From Democratic Transition to Consolidation: The Analysis of 115 Cases of Democratic Transitions in Eighty-six Countries from 1955 to 2007

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at George Mason University

By

Min Zaw Oo
Master of Art
Georgetown University, 2008
Master of Science
George Mason University, 2002

Director: Andrea Bartoli, Professor
Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution

Spring Semester 2010
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA
DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to Chan Moe Naing and other ABSDF comrades who fought and died courageously in the name of democracy.
I would like to express my gratitude to the committee members, Dr. Dennis Sandole, Dr. Monty Marshall and Dr. Solon Simmons for their guidance and wisdom to help me complete this dissertation. I also like to thank Dr. Thomas Flores for making time to review my dissertation and for guiding me to proper statistical models. I also like to express my gratitude to the ICAR’s faculty and staffs for their unflinching endeavor to help students complete their study. My appreciation to the ICAR would not be completed without showing my gratitude to the Point of View Fellowship which allowed me to enjoy the nature and academic life at the same time by the Potomac River. I would not be able to complete this dissertation without support, encouragement and understanding from Wint who has become a part of my inspirations.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables.................................................................................................................. v
List of Figures................................................................................................................. vi
List of Abbreviations..................................................................................................... vii
Abstract........................................................................................................................ viii
1. Introduction................................................................................................................ 1
2. Literature Review...................................................................................................... 10
3. Research Method...................................................................................................... 31
4. Case Selection: 115 Transitions to Democracy....................................................... 63
5. Democratic Consolidation and Outcomes of Transition: Dependent Variables...... 88
6. Descriptive Analysis of Transitions to Democracy and Consolidation.............. 106
7. Inferential Analysis of Democratic Consolidation.................................................. 146
8. Conclusion................................................................................................................ 168
Appendix A: Countries Which Met the Criteria of Imperfect Consolidation .......... 178
Appendix B: The Robustness of the Panel Logit Model in Imperfect Consolidation.. 179
Appendix C: Codebook................................................................................................. 182
Appendix D: Description of 115 transition cases...................................................... 192
List of References....................................................................................................... 340
**LIST OF TABLES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Comparison of the number of transition cases by four studies using the Polity IV dataset</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. List of newly independent countries excluded from the study</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. A Comprehensive list of transition cases to democracy between 1955 and 2007</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Fifteen consolidated democracies among eighty-six transitioning countries</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Thirty-five consolidated democracies worldwide and civil liberty score in 2007</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Cases reversed to non-democracy after having transcended to democracy from 1955 to 2007</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Twenty-four frozen transitions</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Regional dimension of democratic transitions</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Regime types and transitions</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Transition and reverse cases during and after the Cold War</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Characteristics of liberalization and types of former regime</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Resurgence of former regime to power after transition</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Prior regime types, regions and consolidation</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. The Logit Model with the First Criteria of (Model) Consolidation</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. The Logit Model with the Second Criteria of (Imperfect) Consolidation</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIGURE</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The trends of democracy, non-democracy, transition and reverse democracies</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Percentage of cases which experienced factionalism in the first year of democracy</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The comparison of average GDP growth in five years before and after transition</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The comparison of average GDP growth in ten years before and after transition</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Average GDP in transitioning countries, consolidated democracies, reverse democracies and frozen transitions</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. GDP in frozen transitions</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. The nature of political competition while executive recruitment and executive constraint are consolidated</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Graphical comparison of predicted values from two models</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. The comparative trends of civil liberty, intra-state violence and discriminated population in model and imperfect consolidations</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABSTRACT

FROM DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION TO CONSOLIDATION: THE ANALYSIS OF 115 CASES OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS IN EIGHTY-SIX COUNTRIES FROM 1955 TO 2007

Min Zaw Oo, M.A., M.S.
George Mason University, 2010
Dissertation Chair: Dr. Dennis Sandole

This dissertation analyzes 115 democratic transitions from autocracy within the period of 1955 to 2007. The main focus of the study aims to understand how a transitioning country consolidates democracy. This study also analyzes the alternative outcomes of democratic consolidation, such as the transitions which reverse to autocracy and the frozen transitions which fail to consolidate after three-election cycles. Methodologically, this project deploys both descriptive and inferential statistical methods, especially a logit model. This dissertation argues that a model standard of democratic consolidation does not fit into the majority of democratic transitions. By nature, a transition to democracy is a process of imperfections. Democratization is not a revolutionary event but an evolutionary process of transformed conflicts where former elites and new stakeholders continue to compete for power. In rare occasions, a transition may consolidate within the first election circle if underlying conditions are optimum at the time of the transition.
But the majority of imperfectly consolidated democracies strengthen their democratic structures gradually if they manage to ameliorate shortcomings progressively. Economic development, civil violence, discrimination, civil liberty and factionalism are strong influential factors affecting a country’s potential to consolidation.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Political transition from authoritarian system to democracy represents a major trend of political change since the end of the Cold War. While more than two-thirds of the world’s states were under authoritarian rule in early 1970s, in the beginning of the 21st century, nearly two-thirds of the countries were described as democracies (Ulfelder and Lustik 2005,1). The collapses of the Soviet Union and the growth of pro-democracy opposition movements across the world preceded democratic transitions while authoritarian states were attenuated by both governance failure and inadequate economic performance.

However, democratic transitions, either from autocratic or colonial regimes, were not necessarily a smooth path to democratic consolidation. Alternative paths from successful democratization were instability, illiberal democracies, frozen transitions, and even retraction to autocracy among other possibilities. From 1955 to 2004, 60 democracies fell back to autocracies (ibid 5). Political Instability Task Force, after 13 years of vigorous study, has discovered a strong linkage between anocracy—mixed system of both democracy and autocracy-- and instability (Goldstone, Bates, Gurr
& et al. 2005, 16). Although anocracy or “hybrid regimes”\(^1\) was not a sole form of polity in all transitional countries, it was a common pattern in many transitional countries, especially those struggling with factionalism, economic destitution and security predicament.

Larry Diamond reminded us that there is “not now and has never been in the modern world of nation states a perfect democracy” (Diamond 1999, 18). Transition to democracy was a phase of imperfection as well. But this imperfect phase of the beginning could create a plethora of serious crises.

(1.1) The Question to Explore

Varying results of democratic transitions raised a few fundamental questions. Why did some democratic transitions fail? What conditions helped transitioning countries consolidate democracy? Did the way a country transcended to democracy matter? What factors helped democratic consolidations become long lasting? Finally, a sobering question to ask is whether a democratic transition in the Third World can consolidate democracy. Scholars studying democratization might not have a definitive answer to all these questions. Among the questions and explanations, this dissertation attempts to answer the following principle question to expand our understanding of democratization.

- *What factors influenced successful democratic consolidation after a country had transcended to a path to democratic transition?*

\(^1\) Larry Diamond (2002) dubbed the term to characterize a regime which was neither fully democratic nor “politically closed authoritarian.”
There is a plethora of literature and qualitative analyses of democratic transitions. However, quantitative studies of transitions to democracy are still rare. Many studies on democratic transition focus on the conditions contributing to a transition, but only a few quantitative studies attempt to explain how democratic transitions endured democracy. Ulfelder and Lustik (2005), relying on currently available structural data, studied the endurance of democracy quantitatively. But their study did not distinguish the eventual outcomes of democratic transition and did not include other potential influential variables, especially dynamic data. Structural data described underlying conditions, and dynamic factors manifested patterns of interactions among actors (Davies and Gurr 1998). This project attempted to bridge the gap between structure and dynamic influences on democratic transition.

In a similar research to Ulfelder and Lustik, Tatu Vanhanen correlated a list of development-related variables with the “Index of Democratization” in 170 countries. Vanhanen argued that “the level of democratization depends principally on the degree of resource distribution” (Vanhanen 1999, 183). But the study did not focus on democratic transition per se. Instead, the study explored a set of relationship between explanatory variables with overall index of democratization in 170 countries. Again, Vanhanen’s studies relied heavily on structural data.

Another study quantitatively analyzed newly emerging democracies within the period between 1960s and 2000s (Kapstein and Converse 2008). Their methodology was similar to Ulfelder and Lustik in determining a point of transition in the Polity IV dataset.
Their study tested mostly structural variables and concluded that “young democracies” were vulnerable to transitioning crises, and 67 cases survived democratic transition while 56 cases reversed to non-democracy (Ibid, 40). However, sustainability of democracy per se did not express much about consolidation of democracy because a democratic transition could be frozen for decades without being able to reach a consolidation status, despite being able to survive crises.

The study of democratization should encompass both short and long-term changes in society. A number of studies on democratic transition focused narrowly on the short-term changes, and a ‘transitologist’ approach to understand why democratization failed to connect the dots between transition and consolidation (Grugel 2002, 61). On the other hand, the characteristics of transition might shape the pace and potential of democratic consolidation. The analyses solely focusing on ‘objective’ structural elements, such as economic and social conditions, often neglected “short-term political dynamic” (Przeworski 47). This relationship can be understood only if the study explores the linkage between the characteristics of transition and consolidation.

This dissertation attempts to understand how democratic transitions consolidate democracy from 1955 to 2007. This time period represents relatively new democracies in 20th century, especially in Huntington’s late second, overall third, and probably fourth wave of democratization. The study will explore 115 transitions to democracy in 85 countries from 1955 to 2007. The analysis endeavors to bridge a gap between quantitative analysis of structural and dynamic data by incorporating newly coded dynamic variables,
new conceptualizations of dependent and independent variables, and different statistical methodologies. This project also makes an effort to explore the overall process of transition qualitatively to synthesize statistical influence of explanatory variables.

This dissertation treats democratic transition as a form of conflict transformation in which stakeholders continue to interact beyond polity changes. From the transformation perspectives, this dissertation endeavors to understand how the dynamics of security, instability, and factionalism influence political transition in tandem with structural conditions, such as economic development, quality of life, civil liberties, forms of transitions, geographical location, and duration of polities.

The statistical simulation of the dissertation was neither theory-driven as in deductive approaches, nor data-driven as in fishing-net approaches. The method utilized in this study incorporated both theories and data throughout the process even before the list of independent variables had been constructed. This approach intended to avoid statistical uncertainty at the end of the analysis—realizing that none of the independent variables were significant—and deductive limitation—failing to look beyond existing theories.

(1.2) Why Study Transitions to Democracy?

The end of the Cold War has fostered the prospect of the ideological dominance of liberal democracy over other competing ideological foundations. Some scholars even postulated that western democracy was the end of human search for an ideal political system (Fukuyama 1992, Bryce 1921). However, the emergence of democracy was not a
sole characteristic of the end of the Cold War. The rise of violent ‘societal warfare’ in the early 1990s accompanied the wave of democratization all around the world (Marshall 2006). A few other studies also confirmed the relationship between new democracies and violent instabilities (Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 2005). As the consequences of transition to democracy were not necessarily positive, understanding democratization required more than a ‘transitional paradigm’ (Carothers 2002). As Sartori (1991, 437) said, “Democracy may stand unchallenged in principle, and yet in practice be formidably challenged in its performance.”

In addition to instability, the success of any political system lays in the benefits it bestows over its population. People might express these benefits in different forms of political values such as participation in politics, in their warfare values, through economic prosperity, and even through interpersonal values, respect, and peaceful relationships among citizens (Gurr 1970). A successful democratic system confers both non-material and material benefits to its population. Democracy also empowers people to protect and promote their human rights. If a transition to democracy is successful, a democratic system could significantly benefit people living under the system to pursue prosperity and development. Similarly, a failure of democratic transition causes misery, economic and political instabilities, and societal warfare. Understanding the process of democratization enhances the chance of success, and perhaps survival, in democratization.

Moreover, an understanding of democratization may remind us to limit our expectations on the outcomes of democratization. The empirical contemplation may lead us to re-assess the benchmarks of ‘model democracy’ in countries coming out of
autocracy. A country in transition may need certain time and processes to reach a western-standard of model democracy. These countries in third and fourth wave of democratization may have a different path to democratic consolidation than the ways developed western democracies consolidated. Democratization and democratic transition are two separate, albeit interlinking processes, which may require us to look beyond traditional approaches merely aiming to facilitate democratic transitions but failing to look beyond democratic transition. Not only do we need to understand the success factors of democratization, but we also should be aware of the conditions which can mete out failures in democratic transitions.

A clear understanding of democratic transition can also minimize policy dilemma for democracy promoters, especially in western governments and international institutions. The typical approach of western democracies supporting democratization usually aims to bolster a particular faction which they consider pro-democracy and/or pro-west. Such support in democratization often fuels and prolongs factional rivalry among various interest groups, and thus inadvertently undermines the process of democratization and necessitates capacity to regulate conflicts among various parties. Refined understanding of democratic transitions will join knowledge and action together for policy makers to fine tune their approaches to promote democracy in transitional countries. An academic knowledge in international relations is effective in practice if it is packaged in policy-friendly format to be consumed by political leaders (George 1993).

Similarly, political leaders from countries in transitions are constantly struggling to tackle overwhelming challenges. Under autocratic regimes, ethno-political groups
were usually suppressed within a ‘legal’ framework of a political system and forced to go underground if they decide to challenge the regime. The collapse of an authoritarian system, such as Iraq under Saddam Hussein, unleashes full-bloom confrontations among formally repressed ethno-political groups which emerged as communal contenders seeking to dominate a fragile political system undergoing a transition. At the beginning of political transitions, institutions are too weak to regulate emerging conflicts within a system. The result is vibrant factional mobilizations which often neglect democratic ideas and norms these parties once fought for. Additionally, old political culture of authoritarian system is still entrenched in society under transition. Factions use undemocratic means to defeat their opponents and occasionally adopt the practices of former regimes in political crisis. This study tries to highlight what accelerated such crises in transitions and what defused them. This knowledge, hence, will be useful for politicians in transitional countries which are steering towards successful democratization.

(1.3) Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 1 briefly explains the characteristics of transition to democracy. Chapter 2 explores major theories and framework that explains democratic transition and consolidation, and Chapter 3 discusses research methodologies in detail. Chapter 4 outlines 115 cases of transition to democracy and details a set of case selection criteria. Chapter 5 discusses the outcomes of democratization in three categories: democratic consolidation, frozen transition, and democratic reversal. Chapter 6 descriptively explains various factors contributing to
democratic transition and consolidation. Chapter 7 lays out an inferential analysis of democratic consolidation to highlight the essential factors contributing to democratic consolidation. Finally, Chapter 8 synthesizes the findings and presents a stylized model to promote democracy in transitioning countries.
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Chapter Summary

This chapter reviews various scholarly works on democratization through the prism of social conflict. The first part of the literature-review looks at democratic transition from the perspective of conflict transformation. The next section discusses various explanations of democratic transitions from the perspectives of structural and dynamic conditions. Finally, the review chronicles various definitions and debates on democratic consolidation.

2.1. Democratic Transition as Conflict transformation

Hegelian dialectic explained a conflict in three elements: thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Based on the philosophy of dialectical materialism, Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx postulated the development of human society in a form of struggle with an eventual victory of the oppressed. In this sense, synthesis was a new paradigm after thesis was defeated by antithesis. However, the process of democratic transition was far from being a complete synthesis.

Out of 115 transitions to democracy in this study, former regimes collapsed in only 43 cases. The most frequent form of transitions to democracy was a concession of former regimes. In 70 cases, old regimes conceded to the opposition’s demands and/or
sought negotiated settlements with the oppositions. In 47 cases, regime elites played crucial roles to bring the country to transcend to a new system. The leaders or institutions of old regimes regained power after transition to democracy in 31 countries. Among all transition cases, 20 countries went through democratic transitions more than once after falling back to autocracy. Indeed, democratic transition was an incomplete synthesis where thesis and antithesis continued to struggle for dominance. Democratization is a form of a renewed conflict at “the societal level” where parties are still eager to “invent enemies in order to protect and preserve one’s self” (Sandole 1999, 123).

Any social conflict was divided into three major components in Galtung’s ABC triangle: *Attitude, Behavior and Contradiction* (Galtung 1969). Attitude represented psychological perception towards adversaries in a conflict. Behavior was a set of actor-oriented actions driven by perception or rational calculation aiming to achieve aspirations of the actor. Contradictions were the underlying conditions which breed conflicts. In other words, behavior represented dynamics, and contradiction outlines structure of social conflicts respectively. This study was mainly interested in structural and dynamic perspectives of democratic transition as a form of social conflict.

Democratic transitions usually signified a political settlement between adversaries in a protracted social conflict in which wars were fought not for foreign policy goals but for “statehood, governance and the role and status of nations and communities within states” (Holsti 1996, 20). Edward Azar’s explanation of protracted social conflict focused on identity groups whose basic human needs were systematically deprived by states (Azar 1990). Additionally, ‘chosen trauma’ and ‘chosen glory’ were handed over from
one generation to another in perpetuated conflicts (Volkan 1997). Although political settlement in transition might have intended to install a structure to restore basic human needs, such an ideal structure did not function to full extent in the beginning of the transition. Some major basic human needs might still go yet to be fulfilled. Political settlement did not alter long-lasting emotion of adversaries in protracted conflict. Former adversaries might still hinge on attitudes of the past while contradictions remained fully unsolved.

In the field of conflict studies, ‘conflict resolution,’ ‘conflict management’, and ‘conflict transformation’ were philosophical variations with overlapping approaches. Many scholars debated each definition of resolution, management, and transformation. Conflict management was associated with conflict mitigation and limitation of destructive violence without necessarily changing dominant structure (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999, 21). But, the debate on the extent of differences between resolution and transformation were murkier than the definition of management (Mitchell 2002).

Some scholars argued that conflict resolution carried “danger of co-optation” and ending conflict (Lederach 2003, 3). For Lederach, conflict transformation recognized the unending nature of social conflict and thus understood conflict in a dialectical process of social change which included personal, relational, structural and culture transformation (Ibid, 23). Galtung argued that since conflict was “phenomena that have no clear beginning or end,” resolution process was intertwined with conflict transformation (Galtung 1995, 52). Many scholars argued that the process of conflict transformation
called for ‘deep’ changes in structure, relationship, social justice, and cultural perceptions.

By no means did this study intend to join the debate on conflict transformation. Neither did this dissertation explore democratic transition from deep transformation perspectives. Instead, this study inquired into democratic transitions from the perspective of changes in structures and dynamics. From this sense, democratic transitions were treated as both formation and transformation of social conflict. On the formation side, changes in social structure may ignite new issues which subsequently trigger new conflicts (Mitchell 2005). Mitchell cited Mancur Olson’s idea of change-induced conflict that ‘winners’ might be discontented if they felt their achievements were not sufficient while losers might prevent the changes from expending further to protect underdogs’ interests (Olson 1963). Change itself might create relative deprivation, especially among powerful elites who used to enjoy privileges under the old system. Change alone was not sufficient to foster a stable, peaceful, and prosperous transition to democracy.

Change must come with quality resolutions to make it successful. Successful transitions to democracy characterized a process of social change with the essence of conflict resolution. In other words, a stable and enduring transition to democracy was a process of conflict transformation which not only altered the system but also promoted people’s capacity to resolve their conflicts. In the transformation framework, stakeholders interacted with one another both in pre and post transformational phases. Democratic transition could not be understood simply by studying how transitions occurred at a certain point of time. A complete understanding of democratization must consider the
interactions of socio-political actors in a post-transitional period until the outcome of the transition was shaped into a solid polity.

Numerous writings illuminated the relationship between conflicts and democratization. Mansfield and Snyder statistically argued in a series of studies that incomplete transitions to democracy were substantially more war-prone than institutionalized autocracy and matured democracy (Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 1997, 2002a, 2002b, 2005). Other studies attempted to distinguish successful democratic transitions from ‘rocky’ ones in their linkage with conflict. Rocky and failed transitions tend to be more war prone than those which incrementally strengthened democratic institutions (Gleditsch and Ward 1998, 59). Both sides of the arguments appear to agree that generally, democratization was directly related to conflicts. However, the critical question was which elements steered a transition journey smoothly to avoid instabilities.

If democracy was “a system of institutionalized competition of power,” democracy itself was “a tension between conflict and consensus” (Diamond 1990, 49). Democratization suddenly opened up political space to pursue new opportunities which might provoke conflicting interests among new players who were formerly suppressed under old regimes. But, transforming a conflict to consensus was an uncertain process of democratization. A transition failing to reach a point of consensus might be stranded in a loop of social conflict which revived destructiveness in post-transitional period.

2.2. Conceptualizations

A series of democratic transitions after the collapse of the Soviet Union have spurred numerous studies on the processes and triggers of democratic transitions. These
studies generally discussed two trends of debates: how countries reached democratic transitions from autocracy, and how they sustained democratization. Prior to these debates was the fundamental discussions on the meaning of democracy.

What constituted democracy? How did it differ from autocracy? Establishing an accurate meaning of democracy was a protracted debate in the academic community. Maximalists of democratic theories defined democracy in broader terms by encompassing non-political aspects of the social system while minimalists confined the definition within the polity framework of elections and political space available to contest for power. Although this study, by no means, intended to join this debate, it was necessary to operationalize the meaning of democracy in order to accomplish case selection and construction of variables. However, there was no easy answer to define a democracy in “essentially contested concepts” (Gallie 1955, 167 and Whitehead 2002). Even in a minimalist approach which considered the legitimacy of election and freedom of political participation, “there will never be a clear-cut and theoretically grounded dividing line” to mark the definition of democracy (O’Donnell 2007, 7).

According to Held, the word “democracy” means etymological rule by the people (Held, 1987). Some scholars argue that “democracy is ultimately based not on voters, but on citizens ” (O’Donnell 2007, 7). However, it was hard to define what constituted people, and the complexity of modern society made it impractical to include everyone in the decision making process (Dahl 1989 and Schumpeter 1950, 284-285). Thus, representation in the decision-making process became the focal point of polity in modern
societies. Nevertheless, elections and representation alone did not distinguish democracy from autocracy.

According to Dahl (1971, 9), a polyarchy is an ‘institutional arrangement’ facilitating the optimum but ‘imperfect approximation’ of a concept called democracy. Two major differences, among Robert Dahl’s seven minimum criteria, between democracy and autocracy are how representative was chosen and how much opposition could mobilize to contest in elections. These two criteria were the fundamental requirements in defining nominal characteristics of democracy by which standard democratic transitions were operationalized (Ulfelder and Lustik 2005).

Democracy is also considered as a conventional polity which characterizes the sole political system in a state to regulate the process to install authority. Some scholars attempts to link the concept of conventional polity to the government’s ability to provide security for citizens and to practice their rights under a democratic system. The government must be capable of protecting its territory and maintaining “capacity to command, regulate, and extract” political resources (Linz and Stepan 1996b, 11). This concept distinguished the polity under government control from that in an area under the occupation of non-state actors in cases where insurgency was substantially active, such as Sri Lanka where the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam occupied almost all of the northern territories until late 2008.

Dahl (1971) argued that democracy was the incorporation of the existence of opportunities to express preferences, the ability to make and pursue choices, and the existence of institutions enabling citizens to participate in political process. Dahl’s
definition delimited democracy as a process of power transfer from one hand to another. Transfer of power from an incumbent regime to a new one occurred when the cost of repressing the opposition became higher than the cost of power alternation (Dahl 1971, 15-16). If the definition of democracy should go beyond the process of power transfer, it was necessary to draw a line between democratization and liberalization under autocracy.

According to Stepan (1996b), liberalization entailed the improving leniency in the government’s attempt to control opposition. Liberalization did not allow political oppositions to seize state power through an open process within a conventional polity. In contrast, democratization, which also included the degree of liberalization, required a political process that allowed competing actors to contest in elections to determine who conquered state power (Linz and Stepan 1996b, 3).

Transition to democracy was also a contesting definition. Transition was ‘the interval’ between one political system and another (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). A particular political transition might go either the direction of autocracy or democracy. To be qualified as a democratic transition, it must have the minimum characteristic of democracy—a process to elect executives and sufficient political space for opposition parties to mobilize their resources to contest the election. These two components distinguished democratic transition from liberalization in which the polity might remain under an authoritarian system because liberalization under autocracy only reduced restrictions on political activities while electoral process was usually forbidden to the oppositions.
Scholars also distinguished between democratic transitions and consolidation. Democratic consolidation was an ‘advanced’ phase of democratization (Schedler 1998). Democratic norms, democratic means to contest in power, and democratic institutions became “the only game in town” to pursue political power (Linz 1990, 156). In other words, a democratic consolidation was the establishment of “a regime that meets all the procedural criteria of democracy and also in which all politically significant groups accept established political institutions and adhere to democratic rules of the game” (Higley and Gunther 1992, 3). Dynamically, “no significant political group” attempted to topple the democratic regime or use violent means to secede from the state (Linz and Stephan 1996, 15). In this framework, democracy was consolidated after the state subdued or sought negotiated settlement with armed oppositions.

From the perspectives of social conflict, democratic transitions can also be explained by structural and dynamic approaches. Structural approaches examine underlying long-term conditions while dynamic approaches investigate actor-oriented behaviors in social conflicts. Conceptually, this study analyzes democratic transitions from the perspective of structuration social theory explained by Anthony Giddens (1984).

Conflict transformation conceptualized by this study was the interaction between social system (structure) and actors (agents), and the interaction produced and reproduced modifications in the social system in a process of transformation. “An ontology of time-space as constitutive of social practice is basic to the conception of structuration,” Giddens explained (Ibid, 3). Democratic transition was treated in this study as an ongoing process directly related to time and space. According to Giddens, democracy is
“the condition of effective exercise of power in a highly differentiated society” (ibid, 269). Democracy in the transitional period would allow agents to interact among themselves as well as with the system to modify existing polity. The outcomes of modification might be varied; they might lead to consolidation of democracy, be locked into a frozen transition, slide into instabilities, or even a reversal to autocracy.

2.3. Structural Theories of Democratic Transition

The structural-oriented approach was one of the popular methods in study of democratic transition. Structuralists focused on the enduring features of society such as economic development, quality of life, cultural attributes, class formation, civil liberties, civil society and material infrastructures, amongst others (Emelifeonwu 2000). The structural approach enabled quantitative analysts to explore cross-sectional data in multiple countries. The nature of structural data represented “background conditions that constitute root causes of tension and crises” (Davies and Gurr 1998, 4). Structural conditions “constitutes root causes of tension and crises” (Davies 2000, 2). Structuralists more or less assumed that social political structures were difficult to change partly because the costs of changing existing structures can be too high (Kitschelt 1992). Socioeconomic and political structures determined how citizens behave and set their preferences (Cohen 1994). Moreover, structural conditions, such as economic development and infant mortality, did not easily change over time.

Seymour Martin Lipset's seminal article on the requisites of democracy, examining the origins of democracy and dictatorship, was one of the well-known works
in structuralist approach to democratic transitions. Lipset argues that changes in socioeconomic development is the potent indicators of a country’s prospect towards democratization (Lipset 1959). Lipset points out two tracks by which economic development can lead to democratization. In the first track, economic development can foster democratization in autocracies. In the second track, economic development can strengthen legitimacy and stability in democratizing countries (Lipset, 1960). By the same token, Samuel Huntington also concludes that economic poverty was an obstacle to democratization process (Huntington 1991).

However, Lipset's studies are subject to specification biases in terms of their case selections, according to Hannan and Caroll (Hannan and Caroll 1981). They challenge Lipset’s finding by using an event-history analysis that wealthier countries are less likely to change political systems. In other words, rich autocracies are less likely to be democratized. Using a similar statistical method, Ulfelder and Lustik makes the same argument as Hannan and Caroll did (Ulfelder and Lustik 2005).

In a more comprehensive approach, the Political Instability Task Force analyzed all global ‘instability’ events starting from 1955. The “problem set” includes 111 adverse regime changes, 74 ethnic wars, 62 revolutionary wars, and 40 genocides/politicides which occurred during the period of 1955 to 2003 (Goldstone et al 2005, 4). Although the original intention of the research did not focus on democratization, the finding pointed out the linkage between anocracy, a characteristic of transitional countries, and instability.
In a similar but more precise study on transitions, Ulfelder and Lustik pointed out that democratic transition was closely linked to a country’s per capita income (Ulfelder and Lustik 2005, 8). Moreover, their finding added several new dimensions to the study of transition to democracy. Autocracies with any history of democracy were more likely to be associated with the connection between economic development and the likelihood of democratization.

The process of democratization “is set off by prolonged and inconclusive political struggle” (Rustow 1970, 352). Rustow also pointed out that the result of democratic transitions varied from one country to another. “Democracy as a form of government and democratization as a social, cultural, economic and political process have very different rhythms” (Dunn 2005, 179).

Democratic transitions from autocratic or colonial regimes usually came down in three paths in addition to democratic consolidation. Instabilities, such as revolutionary and ethnic wars, might follow a phase of decolonization in many countries; for example, Burma after gaining its independence in 1948. Democratic transitions from authoritarian systems could also result in instabilities, such as the escalation of the Aceh rebellion in 1998 after the fall of Suharto in Indonesia, and other third-wave democratizations in Africa (Gurr and Jaggers 1995, 477-8). Another path of democratic transition was a reversal to autocracy, such as Pakistan after 1958. An alternative path to democratic consolidation was a chronic phase of frail democracy where elections provide a battle ground for factional competitions which often use undemocratic methods to undermine political rivals. In such cases, transitional countries were so immersed in factionalism that
they failed to achieve democratic consolidation after years of democratic transitions, such as Ethiopia after 1995. In some cases, instabilities might accompany weak democracy or autocratic setback.

In his classic book “Political Order in Changing Society,” Huntington argued that political institutions were still unstable to regulate rising conflicts in changing societies (Huntingon 1968). To put it in Huntington’s words, “modernity breeds stability, but modernization breeds instability” (Ibid 41). From quantitative perspectives, Snyder and Mansfield also showed a strong linkage between violent conflicts and new democracies (Mansfield and Snyder 1995). However, Mansfield-Snyder’s finding was challenged by Thompson and Tucker who argued that nations undergoing the process of democratization were statistically independent of the onset of wars (Thompson and Tucker 1997). The claim was later refuted by Mansfield and Snyder by arguing that conceptual description of case selection between two studies was different. In their new statistical analysis, they withheld formally claimed statistical relationship between democratic transitions and outbreak of wars (Mansfield and Snyder 1997).

The challenges of democratic transitions, especially in third-world countries, impel scholars to explore a deeper understanding of democratizations in formerly authoritarian countries. Even ardent democracy promoters, like Francis Fukuyama, acknowledges the fragility of success in democratic transitions but does not formulate a list of comprehensive prescriptions to remediate the curse of democratic transition (Fukuyama 2008).
According to Huntington, the transitions to democratic regimes were distinguished into four general types: 1) transformations where the elites in power took the lead to foster a democratic change, such as in Spain, Hungary, and Brazil; 2) replacements where opposition groups took the initiative to overthrow the old regime to bring about change such as in East Germany, Portugal, and Argentina; 3) ‘transplacements’ where democratization occurred by cooperation between the old regime and opposition groups such as in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Nicaragua); and 4) interventions where democratic institutions were imposed by an outside power such as in Grenada and Panama (Huntington 1991). The types of transitions created their own unique structures which influenced the path of transition to democracy even after a country had reached a point of transition.

There have been a number of structural variables, researchers argue, which influence the outcome of democratic transition. Ulfelder and Lustik argue that economic development reinforced by past democratic system, civil liberty, non-violent collective action, sudden decline of economic performance, resource rent, leadership change, and change in international system promoted democratic transition from autocracy (Ulfelder and Lustik 2005). They tested a list of variables other scholars have theoretically or empirically argued in different statistical methodologies.

2.4. Dynamic Theories of Democratization

In addition to the structure analysis, another approach to study political transitions is the behavior analysis in which political actors interact and exercise certain acts to promote their interests in democratic transitions. The dynamics of transitions to
democracy are “thus understood as revolving around the strategic interactions and tentative arrangements among various political actors” (Karl 1990, 6). In the dynamic approach, the actors involved in the process of democratization are non-monolithic in both a transitioning phase, where an old regime is removed, and a replenishing phase, where democracy matured (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 15).

During both phases of democratic transition, political agents played a significant role influencing the outcome of democratic transition. Transitions could also be understood as the outcome of interactions among government leaders in power and opposition groups (Swaminathan 2001, 18). Democratic transitions altered power structure by strengthening the previously suppressed oppositions. In many cases, democratic transitions overturned the power asymmetry from one side to another. The mode of transition was also determined by the relative strengths of major actors and their strategies prior to the transition (Karl 1990 and Share 1987).

During the process of democratic regime-making, the transitions created ‘hard-liners’ and ‘soft-liners’ among the old-regime supporters (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 16). The inevitable conflict between those trying to preserve old privileges and those striking to install new constraints was the core dynamic of factionalism in political transitions. On the other hand, former opposition allies fell apart and began to pursue conflicting interests under a new system, and their competitions fueled factionalism under new democracy, such as Ukraine after the Orange Revolution. After the transitions, new allies were formed among former enemies as well as new friends. Such alliances and
negotiations sometime resulted in successful democratizations because political actors learned to compromise their interests in a non-zero sum nature of the political arena.

Another way of distinguishing the types of transitions was the use of violent or non-violent resistances utilized by opposition groups trying to foster democratic transition. A report from the Freedom House suggested that transitions enabled by non-violent civic movements led to more ‘freedom’ than violence-prone and elite-driven transitions (Karatnycky 2005). Although the methodology the report used was merely a descriptive statistic, it appeared to have made a set of inferential conclusions. Despite its questionable methodology, the report entertained an idea that the different types of transitions based on the tactics of opposition movements might influence the outcomes of democratic transitions.

The relationship between non-violence and democratization could be explained by the initiation of political culture that might have been set into motion in the beginning of the transition because democracy “requires a distinctive set of political values and orientation from its citizens: moderation, tolerance, civility, efficacy, knowledge, participation” (Diamond 1999, 161). If political actors utilized violence to transform a political system, their use of violence might have become a habitual practice in power struggle among stakeholders. Revolutionary movements in the wake of democratic transition posed a threat to an elected regime after transition to democracy (McClintock 1998). On the other hand, people might use nonviolent methods to seek power shift in a

---

2 The study selected only transitions which were considered democracy by the time they were compared in freedom rating scale. The case selection might have caused selection biases statistically since it omitted unsuccessful transitions which retreated to autocracy.
political system under the process of transition to democracy. However, political actors might deploy nonviolence as an effective weapon to remove their adversaries from power undemocratically; for example, the political crisis in Thailand in 2007 when nonviolent confrontations erupted between Taksin’s supporters and the royalists in the streets of Bangkok. Some scholars argued that the growth of democracy reduced the propensity of collective protests during the transitional period (Schatzman 2005, 306).

The dynamics of transitioning countries could also be contemplated by the nature of political leaders regardless of the political system by which they ruled. Political leaders in executive position sought to maximize their tenure in office which was a zero-sum in nature both in democracy and autocracy (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, Mesquita and Siverson 1995). Political leaders would “use the available tools” at their disposal to maintain power (Mesquita and Siverson 1995, 842). Other scholars argued that political leaders not only preserved their power but also promoted values which might be ideological or material-driven. In order to accomplish desired goals, political leaders attempted “to extract as much revenue as they can from the population” (Levi 1998, 3). Political leaders mobilized their supporters by gaining a larger winning coalition in electoral competition. Conflicting interests and mobilizations could trigger factionalism in transitioning countries especially while the regulations for competitions and democratic norms were not yet well endowed.

Domestic instability during political transition might provoke the military to intervene in national politics. Internal conflicts were a “double edged sword” which might “facilitate armed forces' withdrawal from politics in the short run, but in the long
run, significant levels of civil strife encouraged officers to abort the disengagement process” from national politics (Welch 1987, 23). From cost-benefit perspective, the regime might conclude that the cost of tolerating disturbance was greater than repressing it (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 27). When factional polarizations, ‘radicalism,’ ‘corruption’ and instabilities “reach unacceptable levels” to the military and elected leaders, new democracies might be disrupted by military interventions or auto-coup orchestrated by ruling regimes (Huntington 1991, 41-2). Both the military’s intervention and the regime’s suppressive responses would create factional dynamics that could subsequently reverse the process of democratization to some form of autocracies.

Some scholars, however, argued that vigorous civil societies strengthen democratic governments (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993, and Gill 2000). Horizontally interconnecting civic communities become valuable social infrastructure providing the society with trust, norms, and networks to facilitate coordinated actions (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993, 167). However, a society with vertically organized civic institutions might further distrust among political actors, encourage corruption, and even reverse democratic potential (Ibid, 182).

Another dynamic framework of democratization came from a third-world nation-building perspective. State building in Europe took at least 200 years at the expense of “death, suffering, loss of rights, and unwilling surrender of land, goods or labor” (Tilly 1975, 71). Ample time and “a relatively free hand to persuade and coerce the disparate populations” were two major characteristics of European nation-building (Ayoob 1995, 29). Currently, most democratizing states belong to the third-world, most of which
became independent in mid 19th century. Mohammed Ayoob argued that these countries in
the third world had relatively less time than European states to build their nationhood.
Some third-world states which had chosen the autocratic path were capable of using a
relatively free hand to suppress domestic challenges. However, many of them had
transcended to democratic transition within 50 years before successfully consolidating
nationhood. Democratic transitions reduced, albeit not eliminated, the states’ coercive
capacity to tackle domestic challengers because transition expanded political space for
disparate populations to mobilize their supporters. Democratic transitions in third-world
countries synergized the characteristics of immature nationhood, weak coercive power,
and opportunity for mobilization.

Democratic transitions cultivated “aspirational relative deprivation” escalating
conflict dynamic. Aspirational relative deprivation is characterized by “an increase in
men’s value expectations without a concomitant change in value position or potential”
(Gurr 1970, 51). Under the prospect of democracy, formerly suppressed political and
ethnic groups expected better rights, more wealth and power after a country transcended
to a path to a transition to democracy. However, their actual capacity did not follow
coherently with rising expectation. The discrepancy between expectation and actual
capability was a source of aspirational relative deprivation triggering mobilizations and
often violence. In a similar perspective, Ian Bremmer argued that a closed society had to
go through “a period of dangerous instability” when it embraced to outside world
(Bremmer 2006, 6).
Another byproduct of democratic transition was factionalism. In their study, Ulfelder and Lustik pointed out factionalism as an influential factor contributing to the breakdown of democratic transitions (Ulfelder and Lustik 2005, 14). According to the conceptualization in Polity IV, factionalism was characterized by “parochial or ethnic-based political factions that regularly compete for political influence in order to promote particularist agendas” (Marshall and Jaggers 2005, 25). Factional competitions could be escalating or de-escalating during political transitions. Factions might choose to mobilize popular support to compete for power or to negotiate with adversaries to seek political settlement during the transitions (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 37). This dissertation is particularly interested in factional dynamics influencing the outcome of democratic transition. However, factional mobilizations were inevitable in political transition, and not all factional dynamics were a determinant to a transitional outcome. Therefore, this study focused particularly on certain types of factionalism events, especially those capable of immobilizing a democratic system; for example, the parliamentary revolt in Russia under Yeltsin in 1993.

The base literature illuminates both structural and dynamic aspects of democratic transitions. Overall, this study structured democratization as conflict transformation within the framework of the structuration theory. Deductively, some variables in the study came from the existing works. In addition to them, 25 political transitions were surveyed at a preliminary stage to inductively construct a set of new variables. More details on variable construction will be discussed in the next chapter on the research methodology.
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHOD

Chapter Summary

This chapter outlines the detailed research methodologies and logical sequences which led to a complete construction of research design to study the success and failure of democratization. The study uses both deductive and inductive methods to build a list of variables. Various descriptive statistical methods are also applied to explain the patterns of transition and consolidation of democracy. The study tests assorted variables based on a logit model to assess a set of inferential statistical conclusions to explain the causes of democratic consolidation.

(3.1) Research Questions

Two major research questions of this dissertation are:

- How do the characteristics of transition retrospectively influence a country’s path to consolidation of democracy?
- What factors influence a successful democratic consolidation after a country has transcended to a path to democratic transition?

The first research question is concerned with various characteristics of transitions to democracy, such as types of former regimes, roles of former regime, liberalization, dynamics of mobilizations, residual power of former regimes, roles of liberalization prior to transition, foreign intervention, and security threats.
The second question explores multiple factors listed in the first question. In addition, the second question looks into additional structural and dynamic variables, not only at the time of the transition, but also prior to consolidation.

As a part of the data collection process, this study constructs the units of analysis at the first stage. The following sub-section briefly explains the necessary steps undertaken to select a problem set to study transitions to democracy.

(3.2) Problem Set Selections (Units of Analysis)

In this study, the Polity IV dataset is the foundation of the dependent variables and problem-set selection. Both qualitative and quantitative criteria were used to select each case. Quantitatively, each transition was examined through two minimum criteria of democracy in the Polity IV dataset. The two criteria were executive recruitment and political participation (Dahl 1971, Huntington 1991, 7, Sorensen 1998, 12). The detailed classifications of case selection are discussed in Chapter Four and Five.

Qualitatively, this study examines each case at the time of the transition to democracy. Each transition was studied during a few years prior to the transition, at the year of transition, and at the years prior to consolidation. This process was necessary to code some independent variables to explain transition and consolidation. The case-selection process also filtered a list of dependent variables pertaining to consolidation and democratic reversal cases. According to quantitative and qualitative selection processes, the list of transition and consolidation cases was constructed as follows:

- Hundred-and-fifteen transitions to democracy in eight-six countries from 1955 to 2007 (All cases)
• Fifteen countries among 115 transitions reached a phase of democratic consolidation (Dependent Variable I)

• Forty-four cases in thirty-two countries out of 115 reversed to non-democracy (Dependent Variable II)

• Twenty-four countries were considered frozen transitions (Only for descriptive analysis)

(3.3) Independent Variables

After the selection of all cases and dependent variables, the next step was the selection of independent variables. The process was both inductively and deductively driven. For the deductive part, independent variables were constructed based on existing literature and studies conducted by other scholars. In the inductive approach, the study qualitatively observed an initial 25 transition cases randomly to capture patterns and similarities related to influential factors on democratic transitions and consolidation.

The inductive approach was useful especially when it was necessary to filter a set of independent variables which might not be discussed in existing literature. The inductive method could help a researcher discover new variables which might have been overlooked by deductive approaches (Brewer and Hunter 1989, 57). The combination of inductive and deductive methods would allow this study not only to generate new theories, but also to verify existing ones within the parameter of transition to democracy from 1955 to 2007.

Three criteria of causal explanation called for “co-variation, causal order, and non-spuriousness” (Ibid 57). Similar to other social science approaches, causal
explanatory variables studied in this dissertation were “factors that raise the probabilities of an event occurring” (Gerring 2001, 129). The probability of event was coded into dichotomous variables (0 for non-occurrence and 1 for occurrence) to statistically identify dependent variables while explanatory variables were recorded in various forms such as dichotomous, categorical, and continuous values. The variations in explanatory variables would influence the probability of occurrence if they were empirically influential on democratization and consolidation.

(3.3.1) Direct Foreign Intervention

Huntington (1991) pointed out that foreign military intervention could foster a transition to democracy. In his description, the second wave of democratization was influenced by the allied victory after the end of the World War II (Huntington 1991, 18). Foreign influence on the process of democratization could be discerned in different forms, ranging from direct military occupation overthrowing an authoritarian regime to economic pressures, including both sanctions and assistance (Munslow 1993, Conteh-Morgan 1997, 149). However, most observers agreed that the direct military intervention prior to democratization was much more causally related to a transition than indirect economic pressures.

This study is mostly concerned with the direct impact of foreign intervention contributing to a transition to democracy. Direct foreign intervention included temporary military occupation such as the US’s invasion of Panama in 1989, and credible threat of military intervention for regime change, such as the US’s warning to use military force to
intervene in Haiti in 1994. In the Polity IV dataset, foreign occupation was coded -77. In this dataset, only seven countries experienced direct foreign intervention which meted out transition to democracy. Although this number was numerically small, it was worth testing on a small number of consolidation cases.

(3.3.2) Transition through Liberalization

Some authoritarian regimes liberalized political systems for different reasons, not necessarily to foster democratization. In some cases, autocratic regimes liberalized political participation under domestic and international pressures. Some liberalization occurred when the regimes confidently kept the opposition under control (Huntington 1991, 125, Stepan 1989). In another form of liberalization, political elites or reformers within autocratic regimes initiated the process of liberalization to transcend to a transition to democracy. But the key in the process of liberalization was the regime’s intention to preserve order without losing control throughout the process even if the regime sought genuine democratization. Liberalizers might intend to bring about a full-bloom democratization, but the period of liberalization per se was not the introduction of “fully participatory competitive elections” (Huntington 1991, 129).

Authoritarian regimes might introduce liberalization as a safety-valve to preserve their power challenged by domestic dissidents. But the forces of liberalization might “become radicalized and thereby transformed into forces for democratization” (Gill 2000, 49). In many cases of liberalization, authoritarian regimes lost control over the process and faced snowballing momentum leading towards democratization.

3 The detailed descriptions of coding for each variable were listed in the codebook in the appendix.
Some scholars viewed liberalization as “the process of making effective certain rights that protect both individuals and social groups from arbitrary or illegal acts” (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 7). In this sense, liberalization decreased the cost of political participation that was restricted by recent suppressive rules. Declining cost of participation encouraged dissenters to engage in political process.

In addition to the existing literature on liberalization which focused on formal structural tolerance towards dissention under the liberalization process, qualitative study of the initial twenty five cases showed informal tolerance towards opposition. Authoritarian regimes might tolerate the opposition’s activities, such as strikes, marches, protests, and unauthorized publications. Despite existing legal sanctions on civil liberty, regimes might refrain from forcefully cracking down on the opposition. If authoritarian regimes hesitated to use decisive force or tolerate growing protest for different reasons, the snowballing effect of mass protest could tear down an authoritarian system, such as the People’s Power Movement in the Philippines in 1986.

Most existing literature explains the relationship between liberalization and transition to democracy. But very little was explained on the effect of liberalization on democratic consolidation. This study is interested in the influence of liberalization on the process of democratic consolidation after a country went through a phase of transition to democracy. Liberalization sometimes results in power recuperation of former regime elites after a transition to democracy, such as Turkey in 1983. The impact of liberalization extends beyond a point of transition to democracy. Liberalization might
create a political atmosphere where both the oppositions and the regime amicably interact and foster trust which could minimize factionalism after a transition took place.

In order to test the impact of liberalization on transition and consolidation, this study set out three categories of liberalization. Quantitatively, some criteria from the Polity IV dataset were deployed to determine liberalization. Qualitatively, the study examined each case to develop shared characteristics of liberalization, especially in the form of political participation. Three forms of liberalizations to be examined are as follows:

- **Elite-driven transition:**

  Huntington and Linz called this type of transition ‘transformation’ or ‘reforma’ respectively (Huntington 1991, 114). Their definitions highlighted the role of elites who initiated a reform process to democratization. Generally, elite-driven political transitions, but not all, went through a phase of liberalization; for example, Taiwan in 1992. In the Polity IV, elite-driven liberalization is coded as “Executive Recruitment” (EXREC=5)⁴. Qualitative study of transition cases showed another form of executive-guided transition which was omitted in “Executive Recruitment” criteria in the Polity IV. Some elite-driven transition might transform into a broad-based interim regime prior to democratization; for example Spain in 1977. In the Polity IV, a broad-based transitional regime was coded -88. However, not all broad-based interim regimes were the product of former elites. In some cases, oppositions overthrew a former regime and established an

---

⁴ EXREC 5 was coded as “gradual transition from self-selection.” The current chief executive who came to power via undemocratic process, sought to establish some “regulated’ procedures for executive selection to be employed after s/he steps down” (Marshall and Jaggers 2002, 56).
interim government to facilitate transition prior to elections which formalized democratization; for example a transitional government formed by the dissidents in Romania in 1989. Therefore, it was necessary to distinguish the sources of broad-based interim governments prior to transition.

- **Formal Liberalization of Limited Political Participation:**

  In this form of liberalization, an autocratic regime formally liberalizes political participation of oppositions and other non-regime parties. The regime might open up limited political space and restore political rights for the opposition forces to mobilize but does not allow them to take over the control of state power. In the Polity IV, formal liberalization under autocracy is described in “Participation of Political Competition” (PARCOMP). The PARCOMP score of 3 or greater indicates that the system did not totally suppress the opposition, and opposing political groups were legally allowed to exist and mobilize political actions under existing political framework; for example Taiwan in 1991. Similar to elite-driven liberalization, formal liberalization of political participation might be observed during the phase of broad-based interim government.

- **Tolerance of Limited Political Action:**

  This criterion of liberalization was largely omitted by quantitative examination in the Polity IV dataset. The Polity IV detected liberalization efforts which were oriented in the formal structure of the political system. On the other hand, liberalization existed in a dynamic form and/or informal political tolerance under a non-democratic regime. Under this type of liberalization, authorities allowed or tolerated mass political activities by
dissidents although legal processes of political competition might still be subject to restrictions, and political parties might remain banned.

By no mean did this study assume that the authorities willingly surrogated political actions by dissidents. The regime’s tolerance might be the result of international or domestic pressures. The regime might not be confident to deploy its security forces to forcefully crackdown the oppositions. The regime elites might be indecisive to reach a conclusive policy to respond to the growing opposition movement in the streets. Regardless of underlying reasons, this study was interested in the impact of political actions on democratic transition under lenient political atmosphere. Liberalization by tolerating limited political actions was very common in the Soviet’s satellites in Eastern Europe after Mikhail Gorbachev had initiated Perestroika and Glasnost reforms in late 1980s. In this category, the liberalization period should last at least two years, including the year of the transition. This form of liberalization was potent enough to trigger a snowball effect of popular mobilization within a relatively shorter period compared to structured liberalization within formal political process.

To explain the impact of liberalization on transition to democracy, the period of liberalization should last at least three years prior to democratization except in the case of liberalization by tolerating political actions because political actions could have a snowball effect within a relatively short period and triggered mass mobilizations that effectively challenged the legitimacy of autocratic regimes. This study also tested a short period (one year) of liberalization in all three forms.

(3.3.3) Transition by Replacement
In many cases of transition to democracy, former authoritarian regimes were
ousted by the rapidly rising momentum of revolutionary forces, reformers-cum-
revolutionaries, foreign governments, or internal power struggle. Under this scenario, the
regime collapse directly contributed to a transition to democracy (O'Donnell and
Schmitter 1986, and Share and Mainwaring 1986). The transition was the direct result of
regime ‘replacement’ (Huntington 1991, 114). Some scholars viewed this type of
transition as a political shock or “forced transition” (Pusca 2006, 3). In some studies,
polity change caused by regime collapse was treated as an ‘instability’ event (Goldstone
& et al 2005).

Transitions via sudden fall of autocratic regimes were dramatic, exciting, and
more penetrating in people’s memory of worldwide transition to democracy. The fall of
the Berlin Wall, the People Power Movement in the Philippines, and the Romanian
revolution became powerful symbols of democratic transition. But, in reality, regime
collapse represented only 37 percent of total cases of transition to democracy. Mass
uprising, in many but not all cases, preceded regime collapse prior to democratization. In
some cases, elite fragmentation triggered the abdication of a former executive by the
initiation of a military coup or internally forced resignation.

In some countries, liberalization might have preceded the opposition mobilization that
overthrew the regime. Liberalization usually created political space that encouraged
oppositions to escalate popular dissents to challenge the existing regime. If the regime
failed to dampen the rising tide of grassroots mobilization, the regime either collapsed or
sought a negotiated settlement with the oppositions. The collapse of the authoritarian regime might be a part of a series of events.

This study was interested in the impact of regime collapse on the course from transition to consolidation of democracy. Did the success of democratization depend on the removal of former regime? Did the bad influence of former regime disrupt the momentum of political reform after a country transcend to democratic transition? Testing regime collapse as an explanatory variable would help this project answer these questions.

