AN EXPLORATION OF LONERGAN'S METHOD:
CASE STUDY OF THE CONFLICT IN WESTERN SAHARA

by

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Case Study of the Conflict in Western Sahara

A thesis Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science at George Mason University and the degree of Master of Arts at the University of Malta

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Dedication

I dedicate this thesis to the victims of human historicity, which includes the refugees of the forgotten protracted conflict of my case study and all of us who have forgotten it.

I would also like to dedicate this thesis to my fiancée Mary Bremond, the unintended primary reason I went to study in Malta. Tu es la lumière de ma vie et je t'aime pour toujours.
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Abstract

AN EXPLORATION OF LONERGAN’S METHOD: CASE STUDY OF THE CONFLICT IN WESTERN SAHARA

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Bernard Lonergan’s methodology for developing insights has a successful history in third-party dispute resolution. Practitioners such as Melchin and Picard have applied and expanded Lonergan’s frameworks in interpersonal and interfaith conflict analysis and resolution. Lonergan’s analysis, however, expands beyond gaining insights in third-party mediation. He connects cognitive process with cycles of human development, focusing on the relationship between insights and progress, and bias and decline. This research explores Lonergan’s methodology, discusses comparative analysis with realist frameworks, explores his concept of bias, decline and progress, then applies Lonergan’s methods to analysis of the conflict in Western Sahara. Using Lonergan’s analytical framework provides a method of objectivity.

The territorial conflict between Morocco and Sahrawi nationalists entered its thirty-fifth year, with twenty years of stalemate for a referendum following a 1991 United Nations mandated ceasefire. The Kingdom of Morocco has not successfully negotiated
that autonomy is the best option for resolution. The Polisario Front, the Algerian supported Saharawi nationalist movement, has not convinced the international community that Morocco operates outside international law in preventing self-determination through a referendum. Realist doctrine as an analytical framework, hindered from resistance to humanist insights proves insufficient for addressing intrastate conflicts, such as Western Sahara.

In the fourth chapter, I develop Western Sahara as a case study to examine threats and cares for the stakeholders, bias, decline and progress, and through exploration of bias, historicity and meaning-making, authenticity and unauthenticity in authority. This research intends first to contribute knowledge in understanding application of Lonergan’s methods in intrastate conflict, and provide insights for analyzing the stalemate in Western Sahara.
Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Statement of Problem

This research seeks to explore interpretive frameworks from philosopher, theologian and economist Bernard Lonergan and theorists inspired by his work. Lonergan’s theories on cognitive operations provide discoveries to gaining insights in mediations and have been expanded by scholars such as Melchin and Picard in their work on insight meditation. While scholars influenced by Lonergan have explored his ideas in interpersonal and religious contexts, there is little examination of his methods in protracted international conflicts. This research will explore Lonergan’s methods then explore relevance of those methods to the conflict in Western Sahara as the case study.

1.2 Research Design and Method

This research model is qualitative in scope, using a flexible, exploratory research design. The research intends to answer the question: how do methods of Bernard Lonergan deepen analytical inquiry in interstate conflict? To conduct answer this question, I employ a grounded theory strategy of the methods of Bernard Lonergan. Robson (2002) notes,” The central aim of grounded theory is to generate theory from data collected during the study” (1). This research hypothesizes that Lonergan’s methods
provide deeper insights into international conflict, “grounding” the theory of his ideas’ relevance to frameworks and conflicts that he did not explore directly. In order to test, this hypothesis, I will explore his methods vis-à-vis realist international relations analysis, and then develop a case study strategy to apply Lonergan’s theory to an interstate conflict, the territorial dispute in Western Sahara. The research, in Lonergan’s terms, intends primarily to explain the theories and case study, rather than describe.

Dadosky (2010) states the following:

Description pertains to objects as related to the inquiring human subject, i.e. ‘things related to us’; it always involves the subject in the description. In contrast, explanation pertains to objects as related to one another, or ‘things related among themselves.’ The explanation as corroborated or verified is true independent of the subject. The movement to the world of theory occurs when a community moves beyond the world of practicality and commonsense to things as related to one another. (2)

I would commit an error to describe the conflict in Western Sahara related to his historical or ideological perspective. I would be prone to individual and group bias. If there were a personal relationship between myself and the conflict, then I risk, in Lonergan’s terms, describing the conflict rather than explaining it. In the second and third chapters, I provide understanding of Lonergan’s analysis through description of personal insight developments.

Defending the science of this research, I quote Robson as writing, “Associated with the scientific approach is the need for rigor and for rules or principles of procedure.
However… many real world studies permit both permit and require a flexibility design and execution” (3). I have followed rigor and rules for procedure and the design is flexible. He continues by stating, “The proposal for a real world emphasis is as much about an attitude of mind as an invitation to come out of the laboratory closet” (4).

This research, like Lonergan’s methodology, is outside of the laboratory. For the purpose of this inquiry and the theories of Lonergan, “method” implies operations of a creative, exploratory process. Jamie Price (2011) approaches “method” “in general terms” (5). This research follows Price’s usage of the term. He writes the following:

I invite you to differentiate methods and tools, and to reflect on method in a broader, more foundational sense: method not as technique, but as thinking cap; method as an investigative framework that enables scholars and practitioners to put their heads together to analyze and solve problems; method as a cognitive model that guides the way we use our minds to formulate questions, assess answers, transform the unknown into the known, options into decisions; method, in Bernard Lonergan’s phrase, as a ‘framework for collaborative creativity.’ (6)

Robson concurs. He notes, “Contrary to common preconceptions… it is not obvious what is meant by ‘science’ or ‘scientific’… The so-called ‘standard view’ of science derives directly from a philosophical approach known as positivism” (7).

Price asks his readers which scenario is more likely: biogenetic scientists developing revolutionary advancements in renewable energy or peacemakers and peacebuilders transforming religious conflicts by “making possible the development of
spiritually grounded policies, practices, and laws that directly serve human welfare and dignity without divisively politicizing religious belief and practice” (8). Price hypothesizes that virtually all audiences would wager the first scenario as more likely due to general understanding of method. For Price, scientists and engineers enjoy the reputation of sound methodology, while peacemakers and peacebuilders (including Lonergan, Kenneth Melchin, Cheryl Picard and Jamie Price, et al.) cope with greater uncertainty than professionals in the hard sciences. This is relevant to this research because Lonergan’s methodology is a framework of creativity, rather than a roadmap.

I will not provide a roadmap to solving individual, group or general bias, nor will I provide a roadmap to solving a relatively forgotten protracted conflict. I intend to provide a framework for insights and discover that build from Lonergan’s notions of data of consciousness through cognitive operations, the role of group and general bias in decline of common sense, how these processes affect national security analysis, and how inquiry through Lonergan’s theories, and scholars influenced by him, reveal insights toward thinking of protracted international conflict, with Western Sahara as the example.

Robson defines one form of case study as, “Studies of events, roles and relationships: Focus on a specific event. Very varied; includes police-citizen encounters; doctor-patient interactions; specific crimes or ‘incidents’ (e.g. disasters); studies of role conflicts, stereotypes, adaptions” (9). Since my research is not ethnographic, Robson’s application of case study for qualitative analysis relates to this project through “study of role conflicts, stereotypes and adaptations. He continues by stating, “There may be
difficulties in defining and delimiting exactly what one means by the ‘case’ when the focus moves away from the individual person. Case studies are, then, very various” (10).

Lastly, Robson notes, “In one sense, all enquiries are case studies. They take place at a particular time in particular places with particular people. Stressing this signals that the design flexibility inherent in the case study is there in all studies until we, as it were, design it out” (11). Although the methods and the case study are not positivist, the research sufficiently demonstrates qualitative scientific methodology.

1.3 Purpose of Study

Robson notes that the ideal flexible design researcher must lack bias (12). He writes, “Skills are negated if they are simply used to substantiate a preconceived notion. Investigators should be open to contrary findings. During the data collection, preliminary finding should be submitted to critical colleagues who are asked to offer alternative explanations for the data collection” (13). In Lonergan’s terms, Robson’s call for objectivity is a method for developing insights. The third chapter returns to discuss the role of bias. For the rationale of this research, I will discuss the objective transformation of this research through my development of insights.

Brian Hall offers an anecdote in which he mediates two business partners who could not share the same point of view (14). Hall relates that one saw himself as the optimist while the other saw himself as the pragmatist. Hall recalls a dream he shared with them. While on a sailboat tied to a pier, he looked in one direction and saw cloudless skies and ideal sailing conditions. The rest looked in the opposite direction and had a
different experience. Storm clouds loomed from their vantage on Hall’s imaginary craft. They protested to Hall the danger of the voyage, but Hall could not relate to their experience. In the dream, no party could turn around so no one related to the other’s experience. The two parties had different and opposite world views thus creating conflict. Hall’s anecdote introduces the methodological genesis for this research project.

The case study of interest is the stalemate between Western Saharan nationalists and the Kingdom of Morocco. In light of Hall’s metaphor, I am not on the boat. Not long before the initial thesis proposal drafting (which has little to do with this product), I, like many Americans, virtually had no idea that a conflict of contested statehood between Morocco and Sahrawi nationalists, the Polisario Front (Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el-Hamra y Rio de Oro) exists, let alone that the conflict is older than I am. Compelled to alleviate my own ignorance, I initially set course to study the conflict; however, I soon discovered myself developing bias without due examination of the opposing point of view, essentially I found myself on Hall’s proverbial boat. With prior education in post-colonial theory, I discovered a thesis proposal that appeared to be an undergraduate research assignment (and a poor one at that) for a Marxist economics seminar. With all due apologies to Moroccan readers, I egregiously neglected their needs and interests through a narrow analysis of neorealist economic and political power dynamics infused with critique of identity-based nationalist ambitions. The analytical errors of the proposal transformed the thesis research into a project that relegated the case study secondary to the inquiry of the analytical framework.
The initial research questions became less relevant (and irrelevant in some cases) as I investigated questions raised through inquiry in what seemed a wholly unrelated framework, including Lonergan, Hall, and others. Throughout the course of this project, I found my clearest insights not in review of scholarship pertaining to the conflict, but in reflections of it following examination of the methods and theories associated with philosopher, theologian and economist Bernard Lonergan. Through Lonergan’s analysis, I distance myself from Hall’s metaphorical boat. Indeed, without personal history to the conflict vantage from either direction would be in contempt of critical thinking since secondary sources mostly are the evidence available. Many of Lonergan’s conclusions, and ideas of those inspired by him, are universal and this project will explore them within the body of this project. Mostly, the course of this work will be epistemological in its evaluation, with emphasis on Lonergan’s method then developing application to the case study.

Beards borrows from Mackie a philosophical exercise that assists analogically the struggle of analysis for the outside observer (15). If I stand in a forest and wish to determine the height of a tree, then I am aware of the features around me, of my own calculations and, provided the appropriate instruments available, able to determine to the truth, or accuracy, of the tree's height. I will be aware of asserting a claim to the truth of the tree, but individuals often do not assert claims of knowledge about the claiming of knowledge. To do so, demands further questioning about the proposal's truth-claim: ‘I am making a judgment about a tree,’ rather, answer the proposition through demonstration of the evidence through the understanding the performative process (16). Thus, if I seek to
demonstrate knowledge about the conflict in Western Sahara, or any conflict for that matter (analogically, this equates to calculating the height of the tree), I must first be aware of his or her location, which in this sense is outside the forest. The instruments available to me derive from various sources with diverse vantages to the conflict, hence vastly different data sets for measurement. Therefore, in step with Mackie’s rubric, the truth-claim that I logically can determine about the conflict is not the height of the tree, for to do so when applied to the conflict requires instrumentation that does not exist. I may assess the various measurements from the diverse populations submitting analysis, and logically conclude that I am best equipped to analyze my judgments about the conflict, rather than judge the conflict on its own merits.

Perhaps the Kingdom of Morocco and their Western power alliance (namely the United States, France, the United Nations, et al.) act solely in state interest as they continue to oppress, marginalize, and deny human dignity to the victimized Sahrawis bravely represented by the Polisario Front, which enjoys diplomatic legitimacy from many African Union and non-aligned states. Perhaps the Sahrawis are held captive as political pawns by a few remaining Cold War relic cadres who are pawns of Algeria's competition with Morocco and who threaten Moroccan and international security. Perhaps they obstinately defy King Muhammad VI’s pragmatic autonomy plan in favor of prolonging stalemate for an impractical referendum for a state that if accepted by the international community would be failed-on-arrival as a state and a potential haven for al Qaeda (17). Both positions, among others, demonstrate salient, polemic arguments
advocated by activists, governmental observers, non-governmental organizations, journalists, academics, and others.

If upon conclusion of this research, both the Morocco and Polisario positions have been articulated and critical evaluated though neither position endorsed, then I have accomplished his objective of abstaining from values of judgment (18) in favor of judgments of fact (19), effectively staying off Hall’s boat in order to observe the parties looking in opposite directions. Thus, this body of research seeks to expand a theoretical framework to a conflict of which it previously had not been applied, or at least known to me. In order to accomplish this mission, I will provide a detailed literature review and assessment of the theoretical framework then attempt to apply it to the stalemate of referendum in Western Sahara.

1.4 Limitations of Study

Due to financial and time restraints, I was not able to travel to Morocco or the disputed region during the research and drafting of this thesis, nor am I adequately literate in the critical languages of the conflict, including Hassaniya Arabic, Moroccan Arabic, Spanish or French. Therefore, all sources relating to the case study are English in their origin.

Both sides of the conflict had expressed their interest in informing this research. I was not able formally to employ some key observations and was unable to arrange meeting with other knowledgeable parties due to scheduling difficulties. While several parties will not be referenced directly due to university administrative procedures, their
opinions and insights pertaining to the case study appreciatively increased my humble acumen of the subject.

Many distinguished Lonergan scholars, including my thesis chair, have outstanding expertise on how Lonergan’s methodology. There was not sufficient opportunity to collaborate with these scholars to discuss protracted international conflict analysis and resolution.

1.5 Data Collection

I collected the data for this thesis through literary resources including scholarly articles, chapters, and books pertaining to theories of Bernard Lonergan and scholars building on his work, including insight theory of mediation. I also collected a body of literature pertaining to the conflict in Western Sahara. These sources included non-governmental organization reports from organizations advocating the Kingdom of Morocco’s position and the Sahrawi nationalist position. I sought third party literature including reports from the United Nations, United States government hearings, African Union, and international newspaper reports. I had the pleasure to meet with first generation Moroccan nationals in the United States, a Southern Sudan referendum activist, and non-governmental organization leaders whose opinions shaped my analysis. Due to administrative constraints, I do not directly use data collected by those individuals willing to share their thoughts on this project. Through advancing my acumen of case study, I hope that those who aided this work would see indirectly the value of their time.
Also I attended a two week national security analysis conference hosted by Johns Hopkins University. I ascertained valuable insights about how Lonergan’s theories operate in the analytical discourse of realism in national security. I will offer a discussion on these discoveries.

