REVISITING THE DISCOURSE ON STATE FAILURE: TOWARDS A CONFLICT RESOLUTION TRAJECTORY

by

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A Dissertation
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Dedication

This is dedicated to my loving mother Safia, my late father Ambassador Muhammad Yamin and my wonderful daughter Elizeh.
I would like to extend my deepest gratitude to my Dissertation Committee for their invaluable guidance and time dedicated to this effort. Professor Dennis J. D. Sandole, my Dissertation Chair, has been an inspiration for me all through my time at the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, in pursuit of my M.Sc. and during the past five years for my doctoral studies. Professor Sandole’s support, encouragement and guidance have brought me where I am today. I am also profoundly grateful to Professor Monty G. Marshall. I have benefitted immensely from his wealth of knowledge on the subject of state failure and fragility and meticulous feedback on my manuscripts. Professor Solon J. Simmons has had an equally important role in my dissertation process especially as he was the first I discussed my ideas with. Significantly, he taught me how I could crack open the puzzle and embark upon this seemingly daunting project.

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Abstract

REVISITING THE DISCOURSE ON STATE FAILURE: TOWARDS A CONFLICT RESOLUTION TRAJECTORY

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Dissertation Director: Dr. Dennis J.D. Sandole

This research is a comparative case study of eight states in Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East assessing the impact of external military interventions in response to the perceived threat of state failure in the post Cold War, post 9/11 landscape. The study is guided by the concern that prominent Western literature on state failure and fragility is generally focused on endogenous sources of state weakness and precludes the importance of the regional and global context. It contributes to the literature by presenting a comprehensive multi-level diagnostic framework to effectively guide viable third party interventions in weak, fragile, and failed states. Theoretical inquiry is guided by a small-N approach to explore the context of state fragility and failure in a range of weak, fragile and failed states. Additionally, the research brings to the fore divergent and converging perspectives on the failed states problematique extant in the Global North and the South, integrating them in the proposed theoretical framework.
The study notes that predominant Western discourses on state failure associate the problem with an acute perception of threat to Western security particularly from states of strategic concern, frequently supported by reactive and zero-sum responses. It tests the hypothesis that in the post Cold War, post 9/11 landscape external military interventions in failed and fragile states are more likely to be driven by the security objectives of key global actors and less by humanitarian and development concerns for vulnerable populations. It claims that external military interventions often exacerbate and prolong the dynamics of state instability, compounding the threat to regional and global security. Research findings suggest that the viability of external military interventions in failed and fragile states will depend on the extent to which they are integrated in an overarching conflict resolution process involving bottom-up multilateral interventions at the levels of the state, civil society, region, and the wider global community. Another compelling finding of the research suggests that weak and failing states subjected to the least amount of external intervention are more likely to self-stabilize and embark upon sustainable trajectories of peace. To conclude, the study integrates the findings of the literature review, expert interviews and comparative case studies to make policy recommendations for multilateral collaborative interventions to transform the environment of state fragility and failure.
1. Introduction: The Context and Significance of the Research

Weak And Failing States: A Global Security Challenge

The phenomenon of weak and failing states is not new, but the danger they now pose is unparalleled. When people, goods and information traverse the globe as fast as they do today, transnational threats such as disease or terrorism can inflict damage comparable to the standing armies of nation-states. Absent responsible state authority, threats that would and should be contained within a country’s borders can now melt into the world and wreak untold havoc.


The words of the former US Secretary of State, spoken five years ago, succinctly represent the dire concern with state failure and fragility, a fundamental challenge to global security in the post Cold war, post 9/11 landscape. Globalization and the associated interdependence of states imply that the dynamics of state instability have repercussions for neighboring states and the wider global community, in addition to local communities in weak states. The changing context of the international security architecture and the need for an appropriate response were recognized even earlier in 1992, when the former UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali presented the *Agenda for Peace*, a plan for collective global security, whereby he declared in reference to the state:

Respect for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common international progress. The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory was never matched by reality. It is the task of leaders of States today to understand this and to find a
balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world.

Thus, Ghali’s discourse formalized the nascent doctrine of intervention in sovereign states by members of the global community, acting in concert to address the sources and symptoms of conflict and war in a globalized world. His recommendations provided for various forms of intervention appropriate for the post Cold war environment, including: preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and postconflict peacebuilding. In the Agenda, Ghali clearly specified the use of international military action, as a means for restoring international peace and security, when necessary. Earlier in 1990, the UN Security Council had authorized the use of security forces against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. From 1992 to 1995, the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I, UNOSOM II, and UNITAF - a US-led multilateral force operating under the auspices of the UN) had been mandated humanitarian military operations in the country, beset with ethnic cleansing, tribal warfare, and state collapse. Additionally, during the 1990s, the UN intervened militarily to end wars in Nicaragua (1990), Namibia (1990), El-Salvador (1991), Mozambique (1992), Guatemala (1994), and East Timor (1999), among others.

Pressing forward with similar concerns for global security, a UN report titled the *Responsibility to Protect* (2001), prepared by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, called upon the international community to militarily intervene in sovereign states, without the consent of their governments, for the purposes of humanitarian protection from genocide and large scale ethnic cleansing, as witnessed in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo. With reference to the threat posed by weak, fragile and
failing states, the report made the following observation in unequivocal terms (ibid, 5):

In an interdependent world, in which security depends on a framework of stable sovereign entities, the existence of fragile states, failing states, states who through weakness or ill-will harbor those dangerous to others, or states that can only maintain internal order by means of gross human rights violations, can constitute a risk to people everywhere.

Preventive measures involving the consent and collaborative engagement with governments; and coercive reactive measures against governments, inclusive of international sanctions, prosecution, as well as military intervention (in extreme cases and as a last resort), were urged among other mechanisms outlined in the report. The report was published in the wake of 9/11, but it acknowledged that its preparation had mostly been completed prior to the horrific events the date is remembered by, and thus its recommendations did not specifically address the associated transformation in the global security environment.

Explicitly responding to the terrorist attacks on 9/11 and the associated threat from failed states, on June 1, 2002, former US President George W. Bush, unveiled his National Security Strategy (NSS 2002) at the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York. “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones,” declared President Bush. The new National Security Strategy embodied the shift from a policy of deterrence to a doctrine of preemptive military intervention in weak and failing states like Afghanistan, that “pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states.” NSS 2002 was endorsed by many voices in the United States (see for example Rice 2003 and Fund for Peace 2005).
Articulating the right of intervention in weak and failing states, President Bush justified the Global War on Terrorism (GWoT) launched in Afghanistan the previous year (October 2001). NSS 2002 also prepared the rationale for the invasion of Iraq, the following year (March 2003). Preemptive military intervention by a US-led global coalition in Iraq was aimed at overthrowing a hostile regime in response to the threat of the alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by former military dictator Saddam Hussein. The stated pretext for intervention in Iraq eventually also included the promotion of democracy and the liberation of the Iraqi people. References to both Afghanistan and Iraq as ‘failed’ states by the Bush administration were rife.

The subsequent US National Security Strategy released in 2006 reiterated the desire to engage in “failed states, humanitarian disasters, and ungoverned areas that can become safe havens for terrorists” in collaboration with ally states. The US National Security Strategy (2010) crafted by the Obama administration, echoes a similar commitment to engaging in weak and failing states perceived as breeding grounds of conflict and threats to regional and global security. Thus the perceived threat from various states and humanitarian concerns for vulnerable populations in the post Cold war,

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1 It was suggested by US Vice President Dick Cheney in Meet the Press (NBC) on March 16, 2003, just a few days prior to the US military intervention, that the US military would be greeted by the people of Iraq as “liberators.”

2 Consider for instance, the remarks by Secretary of State Dr. Condolezza Rice at the 88th American Legion Convention, on 29 August 2006, in Salt Lake City, Utah: “Ladies and gentlemen, this strategy can succeed and it will succeed, but if we quit before the job is done, the cost of failure will be severe; indeed, immeasurable. If we abandon the Iraqi people, before their government is strong enough to secure the country, then we will show reformers across the region that America cannot be trusted to keep its word. We will embolden extremist enemies of moderation and of democratic reform. We will leave the makings of a failed state in Iraq, like that one in Afghanistan in the 1990s, which became the base for al-Qaida and the launching pad for the September 11th hijackers. And we should not assume for one minute that those terrorists will not continue to come after the American homeland. That is why President Bush calls Iraq a central front in the war on terror.” GlobalSecurity.Org. Available online at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2006/08/iraq-060829-state01.htm
post 9/11 era, have paved the way for Western-led multi-lateral interventions in weak and failing states.

**Implications of Military Interventions in Weak and Failing States**

‘Humanitarian intervention’ has been controversial, both when it happens, and when it fails to happen.” UN (2001,1).

Despite charting and advocating recourse to military intervention in weak and failing states, the UN is clearly cognizant that unsolicited international troop deployment in sovereign states has in many instances been counter-productive and controversial.

In its *Responsibility to Protect* report (2001), the organization sheds light on four cases of flawed intervention, in particular. Firstly, it mentions the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, when UN forces were present but the “Security Council refused to take the necessary action” destabilizing the entire Great Lakes region for years to come. Secondly, the report highlights NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, raising pertinent questions such as: the legitimacy of NATO’s intervention in a sovereign state; the lack of approval from the UN Security Council and the resultant marginalization of the UN system; and whether the intervention mitigated or exacerbated the human rights situation. Thirdly, the report discusses Bosnia in 1995 where the “failure by the United Nations and others to prevent the massacre of thousands of civilians seeking shelter in UN “safe areas” in Srebrenica” (2001, 1) is brave admission of a promise to the people “cruelly betrayed”. The fourth important failed UN intervention discussed in the report was in Somalia in the early 1990s, mandated as a humanitarian mission that failed through “flawed planning, poor execution, and an excessive dependence on military force” (ibid.). Clearly the aforementioned criticisms, among others raised in the report, resonate with other cases of
multi-lateral interventions in troubled states with or without a UN mandate, and implemented without the consent of governments, as in Haiti (1994), Afghanistan (2001), and Iraq (2003).

Despite the failure of many international multi-lateral interventions in perceived failed states, the post Cold war, post 9/11 global security environment demonstrates a strong inclination for military intervention in sovereign states without the consent of governments, even when intervention is deemed illegal per the UN charter, as in the case of Iraq. Reviewing international trends in military interventions in the wake of the GWoT, Joanna Macrae and Adele Harmer note (2003,1) that humanitarian objectives are being “relegated to their more traditional positions, at the sidelines, with security now center stage.” By the same token, this dissertation argues that the rhetoric on “state failure” provides a rhetorical justification for pursuing the security interests of the US-led global community because it implies the loss of sovereignty of the state. The GWoT in Iraq and Afghanistan, despite exacerbating the dynamics of instability in the respective regions, was justified on the basis of flawed statehood and the associated threats enunciated in policy discourses. The extent to which the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have succeeded in mitigating the Western threat of terrorism is a moot question that needs to be settled by examining the consequences of external military interventions in these countries and respective regions.

International military intervention or the lack thereof, in failed and fragile states has become controversial in the post Cold war, post 9/11 environment because decision-making appears frequently to have been based on a strategic calculus driven by Western security interests. Also, when military intervention is aggressively pursued without regard to ensuring the security of local communities, their property and state infrastructure, it erodes the confidence of local actors in the capacity and willingness of the international community to build peace and promote development, thereby generating the diffusion of insecurity (Monty Marshall, 1999), and exacerbating the conditions of conflict.

Hence this study revisits the problem of global multi-lateral responses to failed states from a conflict resolution perspective. It explores a range of interventions in perceived failed, weak, and fragile states in the post Cold war, post 9/11 environment and finds that military interventions are indeed more likely to worsen, than to alleviate the symptoms of state instability. The dissertation argues that because failed states are generally perceived as threatening, military tactics are inclined to counter the threat regardless of humanitarian concerns, often undermining development and diplomatic initiatives that may be in place to prevent, contain, and de-escalate the conditions of conflict. Thus the strategic response to failed states debilitates and destabilizes them further.

Confrontational tactics employed to counter the perception of threat, nourish and contribute to negative self-fulfilling prophecies (NSFPs) (see Sandole 1999, chapter 6). Sandole explains that NSFP’s may foster self-stimulating/self-perpetuating conflict
processes as well as action-reaction processes, or a combination of both. He argues that such processes are likely to accommodate a culture of violence over a period of time. Thus, the NSFP is rooted in the assumptions and apprehensions of actors representing successful states, and is materialized when their coercive interventions generate tit-for-tat adversarial responses in perceived failed states – a case in point being the CIA’s Predator Drone campaign in Pakistan – a counter-terrorism strategy which has contributed significantly to the radicalization of youth and anti-American sentiment (Zaidi 2010). A military strategy apparently as precision-guided as a Predator Drone campaign has the potential to destabilize a state, the region, in addition to inciting a greater likelihood of threat from non-state actors (refer to Appendix H).

The Nexus Between Discourse and Policy

Despite the aforementioned concerns, Western discourses on state failure and fragility have been useful in highlighting specific problems facing states. Some of them include the issue of widespread institutional corruption, poverty, crime, etc. and serve to create global awareness regarding the challenges faced by ailing and crisis-ridden states, thereby fostering a policy debate within the donor community. Charles Call (2008, 1505) observes that discourse has helped to draw attention to the importance of the state as a critical actor in peace, development and security. He suggests that key players within the international community including development actors, regional organizations and Western militaries take the state and its institutions more seriously in their interventions, as an outcome of the salient discourses.
That said, the liberal use of the term “failed state” in Western policy discourses, lacks a clear understanding of the state-specific context, serves to generate confusion rather than clarity, and promotes reactive rather than problem-solving responses in an increasing number of transitioning, developing, struggling, postconflict, and crisis states. Moreover, there has been a proliferation of quantitative indices in response to the concern with weak and failing states. These indices provide rankings of hundreds of states on account of their weakness, failure, fragility, and instability. In addition to reflecting the policy concern with weak and failing states, the combined effect of quantitative indices serves a number of purposes by projecting the misperception of the loss of sovereign statehood; reinforcing the threat perception; affirming a moral hierarchy in the international system of states; stereotyping and stigmatizing states; and alienating ill-performing states from the mainstream global community.

Sen Kasturi (2008,1) notes that the confusion surrounding the failed states paradigm has “been generated by numerous lists, categories and indicators of fragile, failing and failed states that only add to growing lack of real direction among donors and policy makers alike.” Likewise, Call (2008, 1505) observes that various “imprecise concepts, make for poor scholarship and bad policy”. He highlights (2008) various deficiencies in the conceptualization of state failure salient in the literature, including excessive aggregation of states; “cookie cutter prescriptions” or “tailored solutions” for state-building; the democratic model as a panacea for all states; the Western state as the prototype of the successful state; and the “obfuscation of the West’s role in ‘failure’”. The commitment to promote democracy in weak states espoused in NSS 2002 and the
occupation of Iraq under this pretext, for instance, is a clear reflection that the intervention was guided by an ambiguous comprehension of the problem. I argue therefore, that hierarchical rankings and discourses reinforcing the perception of “us-and-them” often contribute to a magnified threat perception from ailing states, promoting policies that justify aggressive responses, further destabilizing the global security environment.

Rethinking Intervention - Rethinking State Failure

Having highlighted the concerns with the Western conceptualization of state failure and security-centered interventions in weak and failing states, the dissertation acknowledges that military interventions are often necessary for diffusing a humanitarian crisis, containing violence and protecting vulnerable communities from atrocities. That said, creating the conditions for a “negative peace” or the absence of direct physical violence (Galtung, 1969) is merely the first step towards building a “positive peace”, i.e, the creation of structures promoting social, political, and economic stability. Sandole (1999, 203) captures the importance of a comprehensive response to complex conflict environments when he argues that “Realpolitik plays a role, not as the dominant or only element, but as a significant part of a larger whole which recognizes that in complex conflict situations, negative peace may be a necessary (but not sufficient) condition of positive peace.” Thus, while peacekeeping and peace enforcement interventions for the cessation of violence are recommended, the pursuit of development strategies that recognize underlying human needs as root causes of the conflict should be the overarching objective for creating the conditions necessary for state stabilization, and
engendering a positive peace.\(^4\) External military intervention must abide by the principal of doing no harm (see Anderson, 1999).

The dissertation emphasizes that military interventions may be explored as a viable means for mitigating the symptoms of conflict, when they are embedded within an overarching conflict resolution process involving multilateral interventions at the levels of the state, civil society, region, and the wider global community (see Sandole, 1999). Another compelling finding of the research confirms Marshall’s claim that states subjected to the least amount of external intervention are better able to manage instability, in a study demonstrating that South America is the least violent region in the Third World (1999).

**Intellectual Significance of the Study**

The problem of state weakness, fragility and failure has fairly recently come under the microscope in the social sciences although the phenomenon itself is not new. Historically speaking, the fragmentation of states and the emergence of new ones is palpable evidence that states can fail and even fall apart. On the other hand, many states are able to function despite a protracted history of conflict, crisis, and instability – Sri Lanka being a recent case in point. Many crisis and postconflict states are also able to overcome adversity and embrace robust development trajectories. Conversely, a state’s performance could decline and deteriorate. So under what conditions can it be termed a weak, fragile, failing, or failed state? Is it when a state is on the brink of collapse? Is it one with a stalled development trajectory? Is it one that has experienced prolonged war

and violence? Is it one that is unable to provide basic human needs to the vast majority of its people? Is it one that is unable to protect its populace from harm? So on and so forth, one could raise a host of questions shedding light on various symptoms and diseases ailing a failed state.

Ironically, the concept of state weakness, fragility, and failure has not found scholarly consensus on its definition, causes, symptoms, and implications for global instability. Agreement does exist on some key characteristics of the problem, primarily with a focus on endogenous sources. Thus, “state failure”, despite being a buzzword in the modern political lexicon, remains a vague, ambiguous, and often contentious term. In many quarters, especially in states that are labeled failed and failing, the nomenclature is usually not well received (Chris Van Der Borgh, 2008). One of the objections concerning the terminology, elicited in interviews conducted for this research, is that it disguises more than it reveals about the context of the state in question and detracts from academic analysis. On a similar note, Charles Call (2008,1494) suggests that the “concept clouds, even misleads clear analysis”.

Appreciating that the discourse is drawing attention towards the state as a key actor in global security, this study seeks to deconstruct the concept of weak, fragile, and failing states to unravel the elements of Western thinking and to integrate them with Southern perspectives towards a comprehensive theoretical framework. This dissertation shall refer to the terms ‘West’ interchangeably with the ‘Global North’ in reference to key global political and economic actors (particularly the US and its allies as broadly representative of the drivers of the failed states discourses). Likewise I shall refer to the
Global South interchangeably with terms such as the Third World and developing world, generally the region, where the majority of failed and fragile states are located. The interchangeable use of the broad regional classifications is based on the assumption that the conceptualization of failed and successful statehood rests in historical, cultural, development, and political factors associated with these regions and setting them apart.

A research schema pursuing the aforementioned objective of conceptual deconstruction of the failed state problematique is given hereunder.

1. Identify key theoretical concepts in Western thought on the state, relevant to contemporary thinking on state failure (Chapters 3).

2. Identify paradigmatic shifts shaping modern Western thought on state failure in the post Cold War, Post 9/11 landscape (Chapter 3).

3. Highlight common ground and divergences in the diagnosis of the problem across the Global North and the South, elicited through interviews with experts from both regions representing the outsider and insider perspectives respectively.5 The inclusion of regional perspectives from the South, generally unacknowledged in the literature, is critical for theory development on the subject for a number of reasons. Firstly, it provides an assessment of the outsider’s understanding of the domestic sources of the problem. Secondly, it presents the regional and global context of state fragility, generally overlooked or unsubstantiated in Western discourses. Thereby, the insider perspective either affirms or challenges various strands of Western discourse, and offers insights on the regional and global dynamics impeding state performance.

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5 See Sandole (2010, 87) for a discussion on the importance of privileging local actors.
Interview findings are reported in Chapter 4.

4. Evaluate prominent theoretical frameworks in use by contemporary Western development, academic, and policy actors in the literature review (Chapter 3) and propose a theoretical framework for evaluating the conditions of state fragility, failure and collapse (Chapter 5). The proposed theoretical framework proffers a new contribution to the literature on state failure.

5. Provide a comparative assessment of military intervention in a range of eight fragile, failed and collapsed states selected for this research (Chapter 6). This research component adds a new dimension of knowledge to the literature.

6. Examine the conditions of state fragility, failure, and collapse for each case study in light of the proposed theoretical framework (Appendices C-J). This exercise tests the validity of the proposed theoretical framework, and contributes new knowledge to contemporary literature.

Practical Significance of the Study

A comparative case study approach examining eight weak, fragile, and failing states in South Asia, Middle East and Africa (including Afghanistan, Algeria, Iraq, Liberia, Nepal, Pakistan, Somalia, and Sierra Leone) is undertaken to demonstrate the effects of global multi-lateral military interventions. The study makes the claim that a flawed or inadequate diagnosis of the problem has implications for policy and hence intervention. It articulates a theoretical framework as a basis for designing viable and constructive intervention strategies for transforming weak, fragile, and failing states. Various indicators of successful transition, or conversely conflict continuation and
escalation, in response to internally or externally engineered processes to mitigate the symptoms of state instability are examined. Further, the comparative case study serves as the basis for the following considerations for practice:

1. Assessment of multi-lateral military interventions in weak and failing states.
2. Evaluation of combined military and development interventions by external actors.
3. Exploring the trajectories of weak and fragile states experiencing the least amount of intervention.
4. Prescribing policy recommendation for conflict transformation and state-building initiatives undertaken by the global community, in collaboration with regional actors, state, and civil society in light of research findings.

Chapter Summaries

This dissertation is organized in seven chapters and eleven appendices (A-K). The first two chapters present the context of the research and lay out the plan for methodological inquiry. Specifically, Chapter 1: Introduction: The Context and Significance of the Research, discusses the scope, intellectual and practical significance of the research. It also provides a brief overview of the structure of this study. Chapter 2: Research Methodology, states the aims of the research, defines the problem, and presents the hypothesis statement. It spells out the framework of the research design testing the hypothesis. Finally, it sheds light on the strengths and limitations of the research methodology.
Chapter 3: Literature Review identifies the key characteristics of the conceptual evolution of the modern Western normative model of the state, in tracing its relationship with the contemporary paradigm of the failed state. It then presents a review of literature including various strands of the contemporary Western discourses on weak, failing, and fragile states. It reviews relevant US foreign policy and multilateral (UN and the World Bank) policy documents; scholarly qualitative and quantitative literature on the subject, and assesses predominant methodological approaches investigating the problem. Additionally, it examines the paradigmatic shifts in Western thinking on the problem of state failure in the post Cold war, post 9/11 landscape and its impact on policy formulation. Chapter 4: Elicited Views of Experts reports the views elicited from experts from the Global South and North. It provides a preliminary overview of the contemporary Southern perspective on the problem of state failure. Moreover, it explores common ground and divergence in the views of experts representing the Global North and South interviewed for the research. Given the lack of representation of southern voices in global discourses and policy formulation processes, the chapter is intended to contribute to a more inclusive diagnosis of the problem. Reflecting on the learning offered by Chapters 3 and 4, Chapter 5: An Integrated Theoretical Framework Based on Theoretical and Interview Data explores various theoretical constructs to build a comprehensive conflict analysis framework to analyze the conditions of state fragility, failure and collapse. Thus, Chapters 3, 4, and 5 contribute to the salient literature on failed states by offering an alternative diagnostic framework with implications for theory, research, practice, policy, and teaching.
Chapter 6 offers a Comparative Analysis of Case Studies reporting the assessment of state performance trajectories of eight case studies selected for this research - focusing in particular, on the impact of external military interventions in weak states. Chapter 6 draws from research and analysis presented in Appendices C-J. Appendices C-J provide detailed and in-depth theoretical analysis (using the integrated analytical framework proposed in Chapter 5) for each of the case studies, namely Afghanistan, Algeria, Iraq, Liberia, Nepal, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, and Somalia.

Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation. It identifies key findings of the research with implications for theory, research, practice, policy and teaching. Most significantly, it provides policy recommendations for multi-lateral conflict resolution processes in response to the problem of state weakness, fragility, failure and collapse, integrating the findings of the research discussed in Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6.
2. Research Methodology

This chapter discusses the aims of the study, the research problem and the methodology. The first part of the chapter defines the research aims and problem, and presents the hypothesis statement. The second part of the chapter explains the research design testing the hypothesis and states the limitations of the research. The discussion in the following three chapters is guided by the research framework proposed in this chapter. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 explore relevant theoretical constructs in Western state theory; review the scholarly, policy and development literature on failed states; examine and distinguish between regional perspectives on the failed states paradigm; and present a diagnostic theoretical framework for analysis.

Aims of Research

The overarching purpose of this research is to contribute to theory development to guide conflict resolution strategies to transform an environment of state fragility and failure into one of sustainability. To serve this purpose, the study undertakes four research aims. First, it traces the genesis of Western discourses on state failure to explore the perceived nexus between failed states and Western security, and its implications for intervention by key global actors. Secondly, it aims to integrate expert perspectives from the Global South and North to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the root causes of the problem. The southern worldview - what I interchangeably refer to as
the ‘insider perspective’, is generally unacknowledged in the literature, and its inclusion fills a critical gap in the body of knowledge. Thirdly, the study provides a comparative case study of eight states in Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East to assess the impact of global multi-lateral interventions in response to the dynamics of state fragility and failure. Finally, the dissertation makes a range of recommendations focusing on comprehensive peacebuilding and conflict resolution interventions at the levels of the state, region, and global community, in the process integrating the research findings.\(^6\)

The Problem

The international development community is increasingly focused on engaging in fragile contexts, yet there is no firm consensus on what exactly constitutes a ‘fragile’ state or situation, and a wide variety of terms tend to be used interchangeably to refer to such settings... The term fragile is often substituted without a precise change in meaning by ‘failed’, ‘failing’, ‘crisis’, ‘weak’, ‘rogue’, ‘collapsed’, ‘poorly performing’, ‘ineffective’ or ‘shadow’. A fragile situation may be a ‘country at risk of instability’ or ‘under stress’, or a ‘difficult partner’.

( World Bank 2008, 1)

As suggested by the World Bank, the problem of weak, failing, failed, and fragile states is assuming great importance in the global community. The concern has been voiced by other international organizations engaging in global governance, and in US foreign policy, academic, think tank, and development circles. The dissertation contends that various strands of the discourse on state failure draw from and contribute to policy formulation processes pertaining to global security, national defense strategies, peacebuilding, and development (Carment et al, 2009, 115; Call 2008; Boege et al. 2009).

The predominant discourses reflect the concern that weak, fragile and failing states are

prone to high intensity conflict, instability, and violence. Another critical concern is that these states pose a grave threat to regional and global stability (Ghali 1992, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001, NSS 2002, NSS 2006, NSS 2010).

The discourses, generated primarily in the Global North, support a range of global multi-lateral interventions in fragile states including conflict prevention, management, and resolution, as well as punitive and coercive responses. There is lack of clarity, however, in the comprehension of the problem, as suggested in the World Bank citation above, with implications for policy. In this regard, the study notes that current trends in categorizing states as ‘failed’, ‘failing’, ‘weak’, ‘rogue’, among other pejorative classifications generate reactive responses, detracting from a comprehensive diagnosis based on a state’s unique context and trajectory. I therefore emphasize the imperative for a comprehensive multi-level analysis in designing an appropriate response to state instability.

The literature review (Chapter 3) discusses a range of theoretical frameworks, methodologies, indicators and definitions of state failure and fragility used commonly in recent years. It finds that various methodologies do not provide a comprehensive framework for theoretical analysis, although the literature is abundant in categories and their definitions. If one were to start counting the number of categories and labels associated with the ailing, ill-performing state, it would surely make for an interesting study, shedding light on the malleability of the concept.
Marshall (2008, 9), however, argues that near consensus has been reached “on the measurement of state performance and the specification of levels of risk for the many states that populate the global system”. But, he acknowledges (ibid, 4) “There is no consensus on what constitutes a weak, fragile, failing or failed state. Because there is not, accounts of the number of states that should be considered for special treatment vary.” This presents problems as the inability to distinguish between state fragility, failure, and collapse, often leads to flawed policy responses and one-size-fits-all solutions. The agreement on how to measure state performance is encouraging, but the lack of consensus on the conceptualization of the problem is linked to the lack of clarity in understanding the nature and level of threat posed by failed and fragile states to global security. The bulk of the literature does not evaluate the impact of Western-led strategic interventions in concerned states, a gap this dissertation seeks to fill in addition to proposing a comprehensive framework for analyzing the underlying causes of state failure and fragility.

The study builds on a prevailing claim acknowledged by Carment (2008, 3) that the events on 9/11 have reinforced the security-failure nexus, and disengagement from the world’s poorest and poorest-governed nations is no longer an option for the West and the US in particular. He notes (ibid), “The security-failure nexus was, and still is seen in some respects as justification for a more concerted international effort to address the problems of state weakness whether through development assistance or the deployment of third parties to shore up or rebuild weak security institutions.” This concern, representing key multi-lateral policy discourses (in the UN and the World Bank in
particular) is timely and appropriate. However, in the post Cold War, post 9/11 environment fraught with an increasing perception of threat from weak, fragile, and failing states, the dissertation claims that global multi-lateral interventions are likely to be pursued aggressively, in the interests of mitigating the threat to Western security, at the cost of greater violence and instability in states such as Afghanistan and Iraq.

Having stated the relationship between discourse and policy, i.e., the security-failure nexus, the dissertation recognizes that military engagement in response to a perceived threat is often a rational choice for state actors. Moreover, deterrence and containment of violence by military means must precede peace-building and state stabilization processes, whether the state poses a direct threat to global security or to its own communities. That said, the rationale for military intervention begs the question whether it has effectively deterred the threat and transformed the conflict environment; and what constructive, collaborative, and preventive alternatives are available for mitigating the precise nature of the threat. Finally, the study makes the claim that when multi-lateral military interventions in weak and fragile states begin to be perceived by local communities as endangering their lives and property, particularly in cases of prolonged military interventions, they contribute to the diffusion of insecurity (Marshall, 1999), generating deep levels of resentment and hostile behavior, and triggering tit-for-tat responses across a social and political “web of group relations” (ibid, 120), thereby increasing the level of instability in the region. Marshall (ibid) defines the process of diffusion of insecurity as:

systematic violence (i.e. protracted social conflict), creates or reinforces a social psychology of insecurity which tends to diffuse through the network of social ties
and alter the perceptions and policy priorities of the political actors most closely affected by the threat of violence (i.e., all actors in affective proximity; herein, the protracted conflict region). The growing sense of insecurity leads to increasing exclusivity, enmity, and violence in political relations among all groups in proximity to the source of political violence.

Hence, it is argued that reactive enemy-centric responses by external actors in weak, fragile, and failed states, can potentially contribute to conflict enlargement in an environment that may be afflicted with protracted social conflict. Conflict enlargement occurs when more parties are pulled into the conflict scenario, thus becoming more complex (Mitchell 2006, 23). The intervention complicates the conditions when other actors within the regional proximity are affected, diffusing conditions of insecurity such that all political and social relations are impacted, generating a conflict process of escalation and exacerbation.

Figure 1 below illustrates the cause and effect relationship between discourse and policy and their interactive effect on weak and struggling states. It is a simplified representation of a conflict process flowing from Western discourses, essentially ambiguous in their conceptualization of the problem, using rhetoric that is hierarchical, and projects the weak and fragile state as a dire threat to global security, invoking enemy centric responses and conflict escalation and exacerbation processes.
Figure 1: Discourse and Policy - Cause and Effect

Hypothesis Statement

A primary objective of this study is to explore the Western security-state failure nexus, and implications for US foreign policy and multilateral military interventions in perceived failed states. I test the hypothesis that threat perceptions prevailing in policy discourses in particular, in combination with the liberal and conflated use of the terms failed, failing, fragile, weak, rogue, and other pejorative classifications, reinforce the rationale for punitive and coercive measures in perceived failed states. In that sense, the security discourses are representative of realpolitik, supporting counterproductive policies that generate NSFPs (see Sandole, 1999, 203). The dissertation claims that reactive international military interventions in weak and fragile states, advanced by
predominant strands of the discourse, are more likely to compound rather than mitigate state instability – thereby exacerbating regional and global instability.

Research Questions

To assess the aforementioned hypothesis, one needs a greater and clearer sense of the following:

1. What historical and recent international developments have contributed to the evolution of the US foreign policy and international development policies towards failed states?
2. Who are the producers of prominent Western discourses on state failure?
3. How do these discourses contribute to the Western perception of security and its nexus with state failure? What is their interactive and dynamic effect on the policy response to failed states?
4. To what extent are international multilateral interventions successful in transforming failed and fragile states in the post Cold War, post 9/11 environment?

Research Design – Testing of Hypothesis

The study involves four research components to explore the aforementioned questions:

i) Tracing key developments in the conceptual trajectory of Western discourses on state failure (relevant to questions 1 and 2) in Chapter 3. The discussion contextualizes contemporary Western discourses on failed and fragile states, briefly examines the historical evolution of the concept, and identifies shifts in Western security discourses and nexus with policy.
ii) A literature review (relevant to questions 1, 2, and 3) in Chapter 3. The literature review discusses and evaluates key foreign policy, academic and development discourses on failed states, manifest in the principals and practices of key government and multilateral players. The discussion helps to identify gaps in the development of Western theory on state fragility and failure, and to substantiate the hypothesized nexus between Western security and the failed states paradigm.

iii) Structured expert interviews representing voices from the Global North and South (addressing questions 1, 3, and 4). Findings are presented in Chapter 4.

Summary objectives of data collection through structured interviews:

1. Explore the regional variation (of the Global North and South) in the diagnosis of the problem (Chapter 4).
2. Diagnosis of the problem of state failure and fragility (informing theory development in Chapter 5).
3. Identification of policy shifts in the failed states paradigm in the context of changing dynamics of global security (informing review of policy discourses in Chapter 3).
4. Confirm or nullify the nexus between Western security failure and state failure salient in the discourse (informing review of policy discourses in Chapter 3).
5. Exploration of the impact of US foreign policy and multi-lateral development and humanitarian policy prescription in failed states (informing the analysis of
individual case studies Appendices C-J).

6. Make recommendations for a viable and comprehensive international response to mitigate the conditions of state fragility and failure (Chapter 7).

Sample Interview Questions

1. What in your view is a “failed state”? How would you define state failure?

2. Can the terms “failed” and “fragile” states be used interchangeably?

3. Which states do you consider as obvious cases of failure in this decade?

4. What do you think are the root causes and symptoms of state failure in the particular cases you mention?

5. What is the relationship between state failure and international terrorism?

6. How important is the nexus between state failure and Western security in the failed states discourses?

7. Do failed states pose a direct or indirect threat to the West and/or the rest of the world?

8. Is US intervention in countries like Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia

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7 All the questions listed here were not raised in every interview. Participants were given the time to elaborate their thoughts on their particular areas of expertise. In many cases participants provided a lot of information in response to five or six questions. The following protocol on confidentiality was observed: “The data in this study will be confidential. Handwritten notes taken during the interview will be kept in a locked drawer by the researcher and the data collected will eventually be transferred to a password-protected laptop restricting access to others. Handwritten notes shall subsequently be destroyed. The date of the meeting along with the name and affiliation of the interviewee will be noted during the interview process. Unless the research participant wishes to remain anonymous she or he will be acknowledged in a “List of Experts Interviewed” in the dissertation study. References to data from the texts of the interviews and discussion of the research methodology may involve disclosing the relevant expertise of the interviewees, as well as their regional backgrounds to note commonalities and variations in perspectives from the Global North and South – unless otherwise advised by the subjects. Data will not be attributed by name.”
perpetuated by the failed states discourse? Is there any linkage between
discourse and military interventions undertaken by the international
community?

9. What regional and global dynamics could contribute to state instability?

10. Are there any successful models of Western diplomatic, military and/or
development initiatives that have helped to transform weak, fragile, and
failed states?

11. When have international military interventions not been helpful in failed
or fragile states?

12. Should the international community play a role in assisting failed and
fragile states?

13. Have you observed any shifts in US and multilateral development policy
towards failed and fragile states in the post Cold War period and after
9/11?

14. Is there any evidence of negative stereotypes in the failed states discourse?

15. Does the classification “failed state” hurt concerned states in any way?

16. How useful are aggregated rankings of failed states for global key players
and local stakeholders.

iv) A comparative analysis of eight states in the Global South to examine the
effects of international interventions in response to state failure (relevant to
questions 3 and 4 above). The findings are reported in Appendices C-J. The
case studies include Afghanistan, Algeria, Liberia, Iraq, Nepal, Pakistan,
Sierra Leone, and Somalia. Comparative analysis seeks to demonstrate where the discourse places them in regard to their level of fragility and failure, and the relationship between the perception of threat and global multi-lateral interventions. Case studies explore recent conflict trajectories of various states, the response of the international community to instability, and the outcomes of various interventions.

Rationale for Selection of Case Studies

The rationale for case selection is based on an interest in testing the hypothesis that exogenous factors, in particular external military interventions aimed at mitigating failure, could potentially compound the dynamics of instability and in the process, create a security dilemma. All case studies qualify as weak, fragile, failing or failed states in Western discourses. The research sample includes “control cases” that were not subjected to external military intervention and “treated cases” to explore how various states have responded to a range of interventions by the international community, and if they were able to transform the environment of state failure without or with external support. The study also includes states where military intervention was primarily driven by humanitarian concerns rather than a perception of threat, to assess if humanitarian interventions are more effective than security-centered interventions. Below, I summarize the basis for selection of each case in relationship to the factors guiding multi-lateral military interventions.

- States where external military intervention was in response to the perception of threat to the international community (such as the presence of terrorist safe havens
and/or weapons of mass destruction). The case studies include Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan.
- States where the military intervention is designed primarily in response to a humanitarian crisis and where the perception of direct threat to the international community is significantly lower. The case studies include Somalia, Liberia and, Sierra Leone.
- States where there has been no international deployment of troops in response to high intensity conflict and instability, including Nepal and Algeria (control cases).

Data collection for the comparative case studies is drawn from secondary and primary sources including the literature on failed states and interviews with experts, respectively. Experts interviewed were selected on the basis of their experience in one or more perceived failed states, in the realms of development, diplomacy, policymaking, conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and/or in scholarly research.

Comparative case studies seek to address the following questions:

a) Where does the prominent literature, most notably the aggregated rankings of state performance, place the aforementioned case studies? Is there a relationship between state rankings and various global interventions?

b) How have various local, regional and international actors responded to instability in these states? What is the evidence of the application of conflict resolution processes in planning and implementation of state-stabilization initiatives?

c) What factors have been critical in the effectiveness, and conversely the weakness of international interventions, and locally driven processes in transforming an
environment of fragility and failure?

d) What is the impact of external development assistance and multilateral military interventions on state performance? The control cases are used to determine if military intervention has a causal relationship with conflict continuation and escalation.

e) Are the data provided in state rankings in various indices congruent? Rankings are compared to chart each case study’s stability and trajectory and explore whether foreign military interventions have a significant negative or positive impact on state stabilization. For all eight states, an effort has been made to provide data (if available) prior to the most recent outbreak of prolonged armed violence; during the crisis; and postconflict (where applicable), to chart its stability rankings per the indices, and to highlight discrepant findings across the indices. Graphs charting each state’s individual trajectory are provided, in addition to a comparative graph of all cases to demonstrate if external military intervention has a conflict de-escalating or escalating effect. Procedures used in comparative analysis applied to quantitative indices are discussed in Chapter 6.

f) What regional and global factors in addition to domestic ones, have significantly contributed to state instability? See Tables 1 and 2 for examples of regional global factors to state instability.
Table 1: Examples of Regional Threats to State instability

- Territorial and resource disputes.
- Border wars.
- Neighborhood war and the “multiplier-effect systemic contagion” (see Sandole, 1999).
- Spillover of refugees from neighboring countries (immense socio-economic burden on local resources of host country especially when refugee situations are protracted (see Han, 2009).
- Trafficking of narcotics from neighboring countries. This is widely regarded as a serious threat to human security and associated with trafficking of humans and arms, terrorism, crime, and spread of disease (see Antonio, 1998; Warn Policy Brief 2007).
- Military expenditures -- often an indicator of regional arms races and regional rivalries, (see Collier and Anke Hoeffler, 2002).

Table 2: Examples of Global Threats to State Instability

- Inter-state war.
- International treaties and covenants (and implications for stability).
- External military intervention.
- Role of International Financial Institutions (IFIs).
- Implications of development aid.
Levels of analysis

A literature review (see Chapter 3) reveals that the analysis of the problem of state failure is generally centered on the legitimacy, authority, and capacity of the state. Carment, et al. (2009) highlight a state’s authority, legitimacy and capacity (ALC) as the pillars of its success; Jack Goldstone (2008) calls attention to the ‘legitimacy’ and ‘effectiveness’ of state institutions; while Marshall and Cole (2008, 2009) underscore the triangular relationship between governance, conflict and development in assessing the dynamic of ‘societal system effectiveness’ and ‘societal system legitimacy.’ While this study acknowledges the role of state institutions, societal systems and related endogenous drivers and sources of instability, it seeks to highlight the regional and wider international context of state failure and fragility within a contemporary and historical lens. Thus, it analyzes the state from a combined global (macro), regional (meso), and domestic (micro) perspective, arguing for a more comprehensive analysis as illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Proposed Framework for a Multi-level Analysis of the State

Strengths and Limitations of the Research Methodology

The strength of the research lies in the methodological triangulation to confirm the validity of theoretical propositions and findings. The research design relies on several methods to analyze its findings, including a literature review, discourse analysis, interviews, and comparative case studies. I was able to confirm the validity of my inferences by cross-checking them through various methods of data collection and analysis. However, the limitations of the study include the relatively small number of experts I interviewed. Data collection through interviews would have benefitted from a wider range of regional perspectives in particular from the Global South, considering that the study seeks to represent their voices in the literature. A greater diversity of
perspectives from both regions would have been more meaningful in informing theory, and particularly in assessing global multilateral interventions in weak, failing, and fragile states. That said that, I hope that my own voice qualifies this exposition as representing the southern vantage point – generally unacknowledged in the literature. I do not claim to be the voice of the Global South, but one of the voices and I hope there will be more contributions from the region on the subject in future.
3. Literature Review

Introduction

This chapter reviews prominent Western literature on the failed states problematique in exploring three main research questions restated below:

1. What historical and recent international developments have contributed to the evolution of the US foreign policy and international development policies towards failed states?
2. Who are the producers of prominent Western discourses on state failure?
3. How do these discourses contribute to the Western perception of security and its nexus with state failure?

The first part of the chapter identifies underlying constructs from Western state theory cutting across the modern conception of the state. It explores the linkages between classical thought and contemporary Western theory on the state. The second part of the chapter identifies the producers of salient discourses and key conceptual strands. It discusses the renewal of the international focus on the state as a key actor in global peace and stability. It also provides a comparative assessment of quantitative and qualitative approaches used in the scientific measurement of state performance. Policy discourses are discussed in relationship with international developments in the post Cold War, post 9/11 landscape. The nexus between predominant strands of the discourse and
Western security is explored to test the interactive and dynamic effect of discourse on policy formulation. The review concludes with a summary and critique of existing literature followed by questions suggested by the review and examined in the dissertation.

Underlying Theoretical Constructs Informing the Modern Paradigm of the State

This section explores key philosophical influences informing the modern conception of ideal statehood. It observes that the Western state in Europe as well as North America has evolved in response to historical, economic, political, cultural, regional, and geostrategic developments and pressures. Thus, Samuel Huntington’s (1981) view of the American Creed as dynamic and the American political trajectory as one that responds to changes within American society is more or less true for other states in the West. Moreover, this study finds that the evolution of a range of developing, postconflict and postcolonial states in the Global South has been equally responsive to endogenous and exogenous factors. The Western prototype of the state may therefore, not be a useful analytical framework for assessing the performance of states in the Global South – each following a unique trajectory. This dissertation is particularly concerned with the conception of the state in American political thought because state failure and stabilization have become key foreign policy challenges in the post 9/11 landscape, and because the US is the pre-eminent actor guiding global governance processes.

The functions of a state and the search for ideal types have been subjects of age-old epistemological inquiry. The theoretical concern with ideal statehood is evident in the works of classical philosophers such as Socrates recollected by Plato in *Crito* (360
BC), Plato in Republic (360 BC) and Aristotle in Politics (350 BC). For instance, in Republic Plato pondered over five types of government:

a) aristocracy (described as the ideal type);

b) timocracy (governed by the love of power rather than dispensing justice);

c) oligarchy (perceived as self-indulgent pursuit of greater wealth);

d) democracy (premised on equality but in reality anarchy by an unruly mob); and

e) tyranny (dictatorship by one.)

Likewise, in Politics (Book VIII) Aristotle laid out a six-fold classification of types of government, adapted from Plato’s Statesman (360 BC). The classification suggested that three types of states were ideal and three related types were deviations (see Table 3):

Table 3: Aristotle’s Six-Fold Classification of Types of Government.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Correct</th>
<th>Deviant</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government by one</td>
<td>royalty</td>
<td>Tyranny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government by a few</td>
<td>autocracy</td>
<td>oligarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government by many</td>
<td>constitutional government</td>
<td>democracy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These classifications are testament that the concern with ideal statehood has been pervasive throughout recorded history. Francis Fukuyama notes that the state as an institution dates back “some 10,000 years to the first agricultural societies that sprang up in Mesopotamia (2004, 1). In China, a state with a highly trained bureaucracy has existed for thousands of years.” While a state’s configuration appears clearly divided along the
lines between rulers and subjects (Sicker 1991, 17), the structure, capacity and functions of a successful state in the 21st century are still open to debate today as much as they were in 350 BC when Aristotle referred to the state as “a disputed question” (*Politics* Book 3, 1).

It is important to identify the predominant influences in the evolution of the Western concept of the modern state because they define the parameters for ideal statehood in prominent failed states discourses, particularly those salient in the US. Essentially, the functions of the modern Western state, (focusing on the evolution of American state in particular), are governed by two concepts: the first is the intrinsic nature of the state including features such as its external sovereignty (pertaining to relations with other states) and its internal sovereignty (pertaining to its capacity, legitimacy, and authority); the second concept is its relationship with society, as it pertains to the development of a social contract among sections of civil society that can effectively hold sovereign authority accountable for good governance and sustainable social welfare. The relationship between state and society is also tied to the notion of state cohesiveness, an important determinant of the interface between the two, fostered by policy that is responsive to the development of civil society. Notwithstanding the United States successful statehood, state and civil society relations have historically witnessed an ebb and flow. Huntington argues for instance (1981, 33):

The basic idea of the American Creed – equality, liberty, individualism, constitutionalism, democracy – clearly do not constitute a systematic ideology, and they do not necessarily have any logical consistency. At some point liberty and equality may clash, individualism may run counter to constitutionalism, and democracy or majority rule, may infringe on both.
The role of the state perhaps continues to be negotiated in American society. The newly emerged Tea Party movement provides a recent example of American society’s resistance against the state. In this case, the movement is very actively challenging the state’s role in socio-economic regulation. The gun control debate is another example of the polarized American response to the right of keeping and bearing arms, given to the individual by the Constitutional Bill of Rights (Second Amendment) versus the limits of government. Although state-making processes in Western Europe have influenced American political thought in many ways, state-formation in the US has followed its own course with a greater emphasis on the freedoms of the individual vis-à-vis the state.

The American Creed, acknowledges Huntington, may not necessarily be practiced to perfection and often falls short of American ideals (1981, 221). Huntington (1981) also suggests that American ideals are vulnerable to domestic developments within the country as well as changes in the international environment, and notes that the state had traditionally been weak in the US in comparison to Western Europe, where the need to centralize power in the form of a strong government came as a response to feudal social structures. Huntington identified the absence of feudalism as an important factor preventing the consolidation of a strong state in the US for a long time. That said, Huntington’s also maintained that the American creed has traditionally entertained a “distinctively anti-government character” (1981, 33). In fact, he suggests that the state only made an appearance in American political thought at the end of the nineteenth century: “The idea of the state as a legitimizing authoritative entity remained foreign to American thinking and, as a consequence, the European concept of raison d’État
continued as the discredited polar opposite to American traditions of liberalism, constitutionalism, and natural rights,” (1981, 36). It is important to note that leaders who have been influential in defining the course of American history, such as George Washington (1796) and Dwight D. Eisenhower (1961) had in their farewell addresses, warned against the inherent tyranny of executive authority nurtured through foreign alliances and a powerful military industrial complex.

More recently, the American state’s relationship with society has taken a turn towards the Huntington-inspired doctrine of the “national security state” whereby national interests override individual liberties and which taken further may be deemed Machiavellian by some. This has come about most forcefully in the post 9/11 landscape with legislation such as the USA Patriot Act, including surveillance provisions that create the perception of an Orwellian state of sorts. Huntington advocated for a shift in the balance of power tilting more heavily in favor of the government (1981, 41). And he is averse to the demands of cultural diversity in American society. In fact his clash of civilizations theory (1996) is to a great extent anathema to the multiculturalism entrenched in American society - the erstwhile melting pot.

Huntington’s comparison between the Europeans who had to struggle for liberty and equality, and Americans as “born equal” disregards the historic exclusion of minorities in the state. The history of slavery and the struggle for equal rights for women provide lucid examples of systemic discrimination. Women’s suffrage in the United States was achieved as a result of a long movement bearing fruit through the passage of the 19th amendment in the US constitution in 1920 – less than a century ago. Women in
the United States and many other successful states even today, are paid less than men
doing the same work in some of the top corporations, according to a report prepared by
the World Economic Forum. Many sections of American society are therefore not “born
equal” as claimed by Huntington. Although he sheds light on the 1960s – the peak of the
civil rights movement as “the renewal of the democratic spirit (liberty, individual rights,
the limitation of power)” (1981, 174), his stance that American society has an inherently
democratic structure is questionable.

Having mentioned the importance of the dynamic relationship between the state
and society, below I briefly explore various theoretical constructs including the social
contract, state sovereignty, the use of force, the state’s monopoly over the means of force,
democracy, and the administrative functions of the state, as notions shaping the prototype
of successful statehood in contemporary US discourses.

**Niccolò Machiavelli (1460-1527)**

Niccolò Machiavelli used the word “lo stato” (the state) to describe the social
hierarchy that governs and rules a country. In his seminal treatise on political theory
titled *The Prince* (1532), Machiavelli proffered advice to rulers on administering a state.
Importantly, Machiavelli’s dictum despite being controversial, legitimized the use of
superior force and fear, to perpetuate the authority of the state, and to acquire and expand
power. The following quote provides an insight to Machiavellian thought on the state as
an administrative unit (ibid, 42):

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The main foundations of all states (whether they are new, old or mixed) are good laws and good armies. Since it is impossible to have good laws if good arms are lacking, and if there are good arms there must also be good laws, I shall leave laws aside and concentrate on arms.

Elsewhere in his treatise Machiavelli notes (ibid, 75):

A Prince ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select anything else for his study, than war and its rules and discipline; for this is the sole art that belongs to him who rules, and it is of such force that it not only upholds those who are born princes, but it often enables men to rise from a private station to that rank. And, on the contrary, it is seen that when princes have thought more of ease than of arms they have lost their states.

Since the writing of *The Prince*, regardless of shifts in scholarly thought on the nature of the ideal state and its functions and responsibilities, the Machiavellian paradigm has been influential in perpetuating realpolitik (the politics of power – also known as *machtpolitik*), exemplified in the decision-making styles of leaders such as: Richelieu (1585 – 1642); Otto Van Bismarck (1815-1898); Adolph Hitler (1885-1945); and Stalin (1878-1953) among others. In the American context some semblance of the Machiavellian notion of superior force is evident in its military superiority in the world.

But the competition for superior military prowess is not merely characteristic of powerful Western countries. The trend is common in both developed and developing states of the world. There are many states that prioritize high military expenditures over investing in social capital including Pakistan – a perceived failed state, a very clear case of a national security state, and clearly one that believes that its security lies in military superiority.

**The Peace of Westphalia**

A little more than a century after the writing of *The Prince*, Europe witnessed the rise of the modern state whereby it was re-conceptualized as a sovereign entity. This
watershed in the historical evolution of the state emerged as an outcome of the Peace of Wesphalia in 1648, at the end of Thirty Years War in Europe. The Treatise led to the creation of a European community of sovereign states for the first time, “through the agency of such foundational norms of international law as the equality of states, sovereign immunity and the doctrine of non-intervention” (Falk 2002, 313). Thus the European state emerged as the sole form of constitutional authority no longer subservient to the hegemony of the Holy Roman Empire (Krasner 2001, 21). Axtmann highlights another achievement of the Peace of Westphalia as formalizing the end of the practice of foreign intervention on the basis of religion, “No longer, so governments pledged, would they support foreign co-religionists in conflict with their states,” (2004, p. 260).

The Peace of Westphalia shifted the balance of power in favor of the state and consolidated its authority over its subjects, in accordance with the responsibilities of control and supervision, premised on its territorial integrity and border inviolability - hence state sovereignty. It also marked the separation of the church and the state, hence the genesis of the secular state. Axtmann (2004, 260) described the Westphalian state as one where:

The spatial dimension of territorial integrity manifests itself most clearly in the drawing up of territorial boundaries that separate the “inside” (the area of the “domestic”) from the “outside” (the arena of the “international”. “Governing” by the “sovereign” thus aimed to bring about the artful combination of space, people and resources in territorialized containments.

Over the next three centuries, the effects of the Peace of Westphalia spread rapidly across the world, ultimately charting the extension of the state in Asia and Africa, and catalyzing the dynamics of decolonization in the mid-20th century (Philpott 2001, 4; Falk
Even today, the world system of states that emerged from the Peace of Westphalia provides the framework for many international norms of state sovereignty and global politics. The Charter of the United Nations (1945), in Article 2 (4) resonates with the principals of Westphalia in its proclamation that “All members shall refrain in their territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the United Nations.” Therein, the guiding principal of sovereignty articulated by the Peace of Westphalia remains instrumental in forging modern inter-state relations.

**Jean Bodin (1530-1596) and Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679)**

Jean Bodin’s and Thomas Hobbes’ ideas decisively contributed to the concept of state sovereignty in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Both thinkers viewed sovereign authority as absolute. Bodin’s seminal work *Six Books of the Commonweal* or *Six Livres de la Republique* set the stage for further developing political theory, centered on his doctrine of unlimited and indivisible sovereignty. The French thinker Bodin underscored the importance of a system that “should embody somewhere a clear and unquestionable source of authority,” (Dunning, 1896, 86).

Hobbes’ doctrine on the foundations of states and legitimate governments articulated in *Leviathan* (1651) is considered one of the earliest and most influential representations of the social contract. Hobbes argued that people - ungoverned and unregulated – remain in a “state of nature”, and are driven towards competition and conflict in pursuit of gain, security and glory (Wolff 2006, 11). Wolff (ibid, 15) suggests that the Hobbesian paradigm portrays individual rationality as one that preys on
others. This is reflected in the Hobbesian reasoning that a person “cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more” (1651, 161) and explains his conceptualization of the absolute authority of the state as essential for maintaining social order.

The Hobbesian perspective was to a great extent prompted by the philosopher’s fear of anarchy during the English civil war. He maintained that state sovereignty as supreme authority could be founded on ‘a social contract’ between the state and its subjects, whereby the latter agree to submit to the absolute sovereign authority of the former, in exchange for the provision of security. The absence of such authority on the part of the state to control individuals in “the state of nature” could be disastrous. Moreover, Hobbes’ concept of the “state of nature” upheld the elitist notion that individuals will not organize in associations that would constitute a civil society: “No arts, no letters, no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death, and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (1651, 84).

**John Locke (1632-1704)**

Locke’s contributions as one of the great founders of liberalism have been equally important for the social contract theory. Locke’s reasoning provides an antithesis to the Hobbesian paradigm of the desired leviathan of a state to regulate the affairs of society. Locke viewed the state of nature as peaceable and tolerant rather than in a state of war. He did not disagree with the Hobbesian view that human beings are driven by the law of self-preservation, however he believed that the law of nature guides the preservation of mankind through the perpetuation of a moral obligation towards the other (Wolff 2006,
18). He underscored the importance of a civil society as the social condition of civilized cultures governed by reason. The Lockean perception of human nature thus charts a state of moral rights underpinning freedom and equality of the individual, ordained by a law of nature (1690, Chapter II): “the state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions.”

In contrast with Hobbes, Locke cautioned against the inherent tyranny of the state and stipulated that the balance of power in the state should not favor the rulers by putting their subjects at a disadvantage. He held that all political power should be designed for the public good and is conditional on the preservation of the natural rights of its citizens as well as their consent (1690, chapter 7, section 95). “Men being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without his consent.” The ideals espoused by the US constitution, such as the inalienable rights and personal liberty, accorded to US citizens in the First Amendment, draw on Locke’s paradigm. Lockean political philosophy has been a dominant source of influence in American politics. The phrase “Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” is believed to have been adapted from Locke’s expression, “no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions” (ibid, Chapter II).

Locke’s position on absolute sovereignty of the state as the basis of tyranny presents the liberal counterpoise to the state’s monopoly on the use of force per the Weberian dictum. Yet, Locke’s liberalism is also a source of theoretical and practical
tension in American politics today (John T. Scott 2000, 547). The limitation of his philosophy is in the US context is that it transfers all the authority to the people but does not address the issue of identity. Scott argued that such concentration of authority in favor of citizens in a system that favors the majority, puts the rights of minorities and individuals at risk (ibid, 547).

Locke advocated limited government with limits on its authority. He claimed that people had the right to resist and prevent tyranny or the violation of their rights by government. He argued that the right to rebel could keep a check on the state from the “exercise of power beyond right” (1690, Chapter 18, Section 199). The responsibility to prevent tyranny on the part of organized civil society structures is an important element of the Lockean philosophy. More recently, the primacy of the Lockean philosophy and the role of civil society in keeping a check on the state has been challenged by Huntington (1981). He saw the lack of unity in society in terms of its multiculturalism as creating a diversity of demands on government, overburdening the state and preventing it from making the right decisions. Huntington advocated for a shift in the balance of power tilting more heavily in favor of the government thus: “In terms of American beliefs, government is supposed to be egalitarian, participatory, open, non-coercive, and responsive to the demands of individuals and groups. Yet no government can be all these things and still remain a government” (1981, 41).