(3.3.4) Transition by Concession

In contrast to regime collapse, the regime’s concession to domestic and international pressure was the most common track of transition to democracy. In some concession-induced transitions, both the regime and dissidents mutually agreed upon a political settlement to facilitate a transition to democracy, such as South Africa in 1994. Huntington (1991) called this type of transition ‘transplacement,’ or a transition by negotiation between the former regime and the opposition.

In this form of democratization, opposition mobilizations might have occurred prior to transition, but the regime did not collapse as the result of the opposition’s mobilization. Instead, the former regime conceded the opposition’s demands or sought political settlement with the opposition. In some cases, the regime formed a broad-based interim regime by inviting dissidents to steer a transitional phase. Reformist elites from the regime might cooperate with the opposition who were staging protests in the streets.
In most cases, ruling regimes agreed to hold multiparty elections, a fundamental characteristic of democratic transition.

Another perspective of transition through concession was elite pack-making. Political elites established ‘substantial consensuses’ related to new rules of ‘democratic game’ and foundation for democratic institutions (Burton, Gunther and Higley 1992, 3). An elite pact between the ruling regime and the opposition sometime facilitated ‘an institutional breakthrough’ to give birth to a new phase of democratic transition (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 37).

The key principle in concession-driven transition is the avoidance of sudden collapse of ruling regimes. This scenario created less shock and more recognition of change from the side of former rulers. The collapse of autocratic regime did not necessarily purge the regime’s support base in its institutions, such as military, police, and intelligence. For example, the downfall of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines in 1986 left behind frustrated supporters in the military who in turn challenged the Aquino government in several attempted coups even after the country transcended to a path of democratization. Political concession by regime elites more or less convinced their supporters in ruling institutions that they were also a part of the change. Concession by regime leaders might pacify frustrated followers, and therefore, they might show less resistance to new elites in power. On the other hand, if the residual power of the former regime remained significant, a new regime in transition tended to face more resistance to reform.

(3.3.5) Power Recuperation
This project is interested in the impact of residual power of former regimes after a country had experienced a transition to democracy. Not all transition removed former elites from power, especially in elite-driven transitions. Political elites might refrain from seizing power undemocratically after the transition, but the problem of governing and power sharing remained in post-authoritarian era (Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998, 199). In many cases, leaders of former ruling regimes or former dominant political institutions regained executive power after a country had changed from autocracy to democracy. In this dataset, political elites associated with former regimes regained power in 31 transitions. The phenomenon of the resurgence of former communist politicians, once dubbed as “red return,” in Eastern Europe under transition to democracy raised concerns on the future of democracies in these countries (Huntington 1997, 8). The legacies of autocratic regime might flow over into transitional period influencing the performance of both institutions and leadership (Linz and Stepan 1996b, 55).

On the other hand, power recuperation of elites from former regime might have been contributed by pact making among newly emerging political forces. Or, new political forces were so weak that elites from the former regime subdued new forces in elections. In both scenarios, democracy was not necessarily threatened. The impact of power recuperation on democratic consolidation was not discussed extensively in existing literature. The debate on whether to include former regime elements in new political establishment was unsettled. This study will examine the influence of power recuperation by former regime elites by statistically connecting the resurgence of former elites to democratic consolidation.
(3.3.6) Violent Behaviors of Transition

Dissident groups used various means to assert pressure on autocratic regime prior to transition to democracy. Means of opposition mobilizations varied from non-violent protest to armed rebellions. Patterns of popular mobilization increased before the first elections in Latin American countries, such as Portugal, Spain, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru (Bermeo 1997). Opposotions deployed some kinds of violence to bring about democratic transitions between 1974 and 1990 (Huntington 1991, 192). In conflict transformation perspective, political transition was merely a pivot of change in polity without significantly altering the attitudes of political actors in conflict. During the phase of transitional period, political actors might adopt specific behaviors and practice deployed by the oppositions or the regime prior to the transition. Huntington (1968) pointed out that institutional norms and regulations, especially to manage emerging conflicts, were still weak when a state moved into a phase of change. Political actors adopted old practice and behaviors to overcome their opponents after a country transcended to democracy. From a culture standpoint, Robert Dahl asserted that the precedence of democratic culture reinforced a country’s path to democratic consolidation (Dahl 1997, 36). Unfortunately, democratic practice was not deeply embedded in young democracy; therefore, political actors might resolve to old practice to overcome their rivals in emerging post-transitional conflicts.

Some scholars claimed a significant relationship between pre-transition non-violent opposition movements and success of democratization. In a quantitative study, the data suggested that non-violent opposition movement ‘significantly enhanced’ the
outlooks for freedom after transition (Karatnycky and Ackerman 2005, 8). Bonds (2007) tested the same dataset used by Karatnycky and Ackerman by adding other coded data and concluded that “nonviolent people power dominated transitions tend to generate larger and more durable changes (sic)” (8). In addition, transitioning countries which were considered “partially free,” were more vulnerable to post-transitional violence (Ibid). In another large-N study of 323 violent and non-violent campaigns, Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) confirmed the previous assessment that nonviolent resistance organized by oppositions was likely to meet their objectives than violent methods (42).

However, none of these studies indicated a direct relationship between consolidation of democracy and forms of the opposition’s mobilization prior to transition. This project intends to bridge the understanding between means of mobilization and consolidation of democracy. Did violent transition hinder progress of democracy after the collapse of authoritarian regimes?

Means of mobilization was not a clear cut characteristic. Oppositions might use both violent and non-violent means to elevate pressure over the regime. Additionally, transition could be considered violent if autocratic regimes used violent force to quell non-violent mass uprising, such as Burma in 1988. Foreign military intervention could also foster violence during transition to democracy.

Therefore, it was critical to distinguish between violence stemming from the dissidents’ mobilization to seek democratic transition, and violent transition itself. The rationale behind this distinction was the fact that dissidents using violent means to seek political change might have inevitably set precedence of violent political culture which
could have lasting effect even if the country transcended on a path of transition to democracy. On the other hand, not all violent transitions were the result of oppositions’ attempt to seek political change. Dissidents might mobilize mostly peacefully, but the regime’s suppressive response might have resulted in violence and a death toll, especially when the regime attempted to subdued popular protests. In such incident, the transition itself was violent but not the opposition’s mobilization because the violence was the result of the government’s response to crack down non-violent mobilizations. In some rare cases, such as Panama in 1989, violence was the result of external actors invading the country to topple the regime, not by the act of the dissidents.

The approximate indicators of violent mobilizations were death toll and reports of violent acts, such as armed attacks, bombing, military coup, and assassination. Although some military coups might be bloodless, the direct use of armed force to topple the head of state or transform political structure entitled a form of physical violence. In many cases, a coup culture was imposed upon the political system and occasionally revived by politico-military leaders to seek change in power. However, this category of violence should exclude on-going ethnic or secessionist wars which were not directly related to a democratic change. Violent actions must be triggered by the opposition’s attempt to overthrow the government to achieve political transition.

(3.3.7) Characteristics of regime prior to transition

Some scholars argued that the characteristics of the prior regime influenced not only the process of transition but also a country’s potential to consolidate democracy (Linz and Stepan, 1996b, 55, Geddes 1999, 136). Degree of civil society, extent of
economic development and market-orient liberalization, bureaucratic structure, extent of intellectual inputs, and the decision-making process were varied in accordance with the types of non-democratic regime. Not all non-democratic regimes were equally generalized in terms of their impact on the path to and success of democratization. For example, the characteristics of military regimes were substantially different from one-party states. In a large-N study, the characteristics of the prior regime were statistically correlated with the forms of transitional governments (Hadenius and Teorell 2007a, 152).

In order to test the influence of prior-regime types, this study set out a number of independent variables to define the characteristic of former regimes prior to transitions. Depending on the nature of non-democratic regimes, the characteristics of former regimes were divided into six categories: one-party state, military regime, military-civilian, monarchy, colonial occupation, and others. The criteria for categorization are borrowed from World Bank’s Cross-Sectional Time Series Data and Hadenius’s and Teorell’s Authoritarian Regime Dataset. This study constructed the rubric of regime types based on the nature of polity rather than the attributes of the decision-making process.

- One-party State

In the one-party state, a ruling regime belongs to a single political party, such as the USSR and most communist countries. In the one-party state, only the ruling party is allowed to participate in elections while other parties or political groups are barred from

---

5 In World Bank’s dataset, civil-military criteria were distinguished into four categories. In Authoritarian Regime Dataset, 26 regime types, including variations of democracies are included. In case of discrepancy between two datasets, I qualitatively reviewed the case to code it precisely. More detailed description of coding were provided in the code book
participation in the political process (Hadenius and Teorell 2007b, 6). However, the one-party state might have some extent of democratic polity to elect executives within the ruling party.

- Military Regime

If the military’s existing leaders held top executive positions in the government and exercised executive power directly, the regime is considered ‘military’ in the problem set. Military regimes are distinguished from one-party states where civilian politicians controlled executive power. A military regime might have personal dictatorial characteristics. However, to be qualified as a military regime in the problem set, the lead executive, such as president or prime minister, and a significant number of other cabinet members should hold dual positions both in the administration and the military. For example, Burma at the present is characterized as a military regime.

- Military-Civilian

Military-Civilian regime is a civilian government “effectively controlled by a military elite” (World Bank 1999, 19), or the military manipulated civilian leaders behind the scene (Hadenius & Jan Teorell 2007b, 6), such as Turkey among the cases. If a civilian leader, such as personal dictator, used the military to enhance his power by providing the military with substantial privileges, including administrative functions, beyond its defense affairs, the regime was also considered a military-civilian. However, the military might be a powerful supporter of personal dictatorship, but was only the instrument of the supreme leader.

- Monarchy
A regime was considered a monarchy if “a person of royal descent has inherited the position of head of state in accordance with accepted practice and/or the constitution” (Ibid, 6). This category, however, excludes ceremonial monarchy, such as Thailand.

- Colonial occupation

In this category, a transitioning country is ruled by a colonial power. Democratic transition might be a direct result of independence from former colonial power. Colonial occupation is different from foreign intervention whereas the external invasion was relatively short, and the invader did not have intention to rule the country overall.⁶

- Limited Multiparty

Limited multiparty is defined as “regimes that hold parliamentary or presidential elections in which (at least some) candidates are able to participate who are independent of the ruling regime” (Ibid, 6). However, oppositions might be subject to severe restrictions to mobilize political actions. In the Authoritarian Regime Dataset, such polity may accompany with a party dominating political landscape. Opposition movements might challenge the ruling party, but lack opportunities to grasp power through existing political processes, for example Singapore. The Racial oligarchy state, according to Huntington, was also considered as limited multiparty. For example, South Africa and Zimbabwe were ruled by racially segregated limited multiparty system in the problem set.

- Others

---

⁶ Political Instability Task Force’s African model discovered that instability events in former British-ruled countries were more frequent than those ruled by French in Africa. However, this study does not test that distinction of colonial legacy because of the small number of cases.
Any other types of regime which do not fit the above mentioned criteria were coded in this category.

(3.3.8) Security Factors

Mansfield and Snyder (1995) highlighted in their quantitative study that countries in democratic transitions were more war prone than matured democracy or autocracy. This study was more interested in the influence of security factors on a country’s path to democratic consolidation. Civil-military relation was another dimension of security factors as well. External and internal security threats might likely dissuade the military from departing political arenas. Depoliticizing the military was especially difficult if a country was ruled by the military for extensive periods (Diamond 1997, xxxi, Huntington 1957, 1996). The military’s involvement in political affairs degraded the quality of democracy and hence hampered the potential for democratic consolidation.

In the preliminary analysis of 25 cases, security factors, such as domestic and international wars, hindered a transitioning country from consolidating democracy and in some cases contributed to reversal to autocracy. Such security predicaments preceded military coups in many transitioning countries in preliminary cases. Some security problems were the residual confrontation between the government and ideological or identity-based non-state actors prior to the transitional period. On the other hand, transitions might trigger new security challenges which emerged out of new and old confrontations among stakeholders.

Post transitional threats manifest the escalating dynamics of new conflicts; therefore, new threats were likely to be more destructive to the transitional process than
old ones. Democratic transitions might also reduce the tendency to escalate violence if stakeholders had reached a negotiated settlement prior to the transition. In order to distinguish the leverage between new and old security threats, this study created two sets of security threats for prior and post transitional security factors. The influence of security factors were considered within five years prior to transition and a year of consolidation.

Security factors this project explored were external threats, domestic armed conflicts, and instability events defined by the Political Instability Task Force, excluding adverse regime change. Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV), Political Instability Taskforce (PITF), and UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset were cross-referenced to construct a set of these variables as described in the codebook in details.\(^7\)

- **External Threat**

A transitional country is considered facing an external security threat if a country had gone to war with another state(s) or faced significant foreign military threat in last five years prior to the transition or consolidation.\(^8\) Large-scale or frequent border incursion, external states’ material support to domestic insurgency, major military mobilization against another state were considered as significant security threats.

- **Domestic Security Threats**

\(^7\) PITF and MEPV shared overlapping data on instability events.
\(^8\) This variable was coded in three ordinal scales. More details were included in the code book.
Internal wars, insurgencies, and significant terrorist attacks were considered as domestic security threats. Domestic threats were divided into three ordinal scales ranging accordingly: internal wars, insurgency and/or terrorism, and stability.

- Internal wars

On-going or new civil wars resulting in 500\(^9\) annual deaths, including events marked as genocides, were considered internal wars in transitioning countries. Internal wars were distinguished between old and new wars. Old wars were the ongoing violent conflicts that erupted before the transition but continued to exist during the transitioning period. New wars were the onset of armed conflicts that broke out after the transition.

(3.3.8) Factionalism and Factional Mobilization

This project treats factionalism as both structural and dynamic variables in the process of democratic transition and consolidation. The Polity dataset coded factionalism as a condition embedded in a state’s political system where competing groups attempted to displace rivals out of political system or abuse power in hand to exclude others from competition (Marshall & Jagger 2005, 75). The Polity study purposefully distinguished factionalism within the existing political system from factionalism that sought power outside of the political system, such as secessionist insurgency (Marshall 2006b, 11). In this regard, factionalism was visible only under democratic polity because the Polity study treated factionalism in the framework of a structural variable characterized by the conventional political system.

\(^9\) Major Episode of Arm Conflict Database defined 500 annual casualties as internal wars.
On the other hand, factional mobilizations were manifested as conflict dynamics determined by interactions of stakeholders. The dynamics of the conflict in turn influenced changes within the conventional political system. In this study, factional mobilizations outside of political system, such as armed rebellions, were treated as security factors. Factionalism and factional mobilizations were considered as both structural and dynamic variables in this study. From the structural perspective, the Polity IV coded factionalism (PARCOMP=3).

Additionally, factional mobilization was assessed qualitatively in the forms of actor-oriented behaviors, such as system-freezing mobilizations, popular protests, electoral deadlock, legislative deadlock, and other system-weakening mobilizations. This study was interested to explore the characteristics of factionalism in various forms and to understand how actor-oriented behaviors influenced the success of democratic consolidation. Factionalism variables were assessed during the first five years after the transition and prior to democratic consolidation.

(3.3.9) Economic Factors

A plethora of quantitative studies have examined the influence of various economic factors in democratic transition and consolidation. Proportionally, a higher volume of studies focused economic influence on transition than consolidation. The scholars trying to explain democratic transition from the perspective of economic structure viewed democratization as a process rather than a set of events. Political actors made choices to maximize their interest in “a continuous redefinition of actors’ perceptions of preferences and constraints” (Kitschelt 1992, 1028; Downs 1957).
The early wave of the economic perspective of democratization viewed democratic transition as a process of modernization in which capitalism was the heart of democracy (Roxborough 1979, Lipset 1959). The relationship between democracy and economic growth was, however, not simply linear. Although matured democracy performed better in reducing income inequality than institutionalized autocracy, democratization lowered the income of the medium voters (Eriksson and Persson 2002, 14-15). In 22 countries which experienced democratic transition during the third-wave, transition did not produce significant impact on economic growth (Heo and Rubenzer 2004, 14). A country’s democratic ‘life course’—a country’s previous democracy experience prior to transition—strengthened the relationship between economic development and prospect for transitions to democracy (Ulfelder 2006, 8). In another democratization study, the level of democratization was positively associated with “the degree of resource distribution because political struggle for power constitutes a part of the universal struggle for existence in which participants are tended to resort to all available resources” (Vanhanen 2003, 183). Among the countries undergoing transition to democracy, wealthier democracies were much harder to backslide into autocracy than poor states (Ulfelder 2006, 13; Lipset 1960).

Economic variables were the most frequently tested in the study of transition to democracy although research questions might be varied from one study to another. The major interests of this project were the economic variables which manifested economic development and quality of life. The following is the list of economic variables tested in this study: GDP, GNP, and GNI, economic growth measured by rate of change in GDP,
foreign direct investment, infant mortality rate, wealth distribution measured in Gini coefficient, trade by the percentage of GDP,

(3.3.10) Civil Liberty

If a state granted civil liberty to its citizens, it became harder for the state to revoke the already granted rights (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 10). Therefore, the extent of civil liberty might prevent a transitioning state from backsliding to autocracy amidst emerging political crisis. Although autocracies with moderate civil liberties were more inclined to transcend to democratization than those states with scant civil liberties (Ulfelder 2006, 10), it was not very clear how civil liberty influenced the potential for democratic consolidation.

Civil liberty could empower civil society which strengthened “the space between the public and private spheres where civic action takes place” (Grugel 2002, 93). Civil liberties allowed various groups to mobilize and pursue their interests under emerging political framework. Some scholars regarded mobilization of collective actions, such as strikes and protests, as healthy signs of democratic practice (Ekiert and Kubick 1998). On the other hand, sudden emergence of civil liberty might encourage stakeholders to mobilize political actions to undermine their opponents while democratic norms and institutions were still too weak to regulate egressing conflicts among political actors. From this perspective, civil liberties might be a conditional driver to conflict escalation.

In order to test the influence of civil liberty on democratic consolidation, this study used Freedom House’s seven-point scale of civil liberty score. Similar to other variables, civil liberty was assessed five years after the transition and prior to democratic consolidation.
(3.4) Data Collection and Sources

This study collected required data by coding its own variables and adopting existing datasets. Most structural data were collected from the existing databases while most dynamic data were gathered by coding events into a new dataset. The coding guideline followed the criteria defined in this section and the codebook attached in the appendix. The following were the sources of datasets to be adopted in the process of data collection.

- Polity IV Dataset (1955-2007)
  
  This was the core dataset entailing the scores of autocracy and democracy over the period of 1800 to 2007. This dataset also contained the structural data reflecting the status of political transition. Case selection and some dependent variables were collected from the Polity IV dataset.

- World Development Indicators/World Bank’s Cross-national Time-series (1955-2007)
  
  This database contained an economic data source from the World Bank, showing 500 time-series indicators for 210 economies starting from 1945. All economic structural data in this study were extracted from the World Bank’s database.

- Major Episodes of Political Violence (1946-2007)
  
  The database held all forms of major armed conflicts which involved at least 500 fatalities directly related to on-going violence. Each event of violence was tracked at the base rate of 100 deaths per year. Security data (independent variables) were also adopted from this database.
• Civil Liberty Index by Freedom House (1972-2007)

Civil liberty scores were coded in the Freedom House’s “freedom in the world” rating. Civil liberty, an independent variable in this study, would adopt Freedom House’s civil liberty rating starting from 1972.

• Political Instability Task Force (also known as State Failure Taskforce) 1955-2007

A complete PITF dataset was not available to the public. A public version contained ‘instability’ events such as civil wars, ethnic wars, adverse regime change, and genocide/politicide. As defined in the independent variable section for security factors, the data from the PITF dataset were used to describe security-related variables.

• Coups d'Etat (1960-2006)

This dataset contained a list of successful, attempted, or plotted coups from 1960 to 2006. The data would be used in both dependent and independent variables as a part of characteristics of security factors.

• Democracy Time-series Data 1972-2005

This dataset had merged the indicators of democracy by Freedom House, Vanhanen, Polity IV, and Cheibub and Gandhi, and socio-economic indicators from the World Bank. Since most data from this database come from other datasets, it would only serve as auxiliary dataset to fill up data gaps.

• UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset

This dataset was similar to the “Major Episodes of Political Violence” but recorded an armed conflict if battle-related deaths had reached 25. The definition of
armed conflict in PRIO’s dataset encompasses low intensity conflicts, such as communal
riots resulting in some deaths in a state. This dataset would use in tandem with the Major
Episodes of Political Violence to record security variables in this study.

- **LexisNexis  On-Line Data Sources for News Articles**

  The LexisNexis provided news articles from world-wide print and digital media.
  This study was especially interested in hard news reporting major events during relevant
  periods.

**Foreign Broadcast Information Service Electronic Index/World News Connection**

  These sources were a part of the US intelligence community’s open source data
  which monitored and recorded non-English media sources all around the world. Both
  indexes transcribed broadcast news which was translated to English from local languages.

- **Keesing’s World News Achieve**

  The Keesing’s World News Achieve recorded major historic events in each
country but might leave out some important details. The Keesing’s was useful if its
sources were used in tandem with Foreign Broadcast Information Service Electronic
Index and World News Connection.

- **Microsoft Encarta Digital Encyclopedia**

  The Encarta described annual highlights of country events in its country listing.
The Encarta also picked up major country events historically.

- **Authoritarian Regime Dataset V.2**
The dataset classifies twenty-six types of regime based on the democracy scores of Polity and Freedom House. This data was adapted to the variable related to the characteristics of former regime.

(3.5) Data Analysis

Although most analyses of this research were based upon quantitative methodologies, qualitative analysis was blended into the explanation of democratic consolidation by describing the logical sequence of statistical connectivity. The quantitative part of the study used various statistical methods while qualitative approach explored secondary-data source to interpret the meaning of statistical result. Max Weber articulated this connection between quantitative and qualitative analysis in his one of classic works as follow:

“Statistical uniformities constitute understandable types of action in the sense of this discussion, and thus constitute ‘sociological generalizations,’ only when they can be regarded as manifestations of the understandable subjective meaning of a course of social action” (Weber 1947, 100).

The explanation of a ‘casually adequate’ sequence of events depended on probability (Ibid, 99). On the other hand, probability-driven casual analysis of macro events was more structuralistic and hence tended to undermine the interpretation of agents’ actions. This study was not able to adequately address the dilemma of methodological problems between structural and action orientations. Instead, this project incorporated action-oriented variables into scrutiny to minimize the variance between structural and behavior influences on democratic transition and consolidation.
As Adam Przeworski (1979) pointed out in his early work, constructing a model of political change was methodologically challenging. By citing Jon Elster (1978), Przeworski asserted that it was not possible to confirm that an estimated model of an event at a specific time shared similar possibility with an actual event occurring at a different time (Przeworski 1979, 3). Despite the dilemma of methodology, even if “we misjudged the possibilities inherent in a given historical situation,” while ignoring alternative effects on the possibility of an event, “we will at least have a chance to identify correctly some feasible alternatives and the paths that lead to them” (Ibid, 4). In other words, an inferential modeling might incorrectly inform the possibility of an onset of an event. This miscalculation would lead a researcher to identify alternative explanations to predict the same event more accurately. Quantitative modeling of democratic consolidation will be the initial step to expand our understanding of transitions and their paths to consolidation.

(3.5.1) Statistical Method

This study set three primary objectives in data analysis. First, the study intended to describe the status of political transitions all over the world and their outcomes from democratizations. The descriptions highlighted regional factors, trends of democratization, economic performance, factional problems in each outcome of transitions and other crucial factors encompassing democratic transition.

The second objective aimed to establish causal connection between consolidation of democracy and independent variables. At the end of the study, this dissertation will produce a set of stylized facts that can explain the outcome of democratizations,
including consolidation of democracy. As any good model of social phenomenon purposed to nurture theoretical parsimony without sacrificing explanatory power (Evera 1997, 19), this model of democratic consolidation attempted to explain how significant elements influenced the outcomes of transitions.

The third objective called for theoretical validity. In order to meet this criterion, the study tested variables which were either explained by existing theories or identified by the preliminary data analysis process. Theoretical validity addressed three issues. First, the causal connection established by this study should fulfill retrospective accuracy. This meant the stylized facts should have significant explanatory power over the past outcomes of transitions. The second necessity was the model’s ability to forecast future outcomes of transitions and consolidation. The model should be able to serve as an analytical aid to political makers. Third, the stylized facts should be explained qualitatively—explanatory variable should be able to explicate soundly why these facts mattered in democratic transitions and consolidation.

To achieve those objectives, both descriptive and inferential statistical methods were used to compute the data. Descriptive methods were applied to describe the outcomes of transitions and the influence of each independent variable on consolidation and alternative outcomes of transition.

The primary method deployed in this study was a regular logit model with variables structured to reflect the first election cycle. The model was designed to capture how the nature of transition affected the potential for democratic consolidation, and how the influence of underlying conditions within the first election cycle shaped a country’s
democratic future. The dependent variable, democratic consolidation, was tested as a
dichotomous variable to understand the outcomes of transition to democracy. Detailed
description of the models will be discussed in the chapter 7.
CHAPTER 4: CASE SELECTION OF 115 TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY

Chapter Summary

This chapter outlines the overall criteria to select all cases of democratic transitions from 1955 to 2007. The selection criteria were operationalized on two minimum essentials of democracy: political competition and participation. This section surveys existing concepts, which outline a set of frameworks to operationalize a point of transition to democracy from non-democratic system. Each case of transition was extracted from the Polity IV dataset based on five operationalizing criteria to satisfy both the minimum criteria of democracy and adapt coding characteristics of the Polity IV data. This study identifies 115 cases of transition to democracy, in eighty-six countries, during the period of 1955 and 2007.

(4.1) Conceptual Framework of Transition to Democracy

Similar to the unsettled debate attempting to define the meaning of democracy, students of transition to democracy do not customarily share a conclusive meaning of democratic transition. Where did a transition start? Where did it end? At which point did a transition consolidate democracy? At which point did a transition reach other outcomes of democratization? Was the polity or political system of a country sufficient enough to determine the metamorphosis of democratization? What extent of civil liberty was
necessary to define a country’s status on transition to democracy? What were the minimum criteria of the quality of elections to determine if a country was undergoing a transition to democracy? Which magnitude of elite-driven transition undermined the authenticity of democratization? Did the power recuperation of the former regime disqualify democratization? Did territorial fragmentation in violently contested conflicts invalidate the status of transition to democracy?

Obviously, a plethora of questions raised by intellectual exercises strive to enhance the understanding of democratic transition beyond elections and a formal political system. By no means does this study intend to tackle all lingering puzzles of the connotation of democratic transition. Instead, this project is more interested in constructing a set of workable criteria of democratic transition to operationalize variables in the Polity IV dataset without distorting the empirical value of actual transition cases.

The first task of transition criteria requires a distinction between democracy and autocracy. In polity framework, politics is considered as the interaction of ‘state-organizations’ that exist as “formally organized structures of societies”(Eckstein and Gurr 1975, 4). Authority patterns are “a set of asymmetric relations among hierarchically ordered members of a social unit” (Ibid, 22). These asymmetric authority patterns include both the overlapping and mutually exclusive features of democracy and autocracy. As this study utilizes the polity framework to select transition cases, it is essential to conceptualize a point of metamorphosis from autocracy to democracy in order to successfully operationalize coded polity scores to reflect empirical cases of transitions.
To separate democracy from autocracy, this project relies on the minimum characteristics of democracy previously discussed in the literature review section of Chapter Two. To be qualified as democracy, a political system must meet what Robert Dahl called “the procedural minimum.”¹⁰ Two minimum criteria this study is interested are executive recruitment and political competition, as defined in the Polity IV dataset. In other words, the major concept of democracy requires the ‘essential contestability’ to achieve institutionalized decision-making power on behalf of the state by political actors (Whitehead 2002, 14-15). Dahl further identified two principle routes to democratization: one approach, the institutionalization of competition, and the other, expending political participation (Dahl 1971, 4). In a similar concept applied to measure the dichotomy between democracy and non-democracy, Alvarez et al. (1996, 7-8) deployed three criteria: executives must be elected; legislature must be elected; and more than one party must be legally allowed to contest in elections.

The transition from autocracy to democracy is a state of the restoration of both institutionalized competition and participation in the political process to contest leadership positions in a state. The transitioning arrangement usually facilitates the process of executive recruitment by holding relatively free elections where political actors from various groups are allowed to contest for elected position. A transitioning political system opens up opportunities for political actors to legally organize mobilization of supporters, especially to contest an executive position. A major

---

¹⁰ Dahl’s criteria of democracy included ‘eight guarantees’ a political system must provide to its citizens. This study, however, adopted his concept of minimum criteria to define polyarchy, rather than the detailed criteria per se.
distinction between autocracy and democracy is the coexistence of both processes in a political system. Some autocratic regimes might allow opposition groups to engage in limited political actions under liberalization initiatives. But, such liberalization under autocracy becomes a transition to democracy only when legally sanctioned political actions could structurally materialize the gain of decision-making positions in a government.

Some scholars argued that ‘mode of transition’ to democracy was a constellation of the interactions between actors and processes (Schneider and Schmitter 2004, 65). Schneider and Schmitter operationalized transition to democracy in eight categories which were not necessarily correlated (Ibid, 66). Their criteria can be repackaged into three divisions: conflict de-escalation, expansion of political participation and the quality of foundation election. The settlement between oppositions and the regime, and the government’s recognition of structural flaws characterized de-escalation of conflict. However, most transitions in this study were not necessarily the product of conflict de-escalation, or agreements among elites. Negotiation and consensus among political elites often indicated the dynamic of existing conflicts in a state. Theoretically, structural characteristics of polity should be distinguished from dynamic characters of a conflict. Conflict dynamics might transform a structure of political system or vice versa, but they cannot be equated. In this project, the variation of polity was a set of dependent variables whereas conflict dynamics were a part of independent variables. However, among the criteria constructed by Schneider and Schmitter, the quality of founding election and
institutionalization of political participation seem to be the most common elements of
democratization across the literature in the field.

Schmitter and Karl (1991, 83-84) defined eleven compressive points on which
democracies might differ from one another. However, the authors also warned that any
attempt to equate the inclusion of all these elements with a generic model of democracy
would “mistake the American polity for the universal model of democratic governance”
(Ibid., 84). Defining a transition to democracy calls for distinguishing between generic
difference and an essential minimum of democracy.

Kenneth Bollen (1980) defined political democracy as “the extent to which the
political power of the elite is minimized and that of non-elite is maximized” (372). Lipset
(1959, 71) also delineated democracy as “a political system which provides constitutional
opportunities for changing governing officials.” To operationalize the abstract concept,
Bollen divided political rights and political liberties by six indicators (Bollen 1980,
Bollen and Jackman 1989). Bollen’s political rights and political liberties are similar to
Dahl’s conceptualization of political contestation and participation. However, Bollen
(1990, 11) challenged that his criteria differ from Dahl’s conceptualization if each
component and are separately operationalized because Dahl’s criteria overlap one
another. Despite hair-splitting debates on micro differences, structurally sanctioned
political contestation and legally institutionalized political participation have become the
minimal sin qua non of democratization among the scholars of democracy development.

---

11 Bollen’s index of democracy included (1) free and fair election (2) effective process of executive
selection (3) legislative selection (4) freedom of the press (5) freedom to organize opposition, and (6)
government sanctions of rights and regulations.
In addition to the two minimal criteria, some scholars argued that civil liberty must be constituted in the process of democratization (Diamond and et al. 1990, Gasiorowski 1990, 1993 and Dahl 1989). Diamond and et al. (1990, 6-9) outlined three essential dimensions of democracy: effective political competition, inclusive political participation, and political rights and civil liberties guaranteed under a rule of law. But their study did not develop a set of operationalized variables to measure democratization. In a similar dimension, the Freedom House’s seven-ordinal scale of civil and political liberties (1 being the most free; 7 being the most oppressed), developed by Raymond Gastil in the 1970s (Vanhanen 2003, 51), measured an aggregated score for each country to determine their status of ‘freedom’ (Karatnycky and et al. 2001). Each country was classified as ‘free,’ ‘partly free’ and ‘not free.’ A number of studies incorporated the Freedom House’s three-ordinal scale as a part of the indicators of democracy.

Measuring civil liberty is essential to operationalizing the extent of democracy or ongoing democratization in both theoretical and empirical assessments. The extent of civil liberty more or less reflects the degree of political mobilization and organized opposition to the ruling party. However, using the assessment on civil liberty is empirically challenging to determine the point of transition to democracy from autocracy in a country that is ruled by suppressive regimes persistently. The regime collapse or the emergence of interim administration unnecessarily fosters structurally sanctioned civil liberty even if people were already relatively free to engage in political activities in the absence of repressive governments. For example, people taking the streets to overthrow an authoritarian government do not indicate an extent of legally sanctioned civil liberty.
The regime might be hesitant to forcefully crackdown on the protests or might be too incompetent to mobilize security forces whose loyalty is in question. On the other hand, the existence of civil liberty granted by liberalization initiatives, and facilitated by autocratic regimes, does not reflect a transition to democracy until institutionalized opposition is structurally allowed to contest in elections to seek decision-making positions in a state. Hence, measuring civil liberty at the time of transition to democracy proves empirically unyielding.

Additionally, the nature of annual assessment in the polity coding system exacerbates the complicacy to measure civil liberty in a particular year of transition to democracy. The polity system coded changes in political structure annually to reflect existing authority patterns in a state—the Polity IV dataset was an annual time-series data. A polity score of a country in a given year reflects the last change of polity at the end of the year, regardless of the month in which the change might have occurred. For example, the downfall of Ceaușescu in December 1989 paved a way to transition to democracy in Romania. The National Salvation Front (NSF) established an interim regime to facilitate the transition after the collapse of the Ceaușescu regime in December. However, the polity code for year 1989 was -88 which represented a state of regime transition enabled by a broad-base transitional government, although the fall of the regime occurred in December. Similarly, the polity score of Thailand in 1992 was coded 9, increasing from the score of 1. Although the actual transition to democracy (change in polity) occurred in September 1992, the ninth month of the year, the polity score of the change reflects the whole year. Even though the polity scores manifest structural
characteristic of a political system, the coding of a change in polity relies on specific events, such as the formation of interim government, holding of elections, promulgation of new constitutions, inauguration of new presidents and so on. Therefore, the date of polity change, directly influenced by the date of specific events, in turn, shapes the polity score of a given year if a country experienced a change in polity variables.

In contrast to event-induced polity change, civil liberty was shown to be an ongoing process, characterizing not only existing legal sanctions allowing citizens to engage political actions but also actual tolerance of a state on dissents. The mere existence of legal rights did not guarantee civil liberty unless these rights were effectively exercised and respected by the government. In other words, a point of transition to democracy was event-driven, whereas civil liberty characterized a process. For instance, Romania’s polity change in December 1989 did not reflect the actual restoration of civil liberty by the government in the same year.

Moreover, this study is more interested in changes in political structure as a set of independent variables while civil liberty is considered as an independent variable at the point of transition to democracy. Additionally, the polity coding does not exclude civil liberty in constructing authority patterns. Civil liberty is considered as a part of a political system, especially in identifying various degrees of “Political Competition.” The polity concept describes two dimensions of political competition: the extent of institutionalization or regulation of political competition (PARREG), and the degree of “Competitiveness of Political Participation” (PARCOMP). PARREG characterizes the magnitude of regulations and “binding rules on when, whether, and how political
preferences are expressed” while PARCOMP measures the degree of “civic interaction” in which opposition groups and citizens are able to engage in political actions (Marshall and Jaggers 2009, 24). While PARREG demonstrates structural capacity of former rules and regulations, PARCOMP highlights the magnitude of political and civil practice to organize political actions. Therefore, operationalizing political participation sufficiently addresses the issue of political and civil liberty in direct relation to political structure, although the framework would not cover the comprehensive spectrum of civil liberty. In a contemporary setting, civil liberty is synonymous with human rights (Gurr and Jaggers, 1995). Therefore, the exclusion of civil liberty measures in the categorization of democracy does not distort the general definition of ‘institutionalized’ democracy if Competitiveness of Political Participation (PARCOMP) is included in the measures (Gurr and Jaggers, 1995, 471).

In the polity framework, both democratic and autocratic authority patterns share three major concepts: executive recruitment, political competition and executive constraints (Marshall and Jaggers 2005, 13-19). Executive recruitment is the degree of how “institutionalized, competitive and open are the mechanism for selecting a political leader” (Ibid, 49). Political competition is characterized by the degree of institutionalization and systemic restrictions over political competition (Ibid, 68). Executive constraint measures the degree of institutional limitation on the decision-making powers of chief executives (Ibid, 63). While these three concepts are crucial to describe the degree of democracy in a state, executive constraint is not an effective indicator to characterize the point of transition to democracy. Usually, the magnitude of
Executive constraint highlights the maturity of democracy in a country, especially after it has experienced a point of transition from autocracy. It is more sensible to consider executive constraint as a fundamental criterion of democratic consolidation rather than a requirement to distinguish a transition from authoritarian rule. Based on these three major concepts, the Polity measures authority patterns of democracy and autocracy on a 21-point scale, ranging from -10 to +10.

In the Polity dataset, the concepts of political competition and participation can be operationalized into two major variables: ‘Executive Recruitment’ (EXREC) and Competitiveness of Political Participation (PARCOMP). These two variables demonstrate the degree of competitive electoral process by which decision makers are chosen, and the extent of legally sanctioned political space in which political groups are allowed to mobilize political actions to pursue alternative preferences for policy and to systemically organize their supporters to contest electoral power (Linz and Stepan 1996b, 3, Schumpter 1950, Huntington 1991, Ulfelder and Lustik 2005, 2).12

Executive Recruitment is a combination of indicators representing the “structural characteristics executives are recruited: (1) the extent of institutionalization of executive transfers, XRREG; (2) the competitiveness of executive selection, XRCOMP; and (3) the openness of executive recruitment, XROPEN.” The scores of Executive Recruitment (EXREC) range from 1 to 8, 0 being “not applicable.” The minimum criteria of democracy requires that the selection of leaders be structurally regulated, top political

12 All references cited in this sentence described the concept of democracy, not necessarily the direct connection to the Polity IV dataset, except the work done by Ulfelder and Lustik.
leaders who make crucial policy on behalf of the state be elected, and an electoral process that is open to politically active major groups in a state’s conventional polity, which excludes armed insurgents or terrorist organizations operating outside of the legal and former political system (Marshall and Jaggers 2008, 20-22). These criteria are fulfilled when the minimum EXREC score reaches six or greater. At the EXREC score of 6, the component variables are coded as follows: XRREG is coded 3 (meaning the process was regulated); XRCOMP is coded 2 (meaning at least one of the chief executives in the dual-executive system was elected, and the elected executive was the primary policy maker); and XROPEN is coded 3 (meaning the process to contest the position of the primary chief executive was open to major political groups). Therefore, an EXREC score of 6 satisfies one of the two minimum criteria of democracy, political competition. In the dataset developed by this study, only Nepal in 1991 was a transition case with an EXREC score of 6 while the rest of the cases showed an EXREC score of 7 or above.

The Polity dataset measures another essential criterion of democracy, political participation, as a component of Political Competition (POLCOMP)—it sounds quite similar to the prior criterion of democracy, but the Polity measures it differently. POLCOMP consists of two variables: Regulation of Participation (PARREG) and Competitiveness of Participation (PARCOMP). As described in the few previous paragraphs, PARCOMP expresses some degree of civil and political liberty which political groups enjoy to mobilize political activities. However, PARREG is less critical in identifying a transition to democracy than PARCOMP because of the nature of polity coding. The PARREG score reflects the extent of regulation, not necessarily the extent of
freedom to participate or tolerance by the government on dissidents. A higher PARREG score does not necessarily indicate more freedom of participation. For example, Romania, in 1987, was coded PARREG (4-restricted) and PARCOMP (1-repressed) while the country after the fall of the Ceauşescu regime had a PARREG score of 2 in 1990 (multiple identity) and PARCOMP of 3 (factional). In contrast to PARREG, this PARCOMP score was directly proportional to the extent of political freedom—1 being the least, 5, the most. A PARCOMP score 3 or above indicates that political groups, other than the supporters of the regime, were allowed to engage in political actions to contest decision-making positions in the government through elections. Therefore, the use of PARCOMP, with a threshold score of three to identify transition cases, satisfies another essential criterion of democracy—political participation.

Among quantitative studies of transition to democracy, the concepts of political competition and participation are the minimum essentials to recognize a shift from autocracy to democracy. However, scholars operationalized these two concepts in a few different variations. The Index of democratization (ID), developed by Tatu Vanhanen, measures political competition by calculating the ratio of votes gained by the largest party (Vanhanen 2003, 56-51). Political participation was operationalized by measuring the ratio of voter turnout over the whole population. A number of scholars criticized that the use of these two simple measurements was not sufficient to demarcate democracy (Bollen 1990, Moore 1995, Lijphart 1999), and Vanhanen also responded to this criticism in a number of articles and books.
Even if the Index of democratization accurately measures the extent of democracy, there are two major obstacles to using the index to identify a point of transition. First, the measurement is structured as a continuous variable; therefore, it is difficult to identify a cutoff point that distinguishes autocracy and democracy. In contrast, the Polity data are structured into different pieces of ordinal variables whose individual value represents a distinct state of authority pattern in a country, although aggregate polity score is a continuous value between -10 to +10. The second weak point of the Index of Democratization (ID) to study transitions is the availability of data before 1970s. The index relies on other datasets to construct its variables, whereas the Polity Dataset was hand-coded for each country in accordance with specific guidelines. Therefore, the availability of data in the ID depends on the availability of the other datasets on which the ID relies upon. In contrast, the Polity dataset is able to provide required data for all cases starting from 1955 to 2007.

In addition to a number of quantitative studies on democracy, there are two major studies on democratic transition that extensively utilized the Polity IV dataset. Ethan Kapstein and Nathan Converse (2008) operationalized transition to democracy to study “young democracies” by using the Polity IV dataset. Their method adopted and modified the Polity IV’s embedded quantitative description of regime transition (REGTRANS) (Kapstein and Converse 2008, 158, Marshall and Jaggers 2008, 33). The categorical variable REGTRANS in the Polity IV describe a “Major Democratic Transition” which characterized at least a six-point increase in polity score toward partial (+1 to +6) or full (+7 to +10) democratic polity over a period of three years or less. This method was
adopted by other studies on transition to democracy, for example, the study on economic development in transitioning countries by Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005).\(^\text{13}\) The original concept of regime transition in the Polity IV produced 188 “major democratic transitions” between 1955 and 2007. This original conceptualization produced redundant counting of transition cases because democratic transition cases were counted whenever they maintained the same polity score for three years after a year of the transition. Recognizing this issue of redundancy, Kapstein and Converse selected only the last year of the transitioning period to mark a year of transition to democracy. Under this modified concept, Kapstein and Converse identified 123 episodes of democratization from 1960 to 2004.

Although the modified concept of operationalization in the study of Kapstein and Converse improved the accuracy in identifying transition cases, the fundamental flaw in the original framework to operationalize democratic transition remains unsolved. The Polity IV’s concept describes polity scores between +1 to +6 as partial democracy. However, not all countries with polity scores greater than 0 fulfilled these minimum criteria of democracy: competition characterized by the extent of executive recruitment (EXREC score greater than 5); and political participation described by Competitiveness of Political Participation (PARCOMP score greater than 3). For example, South Africa’s polity score in 1953 was coded +4 although Participation (PARCOMP) was coded ‘suppress’ (code 2). Among Kapstein and Converse’s selected cases, at least four cases

\(^{13}\) Rodrik’s and Wacziarg’s criteria of democratic transition appeared to adopt the polity’s transition data directly without making any adjustment; therefore, the data were subject to inaccuracy in identifying cases of transition.
lacked the minimum criteria for democracy.\textsuperscript{14} For example, Kapstein and Converse identified Sierra Leone in 1968 as a transitioning country to democracy although the political participation was suppressed by the government (coded PARCOMP=2). Therefore, the simple increase of +6 polity score towards partial or full democracy is not a sufficient criterion to operationalize democratic transition in the Polity dataset. In contrary, the application of minimum criteria EXREC (6 or greater) and PARCOMP (3 or greater) does not produce any country with polity score less than 0.

Another major study that operationalized transition to democracy in the Polity dataset treated democracy as a dichotomous variable to observe a point of transition where a country acquired two minimum criteria of democracy (Ulfelder and Lustick 2007, 353). Ulfelder and Lustick used Executive Recruitment (EXREC score 6 or higher) and Competitiveness of Political Participation (PARCOMP score 3 or higher) to identify the threshold at which a country moved from autocracy to democracy. Their case-selection also included a variable code representing a regime in transition, which was coded -88 in the Polity dataset, if the transitioning period resulted in a polity with minimum criteria of democracy, EXREC=>6 and PARCOMP=>3.

Although the criteria set out by Ulfelder and Lustick produced cases which met the minimum criteria for democracy, their method produced a list that omitted countries which regained independence. In theory, if a country became democratic and independent concurrently, the transformation was not necessarily a transition from autocracy unless

\textsuperscript{14} These countries were Sierra Leone (1978), Ghana (1970), Nigeria (1999) and Nepal (1990).
the country was formerly ruled by an autocratic system.\textsuperscript{15} However, as this study was interested in the residual effect of previous autocratic systems on democratization, those countries, which were a part of larger autocratic system, should be included in the list of cases. Thus, former Soviet satellites which became democracies at the time of independence were selected as transitioning cases in this study.

Apart from the exclusion of former Soviet satellites, the list of transitioning countries operationalized by Ulfelder and Lustick is quite similar to the list developed by this study, except in a few cases. Ulfelder and Lustick listed seven cases which are excluded in this study because they do not meet the criteria of transition to democracy.\textsuperscript{16} For example, Ulfelder and Lustick listed Turkey (1961) as a democratization case that transcended from a period of regime transition (-88 code in polity). However, the years prior to 1961 were clearly coded as a democracy in Turkey’s polity score. The interruption was the direct result of the military intervention which overthrew the civilian government but restored democracy immediately the next year. Therefore, a period of regime transition (-88 code) followed by a year of democracy alone does not qualify a case to be a transition to democracy from authoritarian rule if the prior-year polity before regime transition (-88) is coded as democracy. In Turkey’s case in 1961, it was a regime interruption within a period of democracy, and not a transition from autocracy to democracy. Other cases included in Ulfelder’s and Lustick’s study did not satisfy the

\textsuperscript{15} The list of transitioning countries developed by Kapstein and Converse included countries which gained independence from former colonizers, such as Cyprus (1960), Trinidad (1962), Sierra Leone (1961), Nigeria (1960), Congo Brazzaville (1960), Zambie (1964), Namibia (1990), Lesotho (1966), Botswana (1966), Mauritius (1968), Bangladesh (1972), and Fiji (1970).

\textsuperscript{16} The cases excluded by this study were Albania (1997), Burundi (1993), Iran (1997), Morocco (1963), Nigeria (1999), and Turkey (1961).
minimum criteria of democracy. Take, for example, Burundi (1993) which descended into anarchy (-77 code in polity) after a brief period of attempted regime transition (-88 code in polity). This anarchy spell was again followed by a period of non-democratic regime.

In order to maximize the accuracy of case selection, this study goes through each case qualitatively by analyzing secondary sources. This process also strengthens the validity of the Polity data to extract transition cases from the existing database. Qualitative analysis of each case minimizes potential conceptual gaps between polity coders and the author of this dissertation. So far there was only Iran (1997), which was in conceptual conflict between this project and the Polity IV because Iran did not structurally change the process of executive recruitment and political participation in 1997. In accordance with the process of executive recruitment, the Council of Guardians qualifies the candidates whether to contest elections, and the participation in the race depends upon the leniency of the religious leaders in the council. Under the same process, the Council disqualified 2,600 moderates out of 8,150 candidates to contest elections in 2003. As long as the same procedure remains in place, the tolerance of religious leaders in the Council of Guardians per se does not make Iran democratic. The tolerance merely indicates the degree of liberalization in political participation. Qualitative analysis of each case, however, is able to resolve conceptual differences and connect the quantitative process with actual events of transition to democracy more precisely than using quantitative data alone.
Table 1. Comparison of the number of transition cases by four studies using the Polity IV dataset

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>115</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>188(^{17})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4.2) Case Selection Criteria of Transition to Democracy

The lengthy debate on measuring democracy is generally divided into two schools of thought. One perspective views democracy as a continuing spectrum that can be ranked and ordered high to low in varying degrees (Dahl 1971, Eckstein and Gurr 1975, Bollen and Jackman 1989, Bollen 1990). Another perspective argues that political systems may only be viewed as a whole entity; therefore, different types of regimes should be classified in categories rather than in ranking degrees (Hadenius and Teorell 2007, Przeworski et al. 1996, 51, Sartori 1987 & 1970 Huntington 1991, Geddes 1999, 121-122). Przeworski et al. (1996, 52) differentiated the types of democracies, such as ‘premier-presidential,’ ‘semi-presidential,’ and ‘mixed’ after 135 countries were distinguished between democracy and non-democracy, which was, therefore, treated as a residual variable. Hadenius and Teorell (2007a & 2007b) identified twenty-six types of regimes in both democratic and autocratic polities as categorical variables. Geddes classified eight types of authoritarian regimes among 163 cases to study regime transition to democracy (Geddes 1999, 133). Nevertheless, the quantitative datasets produced by

\(^{17}\) The polity coding scheme on this variable repeated the same code for three years in some cases and caused redundancy. Hence, the number of transition cases inflated.
different measuring schemes produce a high degree of correlation from one dataset to another (Przeworski et al. 1996, 52, Alvarez et al. 1996, 21, Gurr and Jaggers 1995, 475). But statistical distinctions may be over or underestimated by a shift in a single threshold or cut point, depending on the nature of measurement (Paxton 1995).

Another perspective injecting into the debate between dichotomy and ranking value of democracy is the utility-oriented measurement advocated by Collier and Adcock (1999). They convincingly argued that “justifications for the use of a dichotomous or graded approach are most productive when they focus on specific arguments about the goals and context of research” (Collier and Adcock 1999, 561). At the conceptual level, this study followed the suggestions proposed by Sartori (1987, 182) who suggested that political regimes must be, at the initial step, differentiated between democracy and non-democracy dichotomously, and at a second step, those regimes might be classified into further set of criteria. In accordance with the minimum criteria of democracy, this project constructs a list of transition cases where a country transcended from non-democracy to democracy. The next chapter of this dissertation describes how different categories of democracy are classified to study the outcomes of democratic transitions. The following are the sets of criteria to operationalize democratic transitions in the Polity IV dataset. The criteria are structured, not only to meet theoretical consistency, but also to fit to the nature of polity coding.

(1) To meet competition requirement in executive-selection process, all democratic transitions must have an Executive Recruitment (EXREC) score of 6 or higher in the Polity IV dataset.
(2) To meet the requirement for political participation, all democratic transitions must have a Competitiveness of Political Participation (PARCOMP) score of 3 or higher. PARCOMP scores of 3 or higher indicate that political groups are allowed to mobilize political activities to contest elections, and no significant portion of the adult population was disenfranchised. An exception to this rule is allowed in cases coded 0 (not applicable) in the PARCOMP score while the EXREC is coded greater than 5 in the same year. A PARCOMP score of 0 indicates that the country might be undergoing a transition in polity change. If PARCOMP is coded 0 and EXREC, greater than 5, the case is listed as transition to democracy only if the case meets the minimum criteria for democracy (PARCOMO>=3 and EXREC>=6) at the end of a period in which PARCOMP is coded 0. For example, Nepal in 1990 was coded 0 for a PARCOMP score while its EXREC was coded 6. Nepal, in 1990, was listed as a transition case because Nepal reached both the minimum criteria for democracy in 1999 when PARCOMP was coded 4 (transitional) and EXREC, 6 (dual executive). In a different example, Nigeria, in 1999, was coded with the EXREC score 7 (transitional), and PARCOMP 0 (not applicable). Since Nigeria failed to meet the two minimum criteria for democracy from 1999 to 2007, the end of the study period, the case was excluded.

