UNITED BY GUILT: THE INFLUENCE OF GUILT ON DIMENSIONS OF SUPPORT REGARDING EUROPEAN UNION INTEGRATION

by

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United by Guilt: The Influence of Guilt on Dimensions of Support Regarding European Union Integration

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science at George Mason University, and the degree of Master of Arts at the University of Malta

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Dedication

For Europe
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<td>BBC</td>
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<td>EC</td>
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<td>ECB</td>
<td>European Central Bank</td>
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<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>EFD</td>
<td>Europe of Freedom and Democracy</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
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<td>ERM</td>
<td>Exchange Rate Mechanism</td>
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<td>EU</td>
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<td>EVA</td>
<td>Elinkeinoelämän Valtuuskunta</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEP</td>
<td>Member of European Parliament</td>
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<td>S&amp;D</td>
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Abstract

UNITED BY GUILT: THE INFLUENCE OF GUILT ON DIMENSIONS OF SUPPORT REGARDING EUROPEAN UNION INTEGRATION

Anthony Einsel, MS

George Mason University, 2012

Dissertation Director: Dr. Derek Lutterbeck

This dissertation project looks to examine the philosophical and social arguments made by individuals like Pascal Bruckner about a guilt culture pervading across Europe and a possible connection to support for European Union integration. It draws upon the content of his book *The Tyranny of Guilt: An Essay in Western Masochism*, previously established essays and research on guilt, support for European Union integration, referendum results from various EU treaties, interviews with Members of the European Parliament, and their rhetoric alongside other EU officials. Given the very utilitarian cost/benefit dimension of integration, especially amongst most of the interviewed MEPs and general public, guilt may not be applicable in describing support for EU integration except in certain Member States, and amongst the political, intellectual, and academic elite who are not only more inclined to believe such through their rhetoric and policy recommendations. In an age of economic downturn, people seem more interested in finding a way to live than feeling guilty about their country’s own identity, and if they are, it may be a matter isolated from their view of EU integration.
Preliminary Disclaimer

"Clearly, a civilization that feels guilty for everything it is and does will lack the energy and conviction to defend itself." – Jean Francois Revel

Before anything can be said, it must be acknowledged this dissertation is being done during an ongoing crisis. By the time the development of this intro is done, there lies the possibility of something dramatic happening (or at worst, happened already) on the European continent. On the 3rd of July, British MEP Nigel Farage made the prediction, after the latest European Union Summit regarding the crisis, of the markets necessitating the need for EU and Member State officials to cease their holiday plans and reconvene in August to allay the crisis (Farage, 2012a). In fact, within the past few days news has spread of Spanish regions asking for bailouts (Servulo, 2012), and a number of Italian cities on the verge of bankruptcy (Squires, 2012). The possibility of new articles and thoughts regarding the fate of the European Union which pertain to this research are endless in these uncertain times. If there is a recent development regarding this matter which is left out, the dissertation will to the best of its ability bring it to discussion.
Chapter I – Introduction

“It began with a vision: European economic and political cooperation as a way of avoiding conflict and ensuring peace.”

When one continues from the entry way of the European Parliament’s Parliamentarium Exhibit, the aforementioned statement appears on the digital tour guide. This happens right before a corridor showcasing events from the history of Europe in the 20th century. The events, encapsulated in pictures from hungry children in Finland to the aftermath of World War II, are juxtaposed with calls from various figures in history like Aristide Briand and Winston Churchill, about the necessity of a united Europe. After this, what follows is a small hallway showcasing the supranational institutions which rose at this time to meet such a need.

Since the creation of the European Economic Community in 1957 through the Treaty of Rome, a community of six states ballooned into a European Union. This European Union (EU) now has 27 Member States, a set of governing institutions including its own parliament, a commission, and most notably a currency used in 17 Member States. It still continues to maintain the course with its most recent accomplishment, the Lisbon Treaty, which gave it a restructuring that gave it a fully formed legal personality and a new President of the European Council, Mr. Herman Van Rompuy of Belgium. Accession talks for other European states continue, with Croatia on the road to becoming a part of the Union in 2013.

However, the EU is at a crossroads. Since 2008, when Greece first began to unravel due to the mismanagement of its economy, the EU has been hard at work to prevent Greece from
sliding into bankruptcy. To do so, the EU seeks to create the European Stability Mechanism, which would be used to provide financial assistance to Member States who are in need of it. As of now, it is no longer just Greece who is trouble, Ireland and Spain had to be bailed out, Portugal may need to be bailed out, Cyprus has asked for a bailout, and now Italy may run the risk of having to be bailed out as well. What was once hailed by some (Rifkin, 2004) as a dream which would have eclipsed even the American dream, with its value-based membership, built upon trust and goodwill between Member States looks to be dissolving rapidly as the global economy worsens.

On a metaphysical and philosophical level, there has been a rise in texts and discussions about the decline of Europe. French writer Pascal Bruckner released in 2010, The Tyranny of Guilt: An Essay on Western Masochism, a long essay positing a Europe stricken with guilt. In feeling guilty for all its wrongs in the past, Europe has become highly sensitive to physical and mental indictment for being responsible for the rest of the world’s woes. It is “the very figure of Satan, whose evil presence corrupts everything because it has it’s ‘center everywhere and its circumference nowhere (Bruckner, 2010, p. 23).”

In light of Bruckner’s text, nothing much has been said on whether EU Member States’ citizens also had a rationale of integration due to guilt. For certain EU member states, there are a number of things to feel guilty about, especially within their past history. Whether it is the memory of the Holocaust in Germany, the civil war of Spain, or the collaborationist regime during Vichy France, there have been and still continue to be studies of these issues. However, not much has been noted on whether these, among other colourful events in 20th century Europe, provide a basis for people to support continued pooling of national powers into Brussels: creating a more interconnected Europe. Is this considered the only way to avoid any
and all future conflicts which would bloody Europe’s landscape and subject the world to new horrors? What does NOT being in the EU mean to its citizenry?

This is a fundamental question in light of events. The EU, even as this is written, continues to seek ways to stabilize its presence in light of financial crises. The disaster has not yet abated, and there is potential of further crises in other Member States. This problem is exacerbated by conflict between heads of member states like German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti, and a cavalcade of public and political figures in a scenario which can be described as (in the worlds of British MEP Roger Helmer): “An extraordinarily perverse soap opera.” The chorus of summit meetings, council debates, and discussions continues unabated in the political culture and news. As this dissertation is being written, there lies the possibility of Greece exiting the euro, and Member States like the UK and even Germany, considering a referendum on letting the people decide what they want to do (AFP, 2012).

The events unfolding between Member States entails a pernicious dichotomy on the maintenance of state sovereignty while keeping power in Brussels. This leads into the lingering spectre of the question: “What is Europe?” (Friedman, 2012). This represents, like the EU itself, a sui generis form of conflict, between the Westphalian nation-state and the supranational entity which Member States have ceded economic, political, and social power. It has become an amplified dilemma which begs a similar question raised by Charles De Gaulle: If he cannot govern a country which had nearly 235 different kinds of cheese, what of a continent?

The objective of this dissertation is as follows. Apart from the already diverse results set by previous researchers of support for European integration, the concept of guilt will be factored in. Does historical guilt about actions so long ago in the past colour a sense of distrust
and perception among Member States that they would place more trust in Brussels than their own political class? If not, do the same results which coloured European integration in the past still apply, especially in light of the current events around the continent? Moreover, who does historical guilt affect more, the political class or the general public? In doing so, some recommendations not just for political but public consumption will be made with regards to what exactly must be done in light of figuring some sense of how Member States perceive themselves and their history, vis-à-vis, European integration.

Going off from the rationale driving the formulation of this dissertation, an examination of methodology and data will be laid out. In turn, what follows will be what kind of definition of guilt will be used, as well as other concepts including shame and historical analysis. Following this would be essentially be a recap of various rationales and research projects regarding popular support for the EU, coming from a myriad set of theories including identity, cognitive mobilization, and utilitarian aims. These will then be juxtaposed to the unique set of events that were the referendums of the UK in 1975 pertaining to continued membership in the EEC, the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 (for Denmark), the 1994 Accession Referendum for Finland, and the 2003 Referendum for Malta. Other treaties like the Treaty for the European Constitution (France and the Netherlands) and the Lisbon Treaty (Ireland) will be used dependent on the subject matter. To help provide a frame of reference, the segment will start with what was observed during live interviews with actual Members of European Parliament (MEPs), as well as any and all pertinent speeches and statements made by them, their colleagues, and in a few cases other MEPs and EU officials.

From there, the usage of statistics from already established research, newspaper articles, journal entries, blog posts, plenary session speeches, and conferences will be used to
juxtapose their views vis-à-vis the pervading reality. It should be noted that it is regrettable a less than balanced interview pool was made with regards to political affiliation and Member State samples, but it is hoped who was interviewed can provide an impetus for further, more specific, detail to research.
Chapter II – Hypothesis

The research’s main hypothesis is through the historical memory, especially through atrocities in the 20th century; European integration is supported due to guilt over historical events of the past. It is perhaps apt to note of Bruckner’s comparison between the United States and Europe’s birth. The US was borne to regard the unlimited possibilities while Europe was born out of exhaustion towards sacrifice, content with lacking ambition, and runs the risk of becoming the “Pontius Pilate” of the world (2010, pp. 89-90).

The dimension of citizen participation in the European project provides an already well-established arena of examination regarding the presence of European identity. This field is a multidimensional affair (Boomgaarda, Schuck, Ellenbaas, & de Vreese, 2011), set by a myriad of rationale each with differing reasons regarding EU integration. Some scholars cite utilitarian purposes of EU integration (Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007), national interests (Hooghe & Marks, 2004; Deflem & Pampel, 1996), and overall note the importance of how public discourse can and will shape integration to the EU’s advantage or disadvantage (Gabel, 1998b).

This adheres to a potential cognitive mobilization bent of creating a reality of shared ideas and concepts which creates a Europe with a vision of focusing on inward idealism and no forward thinking possibilities. This is exacerbated through singular testimonials which entail a backward thinking shame in one particular German individual when he broke down and details how his mere Germanhood makes him as culpable as the Germans who committed crimes against humanity long ago (Bawer, 2011). In essence, based on concepts of emotional ‘hot-
spots’ (Volkan, 1997) chosen traumas, and the past to affect the social discourse of the present (Connerton, 1989), guilt may thus be an effective aid in integration support.

This rhetoric is also perpetuated by entities who talk of citizens’ responsibilities towards horrific acts in the past. The philosopher Jaspers (1961) made a dour statement in his tract The Question on German Guilt how “a people answers for its polity (p.61).” Essentially, from this statement it renders any citizen of a particular country, in this case Germany, to be held accountable for any and all political and personal actions made by ancestors and previous generations. To put it in a succinct manner, there is a call to national responsibility, and in this case, it is insinuated upon through a sense of guilt based on acts of history. The presence of it in this aspect may also bring about a cause to action to change one’s perception of self and nationality. This may include, but is not limited to, the changing of national mythology into something more palatable to one’s self and national identity (Abdel-Nour, 2003, p. 712). It will be of note to see if this sentiment is shared within the spheres of support. One other addendum, there is the potential for such coercion to cause people to feel humiliation rather than shame (Deigh, 2006, p. 417). It will be in the interest of the project during the research period to categorize if respondents are humiliated, guilted, or shamed.

It will also be posited of how national identity may play a role in the shift of greater European integration in this study (Spohn, 2005). National identity provides a salient factor in this research approach, especially given the shifts in certain countries within the past two decades. The United Kingdom, thanks to the change in generation and a vaguer understanding of what it means to be British in a multicultural, multinational, country, provides an example. Unlike the earlier generations of the United Kingdom which grew with a pride based on a strong British influence across the globe through colonial empire, there is not much of a formative
element in later post-colonial times (starting in the 1980s) which instills in people a sense of pride (Tilley & Heath, 2007, p. 674). This is not a wholly new phenomenon, for there are certain European states like Malta, who began to evolve a sense of identity to Europe, albeit one which is subordinate to national identity (Abela, 2005/2006, pp. 25-26).

Eichenberg and Dalton (2007) noted of a dynamic change in integration talks based on previous research. Before the Maastricht Treaty, European integration had considerable support due to potential benefits of an economic union. However Maastricht, as is noted through them, was unlike anything ever done in the past. Unlike the Treaty of Rome and other such acts which had a top-down, technocratic, approach, it asked the European citizenry to perceive of the EU into something more than economic. It would be a supranational organization with a political power which advocates concepts like an all-encompassing European identity and an ethos (p. 130).

They have also laid bare possible implications, based on waning public support for EU integration post-Maastricht treaty, of what EU politics may have to deal with. Citizens will be disinclined at further integration in fields like social security and policies which affect national budgets. Also, any cuts or policy forms based on requirements from the EMU will more than likely suffer from a negative reaction, and in due time the possibility of having the welfare cake while eating it too under the EMU becoming more costly may be the case (Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007, p. 145). This falls in line with established research (Gabel, 1998a) denoting how individuals support integration due to comparative advantage, i.e. reaping the economic benefits integration brings.

The utilitarian dimension of integration maintains a rather large prominence in research. Gabel’s (1998b) research on various theories regarding European integration found a huge
correlation between human capital and European integration, bolstered by high education, and classification in the bourgeois political parties and class (p. 348). When people are concerned over their welfare, they will seek to maximize benefits. Through all these aforementioned research, this project expects to see such facets continue unabated in colouring rationales toward European integration, despite the stated hypothesis of guilt being the factor of EU integration.

Based on these developments in the EU, never mind the rise of connecting the subject matter of historical guilt with the EU, the hypothesis is thus raised:

- Support for integration of Member States into the EU is characterized by, among other previously established theories, a sense of historical guilt on their actions of the past.

In essence, the more a country or a citizen of said country feels guilty about their historical past and are not proud of their because of such, they are more inclined to support European integration, and vice-versa. The fundamental issues at hand then are a key event which ought to be examined and observed with great interest. Matthew Feeney of Reason Magazine outlined five reasons why Americans should care about the Euro Crisis, which if it gets worse will affect the United States just as much so, with the fifth reason noting of how the country may have a ‘future of Europeanesque problems and perhaps more frightening, European solutions (Feeney, 2012)’. With this kind of invective being leveled against the EU, it has to be considered why support for it is what it is.

To be sure, this coincides with intentions established by various individuals before the European Union was officially deemed such at Maastricht. The Preamble to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community¹ (EEC) declared as its first objective that it is:

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¹ Otherwise known as the Treaty of Rome
"- determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, resolved to ensure the economic and social progress of their countries by common action to eliminate the barriers which divide Europe, affirming as the essential objective of their efforts the constant improvements of the living and working conditions of their peoples (Treaty of Rome, 1957)"

This also continues into other documents like the Single European Act (SEA), which laid out more foundations for political control and reasserted the aims of the EEC, and how it is:

“MOVED by the will to continue the work undertaken on the basis of the Treaties establishing the European Communities and to transform relations as a whole among their States into a European Union, in accordance with the Solemn Declaration of Stuttgart of 19 June 1983 (Single European Act, 1986).”

Given the existence of treaties like Maastricht, Nice, Amsterdam, and Lisbon, it can be safe to say there is an inherent desire for political union, and how they used economic integration to make this all possible. The last objective of the original Preamble for the Treaty of Rome must at the very least be noted, especially how the people who put this into action were:

“- resolved by thus pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty, and calling upon the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts...”

The question this then raises is who these ‘other peoples of Europe’ are, and what their beliefs are with regards to joining the EU.

To Bruckner, the ‘Old World’ prefers such responsibility due to ease, allowing them to coexist with injustice instead of fighting it, as they apologize for ancient crimes to exonerate themselves from present ones. The idea of collective sin as a result is ‘insidious’ and the contrition of it is not a policy. The history of the world does not contain the rather divisive concepts of sinful or pure nations, but democracies which recognize such acts and the dictatorships which cloak them under the guise of martyrdom (Bruckner, 2010, pp. 98-99). In a Europe where the citizenry of various Member States are slowly becoming discontent with the
project, whether it is the poverty they suffer with or the indignity of having to bail out those who have made poor financial decisions, the desire to eliminate those said barriers may not even be readily present anymore in peoples’ minds.
Chapter III - Literature Review

When examining the literature present regarding European integration and historical guilt, it must be noted how this appears to be a rather current phenomenon regarding the application of the theory of historical guilt and connecting with Europe in an overarching manner. Individuals like Bruckner (2010; 2011) and Dalrymple (2010; 2012) shared a sentiment regarding a perceived spirit of masochism underlying Europe and loss of faith in the values and ideals it initially founded. The latter however examined not just the pronunciations of his observations regarding the reasons to support the EU based on historical memory, but on a cost/benefit rationale.