The balance between state authority and individual autonomy is an issue that has yet to be reconciled in theory as in practice and will perhaps remain a moot issue in the debate on ideal statehood. Realist and liberal arguments shared thus far have
significantly contributed to this debate. Rousseau’s philosophy, summarized below adds yet another dimension to the Western notion of the state.

**Jean Jacque Rousseau (1712-1778)**

Rousseau’s ideas are widely regarded amongst the most prominent contributions to classic democratic theory. The central concept in his philosophy is that of “liberty” (1762). His ideals have had a profound effect on American political thought. The American Declaration of Independence written by Thomas Jefferson in 1776 draws upon some of Rousseaus’s ideas, the most notable among them that all men are created equal. Although Rousseau agreed with Locke and Hobbes on the instinct of self-preservation in guiding human behavior, he had a more optimistic worldview, highlighting the human instinct of compassion for the other (Wolff, 2005, 24). Rousseau’s position in the *Social Contract* (1762) essentially followed the line of theorists who argued that state authority was not a divine right but one that involved the *volonté générale* (will of the people), based upon mutual interest and the idea of cooperation towards their own welfare (1760, Book II, Chapter 1):

The first and most important deduction from the principles we have so far laid down is that the general will alone can direct the State according to the object for which it was instituted, i.e., the common good: for if the clashing of particular interests made the establishment of societies necessary, the agreement of these very interests made it possible. The common element in these different interests is what forms the social tie; and, were there no point of agreement between them all, no society could exist. It is solely on the basis of this common interest that every society should be governed.

The *volonté générale* driven by “considerations of self-love and freedom” (Joshua Cohen, 1986, 279) thus becomes the guiding force of popular state sovereignty, central
to Rousseau’s political theory. In the absence of the volonté générale, Rousseau viewed
the state as potentially repressive. His notion of the volonté générale presumed that the
common good of society rested in liberty and equality. He believed that morality could
not be separated from politics and that freedom was a birthright given to man.

Frank Marini (1967, 467-468) remarks however, that Rousseau’s theory was
“created largely out of opposition to arbitrary government, it urged a higher level of civic
attachment, devotion to the public welfare and the rule of law, but it did not urge issue
decision by the people, not even through responsive mandated representatives.”
Rousseau’s theory then, offers a delicate balance between individual autonomy and the
institutional function of the state in maintaining a just democratic order, which per
Rousseau’s Social Contract lies in the “shared understanding of the common good”
(Cohen, 1986, 278). This presents problems. Cohen (1986), Marini (1967) and others
have noted tensions in, and in the interpretation of Rousseau’s dictum. Questions such
as: the lack of a common societal notion of the public good; individual rights and liberties
versus their contractual obligations; the practical limits of civic engagement in affairs of
government have been viewed as impediments in the realization of Rousseau’s ideals.

The notion of popular sovereignty is closely related to the modern understanding
of the state built upon democratic norms of governance. In a sense, Rousseau refined the
thinking on the social contract, challenging the realist Hobbesian view of state
sovereignty as absolute. Ironically, the liberal and realist tensions between popular
sovereignty and state sovereignty run in the failed states discourse as well, as this study
shall demonstrate. On the one hand the lack of an effective democratic function of the
state is viewed as an indicator of weakness, on the other, states that are unable to exercise coercive control within their territories, are sometimes viewed as having failed.

Consider for instance the conceptualization of a modern Weberian state which calls for the legitimate hierarchy of the state (discussed below), and the ideals of democracy embedded in the American Creed (Huntington 1981), which have for much of American history, resisted strong government.

Max Weber (1864-1920)

Weber innovated on the Machiavellian model of the use of force as a fundamental function of a state, introducing the notion of the state’s monopoly. He defined it as a “monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (italics in the original), in his seminal lecture titled *Politics as a Vocation* (1919, 1). Weber’s theoretical frame underscored the following core components for a successful state:

- the bureaucratic administrative apparatus of the state
- the state’s monopoly on the use of force;
- the legitimacy of the state; and
- the state’s control over territory

In Weber’s re-conceptualization of the state, the absence of the monopoly on the use of force would promote the conditions for anarchy. He justified his proposition by arguing that non-state actors including warlords, terrorists, and rebel groups could weaken state authority by challenging the state as the (1919,1) “soul source of the ‘right’ to use violence.” Additionally Weber (ibid, 3) underscored the role of state institutions such as the armed and police forces, the bureaucracy, and legal structures as the
“administrative means” for organizing the state as a political unit. He viewed the
development of state and society as a complex process, requiring professional structures
of administration i.e. the bureaucracy that binds the state and civil society. Weber’s
dictum on the pre-eminence of the state has served as a major source of influence on the
dominant tradition of modern European state forms, many of them modeled along some
variation of Weberian blueprint: possessing a rational-legal authority defined as the right
to give orders and have them obeyed (Raphael 1991, 170) through bureaucratic structures
(Antonio, 1992, 277); and enforcement capacity through its monopoly on the means of
violence (Barkey and Parikh, 1991, 524; Pureza et al. 2006, 5). However the Weberian
notion of state’s hierarchy remains a controversial issue in American society. The
primacy of Locke’s political philosophy in American political culture underpinning the
interests of civil society essentially resists the Weberian imprint.

In the subsequent section of this chapter, I discuss the interplay of the
aforementioned concepts from Western state theory (including state sovereignty, the
social contract, use of force, the state’s democratic function, and its administrative
capacity) in relationship with contemporary Western discourses on state failure. I
explore the question of how these concepts have shaped Western thinking on state failure
and identify political developments in the post Cold War, post 9/11 landscape that have
reinforced the Western conceptualization of the ideal versus the failed state.

The Producers of the Discourses and Key Concepts

A literature review shows four related streams of predominant Western discourses
produced by regional and global security policy actors; policy research and advocacy
institutes/think tanks; international development organizations; and academia.

Henceforth, I shall broadly refer to these as the “failed states” discourses because the usage of the term is more common than other related terminology including state weakness, instability, fragility, and collapse, and because these terms are generally used interchangeably (even though they are not the same). Below, I delineate the key concepts salient in the discourses, followed by a discussion examining their relationship with various streams of the discourse.

The failed states discourses derive from three key concepts:

i) The security-failure nexus (related to the perception of existential threat posed by weak, fragile and failing states to Western and global security: this vantage point underpins strategic responses involving military intervention aimed at pre-emptive, defensive, humanitarian and state-building objectives in perceived failed states. The perceived security-failure nexus has been a key factor contributing to policy salience.

ii) The Western normative model of the state as the prototype of a successful state: the concept supports the reasoning that state weakness, fragility, failure, and instability in the Global South can potentially be remedied by systemic political change predominantly engineered by Western-led global actors including states and multi-national organizations.

iii) The state as the unit of analysis: pertains to the view of the state as a unitary actor
contributing to its instability. The uni-dimensional level of analysis focuses on state institutions and its capacity, legitimacy, and authority in carrying out a range of functions such as security and rule of law, provision of public services and goods, revenue generation, etc. This approach generally disregards the dynamics of the state’s external environment such as the role of other states, multinational organizations and corporations as well as external non-state actors in destabilizing a state. Likewise, little attention is paid to the role of civil society in relationship with state performance.

A detailed examination of these concepts will be discussed in the integrated summary of the discourses at the end of this chapter. Below, I explore their significance in reference to the four streams of the discourse mentioned above.


The security discourse has evolved in tandem with developments in the international security architecture in the post Cold War, post 9/11 landscape. The discourse brings into sharp focus the threat posed by weak, failing, and fragile states to global security directly or indirectly through: civil war, spillover of violence, threats arising from poverty and environmental degradation, disease, weapons of mass destruction, terrorist networks, and
drug cartels steering in strategies for military interventions in those states. Military interventions in perceived failed states are generally pursued along integrated strategic frameworks to protect human rights, bring stability, promote democracy, and provide economic assistance to re-build states. Strategic planning is generally an externally driven process. Consider for instance the examples of UN peacekeeping and state-building operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and East Timor since the 1990s. The UN’s case for military intervention emanates from the post Cold War increase in inter-state and intra-state conflicts prompting the organization to adapt its policy and capacity to respond to the changing context of global security. The shift in policy came in the form of the Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping presented by former Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali in 1992. While the Agenda for Peace broke new ground by introducing the concept of postconflict peacebuilding, Ghali essentially challenged the concept of “absolute and exclusive sovereignty of the state” (1992, 9) by advocating the use of military intervention without the consent of states. In the years that followed, the UN produced other important policy documents building a case for humanitarian intervention in weak and failing states. These included: The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001), A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (December 2004), and Report of the Secretary General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for All (2005)

The concept of humanitarian intervention has emerged as an international norm
supported by the UN, but it undermines the principal of non-intervention in sovereign states, a customary international law. The potential misuse of humanitarian intervention by global state actors has raised concerns such as the one voiced by Singapore's ambassador to the U.N who stated (Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations 2005, 3):

That is going to be quite controversial for developing countries. We are prepared to look at it with an open mind, but there are others among the developing countries who are a bit concerned. How do you make sure this is not an excuse to interfere in countries’ domestic affairs?

Humanitarian intervention remains a contentious issue to date because the decision to intervene is oftentimes driven by strategic interests of key state actors in the UN. For instance, the UN’s response to the crisis in East Timor was led by Australia, a state with a significant economic stake in the exploration and exploitation of petroleum resources in parts of the Timor Sea provided for by the Timor Gap Treaty signed in 1989 (see Australian Treaty Series 1991). Another illustration of the linkage between humanitarian concern vis-à-vis strategic interest is the UN’s inaction in the Rwandan genocide 1994, widely regarded as evidence of the organization’s lopsided decision-making system favoring the agendas of the five permanent members of the Security Council (US, China, Britain, France, and Russia).

The foreign policy discourse on failed states can be traced back to the US policy concern with ‘rogue states’, which evolved in the post Cold War international security architecture. Petra Minnerop (2002) notes that the demonstration of a shift in threat
perceptions was indicative of a new security strategy in the US separating some states from the rest of the international community. He (ibid, 1) attributes the conceptualization of such an orientation to former President Clinton’s security Advisor Anthony Lake, arguing that it was designed towards “the containment of certain outlaw nations or backlash states and was intended to isolate those states which he identified as opposing U.S. interests and as threatening national and international security interests, particularly Iran and Iraq.”

Ergo, stigmatization such as “rogue” and “terrorist” states served as the rationale for a potential military response and coercive multi-lateral sanctions against certain states. This may be observed in the United States’ relationship with Libya (1992-2003), North Korea, Iraq (under Saddam Hussain), Iran, and Afghanistan (under the Taliban regime). Bilgin and Morton (2002) argue that the reference to “rogue states” was a return to a series of representations of post-colonial states taken to be 'weak', 'quasi', 'collapsed' and 'failed' states. Although this argument suggests some ambiguity in the usage of the term, Bilgin and Morton maintain that it does not imply, that such representations share the same characteristics, nor that the terms are interchangeable, (2002, 55-56).

Explaining the distinction between the two concepts, Bilgin and Morton state that the notion of a 'failed' state, describes the internal characteristics of a state, whereas 'rogue' states refers to the threat posed by their offensive posturing against other states. “What such labels have in common, however, is that they are all classifications of post-colonial states; labels that enable certain policies which serve the economic, political and security interests of those who employ them, ” (Bilgin and Morton 2002, 56).
The threat of rogue states is still salient in the US foreign policy discourse. Bush (2002) for instance, highlights the “new deadly challenges” emerging from “rogue states and terrorists” as much as he emphasizes the threat posed by failed states. However, as suggested by Bilgin and Morton (2002), the pejorative classification of states as “failed” and “rogue” is often utilized as a vehicle for self-serving policies. It is interesting to note (CDI, 2000), that in the last six months of the Clinton administration the term “rogue state” was officially dropped. Sources in the State Department state (ibid), that all the world's 190 states were then placed in new categories such as "States of Unconcern" e.g. Paraguay, Nepal, and Mauritius; "States Leaving Concern" e.g. South Africa; "States of Uncertain Concern": e.g. China and Russia; "States of Disrepair": e.g. Somalia; "States of Pseudo Concern": e.g. Cuba; "Just Plain States": e.g. Britain, Canada, Israel, and Japan. The list of states under each category was not fixed and kept changing on the basis of relations with the US.

Subsequently the former Bush administration reverted to the use of the term “rogue states” and placed countries like North Korea, Iraq and Iran in this category. The label was generally taken as a reference to states that the US had viewed in the 1990’s as: guilty of tyranny, violating international law, in possession of or aspiring to possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as sponsors of terrorism” (Bush 2002). In the post 9/11 scenario George W. Bush’s “rogue states” narrative was renewed with emphasis on the “Axis of Evil” states (Including Iraq, Iran, and North Korea), eventually paving the way for a preemptive war in Iraq.
Ted Gurr (1999, interview transcript) suggests that a failed state is one “of those umbrella terms that sometimes mean whatever people want it to mean.” Woodward (2005, 1) resonates with Gurr as she argues that the usage of the term “covers very different phenomena and conditions, without much apparent recognition of that variety and heterogeneity.” In the US, both scholars concur, the concept gained currency in the early 1990s. The notion became increasingly popular in the aftermath of the Cold war and particularly after 9/11 when it became evident that US military and political preeminence was not challenged by another superpower, as much as by weak states who provided breeding grounds to non-state actors such as transnational terrorists. Francis Fukuyama (2004, 2) notes that, “The problem of weak states and the need for statebuilding have existed for many years, but the September 11 attacks made them more obvious. It seems however that the term “rogue states” and “states of concern” have since became redundant and the new official parlance has advanced the notion of the “failed state” as the new lens to define states, that pose a threat to the US and the global order.


Failed states have come to be feared as ‘breeding grounds of instability, mass migration, and murder’, (in the words of political scientist Stephen Walt), as well as reservoirs and exporters of terror. The existence of these kinds of countries,
and the instability that they harbor, not only threatens the lives and livelihoods of their own peoples but endangers world peace.

In several iterations of the concept, it is suggested that failed states harbor terrorists threatening Western interests, a relational perspective more so than one that seeks to understand the root causes of the problem. Logan and Preble (2006,1) emphasize in their report that, “Although failed states can present threats, it is a mistake to argue that they frequently do. The few attempts that have been made to quantify what “state failure” means, demonstrate that it is not inherently threatening.” Interviews with research participants provide a mixed set of responses with little agreement on whether failed states pose a direct threat to global security, confirming the ambiguity prevailing in the usage of the term and its implications.

US-led post 9/11 global military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have also been pursued on the basis of unsolicited state-building objectives, albeit for explicitly stated national security interests. Post Cold War, the genesis of the US policy concern with state failure can be traced to crisis events in states such as Somalia, Liberia, and Zaire (now known as the Democratic Republic of Congo). The interest was signaled by the establishment of the Political Instability Task Force (PTF) in 1994, originally known as the State Failure Taskforce, sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The task force was set up to examine the occurrence of conflict conditions such as ethnic and revolutionary warfare, regime overthrow, and genocide leading to state failure (see Political Instability Taskforce 2010). While the concern with state failure in the 1990s sparked an interest in the policy community to better understand factors that could likely lead to the failure of governments, the post 9/11 policy concern has primarily been driven
by the perception of direct threat from terrorists, weapons of mass destruction, and rogue elements in perceived failed states.

The nexus between Western security and state failure has been clearly articulated in US national security documents (NSS 2002, 2006, 2010). Post 9/11, former President George W. Bush made a case for preemptive military intervention in weak, failing and rogue states in his National Security Strategy (NSS 2002) reaffirmed in the successive NSS 2006 to protect the security interests of the US and its allies. The NSS 2002 served as the vehicle for preemptive war against Iraq waged by a global coalition of forces led by the US, on the grounds of the alleged threat of weapons of mass destruction. NSS 2002 also made the case that weak and failing states like Afghanistan pose as great a threat as conquering states, and that external military intervention had liberated the country, a reference to the overthrow of the Taliban regime (ibid, 5). The document is emphatic about the threat from failed states with assertions such as: “America is threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones” (ibid, 1).

Similar to the national security strategies crafted during the Bush era, President Obama has reiterated that weak and failing states pose a threat to the US and its allies in the latest NSS (2010). While the Obama administration has omitted the reference to preemptive war in NSS 2010, the escalation of the Predator Drone campaign in Pakistan, is considered a tacit extension of the Bush Doctrine of preemptive intervention in weak, failing and failed states.

In summation of the discourses led by the UN and the US, both preeminent actors shaping the international security architecture, three fundamental assumptions contribute
to their orientations. The first assumption draws on the security-failure nexus, which remains an important consideration in policy formulation and implementation in weak and failing states. References to the threat posed by these states to Western and global security have been brought to the fore in the documents representing the discourses and have led to strategic statebuilding interventions involving military means, development and postconflict peacebuilding initiatives.

A second assumption implicit in the state-building strategies undertaken by both the UN and the US is that regime change and the introduction of externally led political processes modeled along advanced Western institutions, such as the administration of democratic elections are core indicators of the transition to state stability. Critics of the Western normative model of the state include Fareed Zakaria (1997) and Robert Kaplan (2000). Zakaria contends that the tendency to view the Western prototype of democracy as a panacea is flawed reasoning and that exogenous drivers of democratization in weak states have effectively failed around the world. He argues that democratically elected regimes in many states often fail to live up to the liberal values enshrined in the principals of Western democratic models.

In reality, democratic elections have at best been symbolic and are often followed by periods of civil unrest and increased instability in less developed societies. Consider for instance the 2007 elections in Kenya and the 2010 elections in Iraq and in Afghanistan. This is not to make an argument against the merits of democratic systems, but there are long-term processes involving the growth of supportive cultural attitudes and citizens’ capacity to engage the state on accountability of elected leaders that are critical for the
effectiveness of democratic systems. Mohammed Ayoob (1995, 2006) cites the Western European experience of state making and nation building which sometimes spanned centuries. He cautions (2006, 131) that various parts of the Global South are under tremendous pressure to deliver the same results at an unrealistic pace “complicating the state building process”.

A third assumption embedded in the security-centered discourses is the focus on the state as singular unit of analysis. Such an orientation often precludes the diagnosis and ‘treatment’ of regional and global sources of state instability imperative for the transformation of the conflict conditions surrounding the state. Scholars including Carment (2003) and Ayoob (2006) have argued that the international security architecture during the Cold War has significantly contributed to making the environment fertile for state weakness. Carment suggests for instance that: “Many states in the world have failed, are failing or will fail largely because the support they received from one or both of the superpowers as proxy allies during the Cold War withered away after the fall of the Berlin Wall.” (2003, 407). Resonating with Carment’s concern with super power politics during the Cold War era Ayoob (2006, 131) notes that proxy alliances and the transfer of weapons in “fragile polities in fragile regional environments” played a role in perpetuating inter- and intrastate warfare and “greatly accentuated the accentuated the insecurities and instabilities in the Third World.” Other scholars who have explored the importance of regional and wider global factors such as hostile neighbors, international linkages, security dilemmas, Western production and sales of weapons to developing countries include Jared Diamond (1999, 2005) Edward Azar (1978,1985), Marshall
The aforementioned concepts are further examined in reference to various streams of the failed states discourses identified in this chapter.

2. The policy research and advocacy/think tank discourses: prominent contributions have come in the form of indices ranking state performance by the Foreign Policy Magazine and the Fund for Peace (Failed States Index), Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger, Brookings Institution (Index of State Weakness in the Developing World).

Taking heed from the strong policy interest in state performance, a number of think tanks have produced related studies. The concept of state failure has been investigated through scholarly research by institutes such as Cato (Christopher Preble and Justin Logan 2006, 2010) providing substantive policy analysis and the Wilson Center’s Project on Leadership and Building State Capacity prescribing comprehensive and viable conflict resolution interventions in states such as Rwanda, Burundi, and Afghanistan (2006, 2007). Cato and the Wilson Center do not however, represent the mainstream strands of the discourse aligned with the West-centric security paradigm.

The Failed States Index (FSI) produced by the Fund for Peace and sponsored by the Foreign Policy Magazine and the influential Brookings Institution’s Index of State

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Weakness in the Developing World (2008) resonate with the US NSS (2002) in affirming that weak, fragile and failed states pose the greatest threat to global security. In terms of methodology, both indices examine the state as the unit of analysis, focusing primarily on state institutions and internal dynamics of weakness by measuring a range of social, political, economic, and security related indicators. Both instruments use large-N quantitative samples providing annual snapshots of state performance rather than time series analysis used in other statistical indices such as the State Fragility Index and Matrix (2007, 2008, 2009) and the Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger (2008, 2010) which can be used more reliably for generating predictions. Although state performance in both the FSI and the Brookings’ index is classified using different terminology (failure vis-à-vis weakness) the indicators used for operationalizing the problem are more or less similar, pointing towards conceptual ambiguities characterizing the discourses.

The Brookings index has only been produced once (in 2008) but even so it has generated strong interest, one being that it was co-authored by the current US Ambassador to the UN Dr. Susan E. Rice. Per Brookings (2008) it was designed to “provide guidance to policymakers in the US and internationally.” But Sen Kasturi (2008, 2-3) argues that the approach has not been useful for the donor community and various criteria used in the index cannot be applied universally to help states. Moreover, he brings up issues related to operationalization and a disregard for historical factors:

…categories and indicators of progress and performance might also be hard to join up and operationalize… Whilst classifications may seem to work to the advantage of individual donor policy making (meeting targets and plans) they risk ignoring the role of history and past policies that may have contributed to the situation of state failure in the first place.
The hypothesized link between failure and poverty in the Brookings’ index stands in contrast with its conclusions such as “Afghanistan is a fully failed state, second only to Somalia” (see Rice, 2007). Although this statement is plausible, the failure of the aforementioned states cannot be attributed to poverty, a key proposition of the report. Poverty is the symptom rather than the cause of state failure in these two cases, further examined in detailed case studies in Appendices C-J.

The Brookings’ index highlights various threats associated with failed states such as terrorism, weapons proliferation and environmental degradation, but it is does not show the causal link between state failure and these threats. One could argue for instance that successful industrial states in the Global North also contribute to threat such as weapons proliferation and climate change (through a significantly higher global proportion of emissions) – thus bearing an equal or greater responsibility for fuelling conflicts and contributing to global environmental degradation.

The other index mentioned in this subsection is the FSI, possibly one of the most prominent instruments providing a statistical ranking of failed states. A Google search for the term “failed states” consistently generates the FSI’s web content before other related links – a measure of the traffic on its website. The FSI has been at the forefront within the research community using the contentious classification “failed state” in reference to a large number of states, making headlines in the international media. However, its utility as a reliable tool for analyzing a country’s context and diagnosing the problem of failure have been questioned in think tank and academic circles in the West, (Fair, 2010; Logan and Preble 2006, 2010; Carment and Samy 2010). The index has also
sparked controversy in a number of states, which fall under the category of “failed” and disagree with the qualification. Interviews with experts from the Global South conducted for this study have also confirmed this.

The FSI’s contribution to the policy discourses is evident in frequent references to the index in related publications demonstrating that it has a wide and receptive audience within the policy community. A preliminary internet search found a number of policy studies citing the FSI, including one by Rand (Haims et al. 2008) - a leading US think tank which had used the FSI’s definition of state failure for its own study. Similarly, a Congressional study (Ploch, 2009) on the implications for US policy in Zimbabwe cites the FSI. Another Congressional Report (Wyler, 2008) titled Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and US Policy references the FSI in underscoring the perceived nexus between state failure and US security. Likewise, a research paper prepared for the US Army War College (McDonald III, 2006) provides the FSI’s rankings of failed states, highlighting the top twenty most vulnerable states in making the case for enhanced ability of soldiers and units to operate in an irregular warfare environment. There is a plethora of related scholarly, journalistic, and policy documents available on the internet referencing the FSI. The Fund for Peace itself acknowledges its impact on governments, the military and the private sector:

Governments use it, among other things, for early warning and to design economic assistance strategies that can reduce the potential for conflict and promote development in fragile states. The military uses it to strengthen situational awareness, enhance readiness, and apply strategic metrics to evaluate

success in peace and stability operations. The private sector uses it to calculate political risk for investment opportunities.

In an assessment of the FSI, Logan and Preble (2010) posit that many of the top ranking states, such as Liberia, the DRC and East Timore could hardly be perceived as threatening to the West. In the case of Afghanistan, which also ranks amongst the most failed states, the threat they argue has little to do with the state’s “failedness”: “Indeed, Afghanistan was both less failed and more threatening once the Taliban took power”. Elsewhere, Logan and Preble (2010, 8-9) point to the inconsistencies in the FSI’s (2007) cover story titled “Why the world’s weakest countries pose the greatest danger.” They write:

The opening lines of the article declare that failed states “aren’t just a danger to themselves. They can threaten the progress and stability of countries half a world away.” Strikingly, then, the article does little to back up or even argue these claims. It instead concedes that “failing states are a diverse lot” and that “there are few easy answers to their troubles.”

Consistent with this observation, the FSI (2009) contradicts its own position on the relationship between state failure and Western security by noting that the failure of some countries such as Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast, or Guinea is less of a concern than the relatively slower pace of failure of others such as North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan. One may infer from this proposition that the hypothesized nexus between failure and threat is flawed and perhaps the two concepts need to be delinked. In fact, the combined reference to North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan by the FSI alludes to the grave policy concern regarding their nuclear capabilities – suggesting that the FSI is advocating a foreign policy stance rather than analyzing the dynamics of state failure. The concept of
state failure seems to be a simplification device used by the FSI in alignment with the current political rhetoric.

Both the FSI and the Brookings Index differ in their policy prescriptions however. The FSI, despite its heavily threat-invoking rhetoric suggests that the best examples of states that have pulled back from failure are “those that did it without outside military or administrative intervention.”11 The Brookings on the other hand, makes a strong case for intervention (2008, 4) by the US in partnership with international actors through strategies ranging from poverty alleviation to improving security, an agenda resonating with UN and US security discourses on weak and failing states.

3. The development discourses: represented in strategy documents produced by the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), USAID, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), the British government’s Department for International Development (see DFID 2009). Prominent global development discourses are led by the World Bank, USAID and the US State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. The World Bank has been a key proponent of the development discourse on weak and fragile states. Since the 1990s the Bank has drawn attention to ineffective state institutions renewing the focus on the “state” as the key variable.


In 1997 the World Bank produced a document titled The State in a Changing

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World. The report sought to focus global attention on the state as a critical agent of development and security in the international environment. It raised some fundamental questions such as the evolving role of the state, its effectiveness, social and economic functions, and its institutional capacity and performance as an agent of reform. The report took note of developments such as the success of state-led economic progress in East Asia, the collapse of communist states in Central and Eastern Europe, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, fiscal crises in various welfare states, as well as humanitarian emergencies spawning state collapse. With these developments in view, the report raised the importance of the state as a critical actor for the regulation of social and economic order, and discussed various types of state structures, capacity and functions.

Importantly, the World Development Report (iii, 1997) underscored the futility of the minimalist state model, whereby government intervention in socio-economic affairs is limited. It emphasized that a minimal state “could do no harm, but neither could it do much good”. It called for the emulation of post-war East Asian growth models, the so-called miracle economies, as the way forward. Such reconfiguration of states would, by design, give the state a more proactive and prominent role in regulating order and promoting growth. The state was reconceptualized as “one that plays a catalytic, facilitating role, complementing and encouraging the activities of private businesses and individuals.” The report acknowledged that state-led development had failed, but so had stateless development, and argued that effective states promote sustainable development.
Table 4 below gives the World Bank’s view of various elements and scope of the functions of an effective state (World Development Report, 1997). It depicts the minimal, intermediate and activist functions of a state beginning at the most basic level and progressing in an order of desired capacity. The **Minimal Functions** of the state are the most rudimentary functions, which countries with low capacity *must* be able to perform. The minimal state provides basic public goods and services including law and order, justice and security, healthcare, and disaster response. The next level depicts the state at a higher stage of effectiveness. The pre-requisite **Intermediate Functions** include the capacity to regulate the economy, creation of social safety nets, building human capital, protecting the environment, among other functions, in *partnership* with markets and civil society. Finally, the World Bank specified the **Activist Functions** of the state associated with the most capable states. These included playing a more active role in fostering and coordinating market activity, and planning and executing a dynamic industrial and financial policy, in particular.
Table 4: The Scope of State Functions

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<tr>
<th>MINIMAL FUNCTIONS</th>
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<td>Defense, law and order</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Property rights</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Macro-economic management</td>
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<td>Public health</td>
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<td>Improving equity</td>
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<td>Protecting the poor</td>
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<td>INTERMEDIATE FUNCTIONS</td>
<td>Addressing externalities</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Environmental protection</td>
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<td>Regulating monopoly</td>
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<td>Overcoming imperfect education</td>
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<td>Providing social insurance</td>
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<td>ACTIVIST FUNCTIONS</td>
<td>Industrial policy</td>
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<td>Wealth Redistribution</td>
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The World Bank’s renewed focus on the economic and development functions of the state in transforming the global environment was successful in initiating a debate on good governance. The above framework presented by the institution laid out the scope of state functions ranging from the minimal to intermediate and activist for global key players and local state actors to work towards. Despite acknowledging the minimalist functions of the state, the World Bank’s considered the minimal state as a redundant model because it was not considered effective. The Bank advocated that development required an effective state that would do more than perform the functions listed in Table
An effective state should be able to perform all the minimal function and in addition plays a more proactive role in supporting a market economy and support better standards of living. The *World Bank's Development Report* (1997) stipulated that while the minimal state would do no harm, it couldn’t do much good either.

A more recent development oriented view of the state, resonating with the World Bank’s *Activist Functions*, (but contested in liberal theory circles) is proffered by Ghani, Lockhart, and Carnahan (2005,6) highlighting ten core functions of the ideal state, given below.

1. Legitimate monopoly on the means of violence
2. Administrative control
3. Management of public finances
4. Investment in human capital
5. Delineation of citizenship rights and duties
6. Provision of infrastructure services
7. Formation of the market
8. Management of the states assets (including the environment, natural resources, and cultural assets)
9. International relations (including entering into international contracts and public borrowing
10. Rule of law

In 2008 Ghani and Lockhart re-affirmed this model defining the scope of state functions in with respect to Afghanistan in their seminal work *Fixing Failed States*. 
The World Bank’s emphasis on the state’s development role called for a shift in the conventional Western view of the state such as the one defined by Charles Tilly, (1990) renowned sociologist, political scientist and historian. Tilly’s paradigm underscores the state’s monopoly of the means of internal and external power, in addition to its capacity to deliver services to its subjects. He highlights seven core functions integral to state-building: (a) state making, (b) war making, (c) protection, (d) extraction, (e) adjudication, (f) distribution, and (g) production. Another earlier view of the state, from the field of anthropology is given by Robert L. Carneiro (1970, 3) as “an autonomous political unit, encompassing many communities, and having a centralized government, with the power to collect taxes, draft men for work or war, and decree and enforce laws.” The requisite development function of the state, advocated by the World Bank also appears to be missing from this definition. Despite the traction created by the World Bank’s approach, it would be pertinent to bear in mind that the ideal state, its functions, structure and capacity continue to be debated. The state as a construct continues to evolve through a variety of prisms. Modern states are indeed “anything but universal” (Fukuyama 2004, 2).

The Bank’s concern with state fragility in particular led to the establishment of a program called LICUS (Low Income Countries Under Stress) in 2003, a strategic response to some of the world’s weakest states (see World Bank u.d.). Two specific criteria were used for the classification: i) low income, and ii) poor performance in Country Institutional Policies and Institutional Assessment (CPIA). The Bank noted that LICUS states “have significantly worse social indicators than other low-income countries
and have significantly worse portfolio performance” (ibid.1). In 2006, the term LICUS was replaced with “Fragile States” without a change in definition (see Independent Evaluation Group u.d.) At the outset, the rationale of the LICUS approach was to improve aid effectiveness but later it was expanded to include state-building and peacebuilding in addition to its objective of strengthening aid effectiveness.

But the World Bank’s interventions in fragile states particularly its economic restructuring requirements (as preconditions for aid) have been controversial. Its structural adjustment policies (SAPs) have been criticized for resulting in poverty and increasing the dependency of developing countries on donor states. SAPs require states that are receiving aid to reduce expenditures on the social sector (including health, education and development) to ensure debt repayment and prioritize economic policies guided by the World Bank and the IMF (International Monetary Fund) putting pressures on citizens, particularly the poor and middle classes of those countries to lower their standards of living. Studies examining the effects of SAPs by Rodwan Abouharb and Duchesne (2010), Costello Watson and Woodward (1994), Martin Kwamina Panford (2001), and Zulfikar Ahmed Bhutta (2001), among many others produced in the Global South and North confirm this view.

The development stream of the failed states discourses in the US is predominantly led by USAID and Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). Both organizations represent the civilian state-building response to the perception of threat posed by failed states to US national security. (S/CRS) and DFID undertake long-term development interventions in weak, failing and fragile states.
generally entailing building capacity of state institutions, promotion of democracy and
governance reform – from the outside.\textsuperscript{12} Engaging civil society in meeting their
objectives has contributed to a mistrust of NGOs and their perceived ‘donor-driven
agendas’ in many developing states. USAID and the S/CRS in alignment with the US
national security agenda also seek to promote security in fragile states. The USAID’s
strategy document (2005a, 1) recognizes fragile states as the nation’s “most pressing
security threat”. Fischer et al. (2009, 6) observe that “While some European
governments seem to place strong emphasis on development and poverty reduction
programmes in order to counteract crises, the US Government and its support agency
USAID have mainly acted on the need to contain potential spill-over of insecurity and
unstable structures, by means of forceful intervention.” The agency has an office of
Conflict Mitigation and Management in addition to foreign service office positions called
“Crisis Stabilization and Governance Officers” (see Wyler 2007, 11). But, argue Logan
and Preble (2010) in many countries of the world, such as Sudan, Haiti, Cuba, and
Somalia, the US policy response to state failure has been an unsuccessful experiment in
state- building and has not been well-received. Fukuyama (2004, 39) makes a similar
argument against state-building as an exercise that the US has not been able to perform
successfully, since in his own words, the US:


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intervened and/or acted as an occupation authority in many other countries, including Cuba, the Philippines, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Panama, Nicaragua, South Korea, South Vietnam. In each of these countries it amounted to nationbuilding activities – holding elections, trying to stamp out warlords and corruption, and promoting economic development. South Korea was the only country to achieve long-term economic growth, which came about more through the Koreans own efforts than those of the United States. Lasting institutions were few and far between.

Interviews conducted for this research suggest that there has been a transformation in the S/CRS operational culture, in particular under President Obama’s administration. Most significantly, there has been a shift in the organization’s focus from state-building and nationbuilding to conflict prevention. This shift in the organization’s mission is the way forward, however, as Logan and Preble have noted the S/CRS has a limited presence in Iraq and Afghanistan (2010, 9). Given the United States’ strong military presence in the two countries, the need for a civilian surge through S/CRS is arguably greater here than elsewhere.

To be sure, the United States’ socio-economic political trajectory has been exemplary, but lessons of state-building in the country may not be replicable in other states for a number of structural, cultural, historical and political reasons. Another concern is whether state-building processes can be managed from the outside? Shouldn’t change come from within for it to last? A problem inherent in externally driven state-building interventions is that they lack local ownership and participatory decision-making processes undermining the potential for lasting change. The same holds true for the World Bank’s interventions in fragile states. Kasturi notes (2008, 4) that few development actors and donors have prioritized the importance of dialogue and
consultation with civil society representatives in failed and fragile states. Such an approach is necessary for encouraging local participation as a viable intervention for engendering change, it is also important for preeminent international actors to foster a democratic culture in global governance.


The academic literature includes a range of methodologies investigating the problem of state failure including qualitative and mixed method approaches. I shall discuss qualitative studies employing the case study and comparative case study method first, followed by a discussion of prominent mixed method approaches. Although critics of the case study method argue that the small-N research is not generalizable and reliable, it is able to provide an in-depth analysis of the specific context of a state to explore causation. The comparative case-study method examining a smaller number of states with similar contexts and trajectories is also a useful method for testing empirical relationships among key variables and is also used in this study (Appendices C-J).

Statistical analysis of large-N samples on the other hand assumes that the performance of all states regardless of their historical, economic, political, cultural and
regional context can be measured using the same variables. But such a design in most tests lacks internal validity. Consider for instance state-making dynamics in developing, transitioning, and post-conflict states such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Algeria and Bangladesh. They are postcolonial and post-conflict states experiencing qualitatively different patterns of development than advanced state systems such as China, US, France and Germany, but with the passage of time they may acquire comparable levels of stability. Large-N research designs often aggregating hundred plus states, akin to comparing hundred plus people who are learning to swim but all are in different stages: one group is at the beginner level, another has acquired intermediate skills and a third is in advanced stages having trained for a significantly longer period. Rating the performance of all the groups on the same scale would raise concerns about the validity of the test because the scale does not recognize the number of months spent on learning those skills, or for that matter the resources that have been available to various groups for the training. Comparing the performance of swimmers in the three groups on the same scale would essentially be a biased experiment favoring the advanced level of swimmers and having negative implications for the less advanced ones. Thus, the comparative case study method examining states with similar attributes is a more useful approach than the aggregated method where states are often not comparable because of a wide number of different variables. Having briefly discussed some apparent flaws in large N-research methods in examining the problem of state weakness, I shall now review key concepts, terminology, and Western normative models used in the examination of the problem from a qualitative lens.
Key Concepts

In line with prominent discourses on state failure and fragility, the qualitative case study method generally uses the state as the unit of analysis. Key themes include the legitimacy, capacity and authority of state institutions in fulfillment of their functions of justice and security (including control over peripheral regions and borders), social welfare, and economic development. These include studies by Rotberg (2003, 2004), Menkhaus (2004), and Zartman (1995) among others. Carment et al. (2009) refer to the broad consensus in academic scholarship analyzing state performance as the ALC framework, referring to the state’s authority, legitimacy and capacity. Per this paradigm state fragility can be measured by examining various indicators related to the following:

- the functional authority to maintain security within its territory;

- the institutional capacity to provide for the basic human needs of its citizens; and

- the political legitimacy internally and abroad.

Other common themes in the academic literature on failed states include the rise of non-state actors (rebel groups, terrorists, armies and militias) with easy access to small arms and light weapons (Tobias and Klein 2002; Zartman 1995; Rotberg 2003, 2004; and Collier 2007) observed as factors contributing to state fragility. Further, most academic literature postulates that civil wars have a significant causal relationship with the weakening of the state, however, they underscore the importance of the enduring character of violence in defining fragility. But there are scholars such as Carment et al. (2009, 3) who dispute the general hypothesis that violence is a defining feature of a failed
state, a view supported by this study. Carment et. al (ibid) argue that fragility and conflict cannot be equated because “conflict is both cause and symptom of poverty and state fragility.” Further, they observe that conflict is often a symptom not a cause of state fragility and that not all fragile states experience armed conflict. Elsewhere, Carment et al. (2007) have argued that not all poor states are fragile either, a thesis that contradicts a key assumption stated in the report presented by the Brookings’ *Index of State Weakness in the Developing World* (2008).

**Terminology**

Terms, lists, categories of failed and fragile states abound in the academic literature, a problem identified in the security, development and think tank discourses. These distinctions between these categories remains ambiguous as there is no common definition for various terms. A review of literature suggests that the term “failed state” can be loosely applied to a range of states such as North Korea, Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen, Sudan, Bangladesh, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Afghanistan, Iraq, etc. Yet it is not clear how these states are different from each other in terms of weakness, fragility, and failure. Many thoughtful and scholarly definitions and distinctions between various terms have been articulated but the terminology is often used interchangeably and there is and egregious lack of consensus on definitions. Let us examine a few of them. Carleton University’s Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP 2006) provides a comprehensive lexicon of state failure providing definitions for a range of terms describing state performance. They are given hereunder.
- **Fragile states**: states that lack the functional authority to provide basic security within their borders, the institutional capacity to provide basic social needs for their populations, and/or the political legitimacy to effectively represent their citizens at home and abroad.

- **Weak states**: states that are susceptible to fragility or failure because of limited governance capacity, economic stagnation, and/or inability to ensure the security of their borders and sovereign domestic territory.

- **Failing states**: states that exhibit key elements of fragility, and are experiencing organized political violence. Peace processes are weak or non-existent.

- **Failed states**: characterized by conflict, humanitarian crises, and economic collapse. Government authority, legitimacy, and capacity can no longer extend throughout the state, but instead are limited to either to specific regions or groups.

- **Collapsed states**: states that possess no meaningful central governments. These nations exist purely as geographical expressions, lacking any characteristics of state authority, legitimacy, or capacity.

- **Recovering States**: states that exhibit key elements of fragility, but where substantial and at least partially successful “nation building” efforts are present.

This is a useful attempt at defining terms, more comprehensive than other scholarly literature on the subject but most producers of the discourse have their own preferred classifications and understanding of terminology. Recall for instance that the FSI uses the term “state failure”. By contrast, the USAID (2005, 1) uses the term “fragile states” “to refer generally to a broad range of failing, failed and recovering states.” Academics such as Serge Sur (2005, 4) have introduced less well-known terms such as the “bankrupt state”, “Weak, Divided, Incapable, Collapsed, and Beleaguered State “, “rogue state”. Kenneth Menkhaus (2009a) has added many more categories listed below:

1. Complete or near-complete state collapse
2. Hinterland failure
3. Nocturnal anarchy
4. Deinstitutionalized state
5. State within a state
6. Warlord or criminal state
7. De-legitimized state
8. Financially collapsed state
9. Besieged state
10. Mediated state
11. Transitional state

The definitions of these terms are not provided in this space, as my objective is mainly to highlight the seemingly unlimited taxonomy scholarly literature liberally uses to describe state performance. Menkhaus even uses the phrase “wicked problem” borrowed from Horst Rittel to describe state fragility, arguably to highlight the perception of threat characteristic of the security discourses. He also adds another list of categories to shed light on the level of threat posed to Western security by failed states in the order of importance, given below.

1. Take-over by a radical movement of a failed state with nuclear weapons or critical economic or strategic assets.
2. Terrorist base
3. Terrorist safe haven
4. Terrorist target
5. Terrorist financing
6. Terrorist recruiting
7. Transitional criminal base
8. Spillover threats
9. Humanitarian crisis
10. Refugee flows
11. Health threats
12. Environmental threats
13. Piracy threats

It does not come as a surprise then, that the study which was originally published by the Stanley Foundation was subsequently also published by the National Defense University clearly because of its relevance for the defense strategy of the US (see Menkhaus, u.d.). Menkhaus explicitly states that conditions of state fragility have become worse over the past couple of decades and concurs that international security concerns and threat perceptions have increased as a result of 9/11. He states that the typology is intended to help clarify the US national security stance outlined in Bush (NSS 2002) against failed states.

However, in a contrasting finding based on empirical research Marshall and Cole (2008, 2009) argue that state fragility is not on the rise. Likewise, Milliken (2005) posits that state failure is not as common as is generally claimed and that weak states continue to function for a period much longer than they are given credit for. She argues that a state does not cease to be, even in the most repressive environments. This view however is uncommon in prominent discourses. Stein Sundstol Eriksen (2006, 7) suggests that the
Western tendency to perceive a rise in the problem may have to do with the failure of states to fit into Western normative models rather than state failure per se. His thoughts are best articulated in his own words:

By implication, the absence of anything like a modern state in many countries is seen as a problem to be addressed, in order to enable a “normal” state to emerge. However, unlike the modernization school, it does not see the development of such a state as inevitable. Failure is, quite simply, the absence of a liberal or Weberian state, and theories of “failed states” can therefore be considered as a version of the modernisation theory, albeit stripped of teleology.

Critics of the Western normative model of the state include Fareed Zakaria (1997) and Robert Kaplan (2000). Zakaria argues that democratically elected regimes in many states often fail to live up to the liberal values enshrined in the principals of Western democratic models. Kaplan’s criticism of the Western democratic paradigm is in many ways similar to Zakaria’s ruminations. The former argues (2000, xiv) that the problem lies not with the essence of democracy but the “emergence of quasi-democratic ‘hybrid’ regimes,” and (ibid. 60) “transformation toward new forms of authoritarianism.” In addition to these problems, one should also bear in mind the examples of successful undemocratic states such as China, Singapore and Vietnam which suggest that the absence of a democratic system is not a necessary condition of state fragility and failure.

Mixed Method Indices

In this sub-section, I discuss three studies using mixed method and time-series analysis of state failure: the Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger by Hewitt, Wilkenfeld and Gurr (2008, 2010), the State Fragility Index and Matrix by Marshall, Goldstone and Cole (2008) and Marshall and Cole (2009), and Carment et. al’s Country Indicators for
Foreign Policy (2007). I compare the methodologies used in these indices to the ones used in two indices discussed as examples of prominent think tank discourses i.e. the FSI and the Brookings Index of State Weakness in the Developing World. Additionally, I discuss key themes that emerge in these indices and their relationship with leading discourses.

The Peace and Conflict Instablity Ledger (2008, 2010) is a mixed method approach analyzing global trends in conflict, democratization, terrorism, and international development. Using timeline analysis it proffers a three year prediction of risk to instability using the following indicators:

i. Institutional consistency (adherence to democratic political systems);
ii. infant mortality rates;
iii. economic openness/lack of integration in the global economy;
iv. high levels of militarization; and
v. neighborhood security.

The remarkable aspect of this index is the inclusion of the regional and global indicators in addition to domestic ones, all critical levels of analysis. The Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger suggests that the risk of instability of a state can increase as well as decrease abruptly based on internal or external factors (2010, 11). For instance, the authors argue that stability for at-risk states can improve with the termination of a regional conflict or improvement in socio-economic factors. Since the report is based on time-series analysis it can be used for forecasting instability much more reliably than indices offering annual snapshots of instability. Unlike the FSI and the Brookings Index
of State Weakness the report does not claim that the most vulnerable countries pose a direct threat to global stability. They also challenge the salient Western view of terrorism as the most destabilizing sources of conflict in the global security environment, stressing that there are no distinct long-term trends of the incidence of terrorism in global data analyzed between 1970-2007 including 77,000 events (2010,10). Contrary to the widely held post 9/11 perceptions, the authors claim that the height of global terrorist activity was in the early 1990s, and that the concentration of terrorist events has also shifted by region with Western Europe showing the highest incidence of terrorism in the 1970s, Latin America in the 1980s, and the Middle East post 2003 (2010, 8).

The SFIM (State Fragility Index and Matrix 2008, 2009) resonates with the assessment proffered in the PCIL (Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger) regarding the perceived rise in terrorism post 9/11. The authors argue that the “frequency and lethality” (2009, 7) of international trends in terrorism have not significantly increased in recent years and the incidence “remains at extremely low levels, when compared with any other form of political or criminal violence…” The SFIM (ibid.) measures indicators related to state effectiveness and legitimacy in the following key areas: i) security, ii) governance, iii) economic and iv) social development. Time series analysis is employed to measure historical trends and dynamics (human agency and environmental factors); and statics (social and physical attributes, structures and conditions) of state fragility, (2008, 3; 2009, 2). In agreement with most of the contemporary literature the research finds a close relationship between violence and state fragility. However, unlike most other studies, the research includes an examination of the
global and regional context of state fragility rendering a comprehensive analysis of the problem. A very important finding of the study is that several armed conflicts surrounding the regions affected by the GWoT are a “serious challenge to progressive globalization” (2009, 8). This observation fills an egregious gap in the Western literature on state failure which generally does not acknowledge the threat posed to international stability through post 9/11 global military interventions.

In a remarkable effort to provide a comparative evaluation of state performance, the methodology identifies various regions on the basis of geographic location such as Africa. However, the examination of regional factors is partly undermined by the treatment of Islamic countries as one contiguous region. Although the “Muslim” region is further subdivided into sub-systems of “net consumers of energy resources” that are better performing, oil rich states showing high levels of income disparity; and states that are resource-poor and poorly performing. Despite the methodological competencies of the research, the religious categorization of state performance suggests that the research is partly drawing from and responding to US foreign policy concerns. The view of the Islamic community of states as a contiguous global region is a misconception. The fundamental premise for examining the performance of regional clusters of states is geographic contiguity not an ideological one. Spierings et al. (2009) confirm that contrary to the perception that Muslim countries are a homogenous civilization, they show tremendous economic, political and cultural variation.

The third academically produced index offering a time-series analysis of state performance is the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) by Carment et al.
(2007) at Carleton University in Canada. The study agrees with US discourses that failed and fragile states are a security risk, however, it contends that terrorism and state failure are not directly related; that poverty by itself is not a good indicator of state failure; that conflict and state failure are indirectly related; and that rankings of state failure by themselves are not valuable unless they are accompanied by an early warning mechanism. The study identifies state ‘authority’, ‘capacity’, and ‘legitimacy’ as core elements for measuring fragility in line with prominent US discourses. It also suggests that fragility is a process and not an end state.

In exploring the causes of fragility Carment et al. (2007) resonate with Collier (2007) in emphasizing the importance of growth. In contrast with security-centered objectives promoted by prominent US discourses, the report makes the case that human development and capacity building are essential for state-building. They also observe that fragile states show moderate levels of democratic performance, a view that contrasts with mainstream discourses generally linking the absence of democracy with state failure. Unlike the *State Fragility Index and Matrix* the research finds that state fragility is on the rise. It emphasizes the importance of in-depth analysis and prediction of the problem and recommends contextually designed interventions for every case of state failure and fragility, as proposed by this dissertation. Since the publication of the *Country Indicators for Foreign policy* (2007) Carment et. al have been actively engaged in producing detailed case studies of various fragile states.

**Summary and Critique of Prominent Western Discourses**

A scholarly interpretation of what constitutes a failed state has emerged in tandem
with the discourses in Western foreign and development policy. The review of literature suggests that the West is still far from a scholarly consensus on both the terminology and definitions associated with various concepts associated with state failure; that scholarship is mostly concerned with the analysis of state performance from an endogenous lens; that the problem is generally associated with a direct threat to Western security; and that Western normative models of the state are used as yardsticks for state performance, ignoring long-term dynamics of state-making and statebuilding and civil society responses to problems. In this concluding section of the literature review I examine these factors critically.

Methodology and Terminology

The policy concern with the problem of state failure and fragility is evident in the proliferation of quantitative indices produced by academics, think tanks, and government agencies in the West and particularly in the US. Christiane Arndt and Charles Oman (2006) suggest that the number of types of government performance indices is “in the hundreds”. The problem has been investigated with the help of both quantitative and qualitative research methods. Various statistical studies of state performance use related variables and generally produce congruent rankings of state performance, but some conceptualize the problem as state weakness, others as fragility, failure, instability, or collapse. Many of these terms are used to describe states that are postconflict, developing, transitioning to democracy, or experiencing protracted conflict but the terminology does not elucidate the contextual differences and diverse political and development trajectories.
Methodological trends using aggregated models of states performance raise many questions about the validity and reliability of analysis. Can state performance be evaluated on the basis of large-N comparisons using indicators reflecting Western normative models of the successful state? Are all states more or less the same and can they be compared? Marshall (1999, 154) has argued that states are not comparable units on the basis of significant variations in population and territorial size of states, as well as availability of resources.

Contemplating the value of large-N comparisons of states, let us examine specific examples of states to determine why aggregated analyses do not provide a good fit. Could one for instance, use the same scale to compare the collapse of the Soviet Union with state collapse in Somalia, both examples from contemporary history, across a sample of 150 or so states? Perhaps not, given variables such as territorial and population size, resource endowments, political and development trajectories, and the like. Or for that matter could the collapse of the erstwhile superpower be compared with that of landlocked, impoverished, fragile state of Afghanistan, despite contiguous borders and a similar regional environment? Looking at other recent examples, could one compare the collapse of the Iraqi state with that of Somalia? Perhaps not, for a number of reasons, but most notably external, economic, and military interventions that have been decisive factors in Iraq’s collapse, among others that this dissertation explores in the comparative analysis of various states.

Marshall (2008, 21) summarizes various concerns with the trends in quantitative aggregated approaches analyzing the state very succinctly:
The behavioral revolution in the social sciences and its attendant focus on quantitative analysis has existed for about fifty-years now. It has produced thousands of discrete models of political behavior, but only limited coherency in our understanding of the phenomenology of political conflict, governance, and societal development. For the most part, it has complicated, confounded, and compartmentalized rather than integrated and facilitated theory development. This is an academic indulgence that paralyzes public policy. Much of the confusion stems from the academy’s preoccupation with causal analysis and its reliance on behavioral data that is intrinsically fuzzy (rather than precise), interconnected (rather than independent), interchangeable or substitutable (rather than discrete), and based on behavioral responses that are adaptive and strategic (rather than definitive and determinate).

Numerous categories, imprecise concepts, generalizations, reductionism (or simplification) of the problem, data that are outcome-based and visibility-dependent (rather than process-based), are characteristic of a number of quantitative indices ranking states. By contrast, the small-N qualitative literature, including single case studies or comparative analyses, generally demonstrates a thorough knowledge of the unique local context of various states, but the difference between concepts such as weak, fragile, failing, failed, and collapse is still not clearly defined.

Because the terminology describing a state’s performance is ambiguous, it can be used in an arbitrary manner. For instance the terms state weakness, fragility, and failure can be used in reference to a variety of states without denoting specific conditions. Elaborating upon the ambiguity surrounding a number of states qualifying as collapsed and failed in the literature, let us consider two random studies. Zartman’s edited volume on collapsed states (1995) looks at Algeria, South Africa, Zaire, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Liberia, Somalia, Chad, Uganda, Ghana as well as the former Soviet Union – all considered instances of state collapse at some point in recent history. Zartman defines
state collapse in the following words: “Many states recover their balance and return to more or less normal functions, but the states that reach the bottom of the stairs are the cases of collapse. Collapse, then is an extreme case of governance problems; or excessive burdens on governing capacity, a matter of degree but not a difference in nature from the normal difficulties of meeting demands and exercising authority” (1995,8).

In another study, Rotberg (2003) examines a wide range of contemporary cases of state collapse and failure including the DRC, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Somalia, Colombia, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Fiji, Haiti and Lebanon. He makes a distinction between collapsed and failed states (ibid, 9) by suggesting that “A collapsed state is a rare and extreme version of a failed state.” Compare his observation with Zartman’s (1995, 1) who suggests that phenomenon of collapse is “historic and worldwide… but no where are there more examples than in contemporary Africa.”

Rotberg defines failed states as “tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous and contested bitterly by warring factions. In most failed states, government troops battle armed revolts led by one or more rivals” (ibid, 5). Other indicators of state failure discussed by Rotberg include two or more insurgencies, various forms of civil unrest, communal discontent, and manifestation of dissent against state or other actors within state. “It is not the absolute intensity of violence but the enduring character of that violence and the fact that much of the violence is directed against the existing government or regime, and the inflamed character of the political or geographical demands for shared power or autonomy that rationalize or justify that violence in the minds of the main insurgents,” (2003, 5). If one were to go by Rotberg’s definition, then India and Israel, generally
perceived as strong and successful states, should perhaps be included in the list of failed states. Both states have seen insurgencies for a number of decades. In fact, if one were to examine the enduring character of insurgent violence and unrest against incumbent regime, the frequent uprisings in Kashmir Valley, and West Bank and Gaza, provide examples of the most intractable and protracted conflicts in modern history. Hence, some questions come to mind regarding the effectiveness of both states. For instance, have India and Israel not failed various communities? Have they not committed atrocities against their own people, depriving them of their human rights? Have both states not oppressed some of the longest living insurgencies of our times? Are various communities not being deprived of economic and political opportunities? Do all communities have fairly equitable access to basic human needs? Given the enduring character of insurgencies in both India and Israel, are both states potentially vulnerable to dismemberment sometime in the years to come, unless they redress the grievances of disaffected communities?

Consider the scale and magnitude of political and social unrest in India. While protracted insurgencies in Kashmir and the northeastern hill state of Nagaland are known to most, yet another protracted incidence of rebellion, bloodshed and internal displacement persists in India’s Red Corridor, a relatively underdeveloped and impoverished region in the east of the country, comprising the states of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. These states are among those that have been highly affected by Indian Maoist insurgency known as the Naxalite movement. The genesis of the movement can
be traced back to 1967, although insurgent activity significantly de-escalated in the 1990s. Presently, at least twenty different Indian states continue to suffer from varying levels of Naxalite militancy. Ploughshares (Canada) reports that “more than 6,000 people have been killed as a direct result of the conflict in the last twenty years, with an estimated 3,000 to 4,000 deaths occurring in the last decade” (see Plougshares 2008). The Internal Displacement Monitoring Cell (IDMC) reports that in the years 2007-2008 alone, over 300,000 people from Chhattigah and Orissa states were displaced as a result of the Maoist violence (see Internal Displacement.Org 2008, 11). If protracted social conflict, a concept proposed by Edward Azar (1990) and discussed subsequently in this study, has been a significant contributing factor in the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the former federation of Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Somalia, then perhaps both the Indian and Israeli states, and other states experiencing similar manifestations of conflict need to take heed from these lessons.

Now reverting to the aforementioned selection of case studies by Zartman and Rotberg, lets consider the conceptualization of the problem of state failure and collapse. Firstly, it appears through the examination of these randomly selected studies, that the classifications failure and collapse are applied to a wide range of states, suggesting that the problem is quite common – a wide-held perception in the West, questioned by Milliken (2005). By the same token, one could debate that some of the aforementioned case studies such as Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Algeria, and Ethiopia, did not really fail or collapse at any time in recent history. They may have undergone or still be experiencing periods of intense turmoil and volatility, but the manifestation of conflict is not
necessarily an indicator of state collapse. In fact, it is argued by some scholars that conflict escalation (Adam Curle, 1971) or “ripeness” (Zartman, 1989) of conflict sometimes serve as precursors for positive change. Other manifestations of conflict, as an essential dynamic of social and political change, include violent transitions to democratic systems.

