

GLOBAL SECURITY SHIFTS:
THE AGENDAS MADE AND THE THREATS UNADDRESSED

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science at George Mason University, and the degree of Master of Arts at the University of Malta

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis explores the evolution of the concept of security to unveil the characteristics that describe the current dominant security architecture. In other words, it examines the dominant global perception of security and the methods that are used to ensure that form of security. Next, the security environment (the actors, threats, and dynamics present) is analyzed in order to discover whether or not the dominant security architecture is suitably designed for addressing the world's contemporary security environment. The discovery is that the dominant security architecture is that which is designed for a world defined by the Westphalian World Order, an imagined world order with origins in medieval Europe which has been critically disintegrating in the 21st century. Overshadowing this global shift is the literature on the security changes present since the end of the Cold War. In place of the traditional understanding of *national* security, a product of the Westphalian

World Order that was further solidified during the bipolar interstate relations of the Cold War era, the United Nations Development Programme held that their concept of *human* security would redefine security in the 21st century. This thesis critically analyzes several case studies which demonstrate that despite the arguments or desires for the referent object of security to shift from being states to humans, human security is predominantly language further used by states to assert their dominance in the global arena and pursue their own interests amidst substantial and rising challenges to authority and sovereignty in the 21st security environment. Due to the interconnectedness of diverse and borderless security concerns, as well as the unclear distinctions between state and non-state issues, implementation of state-centric security agendas actually threatens the stability and success of the state itself. This research suggests that three main referent objects must equally be taken into consideration in security analysis for the achievement of human survival and prosperity on Earth: humans, their states, and the environment upon which they depend. The Agenda for the Security of Humanity (ASH) is advanced as an analytical tool that demonstrates the interconnectedness of security concerns within these three main pillars in a preemptive manner so that efforts to ensure one form of security do not unsustainably and self-destructively take place at the expense of the other key forms of security.

I. INTRODUCTION

The following account is an analysis on the concept of security in international relations. This work attempts to answer the main question as to what the dominant security architecture is in the 21st century. Once establishing what that architecture is, an analysis is provided to discover whether or not the established security architecture is suitably designed for addressing the contemporary threats that make up the security environment. As “relatively little has been written on the history and evolution of security studies” this work aims to fill gaps within, and build upon, existing security literature.¹ Further advancements will be made by aiming to build theoretical bridges between two currently separate groups of academic bodies: between security perspectives in the United States and those in Europe and between the different approaches adopted within the fields of Conflict Analysis and Resolution versus that of International Security Studies. This multidisciplinary approach will be chronological so as to better demonstrate how history builds off of itself, changes, and repeats itself.

The first section is a literature review that provides readers with an understanding of the historical and cultural contexts from which today’s most dominant perceptions of security emerged. This historical narrative traces the patterns by which security evolved as a concept that centers on the idea of the modern state. It is important to note that the

¹ (Waever 2004)

world was not always perceived as being organized by the imagined borders of countries as it is now; therefore, the form of societal organization before the state structure existed is first explained.² The modern state will come to be defined as the Westphalian state. This is named after the Peace of Westphalia, which was a series of treaties that ended the Thirty Years' War in Europe in the seventeenth century. The Peace of Westphalia recognizably initiated the construction of a territorialized interstate system, known as the Westphalian World Order, in which stability was established primarily through the norms of state sovereignty and non-intervention.³ The evolution of the concept of sovereignty is then traced because that which is named sovereign has typically remained the central referent object of security. This begins with the sovereign kings of medieval Europe by examining the ways in which institutions that would become foundations for the establishment of the modern state were initially created as methods of producing the economic resources required to wage wars. Over time the notion of sovereignty shifted from being held by kings to being held by states. After the formation of the modern international system of states, the collective security initiatives of the United Nations are also placed within the Westphalian context.

Security Studies is predominately a sub-field of International Relations. The theories of International Relations that remain dominant in the minds of the majority of policymakers today were largely established within the Cold War context. These Cold War-based theories shaped the dominant conceptualization of security in the world. This

² (Anderson 1983)

³ (Falk 2002)

meant that when the Cold War ended, the theoretical hunt began for the way in which security would best be conceptualized in the coming new world order. It will then be demonstrated that while the majority of security literature refers to the contemporary environment as the post-Cold War era, the 21st century is more significantly representative of the disintegration of the assumed universalism of the Westphalian World Order. The conventional models of warfare within the Westphalian World Order are no longer applicable for addressing today's most prominent threats. These threats are commonly labeled as the "new wars".⁴ Critiquing this operationalization, the notion of hybridity will replace the concept of the new wars as it is better suited for analyzing the overlapping blend of old and new characteristics of violent conflict in the world.⁵ Hybridity also helps explain the emergence of a blend of state and non-state actors and interests that are involved in today's conflicts. As a paradigm that was designed for addressing these conflicts, human security was asserted by the United Nations Development Programme as that which would revolutionize the 21st century.⁶ In the context of the post-Westphalian world, the notion of "human security" will be analyzed to answer the question as to whether or not it is representative of a true paradigm shift. This would be a shift from the dominant, Westphalian conceptualization of national security, to a security paradigm in which humans, instead of states, are the referent objects of security. Three primary case studies will illuminate the answer. First, an analysis of the United States of America's security strategies and its role in the promotion

⁴ (Kaldor 2007)

⁵ (Boege, Brown, et al. 2008)

⁶ (United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1994)

of the Global War on Terror will evidence that despite the use of human security rhetoric, security for American policymakers remains conceptualized in a state-centric terms of national security. Second, an analysis of Mediterranean regional-building initiatives will demonstrate that despite clearly stated human security objectives, security remains euro-state-centric in the European Union. Finally, in contradiction to Fukuyama's assertion that the end of the Cold War gave birth to the final form of governance, it will be explained that a rising array of countries in the world are exhibiting a new form of state-run, rather than free-market capitalism.⁷ These states inherently represent a state-centric conceptualization of security as their economies are managed to suit the state's political interests.

The conclusions will be posed that the dominant conceptualizations of security are those that were formed in and that are by large only effectively applicable to the Westphalian World Order. It will be concluded that despite the arguments that human security would revolutionize the 21st century, state-centric conceptualizations of national security remain dominant, as evidenced by states' economic actions as well as their foreign policies and security strategies. It is then argued that this state-centric security architecture is limited by its own design in its ability to address the non-state-centric and hybrid threats that are prominent in the post-Westphalian world. The most identifiable self-defeating flaw within state-centric architectures is that profit is perceived in terms of power instead of in terms of sustainability. This is a short-term model of decision-making that is the ultimate reason why national security dominates at the expense of human and

⁷ (Fukuyama 2006)

environmental security. It is argued and evidenced that the ultimate success of the state in the 21st century is dependent upon its ability to address human-centric and environment-centric forms of security.

In place of the insufficient security architecture and in place of the UNDP human security concept which finds itself limited in implementation, the Agenda for the Security of Humanity (ASH) will be offered as a tool for security analysis that is better able to help proactively determine the effects that pursuits of one form of security may have on other forms of security. Three main referent objects of security are evident throughout the security literature as being the most fundamental for achieving not only the security, but also the prosperity of humankind: the environment, humans, and states. It is argued that all other forms of security are either constituent of one of these three main pillars or that they act as linkages between them. Because the neglect of one pillar creates security consequences for the other pillars, the ASH model addresses the main argument that the success of the state in the 21st century security environment is ultimately dependent upon its ability to address human-centric and environment-centric forms of security, despite its current continued state-centrism.

1.1 On Security

Buzan and Hansen point out in their foundational text, *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, that security is best understood as a hyphenated concept in

conjunction with a certain “referent object”.⁸ The term “human-security” then holds the assumption that humans are being considered as the central referent object, or the object of analysis, within that conceptualization of security. Other conceptualizations of security include cyber-security, resource security, national security, economic security, environmental security, cultural security, and more. Each image of security is placed within a different frame that includes certain myths (whether true or not) while excluding others in order to focus on the goals that are present within that specific security conceptualization. As a hyphenated concept, while the notion of security is able to proliferate and expand across diverse sectors it also means that many forms of security are in contradiction to others due to seemingly incompatible goals and priorities. For example, while the goals within economic security are to expand development, unsustainable development models with short-term emphasis on profit making often occur with the cost of the degradation of environmental security. Buzan holds that it is due to the concept of security’s capability to be adopted by many different academic fields that throughout the years International Security Studies (ISS) has taken on an interesting pattern of evolution.⁹

Despite this diversity, Buzan and Hansen state that the evolution of ISS can be traced as having generally focused on four main questions: whether to privilege the state as the referent object; whether to include internal as well as external threats; whether to expand security beyond military security and the use of force; whether to see security as

⁸ (Buzan and Hansen, The Evolution of International Security Studies 2009)

⁹ (Buzan and Hansen, The Evolution of International Security Studies 2009)

tioned to the dynamic of threats, dangers and urgency. Similarly, in his account of International Security Studies, Paul D. Williams defines security studies as those academic measures that attempt to answer the following four main questions: What is security? Whose security are we talking about? What counts as a security issue? How can security be achieved?¹⁰ Williams, Buzan and Hansen each highlight that security analysis must address how security is being defined, whose or what's security is being addressed, and what measures are appropriate and acceptable in attempts to achieve the chosen referent object's security.

In attempts to address these core security questions it has become apparent that the answers will vary depending on the examiner's geographical position in space and their historical placement in time. That is to say, what constituted security concerns during the Cold War environment is different than what constitutes security concerns in today's 21st century environment . . . or at least security concerns *should* have changed in proper coordination with the changes the world experiences through time. Security is a notion that is contingent upon historical and cultural contexts, failing to recognize these contexts results in a failure to properly address the most prominent threats.

1.2 Nature of Security versus Security Environment

¹⁰ (P. D. Williams 2008)

Some of the oldest and most fundamental debates in western philosophy are those on the nature of man. These debates are aimed at discovering what fundamental and inherent human characteristics exist and persist independently of external influences such as culture. Different arguments about human nature have created a divergence of thought influencing foreign policies in different manners. For example, policy-informer Hans Morgenthau's conceptualization of classical realism which became dominant during the Cold War asserted that politics, and the assumedly rational decisions that politicians would make, were rooted in the objective laws that human nature predicts; laws which are consistent through time.¹¹ Morgenthau then argued that the ability to understand the natural laws within human nature would provide an analyst with the ability to predict what decisions politicians would make as they would rationally follow the political laws of man.

To "state the nature" of something is a phrase that has been historically operationalized in a certain way. To state the nature of something is to identify its most inherent, fundamental, unchanging and permanent characteristics. Many academics and philosophers, such as Karl Marx¹², denounced the existence of a fixed nature of man; however, even in contestation of this theory, the phrase "nature of man" or 'human nature' still represents a debate on determining the existence or absence of a set of fixed characteristics that define humanity. What exactly the truth is in this debate is not what

¹¹ (Morgenthau 1948)

¹² (Fromm 1961)

matters here. What matters is the format of debate that has been operationalized with the act of stating the nature of a given referent object.

In the contexts of the 21st century (globalization, the end of the Cold War, the Global War on Terror) academics and policymakers aim to fill a theoretical gap in the literature on international relations, conflict and security so that the dominant paradigms of world affairs actually match the realities of the contemporary threats. That is to say, in place of a debate on the nature of man, the security literature aims at defining the *nature of conflict*.

The nature of conflict, being an activity in which humans are engaged, is dependent upon the nature of humans themselves. Is it possible to then identify the fundamental elements that when present or absent will spark conflict between humans? According to a fundamental theory in the field of conflict analysis and resolution, the underlying root causes of conflict are the deprivation of what are termed as *basic human needs*; needs which, like the nature of any referent object, are consistent across cultural and geographical barriers. Influenced by the works of Paul Sites and Abraham Maslow, John Burton extrapolated on the notion of the existence of basic human needs in his 1979 book, *Deviance, Terrorism and War: The Process of Solving Unsolved Social and Political Problems*.¹³ Burton, as an Australian diplomat during World War II, had become frustrated with the ineffectiveness of traditional realism and he set out to shift the dominant paradigm that was held amongst actors working in international relations. His

¹³ (Rubenstein, Basic Human Needs: The Next Step in Theory Development 2001)

goal was to better be able to identify primary sources of insecurity in the world by paying attention to the root causes of conflicts.

1.3 Philosophy of Conflict within the Changing Security Environment

John Burton helped create what would eventually become the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (S-CAR) at George Mason University. The school holds a philosophy that conflict is a “normal product of human interaction, neither good nor bad.”¹⁴ The next line in the school’s stated philosophy initially seems contradictory to the above quote as it is written that the school recognizes that “the effects of conflict can be positive or negative.” It is a logical assumption to associate goodness with positive effects and badness with negative effects. This would mean that either the school really *does* attribute goodness or badness to conflict, or that it does not correlate positivity with goodness or negativity with badness, which is unlikely. Instead, what it assumedly meant is that conflict in and of itself is neither something to wholly be avoided or wholly be pursued. Conflict does not carry its own inherent values; it is instead the actions humans decide to take in times of conflict that may lead to either progressive or destructive results. Thus it is the goal of conflict resolution practitioners to identify the root causes of conflict (the presence of which is neither good nor bad) to ensure that conflict does not lead to unnecessary negative outcomes. That is to say, S-CAR’s philosophy is that

¹⁴ (The School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution 2010)

conflict is neither good nor bad, but that the outcomes of conflict as determined by human agency can be. That is the philosophy of conflict adopted in this work.

Burton argued that conflict resolution is naught if it identifies human nature as the source of conflict because the nature of humanity cannot be altered. He posits that problems emanating from the conditions created by social structures may be addressed by adjusting the structure to better suit the needs of humankind.¹⁵ It is here that theories of conflict meld with and compliment theories of peace, as Burton's theory of basic human needs coincides with Johan Galtung's conceptualization of structural violence. Galtung's operationalization of positive peace and negative peace will be explored in the following section on the Cold War, yet it is important to note here that Galtung defined violence as "the cause of difference between the potential and the actual". Physical violence then means those methods which limit the potential of a person through the acts that interfere with their physical bodies. In contrast, structural violence is the term used to represent an existence of an institution that facelessly causes injustice or inequality amongst a population.¹⁶

Societal structures in place may either be organized in such a manner that conflict is proliferated or deterred, depending on whether human needs are assured or deprived. In analyzing the contemporary threats that society faces, an important distinction must be made between the *nature of conflict* and the *security environment*. Contrary to the wording of many experts throughout the literature, the end of the Cold War does not

¹⁵ (Burton, Conflict resolution: the human dimension 1998)

¹⁶ (J. Galtung 1969)

represent a change in the *nature of conflict*. The changing nature of conflict does not constitute a new factor for security analysis because the nature of conflict between human beings is that which remains constant. Certain factors, such as the assurance of basic human needs, have to be in place or conflict is likely to emerge consistent with its nature as tied to the deprivation of needs. In line with the theory of basic human needs, conflict emerges, as it always has and likely always will, over issues such as access to food, water, and shelter, over securing identity and recognition. The *nature of conflict* is not the new factor that threatens the security of humanity in the 21st century. What has changed and what is new is the *structure*, the *environment*, which has the potential to either fuel or deter the presence of conflict as it is consistent with its fundamental characteristics.

The nature of conflict is that which remains consistent throughout time. Depending on the contextual environment the factors that cause conflict between human populations may be more or less present than at other times or in other places. The absence of conflict therefore does not mean that the nature of conflict has changed, just that there is an absence of those factors which spark humankind's nature to engage in conflict. Similarly, the change in the way that conflict occurs does not mean that there is a change in the nature of conflict, but rather it represents a change in the tools present during the engagement of human conflicts.

For example, during the Cold War, the new threat of nuclear warfare did not change the nature of conflict; it changed the way in which conflict was acted out as well as changing the level of its intensity. The act of resolving conflicts, no matter the changes

they face depending on different environments which are defined by different historical and cultural contexts, is reliant upon successfully addressing the existence of structural inequalities that lead to the deprivation of basic human needs as they are connected to root cause of the conflict itself. This is not to say there are blanket solutions to resolving conflicts; in fact just the opposite: each conflict must be analyzed specifically in accordance with its own cultural and historical contexts, its own security environment. Blanket methods and theories are sure to fail due to their inherent ethnocentricities and incapacities for understanding the needs of the people at hand.

Contemporary conflicts and wars are not representative of a new nature of conflict, but rather they are taking place within a new security environment. The landscape in the 21st century security environment is carved by levels of intensity of globalizing forces that are unprecedented in human history due to but not limited to the size of the human population and the developments of transportation and communications technologies making the world a smaller place.

Much of the security literature looks at examining the *changing nature of conflict* within the *post-Cold War era*. Two problems exist in the methodologies of these procedures. The first problem has been clarified already, that it is more effective to use the phrase *security environment* than *nature of conflict*. The second problem is that the contemporary security environment has its own defining characteristics. The Cold War was a unique period of time, and that time is over. Continuing to define the contemporary security environment as the post-Cold War era is ultimately limited as it is a method of

defining our time by what it is no longer rather than what it is currently.¹⁷ The goal of utilizing post-Cold War dialogue is to explain the characteristics of the security environment that exist today that are different than those that existed during the Cold War. Ironically in contradiction to those goals, there is a risk in utilizing post-Cold War dialogue in that security may continue to be operationalized in Cold War terms when those terms are no longer applicable in the world today as the Cold War environment has ended. As will be demonstrated, the contemporary security environment is host to an array of defining characteristics such as hybrid warfare, post-Westphalian state structures, diverse violent non-state actors, unprecedented climate change, the rise of state-run capitalism and more. In addressing these issues, a more thorough analysis of security demonstrates that these threats are more significantly tied to the end of the dominance of the Westphalian World Order than they are to the end of the Cold War alone.

