conflict, particularly with regard to who has right to land. Each group claims ownership of Mulenge territory and each shows interest in ruling over it while showing loyalty to it. This divergence in perceived interests led to the third C – that is, confrontation. Korostelina believes that at this stage, each group asserts the universal truth of their own core values. The “ideologization of social identities” as both groups legitimize to themselves their claims to the disputed territory leads to what Korostelina calls “transforming conflicts of interest into moral confrontations between the virtuous Us and the demonized Other” (Korostelina 2007, p. 147). The diaspora Bavibafuliru certainly display the characteristic of seeing themselves as a virtuous Us as opposed to a demonized Other, “Eastern DRC Tutsis”. They say “We the Congolese must own this land, which belongs to our ancestors and to our country” while demonizing Eastern DRC
Tutsis as foreigners from Rwanda who must be deprived from owning the land that belongs to the DRC. Diaspora Bavibafuliru then go a step further with an attitude that can be read as, suggesting that Eastern DRC Tutsis should go and find land in their own country, Rwanda.

As the conflict of interests moves into a moral confrontation, it then takes on the final dimension of the fourth Cs – counteraction (the fourth c). This is where both parties want to keep their position and not surrender or compromise. It is in this regard that you see one group, in this case minority Eastern DRC Tutsis, being discriminated against by the majority (Bavibafuliru). This discrimination reached a tipping point, until Eastern DRC Tutsis could no longer take it and used violence to express their frustration against the Bavibafuliru. This violence was counteracted by the Bavibafuliru with additional violence. This led to killings between the groups. Korestelina suggests this dynamic could even lead to genocide – the extermination of members of one group so another group can stay alone at peace without facing any competition from members of the out-group.

8.4 Diapora and Conflict Reality in Homeland

With regard to claims by participants that killings were the driving factor of the conflict between the two groups, I linked this assessment to what normally happens when a society faces mass atrocities and crimes involving cruelty committed by one party to the other. Daniel Serwer and Patricia Thomson believe that “many in society emerging from conflict care little to be reconciled with those who killed, tortured, or maimed their
families and friends or who tolerated or supported the cruelty” (Crocker, Chester, Hampson & Aall 2007, p. 376). Looking at Serwer and Thomson’s hypothesis, you can realize why most of the Bavibafuliru living in the diaspora categorically opposed any notion of sharing territory with Eastern DRC Tutsis. The diaspora Bavibafuliru viewed the killings as dangerous and believed that the Eastern DRC Tutsis were their enemies. This led most of the Bavibafuliru from the diaspora to care less about reconciling with the Eastern DRC Tutsis. Here, for instance, is what P1 said when I asked if he wanted to share his territory with Eastern DRC Tutsis: “My answer is no! There is no citizen anywhere who would like to share his territory with illegal immigrants particularly after the latter have raped, tortured, killed my fellow innocent citizens and caused the country to be occupied by foreign troops to the detriment of native citizens”. P3 also said this when we asked him if he was willing to share his territory with Eastern DRC Tutsis: “No, because they did not want to share territory with me by exterminating my family, my people and by looting my goods and destroying my properties. No coexistence without justice.” You can certainly see that, as Serwer and Thomson suggest, people emerging from conflicts that involved killings are unlikely to care about reconciling with those they think have killed their loved ones.

There is a major difference however between diaspora Bavibafuliru and in-country Bavibaluliru with regard to sharing territory or reconciling with the Eastern DRC Tutsis. In-country Bavibafuliru were more accepting of and viewed more favorably the idea of sharing their territory and reconciling with Eastern DRC Tutsis than their diaspora counterparts. The reason for this is likely due to the realities on the ground at this point in
time. There are new kinds of interactions that take place today between Bavibafuliru and Eastern DRC Tutsis in country that diaspora Bavibafuliru do not experience. During my research, I found that there is some kind of coexistence taking place on the ground with both communities. I was assured by both Bavibafuliru and Eastern DRC Tutsis living in eastern Congo that communal dialogue between leaders and ordinary people has been taking place recently. There have been workshops, communal meetings, other gatherings to promote reconciliation and coexistence. However, these efforts are not known or seen by diaspora Bavibafuliru. Therefore, diaspora Bavibafuliru tend to have the old stories of the conflict that they experienced before they left the country and have no understanding of the transformation that is taking place between these communities on the ground. The diaspora Bavibafuliru appeared to have frozen memories of past events and provided their answers based on the past and not based what is actually happening or currently taking place on the ground. The frozen memories are the result of being disconnected from the reality on the ground. Bavibafuliru from the diaspora have a new identity overseas which comes with mixed feelings and a new understanding of who they are. The diaspora thinks it understands the issues better, it is educated and well informed by international media about what is going on in their homeland. This phenomenon creates a new class of people, whom I describe as disconnected, idealists, and uncompromised.