I reflect now on the island state of Sri Lanka, which experienced civil war for more than a quarter of a century, yet it continued to maintain the highest levels of literacy in South Asia. In the aftermath of Prabahakaran’s killing, the supremo of Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the country has turned a new chapter in its history, and has at the very least attained the conditions of a negative peace - the absence of war and violence (Galtung, 1969). Negative peace is the foundation for a positive peace - the creation of conditions whereby the structure promotes a harmonious and equitable coexistence for all stakeholders and the root causes of the conflict have been addressed (ibid.) Thus, strengthening institutions to promote equitable development and proportional distribution of political and economic resources, among marginalized ethnic groups including the Tamils, should be the way forward in building a positive peace for the Sri Lankan state. The tourism industry, an important source of revenue generation in the island, would most likely continue to contribute to the country’s economy as it did during the civil war years (see Fernando and Meedeniya, 2009). Sri Lanka’s relatively decent ranking on the UNDP’s Human Development Index (2010) at number 91 speaks to its resilience as a state despite the long civil war. Compare its performance on the UNDP’s scale, proximate to China’s at 89, and much better than India’s placement at 119.
in the same year. Sri Lanka’s performance in the human development sector has consistently remained amongst the best, in the conflict prone South Asian region through the civil war years, and even prior.

Another case study discussed in Zartman’s (1995) volume as an example of collapse in fairly recent history, which I take issue with, is post-colonial Algeria - a relatively young state. The North African country has in recent years emerged from a nearly decade long bloody revolution, but has managed to self-stabilize through locally driven conflict resolution processes. Economically, the country has been able to rely on its oil and gas industry for sustenance during the civil war years. In stark contrast to Zartman’s study, the country has been placed among the UNDP’s topmost HDI improving countries between 1970 and 2010 – over a long span of 40 years. The country did experience upheavals in the forms of coup d’états, a violent Islamist revolution, and terrorism, but it came out of a protracted phase of high intensity violence, as a more peaceful and democratic state than before. Therefore, since the state did embark upon a relatively peaceful and robust political trajectory, could the revolution be considered a significant indicator of failure? The fact that Zartman’s study was published when the Algerian revolution was underway, suggests that there is a scholarly haste in calling a state as having collapsed or failed, when it is experiencing war and violence.

In light of this discussion, I take the liberty to pose a question to the reader who is inclined to disagree. Have many Western European countries and the United States of

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America not experienced revolution and bloodshed? With reference to the American experience, Huntington argued that it has, with the passage of time become a stronger state, and had lacked for most of its history “any concept of the state” (232, 1981). The denial of civil rights to the African American community until the mid 1960s, attests to the flaws in state institutions, despite the ideals enshrined in the Bill of Rights. The civil rights movement was a chaotic period, in not very distant American history, demonstrating that high intensity civil unrest may be symptomatic of crisis, but not necessarily failure, as is often suggested in Western scholarship on state failure.

To be sure, short-term and prolonged periods of crisis are symptoms of instability, but an environment of conflict per se, is not a sufficient condition of state failure as we can judge from recent US history. Resonating with this view, Carment notes (2005) “Today most states that are weak or failed or collapsed are so because they are fairly new and they have not had the opportunity to develop effective political, social and economic institutions”. Ayoob (1995, 2006) resonates with this proposition in citing the Western European transition to democracy – a process spanning centuries. It is imperative for the international community to appreciate that with the passage of time, it may well be possible for weak and fragile states to stabilize on their own, with or without proactive support from the international community.

The Regional and Global Context of State Failure and Fragility

In addition to the aforementioned theoretical constraints associated with:

a) aggregation of states; b) proliferation of diverse lists, categories, and definitions;
c) ambiguous terminology; d) the liberal use of pejorative terms and arguments forecasting apocalyptic scenarios with reference to a considerable number of states; another limitation with theory development in the literature lies in, e) the practically exclusive examination of endogenous sources of state instability in a globalized international security environment. A number of scholars have underscored the importance of the regional and global context of state fragility such as Ayoob (1995, 2005), Marshall (1999), Diamond (2005), Collier (2007), Hewitt, Wilkenfeld and Gurr. (2008, 2010), but generally speaking the state remains the unit of analysis in associated discourses. While the weak, fragile, failing, failed and collapsed state is viewed as a security risk to the global community of states, the literature generally does not acknowledge the risks posed to the state’s security by the wider global community, beyond the region where it is located. Marshall agrees that the consideration of external factors in the generating political instability is “conspicuously missing from most academic research” (2008, 9).

Marshall (1999) and Carment et al. (2009) have highlighted the role of superpower proxy conflicts during the Cold War as having contributed to further weakening and/or failure of vulnerable post-colonial states. Hence it is important to note that weak states are as vulnerable to military and political interventions by more powerful states as they are to terrorist networks and drug cartels. Likewise, Gurr (2000, 232-4) postulates that external involvement of kindred groups and/or foreign states is a critical factor in non-violent protest and violent rebellion in ethnic conflict and hence state instability.
Other studies shedding light on the regional context include Chesterman and Thakur (2005) who have addressed the importance of regional economic and political networks that could undermine weak state institutions, among other factors. They also highlight the failure of foreign interventions in the name of human rights. The authors argue that while violation of human rights calls for the international community’s responsibility to protect, such rationalization is often “invoked opportunistically to justify convenient foreign policy choices…” (ibid, 5). They argue against nation-building projects because of the tried and tested inability of successful states to build nations from the outside.

Chesterman and Thakur (2005) have argued that state failure was not the inevitable consequence of a colonial history but in fact the difficulty for most post-conflict societies was that several processes including state and nation building as well as development were pursued concurrently. They note that at times the processes “worked against one another, leading to the crisis of state legitimacy and the weakening of state institutions” (ibid, 2). Related to this is Charles Tilly’s observation that European state-makers were able to build strong national government prior to the onset of mass politics but in modern states these processes occur at the same time complicating the process (1975, 610).

Comparing the state-making processes in Europe with those underway in many postcolonial states in Africa and Asia, Ayoob makes similar observations about the complexities of modern state building (2006, 129). He notes that Europe ’s experience of state-making was built on the foundation of nation-states evolving into modern sovereign
states. Additionally, he underscores global pressures on Third World states to perform (ibid, 131) in these words:

Given the short time at the disposal of state makers in the Third World and the consequent acceleration in their state-making efforts necessary to demonstrate that they are moving speedily toward effective statehood, crises erupt simultaneously, become unmanageable as the load they put on the political system outruns the political and military capabilities of the state, and lead to an accumulation of crises, which further erodes the legitimacy of the already fragile post-colonial state.

He concludes that the Western expectation from Third World states to fast track the process of state-building is unrealistic (1995; 2006). Debiel and Klein (2002) concur that state building is a long drawn out process and global pressures on post-conflict societies can contribute to delegitimization of the state. Indeed such impatience with instability in post-conflict and post-colonial societies has led to the imposition of inappropriate development models and interventions by foreign states as well as by international financial institutions.

Security-Failure Nexus

Ayoob (1995, 6) suggests that the post 1945 Western thinking on state security can be traced back to the Peace of Westphalia, whereby European state relations were reconfigured along the notion of state sovereignty, and the relationship between the system and individuals. This trend argues Ayoob (1995, 6) “firmly laid the foundations for the dominant tradition in the literature on international relations, in which security became synonymous with the protection from external threats of a state’s vital interests and core values. This tradition in international relations, which portrays states as unitary actors responding to external threats or posing such threats to other states, has been
stronger in the field of security studies than in the rest of the discipline.” The thinking highlighted by Ayoob, also pervades the failed states discourse wherein the weak state is perceived as a threat to the security of other states.

It would be useful to draw attention to Ayoob’s articulation of the Western view of security, evolving in the form of a bipolar international security configuration based on alliance security rather than state security, as evident in the organization of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the aftermath of World War II. Ayoob argues that the bipolar paradigm of security marginalized the Third World from an international conceptualization of security in Western literature (1995, 6). Further, he argues that whereas the term Third World, was used as a descriptive reference to poor, underdeveloped and weak states in Asia, Africa and Latin America (1995, 12), “The dichotomy between the developed, affluent and powerful North and the underdeveloped, poor and weak South is visible in even starker terms now than was true during the Cold War” (ibid, 13). This observation manifests itself in yet starker terms today, through the classification of many of the world’s poor and struggling states as weak, fragile, failed and collapsed.

Ayoob’s description of the “prototypical Third World state” (1995, 15) bears a resemblance with the dilemmas of a “failed state”. He suggests that the most important characteristics of Third World states demonstrate (1995, 15):

- lack of internal cohesion, in terms of both great economic and social disparities and major ethnic and regional fissures;
- lack of unconditional legitimacy of state boundaries, state institutions, and governing elites;
- easy susceptibility to internal and interstate conflicts;
- distorted and dependent development, both economically and socially;
- marginalization, especially in relation to the dominant international
security and economic concerns; and easy permeability by external actors, be they more developed states, international institutions, or transnational corporations.

Similar to the conceptualization of the failed state, Ayoob argues that the term *Third World* has (1995,12) “assumed a life of its own independent of the usage of the terms *First World* and *Second World*”. Perhaps the notion of the failed state represents a paradigmatic shift, in its unitary positioning as a state, in the international security configuration, overlooking its relationship with other states. Further, Ayoob cites Shahram Chubin’s insight on the nature of the global security architecture as it adversely impacts the world’s developing states, and calls for the need for a better understanding of international security vis-à-vis the state: (1995, 13) “the South is under siege – from an international community impatient to meddle in its affairs. States of the South are losing their sovereignty, which in many cases was only recently or tentatively acquired.” Ayoob’s assertion that state-making processes in the Third World are not carried out in an “international vacuum” (1995, 42) is apt in pointing out the significance of external influences, which may impede or facilitate such processes, must be examined in the regional and global context at various levels.

**Policy Implications of the Discourses**

The scholarly, foreign policy, and development literature on state failure is divergent in its diagnosis and policy prescription. Carment et al. (2009, 73) suggest that each perspective “results in policy approaches that are only partially complementary because they define fragile and failed states differently, generate different lists of at-risk failed states, and prescribe different policy approaches.” The dissertation seeks to
demonstrate that the threat that failed states pose to international stability is in some instances overstated, misunderstood, or constructed by the producers of the discourse.

Consider an observation made in the Economist (2009):

On a map of the world using the Brookings index of weak states, the epicenter is self-evidently sub-Saharan Africa… But this overlaps only in part with, say the ungoverned spaces that America’s State Department regards as the nastiest havens for international terrorists, such as al-Qaeda… The State Department identifies other ungoverned spaces such as Yemen (30th on the Brookings index), parts of Colombia (47th), the seas between the Phillipines (58th) and Indonesia (77th)…”

Preemptive and punitive policy responses in “failed states” by Western states are often perceived as a challenge to the sovereignty of the troubled state. William Polk (2010) notes that American and British military presence and timetable in Afghanistan “will not only convince the Afghans that we have become a colonial power but will also serve to convince the adherents to the party line in al-Qaeda, that Usama bin Laden is right to target America and Britain.” When foreign military measures are unaccompanied by palpable levels of restoration of order and adequate public security, they incapacitate rather than uplift the state, and frequently undercut local and external development initiatives underway to strengthen weak and fragile states. Sonali Huria (2009, 2) makes the point that military intervention in Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1979, and the US in 2001, “have left the state, far more conflict ridden, than prior to the intervention.” Among various factors identified in the US failure to effectively intervene in Afghanistan, Huria notes (ibid.) the lack of a “clear post-intervention strategy, military spending that has far outstripped reconstruction assistance, and spiraling civilian casualty figures.”
The implications of the degrading nomenclature for states stereotyped as failed or failing, may include a decline in tourism, foreign direct investment (FDI), and impediments to international trade. At issue is the economic, political and social marginalization of the failed state, and state and non-state actors who represent it.

Resonating with this view is Henry C. K. Liu’s (2005) position that “Failed and collapsed states are a structural trait of the contemporary international system, and not a temporary dysfunction of the Westphalian world order of sovereign states… The structure of the international system both in its political and socio-economic forms has historically set very different rules of the game for how failed states are identified and dealt with”.

Thereby, citizens and organizations belonging to “failed states” may be subjected to discrimination in enjoying the benefits of globalization, on par with citizens of successful states. Visa restrictions and other regulations constraining the mobility of these actors may prevent them from taking advantage of many opportunities for growth, development, and leisure, in various realms of life, open to citizens of other countries. In a sense then, the negative positioning of states, contributes to sharpening the rift between the West and the East, such as the clash of civilizations theory postulated by Huntington (1996).

It is important to note that former President Bush’s *National Security Strategy* (2002) brought into sharp focus the perception of threat evident in the policy discourse wherein he stated that “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.” Such an orientation in official US foreign policy has justified the grounds for the invasion of Afghanistan, subsequent to the terrorist attacks in 9/11. Consider also former Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice’s statement in an op-ed published in The Washington Post (December 11, 2005), “The danger (failed states) pose is now unparalleled. Absent responsible state authority, threats that would and should be contained within a country’s borders can now melt into the world and wreak untold havoc.”

The hypothesized linkage between terrorism and state failure emerged strongly in the implementation of US policy in Afghanistan in particular, and to a great degree in US policy in Iraq as well. In both cases military intervention was carried out under the garb of the Global War on Terrorism (GWoT). The US invasion of Iraq in 2003, is a case worthy of discussion with relevance to the failed states discourse. Unlike Afghanistan the argument for state failure in Iraq, has not been an easy one to make. The US led military invasion of Iraq was effectively pursued on the grounds of preemption against the threat of WMD, a charge which eventually proved erroneous. Initially however, the three major troop-contributing nations (the US, UK and Australia) “gave considerable weight to the humanitarian case for war in their public justifications… Although the humanitarian argument received support in some quarters it was widely rejected,” (Rosenthal and Barry 2009, 108).

Di John (2008, 1) writes that “In recent times, the failure of US interventions in Somalia, Haiti, and Iraq, and the flourishing of terrorist organizations in Afghanistan, have heightened academic and foreign policy interests, in conceptualizing the notion of ‘failed’ states.” The US occupation of Iraq could perhaps be compared with European colonial powers who “justified their
empires, in part, on the idea that their rule, would bring an end to ‘savage’ and ‘barbarous’ rule in the colonies. Powerful countries often intervened in poor, weaker states, to stem social disorder that potentially threatened their security and trade interests.” (ibid, 2). The real agenda for the US intervention in Iraq remains a moot point.\(^\text{14}\) What we do know however is that state-building and reconstruction are now the pretext for the US occupation of Iraq which implies therefore that Iraq did at some point become a failed state – either prior to or after foreign military intervention. This dismal picture of state performance in Iraq is confirmed in studies conducted by Marshall and Cole (2008, 2009), *The Index of State Weakness in the Developing World* (2008), and the *Failed States Index* (2008, 2009), among others. It must also be noted here that prior to US intervention in Iraq in 2003, the Iraqi state under Saddam Hussein had been delegitimized partly for its lack of a democratic function,\(^\text{15}\) a criterion often linked to state failure in Western discourses, as I will discuss in subsequent pages.

Like Afghanistan and subsequently Iraq, an invasive military strategy is also being pursued in Pakistan by the US, albeit less aggressively. Much of the literature and policy discourses on state failure and international security, place Pakistan amongst the world’s most vulnerable and least viable states (see for example, Rabasa et al. 2007; Failed States Index 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009; Marshall and Cole 2008; Chesterman et al. 2005; Cohen 2004; Clunan et al. 2008; and

\(^{15}\) See for example Thomas Carother’s article “The Democracy Crusade Myth” in *The National Interest Online,* July 2007.
The militaristic response by the United States in Afghanistan and Pakistan stems from the “under- or ungoverned spaces” state failure hypothesis, prevailing in the U.S. government and particularly within the Department of Defence, who view failed states as a dire threat to US national security, (Soderberg 2007, Clunan and Trincunas 2008, Rabasa et al. 2007). Western military interventions in Afghanistan since 9/11, and the institution of the U.S. backed democratically elected government in Kabul have been rather ineffective in their DDR (Dismarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration) and SSR (Security Sector Reform) objectives coordinated by ISAF (International Security Assistance Forces) led by US troops (refer to Appendix C)). Reconstruction efforts in post war Afghanistan in the words of Lakhdar Brahimi, UN’s former special envoy to Afghanistan, have been “lousy… We are too late, too bureaucratic, and frankly we spend too much money on ourselves rather than developing the skills of Afghans” (see Doucet 2006). The escalation of violence levels in all three countries (Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan) has served to further destabilize the conflict prone regions of the Middle East and South Asia with extensive collateral damage, fueling resentment against the United States and, arguably boosting recruitment in terrorist networks (refer to comparative case studies).

Effective control of territory has become particularly relevant to the US and foreign policy discourse aligned with the view that “ungoverned spaces” are a symptom of state failure and provide safe havens to terrorists. The ungoverned spaces and failed state nexus has become central to the Western security paradigm, particularly in the
aftermath of 9/11, whereby such territories (e.g. the Pakistan-Afghan border, Somalia, Sudan, among others) are widely regarded as breeding grounds and safe havens for terrorists (Soderberg 2007, Clunan and Trincunas 2008, Rabasa et al. 2007). Thus, a state’s successful performance on the basis of the control of its territory through the use of force, in line with the Machiavellian-Weberian dictum, has come into sharp focus in the discourses on state failure. Hans J. Morgenthau’s interpretation of state sovereignty “as the supreme legal authority of the nation to give and enforce the law within a certain territory” (1949, 305) resonates with this view.

Research Agenda Guided by Literature Review

The literature review suggests that the salient view of the failed state derives from three key concepts including:

a) the Western normative model of the state as the prototype of a successful state;

b) the Western view of the failed state as a unitary actor generating instability locally, regionally, and globally; and

c) the Western perception of state failure as a threat to Western security, resonating with Samuel Huntington’s (1993, 1996) “clash of civilizations” dynamic. (The concept of Western security in the failed states discourses is equated with the globalization of Western interests, not the classic notions of national territorial security.)

Having reviewed various Western theoretical constructs cutting across the notion of ideal statehood e.g., the social contract; a balance between state authority and individual rights; democratic values; the administrative function of state institutions and their relationship with prominent streams of contemporary Western discourses, the study
proposes the examination of the following notions to guide the research further:

- The importance of a multi-level analysis of the state that includes its endogenous and exogenous (regional and global) environment.
- The relationship between state and civil society in perceived failed states as well as an examination of the growth of civil society as a critical indicator of the state’s health (Serge Sur, 2005).
- The validity of the perceived security-failure nexus.
- The applicability of the Western normative model of the state to perceived failed states in the Global South.
- A disaggregated or small-N approach to studying the problem of state fragility and failure.

The aforementioned considerations are explored in interviews with experts from the Global North and South discussed in Chapter 4, following next. They also guide the theoretical framework explored in Chapter 5 and serve as the basis for comparative diagnostic assessment of eight weak, fragile, and failed states (Appendices C-J). In conclusion, Chapter 7 identifies the findings and examines the implications for theory, research, practice, teaching as well as policy, deriving from the discussion in this chapter and those that follow.
4. Interviews: Elicited Views of Experts from the Global North and South on Failed States

Backdrop

Many concerns surround the problem of state weakness, fragility, failure and collapse in Western policy, think tank, development, and academic discourses reviewed in the previous chapter. Mostly, they stem from the perpetuation of various forms and manifestations of conflict and instability and the threat posed to local communities, neighboring states, and global security. The fast pace of globalization has increased the threat of the regional and global contagion of disease, terrorism, refugee flows, narcotics, arms, and human trafficking manifold. While globalization has partly contributed to the evolving nature of threats to international stability, it also presents opportunities for the international community to intervene on behalf of vulnerable communities in conflict-afflicted states to diffuse crisis situations, to enforce and keep the peace, and to assist with economic development.

It is important to acknowledge the international community’s challenging yet successful interventions in conflict hotspots such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, East Timore, Kosovo, Haiti, and elsewhere. This study on the other hand is concerned with a number of international military interventions perceived as ineffective or complicating the conflict environment in troubled states and regions. They include the UN missions in Somalia in the 1990s (UNISOM I, UNOSOM II, and UNITAF); and post 9/11 multi-
lateral interventions in Iraq (GWoT), Afghanistan (GWoT), and Pakistan (GWoT: US Predator Drone campaign). Data collection through interviews is designed to inform a comprehensive assessment of the problem to effectively guide synergetic interventions by local, regional, and global actors. Interviews also aim to highlight perspectives from the Global South generally unacknowledged in mainstream Western literature.

**Aims and objectives of data collection through interviews**

The primary object of conducting interviews was to distinguish between the outsider’s vantage point (of external actors) and the insider perspective (of local actors) and to integrate their analytical perspectives. The selection of interviewees was based on their experience in one or more perceived failed states in the realms of development, diplomacy, policymaking, conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and/or in scholarly research. The interview agenda was guided by questions raised in the previous chapter (Literature Review) exploring exogenous factors impacting state fragility, the role of civil society in state performance, the validity of the perceived security-failure nexus, the applicability of Western normative models to failed and fragile states, and the usefulness of aggregated rankings of state performance as a practical tool for guiding analysis. Data collection from interviews guides the theoretical framework presented in the next chapter and informs policy recommendation in Chapter 7. Henceforth in this chapter, the terms “insider”, “internal” and “local” will be used in reference to the perspectives of experts from the Global South. Conversely, the terms “Western”, “outsider” and “external” will be used in reference to the perspectives of actors from the Global North.
Interview Process

Formal interviews were conducted between February and May 2010, with 25 experts in various fields described above. 13 (52%) of these participants were from the Global South, and the remaining 12 (48%) were from the Global North. Interviews were organized in an effort to ensure a relatively balanced representation of insider and outsider participation (perspectives from the Global South and North respectively). A list of interviewees is provided in Appendix A along with a brief description of their professional affiliations at the time the interviews were conducted. The views of the interviewees have not been attributed by name in this section or elsewhere in the study in line with the protocol developed for the research. Subjects were asked a range questions provided in the interview questionnaire (see Chapter 2). Clarification of some of their responses was sought during the interviews by paraphrasing and reframing the questions. All questions could not be raised in each interview so as to allow participants ample time to elaborate on issues. Questions that could not be raised in a majority of interviews have been noted in the data analysis (Appendix B) and responses have not been reported in this chapter.

Summary Findings

Experts from the Global North and South agree on the state’s capacity, legitimacy and authority as important indicators of state effectiveness. However, they differed on a number of issues in diagnosing the problem. First and foremost, experts from both regions disagreed on the conceptualization of the problem. Southern experts generally reject the classification “failed” in describing states experiencing protracted war and
violence, a view salient in the West. Secondly, Western experts were more inclined to agree with aggregated analysis of state performance, but experts from the Global South favored disaggregated and small-N analysis to provide the specific context of the state and a focused assessment of state capacity. Thirdly, state failure is not considered as common a phenomenon and as grave a threat to global security as it is regarded in some quarters in Global North. In the fourth place, experts in the Global South underscored the importance of the role of civil society and grass-root level economic activity as critical indicators of a state’s viability in conditions of conflict, an aspect which is usually not explored in prominent Western literature. Finally, experts from the Global South drew attention to the vulnerability of weak and fragile states to the policies, orientations and behavior of regional and pre-eminent global actors, a level of analysis that is generally unacknowledged in Western literature. That said, the outsider perspectives elicited in interviews confirmed the validity of the concern expressed by Southern voices.

Experts from the Global North and South confirmed the proposition that post 9/11 Western policy in failed states is tied to the perceived threat of terrorism. Southern perspectives reflected the apprehension that Western-led interventions in perceived failed states are more likely to be driven by Western strategic pursuits rather than humanitarian objectives. Related to this concern, the insider perspective generally believed that policies of intervention are tied to and perpetuated by prominent Western discourses on state failure – a view that could not be confirmed by research subjects from the Global North.
While international aid and development interventions are generally regarded as beneficial in the Global North, Southern experts identified problems such as corruption in recipient states, aid distribution among warlords and militia groups, donor driven agendas, aid dependency, and incoherent planning in aid allocation. Recommendations of experts from both regions included improving mechanisms of international aid through distribution directly within local communities, debt relief, foreign direct investment, and trade subsidies. The involvement of local actors in planning the strategic response to crisis situations and aid allocation procedures were also underscored.

Experts from both regions generally recognize that the international community has effectively intervened in a range of volatile situations threatening state and regional stability. However, Southern voices are particularly supportive of diplomatic and conflict resolution strategies including truth and reconciliation processes, mediation, capacity-building of civil society and local involvement in designing and implementing various initiatives. Finally, experts from both regions recommended a range of interventions in weak, failing and fragile states reported in the detailed research findings below and integrated in Chapter 7 - the concluding chapter which provides policy recommendations.

**Detailed Research Findings**

1. **How do experts from the Global South and North define the problem of state failure?**

Participants from both global regions are conscious of the dynamics of state fragility and instability in various states but they differ on characterizing the problem as “state failure”. The outsider perspective is inclined to consider a failed state as a violent
end state that is unwilling or unable to respond to humanitarian crises and/or environmental disasters, whose authority is deeply fragmented, that is unable to provide minimal public goods, services, justice and security, and to generate revenue. The external perspective also views a failed state as one with high levels of organized criminal activity, poverty, and disease. It is also inclined to use the terms “fragility” and “failure” interchangeably.

While the insider view generally agrees with the above features of state failure, it is critical of the Western lens whereby conditions of overt conflict are so frequently observed as symptoms of state failure. It generally considers state failure to be a rare phenomenon. The insider perspective advocates the examination of the role of civil society and grass-root level economic activity as critical indicators of a state’s viability and resilience in conditions of conflict. Southern experts regard the “failed states” paradigm as a Western construct and frequently see it as having negative consequences for perceived failed states.

2. **What are the exogenous sources of state instability identified by experts from the Global South and North?**

Participants holding insider and outsider views identified a range of similar exogenous factors including:

- regional security dilemmas
- regional contagion of conflict (e.g. cross-border refugee movements, human, drug, and small arms trafficking)
- armed violence along contiguous borders involving ethnic kin-groups and tribal
conflict
- terrorist safe havens in border regions, and
- the adverse impact of the global economic crisis on weak and fragile states.

Experts from the Global South generally also raised the threat to state stability posed by foreign military and political interventions undertaken by preeminent international actors, a view that was opposed by the vast majority of experts from the Global North.

3. How do experts from the Global South and North describe the level of threat posed by failed states to global security in general and the US in particular?

The Southern perspective generally does not regard the problem of state failure as a critical threat to US or global security. The Northern perspective on the other hand is divided regarding the threat to global stability emanating from failed states. Responses ranged from a perception of direct or indirect threat to global security, as the failed state generally posing a greater threat to itself than another, or the consideration of the unique context of the state to define the level and nature of threat to international security.

4. Do experts from the Global South and North perceive a nexus between the threat of terrorism and the conceptualization of state failure in the West?

The perception that failed states provide breeding grounds for terrorist havens is wide-held in the West although a minority dissenting opinion does exist. A Western minority expressed the view that terrorists were more likely to seek sanctuary in states that are not basket cases of failure because they rely on services such as communications technology in planning their operations. The Western view confirms that the threat of terrorism has assumed primacy in Western foreign policy discourses on state failure.
Experts representing insider voices believe that there is no direct relationship between the dynamics of state failure and terrorism. It was argued that historically terrorists have operated in a variety of regions including Europe (e.g. Italian Red Brigades, Germany’s Red Army Faction, the Irish Republican Army) and the United States (e.g. Ku Klux Klan, the Weathermen). They also exist in modern day Russia and have used European cities to plan 9/11 and post 9/11 incidents of terrorism showing their capacity to breed and find sanctuary anywhere regardless of state failure.

5. **Do experts from the Global South and North find quantitative indices ranking state failure, fragility, and instability a useful analytical tool?**

Experts representing the Global North generally find quantitative approaches to be useful, especially in terms of raising awareness and analysis of the situation and generating a dialogue among donors. However, a minority view is conscious of weaknesses in quantitative research approaches (e.g. aggregation of states, proliferation of indices providing different assessments of the problem, exclusion of local perceptions, negative categorization and implications of the associated policy rhetoric. In contrast, experts in the Global South are generally critical of aggregation as an appropriate methodological approach for analyzing the dynamics of state fragility and failure. Although, a minority believed that the indices were useful in terms of research, the majority suggested that they promote a Western paradigm that is value-laden and isolating, that rankings are not congruent with ground realities and are demoralizing, that they tend to be politically motivated and can provide justification for intervention in states that do not fit the Western normative model. Southern experts also forwarded the
view that contrary to apocalyptic scenarios promoted by the label “failed state” and negative state rankings, a number of concerned states have the capacity to self-stabilize and embark on a positive growth trajectory.

6. **How do experts from the Global South and North evaluate the relationship between prominent discourses on failed states and foreign military interventions?**

   There is lack of agreement in the Global North regarding the nexus between the failed states discourse and foreign military intervention. However, the majority opinion rejects the notion that discourse has a direct relationship with policy. On the other hand, in the Global South there is a strong perception of the linkage between rhetoric and foreign military interventions in failed states. A majority of them subscribe to the view that the failed states discourse flows from and complements policy and that a number of perceived failed states have been subjected to punitive sanctions and coercive policies including Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan.

7. **What are the views of experts from the Global South and North on the implications of international military interventions in failed states?**

   Although the implications of international military interventions are a moot point in the West, the principal of intervention is rationalized on the pretext of stabilizing vulnerable states and regions in the world. Global governance through peacekeeping and enforcement is often seen as a legitimate strategic response to ungoverned territories and regional conflict contagion. Experts from the Global South however, generally expressed the concern that the post 9/11 landscape has contributed to a shift in the strategic calculus of intervention that is geared towards Western security rather than the alleviation of a
humanitarian crisis, that it may be pursued in violation of international law (without the approval of the UN Security Council), and that it often lacks coherent planning and coordination.

8. **What are the views of experts from the Global South and North on the implications of international aid and development interventions in failed states?**

Western experts believe that international aid and development interventions have meaningfully addressed many problems in the Global South including the threat of disease in particular, and state instability in general. However half of them noted that the benefits of aid were challenged by one or more of the following factors: huge amount of funds required to re-build post-conflict states; the impact of the global financial crisis on aid; a multiplicity of external development actors in failed states with competing agendas; a lack of commitment to nation-building as a precursor for effective state-building; corruption levels in recipient countries; significant levels of aid returning to donor countries through their contractors; lack of a coherent U.S. aid policy; vested interests of the donor community in maintaining a presence in failed states (e.g. to extract local resources); and politicization of aid distribution. Recommendations for improving aid effectiveness included its distribution directly within local communities to empower them, (e.g. through Afghanistan’s solidarity program). Moreover, it was suggested that trade should be explored as a more viable form of development aid by the donor community.

Experts from the Global South agreed that development assistance could be useful if channeled efficiently, but they were skeptical about the benefits of existing aid
mechanisms as a viable solution to addressing state instability. They identified problems such as corruption in recipient states, aid distribution among war-lords and militia groups, donor driven agendas, aid dependency, and incoherent planning in aid allocation. Recommendations for improving mechanisms of international aid included: debt relief, foreign direct investment, and trade subsidies. The involvement of local actors in the planning the strategic response to crisis situations and aid allocation procedures were also underscored.

9. **What types of interventions do experts from the Global South and North consider successful models of state stabilization?**

Experts from both regions generally recognize that the international community has effectively intervened in a range of volatile situations threatening state and regional stability. However, Southern voices are particularly supportive of diplomatic and conflict resolution strategies including truth and reconciliation processes, mediation, and capacity-building of civil society. In terms of military intervention they noted that UN peacekeeping has been instrumental in civil war termination in a number of countries although the success could be attributed to the relatively small population size, and the long-term presence of peacekeeping troops. They also observed that the UN and the World Bank had not demonstrated their success in building the capacity of states to embark upon and sustain robust development trajectories. Western experts also discussed a range of effective interventions including conflict resolution, crisis management/war termination through military means; peacekeeping; preservation of international borders; strengthening political institutions and development projects.
10. What types of interventions do experts from the Global South and North consider to be ineffective in stabilizing failed states?

Experts from the Global North and the South discussed a range of external interventions. Because a disproportionate number of responses were elicited a regional comparison is not performed. Various challenges identified by research subjects included: a lack of knowledge and sophistication in state stabilization; difficulties in balancing relations between the state and civil society by external actors; a greater emphasis on crisis management through military means compared to development; multiplicity of international development actors and competing agendas; inefficacious use of local resources; lack of local ownership in development processes; regional spillover potential of prolonged military interventions; and the prolonged nature of peace enforcement missions.

11. What recommendations do experts from the Global South and North provide for the international community to effectively intervene in failed states?

Regional recommendations were similar. Experts underscored a range of interventions including: supporting humanitarian objectives; exploring the role of regional organizations in peacekeeping and conflict resolution at the domestic and regional levels; locally led development processes; reinforcement of local institutions and structures; capacity building of local leadership; prioritization of educational and literacy programs; job creation for local communities; trade as an alternative to aid; and rethinking arms sales to conflict afflicted regions. Experts from the Global South particularly emphasized the desire for a greater involvement of local communities in
planning and execution of state building processes and a greater capacity building role of the donor community.

**Conclusion**

Interview findings suggest that the failed states’ problematique remains conceptually ambiguous, and requires a comprehensive diagnosis by integrating the knowledge available in the Global North and South. A comprehensive diagnosis of the problem would include the examination of exogenous factors and a broader examination of the domestic context, particularly the role of civil society and its relationship with the state, generally unacknowledged in Western literature. Additionally, findings confirm the hypothesis that the Western conceptualization of state failure and associated policy discourses are generally guided by a security-centered approach in the wake of 9/11. Therefore, the response of pre-eminent global actors in perceived failed states is more likely to be driven by strategic objectives and less by humanitarian and development concerns. Thus “political will” is now more so than ever before tied to national interests. Interview findings suggest that external military and development interventions have the potential to exacerbate the dynamics of state instability locally and regionally. Views elicited from experts representing the Global North and South prescribe a range of peacebuilding, development and conflict resolution strategies that are discussed in Chapter 7 (offering policy recommendations). A theoretical framework guided by the research agenda presented in the literature review and resonating with interview findings discussed in this chapter, follows in Chapter 5. The discussion in Chapter 5 also explores the question of the legality, ethics, and viability of multilateral military interventions in
fragile contexts, given the international community’s inclination to use force in the post Cold War, post 9/11 environment, as suggested by interview findings.

Detailed interview findings and analysis are provided in Appendix B for the interested reader.
5. An Integrated Theoretical Framework Based on Theoretical and Interview Data

In view of the theoretical and methodological criticisms of the literature discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, this chapter offers an alternative lens for diagnosing the problem of state weakness, fragility, failure, and collapse. I recommend a small-N investigation of the problem in application of the theoretical framework I weave together drawing from contemporary literature and interview findings. The gaps identified in the literature pertain to the domestic, regional and global context of state performance. This chapter, therefore, brings to the fore the importance of a multi-tiered level of analysis. It highlights, in particular, the importance of protracted social conflicts; the problem solving response of local civil society actors; regional contagion of protracted instability; hostile neighbors; and the impact of external multilateral interventions. Because the dissertation is especially concerned with the impact of external military interventions in weak, fragile, and failed states, this chapter additionally explores: a) the legal premise for international interventions; b) theoretical approaches that operationalize the success of military interventions; and c) the pragmatic concern regarding the viability and implications of international military interventions.

In addition to drawing from contemporary Western literature, expert perspectives from the Global South and North elicited in the interviews are used to integrate and build
upon insider and outsider knowledge to guide theory development in this chapter. The theoretical framework developed in this chapter is applied to comparative case studies (Appendices C-J) elucidating on the scope and severity of state weakness and fragility, and particularly, the impact of external military interventions in at-risk states. Additionally, the theoretical framework informs the articulation of policy recommendations in Chapter 7 - the concluding chapter examining the implications for theory, research, practice, teaching as well as policy.

Proposed Theoretical Framework

I propose a theoretical framework using small N-studies to guide practitioners and policy makers in comprehensively analyzing various conditions that could potentially lead to state failure and collapse and, by implication, intervention by the international community to manage if not eliminate those conditions. A host of domestic, regional, and global sources of state instability need to be explored for the purposes of theory development to assess state performance and guide policy. The regional sources of conflict may include: hostile and/or hegemonic neighbors; power asymmetries; chronic refugee flows; trafficking of narcotics, arms, and humans; cross-border spillover of violence and sources of terrorism, etc. Likewise wider global inputs such as: arms sales; military interventions; restrictive trade covenants; ideological pressures; great power competition over minerals and resources in Third World states; donor driven development agendas; and political clientelism; are among many international factors that need to be examined as possible impediments to successful state performance.
When studying the problem of state instability, it is important to be cognizant of the fact that globalization has created a world that is inter-connected in more ways than ever before. Therefore instability in any one state, especially when it is weak, is not entirely a consequence of its domestic context but also what is happening around the world. Consider for instance, a somewhat indirect manifestation of international spillover of violence explored by Sandole, the multiplier-effect-systemic contagion (1999, 148-150). This entails the global diffusion of conflict through the demonstration and band-wagon effects, whereby conflict dynamics (e.g. ethnic insurgency) in one country triggers similar responses in other parts of the world. He cites the perceived link between ethnic conflict in former Yugoslavia with similar dynamic in the erstwhile Soviet Union (also see Sandole, 2007).

The recent popular uprisings against autocratic regimes in many parts of the Arab world present another succinct example of multiplier-effect-systemic contagion. The revolts started in Tunisia and have spread to Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Yemen, Algeria, Morocco, Syria, Bahrain, Oman and other countries in the Middle East and Africa in varying degrees. These and other dynamics of the global security environment call to attention the need for a wider examination of the international environment and its implications for global instability. Ironically, while many of the quantitative indices address the threat of spillover from weak and fragile states, most do not situate them within a regional and international security context (with the exception of Hewitt, Wilkenfeld, and Gurr 2008; Hewitt, Wilkenfeld, and Gurr 2010; Marshall, Goldstone, and Cole 2008; Marshall and Cole 2009). As a result, Western scholarly efforts to
examine various sources of state weakness and fragility do not provide a comprehensive analysis of the problem. The illustration below shows the interconnection between the state’s domestic environment, and the regional and global environments. When examining the performance of a state, it is critical to assess the regional and global influences that threaten its stability or instability, in addition to the threats the fragile state may pose to regional and global security.

Figure 3: Interconnection Between the State, Region and the Global Environment

Figure 3 shows the interconnection between the state, the region, and the wider global environment. A number of prominent scholars who have taken into consideration the regional and global context of state fragility include Edward Azar (1985, 1990), Jared
Diamond (1999, 2005), Monty Marshall (1999), Chestermen and Thakur (2005), and Paul Collier (2007) among others. However, the threat that the weak and failing state poses to the global community remains central to the debate, with little consideration of how the global context imperils the weak, failing and fragile state. This research study argues that the trajectory of state fragility and failure is rooted in exogenous factors as well as endogenous factors.

The theoretical framework developed in this chapter explores the endogenous (structural and societal) and exogenous (regional and global) conditions, which could potentially lead to state instability and fragility, possibly creating the conditions of failure when afflicting the state over prolonged periods. Based on the theoretical considerations presented subsequently in this chapter, the study defines state failure as an end-state where the state suffers from an overwhelming loss of legitimacy across considerably vast stretches of its geographic area, where it is unable or unwilling to provide public goods and services, justice and security, opportunities for self-actualization and socio-economic development, where its relationship with civil society is highly asymmetrical, and where society itself has become highly fragmented, challenging the cohesiveness of the state through the manifestation of protracted conflict.

The theoretical propositions guiding this chapter derive from Diamond’s five-point framework (2005) which ties in with Marshall’s Protracted Conflict Region (PCR) model (1999), and Edward Azar’s protracted social conflict theory (1978, 1985, 1990). The discussion also sheds light on the implications of military interventions on weak states drawing on Marshall’s insecurity diffusion and minimal intervention concepts.
(1999). In response to the concern with destabilizing military interventions, the chapter reflects on Patrick Regan’s (1996) and Taylor B. Seybolt’s (2007) conditions for successful third party interventions and builds the case for multi-sectoral and collaborative conflict resolution processes in weak, fragile, and failed states. The proposed framework is subsequently applied to a range of perceived failed states in South Asia, Africa and the Middle East to assess the extent of their weakness, fragility, failure, and collapse and prospects for resolution (Appendices C-J). The critical components of the theoretical framework postulated for the diagnosis of state failure are illustrated in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Critical Components of State Failure
Identifying Critical Components of State Failure

As a point of departure, I explore Diamond’s five-point framework articulated in his seminal work *Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed* (2005). The framework is particularly useful because it shows that state collapse is inextricably tied to societal responses, a consideration that is generally not explored in contemporary Western literature. Societal response is an important change dynamic especially when it is able to create the demands and pressures on the state to deliver. Diamond identifies a combination of endogenous and exogenous variables in analyzing the problem, an approach that is different from the mainstream literature, generally inclined to treat the state as the unit of analysis.

Diamond (2005) employs a comparative qualitative approach in investigating various collapse scenarios in pre-historic, historic, and contemporary societies, ranging from the Maya to Easter Island, from Rwanda to Haiti and the Dominican Republic, from Norse Greenland to the highlands of New Guinea, and others. Ruminating on lessons of history, he discusses factors that could potentially place some societies most at risk. Under exploration here are questions such as: why some past societies collapsed while others didn’t? What made some of them more vulnerable? Why some were unable to perceive their weaknesses and problem-solve? What problem-solving lessons could be learned from their trajectories of resilience, survival, and conversely weakness?

Five factors critical for determining a society’s proclivity to failure, or conversely, survival, are identified in the treatise:
i. Environmental degradation

ii. Climate change

iii. Hostile neighbors

iv. Friendly neighbors

v. Societal response to problems

This dissertation explores three of these factors, with the exception of environmental degradation and climate change because they are not within the purview of this research. I do not, however, underestimate the importance of these two factors. Given the rate at which our planet is experiencing climate change and environmental degradation, the survival of many vulnerable states is threatened. For instance, it is postulated that Bangladesh could submerge in its entirety within the next two decades or so, as a result of rising sea levels associated with climate change. Diamond (2005) thoughtfully examines how climate change has contributed to the decline of past societies including the drought in the Native American society of the Anasazi, leading to its collapse. One could consider similar problems in modern societies, such as the recurrence of long lasting droughts and famines in states like Ethiopia causing hundreds of thousands of deaths, putting millions of lives at the risk of starvation, and resulting in socio-economic collapse. Consider also how the troubled state of Yemen could be impacted when Sana, its capital city runs out of water by 2025, unless plans are made to address the situation in advance. Climate change and environmental degradation

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17 See “Yemen capital will run out of water by 2025” in Wash News Middle East and North Africa. Dec 9,
threaten many parts of the world in a number of ways and I humbly defer the interested reader to Diamond’s (2005) scholarship on the implications for states and societies.

Diamond’s (2005, 3) definition of societal collapse underpinning his five-point framework is especially useful because it clarifies the difference between milder types of decline and the extreme nature of collapse, a detail that is critical for the design of an appropriate intervention and is generally obscured in large-N quantitative rankings of state performance, particularly those do not use time-line analysis. Consider his words:

By collapse, I mean a drastic decrease in human population size and/or political/economic/social complexity, over a considerable area, for an extended time. The phenomenon of collapses is thus an extreme form of several milder types of decline, and it becomes arbitrary to decide how drastic the decline of a society must be before it qualifies to be labeled as a collapse. Some of those milder types of decline include the normal minor rises and falls of fortune, and minor political/economic/social restructurings, of any individual society; one society's conquest by a close neighbor, or its decline linked to the neighbor's rise, without change in the total population size or complexity of the whole region; and the replacement or overthrow of one governing elite by another.

As suggested by this definition, it is imperative for researchers to consider the severity of collapse and failure, before arbitrarily using classifications predicting end-state scenarios for states experiencing minor declines and falls. Flawed concepts lead to flawed interventions - a primary concern guiding this dissertation research (also see Sandole, 1997). Among Diamond’s (2005) five factors contributing to state collapse, some are viewed as more significant than others, depending on the context. Below, I reflect on his concepts of societal responses (an endogenous consideration) and hostile and friendly
neighbors (exogenous considerations) as I build an alternative framework for analyzing the context of state fragility.

**Societal Responses to Problems: An Endogenous Concern**

I shall first discuss Diamond’s last set of considerations in his five-point framework: a society’s and its leaders’ response to its problems, described as the *most* critical factor related to a state’s success or conversely, failure (2005, 14). Diamond suggests that while the first four considerations in his five-point framework may or may not necessarily contribute to societal collapse, the fifth factor is always significant. He argues that (ibid, 14-15) “a society’s responses depend on its political, economic, and social institutions and on its cultural values. Those institutions and values affect whether the society solves (or even tries to solve) its problems.” Throughout his treatise, Diamond is emphatic about the society’s response to its problems as a pivotal characteristic defining its rise or fall. But very little attention is paid to this factor in the contemporary literature on failed and fragile states which appears to be following the trends in journalistic media - reporting bad news because it makes good news. Civil society mobilization in response to environmental, political, economic, and social upheaval, and in creating the demands and pressures on states to deliver goods and services, is rarely examined in relationship with the state’s capacity to endure systemic shocks. Civil society supports states in many of its functions and can hold it accountable – a factor that must be examined in the context of state performance.

Consider an example of how the *Failed States Index* fails to address civil society in its analysis of Pakistan’s performance. C. Christine Fair (2010) argues: “So, Pakistan
faces severe challenges. But Pakistan has also made important strides which are not captured by this index.” She discusses a number of factors that pose a threat to Pakistan’s instability, in addition to how the society is working to address those shortcomings. For instance, she mentions that opportunities for affordable private education are growing and filling a serious void in education that public schools are unable to fill. Fair sums up her criticisms of the FSI thus (ibid.):

In short, the Failed States Index is clearly only one side of the die. While sitting at a computer crunching numbers, even with expert input as the index apparently uses, the larger story is missed. Pakistan has its problems and enormous challenges lay ahead, but it is far from a failed or even failing state.

Contrasting with this methodological approach, Diamond explores the response of various societies in his case studies as well as the reversibility of the extent of the damage (2005, 8). For instance, he compares the Dominican Republic and Haiti, two impoverished states, and argues that although both lie side by side, sharing similar histories of colonization and facing similar development challenges, the Dominican Republic’s policy and grassroots commitment to protect the environment has been a key factor contributing to its relatively better growth trajectory.

Civil society serves as an important interface between government and the grassroots, and its role as a catalyst of change in ill-performing states must be thoroughly examined as part of a comprehensive analysis of a state’s trajectory, in addition to the other important factors. Diamond emphasizes that a society’s responses and the action or inaction of its leaders are equally important (ibid, 353). The cases of Algeria and Nepal discussed in Appendices D and G demonstrate that left to manage their own problems, fragile states can develop the capacity to effectively diffuse crisis situations and embark
upon viable transition trajectories. Algeria’s case in particular draws attention to the elite response to civil war, which was managed by an internally driven reconciliation process. Liberia provides an excellent example of the role of civil society in civil war termination and is discussed in Appendix F. Likewise, Pakistan’s vibrant civil society is discussed at length in Appendix H as a critical factor in societal resilience, notwithstanding the internal and external challenges to the country’s stability. Civil society reconciliation efforts in Somalia’s Somaliland and Puntland in Appendix J also demonstrate their effectiveness in building peace in a fragile context.

**Hostile Neighbors: An Exogenous Factor**

Another set of critical considerations in societal collapse, argues Diamond (2005, 13) are hostile neighbors. It is important to broaden this perspective and consider also the role of hostile great powers, which could threaten the stability of weak and fragile states. For the purposes of this research, I have examined the relations of weak and fragile states with neighboring states as well as their contentious relationships with distant conquering states. Patterns of sporadic or chronic hostilities with neighboring states are explored with regard to their impact on state fragility. Likewise, the impact of Western-led humanitarian and strategic military interventions in perceived failed and fragile states are also examined.

Diamond (2005, 13) argues that a society is able to deter its adversary as long as it remains strong, and is likely to be challenged in conditions of weakness. Thus, a society becomes weaker or collapses as a result of military intervention, which may have been the most “proximate cause”, but the “ultimate cause” will have been the one that is the
underlying cause of the weakness, e.g. environmental degradation. “Hence, collapses for ecological or other reasons often masquerade as military defeats,” (2005, 13). This is an important point that I explore in the comparative analysis of states (Appendices C-J). I argue, however, that in many instances of state fragility, external military intervention is a factor that contributes significantly to state fragility and, in combination with other problems such as protracted social conflict, often becomes a critical cause of collapse depending on its scale and magnitude, e.g. in Afghanistan and Iraq.

**Friendly Neighbors: An Exogenous Concern**

Another set of considerations that I draw from Diamond’s (2005) treatise is the importance of stable and cooperating neighbors. I find this factor quite pertinent in the evolving context of globalization when regional economic integration is increasingly becoming the norm. Diamond articulates his concern about the implications for a state’s stability when trade relations and dependency on a neighbor are constrained by some weakness. Thus he argues (ibid, 14):

Most societies depend to some extent on friendly neighbors, either for imports of essential trade goods (like U.S. imports of oil, and Japanese imports of oil, wood, and seafood, today), or else for cultural ties that lend cohesion to the society (such as Australia's cultural identity imported from Britain until recently). Hence the risk arises that, if your trade partner becomes weakened for any reason (including environmental damage) and can no longer supply the essential import or the cultural tie, your own society may become weakened as a result.

Although Diamond is primarily concerned with the potentially adverse impact of trade dependence on a weak neighbor, generally speaking a weak neighbor does not bode well for the stability of a state and the region in general. Conflict and instability can spill over into the region affecting other states in various forms and manifestations including
disease, human displacement, trafficking of arms and narcotics, organized criminal activity, and so on. Thus, I argue that good and stable neighbors are fundamentally a positive indicator for the long-term stability of a weak state. Clearly, the good neighbor effect increases manifold when a state can rely on a continuous supply of goods, but even more so when the trading neighbor, by virtue of the economic stakes, supports conflict resolution processes across the border in the event of instability. Thus, the question of increased economic cooperation takes center stage because of the vital importance of regional cooperation for sustainable economic development of developing regions.

Regional economic integration has a positive spin-off effect on state stability. The post-World War II era has seen the emergence of a number of regional trading blocs in Asia, Africa, Europe and the Americas. The creation of regional economic blocs in various parts of the world has facilitated international trade and protected those blocs from fluctuations in the world economy. The experience of these economic blocs also shows that the social and economic development of any country will benefit by linking up to the global economy as part of a regional bloc rather than independently. An integrated regional economy boosts the economic development of a country through the advantages of geographic proximity (such as lower transportation costs and time constraints), and economies of scale in production and infrastructure.

Member countries of regional economic blocs are also better able to interact in the global systems of finance, investment, trade, and institutions. The countries that are not part of a trade bloc face the risk of discrimination of their exports and loss of competitiveness, and may be vulnerable to adverse fluctuations in the global economy.
Western Europe was the first region to adopt regional economic cooperation in 1949, with the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community and the foundation of the European Economic Community (EEC) following the 1957 Treaty of Rome (Khan & Zafar, 1998, 3). A number of sub-regional and regional cooperation schemes developed in different parts of the world following the EEC. The late 1980s and early 1990s saw a strong trend towards regional economic integration particularly among the developed countries. A European Single Market was evolved by 1992. The USA, Canada, and Mexico formed a Regional Trade and Investment Agreement (RTIA) called NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement). A new customs union known as MERCOSUR (Mercado Común del Sur or the Southern Common Market) emerged in South America (including Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay). The Andes countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) formed a Free Trade Area, and the ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) Free Trade Area comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand also materialized (Khan & Zafar, 1998, 5-7). Presently ASEAN has evolved to include ten member states.

Regional economic organization is critical for conflict resolution and state stabilization processes (see Sandole, 2007). If regional institutions are given incentives for forging economic partnerships, it would serve as a viable mechanism for building their stakes in promoting rather than spoiling the prospects of their neighbors’ peace and stability. The role played by ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) in conflict management and resolution processes in Liberia and Sierra Leone, provides a
clear illustration of the peace dividends that regional economic integration can pay (see Appendices F and I).

**Protracted Social Conflicts: An Endogenous and Exogenous Concern**

Edward Azar’s theory (1978, 1985, 1990, 1991) of protracted social conflicts (PSCs) draws from various scholarly perspectives including John Burton’s basic human needs theory (1979, 1990), providing a useful framework for analyzing the domestic context of state fragility. Azar (1978, 50) defines PSCs as prolonged conflict processes involving deep-rooted non-negotiable basic human needs and not simply periods of warfare or a cluster of conflict events. Such is the scale of the intractability of the conflicts that they remain unresolved for decades or longer, partly owing to the complex nature of issues involving threats to identity, historical grievances, denial of basic human needs and rights, and partly due to intransigent attitudes of conflict actors (ibid, 53).

Azar examines a range of states experiencing PSCs (some of which have been resolved) including his country of origin, Lebanon, and others such as Sri Lanka, Israel, Northern Ireland, Iran, Sudan, Nigeria, South Africa, and Cyprus. He posits that PSCs are generated by the interplay between a state’s communal content, deprivation of basic human needs, governance and the state’s excessive reliance on authority, and the role of external actors and groups:

1. The ‘communal content’ or identity groups within a state are distinguishable along deep-seated racial, religious, ethnic and/or cultural cleavages. Azar views the asymmetric relationship between the state and identity groups as a legacy of a state’s colonial past where power is monopolized by one or a few communal groups.
The preservation of the status quo by dominating groups leads to the marginalization of weaker identity groups, manifest in the denial of their individual needs and interests, on the basis of their membership in a certain social group – thereby generating conflict behavior.

2. Azar’s concept of the deprivation of basic human needs is viewed as a key factor in the collective expression of frustrated needs, manifest in protracted social conflict. He underscores that PSCs are driven by a group’s limited access to human needs, particularly the ones that satisfy its developmental requirements. The denial of human needs as fundamental are: security, freedom (of cultural and religious expression), and recognition of identity. These are seen as the underlying causes of the dysfunctional relationship between state and society. He also underscores the importance of “effective participation in the processes that determine conditions of security and identity” (1985, 60).

3. The state’s role is regarded as pivotal in the equitable distribution of resources to fulfill the political, social, cultural and economic development needs of identity groups, considered universal and ontological. Azar and Ayer (1990,10) state that “Most states which experience protracted social conflict tend to be characterized by incompetent, parochial, fragile, and authoritarian governments that fail to satisfy basic human needs.” These state systems are deeply entrenched in bureaucratic and hierarchical traditions; usually have very weak participatory mechanisms and limited political capacity; and their elites are typically unresponsive to the needs of various identity groups – the communal content – deepening the societal divisions.
with the passage of time and prolonging the dynamics of conflict. Thus, he brings the state’s capacity for (or absence of) good governance and regulating conflict behavior into sharp focus.

4.) Finally, Azar’s framework examines external influences perpetuating PSCs, primarily in the form of ‘international linkages’, whereby conflict actors become dependent on external actors or groups (including state and/or non-state such as diaspora and hostile states) for political and economic sources of support. This is an important factor, considering the oft-voiced concern that many ongoing intractable conflicts in the world are fueled by external sources supplying military and financial support. Ramsbotham and Miall (2006, 87) describe international linkages as global patterns of ‘clientage and cross-border interest’ drawing on Azar’s view of international linkages guiding the formation of domestic social and political institutions and their influence on the role of the state (1990, 11).

This dissertation uses Azar’s framework to explore the domestic context of state fragility, as well as cross-border interests and linkages with states and non-state actors playing a role in the perpetuation of conflict dynamics, in comparative case studies in Appendices C-J. Somalia and Afghanistan provide two very clear illustrations of PSCs leading to state failure. Various PSC variables discussed above are examined with reference to all the case studies in an assessment of their risk to failure and collapse.

**Regional Security: An Exogenous Factor**

Monty Marshall views security essentially as a regional issue (1999). He argues that if “a real ‘peace dividend’ is ever to be realized and a systemic peace ever to be attained,
then the prisoner’s dilemma game of regional security must be successfully overcome” (ibid, 223). Exploring the process of diffusion of insecurity in cultures of violence, he (ibid, 138-139) presents the concept of the ‘Protracted Conflict Region (PCR)’ suggesting that the spillover of the culture of violence is a function of spatial proximity and “affects all social relations in proximity to the violence”. While the culture of violence most directly affects “confrontal” states situated at the core of the PCR, it spreads to populations in peripheral states (those surrounding core states) and marginal states (situated beyond the peripheral states) within the region, although to lesser degrees. Marshall’s thesis holds resonance with Sandole’s (1999, 2007) discussion of three types of spillover (functional spillover, external intervention, and multiplier-effect systemic contagion), whereby conflict can spread within an area, beyond the area and its boundaries, and even far away from its origin.

Marshall identifies six broad regions of the world including the Middle East, Southern Africa, South Asia, South East Asia, the Korean Peninsula and Central America as falling under the PCR category, arguing that fault lines of spillover can be traced back to unresolved conflicts in the post World War II landscape. While this dissertation does not explore weak and fragile states as examples of the fallout of WWII or colonization, it finds that protracted conflict regional contagion, in combination with other critical factors discussed earlier in this chapter has a significant impact on regional instability. Various regions of the world under examination in this research, including South Asia, West Africa, the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, demonstrate symptoms of this problem. The weak and fragile state syndrome provides a good fit for Marshall’s PCR theory.
(1999), whereby patterns of violence are observed as having a regional clustering effect. The PCR effect is explored in detail with reference to case studies in Appendices C to J.

A factor that is very important is the impact of international arms transfers on state failure. It has been empirically established that some of the most successful Western states maintain high levels of military expenditure, having a spin-off effect on international arms races; generating high levels of revenue from arms sales to many fragile, poor, and developing states. By one estimate, there are over 600 million items of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) that have been distributed throughout the world (Yamin 2010, 38). It is reported that well over a thousand companies based in more than ninety eight different countries are engaged in the production of SALW (ibid.). Of these countries, the United States, Russia, France, and Britain, are by far the biggest exporters of small arms, with a sales volume greater than the next fourteen countries combined. It is important to consider the socio-economic repercussions of arms transfers, particularly in low-income countries, where the basic needs of many citizens are not met. In 2002, arms supplies to Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa constituted 66.7 percent of the value of all arms supplies worldwide. Ironically, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, a peace making entity, accounted for ninety percent of those supplies (ibid). Marshall (1999), Ayoob (1995) and Buzan (1991) have discussed the destabilizing effects of arms transfers in the Third World. Moreover, Buzan (1991, 213) argues that arms transfers have been the “characteristic tool of intervening great powers in almost every Third World Security Complex.”
External Intervention in Fragile and Failing States

The trends in the internationalization of security have contributed to an increasing reliance on multinational interventions in weak, fragile, and failing states (e.g., the current NATO campaign in Libya). Foreign multi-lateral interventions have traditionally involved the use of military, economic, diplomatic, and peacemaking strategies in response to various types of conflicts. The interventions sometimes rely solely on one, or a combination of the aforementioned approaches, using a carrot or stick, or mixed carrot and stick strategies. Among these aforementioned strategies, military interventions have often sparked controversy, even when they are undertaken for humanitarian purposes such as the UN interventions in Somalia and Haiti, and the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 and more recently in Libya. Arguments against humanitarian interventions are centered on the notion of state sovereignty, decrying the use of force in a state without its consent. Another concern with humanitarian intervention is that, regardless of stated motivations, intervention is often perceived as a political act serving the interests of the intervenors. Apprehensions regarding the potential abuse of the principal of humanitarian intervention, in the quest of states to maximize their own security as rational actors, are also widespread.

