PAVED WITH GOOD INTENTIONS: THE STRUCTURAL IMPACT OF GENDER ON POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

by

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UPaved with Good Intentions: The Structural Impact of Gender on Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Implementation

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts at George Mason University

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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my mom, Cathy Lownie Degi, and to the women like her whom I interviewed for this project, whose courage to leave bad marriages taught me about self-respect and strength; to my partner’s parents, Barbara and Ron Mount, whose compassion, patience and selflessness towards one another has taught me what it takes to build a joy filled and equitable marriage; and to my partner, William Mount, for his commitment to building this kind of marriage with me.
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ABSTRACT

UPAVED WITH GOOD INTENTIONS: THE STRUCTURAL IMPACT OF GENDER ON POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

Elizabeth A. Degi, M.A.
George Mason University, 2012
Thesis Director: Dr. Joseph Scimecca

This thesis traces the outcomes of a legal reform enacted in Bali to address unintended consequences of a World Bank policy that undermined women’s economic, legal and human rights. This qualitative exploratory inquiry emphasizes how cultural concepts of gender structurally influenced the legal reform; both the construction of the policy, and the outcomes stemming from its implementation. The analysis suggests that policy measures intended to ‘empower’ women which fail to address the influence of gender in the formation and functioning of social institutions reinforce conceptualizations of gender that constrain women’s autonomy and reify patriarchal sociocultural institutions. This work seeks to allow women’s voices to reflect back on and reciprocally transform social theories and practices. This thesis is intended to contribute to theoretical understandings of the influence of gender in legal reform efforts.
I. INTRODUCTION

The recent wave of political transitions ushered in during the Arab Spring must be accompanied by vigilant attention to policy measures taken to ‘empower’ women within countries transitioning from a collapse of central governance structures. Historically, the need to establish new juridical-political institutions has been viewed by policy makers as an opportunity for fostering greater gender equality in societies where androcentric gender ideologies form the bedrock of familial, legal, and economic institutions. Such transitions have been followed with a barrage of programs and policies designed to make manifest in women’s lives the equalities granted by national legal systems or international treaties ratified by the transitioning countries (Cheldelin and Eliatamby 2011). However, the construction of many of these measures have been guided by neoliberal discourses that posit if women are given access to legal or economic resources, they will be able to transcend entrenched sociocultural structures that have historically subjugated them (Bergeron 2003). This narrow conceptualization of women’s empowerment places the onus on individual women to successfully transcend structurally violent systems, rather than pressuring societies to transform systems that subjugate women in private life and posit women in non-dominant social positions within juridical-political institutions.
In this thesis, I trace the outcomes of one such measure implemented in Bali, Indonesia in response to unintended consequences of a World Bank investment made in the aftermath of the fall of Soeharto’s\(^1\) New Order in 1998. Both the World Bank investment and the subsequent measure to address the resulting unintended consequences failed to account for the ways pervasive cultural perceptions of gender intrinsically affected the formation and functioning of social institutions. This led to the measures more deeply entrenching juridical-political and social institutions that marginalized women from positions of social power. Analyzing the dynamics surrounding the implementation of these measures in Bali provides a “paradigmatic case study” (Flyvbjerg 2004), useful for developing a metaphor illustrative of the potential outcomes of policy development frameworks that reduce ‘empowerment’ to solely legal or economic terms. While this case study cannot provide a fail-safe roadmap for future policy development, it does illuminate potential problems that future efforts to implement similar policies may encounter. The findings of my research, when brought into dialogue with scholars exploring third party conflict interventions and the work of feminist sociologists, suggests that this reductionist view of ‘empowerment’ further reifies structurally violent cultural intuitions. The outcomes of this further entrenchment manifests as an acceptance of physical, emotional, and psychological violence towards women, as well as the exclusion of women from full participation in the economic, social, and juridical-political institutions that comprise the public and private spheres of a

\(^1\) Many Javanese, including Soeharto, use only a given name without a surname.
A policy development framework that substantively grapples with the impact of gender in policy implementation is necessary to mitigate such outcomes. However, the adoption of such a framework is unlikely unless policy makers and international organizations involved in peacebuilding recognize gender as a social institution that affects policy outcomes (Lorber 1994; Martin 2004; Risman 2004). As Judith Lorber argues, “change is unlikely to be deep-seated unless the pervasiveness of the social institution of gender and its social construction are made explicit” (1994:10).

To “make explicit” the ways gender structurally influences the development and outcomes of policies implemented to assist countries transitioning from a collapse in central governance structures, I explore the intersections of gender ideologies, state juridical-political power, and women’s everyday experiences with domestic violence in the aftermath of collapses of central governance structures in Indonesia. Domestic violence (DV) presents fertile ground for analyzing the confluence of gender ideologies, daily lives, and state power, as DV is both able to occur because of women’s non-dominant status, while also serving as a pragmatic means of reinforcing this subjugated social position (Dobash and Dobash 1979; Lorber 1994; Martin 2004; Risman 2004; Sciortino and Smyth 2002). DV is a glaringly overt manifestation of misogynistic societal underpinnings; it lays bare Bourdieu’s “profoundly buried structures,” (Bourdieu 1992:7), as societal responses, both by juridical-political institutions and social networks surrounding victims indicate societal views of women’s rights and power. As such,
analyzing DV as a manifestation of women’s social subjugation serves to make visible “gender’s invisible dynamics and complex intersections with other institutions more apparent,” providing the opportunity for “critical analysis and change” (Martin 2004:1249).

Incorporating an analysis of gender ideologies pervasive within societies targeted for intervention may result in the development of policies that effectively shift such structurally violent cultural institutions, providing space for cultural transformations that hold true potential for more fully ensuring women’s rights (Bergeron 2003). Looking to prevalent cultural gender ideologies- rather than simply the economic or legal status of women- would move away from policy development frameworks that conceptualize ‘taking gender into account’ as “add women and stir” (Dharmapuri 2011; Mertus 2008). The paradigm would shift to recognize and address gender as a social structure (Risman 2004) “built into the organization and politics of all social institutions, the interactions of everyday life, and the consciousness of self we call identity” (Lorber 1994:5). This would excavate the influence of gender as one of the “profoundly buried structures which constitute the social universe, as well as the ‘mechanisms’ which tend to ensure their reproduction or their transformation,” (Bourdieu 1992:7). Such a framework would recognize gender as “a fundamental code” (Goffman 1977:301) that informs and constrains individuals’ interactions and forms the bedrock upon which all social institutions are built. Resulting policies would have the potential to adapt structurally violent cultural institutions to release pressure on social systems that place women in positions of marginalized social and political power.
The Case for Reconceptualizing Gender

Building from the work of feminist sociologists who advocate for a recognition of gender as a social institution (Lorber 1994; Martin 2004; Risman 2004), I argue that gender intrinsically influences the formation and functioning of social intuitions, and is one of the key components that form the roots of structural violence. Social systems that limit individuals’ ability to acquire social and economic capital based on their gender status (Lorber 1994) produce structurally violent institutions (Burton 1997). This systemic process arises from social constructions of gender and, simultaneously, reinforces and legitimates these constructions (Lorber 1994). Individuals’ access to social capital is constrained by their gender status and their behaviors are limited by gender ideologies. Their compliance with these ideologies fortifies the structures that arise from the ideologies through their behavioral compliance within these systems. As Lorber asserts:

Gender organizes social relations in everyday life as well as in the major social structures, such as social class and the hierarches of bureaucratic organizations (Acker 1988; 1990). The gendered microstructure and the gendered macrostructure reproduce and reinforce each other. The social reproduction of gender in individuals reproduces the gendered societal structure; as individuals act out gender norms and expectations in face-to-face interaction, they are constructing gendered systems of dominance and power (1994:6).

In the context of domestic violence, women’s ability to exit a violent intimate partnership is limited by the structurally violent systems in which the relationship is taking place. The structures surrounding her limit her access to resources necessary to exit the relationship. Her access to social capital, which would yield social networks to assist her transition to another living situation or provide protection, is limited by social
mores that place the onus of the relationship’s success on the woman. Moreover, her social capital is determined not only by her ability to ‘keep’ a man, but by her position as half of a couple. She has more social standing as a woman within a relationship that complies with culturally dictated norms that arise from gender ideologies than she does as a single woman. A lack of social capital necessary to exit the relationship is further compounded by the often present lack of economic capital. Should a woman be able to transcend these structures and gain access to the social and economic capital necessary to exit the violent relationship, social structures arising out of gender ideologies still limit her ability to exert influence to change the structurally violent systems that she had to transcend. Her ability to advocate for meaningful social change will be hampered by her position as a woman who was not able to successfully comply with behaviors dictated by pervasive gender ideologies. Further, her limited social and economic standing as a single woman within an androcentric society impedes her ability to yield influence in governmental or community systems that might yield changes to structurally violent social institutions.

These processes form a constraining system that dictate individuals’ behaviors and social interactions based on gender ideologies (Bourdieu 2004; Goffman 1977; Lorber 1994; Martin 2004; Risman 2004). Gender, therefore, must be understood as an element that fundamentally informs the functioning and formation of social institutions (Lorber 1994; Martin 2004; Risman 2004). Transformative development efforts must move away from policy construction frameworks that conceptualize gender as ‘what is happening to women?’ towards paradigms that substantively grapple with the ways
gender ideologies functionally inform the social systems targeted for intervention. This shift will constitute the “deliberate restructuring” (Lorber 1994) necessary for making manifest in women’s lives the rights and safeties afforded to them by international treaties and national laws.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Each section within this literature review explores topics informative to this inquiry independently. However, the overall frame of the influence of gender in the formation and functioning of social structures means that themes in each section resonate throughout. Each of the five sections build on the preceding section: 1) The formation of gender ideologies; 2) How these ideologies inform the construction of gender as a social institution, a process I term ‘structural gender’; 3) The ways gender intrinsically influences the construction of structurally violent social institutions; 4) Domestic violence as a systemic cycle that both functions because of structural violence while also serving as a practical means of enforcing power relations that place women at risk of violence; 5) How internationally sanctioned peacebuilding efforts have historically addressed- or failed to address- structural violence and gender.

Gender Ideologies

Internationally sanctioned policies intended to assist countries transitioning from a collapse of central governance structures must account for the influence of structural gender in order to develop effective policies that account for gender as an element that fundamentally informs the formation and operation of social structures. Cultural concepts of gender inform dynamics of family systems, juridical-political institutions and policies created by these institutions, and cultural norms that dictate ‘appropriate’
behaviors within society (Lorber 1994; Martin 2004; Risman 2004). These dynamics constrain individuals’ roles within professional, political and familial systems, and interpersonal relationships. Individuals’ compliance with social norms ascribed by gender further reinforces the legitimacy of these constructions (Goffman 1977; Kroska 2000; Lorber 1994). To substantively grapple with the ways structural gender influences the construction and function of social intuitions, a policy construction framework is needed that conceptualizes gender not as ‘what is happening to women?’ but rather as ‘how do cultural norms and attitudes about gender constrain and order individuals’ behaviors in everyday life, the propagation of cultural norms, and the functioning of social and political-juridical institutions?’ The concept of ‘gender ideology’, a term that has come into vogue in feminist and sociological literature in the past thirty years to capture the complex processes by which socially prescribed gender norms inform individuals’ behavior and in turn reifies these gender norms (Davis and Greenstein 2009; Kroska 2000; Lorber 1994), may offer an auspicious framework for assisting policy makers in assessing the how gender functionally informs the social systems targeted for intervention.

Lorber asserts that gender ideology is “the justification of gender statuses, particularly, their differential evaluation. The dominant ideology tends to suppress criticism by making these evaluations seem natural” (1994:30). Gender ideology is both the set of social ‘rules’ that informs and constrains individuals’ behaviors based on their gender (as prescribed by those with whom they interact), and the social process by which individuals’ compliance within these socially defined rules further reify the
appropriateness of individuals’ compliance with these standards. This dual process is elucidated more clearly in dialogue with Goffman’s (1977) discussion of the ways gender structures our interactions with others. Goffman argues that gender is “a fundamental code” (1977:301) that reifies social interactions into social structures. Through our interactions with others, we come to make meaning of our own gendered identities, and in the process legitimate the social conceptions of gender that gave rise to our gendered performances. This code also establishes the conceptions individuals have concerning their own identity. Viewed through Goffman’s paradigm, gender is a system that dictates our social interactions with one another, and through these interactions, we come to adopt these ‘gender ideologies’ as intrinsic to our own identity, social behaviors, and place in the world.

Kroska’s (2000) work empirically explores how individuals engage in this process, informing the dynamics unfolding in Bali by emphasizing the role social interactions- demonstrated in her study by individual’s ability to recognize aspects of their own behavior in others- play in the construction of our own gendered identities. The 2010 reforms were enacted to address long standing legal edits mirrored in cultural concepts of property, gender, family, and social positioning. Kroska’s (2000) emphasis on the influence of social interaction in informing our own sense of our place in the world contextualizes the cultural obstructions that women faced when trying to leverage the new reforms, as they challenged their own gender-identity ideology as well as their community’s perceptions of what actions were- and were not- appropriate in context of their gender.
Building off empirical work, such as Kroska’s, in dialogue with Goffman’s theoretical work, policy makers may be able to develop salient tools that assist in analyzing the ways gender ideologies functionally inform the creation and operation of social institutions. This would effectively move policy development efforts towards a framework that accounts for structural gender within the social systems the policies are aimed at assisting.