¹⁷ (Renner 1997)

II. EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF SECURITY

The word *sovereignty* is derived from the French word *souveraineté* which itself came from the Latin word *superanus*, which meant supremacy.¹⁸ According to the New Oxford American Dictionary, sovereign as a noun means “a supreme ruler” while as an adjective it means “possessing supreme or ultimate power”.¹⁹ In the modern system states are those powers that are considered as holding sovereignty. In contrast, before the formation of the Westphalian World Order, in the medieval system the sovereign were not states, but kings.

The main referent object of security has historically and dominantly remained centered upon that object which is considered sovereign above others. In the medieval organization of society this meant that the referent object of security was the kings, emperors, and their families. In the modern system this means that the dominant referent object of security is the state.

2.1 The Medieval Sovereign Kings

¹⁸ (Valaskakis 2000)

¹⁹ (Stevenson and Lindberg 2010)

In contrast to the modern centralized state system, the medieval organization of society demonstrated an array of overlapping authorities.²⁰ Of these authorities, it was the Germanic kingdom that emerged as the dominant kingdom in Europe and in its expansion it became known as the Holy Roman Empire. This empire in fact had very little to do with the Roman Empire that preceded it. In his 1756 work, *An Essay on Universal History, the Manners and Spirit of Nations from the Reign of Charlemagne to the Age of Lewis XIV*, Voltaire wrote that “The Holy Roman Empire is neither Holy, nor Roman, nor an Empire.”²¹ Even though this quote would centuries later come to most widely be recognized as part of Mike Meyer’s comedy sketch, “Coffee Talk with Linda Richman” as part of the televised show *Saturday Night Live*, it was mainly true²².

The actual Roman Empire had its capital moved from Rome to Byzantium by Emperor Constantine in the year 330 AD. Constantine renamed the city after himself, Constantinople, and it became what is now considered the Eastern Roman Empire. Constantinople endured until the year 1453 when it was taken by the forces of the Ottoman Empire.

While Constantinople developed in the East, Rome in the West gradually deteriorated towards the end of the fifth century. What remained in its place were scattered overlapping kingdoms that were primarily led by Germanic kings. In an attempt to pick up the pieces of the Roman Empire that remained in the west, in the year 800, Pope Leo III crowned Charlemagne as emperor of the Western Roman Empire. After

²⁰ (Buzan and Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies* 2009)

²¹ (Voltaire 1756)

²² (Myers 1994)

Charlemagne's death the political empire once again began to crumble, yet the religious reign and organization under the Pope remained. Of the European kingdoms, the Germanic kingdom led by Otto I emerged as the strongest and farthest reaching. Pope John XII crowned Otto as emperor in the year 962 in what was another attempt by the religious authority to reform the political authority that was previously the strength of the Roman Empire. The Holy Roman Empire was born in this marriage between Pope John XII and King Otto I.

The Holy Roman Empire was in no way the image of a centralized state; it was instead constituent of many overlapping kingdoms. Joseph Strayer notes that "In the early Middle Ages the dominant form of political organization in Western Europe was the Germanic kingdom, and the Germanic kingdom was in some ways the complete antithesis of a modern state. It was based on loyalties to persons, not to abstract concepts or impersonal institutions."²³ Those holding the power of sovereignty in the medieval system were the rulers of kingdoms. Those living in a kingdom recognized a certain man as king and his family as sovereign rulers of the land. Their power of sovereignty to rule as they desired was legitimized by the understanding that their sovereignty was divinely handed down to them through their familial line. This was the assumed natural order and it was given legitimacy through the notion of *natural law* which applied to those who held the power of sovereignty, the kings. As security was consistently a concept that applied to the sovereign, the kings and their families required a tool for ensuring their security.

²³ (Strayer, Tilly and Jordan 2005)

The sovereign put forth great measures to disarm the civil source of threats to their power. In today's terms these would be considered non-state threats, though what they were at the time was essentially non-sovereign threats. According to Charles Tilly, the security environment in Europe until the state's monopolization of violence was defined by ordinary men who had weapons commonly available to them. Within any kingdom, concentrated means of non-state force held the potential to overwhelm the sovereign rulers.²⁴ Tilly notes that since the seventeenth century the sovereign rulers were able to develop a monopoly of the use of force. Max Weber's definition of a state is that a state is a human community that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force.²⁵ European history demonstrates that the dominant model of the modern state that was to emerge, the Westphalian state, was that which held the monopoly on the legitimate use of force in the world.

Paul Kennedy writes that the state's monopoly on the use of force evolved in Europe as "warlike rivalries among its various kingdoms and city-states stimulated a constant search for military improvements, which interacted fruitfully with the newer technological and commercial advances that were also being thrown up in this competitive, entrepreneurial environment. Possessing fewer obstacles to change, European societies entered into a constantly upward spiral of growth and enhanced military effectiveness which, over time, was to carry them ahead of all other regions of

²⁴ (Tilly 1992)

²⁵ (Weber 1921)

the globe.”²⁶ This militaristic and economic upward spiral is well demonstrated by Charles Tilly’s historical analysis on the relationship between war making and state building. In his analysis it is argued that a side effect of army building was the economic formation of the state. According to Tilly, “A ruler’s creation of armed force generated durable state structure. It did so both because an army became a significant organization within the state and because its construction and maintenance brought complementary organizations- treasuries, supply services, mechanisms for conscription, tax bureau, and much more- into life.”²⁷ In other words, permanent institutions were put in place in order to financially fuel the act of waging war.

The main tool of security for the medieval sovereign rulers was the knights. Knights, in return for their services, were compensated by their kings or lords with their own land. Characteristic of a feudal order of society, with this land came also serfs to manage. Thereby the knights became a distinctly higher social land-holding class. This was the feudal levy, the trade-off between acquiring land and a higher class in the feudal order and submitting military service for the king when demanded.

In their desires for the accumulation of more wealth and power than surrounding kingdoms, rulers turned to hiring mercenaries, who were more effective in battle than their knights. Mercenaries grew in military importance over knights from the year 1200 to 1500.²⁸ Tilly notes that in the fifteenth through seventeenth centuries, armies were

²⁶ (Kennedy 1989)

²⁷ (Tilly 1992)

²⁸ (Strayer, Tilly and Jordan 2005)

largely constituent of mercenaries.²⁹ However, some kingdoms maintained their reliance on local levies, as the Germanic kingdom until the year 1618 with the emergence of the Thirty Years' War.

Mercenaries, unlike knights, did not fight for land. They fought for money. This meant that in order to hire mercenaries, ruling parties had to come up with sufficient economic resources. As the scale of war increased, and as mercenaries were the main tool of warfare at the time, the ability to borrow financial resources from other populations than one's own became "crucial to military success".³⁰ The integrated economic infrastructure between states was emerging as the sovereign took on debt to finance their wars.

As the mercenaries themselves were not living on the lands or amongst the societies that they fought for, they share many similar traits to the private militaries of today and may therefore be considered non-state actors in some ways. Thomson states that the authorization of this non-state form of violence by the sovereign state leaders themselves led to the complication that unauthorized forms of non-state violence could turn against the state itself.³¹ That is to say, because mercenaries were driven by financial incentives alone they held no true allegiances and were unreliable should finances run low as they could easily be bought off by competitors. As explained by Strayer, "Mercenaries frequently fought better than militias and feudal levies, but only so long as they received their pay; disbanded or unpaid mercenaries regularly turned to extortion,

²⁹ (Tilly 1992)

³⁰ (Tilly 1992)

³¹ (Thomson 1994)

pillage, and banditry”.³² These risks associated with mercenary armies led state rulers to focus on creating their own permanent armies that would hold allegiance throughout times of war or peace.

Through the years standing armies came to replace the unpredictable mercenaries. The costs and risks involved with hiring mercenaries led rulers to focus on enlisting their own citizens. Beginning in the fifteenth century, the trend was that European rulers financed their permanent standing armies through increased taxation. Eventually this trend for the tool of warfare evolving into state armies would be finalized once the French Revolutionary War emerged.³³ For the first time, soldiers were hired as full-time professionals, meaning that they remained soldiers even in times of peace. The cost of waging war therefore exploded due to the fact that standing armies had to be financially compensated at all times regardless of conditions of war or peace. Strayer notes that “national armies depended on the ability of rulers to raise money and supplies to keep them going. Army-building rulers borrowed in the short run, seized valuable property in the medium run, and taxed in the long run”.³⁴

Through the process of waging wars, two mutually reinforcing monopolies eventually emerged: the sovereign’s monopoly on the use of force and the sovereign’s monopoly on taxation.³⁵ In order to finance the act of waging war, rulers had to absorb more financial resources from their subjects. This was most effectively done through

³² (Strayer, Tilly and Jordan 2005)

³³ (Tilly 1992)

³⁴ (Strayer, Tilly and Jordan 2005)

³⁵ (Lutterbeck 2012)

taxation. As the sovereigns were the only powers who held the ability to tax their subjects, they were those who were able to build a monopoly on the use of force. Ordinary men were no longer a threat to the emerging state's economic and military infrastructure.

The state and civil society, the public and private spheres, were emerging as two separate entities. That which connected them was taxation. In return for their financial assistance, state leaders could provide individuals with guaranteed protection with their armed forces. Initially the sovereign rulers, in their collection of taxes and levies of men, resembled racketeers because "at a price they offered protection against evils that they themselves would otherwise inflict, or at least allow to be inflicted."³⁶ The sovereign kings of the medieval system developed a monopoly of the use of force and through the process of requiring financial resources to win wars institutions were emerging that resembled an organized state. Tilly's assertion that war made states and states made war hold true with Kennedy's analysis on the rise and fall of great powers in the world. Kennedy holds that the explanation for the rise and decline of great powers is due to the correlation between the productive capacity of a state and its military power relative to other states. The higher the productive capacity and stronger the economic infrastructure, in the end the greater its military power will be. That is to say, in the long run a state's economic power will translate into military power.³⁷

³⁶ (Tilly 1992)

³⁷ (Kennedy 1989)

The sovereign kings had developed one of the key factors of modern state-building, and that was the formation of economic institutions that evolved as a result of the need to finance war and establish the security of the sovereign themselves. Thomson notes that “sovereignty is the international institution that organizes global politics”³⁸. But the kings of the medieval era would not remain recognized as the wielders of the power of sovereignty, as after the Protestant Reformation and the Thirty Years’ War, the idea of a centralized state would be recognized as that which held sovereignty. Monarchical rule in the medieval structure of society would change and become national rule in a centralized and territorialized interstate system.³⁹ Another key factor of the formation of the modern state was about to emerge, as the idea of state sovereignty emerged out of the process of the Peace of Westphalia.

2.2 The Modern Sovereign States

The Holy Roman Empire existed as a system of weak alliances between kingdoms until the Protestant Reformation gained strength. Christendom fractured and war emerged over sociopolitical issues between Protestants and Catholics in Europe until the Peace of Westphalia, which was a series of treaties that ended the Thirty Years’ War lasting from

³⁸ (Thomson 1994)

³⁹ (Buzan and Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies* 2009)

1618 until 1648.⁴⁰ Settling the religious warfare, according to Buzan and Hansen the Peace of Westphalia “is dated as the founding moment when states decided no longer to interfere in each other’s religious choices.”⁴¹ The significance of such an event is reiterated by Kennedy, where he writes that, “The most significant feature of the Great Power scene after 1660 was the maturing of a genuinely *multipolar* system of European states, each one of which increasingly tended to make decisions about war and peace on the basis of ‘national interests’ rather than for transnational, religious causes.”⁴² Non-interference among states and agreements to no longer wage war on a religious basis were the founding notions of the treaties.

The principle of non-interference instated in the Peace of Westphalia continued to expand and evolve, as it would come to form the basis of the modern international system of sovereign states. Its success as the basis of the Peace of Westphalia meant that non-interference as an interstate principle would retain “its central status” throughout the evolution of the modern state as it was “seen as the precondition for creating international stability and order”.⁴³ At the time, the principle of non-interference meant that the Peace of Westphalia delivered sovereignty to constituent states and therefore rendered the Holy Roman Empire more or less powerless; however, the Holy Roman Empire would remain until it was officially dissolved during the Napoleonic Wars in 1806 by Francis II and was absorbed by the preceding Austrian Empire.

⁴⁰ (Kennedy 1989)

⁴¹ (Buzan and Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies* 2009)

⁴² (Kennedy 1989)

⁴³ (Buzan and Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies* 2009)

The Westphalian state structure remained strong due to its ability to develop institutions that remained constant over space and through time. Strayer holds that continuity in space and time are fundamental aspects of state-building. Without the threat of religious warfare, and with the newly territorialized states, a new level of stability arose that allowed for permanent institutions to strengthen through time.⁴⁴ The Westphalian World Order became the dominant method of the organization of society on Earth. “The modern state, wherever we find it today, is based on the pattern which emerged in Europe”.⁴⁵ Strayer writes that the Eurocentric model of the state was either chosen by other societies as their own model or it was forced upon them due to the forces of colonialism that ensued out of Europe. The Partition of Africa is an unfortunate example of the latter; given that Europeans in 1884 aimed at dividing the continent amongst themselves and drew artificial Westphalian-state borders that in no way reflected indigenous migration routes or geographical realities on the ground. Falk also notes that the Westphalian system of states extended throughout Asia and Africa through the dynamics of decolonization, and that the Westphalian states conceptualized security in relation to war or peace between other states.⁴⁶

A key transformation from the medieval to the modern system of governance had occurred: the disintegration of overlapping competing levels of authority and the rise of a territorially-defined sovereign state with a centralized decision-making institution.⁴⁷ In

⁴⁴ (Strayer, Tilly and Jordan 2005)

⁴⁵ (Strayer, Tilly and Jordan 2005)

⁴⁶ (Falk 2002)

⁴⁷ (Buzan and Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies* 2009)

the act of agreeing to assign sovereignty to territorially-based states in the Peace of Westphalia, the medieval system of absolute monarchies was coming to an end.

The understanding of sovereignty continued to evolve through time, transferring from belonging to kings to belonging to states. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 was an important part of an evolutionary process that unfolded the doctrine of popular sovereignty. In the seventeenth century John Locke, forefather of idealist, or liberalist political ideology, linked sovereignty to democracy rather than to authoritative rulers. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, later in the eighteenth century, would agree: the people should be the ultimate wielders of sovereignty.⁴⁸ Popular sovereignty represented a change in the conceptualization of security. It meant that everyday people could be the referent objects of security. The idea was that people would delegate to the state and its economic and military strength, but that it would act in the interest of the people themselves. The assumption formed was that national sovereignty, under this doctrine of the social compact, would equally represent the popular sovereignty of the citizens living within the borders of that territorialized state. Therefore, security remained state-centric throughout the construction of democratic systems of governance due to the fact that the state was that which had developed an economic and military infrastructure the likes of which civil society was unable to replicate.

The state, the Westphalian state that is, may have represented a new wielder of sovereignty as opposed to the kings; however, war waging and state building continued to be factors that were linked in an intensifying spiral of evolution. The Peace of Westphalia

⁴⁸ (Valaskakis 2000)

did not represent an end to the act of waging war; it represented agreements to not wage war on religious bases. As the Peace of Westphalia did not represent the end of waging war it did not represent the end of state-building itself. Economic and military factors of state-building and warfare intensified through time. The sovereign power, the Westphalian state, continued to develop a monopoly on the use of violent force.

It is important to note that the sovereignty of the medieval kings did not go unchallenged. Notably, in England in the year 1215, the assumption of the ultimate sovereign power of the kings was challenged when King John was forced, by a group of rebellious barons who wanted their rights to be recognized, to sign the Magna Carta. Among these rights the document declared that “No freeman shall be taken, imprisoned, disseised, outlawed, banished, or in any way destroyed, nor will We proceed against or prosecute him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the land.”⁴⁹ Unfortunately, civil war emerged between the King and the barons after Pope Innocent III nullified the Magna Carta. According to the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration the document was ultimately reinstated into law in 1297.

The desire for individual rights that was asserted in the Magna Carta would influence the evolution of human rights well beyond the end of the medieval organization of society, as it was the rights guaranteed under the Magna Carta for the English people that American colonists equally desired. The American Revolutionary War lasted from 1775 to 1783. The American Constitution and Bill of Rights directly transferred some of the rights listed in the Magna Carta to apply to Americans, such as the right to the due

⁴⁹ (U.S. National Archives and Records Administration 2012)

process of law. Throughout the Americans' struggle for independence was their fight for their understanding of popular sovereignty.

Troubled with their own socioeconomic inequalities, the French were inspired by the fight for individual rights in the American Revolution and the French Revolution began shortly thereafter in 1789. The French Constitution that emerged in 1791 upheld sovereignty as "indivisible, inalienable and imprescriptible".⁵⁰ Ending ten years after its beginning, in 1799 the French Revolution ultimately ended with the beginning of the Napoleonic Wars which would last from 1803 until 1815. Out of the revolution, French military leader Napoleon Bonaparte rose to power and declared himself Emperor of the French, though he desired to be Emperor of the entire world. As emperor, sovereignty would be solely wielded by Napoleon himself. Napoleon would need an army the size of which the world had never seen in order for him to achieve his political aspirations.

