WALLED: DIVIDED SOCIETIES & IMPACT ON IDENTITY

by

Suzan D. Tuğberk
A Thesis
Submitted to the
Graduate Faculty
of
George Mason University
in Partial Fulfillment of
The Requirements for the Degree
of
Master of Science
Conflict Analysis and Resolution
Master of Arts
Conflict Resolution and Mediterranean Security

Committee:

__________________________________________
Chair of Committee

__________________________________________
Graduate Program Coordinator

__________________________________________
Director, School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution

Date: __________________________

Fall Semester 2011
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA
University of Malta
Valletta, Malta
Walled: Divided Societies & Impact on Identity

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science at George Mason University and the degree of Master of Arts at
the University of Malta.

by

Suzan D. Tuğberk
Bachelor of Arts
George Mason University, 2006

Director: Karina Korostelina, Professor
School of Conflict Analysis and Resolution

Fall Semester 2011
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA
University of Malta
Valletta, Malta
DECLARATION FOR RESEARCH PAPER

I declare that this research is my own work and no part of it has been copied from any other previous work on the subject, except in such instances where acknowledgment has been duly made.

Signature: [Signature]

Date: 28 September 2011
DEDICATION

To the key players in my life

who accompany me on my journeys

no matter how near or far
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis has been a process in the making upon the acceptance and enrollment of this program, knowing that it would be a mandatory component for graduation. Thank you to all of the professors and lecturers throughout the year who opened my eyes and mind to new concepts and lenses to view the world; it has been truly inspirational and made this work possible. I would like to further thank my adviser, Professor Korostelina, for all of her help, guidance and insight into identity during her course and when writing my thesis. Also, there were instrumental behind the scenes players of both universities who contributed to the overall graduate experience—I am appreciative of all their efforts and time.

My family has been a constant source of support and springboard of ideas. Without their help, attending this program would not have been feasible. Thank you to my parents for their constant stream of encouragement. Thank you to my sister, Alisa, for always looking out to ensure that I am on the right track and taking full advantage of my graduate experience and program. A special note of thanks to my sister, Aylin, whom without I would not have been writing about walls and their identity impacts on society. As I was teetering between eight different thesis ideas, Aylin directed me towards this topic and was the source of motivation for deciding on this path.

Finally, I truly could not be the student I am without my fiancée, Marius, who helped make my graduate experience the best that it could be—he was there every step of the way.

Thank you to all of the contributors to this program. My time as a graduate student is one of the most enjoyable experiences that I fondly look back on.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIST OF TABLES</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1: Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Purpose of Study</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Assumptions of Study</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2: Methodology</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3: Theoretical Concepts</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Identity</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. Social Identity</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii. Social Identity Theory</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv. Large-group Identities</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v. Chosen Traumas &amp; Chosen Glories</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vi. Transgenerational Transmissions &amp; Reservoirs</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vii. Structural Violence</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>viii. Basic Human Needs</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ix. Positive Peace &amp; Negative Peace</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x. Contact Theory</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4: Literature Review</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 German Case Study: Background</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 The Berlin Wall</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3 Cyprus Case Study: Background</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4 The Green Line</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5 Literature Review Conclusion</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5: What is a Wall?</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 6: The Green Line in Cyprus &amp; Identity Impacts</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1 Identity before the Green Line</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2 Identity after the Green Line</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3 Conclusions of Cyprus Identity Analysis</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 7: The Berlin Wall in Germany &amp; Identity Impacts</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South and North Cyprus Main Economic Indicators, 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Psychological Factors of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIGURE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 7</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 8</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 9</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 10</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 11</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BW</td>
<td>Berlin Wall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BWS</td>
<td>Barbed Wire Sunday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BZ</td>
<td>Buffer Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>Contact Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Deutschland Demokratische Republik (German Democratic Republic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOKA</td>
<td>Ethniki Organosis Kyprian Agoniston (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC</td>
<td>Greek Cypriot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>Greek Cypriot Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GL</td>
<td>Green Line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROC</td>
<td>Republic of Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIT</td>
<td>Social Identity Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC</td>
<td>Turkish Cypriot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>Turkish Cypriot Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRNC</td>
<td>Turkish republic of northern Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFCYP</td>
<td>United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABSTRACT

WALLED: DIVIDED SOCIETIES & IMPACT ON IDENTITY

Suzan D. Tuğberk, M.S., M.A.

George Mason University, 2011

Thesis Director: Professor Karina Korostelina

This research aims to understand how and if walls built during conflicts have an impact on identity. Walls are a common mechanism of conflict dating back in history, but serve varying purposes. Whatever the reason, walled societies undergo transformations not only during a wall’s existence, but after the wall is removed or opened, leaving residual damage. These transformations affect the identity structures and related areas of basic human needs and security that have changed over time.

To better understand the impact on individuals and society at-large, a flexible research design employing symbolic interactionism, ethnographic studies and data collection through secondary sources will be used in a comparative case study. The Berlin Wall in Germany and the Green Line in Cyprus are the two cases chosen because of their similar and different identity qualities, as well as presenting a historical and contemporary context. Both examples utilize physical division barriers to provide specific functions,
but have separationist side-effects. Overall, this thesis seeks to demonstrate that walled societies compromise and shift the identity, well-being and security of a person, group and/or nation.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Throughout historical conflicts that have risen across the globe, walls have been implemented as a byproduct of hostilities between parties. The construction of walls is not a new invention; it has been utilized in China via the Great Wall, which was built between 220 and 206 BC. The Knights of St. John in Malta fortified the current and former capitals, Valletta and Mdina, respectively after their victory over the Turkish invaders and to help fend off future opponents. In contemporary history, walls have been used and are still standing in some cases that were originally constructed to prevent specific identity groups from entering and/or leaving, as well as serving other means. “In 1730, Frederick Williams also built the most comprehensive wall Berlin had so far seen. Its aim was not just to defend Berlin against enemies, but to act as an ‘excise wall,’ enabling the King to tax travelers, commercial shipments, or any consumer goods being moved in and out of the city. The wall was also intended to prevent frequent desertions from the king’s army” (Taylor, 2006, pg. 9). However, the walls that divide territories during conflict have greater effects than restricted travel and impact the transformation of conflict. In addition, the effects of a wall transcend the duration of a conflict itself, leaving residual damage.

I was personally struck during a conversation with my sister in discussing byproducts of conflicts. She had mentioned an exhibit that was in Geneva, Switzerland
in the fall of 2009 that she had visited and was greatly moved by. The Murs photo exhibit showcased walls that divide humanity. Geneva’s Mayor, Rémy Pagani expressed the motivation of this exhibit as a thought provoking process, “to make people notice and think about walls, to remind them that when the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 world leaders spoke eloquently about its demise, saying never again…and yet ‘sadly, the world has continued to see walls block the path of man” (Wallace). During this discussion, we began to think about the walls around us, either in our geographical vicinity, in the news or in the past. Immediately, I knew that I wanted to look at walls through identity to see how it alters relationships and dynamics. Therefore, this thesis and research will work towards ascertaining how walls affect conflict areas, individuals and groups. Moreover, the research will compare how walls affect conflict and post-conflict situations in relation to identity while touching upon basic human needs (BHNs) and security. A comparative case study will be used to analyze these areas and what role walls play in shaping the direction and outcome. The chosen samples are the Berlin Wall (BW) in Germany and the Green Line (GL) in Cyprus. Both cases of physical division demonstrate the specific areas aforementioned and also provide examples of wall side-effects, which impact society and transcend resolution or ceasefires.

In terms of identity and walls, the research will try to determine how ingroups and outgroups are created during conflict as a result of the wall itself. Learning about the effects of ingroups and outgroups through the construction of walls will help demonstrate how identity groups are formed. Walls of conflicts have direct effects while present and after that changes identity groups and also creates natural after-effects in post-conflict
zones. Identities do not end when the conflict does. Identities created during conflict will have lasting effects on identity and relations both domestically and internationally. The research will attempt to address how the ingroup and outgroup identities formed as a byproduct of walls also transcends the time frame of a conflict and effects healing in post-conflict areas.

The basic function of a wall is to keep people from either entering or leaving. The general assumption may be that a wall is built to prevent harm and provide safety. However, as this thesis will try to demonstrate, a wall may actually cause harm relating to a person, group or nation’s identity, well-being and security. Despite the general notion of providing protection and privacy by keeping unwanted things or people out, division may have adverse effects on populations and harmful side-effects. The side-effects will also be an area further explored throughout this paper to provide a greater understanding of how physical barriers not only limit travel and access, but also society’s and individual’s operations and daily life.

1.1 Purpose of Study

The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of walls that divide territories to learn how these barriers transform conflict and post-conflict periods. This research aims to compare how walls effect populations in conflict zones in relation to their identity, while also tying in aspects of BHNs and human security. To analyze these areas a comparative case study will be used between Cyprus’ GL border and the BW in Germany. All of these examples utilize physical division barriers to provide one or more specific functions that have side-effects that impact the direction of the conflict and
transcend resolution or ceasefires. This study was chosen because of its focus on identity impacts and additional effects in security via BHNs and human safety. The use of these components provides a basis for a systemic analysis of the effects that walls have within conflict societies. A wall is such a simple concept, but the effects of it on other areas such as identity have been potentially ignored or little understood. I hope to use this thesis project to better inform myself and others of the dangers that a division may have on the community at-large and its role. I was personally inspired after discussing the Cypriot GL in combination with a photo Exhibit at the Murs gallery with a family member. This exhibit showcased walls that divide humanity in the fall of 2010 and was a perfect precursor to this subject of walls and highlighting that a wall has a wider impact. My goal is to take what the Murs gallery displayed and expand upon it and put it into words for my thesis.

1.2 Assumptions of Study

My assumptions propose that walls have a much wider and lasting effect than that of just a physical or divisional barrier. Identities are created and/or shifted, BHNs and security are affected and thus daily life is changes for the affected societies. Both case studies will illustrate how a wall utilized in and because of conflict is more than a simple wall, but deeply impacts conflict zones across identity and related threads of human security and BHNs. The BW will help provide a historical context and the GL will demonstrate current trends and determine what is consistent with the Berlin experience and what is different. Overall, I propose that this thesis will demonstrate the following:

- Walls aid or create the development of changing and/or new identities
• Walls effect the aftermath of conflict by impacting restorative processes and identity shifts that may have occurred.

• Walls have the ability to protect or harm populations, despite the original intentions for its construction.
CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY

This research will employ two case studies to draw comparisons to demonstrate the common effects walls and conflict produce. Robert Yin states that case study research as a method is an “empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence is used” (Yin, 1984, pg. 23). Critics of the comparative case study method believe that focusing on a limited number of cases may limit the scope of definitive information that can be applicable to larger areas. However, I have chosen to do a comparative case study in belief that drawing similarities and differences between two cases will enhance the in depth analysis of an area with limited research. There are also researchers discontent with this method because it may be seen as a purely exploratory tool. This may ring true for the purpose of this research, but it is through exploration that new insights and information may be discovered and uncovered or increase current understandings.

In choosing the cases for this research, I have decided to use the walls in Berlin, Germany and Nicosia, Cyprus. The BW will be used as a historical example that provides conclusive data that strengthens the comparative research when reviewing the collected information against Cyprus.
Within the Berlin, Germany case study, this research will analyze identity to draw conclusions on transformation and construction of identity during and after the fall of the wall. BHNs and security aspects will also be woven into the research as these two areas are directly impacted by the Wall’s presence and become related to identity.

The Cyprus conflict is a cold conflict where Greek or Turkish Cypriots (TCs) are now able to pass through seven different crossing points of the GL, which separates the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). This wall was originally built as a divisional mechanism to help maintain peace as part of the United Nations’ peacekeeping efforts. This border’s effects on identity will be analyzed to understand what changes have occurred, if any, and correlated changes in society.

The German and Cypriot cases include two large-group identities that are the main players in the social identity process within their respected areas. However, in Germany, both identity groups have a common ancestry, culture and ethnic background prior to the construction of the BW. Whereas in Cyprus, the identity groups come from different origins and cultures—an ethnic divide was already present before the GL was built. Comparing two cases with different identity frameworks will enhance the analysis, to see whether or not the effects of partitioning are relevant to identity as a whole.

Additionally, these cases demonstrate how identity is a part of the systematic development of conflict, where identity is created and strengthened through conflict. Walls have an implicit role in this development through its impact on identity. Moreover, walls are built with particular purposes to protect and secure individuals or a nation from danger, whether real or perceived. This directly relates to BHNs on multiple levels. The
research will explore BHNs in terms of safety, security (personal and economic), identity and belonging.

This paper will also employ symbolic interactionism, which looks at how individuals react towards things based on their meanings. These meanings can be personal, communal, situational, etc. and modified through interpretation. Walls as a symbol are a powerful source of imagery that elicits emotion and stimulates reactions from individuals or populations as a form of expression. Vamik Volkan identifies symbols in terms of reservoirs and chosen traumas or chosen glories, which a wall can represent. The research aims to extract the meanings of the case study walls as symbols and byproducts thereof, and their effects on identity groups.

Gathering the information to analyze walls in Cyprus and Germany will be done via a flexible design. This will include forms of ethnographic field research and information collected via secondary sources. The comparative case studies will also permit in depth coverage.

During the research process, I was able to visit Berlin, Germany to better understand the post-wall society dynamics and identify any differences that maybe visible and caused by a reaction to the Wall’s existence. Ethnographic observation, developed by Franz Boas, looks at the daily interaction and participation of individuals. In this situation, I was drawing comparisons between East and West Berlin as representatives for their greater eastern and western territories in Germany. Through ethnography, I was able to better understand the cultural settings of post-wall Berlin that are reflective in the social identity groupings. The use of ethnography in this research is
purely participant observation driven in order to become well acquainted with the identity
groups. However, I was only able to spend a short amount of time in Berlin. Thus, the
findings described later in the thesis only provide a snapshot of the identity groups. To
better understand and fully flesh out the initial findings, a more in depth process of
ethnography needs to be conducted to increase awareness and education about the
identity groups’ daily operations. In addition, the overall research of walls in conflict
settings could also be further enhanced by conducting ethnographic studies in Cyprus to
complete the comparative study method.

The use of secondary sources was extremely instrumental in gathering data and
information for both case studies. A primary source is first-hand knowledge and/or
experience, which I was able to formulate through my observation in Berlin. However, a
secondary source encompasses generalizations, synthesizes information gathered by a
second-party and leads to evaluation of that information to create an analysis. Unable to
conduct first-hand research in Cyprus, the use of secondary sources became critical and
invaluable to this project.

I found an abundance of information relating to statistics and experiences that
were side-effects and direct impacts of the walls in Germany and Cyprus. Studies
conducted on the social identity process and related elements for identity groups in these
situations were also available. However, I could not find a specific study that described
results of identity changes driven by the walls in conflict. Instead, using the secondary
sources created a platform for which to greater understand the changes endured by
affected identity groups. The information collected then could be broken down according
to the theoretical concepts utilized to decipher the impact on identity and related threads of BHNs and security. Comparing two case studies along with the aforementioned analyses via secondary sources, supported by the ethnographic observation, yielded results for how walls create reactionary identity changes and byproducts thereof.
CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL CONCEPTS

Identity

Identity can be perceived as an umbrella concept, with many underpinnings that build an identity structure for an individual, group or nation. Identity is molded by the following parameters:

- **Actuality**—identity is created via social identity interaction and comparison between one’s ingroup and outgroups;
- **Salience**—exemplifies the main stance of one’s identity within other identities and is independent of context and intergroup relations;
- **Valence**—demonstrates either positive or negative identity (Korostelina, 2010).

This paper aims to illustrate how identity shifts were created as a reaction to walls dividing territories in Germany and Cyprus in the 20th and 21st centuries. The formation of groups, both out and in, are part of social identity construction that is molded and shaped by other identity factors, such as minor differences, chosen traumas and glories, reservoirs and more. The research will take these and other items into consideration while analyzing the identity impacts.