**Structural Gender: The Influence of Gender Ideologies in the Construction and Operation of Social Institutions**

The seminal works of feminist sociologists exploring gender as an institution have laid the foundations for this inquiry. Judith Lorber’s (1994) groundbreaking work explicating the social construction of gender argues that:

The familiar data about women and men in the economy, education, the media, law, medicine and politics are the concrete manifestations of an underlying structure - the social institution of gender. The concept of gender as an institution explains work patterns (why do occupational gender segregation and stratification persist?), family patterns (why is housework mostly women’s responsibility?), norms of sexuality (why is there violence against women?), the micropolitics of authority (why are there so few women leaders?), and symbolic cultural representations (why are they seen through men’s eyes?) (Lorber 1994:7)

This inquiry looks to domestic violence as one such “concrete manifestation” of underlying social institutions of gender. Policy makers tasked with assisting countries transitioning from collapses in central governance structures must recognize gender as a mechanism that intrinsically informs the construction and function of social intuitions within the social systems in which the policies will be implemented. Lorber (1994) contends that gender is an institution intrinsically embedded throughout all social processes and social organizations. Gender, she argues, is “a process of social
construction, a system of social stratification, and an institution that structures every aspect of our lives because of its embeddedness in the family, the workplace, and the state, as well as in sexuality, language and culture” (1994:5).

The need for such a framework is reiterated by Patricia Yancey Martin (2004), who argues that viewing gender as a social institution makes visible the “invisible dynamics and complex intersections with other institutions more apparent and subject to critical analysis and change” (2004:1249). Based on an analysis tracing the sociological concept of institutions starting in the early twentieth century, she argues that gender clearly functions as a social institution. Most salient to this inquiry are her assertions that gender is an institution as it constrains group members’ actions by forbidding choices of actions available. Institutions, she further argues, dictate a set of interrelated social positions that are enacted relative to one another. Paramount to this inquiry is her assertion that gender must be understood as an institution, as gender is:

Internalized by group members as identities and selves and they are displayed as personalities. Institutions are not only external to individuals. Members’ experiences within- with and in- institutions become incorporated into their identities and selves as members identify with their positions, the practices they enact, and the positions they occupy.

Martin’s assertion sets the stage for understanding the relationship between gender ideologies and gender as an institution. This dialectic relationship must be seen as a process, a negotiation between the individuals’ compliance with (or deviance from) accepted norms of gendered behaviors, and the reinforcement of these norms through individuals’ adherence with them. My analytical approach builds on Lorber’s (1994) and Martin’s (2004) work, but differs slightly in the conceptualization of gender as a social
institution. They focus primarily with the ways gender as an institution is manifested in society. My analysis seeks to understand how gender as a process influences the formation and functioning of social institutions.

This conceptualization is more closely aligned with Barbara Risman’s (2004) work discussing gender as a social structure. Risman offers a “conceptual framework, a scheme to organize the confusing, almost limitless, ways in which gender has come to be defined in contemporary social science” (2004:430). She argues that gender should be conceptualized as a social structure, rather than an institution, “because this brings gender to the same analytic plane as politics and economic, where the focus has long been on political and economic structures” (2004:431). However, she is quick to point out that this terminology, too, is problematic, as there is no widespread consensus as to what constitutes a ‘structure’ within sociological literature. Like Martin (2004) and Lorber (1994), she is intent on situating “gender as embedded not only in individuals but throughout social life” (2004:431).

I share Lorber, Martin and Risman’s frustration attempting to linguistically encapsulate the simultaneous processes by which gender ideologies inform/constrain individuals’ behaviors and structurally influence the formation and functioning of social institutions. I find particularly compelling Risman’s attention to the “mechanisms that produce gendered outcomes within each dimension of the social structure” (2004:430), which include individuals’ actions in accordance with gender ideologies. Lorber also touches on this dialectic process:

Without individual actions (voluntary or coerced) there would be no social institutions, since the social structures we call “gender,” “government,” “family,”
“economy,” and so on must be enacted every day in order to continue and in that enactment are strengthened or weakened, sustained or resisted (D. E. Smith 1987)…The patterned and intertwined structures of work, family, culture, education, religion, and law are gendered, and they deeply and continuously shape the lives of individuals. Through these gendered personalities and identities, these patterns are internalized and willingly reenacted (1994:7).

I believe a term that captures both the process and the outcomes is necessary in policy development to emphasize that the construction and functioning of social institutions is informed by dominant gender ideologies pervasive within a given culture. Throughout this thesis, I will use the term ‘structural gender’ to denote this process and its outcomes. Examples illustrative of structural gender manifested within juridical-political social institutions include policies place the onus for rape on the victim rather than the perpetrator. In Darfur, the Sudanese government punish women victims of rape for “fornication” unless a woman can provide four adult Muslim men eyewitnesses to prove the sexual intercourse was forced against a woman’s will (Kristof and WuDunn 2009) The woman’s family honor is tied to her perceived chastity within her culture, and her sexual defilement is an affront to her family’s prestige within the community. Additionally, her victimization threatens the Sudanese government’s standing within the international community; the government has a vested interest in keeping rape victims silent to avoid sanctions for failing to provide for women’s safety. Within the U.S. military, women service members who report rape and other forms of sexual assault have been demoted, subjected to verbal abuse such as name calling- one of the starkest examples of this that a service member has shared with me is the term “cum bucket” used against a woman serving in Iraq in an all-male unit in which she was pressured into sex repeatedly with members of her unit- and threatened with further violence (Hunter 2007;
Morris 1999). Recent class action law suits\(^2\) filed against the U.S. military implicate the highest levels of leadership, including former Secretaries of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Robert Gates, based on the assertion that their support of military cultural practices propagates and excuses sexual abuse.

Extralegal cultural customs illustrative of structural gender outside the juridical-political realm include such practices as honor killings and circumcision traditions. In Palestine, a daughter’s engagement in extramarital sexual relationships can irreparably damage her family’s honor. To restore family honor damaged by a daughter who ‘misuses’ (Ruggi 1998) her sexuality- exerts it in a way that deviates from behaviors that conform with dominant gender ideologies- the family will often kill the daughter, a practice commonly referred to as “honor killings” (Awwad 2002; Ruggi 1998). Her identity is grounded in compliance with dominant sexual norms, and the repercussions of her behavior on her family’s social standing suggest that one of her paramount values within the familial institution is to be a symbolic extension of the family’s commitment to behave within the bounds of appropriate behaviors as dictated by religious and sociocultural norms. In Maasai villages in many parts of Eastern Africa, men’s circumcision ceremonies denote men’s strength and courage, and his behavior throughout the ceremony reflects on his family’s honor (ole Saitoti 1988). Cultural concepts of strength are tightly intertwined with masculinity, and the circumcision ritual serves as a litmus test for men’s strength. Any movement or sound emitted by a man while he is being circumcised- an operation often accomplished with such devices as a rusty nail or

\(^2\) See for example: Cioca et al v. Rumsfield and Gates, C.A. 11 cv 151
shard of glass- is a sign of weakness and lack of appropriate masculinity. Men who as much as flinch are shunned from the community indefinitely, as they are unable to comply with socially prescribed concepts of masculinity (ole Saitoti 1988). Gender ideologies which dictate the appropriate behaviors for men have not only influenced the development of the circumcision ritual, they have also extended the man’s behavior to be reflective of his family’s status. The linking of individual behavior and familial institutions is reflective of the process by which the construction and functioning of social institutions is informed by dominant gender ideologies pervasive within a given culture. Gender within this context must be seen as having clear structural implications within societal institutions.

**Structural Violence**

Similar to feminists researchers’ need for a term that captures gender as a process, rather than a particular outcome, theorists addressing violent conflict grapple with ways to conceptualize violence. Galtung’s (1969) theory of ‘structural violence’ moved conflict studies towards recognizing violence as a system of unequal power relationships that limit those in marginalized positions of power from gaining access to basic goods necessary for survival. As gender serves as a major determinant of one’s social position (Lorber 1994; Martin 2004; Risman 2004), individuals’ access to goods and services necessary for their survival is in part dictated by individuals’ culturally perceived gender identities (Burton 1997). Therefore, the processes by which these institutions are reified through these interactions are inevitably influenced by structural gender. This process gives rise to institutions that limit or permit individuals’ attainment of basic needs
necessary for their survival - access to food, water, shelter, and safety from psychical violence from other individuals or geopolitical conflict - based on individuals’ position within a society, which is in part dictated by individuals’ culturally prescribed gender identities.

Structural violence provides a conceptual framework for recognizing violence as an operational system that constrains individuals’ abilities to survive. Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois (2004) argue that violence cannot be understood as an “it” that can be “readily objectified and quantified so that a ‘check list’ can be drawn up with positive criteria for defining any particular act as violence” (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004:2). Violence, they assert, must rather be understood as complex social processes that limit individuals’ safety and autonomy, as well as direct violence - that is, physical violence committed against an individual by either another individual or as a result of geopolitical conflict - that endangers individuals’ physical, emotional and psychological well-being.

Structural violence has myriad manifestations. For instance, ‘racist’ structural violence within the U.S. is apparent in the disparate sentencing guidelines for crack vs. cocaine in U.S. legal responses to drug crime that has resulted in an overwhelmingly majority of Blacks held within U.S. prisons. It is also apparent in U.S. public school funding, which is based on local property values. The social segregation of many American neighborhoods, and the disproportionately low property values of neighborhoods with high Black populations, has given rise to impoverished school systems that service primarily Black students and well-funded school systems that service
primarily White students (Kozol 1992). While the pervasiveness of direct violence against Black within the U.S., such as lynching, has obviously declined in the decades following the Civil Rights movement, structural violence continues to limit many Blacks access to the same opportunities as Whites.

My particular attention to the influence of structural gender that gives rise to structural violence is based on my concern— one shared by a growing number of feminists working in development and academia\(^3\)— that the growing attention to gender in conflict following the passage of U.N. Security Resolution 1325 has eschewed from addressing structural violence. While national and international organizations have increasingly incorporated gender into their practice in the eleven years following the passage of 1325, their attention has primarily conceptualized ‘gender’ as women, rather than as a complex process, “of social construction, a system of stratification, and an institution that structures every aspect” of social life (Lorber 1994:5).

This limited framework has failed to yield changes to the social institutions that have historically limited women’s autonomy, as well as their abilities to fully access the services and goods necessary to provide for their safety and well-being (Bergeron 2003). A more expansive framework built on incorporating an analysis of gender ideologies in order to account for the influence of structural gender would allow policy makers to address what Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois call the “violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalities of everyday life” (2004:1), and would result in policies that have the potential to transform structurally violent social institutions.

\(^3\) See for example Barrow 2010, Bergeron 2003, Cheldelin and Eliatamby 2011, and Shepard 2008,
Domestic Violence

I follow the example of Sciortino and Smyth and use the term ‘domestic violence’ throughout to mean “physical or psychological assault within the couple…by males against their female partners” (2002:95). My choice to use this term definition, rather than the broader term ‘intimate partner violence’, which encompasses violence between GLBTQ couples and heterosexual women who physically assault their male partners, reflects my specific attention to women’s abuse by men within intimate partnerships, as I am specifically arguing that DV is both an overt manifestation of gender ideologies that position women in marginalized social roles vis-à-vis men.

My focus specifically on DV as a social phenomenon follows dominant trends in feminist literature on domestic violence. Growing recognition of the disproportionate rates at which women are victims in the context of violent intimate partnerships has yielded a canon of feminist literature arguing that violence by men against women in the context of an intimate partnership is “primarily a problem of men using violence to maintain control over ‘their women’, a control to which they feel they are entitled and that is supported by a patriarchal culture” (Johnson and Ferraro 2000:949). Physical, emotional, and psychological abuse of women by men in intimate partnerships, as well as the withholding of economic and social resources necessary to escape such abuse resulting from the structurally violent social intuitions in which they live, functions as both “a symptom of women’s subordination and one of the practical means to enforce it”

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4 Johnson and Ferraro (2000) offer an excellent and exhaustive literature review tracing the genesis of this argument. Dobash and Dobash (1979) also extensively address the evolution of feminist theories related to DV.
(Sciortino and Smyth 2002:95). DV serves as an overt manifestations of these gendered systems of power. Women would not be subjected to such violence if they held equal power within their intimate partnerships; simultaneously, the violence reinforces the marginalized power women hold within intimate partnerships.

Atkinson, Greenstein, and Lang’s (2005) empirical work furthers Sciortino and Smyth’s (2002) assertion that women’s marginalized power within a relationship underlies incidences of DV, looking specifically at men’s individual level gender ideologies rather than macro level gendered power dynamics. Through a revision of relative resource theory, they find that “traditional” men who want to- but do not- have more financial resources than their wives are more likely to commit DV as a means of reasserting their dominance. Their work emphasizes the importance of gender ideology in understanding DV, clearly delineating the link between resources and ideology that previous empirical works on resource theory and relative resource theory. These previous theories assert that violence serves as a means of compensating for men’s lack of resources relative to a more financially powerful wife. These theories, they argue, fail to account for the cultural variables “and take for granted that married men want to be breadwinners, particularly in comparison to their wives. In other words, rather than accurately reflecting the variability in men’s gender ideologies, such arguments assume all men to be traditional” (Atkinson, Greenstein & Lang 2005:1137). Their work informs this inquiry by calling attention to the importance of incorporating analyses of individual level gender ideologies in addition to structural determinants of DV.
Burton (1997) and Galtung (1969) both emphasize that domestic violence is a form of structural violence, as the institutions propagating male privilege in marriage give rise to both the situations that provoke physical abuse and the cultural, economic and social barriers that prevent women from escaping it. As I will lay out in the paradigmatic case study, Balinese women’s ability to leave marriages in which psychical, emotional and/or psychological abuse is occurring are constrained by these cultural, economic and social barriers, as well as by gender ideologies that they themselves have incorporated into their own gender identities and habitus, further encumbering their abilities to escape intimate partnerships in which domestic violence is occurring.