The pre-eminent issue at hand with these three’s examination of Europe’s guilty conscience is a lack engagement of their theory in the field. Narrative analysis where the usage of media, literature, philosophy, is used heavily (especially with regards to Bruckner and Dalrymple), there has yet to be an attempt to clarify and perhaps quantify this within the field. This said, it is a relatively new phenomenon with some individuals (if not researchers) who have already engaged in experiences which tap into this guilt feeling (Tenenbom, 2011). Even Sarrazin (2012), when he connected the euro with the Holocaust, appears to have not yet made the leap into connecting such feelings with the general populace.

Consideration is also given with regards to previous research concerning historical guilt, and how it is perceived and applied to people. This includes whether there can be salience in collective guilt (Deigh, 1999; 2006) or is there a human feeling which is more effective than
such, notably shame (Abdel-Nour, 2003; Tarnopolsky, 2010). The initial literary examples will most notably pertain to the German experience of World War II, and in the case of France, what is known as the Vichy Syndrome, developed by Rousso and Goldhammer. This syndrome described over how France handled its history of the Vichy Regime, attempting to reconcile its past with discerns what was fact and fiction. These are a kind of process that bred documentaries like “The Sorrow and the Pity”, which confronted the French with an uncomfortable reality, so much that it was banned from being released in the country.

Lastly, there will be an analysis already previously established examinations of support on EU integration for a number of reasons. These include the classic rationale of utilitarianism (McLaren, 2005; Gabel, 1998b), cognitive mobilization (Inglehart, 1970), identity (Spohn, 2005; Hooghe & Marks, 2004; McLaren, 2004, et. al), and support national politics (Anderson, 1998). On a qualitative level, these concepts have been examined in three Members States: Spain, Germany, and the UK (Medrano, 2010) with differing results concerning support for integration, but this is (barring any competing dissertations which have yet to be published) the first time where the concept of this guilt which is said to force Europe (never mind the United States) to ‘endlessly atone for what it has inflicted on other parts of humanity (Bruckner, 2010, p. 34).’

Given the very embryonic stages of these trains of thought, it will be the objective of this project to at the very least bring it down to ground level, and once reviewed, applied readily through personal interaction and comparison to what has already been set in its foundation. As was said in the previous section, ‘guilt’ in the regard of this literature will focus on the feelings respondents have towards their respective country and the actions done in the past, and as a result of their ill feelings toward it, they will integrate into the EU in order to provide recompense and prevent such actions and feelings from ever occurring.
The Concept of Guilt

Before engaging in further examination, it is necessary to define what type of guilt is being discussed, based on its psychological, moral, and social dimensions. Since this is an endeavour which seeks to make such studies applicable to numbers of people, the use of Paul Hiebert’s definition of a guilt society, in his *Anthropological Insights for Missionaries*, will be used:

“Guilt is a feeling that arises when we violate the absolute standards of morality within us, when we violate our conscience. A person may suffer from guilt although no one else knows of his or her misdeed; this feeling of guilt is relieved by confessing the misdeed and making restitution. True guilt cultures rely on an internalized conviction of sin as the enforcer of good behavior, not, as shame cultures do, on external sanctions. Guilt cultures emphasize punishment and forgiveness as ways of restoring the moral order; shame cultures stress self-denial and humility as ways of restoring the social order. (Hiebert 1985, 213)”

With this establishment out of the way, guilt may now be used in a more distinctive way for this research.

Guilt as such, may be construed as a form of moral feeling, akin to the thoughts of philosophers like Wittgenstein. Deigh (1999) observed guilt to be such to due to how it needs a practice of regulating human conduct and relations through “requirements, rules, dictates, judgments, and other verbal expressions of a governing, moral authority (p. 315).” This comes across as divergent from Herbert Morris’s (1988) concept of ‘nonmoral guilt’. When it comes to the notion of ‘moral guilt’s’ dominion over the rest of the guilt, he was keen to note how problematic the concept of guilt can be due to a human need of making sense of the world (p. 222).

In the case of historical guilt, Morris’s analysis was manifest in his segment over what is known as unjust enrichment and vicarious guilt, where an individual feels guilty over the actions
of ancestors and like people in the past. Bruckner (2010) alluded to this when he noted how Europe considers history as a nightmare and wards it off by ‘norms, rules, procedures (p. 89).’ It is a continent stricken with the fear of returning to, in the words of Stefan Zweig, ‘explosions of collective bestiality (p. 73)’ exhausted by war and had to construct something like the European Union as a means to survive (pp. 189-190). One may argue there is a security dimension to the EU as something to prevent war, but given the use of rhetoric (which will be covered later), there appears to be an attempt to regulate not just state conduct, but human conduct.

Morris (1988) referred to Karl Jaspers’s Question of German Guilt when examining the first type of guilt mentioned above, and extrapolates what it may mean to have metaphysical guilt, as in the type based on inaction regarding somebody else’s acts of violence. He then posited how the feeling of guilt is from a benefit resulting from an unfair distribution which was out of any guilty person’s control, with a known party being left out of the equation. Thus it would force said person who felt guilty to perhaps act upon feelings to rectify such situations. It is something unlike moral guilt, since the guilt would be blameless since it is independent and away from possible choices to inflict wrong (pp. 236-237). This circumstance of identity is formulated based upon the actions of others, and Morris attempted to claim how, when a person makes identity ties to heinous acts done in the past, it can also be applicable to others who can do the exact same among their own kith and kin of their own volition. These commitments are thus revealed through emotional responses (p. 240).

It can be construed as a part of the conceptualization of joint commitments (Gilbert, 1997), based on a party’s readiness to devote time and effort into a project or idea. When placed in the realm of ‘collective guilt’, Gilbert notes of how such a term is not a sum of every person’s individual guilt regarding something, and how there is no way to break it down into
easily quantifiable segments. Members of a group “share equally in collective guilt, but they do not have equal shares. Nor do they have unequal shares (p. 81).” It is not so much harsh as it is tragic based on the reality of how being in a group membership may give discomfort especially when wrong acts are committed, to share such a feeling even though one may be innocent of wrongdoing. To Gilbert, this can be a sensible response to have, especially when one is in a group (pp. 84-85).

This aid, there are issues at hand when it comes to the perceptions of reality, especially with how individuals and societies at large react to atrocity. In examining the psychosis of post-war Germany, Adorno (1986) argued how forgetting National Socialism is less of a response more along the lines of ‘psycho-pathology’ and more along the lines of general social situations. If anything, the fascism he spoke of still exists with the process of dealing with the past sadly failed. Apparently like before, people are in a state of dependence in an economic order with no control over it. In order to live, they must operate within its sphere of influence, and shirk any type of intellectual effort due to a culture which prevents the society from effectively doing so (pp. 117-118, 124-125). These trains of thought raises the issue how people differentiate what exactly is fact or opinion.

Adorno’s examination of guilt may also provide credence to the idea of ‘unconscious guilt’ and its Freudian influence (Smith, 1968), where actions are made on the basis of a guilt not known to the actor. Smith found, through his analysis of Freud’s Civilization and its Discontents that such guilt can be used to alter society, where emotions like discontent and anxiety may be used to foster such feelings. This type of guilt had been traced as far back as Ancient Greece
where the process of detecting the illness of guilt is similar to that of Freud. Unlike Freud who treated unconscious guilt as an illness which is healed when a citizen accepts, the Ancient Greeks treated it as a way to “awaken nemesis against their opponents (1968, p. 514).” This ‘unconscious guilt’, from the look of things, may be weaponized and help change the political and social structure of societies.

The Possible Conception of Shame

Hiebert, apart from detailing the concept of the guilt society, also denoted the concept of the shame society:

“Shame is a reaction to other people's criticism, an acute personal chagrin at our failure to live up to our obligations and the expectations others have of us. In true shame oriented cultures, every person has a place and a duty in the society. One maintains self-respect, not by choosing what is good rather than what is evil, but by choosing what is expected of one (Hiebert 1985, p. 212).”

It is also acknowledged how Hiebert denoted how Western societies are more prone to guilt and Eastern societies are prone to shame. However, the literature given in this regard provided a very jaundiced view where shame and guilt seem as if they are used intermittently and are applied to different circumstances.

Abdel-Nour (2003) believed shame is a much better indicator of current political behavior and the concept of national responsibility compared to guilt. While guilt allows a form of recompense for transgressions, not all like acts have to originate from it, and moreover self-reflection may lead to what he termed ‘self-love’ – the act of justifying and compromising actions based on what was the past. Shame comes into play, especially when it raises

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2 "The analyst detects illness; he determines that the illness is due to a sense of guilt which the patient (individual or society) has hidden from itself; he announces the means of relief (further analysis); and then proceeds, through an elaborate process of discovery (prolonged analysis), to a precise determination of what has produced the sense of guilt. Making the sense of guilt conscious will not wholly solve the problem of illness, but it makes the problem (the political one) more amenable to solution (Smith, 1968, p. 511)."
awareness of certain failings of an individual, i.e. something which sullies an idealized image of the person in his or her eyes and that of the surrounding society (be it real or fabricated). Guilt ponders the question “What have I done?” while shame ponders “What am I?” In this regard, people with guilt are compelled to right wrongs, while people with shame are compelled to hide. Yet the latter can also compel self-improvement so said individuals not be considered a failure of a disappointment to themselves and their surrounding world (pp. 708-709).

To feel guilty then, actions must have been made where an individual can definitively say they ought to not have been performed when it occurred, and are things which cannot be regarded as something worth repeating again (Abdel-Nour, 2003, p. 709). Shame is a sign of an individual’s ability to be aware of his or her faults and be able to be self-critical, and is more susceptible to ideas of transforming the national mythology. In light of this, individuals who take their national identity must hold responsibility for actions in the past either through guilt or shame. This is either made by putting up a mirror through their face and persuading them to become responsible and aware of the consequences of their actions, including the great ones, or to ask them to be more self-critical and reassess their self-perception vis-à-vis the nation (pp. 712-713).

What was discerned from Abdel-Nour’s (2003) study is a differentiation between acts which are either finite or perpetual. Guilt in this regard focuses on some form of immediate recompense, while shame is more inclined to give rise to either perpetual self-damnation or improvement because of awareness of the self vis-à-vis the society. This begs the question then of what happens to a nation when certain events like the Holocaust occur? Can there be a convergence of guilt and shame based on an action which cannot be rationalized or defended, and as such lead to a psychological breakdown in which the Germans ask “What have I done?”
as well as “What am I?” Or was there, as Ley (2007) theorized an initial shift from guilt to shame during the Holocaust, where like Abdel-Nour juxtaposition between exposure and recompense to an event to a distant spectator spot where examination can be made and perhaps from there, action (Leys, 2007, p. 9)? Could shame be the ‘nonmoral guilt’ of Morris freewheeling to a larger frontier?

In essence, may they have done this because this is who they are, and due to the panopticon that is geopolitics, they are locked in a perpetual cycle of recompense of paying the debt incurred against humanity in that twelve year period, and as much as they change themselves to make it possible, it is never good enough? Bruckner (2010) balked at this statement for history in his view also abolishes what he termed ‘blood debts’ between societies. It lets the ‘dead bury the dead’ and not letting that happen may force others to focus on what divides instead of unites and obligates new generations to bear the burden of ancient wrongs and resentments (2010, pp. 162-163).

Indeed, in current democratic societies there is a consideration on the importance of shame, given how it may be construed as an emotion to avoid in social, governmental, and institutional practice and discourse (Tarnopolsky, 2010). Shame to some theorists (Etzioni, 2001) is “needed to express and reinforce the shared moral values that countries such as America are in danger of losing (Tarnopolsky, 2010, p. 4).” Any form of shaming penalties is, in purview of Etzioni (2001) democratic due to a witnessed societal disapproval of acts instead of institutional factors like incarceration, which foster “recidivism far more than rehabilitation (pp. 42, 46)” . This Tarnopolsky (2010) noted when she begins examination of shame, that its mere presence does not guarantee people being arbiters of virtue, and can lead “society to new and subtler forms of tyranny and despotism in our psyches and our polities, or vice versa (p. 7).”
There may be however, limits to shame, in the context of the EU. Kelemen (2006) outlined three different reasons how shame can be an ineffective impetus for political action. This includes, the tolerance in politics towards normative concepts of ‘ought’ and ‘is’, the conflict of norms between states despite certain shared ones, and the influence of actual geopolitical power (pp. 1303-1304). Reasons based on rationality were also just as likely to compel institutionalization of various EU policies and organizations just as shame would. In essence, utilitarian cost/benefit analysis, through rational choice institutionalization, works as a bigger impetus toward integration politics. This may explain unilateral actions like when Chancellor Merkel shunned popular opinion and approved a loan for Greece during the earlier years of the euro crisis (Kupchan, 2010). This perhaps extends to criticisms made on the effectiveness of the Vichy Syndrome on France (Gordon, 1995), with citizen interests becoming more overly concerned with contemporary and egocentric issues like capitalism, socialism, and the economy. With regards to who considered the problem of Vichy to be rather important, it is not so much the general public, but French politicians, intelligentsia, journalists, who invested in the so-called ‘psycho-drama’ (Hoffmann, 1994).

Guilt and History

Despite this, there have been several policy recommendations regarding a connection toward guilt and European integration. Alfred Pijpers (2006), made a proposition with regards to EU policies in the reassessment of nations’ responsibilities and acts during World War II as a means to build citizenship, and by extension EU integration. He notes in particular of how Germany’s younger generation may become tired of dealing with historical ‘guilt’, and the way to assuage such burden is to distribute complicity of the Holocaust amongst other European states (like the Netherlands, Bulgaria, Italy, Austria, etc.). The sharing of historical memory
would then give rise to a deeper concept of European citizenship. There have been already EU
based initiatives of creating programmes like the Consultation Forum on the Future Programme
for Active European Citizenship and the creation of the “European Holocaust Memorial Day” to
help foster a collective memory, a recommendation shared alongside others as well (Tavares,
2012, p. 10). The matter remains however contentious, given the highly dissimilar methods of
each Member State in handling their history (especially in debates), plus the overall narrative
being less about the Holocaust and more so a stand against communism and fascism (Probst,
2003, pp. 54-55).

This continues to become more problematic when it is argued how current historical
writing ‘sublimates moral judgment into the narrative form it employs (Braun, 1994, p. 181).
‘Reality’ is created by those in command of the narrative from whatever historical documents
and ‘facts’ are obtainable. Historical representation is based not so much a modicum of truth
but plausibility, distinctive from the possible (science) and the imaginary (art). Interpretation
and even evidence becomes highly suspect by third party views, especially in light of events like
the Holocaust (pp. 195-196). This is a problem of history covered by White (1966) when he
noted of the burden it holds.

The ‘burden of history’ White spoke of is its adherence to the ideas and practices of
nineteenth century art and science, where it was thought of to be the ‘epistemologically neutral
ground’ between such, settled in a milieu of not what history is but what it ought to be (White,
1966, pp. 111, 126). However, due to the progress of science and art, history has become a field
leveled with criticism from both sides as a corruptive influence that does not allow for the full
maximization of properly examining society and mankind (pp. 113-114). History compels people
to look back at the past without giving any consideration of the present and from there the
unknown future. This is most prevalent with regards to a couple of philosophers he cites of their views in the aftermath of World War I. In order to secure the peace of the continent, states must sublimate their identities, including how they run their governments and economies, into a much larger entity. Going it alone, according to various sets of political rhetoric including EU Council President Van Rompuy (2010), is something to be frowned upon extensively. It appears to support going back to the very state of being that brought about those two World Wars, and as such a country must feel guilty of bearing such feelings. It must avoid such temptations, and in order for it to stop from doing so, must undertake a form of ‘penance’ in sublimating what may be considered a base instinct like nationality into something more ideal like what would be considered a ‘supranationality’. Then if there is any form of trepidation or uncertainty, such Member States are looked upon with shame and disapproval unless they follow whatever criteria they signed up for.

Guilt as a result is operationalized in a way that there is a feeling of embarrassment and disappointment not taking part of the European project. Because of their being part of projects which in the past that hurt a lot of people, or beliefs which have caused such to occur, the only way to curb these aforementioned ‘explosions of collective bestiality’ is to become part of a greater entity, to cede various powers a sovereign nation-state has to a larger entity, so that it may secure the peace and avoid war. In this way, it is an attempt to figure into the study of EU integration another independent variable or two alongside an already varied set.