Social Identity

“Social identity is knowledge about membership in social group (ingroup), emotional involvement and loyalty to ingroup and beliefs about ‘sameness’ of ingroup (common attitudes, stereotypes, values, similarity) and differences with outgroups. Each identity is shaped as a result of membership in ingroup and as an opposition (comparison) to outgroup. Existence of outgroup, negative and conflict relations with it strengthen group identity” (Korostelina, 2010).
Social Identity Theory

Social Identity Theory (SIT) developed by Tajfel and Turner in 1979 through a study of group members’ discriminatory practices against non-group members. Tajfel and Turner defined the study’s outcome as SIT, which believes that individuals have multiple social identities. The identities are derived from perceived membership within a group and one’s concept of self (Hogg and Vaughan, 2002). This way of thinking leads to the “us” versus “them” thought process and group membership. Belonging to the former category places that person in the “ingroup” and anyone outside of it in the “outgroup.” Thus, SIT is a process of self-categorization by putting oneself into certain brackets and keeping others out as a consequence. Following the categorization procedure that feeds ingroup favoritism, there are subsequent elements that further boost the ingroup image. Self-esteem, discrimination, biases and prejudice all become interwoven factors in SIT because a person and its group is looking to differentiate itself in a positive manner to demonstrate a form of superiority. Brewer’s theory of “optimal distinctiveness” (1994, 2000, 2001) also suggests that distinction is necessary for an individual and his/her group in terms of intracategory assimilation. However, Brewer also believes that an individual needs to have his/her own self-distinction, labeled inercategory contrast. Both these concepts intersect with one another because “social identity provides access to social consensus and gives opportunity to use this consensus as a basis for self-verification” (Korostelina, 2010).
Large-Group Identities

Large-group identities are considered to be a part of natural evolution as “an end result of a historical continuity, geographical reality, a myth of a common beginning, and other shared events” (Volkan, 1997, pg. 22). The formation of large-group identities also creates prejudices between groups for differentiation purposes and to formulate a “we-ness”, which can lead to ethno-nationalism. Other attributes also shape group identity, such as a common language, religion or attachment to land where ancestors are buried. This is particularly applicable in Cyprus amongst the Cypriot group identities. Volkan notes that this shared understanding that also defines one group from another serves a specific purpose that W.H. Auden remarked on saying that “if we did not have a hated ‘them’ to turn against, there would not be a loving ‘us’ to turn to (as cited in Volkan, 1997, pg. 25).

Chosen Traumas & Chosen Glories

The chosen trauma and glory concepts were developed by Volkan, who explains that without a proper and adequate form of mourning for a loss, one is unable to accept change. Furthermore, this is part of a natural human process:

“Human nature gives us a painful but ultimately effective way to let go of our previous attachments, to adjust internally to the absence of lost people or things and to get on with our lives. When we finish the work of mourning, we feel a new surge of energy and an adaptive liberation that may be expressed in undertaking new projects or developing new friendships” (Volkan, 1997, pg. 36).

There are different components to mourning, the first being crisis grief and the second is referred to as “work of mourning.” The first inhibits emotions of shock, denial, sadness, anger and pain among other feelings. The second phase overlaps with the latter portion
of the first and aids the mourner via assimilation and adaptation to the new order or changed reality. The overall process is to enable the mourner to sufficiently mourn the loss of an object. “An object is that to which a subject relates,” and then the object relationship is converted into a memory that will no longer hinder the mourner psychologically (Daniels). Mourning is typically applied to the loss of a life, but this process is also applicable to the loss of any object. It is critical that an individual or group mourn fully, though “in other situations, a shared calamity can leave members of a group dazed, helpless, and too afraid, humiliated, and angry to complete or even initiate a mourning process” (Volkan, 1997, pg. 40).

In short, the chosen trauma “describes the collective memory of a calamity that once befell a group’s ancestors. It is more than a simple recollection; it is a shared mental representation of the event, which includes realistic information, fantasized expectations, intense feelings, and defenses against unacceptable thoughts” (Volkan, 1997, pg. 48).

However, the events do not necessarily need to be traumatic. There are glorified moments the individuals, communities and nations keep at heart in present day though the event the emotions stem from my have happened centuries ago. These types of memories known as chosen traumas and glories are left unmourned and passed down within families and kinship via transgenerational transmission.

Transgenerational Transmission & Reservoirs

Transgenerational transmission and reservoirs are two concepts also developed by Volkan. Transgenerational transmission is passed down through mixed mediums:
narratives, behavioral patterns, nonverbal messages and intuition that are then absorbed and influences a person, group or nation’s actions. Volkan analogizes transgenerational transmission to psychological DNA that is planted and in the character and personality framework of the next generation in accordance to the relationship with the older generation. However, Volkan notes that “psychological DNA affects both individual identity and later adult behavior. It is important to remember that what is transmitted may also change as it passes from one generation to the next” (Volkan, 1997, pg. 44).

Structural Violence

According to Johan Galtung, structural violence can be broken down to the following definition: structural violence is the inanimate actor which inhibits BHNs, development and upward mobility, and is directed toward certain groups of people in a society. This is because the framework society has created is an unbalanced distribution of resources. Examples of resources may include education, health services, or sanitary living conditions. All three of these instances if ill provided for will hinder a person’s livelihood, whereas it could enrich those who are beneficiaries of them. In contrast to structural violence, Galtung discusses personal or direct violence, where there is an actor who commits violence. When violence is structural, one cannot see it with their eyes, it is something you may or may not feel within a system. The cause for direct violence according to Galtung is “the difference between actual and potential realization” (Galtung, 1969, pg. 168).
**Basic Human Needs**

John Burton is another great contributor to the field of conflict resolution with a long and rich background in the area. Burton believes that the root cause can be determined through the deprivation of human needs, “including extreme poverty, vulnerability to assault, rupture of basic human relationship of family, friends, and loved ones, unhealthy or inhospitable environments in which food, clean water, and proper sanitation are lacking. It destroys people’s livelihood,” (Rothbart, 2010). Structural violence is the inanimate actor which inhibits BHNs, development and upward mobility, and is directed toward certain groups of people in a society. Thus, the wall in Berlin and Cyprus are tools of structural violence that affect the identity dynamics and lead to various expected and unexpected reactions and side-effects.

BHNs can also be affected by walls through identity and overlaps with identity theories, including but not limited to: ingroups and outgroups, Volkan’s work on chosen traumas and glories, transgenerational transmission and reservoirs, along with Henri Tajfel and John Turner’s theory of social identity and Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation (1970). Following is an example of how identity and BHNs can overlap:

Typically, one group on a side of the wall will have more or less of something because of the impact the wall has created. When this gap of goods, services or freedoms, in essence, a BHN is discovered, then an individual or group may experience relative deprivation. The lack of a basic human need on one side, which may then be exposed on the other, will create this sense of depravity in comparison to their counterparts. This could further stigmatize the identities. Therefore, the origin of the animosity may not be identity-based, but is transformed into identity via the lack of BHNs. BHNs and identity are therefore directly related in this case.

Another area which dovetails into identity and BHNs is human security. Often times a wall is built as a source of protection, but it may not always serve the original
intent. This study will utilize the broad definition of human security that includes the protection of individuals impacted by conflict, including economic security, threat to dignity and violence. Though a wall may have a specific purpose to safeguard citizens’ welfare and security, it can actually inflict danger and harm via BHN deprivation. The economic ramifications can also create forms of structural violence by limiting the potential of a group during and after conflict.

A BHN can be the basic necessities of life (food, shelter, clothing, etc.), but it goes beyond that into physical, emotional, aesthetic and self-fulfilling needs and are applicable to social organizations. Burton addresses needs beyond cultural values that are more fundamental and co-created; he further acknowledges that these and “basic physical requirements” comprise BHNs. If removed from society, “there cannot be ongoing social relationships and harmonious organizations…that are systemic needs of the individual that are operational at the level of social organization” (Burton, 1979, pg. 37). Burton drives home the point that BHNs provide a functioning system for society and life is “relevant to all levels of behavioral relationships” (Burton, 1979, pg. 37).

However, Burton is not the inventor of this theory, but rather a successor of it, who has utilized BHNs to reexamine conflicts through a different paradigm. Burton credits Paul Sites, who identified eight essential needs: consistency to response, stimulation, security, recognition, derivative needs of justice, meaning, rationality and control (Sites, 1973). Yet, Sites’ work was an outgrowth of Abraham Maslow’s theory of human development and relation to BHNs. Maslow categorized these as follows: physiological, safety, belongingness/love, esteem and self-actualization (Maslow, 1954).
Perhaps, Maslow was inspired by Karl Marx’s thoughts as written by Hegel: “the whole of history is a preparation for ‘man’ to become the object of sense perception and for needs to be the needs of ‘man as man’ (Rubenstein). This is demonstrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs

(Graphic provided by: Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs and Twitter)

Maslow’s theory of human development can also be viewed in four specific areas: emotion, aesthetics, self-fulfilling and physical. This is illustrated in Figure 2.
Thus, the concept of what is a BHN and its effects on society and an individual is expansive. Safety/security is a BHN element in terms of the need for structure, predictability, stability, and freedom from fear and anxiety. In addition, identity is a core component. In fact, “for Burton, the needs most salient to an understanding of destructive social conflicts were those for identity, security, recognition and personal development” (Rubenstein). Identity is a sense of self in relation to the outside world, which also correlates to recognition. Identity becomes a problem when one's identity is not recognized as legitimate, or when it is considered inferior or is threatened by others.
with different identifications. Freedom, of course, is considered not only a universal basic human right, but also an essential need for oneself. Freedom is multi-faceted and varying in degree and shape that affects related points of BHN, such as belonging/love via community, family and personal interaction.

Positive Peace & Negative Peace

Galtung defines two sides of peace as negative and positive. The former is the absence of direct violence, which is considered negative because this does not affect the root cause and thus does not lead to social justice. Whereas positive peace is the absence of structural violence and therefore is aimed at resolving the root cause of conflict, creating social justice and lead to long term stability. As an example, a ceasefire is negative peace; there is no direct assault taking place. However, the conflict is at a stalemate and lasting peace is unrealized, such as the Cyprus conflict, which has been deadlocked in peace negotiations for nearly 50 years. Justice is “an act or state where you treat equals equally and unequals unequally, it is fairness, equal distribution and respect” (Rothbart, 2010). Therefore positive peace is social justice and this is the central mission to conflict resolution according to Galtung. The fall of the BW can be seen as an application of positive peace, where the structural violent element was removed from society that was previously impeding resolution and healing. Once the Wall came down, society was able to begin to address and acknowledge past injustices, reunite and work towards a future cooperation.
Contact Theory

Communication and interaction are basic necessities for positive relationships and life needs. Gordon Allport developed contact theory (CT), which was built on the premise that certain conditions must be met to help reduce and/or eliminate social prejudices (Allport 1954). This theory has become widespread and applicable to all areas where discrimination is present. Allport asserted that “under appropriate conditions interpersonal contact is one of the most effective ways to reduce prejudice between majority and minority group members” (Schiappa, Gregg and Hewes). This is the process of “reconceptualization of group categories” (Schiappa, Gregg and Hewes).

The redefinition of categories is essential and possible due to the mistaken or incomplete information ascribed by one individual or group towards another. A prime example of how this is implemented is through the educational systems that propagandizes specific interests. “Categories are formed based on learning the relevant functional, perceptual, or other sorts of attributes that members of a category share. To be meaningful and useful, categories must include items and exclude others, thus humans acquire social categories by learning a set of ‘similarity/difference relationships’ that demarcate one category from another” (Schiappa, 2003). Prejudicial attitudes and relationships are formed in response to negative experiences, publicized stereotypes or social interaction amongst friends and family or other types of osmotic processes. Categorization can thus be considered the process responsible for stereotyping (Hogg and Abrams, 1988, pg. 73).
To counteract this, interaction and communication are necessary tools so that individuals and groups are able to make real, live, personal connections and judgments about their outgroup members. Avoidance, whether intentional or not, constitutes negative social behavior and therefore negative attitudes, perceptions and beliefs (Schiappa, Gregg and Hewes). Contact will help to demystify the negative stereotypes that Hogg and Abrams credit as creating the negative situations amongst varying groups. Pettigrew (1988) notes that this process is an educational experience to better inform the minority or outgroup to help with behavioral changes that will foster positive connections and a reevaluation of the majority or ingroup. Though the categorization may still exist after contact and group interaction occur, the salient traits, which are the category attributes, along with the perceived similarity or different relationships can be positively modified, thus changing attitudes and behavior (Schiappa, Gregg and Hewes). Though increased contact has been proven to help reduce and eradicate negative attitudes and patterns of behavior, there are opposing views amongst academics and researchers in social science and psychology. H.D. Forbes contends that contact could also lead to potentially harmful outcomes “because of its effect on cultural differences, rather than on stereotyping, and it may be a cause of antagonistic relationships more often than a cure for them, because, given cultural differences between groups, contact sets up conflicts of interest regarding how exactly the groups are to converge on a common culture or common norms in their dealings with each other” (Forbes, 1997, pg. 79).

However, in order for CT to be applied successfully, there are four conditions that must be met:
1) Acquaintance potential
2) Equal status
3) Cooperation
4) Social and institutional support

This study will focus on the first two conditions as they relate to the Cypriot and German case studies. Acquaintance potential is “successful contact that requires frequent systematic meetings. Contact facilitates the discovery of similar attributes that promotes a desire for togetherness and/or lasting relationship, as described by the “attraction-similarity hypothesis by Byrne (as cited by Yildizian and Ehteshami). As aforementioned, the more contact the more probable stereotypes are able to be dismantled and reappraised making the ability to interact a vital factor in CT application. Equal status focuses on putting individuals and groups on an even playing field to address inter-group negative stereotypes. Equal status also concerns the “equal ability in relation to pursuing common (super ordinate) goals” (Yildizian and Ehteshami).
4.1 Germany Case Study: Background

In 1961 the BW was constructed and lasted nearly 30 years, separating East and West Germany into communist and federal republic cities respectively. The BW was a clandestine operation that began on August 12, 1961 under the leadership of Erich Honecker, who at the time was the Central Committee secretary for security matters in the German Democratic Republic (GDR).

In the beginning, the Wall was made of barbed wire and armed guards, but was fortified in a short amount of time and spanned approximately 107 kilometers in length and almost four meters high in most places and intersected 192 streets in total (Wolski). Over the course of its lifespan, the BW underwent four major construction phases.

The Wall was originally meant to prevent freedom of movement, but had other side-effects, such as increased economic stagnation in East Germany. The Statistical Yearbook of West Germany reported that 257,308 East German refugees left West Berlin in 1953. From 1954 through 1960 the rate of refugees was approximately 95,000 people per year and ceased with the construction of the BW in 1961. However, the Wall exacerbated the economic problems and locations within West Berlin were differentially affected by the city’s division.
“Firms located in areas of West Berlin close to employment and residential concentrations east of the Berlin Wall experienced the largest reductions in productivity from diminished production externalities and the largest increases in wages required to attract commuters. Similarly, residents located in areas of West Berlin close to employment concentrations East of the Berlin Wall experienced the largest reductions in income from lost commuting possibilities” (Ahlfeldt, Gabriel and et al).

The refugees had a premonition of what was to come, though they may not have fathomed it coming to fruition entirely. However, the fear that the “mesh of the iron curtain will be cemented closed…being trapped in an enormous prison” was real enough for individuals and families to take flight (Taylor, 2006, pg. 174).

The key areas affected by the Wall were lack of benefits from production externalities, which is directly correlated to productivity, rental rates and unemployment. All of which suffered as a result of the construction and operation of the BW. “This reduction in employment opportunities reduces expected worker income, which in turn reduces rents and residential population” (Ahlfeldt, Gabriel & et al). These economic ramifications affect the status of human security, in terms of “economic security.” A person’s opportunities, standard of living and cost of living were all compromised through the BW’s effects on the city’s production, industry and overall business that changed employment, wages, rental rates and more.