This attitude manifested among the diaspora Bavibafuliru is not new. It is a phenomenon that has been well researched. Individuals living abroad as a result of conflict typically tend to become disconnected from the reality of things taking place in their homeland. These diaspora populations can in fact miss out on new developments in
their homeland, as many do not visit following their relocation to Europe, the Americas, Australia, and other country that hosts refugees.

While conducting his research on the Ethiopian diaspora in the US, Terrence Lyons, a professor at the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (S-CAR), at George Mason University said the following:

As the years pass, diaspora groups are likely to be increasingly distant from homeland events. Stories are told and retold, sometimes freezing images in the past and making it difficult to incorporate new information that may be from untrusted sources. As with refugees, ‘self-identity is anchored more to who she or he was than what she or he has become.’ At the same time, however, those abroad may have a more informed perspective on such critical issues as the likelihood that a major outside power will intervene or international institution condemn a regime (Lyons 2007, p. 533,).

Lyons’ description of Ethiopians in the US has distinct similarities with the diaspora Bavibafuliru. As new events are developing in their homeland, diaspora Bavibafuliru appear to be distant from changes. Therefore, they retell stories of the past which have not been informed by the experience of more current events that have started to shape new identities and create understanding between Bavibafuliru and Eastern DRC Tutsis living in country.

Diaspora Bavibafuliru’s disconnect with the realities in country lead to a certain kind of analysis of events that some might view as radical, insofar as it shows no signs of wanting to compromise on issues such as reconciliation and coexistence. Lyons describes this phenomenon as follows: “In some cases, diaspora groups produced by a specific set of traumatic memories create ‘conflict-generated diasporas’ that sustain and often amplify their strong sense of symbolic attachment to the homeland” (Lyons. 2007 p.
Lyons continued by saying that “Conflict-generated diasporas tend to be less willing to compromise and therefore reinforce and exacerbate the protractedness of homeland conflicts” (Lyons 2007, p. 530).

Coleman believes that the potential issues that lead to intractability in internal rivalries include resources, values, power, social identity, inequalities or basic human needs (Pence 2003, p.3). I have also identified rivalry between Bavibafuliru and Eastern DRC Tutsis as linked to power. There is discord between the people from these two communities not only related to who should own the land, but also over who should rule over the other. My data indicate that Eastern DRC Tutsis want some kind of autonomy. They want to have their own territory that they can also control and have authority over. However, the Bavibafuliru are opposed to such a move. Bavibafuliru believe that the land currently occupied by Eastern DRC Tutsis belongs to them, and through this legitimize claims that they should be the ones controlling that land. Thus, they must also rule over the Eastern DRC Tutsis. This view was repeated most often by diaspora Bavibafuliru. In-country Bavibafuliru were somewhat more open to letting Eastern DRC Tutsis have their own territory and have a leader of their own if they wished. Nevertheless, issue of land seems to be dominant. For instance, diaspora Bavibafuliru do not want to Eastern DRC Tutsis to be called Banyamuleng because they see Mulenge as their land. They don’t want to see people they identify as foreigners to self-declare themselves using the name of their land (Mulenge).

What is essential to note in this study is the role of the diaspora in the conflict that is occurring between Bavibafuliru and Eastern DRC Tutsis in the DRC. Diaspora
populations, though far from their homeland, still feel that they are connected to it and have a responsibility to contribute to what is taking place on at home. The diaspora, which has come into contact with the external world, develops new views about what is happening at home. Most of the people who are resettled in Western capitals from conflict countries enjoy the freedom and liberty of their host countries. Their attempts to influence politics in the homeland are shaped to some extent by their experiences in the new countries they now call ‘home’. Thus I believe in this study that diaspora Bavibafuliru though they appeared to be disconnected from the reality of the moment that is developing on the ground in eastern Congo are nevertheless playing a very influence role.

The role they play can either shape the societies or exacerbate the situation depending on the level of influence they have back home. If diaspora Bavibafuliru are influencing people in the homeland to resist what they call “foreign invasion” by Eastern DRC Tutsis, then they can exacerbate things and spoil any efforts that have been made toward reconciliation and developing a common understanding between the communities. On the other hand, if diaspora Bavibafuliru are positively engaging in the reconciliation process, then that could help build the social fabric again between the two communities. I will look further into the influence of the diaspora in the second phase of my study.