1.6 Data Analysis

When drafting the outline of this research, I originally had intended more prominence to analysis of the case study rather than to analyzing the framework. As the research advanced, the original research questions became less important as new questions arose. I focus greatly on interpreting Lonergan’s thoughts, then applying them to the Western Saharan conflict. The research provides background to the conflict, and traces how the discussions on Lonergan and other scholars discussed provide insights to the Western Saharan conflict.

1.7 Measuring Instrument

According to Robson, “This approach to research makes great demands on the researcher while carrying out the study. It is commonly said that it involves the researcher-as-instrument” (20). With respect to Robson’s acknowledgment that I am the instrument of the research, a net-book and digital recorder aided the research and drafting of this project, which were essential since I traveled between the United States and Europe while researching and drafting.
The following chapter begins with review the objectives of this research, discusses the context of method as it applies to this study, introduces background of the Bernard Lonergan, and then reviews the literature numerous scholars who have explored Lonergan’s ideas. Following the discussion of scholars influenced by Lonergan, the chapter then discusses ideas from Lonergan’s thought published through collected essays that this research finds applicable to interstate and intrastate conflict.

In the third chapter, I will discuss bias from the perspective briefly from realism, from Lonergan, and from scholars influenced by his work. I explore bias from the vantage of a text outlining approaches to national security analysis. I will demonstrate how Lonergan’s framework builds on established methodology for analyzing conflict from the national security perspective. The third chapter also discusses Lonergan’s concept of knowledge vis-à-vis national security analysis in order to explore similar themes in the analytical discourses.

The fourth chapter introduces the case study of the Western Saharan conflict. The chapter begins with a literature review of scholarly, journalistic, governmental and non-governmental organization texts that address the conflict, and then presents a brief historical background and overview of the role of international and national third parties, and significant regional and global contexts. Finally, the chapter discusses how ideas presented in prior chapters apply to the conflict.
The fifth chapter summarizes the most significant findings from the preceding chapters and concludes with personal observations, insights and recommendations. Following the conclusion, the appendices include a matrix charting Lonergan’s theory of cognitive operations, a map of the conflict territory and a map of Morocco’s historical claims of territory.
Chapter 1 Notes

4. Ibid, 10.
6. Ibid.
7. Robson, 19.
10. Ibid.
11. Robson, 184.
13. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Pham, J. Peter. “Not Another Failed State: Toward a Realistic Solution in the Western Sahara.” *Journal of the Middle East and Africa* 1 (2010), 18.
Chapter 2: Background and Literature Review

2.1 Chapter Introduction

In providing background and literature review, I introduce ideas from Lonergan and scholars building on his theories. In the following chapter, I will discuss insights from Lonergan’s methodology compared with realist national security analytical methodology. The following chapter then discusses the effect of bias on analysis and historical development, then methods to overcome bias. The fourth chapter provides literature review, background of the case study and analysis.

When contemplating a nearly four decade old protracted conflict that observers note is understudied, (1) why approach the issue guided by the thinking by a Canadian Jesuit philosopher? Literature on the Western Sahara conflict tends to be polemic, advocating either the Moroccan position or the Western Saharan position (2). Lonergan’s approach offers an ontological methodology to approach the conflict against polemics by analyzing the emotive attachments from various viewpoints of the conflict.
2.2 Context for Lonergan’s Method

Bernard Lonergan (1904 - 1984) was born in Quebec Canada and graduated from the University of London in 1926. His dissertation “came to a personal confrontation with St. Thomas and Aristotle that would leave him far from the established ‘schools’ and be powerful in fertilizing his own influence for further evolution and new creative thinking” (3). Lonergan published in 1957 his landmark treatise *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, which Crowe and Vertin describe as “a profound rethinking of cognitive theory on the basis of seven centuries of mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, depth psychology, the social and human sciences, and modern philosophy” (4).

Lonergan’s process of cognitive operations, to which I will return momentarily, provides a foundation to seek and discover new insights that ultimately lead to transformation of the conflict; it does not argue, for instance, that a problem is economic and therefore requires an economic plan in order to address the problem. Lonergan’s understanding of methodology is a creative process that occurs when parties in conflict learn about the relationships between the threats the face and the cares they support.

These discoveries occur to us daily. For example at a grocery store in Malta, I accidentally blocked the passage of a grocery associate while he attempted to perform his task (a position I labored in throughout my undergraduate career). I offered to him, “Let me get out of your way.” The associate experienced hearing a customer react to being in his way. Asking of himself, “what is it?” he searched for understanding. The associate
understood the customer say, “Get out of my way.” Reflecting, the associate asked himself, “Is it so?” (So I gathered by his angry reaction to experiencing my unusual syntax for a polite deference to his passage.) In order to gain insight, he retorted harshly, “Did you tell me to get out of your way?” Responding to his quest for insights, I experienced my own and politely repeated my deference. Having deliberated, evaluated and decided upon his insight, he apologized for his misunderstanding. I politely replied that I understood. This misunderstanding demonstrates a real-world application of a Lonergan methodology to gain insights in order to convert potentially violent communication into non-violent communication.

As the example above, much of Lonergan’s literature and scholarship related to his ideas addressed interpersonal conflict or issues associated with religious conflict. The conflict in Western Sahara is not religious in its origin, whereas the stakeholders share Islam in common. Lonergan’s frameworks such as cognitive operations, discovering insights, and “de-linking” (5) are core concepts of insight meditation, in which practitioners often apply in interpersonal conflicts or religious conflict.

Meynell quotes Lonergan as seeking to “thoroughly understand what it is to understand, and not only will you understand the broad lines of all there is to be understood, but also you will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all further developments of understanding” (6). According to Haughey, “Lonergan’s understanding of understanding developed from his sorting out and distinguishing the component parts of achieving knowledge and determining choices. After thinking through its discrete operations, he posits what he calls a transcendental precept for each
component in the process. The steps are first to be attentive in taking in one’s experience” (7).

His next landmark opus *Method in Theology*, published in 1973 builds on his methodologies from *Insight*. In this text, drawing from interdisciplinary sources, Lonergan presents ideas on subjects such as human development, human historicity and others that influence essays that I will review shortly. In *Insight*, he outlines cognitive operations he considers (8) “data of consciousness” and characterizes the following: experiencing, which is the sense of incoming data; understanding, which asks of the experience “what is it”; and reflecting, which asks of the understanding “is it so”, thus testing the insight by reflecting on the understanding (9). The cognitive operation then progresses into a decision phase in which the information is valued for significance, deliberated for options for available responses, evaluated for action of best outcome, then decision on whether to take the action (10).

2.3 Literature Review

Through articles, chapters, and working papers, the work of many scholars profited this research on Lonergan. Several books were particularly useful in providing me with a background to the work of Bernard Lonergan. Fredrick Crowe, an editor of Lonergan’s *Collected Works*, has published over 100 books, chapters and articles on the thoughts of Bernard Lonergan. Published in 1989, *Appropriating the Lonergan Idea*, edited by Michael Vertin, thoroughly covers the development, expansion and influence of
Lonergan’s philosophy and theology. This thesis has relied on Crowe and Vertin for a wealth of background information on Lonergan’s theories.

Michael Shute (1993) published The Origins of Lonergan’s Notions of the Dialectic of History. This text has been of extraordinary value for contextualizing Lonergan’s essay on history, which this research will examine shortly. Expanded from his doctoral dissertation, Shute’s text is of particular interest to this thesis in discussion of bias and cycles of decline and progress.

Of the scholarship that I examined exploring Lonergan’s thoughts, I found Hugo Meynell’s An Introduction to the Philosophy of Bernard Lonergan (1991) to be the most accessible for researchers (especially non–theologians, such as myself) seeking a foundation in Lonergan’s frameworks. Like the preceding books mentioned, much of Meynell’s text has limited application for this research, yet it strengthened my grounding in Lonergan’s discourse. I will revisit Meynell in examination of bias in the following chapter. Meynell argues that Lonergan is one of the most important thinkers of the twentieth century. He suggests, “Out of all contemporary philosophers of very first rank, Bernard Lonergan has been up to now the most neglected” (11).

Glowacki (2011) considers twenty years after Meynell’s assertion that study of Bernard Lonergan's theories in methodology of interiority, from which scholars advanced insight theory, has grown in prominence (12). She explores theoretical linkage between Lonergan, insight theory, and Buddhism. I found Glowacki’s chart organizing Lonergan’s four levels of cognition particularly useful and thank her for permission to include it in the appendix of this research. She quotes Picard as describing Lonergan’s
work as, “A discovery process where we come to understand our cognitive performativity in day-to-day actions” (13). Inspired by Lonergan’s teaching, scholars at Carleton University in Ottawa Canada, including Picard, developed insight theory of mediation.

Glowacki suggests exploring Lonergan and insight theory demonstrates growing attention to his analytical frameworks. Nunez (1999) applies Lonergan’s theological ethics to environmentalism (14) and Haughey (2002) studies Lonergan’s in terms of responsibility in human rights. Haughey notes that Lonergan did not address directly human rights, but Haughey builds on Lonergan’s insights on ethics and apprehension of values to support human rights theory (15). Haughey writes, “In the case of human rights one would see the truth of human dignity both in the abstract and concretely as warranting the assent of judgments of fact and value, thus being open to action on behalf of the one possessing that dignity” (16). Haughey sees human dignity in Lonergan’s judgments of fact and value. For Lonergan, Haughey would argue, human dignity would operate as a good, and for Lonergan “good is concrete rather than an abstraction” (17).

Brennan (2008) in an online chapter expanded to a law review article, which I will discuss shortly, explores Lonergan’s insights on authority and authenticity. Brennan (2005/2006) also applies Lonergan’s theories to legal theory in inquiry of the rule of law. He quotes Lonergan from Insight, “Prior to the criteria of truth invented by philosophers, there is a dynamic criterion of the further question immanent in intelligence itself” (18). Brennan refers to this inquiry as “inner law.” He writes, “It precedes, and asks to measure, all else that might come later, including especially what we do in the name of law. The law of any community, I shall argue, is what is generated by and only by human
operators faithful to the foundational operator that is inner law. For that desire, rather than something external to us, is our ‘natural law’ (19). His invocation of Lonergan explores and interiority and the law. His aim is to “pursue the alternative claim that, in virtue of how we human beings have been made, first, that a rule of law is possible, second, there is no credible alternative to its being a dynamic activity and achievement, and third, living lawfully is a matter of humans’ succeeding in the inherently dynamic work of their own intelligent self-constitution” (20). Brennan’s rule of law articulation informs Lonergan’s theories applied to peacebuilding and peacemaking in conflict resolution. While his study on Lonergan’s interiority in the rule of law is informative for the reasons discussed above, his section on authority illuminates portions of Lonergan’s philosophy that I find is more pertinent to the questions of this research than his work on “inner law.”

Also researching study of Lonergan’s ideas, Derek Melchin (2008), son of Kenneth Melchin whom I will discuss shortly, published his dissertation on transformation of religious conflict through insight, learning, and dialogue. Melchin’s exploration of Lonergan in religious-based conflict attests to the success of insight theory in interpersonal disputes. Melchin explores insights resulting from “dialogue situations” in which “one may wonder about all kinds of different things that crop up during the course of a conversation. “What do you mean by that?” “Why did he use that word?” “Why doesn't her facial expression match what she's telling me?” “Why isn't he understanding what I'm trying to tell him?” (21). The context of the above is parties in a religious dispute; there is relevance for any mediation or negotiation.
Beards (1994) addresses Lonergan’s theories in the construction of historicity. For the purposes of this research, I found Beards’ analysis helpful for understanding the application of Lonergan in the context of interstate and intrastate conflict. The discussion of Lonergan’s construction of historicity returns to Beards.

McPartland (2007), like Beards, is concerned with Lonergan’s role in the philosophy of history. McPartland writes, “Lonergan is known principally for his cognitional theory and his theological methodology, his earliest intellectual ambition was to formulate a modern philosophy of history… For various reasons… he never addressed this task in a single work. We must accordingly look for his reflections on the philosophy of history scattered in various books, articles, and lectures” (22). McPartland’s discussion of Lonergan and the philosophy of history are useful for background information, but diverge from this research’s utility. Lonergan’s answers to Marx, Hegel, and others do not address the aim of this research.

McCarthy (1997), like McPartland, examines Lonergan in the context of conflict within philosophy. McCarthy writes, “The crisis in contemporary culture reflects a dramatic shift in the assessment of human reason. In the first phase of modernity, scientific rationality was judged to be omnicompetent; in the second postmodern phase, there has been increasing despair about the possibility of rational agreement, even in the province of science” (23). He concludes that the conflict in philosophy has supported emotivism in ethics and relativism in epistemology. Lonergan’s analysis is central to McCarthy’s discussion on conflict in philosophy. He discusses the effect of emotions and values on conflict; however, the scholarly work of McCarthy, like McPartland, is not the
most useful source for this research’s exploration of Lonergan in conflict analysis and resolution.

As noted in the preceding chapter, Lonergan draws distinction between explanation and description. Dadosky (2010), building on Lonergan scholar Robert Doran (1979), expands on this dialectic through religious symbolism. Dadosky presents the following example:

One of the goals in the natural and human sciences is to move from description to explanation. That is, a biologist is not just interested in the description of this particular organism; she is interested in understanding how that organism is related to other organisms in the same genus or species. In other words, she is interested in the nature of the organism.

(24)

Dadosky’s analysis focuses on Lonergan’s ideas toward religious symbolism and meaning-making. This research will return to meaning-making in discussion of Lonergan’s essays.

Nielsen (1991) explores Lonergan’s concepts of community building in the context of organizational management. He offers a method across traditions and cultures. Nielsen writes:

In the pattern of objective consciousness, the ‘objectivity’ of the ‘other’ is the result of three distinct judgments: I am, you are, and I am not you. The pattern is different with intersubjective consciousness. While the first two
remain the same, the third moment is fundamentally different: ‘I am not you,’ one makes the judgment that ‘I am we.’ (25)

He describes Lonergan’s intersubjectivity as, “The spontaneous helping of a falling person. …‘This prior ‘we’ is vital and functional. Just as one spontaneously raises one’s arm to ward off a blow against one’s head, so with the same spontaneity one reaches out to save another from falling” (26). Lonergan’s notion of “I am we” is vital component of his theories, but due to the breadth of Lonergan’s writing and scope of this research, this research does not focus on this section.

For Lonergan, as will be discussed shortly, power resides in cooperational authority resulting from the strength of community. While Nielsen expands Lonergan to the workplace, the application is relevant for conflict resolution. Nielsen's testimony to Lonergan's cross-cultural and cross-traditional universality assists this research, lest in the fourth chapter I present a monolithic study with assumption that the Western Sahara conflict operates within the cultural norms of Lonergan.