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3 This passage in particular of Paul Valery said this: “History is the most dangerous product evolved from the chemistry of the intellect. ... History will justify anything. It teaches precisely nothing, for it contains every-thing . and furnishes examples of every-thing. . . . Nothing was more completely ruined by the last war than the pretension to foresight. But it was not from any lack of knowledge of history, surely (White, 1966, p. 120)?”
European Integration  
  Public Support for integration into the European Union is a storied topic covered by many researchers (Boomgaarden, Schuck, Ellenbaas, & de Vreese, 2011). This was an evolution from the era of ‘permissive consensus, where elites would engage in the deals themselves, into one of a ‘constraining dissensus’ where they now have to give consideration to its citizenry when negotiations about Europe are held (Hooghe & Marks, 2008, p. 5). These have ranged from arguments from utilitarian support of cost and benefits (McLaren, 2005; 2007; Gabel, 1998a; 1998b), cognitive mobilization (Inglehart, 1970; McLaren 2007; Hooghe & Marks, 2006), political support (Anderson, 1998; Gabel, 1998b) and identity (McLaren, 2002; Hooghe & Marks, 2004). Lindberg and Scheingold’s (1970) terminology of utilitarian and affective support provides a basis with the former’s focus on cost/benefit analysis and the latter’s focus on an emotional response to the abstract concepts of European identity (Lindberg & Scheingold 1970, p. 40). This wide berth of research gives rise to a multi-layered research matter where there has yet to be no a scholarly consensus on the answer (Hooghe & Marks, 2005, p. 20). To speak of European integration and not allude to the voluminous research already made regarding what colours support in the public domain, despite the sample made in the project being only six people, would have extensively shortchanged the project.

Cognitive Mobilization and Political Trust  
  The field of cognitive mobilization and political trust conceive of a support for European integration as either the result of education and social mobilization or as a result of one’s opinion on the current domestic situation of one’s country. While familiarity in and of itself does not entail positive support for integration, age, social class, foreign travel, raised income and a communications development which disseminates positive pro-EU news and resources
lead to greater public support for supranational European institutions (Inglehart, 1970, p. 70). McLaren (2006) also attributed cognitive mobilization in that those who have very little knowledge about the EU and have very little political conversation with friends are more ambivalent towards it (p. 388).

In the political trust dimension, the result is then the gauging of EU opinion through the already known national institutions (Anderson, 1998). Although, it has been found that, even if one has knowledge of the institutions, if citizens believe they are underrepresented, support for the EU decreases no matter if economic circumstances are good (Rohrschneider, 2002). De Vreese (2004), in his analysis on what would constitute “Yes” or “No” votes in the 2005 French and Dutch referendums found that cognitive mobilization coloured support for integration in a positive manner. This said, there has been research on how the theory may only be valid in certain Member States, like the original six in the EEC (Gabel, 1998b, pp. 351-352).

Utilitarianism
One of, if not the, most prominent dimensions which is said to colour support for EU integration is of the utilitarian argument of cost/benefit analysis. Given the EU’s historical development in the style of functionalism, with its focus on technocracy and spillover (Kurt, 2009), which began in the realm of finance and economics, it is rather necessary to consider this dimension (Gabel, 1998b). This is made considerably more so given how its proponents prefer such over the nation-state with its “certain dogmatic traits that result in lessening public welfare (Kurt, 2009, p. 45)” and the observation of how a political institution which was meant as way to avoid something akin to “Sophie’s Choice” tended to focus extensively in financial and economic dimensions (Noordegraaf-Eelens & de Mul, 2011). Efficiency is to be found in
supranational/transnational institutions, and would, ideally result in a shift of loyalty from the nation-state to the supranational institution (Rosamond, 2000; Hooghe & Marks, 2008, p. 3).

This dichotomy was found to be divergent between the public and the political elite. Public seeks to integrate and cede control to the EU based on the volatility of the labour market dependent on the policy field, and the elite are more inclined towards optimal solutions at the EU level (Hooghe, 2003). Elites and the citizenry have different visions of Europe, one wants to be able to govern and project political influence, and the other wants an EU which protects from the excesses of the market (p. 17). Such opinions on what the EU ought to be gives rise to a debate on the place of functionalism since the theory is said to have no set end towards a growing technocracy, it would be against continental integration due to its propensity to impose limits on such projects (Kurt, 2009, p. 51). Said projects would cause nationalism to wither away and loyalty would then become based on the concept of supranational sentiment in the visions of Monnet and Schumann. However, this would only work where “integration could ensure permanent positive sum results (Rosamond, 2000: pp. 76-77).” This is going in line with already established rationale regarding incentivizing entities into institutional framework (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Verdier, 2005).

Within utilitarian support for integration there exists a dichotomy between two types: egocentric and sociotropic. The former bases integration on how certain individuals gain or lose in being a part of the EU, with social class and job status colouring their support in either positive or negative fashions (Gabel & Palmer, 1995; 1998b; Inglehart, 1970, p. 67). The latter type, sociotropic, based integration on the economic gains for one’s group/country (Hooghe & Marks, 2005, p. 421), with notably those who believe their companies will not be affected by EU
legislation due to close proximity with the EU median, having higher support for integration (Hooghe & Marks, 2004, p. 3).

On the reverse side, utilitarian motivations were found to colour euro-scepticism (McLaren, 2005). Although wildly divergent across Member States, her research found a connection between Euro-sceptic states and the feeling they were disadvantaged when it came to examining costs and benefits they perceived to be getting from their membership (pp. 11-12), more so than national identity (although exceptions like the UK and Denmark were found). To do this she used a Eurobarometer question\(^4\) which she believed was more effective in directly measuring egocentric utilitarianism rather than that of occupation, income, and education. Euro-scepticism, as well as Euro-philia (McLaren, 2007), are affected based on satisfaction and belief in the distinctive benefits being part of the EU can deliver. Mistrust of national institutions was also considered, but then rounded out by the finding how it was moreso mistrust in EU institutions than national institutions which coloured Euro-scepticism (McLaren, 2005, pp. 14-15).

Dalrymple (2010) posited that if one asked a pro-EU person why they support European project (i.e. The European Union), the answer would be the avoidance of war and the security of peace (p. 84). This argument was one he considered to be pessimistic and highly dependent on what he thinks was a suggestion which, alongside its opposite, cannot either be proved or disproved. Argument being is if it had not been for the EU, all states in Europe would be ‘at each other’s throats again (p.87).’ The founding fathers Schumann, Monnet, and Adenauer did not honestly believe without their plans for European unity a war would break out again. Real

\(^4\) Do you think that (OUR COUNTRY) being a member of the European Union has brought you personally many more advantages, more advantages, as many advantages as disadvantages, more disadvantages, or many more disadvantages (Eurobarometer 57.1, 2002).
motives, as against declared ones, are always a matter of conjecture, and cannot finally be proved to have operated (p. 92). Dalrymple then said this:

“The answer, I think, is obvious: the European Union is like a giant pension fund for defunct politicians, who either cannot get elected in their own countries or are tired of the struggle to do so. It is a way for politicians to remain important and powerful, at the center of a web of patronage, after their defeat or loss of willingness to expose themselves to the rigors of the electoral process. One of the characteristics of modern political life is its professionalization, such that it attracts mainly the kind of people with so great an avidity for power and self-importance that they do not mind very much the humiliations of the public exposure to which they are inevitably subjected (Dalrymple, 2010, p. 94).”

This belief is then boiled down to what he thinks is a force zero-sum decision: total war or total peace.

“What was true of Germany was true of the rest of Europe. What counted from now on was the standard of living and the means by which it could be protected from the vicissitudes of economic life. Europeans are fearful of the future because they fear the past; they are desperate to hang on to what they have already got, what the French call les acquis, because it represents for them the whole purpose of their existence. They do this even when the situation calls for flexibility, and when a lack of flexibility threatens the entire system. Of course, the cost to everyone of the generous social security provisions is great and abuses are common; but it is a price that Europeans are willing to pay because security and stability (even if they ultimately prove illusory) are worth so much to them. (Dalrymple, 2010, pp. 148-149)”

There appears to be an inclination towards risk aversion found throughout most of the research on EU integration. It belies a kind of radical sense of prudence which, according to Bruckner (2010), is no longer willing or able to make decisions when finding a way through a life filled with uncertainty. In Nietzschean terminology, since politicians believe they are at perpetual risk of becoming the monsters they fought against, they must apply the same restraint to its citizenry whether it is through education or not even allowing them a referendum in affairs like EU integration.
Identity in European Integration

In light of the affective discourse regarding support for the EU, research has shown in particular the strength of national identity. Hooghes and Marks (2003, 2004, 2008) believe that while utilitarian benefits play a part, they are second when compared to group identities and the subsequent emotions behind them. Where it is most notably present is usually in member states with a very divisive political environment. Their results found there was a possibility of national identity to coincide with European identity and integration, and it was only those who deemed their national identity to be exclusive.

When it comes to more positive findings, due to the current changes in geopolitics and culture, there is some recourse in the possibility of cordial association between different identities. In essence, a person can see no cognitive dissonance in having not just a national identity but a European identity as well (Abela, 2005/2006). Indeed, integrating into the EU was argued as a procedure meant to rescue the nation-state (Milward, 1992). This said, in Member States where the political elite are divided, identity produces Euro-scepticism, whereas if elites are united in Europe, identity and integration can co-exist (Hooghe & Marks, 2005, p. 437).

However, it was also found that integration support in terms of post-national rationale is not as readily prevalent in various Member States, but more so national concerns (Deflem & Pampel, 1996). Then there were findings which revealed how exclusive national identities were more euro-sceptic, and if there is a disparity of integration perspective between elites and the common citizenry, then more than likely there will be an influence of those who are also euro-sceptic as well (Hooghe & Marks, 2008, pp. 20-22; Marks & Hooghe, 2003). This included the general public and when regional integration is not just economic but political as well. It was also found by them that, like McLaren (2002), opposition to EU integration is based upon
‘tapping deep-seated fears’ through mobilization and construction in political conflict regarding the subject matter. Although roughly a year later, after examining public support of integration on a perceptual and not a demographic level, she found utilitarian aims being more potent in opinion than national identity (McLaren, 2005, p. 13). Again this raises another form of collusion of proxies and utilitarian benefits possibly triumphing over any sense of post-national idea. Stronger national feelings also appear to attribute greatly to lower support for EU integration as well (Carey, 2002).
Chapter IV – Methodology

Given the scope of the project, it was decided, in order to mitigate undue wear and tear and stress, to utilize qualitative analysis through the use of personal interviews with Members of European Parliament. This was done during their committee meeting sessions in Brussels on the week of 9 July 2012 at the Altiero Spinnelli Building. The six MEPs who gave interviews are (in order of research outline and political affiliation):

**Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D)**
- Professor Edward Scicluna (Malta)
- Mr. Peter Simon (Germany)

**Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD)**
- Mr. Morten Messerschmidt (Denmark)
- Mr. Sampo Terho (Finland)
- Mr. Roger Helmer (United Kingdom)
- Mr. Nigel Farage (United Kingdom, as represented by personal spokesman Mr. Andrew S. Reed)

The initial sampling attempt was that of focused randomization. Originally it was to be within the sample range of France, Germany, Malta, and the United Kingdom, with two MEPs from each country (each of a different political group) asked for a 20 to 60 minute interview. Unfortunately due to previous commitments and busyness for a variety of MEPs, it was a rather difficult endeavour to follow this style of sampling. It would perhaps have been in the best interest of the project to be more insistent towards MEPs regarding potential interviews; it was
thought to be considered prudent at the time to be polite and accept a ‘no’ decision. As such variables covered in other research projects like gender, were left out given the circumstances.

Exceptions were then more or less made when doing random sampling. With regards to the UK, after observing plenary speeches of Messrs. Farage and Helmer, it seemed like a reasonable decision to try and speak with them on the project. Then, when it was uncertain whether an ideal amount of MEPs would be attained, certain MEPs were asked of any recommendations within their political group for potential interviewees. It worked successfully with Messrs. Messerschmidt and Terho, with the help of Mr. Reed. As such, due to the lack of success in getting French MEPs, the sample countries shifted to remove France and include Denmark and Finland. It is acknowledged that the sample does not adhere to an ideal objective ratio with 4 Euro-sceptic and/or EU-critical MEPs to 2 Pro-EU MEPs, but it was (and still is) the hope that despite this there lies worthwhile information in those interviews.

Written interviews were also considered, however, given the subject matter and the belief in establishing some form of personal rapport with the MEPs, and the benefit of observing bodily reactions when these questions are being asked (Ryen, 2001). Their being put on the spot in a face-to-face interview would reveal in some way their convictions and considerations about the subject at hand, without having the luxury to think about it if they had a written interview. Luker (2008) stated the purpose of interviews is not to examine the mindset of one person’s head, but to examine the mindset of other people’s heads. If a similar sentiment is heard from people within the same region who do not know one another, there is the possibility of finding some trend or thought process which is a social phenomenon and not just an individual one (p. 167).

What was noticeable during correspondence was how the MEPs from the EFD were quicker than most of the Pro-EU parties when it came to responses to the letter.
As such, the interviews with the MEPs were considered to be the establishing frame of reference in order to provide further insight to the research project. There were eight questions and prompts utilized throughout the interview. While not known at the time of the similarities between styles, it was realized the types of questions adhered to realizing a narrative structure formulated by Labov (1972):

- What does the term ‘European Project’ mean to you? (Frames the interview [The Abstract])
- Verify why more or less of Europe and/or the EU? (Sets the discussion based on their positive or negative answer to the previous question [Orientation])
- What do you think is your home country’s citizenry’s duty in that regard, and why the opposition behaves the way it does? (Gauges the interviewee’s investment on the subject matter and how others should view it. [Complicating Action])
- The hypothesis of guilt colouring public support for the EU is set up with the mention of Thilo Sarrazin and his book “Europe Does not Need the Euro”, which is then followed by the question of whether the same idea guilt colours EU support applies to their home country (Another [Complicating Action] due to the argument of how guilt supports EU integration, and based upon the answer given, gauge on how the interviewee wishes the interviewer and subsequent listeners and researchers to interpret what ought to be the case [Evaluation]):
  - The idea Germany has to support the EU is because it’s “driven by the very German reflex that the Holocaust and World War II will only be finally atoned for when all our other interests, including our money, is in Europe’s hands.”
- Two-pronged question: If things go to where you want them to go (be it lesser or more EU integration), what do you believe will happen and what will you be doing while it occurs? (The question allows the interviewee to evaluate possible [Resolutions] to the outcome of two scenarios and to place himself on a normative position on what he will or will not do if they come to light)
- Final Wrap-Up Question: Anything else you would like to say about the subject matter before we conclude? (Returns everything to the present moment and allows them to contextualize current beliefs and feelings on what should or should not be considered by others who will may wish to take part of this interview [Coda])

From what was established here, this was a qualitative endeavour meant to gauge causal aspects between guilt and EU integration. Once again, the feeling of guilt towards the actions done in the past (Volkan’s ‘chosen trauma’) provides an impetus for individuals from different
countries with different histories, compels them to cede certain facets of their country and life to a supranational institution.

The content of the interviews (specifically the concept of guilt) will be compared to public support for integration through referenda, narrative, and the occasional statistics, with no use of the Eurobarometer. The usage of referenda over Eurobarometer polls was based on the idea of how referenda are “not neutral decision making instruments (Hooghe & Marks, 2006, p. 248).” Given the controversies raised by referenda throughout the EU in its current history, it seemed prudent to opt for this approach. A referendum grants people democratic power to effectively decide upon their next course of action, and incentivizes both sides of the argument to engage in discourse providing the rationale to support referenda X, Y, and Z. Again, the time of permissive consensus for EU integration has ended, and moments where the constraining dissensus (Hooghe & Marks, 2008) can be acted upon by the general public.

Like de Vreese (2004), the use of Eurobarometer data, while helpful, has been heavily relied upon and with a research topic like guilt colouring support for integration, it requires a novel execution where Eurobarometer data is not enough to suffice. That and the opinions of MEPs, especially given their position as elected representatives of the Member States; seem to be a rarity in EU integration research, due to their being the only democratically elected officials in the supranational entity. Then there is also the allegation of bias for the Eurobarometer, which may be of no surprise given how it is funded by the European Commission. Neil O’Brien of the Open Europe think tank, noted how in a May 2006 poll, of how the public is being offered only “integrationist” options without any “anti-integrationist” choices (Beunderman, 2006). This research seeks to offer the possibility of allowing its interviewees the chance to advocate such stances.
Narrative Analysis is used based on the rather metaphysical, philosophical, and political rhetoric which, now more than ever, colour the discussion of integration. Juxtaposing what is said by the MEPs vis-à-vis their own words in plenary speeches, conferences, and even other MEPs and EU officials was meant to gauge continuity, and the previously established research of public support for integration. From there, a connection will be attempted to see if such support works alongside historical guilt. This was something advised by Mr. Bruckner in a personal correspondence:

“Except a few cases of honest confession, modern guilt never appears as such. It always comes in disguise, so you have to deduce it from what is said. It is an underlying sentiment which covers many others. You have to study discourses, first and then make your assumption (Bruckner, 2012).”

From what can be discerned this analysis may not be an exact science, but to notice such matters is the objective of the research regardless.