Outside of economic effects from the Wall, there were also BHNs being deprived, identity crises and shifts taking place and freedoms being abused. Freedom entails many formats, including freedom of movement, freedom from fear and anxiety and personal freedom, which the people of East and West Berlin in particular did not have. People who tried to escape to the West risked their lives to gain back lost freedoms. Between 1961 and 1988 over 100,000 GDR citizens attempted to escape from the Wall’s...
imprisonment. It is estimated that more than 600 escapees were shot and killed by GDR border guards or from other injuries sustained during their journey. There were 136 additional BW related deaths during this time frame:

“Ninety-eight people who were shot, accidentally killed, or killed themselves when they were caught trying to make it over the Wall; 30 people from both East and West who were not trying to flee but were shot or died in an accident; 8 GDR border guards who were killed while on duty by deserters, fellow border guards, fugitives, or a West Berlin police officer; and at least 251 travelers from East and West who died before, during, or after inspections at checkpoints in Berlin” (Facts and Figures).

The BW demonstrates how walls of conflict have deep impacts that affect multiple layers of society’s fabric. The Wall was built in 1961 and fell on November 9, 1989. “When it came down, the people communicated the message that what we want is freedom, without barriers and divisions. We want the opportunity to grow and prosper” (Dayal).

Nearly a year later, East and West were formally reunited. This reunification process after decades of separation has a significant influence on the German identity today. Throughout my own personal experience in Germany and in Berlin, I have found that there is a desire amongst certain individuals and groups to have the Wall rebuilt or to live as if it were there. This sentiment comes particularly from inhabitants of West Berlin and West Germany who believe that their tax dollars are funding the reconstruction of the eastern areas rather than their own neighborhoods and programs. In fact, “Chancellor, Angela Merkel provoked a storm of protest by suggesting west German states have fallen into decay because of the vast amount of public money that has been ploughed into former East Germany since the fall of the Berlin Wall 19 years ago” (Merkel Warning on German Funds Gap Stirs Old Divisions). There are several identities that exist today within Germany: the German, East German and West German. One of the goals of this
thesis is to see how the BW helped to create or further promote identities via ingroups and outgroups, reservoirs and social identity among other areas. Thus far, it can be noted that there is a profound effect on identity, but it has not been explicitly labeled or categorized.

4.2 The Berlin Wall

“You know the assignment! March!”
-- Honecker to GDR army HQ giving final consent to build the Berlin Wall

Prior to the summer day of August 13, 1961, which became known as “Barbed Wire Sunday” (BWS), Berlin was considered to be a well-populated, thriving city center. It is hard to imagine that one day later, the city’s infrastructure was literally cut in two by a wall that severed streets, U-Bahn (subway) lines, neighborhoods, telephone lines and most importantly, the citizens of Berlin and East and West Germany.
Figure 3: Divided Berlin, 1948-1990


The allied portion formed West Germany, known as the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), while the Soviet Union made up East Germany (a Warsaw Pact member), referred to as the GDR, which can be seen in Figure 3. The creation of these sectors was agreed upon in January 1994 by the inter-Allied European Advisory Commission in London. During the discussions, there was no formal agreement or documentation concerning the western allies’ access to East Berlin, despite it covering 96 miles inside the Soviet Zone. General Eisenhower’s deputy, General Clay, would later
say, “I was mistaken in not at this time making free access to Berlin a condition of our withdrawal into the occupation zones” (Chapter XVII: Zone and Sector).

Prior to the division, West Germany appeared as a haven and opportunity to East Germans looking for political freedom, economic advancement, better employment and higher standards of living. This proved more than just mere temptation, but a real chance that many East Germans acted upon and relocated for. Between 1945 and 1961 the GDR suffered from immense brain and economical drain. In hindsight, the beginnings of the BW could be seen via *Aktion Ungeziefer*, meaning Operation Vermin.

“It all began in 1952 with the GDR's "Operation Vermin." At the time, East Berlin began turning the barbed wire along its western border into a "protective barrier." Citizens considered politically disloyal (those who ran the GDR considered them "vermin") who lived closer than 1,640 feet to the fence were moved elsewhere. In 1961, hundreds of thousands of mines were placed along the fence; the ditch behind it was dug and molded with concrete, after which any living greenery within a 19-foot stretch was sprayed and killed so that the footprints of potential escapees could be seen on the bare ground and in the sand. A patrol road used by border guards completed the picture” (Schulz-Reiss).

Moreover, President Kennedy of the United States clearly understood the GDR’s condition during the early 1960’s, though he could not have imagined it actually taking place. Kennedy had a conversation with aide, Walt Rostow, where he said that “Kruschev is losing East Germany. He cannot let that happen. If he loses East Germany, then he loses Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe as well. He cannot let that happen…He will have to do something to stop the flow of refugees—perhaps a wall” (as cited in Taylor, 2006, pg. 146). Eventually, two and a half million people fled from East to West, which decreased the GDR’s population by 15% (Taylor, 2006, pg. 18). Large pools of individuals fleeing were young, intelligent, well qualified citizens. As historian Frederick Taylor commented, “the country [GDR] was losing the cream of its educated
professionals and skilled workers at a rate that risked making the Communist state totally unviable” (Taylor, 2006, pg. 18). In addition to this problem, the GDR was facing economic difficulties; in 1952 it was already 700 million marks in debt.

By 1960 the German word Torschlusspanik epitomized the GDR’s current situation; translated it means “panic that the door will be closed.” This panic was set off by the GDR’s propaganda against West Germany while simultaneously decreasing free movement between East and West. This was to prevent the bleeding from the East. “The GDR was suffering from serious shortages of raw materials and quality industrial products as well as food. It was heavily in debt both to the USSR and the West” (Taylor, 2006, pg. 119).

The answer to this human problem was cutting off the source. Nikita Kruschev, who succeeded Stalin, kept Walter Ulbricht, who was the Chairman of the Council of State of the GDR, as his right arm. Ulbricht had worked on a plan for many years that was finally chosen due to limited options—the GDR must build a wall to plug any leaks. “In May 1961, 17,701 fled through West Berlin, 19,198 in June, and then 12,578 in the first two weeks of July alone. Entire factories and offices were emptied of their staff as more East Germans left while they still had the chance” (Taylor, 2006, pg. 136). These actions made the GDR’s present condition no longer viable and Kruschev’s back was against the wall, giving way to Ulbricht’s wall plan.

On July 6, 1961 the orders were given to Ulbricht to move forward with this border plan. The Wall ran close to 100 miles, was 11.8 feet tall, and used 18,200 concrete posts, 150 tons of barbed wire, five tons of binding wire and two tons of staples.
Thirty of the miles divided East and West from one another, and the remaining mileage sealed of the surroundings of East Germany. There were over 300 manned, watchtowers and an in between border area known as no-man’s land, which “was littered with lethal obstacles, alarms, and self-activating searchlights, an eleven-foot-high clamber-proofed slab fence representing the final, on its own near-insuperable obstacle” (Taylor, 2006, pg. 19). Figures 4, 5 and 6 provide an illustration of the border layout in its most completed form along with statistics pertaining to wall patrol and a map of BW’s territorial coverage and checkpoints.
Figure 4: Layout of Border Fortifications

(Illustration and BW Information provided by: Facts and Figures, Berlin.de)
### The Wall in numbers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Length</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total length of the border to West Berlin</td>
<td>155 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner-city border between East and West Berlin</td>
<td>43 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border between West Berlin and the GDR (&quot;outer ring&quot;)</td>
<td>112 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border crossings between East and West Berlin (roads/railway)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border crossings between the GDR and West Berlin (roads/railway)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation towers</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dog runs</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-vehicle trenches</td>
<td>105.5 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact or signal fences</td>
<td>127.5 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border patrol roads</td>
<td>124.3 km</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Figure 5: The Wall in Numbers (Berlin Wall Factsheet)*

(Illustration and BW Information provided by: Facts and Figures, Berlin.de)

---

![Map of the Berlin Wall](map.jpg)

*Figure 6: Map of the Berlin Wall*

(Provided by: Todesstreifen)
The Wall would threaten various life aspects for all Berliners, 50 million people in the West, but particularly the 17 million GDR citizens who remained in the East until November 9, 1989 when the Wall came down.

4.3 Cyprus Case Study: Background

Since 1974, the country has been separated both geographically and ethnically between the Greek Cypriots (GCs) and the Turkish Cypriots (TCs). Peace and negotiation talks have been discussed, stalled, called-off and resumed in a cyclical pattern for over thirty years without much progress towards finding a solution. The causes of the conflict have hardened with time and rooted themselves into the identity of the GC and TC communities in the process.

To understand the identity relations in Cyprus, it is important to note the historical background. Cyprus was founded within Greek culture, “the island's Greek heritage dates back to the Achaeans from southern Greece, who settled there between 2000 and 1600 BC” (Greek Cypriots). Since then Cyprus had various rulers over the centuries leading up to 1571, when the Ottoman Empire took over. In 1878 the Ottomans leased Cyprus to the British, who officially colonized the island in 1925. In the 1930s through the 1950s, a brewing ideology within the Greek Cypriot community (GCC) was occurring in the form of enosis. Enosis is the idea of becoming united with Greece. As a response to enosis the Turkish Cypriot community (TCC) formed their idea of taksim, a partitioning of the island into two separate nations. As the discord felt by the GCC against British rule augmented, Britain granted Cyprus its independence on August 16,
1960, creating the ROC. Political leaders of Britain, Greece and Turkey met in Zurich and London, where they formed agreements and created a power-sharing constitution.

In 1963 the constitution was dealt a severe blow; Turkish representatives pulled out of the official government created in 1960 and started operating a self-government in the TCC. During this time frame inter-communal violence was breaking out and the UN deployed the UNFICYP, which still remains there today. The UNFICYP negotiated a ceasefire in 1964, which left Cyprus in a state of negative peace. In 1974 Cyprus encountered the ramifications of an unsettled conflict.

The National Organization of Cypriot Fighters known as EOKA was established in 1955 and existed until 1959 and resurfaced in 1971 as EOKA-B. In 1974, EOKA-B staged a coup d’état to oust president Makarios and create enosis. Though it did successfully remove Makarios for a short period of time, the coup failed five days later when Turkey intervened via military force. Less than one month later, Turkey attacked again and gained a total of 37% of the land in the northern part of the island. The TC official narrative calls the historical events of 1974 an “intervention” and “peace operation” (Volkan, 1978), whereas the GCs call it an “invasion.”

Since this time, Cyprus has been divided by the GL wall; GCs live in the south and TCs in the north. Taksim is essentially taking place, just not in the way that the TCs originally envisioned. Cyprus’ Ambassador to the United States, Andreas Kakouris, remarked that “each day that passes solidifies the effects of the invasion and separation… peace is not the absence of war, but rather the presence of justice” (Kakouris), which resonates with Galtung’s concept of positive peace.
In 1983 the TRNC was self-declared and is today only officially recognized by Turkey. In 2003 the first passage along the GL was opened; today there are 7 passages in total, with the last one opened on October 14, 2010. The core conflict parties are the GCs and TCs themselves, but each have close ties to their respective motherlands, especially the TRNC as they are economically dependent on Turkey. The TRNC is more closely aligned with its motherland in comparison to the ROC, not only because of economics, but also politically the TRNC feels that Turkey offers protection with their present military troops and looks at Turkey as a liberator of their people since 1974.

The Cyprus conflict and GL separated and polarized identities into identity-based groups over the decades. The construction and operation of the GL has had severe effects upon the identity of Cypriots as a whole and the identities tied to the motherlands—Greek and Turkish. Volkan, who is a TC and identity theorist, discusses how events in history can be used as chosen traumas and chosen glories. These events attach themselves to the identity of a person and nation. The GCs view the acts of 1974 as an invasion and this event in history has become a chosen trauma that has plagued the GCs, who believe that as long as the Turkish military troops remain in Cyprus, there is a possibility of this trauma repeating itself. Approximately 35,000 Turkish troops are stationed in Cyprus today (Theodolou).

Identity has become a key feature in the Cypriot conflict, often referred to as the “Cyprus problem,” and was always an underlying issue, but the events of the conflict heightened the sensitivity and identity friction. The GL has estranged two communities, who further distinguish themselves through ingroups and outgroups by identifying with
their motherland’s roots to define who they are and are not. Rather than two large-group identities, “a durable solution to the prolonged Cyprus problem can be feasible only if a Cypriot identity is successfully generated” (The Cyprus Conflict and the Question of Identity). However, in order to do this, understanding the GL’s impact on the two communities is imperative.

As a result of the conflict, embargos have been placed on the TRNC, isolating the TCs economically. Once again, the GL has played a large role in distinguishing the economic benefits of an internationally recognized nation, unlike the TRNC, and the power politics relating thereto.

“Cypriot Greeks managed to convince international organizations to impose severe embargoes on the Cypriot Turks. Accordingly, trading directly with foreign countries became impossible, and travel documents issued to the Cypriot Turks by the northern Cypriot Turkish authorities were not recognized by the international community. No direct flights to the Turkish side of the island were permitted, and mail to and from the Turkish side could only travel through Turkey. Cypriot Turks were not allowed to compete in sports in foreign countries (except in Turkey.)… After living in actual enclaves for eleven years [between 1963-1974], the Cypriot Turks from 1974 to the present time have continued to live in an invisible enclave (Volkan, Trauma, Identity and a Search for a Solution in Cyprus).

On October 14, 2010, the seventh crossing was opened on the GL and since 2003, TCs and GCs can pass through the border. This is a great step toward opening communication, dialogue and interaction between both communities, but it also illustrates the riches of the Greek south and the impoverishment of the Turkish north. The TRNC has been surviving off of high subsidies from the Turkish government. After 1974, Turkey was said to subsidize up to 80% of the budget and since the 1990s that percentage has been halved (Cyprus - The "TRNC"). The economic differences foster feelings of relative deprivation. According to Gurr, “we tend to decide how well-off or deprived we are not from any absolute standard, but by comparing ourselves
with other people. We decide on what we deserve and what we should expect from looking at other people. We then compare ourselves with this standard” (Gurr, 1970).

The Cypriot conflict’s GL has increased effects on identity since built. The identity of the Cypriot people suffers as a consequence and identities of GCs and TCs have hardened themselves into generalizations of outgroups that are passed down to future generations via transgenerational transmission. Furthermore, the wall has impacted the economic politics for the entire nation of Cyprus and caused relative deprivation as the borders open and individuals compare themselves with the “others.” The wall’s effects on identity are not measurable in full, but can be accounted for in certain degrees. With the GL still standing, it is difficult to see how the wall’s impact on identity will transcend post-conflict, but it is evident thus far that its effects are much wider than maintaining security and peace amongst the Cypriots.

4.4 The Green Line

The GL in Cyprus demarcated the geographical territories between Turkish and Greek populations. The Line was first conceived in 1964 prior to the construction of the actual physical division of the island. “Major-General Peter Young was the commander of a ‘peace force,’ a predecessor of the present United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). After stationing his troops in different areas of Nicosia, Young drew a cease-fire line on a map with a green pencil, which was to become known as the ‘Green Line’ (Green Line (Cyprus)). After the events of July 1974, the GL became a true barrier and impassable for Cypriots. The GL is also referred to as a separation barrier, similar to the words used for the Israeli-Palestinian wall. This reference came about in 1983 after
the self-declaration of the TRNC. Attila Line is another name by which the border is known, coming from “Operation Attila,” which was the name of the Turkish military action in 1974 that is later discussed. However, the most common term is the GL to refer to this divisional border of Cyprus.