(3) Prior to democratic transition, all cases must be non-democracy. To operationalize this concept, a country must have an EXREC score less than 6 or a PARCOMP score less than 3, prior to democratic transition. An autocratic country might meet either one of the criteria, but not both, under liberalization initiatives.
(4) If the prior-year polity before transition was a period of regime interruption, such as anarchy (polity code -77), foreign occupation (polity code -66), or a broad-based transitioning regime (polity code -88), the case was coded as transition to democracy, only if the case met two minimum criteria of democracy. To be qualified as a transition to democracy from autocracy, a country’s prior polity before interruption and transition must be non-democracy. Once a country reaches the criteria \( \text{EXREC} \geq 6 \) and \( \text{PARCOMP} \geq 3 \), the minimum polity becomes zero. Therefore, the criteria intrinsically excludes autocracy cases and minimizes the chance of misidentification on democratic transition.

(5) A newly independent country is classified as a transition to democracy only if democracy followed a colonization period, and a prior regime was autocratic. For example, Ukraine, in 1991, was identified as a transition case because it was ruled by an extensive autocratic system, while independent Jamaica, ruled by the British in 1959, was excluded.

The following is the list of twenty-one newly independent countries excluded from the case selection:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Polity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo Brazzaville</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The nature of unification and already entrenched democratic institution in West Germany disqualified the country in 1990 from a list of transition cases.

In accordance with the five operationalizing criteria of transition to democracy in the Polity IV dataset, this study identifies 115 transition cases in eighty-six countries. In some countries, democratic transition took place as many as four times during the period of the study. The following is the list of cases that transcended to democracy between 1955 and 2007.

Table 3. A Comprehensive list of transition cases to democracy between 1955 and 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Polity</th>
<th>Last Polity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo Brazzaville</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo Kinshasa</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Rep</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Rep</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea South</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea South</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea South</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Wage</td>
<td>Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter Summary

This chapter outlines the concepts of democratic consolidation within the polity framework. The criteria of consolidation call for competitive electoral processes that allow all major political groups to participate under a free political sphere. All major political actors adhere to democratic norms and procedures to compete for power within a state. The criteria identify fifteen consolidated democracies among all eighty-six countries. Another outcome of transition to democracy is democratic reversal, where a transitioning state regresses to non-democracy. The study identifies forty-four cases (32 countries) of democratic reversal. This section also explores frozen transition when a transitioning country fails to consolidate democracy after fourteen years. The research identifies twenty-four countries that were considered frozen transitions.

(5.1) The Concepts of Democratic Consolidation

In the beginning of the 21st century, economic crises, corruption, ethnic conflicts, terrorism and weak governance become constant threats to the consolidation of democracy in the third wave. Most countries that experienced democratic transition in mid- to late-1990s are still struggling amidst transitional crises and have failed to
consolidate democratic gain until the early 21st century. Many transitioning countries became “incoherent polities” and were considered as “un-consolidated polities” (Gurr and Jaggers 1995, 478). Incoherent polities, including anocracies, or illiberal democracies, were prone to political instabilities, such as internal warfare and regime reversal (Ibid, Goldstone et al 2005). The outcomes of transition to democracy, especially among those countries riding the third wave of democratization, were not necessarily the consolidation of democracy after all.

Among scholars of democratization, the concept of democratic consolidation is the least settled discussion, suggesting the topic deserves more expanded empirical study. Among the literature on democratization, the studies on transition to democracy are proportionally higher than those on consolidation. The conventional approach to the conceptualization of democratic consolidation is usually constructed in either a wish-list, also known as teleological, or westernization frameworks, also dubbed model democracy. Some scholars associate the process of preventing a democratic country from regression to either autocracy or illiberal democracy with consolidation, also named “negative consolidation” (Schelder 1998, 94-95). On the other hand, “positive” consolidation is the process that progresses toward higher quality of democracy. Both positive and negative aspects of consolidation concepts highlight valid concerns regarding the conceptualization of democratic consolidation.

Democratic stability and survival are one of the essential qualities of consolidated democracy, occurring after a country reaches a point of consolidation (Gunther,
Diamandouros & Puhle 1996, 153; 1995). Despite the variations of minor difference, a widely recognized definition of democratic consolidation was spelled out by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan as “a political situation in which, in a phrase, democracy has become ‘the only game in town,’” behaviorally, attitudinally, and constitutionally (1996b, 5).

Along this line of conceptualization, other scholars stress the stability of the political system as one of the requirements for democratic consolidation. Przeworski argues that democratic consolidation occurs “when no one can imagine acting outside the democratic institutions” (Przeworski 1991, 26).

Consolidation involves a second dimension, relating to the stabilization, routinization, institutionalization, and legitimization of patterns of politically relevant behavior. Specifically, we consider a democratic regime to be consolidated when all politically significant groups regard its key political institutions as the only legitimate framework for political contestation, and adhere to democratic rules of the game” (Gunther, Diamandouros and Puhle 1996, 152).

If consolidation of democracy means the stabilization of a political system, is it necessary for a consolidated country to not regress toward non-democracy or semi-democracy? Some scholars believe that the consolidated democracy could break down in the future (Linz and Stepan 1996b, 6). O’Donnell argued that the discrepancy between formal and informal political institutions in a state might obscure the conceptualization of democratic consolidation, because informal or a “concealed institution,” such as “clientelism and, more generally, particularism” were the “permanent feature of human
society” (1996a, 40-42, 1996b). In other words, a state might have a consolidated democracy in formal institutions, such as the constitution and electoral structure, without having established attitudinal convictions towards democracy and its norms, especially when factional competition is paramount. Empirical studies indicate that even a consolidated democracy might suffer from factionalism if a country faces political and economic crisis, for instance, like the United States during the Vietnam War period.\textsuperscript{18}

Given the life span of modern democratic states, it may still be too early to determine whether the consolidation of democracy is permanent.

The breakdown of democratic consolidation can be distinguished into two forms: regression to semi-democracy and non-democracy. At the conceptual level, it is important to distinguish between a breakdown of consolidation and a breakdown of democracy. In the former case, a consolidated democracy loses consolidation criteria but still maintains the minimum essentials of a democracy, such as competitiveness of political participation and an open electoral process to contest for executive positions. In the latter case, a country loses the essential criteria of democracy and becomes a non-democracy. If the conceptualization tolerates both types of breakdown to define democratic consolidation, it would be illogical to consider a country as consolidated if it could regress to non-democracy afterwards. In this study, the conceptualization of democratic consolidation requires a country to not regress to non-democracy although a consolidated democracy might lose essential criteria of consolidation. To verify the

\textsuperscript{18} The undergoing study was conducted by the Political Instability Task Force funded by the US government. For more details, see Monty Marshall’s “Examining the occurrence and organization of factionalism” (2006b).
validity of the criteria of consolidation, this study tests the requirements on consolidated states to determine how consolidated democracies did not regress to non-democracy.

This study is interested in consolidated democratic polity as one of the outcomes of transition to democracy. Consolidated polity of democracy manifests as structural elements of a country’s political system. However, in most of the literature on democratic consolidation, scholars define democratic consolidation beyond the polity of a state and inevitably create two fundamental problems: tautological measurement and criteria beyond operationalization. For example, if the lack of significant security threats is a criterion of consolidation in a state, any study that analyzes security factors as an independent variable would tautologically measure consolidation of democracy. On the other hand, if a definition of consolidation requires mass citizens’ attitudinal conviction to democracy, measuring public opinions en masse in any large-N study would be beyond the comprehension of any researcher, at least for this moment. For these methodological constraints, this study limits democratic consolidation as a form of polity. Before going into the detailed criteria of consolidation, the following sub-section outlines the various definitions of democratic consolidation.

Linz and Stepan argued that the first criterion of democratic consolidation must exist as a form of “governance of a state” (1996b, 7). They set five major arenas to identify a “modern consolidated democracy”: vibrant civil society, systemically organized political society, rule of law, efficient bureaucratic apparatus, and institutionalized market. In the polity framework, political competition concepts (POLCOMP), measured in Political Competition (PARCOMP) and Regulation of
Political Competition (PARREG), reflect the extent of civil and political society. Executive Recruitment (EXREC) and Executive Constraint (EXCONST) partly reflect the degree of existing bureaucratic and legal structures. The polity framework excludes only the extent of the institutionalized market in its measurement.

Larry Diamond set out “indicators” of democratic consolidation in three layers of society: elite, organizations and mass public (Diamond 1999, 65-69). Both political actors and institutions embrace democratic norms and behave in accordance with democratic procedures as the only mean to compete for power (Ibid). Diamond’s notion of democratic consolidation went well beyond the institutionalization of polity in a similar way to how O’Donnell criticized the heavy emphasis on formal institutions to determine the criteria of consolidation. Similarly, from the perspective of political culture, Shin and Wells observed citizens’ attitudes toward democracy in six Asian countries that were considered democracies in 2005. Their study concluded that, despite people’s preference to democracy, in some democracies such as the Philippines, Mongolia\(^\text{19}\) and Thailand, people have “yet to shed their authoritarian habits and mindsets” (Shin and Wells 2005, 99). Obviously, the polity framework fell short of measuring political culture and grassroots attitudes on democracy to determine the consolidation status of transitioning countries. This shortcoming did not necessarily invalidate the study, since this study was the focus of the polity structure of consolidation although the study might not be able to gauge the attitudinal consolidation of democracy in transitioning countries.

\(^{19}\text{This study identified Mongolia as a consolidated democracy in polity framework.}\)
Schneider and Schmitter (2004, 67-69) outlined twelve items of scale to measure consolidation of democracy. All twelve categories directly relate to the behaviors of political actors, demonstrating the efficacy of how they interact in adherence to democratic norms and their acceptance of institutionalized democracy as the only game in town. Most criteria, for example electoral volatility and agreements among political actors, as set out by Schneider and Schmitter reflect the conflict dynamics of transitioning countries rather than polity structure. At least four criteria were the direct manifestation of the extent of factionalism measured in the polity framework, especially Political Competition (PARCOMP). At least one criterion characterized the extent of executive recruitment and constraint.

Gunther, Diamandouros, and Puhle proposed five major indicators to identify consolidated democracy: “alternation in power between former rivals,” “continued widespread support and stability during times of extreme economic hardship,” “successful defeat and punishment of a handful of strategically placed rebels,” “regime stability in the face of a radical restructuring of the party system,” and “the absence of a politically significant anti-system party or social movement” (1995, 12-13). The authors also noted that “full consolidation” is unachievable to fulfill all spectrums of the ideal type of democratic consolidation. Similar to the framework laid out by Schneider and Schmitter, Gunther and et al. focused their criteria on conflict dynamics of political actors, rather than structure. This study, however, limits democratic consolidation in structure characteristics of polity while conflict dynamics are considered as independent variables influencing a state’s potential to consolidation.
(5.2) The Criteria of Democratic Consolidation

Operationalizing criteria of democratic consolidation in the polity framework must be structurally oriented because the nature of polity reflects the political structure of a state. However, the congregation of polity components, especially Political Competition (PARCOMP), includes dynamic elements of political actors who shape the institutional structure of a country’s polity. In any approach to the consolidation of democracy, structurally, dynamically, behaviorally, attitudinally or constitutionally, the conceptualization must capture the core theme of democracy, being the only means to acquire political power. In a consolidated democracy, an institutionalized and regulated electoral process is “transparent and its outcome are institutionally uncertain” (Marshall and Jagger 2005, 61, Ulfelder and Lustik 2005, 4). No single group should be in perpetual domination of electoral politics. Based on the literature discussed in the above subsection, the following are the criteria of democratic consolidation:

(1) Executive recruitment processes should be fully regulated and open to other political groups to participate. Major policy-makers are elected by a popular or an elected assembly. Elections must be free and fair and participated in by more than two major parties. The electoral outcome of the executive must not be influenced by non-elected officials, such as the military, non-electoral processes, or foreign powers. Major opposition parties accept the electoral result—no boycotts by significant political groups. In the Polity IV, these criteria were coded in an Executive Recruitment (EXREC=8) score of eight, “competitive elections” (Marshall and Jaggers 2005, 61).
(2) Institutionalized electoral participation must be open and competitive. Political competition is clearly regulated, and no major political or social groups are excluded from the political process. Nationally organized major-political parties participate in free and fair elections. Political groups compete for political influence within a stable institutional framework with little or no use for non-democratic means, such as violence and coercion. Political competition is no longer characterized by factionalism in which “parochial or ethnic-based political factions” favor their group members and promote crosscutting agendas while trying to exclude rival groups from political processes by using non-democratic methods (Marshall and Jeggers 2008, 26). In the Polity IV dataset, a Political Participation and Competition (PARCOMP=5) score of five characterizes fully regulated and competitive features of political participation in a democratic state.

(3) Executives, such as the President or Prime Minister, are subject to at least moderate limitation in exercising their power. This criterion manifests the degree of state apparatus pillaring democratic structure of a country and the extent of “horizontal accountability.” In the Polity IV dataset, Executive Constraint (XCONST) characterizes the limits on chief executives imposed by any “accountability group” (Ibid., 63). However, the XONST score tends to be lower on average in presidential systems than in parliamentary ones. To avoid skewing more weight on parliamentary systems, this study set a cut-point at XCONST score three (XCONST>=3) at which the difference between parliamentary and presidential systems are minimized. Moreover, XCONST is highly correlated with
EXREC and PARCOMP, and would produce little effect on the classification (Ulfelder, 2007, 355).

1. Consolidated democracies must have an overall polity score of +6 or more. This feature double-checks the consolidation criteria against actual selection of consolidation cases to avoid mistakenly identifying non-consolidated cases.

2. A consolidated country should not regress to non-democracy within three election cycles, approximately on an average of ten years. A consolidated country may, however, “de-consolidate” the democracy during this timeframe but still maintained the minimum essentials of democracy. None of the consolidated countries fell back to non-democracy in this study. This criterion was designed to strengthen the validity of the consolidation concept among selected cases.

3. A consolidated democracy should have at least three years of a transitioning period. This requirement is driven by logical necessity rather than theoretical consideration. Some countries that met the above-mentioned criteria, such as Greece, Hungary, Laos and Portugal, had features of consolidated democracy within the same year of transition. Logically, there must be some period between a point of transition and consolidation.

Another purpose of the three-year gap intends to strengthen data accuracy. All databases, especially large ones like the Polity, are subjected to issues of coding liability because of changes in coders and coding rules over time. At one point or another, coding liability might affect the data accuracy for certain countries at specific short periods.
a longer period, data accuracy increases. A coder might mistakenly identify a country as a consolidated democracy—in accordance with the Polity features—for a short period of time, especially when the country goes through complex political changes. However, the coding tends to be accurate in the long run as the country surpasses the period of complex political interaction.

For example, this was the case with Laos, which had all features of consolidated democracy in 1958. In the very same year, Laos went through a democratic transition. However, the consolidation and transition lasted only two years because of the military coup in 1960 that installed a government led by neutralist Prince Souvanna Phouma. Moreover, reports indicated that the 1958 Laos elections were charged with corruption. The influence of foreign elements might also disqualify the criteria of democratic consolidation. The Laos case might have been a coding liability issue. To correct such liability issues, spacing three years between the year of transition and consolidation fully disqualifies Laos as a consolidation case.

In accordance with the consolidation criteria, the following are the transitioning countries that successfully consolidated democracy between 1955 and 2007.

Table 4. Fifteen consolidated democracies among eighty-six transitioning countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country name</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Years between Transition and Consolidation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>2006-2007</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>1996-2005</td>
<td>3*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1978-2007</td>
<td>3*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Hungary 1993-2007 3*
Lithuania 1994-2007 3*
Mongolia 1996-2007 4
Panama 1994-2007 5
Poland 2002-2007 13
Portugal 1979-2007 3*
Slovak Republic 2006-2007 13
Slovenia 1994-2007 3*
Spain 1982-2007 4
Taiwan 1996-2007 4
Uruguay 1989-2007 4
Venezuela 1969-1991 11

* These countries attained consolidation characteristics in the same year of transition from non-democracy. The three-year gap was artificially created to logically satisfy the concept of consolidation from transition.

The criteria produced fifteen transitioning countries that all consolidated democracy between 1955 and 2007; Venezuela became the earliest consolidated democracy in 1969. None of the consolidated countries regressed to non-democracies until 2007, although Venezuela and the Czech Republic de-consolidated democracy in 1991 and 2005 respectively. Both Venezuela and the Czech Republic maintained the basic essential characteristics of democracy, even after de-consolidation. Therefore, the consolidation criteria passed the test of non-democratic regression until 2007.

Some literature highlights the viability of civil society and civil liberty in matured democracies (Linz and Stepan 1996b, 8, Diamond 1999, Schelder 1998), while other scholars emphasize the institutionalization of states’ democratic structures over the degree of grassroots civil society (Huntington 1968). Although the polity framework does not directly measure the extent of civil and political rights, the criteria for democratic consolidation should address the issues of civil liberty. To ensure the validity of
consolidation criteria, this study investigated the Freedom House’s civil liberty score in all consolidated countries worldwide in 2007.

Table 5. Thirty-five consolidated democracies worldwide and civil liberty scores in 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Political Rights*</th>
<th>Civil Rights*</th>
<th>Freedom Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* One being the highest civil and political liberty on a seven-point scale; F=free, PF=party free, NF=not free (the data were adopted from the Freedom House’s Freedom in the World dataset)
The civil-liberty test on all consolidated countries demonstrates that the transitioning countries selected by the consolidation criteria are comparable to the rest of model democracies. Although the Polity dataset does not explicitly include civil liberty scores, the consolidation criteria sufficiently encompasses the requirements of civil liberty and political rights in consolidated democracies.

(5.3) Other Outcomes of Democratic Transition: Alternatives to Consolidation

The data shows that only fifteen countries were able to consolidate democracy among eighty-six countries, in total 115 cases of transition to democracy. Only four countries consolidated democracy in more than five years after transition to democracy while eleven countries met consolidated criteria within five years. The data shows that only seventeen percent of transitioning countries (thirteen percent of all cases) become consolidated democracies. The remaining non-consolidated cases can be divided into democracy and regression to non-democracy.

(5.3.1) Regression to Non-Democracy

One of the outcomes of democratic transition is the regression to non-democracy or a “reverse wave” of democracy in Huntington’s words. Forty-four cases (32 countries) regressed to non-democracy from 1955 to 2007. Democratic reversal included countries that fell into anarchy followed by autocratic rule, such as the Dominican Republic in 1963, or re-democratization, such as Comoros in 1995. Only Haiti (1999) and Sudan (1969) reversed to autocracy via broad-based transitioning attempts (polity code -88). Some -88 coding in the polity dataset includes cases where a military coup triggered an interim transitioning body from one government to another, and not necessarily to
democracy. In Sudan, the military coup of 1969, followed by the formation of the Revolutionary Command Council, characterized by an interim transitioning body that resulted in autocracy. In Haiti, the legislative impasse in 1999 resulted in an interim government appointed by President René Préval. However, the interim body facilitated a transition to non-democratic rule under fraudulent elections, which allowed former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to return to power. The following lists the transitioning countries that reversed to non-democracy:

Table 6. Cases reversed to non-democracy after having transcended to democracy from 1955 to 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Polity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>-77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo Brazzaville</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Rep</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>-77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>-77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>-77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea South</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea South</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>-77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(5.3.2) Frozen Transitions

Some transitions neither consolidated democracy nor regressed to non-democracy after an extensive period of nominal democracy. Some scholars distinguish different types of non-consolidated democracy (Diamond 1997, 1999, Sartori 1987, Booth 1989, Collier and Collier 1991, Collier and Levitsky 1996, Gasiorowski 1990, Linz 1994). Collier and Levitsky (1996, 27) identified more than one hundred subtypes of democracy by deploying different theoretical criteria of democracy. This study was interested in democratic transitions that failed to consolidate after a substantial period but maintained the minimum criteria for democracy for an extensive period. The following are their descriptions of frozen transitions where countries neither consolidated nor regressed to non-democracy:

(1) A transitioning country is considered a frozen transition if it fails to consolidate democracy in fourteen years from the last attempted transition to democracy. In a quantitative assessment of Ulfelder and Lustik’s (2005, 12) study, the risk of backsliding to autocracy remains high until a country reaches fifteen years of democratic polity. However, among consolidation cases, only Chile took
seventeen years while the second longest was thirteen years in both Poland and the Slovak Republic. Most consolidated countries took less than five years to reach a point of consolidation. Therefore, the fourteen-year threshold should be sufficient to identify frozen characteristics of a transitioning country. This period reflects three election cycles in most democratic countries. By no means did this study assume that a frozen transition was permanent without being able to consolidate democracy or reverse to non-democracy.

(2) A frozen case should not be a consolidated democracy in 2007. This criterion calls for the logical necessity to identify a frozen case. If a case is considered frozen, this case should remain frozen at the end of the study period.

In accordance with this criteria, twenty-four countries were considered frozen transitions as follows:

Table 7. Twenty-four Frozen Transitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Rep</td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea South</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Among twenty-four cases of frozen transition, only Venezuela was a formerly consolidated country which de-consolidated democracy in 2001 without having been able to re-consolidate in a fourteen-year time span. The rest of the frozen cases remained unconsolidated until 2007 since the last time the country had transcended to democracy.

The polity scores of frozen cases were, however, not comparable to one another because the range of polity scores in each frozen year ran from five to nine in all twenty-four countries. Polity scores fluctuated one year after another, even in the same country, and some frozen countries appeared to be closer to consolidation than others. For this asymmetric nature of frozen cases, it is difficult to construct frozen transition as a dependent variable to calculate inferential statistists, but it would be worthwhile to explore descriptive statistics of frozen cases to identify significances of various factors on dragging transition.

This section of the dissertation identifies three outcomes of transitions from authoritarian rule: consolidation, democracy setback and frozen transitions. These outcomes were tested in different statistical calculations as separate dependent variables, rather than three categories of a single variable. Because of the nature of polity shifts in transitioning countries in different given years, it seems almost impossible to construct a dependent variable with three categorical variations.
CHAPTER 6: DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY, CONSOLIDATION AND OTHER OUTCOMES

Chapter Summary

This chapter discusses descriptive analyses of the inquiry on various characteristics of transition to democracy and the outcomes of transitions which are divided into consolidation, democratic reversals, and frozen transitions. The first section of the chapter describes general characteristics of democratic transition from autocracy. The second section will analyze how the characteristics of transition to democracy are associated with democratic consolidation. The section also compares and contrasts consolidation cases with democratic reversal and frozen-transition cases to explain the affects of factionalism, regional factors, and economic development.

(6.1) Analysis of Transition

(6.1.1) Regional Perspectives and Types of Former Regime

This sub-section of the chapter discusses various characteristics of democratic transition before moving to the analysis of democratic consolidation. Geographically, Africa turned out to be the continent with the most frequent transitions to democracy in the last five decades. Overall, 28 African countries attempted 38 democratic transitions. South America, with 29 transition cases, followed Africa as the second most-frequently transitioning region although Europe was the second-highest region of transitioning
countries. Both Africa and South America were also the highest regions with multiple transition cases. In comparison with Europe, democratic transitions in Africa and South America were more likely to experience multiple transitions. The multiple transitions indicate frequent democratic reversals as well. In other words, multiple-transitioning countries are weak democracies.

If reverse democracies are taken into consideration, Africa is also the region with the largest number of revered transitions and reversed-democratic countries. Asia turns out to be the region with the second most frequent reverse-transitions because of Thailand, Pakistan and South Korea—in total these three countries represent 8 out of 13 reverse transitions. In South America, the total of 9 transitions reversed to autocracy. Among 32 transitioning countries which regressed to autocracy—some experienced multiple reversals, 21 of them re-transitioned to democracy—9 countries from Africa, 4 from Asia, 1 from Middle East, 6 from South America, and 1 from Europe.

From the regional perspective, European transitions tend to more stable than other parts of the world. But most reversed transitions (66 percent of total reversed countries) retry democratization and remain democratic at least until 2007. Multiple attempts to transition characterize not only the extent of unstable democracy but also the acceptance that democracy is a legitimate form of governance despite the shortcomings. In those re-transitioning cases, the autocratic rulers were not capable to consolidate an alternative system to democracy.
### Table 8. Regional dimension of democratic transitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sub-Saharan Africa</th>
<th>Asia-Pacific</th>
<th>Middle East</th>
<th>South America</th>
<th>Caribbean</th>
<th>Central &amp; Eastern Europe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of transitions</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of transitioning countries</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of countries with multiple transitions</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Reverse Transitions</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Reverse democratic countries</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of re-transitioning countries</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regional factor is, however, less influential to democratic transition if the type of former regimes is taken into account to explain the structural conditions of multiple transitions. Transition from one-party state, especially in Europe, tends not to experience multiple transitions. Only three European countries formerly ruled by one-party state experienced democratic reversal after transition. In other words, a transition from a one-
party-state is less prone to democratic reversal. Even in Africa, among 18 countries which experienced reverse transitions, only Guinea-Bissau (1994), Comoros (1990) and Zambia (1996) were one-party states. If we considered the ideological dimension of a one-party state, those ruled by entrenched communist regimes were less likely to experience multiple transitions even in Africa, compared to other regime types.

Table 9. Regime types, number of transitions, and democratic reversals in world’s regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>One party</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Military Civilian</th>
<th>Monarchy</th>
<th>Colonial</th>
<th>Limited Multiparty</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

T: transitions  
R: Reverse transitions

The transition from the military regimes reversed to autocracy most frequently than any other type of regimes. Among 48 cases of multiple transitions in 20 countries, 30 cases (63 percent) were formerly ruled by the military or military-led civilian governments whereas only 6 cases of multiple transitions were previously governed by one-party states. Transitions from limited multi-party regime were the least likely to regress to autocracy.
Although this descriptive statistic is not powerful enough to make a causal connection between the democratic reversal and the regime type, the nature of military regimes appears to be related to the frequency of transitions. Other studies showed that military regimes were usually less durable than one-party states if the number of years of regime survival was compared to other types of autocratic regimes (Geddes 1999, 133). In other words, military regimes were more likely to transcend to democracy than one-party states. Not only is a military-ruled country susceptible to transition to democracy but also the country is vulnerable to another military-takeover or democratic reversal. This finding on the military regime is in agreement with Huntington’s thesis that “where military governments have given up power more or less voluntarily, those militaries will continue to have substantial influence in their society after their withdrawal from power” (Huntington 1996, 9).

(6.1.2) Not Really “the End of the History”

For some scholars, the end of the Cold War marks the era of worldwide democratization after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Fukuyama (1989, 4) euphorically postulated that human races were close to “the end point of man’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.” His thesis appeared to be supported by an increasing number of transitions to democracy at the downfall of communist ideology. If the last five decades were divided into two eras between before and after the end of the Cold War at 1991, 61 transitions to democracy were attempted in the post Cold War era, compared to 44 transitions before the collapse of the USSR. Some scholars argued that the Cold
War ended in late 1989 at the collapse of the Soviet empire in East Europe (Mueller 2002). If the era was divided at 1990, the number of transitions that occurred in the post Cold War period increased to 70 cases, almost a 56 percent increase from the Cold War period.

Figure 1. The Trends of democracy, non-democracy, transition and reverse democracies

However, Fukuyama’s end-of-history thesis becomes weaker if the number of reverse transitions is compared between two periods. Indeed, more democratic transitions reversed political direction to non-democracy after the end of the Cold War than during the period. Twenty-four transition cases from 22 countries regressed to non-democracy after the end of the Cold War while only 20 cases from sixteen countries had reversed to autocracy during the Cold War period. Although the collapse of the Soviet Union sprung
the outbreak of democratic transitions, the ideological defeat of communism had little
effect to deter the reverse wave of democratization. Although liberal democracy might
have claimed victory in ideological contention, the success of democratization required
more than ideological underpinning. Indeed, only three former communist countries,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus regressed to autocracy after the Cold War. While the
ideological defeat of communism might have influenced the transitions in post-
communist countries, the collapse of the USSR made little impact on the transition in
non-communist countries. The victory of liberal democracy on the ideological front failed
to prevent transitioning countries formerly ruled by non-communist regimes from
backsliding to autocracy. If an ideology was not a factor of influence on the success of
democratization, there must be other factors which were more critically shaping the
outcomes of democratic transitions. In the subsequent chapter, this study will analyze
various other factors and their influence on the success of democratization by using
inferential statistical methods.

Table 10. Transition and Reverse Cases During and After the Cold War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1991 as the end of the Cold War</th>
<th>1990 as the end of the Cold War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prior to 1991</td>
<td>1991 and Beyond</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Transition</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Transitioning</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Reverse Cases</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cases</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Reverse Cases</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Despite the increase of reversed democracies in the post Cold War period, the rate of democratic regression slows down after year 2000. Only 7 transitions reversed to non-democracy after 2000, compared to 17 cases between 1990 and 1999. Among the 17 cases that reversed to autocracy right after the Cold War, 12 of them returned to democratic transition in 9 countries in less than ten years. The quick return of democracy in the post Cold War period may demonstrate the fact that the growing numbers of states have embraced democracy as a legitimate form of governance. But democracy experiments were occasionally followed by undesired political effects which stirred up instabilities and threatened the integrity of states. In some cases, dominant political institutions, such as the military, stepped in to minimize affects of instability and to preserve the unity of the state, such as the military intervention in Thailand in 2006 when civilian political rivals placed the country under siege. In other cases, seething factionalism impelled a dominant party, which usually held executive authority, to consolidate power by disproportionally limiting political rights and civil liberty to subdue political rivals; for instance, the takeover of Cambodian People’s Party’s (CPP) Hun Sen in 1997.

Nevertheless, the military appeared to be reluctant to grab political power after the post Cold War period. According to the Coup Dataset provided by the Center for Systemic Peace, there were only 33 successful coups worldwide in 26 countries after the end of the Cold War, compared to 86 successful coups in 46 countries within twenty years before the end of the Cold War. Among the transition countries, 23 successful
coup leaders were quickly subdued in a short period or because the military returned to
democracy in a short time, sometimes even within a year. In such cases, a military coup
failed to change a polity of a state in a given year because the year-end polity remained
intact. Therefore, some successful military coups did not make a change in polity coding
in transitioning countries. Nine transitioning countries where the military launched
successful coups were redirected to another phase of democratic transition in the 1990s
and 2000s. Military coup was the major immediate cause of democratic regression in the
post Cold War era. In all coup events, either democratic or autocratic polity followed a
successful coup after the end of the Cold War, except in Sierra Leone where a successful
coup was followed by anarchy or all-out-civil war which destroyed democratic polity.

The characteristics of the military coup suggested that the military was still an active
stakeholder in the post Cold War era, but the military’s intervention in politics was less
likely motivated by its indulgence to monopolize state power, given the fact that most
military coups were quick to transform to democracy in a short-period.

(6.1.3) Liberalization and Transition to Democracy

Another perspective to scrutinize democratic transition is the relationship between
the characteristics of liberalization and regime types. This study differentiates three types
of liberalization as described in Chapter 3, the methodology section: (1) liberalization of
political competition, (2) executive guided liberalization, and (3) tolerance of political
mobilization. By no means does this study assume that all types of liberalization are a deliberate act of former regimes to foster democratic transition. This research approaches liberalization as an extent of civil and political space allowing opposition groups to mobilize to pursue their interests. Some liberalization attempts are the result of safety-valve measures which initially intend to defuse dissent in a seething environment. Some attempts aim to save old systems facing substantive pressures from the general population.

The first type of liberalization was observed when autocratic regimes formally allowed opposition groups to mobilize limited political actions. Under such form of liberalization, dissident groups might be reinstated to the “legal fold,” or restrictions on freedom of association might be lifted. Opposition groups were legally allowed to exist but were subject to restrictions which prohibited them from taking state power. Such type of liberalization was common in limited-multiparty systems where a dominant party monopolized governing power but allowed other parties to legally exist under restrictions. Limited multiparty states were not structurally closed in the arena of political competition, but the oppositions faced informal or legal restrictions to effectively mobilize political actions. For example, the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) was a dominant party in Mexico with the help of frequent electoral fraud since 1929 until it was weakened in relatively free and fair elections in 1994. However, the leftist coalition National Democratic Front (NDF) was allowed to exist as a legal political party albeit subject to restrictions in the political arena which favored the PRI undemocratically. The NDF was even allowed to participate in the 1988 election.
Another type of liberalization was initiated by former regimes which established procedures or set a certain timeframe to transfer power or transform the system to more liberal or democratic regime. In most cases, executive-guided transition was accompanied by a period of tolerance to political activities although they might be restricted under existing regulations. Executive-guided transition was the most common type of structurally-oriented liberalization by which former regimes facilitated a democratic transition.

Unlike the first type of structurally oriented liberalization, the third kind, the liberalization of political activities, characterized the conflict dynamic between ruling regimes and oppositions. The liberalization of political action manifested the degree of the regime’s tolerance towards political mobilization of opposition groups. In this scenario, an autocratic regime might be hesitant to crackdown the opposition forcefully. Or the quickly rising momentum of the opposition movement paralyzed the regime’s capability to decisively subdue the dissidents. In the half of the cases which experienced this type of relaxation, liberalization by expanding political activities was the result of liberalization in political structures in the first and the second type.

The pattern of liberalization demonstrated that the overwhelming majority of political transitions were preceded by some forms of liberalization. Eighty-one cases in 67 countries (78 percent of total transitioning states) experienced at least one type of liberalization. Forty-five cases in 38 countries went through either liberalization of restrictive competition or executive-guided liberalization. In other words, 39 percent of all cases, 44 percent of all transitioning countries, experienced at least three years of a
structurally liberalized period prior to democratic transition to democracy. Thirty-six cases in 35 countries, 40 percent of the total transitioning countries, came across at least one year of increasing political activities either tolerated or unwillingly permitted by the former regimes although the system might be structurally closed to liberalize competition or executive-guided transition.

The data shows the significant role of liberalization in the process of transition to democracy. Countries where political mobilization met a determined and capable crackdown by autocratic regimes were less likely to transcend to democracy. Structurally liberalized initiatives endorsed by autocratic regimes were critical to accelerate political actions organized by the dissidents. The opposition movement in turn convinced the ruling regime that transition was inevitable. In every case where former regimes liberalized political competition and guided a political process for change, oppositions enjoyed a period of political activities the regimes might tolerate. This descriptive analysis demonstrates that the behavior of former regimes in response to the dissidents’ mobilization is critical to a transition to democracy from autocracy.

This analysis contests against the conventional wisdom that the major change agent in democratic transition is the opposition groups rather than former regimes. This study argues that both regimes and oppositions played crucial roles in shaping political atmosphere conductive enough to foster transition to democracy. How regimes response to the oppositions’ demand for democratic change is critical even in cases where regimes refuses to lift structural restrictions. There were 70 cases, 60 percent in total, where former regimes did not initiate any structure alterations to liberalize political participation.
or guide a transitional process. Even among those 70 cases, 36 of them experienced at least one year of political mobilizations which were not overwhelmingly coerced by former regimes.

However, the relationship between regime type and characteristic of liberalization was not distinctive, except in the first type, the area of restrictive competition. One-party states were not inclined to structurally open up political space for dissidents to contest executive power, compared to military regimes or limited-multiparty states, because political structure of the one-party state was the major obstacle to allow oppositions to openly contest the ruling regimes in pursuit of decision-making power of the state. Both executive-guided liberalization and tolerance of political activities were observed in one-party, military-ruled, military-civilian, and limited-multiparty states quite symmetrically.

Table 11. Characteristics of Liberalization and Types of Former Regime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Former Regime Types</th>
<th>(1) Liberalization under Restrictive Competition</th>
<th>(2) Executive Guided Liberalization</th>
<th>(3) Liberalization by Tolerating Political Activities</th>
<th>1 &amp; 2 only</th>
<th>2 &amp; 3 only</th>
<th>1&amp; 3 only</th>
<th>All Three Forms of Liberalization</th>
<th>None</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Any Type 1</strong></td>
<td><strong>Only Type 1</strong></td>
<td><strong>Any Type 2</strong></td>
<td><strong>Only Type 2</strong></td>
<td><strong>Any Type 3</strong></td>
<td><strong>Only Type 3</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One-party</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military-civilian</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial occupation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Multi-Party</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(6.1.4) Revolution vs. Transformation

Is democratization a revolution of political change? A conventional wisdom of “democratic revolution” was modeled upon French and American revolutions where former rulers were deposed by mass uprising or armed struggle to reclaim a democratic polity as the result of revolutionary movements. The revolutionary perspective of democratization is reinforced by political rhetoric and sensationalized images of mass uprising in the Philippines, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and other relatively non-violent mobilizations organized by opposition groups seeking a transition to democracy from autocracy.

In order to test this revolutionary thesis, this study structures a variable which identifies a democratic transition where leaders of former regimes or re-labeled ruling institutions regain power right after a country’s transition to democracy. Thirty-one out of 115 transitions, 27 percent of total cases, restored former regimes or leaders of former ruling institutions to power immediately after a democratic transition. Power recuperation of former decision-makers in nearly one-third of democratic transition effectively invalidated a claim that democratization was a revolutionary process. This data only considered cases where leaders of formerly ruling institutions regained dominant position in formal structural of governing system, such as executive positions and parliamentary ascendancy. The number of such cases could increase if we considered informal political
influence of former power holders in cases where the military was a powerful political institution, such as Turkey, Thailand, or Indonesia.

The data showed that one-party states, especially in Europe, were the most likely to result in power recuperation of a former regime in transition, compared to the other types. In the ANOVA statistical analysis, one-party states were the most likely to restore former regimes to power after a transition, compared to other types of regime (P value=0.000). The countries ruled by limited multiparty regimes were the second most likely transitions that returned power to former regimes. Since the data were compared among all transition cases, which represented the whole population of the study, I would generally conclude that transitions from one-party states were more likely to result in restoration of former regime to power, compared to other regime types. Among 50 cases where the military was a part of ruling elites, only 7 cases resulted in power recuperation of former regimes whereas 13 cases in 28 transitions from one-party states restored leaders from former regimes to power. Similarly, 8 out of 28 transitions from limited-multiparty states resulted in the restoration of former elites to power.

This particular aspect of the data might appear to contradict the previous analysis on military regimes which tended to re-intervene in politics after transition. But a deeper analysis reveals that the military’s intervention in politics after democratic transition is less visible in the formal political structure, such as in executive position or parliamentary body. The military in most cases stays outside the formal political structure but continues to influence crucial decision-making process in a transitioning country, especially in
security sectors. Only 10 out of 50 transitions from military-ruled countries were able to strengthen democratic structure within one-election cycle. But if informal influence of the military in the country’s political affairs is considered, Greece is the only country which effectively demilitarizes the political system right after the transition.

Compared to one-party states or limited-multiparty regimes which were structured as political parties, the military was not a political party by nature. In one-party states, especially in former communist countries, previous ruling institutions were relatively easily transformed to political parties to contest in the newly restructured political arena. In contrast, the military, which was hesitant to abandon its political ambition, was structurally incapable of transforming itself to a political party. Instead, in rare cases, leaders from the military might form or adopt a political party to enhance the military’s institutional interest during a transition to democracy; for instance, Gen. Park Chung Hee’s Democratic Republican Party (DRP) regained power in 1963 after a democratic transition in South Korea. Nevertheless, the military was more inclined to manipulate constitutions or executive-decision-making processes to insert its influence in national politics rather than creating a political party to contest for power.

Though the military’s structural constraint limited its visible role in formal polity structure after a country had gone through a transition, the military continued to play active roles in politics. This phenomenon was frequently observed in Latin America and Africa. These regions produced the highest rate of multiple transitions under military rule, but none of the military-ruled countries in these two regions, except Burkina Faso in
1978, installed former military rulers to power after the transition because the military stayed out of formal executive structure after the transition. Instead, the military exerted its influence from informal political channels. Although the role of the military was not overtly visible in polity, its perpetuated influence in politics remained strong. This residual influence clearly resurfaced when the military launched a coup that diverted a transitioning country towards non-democracy. If we consider informal residual influence of former ruling elites, especially the military, on a state’s political system even under a transition to democracy, the elements of former regimes remained powerful in at least more than half of transition cases.

The patterns of the influence of former regimes in democratic transition indicated that democratization was far from a revolutionary ouster of former power holders from the political arena. There were cases which characterized revolutionary aspects of democratic transitions where former regimes were totally removed from the political process in transition. But the mere existence of such cases was not sufficient to make a conclusion that the nature of democratization was the complete elimination of old regimes from power.

Instead, transition to democracy restructured conflict dynamics and reshaped the way political actors interacted although democratic norms and exercise were yet to be widely embraced by stakeholders. Old conflicts were transformed into new conflicts while new political actors pursued incompatible interests under newly emerging political and social spaces.
If democratic transition was characterized as a process of transformation than revolution, did the residual influence of former regimes undermine democracy development? The analysis of consolidated democracy revealed that the residual power of former regime was not necessarily a hindrance to democratic consolidation. Four countries out of fifteen consolidated democracies restored leaders of former regimes to power after transition. The transitions in Spain, Lithuania, Mongolia, and Taiwan reinstated the leaders of previous ruling institutions to power even after the countries transcended to democracy. The data suggested that the residual predominance of former regimes did not obstruct a country’s path to consolidation. Post-transitional conflicts between old and new political forces were the sine qua non of democratic transition. The existence of conflict per se did not contravene the development of democracy. But how they interacted and the consequences of their interaction shaped the path from transition to the consolidation of democracy.

Table 12. Resurgence of former regime to power after transition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Former Regime Types</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Asia-Pacific</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Middle East</th>
<th>America</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One-party</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military-Civilian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Multi-party</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(6.2) Analysis of Consolidation

123
This study identified fifteen consolidated democracies among transitioning countries from 1955 to 2007. This sub-section discusses the various characteristics of consolidated democratic transitions. At first, this analysis explores the aspect of time factor in consolidation. When did a consolidation take place? Is the age of democracy associated with democratic consolidation?

In event history studies, the age of democracy in a country strengthens the endurance of democracy and prevent it from backsliding to autocracy (Ulfelder and Lustik 2005 & 2007). The risk of regressing to autocracy subsides after a country has preserved democratic polity for fifteen consecutive years (Ibid). From a theoretical standpoint, culturalist perspectives of political change might explain the relationship between the maturity of democratic polity and consolidation. From a political culture framework, Harry Eckstein (1988, 792) explained that political actors learned lessons from an early period and generated productive actions creating “predictability in interaction” in a later time as democracy matured. In a hybrid framework of culture and development, economic prosperity and improving quality of life satisfied the general public who embraced rewarding experiences and rejected radical change over time (Inglehart 1990, 45). These schools of thought discern democratic consolidation as a gradual process which is associated with the maturity of democracy.

But in this study, the data shows that the age of democracy is not directly associated with democratic consolidation. As described in the chapter five, only four cases of consolidation took place ten years after democratic transition occurred. The rest of the ten countries consolidated democracy within the first five years of transition which
was equivalent to one election cycle in most electoral systems. Actually, six countries manifested the characteristics of consolidation since the first year of transition. On average, consolidation occurred 5.4 years after a country had transcended to democracy if the year of consolidation was counted in countries where their polity met consolidated criteria even in the first year of transition.

Although the time factor made logical and theoretical sense, this empirical study demonstrates that most consolidation occurs at the early stage of democratic transition. Ten out of 15 countries consolidated democracy in less than five years after transition. Empirically, democratic maturity is less powerful to explain the onset of consolidation in most cases. A country’s polity may consolidate democracy even when democratic norms and institutions are not fully matured. Political culture, similar to other structural variables, develops over time. Structural elements of democracy may strengthen their foothold when democracy ages. However, structural maturity does not explain sufficiently in cases where democracy is consolidated in the early years of transition. Consequently, if democratic maturity is not a critical factor, what other underlying issues influence democratic consolidation? The next chapter on inferential statistical analyses will answer how other structural and dynamic factors shaped a country’s path to consolidation.

Although this study observed early consolidation in most cases, democracy might consolidate over time as well. Chile, Slovak Republic, Poland, and Venezuela all consolidated democracy ten years after they had transcended to democratic transition.
The political culture framework might explain that the time factor and democratic maturity contributed to consolidation in these cases. Democratic structures matured over time and strengthened democratic norms and exercises in society leading the country to consolidate democracy. At the same time, it was worthy to note that political culture was a dynamic process which interacted with political structure. Culture influenced structure but unnecessarily determined the shape of structure (Almond 1990). Political structure in turn shaped the dynamic of political culture as well. The “civic culture” might change dramatically in response to immediate political events and regime performance (Ibid, 144). After years of consolidated democracy, deconsolidation in Venezuela and the Czech Republic might suggest that political culture was fragile and susceptible to shift to a negative direction in the event of political and economic crises. Although the maturity of democratic polity might prevent a country from backsliding to autocracy, the endurance of democracy per se unnecessarily contributed to the consolidation of democracy. A country might become frozen in transition even if democracy was endured for a substantial period without regressing to autocracy.

(6.2.1) Prior Regime Types, Regions and Consolidation

The first part of this chapter analyzed the regional dimension of transition to democracy. The analysis revealed that Europe was the region with the least number of multiple transitions—only one multiple transition out of 24 transitioning countries. Similarly, the regional factor appeared to be connected to democracy consolidation as well.
More transitions in Europe became consolidated democracies compared to all other regions of the world. Nine out of twenty-four transitioning countries became consolidated democracies in Europe followed by Latin America, where four countries out of nineteen accomplished consolidation. Two out of ten countries in Asia joined the list of consolidation. Although Africa experienced the largest number of transitions to democracy in twenty-eight countries, none of them was able to consolidate in the last sixty years.

Table 13. Prior Regime Types, Regions and Consolidation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Former Regime Type</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>South America</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Total Consolidated Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One-party</td>
<td>2 (2)*</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>7 (20)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>0 (5)</td>
<td>1 (15)</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military-Civilian</td>
<td>0 (9)</td>
<td>3 (6)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Multi-party</td>
<td>0 (4)</td>
<td>0 (7)</td>
<td>1 (4)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2 (20)</td>
<td>4 (28)</td>
<td>9 (25)</td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The number in parentheses indicates the total transitions.

Considering the characteristics of former regimes, a one-party state appeared to be the most conducive to consolidation among transition cases. Nine out of 28 transitions consolidated democracy from one-party states. Among 50 cases from formerly military-ruled courtiers, 5 of them became consolidated democracies. Only 1 out of 28 transitions previously ruled by limited multiple-party regimes consolidated democracy. Since the highest number of one-party states was situated in Europe, it was hard to make a
distinction between the regional effect and characteristics of one-party states on consolidation.

However, the characteristics of limited multiparty systems appeared to hinder the potential to democratic consolidation in transitioning countries. Out of 26 transitioning countries formerly ruled by limited multiparty regimes, only Portugal became a consolidated democracy from Europe. Even if the regional factor was considered, the characteristic of limited multiparty was distinctively associated with near absence of consolidation. Although, compared to other regions, Africa hosted the largest number of transitions in 11 countries formerly ruled by limited multiparty regimes; the other parts of the world included 15 countries transitioning from limited multiparty states. Besides Africa, neither Asia nor Latin America produced consolidation from limited multiparty states. Out of 28 transitions from limited multiparty states, only one became a consolidated democracy.

Compared to the countries formerly ruled by limited multiparty states, transitions from military regimes appeared to have a better chance to consolidate democracy. Out of thirty-seven countries formerly ruled by the military or military-dominated civilian governments, five of them became consolidated democracies. In other words, only 4 percent of transitioning countries from limited multiparty accomplished consolidated democracy, whereas 14 percent of countries formerly ruled by the military accomplished consolidation. Among 24 frozen transitions, 8 of them are the countries previously ruled
by limited-multi-party states—the highest number of frozen transitions compared to the other types of regimes.

(6.2.2) Factionalism and Consolidation

In the polity study, the term ‘factionalism’ carried a specific meaning to reflect a particular standing of polity structure of a state. Factionalism in everyday language might mean the mere existence of groups competing for power to advance their interests. Polity interpreted factionalism as a form of contentious political competition in which rival groups were subject to restrictions in the political arena. Unlike an institutionalized autocratic system, a factionalized political structure allowed opposition groups to exist. Factionalized political groups were organized upon ethnicity, race, strict ideology, religion, class, or personality cult. The distinction between factionalism and interest groups under a democratic system was the degree of tolerance to opposition and the extent of structurally confined restrictions against rivals.

A factionalized system might be nominally characterized as a democracy for allowing opposition groups to participate in relatively free, albeit unfair, elections. Factionalized polity might allow oppositions to mobilize political actions, despite limitations, to contest power. But democracy was not the only game in town among political stakeholders; instead, factionalized groups used a nominal democratic system as an instrument to exclude dissidents from political arena. Factions were not reluctant to violate democratic norms and procedures to secure political power, especially associated with executive positions. In a matured democracy, power was legitimimized by the exercise
of democratic procedures whereas in a factionalized polity, democratic procedures were
subject to be manipulated as an instrument to legitimize power. Venezuela under
President Hugo Chavez is the epitome of a factionalized nominal democracy.

The Polity coding identified factionalism as a sub-component variable of political
competition concept. Coded at the score of three, Competitiveness of Participation
(PARCOMP), characterized a factionalized political system within a state (Marshall and
Jaggers 2009, 75-77). The polity coding captures the extent of factionalism at two levels
of political competition, namely “concept” six and seven. Concept six explains that
factionalized competition is more restricted, and political competition is less open than
concept seven. In other words, the first type of factionalism is usually observed in semi-
autocratic systems, and the second type, in semi-democratic systems. It is important to
note that the polity only detects factionalism which is structurally characterized in
“conventional politics” (Marshall 2008, 3). Polity excludes factionalism which occurs
outside the political system, for example, outlawed groups operating underground or
insurgency. For this reason, polity usually does not capture factionalism under
institutionalized autocracy, such as the former Yugoslavia, because a strict one-party
state disallows opposition groups to exist legally to contest for power. Therefore,
factionalism in a repressive autocratic system is not visible in polity data.

Factionalism may exist in every society regardless of political system, even in a
matured democracy. But the degrees of factionalism are varied. The critical threshold this
study concerned is an extent at which factionalism undermined the quality of democracy
within a state. Factionalism is one of the major drivers of political instability as well
(Goldstone & et al. 2005, 19). Factionalism in unstable democracy is inclined not only to
downgrade the essence of democracy but also to reverse the progress to autocracy. This
study ascertains various characteristics of factionalism in new democracies especially
during the first election cycle.

The polity data describes factionalism as a structural variable that characterized a
political system. But the interaction among political actors manifests dynamic
characteristics of factionalism. Factionalism-struck polity usually exhibits one or more
signs of conflict behaviors resulted by factional mobilization. Although such mobilization
may signal an impending onset of political violence, factional dynamics are largely
associated with civil disorders. They are more or less non-violent in physical form of
mobilizations. Factional mobilization expresses the degree of conflict dynamics that
could potentially alter the existing political system or hinder a democratic transition from
consolidating democracy. The following are the characteristics of the factional dynamics
observed in transitioning countries suffered from factionalism.