Conscription was introduced as a method of raising a mass military force. Conscription came to represent "the touchstone of the relationship between state and civil society" because of the trade-off that occurred between citizens and the state. While citizens were required to perform military service, in fulfillment of their conscript obligations they were provided with rights to be involved in the political decision-making processes of the state.⁵¹ Conscription and citizenship were in this way two sides of the same coin. Here it is interesting to note that the sovereign's monopolization of the use of force was occurring through a trade-off between the state and the public much in a

⁵⁰ (Valaskakis 2000)

⁵¹ (Woloch 1986)

parallel manner that the sovereign's monopolization of the use of force occurred centuries before with the feudal levy.

The creation of a permanent conscript exacerbated the financial elements of warfare to a new degree. The evolutionary process of hiring mercenaries to establishing standing armies was completed. Higher taxes had to be implemented to administer this force, and the idea of citizenship had emerged. Conscription and taxation required the state to make trade-offs with its people. Though citizens were taxed they were provided with security. Though they were required to serve in the military they were rewarded with democratic power.

Napoleon's attempt at building an empire was defeated at the Battle of Waterloo in 1815. King Louis XVIII received the French crown. While Louis XVIII was now King, the Charter of 1814 ensured that France was representative of a constitutional, rather than absolute monarchy, meaning that the position of king did not hold the sovereignty that it did before the French Revolution.

At the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Prussian military strategist, Carl von Clausewitz, authored his famously influential account of military strategy, *On War (Vom Kriege*, in German) in 1815 and it was published in 1832.⁵² Clausewitz highly influenced the evolution of the theory of political realism which would stronger emerge after World War II. According to Clausewitz the war was a legitimate tool for the state, as it was simply one of several political options. By referring to the 'state' Clausewitz is of course

⁵² (Clausewitz 1832)

referring to the Westphalian state structure in which he lived. Clausewitz's strategies of warfare continued to be adopted even while the tools of warfare were beginning to change through the process of industrialization.

The emergence of industrial warfare ensured that, besides whether or not war was a legitimate tool of the state, as Clausewitz held, the state was now the only actor that had the capabilities to wage war at all. With industrialization came the monopoly of the state's use of force to a new degree. Citizens would not have access to technologies of the state such as tanks and submarines. Warfare in the modern era required technologies that only the state had economic resources to acquire. These technologies further ensured that the military capacity of the state was limited by the state's economic capacity.

The upward spiraling of economic and military powers of the state merged with industrialization to create total war. "Total War" is the term used to describe the fact that wars were no longer defined as battles between states' armies, but were instead defined as battles between states' entire economies. With the security environment defined by industrialized warfare, the state could only be as effective in war as its economic resources would enable it; the total economy of the state became a factor in the outcome of warfare.

The industrialized state of war in World War I and World War II demonstrated that war had become conquests between states and their economies rather than between military forces alone. The "ratchet effect" is a term used to demonstrate how state expenditure on military power continues to increase even after times of conflict have

ended, as the state will not want to lose what military advantages it has gained.⁵³ Over time this means that competing states and their militaries will continue to increase spending on military affairs, as the state of their militaries reflects the state of their economies. The ratchet effect through time as a principle legitimizes Kennedy's observation of an "upward spiral of growth" as well as Tilly's observations of war making as tied to state building. Security as understood within this Westphalian interstate system and as it became industrialized meant that the state was further evidenced to be the ultimate provider of security as average citizens had no capabilities to compete in the states' war games. The conceptualization of security had effectively become state-centric and human populations in the world were assumedly organized within the Westphalian World Order.

According to Valaskakis, the architecture of the Westphalian World Order was supported by five main pillars.⁵⁴ The first is that national governments are the only holders of legitimate sovereignty. This was made clear from the Peace of Westphalia throughout the French Revolution. The second pillar is that sovereignty is defined by geographical territory. State centrality aided its ability to continue institutions through time, and land was a factor that was much desired since the feudal order. The third pillar is that national governments are the most powerful actors in the world. The Peace of Westphalia not only limited the power of the Holy Roman emperors, but it also limited the power of the Pope by introducing secular authority. The Church would continue to

⁵³ (Tilly 1992)

⁵⁴ (Valaskakis 2000)

become further separated from the state itself. The fourth pillar is that the only enforceable law is that which is based on treaties between sovereign state governments. Collective security initiatives produced International Law which was only legally binding and enforceable between sovereign states. The fifth and final pillar is that war is perceived as a legitimate instrument in international relations. As influenced by the works of Clausewitz after the Napoleonic Wars, war is perceived as a legitimate political action should no other means of conflict resolution be evident. The fourth pillar of the Westphalian World Order, that the only enforceable law is that which is based on treaties between sovereign states, had yet to be fully constructed on a global level before the outbreak of World War I. Industrialized warfare and the outbreak of World War I in Europe in 1914 meant that security had to undergo a paradigm transformation of sorts.

Industrial technologies plus the ratchet effect of warfare meant that if security continued to be pursued by individual states in pursuit of their own political interests the destruction of World War I would inevitably occur again. If security were solely understood within a model that created win-lose scenarios in interstate competition, a security dilemma emerged. In response to the threat of mass human destruction through world warfare initiated between states, security initiatives began to expand to adopt cooperative instead of competitive models. Collective security initiatives emerged through interstate alliances, though they still centered on the security of the Westphalian states and in that way they in no way represented a shift in the referent object of security away from the state. In this way, the intergovernmental institutions of the League of

Nations and the United Nations that came to represent collective security initiatives were continuing to strengthen the Westphalian-state-centralization of security.

2.3 Collective Security of Westphalian States

As a direct reaction to the end of World War I, the League of Nations was created in 1919. The League of Nations held a conceptualization of security that was not centered on the Westphalian state, but on a collectivity of Westphalian states. That is to say, collective security meant that the security of one sovereign state could only be achieved through the joined security of those sovereign states around it. Though the League of Nations did not prevail, its successor, the United Nations, continues to predominately view security through the lens of a collectivity of Westphalian states.

The League of Nations was born out of idealist/liberalist thought and assumed that the security of states was better achieved by guaranteed collective norms, such as the formation of its Permanent Court of International Justice, rather than through military pacts. Idealists believed that a system of international law could settle disputes and help to improve imperfect social conditions.⁵⁵ The inability of the League of Nations to provide sanctions and its general ineffectiveness was demonstrated by the continued outbreak of interstate violence as well as the withdrawal of Japan and Germany. In 1939, the security environment was re-shaped by contextual realities as well as human theories

⁵⁵ (Hough 2004)

as interstate conflict erupted with World War II, giving realists theoretical opportunities to denounce idealist paradigms. In 1939, E.H. Carr wrote *The Twenty Years' Crisis* and critiqued idealists by labeling them as utopianists.⁵⁶ Carr refuted the idealist concept of a harmony of interests, that human beings can cooperate based on the ability to identify shared interests, and asserted that in reality humans will cause conflict over competition for power. The idealist international moral norms posited by the collective security attempts of the League of Nations, according to Carr, were invented to perpetuate the dominance of certain states by imposing relative morality on other states.⁵⁷ Carr shared a view with Thomas Hobbes that the world was an anarchic and amoral environment and that the notion of morality was relativistic. Attempts at defining universal interests or morals would always exemplify a certain state's attempts at coercing power over others. Rallying terms such as peace were then coercive assertions of the status quo. Certainly the context of the security environment defined by Nazi Germany provided a harsh and terrible image of the state itself. Despite Carr's realist positions, he contradicted his own arguments by stating "pure realism can offer nothing but a naked struggle for power which makes any kind of international society impossible".⁵⁸

At the end of World War II, the League of Nations was revamped as the United Nations in 1945, aiming once more for intergovernmental collective security. Still holding aspects of idealist ideology, the UN blended its new structure with realist thought to create a central core of five great powers. The United Nations, under the direction of

⁵⁶ (Carr 2001)

⁵⁷ (Korab-Karpowicz 2011)

⁵⁸ (Carr 2001)

Eleanor Roosevelt, made a significant historical landmark in 1948 with the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The UDHR was based on the notion that humans all share an inherent dignity that must be upheld throughout the world.⁵⁹ Before human rights became an institutionalized norm, the preceding historical narrative evidenced that the notion of natural law had been that which justified the divinely assumed ability to rule in the medieval era. The Magna Carta, the American Constitution, and the French Constitution helped to transform the divine rights of natural law into natural rights. Natural rights asserted that individuals were holders of certain rights that no government should be allowed to impede upon. Eventually, after the Napoleonic Wars, World War I and World War II, the United Nations aimed to reaffirm faith in basic human dignity through the formation of legally binding human rights law.

Two forms of law emerged out of the structure of the United Nations, International Human Rights Law (IHRL) and International Humanitarian Law (IHL). These international laws applied only to Westphalian state structures and therefore were also only enforceable by Westphalian states. The continued emergence of non-state human rights issues, such as the rights of indigenous peoples who may be opposed to the structure or laws of the Westphalian state, and continued emergence of non-state threats, such as terrorist organizations, would surely come to challenge the understanding of security in the Westphalian World Order. This is because international laws are state-centric; they inherently cannot apply to those not affiliated with the state.

⁵⁹ (United Nations, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights n.d.)

International Human Rights Law (IHRL) and International Humanitarian Law (IHL) have different evolutionary histories but are both legal tools for the United Nations' goal of global collective security and protection of human rights. International Human Rights Law functions through times of peace as a measure guaranteeing that states must respect and support the inherent human rights of their citizens. International Humanitarian Law (IHL) by contrast functions specifically in times of armed conflict, protecting individuals that may be affected as well as limiting the methods of warfare that degrade human dignity, such as torture.

The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, with its two optional protocols (the Optional Protocol on Civil and Political Rights and the Second Optional Protocol aiming at the abolition of the death penalty) were created in 1966. Once the covenants were sufficiently ratified in 1976 they, along with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, entered into the force of law to constitute the International Bill of Human Rights.

International Human Rights Law is reminiscent of the notion of popular sovereignty, restricting the state from engaging in any actions that infringe upon human dignity. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights states that, "By becoming parties to international treaties, States assume obligations and duties under international law to respect, to protect and to fulfill human rights."⁶⁰ IHRL faces the limitation that it is only enforceable should a state choose to sign and ratify international human rights treaties.

⁶⁰ (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 1996-2012)

According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, “International humanitarian law (IHL) is a set of rules which seek, for humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects of armed conflict. It protects persons who are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities and restricts the means and methods of warfare.”⁶¹ International Humanitarian Law differs from International Human Rights Law in that it applies to the rules of active warfare, or rather that it aims to establish those rules. IHL is largely based on the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols aim to protect civilians who are not taking part in warfare, including health and aid workers. They also aim to protect those who are no longer participating in warfare, including wounded, shipwrecked, or sick soldiers or prisoners of war.⁶²

Under IHL, the principle of Proportionality, in Article 51(5) (b) of the First Additional Protocol, states that even if a clear military target exists, it is not legal to attack if the harm to civilians or civilian property that occurs is excessive to the outcome of the military advantage. Destruction of civilians or their property is, however, justifiable under Article 52 of the First Additional Protocol, which asserts the principle of Military Necessity. The principle of Distinction, through Article 48 of the First Additional Protocol, prohibits any means or methods that make clear distinctions impossible between armed combatants and legally protected civilians. The principle of Precaution in Attack is part of the principle of Distinction, and holds that precaution must

⁶¹ (International Committee of the Red Cross, *Treaties and Customary law: overview 2010*)

⁶² (International Committee of the Red Cross, *The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols 2010*)

be taken to distinguish between civilians and combatants and to spare civilians from harm.

What is evident is that the principles of International Humanitarian Law perceive warfare as a state versus state action. Civilians and the state's militaries are perceived as two separate entities, as warfare itself is that which is to take place solely between the states' militaries. This understanding of armed conflict is suited to the architecture of the Westphalian World Order as well as to Weber's definition of the state as that which holds a monopoly on the use of force. International Humanitarian Law will greatly be challenged to appropriately adapt within a post-Westphalian security environment.

Moving beyond the devastation that occurred throughout the WWI and WWII, as well as the formation of intergovernmental collective security institutions that aimed at protecting the newly declared human rights, the Westphalian World Order remained the dominant perception of international relations throughout the Cold War. As Richard Falk notes, "The decades after World War II represented the climax of the Westphalian conception of world order, that is, the extension of the state system to Asia and Africa via the dynamics of decolonization, the continued preoccupation by governments with security in relation to war and peace, and a geographical focus on 'bipolarity' that reflected the centrality of the encounter between two superpowers and their respective blocs of subordinate allies."⁶³

⁶³ (Falk 2002)

2.4 Cold War Security Conceptualizations

World War II ended in 1945 and the Cold War arguably began in 1947 after the United States adopted the Truman Doctrine, which abolished the U.S. foundation of non-interference in foreign affairs by sending military aid to Greece and Turkey in order to help stop the spread of communism. The alliance that was once held between the Soviet Union and the United States had ended in distrust as each side held anxiety over the intentions and massive military capabilities of the other. American capitalism and Soviet communism were perceived as opposite ends of an ideological spectrum and the key to achieving world hegemony was in the dominant spread of their respective political and economic ideologies. The Cold War, if it can be labeled as such, ended with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.

The League of Nations' and the United Nations' notion of collective security was implemented in militaristic terms as collective defense during the Cold War. The 1949 formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) assured the collective military defense of the West and, in response, in 1955 the East developed the Warsaw Pact as their measure of collective military defense. These collective defense organizations were the strength behind the maintenance of a bipolarized security environment in the Cold War.

The Cold War security environment (the threats that existed) shaped the way in which the security architecture (the conceptualization of security meant to deal with those

threats) was designed at a very influential level due to the new technological developments and threats associated with nuclear weapons. Two superpowers in the world held the key to those technologies and for over forty years the way in which they strategized to achieve world hegemony over the other without engaging in nuclear warfare, which would ultimately lead to their own destruction, determined the way security as a concept was defined. As noted by Paul Williams, “Particularly as it appeared during the Cold War, the dominant approach within security studies may be crudely summarized as advocating political realism and being preoccupied with the four Ss’ of states, strategy, science and the status quo”.⁶⁴ Due to the span of its influence, the theories of security that were either born out of the Cold War environment or that supported its reality are those that tend to remain dominant in political thought of international relations, even though the Cold War was only a bubble in time, and not the historical model in any way. The understanding within International Relations was that Westphalian states were central referent objects and key power players, that an emphasis be placed on developing technology and deterring the nuclear capabilities of other states, that attempts at security be done through strategizing against the opponent state within the bipolar environment, and that the states’ ideologies supporting their differing structures be adopted by all other states in order to assure global balance and security.

The realist school of political thought in the field of International Relations (IR), solidified as reality by the bipolar interstate environment of the Cold War, is that which informed the understandings of security as the concept began to evolve as a central idea

⁶⁴ (P. D. Williams 2008)

for emerging fields of study. While there are many different branches of realism today, they all stem from the assumption that states compete in an anarchic environment for power over one another, as power is assumed to be the main interest of the state. Realism is considered pessimistic due to its assertion that the selfish pursuit of power is at the core of human nature itself.

The Cold War contextual environment influenced the assumptions and theories that made up realism and at the same time the theories of realism influenced the security agenda and strategies of the Cold War. Man-made theories are never born separate from their historical and cultural influencing contexts, yet they can in turn shape those contexts as well when human actions are chosen based off of those theories. It is in this way that realism became a dominant paradigm.

Influenced by the earlier works of E.H. Carr in his realist critique of the League of Nations, Hans Morgenthau authored *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* in 1948, leading him to be considered as a modern father of what is known as twentieth century classical realism. According to classical realism, failings in international politics such as the emergence of war are due to the flawed nature of individuals who pursue self-serving foreign policies. The pursuit of power is considered rational due to the nature of humanity. In this way, a state's strategies or policies may be pre-emptively identified in a cost-benefit analysis that shows which option a statesman is likely to choose in a rational manner.⁶⁵ This emphasis on the analysis of the decisions of the state is central in realist ideology. Classical realist thought posits that non-state actors,

⁶⁵ (Morgenthau 1948)

including non-governmental organizations, were irrelevant to world affairs as the world was defined by a state system. The term *power politics* is used in reference to this state-centric notion of competition over national interests.⁶⁶ Within the system of power politics, it is assumed that the interests of one state are achieved at the expense of another. This competitive assumption is most often referred to as a *zero-sum game*, signifying that the only possible outcome is a win-lose scenario. These theoretical assumptions caused a constant *security dilemma*. The solution for the security dilemma held by realists was the notion of the balance of power. As stated, it is the realist assumption that the international arena is anarchic, without structure to provide any sense of security. Powerful states are able to address the security dilemma within the anarchic environment by maintaining the status quo of their power and not letting any state player gain too much of an advantage over others.

Classical realism equated security and power to the state's military alone. Even during the Cold War, as globalizing forces continued to intensify the interconnectedness of states through time, these assumptions were questioned as economic interdependence gained attention. Neorealist thought expanded to accept that economic activities, and not just military ones, could be used to pursue a state's interests in power.