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6 Correspondence is left as is.
Chapter V - Engaging the EU By Its Official Channels

Before the interviews of the MEPs are dealt with, three particular frames of reference will be established: two from former European Commissioners, and the other from the current President of the European Council. For the sake of brevity and to provide an initial base for to try and verify the research hypothesis with the MEPs interviewed, these three individuals and their particular speeches and (in one case) article were chosen based on their close inclination to already established literature review on utilitarian cost/benefit analysis and the concept of historical guilt in the 20th century. The following events and statements may be one of many, but the fact the usage of such rhetoric in the highest offices in the EU permit an opportunity to see if the interview sample’s viewpoints not only synchronize with each other but within institutional hierarchy.

In 2005, Margot Wallström, the Swedish former European Commissioner for Communications, generated controversy on part of a speech she would have used before excising the passage when she commemorated VE day in the Czech town of Terezin, right after linking the cause of World War II to nationalism, pride, greed, and competitions between nation-states:

“Yet there are those today who want to scrap the supranational idea. They want the European Union to go back to the old purely inter-governmental way of doing things.
I say those people should come to Terezin and see where that old road leads (Wallström, 2005)."

There was a debate which was raised around the time when the manuscript of the speech was made. Wallström has since denounced the British press (which generated the most media buzz regarding the flap) as lying about the existence of such comments, while a representative of hers said she removed the passage due to time constraints to use the full text (Vucheva, 2005), and it was said the original speech was preemptively posted on her blog site and handed out to journalists. She had even written on her blog back then of her indignation of how her words were being used (The Local, 2005). The controversy even spilled over to Sweden where Wallström’s countrymen also put her to ask for her speech. Former UK MEP James Hugh Allister did the same and took offence of what he believed to be hijacking the Holocaust to drum up support for the still developing EU Constitution (Lennart, 2005; Allister, 2005). This furor raised by the British and the reactions of discomfort from Wallström, her fellow countrymen and other MEPs also helped to solidify the inclusion of this statement as a frame of reference.

On the other side is the Dutch former European Commissioner for Internal Markets and Services, Frits Bolkestein. On 4 June 2011, he penned an article on the Wall Street Journal that lamented about the slow cultural suicide of the West. Europe refuses to stand up for the values it once held dearly, and argued how the UN was formed to weaken its influence, and is weaponized by other cultures to be used as a cudgel. If Europe can take back its pride and achievements the world would be better off, Bolkestein hoped (Bolkestein, 2011). Although a

7 www.munkhammar.org/blog/pdf/SpeechTerezin1.doc
8 "I think it is incredible that a mark of respect for the past and the suffering of the 35,000 people who died in Terezin should be used in this way. My message was to outline the reality of the history of the European Union and the importance to ensure this never happens again." Note: The former commissioner’s blog appears to no longer be in service.
9 http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/wallstrom-i-blasvader-for-nazital_420747.svd
former EU Commissioner released his beliefs of how the continent is going to pot because it no longer upholds its values, he still applied it in generalities, with no specificity with regards as to who within Europe was more inclined towards guilt. This said, Bolkestein provided a view not found amongst EU Commissioners on a subject rarely spoken about from them.

On 9 November 2010, European Council President Herman Van Rompuy, addressed an audience in Berlin on anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, about how the age of the ‘homogeneous’ nation-state is over, and all must fight the danger of some new Euro-scepticism. It is a lie Van Rompuy said, of how Member States think they can ‘survive alone’ in a globalized world. Then this following statement was made: “Fear leads to egoism, egoism leads to nationalism, and nationalism leads to war (Van Rompuy, 2010).” This has been given a rather negative reaction, especially by British MEPs, with Mr. Farage noting that: "This man is an overpaid catastrophe who wants to abolish our nation. Nation states will not disappear because they are the expression of peoples' will. The EU is swimming against the tide of history. The number of nation states in the world is increasing all the time (Waterfield, 2010)." The speech posited a belief system which may be constituted as a means to persuade people to promote the EU based on its tangible benefits, and as something said to avert the aforementioned downward slide to barbarism. No matter the rationale for not supporting integration, regardless of whether it is good or bad, Van Rompuy’s words on surviving alone and nationalism seem to insinuate an attempt to shame (Abdel-Nour, 2003).

Malta and Guilt

The first interview with Professor Scicluna\textsuperscript{10} was unfortunately very brief due to time constraints based upon an error of scheduling. The environment to have the interview was then

\textsuperscript{10} Scicluna, E. (2012, July 10). Personal Interview.
rendered not as ideal as planned. This said, it was decided to work within those constraints as much as possible, and the necessity to undertake that was made even more urgent given how Professor Scicluna did not wish to be recorded for the interview. The further discussion of his words will be brought out to the best of the report’s abilities based on the notes taken during the interview.

From the start, when the subject matter of EU integration was broached, Professor Scicluna spoke about how he disapproved of the way the other political institutions were handling the crisis. He believed it was a unilateral process instead of a vision between the various political groups, where agreements are negotiated until it becomes acceptable to all parties. He was not exactly keen on such procedures bypassing the European Parliament, and believed that it ought to be kept informed. He found this to be rather unfair, especially to Greece, especially when automaticity towards a more efficient EU should be at hand.

Pressing Professor Scicluna upon the guilt question, or at least any other question, was made difficult not just due to the constraint in time, but his initiative to begin speaking when the subject of integration came up. He immediately went off on the problems regarding the current legislations being undertaken during the EU, and his issue with the ECB. He spoke of this in what appeared to be a very methodical, functionalist, utilitarian style of thought, noting how it is necessary for the EP to engage in such matters and allow for a better oversight in making the right choices. It was his hope that the EU would be able to continue, yet he said it was necessary to be patient for it would take years to happen. Professor Scicluna supported a process which would happen slowly but surely, and how it was best not to project too readily of grand designs just yet. Malta had already given up some mobility to the ECB, and it is through communication to the smaller microcosms of society like villages, and the processes of
technology and development which would allow that vision to be possible. These appear to be in line with Hooghe’s (2003) functional analysis of elite support for integration, in their desire to shift various policies and issues into the European level.

It was acknowledged that while it would have been worthwhile to enter into the conversation and set things on track, it was decided to let Professor Scicluna take control in order to observe at least some form of natural reaction and to allow him a forum to say what he believed was needed to be said. This and it allowed the utilization of Mr. Bruckner’s personal recommendation to look into the discourse and dialogue in order to figure out if there was any kind of guilt feeling in Professor Scicluna and also to see if this is a shared feeling with other Maltese (Luker, 2008). Based on his focus on technocratic and governmental facets regarding the EU, guilt may not really be a factor in why he supports deeper integration. This is supported by a number of his plenary speeches in the Parliament, citing the need for the EU to take political leadership against the financial markets, the creation of a system to stabilize the eurozone areas, all the while trying to maintain role of Member States in the conflict (Scicluna, 2010; 2011a; 2011b).

The Maltese Referendum of 2003

With Professor Scicluna’s interview, it was time to examine his mindset regarding EU integration when placed alongside support in both the political and public dimensions of Malta regarding integration. To do this, Malta’s referendum on acceding to the EU will be considered, as well as a number of various journals, articles, and editorials where the topic of the EU takes center stage.

The Republic of Malta was one of ten states to join the European Union on 1 January 2004, and uniquely was the only one with a major political party opposed to it: The Maltese
Labour Party (*Partit Laburista*). Due to the highly polarized nature of Maltese politics between that party and the centre-right, Pro-EU Nationalist Party, the election turnout was at 91% and the ‘Yes’ vote which entailed support for Malta to join the EU won by a close margin (psclane@buffalo.edu, 2005).

The Labour Party’s strong ‘No’ campaign was made with two particular appeals. The first, albeit unsuccessful appeal by then Labour Party leader Alfred Sant, was to provide an alternative, somewhat pro-European, solution by noting how Malta can have a partnership with the EU like Switzerland does. However it was deemed too vague and lacked any positive support or attestation to credibility, especially from the EU itself. The other appeal was much more effective: citing that Maltese would suffer from more expensive food prices, foreigners buying Maltese property and raising the cost of living, and the losses of Maltese jobs in the public sector, civil service, and others from the hands of other workers like Sicilians or East Europeans (Briguglio, 2004).

The Maltese Labour Party’s brochure of “Partnership: The Best Option of Malta”, acknowledged that the country cannot go it alone, yet it had to have some retention of its political maneuvers in order to bring about agreements with the EU which may grow or shrink depending on circumstances. This is bolstered by Mr. Sant’s autobiographical tract, *Confessions of a European Maltese*, which argued against the EU’s ‘bureaucratic uniformity’, and how a micro-state will lose any leverage if it cedes power to a wider entity (Briguglio, 2004). At the end of it, Sant wished for nothing more than to leave the decisions of the future to the Maltese and to let them decide how to turn their lives around.

The Pro-EU sides of not just the Nationalist Party but the Alternative Democracy Party, believed membership to the EU would allow them access to a greater market, and also
improvement opportunities. In the case of the latter these include educational and work opportunities for students, and a chance to better engage with improving the environment and worker/consumer/gender rights. Access to the EU would also grant those funding privileges, which was more than likely used to improve infrastructure and allow them concessions in other fields like free movement of workers, the environment, and foreign policy (ibid).

Once again, one may see the utilitarian and identity dimension found in these tracts of support for the EU, but not one of historical guilt. It perhaps is no surprise since Malta, despite its 7000 year history, is a relatively nascent state compared to the other Member States examined in this research. During World War II, it was still under the jurisdiction of the British Empire, and was at the forefront of the war effort due to its renowned resilience against daily bombing raids between the years of 1940 and 1943. So there is that potential dimension at hand.

However, this has not stopped a number of politicians and academics to imbue support for integration into the EU with a spiritual dimension (Vella Bardon, 2012; Mifsud, 2012). Dr. Klaus Vella-Bardon, after noting the benefits Malta received from the EU like infrastructure, promotion of small enterprise, and environment-friendly policies, spoke of the need for politicians to have a soul. He derogates a Europe which is falling apart due to their adherence to a ‘neo-liberal capitalist’ model of economics which leads to rampant consumerism. Then notes how it is necessary to look at the ideals of the Founding Fathers of Europe, which came from two World Wars, and who were dedicated to building a Europe based on “Based on solidarity, participation and cooperation, promoting peace, security, progress and prosperity (Vella Bardon, 2012).” Such statements fall upon the realm of Abela’s (2005/2006) analysis of how Maltese can both have their own identity and a European one.
In light of the last EU Summit in late June, a debate is being held in Malta about what exactly it must do. MEP Dr. Simon Busuttil of the European People’s Party, in an editorial on 18 July 2012, spoke of the future of Europe being Malta’s future as well. In response to a statement by European Commission Vice President Vivianne Reding asking for a stronger political federation in Europe, Dr. Busuttil notes how it should be the same goal for Maltese politicians, yet noting it requires public support (Busuttil, 2012). The article, which appeared on The Malta Times on 28 June 2012, had Vice President Reding compare the euro project to how the United States developed their economy and how a financial and banking union in a similar vein may be the course for Europe. “Such a banking union should be backed by the full faith and credit given jointly by the euro area governments and, one day, by a European Finance Ministry,” she said (Reding, 2012). However given the crisis of confidence she previously acknowledged earlier in the article, it begged the question of whether this statement is disingenuous, given on whether it should be backed instead by euro area citizens through referendums.

Charles Mangion, Opposition spokesman on economic development, said after the Summit about how its mechanisms may be detrimental to further economic development in the country. This is based on how the new stability and financial protocol basing voting influence on contribution amounts, in which Malta has the smallest. In this regard, Mangion notes of the importance of democratic consideration, and has also advocated analysis of the stipulations and putting it through the parliament before any decision has been made (timesofmalta.com, 2012). Prime Minister Lawrence Gonzi also has taken umbrage against the current Summit talks, for the Treaty is asking Malta to make adjustments on things like retirement, a policy field which Gonzi wishes to further discuss while the treaty is being drafted. Labour leader Joseph Muscat,
despite his support for continued membership in the euro and the EU and more authority to the ECB, stated the primacy of consulting parliament before any deals with the EU is made (timesofmalta.com, 2011). However, the question must be asked why this is the case now, compared to eight years ago when MP Edwin Vassallo was quoted in saying: “If the EU demands it, we have no option but to abide by what it says,” regarding its entry into the euro despite lacking a referendum like the UK and Denmark (Sacco, 2004)?

Germany and Guilt

Unfortunately, leveling the guilt question to Mr. Simon\textsuperscript{11} was believed impossible to do. Given his nationality to be the same as Mr. Sarrazin, never mind the nature of the interview, raising the question seemed imprudent. Fortunately, when the subject matter of the interview was asked by Mr. Simon: that of integration, one could say it was possible to gauge from discourse the opinions held. What is observed and gleaned may not reflect the entirety of Mr. Simon’s personal disposition (if at all); however with Mr. Bruckner’s previous recommendation in mind, the interview with Mr. Simon was handled the most delicately out of all the others. The following passages were redeemed as best as possible, given how Mr. Simon declined to be recorded for an interview.

When the subject matter of European integration was dropped, Mr. Simon, for lack of a more fitting term, gushed of how the EU allowed, in one moment, an ‘extraordinary, exceptional peace’ in a continent which never knew it. To Mr. Simon, there is no reasonable alternative. He then noted how the last time Europe has ever experienced any peace was during the time of Charlemagne and the Holy Roman Empire, a view shared also by Rifkin (2004). The EU helps

with fragile political interests and allows the citizenry of the continent to feel secure, preserving a way of life which is believed to be under threat unless it is with Europe (Milward, 1992).

Notably, Mr. Simon likened the EU in a positive manner to Yugoslavia under Tito, and how much it worked in that regard. Through the unification of disparate regions, it would prevent nations from entering into old conflicts that would lead to the same bad habits. He then shifted to a cost/benefit dimension in that a common voice was necessary in current politics. To help prove his point, he cited in particular his home state in Germany, Baden-Württemberg and the neighbouring state of Bavaria.

He noted of the number of internationally known corporations within these states, with automobile companies like Daimler AG, Porsche, BMW, and Audi, and shoe manufacturers like Puma and Adidas. After this he then cited the populations of both states, Baden-Württemberg with approximately 11 million people and Bavaria with 12 million, and juxtaposed them to the city of Shanghai, which has 30 million people, which he believed has more economic and political influence compared to just two states in Germany. To him, this type of disparity necessitated a more unified approach where both states (and by extension other Member States of the EU) can negotiate with larger parties. He also quoted the statistics of how 70% of German exports go to the EU.

The return to nationalism in Mr. Simon’s case is a dangerous one, and the population has to move forward with EU integration. Politicians thus had a duty to be clear on what is necessary in that regard, no matter if they are on the right or the left. Peace, according to Mr. Simon, is an unnatural state of being, not God-given in any way. German Chancellor Brandt was cited in this regard with a paraphrase of how nothing is ever natural, and that people must work on keeping things together, and working upon each Member States’ strengths. This is the only
chance they have to work together, and if the EU dissolves there runs the RISK of potential conflict. He said it does not matter if the likelihood of any conflict is at 1% or at 99%, it is better to keep things together just in case. Maintaining the EU to Mr. Simon would be much cheaper than a war, and every alternative would cost more. In a world with very strong, dynamic, countries like China, Europe needed to speak and work in one voice.

German Public Support for Integration

Germany is unique amongst the EU Member States examined in this research, as it is the only one which was one of the original six Member States who signed the Treaty of Rome, and never had a referendum regarding membership to the EU. Based on historical events with the government-led foundation of the ECSC and EEC alongside France, Italy, and the Benelux countries, it is of not much surprise Germany has never had any. In fact, the Maastricht Treaty was only signed and approved in the Bundesrat and Bundestag, and not by the general populace unlike in four other Member States. Notably, in a 1992 Los Angeles Times article about its passing in Germany, then Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel said one of the many reasons for ratifying the treaty was countering right-wing extremism. This is ‘the common task of all democrats, all citizens, all good Europeans (AP, 1992).”

While not really about the EU in particular, the travelogue of Tuvia Tenenbom (2011), I Sleep in Hitler’s Room – An American Jew Visits Germany, may be seen as a usable frame of reference in potential conception of German support for integration and the concept of guilt. While more a literary work and not a scholarly work, the interaction between Tenenbom (a director at the Jewish Theater of New York) and Germans was seen to have substantial information on gauging the salience of the hypothesis through personal conversations and
interviews. It is above all else, a story which has an interesting history and provides a more public dimension to German concepts of historical guilt.

This is markedly shown when he remembered how the German publisher of his book refused to let it be released nationwide unless it was toned down and any trace of passages which can be seen to insinuate German anti-Semitism removed. A private conversation noted how any book that paints such a potential picture (even if it is through personal conversation between individuals), would not be published at all in Germany. To Tenenbom, this is more about image than truth in the way Germany tries to protect itself.