- System-freezing mass mobilizations

When underdog political rivals felt the existing system was no longer serving their
interests, the opposition might attempt to interrupt or shut down the operations of the
systemic apparatus. Political groups might mobilize their supporters to take the streets to
disrupt daily activities of properly functioning states by holding mass rallies and marches
to shut down the governing system. Factionalized mobilizations were different from other
non-violent protests in a democratic system in an extent that factionalism-driven protest
actually implemented mobilizations to interrupt the system’s function in a massive scale.
System-freezing mobilizations intended to cripple the government’s function to discredit the ability of power holders in office. For example, the anti-government People Alliance for Democracy (PAD) used predominantly non-violent tactics in Thailand to shut down the government’s function by seizing official buildings and critical infrastructures in 2006.

- System-freezing electoral mobilizations

Similar to the first type of mobilization, this activity was a parliamentary revolt carried out by elected representatives from the opposition in the parliament attempted to suspend the decision-making function of the institution beyond the constitutional limitations. Some important individuals or allied groups in the government might implement such mobilizations to disrupt effective functioning of a government. Elected representatives might use existing constitutional provisions to depose the government or undermine the ability of governing majority in the parliament. The electoral conflict was so contentious that rivals were inclined to purse a zero-sum outcome rather than a negotiated settlement. In return, the government in power might also exercise extreme measures provisioned by the constitution to restrict the ability of the opposition to pressure the ruling body. Some examples of such factional dynamics were the opposition’s attempt to organize a non-confidence vote, the dissolution of the parliament by the executives, suspension of the parliament, and the termination of the cabinet. Factional contention might also choke up the parliament until it was unable to make any new laws or progress existing procedures. For instance, the Sudanese coalition
government which came to power after the 1965 election, collapsed after the right wing Umma Party attempted to introduce a non-confidence vote to off-balance Mahgoub’s coalition government in mid 1969.

Electoral Deadlock

When political factions failed to acknowledge an electoral outcome in executive elections, election-related disputes under factionalized democracy might result in an electoral deadlock. This political impasse signified system incompetence to regulate a growing intensity of factionalism in the immature democracy. Factionalized electoral deadlock ensued when an election result failed to decide a winner after the existing legal processes were exhausted, or one or more major parties refused to concede in an election. A matured democracy might face a similar situation; for instance, the US presidential election between Al Gore and Bush in 2000. But, the intervention of the Supreme Court and Al Gore’s concession dissipated any potential deadlock. In another instance, an indecisive election result between Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) and All People’s Congress (APC) in March 1967 constituted an electoral deadlock that was followed by two consecutive military coups. Another form of electoral deadlock was the boycott of the election by major opposition parties. Widespread allegation of irregularities which might contribute to oppositions’ rejection of the election result also signified electoral factionalism. Electoral boycott characterized an impending post-election factional confrontation because election boycotts automatically sidelined the opposition from power. But opposition groups were charged with enmity for having defeated unfairly and determined to redeem their loss after the election was over. On the other hand, the
victorious party in boycotted elections might deploy suppressive measures in response to
the mobilizations of opposition groups.

- Elite Capitulation and Fragmentation

Resignations of senior leaders, such as cabinet members and president, manifested the
intensity of factional confrontation within a political system if the abdication of senior
leaders resulted in conflict escalation. Although resignation of leaders might pacify
discontented groups, such abdication might also encourage the opposition to invigorate
their mobilizations to advance political interest. In another form, factional competition
within a government might result in the removal of senior opposition leaders from
cabinet positions. For example, the Malaita Eagles Force (MEF), the militant outfit of
Melanesian ethnic group in Solomon Island, collaborated with disgruntled police officers
and forced Prime Minister Ulufa'alu to resign in June 2000.

System-interrupting Factional Mobilization

As disadvantaged rival groups no longer held confidence in a current political system
to pursue their interest, they might seek extreme measures to subvert existing political
leadership as they felt that their aspiration was no longer satisfied by existing
conventional procedures. Unsuccessful military coups, such as the attempted military
takeover in Venezuela in 2002, and plotted coups, such as the one in Fiji in 2007,
characterized system-interrupting mobilizations in factionalized young democracies. If a
coup was successful, a country’s polity would change to a form of autocracy resulting in
a democratic reversal. Attempted or successful assassinations of government executives
or prominent leaders also signified factionalism in a society if the plot was orchestrated by political or identity-based groups.

- **System-realigning Factional Mobilization**

  Although some factionalized democratic transitions were interrupted by successful military coups, the military might return power to civilian rule after a short period of interventions, such as those events in Thailand and Turkey. In most cases, the military interventions were triggered by civil disorders stemming from factional mobilizations. In such circumstance, the military intervened in politics in an attempt to realign the existing political system but did not intend to change overall polity. System-realigning mobilizations indicated that significantly powerful institutions within a system defused political factionalism unconventionally.

- **System-weakening Factional Mobilization**

  System-weakening factional mobilizations characterized communal conflicts among various identity-based factions, such as ethnic and religious groups. Violence might be a part of mobilizations but fell short of insurgency or terrorism. Unlike system-freezing mobilizations, the mobilization in this category did not directly target the state or attempt to bring down the mechanism of the system. Some studies, however, argued that protests in fragile democracy strengthen civil society and did not necessarily threaten emerging democracy (Norris 2006, 14). But factionalized protests went beyond a form of lawful protest under democracy. Large ethnic and communal riots organized by identity-groups, such as those episodes in Solomon Islands between Melanesian and indigenous Isatabu Islanders, highlighted the extent of system-weakening factional mobilization
which was usually widespread in major populated areas rather than isolated small-scale incidents.

Since most consolidating countries met consolidation criteria in the first year of transition, its polity did not reflect the extent of factionalism that could threaten democracy development because polity’s consolidating criteria automatically excluded factionalism in a political system. In other words, democratic consolidation characterized a system without factionalism. Six countries consolidated democracy during the first year of transition from autocracy. The other nine countries took at least one election cycle before they reached a point of consolidation.

Even in the nine countries which did not consolidate in the first year of transition, only the Slovak Republic experienced factionalism during the first five years of transition. The rest of the countries did not experience factionalism at all from a year of transition to a year of consolidation. Czech Republic and Venezuela suffered from factionalism only after they deconsolidated democracy after a substantial period of consolidation. Even these two countries lacked factionalism during the first election cycle immediately after transition. Overall, only one country out of fifteen consolidated cases experienced factionalism.

The effect of factionalism was more distinctive in cases which regressed to non-democracy after transition. Forty out of 44 reversed-transition cases experienced factionalism in a year prior to the onset of reverse democracy. Even in the other 4 reverse cases (Turkey in 1990, Nepal in 2002, Thailand in 2006, Fiji in 2006), one or more types
of factional mobilizations were observed within five years prior to the onset of
democratic reversal although the polity coding did not capture the cases in factional
criteria. This finding supported the previous research conducted by the Polity Instability
Task Force which postulated that factionalism was one of the potent drivers of instability
which included adverse regime change (Goldstone & et al. 2005).

Based on the taskforce’s model, Ulfelder (2006, 2) expanded his analysis on the
onset of factionalism in new democracies. Among 112 cases which excluded democratic
transitions from factional states, foreign occupation, or collapse of central state authority,
sixty-four cases (57.1 percent) experienced factionalism in the first year of democracy
(Ibid, 12). This study identified 70 cases of transition (60.9 percent) which were affected
by factionalism in the first year of transition to democracy. Forty-two out of 70
transitions (60 percent) which experienced factionalism during the first year of
democracy which reversed to non-democracy. Although not all factionalism contributed
to democratic reversal, factionalism was associated with the onset of reverse democracy
under transition in most cases. Similarly, 16 cases of frozen transition out of 24 (66
percent), were impinged by factionalism in the first year of democracy. The effect of
early factionalism in transition was the most obvious in democratic consolidation.
Lacking factionalism in early years of transition was a significant characteristic of
consolidated democracy.
(6.2.3) Economy and Transition

The linkage between democracy and economic development was a widely debated subject in the study of democratization. Most literature focused analysis on the impact of economic development on the prospect of democratization rather than the other way around (Lipset 1959 & 1960). Some scholars refined this version of development-driven democracy and argued that autocratic regimes with a high-level of economic development were less likely to transcend to democracy than those with moderate development (Huntington 1968 & 1991, Hannan and Caroll 1981, O’Donnell 1973, Ulfelder and Lustik 2005). But the level of economic development was closely associated
with the probability that democracy would survive in transitioning states (Przeworski and et al. 1996, 296).

On the other hand, does democratization promote economic growth? Some scholars argue that the effect of democratization on economic growth is inconclusive. The impact of democracy on economic development is statistically insignificant while political stability appears to influence positively on economic development (Mehanna 2006). This study has joined this debate to understand the influence of democratization on economic development. At first, this research was interested in short-term impact of democratization on economic growth in 115 transitions to democracy. To accomplish the task, this study compared average GDP growth rate of the last five years prior to transition and that of the next five years after transition. To compensate for the missing values in the data, the study imputed the missing values by applying the algorithm through the Amelia II program provided by King, Honaker, Joseph, and Scheve (2001). Both paired and unpaired t-tests were administered to identify the differences between two growth rates in pre and post transitional periods.

None of the t-test statistics showed any statistical significance to determine the difference between the two growth rates (P value=0.8611—highly insignificant). The following graphical presentation in Figure 3 showed similar variations of growth rate in both periods of transition to democracy. Although both periods suffered from economic decline, economic growth in most transition represented positive outlook in both pre and post transitional periods. Countries with very sharp fluctuated GDP growth were those
experiencing state failures or wide-spread warfare followed by a period of democratization.

Several more comparison tests were run in countries which experienced reverse democracy and those transitions which never regressed to autocracy. However, the average economic growth rate was not statistically significant in both reverse and non-reverse transitioning countries (P value=0.465), even in countries which consolidated democracy. For a period of five years—a relatively short term- this study concluded that democratization did not foster more economic growth. To understand the longer term

Figure 3. The Comparison of Average GDP Growth in Five Years Before and After Transition
impact of democratization, this project also compared the average GDP growth rate in ten years before and after the transitions.

Similar to the previous tests, the average growth rate in a 10-year-period was not different between pre and post transitional periods. In both the paired and unpaired t-test, the average GDP growth of ten years in post transitional period did not make any statistical difference from the rate in pre transition (P value=0.527). In a separate t-test in non-reverse countries, the difference between the average of two growth rates was not significant as well (P value= 0.557). The following is a graphical representation of the comparison between the average GDP growth rate between 10 years before and after transition. According to the result, on average, democratization did not necessarily foster economic growth even in ten-year time span regardless of the success and failure of democratic transition.
Figure 4. The Comparison of Average GDP Growth in Ten Years Before and After Transition

It was not surprising to observe the importance of democratization upon economic growth if we considered the economic characteristics of transitioning countries in the last sixty years. The economic character of transitioning countries was more similar to that of autocratic regimes than democratic countries. Although the total GDP of transitioning countries was higher than that of autocratic states, countries in transition were still far from approaching the economic characteristics of a matured democracy. The development gap between matured democracies and transitioning countries were still opening wide. In 2007, the total GDP of all democratic countries stood at US $ 47553.46 billion whereas the GDP of the countries that experienced democratic transition showed US $ 11761.01 billion. The GDP gap between the two was 35792.45 billion US $, the ratio of 4 to 1. In 1980, the GDP ratio between all democracy and the transitioning
countries stood out. In last thirty years, the GDP gap between democracy and transition barely made a difference.

To understand the variations of different types of transition, this study also compared the average GDP of consolidating countries, reverse democracies and frozen transitions. The average GDP of transitioning countries that had ever experienced democracy regression was the lowest compared to other transitioning states that never regressed to autocracy. It was not surprising to observe that consolidated transitions produced a better average GDP than overall transitioning countries and reverse democratic regimes. Generally, good economic performance was associated with democratic survival in transitioning countries.

Figure 5. Average GDP in transitioning countries, consolidated democracies, reverse democracies and frozen transitions
However, affluence might not be a significant factor contributing to the potential for democratic consolidation although economic prosperity might prevent a democratic country from backsliding to non-democracy. Among all countries that had experienced democratic transition, the average GDP of countries in frozen transition ($282.34 billion in 2007) surpassed that of consolidated democracies ($236.51 billion in 2007) whereas the average GDP of reverse transitions sat at the lowest ranking ($98.5 billion). Actually, the GDP of frozen transitions rose above average world’s GDP ($357.29 in 2007) in mid 2000s because of five major countries: Russia, Turkey, South Korea, Mexico, and Brazil. These countries outperformed consolidated democracies in the economic arena since the late 1980s, except Russia, and significantly in the early 2000s. Despite their long-standing affluence, these countries did not manifest consolidating characteristics of polity. At the same time, the exclusion of these five outliers countries would have transformed the graphical presentation of frozen democracies’ GDP to a line more closely resembled to average transitioning countries. In other words, without these outliers, frozen transitions were economically weak.
Three explanations might bestow an answer to the mismatch between consolidation and economic performance. First, economic performance may not be a good indicator of democratic consolidation although prosperity can prevent a country from regressing to autocracy. Second, the benchmarks of a model democracy in western standards may not be applicable to other democracies which have entrenched their democratic roots in different forms. Third, democratic consolidation might be a rare phenomenon that would have never come to most transitioning countries. Since the model standard of consolidation is not encompassing enough to explain the alternative forms of consolidation in most new democracies, this study will create the second variable of consolidation to explain less perfect forms of consolidated democracy. More details on the imperfect consolidation are discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 7: INFERENTIAL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

Chapter Summary

This chapter creates the second criteria of consolidation to explain less perfect form of consolidated democracy in new transitions. This study tests both consolidation criteria in a logit model in which the dependent variable is democratic consolidation. Infant mortality rate, civil liberty, the percent of discriminated population, and the regime types are the significant factors influencing a country’s potential to democratic consolidation.

(7.1) The robustness of Polity Coding and New Criteria of Consolidation

In Chapter 5, this dissertation outlined the detailed criteria of democratic consolidation and identified fifteen countries which consolidated democracy. Democratic consolidation was defined based on three criteria in polity: executive recruitment (EXREC=8), participation and competition (PARCOMP=5), and executive constraint (XCONST>=3). Another essential criterion of democratic consolidation is the endurance of democracy, even by minimal standards, without regressing to autocracy. This study applies the criteria on other matured democratic countries to ascertain that the measures actually produces “model democracy” by the western standard.
However, there might be two potential theoretical and practical problems as some
descriptive tests have identified, especially in the issues of economic development. First,
the western notion of a model democracy might not be the general standard of democratic
consolidation in other parts of the world. Other democracies, especially young
democratic countries, might have enrooted consolidation in different forms than matured
western democracies. Second, the robustness of polity coding might be an issue—the
polity score might not be discrete enough to differentiate between two end points, for
instance, PARCOMP 4 and 5. For the first issue, this study could not do much to
ameliorate the complicacy. But this research can effectively strengthen the robustness of
polity coding and its impact on the choice of dependent variables by creating another
consolidation variable that represents transition cases more broadly despite imperfection.

This project surveys the borderline categories in executive recruitment,
participation and competition, and executive constraint to assess the robustness of the
coding. The code 7 for executive recruitment (EXREC), which is one point below the
consolidation criteria at code 8, is characterized as “transitional or restricted elections”
(Marshall and Jaggers 2009, 58). The code 2 in executive constraint (XCONST) is
classified as “intermediate category 1” (Ibid., 65). Similarly, the code 4 of participation
and competition (PARCOMP), one point below the code 5 which is categorized as
“competitive” competition, was catalogued as “transitional” (Ibid, 80). All three
categories are situated next to the scales which express borderline characteristics. Hence,
it would be worthwhile to test these borderline categories in democratic consolidation.
Globally, no country had an executive-constraint (XCONST) score less than three if a country met PARCOMP greater than or equal to five (parcomp>=5) and EXREC greater than eight (exrec<8). It is safe to assume that a XCONST score of three and above is one of the sufficient indicators of consolidation. Similarly, once a country reached a PARCOMP score of five, it would not go lower than score 8 in EXREC, except in Uruguay and Taiwan. Even in these two countries, the total polity years of such incidents were only 8 out of 8,948 polity years worldwide since 1955. In plain language, once a country experiences widely accepted fair-and-regulated political competition, an executive-recruitment process would be highly competitive.

However, the major problem rested upon the degree of political participation and competition (PARCOMP). Even if a country has reached an EXREC score of 8, its PARCOMP score might be as low as 2. Eighty-three countries experienced the PARCOMP score of less than 5, despite the EXREC score of 8, in 1,200 out of 8,948 polity years worldwide since 1955. In other words, a country might have a highly competitive procedure of executive recruitment without a stable democratic political competition. Unstable political competition demonstrates that political actors have not embraced democratic means as the only game in town. The most troubling part of democratization turns out to be political competition rather than competitiveness of executive recruitment procedures. As discussed in the previous chapters, political competition was largely associated with conflict dynamics. A country might have consolidated structurally without being able to do so dynamically.
Figure 7. The nature of political competition while executive recruitment and executive constraint are consolidated from 1955 to 2007

As the figure above shows, a PARCOMP score of 5 has been the most prevalent form of democratic consolidation all over the world because the matured democracies have met the model criteria of consolidation decades ago prior to the consolidation of new democracies. The first criteria, which the figure represents in two bars in far left, are still applicable to matured democracy. But in new democracies, political participation may be less stable even if a country meets two criteria of executive recruitment and constraint. The PARCOMP score at 4 represents a transition from or to competitive participation. Considering the fluid nature of political competition, this study extended
the consolidation criterion to a PARCOMP score of 4, which characterizes a transition from factionalized political competition to broader competitive political participation.

The study constructs the second criteria of democratic consolidation as follows:

(1) Executive Recruitment (EXREC) equal to 8

(2) Participation and Competition (PARCOMP) equal to or greater than 4

(whereas it was 5 in the original criteria)

(3) Executive constraint (XCONST) equal to or greater than 3; and

(4) A country should not regress to autocracy after democratic transition. This factor was theoretically considered to remove the cases which regressed to autocracy after having met the second criteria of consolidation.

Apparently, some countries, such as Brazil, Argentina, and the Philippines, previously classified as frozen transitions, meet the new consolidation criteria. A total of 40 countries, including 13 frozen transitions, were identified as a consolidated democracy under the new criteria. Among them, 18 countries\textsuperscript{20} consolidated democracy at the very first year of transition to democracy. Unlike the first criteria of consolidation, the second set of criteria is not autocracy-proof. A country may backslide to autocracy even if it meets the criteria in executive recruitment, political competition and executive constraints. Five countries reversed to autocracy, and 10 of them de-consolidated after having consolidated under the second criteria. Therefore, the second criterion of consolidation is inherently imperfect. This study will test both sets of consolidation criteria as the dependent variables in order to strengthen the validity of coding robustness in the polity scheme.

\textsuperscript{20} Panama, Venezuela, Brazil, Spain, Portugal, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Greece, Lithuania, Mali, Senegal, Kenya, Mozambique, South Africa, Madagascar, Mongolia, and Solomon Islands
(7.2) Two Models of Inferential Statistical Analyses

This study is concerned with two aspects of democratic transition. First, this project is interested to explore how the transitional characteristics influence the potential for democratic consolidation in the future. Second, this dissertation looks into the variables which can change gradually over time impact on a country’s potential to consolidate democracy.

The dependent variable, democratic consolidation, is coded in a binary form; 1 being consolidated and 0 being non-consolidated. For instance, if a country consolidates democracy ten years after the transition and never backslid to autocracy, the country is coded 1 at the year of transition. Independent variables tested in this regular logit model reflect underlying conditions of a country by the time the transition took place rather than the year when a country consolidated democracy. The total of 115 observations represents all cases in this model. Two logit models test the first criteria of (model) consolidation and the second criteria of (imperfect) consolidation as two different sets of dependent variables. The table below is an example of the data arrangement in the logit model.

21 The log-likelihood of logit uses the following algorithm (King 1998, 101):
ln L (β | y) = ∑_{i=1}^{n} [ y_i ln[1+exp(-x_i β)] - (1-y_i) ln [1+exp (x_i β)] ]
The panel logit model for the random effects uses the following formula (Stata 2007, 215):
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Consolidation (2nd criteria)</th>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>X1 X2 X3 X4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>X1 X2 X3 X4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>X1 X2 X3 X4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>X1 X2 X3 X4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>X1 X2 X3 X4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>X1 X2 X3 X4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In quantitative fields of social science, many statistical models are constructed based on preconfigured hypotheses. The advantage of this approach allows a researcher to move closer to preexisting theories and limits the number of variables to test in a model. But the disadvantage is the possibility that the preconfigured model ignores other important explanatory variables that might augment the explanatory power of the model. For this reason, this study purposefully avoids pre-configuring a set of hypotheses to run the statistical models. At the same time, this project considers variables highlighted by existing theories and researches. A pilot study, which surveyed 25 random cases prior to the case-selection process, was a precursor to the variable selection procedure which was designed as a hybrid model between the “fishing-net approach” and the theory-driven hypothesis. The variables were selected based on three major categories: development, security, and political mobilization.

(7.3) Explanatory Variables

In Chapter 3, the research method detailed every variable coded by this study. These variables measures a variety of underlying characteristics of a transition by the time a country experiences new democracy. The coded variables in this study only demonstrated specific conditions closely associated with the transitional events. In
addition to them, this study also restructured other variables extracted from eight major
databases. Some of the variables are reduced by the application of factor analysis. The
total variables tested in the logit models included: transition by foreign intervention
(traninterven), transition by liberalization (tranliberal), liberalization under restricted
competition for three years (libcomp), liberalization under restricted competition for one
year (libcomp1), liberalization under executive-guided transition for three years
(libexguid), liberalization under executive-guided transition for one year (libexguid1),
liberalization by expanding political activities (libpolact), transition by replacement
(tranreplace), transition by concession (tranconces), power recuperation (regain),
oppositions’ mobilization (oppmob), behavior of transition (behavtran), types of former
regime (oldregime), external threat (exthreat), infant mortality rate, average five-year
civil-liberty score from the year of transition, total summed magnitudes of all civil
violence, the percent of population experiencing political and economic discrimination in
a state, foreign direct investment, Gross Domestic Product, Gross National Income, GDP
per capita, annual GDP growth, GDP per capita growth, number of phones, trade by
percentage of GDP, urban population, and the number of anti-government
demonstrations. However, not all variables are shown in the model presented in this
chapter. I have dropped some variables which can have high multicollinearity effect on
the model by running factor analyses.

The inevitable problem in the use of multiple datasets was the implication of
missing values. Most of the data extracted from other databases included variables with a
large number of missing values, especially the data produced by the World Bank’s
Development Indicators. However, most statistical programs, in this case the Stata, would drop observations to compensate missing values. “While the use of complete case methods that drop subjects missing any observations are commonly seen in practice, this approach has the disadvantage of being inefficient as well as potentially biased” (Horton, and Kleinman 2007, 79). “Listwise deletion,” a commonly used method in statistical packages, not only reduced the number of observations but also produced biased estimates and higher variance (Honaker and King 2010, 566). Since the total number of cases in the logit model is only 115, the missing data, especially in the observations prior to 1960, can distort the actual outcome of the model. To remedy the missing value problems, this study used the Amelia II software package written by Honaker and King to impute missing values in explanatory variables (King, Honaker, Joseph, and Scheve 2001). To avoid over imputation, this project only used imputed variables whose missing values were less than thirty percent of total observations in the model. All variables selected above did not exceed the missing-value threshold. Although all variables were tested for each model, the data reduction process eliminated some variables which were closely associated with the other major variables in the final models.

(7.4) The Logit Model with First Criteria of Consolidation (Model Consolidation)

The logit model tested both perfect and imperfect criteria of democratic consolidation as dependent variables. For each of them, multiple sub-models were tested to compare the effectiveness of each model. During the process of the model selection,
some variables which had large multicollinearity effects were dropped because high multicollinearity could distort coefficient estimates, especially in a small sample size (Gujarati 2003, 348)—in this case, the logit model which contained only 115 observations. This study also compared two most promising last models by using an ‘ado’ file, called SPost, written by Long and Freese (2005). Lrtest and fitstat commands (Long and Freese 2001, 110-121) were used to run a post-estimation test.

(7.4.1) The Logit Model with the First Criteria of Consolidation (“the Model Democracy”)

This model tested the first criteria of democratic consolidation in which fifteen transitions were consolidated out of 115 cases. I have run a series of factor analysis to reduce the number of development variables into four: GDP per capita, trade by the percentage of GDP, GDP per capita growth, and log of infant mortality rate. All variant explanatory variables are averaged to five years from the year of transition to analyze their effect within the first-election cycle; for example, the GDP per capita is calculated for five-year average, representing one-election cycle right after the transition takes place. Total four logit models are tested for both model and imperfect consolidations.

The model 1 tests the variables which demonstrate significant influence on consolidation in the descriptive statistics in the chapter 6. The model 2 throws in the largest number of control variables without triggering significant multicollinearity. The model 3 and 4 adjust the extent of control variables while maintaining the theoretical validity of the models—the models must be able explained conceptually. All four models are compared by using fitstat command which computed “BIC statistics” (Bayesian
information criteria) proposed by Raftery (1996) (Long and Freese 2001, 86). The BIC statistics “strongly support” the model 1 among four. However, considering the degree of control variables, the model 4 may be at best to explain the causes of model democratic consolidation.

To check the robustness of the model, this study juxtaposes the predicted values to the actual consolidation and non-consolidation cases. The model correctly predicts 9 out of 15 consolidation cases at above 0.75 percent of probability and 94 out of 100 non-consolidation cases at less than 0.25 percent probability. The appendix B describes the detailed table of the robustness and predicted cases.

According to the model 4, a transition from one-party state, an executive-guided transition, trade and the collapse of the former regimes are positively influencing the potential for model consolidation. High infant mortality rate, civil liberty infringement, and the percent of discriminated population during the first election cycle can undermine the potential for consolidation at the model standard.
Table 14. The Logit Model with the First Criteria of Consolidation (Model Democracy)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>mod1</th>
<th>mod2</th>
<th>mod3</th>
<th>mod4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transition from one-party state</td>
<td>2.392**</td>
<td>3.778*</td>
<td>3.403**</td>
<td>4.412**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.191)</td>
<td>(2.081)</td>
<td>(1.733)</td>
<td>(1.888)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive guided transition for 1 year</td>
<td>2.068*</td>
<td>2.110</td>
<td>2.303*</td>
<td>2.825*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.114)</td>
<td>(1.556)</td>
<td>(1.268)</td>
<td>(1.490)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition from military regime</td>
<td>-0.298</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.601)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lead 5-year-average infant mortality rate (log)</td>
<td>-1.817**</td>
<td>-3.293**</td>
<td>-2.557**</td>
<td>-2.662**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.837)</td>
<td>(1.408)</td>
<td>(1.212)</td>
<td>(1.175)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regime collapse</td>
<td>4.362*</td>
<td>3.092*</td>
<td>3.182*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.311)</td>
<td>(1.836)</td>
<td>(1.822)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fomer regime regains power</td>
<td>-2.588</td>
<td>-2.285</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.657)</td>
<td>(1.500)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe region</td>
<td>-0.788</td>
<td>-1.561</td>
<td>-1.024</td>
<td>-0.638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.350)</td>
<td>(1.781)</td>
<td>(1.763)</td>
<td>(1.665)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lead 5-year-average civil liberty score</td>
<td>-1.901***</td>
<td>-3.729**</td>
<td>-3.421***</td>
<td>-3.711***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.732)</td>
<td>(1.470)</td>
<td>(1.316)</td>
<td>(1.384)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lead 5-year-average trade by percent of gdp</td>
<td>0.0217</td>
<td>0.0208</td>
<td>0.0287*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0176)</td>
<td>(0.0156)</td>
<td>(0.0166)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foreign threat</td>
<td>-0.785</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.073)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lead 5-year-average magnitude of civil violence</td>
<td>-0.206</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.665)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lead 5-year-average number of protests</td>
<td>-0.546</td>
<td>-0.683</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.760)</td>
<td>(0.796)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lead 5-year-average discriminated population</td>
<td>-1.553*</td>
<td>-0.977</td>
<td>-1.372*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.902)</td>
<td>(0.663)</td>
<td>(0.771)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>oppositon's violence prior to transition</td>
<td>0.377</td>
<td>0.446</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.625)</td>
<td>(0.649)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>8.512***</td>
<td>17.06**</td>
<td>12.32**</td>
<td>12.14**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.198)</td>
<td>(7.007)</td>
<td>(5.119)</td>
<td>(4.737)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC used by Stata</td>
<td>69.283</td>
<td>92.019</td>
<td>80.684</td>
<td>78.712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>115</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(7.4.2) The Logit Model with the Second Criteria of (Imperfect) Consolidation

This model tests the criteria of imperfect consolidation which includes 48 cases out of 115 transitions to democracy. Similar to the first consolidation model, the model 5 tests the variables which stood out in the descriptive analysis. The model 6 adds up the largest number of control variables without causing serious multicollinearity although some variables may have mild correlation. The model 7 and 8 test the variables which can explain the causes of imperfect consolidation influenced by the variation in the explanatory variables within one election cycle. All models, from 5 to 8, are compared by using BIC statistics.

Although the model 5, the most simplistic version, turns out to be the most fitting, the model 8 appears to be the strongest conceptually because of the control variables in the model. The model 5, despite its stronger fit, predicts only one more case of consolidation and non-consolidation better than the model 8. According to this model, transition from all forms of military rule, infant mortality rate, percentage of discriminated population, foreign threats, and infringement of civil liberty hamper the potential to consolidate democracy although the model considers the regime collapse, revival of the former elites, trade and civil violence. Similar to the model which tests the model consolidation, this imperfect-consolidation model signifies the importance of the first election circle.

The model 8 predicts 28 out of 48 consolidation cases and 66 out of 67 non-consolidation cases correctly at more than 0.75 probability. At the probability lower than 0.25, the model correctly predicts 44 out of 48 consolidation cases and 47 out of 67 non-
consolidated cases. The detailed information and the robustness chart are presented in the appendix B.

Table 15. The Logit Model with the Second Criteria of (Imperfect) Consolidation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imperfect Consolidation as Dependent Variable</th>
<th>mod5</th>
<th>mod6</th>
<th>mod7</th>
<th>mod8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VARIABLES</td>
<td>Odd Ratio</td>
<td>Odd Ratio</td>
<td>Odd Ratio</td>
<td>Odd Ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition from military regime</td>
<td>-1.868**</td>
<td>-2.273**</td>
<td>-2.145***</td>
<td>-1.963**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.754)</td>
<td>(0.925)</td>
<td>(0.812)</td>
<td>(0.792)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition from one-party state</td>
<td>0.392</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.041)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lead 5-year-average gdp per capita</td>
<td>8.51e-06</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000232)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent behavior of transition</td>
<td>0.325</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.350)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lead 5-year-average gdp growth</td>
<td>-0.116</td>
<td>-0.112</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0831)</td>
<td>(0.0714)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime collapse</td>
<td>-0.358</td>
<td>-0.215</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.694)</td>
<td>(0.632)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former regime regains power</td>
<td>-0.711</td>
<td>-0.671</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.766)</td>
<td>(0.709)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lead 5-year-average infant mortality rate (log)</td>
<td>-1.848***</td>
<td>-2.329***</td>
<td>-1.974***</td>
<td>-1.554***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.634)</td>
<td>(0.871)</td>
<td>(0.692)</td>
<td>(0.509)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive guided transition for 1 year</td>
<td>0.273</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.695)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign threat</td>
<td>-1.240**</td>
<td>-1.526**</td>
<td>-1.129**</td>
<td>-1.341**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.538)</td>
<td>(0.712)</td>
<td>(0.553)</td>
<td>(0.583)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe region</td>
<td>-1.027</td>
<td>-2.368</td>
<td>-2.176</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.015)</td>
<td>(1.477)</td>
<td>(1.330)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lead 5-year-average civil liberty score</td>
<td>-1.603***</td>
<td>-1.864***</td>
<td>-1.894***</td>
<td>-1.645***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.411)</td>
<td>(0.500)</td>
<td>(0.469)</td>
<td>(0.439)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lead 5-year-average discriminated population</td>
<td>-0.493**</td>
<td>-0.560**</td>
<td>-0.541**</td>
<td>-0.571**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.240)</td>
<td>(0.268)</td>
<td>(0.259)</td>
<td>(0.250)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lead 5-year-average trade by percent of gdp</td>
<td>-0.0176**</td>
<td>-0.0189*</td>
<td>-0.0180*</td>
<td>-0.0137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00874)</td>
<td>(0.00108)</td>
<td>(0.00978)</td>
<td>(0.00882)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lead 5-year-average magnitude of civil violence</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td>0.296</td>
<td>0.322</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.318)</td>
<td>(0.296)</td>
<td>(0.283)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lead 5-year-average number of protests</td>
<td>-0.210</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.310)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC used by Stata</td>
<td>15.22***</td>
<td>18.32***</td>
<td>17.07***</td>
<td>13.89***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.500)</td>
<td>(4.903)</td>
<td>(4.042)</td>
<td>(2.939)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>123.173</td>
<td>160.052</td>
<td>128.78</td>
<td>131.236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>115</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(7.5) Interpreting and Synthesizing the Statistical Result

Both models tested in this study show significant statistical power to explain democratic consolidation. The first model explains how underlying factors during the first election cycle influences a country’s potential to consolidate at a model standard. The second model highlights the impact of the explanatory variables, which also reflect the variation during the first election cycle, on a country’s potential to consolidate even imperfectly. Despite the differences between the classification of the model and imperfect consolidations, infant mortality rate, regime type, civil liberty, systemic discrimination are significant drivers of consolidation in both model and imperfect consolidations. The following graphical presentation shows consolidated and non-consolidated cases predicted by the models.

Figure 8. Graphical comparison of predicted values from two models
Despite the strength of the models, these logit models appear to be more deterministic on a country’s path to consolidation. According to the model, a country’s underlying conditions during the first election circle are likely to shape the future of the transition. As I have argued earlier, the imperfect consolidations de-consolidate much more frequently than the perfect consolidations and occasionally regress to autocracy. The logit model does not take account of how a country can gradually improve shortcomings, for instance the quality of life which is negatively associated with consolidation. But the value of the logit models highlights regime types and liberalization as the characteristics of the transition. At the same time, the models reject other characteristics of transition as insignificant factors, such as violence in transition, resurgence of former elites, and regional factor.

The previous descriptive analyses explain that the countries which meet the first criteria of consolidation are rare—15 out of 115 cases in 86 countries. Both the descriptive and inferential analyses lead this study to conclude that the model standard of democratic consolidation is too stringent to explain democratic consolidation in new democracies. Or new democracies hardly consolidate to a model standard. They might have strengthened the procedures to elect executive policy makers but are still falling short of consolidating political competition. In other words, although political actors embrace democracy as the core structure of the political institution, they may disregard democratic norms when political groups contest for power. The major shortcoming of
new democracies is the dynamic of competition, rather than the structure of the institution.

The logit models test various characteristics of transition and its influence to a country’s potential to consolidation. In all logit models, foreign intervention, regime concession, regime’s power recuperation, and the extent of violence during the transition did not explain well the cause of democratic consolidation, either by the model standard or the lenient criteria of democratic consolidation. But the regime types, existing foreign threats at the time of transition, regime collapse and executive guided liberalization stood out well to explain the cause of democratic consolidation.

The logit models reinforce the previous descriptive analysis by highlighting that the success of democratic transition does not depend on the revolutionary outcome of a transition. Although the model signifies the collapse of the former regime in transition as a driver to model consolidation, only 4 consolidated transitions completely removed the former regime in transition. The former regimes did not collapse in 11 consolidated transitions. Since the large number of non-consolidated transitions (62 out of 100) did not overthrow the former regimes, the model prediction appears to weight towards non-consolidation cases than consolidation. Democratic consolidation might take place even if former regime regained power after transition, such as in Spain, Lithuania, Mozambique, and Mongolia. Former regimes did not regain power in 84 cases, but only 14 of them became the second-tier consolidation. Out of 42 regime collapses, only 6 countries became consolidated under the second criteria. Among 39 non-violent
transitions, only 9 of them consolidated perfectly; on the other hand, 20 out of 38 non-
vviolent transitions consolidated by the imperfect standard. At the other side of the
spectrum, 6 out of 77 violent transitions became consolidated democracy by the model
standard and 28 of them imperfectly consolidated. The statistical analyses in both the
logit and descriptive results conclude that how the transition occurred does not determine
the success of democratization, except the regime types and liberalization for the model
criteria of consolidation.

But a transition from one-party state was, on average, 4 more times likely to
become a model democracy than those from non-one-party states, considering other
factors equal. An executive-guided transition was, on average, almost 3 more times likely
to become a model democracy if other factors were controlled. This finding by the logit
model is synonymous with the previous descriptive analysis which demonstrated that 9
out of 15 consolidated countries were formerly ruled by one-party states. Seven out of 15
consolidated countries experienced at least one year of executive guided transition under
one-party regimes.

In the second criteria of consolidation, which is more representative of the
consolidation in new democracies, a transition from military regime on average decreases
the probability of consolidation by almost two times more than non-military transitions,
keeping other factors constant. This finding compliments the influence of the one-party
state highlighted by the first logit model. The transitioning states under foreign military
threats in the last five years prior to the transition were less likely to consolidate
democracy. For example, keeping other factors constant, a country which went to war
with another state in the last five years decreased 1.3 times the probability of being consolidated by, compared to a country which faced significant foreign threat but fell short of going to war.

The explanatory variables which fluctuate over time appeared to explain democratic consolidation better than the static variables which characterized the initial phase of a transition, such as the power of recuperation of former regimes. The civil liberty score and infant mortality rate consistently influenced the probability of democratic consolidation. The one unit increase in the infringement of civil liberty—seven ordinal scales with 1 being the “highest freedom” and 7 being the lowest (Freedom House 2009)—would decrease the probability of model consolidation by 3.7 times. Similarly, one unit increase in civil liberty score decreases the probability of imperfect consolidation by 1.65 times, keeping other explanatory variables constant. To strengthen the robustness of the models, this study also tested them without the civil liberty variable, considering that democratic consolidation might encompass civil liberty. However, the other variables, except the trade per the percentage of GDP, remained statistically significant, and their coefficients made only slight changes.

In other statistical studies, the infant mortality rate turned out to be an encompassing proxy for human development (Esty et al. 1995). GDP alone and GDP growth rate do not necessarily represent overall human development. Infant mortality rate turns out to be an efficient indicator of the quality of life and “social legitimacy” (Marshall and Cole 2009, Marshall and Goldstone 2007). In the descriptive analysis, this study compared GDP growth rate in pre and post transitional years and concluded that
democratization did not generate economic development. In both models, growth rate by GDP per capita does not show statistical significance. But the data demonstrate that a one unit increase in the log of infant mortality rate is 2.6 times more likely to decrease the consolidation potential by the model standard. Similarly, one unit increase is 1.6 times more likely to decrease the consolidation potential by the imperfect standard. Among the economic indicators, trade by the percentage of GDP is only important when the regional factors are considered, such as Europe and non-Europe distinctions.

In both models, the percent of population suffering from ‘repressive’ discriminatory policies in political or economic sectors—the Minority at Risk dataset recorded them at the highest level of a 5-point scale (CIDCM 2007, 11)—is negatively associated with a country’s potential to consolidation. Ten percent increase of population under repressive discrimination is 1.3 times more likely to decrease the model consolidation potential. Similarly, ten percent increase of discriminated population is 0.5 times more likely to decrease the imperfect consolidation potential.

Discriminated population may indicate the growing extent of factionalism in a transitioning country—the correlation between the two is 0.15 by the end of the first election cycle in transitioning countries. To understand the linkage between discriminated population and factionalism, this study tested another panel logit model on factionalism, defined by the Polity’s PARCOMP score at three (Marshall and Jaggers 2008, 75). A factional dependent variable is coded in a binary form for each lagged year whenever a country’s PARCOMP score was recorded at 3. A panel logit tests all transition cases for the years when a case met minimum criteria of democracy. On average, the increase of
ten percent in discriminated population amplifies almost 1.4 times the probability of factionalism in a coming year in a transitioning country. Discrimination exacerbates institutionalized factionalism which in turn undermined the quality of democracy.

According to the models, a country formerly ruled by a one-party state whose elites decide to liberalize political structure at least one-year prior to the transition is an ideal characteristic for the model consolidation. The potential to consolidation would increase if that regime decides to resign or collapse under mounting pressure from the opposition movement. Once the transition takes place, political actors promote quality of life, reduce discrimination and strengthen civil liberty while engaging with the global community in economic interaction, especially within the first election cycle.

However, most new democracies will consolidate by the imperfect standard. An idea transitioning country is a non-military ruled state which is also not threatened by foreign enemies. During the first election cycle, political actors improve quality of life and promote civil liberty and minority rights. At the same time, stakeholders in transition minimize factionalism and strengthen tolerance to political competition. Then even a country which transitions to democracy with flaws can consolidate democracy imperfectly.

This discussion has outlined a number of significant factors on the potential for consolidation. People’s quality of life, systemic discrimination, and civil liberty infringement\textsuperscript{23} inversely affect a country’s consolidation potential. The strongest factor

\textsuperscript{23}This study also tested the relationship between civil liberty and discrimination. However, although the relationship was statistically significant at 90 percent, one point rise in civil-liberty infringement score on
among the underlying impetus to consolidation is the quality of life, characterized by the infant mortality rate. I will repackage all the findings into a stylized model to highlight a path way to democratic consolidation in the next the chapter to conclude this dissertation.

average increased only 0.8 percent of discriminated population in a given year, keeping other factors constant.
The end of the Cold War created an impression that liberal democracy became the paramount political system of human society. Euphoric scholars, like Fukuyama (1989 & 1992), predicated the downfall of an authoritarian system and the dominance of liberal democracy. On the other hand, realist scholars, like Huntington (1991 & 1997), cautiously attended that similar to the second waves of democratization, the third and fourth waves of democratic transitions were likely to experience the reverse wave of democracy. The optimists are right on some extent because the number of democracies increases almost two folds two decades after the Cold War. The realists are correct as well because 20 democratic countries reversed to autocracy after the Cold War. The rate of regression was higher than the Cold War period where only 16 transitions reversed. The predications from both sides of the argument may not contradict each other if we consider a missing link between democratic transition and regression. That link is the quality of democracy in transitioning countries.

Despite the numerical growth of democratic countries, strong democratic systems are rare among new democracies. Only 15 transitioning countries from 1955 to 2007 met the western standard of democratic consolidation or “the model democracy” attributed in polity criteria. The major shortcoming of new democracies, however, is the dynamic of
competition, rather than the electoral or constitutional structure. Even those countries
which do not meet the criteria of the model democracy have comparable electoral
structures to select governing leaders. But, political actors still fail to adhere to
democratic norms even in countries which never regressed to autocracy when ethno-
political groups compete for power under an established democratic structure. In these
countries, elections may be free, but they are not necessarily fair. Some groups may have
advantages over others. Some major groups may still be subject to exclusion from the
political system for instance, in Columbia, Mexico, Indonesia, and the Philippines to
name a few. As O’Donnell points out, “clientelism and, more generally, particularism”
are the entrenched features influencing an existing political structure (1996a, 40-42,
1996b). The inconvenient truth of democratization is that democratic transition is full
with imperfections. The yard stick of model democracy upheld by the western liberal
democracies may be inappropriate to gauge the success of democratization in new
democracies. After surveying the trend of transition and consolidation, I am not sure most
transitions will ever consolidate democracy to a model standard even in coming decades.

On the other hand, new transitions may enroot democracy in a form of imperfect
consolidation. Although it may sound oxymoronic, among 86 countries that have
attempted 115 transitions, 25 states, excluding the 15 model consolidations, are
imperfectly consolidated. Unlike the model consolidation, the imperfect consolidation
characterized by polity components is not autocracy-proof. In the dataset, fifty-five
countries met the criteria of imperfect consolidation. Among them, 15 countries regressed
to autocracy at one point since 1955. At least 6 imperfect consolidations regressed to
autocracy after having met the criteria. In 2007, only 43 countries out of 87 transitioning states were imperfectly consolidated. Twenty-seven of them fell short of consolidation while the remaining 17 reversed to autocracy.

A path to democratic consolidation has to start with the recognition of the imperfect nature of democratization. The first step of a democratization process is the prevention of democratic reversal rather than the inquest of a perfect consolidation, especially in a country where underlying conditions, such as quality of life, ethnic discrimination and ongoing violence, are not in favor of consolidation. It is not to say that democracy will automatically mature over time. A transition can become frozen if essential conditions fail to improve in the long run. If underlying conditions are gradually ameliorated, a transition is likely consolidated further down the road. If the underlying conditions are optimum, a transition may consolidate even at the very first year of democratization—6 countries consolidate democracy at the year of transition; and 18 of them fulfill the second criteria of consolidation at the first transition year as well.

But it is not time that strengthens democracy. The existing conditions at the time of the transition are not deterministic either. Democratic consolidation depends on how political actors improve essential foundation progressively after a transition moves on. A transition may take place under very unfavorable situations. Former regime elites may retake power even after the transition occurs, such as the Nationalist Party (KMT) in Taiwan in 1992. A transition might take place under the influence of the military, such as Chile where the opposition groups joined the electoral process overshadowed by the
military-orchestrated constitution in 1988. Mongolia transitioned to democracy in 1992 while its growth rate for the GDP per capita stood at minus eleven, and the former ruling Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party regained power after the first election. But these countries managed to move toward democracy consolidation gradually.

Not all authoritarian regimes are created equal. In this study, early consolidated democracies were formally ruled by one-party states in most cases. In the logit model, the transitions from one-party rules are almost 4.5 times likely to accomplish a model consolidation, compared to the other forms of authoritarian regimes if other factors are controlled. The countries formally ruled by the military regimes are almost two times less likely to consolidate even in imperfection because the military hardly leaves politics at least for some extent of time, even after the transition. The military-ruled countries experience the largest number of multiple transitions and the most frequent democracy reversal. Except Greece and Ecuador, the other 10 military-ruled transitions had to go through at least one to three election cycles to consolidate democracies even by imperfect standard. Demilitarization of democratic transition is a process, not an event determined by the transition, per se.

The characteristic of a transition is not deterministic to a country’s path to consolidation. Violent transitions, such as in El Salvador, Columbia and the Philippines, become imperfectly consolidated after the countries have gradually alleviated their violence-prone pasts. In contrast to the report compiled by the Freedom House (Karatnycky 2005), the data from this dissertation does not support that non-violent transitions contribute to more freedom and the success of democratization. At least 49
transitions were relatively peaceful\textsuperscript{24} by the time of the transition but still failed to consolidate democracy. Violence caused by foreign intervention, although such cases are rare, does not deter a country from consolidating as well, such as the transition in Panama after the US invasion in 1989. Thirteen countries experiencing some extent of civil violence in a year before the transition became imperfectly consolidated democracies.

A transition may consolidate democracy even in early years if the underlying conditions are conductive enough to foster consolidation. However, the majority of transitions did not emerge from such quintessential scenarios. Even if flawed consolidations are counted, early consolidations are rare—only 18 out of 115 transitions consolidated before one election circle. Most democratic transitions emerge from flawed political and economic conditions. The most critical question is how a country survives the incompleteness of the transition and progresses towards democratic consolidation after it experiences the fresh taste of relative freedom.

Even by the imperfect standards, only 18 countries in this transition dataset met the consolidation criteria in 1991 soon after the end of the Cold War. By the end of 2007, 43 countries are considered imperfectly consolidated. Infant mortality rate, civil liberty, and the percentage of severely discriminated population during the first election cycle can negatively affect a country’s potential to consolidate a transition. As a country improves these underlying conditions gradually, a transition can likely consolidate democracy progressively despite all odds a country might face at the time of the transition.

\textsuperscript{24}Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) score was rated 0, denoting no violent episodes, for last three consecutive years and the transition year in these countries.
Citizens’ quality of life, characterized by infant mortality rate in this study, is one of the critical conditions contributing to the development of democracy. The infant mortality rate is also inversely correlated with economic development as well—in this transition dataset the correlation between the infant mortality rate and the GDP per capital was about -0.25. However, it is important to distinguish that post-transitional economic development is more critical than pre-transitional growth. Affluence can strengthen democracy (Lipset 1958, Bollen 1979, Barro 1996) even in the early period of transition but the poverty at the time of transition does not prevent a country from consolidation if it can manage to augment development progressively. This study, nevertheless, identifies that democratization does not necessarily promote economic growth; neither does a transition hinder economic development as well (Rodrik and Wacziarg 2005). It is also important to note that economic growth alone does not promote democracy. Economic growth, especially a country’s interaction with the global economic community, needs to be accompanied by improved quality of life of its citizens.

The association between civil liberty and democratic consolidation appeared to be self evident. But transition to democracy does not automatically foster a stringent standard of civil liberty. According to the Freedom House’s rating scale, only 10 out of 40 imperfectly consolidated countries met “free” status\(^{25}\) in the first year of the transition according to the civil liberty scores. Twenty-eight of them were “partly free,” and two of them not free. The extent of civil liberty declined dramatically in consolidated countries.

\(^{25}\) Freedom House rating averages the combined score of civil and political rights measured in 1-to-7 scale. The average score 1 to 2.5=free, 3 to 5=partly free, 5.5 to 7=not free.
from the mid 1980s to 1994 but re-grew again from the mid 1990s to 2000s. The unsettled dynamic of political competition in imperfect consolidations may contribute to the fluctuation of civil liberty in flawed consolidated transitions. As I have argued in Chapter 6, democratization is not a revolution. Democratic transition is a transformed conflict where former elites and new stakeholders compete for power in a freshly constituted political and economic sphere. Depending on the degree of seething competitions, the extent of civil liberty in new democracies may fluctuate accordingly.

In the logit model that tested the imperfect consolidation, the percent of population experiencing oppressive discrimination, defined in the Minority at Risk (MAR) dataset is a strong underlying factor which can undermine a country’s consolidation potential. Not surprisingly, similar to the civil liberty score, both the degree of discriminated population and civil violence also fluctuate, especially in an imperfect consolidation. The patterns of civil liberty, discrimination, and civil violence are quite resembled in both types of consolidations. It is also notable that countries that meet consolidation criteria, even imperfect ones, ameliorate adverse conditions gradually in progression. The Figure 10 below compares civil liberty and the percent of discriminated population and civil violence in the first and the second consolidation criteria.
Figure 9. The comparative trends of civil liberty, intra-state violence and discriminated population in model and imperfect consolidations (adjusted scales in each pair)

Lastly, this study asserts that the increasing number of discriminated population is likely to undermine a country’s potential to consolidate democracy in both types of consolidation. Discrimination is closely associated with factionalism which may be observed in the forms of non-violent protests in young democracies. Some scholars have postulated that mass protests and popular mobilization can overload unstable governing institutions and thus detrimental to freshly transitioned societies (Huntington 1968, Crozier, Samuel Huntington, and Joji Watanuki 1975). Massive mobilization of protests in “fragile states” may have very different consequences from those in matured democracies. Non-violent mobilization can trigger violent riots and other consequences
of instability. Non-violent protests in young democracies may not simply express dissent, but they could also be a part of political tactics to seek a regime change, such as contemporary turmoil in Thailand and Kyrgyzstan. This study also identifies a linkage among discrimination, non-violent protests, and factionalism in transitioning countries. If a transition experiences factionalism, it tends to remain effective against consolidation for a number of years. A factionalized transition can either reverse to autocracy (Goldstone & et.al. 2005) or freeze a country in a perpetuated transitional stage.

A country may consolidate democracy in a rare situation if all underlying conditions are optimum enough to develop democracy even within the first election circle. But most countries transcend to democracy amidst imperfect conditions. Accepting the nature of imperfection is the first step to consolidate a transitioning democracy. Post transitional progress is more critical to how a transition takes place. How imperfect a transition may be, political actors can ameliorate the shortcoming and bring the country towards a consolidated democracy.