**Peacebuilding and Statebuilding**

The 2010 reforms were made in response to unintended outcomes of the World Bank’s investment in 1998 that had prompted a embracing of Balinese customary law. Previous scholarly works analyzing similar measures argue that internationally sanctioned statebuilding efforts enacted to assist countries transitioning from a collapse in central governance structures are inherently agenda laden. The interests of sponsoring governments the development of newly formed governments have lead scholars to warn that "peacemaking is a risky business" (Stedman 1977:5). This caution is well grounded in Pugh’s (2004) findings that, when deconstructed, most peace and state building operations actually serve to reinforce dominant structures of institutionalized power that primarily address the needs of the elite. The heavy reliance on third party interventions, with their myriad political and financial agendas that are not always in concert with the needs of non-elites affected by war, makes peacebuilding risky business indeed.
Several scholars analyzing past interventions fail to deeply wrestle with fundamental questions of power and inclusion provoked by international investments in peace building efforts. Paramount to any analysis must be a consideration of the following: Who is setting the agenda in state and/or peace building? Whose voices are included and excluded from the process of setting the peacebuilding agenda? What factors outside of local interests are contributing- positively or negatively- to state and/or peacebuilding efforts, especially pressures imposed by funders? Pugh’s (2004) work is unique within this body of literature, as he deeply delves into a critical analysis of the larger structures of power and privilege undergirding peace and statebuilding. However, several dominant works in this literature fail to address questions that seek to clarify how power is constructed, maintained and leveraged. This sets the stage for a greater that (ostensibly) well intended policies aimed at assisting emerging governments will end up privileging established elite social power. This failure to grapple with questions of power and privilege bodes poorly for prospects of greater inclusion in societies where women have historically been marginalized from social power.

Jarstad (2008) unpacks the assumption, often taken for granted in peace and statebuilding efforts, that efforts to build capacity for democracy and to establish peace should be viewed as mutually beneficial, intrinsically intertwined processes that assist in stabilizing societies transitioning from war. They have been thought of as “wishfully…parallel and mutually beneficial processes” (Jarstad 2008:19). Because these two processes are regarded as positive goals, there is a gap in the literature on
tradeoffs sometimes made between peace and long term democratization of societies on conflict.

In reality, a paradox exists. While well-established democracy is a means of negotiating divergent interests, the process of establishing democracies is often inherently conflict laden. The core elements of democracy—participation, descent, competition between oppositional parties, and mobilization of interest groups—are kindling waiting to alight in the tinderbox of economies and infrastructures shattered by conflict. Therefore, the two need to be thought of as processes independent from one another; “from violence conflict to peace on the one hand, and from authoritarian rule to democracy on the other” (Jarstad 2008:21). Combined, these two processes comprise her “war to democracy transition” (2008:20), a term which allows her to express the dynamics between the two separate processes. As with Coleman (2011), who argues that the dynamics of intractable conflicts themselves become factors contributing that necessitate study, Jarstad argues that the dynamic interplay of the two processes is under theorized, and further inquiry is vital to provide understanding of potential dilemmas that arise when undertaking the processes. Separating the two allows an analysis of the conditions under which these processes clash, making it possible to study the dynamics of the ‘clash’ and understand how these dynamics further protract conflict. As Coleman posits, “such an analysis makes it possible to avoid several dilemmas and to properly design means to support peace and democracy simultaneously” (2011:35).

Paris and Sisk contend that peacebuilding efforts are in fact international “experiments”, whose methods and strategies are evolving without canonical guidelines

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for the ‘right’ way to transform “a fragile ceasefire into a stable and lasting peace” (2009:1). Unexamined contradictions in peacebuilding have led to systemic patterns of policy problems facing peacebuilding organizations (PBOs). They point to similar contradictions highlighted by Jarstad (2008), arguing that processes attempting to foster political and economic infrastructure in support sustainable democratization are simultaneously distinct from and intrinsically intertwined with the societal shift from violence to peace, and are not necessarily mutually beneficial. The lack of discourse surrounding these challenges has resulted in systemic policy challenges; paramount among them is the fact that statebuilding efforts have often been under prioritized in peacebuilding efforts. Echoing Pugh’s (2004) criticism, Paris and Sisk argue that reliance on measures attempting to produce immediate political leadership or private sector stability- rapid elections, accelerated economic privatization- do little to construct infrastructure for sustainable governance. They argue that this results in elites resuming powerful strangleholds on state institutions following peacebuilding efforts.

In an effort to provide guidelines for these “international experiments” (Paris and Sisk 2009:1), Doyle and Sambanis (2000) attempt to clarify best practices that lead to sustainable outcomes. They present findings stemming from the first quantitative inquiry analyzing the correlates of successful peacebuilding, as leniently defined by an end to war and to continued low level violence and uncontested sovereignty and strictly defined by these factors along with meeting minimum benchmarks of democratization, and of UN operations to outcomes of peacebuilding. Based on their analysis of 124 post-World War II civil wars, they assert that the greater the local or international capacities in an area, the
greater the likelihood that peacebuilding efforts will succeed, and that these variables, along with measures of hostility as defined by length of the conflict and the number of causalities, are influential determinants of peacebuilding. Furthermore, they argue that multilateral, UN peace operations and peacemaking aimed specifically at facilitating a peace treaty make a significant difference in determining the long range success of peacebuilding efforts.

Stedman discusses the pitfalls to peacebuilding presented by ‘spoilers’- “leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it” (1977:5). He points out that leaders who negotiate and agree to peace settlements place themselves at risk from spoilers who may try to manipulate the settlement for furthering their own aims, from followers who feel the agreement undermines core values over which the conflict was being fought, or from parties excluded from the peacemaking table. Based on a study of cases of spoiler management, he argues the, "crucial difference between the success and failure of spoilers is the role played by international actors as custodians of peace" (Stedman 1977:6).

Pugh (2004) directly confronts issues of power and privilege inherent in third party peacebuilding efforts largely conducted by state and international coalitions. He asserts that the reason little scrutiny has been directed towards the role of peacekeeping and even humanitarian efforts in sustaining power structures that reinforce the privileges of the elite and of powerful states is due to the “framework of liberal imperialism” underlying “efforts to control or isolate unruly parts of the world” (2004:39).
International interventions have clung to positions of ostensible ‘neutrality’ that, when scrutinized, in fact privilege the status quo *politick real* by not ensuring infrastructure or means for non-dominant groups’ needs to be addressed through the peacemaking process.

Lake (2010) echoes Pugh’s concerns, arguing that one of the reasons the dynamics involved with international interventions engaging in peacebuilding often ends up reifying elite power structures is because the current model of statebuilding focuses on a formal-legal construct of legitimacy which empower laws and institutions to create social order. While he asserts that this model is doomed to failure because of the anarchist situation during and following civil war, he departs sharply from his critical analysis in his proposal for a “relational” concept of legitimacy (Lake 2010:36). Using social contract theory, he argues that an ideal model of statebuilding will involve a sovereign (in the form of an international coalition or PBOs empowered to act by international coalitions) that will draw legitimacy from those governed by providing security and safety in exchange for compliance. This assertion raises cautionary flags when brought into dialogue with even the most cursory reading of prominent theorists who address sovereign power, specifically Foucault (1978) and Agamben (1998). Lake’s failure to question what ‘security’ and ‘safety’ look like, and who gets to decide which conceptions of these ideas get operationalized in sovereign power. Agamben posits that those displaced by war live in the “state of exception”: they are both outside the protection of a sovereign state that takes their interests into account, and also at the whim of that same sovereign as it has the power to define their “bare life”- access to food, water, shelter (1998). The work of critical social theorists suggests that Lake’s relational
concept of legitimacy would fail to provide space for the inclusion of women in newly formed juridical-political institutions. Moreover, Pugh’s (2004) work suggests that his relational model may increase the likelihood of further entrenching social systems that result in structural violence.

**Peacebuilding for Whom?**

Many theorists grappling with the implications of peacebuilding, save for Pugh (2004), contend that third party interveners are essential components of sustainable statebuilding; not perfect, but necessary nonetheless. However, Lake (2010), Jarstad (2008), Doyle and Sambanis (2000), Paris and Sisk (2009), and Stedman (1997) all fail to question which parties’ conceptions of “state” and “peace” are taken into account when undertaking state and peacebuilding. While each of these authors argues that there are challenges and paradoxes, they approach discussions of these challenges from the standpoint of ‘how’ to build state infrastructure or sustainable peace. They fail to address ‘who’ these processes will benefit and who gets to decide what these processes look like. Conceptualizations of ‘state’ and ‘peace’ are those imposed by the third party interveners, not necessarily the local populations. The assumption that peacebuilding by third party interveners will benefit the parties targeted for intervention leaves the potential for women to be further marginalized from positions of juridical-political power, subjugated in social life, and at greater risk of gender-based violence.

As Pugh (2004) points out, in a state newly emerging from war, the voices of the elite are most likely to garner access to bodies imposing temporary sovereign power. Therefore, ‘security’ and ‘safety’ will be defined through terms that protect the interests
of elites. Lake (2010) nods to this reality when he says the one of the first orders of the interveners in his alternative conception is to protect property rights, rather than, say, access to safe water or protection from sexual violence in IDP camps. His assertion hints that the basic needs of those most displaced by war, those who need access to essentials to sustain bare life, are going to play second fiddle to elite who have higher access to those imposing sovereign power. Lake’s argument that a state can claim a conception of social order defined by an outside intervener “as its own” further points to Pugh’s assertions. Foucault points out that the categories of the elite are foisted upon and then adopted by non-dominant groups; this adoption by non-elites then serves as a form of social control to reinforce the dominance of the sovereign elites (1978). A critical reading of social theory suggests that Lake’s ‘relational’ model of statebuilding is primarily concerned with the relationship between elites and international intervening third parties.

Other authors hint at these uneasy power dynamics as well. Jarstad (2008) points to the elite power structures underlying state building in her model of “systematic” dilemma, which pits local interests against international ownership of the peacebuilding process. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) also expose these structures when they assert that contemporary peacebuilding sometimes includes temporary control over political processes. Furthermore, they assert that the greater the local or international capacities in an area, the greater the likelihood that peacebuilding efforts will succeed. However, they fail to delineate whose voices/rights/needs/demands are taken into consideration by the entities providing international capacity. If local capacity is lacking, and this lack is
being compensated for by increased international capacity, these questions of power are paramount in determining the extent to which the needs of non-elite local actors are taken into consideration. Greater attention to who is setting the interveners’ agendas, and how are these agendas being- or not being- informed by local concerns is needed.

Laying the foundation for sustainable third-party interventions

International investments are laden with motives not necessarily aligned with local needs. International investments can be detrimentally impacted by interagency rivalries and donors’ desires for measureable, short term outcomes that may not even address the needs of local population. While efforts to establish democracy may hold long term promise for ensuring a multiplicity of participants in the functioning of a peaceful state, the process of building infrastructure necessary for this long term outcome is wrought with potential for exclusion. The voices of women, as well as non-dominant economic and ethnic groups may be absent from the negotiating table when deciding how new juridical-political institutions will be funded, structured, and overseen.

The tensions inherent in third parties assisting in transitions from violence to peace and from anarchy to democracy make it essential for interveners to take into account the voices of women and other non-dominant, non-elite actors. Pressures imposed by funders, truncated timelines, discordant priorities of nations involved in coalitions all contribute to statebuilding being a messy process wrought with power struggles. Taking these power struggles as a vital component to be addressed must underlie any sustainable peace effort that claims to take into account the voices of those who have been most impacted by war. The cautionary flags raised by Pugh (2004)
inform the analysis of the Balinese case study by pointing out potential problems arising from intersections of power, international organization agendas, lack of attention to local interests, and the marginalization of women’s voices in state building efforts.
III. METHODS

My analysis is grounded in ethnographic fieldwork, including participant observations and semi-structured individual and focus group interviews. I conducted my fieldwork from the last week of June 2011 and throughout July 2011, in an urban village situated on the outskirts of Bali’s capital city, Denpasar, in Indonesia. My exploratory research design was guided by a series of questions aimed at understanding how the fit and frictions between the intended outcomes of the 2010 legal reforms, as envisioned by the women who advocated for their passage and the actual lived experiences of women who had attempted to leverage the reforms in the time since their passage. Specifically, my questions were: 1) what challenges lawyers have faced when representing women petitioning for divorce since the 2010 reforms were enacted, and 2) how these challenges are situated within larger power structures undergirding Balinese social and economic system.

Research Design

I employed a cross-sectional inductive research design for this exploratory study, informed by grounded theory methodology and feminist approaches. An exploratory research design was appropriate for several reasons. Paramount among them was the need to establish a preliminary in-depth understanding of how the 2010 reforms have impacted women, as to date no empirical research had been conducted on the outcomes.
of the reforms. As exploratory research seeks to find out how people function within their social contexts (Schutt 2009), this design was ideal for understanding how the 2010 reforms have changed the lives of women most directly impacted by the law; women in marriages in which domestic violence is occurring and the lawyers who are tasked with assisting them.