The border stretches 112 miles across the entire island, ensuring that the Turkish and Greek identity groups are sealed off from one another. This guarding of the partition is known as the buffer zone (BZ) and literally splits the capital of Nicosia in two, where it is the only divided capital in the world and country in Europe (The Green Line; Chislette, 2010, pg. 1). The land between the BZ differs in width, ranging from less than 20 meters to seven kilometers in some locations. The total coverage of the GL occupies about 3% of the island, encompassing some of the most valuable agricultural areas (UNFICYP Background). The map of Cyprus in Figure 7 shows the GL and geographic separation of Cyprus.
The wall is secured with barbed wire along with the UNFICYP, who maintains surveillance through a system of observation posts, and air, vehicle and foot patrols. After the summer of 1974, “strict adherence to the military status quo in the buffer zone, as recorded by UNFICYP at the time, has become a vital element in preventing a recurrence of fighting. UNFICYP maintains surveillance through a system of observation posts, and through air, vehicle and foot patrols. The task of the Force has significantly been complicated by the absence of a formal ceasefire agreement” (UNFICYP Background).
4.5 Literature Review Conclusion

The literature review indicates that walls were constructed for specific means, either political or security. However, these walls have a much wider influence on societies during and after conflicts end. There is clear evidence that economies are disrupted via divisions. BHNs are affected and there is statistical data relating to these areas available. However, in terms of identity, the impact a wall may have during and after conflict is yet to be determined. There is information that identity is definitely affected, as illustrated through relative deprivation, ingroups and outgroups, chosen traumas and glories and transgenerational transmission. However, the area of identity is quite large and there are many other aspects that need to be analyzed to create a true understanding of the short and long-term impacts that walls have that this research endeavors to discover. The reasons for the wall and its outcomes transcend these original purposes and interests. This thesis hopes to identify how it transforms and what the implications of this transformation are on identity.
CHAPTER 5: WHAT IS A WALL?

A wall can have different definitions and interpretations pending on whom one is speaking with. Technically, a wall is “a high thick masonry structure forming a long rampart or an enclosure chiefly for defense” (Wall). However, there is other terminology used to describe divisions and partitions, such as separation barrier. A barrier is defined as “something material that blocks or is intended to block passage” (Barrier). A wall is something constructed, in the case of Germany and Cyprus, they were purposefully and meticulously engineered, though reasons behind both walls differ.

The GDR wanted to keep the East Germans from immigrating to western controlled areas because the brain and labor drain was affecting the economic stability. Cyprus’ wall was built and secured by the United Nations to quell the violence and create physical security. Despite the reasons behind the walls, they were built to keep people in and out effectively. The duration of both walls is multi-decade; the BW existed for 28 years, 3 months and 4 days, while the GL has been impassable since July 1974, more than 37 years. The BW fell and the GL still exists and is now being referred to as a separation barrier. The change in reference from wall to separation barrier is interesting and indicative of a specific view on the wall’s existence.

What is a wall? When a person thinks of a wall, s/he may think of something concrete, sturdy, impassable and generally not transparent, though that is not always the
case. For instance, if glass is used to separate one room from another, often times a person will say, “there is glass there” or it is a “glass wall.” However, a person does not refer to it as simply a wall, but gives it another categorization or specifically defines it as a glass wall. What makes a wall a wall versus a separation barrier? A wall is a physical division, typically used in conflict as a means of security to keep threats out, such as in Cyprus. However, it can also be a means of entrapment, like it was in Germany. The latter is akin to caged animals, where without a way to keep animals confined, they would break free, roam and live where they please. The difference is that many people lived in East Berlin, remained there willingly, but wanted to work in West Berlin for purely economic reasons and opportunities that their own area could not provide. It was a means of self-preservation rather than abandonment.

A separation barrier on the other hand serves the same function as a wall, but instead of existing for security reasons, it exists for political reasons. A separation barrier may not have been built with ulterior motives; it may have been constructed for security reasons, like in Cyprus. However, its current status and reason for standing is no longer that of security and it now serves a different purpose, typically related to politics and/or current unresolved conflicts, also like in Cyprus and also in Israel and the disputed Palestinian territories. This is why the change in reference of the GL to a separation barrier is representative of political hostilities.

One of the most obvious historical examples paralleling that of the BW is Israel’s barrier in the contested Palestinian territories. It is hard to imagine an even greater version of a wall than that in Berlin, which was continuously strengthened and fortified.
with time. However, the wall in Israel, if fully executed, will stand at 25 feet high and span more than 400 miles. This is four times as long and in specific areas almost twice as tall as the BW (Parry).
CHAPTER 6: THE GREEN LINE IN CYPRUS & IDENTITY IMPACTS

6.1 Identity before the Green Line

The identity structure of Cyprus is complicated due to its historical occupiers, having both Byzantine and Ottoman Empire roots. The strong affinity for the motherlands of the prime identity groups of Cyprus is widely acknowledged and subsequently built into the identity codes for GCs and TCs. As a result, Cypriot identity as its own entity has lacked sufficient support from these identity groups. The Cypriot identity deficiency is further exacerbated by the long-term separation of the island’s large-group identities.

During the mid-twentieth century, ethnic conflict broke out and since 1974 the island-nation has been divided by the GL. Prior to the violence of the 1960’s, the subsequent conflict and division of 1974, both identity groups lived in relative harmony with one another. “In the beginning of togetherness, there was no sign of overt troubled relations, but differences over ethnic origin, religion, language, and customs inevitably led to a low level of interaction” (Yilmaz). In fact, the peaceful existence of both communities was exemplified by their common lifestyle and economic conditions. There was a certain harmony experienced by Cypriots at the grass root level, despite other cultural dissimilarities. GCs, like motherland Greece, are primarily Christian Orthodox who speak Greek, while TCs are predominantly Turkish speaking Sunni Muslims. The
history between the respective populations already created social identities and categorizations that influenced the social perceptions and behaviors of Cypriots. The contrasts of “us” and “them” were planted far before the events of 1974. Intermixed communities did exist, but were not as populous as homogenous communities. “In 1960 Cyprus had 619 villages out of which 319 were Greeks, 120 were Turkish Cypriots and 106 were mixed” (Yildizian and Ehteshami). However, the identity dynamics shifted with the intervention/invasion by Turkey that resulted in a fully constructed and fortified border—the GL.

Before the border the available identities in Cyprus were embedded in the social practices of the populations. The differences between the social practices, be it religion, language, education or other social and cultural differences aided identity construction. “Identity is generated, confirmed, and transformed in the process of interactions between groups and individuals; it is dialectic between similarity and difference” (Korostelina, 2007, pg. 16). The differences are used to strengthen the identity structure by increasing “sameness” within the ingroup and affirm its actuality. When members of an ingroup accept and recognize their social identity, they become real, loyal and attached for protection. This increases feelings of “we-ness” and forms a stronger emotional bond between the individual and group. Though the large-group identities of Cyprus may have appeared to be at odds with one another, they were not in opposition of one another.

The “sameness” experienced by group members formed the ingroup and created categorization in Cyprus through a cognitive process to define intergroup boundaries through self-definition. By defining oneself and “we-ness” within the group, the identity
of the outgroup was simultaneously being established. Stereotypes were developed or ascribed by connections to “motherlands” that the ingroups fixated onto the outgroups, but the comingling and coexistence of the identity groups supported a positive valence. Before the GL, Cypriots were in preexisting ingroups and outgroups based on the categorization of social relationships. Primary groups consisted of friends and family and primordial groups based on ethnicity and religion were the two main classifications that comprised the large-group identities in Cyprus—either Greek or Turkish. This was enhanced via socially constructed nation groups from the affinity of “motherlands.”

6.2 Cyprus Identity after the Green Line

The wall’s separationist effects on Cyprus have essentially become permanent after 37 years of division. Due to this, the two main identity groups have undergone identity shifts creating greater identity distinctions. GCs and TCs are more divided, no longer used to interaction that intensifies negative perceptions leading to current and future misunderstandings. Now, the identity groups view each other as representatives of the Greek and Turkish national identities, rather than former GC and TC identities.

Today, both GC sand TC identity groups display a higher level of salience due to the lack of social interaction. Salience becomes an act of self-preservation of their ingroups. Each group shares great similarities amongst members—groups have their own intracategory generalizations, the outgroup is seen as antagonistic and thereby resulting in minimal social exchange between identities despite border openings.

The enhanced “we-ness” and feelings of “us” versus “them” changed the shared cultural dynamics within Cyprus. “Until the 1970s, Turkish Cypriots could communicate
adequately in Greek and a significant number of elderly Greek Cypriots could understand some Turkish. However, political conflict gradually led to increasing linguistic barriers. As animosity increased, the act of speaking the enemy's language was considered unpatriotic. Now, after twenty-six years of complete separation, very few Greek Cypriots can understand Turkish and no young Turkish Cypriots speak or understand Greek” (Papadakis). Moreover, Cypriots of both sides began to draw new post-Green Line cultural demarcations to promote the differences between each other. There is a growing disparity amongst what is Greek and what is Turkish. Names for previously held areas of Greek or Turkish descent have been renamed; recently opened borders and cities are referred by different names. For example, Ammochostos in Greek and Gazimağusa in Turkish are the names for the area of Famagusta.

Nonetheless, the likeness between the two identity groups is visible in various daily facets. Both share a Mediterranean culture that affects the cuisine, family structure, and way of living. They are also connected through their historical experiences under the Ottoman Empire and British colonial system, despite any grievances born from those years. However, as Volkan explains in his minor differences theory, this can potentially be harmful for an identity group because similarities affect the ingroup. Therefore, the differences need to be emphasized to clearly define the outgroup where negative attitudes can be projected onto in order to raise self-esteem and protect the social identity categorization.

Aside from minor differences, identity has been fragmented and in some cases lost. Almost 84% of Cyprus is 15 years of age or older. Over 10% are above the age of
65 and the median age is 34.8 years (Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook). This means that a significant number of the population were either directly affected by the GL’s change in landscape or are first generation of the wall’s descendants that corresponds to the effects of transgenerational transmission that is examined later. Following are two examples of first generation GCs who express their feelings in regards to the “Cyprus problem” and how the wall has affected their lives.

“I am sad because Ammochostos is so close but we can’t go see it. Especially when we go to Deryneia and you see it from far away and can’t go. You feel bitterness, and every once in a while, hate. Feelings are much more intense at Deryneia.” (Hadjiyanni, 2002, pg. 54).

These words touch upon the impact of separation. Being able to see and not visit only heightens the frustration and hatred that one side will feel for another and prevents individuals from making the personal connections to territories in Cyprus that their identity craves because of historical or familial ties.

A young GC boy also explains that he is no longer able to go home or have a home, but is trapped in an identity no man’s land. “Anywhere I go I don’t give a damn. Anywhere else I go, it is not my topos [place, birthplace, space] since I can’t go to Trikomo” he says (Hadjiyanni, 2002, pg. 52). Without the sense of home, the boy is unable to create life roots, but is living as an indisplaced person in his own country. Not only do these examples highlight the lack of identity as an individual and also with their own country and home, but it demonstrates the suffering experienced from a lack of belonging, which is a BHN, and the sprouting of seeds of hatred. Finn Stepputtat explains that a natural identity exists between people and places and that these places are marked by boundaries that feature their identity and culture. The home is a physical
representation of territory, but Cypriots are without their homes and thus missing a critical part of their identity.

6.3 Cyprus Identity Analysis Conclusions

Political consequences fell into place as a reprimand for the self-declaring TRNC that seemed reluctant to work out a satisfactory resolution for both sides in 1983. These political adaptations were made using the wall as an international imposed border that was leveraged by the international community by placing severe embargoes on the TRNC. The original purpose of the wall was security to prevent a renewal of violence, but now its political means also affected the identity dynamics of the TC citizens.

As a consequence of the international limitations the TRNC economic infrastructure is weak. “The TRNC has been less able to develop tourism and industry. This is partly a result of a lack of funds for necessary investments and infrastructure improvements, but it is also an outcome of an international trade embargo that the Republic of Cyprus has been successful in levying against the Turkish Cypriot regime” (Papadakis).

“International air companies do not fly directly to northern Cyprus and that tourists wishing to travel there must work their way through Istanbul, raising expenses and travel time. For these reasons, there has been a steady migration of TCs abroad, to places such as Turkey and the United Kingdom, in search of employment. The unemployment problem in the north contrasts with the full-employment status of the south, one it has been enjoying continuously for more than 20 years, which leads to a net import of workers from abroad” (Papadakis).

The stated prices for a roundtrip flight from Malta to Ercan Airport in the TRNC would cost $3,094 compared to $397 to fly to the Greek airport of Larnaca for the same travel dates on Kayak.com.
The embargoes do not only hinder tourism and investments coming in, but it does not allow for direct foreign trade, leaving the TRNC to rely heavily on imports provided by Turkey as their only option. The TRNC receives 500 million Euros a year, which now accounts for 30-40% of the budget, compared to previous decades when aid accounted for as much as 80% of the budget. This may be considered an improvement; however, the effect of the wall remains. The GL cripples the government of the TRNC, which directly hinders the people’s ability to economic opportunities that support higher standards of living, employment security and openings, thus effecting BHNs and identity as related thereto. There is an economic disparity between the GCC and TCC. Today, the GNP of GCs is three times higher than that of TCs (Michael, 2007, pg. 591). Table 1 illustrates other dimensions of the north-south economic gap. Between 1977 and 2000 the average annual GDP was one percent lower in the TRNC than the ROC and labor productivity was at 40%, which is roughly the same percentage from 1974 statistics. As of 2003, the TRNC had a GDP of 1.1 billion Euros and GDP per capita was 5,300—this is 10% and one third of the GDP and GDP per capita in the ROC (Noë and Watson).
This political and economic entrapment caused by the GL, only reinforces the social identity categorization, creating greater prejudices and biases towards the “other,” while strengthening its own salience and actuality as a response to these ramifications caused by the wall’s presence.

**Green Line Identity Byproducts**

The GL has created a chain of events across multiple sectors. The original intention was security; however, it has effected international cooperation politically and economically. This in turn has affected the tourism industry in the TRNC, led to unemployment and waves of migration of TCs who are seeking economic opportunities elsewhere. In the meantime, Turkey has sent waves of immigrants from mainland

---

*Table 1: South and North Cyprus, Main Economic Indicators (2003)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>South (G/C)</th>
<th>North (T/C)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (1000)</td>
<td>730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (€ bn)</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (€)</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour productivity (€)</td>
<td>35,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry (incl. construction)</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>72.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workforce (%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry (incl. construction)</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average real GDP growth 1977-2000</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average real GDP growth 2000-2003</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth 2004 (estimated)</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average curr. acc. bal. 2000-2003 (%GDP)</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average inflation rate 2000-2003</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average govt. budg. def. 2000-2003 (%GDP)</td>
<td>-4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Including Turkish settlers*
Turkey, referred to as “Turkish Settlers.” In fact, today there are an estimated 115,000 Turkish Settlers, while approximately 87,600 TCs remained as of 2001, compared to the 1974 estimates of 118,000. Today, the Turkish Settlers outnumber the indigenous Turkish population of Cyprus (Laakso). The Turkish Settlers are a post-wall development in response to the GL’s political/economic consequences that motivated TCs to emigrate from Cyprus for better economic opportunities. Turkey and the TRNC invited an influx of immigrants from mainland Turkey. Turkish Settlers were promised jobs, land, free housing and hopes of a better life opportunity. Politically this is opposed by the international community, as stated by the Council of Europe in 2003 as a form of “hidden colonization” and an obstruction to future peace potential for the “Cyprus problem.”

In addition, the TCs indigenous to Cyprus do not affiliate themselves with their mainland brethren and feel resentment as well as culturally and physically violated. The TCs have placed themselves in a separate categorized ingroup, splintering the Turkic identity group of Cyprus in two.

According to a Cyprus forum, there are multiple identity factors that divide the Turkish Settlers from the TCs. This includes their Anatolian, Kurdish or Black Sea lineage that are culturally different from the Cypriot culture. Turkish Settlers have lower levels of education and socio-economic status, are more religious with extremist tendencies and viewed as culturally backwards. Furthermore, the moral codes and ethics of Turkish Settlers differ from the Cypriot norm (Cyprus Warrior). In a 1991 New York Times article that interviewed TCs, one person commented on the changes of living
affected by the Turkish Settlers attributing higher crime rates to this new identity group. "People in northern Cyprus are not used to locking their cars, their houses…Men sitting at the outdoor cafes that line the pretty harbor lament what has become of Turkish Cyprus” (Bohlen).