Lyons says this about diaspora groups, regarding their participation and influence in the political strategies at home: “Diaspora groups with their origins in conflict often cultivate a specific type of linkage where homeland territory takes on a high symbolic value and becomes a focal point for mobilization...as a result, diasporas...tend to frame conflicts in
uncompromising and categorical ways that in turn influence the political strategies of parties back home” (Lyons pg 545, December 2007).
CHAPTER 9
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INTERVENTION

9.1 Creation of Common National Identity

I would like to close the discussion of my findings by providing some preliminary recommendations that will be later explored and expanded during the second phase of my study. The intervention I suggest here will be based on the current data I collected. I am looking at what can be done to repair the damage that has been done in separating these two communities that lived side by side before the 1996 war of liberation. I am also interested seeing what can create trust among the people of these two communities. Is there a possibility that these communities can once again live together and create what Volkan calls “togetherness” (Volkan 1997, p. 101) and not living in separation? I believe that it is possible to resolve the differences Bavibafuriri and Eastern DRC Tutsis by using Korostelina’s conflict transformation model of forming “a common national identity” (Korostelina 2007, p. 223) between the two communities.

I like the idea of supercategorization (Korostelina 2007, p. 202), a concept in which several groups are brought together to be as one common group, but I don’t think it would be the best possible and quick solution to address this conflict. I will explain further my argument in the following paragraph. In the supercategorization model, “the
new common identity changes people’s conceptions of the membership from different
groups to a much more inclusive group and makes individual attitudes toward former out-
group members more positive, even if they had a long history of offences” (Korostekina
2007, p. 202). Fuhrmann and Tir said that “the ethnic group’s homeland often overlaps
with the homeland of one or more neighboring groups…The groups see little room for
compromise over this land; it is not something that can be divided, shared, or substituted
for with” (Fuhrmann and Tir 2009, p. 5). Therefore, because some core elements of
national identity such as the sense of peoplehood, attachment to the land, confidence in
history, and commitment to culture and religion sometimes could not be negotiated, it is
vital that instead of using supercategorization, a concept that I personally view as creating
“one nation under one God,” a dialogue of identities between Bavibafuliru and Eastern
DRC Tutsis be discussed instead. This keeps me from having to change the identity of
one particular group or try to make one group assimilate with another.

9.2 Dual Identity Theory

I discussed earlier on how Bavibafuliru were not ready to give away even one
inch of their land to the Eastern DRC Tutsis. As there could be some difficulties
regarding the land issue because it is regarded as non-negotiable, other types of identities
such as religion, power, and politics can be discussed to give both communities the
opportunity to understand each other’s beliefs, ideas, and positions, as well as understand
or be aware of the biases of each other’s identity. Therefore, I recommend that the dual
identity concept be used, which emphasizes the creation of a new national identity
between Bavibafuliru and Eastern DRC Tutsis, thereby creating one new umbrella group
with the two subgroups (Bavibafurut and Eastern DRC Tutsis) (Korostelina 2007, p. 202). Here we will still have a chance to have the dual identity, which is connected with the new common group (new national identity) while allowing each group to reflect membership in its own subgroup. This is to try to create a positive balance of differences and similarities where all members of the new group will have positive attitudes and stereotypes toward the other (Korostelina 2007, p.g.203).

Duel Identity Likely  Supercategorization possible but Unlikely

Figure 2: Diagram showing the dual identity model concept:

Source: Beyond intractability
Achieving the dual identity concept between Bavibafuliru and Eastern DRC Tutsis will first require that work be done to create the space for community. Some members of these two communities live in the same area but do not have a lot in common or do not interact. The social psychology contact theory of Pettigrew and Tropp (Korostelina 2007, p. 201) will be useful for conceptualizing the formation of a common national identity between Bavibafuliru and Eastern DRC Tutsis. As there is the lack of interaction between the two communities, the more contacts with representatives of both communities each has, the more positive their attitudes toward one another will be (Korostelina 2007, p. 201). But I will have to reiterate that contacts alone between members of these two communities will not be enough to create a common identity or improve the intergroup relationships between communities that do not often interact. But as Korostelina indicated, there will be need to get the two communities engaged in a variety of activities in order to reduce prejudice, stereotypes, and biases (Korostelina 2007, p. 201). These activities include but are not limited to creating equal status among the two communities, allowing cooperative intergroup interaction or dialogue, creating opportunity for personal acquaintances among group members of the Bavibafuliru and Eastern DRC Tutsis, etc. (Korostelina 2007, p. 201).