Once he hits the road, there was a menagerie of encounters which seem to delve into the German psyche. In doing so it was figured out what it means to be German in some people, and what they think is the best thing about being one. In one particular passage, to be German is to be punctual, dutiful, reserved, and analytical, and the best thing about being German is based on location due to the ease of travel (Tenenbom, 2011, pp. 1139-1141). Another telling story was when Tenenbom asked one of his German acquaintances when they would raise the German flag: only at soccer games. The reason being, according to Tenenbom’s acquaintance, would be because others would call such people Nazis if it would happen any other time. In one other instance, a doctor proclaimed he was proud to be a ‘European’, and while he notes “Europeans did much shit, too. But I am proud to be European still (Tenenbom 2011, pp. 1294-1295).

One of the more distinctive events during his travels was when Tenenbom arrived in Dachau and conversed with its citizenry. He then asked a striking question to somebody who did not wish to have any interest in knowing who within the neighborhood was involved in the concentration camp, for all he wanted to do was to think of the future and not the past.
Tenenbom (2011) followed through with a question asking if one can move forward if he or she does not know where one comes from. The man did not give any answer (pp. 1438-1439). Once he was pressed even further, the man broke down into tears about not wanting to see ‘it’ when he looks into a mirror:

“It’s going to be me, staring at me from that mirror. And I don’t want to see it!”

Those people are you?

“Yes.”

Them?

“Yes.”

They are you?

“Yes.”

The Nazis.

“Yes.” (Tenenbom 2011, pp. 1448-1451)"

This particular emotional response seemed to cut deep within the psyche of certain individuals in Germany. It does beg the question, if pushed, on whether this type of attitude also drives public opinion on EU integration. This said, one of the more telling dimensions of public support was that of German public opinion on Maastricht back then. In 1992, 70% of the German population was wary of giving up the deutschmark toward something new and unknown, yet at the same time curbing the money supply and the inflation rate (Goldstein, 1992, p. 121). There perhaps may be some form of divide between guilt feelings and integration, especially when money is involved. This is most especially prescient in recent times, for the German central bank (notably its president Jens Weidmann) is currently at odds with the ECB and the political
establishment, on the potential involvement it may have in assuaging the sovereign debt in other EU Member States (Reiermann, Sauga, & Seith, 2012).

Bernard Schlink, the author of the novel turned Academy-Award winning film, *The Reader*, defines historical guilt (or as he puts it ‘guilt about the past’) as an infection towards an entire generation. This type of guilt not only grows out of the past, but into the present generation and possibly the future generation, similar to how Carl Jung characterized ‘collective guilt’. Schlink acknowledges this concept of guilt as a leitmotif in German culture, and attempts to examine it through literary discourse and not through a moral or political one.

The mastering of the past through law is a thought Schlink shares with Bruckner (2010) with regards to guilt. In Germany, a recognized term is used for this: *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*. It has no corresponding word in other languages, but it’s defined as an act which: brings the past into such a state of order that its remembrance no longer burdens the present (Schlink, 2010, p. 43). The past, to Schlink, is ‘not simply the events that have happened but a construction of them in a manner that successfully integrates them into an individual or collective memory (p. 45).’

**German Political Elite Dimension – Proponents and Dissenters**

Professor Wilhelm Hankel, one of four German professors who sent a court case to Karlsruhe of how bailouts were in direct contravention of treaties, rendered this statement about his native Germany during a conference. For him, Germany is a nation which does not accept to be a nation and that after the war they became less of one and more a society of merchants. The goals and aims of living were tethered to the Deutsche Mark, and prosperity would be guaranteed if they worked hard and kept the currency strong. This was apparently rhetoric used by politicians like Adenauer (Hankel, Rescuing Plans for the Euro or Fighting for a
Better Europe?, 2011). The only issue which Hankel noted was it was not foreseen how a merchant nation’s mentality can become lobbyist in character, and the eventual syncretism between that and the macroeconomic ambitions of the Euro would count for a very dangerous scenario.

One of the more controversial voices regarding German guilt is former Bundesbank minister Thilo Sarrazin. Renowned and reviled for his 2010 book Deutschland schafft sich ab (Germany Does Away with Itself), Sarrazin recently released a new best-selling book: Europa braucht den Euro nicht or “Europe Does not Need the Euro”. Most of the treatise consisted of mostly economic statistics regarding how utilizing the single currency does not essentially mean instant prosperity. However Mr. Sarrazin made this provocative statement regarding the decisions made by the German government regarding Eurobonds and the bailout of struggling eurozone countries:

“They are driven by the very German reflex that atonement for the Holocaust and World War II is only finally done when we all put our concerns, our money, in European hands (2012, p. 203)”.

This line of thinking shared a similarity to Volkan’s concept of chosen trauma. Through real information, high expectations and feelings, and hostility against contrary thoughts, it not merely recollecting the memory, but sharing a mental construct of the event. Volkan noted of the risk of the shared trauma to bind a group together and make them continue to feel powerless if there are no other circumstances that would allow them not to feel like this (pp. 47-48).

In the case of historical guilt with regards to Germany, Bruckner (2010) noted of people’s obsessions with Auschwitz, and how the groups who have suffered in a tragic fashion wished to align with this concept of suffering. Suffering is a right-giver, and may even be the
sole source of rights, according to Bruckner. It is a generator of reparations and implies three elements: “a broadening of the range of the intolerable (offenses that used to be accepted are now condemned), an end to impunity for criminals, and finally, the sacredness of the victim (pp. 114-115).”

In the case of Vergangenheitsbewältigung's purpose of unburdening the present through its mastering the past, it seems to continue in becoming a struggle. This is highly present within the German political elite, most notably Chancellor Merkel. In the midst of the euro zone crisis, she attempted to rally against this state of duress. She stated how Europe should not take 50 years of peace and prosperity for granted and leveled a historical obligation to “protect by all means Europe’s unification process begun by our forefathers after centuries of hatred and blood spill (Pop, 2011).”

In a plenary speech on 18 June 2008, German MEP Martin Schulz from the S&D expressed his disappointment at the ‘No’ vote Ireland gave in its referendum of the Lisbon Treaty, and said this entailed a crisis of confidence, especially with regard to the supranational institutions of the EU. He lamented the lack of passion on the Pro-EU side, which has lost its passion since the end of World War II when it ‘melded Europe together’. Instead it belongs to the ‘anti-Europe movement’, and then made this remark:

“The passion has migrated to the other side, the side which speaks ill of Europe, on the right wing of the political spectrum. It lies with those who speak ill of Europe, and who do so simply because they are afraid. In Europe, however, this mixture of social decline and fear has always opened the door to fascism (Schulz, 2008).”

The invective of history and the idea of war were made by a German MEP against criticisms leveled at the EU, and can be said to be a thinly veiled conceptualization of guilt.
This kind of disposition even reaches as far back as the Maastricht Treaty. In a 2005 interview, Professor Hankel remembered an encounter he had with future German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer during a conference analyzing the risks of a single currency. Which Fischer acknowledged the issues at hand he, along with other members of his Green Party, voted yes on the Maastricht Treaty. When a student asked why that happened, Fischer responded: “After Auschwitz, no German politician can afford to vote against Europe (Hankel, 2005).” This kind of disposition falls in line with the way the narrative of German history is affected by one particular desired narration (Braun, 1994), the potential shirking of intellectual action regarding this particular state of affairs (Adorno, 1986), and what can be considered a variation of Smith (1968) where the German polity always awakens the nemesis of nationalism and the Holocaust to keep people in line, wherein the older generations are reminded of it, and the newer ones are introduced to it. Bruckner (2010) noted how demonization of identities prevents countries from prevailing over its trauma and give room for reflection (p. 125). Contrition cannot define a political order, yet it seems once again the aforementioned invective by Germany makes it the norm, by igniting the spectre of fascism whenever the Euro-sceptic movement comes to the forefront. It is this kind of pathology which not only coerces German to going down this path, but also devises solutions which may only benefit them in the short-term rather than the long-term (Beck, 2012).

However, when the use of the Holocaust and past history is done by another party (be they German or otherwise) there is a sense of palpable frustration and anger that can be seen in various political figures reactions. When Sarrazin’s latest book was released and the aforementioned quote connecting the euro and the Holocaust was made, it was called a “despicable calculation” by Finance Minister Wolfgang Schauble, “worthless” by leading
member of the Social Democrats Peer Steinbrueck, and “pathetic” by leader of the Greens Juergen Trittin (Baghdjian, 2012). Researching various speeches made during plenary sessions at the Strasbourg parliament also showed these rather perniciously sensitive reactions to the mention of events during the early 20th century, notably the Enabling Powers Act of 1933, which was leveled by British MEP Daniel Hannan against what he believed to be actions in violation of parliamentary proceedings (Hannan, 2008). This act caused him to be derided by his political group, which he subsequently departed.

It was these very reactions that rendered referring to such matters to Mr. Simon near to impossible without botching the interview. Indeed, when asked to consider the possibility of the EU breaking down, it was asked if he would, among other like-minded people, try and rebuild a united Europe from the remains, he looked rather despondent on that prospect. He believed that a second chance would probably never occur, and pretty much stated, if insinuated upon what can be recalled, of the necessity of keeping things together. It looked as if integrating the states of Europe together was something he believed to be a responsibility not just for him but others as well.

A press release from the S&D titled “For a European Socialist Alternative” alluded to the utilitarian concerns which Mr. Simon spoke in their written fear of how going back to what the political group considers “the eighteenth century nation-state” would cause them to become subservient to ‘superpowers, past and future, and to the dictatorship of the market (Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, 2012).’ One could argue how subservience

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12 Speech on 31 January 2008 on the Interpretation of Rule 19(1) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QVeMBN80cI – Note the reaction of MEPs Schulz and Daul due to Hannan’s statement around 6:32.
still exists, especially when people like Mr. Barroso say the EU is like a ‘non-imperial empire’ and that nations cannot do it alone, they need Europe. It appears to be a crossroads of egocentric and sociotropic utilitarianism, where it is to the benefit of Europeans that integration be the case. In the words of British historian Timothy Garton Ash, Germany is too large for Europe, but too small for the world, and if it does not have Europe, it will be a dwarf in a growing world of giants (Ash & Hannan, 2011).

The United Kingdom and Guilt

Out of the five Member States analyzed in this research, the United Kingdom is the one where information, especially in the realm of Euro-scepticism, was yielded in high quantities. Previously established research (McLaren, 2004) confirmed such trends to exist.

Mr. Helmer did not believe guilt colours British public support for EU integration, with the colonial history of the British Empire and the need to sublimate such conquering impulses cited as a reason to integrate. The only people who adhere to that, according to him, are those within the left-wing establishment in media and politics. Any guilt pertaining to the colonial past is not felt much within the ‘ordinary British people’. What does drive supporters of the EU in Britain is their investment into what was thought to be exciting and the way of the future, and reluctance to let it go. Mr. Helmer thought instead of guilt it is more of embarrassment and depression at the end of empire, and cited the Suez Crisis as an impetus for joining the EEC at that time, especially within the ranks of the Home Office. While he admits the British colonial period a lot of bad things happened based on the standards of the day, but ‘we probably did a

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13 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I8M1T-GgRU
hell of a lot more good than harm and that’s a view I must say I subscribe to.’ Mr. Reed echoed those sentiments on behalf of himself and Mr. Farage.

This view of why the UK joined the EEC is echoed by Mr. Hannan, who stated how the UK’s accession in 1973 was during a time of ‘national angst’ and economic decline (Hannan, 2012). Both hold the persuading rhetoric was based on economic grounds (for trade, according to Mr. Helmer is always a good thing) while retaining national sovereignty, and the overarching narrative that the British public was deceived in 1975 referendum. If anything (to Mr. Helmer), guilt is more something the Germans would have, based upon their history of being bad Europeans, and thus they want to become good ones. Mr. Farage, in a rebuttal to former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown during the latter’s visit to the European Parliament, noted how the current government apologized for ‘virtually everything’ (e.g. the Amritsar massacre, slavery), except for their decisions to further bind the UK into the EU (Farage, 2009).

Mr. Reed noted how mankind has the same inclinations towards heroism and crime, joy and sorrow, yet there are many unique cultural characteristics between each nation to make them their own entity. The only who are ashamed, according to him, are those who try to make other people ashamed of it, again hearkening to the narrative issues Braun (1994) and Smith (1968) alluded to. One book reviewer of The Tyranny of Guilt noted how his daughter at a university class ignored the thinly-veiled contempt of the lecturer when she raised her hand to answer the question: “How many of you are proud to be British (Johnson, 2012)?” Given current observations, it may no longer be the case with the general public if the commentary on how patriotic the country was during the 2012 Olympics was any indication (Farage, 2012c).

16 Said view is also hypothesized by Dalrymple (2010, p. 143).
17 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XDwQEEAZhWM
Due to well-established historical precedent, they are displayed in this way and are told they have to support to the EU. To Mr. Reed, they are confined by this reputation and, in his words like in the Nazi period, being told what to do. They are so conditioned to it, that they are awestruck at people who do not approve of the EU. Mr. Helmer said that when he, a representative of 4.2 million people (his region the East Midlands), talks about how his constituency thinks otherwise of current EU policies, pro-EU proponents are ‘genuinely surprised’. To be pro-EU is to be part of a compulsory orthodoxy in Brussels in Mr. Helmer’s opinion, and to disagree with their views (especially EU integration), is grounds to be looked at as a heretic. These officials, with high salaries and pensions, do not want such rhetoric to ‘rock the boat’ so to speak, and perpetuate the sense of disparity between the public and politicians (Rohrschneider, 2002). Mr. Reed subscribed to a view similar to Dalrymple (2010) when he chided about work at the European Parliament being something tantamount to running on a hamster wheel.

Research into Messrs. Helmer and Farage’s past history revealed a storied employment history in the private sector, and this, in line with their opinions of how EU legislation is highly encroaching to business; seem to contribute to their position against it. So experience running a company (or at least something not akin to something like a corporation), and exposure to government-led controls on it can colour support for integration, in line with previous research on how perceptions of EU involvement influence businessmen’s disposition (Hooghe & Marks, 2004).

Regarding the British Referendum of 1975
The British “Yes” vote on the referendum to stay within the EEC was a unique event in history. As of yet, it is still the only nation-wide referendum ever held throughout the United
Kingdom, and Euro-sceptic parties like the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP, which Messrs. Farage, Helmer, and Reed are part of) are trying to regain a similar kind of opportunity in the nearing future. Recently, Mr. Farage hand carried a letter to 10 Downing Street to prompt Prime Minister David Cameron of interest in having a say in it. In order to provide a greater analysis of whether such actions are prescient at this time, it is best to examine the nature of the referendum as well as opinions of it after the fact.

On 6 June 2005, BBC News commemorated the “Yes” vote in their ‘On This Day’ segment, which brought a set of viewpoints of people who voted. While not a comprehensive list, it does provide a sense of perspective on why such people voted like they did. Rationale for voting was distinctive. One individual remembered how his parents voted “Yes” to stay in the Common Market for economic benefits and prosperity, with the idea of no more European wars as a nice bonus. He understood why they voted the way they voted, but then he perceived the answer would have been different if it had ask if people supported the idea of a European super state with many powers bestowed to national governments handed over to politicians in Brussels.

This disposition ran the gamut of most of the testimonials on the feature. For a number of people, based on their experiences after the fact, they felt like they were deceived by their politicians on what joining the EEC meant. One thought it was so the UK was able to negotiate their terms and deals with free-trade agreements, and swore the question asked in 1975 was not so much “Should we continue negotiations?” and not “Should we stay in the EEC? (BBC News, 2005)”

For some there is a sense of disillusionment in how the government lied then and continues to lie now, and that whenever the people disagree with certain issues, they still wish
to get their way\textsuperscript{18}. When Mr. Helmer was 21 he voted “Yes”, and regretted it. Mr. Reed however was a unique exception, basing his vote not so much on an economic dimension but a historical dimension. He observed back then at how kingdoms and territories slowly grew and united, he thought back then that the accession of the UK into the EEC was another event in the process of history. This may give rise to a functionalist, historical, perspective, seeing as it as just a natural progression of people and society.

Mr. Farage, when he made that aforementioned personal challenge to Prime Minister Cameron when Europe on 6 July 2012, said how the generation of his parents thought they were voting to remain a part of common market that would not violate national sovereignty, and were conned. Like Mr. Helmer, he referred back to William Hague in how the EU is a 1970s solution to a 50s problem and how the world has moved on from such matters (Farage, 2012b).

This type of narrative shift may reveal a high cognitive dissonance as to the usage of guilt in EU politics Mr. Reed was also keen to note that each country had a different way of delivering the message of joining the EU, the Germans wanted to atone for its war guilt, France wanted to glorify itself, and the UK sought economic benefits. Although this begs the question of whom Merkel or any German politician is talking to when they say not to take 60 years of peace for granted. Are they speaking to the Germany citizenry, the European citizenry, or just amongst the political class in all Member States?