Secondly, an exploratory research design was ideal for allowing me to understand the relational and contextual dynamics surrounding the 2010 reforms. As I was researching DV as one of Lorber’s “concrete manifestations” (1994:7) of gender as an institution, my goal in understanding this impact of the 2010 reforms was to get a greater sense of the way social power is constructed in Bali, and how this construction is gendered. My approach aligned with Smith-Lovin’s (2000) assertion that sociologists should be striving to develop “the core understanding of a process that allows us to project future patterns,” rather than concentrating “too much on generating complete understanding for a past event” (2000:304). She contends that the rise of easy access to individual-level data and software that facilitates analyzing myriad variables at once has led the discipline away from its relational focus, yielding theories that do not aim to generate understanding of future patterns of social life. My use of an exploratory design allowed me to focus on the influence of power, micro-to-macro interactions, and creativity of individual actors that influence the social world I was seeking to understand.

I find compelling Smith-Lovin assertion that the goal of scientific, particularly sociological, explanation should be “to provide a simple, powerful model of how some process generates a large number of previously complex phenomena” (2000:301) that is
“forward-looking” in nature (2000:302). Employing an exploratory model held the most potential for yielding “productive, general, generative explanations that can apply to a wide variety of circumstance in both the past and future” (Smith-Lovin 2000:305).

My design drew from grounded theory methodology, which offered an ideal approach for this inquiry as it hones in on social processes underlying phenomena observed (Glaser 1992) and places emphasis on processes of social construction (Charmaz 1990). This approach allowed me to understand the social power relationships undergirding women’s petitions for divorces and allowed new theoretical insights to emerge from data observed, rather than constraining my observations and analysis in the context of pre-established theoretical frameworks. Analyzing the extent to which these petitions have been successful shed theoretical insight on how well the 2010 reforms address social constructs of power underlying marital obligations. Moreover, grounded theory allowed me to focus on how women’s gender-ideological identities are socially constructed within the context of Balinese culture, and how the processes guiding this construction are informed by larger social constructions of power, access and privilege. As data analysis and collection happen simultaneously in grounded theory models, I was able to refine data collection questions to better reflect these social processes as they emerged, which allowed for richer, more salient data to be collected (Charmaz 1988) as I gained more information about women’s lived experiences following the implementation of the 2010 reforms.
Grounding the Theoretical: Bali as a Paradigmatic Case Study

The use of an exploratory research design also held the most promise for yielding a case study that had the potential to inform future policy development. I follow Reinharz’s (1992) definition of a case study, using the term to refer to research focusing on a single issue, rather than seeking to generalize through comparative analysis or compilations of many instances of a given phenomenon. Carroll (1976:xii) contends that “case studies dealing with the experience of selected groups of women in diverse cultures and time periods” are necessary to generate theory that holds potential for understanding intersections of gender and power (Reinharz 1992:164). Feminist case studies analyze changes to a particular social context or phenomenon, analyze the significance of these changes for future similar events, and analyze the relationships and intersections among the various contexts and dynamics of the phenomenon being studied.

Analyzing the complex process by which gender ideologies influence the construction and functioning of social institutions - the process I am referring to as ‘structural gender’- and how structural gender effects the ways ‘empowerment’ policies play out when implemented is better understood in the context of a concrete example. The events surrounding the implementation of a 2010 legal reform (2010 reform) in Bali, Indonesia that was aimed at rectifying unintended consequences of a World Bank policy following the fall of Soeharto’s regime in 1998 provides a salient paradigmatic case study (Flyvbjerg 2004), useful for developing a metaphor for illustrating the possible results caused by a lack of attention to structural gender in policy development.
In Bali, this lack of attention resulted first in a policy measure, made by the World Bank, which further entrenched structurally violent social institutions. The lack of attention to structural gender in the creation of the second policy, the 2010 reforms, yielded an impotent empowerment measure that placed the onus on individual women to transcend structurally violent social institutions, rather than addressing the sources of structural violence to create space for women to gain the autonomy and social standing necessary to ensure their safety and provide space for greater participation of women in institutions of social power. Clearly, the events following a collapse of central governance structures will have different outcomes based on cultural specificity, geopolitical circumstances surrounding a collapse, economic conditions, and other factors that will be unique to any given situation. Despite this, evaluating the ways a lack of attention to structural gender played out in a paradigmatic case study provides insight by setting the groundwork “for the development of a nuanced view of reality” that may prove infinitely more useful for policy makers than attempting to construct “general, context-independent theory” that has little hope of providing predictive theory (Flyvbjerg 2004:422). While this case study cannot provide a failsafe ‘road map’ for future policy development, the paradigmatic case study may shine a headlight on some of the cliffs that policy makers must steer around in order to move towards measures that have the potential to substantively address structural violence. Evaluating the effects of a reform aimed at domestic violence is a particularly apt way to illustrate the effects of structural gender in policy implementation, as domestic violence is an overt manifestation of gender ideologies that marginalize women from positions of social power while
simultaneously acting as a mechanism that reinforces status quo power dynamics that result in structurally violent social institutions.

Definition of Terms

The 2010 reforms addressed economic, proprietary and custodial structural challenges encumbering women’s ability to leave violent marriages. Therefore, an analysis exploring the how legal reforms assisted in women’s ability to leave violent marriages should evaluate the success of a divorce in part on a divorced woman’s ability to economically provide for herself and any dependent children, attain property rights of joint marital property, and gain custody rights of her children. For the purposes of my study, I relied on language from the 2004 Indonesian national law Undung undung 23/2004, which outlaws the affliction of “physical, emotional and psychological” harm between spouses. I limited my working definition of “domestic violence” to specific incidences of a husband physically, emotionally or psychologically harming his wife, constraining the definition not just by the gender relationship but also by situating it within the juridical-political institution of marriage. This limited scope allowed me to focus more closely on my research questions.

I deemed a woman’s petition for divorce under the 2010 reforms “successful” based a woman’s ability to transition from violent marriages into sustainable living situations. I used the term “sustainable living situations” to denote a woman’s ability to provide shelter, food, clothing and access to clean drinking water for herself and any dependent children, in line with the idea that such necessities would be the absolute bare minimum resources necessary for escaping systems of abuse, regardless of a more robust
ability to gain long term economic or social capital necessary to establish herself as an respected entity within the juridical-political or social networks of the community.

Sample

I employed purposive sampling methods, selecting sample elements based on their positioning within the Balinese legal activism arena (Schutt 2009). Purposive sampling offered the best possible means of highlighting the relationships explored in my research questions, as the number of people engaged in leveraging the 2010 reforms was very small; limited to a handful of academics, legal activists, NGO professionals employed in programs directly addressing gender-based violence in Bali, adult children (over eighteen years of age) of Balinese women that have been abused by their husbands, and women who themselves were petitioning for divorces under the 2010 reforms. I identified my interview participants using snowball sampling techniques, which gave me access to purposive sample elements as they were identified by successive interviewees. Snowball sampling was ideal as my sample population was difficult to engage due to the limited number of people in the sample. My individual and group interview sample of eighteen individuals was in line with previous inquiries related to gender that employ ethnographic design (Barber 2008)⁵.

My interview⁶ respondents participants included: Four women Balinese lawyers who work for the Balinese women’s legal advocacy organization Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Asosiasi Perempuan untuk Keadilan (LBH APIK), which is similar to the free

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⁵ Barber (2008) embeds her study of masculinities at a small hair salon in suburban Southern CA, using ethnographic methods consisting of 40 hours of observation, 15 formal in-depth interviews with clients and a group interview with three hair stylists.

⁶ All interviews were conducted in English unless otherwise noted.
legal services provided by Legal Aid Society organizations within the United States, conducted in English and Bahasa Indonesian with the assistance of a translator; one Dutch woman academic married to a Balinese man who was active in advocating for the reforms and collaborates with LBH APIK to write and translate pamphlets explaining legal rights to Balinese women; three American academics who have worked in Bali on gender issues for nearly two decades; three Balinese academics who address gender through their research; one Javanese academic working on gender and violence in Indonesia; two activists working with female sex workers in Bali who have extensive background addressing gender-based violence in Bali; one Balinese adult man whose mother has been and continues to be abused by his father; one female survivor of domestic violence who divorced and retained custody of her child, conducted in Balinese with the help of two translators; and two community activists, one woman, conducted in English, and one man, conducted in Bahasa Indonesian with the help of two translators. These activists work closely with women who experience sexual violence in the context of intimate partnership relationships, although their work is not directly focused on the law or domestic violence.

My initial interview participants were identified with the assistance of anthropologists Leslie Dwyer and Degung Santikarma, both of whom live in the village in which I conducted my fieldwork. Dwyer has lived there for nearly two decades, and Santikarma is a native to the village and is a relative of the family with whom I lived while conducting my fieldwork. Dwyer is an anthropologist and ethnographer with 17 years of experience working in Indonesia, Santikarma is a Balinese anthropologist and
human rights activist. Together they have collaborated on projects related to gender and conflict in Bali, ritual practice, power and inequality, and the ethics and politics of field research in conflict and post-conflict settings. Their extensive networks in the human rights and women’s right communities provided access to salient subjects to include in my purposive sample. They have been directing collaborative research programs in Bali since 2005, and were well equipped to provide guidance on this project methodologically and help me navigate the ethical quagmire of engaging in ethnographic cross-cultural research (Patai 1991; Schepers-Hughes 2000; Stacey 1988).

Data Collection

Ethnographic observations over five weeks between June 26, 2011 and August 1, 2011 augmented focus group and one-on-one in-depth interviews. My observations were conducted while living in the village within the home of an upper middle class family, and while participating in religious ceremonies, ritual offering preparation, shopping at local markets, and socializing at concerts, over dinner, and into the wee hours of the morning over clove cigarettes and locally produced liquor with community members active in social justice, environmental and legal advocacy efforts. I employed theoretical sampling to explicate theories emerging from interviews and observations. I conducted open structured and semi-structured interviews lasting between 45 minutes-2 hours in English and Bahasa Indonesian with the help of a translator.

I contextualized responses from my interviews with extensive participant observations in the community where I lived while conducting my fieldwork. Thus, in addition to the individuals with whom I conducted semi-structured and informal
individual and group interviews, my sample included the men and women with whom I lived while conducting my fieldwork. This included the family in whose home I lived for the five weeks I was in Bali, as well as the members of the community with whom I interacted daily at the market, at local food stalls, at religious ceremonies, and while doing the “deep hanging out” (Geertz 1998) that constitutes much of ethnographic participant-observation.

Guided by Dwyer and Santikarma’s suggestions as well as from themes emerging from early interviews using grounded theory methods, I embedded myself in social activities of the village in which I was living to further inform concepts emerging from the data. I focused especially on activities that highlight women’s daily experiences and the cultural expectations associated with Balinese women’s gender-ideological identities. The family with whom I lived and the friendships that I cultivated increased my understanding of Balinese social life and how gender as an institution structures social interactions.

**Data Analysis**

As data analysis and data collection occur simultaneously in grounded theory methods, I coded data from these observations and focus groups daily as I moved through data collection. Each evening was spent under my mosquito net in bed, laptop balanced on my knees typing field notes as I combed through my notes from the day. Coding my observations for theoretical insights, I delineated theoretical frameworks that contextualized my observations in larger constructs of social life. To further illuminate emergent theories, I conducted theoretical sampling, selecting further purposive sample
members, to exhaust concepts emerging from coding and data collection (Charmaz 1988; Glaser 1992).

Once my field work was completed, I revisited literatures on domestic violence, legal reforms on domestic violence, and internationally sanctioned development efforts similar to the World Bank’s intervention in Indonesia following the fall of Soeharto’s regime. Going into the field, I had not intended to inquire about the World Bank’s intervention, as I was primarily focused on the 2010 reforms. My attention to the relationship between women’s experiences attempting to leverage the 2010 reforms and the World Bank intervention emerged as a result of using grounded theory methods, which provided space for my research participants to draw attention to the ways the 2010 reforms were in some ways a direct response to the World Bank intervention. While the 2010 reforms may have been necessitated simply because of the disconnect between the 2004 national law on domestic violence (Undung undung 23/2004) and Balinese adat law, my participants drew my attention to the relationship between strengthened adat law and the World Bank’s 1998 decentralization efforts. Further reading of the relevant literatures on development in countries emerging from a collapse of centralized governance structures corresponded with the experiences relayed by my research participants.

The emergent themes upon which I build my argument are based on my interview participants’ assertions of their experiences advocating on behalf of victims of domestic violence or, in the case of survivors, their personal experiences navigating the complex social relationships constraining their options for exiting the relationship in which the
violence occurred. The themes also emerge from my observations of gender relationships in Bali in everyday social interactions. I did not personally witness any physical violence or verbal altercations between my respondents and their intimate partners, nor see any bruises, lacerations, or other physical ‘evidence’ of the violence they reported to me. However, in all of the instances discussed within the context of the interviews, my respondents placed a heavy emphasis on physical violence experienced by either themselves or the clients they represented; explaining that acute physical violence, not only emotional or physiological abuse, was what necessitated their/their clients’ escape from the intimate partnership. Through my analysis I will lay out how a woman’s ability to leave a violent partnership is encumbered by structural violence undergirded by gender ideologies that position women in subjugated social positions. This analysis is grounded in my participants’ experiences, my reading of the relevant literatures, and my interactions within the community where I lived during my fieldwork.

Validity and Reliability

The measures I used in my inquiry arose from the data collected using grounded theory methods (Charmaz 1990; Glaser 1992). The development of concepts was directly grounded in observations of empirical data observed, and definitions arose from the concepts explored through my questions (Becker 1998). As the data themselves yielded the measures, validity is intrinsically grounded in the data.