Again, for me, religion and politics can be openly discussed; these are not taboo issues such as giving a portion of land to someone considered enemy. As both the Eastern DRC Tutsis and Bavibafuliru are religious, there could be an opening here to bring these communities together to share the same religious space and restructure the boundaries between them. It is certain that religion is penetrable, and has no boundaries because
people want their religion to expand, and religions open up membership to everyone regardless of race, gender, tribe, ethnic group or national origin. Therefore, religion can be used as reconciliatory platform on which to build. Instead of having churches or faith based organizations specifically reserved for Eastern DRC Tutsis and Bavibafuliru separately, programs or projects can be implemented to allow members of the two communities to worship God together though religious conventions and workshops. This may even extent to the creation of megachurches, or faith based organizations where members of both communities mix and worship God together. A rapprochement on this basis could allow members of the communities to start interacting through common group prayers; the idea would be that the more contacts they have with one another, the more positive their attitudes toward one another would be. This could also help reduce prejudice, stereotypes and biases as they would sit together and listen to each other. Creating a space for Bavibafuliru and Eastern DRC Tutsis to share their views, ideas and beliefs could help reshape some of the boundaries and biases while creating a common understanding. This could help community members develop common goals for their territory, while reinforcing the intergroup support and loyalty needed to achieve a common national identity.

9.3 Addressing misperceptions

There are a lot of misperceptions and conspiracy theories surrounding the conflicts between Eastern DRC Tutsis and Bavibafuliru. Understanding the history of the people, the place, and the origins of each group could be necessary to address some of the
misinformation that is widespread among the two communities. History lessons could play an important role, however, limiting the effort to teaching history won’t be enough to address the misconceptions the two communities have. A lot more can be done especially identifying areas where the two groups have something in common, then use those platforms to create the “togetherness” (Volkan 1997, p. 101). It is important to create trust and teach people to tolerate each other while demystifying “foreign identity” status of Eastern DRC Tutsis. As long as one group continues to believe that the other is foreign, it will be difficult to create a common national identity. Acceptance for brotherhood/sisterhood and good neighborhood must be a priority for any plan to be implemented when trying to create a common national identity between the Bavibafuliru and Eastern DRC Tutsis. I hope to continue part two the study in the near future using what I now know about the dynamics of the conflict between the Bavibafuliru and the Eastern DRC Tutsis.

It is my hope that part two of the study will bring more light to my research, and will likely provide final recommendations suitable to address the differences of all parties.
CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSION

In the study, both groups have expressed concerns over issues related to citizenship, land or territorial appropriation, killings, and power. These common themes were raised by almost all of the participants. In this study, I used theoretical frameworks and hypotheses concerning social, ethnic, and identity conflicts to explain the group dynamics of the rivalries between the Bavibafuliru and the Eastern DRC Tutsis. These frameworks coupled with my knowledge of the field of CR help me in the sense making of the conflict between the two communities. It was clear that the salient identity for the Eastern DRC Tutsis was the citizenship while the salient identity for the Bavibafuliru was their belongingness to the mother land (Territory). Eastern DRC Tutsis believe that losing their bid claiming the Congolese citizenship is something that they can’t afford. They see a threat to their security, and are not ready to give up their hope of being recognized as Congolese by other tribes surrounding them including the Bavibafuliru. On the other hand, some Bavibafuliru, especially the diaspora as it was determined in this study are very reluctant to accept the Eastern DRC Tutsis as Congolese. They continue to believe Eastern DRC Tutsis are Rwandans (People of Rwandan origin). Diaspora Bavibafuliru have also expressed loyalty to the territory of Mulenge, an area in which Eastern DRC Tutsis live.
This has led to the continued tensions between the Bavibafuliru and the Eastern DRC Tutsis over the land issue in Mulenge. Co-existence, here I mean one group living next to the other appears not to be of concerns as suggested by the study but interactions between the two communities are very limited. The diaspora Bavibafuliru participants for instance acknowledged that the presence of the Eastern DRC Tutsis in Mulenge was not a problem but at the same time do not want to share their territory with them. As a matter of fact, this led to an attitude among the diaspora Bavibafuliru preferring to see the two communities ruled under one authority. Diaspora Bavibafuliru want one authority, but that authority must be under the control of the Bavibafuliru because they believe the Eastern DRC Tutsis occupy their land, meaning that they live in their territory. This study suggested some preliminary recommendations regarding theoretical approaches and intervention strategies that can help address the ongoing internal conflict between the Bavibafuliru and the Eastern DRC Tutsis. These preliminary recommendations are based solely on the current data I have collected; a more comprehensive framework for intervention will be the focus of the second phase of the study.