Orji in his 2005 dissertation, published in 2008, also applies a cross-cultural, cross-traditional reading of Lonergan. Orji explores Lonergan's work on four-fold formation of dramatic, individual, group and general biases, transforming into short-term and long-term decline, as does Fitterer (2008) Nordquest (1994) and many others. This chapter returns to this topic when reviewing Lonergan’s work and focuses on the discussion in the following chapter. Orji applies his field study in Sub-Saharan Africa while working on religious and ethnic conflict. Most notable for this product, Orji
expands on Lonergan’s discussion of bias in Insight Orji, like Derek Melchin, primarily is concerned with applying Lonergan to religious conflict. Orji, however, interprets Lonergan’s methodology in ethnic conflict through his field work experiences in Nigeria.

Kegan (1982) focuses on human development. Concerned with cognitive psychology, he outlines subject-object balancing in Kolhberg's stages of moral development. While many of the problems Kegan addresses in developmental psychology have limited relevance to international conflicts between interstate and intrastate actors, I find particular relevance in Kohlberg’s stages of moral development within the context of discussing Lonergan in the international conflict (27). Stages one through five are as follows: the first is punishment and obedience orientation, with a social perceptions as the subject “structure” and reflexes, sensations, movements as the object “content”; The second is instrumental orientation, with simple role-taking and marketplace reciprocity as the subject and social perceptions as the object. The third stage is interpersonal concordance orientation, in which subject values are mutuality and reciprocal roles-taking and object values are mutuality and reciprocal role-taking. The fourth stage is social orientation, valuing structurally societal groups and institutional society and objectively mutuality and reciprocal role-taking (28). Finally, Kohlberg's last stage is universal principles orientation. This stage subjectively values community of the whole, rights, and inter-individuality. Objectively, this stage values societal group and institutional society (29).

Kegan presents an example of 1978 field research of moral judgment interviews with Israeli soldiers. For some, he writes, “The Arabs were simply not considered as
human as the Israelis” (30). He continues that other Israeli soldiers reported, “They maintained a sense of being only part of a bigger collective to which the Arabs had also to be admitted, however begrudgingly” (31). Then he discusses the reactions of Israeli soldier-medics. Kegan writes, “Most would take little or no measures to care for [the wounded] and one even suggested that it was preferable to murder them to eliminate the chance of their killing more Israelis” (32). Finally, Kegan presents a medic who reacted morally within Kohlberg’s fourth stage of social orientation. Kegan documents the medic stating:

Now if you understand… that I took care of them in the exact manner as I took care of Israelis—well, if you’re talking about the medical part it’s correct. If you are referring to the spiritual part it’s incorrect… Regarding the Arab I’ll do the same actions, but I’ll do it not out of love—well, out of—I don’t know, not out of love for the man but out of some kind of duty I feel I have toward him. (33)

I find Kegan’s research anecdote particularly compelling. In terms of applying Kohlberg’s stages of morality to a protracted conflict, if stakeholders, especially combatants, could progress to Kohlberg’s fourth stage of moral development, the implications for post-conflict peacemaking would be virtually ideal. The fifth stage of universal principles orientation literally would be ideal, but the fourth stage would be good. Without attempting to echo realist proponents of perpetuating negative peace (34), if the combatants are not combatting lest we dismiss the progress of a fourth stage in
want of the fifth. In terms of the case study I will examine, I have found only trace information that directly addresses rebuilding relationships post-stalemate (when and if ever that might be). With two decades of negative peace, let us hope that there will be capacity for building fourth stage moral development.

Kenneth Melchin and Cheryl Picard have been leaders in application of Lonergan’s methodology in conflict analysis and resolution. As architects of the insight theory of mediation at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada, Melchin and Picard have developed an approach to conflict resolution that seeks understandings within the negotiation, facilitation or mediation and to break through stalemates.

They outline a five-step process to insight mediation. The first step is attending to the process. They write about this step, “The goal is for the mediator and parties to arrive at a shared understanding of the process and protocols to be used in the mediation session, and for parties to agree to proceed on the basis of this understanding” (35). According to Melchin and Picard, the next step in insight mediation is to broaden understanding, which mediators do by allowing the stakeholders to talk to each other about why they have participated and what they wish to achieve from the discussion if the talks advance (36). Melchin and Picard write, “Beginning mediation by stating hopes about a productive conversation, rather than re-articulating demands, has the effect of setting the discussion on a positive footing and encouraging parties to begin the hard work involved in mediation” (37). For Melchin and Picard, the third step, deepening insights, is the most important. Lonergan’s influence on this step is invaluable to the process. Melchin and Picard write the following:
Deepening insights involves identifying and probing more deeply into feelings to understand the values, cares, and threats that lie behind the issues in the dispute. Here is where the important learning occurs. In this step, mediators are particularly empathetic and nonjudgmental, and they draw heavily upon curiosity, skills of reflective listening, and strategies of deepening, to evoke the parties' own questioning about what lies below the surface of the conflict. (38)

When stakeholders of a conflict fail to listen to each other’s feelings, there are few breakthroughs toward resolving the conflict. Lonergan’s method of understanding and reflecting operates best at this level through focus on valuing the cares and threats that drive the conflict. Melchin and Picard’s fourth step is exploring possibilities, which occurs “quite naturally and easily once parties gain insights into the values and cares behind actions, overcome barriers imposed by feelings of threat, and come to realize that both sets of cares can coexist” (39). The last step focuses on making decisions. Melchin and Picard emphasize that each step requires active, consensual process from both parties to move the discussion towards a desired outcome (40). While examining the five steps of insight mediation are necessary to developing the influence of Lonergan on conflict analysis and resolution, the context of these five steps occurs for the mediator who has stakeholders present at the mediation. Melchin and Picard have success in their methods; however, it is difficult to conceive application of their ideas to international conflicts outside of the negotiation table. In interstate and intrastate conflicts where an analyst does
not have stakeholders present in order to gain insights, one still may obtain insights by focusing on the threats and cares of each faction.

Melchin and Picard focus on the relationships between threats and cares. Key questions for them include, “What are mediators looking to do when they probe for underlying cares and threats? How do these cares and threats function to create and sustain conflicts? What happens when parties make breakthroughs that open new avenues for resolution? What is the ‘magic’ really about?” (41). Melchin and Picard write, “Insight mediators understand that conflicts arise when we believe that our cares are threatened by those of others. Because conflicts involve values, we experience threats to our values as threats to ourselves as persons” (42).

Melchin and Picard’s methodology is profoundly and admittedly optimistic. Through examination of the case study, and meeting with stakeholders who are not directly quoted in this research, optimism does not drive the process. Melchin and Picard write the following:

Still, through all this realism, conflicts continue to be resolved. Even when outcomes cannot be called ‘resolution,’ intervention strategies open new avenues for living with differences. We are not always sure how this happens. Nor are we always sure how to make it happen again. But we do know that, sometimes, some interventions do help. Consequently, much of the original optimism about the role of conflict practitioners remains. (43)
The context Melchin and Picard write in the above, again, is not the international theater. International conflicts in which state interest is a factor have by definition avoided premises that account for the optimism of insight mediators; premises such as negotiations based on values, feelings and emotions. Such terminology has been mocked by power elites in United States foreign policy (44), yet realist approaches to conflict resolution have failed to break stalemates in conflict such as Cyprus, Israel and Palestine, and many others, including Western Sahara and Morocco.

From the analytical perspective, researchers who have visited the refugee camps document emotional, personal accounts that inform insight theory of analysis. Furthermore, a realist analysis understates the emotions of the conflict for the stakeholders. While I researched the case study, I was aware that this is an academic exercise that intends to contribute knowledge to the conflict analysis and resolution field. When I presented ideas of this conflict to acquaintances unfamiliar with the conflict in Western Sahara, many queries centered on “who cares,” which quickly translates into “I do not know about it and why should I care about it?” Dismissive inquiry of lesser known conflicts might produce such emotive questions. If this is so, then it is appropriate for a researcher to investigate his own emotive responses to data collected throughout the research. Lest I neglect that this conflict has caused extreme suffering and human capital damage for longer than I have been alive.

The dominant framework for discussing protracted international conflicts such as Western Sahara is the realist doctrine, which focuses the state as “the central unit in international relations and is the central reference point for security” (45). From a realist
perspective, there is no reason for me as a researcher to concern myself with the plight of
refugees who have been living in inhospitable conditions, separated from their families
for over thirty years. Likewise, a realist methodology does not provide a framework for
me to empathize with Morocco’s threat to national identity and legitimacy of the crown.
Butler (2009) notes, “Given its roots in a Machiavellian appreciation for power, a
Hobbesian pessimism of regarding human nature, and a Clausewitzian belief in the
notion of war as the continuation of politics by other means, realism is the progenitor of
the field of security studies” (46). Hans J. Morgenthau, an architect of American realism,
believed that states do not possess feelings and are therefore irrelevant to conflict analysis
and resolution (47).

If realist theory, often supported by proponents of conservative political ideology,
abhors consideration of the state as living, breathing, human entity, then it is curious that
in American political and economic theatre is willing to afford this right to corporations. I
find this sadly ironic because the discussion of feelings in the international theatre has
been marginalized; however, the United States Supreme Court in 1886 granted the
fourteenth amendment to corporations in Santa Clara County vs. Southern Pacific
Railroad (48) and strengthened the freedom of speech in 2010 for corporations in
Citizens United vs. Federal Election Commission (49). I should not reject the premise of
a question that inquires how the Kingdom of Morocco feels about its state security or its
claims to a pre-colonial kingdom that included the land disputed today, nor should I
reject inquiry of how the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic feels about the indefinite
postponement of their statehood recognition ambitions.
Melchin and Picard suggest, “Values manifest themselves in feelings: the stronger the value, the more intense the feeling. Insight mediators believe that understanding our actions involves acknowledging our feelings and gaining insight into the values, cares, and threats that lie behind them” (50). Values and feelings are not relevant only to interpersonal parties in conflict mediation, parties such as a divorcing couple, an inter-religious conflict, or participants of an international conflict, and others. Values and feelings are relevant for me to gain insight to what is at stake for the stakeholders. Melchin and Picard write, “Sometimes values actually are in conflict and perceived threats are real. What is important, in these cases, is understanding the boundaries of the conflicts and threats. This is what can be achieved through the insights that understand the values operative in parties’ feelings” (51). For instance, the threat of a fully recognized Sahrawi nationalist state is a real threat to the Kingdom of Morocco, as is the permanent postponement of an independence referendum for the Sahrawi nationalists.

Thus, for Melchin and Picard, conflict arises from threats and cares. Stakeholders need to the process between feelings and threats behind, or de-linking, and to learn from Lonergan’s term of inverse insights. Melchin and Picard write:

What inverse insights discover is that expected meaning or intelligibility implied in the questioning is not present in the particular body of experience. Questions bring specific expectations to our experiences. They orient us in particular directions because they lead us to expect certain things in the experiences. Inverse insights disengage us from these
expectations, and they open up our learning to new lines of questioning that explore alternative pathways. (52)

In terms of mediations or negotiations, unanticipated reactions occur to experiences. For instance, perhaps the inverse insight might be a tactic of deception. The lessons are useful for purposes of examining interstate and intrastate conflict because the actors, while ostensibly representing the interest of their constituents, are individual rational actors. Melchin and Picard suggest, “Conflicts, even when they involve violence and abuse, often draw parties into distorted expectations about the necessity or inevitability about their situation. Parties feel that there is no way out” (53). This describes the stalemate in Western Sahara, as this research will examine more closely in the fourth chapter.

The context for applying Lonergan’s insights and Melchin and Picard’s insight mediation is clearest in interpersonal disputes where parties are able to meet directly through a mediator and learn from insights gained while exploring threats and cares. They write the following:

Insight mediators use the language of cares and threats in mediation, and Lonergan’s philosophy presents a theory of feelings and values that helps explain how cares and threats function to dynamize conflict. Feelings carry deeper values, but they often do this work without our reflective awareness or understanding. (54)
Lonergan’s frameworks in international contexts of interstate and intrastate stakeholders are challenging to apply. While Lonergan’s methodology and insight theory have clearest applications for two-party disputes, exploring relevancy beyond a mediation or negotiation table proves to be more difficult because neither nation-states nor non-state actor organizations are monolithic, personal entities.

For example, one might more easily imagine Christopher Ross, the current United Nations Special Envoy for the Western Sahara conflict, employing Lonergan’s methodology during high-level negotiations with the key stakeholders than using Lonergan’s methodology to address the conflict’s root causes. Ross could examine the insights of Polisario Front leader Muhammad Abdelaziz, but not of the Polisario or of the Sahrawis. In order to consider Lonergan’s relevance outside of the negotiation table, several of his essays, building on cognitive operational theories, prove useful for analyzing interstate and intrastate conflict.

Individuals necessarily lead states and organizations of non-state actors, and individuals comprise both entities, therefore despite realist criticism of international relations that rejects attention to emotions and feelings, this research finds it appropriate and necessary to consider them in analysis of conflict, hence logically providing for a Lonergan’s exploration of protracted international conflicts such as the case study of Western Sahara, to be explored more deeply in the fourth chapter.
Most of the Lonergan’s literature examined in this research draws from essays published in *A Third Collection: Papers by Bernard J.F. Lonergan, S.J.*, published in 1985, and *Collected Works* of Bernard Lonergan, published in 2005. Building on his ideas throughout his career and pivotal works, *A Third Collection and Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan: Philosophical and Theological Papers, 1965-1980* include thoughts that I find highly relevant to interstate and intrastate conflict. From *Third Collection*, scholarship of focus to this research includes: “Dialectic of Authority” and “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness” and “Healing and Creating in History.” This research discusses “The Human Good” from *Collected Works: Philosophical and Theological Papers*. The following chapter will discuss sections from *Insight*, discussing ideas of the known and unknown, and then focusing on how bias affects cognitive operations and common sense.

Published in 1985, “Dialectic of Authority” explores the relationship power and authenticity. Lonergan writes, “Authority is legitimate power” and “the source of power is cooperation” (55). In an interstate conflict where territory is subject to dispute, at root cause for Lonergan is lack of cooperation from the stakeholders. He continues by stating the following:

As the source of power is cooperation, so the carrier of power is the community. By a community is not meant a number of people within a frontier. Community means people with a common field of experience,
with a common or at least complimentary way of understanding things, with common judgments and common aims. Without a common field of experience people are out of touch... they will misunderstand one another, grow suspicious, distrustful, hostile, violent. Without common judgments they will live in different worlds, and without common aims they will work at cross-purposes. Such, then, is community, and it is community that hands on the discoveries and inventions of the past and, as well, cooperates in the present, so it is the community that is the carrier of power. (56)

In chapter four, I will explore the role of community between the stakeholders. It is not sufficient to hypothesize and conclude that community relationships between Polisario separatists and the Moroccan government severely are broken. The narratives of the refugee camps greatly concern analysis of community and chapter four will seek to explain, as best as the research can without advantage of field research in the camps or region, the role of community and power in the relationships affected by the conflict.