All combined the TCs feel that they are more civilized and cultured. Being connected in the same identity group would be damaging to their self-esteem, so negative feelings, perceptions and attitudes are projected onto the Turkish Settlers, and thus creating a new identity group and TC outgroup. There is also the creation of a majority-minority dynamic between the two Turkic identity groups. TCs are feeling outnumbered, becoming the minority in their own homeland and created a new “us/we” and “them/they” perspective. A TC provided an analogy to express the identity group sentiments: “We are ‘the Last of the Mohicans.’ They turned us into ‘Indians.’ They got rid of a whole culture. At least there are people who still remember the ‘Indians.’ But who will remember us?” (Navaro-Yashin, 2006, pg. 94). The current result of the GL chain reaction is the creation of a new identity group, intergroup disparity, and a struggle for minority-majority status.

Refugee Identity Creation

“I live here because I hope, and I hope because I live here” (The Green Line)
--Refugee woman who lives near the Green Line -1km away from her homestead.

In addition to the Turkish Settler identity formation, the events of 1974 created another identity group—refugee identity of internally displaced persons (IDPs). During the Turkish intervention/invasion, the fleeing and redefinition of borders left over
200,000 inhabitants internally displaced. As of 2009, there were 201,000 IDPs still accounted for, which amounts to 22.3% of the total population, making Cyprus the country with the highest number of IDPs as a percentage of population (United Nations General Assembly).

Anne Jepson visited the refugee housing site outside of Nicosia and observed that “the history was very quickly evoked with these families, as were the attendant emotions—the grief and loss was still very raw, twenty-five years on” (Jepson, 2006, pg. 163). Jepson also noted that the nostalgia and loss felt for one’s home is constantly rekindled because of the close proximity to a person’s birthplace as well as being in their own country. This is compounded by the impasse caused by the GL that for decades did not allow individuals to even visit. This perpetually keeps all IDPs in an infinite identity search and is tied to freedom of movement, belonging and love as a BHN.

Some refugees also experience what Volkan coined as “enclave mentality.” Volkan used this term in relations to the TCs who are unable to travel and do not benefit from the European Union’s acquis communautaire (law), which inhibits travel and therefore freedom of movement, placing affected individuals in a psychological enclave. This mentality can also be applied to IDPs who are also quarantined mentally from lack of self-identity. The GL acts as the catalyst for “enclave mentality” and until removed will continue to program itself into the identity make-up of IDPs and TCs alike.

The GL border has had severe ramifications on the basic human rights of Cypriots, including the freedom of movement. Prior to the opening of border crossing points, north and south residents were restricted within the designated territories severed
by the patrolled partition. Since the opening, TCs may pass unchecked into the ROC, while the GCs must present identification and apply for a visa if they intend to stay for more than 30 days at length.

Freedom of movement also affects TCs whose right has been jeopardized due to the Cyprus conflict and embargoes. “Travel documents issued to the Cypriot Turks by the northern Cypriot Turkish authorities were not recognized by the international community. No direct flights to the Turkish side of the island were permitted, and mail to and from the Turkish side could only travel through Turkey” (Volkan, Trauma, Identity and a Search for a Solution in Cyprus). Thus, TC human rights are being ignored and as a group are recognized as “second-class human beings” who are forced to live in an invisible enclave.

Reservoirs

A reservoir encapsulates meaning via imagery that can be shared and changed by individuals or groups. In Cyprus, the creation of the GL also established a new reservoir in Cyprus. Roger Zetter believes the wall is a physical representation and symbol of obstruction to the continuity and of what has been lost, which is applicable to both sides and a shared reservoir (Zetter, 1998, pg. 308). The wall’s reservoir system is multifaceted, not only does it represent a disconnect, but it represents imprisonment, lack of freedoms and hatred. The interpretation of the wall is dependent upon the viewer and/or group. Another common reservoir among nation-states is a flag. The use of flags in Cyprus has changed with the onset of conflict and since the construction of the wall.
**Flags**

The wall separating both identity groups has strengthened nationalistic fervor for each Cypriot side and their respective motherlands. Flags were rarely used as a means of symbolism prior to the division of Cyprus. However, after the construction of the GL, both GCs and TCs began to employ the use of flags for specific purposes. The flags became Cyprus’ political reservoirs. The GCs began to hoist the ROC and Greek flags to prevent political recognition of the TRNC by the international community. The TCs on the other hand, fly their flag and that of Turkey, to demonstrate their independence from the ROC and represent the TRNC as an official entity. The TRNC displays two enormous flags, Turkish and TRNC, on the mountain range that is accompanied by Atatürk’s famous words, “how happy to say I am a Turk.” This insignia is visible from miles away and is one of the things many visitors to Cyprus will see first when preparing to land from their flight. As a reservoir, the flag represents presence and control that the TRNC is an actual entity; it too serves as a message to the international community. The flags are an expression of identity power struggle externally and patriotism and nationalism internally.

**Transgenerational Transmission & Chosen Traumas**

The GL has had a natural isolation effect between both GC and TC populations. As a byproduct, the isolation between both identity groups has led to what Volkan calls transgenerational transmission. “Massive traumas at the hands of ‘enemies’ affect both individuals and societies for decades. The ‘therapeutic’ way of dealing with previous generations’ massive social traumas is not to deny or repress what happened to the
ancestors, but to be aware of the history. There could be no solution on the island without understanding and addressing traumas of both communities” (Volkan, 2008). Without this mutual understanding that Volkan explains is necessary toward healing, then transgenerational transmission occurs, where the traumas are passed down from one generation to the next. Transgenerational transmission is also linked to what chosen traumas. A chosen trauma is a type of memory that is left unmourned and passed down within families and kinship via transgenerational transmission. Volkan discusses how large-group identity revolves around a certain “sameness” stemming from a subjective experience endured by a mass of people. This experience links individuals to one another and creates a feeling of “sameness.” As large-groups, the TCs and GCs are bonded by their own respective “sameness” created by their chosen traumas.

In Cyprus, the historical events that represent chosen traumas differ amongst the Greek and Turkish identity groups.

“When Cypriot Greeks and Cypriot Turks, and in fact Greeks and Turks in general, speak or write about what has happened in Cyprus during the last five decades, they select and highlight two different events respectively as the most traumatic and devastating for their communities. Greeks rank the landing of the Turkish army on Cyprus in July 1974, and the dividing of the island by a de facto border into northern Turkish and southern Greek sections, as their most devastating societal trauma during the course of the “Cyprus problem.” When Turks speak or write about the “Cyprus problem” they go back to 1963 and recount their horror story when the Greek Cypriots, who outnumbered Cypriot Turks four to one, forced the Cypriot Turks to live in subhuman conditions in enclaves geographically limited to three percent of the island. They lived this way, surrounded by their enemies, for eleven years” (Volkan, 2008).

Though the chosen traumas are different for the identity groups involved, the impact is just as significant and compounded by the ostracized environment that the GL created. Both identity groups lack sufficient communication channels and interaction to begin to address the trauma and acknowledge each others’ past. As a result, the succeeding and
future generations have and will grow up in societies intolerant of their own fellow
countrymen and change their social identity, which has become part of the structural
violence of the conflict. When looking at all of the elements combined, a causal reaction
can be traced from the historical events to the creation of the GL and its aftermath
impact. The chosen traumas that have not been able to be adequately dealt with to bury
the “loss” and move forward is being taught to the youth of the nation in Turkish and
Greek narratives. As such, the educational systems are being utilized to further project
the traumas onto future generations and are implemented as part of a structurally violent
structure.

Chosen Traumas & Large-group Identity

Additionally, Volkan states that when one large-group traumatizes another, the
suffering and impact may be felt for many years, which is evident in the Cyprus case
where the TCs’ trauma dates back to 1963-1964 and the GCs’ trauma from 1974. Volkan
continues to explain the dynamics of large-groups, and that because they are made up of
people, they exhibit commonalities in their reactions and responses, which is then a
reflection of their own personal reactions and responses. However, Basir Khan explains
that “once large-group responses begin to appear, they take on lives of their own and
exhibit themselves in societal, cultural or political processes” (as cited in Volkan, 2011).
Volkan uses a metaphor of a large tent to demonstrate a large-group coexisting under the
tent, with the tent becoming a canvas of the large-group identity. As such, the group
becomes responsible for any maintenance and repairs that must be made if there are any
damages or wear over time. If this is not cared for properly then the group will potentially experience:

- Shared sense of shame, humiliation and victimization;
- Shared sense of guilt for surviving while others perished;
- Shared (defensive) identification with the oppressor; and
- Shared difficulty or even inability to mourn losses.

These experiences can also lead to a fifth stage if there is no resolution:

- Shared transgenerational transmission of trauma.

Currently, Cyprus is experienced the latter two because the identity groups are unable to maintain their identity canvas successfully.

Chosen Traumas, Reservoirs & Transgenerational Transmission

Educational systems have become a tool to imprint the historical grievances, feelings of mistrust and security threats into the youth. In 1935, Ulviye Mithat wrote for Ses newspaper and commented that “elementary schools are the cradle of our culture,” which exemplifies the importance of education beginning with the rudimentary levels. In fact, Greek-Cypriot children learn that the island was and “will always be Greek,” and TCs learn that ‘the island is Turkish and should go back to Turkey” (Hadjipavlou, 2007 pg. 357). Thus, the cycle is never broken, wrongs are rehashed rather than resolved and animosity continues to thrive between the two cultures—GC and TC. In fact, education helps transform these two ethnic communities into two nationalistic communities.

“Education was perhaps the most important, for it affected Cypriots during childhood and youth, the period of greatest susceptibility to outside influences” (Cyprus Ethnicity). TCs cite educational materials as the second leading influence on their perception of GCs and
the GCs cite it as their fourth leading reason in establishing opinions of the TCs (United Nations General Assembly). Overall, education is the primary tool used by both populations to express their national narratives. Table 2 shows education as a social psychological factor of the “Cyprus problem.”

Table 2: Social Psychological Factors of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Greek Cypriots</th>
<th>Turkish Cypriots</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Different values and</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>beliefs cultivated by</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the separate educational systems of the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N = 1.072</td>
<td></td>
<td>N = 1.038</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Provided by: Maria Hadjipavlou, 2007)

However, education is a potential avenue for CT to be administered and reconceptualize the categories, also thereby affecting the social identity process. Currently, education is used as a means to produce and reproduce stereotypes, negative experiences and prejudice. Reformating the educational systems so that there is a unified Cypriot history taught in schools will require communication and cooperation. This is hindered by the wall that has severed the communication ties between both identity groups. Before the educational system can be changed, the communication channels need to be improved upon, which will alter the identity groups perceptions of each other through a new social identity.
Identity as discussed thus far is affected by transgenerational transmission of chosen traumas, reservoirs in society and the social identity process. In the research conducted, the GL has produced new identity groupings. However, a new culture and identity of togetherness that is detrimental to the future has failed to form—“Cypriotism.” Cypriotism is coined by Kahn, meaning Cypriot identity (as cited by Volkan, 2011). Instead the competing GC and TC identity groups have created a mutual system of structural violence from their prejudice behavior.

Identity’s impact on education is a source of structural violence. Mary Hadjipavlou conducted a study in 2002, interviewing 1,073 GCs and 1,073 TCs to determine their opinions and views regarding the conflict and its root causes. Only 28% of GCs and 33% of TCs believe that their differences in culture and civilization are the cause of conflict in Cyprus. This can be ascribed to the pre-conflict lifestyle within Cyprus, where Turks and Greeks lived in harmony with each other as neighbors and community members. However, roughly 66% of both GCs and TCs believe that the different values and beliefs cultivated by the separate educational systems influenced the creation and perpetuation of the conflict (Hadjipavlou, 2007, pg. 359-361). Hadjipavlou was analyzing educational effects on root causes, but her results also demonstrate the negative impact of cultural and identity differences fostered due to separate educational systems. Thus, the physical barrier that prevented needed interaction between the large-group identities and its damaging effects is a source of structural violence.
Communication Creation

In the case of Cyprus, now that the border has opened in seven locations, people are able to cross and interact, but the long-term separation has mentally barred people. The Peace Economics Consortium in Cyprus conducted a survey of border crossers who stayed overnight during their visits. The survey found that 97% of GCs and 95% of TCs returned home on the same day. At the same time, only 0.3% of GCs answered affirmative to encountering problems while crossing (Economic Interdependence Project). This illustrates that the limited interaction is consensual given that there are little to no difficulties in physically crossing; it is not because of opposition.

A survey was conducted in 2010 by Cymar Market Research that asked participants if they had contact with the other community. Figure 8 reflects that roughly one quarter of GCs and one third of TCs had cross-identity interaction prior to the construction of the GL.
Jarraud and et al. also discovered that the majority of responses from GCs noted that they believe GC and TC communities are able to coexist peacefully in a united Cyprus. As such, application of Allport’s CT can help reduce the social biases and stereotypes between Greek and Turkish populations in Cyprus, but the right conditions must be present. If successful, the “reconceptualization of group categories” can be undertaken by the conflicted identity groups. However, communication channels are

Note: In this figure, ‘incidental’ refers to contact outside of the context of professional and personal relations.

Figure 8: Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Communication and Interaction
(Provided by: Jarraud, Lewis, Mentesh and Maneoglu)
limited between the populations in Cyprus and other means of interaction need to be sought out. A study conducted by Cymar Market Research demonstrated that one third of each identity group has communication with the other group, but that this contact is considered to be superficial. The following pie charts in Figure 9 indicate that the contact between the GCC and TCC is stagnant or declining after the border checkpoints opened:

![GCC and TCC Contact Levels after Border Openings](Provided by: Cymar Market Research)

As shown in the above charts, GC contact with TCs has remained roughly at the same level since the first border opening. More than half of the TCs claim that their contact with GCs has declined since the border crossings were opened. Though contact may not be increasing, the potential for contact to mitigate negative or tense identity relations is present.

During the same research, participants were asked about the level of trust, which has stayed within a positive realm according to the results, as displayed below. However,
60% of respondents said that the interaction with the other community has positively influenced their level of trust, while 40% said it negatively affected their trust in the "other." The study indicates that the border crossings made available have positively and negatively affected relations. The results of this survey can be seen in Figure 10 (Cymar Market Research).

![Influence of contact on level of trust](image)

*Figure 10: Influence of Contact on Level of Trust*

(Provided by: Cymar Market Research)

As Forbes warned, there can be negative consequences to CT’s recommendations and potentially decrease willingness and aggravate already tense relationships. Despite 40% of those surveyed indicating negative results from cross-communication between
identity groups, the overwhelming response of whether or not contact should continue supports Allport’s theory. According to Figure 11, Cymar Market Research’s survey illustrates that nearly three-fourths of each identity group believes that contact between each other should continue.

![Figure 11: Survey of Future Communication Between Communities](Provided by: Cymar Market Research)

During conflict resolution workshops conducted by Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, positive responses to intermixed identity group interaction were also received.

“I did not like Greeks before (coming to these conflict resolution workshops). In the first workshop I participated, to my surprise I saw Turkish Cypriots embracing and kissing Greeks. I did not like that at all. I did not want them to do so. How could they kiss our enemy, I thought. I have now changed. I don’t mind it. I may even think of doing it myself one day” (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, 1998, pg. 252).

These words of a TC participant exemplifies the need for communication to reconceptualize misunderstood and misrepresented categories. GCs during the workshops also shared positive reactions to interaction with TCs. “Being together in a number of environments in these workshops I was surprised to see how quickly we could
mix and feel at ease with each other. I now dream of Turkish Cypriots” (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, 1998, pg. 252). The opportunity for intermixed identity exchange during these workshops is proof of the power of communication and interaction.