The utilitarian view of costs and benefits is supported by even the pamphlets given throughout the referendum period. The Labour Party pamphlet which was sent out at that time noted these objectives of the Common Market:

\begin{itemize}
  \item “To bring together the peoples of Europe.
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{18} news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/witness/june/6/newsid_4586000/4586791.stm – All discussions and testimonials are found here.
• To raise living standards and improve working conditions.
• To promote growth and boost world trade.
• To help the poorest regions of Europe and the rest of the world.
• To help maintain peace and freedom (HM Government, 1975).19"

Apart from this, the pamphlet said a joining with the Common Market was meant to secure food, money, and jobs, and sought to allay fears of losing national identity. One of the more notable segments of the pamphlet was a scenario of the “No” vote, which entailed a UK locked out of business and political clout on the world stage, especially with regards to decision-making in Brussels. In the pamphlet the Common Market “is flexible. It is ready and able to adapt to changing world conditions (ibid).” Other proponents aside from the Labour Party included the Conservative Party and Liberal Democrats, including future Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, as well as the entirety of the newspaper establishment in Britain. The “No” votes were mostly from the fringe right and left of Labour and Conservative, as well as others like the Communist Party, and included figures like Tony Benn and the aforementioned Enoch Powell (Cockerell, 2005).20 It appears that cost/benefits will be considered worthwhile, as long as other dimensions of individuals and society, like identity and personality, are protected (Spohn, 2005).

Guilt does not appear at all to colour support for EU integration for Messrs. Helmer and Reed. Instead, their interviews seemed to prove the utilitarian argument on the sociotropic dimension regarding both their personal and public support for the EU. Perhaps it can be argued that with regards to a rejection of further integration, sociotropic utilitarianism may be seen to preclude egocentric utilitarianism, in their belief of allowing the rest of their country to access to an environment where they may individually pursue their interests. The true

19 http://www.harvard-digital.co.uk/euro/pamphlet.htm
20 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4609131.stm
egocentric utilitarianism issue then, which unfortunately cannot be proved or disproved (Dalrymple, 2010), is both interviewees’ belief in the vested interest pro-EU people have with regards to EU integration based on the benefits being a part of the Parliament entailed. This was another dimension where Mr. Bruckner’s recommendation seemed apt, for when it comes to politicians, they may not wish to reveal outright egocentrism in working with the EU.

Cognitive mobilization does not seem to be a good indicator towards positive support for the EU. Messrs. Helmer and Reed, individuals who have acquired a college level education (Mr. Helmer also has an MA), have at least worked in the private sector (again Mr. Helmer), and not only know about the EU, but also worked on it based on their capacity, do not have any positive opinion at all on integration²¹.

Denmark and Guilt

When asked whether there is a sense of guilt colouring Danish support for integration, Mr. Messerschmidt²² believed it is not the case for his countrymen. He did agree it has a large dimension in German self-identification, and noted how that country’s 99 MEPs are in every political group except for the Euro-sceptic or reformer groups. He noted how Denmark was historically, on the side of the Allies in World War II before being occupied, and has always had problems with Germany since the 16th century. Instead he believes it is due to a mentality

²¹ These allusions to their educational background may be found in their (as well as many others) curriculum vitae on the European Parliament website:
developed in the 30s and 40s of being a “Lilliput” state, which entailed a disposition towards figuring out how mini-states should act.

Mr. Messerschmidt referred to a famous exchange between foreign affairs minister Scavenius and Prime Minister Stauning. After the former returned with a settlement with Nazi Germany, Stauning after reading it said “With this agreement we’ll be cheated.” Scavenius then noted “Well the minor countries are always cheated.” Mr. Messerschmidt found this most prominently in the left-wing parties of Denmark, noting how since it is a small country and if they do not make agreements where they might be cheated it will just end up being worse since the bigger countries “will eat them.”

The Danish Referendum of Maastricht

One of the biggest watershed events during the EU’s modern history is of course the Maastricht Treaty. This treaty not only set the stage for introducing the euro, it turned the EEC into the EU. Denmark was one of only three Member States who had a referendum: the other two being France and Ireland. On 2 June 1992, with a turnout rate of 83.1%, the ‘no’ vote won at 50.7%, with the yes vote coming behind at 49.3%. This torpedoed the Maastricht Treaty process, and it was not until the Edinburgh Agreement which allowed for opt-outs in various policy field for Denmark that they put a second referendum to motion in 1993, with another high turnout (86.5%) the ‘yes’ vote won by 56.7%, with the ‘no’ vote being 43.3% (EU-Oplysningen, 2006a).

The rationale behind supporting or not supporting the Maastricht Treaty was varied dependent on the party. The Liberal Party said it was for a Common Foreign and Security Party. The Conservatives wanted a strong European Community to help support the Baltic States and new acceding Member States like Sweden, Finland, and Austria. Finally, the Social Democrats
said it helped on environmental and social policies. For the ‘no’ vote, the Social People’s Party said the Treaty would give rise to an armed EC with a standing military force. The Progress Party thought it reduced Denmark’s high social standards, and the Christian People’s Party thought it was a loss of self-determination and contrary to the Danish constitution (ibid). This appears to adhere to some part of an argument regarding how Danes said ‘no’ because the EU threatened the social welfare system, never mind not wanting to deal with the current political inclinations of the EU and other Member States (Sorenson, 1993).

For the rationale behind supporting or not supporting the 1993 referendum, the opposition to the Edinburgh decision (which included the Progress Party and the newly formed June Movement) said it was just the same treaty being voted again. There were also the same concerns about the Danish social model as well as the labour market if they accepted the treaty, never mind declared issues of democratic deficit and transparency in the EU political structure. Support for the ‘yes’ vote was based on the rationale of how the opt-out agreements23 were able to accommodate the demands of the parties who negotiated the matter. Even the Socialist People’s Party, who initially voted no, now said yes. Other reasons for the yes vote were to avoid a negative impact on the economy and the necessity of a stable and secure political structure of Europe due to events at the time (EU-Oplysningen, 2006b).

It should be stated of how at the time of the ‘yes’ vote being made, a riot occurred in Copenhagen apparently based on the apparent frustration of the ‘no’ vote, according to the

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23 The four opt-outs were:
1. European citizenship does not replace national citizenship, and settled exclusively by Danish laws, who have Danish citizenship.
2. Denmark does not introduce the euro as their currency.
3. Denmark does not participate in the EU’s common defense policy.
4. Denmark does not participate in the part of judicial cooperation, which uses majority voting and Denmark are at risk of being outvoted. It is now the EU’s asylum and immigration and judicial cooperation.
now defunct Anti-Maastricht group the June Movement. Drude Dahlerup, a spokeswoman said how despite the 56.8% yes vote, the fact there was still a fairly large percentage of people voted no and as such, “a clear indication of the deep split between parliament and the people (Lambert, 1993).”

Mr. Messerschmidt spoke of how his family, especially his mother, was engaged in the discussion of the Maastricht Treaty. She was a socialist, and the concerns about democracy and transparency made a huge influence on him. It was asked, based on her political affiliation (one Mr. Messerschmidt does not appear to share due to his affiliation as the Danish People’s Party) how she voted, and she voted no. Mr. Messerschmidt answered with a pondering of how Danish Socialists has changed since then, and after the four opt-outs, a Euro-critical party became a more Euro-participant party. His mother however has not changed her position, and has a rather harsh view on the matter.

When asked about why Danes may support the EU, Mr. Messerschmidt admitted he did not have a full answer for that, and notes it must be a tough question to answer when he finds popular support is weak. Given the rather split nature of Danish votes on Maastricht and the euro, this seemed to be a rational observation. He said of how the elderly generations will “probably point out it’s a security matter "with regards to the absence of war, and that keeping France and Germany together creates some stability in Europe. Mr. Messerschmidt agreed to that, as well as the utilitarian grounds of economic commerce and the value of money.

He did note in particular a third argument, a controversial one which may not really be heard at all, yet Mr. Messerschmidt is confident it is in Danish Pro-EU supporters, most notably perhaps those in the political establishment. The EU allows them to ‘impose regulation on Member States that they would never have a chance to do on a national democratic agenda.’
Policies like agricultural support would be passed in the EU instead of back home in a democracy, where it could run the risk of controversy in the country as a waste of money. Mr. Messerschmidt noted such politicians will never admit this, but he believes it plays a part in support. One could probably state that, like what was said by Mr. Helmer and Mr. Reed a while earlier, McLaren’s (2005) egocentric (and on a minor political scale sociotropic) utilitarianism writ large by bureaucrats and career politicians. It allows them to shortcut past “the messy, vulgar, clamorous irrationality of public life (The Economist, 2011)” and put into effect their political projects. This may also explain how Denmark accepted the Maastricht Treaty after the Edinburgh Agreement.

Cognitive Mobilization did not appear to colour support for EU integration in any positive light, and may not be a good indicator at all in the case of Mr. Messerschmidt (who has a degree in Law from the University of Copenhagen and was a member of the Danish Parliament). In fact, it may more so familial influence when it comes to mobilizing and colouring views of European integration, especially with regards to the influence his mother had on him during the Maastricht referendum. Given the divergence between his political affiliation and his mother’s retained viewpoints since then, arguing of integration based on an influence of left-right convergence may be hard to do (Gabel, 1998a; 1998b). Parental and family influence could be a potential building block with regards to how people eventually develop their opinions about the EU. The fact that Mr. Messerschmidt was influenced by here even unto his higher education and political career, provide an example to dissect and perhaps follow.

Finally, the hypothesis of guilt colouring support towards EU integration was not found in any degree with regards to the Mr. Messerschmidt. Support for EU integration was more or less based on again; a very sociotropic utilitarian model of support in his case. This model of
belief has a sense in confidence about Denmark in a way, due to his belief that it can find ways to forward its interests in the world. Although the question of whether he would do the same if Denmark was not in much of a sound economic situation compared to what it is right now, given his confidence and political affiliation it may in fact be the same there as well. This kind of confidence is so pronounced, that he had no qualms saying right in his office of his belief in doing away with institutions like the European Parliament.

Of the sample countries covered in the research, Denmark was the only one as of yet which has underwent a research project regarding Pijpers’s (2006) recommendation. In a particular one by Sune Bechmann (2008), in the case of examining the Holocaust in Danish society, he found there to be not much of a foundation of it. Education about the Holocaust was done in a laissez-faire manner, any activities which would engage Danish citizenry to it received minimal funding, and established institutions like the Holocaust Museum focused on broader topics like the history of the Jews in Denmark even before the Holocaust ever happened. From the look of things at the moment, this does not seem to be a pressing concern for Denmark which would, according to Bechmann, require an interest which the country did not have during the research project.

Finland and Guilt

When asked the question whether there is a dimension of Finnish guilt in support for the EU, Mr. Terho\textsuperscript{24} does not believe that, despite Finland being on the same side as the Germans in World War II. This is due to how the war was fought against the aggressing Russians. In essence, their view of the war was mostly as an act of self-defence against an invading neighbouring power. It is a power that, despite the fall of the Soviet Union, still looms

\textsuperscript{24} Terho, S. (2012 July 11). Personal Interview.
over Finland. A professor from Tampere University, noted how Finnish foreign policy with the
EU and the euro, especially in the last 20 years, has been about getting as far away from
Moscow as possible (Evans-Pritchard, 2012a).

Mr. Terho noted how support for the EU has become a tradition since Finland’s
accession in 1995 within the political class. Finland had to show its commitment to the EU, and
get to the core of decision making, and embrace it as fast as possible regardless of the cost. He
notes this has gone on until the Eurocrisis, where for the first the Finnish are reconsidering what
it means to be a part of the EU, and hopes other political parties will also reconsider. This is
most especially due to Finland’s population and political dimension since, as Mr. Terho put it,
“Even if we are with the big guys on the tables where they make the decisions, it is still them to
make the decisions, we are only there to observe because we are a small country.”

With regards to the question about the rationale of Pro-EU Finns, Mr. Terho said that,
before his party the True Finns came into being, joining the EU combined the interests of both
the right and the left-wing of Finnish politics, even though their rationale was highly divergent.
The right-wing parties thought there were economic benefits for joining the EU and the euro,
and the left-wing parties thought it adhered to, according to Mr. Terho, a part of their core
ideology of a “Brotherhood of Man over all national borders and all that.” Mr. Terho, breaking
with his other EFD colleagues, hoped that the EU was reduced considerably in the crisis, and
that Finland stays in the euro zone. This said, he lamented that if he had foreseen what was
going to happen, he would not have recommended Finland to accede.

Finnish Public Support for EU Integration

Before acceding into the EU, the Finns underwent a nationwide referendum on 16
October 1994. 56.89% of the Finnish population voted yes to join the EU, with a divide between
the urban areas who were inclined to say ‘yes’ and the rural areas who said ‘no’ (43.11%) (European Election Database, 2011). The rationale for joining the EU seemed to engage in a very utilitarian dimension, given how Finland is an export-centric country dependent on the EU market, and there was a fear of a potential economic crisis and potential problems if Finland did not join the EU at the time (Sundberg, 1995). Indeed, after the fall of the Soviet Union, Finland underwent an economic crisis between that event and their accession to the EU. There was a convergence at that time of, in the words of Norwegians: ‘bad luck, bad policies, and bad banking (Halme, 2002).’

From this it can be discerned that a sociotropic utilitarian dimension (Hooghe & Marks, 2005) to Finland’s public support for the EU. It served as a means to get itself out of a very dire situation due to seismic geopolitical movements. Then there is the sense of identity dimension at hand where they could tether themselves into more of Western Europe and move away from the influence of Russia. In essence, Finland joining the EU was to serve its economic interest and their ability to retain their national identity (Ingebritsen & Larson, 1997). So it could be said that guilt is a non-existent matter in the case of Finland, and thus has “no ensnaring duty to a mystical ‘Europe’ (Evans-Pritchard, 2012a).” Alexander Stubb, Finland’s Foreign Minister of Europe, lamented of how the deal was broken in how every country would look after its own finances (ibid). In the case of cognitive mobilization it was found that the Finns in urbanized areas were more inclined to integration while those in rural areas were not (Ekholm, 1998).

Given the economic crisis and the behavior of various Member States, a political shift was bound to happen. In April 2011, the euro-sceptic, anti-immigration True Finns party (of which Mr. Terho is a member of), won 19.1% of the vote, and contributed to the change in

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25 http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/country/finland/eu_related_referendums.html
outlook of the EU in Finland. In a report by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, the True Finns take a more local view in helping to solve national and political problems. This said, while there has been a shift in tone regarding support it has been found that the EU, Finnish public support for the EU has surprisingly been positive. In an EVA\textsuperscript{26} Value and Attitude Survey of 2012, it was shown Finns still have a positive view on the EU and the euro, yet at the same time have become much more critical about the EU. With regards to the euro, the survey notes it may not exactly be because of a redeeming quality of the euro, but that there were no other acceptable alternatives. They also were critical of deeper integration, yet find no potential threat of isolation in the world stage (Haavistoh, 2012).

Again this said, it has not stopped even foreign ministers from preparing for an eventual Finnish withdrawal from the Euro (Evans-Pritchard, 2012b). While there is still support, even from the True Finns (the party of Mr. Terho), it was stated Finland must at least be prepared for it as an eventuality. It appears that even when there is a utilitarian, identity dimension in support for the EU, if events seem like it would be detrimental to the economic and political status of the country, for some Member States like Finland they will, despite desires to remain, possibly sever ties if worse comes to worst.

In the case of Mr. Terho and Finland, it came across as markedly similar to that of Messrs. Helmer, Reed, and Messerschmidt. In the realm of utilitarianism, there was again a sociotropic dimension (Hooghe & Marks, 2005; 2004), where joining the EU was seen to be a boon to the Finnish economy, especially due to the chosen trauma of an isolated period of economic woes. However, there was an identity-based influence on support, as integration gave Finland a rationale to embrace Western Europe, and escape the influence of Russia.

\textsuperscript{26} Finnish Business and Policy Forum
Cognitive mobilization is hard to pinpoint on Mr. Terho, who not only has a Master of Philosophy, but was a Eufor peacekeeper, and researcher for various institutions, for he is familiarized with the EU, yet his wariness of future events is uncertain as he wished to stay within the EU and the euro, yet acknowledged how bad he thought things are and he would have never supported it if it came to that.