As far as this study goes, diaspora Bavibafuliru still believe that Eastern DRC Tutsis are Rwandans (meaning foreigners). I believe it is difficult for them to engage with Eastern DRC Tutsis in finding the solution to the conflict. Unless this discourse changes, it looks like it could be difficult for most people I interviewed in the diaspora to accept Eastern DRC Tutsis as Congolese or live in harmony with them. If that perception does not change, then the problem of identity based on nationality of the Eastern DRC Tutsis could continue and discrimination between these two communities will likely persist.
APPENDIX A.

DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS

Interviews and questionnaires questions

1 Questions related to possible causes # 1

1 According to you; what do you think is the driving factor of the conflict between the Bavibafuliru and Eastern DRC Tutsis?

2 After you identify the driving factor in question no 1, why do you think that is the case?

Answer questions 3 and 4 if they are different from question no 1; do you think they are also important factors that drive conflict between the Bavibafuliru and Eastern DRC Tutsis?

3 Do you think there is a feeling of enmity and mistrust between the Bavibafuliru and the Eastern DRC Tutsis? If yes, or no why?

4 Is territorial dispute a concern between the Bavibafuliru and Eastern DRC Tutsi in Eastern Congo? If yes or no, explain

5 Given that the status of the Eastern DRC Tutsis in Congo is viewed by different people in different ways, what is your perceptive about their status? Choose from the following
   a) Banyamulenge
   b) Banyarwanda,
   c) Congo Easterners
   d) Foreigners
   e) None of the above
6 The Eastern DRC Tutsis claim that they have been deprived of political participation in the DRC; therefore, they needed to fight for their rights. Rate this sentence according to your view.
   a) I strongly agree
   b) I partially agree
   c) I strongly disagree
   d) I disagree
   e) None of the above

7 The Bavibafuliru claim that the Eastern DRC Tutsis did not integrate in their societies because they kept their own tradition and language Kinyarwanda. Rate this statement according to your view.
   a) I strongly agree
   b) I agree
   c) I strongly disagree
   d) I disagree
   e) None of the above

II Questions related to possible solutions #2

8 If identity; that is seeing yourself as a member of a particular group, while seeing the other group as enemy is the primary concern between the Bavibafuliru and the Eastern DRC Tutsis, what do you think can be done to heal your differences?

9 Do you talk to each other about the divide that is seen between you?

10 If coexistence continues to be a serious matter, what can be done to bring the Bavibafuliru and Eastern DRC Tutsis together?

11 Are you willing to share your territory with the Eastern DRC Tutsi? If yes or no, explain.

12 What is your view about forgiveness between the Bavibafuliru and Eastern DRC Tutsis? If the Eastern DRC Tutsis or Babibafuliru ask for forgiveness, who do you think should initiate the forgiveness process?
   a) The national leaders
   b) Local leaders
   c) Ordinary individuals,
   d) Church leaders
13. Do you think the Eastern DRC Tutsis and the Bavibafuliru should be ruled under one authority instead of separate authorities that is seen today? Rate this statement according to your view.
   a) I strongly agree,
   b) I agree,
   c) I strongly disagree,
   d) I disagree,
   e) None of the above
APPENDIX B.

INFORMED CONSENT FORM I

Sample #1 for questionnaires.

RESEARCH PROCEDURES
This research is being conducted to study rivalry between the Bavibafuliru and the Eastern DRC Tutsi. The results of this study will help in the implementation of a framework for a possible intervention strategy to address the issues and concerns between the two communities. This will ultimately allow people from both groups to once again live in harmony and co-exist peacefully.

If you agree to participate, you will be asked to complete a one-time, and confidential questionnaires about your views. These questions require 30 to 45 minutes to complete. The questionnaires are attached with this consent form.

RISKS
There are no foreseeable risks for participating in this study.

BENEFITS
There are no benefits to you as a participant other than to further research in the understanding of the problem being explored here. No cash will be provided to any participants for contributing to this study.

CONFIDENTIALITY
The data in this study will be confidential. The questionnaires do not include any information that will directly identify you as an individual, unless you specifically state that you want to participate with your name in the written thesis. While it is understood that no computer transmission can be perfectly secure, reasonable efforts will be made to protect the confidentiality of your e-mail transmission. No identifying information, such as name or computer IP address, will be recorded.