One major element this study fails to cover is how political actors settle post-transitional conflicts and institute competition gradually to a peaceful and stable democratic system in consolidated democracies. If the destiny of a transitioning democracy is not determined by how the transition takes place, there must be the processes by which political actors ameliorate their shortcomings. How a factionalized country, such as Slovakia, settles contentious competition and advances to consolidate democracy may be the most interesting aspect of democratic consolidation. Perhaps,
further researches may enlighten how conflict resolution plays a role in the process of democratic consolidation.
APPENDIX A: COUNTRIES WHICH MET THE CRITERIA OF IMPERFECT CONSOLIDATIONS FROM 1955 TO 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dominican Rep</th>
<th>Dominican Rep</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Panama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Chile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Albania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These countries met the second consolidation criteria (imperfect consolidation) between 1955 and 2007 and did not reverse to autocracy after having met the criteria. However, some countries in the list might have reversed to autocracy in the past and might have just met the criteria a few years ago.
### APPENDIX B: THE ROBUSTNESS OF THE LOGIT MODELS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Pr&gt;0.5</th>
<th>Pr&lt;=0.5</th>
<th>Pr&gt;0.75</th>
<th>Pr&lt;0.25</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model Consolidation</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-consolidation</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Model 4) Pr<0.25, Year

**Poor prediction (consolidation cases with probability less than 0.25)**
- Venezuela
- Slovak Republic

(Model 4) Pr >0.75

**Good prediction (consolidation cases with probability higher than 0.75)**
- Chile
- Spain
- Portugal
- Poland
- Hungary
- Czech Republic
- Slovenia
- Mongolia
- Taiwan

(Model 4) Pr<0.25, Good Prediction (non-consolidation cases with probability less than or equal to 0.25)
- Haiti
- Haiti
- Haiti
- Dominican Rep
- Dominican Rep
- Mexico
- Guatemala
- Guatemala
- Honduras
- El Salvador
- Nicaragua
- Colombia
- Guyana
- Ecuador
- Ecuador
- Peru
- Liberia
- Sierra Leone
- Sierra Leone Ghana
- Ghana
- Nigeria
- Central African Republic
- Congo Brazzaville
- Congo Kinshasa
- Uganda
- Kenya
- Burundi
- Djibouti
- Ethiopia
- Mozambique
- Zambia
- Zimbabwe
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pr&gt;0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperfect</td>
<td>34 (48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-consolidation</td>
<td>10 (67)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(Model 8) Pr<0.25, Year
Poor prediction (consolidation cases with probability less than 0.25)
| Panama | Georgia | Niger | Mozambique |

(Model 8) Pr>0.75, Year
Poor prediction (non-consolidation cases with probability greater than 0.75)
| Yugoslavia |

(Model 8) Pr >0.75
Good prediction (consolidation cases with probability greater than 0.75)
| Dominican Rep | Spain | Portugal | Poland | Hungary | Czech Republic | Slovak Republic | Uruguay | Macedonia | Croatia | Slovenia | Greece | Bulgaria | Estonia | Lithuania | Ukraine | Benin | Ghana | South Africa | Taiwan | Korea South | Philippines |
| El Salvador | Brazil | Chile | Argentina | Spain | Portugal | Poland | Hungary | Czech Republic | Slovak Republic | Uruguay | Macedonia | Croatia | Slovenia | Greece | Bulgaria | Estonia | Lithuania | Ukraine | Benin | Ghana | South Africa | Taiwan | Korea South | Philippines |

(Model 8) Pr <0.25
Good prediction (non-consolidation cases with probability less than 0.25)
| Haiti | Liberia | Liberia | Sierra Leone | Sierra Leone | Ghana | Central African Republic | Congo Brazzaville | Congo Kinshasa | Uganda | Comoros | Sudan | Sudan | Turkey | Lebanon | Korea South | Pakistan | Pakistan | Pakistan | Nepal | Thailand | Thailand | Thailand | Cambodia | 181 |
APPENDIX C: CODEBOOK

(1) Transition by Foreign Intervention (traninterven)

The polity of prior year before the transition should be -66, or transition was the direct result of foreign intervention. If the foreign military threat directly results in a transition to democracy, such as Haiti in 1994, it was coded ‘1.’ However, merely peace-keeping intervention alone did not qualify this category even if a political transition followed peacekeeping. To qualify in this category, foreign intervention, including threats of military intervention, should intend to either remove old regimes or install new political system.

1= foreign intervention fostered a transition to democracy
0= no foreign intervention preceding a democratic transition

(2) Transition by Liberalization (tranliberal)

Transitions occurred following a period of liberalization. There are three types of liberalization. If a case experienced one or more type of liberalization, it was coded 1 in ‘tranliberal.’ Some cases might fall under this category while they were under a broad-based transitional process prior to democratization which was coded -88 in polity dataset.

1= liberalization preceded democratic transition
0= democratic transition occurred without liberalization

1. Liberalization under restricted competition for three years (libcomp)
Political competition was not completely cracked down but institutionally closed. Under this type of liberalization, political parties were allowed to form and mobilize political actions which were subject to restrictions. However, the electoral process remained close or severely restricted to assure the dominance of the ruling regime. In many cases, factionalism was a typical form of political participation under this category of liberalization. This criterion of liberalization should precede the transition for at least three consecutive years. In Polity IV, PARCOMP score of three consecutive years before transitions should be greater than 2.

1= limited activities of political parties were allowed for at least 3 consecutive years
0= no limited activities of political parties were allowed for at least 3 consecutive years

2. Liberalization under restricted competition for one year (libcomp1)

1= limited activities of political parties were allowed for at least one year
0= no limited activities of political parties were allowed for at least one year

3. Liberalization under executive-guided transition for three years (libexguid)

Although a country’s electoral process was not intentionally opened, the regime established procedures or timeframe to transfer power to a democratic or more liberal regime. Executive-guided transitions were usually accompanied by liberalization of political activities described in the third category. In Polity IV, such type of liberalization
might be coded 5 in *executive recruitment* (EXREC) for three consecutive years prior to the transition.

1= executive-guided liberalization preceded at least three consecutive years prior to the transition

0= no executive-guided liberalization preceded the transition

4. Liberalization under executive-guided transition for one year (*libexguid1*)

1= executive-guided liberalization preceded at least one year prior to the transition

0= no executive-guided liberalization preceded the transition at least one year prior to the transition

5. Liberalization by expanding political activities (*libpolact*)

Although an authoritarian regime restricted other political parties to participate in political competition for executive positions, the regime might allow non-party political organizations to exist and exercise their political activities, such as non-violent protests and limited labor strikes. Under such a liberalization period, the regime might be tolerant of dissident activities. This type of liberalization was coded here if significant dissident activities, such as general strikes, mass protests, and rallies, were reported but more or less tolerated by the regime. The relaxation of political actions may be the result of executive-guided transition or liberalization of political competition. This criterion of liberalization should last at least one year prior to the transition.

1= authorities tolerated political activities of dissidents at least one year prior to the transition

0= authorities did not tolerate political activities of dissidents prior to the transition.
(3) Transition by Replacement (tranreplace)

Mass mobilization, such as nation-wide protest, riots, or revolution, overthrew the old regime during or prior year of the transitions. As a result of the mobilization, the former regime collapsed and democratic transitions took place. The oppositions’ mobilization might have induced a series of concessions by the regime. In such events, only the last outcome of mobilizations prior to the transition is considered.

1= former regime collapsed during or prior year of the transition characterized by oppositions’ mobilizations

0= former regime did not collapse during or prior year of the transition

(4) Transition by Concession (tranconces)

Oppositions’ mobilizations might induce concessions, but the former regime did not collapse. The highlight of such transition is a negotiated settlement. The final transition was the result of negotiated agreement between the former regime and the opposition. The elite-driven transition is also coded in this category. This type of transition may be preceded by broad-based transitional attempts coded -88 in the Polity IV.

1= democratic transition occurs after a ruling regime conceded some or all political demands by the opposition

0= no regime concession was observed

(5) Power Recuperation (regain)
In some cases of transition, polity change did not necessarily mean the change in leadership or the leading institution. Former senior leaders of old regimes might secure victory in transitional elections. Power recuperation is coded in the following scenarios:

- Leaders of former regime won elections. Although they might represent a new political coalition, the case would be coded as power recuperation if the leaders held senior positions in former regimes.

- Former ruling party, despite the change in its name, regained power

1 = former executives or ruling institution, albeit in different institutional labels, secured victory in transitional elections

2 = former executive or ruling institution failed to secure victory in elections

(5) Means of Transitions

Means of transitions were divided into two categories: oppositions’ mobilization and behavior of transition. In some cases, both criteria might overlap.

(5.a) Oppositions’ Mobilization (oppmob)

Four-point scale of violent mobilization was used to measure oppositions’ mobilization prior to the transition. Violent mobilization constituted armed attacks, riots targeting property and regime elements, terrorism, military coup and armed insurrection. Oppositions conducting violent mobilization should seek a change in political system rather than autonomy or secession. Violent actions must be triggered by the oppositions’ attempt to overthrow the government for political transition. 3 = oppositions’ mobilization prior to the transition was significantly violent.
• The approximate indicator of violent mobilizations was the death toll which might have reached 100 *within three years* prior to the transition.

2= oppositions’ mobilization prior to the transition was *moderately* violent

• If the death toll caused by the opposition’s mobilization did not reach 100 but met annual 25- death threshold *within three years prior to the transition*, it was considered moderately violent. If the military coup preceded the transition, and the coup facilitated reforms, the case would be coded 2 although the death toll might not meet the threshold 25.

1= oppositions’ mobilization prior to the transition was *mostly non-* violent

If the death toll was less than 25 *within three years* prior to the transition, but violent mobilizations were reported, the mobilization was considered mostly non-violent. However, if the regime’s crackdown on seemingly non-violent protests resulted in more than 25 deaths, the opposition mobilizations, albeit non-violent in nature, should be coded as 1 because excessive use of force incited violent response from oppositions.

0= oppositions’ mobilization prior to the transition was non-violent

No significant report of violence was observed *within three years* prior to the transition.

The data for coding were synchronized from Freedom House’s Study, Major Episodes of Political Violence, and PRIO’s Battle Death Database. If there were discrepancies among three of them, additional research was carried out to determine precise situation.

(5.a) Behavior of Transition (*behavtran*)
Regardless of the source of violence, the behavior of transition manifest the degree of violence involved within three years prior the transition. The violence might be the acts of the regime, dissidents, third-party interveners, or ethnic rebellions. Similar to the oppositions’ mobilization, four-point scale was used to assess the means of transition.

3= the transition was *significantly* violent

- The approximate indicator of violent mobilizations was the death toll which reached 100 annually at least one year *within three years* prior to the transition.

2= the transition was *moderately* violent

- If the annual death toll *within three years prior to the transition* did not reach 100 but met 25- death threshold for at least one year, it was considered moderately violent. If the military coup preceded the transition, and the coup facilitated reforms, the case would be coded 2 although the death toll might not meet the threshold 25. The assassination of political leaders will be coded here.

1= the transition was *mostly non- violent*

Although the annual death toll was less than 25 *within three years* prior to the transition, if violent activities were reported, the mobilization was considered mostly non-violent.

0= oppositions’ mobilization prior to the transition is non-violent

No significant report of violence was observed *within three years* prior to the transition.

(6) *Types of Former Regime*(oldregime)

1= one-party state
2=military regime
3=military-civilian (military-one-party)
If there are multiple regime types three years prior to transition, the longest duration of regime type will be taken as the characteristic of the regime. For example, in Peru in 1979, the characteristics of the regime was military-civilian but the country was under military rule in 1978 and 1977. Since the military rule was the longest duration that reflected the major orientation of the prior regime type, Peru’s transition in 1980 was a change from a military rule.

(6.1) One-party State of (oldregime=1)
A ruling regime belongs to a single political party. Only the ruling party is allowed to participate in elections, and other parties or political groups are barred from participation in political process, such as communist regimes.

(6.2) Military Regime (oldregime=2)
If the military’s existing leaders hold top executive positions in the government, and the military exercise political power directly, the regime is considered military in the problem set. A military regime in the problem set, the lead executive, such as president or prime minister, and significant number of other cabinet members should hold dual positions both in the administration and the military. The code ‘Military’ in both World Bank’s Cross-national Time-series Data and Authoritarian Regime Dataset and ‘military no party’ in the latter will be coded as ‘military regime.’
(6.3) Military-Civilian \((oldregime=3)\)

A civilian government effectively controlled by a military elite, or a civilian leader provides the military with substantial power beyond its defense function.

‘Military-civilian’ in World Bank’s Cross-national Time-series Data and ‘military one-party’ or ‘military multiple-party’ in Authoritarian Regime Dataset will be coded as military-civilian.

(6.4) Monarchy \((oldregime=4)\)

A regime is considered monarchy if “a person of royal descent has inherited the position of head of state in accordance with accepted practice and/or the constitution” (Hadenius & Jan Teorell 2007b, 6). The code ‘monarchy’ in Authoritarian Regime Dataset will be considered as monarchy in this dataset.

(6.5) Colonial occupation \((oldregime=5)\)

A transitioning country was ruled by a colonial power. The code ‘occupation’ in Authoritarian Regime Dataset is qualified as colonial occupation in this study.

(6.6) Limited Multi-Party

To be coded in this category, Authoritarian Regime Dataset must code a country in particular years as ‘limited multi-party,’ and the country does not meet minimum democracy criteria.

(6.7) Others \((oldregime=6)\)

Any other types of regime which do not fit the above mentioned criteria will be in this category.

(7) External Threat \((exsigthreat)\)
2= a transition country went to war with foreign country in last five years

If a country in specific period is coded as in armed conflict with another state in Major Episodes of Political Violence, Political Instability Taskforce, or UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, the country of interest is considered facing external security threat.

1= a transition country is facing significant foreign military threat in last five years

If a country mobilized its military in confrontation with other state(s), the case was considered significant military threat. Large-scale or frequent border incursion by other state(s) was coded as significant security threat, such as Lebanon and Israel in 2005. If another state is actively supporting insurgency with substantial war-like materials to threaten the security of transitioning country, the case is coded here.

0= a transition country is not facing significant foreign military threat last five years
APPENDIX D: NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF 115 TRANSITION CASES

Country Name:            Albania                                            Year of Transition:  1990
The collapse of Communist regimes elsewhere in Eastern Europe and growing civil unrest within the country forced the regime’s leaders to introduce a series of reform initiatives in political, economic, judiciary systems. Following the shakeup in Easter Europe, Albanian protestors, consisting of students, intellectuals, workers and youth, pressured the regime to restore religious freedom, transform economy to a market-oriented system and curtail the power of the Sigurimi, security unit responsible for cracking down dissidents. A large student demonstration at Tirana State University and subsequent violent riots erupted in December 1990 triggering a series of reforms. Ruling Albanian Workers’ Party (APL) lifted the ban on the formation of independent political parties. The announcement was followed by the formation of the Democratic Party (PDS), the first opposition party to be formed in last 46 years. At the same time, Central Council of Albanian Trade Unions and other groups were actively involved in mass movement to pressure the regime for a change. Albanians voted in the first multiparty elections held in February 1991. Although a few irregularities were reported, the result of the elections reflected the actual cast of the vote. The APL defeated the PDS by gaining 169 out of 250 seats in the People’s Assembly. The defeat of the opposition was due to the unequal assess to state-controlled media and financial resource, rather than voting fraud. The disaffected opposition supporters violently clashed with police in post-election confrontation. To register its dissatisfaction, the PDS boycotted the opening session of
the legislature in April 1991. Labor activists led a series of general strike in April and May to force the newly appointed government to resign in June 1991. A transitional coalition government took over in the same month to prepare for new elections which were held in March 1992. The PDS won 62 percent of the popular vote and 92 of the 140 seats in the People's Assembly, and Sali Berisha of the PDS was elected President by the legislature. Although the success of the PDS appeared to strengthen the process of transition to democracy, the nature of political mobilizations reflected the continuing characteristics of factionalism. Berisha’s rule became increasing autocratic and scurrilous of the judiciary system after a few years of the transition. President Sali Berisha’s Democratic Party was accused of voting fraud in general elections held in mid-1996. The dissatisfaction was exacerbated by the collapse of several fraudulent investment schemes which triggered a series of widespread protests and riots leading to an armed rebellion, especially in the south. Mounting instabilities forced Berisha to announce new elections to be held in July 1997. Socialist Party of Albania (PSS), mostly comprised of socialists from former APL, garnered 65 percent of the vote and defeated the ruling PDS. The electoral success of the PSS reflected the country’s redirection towards the path of transition to democracy.

| Country Name | Argentina                   | Year of Transition | 1973 |

The military regime led by General Juan Carlos Onganía faced popular resistance and civil violence in 1969. Despite the formal ban on political activities of dissidents, General Confederation of Labor, organized worker activists, staged frequent strikes and protests against the regime. The unrest continued until a moderate military junta led by
General Alejandro Lanusse removed the hardliner General Roberto M. Levingston in March 1971. In the same year, a small muniny was aborted by the government. Lanusse attempted to seek reconciliation with moderate Personists, legalized political parties and promised an election to be held in 1973. Justicialist Movement (Peronist), Radicals of the People and six small centrist parties formed a coalition “Hour of the People” to support the government’s plan to hold elections for a transition. Political activities were revived since mid-1971. Subsequently, fractured Personist groups and other dissident terrorist organizations carried out a series of bombings and assassination of moderate leaders. Violence broke out as the result of the confrontation between worker protestors and police in 1972. The junta held elections in March 1973, and Dr. Héctor Cámpora, supporter of influential Juan Domingo Person who was in exile, gained the largest numbers of vote. The military tried unsuccessfully to negotiate with the Personists for its role in the national politics. But the military accepted the popular mandate of the election. Nevertheless, widespread acts of lawlessness continued amidst the factional fighting among Personist groups. Deteriorating political and economic conditions led to the return of the military rule after Lieutenant General Jorge Rafael Videla seized power and dissolved the parliament in 1976.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
<th>1983</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

A military junta led by Gen. Videla ousted President Isabel Peron in March 1976. The new junta escalated its systematic suppression against the leftist oppositions, resulting in politicides between 1976 and 1980 (Political Instability Taskforce’s case). After moderate Gen. Robert Eduardo Viola was sworn into office as president in March 1981,
he initiated limited liberalization, calling for dialogue and orderly return to democracy. Human rights and labor activists escalated their mobilization during the period of liberalization. However, the internal military coup led by General Leopoldo Galtieri removed Viola in December 1981. Galtieri, however, faced daunting challenge of collapsed economy and rising popular mobilizations by oppositions. Galtieri unsuccessfully invaded the British’s Falkland Islands in his attempt to deflect public dissents by instigating nationalistic fervor in April 1982. The debacle of the Falkland war forced Galtieri to resign, and a new junta led by General Bignone came to power. The military government, embattled by the war, internal dissent and domestic pressure, promised to hold elections in 1983. Raul Alfonsín from the Radical Civil Union (UCR) became president as the result of the UCR’s victory in the election in October 1983 as the Personists remained divided. The Alfonsin administration tried to depoliticize the military and bring those responsible for mass atrocities to justice. However, the pressure from the military forced the government to grant amnesty to lower-ranking officials. The transition to democracy at this time was relatively successful in removing the military from Argentinean politics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Armenia</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similar to other former Soviet satellites, Armenia’s nationalist fervor reemerged during Mikhail Gorbachev’s liberalization period in mid 1980s. Gorbachev’s glasnost initiative opened up the discussion of controversial issues and paved a way to the emergence of nationalist political groups. One million Armenians took the streets to rally for the annexation of Azerbaijan’s Nagorno-Karabakh where predominantly Armenian
population had ignited a secessionist movement to reunite with Armenia. A major earthquake that devastated Armenia, the government’s slow response, Azerbaijan’s economic blockade due to the war in Nagorno-Karabakh deepened the pro-independence movement in Armenia. Armenian formed the New Armenian Army (NAA) as a separate force from the Soviet’s military in May 1990. Consequently, hostilities erupted between the NAA and the Soviet forces based in Yerevan in May 1990, resulting in the deaths of five Armenians. The Armenian Supreme Soviet, a legislative body of Armenia under the USSR, declared independence in September 1991 as Armenians overwhelmingly voted to secede from the USSR. The first popular elections were held subsequently, and Levon Ter-Petrossian, the leader of the Pan-Armenian National Movement (PNM) and former chairperson of the Armenian Supreme Soviet, became the first elected president after the independence. The transition to democracy was, however, marred with factionalism and ensuant electoral frauds in 1966 elections.

| Country Name | Armenia | Year of Transition | 1998 |

Economic conditions in Armenia deteriorated rapidly since 1992. At the same time, the territory dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh region fueled Armenian nationalism throughout the country. Armenians were also angered by corruption and dominance of former communist elites. After a controversial election held in September 1996 amidst the allegations of vote fraud, popular protests escalated into violent clashes with police and triggered a suppressive crackdown. Having lost his party’s support in the legislature as a result of his controversial plan to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, President Ter-Petrossian, who was elected in the dispute
election, resigned under pressure in January 1998 and was replaced by Prime Minister Robert Kocharian, who was subsequently elected President in March 1998. The brief interruption of democratic transition was successfully restored.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Azerbaijan</th>
<th>Year of Transition 1992</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Despite Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s liberalization initiatives to allow non-communist political groups to voice their interests, the leaders of the Azerbaijan Communist Party (ACP) was initially reluctant to follow the suite of other Soviet satellites. Meanwhile, the USSR’s liberalization initiatives encouraged the nationalists to set up an organized platform known as the Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF). The APF staged a nation-wide strike in September 1989 to force the ACP to formally recognize the APF. The territorial dispute with Armenia regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh region intensified Azerbaijani nationalism and the mobilization of the PFA which took control of Baku in January 1990. The tension erupted into ethnic riots and instability, triggering the government to declare a state of emergency. The Soviet government sent troops to Baku to reestablish order, resulting in the death of over 100 people. Subsequently, the ACP enforced the state of emergency by banning political demonstrations, outlawing ultra nationalist groups and detaining the leaders of the APF. Despite the tough measures, the nationalist movement remained strong and pervasive among the population. Although Azerbaijan held the first multiparty elections to the Supreme Soviet under the USSR in 1990, the restrictions of political campaigns for the oppositions allowed the ACP to secure a majority of seats. The failure of the Moscow coup orchestrated by the communist hardliners in August 1991 accelerated the independence of Azerbaijan,
similar to other USSR satellites. The coup triggered a mass demonstration in Azerbaijan calling for the end of the state of emergency and the restoration of independence. The Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet voted in favor of the protestors and declared Azerbaijan’s status independent in August 1991. Ayaz Mutalibov, the new Communist Party leader, became the first President of the republic and, the legislature was dominated by the representatives of the Communist Party. Widespread dissatisfaction with Mutalibov was fueled by the fall of the Nagorno-Karabakh town of Khojaly to Armenian troops and the massacre of over 1,000 people there. Popular outrage and mobilizations of the Popular Front eventually forced Mutalibov to resign in March 1992. In a new multi-party presidential election in June 1992, Abulfez Elchibey, the leader of the Popular Front, won the election with almost 60 percent of vote. Conflict with neighboring Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh continued.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
<th>Year of Transition 1991</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Since Bangladesh gained independence after Pakistanis troops surrendered in 1972, Bangladesh was ruled by authoritarian-style leaders and military regimes. Two presidents were assassinated in military coup during that period. General Hossain Mohammad Ershad took power in a military coup in 1982, proclaiming martial law, suspending the constitution and prohibiting all political activities. Under his martial-law regime, however, other opposition parties were allowed to exist. Two major opposition groups formed an alliance, called the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy, and pressured Ershad to lift martial law. Ershad eased martial law restrictions in March 1986 and held parliamentary elections to which many opposition groups boycotted. The Jatiya
Dal Party, supporters of Ershad, won the election. Similarly, Ershad proceeded with plans for a presidential election despite the rejection by all major opposition groups. Ershad secured majority vote in the presidential election and gained full legislative support from the Jatiya Dal Party. Oppositions continued to stage protests and general strikes to press the government to hold free and fair elections. The Ershad regime held new elections in March 1988, but the oppositions boycotted again. Subsequently, the Jatiya Party won a landslide victory. Amidst economic difficulties, massive floods hit Bangladesh, leaving 30 million people homeless. Various opposition groups also escalated their pressure on the Ershad regime for a change. Faced with series of strikes and violent demonstrations, Ershad offered his resignation in December 1990. An interim government held the nation’s most free and fair elections till that date in February 1991. However, factional confrontation continued among former allies amidst violent protests and general strikes. The oppositions kept on using election-boycott strategies to undermine the party in power.

**Country Name**  
**Belarus**  
**Year of Transition** 1991

Similar to other former Soviet’s satellites, Belarus’s transition to democracy and independent statehood came along with the collapse of the USSR. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s introduction of political and economic reforms facilitated the rebirth of Belarusian nationalism in late 1980s. The Nationalists formed Belarusian Popular Front (BPF) to revive Belarusian language and reverse repressive Stalinist policies in October 1988. Despite being a part of the USSR, relatively open elections were held to elect representatives to the Supreme Soviet in 1990. Although the Communist Party continued
to dominate the legislature, growing nationalist sentiment drove Belorussia to declare symbolic sovereignty in 1990. The failed coup attempt initiated by hardliners in the heart of the USSR accelerated the downfall of the USSR in 1991. Following the suite of other republics, Belarus declared its independence in August 1991. The initial phase of transition to independent democratic state appeared to be the victory for the nationalists. But the Parliament chosen as the Supreme Soviet remained intact after the independence, allowing former communist elites to maintain crucial control of power. Byelarus National Front, the major opposition group, challenged the legitimacy of the parliament and called for new elections. The Front successfully collected 400,000 signatures, which was sufficient to force the government to hold a referendum to decide holding of new elections. Although the parliament voted to block the referendum, new elections were scheduled for March 1993. The first presidential election took place in July 1994 and resulted in the landslide victory for little-known Alyaksandr Lukashenka who campaigned for anti-corruption and closer ties with Russia. Lukashenka rolled back some liberalization measures, including market reforms, and gradually curbed civil liberty and political rights. By mobilizing popularity and utilizing repressive measures, Lukashenka subdued political opposition and dominated all branches of the government. Belarus’s short-lived transition to democracy ended at the consolidation of Lukashenka’s power in the government.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Benin</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
<th>1991</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
The military junta, led by Maj. Mathieu Kérékou, formed the Benin People’s Revolutionary Party (PRPB) in 1975 to rule the country under a single-party socialist system. Economic deterioration and rising dissatisfaction triggered an attempted coup against President Kerekou in March 1988. The coup leaders enjoyed substantial support from the public and within the military. The worsening economic and political conditions reached a flash point erupting into public protests in January 1989. The riots between angry crowds and security forces resulted in a number of deaths, including two security officers in Benin's capital city, Porto-Novo. Under domestic and international pressure, Kérékou made a major political shift to move away from Marxism-Leninism. Benin officially abandoned Marxist-Leninist ideology and constituted a National Conference of Active Forces of the Nation in 1989 to decide the future path of the country. The National Conference became the interim authority since February 1990 and elected technocrat Nicephore Soglo as interim Prime Minister. President Kerekou's own authority was considerably weakened by the check and balance within the new power structure. Kerekou later resigned his role as defense minister, allowing the expansion of civilian control over the military. The presidential election was held in March 1991, resulting in Soglo’s victory over Kérékou. The success of electoral process directed Benin to become the first African country to successfully transcend from dictatorship to multiparty democracy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Bolivia</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1982</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The military overthrew the Paz Estenssoro government while his mother party the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) was divided into various factions. Since the takeover, the military became a dominant political force in Bolivian politics for decades. The junta suppressed the oppositions, especially the leftist groups and the unions of miners. After the death of General René Barrientos Ortuno, a series of short-live governments were installed by one coup after another. A coup in 1971 brought Colonel Hugo Banzer Suárez to power. Supported by right-wing political and economic forces, Banzer declared martial law, arrested oppositions, cracked down peasants and banned political parties and other politico-civic organizations. Under increasing international and domestic pressures, Banzer agreed to hold elections in July 1978. However, the legitimacy of the elections was weakened by widespread allegations of fraud and inconclusive electoral outcomes. Electoral turmoil triggered a series of coups and counter coups among the military’s presidential candidates. General Juan Perdea Asbun forced Gen. Banzer to resign from the presidential post and to hand over power to a military authority that installed Perdea as president. However, Gen. Perdea’s government was removed by another coup orchestrated by General David Padilla in November 1978. Padilla announced new elections to be held in July 1979. However, the new elections did not produce a clear winner; therefore, political leaders sought a compromise that appointed President of the Senate Walter Guevara to the presidency until new elections could be held in 1980. However, Guevara was again ousted by a military coup led by General Alberto Natusch in November 1979. Under intense domestic pressure, Natusch resigned in the same month to be replaced by another provisional president Lidia Gueiler.
who was also overthrown by a coup led by General Luis Garcia Meza. His government became a target of domestic and international pressure for its grave human rights abuses and repressions. After another military coup forced Garcia Meza out of power in 1981, three separate military governments in 14 months had struggled unsuccessfully to consolidate their power. Meza was replaced by General Celso Torrelio who was also ousted by General Guido Vildoso in July 1982. The military’s control, already weakened by internal power struggle, was challenged by labor strikes and widespread civil unrest. Under mounting pressure, Vildoso convoked the Congress elected in 1980 to choose a new chief executive. In September 1982, the electoral court announced the victory of Dr. Siles in the 1980 elections. General Vildoso transferred power from the military to the elected civilian administration on October 10, 1982, facilitating a transition to democracy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Having faced with growing political opposition in 1958, the military regime, which came to power since 1964, softened restrictions on political oppositions. Student demonstrations and small guerrilla movement increasingly threatened the stability of the country and challenged the legitimacy of the regime. After General Artur Costa e Silva, who had been voted president by the legislature in 1967, suffered from incapacitating strokes in 1968, the hardliners within the military responded to the left-leaning agitations by launching an inter-regime coup. The new junta escalated suppressions on the oppositions, especially on leftist groups. Despite the suppression, Brazil enjoyed
economic growth under the military rule, and the regime became confident of their ability to control the country. When General Ernesto Geisel took the presidency in 1974, he began to open up limited political space for oppositions which were allowed to participate in local and state elections. General João Baptista Figueiredo succeeded Geisel in 1979 and continued liberalization of political control, allowing exiles to come back to the country and form political parties. Amidst economic crisis, thousands of Brazilians took the streets demanding direct elections for president. Instead, the regime adopted an Electoral College system which chose 74-year-old Tancredo Neves as president in competitive elections held in January 1985. After the death of Neves, Vice-President-elect, Sr Jose Sarney, was sworn in as acting President in March 15. The election in 1985 and relative freedom of political groups demonstrated the country’s path to a democratic transition.

| Country Name | Bulgaria          | Year of Transition | 1990 |

The political turbulence triggered by glasnost and perestroika in the Soviet Union had transcended to Bulgaria, one of the Soviet’s satellites. Pro-democracy oppositions, environmental groups and civic organizations gradually spoke out for change and began to mobilize their political bases. The failure of economic reforms and public unrest forced communist leader Todor Zhikov and his close associates to resign. He was replaced by popular member of his politburo Petar Mladenov who lifted restrictions on opposition groups, instituted a multiparty system and restored civil rights of Bulgarian Turks. In June 1990, the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), former ruling communists, won the
parliamentary elections, and Mladenov became president. However, he was forced to resign after a scandal regarding his inclination to use of force in the suppression of student demonstration had surfaced. The parliament replaced him with Zhelyu Zhelev of the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) as president. Moreover, the deteriorating economy also led to the resignation of Prime Minister Andrei Lukanov of the BSP in November 1990. He was replaced by an independent candidate Dimiter Popov, and UDF won the new elections in 1991 by a narrow margin. Under a new constitution, the direct elections to choose presidential post was held in January 1992, and Zhelyu Zhelev won the election.

Country Name         Burkina Faso         Year of Transition 1978
After Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) had gained independence from France in 1960, the country was destabilized by a series of military coup and internal upheavals. President Maurice Yameogo established a one-party dictatorship while banning opposition parties. Yameogo was, however, challenged by general strike and demonstrations which triggered a military coup to depose Yameogo in January 1966. The junta led by Lt. Col. Sangoule Lamizana liberalized political restrictions and adopted a new constitution in 1970, allowing an establishment of a civilian administration and an elected assembly that operated under the influence of the authority of Lamizana who occasionally intervened in political crises. Another constitution was approved by referendum in November 1977 that legalized all parties to participate in legislative and presidential elections in 1978. Through the electoral process, Lamizana became the president, and the country transcended to a phase of democratic transition. However, democracy was beset by
popular unrest and labor strikes continuing through 1979 and 1980. Amidst protracted civil unrest, the elected government was overthrown by a military coup led by Col. Saye Zerbo on November 25, 1980. The coup leaders suspended constitution and banned all political activity, effectively reversing the political coast to autocracy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Burundi</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

After Maj. Pierre Buyoya overthrew the regime of Col. Bagaza in 1987, the new junta tightened restrictions on opposition groups by dissolving their organizations. Buyoya approved a constitution in 1991 that allowed multi-party elections for president and universal suffrage among voters. Under new electoral process, Frodebu party leader Melchior Ndadaye, ethnic Hutu, won the election and became president in July 1993. However, his assassination carried out by the army paratroopers, allegedly acting on the order of former President Buyoya, ignited a wave of ethnic violence leading into the Hutu-Tutsi civil war. Although Buyoya returned to power by a military coup in July 1996, he was under domestic pressure to seek negotiated settlement with the Hutu oppositions. Buyoya and Hutu-dominated National Assembly agreed upon a transitional administration in which Buyoya took the presidential post in November 2001. However, two main Hutu insurgent groups vowed to continue the fight against the transitional government. The government, sharing power between ethnic Hutu and Tusi parties, wrote a new constitution and held elections in accordance with a transitional plan. In November 2003 the largest Hutu-dominant rebel group, Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD), joined the peace process and agreed to participate in
ongoing political arrangement. The new constitution was overwhelmingly approved in a referendum taken place in February 2005. The FDD won a majority in both houses in the legislative elections which were held in the same year. FDD leader Pierre Nkurunziza was sworn in as the first president under the new constitution, and the electoral process directed the country towards a transition to democracy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Cambodia</th>
<th>Year of Transition 1993</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

As the Soviet Union sharply decreased financial support to the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia at the end of the Cold War, Vietnam withdrew its troops from Cambodia in September 1989. In October 1991, four major Cambodian groups agreed upon a comprehensive settlement allowing the UN to supervise cease-fire and undertake transitional authority. The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) held free elections in May 1993 to elect representatives for a constituent assembly. Prince Ranariddh's FUNCINPEC Party won the election with 45.5 percent of vote and formed a coalition with other parties. The constituent assembly drafted and approved a new constitution in September 1993. The democratic transition was, however, disrupted by factional fighting in July 1997 between Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), led by former communist leader Hun Sen, and Ranariddh's FUNCINPEC. Hun Sen took over premiership as some FUNCINPEC leaders were forced to flee from Cambodia after defeat. Following a peace agreement brokered by Japanese officials, former Prime Minister Ranariddh returned from exile to contest in elections in 1998. Amidst allegations of voter fraud and intimidation, an agreement was reached between Funcinpec
and the CPP to form a coalition government in which Hun Sen was the sole prime
minister. Cambodian electoral politics continued to mire with factional confrontations
afterwards.

Country Name Central African Republic Year of Transition 1993

The repressive regime of Bokassa was overthrown in a French-backed coup led by
his unsuccessful reforms within six months. Kolingba ruled the country as the head of the
Military Committee for National Recovery (CRMN) until it was dissolved in favor of a
new cabinet with increased civilian participation under the influence of the military.
Kolingba received a new mandate as president in a referendum held in November 1986.
The referendum also approved a new constitution that established a parliament and a
single-party system. However, political unrest, strikes and protests pressured the
government to open up for democratic change. Under mounting pressures, Kolingba
allowed a constitutional amendment to transcend to a multi-party system under which
political parties were allowed to form in 1991. However, Kolinga attempted to preserve
his power by denying a meaningful democratic change. Under international and domestic
pressure, Kolinga held a presidential election just to be cancelled as he was trailing in the
voting in 1992. In turn, a new transitional government was formed to prepare for
elections scheduled to be held in February 1993. Widespread strikes accompanied by
considerable violence broke out in April to June 1993, in response to the delayed
elections. Facing domestic discords, Kolingba had to hold presidential and parliamentary
elections in August 1993. The results showed a clear rejection of Kolingba, and Ange Patasse, the leader of the Movement for the Liberation of the Central African People (MLPC), won the runoff elections. Patasse became the first president to be elected in relatively free election in the country’s history. Although Central African Republic was able to step towards a democratic transition, instabilities continued. In March 2003, Patassé’s government was overthrown, while he was out of the country, by former army Chief François Bozizé. He held new elections in 2005 and became president.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Chile</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since the government of Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei-Montalva was overthrown by a military coup in 1973, Gen. Augusto Pinochet took over control of the country as president. His rule was mired with human rights abuses and repression on civilian oppositions under the decree of state of emergency until the end of 1980s. A new constitution was approved in September 1980 after a controversial referendum allowing Pinochet to rule another eight year term. Although he included some civilian to the new cabinet, Chile remained a police state under stringent oppression of Pinochet. A limited liberalization period in early 1980s opened political venue for civilian oppositions to mobilize their supporters. At the downturn of Chilean economy, large-scale protests and a wave of bombings in major cities challenged the rule of Pinochet. Civil unrest and deteriorating economy impelled Pinochet to re-impose a state of emergency in 1984. The repression became worsen after an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Pinochet in 1986. However, the state of emergency was lifted in 1988, and Pinochet held a plebiscite in October to decide the extension of his presidential term. Majority of voters denied his
third term, and Pinochet ended his post in 1990, following free presidential and legislative elections. The oppositions formed a coalition Parties for Democracy (CPD) to elect moderate Christian Democrat Patricio Aylwin as president in December 1989. Pinochet remained commander in chief and life-long senator. Elected civilian leaders attempted to amend the constitution that was designed to enhance the military’s role in Chilean politics. Both sides reached a set of compromised amendments which expanded the role of civilian official and limited the military’s participation in legislature. After the second free elections in 1993, the civilian system was able to rein in the military to be accountable for human rights abuses. Two other elections held in 2000 and 2005 were much regarded as free and fair. After constitutional amendments were added to strengthen the civilian rule in 2005, Chile became one of the consolidated democracy in 2006.

| Country Name | Columbia | Year of Transition | 1957 |

The assassination of liberal leader Gaitán sparked a string of bloodshed confrontations between right and left political groups in Columbia. The violence killed estimated 180,000 Colombians before it subsided in 1958. Amidst the rising tensions between the leftists and rightists, the military overthrew the Conservative government in 1953. Under the rule of the junta, General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla became provisional president. Despite the suppression of the guerrilla movements, both the Liberal and the Conservative parties were able to operate and participate in the Constituent Assembly. When Pinilla attempted to revise the constitution to consolidate his power, he was ousted by the military
supported by liberal and conservative rivals in May 1957. The leaders of the
Conservative and Liberal parties reached an accord with the new junta which promised to
hold free elections. The power-sharing agreement, known as the Pact of Sitges, was
ratified by a national plebiscite, and legislative elections were held in December 1957.
The constitution allowed a joint-party rule, alternating presidential post between the
Liberal and the Conservative parties. The power-sharing arrangement effectively
diminished political violence through 1960. However, leftist guerrillas inspired by the
Cuban Revolution emerged in Colombia in 1960s. Although the country was able move
towards democratization, the government has been constantly challenged by ongoing
drug-inspired insurgency for decades.

Country Name        Comoros        Year of Transition       1990

Radical nationalist leader Ali Soilih, who came to power after a successful revolution
shortly after independence, was ousted by a mercenary-inspired coup in 1978. Ahmed
Abdulla, backed by French mercenaries, returned to power and established a one-party
rule until he was assassinated in 1989. Prior to his death, violent unrest broke out in
protest against a referendum result that allowed Abdallah to seek third six-year term in
November 1989. Up to 200 young protestors were arrested during the episode. After
Abdallah’s death, various political groups reached an agreement in December 1989 to
end the previous one-party system. Presidential elections were held in March 1990, and
Said Mohamed Djohar was declared the winner of the country's first free presidential
elections since independence in 1975. Although Djohar tried to bring reconciliation to the
country by incorporating oppositions to the government, his government of national unity
failed to preserve stability, and subsequently, another coup led by Bob Denard and his band of mercenaries ended a brief period of democratic transition in 1995.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Comoros</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After President Ahmed Abdulla, who was backed by French mercenaries and South Africa, was assassinated in 1989, Said Mohamed Djohar came to power through elections until he was deposed by another coup led by French mercenary Bob Denard in September 1995. French troops, however, intervened the crisis and arrested Denard to restore Djohar to power and form another government of reconciliation. Under the new arrangements, internationally monitored elections were held in March 1996, resulting in the victory of Mohamed Taki who became an elected president. Taki drafted a new constitution that expanded his authority as president and established Islam as the foundation of all legislation. The move upset other ethnic groups residing outside of the mainland country. Popular discontent soared across the country, and secessionist movements in the islands of Nzwani and Mwali challenged the central rule by declaring independence. Amidst political chaos, Colonel Azzali Assoumani launched another coup to topple the civilian government and subsequently promised to return to a civilian government in 1999.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Comoros</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The interim government led by President Tajidine Ben Said Massounde replaced President Taki, who came to power through the 1996 elections, after his death in November 1998. Dissatisfaction with Tajidine’s policies led to another coup in April 1999 by Colonel Azzali Assoumani who promised to return to civilian rule. The junta
wrote a new constitution and presented it to the public in a general referendum. Citizens, in turn, voted in favor of the new constitution to reunite three islands in December 2001. The constitution also outlined a decentralization plan to pacify the grievances of Nzwani and Mwali islanders. In a move to inch towards an electoral politics, Azzali Assoumani stepped down from power, paving a way to a transitional government in January 2002. Assoumani resigned from the military to contest in a controversial election held in 2002. Although he declared to be the winner of the election, the oppositions challenged the legitimacy of the election because of widespread fraud. Despite the contestations of political parties, the quality of the 2002 elections and the nature of Assoumani’s rule disqualified the country to be a path to democratic transition. Nevertheless, in 2004 local elections, Assoumani’s supporters won only 12 out of 55 seats. In presidential elections held in 2006, Ahmed Abdallah Mohamed Sambi, a Sunni Muslim cleric, defeated Assoumani and became president elect of the country. Assoumani honored the election result, facilitating a transfer of power peacefully to begin a new phase of democratic transition in Comoros.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Congo Brazzaville</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1992</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nearly one dozen coups and military mutinies wreaked havoc political instability in the Republic of Congo since its independence from France in 1960. After two decades of Marxist-Leninist policies in successive regimes, the collapse of the Soviet Union accelerated the process of transition towards democracy starting from 1990. The president and the Central Committee announced, in 1990, a transition to a multi-party
system from the existing one-party state where the military was an influential actor. President Sassou-Nguesso held a referendum in the spring of 1992 to approve a new constitution which laid the groundwork for the transition to a democratic system. In accordance with the plan, presidential elections were held in August 1992. Pascal Lissouba of Pan-African Union for Social-Democracy (UPADS) defeated other candidates, including former president Sassou-Nguesso in the transitional election. Sassou-Nguesso conceded the electoral outcome. Despite the relative success of electoral process, the transition to democracy was weakened by immature democratic norms and factionalism. Sings of instabilities surfaced as President Lissouba dissolved the National Assembly in November 1992 and called for new elections in 1993. The factional confrontation erupted into violence between the groups of Lissouba and Sassou-Nguesso in 1997. Sassou-Nguesso’s militia, supported by Angolan troops, captured the presidential palace and forced President Lissouba to flee from the country, effectively ending a phase of democratic transition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Congo Kinshasa</th>
<th>Year of Transition 2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President Mobutu had to flee from the country when the rebels, led by Laurent Kabila, with the support of the Tutsi-dominated government of Rwanda, entered Kinshasa in May 1997. By the time Kabila took over power, Congo had already suffered from massive refugee problems, collapsing economy, lawlessness and state failure. Kabila declared himself president and promised to establish a democratic system. However, the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL), anti-Mobutu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

214
coalition, was fractured by factional rivalries which pushed the country into another civil war and state failure. After the failure of the Lusaka Accords to implement a peace process in 1999, Laurent Kabila was assassinated in January 2001. His son Joseph Kabila was designated as the new president of the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2001. Despite the skepticism on his inexperience, he succeeded in negotiating the withdrawal of foreign troops from DRC and secured a series of peace agreements with the oppositions. The UN peacekeeping troops had to remain in the country as heavy fighting continued in the eastern province. President Kabila formed a transitional government which included opposition leaders in 2003. The interim government held a constitutional referendum in December 2005 in which voters overwhelmingly approved the new constitution. Consequently, the legislative and presidential elections were held in July 2006, and incumbent president Joseph Kabila was reelected by majority of votes. Despite the isolated violent events and the complaints filed by opponent Jean-Pierre Bemba, the elections were mostly judged legitimate. The electoral process helped the country steer to a path to democratic transition in Congo Kinshasa.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Croatia and Slovenia seceded from Yugoslavia in June 1991 after the death of Tito and the fall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe. The independence was followed by a civil war fought between Serbs and Croats. The right-wing nationalist Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), led by Franjo Tudjman, overwhelmingly won the election held in May 1990. Although Tudjman ruled the country in increasingly authoritarian manner, opposition parties were allowed to contest in successive elections.
in which the HDZ secured victory again in October 1995. The military victories over Serbs and the divisions among opposition groups helped the HDZ to attain another triumph in parliamentary elections in 1997. The HDZ’s dominance in electoral politics was weakened after Tudjman fell ill. The Supreme Court appointed an interim president to govern the country until multiparty elections could be held in February 2000. Stipe Mesic, the candidate of the Croatian People's Party (HNS) defeated Drazen Budisa of the HDZ in the presidential elections. Constitutional changes in November 2000 promoted the authority of the parliament and reduced the power of the president. The changes also eliminated the HDZ-controlled of upper house in the parliament. The constitutional amendments and moderate victories in free elections helped the country move a step closer to democratization. Following legislative elections in November 2003, the HDZ party again secured victory, and its candidate Ivo Sanader became the prime minister. In 2005 presidential elections, President Mesic defeated the HDZ candidate. Despite continuing factionalism, the country remained within the framework of nominal democracy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Czech Republic</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Although Czech Republic became an independent country in 1993 after the split with Slovakia, the actual transition took place at the end of 1989. Therefore, the coding should refer to the facts in Czechoslovakia in 1989 and prior respectively. But the analysis of post transition period in Czech should start from 1993 after it became a separate independent state.)
The opposition movement in Czechoslovakia gained its momentum after Mikhail Gorbachev had introduced reform initiatives in the Soviet Union. In both Czech and Slovak, dissidents organized two major pro-reform coalitions respectively to spearhead changes to a democratic system. The oppositions formed Civic Forum in Czech while Slovak counterparts organized a movement called Public Against Violence (PAV). Despite the communist government’s attempt to suppress the growing tide of demonstrations, the oppositions continued massive protests. Eventually, the communist leaders gave in by removing a constitutional clause which had mandated the leading role of the Communist Party in November 1989. Subsequently, the party's entire leadership resigned. President Gustav Husak also stepped down and was replaced by dissident leader Vaclav Havel elected by the Federal Assembly in December 1989, with the task to hold free elections in which Havel’s Civic Forum won the majority of seats in the parliament while the PAV, led by Vladimír Mečiar, secured victory in Slovakia. The tension between the leaders of Czech and Slovak grew significant after parliamentary elections in June 1992. Disagreements and unsettled differences between two republics led to Slovakia’s declaration of its sovereignty in July. After a series of negotiation, two republics agreed to split at the end of 1992. Czech became a consolidated democracy in a few years after the transition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Djibouti</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After Djibouti gained independence from France in June 1977, people elected Hassan Gouled Aptidon, an Issa, as president. Aptidon, backed by his own majority Issa ethnic group, consolidated his power by declaring Djibouti one-party state led by his People’s
Rally for Progress (RPP) in 1981. Minority Afars and other dissident groups organized armed rebellions that met harsh suppression by the government in 1991. However, the rebel movement grew and expanded its control to two-thirds of the territory in 1992. Under both domestic and international pressure, especially from France, the government held a constitutional referendum in which people voted in favor of political reforms to a multi-party system. However, the new system was designed to restrict the oppositions from participating in political process by requiring them to seek approval from the government. Subsequently, the fighting ensued in 1993, and the government forces drove the rebels out from strategic locations. In another attempt to foster stability in the country, both sides agreed upon a peace treaty that would allow rebel Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) to stand as a legal organization. But some factions of FRUD continued fighting against the government. Although some opposition members were included in the government, Aptidon remained the principle power holder of the government. In early 1999, Aptidon announced his retirement as his health was getting deteriorated. His nephew Ismail Omar Guellah contested the elections as candidate for RPP-FRUD alliance against independent candidate Moussa Ahmed Idriss, backed by other opposition groups. Outside observers judged the elections free and fair in which Guellah defeated Idriss despite the initial allegations of irregularities by the opposition. The remaining FRUD faction signed a ceasefire in 2000. However, factional competition continued after the transition, and the government was threatened by a failed coup attempt by police officers in December 2000.
After the assignation of military dictator Rafael L. Trujillo in May 1961, ‘puppet’ president Joaquín Antonio Balaguer Ricardo began to initiate political reforms. Opposition movements led by Viriato Fiallo, the Unión Cívica Nacional, became increasingly powerful by mobilizing workers and general public in strikes and protests. Embattled Balaguer and the oppositions agreed to form an interim council to govern the country until the inaugurations of a new president and the congress which were scheduled in February 1963. Eighteen parties participated in the elections in December 1962, and Juan Bosch, the leader of the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), defeated his opponents and was inaugurated in February 1963. The transition to democracy was, however, short-lived by another military coup with the support of the minority right-wing parties in September 1963. The junta ruthlessly suppressed the moderate and leftist groups. The military coup also triggered violent clashes among moderates favoring the Bosch’s government and pro-junta factions.