In 1979, classical realism was challenged by Kenneth Waltz's formulation of neorealism in his *Theory of International Politics*. It was the 1973 oil crisis, in which OPEC set an embargo on the United States due to its support of Israel, which sparked an evolution in realist thought to expand its analysis to include economic incentives

⁶⁶ (Hough 2004)

beyond the assumed rational pursuit of power through military means. As explained by Hough, while neorealism expanded the realist agenda to address non-military aspects of international relations, security continued to be considered in military terms. Neorealists considered security to be within the military dimension of International Relations, whereas a new sub-field, International Political Economy, would deal with economic dimensions.⁶⁷

2.4.1 Security Studies

Security in the United States was framed within realist assumptions of the world. Building off of these assumptions as a sub-field to International Relations, Security Studies was formed to address the threat of nuclear warfare. Due to the massive devastation that the use of nuclear weapons would cause, security was based in theories of deterrence. The United States and the Soviet Union were locked in cold contention as both held nuclear capabilities and it was clear that whoever would strike first would be struck second. Within deterrence theory, Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) became the doctrine that explained why the two superpowers did not fight each other directly, giving the non-traditional mode of warfare the label cold as to demonstrate the lack of interstate battle deaths between the superpowers themselves. *This excludes the unfortunate reality of proxy wars, which will be explained in a following section. As*

⁶⁷ (Hough 2004)

Betts states that the prospects of nuclear war led to an inherently theoretical standard of thinking as the mass threat of nuclear warfare had never before occurred in history of mankind.⁶⁸ Therefore, in order to avoid nuclear destruction strategists engaged in a theoretical two-player game of deterrence, mapping out every possible imagined action and reaction. This process, with so many lives at stake should their nuclear strategies be wrong, required more than military minds alone.

Strategic Studies gave new life to the term security as it was mobilized in order to bring civilian experts into military affairs during the Cold War. Since the historical distinction between public and private sectors in society, war was an act that traditionally excluded civilians as it was a tool of the state to pursue political objectives. The conventional framework of warfare and its included actors was not sufficient to meet the demands of Cold War strategizing in the new context of mass obliteration by nuclear warheads. Therefore, according to Ole Waever the use of the term *security* in place of *war* or *defense* opened up the playing field to non-military experts such as social scientists and physicists.⁶⁹ Security then became a banner under which a wider array of civilian experts could march to the beat of the state. It is observed here that, contrary to many Cold War/ post-Cold War myths, the Cold War included both non-state and state actors, thus being more representative of a hybrid conflict than a clearly defined old war.

⁶⁸ (Betts 1997)

⁶⁹ (Lipschutz 1998)

2.4.2 Peace Research

In contradiction to many assumptions in the security literature, the Cold War did not represent an era in which security was unanimously accepted in realist terms. In the 1960s and 1970s, Peace Research rose to challenge the field of Strategic Studies. It is interesting to note, however, that Peace Research primarily took off in Europe while the United States maintained its realist-fed Strategic Studies. This makes sense considering the different roles that the United States and Europe held during the Cold War. Under Peace Research, as the title suggests, security was assumed as being achieved through peaceful relations rather than through the acquisition of power, which was the dominant assumption in theories at the time. In this way the assumptions in the field of Peace Research were not based in the realist paradigm but were instead aligned with liberal thought.

Johan Galtung is recognized as the father of Peace Research as his operationalization of the terms *negative peace* and *positive peace* became tools of analysis that divided researchers into two groups with different aims. This is unsurprising as Galtung had argued that positive and negative peace should be considered as two completely separate concepts, meaning that one may clearly exist without the other. Johan Galtung originally introduced the terms positive peace and negative peace in an editorial to the *Journal of Peace Research* in 1964. Negative peace is defined as “the absence of violence, absence of war” while positive peace “is the integration of human

society”.⁷⁰ These separate forms of peace are in correlation to Galtung’s operationalization of the separate forms of violence, personal and structural. The absence of personal violence, which directly threatens the personal, physical survival of an individual, leads to negative peace. The absence of structural violence, which leads to the formation of injustice or inequality through the social systems set in place, leads to positive peace.⁷¹ Personal violence and the aims for negative peace include issues such as traditional warfare, torture and murder while structural violence and the aims for positive peace include issues such as unequal access to goods and services, preventable starvation and poverty, etcetera. Unlike attempting to achieve sustainable positive peace by addressing structural violence, in efforts to achieve negative peace the actors are clearly identifiable. During the Cold War, the threat was placed with an enemy that was identifiably an opposing state and its military capabilities. Therefore within this context, peace researchers at the time were predominantly interested in attempts to achieve negative peace through arms control and disarmament efforts. Peace research challenged realist thought in that the goal was not the acquisition of power in a zero-sum competition but it was instead the formation of peace. While Peace Research represented a challenge to realist assumptions, the principal pursuit of negative peace in the Cold War context continued to define security in a state-centric militaristic manner.

⁷⁰ (J. Galtung 1964)

⁷¹ (J. Galtung 1969)

2.5 Post-Cold War Hunt for a New Security Paradigm

The end of the Cold War in relatively peaceful terms meant two things for policymakers. First, it meant that security traditionalists would be challenged due to the deterioration of the reality of their theoretical models of power politics and bipolarity. Secondly, while traditionalists were challenged, the proponents for widening the definition of security had new opportunities for advancement. The search for the new dominant paradigm was on. What would the new order of the world look like? How would security best be defined in this new world order?

In the post-Cold War search for a new world order, security had to be re-conceptualized. Interestingly, a clear divergence emerged between the conceptualization of security in the United States of America and the conceptualization of security in the European Union. This divergence remains in place today. In general, American scholars and analysts have maintained a realist approach to international relations and security while European scholars and analysts have widened debates about security to a much more visible degree. Americans debates continued primarily with intra-realist debates with some inclusion of Constructivism whereas Europeans debates came to include Critical Security Studies, the Copenhagen school, Feminist Security Studies, Post Colonialism, and more.⁷²

⁷² (Waever 2004)

Without directly acknowledging the concept of security, Strategic Studies argued that it was achieved through power while Peace Research argued that it was achieved through peace. It was within this debate that Barry Buzan seized an opportunity to plant the academic seeds of International Security Studies. He put forth the argument that security, which had thus far been used as a concept within other fields instead of being viewed as a separate field with its own concepts, was that which “had the ability to act as a conceptual meeting ground between the extremes of Realist Strategic Studies ‘power’ on the one side, and the ‘peace’ of Peace Research on the other”.⁷³ Out of the 1980s it did in fact appear that security as a field of study was indeed gaining its own rights as it propelled away from the Cold War traditionalists, Security Studies and Peace Research, and their state-centric focus of national security. This shift from the concepts of peace or power to the concept of security in the 80s led to a continued widening of security debates through the years; however, after 11 September 2001 many security debates re-narrowed.

As noted by Paul Williams, a major development in growing security studies into its own skin was Barry Buzan’s security framework as provided in his book *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*, originally published in 1983.⁷⁴ Parallel to Williams’ argument that security studies must evolve on its own out of the euro-and-state-centric perceptions tightly glued to the field of international relations, Buzan highlighted the problem that national security was failing to adapt its agenda to suit contemporary threats. His book put forth a revised manner of

⁷³ (Buzan and Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies* 2009)

⁷⁴ (P. D. Williams 2008)

understanding security in the world after the Cold War that addressed this gap. A second edition published in 1991 titled *People, States & Fear: an agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era* further helped the field of security studies to evolve to better address post-Cold War threats.

In his book Barry Buzan set out with aims to provide the concept of security with an empirical founding as he argued that the field had never yet properly been developed. Buzan states that the field of security studies had been neglected for five main reasons.⁷⁵ The first reason was the fact that the concept of security is so overwhelmingly complex that theories had not been able to come together on the same page. A second reason was that the concept of power was parallel enough to security to where it overshadowed the security dialogue. Thirdly, those who aimed to move away from traditional power politics developed the field of Peace Research, not Security Studies. The fourth reason was that the field of Strategic Studies continued to produce a large amount of literature that centered on defense and military policies, thus supporting the realist understandings of power politics and the central role of the state. Finally, the field of security studies was neglected due to the fact that there were and are many incentives for maintaining a large degree of ambiguity within the concept of security. For example, ambiguous foreign threats may be addressed through the lens of national security while enabling the state to hide its true intentions, such as interests in access to resources abroad.

Buzan's conceptualization of security includes levels and sectors. There are three levels of security analysis including individuals, states, and finally international systems.

⁷⁵ (Buzan, *People, States & Fear* 1991)

Within any of these levels of analysis five sectors of security may be considered: political, military, economic, societal, and environmental. Buzan argues that this framework enables analysts to address individual security concerns and decode them within their placement within a specific level and sector. At the same time Buzan emphasized that the macro intention of such a methodology is to evidence the intricate interconnectedness between different security concerns and that analysis of one security concern on its own is useless as it is part of a larger web of security in which many factors must be analyzed. Buzan states that the five sectors “do not operate in isolation from each other. Each defines a focal point within the security problematique, and a way of ordering priorities, but all are woven together in a strong web of linkage.”⁷⁶ Notably one of the most significant concepts to emerge out of the Copenhagen school is *securitization*. Securitization is the process by which a given issue becomes considered a threat to security.⁷⁷

Ken Booth, author of the influential book *Theory of World Security*, critiqued the Copenhagen school as he helped develop Critical Security Studies, or the Welsh School.⁷⁸ *Emancipation*, in contrast to the Copenhagen school, is the foundational security concept for the Welsh school of Critical Security Studies, championed by Ken Booth. Booth holds that emancipation is that which frees people from the constraints that limit their potentials. War, poverty, and denied access to education are all exemplified as

⁷⁶ (Buzan, *New Patterns of Global Security* 1991)

⁷⁷ (Buzan and Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies* 2009)

⁷⁸ (Booth 2007)

constraints. In contrast to power, the foundational concept within realist thought, Booth and Wyn Jones assert that emancipation is that which produces security.⁷⁹

In regards to the end of the Cold War and what it meant for security, Francis Fukuyama arguably began some of the largest debates that would emerge. In 1992, Francis Fukuyama asserted in his book, *The End of History and the Last Man*, that the end of the Cold War with the victory of capitalism gave rise to the ultimate and final form of governance in the world.⁸⁰ In response to Fukuyama's arguments, Samuel P. Huntington wrote an article titled "The Clash of Civilizations?" that was published in *Foreign Affairs* in 1993. Three years later Huntington expanded his thesis into a book titled *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*.⁸¹

In the post-Cold War search for the model that would suit the new era, Samuel P. Huntington's thesis of the "clash of the civilizations" was unfortunately considered by many state actors throughout the world as a legitimate possibility. The bipolar world faded away and Huntington's theory was that the new world order would be a multipolar environment in which conflicts would arise between eight identified civilizations, which he listed as the Japanese, Confucian, Hindu, Islamic, Western, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, the African civilization. Huntington argued that different states being members of the same civilization would band together against the other civilizations. Specifically, he makes note that the western hegemony would have to fight non-western

⁷⁹ (P. D. Williams 2008)

⁸⁰ (Fukuyama 2006)

⁸¹ (Huntington 1996)

civilizations as they moved into their post-colonial phases, no longer subject to the West themselves.

According to Kevin Avruch, Huntington's theory of the clash of civilizations "was simply bad social science"⁸². The assumptions made in identifying the eight conflicting civilizations demonstrate a clear misunderstanding on the notion of culture. Culture is not fixed or homogenous, many co-cultures and sub-cultures exist, creating layers of complex identities. In much the same way that Huntington challenged Fukuyama in *Foreign Affairs*, Richard Rubenstein in turn challenged Huntington through the same channel. He critiques that Huntington's perception confuses ethnicity with civilization, falsely asserting that all members of one of his eight listed groups hold the same values and experiences. Rubenstein goes on to write that, "Huntington's thinking remains bounded by the assumptions of the Cold War period. For him, as for earlier realists, international politics is, above all, a struggle for power between coherent but essentially isolated units, each of which seeks to advance its own interests in an anarchic setting."⁸³

Huntington's thesis depended upon a certain understanding of *ethnic conflicts*. This understanding was conceived in the Cold War bipolar environment. Labeling the Cold War as cold signifies a lack of the outburst of physical violence. Despite this more relatively peaceful image, the United States and the Soviet Union were able to maintain their own coldness by enlisting third parties to wage hot wars on their behalf. These wars,

⁸² (Avruch 2012)

⁸³ (Rubenstein, Challenging Huntington 1994)

taking place in other countries outside U.S. or Soviet soil but for their interests, are known as proxy wars. According to the Oxford Dictionary, a proxy war is that in which a major power instigates a war in which they themselves do not become involved. The doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction justified the use of proxy warfare because direct warfare would have escalated into nuclear devastation. Using proxy tactics, the United States and the Soviet Union were able to avoid American and Soviet casualties at the expense of using foreigners to fight against each other for the superpowers' interests in the war between the spread of capitalism versus communism. Proxy wars led to devastating unforeseen consequences across the globe. Unfortunately the devastated infrastructures of many countries are not placed within its historical context and current structural problems are instead blamed on such notions as "ethnic conflict" instead of acknowledging the reality that the insecurity was a consequence of foreign influence. The so-titled ethnic conflicts have little to do with ethnicity, and much to do with structural causes of targeted insecurity an inequality, leading to contentions for the assurance of basic rights. As will be demonstrated, the degradation of basic needs and rights is also that which fuels conflict in the 21st century.

III. THE 21ST CENTURY SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The 21st century security environment is best defined by the disintegration of the dominance of the Westphalian World Order. Unprecedented levels of globalizing forces have been a leading cause of this disintegration. Valaskakis writes that, “An important feature of contemporary globalization has been its *asymmetrical* and *uneven* character. Had all sectors of human activity globalized at the same pace, the process itself would have been trivial. . . . These asymmetries have created winners and losers and have threatened the social fabric of many countries undergoing rapid and often unwanted social and economic change.” These asymmetries, associated with the socioeconomic nature of hybrid conflicts in the world today, destabilize the five pillars of the Westphalian World Order that were earlier identified. In the 21st century, the five Westphalian assumptions are each challenged. These assumptions were those that: the state is the only wielder of sovereignty; sovereignty is defined by geographical territory; the state is the most powerful actor in the world; the only enforceable international law is that which is agreed upon between states; and that war is a legitimate political tool.⁸⁴

⁸⁴ (Valaskakis 2000)

3.1 Old Wars, New Wars?

Changes in the 21st century security environment are often explained in terms of differentiating the “old wars” from the “new wars”. New Wars Theory was given weight by British professor at the London School of Economics, Mary Kaldor, in the 1998 publication of *New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*.⁸⁵ In general, the old wars are defined by the conventional perceptions of warfare as a state versus state affair. The actors involved in violent conflict of these wars were the military combatants of states. In contrast the new wars are defined by an increasing prevalence of non-state actors and non-state issues being involved in today’s violent conflicts. The old wars/new wars dialogue is a useful tool for understanding what factors determined security in the past versus what factors determine security today; however, a misconception is present when it is taught that the influential event that marks the change from the old to the new wars was the Cold War and its ending. This misconception will be addressed further as the notion of hybridity is positioned as a better analytical alternative than new wars theory.

Kaldor writes that the conceptualization of conventional warfare, which is characteristic of the old wars, was largely influenced by Prussian military strategist Carl von Clausewitz’s operationalization of war as the pursuit of a state’s political interests by

⁸⁵ (Kaldor, *New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (2nd Edition) 2007)

violent means.⁸⁶ In realist fashion, the violent pursuit of power between states is a legitimate action due to the historical evolution of the state's monopoly on the use of force. As explained in the historical analysis of this report, the state achieved that monopoly because economic institutions that further separated the public from the private were created in order to afford the costs of waging war and providing security. It is in this way that conventional warfare is better understood as being representative of the Westphalian World Order, and not simply the Cold War.

Conventional understandings of inter-state warfare perpetuated in modern attempts to operationalize, and even quantify, warfare. Influenced by Clausewitz's definition of war, the New Oxford American Dictionary today defines war as "a state of armed conflict between different nations or states or different groups within a nation or state".⁸⁷ The Correlates of War (COW) Project, led by Singer and Small of the University of Michigan, defined war as including at least 1,000 battle deaths taking place either between states, or between a state and a rebellious force.⁸⁸ Less than 1,000 battle deaths were not war but armed conflict. The University of Uppsala's Conflict Data Project (UCDP) and the International Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) teamed up to operationalize armed conflict as prolonged violent conflict either between states' militaries or between a state and an organized armed group.⁸⁹ According to these definitions of warfare and of armed conflict, the state must be a main referent object.