Today, GCs and TCs are able to interact socially with one another, but there is a constant avoidance between both communities. Avoidance constitutes negative social behavior of attitudes, beliefs and perceptions. The remedy is contact, which according to Pettigrew is also part of an educational process. Contact has the potential to be beneficial as well as catastrophic, causing antagonistic relationships that Forbes discusses. However, with constant avoidance between the identity groups there is no opportunity for acquaintance potential, which is one of the four key conditions needed for CT to be successfully applied. Another hindrance is the lack of equal status. Despite this, Yildizian and Ehteshami’s preliminary conclusions from surveying GCs and TCs shows that after the GL was opened the contact made thereafter has positively affected the perceptions of each other, decreasing feelings of hostility and mistrust amongst the identity groups. This demonstrates the importance of contact and potential success if applied on a continual basis.

Identity Transformation

It would be an overstatement to suggest that the identity, cultural and ethnic differences happened only after the construction of the GL in 1974. However, the Line itself has played a vital role in preserving and fostering animosity that has hardened with the passage of time. “As both groups identified with their mainland "brothers," their respective cultures were transformed in ways that drew them apart from each other. This
The process began with the identification of each group with the history of the "motherland" rather than the history of Cyprus" (Papadakis). In addition, the Line has served as an enforcer of homogenous identity groups. After the failed coup and the Turkish military reaction, the island was split into identity sectors with large numbers of IDPs suffering and the Turkish government seizing 37% of the land in the north. The GL built to stop violence instead has hastened the formation and isolation of identity groups that once shared commonalities and today share hostilities.

“The Cypriot identity under question does not necessarily erase, or clash with, Greek or Turkish identities of the communities, but must be understood as an overarching definition of ethnicity fostered by sharing a common land and history of togetherness” (Yilmaz). If the “Cyprus problem,” is to be resolved and TC and GC identity transform into one Cypriot identity, then the physical partitioning of the island must be removed and a new social identity process needs to proceed. “It is a fact that the Greek Cypriots or the Turkish Cypriots are culturally under the influence of Greece and Turkey respectively. But the crystallization of the Cypriot identity and the formation of political togetherness can only be possible by conscious resistance to the assimilating influences of these both external cultures and by disseminating and developing our local cultural characteristics of Cyprus” (An).

**Future of Identity in Cyprus**

In order for both Cypriot identity groups to move forward together and work towards a positive peace, the nation will need to deal with their historical grievances, the chosen traumas that have not been addressed need to be recognized and acknowledged by
both parties. This will lead to a process of sympathy and healing, which will bring about compassion and emotional identification of the “other” in what Broome calls “relational empathy” (Broome, 1993). Relational empathy fosters a new, mutual understanding and shared meaning between parties. Broome explains this as awareness of the “other’s” life experience that is then interpreted according to the person’s own meaning-making system and context. “While one can never become another person, it is possible to erect a structure within the framework of which the ‘other’s’ interpretation of the world or of ‘us’ takes shape or assumes meaning” (Broome, 1993, pg. 100).

Unfortunately, the construction and existence of the GL for more than three decades has severely impacted the identity situation in a negative manner in Cyprus, making it hard to overcome Cypriot identity deficiency, misconceptions, stereotypes and negative feelings and actions toward one’s outgroup. CT is a potential avenue for success that can then reshape identity through social interaction and categorization to establish a cohesive identity structure. The critical point in doing this is interaction and with the GL standing it is not feasible. A society cannot operate properly in the midst of structural violence and deprivation of needs relating thereto, which the wall is currently responsible for.

Conclusions

The findings through researching the Cyprus case study and information and data collected on the Green Line’s identity impact has yielded that following results. The two separate large-group identities in Cyprus pre-existed the GL, but the wall has altered the social identity categorization process causing insufficient means to produce a
united Cypriot identity. A “we-ness” has not been able to develop adequately in one Cypriot membership. Without the “we-ness” formation there is no self-esteem available to establish an ingroup, build its superiority and project onto others to make a viable identity group. The post-Green Line era has been flanked with identity disparities and grievances that were not before in existence. Previously, the social identity process had created two well-defined ingroups, GCs and TCs through members’ socialization, generating large-group identities. The aftermath of the wall led members to re-identify their actuality as a response to restricted interaction that disrupted the daily balance of cohabitation. Salience for each identity group grew, augmenting the bonds of “we-ness” within the ingroup and stereotypes, negative perceptions, beliefs and attitudes towards the outgroup. As an outcome, the identity valence is negative.

Regardless of the large-group identity shifts caused by the wall’s preclusion of social interaction, the primary, primordial and socially constructed nation groups did not change. Actually, all three were enhanced in terms of their relationship to the ingroup members. Identity shifts in Cyprus created deeper divides between identity groups, greater misperceptions and hostility towards one another in order to increase the ingroups’ superiority. In addition, the assigned attributes that each group viewed the other pre-wall and post-wall changed.

The political and economic restrictions placed on the TRNC reinforced the social categorization of set identity groups and increased their levels of prejudice, bias and negativity towards the “other.” Once again, the identity mold was altered in degree of actuality, salience and valence. In addition, the TCs and their governing body became
locked in an invisible enclave that is life dependent on Turkey because of the international embargoes imposed on the TRNC. This structure generates identity confusion and problems because TCs are in need of self-discovery and acknowledgement, which has been buried beneath the identity ascribed to them by their motherland protectorate. TCs are in need of a new social identity and recategorization process to release suppressed identity elements. In addition, the political and economic subsequent consequences created by the wall yielded an influx of immigrants and migrants to and from the TRNC. The end result of the population exchange was a new identity group—Turkish Settlers, who have not assimilated into one Turkic identity with the TCs.

IDPs became a sub-identity group for TCs and GCs, while at the same time lacking in identity. The loss of identity and membership in either of the large-group identities is the commonality between its members. Over 200,000 individuals are grouped together as an IDP, with the remaining population as the new outgroup. IDPs are also group members of the “enclave mentality” psychological identity group. This group was first developed during the events of the TCs chosen trauma and then renewed after the Line was built. Today, members include TRNC citizens and IDPs, who are ensnared in the wall’s restrictive limitation and displacement effects.

The wall curtails freedom of movement, which dovetails into many conflict related subject matter. Freedom of movement affects a person’s basic human rights and needs and is structurally violent, therefore also hampering identity. The GL is a reservoir of obstruction, collective incarceration and injustice. Other reservoirs are utilized that
have developed in the post-Green Line decades, such as the use of flags that was also discussed. All of the reservoirs are indicative of deeper meanings and identity frustration. The reservoirs identified in this research act as a symptom of the chosen traumas. Though there can be positive reservoirs and chosen glories, the wall demonstrated negative impacts. Both large-identity groups have not been able to mourn their traumas sufficiently and pass continue to display their grievances in reservoirs and pass their chosen traumas and reservoirs down to subsequent generations and social systems. This transgenerational transmission, like in the educational systems, can cause structural violence inflicted on both large-group identities.

Walls are a system of structural violence onto their own that removes the ability to communicate, which is a basic human right and need for humans. This lack of communication creates a new social identity process because of the changes in social dynamics that effect interaction, which is at the basis of creating social identity. Now that borders are open in Cyprus, it does not mean that a new process of social identification is taking place. People were prevented from intermixed identity interaction for so long that they are not able to readapt to permissive interaction. Stereotypes, prejudices, biases and negative feelings projected onto the “other” were magnified during isolation; currently, there is little to no desire to comingle because of mistrust, lack of interest and understanding.

The study conducted by the Peace Economics Consortium and Cymar Market Research indicate that communication was so severely severed and forbidden that shared commonalities have disappeared and communication channels once open are now closed.
Current forms of communication yield both positive and negative results, but overall Cypriots believe that interaction should continue. In turn, this will increase the acquaintance potential that is needed for CT application.

CT’s applications are not steadily employed in Cyprus. The interaction is based on the individual’s willingness and as learned, much of it is considered to be superficial. Infrastructure and programs needs to be implemented for CT to take full effect, coupled with welfare, aid programs and job creation in the TRNC to promote equal status. CT requires four items as aforementioned. Acquaintance potential and equal status are two of the four focused on in this research and will need governmental and international support to be employed properly. As of now, CT, though applied limitedly with some positive results, will not be able to serve a productive means to an end of avoidance and reconceptualize social categories/identity.

The GL is an obstacle to identity cohesion, preventing reconceptualization of categorization and positive social identity structures. It fosters negative reservoirs, chosen traumas and serves as a vantage point for relative deprivation. The wall also enforces structurally violent systems that affect BHNs and identity. The GL only serves as a temporary measure to instill negative peace. Perhaps it is better to have negative peace than no peace at all; however, if negative peace exists, then violence is just around the corner. The GL, as my assumptions presumed, effects identity caught in conflicts. It impacts the restorative processes, making resolution efforts from identity groups more difficult to put in place and act upon. In addition, the wall has multiple effects on identity through shifts implemented overtime as reactions to the wall’s existence and related
effects within society. There are also harmful effects on populations via temporary and permanent displacement, loss of identity and belonging and removal of needs and rights.
Chapter 7: The Berlin Wall in Germany & Identity Impacts

7.1 Identity during the Berlin Wall Years

As previously mentioned, identity formation is shaped by three factors: actuality, salience and valence. The reality of the BW situation struck cords within the city’s infrastructure and citizens forever changing the identity. Actuality is constructed via social identity interaction between ingroups and outgroups. Prior to BWS, East and West was divided in context, the former being part of the Iron Curtain, which already created different large-group identities within Germany as a whole. However, when the iron became cement with a physical wall, the identities further steered away from one another due to a forced lack of interaction. The distance between the ingroups and outgroups would not be known until the Wall would be torn down nearly 30 years later, which would confirm the actual identities that changed over time. In the meantime, East German’s valence began to move in a negative direction because of the BW’s collective incarceration that restricted BHNs, changed the security status and ruptured group identity. Not all East Germans were against Kruschev’s communist government or Ulbricht’s closed borders, but the majority was longing for their loss of: freedom, identity, rights pertaining thereto and other social mechanisms.

According to Volkan, large-group identities are bound to shift, they are an end result from history and geography. The BW perfectly illustrates a shift in group-identity,
which would later use the changes occurred as a means of prejudice to raise the self-esteem of the newly defined ingroup in post-Wall Germany.

Volkan also looks at symbols through reservoirs. Taylor perfectly sums up what the BW would stand for during the division of Germany: “what they [GDR] were creating here would become a symbol for the world of division and cruelty…” (Taylor, 2006, pg. 183). Thus, the BW was a reservoir that represented separation, loss of freedom, loss of daily interaction, networks (family, friends and business) and much more as daily routines were shattered overnight and devastated going forward after BWS.

This reservoir impacted the beliefs of the German people who now thought of Germany as “two states in one nation” and as late as 1987, 97% of the West thought that unification would never be possible. The East’s hopes for reunification fell from 14% in 1970 to nearly a 0% chance in 1984 (Heneghan, 2000, pg. 16). This conviction, served by a constant reminder by the BW’s existence also impacted the views of Germany by Germans. “West Germans became increasingly used to simply calling their own country Deutschland and using the initials DDR for their communist neighbor…half of the youth considered the authoritarian society next door a foreign state” (Heneghan, 2000, pg. 16).

The Wall also created other reservoirs within its surroundings because of its effects on communities and people. The East German border control station gained the name “Palace of Tears” because of the visitors leaving the East behind. Those departing left with tearful goodbyes from friends and family who were not allowed to leave. “Visitors from the West rarely cried when they left the DDR at Friedrichstrasse. Tears were an Eastern product” said Bierman, an East German citizen (Wyden, 1989, pg. 344).
The “Palace” served as a multi-reservoir system, it also represented the violation of people’s privacy. The building was built with glass walls, “it suggested that the authorities wanted to make everything and everyone totally visible, to strip people of their secrets, their privacy” (Wyden, 1989, pg. 344).

When the identity of Germans was cemented into two large-groups: East and West, it also created subdivisions of identity amongst the populations. Home to the “Palace of Tears” were the “Ost-Mädchen” (Eastern Girls). These girls would loiter around the “Palace” to attract male foreigners and temporary laborers, many times using crocodile tears as a sympathy trick, another reason attributed to the “Palace’s” name. A date with an Ost-Mädchen would cost 20 western Marks and maybe a carton of cigarettes as well. The BW not only created sub-identities, but it also created sub-industries, an East Berlin sex trade being one of them.

Identity was distraught after the BW, especially considering the identity struggles that Germany had undergone in recent history. The Wall led to greater identity confusion, removing familiarity, belonging and creating disjointed communities. “My very own childhood world had been partitioned! The places where I had been at home and school were safely tucked into the West. My father’s business and the graves of my antecedents were part of the East” were the words of an American-German, visiting Weissensee, East Berlin in 1965 (Wyden, 1989, pg. 337). These words capture the identity shock that was felt amongst German citizens who no longer could identify with what had once been their normal surroundings.
The BW forever changed identity within East and West, but it was the East Germans who suffered the most severe blow. Their BHNs were deprived, the security environment was greatly altered and the people and the land were kept behind the times, as if frozen in the 1960’s, which has made the reunification process difficult to adapt to, along with a different social order that influenced their identity. These effects are illustrated vividly in the aftermath of the Wall coming down.

7.2 Identity after the Wall

With the Wall separating East and West, growing disparities of cultural identity became imminent and omnipresent after the fall of the Wall. Of course, this could also be expected from the merging of antitheses: from state bureaucracies, economic, social and daily life systems, everything between East and West differed. Separation of 40 years, nearly 30 of which harbored a physical division, compounding the isolation effect and byproduct of partition, led to identity disparity, shock and confusion in the search for a unified German identity that is still in progress today.

Politically, there are sparring parties that disagree over the gravity and events of the BW. During the 50 year commemoration of the building of the BW, the ceremony was marred by members of the left party when refusing to stand to honor the victims who died. Furthermore, a left youth newspaper even praised and thanked East Germany for building the Wall. Berlin Mayor, Klaus Wowereit, attributed the justification of the Wall as “the Linke (Left) just trying to salvage the old East German Identity” (Martinez). As of 2009, one in seven Germans (either East or West Germans) want the BW back.
according to a survey of 1,002 people during the 20th anniversary of the Wall’s collapse (Copley).

Though reunification hopes started on a high note with groups chanting “we are one people” rather than “we are the people” and others calling out “Germany, United Fatherland” during Leipzig’s November 20, 1989 protest march, it is apparent through the current political divide that for some, “we are one people” is an untruth (Heneghan, 2000, pg. 39). However, one in seven is an improvement from previous polls, where 20% in 2007 and 24% in 2005 said they would like the Wall back (Poll: 24% of West Germans want Berlin Wall back). Overall, unity was not as close as imagined it would be by crossing the once forbidden border.

The actual effects of the Wall gravely shaped the identity of both East and West Germans and hardened into an identity border in effect. For some, identity is a new concept which they previously had not felt a connection to. Uwe Kolbe is a poet born and raised in Prenzlauer Berg, an East Berlin neighborhood, who has spoken about his own identity confusion. Kolbe illustrated this in his poem, “Ich war nicht darauf vorbereitet, ein Deutscher zu sein” (I was not prepared for being a German). Kolbe believes that being from the GDR denied him any relation to German nationality and identity and that only traveling outside of the GDR enabled him to understand himself as a German. These sentiments are empathized with other GDR citizens who were imprisoned by the 100 mile BW that kept them from knowing their own identity. Others may say that despite not having their own “exclusive identity,” it does not mean they do not have an identity because identity is multi-faced, stemming from numerous group
memberships. What Kolbe and others may feel is what Brewer calls “optimal distinctiveness,” where self-distinction is needed for intracategory assimilation. In this case, the assimilation for Kolbe would be with the GDR. In addition, Brewer’s theory also believes that an individual needs self-distinction for inercategory contrast, so that the person has a sense of self. This is where “optimal distinctiveness” and SIT intersect as Korostelina notes for the self-verification process. The need for inclusion and differentiation keep each side in balance with one another (Brewer, 2001, pg. 21).