The lawlessness triggered by fighting among military factions and the fear of communist takeover triggered the US invasion of Dominican Republic under the guise of protecting American citizens in 1965. With the intervention of Organization of American State (OAS) ceasefire agreements was reached among warring factions, and the withdrawal of American troops were facilitated. Despite the allegations of fraud, Joachin Belaguer (Reformist Party), who had served under Trujillo, won the election in June 1966. His twelve-year rule was mired by unfair elections, opposition boycotts and restriction of
opposition movement. Under his rule, Dominicans enjoyed relative stability and economic development, and Belaguer was reelected in both elections in 1970 and 1974. The Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD), led by former president Bosch, boycotted both elections, charging restrictions on his campaign activities. The economy trembled in mid 1970s at the decline of world sugar prices, and Balaguer’s support began to decline. In 1978 elections, he was defeated by PRD candidate Silvestre Antonio Guzmán despite the allegation of fraud and intimidation. Dominican Republic reached another phase of democratic transition which was also dragged along factional confrontations until 1996.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>East Timor (Timor-Leste)</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>East Timor (Timor-Leste)</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since the Indonesian occupation of East Timor in late 1975, the brutal counter-insurgency campaign waged by the Indonesian military against the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) took heavy toll on human rights and civil liberty in East Timor. Despite the military defeat, FRETILIN continued to wage guerrilla war against the Indonesian troops while sustaining awareness campaign in international front to advocate full independence from Indonesia. Indonesian political crisis triggered by economic predicament forced strong-man Gen. Suharto to resign from presidency in May 1989. The downfall of Suharto paved both the democratization of Indonesia and the independence for East Timor. Indonesian President B.J. Habibie who replaced Suharto announced his government’s desire in January 1999 to hold a UN-sponsored referendum in East Timor to allow Timorese to choose between autonomy within Indonesia and full
independence. Timorese overwhelmingly turned out in polling states and voted seventy-eight percent in favor of independence in August 1999. The pro-independence outcome of the referendum was followed by a large-scale violent campaign orchestrated by pro-Indonesian Timorese militias backed by the Indonesian military. The violence killed approximately 1,300 Timorese and forcibly relocated 300,000 people into West Timor as refugees. Under the supervision of the international community, Australian-led International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) deployed to East Timor to curb ongoing violence to an end. The Indonesian government ratified the result of the referendum in October 1999 and repealed the 1976 legislation that had annexed East Timor as a part of Indonesian territory. Subsequently, the Indonesian forces withdrew, and the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) supervised the transition to full independence of Timor-Leste, a new country name. Timor-Leste held its first democratic elections in which sixteen political parties participated in August 2001. The FRETILIN Party secured the majority of Assembly seats and formed a parliamentary form of government in May 2002, and Mari Alkatiri, FRETILIN's Secretary General, became the first Prime Minister. Xanana Gusmao, formerly imprisoned leader of the FRETILIN, was elected president in free and fair elections in April 2002. Newly independent democratic Timor-Leste was far from stability and prosperity. The mutiny initiated by disgruntled soldiers flared into violence in April 2006 and led to the collapse of civil order. The government had to request assistance from Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Portugal to send security forces to clamp the violence in the country. The crisis forced Prime Minister Alkatiri to resign, and a new cabinet led by new PM Ramos-Horta was
sworn in. In 2007 presidential election, Ramos-Horta, who ran as an independent
candidate, won by a landslide victory in a runoff election. Despite the integrity of
electoral process in free and fair elections, sporadic violence characterized relative
instability.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Ecuador</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1968</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since the end of the World War II, Ecuadorian politics was mired with military coups and
factional confrontations between leftist and rightist political groups. Although Arosemena
Monroy, who took office in November 1961, enjoyed popular support, his subsequence
policies fostered adversaries from both leftists and rightists. Amidst rising unpopularity
of the government, a military junta overthrew Arosemena in 1963 and announced a series
of economic and social reforms. Junta President Castro Jijón promised that the military
would return the country to democracy rule once the junta had subdued insurgency and
laid out the “foundation of reforms.” Despite the military rule and prohibition of protests,
opposition parties were allowed to exist as legal entities. During this period, two political
coalitions were formed among right and left political organizations respectively to
consolidate their own strength. The oppositions used existing political space to mobilize
their activities. Protests and strikes erupted again, but the junta arrested key opposition
leaders after terrorist bombings. The opposition protests and unrest, nevertheless,
continued to pressure the junta for change. Embattled junta was deposed by its own
military which proposed to form an interim civilian government until free elections could
be held. Although Clemente Yerovi Indaburu, a wealthy businessman, led a civilian
administration and brought relative stability to the country, strikes and protests continued
in 1967. In the same year, a new constitution was promulgated in May. In presidential elections held in June 1968, former president José María Velasco Ibarra defeated his opponents. Ecuador’s democratic transition was, however, shortened by another military coup in 1972.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Ecuador</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In presidential elections in June 1968, former president José María Velasco Ibarra defeated his opponents. Ecuador’s democratic transition was, however, shortened by another military coup in 1972. The coup was triggered by the military’s fear of leftist takeover when the president included a leftist leader as a presidential candidate.

Brigadier-General Guillermo Rodriguez Lara, commander in chief of the Army assumed the position of head of state. President Rodríguez was again ousted by another military coup led by the chiefs of three military branches in 1976. The new junta promised to return to a constitutional government and lifted some restrictions on civil liberty. The junta invited oppositions to submit nominations to the proposed constitutional committees in June 1976. Some opposition groups, such as the National Civic Union (Junta Cívica Nacional), were fractured by disagreements over the question of dialogue with the junta. They escalated their mobilizations to expedite political reform by launching strikes and protests against the junta which in respond declared martial law in October 1976. In preparation for the transition to democracy, a referendum was held in January 1978, and free elections, in July. In a second round of presidential elections held in April 1979, Sr Jaime Roldos Aguilera, the candidate of the left-oriented Concentration
of Popular Forces (CFP), won overwhelmingly, defeating his right-wing opponent. The transition took place in accordance with the result of the election. Ecuador continued to suffer economic stagnation and factional politics that led to an attempted military coup in 2000 but remained as a transitioning country to democracy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>El Salvador</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1984</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Under growing public dissents and instabilities, the military officers ousted the government of General Carlos Humberto Romero in October 1979. The new junta, led by Colonel Adolfo Arnoldo Majano and Colonel Jaime Abdul Gutierrez, offered some concessions to moderate oppositions by including three civilians in the ruling junta which also promised to hold free elections. However, other major moderate parties, such as labor organizations, peasant groups, and the Roman Catholic Church, remained outside of the dialogue with the junta while violent conflicts ensued between the government and insurgents. Under renewing international and domestic pressure, José Napoleón Duarte, a widely respected Christian Democrat, was installed as president of El Salvador. In March 1982, elections were held to choose a 60-member assembly responsible for electing an interim president, preparing for new elections and writing a new constitution. The elections strengthened the right-wing groups in the assembly by electing ultra-rightist Major Roberto d'Aubuisson, of the Nationalist Republican Alliance party (ARENA), as its president. As a result of the right-wing takeover, the guerrillas intensified attacks. The draft constitution was prepared by the assembly while the government initiated unsuccessful peace efforts with the insurgents in 1983. In presidential elections held in
May 1984, José Napoleón Duarte, a candidate of Christian Democrat, won the presidency defeating Roberto d'Aubuisson of rightwing ARENA. Although the political process allowed mobilizations of legal opposition political parties to compete in the election, the leftist guerrilla coalition Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) was still fighting against the government. In 1988 and 1989 legislative and presidential elections, ARENA swept electoral victories, and its candidate Alfredo Cristiani became president. The FMLN and the government reached a peace agreement, under the UN-mandated mediation, which allowed the FMLN to transform a legal party. The first postwar presidential elections were held in March 1994, and ARENA’s candidate Armando Calderón Sol defeated FMLA candidate Rubén Zamora.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Estonia</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s reform initiatives in late 1980s revived the independence sentiment of Estonia and other Soviet satellites. Pro-independence movement gained momentum after a grassroots movement organized a mass protest against an ecologically destructive phosphorite mining in 1987. The success of the protest was an important precursor to the development of broad-based opposition organizations, such as the Estonian Popular Front and the Estonian National Independence Party in 1988. In the mean time, reformists within the Supreme Soviet of Estonia, legislative body in Estonia, sharing the independent sentiment with the growing grassroots movement, eventually passed a declaration of sovereignty in November 1988. Although the Soviet leadership refused to accept full independence of Estonia, the newly elected Estonian
Supreme Soviet declared that the transition to absolute independence was under way. However, the Estonian nationalists were divided into two camps. One group wanted to seek a negotiated settlement with the Soviet because of Estonia’s economic dependence on the Soviet Russia. The other group rejected gradualism and stressed independence as an immediate goal. However, the failed coup against Gorbachev in August 1991 and the Soviet’s crackdown in Latvia and Lithuania in January 1991 united two camps into seeking full independence in August 1991. The European Community recognized Estonian independence in right after the declaration, and the Soviet followed the suit in September. A constitutional assembly was established to draft a new constitution in September 1991. Estonia adopted a new constitution in July 1992 and held its first legislative elections in September. Mart Laar, conservative nationalist, became prime minister, leading a coalition government. Estonia’s transition to democracy was, albeit non-violent, weakened by factional dispute over the criteria of citizenship. The Estonian parliament passed a constrictive citizenship law which excluded almost one third of the population, especially ethnic Russian, Ukrainians and Belorussians. The restrictive citizenship automatically disenfranchised the minority population which could neither vote nor contest in election. Despite the existing tension between Estonians and non-Estonians, the government generally heeded to the calls to restore human rights of ‘non-citizen’ community.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

226
After Ethiopia lost financial and military support of the Soviet Union in late 1980s, Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam’s regime was increasingly unsecured under growing military threat from opposition forces. The rebellions led by the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) gradually gained territorial control while defeating the government troops in 1991. Eventually, the rebel coalition Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) advanced to Addis Ababa and forced Mengistu to flee to seek asylum in Zimbabwe. The EPRDF, along with the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and other armed opposition factions, formed the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) to facilitate new elections and draw a new constitution. Soon after the formation, the TGE began to fall apart after the OLF, the largest partner of the coalition, had left the interim government in June 1992. The factional confrontation erupted into violent fighting in the Arusi and Wallega regions dominated by Muslim Oromo ethnic groups. Eritreans voted overwhelmingly for independence in a referendum in April 1993, and subsequently, with the consent of Ethiopia, Eritrea declared independence. The TGE, dominated by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), continued to restrict political actions of opposition groups amidst violent confrontations. Under the shadow of instabilities, elections to select the members of the Constituent Assembly were held in June 1994, resulting in the victory for the EPRDF. Despite the objection from main opposition groups, the assembly rectified the constitution. National and regional legislative elections held in May and June 1995 also landed another victory for the EPRDF as the opposition coalition of 30 political parties boycotted. Opposition parties could have participated in
the election and secured critical portion of the seats if they had chosen to contest in elections. The Council of People's Representatives elected Dr. Negaso Gidada, a leader of Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO) which was a part of the EPRDF, as President of the Republic, a largely ceremonial role, and Meles Zenawi, the interim head of state in August 1995. The war broke out between Ethiopia and Eritrea in May 1998 and ended under a peace agreement in December 2000. Domestic electoral politics continued to be tainted by factional confrontations despite the nominal characteristics of democracy qualified by relatively competitive elections and the oppositions’ ability to politically mobilize their support.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Fiji</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fijian politics was entangled with ethnic tension between Indian-Fijian and indigenous Fijian. Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni Ligamamada Rabuka of the Fiji Military Forces led a bloodless military coup to remove Indian-dominant legislature in May 1987. The governor general later endorsed the coup and appointed members of the Council of Advisers to help him govern the country and hold new elections. The oppositions, including ethnic Fijians who voted in favor of the ousted coalition government, called for a campaign of civil disobedience. Rabuka, who was dissatisfied with the outcome of the elections, staged a second coup and revoked the constitution in September 1987. Rabuka formed an interim government headed by ethnic Fijian Sir Kamisese Mara, whose Alliance Party had been defeated in the 1987. The regime arrested some opposition members when weapon shipment bound to Fiji was seized in Australia as well as in Fiji
in 1988. The interim government drafted a new constitution that enshrined the dominance of indigenous Fijian. The constitution was proclaimed in July 1990, and new elections were scheduled in 1992. Although some groups claimed to boycott the elections in protest of the constitution, all major parties participated in the election. Maj.-Gen. Sitiveni Rabuka, president of Fijian Political Party (FPP) won 30 of the 37 House of Representative seats reserved for ethnic Fijians. Upon his post-election promise to review the constitution, Indian-dominant opposition Fiji Labor Party supported him to be elected as president. Despite the racist nature of the constitution, the quality of elections and political participation were nominally democratic. The transition also opened up opportunities to revive the constitution which was again amended in 1997 to expand the representation of Indians. A coalition of parties led by the ethnic Indian-dominated Fiji Labor Party (FLP) defeated Rabuka's Fijian Political Party in 1999 elections. As a result, Mahendra Chaudhry became Fiji's first ethnic-Indian Prime Minister. A group of indigenous Fijians, in protest of the election result, stormed the Parliament and seized several hostages, including Prime Minister Chaudhry. The crisis triggered the military to intervene by dissolving the Parliament and forming a new interim government. Fijian’s transition was interrupted by ongoing ethnic conflicts and a military intervention.

**Country Name** 
Fiji 

**Year of Transition** 
1990

Fijian politics was entangled with ethnic tension between Indian-Fijian and indigenous Fijian. Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni Ligamamada Rabuka of the Fiji Military Forces led a bloodless military coup to remove Indian-dominant legislature in May 1987. The
governor general later endorsed the coup and appointed members of the Council of Advisers to help him govern the country and hold new elections. The oppositions, including ethnic Fijians who voted in favor of the ousted coalition government, called for a campaign of civil disobedience. Rabuka, who was dissatisfied with the outcome of the elections, staged a second coup and revoked the constitution in September 1987. Rabuka formed an interim government headed by ethnic Fijian Sir Kamisese Mara, whose Alliance Party had been defeated in the 1987. The regime arrested some opposition members when weapon shipment bound to Fiji was seized in Australia as well as in Fiji in 1988. The interim government drafted a new constitution that enshrined the dominance of indigenous Fijian. The constitution was proclaimed in July 1990, and new elections were scheduled in 1992. Although some groups claimed to boycott the elections in protest of the constitution, all major parties participated in the election. Maj.-Gen. Sitiveni Rabuka, president of Fijian Political Party (FPP) won 30 of the 37 House of Representative seats reserved for ethnic Fijians. Upon his post-election promise to review the constitution, Indian-dominant opposition Fiji Labor Party supported him to be elected as president. Despite the racist nature of the constitution, the quality of elections and political participation were nominally democratic. The transition also opened up opportunities to revive the constitution which was again amended in 1997 to expand the representation of Indians. A coalition of parties led by the ethnic Indian-dominated Fiji Labor Party (FLP) defeated Rabuka's Fijian Political Party in 1999 elections. As a result, Mahendra Chaudhry became Fiji's first ethnic-Indian Prime Minister. A group of indigenous Fijians, in protest of the election result, stormed the Parliament and seized
several hostages, including Prime Minister Chaudhry. The crisis triggered the military to intervene by dissolving the Parliament and forming a new interim government. Fijian’s transition was interrupted by ongoing ethnic conflicts and a military intervention.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Georgia</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similar to other former Soviet satellites, a transition to democracy in Georgia came hand in hand with rising independent sentiment. Liberalization policies under the leadership of Gorbachev and growing nationalist sentiment encouraged the oppositions to call for independence from the Soviet Union in late 1980s. Ethnic minorities in Ossetia and Abkhazia, who were claiming not to be part of Georgia, came to a confrontation with the nationalists who were mobilizing their supporters across the country. Pro-independence demonstrations in capital Tbilisi met with violent crackdown by Soviet security forces in April 1989. Nevertheless, under the liberalization initiatives, political parties were allowed to contest in elections to the Georgian Supreme Soviet, a legislative body in Georgia under the Soviet Union in November 1990. The Round Table-Free Georgia, a coalition of pro-independence parties, led by nationalist dissident Zviad Gamsakhurdia, won the majority of seats in the election, and Gamsakhurdia became Georgia’s de facto head of the state. The nationalist-dominant Georgian Supreme Soviet declared independence from the USSR in April 1991. The collapse of the Soviet’s communist party after the failed coup attempt by the conservative in August 1991 also accelerated the process of Georgia’s independence. Gamsakhurdia won 86 percent of the vote and became elected president in the elections held in May 1991. The transition to democracy
was, nevertheless, weakened by internal strife fueled by ethnic conflicts between
Georgian and minorities especially in Ossetia and Abkhazia. The oppositions to
Gamsakhurdia launched a series of protests demanding his resignation soon after the
election in September 1991. Gamsakhurdia responded with repressive measures which
were deemed human rights abuses by international community. In the same year, a war
erupted between Russian-backed Abkhaz and South Ossetian rebels and Georgian troops
trying to prevent the minorities from breaking away from Georgia. On the other hand, the
confrontation between Gamsakhurdia and his opposition ruptured into an armed conflict
in capital Tbilisi. Opposition forces besieged the government’s headquarters and forced
Gamsakhurdia to flee from Georgia in January 1992. With the help of Russian forces,
Eduard Shevardnadze, a member of the former Soviet official, was chosen to temporarily
lead the country as acting chairperson of the State Council, the new legislature, in March
1992. Shevardnadze was elected by popular vote in October that year. A shaky transition
to democracy was strengthened by a new constitution which came into effect in October
1995. The constitution outlined a parliamentary democracy with strong executive power
resting at the president. Georgia’s democratic transition remained fragile, and the
country’s elections were far from free and fair in conduct until the elections held in 2004.

Country Name                 Ghana                                       Year of Transition  1979

Democratically elected Prime Minister Busia's government was overthrown by a coup led
by Colonel Ignatius Kotu Acheampong in 1972 amidst economic crisis. Although the
ruling Supreme Military Council (SMC) initially promised to return to a civilian rule, the
junta proposed a ‘union government’ that would consist of the military officers and civilians in 1978. However, the oppositions overwhelmingly rejected the proposal, and consequently, the junta outlawed them in 1978. In the same year, the council ousted Acheampong in favor of General Frederick W. Akuffo. The junta lifted the ban on political parties in January 1979 but disqualified over 100 prominent civilian leaders from holding public office. A small band of reformist officers led by Flight Lieutenant Rawlings overthrew the SMC-led regime in June 1979. The new junta replaced the SMC with Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and executed Acheampong, Akuffo, and Lieutenant General Afrifa, along with a few SMC leaders after summary trials. The AFRC promised to hold legislative and presidential elections as scheduled on June 28, 1979. People's National Party (PNP) captured majority of seats in legislative elections, and PNP candidate Limann defeated his opponent from Popular Front Party (PFP) in presidential election. However, Rawlings warned the elected representatives that the military might intervene again if people in power misbehaved. When the country suffered from deteriorating economic crisis, Rawlings fulfilled his words by launching another coup to topple Limann’s government in December 1981. His coup was welcomed by grassroots workers and the poor. With popular support, Rawlings turned Ghana into more radical economic reforms until he accepted a negotiated structural adjustment plan with the IMF in late 1980s. Rawlings suspended the 1979 constitution, dissolved the parliament and banned political parties. He formed Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) as a governing body with executive and legislative powers. Rawlings became president in military-ruled one-party state in 1983.
Rawlings began to initiate political and economic reforms under domestic and international pressure while facing economic crisis in the country. In a public referendum, people endorsed a new constitution in April 1992. The constitution outlined a multi-party system consisting of a president and a legislature. The long standing ban on political activities was lifted, and political parties were allowed to organize to participate in elections to be held in late 1992. The ruling Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) and its supporter formed a new party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC), to contest the elections which the oppositions charged unfair. As the result of the opposition boycott, only 17 seats out of 200 were gained by opposition parties in 1992 elections. Rawlings was elected as president in a controversial presidential election. However, learning lessons from the past, oppositions fully contested against the ruling NDC in 1996 elections. Although the 1996 elections were freer and fairer than the past, the NDC’s monopoly over state’s resources used to enhance election campaigns deprived the opposition of fair changes, so was the quality of the election. President Jerry Rawlings was reelected with about 57 percent of the vote for a second four-year term. His National Democratic Congress also gained two-thirds of the parliamentary seats, trailed by New Patriotic Party (NPP) as the major opposition. Limited by two terms in accordance with the constitution, Rawlings did not contest the presidential elections in December 2000. His departure from electoral contests paved a way for the opposition’s victory in both legislative and presidential elections. NPP candidate John Kufuor was
sworn in as president in January 2001, the first time since the independence that power transfer to civilian government came peacefully and democratically.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
<th>1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

In April 1967, just a few days before a general election, Colonel George Papadopoulos led a group of colonels in a successful military coup and established a military junta “Regime of the Colonels” which ruled Greece until 1974. The Colonels suspended the constitution, banned political parties, imposed censorship, and arrested scores of oppositions, especially suspected leftist sympathizers. King Constantine II launched a counter coup with some supporters within the military, but the attempt failed to overthrow the junta. The junta approved a drafted constitution which institutionalized the military rule in 1968. However, the opposition movement within Greece and among exiles in Europe gained their momentum as the first major demonstrations broke out in Athens at the funeral of former premier George Papandreou in November 1968. The disapproval of the junta within the military became more obvious when a mutiny within the navy unsuccessfully challenged the rule of Premier Papadopoulos in 1973.

Subsequently, Papadopoulos abolished the monarchy and declared Greece a presidential republic with himself as president. Under rising domestic and international pressures, he declared a broad amnesty for political dissidents and announced that elections would be held in 1974. After the brutal crackdown of anti-government protests organized by university students, hardliners in the military who were concerned with Papadopoulos’ political reforms, overthrew him to extend the military rule in November 1973. The new
junta, led by General Phaidon Gizikis, cracked down the oppositions. The suppression scrapped away ongoing liberalization initiatives. In the mean time, the military coup in Cyprus, allegedly instigated by Athens, developed into a military confrontation between Turkey and Greece. The Turkish military drove out Greek troops in Cyprus and occupied a part of the land in July 1974. The Greece’s defeat subsequently dissipated the junta’s support among nationalist officers. In the same month, the junta decided to abdicate its power. Gen. Gizikis summoned Constantine Karamanlis, former primer in exile, to form an interim government to oversee the transition to democracy. The interim government reversed the junta’s policy and opened up political space and lifted restrictions on civil liberty. In September 1974, the interim government approved a proportional electoral system with national elections which were held in November. Karamanlis’s conservative New Democracy Party (ND) secured a clear victory in elections and retained his premiership. In June 1975, the elected parliament approved a republican constitution by which Karamanlis was elected president in May 1980. Greece’s democratic transition was successfully consolidated in a few years later.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Guatemala</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1966</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Left-leaning President Jacobo Arbenz, who was elected in democratic elections in 1951, was overthrown by a military coup which was supported by the United States in 1954. The coup leader, Col. Carlos Castillo Armas, formally assumed presidency amidst the power struggle among the coup leaders. Castillo reversed Arbenz’s land reform programs, disenfranchised peasants, banned political parties and committed human rights
abuses to repress oppositions. After Castillo was assassinated by a presidential guard in July 1957, he was succeeded by a new junta, led by a series of military leaders. General Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes consolidated control and became president via fraudulent elections in March 1958. Ydigoras was again ousted by another military coup masterminded by Defense Minister Enrique Peralta who became president in 1963. Peralta suspended constitutional guarantees and scrapped the forthcoming elections. Despite the suppression, terrorism and unrest continued to challenge the junta under Peralta. Under domestic and international pressure, the regime allowed opposition parties, including moderately left-leaning Revolutionary Party (PR), to contest the elections scheduled to be held in 1966. The opposition leaders were subject to face intimidation and restrictions imposed by the military. In an attempt to subdue the oppositions, PR presidential candidate was assassinated before the elections were held. He was succeeded by his brother, Dr. Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro who defeated Col. Juan de Dies Aguilar de Leon of pro-military Institutional Democratic Party (PID) in the elections. Although free elections marked a new era of transition to democracy in Guatemala, guerrilla actions continued to challenge the government throughout the country, leading to the government’s imposition of the state of siege in November. Mendez, who campaigned on a reformist platform, was unable to overcome the oppositions from the military to implement his policies. Unweaving political conflict in transition was exacerbated when General Fernando Romeo Lucas García, supported by an alliance of the PR and PID, became president in a fraudulent election in 1978. Lucas
escalated state violence against oppositions, effectively reversing young democratic
transition into autocracy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Guatemala</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
<th>1986</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

A group of young officers led by General Efrain Rios Montt ousted the General Lucas’
government in March 1982. Rios Montt established a military junta, suspended the
constitution, disbanded the legislature and escalated counter insurgency campaigns
resulting in massacres of civilians in Mayan-dominated regions. Another military coup
led by Brigadier General Oscar Humberto Mejía Victores overthrew Ríos Montt in
August 1983. Coup leaders claimed their intention to revive political reforms and ended
the state of emergency. In July 1984, the junta held elections to elect an 88-seat
constituent assembly that would be responsible to draw a new constitution. Moderate
Christian Democrat, with about 17.2 percent, became the top vote holder among
seventeen parties which contested the elections. The Constituent Assembly promulgated
the new democratic constitution in May 1985, legalizing political parties and their
activities. The constitution also increased the power of the legislature over the executive
and outlined a plan to hold general elections in November. Christian Democrat Marco
Vinicio Cerezo Arévalo won the runoff presidential elections in December 1985 and was
inaugurated for a five-year term in January 1986. The Cerezo administration introduced a
series of reform to strengthen democratic institution and depoliticized the military. Initial
stability under the Cerzo’s government was disrupted by failing economy, rising civil
violence and political unrests marked by labor strikes and widespread demonstrations.
Guatemala continued to suffer from factional politics until 1996 when Alvaro Arzú Irigoyen of the center-right National Advancement Party (PAN) was elected president. Arzu succeeded in ending the long-running civil war with leftist insurgents by signing a peace accord in December 1996.

**Country Name**          **Guinea-Bissau**          **Year of Transition**       **1994**

Guinea-Bissau government led by Luis de Almeida Cabral, a leader of African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), was overthrown by a military coup in 1980. Coup leader João Bernardo Vieira transformed the junta’s Revolutionary Council into a one-party state in 1984 and reconstituted the National Popular Assembly (ANP). President Vieira and his military-dominated government survived an abortive coup in 1985. At the diminution of Marxist ideology, the ruling regime formally approved a transition to “integral multipartyism” in January 1991. The Supreme Court ended 17-year of one-party state by legalizing opposition two parties the Guinea-Bissau Resistance Bassat Movement (Bafata) and the Social Democratic Front in December 1991. The elections were scheduled for November 1992, and the oppositions were for the first time allowed to hold demonstrations in March 1992. After a failed coup attempt, the government arrested dozens of soldiers and Leader João da Costa, opposition leader of the Party for Renewal and Development (PRD) — composed mainly of educated dissidents who left the ruling PAIGC in March 1993. In the mean time, the opposition to the PAIGC was attenuated by fragmentation among opposition parties. In multiparty elections which were held in July and August 1994, the PAIGC won both the legislative
and presidential elections. Despite the accusation of fraud, presidential opponent Kumba Iala, leader of the Party for Social Renovation (PRS) accepted the defeat. International observers declared that the elections were free and fair. After a few years, the transition to democracy was offset by a mutiny as Vieira tried to dismiss the army chief of staff. The confrontation erupted into a civil war between mutinying troops and soldiers loyal to the government. The rebels successfully dislodged Vieira from power in 1999, disrupting a short phase of democratic transition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Guinea-Bissau</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

João Bernardo Vieira of PAIGC was reelected as presidential in the country’s elections in the beginning of democratic transition in 1994. Mutinying troops ousted Vieira from power in 1999 after the rebels militarily overpowered the government forces. In a series of negotiations under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Vieira and Mane agreed to form an interim government until elections were held. After the withdrawal of troops from neighboring Senegal and Guinea supporting Vieira, a sudden resurgence of fighting overthrew President Vieira, resulting in the victory of Gen. Mane who turned over power to PAIGC statesman Malan Bacai Sanha to lead the country as acting president. In November 1999, twelve candidates and 13 political parties contested presidential and legislative elections. Kumba Yalla, candidate of the Social Renewal Party (PRS), defeated interim President Malam Bacai Sanha in both presidential and legislative elections. In early 2000, democratically elected civilian government led by Yalla was sworn in. Another transition to democracy was marred with
factional instabilities within the government leading to another military coup which

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Guinea-Bissau</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

President Yalla dismissed Prime Minister Caetano N’Tchama and Baciro Dabo as head of
his personal security in March 2001. In mid-November 2002, Yalla dissolved the
legislature and dismissed the Cabinet. The military dismayed by Yalla’s political
maneuver seized power in September 2003 in a bloodless coup. The coup leaders set up
Military Committee for the Restitution of Constitutional and Democratic Order
(CMROCD), which was led by the armed forces chief of staff, Gen. Verissimo Correia
Seabra, who also declared himself interim President. The CMROCD appointed a
transition government led by Antonio Artur Sanha in October 2003 to undertake
legislative elections in 2004. Elections to the National People’s Assembly (the
unicameral legislature) were held in March 2004, resulting in the victory for African
Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC) tailed by former
the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC), was appointed as the new
Prime Minister in May. Hundreds of soldiers in another mutiny staged demonstrations to
seek the settlement of payment, and the soldiers in mutiny killed Gen. Verissimo Correia
Seabra, the armed forces chief of staff, who had led a military coup against Yalla in 2003.
However, the mutiny came under control after negotiations and appointment of new
military commanders. In the second round of presidential elections held in July 2005, former ousted president Vieira defeated Malam Bacai Sanha of PAIGC. International election monitors declared the elections free and fair. Guinea-Bissau again transcended to a path to democratic transition in 2005.

**Country Name**  
Guyana  

**Year of Transition**  
1992

Prime Minister Linden Forbes Sampson Burham consolidated his power in 1978 by altering the Constitutional amendment procedures to grant him unlimited presidential power. Following the death of Burnham in August 1985, new Guyana government, led by Hugh Desmond Hoyte, came under growing international and domestic pressure for reforms. Consequently, Hoyte reversed Burham’s policies and initiated a reform process. An internal “Integrity Commission” submitted a recommendation to the government that it initiate dialogue with all other political groups to speed up electoral reforms in August 1988. The government later reached agreements with the oppositions to move towards free and fair elections in April 1991. The general elections, which were held in October 1992, resulted in a narrow victory for the People's Progressive Party (PPP). Guyanese elected Cheddi Jagan of the PPP as President, who defeated the candidate of ruling People’s National Congress (PNC). The progress to democratic transition was, however, hindered by factional conflicts between major parties. Nevertheless, the country was able to maintain nominal features of democratic elections. The PPP again defeated the PNC in 1997 elections which the PNC accused of election fraud. Members of the PNC boycotted
the National Assembly, refusing to take their seats, and sporadic political riots broke out following the election.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Haiti</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
<th>1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The reign of Duvalier family ended after President Jean-Claude Duvalier, under mounting political pressure, was forced to flee the country by the US intervention in February 1986. The military, which took over the country at the fall of Duvalier, drew a new constitution to restore the bicameral legislature and limit the power of the central government. The constitution was adopted in 1987. Although an independent council was established to supervise elections in 1987, the military muzzled up the council from functioning effectively. A fraudulent election in 1988 named a civilian, Leslie Manigate as president, just to be overthrown by the military four months later. Lieutenant General Prosper Avril took over presidency and continued to suppress his oppositions. Avril, in turn, was challenged by two coup attempts in April 1989, resulting in bloodshed confrontations. Amidst economic crisis, boiling unrests and growing international pressure, Avril resigned in March 1990. A civilian-led interim government replaced Avril to undertake elections. Internationally supervised elections were held in December 1990 and resulted in a victory for left-wing Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a Roman Catholic priest. Aristide’s attempt to reform political system and subdue corruption trigged another bloody military coup in September 1991, reversing the path of democratic transition to a military rule.
Country Name: Haiti  Year of Transition: 1994

The junta that overthrew elected-President Aristide came under intense international pressure. The United Nations imposed sanctions against the regime to pressure the military to transfer power to the elected president. In 1993, the UN and the Organization of American States (OAS) crafted an agreement with the junta, led by Brigadier General Raoul Cédras, to allow Aristide to return to power. Although the military initially refused to step down, facing the threat of another military intervention by the United States, the junta leaders left the country for exile in Panama. Subsequently, Aristide was restored to power in October 1994. Although Aristide’s resurrection steered the country back on the path to another democratic transition, he had to face unsettling economic crisis and growing threats of mutiny by security forces. Aristide was again reelected in 2000 elections which the oppositions boycotted and the international community questioned its legitimacy. Aristide’s rule became increasingly autocratic until he was forced to step down by internal unrests, especially armed rebels closing in on the capital city in 2004. Aristide was exiled to the Central African Republic under US military escort and replaced by Haiti’s chief justice of the Supreme Court, Boniface Alexandre.

Country Name: Haiti  Year of Transition: 2006

Increasingly autocratic rule of Aristide faced growing opposition movements, invigorated by the rebellions. Facing international and domestic pressures, Aristide resigned and fled the country for exile in 2004. Under the arrangement of the UN Security Council, a transitional government was formed with a seven-member Council of Sages. The council
appointed Gérald Latortue as interim prime minister in March 2004. In accordance with
the transitional plan, Haiti held presidential elections in February 2006. The first round of
the presidential election in February 2006 between two leading candidates were largely
disputed and marred by allegations of irregularities. In a run-off election held in March,
former president René Préval narrowly defeated rival Leslie Manigat. Although Haiti was
steered back on the track to democratic transition, Préval had to face daunting challenges
from deteriorating economy, residual factional problems and corruption among security
forces.

| Country Name | Honduras | Year of Transition | 1982 |

Honduras politics was dominated by the reigns of successive military governments
grabbing power one after another throughout the 20th century. President Ramon Ernesto
Cruz, who won the elections in 1971, was deposed by General Lopez Arellano in a
bloodless coup in December 1972. General Lopez was again overthrown in April 1975 by
General Juan Alberto Melgar after Lopez’s bribery scandal surfaced to the public. Gen.
Melgar was also ousted by another military coup, the third coup within six years, led by
General Policarpo Paz Garcia in August 1978. Following the success of leftist revolution
in neighboring Nicaragua, the United States, the major backbone of the successive juntas
in Honduras, began to put pressure on the regime to transform into a constitutional
government. General Garcia held elections to form a 71-member National Constituent
Assembly in April 1980. The assembly was tasked with drafting the country’s 15th
constitution and holding presidential elections. Although opposition Liberal Party gained
most number of seats in the assembly, the military and its ally Nationalist Party (PN) held most cabinet positions. Under the transitional civil-military government headed by General García, gradually growing political space created opportunities for opposition groups to engage broader activities. In September 1981, 60,000 Hondurans took the streets in protests in Tegucigalpa against alleged repression by security forces. Public demonstrations also boosted the oppositions’ platform in the election. The transition regime held presidential elections in November 1981. Dr Roberto Suazo Cordova, Liberal Party (PL) candidate, defeated rival conservative PN candidate Ricardo Zuniga Augustinus. In the newly elected Congress, the Liberals gained the largest number of seats, and a new government was formed based on the election result. The new constitution was approved in 1982, and Honduras experienced its first democratic transition after decades of military rule since 1963. Nevertheless, the military still wielded considerable influence in the nation’s politics. Honduras politics remained divided between conservatives and liberal factions after the transition. When Liberal Party candidate Carlos Roberto Reina Idiaquez took office in 1993, he escalated security sector reforms reducing the role of military in political spheres. Strengthening democratic and market-oriented economic reforms gained momentum after its first fully free and fair elections held in November 1997 in which Liberal Party swept victories in both presidential and legislative elections.

**Country Name**: Hungary  
**Year of Transition**: 1990

The Communist government gradually increased its contact with non-communist regimes in the west in 1970s. Although economic and political reforms were partially taken place,
the Kadar regime maintained friendship with the USSR. An economic decline and growing mass demonstrations led to the replacement of Kadar with Karoly Grosz in 1988. Grosz introduced various liberalization initiatives to develop private sectors and to open up political space by relaxing censorship regulations, allowing political groups to form and permitting civil groups to protest. The reformers within the ruling party initiated measures to revise the constitution to transform the country towards a multiple-party system in 1989. The Parliament passed the Law of Assembly and Associations to expand political participation and organization in January 1989. The act legalized the existence of rival political parties to the communist party and other civic associations that became active in 1988. Civic opposition groups, taking the opportunity of growing political space, mobilized their supporters in different forms of non-violent actions to accelerate reforms. The changes in emigration restriction also opened up Austro-Hungarian border allowing Hungarians to immigrate to West Germany. The change in immigration policies signaled the undergoing transformation within the ruling regime. Hungary held its first free legislative elections in 45 years in March 1990 and transformed the country from one-party state to a multiple-party democracy. Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), a coalition of center-right parties, secured a parliamentary majority, and its leader József Antall became Prime Minister to head the new government. The National Assembly chose Árpád Göncz, a writer, as president. After a few years, Hungary became a consolidated democracy.

| Country Name | Indonesia | Year of Transition | 1999 |
Gen. Suharto ruled the country under a suppressive authoritarian system where his Golker Party backed by the military was the only ruling institution in Indonesia until the end of 1990s. Opposition to his rule grew steadily as Islamic radicals and university students challenged the government in occasional demonstrations and protests. The economic development, which was one of the core successes of Suharto, declined suddenly when the Asia financial crisis hit Indonesia in mid 1997. The government was forced to devalue its currency which subsequently exacerbated hardship for middle class and the poor. Riots and protests broke out in Indonesian cities in early 1998 and triggered harsh responses from the government killing hundreds to maintain stability. The growing unrests and continuing protests led by students forced Suharto to resign in May 1989. Suharto was replaced by his vice president Baharuddin Jusuf Habibie as president. President Habibie introduced some reform initiatives reversing Suharto’s suppressive measures. In June 1999, Indonesia held multi-party elections for the House of Representatives in June 1999. Opposition Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) led by Megawati won the largest number of seats but failed to gain majority. Former ruling Golkar appeared at the second. The People’s Consultative Assembly later elected Abdurrahman Wahid of the National Awakening Party as president in October 1999. Indonesia transcended to a path of transition to democracy under the newly elected civilian government which gradually introduced a series of reforms to limit the role of the military in national politics. However, the country continued to suffer from violent ethnic conflicts and terrorist attacks while undergoing the transition.
Since Cote d'Ivoire gained independence from France in 1960, the country was ruled by a small group of political elites who were able to maintain relative stability by restricting opposition activities. Student-led demonstrations forced the ruling Democratic Party of Cote d'Ivoire’s (PDCI) to transform the country from one-party system to a limited multi-party rule in 1990. However, the PDCI under the leadership of Henri Konan Bedie systemically alienated the oppositions from political arena until late 1990s. The growing unrest exacerbated by the charges of corruption in Bedie’s government triggered a bloodless military coup that overthrew the government in December 1999. The junta, under the leadership of General Robert Gueï, held a constitutional referendum which retained electoral restrictions in favor of direct Ivorian descents in July 2000. The restrictions especially alienated Muslim candidates who called for the boycott of the elections subsequently. Expecting the potential defeat in the elections, Gen. Guei attempted to stop vote counting when the result indicated the victory for his rival Laurent Gbagbo. However, popular mass protest forced Gen. Guei to accept his defeat, and Gbagbo declared winner in October 2000. The widespread violence between Muslim supporters of northerner Alassane Ouattara and pro-Gbagbo Christian supporters from the south killed over 200 following the election. Though two leaders promised to promote reconciliation, unrest continued. The government survived a failed military coup in September 2002. But ethic insurgent groups gained their momentum and controlled
territories in the north and west of the country since 2003. Despite the French-brokered peace agreement in 2003, sporadic violence continued.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
<th>2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Brief Description of Transition**

Under domestic and international pressure, the Moi government transformed the country from one-party rule to a limited multiparty system in December 1991. The change legalized other political parties in addition to the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU). However, the opposition parties were subject to systemic restrictions by the government while their strength was also weakened by factional splits among ethnic lines. In legislative and presidential elections held in December 1992, Moi was reelected and his KANU gained majority of seats in the assembly. The oppositions to the government escalated confrontation by organizing labor strikes and widespread protests in 1997. But the divided opposition movement was defeated again by the KANU in fraud-laden elections in December 1997. At the early 2000s, Kenyan economy sharply declined while the oppositions to Moi regained their momentum. Moi, facing a constitutional term-limit barring him to seek reelection, handpicked Uhuru Kenyatta, son of former President Kenyatta, to run the presidential elections scheduled to be held in 2002. Several opposition parties rallied behind the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), led by former vice president Mwai Kibaki, to challenge the KANU in the 2002 elections. Kenyatta’s KANU was also weakened by the defection of several prominent leaders to the NARC. In presidential and legislative elections held in December 2002, the NARC defeated the
KANU with 2 to 1 majority in both elections. International observers judged the elections free and fair. As the result, under the newly elected government led by Kibaki, Kenya was able to land on a path to democratic transition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>South Korea</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Syngman Rhee ruled the country as president with little constraints on his power under the constitution rectified in 1948. Although political parties were allowed to exist legally, Rhee systemically suppressed the oppositions and restricted civil liberty to subdue his potential challengers. Rhee’s Korean Democratic Party (KDP) continued to dominate the political arena and manage to win successive elections until 1960. The government’s manipulation of the 1960 elections triggered nationwide protests organized by students seeking democratic reforms. Initially, Rhee attempted to quell the protests violently by killing at least 100 students. Under intense international and domestic pressures, Rhee was forced to resign in April 1960. Rhee’s regime was replaced by a caretaker government which amended the constitution to restrict the executive power of the president. Subsequently, the interim government held new elections in which the Democrat Party, opposition to the Rhee’s regime, won two thirds of the seats in both houses of the parliament. The transition to an elected civilian rule characterized Korea’s first democratic transition since the breakup of North and South Koreas. In the meantime, the Democrat Party was divided into two camps, one led by John Myun Chang and another, Yoon Bo Sun respectively. The civilian government under the leadership of
Premier John Chang was subject to intense pressure from student groups to purge former official who had collaborated with the Rhee’s regime. The pressures from activists increased fear among the military leaders. The military’s concerns were exacerbated by potential instability and students’ agitation to unify with North Korea. Eventually, the military overthrew the civilian government in May 1961. The junta led by Park Chung Hee proclaimed martial law, restricted civil liberty and dissolved the parliament.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>South Korea</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1963</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The junta led by Gen. Park Chung Hee, who overthrew the first elected civilian government in 1961, came under pressure from the United States and domestic oppositions to return the country towards representative democracy. In December 1962, Gen. Park held a referendum to decide whether to return to a presidential rule. Voters overwhelmingly adopted a revised constitution aiming at returning to a system with representative executive authority. The junta subsequently lifted bans on political activities opening doors to civilian oppositions to challenge his authority in coming elections. With Gen. Park’s blessing, pro-military Democratic Republican Party (DRP) was prepared to contest in the elections. Although Gen. Park initially announced not to participate in the elections, he reversed his decision. Under factional disagreements, civilian oppositions were not able to fortify a strong coalition to compete with Park’s DRP. In the elections held in October 1963, Park narrowly defeated his opponent for a four-year term presidency. Disunited oppositions lost majority of seats to the DRP in
legislative elections as well. After the electoral victory of the DRP, South Korea was redirected to the path of democratic transition again. Within a limited democratic framework, Park cleverly maneuvered around constitutional restriction on term limits and narrowly won every democratic presidential election until 1971. After his narrow defeat in the 1971 presidential election, Park reversed the direction of democracy by revoking civil liberty under the decree of martial law. Park continued to rule the country under authoritarian-style leadership until his assassination in October 1979.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>South Korea</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After the assassination of President Park, Premier Choi Kyu Hah became acting president and placed the country under martial law in 1979. An intra-military coup later promoted General Chun Doo Hwan as the dominant political leader. Despite the crackdown and restrictions on political activities, demonstrations in protest to existing martial law erupted in major cities in 1980. In attempts to quell the protest, the army killed over two hundred protestors in violent crackdowns. Gen. Chun became president by indirect vote after President Choi stepped down in August 1980. New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP), the main opposition group in the National Assembly, demanded constitutional amendments to allow direct popular elections to select president and restoration of civil rights for political activities. The opposition to the ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP) gradually gained momentum after a petition campaign for constitution reforms in 1986. The oppositions held nation-wide demonstrations defying the government’s tight security measures in June 1987. In the mean time, radical student movements ignited violent
protests resulting death and injuries among both police and demonstrators. Facing domestic and international pressure, Chun Doo Hwan was forced to open up a competitive electoral process in coming elections. The whole cabinet resigned in May 1987 in a symbolic gesture to allow free elections next year. However, the divided opposition candidates helped the ruling DJP to secure another victory for its candidate retired Gen. Roh Tae Woo in presidential elections. In the legislative elections, the DJP secured the largest number of seats but failed to capture the majority. The DJP merged with two other parties in 1990 to form the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) which became the majority in the legislature. The Peace and Democracy Party (PDP), led by Kim Dae Jung, stood as the main opposition in the parliament. Relatively competitive electoral process helped South Korea to experience another track to democratic transition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Latvia</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td></td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similar to other Soviet satellites, Latvia’s path to democratic transition came along with independence from the USSR. Liberalization in the USSR in late 1980s revived pro-independence sentiment in Latvia. Starting from 1988, prominent Latvian leaders and newspapers began to voice their call for independence. The Popular Front of Latvia, which was founded in October 1988, organized a broad-based civic movement to pursue independence from the USSR. The Front, however, initially limited its demand to wider autonomy rather than a full independence. Many moderate communist leaders in Latvia supported the Popular Front and its nationalist mobilization. Growing pro-independence
sentiment and expanding political liberalization allowed the opposition coalition, which was led by the Popular Front, to secure majority of seats in both 1989 local elections and 1990 elections to the Supreme Soviet, a parliamentary body of Latvia. Having entrenched in the governing body, the Popular Front pushed towards full independence. The Supreme Soviet of Latvia passed a resolution calling for restoration of sovereignty in May 1990. However, the USSR refused to recognize Latvia’s independence and threatened with an imminent military crackdown. The Soviet’s attempt to subdue the nationalist movement was met with non-violent mass protests in early 1991. Four people were killed during the attack launched by the Soviet Ministry of the Interior in January 1991. The breakdown of military coup by communist hardliners in Moscow accelerated Latvian independence in August 1991. The Soviet eventually recognized Latvia independence in September, enabling the country to proceed to a full fledge transition to democracy from a single-party state under the USSR. Latvia held its first multiparty parliamentary elections in June 1993 and restored its old constitution of 1922 in July. Although Latvia faced a citizenship problem among non-native Latvians because only 52 percent of population was ethnic Latvians, the transition to democracy was relatively peaceful.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lebanon’s factional politics was intensified by the interference of regional powers and transnational religious and political groups. The Lebanese government was largely influenced by the occupying Syrian forces prior to the transition. Prime Minister al-Hariri
resigned in protest of the extension of presidential term for Émile Jamil Lahoud backed by Syria in 2004. The assassination of al-Hariri in February 2005 triggered a wave of anti-Syrian sentiment across the country. The demonstrations challenged the Syrian-backed government and demanded the withdrawal of Syrian forces. In response to international and domestic pressure, Syrian troops departed Lebanon in April 2005. At the decline of Syrian influence, a caretaker government, led by moderate pro-Syrian Prime Minister Najib Mikati, was formed to help the country prepare for new elections. In the final round of Lebanon’s parliamentary elections held in June 2005, Lebanese voters favored the March 14 Alliance, anti-Syrian coalition led by deceased Hariri’s son Saad Hariri. It was the first time a single electoral block won the election which was monitored by the United Nations in Lebanon. Lahoud, who resisted calls for his resignation, appointed an anti-Syria prime minister Fuad Saniora. Relative freedom of political parties to contest in the election without being overshadowed by external powers was a landmark of the 2005 election. As a result, a cabinet “made-in-Lebanon” was created by the elected representatives. However, the country came close to the revival of another civil war when the military confrontation with Israel led to rampage destruction of Lebanese infrastructure in 2006. Factional and religious violent erupted in May 2008 killing about 80 people when the majority in the government attempted to curtail Hezbollah’s power. Under a deal brokered by the Arab League, the majority and minority parties agreed to share a veto for cabinet decisions. Lebanon’s nominal transition to democracy remained fragile.
Prime Minister Joseph Leabua Jonathan who ruled the country under an authoritative system since 1970 was overthrown by a military coup in 1986. The junta led by Major-General Justin Lekhanya later dethroned King Moshoeshoe as he refused to endorse Lekhanya’s dismissal of several senior members of the military council in 1990. His son Letsie David Mohato Bereng Seeiso was later enthroned as a ceremonial king. The junta leader Lekhanya was also ousted by a bloodless military coup in April 1991. The new junta, led by Major General Phisoane Ramaema, crafted reform initiatives in 1991 and lifted bans on political activities to move towards general elections. A constituent assembly drafted a new constitution in the same year to facilitate a transition to democratic rule despite some controversial provisions. The country’s first democratic election was held in March 1993, and the Basotho Congress Party (BCP), headed by Ntsu Mokhehle, emerged as a winner sweeping all 65 seats in the National Assembly. A transition to democracy was, however, weakened by factional conflicts among political elites. King Letsie, who wanted his father to be reinstated as head of state, deposed the BCP government in a coup backed by the military in August 1994. After a lengthy negotiation, the BCP government was reinstated in September 1994, and Moshoeshoe II became head of state in 1995. The power struggle within the BCP led to Mokhehle’s resignation from the party to form a new party, Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD). The LCD’s overwhelming victory in the 1998 legislative elections, which were pronounced free and fair by local and international observers, was disputed by the
opposition groups which ignited mass protests later joined by the army. The government was unable to contain the mutiny and requested South Africa to intervene. The violence resulted in large-scale destruction of infrastructure and over 100 deaths.

Country Name                  Lesotho      Year of Transition  2002

Lesotho’s transition to democracy was interrupted by factional conflicts among political groups which could not agree on the electoral result as the “only game in town.” The Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), a breakaway from former ruling Basotho Congress Party (BCP), won a landslide victory sweeping all seats but two in the 1998 general elections which independent observers proclaimed free and fair. The opposition groups losing their grounds in electoral competitions launched widespread protests. Stability of the country was deteriorated by an army mutiny and general strikes from civil servants. The government requested South Africa to intervene to restore order. Over hundred people were killed by the military confrontation between the intervening troops and resisting mutineers. LCD leaders and the opposition groups reached an agreement in 1998 to hold new elections with expanded numbers of seats in the National Assembly. The new arrangement included proportional seats allowing the oppositions to gain significant numbers of seats in the elections held in May 2002 although the LCD won the majority of seats. After a few years of factional fighting and instability, Lesotho was redirected to a path to democratization.

Country Name                  Liberia      Year of Transition  1997

258
A group of Liberian dissidents launched armed rebellions against the junta led by Samuel K. Doe in 1989. The National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), a rebel group led by Charles Taylor, took control of the vast majority of country side while fighting ensued between the Doe government and the rebels until 1996. Peacekeeping forces from Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervened in 1990 and saved the capital city from falling into the hands of the NPFL. After the assassination of Doe in September 1990, the ECOWAS helped Liberians formed an interim government which Taylor refused to cooperate. After a series of negotiations and more than a dozen peace accords, warring factions agreed to form a transitional government in 1996. Under the auspicious of Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), Taylor and other factions accepted a disarmament process and consented to participate in legislative and presidential elections in 1997. Charles Taylor won a landslide victory as president, and his party National Patriotic Party gained a majority of seats in the National Assembly. International observers judged the elections free and fair. After seven years of civil war that killed more than 150,000 Liberians, the country tried to transform towards a democratic system through ballet boxes.

| Country Name | Liberia | Year of Transition | 2006 |

Initially, the government led by Charles Taylor appeared to forge reconciliation with his adversaries by incorporating them into the government. However, the government failed to revive the country’s collapsed economy and accomplish much needed reconciliation. Instead, the Taylor government supported the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a rogue
rebel group in neighboring Sierra Leone which was wreaked havoc by the civil war. The United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions on Liberia for aiding the RUF in 2001. Domestically, Taylor’s armed gangs increasingly suppressed the opposition members. Starting from 2000, the government shut down several independent news and radio stations in a measure to curb oppositions to Taylor. His misrule gradually triggered the resumption of insurgency organized by Taylor’s former adversaries. The rebels formed Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) to wage war against the Taylor government. Despite several attempts to secure ceasefire, fighting continued. The rebel forces crashed government troops in countryside and inched towards the capital city.