⁸⁶ (Clausewitz 1832)

⁸⁷ (Stevenson and Lindberg 2010)

⁸⁸ (Singer and Small 1972)

⁸⁹ (UCDP/ PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset 2007)

Kaldor instead insists that “the new wars arise in the context of the erosion of the autonomy of the state and in some extreme cases the disintegration of the state.”⁹⁰ This means that new wars, the most prominent form of warfare in the world today, are not defined by a state’s decision to engage in warfare, but rather by the absence of state structures that can lead to the outbreak of violence between non-state actors or vice versa. Conventional warfare since the formation of the Westphalian World Order in general has kept separate the public from the private as it is not civilians who engage in battle but a state’s military. In contrast, the majority of violent conflicts today do not take place between opposing states’ militaries but are waged by non-state violent actors (VNSAs) within the borders of a state itself. Kaldor states that since the end of World War II, more than three-quarters of warfare has taken place internally within the borders of the state.⁹¹ Contrary to the understanding of conventional warfare, the victims are not limited to state military actors: 6 million civilian casualties and 12 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) were counted at the start of the 21st century.⁹² While the military to civilian death ratio was eight military deaths to one civilian death at the beginning of the 20th century, it changed in the 21st century to one military death for every eight civilian deaths.⁹³

Rising to the top of today’s national security concerns are “failed” or “failing” states, exhibited by their inability to be defined by the Westphalian state structure as well as the inability for conflict in these non-Westphalian failed states to be identified as

⁹⁰ (Kaldor, *New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (2nd Edition) 2007)

⁹¹ (Kaldor, *New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (2nd Edition) 2007)

⁹² (Brown 2003)

⁹³ (Kaldor, *New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (2nd Edition) 2007)

conventional warfare. The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America (a “strong” state as exhibited by its Westphalian state structure) was subtitled “A New Era” and it stated that today’s most prominent threats do not come from the armies of strong states but from the violent non-state actors arising “from weak or failed states”.⁹⁴

The International Relations and Security Network (ISN) published a report in 2008 that identified six specific types of VNSAs that identified the 21st century security landscape.⁹⁵ First, warlords are defined as typically charismatic leaders who control a specific territory within a state. That territory is usually that which contains resources that are profitable to the global market, are easily looted without needing a large infrastructure, and are easily transportable. Warlords are supported by non-state private military forces. Their aims are to maintain autonomy from the state and will collaborate with the state as long as that autonomy is not threatened. The second forms of VNSAs are militias. Militias are defined by the ISN as often similar to warlords but as lacking a strong charismatic leader. Operating within states that fail to help youth gain access to their basic economic and human needs, militias can either act as gangs that prey upon the civilian population or they can act as legitimate forces that aim to fulfill a need that the state is failing to fulfill. Third, paramilitary forces are usually extensions of the state’s own armed forces but are outside its formal practices. The ISN report states that once formed, paramilitary forces are often difficult to control. Fourth, insurgencies are

⁹⁴ (U.S. Department of State 2002)

⁹⁵ (P. Williams 2008)

organized movements that either aim to overthrow and control the state's government or they aim to form their own autonomy that is separate from the state itself. The fifth type of VNSAs identified are those defining the age of America's Global War on Terror, terrorist organizations. While many VNSAs may use terror as a method, terrorist organizations are stated by the ISN report as specifically using terror aimed at the civilian population as their central strategy. Finally, criminal organizations are defined as groups aiming to accumulate profit through a variety of underground activities such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, smuggling valuable resources, or extortion.

Many of the non-state actors that are constituent of the new wars resemble forces that were common before the modern Westphalian state was even formed. Many of these forces are defined by privatization, non-state military forces acting independently or even hired by the state itself. In this way, for example, the difficult-to-control paramilitary forces resemble the mercenaries of old that were used to wage wars before the standardization of the professional state standing armies. If the actors involved in the "new wars" are primarily non-state actors, these wars are more representative of pre-Westphalian warfare; they are not new, they are ancient. In fact, the new wars hold characteristics of very old wars besides the actors involved as well. The interests, causes, and motivations of these wars are those which have sparked conflict between human populations since human populations have existed. As Kaldor states, group identity recognition, rather than states' geopolitical interests, are those that lay at the heart of

many new wars.⁹⁶ Groups may choose violent methods if their basic human needs are not being met by the dominant structures in place that create economic inequalities.

Operationalization of global conflicts as new wars versus old wars may be very misleading for readers due to the overlapping characteristics and unclear distinctions through time. The goal of the old wars/ new wars distinction is to influence the minds of policymakers to change their dominant perceptions of conventional warfare to suit the realities of 21st century threats. Kaldor states that as a “catch-all” term, the concept of globalization is that which provides the context for the new wars.⁹⁷ While globalization is also an ancient phenomenon, contemporary increases in world interconnectedness from the evolution of communications and transportations technologies, a large human population, and economic interdependencies between states, makes globalization largely considered a contemporary phenomenon due to its unprecedented scale of influence in the 21st century. So while, as a result of unprecedented globalization and the disintegration of the universalism of the Westphalian World Order, there are new factors that need to be addressed in the 21st century security environment, the end goal of new wars theory to inform policymakers is in itself hijacked by internal academic debates as caused by the operationalization of old versus new. These debates, while valid, should not take away from the fact that there are very new factors specific to the 21st century security environment that security analysts will be challenged to address.

⁹⁶ (Kaldor 2007)

⁹⁷ (Kaldor 2007)

In short, the 21st century does not exhibit a change in the nature of conflict. The nature of conflict is tied to that which is disconnected from historical influences and remains constant in its connection to the fulfillment of basic human needs which may be the result of direct, cultural, or structural violence. The nature of conflict is not new, but the security environment certainly is. The environment of today in which conflict has the potential to spark or be resolved is not an environment with which policymakers and security analysts will fully be able to be familiar. Conventional warfare as influenced by Clausewitz and traditional international relations as informed by superpower bipolarity are paradigms that are no longer suitable. The notion of hybrid warfare may be better able to analyze 21st century violent conflicts without causing the misinterpretations that the old wars/ new wars dialogue might cause.

3.2 Hybridity

The contemporary security environment consists of a hybrid blend of state and non-state actors and issues. The Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management published a report in 2008 stating that many of the violent conflicts of today “are hybrid socio-political exchanges in which modern state-centric as well as pre-modern traditional and post-modern factors mix and overlap. The state has lost its central position in violent conflicts of this kind, both as an actor and as the framework of

reference.”⁹⁸ Hybridity is a concept that is useful for analysts and academics in several important ways. First, hybridity is a useful theoretical tool due to the fact that it is able to draw upon historical examples as well as address what changes are new to today’s security environment. In other words, it is able to address the overlapping blend of “old” and “new” traits of warfare as well as include the blend of state and non-state issues and actors that are involved in today’s conflicts.

The characteristics of the new wars, placed within the context of globalization, are those that center on issues of identity, access to resources, and the deprivation of basic human needs. In this way, the new wars share the same nature of conflict that has existed since the dawn of man, and are thus, not new. As a replacement to *new wars*, the term *hybrid conflicts* is not used here to represent a new nature of conflict. Neither does the use of the term here assert that the blending of state and non-state issues and actors is new. Hybridity existed in warfare both during and even more visibly before the Cold War. It is in this way that the use of the term hybrid threats is more consistent with the reality of the nature of conflict itself than operationalization of new or old wars could be.

Globalization, the context that defines the new wars, is not new. There are certain globalizing factors, however, that allow for globalization to be largely considered as a contemporary phenomenon. Paul Collier, author of the book, *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It*, writes that globalization occurs from three processes: trade in goods, flows of capital, and the

⁹⁸ (Boege, Brown, et al. 2008)

migration of people.⁹⁹ Contrary to the myth of the newness of globalization, Collier writes that in terms of two of these processes, flows of capital and the migration of people, developing countries were much more globalized a hundred years ago than they are now. The first factor, trade in goods, is that which has grown to unprecedented levels in the 21st century. In regards to the production and transportation of marketable commodities, before 1980, developing countries maintained the role of exporting raw materials. In contrast, today the majority (80%) of developing countries house the production and manufacturing of commodities. As production requires the use of land, exports are likely to benefit the land-holders. The problem here is that often the land-holders are actors such as mining companies. Therefore globalization, based on commodity exporting, is “likely to generate quite a lot of income inequality.”¹⁰⁰ Income inequalities that exist internally within these countries are tied to the globalized economy of the external world. Kaldor herself writes that while much of the literature describes the new wars as being internally localized within a state’s borders, the fact is that the transnational context of globalization makes it very challenging to actually distinguish the internal from the external factors in today’s violent conflicts.¹⁰¹ In place of the misunderstandings caused by describing these conflicts as placed internally, the term hybrid conflicts is better able to explain the transnational, internal and external reality of threats in the globalized world.

⁹⁹ (Collier 2007)

¹⁰⁰ (Collier 2007)

¹⁰¹ (Kaldor, *New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (2nd Edition) 2007)

Hybridity is also a concept that is able to better bridge the gap between the world of academia and the policy world due to the fact that hybrid threats, hybrid warfare, and hybrid conflicts are terms used by today's state military forces as factors that they must now address. As reported by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), U.S. military officials informed Congress that future threats were likely to consist of hybrid blends of conventional and irregular warfare. Senior officials made the plea that U.S. forces must adapt to this security environment defined by hybrid warfare in order to effectively address future conflicts.¹⁰² While the term 'hybrid warfare' is not considered by the Department of Defense (DoD) as representing a new form of warfare, it is used to describe "the increasing complexity of armed conflict that will require a highly adaptable and resilient response"¹⁰³ Hybridity is a term that is not trapped to remain solely in the realm of academia due to the fact that it is already used by 21st century military forces. In this way the notion of hybrid conflicts better helps to bridge the gap between academic theories and the realities on the ground.

The notion of hybridity may also be applied to help explain the security environment in the post-Westphalian World Order by explaining the characteristics of the "failed states" which are highly placed threat priorities on the U.S. security agenda. In terms of the threats associated with these weak or failing states, Volker Boege writes that "regions of weak statehood generally are places in which diverse and competing institutions and logics of order and behavior overlap and intertwine: the modern logic of

¹⁰² (United States Government Accountability Office 2010)

¹⁰³ (United States Government Accountability Office 2010)

the ‘formal’ state, the pre-modern logic of traditional ‘informal’ societal order, the post-modern logic of globalization and international civil society with its abundance of highly diverse actors, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), multinational enterprises (MNEs), international organizations, development aid agencies, private military companies (PMCs) and so on. This leads to hybrid structures of political life as local customary patterns and logics of behavior mix and overlap with modern and post-modern patterns and logics . . . One has therefore to acknowledge that the modern western-style Weberian/Westphalian state hardly exists in reality beyond the OECD world. Rather the ‘actual existing states’ in most parts of the Global South are hybrid political orders combining elements of the western model and elements stemming from the local pre-colonial indigenous traditions of governance and politics.”¹⁰⁴ Acknowledgement of the characteristics of hybrid political orders is necessary if the U.S. plans to succeed in addressing the threats emanating from “failing states”.

Warfare has undergone a transformation. Warfare is now characterized by its inclusion of non-state actors and civilian victims. It is characterized by the prominence of technologies that disconnect people from the reality of killing others due to the fact that the push of a button from afar is now more deadly than a hundred-man army. As warfare is undergoing a transformation so too must our conceptualizations of security shift from the traditional paradigm of national security.

Despite the academic widening efforts starting in the 1960s, 70s and 80s, the modern state remains fixed as the central main referent object of security. The

¹⁰⁴ (Boege, Traditional Approaches to Conflict Transformation- Potentials and Limits 2006)

assumption of the state's centrality in providing security is demonstrated by Joseph Strayer's words that, "In the world of today, the worst fate that can befall a human being is to be stateless".¹⁰⁵ This state-centric perspective inherently makes two key assumptions: the assumption that the state is the ultimate provider of security and the assumption that state institutions are the only institutions which can provide security.

The first assumption that the state is the provider of security is not always true, as the state is also often a creator of insecurity for human beings. Many historical examples demonstrate this fact, from the Nazi regime of Germany to the Pinochet regime of Chile, but even more recent events make this fact clear and known to all peoples. Most recently notable, the events of the "Arab Spring" and the "Occupy Wall Street movements" both demonstrate the fact that citizens are recognize structural inequality and that they demand equal opportunities for achieving basic human needs. The Arab Spring, which will further be explored in the context of the European security strategy at a later point, was the name that was misleadingly assigned by the media to represent the spread of mass protests across many Arab countries in Northern Africa and the Middle East in 2011. The revolutionary protests and copy-cat suicides were sparked in late 2010 when a young, educated Tunisian man set himself on fire after police took away his only source of income, a vegetable cart. Not limited to Northern Africa and the Middle East, 2011 exhibited unrest between people and their states throughout the world as the Occupy protests emerged in cities across the world. According to the "unofficial 'de facto'" website of the Occupy Wall Street movement, OccupyWallSt.org, "Occupy Wall Street is

¹⁰⁵ (Strayer, Tilly and Jordan 2005)

a people-powered movement that began on September 17, 2011 in Liberty Square in Manhattan's Financial District, and has spread to over 100 cities in the United States and actions in over 1,500 cities globally. #ows is fighting back against the corrosive power of major banks and multinational corporations over the democratic process, and the role of Wall Street in creating an economic collapse that has caused the greatest recession in generations. The movement is inspired by popular uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia, and aims to fight back against the richest 1% of people that are writing the rules of an unfair global economy that is foreclosing on our future.”¹⁰⁶

The ultimate significance of such recent events is still unknown. Some argue that these events will fade from their springs into dormant winters while others argue that similar events will continue until global economic reform occurs. Representative of the latter view, Valaskakis writes that “It is our contention that the acceleration of ‘globalization’ in the late twentieth century has severely destabilized the Westphalian Order by weakening the authority of national governments. An increasing number of human activities are now escaping national regulation and spinning out of control. The emerging cracks in the global governance superstructure are deepening to the point where the whole system could break down within the next ten years.”¹⁰⁷

The second assumption that the state is the only wielder of institutions for conflict prevention, management, and resolution (CPMR) is also not true. The absence of state

¹⁰⁶ (OccupyWallStreet n.d.)

¹⁰⁷ (Valaskakis 2000)

institutions does not mean an absence of institutions.¹⁰⁸ Indigenous methods of CPMR are unnecessarily, unfortunately, and ethnocentrically overlooked in today's security analysis. Especially in the nature of hybrid conflicts, pluralistic inclusion of indigenous methods of conflict prevention, management, and resolution needs to occur for efforts to suit the needs of the communities at hand as well as to last as effective measures for the long-term. Indigenous methods of CPMR are overlooked due to the fact that they are not framed within the structure of the Westphalian World Order and do not fit the conceptualization of national security that has been dominant in the world. This is because often indigenous livelihoods such as nomadic pastoralism are not geographically bound within the borders of a state.¹⁰⁹ They also often do not include activities that produce commodities that are valuable to the world market economy and that would therefore strengthen the economic security of the state itself.

The reality is that in many cases states do create a secure environment for their citizens while in other cases states create insecurity. The mass protests that have occurred throughout 2011 have been from people in opposition to the method of governance of their states. Both the Arab uprisings and the Occupy protests shared in common the trait that the people desire their basic human needs to be met through institutions that promote socioeconomic equalities and that do not exacerbate inequalities. Many of today's conflicts that arise out of socioeconomic inequalities or the deprivation of basic human needs require a change in understanding of conflict. The paradigm of conventional

¹⁰⁸ (Boege, *Traditional Approaches to Conflict Transformation- Potentials and Limits* 2006)

¹⁰⁹ (Odhiambo 2003)

warfare is an unsuitable model for addressing today's prominent hybrid conflicts. Michael Renner puts the problem of maintaining a conventional model of warfare into perspective as he writes that, "By subsuming these new issues under the old thinking of national military security, efforts to address them in effect become militarized. Hence . . . refugees are seen as menacing hordes to be intercepted on the high seas. . . . environmental degradation is seen as simply another item in which national interests are to be protected. . . . the proliferation of drugs is tackled through military eradicating cocaine crops instead of through efforts to provide alternative livelihoods for desperate peasants." ¹¹⁰ In a measure to move away from the conventional understandings of warfare and national security, the concept of human security rose to the forefront of security debates in the 21st century.

3.3 Human Security: A Shift from National Security?

Recognizing the economic nature that is tied to the deprivation of basic human needs in today's violent conflicts, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) made a move to shift the paradigm from national security to human security. Human security, the UNDP's concept that it promoted in its 1994 edition of the annual Human Development Report, was asserted as the concept that would both "revolutionize" and

¹¹⁰ (Renner 1997)

define the 21st century.¹¹¹ In its 1994 Human Development Report, the UNDP recognized the need for a paradigm shift away from the domination of national security by stating that “We need another profound transition in thinking . . . for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy, or as global security from a nuclear holocaust. It has been related more to nation states than to people.”¹¹² The UNDP was arguing that the realist-informed state-centric paradigms that were dominant throughout the Cold War were insufficient to address the realities of the emerging hybrid threats. In this way, national security agendas are failing to secure the needs of citizens while, instead securing the needs of the state.

The United Nations Development Programme was put together in 1965 by the United Nations General Assembly. The UNDP was to be the UN’s tool for collective security that would focus on poverty reduction, democratic governance, crisis prevention and recovery, HIV/AIDS avoidance, and environmentally sustainable energy development of Westphalian states.¹¹³ Today, the UNDP is also a critical actor for the promotion the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), a list of eight development issues to tackle world-wide by the year 2015 which reflect the security environment of the 21st century. The MDGs are: end poverty and hunger, achieve universal education, promote gender equality, reduce child mortality, improve maternal

¹¹¹ (United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1994)

¹¹² (United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1994)

¹¹³ (United Nations Development Programme, Overview: A world of development experience 2012)

health, combat HIV/AIDS and other threatening diseases, ensure environmental sustainability, and develop a global partnership for development.¹¹⁴

One will notice that the issues within the UN's agenda are not bound within the borders of any given state. Human security is posited as the security paradigm that is able to help fulfill the Millennium Development Goals and to help address the most prominent threats that individuals face in the world today. The original published list of threats that should be addressed under the human security agenda was categorized into seven categories: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security.

As a written theory of security, the creation of human security was not the world's first example of expanding the definition of security, as demonstrated by this report's historical analysis on the evolution of security as a concept. Human security, however, did represent a paradigm shift on paper in several key ways. Intergovernmental notions of security that came before human security (common security, collective security, comprehensive and cooperative security) maintained a state-centric model of analysis.¹¹⁵ Analysis within these security conceptualizations centered on ensuring the security of states as the main referent object, even whilst expanding to incorporate non-state issues. Human security's main claim as a paradigm shift is in its analysis of the security needs of human individuals as the main referent object, regardless of their positions in any states.