Lonergan’s Dialectic of Authority also concerns the relationships between meanings and values. Lonergan writes the following:

Men live in two worlds. From infancy they live in a world of immediacy, a world revealed by sense and alive with feeling. Gradually they move into a world mediated by meaning and motivated by values. In this adult world the raw materials are indeed the world of immediacy.... As exercised
within the world mediated by meaning and motivated by values, power resides in the word of authority…. It is that word that distributes the cooperation among cooperating members; it is that word that bans from social intercourse those that would disrupt the cooperating society. (57)

Studies such as Leite, Olsson, Shelley, et al. (2006) (58) define the conflict in resource-driven terms. In Lonergan’s terms, this is the “world of immediacy.” Scholars such as Zunes and Mundy focus on what Lonergan would consider a world mediated by meaning and motivated by values.

Lonergan also writes in “Dialectic of Authority,” “The sufficient condition must include authenticity. The external criterion need not be accompanied by authenticity. For in human beings authenticity always is precarious. Commonly, indeed, it is no more than a withdrawal from unauthenticity. Such, then, is the dialectic of authority” (59). The operation of authenticity within authority is central to all interstate and intrastate conflicts, as well as local, communal and interpersonal relationships. Brennan (2008) simplifies Lonergan’s analysis of authority and authenticity. He writes, “If there is a terminological trouble with this identification, it concerns Lonergan’s locating authority in the community without regard to the nature and quality of that community’s field of common judgments and aims” (60). He continues by stating the following:

On Lonergan’s usage, a community of persons would enjoy authority no matter how dogmatically closed it was to further learning. Lonergan does go on at once to distinguish between ‘authentic’ and ‘unauthentic’ fields of common judgments and aims, and, thus, between authentic authority
and unauthentic authority. Fundamentalist communities would therefore possess authority, but lack “authentic authority. (61)

In 2007, the Kingdom of Morocco offered autonomy to Western Sahara as part of the negotiation, which will be explained in greater detail in chapter four. The plan’s reception as authentic or inauthentic concerns the authority it would have should the Polisario accept regional autonomy rather than self-determination. Brennan writes the following:

Lonergan’s usage is workable, but it would seem more to the point, and truer to common usage, to identify as authority – and authoritative – the community that is engaged in and committed to furthering judgments and aims that ask and answer the questions of the day, and as authoritarian the community that is collectively engaged in blocking the asking and answering of questions. (62)

The Kingdom of Morocco under the leadership of Muhammad VI enjoys from the West a reputation as the hallmark of aristocracies tolerant towards its own people. It is questionable, however, how the Kingdom of Morocco would participate in communal relationships with former combatants if the Polisario were to accept an autonomy plan.

Lonergan’s contention, supported by Sharp (1973), would be that autonomy, rather than self-determination, requires authenticity from the central government and submission from the empowered. Sharp contests, “The single quality of any government,
without which it would not exist, must be the obedience and submission of its subjects” (63). Under the autonomy plan, how could the Kingdom of Morocco develop authenticity for cooperative power that would be acceptable to Sahrawi nationalists? Sharp suggests, “The relationship between command and obedience is always one of mutual influence and some degree of inter-action—which is ‘mutually determined’ action involving a two-sided relationship between the ruler and the subjects” (64). As this research will explore, the Kingdom of Morocco has not capitulated enough command in order to gain the obedience of the Sahrawi nationalists, nor has the Polisario advanced in accepting stake with the Moroccan community.

In “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,” Lonergan outlines his notion of collective responsibility, which Haughey had developed towards human rights. He notes, “People are responsible individually for the lives they lead and collectively for the world in which they live them” (65). He builds a framework that recognizes the role of personal responsibility but builds into a collective in order to introduce his dialectic the notion of natural right, attributed to ancient Greeks, and from historical thinking from the nineteenth century, human historicity (66). His essay seeks to marry the notions.

First, Lonergan defines his usage of historicity. He writes, “A contemporary ontology would distinguish two components in concrete human reality: on the one hand, a constant, human nature; on the other hand, a variable, human historicity. Nature is given to man at birth. Historicity is what man makes of man” (67). Forgiving his dated gendered terminology, Lonergan understands mankind’s development of itself through malleable processes of meaning making. Second, he writes, “This is my present point, all
such change is in its essence a change of meaning—a change of idea or concept, a change of judgment or evaluation, a change of the order or the request” (68). He then provides constitutional change as an example. Lonergan writes, “The state can be changed by rewriting the constitution; more subtly but no less effectively it can be changed by reinterpreting its constitution” (69). This research returns to Lonergan’s discussion of historicity through constitutional change through discussion of Morocco’s recent constitutional reforms in the fourth chapter.

Lonergan discusses in “Dialectic of Authority” the significance of community in authenticating authority, and he returns to community in the composition of historicity. He applies community broadly to reach for a “human community” with “a common field of experience, a common mode of understanding, a common measure of judgment, and a common consent” (70). His search for a concept of human community is an exploration of universal meanings. He continues his search arguing as follows:

Such community is possible, the source, the ground of common meaning; and it is this common meaning that is the form and act that finds expression in family and polity, in the legal and economic system, in customary morals and educational arrangements, in language and literature, art and religion, philosophy, science and the writing of history.

(71)

Kegan supports this by noting, “Even in this narrow domain of meaning-making (the physical world), the themes of natural emergency and the experience of evolution can be
made to emerge” (72). Kegan expands on his evaluation of meaning making by invoking Lawrence Kohlberg’s study of moral reasoning and development.

Thus, for Lonergan and supported by Kegan, historicity is an evolutionary process of meaning making. Lonergan seeks a direction of historicity where collective responsibility is a product of human community. He separates the natural world from the world of meaning, suggesting that “community itself is not a necessity of nature but an achievement of man” (73). He continues by stating, “Without a common field of experience people get out of touch. Without a common mode of understanding, there arise misunderstanding, distrust, suspicion, fear, hostility, factions. Without a common measure of judgment people live in different worlds” (74).

This thought returns the discussion toward interstate and intrastate conflict analysis: two rival factions, as will be explored in the research the Kingdom of Morocco and Sahrawi nationalists, lack the common mode of understanding. Lonergan suggests, “Then common meaning is replaced by different and opposed meanings. A cohesion that once seemed automatic has to bolstered by the pressures, the threats, the force that secure a passing semblance of unity but may prepare a lasting resentment and a smoldering rebellion” (75). Regarding the conflict in Western Sahara, how do changes in the Moroccan constitution affect meaning for Sahrawi nationalists? How would a referendum for independence threaten the meaning of the Moroccan throne? As I will explore, Lonergan’s framework on historicity describes conflict through opposing interpretations in constructed meanings. He borrows from Alan Richardson, “Historical mindedness, meaning that ‘to understand mean and their institutions we have to study their history....
Indeed, historicity and history are related as object to be known and investigating subject” (76).

From outlining his concept of historicity and historical mindedness, Lonergan develops his usage of “natural right.” He traces the philosophy of human nature back to ancient Greece and writes of social construction, “What had been made by human convention, could be unmade by further convention. Underpinning human manners and customs there was no permanent and binding force. The conclusion was scandalous and the notion of natural right was found in its rebuttal” (77). He continues his exploration by stating, “Underneath the manifold of human lifestyles, there existed a component or factor that possessed the claims to universality and permanence of nature itself” (78). Thus, for Lonergan, there is a human nature that is found within cognitive performance, but the product of the cognitive performances, such as meaning making in historicity, such as conflicts, are not human nature.

In order to explore natural right, Lonergan borrows from Aristotle, who defined nature through movement and rest (79). Lonergan writes, “In man such a principle is the human spirit as raising and answering questions. As raising questions, it is an immanent principle of movement. As answering questions and doing so satisfactorily, it is an immanent principle of rest” (80). He continues by outlining the following three elementary questions: “questions for intelligence, questions for reflection, and questions for deliberation” (81). Thus, Lonergan has located his cognitive operations as elementary and universal for human nature and the outcomes of the methodology as the foundations of historicity. According to Lonergan, “It is in the dialectic of history that one finds the
link between natural right and historical mindedness. The source of natural right lies in
the norms immanent in human intelligence, human judgment, human evaluation and
human affectivity” (82). He concludes by stating the following:

Beyond dialectic there is dialogue. Dialectic describes concrete process in
which intelligence and obtuseness, reasonableness and silliness,
responsibility and sin, love and hatred, commingle and conflict… While
the dialectic of history coldly relates our conflicts, dialogue adds the
principle that prompts us to cure them, the natural right that is the inmost
of our being. (83)

Through this review of Lonergan’s discussion on human nature and historicity, this
clarifies that central to human nature is the cognitive process of inquiry, rather than the
products of that inquiry. While conflicts are rooted in historicity, again, they are not
carried by human nature. I do not suggest that dialogue is the solution to conflict, per se,
as one might infer from Lonergan; however, it is the principle that prompts the solution.

Having introduced Lonergan’s philosophy towards history, this thesis next
introduces a third Lonergan essay: “Healing and Creating in History.” Before Lonergan
begins defines his notion of healing and creating in history, he clarifies what he means by
history, which follows from “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness.” Lonergan
writes, “It would seem, then, that we have to do with healing and creating in human
affairs. Now if ‘history’ may be taken broadly to mean human affairs, it is not too
difficult to obtain at least a preliminary notion of what is meant by the other two terms in
our title, ‘healing’ and ‘creating’ (84). Lonergan does not seek to “heal” or “create” any particular history, thus this research must use caution when applying frameworks from this essay to the case study in order to remain honest to the context. Lonergan identifies lack of creativity, which he understands as closed-mindedness, as a key symptom of malaise for human affairs. Lonergan writes, “There are many and varied circumstances under which civilizations break down. But there is one ultimate answer that rests on the intrinsic limitations of insight itself. For insights can be implemented only if people have open minds” (85). Thus, for Lonergan, in order to heal and create in history people must remain open to new insights and inquiry. As noted earlier, inquiry is elementary to human nature, but the product of the inquiry is elementary to historicity. For Lonergan, in order to create and heal, people need to inquire more about the products of their initial inquiry, hence gaining more insights.

Lonergan follows this discussion by introducing characterization of biases, which he sees as limiting creativity. He outlines the bias of individual egoism, bias of group egoism, and general bias. The following chapter will examine these biases in detail. Lonergan relates “the distorting effect of all such bias on the whole process of growth” (86). He continues by stating, “Growth, progress, is a matter of situations yielding insights, insights yielding policies and projects, policies and projects transforming the initial situation, and that correct and complement the deficiencies of previous insights” (87). He refers to this as the wheel of progress. As discussed in the following chapter, “This wheel of progress becomes a wheel of decline when the process is distorted by bias” (88).
Following this discussion on the malady against creativity and healing, Lonergan then readdresses his direction of healing and creating. Lonergan sees human development as a two-fold process:

There is development from below upwards, from experience to growing understanding, from growing understanding to balanced judgment…. But there is also development from above downwards. There is the transformation of falling in love: the domestic love of the family; the human love of one’s tribe, one’s city, one’s country, mankind. (89)

Healing for Lonergan is a transformative, spiritual performance. In order to understand Lonergan in his context, this is vital to note. Lonergan concludes, “Is my proposal utopian? It merely asks for creativity, for an interdisciplinary theory [paraphrasing William James] that at first will be denounced as absurd, then be admitted to be true but obvious and insignificant, and perhaps finally be regarded as so important that its adversaries will claim that they themselves discovered it” (90). Since Lonergan suggested at his introduction that he specifies no single history, rather he discusses history as human affairs. His notion to create and heal is rather utopian, but only if he suggests a finality. He speaks in terms of development and progress rather than a destination of healed historicity. While influenced by utopian idealism, I argue that the notion is practical. Historicity is not an ailment to be cured; rather it is condition to be progressively managed.
Previously, this thesis discussed insight mediation as practiced by Melchin and Picard. They documented over twenty years of success implementing Lonergan’s “utopian” proposal. How effective are these ideas in the arena of international conflicts with interstate and intrastate stakeholders? The international arena requires Lonergan’s frameworks regarding healing and creating through the redress of bias, endorsing open-mindedness, and promotion of inquiry. To be more precise, scholars, analysts, observers, and stakeholders of conflicts in the international arena require Lonergan’s frameworks for inquiry and insight to heal and create in history.

The final Lonergan essay reviewed for this research, “The Human Good,” is a transcript from a conference in 1976 entitled “Beyond Relativism” for the Institute for Human Values at St. Mary’s University in Halifax, Nova Scotia (91). Lonergan elaborated on ideas from Method in Theology in which he discusses “a set of variables, namely skills, feelings, values, beliefs. They are all variable: different skills you will find all over; feelings are a great variety; values—various meanings and various valuations; and beliefs” (92). These variables are important to understanding Lonergan’s notion of development. The following section explains Lonergan’s usage of these terms from the lecture at the conference.

Lonergan develops his concept of skills from developmental psychologist Jean Piaget, who is central to Kegan’s study on operational development. Lonergan notes the following from Piaget:

Immediate operations: you operate on what you can touch, what you can see, what you feel, and so on. Mediated operations: you operate
immediately with respect to a sign, a symbol, an image, and by the mediation of the sign, the symbol, the image, you operate with respect to the referent. That distinction leads to a distinction in the development of culture. (93)

For Lonergan, skills develop from the learning process of developing meaning from an image. Lonergan continues suggesting that meaning is protean. He outlines a developmental history from the proto-classical age where “meanings aren’t very well controlled, you have the multiplication of myths and magic, of rituals” to the classical age when “meanings are controlled by universal principles; you have the perennial philosophies, the immortal works of art, the laws and customs… and nothing changes” (94). He concludes, “In the modern world, the controls of meaning are ongoing, they are developing. You move in human historicity” (95). This recalls Lonergan’s discussion on historical mindedness: skills are a product of human nature but the application and results are not, hence various levels of development and historicity.

Lonergan next outlines his discussion on feelings as a variable. He distinguishes between intentional and non-intentional feelings. Non-intentional feelings occur at the biological level, such as hunger and thirst. Intentional feelings are the most significant for the purposes of this research. Lonergan then evaluates intentional feelings as “intentional responses that are evoked by objects and that evoke objects. They respond to what is perceived, imagined, represented” (96). Thus, feelings are the responses to the world mediated by meaning while skills are what construct it. Lonergan continues by stating,
“They relate us not just to a cause or goal, but to an apprehended object or an imagined object; and they give intentional consciousness, they give this world mediated by meaning, its mass, momentum, drive, power” (97). Without the feelings reacting to the meanings, there is no movement to create more meanings. Lonergan, at this stage, is concerned not only with human development (hence invoking Piaget), but also historical development. His discussion on feelings, as well, informs discussion on natural right and historical mindedness. As he noted, in that essay he intended to unite the concepts. Here he continues the method of that structure.