Despite the controversy, many actors within the international community have welcomed the global Responsibility to Protect vulnerable populations when a state is unwilling or unable to do so. This refers to the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) norm that became part of international law in 2006. The failure to prevent immense humanitarian suffering during the Rwandan genocide (1994), the Srebrenica massacre in
Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995) in UN “safe areas”, and the inaction against the genocidal Russian invasions of Chechnya (1994, 1999), have sparked quite as much controversy as the failed UN intervention in Somalia and the disputed NATO intervention in Kosovo. The post 9/11 security landscape has created the conditions for multi-lateral interventions in failed and fragile states, in response to their perception as terrorist breeding grounds and safe havens.

Against this backdrop, including appropriate theory and practice, the study considers three questions: (1) What is the legal basis for intervention in failed and fragile states? (2) How can we operationalize the success of intervention? (3) How do we deal with the pragmatic concern regarding viability and implications of international military interventions?

Is military intervention legal?

Post World War II, the principal of non-intervention in sovereign states was recognized as customary international law. The adoption of the doctrine in the evolving international security architecture can be traced back to the declaration of the UN ban on the threat or use of force in Charter 2.4 (UN 1945) stating that “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state…. The principal of non-intervention was re-asserted in several UN conventions. UN Resolution 2131 9 (XX) adopted by the General Assembly in 1965 is a lucid representation of the importance ascribed to the principal. It reads as follows (see United Nations General Assembly 1965):

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1. No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are condemned.

2. No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights or to secure from it advantages of any kind. Also, no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State.

3. The use of force to deprive peoples of their national identity constitutes a violation of their inalienable rights and of the principle of non-intervention.

4. The strict observance of these obligations is an essential condition to ensure that nations live together in peace with one another, since the practice of any form of intervention not only violates the spirit and letter of the Charter of the United Nations but also leads to the creation of situations which threaten international peace and security.

5. Every State has an inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social and cultural systems, without interference in any form by another State.

6. All States shall respect the right of self-determination and independence of peoples and nations, to be freely exercised without any foreign pressure, and with absolute respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Consequently, all States shall contribute to the complete elimination of racial discrimination and colonialism in all its forms and manifestations.

7. For the purpose of the present Declaration, the term "State" covers both individual States and groups of States.

8. Nothing in this Declaration shall be construed as affecting in any manner the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, in particular those contained in Chapters VI, VII and VIII (see United Nations General Assembly 1965).

The resolution upholds the doctrine of non-intervention by a state or group of states, in the affairs of another state, through any form of military, political, and economic means, for the purposes of transforming its political, economic, social and cultural environment. The use of force, armed intervention, and threats thereof are condemned in the
first clause of the resolution underscoring its significance. The resolution clearly prohibits a state or a group of states from intervening in another state for the purposes of regime change and responding to internal civil strife, in the interest of peaceful coexistence and international security, and affirms the concept of state sovereignty - the authority of a state to govern itself.

The UN charter (1945) does, however, make some exceptions to this rule. For instance, Article 51 provides for the right of individual or collective self-defense through the use of force, in the event of an armed attack against a member state. Likewise, Article 53 authorizes the use of enforcement action through regional arrangements with the approval of the Security Council (UN 1945). Although non-intervention remains a customary principal of international law, in practice, several developments have made it permeable. For instance, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace (1992) affirms the rationale for the use of military intervention to end civil wars in weak and fragile states. The UN, under the leadership of former Secretary General Kofi Annan, also institutionalized the concept of humanitarian intervention in the Responsibility to Protect report (2001) reacting to the international controversy generated by NATO’s intervention in Kosovo. Related UN reports, A more Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (2004) and Report of the Secretary General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for All (2005), have since endorsed the concepts of collective global security and shared responsibility.

The Bush doctrine (US NSS 2002) prescribing pre-emptive military intervention in weak, failing, and rogue states also significantly undermines the principal of non-intervention, given the wide international support for the GWoT, despite the fact that intervention in Iraq was not authorized by the UN Security Council. Because the concept of state failure is also
related to the loss of state sovereignty (UN 2001; Christopher Clapham, 1998, 148; Morgan, Earl-Conteh, 2006), the liberal reference to many states as weak, fragile and failing precludes the application of the principal of non-intervention. Rarely is a distinction made between weak, fragile, and failing states in policy discourses, and the categorization makes the so-called states particularly vulnerable. Although it has been argued that the term failed and rogue states are not legal categories, and “best avoided, at least in legal discourse” (see Chatham House, 2007), the terminology has been politically expedient for rationalizing interventions in states like Afghanistan and Iraq.

**Operationalizing the Success of Military Interventions**

It is essential to examine the short and long-term effects of military interventions in determining their effectiveness. This research contributes to the debate on the implications of interventions by examining their effects in eight states of which two are “control” cases and the remaining six are the “treated” cases. The case comparisons reported in Chapters 6 draw on some of the variables used to operationalize the success of interventions in two empirical studies summarized below.

Regan’s (1996) study on conditions for success in third party interventions operationalizes success in terms of cessation of hostilities for a minimum of six months, considered a short but sufficient timeframe for policy makers to explore the option of problem-solving dialogue with the adversary. He examines a sample of 196 military, economic, and combined military/economic interventions in response to 85 civil conflicts (spanning a period of 50 years) undertaken on behalf of a government or the opposition.¹⁸ He

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¹⁸ Regan (1996, 343) defines an economic intervention as involving “economic aid or trade, and economic
proposes that third parties should pursue mixed military and economic strategies based on the finding that an individual strategy (relying either on military means or economic measures) is about 60% less likely to succeed than the mixed approach. Providing best and worst case scenarios, he states that a single focus strategy on behalf of the opposition has about a 5% likelihood of success whereas a mixed intervention on behalf of the government has a 64% chance of success (ibid, 352), clearly arguing in favor of collaborating with state authorities and avoiding a purely militaristic response.

In a more recent study with a qualitatively different methodology, Seybolt (2007) argues that the success of humanitarian military interventions is measurable by the number of lives saved. The study posits that about half the number of interventions in the 1990s were successful in terms of mortality statistics and outcomes of military and humanitarian initiatives undertaken by third parties. Somewhat similar to Regan’s conclusion, Seybolt makes the case that mixed military and humanitarian interventions have a greater likelihood of success. Further, he notes that the political will to mobilize a sufficient number of troops in risky environments is also a significant factor in the ultimate success of third party interventions. In exploring these factors to investigate the success of interventions in comparative case studies, the dissertation pays particular attention to the number of lives saved and outcomes demonstrating successful war termination and fostering conflict resolution processes. Moreover, reliance on strategies providing security to vulnerable populations and participatory economic and development interventions to strengthen state and societal institutions, are also discussed.
The Viability of Military Interventions

East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Liberia stand out as examples of successful multi-lateral military interventions led by the UN in weak and fragile states. In East Timor, the Australian-led INTERFET (International Force for East Timor) intervened in September 1999 to stop a campaign of genocidal violence in the aftermath of the UN backed referendum favoring East Timor’s independence from Indonesia. Following the end of hostilities in October 1999, the establishment of the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was replaced by the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) in 2002, and remained actively engaged in statebuilding and democtrization processes until the end of its mandate in 2005. The following year, however, a political, humanitarian and security crisis broke out, an indicator of the fragile peace the UN had perhaps enforced rather than fostered. The transition process in East Timor, backed by UNTAET and UNMISET, is now being supported by the United Nations Integrated Mission in East Timor (UNMIT) carrying a mandated presence of five more years due to end in February 2011. Despite these developments, East Timor is widely regarded as a successful model of regime change through externally driven war termination and state-building interventions.

Liberia and Sierra Leone, two post-conflict West African neighbors are also regarded as success stories of multilateral interventions by the UN. In both cases (examined in Appendices F and I), despite many challenges and problems, intervention was ultimately successful in bringing an end to prolonged hostilities in some of the bloodiest civil wars in African history. So far, both countries have been able to sustain a negative peace. In Liberia two civil wars spanned a period of nearly 15 years (1989 – 2003), and in Sierra Leone the
civil war lasted for a decade (1991-2001). UN missions in both countries maintain their operations and peace continues to be enforced at a high cost of resources available to the organization in terms of personnel, supplies, and prolonged presence. The NATO intervention in Kosovo (1999) is also regarded as successful in terms of bringing an end to a humanitarian crisis, but it sparked international controversy because the punitive airstrikes against Serbia lacked a clear mandate from the UN Security Council (see Sandole, 2007).

While the UN and NATO may not have acquired the capacity to build states, they have demonstrated their capacity to stop genocide and help terminate civil war in some situations, including the ones mentioned above. Logistical factors facilitating the success of these interventions include small population size and small territory, and the political commitment of third parties to invest resources, including adequate numbers of troops. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, the domestic and regional efforts for conflict resolution have also been critical factors in war termination. International efforts to address the sources of the conflict include economic sanctions against the trade in “blood diamonds”. Despite some of these successes, the willingness and capacity of multilateral organizations to successfully intervene has been tested in many more instances of protracted conflict situations involving genocide and civil warfare in the post Cold War, post 9/11 landscape, including in Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, Bosnia Herzegovina, and Sudan, states that are relatively large, densely populated and/or having highly diverse populations. The US led multilateral interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have also generated controversy. The fact that post 9/11 intervention in Afghanistan has become the longest war in US history, surpassing Vietnam, with no definitive or imminent outcome or settlement of the troubles in
Afghan society, or abatement of terrorist threat to Western interests, raises questions regarding its viability. The economic, ecological, social, and psychological costs of the war in Afghanistan for all conflict actors on the ground, and the war’s contagion in the region (particularly in Pakistan), raise critical questions about the implications of the strategy.

Reflecting on the US-led intervention in Afghanistan, Kenneth Boulding’s (1962) loss-of-strength gradient, a theoretical model provides some helpful insights about the viability of foreign interventions particularly in distant territories. The model shows the loss of strength of an intervention in terms of the distance between home and the target of aggression. It takes into consideration obstacles in the logistics of a military intervention and posits that the further the distance, the weaker the strength of the intervention. Time taken for troop and supply movement and the costs of transportation and maintenance are factors that help to determine why geographical distance becomes a critical factor impeding the viability of an intervention. The theory helps to explain the ineffectiveness of many interventions, the clearest example being the post 9/11 US-led NATO intervention in Afghanistan.

Comparing the manifestation of the GWoT in Afghanistan and Iraq, one could argue that the geographical distance from the US and member countries of the global coalition to the aforementioned countries may have played a decisive role in influencing the effectiveness of the intervention. There are other considerations, tactical ones such as Afghanistan’s mountainous terrain compared to relatively flat landscape in Iraq, and strategic ones such as Afghanistan’s forgotten war status while the war in Iraq was in full swing. Nevertheless, the logistics and associated costs of a military intervention are important factors that would to a great degree determine the success of the intervention. Boulding’s thesis also
ties into Seybolt’s (2007) claim that the deployment of a sufficient number of troops is imperative for the success of an intervention, a factor that would always be more challenging over a great distance.

The termination of the US-led global intervention in Iraq in August 2010 is considered successful in terms of the withdrawal of combat troops and handing over security to Iraqi forces, but the intervention’s success and rationale have been widely debated, particularly in view of the fact that there was no armed conflict in Iraq prior to the US-led global intervention. The stated objective of the intervention was to deter the use of weapons of mass destruction, a threat which subsequently proved fallacious. Moreover, it resulted in a high number of civilian casualties, destruction of infrastructure, environmental degradation, high levels of internal and external displacement, the collapse of the Iraqi state, increased levels of regional instability, empowerment of Iran, and has not, thus far, demonstrated significant evidence of stabilization through select indicators of socio-economic growth and conflict resolution processes. Democratic parliamentary elections held in March 2010 had inconclusive results and were fraught with allegations of fraud, suggesting that the externally led democratization process has not been viable.

Empirical evidence suggests that UN and multilateral military interventions in civil conflicts have not had a high success rate. The *World Development Report: Conflict, Security and Development* (World Bank, 2011) suggests that rather than providing assistance to countries struggling with escalating levels of violence, donor assistance and peacekeeping effort is generally geared towards post-conflict transitions. Examining the success of UN interventions in effecting peace, Michael J. Gilligan and Ernest J. Sergenti (2007) find that
UN interventions had no causal effect in shortening a civil war, although they were more effective in building a sustainable peace in postconflict environments. Virginia Fortna’s (2004) research finds that post World War II traditional peace enforcement interventions undertaken by the UN and other organizations during civil wars did not demonstrate a high likelihood of success, “with peace more likely to fail when UN peacekeepers are present than when they are absent” (ibid, 271). In the post Cold War world, she argues, the record of peacekeeping missions is “slightly better” (ibid). But, resonating with Gilligan and Sergenti (2007), she finds that UN peacekeeping operations serve as an effective conflict management tool primarily in postconflict environments.

Examining UN interventions from a state building perspective, Kelly Siegal (2010) claims that, while intervention in postconflict conditions may contribute to building peace, the presence of the UN peacekeeping missions in various states has not shown improved economic growth or improved social indicators accrued through robust institution-building. An even more compelling assessment of protracted global conflict regions by Marshall (1999, 215-223) shows that relatively lower levels of violent conflict in South America are related to the least amount of intervention in the region. Regional development trends (1970 to 2010) for South American countries reported by the Human Development Report (UNDP 2010) resonate with Marshall’s analysis in that the region shows a significantly improved development territory. One could infer, therefore, that internally driven stabilization processes with the least interference from the outside are more viable than externally driven interventions.

This dissertation makes the case for non-intervention in line with Marshall’s (1999)
claim that external interference may have a relationship with higher levels of instability in the state and across the region owing to diffusion of insecurity. It explores the conflation between policies of assistance to help weak, failing, and fragile states and policies that are oriented towards the defeat of the adversary. The latter often contribute to significant levels of collateral damage undermining rather than complementing efforts to mitigate conflict. Oftentimes, policies of assistance are also influenced by local politics and the intervenor role becomes antagonistic.  

**Conclusion: The Need for a Conflict Resolution Paradigm**

This chapter builds the case for a comprehensive context-specific integrated theoretical framework for examining the problem of state fragility and failure. Given the interconnected nature of actors comprising the globalized world (see Dugan 1996), it is imperative for policy makers to adopt a comprehensive multi-level analysis of the problem as a basis for the design and implementation of effective problem-solving interventions (see Sandole, 2010). The literature review and interview findings (Chapters 3 and 4 respectively) suggest that Western theoretical frameworks generally treat the state as the unit of analysis, without taking into adequate consideration the regional and global context of state fragility and failure. Moreover, mainstream Western theory does not usually explore the state’s relationship with society and the capacity of civil society to effect systemic change, dynamics that are critical for determining a state’s resilience to cope with instability. The disadvantage of an exclusive focus on the dynamics of state instability generally in Western theory, is that it provides a lop-sided analysis of the problem, sometimes magnifying the level of threat to domestic, regional and global stability, and potentially rationalizing reactive external
responses that are self-defeating and counterproductive.

In addition to a broader analysis of the domestic context of the state, this chapter recommends analyzing the problem from a multi-tiered perspective, examining the historical, regional and global context. As an alternative to the large-N theoretical framework an approach common in the West, this chapter suggests a small-N methodology to examine the context of state fragility, supported by in-depth consideration of historical, endogenous, regional, and global factors. The proposed methodology is applied in the analysis of case studies (see Appendices C-J) in this dissertation. Specifically, a five-pronged theoretical framework developed from the literature is presented to assess the conditions of instability and conversely the potential for state stability. The diagnostic framework is grounded in the following considerations:

a) *protracted social conflicts* (Azar 1978, 1985, 1999);

b) *protracted conflict regions* (Marshall 1999);

c) *destabilizing military interventions* drawing on Marshall’s notions of minimal intervention and the diffusion of insecurity effect (1999);

d) *hostile versus cooperating neighbors* (Diamond 2005);

e) *societal and institutional problem-solving responses* (ibid).

The framework encompasses the conventional Western focus on the domestic sources of instability, including prolonged conflict and crisis conditions, and the role of state institutions in particular, which are important for measuring state performance. Secondly, it provides for a more elaborate exploration of the regional context of state fragility, acknowledging the significance of protracted regional instability and hostile neighborhoods.
Thirdly, it brings into sharp focus the global context, wherein the role of external military interventions in weak states is highlighted, a factor postulated as destabilizing and conflict exacerbating – a problem that is generally unacknowledged in Western literature. The claim is partly supported by a number of studies (Regan 1996; Fortna 2004; Gilligan and Sergenti 2007; Seybolt 2007; and Siegal 2010) suggesting that the international community has not yet acquired the desired level of sophistication to help build states using multi-lateral military strategies as a main premise for intervention. The discussion also suggests that minimal intervention in weak states is the best recourse (Marshall 1999). Additionally, Boulding’s thesis (1962) on the viability of interventions being contingent on the distance between home and target country, a related theoretical premise is referenced to make an argument against a military strategy in distant lands, in particular.

Finally, the theoretical framework proposed in this chapter calls for the examination of regional and domestic resilience factors of a crisis-afflicted state, including cooperating neighbors and institutional and societal problem-solving responses. The examination of state resilience processes is missing in the dominant literature, and is critical for an informed diagnosis and effective responses to state instability. The absence of this factor in mainstream Western research and theory formulation serves to obfuscate the role of indigenous systemic change, development, and conflict resolution processes, paving the way for externally engineered problem-solving mechanisms that are often inappropriate for the country context.

Chapter 6 following next, uses the integrated theoretical framework proposed in this chapter to provide a comparative analysis of the context of state fragility, failure, and collapse drawing on the research findings shared in Appendices C-J (examining each case
study separately). Secondly, it provides a comparative analysis of quantitative rankings of state performance given in twelve different indices to examine the performance trajectories of: a) six states pre- and post military intervention; and b) two “control cases” pre- and post conflict, where there was no military intervention in response to protracted instability. The analysis contributes to the evaluation of the impact of military intervention in fragile contexts using quantitative data, and is supplemented by qualitative analysis using the criteria for successful interventions defined by some of the studies referenced in this chapter. The criteria for successful intervention include: a) cessation of violence to create the space for problem-solving dialogue; b) mortality statistics; and c) improved socio-economic indicators (Regan 1996; Seybolt 2007; and Siegal 2010 respectively). These criteria are also used in evaluating the impact of multilateral military interventions by this study in Appendices C-J, and to test the impact of reactive external military interventions versus local and regional problem-solving responses, with or without collaboration with the international community.
6. Comparative Analysis of Case Studies

The analysis in this chapter draws on the research findings presented in Appendices C-J to: a) assess the context of state fragility and failure of eight case studies examined in this study to determine if the classification “failed state” is a conceptually valid description of various states; b) assess the impact of multi-lateral military interventions in weak, fragile and failed states postulated as destabilizing in Chapter 4 (Interviews) and in Chapter 5 (An Integrated Theoretical Framework); c) to test the interactive and dynamic effect of the dominant failed states narratives on states of strategic concern and non-concern examined in Chapter 3 (Literature Review); and d) to assess if weak states can develop the capacity to mitigate the conditions of instability on their own with minimal external intervention as suggested in Chapter 5 (An Integrated Theoretical Framework).

Comparative analysis of case studies drawing on findings presented in Appendices C-J suggests that prominent Western discourses liberally refer to the term “failed state” to describe a number of developing, struggling, postconflict and poor states, which is often a flawed diagnosis of the problem. Moreover, findings suggest that states of strategic concern to pre-eminent Western actors are more likely to experience external multi-lateral military intervention when classified as “failed” in prominent policy discourses. Thus, it could be inferred that the classification state failure may sometimes
be used to serve the strategic interests of Western state actors, particularly when the perception of threat is high. Additionally, evidence suggests that military interventions in fragile, failed, and collapsed states are counterproductive and destabilizing, as seen in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Somalia (see Appendices C, E, H, and J). It may be concluded therefore, that the Western failed states narrative generates greater instability regionally (see Marshall’s discussion of diffusion of insecurity, 1999) and in the wider global security landscape by engendering NSFPs (Sandole 2007).

Another important findings presented in this chapter is that, weak and fragile states that are not subjected to external military intervention may be better able to self-manage instability as seen in Algeria and Nepal (see Appendices D and G). Because their problem-solving responses are self-perpetuated and locally owned, these two countries have shown a greater capacity for conflict resolution and sustainable peace. Moreover, the absence of external military pressures provides the space required by local state and civil society actors to generate their own solutions.

Yet another important finding presented in this chapter suggests that multilateral military interventions in weak states are liable to do more harm than good, unless they are supported by local and regional peace constituencies and peace processes e.g. in Liberia and Sierra Leone (see Appendices F and I). Significantly, these research findings suggest that an external military intervention is likely to be most effective when designed to enforce and keep the peace, and to create the space for problem-solving dialogue and mediation, leading to peace agreements and political solutions for state instability.
Below, I present the methodology used to reach the aforementioned findings followed by detailed analysis.

**Methodological Design**

This chapter employs the comparative method to examine the conditions of state fragility and failure and the impact of external military intervention using the integrated theoretical framework proposed in Chapter 5. A “controlled” comparative methodology is used to examine case studies differing with respect to the variable of interest, i.e., military intervention. Six states (refer to Appendices C, E, F, H, I, J examining Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, and Somalia respectively) were subjected to external military intervention (a natural experiment), while two states (refer to Appendices D and G examining Algeria and Nepal) which differ with respect to this variable, were used as “control cases”. The state performance trajectories of the first six cases are compared to test the hypothesized destabilizing impact of external military intervention, in particular, in addition to the other theoretical considerations (protracted social conflict, protracted conflict region, hostile neighbors, problem-solving responses of civil society actors and state institutions) proposed in Chapter 5. Additionally, the performance trajectories of the two “control cases” are examined to test their capacity to problem-solve with minimal intervention by external actors. Comparative assessment for each case entails the following components:

1. A comparative analysis of the current context of state fragility, failure and collapse using the five-pronged theoretical framework proposed in Chapter 5.
2. A comparative analysis of rankings provided in quantitative indices to examine the performance trajectories of all eight states, pre- and post military intervention; and pre- and post conflict (in cases where there was no military intervention.) The analysis is supplemented by a qualitative assessment of state performance.

3. A comparative assessment of local, regional, and international problem-solving responses in the eight case studies.

A comparative Analysis of the Current Context of State Fragility, Failure and Collapse using the Integrated Theoretical Framework (proposed in Chapter 5)

This section draws on the research findings (see Appendices C-J) conducted for this study. Analysis suggests that prominent Western discourses liberally refer to the term “failed state” to describe a number of developing, struggling, postconflict and poor states -- often a flawed diagnosis of the problem. All eight case studies in this dissertation have been referred to as failed states in contemporary Western literature including scholarly, development, and policy documents. While a few of them are indeed failed states, as I shall demonstrate, classifying all of these states as failed and prescribing one-size-fits-all solutions is inappropriate with the potential for exacerbating a complex conflict environment. A number of other poor, struggling, postconflict and developing states are also referred to as “failed” – a classification that has generated more confusion than clarity about the specific context of a state, and contributed to flawed policy responses.

This study seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the problem of state failure as a premise for effective problem-solving by the global community. I argue that
state failure is a rare phenomenon, often preceding the geographic fragmentation of a state, a phenomenon that I characterize as state collapse. This study defines a failed state as one that suffers from an overwhelming loss of legitimacy or loyalty across considerably vast stretches of its geographic area, where the state is unwilling or unable to provide public goods and services including justice and security, and opportunities for self-actualization and socio-economic development to a majority of the populace, where the relationship between the state and civil society is highly asymmetrical, and where society itself is highly fragmented, challenging the cohesiveness of the state through the manifestation of protracted conflict. State collapse may also manifest as deeply embedded societal fragmentation such that its territorial integrity is reduced to a virtual reality with various regions functioning as quasi-independent governing units, as in Somalia or Sudan. Thus, the lack of an effective central government for a protracted period is considered a defining feature of a collapsed state, a condition far more severe than state failure, where government exists but is unable to perform effectively.

By an effective government, I mean a state performing in the least its minimal functions, but preferably its intermediate and activist functions (see Chapter 3). The World Bank (World Development Report, 1997) suggests that minimal functions are the most rudimentary requirements a state with low capacity must be able to fulfill. They include providing basic public goods and services, maintaining law and order, health, and disaster response. The World Bank, however, argues that a minimal state “could do no harm, but neither could it do much good” (ibid, iii), therefore, it is not an acceptable or effective model. Evidently, the concern with the minimal state model rests in its
incapacity to support and regulate the socio-economic affairs of society. Nonetheless, for
the purposes of this dissertation, the minimal state model provides the basic framework
for a negative peace, a premise for building intermediate and activist (maximalist) state
functions, potentially engendering a positive peace. Thus, I argue that if the minimal
state exists, it is not a failed state; rather, it demonstrates the conditions necessary for
building a more successful state.

Although I argue that state failure and collapse are rare phenomena, two of my
case studies (Afghanistan and Iraq) are clear cases of state failure in the present
international context, and another (Somalia) provides an example of a collapsed state.
Iraq and Afghanistan’s failed status rests on a number of considerations. First, one musts
highlight the most obvious symptoms of state failure, particularly the state’s inability to
perform its minimal functions for prolonged periods (two to three decades in both cases),
including the provision of personal security, food security, healthcare, and emergency
response. Presently both countries are experiencing insurgency, likely to escalate in
intensity if foreign troops are withdrawn in the short to medium term. The present Iraqi
regime does not have the capacity to fight insurgents on its own, and could be disbanded
without too much difficulty without US military support for the government. Note that
the US retains a non-combat troop presence in Iraq. The troops continue to engage in
combat using helicopters and unmanned aircraft against insurgent forces (see Center for
Research on Globalization, 2010).

In Afghanistan, the withdrawal of US security forces could leave the country in a
state of mayhem, similar to the post Soviet-Afghan war scenario, which ultimately led to
the Taliban seizing control of the government. In terms of providing security, the government has been unable to maintain order in the country and much of its control is limited to Kabul, relying on US led ISAF troops. Moreover, President Karzai’s government does not have the capacity to sustain itself economically without foreign aid.

Having stated that the state in both Afghanistan and Iraq hinges on external support for its limited security function, it must be mentioned that these states are not able to perform additional minimal functions such as the equitable and satisfactory provision of public goods and services to a significant proportion of its populace (see Appendices D and F). This suggests that external actors are at best performing the function of securing the government, but have been largely unable to bolster its capacity to carry out in the least its minimal functions (engendering a negative peace). Presently, the role of military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq is seen as interfering with domestic political and economic processes, and unless accompanied by robust conflict resolution processes, it is bound to produce a zero-sum outcome, however long the external military presence is maintained. Intense levels of violence occur in both countries and citizens suffer from a flagrant denial of basic human needs, undermining state legitimacy and the political viability of both states.

On using the minimal state model as a yardstick for defining failure, let us consider Liberia and Sierra Leone, both qualifying as minimal states, albeit relying extensively and relatively successfully on external actors for support. In post civil war Liberia, peace is still being enforced by external actors and the government remains amongst the world’s most aid-dependent countries, showing significantly increased donor
dependence over the years (see Appendix F). In Sierra Leone on the other hand, (see Appendix I) external peacekeeping support was withdrawn in 2005, however, like Liberia, it remains highly dependent on external aid for sustaining itself economically in fulfillment of its minimal functions.

However, despite the reliance on external financial and military support by both Liberia and Sierra Leone, I do not classify them as failed states, although they are postulated as extremely fragile states. The main reason why Sierra Leone and Liberia are not considered failed is, because both are locally perceived as legitimate and are politically viable. Further, their security function, albeit having being bolstered by external support, has been effective in restoring security, even if the peace is negative. Thus, unlike Afghanistan and Iraq, both states are able to perform minimal state functions.

In making the distinction between state failure and fragility using the minimal state model, Nepal and Algeria provide examples of two states with demonstrated capacity to manage instability through internally engineered conflict resolution processes, although the peace in both countries remains negative (see Appendices D and G) and both are in vastly different stages of development. Algeria falls in the high human development category (HDI 2010), suggesting that it is a better performing state with greater prospects for viability, despite experiencing prolonged civil warfare in recent history, sporadic terrorist activity, and recent bouts of revolutionary unrest along with other Arab and North African countries.
Nepal, on the other hand, is far more developmentally challenged and falls in the low human development category (ibid.). On average, 55% of its annual development expenditure is financed through foreign aid, indicating its reliance on aid (see Government of Nepal 2009). Nepal may continue to experience prolonged periods of intermittent turbulence as it navigates a nascent democratization process after centuries of autocratic rule. That said, both Nepal and Algeria are able to more or less fulfill, in the least, the minimal functions of state performance. Significantly, the fact that they are both able to demonstrate their capacity to build a negative peace, suggests that the environment is considerably less fragile than the peace in Liberia requiring enforcement by external actors.

Having discussed the current performance trajectories of six states so far, I am left with two states, Somalia and Pakistan, both very different from all of the aforementioned cases and from each other. Somalia provides an example of a collapsed state demonstrating the characteristics associated with the problem, described earlier in this chapter. The country has been without an effective central government for two decades, and has concurrently engaged in protracted civil war, experiencing cycles of escalation and de-escalation. Second, a number of regions in Somalia operate as semi-independent governing units including Somaliland, Puntland, and Jubaland. Third, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia does not enjoy nation-wide legitimacy or authority; with its troop strength and associated security capacity (see Appendix J) being negligible. Forth, the TFG is not able to perform other minimal functions of a state such as provision of public goods and services. The country’s protracted lack of an effective
central government, deep-seated societal fragmentation manifest in protracted social conflict and the existence of several quasi-states operating within its territorial parameters, suggest that it qualifies as a collapsed state, again a condition far more severe than state failure where the state exists but is unable to fulfill minimal functions, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Finally, Pakistan’s performance trajectory presents an analytical conundrum. The country shows medium levels of human development, albeit on the low performing end, according to the UNDP’s HDI (refer to discussion in Appendix H). From the development perspective, it is able to perform some activist functions related to the economic regulation of the affairs of the state and society. That said, the country has experienced an exponential increase in turbulence in recent years and appears generally unable to maintain law and order in various regions, with implications for its economic growth and overall stability. Some of the regions experiencing turmoil include its tribal belt and the Khyber Pakhtun Khwa province, subjected to the protracted spillover of war-plagued Afghanistan, within close proximity. In the post 9/11 security environment, Pakistan also continues to demonstrate rising levels of terrorism, amongst the highest in the world in recent years. The insurgency in Balochistan and civil unrest in many other parts of the country, including Karachi, the key seaport and industrial center of the country continue to test its resilience.

Pakistan’s inability to contain various forms and manifestations of conflict and violence during the past decade in particular shows that the state’s security apparatus is ineffective. Although this dysfunction alone is not sufficient to classify it as a failed
state, its trends in armed violence (see Appendix H), suggest that it is at risk of failure in the medium to long-term. There is no doubt however, that the country is experiencing a mild type of a decline potentially leading to failure, unless adequate institutional responses are undertaken to mitigate the underlying causes of the violence. Thus far, the state has exercised the use of force to quell the symptoms of unrest in various parts of the country, alienating local communities and fuelling recruitment in dissident organizations.

The analyses of the aforementioned states suggests that the nature of weakness of each of these states is contextually very different requiring solutions that are responsive to domestic ground realities and the regional security environment in particular. All these states are charting their unique course developmentally, politically, and economically. The label “failed state” to describe many of them is at best a misnomer and generates misguided policy responses on the part of the international community. Below, I discuss the impact of the conceptual ambiguity pervasive in Western failed states narratives, postulated as generating reactive policy responses and hence greater regional and global instability.

A Comparative Analysis of Rankings Provided in Quantitative Indices

Analysis entails tracing the performance trajectories of six states subjected to military intervention. The findings are supplemented by a qualitative comparison of research findings pertaining to state performance pre- and post military intervention in response to instability; and of two “control cases” pre- and post instability. The control cases differ with respect to the variable of interest i.e. the absence of military intervention in response to protracted instability. (See Appendices C-J for case-specific analysis for
each state). Research findings suggest that military interventions in failed and fragile states that are not designed as a component of an overarching conflict resolution process at the level of local civil society and the state, regional organizations, and the international community tend to do more harm than good. Case studies demonstrate that foreign military intervention: i) ranging from a light to heavy footprint; ii) driven by strategic interests over and above humanitarian concerns for vulnerable populations; iii) with or without a UN mandate authorizing the use of force, generate greater violence and instability in the state and the region, even when the intervention is combined with development assistance. A quantitative comparison of indices (see Figure 5) suggests that states that did not experience external military intervention e.g., Algeria and Nepal (refer to Appendices D and G) are able to manage instability better than states that have experienced direct military intervention. This is particularly true for states that experience a military intervention that is driven by strategic rather than humanitarian objectives and deviates from the objective of crisis management and conflict resolution, e.g., in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan (refer to Appendices C, E, and H). That said, analysis suggests that even when an intervention is primarily humanitarian (refer to discussion on Somalia in Appendix J) it can contribute to greater instability locally, regionally, and globally.

Research findings confirm that fragile and failed states are better able to manage instability when there is no military intervention by the international community as observed in Algeria and Nepal (refer to Appendices D and G), where both states were able to terminate prolonged civil warfare through internally driven conflict resolution.
processes. Finally, the findings suggest that although humanitarian military interventions in relatively small states with a small population size, such as Liberia and Sierra Leone (see Appendices F and I) have been successful in peace enforcement, they have not been able to support the state-building capacity of local actors, possibly because of stalled political and economic activity fostered by dependence on external intervention and support systems. With reference to international military intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone, it is also important to note that local civil society and regional state actors were instrumental in mobilizing peace constituencies and peace processes that were critical in civil war termination. Thus, it may be concluded that military intervention without the collaborative effort of local and regional actors would have been in vain, and is imperative for the success of an intervention.
Figure 5 provides a comparative assessment of the performance trajectories of all eight cases studies. These include six failed and fragile states subjected to external military intervention in recent history (Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, and Somali) and two “control cases” (Algeria and Nepal) that didn’t. The data for the comparative assessment has been drawn by collecting the mean scores of 12 quantitative indices (see Appendix K for information pertaining to each index by country) using indicators related to conflict, governance and development, for each state’s rankings of state performance. Mean scores of country rankings are calculated using time series data spanning the pre-intervention, during intervention, and post-military intervention phases. For the “control cases” mean scores are calculated for pre-crisis, crisis, and post crisis periods as there was no external military intervention. Note that by crisis I am referring to national civil war in both “control cases”. The mean scores are shown using a line chart (Figure 5) representing a visual quantitative cross comparison and are analyzed below.
Findings suggest that Algeria and Nepal, the “control” cases, demonstrate the two most steadily improving trajectories of state performance. However, as recently as the period between 2008-2010, Sierra Leone shows a slightly better improvement than Nepal, spiking sharply upwards at the tip. Iraq and Afghanistan, two states that have been subjected to prolonged and aggressive use of force by external actors, show the weakest trends in state performance in comparison with all other states. Of these two, Iraq was significantly better performing pre-intervention, while Afghanistan was clearly a failed state prior to the current intervention and does not show significant improvement in state performance.

It is interesting to note (see Appendix K) that Iraq and Nepal were at par in terms of human development prior to the breakout of crisis, but Nepal, the control case, shows a vastly improved state performance trajectory in comparison (see Figure 4 above). Somalia, where direct military intervention was relatively short-lived, shows slight improvement in performance over the years as shown in Figure 4. Its performance trajectory shows that it is the third weakest state, performing considerably better than both Afghanistan and Iraq, subjected to protracted external military intervention, indicative of its impact. Pakistan also shows a downward trend in recent years (see Figure 5), markedly since the commencement of the U.S. Drone campaign. Its performance trajectory is positioned around the middle in comparison to other states, better than Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and Liberia, but worse than Nepal, Sierra Leone and Algeria, according to the comparative rankings of state performance in indices measuring conflict, governance and development (see Figure 5).
Liberia and Sierra Leone (see Figure 5), two cases subjected to external military intervention, albeit primarily humanitarian, are showing relatively better levels of improvement in state performance than states where the intervention has been guided by Western strategic and security concerns (e.g., in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan). Sierra Leone shows a sharp improvement in state performance in recent years in comparison with Liberia, where peacekeeping operations are still underway, although civil war in both states was successfully terminated several years ago.

**Comparative Qualitative Analysis of State Performance Trajectories (see Appendices C-J).**

Qualitative analysis in this section is intended to supplement the aforementioned quantitative findings depicted in Figure 4, to examine the drivers and impact of military intervention in fragile contexts. The discussion confirms the hypothesis that military interventions in fragile contexts are destabilizing and self-defeating, and that rather than securing the objectives of global security, they create greater insecurity through the diffusion of insecurity (see Marshall 1999) and the generation of NSFPs (see Sandole 2007). Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan provide examples of unsuccessful military campaigns ranging from a relatively light to heavier footprint, and limited versus prolonged engagement in a range of four failed and fragile states. With the exception of Somalia, where US and UN forces had intervened militarily between 1992-1995, the other three cases of international military intervention led by the US are GWoT related, suggesting that the likelihood of intervention has increased considerably in the wake of 9/11. Incidentally the post 9/11 interventions have not involved the deployment of UN
troops in the aforementioned states. Moreover, the GWoT related US-led military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq (2003-2010) and US Predator Drone campaign in Pakistan (2003-2011) lack the authorization of the UN Security Council, implying that the interventions serve the strategic interests of a section of the global community allied with key Western state actors and are devoid of a global consensus on the need for a multilateral military response. Although in Afghanistan, a number of UN Security Council Resolutions were adopted in the events following 9/11, they primarily affirmed their support for international efforts to prevent, suppress and root out terrorism, but none provide a clear mandate to the US led NATO military intervention in the country, except for intervening to facilitate the Bonn Process.¹⁹ Note that UN Security Council Resolution 1383 (2001) affirms Afghanistan’s independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty -- principals that have been violated by external military intervention.

The inclusion of Somalia is important, as it provides evidence of the dynamic of US-led multilateral intervention (albeit relatively short lived) in a fragile state, primarily in response to a humanitarian crisis, but having strategic undertones (Kurth 2005, 93), suggesting that the drivers of US policy have not changed radically in the aftermath of 9/11. Arguably, however, the events of 9/11 have precipitated the frequency and justification for US-led foreign military intervention in failed states. The post 9/11 US military intervention in Pakistan has been of a less invasive nature involving a Predator Drone campaign. The primary motivations for intervention are strategic and security-

centered based on the threat from terrorists finding safe haven in Pakistani territory. US military intervention in Pakistan as well as Yemen has also been justified under the “ungoverned spaces” discourse directly linked to the problem of state failure (see Rosenbach, 2009).

Among these four case studies of military intervention, Afghanistan and Iraq share two common variables: i) intervention was justified under the rubric of the war on terrorism, and ii) military interventions have been protracted with a heavy footprint, confirming the perceived nexus between Western security and state failure. In both states, the international community launched an adversarial response - a war (GWoT), aimed at a change in regime accompanied by military occupation by foreign forces. An assessment of military intervention in both countries shows that it has not been successful so far, neither in terms of eliminating the threat of terrorists; nor in terms of restoring any semblance of security; or being able to create political and economic stability, for that matter. In both cases, apart from achieving the objectives of dismantling unfriendly governments and the installation of US-backed governments, military interventions have resulted in high levels of collateral damage, internal and external displacement, and a rise in violence and insecurity. The intervention in Iraq has destabilized the Middle East, changing the power distribution in favor of Iran, a regime considered highly hostile towards the West. From this perspective, the intervention has made the United States and its allies more insecure and, therefore has been counterproductive and self-defeating.

South Asia, as well, is significantly more unstable as a result of the GWoT. As in Iraq, the incidence of terrorism has spiraled dramatically in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
since the launch of foreign military operations. In Pakistan, which is generally regarded a failed state in Western discourses, the perception of threat posed by terrorist groups is very acute. However, the US military intervention in the country has been limited, especially in comparison with Afghanistan and Iraq. Nonetheless, the intensity of US military operations in Pakistan has escalated with the passage of time and significantly so, after the arrival of the Obama administration. The escalating US military intervention persists in the form of a Predator Drone war, and is aimed at hunting down al-Qaeda and its allies. These attacks have increased to an average of one strike per week under President Obama (Bergman and Tiedemann 2010). The report by Bergman and Tiedemann argues that the civilian fatality rate is about 32%, although estimates vary between 10% to 98%. The authors note that the killings of civilians by Drone strikes in Pakistan is a controversial issue, with only 9% popular approval according to a Gallup poll. They also claim that Drone strikes do not demonstrate any significant impact on curtailing the Taliban’s operations in Pakistan or Afghanistan, or in deterring Western terrorist recruitment.
Likewise, Rafia Zakaria (2009) notes that despite the estimated twelvefold increase in the number of Drone attacks during President Obama’s administration, the retaliatory suicide bombings in Pakistan engineered by the Taliban have not shown a decline. Hence, it could be inferred that the Drone campaign has been ineffective in eliminating the Taliban leadership, its stated objective, in addition to provoking a spate of suicide bombings and destabilizing the country further.

Sharing a 1,500 mile-long porous border with Afghanistan, namely the Durand Line, Pakistan also demonstrates the regional contagion of violence as a result of a prolonged external military intervention, contributing to the diffusion of insecurity produced by protracted neighborhood war and protracted social conflict (see Marshall 1999). Much of it lies along treacherous mountainous terrain, providing easy passage and safe haven to terrorists, escaping from the US military offensive in Afghanistan. The
contagion effect includes the spillover and impetus from the Taliban movement in Pakistan and associated acts of terrorism, a chronic flow of refugees from Afghanistan, and trafficking of weapons and drugs. The fallout of the GWoT in Afghanistan also includes a return to extensive cultivation and illegal exports of poppy, a menace that was successfully eradicated by the former Taliban government (see Crosette, 2001). Under the Karzai regime, Afghanistan supplies approximately 90% of the world’s opium demand, with less than 2% being impounded by the local security and NATO forces. Compare this with Colombia, the world’s largest producer of cocaine, successfully blocking 20% of the outbound traffic (see UNODC 2009).

The US-led UN intervention in Somalia in 1992, presents a fourth example of a fairly unsuccessful international military intervention in a failed state. Unlike the interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan, the mission in Somalia had a UN mandate. Nonetheless, it failed to restore order in the country and served to complicate the conflict dynamics, discussed further in Appendix J. The UN’s peacekeeping experience in Somalia also shows that foreign troops risk getting drawn into the conflict and losing their credibility as neutral arbiters and effective peacekeepers. Despite a humanitarian mandate and intended neutrality of intervention, the external intervention failed to disarm warring tribes and mediate a peaceful settlement of the conflict. It also became controversial for allegedly fuelling the war economy and perpetuating warlordism (See Lofland n.d. and Jan, 2001). The ineffectiveness of the mission also contributed to the erosion of local confidence in the international community (Jan, 2001), a factor contributing to radicalization of local actors, creating the space for Islamist non-
state actors, and in shaping reluctant attitudes toward externally driven peace processes (see Appendix J).

For the purposes of comparison, I examine the response of the international community in four other cases of fragile and failed states Liberia, Sierra Leone, Algeria and Nepal. These cases share an international standing of varying levels of strategic non-concern for the West, and demonstrate their capacity to terminate civil war with or without external military intervention. The examples of Algeria and Nepal are, again, the “control cases” in this study. The international community did not intervene militarily in these two states in response to a humanitarian crisis. Yet, after protracted civil warfare, both countries were successful in civil war termination through top-down or bottom-up peace processes that were largely internally driven. This is an unanticipated finding of this research, supporting Marshall’s thesis on minimal use of force and military armament (1999, 146), and ties into my hypothesis challenging the practice of military intervention in failed and fragile states.

On the other hand, however, both Liberia and Sierra Leone also having come out of a prolonged recent history of civil war, are enjoying a peace that may partly be credited to external military intervention. These two cases provide lessons for when external military intervention in response to state failure can be a viable option and offer a four-fold explanation for success. First, in both instances, civil war termination was accomplished through an overarching conflict resolution process engaging local, regional and international actors. Second, intervention was primarily humanitarian, and centered on policies of assistance, rather than the pursuit of Western security interests. Third,
military intervention was backed by the international community’s willingness to
mobilize sufficient resources. Finally, Liberia and Sierra Leone are both relatively small
countries in size and population, bolstering the logistics of intervention feasible. That
said, these two cases reveal that while peace has been enforced with the assistance of
external troop deployment, it is a negative type of peace. Thus, the international
community does not have the capacity to support an institution-building process to
promote a positive peace in these countries, or simply, that state-building from the
outside is not a viable mechanism. The two cases are discussed at length in Appendices F
and I.

A Comparative Assessment of Successful Local, Regional, and International Problem-
Solving Responses in Failed and Fragile States

In this section, I have highlighted the role of conflict resolution processes in civil
war termination in Algeria, Liberia, Nepal and Sierra Leone (refer to Appendices D, F, G,
and I.) Research findings suggest that these states have been successful in civil war
termination either through locally driven peace processes, or in collaboration with
regional and international actors. Postconflict, however, none of the countries has
demonstrated significant progress in socio-economic development or substantial
institutional readjustments in addressing the structural inequalities contributing to the
outbreak of protracted violence in recent history. I argue therefore, that contrary to the
generally optimistic assessments of various quantitative indices, these states are still
extremely vulnerable. Note that all of these post-conflict countries continue to
experience low intensity violence, which may be taken as an early warning signal by the
international community for consideration of conflict prevention strategies in collaboration with local and regional actors.

It is important to note also that peace is being enforced in two of the countries with the support of external actors or through internal security measures (UN peacekeepers in Liberia and a military-backed government in Algeria), the latter maintains a state of emergency in the country declared at the onset of the civil war in 1991. Where the peace is not being enforced through external or internal military means, as in Nepal and Sierra Leone, the environment remains highly susceptible to the outbreak of violence (see Appendices G and I).

**Algeria and Nepal as models of internally driven state stabilization processes**

Algeria and Nepal (see Appendices D and G) have accomplished their peace, albeit a negative one, as an outcome of internally driven processes, *without* any external military intervention or peace enforcement effort by regional, sub-regional or international organizations. Their success attests to the importance of top-down reforms (in Algeria) as well as civil society peace movements at the grassroots (in Nepal) in fostering positive political and social change. In Algeria, civil war came to an end when one of the key warring factions called a unilateral ceasefire and the government announced mass amnesty as part of a nationwide reconciliation initiative.

Algeria has had two democratic elections in the post civil war landscape in favor of President Bouteflika, who led the country out of civil war. There is evidence, however (refer to Appendix D), that aside from appeasing former insurgents, scandalously forgiving many public representatives perpetuating mass atrocities during the civil war
and offering a financial reparation plan for the families of victims, the government has achieved little in terms of balancing the socio-economic inequalities ailing the society. The Algerian national reconciliation plan is also considered incomplete because it does little to address the psychological trauma of victims. President Bouteflika is now serving a third term in office, with many voices protesting the rigging of elections (see BBC, 2004). Finally, as mentioned earlier, the relative calm in the country is being enforced through a state of emergency -- a militaristic measure on the part of the government, reflecting on the fragility of the peace.

Similar to war termination in Algeria, which was a result of an internally driven peace agreement between various parties to the conflict, the Nepal model also provides an example of a locally engineered political compromise after years of prolonged violence. The pressures exerted by the Maoist insurgency, combined with the struggle for democratization by Nepali political parties, over an extended period of time led to a change in the system of government from centuries old monarchy to a democratic republic. Nepal’s example demonstrates the importance of social movements as a critical dynamic of change, highlighting the significance of official and unofficial dialogue as well as mediation in support of the peace process.

The historic peace accord in Nepal was the outcome of a mass movement bringing more than a million people out in the streets during Jandolan II in April 2006. There is evidence that despite the friction between Maoist insurgents and the parliamentary political parties, an informal dialogue mediated by local actors exploring their respective role in the peace process, contributed to the success of the movement (see
Berghoff Foundation for Peace Support, n.d). Formal peace talks (2001, 2003, 2006) between the government and the Maoists were also important. Apart from a minimal observer role of UNMIN (United Nations Mission in Nepal), formal negotiations were locally driven and facilitated (ibid.).

Liberia and Sierra Leone: examples of successful international military intervention

The remaining two failed and fragile states selected for this research study, Liberia and Sierra Leone, are also post-conflict states whose current state of relative stability is partly, though not entirely attributable to costly long-term UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations that are ongoing. Data analysis suggests that Liberia and Sierra Leone are the exception, rather than the norm, in terms of the success of external military intervention in WFFC states. Bear in mind also that in both cases, initial interventions by ECOMOG forces were counterproductive. The subsequent entry of UN peacekeepers (UNMIL) in Liberia came many years later, after prolonged violence and a series of failed attempts at peacemaking by local and regional actors, a state of war weariness, and desperation. Two additional factors, critical in UNMIL’s success, must also be mentioned:

a) The signing of the ACCRA Comprehensive Peace Agreement as a result of the tireless efforts of Liberian grassroots movements, including women, clergy and youth, as well as regional diplomacy and mediation. Thus, the UNMIL came in, not to coercively impose a peace that the Liberians were not ready for, but to facilitate a peace process engineered largely by local actors and supported by regional actors and organizations.
b) The relatively small size of the Liberian population as well as the small geographic area of the country, made it economically and tactically viable for UN peacekeepers to achieve their objectives, including, in particular the restoration of security. Undoubtedly the success of the mission reinforced their welcome in Liberia as well as enhancing their credibility.

Thus, I argue that military intervention in Liberia was successful in that it provided peace enforcement and support for a process that was locally owned and engineered.

Military intervention in Sierra Leone, although considered a success story, also met with many challenges and initial failures. Like neighboring Liberia, Sierra Leone did not respond well to the deployment of the ECOMOG. As discussed in Appendix I, ECOMOG’s peacekeeping mission faced many problems, and the Nigerians who were leading the operation ultimately decided to leave the country. Subsequently, though, other West African states sent in their troops to reinforce the operation, but it remained largely unsuccessful. Thereafter, in view of the continuation of mass atrocities, the international community deployed UNAMSIL to restore law and order, a task the mission found difficult to manage, therefore suffering many humiliations at the hands of the insurgents. The watershed in the crisis was the injection of British rapid reaction forces (Operation Pallisar), which enabled the UNAMSIL to recover lost ground and deliver on its mandate to enforce peace.

Finally, it must be acknowledged that the termination of the civil war did not come about solely through the successful reinforcement of UNAMSIL through Operation Pallisar. Other factors, including the increase in funding and troops to the mission; a
series of international diplomatic and legal efforts undertaken by the UN involving diamond, arms and travel sanctions; as well as international efforts to curtail the alliance between Liberian President Charles Taylor and the RUF were equally important. International intervention in Sierra Leone highlights the importance of diplomatic and legal avenues to mitigate regional and international factors, directly or indirectly fuelling the violence. In the final analysis, a combination of diplomatic, military and legal measures were responsible for turning the tide in favor of peace in Sierra Leone – an emphasis on militaristic solutions at the cost of diplomacy and international cooperation would have been an exercise in futility.

**Comparative Analysis of Indices – Procedures (Appendices C-J)**

Quantitative rankings of eight case studies of perceived failed and fragile states produced by 12 prominent indices, have been compiled and charted for this research and reported in Appendices C-J informing the analysis in this chapter. The comparative analysis of quantitative indices with respect to the performance of each state given in Appendices C-J is intended to: a) to determine what each says about the eight case studies; b) to test the congruence of the findings across a sample of 8 to 12 indices depending on the availability and applicability of data for each state; c) to determine if quantitative findings are compatible with expert views elicited through interviews; and d) to explore the relationship between predominant discourses and the perceived security-failure nexus pertaining to each case study.

The indices use a range of variables related to governance, conflict, and development. In view of Marshall’s proposition that governance, conflict and
development are “fundamental aspects of the dynamic societal systems” whereby the “quality of each effects the potential of the others” (2008, 5), a range of related indices relying on different indicators and weighting systems has been selected for evaluation and comparison of state performance. The assumption is that if governance, conflict, and development are interdependent, then various rankings should be fairly congruent. So, for instance, if a state ranks positively on an index measuring governance, it’s ranking on another index measuring peace and stability, or human/economic development, should be relatively proximate. The list of indices is given in Table 5 below.

Data have been collected from various quantitative indices for all case studies on Afghanistan, Algeria, Iraq, Liberia, Nepal, Pakistan, Sierra Leone and Somalia. In the case of four African case studies (Algeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia), comparative rankings are provided for all 12 indices, whereas for the comparative mapping of rankings for the remaining states (Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Nepal), two indices specifically designed to measure African governance are not included.
Table 5: List of Quantitative Indices and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Quantitative Index</th>
<th>Abbreviation used</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1  State Fragility Index and Matrix (George Mason University, Virginia)</td>
<td>SFIM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2  Failed States Index (The Foreign Policy /Fund for Peace, Washington D.C.)</td>
<td>FSI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3  Index of State Weakness in the Developing World (The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C.)</td>
<td>ISW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4  Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (Carleton University, Ottawa)</td>
<td>CIFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5  Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger (University of Maryland, Maryland)</td>
<td>PCIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6  Low Income Countries Under Stress (World Bank Group)</td>
<td>LICUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7  Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank Group)</td>
<td>WGI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8  Global Peace index (Vision of Humanity, Sydney)</td>
<td>GPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9  Human Development Index (UNDP)</td>
<td>HDI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Global Competitiveness Index (World Economic Forum, Geneva)</td>
<td>GCI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, London)</td>
<td>MIIAG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Harvard Kennedy School Index of African Governance (Harvard University, Massachusetts)</td>
<td>HKSIAG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusion

All states that I have examined in the eight case-study Appendices C-J and in this chapter, are ranked among highly fragile or failed states according to the aforementioned indices assessing state performance. Some of the states are postconflict or postcolonial, and all of them continue to experience varying levels of instability. The geographic size and populations of the states vary considerably. Some are geographically bounded or
situated within a protracted conflict region. They also differ in respect to relations with neighbors, governance, conflict, development, civil society mobilization, and the perceived threat posed to Western security (bearing on the design of external intervention). These aforementioned variables are postulated to influence a state’s stability in varying degrees, and I relate them to each state’s performance to assess its resilience, fragility, or failure in this chapter, particularly to support my argument that the classification “failed state” misleads analysis and global policy responses.

A comparative analysis of quantitative indices with respect to the performance of each state is given in Appendices C-J to test the congruence of the findings across a sample of 8 to 12 indices depending on the availability and applicability of data for each state. The analysis of data from quantitative indices is also compared with expert views elicited through interviews and secondary data to examine if they agree. The analysis in Appendices (C-J) also explores the relationship between predominant discourses and the perceived security-failure nexus pertaining to each case study.

The discussion in this chapter confirms a key hypothesis of this dissertation that military interventions in the post Cold War, post 9/11 landscape are more likely to be guided by strategic than humanitarian concerns. I have presented evidence confirming that military intervention in states of strategic concern to key global state actors, generates greater instability in a conflict-afflicted state, and the regional and global security environment (e.g., in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan). That said, the chapter suggests that even when a military intervention is primarily humanitarian in nature, it risks exacerbating a complex conflict environment (e.g., in Somalia) unless it is planned
in close collaboration with local and regional peace constituencies and is embedded within an over-arching conflict resolution process (e.g., in Liberia and Sierra Leone). A very important finding underscored in this chapter is that weak states experiencing protracted conflict in the form of civil warfare (e.g. in Algeria and Nepal) are capable of problem-solving much better when there is minimal intervention by the global community, and particular when the use of external force is not exercised. These states demonstrate that weak state can evolve the capacity to navigate conflict resolution processes and to embark upon relatively stable state stabilization processes, when comparison with other states experiencing military intervention in response to instability.

In Chapter 7 which follows next, I recapitulate the key findings of this research study discussed thus far in Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 and discusses their implications for further research, theory, practice, policy as well as teaching the problem of state failure and fragility.
7. Key Findings and Implications for Theory, Research, Practice, Teaching, and Policy.

“It is well known that anticipating state failure is as much a matter of being able to generate an effective response as it is of getting the analysis right. But is the international community furnished with a solid analytical base from which to generate good response strategies?” David Carment (2003, 407)

This chapter revisits the purpose of the research in articulating its relevance and importance in contributing to the debate on state failure. It provides a perspective that comes from the Global South, which is generally unacknowledged in the literature. In doing so, it explores how the failed states paradigm has evolved as a Western construct and provides limited comprehension of the problem, as well as reflecting on the implications for policy, as suggested in the aforementioned quote by Carment. It also provides an evaluation of the integrated theoretical framework proposed by the study in comprehensively analyzing weak, fragile, and failed states. This theory is used as a basis for comparing eight states drawing implications for theory, research, practice, teaching, and policy. It concludes the discussion by summarizing the findings and highlighting key recommendations.

The Purpose and Relevance of the Research

This dissertation was guided by four main research objectives:

a) to guide theory development on the problem of state fragility, failure, and collapse;
b) to examine the theoretical and policy nexus between Western security and state failure, and implications for intervention by the international community;

c) to examine and evaluate the strategic response of the international community to crisis conditions in fragile contexts (often perceived as “state failure” in prominent Western discourses); and

d) to make recommendations for multi-lateral state stabilization and conflict resolution strategies in fragile environments.