PARTICIPATION
Your participation is entirely voluntary; you may stop to participate in this study at any time and for any reason. There are no costs to you or any other party. If you decide not to participate or if you withdraw from study, there is no penalty.
CONTACT
This research is being conducted by M.S. Candidate Runyerera B. Londoni, School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (S-CAR) at George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia, U.S.A. He may be reached at phone number 561-674-3380 (USA) for questions or to report a research-related problem. The advisor of the student research is Dr. Leslie Dwyer, S-CAR, George Mason University. Dr. Dwyer can be reached at phone number 703-993-9406. You may contact the George Mason University Office of Research Subject Protections at 703-993-4121 if you have questions or comments regarding your rights as a participant in the research.

This research has been reviewed according to George Mason University procedures governing your participation in this research.

CONSENT:
I have read this form and I agree to participate in this study.
INFORMED CONSENT FORM II

Sample #1 for interviews.

RESEARCH PROCEDURES
This research is being conducted to study rivalry between the Bavibafuliru and the Eastern DRC Tutsi. The results of this study will help in the implementation of a framework for a possible intervention strategy to address the issues and concerns between the two communities. This will ultimately allow people from both groups to once again live in harmony and co-exist peacefully.

If you agree to participate, you will be asked to answer questions that are attached to this consent form.

RISKS
There are no foreseeable risks for participating in this study.

BENEFITS
There are no benefits to you as a participant other than to further research in the understanding of the problem being explored here. No cash will be provided to any participants for contributing to this study.

CONFIDENTIALITY
The data in this study will be confidential. Questions for interviews do not include any information that will directly identify you as an individual, unless you specifically state that you want to participate with your name in the written thesis. The interviews will not be audio-or videotaped. The notes taking during the interviews, and all other records, will be securely kept and file, and stored, at the office of the student researcher. No interview answers will be provided through-mail.

PARTICIPATION
Your participation is entirely voluntary; you may stop to participate in this study at any time and for any reason. There are no costs to you or any other party. If you decide not to
participate or if you withdraw from study, there is no penalty.

**CONTACT**  
This research is being conducted by M.S. Candidate Runyerera B. Londoni, School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (S-CAR) at George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia, U.S.A. He may be reached at phone number 561-674-3380 (USA) for questions or to report a research-related problem. The advisor of the student research is Dr. Leslie Dwyer, S-CAR, George Mason University. Dr. Dwyer can be reached at phone number 703-993-9406. You may contact the George Mason University Office of Research Subject Protections at 703-993-4121 if you have questions or comments regarding your rights as a participant in the research.

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CURRICULUM VITAE

Runyerera B. Londoni was born and grew up in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). As a former refugee, Bernard ran from the war in the Eastern DRC in 1998 and took refuge in Bujumbura, Burundi. He settled in Harare, Zimbabwe with his family in 2001. He lived and traveled to several African countries including Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Bernard has a Bachelor of Arts (Honors in International Relations and Political Science) from Lynn University, Boca Raton Florida (U.S.A) where he served as the student body president. As a MS Candidate at the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (S-CAR) George Mason University in Virginia, Bernard occupied positions of the President of the Africa Working Group (AWG) from May 2009-September 2011. He has been accepted to pursue his PhD in Fall 2011 at S-CASR.

Bernard is a Regional Analyst for Africa at iJET Intelligent Risk Systems, Annapolis, MD a 3-I MIND Company. He covers West Africa and other Afrique Francophone countries. His main responsibilities include monitoring operational threats and early warning indicators while publishing intelligence of incidents such as terrorism, security threats, conflicts and geopolitical developments. Bernard is also a regular contributor of the online forum- Unchain Africa Press where he has published several articles on issues related to conflict resolution, politics, and social economic problems.

Before joining iJET, Bernard was a staff intern at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Africa Program. In February 2007, Bernard was appointed the South-East Region Representative for Africa Action Student Network, and served in the steering committee. Bernard also served as the Regional Director for Americans for Informed Democracy 2007-2008. Prior to coming to study to the US, Bernard interned at the American Embassy public Affairs Section, Harare Zimbabwe (2004-2005) where he was selected to join the Unites States Student Achievers Program (USAP). He obtained his advanced Diploma in Computer Science and Business Studies from the Association of Computer Professionals, London. He also received his Business Marketing and Public Relations Certification from the London Chamber of Commerce Institute.