¹¹⁴ (D. o. United Nations 2010)

¹¹⁵ (Chenoy and Tadjbakhsh 2007)

Human security represented a paradigm shift on paper in a further interesting way. This was a model of security that did not come out of one of the traditional political auspices of the International Relations field. Human security seemed to be born out of a different mother than most other security conceptualizations, that of international development. This makes sense due to the fact that even states' militaries today are enlisted in nontraditional, developmental roles, such as reconstruction, disaster relief, and peace building initiatives.¹¹⁶ It also makes sense due to the fact that the majority of hybrid conflicts take place in hybrid political orders where economic equalities and equal access to basic life claims are not fully present.

The 1994 Human Development Report states that the “real foundation of human development is universalism in acknowledging the life claims of everyone.”¹¹⁷ Chapter 2 goes on to state that “The concept of human security stresses that people be able to take care of themselves: all people should have the opportunity to meet their most essential needs and to earn their own living. . . Human security is therefore not a defensive concept- the way territorial or military security is. Instead, human security is an integrative concept. It acknowledges the universalism of life claims. . .”¹¹⁸ Human security is therefore not only supportive of the claims of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights but it also resonates with the concept of basic human needs. As the deprivation of basic human needs, causing conflict, can be caused by a structure that promotes injustice and/or inequality, developmental (inherently economic) reform in support of human

¹¹⁶ (Brown 2003)

¹¹⁷ (United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1994)

¹¹⁸ (United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1994)

security is that which can address said conflict while supporting people's life claims and basic needs.

3.3.1 Post-Westphalian Sovereignty?

The United Nations' Human Security Unit (HSU) is placed within the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). This is evidence that human security is a theoretical tool for justifying the act of humanitarian intervention that might otherwise contradict the notion of state sovereignty on which the modern international system was built. Sovereignty no longer exclusively protects States from foreign interference; it is a charge of responsibility that holds States accountable for the welfare of their people."¹¹⁹ The responsibility mentioned in this quote is the "Responsibility to Protect", often simply referred to as R2P.

Authors of *Human Security: Concepts and Implications*, Anuradha M. Chenoy and Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, state that the human security framework is built upon the notion of the "responsibility to protect" as an extension of the UN's fundamental conceptualization of collective security.¹²⁰ If human security is built off of the notion of the responsibility to protect, it is interesting to note that the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was not adopted as an interstate norm until it was used by the United Nations General Assembly in paragraphs 138 and 139 of their final report of the 2005 World

¹¹⁹ (United Nations, The Responsibility to Protect 2012)

¹²⁰ (Chenoy and Tadjbakhsh 2007)

Summit, 11 years after the creation of human security.¹²¹ Before this, in 2001, the Canadian government (a strong supporter of the human security framework), through the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) suggested that “the responsibility to protect” be adopted as the new phrase to replace the wording that was used until that time to represent the same methods of intervention, the “right to intervene”.¹²² Given that the “responsibility to protect” did not exist as a framework in 1994, human security would have to instead have been built upon the notion that the R2P replaced: the “right to intervene.”

The ICISS report stated that “There are continuing fears about a ‘right to intervene’ being formally acknowledged. If intervention for human protection purposes is to be accepted, including the possibility of military action, it remains imperative that the international community develop consistent, credible and enforceable standards to guide state and intergovernmental practice. The experience and aftermath of Somalia, Rwanda, Srebrenica and Kosovo, as well as interventions and non-interventions in a number of other places, have provided a clear indication that the tools, devices and thinking of international relations need now to be comprehensively reassessed, in order to meet the foreseeable needs of the 21st century.”¹²³ The ICISS addressed a need for a security paradigm transformation to occur from state-centrism (right to intervene) to human-centrism (responsibility to protect). The “responsibility to protect” and the “right to intervene” certainly carry different connotations and it is important to note that the

¹²¹ (United National General Assembly; 2005)

¹²² (Evans and Sahnoun 2001)

¹²³ (Evans and Sahnoun 2001)

framing of these issues is addressed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty because regardless of the language used, intervention is at the heart of the issue at hand.

The right to intervene is framed in a national security state-centric manner. It implies evaluating intervention from the side of those who are intervening, rather than evaluating the needs of those who may or may not be in need of protection. In other words, the responsibility to protect implies that there exists a duty to support the human rights of those in need, whereas the right to intervene implies that if states have an interest, no matter the nature of that interest, they have a right to breach another state's sovereignty.

The co-chairs of the ICISS, Gareth Evans and Mohammed Sahnoun, argued that the responsibility to protect must include the responsibility to react, prevent, and rebuild. This notion, if implemented, would help address the economic nature of 21st century conflicts as the sources of these conflicts lies within the realm of development. However, if human security, due to the actual timing of its formation, is more aligned with the notion of the right to intervene, it would carry the potential to theoretically support actions of intervention that are political, and not humanitarian, in nature. The ICISS itself admits that "Changing the language of the debate, while it can remove a barrier to effective action, does not, of course, change the substantive issues which have to be addressed."¹²⁴

¹²⁴ (Evans and Sahnoun 2001)

Fen Osler Hampson notes that human security is fundamentally humanitarian in that it aims to act as a theoretical tool for the expansion of international law.¹²⁵ As human security is both bound to and supportive of International Humanitarian Law, it also theoretically supports the assertions within the “Responsibility to Protect”. Intervention in support of human security would naturally be titled as humanitarian intervention. Human security, as the new norm, is then the philosophy that justifies the act of breaching the concept that defines the modern international Westphalian state system, non-interference, due to the need to help secure universal human rights. That being noted, intervention in the support of national security would naturally be titled as political intervention. One can then imagine that if national security were the norm instead of human security, that intervention would then not be humanitarian, but would be political, breaching state sovereignty with aims to support the structure of the intervening state itself, such as through gaining access to resources deemed essential under the state’s model of economic development, resources like, for example, oil. One might laugh at the absurdity of the thought until one remembers that changing the language of the debate does not automatically change the substantive issues which need to be addressed. Then one might instead wonder what paradigm truly persists in the world today, national security or human security. If instances occur in which the theories of human security and the responsibility to protect are used to gain access to countries for such political reasons as access to resources, the states that act in such a way make a mockery of what would

¹²⁵ (P. D. Williams 2008)

have been a deeply influential step forward for humankind and they fail to learn from the tragedies of genocides past.

Changes in international norms of intervention and changes in the understanding of sovereignty challenge the assumptions of non-intervention and state sovereignty that have defined the international system of states since the Peace of Westphalia. Operationalization of proper forms of intervention need to occur to prevent the genocides such as occurred in Bosnia in 1995, Somalia in 1993, and Rwanda in 1994. Following a historical pattern of changes in sovereignty as connected to changes in the organization of society, one may logically assume that a new world order is emerging due to the emergence of changes in the legal basis for intervention, the rise of non-state violent actors being central to today's conflicts, the wide array of non-state governing authorities that act as institutions where the state does not, technological and globalizing innovations, and a security dialogue based on human-centrism rather than state-centrism.

3.4 The U.S. and the “Global War on Terror”

Human security was posited as the security paradigm that would best suit the challenges in the post-Westphalian World Order. This means that it would be able to address the socioeconomic nature of conflict as well as move past traditional understandings of the Weberian state to better address the reality of hybrid political orders in the world.

Human security fails to represent a security paradigm shift in the security agendas and strategies of the United States of America. While human security rhetoric is often used, in their implementation U.S. security efforts remain Westphalian-state-centric despite the post-Westphalian security environment. The Carter Doctrine was born out of President Carter's 1980 State of the Union Address in which he stated, "Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."¹²⁶ As oil is the main resource under the current model of economic development, access to oil from the Persian Gulf was officially placed as high priority on United States' security agenda. Ten years later the U.S. would find itself intervening in the Persian Gulf.

The Iran-Iraq War cost Iraq many millions of dollars. Many loans were taken from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in order to finance the war. President of Iraq Saddam Hussein was under continuous pressure that the economic infrastructure of Iraq would collapse due to the fact that neighboring states refused to simply forgive Hussein's loans; he turned to oil. Hussein believed that lowering the production of oil would increase its price in the market and Iraq would thereby be able to acquire higher profits from its sales. Neighboring states disagreed, and Iraq ultimately invaded Kuwait for access to its oil. Several months later the U.S. entered what would become the 1990/1991 Persian Gulf War.

¹²⁶ (Carter 1980)

In efforts to garner international support for the agenda within the Carter Doctrine, “In the 1990s, the United States repeatedly asked its European allies to provide NATO with a new rationale by expanding the Alliance’s mission to the so called “out-of-area”, in particular to the Persian Gulf, but its efforts were to no avail.”¹²⁷ NATO was developed as a measure of collective defense against the Soviet Union in the Cold War and now that the bipolar organization of society had ended, the U.S. aimed at expanding the purpose of NATO from being a defensive alliance to a mechanism that enabled the pursuit of NATO states’ broader security interests.

Interesting to note is that in the year 2000, Saddam Hussein demanded that oil be priced in euros instead of dollars. President Bush viewed this as a threat to national security due to the importance of the oil economy for the state’s security. Later, after the U.S. overthrew the Iraq regime, Iraqi oil sales continued to be carried out in U.S. dollars.¹²⁸

After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 the Persian Gulf remained high on the United States’ security strategy. In 2002 the government of the United States of America published its national security strategy, subtitled “A New Era”. President George W. Bush stated that the success of states in this new era was dependent upon their ability to “unleash the potential of their people” through the assurance of their basic human rights and political and economic freedom.¹²⁹ Bush’s language on the new factors that guarantee security in the world is consistent with both the claims of basic human

¹²⁷ (Aliboni 2011)

¹²⁸ (Hammond 2012)

¹²⁹ (U.S. Department of State 2002)

needs theory (that the source of conflict is in the lack of fulfillment of their rights and needs) as well as those of the UNDP's 1994 definition of human security (which emphasizes the rights of individuals instead of states).

Despite Bush's initial use of human security rhetoric that would lead us to assume that the United States was adapting its notion of security to better suit the realities of 21st century threats, in his following statements his rhetoric clearly changes and falls back into the ideology of traditional realist state-centric power politics. This demonstrates that national security, and not human security, was the true priority for the United States despite changing times. Bush was also inconsistent in his argument because while he stated that the US seeks a "balance of power" (the realist solution to the 'security dilemma' caused by a win-lose model of competition between states) and "good relations among the great powers", he also stated that the "United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence".¹³⁰ President George W. Bush could not truly have insisted upon a balance of powers in the world when he recognizes at the same time that the U.S. is unchallenged as the world's most powerful country. This would mean that the power of the United States itself would need to be challenged for global balance to be achieved. Instead, what he meant is that the U.S. seeks free societies for all peoples as well as a balance of power between those free societies, excluding the United States itself as it "enjoys" its "unparalleled" position. Not very well hidden throughout his language, George W. Bush's 20 September 2002 submittal to the National Security Strategy shows that the strategy of the U.S. is to

¹³⁰ (U.S. Department of State 2002)

maintain its position as the most powerful country in the world while using a human security rhetoric only so far as to promote liberty for all societies while monitoring their growth in order to *balance* their power from challenging the United States itself.

On 20 September 2001, exactly one year to the day before the National Security Strategy was published, President George W. Bush had declared a “war on terror” in his address to Congress and the American public in response to the recent 9/11 attacks on U.S. soil. In his address Bush stated: “On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country . . . Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even in success. We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, and drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.”¹³¹ There were several implications for the decision of President George W. Bush to classify the terrorist attacks of 9/11 as an “act of war”.

First, claiming the attack as an act of war entitled the U.S. with the ability to pursue its attackers in a measure of self-defense and in accordance with international law. As previously stated, the *responsibility to protect* was officially coined in the 2005 World

¹³¹ (Bush 2001)

Summit, in which all state parties agreed that “each individual state has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means.”¹³² Those means would be through the Security Council in accordance with Article VII of the Charter of the United Nations which holds that, “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken”; however, “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations”¹³³ An act of war under Article VII of the United Nations Charter legitimizes a state’s decision to forcibly retaliate in a measure of self-defense. If an act of war is declared on terrorist organizations, instead of on an identified state itself, the U.S. would claim the right for its military to expand across any state border that might house terrorist activities. The Global War on Terror in this way is a method for the United States to expand its military forces across the world while based on a dialogue of legal legitimacy and humanitarianism.

A second implication of labeling the events of 9/11 as an “act of war” is that it demonstrated that the leaders of the United States lacked an essential understanding of warfare in the 21st century security environment. Conventional warfare is that which takes between state entities, a paradigm dominant since the formation of the Westphalian

¹³² (Report of the Secretary-General 2009)

¹³³ (United Nations; 2012)

World Order and through World War I, World War II and the Cold War. If 9/11 was an act of warfare, the United States could find legitimacy in breaching the sovereignty of the state that it believed was associated with the terrorist attacks.

The terming of the “war on terror” demonstrates a failure to understand terrorism as well as warfare. In pursuing a war on terror in the Middle East, the United States continues to try to fit square pegs into round holes. Terror is not a state. Terrorists are non-state actors. Who then are terrorists if they cannot be identified as the terrorists hailing from the territorialized state of Terror? The war on terror holds the false assumption that terrorists are representative of some unified, homogeneous group that may be identified.

The foreign policies of the United States demonstrated that it maintained a Westphalian, realist image of international relations, even though the Westphalian World Order had come to an end. Bound to fail, the U.S. tried to apply a Westphalian-state-centric model of warfare in its attempts to address terrorism, a non-state threat. Through the evolution of the dominance of the Westphalian World Order, the modern state grew to be recognized as the only legitimate wielder of the use of force or violence in the world. Non-state actors thus do not hold legitimacy in the use of force or violence as a natural result of their statelessness. It is then assumed that it is the responsibility of the state to eliminate those non-state actors who participate in violent acts, such as terrorism. This assertion redirects the public away from the fact that states promoting a war on terror have the potential to, and often do, engage in acts of terrorism themselves.

Instead of shifting from national security to human security, Richard Falk notes that, “the U.S. led a return to Westphalian geopolitics in its narrower state-centric ethos, a backlash against the UN, and a primary reliance on the world economy to address problems of human suffering (including poverty and the AIDS epidemic) and ecological sustainability”.¹³⁴ National security remains the dominant perception of security in the United States. The problem is that the U.S. pursuit to ensure the security of the state is occurring at the expense of other essential forms of security. Most notably, the U.S. warring presence in the Middle East threatens the human security of both the people of the Middle East and in turn of Americans themselves. Before the events of 9/11, Ron Paul had addressed the U.S. foreign policy of military interventionism and had declared that these policies, matters of national security, were increasing risks to the human security of Americans. “Our foreign policy of military interventionism has brought us death and destruction to many foreign lands and loss of life for many Americans. From Korea, Vietnam, to Serbia, Iran Iraq and now Afghanistan we have ventured far from our shores in search for wars to fight. There is no evidence that this policy serves the interest of world peace. It certainly increases the danger to all Americans as we become the number one target of terrorists”.¹³⁵

Ron Paul hinted at the fact that the U.S. conceptualization of national security was ultimately not ensuring the security of the state because it degraded human security, on which national security is ultimately dependent. He stated that the U.S. national security

¹³⁴ (Falk 2002)

¹³⁵ (Paul 1999)

strategy “has nothing to do with national security. Matter of fact our national security is more jeopardized by permitting this to happen because we are allowed to start a war, we’re allowed to have our military men killed, we are allowed to have more attacks on us by terrorists.” Ron Paul even stated that the Central Intelligence Agency warned U.S. policymakers about the pursuit of its national security agenda when he said, “I believe very sincerely that the CIA is correct when they teach and talk about blowback. When we went into Iran in 1953 and installed the Shah, yes there was blowback. A reaction to that was the taking of our hostages and that persists. And if we ignore that, we ignore that at our own risk. If we think we can do what we want around the world and not insight hatred then we, then we have a problem they don’t come here to attack us because we are rich and we’re free, they come and they attack us because we’re over there. I mean what would we think if we were- if other foreign countries were doing that to us?”¹³⁶

The case of the United States and its role in promoting the Global War on Terror demonstrates that the security agenda of the U.S. fails to have undergone any shifts from its traditional state-centrism despite its use of human security rhetoric. A state-centric national security agenda will ultimately prove insufficient in addressing the array of issues present and emerging in the post-Westphalian World Order security environment.

3.4.1 Influence Across the Atlantic

¹³⁶ (Richman 2007)

The 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) was quickly published as a result of the pressure that was generated by the U.S. and the Global War on Terror.¹³⁷ The United States' security agenda is influential throughout the European Security Strategy as the ESS itself states that "The United States has played a critical role in European integration and European security, in particular through NATO. The end of the Cold War has left the United States in a dominant position as a military actor."¹³⁸ The strategy continues to state that it is the prerogative of Europe to assist the United States in creating global security due to the fact that "no single country is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own." Terrorism is listed as the first threat in the section of the report titled *Key Threats*, and in their aims to address the roots of terrorism Europe and the United States justify the actions of preemptive interventionism. "Our traditional concept of self-defense - up to and including the Cold War - was based on the threat of invasion. With the new threats, the first line of defense will often be abroad...left alone; terrorist networks will become ever more dangerous."¹³⁹ The final section before the conclusion, *Policy Implications for Europe*, declares that the European Union and the United States can be a "formidable force for good in the world" if they develop a "strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary robust intervention".¹⁴⁰

This EU-U.S. alliance gained strength in 2010. The attempts of the United States to expand the capabilities of the defensive alliance of NATO, while failing through the

¹³⁷ (Andersson, et al. 2011)

¹³⁸ (European Union; , A Secure Europe In A Better World: European Security Strategy 2003)

¹³⁹ (European Union; , A Secure Europe In A Better World: European Security Strategy 2003)

¹⁴⁰ (European Union; , A Secure Europe In A Better World: European Security Strategy 2003)

1990s, were achieved in 2010 in Lisbon. The Lisbon Strategic Concept was agreed upon; it evolved NATO from being a defensive measure of collective security to becoming a proactive organization that enabled member states to address a broader set of issues on their security agendas that were outside the original NATO region itself.¹⁴¹ Even though members of NATO remain those within the Euro-Atlantic region, with the adoption of the Lisbon Strategic Concept, “NATO has remarkably strengthened its capabilities to intervene in different places and for whatever objectives the allies may want or need.”¹⁴² The implications for the U.S. with its interests in the Middle East are more obvious; however the new NATO capabilities may also influence or assist the European Union’s current Mediterranean regional-building initiatives as well.