Lonergan identifies two expressions of intentional responses: “self-regarding and self-transcending. The self-regarding “is what is agreeable, disagreeable, satisfying, unsatisfying” (98). Lonergan uses self-regarding responses in discussion of progress and decline, to which this section arrives shortly. “The self-transcending are vital values; values of health, and so on; social values: the vital values of the group; cultural values” (99). These intentional responses, which Lonergan relates to values Lonergan, also are vital to his philosophy of development, either through progress or decline.

Lonergan continues to define his application of values. He writes, “Values stand not in isolation but in a scale of preference. Apprehensions of values are not only transient feelings… Feelings can either be reinforced by approval, curtailed by disapproval, given a subterranean existence by repression” (100). Thus, Lonergan builds this far in the essay that how one responds to the world mediated by meaning affects how the world mediated by meaning responds to them. He writes, “So we have skills,
command of language in a world mediated by meaning, feelings that bring the world mediated by meaning alive” (101).

Lonergan’s application of “value” in this context differs from the definition in common parlance. Values, in this sense, are not morals, per se. They are in terms of this discussion, as noted above, results from feelings. Once there is a determination that an experience has been understood, then there is a process of valuing the understanding. He writes, “There is the question about the good. If it is good, is it worthwhile? The question that stops us is the question of the good” (102). As Lonergan presents his development of understanding, we see how value operates in this context. There is an experience. The experience is understood. Then the experience is valued.

Lonergan then progresses value into ethics and morals. He provides an anecdote in which a person is told by another that due to the conditions of the anecdote the first person had no right to be there. Lonergan demonstrates the following:

This is communicating an ethical judgment… It is not strictly an ethical judgment; it is an ethical feeling; but it ties in very closely with judgments of value. It is in the apprehension of values in feeling, in intentional feelings of the self-transcending type. So you have the apprehension of values in intentional responses, the notion of value in query. Is it truly good? Is it really worthwhile? And the evaluation in the judgment of value itself. When you make the judgment of value about your own concrete situation, you are moving towards the moral realm. (103)
Lonergan has introduced skills from which meaning is made, feelings which are results of the meaning, and value which determines the worth of the feeling. He has differentiated value from ethical and moral judgment. Beliefs are his final variable. Lonergan notes, “Can believing be defended? … Otherwise, you don’t have the accumulations over the generations” (104). His discussion leads us to his classification of human development.

Lonergan identifies human development as either coming from below upward, that is the apprehension of value through experience, understanding and reflecting in the value of the insight; then “there is development from above downwards, the benefits of acculturation, socialization, education, the transmission of the tradition” (105). Having demonstrated these four variables for human development, Lonergan presents his case of historical development, which he describes through the motions of progress, decline and recovery (106).

As referenced, Lonergan describes historical process through cycles of progress and decline. He writes, “There is a cyclical and cumulative process that results when situations give rise to insights revealing new possibilities. New possibilities lead to new courses of action, new courses of action produce new situations, and new situations give rise to further insights revealing still further possibilities, and so on” (107). According to Beards, “Development is characterized by probabilities, so that, in the case of the human world, the meaningful, or even meaningless, decisions of influential individuals or groups play a crucial role in development and decline” (108). Beards is concerned with Lonergan’s notion on historical development, but he cannot arrive at Lonergan’s historical development with discussion on his characterization of human development.
This synthesizes the significance of Lonergan’s discussion of the four variables of skills, feelings, values and beliefs. How individuals gain and process insights is at the center of human and historical development. Lonergan writes, “Insofar as orientation is self-regarding, intelligence will again lead, but the private interest of individuals will balk and the special interest of groups will… impose its own special type of intelligence… In this fashion, the social group is biased, development occurs, but it restricts favor to some and neglects the rest (109). Lonergan returns to discussion on self-regarding values and self-transcending values. He warns that in the world mediated by meaning, in which skills understand the meanings, feelings interpret them and values judge them, self-regarding values lead to decline because biases that threaten the prevailing, special interest insights are rejected, either through punishment or repression. Lonergan concludes by summarizing the gravity of the lecture. He states, “What we are talking about is not simply process but historical process. It is not something of the past; it is something that we are part of, it is human history, it is something in which we are involved in now and for the rest of our lives” (110).

In the journey of this research to discover how the frameworks and methodologies of a Bernard Lonergan, and various scholars influenced by his work, apply to international territorial conflicts concerning interstate and intrastate stakeholders, I find the quest clearer than I hypothesized. As the fourth chapter explores, the conflict in Western Sahara is a result of human and historical development, so of course it is subject to inquiry of Lonergan’s analysis. While this does not answer this thesis, per se, the
research proceeds to the next chapter with Lonergan’s methodology operating significantly outside the scope of interpersonal dispute mediation.
Chapter 2 Notes

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4. Ibid, 7.
10. Ibid.
11. Meynell, 1.
13. Ibid.
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28. Ibid.
29. Ibid, 71.
31. Ibid, 70.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
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37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid, 81.
41. Ibid, 82.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid, 76.
46. Ibid.

50. Melchin and Picard, 82.

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53. Ibid, 97.

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77. Ibid, 171-72.
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96. Ibid, 336.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid, 338.
104. Ibid, 342.
105. Ibid, 340.
106. Ibid, 344.
107. Ibid.
108. Beards, 212
110. Ibid.
Chapter 3: Discussion

3.1 An Insight

Lonergan uses an ancient story of Archimedes to demonstrate an example of an insight. While in a bath, Archimedes discovered the principle of density through water displacement. He charged through the Syracuse streets naked, shouting “Eureka!” (1). I experienced an Archimedes moment after first introduction to Lonergan’s method. I discovered an insight on how to relate to the information presented to me on Lonergan’s cognitive operations. The methodology reminded me of a cognitive process from a different context: OODA, the Boyd Loop: “observe, orient, decide and act” (2).

I recalled lessons from youth athletics when my military veteran father instructed to me Boyd’s loop to increase my awareness during a contest. As a young ice hockey goaltender, I understood that my opponent had a three step advantage because he had observed my position, oriented to attack and decided at what point of the net to shoot. In order to prevent a goal, I needed to anticipate his decision, orient myself to his action, decide how to react, and then perform the reaction. Looking back on my experience, the process of each calculated reaction demonstrated Lonergan’s cognitive operations.

While Boyd’s loop is a cognitive process articulated to avert physical attack rather than ascertain knowledge, I find it as a useful device to ground Lonergan's cognitive
process, which Professor Jamie Price also labels “looping.” I do not know if when Lonergan developed his methodology he had Boyd’s loop in mind; however, I found the similarity useful when I first encountered Lonergan. When I described my learning of Lonergan’s method to my friends and family, their insightful “gotcha” moment occurred when I described Lonergan’s methodology of cognitive processes as “OODA, only more philosophical.” It is with such insights in mind that this research discusses Lonergan’s frameworks vis-à-vis another context of conflict analysis: realist national security analysis.

3.2 On National Security Analysis

In the summer of 2011, I had the honor to participate in a national security analysis seminar hosted by Johns Hopkins University. This was an ideal venue to discuss ideas of this thesis with graduate students from various graduate programs, many of which approached conflict analysis from the perspective of realist security studies and counter-terrorism. Theorists like Lonergan, Melchin and Picard had not appeared on their syllabi. This highly rigorous, intellectually stimulating seminar occurred in an atmosphere that tends to dismiss methods discussed in the previous chapter, such as insight theory of mediation. This discussion of the thesis results from insights obtained while exploring how and if Lonergan’s methods apply in the context of national security analysis.

As mentioned in the literature review, the elites of policy tend to avoid emotive discussions from their policy. In 2009 President Obama faced criticism for suggesting
that empathy should be a criterion for jurisprudence (3). The reproach of the president’s remark demonstrated mainstream aversive to a humanist principle that I find practical and relevant to Lonergan’s method. Also, in a famous press conference in May 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld received a question asking him to elaborate on an issue. From the transcript, the reporter asks of the Secretary and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Could I just get the two of you maybe to free associate a bit more of that subject? We’re seeing a…” (4). Laughing, the Secretary interrupts, “To do what?” The reporter responds also laughing, “Free associate. It’s a sort of touchy-feely ‘70s term.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman replies that he doesn’t believe that he can, and the Secretary responds with laughter, “You got the wrong guys!” (5). While Lonergan’s frameworks or Melchin and Picard’s insight mediation are not proposing free association, per se the moment’s levity over the connotation of “free association” relates to this research because it ideally demonstrates the tension between realist analysis of conflict and insight analysis. Why did the moment turn to levity rather than the Secretary and the Chairman simply reply that they are not at liberty to free associate on matters of national security? Why was President Obama embarrassed for suggesting that a Supreme Court justice should demonstrate empathy? I suggest that it is due to group and general bias, which I will return to discuss momentarily.

The famous press briefing mentioned above ostensibly introduced the world to the brilliance of Secretary Rumsfeld’s epistemology. Secretary Rumsfeld stated the following: “As we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things
we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we don't know we
don't know” (6). As mentioned in the previous paragraph, Secretary Rumsfeld does not
consider himself “touchy-feely,” and as demonstrated in the last chapter, since Lonergan
bases his methodology on senses and feelings, suffice it to say his philosophy is “touchy-
feely.” As this research seeks to explore application of Lonergan’s methodology in the
interstate and intrastate arena of conflict analysis, Secretary Rumsfeld seems to have
provided the link.

Rumsfeld’s reply to the reporter mirrors Lonergan’s explanation on known
unknowns and unknown unknowns. Lonergan considers the distance between known
unknowns and unknown unknowns a horizon. He writes the following:

We can distinguish the known, the known unknown, and the unknown.
This distinction is applicable to any stage of development, and it gives us a
tool that enables us to speak briefly about the development in the subject.
The known is the range of questions that I can raise and answer. It is
settled by the series or group of questions I can ask and answer. Beyond
the known… there is the known unknown, the things I know I don’t know.
That is a much broader circle. There is a range of questions that I can
raise, find significant, consider worthwhile, have some idea how to
answer. But at the moment I cannot answer them…. Thirdly, there is the
unknown unknown, the range of questions that I do not raise at all, or that,
if they were raised, I would not understand, or find significant, or, if I
understood what is meant, I would see no point in asking them… This is
the realm of the unknown unknown, the field of indocta ignorantia. And
how big it is we do not know. (7)
Secretary Rumsfeld’s classifications could be related to Lonergan’s through coincidence or perhaps he had been introduced to Lonergan’s philosophy and applied it in the context of national security and intelligence analysis. (That is a known unknown.) Whether intentional or coincidental, Rumsfeld’s usage of Lonergan’s epistemology is an example of grounding Lonergan’s methodology in context that applies outside a mediation, facilitation or negotiation. Thus, when I contemplated how Lonergan’s method could be applied to a field deeply rooted in political realism, I only need look to Donald Rumsfeld, whose hawkish policies render application of Lonergan’s peaceful philosophy ironic.

I wonder how a Pentagon spokesman would have responded in late December 2010 to an inquiry regarding the stability of President Ben Ali’s government in Tunisia. The reporter inquiring about the “unknown unknown” likely his or her question would have been regarded as absurd and insignificant. Had that the question been asked in December, then a month later the reporter would have been considered ingenious since an unknown unknown for the policy elite was a known unknown for the reporter. Reporters asked after the fall of the Ben Ali government why the United States did not forecast the Arab Spring. In both Lonergan’s terminology, the Arab Spring was beyond our horizon.

The question asked to the Secretary of Defense in which he provided a Lonergan response pertained to information relating to the analysis of Iraq’s alleged pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. Without digressing too far into policy, intelligence analysis on Iraq’s alleged pursuit of weapons of mass destruction proved to be dubious and inaccurate. How the intelligence failed is a question beyond the scope of this section; however, while the military elite embraces Boyd’s loop as a framework for cognitive
operations, perhaps our national security apparatus could benefit from, as Price calls it, Lonergan’s “looping,” as well. In effect, before deciding an action from a sensory experience, understand it through asking what the experience is, then reflect on the insight it provides by asking if it is so. While this seems to be mundane and obvious, analysis of data submitted for policy, and then policy decisions following the process of that data propelled the United States into the war in Iraq. While this research does not have interest to question the result of the invasion, suffice it to say in Lonergan’s terms, the intelligence was not so.

3.3 On Bias

During the above mentioned seminar, the faculty, compromised of academics and retired government officials, presented a text by a career analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency, drafted to instruct recruits on the methodologies involved. (The text is publically available on the agency’s website.) Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (1999) by Richards Heuer relates to this thesis because it emphasizes on cognitive bias, devoting about one third of the text to the subject. Heuer defines cognitive biases as “mental errors caused by our simplified information processing strategies” (8). He continues by stating, “It is important to distinguish cognitive biases from other forms of bias such as cultural bias, organizational bias or bias that results from one’s own self-interest” (9). This I find to be a shortcoming of his focus because he excludes what Lonergan would consider group bias and general bias.
Also, Heuer does not consider that cognitive bias “results from any emotional or intellectual predisposition toward a certain judgment, but rather from subconscious mental procedures for processing information” (10). For Heuer, a cognitive bias results when “the apparent distance of an object is determined in part by its clarity” (11). He writes in order to remind national security analysts to “transform an abstract notion such as ‘structure’ or ‘subject-object differentiation’ into something almost palpable” (12). Lonergan expresses this development through reference of Piaget’s operations and skills (13). Kegan offers an example of a father and two children on the Empire State Building looking down on people on the street. The younger comments that the people are tiny ants, while the older boy comments that they look like tiny ants (14). Thus, when in the seminar reading of Heuer, the insight occurred that he asks of his audience to notice the difference between what ants are and what looks like ants. This example demonstrates that while Heuer offers a strong methodology on analysis, adding Lonergan’s framework to Heuer strengthens an analyst’s understanding of the role of bias in restricting insights, thus weakening analytical products.

Like Heuer, Fitterer also considers bias to be a “cognitive malfunction”; however, for Fitterer cognitive bias “tangles with emotion and often cuts short open-mindedness of free inquiry” (15). Fitterer, like Lonergan, argues that cognitive biases are emotionally driven. He uses Lonergan to separate judgment of value from apprehension of values. He quotes Lonergan, “Between judgments of fact and judgments of value lies the apprehension of value by emotions” (16). Thus, the presence of emotions divides Fitterer’s and Lonergan’s explanation of cognitive bias from Heuer’s discussion.
Fitterer discusses Nussbaum’s exploration of emotions and judgment. He quotes Nussbaum as follows, “Emotions are forms of evaluative judgment that ascribe to certain things and persons outside a person's own control great importance for the person's own flourishing” (17). She builds on this by adding, “Emotions always involve thought of an important object combined with thought of the object's salience or importance; in that sense, they always involve appraisal or evaluation” (18). He suggests that in her view emotions are “identical with personal evaluative judgment” (19). Fitterer adds an example from Nussbaum in which she discusses a report from her sister informing that their mother is gravely ill. Fitterer demonstrates Nussbaum’s ownership of emotions: “Emotions as evaluations are always anchored in the human subject—they are my emotions, my value, my loss. Emotions contain an ineliminable ‘me’ to which projects, schemes, and whole life goals are intrinsically connected (20).