SIT explains that identity is derived from membership of a group and one’s concept of self. “Social identity is a feeling of belonging to a social group, as a strong connection with social category, and as an important part of our mind that affects our social perceptions and behavior” (Korostelina, 2007, pg. 15). Despite Kolbe not feeling “German,” he is still a member to other groups. As a poet, he is a literary member and as a GDR citizen, he is a member of East Germany and their identities. Membership within these groups creates the “us” versus “them” connotation as individuals undergo a process of self-categorization. The BW played a significant part in the self-categorization of East and West Germans, not giving either side a choice of membership. Once the Wall was erected, immediately individuals were relegated to specific ingroups and outgroup because they were not able to join the other unless escaping or entering successfully. Usually, SIT brackets people into groups to keep others out as a result; the Wall served as an SIT enforcer in this regard.

After categorization, comes favoritism to raise the self-esteem and increase the ingroup self-image. Self-esteem, discrimination, biases and prejudice all become a part
of SIT for the purpose of differentiating itself in a positive manner to demonstrate a form of superiority. This mimics a survivalist mentality, where the need for social comparison is used to protect oneself or group. “The need for social comparison is aroused when there is uncertainty about one’s standing on some dimension of self-evaluation, uncertainty that can be resolved by comparing one’s own position to that of relevant others (Brewer, 2001, pg. 24). The entire process of social identity is a form of protection, encapsulating individuals by creating boundaries to keep “them” out and “us” in.

The BW made the social identity process inevitable, but also affected the process after the fall of the Wall for societies’ members. The aforementioned traits of self-esteem and the tactics used to increase it were more heavily employed during reunification and can still be seen today. Whereas before the Wall, no choice to categorization between the East and West ingroup and outgroup was available. Now individuals have the choice of membership. “Social identity can be accepted or rejected…it is a result of free choice and entails no commitments” (Korostelina, 2007, pg. 17).

Today, Germany straddles two main different identities that are still in attempt to blend together. An ingroup and outgroup still persevere instead of one large-group identity with a shared understanding and “we-ness.” To create “we-ness” a new social identification process will need to take place to foster feelings of understanding. Rather, Germany is demarcating each side; the nicknames “Ossi” (East German) and “Wessi” (West German) coming from the German words for East (Ost) and West (West) are common terminology to distinguish individuals, groups and organizations from one
another. These given names have underlying meanings to them that represent the prejudices both sides feel towards one another and their misconceptions. Jammer-Ossi (moaning Easterners) and Besser-Wessis (know it all Westerners) are different versions of the nicknames that are indicative of feelings towards one another. Popular jokes have surfaced using these terms, where the West is depicted as arrogant and money hungry and the East as ungrateful, complaining and lazy. Ossi and Wessi mark the separation between both German identities and the difficulty in bringing these two identities together to form a German people’s identity. The current use of these terms and other adaptations, such as “Wossi” (a West German living in East Germany), indicate that there is still a wall present, often referred to by Germans as a “wall in the head.”

The unappreciative attitude of the Ossis perceived by the Wessis is a large point of resentment. Westerners feel a great change in reunification relating to their tax dollars’ that have increased and are pouring into the GDR territory. These feelings tie into the reunification promises that were made in hopes of raising the GDR to western standards within one parliamentary term (four years). However, the GDR was not used to a competitive, free economy and citizens relied on taxes from the West rather than combining that with a diligent workforce. The sense of competition has also led to grievances among Easterners who feel that a fair share of privatization is not being dispensed throughout Germany. Eighty percent of firms privatized by 1994 were western run, insolvencies in the east tripled in two years and companies in the East struggled to exist in a market economy (Starkes, 1997, pg. 95).
The GDR was used to a slow paced, lackadaisical working environment due to the economic breakdown it experienced combined with elements of socialism. “The workplace was usually free from stress, as shortages of materials frequently limited the time that was productively occupied” (Starkes, 1997, pg. 15). Stuart Parkes notes that the famous line, “time is money,” was not comprehended by the former GDR citizens, who were not used to efficiency and higher rates of productivity. Instead, there is a “handout mentality,” where you get paid whether or not you have actually worked to earn the full amount. If there is a shortage, it is because the government is not providing for its people properly, not that the people are not providing enough through their work. Additionally, Marx’s concept of the development of the individual rivaled productivity at work. Hegel and Marx explain this when describing how “a saving of labor time is tantamount to an augmentation of free time, i.e., time for the full development of the individual, which in turn, as the greatest force of production, had a retroactive effect on the productive power of labor” (Marx, 1953, pg. 599). There were 124 non-working days in the 1980’s, by 1985 20% of the GDR population worked less than 40 hours per week and working days could end as early as 3:00pm (as cited in Rueschemeyer and Lemke, 1989, pg. 168).

Following reunification, there is a post-communist identity versus the capitalist identity in Germany that had a rippling effect into individual and social identity properties.

Westerners also grappled with an overnight change in their personal identity make-up. Patrick Süskind, who wrote the article, Deutschland, eine Midlife-crisis, belonged to the generation that neither knew a unified Germany before sectors were created in 1949 and was not part of the new youth movement. In his article, Süskind
writes about his emotions that much of the westerners in his generation resonated with. There was a positive response to the initial fall of the Wall, but later would turn into a sense of post-nationalism. Süskind claims that the FRG was ready for anything, but not for “Germany, united fatherland.” Sociologist Wolf Wagner also commiserates with other westerners experiencing identity confusion when the Wall came down. “The Federal Republic I grew up in was not Germany, only West Germany…Over all these years, I had built up an anti-heroic and, as I understood it, an anti-German identity. And then these refugees arrived calling out ‘Deutschland’ from the train windows” (as cited in Heneghan, 1996, pgs. 79-80). Süskind’s compliment Wagners, when writing that “this state [Federal Republic of Germany] had proved itself in a thoroughly unprovisionally good way, it was liberal, democratic, useful and run on the basis of law—and it was exactly as young or old as we were and therefore in a sense our state” (Süskind).

However, Wagner and Süskind’s state was no more; it now belonged to all Germans, not just West Germans, which shook identity foundations.

Collectively, GDR citizens believed themselves to be second-class citizens in the reunified Germany, which was captured in a 1994 poll, where 76% of the respondents shared this sentiment. Moreover, there is an alienation effect taking place between Ossis and Wessis, preventing further comingling that is necessary to bridge the identity gap. In 1994, three percent of marriages were between East and West partners. Unity is not only a political process in Germany, but also a socialization process. Both sides need to recognize each others’ values in order to rectify misperceptions and misunderstandings. According to an article cited in Der Spiegel magazine, the GDR also has noteworthy
traits. The GDR’s “ability to create networks and to deal with chaotic situations at work, along with the sense of togetherness” can be advantageous in moving forward in a united fashion (as cited in Parkes, 2007, pg. 100).

The identity split reinforces the actuality of identity that both large-groups are feeling. Greater differences between groups and threats to the ingroup, whether perceived or real also attribute to actuality (Korostelina, 2007). The strains felt between East and West Germans after reunification is heightened through their lifestyle cleavages and economic consequences of unification. The actuality of each group is understood via the social context of contemporary Germany in a post-Berlin Wall era. Previous membership to specified parts of Germany also added to the identity complications. Prejudices and biases created during the 28 years of being walled inhibited some members from adapting to a joint German identity. As such, these negative views are used to boost self-esteem as a source of protection to their personal and group identity. Korostelina explains that membership in a special social group or category, such as the eastern communist and the western capitalist Germans will influence its members through behavior and socialization processes. “A person will internalize his or her membership in this group and will perceive it as a part of his or her own personality…‘Who am I ax X?’” (Korostelina, 2007, pg. 21).

In addition to the identity struggle between East and West, there is also a splintering of identity within the East itself. Some parts of the eastern community began to work towards preservation of their former GDR systems shortly after the Wall came down; “we still have the chance to develop a socialist alternative to West Germany…we
still can turn back to those anti-fascist and humanist ideals we started with…(Heneghan, 2000, pg. 39). The term “Ostalgie” was coined that meant nostalgia for East Germany. Though the percentages are decreasing, there are still easterners who long to return to Erich Honecker’s GDR with the BW in place. There is resentment among East Germans for the perceived colonial style take-over of East Germany by their West Germany brethren. In a short amount of time, GDR products, stores, companies and images that belonged to the East German culture and identity were removed barely leaving a trail that East Germany was ever there. Others, such as, Helmut Schmelz, owner of a Stasi-themed bar in Berlin, says that Ostalgie is not about wanting back communism, but wanting to return to what the social system offered. “We miss the good aspects…Unemployment was non-existent, everyone was able to pay the rent, which is not the case today. That is what people miss, a feeling of safety” Schmelz remarks (Schmelz).

Prior to the construction of the BW, an ingroup and outgroup was already formed. In a global context, communist countries and the Soviet Bloc were viewed as an outgroup from western ideals and standards of living. When the Wall was built, the ingroup and outgroup in Germany underwent a change due to separation. The West went through what some have called an economic miracle, building itself through hard work, industrialization and free market economy strategies via capitalism, while the east was economically suffering and becoming dilapidated. The Wall not only effected identity, but also destroyed components of BHNs and security.

Due to the severing of all ties during the years of the Wall there was no social exchange permitted and relationships were cut off overnight. The culture of both German
states began to separate from one another as the power of the BW’s division further exposed any cracks in the German identity fault line. Though people of both sides were elated the day the Wall fell, these feelings of excitement and celebration quickly changed as the differences that formed from estrangement were surfacing. “People point to differences in dialect, in everyday behavior, in body language” comments Jen Reich of the New Forum, and goes on to say that because the differences are more or less subtle, it is what makes it so clear and perceptible to Germans themselves (as cited in Heneghan, 2000, pg. 145). These differences are exploited, as earlier noted in SIT because it makes the ingroup member(s) feel better (ingroup favoritism) and raises self-esteem. This also correlates to how group identities project minor differences onto others to highlight differences. This is done because if “we” are too similar to one another then it can also be harmful and affect “us.” Therefore, the minor differences are emphasized on to make the differences stronger and more prominent so “we” can project our negative feelings onto others, hence why subtlety becomes obvious (Volkan, 2008).

The negative feelings that each identity group harbors for the other can be mended, but interaction and communication are obligatory, which will lead to the reconceptualization of group categories. Ossis and Wessis may not be mislabeled with the information collected, but rather they are misunderstood because they come from such different perspectives and backgrounds. Communism and capitalism are at odds with one another—it is only natural that its offspring will also be the same. This in turn has created social categories, because as Schiappa noted, categories must include and exclude to clearly define itself and raise self-esteem. When looking for reasons to be
different, prejudicial attitudes and relationships are a natural outcome of such actions. Hogg and Abrams believe this is a response to negative experiences and therefore responsible for stereotypes, such as Ossi and Wessi. The remedy to this is CT and SIT application via communication and interaction.

As mentioned previously in regards to CT, acquaintance potential and equal status are two of four conditions needed. Equal status is more difficult to achieve than what former German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, promised during reunification. His words of building “flourishing landscapes” for the East are mocked by disheartened citizens who face lower wages, higher rates of unemployment stemming from the inability to compete with business in the West, and a further loss of two million citizens, particularly youth looking for jobs elsewhere. The footing between East and West’s identity groups is unbalanced and hinders potential communication channels that foster through businesses and industries across both sectors. However, current Chancellor, Angela Merkel, said on the 20 year anniversary of reunification that she believes the merging of East and West to be more successful than not. This cannot go unrecognized when 1994 polls demonstrated that 71% of the respondents from the former GDR felt more freedom than before, nearly 79% favored a market economy and in a later poll in 1995, 57% felt they were better off post-reunification (Parkes, 1997, 209).

Nevertheless, a psychological divide remains, as if the BW was still intact in the minds of many German citizens. According to polls administered by the Allensbach Institute, 47% of Wessis and 28% of Ossis in July 1994 agreed with the “we are one people” slogan, which decreased from 54% and 45% respectively when taken in
November 1990 (Heneghan, 2000, pg. 152). This change can be attributed to the euphoria first experienced during the official reunification compared to the struggles experienced later due to growing skepticisms, resentment and a lack of unified German personal and cultural identity. However the change in attitude and perception of the German people is justified, the bottom line is that there lacks identity solidarity.

Oliver Schmidtke of the University of Victoria, Australia argues that there is a reproduction of the division still today and two distinct “Germanies” (East and West) are very much alive. Schmidtke comments on the reunification process as both a blessing and curse. West Germany’s support provided for prosperity, industrial development, infrastructure via telecommunications and public roadways and successes in other areas. However, the curse is that the West German state at the time handled the merging procedures singlehandedly, placing the GDR under its wing, but leaving the GDR and its citizens without a voice and no sense of ownership. In fact, the East may say that merge is not the appropriate word, but rather adopt, because they were adopting what was deemed to be the superior West German systems. Schmidtke believes that this placed a deep scar on the collective East German psyche, but with newer generations this scar is becoming fainter (Schmidtke). Parkes also comments that seven years after reunification the majority of easterners feel victimized from the procedures and processes imposed upon them by the “outside.” Though the West German people suffered from the Wall, the East Germans can be considered the main victims. East German citizens lost elements of their BHNs, their security environment was greatly altered into a state of fear, and after reunification their education, work and life skills were severely
insufficient, making adaptation to modern capitalism of their German counterpart difficult.

According to transgenerational transmission theory, the resentments may not dissipate with time. Moreover, the former GDR struggles with social inequality and relative deprivation that easterners experience when looking at the statistics of the West. In the East, unemployment is twice as high, there are four times more the amount of welfare recipients, and discrepancies in wages exist, where 20% of the population makes less than 7.50 Euro/hour (Schmidtke). Schmidtke goes on to say that the social inequalities are evidence of a split identity and categorization of a first and second class citizen of reunified Germany that can be overcome with economic security.

Nearly three years after reunification, Kohl cogitated and realized that the “flourishing landscapes” may have been too easily drummed up in his mind. “If we’re honest with each other, we have to admit that these 40 years of division have left a deep impression on the way we deal with each other. I didn’t think it would be like this and I see now that I made a big mistake. We have to get over this” (Heneghan, 2000, pg. 144). Germany still has work to do to be able to “get over it,” but the grievances are dissipating and people are adjusting. However, the question of a cohesive identity remains—identity cannot be adopted, it is molded and influenced. If the “good old days” memories that Ostalgie portrays cannot be mourned properly to free themselves from the past, then Germans will continue to transmit these emotions which can hinder the identity process further.
7.3 Conclusions of Identity Analysis

The Berlin Wall case study that affected Germany’s large-group identities ascertained that changes identity and related areas of BHNs and security occurred as a result of division. Before BWS, two distinct large-group identities existed within Germany, but the BW affected the identities in place. Lack of interaction created a new social identity process that recategorized the German people. Dissimilarities were primarily discovered after the Wall came down. During this transition the identity mold began to change. The valence of East German identity turned negative because of the Wall’s imprisonment impact that limited BHNs and altered the security status. The BW forever changed East German identity that the country is grappling with post-reunification in merging with the West German identity. Currently, both large-group identities project prejudices and negative perceptions towards the “other” to increase their ingroup favoritism and self-esteem.

The BW also served as a symbolic image as a reservoir as an invasive and obstructive force, representing separation and a multitude of losses: freedom, interaction, networks and daily operations. The Wall also created additional reservoirs within its boundaries, such as the “Palace of Tears.”

The impact of the BW’s separation was immediate and shocking because the identity groups were not prepared to be disconnected overnight. The disjointed identity groups later diverged further away into two separate large-group identities—GDR and FRG. Additional identities were constructed as part of these large-groups, as demonstrated through the “Ost-Mädchen” identity. However, alternated and newly
created identities were not the only identity effects, but also a loss and confusion of identity occurred.

Some individuals experienced a lack of identity that was suppressed because of separation and isolation. Members of this category could not make connections to their primary, primordial or socially constructed nation groups. Non-identified individuals were not optimally distinct and therefore not self-verified in society that otherwise would allow identity group assimilation. Essentially, there was an identity delay for citizens affected by the non-identity effect of the BW.