The final core task that is listed in the ESS is *environmental and resource constraints*; it is written that “increasing energy needs will further shape the future security environment in areas of concern to NATO”.¹⁴³ Energy needs, for a state politician for all intents and purposes can be synonymous with oil due to the current model of development. Due to the fact that the U.S. had tried, for several years after the Carter Doctrine was introduced, to expand the jurisdiction of NATO it would come as no surprise that the new NATO expansion could tie in with the U.S. national security interests for securing oil in the Middle East.

¹⁴¹ (Aliboni, *The New NATO Strategic Concept and the Mediterranean* 2011)

¹⁴² (Aliboni, *The New NATO Strategic Concept and the Mediterranean* 2011)

¹⁴³ (North Atlantic Treaty Organization; 2010)

3.5 European Security through Region-Building

The Mediterranean region provides an excellent case study for examining the challenging dynamics of the post-Westphalian world. In the Mediterranean, different forms of governance and an array of environmental, human, and national-centered security issues are immensely present and pertinent. As noted by Stephen Calleya, “The post-Cold War Mediterranean is a geographical area where the majority of contemporary soft and hard security challenges are present, including ongoing conflicts in each sub-region of the basin primarily over territorial claims, the proliferation of weapons, terrorist activities, illegal migration, ethnic tensions, human rights abuses, climate change, natural resources disputes especially concerning energy and water, and environmental degradation.”¹⁴⁴

Despite the Mediterranean’s excellent portrayal of the dynamics of the post-Westphalian world, the European Security Strategy, influenced by the onset of the Global War on Terror, does not include the term *hybrid* even once, even though it would assist in the recognition and addressing of the “internal and external aspects of security”.¹⁴⁵ The term *Westphalian* also never appears in the document. Instead, the security environment is continuously referred to as “The post-Cold War environment” in which security and development are inextricably linked.

¹⁴⁴ (Wohlfeld and Calleya 2012)

¹⁴⁵ (European Union; , A Secure Europe In A Better World: European Security Strategy 2003)

Throughout the Cold War and after its ending, European scholars in general have engaged in a more diverse security debate than American scholars have. The Copenhagen School, the Paris School and the Welsh School each emphasize different schools of thought in terms of security while the Americans largely engage in security debates through intra-realist debates of offensive versus defensive realism.¹⁴⁶ As such it is consistently seen throughout European literature on security that a new paradigm is needed in order to better address the threats constituent of the 21st century security environment. In this literature the security environment is consistently explained as the “post-Cold War era”. The Cold War/ post-Cold War dialogue does highlight certain truths as well as help legitimize the need to develop a more comprehensive and effective security paradigm. It is effective in explaining a widened array of non-state threats that should be considered by states since the end of the bipolar system of international relations that largely centered on nuclear deterrence. However, as has been explained, the ending of the Cold War in reality does not mark a clear distinction between the threats in the “old wars” and the threats in the “new wars” of today. Hybridity existed both before and during the Cold War; however, such factors as the hot condition of proxy wars during the Cold War were overshadowed by a security emphasis on world-wide nuclear deterrence.

Despite the usefulness that is found in Cold War/ post-Cold War mythology, the dominance of this analytical tool in the security literature is detrimental if it overshadows the fact that even larger structural issues are at stake which are not due to the end of the

¹⁴⁶ (Waever 2004)

Cold War but due to the end of the assumed universalism of the Westphalian World Order. The Cold War was not the historical model, but rather a unique bubble in time that shaped foreign policy and security conceptualizations to a large degree. The larger issue, which in fact encompasses the Cold War/ post-Cold War distinction, is the Westphalian/ post-Westphalian distinction. This distinction further aids the arguments in Cold War/ post-Cold War or post-9/11 distinctions as it greatly evidences a need for security reconceptualization to suit the realities of the 21st century security environment. If security analysts and policymakers today continue to solely include Westphalian-state-centric issues in their agendas then they face the threat of not properly addressing the threats that constitute the 21st century security environment.

The Westphalian/ post-Westphalian distinction helps to explain the dominance of the balance of power rhetoric in the United States as it largely remains a Westphalian state; it also places regional security-building initiatives, such as efforts to build a Mediterranean security community, within a context that highlights the different challenges present in post-Westphalian structures. Many of the Mediterranean states that are members of the European-initiated Mediterranean region-building initiatives are not, themselves, representative of Westphalian or Weberian states- they are instead, hybrid political orders. Even European countries themselves demonstrate a post-Westphalian structure due to the continued prominence of shared governing institutions that are regionally based instead of state based. James Sperling explains in an EU-Grasp Working Paper that the transition into a post-Westphalian state structure is occurring in such developments as 1) the erosion of a single state's ability or desire to control internal and

external flows of good and ideas and, 2) the voluntary acceptance of weakening state sovereignty with the acceptance of mutual governance systems with the aims of maximizing benefits and addressing transnational threats. “Territoriality is increasingly irrelevant, particularly in Europe.”¹⁴⁷ The mutual system of governance between European states is the European Union (EU), which demonstrates its post-Westphalian characteristics. The European Union is the central political and economic partnership between 27 member states, with the euro as a common currency and a legal framework designed by the main three EU institutions, European Parliament, the Council of the European Union, and the European Commission. Due to Europe’s post-Westphalian structure, as well as its desired partnership with Mediterranean hybrid political orders, a Westphalian-centric conceptualization of national security is ineffective. The UNDP’s notion of human security would be that which would theoretically be able to better support the goals of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as aid European states in analyzing the non-state-centric, hybrid nature of 21st century security threats.

3.5.1 The EMP and the Arab Uprisings

Unfortunately, in its implementation human security fails to represent a security paradigm shift in Europe as it does in the United States. Despite evidence that the European structure moves away from national security, it has not proved to be moving

¹⁴⁷ (Sperling 2010)

toward human security but rather towards European-regional security. In this regional security agenda, human security is imperative, but specifically for the humans that live within the realm of the European region.

The clearest example of this dominant conceptualization of Euro-state-centrism lies with the structural failings of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). In a 1995 regional security-building initiative, the Barcelona Declaration, signed by 15 states of the European Union (EU) and 14 non-EU Mediterranean partners, formed the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, also known as the Barcelona Process. Member states signed the Barcelona Declaration in agreement of an awareness of “new political, economic and social issues on both sides of the Mediterranean.”¹⁴⁸ Shifting from traditional state-centric conceptualizations of national security, the EMP appeared to be a measure of Mediterranean regional security building and of collective and co-operative security. The partnership’s three main dimensions certainly resonated with the goals of the UN’s human security agenda which were posited the year before. The first dimension of the EMP is that of *political and security dialogue*, which “aimed at creating a common area of peace and stability underpinned by sustainable development, rule of law, democracy and human rights”. The second dimension is the economic and financial partnership, “including the gradual establishment of a free-trade area aimed at promoting shared economic opportunity through sustainable and balanced socio-economic development”. The final dimension was the social, cultural and human partnership, “aimed at promoting understanding and intercultural dialogue between cultures, religions and people, and

¹⁴⁸ (European Union; , Barcelona Declaration 1995)

facilitating exchanges between civil society and ordinary citizens, particularly women and young people.”¹⁴⁹ Most notably, in contradiction to the stated goals for free trade between northern and southern partners, Europe has maintained many barriers for trade, especially with respect to North African agriculture.¹⁵⁰

Judging by its structure, inclusion of diverse states, and stated initiatives, the EMP promised to be Europe’s, and the Mediterranean’s, largest champion of the United Nations’ new human security paradigm. The late Professor Guido de Marco, Chairman of the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies (MEDAC) at the University of Malta, was a signatory of the Barcelona Declaration, as he believed that “there can be no security in Europe unless there is security in the Mediterranean and there can be no security in the Mediterranean unless there is security in Europe.”¹⁵¹ This quote emphasizes the importance of regional security conceptualizations. In tribute to Professor Guido de Marco, Professor Stephan Calleya, current director of MEDAC, quoted de Marco’s statements at one of the first Euro-Mediterranean seminars: “Pursuing peace in a sea of turmoil is our shared responsibility. Building a Pax Mediterranea is the challenge which we Ministers and diplomats, parliamentarians and educators are facing. A challenge and a trust which we must face and hold for future generations.”¹⁵² Recognizing the socioeconomic nature of conflicts in the region and emphasizing the importance of constructing a Mediterranean regional-security agenda, Calleya notes that

¹⁴⁹ (European Union 2012)

¹⁵⁰ (Ghai 1997)

¹⁵¹ (Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, *Mediterranean Perspectives on International Relations: A Collection of Papers on the Occasion of MEDAC's 20th Anniversary* 2009)

¹⁵² (Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, *Tribute to Professor Guido de Marco* 2011)

“political differences and economic disparities between Europe and the southern shores of the Mediterranean have resulted in a situation where both perceptual and tangible gaps have continued to increase. It has therefore become very clear that if geo-strategic stability between Europe and the Mediterranean is to be achieved a more concerted effort must be implemented with a focus on the Mediterranean.”¹⁵³

Guido de Marco’s call to action for a collaborative Mediterranean has yet to be properly heard. Calleya critiques that despite the imperativeness and importance that is held in regional security building initiatives such as the EMP, “The high expectations raised in 1995 by the Barcelona Declaration have not been fulfilled.”¹⁵⁴ The ineffectiveness of the EMP thus far is largely due to euro-state-centrism. Unfortunately instead of being representative of a true human security agenda that is better able to address the economic disparity between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean, the EMP turned out to represent more of a European-regional security institution than a Mediterranean-regional security institution; after all, the EMP originated as an initiative of the European Union itself. The Eurocentric name of the initiative, the “Euro-Mediterranean Partnership” should surely have foreshadowed its failure due to the fact that the European side of the Mediterranean was explicitly highlighted while African and Middle Eastern Mediterranean states were ignored.

The majority of regional building initiatives within the EMP were based in European perspectives and therefore, without equal representation, non-European

¹⁵³ (S. C. Calleya, *From the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to the Union for the Mediterranean* 2009)

¹⁵⁴ (S. C. Calleya 2002)

partners of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership lacked enthusiasm for the process.¹⁵⁵ The southern and eastern Mediterranean states did not share equal positions with the European states in the EMP. Rather than being true equal partners North African and Middle Eastern states were merely guests without say in a European house.¹⁵⁶ The EMP's meetings "were concluded not with a joint statement but with a statement written by the EU president, very often including items which were not truly shared by all members but towards which the house guests showed acquiescence, condescension or complacency."¹⁵⁷ This meant that in developing the structure of the EMP, Europeans lacked insight on the depth of cultural sensitivities that Mediterranean partners would feel from an EU-based expanding initiative due the history of European colonization. In reference to the creation of Westphalian states, Huseyin Isiksal writes that, "it has been ignored that it was imperialist powers that created those artificial boundaries in the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean".¹⁵⁸ Without equal voting rights and membership in the EMP it did not appear all too different from another form of western expansionism.

Besides the failure of its Eurocentric design, the success of the EMP was being limited by a lack of cooperation from the authoritarian regimes that existed along the southern shores of the Mediterranean. Zaid Eyadat writes that, "The majority of the Arab world was in the hands of a few powerful dictators, who employed countless

¹⁵⁵ (Aliboni and Saaf, Human Security: a new perspective for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation 2010)

¹⁵⁶ (Aliboni, The State of Play of the Union for the Mediterranean in the Euro-Med Context 2010)

¹⁵⁷ (Aliboni, The State of Play of the Union for the Mediterranean in the Euro-Med Context 2010)

¹⁵⁸ (Isiksal n.d.)

authoritarian policies.”¹⁵⁹ While this would provide strong challenges for achieving cooperation, critical analysis of the EU’s relationship with those authoritarian regimes demonstrates that a clear European-centric security agenda remained dominant over Mediterranean human-centric approaches despite the rhetoric of the EMP. The EU’s regional security initiatives focused on the stabilizing relationships with state leaders in the region while neglecting the basic human needs constituent of the people themselves. “On hindsight, the EU-Mediterranean partnership from the 1990s to the eve of the Arab Spring focused primarily on official state-to-state relations. It lacked a broader approach towards security.”¹⁶⁰ That is to say, the EMP failed to represent the adoption of a new security paradigm due to the fact that decisions were made with a president-to-president bias in a manner that was consistent with political national security agendas while largely ignoring human security.

The European Union worked with the southern Mediterranean authoritarian regimes for several reasons relating to European security. It is important to note that European interests in collaborating with the authoritarian regimes were all based on short-term incentives. Good relations were desirable due to the mass amount of oil and natural gas present within the borders of southern Mediterranean states. The EU was also willing to support authoritarian regimes to an extent in order to maintain political stability that might otherwise lead to an increase of immigration from Northern Africa into Europe.¹⁶¹

The events of 9/11 and the Global War on Terror heightened fears of migration in

¹⁵⁹ (Eyadat 2012)

¹⁶⁰ (Knoops 2011)

¹⁶¹ (O'Donnell 2011)

Europe. With islamaphobia increased, right-wing nationalism had a new foothold. Consequently, in terms of security, the world witnessed a reversion to state-centric analysis based on fears of outsiders. Xenophobia is evident in the criminalization of immigrants in Europe in recent years, an act that is inconsistent with human rights obligations. Increasing restrictions on immigration from developing or poorer countries has been the majority trend in the past decade.¹⁶² In regards to the treatment of immigrants in the Mediterranean, national security biases have continued to occur at the expense of the human security of immigrants who are in many cases already victims searching for better opportunities. Immigration policies consistently victimize those who are already victims. This is evidenced by the fact that “In 2010, the EU notably continued trying to negotiate readmission agreements with its southern partners so that they would take back illegal immigrants from Europe- notwithstanding the poor human rights record of several southern neighbors in handling migrants.”¹⁶³

If human security was the objective in Mediterranean region-building initiatives, why, beyond the euro-state-centric incentives, would the EU continue to collaborate with authoritarian regimes if the people under those regimes desired systematic change that would better address their socioeconomic needs? State politicians and policymakers may have justified their cooperation through a belief in Arab exceptionalism. As it was explained in the historical narrative, one may recall that the idealist-inspired formation of the League of Nations was critiqued by the influential realist E.H. Carr, who held in a

¹⁶² (Ghai 1997)

¹⁶³ (O'Donnell 2011)

manner reminiscent of the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes that a values-based institution fails to take into consideration the fact that morals and values are relative to a specific group.¹⁶⁴ This belief supports critics of the United Nations who claim that the spread of international law is effectively the westernization of the world; in other words it is a method for the West to its values and systems upon other nations whose values and systems may be different. This notion of the absence of universal moral norms supported Arab exceptionalism, the theory that Arab countries experienced a separate evolutionary history than democratic nations and that authoritarianism is a legitimate method of organizing society that suits the needs of the Arab people.

Whether or not European state leaders subscribed to these ideas or not, Vera Knoops states it well by writing that, “The focus on order and stability, and the willingness of the EU to accommodate and continue to provide aid to the authoritarian regimes in several of these countries put the EU in an awkward position when the people in these countries rose up against their governments demanding reform.”¹⁶⁵ A true human-centric security analysis within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership would have proactively recognized the interests and needs of the Arab protestors before Arab uprisings in 2011. These events greatly questioned the effectiveness and incentives of the EMP itself. Authoritarianism taking place at the expense of human security was not

¹⁶⁴ (Carr 2001)

¹⁶⁵ (Knoops 2011)

accepted by the Arab people. “It is clear that throughout the region, the rationale supporting these regimes effectively collapsed.”¹⁶⁶

Delegitimizing the assertions of Arab exceptionalism, Omar Grech writes that “The view that human rights and democracy are not in sync with the Arab ‘forma mentis’ or that these concepts are inimical to, or in tension with, Arab religious values or cultural norms (a view often terms as Arab exceptionalism) was clearly and unequivocally refuted by the Arab protestors in the streets of Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. Arab, European and American diplomats, politicians and religious leaders, who claimed that democracy and human rights are Western impositions, have been shown to be either wrong or deceitful...there is no a priori prejudice in the peoples of the Arab world against human rights and democracy.”¹⁶⁷ In line with this argument supporting the universalism of human rights, President of the *Forum Euro-méditerranéen des Instituts de Sciences Economiques* (FEMISE), Ahmed Galal stated that “Recent upheavals in the Middle East have shown that people in Arab countries share the same aspirations of other people around the world. Many thought that Islam, history or culture justified the presence and persistence of authoritarian regimes, but the Arab Awakening proved that notion wrong. The end of Arab exceptionalism means that the region must be treated like any other. The democratic impulse, which continues to spread across the region, is motivated by the desire for more freedom and social justice.”¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁶ (Eyadat 2012)

¹⁶⁷ (Grech 2012)

¹⁶⁸ (Forum Euro-méditerranéen des Instituts de Science 2012)

What the Arab Spring demonstrated to the world was that the Arab people themselves were not accepting their authoritarian presidencies and in a manner more democratic made their voices heard over their concerns for equal economic opportunities. Eyadat writes that "...the Arab revolutions of 2011 revolve around the growing issue of a lack of dignity in personal lives....Many have been stuck in a cycle of poverty and inability to obtain fulfillment in life. Masses of educated youth felt constant humiliation and frustration, with an inability to control their destiny."¹⁶⁹ Achievement of basic human needs appeared to be the end goal of the protesters. The fact that they protested against their own governments demonstrated that the source of deprivation of their needs was due to the structural violence caused by the authoritarian structures.