In the first chapter, I stated that I do not have a connection to the case study discussed in the following chapter. I used Hall’s story of the men on a boat looking in opposite directions, one direction picturesque and the other direction foreboding, and they were unable to turn around and see the other’s point of view (21). Also, I noted Lonergan’s distinction of explanation, which is the object in relation to itself, and description, which is the object in relation to us (22). In Hall’s analogy of the men on the boat, they lack the capacity to explain since they can only experience the storm clouds in relation to themselves. Nussbaum describes the anchoring of emotions.

If a United States policy adviser who had lost a family member due to a terrorist attack advised the president to conduct hostile regime change against the state allegedly
connected to the attack, what would be the president’s options for considering the advice? The power of the emotion likely anchors the advisor on one end of Hall’s metaphorical boat, and the advisor’s capacity to explain rather than describe his or her analysis likely would be affected adversely. The judgment for a policy advice likely would reflect the advisor’s personal experience, rather than an evaluation divorced from his or her personal experience. Fitterer and Nussbaum point out emotions are never wrong; however, the conclusions resulting from the bias are subject to error.

Following Fitterer’s discussion on Nussbaum and emotions, he then turns to Lonergan and bias. Fitterer, like Heuer, does not consider bias to be a problem to solve, rather he “points out what any solution would have to deal with” (23). Fitterer clarifies his definition of bias. He writes, “Bias is not a presupposition, so it cannot simply be a matter of holding the wrong one. Rather than consisting in an error of fact, bias is an emotional and reactionary response to social inter-relations” (25). He builds from chapter seven of Insight and the essays discussed in the literature review especially “Healing and Creating in History.” Fitterer outlines Lonergan’s four modes of bias: dramatic bias, individual bias, group bias, and general bias, of which overlapping into personal bias are individual, group, and general (26). Lonergan explains the effect of bias on common sense. He writes, “Four distinct aspects call for attention. There is already mentioned bias arising from the psychological depths.... There is also individual bias of egoism, the group bias with its class conflicts and a general bias that tends to set the common sense against science and philosophy” (27).
As noted in last chapter’s discussion on “Dialectic of Authority,” Lonergan argues that the carrier of power is the community and that a community is a common field of experience (28). Lonergan writes, “Without a common field of experience people are out of touch... they will misunderstand one another, grow suspicious, distrustful, hostile, violent. Without common judgments they will live in different worlds, and without common aims they will work at cross-purposes” (29). This misunderstanding, suspicion, distrust, hostility and violence result from cycles of decline through group and general bias.

Lonergan develops his notion of community through exploring common sense. He writes the following:

Common sense is practical. It seeks knowledge, not for the sake of pleasure of contemplation, but to use knowledge in making and doing. Moreover, this making and doing involves a transformation of man and environment, so that the common sense of a primitive culture is not the common sense of an urban civilization, nor the common sense of one civilization is the common sense of another. (30)

Lonergan also comments, “To err is human, and common sense is very human” (31). He explores the dialectic between common sense as practical and common sense as regressive. For Lonergan, common sense is a general bias because it is “incapable of analyzing itself” (32). Connecting Lonergan’s notion of common sense with his notion of community, he argues, “There is a larger dialectic of community. Social events can be traced to the two principles of human intersubjectivity and practical common sense” (33).
Lonergan identifies dramatic bias in terms of psychological malfunction. Shute refers to it as a “blind spot in the individual psyche” (34). Shute continues by explaining, “Dramatic bias constitutes a weakening of the common sense and, accordingly, it affects the flow of acts which would recognize and promote successfully the human cooperation which produces the good of order” (35). Fitterer notes that dramatic bias is a condition “about which we have, initially, little control” and “is a maladjustment of the dramatic pattern of experience, that pattern of salience through which the concerns of concrete living are met, and it is common-sense insight that masters the concrete” (36). He continues by arguing, “Prior to its later overt and conscious manifestations in the biases of egoism, group prejudice and anti-intellectualism, dramatic bias is already at work covertly and unconsciously skewing the agenda of our practical intelligence” (37). This form of bias does not have direct application in analyzing interstate or intrastate conflicts, although it is important for understanding Lonergan’s classification of bias.

The discussion in previous chapter of “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness” and “The Human Good” explored how the cognitive operations of the individual affected historical development and valuing. As also explored, valuing and emotions connect one to the how one sees their role in his or her environment. For Lonergan, individual bias results from egoism. He writes, “Egoism is neither merely spontaneity nor pure intelligence but an interference of spontaneity with the development of intelligence. With remarkable acumen one solves one’s own problems. With startling modesty one does not venture to raise relevant further questions” (38). He defines it as “an incomplete development of intelligence” (39). Meynell explains, “Individual bias leads a man to
pursue his own needs and desires at the expense of general good” (40). Fitterer considers that individual bias places an individual against the world or against him or herself (41).

Next, Lonergan differentiates individual bias from group bias. He explains, “While individual bias has to overcome normal intersubjective feeling, group bias finds itself supported by such feeling. Again, while individual bias leads to attitudes that conflict with ordinary common sense, group bias operates in the very genesis of common sense views” (42). In the previous chapter introducing “Healing and Creating History,” Lonergan expressed his lament of group bias through restricting creativity to accept innovative insights that lead to progress. Meynell writes, “Only those practical insights are liable to be out into effect which either meet with no group resistance or find favor with groups powerful enough to overcome what resistance there is… Dominant groups are not so liable to veto technical and material ideas for improvement as they are proposed changes in the political and economic institutions” (43). Fitterer defines group bias a condition of “my group against other groups, our ways against their ways” (44). Lonergan’s consideration of group bias is a connection of his ideas to identity theorists of conflict analysis and resolution.

Finally, general bias is Lonergan’s last classification. Meynell considers general bias to be “a lack of self-analysis inherent in common-sense” (45). Common sense does not reflect on itself. Fitterer explains, “General bias [is] where one whole mode of being intelligent postures against other valid ways of deploying intelligence. An example is favoring common sense pragmatism over all other modes of thinking, be they intellectual, religious, artistic or some other mode” (46). Shute expands general bias beyond my
example to include the human community. He writes, “It is the failure by all groups to take up the task of the long-range point of view, on the grounds that it is impractical; instead of increasing the human contribution to the intelligible control of human history it is diminished” (47). For Nordquest, general bias occurs “when the social situation then no longer operates as a heuristic device, no longer fosters insights, but instead breeds despair and oversights. So emergent probability may bring either progress or decline, as conditions are created which make either further insights or oversights more probable” (48). Meynell suggests that to overcome general bias, communities must counterbalance it through “detached intelligence which will neither be forced into an ivory tower nor capitulate to the social surd” (49).

For example, the mainstream United States’ discussion on healthcare tends to be hostile to providing universal healthcare to its citizens, although Scandinavian states provide their citizens with these services. The common sense of the United States distrusts the state for providing the service, favoring a system that advantages the private sector. European states criticize the United States for failing to provide universal healthcare, yet general bias against a universal healthcare system permeates the common sense of the United States. For another example, when policymakers attempt export the United States’ expression of democracy to states like Iraq and Afghanistan, the policy dismisses that the common sense of the societies includes general bias to radically different systems. Eliot Cohen, championing United States’ hegemonic ambitions during the Bush administration, writes, “Whether or not one agrees with the current U.S. attempt to create a democratic Iraq, no one dares suggest (at least not publicly) that Iraqis are, by
virtue of history, culture, faith, or race, incapable of ruling themselves” (50). The common sense of the Bush administration prohibited insights that advised against exporting, especially through violence, a system of governance to several of what Lonergan calls communities whose common senses prohibit progressive insights from flourishing. While Huntington describes such encounters as clashes of civilizations, Lonergan would argue that they are clashes of general biases (51).

3.4 On Decline and Progress

As referenced in the in chapter two, Lonergan describes historical process through cycles of progress and decline. Progress results from revealing new insights and decline results from repressing or expelling them. Shute summarizes Lonergan’s decline as follows:

As the consequence of the cumulative effect of this four-fold bias, there occurs a regressive cycle of decline. It is initiated by a flight from understanding. By virtue of decreasing effectiveness of authenticity in human living it leads in the extreme to the corruption of the social situation, the complete compromise of authentic scientific investigation, and the suppression of all further questions relevant to the long-range point of view. (52)

In the above, Shute considers long-range decline but neglects short-range decline. Lonergan characterizes the two ranges through their result from group bias and general bias. Nordquest writes, “Lonergan attributes a shorter and a longer cycle of decline to
group bias and the general bias of common sense. Group bias alone produces the shorter cycle, one limited in time because the exploitation by the in-group threatens the interests of the out-groups and generates corrective action by them” (53).

Therefore, general bias, unlike group bias, is not as sensitive to time. Peacebuilders and peacemakers can work on repairing relationships, but general bias is more deeply rooted. Price uses Galileo as an example (54). From Aristotle to the 17th century, general bias prevented new insights regarding falling objects to arise. While Price uses the Galileo analogy to call for a revolutionary moment in methodology of peacemaking, he demonstrates a clear example of long cycle decline resulting from general bias. Nordquest argues the following:

When such practical and theoretical oversights prevail, the longer cycle of decline begins. The situation-bound knowledge of common sense is unable to resist because it lacks the perspective needed to detect anachronistic or anomalous features of social life. Because it is contextual, common sense becomes ever more inept as the situation that confines it becomes less and less intelligible. (55)

In the previous chapter while discussing Melchin and Picard, I suggested that insight mediation is an optimistic method. I noted above that I find Lonergan’s ideas “touchy-feely.” Following exploration of egoism, group bias and general decline within common sense, I have not demonstrated Lonergan’s methods to be optimistic. I have, though, mentioned that Lonergan does allow for progress and recovery.
The previous chapter discusses four of Lonergan’s essays introducing his notions of progress and recovery. Returning to these essays, first, in “Dialectic of Authority,” the source of power is in the community (56). Progress results from authentic power within the community. Lonergan distinguishes authenticity and unauthenticity. Lonergan writes, “Authenticity and unauthenticity are found in three different carriers: in the community, in the individuals that are authorities, and in the individuals that are subject to authority” (57). Following his discussion on authenticity, he returns the discussion to progress. Lonergan argues, “The fruit of authenticity is progress. For authenticity results from a long-sustained exercise of attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, responsibility” (58). Next, in “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness,” Lonergan implies that people overcome historical conditions, and he argues for progressive development. He states, “What had been made by human convention, could be unmade by further convention” (59). Following, he writes, “The source of natural right lies in the norms immanent in human intelligence, human judgment, human evaluation and human affectivity” (60).

Then, in “The Human Good,” Lonergan emphasizes the role of feelings in the process of meaning making. He writes that feelings “give this world mediated by meaning, its mass, momentum, drive, power” (61). He continues by identifying progress through self-transcending values “of health, and so on; social values: the vital values of the group; cultural values” (62). Transcending values allow for deeper insights. Lonergan writes, “New possibilities lead to new courses of action, new courses of action produce new situations, and new situations give rise to further insights revealing still further possibilities, and so on” (63). Finally, in “Healing and Creating in History,” Lonergan
discusses his notions of progressive historical development. He writes, “Growth, progress, is a matter of situations yielding insights, insights yielding policies and projects, policies and projects transforming the initial situation, and that correct and complement the deficiencies of previous insights” (64). He asks rhetorically if his proposal is utopian. He responds “It merely asks for creativity, for an interdisciplinary theory” (65).

Having returned to Lonergan’s essays, I have demonstrated that he suggests historicity is not confined to cycles of decline. He asks if his methodology is utopian, but does not offer a structure. He does not offer a structure for healing and creating in historicity because the lack of such a structure is a symptom of the problem. Fitterer outlines three methods in order to cope with cycle of decline. First, the “most basic condition for overcoming group bias is a self-critical self-awareness, a common sense insight that would see the practically wise value of the harmonious integration of individuals, groups and modes of thinking.” He continues by advocating, “Some higher social integration beyond ‘our way of doing things’ must become a pragmatic plank in ‘our’ platform” (66). Second, he calls for compensating bias through “a rational control of appearances” (67). He acknowledges that bias in humanity cannot be eliminated, per se, but he argues for bias correction. He presents for an example the effect of the feminist movement on the postal service. While the postal service, and the United States, has not transcended gender bias, there has been success in the rational control of appearances. Fitterer writes, “In the past, for example, no post office would ever hire a woman as a letter carrier because… who had ever heard of such of thing! After a time of deliberate
hiring of women, however, the notion of such prohibition simply ceases to arise because new appearances disallow that negative insight” (68).

Lastly, Fitterer’s “third point about compensating for bias is that it must proceed gradually, precisely because it can enflame the emotions that are the problem… Thus, common sense has a suspicion of sudden or dramatic change, and it tends to fear resistance” (69). Fitterer’s example of women’s service of letter carriers demonstrates his third condition as well. Common sense informs us that common sense is resistant to change. For another example, the common sense of Malta reflects traditional Roman Catholic values. The prevalent national debate focused on referendum for the legalization of divorce, a process deeply entrenched in the common sense of the United States. In May 2011, the passage of the divorce national referendum reflected incremental changes in Malta’s common sense regarding an issue that is emotionally charged for the island. The emotions demonstrated in the national debate demonstrated both group and general bias. I would not argue that the referendum overcame short-cycle decline because of the salient emotions dividing the two factions. However, I argue that the referendum is an example of incremental progress in overcoming general bias for women seeking redress of domestic violence.

3.5 Concluding Thoughts
I believe that Lonergan would consider the insights of this research to be insightful common sense, that is, artistic and practical. Lonergan writes the following about the practicality and common sense:

In the drama of human living, human intelligence is not only artistic but also practical…. The history of man’s material progress lies essentially in the expansion of these ideas. As inventions accumulate, they set problems calling for more inventions. The new inventions complement the old only to suggest further improvements to reveal fresh possibilities, and eventually to call forth in turn the succession of mechanical and technological higher viewpoints that mark epochs in man’s material progress. (70)

In the above passage, Lonergan explains human intelligence. Rosenberg also addresses human intelligence. He relates quotes Indian philosopher J. Krishnamurti as suggesting, “Observing without evaluating is the highest form of human intelligence” (71). Rosenberg notes that he reacted dismissively to the comment, and then he realized that he had confirmed the statement by asserting an evaluation. He suggests, “For most of us, it is difficult to make observations of people and their behavior that are free of judgment, criticism or other forms of analysis” (72). Rosenberg’s term of evaluation differs from Lonergan’s since for Lonergan evaluation leads to the “what should I do?” question in which factors to consider include “openness to full range of alternatives” and
performances and either “responsible or irresponsible” (73). Rosenberg’s notion of human intelligence, like Lonergan’s, emphasizes humanist understanding.