Multiple threats to reliability existed due to the subjective nature of ethnography. I have controlled for these threats as best as possible by using grounded theory guided by feminist methodology. Reliability in ethnography is encumbered by the fact that, in
ethnography, one of the measurement instruments is the researcher herself; however this threat is controlled for in part by the goals of feminist ethnographic research, which aims for an “intersubjective understanding between researchers and the person(s) studied” (Reinharz 1992:46). Taken in context of this aim, I attempted to attenuate threats to reliability by my use of grounded theory, which allowed the measures I employed to arise from my subjects’ experiences. This allowed for the understanding of phenomena researched to be an intersubjective understanding that has the potential to be replicated by a similarly situated researcher, rather than a subjective assessment based solely on my interpretations of the social world in which I was embedded and my analysis of the data relayed by my participants.

Leading ethnographers assert that, when ostensibly ‘less’ subjective methods are deconstructed, ethnography is actually no more fraught with threats to reliability than other research methods:

The social situations of face-to-face interaction must be understood first as a unique product of the competencies, reflexivities, and assumptions of reciprocity among participants. In this perspective the abstractions necessary to make comparisons and thus generalizations across social situations have no “objective” standing. They are themselves constructed from the social situation of the inside participant or the outside observer (Burawoy 1991:272).

I also controlled threats to reliability by viewing the social processes I am explored as manifestations of macro social processes. Like Burawoy’s (1991) discussion of Geertz’s work on Balinese cockfighting, my interest in studying dynamics surrounding the implementation of the 2010 reforms arise from my belief that theses dynamics lay bare structures undergirding “the social organization of Balinese society and the Balinese
sense of self,” (Burawoy 1991:273) particularly the ways this sense of self is informed by
gender-identity ideology. Burawoy (1991) asserts that “grounded theory can build up the
macro from its micro generalizations,” viewing micro level social interactions as
expressions of macro social processes. My findings may be reproducible by social
researchers seeking to explicate macro social structures in Balinese society using similar
grounded theory methods.

Limitations

A comprehensive quantitative ‘snap shot’ systematic statistical comparison of the
rates of domestic violence in Indonesia with countries that have not experienced a
collapse in central governance structures in relatively recent history would have
significantly contributed to an understanding of how domestic violence is functioning
within these cultures and perhaps would have pointed to some disparities between
countries that have had relatively static leadership structures. My sustained effort over
the course of three months to find a uniform source presenting the number and types of
incidences of domestic violence across countries yielded a hodgepodge of numbers
produced with different data collection methodologies and disparate working definitions
of domestic violence. These statistics were produced by a wide range of sources,
including but not limited to the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women to the World
Health Organization to the World Bank. The lack of a uniform data collection method or
common working definition of domestic violence impeded my attempts to discern a clear
comparison of domestic violence across countries. My decision to exclude comparative
statistical data was deliberate, and stems from my concerns that to try to corral these
diverse data into something approaching a comprehensive comparison would produce a picture that was neither reflective of the actual rates of domestic violence nor methodologically valid.

The other significant limitations of this research were my lack of linguistic fluency in the Bahasa Indonesian and Balinese languages, and the relatively limited duration of my fieldwork, which lasted only five weeks. My dearth of language skills exacerbated cultural differences between my research participants and myself, and also necessitated the use of an interpreter. This increased the likelihood that my questions—and my understanding of my respondents’ answers—were ‘lost in translation’, that the meanings behind my questions were misconstrued, and that I misunderstood the meanings of my participants’ responses. The limited time I had available in Bali also restricted my ability to gain deeply nuanced understandings of the culture and context of my research.

I have done my best to control for these limitations by relying on the vast experience and wealth of knowledge of Leslie Dwyer and Degung Santikarma, who have been tirelessly patient in providing background to any questions I have regarding my participants’ responses. They have also helped situate these responses in the larger historical political and cultural context in which the World Bank investment and 2010 reforms were implemented.

**Feminist Methodology**

At every stage, my aim was to make this research process a ‘feminist’ endeavor, firmly rooted in feminist methodological theories to the fullest extent possible. For me,
this meant first and foremost that this inquiry would be informed by an overarching rejection of “science and science-making [that] tends to serve and reinforce dominant social values and conceptions of reality,” (Du Bois 1983), and by an understanding that my “research has political consequences and ‘action’ has theoretical implications.” (Reinharz 1992).

Feminist scholarship departs from more traditional social science methods in both “its choice of problems and ultimate objects,” (Lott 1981). The subject matter with which I have chosen to engage and my aims in answering the questions I have laid out are intrinsically informed by my commitment to a feminist agenda that compels me to look beneath the superficial trappings of a given social phenomena to question how gender has influenced its construction, dynamics and propagation.

While there are myriad interpretations of what a feminist methodological approach could entail, I relied on two guiding principles that have emerged from feminist researchers’ “skepticism for accounts that seem to have no grounded bias (but turn out to be anchored to dominant interests)” (DeVault 1999:41). First, my inquiry was guided by the notion that feminist scholarship in inherently linked to social action (Unger 1982). Central to feminist research is a commitment to inquiry comprised “not just of the mechanical observation of nature and others but the intervention of political and moral illumination” (Harding 1986) with the conscious intention to leverage findings to press for social change. Feminist research undertakes questions and embraces methods which lay bare Bourdieu’s (1992) “deeply buried” social structures, especially as they pertain to issues of power, dominance, subjugation, and social stratification along race and gender
classifications. A ‘feminist’ method is distinct in its commitment to change “the systems of social organization that control women,” (DeVault 1999), and seeks knowledge “potent for constructing worlds less organized by axes of domination,” (Haraway 1988). My intention in undertaking this inquiry was to make visible the ways construction of the 2010 reforms was informed by conceptualizations that limited women’s empowerment to legal and economic terms, while eschewing from tackling larger patriarchal structures in Balinese society such as prevalent polygamy and privileging of male children that limits the social capital of Balinese women regardless of their economic and legal standing.

In acknowledging these goals, I also embraced the second distinctly feminist commitment guiding my methodological approach to this inquiry: An understanding that my “models of inquiry” reflects how I “conceptualize what is, what is to be known, and how it is to be known” (Du Bois 1983), and an open commitment to be transparent with my experiences and how they may influence my process and findings. From my vantage point, it seems only logical that one’s own personal experiences would be central to the way a researcher approaches and interprets her work; yet, in positivist research the lived experiences of a researcher is generally viewed as a contaminant to one’s methods and findings, rather than an asset. A feminist approach acknowledges that ‘objective’ research- data extraction from a pristine source of ‘truth’ to be processed into ‘unbiased’ knowledge- is a façade, and an approach that reinforces constructions of reality positing men’s experiences as universal. My embrace of a feminist research methodology is grounded in a commitment to in some small way lift the veil of the canonical social science approaches which assert that a social science method could exist independent of
these trappings, as I believe that research- feminist or not- cannot be value free, as “science is made by scientists, and both we and our science-making are shaped by our culture,” (Du Bois 1983).

Appropriateness of Research Design

My research design was ideal for addressing emergent issues stemming from the 2010 reforms. The sampling and data collection techniques I selected allowed me to capture rich data from people most impacted by the 2010 reforms. The methodological commitments I laid out guided the conduct of this inquiry, and also informed the ethical standards necessary to ensure the safety and well-being of my informants. The philosophical and operational factors I incorporated into my research design yielded empirical data that furthers theory and understanding of how women’s empowerment is conceptualized in local contexts, and the extent to which these conceptualizations encapsulate the richness of women’s lived experiences.
IV. FINDINGS

Uneasy Inheritances

Standing on the fourth floor terraces of one of the neighboring houses to mine in the urban village outside of the Balinese city of Denpasar, my downward gaze to block the hot evening sun meets the tightly compressed patchwork quilt of roofs jammed tightly within the family compound. The compound itself, similar to the hundreds of others in the village, is home to about 70 people, cousins, uncles, brothers, teens posturing over guitars and making eyes at teenage girls whose arms are shielded against the sun by cotton gloves and long sleeve hoodies, young mothers, chickens, and a pack of children. The kids run in between the maze of enclosed rooms that house individual nuclear families, temples in which dwell the souls of relatives departed but not yet reincarnated into the family, outdoor kitchens, and open pavilions where aunties and grandmothers sit hours on end preparing offerings for the dozens of rituals that provide the framework for every event of social and spiritual life on this island. The reality of life in these cramped quarters, made all the more tight by the half dozen motor bikes that line the entry way of the compound, leaves little to the imagination as to how conflict over property rights— who has legitimate use of what in the compound—could spark. The fact that families like the one I am living with have inhabited the same compounds for centuries—nearly 400
years in my homestay- makes it even easier to understand how this spark could quickly become a raging conflagration.

Conflicts over land ownership in Bali have been central to violent conflict for decades (Dwyer 2010; Dwyer and Santikarma 2003; Robinson 1995). In Bali, the political violence of 1965 was carried out under the ostensible banner of ridding the country of the threat of communism. In actually, the chaos of mass killings of between 100,000-300,000 people on Bali in the four months following the Thirtieth of September Movement (Gerakan 30 September) in 1965 were sometimes carried out to settle disputes over tightly contested land.

Balinese customary law, adat, prescribes the manners by which land is inherited within families. The family compounds are divided between nuclear families. As families contract and expand over lifetimes of marriage, childbirth, and death, the use of different spaces within the family compound passed from father to son on and on. Eldest sons received preference as to the inheritance of land.

Four hundred years is plenty of time for resentments to swell.

I am sitting on the paved gravel of Taman 65, the small park- about an eighth the size of a basketball court- tucked into a family compound in Denpasar commemorating the victims of ’65. My friend U. passes me another clove cigarette, leaning in to light it while pointing to the house caddy corner to the park. His room sits about 30 meters away from the park, reached through a maze of dark walkways shaded from the hot sun by the squashed roofs of the many buildings packed into the crowded compound. U. leans in further, his wildly unkempt hair even further disheveled from the many times he’s
popped his motorbike helmet on and off throughout the hot day. “That house there, my [great] uncle lives there. But it wasn’t supposed to go to him. It was supposed to be [my uncle] E.’s house. But E.’s father was killed in ’65. That’s how he got it. People say they killed him because it’s the nicest house in here.”

It’s not just the inheritance of land that is contested, and, because of *adat*, tied to gender. The upkeep of family lands, upon which sit three family temples in which the spirits of family members dwell until being reincarnated in a newly born family member, is the responsibility of the women in the family. U.’s hands flail as he continues his story about the house his uncle lives in that should have gone to E. “Now, because [my uncle] E. has no land in this compound, and because he and my other uncle married a modern Western woman, there are no women to help my mom with the offerings.” I look up from staring at U.’s knotted curls, and my eyes rest on A., who has been dating U.’s brother for eleven years. “I think that’s one of the reasons they won’t get married. She doesn’t want to have to stay at home and help my mom make offerings.”

Under *adat*, daughters married into their husband’s family, and lived on their lands. As daughters transitioned from their family of origin, their status and role also transitioned. Their work shifts from being helpers to their mothers, aunties and grandmothers in the daily grind of preparations for rituals to being the upkeepers of their husbands’ family temples. In addition to being a stringent patrilineal system of inheritance laws, *adat* also signifies an ambiguously defined but still highly influential ideological canon regarding ideal ordering of social life, which “are invoked in varying proportions, and with varying levels of sincerity, to pursue ends that range from the
disempowerment of rivals to the protection and mobilization of the underprivileged” (Henley and Davidson 2008:818). In contemporary context, the historical law structure of adat effectively ties together history, land and law; the paramount tenant of the law is the control of the land, and that land rights originate from historical ownership of land. Men’s role in upkeeping the familial land had historically been one of providing financial resources. Women were- and continue to be- responsible for the upkeep of the spiritual aspects associated with the land, including ceremonial offerings for “every fucking thing from getting a new chicken to having a baby to buying a new car,” as one of my participants told me of the Balinese ceremonies that gird all aspects of social life.

In the 32 years of Soeharto’s regime, adat had begun to fall out of vogue. The rule of law was centralized within Soeharto’s grasp on all things governance, and his open door policy that had ushered in a mass investment by transnational businesses also brought with it more modern conceptions of gender relations. The tight patrilineal inheritance of Balinese customary law began to lessen in the wake of international tourism. Women left the home to work in the spas and restaurants of Sanur Beach and red light clubs of Kuta, and the burden of temple upkeep had to be squeezed into the early morning hours before heading off to offer tourists ‘traditional’ Balinese massages for $6 an hour.

According to legal activists at LBH APIK, Balinese gender ideologies positioned a married women as ‘property’ of her husband’s family. When daughters married they transitioned from being a financial burden on her family of origin to the property of her husband. The transaction was beneficial for the husband’s family, as the newly acquired
daughter became responsible for the upkeep of the family land. My research participants from LBH APIK explained that these conceptions had slowly, tepidly begun to subside in recent decades with the influx of Western culture and increased transnational tourism. 

*Adat* reinvigorated by World Bank post-conflict investment

When Soeharto’s regime fell in 1998, the World Bank made significant investments in programs to strengthen local governance structures using its “Washington Consensus” model (Bergeron 2003; Henley and Davidson 2008) in an effort to limit the likelihood of another central dictatorship from taking hold. What this ‘strengthened local governance’ translated to in many areas of Indonesia was a “frantic rediscovery” (Henley and Davidson 2008:816) of *adat* customary law structures, fostered in large part by ideological and material support from the World Bank for indigenous law structures. In Bali, the resurgence of *adat* heralded a renewed embracing of these gender ideologies in juridical-political institutions. This in turn reinvigorated gender ideologies that marginalized women from positions of power within family life. The strengthened *adat* system institutionally fortified cultural traditions of patrilineal inheritance, including custody rights of children and joint marital property, codifying the inheritance traditions that had begun to fall to the wayside in the era of transnational economies.