In pursuance of the first two objectives, the research explored the salient theoretical and discursive content informing the evolution of the failed states paradigm in the West. In doing so it identified key actors and organizations guiding the debate, prominent thematic strands, and a range of theoretical approaches used in the diagnosis of the problem, while offering an assessment of the strengths and limitations of salient theoretical frameworks and research methodologies. It noted, in particular, that theory development on the subject was generally guided by the Western normative model of the state which is essentially incompatible with the historical, development, cultural, and political trajectories of many weak states in the Global South; that it generally focussed on the endogenous dynamics of the problem, using the state as the unit of analysis and offering limited insights on external factors contributing to the problem; and that it often resonated with the US foreign policy stance in fundamentally concerning itself with the threat to global stability posed by weak, fragile, and failed states (and to that extent depicting the “failed state” as the “other”).
Therefore, in exploring the theoretical and discursive characteristics of the failed states paradigm, the dissertation sought to examine the strategic implications of prominent Western discourses and their interactive and dynamic effect on the policy response of key global actors. This included, in particular, an examination of the role of the United States as the pre-eminent international political and military player in the global security landscape. Analysis of the failed states discourses was focused on those current specifically in the US, and in key Western allies, in the realms of peacebuilding, development, think tank research, academia, and the policy community.

Data collection through interviews revealed that while analytical perspectives from the Global North and South converged on a range of symptoms and root causes of the problem, there were many areas where theoretical analysis could be strengthened by incorporating a local (i.e. Southern/insider) understanding of the dynamics of the problem; supporting a comprehensive contextual appraisal of ground realities; and broadening the scope of analysis to regional and wider global levels. Very importantly, this ties in with Oliver Richmond’s (2005) recommendation that the incorporation of the Southern/insider perspective privileges the local actor through decision-making involving local participation and ownership, in addition to being sensitive to the local culture, traditions and ground realities. These findings led to the development of a comprehensive multi-tiered framework for diagnosing the problem of state failure and fragility, building on a range of theoretical models discussed in academic literature, and by integrating the perspectives of experts from the Global South and North. Further, the dissertation built the case for an enhanced comprehension of the problem, using a
theoretical framework applicable to small-N studies to guide researchers, practitioners, and policy makers, and also applied in this study.

A third research objective, related to the first two (exploring theory development and examining the theoretical and discursive content), involved testing the hypothesized nexus between Western security and state failure. This entailed an examination of the prominent strands of the failed states discourses to see if they have an interactive and dynamic effect on national security and foreign policy, through some “negative self-fulfilling dynamic” (see Sandole, 1999), particularly with reference to the United States in view of its global military and political primacy. Specifically, the research sought to contextualize the conceptual evolution of contemporary Western discourses on failed and fragile states, in the backdrop of related international developments in the post Cold War, post 9/11 landscape.

A fourth research objective, stemming from the aforementioned concern, was guided by the international community’s inclination to engage militarily in fragile contexts in the post Cold War, post 9/11 landscape. Thereby, the research sought to evaluate the impact of external military interventions, as a strategic international response to state instability, in combination with or without non-coercive strategies such as development and diplomacy. To accomplish this aim, the research examined global responses to instability in eight weak, fragile, and failed states using a comparative “controlled” case study approach. The controlled case comparison involved a research sample of six states that had been subjected to international military intervention in combination with economic assistance and/or diplomacy, and two “control” cases that
had received international financial assistance during and post-conflict, but had not been subjected to coercive international measures. Of special significance in the “control cases” was the absence of an international military response to protracted crisis conditions. The selection of case studies was designed to test the hypothesis that strategic interest in a conflict or crisis afflicted state is more likely to generate a reactive and punitive international military response, with the potential to complicate the conflict environment through its enlargement (Mitchell, 2006); escalation; regional contagion through associated diffusion of insecurity effect (Marshall 1999); and tit-for-tat responses. This all culminates in counterproductive, self-fulfillment of a flawed hypothesis, a point made often by conflict resolution pioneer John Burton as part of his argument on behalf of a conflict resolution approach to complex conflict situations (see Burton on conflict “provention”, 1990; Ramsbotham et al. on “cosmopolitan conflict resolution, 2005; Sandole, 1999, chapter 1; and Sandole 2010). The selection of “control” cases also contributed to the assessment of the performance trajectory of states, primarily engaged in managing instability using internally driven peacebuilding and conflict resolution processes, with minimal external intervention.

In addition to testing the impact of multi-lateral military interventions (often led and mobilized by a great power) in fragile contexts, comparative research rested on qualitatively contextualizing the nature of fragility, failure, and/or collapse of the eight case studies. The analysis was supported by assessing the state stability/instability trajectories using data from prominent quantitative indices measuring state performance in areas related to conflict, development, and governance. Additionally, comparative
analysis evaluated the impact of a range of local, regional and international state stabilization processes in all eight cases. The exercise provided the opportunity for evaluating global multilateral interventions in perceived failed states from a conflict resolution lens.

The last but not the least important research objective integrates the findings of the research to make policy recommendations for local, regional and international state stabilization processes. Related findings are presented in this chapter following the discussion of key findings of the research process in line with the aforementioned objectives.

**Key Findings and Implications**

1. **The Failed States Paradigm: Discursive and Theoretical Influences.**

   In an attempt to deconstruct the failed states paradigm, the dissertation explored key theoretical and discursive influences shaping the debate. The findings suggest that the salient view of the failed state derives from three key concepts including:

   a) the Western normative model of the state as the prototype of a successful state;
   
   b) the Western view of the failed state as a unitary actor generating instability locally, regionally, and globally; and
   
   c) the Western perception of state failure as a threat to Western security, thereby feeding Samuel Huntington’s (1993, 1996) “clash of civilizations” dynamic.

   Below, I briefly recapitulate these concepts and where applicable, implications for theory, research, practice, teaching and policy.
a) The Western Normative Model of the State as the Prototype of the Successful State

The study observes that the conceptual prototype of the successful state in Europe as well as in North America, subscribes to principals such as the social contract; a balance between state authority and individual rights; democratic values; and the administrative function of state institutions. While less successful states in the Global South could clearly benefit from the application of these principals, the Western policy community has demonstrated a strong disposition to impose these values from the outside, when local communities and institutions may not be ready to embrace them in their political cultures. The evolution of democracy in the West was the outcome of a historical, cultural, economic, political and intellectual experience, a process that must be allowed to take its own course in less developed states. Allowing local systemic change dynamics to evolve unhindered, will ensure the viability and durability of their outcomes, as they will be owned by primary stakeholders.

The Western tendency to promote democratic values and other principals enshrined in the normative model of the state, through coercive and non-coercive interventions in states in the Global South, is often viewed as invasive and counter-productive by local communities. Western interventions to promote democracy from the outside have rarely fostered democratic cultural values in a weak nation, unless they are supported by a call for change from within. Iraq and Afghanistan offer the clearest modern-day examples of the international community’s ineffectiveness in jump-starting a democratic system, despite its prolonged military, political, diplomatic and economic
engagement in both states. In this context, the powerful words of the young Afghan female politician and activist Malalai Joya come to mind, offering food for thought for policy makers: “No nation can donate liberation to another nation.” Therefore, it would be best for the international community to exercise more patience with weak and developing nations, and allow their own societies to claim their human rights, freedoms, and liberation from dictators. This is presently being witnessed in Tunisia and Egypt, most recently, and in other states in the Middle East and North Africa region, an indication that the West has inspired forces of democratic change in some of the most autocratic regions of the world, and that civil society in many of these states possesses the wherewithal to effect change with minimal direction from external actors.

On a related note, it is important to bear in mind that the process of successful state-building, including democratization, can sometimes span centuries, as in the case of Western Europe (Ayoob, 2005). A considerable proportion of states in the Global South are still in relatively early stages of post-conflict and post colonization development. Hamza Alavi (1972) a prominent Southern scholar provides another useful insight into the tenuous development processes in postcolonial societies, whereby the military, political and administrative institutions are overdeveloped during colonial rule, designed to serve the interests and authority of the ruling elites at the expense of the welfare of the colonized people. Thus, Alavi seeks to explain why many postcolonial states such as Pakistan and Bangladesh have demonstrated a greater appetite for military dictatorships

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and autocratic civilian rule, stalling democratic processes. Scholars such as John Saul (1974) have found Alavi’s thesis useful in rendering a better understanding of postcolonial East African States.

Therefore, one could argue that judging the performance of poor, developing, post-conflict and post-colonial states in the Global South, through the Western standard of highly advanced statehood, exerts unrealistic pressures on young states to fast-track the process of statebuilding, often complicating rather than facilitating their development trajectories (Ayoob 2005). Examples of adverse external pressures include among others, international calls for regime change, sometimes exercising the use of military force; financial structural adjustment programs (SAPs), burdening local communities to meet the aid conditionalities of IFIs; clientelism and donor driven political agendas; development and peacekeeping operations that stall local political and economic processes through increased donor dependency.

That said, international pressures are sometimes useful, especially when they support domestically driven dynamics of social and political change. For instance, international pressures for regime change are effective when they bolster local indigenous social movements as in Egypt in February 2011; and in Pakistan in 2007, leading to the end of former President Pervez Musharraf’s military dictatorship. The potential pitfall of international involvement in statebuilding processes in weak states rests in the eagerness of external actors to steer change from the outside, with minimal collaboration with domestic state and civil society actors. Even when there is evidence of collaboration through financial aid and development programs, local voices are frequently
unacknowledged in planning and policy formulation. Such interventions often do more harm than good. They may also be very destabilizing in circumstances where coercive strategies such as economic sanctions are pursued to manipulate the behavior of ruling elites, especially when it adversely affects local communities. Likewise, the use of force by pre-eminent global actors tends to be controversial, often contributing to a perception in the Global South that strategic interest, rather than democratization and other state-building objectives, is the driver of the policy of intervention. This concern stems from the observation that more often than not, military intervention in troubled states is pursued at the cost of greater instability.

b) The Failed State as a Unitary Actor Generating Instability Locally, Regionally, and Globally.

From a theoretical perspective, the literature review suggests that Western scholarship generally approaches the problem of state weakness using the state as the unit of analysis, without taking into adequate consideration regional and global factors undermining its development and stability. Moreover, Western theoretical frameworks examining state failure do not usually explore the state’s relationship with society and the capacity of civil society to effect systemic change, dynamics that are critical for determining a state’s resilience to cope with instability. The disadvantage of an exclusive focus on the dynamics of state instability is that it provides a lop-sided analysis of the problem, sometimes magnifying the level of threat to domestic, regional and global stability, and potentially rationalizing reactive external responses.
In addition to a broader analysis of the domestic context of the state, the dissertation builds the case for analyzing the problem from a multi-tiered perspective, examining the historical, regional and global context, aspects that are generally neglected in Western literature on state failure. Related to this approach, the study makes the claim that state fragility and failure are highly context dependent processes that cannot be assessed through annual snapshots of events in a particular country, proffered by many large-N quantitative models such as the Failed States Index and the Brookings’ Index of State Weakness. Such models support policy responses that lack a holistic comprehension of the dynamics of instability in a particular state, advocating one-size fits all solutions. As an alternative to the large-N theoretical framework, the dissertation proposed a small-N methodology to examine the context of state fragility, supported by an in-depth consideration of historical, endogenous, regional, and global factors. In examination of the historical, domestic, regional and global context of a range of eight weak, fragile, failed, and collapsed states, the dissertation employed a five-pronged theoretical framework developed from the literature, to assess the conditions of instability and conversely the potential for stability. The diagnostic framework is grounded in the following considerations derived from the literature:

a) protracted social conflicts (Azar 1978, 1985, 1999);

b) protracted conflict regions (Marshall 1999);

c) destabilizing military interventions, drawing on Marshall’s notions of minimal intervention and the diffusion of insecurity effect (1999);

d) hostile versus cooperating neighbors (Diamond 2005);
e) *societal and institutional problem-solving responses* (ibid).

The framework encompasses the mainstream Western focus on the domestic sources of instability, including prolonged conflict and crisis conditions, and the role of state institutions in particular, which are important for measuring state performance. Secondly, it provides for a more elaborate exploration of the regional context of state fragility, acknowledging the significance of protracted regional instability and hostile neighborhoods. Thirdly, it brings into sharp focus the global context, wherein the role of external military interventions in weak states is highlighted, a factor that can be highly destabilizing and conflict exacerbating, and is generally unacknowledged in Western literature. Finally, the framework calls for the examination of regional and domestic *resilience factors* of a crisis state, including cooperating neighbors and institutional and societal problem-solving responses. The examination of state resilience processes is missing in the prominent literature on state failure and fragility, and is critical for an informed diagnosis and strategic responses to state instability. The absence of this factor in mainstream Western research and theory formulation serves to obfuscate the role of indigenous systemic change, development, and conflict resolution processes, paving the way for externally engineered problem-solving mechanisms that are often inappropriate for the country context.

The proposed theoretical framework builds on salient Western and non-Western theory to provide a more holistic comprehension of the problem, recognizing that the domestic context of fragility is important. Additionally, as indicated by Dugan (1996) it asserts that in a globalized and inter-connected world, the weak state is vulnerable to
regional and international factors. From the policy perspective, therefore, it is important to generate solutions that are not merely directed in response to the endogenous dynamics of state fragility, but are equally responsive to the regional and international dynamics undermining effective state performance. Moreover, the proposed theoretical framework makes the case against military interventions in fragile contexts, except when they are integrated in an over-arching conflict resolution process (see Sandole’s discussion of NSFPs, 2007, chapter 3) or swift intervention to halt systematic killings of non-combatant populations under the humanitarian R2P principal. Such a strategy is discussed in more detail subsequently in this chapter. Further, the dissertation argues that, although the minimal state model is rejected by the World Bank (2007), it provides a basic framework for many poor, weak, and developing nations to build their capacity. The minimal state should thus be validated by international development actors, as having the potential for building intermediate and activist (maximalist) state functions, moving from a negative peace towards a positive peace trajectory in conflict resolution terms.

c) The Western Perception of State Failure as a Threat to its Security.

The findings generated by this study confirm the hypothesis that the label ‘failed state’ often invokes a strong perception of threat in the West, especially when it is used to describe states of strategic concern. The study notes that in the wake of 9/11, an international policy concern with state failure and associated threats was articulated in a number of UN policy documents including An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping (1992); the Responsibility to Protect report (2001); A
more Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (2004) and Report of the Secretary General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for All (2005). All of these reports have endorsed the concepts of collective global security and shared responsibility, including military intervention as a peacebuilding strategy, thereby overshadowing the international principal of non-intervention in sovereign states.

In the post 9/11 landscape, in particular, the policy rhetoric on failed states has been redefined in line with the strong perception of the terrorist threat. Thereafter, the vernacular associated with state failure began to be used even more commonly in Western security discourses, providing the rationale for pre-emptive multi-lateral military interventions advocated in US National Security Strategy documents (2002, 2006, and 2010). Negative terminology classifying states as weak, failing, failed, and rogue, has since been salient in the security discourses. Moreover, in scholarly, development and think tank literature, the generation of numerous lists, classifications, and indices measuring state performance, have contributed to ambiguity in defining the concept, thereby generating misguided policy responses to the problem.

The dissertation finds that conceptually, there is a tendency in prominent Western discourses to label a conflict or crisis-afflicted state as “failed”, although a conflict environment, and civil war in particular – widely associated with state failure, is not a necessary or sufficient condition of the problem. Contrary to the liberal Western tendency to label many poor, weak, struggling and post conflict states as “failed”, this dissertation postulates that state failure is a rare and uncommon phenomenon. The study defines state failure as an end-state where the state suffers from an overwhelming loss of
legitimacy across considerably vast stretches of its geographic area; where it is unable or unwilling to provide public goods and services, justice and security, opportunities for self-actualization and socio-economic development; where its relationship with civil society is highly asymmetrical; and where society itself has become highly fragmented, challenging the cohesiveness of the state through the manifestation of protracted conflict.

From a scholarly perspective, then, this dissertation questions the liberal use of the term “state failure” in describing a number of states, as it misguides analysis and reinforces the perception of threat, thereby generating reactive confrontational responses, particularly in states of strategic concern, which are largely self-fulfilling and, therefore, self-defeating. Considering that state failure is a key foreign policy and national security challenge for the United States and its key Western allies, it is imperative that the problem be diagnosed using a comprehensive theoretical framework to guide policy formulation. This calls for extensive research to investigate the problem from a multi-tiered conflict resolution framework, particularly in collaboration with scholars from the Global South. Moreover, guiding a better understanding of the problem, through teaching in universities with programs in peace, conflict, security, and public policy, is also imperative, given the dire perception of threat to global security from failed states.

Comparisons of Eight Case Studies: An Assessment Of Military Intervention And Implications For Fragile States And Regional And Global Security

Key Finding 1: Pitfalls of Strategic Interventions in Fragile States

A comparative analysis of eight weak, failed, and fragile states confirms a key research hypothesis that states of strategic concern to pre-eminent Western actors are
more likely to experience external multi-lateral military intervention when classified as “failed” in dominant policy discourses. It may be inferred, therefore, that the “failed state” rhetoric is politically expedient for pursuing a military strategy in states of strategic significance. Because the concept of state failure is tied to a state’s unwillingness and/or inability to protect its citizens, in essence it implies a loss of sovereign statehood, placing a “failed state” at risk of external military intervention, otherwise deemed illegal according to the Westphalian principals of international relations, which have been in place for nearly four hundred years. The loss of sovereign statehood implicit in the concept of state failure invokes the international community’s Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which has been accepted as a new international norm (see Evans, 2008).

It is important to note that multi-lateral military intervention can effectively support local and regional crisis mitigation processes, if and when intervening states are not driven by direct strategic intent. While strategic concerns are sometimes regarded as grounds for just war in the interest of national and economic security of intervening states, they are likely to undercut the stated objectives of intervention to prevent or diffuse a humanitarian crisis and re-build states, thereby complicating the conflict environment.

To address the concern that external military interventions can be subject to misuse, particularly in states with strategic significance, it is recommended that an intervention must be authorized by the UN Security Council, as much as possible, in consultation and partnership with key regional and sub-regional organizations. Such wide-level consultation processes would help to build a global consensus on the moral
imperative of intervention, especially when the terms of the intervention are clearly
specified. The UN should also take steps to include more countries from the Global
South as permanent members of the UN Security Council, particularly so that its
decision-making processes and outcomes are perceived as more representative and
balanced, particularly when they involve controversial decisions such as military
intervention.

When the decision to use force in a fragile environment is approved through a
global consensus, the operation must incorporate strategic planning demonstrating an
understanding of the local context (in consultation with local, state and civil society
actors). It must clearly include a phased drawdown timetable in its planning stages,
incorporating a coherent Security Sector Reform (SSR) plan where appropriate, and in a
timely manner, transfer the responsibility of maintaining law and order to local actors.
Prolonged peacekeeping operations are often an indicator that the underlying causes of
instability have not been addressed and the recurrence of violence is likely (see Hewitt,
Wilkenfeld, and Gurr 2010, 1-4). Therefore, a practicable drawdown strategy is
contingent on robust conflict resolution processes.

Peacemaking missions can be also be challenged by the lack of adequate
resources, which reflects an absence of adequate design. This raises the issue of how the
mission is framed, in essence, what its objectives are: violent conflict prevention,
peacemaking, peacekeeping, and/or peacebuilding (see Sandole 2010, chapter 3). The
effort is usually costly and the international community must be willing to commit
necessary human, military, and financial resources to ensure that it is successfully
implemented. Failure to do so raises an ethical question for international military intervention because an ill-planned and ill-equipped military initiative will do more harm than good. Coordinating a military intervention with legitimate and “neutral” regional and sub-regional peacemaking organizations can economically and logistically be more viable for a sustained peace-making effort, when practicable. Research suggests that UN peacekeeping missions have benefitted from such partnerships in fragile environments (see Appendices F and I).

Despite some successes in the international community’s capacity to diffuse crises (e.g., in Liberia, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Bosnia), the study argues that the international community is just as likely to make matters worse (e.g., in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq). The fundamental challenge for viable military intervention in fragile contexts is that it must be able to restore the security of local communities swiftly and do no harm to them. The engagement of external peacekeeping troops should be deemed neutral and perceived as protecting local communities from violence (see Sandole’s account of United Nations Preventive Deployment Force [UNPREDEP] in Macedonia, 2010, chapter 3). The evidence presented in the dissertation suggests that, even when an intervention is primarily humanitarian, poorly planned peace operations can fuel a conflict further, Somalia being a case in point. Thus, the political will to commit sufficient resources, a deep understanding of ground realities, and an appropriate response and in general an appropriate design, are critical for the success of an intervention.
While making an argument for sufficient financial capacity and human resources to support the viability of an intervention, it is important to emphasize that the odds of the success of a military intervention especially when it is unable to swiftly restore order and security and to enforce peace, are often low. Prolonged military interventions led by the US in Afghanistan and Iraq in the post 9/11 landscape demonstrate that despite incurring extremely high financial and human costs, there is little evidence that the effort has been successful in meeting the national security objectives of the US – especially as they pertain to reducing the terrorist threat. The reconstruction and stabilization of both countries, another key objective of external intervention in both countries, has presented itself as a herculean task the international community has not been able to measure up to. A recent study by the Brown University (Watson Institute for International Relations 2011, 1) suggests that US war costs alone have reached at least $3.4 trillion to date and could reach up to $4.4 trillion in projected war spending by the year 2020. The study does not take account of the war costs of allies in financial terms. Nevertheless, the US war costs estimated by 20 academics at Brown University provide a solid basis for key global state actors to revisit the rationale for military intervention in crisis states. A detailed examination of the costs of war for intervening countries is beyond the scope of this dissertation, however, it is an important argument which calling for less expensive and sustainable alternatives such as equitable economic and human resource development, often lying at the root of instability in post-conflict and developing countries.
In view of the potential pitfalls of military intervention, the study argues that international and regional diplomatic and unofficial peacemaking efforts must be pursued exhaustively, prior to the use of force. The military option should be the last recourse (except under an R2P intervention authorized under a global consensus), and must be planned within an overarching conflict resolution process providing for political dialogue and reconciliation between conflict parties through indigenous and externally mediated peace processes. The study finds that community reconciliation efforts and problem-solving initiatives should take precedence in conflict and postconflict societies, which is an alternative to conventional state building approaches led by external actors, often primarily focused on institution-building support.

That said, the study acknowledges that external military interventions can potentially be effective as a peace-enforcement and crisis intervention mechanism, contingent on the political willingness of the international community to commit sufficient resources to a sustained and ambitious peacekeeping effort. From an ethical perspective, the exercise of force by external actors must clearly demonstrate its capacity to restore security and most of all protect local communities. On the issue of combining development assistance with military intervention, a strategy prescribed by Regan (1997), the research finds that aid generally increases the dependence of recipient states on donors, often interfering with weak local economies, and stalling local economic and political processes. In the final analysis, the success of a multilateral military intervention depends on the extent to which it is integrated within an over-arching conflict resolution process, involving regional and international diplomacy, local peace-
making initiatives, and support rather than externally designed solutions for local institution-building processes.

**Key Finding 2: Problem-solving Capacity of Fragile States - the Resilience Factor**

Arguably, one of the most important findings of this research is that weak and fragile states that are *not* subjected to external military intervention may be better able to self-manage instability. Because their development trajectories are self-perpetuated, they show a greater potential for sustainability. Moreover, the absence of external military and development pressures provides the space required by local state and civil society actors to generate their own solutions and to rely on local and regional mechanisms for problem-solving.

As seen in previous chapters, civil society can successfully engage in the politics of protest, lobby for peace and create the space for formal negotiations culminating in peace agreements and war termination. The role of civil society actors in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Nepal demonstrates that they can be effective catalysts of change in fragile states. In all three cases, civil society was at the forefront in mobilizing the critical mass in making appeals for change at the institutional and societal levels. In Pakistan as well, I have argued that, a vibrant civil society has emerged as a key agent of change in its nascent transition to democracy, as well as supporting the state in performing many of its minimal functions such as providing educational opportunities, disaster relief and recovery initiatives.

In Somalia, post state collapse, the role of civil society and community leaders in the Puntland and Somaliland regions provide models for successful community
reconciliation, positively impacting institution-building and associated economic growth. These initiatives are persuasive in making the case that bottom-up inclusive initiatives should precede other forms of state building interventions, particularly in fragmented societies, often a characteristic of a fragile state. Therefore, community reconciliation processes, drawing on traditional participatory dispute resolution processes -- both formal and informal -- to promote a meaningful dialogue across a broad spectrum of civil society, are imperative for restoring order and security. It can be safely concluded, therefore, that civil society mobilization in fragile contexts should be pursued as a premise for state stabilization.

These lessons resonate with Diamond’s (2005) claim that societal responses to problems are critical in understanding why some societies collapse and others didn’t. From a conflict resolution perspective, John Paul Lederach (1997), in particular, underscores the importance of grassroots and civil society leadership in transforming a conflict environment. In a similar vein, Fukuyama (2004, 30) postulates that the organization of society into cohesive groups of various types such as watch-dog or advocacy groups, is more likely to succeed in the fulfillment of demands for effective state institutions.

In prescribing policy responses to engage civil society as a catalyst for change, a number of recommendations are given for the consideration of concerned global pre-eminent state actors and organizations:

- Support civil society peace constituencies in civil war contexts through media, diplomacy, and unofficial engagement.
- Facilitate consultation processes to engage civil society in dialogue with policy makers.

- Promote local, regional and international civil society networks to build conflict resolution capacity.

- Empower local communities and leaders through their involvement in planning and implementing development initiatives in fragile states.

- Explore traditional participatory problem-solving and dispute resolution mechanisms as the basis for building and sustaining peace in fragmented societies.

**Key Finding 3: Scope and Significance of Local and Regional Conflict Resolution Mechanisms**

Research findings suggest that multilateral military interventions in weak states are liable to do more harm than good, unless they are supported by local and regional peace constituencies and peace processes. It is postulated that because multilateral interventions in failed states are often strategically motivated, they tend to be centered on military objectives and less inclined to engage in diplomacy, conflict resolution and state-building processes. Thus, they tend to generate greater violence and instability, often compounding rather than mitigating the sources of perceived threat. Perhaps one of the most important lessons learned in this study is that peace must be built from within, with minimal external intervention.

Most significantly, research findings suggest that an external military intervention is likely to be most effective when designed to enforce and keep the peace to create the
space for problem-solving dialogue and mediation, leading to peace agreements and political solutions for state instability. To foster a culture of peace (see Sandole 2007, chapter 10) in the global security environment, the international community should prioritize the mobilization of its resources towards conflict resolution and preventive diplomacy. It should also consider regional approaches to state stabilization, as hostile neighbors and neighborhood warfare have negative implications for state stability. Moreover, regional security dilemmas divert state actors and domestic resources away from socio-economic development, and are often channeled towards high defence expenditures and arms races.

Early warning mechanisms using quantitative and qualitative data to monitor conflict hot spots around the world offer many opportunities for timely conflict prevention, especially when it involves regional research institutions and think tanks. Key multilateral organizations such as the UN and the World Bank have instituted a range of early warning mechanisms to preemptively respond to crisis situations, demonstrating the need for greater reliance on such activities. One possibility for strengthening these mechanisms would be to replicate them at regional and sub-regional levels in partnership with the UN and the World Bank, when possible. Regional early warning mechanisms could provide enhanced opportunities for research and analysis by virtue of their proximity to, and deeper knowledge of local conflicts. They may also be able to mobilize regional resources for conflict prevention in a more timely and cost-effective manner, owing to a direct stake in regional stability.
The role of economic regional and sub-regional organizations in conflict prevention, management and resolution cannot be over-estimated. The catalytic role played by ECOWAS, a sub-regional economic organization in promoting conflict resolution processes in Liberia and Sierra Leone, provides a clear illustration of the mobilization of regional resources to this end. The theory underlying the capacity of regional economic organizations to foster peace suggests that, economic stakes in regional stability create incentives for sustained engagement in building regional peace (Angell, N. 1912; Mansfield E.D., Power 1994). Such a commitment was indeed displayed by the ECOWAS in supporting and promoting local, regional and international efforts in war-plagued Liberia and Sierra Leone. Importantly, the organization was successful in mobilizing a coordinated international military and diplomatic response to supplement the respective peace processes. Although the deployment of ECOMOG forces in Sierra Leone and Liberia was not quite successful initially, the peace processes in the two West African states were supported by the political and diplomatic efforts of the ECOWAS leadership, ultimately leading to civil war termination. Thus, ECOWAS must be credited for playing a key role in brokering the peace in Liberia and Sierra Leone.21 22

To demonstrate the organization’s sustained commitment to regional peace, it is important to mention ECOWARN, an early-warning, conflict prevention, resolution, and peacekeeping mechanism supported by the ECOWAS (Nyheim, 2009). Specifically,

22 Bakhoum, Habiboulah. (n.a.) “ECOWAS as a Regional Peace Broker.” Available online at: http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/sorting_out_the_mess_ecowas_regional_peace_broker_h_bakhoum.pdf
ECOWARN is a data collection, monitoring and analysis tool, employing quantitative and qualitative methods to track existing and emerging crises, and post-conflict transitions. While this research study did not assess the impact of this conflict resolution mechanism, its existence points to ECOWAS’s evolving capacity to respond to conflict in West Africa, and builds the case for regional economic organizations as viable agents of peace in fragile contexts.

Similar models of sub-regional economic organizations include the ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations), widely recognized for building stability in a protracted conflict region. A yet more compelling model supporting the concept of regional economic integration, as a precursor for peace and security in a protracted conflict region, is the European Union (EU) (see Sandole 2010, chapter 3). The evolution of this regional model of cooperation in postwar Europe is testament that when regional interest is seen as national interest, it has a long-term stabilizing effect on the region as a whole.

Conclusion

This study has contributed towards a better understanding of the problem of state fragility, failure, and collapse. It also provides policy recommendations for multi-tiered conflict resolution responses involving collaboration between local, regional and key global actors. In the post Cold War, post 9/11 landscape, prominent Western policy discourses on weak, fragile, and failed states have increasingly focused on the threat that failed states pose to global stability. Patrick (2011) argues that failed states have become the West’s “biggest fear”. He refers to them as “the bogeyman of the international order,
the nightmare that inspires our national security doctrines and keeps our top officials up at night” (ibid.). The perceived nexus between state failure and Western security is postulated as generating reactive, multilateral responses in troubled states, oftentimes exacerbating and prolonging the conflict dynamics. From a global development and peacebuilding policy perspective, little attention has been paid to exploring preventative and transformative responses fostering partnerships between local, regional, and global actors. Likewise, the importance of indigenous conflict resolution and traditional institution building processes generally remains unacknowledged in policy discourses.

Theory formulation in mainstream Western literature is generally focused on a uni-dimensional analysis of the problem, primarily the endogenous sources. The importance of regional and global factors undermining state stability, are generally overlooked in the debate, contributing to a limited comprehension and inadequate responses to the problem. This dissertation proposes an integrated theoretical framework to guide analysis and effective policy formulation and implementation. The approach entails fours levels of analysis (endogenous, regional, global, and historical); highlights state resilience processes in an assessment of the problem; and integrates Western knowledge with perspectives from the Global South. The dissertation acknowledges the importance of including perspectives from the Global South in analyzing a problem that most directly affects them, and is critical for the process of comprehensive theory development and policy formulation.

With respect to research, the dissertation builds the case for bringing together scholarly perspectives in the Global North and the Global South towards a more holistic
diagnosis of the problem. It advocates small-N approaches that are context-specific and supported by comprehensive multi-tiered analysis of the problem, versus large-N quantitative models, ranking hundreds of states using the same variables. This recommendation is based on the concern with the reliability of comparative analysis using aggregated approaches, as many states are in different stages of development, experience unique regional challenges, show significant variations in population, territorial size, and availability of resources. Large-N quantitative indices are in vogue in Western literature, each with its own set of classifications and definitions for weak state performance, often contributing to ambiguity rather than conceptual clarity. Many of the categories and definitions associated with the problem of state failure also evoke a strong perception of threat to the West, rationalizing reactive policy approaches (see Sandole 2007, chapter 3).

While Southern scholars such as Eqbal Ahmed (1980, 2006) have also proffered some categories to analyze Third World states (e.g. the Elective-Parliamentary system, the Ascriptive-Palace system, the Dynastic Oligarchic-system, the Pragmatic-Authoritarian system, the Radical-Nationalist system, the Marxist-Socialist system; the Neo-Fascist system), he argues that the purpose of such classifications is limited - to “draw attention to the to the varieties of politics in the Third World, and to establish a framework for comparison in order to better understand the process of change, including sudden shifts from one system toward another. Second, taken together the seven categories are not comprehensive” (ibid. 2006, 130). In view of Ahmed’s reflections on empirically taking account of Third World states, categories and classifications should
aim to provide as much as possible the specific political, ideological and economic appraisal of the context.

To guide policy and practice, a key question I have sought to explore in the dissertation, is the impact of Western multi-lateral military interventions in weak, fragile, and failed states. I have suggested that reactive multi-lateral military interventions, even in combination with development assistance, tend to do more harm than good, unless they are integrated in an overarching conflict resolution strategy that is supportive of local and regional peace processes. While short-term military strategies are often critical for the immediate cessation of violence, it is important that the focus on the use of force is not prolonged and is perceived as protecting local communities. Medium to long-term strategies for state stabilization and conflict transformation are exceedingly important for the success of a multi-lateral intervention. They must address, in addition to the symptoms, the underlying causes of instability including the denial of basic human needs and rights; fractured relationships between communities; outstanding regional disputes and neighborhood warfare as indicated in Sandole’s “3 levels of conflict reality” (2007; 2010, 39-40).

Another critical concern raised by this dissertation is donor dependency often associated with economic assistance. Thus, I have suggested that alternatives to aid such as regional and international trade should be supported by the international community. Likewise, the promotion of a culture of conflict prevention (see Sandole 2007, 176) through early warning; regional economic integration; and building the capacity of, and engaging with civil society, are important for the long-term transformation of a local and
regional conflict environment. It is critical for the international community to mobilize its resources in line with these approaches as an alternative to the reactive use of force, often generating higher levels of instability locally, regionally, and globally. Finally, such an approach requires that concerned states in the Global South, in particular, contribute to knowledge production far more than they do now, to inform policy formulation locally, regionally and globally.
Appendix A

List of Experts Interviewed


Appendix B

Analysis of Interview findings

Question 1. Subjects were asked, “What is a failed state”: their responses indicate that perspectives from the Global North and South are generally similar in their understanding of the causes and symptoms. In reflecting on the problem of state failure, most responses resonated with the ALC model (Carment et. al 2009b, 12), identifying the core components of state fragility, as: a) erosion of state authority; b) lack of state legitimacy; and c) the state’s lack of, or limited capacity to provide social services, order, and security. Their responses suggest that there is conflation in the usage of the terms fragility and failure, and that the tendency to use the terms interchangeably is common. The range of characteristics of state failure discussed by participants is specified in the table below to show that some of them are the same as the ones used to define state fragility. Carment et al.’s (2009b) ALC framework is applied to classify the independent variables. In some cases, independent variables have been placed under more than one category of the ALC model owing to a direct relationship with the dependent variable
Table 6: Range of Characteristics of State Failure Discussed by Research Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>Legitimacy</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarianism; oppressive government; human rights violations by the state</td>
<td>Failure to fulfill citizen’s expectations</td>
<td>Poor governance; failure to provide minimal social services;(symptoms of poverty and disease)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragmentation of authority; significant level of elite infighting</td>
<td>Fragmentation of authority</td>
<td>Unable to respond to humanitarian crises/environmental disaster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unable to exercise force, and maintain law and order; active engagement of organized crime groups;</td>
<td>Unable to exercise force, and maintain law and order; active engagement of organized crime groups;</td>
<td>Pervasive insecurity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Limited to no administrative capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overwhelming loss of control of territory/ungoverned spaces</td>
<td>Overwhelming loss of control of territory/ungoverned spaces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unable to extract resources</td>
<td>Unable to extract resources</td>
<td>Unable to extract resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erosion of social contract</td>
<td>Erosion of social contract</td>
<td>Erosion of social contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Loss of identity of state (raison d’etat)</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
Perspectives from the Global South: Two claims in response to the question “What is a failed state?” proffered by a significant number of Southern experts (69%), were notably distinct in the lack of their acknowledgement by the vast majority (75%) of subjects from the Global North. One could safely infer, therefore, that the views (described below) are representative of the insider (Southern view), and are not current in Western discourses (outsider view), generally speaking. The first claim being that a high intensity and protracted conflict environment in a state, such as war or insurgency, do not have a direct relationship with state failure. Secondly, it was argued that many states engaged in protracted violent conflict are able to stabilize on their own, therefore, the manifestation of long drawn-out violent conflict should not be taken as a sufficient indicator of state failure. Southern experts interviewed for this research proposed that cases where there is an outsider perception of state failure warrant a more comprehensive analysis of the domestic environment, including examination of factors that are positive indicators of state resilience and viability e.g. evidence of civil society mobilization and grassroots level economic activity.

Participants were of the view that the classification state failure predicates an end-state, one whose development has stalled – a rare phenomenon. One participant, a development expert, was emphatic that even Somalia, often considered a text-book case of failure should not be classified a failed state owing to positive indicators of economic and political activity in many parts of the country. These two claims suggest that while participants from the Global South are conscious of the dynamics of instability in various states they do not necessarily view conflict ridden states as failed. This paradigmatic
schism appears to be very clear in view of Carment et al.’s (2009b, 10) finding, that mainstream views in the discourses (on development, conflict and stability) in the Western literature on failed states, generally define it as a ‘violent end state’, or one with ‘low capacity’.

Southern participants generally expressed the concern that the term “state failure” is primarily a Western construction of reality serving to reinforce the dichotomy between East and West. Some of them (30%) shared the concern that the classification is often associated with countries unfriendly to the US in addition to countries experiencing protracted instability. One of them observed that post world War II states were described as “crisis states”, but in modern day parlance postconflict states are often contentiously labeled “failed”. Another participant postulated that “failed states” stereotyping prevails with reference to Islamic states particularly in the media and policy discourses, and that there was no evidence of selective “stereotyping” in the case of many other perceived failed states. The participants were of the view that the label “state failure” is consequential for states that are struggling with unstable postconflict and democratic transitions, especially when the classification is used to justify external military intervention.

Question 2. Participants were asked to discuss exogenous factors contributing to state instability, fragility and failure. Responses suggest that experts from various parts of the world -- developed, developing, and underdeveloped -- are cognizant of a range of factors contributing to the regional spillover of conflict making states particularly vulnerable to instability. For instance, one participant stated that regional security
dynamics in Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire have implications for instability in postconflict Liberia. The main exogenous factors contributing to state instability discussed by participants included:

- cross border refugee movements to neighboring states that are often struggling themselves (e.g. from Zimbabwe to South Africa, the latter having a large proportion of local disaffected communities);
- human, drug, and small arms trafficking (e.g. in Africa and South Asia);
- armed violence along contiguous borders involving ethnic kin-groups (e.g. Maoist insurgents in Nepal and India), and tribal conflict dynamics (e.g. in Africa’s Great Lakes region);
- terrorist safe havens in border regions (e.g. in Pakistan); and
- the adverse impact of the global economic crisis on: foreign direct investment in weak states (e.g. falling remittances in Nepal, Tajikistan, and Liberia); and trade and industry (e.g. Cambodia’s hurting textile industry and resultant unemployment) in troubled states.

**Perspectives from the Global South:** While representatives of both the Global North and South were more or less equally concerned with regionally located exogenous threats such as hegemonic interventions and political meddling in neighboring states, it was interesting to note some differences in worldviews. 69% of Southern experts were concerned for instance, that political and military intervention by Western actors in troubled states (e.g. Iraq and Afghanistan) have exacerbated the dynamics of state fragility and the threat to regional and global security. It is important to acknowledge
that a minority among Western participants (25%) were in agreement with this concern but the vast majority did not view military intervention by Western actors as a destabilizing factor. Western experts generally were of the opinion that the problem of state failure warrants Western-led international military intervention and peacekeeping to contain violence.

Question 3. Participants were asked to share their reflections on the level of threat posed by failed states to global security. Their responses (delineated below) suggest that experts in the Global North were equally divided about the threat to global stability from failed states. On the other hand, a majority of Southern experts (69%) did not perceive the problem of state failure as a critical threat to global security. A list of various responses provided by Western experts is given hereunder:

- Failed states may or may not pose a threat to Western interests.
- The scope and level of threat can only be determined by examining the unique context of a failed state.
- Some semi-functioning states may be more of a threat to Western interests
- failed states may pose an indirect threat to the West in terms of: disease (HIV, avian flu), and climate change.
- Failed states may pose a direct threat through terrorist safe havens in ungoverned territories.
- Most failed states pose a greater threat to themselves than to any other state for instance (e.g. Nepal and Zimbabwe). Most fragile states don’t match the description of failed states that pose a threat to the West.
- Failed states pose a threat to global insecurity by harboring criminal organizations
- failed states do not pose a direct threat.

Question 4. Participants were asked to share their views concerning the relationship between the threat to US national security and state failure. The outsider view resonated with the ambivalence expressed in response to the previous question regarding the level of threat posed by failed states to global security. Additionally, a few U.S.-specific reflections highlighting the perception of threat associated with state failure were shared, given hereunder:

- **State failure has emerged as a post-communist era foreign policy concern**: the fear of mega-states has subsided and has been replaced by the fear of failed states
- **There are different categories of failed states with different implications for US foreign policy**: US foreign policy in many states is not directly concerned with state failure, but more specific policy objectives.
- **Labeling a state “failed state” has political reasons**: when policy-makers believe that a state poses an existential threat of harboring terrorists, they start referring to it a “failed state”. States are usually not labeled “failed” if they pose a humanitarian or regional threat of instability. For instance, people were not aware of Yemen’s problems until Senator Joe Lieberman, head of Homeland Security Committee, started talking about it as a failed state experiencing insurgency and harboring a terror threat, thus invoking the possibility of invading it. Failed states did exist before 9/11 but did not have the political resonance. Likewise, the
common man became conscious of the problem of state failure as a threat to US security in the post 9/11 landscape.

**Perspectives from the Global South:** A vast majority of research subjects (69%) did not view the problem of state failure as posing a direct threat to US national security.

Question 5. Participants were asked to comment on the **nexus between the threat of terrorism and the conceptualization of state failure in the West**. Responses (67% representing the Global North) indicate that the perception that failed states provide breeding grounds for terrorist havens is wide-held. It was suggested that in Western foreign policy discourses on state failure, the threat of terrorism has assumed primary importance. One participant stressed that Yemen and Somalia are of pressing concern for US foreign policy because of the terrorist threat and less because they are failed or failing states. Similarly, it was argued that US intervention in Afghanistan is justified by the national security concern with the terrorist threat more so than the problem of state failure itself.

On the other hand, a minority (33% of Western experts) suggested that state failure does not foster terrorism and there are many failed states that don’t harbor terrorist safe havens. Some participants observed that the Western media is fundamentally responsible for the common association between state failure and (Islamist) terrorism. It was argued that historically terrorists have operated in a variety of regions including Europe (e.g. Italian Red Brigades, Germany’s Red Army Faction, the Irish Republican Army) and the United States (e.g. Ku Klux Klan, the Weathermen), and elsewhere.


**Perspectives from the Global South:** Southern views on the nexus between the threat of terrorism and the conceptualization of state failure suggest that participants are conscious of the strong Western perception of the threat of terrorism from failed states. While a minority (31%) empathized with the Western threat from terrorism thriving in failed states, the majority (69%) believed that there is no direct relationship between state failure and terrorism. An expert advised that the presumed relationship between state failure and terrorism detracts from a serious academic discussion about the real causes of state fragility and failure. Participants emphasized that terrorist havens exist in many regions including modern day Russia and Europe. It was argued that the adversary could find sanctuary anywhere, irrespective of whether a state was failed or not. State failure is therefore, not necessarily considered as fertile grounds for terrorist operatives.

One participant suggested that terrorist organizations directly threatening the US, view US foreign policy as hostile to their cause. Thus, eliminating terrorist sanctuaries in failed states is important, but it will not address the underlying drivers of the threat as terrorists could possibly find sanctuaries in Western locations such as Berlin, Birmingham, and Bonn. It was recalled that the terrorist attacks on 9/11 had been organized by a Hamburg based cell of al-Qaeda. A participant noted that U.S. foreign policy is concerned with addressing post 9/11 symptoms of terrorism, but it is not cognizant of how its foreign policy may be adapted to mitigate the causes of the threat. It was recommended that terrorism must be addressed with both short-term and long-term strategies. Short-term strategies entail military options, but long-term strategies are imperative for resolving conflicts such as the intractable conflict between Israelis and
Palestinians. By the same token, it was argued that al-Qaida positions have traction in the Muslim world because terrorists use genuine grievances such as the persecution of Palestinians to recruit in their file and ranks. One participant raised the need for an appropriate US-led global strategy/foreign policy approach as an alternative ideological response to terrorism. Related to this recommendation was the opinion that US foreign policy is guided by the good-guys-vs.-bad-guys narrative in responding to the terrorist threat, rather than seeking an understanding of the underlying causes stimulating terrorist behavior.

Question 6. Participants were asked whether they perceive the problem of state failure to be on the rise or decline. The researcher was not able to discuss this question in all but two interviews, due to the paucity of time. As the responses are not broadly representative of either the insider or outsider view, they have not been shared in this research study.

Question 7. Participants were asked to comment on the utility of quantitative indices ranking state failure, fragility and instability. Responses indicate that there is a lack of agreement in Western schools of thought regarding the academic value of quantifying the problem of state failure, and various state rankings based on such methodologies. Half of the participants (50%) representing the Global North observed that the construction of quantitative indices was a beneficial exercise primarily for the following reasons:

- Indices draw attention to troubled states and stimulate a debate among local actors.
• They call for diagnosis and encourage problem solving.

• They make the case for support and rehabilitation of weak states.

• Indices raise awareness about issues among donors and start a dialogue that is helpful for policymakers. For instance, the discussion on corruption in Africa, has brought the problem into sharp focus within the donor community.

• Ground realities in failed states are not impacted by focusing on their problems in quantitative rankings. An instance of this is the dwindling tourism in Fiji, which has been affected by military coups rather than Western discourses on state failure.

Having acknowledged the utility of quantitative rankings, about half of the aforementioned participants (25% of the sample), added that indices have weaknesses as well as strengths. For instance, it was argued that data should be based on local, rather than foreign perceptions. Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) was cited as an effective barometer for measuring public sector corruption levels in the context of local perceptions. Various criticisms representing Western reflections on the quantitative rankings of state performance, are given below:

- **Categorization as analysis does not help explain the context of the states.** All states have unique problems that are concealed by aggregation of data. Many of the same states show up on the indices assessing their vulnerability to failure yet there is no analytical value to grouping these states. The methodology obscures the differences between a lot of cases, examples given include: North Korea - a
strong state; Somalia - suffering from fragmented sovereignty; and Pakistan and Afghanistan - functionally different from each other.

- **Brookings Index on State Weakness (2008) was produced only once** and the lack of follow-up research in subsequent years undermines its utility as a tool. Tracking state performance - a dynamic process, on an on-going basis is critical for the design of such tools.

- **There has been a proliferation of indices and there are tensions in their data and assessment.** It was argued for instance that David Carment’s data suggest that state fragility is on the rise, where as Monty Marshall’s reports present a downward global trend in state fragility. Similar discrepancies in quantitative analysis have not been helpful in informing policy and effectively guiding academic debate on the subject.

- **The selection of independent variables** is pertinent in some cases but not others. For instance, the assessment of a state’s formal institutions does not provide adequate analysis in cases where a state possesses informal tribal, cultural, and social institutions.

- **Negative rankings of states may be detrimental to their interests.** It was argued that the emphasis on instability and failure generates panic, fear and reactive strategies, rather than cultivating a collaborative international environment for problem-solving. Adverse state rankings discourage the flow of foreign direct investment and have other economic implications. The indices
engineer outsider perceptions and pejorative classifications such as “failure” in particular carry a variety of connotations.

**Perspectives from the Global South:** responses elicited from experts indicate that quantitative rankings are generally not considered a useful tool in the South. Not one out of the 13 experts interviewed suggested that indices prepared in the West were used in local or externally-led problem-solving processes in troubled states. Although some of them (23%), suggested that indices may provide useful data for research purposes, they argued that quantitative rankings do not provide the context to design appropriate interventions. Further, experts from various states perceived as fragile, weak, unstable, or failed underscored that quantitative rankings do not build a case for external development support for their countries. While development assistance may be given to at-risk states, the process is not guided by rankings in indices. They added that many developing states qualify for development support whether or not they are considered failed or fragile. Additional insider reflections on quantitative indices are presented below:

- **Indices represent a Western paradigm – an outsider view:** it was suggested for instance, that the rule of law indicator frequently used to measure the performance of states reflects part of the liberal tradition in the West. Tribal structures in many states have no rule of law, but social organization structures exist nonetheless. It was noted that while rule of law may be a desirable goal, fragile states require time to evolve institutionally because they are in different stages of social development. Participants opined that the touchstone frame of
reference for “state failure” ought to be what local communities expect from their government, and if they have low expectations indices based on outsider expectations, indices merely represent a Western standard vis-à-vis state performance.

- **The classification state failure is value-laden and predicates an end state:** international donors and corporations are discouraged from investing in states that are labeled “failed”. Thus, rather than helping the country which may be the objective some indices such as the Failed States Index have a negative effect. The example of the Arab Human Development Report, prepared by Arabs, was cited as a useful exercise that was replicable in other regions. It was strongly recommended that more countries in the South should produce indices by using polls to assess the expectations of their people.

- **Quantitative indices provide the pretext for intervention by Western state actors in states that may be undemocratic:** the common association between state failure and weak or absent democratic institutions salient in quantitative indices is perceived by some in the Global South as supporting policy objectives justifying international interventions.

- **Indices can be politically motivated and power driven:** participants voiced the concern that rankings appear to isolate certain states. Further, it was argued that the emerging trend in the classification of states as “failed” obscures analysis as the definitions are outcome-based rather than process-based. The examination of political, social, economic and cultural processes across time and space was
considered imperative for assessing state fragility and failure. It was observed that Pakistan is just as failed or not failed today as it was in the 1990s, yet it is has only recently come to be regarded as a failed state. The country is as open to non-state actors and terrorist havens today as it was when thousands of madrassahs were established in the 1990s - suggesting that the discourse on state failure is visibility-dependent.

- **The proximity between certain states is inaccurate on various indices:** it was suggested that because many states have totally different capacities to govern and to control their territories, rankings can be misleading.

- **States that are considered most vulnerable often have the capacity to move forward:** indices need to distinguish between those states that are really failed, and those that are on a development trajectory. The term “failed state predicates an end state.

- **States rankings exert psychological pressures.** Local actors tend to lose self-confidence as the broad conceptualization of failure is degrading. Adverse rankings upset domestic politics, as they appeal to the political opposition and nefarious elements including terrorist organizations.

Question 8. Participants were asked to evaluate **the relationship between the predominant discourses on failed states and foreign military interventions.**

Responses suggest that there is lack of consensus in the Global North concerning the effects of extant discourses on military interventions in failed states, however, half (50%) rejected the hypothesized nexus between discourse and intervention. The
remaining 50% of responses were divided between those having a firm belief that discourse has negative implications for intervention (25%), and those who were uncertain about the effects of discourse on intervention (25%). Arguments proffered to substantiate various positions are summarized below:

- **The label “failed state” can subject a state to military intervention.**

  Participants stated that labeling states “failed” rather than “fragile”, “at-risk”, “unstable” or “weak”, may have unintended consequences and implications for policy. It was argued that the language needs to be debated and settled as there is no commonly understood meaning of the term state failure. A participant observed that the term had been co-opted by neoconservative politicians. It was stated that when political dynamics reach a stage where policymakers start describing a state as failed, military intervention becomes a likely recourse. Thus, when one hears the reference to a “failed state” in legislative circles, it is a clear indication that the case for military intervention is being developed. It was emphasized however, that the label “failed state” becomes “tough to undo” even when there is no real evidence of an existential threat emanating from the perceived failed state.

- **The precedence for using rhetoric (such as “rogue states”) to justify intervention exists.** Participants highlighted the tendency to use rhetoric to bolster policy and noted that since there is a strong relationship between the terrorist threat and perceived failed states, one could infer that the failed states discourse has implications on policy. Yemen’s example was cited as a state that
is the latest to have been labeled “failed” although it is not failed, despite its troubles. The real problem in Yemen as far as US is concerned is al-Qaeda and one may conclude that it is the threat of terrorism used as justification for military engagement that has earned Yemen the label “failed state”.

**- Discourse may be used to explain policy but not to invade a country.** It was argued that the failed states discourse gained currency in the aftermath of 9/11 and opened up a debate about international security. However, it was suggested that discourse and policy are not the same and intervention is not based on discourse. Various experts opined that policy formulation processes are detached from external discourses exemplified in state rankings and indices. A participant highlighted the point that in Afghanistan the “failed states” discourse wasn’t the dominant motivation for invasion - although it may have been presented as a failed state after the intervention to garner support for policy. Another participant added that whether Afghanistan falls in the failed state category or not, US policy has moved beyond the paradigm and rhetoric is not important in this case.

**Perspectives from the Global South:** responses indicate that in the South there is a stronger perception of the linkage between the predominant discourses on failed states and foreign military interventions. 54% of the participants believed that the failed states discourse is tied to or represents policy. Participants cited punitive sanctions against North Korea and Iran, coercive policies in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as evidence of linkage between policy and discourse. It is important to note that 31% of the participants representing insider views, did not have the opportunity to discuss this question, and the
remaining 15% were uncertain about the relationship between discourse and foreign military intervention.

Question 9. Participants were asked to comment on the implications of international military intervention in failed states. Responses indicate that views from the Global North and South are not aligned on this issue. Western voices generally focused on the rationale for military intervention - underscoring a stake in global stability and lack of governance in various states. Nonetheless, there was a difference of opinion across the outside perspective regarding the effectiveness and success of international military interventions in perceived failed states suggesting that the issue is being debated in the Global North. On the other hand, experts from the Global South were concerned with the legality and ethics of international military interventions in weak and fragile states, and generally viewed post 9/11 interventions as driven by Western security objectives, rather than as a response to humanitarian crises. A shift in strategic intervention in failed states in the post 9/11 landscape was referenced by Southern experts (46%) and acknowledged by a (33%) of Western experts. Regional reflections are summarized below.

Perspectives from the Global North

- The international community is concerned with ungoverned states, and intervention is designed to stabilize them: Western experts generally supported the notion that key actors in the international community (including the US, Britain, and their allies in the Western world), have an interest in protecting vulnerable populations and restoring state stability
- The emerging system of global governance places the responsibility of intervening in unstable states on the US and its allies: the international community is exploring various means of global governance including military intervention and governance by multi-national corporations. It was noted that globalization and associated political and economic stakes in the stabilization of fragile states could also serve as factors guiding international interventions.

- Instances of state failure with regional spillover require peacekeeping and military interventions: some participants (25%) observed that instability in countries such as Afghanistan and Somalia spilling over into neighboring states, calls for crisis management through military means by key global actors.

- The pitfall of military intervention: a minority representing Western participants (33%) noted that the loss of civilian lives and property through excessive use of global military forces could be counterproductive in meeting the objectives of stabilization. It was recommended therefore, that when military intervention is viewed unfavorably, tactics should be revisited. For instance, one participant highlighted that in post-2006 Iraq, the use of force had become more focused in a re-thinking of tactics by General David Petraeus. It was argued that military interventions, such as in Afghanistan, have rarely helped stabilize a country, partly because military deployment in pursuit of strategic objectives has undermined state stabilization processes. Military intervention in Haiti in the 1990s was viewed as an exception, but despite its success, the intervention was considered controversial. Hence, while military intervention may bring forth short-term stability, it fosters long-term instability.
- **Shift in military intervention strategy post 9/11**: 33% of respondents acknowledged that prior to 9/11, military interventions in failed states were designed in response to humanitarian crises. However, it was observed that post 9/11 interventions are guided by the threat to US national security, rather than the protection of local communities. It was emphasized that post 9/11 interventions are generally in response to the threat of terrorists, nuclear weapons, narcotics proliferation, and global criminal networks. Moreover, it was stated that although a heavy military footprint in pursuit of al-Qaeda undermines development objectives in Afghanistan, it is imperative for the pursuit of immediate US security concerns.

**Perspectives from the Global South**: responses suggest that in many perceived failed states, foreign military interventions are generally not viewed as having effectively contributed to state stabilization processes. 85% of experts interviewed for this research, expressed their reservations with the international community’s capacity to restore stability in turbulent states. While some exceptions were cited, (discussed under successful examples of intervention), experts conveyed their dissatisfaction with strategic planning in, and the selection of countries where military interventions were undertaken by the international community. Research subjects’ responses are summarized below:

- **Foreign intervention is often in violation of international law**: intervention on the basis of state failure is potentially a dangerous concept even if it is humanitarian, because it is subject to abuse and because the intervening party advances its own goals. It was stated that the UN charter is based on the system of state sovereignty and there is a global consensus around it. Hence, state intervention for humanitarian purposes is contentious,
when it undermines state sovereignty and a state should be helped in accordance to the respect owed to its sovereignty. When mobilizing resources available to the international community, an intervention must have the backing of the UN Security Council. In other words, the terms of intervention must be clearly specified through a global consensus so that it does not rest on ambiguous legal grounds.

- **Intervention by the West is often selective**: responses suggest that international military interventions are generally regarded as serving the strategic interests of preeminent global state actors. Conflict hotspots in Africa are perceived as being overlooked while the international community has in recent years concerned itself with Iraq and Afghanistan - without being able to transform the conflict environment in either country. One participant suggested that post 9/11 interventions around the world were effective except for countries in the Islamic block, where they were contributing to conflict escalation because of the focus on strategic objectives. Interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq in particular were viewed as destabilizing the two states and their respective regions.

- **Lack of coordination and coherent planning in international military interventions**: poor coordination and lack of coherent planning by the international community, especially when multiple external actors are engaged in an intervention, were noted. International peacekeeping and coalition forces are often perceived as interested in promoting their competing agendas undermining their operations, and signaling the mission’s weakness to the adversary. Additional problems cited, included: alliances with
warlords and militia groups, lack of reconstruction and development work, corruption, and lack of adequate resources.