Few analysts at the Pentagon or the Central Intelligence Agency would disagree with Lonergan’s quote, “Human intelligence is not only artistic but also practical” (74). Yet, the application of the term “human intelligence” vastly is different in context. For realists in the national security field, human intelligence refers to shadowy, clandestine operations. For Lonergan and Rosenberg, human intelligence is an evolutionary, progressive process of learning, understanding and discovery. Is it revolutionary to suggest that excellence in Lonergan’s and Rosenberg’s usage of the term protects our national security stronger than does the Heuer’s or Rumsfeld’s usage of it?

Through discussions in the national security analysis seminar, which, again, was deeply entrenched in realism, graduate students discussed realists like Huntington and Cohen, rather than humanists like Lonergan, Melchin and Picard. Common sense informs us that the United States will maintain an enormous national security apparatus through a realist notion of security, while professing leadership of the international community in humanist principles. Group bias and general bias suggest that tension exists between those who advocate military defense of the nation versus those who advocate humanist principles to defend humanity, which includes our nation. Should security studies syllabi include Lonergan’s methodology? The discourse of national security analysis is similar to Lonergan’s analysis in terms of method.

I hope that this discussion would lead to discoveries that would aid the national security analyst in deconstructing adverse evaluations of humanist analysis. While
realists like Secretary Rumsfeld, Admiral Mullin or Heuer might not be “touchy-feely,” Lonergan’s methodologies inform the processes that they employ in their contexts. Whether one is a peacemaker or a counter-terrorism analyst, the methodology of Lonergan and scholars influenced by his thinking greatly enhances the capabilities of the analysis.
Chapter 3 Notes


5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.


9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Heuer, 12.


17. Ibid.
18. Ibid, 75.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid, 76.
23. Fitterer, 82.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
31. Ibid, 250.
32. Ibid, 251.
33. Ibid, 243.
35. Ibid, 46.
36. Fitterer, 82.
37. Ibid, 83.
39. Ibid.
41. Fitterer, 82.
43. Meynell, 116.
44. Fitterer, 82.
45. Meynell, 116.
46. Fitterer, 82.
47. Shute, 50-51.
49. Meynell, 120.
52. Shute, 49.
53. Nordquest, 93.
55. Nordquest, 93.
57. Ibid, 8.
58. Ibid, 9.
60. Ibid, 106.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid, 344.
65. Ibid, 176.
66. Fitterer, 84.
67. Ibid.
68. Fitterer, 85.
69. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
Chapter 4: Case Study

4.1 Literature Review

In the previous chapters, I discussed methods of Lonergan and scholars influenced by his work. I presented that Lonergan’s ideas are universal in scope through his theories of decline and progress. I developed Lonergan’s frameworks vis-à-vis realist analysis and have discussed briefly the conflict in Western Sahara in order to develop a case study.

There is a range of non-governmental organization advocacy literature on the stalemate in Western Sahara. Non-governmental organizations such as International Crisis Group, Forced Migration Online, Amnesty International, Western Sahara Resource Watch, their partner Fish Elsewhere, Defense Forum Foundation, and many others publish articles and reports documenting Morocco’s human rights violation, breaches of international law, and injustice of the referendum’s prohibition. Also, the United States Department of State annually releases human rights reports on both Western Sahara and Morocco. I also reviewed numerous nationalist blogger websites advocating self-determination for Western Sahara and document the inhospitable conditions of the refugee camps.

However, there is a scarcity of scholarly literature and there are few books pertaining to the conflict. Jose Ramos Horta introduces Toby Shelley’s (2004) Endgame
in the Western Sahara: What Future for Africa’s Last Colony by stating, “It had been many years since a book on the Western Sahara was published in English” (1).


Four books compromised for this thesis the majority of the textual research for the case study: Shelley, as mentioned above, Erik Jensen’s Western Sahara: Anatomy of a Stalemate (2005), Pablo San Martin’s Western Sahara: The Refugee Nation (2010) and Stephen Zunes and Jacob Mundy’s Western Sahara: War, Nationalism and Conflict Irresolution (2010). Professor Stephen Zunes and doctoral candidate Jacob Mundy, who researched with the non-governmental organization International Crisis Group, offer a definitive scholarly analysis of the current state of the conflict. For an examination of identity formation and the most current scholarly account of the peace process, Zunes and Mundy are excellent. Their research is thorough, although it does not pretend to represent both viewpoints of the conflict.

Initially, I had not reviewed literature that offered the perspective of the Kingdom of Morocco. During the research period of this thesis, I did not find a single book (in English) that academically outlined Morocco’s historical claim to the territory (during drafting I discovered one). Several books included the issue in section, including the
following: Cohen and Hahn (1966) (yet they published this text prior to the conflict); Pernell’s (2000) *Morocco since 1830: A History*, which is an excellent source for Moroccan history yet does not present thoroughly Western Sahara; Hughes (2006) *Morocco under King Hassan*, which examines the historical context and does well for subjectivity; and García-Arenal’s (2009) *Ahmad Al-Mansur: the Beginnings of Modern Morocco*, which only briefly discusses Western Sahara. In light of the literature’s scarcity, my initial bias individual and group bias, prohibiting opposing insights and critical thinking, at least reflected the available scholarship.

In order to gain insights toward the rationale of Morocco, the Moroccan American Center for Policy, a non-profit lobbying organization for the Kingdom of Morocco, offered to discuss the issue and advised readings from their website, several others, and advised some scholars such as J. Peter Pham whom I should examine. Pham received his Ph.D. in theology and served in the Vatican, then transitioned to realist international relations focusing on the Middle East and North Africa. With Pham’s theological background and publication on Western Sahara, perhaps he might appreciate my connection of the conflict to Lonergan’s methodology; however, since I challenge the neorealist assertions of his analysis because his focus dismisses the prospects of a Western Saharan state and the emotive salience of Sahrawi nationalism, perhaps my research will not make his reading list.

Erik Jensen served from 1994-1998 as the head of mission for the United Nations head to Western Sahara. His text is analysis is a strong consideration from the position of a third party leader: the writing is accessible and as sufficiently impartial toward
distributing responsibility between stakeholders. While he also provides a critical account of the UN mission, his treatment refrains from allotting culpability on the UN for failure of the mission to supervise a referendum. Jensen introduces the text discussing the particulars: the problematic question of identity, which is core to the referendum issue.

Jensen, defending the United Nations’ mission, writes:

The United Nations (UN), Security Council, and Secretariat have been criticized, even accused of incompetence, for the failure of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINSURO) to implement the settlement plan supposedly agreed by the Kingdom of Morocco and the Algerian-backed Frente Polisario (Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Seguia el-Hamra y Rio de Oro), as parties to the conflict. In reality, the two agreed to differing and incompatible interpretations of what was proposed…. Morocco and the Frente Polisario have been consistent in their attitudes and steadfast in upholding them. The core issue was and remains the electorate deemed qualified to vote in a referendum. (2)

Since Jensen’s publication, Morocco’s political will for identifying an electorate has declined, opting for negotiation based on an autonomy plan that I soon will discuss. Jensen’s examination focuses on the peace process and best articulates the role of third parties, including Spain, the UN and the African Union.

Pablo San Martin, a journalist, constructs the conflict’s history from the collapse of the Spanish empire from the War of Cuban Independence, or Spanish-American War as it is also frequently referred, then to constructing Sahrawi identity and nationalism,
then focusing on daily life in the refugee camps through nation-building, security and institutional capacity building. He also criticizes the role of the UN, as was defended by Jensen. San Martin writes the following:

According to the doctrine of the UN... General Assembly documents and Security Council resolutions, the Western Sahara the last non-self-governing territory (that is, colony) in Africa; the sovereignty of neither the Moroccan kingdom nor the Sahrawi Republic has ever been recognized by the UN. But, as the years evaporated without any progress, but only fruitless negotiations and endless delays, it progressively became clear that the UN would never fulfill its mission, given its unwillingness to confront Rabat’s continued obstructionist strategy. (3)

While San Martin faults the United Nations for its failure to resolve the referendum, not surprisingly, he primarily assesses blame to Morocco. He supports his argument through a quote from a James Baker interview following the failure of the 1997 Houston Accords and the 1999 amendments. San Martin quotes Baker as saying the following

When we got right up to having identified people who were entitled to vote, the Moroccans then walked away from the plan. Why did they do that? You’ll have to ask them but I would assume it was because they worried that they wouldn’t win the vote… The closer we got to implementing [the plan] the more nervous I think the Moroccans got about whether they might not win the referendum. (4)
Former Secretary Baker, as the Special Envoy to the mission, presented another plan after the February 2000 failure of the first plan. The second plan, endorsed unanimously by the Security Council in July 2003, attempted to unblock the stalemate. San Martin notes that it was the “optimum political situation” and he paraphrases Kofi Annan by stating, “If the previous proposals had failed because they were ‘zero-sum games’, the Baker II though a combination of elements from various proposals, provided ‘each side with some, but perhaps not all of what it wants.’ It consisted of a transitional period of four to five years of autonomy under Moroccan administration, followed by a referendum” (5). I will return to Baker in a moment in discussion of Lonergan’s methods.

Shelly’s analysis strongly sympathizes with the nationalist Sahrawi struggle. He emphasizes the international context, regional strategic security interest, exploitation of natural resources, and remnants of the Cold War’s effect on the conflict. Shelley suggests, “Morocco’s success was in the US and France onside and persuading the Soviet Union it had no interest in entering the game” (6). Morocco, however, continues to describe Polisario through arcane Marxist revolutionary zealotry (7). Shelley also argues that United States security interest perpetuates the conflict. He states, “The unpacking of this tale [Morocco’s assistance in averting a terrorist attack] says much about the nature of Morocco’s relationship with the United States and Europe and, by extension, with its neighbors and the rest of the world. That, ultimately, provides the geopolitical backdrop to the more than a quarter century of Moroccan rule over most of Western Sahara” (8). His analysis is self-evident. Of course realist state interest and geopolitical hegemony strongly influence the stalemate. Morocco has been a strong ally to the Western-
controlled international community, and, referring to Lonergan’s epistemology, Morocco is stable. Morocco is a known-known, while an independent Western Sahara would cause great uncertainty in a region that must constantly cope with uncertainty.

In terms of regional security, Shelley also discusses the regional bipolarity of Algeria and Morocco’s in competition over Western Sahara. He quotes Addi, “The contradiction between proclamations of unitary faith and the animosity of relations finds roots in the authoritarian mode of legitimation of power in each of the two countries” (9). Legitimation of power for Morocco focuses not only in the authority of governance, but also on the authority of the crown itself. In “Dialectic of Authority,” Lonergan discussed authentic versus unauthentic authority. For Lonergan, the authority of the government and of the crown lacks authenticity if the occupation or negotiated autonomy lacks power from the community, which Lonergan understands as establishing a common sense of shared values, ideally encouraging alternative insights to develop within the common sense.

4.3 Background

This background quickly highlights several periods of the Western Saharan context. From 1578-1727, Moroccan kings ruled during the era of pre-Spanish colonization. This history, part of the Greater Morocco thesis, as I will discuss is an example Lonergan’s historical development discussed in the second chapter.

The next major era was 1884-1975, the era of Spanish colonization. Following Spain’s withdrawal from Western Sahara in 1975 and an International Court of Justice
ruling that Western Sahara is independent, King Hassan II led 350,000 Moroccan civilians into Western Sahara during a nationalist claim to the territory. The Polisario declared the partially recognized state of the Sahrawi Arabic Democratic Republic, operating in exile from Algeria.

Then, from 1976-1991, war ensued between Morocco and Polisario separatists. The United Nations mandated a ceasefire in 1991 in order to prepare for a referendum of self-determination. The major obstacle was the voter eligibility since Spain had conducted the only official census in 1975 prior to the war.

In 2000, Morocco rejected Special Envoy James Baker’s proposal. Talks ensued again in 2003 with a second Baker plan that the Polisario rejected. Since 2007, Morocco has negotiated on the principle of autonomy, insisting that a referendum is not an option. The negotiations have produced no traction under two special envoys following Baker, with the current rounds having concluding in New York in the summer of 2011.

The Polisario continue to proclaim their right to self-determination while Morocco proclaims that the kingdom the autonomy plan, which was a concession the King Hassan II refused, has compromised in good faith. Non-governmental organizations routinely condemn Morocco for human rights violations against Sahrawis, while Morocco also enjoys the support of the Western powers of the international community.

Having overviewed the historical background of the stalemate, the role of third parties and the international context shape the current state of the process. The following overview of third parties provides a brief and necessary background and context.
Following, I briefly will outline conditions with the international arena that also shape the status of the conflict.

Regarding international government organizations, the United Nations, African Union and European Union significantly shape the status of the conflict. The United Nations mandated the ceasefire and maintains the current mission for the referendum. The African Union has been pivotal in support of the Sahrawi nationalist movement. The European Union continues to be active in trade and security regulations. Non-governmental organizations such as Western Sahara Resource Watch have demonstrated the European Union’s trade policies, especially regarding fishing and phosphate exploitation. The role of non-governmental organizations in advancing research on the conflict has been instrumental. I have mentioned several whom are some of the most active.

The influence of national third parties on the stalemate also necessitates a brief overview. The Polisario receives financial and political support from Algeria and the government-in-exile locates in the Tindouf camp of southeastern Algeria, which brings into question whether they are a third party or a stakeholder. Until 1979, Mauritania engaged in war with Polisario and currently fosters strong relations with both stakeholders. The United States, under former Secretary of State James Baker, initiated a peace process and has continued to host talks in New York. Since the Clinton administration, the United States has advocated the autonomy plan now proposed by Morocco. The United States operates within realist state interest with 2004 free trade agreement, natural resource exploration and arms trade. France and Spain also
demonstrate state interest through their colonial legacies to Morocco and Western Sahara through economic and cultural hegemony.

Finally, I have demonstrated that the stalemate is international in scope. I will briefly contextualize the stalemate within a regional and global context. During the referendum process of 2000, Indonesia decolonized East Timor. The self-determination of East Timor inspired Sahrawi nationalists, as they compared their occupation with the East Timorese. In 2008, the Western powers of the international community welcomed Kosovo as then the world’s youngest democracy, controversially separating from Serbia. Finally, in 2011 South Sudan inspired Sahrawi nationalists through a relatively peaceful referendum for their self-determination.

The current regional and global political climate for the negotiations includes the so-called Arab Spring, which history has not yet had the benefit to define. In Lonergan’s terms as noted in the third chapter, the Arab Spring was an “unknown unknown.” The Arab Spring, while lacking concrete analysis, seems to have occurred as, in Lonergan’s terms, a cycle of progress; however, the realist fear of uncertainty has merit. In the midst of the Arab Spring, The United Nations enacted the right-to-protect and resolved to suppress the Gaddafi regime. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization supported rebel factions of whom they had scant intelligence. With Gaddafi having been aligned with the Sahrawi Arabic Democratic Republic, Morocco charges that Polisario militants served for hire against NATO forces. However, stalemate between the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus presents another challenge to the international community between realism and self-determination. Also, significantly, in 2011 Palestine
unilaterally petitioned the United Nations at the General Assembly for statehood recognition under inevitable threat of United States, thus dramatically challenging the realism of United States’ action versus the idealism of United States’ values.