With the current debate going on regarding Finland’s potential exit with the euro, it appears that there is a conflict of interests between sociotropic utilitarianism and identity preservation. The EU may no longer be seen as an economic benefit to the Finns so they may decide to take their chances and leave, but the potential loss of established relationships with the West and the looming influence of Russia may cause them to embrace the EU even further, no matter how painful it may become. At this point in time it cannot be said which type of integration dimension would give rise to how Finland reacts to this situation, but in the nearing months something may come from it.
Chapter VI - Guilting the Guiltless, Shaming the Shameless

At this point of the research, the hypothesis of guilt colouring support for integration into the EU does not cover the entirety of Europe. The ‘chosen trauma’, in the vocabulary of Volkan seemed to not exactly be World War II when it came to various Member States of the EU and its politicians and citizenry. In truth, the ‘chosen trauma’ which coloured a number of Member States into the EU, was in terms of economic and political dimensions of more recent times. This trauma, if not remedied, was thought to marginalize those member states on those two fronts. With regards to Bruckner (2010), a criticism had been leveled at how most of his results and research was mostly relegated to France (Eaglestone, 2010). Indeed, judging from the interviews of the Euro-sceptic MEPs this guilt glove does not fit on the entirety of Europe, and will vary depending on the country.

For countries like Malta and Denmark, the chosen trauma appears to be less their historical legacy but more their geographic status as small states and the overwhelming desire to maintain their domestic and international interests. For Finland, its chosen trauma was the period between 1991-1995, where it had to deal with its economic issues on its own, and adjust to a new geopolitical order where the superpower next door no longer existed as it did throughout the 20th century. For the United Kingdom, it was not just the loss of empire, but the economic situation of the 1970s, and the desire to get back on its feet through an opportunity they thought would give them an economic advantage while allowing them to retain their sovereignty.
Unsurprisingly, it is only Germany which seems to engage in the rhetoric and discourse of guilt. They are, out of the sample chosen, the ones who continued to maintain the rhetoric of war and peace regarding integration. Before he spoke of the more concrete and tangible aims of being a part of the EU, Mr. Simon noted, once again, of the unprecedented amount of peace had since World War II, and how it must not sacrificed regardless if there is a low chance of conflict in regards to the EU breakup. The already established observations of Merkel (Pop, 2011), Fischer, and the signers of the Maastricht Treaty appear to back this type of disposition within the German political class, with any disagreement (Hankel, 2011; Sarrazin, 2012) or utilization of historical argument (Hannan, 2008) used against them harshly criticized.

Messrs. Messerschmidt, Helmer, Reed, and Farage would perhaps balk at these statements, based on their disposition of confidence in their own respective countries. Mr. Messerschmidt admitted Denmark is Denmark, but did not see that as a limitation. To him, even if a country is geographically or population-wise small, it just has to find other areas where one can stand out and do quite well. He noted how in GDP per capita, Denmark is, he believed, is one of the richest in the EU. Those individuals believed in their own countries for better or worse, and how it could achieve their objectives and goals by figuring it out for themselves instead of having something they once thought would help them, hinder it. It is perhaps duly ironic, that maybe the true Lilliputian state in Europe, is the largest, most populous, and yields the most benefits as long as the EU exists. So there with regards to how identity colours support for the EU, it is found to be very alive and well within the MEPs, albeit with a lot more confidence in the Euro-sceptic camp in individual Member State action than in the pro-EU camp. Shame may also not be much of a factor either due to said confidence and desire for self-determination. This may explain why they were more accommodating in letting themselves be
recorded for interviews in their personal offices (most of which are replete with their own national flags and paraphernalia) than Professor Scicluna and Mr. Simon, who held their interviews at the Parliament’s bar.

Cognitive mobilization (Gabel, 1998b; McLaren, 2007; de Vreese, 2004), in how it regards people who have more education and political discussion, may not actually be a good indicator of analyzing future public support. This is not so much due to already established results of those among the Member States who were more likely to be inclined to such but, based on the interviews, runs the risk of coming across as a call to an uncritical *bien-pensant*ism of European politics. It is as if to second-guess the intelligence and activity of the MEPS in this research. With regards to this field of how people support EU integration, perhaps extra study towards the personal educational history of each respondent, never mind the content of the class should be considered. In the case of Mr. Messerschmidt, with his political views being influenced by his mother, family life may play in support on EU integration, and could provide for further research. The same goes on whether an MEP has had experience in working and/or running a business, in the case of Messrs. Helmer and Farage. However, this would all be the work of other projects as it is beyond the scope and objective of this one.

Dalrymple’s “New Vichy Syndrome” theory, alongside the original, does not appear to tie very heavily into the public dimension of the Member States in question. Like what was found in studies and criticisms of the original syndrome (Gordon, 1995; Hoffmann, 1994), people may have more concern about pressing contemporary issues rather than the overarching narrative of their history, with the political class being more concerned over it than the general public. They may actually be in some Member States’s cases an atmosphere where historical guilt is in isolation from any extant national policies regarding economics, integration, and other
interests. While not a case sample utilized in this research, one may observe pictures showcasing malaise and status of people in Greece, Spain, or perhaps future EU Member States, and see there is more concern about the contemporary situation, with emotions invested in not only their governments but the EU (Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993).

This could be said to have happened as far back as the French and Dutch referendum of the EU Constitutional Treaty, it may be said that a political and public disconnect was revealed. Mr. Chirac’s emotional appeal and the response by the French through shame and cost/benefits, was summarily rejected by the populace from issues (AP, 2005), alongside Prime Minister Balkenende’s government promotion with threats of economic collapse, war, and disparaging remarks of ‘no’ voters as uninformed and ignorant (The Economist, 2005). They lost to citizens concerned about an expensive regime, a loss of identity, and a mistrust of a national government and Brussels which spoke more for themselves and not the people (Mulvey, 2005).

Guilt – The Projection of the Elite?

It has become readily apparent, throughout the research, that the invective used by seizing guilt feelings, appears to be mostly the construct of the political elite. Granted there are deep emotional scars dependent on individuals regarding the past (Tenenbom, 2011), yet this may or may not translate into ceding sovereignty over to supranational institutions. Instead, among the academic intelligentsia and the political class, there is a widespread regard to elucidate a sense of guilt based upon history, and from there develop a more integrated consciousness.
This may be in line with Messerschmidt’s analysis of how there is not much of a concept of Danish guilt on the Holocaust\(^\text{27}\). Such a proposition from Pijpers (2006) does also fly in the face of other Member States, especially those within the Allied Powers. It is not a one size fits all category, and would need to necessitate a better solution to get places like the United Kingdom and Malta (both members of the Allies) and Finland (who fought self-defensive wars against the Soviets) to cede sovereignty and integrate into a European citizenry.

This can be seen to come off as a perversion of the “War Guilt Clause” (Article 231) in the Treaty of Versailles, which foisted responsibility for World War I upon Germany and was a subject of contention among the citizenry during this time. Pijpers (2006) could be said to be asking countries to not only burden share in terms of economic and political dimensions, but also historical dimensions. A crude observation can be made of this kind of dynamic as if “Hey you are just as guilty as the Germans were when it came to the Holocaust, ergo share the blame of what you did and did not do and come together in the EU to make sure such matters no longer exist (Gilbert, 1997).” An appeal to mass culpability to one of the greatest horrors of the 20\(^{th}\) century does not entirely seem like a wise course of action. When one examines the way British voters are eager to have referendums regarding the EU, never mind Germany, and potentially the rest of them, the ‘suggestion’ of playing what could be said to be the “Holocaust Card” seems highly suspect.

In a 2007 article of The Economist’s Charlemagne section, it noted of how problematic segueing together at times disparate, and at worst hostile, histories together when it came to the 2004 enlargement. Citing the EU’s conception of history from ‘forgiveness’ to an inflexible ‘even smug’ impression, it talked about how the use of post-war conflict resolution is used to

\(^{27}\) Indeed one of the most notable episodes during the German occupation of Denmark was the Danish resistance’s successful evacuations of its Jewish population outside of the country.
maintain further debate. This was especially pointed towards Josep Borrell, a former president of the European Parliament, who harangued some Swedish officials because their complaints about the monthly travels between Brussels and Strasbourg, and how the historical dimension to it is lost on them since Sweden was a neutral party in World War II. Then there was the problem of how each Member State has their own way to deal with their past history, from repeated penance (Germany), silence and myth-making (France), or what could be termed as collective amnesia (Spain). The article thus made a final assessment of how the EU needed to listen and understand different views of the past, if they want to know how to handle future conflicts which may occur inside and outside the EU (The Economist, 2007).

While there is perhaps room for a recommendation to further fund and administer new policies on the way the history of a European state in World War II and its role in the Holocaust (Pijper, 2006; Bechmann, 2008), it seems highly unlikely at this current moment due to controversy at the supranational level, especially with regards to the new European House of History opening in 2014. According to Articles 22 and 23 of the proposition document, it will provide a focus on European history from World War I to the present day, with smaller exhibitions from various eras like the medieval and modern times. There will not be any unique focus on the Member States’ individual histories, but more so on the era of peace “Europe has enjoyed since the end of the Second World War (Borodziej, et al., 2008, p. Art. 23).”

To borrow a phrase used by UKIP MEPs like Mr. Helmer and Mr. Godfrey Bloom, such maneuvers are a call towards ‘historical harmonization’. In their rather florid invective, it could be said such a matter is a ‘cartel operated by governments against the interests of citizens (Helmer, 2012)’. Given the controversy already made between MEPs on how to handle this
European House of History, the historical harmonization of nearly-heterogeneous European histories may be seen as superfluous at best and narcissistic at worse\(^29\), especially even more so in an age of austerity (Waterfield, 2011). In the words of Mr. Messerschmidt: “Identity is not a matter of bureaucratic maneuvers, but a matter of feeling (Messerschmidt, 2011).” Identity may change and may accommodate others along with it (Abela, 2005/2006), but it seems to work best when it is an organic matter which is not manipulated by functionalist-focused technocrats and developed from the bottom up, with any further solutions worked through in the same way.

This line of thinking shares a similarity to Volkan’s concept of chosen trauma. Through real information, high expectations and feelings, and hostility against contrary thoughts, it not merely recollecting the memory, but sharing a mental construct of the event. He notes of the risk of the shared trauma to bind a group together and make them continue to feel powerless if there are no other circumstances that would allow them not to feel like this (pp. 47-48). Mr. Reed’s statements about how he believes this is the case for Germany, and in his words: “Their government killed a lot of people for no good reason. They can’t think of a reason why it would’ve been good. They’re not allowed to discuss it in terms which would make it acceptable. The whole future of the global conspiracy is to keep the Germans in a state of endearing guilt. I don’t think it works terribly well.” The pooling of joint commitments through the realm of collective guilt (Gilbert, 1997), seemed not to describe some of the opinion leveled towards EU integration. For those people who do not believe such, if there is guilt to be had (unconscious or not) or shame, it is used as a means toward perhaps not just social change but the maintenance of certain status quo mentality (Smith, 1968).

It seems fitting to note a statement made by 19th century German historian Leopold von Ranke for this particular segment. He lamented the idea of history being left to novelists who treated it in ‘fictitious matter’, for “A strict representation of facts, be it ever so narrow and unpoetical, is, beyond doubt, the first law (von Ranke, 1887).” Given how there is also a bit of debate regarding what can be seen as a limitless scenario of ‘post-war humiliation’ (Gottfried, 2012), researching history as is sounds like a proper course of action with regards to reconciling Europe’s past with the present. However given the clashing egos and the problem of historical harmonization, a universal narrative involving many states in Europe chanting their own ‘mea culpa’ over the same event seems highly unlikely to work. If it does, it will take a while. As of yet, a Europe-wide Vergangenheitsbewältigung where this occurs may not be viable, may not be desirable, and may not exactly be what is needed to set the continent aright. It is as Smith (1968, p. 511) said of how the feeling guilt may not solve the underlying illness but it renders solution in the political dimension. The issue this raises is how it may treat the patient, but not cure whatever malady he or she is with.

On the public sphere, especially in Member States stricken with economic malaise and poverty, guilt may not even play much of a factor in their opinion on whether or not they should stay or leave, provided of course they are allowed the option to leave the EU. The malcontent, despairing, populace who commit suicide, riot, or loot in either Athens or Madrid, could perhaps care less about their country’s past wrongdoing, as the government and the supranational institution there is a member of no longer is no longer beneficial economically, politically, and culturally. The problem there with regards to Germany’s relation with such, as they are being derided and denounced by such countries, is not so much a return to nationalism and militarism, but sanctimony and irresponsibility. In essence, they are not making the hard choices and
maintaining a system where it is to their benefits at the cost of other countries, which cannot
devalue or command their own currency and economics since they possess the same one the
Germans have (Cohen, 2011). It is, as peculiar the statement may sound, a truly egocentric
approach (in the case of the political elite), masquerading as a sociotropic appeal30.

This has big economic, political, and social implications as the euro crisis continues, and
raises new suggestions and procedures for a better attempt to analyze political and public
discourse regarding the EU, promote a more participatory democracy in European states on
views of themselves and if they wish to be a part of Europe or not and raise the thought of
whether or not its existence is dependent on stopping another continental war. Citizens on
their own are said to lack the basic information to decide upon the EU and thus utilize national
politics as a proxy for their support. If the pro-EU government is supported, the result thus is
more public support (Boomgaarden, Schuck, Ellenbaas, & de Vreese, 2011, p. 251). Yet more
and more, they are not, the sociotropic and egocentric utilitarianism appeal may have already
been exhausted, and it that as if there is no economic security, then there is no security for
identity or just any outright feeling of security at all.

The utilitarian dimension thus, can be said to be supported if, based on the rationale of
the samples in this project show, if there is a chance to retain bits and pieces of national
identity. Tellingly enough, apart from historical memory, the social welfare system was seen as
a factor in defining support for the EU, and if there is a tangible benefit in having this cake and
eating it too, the public will vie for it. If not, then there is a sense of uncertainty at the potential
topping of economic, national, and in some cases most importantly welfare interests. For if the

30 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E6ni6EcL9hQ – The Dutch elections coming up in September have
also given a forum for these kinds of utilitarian appeals, where these “500,000 Dutch entrepreneurs” will
only succeed if they are a part of Europe.
populace cannot fulfill basic human needs nor have a life for themselves as well as others, then there lies the potential to shift blame and define themselves by identity with the ‘other’. This begs the question of “How does one guarantee the security of their identity,” for there lays the possibility of a theory: When there is a conflict between the economy and politics, the economy always wins (Hankel, 2011).

The swastikas and “Bank of Berlin” graffiti which dot the Athens landscape may provide a small glimpse over what may come in the nearing future (Mail Foreign Service, 2012). Here there may be collusion between trust in the effectiveness in EU governance (Rohrschneider, 2002) and utilitarian benefits. If the costs are too high, and the standard of living plummets to despairing levels, a lack of trust may become more readily apparent in the attitudes and actions of a disenfranchised populace. John Redwood, a Conservative MP, made a speech in Westminster which may describe this scenario, where the fabric of consent and goodwill unravels in democracies. To do this he utilized statements made by Greeks about how the rich do not want to be taxed and the poor do not want the government to take away their benefits, because they ‘all on autopilot from Brussels (Redwood, 2011)’31. In the aforementioned case, it may not be so much autopilot from Brussels, but on autopilot from Berlin, given Chancellor Merkel’s pro-active character during this time.

Eaglestone (2010) also criticized Bruckner’s text of utilizing the rhetoric of cultural clashes which necessitate the adage “now’s the time to choose your side”. Perhaps it is not so much the time to choose a side, but the time to be able to choose a side, to be able to converse with other cultures of their own accord instead of clashing with them because of how each are interconnected through the EU. Europe is a complex entity, and the diversity it has is its

31 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZK_yKhR_q0A
greatest strength and weakness. Yet the only way to make disparate entities decide upon useful policies and ideal actions is to allow their citizenry a chance to decide for themselves what kind of government they wish to have and what they want out of it. Sarrazin (2012) noted at the end of his latest book how this diversity of States, peoples, and societies on the continent, could allow an outpouring of different solutions which would encourage ‘individuality and innovation (p. 409).’ The European Union’s motto prides itself in “Unity in Diversity”, yet there appears to be more and more a monochromatic shade of what it means to be unified. People can have their cultural foibles and fancies, yet allow the consolidation of power to be made by one set of supranational institutions where most of the representatives and officers are not elected by their constituents, and where they pass laws which do more harm than not. Political theories like Habermas’s theory of communicative action, and his belief in its necessity on contemporary European politics must not be forgotten (Habermas, 1983).

It also seems like in lieu of any propensity towards being guiled to support the EU, there have been also supporters of Monti like leader of the centre-left Democratic Party Pier Luigi Bersani, who makes statements like these when asking for German flexibility:

"The unification of Germany was carried out with the aim of equilibrium between a big Germany and an integrated Europe... Italians and Germans should remember this (Moody, 2012)."

This runs all too much the risk of marginalizing people from the debate of whether or not there should be more of Europe. It has been noted how said debate is a subconscious phenomenon and it was noted (Seidendorf, 2011) how it can be degraded in to conjecture, stereotyping, and fear mongering, and the creation of an identity debate of us vs. them. One of the solutions dictated in the texts of the aforementioned statement also noted Chancellor Merkel must set forth a new vision for Europe which focuses less on the 20th century and
nationalism and building upon the need of strengthening Europe against other powers in the world (Paterson, 2011). Solutions like the previous one are perpetuated as well by others (Harding, 2012) of the need to tether support for the EU on narratives other than the war.