Under intense international and domestic pressure, President Taylor resigned for exile in Nigeria in August 2003. The fall of the Taylor government facilitated the deployment of peacekeeping troops under the auspicious of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). A peace agreement formed a two-year power sharing interim government headed by Charles Gyude Bryant. Legislative and presidential elections were held in October and November respectively in Liberia’s most free, fair and peaceful elections in its history. Voters elected Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, an economist and former dissident, as the first female president of an African nation. Political condition remains stable since the 2005 elections.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

260
Gorbachev’s initiatives to foster liberalization in the USSR led to the revitalizations of Lithuanian nationalist movements, similar to other former Soviet satellites, in late 1980s. Lithuanian leaders formed a special commission to propose constitutional amendments to expand reform initiatives within Lithuania in 1988. The members of the commission, including both communist and non-communist intellectuals, organized a broad-based pro-independence coalition called the Lithuanian Movement for Reconstruction, also known as Sajudis, in June 1988. Sajudis mobilized mass rallies in June and August 1988 to promote the sense of Lithuania nationalism. At the same time, opening political space also allowed the growth of newspapers, including those published by the Sajudis. The nationalists, gaining momentum through mass mobilization, proclaimed Lithuania sovereignty in mid 1989. Having sympathized with pro-independence sentiment, the Communist Party of Lithuania (CPL) seceded from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in December 1989 and allowed the participation of non-Communist candidates to contest in coming elections. The candidates associated with the Sąjūdis won an absolute majority in the Supreme Council of the Lithuania, legislative body of Lithuania, in February 1990. The parliament, dominated by the nationalists, declared the restoration of independence from the Soviet Union in March 1990—the first Baltic country to secede from the USSR. A public referendum overwhelmingly endorsed the declaration in 1991. However, the USSR was reluctant to approve Lithuanian independence and increased economic, political and military pressure to prevent Lithuania independence. Soviet troops stormed Lithuania capital Vilnius and took over the television tower in January 1991. The raid, which killed 14 civilians and injuring 700, fortified Lithuanians’ resolve
to independence, instead of damping it. In the mean time, the failure of hardliners’ military coup in Moscow accelerated the collapse of the Communist Party of Soviet Union in August 1991. Sajudis and nationalist groups overwhelmingly opposed the hardliners’ attempt to impose a state of emergency in Lithuania. The failed coup in Russia accelerated the success of Lithuanian independence which was recognized by the European Community subsequently after the coup. The Soviet government followed the suit in September 1991, acknowledging the independence of Lithuania. The parliamentary elections were held in 1992, and the Democratic Labor Party, formerly the CPL, defeated Sajudis, partly because of the popularity of party leader Algirdas Brazauskas as well as the infighting within the Sajudis. Lithuanian voters approved direct elections to select the president, and the presidential election was scheduled in early 1993. The departure of Russian troops in August 1993 also strengthened the independence of Lithuania. Since the beginning of the independence, Lithuanian transition to democracy met consolidation characteristics and remained stable until the present.

Country Name  Macedonia  Year of Transition  1991

The breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was the direct cause of Macedonian independence in 1991. After Slovenia and Croatia declared independence, Macedonian Slavs voted overwhelmingly to form a separate independent state in a referendum held in September 1991. Although Macedonia was a multiethnic state composed of majority Slavs (67 percent) and minority ethnic Albanians and other small
ethnic groups, the secession from Yugoslavia was the most peaceful process compared to its counterparts. At the initial phase of the independence, the struggle for international recognition became the center issue of domestic politics as Greece opposed to the use of name ‘Macedonia’ which was also a part of Greece region. A new constitution laid out a parliamentary democracy in November 1991. The first democratically elected government was a multiethnic coalition led by Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski of the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM), a transformed outfit of former Communist party. However, growing ethnic factionalism gradually polarized the party, and popular support shifted towards more nationalist Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonia National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) in late 1990s. A power struggle between the SDSM and the Liberal Party within the governing coalition facilitated the oppositions’ attempt to defeat the former communists in 1998 elections. The VMRO-DPMNE and its moderate allies secured victory in the 1998 elections. However, ethnic tension with minority Albanian erupted into an ethnic war in early 2000s.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Madagascar</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Under the 16 years of President Ratsiraka's rule, Madagascar gradually suffered from economic mismanagement guided by revolutionary socialism based on the 1975 constitution establishing a highly centralized state with little tolerance to opposition parties. Historically, Madagascar was characterized by factional conflicts between coastal residents (cotiers) and central highlanders (merina). Facing economic decline, Didier
Ratsiraka, an ethnic cotièr, attempted to remedy the crisis by introducing liberal reforms in economic policy in late 1980s. Consequently, Ratsiraka relaxed some restrictions on civil liberty by allowing more political parties to establish. The oppositions taking the advantage of emerging political space and ill economy mobilized their supporters to challenge President Ratsiraka in the 1989 elections. Divided opposition candidates lost the elections which were charged with fraud and irregularities. Oppositions staged protests in violent confrontation with the security forces resulting in the deaths of 75 people. The opposition groups, which formed an alliance called the Active Forces Committee (CFV), launched massive uprising calling for democratic reforms in 1990. The presidential guards opened fire at thousands of protestors marching towards the Presidential Palace, killing 30 demonstrators in August 1991. The rising tide of the opposition movement forced President Ratsiraka to concede to the Panorama Convention which established a transitional government stripping him of most presidential powers in October 1991. Voters approved a new constitution by a wide margin in a national referendum in August 1992. Madagascar held its first free presidential elections under the new constitution in November 1992. In the second round of voting, opposition candidate Albert Zafy defeated former President Ratsiraka. In next elections in 1997, Ratsiraka was victorious over Zafy. Despite the factional competition, contestation remained confined within electoral process until March 2009.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Malawi</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

264
Malawi was ruled by President Hastings Kamuzu Banda of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) under a one-party system since 1967. Under pressure from financing international powers, the government released all but a dozen political prisoners in 1991. Malawi's Roman Catholic Church issued a pastoral letter highlighting the government’s human rights abuses in March 1992. The letter consequently sparked student protests signaling the rise of opposition movements. The protest and riots flared up in the same year after the arrest of opposition leader Chakufwa Chihana. Police opened fire at the rioting protesters resulting in at least 38 deaths. Alliance for Democracy, opposition coalition, continued to raise its call for a transition to a multiparty rule. In response to the international pressure calling for political reforms, President Banda promised to hold a referendum to decide whether to choose a multiparty system. Two main opposition groups, the Alliance for Democracy (Aford) and the United Democratic Front (UDF), staged massive rallies in early 1993 to mobilize public support to a transition to democracy. Malawians overwhelmingly voted in favor of a multiparty system in a referendum held in July 1993. The Parliament under the control of Banda’s MCP adopted constitutional changes to end one-party rule. To facilitate fairness in the election, the military attacked the Young Pioneers, Banda’s militia wing responsible for intimidation of oppositions and grassroots voter in December 1993. Banda’s 30 year rule of dictatorship was ended by the elections resulting in the victory for Bakili Muluzi who defeated Banda in May 1994. Despite its transition to democracy, Malawi continued to suffer from factional contestations among three main parties, and election-related violence and voting fraud occasionally characterized political competition.
The military junta that ousted dictator Modibo Keita in 1968 ruled the country under the 1974 one-party constitution until 1991. In response to growing economic crisis, the government led by Lt. Moussa Traoré restructured its economy in late 1980s by privatizing some government enterprises. Consequently, congress of the Democratic Union of the Malian People, Mali’s only political party, endorsed calls for structural reforms that would eventually create a multiparty system in April 1990. Although Traoré allowed independent political organizations to form and opened up limited civil liberty, he was reluctant to bring the country to full democracy. The liberalization was an opportunity for pro-democracy oppositions to coordinate their campaigns against the government. The oppositions formed the Alliance for Democracy in Mali (ADEMA) to mobilize popular discontent opposing the rule of Traore. The oppositions organized a series of protests triggering a harsh crackdown from security forces which killed over 100 demonstrators in March 1991. The army later refused to crackdown the growing protests and ousted Traore in a coup led by Lt. Col. Amadou Toumani Touré. The new junta restored stability in the country and promised to turn the country to a civilian government. The junta allowed more than 30 political parties to form to contest in coming elections. In the mean time, the ethnic rebellion in the north de-escalated under an Algerian-sponsored agreement that allowed quasi autonomy to Tuareg groups. Voters approved a new constitution in a referendum in January 1992. In the first presidential elections, ADEMA candidate Alpha Oumar Konaré defeated his rival Tieoule Mamadou
Konate of the African Democratic Rally (RDA). The turnout was only 16 percent of eligible voters in the second round of presidential voting, and the majority of Mali’s 48 political parties boycotted the elections on accusations of frauds and irregularities. Although the country was directed to a path of democratization, Mali’s political arena was strongly influenced by factionalism based on ethnic lines. The oppositions boycotted the 1997 legislative elections manifesting growing factionalism in the country’s path to democracy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mexico’s political arena was dominated by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) since its founding in 1929. The PRI suffered from a major split as reformers within the party sought more democratic liberalizations in 1987. Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solórzano, dissident PRI member who was repelled from the party, ran as a candidate for leftist coalition National Democratic Front (NDF) against Carlos Salinas de Gortari, PRI candidate in 1988 presidential election. Although widespread electoral fraud helped Salinas defeat Cárdenas, the opposition movement gradually built up momentum all the way to the next election. Political and economic success of Salinas in early 1990s was overshadowed by the rise of Zapatista rebellion in southern Mexican state of Chiapas in 1994. The Zapatista movement highlighted the plights of indigenous people and sought political and economic reforms in the country. The allegation of fraud in legislative elections of 1991 also tarnished the PRI’s reputation and fueled anger towards the PRI. The growing strength of opposition parties, especially leftist Democratic Revolutionary
Party (PRD) and conservative National Action Party (PAN), became a daunting challenge to PRI in coming presidential elections held in December 1994. However, PRI candidate Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León received barely over 50 percent of the vote and was elected president. Although the PRI gained largest number of seats in the legislative elections, it controlled only 55 percent in the lower house of Congress. Observers proclaimed elections largely free and fair despite the reports of numerous irregularities. Growing opposition movement facilitated by electoral process weakened the PRI’s dominance of power and paved more reforms in coming years. In presidential elections held in July 2000, the PRI was defeated by Vicente Fox Quesada of PAN.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Moldova</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since the introduction of political and economic reforms by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in mid-1980s, several Moldovan pro-reform opposition groups gradually emerged without legal status in late 1980s. The opposition groups formed the Popular Front of Moldova (PFM) in 1989 to mobilize public support and organized anti-Soviet rallies and large demonstrations. A major part of the popular mobilization was contributed by the rise of Romanian nationalism which came into clash with other Russian and Ukrainian minorities, especially in the Trans-Dniester region. The tension between Russian speakers and ethnic Moldovans escalated into secessionist movements in the east and southern parts of the country. Following the failed coup against Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, Moldova declared its independence in August 1991. The PFM, soon after the independence, took control of the government and held direct
presidential elections in December 1991. Mircea Snegur, a reformist former CPM member, was elected president unopposed. The independence accompanied by the transition to democracy was marred with ethnic wars in Transdniestria where secessionist ethnic Russians proclaimed independence in late 1991. The PFM lost its public support over its policy to reunite Moldova with Romania. At the demise of PFM, the Agrarian Democratic Party (ADP), made up of mostly former communists, formed a new government opposing the unification with Romania in 1992. Moldova’s first multiparty parliamentary elections were held in February 1994, and the ADP seized the largest number of seats. The first post-Soviet constitution took effect in July 1994, strengthening the on-going democratic process. The first multi-candidate presidential elections were held in December 1996, and Petru Lucinschi, a former leader of the Communist Party of Moldova, defeated former president Snegur who campaigned on a pro-Romanian platform.

Country Name       Mongolia       Year of Transition       1992

Following the reform initiatives of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, Head of State Jambyn Batmonh introduced Mongolian versions of ‘glasnost’ and ‘perestroika’ in late 1980s. Despite the initiatives to reform economic policies, Mongolia’s economy continued to decline. Consequently, the Central Committee of the ruling Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) adopted the Politburo proposals to allow greater media freedom. The liberalization led towards democratic electoral processes in December 1988. Commissions were set up to amend the constitution and the party
regulations. Growing pro-democracy movements in Eastern Europe and the prospect of reforms encouraged Mongolian dissidents to organize their movements facilitated by tolerance of the MPRP regime. Pro-democracy dissident groups formed the Mongolian Democratic Union (MDU) in December 1989, and the government recognized it as a legal organization. The MDU and other opposition groups staged a series of pro-democracy rallies to pressure the MPRP to speed up democratic reforms. The whole leadership of the MPRP resigned to accelerate reforms in March 1990 and was replaced by new leaders to facilitate the transition. People's Great Hural, a legislative body, approved a multiparty system in May 1990, making it a turning point to democratic transition. Mongolia’s first multiparty elections for the People's Great were held in July 1990, resulting in the victory for the MPRP which defeated ill-prepared opposition parties. The People’s Great Hural elected Punsalmaagiyn Ochirbat of the MPRP as president along with a vice president from the Social Democratic Party. Ochirbat continued political and economic liberalizations to gear up the process of democratization. The People's Great Hural overwhelmingly approved a new democratic constitution in January 1992, clearly cementing the ongoing process of democratic transition. Under the new constitution, the first direct presidential elections were held in June 1993. Ochirbat, supported by the opposition coalition, defeated the MPRP candidate while the MPRP won the majority of seats in the legislative election.

Country Name                Mozambique                            Year of Transition  1994
Since it gained independence from Portugal in 1975, Mozambique was ruled by the leaders of FRELIMO regime under a one-party system which was closely allied to the Soviet bloc. The FRELIMO supported black nationalist rebels in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). In return, South Africa armed and financed anti-communist guerilla movement known as Renamo in Mozambique. Although President Samora Moises Machel reached an agreement with South Africa to mutually cut of their support to respective guerrilla movements in each country in 1984, fighting between the government and Renamo continued throughout 1980s. At the fourth congress of the FRELIMO held in 1983, the delegates expressed desires to move towards decentralization of political power. After the death of President Machel in 1986, foreign minister Joachim Chissano succeeded his place to continue reform initiatives. In 1990, Frelimo’s government adopted a new constitution that rejected Marxism-Leninism and embraced a multiple party system. The constitution opened doors for an internationally brokered peace process resulting in an agreement between the government and the Renamo in 1992. Under the supervision of the United Nations, elections were held in October 1994 in accordance with the peace accord. The elections went peaceful without major incident. Incumbent Frelimo candidate Joaquim Chissano defeated his rival Afonso Dhlakama of Renamo in presidential elections. Frelimo also narrowly won the legislative elections. International observers judged both elections free and fair, and Renamo agreed to recognize the election result. Mozambique’s democratic transition continued without much incident among political competitors in successive elections except occasional boycotts and electoral complaints.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Nepal</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
<th>1959</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An autocratic rule by Prime Minister Maharaja Mohan Shumsher Rana was ended with his removal from office in November 1951. A more moderate government headed by Matrika Prasad Koirala was sworn in afterward. After the death of King Tribhuvan, his successor King Mahendra announced his plan to change towards a parliamentary constitutional monarchy in December 1957. A new constitution was promulgated to hold elections to select members of a bicameral parliament in February 1959. Under the constitution, the king remained the head of state wielding veto power over the cabinet’s decision. In legislative elections held in March, Nepali Congress Party secured the largest number of seats, and its leader P. Koirala became the prime minister. Despite its transition to constitutional democracy, civil unrest triggered by tax reform law weakened the credibility of the elected government. In the mean time, the border dispute with China interrupted a short period of stability. Land owners, conservative and royalists were concerned with the government’s reform initiatives which threatened the interests of the powerful. In response to the rising tide of leftist reforms, King Mahendra, who had authority to declare emergency, launched an auto-coup abolishing the parliamentarian government in December 1960. Mahendra dissolved the parliament and suspended sections of the constitution. The coup terminated the initial phase of transition to democracy which lasted only less than two years.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Name</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>Year of Transition</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>272</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Political parties were banned until 1990 under Nepal’s partyless panchayat system which allowed the king to possess executive power. The Nepali Congress Party (NCP) and the United Left Front (ULF) organized massive pro-democracy rallies to challenge the absolute monarchy and pressed the regime to move towards democratic reforms since early 1990. Initially, the government attempted to quell the protests with violent force killing as many as 150 protestors. Although King Birendra dismissed Prime Minister Marich Man Singh Shrestha to pacify enraged public, the confrontation between protestors and security forces continued. The protests forced the king to remove the long-standing ban on political parties and to allow the formation of a coalition government which was headed by Krishna Prasad Bhattarai of the NCP as prime minister. The fresh government prepared to draw a new constitution outlining a parliamentary system with a constitutional monarchy. The constitution curtailed crucial executive authorities the king previously enjoyed. The king officially accepted the constitution in November 1990, and parliamentary elections were scheduled for 1991. Nepal held its first multiparty elections in May 1991, and moderate NCP won the majority of seats in the parliament. The success of transition to democracy was however diluted by the factional confrontation between the NCP and the United Marxist-Leninists (UML), the largest opposition. Post transitional instability was invigorated by the “people’s war,” guerrilla movement launched by radical Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist). Amidst the rising Maoist threat, the king assumed his royal power, declared emergency and suspended some parts of constitution in 2000s. In response to the king’s auto-coup, a seven-party opposition alliance including the Maoist insurgents spearheaded mass protests throughout the
country. Faced with military blockade and popular uprising, the king conceded the opposition’s demand to restore the parliament. The new government and the Maoist insurgents reached a peace agreement in November 2006. Under the agreement, the Maoists were allowed to participate in the coalition government. After twist and turn between the Maoists and the government, the main parties agreed to abolish the monarchy after the elections scheduled in 2008.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Nicaragua</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since the end of the autocratic rule by Anastasio Somoza Garcia in 1979, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), the guerrilla group which spearheaded the uprising to topple Somoza, governed the country in increasingly Marxist-oriented and authoritarian manners. Although the opposition parties were not banned, they refused to participate in the 1984 elections. To dislodge the Sandinista regime, the United States under the Regan administration armed the Contra insurgents since early 1980s. In the mean time, the military confrontations between Nicaragua and Honduras became a major security threat because the Contras were operating from Honduras as their launching pad. In late 1980s, Nicaragua economy was taking toll from the impact of war and US economic embargo. Under the auspicious of leaders from Central America and the United Nations, the Sandinista agreed on a peace plan in 1989 that outlined a free and fair democratic election and disarmament of Contra insurgents. Despite the peace agreement, some factions in the Contra refused to give up arms while others decided to join the political process. Being confident of the victory, the Sandinistas lifted political restrictions on
opponents prior to the elections which were scheduled for early 1990. In internationally monitored elections, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro of the National Opposition Union (UNO), a coalition of 14 anti-Sandinista parties, defeated incumbent president Ortega. Ortega recognized the opposition victory, and both leaders agreed to promote reconciliation. Following the elections, demobilization of Contra continued. The Sandinista remained a powerful political force which occasionally stirred up general strikes and protests to pressure the government. Class-based factional problems and human rights abuses, especially in rural areas, however weakened the process of democratization.

| Country Name | Niger | Year of Transition | 1992 |

After the death of President Seyni Kountché, leader of the junta who came to power in a coup in 1974, Ali Seybou, the army chief of staff, succeeded the presidency in November 1987. Seybou initiated limited liberalization by releasing most political prisoners and promoting reconciliation with the opposition in 1988. The Seybou government drew a constitution to transform the country to a civilian rule under a single-party system in which recently created National Movement for the Developing Society (MNSD) became the country’s sole political party in 1989. Dissatisfied with limited reforms and one-party state, Mouncore, exile opposition group, reignited its activities inside the country to pressure the Seybou regime. Starting from early 1990, public protests sprung across the country. The government’s austerity program to tackle economic decline partly contributed to the protests. Student riots in February, which killed at least 11 students,
snowballed into a mass uprising where 95 percent of workers protested against the
government. When the army and labor unions withdrew their association with the
country’s sole party MNSD in protest against the one-party rule in January 1991,
President Seybou conceded to popular demands. Seybou resigned from the MNSD and
declared his government transitional in July 1991. The government facilitated a broad-
based national conference to revise the constitution in the same month despite the
opposition’s complaint over the over-representation of delegates closely associated to the
government. An interim government was formed and the president’s executive power
was stripped off, subsequently. Instability grew in 1992 because of the army mutiny
seeking back pay and secessionist rebellion of Tuaregs in northern Niger. A turning point
emerged when voters ratified a multiparty democratic constitution in December 1992. In
1993 elections, Mahamane Ousmane of the Alliance des Forces du Changement (AFC-
Alliance of the Forces of Change), a coalition of nine parties, was elected president, and
the AFC also won a majority in the parliament. However, the transition to democracy was
hindered by growing factionalism within the ruling coalition and deteriorating economy.
The power struggle within ruling elites set off an administrative deadlock as the National
Assembly dismissed the whole cabinet by a no-confidence vote in late 1994. The
disagreements between President Ousmane and Prime Minister Hama Amadou delayed
the implementation of peace accord with the Tuareg rebels. Amidst impending instability
and growing political tension, a military coup led by Colonel Ibrahim Bare Mainassara
seized power in January 1996. The junta arrested the president and the prime minister,
banned all political parties and revised a new constitution which granted the president
with extensive executive power. Although the ban on political parties was lifted, Mainassara won presidency in a following rigged election in July 1996. The transition to democracy was curtailed by the military coup and subsequent rule of Mainassara in authoritative manner.

| Country Name | Niger | Year of Transition | 1999 |

President Ibrahim Bare Mainassara, who seized state power in a coup in 1996, consolidated his presidency in subsequent fraudulent elections. Despite occasional protests and a small army mutiny during the rule of Mainassara, weak opposition groups were not capable to effectively challenge the regime. After Mainassara was assassinated by members of his presidential guards in April 1999, a 14-member military council known as the National Reconciliation Council appointed Major Daouda Malam Wanké to replace Mainassara. The new junta faced suspension of international assistances amidst economic deterioration, in effort to pressure the regime to return to a civilian rule. The junta formed the National Reconciliation Council to supervise the drafting of a new constitution which outlined a semi-presidential multiparty system. Voters approved the new constitution in July 1999, and subsequently, legislative and presidential elections were held in October and November 1999. Tandija Mamadou, candidate of National Movement for the Developing Society (MNSD), formerly a ruling party, secured victory in both elections. International observers judged the elections free and fair despite low voter turnout—less than 30 percent of eligible voters participated. The transition to
democracy remained weak in early 2000s because of political unrests--student riots in 2001 and an army mutiny in 2002.

| Country Name | Nigeria | Year of Transition | 1979 |

Nigerian politics was dominated by the mixture of feeble civilian rules and domination of the military in national politics since the independence from the British in 1960. Instabilities triggered by ethnic violence and fragile civilian rules were accompanied by a series of military coups since 1966. Starting from mid 1970s, the rulers within the military junta pronounced various political and economic reforms. Nevertheless, the leadership instability within the military multiplied at least four intra-regime coups.

General Murtala Mohammed, who pronounced his dissatisfaction with ongoing reform process, ousted the regime led by General Gowan in October 1975. General Mohammed, however, came up with his own plans towards a gradual transition to civilian rule, including anti-corruption campaigns. Despite the popularity of his reforms, Mohammed was assassinated in an abortive coup in February 1976. Lieutenant General Olusegan Obasanjo, chief of staff, became the leader of the junta to replace Mohammed. Obasanjo resumed the reform initiatives grounded by his predecessor to steer the country towards a democratic transition. Under the rule of the military junta in late 1970s, a few student protests broke out in response to economic hardship. In preparation for a civilian rule, the junta held local elections to choose local government council in 1976. In August 1976, the elections were held to select the members of National Constituent Assembly which would review the draft constitution. The assembly formally presented the new
constitution to the head of state Obasanjo in August 1978. Subsequently, the junta lifted the ban on political parties and their activities. Five political parties contested in five separate elections held in July and August 1979. Shagari, the candidate from the National Party of Nigeria, was elected president despite the challenges by three opposition parties on procedural and constitutional issues. General Olusegun Obasanjo declared that he would retire from military service and promised that the military would cooperate with the new civilian regime. The transition to democracy was nevertheless marred by corruption, civil unrests, factionalism, electoral fraud, economic mismanagement and xenophobic policies under civilian rule. Dissatisfaction among northern Muslims, who were upset by the government’s inability to address their grievances, erupted into armed rebellions in late 1980. Citing instabilities and incompetence of the Shagari government, Major General Muhammadu Buhari ousted the civilian regime in a bloodless coup in early January 1984. The transition to democracy was reversed to a military rule which was also attenuated by at least seven intra-regime coups until 1997. In response to the international and domestic pressures, the junta led by General Abdulsalami Abubakar attempted to introduce reforms towards a democratic transition. Abubakar lifted bans on political organizations and activity to prepare for elections. Presidential and legislative elections were subsequently held in February 1999. The elections were charged with widespread allegations of fraud and irregularities. The election result was the victory for former military leader Olusegun Obasanjo and his his People’s Democratic Party. Despite the transition to civilian rule, the quality of election failed to meet nominal characteristics of democratization.
A period of parliamentary democracy following the independence was a mixture of weak governance and persistent social disorder exacerbated by the rising tension between India and Pakistan. Eleven-year old experiment of democracy was terminated when President Iskandei Mirza, with the support of the military, abrogated the constitution, declared martial law and banned political parties in October 1958. In less than a month, the military, led by Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, forced Mirza to resign. Khan became the president armed with strong executive power, deriving from the previous system of parliamentary democracy. To legitimize his presidency, Ayub introduced four-tier electoral system, known as “Basic Democracy” in 1959. The last tier at local level, two third of council members were directly elected by popular vote, in a pyramidal political system, while one third of the members were appointed by administrative officers. The rest tiers were indirectly elected from lower tiers. Following the local elections held in December 1959 to early 1960, the Ayub government secured majority of affirmative votes to legitimize his rule. Ayub Khan, subsequently, established a special commission to draft a new constitution that outlined a federal republic with a strong president and a 150-member unicameral national legislature, and both the president and legislators would be chosen by electoral colleges consisting of elected members of local councils under the four-tier system. In 1962 elections held for the national and provincial assemblies, individual politicians participated to get elected to the National Assembly as
political parties were still banned. The restriction on political parties obscured the definite nature of democratic transition in 1962. Immediately after the elections and the formation of the new cabinet, the government lifted the ban on political parties and their activities with a few categorical restrictions. Ayub established the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) as the ruling party of Pakistan. In next elections held in 1965, opposition political parties contested against the PML. The electoral colleges re-elected President Ayub defeating his opponent, Fatima Jinnah, candidate of the opposition coalition. The reintroduction of democracy however abruptly ended as Ayub resigned from his post, under mounting pressures from oppositions and general public over his handling of the Kashmir war, in March 1969 and handed power to the commander in chief General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan who was designated as a martial-law administrator.

| Country Name | Pakistan | Year of Transition | 1973 |

The bitter and bloody civil war between East and West Pakistan ended with the defeat of the Pakistanis army by the Indian forces backing the separatist East Pakistan rebels. President Yahya Khan, who came to power by the designation after former President Ayub had resigned, agreed to step down under mounting pressure in December 1971. Yahya was immediately succeeded by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, leader of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), which had won December 1970 elections prior to the onset of the civil war. Amidst continuing instabilities, martial law remained in place until the Bhutto government lifted the decree and convened the National Assembly which consisted of elected representatives from West Pakistan in the 1970 elections. The assembly drafted
Pakistan’s third constitution which structured into a two-chamber legislative body, deviating from the existing presidential system. Bhutto promulgated the constitution in April 1973, and elections to the Senate were held in July same year under the new constitution. A joint session of both legislatures elected Bhutto as prime minister and Chaudhri Fazal Elahi as president in August. Despite the official transition to parliamentary democracy, instabilities and factionalism detracted the country from its path to democratization shortly after the transition. The Bhutto government became increasingly heavy headed in response to growing oppositions. The Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), the opposition coalition, boycotted the provincial elections in 1977, accusing the ruling PPP of electoral fraud. The PNA called for protests which erupted into violent riots in many cities killing about 350 people. The electoral deadlock between the PPP and the PNA, and growing instabilities triggered a military coup led by General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq in July 1977. The martial-law regime tried Bhutto for the murder of a political opponent and hanged him on a guilty count in April 1979.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The junta led by General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, who came to power in a military coup in July 1977, held a referendum in late 1984 which endorsed Zia’s Islamization programs and his rule. A restricted election was held in February 1985 despite the calls for boycott by opposition parties which were subject to restrictions under martial law. General Zia consolidated his authority by securing a constitutional amendment following the elections in 1985. In accordance with the amendment, the National Assembly would merely
become an advisory body, and vast executive power rested in the hand of President Zia. He reluctantly lifted martial law in December 1985 and allowed political parties to register in early 1986. The political opening accelerated the opposition’s mobilizations led by the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) which was spearheaded by Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People's Party (PPP). The MRD organized mass rallies to keep pressure on Zia to overturn the existing constitutional structures in late 1986. The government arrested Bhutto and hundreds of supporters and killed at least 25 people in clashes. Riots and bombings frequented the political scene in late 1980s. In response to growing opposition movement, Zia dissolved the civilian cabinet and the National Assembly in May 1988, and named a caretaker cabinet to reconsolidate his rule. However, the death of Zia in August 1988 in a plane crash, reportedly caused by “internal sabotage,” made another turning point for a chance to democracy. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Chairman of the Senate, became acting president who declared a state of emergency but promised to hold new elections as planned in late 1988. The oppositions formed two coalitions to represent major parties to contest the election while Bhutto’s PPP decided to enter the race on its own. In November elections, the PPP won the majority of seats and secured a coalition with smaller parties to form a government in December 1988. Observers proclaimed the elections free and fair. Pakistan descended to a path to democratization again amidst instabilities, ethnic and ideological factionalism. The president, under the authority of the existing constitution, used his power to dissolve the government in three separate occasions until an amendment was passed in April 1997. Civil violence among ethnic, religious and rival political groups weakened already fragile
democratic process since mid 1990s. The rift between the Pakistani military and the
civilian government led to another military coup in October 1999 that deposed Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif who came to power in 1997 elections. General Pervez Musharraf
took over the executive post, suspended the constitution and dissolved the legislature.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Panama</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td></td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panama held direct presidential elections in May 1984 after the death of General Omar
Torrijos in 1981. General Manuel Noriega, who emerged as an influential political
stakeholder in post-Torrijos era, manipulated the election result to pick the candidate
from *Democratic Revolutionary Party* (PRD) which was backed by the military.
Although Ardito Barletta became the president, General Noriega retained actual
executive power in the government. The Noriega regime became increasingly
suppressive on his oppositions, and the United States gradually cut off its assistance to
Noriega, who was also an informant of the Central Intelligence Agency. Starting from
1987, domestic oppositions to Noriega grew significantly. The Civilianization Crusade,
newly formed opposition coalition, organized protests to express their discontent with
Noriega soon after Colonel Roberto Díaz Herrera publicly denounced Noriega of election
fraud and for his involvement in drug smugglings. Subsequently, a U.S. Court in Miami
indicted Noriega on drug-related charges in 1988. Although presidential elections were
held in May 1989, Noriega nullified the result when the exit poll indicated the victory of
opposition candidate Guillermo Endara. Noriega narrowly survived the attempted
military coup by disaffected troops from the armed force. The United States refused to
acknowledge the government installed by Noriega and imposed more economic sanctions on Panama. Eventually, the US troops invaded Panama, defeated Noriega’s troops within days and captured him in December 1989. The US installed a caretaker government led by opposition candidate Guillermo Endara of Arnulfista Party in recently annulled election. During the transitional period, the US advisers implemented crucial policy decisions behind the scene. The US’s important accomplishments were the transformation of the Panama’s military into a civilian police force and a strong economic recovery boosted by massive US aid amounting almost $ 1 billion. The first free and fair elections were held in May 1994, resulting in the victory for Ernesto Perez Balladares from Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), former party of Noriega’s supporter. As the US troops withdrew in late 1990s, Panama took complete control of its sovereignty, including the canal and the US bases. Panama’s transition to democracy became successfully consolidated in a few years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Paraguay</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Paraguay experienced a series of instability events including international conflicts and civil wars while the country suffered from perpetuated military dictatorship from the beginning of independence in 1811 to mid 1954. General Alfredo Stroessner, who came to power in a military coup in 1954, ruled the country under repressive measures alienating opposition groups from the main stream political process until 1989. President Stroessner won every election in tightly controlled political environment, partly favored by economic development in 1960s, and partly contributed by suppression under the State of
Siege Act. Starting from 1984, Stroessner lifted some restrictions allowing a few exiles to return Paraguay and opposition Febrerista Party to hold a rally in the capital for the first time in 20 years. Despite the continuing human rights abuses by the regime, the opposition movement gradually gained momentum since mid 1980s. In 1985, opposition coalition Acuerdo Nacional called for public demonstrations and student protests demanding a transition to “true democracy.” In the same year, farmers were protesting for low prices of their products. Amidst economic decline and at the coming end of Stroessner’s term in 1988, the ruling Colorado Party was also divided between those who preferred a civilian government and those supporting the extension of Stroessner’s presidency. The opposition movement, led by Acuerdo Nacional, continued to mobilize general public and called for a dialogue with the regime under the auspicious of Paraguayan bishops. The government showed mixed signals in its response to growing demands to liberalize the country’s political system. In April 1988, the regime removed state of siege act which was in place for decades to suppress the opposition movement. At the same time, the government continued to threaten the oppositions with arbitrary detentions and restriction on civil liberties. Despite the boycotts from major oppositions, the presidential elections were held in February 1988 under restricted atmosphere favoring Stroessner to get reelected. The opposition charged that the elections were manipulated by widespread fraud. Growing unpopularity of Stroessner and the power struggle within the regime erupted into a surprised military coup led by General Andrés Rodríguez who removed President Stroessner and abolished the government in February 1989. Some observers put the death toll between 100 and 300 as the result of infighting.
between the military factions. The new junta scheduled new elections in May, and Rodríguez declared himself a candidate, pledging that he would serve only one term. The elections were flawed partly because most opposition parties were not prepared enough to contest the race under restrictions. Although the Communist Party remained banned, most formerly restricted parties were allowed to participate. Rodríguez and his Colorado Party, won both the presidential race and legislative elections. In spite of the reported fraud and irregularities, the election result was mostly accepted as accurate. The opposition parties gained almost 32 percent of seats in the legislature. Under the new government, Rodríguez promoted economic and political reforms. The new constitution came into effect in June 1992, restricting the power of the president and the role of the military in political landscape. The new provisions also institutionalized free and fair electoral processes. Despite the reforms strengthening democratic structures, Paraguay continued to suffer from factionalism and residual interference of the military in national politics. The confrontation between President Wasmosy, who won the May 1993 presidential election, and General Lino Cesar Oviedo, the army commander, came close to another military coup in 1996. Growing factional conflicts resulted into the assassination of a presidential candidate of ruling Colorado Party in March 1999.

Country Name                  Peru                  Year of Transition  1956

In 1945 the National Democratic Front, a coalition of liberal and leftist parties, including the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), supported José Luis Bustamante Rivero in his bid to the presidential post. The National Democratic Front also gained a
majority of seats in both houses of the legislature. The new government instituted liberal reforms, strengthened civil rights and restricted the executive power of the president. The leftist reform sparked political tension between military-backed right-wing economic elites and the APRA, supported by middle and working class. Consequently, rightist leaders, led by General Manuel A. Odria, overthrew the APRA government and outlawed the alliance in 1948. After taking over the government, the coup leaders redirected economic policies to bolster development in the country. The success of economic development was accompanied by populist agendas, including the military’s promise to return to democracy. Odria held free and fair elections in June 1956 but did not contest in the presidential race. Manuel Prado, a conservative patriarch who was blessed by banned left-wing APRA and Odria, won the presidential election. Prado later lifted the ban on the APRA as promised, allowing its exiled leaders to return to Peru. Although Prado faced both economic and political challenges when he took the office, his administration was able to stabilize the economy in 1960. The government approved a plan to gradually nationalize majority of oil-production facilities in Peru. Right-wing political groups were concerned with the government’s inclination to the left. The runoff in the 1962 presidential elections among three candidates exacerbated the rightist concerns that leftist candidates would defeat the military-backed Fernando Belaúnde Terry of the Popular Action Party. The military consequently overthrew the government to disrupt a pending agreement between two candidates, Manuel Odría and Haya de la Torre of APRA, to elect Odria as president with an APRA vice-president. Although the military promised to return to a civilian rule and installed General Ricardo Pío Pérez Godoy as president in
July 1962, the junta deposed him in March 1963. The transition to democracy was reverted to another military rule.

**Country Name** Peru **Year of Transition** 1963

During the presidential elections in 1962, none of the top three candidates received necessary one-third of popular vote to win the election. To prevent the victory of left-leaning Odria, the military overthrow the government. Under domestic and international pressure, the junta promised new elections and installed General Ricardo Pío Pérez Godoy in July 1962 just to be replaced by General Nicolas Lindley, the second-in-command and hitherto Army Minister. The junta promised new elections. Presidential elections took place in June 1963, marking the return to a constitutional democracy. Fernando Belaunde of the *Popular Action Party* (AP), former military-favored presidential candidate in 1962 election, won the elections, defeating Haya de la Torre, representing the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) which dominated the congress. The competition between the APRA and Belaunde signified right-left factionalism in Peru’s incarnation of democratic transition. President Belaunde was reelected in June 1968 but overthrown in a bloodless military coup led by Gen. Juan Velasco in October 1968. Leftist junta of Velasco nationalized multiple industries, including the Peruvian subsidiary of Standard Oil.

**Country Name** Peru **Year of Transition** 1980
Another military coup overthrew the Peruvian government in 1975 after the outbreak of a series of strikes and protests against the ailing President Velasco. General Francisco Morales Bermúdez, who became the president afterward, promised to return to democracy in 1977 amidst deepening economic problems and growing dissatisfaction. Bermúdez was challenged by unresolved political crisis between military and civilian leaders. Under limited political space, political parties eligible for the June elections were allowed to campaign their positions in early 1978. Despite the military rule, the Peruvian military did not eliminate the civilian nature of national politics. Although the military declared martial law and outlawed leftist groups in response to nationwide protests, the military held legislative elections for the assembly in 1978. The American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) captured 36 percent of the votes but failed to consolidate its power base on the assembly. The revival of the constitutional assembly showed no sign of abating political tension between the military and civilian politicians. Riots and strikes, instigated by leftist groups, continued throughout 1979. The military moved forward with its original plan to restore a civilian rule and held the presidential elections in 1980. Former president Belaúnde was elected in the elections and formed a government in accordance with the newly proclaimed constitution. Belaúnde adopted a conservative program aiming to reverse many of the reforms of the Velasco era. The new government faced civil strife and political violence since it came to power in the beginning phase of another democratic transition. Amidst political and economic crisis, Belaúnde faced growing pressure from both left and right political groups. The military refused to be taken controlled by the civilian government. An extreme left-wing guerrilla
movement, Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso), started gaining momentum in the highlands since 1980. Serious acts of terrorism and political violence erupted in the country—the annual count of political violence reached nearly 300 acts in the period of 1979-1981.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Peru</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hyperinflation, exacerbated by economic mismanagement of the García administration, elevated public discontent against the regime in early 1990s. In the mean time, increasing terrorist threat from Moaist Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) deteriorated the government’s reputation. Neither left nor right were able to consolidate solid political base prior to the presidential elections. Dissatisfied voters elected Alberto Fujimori, an academic, as president by a large popular margin in 1990. Although Fujimori tried to tackle the economic crisis and terrorist threat, he faced growing oppositions from elected legislators as he lacked a majority of power base in the Congress. In an attempt to consolidate his rule, Fujimori seized power in an army-backed, presidential coup, suspending the portion of the constitution which recognized the authority of the Congress and of the judiciary. Despite the condemnations from the foreign government, the auto-coup was broadly supported by Peruvians. Fujimori held new legislative elections in November 1992 to elect the members of the Democratic Constituent Congress (CCD). Many opposition parties boycotted the election in which candidates backed by Fujimori won a solid majority of seats. The CCD, dominated by Fujimori’s supporters, reelected
him as president in early January 1993. In the same month, 12,000 candidates competed in elections for municipal posts in 187 cities. With the support of the elected representatives, Fujimori revised the new constitution which was approved in a referendum by a majority of about 53 percent in October 1993 despite the objection from the oppositions. The new constitution strengthened Fujimori’s presidency and his executive power. The transition to democracy was a borderline case because of the expansion of executive power. However, the nature of polity changed from the previous auto-coup period as the country held new elections despite the boycotts of the opposition. Fujimori was reelected in 1995 election and was forced to resign in 2000 because of a corruption scandal.

**Country Name**  
**Philippines**  
**Year of Transition**  
1987

Ferdinand E. Marcos, who was elected president in 1965, ruled Philippines under increasingly suppressive measures amidst instabilities and growing insurgent threats since early 1970s. He detained political opponents, restricted media freedom, and dismissed the Congress under martial law in 1973. In twist and turn, Marcos manipulated a constitution-drafting process to promulgate a new constitution in 1973 that allowed him to grip absolute power and to rule the country by decree. Martial law was lifted in 1981, and under the constitution which permitted the president to hold indefinite terms, presidential elections were held in June 1981 despite the boycotts by most opposition parties. Marcos was again elected president who possessed crucial executive power under National security Code and Public Safety Act allowing him to exercise his authority over
the legislative body, National Assembly. The opposition movement gradually gained its
strength starting from late 1981. The oppositions formed coalitions, such as the Social
Democratic Party of the Philippines and the United Nationalist Democratic Organization,
to assert political pressure over the government within the National Assembly in late
1981. The assassination of opposition leader Benigno Aquino after his return from exile
in August 1983 invigorated the opposition movement to formidable political momentum.
Estimated 500,000 people participated in a non-violent protest in September, one month
after the tragedy. Following the peaceful protest, violent confrontations erupted between
police and demonstrators, resulting in at least 11 fatalities and 200 wounded. Marcos
bowed out some demands from the opposition by liberalizing restrictions on political
activities, in effort to convince the oppositions to participate in the legislative elections
held in May 1984. Under growing pressure from the United States which was the main
funder to the regime and intense domestic protests, Marcos announced to hold
presidential elections in early 1986. Throughout 1985, sporadic mass protests and riots
erupted around the country. In one incident in Escalante, police killed at least 20
protestors in a clash. Another crucial event that fueled public outrage was a rigged
presidential election that granted Marcos another term in February 1986. Corazon
Aquino, the widow of Benigno Aquino, was chosen as the candidate to represent the
United Nationalist Democratic Front (UNIDO), the coalition of opposition parties, in the
presidential election. Aquino mobilized her supporters in non-violent campaigns and
declared winner of the election. The uprising, aided by the support of Roman Catholic
Church, reached a crucial turning point to victory when minister of national defense Juan
Ponce Enrile, Deputy Chief of Staff Fidel Ramos and other leading military figures joined the popular uprising against the Ramos regime. Small-scale violence erupted briefly between the government and the rebel soldiers. Facing intense domestic uprising and losing support from the US, Marcos fled the country. Aquino became the official president of Philippines and accelerated political reforms, including the promulgation of a new constitution in February 1987. Aquino inherited massive foreign debt, insurgencies and more importantly the Philippines military embedded with Marcos supporters. President Aquino survived several coup attempts orchestrated by Marcos supporters within the military. Under the Ramos regime which came to power in the 1992 elections, the civilian control over military was gradually strengthened.

| Country Name | Poland | Year of Transition | 1989 |

Polish Communist Party ruled Poland as a loyal satellite of the Soviet Union since the end of the World War II. Economic crisis in late 1970s and mounting pressure from civic movement led by the Solidarity, trade-union led opposition coalition, forced the communist regime to open up more freedom in 1981. The communist regime, backed by the Soviet, violently cracked down the Solidarity in late 1981 and early 1982 because the movement had gained momentum in challenging the legitimacy of the communist regime and its relationship with the Soviet Union. Despite the ban on the Solidarity, the movement remained active underground. Having faced the western sanctions, the regime began to soften its grip in 1986 by releasing some prominent figures of Solidarity members. The Polish regime, overshadowed by liberalization efforts under Mikhail
Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, announced to hold a referendum to decide economic and political reforms in 1987. The Solidarity called for boycott to the referendum. The Solidarity mounted a number of labor strikes in 1988 to assert pressure on the communist regime to legalize the organization. In the same year, the parliamentary committee released a report highly critical of the government and recommended the inclusion of non-Communists into the government. Subsequently, Prime Minister Messner and entire cabinet resigned in September 1988. The new communist government, led by Mieczyslaw Rakowski, regarded as an orthodox Communist, replaced the old one. A series of talks between Rakowski’s communist regime and the Solidarity movement culminated an agreement providing the legalization of the Solidarity and holding of elections to select members of two-chamber parliament. The elections, which were held in June 1989, revealed overwhelming victory for Solidarity candidates who received about 70 percent of popular vote and won all seats in the Senate except one. A coalition government led by the Solidarity was formed, and its leader Tadeusz Mazowiecki became the first non-communist prime minister since the end of the World War II. In presidential elections held in 1990, Solidarity leader Lech Walesa was elected president succeeding former Communist President Wojciech Jaruzelski. After the defeat of communist rule, the Solidarity split into two groups, supporting Walesa and Mazowiecki respectively. The initial path to democratization was political jockeying into factional competitions which resulted in short-lived parliamentary coalitions between 1991 and 1993. Political competition, despite mild factionalism, remained confined within electoral process in 1990s. Poland’s democratic transition became consolidated in 2002 after the
2001 legislative elections in which the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) emerged as the largest party overwhelming defeating the Solidarity-led coalition.

| Country Name | Portugal | Year of Transition | 1976 |

As aging dictator António de Oliveira Salazar was incapacitated by a stroke, his longtime associate Marcello Caetano took over premiership to prolong 36-year-old “corporatist dictatorship” in 1968. Although Caetano relaxed repressions on political activities and initiated constitutional reforms, Portugal’s new constitution, promulgated in 1971, retained the old system’s basic premises of metropolitan politics restricting political participation and civil liberty. Elections were held under restricted freedom for the opposition parties, and the ruling National Popular Action Movement, favored by limited participation under the constitution, swept an electoral victory in 1973. On the other hand, the regime permitted democratic oppositions to hold large rallies prior to the election. The government at the same time was facing student strikes and growing dissents within the military over the regime’s retention of colonial policy and slow pace of reforms. In April 1974, the military coup led by General Spínola forced the government to hand over power to the Junta of National Salvation. Soon after the takeover, the junta announced the revival of civil liberty and amnesty for political prisoners. Spinola as president formed an overwhelmingly civilian cabinet as a broad-based interim government in May. The junta announced elections for the Constituent Assembly scheduled to be held in April 1975. The sudden freedom was also followed by
labor unrests and factional contentions within the opposition movement, especially between leftists and moderates. Movement of the Armed Forces (MFA), a pro-communist faction of the junta, forced President Spínola to resign to be replaced by leftist General Francisco da Costa Gomes in July 1975. Power struggle among socialists, communists and rightists came close to the brink of civil war after the collapse of Salazar’s dictatorship. After an aborted coup attempt by right-wing officers in the military in March 1975, the pro-communist MFA created an all-military Revolutionary Council equipped with legislative and executive powers, in an attempt to consolidate communist control of the government. The Revolutionary Council required political parties to accept its rule at least for five years as the highest governing body as a perquisite to contest in the elections. The result of the legislative elections in April 1975 revealed public dissents against the communists. Socialists and their allies gained 64 percent of the seats in the elections defeating the communists. When Premier Gonçalves introduced a plan to bypass the legislature, anti-communist riots erupted between communist supporters and their opponents in the street. The military was also agitated by the jockeying of the communists and called for a new moderate government. Eventually, in response to rising pressures from various quarter of the society, President Gomes replaced Gonçalves with moderate Vice-Admiral José Pinheiro de Azevedo in September. Azevedo restored relative stability and adopted moderate economic policies to attract foreign investment to the country. The moderates within the military aborted a leftist coup plot in November and expelled the communists from the Revolutionary Council which acted as an interim body. The government promulgated a new
constitution in April 1976 and held its first free parliamentary and presidential elections in April and June. Moderate General António Ramalho Eanes won majority votes in the presidential elections, and Mário Soares, leader of the Socialist Party, formed Portugal’s first constitutional government since 1926. After bitter and dangerous confrontations following the collapse of the dictatorship, Portugal narrowly survived factional conflicts and transcended to a path to democracy. Next elections were free and fair, and Portugal became a consolidated democracy in few years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Romania</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nicolae Ceauşescu succeeded Gheorgiu-Dej as the head of the Romanian Communist Party in 1965 and became president of the state council in 1967. Ceauşescu’s more ‘independent’ stance away from the Soviet Union promoted better relationship with the west and attracted foreign credits as well. While the Communist government ruled the country under strict enforcement of Communist orthodoxy with little tolerance for deviation in a single-party system, Ceauşescu’s power evolved around his personality cult, rather than the party or communist ideology. Nevertheless, under Ceauşescu’s relatively amicable foreign policy and trade openness, Romania enjoyed substantial economic growth in 1960s and 1970s. Although Ceauşescu’s popularity began to decline with the growing economic adversity in 1980s, he rejected, in fear of losing control, the Soviet’s model of reform initiatives undertaken by Gorbachev in mid-1980s. In the meantime, Ceauşescu’s plan to forcibly relocate Hungarian minorities drew widespread criticism internationally in 1988. Despite the mischief and mismanagement, domestic
oppositions to Ceaușescu were weak and isolated until 1989. A small protest broke out in response to the attempt by the local official to evict a dissident pastor in Timișoara in December 1989. The crackdown on the protestors fueled public anger and provoked mass protests across the country. Although the troops obeyed orders initially to quell the protestors, they later joined the demonstrators. After a mysterious death of defense minister, Ceaușescu appointed Victor Stănculescu to oversee security matters. However, Stănculescu and the rest of the military official, backstabbed Ceaușescu and accelerated his downfall in 1989. Ceaușescu was later executed after a summary military tribunal. A transitional government was established by National Salvation Front (NSF), which was formed mostly by members of the second echelon of the Communist Party. Multiparty legislative and presidential elections were held in May 1990, and Ion Iliescu of the NSF defeated other candidates from Christian Democratic National Peasants’ Party (CDNPP) and National Liberal Party (NLP). The NSF also swept two-third of seats in the legislative elections. Although the oppositions charged the NSF of voting irregularities and intimidation, the oppositions agreed to participate in the new parliament. Romania continued to suffer from factional confrontations between former Communist elites and new democratic reformers in early years of democratic transition. Romanians approved a new democratic constitution to strengthen ongoing transition to democracy in December 1991.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The democratic transition in Russia was a direct byproduct of the collapse of the Soviet Union in early 1990s. Having faced attrition of economic growth, the defeat in Afghanistan and incompetence of the communist rule, Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, initiated liberalization measures calling for *glasnost* (openness) in freedom of expression and *perestroika* (restructuring) of change in economy and political systems in 1986. Gorbachev proposed to the Central Committee in January 1987 that the USSR needed new directions to a system that could allow competitive elections. A national conference of the Communist Party approved Gorbachev’s recommendation in July 1988 and facilitated the USSR constitution amendments which would replace the Supreme Soviet with 2250-member Congress of People. Elections were held in March 1989 to select the members of the congress. The change, despite the domination of the incumbent Communist Party in the Congress, encouraged opposition voices in the legislature. Consequently, liberalizations created tension between conservatives who were concerned with the demise of socialist aspirations and reformers who thought the current liberalizations were not sufficient to foster a real change. Local elections in 1990 also showed the emergence of small political groups that took away seats from the Communist Party. Another crucial move to liberalization was the dilation of power away from the central to the states. Boris Yeltsin, reform advocate who deserted the Communist Party, became the president of Russia Federation, the largest republic—unofficially the second-ranking elected position in the country. At the revival of nationalism across the USSR, ethnic conflicts and separatist movements challenged the legitimacy of the central power and threatened the stability of
shaky transition. The turning point that accelerated the reform process was a failed coup attempt by the communist hardliners in 1991. The raid of Soviet security forces on the Lithuanian television station and an attempt to overthrow Lithuania's nationalist government showed an early sign of mobilizations by hardliners in January 1991. The implication resulted in more than a dozen deaths. The coconspirators of the coup placed Gorbachev under house arrest and formed a junta called the State Committee for the State of Emergency in August 1991. Yeltsin emerged as a leader of counter-coup reformists and mobilized Russian public to oppose the coup which collapsed within a few days. Having lost his political caliber, Gorbachev resigned as the chief of the Communist Party and called for the dissolution of central organs in late August after his house arrest. The Russian government, led by Yeltsin, took over the power vacuum left open by the fall of the Communist Party. In December 1991, the leaders of Russia Ukraine and Belarus declared the end of the Soviet Union and proclaimed the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Independent Russia inherited a veto seat in the United Nations Security Council. The democratic transition in Russia was shaken by deteriorating economy under radical reforms, power struggle within political elites between reform-oriented Yeltsin and conservative speaker of the Parliament Ruslan Khasbulatov, and ethnic secessionist wars. Although the tension between executive brunch and the legislature was temporarily defused at the end of 1992, the conflict remerged as conservatives attempted to impeach Yeltsin in March 1993. Yeltsin replaced the existing constitution with a new version allowing him of vast executive power in September 1993. The parliament, in return, nullified his presidency and formed a new government. The
crisis erupted into violent conflicts as the military siding with Yeltsin stormed the Parliament barricaded by rebel legislatures in October 1993. President Yeltsin held a referendum to approve the new constitution which allowed extensive executive power in December 1993. Since the end of the Soviet era, Russian politics has been dominated by strong presidents, elected in relatively free but fair elections.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Senegal</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Power struggle between President Leopold Senghor and Prime Minister Mamadou Dia destabilized Senegal politics in early 1960s. After an abortive coup orchestrated by the prime minister, the president consolidated his power by strengthening executive power since the end of 1962. The constitution under the Senghor’s government restricted free electoral process to reduce the gain of opposition parties and guarantee the dominance of Senghor’s Senegalese Socialist Party’s (PSS). President Senghor retired from politics in 1981 and handed over power to his protégé Abdou Diouf. During 20-year rule of President Diouf, he made a number of constitutional changes to expand political participations by allowing limited activities of opposition parties. Despite the amendments of the constitution, the elections were manipulated by the supporters of the PSS. In response, the oppositions staged mass rallies and protests in 1983. The elections in 1988 also triggered violent clashes between the opposition supporters and the police, leading to the imposition of state of emergency. Since the elections in 1993, Diouf and his PSS gradually lost popular appeal to Senegal voters despite their electoral victory. Consequently, militant oppositions assassinated a member of prominent election official
in retaliation for alleged fraud. In the midst of economic depression, the government failed to secure peace with separatist insurgents in the southern region of Casamance in 1990s. Facing oppositions’ demand to bring more transparency to the electoral process, the government established National Electoral Observatory (ONEL) in 1997. In addition, the coup in neighboring Cote d’Ivoire, triggered by the ruling regime’s attempt to steal the elections, reminded the government of potential grave consequences if electoral processes remained manipulated. The National Assembly, dominated by the PSS, however, voted to revise the constitution in 1998 to remove the term limit on the president allowing Diouf to seek another term in 2000 elections. The PSS’s attempt unwittingly solidified the opposition parties which agreed to support a single candidate to challenge Diouf in coming presidential elections. In the second round of presidential elections held in March 2000, opposition candidate Abdoulayé Wade, leader of the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) defeated Diouf decisively. The removal of the dominance of the PSS accelerated the Senegal’s transition to democracy. A new constitution was approved in a public referendum in January 2001, which reinstated presidential term and dissolved the PSS-dominated Senate. The constitutional amendment and Diouf’s decision to withdraw from politics also fortified on-going democratic processes. The PDS’s coalition swept overwhelming majority of seats in the legislative elections held in 2001. The Casamance Movement of Democratic Forces (MFDC) signed a peace agreement with the Wade government in March 2001 despite the rejection by some hardliners within the MFDC. Wade was reelected president in 2007.
At the end of one-party rule under the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, the republic was fractured into Serbia Montenegro, Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbia and Montenegro jointly declared the formation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in 1992. Although the government removed bans on political parties in 1990, Slobodan Milosevic’s Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) remained dominant in the FRY’s political arena. Milosevic’s militant support to Serbs in neighboring Croatia and Bosnia fueled violence and international condemnations leading to economic and diplomatic sanctions. Domestically, the oppositions to Milosevic gradually grew amidst economic hardship and suppression of his challengers. A coalition of opposition parties formed the Democratic Movement for Serbia (later known as Zajedno), organized protests and later took control of local governments in 1997.