4.4 On Analysis

Shelley traces the occupation of Western Sahara throughout the colonial period, thereby demonstrating it as a perennial state of war (10). In Lonergan’s terms, general and group biases have resulted in short term and long term cycles of decline. For Shelley, French colonial interest, then Spanish colonial interest, then Moroccan colonial interest characterize the roots of Sahrawi imprisonment in occupied territory. Third parties, who perpetuate the conflict, while not colonial, also perpetuate the cycle of decline through general, group and individual bias. First, there is a lack of political will. Few Americans, including myself prior to this research, are familiar that the conflict exists. The general bias perpetuating the stalemate is the permeation of individual biases that prohibit insights from developing: lack of knowledge.

In terms of Lonergan’s horizon, for individuals there is no reason to foster insights, or political will, on unknown-unknowns. If one is not familiar that a territory exists, then it is impossible for the individual to know that it is in conflict. If an individual does not know that a territory is in conflict, then it is impossible for them to care about the plight of the stakeholders. If an individual gains insight that a conflict exists, but discovers that negative peace sustains a level of violence that does not shock the conscience, then there is little reason to develop political will to foster insights that
resolve the conflict. Thus, there is general bias of the United States citizenry against resolving the conflict.

Within this general bias long-term cycle of decline, the groups of Americans who are aware of the conflict and for whom it evokes an emotive response will demonstrate group bias short-term cycle of decline against resolution. The reasons for this include the common sense that suggests negative peace is sufficient because it ensures stability, security and economic opportunities for private enterprise (the realist interpretation), the group will be a diaspora with emotive allegiance for their ethnic community, or they the group will be anti-neocolonial activists. Therefore, if the United States had the political will, the United States could intervene. Former Secretary of State James Baker, who offered a “third way plan,” which I will discuss shortly, discovered that creating insights from a third party is, like Lonergan’s operations of consciousness, a creative method to foster dialogue, rather than a formula for peaceful resolution.

While the central issue of the stalemate is the referendum, Morocco’s claim to an imagined historical past, as noted previously, is deeply rooted in the conflict. The Moroccan-American Center’s historical timeline for the background of the conflict includes a pre-colonial era when Moroccan kings ruled the region, with the nomadic tribes pledging their allegiance to the crowns. San Martin argues that it was an invention by a nationalist leader. He writes, “Rabat’s interest in the land… dates back to 1956 when the leader of the Istiqlal Party, Al-al El Fassi, formulated the idea of Greater Morocco, which he claimed to be the legitimate heir of the Almoravid Empire of the eleventh and
twelfth centuries” (11). Appendix B provides maps both of the disputed territory and the imagined territory of Greater Morocco.

I use “imagined” not to suggest “untrue.” I do not offer a judgment of fact because I do not possess it. Literature, such as San Martin’s, that sympathizes with the Sahrawi cause dates the Greater Morocco theory to 1956 as a method of nationalist propaganda. For the Moroccan-American Center, it is a source of historical pride (12). Again, whether or not it is “true” is not my concern. Prior El Fassi’s insight, which was a cognitive operation actuated by emotions, feelings and values, he developed a framework that intimately shapes the conflict in Western Sahara and Moroccan identity. While his notion certainly led to group bias and general bias in Morocco, hence cycles of decline, it demonstrates an example of Lonergan’s process from cognitive operations to historicity.

Introducing this thesis, I discussed the transformation of this research from the thesis proposal that would have been a point-by-point critique of Morocco’s occupation into an exploration of Lonergan’s analysis that then considers the conflict in Western Sahara. Having demonstrated that the litany of literature above and the activity of non-governmental organizations, mostly reviewed during proposal submission, one might forgive my initial bias against Morocco’s aggression. The evidence seemed clear: Morocco enjoys the full realist full support of the United States, France and the United Nations. Only one member of the G20, South Africa, recognizes diplomatically the Sahrawi Arabic Democratic Republic, which is recognized by African Union. The polarity seemed clear: academics, journalists, human rights non-governmental
organizations, and many developing nations aligned with the socialist pole of the Cold War on one side, the power elite on the other.

As a graduate student engaged in humanist idealism and universal principles, naturally my research would veer left away from Morocco’s occupation perpetuated by multinational corporate greed and Western power state interest in economic, political and security control. Indeed, the journalists, activists and academics have standing in their critiques. While I have not been party to any of the documented abuses, I would not dismiss them as fiction. Why would I not recite eighty pages of example after example of Morocco’s injustice toward the Sahrawis, and then submit my thesis as complete? Indeed, this would have been most unfortunate research.

Returning back to the grounding the theory, I hypothesized that Lonergan’s methodology and the methodologies of scholar-practitioners such as Price, Piaget, Kegan, Melchin and Picard provide a framework to gaining new insights to protracted international conflict. While the case study is the conflict in Western Sahara, the case study also operates as the researcher analyzing the case study of Western Sahara. As a researcher who consumed a substantial breadth of the literature pertaining to the conflict—or so I will now consider the “subject”—I embraced the challenge under a guise of objectivity because I was aware of my known unknowns. I knew that prior to a brief classroom exercise I had no exposure to the conflict, ostensibly able to analyze as a tabula rasa.

Kegan, writing about the brilliance of Piaget’s experiments, notes, “Evolutionary truces establish a balance between subject and object….They transform an abstract notion such as ‘structure’ or ‘subject-object’ differentiation’ into something almost palpable”
(12). He continues by stating, “The deep structure of the truce, simply put, is that the perceptions are on the side of the subject; that is, the child [in this case of research, the analyst] is subject to his perceptions in his [or her] organization of the physical world” (13). In the third chapter, I offered Kegan’s example of the children on the Empire State Building looking at the people below saying that they look like tiny ants. Kegan concludes, “[The] statement is as much about [the child in the example] looking at his perception as it is about the people” (14).

Also in the last chapter while, I noted how this example relates to national security analysis. Heuer, without employing Kegan’s discourse, instructed intelligence analysts to disembed their subject-object orientation. Thus, through the process of grounding Lonergan’s theory to the case study of Western Sahara, I have related data of consciousness to historicity, disembedded myself (as best as possible) from objectivity into subjectivity, whereas I stepped away from my perceptions, analogically from seeing that Morocco’s aggression toward Western Sahara are “ants” into understanding my perception that the policy looks like ants. The group bias of academics, activists and journalists, who may have standing in criticism for the policies of Morocco, shaped my initial bias because I had failed to seek out new insights. Having fostered insights and empathized with both stakeholders in light of a common sense context that produces a cycle of decline by repressing insights to empathize with those for whom there is no realist rational reason, I conclude that the theory is grounded in respect to the case study.
5. Ibid.
8. Shelley, 6-7.
10. Ibid, 187.
11. San Martin, 66.
Chapter 5: Conclusion

In the introduction, I discuss that the proposal of this thesis concerned the case study as the primary focus of the research. The initial research design, however, did not reflect insightful analysis of the Western Sahara case study. Why was my research not insightful? The data collected reaffirmed my hypotheses because the scholarship advocated the same position of a politicized international conflict. While that does not dismiss the research of scholars like Zunes and Mundy, whose analysis I find careful and thorough, the initial ideas regarding the case study neglected exploration of Lonergan’s data of consciousness. Effectively, this research transformed from a master’s thesis that condemned Moroccan hubris and human rights violations by synthesizing Zunes, Mundy, Hodges, Damis and other scholars with activists and journalists such as Shelley, San Martin, and contributors to websites such wsrw.org into a theory-driven exploration of Lonergan and insight theory, following my own inquire of if my research proposal was so.

While I researched in Washington, representatives of the Moroccan embassy assisted through explaining their positions regarding history, the peace process, and the autonomy plan. By definition, their information was biased toward the Moroccan agenda, yet the time to listen to their position and read the texts they recommended allowed to develop new insights in order to, in effect, balance the insights from the academic,
journalist activism and non-governmental organization reporting that prosecutes the
Kingdom of Morocco’s the alleged occupation of Africa’s last colony. Information
obtained in interviews, which due to academic administration I did not directly use, and
readings presenting a position favorable to the Kingdom of Morocco note a dramatic
change in policy through promoting the autonomy plan. In one sense, this demonstrates
Lonergan’s cycle of progress because an insight that the reign of Hassan II did not
tolerate is embraced by King Muhammad VI. However, as noted in the fourth chapter,
consideration of the autonomy plan as a demonstration of progress does not suggest
conclusion that it is the best option for the nationalist Sahrawis. One may, however,
logically conclude that the common sense of the Muhammad VI’s reign welcomes certain
insights prohibited in the reign of his father, Hassan II.

Also in the introduction, while discussing this transition in the rationale of the
research, I offer Hall’s allegory of the men on the boat looking in opposite directions. I
explained that my interest vis-à-vis the case study is to get off the boat, although I could
have stated the same metaphorical point if I had expressed that my intention is to turn
around and see the position of the men facing the opposite direction. I offered this
anecdote within the rationale to analyze my own process of overcoming individual bias.
As noted in the introduction, I do not have a connection to the case study. Therefore, I
had a weak salience of individual bias toward a conflict that is highly emotionally
charged for the stakeholders. I do not find it likely that the Polisario cadres, those whose
lives have been defined by what they see as over thirty years of apartheid, reflect on King
Muhammad VI’s feelings and emotions to his threats and cares. Nor is it likely that he
reflects with the same empathy towards those who toward the Moroccan position have been the primary threat to national security and the crown’s legitimacy. As a graduate school with no invested interest other than the pursuit of peace and knowledge, my emotive values do not share the salience as the stakeholders. Therefore, there is no logical reason for me not to engage this research with a high degree of objectivity. While I referred to the case study various times before the fourth chapter, I departed from it in terms of focus in order to explore Lonergan’s analytical frameworks.

The second chapter reviews scholars such as Price, Kegan, Melchin and Picard, who inspired by Lonergan’s thought have advanced his method in practice through insight theory of mediation. Practitioners such as Price, Melchin and Picard successfully apply insight theory to interpersonal disputes and peacebuilding in interfaith mediation. Practitioners guide stakeholders through methods of gaining insights in order to more deeply understand the interactions within emotions and values in order to foster non-violent communication. Lonergan connects personal cognitive inquiry, which he identified as natural right, with the process of human development, or historicity. Concluding from this, applying Lonergan’s methodology and insight mediation for interpersonal and interfaith conflict analysis and resolution has a successful proven history. Yet, with much of Lonergan’s thought devoted to overcoming bias in order to reverse cycles of decline into cycles of progress, as he suggests “healing and creating” history, the ideas discussed are not confined to disputing individuals learning through insights regarding their threats and cares.
The third chapter explores conditions in which Lonergan’s methods apply to realist national security analysis. General bias within the common sense of realism inhibits insights that are “touch-feely.” In the 2003, jingoism toward war in Iraq, national security analysts, policy makers, academics and the media succumbed to a general bias that prohibited rational inquiry into the justifications of conflict. Testing application of Lonergan’s methods to interstate and intrastate conflict, this example validates utility. Post-invasion common sense attributes the invasion to administration corruption and exploitation of natural resources. I neither advocate nor prosecute this assertion; however, following this research I am convinced primarily that the impetus to violence was the corruption of the common sense itself, rather than shadowy administration officials conspiring with the energy and defense sectors, or however post-invasion common sense seeks to recreate an unfortunate moment in United States hegemonic ambition.

In the study, my analysis follows the thoughts of the third chapter. I supported my argument of grounding a theory by applying it to the case study. The quest for subjectivity completes this research. Following this research, I hope to visit Morocco, Western Sahara and return to Washington and speak again with those who offered assistance while I last visited the states. I would expect that anyone who would speak to me in Morocco would be suspicious of my inquiry because I am not a government official, entrepreneur or an activist. I am just a curious graduation student who is interested in healing and creating historicity and deconstructing my own objectivity in order to gain insights to do my part progressing group and individual common sense.
## Appendix A: Glowacki’s Table

Lonergan’s Four Levels of Cognition:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels of operation</th>
<th>Questions being asked</th>
<th>Factors to consider</th>
<th>Performances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Experiencing</td>
<td>Senses reacting to incoming data</td>
<td>Role of past insights reshaping experience of sensory data; creating reference frames and habits</td>
<td>Attentive - Inattentive (listening, watching, noticing, attending)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Understanding</td>
<td>What is it? Leads to insights through questioning data of experience</td>
<td>Role of wonder &amp; curiosity</td>
<td>Intelligent, Insightful Obtuse (lines of questioning)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Judging/verifying</td>
<td>Is it so? Tests understanding by reflecting on insights through more questioning</td>
<td>Role of doubt; whether relevant data is data of sense or consciousness or both influence of authority figure</td>
<td>Reasonable, Critical Uncritical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Deciding</td>
<td>Valuing</td>
<td>Whether the feeling is (a) simply about attraction aversion, or (b) something of genuine value, and if so on what level: vital, social, cultural, personal, spiritual.</td>
<td>Self-appropriation of feeling</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deliberating</th>
<th>What can I do?</th>
<th>Formulation of options based on values</th>
<th>Open/Creative - Habitual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evaluating</td>
<td>What should I do?</td>
<td>Openness to full range of alternatives</td>
<td>Responsible - Irresponsible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B: Maps of Western Sahara

Map of Disputed Territory
Map of Greater Morocco

Bibliography
Bibliography


Curriculum Vitae

Brian J. Farrell grew up in Southern Maine. He attended the University of Southern Maine, where he received his Bachelor of Arts in History in 2006 then Bachelor of Arts in Political Science in 2008. His thesis from the USM Honors Program (2007) explored anti-Semitism in the United States from 1938-1944. While active in university leadership, he worked in the overnights throughout his education. Following his education in Southern Maine, he coordinated an adult soccer league committed to community building for Portland’s growing African immigrant populations. He also researched international trade for the Maine International Trade Center, successfully managed a campaign for a local politician, while maintaining his overnight employment.

He went on to intern for the Department of State in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor in the Office of Near East and South and Central Asian Affairs. Following his internship in 2009, he was hired by a contractor for the Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security. His life dramatically changed when the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution invited him to study, then informed him about an opportunity to study jointly with the Mediterranean Academy for Diplomatic Studies at the University of Malta.

Following completion of this research, he traveled France to learn more about the culture and language of his fiancée before returning to the United States. He hopes to find employment in the field of conflict analysis, resolution and security thus paying off the burden of his student loan debt, which could balance the budget of the United States. He dreams of a life in which he can professionally make a positive contribution to the global community and his country, develop a wonderful life with his fiancée, and pursue doctoral studies because study, research, and ideas are the passion of his life.