The “Ostalgist” identity group formed as a post-wall reaction for individuals who could not mourn the loss of the socialist system and its implications. At the same time, a sub-identity West German group was also created in response to reunification resentment targeted toward East Germans. Politically there is also an identity divide amongst parties who express the aforementioned sentiments on both sides of the spectrum.

BW influenced social identity and self-categorization. The Wall provided some members with no choice of group membership and became an authoritarian means of identity placement. Social comparison became a very prevalent step during reunification because there was a high level of uncertainty for members of an ingroup that no longer existed in geographic context. Germany was no longer physically divided, but the “wall in the head” existed. Ingroup members interact differently because of their walled socialization experience. Now, an identity border is thriving between both communities of East and West. The social comparison aspect of SIT was a source of protection for members who were trying to formulate new ingroup boundaries to clearly define the “us”
and “them.” Now that there is a choice of membership in post-Berlin Wall Germany, social identity became more significant because it can either be accepted or rejected. Given that there are two main different identities within Germany today, it indicates that the social identity of a united Germany has been rejected, which is portrayed through the “Ossi” and “Wessi” nicknames. This identity differentiation is not only brought on by the differences ensued during separation, but also the negative consequences of reunification. The GDR was unable to adapt in a short amount of time to a competitive, free economy and suffered great losses because of that within the eastern borders. Unemployment rose, companies shut down in the face of privatization, wages are lower in the East than the West, while the tax revenue from the West is the backbone of the East’s development.

Work environment disparities also spilled over into individual and social disunity. Collectively, GDR citizens feel like second-class citizens post-reunification and separation between the large-group identities continued. A new socialization process via SIT is necessary to help remedy the lack of interaction and exchange to reframe social identity to promote new categorization and membership of a united ingroup. Continued separation physically reinforces the actuality of both large-group identities and encourages a sense of competition between each other for superiority. Prejudices and biases are projected and dictate the current identity course for Germany. Minor differences are magnified and dramatized to further distinguish an ingroup from an outgroup and raise its self-favortism and esteem to protect the ingroup.
Creating an accommodating environment for CT will promote acquaintance potential, increase communication and cultural exchange. Simultaneously, the German government needs to pay great attention to establishing equal status to meet CT’s requirements. If the methods of CT and SIT fail then any negative feelings such as contempt or resentment of one identity towards another may be transmitted transgenerationally according to Volkan.

Currently, Germany has not adequately mourned the memories of the past that resurface within the nation, illustrating the identity disconnect amongst the population. There is progress in the diminishing of negative feelings post-reunification, but also a lack of cohesion exists between both large-group identities whose overall goal once the Wall was dismantled was to fully unite as one large-group (German) identity.

During my research, I was able to travel to Germany and visit Berlin. While observing different areas of Berlin, I witnessed disparaging views of East and West Berliners. The former appears to still be in search of a post-wall identity. I discerned that neighborhoods, such as Prenzlauer Berg that were close to the Wall and other surrounding areas of the eastern Berlin had a non-conformist attitude. The East looks as if it does not want to bend towards the riches of the West. Buildings are run down, public areas left unkempt, graffiti runs rampant along the exteriors and the people also do not partake in the spoils of capitalism. My personal thoughts were that the people strive to be different, so they do not conform to western standards, but by doing so, they are actually conformists in their own right. When in western Berlin, immediately one feels as though they are in a western European city center with well cared for buildings, public parks and
museums. There is a certain hustle and bustle to society’s steps, business is a core function of the daily life and individuals are dressed with care and style.

Observations made in Berlin demonstrate that there is still a lack of unity; instead the city is living with two large-group identities. They are not necessarily in competition with one another, but rather uninterested with one another. There is a lack of personal connection and constant avoidance, which is a source of negative social behavior, perceptions and beliefs. Though this is not leading to violent conflict, there is a social conflict present.
CHAPTER 8: COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY FINDINGS

8.1 Comparative Wall Analysis

Reservoirs are a common identity marker used in both cases. The walls symbolize destruction, obstruction, frustration and hatred. Yet, walls were not the only reservoirs, but rather walls gave rise to a reservoir-making system in affected areas. In Cyprus, the chosen traumas are also reinforced by the wall’s presence as a reservoir. Another mutual reservoir of walls is structural violence, which is multi-pronged in these situations. Structurally, the walls instill fear and grief merely by existence. The violence experienced as a border-cropper transforms to a new kind of fear and anxiety. Even if one is allowed to pass through the borders due to openings or permitted traveling visas, the experience is unsettling as described by Gumpert and Drucker.

“There is something unnerving about crossing borders...The presence of natural barriers—rivers, seas, and mountains—are understandable. But there is something horrifying, frightening about borders—to be momentarily located between two artificial lines of hostility. There is a sudden realization that you might not belong to any place, that you might be abandoned to wandering between factions that do not recognize you. And there is a sudden awareness that borders are not just geographic barriers, but that they are the enemy of talk, of interaction, of the flow of ideas, in short, they are the opponents of communication” (Gumpert and Drucker, 1998, pg. 237).

Not only does a wall induce fear, but it limits the rights of man and freedom.

Communication is a basic human right and need that when violated it changes the social landscape, affecting necessary interaction and exchanges. The inability to communicate between identity groups, the social identity process will shift and create
changed forms of identity in a negative manner, increasing social prejudices. Therefore, walls are also a system of structural violence and repressive rights onto their own. Elimination of communication in society is the abstraction of a basic human right and need amongst all citizens. This lack of communication creates a new social identity process because of the changes in social dynamics that effect interaction, which is at the basis of creating social identity.

The identity structures of the German and Cyprus case studies were different from one another. The former was comprised of a large-group identity that was fragmented between communism and capitalism and then further subdivided with the onset of the Berlin Wall. However, the backgrounds of the identity groups within German had many commonalities shared amongst group members, creating a sense of “sameness” across the entire nation. The Cyprus case study had two distinct large-group identities that always strived for differentiation. This differentiation war marked through social practices and later became hostile during the turmoil of the 1960s and 1970s that only increased in severity after the Green Line was built in 1974. In the Cyprus case, there was also a lack of a national identity shared by all Cypriots, whereas there was a German national identity that connected the Germanic large-group identities.

Despite the differences in identity composition in Germany and Cyprus, both nations lived in a relative state of harmony pre-wall context. Ingroups and outgroups lived in a state of balance until disrupted by the walls instituted through conflict. Post-wall eras for both cases illustrate that differences were intensified by increasing “sameness” within ingroups and magnifying the dissimilarities of outgroups. Minor
differences were exploited despite being minor in scale. Through this process the bonds of “we-ness” were strengthened between members and their respective identity groups. In order for this to happen, stereotypical patterns of behavior, producing negative attitudes, beliefs and perceptions were created in the large-group identities. This development increased ingroup favoritism and raised self-esteem to demonstrate a group’s superiority. Particularly in Cyprus compared to Germany, this increased the actuality and salience of the identity groups analyzed. When comparing the large-group identity backgrounds, this can be explained due to the pre-wall national identity structure. The commonalities the Germans experienced with one another prevented extreme forms of salience developing, whereas Cyprus’ increase in salience divided the large-group identities even more, creating a clash.

Both cases demonstrate that walls change the scope of identity and create new social identity during and after a wall’s presence. The new social categorizations of the identity process reconceptualized the large-group identities in a negative manner in both Germany and Cyprus. The end result is a low level of interaction in both countries between newly established or reinforced large-group identities.

The walls did have different effects on German and Cypriot populations. In Cyprus there were international endorsed political ramifications that endangered the economic health of the TRNC and TCs. In Germany, the political ramifications were self-inflicted rather than globally orchestrated. Yet, the consequences of the political dynamics caused by walls were similar in economic terms. Both cases indicate economic gaps between large-group identities that are considered to be the greater victims of walled
societies. In the GDR and TRNC unemployment, earnings and GDP rankings are severely lower than their outgroups today. Germany and Cyprus represent contemporary cases, but the wall in Cyprus still exists. This gives a limited indication of long-term effects since the first and second wall generations primarily comprise the affected populations. In analyzing the identity group emotions emitted pre and post-wall time frames, both cases exemplify active, negative transgenerational transmission. Therefore, both are suffering from chosen traumas that were not adequately dealt with emotionally and still have an active presence in current identity structures.

Both cases show a non-identity formation caused by the walls. In Cyprus, the lack of identity is characterized by the absence of home—the physical connection to ancestral land and former housing. In Germany, citizens were unable to optimally distinguish themselves within society, therefore missing connections to their social groupings—primary, primordial and socially construction nation. Now that the BW has collapsed, individuals in this category have undergone a process of self-discovery and identification. Unfortunately, the Cypriots affected are unable to claim or reclaim their identities because of the GL’s current presence. BHNs are a common thread woven into identity and eluded to in the case studies. The loss of identity is an obstruction to one’s BHN, it leaves individuals, groups and communities bereft of the sense of belonging and needed love. The natural identity created between people and place does not exist when walls partition people from place. Moreover, the loss of freedoms across multiple areas prevented the fulfillment Maslow’s top four areas of BHNs.
The BW and GL were created as a security measure, but with different end goals and security interests. In Germany, the BW was for the protection of the GDR’s economic and human capital welfare. The wall was not a form of security for the people, but in actuality it was a form of security against the people. In Cyprus, the GL was a source of human security measure initiated by the United Nations to prevent continued violence and repeated outbreak of physical conflict. The cases demonstrate that walls can be state or internationally sanctioned; it is not limited to specific contexts in this regard.

Walls affect people on both sides, but as indicated by the involved large-group identities, there is a greater outcome of victimization for one group over another. In Cyprus, the TCs experienced the same wall ramifications as the GCs as well as additional consequences that hampered their political, economic and personal freedoms. In Germany, the East Germans were also the victims of the Wall, who were deprived personally of rights, freedom, environmental security (personal space and economic welfare).

The victims of the BW and GL experienced identity shifts from onset limitations of standards of living due to repressive government and/or economic deficiency, lack of opportunities and upward mobility, insufficient BHNs and more. All large-group identities underwent social categorization reinforcement from political and economic wall effects. Reinforcement caused increases in prejudices and biases of outgroups, and salience, actuality and negative valence of ingroups.

The economic disparities enlarged during partitioning in Cyprus and Germany has developed relative deprivation between identity groups. The research conducted did not
delve into the effects that relative deprivation has on identity, but this is another area where walls impact society and another avenue of identity effects that future studies should analyze to enhance the understanding of walls divisive powers.

Walled societies have similar and different outcomes, some of which have previously been noted. Another difference is related to migration. The GDR utilized the BW as a migratory plug, compared to the GL, where the wall served as a migration channel. Though GDR citizens wanted to escape, they were collectively incarcerated. However, TCs who wanted to immigrate to fulfill their BHNs in terms of economic and other means of livelihood left Cyprus. Turkey and the TRNC responded to the large migration numbers by sending large numbers of Turkish citizens, known as Turkish Settlers to Cyprus. The ripple effect of the wall’s BHNs impact set off a chain of events in Cyprus, from BHN limitation to migration for fulfillment, to immigration of Turkish Settlers, which in the end created a new social identity process, categorization and identity group. Cyprus also experienced another identity-group formation—refugee identity. Refugee identity was a reaction to the GL’s restriction on freedom of movement, inability to return home and constant re-traumatization and re-victimization caused by the wall’s existence as a reservoir.

New group identities appear to be a result of division and its related effects. The GDR also experienced new identity groups within its boundaries—the “Ost-Mädchen.” New identities are not isolated to effects during a wall’s existence, but can be created post-wall existence. In Germany, a new identity group named “Ostalgists” has surfaced, who long for a return to the past. New identity in a post-wall era is yet unknown in
Cyprus so a comparison cannot be made, but there could be groups who would prefer to maintain the current status quo and de facto border.

The research indicates many overlapping qualities in walled societies. Freedom of movement is an immediate effect of a wall’s division, which hampers basic human rights and needs that all of Germany and Cyprus experienced. In Cyprus, the freedom of movement or lack thereof is compounded by the political embargoes placed on TRNC citizens that further restrict travel capabilities. As such, psychological changes occurred as described in “enclave mentality” and feelings of second-class human beings. Though not discussed in terms of movement outside of the GDR in this research, it is important to note that East Germans were also restricted from outside travel until changes in subsequent decades enabled citizens to visit other Soviet Bloc countries.

According to the research, interaction and communication are necessary means to creating a new, positive social identity process to reconceptualize the current categorization and remove the post-isolationist effects of walls. Without interpersonal exchange across identity groups, chosen traumas will not be sufficiently acknowledged by societal actors, preventing relational empathy. Instead, the affected areas will exist in a permanent state of negative peace, if there is a type of peace at all. In Germany and Cyprus, both exhibit negative peace in varying degrees. Without social and identity cohesion a true positive peace is absent and the potential for identity-based violence to begin or renew looms ahead.

In Cyprus, the educational system is a powerful means of communication to address the chosen traumas to prevent future transgenerational transmissions and
simultaneously aid a new process of social identity via successful application of CT. Currently, education is being used to inflame the large-group identity disparities rather than enabling a healing process that is desperately needed in walled societies. Germany now operates under one educational system compared to the two distinct systems in Cyprus that was implemented in the early years of post-colonization. Other means need to be sought to increase communication across identity groups that have created a status quo lifestyle of avoidance.

Both Germany and Cyprus suffer from a non-existent national group identity, which has resulted in a system of mutual identity structural violence. Identity and its perceptions, beliefs and attitudes toward “others” are steeped in education and socialization that prevents future interaction. Inhibiting of identity group exchange only promotes a negative communication cycle, perpetually instilling social systems that are structurally violent. However, identity is not the only source of structural violence. The walls themselves are the most significant source of structural violence because of what it represents as a reservoir and as such, how individuals symbolically interact with the presence of walls, as well as its residual effects economically, politically and personally (this includes BHNs, personal rights and freedoms, and security).

One of the key finds of the Cymar Market Research cited in Cyprus is that there is a common belief that both large-group identities are able to coexist peacefully. Currently, Germany’s East and West identity groups are also living together in a state of peace, but not cohesion. This potentially identifies the creation of negative peace as the first step and cohesiveness as the second, thus accomplishing positive peace.
Through comparing both case studies of potential and actual applications of CT, the negative impacts on identity caused by walls can be reduced. Communication if applied effectively and meeting the four conditions, two of which were specifically discussed in the research (acquaintance potential and equal status), social biases, prejudices, negative attitudes, beliefs and stereotypes can be assuaged. The bottom line deduced from both case studies is that inter-group identity interaction is obligatory in post-wall zones to move forward positively and prevent any relapse or stagnation of identity-conflict.

8.2 Concluding Remarks

Finally, both case studies indicate that walls built during conflicts and political tensions are not a temporary measure. The BW existed for 28 years and the GL is still standing since built in 1974. Walls are long-term obstacles to peace and will indefinitely alter the identity landscape of affected areas.

This research and case studies used to learn more about the impacts walls have on identity and related tributaries demonstrate that the effects are massive and potentially permanent. However, theoretical applications are available to mitigate the negative consequences. This thesis examined walls and identity that include links to BHNs and security, but there are many other reactions to walled societies that need closer analysis to create a well-developed understanding of social impact as a whole. This paper illustrates that walls transform identities, create new identity groups during and after walls exist, influence the social restoration process in post-wall zones and compromise the safety and
well-being of citizens involved. The initial assumptions of this research are evident in the German and Cypriot wall case studies.
REFERENCES


Schmelz, Helmut. Interview by Sheena Rossiter. Tape recording interview. 6 Nov. 2009.


CURRICULUM VITAE

Suzan D. Tuğberk graduated from Hilton Head Preparatory School, Hilton Head Island, SC, in 2001. She received her Bachelor of Arts from George Mason University in 2006. She was employed as a development assistant at Georgetown University, later as the director of marketing for a financial services company and received her Master of Arts in Mediterranean Security Studies from University of Malta in 2011 and a Master of Science in Conflict Resolution and Analysis from George Mason University in 2012.