Although Zajedno became weakened by internal factions, Milosevic’s regime faced more international pressure when he unleashed ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo which led to the NATO-led bombing campaigns. After the defeat in Kosovo, Milosevic agreed to hold new elections as he miscalculated popular support and cohesiveness of the oppositions which united under the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS). All 18 parties of the DOS backed Vojislav Koštunica to challenge Milosevic in 2000 elections. Pro-democracy student movement Otpor, which grew out of student protests in 1998, became a viable network of opposition movement against Milosevic during the election
campaigns. The oppositions organized grassroots campaigns to counter Milosevic and his SPS which was in control of the security force and state media. The initial result of the election held in September 2000 showed a clear lead of Koštunica which won 53 percent of the vote, compared to Milosevic’s 35 percent despite fraud and vote rigging by Milosevic’s supporters. The DOS also gained more seats in the federal parliament’s Chamber of Citizens and municipal governments. When the SPS-dominated Federal Election Commission annulled the election result to stage a rerun, the oppositions launched nationwide massive protests and general strikes, occupying parliament building and the government radio-television station. Milosevic later conceded to his defeat, and Koštunica was formally inaugurated in October 2000. The defeat of Milosevic became the FRY’s transition to democracy from one-party domination under the SPS. The FRY parliament ratified a new constitutional charter to establish a new state union changing its name to Serbia and Montenegro in 2003. In accordance with the agreement, the Republic of Montenegro held a referendum with enough vote to seek independence and became a separate state in 2006.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Sierra Leone</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sierra Leone was wreaked havoc by weak governance, instabilities and the military’s interventions in national politics since the country gained independence from the British in 1961. Prime Minister Siaka Stevens amended the constitution to outlaw political parties, except the ruling All Peoples Congress (APC), to erect a single-party state since 1978. Steven picked Maj. Gen. Joseph Saidu Momoh to succeed premiership in 1985.
Under the Momhon administration, a new constitution was approved by a popular referendum to transcend to a multiparty system in 1991. The prospect of democracy was hampered by growing insurgency with the support of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) which was waging war against the neighboring Liberian government. Starting from 1991, Revolutionary United Front (RUF) backed by the NPFL troops launched attacks across the Mano River boundary and took a number of major towns. The Sierra Leone government requested the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) for the military intervention to deter the rebels from taking major cities. However, the threat to the Momoh’s government came unexpectedly from its own military. Midlevel Army officers, who organized in protest for back pay, launched a full-scale coup to topple the government in April 1992. Captain Valentine Strasser arrested first coup leader Lieutenant Colonel Yayah Kanu and formed a junta called the National Provisional Ruling Council. Strasser imposed restrictions on media and suspended the 1991 constitution despite his promise to return to a multiparty democracy. Having faced growing insurgency, counter-coup plots, economic deprivation, international pressure and economic crisis, in 1994, Strasser approved a two-year transition period to hold multiple elections scheduled for 1996. A month before the scheduled presidential elections, Brigadier General Julius Maada Bio ousted Strasser in a palace coup in early 1996. Amidst political chaos, voters braved to poll satiations to participate in the country’s first multiparty elections in nearly 30 years. In the runoff election in March 1996, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) was elected president with 59 percent of the votes. Voters also elected members of the new Parliament in which the
SLPP also turned out to be a winner. The transition to democracy was overshadowed by the ongoing civil war and dissatisfactions among the hardliners in the military. Despite the signing of a peace accord between the government and the RUF, violence continued. Major Johnny Paul Koromah launched another military coup and toppled the democratically elected government in May 1997. The coup incurred the wrath of the international community and subsequent UN-imposed sanctions on the junta.

**Country Name**       **Sierra Leone**       **Year of Transition**       **2002**

The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), a junta which ousted President Kabbah’s democratically elected government in 1997, faced immense international pressure to return power to the civilian government. In March 1998, Nigerian-led West-African peacekeeping troops ousted the AFRC junta from capital Freetown and reinstalled the Kabbah’s administration to power. However, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), in collaboration with the AFRC, controlled most parts of the country outside the capital. The RUF intensified violent campaigns and came close to overthrowing the government in Freetown in January 1999 until the ECOMOG peacekeepers drove the insurgents out from parts of the capital city. The RUF’s violence left thousands in death. Under the auspicious of the international community, the Kabbah’s government and the RUF, led by Foday Sankoh, signed a peace agreement to form a transitional government that included several RUF leaders in the cabinet in July 1999. The United Nations established a peacekeeping mission to monitor ceasefire and oversee the disarmament and demobilization of the insurgent forces. However, the RUF leaders refused to
implement the peace accord and pursued another hardline approach by holding hundreds of UN peacekeepers hostage. In another episode, the bodyguards of Sankoh shot at demonstrators in front of his house in Freetown, killing as many as 20 people in May 2000. Both incidents led to the arrest of RUF leaders who lost their ranks from the government. The remaining RUF forces were later disarmed quite successfully in early 2002. Upon the improvement of security, peaceful elections were held in May 2002, resulting in the victory for Kabbah as re-elected president, and his Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) won a landslide majority in the legislature. Despite the irregularities and allegation of fraud, the quality of the election would not distort the electoral outcome significantly. At the end of Kabbah’s term, his vice president, Solomon Ekuma Berewa, contested the presidential elections in 2007. However, voters, dissatisfied with slow pace of development and widespread corruption, elected opposition candidate Ernest Bai Koroma of All People's Congress. Post-conflict democratization in Sierra Leone was relatively peaceful despite weak governance and enduring factionalism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Slovakia</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Similar to Czech, the actual transition took place in 1989. But post transition data were collected from 1993 onwards) After the collapse of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia, both Czech and Slovak held multi-party elections in January 1990. Public Against Violence (PAV), pro-reform dissident coalition, won the elections in Slovak. However, unrecognizable differences between two republics led to a breakup into two independent states after the parliamentary elections in 1992. Vladimir Meciar's
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) continued to rule Slovakia until it failed to form a coalition in 1998 elections.

**Country Name**  
Slovenia  
**Year of Transition**  
1991

Pro-independent sentiment in Slovenia grew gradually in 1980s while it was a part of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia partly. Political tolerance of the ruling communist party fostered the growth of independent civic and political groups in Slovenia in late 1980s. De facto opposition parties were formed in 1989 to mobilize public support for a democratic transition. In the mean time, the prospect of secession from Yugoslavia came under pressure from Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia. When Milosevic and his Serbian supporters attempted to undermine party organizations of Slovenia, Slovene leaders threatened to secede from the Communist League. In April 1990, Slovenia held the first free elections under communist rule since 1938. The Democratic-United Opposition of Slovenia (Demos), seven-party coalition, defeated the Communist Party in the regional parliamentary election. Slovenians overwhelmingly endorsed independence from Yugoslavia in a referendum in December 1990. The Slovenian leaders eventually declared independence, alone with Croatia, in June 1991. The declaration of independence was followed by a brief 10-day war with Serbian-led federal troops who were repelled by Slovenian troops. The international acknowledgement of Slovenia’s independence in early 1992 escalated the process of democratic transition as well. Slovenian held its first presidential and parliamentary elections in December 1992, and center-left Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS) won
the majority in the parliament. Slovenia became the most stable transitioning democracy among former Yugoslavia countries and was able to consolidate democracy after a few years of the transition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Solomon Islands</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since Solomon Islands gained independence from the British in 1978, the country’s electoral democracy was overshadowed by periods of short-lived governing coalitions and fragile alliances. Ethnic tensions between native Isatabu Islanders (Guadalcanal) and majority Melanesians erupted into violent confrontations in late 1990s. Indigenous Isatabu Islanders, resented by political and economic affluence of Melanesian settlers in their territory, intensified violent campaigns to drive out Melanesians from Guadalcanal in 1999. The confrontation between the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM) and the Malaita Eagles Force (MEF)—militant outfits of both ethnic groups—resulted in a number of deaths and thousands of displaced people in Guadalcanal. Despite the declaration of state of emergency and international efforts to broker a peace accord, violence continued to destabilize the country. The MEF, in collaboration with disgruntled police officers, seized control of the capital and forced Prime Minister Ulufa'alulu to resign in June 2000. Although the militant groups signed a peace accord under the auspicious of Australia in October 2000, many of them refused to surrender their weapons. Despite fragile security conditions, elections were held in December 2001, and Allan Kemakeza of People's Alliance Party became prime minister. The Kemakeza government, however, failed to subdue widespread anarchy and asked the National Parliament to approve an
international peacekeeping plan. The Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), Australian-led peacekeeping force, was deployed to restore order and stability in July 2003. As security conditions improved, the size of peacekeeping forces was significantly reduced in August 2004, allowing Kemakeza government to take full control over the country. The end of anarchy marked the return of democratization to Solomon Island. Nevertheless, the electoral democracy remained marred by factionalism, communal conflicts and government corruptions.

| Country Name | South Africa | Year of Transition | 1994 |

The transition to democracy in South Africa was the direct result of the negotiated settlement between the African National Congress (ANC) and the ruling National Party (NP). The NP ruled the country under strict policies of white domination and racial separation known as apartheid under a white-only democratic system. The ANC and other black dissident groups went underground in early 1960s and waged a protracted guerrilla war against the apartheid regime. Under intense international pressure, President P. W. Botha initiated limited political liberalizations in 1988 but continued to repress major opposition groups. The anti-apartheid movement rejected Botha’s limited reforms and continued pressing the government for fundamental changes. The oppositions staged general strikes, protests and violent attacks against the apartheid government until early 1990s. Facing both domestic and international condemnation, moderates within the ruling NP realized the inevitability of fundamental reforms. Consequently, President Botha, in disagreement with moderate Frederik Willem de Klerk’s reform initiatives, resigned in
August 1989. De Klerk was elected by the electoral college following the September election, and became president. The new administration embarked on the critical reforms by removing bans on political organizations, including the ANC, and releasing key political prisoners in 1990. The Parliament repealed all of the country's major apartheid measures in 1991. Despite the ongoing negotiation between the government and the ANC, serious confrontations erupted between the ANC and the Inkatha backed by the regime in 1991. The violence killed as many as 1200 people in 1991 alone. On the bright side, the government, the ANC, the Inkatha and other groups signed a national peace accord in September 1991, outlining a transitional plan to multiparty democracy in post-apartheid system. As the government and the ANC reached temporary deadlocks in Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa), a negotiation body, the ANC organized mass rallies and general strikes to step up pressures on the regime in 1992. Eventually, the government and the oppositions reached an agreement to establish “one person one vote” system in November 1993. In accordance with the accord, the Transitional Executive Council was formed to oversee national elections and transitional processes. “Substantially free and fair” elections were held in April 1994, and nearly 20 million voters went to the poll. The ANC received 63 percent of the votes, followed by the NP which garnered 20 percent of votes. The ANC and the NP joined the coalition government led by Nelson Mandela as elected president by the National Assembly. Although political violence continued sporadically even after the formation of new democratic government, the death toll decreased significantly—224 deaths a month in
1994 to 105 a month in 1995. The new constitution was promulgated in stages between 1996 and 2000, cementing the process of democratization.

| Country Name | Spain | Year of Transition | 1978 |

Under the right-wing dictatorship of General Francisco Franco, leftist-inspired strikes and student protests challenged the Franco’s government in 1960s and 1970s. Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), a separatist movement, also ignited violence to undermine the regime at the same time. Aging Franco, who ruled the country as de facto regent, created a prime minister post to administer executive functions. The prospect to replace aging Franco became a major source of struggle between conservatives and reformers within the regime. In the mean time, the confrontation between the regime and the Roman Catholic Church in Spain distorted the image of the regime as the church criticized the regime for its treatment of the Basque people. The death of Franco in November 1975 paved a path to liberal political reform as moderate Prince Juan Carlos assumed power as King of Spain. In the same year, wide-spread demonstrations erupted across the country to express people’s dissatisfaction with the regime. Domestic unrest feared political elites with a prospect of revolution similar to the leftist-influenced military-led transition in Portugal in 1976. To facilitate a controlled transition, King Carlos replaced conservative Prime Minister Carlos Arias Navarro with moderate Adolfo Suárez González in July 1976. The new government led by premier Suárez promised to open political process for free elections. Political parties were legalized to contest in coming bicameral legislative elections which were scheduled to be held in June 1977. Despite sporadic political
terrorism, the elections were relatively free, fair and peaceful. Premier Suárez’ Union of the Democratic Center (UCD) won the largest number of seats but fell short of a majority. The new parliament, which included elected representatives from all spectrums of political life, was also tasked with drafting a new constitution. A referendum was held to approve the new constitution in October 1978. The constitution set up a constitutional monarchy and outlined a separation of church and state, cementing the country’s transition to democracy. The initial path to democratization was, however, challenged by slow economic growth, rising unemployment and inflation, terrorist activities of the ETA, and power struggle between right and left political elites. The government survived two conservative coup plots in 1981 and 1982. Starting from mid 1980s, political actors were able to contain their competition within existing electoral framework, and Spain became a consolidated democracy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Sudan</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
<th>1965</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Sudan had suffered from protracted civil wars triggered by ethnic conflicts since the country gained independence from the British in 1956. A military coup overthrew the post-independence civilian government which had been battered by factionalism and ethnic uprisings, in November 1958. The junta, led by Lieutenant General Ibrahim Abboud, suspended the constitution and disbanded the parliament in attempts to consolidate his power by forming a cabinet with himself acting as President of the seven-member Supreme Military Council. Under Abboud’s ‘Sudanization’ policy, ethnic animosity deepened between Arab-led ruling government and non-Muslim ethnic groups.
in Negroid and southern provinces. However, the opposition to the Abboud government was insignificant in early 1960s, partly because of the government’s preemptive crackdown on suspected opposition leaders. As a sign of softening political grip, the government held local elections in 1963. Abboud attempted to address the longstanding problem of southern provinces by setting up a commission to investigate complaints from southerners in September 1964. The opposition groups, including leftist Anti-Imperialist Front, took this opportunity to vent out their criticism to the government. The criticism sparked student riots leading to mass protests joined by other banned political groups to denounce the government’s policies and demand power transfer to a civilian rule. The government’s attempt to quell the protests killed 27 persons and injured over 100. Under intense pressures, the military struck a deal with the opposition leaders to form a transitional government in which Abboud remained head of state without effective executive power. The transitional regime lifted bans on political parties and restored civil liberty to direct the country towards transition to democracy. In response to growing internal pressure and continuing unrests, President Abboud resigned in November 1964. The coalition of the interim regime was, however, fractured by disagreements between right-wing Umma, National Unionist parties (NUP) and the Moslem Brotherhood on the one hand, and the Communists and pro-Nasserites on the other. One major issue was the autonomy for southerners who were waging rebellions against the government. Following a serious parliamentary crisis between political parties in the government, the elections were held in the northern region in April 1965. The Umma and NUP picked up the largest number of seats, followed by the Communist Party. However, the oppositions,
especially the People's Democratic Party (PDP), called for boycott of the elections in the south, citing violent confrontations with security forces. The new elected government coalition was, nevertheless, weakened by more parliamentary crises amidst factional confrontations between right and left political elites. The coalition collapsed when Prime Minister Mahgoub dissolved the Constituent Assembly after right wing Umma Party attempted to introduce a non-confidence vote to off-balance Mahgoub’s coalition government in mid 1969. Economic decline and ethnic insurgencies exacerbated diminishing credibility of the government. The transition to democracy was short-lived when another military coup led by Colonel Gaafar Mohamed el-Nimeiri ousted the civilian government in May 1969. The junta appointed the Revolutionary Command Council, suspended the constitution and dissolved the parliament.

| Country Name | Sudan | Year of Transition | 1986 |

Colonel Gaafar Mohamed el-Nimeiri, who came to power after overthrowing the elected civilian government in 1969, set up a left-wing government under the guidance of a revolutionary council. The leftist alliance in the government, however, collapsed when the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) opposed Nimeiri’s policy to reach out anti-Communist Arab states. Nimeiri, taking a socialist stance, removed the communists from the government. In response, communists launched a failed coup which was in turn defeated by a counter coup in July 1971. Following the coup attempt, Nimeiri consolidated his power by promulgating a new constitution which provisioned a single-party state in August. Under the new constitution, Gen. Nimeiri, the sole candidate, was
elected president in September 1971. The Revolutionary Council was dissolved and replaced by a political bureau of the Sudanese Socialist Union in accordance with one-party rule. The threats from communists impelled Nimeiri to seek a peace agreement with the Anyanya insurgents in the south in 1972. The treaty granted the southerners with an autonomous region with strong legislative power over local issues. The opposition to the Nimeiri regime resurfaced again in mid 1970s. A mutiny among southern troops and a series of coup attempts in 1975 demonstrated the ensuing instability under the Nimeiri government. In foreign policy front, Nimeiri ditched its relationship with the Soviet Union and reached out to the United States. His stance had already made regional enemies, especially Libya who in turn supported the communist oppositions in Sudan. The confrontations between Nimeiri and his opposition escalated in 1982 amidst riots in several major cities over deteriorating quality of life. The regime scrapped the agreement with the southerners when oil reserve was discovered in the south in 1982. Another trigger for instability was the introduction of Islamic law (sharia) into the penal code in 1983. The result was the revival of massive insurgency in the south, allegedly supported by Libya. The imposition of Islamic law also provoked general strikes and protests forcing the government to declare state of emergency in April 1984. Despite Nimeiri’s Islamization, the government had to crack down Islamic fundamentalists who were disappointed by the regime’s denunciation of the Muslim Brotherhood and the rise of southern rebellion. The embattled regime was removed in a military coup led by Gen. Abdul Rahman Swar al-Dahab, who was appointed by Nimeiri as Defense Minister, while Nimeiri was out of the country in April 1985. Dahab formed the Transitional
Military Council and a provisional cabinet to govern the country until a new government was elected next year. In April 1986, Sudanese voted to elect members of the National Assembly in the country’s first free elections since 1965. Despite the ongoing civil war in the south, the elections were held without much violent incidents except in some southern and western provinces. Centrist Umma Party, led by Sadiq al-Mahdi, gained the majority of seats, and Mahdi became prime minister. The transition to an elected civilian rule was marred by ongoing civil war, famine, economic crisis and factionalism between moderates and Islamists within the government. The new government unsuccessfully reached out the southern rebels to seek a political settlement. On the other hand, Islamists were concerned with the government’s concession upon the relaxation of Islamic law over non-Muslim population. The coalition government, in addition, was fractured by indecisive leadership, corruption and factionalism. The transition to democracy was abruptly ended by a military coup that removed the Mahdi government in June 1989. The Islamic army officers, led by Brigadier General Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, dissolved the parliament, suspended the constitution and revoked civil liberty. Although political parties were banned, supporters of fundamentalist National Islamic Front enjoyed privileges within the government.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td></td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Taiwan was established by the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party -KMT) government in 1949 after it was defeated by the communists in mainland China. Since its foundation, the KMT instituted a single-party state which ruled the country under martial law until 1989.
Chiang Ching-kuo succeeded his father Chiang Kai-shek upon his death in 1975 and began to introduce gradual political reforms. The government lifted the 38-year old martial law in July 1987 and allowed political groups to hold mass rallies subsequently. Even prior to the relaxation of martial law, the oppositions organized a new political platform called the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) despite the ban. The members of DPP gained about 25 percent of the votes in legislative elections held in December 1986.

After Lee Teng-hui became the first native-born Taiwanese president in 1988, he accelerated liberalization initiatives laid out by his predecessor. As a crucial step towards a democratic transition, the government legalized opposition parties in 1989, and the DPP became the strongest challenger to the KMT. The ruling KMT under Lee’s leadership gradually removed old guards from the previous generation to facilitate the role of younger generation. The DPP and other opposition groups, taking advantage of newly permitted political space, frequently launched rallies and protests to pressure the government for more substantial reform. The KMT held multiparty national elections for the first time in December 1989. Although the KMT gained the majority of seats in the election, the DPP and other oppositions significantly increased the number of seats, sufficient enough to propose legislations. The DPP brought political confrontation to a legislative platform to challenge the ruling KMT. In December 1991, Taiwan held its first full elections to select 327 members to the National Assembly replacing the ‘life seats’ which were allocated for old guards from the mainland constituencies since 1949. Although the KMT took 71 percent of the votes, the oppositions were able to expand their strongholds. The new National Assembly revised the constitution to constrain...
presidential power and to promote the role of the assembly in 1992. Although KMT candidate Lee was reelected president in the 1996 elections, the electoral process was free and fair for the first time. Taiwan’s transition to democracy was consolidated within a few years of the transition. Taiwanese voters elected DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian president for the first time in 2000 elections, ending political dominance of the KMT for more than 50 years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Thailand</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
<th>1969</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The Thai military had become one of the major actors in Thai political arena since the end of absolute monarchy in 1932. Faced with domestic unrests and discords within the military, Premier Phibun introduced limited political reforms in 1955. The reform was, however, short lived by another military coup at the peak of the friction between the Phibun government and Thai traditionalists. A new junta, led by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, reversed Phibun’s reform initiatives and ruled the country by decree. While political opposition to the junta was invigorated mainly by elite-driven factionalism, Communist-inspired domestic insurgencies erupted in rural areas since mid 1960s. After General Thanom succeeded Sarit after his death in December 8 1963, Thanom preceded a constitution-drafting process that would establish a legislative body with strong executive government. The government-appointed Constituent Assembly approved the constitution in February 1968. However, the government’s decision to retain martial law sparked student protests and erupted clashes with police in Bangkok for the first time in 11 years. To contest in the coming elections, political parties organized campaigns under
martial law restrictions. In February 1969 elections, Thanom’s United Thai People’s Party (UTPP) gained the majority of seats in the House of Representatives, followed by the largest opposition Democratic Party. Despite the electoral victory of the former regime’s party, the oppositions, especially the voting power of independent candidates, demonstrated their strength by passing a bill opposed by the government in 1969. The transition to democracy was, however, retroverted to another military rule two years after the transition as the Thanom’s government was facing increasing opposition in the National Assembly. Leftists and democrats posed a threat to the government’s proposed military budget which was in dire need to subdue growing insurgencies in remote areas. Thanom terminated the constitution, abolished the parliament and banned political parties, and ruled the country under his military dictatorship.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Thailand</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1974</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Field-Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn’s military government faced growing challenges after it seized power in an autocoup in November 1971. Unlike the previous era of military rule, the oppositions had already rooted their support bases in society to challenge the junta, especially around capital city Bangkok. In the mean time, communist insurgencies continued to grow as the rebels were now armed with more advanced weapons to disrupt the government’s counterinsurgency campaigns. Despite the government’s attempt to curb the media and political activities, hostile press and student protests became frequent challengers to the legitimacy of the military rule. Students formed the National Student Center of Thailand in November 1972 as an informal
opposition platform to pressure the regime. The students criticized the government for various issues ranging from illegal hunting to the U.S. presence in Thailand. Although the military appointed a committee, mostly composed of civilians, to draft a new constitution, the tension continued to escalate. The government violently responded the student uprising in October 1973, resulting at least 77 dead and 800 wounded even by the official toll. The bloody demonstrations eventually forced Thanom and his associates to resign and leave the country for exile. King Bhumibol Adulyadej appointed Sanya Thammasak as prime minister to head a predominantly interim civilian government in October 1973. Although Thanom was ousted, the students continued protests forcing Prime Minister Thammasak to resign briefly in May 1974. Political turbulent was exacerbated by farmer demonstration, labor strikes, anti-Chinese riots and communist insurgency at the onset of the country’s attempt to move towards another democratic transition. Under mounting pressures to accelerate reforms, the interim government promulgated a new democratic constitution in October 1974. The first free elections under the new constitution were held in January 1975. Around 2200 candidates from 42 political parties contested for the seats in the National Assembly. Although the Democratic Party secured the largest number of seats, it fell short of the substantial plurality. A fragile coalition government emerged amidst factional confrontation between leftist and right-wing political groups. The transition to democracy did little to alleviate the rift in the society between growing radical left and traditionalist right groups which occasionally erupted into violent protests. Amidst rising instability, the military supported
by the right-wing groups, removed the civilian government in October 1976. Thailand’s transition to democracy ended prematurely at the hand of a military intervention.

| Country Name | Thailand | Year of Transition | 1978 |

The military overthrew the fragile civilian government in 1976 amidst the confrontation between right-wing and leftist militant groups soon after former dictator Thanom and Praphas returned to Thailand from exile. The military leaders appointed hardline royalist Tanin Kraivixien, former Supreme Court judge, as prime minister who removed leftist oppositions from government ministries, media and universities. The new right-wing government backed by the military proved to be more suppressive than the previous ones. The government had incarcerated over 5000 opposition members in 1976 alone and drove out remaining opposition members into hiding. A splinter faction within the military attempted an aborted military coup in March 1977. Uneasy relationship between the rightwing prime minister and the military leaders turned sour by a bomb attack targeting the King and the Queen in September 1977. Another military coup, led by Admiral Sängad Chaloryu and General Kriangsak, ousted the Thanin government in October 1977. The military formed the Revolutionary Council, and subsequently, the King appointed General Kriangsak as Prime Minister. While maintaining restrictions on political activities, the junta promulgated a new constitution in December 1978. The constitution structured a bicameral legislature with a lower house consisted of elected representatives and an upper house, dominated by military-appointed legislators. Despite the automatic representation of the military in the legislature, the constitution specified a period after
which military personnel and civil servants would be barred from running the premiership and cabinet posts after 1983. After the promulgation of the new constitution, political parties remerged to contest in scheduled elections in April 1979. Although two candidates and 13 political workers were murdered during the campaign period, the violence was less significant compared to the previous election. Most moderate to far right conservative parties and leftist Social Democratic Party contested the elections where the voter turnout was less than 25 percent. Both houses re-elected Premier Kriangsak who was supported especially by the military’s handpick Senate. Kriangsak formed a new short-lived cabinet in May 1979. The transition to democracy also brought along anti government demonstrations in Bangkok. Prime Minister Kriangsak was forced to resign after a major cabinet crisis amidst growing economic instability. General Prem Tinsulanonda, commander in chief of the army and minister of defense, succeeded Prime Minister Kriangsak. Although Prem’s reign demonstrated the domination of the military in the national politics, civilian members of oppositions were appointed to major cabinet posts under his government. Prem narrowly survived an attempt coup by the military officers and a cabinet crisis in 1981.

| Country Name | Thailand | Year of Transition | 1992 |

The military remained a dominant political force in Thai politics although civilian political parties and civil liberty were relatively free to exercise their functions since 1978. General Prem Tinsulanonda, who succeed Prime Minister Kriangsak, was reelected by the parliament in 1983 and 1986. The elections in 1988 demonstrated the growing
influence of civilian politicians in Thai politics. Chatichai Choonhavan, a wealthy businessman of Thai Nation Party (Chart Thai), became prime minister as his TNP won the largest number of seats in the election. Chatichai headed a coalition government that consisted of the members of Democratic, Social Action, Rassadorn, United Democracy Parties. The initial popularity of Chatichai government was eroded by corruption and factionalism among political elites, especially between the military and civilian leaders. Consequently, the military removed the civilian government in a bloodless coup in February 1991, citing the government’s corruption. The other untold reason was the military’s uneasiness with ablactating strength of traditionalists in political stronghold. General Sunthorn Kongsompong declared martial law, abolished the constitution, dissolved the parliament, revoked press freedom and dismissed the cabinet. The military appointed leading businessman Anand Panyarachun as prime minister to head a new technocrat government while the military was playing behind the scene. The junta appointed mostly retired or active military personnel to a newly formed Legislative Assembly. In order to restore foreign investor confidence, martial law was lifted in May 1991. New political parties, especially pro-military in their stance, were formed to support General Suchinda Kraprayoon in March 1992 elections while other civilian parties, particularly former ruling coalition parties, were disarrayed. Pro-military coalition appointed General Suchinda as prime minister to head a new government. Suchinda’s designation angered general public who staged massive demonstrations in Bangkok and other cities in May 1992. Initially, the military cracked down the protests violently, killing at least 52 demonstrators. King Bhumipol eventually intervened
between the pro-democracy oppositions and the military to resolve crisis peacefully. In response to public anger, Suchinda was forced to step down, and the king re-appointed former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun to lead an interim government to hold new elections scheduled in September 1992. A pro-democracy five-party coalition formed a new government and elected Chuan Leekpai as prime minister. At this time, the democratic transition, unlike the previous ones in Thailand, emerged with little influence from the military which was now retreating from political arena. Thailand’s democracy miracle lasted over 13 years until the military intervened again to break political deadlock between the Thaksin’s government and traditionalists in 2006.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
<th>1973</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Turkey had been secularized since the foundation of the republic in 1923 despite the country’s overwhelming majority of Islamic population. At the wake of Islamic traditions and communism during the Cold War, political struggle unfolded among nationalists, Islamists and leftists, in addition to ethnic secessionist movements. The Turkish military emerged, amidst factional competitions, as one of the important political actors responsible for steering the country’s political path. The military was initially ordained to Kemalism, political ethos of national leader Mustafa Kemal who called for the creation of democratic and secular state. Because of the government’s reliance on the military to subdue instabilities under martial law, the role of the military became prominent in the nation’s political affairs. Amidst growing anti-government unrests, the military overthrew
the Democratic Party’s (DP) civilian government in 1960. However, the military quickly restored basic democratic criteria by allowing political activities and holding multi-party elections under the new constitution although the military continued to suppress communists and members of the DP. The military secured an agreement with elected civilian coalition to elect coup leader General Gursel as the president of the republic. Despite the civilian government, the military remained influential in the national politics and occasionally used its power to reject unfavorable legislations. The military was worried by the center right’s lost control of the National Assembly after the 1969 general elections. In the mean time, political violence and terrorist activities grew amidst economic decline and clumsy reforms. The military demanded the civilian government take strong measures against the unrests or face a coup in 1971. The parliament pandered the military by introducing martial law in April 1971, and subsequently, the Demirel government was replaced by a new cabinet consisting of nonpartisan technocrats and statesmen who were acceptable to the military. The semi-coup and continuing martial law deprived the country of nominal democratic criteria while political activities were restricted. Moreover, the military oversaw a two-year period of “guided democracy” behind civilian administrators. A political crisis erupted again between the civilian politicians and the military leaders as the current term of President Cevdet Sunday expired in 1973. Both sides could not agree on a candidate to succeed Sunday. Political fallout within Demirel’s Justice Party and the military’s hesitance to launch an all-out coup paved a compromised solution which elected Senator Fahri Korutürk, a retired navy chief, as president who was acceptable to both sides in April 1973. Justice Party was
defeated in October 1973 elections because of the defections of its right-wing members. In a sign of the military’s retreat from national politics, a number of senior military officers were reassigned, and many others retired. The changes in 1973 redirected the country on a path to democracy. However, the country continued to suffer from political violence and political unrests leading to another military coup in September 1980.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The military toppled the elected government in September 1980 in a bloodless coup amidst growing terrorist attacks and mounting unrests despite the extension of martial law. The junta, led by General Kenan Evren, chief of staff, detained Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel, dissolved the parliament and abolished the constitution. Unlike the past semi-coup, the military formed five-member National Security Council (NSC) to rule the country directly. The NSC appointed an interim premier and promised to hold new elections following the drafting of a new constitution. In the mean time, the junta, under its martial law authorities, arrested more than 40,000 suspected alleged terrorists and opposition members. Martial-law courts handed down 68 death penalties by the end of 1981. When the military was able to restore order and economic stability in 1982, the junta appointed the constitutional commission to draft a new constitution which was approved by a national referendum in November 1982. The constitution replaced the former bicameral legislature with a single national assembly and granted strong executive power to the president who would be elected by the assembly. In accordance with a temporary clause of the new constitution, General Kenan Evren automatically became the
The ruling NSC allowed only three parties to contest in coming elections and publicly supported Nationalist Democracy Party (NDP) which was running on a law-and-order platform. The Motherland Party, headed by conservative Turgut Özal won 45 percent of the vote in legislative elections in November 1983 while the NDP received only 23 percent. Nevertheless, the military accepted the electoral outcome and dissolved the NSC, and Gen. Evren remained president under a transitional provision. Later President Evren formally asked Özal to form a cabinet in December 1983. The government lifted the existing political bans in September 1987 imposed by the military junta, allowing broader participation of political parties in electoral competition. In 1989, Turgut Özal was elected to be the country’s first civilian president since 1960. His election also indicated the military’s retroaction from politics and the fortification of ongoing transition to democracy.

| Country Name | Uganda     | Year of Transition | 1980 |

Commander Idi Amin Dada came to power in 1971 after his military coup overthrew a civilian government led by Prime Minister Milton Obote. Amin declared himself president, dissolved the parliament and changed the constitution to consolidate his absolute power under a military dictatorship. Amin’s suppressive rule and mismanagement drained both human and economic resources of the country starting from the mid 1970s. His regime faced both international and domestic pressures condemning his dictatorship. Neighboring governments of Botswana, Tanzania, and Zambia financed and armed the opposition movement led by ousted Obote. The Uganda Liberation
Movement launched military strikes inside the country against the Amin’s junta since mid 1970s. President Idi Amin narrowly survived an assassination attempt in June 1976. In the mean time, Amin systemically terminated his political oppositions, especially from rival ethnic groups of Acholi and Langi tribes. Amidst growing domestic oppositions and fractures within the Amin’s regime, the critical mistake accelerating his downfall was the invasion of northwestern Tanzania by the end of October 1978. Uganda troops were driven back by the Tanzania military and Ugandan exile groups. Subsequently, the Tanzanian military, accompanied by the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF), a fragile opposition coalition, invaded Uganda in early 1979 and captured capital city Kampala in April. Amin fled to exile in Libya consequently. The UNLF formed a provisional government led by Professor Yusufu Lule who was considered pro-west and conservative. Under the interim administration of the ruling Military Commission in Uganda, elections were held in December 1980 to elect the members of a newly reconstituted National Assembly. The election result showed the victory for the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) party which gained an overall majority of seats despite the objection made by the Democratic Party (DP). Dr Milton Obote, formerly the President of Uganda, of the UPC, came back to power as an elected president. The transition to democracy was however weakened by the continuation of factional and ethnic conflicts. Former rebel leader Yoweri Museveni rejected the Obote’s victory and ignited a multiethnic guerrilla movement, called the National Resistance Army (NRA), in Buganda in 1981. Human rights abuses and far-flung corruption exacerbated instability under the UPC rule. In response to ongoing crises, a group of military officers from Acholi ethnic
group staged a coup in 1985 and ousted the UPC government. However, Tito Okello, the leader of the coup, did not gain substantial support to consolidate his power. The junta negotiated with the NRA and formed a broad-based interim government. However, the shady power-sharing agreement fell apart as the NRA ousted the ruling Military Council of General Tito Okello in January 1986, and Yoweri Museveni was sworn in as president. Under the rule of Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM), Uganda was ruled under a ‘no-party’ system which severely curtailed organized party politics and heavily favored the incumbent Museveni in controversial elections.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1991</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Initially, the hardline leadership of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) resisted liberalization initiatives laid out by USSR leader Mikhail Gorbachev in mid 1980s. The nuclear disaster of Chernobyl in 1986, which was initially blocked out by the authority, became a trigger point provoking public sentiment against the communist regime. Subsequently, the incident also sparked national sentiment to proclaim sovereignty from the USSR. Ukrainian dissident groups, embolden by the inability of the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU) to subdue popular fronts in Baltic satellites, invigorated the moment of growing nationalist sentiment in late 1980s. Dissident organizations formed the Popular Front, also known as Rukh, in summer 1988 to mobilize general public by holding mass protests to support liberalization initiatives. However the Rukh still fell short of calling for full independence. Rukh candidates from Democratic Bloc secured 14
percents of the seats while the majority was occupied by the CPU during the elections held in March 1990. Despite the electoral dominance, the CPU’s influence among general public was declining at the peak of the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe in late 1990s. Rukh elevated the call for wider sovereignty and occasionally advocated for independence in 1990. Eventually, the failure of hardliner’s coup in Moscow accelerated the nationalists’ call for the independence of Ukraine in August 1991. Ukrainians overwhelmingly voted for independence in a referendum held in December 1991. Leonid Kravchuk, the leader of the CPU who broke up with the CPSU and supported the independence, was elected president in the Ukraine’s first presidential elections held in December 1991. Despite the transition to democracy, the oppositions within Rukh were too factionalized to capitalize political gains out of political change. Rukh later organized itself to stand as an opposition party in late 1992. Declining economy and slow reform stirred up labor strikes and protests in 1993. In multiparty democratic elections held in July 1994, Leonid Kuchma, who became the prime minister in 1992, defeated incumbent Kravchuk. Although the elections in 1994 were relatively free, the transition to democracy was initially weakened by obscured division of executive power between the president and prime minister until the new constitution took effect in 1996.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Uruguay</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1985</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The military had become a major decision maker in Uruguay’s political affairs since 1973 after it successfully subdued the country’s pervasive insurgency. The junta
extensively took repressive measures to silence domestic oppositions while political parties were banned under the military rule. The junta held a referendum in 1980 to endorse a proposed constitution which would allow the military to hold extensive power in national security affairs, along with strong executive power. Prior to the referendum, the junta lifted a ban on political activities and allowed three main political parties to operate for the first time in July 1980 since 1974. The opposition organized a vote-no campaign which contributed to a narrow defeat of the military-proposed constitution. The failure to secure popular support and intra-military factionalism diminished the role of hardliners and promoted pro-reform military leaders to crucial positions in 1981. Despite the rejection from major opposition leaders, the military went ahead with its own liberalization plan which would restore a civilian administration in 1985. Under the military-led liberalization plan, the junta named General Gregorio Alvarez, a retired army commander, as the transition president for three and half year to oversee the reform process in 1981. The Alvarez government approved a statute in July 1982 which recognized Colorado, Blanco and Unión Cívica parties while leftist parties remained banned. The junta invited representatives from civilian oppositions to a constitutional convention to draft a new document which outlined the future of the country after the military rule. However, the breakdown in negotiation between the military and civilian leaders led to a series of peaceful protest and general strikes organized by civilian parties, labor unions and student groups in their efforts to put pressure on the military regime in late 1983. The military and civilian leaders eventually reached a compromise in constitutional forum that would reduce the power of the armed force and restored civil
rights, and in return, civilians agreed to observe the ban of some politicians especially the leftists. For the first time in 13 years, national elections were held in November 1984. Julio María Sanguinetti of the Colorado Party, was elected president to replace General Gregorio Alvarez. In 1985, the government granted an amnesty covering all military personal accused of human rights abuses under the military rule. In legislative elections in 1994, the Broad Front, a leftist coalition, was allowed to campaign legally. After a few years of the transition to democracy, Uruguay became a consolidated democracy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Name</th>
<th>Venezuela</th>
<th>Year of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1958</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Colonel Marcos Pérez Jiménez, who became president of Venezuela in 1953 in a rigged election, ruled the country under a military-dominant dictatorial regime. President Jimenez committed human rights abuses to silence his oppositions which challenged his rule despite the oil-driven economic development. At the end of his five-year term, Jimenez held a fraudulent plebiscite to endorse the extension of his presidency in December 1957. Christian-socialist Committee for the Organization of Independent Elections (COPEI) and the Republican Democratic Union, the only two legal parties, were not allowed to participate while their political activities were rendered functionless under restrictive decrees. In a sign of growing discontent within the military, several army regiments and the air force personal mutinied in protest against the extension of Jimenez’s presidency in January 1958. Although Jimenez initially crashed the revolt, the momentum of the mutiny erupted into street fighting between the dissenters and president’s loyal units in late January. The fighting inflicted over 200 fatalities and 1000
wounded. Amidst the revolt, President Jiménez fled to Ciudad Trujillo, and the rebellion leaders formed a military junta as an interim government and promised to hold elections before the end of the year. Under the prospect of transition to democracy, some prominent civilian opposition leaders returned to Venezuela from exile. The conservatives within the military attempted to launch counter coups to stall the reform process in July, but general public took the streets in show of support to democratic reforms. Venezuelans voted in both free presidential and legislative elections in December 1958 and elected Rómulo Betancourt or the Democratic Action Party (AD) as provisional president. The AD also won the largest number of votes in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies. Soon after the election, supporters of Admiral Wolfgang Larrazábal, a candidate of the Republican Democratic Union, rioted in Caracas, stronghold of Larrazábal, in protest of the electoral outcome. However, Larrazábal and other candidates accepted the election result pacifying their supporters. Under the first term of the Betancourt government, the country faced growing mobilizations from both left and right political groups supported by Cuba and Dominican Republic respectively. President Betancourt promulgated a new constitution to expand more labor and political rights in January 1961. New elections in 1963 resulted in a victory for AD candidate Raúl Leoni. In the second term of a civilian administration, stability was restored except a military mutiny by the National Guard which was easily taken under control in 1966. The elections in 1969 demonstrated the consolidated nature of democratic transition. For the first time in the country’s history, a candidate from the opposition party peacefully and constitutionally came to power through free elections. Dr. Rafael Caldera of Christian
Social Party (COPEI) defeated the nominee of the ruling AD. However, the country’s democracy was threatened by growing unpopularity of the government for its inability to tackle economic problems, social disparity and widespread corruption in early 1990s. Some military officers, led by Hugo Chávez Frías, staged an unsuccessful military coup in February 1992. The coup marked the growing division between the right and left political groups. After the electoral victory of Hugo Chavez in 1998, he attempted to expand the presidential power to rule by decree in critical areas of policy making in 2000 and 2001. In response, the oppositions formed the Union Party, a new political party to garner support for the Democratic Action (AD) party and the Social Christian Party (COPEI). The confrontation between the Chavez government and the oppositions resulted in general strikes, mass protests and an attempted military coup. Although Venezuela continues to maintain the competitiveness of elections, growing factional competition has dissipated the characteristics of democratic consolidation.

**Country Name**          Zambia          **Year of Transition**  1991

The Republic of Zambia experienced intense domestic and international strife at the peak of Black nationalist movement in the region since the country gained independence from the British rule in 1962. The conflict between ethnicity-based political parties, especially the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) and the opposition United Progressive Party (UPP), led to the UNIP’s consolidation of power by transforming the country into a one-party state in 1972. The constitutional amendment prohibited all other political parties, except the ruling UNIP, until 1991. Zambia’s support to the ANC
insurgents who were seeking refuge close the border also distorted its relationship with South Africa which occasionally launched military strikes into Zambia territory until late 1980s. Economic stagnation and intra-party power struggle destabilized the UNIP’s grip of power in late 1980s. President Kaunda restructured the cabinet in 1988 and sacked his prime minister, Kebby Musokotwane, in March 1989. Despite the president’s attempt to introduce economic reforms and promise to hold a referendum to decide the fate of current one-party system in 1990, his action was too little and too late to deter growing dissatisfaction among general public. Student protests erupted to demand a multiparty system and the resignation of Kaunda in June 1990. The confrontation between the security forces and the protestors resulted in 26 deaths and 124 injured. Immediately following the crackdown, an army faction launched a military coup and took over the state-run radio station. Thousands of people came out to the streets to support the anti-Kaunda military coup. The government quickly overpowered the army officers and reclaimed its control. Despite the setback, the oppositions had successfully fostered substantial anti-Kaunda sentiment among general public. The UNIP government eventually bowed to the popular demand and legalized opposition parties in December 1990. However, the UNIP restricted the number of opposition rallies and disallowed new voter registrations. UNIP supporters used violence to threaten the opposition members and disrupted rallies to intimidate voters from siding with the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), major opposition party. In a multiparty election held in October 1991, President Kaunda was soundly defeated by Frederick Chiluba, candidate of the MDD. International observers pronounced the election free and fair. The transition to
democracy through a free election was, however, marred by factionalism, widespread corruption and abuse of power by the MMD which was also fragmented by defections and intra-party power struggle. In November 1996, the MMD-dominant parliament and President Chiluba passed a controversial constitution amendment which disqualified presidential candidates whose parents were not native Zambians. The requirement dislodged former President Kaunda of the UNIP from the contest. Because of the UNIP boycott, Chiluba was easily reelected president in 1996 in an election which was marred with voting irregularities amidst low turnout. The event distorted the country’s path on transition to democracy. However, President Chiluba agreed to step down after he failed to amend the constitution enabling him to seek a third term of office. MMD candidate Levy Mwanawasa narrowly defeated his rivals in 2001 election and succeeded Chiluba despite the criticism from the opposition for voting irregularities. Zambia remained a struggling democratic transition.

| Country Name | Zimbabwe | Year of Transition | 1980 |

Southern Rhodesia, originally administered as part of the British South Africa Company, was ruled by white minority. Rhodesia’s white regime sought compromise with some moderate black leaders by introducing a new constitution allowing limited black participation. However, Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), major black opposition groups, did not accept the arrangement, and the violent confrontation ensued between the white government and black oppositions. By the mediation of British and United States, the white accepted
majority rule by the blacks in accordance with the Lancaster House agreements in December 1979. A new election was held, and nine black parties contested in the election. Mugabe of Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) won the election amidst the allegation of voter intimidation.
REFERENCES


Galtung, Johan. 1995. Conflict Resolution as Conflict Transformation: The First Law of


…………….. 2007b. Authoritarian Regimes Data Set, version 2.0: Codebook: Department of Political Science, Lund University.


Doubleday.


................................. 2006b. Examining the occurrence and organization of factionalism Arlington George Mason University.
2008. Situating the polity conceptualization of 'factionalism' within a
generalized, sequencial (systemic) political conflict process Arlington: George
Mason University.

George Mason University.

2009. Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristic and Transition
Systemic Peace 2009 [cited 09/29 2008]. Available from

College Park Center for International Development and Conflict Management,
University of Maryland 2005.


Center for Systemic Peace.

MLN and Peru's Shining Path. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace
Press.

Mesquita, Bruce Bueno de , and Randolph Siverson. 1995. War and The Survival of
Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political

Miall, Hugh; Ramsbotham, Oliver; and Woodhouse, Tom. (1999). Contemporary
Conflict Resolution. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press


Mueller, John 2002. When did the cold war end? In Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association. Boston, MA.


PRIO, Armed Conflict, 1946-2001. Uppsala Conflict Data Project, Uppsala University, Sweden, and International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), Norway


Pusca, Anca M. 2006. Democratic Transition and Disillusionment: The Case of Romania International Relations, American University, Washington DC.


Robert D. Putnam. 1996. 'The Strange Disappearance of Civic America.' The American Prospect, 24


Comparative Politics 2 337-363.


Min Zaw Oo was a pro-democracy activist in the 1988 mass uprising in Burma/Myanmar while he was a high-school student. Min later joined the student-led armed struggle fighting a guerrilla war along the side with ethnic minorities before he came to the United States as a scholarship recipient to continue his education in 1996. Min graduated from the University of Maryland in 2000, double-majoring in Public Relations, and Government and Politics. In 2002, Min completed his first master’s degree in Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University. He later returned to the Thailand-Burma border and managed a scholarship program for Burmese dissidents in Thailand. He was also the director for outreach and strategy at Washington-based Free Burma Coalition until 2004. Min completed his second master’s degree in security studies at Georgetown University while studying for a PhD at the ICAR.