Question 10. Participants were asked to comment on the implications of international aid and development interventions in failed states. Responses indicate that experts from the Global North and South share a range of views on the implications of development aid representing an ambivalence about its benefits. From the Global North, a small number of participants (33%) opined that robust international aid to alleviate the threat of disease (e.g. HIV and malaria in Africa and South America) in particular, and state-building processes in general, have been beneficial. One participant cited economic aid given to Soviet Union in the mid-1990s to prevent state failure as a “perfect example” of the utility of aid. Likewise, the participant also considered debt relief in Africa, an exemplary illustration of helpful financial assistance. Defending the utility of aid, a participant stated that the donor community tends to be impatient in assessing its benefits. However, 50% of Western participants who answered this question felt that while aid could be beneficial its efficacy was challenged by one or more of the following factors: huge amount of funds required to re-build post-conflict states; the impact of the global financial crisis on aid; a multiplicity of external development actors in failed states with competing agendas; a lack of commitment to nation-building as a precursor for effective state-building; corruption levels in recipient countries; significant levels of aid returning to donor countries through their contractors; lack of a coherent U.S. aid policy; vested interests of the donor community in maintaining a presence in failed states (e.g. to extract local resources); and politicization of aid distribution. One participant suggested that aid
could be tied to a donor’s strategic interests in that it may be provided as a “political
gesture of commitment” to a country to earn their cooperation, (as in the case of the
Kerry-Lugar aid package to Pakistan) which influenced elite behavior in Pakistan in
cracking down on the Taliban. Recommendations for improving aid effectiveness
included its distribution, directly within local communities to empower them, (e.g.
through Afghanistan’s solidarity program). Moreover, it was suggested that trade should
be explored as a more viable form of development aid by the donor community.

**Perspectives from the Global South:** Responses indicate that although experts from the
Global South agreed that development assistance could be useful if channeled efficiently,
they were skeptical about the benefits of existing aid mechanisms. It was argued for
instance that corruption levels in certain states undermine the institution of international
aid. It was also observed that INGDOs (international non-governmental developmental
organizations) did not demonstrate coherent planning in aid allocation. Participants
stressed that aid was not as effective a stabilization intervention as foreign direct
investment, as the former addresses the symptoms rather than the sources of state
instability. In reference to Pakistan, it was opined that historically aid flows to the
country, had not demonstrated their ability to mitigate its problems. Moreover,
participants felt that aid is often given as an incentive for government to toe the donor
country’s line. Participants argued that financial aid should be given to local actors with
minimal expectations in meeting donor agendas. It was also speculated that development
aid is liable to be misappropriated and used for amassing arms and ammunition.
With reference to Liberia, a participant suggested that international assistance was not the primary factor that had put the country on a constructive political trajectory. Rather, positive change in the country should be attributed to the war weariness of the masses and associated endogenous factors. While it was acknowledged that the country had benefited from aid assistance from the World Bank, DfID (UK Department for International Development), and the US, in terms of job creation and human development, it was noted that the massive levels of aid provided to Liberia could not be justified in terms of its progress. Another participant observed that although the international community was helping build Liberian state institutions and steering in a politically viable trajectory, the state was not still not viable economically and therefore not sustainable without a continuous flow of aid.

It was stated that the international donor community often responds to humanitarian crises with strategies that are not designed in consultation with local actors and hence, they are not appropriate for the country context. Further, the recipient country becomes dependent on donors, often lacking the leadership that would take a firm stance on prioritizing their development needs. Some participants noted that INGOs (in Afghanistan) were distributing aid to warlords and militia groups who were at the forefront in perpetuating turmoil and instability. Recommendations for improving mechanisms of international aid included: debt relief, foreign direct investment, and trade subsidies.

Question 11. Participants were asked to identify **successful models of international intervention in state stabilization and reconstruction processes**. Responses have not
been quantified because a number of participants did not have the time to address this question. Nonetheless, responses suggest that experts from the Global North and South are of the opinion that the international community has effectively intervened in a range of volatile situations threatening domestic and regional stability. Southern voices appeared particularly supportive of diplomatic and conflict resolution interventions at various levels, while Western experts discussed a broader range of interventions, including crisis management/war termination through military means; peacekeeping; strengthening of political institutions; preservation of international borders, and development projects.

**Perspectives from the Global North:** Western experts cited the examples of post world War II Japan and Germany as good examples of state building by external actors. Liberia and Sierra Leone were cited as successful modern examples of state stabilization and reconstruction with the assistance of international community. However, experts from both the North and the South acknowledged that peace is being sustained in both Liberia and Sierra Leone with substantial international military presence, and that crisis management by the international community has been accomplished through multi-sectoral interventions including: the mobilization of significantly high levels of economic resources; a surge in peacekeeping troops; robust development projects; and international diplomatic and political measures to address the sources of instability. In both instances, the relatively small population size, and the long-term presence of peacekeeping troops, were deemed critical factors contributing to the ultimate success of peacekeeping missions.
Other modern successes of international intervention in unstable states identified by the participants included: Mozambique, Kosovo, Haiti and East Timor. Sudan was cited as an example of relative success where the country is now perceived to be on a trajectory of recovery. The international community was credited for supporting the preservation of international boundaries in Sudan as well as Chad. A participant suggested that the US in particular, has been instrumental in holding together the territorial boundaries of many states, which would otherwise be absorbed by their neighbors. The international community’s collaboration with existing governments was considered central to the success of external interventions.

**Perspectives from the Global South:** responses suggest that a variety of international interventions in perceived failed states are viewed favorably in the less developed part of the world. Examples of successful intervention identified, highlighted in particular conflict resolution processes such as: post genocide truth and reconciliation processes in Rwanda; the Bosnian peace process; capacity building and organization of civil society in Haiti; Norwegian mediation in Sri Lanka’s civil war, and the international community’s military intervention and peacekeeping assistance in East Timor’s transition to independence.

Question 12. Participants were asked to identify and discuss *ineffective international interventions in failed states.* Since a disproportionate number of experts from the Global North and South have answered this question, their responses have not been quantified or compared. Experts from the Global North and the South tend to agree that external interventions present many challenges.
Perspectives from the Global North

Western experts shared one or more of the following concerns: the international community does not have the knowledge and sophistication to deal with state failure; an intervening state may isolate the state and work with NGOs as if the country has no government (as in Haiti); state building is often a militarized process whereby there is a fusion of the military and security apparatus with economic development programs; multiplicity of development actors and competing agendas (as in Afghanistan); lack of transparency; poor coordination; inefficacious use of resources; lack of local ownership in development processes; and the tendency by the US to conduct covert and clandestine operations in failed states (guided by the view that failed states cannot police themselves).

Perspectives from the Global South: Interviewees commented on the threat of regional spillover of violence when a military intervention is prolonged as in the case of Afghanistan where the intervention by the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) has been underway since October 2001. Additionally they cited the exacerbation of conflict dynamics (UNOSOM I and II) and inaction by the UN mission in the face of massacre (Rwanda and Srebrenica). Some participants opined that Liberia and the DRC are not viable models of international intervention because of prolonged engagement.

Question 13. Participants were asked to make recommendations for the international community to effectively intervene in failed states: responses have not been quantified due to a disproportionate number of responses from experts representing their respective regions. No distinct paradigmatic orientations emerged in the responses of experts from
the Global North, however the insider view appeared more focused on locally led state building processes, capacity building of local communities, and local participation in decision-making. Various recommendations are provided next.

**Perspectives from the Global North:**

Participants suggested that meaningful state building processes would entail the following:

- addressing unique problems through a local understanding of the context
- building institutions by reinforcing existing structures
- appreciating local and indigenous mechanisms for bolstering political and economic institutions
- promoting peacebuilding processes such as reconciliation
- focusing on poverty alleviation and development
- generating avenues for employment
- building local leadership at various levels
- peacekeeping and military interventions to prevent regional spillover
- having a clear legal mandate (domestic and global) to engage in a failed state that poses an existential threat
- supporting humanitarian goals
- giving preference to civilian surge as opposed to troop surge
- exploring and diversifying options for increasing aid
- working with local and regional partners and encouraging them to take the lead in pursuing endogenous processes
- introducing more rigorous processes in the US Executive Branch to consider the costs and alternatives to military interventions
- aid should not be designed to create more jobs for donors
- exploring fair trade as an alternative for aid
- rethinking new political formations along the EU model.
- Promoting a more proactive role by regional organizations in maintaining regional stability
- exploring regional peacekeeping structures as a means for conflict prevention and as a substitute for costly armies maintained by countries (such as through the engagement of civil society actors in Africa in the US-led Africom initiative)
- rethinking arms sales to unstable regions.

**Perspectives from the Global South:** recommendations for effective interventions in perceived failed states are delineated below.

- provide support for locally led state building processes
- provide financial aid to community leaders to help rebuild local communities
- prioritize education and literacy programs
- initiate development work as soon as there is a cessation of armed violence
- build local capacity in providing security and minimize the burden on external forces
- listen to the priorities of the local communities
- operate on a local level rather than the national level: start small, at the level of the smallest administration and work up to the village, district and finally the
national level; work through formal and informal associations such as elected bodies and traditional local bodies, NGOs, tribal leaders, community based organizations, and local provincial reconstruction teams

- strengthen local initiatives
- support regional conflict resolution processes for a more sustainable peace
- holding democratic elections should not be perceived as a panacea as it addresses one aspect of state building. Other elements of state stabilization such as access to services and human rights (including minority rights) need to be fostered.
Appendix C

Afghanistan

23 All maps in Appendices C-J are from the CIA World Factbook unless otherwise indicated.
Recent History of Conflict and Instability

Afghanistan is strategically located at the crossroads between Central Asia, the Indian subcontinent and the Middle East. Great conquerors including Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, and many a Mogul emperor have unsuccessfully aspired to establish their control of the area. In the 19th century, the region became the fulcrum of the Great Game between Britain and Soviet Union competing for influence in Central Asia and India. The Durand Line marking the 1500-mile disputed boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan is a legacy of the Great Game. It was arbitrarily drawn on the map in 1893 by Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, a British diplomat - as a buffer against Afghanistan, dividing the unruly warrior Pashtun tribes of Afghanistan and defining the outer edge of former British India. Afghan warriors fought the British relentlessly for 80 years from 1838 to 1919 - ultimately emerging victorious.

More recently, Afghanistan became a proxy battlefield for imperialist competition between the United States and the erstwhile Soviet Union, following the Soviet invasion of the country in 1979. The decade long Soviet-Afghan war is often viewed as having hastened the collapse of the Soviet empire. The flow of US arms through Pakistan into Afghanistan was a manifestation of US involvement in the conflict by proxy. US Stinger Anti-Aircraft missiles and combat training provided to the Afghan Mujahideen were instrumental in ending the Soviet occupation of the country.24 Although Afghanistan has earned the metaphorical reputation of the “Graveyard of Empires,” the region has paid a heavy price for an unenviable history of engagement with foreign invaders. By the time

the Soviets withdrew their last troops in February 1989, the country was in ruins. An estimated one and a half million Afghans had been killed.25 According to the BBC, more than half the Afghan population was displaced, with a majority fleeing for safety across the border to Pakistan and Iran.26

The US led military offensive in Afghanistan, which entered its 10th year on October 7, 2010 set the stage for a “rhetorical” Global War on Terrorism (GWoT). It involved an international coalition of troops contributed by the US, its NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) allies, and the Afghan opposition group known as the Northern Alliance. The Northern Alliance primarily comprises three non-Pashtun minority ethnic groups – Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras and at the time had a strength of 15,000 soldiers.27

The GWoT in Afghanistan - now the longest war in US history and the longest ongoing war, was launched in response to the terrorist attacks on 9/11 against the predominantly ethnic Pashtun Taliban regime in Afghanistan for providing safe haven to al-Qaeda. Within a matter of weeks, war proved successful in deposing the Taliban government, destroying terrorist camps and forcing al-Qaeda to go into hiding.

Recounting the swift initial US success in Afghanistan in 2001, the New York Times reported that the operation had:

revitalized the American way of war. Indeed, it was a remarkably effective campaign. Approximately 100 CIA officers, 350 Special Forces soldiers, and

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15,000 Afghans — running as many as 100 combat sorties per day — defeated a Taliban army estimated at 50,000 to 60,000 plus several thousand al Qa'ida fighters.28

The overthrow of the Taliban regime, however did not bring an end to al-Qaeda and Taliban’s presence in Pakistan. On the contrary, the use of hardpower by Western forces has helped galvanize Jihadist propaganda in the region fueling recruitment locally and in neighboring Pakistan. Over the passage of nearly a decade, Afghanistan has witnessed a continuation and exacerbation of the levels of violence. This is evident in the resurgence of the Taliban, a surge in US troops in 2010, a rise in coalition and civilian casualties, and chronic internal and external displacement.

Despite the implementation of a post-conflict reconstruction and governance plan for Afghanistan, namely the Bonn Process, and the subsequent administration of two democratic elections in 2004 and 2009, Afghanistan continues to be mired in political, economic and social turmoil. For many research participants interviewed for this study, the country presents one of the clearest examples of a failed state with vast stretches of ungoverned territory, abject poverty, deep ethnic cleavages, highly uneven development, poor infrastructure, terrorist safe havens, production and trafficking of narcotics, small arms proliferation, and refugee flows, threatening regional and global security.

In the years following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 Afghanistan has been positioned as one of the most dangerous and unstable countries in the world. The US NSS (2002) articulated the United States’ post 9/11 national security agenda underscoring military pre-emption of threats posed by weak and failing states. US policy on this issue was upheld in ensuing National Security Strategy documents (NSS 2006, 2010) advocating military intervention in weak and failing states in partnership with its allies. The NSS (2006) reiterated the commitment to engage in “failed states, humanitarian disasters, and ungoverned areas that can become safe havens for terrorists”
in collaboration with allies. The US National Security Strategy (2010) crafted by the Obama administration, echoed a similar commitment to engaging in weak and failing states perceived as breeding grounds of conflict and threats to regional and global security. Thus the perceived threat from failed states in the post 9/11 landscape paved the way for Western-led multi-lateral interventions in weak and failing states.

Figure 7 above charts global rankings of Afghanistan in various quantitative indices assessing state governance, conflict, and development. These ranking are more or less congruent, generally placing Afghanistan at the highest risk of failure – or in very close proximity to states facing the highest risk of failure. Most notably however, post 9/11, Afghanistan’s state performance rankings demonstrate a decline, despite the active involvement of the international community including the US-led International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) and a number of development actors. The most optimistic assessment of state performance is provided by the HDI (2010), placing the country at number 15, still amongst the worst performing countries in the world. The HDI does not provide a ranking for the country in previous years, so one cannot use it to draw conclusive inferences about Afghanistan’s development trajectory in the post 9/11 landscape. But given the number of years Afghanistan has been at war (both inter-state and civil) during the past three decades, its growth trajectory has unquestionably declined, with bleak prospects for significant improvement over the short to medium term.

While quantitative rankings confirm that Afghanistan has more or less failed as a state in terms of its governance indicators, poor development, conflict, and poverty, they
mostly measure the symptoms of failure and not its underlying causes. The rankings also do not test the causal relationship between successive military interventions and Afghanistan’s deteriorating state performance. Below, I consider the factors that have contributed to Afghanistan’s failed statehood in light of the theoretical framework proposed in Chapter 5.

**Factors Contributing to State Failure in Afghanistan**

Considering the definition of state failure proposed by this study in the previous chapter, I am inclined to agree with the state performance narrative represented in various quantitative indices ranking Afghanistan amongst the most ineffective states. I define a failed state as one that suffers from an overwhelming loss of legitimacy across considerably vast stretches of its territory; where the state is unwilling or unable to provide public goods and services including justice and security, opportunities for self-actualization and socio-economic development to a majority of the populace; where the relationship between the state and civil society is highly asymmetrical; and where society itself is highly fragmented challenging the cohesiveness of the state through the manifestation of protracted conflict.

Having identified the characteristics of a failed state, it is important to consider the problem theoretically in light of the framework proposed in the previous chapter, to explore underlying causes and to relate them to societal, systemic and external dynamics, to confirm if the state in Afghanistan is experiencing a serious condition of failure or a minor decline in capacity, legitimacy and authority. Various theoretical considerations proposed for this diagnostic lens include: societal and elite response to problems,
protracted social conflicts (PSCs), hostile and cooperating neighbors, protracted conflict regions (PCR), and military interventions. These factors are examined in Afghanistan’s context as critical determinants of state failure, and are discussed below.

**Protracted Conflict Region**

Afghanistan lies at the crossroads of multiple regional security complexes including the Middle East, South Asia and Central Asia, an unenviable situation which has made it historically vulnerable to foreign invasions and more recently, drug cartels and terrorist networks. Post Cold War era, the country has also become a battlefield for strategic competition between nuclear archrivals India and Pakistan. Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan have historically been tenuous. Its support to the erstwhile Taliban regime, and ongoing covert support to the Afghan Taliban insurgents (of particular concern to Western state actors) is an extension of its vision for strategic depth against the perceived nuclear threat from India, unfulfilled, so long as the India friendly Northern Alliance remains politically pre-eminent in Afghanistan. Political regimes in Afghanistan, with the exception of the Taliban government, have traditionally been hostile to Pakistan. The hostilities were partly rooted in ideological and political differences related to the erstwhile tripolar Communist alliance (Soviet Union, India and Afghanistan). In 1947, Afghanistan was the only country that opposed Pakistan’s independence in the UN Security Council and has since refused to recognize the Durand Line, marking the long and porous and now infamous international border between the two states.
The regional dimension of state fragility (Marshall 1999) in Afghanistan’s context suggests that stability in the country is partly tied to resolving the regional security dilemmas involving Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India in particular. Peaceful neighbors are critical for Afghanistan’s long-term peace. Clearly, Pakistan would have a genuine incentive to give up its support to the Afghan Taliban, if its outstanding political disputes with India are resolved, and the paradigm shift can best be effected by addressing the core disputes involving the three states. Having said that, it is important to recognize that addressing this regional dimension of the puzzle, does not in any way adequately address the root causes of insurgency, instability, and state failure in Afghanistan.

**Protracted Social Conflict**

While the Taliban safe havens in Pakistani territory are generally perceived by the United States as a crucial factor impeding the success of the GWoT in Afghanistan, the protracted social conflict is a significantly more important factor impeding the country’s path to stability. Azar’s PSC framework is helpful in analyzing the sources of protracted social conflict in Afghanistan. They include: a) the communal content in Afghan society manifest in the cleavages between the ethnic Pashtuns on the one hand and the Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks on the other; b) the state’s relationship with identity groups (distinguishable along ethnic lines - historically favoring Pashtun supremacy but generally discriminating against them in the post 9/11 institutional environment); c) the state’s inability to fulfill its governance function (including rule of law, provision of public good and services, socio-economic development, promoting participatory and people-centered decision-making processes), remains a critical factor favoring the
Taliban’s resurgence; and d) international linkages, pertaining to ties with foreign state and non-state actors for political and economic support.

Clearly, state stabilization in Afghanistan is contingent on political and societal reconciliation. The state’s inability to provide justice and security to its citizens is a major factor perpetuating social conflict. A 2009 survey conducted by the Asia Foundation suggests that satisfaction with the performance of state courts has fallen since 2007. In 2010, another survey conducted by the same organization reported that security remains a critical concern for Afghan people, and conditions are seen as deteriorating. Moreover, the government’s inability to provide security explains why at least half of the survey respondents expressed some sympathy with armed insurgents.

Based on these perceptions of the state’s ineffectiveness, one could marshal the argument that the Karzai regime is just as failed, or even more than it had been under the barbaric Taliban regime. After all, the Taliban regime had been instrumental in enforcing peace, albeit a strictly negative type, before they were disbanded in October 2001. Moreover, the Taliban regime had successfully eradicated poppy cultivation, a menace that has re-emerged post 9/11 and is viewed as a serious threat to global security. 90% of the world’s opium supply originates from Afghanistan and less than 2% is seized by Afghan and NATO forces. Afghanistan is also the second largest producer of cannabis

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31 Ibid. p. 4

resin in the world. Revenue generated from the drug trade provides a significant source of income for the terrorist network in Afghanistan. It is clear that as far as the global narcotic threat is concerned, it increased sharply in the aftermath of the GWoT. Thus, in some very palpable ways the GWoT has generated more threats to global security rather than fulfilling its security objectives. An expert assessment of external intervention on state performance in Afghanistan elicited in interviews conducted for this research is shared below:

The international community has lost their moral high ground in Afghanistan. In 2002, the Afghan fear of the Taliban contributed to their welcome, however now Afghans commonly believe that the US is occupying Afghanistan. There has been an increase in such discourses in the country. People have been left out of political processes, choices are limited, and the security situation is appalling. During the last elections, people were constrained from voting due to insecurity, particularly those who lived in rural areas. Local communities now see that the US as supporting actors who promote their interests, rather than local interests. The election was widely perceived as fraudulent but there is a vacuum of leadership and there is no leader other than Karzai. People feel disappointed with international actors. The new government, like the previous one is mostly composed of former warlords and commanders, and the Karzai government has lost its legitimacy. There were expectations that Karzai will change the course of politics after re-election, but it’s the same cabinet with a weaker government. While the international community has the political will to support a good political system in Afghanistan, it does not support the right political players.

Resonating with Azar’s notion of the role of international linkages in perpetuating PSCs, experts interviewed for this research underscored that the state is heavily dependent on international actors and suggested that the regime would collapse without foreign financial and military support, and civil warfare would be its most likely

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34 Ibid. “Estimates vary widely about how much money the Taliban derives from the drug economy; from 70 million a year to 500 million a year.” P.13
outcome. Arguably, owing to the lack of local legitimacy, externally backed political systems usually represent the policies of divide and rule, capitalizing on inter-ethnic competition to consolidate their own control.

The Karzai regime, for instance, has adopted practices that politically and socially alienate the Pashtun majority. The most recent parliamentary elections held in September 2010, are believed to have “sharply reduced representation” of the Pashtun majority and have created a sense of “insecurity, disaffection, and fraud” wrote Carlotta Gaul in the New York Times on December 29, 2010 in “An Election Gone Wrong Fuels Tensions in Kabul”. Similarly, it has been noted that Tajiks predominate the Afghan National Army’s command structure and troop strength. A research report by the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) suggests that the Afghan National Police is overwhelmingly Tajik demonstrating a culture of ethnic marginalization in the security sector.

Much as Afghanistan has been subjected to invasion and exploitation by foreign state actors, it has also been vulnerable to foreign non-state actors and their supply of arms and funds to fuel the violence, and their safe havens. Al-Qaeda’s strong ties in the country and their affiliation with the Taliban in particular, a legacy of the Afghan Jihad against Soviet rule, have been pivotal in bolstering the tyrannous Taliban regime which showed little respect for human rights generating immense insecurity in society. It is speculated

that the Taliban insurgents continue to maintain strong linkages with foreign state and non-state actors for funds and ammunition. They also rely on foreign recruitment from Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Chechnya, Arab states, Turkey, and Western China, among others.\textsuperscript{37} The exact number of Taliban and foreign militants has been difficult to gauge.\textsuperscript{38} However, in view of the strong resurgence of the Taliban in recent years, it appears that insurgent recruitment is ongoing and executed with a great degree of success. Thus, British historian Arnold Toynbee’s view of Afghanistan as a “round-about of the ancient world” with routes converging traffic “from all quarters of the compass and from which routes radiate out to all quarters of the compass again” (1961, 2) is just as true in the post World War II and post 9/11 landscape, where the society remains at the center of armed clashes between great powers and non-state actors.

**External Military Interventions**

In addition to Afghanistan’s location in a protracted conflict region and enduring protracted social conflicts, another critical factor contributing to state failure in Afghanistan is external military intervention, a phenomenon that has plagued the country for much of history and has earned it the title of the “Graveyard of Empires.” During the past three decades alone, Afghanistan has experienced two prolonged phases (about ten years each) of external military intervention. The first phase involved the Soviet invasion lasting from 1979 to 1989, and subsequently the GWoT (2001 - date). The social, psychological, ecological and economic costs of foreign conquests have been


\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
monumental for Afghan society. Chronic displacement provides just one indicator of mayhem the society has witnessed over the last three decades. A study examining patterns of international migration in the 21st century demonstrates that Afghanistan demonstrates the largest absolute outflows of migrants in the world, after Mexico. Among 2.8 million displaced Afghans, a vast majority has been affected for over 29 years and have been relocated to 69 asylum countries (2008). These figures do not reflect a significant number of unregistered Afghan refugees in neighboring Pakistan and Iran; they are those who avoid living in squalid and unsafe refugee camps, although the alternatives for them are not significantly better. A 2009 UNHCR estimate suggests that approximately 275,000 Afghans remain internally displaced. Below, I evaluate the GWoT’s impact as a state stabilization strategy in Afghanistan, considered vital for mitigating the terrorist threat associated with state failure.

GWoT: Objectives and Local Perceptions

US and NATO troops were deployed in Afghanistan in response to terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The US mission named Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was deployed as a combat operation to hunt down key al-Qaeda and Taliban

leadership and initially operated independently from NATO’s ISAF (International Security Assistance Forces). OEF, did not however, have a UN mandate. ISAF on the other hand, had a peace enforcement mandate under the authority of the UN. With the passage of time, OEF and ISAF’s missions have converged, and peacekeepers have also turned into combat troops. The total number of foreign troops in Afghanistan has reached about 107,000 with 68,000 US troops and 39,000 troops from 42 allied nations including Britain, Canada, Australia, Germany, France, Poland, and Turkey. Many NATO countries also supply troops to the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) under the Combined Central Command conducting counter-terror and counter-insurgency operations.

If local perceptions could be taken as an indicator of the success of an external intervention, then it appears that the local confidence in the military operations under the GWoT has eroded over the years. According to an ABC poll conducted in 2009, 77% Afghans consider US/NATO airstrikes unacceptable in terms of collateral damage. The same survey reveals that Afghan support for external troop presence has declined from 83% Afghans having a favorable view of the Western troop presence in 2005, to only

44 NATO. ISAF Mandate. Available online at: http://www.nato.int/ISAF/topics/mandate/index.html
45 Ibid.
47% in 2009.\textsuperscript{49} The poll reports that in 2009 only 37% Afghans supported Western troops in the areas where they lived, only 18% were in favor of a troop surge, while 44% wanted a decrease in forces.\textsuperscript{50} Likewise, in 2005, 68% Afghans felt that the US had performed well in their country, but in 2009 the support for the US had dropped to 32%.\textsuperscript{51} In the same year (2009) the proportion of Afghans who felt their problems had been resolved by foreign forces was a mere 24%.\textsuperscript{52}

Having briefly discussed pessimistic trends in local perceptions concerning the ongoing external military intervention in Afghanistan, below I explore the problem using five theoretical vantage points.

i) Marshall’s claim that external interference may have a relationship with higher levels of instability in the state and across the region generating a diffusion of insecurity effect (1999).

ii) Regan’s postulated conditions for successful third party intervention, whereby success is operationalized in terms of cessation of hostilities for a minimum of six months (1996). Six months is considered by Regan, a short but sufficient timeframe for policy makers to explore the option of problem-solving dialogue with the adversary.

iii) Seybolt’s operationalization of the success of humanitarian military interventions measured by the number of lives saved (2007).

iv) Siegal’s gauge for an intervention’s success measuring improved economic

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.
growth or improved social indicators accrued through robust institution-building (2010).

v) Boulding’s loss-of-strength gradient, a theoretical model exploring the viability of foreign interventions in distant territories (1962).

The aforementioned frameworks (described in Chapter 5) raise several questions regarding intervention in a fragile context including the impact of the intervention on the domestic and regional security environment; its capacity to end hostilities and creating the space for a problem-solving dialogue; the number of lives saved; evidence of sustainable development and institution building post intervention; and the loss of strength of an intervention defined by the distance from home and the target of aggression, thus the loss of its viability.

The answers to these questions reflect the weaknesses in the US-led 3D (defence, diplomacy, and development) interventions underway in Afghanistan. The primacy of military tactics in the intervention has a destabilizing effect on the country and the regions. The insurgency and the military operations have spilled over in to Pakistan, a diffusion of insecurity effect, explored further in Chapter 11. Concerning the local diffusion of insecurity, a fairly recent assessment by the former Commander of the combined US and ISAF forces General Stanley McChrystal confirms that civilian casualties and collateral damage have been critical factors contributing to insecurity in Afghanistan. He writes:53

Civilian casualties and collateral damage to homes and property resulting from over-reliance on firepower and force protection have severely damaged ISAF’s

53 Ibid. p.2-5.
legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people. Further, poor unity of effort among ISAF, UNAMA, and the rest of the international community, undermines their collective effectiveness, while failure to deliver on promises further alienates the people.

McChrystal also draws attention to widespread political disenfranchisement and a persistent lack of economic opportunities for the populace under the Karzai regime. Moreover, he highlights the disconnect between the Karzai regime and rural communities, and the inability of the government to protect the local population from escalating insurgent violence and the breakdown of social cohesion, among a host of other factors related to the failure of the prolonged intervention.  

It appears that although the post 9/11 Western military intervention in Afghanistan has involved a multi-sectoral strategy (characterized by a 3D framework), the U.S. and its local and international partners in Kabul have been relatively unsuccessful in their DDR (Dismament, Demobilization, Reintegration) and SSR (Security Sector Reform) objectives. Reconstruction efforts in post-war Afghanistan in the words of Lakhdar Brahimi, UN’s former special envoy to Afghanistan, have been “lousy… We are too late, too bureaucratic, and frankly we spend too much money on ourselves rather than developing the skills of Afghans.”  

A research participant interviewed for this study observed that while international actors in Afghanistan have tried to help, there was initially a lack of coordination between US and NATO forces, leading to tensions, and lack of a concrete plan. The participant opined that the initial objective to dismantle the Taliban was achieved, but the mission failed to provide security. It was noted that

54 Ibid. p.2-9.
various NATO countries are pursuing competing agendas, signaling the coalition’s weakness to the Taliban.

Finally, Boulding’s (1962) loss of strength gradient raises the issue of the economic and logistical viability of the intervention especially given the distance to Afghanistan. The long drawn-out GWoT in Afghanistan still shows no signs of a decisive military outcome for the global coalition. Additional issues cited by research participants with respect to various prongs of the 3D approach in Afghanistan, are delineated below:

**Military/Defense Objectives**

- Failure to provide security and restore rule of law.
- Heavy pursuit of counter-terrorism objective at the cost of state re-building.
- Afghanistan’s forgotten war status (2003-2009) when the focus of the international coalition had shifted to Iraq.
- Lack of coordination among intervening actors.
- Inability of the international community to win the hearts and mind of the people.
- Western troop presence counter-productive in the presence of the Islamic ideological agenda of the non-state actor.

**Development Objectives**

- Lack of a concrete development plan for re-building Afghanistan.
- Provision of aid to warlords and militia groups, rather than local community leaders. (Aid is inextricably tied to politics and there is a lack of investment of resources where the need is greatest.) The Afghan Solidarity Program was cited a
rare success story because it empowers local communities who can request funding.

- Limited reconstruction effort beyond Kabul.
- Lack of coordination among various external development actors.
- Inflexible procurement procedures and aid disbursement policies.
- Lack of local ownership in the design, development and implementation of capacity building projects.
- Dependence on US contractors means 80 cents of each dollar given in aid comes back to the US.
- Donor dependence on aid has stalled internal development processes.
- Corruption is pervasive and undermines the benefits of development aid.

**Diplomatic Initiatives**

- Unresolved regional security dilemmas contribute to the complexities in Afghanistan.
- The dynamics of competing neighboring rivalries at play in Afghanistan are a challenge to the peacemaking effort in Afghanistan.

**Conclusion**

The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that Afghanistan is a failed state, primarily a consequence of a deeply divided society, inter-state warfare, civil warfare, regional security complexes, and external military intervention. The most recent international military intervention, which was defensive in nature, but concurrently aiming to stabilize the state has had a debilitating impact on Afghanistan and the region,
engendering a diffusion of insecurity effect across a web of social and political relations within and across the borders. Although pre-eminent Western actors associate the threat of terrorism with the conditions of state failure pervasive in Afghanistan, the reactive military response in Afghanistan post 9/11, has served to undermine the Western security objectives. The multi-sectoral response of the international community has relied heavily on addressing the symptoms of the threat through hard-power, rather than the underlying causes of state failure through local and regional conflict resolution initiatives.

Military intervention in Afghanistan has been combined with an economic development strategy, recommended strongly by Regan (1996), but it has not been able to restore security or create the space for a political dialogue between warring factions. Another lens for evaluating an external intervention proposed by Siegal suggests that improved economic growth and associated institutional development are important indicators of success (2010). This hasn’t been the case in Afghanistan where the writ of state does not extend beyond Kabul and the state is unable to perform even the minimal functions prescribed by the World Bank (see Chapter 3).

The fallout of the GWoT in Afghanistan includes extensive collateral damage, chronic human displacement, and poor socio-economic development. An enemy-centric orientation and failure to protect local communities from insurgent violence have eroded the confidence of the people in the capacity of international actors to provide security; contributed to growing levels of resentment; and continuing recruitment in Jihadist terrorist groups in Afghanistan and neighboring countries, as well Muslim communities far and wide. External military occupation of Afghanistan has bolstered the terrorist
propaganda inciting greater hostility towards Western actors. Most significantly, the Taliban ideology has spilled over into Pakistan like wildfire, triggering greater instability and an unprecedented incidence of terrorism. Pakistan’s contiguous borders with Afghanistan and militant safe havens in adjacent tribal areas created during the Soviet Afghan war have facilitated this process of Talibanization in Pakistan in the post 9/11.

The ongoing external intervention in Afghanistan has not seriously explored a conflict resolution process to reconcile ethnic communities mired in deep societal cleavages. The restoration of security is partly dependent on political reconciliation and dialogue to support local peacebuilding and development processes. Presently, the Afghan state is almost entirely dependent on foreign actors for the provision of its own security and sustenance. However, the security requirements of the populace remain unfulfilled. In the event of the withdrawal of international economic, political, and military support, Afghanistan will most likely break out into civil war. Therefore, resolving the deep societal fragmentation plaguing the country should be a key point for intervention for state stabilization. This would entail designing problem-solving process that includes a broad representation of all ethnic groups, civil society and local community leaders.

Thus the success of the international community’s engagement in Afghanistan would depend on the extent to which they are able to help restore security; empower local communities; promote ethnic reconciliation; and build the capacity of Afghan civil society. Last but not least, Afghanistan’s stability is tied to the regional security complexes in South Asia. The international community must engage diplomatically to
support the resolution of outstanding regional conflict in building a viable peace and stability in the region.
Appendix D

Algeria
Recent History of Conflict and Instability

Algeria is a young postcolonial and post-conflict state. Having experienced a bloody civil war (1992-1999) that claimed nearly 200,000 lives, it has demonstrated its capacity to manage high intensity conflict without relying on armed external intervention.\(^{56}\) It should be noted however, that even though it has been over a decade since civil war came to an end, the country still remains in a state of emergency declared in 1992 at the outset of the armed insurgency. While widespread civil warfare came to an end in 1999 through a process of political reconciliation, Algeria continues to experience sporadic, low intensity violence, particularly the incidence of terrorism.\(^{57}\) Nonetheless, mortality statistics remain low with a total of 249 reported fatalities in 2009.\(^{58}\)

That said, in a very recent development Algeria is witnessing a renewal of civil unrest across the country to protest food prices and unemployment, and to demand greater political freedoms. While the most proximate cause of the ongoing street protests in Algeria appear to be the multiplier effect systemic contagion, following mass uprisings against autocratic regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere in the Arab world commencing in January 2011, the unrest essentially is a reflection on the Algerian state’s negligence in instituting greater socio-economic and political reform towards a positive peace, since civil war was successfully terminated.

The decade long civil war, a confrontation between revolutionary religious parties and the autocratic Algerian state was a period that is widely viewed as the manifestation

\(^{58}\) Ibid.
of state failure in Western discourses. The seeds of friction between government forces and Islamist groups in the country were sown by the dictatorial rule (1965-1978) of President Houari Boumedienne, the fourth President of the young country, having gained independence from French colonial rule in 1962. Boumedienne’s rise to power in a military coup d’état in 1965 positioned the military as a key player in Algerian politics for a long time to come. However, Boumedienne’s demise in 1978 emboldened opposition elements that had long been resentful of repressive one-party rule and the imposition of secular values in Algerian society.

Algeria’s chronic socio-economic woes, in combination with the collapse of the oil market (a primary source of revenue), led to violent and widespread political unrest against the government of President Chadli Benjedid in 1988. A number of Islamic political parties including the Front Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Front, FIS) formed to agitate against the government. The overwhelming success of FIS in nationwide elections in 1992, generally perceived as free and fair, was based partly on their religious ideology, but more so on their promise for economic and political reform. The potential imminence of an Islamic regime, resulted in a military coup d’état and a ban on the FIS. Thus Algeria broke into a civil war (1992) involving a brutal terrorist campaign led by the FIS.

Ultimately though, the FIS went underground and split into various moderate and extremist factions including the Groupe Islamique Armée (Armed Islamic Group, GIA) and the Armée Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Army, AIS), to organize the rebellion against the military-backed government. However their ruthless campaign of
violence disillusioned many Algerians, and led to their defeat in the multiparty elections held in 1997. The announcement of a unilateral ceasefire by the AIS, and the government’s offer of mass amnesty resulted in a peace accord with the government in June 1999.\textsuperscript{59} However the GIA and the GSPC (Salafist Group for Call and Combat) have continued their terrorist attacks to date.\textsuperscript{60}

**Algeria contextualized in the Failed States Narratives**

![Figure 8: Quantitative Rankings of Algeria’s State Performance](image)

**Figure 8: Quantitative Rankings of Algeria’s State Performance**

Algeria’s state performance rankings on various indices (see Figure 8) assessing conflict, governance, and development suggest that the country has moved ahead of an environment of extreme instability during the civil war years. In reference to the civil

\textsuperscript{59} IISS.

war years, J.N.C. Hill (2009) challenges a widely held thesis in Western discourses (see for example Zartman, 1995; Erin Hackel and Gotthard Stein, 2000) that Algeria became yet another failed African state with the onset of the civil war in 1992. The Western inclination to equate civil warfare with state failure has been discussed in the review of literature (Chapter 3). Another factor, which may have contributed to Algeria’s classification as a failed state in mainstream Western discourses, could have been the concern with Islamist terrorist groups seeking to overthrow Bouteflika’s government. Recall that the perception of the terrorist threat is a theme that cuts across much of the prominent scholarly literature and security discourses on state failure reviewed in Chapter 3.

Prolonged high intensity conflict as in the case of Algeria, involving nearly 200,000 deaths, does in fact, raise valid concerns about the capacity of the state to perform various functions ranging from governance to security. Clearly, the outbreak of widespread violence was evidence that the state had failed to satisfy its citizens, and its legitimacy, authority, and capacity were seriously challenged. Nonetheless, Algeria provides a clear illustration that ultimately the state was able to successful terminate civil war relying on conflict resolution strategies. Additionally, it exercised its authority by continuing the state of emergency (in effect to date), which quite likely served to protect the public from the incidence of terrorism and may have enjoyed public legitimacy to that end. The state’s ability to restore and hold the peace, albeit negative, for well over ten years is evidence that the civil war was not a manifestation of state failure. I have argued in Chapter 5 that the problem of state failure requires a comprehensive multi-level
analysis, and its diagnosis should not exclusively focus on the conditions of conflict and crisis, which are important, but should be considered in relationship to societal and elite responses. Additionally, a multi-level comprehension of the problem calls for a regional and wider global analysis of state fragility and failure.

The significance of the multiple level of analysis in the Algerian context is brought forth in Hill’s observation that there is a “dichotomization of the international and domestic spheres and its privileging of domestic factors in its analysis of the development of socio-political and economic crises in post-colonial African states” (2009, 39). Highlighting the role of the World Bank and the IMF in financing the Algerian’s government’s counter-terrorism campaign, Hill argues that it is important to take into account the “mutual imbrication” (ibid. 39) of domestic and international factors in identifying the factors contributing to instability.

The role of the aforementioned international linkages in perpetuating conflict dynamics is an important factor that should be considered in analyzing the Algerian civil war. Hill (2009, 53) argues Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) of the IMF and the World Bank played a key role in “motivating and implementing the economic reforms that led to the financial windfalls for each side, through either the formal or informal economies, and helped motivate some Algerians to take up arms against the state.” She cites for instance the loss of 450,000 jobs in 1994, in an already ailing Algerian economy as a result of cutbacks and economic liberalization policies demanded by the IFIs (International Financial Institutions.) The negative effects of structural readjustments fuelled the Islamic insurgency through the availability and recruitment of unemployed
and disillusioned youth. Further, Hill notes, the financial support accorded to ruling authorities prolonged the conflict by empowering the government to sustain their struggle against the insurgents. Thus, she concludes international actors, played a “central role” in the conflict. The negative impact of SAPs on vulnerable populations in the developed world has been discussed in Chapter 3. Kasturi (2008, 3) concurs that “global policymaking led to the growing impoverishment of populations and contributed to social collapse through universal policies of privatization.”

Independent of the analytical limitations of the failed states discourse relating to Algeria, the question that the international community did not intervene military in Algeria although it was considered a failed state, needs to be clarified. On the issue of intervention, I maintain that pre-eminent global actors are inclined to consider the military option in failed states of significant strategic concern to the West. It is important to acknowledge however, that Algeria does carry strategic international interest owing to its oil and gas reserves (sixteenth and eight largest in the world respectively, according to the CIA World Factbook). Clearly however, the West’s reliance on Algerian oil and gas supplies was not critical to the extent of mobilizing an international military response to the crisis, as for instance in the case of intervention in East Timor (see Chapter 5), where the UN peace enforcement mission was actively lobbyists and led by Australia, primarily to secure its economic stakes in the region.

The Islamist nature of the insurgency in Algeria was also presented a concern, and Algeria’s links with foreign terrorist organizations continue to be a source of
However, as far as the perception of the terrorist threat is concerned, the Algerian civil war may have sparked a stronger reaction in the West had it occurred in the post 9/11 landscape, with Al-Qaeda having developed strong ties with GSPC, the Salafist Jihadist opposition group in Algeria. Hence during the Algerian civil war, key global actors were neither threatened by a disruption in Algerian oil and gas imports, nor by a strong and direct terrorist threat. Nor for that matter, did they consider military intervention on the basis of a humanitarian concern for the people of Algeria. But as discussed earlier in this section, Western led global financial and development actors (IMF and the World Bank) responded to the civil war by financing the government’s counter-terrorist campaign.

The primary objective of selecting Algeria as a case study in a comparative analysis of failed and fragile states rests on the variable of difference (i.e. external military intervention), in response to the perception of state failure and its outcome. Below, I discuss factors contributing to the termination of civil war without external assistance to enforce and build the peace, an internally driven process that may be replicated by other countries experiencing civil war.


Recent Algerian history provides an example of the bloodiest civil wars in post World War II Africa, brought to a relatively peaceful end through internally engineered conflict resolution processes. Through its fairly young postcolonial development

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61 See Carol Migdalovitz (2009). “The U.S. State Departments lists the two Algerian groups as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). The most notorious is Al Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM), which pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda”
trajectory, the Algerian state has experienced a number of setbacks at various levels, but it has shown a remarkable capacity to manage its problems. Its institutional responses to the crisis (a key theoretical consideration proposed for the diagnosis of the problem of state failure), during the civil war years attest to its resilience and viability as a state.

Shedding light on the top-down reform process in Algeria, Rachid Tlemcani (2007) notes that President Abdulaziz Bouteflika was successful in fostering an environment amenable to peace, through a national reconciliation plan that included moderate Islamic political parties. Additionally, it provided incentives for disarmament. The plan paved the way for a national referendum approving the Civil Concord Law giving amnesty to former insurgents in September 1999. Another referendum on the Charter for National Peace and Reconciliation was passed in September 2005 under Bouteflika’s continued leadership. The Charter provided compensation to families of victims of violence and disappearances. It also provided for an exemption for security forces from prosecution for crimes of war, and to all others, except those who had committed murder, rape and bombings during the civil war years (Migdalovitz 2009, 3). Tlemcani (2007) and Migdalovitz (2009) observe, however, that the amnesties were somewhat controversial as they sought to bring closure to acts of violence without proper investigation, and were too lenient on many security sector officials who had been involved in heinous crimes. Furthermore, the plan for reparation to victims’ families was not perceived as adequately addressing their trauma, without a supporting truth and reconciliation process. Tlemacani (ibid.) adds however, that the most successful reconciliation initiative was the reintegration of various Islamic parties in political
processes and government affairs, contributing positively to “increased professionalization and expertise.”

Generally speaking, Algeria’s post-conflict transition has been relatively stable. Migdalovitz (2009) notes that the predominant role of the military in Algeria’s politics has ebbed, although a low incidence of domestic terrorism persists. In 2004, President Bouteflika was re-elected with over 83.5% of the vote, generally perceived, as the popular endorsement of his regime’s efforts to restore law and order and promote a peaceful environment, as well as providing a positive indicator of the democratization process in the country. In 2009, Bouteflika was elected President for a third time winning 90.24% votes. His third term was made possible by a constitutional amendment in November 2008, lifting the two-term limit on a presidency (Migdalovitz, 2009).

Having noted the Algerian state’s capacity to manage the conflict, it is important to consider a range of political, social, and economic factors which make Algeria vulnerable to political, economic, and social instability in the short to medium term. In the first place the Algerian state is a military backed anocratic regime – a combination of democratic institutions with dictatorial rule. According to Marshall and Cole (2009) anacrocies are more prone to instability than pure democracies and dictatorship. With reference to Algerian they argue that the system has evolved thus in a “stalled transition to greater democracy” (ibid, 10). As mentioned earlier, the continuation of the state of emergency restricting certain civil rights is also an indicator that peace is being enforced, and clearly is a negative type of peace.
Secondly, the cohesion of Algerian society is challenged by identity based conflict manifest in the alienation of the Berber minority. Data is not available to show the steps the Algerian state may have taken to ensure a balanced representation of the erstwhile alienated Kabyle communities who identify themselves as ethnic Berbers rather than Arabs. The Kabyle region was a conflict hotspot during the civil war, and demands for social, political and economic reforms were amongst the underlying drivers of the Berber revolt.\(^6\)

The issue of displacement during the civil war presents another concern. It is estimated by various sources including the EU that 1.5 million Algerians were displaced from rural areas during the civil war.\(^6\) The Algerian government does not challenge these figures but does not provide information about the rehabilitation or return of various displaced communities, a factor that could lead to social unrest. Algeria also shows an extremely high infant mortality rate at 138.24 deaths (country comparison to the world 3rd out of 224 by the CIA World Factbook).\(^6\) Hewitt, Wilkenson and Gurr (2008, 2010) consider infant mortality a critical factor in state instability and this is a clear warning for the Algerian state to cater to the basic needs of its communities. There is widespread perception of corruption and bribery in the justice system.\(^6\) Moreover, the system does

\(^6\) Minority Rights Group International. p. 48 
\(^6\) IDMC. “Algeria: National Reconciliation Fails to Address Needs of IDPs.” Available online at: http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountries)/56E89CA76EBC5B12802570A7004A24AF?opendocument&count=10000
not accommodate minority representation through quotas in the parliament.\textsuperscript{66} Finally, Algeria’s significantly low annual GDP growth rate at 3% and a high unemployment rate at 13.2% (2008 estimate), do not augur well for its short to medium term political and economic instability.\textsuperscript{67} Some of these factors perhaps explain the recent recurrence of country-wide social unrest.

**Conclusion**

The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that the Algerian state has been fragile for much of its postcolonial history. However, the state’s capacity to terminate a prolonged civil war (1992-1999) reflected its ability to resolve its problems, a positive indicator in a young state’s evolution. Most importantly, Algeria provides a successful model of state stabilization without external military intervention. The dissertation argues that a global military response to international humanitarian disasters, perceived as a strong indicator of state failure, is generally aligned with the strategic and security interests of key Western actors. In the Algerian case, key global state actors were neither significantly threatened by a disruption in Algerian oil and gas imports, nor by a strong and direct terrorist threat. Nor for that matter, did they consider military intervention on the basis of a humanitarian concern for the people of Algeria. Instead, Western led global financial and development actors (IMF and the World Bank) intervened by financing the Algerian government’s counter-terrorist campaign which had Islamist overtones.

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{67} Migdalovtiz. (2009) p.4.
Notwithstanding the relative success of the internally driven top-down peace process in Algeria entailing national disarmament, reconciliation, and reintegration, the post civil war Algerian peace is of a negative type, challenged most recently along the wave of revolutionary unrest in the Middle East and North Africa region. Algeria’s political environment needs to be strengthened through more openness and greater dialogue at various social tiers. The continuation of the state of emergency imposed during the civil war undermines the dynamics of democratization emergent in the post war landscape. Whether Algeria is able to strengthen its system further, depends on the state’s willingness to reform the justice sector, to diversify its economic base which is highly dependent on the oil and gas sector, to address the political and economic grievances of the Berber minority, and to facilitate a more prominent role for ethnic minorities and women in policy making. Presently only 3% parliamentary seats are reserved for women.68

Finally, Algeria’s long-term stability is also dependent on its willingness to resolve its political disputes with its neighbors, particularly with Morocco, towards building a peaceful regional environment. Its relations with Morocco have been strained by the diplomatic support and territorial sanctuary provided to the Polisario, an independence movement in Western Sahara, territory claimed by Morocco. The Algerian backed Polisario movement for independence is considered a proxy Algerian war against Morocco. Both states are also at odds over the jurisdiction of Tindouf province in Western Algeria.

That said, like any young, developing, and post-conflict state, Algeria has many milestones to cross in its evolution towards a functionally robust and stable democratic state. Analysis of quantitative indices measuring a range of indicators of state performance demonstrates that compared to other weak states subjected to external military intervention, Algeria shows significantly better performance in the years after the civil war.
Appendix E

Iraq
Recent History of Conflict and Instability

Iraq, formerly Mesopotamia, has a rich cultural history and has been home to some of the world’s oldest civilizations, going back 10,000 years. It also has a history of invasion and conquest, falling under Ottoman rule in the 16th century which lasted till the end of World War I. Thereafter, it became a British protectorate until 1932 when the Kingdom of Iraq gained independence. A coup d’etat in 1958 led to the establishment of the Republic of Iraq. The Republic was under the dictatorial rule of Saddam Hussain from 1979 to 2003, until the US invasion of the country. During Saddam’s rule the country remained afflicted by internal conflict characterized by sectarian (Shia) revolts and Kurdish insurgencies. The Saddam regime witnessed many inter-state wars including the First Persian Gulf War also known as the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the Second Persian Gulf War during (August 1990 – February 1991) when Iraq invaded Kuwait but was repelled by an international military response led by the US known as Operation Desert Storm (under the auspices of the UN,) and a UN authorized air embargo and economic sanctions (1991-2003) contributing immensely to Iraq’s socio-economic woes. In March 2003, the air embargo came to an end, with the US led invasion of the country under the garb of the GWoT. Two years after the invasion, Kofi Annan former Secretary General of the UN, claimed that Iraq’s condition was worse off than it had been under Saddam.69 It is widely believed that foreign multi-lateral intervention has done more harm than good in Iraq.70

70 See for example Perry, William J., James A. Baker III, Lee H. Hamilton, Lawrence S. Eagleburger,
Iraq contextualized in the Failed States Narrative

Figure 9: Quantitative Rankings of Iraq’s State Performance

The comparison of quantitative indices in Figure 8 suggests that Iraq ranks amongst the highest at-risk states on a range of indicators related to conflict, development, and governance. Its considerably better performance in human development prior to the GWOT, shows that military intervention has likely been a major factor in its collapse. Likewise, research findings suggest that the country’s present state of failure is primarily attributable to exogenous factors (external

military intervention as well as economic sanctions), significantly less than the absence of a democratic system, cited frequently by the former President Bush’s administration, as central to Iraq’s flawed statehood. The promotion of a democratic state became an oft-cited justification for war, particularly after it became clear that Iraq did not possess WMD, the main pretext for taking the GWoT to the country.\(^71\) It is important to recall that the lack of a democratic state is often linked to the concept of state failure in Western theory. Initially however, the three major troop contributing nations (the US, UK and Australia) tried to build up a humanitarian case for war in their public justification, another criterion linked to failed statehood. But, argue Rosenthal and Barry, “Although the humanitarian argument received support in some quarters it was widely rejected,” (2009, 108).

Arguing that the US intervention in Iraq has been a failed attempt at re-building a state Di John (2008, 1) compares the US occupation of Iraq with European colonial powers who “justified their empires, in part, on the idea that their rule, would bring an end to ‘savage’ and ‘barbarous’ rule in the colonies. Powerful countries often intervened in poor, weaker states, to stem social disorder that potentially threatened their security and trade interests.” (ibid, 2). That said, the underlying drivers of US intervention in Iraq remain moot.\(^72\) What we do know however, is that state-building and reconstruction eventually became the grounds for Western military occupation of Iraq. This leads one to question what

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circumstances led to Iraq’s failure. I argue that Iraq was considerably weakened by international economic sanctions during the 1990s but most likely failed after foreign military intervention in 2003. The dismal picture of state performance in Iraq is confirmed in statistical analysis conducted by Marshall, Goldstone and Cole (2008), *The Index of State Weakness in the Developing World* (2008), and the *Failed States Index* (2008), among others depicted in Figure 8 above. The HDI ranking preceding the GWoT years in Iraq shows the country in a significantly better position.

Factors contributing to Instability and State Failure in Iraq

Iraq presents a case of rapidly deteriorating state performance leading to state failure during the last two decades in particular. Iraq’s case is quite unique because unlike many of the perceived failed states examined in this study, Iraq was on a relatively advanced development trajectory in the 1980s, the period preceding its decline. Jonathon E. Sanford (2003,6) notes that notwithstanding the economic fallout of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), Iraq’s patterns of urbanization “were typical for most advanced developing countries. In 1989, Iraq had life expectancy and mortality rates comparable to those for Saudi Arabia, Libya, and other high-income Arab countries.” Sanford also provides evidence that the period between 1958 to 1988 was one of robust growth for the Iraqi middle class, an indicator that is usually linked to societal progress. He writes (ibid):

In the late 1980s, Iraq’s middle class was a highly urbanized, secular, well-educated group, consisting mainly of state employees and civil servants. According to one estimate, the middle class rose from 28% of Iraq’s urban population in 1958, to 54% in 1988.
Unlike many instances of perceived failed states examined in this study, Iraq does not have a history of poverty and socio-economic woes – prior to the international economic sanctions and air embargo imposed in the 1990s. Its oil wealth and massive revenues from oil exports had been a source of widespread prosperity. Likewise, Iraq was not considered a weak state prior to the GWoT in 2003. It was in fact a major player in Middle Eastern politics and was even viewed as possessing WMD by the former Bush regime, the pretext for the global military intervention. Perhaps, the only critical indicator of its flawed statehood, from a Western vantage point was the fact that it was an authoritarian state. But autocratic rule had not really created the conditions that would lead to societal collapse in the short to medium-term. In terms of providing public goods and services, Iraq was performing quite well until the 1980s, with “one of the best educational systems in the Arab world, a well educated population and generally good standards of medical care” (Sanford 2003, 1).

Iraq’s political, economic, and social downfall began with the imposition of the UN sponsored economic sanctions and air embargo. Until this time, Iraq’s economy had been highly dependent on its revenues from oil exports. The UN reports that in 1989 the oil sector comprised 61% and agriculture only 5% of the GNP.\(^73\) The sanctions led to severe food insecurity, deterioration in health status (increased child mortality, resurgence of illness associated with disease and epidemics), and an economic crisis that significantly impoverished the state and the society.\(^74\) In 2000, the *Guardian* reported that half a


\(^74\) Eric Hoskins, 1998. The Impact of Sanctions: A Study of UNICEF’s Perspective, Table 3, MD
million Iraqi children had died as a result of starvation since the UN sanctions were imposed. Likewise, a report by the American University describing the impact of the UN sanctions observed the following:

sanctions have caused skyrocketing inflation and plunging wages. Skyrocketing inflation and plunging wages make it impossible for most people to buy on the free market, relying instead on the limited food rations the government provides at subsidized prices. As a result of sanctions, the economy has declined by an estimated 40%; Iraq's rate of inflation runs in the triple digits. Furthermore, sanctions have cut living standards to half their pre-war level. The cost of living (as a result of U.N. sanctions) has increased drastically for Iraq.

The sanctions contributed to significant economic and social decline during the 1990s, yet they were not the ultimate cause of the Iraqi state’s collapse, although they weakened the society considerably. In 1999, Iraq’s HDI (UNDP, 1999) ranking was 125 out of 174 countries, not too encouraging, but still better than India’s (at 132) in terms of development at the time. That said, the ultimate factor in Iraq’s collapse was the global military intervention in the post 9/11 landscape. The collateral damage and environmental degradation caused by the war, does far outweigh other factors contributing to the weakening of the state. Arguably, global economic sanctions followed by military intervention in Iraq, altogether spanning a period of approximately two decades have been the two most significant factors leading to state failure in Iraq, considerably more so than the authoritarian regime led by Saddam Hussein, regional

Consultant, UNICEF New York February

inter-state warfare and security dilemmas, and protracted social conflict. Next, I explore these factors in the Iraqi context.

**Protracted Conflict Region and Social Conflict**

Iraq’s modern history has witnessed a fair share of domestic and regional problems including inter-state war, ethnic and sectarian strife, unresolved territorial and resource disputes, border wars, and active secessionist movements. Iraq has not been a peaceful neighbor and was in fact a menace to regional peace. Its’ maritime boundary dispute with Iran in the Shatt al Arab waterways in the Persian Gulf has historically been a recurring source of contention triggering a war (1980-1988) and troop deployment as recently as December 2009.\(^78\)\(^79\) The Iraq-Kuwait dispute over war reparations related to the Gulf War (1990-1991) remains unresolved 19 years after Baghdad invaded Kuwait, with Iraq owing a balance of $25.5 billion to Kuwait.\(^80\)

Likewise, Iraq and Turkey have had a long-standing dispute regarding the autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq. Renegade Kurds in Iraq continue to threaten unrest in Turkish Kurdistan, the southeastern part of Turkey.\(^81\) Northern Iraq’s PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) separatists have been engaged in a violent struggle for an independent state for ethnic Kurds in South Eastern Turkey along Northern Iraq’s border. The armed

confrontation between Turkish troops and PKK guerillas has been raging for over 25 years and has claimed 40,000 lives.\textsuperscript{82} \textsuperscript{83}

The aforementioned conflicts suggest that Iraq in its modern history played the role of regional hegemon and not a failed state. Although, its regional and domestic conflicts exerted pressures on the state and society, global economic and military interventions were the major factors in its collapse. Its relatively positive socio-economic indicators discussed in the previous sub-section provide evidence to this effect. In stark contrast, there was rapid social, political and economic decline in the aftermath of the UN imposed economic sanctions and the GWoT. Iraq’s extremely poor state performance in the years following the external military intervention is illustrated in a range of quantitative indices measuring state performance depicted in Figure 8 above. External military operations have officially come to an end leaving Iraq on the brink of civil war, a high incidence of terrorism, and a state that is unable to provide goods and services to a majority of its population.