For women caught in abusive marriages, the limitations of *adat* pragmatically eliminated any possibility of escape. If a woman did decide to leave, she did so without any economic resources. She had no legal standing to petition for economic redress of property- land or otherwise- gained over the course of the marriage or for custody of their
children. Moreover, she was now legally unable to inherit familial land from her family of origin, necessitating that she remain in a marriage to ensure her livelihood later in life.

In 2010, women’s legal activists, including women from the legal organization LBH APIK, successfully partnered with Balinese customary law leaders to formalize legal reforms constructed to remedy the proprietary and custodial measures of *adat* law which prevented women from gaining property and custodial rights in the event of a divorce. The measures were enacted with the aim of empowering women to leave abusive marriages by providing them with economic, proprietary and custodial recourse.

In the immediate aftermath of the 2010 reforms being implemented, “divorce went up,” says Y. We’re sitting in the front room of her clean and quiet office at LBH APIK, and she is explaining to me why leveraging the reforms has been challenging. “When the law initially passed, people reported more abuse, because people were more aware. But the economy was going down at the same time. As the economic conditions went down, abuse went up and divorce also went up.”

However, the increase in divorce was not attributed by community members to the economic downturn. I have taken my notes from my meeting with Y. to my next meeting with a group of LBH APIK lawyers at one of their offices outside of the city. I ask them about what happened when the divorce rate initially climbed after the 2010 reforms were passed. “There was this perception that ‘this is what happens when you educate women,’” explained L., throwing her hands up in frustration. She and I, along with my translator and four of her staff members, two of whom are attorneys, are crammed into her tiny office.
The office is a small room off the front of her middle class home on the outskirts of the village. My translator and I had pulled up to the house to find half a dozen kids running through the yard, accompanied by scratching chickens ducking their soccer balls and scrambled games of tag. The children had followed us into the office, a few of them perched on staff members laps, others leaning against the open door frame. Advertising stickers for “Levi’s 501” brand jeans dot the file cabinets, against which a little girl about six or seven years old leans while listening attentively to us discuss the impact of Undung undung 23/2004 in Balinese, Bahasa Indonesian and broken English.

The blending of home life/care giver and professional life/attorney doesn’t end at the casual blending of children’s play yard and grown up’s work space. One of L.’s colleagues, G., has recently successfully petitioned for divorce, gaining custody of her son in the process. She explains to me that her background in law helped her through her own divorce. She did not seek to gain custody under the 2010 reforms, but rather through a clever leveraging of a “Blue Movie” law outlawing pornography. She caught her husband making a pornographic film and reported him to local authorities. When she began to explore divorce proceedings, her husband told her she could have custody of her son if she repealed her report. She took her son and left the marriage.

Martial success- and failure- is the responsibility of women

While L. was able to leave her marriage with her son, and the women being served by LBH APIK lawyers have the chance to do the same now due to the 2010 reforms, there is a limit to the assistance the law has been able to afford Balinese women seeking divorce. L. laughs as she explains to me, “he made the movies, but it’s my fault!”
Her laughter is exasperated, not comedic. The other lawyers nod in silent agreement. I ask more questions about this. “You have to follow your husband. How successful he is is how successful you are. You are responsible for the marriage. How people think of him is how they think of you. If the marriage fails, it was not because of something he did, it was because of what you didn’t do.”

A husband with a better wife wouldn’t have needed to make a blue movie.

A husband with a more obedient or more helpful or more beautiful or more useful wife wouldn’t need to beat her.

Six days later I am sitting on a woman’s porch in a rural village that Y., the LBH APIK attorney, has asked to bring me to visit. The day has been rough. Our journey together started at 9AM to travel the four hours to her village. An hour into the (very) bumpy ride, the hood of the car starting smoking. Now, many things in Bali tend to smoke- burning trash, most of my the friends I have made- hell, even I have started causally smoking clove cigarettes (only for participant observation purposes, clearly), but a car hood smoking seemed an occasion for a bit more alarm than the other smoldering things I have come across on this island. One hour, one beer (for my translator M.) one begged use of warung- a Balinese food cart or small shop- owner's bathroom (for me) and several phone calls later, Y.’s cousin pulled up in a second SUV and we continued our journey, sans smoking car.

After the bumpy start to the day, I am mellow sitting on the porch. I am surrounded by seven children in various states of late-midafternoon stupor. I don’t know if they are being calm because it is late in the day or because they are curious about this
White lady asking questions in English. The woman who the porch belongs to is telling me about the child she is holding. She is severely mentally delayed, the size of a seven year old, but wearing a bib and diaper. Her eyes stare off to the left of my face, a smile just tugging at the corners of her lips. The girl is not really the woman’s daughter. Her biological mom was the woman’s neighbor. The girl’s father died, and the mom needed to remarry to support herself. The new husband didn’t want the girl, and the mom had no financial means of supporting herself, much less her high need daughter. The neighbor took in the girl, and the mom contributes what financial support she can towards her care.

I ask Y. why she wanted to bring me here today. She tells me she wants me to see how marriage here is central to a woman’s survival, and also to how people think of her. The conversation turns to focus on what we had discussed packed into Y.’s LBH APIK office. “So, if a marriage fails, it’s the woman’s fault?” The woman on the porch, surrounded by the seven children and two women neighbors nod, their bobbing heads joined by Y. and her woman friend who has accompanied us for the day. My friend M., a guy pal who is pitch hitting as my translator for the day as my usual woman translator had to work that day, looks down at the chickens scratching the ground.

“When a woman gets divorced, the Balinese word she’s called means ‘widow’,” says Y. Balinese language doesn’t have a word for ‘divorcee’, she tells me and the assembled women, children and chickens surrounding me. The prospects for remarrying are slim. The burden of marital success that the ‘widow’ has failed to live up to once spells disaster for future courtships to be taken seriously in the unlikely event that another
man would pursue her. Her perceived inability to ‘serve’ her ex-husband’s family will undermine her attempts to gain any suitor’s family approval of a new marriage.

The quiet of the hilly village is so different than the urban hum of constant motors in our village four hours down the mountain. The conversation has been heavy, and the quiet feels pregnant with a sense of sadness. I am uncomfortable, eager to fill the silence.

“What’s the word for when a man gets divorced?”

Great peals of laughter ring out, each of the women bursting out in hearty guffaws. “They call him a man! That’s what they call him!” shouts Y., startling the mentally delayed girl and sending the chickens scattering. The social stigma of divorce is the sole domain of women.

Tenants of adat regarding property and gendered work intertwine

Later that evening M. gives me a ride back to my house on his motorbike. We’ve become good friends over a shared fear of corporate farming and shared love of American blues music. Early in the month that I spent in Bali he had taken me to see the farming village where his mother grew up, showing me different aspects of steppe agriculture and the fine arts of eating rabbit sate. “Was today weird for you?” I ask. “You were super quiet.” He tells me that he had been thinking about his mom while I had been talking with the women.

When M. was five his mother moved back to the village she had grown up in, leaving him and his sister with their father. His father had decided to take a second wife—a once common practice in Bali that has declined to include less than 5% of Balinese marriages today—“not common, but allowed”—according to my conversations about
polygamy with a local academic who works on gender issues. His father married again against M.’s mother’s wishes, and she moved back in with her parents. “I didn’t understand what was happening. I just knew my mom was gone,” he says. I think of the little girl sitting in the lap of the woman on the porch. Her mother’s only shot at financial stability was to leave her behind. M.’s mom attempt at forcing a play from her husband resulted in the same outcome for M.

Property doesn’t just mean land

“He mom’s actually really lucky she was able to go home.” I am with G. again, at the home of a European academic who regularly consults for LBH APIK doing advocacy. “Most parents won’t take a daughter back once she leaves the house to get married.” The woman is viewed as the husband’s ‘property’- not just in the sense that he controls her, but also in that he is responsible for her financial well-being. “Some of this goes back to the land rights issues,” says H., the academic. It’s important to remember, she explains, that women historically would not be able to inherit family land. Having an unmarried daughter in the home was not just a financial burden, but also did nothing to offer the parents stability in their old age, as they needed a son to make sure that they would have someone in the home to take care of them financially in their later years. The son’s wife would take care of the cooking and responsibilities for the ritual offerings.

M.’s mom eventually returned to her husband, reconciling herself to the fact that she now shared the crowded house with another woman and the two sons that resulted from her husband’s union with his second wife. While the presence of a second woman
in the marriage was not to her liking, the help may have proved useful in the upkeep of family temples.

**The Gendered Burden of the ‘Ritual’ Economy**

I wake each morning to the sound of the grandmother in my family compound arranging offerings at the foot of the three family temples, situated about 20 meters from my open bedroom window. It is before dawn. Only the mosquitoes and the women are up at this hour; one a constant threat to the health of the island, the other the central backbone to ensuring its economic and spiritual survival.

The use of land, the economy, and the spiritual traditions of the island are all tightly interwoven. Also, they are all deeply dependent on women’s maintenance of culturally defined gendered norms.

In the days leading up to the ceremony of *Galungan*, which celebrates the conquest of the indigenous Bali Aga by the Javanese (the island adjacent to Bali), everywhere I went I encountered eager shop keepers who explained that “Bali Christmas” was fast approaching. While the holiday has more shared origins with the U.S.’s celebration of Columbus Day, the ubiquitous tourist explanation is that *Galungan* is “Bali Christmas”, and is accompanied by elaborate and enormous ritual offerings, for which women are primarily responsible for producing. As the tourism industry has increased, so too has the complexity and size of the offerings, and the amount of hours that women spend producing them. Leslie Dwyer’s computer CPU went kaput the night before *Galungan*, and the computer technician that was attempting to resurrect it was chatting to me about his family’s preparations for the holiday while he poked and prodded the
obstinate machine as I sat in her kitchen munching on tempeh topped with sambal. My query as to how holiday prep was going at his house prompted the technician to tell me that he and his wife were really eager to move back to Java, where she was originally from, because the pressure for her to help the women in his family prepare the ritual offerings was endangering her health. Despite being six months pregnant with their first child, his mother, aunts, sisters and cousins had insisted on having her assistance, and she had been working to prepare offerings from 3a.m. until midnight for the preceding three days. She had started bleeding vaginally. But the holiday was upon them, and the bleeding was not too bad, his aunts had said. And so the pressure for her to continue to assist in making rituals had not ceased. And neither had the bleeding. Even though the computer technician was worried for her health and the health of their unborn baby, the pressure from the family for her to assist in the propagation of Balinese culture constrained his ability to advocate on their behalf.

While Balinese women are making offerings for the temples, the men are making a *penjor*, a large ceremonial pole displayed outside the family home, which is a symbol of Mount Agung, where the gods reside. Making a *penjor*, which is hard work, a lesson I learned through many failed attempts to assist in the efforts. Every one of the several *penjor* I witnessed being made was the result of a group project, a cluster of men gathered over the pieces of what was to become one singular *penjor*. The offerings made by the women, however, are often made solo, and *hundreds* of offerings per nuclear family. I was at one of the family compounds adjacent to mine two days before *Galungan*, and went to put a bottle of water in the fridge. The entire thing was packed
with offerings, crammed wall to wall with little, intricate, painstakingly made offerings to be placed around the temple at home and in the village temple.

The morning of Galungan, I awoke to the sounds of chanting, bells, and the smell of (very, very strong and slightly unpleasant) garlic-y spice wafting into my window at 8 in the morning. I had first gotten up around 5 to appease my bladder. Stumbling sleepily to the bathroom, I saw S., the mother of the family with whom I was staying, dressed in full ceremonial garb and putting together an elaborate tower of fruit for an offering for one of the many ceremonies of Galungan. U., who is related to S., later tells me it is a point of contention in the community that women like S., who worked outside of the home as a police woman, purchased rather than made by hand the hundreds of smaller offerings that get placed around the temple. The money involved not only reflects a class division for many women, but also speaks to concepts of femininity. Femininity is service to the family’s temple. Not riding around on a motorbike in a police uniform.

When U. told me that women’s purchase of offerings was a point of local gossip, my mind jumps to the events of most ‘normal’ (as in, not Galungan) mornings in the home where I was staying. I would roll out from under my mosquito net between six and seven in the morning, and dodge the family’s ever corrigible puppy while attempting to fry eggs without getting my pajamas chewed on. Almost every morning S. would be in the shower, getting ready to go to work. The mornings the shower was silent her motorbike, with her pink helmet perched atop its resting handlebars, would already be gone.
By comparison, her husband- a generous, funny man who relishes his chance to practice his English skills with me- has only twice been out of bed on any of the mornings I have cooked in their kitchen. Most days I tiptoe past the room he shares with S. The open door reveals him sprawled face down asleep on the bed, his bare back covered up to the waist by the thin blanket, his ears muffled against their biting, yapping puppy so he can get a few more hours of sleep in.

I have run into S. in the market while is shopping for family groceries, in the kitchen cooking, while feeding, chasing or scolding the aforementioned bad dog, and while cleaning the yard. Her paid work outside of the home is demanding, I know, from the stories her cousins tell me. She is respected for her job, and thought well of in the community. The pictures of her in her police uniform that line the family living room walls speak to her family’s pride in her work. That she also balances the maintenance of hearth, home and temple with her job leaves me with a feeling of exhaustion just watching her. But, apparently, she’s supposed to be expected to make the ritual offerings by hand rather than pick them up at the market on her way home from work before she cooks dinner for her family.