Yet the recommendation of setting forth a new vision of Europe which focuses less on the 20th century and nationalism could be said to run contrary to the founding ideals of Monnet, Schumann, and Adenauer, who wanted above all else peace from World War II. Subverting the narrative to a more utilitarian dimension runs the risk of upsetting Pro-EU supporters who adhere to the belief that it is a deterrent to war.

To paraphrase Napoleon Bonaparte: “A man does not have himself integrate for a half-pence a day or for a petty distinction. You must speak to the soul in order to electrify him.” Now for than ever, the spark (or EU-phoria) seems to have gone, when people are not able to find jobs, feed their families, and so forth. Basic human needs (Burton, 1988) subvert the primacy of any feeling of guilt or association to identity for as long as they are more concerned about their survival, in conditions they believe is the fault of their national government (perhaps considered a proxy from Brussels). In truth, the only place where concepts which compel people to do things, like guilt or shame, exist in European politics, may be only among the elites in government, the media, and academia, cognitively mobilized through bien-pensant education, to perform this ‘psychodrama (Hoffmann, 1994)’ at a European level. Whether the feelings expressed is real or a performance piece (Dalrymple, 2010), maybe left to the opinion of those who observe it.

32 Speaking on behalf of a pro-EU friend who recommended such matters
When Monnet, Schumann, Adenauer, Spinelli, and the like created the foundations for what was the EU, it can be said that they may not have anticipated this development. The desire for no more war can be seen to be no longer an adherent of supporting integration, it is moreso the tangible costs and benefits, never mind the personal desire for identity maintenance which now colours the European Dream. They did not plan ahead to later generations, who have never experienced war, did not share the same chosen traumas as other countries, and moreover engaged in the kinds of arguments and rationale that compelled various countries to say no to various European Treaties, which then compelled the EU to retool them and slide them around so they may be approved by national parliaments instead of the populace. The investment the EU political elite give to the project, makes them more than eager to not take into consideration (or worst, willfully express contempt and chiding displeasure) opposing viewpoints (Ross, 2007, p. 15)\(^3\).

The prospects outlined at this point in time may be said to be of a general sort, citing already established recommendations on what the EU can do to help mitigate or excise their problems. However, the current increased tension in the political and social climate have made these previous recommendations potentially all the more prescient. Like the previously

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33 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bdob6QRLRU – While one of many, it is this kind of opinion which is frowned upon by Pro-EU proponents, and either ignored (as seen by Mr. Barroso) or ridiculed (by Mr. Schulz)
established research of public support on European integration, it would be to the project’s detriment if they were not at the very least covered.

If the EU wishes to survive, it first off must not engage in actions which will be construed as elitist and antidemocratic. Hooghes and Marks (2006) have recommended reducing the EU into a more Type II approach for various policy fields and if that does not work, avoid events which would entail potential referenda in its Member States (p. 249). If one observes the current structure of the EU, with its President of the European Council, a Commission which makes and enacts the laws, a new legal personality, a flag, an anthem, and the myriad number of institutions, committees, organizations, bureaucrats and so forth, the first part is easier said than done.

Jean Monnet was noted to have said “the construction of Europe, like all peaceful revolutions, needs time: time to convince, time to adapt people’s thinking, and time to adjust to great transformations (Goldstein, 1992, p. 63).” However, given the threat of contagion throughout the continent and the general feeling of discontent held amongst the populace of various Member States, it seems this peaceful revolution will end in the fomenting of antagonisms between nation-states, and chaos within each country’s borders. Time no longer appears to be on the side of the EU as each Member State entertains thoughts which run contrary to the ideals of Brussels. In fact the Maastricht Treaty was accused of doing too much too soon, and as a result, despite an integrated economic model, political conflicts kept Member States at each other’s throats (Goldstein, 1992, pp. 130, 132).

The problem therein of the utilitarian, functionalist, approach to integration (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Verdier, 2005; Schmitter, 1970; Kurt, 2009), is unfortunately is its overt focus on technocracy and its inherently experimental nature. This said nature gives rise to uncertain
outcomes and decisions, and ventures into new policy areas with new incentives and rewards. Adding to this is what was deemed “Peña’s insecurity principle”, where uncertainty, coupled with global insecurity, may result in integration negotiators not even sure of their being around to implement their commitments and/or certain actors being “suddenly and unconstitutionally removed from office” and if “their successors will not deny responsibility for previously negotiated ‘solutions’ (Schmitter, 1970, p. 850).” One could argue how former Prime Ministers Papandreou and Berlusconi were removed and replaced with ‘appointed’ ones as examples of this in action.

This ‘credible commitment’ found in joining the EU may have bound insolvent Member States to obtain benefits, but it has also bound them into, what Mr. Farage calls, an ‘economic prison’. Now it appears more or less, that any and all decisions about certain matters will be decided by EU leaders on what these countries (currently Greece for the moment) will have to do in the future, and to deter possible future crises instead of reacting to them (Pearson, 2012). It must be raised that the usage of the term ‘unconstitutionally removed from office’ is a markedly dangerous prospect, especially in European politics where it is argued that the aforementioned removals from office were not from the bottom (akin to the events colouring the Arab Spring), but from the top by bureaucrats and pro-integration heads of state. Schmitter (1970) may have foreshadowed this in how the unaccountable former’s actions, may in turn bring about a high potential for conflict (p. 865). This ‘integrative showdown’ unfortunately, will not only be found in the conferences and summits between EU heads of state, but on the streets as the malcontent, demoralized, populace vent anger and seek retribution for their hardship, not only upon the politicians in Brussels and Berlin, but also other groups which they believe are threatening their climb out of the fiscal hole (Blackstone, 2012).
A consultative Europe which allows its people to reconcile its own terms in working together seems to be a much better option than the setup of an organization where its ruling members impress upon them that an act of catastrophe is in the cards if they do not agree. It is perhaps the lesser of two evils in light of the EU, between continued centralization and allowing ‘populism’ to hold sway. Mr. Farage, consistently says throughout his plenary speeches, conferences, and news of how if one robs a people of their ability to change their governments through the ballot box, or worse their belief they can, then all they are left with is nationalism and violence (Farage, 2010)34. The attempt to conquer the nemesis of nationalism appears to only have made it stronger. Perhaps instead, this nemesis no longer adheres to the common usage of the word which describes the antagonist in storytelling, but the classic Greek concept, the spirit of divine retribution against those who succumb to hubris.

Even when the Maastricht treaty was being considered there were already a number of problems the nascent EU would have to engage. Notably the first was an economic dimension in light of the economic crisis in the early 1990s, which was anathema to any growth and would strain the social protection systems of the twelve Member States already part of it. Then there was also the issue of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in light of currency instability, its inability for a cohesive foreign policy in light of the Yugoslav Civil War, and the lack of a common commercial policy (O’Keeffe, 1995, pp. 24-27). Then there lies the issue of the acquis communautaire for countries wishing to accede into the EU, which then-President Jacques Delor noted was necessary for new members, with no recourse to opt-outs like the UK and Denmark based on, as Delors put it, “long-service bonus” (p. 29).

34 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2gm9q8uabTs
O’Keeffe concluded by noting how while it seemed remarkably ideal from an outside point of view, he acknowledged that the citizens of Europe sees the EU and the market “costly, complex, remote, and with an unclear purpose (p. 54).” Then there lay the possibility of a two-speed Europe based on various Member States’ reluctance to adhere to certain EU directives and codes of conduct. O’Keeffe then expounded the necessity of having the EU not lose the principles it was based on: respect for rule of law, a democratic tradition, and the value of fundamental human rights (p. 55). His analysis on the problems of EU integration must be given some slack due to publishing of 17 years ago at a time where the discussion about EU integration has not reached the levels of what is happening now.

It may be a good recommendation for the EU to begin a democratic reform regarding the matter. However, it seems to be a tall order to become more democratic when it appears that the exact opposite is going to be the case. A popular aphorism used is “The bureaucracy is expanding to meet the needs of the expanding bureaucracy” and from the aforementioned articles involving large amounts of money used to fund lavish EU projects, that seems to be the case. Although Goldstein (1992) noted of a possibility of more realistic reform, he perhaps did not anticipate Member States like Greece to disintegrate like it did. Giving greater legitimacy to the EU has been recommended as far back as 1975 (Henig, 1975, p. 498). However given how such recommendations have been pressed even to this day, this is, once again, easier said than done. This is also exacerbated by the declining turnout in EU Parliamentary elections, which was fewer than 50% on average in the 2009 elections (European Parliament, 2012)\textsuperscript{35}. If research

\textsuperscript{35} http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/000cdd9d4/Turnout-%281979-2009%29.html – The only one of the Member States who breached the 50% mark in voter turnout were Denmark and Malta.
regarding public support for integration finds people colouring their support on a cost/benefit analysis, then it begs the question of why parliamentary election turnout has dropped like it did.

When the time comes for referenda in countries like the UK and Germany, the EU may have to bow gracefully to the will of the people, lest they wish to undertake the potential brutal reaction of force majeure (Henig, 1975, p. 494). Retooling and repackaging referendums like in 1992, 2005, and 2008, is no longer a viable option, and a genuine debate must be held (Costi & Egli, 2005, p. 184). However these researchers said how foolish it would be for the EU to allow the French and Dutch ‘No’ vote to derail what was already well-established since 1955. Yet here is the continent, teetering on the brink of disaster, while people hem and haw about populism, referendums, and how they can get Germany to bail them out. They said it would take time for the elites to soul search and make that possible (p. 181), but given the circumstances time is not a luxury any European politician can afford. Calls for a referendum, like what former Danish eure-sceptic MEP Jens-Peter Bonde did during the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty (Whitman, 2005, p. 675), must not be met with laughs and derision. Moralistic judgments (Rosenberg, 1999), regardless of political inclination and mistrust of the public, must not be the norm.

The treatment of the EU varies between governments of Member States, based on their desires, political culture, and language. Mr. Reed noted how one cannot have democracy unless there is a common language, especially in such a big debate. This is a conflict between settled cultures (tradition and common sense) and unsettled cultures (ideology). The nation, usually formed and developed for a long period of time, vs. the supranation, where the EU’s ideological based belief on utilitarian functionalism as a means to avoid war and sublimate national feeling, competes with 27 other cultures of varying historical situations, and has to rely on its relatively
monoculture institutional structures to forward it in the long run. In the end, depending on each culture’s history and status, some ideologies and systems will succeed, and some will fail (Swidler, 1986, p. 284). The current scenario may hedge towards the EU’s bureaucratic, functionalist, utilitarian, guilt culture to failure. Instead of the rehabilitation into a common unity, the EU may have caused their Member States to undergo recidivism to the state of being the EU sought to abolish (Etzioni, 2001).

This research does not intend to be an end-all, catch-all of the debate, but given this new age of austerity in Europe, with new ideas about the continent trickling through the mainstream (Bruckner, 2010; Dalrymple, 2010; Sarrazin, 2012), a new debate to resolve this conflict must arise. If the aim of a United Europe is to exist it must no longer be at the Type I Diplomatic setting within the Spinnelli and Berlaymont buildings in Brussels. It is to be held in the local level with both sides campaigning over the pros and cons regarding European integration, and deciding themselves whether to stay, leave, or have more of a say in what is going on in Brussels. As Bruckner said, “either identity is a collective project or it is a rejection, and thus a negative construction opposed to a demonized third party. But this demonization is precisely what prevents the country from surmounting its trauma and beginning to reflect on itself (Bruckner, 2010, p. 125)”.

Ultimately, examining guilt as a means to colour support for EU integration appears to be a contentious field due to the heterogenic nature of country’s history and state of being. This said, given the propensity of political elites to use the invective of guilt if this research is any indication, perhaps a more widespread analysis of the political culture of the EU from the Parliament to even the Commission will have to take place. Future research in this case may be difficult due to the personal nature of guilt and is rather dependent on the political inclination of
the interviewee in question, and dependent on the person it may give rise to difficulties in information retention if interviews are not recorded. Research projects that focus on one political group at a time may be a more ideal approach to the matter. If there are trends with MEPs of various Member States in the political group, they may used as a frame of reference when it is applied to research projects of different political groups and from there, examine if these sentiments are shared within their respective constituencies.

Perhaps a travelogue done in the style of Tenenbom (2011) across Europe may be a much more efficient, if not very cost-effective rendition of the project. Although only relegated to just five Member States, some foundation has already been made. It is up to future researchers to work accordingly with such matters in order to confront and perhaps quantify the guilt feelings noted by Dalrymple, Bruckner, and Bolkestein. Perhaps the political elite fret too heavily on it, while the regular people may not feel the exact same way. In a brittle continent where the next big event is hard to predict, especially with regards to what kind of impact it is and how big it will be, this is perhaps a necessary endeavour. This not only would reveal their inclination toward integration, but to also see if the philosophical dilemmas leveled by such individuals are isolated from the EU, or are a part of it. Timing however may be a critical factor, as it may fluctuate or even be frowned upon depending on the countries in question, and the current political situations both domestic and foreign.

A reexamination of public support on EU integration may also be an applicable avenue. Does the previously established research on utilitarianism (McLaren, 2005; 2007; Gabel, 1998a, et al), identity (Hooghe & Marks, 2004; Spohn, 2005, et al), cognitive mobilization (Inglehart, 1970, et al.) change extensively during a time of economic crisis, especially in Member States like Greece and Spain? What about the newer Member States who have not yet joined the euro,
like Poland, Lithuania, and Bulgaria? They have recently said how in the near future they were unlikely to integrate more into the EU by adopting the euro because of the current economic and political situation (Fox, 2012). It would be interesting to see what is the prevailing sentiment which colours public support in these times.

“We are not unifying states, we are unifying human beings.” Bruckner attributed this quote to Jean Monnet (2010, p. 184), probably noting the man’s dreams for the European project. Yet the only people who are unified in this present time in Europe are those in the elite quarters of society, and those are who unified in their discontent with the political system. Those in the elite are mired in an egocentric utilitarian prism where guilt and shame may be felt and used accordingly as a cudgel where its effectiveness varies between unique Member States. Yet peoples’ identity, their trust towards governing institutions and opinions on what will benefit themselves and others are more paramount than the historical past and anything terrible their country has done. If there is any feeling of guilt, it may very well actually be isolated within the national communities, and may have to be dealt with on that level alone. In the meanwhile, more existential matters prevail and they wish to work with it in any way possible, with negative implications if there are not allowed to by politics.

One of the EU’s principles as manifested by the Maastricht Treaty is the principle of subsidiarity. This is where the institutions will take action on certain political decisions if they cannot be achieved by the Member States. Perhaps it is time to append this principle, in that the Member State shall take action in accordance with it, if the political decisions with a positive result cannot be achieved by the EU. The time is coming where this may happen in various Member States, and if they are incapable of controlling their own political environment and are browbeat by politicians in EU and Brussels that integration is the only way to survive in a
globalized world and prevent another war from occurring. However, it may just be the opposite if things get much worse in the nearing months. People may say what they will about statements from people like Messrs. Bruckner, Farage and Sarrazin, but it can be said they have provided a foot in the door when it comes to examining why the EU is supported the way it is. Like them, this research project proposes such matters it should be discussed and considered in the public, and hopes it provided a good start regarding future insight in the connection between European integration and guilt.
Appendix – Interview Questions Used

-What does the term ‘European Project’ mean to you?

-Why must there be more (or less) of Europe/the EU?

-What do you think is your home country’s citizenry’s duty in that regard, and why do you think the opposition behaves the way it does?

-One of the concepts I’m research on what colours support for integration is guilt. Thilo Sarrazin wrote a book recently that noted the idea that Germany has to support the EU is because it’s “driven by the very German reflex that the Holocaust and World War II will only be finally atoned for when all our other interests, including our money, is in Europe’s hands.” What do you think of such a statement?

Do you think it applies to your country regarding guilt as a means of support?

-If things go where you want them to go (lesser or more EU), what do you believe will happen? What will you be doing as it occurs?

-What happens if it were the opposite?

-Anything else you would like to say about the subject matter before we conclude?
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Curriculum Vitae

Anthony O. Einsel graduated from St. Cecilia’s High School, Hastings, Nebraska in 2004. He received his Bachelor of Arts in International Relations from Creighton University in 2008, and has spent part of his undergraduate term abroad at the University of Edinburgh in the United Kingdom and Vesalius College in Brussels Belgium for the 2006-2007 school year. He is set to receive two Master’s in Conflict Analysis and Resolution and Conflict Resolution and Mediterranean Security from George Mason University and the University of Malta respectively in 2012.