Data on public perceptions of Iraq’s justice system is not available, however, a Human Rights Watch Report titled \textit{The Quality of Justice: Failings of Iraq’s Criminal Justice System} (2008) details how thousands of defendants wait months and sometimes years in pre-trial detention without judicial review and lack of meaningful defense in the Central Criminal Court of Iraq. Abuse in detention, failure to hold children separately

\textsuperscript{82} \textit{Guardian}. “Iraq demands Turkey withdraw from border conflict with Kurds.” By Mathew Weaver. February 26, 2008. Available online at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/26/kurds.iraq

\textsuperscript{83} \textit{Times Online}. “PKK Leader Offers Turkey an Olive Branch to End War.” May 26, 2009. Available online at: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article6360955.ece
from adults and to provide them better facilities are amongst a host of other problems identified in the report.\textsuperscript{84}

The Kurdistan Autonomous Region in Northern Iraq, a quasi-autonomous state has also signaled its right to independence as a separate nation. The issue of the Kurd “disputed territories” within Iraq, including Kirkuk and Mosul has been a source of tension between Iraq’s central government in Baghdad and Kurd authorities.\textsuperscript{85} Presently, there is also a strong perception among the Arab Shi’as, Sunnis and Turkmen in Iraq that a larger and economically stronger Kurdistan could lead to the dismemberment of the Iraqi state.\textsuperscript{86}

**External Military Intervention**

The case for multi-lateral intervention in Iraq was built by former President Bush in the US NSS (2002) in a call for preemptive war against weak, failing and rogue states.\textsuperscript{87} It is important to note that the intervention was orchestrated under the auspices of NATO but was not authorized by the UN. The use of force in Iraq can be gauged by the massive levels of troop deployment in Iraq, turning it into the main battlefield in the war against terrorism. The Brookings Institution reports that in March 2003, when Iraq was invaded, the total number of foreign troop presence was 173,000 including 150,000

US troops and 23,000 allied forces.\textsuperscript{88} US troop deployment in Iraq fluctuated over the years, tending to be incremental during the first two years and hitting an all time high of 183,000 US troops by the end of 2005.\textsuperscript{89} The next two years saw a steady decrease in troops but US troop strength shot up again towards the end of 2007, with approximately 183,000 troops.\textsuperscript{90} The ensuing years witnessed a consistent decrease in US troops. In 2009, all US allies withdrew their troops and by August 2010 all US combat forces were withdrawn. It is expected that all other non-combat US troops will be withdrawn by December 2011.\textsuperscript{91}

Unlike Afghanistan, the GWoT in Iraq has officially come to an end. From the US perspective it has been a victory for the global coalition in terms of dismantling Saddam Hussein’s hostile regime, and its replacement with a friendly US backed government headed by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The US also views the administration of parliamentary elections (in March 2010) as an important indicator of the promotion of democracy, one of the key stated objectives of its intervention. But holding democratic elections is not a significant indicator of progress, unless accompanied by measures addressing the underlying problems that impede the security and development of Iraqi society. Recommendations for effective engagement for state stabilization by the international community are provided in the concluding section of this chapter.

\textsuperscript{89} ibid.
\textsuperscript{90} ibid.
Below, I examine the harm done by the international military intervention, which I argue has been a major factor in state collapse. To substantiate my thesis, below I discuss the mortality statistics, internal and external displacement figures, local perceptions of the intervention, the incidence of terrorism, escalation of sectarian and ethnic tensions, poor ethnic re-integration in the security sector, a significant increase in narco-trafficking since foreign occupation in 2003, and the regional contagion of instability.

Estimates on civilian casualties in Iraq show a high variation ranging between approximately 100,000 to over a million as illustrated in Table 7 below. Assuming that the number probably lies somewhere in the middle, it is a significant proportion of the Iraqi population. At either end, the figures are high enough to argue that the human cost of the external intervention couldn’t be morally justified as collateral damage, and that it significantly threatened and disrupted the lives of Iraqi people.

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93 Iraq’s approximate population stands at 28,945,569. CIA World Factbook. “Iraq”
Table 7: Estimates of Civilian Casualties in Iraq

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Estimated number of civilian casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Brookings Iraq Index(^{94})</td>
<td>111,600 (May 2003 to November 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Iraq Body Count (IBC)(^{95})</td>
<td>95,428 - 104119 (includes data from the beginning of the war in March 2003 to February 15, 2009). IBC reports that 46% of people killed in US air raids were women and 39% were children. (Compare to 16% women and 12% children killed by suicide bombings.)(^{96})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. MIT Center for International Studies(^{97})</td>
<td>Up to 200,000 (approximate estimate of the first two years of war beginning in March 2003 to the publication of the report in July 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The Lancet(^{98})</td>
<td>655,000 (an estimated 2.5% of Iraq’s population killed between March 2003 to July 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Geneva Declaration</td>
<td>76,266 reported killed as a direct result of conflict between 2004 and 2007). Iraq is ranked as the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{94}\) Brookings. (2010).  
\(^{98}\) The most common cause of death as a consequence of war was attributed to gunfire. The Lancet, “Mortality after the 2003 Invasion of Iraq” *Volume 368, Issue 9545*, Pages 1421 - 1428, 21 October 2006
The toll paid by the Iraqi society is also evident in human displacement figures. A 2007 report by Refugees International called the displacement crisis in Iraq one of the fastest growing in the world. Displacement figures for the following year (2008) suggested that 1.9 million Iraqis had fled to neighboring countries in particular Syria and Jordan. Internal displacement estimates for the same year were even higher at 2,842,491 reflecting a raise in inter-communal violence. According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the number of global refugees, (not counting the displaced Palestinians living in several Middle Eastern countries) has risen to 11.4 million and almost half of the refugees are from Iraq and Afghanistan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Violence</th>
<th>deadliest armed conflict during this period.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Opinion Research Business (ORB)</td>
<td>1,033,000 (estimated between March 2003 and August 2007)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An increased incidence of drug trafficking has also been observed in Iraq since 2003. Reportedly, the conflict environment and open borders have made Iraq a key transit point for international drug trafficking. Likewise, the incidence of terrorism has increased significantly. Figure 10 below shows the sharp rise in terrorism in Iraq in the wake of the GWoT. Notice that the problem remained very low in the 1990s (when economic sanctions were underway), and almost negligible in the preceding years, but spikes sharply in the aftermath of the GWoT.

![Figure 10: Sharp Rise in Terrorism in Iraq in the Wake of the GWoT](image.png)

Source: START

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106 Boyne, Sean and Aaron, Christopher. (2006) “Conflict and Porous Borders Open up Iraq to Drug Traffickers,” in Jane’s Intelligence Review, 2006. A UN report confirming this development is available online at [http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2005/unisnar897.html](http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2005/unisnar897.html). An Al-Jazeera report aired on Sept 18, 2009 titled “Inside Iraq – Iraq’s Drug Challenge” claims that drugs originating from Afghanistan come into Iraq through Iran and find their way to Europe and Gulf countries. The report claims that prior to the US military intervention in Iraq, there was a zero rate of drug use and 14,000 new drug users have been reported by the Iraqi government between 2003 and 2007. Available online at: [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U9-ubOY4bY](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U9-ubOY4bY)

A Center for Strategic and International Studies report prepared by Cordesman (2009, 9) noted that the number of global terrorist attacks doubled in 2008, with Iraq suffering the second highest number of related casualties after Pakistan, and followed by Afghanistan (2009, 11). Military interventions under the GWoT in all three states have triggered an unprecedented rise in terrorism and substantially increased the threat to domestic and regional stability, and arguably to Western security. The high incidence of civilian fatalities in Iraq and Afghanistan by Western troops has contributed to radicalization of Muslim youth in particular, and is widely believed in the Muslim world to be fuelling recruitment in the ranks of Islamist terrorist groups. A research participant interviewed for this study observed that foreign troops in Iraq were unable to distinguish between al-Qaeda and ordinary Iraqis, and in their effort to support the government they killed the locals indiscriminately, exacerbating anti-US sentiment in the Middle East. This view is also held by the Homeland Security Monitor (August 19, 2003). Negative perceptions about the US and Western troops while the GWoT was in full swing, may also be gauged from polls conducted by the BBC in August, 2007 and March 2008. The findings are delineated below.

- In August 2007 58% of Iraqis had “no confidence” in US and UK occupation forces.108

- In August 2007 38% (the majority) of Iraqis expressed that reconstruction effort since March 2003 had been “very ineffective.”109


- In August 2007 53% of Iraqis said that they “strongly oppose the presence of coalition forces in Iraq”.\(^{110}\)

- In August 2007 48% (the majority) of Iraqis expressed that the US and coalition forces had done “a very bad job” of carrying out their responsibilities.\(^{111}\)

- In March 2008 46% (the majority) of Iraqis had no confidence at all in US and UK occupation forces.\(^{112}\)

- In March 2008 46% (the majority) of Iraqis expressed that if US forces left the country the overall security situation would improve.\(^{113}\)

- In March 2008 54% of Iraqis said that they did not feel it was the right time for those who had left the country during the violence to return.\(^{114}\)

- In March 2008 39% (the majority of) Iraqis expressed that a having a new President in the US will “not make much difference” in making things better for Iraq.\(^{115}\)

Finally, it is important to draw attention to the impact of the war on the sectarian divide (Shia Sunni). Iraq has a population of 97% Muslims, deeply divided along sectarian lines. Shias constitute 60%-65% and Sunni 32%-37% of Muslims in the country.\(^{116}\) While Shias appear to have a numerical advantage, under the Saddam regime the Sunnis pre-dominantly occupied leading positions, creating a strong sense of marginalization among the Shia community. But the sectarian and ethnic societal schisms was deepened or rather inflamed, as a result of the intense power tussles that

\(^{110}\) Ibid. p.11.
\(^{111}\) Ibid.
\(^{113}\) Ibid. p.17
\(^{114}\) Ibid. p.20
\(^{115}\) Ibid. p.18
\(^{116}\) Ibid.
followed the overthrow of the Saddam regime by the GWoT. 117 For instance, Iraq’s security forces showed an underrepresentation of Sunnis (less than 10%) in the year 2006. Similarly, many units in the armed forces have been created along geographic lines representing Shia, Sunni and Kurd populations.118 Likewise, the Iraqi National Guard units are also representative of various geographic regions, rather than Iraq as a nation.119 These distributions show that the post GWoT political environment has sought to reinforce the rifts between various identity groups in Iraq, a policy that is fuelling the civil war in Iraq – a highly volatile security environment that emerged in tandem with the GWoT in Iraq. Moreover, the US objectives to place a cooperating government in Iraq to counterbalance Iran have backfired, as the US intervention in the region has upset the power asymmetries significantly, thereby strengthening Iran’s position.

Conclusion

This chapter makes the case that although Iraq’s modern history has not been without domestic and regional turmoil in various forms and manifestations, prior to the imposition of economic sanctions in the 1990s, the country was managing its problems fairly successfully. Iraq’s development trends in particular, were comparable to most advanced developing countries. Its standard of education was amongst the best in the Arab world, and it was also able to provide good medical care to its citizens. Moreover, it had a robust middle class, a positive indicator of societal progress. Clearly, Iraq was

119 Ibid. p.97
not a failed state when a global coalition led by the US invaded the country in 2003. However, it was perceived a rogue state, posing a direct threat of WMD to the West and its allies. Subsequent to overthrowing the Saddam regime and declaring that the threat of WMD had been erroneous, state building and democratization of the country became the mainstay of the US-led military strategy, dominant themes in the Western failed states’ discourses.

Research findings suggest that the main causes of societal and state collapse in Iraq are exogenous. They include the imposition of a prolonged air embargo and economic sanctions between 1991-2003, and the US-led GWoT (2003-2010). While the sanctions crippled Iraq’s economy significantly and resulted in dire socio-economic woes for Iraqi society, ultimately it was the GWoT that caused the state to collapse. The GWoT in Iraq resulted in extremely high levels of collateral damage, internal and external displacement, exacerbation of ethnic and sectarian divisions, and a very high incidence of terrorism. Today, Iraq faces a complex state of societal fragmentation comparable to Afghanistan and Somalia. The international community led by the US, has been fairly ineffective in jump-starting Iraq’s transition to democracy. Despite the administration of free and fair parliamentary elections in 2010, Iraq’s central government lacks the legitimacy, capacity, and authority to restore order and provide basic services to a vast majority of its people. As recently as August 2010, Iraq’s top army officer, Lt. General Babaker Zebari stated that the army did not have the capacity to ensure the country’s security and probably will not be for another decade.120 The resurgence of

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sectarian violence across the country suggests that the country is teetering on the brink of civil war. The Global Peace Index (2010, 23) ranks Iraq among the five least peaceful countries during the last four years. It also lists Iraq as the country with the third highest number of refugees and IDPs in the world (ibid, 93), after Sudan and Colombia and followed by the DRC and Afghanistan. These figures speak to the destabilizing impact of economic sanctions and external military intervention in Iraq over the past two decades, having reduced it to the ranks of some of the most failed and violence prone states in the world.

In the present context, the greatest challenge to restoring stability in Iraq lies in addressing the deep ethnic and sectarian cleavages that are fueling political and social turmoil, and to ensure a process whereby the distribution of economic, social, and political goods and services is perceived as equitable, just, and participatory. Another monumental challenge for the Iraqi state is to diversify its economic base, traditionally dependent on oil exports. The extent of environmental degradation and infrastructural damage during the war years means that Iraq has a long road to travel in terms of development. But any kind of meaningful development is contingent on peace and security in the country. Community reconciliation and ethnic reintegration remain critical for building peace and stability and the international community could potentially play a mediating and facilitating role in this process.

Bottom-up community reconciliation in Iraq would be key to restoring stability in the deeply fragmented Iraqi society. A suitable reconciliation process would entail repairing

\footnote{online at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-10947918
121 Institute for Economics and Peace. (2010)}
broken relationships, seeking the truth about past wrong-doings, and retribution. Tribal leaders in Iraq have used traditional mechanisms for community dispute resolution for retribution and reintegration of youth who collaborated with insurgents.\(^{122}\) Diwaniyya (consensus building) is an alternative dispute resolution mechanism - an age-old Arab tradition and tribal custom. Sulha or reconciliation is a two-step process involving negotiation and mediation to address the grievances of antagonists following by a public announcement of forgiveness. Diwaniyya and Sulha are centuries old tribal problem-solving strategies have been instrumental in the restoration of security and re-building social cohesion in the aftermath of violence. These processes must be pursued within a broader national reconciliation, reintegration, and development vision that includes grassroots communities, the civil society, and state institutions.

\(^{122}\) Ibid.
Appendix F

Liberia
Recent History of Conflict and Instability

Liberia is a small West African country, roughly the size of Tennessee, with a relatively small population of about three and a half million people. It was governed by an Americo-Liberian (descendants of freed American slaves) oligarchy, representing no more than 5% of the population, since the country’s independence in 1847 through 1980. The period of Americo-Liberian domination in the country was marked by the political and economic marginalization of indigenous communities, and was persistently challenged by riot, rebellion, and insurgency. Foreign interference, pervasive corruption, inequitable distribution of resources, structural inequalities, greed, lawlessness, and intense ethnic rivalries, led to long periods of political turbulence, coup d’états and eventually two civil wars, spanning a period of 14 years (1989-2003).\(^{123}\)

Civil war finally came to an end through the ACCRA Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed on 18 August 2003 by the Government of Liberia, the Liberians United For Reconciliation And Democracy (LURD), the Movement For Democracy In Liberia (MODEL) and political parties.\(^{124}\) Despite the socio-economic and development challenges that lie ahead, Liberia’s post-conflict transition has shown promise. The administration of a democratic election in 2005, generally perceived as free and fair, resulting in the appointment of President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, an economist and the first African Woman head of state, have generally been viewed by the international


\(^{124}\) The text of the agreement is available at the following link online: http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/liberia_08182003.pdf
community as positive developments.\textsuperscript{125} It should be noted however, that the recently released Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s Final Report (2009) has recommended that Sirleaf, along with 50 other public officials, be barred from holding office for the next 30 years for their support to warring factions during the civil war. Notwithstanding the controversies and the dire socio-economic challenges faced by Liberia, the country has been able to hold the peace in the aftermath of fourteen years of brutal civil war.

Liberia contextualized in the Failed States Narrative

![Figure 11: Quantitative Rankings of Liberia’s State Performance](image-url)

Liberia, a post-conflict West African state was considered a basket case of failure until fairly recently, particularly during the two successive phases of civil war. The Liberian civil wars spanned nearly a decade and a half (between 1989-1997 and 1999-2003) claiming over 250,000 lives, internally displacing more than a million people, and forcing hundreds of thousands to flee as refugees to other countries.\textsuperscript{126} That said, its post-war landscape shows a remarkable capacity for holding the peace, although it may be very fragile. Liberia’s post war stability dynamics measured by the \textit{Global Peace Index} (2010) show the country as the 99\textsuperscript{th} most peaceful country in the world (out of 149), a relatively optimistic ranking given its recent history of protracted warfare. Similarly, the \textit{Failed States Index} reflects a steady improvement in Liberian state performance, moving its ranking up from 9 in 2005 to 33 in 2010. Liberia’s post-conflict transition has heralded the democratic election of President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the first woman African head of state in 2005, widely hailed in Western discourses as a significant indicator of progress. Since the end of the civil war and the election of President Sirleaf, the country does not figure prominently in pre-dominant Western narratives on state failure; it is in fact, often quoted as a success story.\textsuperscript{127}

But despite the termination of the civil war and the administration of democratic elections, and the resultant restoration of Western confidence in Liberia, resonating in the GPI and FSI, a majority of quantitative indices assessing conflict, governance and development in Liberia, tell a different story. For instance the UNDP’s HDI shows that

\textsuperscript{126} Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia (2009, 44)
in 1990, the year after the civil war broke out, Liberia had the 25\textsuperscript{th} lowest human development global ranking. However, in the post civil war landscape, several years after the civil war ended, the country has the 8\textsuperscript{th} lowest development ranking in the world (HDI, 2010). Other indices, depicted in Figure 10 above, show Liberia closer to the HDI ranking than the relatively encouraging rankings of the GPI and the FSI in the postwar landscape.

The review of literature (Chapter 3) suggests that Western conceptualization of state failure presumes that it has a direct relationship with civil war, as well as linking the problem to the lack of democratic system. The Western confidence in Liberian state performance confirms this proposition. But Liberia’s security environment is still very fragile and vulnerable to periodic volatility.\textsuperscript{128} Notwithstanding the successful termination of civil war and a democratically elected leadership, its socio-economic indicators show that the country is at extremely high-risk of conflict. The US government states that Liberia remains one of the poorest countries of the world.\textsuperscript{129} 63\% of the Liberian population lives below the poverty line, with 48\% living in extreme poverty.\textsuperscript{130} The country also has one of the highest infant mortality rates in the world at 138.24 deaths per 1,000 live births.\textsuperscript{131} Its country comparison to the world, in terms of infant mortality provided by the CIA World Factbook is 3rd among 224 states.\textsuperscript{132}


\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{132} CIA World Factbook. Liberia. Available online at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
Unemployment rates in Liberia are still above 75%, an extremely high figure that does not bode well for its stability in the short to medium term. Liberian also faces a critical shortage of electricity infrastructure, seriously impeding its economic growth and investment climate.

Likewise, the UN has cited various challenges to sustaining the peace in Liberia including boundary disputes between old and newly established counties, inter-tribal property disputes, unemployed youth, labor disputes over salaries, a high incidence of rape (involving girls under the age of 15), lack of public confidence in the justice system fueling mob violence, armed robberies, and tensions between the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and other security agencies. Interviews with development experts from the Global South and North suggest that Liberia may not be able to hold the peace without the peacekeeping forces of UNMIL (United Nations Mission in Liberia). They suggest that while Liberia has shown political recovery, economically it is not a viable state. Despite extremely high levels of international aid supplies to Liberia in recent years, the country has shown little progress to justify the aid. The UN reports that Liberia’s aid dependency is amongst the highest in the world.

Figure 12 shows that in

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134 See IFC (n.a). IFC Issue Brief / IFC in Post-conflict Countries: Liberia & Sierra Leone. Available online at: http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/media.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/AM08_Liberia_SierraLeone/$FILE/AM08_Liberia_SierraLeone_IssueBrief.pdf
2008 foreign aid to Liberia represented 771% of government spending, increasing steadily in post war years.

Likewise, Save the Children (2009, 5) confirms that Liberia has become one of the world’s most aid-dependent countries. It reports that post civil war Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) to Liberia has increased dramatically, up nearly 1,000 percent from 2001. Foreign aid to Liberia equals 120 percent of the country’s gross national income, according to Save the Children. Heritage Foundation’s 2011 Index of
Economic Freedom shows Liberia as the 160\textsuperscript{th} freest economy in the world, a ranking that does not augur well for Liberia’s economic viability.\textsuperscript{138}

While this dissertation doesn’t consider Liberia a failed state, it challenges Western narratives that consider it a success story in the post civil war landscape. My opinion is based on the fact that Liberia’s peace continues to be enforced by the UN, and the state has not adopted policies to sustain its economy, heavily dependent on foreign aid. Thus, I argue that the Liberian state could experience social unrest and political turmoil if and when UN peacekeepers are withdrawn.

**Factors contributing to the Success of External Military Interventions**

A key consideration for including Liberia in my dissertation research rests in the fact that military intervention in response to perceived failure has been successful in enforcing and keeping the peace; this also holds true for Sierra Leone, another case study included in my research. The outcome of military interventions in these two countries challenges a key hypothesis of this study proposing that failed states discourses lead to destabilizing interventions, more likely to exacerbate than to alleviate the conditions of conflict. There are in fact, additional examples of more or less equally successful military interventions such as the UN intervention in Timor L’este and the NATO intervention in Kosovo. Despite these successes, I make the case (citing the examples of Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan) that military intervention can contribute to greater instability in the state and the region, and threaten global security. The two cases of successful military intervention examined in this study suggest five critical variables of

\textsuperscript{138} Heritage Foundation.(2011). *Index of Economic Freedom*. Available online at: http://www.heritage.org/index/country/Liberia
difference that have contributed to the relative success of military intervention. These variables pertain to the specific context of the state and to the nature of external intervention. Specifically, they include:

i) Small geographic and population size of perceived failed state,\(^{139}\)

ii) Protection of civilian populations - refer to Seybolt’s consideration of number of lives saved in operationalizing the success of an intervention (2007);

iii) Military intervention designed to supplement locally owned peace processes.

iv) Partnerships with regional peacekeeping organizations; and

v) Civil society, regional and international collaborative conflict resolution responses.

Having identified the key factors that contributed to the relative success of these military interventions, it is important to mention that the first phase of military intervention in Liberia, a sub-regional initiative supported by ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) was a failed initiative, suggesting that the intervention was not a guaranteed success despite the presence of supporting conditions mentioned above.\(^{140}\) The initial failure of the intervention could be ascribed to the prolonged and aggressive presence of regional peacekeeping forces, undermining their credibility so that they began to be perceived as a force of occupation rather than one of liberation (Howe 1996-1997). Similar dynamics have undermined NATO interventions in

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Afghanistan and Iraq discussed in previous chapters. Additionally, I argue that while the second phase of UN led external military intervention in Liberia may have been instrumental in enforcing the peace, for the time being it seems unlikely for the peace to hold without the assistance of foreign troops. Thus, in operationalizing the success of a military intervention, I subscribe to Siegal’s premise that improved socio-economic growth based on robust institution-building is imperative for the viability of the intervention (2010), an element missing from Liberia’s stability trajectory.

Below, I provide detailed evidence pertaining to the strengths and weaknesses of the international peacekeeping response in Liberia.

**First Phase of External Military Intervention: ECOMOG’s Failures (1990-1996)**

The international community’s peacekeeping response in Liberia is distinguishable by two phases. The first phase of intervention was launched in August 1990 with the mobilization of ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group) also known as Operation Liberty. This was a peacekeeping operation planned and implemented by ECOWAS, a sub-regional organization. ECOMOG’s mandate included peacekeeping and peace enforcement with contingents from Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, and Sierra Leone. Starting out with 3,500 troops in its initial phase, by 1993, ECOMOG had 12,000 troops (9,000 Nigerians and the rest from Gambia, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Mali and Guinea) to support of the evolving nature of a more aggressive peace enforcement stance.  

141 142

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Howe (1996-1997, 146) notes that Operation Liberty was the first sub-regional military force in the developing world in the post Cold War landscape, and the first sub-regional organization the UN agreed to work with in partnership. But there were a number of flaws in the planning and implementation, serving to undermine the mission considerably. Operation Liberty was planned hurriedly and launched before clear terms of reference could be spelled out (Dowyaro, 2000). As noted above it faced a hostile reception in Liberia at the outset. Dowyaro states that the basic principals upheld in ECOMOG’s mandate were in contradiction with ground realities. For instance, he argues that while ECOMOG was expected to maintain a ceasefire, none existed. He also suggests that ECOMOG’s role evolved to the hybrid performance of peacekeeping, counter-insurgency and peace enforcement, all having essentially different objectives. Further, ECOMOG remained underfunded, faced a manpower deficiency, was politically divided along Anglophone and Francophone West African states, and its military capability was not sufficient to respond to the complex security environment. Contributing member states had different aims and objectives and remained resentful of Nigerian dominance of the operation that provided 70% of personnel, finances and other supplies to the mission. Thus, ECOMOG represented a microcosm of sub-regional political tensions, and was often challenged by incompatible intervenor and stakeholder goals.

ECOMOG’s prolonged presence changed the local perceptions of peacekeeping forces to that of a force of occupation. ECOMOG’s alliances with local factions also

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compounded the resentment of local communities (see Howe, 1996 -1997). Thus ECOMOG was largely an ineffective operation and often branded as part of the problem than a solution for Liberia’s crisis. It is important to mention that the first phase of regional military intervention in Liberia came about as the UN and the US declined to intervene in the war despite a sustained campaign of massacres in the country (T. Ocran, 2001, 141; Fund for Peace, 2003; Max Ahmedu Sesay, 1996).

**Second Phase of External Military Intervention: Successes of UNMIL**

The Liberian civil war provided the first instance of the UN’s collaboration with a major regional organization, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in redefining the notion of state sovereignty to authorize external intervention. The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), with troop strength of 15,000 was deployed in October 2003, taking over peacekeeping responsibilities from the ECOWAS mission to enforce peace in Liberia. To date, the UNMIL maintains a presence in Liberia and works in collaboration with ECOMIL (ECOWAS Mission in Liberia), a sub-regional peacekeeping force. (In August 2003, following President Charles Taylor resignation from office, ECOWAS deployed a 3,660 strong peacekeeping mission representing eight West African states in Liberia, known as ECOMIL a peacekeeping mission, ahead of the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement - a negotiated settlement formalizing the end of the civil war.) UNMIL is tasked with the following mandate:

- Support for implementation of the ceasefire agreement

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145 Ibid.
- Protection of UN staff, facilities and civilians
- Support for humanitarian and human rights assistance
- Support for Security Sector Reform
- Support for implementation of the Peace Process

UNMIL has demonstrated considerable success in its efforts to maintain the peace, to provide assistance to local human rights institutions, to provide support to displaced communities and refugees, to effectively monitor borders, and in DDRR (Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration). Ultimately however, UNMIL’s success shall be determined when it is able to drawdown, handing over the efficient and equitable provision of security (including access to justice and safety of citizens) to local institutions. Nonetheless the peace enforcement success of the intervention thus far, can be attributed to a combination of factors.

One, the war fatigue in Liberia after 14 years of armed conflict contributed to a positive reception of external military intervention. Experts interviewed for this research suggest that Liberians were willing to give UNMIL a chance, given the state of despondency after years of unremitting violence. They underscored the importance of this psychological factor as crucial in keeping the peace, more so than effective governance on the part of the state.

Secondly, the mediation of a peace agreement prior to peace enforcement efforts, the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement brought key stakeholders to the table, including the Government of Liberia and warring factions, and had the support of civil society

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peace activists. It was signed on August 18, 2003, by the African Union (AU), ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), EU and the International Contact Group on Liberia. The development favored Liberia’s peaceful political trajectory entailing successful mediation and monitoring of the ACCRA Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The inclusion of the civil society in the peace process indicates that the peace constituency in Liberia had gathered a critical mass and was a pivotal force in effecting positive change. Research participants confirmed that the role played by the Liberian civil society particularly groups representing women, youth, and clergy was instrumental in leading to a series of talks between the warring factions and the Government of Liberia.

Thirdly, it should be emphasized that Liberia is a small country (roughly the size of Tennessee) with a relatively small population – thus peacekeeping contingents have relatively less ground and fewer people to deal with. UNMIL also has access to an abundance of resources, given that it is one of the UN’s most expensive peace-keeping operations.147 This factor may also explain why UNMIL has been able to ensure a meaningful presence in Liberia during its post-conflict transition and reconstruction phase, with 15,000 troops contributed by 49 different countries at its disposal. The presence of peacekeeping forces and resources available for Liberian DDRR (Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Rehabilitation) also demonstrate the

political willingness of the international community to meaningfully sustain the peace, a critical factor in the success of the intervention (Seybolt, 2007).

Research participants indicated however, that disarmament and reintegration planning by UNMIL showed a lack of understanding of the local realities and would have been more successful, had it involved local actors in planning stages. However, to its credit UNMIL’s DDRR program was officially ended by President Sirleaf in July 2009, six years after it was launched. A UN report claims to have disarmed and demobilized more than 101,000 ex-combatants, including 20,200 women, 9,000 boys and 2,700 girls.148

Another important factor in UNMIL’s success appears to have been the presence of a first-ever all women’s police unit (from India). The unit had a positive effect in the restoration of the rule of law, as it resulted in a substantially increased reporting of gender based violence and a decrease in the incidence of the crime.149 A spin-off result of this initiative has been the replication of the model by the Liberian security agencies.

Finally, it is important to mention favorable local public perceptions of international troop presence. Opinion polling in Monrovia, Buchanan, and Tubmanburg demonstrates a very positive view of UNMIL’s capacity to provide security to the inhabitants of these cities.150 To UNMIL’s credit, it has successfully supported democratic elections in its post-conflict transition, heralding a long-awaited era of legitimate government in the

country. Research participants confirmed that the holding of democratic elections in 2005, contributed tremendously towards building the confidence of the Liberians to support a peaceful and democratic environment.

**Conclusion**

During the civil war years (1989 to 1997 and 1999 to 2003), Liberia was regarded a basket case of state failure in Western discourses. Since the termination of protracted violence in the country, a wave of international optimism has emerged. The cessation of armed hostilities in Liberia was a collaborative local, regional, and international effort. However, peace continues to be enforced by external actors, suggesting that it is very fragile and must be strengthened through local conflict resolution and development initiatives. External military intervention in Liberia presents an example of a humanitarian response to a failed state, although it was primarily led by a sub-regional organization, ECOMOG. UN presence in the initial phase was restricted to successive observer and support missions, namely UNOMIL (United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia) mandated from 1993-1997 and UNOL (United Nations Peace-building Office in Liberia) mandated from 1997-2003. However, it was not until 2003, after a period of 14 years of war and violence, and systemic human rights abuses against innocent Liberians including women and children, that the international community agreed to deploy UNMIL, a peace enforcement mission.

UNMIL’s success in Liberia has been contingent on a number of factors including the small size of the country and its population (conditions favoring military logistics); a

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grassroots peace constituency; partnerships with regional and sub-regional organizations; a peace process involving local, regional and international actors; the international community’s political willingness to commit the required resources to support the peacekeeping mission; a relatively successful disarmament initiative; and innovation in peacekeeping (e.g. the women’s police force) that is responsive to local realities.

Despite the success of the UN’s peacekeeping mission and the peace process, Liberia is still at extremely high risk of instability. Security sector reform is underway but remains a challenging goal for external actors and the Government of Liberia in comprehensively building the capacity of local actors to provide safety, security and justice (see Malan 2008). A 2009 USIP study conducted in Liberia reveals that public perceptions of the justice system are highly unfavorable, with an overwhelming majority, especially those living in rural areas, expressing a strong dissatisfaction with the formal justice system.152 The study also notes that state policies aimed at regulating the customary justice system, in their compliance with human rights and international standards are having unintended adverse consequences.153

The cohesion of Liberian society continues to be challenged by identity-based divisions. None of Liberia’s multiple ethnic groups constitute more than 20% of the population (Howe 1996-1997). Religious divisions also exist, with a Christian population of about 40%, indigenous African faiths constituting 40%, and

153 Ibid.
Muslims constituting 20% of the population. High infant mortality, poor literacy levels, a high crime rate, inadequate re-integration of ex-combatants, and lack of gender mainstreaming in politics pose critical threats to Liberian peace. Liberia is also reported to have a burgeoning drug trade posing a serious threat to its stability. Widespread addiction to drugs mostly involving ex-combatants, its production and trafficking are cited as obstacles to post-war recovery. The status of the rehabilitation of 9 out of 10 Liberians displaced during the 14 years of civil war also remains undetermined.

That said, Liberia’s civil society has been instrumental in the termination of the civil war. It has demonstrated the potential to act as an effective pressure group on the Liberian state to bring an end to civil war through peace agreements. However, like most postconflict developing countries it may take Liberia decades to stabilize. In that sense, the international community’s support to the Liberian state is helpful. However, Liberia’s viability must be built from within rather than remaining dependent on foreign financial and peacekeeping support. The international community should encourage Liberia to adopt indigenous economic development policies that gradually wean it away

154 Ibid.  
159 IDM. Global Statistics. Available online at: http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpPages)/22FB1D4E2B196DAA802570BB005E787C?OpenDocument&count=1000 Internal Displacement Monitoring Center reports that “Of this figure more than 1,500,000 were displaced by rise in intercommunal violence since February 2006.”
from foreign aid, build the capacity of the Liberian security sector so it becomes self-reliant, and encourage civil society to more effectively participate in public policy formulation.
Appendix G

Nepal

Recent History of Conflict and Instability

Nepal is a small post-conflict South Asian state. It has fairly recently embarked upon the path to political recovery from a decade long Maoist insurgency (1996-2006) against the monarchy that ruled the country for much of its history. Over 13,000 people lost their lives during the decade long civil war in Nepal, and up to 70,000 people displaced during the civil war still remain unable or unwilling to return home. \(^{160}\) \(^{161}\) The civil war represented a tri-polar conflict between the Maoist insurgents, the pro-

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parliamentary political parties, and the palace, spurred by deep-seated “socio-political exclusion, economic disparity, regional inequality, and widespread poverty” (Ramesh Kumar Sharma, n.d. 3). The People’s Movement in the 1990’s heralded an era of democratic change as political parties along with civil society aggressively mobilized against the authoritarian one-party Panchayat System. The shift towards multi-party democracy and a constitutional monarchy garnered widespread support across Nepali society, particularly the marginalized sections of the society (ibid.).

To sum up the events leading to civil war, constitutional reforms introducing a bicameral legislature and a constitutional monarchy were implemented as a result of a mass social movement known as Janandolan I, taking effect on November 9, 1990. But the failure of the elected representatives and the government in addressing poverty and structural inequalities fueled an emergent Maoist insurgency, ultimately escalating into a civil war. The violence perpetuated by the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) and the army of the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN Maoist), the main combatants was widespread. In February 2005, King Gyanendra, overthrew the elected government and declared a state of emergency in response to what he claimed to be the failure of the government to repel the insurgency. The return of the monarchy was followed by weeks of violent strikes and protests. Eventually, Janandolan II, a popular uprising in April 2006, in tandem with mounting international pressure, forced the King to reinstate the Parliament, at which point the Maoists declared a three-month cease-fire. This led to a series of developments including the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in November 2006;
and the formation of a) an interim government with proportional representation, including the Maoist – a historic achievement; and b) an interim legislature in March-April 2007. In December 2007, the Nepali parliament abolished the monarchy as part of the peace deal with the Maoists. The following year in April (2008), democratic elections were held, bringing the Maoists to power and Nepal began its formal transition to a federal democratic republic.

While the insurgency has come to an end through peace deals and subsequent abolition of the monarchy, the country’s political landscape still remains mired in instability. The gap between value expectations and perceptions of deprivation has remained high in Nepali society. Institutional discrimination on the basis of caste, ethnicity and gender persists. An elitist and feudalistic culture thrives despite the constitutional reforms in 1990 geared towards a more inclusive political and socio-economic system. Sharma sheds light on serious social-economic woes including dire poverty (more than 31% of the population lives below the poverty line) and underdevelopment as important underlying sources of conflict (ibid. 6). Unemployment in the country is also extremely high at 46%, according to a 2008 estimate.162 Given the complexities associated with a nascent democratic trajectory it is not surprising that Nepal’s first democratically elected coalition government led by the Maoists, disintegrated after eight months in office (May 2009), when Prime Minister Prachanda resigned in a disagreement with President Yadav’s support to the Army Chief in a disagreement concerning the reintegration of former rebel fighters into the national army.

Subsequently, a new coalition government was formed in Nepal representing the Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) and the Nepali Congress party, but it excluded the Maoists who began to agitate against the government’s decision to retain the Army Chief. The renewed unrest in Nepal was perceived as a threat to peace agreements that brought an end to a decade long civil war. The UN reported that the reintegration and the rehabilitation of the Maoist army personnel and the democratization of the Nepal Army, the main actors in the recent conflict, remain critical challenges to sustaining the peace.163

In June 2010, Prime Minister Madhav Kumar (Prachanda’s successor) resigned under Maoist pressure but agreed to remain in office in an interim caretaker government. Finally, in February 2011, Jhalanath Khanal was elected Prime Minister in parliamentary elections. The BBC reports that it took 17 attempts by the Nepali members of parliament to elect the new Prime Minister who headed the CPN-UML, the third largest party in the House.164

Nepal contextualized in the Failed States Narrative

The decade-long civil war in Nepal appears to have earned Nepal the classification of a failed state in Western discourses in fairly recent history, apparently in keeping with the haste in the West to equate conflict with failure. In an interview published in the Nepali Times Bhojraj Pokharel, a career bureaucrat with the government of Nepal offered an interesting insight:

When I was at Harvard for a Master's degree last year, I was often asked, "Is Nepal a failed state, or on its way to becoming one?" I said we are not a failed state but we are moving towards the red line, and faster now. But whether we become failed or not depends on how we react.

This is an astute observation resonating with the theoretical framework proposed in this dissertation suggesting that state failure is contingent on societal responses, that conflict is not necessarily a symptom of failure, and that it is often a catalyst of change as in this case. To take heed from Ayoob’s thesis on the Third World security predicament (1995, 2006), the West needs to be patient with Nepal as democratic transitions tend to be violent and can possibly take centuries. However, it is important to note that because Nepal is primarily a state of strategic unconcern, it does not figure very prominently in Western policy discourses on failed states as do states like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, and North Korea. Thus, even as Nepal endured a long civil war and alarm bells were sounded in the West, Nepal did not come under the global pressure of a

potential foreign military intervention that many other perceived failed states of strategic concern have experienced.

Apparently, it is the perception of direct threat from terrorist safe havens and/or the nuclear arsenals of failed states of strategic concern that places them on the policy radar. The dichotomy between failed states of strategic concern and states of strategic un-uncern in policy discourses suggests that preeminent Western actors are essentially concerned with states that pose a threat to their interests, rather than their failedness. Thus, the classification “state failure” is politically expedient because it helps to build the case for a military intervention as it implies the loss of state sovereignty.

In 2008, Nepal began its formal transition to a federal democratic republic. While the insurgency has come to an end through peace deals and subsequent abolition of the monarchy, the country’s political landscape remains mired in instability. In the post civil war landscape Nepal is still considered fragile but its rankings of state performance in a range of quantitative indices measuring levels of conflict, development and governance, do not place it amongst the highest at-risk states, the rankings being more or less congruent. The GPI (2010) views Nepal most favorably compared to other indices (82nd in a global comparison of 149 countries, which comes as a surprise as the index links a country’s peacefulness to economic performance. However, the GPI’s assessment is challenged by the GCI (WEF 2009-2010) which places Nepal in the tenth position in a global comparison of 130 states.
It could be argued that the termination of the civil war in 2006 has restored Western confidence in Nepal somewhat. But the fact that Nepal is a transitioning democracy combined with colossal socio-economic development challenges suggests that its political trajectory is likely to remain unstable in the short to medium term, and that quantitative assessment of its relatively improved performance post civil war is somewhat optimistic. This is not to suggest that Nepal is a failed state or that it had failed during the civil war, but the state remains as fragile as it was prior to the decade long insurgency, and it may take a long time to get on its feet. Indeed, robust civil society mobilization in Nepal’s recent history is a strong indicator that the Nepali society is capable of resolving its problems and is poised to create the demand and pressures on the state to deliver.
The underlying causes of civil warfare in Nepal generally remain unaddressed and it will be a long time before the Nepal state will be able to mitigate them. UNDP’s HDI (2010) places the country on the lowest tier of human development and the country continues to struggle economically. Moreover, environmental degradation is a serious challenge contributing to extremely poor socio-economic conditions and lack of development, in addition to posing a risk to public health.167 Nepal has also been challenged by natural disasters including frequent floods, landslides, and debris flow resulting in the loss of human lives and considerable damage to infrastructure.168 The Nepali monarchy’s unwillingness to conserve and manage its environmental resources was a critical factor leading to the unrest. Thus, any government even if it is democratically elected will face tremendous pressures from the increasingly vocal civil society to deliver what the monarchy couldn’t.

Nevertheless, to Nepal’s credit it has taken constitutional measures to build a legal foundation for a more inclusive society. This is reflected in the impressive 33.6% quota reserved for women’s seat in the legislative assembly and the improved representation of ethnic minorities.169 170 However, these measures may simply favor the elites as pointed out by Sharma (n.d.), unless accompanied by swift economic reforms,

evenly distributed development, and directly benefitting disaffected minorities. Nepal’s unemployment rate affecting about half of the population, makes its post-civil war environment highly fragile. Post-conflict, the country is attracting commendable foreign direct investment, but these figures are at odds with its unemployment levels in particular. Its higher education enrolment rate is also extremely low at 5.6%.\(^{171}\)

A former U.S. Ambassador to Nepal (Woodrow Wilson Center, 2003) brought attention to a number of structural factors that make governance an immense challenge in Nepal. Thus, he stated “even in the best times, Nepal is a difficult country to govern.” He noted that Nepal’s high mountains make it difficult terrain for transportation and provision of goods and services, which combined with a burgeoning population and lack of fertile land, has resulted in poor socio-economic conditions.

In addition to the aforementioned structural factors, the fact that Nepal is a landlocked country makes it extremely dependent on the whims of its neighbors. Collier (2007) identifies landlocked countries with bad neighbors as a situation that does not favor the economic well-being of their people. Nepal has several border disputes with India with whom it shares a 1,690 kilometers long porous border. The disputed land includes Kalapani a 75 square kilometer area.\(^{173}\) The boundary of the Mahakali river or the Indian Sarda river is also disputed - at issue is the allocation of water and hydropower resources.\(^{174}\) Another 209 hectares of land is disputed with India owing to changes in the

\(^{174}\) Ibid.
stream of the Mechi river. Additionally, jurisdiction over various areas covering approximately 600 square kilometers along the border has been a source of contention.

But the biggest threat to Nepal’s reliance on trade with India is a secessionist movement active in the Terai region, a transit point for 90% of Indian imports. While India enforces a stricter border regime to check the cross border movement of Maoist insurgents into India, drugs being smuggled from India to Nepal is on the rise, making its citizens extremely vulnerable to drug abuse and associated problems including the prevalence of HIV/AIDS among the injecting drug users.

Role of Local and International Actors in Civil War Termination

The main reason this case study was selected for research on perceived failed states is the key variable of difference i.e. external military intervention in response to instability. Nepal (and Algeria) were selected primarily to compare the trajectories of state performance in situations where there was no external military intervention. Both cases suggest that fragile states may indeed be able to manage instability even when it manifests itself in the form of prolonged civil warfare. Nepal’s peace process has been internally driven and demonstrates a process of civil society activism, confrontation with ruling elites leading to civil warfare, sustained popular pressure on government leading to negotiations, de-escalation and a peace agreement.

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175 Ibid.
176 Ibid.
The International Crisis Group reports that the Comprehensive Peace agreement signed in November 21, 2006 was the outcome of months of slow yet difficult talks between the Maoists and the government, followed by Jandolan II – the second uprising in April 2006 and the declaration of the ceasefire by the Maoists.\footnote{International Crisis Group. (2006). “Nepal’s Peace Agreement: Making it Work” 15 December. Available online at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en(regions/asia/south-asia/nepal/126-nepals-peace-agreement-making-it-work.aspx} International involvement in the peace process was essentially supportive but low-key. It included a disarmament program under the UN’s supervision.\footnote{Ibid.} Additionally, international actors have provided development assistance to alleviate many concerns faced by marginalized communities prior to the peace agreement leading to civil war termination and post-conflict (Stewart and Brown 2009).

Specifically, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement provided for a cease fire, a plan for holding the elections for a constituent assembly, abolition of the rights of state administration by the monarchy, formation of an interim legislature and government with Maoist representation, ending feudal land ownership and all forms of feudalistic structures, protection of industries, ensuring worker’s rights, and other socio-economic and security concerns.\footnote{SATP. (2006). “Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2006.”Available online at: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/nepal/document/papers/peaceagreement.htm} That said, a host of issues including lack of confidence-building between conflict actors, poor facilitation and dialogue mechanisms, and an elite driven process among others, presented some flaws in the peace process, arguably testing its viability. \footnote{International Crisis Group. (2006).}
Conclusion

The peace process in Nepal was steered by local actors with minimal support from outside, save in the form of steady diplomatic pressure on the monarchy to concede. The movement for democracy in Nepal was characterized by a popular uprising, Jandolan I and Jandolan II, in tandem with a series of official and unofficial negotiations at various tiers of the multi-layered conflict. After a decade of war and violence, the Nepali Maoist insurgents and the democratic political parties were finally able to reach a compromise agreement, terminating civil war, and ending a monarchy that ruled the country for well over two centuries.

Research findings suggest that because Nepal is a strategic non-entity, the country was not subjected to external military intervention despite the prolonged political upheaval resulting in the loss of tens of thousands of lives and human displacement. The case study provides three important lessons with regard to the problem of state failure and the international response. First, it suggests that a small fragile state can stabilize itself without international military intervention and can embark on a democratic trajectory in spite of protracted conditions of instability, and considerably weakened state legitimacy, authority, and capacity. Civil society mobilization has been critical to this process supporting Diamond’s thesis on considerations to determine collapse (2005).

Secondly, evidence suggests that states of strategic unconcern are not likely to be subjected to external military intervention because their instability is not perceived as a direct threat to Western security. This confirms the security-failure nexus salient in predominant failed states discourses. Thirdly, it suggests that in order to
comprehensively analyze the conditions of state fragility in Nepal, one must examine its
domestic, regional and international context. The tendency is generally to look at the
domestic context with a seemingly exclusive consideration of the conditions of conflict.
Thus, in the post civil war environment, Nepal’s rankings on a range of indices
measuring state performance have improved considerably. However, given that Nepali
society remains challenged by severe environmental degradation, extremely poor
economic and social indicators, secessionist movements, and political turmoil associated
with democratization, it is too soon to suggest that Nepal is significantly less vulnerable
to civil war than it has been in its recent history. Nepal’s geographic landscape also
poses a major structural impediment to governance. Moreover, being a landlocked
country, with 90% of trade reliance on India with whom it shares territorial disputes, does
not bode well for the country. Thus, it must diversify its avenues for trade to decrease its
dependence on India, which could be jeopardized by escalation of hostilities.

In terms of wider global pressures on Nepal’s growth trajectory, the country has
been at an advantage because the international community’s role in the termination of
civil war has primarily been supportive. The classification of state failure did not elicit
punitive or coercive responses by the international community, supporting a key
hypothesis that external military intervention for a humanitarian concern in the post 9/11
landscape, is more likely to be pursued in view of the strategic interests and the
perception of threat by intervening actors.
Appendix H

Pakistan
Recent History of Conflict and Instability

Pakistan is a post-colonial state and an emerging democracy. Its most recent
democratic elections were held in February 2008 after eight years of military rule. Since
independence in 1947, Pakistan has navigated a chequered military and civilian political
trajectory. Military dictatorships and civilian authoritarianism have undermined the
development of robust state institutions. Prolonged periods of military rule in Pakistan
have also promoted a culture of militarization in politics and governance. Civilian
governments in Pakistan tend to rely heavily on the military as an instrument for
enforcing domestic order, paying considerably less attention to human rights and conflict
resolution. The country has endured various forms and manifestations of conflict
including inter-state war, secession, ethnic insurgency, sectarian militancy, and terrorism.

Pakistan’s history of warfare and outstanding territorial disputes with nuclear
archrival and neighbor India, have partly contributed to the country’s evolution as a
security state, one where military security is pursued at the cost of human security. The
two states have engaged in border skirmishes across the disputed frontier in Kashmir, a
nuclear flashpoint, since independence from British colonial rule.184 185 Heavy troop
deployment along the borders and cross-border incursions by the South Asian neighbors
are characteristic of the inter-state relationship. Pakistan’s protracted territorial dispute
with India is central to the troubled relationship between the two nuclear archrivals. The

The unresolved Kashmir dispute has led to two full-scale wars (1948, 1965) and a low intensity confrontation, known as the Kargil War (1999) between the South Asian states. Outstanding political disputes between Pakistan and India also include the Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation water dispute, unresolved since 1998; Sir Creek Boundary dispute over the undemarcated 60 mile strip of water along the Rann of Kuch marshlands, unresolved since 1965; and the Siachin Glacier dispute, unresolved since 1984. Additionally, Pakistan and India went to war in 1971, which led to the secession of East Pakistan as the independent state of Bangladesh.

Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan, situated to its west, have also been historically tenuous. The Durand Line marking the 1,500 mile international border between the two countries is not recognized by Afghanistan and remains one of the obstacles in the way of improved bilateral relations between the two countries. Moreover, successive Afghan governments have taken the position that the entire Pashtun belt in Pakistan should be under Afghan territorial control.

190 Library of Congress. p. 5
Domestically, Pakistan’s statehood continues to be challenged by secessionist movements and insurgency. Its largest yet least developed province Balochistan has witnessed sporadic insurgescies (1948, 1958-59, 1962-63, 1973-77, 2004-date) led by nationalists demanding greater autonomy, political rights, and control over natural resources. The Baloch insurgency has escalated in recent years and has been complicated by Pakistan’s contiguous borders with Afghanistan, giving al-Qaeda and Taliban access to this sparsely populated vast stretch of territory. The situation is further complicated by another unfriendly neighbor, Iran, home to a million ethnic Baloch living across the border from Balochistan. The Pakistan government has historically mismanaged the conflict in Balochistan by neglecting to equitably share national resources towards the socio-economic development of the province and suppressing the insurgency with an iron fist. Neighboring India has allegedly been adding fuel to the fire by covertly supporting the secessionist movement in Balochistan. A military counter-insurgency campaign has been underway in the province since 2006 contributing to escalating levels of violence.

The Pakistani state has paid little attention to socio-economic development generally across the country, allocating a large proportion of its annual budget to compete

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193 Ibid.
194 In a roundtable discussion organized by the Council on Foreign Relations gathering international experts on South Asia, C. Christine Fair of Rand Corporation stated that “Indian officials have told me privately that they are pumping money into Balochistan.” See Foreign Affairs (2009). “What’s the Problem with Pakistan.” Available online at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/roundtables/whats-the-problem-with-pakistan
in an arms race with India. The India-centric security posturing is also the driver of Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine. Development across the country is uneven and there are vast swathes of land where evidence of governance is scant.\textsuperscript{195} Pakistan also faces an insurgency in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly North West Frontier Province) and the FATA region, adjacent to Afghan borders; and a high incidence of terrorism in recent years, destabilizing the country at an unprecedented scale. Ungoverned territories, terrorist sanctuaries, and a rise in militancy are factors that have earned it the classification of a failed state in prominent Western discourses, particularly as they are perceived as directly threatening the West. Moreover, a grave apprehension in the West that its nuclear arsenal could fall into rogue hands has earned Pakistan the unenviable distinction of the most dangerous state in the world.\textsuperscript{196}

While Pakistan has been a victim of poor governance and an India-centric security paradigm, it has also suffered the fallout of protracted war and violence in neighboring Afghanistan. Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan has been burdened by the largest refugee community in the world.\textsuperscript{197} \textsuperscript{198} At peak levels, approximately 5 million Afghan refugees lived in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{199} The flow of Afghan refugees has continued since the launch of the GWoT in Afghanistan. In addition to the

social and economic pressures associated with the refugee influx, Pakistani society has experienced an exponential rise in small arms and light weapons supplied by local and foreign state and non-state actors through three decades of war and violence next door.

Pakistan has also been drawn into the GWoT in Afghanistan. The Pakistan military has been a key ally of the United States in the war on terrorism, although the relationship between the countries suffers from a deep trust deficit. US military intervention in Pakistan, most visible in US Predator Drone attacks in northwestern Pakistan, has fueled recruitment in militant organizations and solidified the resistance against the state in the form of a fast growing Taliban movement – the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

According to a New America Foundation study, out of 114 reported Drone strikes between 2004 and 2010 killing between 830 to 1,210 individuals, the civilian fatality rate was approximately 32%.²⁰¹ The unprecedented scale of terrorism organized by the Taliban is widely seen as the blow-back of US Predator Drone strikes in tribal areas, tacitly authorized by the Pakistan government. Post 9/11 Pakistan military’s counter-terrorism campaign in its northwestern region has been a source of intense turbulence, destruction of private property and infrastructure, and historic levels of displacement.

In addition to Pakistan’s domestic, regional and international security dilemmas Pakistan has borne the brunt of an unprecedented scale of natural disasters including

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earthquakes and floods during the past five years, significantly contributing to its dire socio-economic woes.

Pakistan contextualized in the Failed States Narrative

Figure 14: Quantitative Rankings of Pakistan’s State Performance

Pakistan’s country rankings on various indices assessing governance, conflict, and development generally suggest that it is a moderately vulnerable state. Although assessments vary, some are more pessimistic than others. Pakistan shows unsatisfactory human development indicators (HDI) although it is far from the least developing countries in the world. Because it falls in the medium tier level of development, it is not considered a LICUS state. It shows moderately high levels of fragility in the CIFP and
SFIM, higher levels of state weakness in the ISW, and very high vulnerability to failure in the FSI. The GPI places it amongst the four consistently least peaceful countries in the world, citing 11,585 terrorism related deaths in 2009, and 6715 in 2008, compared to 189 in 2003 (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2010, 27). While Pakistan does not figure amongst the top 25 states at the highest risk of instability in the PCIL, it is among countries showing one of the largest increases in the risk of instability in recent years. Significantly, Pakistan figures prominently in the policy discourses on failed states in the West, reflecting a strong security concern with Pakistan’s ungoverned territories and terrorist safe havens.

Generally speaking, the failed states discourses tend to ascribe Pakistan’s increasing risk of failure to its ungoverned territories, terrorist sanctuaries, ethnic insurgencies and uneven development across the country. Little consideration is given to Pakistan’s regional security context including the conflict contagion from Afghanistan and historically volatile relations with India. Moreover, negligible attention is paid to the US role in supporting non-state actors in the region during its proxy war against the Soviet Union, arming local and foreign Jihadists, now known as the Taliban and al-Qaeda to the teeth. Egregiously, no consideration is given to the US Predator Drone campaign, the most proximate factor inducing a dramatic rise in instability in the ailing Pakistani state, in prominent failed states discourses.

Factors Contributing to State Fragility in Pakistan

Although Pakistan faces dire domestic, regional and international pressures, I argue it is not a failed state. Consider the definition of state failure proposed by the
study: an *end-state* where the state suffers from an overwhelming loss of legitimacy across considerably vast stretches of its geographic area, where it is unable or unwilling to provide public goods and services, justice and security, opportunities for self-actualization and socio-economic development, where its relationship with civil society is highly asymmetrical, and where society itself has become highly fragmented challenging the cohesiveness of the state through the manifestation of protracted conflict.

At first glance, the definition appears to fit the Pakistani context well, resonating concerns salient in Western discourses on state failure such as ungoverned spaces, the erosion of the social contract, pervasive insecurity and the like. To be sure, unfavorable constitutional measures have resulted in ineffective integration of tribal societies creating parallel legal systems and ungoverned spaces. Moreover, the erosion of the social contract in Balochistan, Sindh, and Pakhtunkhwa provinces in particular is a cause for concern. Thirdly, pervasive insecurity in the country is a critical factor contributing to its fragility.

Despite the aforementioned challenges, I argue that Pakistan is undergoing a minor type of decline and is not likely to collapse in the short to medium term as have Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia. Somalia provides a textbook case of state collapse (see Chapter 13), having been without an effective central government for the past two decades. In Afghanistan, the Taliban control at least 75% of the territory and the writ of the Karzai government is limited to Kabul. Likewise in Iraq, the state remains under US occupation and cannot control its territory without US support. Pakistan has not reached
such a stage yet. It does still have considerable control of its territory, and its security function, albeit challenged, is not contingent on the support of external actors.

However, as discussed earlier in the chapter, over the years Pakistan has become a security state. In recent years, its sovereignty has been challenged by the local dynamics of conflict (insurgencies and terrorism) and the engagement of external state and non-state actors on its territory. The state is now also experiencing a democratic transition, spurring confrontations between the state and society at various levels. Thus, the Pakistani state stands considerably weakened by domestic and external pressures. However, based on theoretical considerations discussed in Chapter 5, the most significant factor that attests to Pakistan’s resilience is its vibrant civil society and its problem solving response which given enough time will enable it to become a successful state, although under the current circumstances, Pakistan’s short to medium-term stability is immensely challenged.