Economic structures further constrain gendered divisions of labor

The tremendous pressure to maintain familial temples, which might- after a cursory glance- be viewed only as important to a particular family, is better understood in the context of Balinese tourism. An overwhelming amount of the island’s economy depends on tourism (World Bank 2002), which is driven primarily by the draw of Bali’s ‘culture’. Tourists seek out this culture not just in dances like the public performances of
kecak and barong, which have been vastly altered to suit Westerner’s perceptions of ‘traditional Balinese culture’ (Pollman 1990), but also in family compounds. During Degung Santikarma’s (under whose guidance I conducted my fieldwork) grandmother’s funeral, a bus filled with tourists pulled up to his family compound eager to witness a ‘traditional Balinese cremation’. But for the fact that Degung and his brother Alit are fluent in English (and that Alit is rather intimidating), the funeral would have been overrun by sunburned Australians toting Canons. One of my acquaintances within the village where I stayed did not fare so well during his own father’s funeral: The inhabitants of two tourist buses flooded into his family compound, ate all of the sate and sambal that had been prepared for the mourners, and happily slurped up the sodas (which are not cheap) set up for family members while enjoying their first hand encounter with Balinese culture. Tourists’ desire to engage with Balinese culture places pressure on each individual to maintain the vast, elaborate ritual practices in both public and (what should be) private spaces.

The burden caused by the larger economic system’s dependence on cultural tourism manifests itself in individuals’ family life in myriad ways: As pressure for women to remain working in the home rather than seeking employment (cutting off options for them to gain greater financial autonomy); as pressure for men to marry women who have ‘proven’ they can produce male heirs so that family temples remain within a given family (many young couples are not given their family’s blessing to marry until after the woman has become pregnant); and as pressure for men to not marry ‘modern’ women who will work outside of the home.
Attacking the Culture

The pressures to maintain familial lands and continue the ritual economy further reinforced the legal and cultural tenants of *adat* that were revitalized by the World Bank’s 1998 investment. Recognizing the constraining influence of these economic, familial, cultural, religious and legal institutions is necessary to contextualize community perceptions of women who sought divorce under the 2010 reforms. Following the passage of the 2010 reforms, women seeking redress from domestic violence by leveraging the new laws were met with extreme animosity. In addition to negative reactions from violent husbands, husbands’ family members, and frequently from the women’s own parents, women were cast as social pariahs guilty of “attacking the culture” by members of the community at large. “In the villages, when a woman tries to put her husband on trial, she is accused of putting the ‘culture’ on trial,” explained one of my respondents, an attorney with LBH APIK who had been active in advocating for the 2010 reforms. She is seen as flying in the face of cultural mores that position her as both someone that should be of service to her husband’s family, as well as the economic pressure to maintain his family’s temples.

The assertion that women attempting to leverage the 2010 reforms were “attacking the culture” can only be understood in the broader context of economic and familial systems. Women were petitioning for land rights that had been the privileged domain of men for centuries. Moreover, they were claiming that they had rights to retain custody of their sons, to whom familial land would pass once her husband died. In addition to these challenges to deeply entrenched socio-cultural systems, these women’s
claims undermined the greater economic stability of the island by her abdicating her responsibility for upkeeping family temples. In addition to challenging cultural norms arising from historical precedents, women petitioning for their newly granted legal rights were flying in the face of ‘traditions’ so recently undergirded by the World Bank’s investment in local governance that led to the resurgence of adat. The duel influence of adat over land rights and social norms meant that women were not only undermining property rights- a tightly contested arena on an island home roughly the size of Delaware- they were also stepping outside of tightly defined social identities that relegated them to non-dominant roles.
V. DISCUSSION

The Constraints of Structural Gender

While Henley and Davidson assert that the revival of *adat* has led to greater representation in local bureaucracies of groups marginalized under Soeharto, girded local claims to land that had been appropriated by the state, and provided effective means to circumnavigate notoriously corrupt governance structures, they point out that this legal renaissance has had a dark underside for women that has been “particularly visible- and for international supporters of the movement, particularly embarrassing” (2008:838).

The subsequent undermining of women’s autonomy and security resulting from the resurgence of *adat* has manifested itself in various ways across Indonesia. It has led to fewer women occupying leadership positions in Lombok villages, now than under Soeharto’s New Order, and to resistance of women appointments as local officials in West Sumatra, despite historical matrifocal kinship patterns (Henley and Davidson 2008).

The lack of attention to structural gender throughout policy development set the stage for policy outcomes that had the potential to privilege elites during post-conflict reconstruction (Bergeron 2003).

The influence of structural gender in the fallout in Bali resulting from the World Bank measures and 2010 reforms is better understood when viewed as part of an interrelated system. The cultural, juridical-political, economic and familial structures that
constrained individual actors’ abilities to leverage the 2010 reforms were all deeply informed by gender ideologies. When intertwined as a systemic whole, the resulting gendered structure deprived women of basic human needs and undermines their ability to leverage their newly granted legal rights. Burton (1997) argues that the roots of structural violence are policy and administrative decisions that deprive individuals’ rights and limit their access to basic human needs. The results stemming from a lack of attention to the structural impact of gender in the formation of both the World Bank’s post-conflict intervention and the 2010 reforms clearly contributed to the propagation of social institutions that undermined women’s access to physical well-being, social capital and economic security.

To move towards this structural understanding, all aspects surrounding domestic violence in Bali must be viewed “as a dynamic whole- as something going on-no part of which can be can be understood by itself” (Mead 1934:7). Visually mapping the tenants of the 2010 reforms using a modified version of Cheldelin and Lucas’s (2003) nestled framework for conflict analysis highlights the ways the World Bank’s investment strengthened interrelated cultural and economic aspects undermining women’s ability to leave abusive marriages. The dynamics occurring within each circle are constrained by the dynamics happening within each outer circle.

The findings of my fieldwork are mapped on this framework. The outer circle, in which the World Bank intervention, transnational tourism, and colonialism is depicted, constrains the strict patrilineal inheritance patterns and gender ideologies mapped within the next inner circle. The tenants of adat and gender ideologies plotted within the meso
circle constrain the aspects listed within the second-to-center circle. The social perceptions of gender and customs of familial life are reinforced by the juridical-political, economic and historical structures of the outer two circles. The inner most circle, representing the individual level dynamics of an abusive marriage, is constrained by the dynamics mapped within all of the surrounding circles. Conceptualizing an abusive marriage as existing within these socio-political structures clarifies the structural influence of gender on the formation and functioning of social institutions. Gender ideologies highly inform the functioning of all institutions plotted on the map, as described in detail throughout the Findings chapter of this thesis.

The backlash against women seeking property rights under the new law- the claim that women were “attacking the culture”- can be accounted for by the limited scope of the 2010 reforms. Data from my fieldwork suggests that all factors mapped on this matrix contribute to a woman’s ability to exit an abusive marriage. However, the 2010 reforms addressed only the factors that are in bold text (see Figure 1 on following page).
World Bank intervention catalyzed resurgence of adat

Dynamics of husband abusing wife.

Preference for male heirs makes it difficult for women to keep sons because husband’s family will try to retain custody.

Economic dependence on husband: responsibilities for childcare and ritual tasks encumbers work outside of home.

Obligation for wife to serve husband’s family

Mores about social life institutionalized by adat.

Vestiges of colonialism: Balinese woman as sweet, quiet and compliant (not advocating in court) is part of the “culture”.

Patrilineal inheritance

Masculinity tied to ownership.

Adat laws

Community/societal perception that if marriage fails it is because the woman was not an adequate wife—leads to shame and silence.

Preference for male heirs makes it difficult for women to keep sons because husband’s family will try to retain custody.

Wife’s family unwilling to support once she is married because she ‘belongs’ to her husband’s home/ is his family’s financial responsibility: stems in part because the daughter could not inherit familial land.

Obligation for wife to serve husband’s family

Mores about social life institutionalized by adat.

Vestiges of colonialism: Balinese woman as sweet, quiet and compliant (not advocating in court) is part of the “culture”.

Economic pressures to retain perception of ‘traditional peace loving’ culture to attract tourism.

Figure 1. Structural constraints hindering implementation of the 2010 reforms

Narrow definitions of ‘empowerment’ reinforce structural violence

The fallout resulting from the World Bank measure’s and 2010 reforms’ failure to account for the ways structural gender would influence the intervention’s outcomes calls
attention to the interplay of structural gender within social and juridical-political institutions and the reinforcement of gender ideologies by individuals, both through their own compliance with the tenants of these ideologies and their actions to pressure others to comply as well. These interrelated processes lay the foundations for deeply entrenched structural violence that impedes women’s abilities to escape domestic violence. Burton (1997) argues that the roots of structural violence are policy and administrative decisions that deprive individuals rights and limit their access to basic human needs; the results stemming from a lack of attention to the structural impact of gender in the formation of both the World Bank’s post-conflict intervention and the 2010 reforms clearly contributed to the propagation of social institutions that undermined women’s access to physical well-being, social capital and economic security. The structures surrounding the domestic violence happening within the home were further exacerbated by the structural violence imposed through social institutions that had historically subjugated women, such as patrilineal inheritance and marital customs that positioned women in non-dominant positions of power within familial systems. Moreover, the World Bank’s investment had further reinforced pressures on women’s identity and orientation within society that were already being constrained by the pressures imposed by tourism (Picard and Wood 1997) and vestiges of colonialism that had given rise to the myth of ‘traditional’ Balinese harmony (Pollmann 1990). The limited scope of the 2010 reforms did not address these economic and cultural constraints, setting the stage for the backlash against women who attempted to assert their legal rights granted by the 2010 reforms, as these women’s actions challenge deeply entrenched social ideologies of gender.
The interplay between the dual dynamics of domestic violence at the level of interactions between individuals and structural violence that limit women’s agency at the more macro level of individuals’ interactions with institutions such as the economy results in “symbolic entrapment” (Sharp 2009:267); the prevention of a person’s ability to take a course of action because to do so threatens symbolic boundaries that comprise salient social identities. Building on past work that suggests individuals either remained symbolically entrapped or renounce their identities through their efforts to escape, Sharp (2009) argues that people experiencing domestic violence are able to escape symbolic entrapment while retaining these identities if they are able to use vocabularies that normalize their actions in the context of their social situation, reframing their course of action as appropriate to their socially imposed identities. The limited scope of the 2010 reforms narrowly positioned women’s ability to transcend deeply entrenched structural violence solely by petitioning for resources that were historically, culturally and legally associated with masculinity. This framing challenged historical concepts of appropriate behaviors and social roles for women and men, leading to the cultural backlash that ensued when women petitioned for custody and property rights.

Contextualizing the backlash against the 2010 reforms

The community outrage directed at women attempting to leverage the 2010 reforms to assert their rights violated gender ideologies, which in turn undermined the legitimacy of social power structures that draw authority through the subjugation of others. This complicated dynamic is highlighted by Foucault (1978), who argues that societal power structures assert and reinforce their power over individuals by accessing
control of the body. The corporal body is the site where engagement between individuals and macro-level power structures and societal institutions takes place, resulting in the cultivation of population that is compliant with the dictates of dominant social norms.

Mbembe (2003) furthers Foucault’s idea with his concept of “necropolitics”, arguing that modern manifestations of juridical-political power exert dominance over individuals’ mundane lives. This juridical-political power is distributed throughout society by vesting individuals in the maintenance and propagation of the state, by cultivating a state in which individuals view their own success as interdependent on the success of the state.

In Bali, individuals viewed their own economic success on the success of the overarching community’s ability to portray a perception of culture in line with the dictates of cultural tourism (Hitchcock 2001; Picard and Wood 1997; Wood 1980). Women petitioning for redress from domestic violence directly challenged the carefully cultivated images of docile, happy women performing rituals. These petitions both undermined the legitimacy of Bali’s ‘traditionally peaceful’ social order, and also threatened the gendered division of labor that ensured the up keep of family temples. Women’s ritual labor in the production of offerings, maintenance of family temples and performances of ceremonies within the family compound and community temples are central to the appeal of cultural tourism.

Elizabeth Gilbert’s juggernaut novel *Eat Pray Love* (2006) captures the vital role the maintenance of these structures play in Bali’s economy and highlighting the cultural ubiquity of these constructions. She says in her opening remarks on her time in Bali that,
“the whole place has arranged itself to help you, the Westerner with the credit cards. English is spoken here widely and happily… everyone is desperate to help you, desperate for work” (2006:216). She continues highlighting the role culture plays in tourism, saying of the village where she is staying that, “Ubud has long been considered the cultural hub of the island, the place where traditional Balinese painting, dance, carving and religious ceremonies thrive…the tourists who come to Ubud would prefer to see an ancient temple ceremony than to drink a pina colada in the surf.” The centrality of maintaining this image of tourism illuminates the community backlash against women attempting to leverage the 2010 reforms as an example of Mbembe’s (2003) concept of necropolitics. Individual community members’ responses further reinforced women’s subjugation, reifying the very social structures the 2010 reforms aimed to help women transcend.