Evidence of civil society’s role in managing Pakistan’s problems includes countrywide relief and rehabilitation initiatives in response to environmental disasters such as the massive earthquakes in 2005 and 2008, and unprecedented floods in 2010. Likewise, during an unprecedented internal displacement crisis in 2009, the largest and fastest in the country’s history, local communities came forward to host a large proportion of the affected in their homes. The IDMC reports that “Host communities in areas of displacement took in millions of displaced people and provided some form of shelter.”202 Earlier, in the study I have quoted Christine Fair, a prominent US, South

Asia expert who argues that Pakistan’s civil society provides many public services where the state has failed, most exemplary among them being private education.203

At another level, demonstrating its capacity to effect political change, activism by civil society was instrumental in ending the eight-year dictatorial rule of former President Pervez Musharraf and subsequent administration of democratic elections. Pakistan’s civil society is represented by its grassroots communities, a free and vocal media, student and youth groups, NGOs, lawyers and other professional groups, among others, who have actively created demands and pressures on the state to shift agendas, served as social safety nets, and supported political parties and democratic elections. Having highlighted the promising response of civil society, I must add that Pakistan faces immense regional and international challenges that have significantly weakened it in its recent history, are critical for assessing the context of its fragility comprehensively.

**Regional Security Dilemmas**

Pakistan provides an example of a fragile state bearing the brunt of the regional contagion of armed violence, involving both terrorist networks, drug cartels, and foreign military intervention in neighboring Afghanistan. While state stability in Pakistan has been challenged by intermittent political unrest, and outstanding political and territorial disputes with India, it was the fallout of three decades of war and violence in neighboring Afghanistan appears to have taken the greatest toll on its socio-economic development.
In a study on the regional costs of state failure, the authors postulate that neighbors of a failing state lose, on average, about 0.6 percentage points of growth each year due to externalities inflicted upon them.\textsuperscript{204} Considering that Afghanistan has been a failed state, and at war for over three decades now, the economic costs for Pakistan, solely on the basis of this equation are around 18 percentage points of growth, a significant loss. Note that this estimate does not include the costs of the spillover of crime, drugs, terrorism, and peacekeeping duties on neighbors of failing states which increase the economic costs of instability in Afghanistan manifold.\textsuperscript{205}

The most immediate fallout of war and violence in Afghanistan has been the flow of refugees, a factor that generally remains unaccounted in Western indices offering an analysis of state fragility and failure. Pakistan has been home to the largest refugee community in the world for over three decades. Afghan refugees have been pouring into Pakistan since the Soviet Afghan war started in 1979. Although it is claimed that 3.5 million Afghan refugees have been repatriated to their home country with the assistance of UNHCR since March 2002. However, approximately 1.8 million Afghan refugees still remain in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{206} In addition to being an economic burden on Pakistan, the refugees who usually cannot find employment are highly vulnerable to recruitment by the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

Pakistan has also evolved a weapons culture during the last three decades, now deeply entrenched in society. The problem became quite visible when Klashnikov-toting men

\textsuperscript{205} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{206} UNHCR 2008.
began to be seen commonly in Pakistan’s northwestern regions soon after the Soviet-Afghan war broke out. All forms of small arms and ammunition have made their way into Pakistan, the clearest evidence of which is the exponential rise in the culture of violence and terrorist incidence.

The Impact of the US Drone Campaign

Pakistan has become increasingly unstable in recent years as suggested by many of the indices shown in Figure 13 above, however, these assessments do not acknowledge the destabilizing role of the GWoT in the region. Interestingly, the incidence of terrorism in Pakistan has increased significantly in tandem with the escalation in the Predator Drone campaign initiated in 2004 by the former Bush regime, and experiencing a sharp rise under the Obama administration. Many in Pakistan, perceive the terrorist strategy to be a tit-for-tat reaction against the Pakistani state’s counter-terrorism cooperation with the US government. Table 9 from the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) below, shows a dramatic increase in terrorist related violence between 2003 (the year prior to the implementation of the Drone campaign) and 2011.
Table 8: Sharp Increase in Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan post-2003.

Source: SATP Available online at: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Civilians</th>
<th>Security Force Personnel</th>
<th>Terrorists/Insurgents</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>1471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1522</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>1479</td>
<td>3596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2155</td>
<td>654</td>
<td>3906</td>
<td>6715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2324</td>
<td>991</td>
<td>8389</td>
<td>11704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1796</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>5170</td>
<td>7435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9637</td>
<td>3423</td>
<td>20272</td>
<td>33332</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Data till February 20, 2011

Source: Figures are compiled from news reports and are provisional.
Now, compare the rise in the terrorist incidence to the sharp rise in Drone strikes provided in Figure 15 suggesting that there is quite possibly a relationship between the two.

Figure 15: US Drone Strikes 2004-2011
Source: New America Foundation. Available online at: http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones
Table 9: Trends in Sectarian Violence in Pakistan
Source: SATP. Available online at:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Incidents</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Injured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>1170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2540</td>
<td>3486</td>
<td>7488</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Figures are compiled from news reports and are provisional.

Year 2011

The relationship between the recent trends in terrorism and Drone strikes appears particularly strong in consideration of the view that the trends in sectarian violence, another destabilizing factor have been significantly less intense. Table 10 shows that between 1989 to 2011, a significantly longer time span than the post 9/11 incidence of terrorism perpetrated by the Taliban, Pakistan suffered approximately 3,486 fatalities in sectarian violence, a much lower figure.
The US military presence in Pakistan, although relatively lighter in comparison to Afghanistan, has provided fodder to the Taliban insurgency. The escalation of violence levels in both countries as a result of the GWoT has served to further destabilize the conflict prone region and has generated extreme level of resent towards the US. Public opinion regarding US military engagement in Pakistan is highly unfavorable. An IRI Survey (2009) suggests that 73% of Pakistanis do not support the US making incursions in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Likewise a poll conducted by the New America Foundation reveals that tribal communities are strongly opposed to US military operations in the region including American Drone attacks, and that they would rather have the Pakistani military fighting the militants.

In the aftermath of 9/11, rising public perceptions of threat from the US military occupation of neighboring Afghanistan provided the Taliban the opportunity to seek sympathizers in FATA. There is little doubt that Taliban’s recruitment process has benefitted from an increase in the use of unmanned US Predator Drone aircraft inside Pakistani territory and the widespread devastation caused by Pakistan military’s counter-terrorism operations resulting in further alienating the politically and economically disenfranchised local communities.

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209 Ibid.
A New York Times article titled “Death from Above, Outrage Down Below” (May 16, 2009), by David Kilcullen and Andrew McDonald Exum resonates with these views in making the argument that the costs of the Drone campaign far outweighs its benefits. They compare the reactions to drone strikes in Pakistan, with events in Somalia in 2005 and 2006, when similar strikes were used against the Union of Islamic Courts. They write that the “American use of force solidified the power of extremists. The Islamists popularity rose and the group became more extreme. … The persistence of these attacks on Pakistani territory offends people’s deepest sensibilities, alienates them from their government, and contributes to Pakistan’s instability.” The legality of Predator Drone strikes has also been questioned by Phillip Alston, UN’s special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions who argues that the use of Predator Drones to carry out targeted killings, lacks legal basis, and may be in violation of international law. 212

Thus, while Pakistan has come increasingly under the US policy radar on failed states, there is little understanding in policy circles, that the military strategy pursued by the US has become the most proximate cause of instability in Pakistan recently, compounding regional instability, fueling anti-US sentiment and recruitment in terrorist organizations, and multiplying the threat to Western security.

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Conclusion

The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that Pakistan is widely regarded as a failed state in Western discourses owing to the strong perception of the terrorist threat. As argued in the literature review (Chapter 3), post 9/11, the classification state failure provides justification for intervening in failed states as it implies the loss of the state’s sovereignty, making the principal of non-intervention in sovereign states redundant. Thus, the classification is expedient in conducting the US Predator Drone campaign in Pakistan. However, the US military strategy in Pakistan has significantly contributed to instability in Pakistan and is the most proximate cause of increasing levels of insecurity. Moreover, I argue that while Pakistan has become increasingly fragile in recent years, it is also experiencing a transition to democracy and a more vocal civil society adding to the pressures on the state.

The discussion in this chapter recommends a multi-level analysis of the conditions contributing to Pakistan’s instability, identifying a range of domestic, regional and international factors that have contributed to it. At the regional level, Pakistan has historically remained under tremendous pressure from a number of hostile and unfriendly neighbors, including protracted conflict contagion from neighboring Afghanistan. Domestically, Pakistani society is experiencing insurgencies strife in a number of regions including Balochistan and FATA. It has also suffered the brunt of sporadic sectarian strife in many cities in its recent history. That said, Pakistan is a nascent democracy and is likely to show
increasingly levels of political instability and violence that are related to the process of democratization. Most significantly, I find that US military intervention in Pakistan has a direct relationship with the rising incidence of terrorism and increased recruitment in the ranks of Taliban and al-Qaeda. Thus, the US strategic response has exacerbated the terrorist threat to Western security as well as compounding complex regional security dynamics.

The chapter argues in line with Diamond’s thesis (2005) that the most important consideration attesting to Pakistan’s resilience is its vibrant civil society. Civil society mobilization in response to Pakistan’s recent history of colossal natural disasters; as a social safety net; a burgeoning NGO culture; provision of services such as education; and as an active force in the democratization process suggests that it will help the state to persevere in the short to medium term. Finally, the chapter recommends that the international community could best contribute to state stability in Pakistan by mediating a number of outstanding regional disputes with hostile neighbors including Afghanistan and Pakistan, an approach that is likely to generate greater peace and stability in the region.
Appendix I

Sierra Leone
Recent History of Conflict and Instability

Sierra Leone is one of the world’s poorest and least developed states. Situated in West Africa, its recent history of independence from colonial rule and slavery is less than half a century old. Although it possesses a wealth of minerals including diamonds, gold, and iron ore, as well as producing agricultural commodities such as cocoa, coffee and fish, its economy has not benefitted from these resources. On the contrary, competition over the control of diamonds mines, led the country to a decade long civil war (1991-2002) waged by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), in the form of a ruthless guerilla campaign, involving gross violation of human rights such as rape, looting, civilian amputation, and mass recruitment and training of child soldiers. The RUF could not be repulsed by the government of Major General Joseph Saidu Momoh, President since 1985, nor could they be contained by the NPRC (the National Provisional Ruling Council) led by Captain Valentine Strasser, who overthrew the authoritarian Momoh government in 1992. As the RUF threatened to take over Freetown, the NPRC, contracted a South African mercenary firm, Executive Outcomes, to back up their own forces, finally forcing the RUF to retreat.

In April 1996, mounting public and diplomatic pressure forced the NPRC to relinquish their control to a civilian government in a democratic election, leading to the appointment of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. In May 1997, Kabbah was overthrown by the AFRC (Armed Forces Revolutionary Council) under the leadership of Major

\[213\] Sierra Leone gained independence from Britain on 27 April 1961.
\[214\] See, Lancaster, Carol. (2007)
\[216\] Ibid.
Johnny Paul Koroma, an RUF ally. Ten months later, ECOWAS mobilized ECOMOG troops led by Nigerian troops, who successfully dismantled the AFRC and reinstated President Kabbah’s rule. But when intense violence between ECOMOG forces and RUF brought the war to the capital Freetown, the international community mediated the Lomé Peace Agreement (July 1999), between President Kabbah and the RUF leader Foday Sankoh, appointing the rebel leader as Vice President of the country, and offering government posts to others member of RUF.217 But the Lomé Peace Agreement was contentious, not only in the hasty appointments of RUF members in government, but also for giving them protection from prosecution for crimes against humanity (Woods and Reese 2008, 48).

Despite the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement, when ECOMOG forces left the country in 2000, RUF in a manifestation of hostility towards UNAMSIL (United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone) attacked and abducted several hundred members of the international peacekeeping force, unleashing yet another reign of terror.218 The Indian and Kenyan led UNAMSIL forces were largely unable to respond effectively to the offensive, and were reinforced through the injection of British troops (Operation Pallisar), making a critical difference to UNAMSIL’s capacity to enforce peace. UNAMSIL’s total strength in mid-2002, rose to 17, 500, the largest UN peacekeeping operation at the time (Chege 2002). The civil war was officially announced over in January 2002, after the surrender and disarmament of an approximate 45,000 combatants

217 Ibid.
(Chege, 2002). Estimates of casualties during the civil war range between 20,000 to 50,000. It is estimated that up to 2.5 million people may have been displaced by the conflict. This was more than half of Sierra Leone’s entire population which was about 4.5 million at the time.

Postwar Sierra Leone has successfully held democratic elections twice, in 2002 and 2007. President Kabbah was re-elected in 2002 but did not seek re-election in 2007 for a third term per the laws of the land. The democratization process has generally been commendable and the military has also distanced itself from politics. Nonetheless, the issue of election procedures favoring the election of tribal chieftains is perceived as marginalizing ethnic minorities (Lancaster, 2007). Other challenges such as government’s control of the judiciary and associated corruption in the justice sector also present problems. Moreover, the country has demonstrated little signs of economic growth and many of its goals remain unaccomplished owing to the demands of reconstruction. Re-building the country is going to take a long time, however, the fact that Sierra Leone has not relapsed into violence, nearly a decade after its prolonged engagement with high intensity armed violence, is arguably a sign of “tentative recovery” (Chege 2002, 148).

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222 Ibid.
Sierra Leone contextualized in the Failed States Narrative

Sierra Leone’s success in keeping the peace, despite its recent history of intense turmoil is widely considered to be a positive indicator of state recovery in Western discourses. Its rankings on a range of indices assessing governance, conflict and instability are fairly congruent. However, its development indicators suggest that the country is still at extremely high risk. The HDI (2009) shows Sierra Leone’s development performance at nearly rock bottom, ranking 180th compared to 182 states. The SFIM’s (2009) findings resonate with the HDI’s assessment that the country’s vulnerability is extremely high. The LICUS scale shows it as a core LICUS country in the first two years of assessment (2003 and 2004) and subsequently upgrades it as
marginal LICUS (2005 and 2006). The HKSIAG (2008, 2009), CIFP (2007, Brookings (2008) and the PCIL (2010) show it as a high risk state, but are slightly more optimistic. The MIIAG (2000-2010) also depicts a steadily improving performance, while the FSI (2010) is even more optimistic about Sierra Leone’s relative state performance, positioning it at 28th at risk of failure in a global ranking. The Global Peace Index (GPI 2010) gives it the most favorable ranking (compared with other indices measuring similar indicators) as the 97th least peaceful country reflective of its post civil war calm.

But despite the termination of violence and a steadily improving state performance trajectory shown in a number of indices, the country is still at a high risk of instability. Consider, for example a 2007 UN estimate of unemployment levels at 65% of the population, enough to trigger civil unrest at any point.223 A more recent UN report states that illicit trafficking of cocaine to Sierra Leone poses a significant threat to its stability as the country struggles to consolidate its peace.224 The problem is further compounded because drug trafficking is often accompanied with arms and human trafficking as well.225 Likewise, the public perceptions of the justice system are poor. Freedom House reports that while courts promise fair hearings and competent, independent and unbiased tribunals, the people of Sierra Leone perceive corruption to be the determining variable in court proceedings. Moreover, 75% of the population does not

225 Ibid.
have access to judicial proceedings in a language they understand. Opportunities for higher education are very limited, with only two universities serving the entire population. The infant mortality rate in the country is also very high at 81.86 per thousand births; its global ranking is 15th in comparison with 224 countries according to a 2009 estimate.

Perception of ethnic discrimination in the security sector is commonly reported especially in military appointments and promotions. Likewise ethnic and gender imbalances in parliament are extant. In the most recent elections in 2007, Sierra Leone switched its previously held proportional representation principle to “first-past-the-post” geographical constituencies which is considered controversial by some, as it favors tribal strength and puts minorities at a disadvantage. Similarly, the election of only 16 women (13.2% representation) in the parliament suggests the need to take measures to empower women and ethnic minorities.

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In analyzing the conflict conditions Draman and Carment (2003, 2) call attention to the regional security context involving both Sierra Leone and Liberia as perpetuating “most notably, a ‘highly criminalized war economy’ that sustained the trade in diamonds, arms and drugs.” They note, in particular, the regional contagion of the conflict in Liberia as destabilizing the neighborhood. In a positive development, postwar Sierra Leone has developed cordial relations with neighboring Liberia. In breaking away from a history of hostilities, the two countries signed a non-aggression pact in 2007.233

However, Sierra Leone still has outstanding political disputes with neighboring Guinea. One of them concerns the demarcation of a section of the Mao/Makona river, a legacy of their colonial past, presently occupied by Guinea.234 The two states also dispute their claim over Yenga region, thought to be rich in diamonds. The hamlets of Yenga are also under Guinean occupation. The conflict has been unresolved since the late 1990s.235

Regardless of its internal peace and willingness to make peace with neighboring Liberia, Sierra Leone provides an example of a fragile state where prolonged civil war was once perceived as a symptom of state failure. Although, civil war termination is widely regarded as a significant indicator of improved state performance in Western discourses, the underlying socio-economic causes of civil warfare remain largely unaddressed. Like Nepal and Liberia, Sierra Leone does not figure prominently in the

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policy discourses on state failure, arguably owing to its status of strategic unconcern to the West. This may also be a factor reflecting its relatively optimistic rankings on state performance despite evidence of improved human development indicators.

Like Liberia, Sierra Leone has been selected to test the impact of military intervention in a perceived failed state. The key consideration for including Sierra Leone in my dissertation research rests in the fact that military intervention was successful in enforcing and keeping the peace, in contrast with my hypothesis proposing that failed states discourses lead to destabilizing interventions, likely to exacerbate than alleviate the conditions of conflict. That said, the success of military intervention in Sierra Leone was contingent on a number of conditions delineated below:

i) Small geographic and population size of perceived failed state.

ii) Right mandate and resources. UNAMSIL was the largest peacekeeping mission at the time. Its total estimated expenditure stands at $2.8 billion.  

iii) Humanitarian objectives.

iv) Partnerships with regional peacekeeping organizations.

v) Civil society, regional and international collaborative conflict resolution responses.

The role of civil society peace constituencies, involving women’s groups and prominent individuals must be highlighted for their initial efforts to end civil war by drawing the government and rebel forces into peace talks, efforts culminating in the

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signing of the Abidjan Accord in 1996. Similar grassroots peace initiatives such as the Mano River Bridge Initiative, the National Coordinating Committee for Peace, the civil society ‘contact group’, and the involvement of diasporic communities were instrumental in creating opportunities for engagement with rebel forces, and building the momentum for bringing civil war to an end.

Having identified key factors that contributed to the relative success of these military interventions, it is important to mention that the initial phases of military intervention in Liberia, a sub-regional initiative supported by ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African Nations) and by the UN were ineffective. The ECOWAS intervention undertaken by ECOMOG entailed a pre-dominantly Nigerian 9,000 strong contingent that succeeded in dismantling the military junta in early 1998. The military intervention was preceded by failed diplomatic initiatives and rising tensions. ECOMAG’s initial mandate of sanction enforcement was subsequently changed to military intervention. Likewise the UN mission faced great difficulties due to RUF’s hostile posturing. The intervention of 1,300 British troops in May 2000, a rapid reaction force under a Commonwealth mandate (Operation Palliser) initially intended to evacuate British nationals in 2000, helped to provide the support UNAMSIL needed to overcome the hostilities.

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238 Ibid.
240 Ibid.
241 Ibid.
An Assessment of the International Response to the Civil War in Sierra Leone

i. ECOMOG

Of ECOMOG’s intervention in Liberia in 1998, Draman and Carment (2003) argue that it had its pros and cons. Firstly, it provided a good model for a regional initiative to maintain peace and uphold peace agreements, given that Cold War alliances had fizzled out. On the other hand, they argue, the military intervention was alleged to have been brutal, corrupt and biased against the local populace. They suggest that this had also been the experience in ECOMOG’s deployment in neighboring Liberia, and had lessons been learnt, the ECOMOG/UNAMSIL joint mission may not have faced the abductions and humiliations of the UN personnel by the RUF. Further, they suggest that the deployment of sub-regional peacekeeping forces is challenged by the regional politics of member countries. Such operations, must therefore be complemented by significantly stronger international peace support, in particular from the UN.

Notwithstanding the weaknesses of the ECOMOG, Felix Lima (2002) opines that the reinstatement of the legitimate civilian government was a notable accomplishment on the part of the ECOMOG. He acknowledges, however, that the tactics adopted by predominantly Nigerian troops who were leading the ECOMOG were not without consequence, especially since Nigeria controlled the military strategy as well as contributing most of its operational costs. Having aggressively gained control of Freetown and reinstalling Kaabah’s government, in January 1999, ECOMOG met with a severe RUF and AFRC backlash as they advanced into Freetown, resulting in significant losses to the Nigerians, who subsequently decided to leave Sierra Leone, abandoning the
ECOMOG’s operation. ECOMOG forces thus had to be reinforced with troops from other countries including Ghana and Mali at a critical time.

Woods and Reese (2008) resonate with the analysis. They suggest that ECOMOG’s failure to prevent the resurgence of rebel forces in early 1999, was their biggest weakness considering that they had the intelligence, but did not make preparations for it. Their negligence resulted in yet another reign of terror unleashed on civilians. Second, they argue that ECOMOG’s contingents were demoralized and lacked discipline. Many of them were war weary soldiers who had served in ECOMOG’s mission in Liberia, were underpaid or not paid at all, and not looked after well. Third, they agree that Nigeria’s domination of the mission led to the reluctance on the part of other contingents to submit to the command and control structure. Other problems identified by Woods and Reese (2008) include operational and tactical weaknesses, lack of funding, and a poor effort to train the local security agencies in maintaining law and order upon ECOMOG’s withdrawal.

ii. UNAMSIL

UNAMSIL was authorized as a peacekeeping and monitoring force with an initial strength of 6,000 troops. It was also tasked to undertake a DDR process in accordance with the Lomé Peace Agreement. Woods and Reese (2008, 57-58 ) present a vivid

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description of the initial setbacks faced by UNAMSIL:

Soldiers from the various member states arrived in Freetown in waves over several months beginning in January 2000. Most of the national contingents did not bring their own logistical support and quickly found that there was insufficient infrastructure and logistics to accommodate them, particularly when they moved out of Freetown into the countryside. As military equipment was shipped into the port of Freetown, it was placed in areas without security. As a result, much of the initial load of military equipment was stolen and either sold on the black market or appropriated by various criminal sources. When they finally received their equipment, they began to deploy throughout the country where 40,000 to 50,000 combatants were operating. Many of the soldiers spoke different languages, which caused issues with command and control.

Additionally, Reese and Woods (2008) state, the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process was off to a slow start, with its disarmament initiative failing to deliver. The security environment was highly unstable for effectively conducting the operation, largely due to ECOMOG’s early withdrawal and failure to build and train the local security infrastructure. Subsequent to the Nigerian withdrawal from Sierra Leone, the UN increased the strength of UNAMSIL to 11,000. However, the UN command’s commitment to maintaining strict neutrality and reluctance to use force emboldened the rebels, leading to the RUF’s ambush of a Kenyan UNAMSIL contingent on May 4, 2000. The Kenyans were captured, and a force of 2000 Zambian troops sent to the rescue the Kenyans were also taken hostage. This led to an appeal by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to the United Kingdom and other states to intervene.

The intervention of 1,300 British troops on May 7, 2000, a rapid reaction force having a Commonwealth mandate (Operation Palliser) initially intended to evacuate
British nationals, ultimately provided the support UNAMSIL needed to recover from its losses. Operation Pallisar ended on June 15, 2000, after taking control over strategic areas and driving the RUF away. In addition they provided technical support and training. However the British returned in August 2000, when an RUF faction known as the West Side Boys nearly defeated the UNAMSIL. UNAMSIL command was not willing to respond to the violence through an adequate peace enforcement response, revealing a disconnect between ground realities and tactics (Woods and Reese 2008).

In the face of the challenges faced by UNAMSIL, by March 2001 its strength was increased to 17,500 making it the UN’s largest peacekeeping operation at the time.245 Around this time, a series of important tactical and international political developments (Adebajo and Keen 2007, 265-7) bolstered the UNAMSIL’s operations on the grounds, resulting in the defeat of the RUF and the end of the civil war by early 2002. Specifically, the developments leading to civil war termination included:

- the increasingly critical role of Guinean armed forces, reinforced by the Kamajors, (traditional hunters from the Mende ethnic group);
- international efforts to regulate Sierra Leone’s diamond trade, specifically the imposition of UN sanctions;
- international efforts to undermine the alliance between Liberian President Charles Taylor’s and the RUF, particularly the diamond, arms and travel sanctions imposed by the UN;

- the increase in funding and troops (totally about 20,000) to UNAMSIL and the adoption of a more pronounced enforcement mandate;
- Successful British operations against the Westside Boys;
- Change in the RUF leadership from Sanko to moderate leader Isa Sesay.

Conclusion

The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that Sierra Leone has successfully held the peace nearly a decade after the long civil war was terminated. The role played by civil society, regional actors, international community was instrumental in civil war termination. The positive outcome of external military intervention (despite initial failures) apparently challenges my key hypothesis that it is more likely to destabilize a conflict environment, but in actual fact, the case provides insights on the special conditions that supported the success of the intervention process. First, the cessation of hostilities came about with the efforts of civil society peace constituencies; and sustained, coordinated regional and international peacemaking and peacekeeping initiatives. Boulding (1962) would agree that regional collaboration between the Guinean armed forces and UN peacekeepers reinforced the military intervention. Second, the proactive role of ECOWAS a regional organizations, in conflict de-escalation in particular was critical in driving the local peace process, and in mobilizing a wider international effort involving the UN.

Third, peacekeeping costs were extremely high suggesting that the political will to mobilize a sufficient number of troops is extremely important for the success of an intervention, a thesis proposed by Seybolt (2007). Recall that the initial phase of the UN
intervention in Sierra Leone suffered significant setbacks as a result of inadequate troop deployment. Fourth, it should be remembered that the logistics of the military intervention after the troop surge were relatively more manageable given the small size of the population and territory. Finally, international efforts to address the sources of conflict continuation, specifically UN sanctions banning the flow of arms and the trade in diamonds were an effective legal measure. That all UN peacekeeping pulled out of Sierra Leone by 2005 and local conditions have generally remained peaceful speaks volumes for the success of the intervention.

The country’s ability to sustain the peace is positively reflected on a number of quantitative indices on state performance. However, Sierra Leone’s development trends appear bleak, ranked the 12th least developed country on the UNDP’s HDI (2010). Thus, while the international military intervention was successful in enforcing the peace, it has not demonstrated the capacity to contribute to economic growth. This resonates with Siegal’s thesis (2010) arguing that despite the UN’s ability to build peace, the presence of the organization in a fragile environment does not support improved economic growth, improved social indicators and associated institution-building. On the impact of financial aid in Sierra Leone Vandy Kanyako (2010, 44-45) writes that while it has been useful in supporting the growth of civil society, it has also distorted its growth by primarily benefitting urban groups and creating disparities among them and within their constituencies.

Although the international community has restored security in Sierra Leone, a desirable milestone, the ethnic imbalance in the parliament suggests that identity-based
marginalization prevails, which in combination with poor perceptions of the justice system, a very high unemployment rate; poor health services and very high consumption of narcotics, do not augur well for Sierra Leone’s medium to long-term stability. Finally, it is important to highlight the fact that the UN resisted the calls for intervention for a long time on the grounds that the civil war was an internal problem, in exercise of the principal of non-intervention (David Keen, 2005, 91-92), demonstrating the international community’s reluctance to engage in humanitarian crises in states of relative strategic unconcern.
Appendix J

Somalia

‘Peace is only sustainable when it is owned by local actors and not by what outsiders want.’ Statement made at a seminar in the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars (Jan 28, 2010) titled “Peace Mapping in Somalia.”
Recent History of Conflict and Instability

Somalia gained independence from colonial rule in 1960 and was formed by the voluntary unification of two separate colonial territories known as British Somaliland and Italian Somalia. For the past two decades however, the country has been without a central government and is widely regarded as a textbook case of state collapse. The capital city Moghadishu is controlled by warlords and is mired in lawlessness. Somalia’s descent into chaos may be attributed to a combination of factors including the fall of Siad Barre’s repressive regime in 1991, hastened by waning super-power support at the end of the Cold War, and clan-based insurgency. The United Somali Congress (USC), a prominent political and paramilitary organization representing the Hawiye clan in south central Somalia played a key role in Barre’s ouster, who had himself assumed power through a military coup in 1969. Barre’s fall was followed by a protracted civil war. Within the first year of civil war 300,000 people lost their lives, 5 million faced starvation and disease, and 1 million were displaced. Between 1991-1993, Somalia was also afflicted by a severe famine that killed up to 280,000 people and displaced up to 2 million. By most accounts the famine was considered to be the fallout of the conflict. Almost two decades later, at the time of this writing, warnings of another drought threatening 2.5 million lives and a potential agricultural collapse in Somalia are

being sounded. Some estimate that up to a million lives have been lost in Somalia since 1991 as a result of the civil war.

The people of Somalia are clearly divided across five states (Puntland, Somaliland, Banadir, Riverland and Jubaland), a legacy perhaps of its colonial history. Cousens and Kumar (2001, 57) observe that despite the evolution of a national Somali identity in Somalia’s postcolonial trajectory, the primacy of clan-based political identities contributed to political fractionalization and societal fragmentation. As a result of protracted clan warfare and insurgency 1.5 million people remain internally displaced in Somalia, considered one of the largest internally displaced communities in the world. The total number of displaced people stands at 3.5 million. Approximately 513,820 people are known to be living in unsanitary and overcrowded conditions in neighboring countries including Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Yemen. 60,000 Somalis flee their homeland every year, while 3.6 million people in Somalia currently require emergency food aid (Bradbury and Healy 2010, 14).

252 IISS Armed Conflict Database http://acd.iiss.org/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_ConflictSummary.asp?ConflictID=198
The absence of a centralized legitimate government has, with the passage of time enabled Somali pirates operating off the Somali coast to ambush foreign vessels using the waterway for international trade. Another related threat emanating from Somalia is its vulnerability to terrorists, particularly al-Qaeda who have found sanctuary in the country, having strong ties with the Islamist extremist group Al-Shabaab. James Phillips (2002) notes that Somalia has a long seaport, not patrolled in its entirety and providing easy access to al-Qaeda into the country by sea.

Armed violence in Somalia has undergone cycles of escalation and de-escalation. A number of local and external efforts to mediate peace have been organized during the last two decades involving the Arab League, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the UN, but have been largely unsuccessful in reconciling Somali society. Failed local peace initiatives often result in more violence, however, some regions including Somaliland and Puntland have stabilized considerably in recent years, as I shall subsequently demonstrate.

Somalia presently has a Transitional Federal Government (TFG), formed in late 2004 in the fourteenth attempt to create a central government in the country since 1991. President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed was the first to preside the UN-backed TFG. The administrative mechanism was designed to provide proportional representation to Somalia’s Darod, Hawiye, Dir, and Digil Mirifil clans through the long-established yet debated “4.5 formula”. Although all stakeholders did not regard it as a fair solution, it allocated an equal number of parliamentary seats (61 each) to the aforementioned clans,
and 31 seats to remaining groups including minorities and women (Hanson and Kaplan 2008).

Presently the TFG is headed by President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed a moderate Islamist, enjoying Western support and committed to the restoration of order and a political dialogue in divided Somalia. Ahmed was elected President by the Parliament in January 2009 as a successor to Somali President Abdullahi Yousuf Ahmed who had relinquished his position a month earlier, over political differences with Prime Minister Nur Hassan. The TFG has about 2,000 troops compared with 5,000 and 15,000 under the command of Puntland and Somaliland authorities, the self-declared autonomous northern republics. Troop capacity of a number of prominent political players (non-state actors) in Somalia is not known. Internal violence is characterized by clan warfare in many parts of Somalia. Various parties presently engaged in armed conflict include the TFG, the United Somali Congress – Somali Salvation Alliance (USC-SSA), Al-Shabaab, and a number of clan based militia forces. Regionally, Somalia has been engaged in a number of conflicts with neighboring states. Its territorial claims on Somali-inhabited areas in northeast Kenya, the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and Djibouti have been a source of contention and history of warfare with its neighbors.

Somalia has been included in this research for three main reasons. In the first place, it provides a classic example of a failed state for purposes of analysis; and secondly, it provides insights into the motivations for external military intervention

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(albeit short-lived) by preeminent global actors (the UN and the US) in the pre-9/11 landscape. Finally, the impact of external military intervention in Somalia is examined and compared with other international initiatives.

Somalia Contextualized in the Failed States Narrative

Western discourses generally emphasize the humanitarian dimension of the US-led UN missions in Somalia in the early 1990s. However, Bradbury and Healy (2010) argue that the US intervention was also a response to the threat the collapsed Somalian state posed to the “New World Order” proclaimed by former President Bush at the end of the Cold War. Kurth also suggests that the intervention was partly driven by strategic interest (2005, 93). If so, one could argue that the drivers of US policy of external military intervention in response to failed states did not change radically in the aftermath of 9/11. One must acknowledge however, that the intervention in Somalia was triggered by a humanitarian crisis (even if strategic interest was a factor). I argue that post 9/11, US led foreign military interventions in perceived failed states have experienced a policy shift grounded in the perception of direct threat to the West. Thus, US policy in the current international political climate will likely not be responsive to a humanitarian concern for vulnerable populations.

Ironically however, the humanitarian card has been used post 9/11 in Afghanistan and Iraq (Kurth 2005) among other factors including the elimination of terrorist safe havens and WMD.258 It appears that the lines between humanitarian response, dealing

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258 The issue of humanitarian intervention or lack thereof begs the question why humanitarian crises such as the genocide in Rwanda or Sudan more recently have not provoked a military intervention on the part of the US and multi-lateral agencies.
with rogue governments, and fighting terrorism are often blurred in policy discourses. But the extensive collateral damage and human displacement caused by the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate that the humanitarian objectives of external actors have been secondary. The perception of threat associated with these states has played strongly in a West-centric intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq where external actors are seen as conflict actors and occupiers, rather than mediators of domestic and regional peace. Unlike Afghanistan and Iraq, in Somalia the military intervention was short-lived and was not a major factor in collapse, but it served to complicate the conflict environment. The shortcomings and impact of the intervention are examined subsequently in this chapter.

Factors Contributing to State Collapse in Somalia

![Figure 17: Quantitative Rankings of Somalia’s State Performance](image-url)
Figure 17 shows that Somalia’s state performance indicators related to conflict, governance, and development have been extremely poor during the past two decades of civil war in Somalia and years prior. Its development performance is not reflected in the UNDP’s HDI after 1996 (a few years after the outbreak of civil war in 1991). However, the Human Development Report (1992) uses data from 1989 and 1990, the years preceding Siad Barre’s ouster and external military intervention, suggesting that conditions were not significantly better. Therefore, one may infer that the conditions leading to potential collapse existed prior to military intervention and that it was not a major factor contributing to Somalia’s descent into chaos. This may also be explained by the fact that the intervention was relatively short-lived. It did, however, contribute to greater instability in Somalia and the region by shoring up warlordism, interfering with local political and economic processes, and proxy wars. The PCIL shows a relatively improved performance in Somalia’s instability in recent years, although it remains a high-risk state. Research conducted for this study shows that some regions in Somalia including Somaliland and Puntland have been able to manage instability on their own relatively successfully.

On the issue of what factors make Somalia a failed state, the most obvious one is that it has been without a central government for an extended period of time. Somalia’s poor performance is confirmed in a majority of indices ranking state performance shown in Figure 16 above. Moreover, Somali society is highly fragmented with several regions operating as autonomous units. Somaliland is a self-declared independent republic since
1991, but has been denied international recognition as a sovereign state.\textsuperscript{259} Jubaland, situated in southwestern Somalia declared itself independent in 1998; its autonomous status remains unsettled, however.\textsuperscript{260} Likewise Puntland in north-east Somalia declared itself an autonomous state in August 1998, but seeks to be part of a federal Somalia.\textsuperscript{261} According to a UN report Puntland has declared a temporary secession till the restoration of stability in Somalia.\textsuperscript{262} Thus, the absence of an effective central government has led to a crisis of fragmented sovereignty and a society that is deeply divided. Ethnic infighting and clan cleansing following the 1991 overthrow of Siad Barre’s regime were so horrific that relationships between various tribes are still fractured. The narratives of Somali diaspora and the transgenerational transmission of trauma are reflective of deep-seated societal cleavages and protracted social conflict, a key theoretical consideration in determining state failure.\textsuperscript{263}

In addition to protracted social conflict and the absence of an effective sovereign for an extended period of time, Somalia’s collapse can also be attributed to the fact that is situated in a protracted conflict region with hostile neighbors. Regional rivalries in the Horn of Africa have led to proxy wars between Eriteria and Somalia (Terrence Lyons 2007; Amin Jan 2001, 58). Tensions persist along Somalia’s border with Kenya, Ethiopia


\textsuperscript{261}BBC. Country Profile Somalia. Available online at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/4276288.stm

\textsuperscript{262}See Ref World (2009). “Freedom in the World 2009 – Somalia” Available online at: http://www.unher.org/refworld/topic,45a5199f2,45a5f8ce2,4a645283c,0.html

and Djibouti. Somalia’s territorial claims on Somali-inhabited areas in northeast Kenya, the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and Djibouti have been a source of turbulence.264

Tracing the recent history of Somalia’s relations with other states in the region, it is important to note that it has been engaged in direct and proxy warfare on several fronts. Between 1960-64 Somali backed guerillas fought security forces along the border with Ethiopia and Kenya to further Somalia’s demand for a Pan-Somali state.265 Also, in 1977-1978 Somalia invaded and lost the Ogaden war with Ethiopia to fulfill its irredentist position for a greater Somalia.266 Subsequently, in 1982 Ethiopia invaded Somalia, capturing two Somalian border towns Balumbale and Galdogob. However, Ethiopia’s threat to divide the country led to the Western flow of military aid to Somalia, instrumental in repelling the Ethiopian military.267

The West’s role in fueling regional conflict is manifest in the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in December 2006, complicating the conflict environment. The Ethiopian military campaign was planned to oust the increasingly popular Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a coalition of Islamic courts that had toppled the US backed coalition of warlords known as the Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism, from the seats of power in Moghadishu. The ICU, dreaded in the West for its links with al-Qaeda, had


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been relatively successful in providing services and security to the public, and was seen as an alternative to the ineffective TFG. The Ethiopian offensive was combined with US bombings of retreating ICU forces, allegedly harboring terrorist operatives (Bradbury and Healy, 2010, 14). External military intervention allowed the Islamist extremist group Al-Shabaab to “rally support from and recruit amongst those marginalized by the transitional government, and they radicalized the Islamist movement” (International Crisis Group 2009).

Because the state’s law and order apparatus is ineffective, Somalia provides fertile grounds for militias and terrorists. Note that the TFG (Transitional Federal Government) merely has about 2,000 troops compared with 5,000 and 15,000 under the command of Puntland and Somaliland authorities. Moreover each clan has its own security force. There are 4 major clans and a number of subclans and minorities in Somalia. The Darod, Hawiye, Isaaq, Rahanwein, Dir, and Digil Mirifil clans are the main players in the political playing field.

Public perceptions of the justice system in Somalia are poor. A 2005 report prepared by the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue underscores “a severely undermined

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269 Ibid.
270 See Global Security.Org. “Introduction to Somalia” suggests that owing to inter-marriage “98 percent of the people are described as Somalis. The Somalis are united by language, culture, and religion as well as by common descent. All Somalis trace their origin to two brothers, Samaal and Saab, said to have been members of the Arabian tribe of Quraysh, to which Muhammad belonged. The descendants of these two brothers constitute six clan families or tribes. The Dir, the Darod, the Isaaq, and the Hawiayah make up an estimated 75 percent of the population and belong to the Samaal line. The Rahanweyn and the Digil belong to the Saab line. The Samaal are nomadic or seminomadic pastoralists, while the Saab are farmers and sedentary herders.” Available online at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_93-1_chp1.htm
public trust in the formal judicial system.”

The public views courts as too problematic, uncertain, and prone to corruption.”

Militancy and terrorism pose an existential threat to Somali society and have led to the exodus of the educated sections of society. Unemployment in Somalia is high at 30%, as is inflation. The CIA World Factbook reports that businesses in Somalia print their own money, therefore inflation rates cannot be determined. Additionally, Somalia has a very high infant mortality rate at 109.19 deaths per 1,000, ranking 6th in a global comparison of 224 countries. Likewise, life expectancy is low at 49.63 years. Low primary school enrolment (19%) and the higher education enrolment rate (0.1%) speak to its bleak development potential in the short to medium term. Unemployment, inflation, lack of law and order, poor health and literacy levels, and a culture of militancy have also contributed to Somali transnational terrorism, particularly piracy, stirring up a perception of threat in the West.

That said, a number of Somali-led peace processes have taken place at various levels in Somalia over the course of the past two decades showing Somali society’s willingness and commitment to resuscitate the state. Additionally, civil society in Somaliland and Puntland has demonstrated its capacity for sustainable economic growth in the respective regions. These communities provide replicable reconciliation models

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272 Ibid. p. 31 For more details about limitations of the Somali justice system refer to the report.
for other conflict zones in Somalia. Their recent local peace-making and community reconciliation efforts are examined subsequently.

It has been argued by scholars, Menkhaus (2004) most prominently, that collapsed states do not pose as grave a threat to the West, as do semi-functioning states. This is based on the perspective that collapsed states are not able to provide the communication and infrastructure support required for terrorist networks to operate successfully. Although this may be correct to some extent, in the case of Somalia, it does not hold true because the country is seen as posing a direct threat to the interests of the international community. The threat of terrorism associated with al-Qaeda’s presence in Somalia, its ties with Al-Shabab; and from Somali pirates, has increased significantly in the post 9/11 landscape. One could safely conclude that the West’s concern with Somalia in the present context stems from the aforementioned threats, far more than the concern with the state failure and humanitarian concerns.

**An Assessment of the International Response to Instability in Somalia**

The failure of UNOSOM 1 (United Nations Operation in Somalia 1), a humanitarian mission to help the Somalis trapped in civil war and famine, prompted the outgoing US administration of then President George H. W. Bush to authorize the deployment of US forces to protect humanitarian operations and create a secure environment for political reconciliation amongst local clans. US intervention in Somalia was dispatched on December 9, 1992 through Operation Restore Hope or the Unified

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278 See Bradbury and Healy (2010).
Task Force (UNITAF), with the authorization of the UN Security Council. In May 1993, UNITAF was organized to work with a restructured UNOSOM II which was authorized “to use ‘all necessary means’ to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia”. UNOSOM’s engagement in Somalia characterized for the first time, a UN military intervention in a conflict without the prior consent of state authorities. The deployment of US Operation Restore Hope served to expand the US and UN’s military role in the post Cold War security architecture. (Lofland n.d., 53). However, Bradybury and Healy (2010, 11) have argued that the UN mission was instrumental in planting the seeds of Islamic militancy as the intervention was propagated as an invasion of an Islamic country by Osama bin Laden. Moreover, the US preoccupation with the security threat posed by state collapse in Somalia has “reinforced in the minds of Somalis that peacebuilding in Somalia has largely been driven by outside, rather than Somali interests.” (Bradbury and Healy 21, 2010, 16).

Arguably, even though, international engagement in response to the turmoil in Somalia may not have been the major factor in state collapse, it is widely considered to have exacerbated local and regional conflict dynamics. Bradbury and Healy (2010) argue that while UNOSOM II was partly successful in its mission to save lives, ensure food supplies, create jobs, and facilitate some local agreements to build peace and security, by and large it failed to disarm warring tribes and mediate a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Further, UNOSOM became controversial for allegedly fuelling the war economy and for shoring up warlordism (Lofland, n.d.). Jan (2001, 61) writes that

UNITAF’s cooperation with faction leaders to allow the passage of humanitarian relief and heavy weapons was a strategic error seen as bolstering warring factions. Notwithstanding Somalia’s complex domestic and regional challenges, the UN’s peacebuilding role is described by Jan as “minimal” (2001, 54). He notes that the international community’s inability to disarm various factions emboldened them further, resulting in the erosion of local confidence in the peacekeeping mission. In March 1995 UNOSOM II was withdrawn from Somalia.²⁸⁰

Jan (2001, 53) argues the country’s political processes including internal reconciliation processes had “frozen as a consequence of massive UN presence in the country” but resumed after the withdrawal of the UNOSOM II. He (ibid, 56) emphasizes that the popularity of the sharia authorities in Somalia could partly be explained by their capacity to perform basic governance functions and to facilitate social integration better than external actors. Institution building mechanisms such as the formation of district and regional councils were imposed on the Somalis by UNOSOM II and lacked a participatory planning element (Jan, 2001, 66). Clan reconciliation initiatives that generally did not involve UNOSOM II “were in fact much more conducive to peacebuilding efforts.” (ibid, 63).

Significantly, one of the unintended consequences of the mission was that it assumed the role of a conflict actor, following the killing of twenty three Pakistani peacekeepers on June 5th, 1993, likely at the behest of General Farah Aideed (ibid. 72). Thereafter, the international effort was “subsumed by the military objective of

²⁸⁰ Ibid.
marginalizing and eliminating Aidid. A clandestine military operation, including psychological warfare, was launched against Aidid, with “Wanted” posters displaying his picture being posted and dropped all over south Mogadishu and the price of U.S. $25,000 placed to his head” (ibid, 73-74).

Jan’s concern with the international community’s role in fuelling the war economy (2000) is a problem that also afflicts Afghanistan where the local economy become dependent on the heavy UN presence and its economic resources (Ghani and Lockhart 2008). It is argued that when the UN becomes a major provider of financially lucrative employment, it creates significant economic disparity and tensions within the social class structure in the recipient country (ibid). Jan (ibid, 61) suggests that UNOSOM II became the single largest employer with three thousand Somalis on its payroll. Ironically many of the security guards engaged by the UNOSOM II were Aideed’s supporters “moonlighting” as militias. Other distortions in the local economy included a decline in indigenous entrepreneurship and the growth of a service sector catering to UNOSOM II’s needs.

Internationally led peace initiatives in Somalia have also not succeeded (Bernard Harborne 2010, 45). Up to 12 unsuccessful peace initiatives were organized during the 1990s by various organizations, including the Arab League, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the UN. Although Menkhaus (2010, 17) notes that of these only half were full-fledged national peace conferences. He identifies a host of weaknesses in external mediation attempts including misdiagnosis of the problem, over-emphasis on state-revival and power-sharing, lack of international political will, lack of strategy, lack
of neutrality and poor quality mediators. By contrast, Somali-led peace processes have been more successful than international initiatives and are described below to show the capacity of Somali society to resolve their own problems.

**Local peace processes**

A number of Somali-led peace processes have taken place at various levels in Somalia over the course of the past two decades. Panelists at a seminar at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars (2010) stated that there have been ninety local peace initiatives that have ended the violence in some parts of Somalia, notably Puntland and Somaliland. Somali-led peace processes have been more successful than international initiatives as they aim to end violence and restore public security. They also noted that external actors often do not possess adequate knowledge of the local context. The Puntland and Somaliland experiments with traditional peacebuilding are successful models where they have been able to create local governance structures that are working. Sharia law is a component of traditional conflict resolution in Somalia and its application has been effective.

Local peace processes focus on the restoration of security so that communities can live together through distributive justice, rather than retribution. The cessation of violence is reinforced through ceasefire agreements and confidence building measures. The initiatives foster truth and reconciliation; consensus-based decision making; facilitate distributive justice through compensation payments (*diya*); and institute local conflict resolution and monitoring mechanisms for conflict prevention. These models provide a number of lessons for replication in other regions in Somalia (Wilson Center for
International Scholars, 2010). First, reconciliation should precede state building.

Secondly, the process should be inclusive. Stakeholders and spoilers must be involved in planning and conducting political deliberations; proportional representation of clan representatives, and a diverse and broad representation of civil society members must be ensured. Anticipating the possibility of failures and setbacks is also an important part of the process and is considered in local peace initiatives.

Farah (2001, 138) and Bradbury and Healy (2010, 50-51) have also noted the catalytic role of traditional elders, *akils* (wise ones); the council of elders, *guurti*; the mobilization of women (also see Jan, 2001, 57); and the influence of poetry in local peacemaking processes. One of the caveats in this process noted by Bradbury and Healy (2010) is that local processes are vulnerable to regional and national politics. Moreover, local level state-building contributes to broader state-building but may be perceived as a threat to a weaker nascent government (Wilson Center for International Scholars, 2010). Despite some challenges in the implementation of the local peace processes, both Puntland and Somaliland provide robust national reconciliation models that are sustainable.

**Conclusion**

The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that the state in Somalia collapsed as a result of the complexities it faced during the past two decades. The absence of an effective national government and a crisis of fragmented sovereignty; protracted social conflict and associated economic and agricultural collapse; and regional security complexes have been key factors spelling the country’s descent into chaos. External
intervention in Somalia has been destabilizing and has compounded the crisis. Although the UN missions in Somalia had incorporated an economic development strategy with a military response prescribed by Regan (1996), it interfered with the local economy and made the communities entirely dependent on external actors. Seybolt’s (2007) claim that the success of an external intervention can be measured by the number of lives saved confirms that the intervention was highly ineffective. It was neither able to restore security, nor mediate peace. It was also unable to put Somalia on an economic development trajectory that would address severe food insecurity.

The Somalian experience shows that the TFG backed by the international community lacks the capacity, legitimacy and authority to restore security, provide social services and goods, and perform the economic function of the state. Thus, the TFG is not able to perform the function of a minimal state. However, decreased violence levels and economic growth in Puntland and Somaliland have come about as a result of local governance and peace initiatives, speaking for the potential of civil society in these regions to restore stability. The replication of these models on a national level could possibly revive the Somalian state.

Logan and Preble (2006), Jan Pieterse (1997, 90), and Carment (2003, 409) have suggested that external nation building in Somalia has been an unsuccessful experiment, that the global community does not have the capacity to respond effectively even on a humanitarian mission, and has generated greater violence and instability. Moreover, donor dependence and expectations stalled the growth of local political cultures, economy, and peace initiatives. While the international community could play a
mediating role in Somalia, Western state stabilization initiatives have not created the space for addressing Somalia’s complexities through dialogue. In the presence of Islamist militancy Western presence also facilitates the radicalizing agenda of the non-state actor. The Somali community, suggested a research participant interviewed for this study, is now wary of the UN and AU (African Union) presence and logos. Moreover, reflecting on the international community’s role, a research participant argued that they should have gone to different regions and insisted on reconciliation (to address the underlying causes of the problem) rather than focusing on disarmament (to address the symptoms of the conflict). Any effort to rebuild Somalia must seek to rebuild relationships through reconciliation processes as the building block of transforming the conflict environment.

Although the appetite for intervention in Somalia has dampened post 1993, the international community could engage to resolve the broader regional conflicts; prevent the perpetuation of proxy wars; provide funding to the regional government; provide assistance in literacy and agricultural initiatives; and in rebuilding infrastructure. The importance of reconciliation as a precursor for institution building, and respect for local customs and traditions by the international community, are critical for the success of state stabilizing initiatives in Somalia.
Appendix K

Data from Quantitative Indices

This appendix explains the methodology used for standardizing the data drawn from quantitative indices presented in the form of bar charts (see Appendices C-J). Data from twelve quantitative indices are taken for each of the eight case studies (where applicable and if available), to determine if their rankings of state performance are congruent, and if quantitative analysis is compatible with the views of experts elicited through interviews. Appendix K also provides the standardized data used to prepare the bar charts. The indices and abbreviations used are specified in the table below.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Quantitative Index</th>
<th>Abbreviation used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1  State Fragility Index and Matrix (George Mason University, Virginia)</td>
<td>SFIM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2  Failed States Index (The Foreign Policy /Fund for Peace, Washington D.C.)</td>
<td>FSI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3  Index of State Weakness in the Developing World (The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C.)</td>
<td>ISW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4  Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (Carleton University, Ottawa)</td>
<td>CIFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5  Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger (University of Maryland, Maryland)</td>
<td>PCIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6  Low Income Countries Under Stress (World Bank Group)</td>
<td>LICUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7  Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank Group)</td>
<td>WGI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8  Global Peace index (Vision of Humanity, Sydney)</td>
<td>GPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9  Human Development Index (UNDP)</td>
<td>HDI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Global Competitiveness Index (World Economic Forum, Geneva)</td>
<td>GCI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, London)</td>
<td>MIIAG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Harvard Kennedy School Index of African Governance (Harvard University, Massachusetts)</td>
<td>HKSIAG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Standardization of Rankings from Quantitative Indices: Methodology**

The indices given in the table above all use a range of different indicators and their own scales to rank countries. Each index also evaluates a different number of countries, which may vary every year. The respective rankings for each of the eight case studies given in each index, and the total number of states ranked, are provided in Appendix K. For the purpose of comparison, rankings have been standardized to provide an ordinal ranking of states starting from 1 (denoting highest risk or instability, fragility, or poorest level of performance in an area), and indicating a reduced risk of
instability, the greater the score. Therefore a ranking of 1 indicates the highest risk and 45 would indicate a significantly lower risk of instability. Some indices (namely the FSI, ISW, and CIFP) have applied a similar scale to rank states and their rankings have not been changed for comparison. Other indices (the GPI, HDI, GCI, MIIAG, and HKSIAG) have ranked them in reverse order, therefore their rankings have been reversed for uniformity.
The **SFIM** uses a scale of 0 for “no fragility” to 25 for “extreme fragility” for more than 160 countries that have been ranked for various years. For the purposes of approximate standardization, each country has been assigned an ordinal ranking based on its positioning on the matrix. Thus, Somalia is ranked number 1 as it is placed at the top of the matrix showing a fragility scale of 25, DRC is ranked number 2 for its placement right below Somalia (scoring 23 on the index), and so on for all countries ranked on the matrix.

The **PCIL** provides scores for 25 states at the highest estimated risk of instability ranging from 1 for “highest risk” to 25 for “lesser risk”. All eight case studies for this dissertation do not rank amongst the highest 25 states at risk by the PCIL, therefore, rankings have been provided where applicable, consistent with the ordinal standard applied in this analysis.

**LICUS** ranks a range of 17 to 26 states over a period of 4 years between 2003 to 2006, classifying them as **core LICUS**, **severe LICUS** and **marginal LICUS**. An ordinal ranking of 1 has been assigned to countries marked core/severe for all four years of assessment, and a score of 20 has been assigned to the country when it was classified as **marginal LICUS**, for approximate standardization. As in the case of the PCIL, some of the states researched for the dissertation, namely Iraq, Pakistan, Nepal and Algeria, are not classified as LICUS, and a ranking is not available for them. Therefore, they are not included on the LICUS scale.

Finally, the **WGI** provides percentile scores for six dimensions of governance for 213 countries. They include the following:
1. Voice and accountability
2. Political stability no violence
3. Government effectiveness
4. Regulatory quality
5. Rule of law
6. Control of Corruption

The mean scores for each state’s performance for each of the six dimensions have been calculated to standardize the data for comparison.
### Afghanistan

#### Rankings of state performance: Standardized data

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<td></td>
<td>2008 - 2010</td>
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### Rankings of State performance: Standardized Data

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*281 Information not available for the year 1992 when the civil war started or before in this database.*

*282 Data from the first year after the end of the civil war (1992-1999)*

*283 Most recent data available.*
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<sup>284</sup> Reflects data from 1990, a little more than a year before the civil war broke out.

<sup>285</sup> Data from the year after the end of the civil war.
## Iraq

### Rankings of State performance: Standardized Data

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Index</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country Ranking</th>
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286 Earliest available ranking.
### Rankings of State Performance: Standardized Data

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<th>Index</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country Ranking</th>
<th>Total number of countries ranked</th>
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287 Data is provided for the earliest year available (1996) which in the case of Liberia is a year before the first civil war ended; for 2003 - when the civil war ended; and for 2008, the most recent data available, in comparing the progress and deterioration of the country over the years.

288 This is a reverse ranking demonstrating that Liberia stands at the 25th lowest human development global ranking.

289 Most recent data available after the cessation of the civil war in Liberia in 2003.
## Liberia

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Supplementary data: The data for WGI includes the years 2000, 2006, and 2008, with scores of 46, 21, and 23, respectively, for each year. The GPI index is not ranked for the years 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010, with the data for the years 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010 indicating the absence of ranking.

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290 Data provides a comparison of the country context when civil war broke out in 1996, when it ended in 2006 and the most recent data available since the end of the civil war (2008).
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**291** Data is given for the year marking the outbreak of the civil war (1996), the year it ended (2006), and most recent post conflict indicators (2009).
### Pakistan

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<sup>92</sup> Data attempts to provide a comparison of the country context in the midst of the civil war 1996 (earliest data available, when it ended in 2002 and the most recent data available since the end of the civil war (2008). The civil war lasted from 1991 to 2002.
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<sup>293</sup> Earliest data available on the indicators.
## Somalia

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294 Development figures given in the Human Development Report 1992 are from 1990 and real GDP per capita reflected in the ranking is from 1989, prior to external interventions in Somalia through Operation Restore Hope and UNOSOM I and II.

295 The data is from 1993 when UNITAF and subsequently UNISOM II were operational.

296 Data for the years immediately following the withdrawal of UNOSOM II in 1995 the final phase of military intervention by external security forces are not available for Somalia. According to the Human Development Report for Somalia “In Somalia, an HDI has not been estimated for UNDP’s global report because neither a government, nor an economic institution exists that could provide reliable and comprehensive data. Furthermore poor security conditions have precluded more systematic data collection by international agencies.” [http://mirror.undp.org/somalia/HDR98/cpt1.pdf](http://mirror.undp.org/somalia/HDR98/cpt1.pdf) p.21

297 Ibid.
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**Curriculum Vitae**

Saira Yamin teaches at the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan and at the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, Virginia. She has frequently lectured at the University of Peshawar, University of Karachi, and at the American University, Washington D.C. Saira has been involved with Women In Security Conflict Management and Peace (WISCOMP), New Delhi, as a resource person at its annual Conflict Transformation workshops working with Pakistani and Indian youth and professionals.


Saira has made appearances as a security analyst on Al-Jazeera, BBC, Canada TV, Pakistan Television and Voice of America. She was a French and English News Reader for Radio Pakistan and a DJ on FM 100, a popular radio station in Islamabad.

She has worked extensively in the development sector in Pakistan advocating human rights for women and children.