Lack of attention to structural influence of gender pervasive in similar policies

The dynamics highlighted by the paradigmatic Bali case are emblematic of dominant contemporary paradigms guiding post-conflict reconstruction. The oversights of the structural impacts of gender are consistent with trends of international investments and corresponding measures aimed at addressing unintended consequences that detrimentally impact women. Calls for the involvement of women in the conceptualization and implementation of post-conflict security measures and economic empowerment programs (World Bank 2011) have been limited by frameworks that solicit women’s participation in pre-configured roles that, while eschewing overtly ‘male’ language, limit women’s abilities to substantively contribute to conflict transformation
(Bergeron 2003). The narrow purview of ‘empowerment’ measures that address only
economic factors reify the very factors the measures were designed to address.

In Bali, this limited conception of ‘empowerment’ led to the creation of legal
reforms that did nothing to address gender ideologies that conflate women’s identities
with service to family and upkeep of culture, nor to address the economic systems that
had placed further pressure on individuals to maintain these gender ideologies. Instead,
the measures resulted in further entrenching systems of social power that privilege
traditional elites- in this case, men- consistent with Pugh’s (2004) findings.

If policy makers had used a development framework that incorporated an analysis
of the ways structural gender influenced individuals’ behaviors and reinforced economic,
familial, and juridical-political institutions, they may have been able to identify the
various pressure points constraining women’s autonomy. Such a framework would have
alerted the World Bank to the potential detrimental impact their decentralization measure
could result in for women. It would have provided the legal activists at LBH APIK a
productive means of identifying structural violence that would impede their future
clients’ efforts to leave marriages in which domestic violence was occurring.
VI. CONCLUSION

In depth analysis of the ways the World Bank’s investment in Indonesia reinforced historical sources of structural violence within social institutions clarifies the ways structural gender influences the outcomes of policies intended to assist countries transitioning from a collapse in central governance structures, as well as in measures designed to address any unintended consequences of such policies. The findings of this research highlight potential pitfalls policy makers may encounter when designing interventions aimed at improving the lives of women in countries transitioning for a collapse of central governance structures. The implications on social life I address in Discussion chapter of this thesis call for a greater attention to structural gender in policy development.

Policy Implications

Extralegal approaches may currently offer the best hope for immediate implementation of policies that take the effects of structural gender into account. Snajdr (2005) highlights the promise of informal interventions to domestic violence. His qualitative research inquiry with a grassroots Muslim women’s organization, the Society of Women Muslims (SWM), explores how informal measures to domestic violence are shaped by discourses of religion and ethnicity, differing greatly from formalized legal responses often used to address. While he advises that SWM’s efforts often furthered the
group’s political agenda, the approach makes a unique contribution as it attracts women who are seeking assistance other than strictly defined safety or formal justice. In settings where implicit regulations of cultural politics limit women’s options outside of formal marital structures, women may seek options that allow them to stay in the marriage.

Informal measures also present more viable options for women who live in societies that do not prioritize domestic violence in criminal or legal responses (Snajdr 2005:302). SWM’s approach grew out of failures of traditional state interventions. Kazakh police admit that domestic “disputes” are low priority cases, and that current state approaches have been ineffective; the court system’s punishment for abusers, if any, is a fine that ends up undermining the financial well-being of the entire family. While SWM’s approach, which is highly informed by the tenants of Islam on women’s roles as wives, “may appear conservative, disempowering, and even dangerous from a secular perspective, they have nevertheless attracted victims of abuse who are in search of something other than safety or formal justice” (Snajdr 2005:295) because those options may not be viable given the cultural or legal context.

**Potential Entry Points for Broader Frameworks**

An auspicious starting point for policy makers would be to conduct analyses of the ways women in areas targeted for assistance conceptualizes their own social positions. This type of analysis would highlight the ways in which women’s participation in social life is ordered by gender ideologies, and perhaps offer insight into how structural gender is limiting individuals’ social power, especially as it relates to their ability to ensure their own safety. A recent empirical study conducted in Nusa Tenggara
Barat, Indonesia investigated how women conceptualize their own experiences of domestic violence, which yielded useful information for understanding the cultural saliency of Western frameworks commonly used in policy development addressing domestic violence. One of the key findings was that women often felt their husbands were justified in their use of verbal abuse, physical violence, threats of harm, economic domination, restrictions of women’s mobility and a husband's public infidelity. While the women expressed anger, shame, and a desire for their husbands to be punished, they also emphasized the cultural appropriateness of their husbands’ actions and their authority to treat their wives in this way. The gender ideologies which had given rise to these women’s identities positioned violence as an interaction appropriate to their social position. This insight provides important information for policy makers, as measures developed to attenuate domestic violence within this culture would need to address women’s perceptions of diminished self-worth, as women’s perceptions of the cultural appropriateness of their abuse would limit women’s willingness to use newly bestowed resources to escape partnerships in which domestic violence is occurring. Measures that focus only on providing economic or legal means for women to leave these partnerships will not suffice; in order to be effective, policies must also address the gender ideologies women have adopted that posit their abuse as appropriate and merited.

Other recent empirical work conducted by social scientists on the outcomes of policy interventions have begun to incorporate analyses of gender ideologies to access the success and limits of these measures. These studies may be important first steps to highlighting gaps in policy measures caused by a lack of attention to structural gender, as
increased research on the influence of gender ideologies and how these ideologies give rise to structural gender may provide useful ‘roadmaps’ for policy makers to incorporate similar types of analyses in future policy development.

One such study that I believe holds especially promising potential evaluates how association between men’s breadwinning status and gender ideology is influenced by labor markets (Cha and Thébaud 2009). Cha and Thébaud chose to focus on men because they hypothesized that breadwinning ability is a central component of men’s masculine identity, and that men’s adoption of this belief contributed to the overarching construction of economic social institutions. Their research built off previous work arguing that men who are breadwinners are less likely to endorse egalitarian ideology than men in arrangements where women also substantially contribute to household financial well-being. Their inquiry, conducted using cross-national data drawn from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation Doing Business database, is particularly auspicious as it evaluates the intersections of macro-level social institutions- the economy and labor markets- and individuals’ development of gender ideologies. Exploring how individuals’ participation in macro-level social institutions informs their gender ideologies and also in turn reinforces these dominant gender ideologies on a broader societal level is vitally important for understanding of how structural gender arises from individuals’ participation in social institutions. Studies such as Cha and Thébaud’s (2009) has the potential to highlight how gender ideologies reinforce status quo power constructions
within familial systems, and how these constructions at the individual level give rise to structurally violent intuitions—such as the economy—at the macro-social level.

Two other recent studies explore the potential of incorporating assessments of gender ideologies into policy development to improve the likelihood of transforming structurally violent social institutions. Subramanian’s (2008) work on changes in family law in India posits that legal measures made in alignment with culturally accepted conceptualizations of gender have a greater likelihood of transforming women’s abilities to petition for divorce and alimony. Muslim alimony and divorce laws were reformed to provide women more equal status within family life, which in turn led to increased rights within broader social institutions. Unlike the 2010 reforms in Bali, which failed to take into account the effects of pervasive gender ideologies in the functioning of social institutions, the reforms in India built off changes in laws that local legislative leaders and family heads viewed as credible based on changes in family norms, not only in constitutional rights and transnational human rights law. Subramanian’s (2009) findings reinforce Sharp’s (2009) argument that women who are able to frame their priorities for exiting a violent marriage in line with their gender-identity ideologies are able to transcend cultural barriers impeding their ability to escape the relationship.

Gupta and Sharma (2006) extend Subramanian’s (2009) and Sharp’s (2009) concept of considering gender ideologies in construction of policies to include state institutions. Their comparison of case materials from two government sponsored programs designed to empower poor women in rural India suggest that programs with very different pragmatic approaches to improving women’s agency result in expansion of
both state sponsored welfare structures as well as infrastructure to support women’s employment through workfare programs, increasing women’s access to economic resources.

A Need for Continued Vigilance

The recent empirical research highlighted above shows the potential for substantive progress to be made by incorporating assessments of structural gender into policy development frameworks to yield policies that substantively address gendered causes of structural and direct violence. However, the potential benefits of current policies being supported by dominant organizations active in assisting women in countries transitioning from collapses in central governance structures, such as the World Bank and the United Nations, continue to be limited by measures that emphasize the importance of economic resources while underemphasizing the socio-cultural institutions encumbering women’s ability to leave violent marriages. The persistent reliance on this limited framework overlooks the structural nature of domestic violence and necessitates individual women to successfully transcend structurally violent systems, rather than fostering a transformation of social structures that place women at risk of domestic violence and the effects of other forms of deeply entrenched structural violence.

The World Bank’s lack of attention to the potential structural impact of gender on the implementation of their post-conflict investment in Indonesia is reflective of larger paradigmatic schema guiding post-conflict interventions. The implications of overlooking the structural impact of gender, as highlighted by the fallout in Bali, include the potential for detrimentally impacting the individual women constrained within the
conflict targeted for intervention and undergirding institutions and policies that deprive women of basic human needs. This reinforcement of structural violence further limits women’s abilities to take up leadership roles or gain greater equity in familial systems in societies transitioning from a collapse in central governance structures, undermining progress towards the transformative inclusion of women envisioned in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325.

Theorists wrestling with the implications of overlooking the effects of structural gender note that these trends are cause for alarm. Bergeron (2003) argues that, despite the fact that a neoliberal paradigm within the Bank has recently given way to a “post-Washington consensus” that aims to integrate social and economic dimensions of development that include a focus on gender and sustainability, when deconstructed, the ways this ‘post-Washington’ theoretical approach constructs meanings of gender equity and development actually provides little space for social transformations that have been called for by feminists working in development.

While Bergeron’s argument is disturbing in its own right, it provokes larger questions of social power and control when brought into dialogue with Pugh’s assertion that peacekeeping efforts are guided by a “framework of liberal imperialism” underlying “efforts to control or isolate unruly parts of the world” (2004:39). Pugh asserts that international interventions have clung to positions of ostensible ‘neutrality’ that, when scrutinized, in fact privilege the status quo *politick real* by not ensuring infrastructure or means for non-dominant groups’ needs to be addressed through the peacemaking process. The implications of Bergeron and Pugh’s arguments highlight an urgent need for
increased scrutiny of programs claiming to address the needs of women in post-conflict reconstruction or further women’s ‘empowerment’.

**Future Inquiries**

Further empirical work is necessary to understand how assessing gender as an institution (Lorber 1994; Martin 2004) or social structure (Risman 2004) impacts policy implementation. Academics and practitioners must work together to develop ways to operationalize these theoretically challenging concepts in order to build effective policies. One beginning point that would start to lay this foundation would be simply assessing the working definitions policy agencies are employing in their data collection on gender-based violence.

A systematic statistical comparison of the rates of domestic violence within Indonesia and between Indonesia and other countries transitioning from a collapse in central governance structures would have augmented this thesis. My sustained effort over the course of three months to find a comparative ‘snap shot’ of the number and types of incidences of domestic violence in both countries yielded a smattering of numbers—each produced with different data collection methodologies and disparate working definitions of domestic violence—from a diverse range of sources, from the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women to the World Health Organization to the World Bank. The inclusion of numbers that contrasted the rates of domestic violence in Indonesia as well as contrasting the Indonesia case with countries that have not experienced a collapse of central governance structures in the relatively recent past, would have significantly contributed to an understanding of how domestic violence is
functioning within these cultures and perhaps would have pointed to some disparities between countries that have had relatively static leadership structures. My deliberate decision to eschew from attempting to present such data stems from my concerns that to try to collate data collected and defined in widely varying terms would force me to attempt to corral numbers together that simply have no common methodological basis, producing a picture that was neither reflective of the actual rates of domestic violence nor methodologically valid.

Clearly, further research to collate the significant empirical data which have been collected by NGO and governmental organizations is needed in order for researchers and policy makers to be able to look to these data as benchmarks for the status of domestic violence both within individual countries and when comparing one local to another. The amount of political will and financial resources that have produced these data, despite their methodological limitations stemming from a lack of uniform definition and collection methods, suggest that NGOs and governmental organizations are committed to substantively supporting efforts to increase women’s safety and lay cultural foundations necessary for them to be more fully integrated into social institutions of power. I strongly doubt these gains would have been made without the efforts of the tenacious activists, women survivors of gender-based violence, feminist researchers, and supportive government leaders who all advocated for the passage of reforms such as U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325 and continue to hold policy makers feet to the fire to ensure that the rights envisioned in these measures are made manifest within women’s lived realities. Further efforts of social scientists to produce uniform data collection
methods and working definitions are necessary to ensure the efforts of these visionaries will result in data sources that can be easily and effectively leveraged to create policy measures that have the potential to address structural violence contributing to the rates of domestic violence across the globe.

Towards a More Empowered Tomorrow

Incorporating an analysis of the ways gender as a social structure (Martin 2004) influences the formation and functioning of social institutions (Lorber 1994; Martin 2004; Risman 2004) into policy development holds promise for highlighting the ways policies may reinforce structurally violent social institutions. This would alert policy makers to potential problems before the policies are implemented, reducing the potential for unintended consequences that disproportionally impact women that would necessitate further intervention to ‘clean up’ after implementing a policy that further ensnares women in structurally violent intuitions. Assessing the ways structural gender influences the formation and function of social institutions will increase the effectiveness of policies aimed at assisting countries transitioning from a collapse in central governance structures and programs designed to empower women in the midst of these transitions. Such assessments in policy development have the potential for substantively grappling with historical sources of structural violence. This expanded policy development framework would finally hold the potential for transforming social institutions that subjugate women in private life and relegate them to impotent roles in macro-level social institutions, such as the economy and juridical-political institutions, paving the road towards a tomorrow in
which women are no longer limited by gender ideologies that minimalize their rights to safety and a secure future.
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REFERENCES


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