The events in 2011 supported the theory that basic human needs are universal, a shared trait between humanity. Challenging Huntington, a clash within civilizations was occurring rather than one between them due to the fact that the source of these conflicts was not in ethnic or religious differences but is in the deprivation of basic human needs caused by institutions creating economic inequalities. These events highlighted truths in Burton's human needs theory and Galtung's structural violence theory at the same time as highlighting the falsities of Huntington, the classical realists.

Certainly, authoritarian regimes amongst the southern and eastern partners would prove to be a difficult obstacle in initiating a regional human-centric security initiative. However, the EMP, in its human-centric security analysis, should have noted that the Arab people desired for the regimes to end. Therefore, the EU and the EMP should have

¹⁶⁹ (Eyadat 2012)

placed less emphasis on cooperating with the leaders of authoritarian regimes and should have instead further promoted the human security of the Arab people. Swifter resources and assistances should have been provided aid the countries with peaceful, rather than violent transitions to more democratic systems. On this point Calleya states, “The European Union's credibility is severely undermined when it does not deliver the funding it allocates to those countries that have recently experienced a profound change. During the first nine months of the ‘Arab spring’, EU funding to Tunisia and Egypt has not been forthcoming and has added to the uncertainty that is being experienced at this moment”.¹⁷⁰ The non-European partners should have held equal share in the regional dialogue and incentives for them to promote democratic systems of governance in accordance with their peoples’ desires should have been initiated. Instead of a human-centric security analysis, it is clear that a national security agenda, focused on short-term political stability and continued access to resources such as oil, was the European prerogative.

Despite its degree of failure thus far in implementation, the Barcelona Process is representative of an imperative idea that moves the theory of human security into action. Successful reforms of the Barcelona Process have been occurring. Most notably, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) looks at creating a co-presidency between northern and southern states.¹⁷¹ This would help to replace the Eurocentric design of the EMP. Many challenges remain, notwithstanding the Arab-Israeli conflict on the East shore that

¹⁷⁰ (Wohlfeld and Calleya 2012)

¹⁷¹ (Aliboni, Joffe, et al. 2008)

stands as a tremendous road-block to successful Mediterranean region-building. Highlighting this point, Guido de Marco wrote that “We may not have peace in the Mediterranean even though we may have peace in the Middle East, but we can never have peace in the Mediterranean unless we have peace in the Middle East”¹⁷² It is evident that United States and its role in the Middle East, whether in promoting peace or conflict, will be tied to the fate of the Mediterranean Region as well. The UfM will retain the EMP’s three main dimensions, and with proper structural reform potential exists for successfully opening a Mediterranean security dialogue. This is important in wake of the Arab uprisings and should be taken advantage of in order to initiate long-term sustainable partnerships focused on closing the economic disparities between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean.

3.6 The Reemergence of History: The Rise of State-Run Capitalism

So far it has been demonstrated that the UNDP concept of human security fails to represent a paradigm shift in the United States of America as well as in the European Union, two of the most powerful state entities in the post-Westphalian World. While they exhibit different forms of state-centrism (the U.S. exhibiting a more Westphalian state structure and the EU existing as a collective security umbrella under which Westphalian states are secured) they are not the only countries whose policies fail to represent human-

¹⁷² (Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, *Mediterranean Perspectives on International Relations: A Collection of Papers on the Occasion of MEDAC's 20th Anniversary* 2009)

centrism. Countries such as China, Russia, India, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Algeria, Ukraine, Nigeria, South Africa, Brazil, and others exhibit a strong degree of extreme state-centrism due to the fact that their economies are largely not free-market based but are instead controlled and monitored by the states themselves. Kurlantzick reports, “Across much of the developing world, state capitalism- in which the state either owns companies or plays a major role in supporting or directing them- is replacing the free market.”¹⁷³

Contrary to the argument posed in Francis Fukuyama’s *The End of History and the Last Man* that the end of the Cold War gave rise to the final form of government with liberal democracy’s free-market capitalism,¹⁷⁴ history continues to be written in ways unforeseen, as evidenced by the rise of a new form of capitalism in the world: state-run capitalism. A special report by the *Economist* held that “The invisible hand of the market is giving way to the visible, and often authoritarian, hand of state capitalism.”¹⁷⁵ That a new form of governance is being formed provides further evidence that the world should no longer be defined as existing in the post-Cold War era, and the current post-Westphalian era and its own defining characteristics must be acknowledged.

Ian Bremmer, president of the Eurasia Group, the “world’s leading global political risk research and consulting firm” concisely explains an important and threatening shift that has occurred in the global economic system: the allure for states to

¹⁷³ (Kurlantzick 2012)

¹⁷⁴ (Fukuyama 2006)

¹⁷⁵ (The Economist, The visible hand 2012)

interfere with the market for political motives.¹⁷⁶ Bremmer writes: “The fall of communism did not mark the triumph of free-market capitalism because it did not put an end to authoritarian government. . . Authoritarian governments everywhere have learned to compete internationally by embracing market-driven capitalism. But if they leave it entirely to market forces to decide winners and losers from economic growth, they risk enabling those who might use that wealth to challenge their political power. Certain that command economies are doomed to fail but fearful that truly free markets will spin beyond their control, authoritarians have invented something new: state capitalism. . . This is a form of capitalism but one in which the state acts as the dominant economic player and uses markets primarily for political gain.”¹⁷⁷

Bremmer goes on to describe that in state-run capitalism, governments select private companies to compete in economic sectors as their own political champions. These companies are used to exploit resources and create a large number of jobs. The wealth that is then generated by the exploitation of resources by the state-managed companies can be used in ways that suit the political interests of the state itself. According to *Bloomberg BusinessWeek*, by the year 2015 state-owned wealth funds will control far more than private investors with an estimated \$12 trillion in assets.¹⁷⁸ The report also notes that “State companies now control about 90 percent of the world’s oil and large percentages of other resources- far cry from the past, when BP and ExxonMobil could dictate terms to the world.” An *Economist* special report agrees, holding that the

¹⁷⁶ (Eurasia Group 2012)

¹⁷⁷ (Bremmer 2010)

¹⁷⁸ (Kurlantzick 2012)

world's 13 largest oil firms, holding more than three-quarters of the world's oil supply, are all state-managed as is the world's largest supplier of natural gas, the Russian owned company Gazprom.¹⁷⁹

The assertion that state-run capitalism is a rising trend in the world is contradictory to the view that private multinational corporations are the key players in the global economy. This view has been the dominant perception for many years before the 2008 financial crash. Many challenges to the sovereign power of the Westphalian state itself are due to the expansion of sovereign private entities in the world, such as multinational corporations. States are ultimately responsible for regulating corporations and in response to the challenges to the structure of the Westphalian state the world is witnessing a reversion to economic state-centrism so as to re-secure the state structure. It is not to suggest that private multinationals are not powerful actors wielding a large degree of influence; however, it appears the U.S. and European multinationals are threatened to be outcompeted by rising trends of state-managed companies.¹⁸⁰

The U.S. *Quadrennial Defense Review* in 2010 noted that “The United States faces a complex and uncertain security landscape in which the pace of change continues to accelerate. The distribution of global political, economic, and military power is becoming more diffuse. The rise of China, the world's most populous country, and India, the world's largest democracy, will continue to shape an international system that is no longer easily defined- one in which the United States will remain the most powerful actor

¹⁷⁹ (The Economist, A choice of models: Themes and variations 2012)

¹⁸⁰ (Kurlantzick 2012)

but must increasingly work with key allies and partners if it is to sustain stability and peace.”¹⁸¹ In order to remain competitive amongst rising state-run capitalist states, increasing economic pressures may lead the United States to adopt a more state-run economic infrastructure as well. *Bloomberg BusinessWeek* itself suggested that in order to remain competitive forces, the U.S. and European governments “would do better to learn” from state-run capitalist structures.¹⁸² This view, a deeper cementing of state-centrism in the world, is supported by claims that the free-market economy led to the 2008 financial crisis. Therefore, increased state interference would be justifiable in order to positively redirect the economy. This, in fact, has been the dominant perception among American economists, following the lead of Keynesian key advisor Paul Krugman. If, however, the free-market was not to blame the conclusion would surely be different. In contrast, if it was state interference with the economy that actually led to its mismanagement then the further adoption of state-centric policies would certainly not be progressive.

“State-centrism” in regards to economic decisions, through the analytical lens of security studies, refers to the actions that states take in interfering with the economy in order to achieve political rather than truly economic incentives. State-management of the economy is not new; the dominance of mercantilism was evident throughout Europe in the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries. As it is with the “new wars”, the “new” rise of state-run capitalism in reality is best understood as a hybrid condition that blends

¹⁸¹ (Department of Defense 2010)

¹⁸² (Kurlantzick 2012)

very old characteristics with the newly unprecedented globalized state of the world. Hybridity is that which best explains the condition of the 21st century security environment. That being noted, it is also important to place the recent rise in the spread of state-run capitalism within the economic context that was created as a result of the 2008 financial crisis. The rise of state-run capitalism as a form of governance in the 21st century is legitimized by the dominant view that the 2008 financial crisis was caused by the failure of free-market capitalism.

Within days after Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy protection on 15 September 2008, state politicians in Washington assumed the responsibilities of economists in New York. As Brenner notes, this was a “momentous shift in economic and financial power from America’s capital of finance to its capital of politics.”¹⁸³ The economic context for the 21st century was established, as the *Economist* reported that “The era of free-market triumphalism has come to a juddering halt, and the crisis that destroyed Lehman Brothers in 2008 is now engulfing much of the rich world. The weakest countries, such as Greece, have already been plunged into chaos. Even the mighty United States has seen the income of the average worker contract every year for the past three years.”¹⁸⁴ The euro, the economic value that binds together member states of the European Union, has been facing major challenges, in turn challenging the legitimacy in regional institutions/collective security bodies and providing incentives for reversion to state management, rather than regional governance. What the *Economist* fails

¹⁸³ (Brenner 2010)

¹⁸⁴ (The Economist, The visible hand 2012)

to recognize in the above quote is that the government stepped into New York out of the assumption that the free-market system was failing when in reality, that free-market system was never in place.

Jeremy R. Hammond provides a recent analysis comparing the soundness of the economic advice of Ron Paul versus that of Paul Krugman up to and through the 2008 financial crisis. Hammond notes that explanations for the crisis itself generally fall into two categories: “those that assign responsibility to an unregulated free market, and those that point to government intervention in the market as itself being the problem. Proponents of the former view argue that the government should regulate and manage the economy, while proponents of the latter argue in favor of a free market.”¹⁸⁵ The comparative analysis is more than a review of Paul versus Krugman, but rather of the views of the Austrian school of economics (followed by Ron Paul) and the views of the Keynesian school of economics (followed by Paul Krugman). The Austrian school holds that government interference in the economy tends to exacerbate problems that it is unable to solve, whereas the Keynesian school holds that the government should have a larger role in managing the economy, out of the assumption that the private sector is bound to create inefficiencies.

Many analysts argued in a Keynesian manner that free-market capitalism was to blame for the economic meltdown, calling for further government regulation, legitimizing the acts of bail-outs and government subsidies. Hammond writes that “...while Ron Paul was warning of a bursting bubble and imminent recession, Krugman continued to

¹⁸⁵ (Hammond 2012)

reassure readers that the U.S. economy was in fundamentally sound condition. While Ron Paul was warning of the danger of people spending beyond their means, Paul Krugman was hailing excessive consumerism as a positive force for job creation that had helped to insulate the U.S. economy from financial troubles other countries were facing.” This means that Keynesian analysis, as posed by Paul Krugman, reassured Americans to continue to live beyond their means. Keynesian economics influenced politicians in a way that perpetuated and legitimized the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy of intervention. Austrian economic analysis argues that the Federal Reserve actually creates problems by intervening as it hides the reality of economic conditions to the public. In other words, as warned by Ron Paul, “when interest rates are high, it encourages savings, but when the Fed artificially lowers interest rates, the incentive is to borrow and to spend, rather than to save dollars that would have less purchasing power tomorrow than today.”¹⁸⁶

The free-market cannot legitimately be blamed for the 2008 financial crisis due to the fact that the Federal Reserve held a monetary policy that was state-managed, and therefore the U.S. economy was not representative of a free-market managed by the forces of supply and demand. Hammond asserts that “The Fed’s manipulation of the interest rate sent wrong signals to borrowers and investors that created artificial booms”. Ron Paul had argued that the Federal Reserve “comes along and they crank out the credit and they lower the interest rates artificially, which then encourages business people and

¹⁸⁶ (Hammond 2012)

consumers to do things that they would not otherwise do. This is the expansion of the bubble part of the business cycle, which then sets the state for the next recession.”¹⁸⁷

While the U.S., in accordance with the observations of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, may be inclined to further a state-centric policy approach in order to remain a key competitor in the world economy,¹⁸⁸ it must recognize that state interference is often a cause of economic instability and therefore it risks attempting to wash a dirty plate with the same food that dirtied it.

State-centrism, solely ensuring the development and security of the state structure itself, would be a progressive paradigm if it were parallel with human-centric and environment-centric perceptions of security. In reality, state-centrism repeatedly takes place at the expense of these forms of security. This means that further adoption of state-centric policies will ultimately come back to threaten the success of the state in the long run. It cannot be reiterated enough that if the state continues to make decisions based on ensuring the state’s own short-term security without willing to invest in human-centric and environmental initiatives, the state itself in the long run will not succeed as it is dependent on human security and environmental security.

State-centric security architecture is that which remains dominant in the world in the 21st century despite the growing prominence of non-state centric security issues that should raise concern. This security architecture, if it progresses without widening the conceptualization of security to address non-state issues, is unsuitable for addressing the

¹⁸⁷ (Hammond 2012)

¹⁸⁸ (Quadrennial Defense Review February 2010)

21st century security environment and because of that, state-centrism will continue to pose negative consequences for the economy, for humans, for the environment, and ultimately for the states themselves.

3.6.1 Economics to Ecology and Human Security: Costs of State-centrism at Sea and on Land

Economic consequences of state-centric pursuits of national security only matter in as much as they affect human beings, whether directly or indirectly. An excellent example of this is state interference in the fisheries and aquaculture industries, which distorts the perception of supply and demand in a manner that is biologically unsustainable. This is evidence to the fact that beyond economic consequences, state-centric agendas have significant ecological consequences as well. A free-market system would limit overfishing due to the fact that increasing rarity of a fish species would increase its price and lead consumers to eventually choose other more sustainable options due to economic pressures. If a state interferes with this economic process to maintain low prices of certain fish, the demand will continue to be high and the fish population will not have time to recover. A report published by the World Bank asserts that “subsidies continue to support unsustainable fishing practices.”¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁹ (The World Bank, *Sunken Billions: The Economic Justification for Fisheries Reform* 2009)

The stakes for addressing the inefficiencies of state-centrism are high. The world's capture fisheries and aquaculture provides billions of humans with food security and millions of humans with job security. As reported by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), "Trade in fish represents a significant source of foreign currency earnings, in addition to the sector's important role in employment, income generation and food security".¹⁹⁰ In 2010 the FAO published the *State of the World Fisheries and Aquaculture* (SOFIA) report which established the following context: "As the world endeavors to recover from the combined impact of a global food price crisis, financial crash and economic recession, many hundreds of millions of people are facing increased uncertainty and real hunger."¹⁹¹

In 2008 capture fisheries and aquaculture provided 142 million tons of fish for the world, the great majority, 115 million tons, was used for human consumption. China maintains a great lead in fish production as 47.5 million tons of the 142 million tons of fish produced in 2008 was produced by China. The remaining amount of over 90 billion tons alone held an estimated value of US\$93.9 billion. Despite these estimations, marine fisheries are contributing significantly less than they should be to the global economy. According to the World Bank, bad governance and practices account for an annual loss of \$50 billion.¹⁹² So while the fisheries sector, necessary for providing for humans world-wide, holds such potential for positive economic growth, instead poor management is degrading the environment and causing economic losses of over \$2 trillion in the last

¹⁹⁰ (FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department 2010)

¹⁹¹ (FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department 2010)

¹⁹² (The World Bank, *Sunken Billions: The Economic Justification for Fisheries Reform* 2009)

three decades. Even more significantly, the World Bank declares that its estimation of an annual loss of \$50 billion is on the conservative end, as it does not include the economic losses caused by illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing. Beyond the costly environmental consequences of IUU fishing, it is an act that deprives human rights due to the fact that IUU fishing costs developing or fragile countries, dependent upon fish stocks for food and job security, up to an extra \$15 billion each year.¹⁹³ While not including these costs, the World Bank's \$50 billion estimate also does not include management costs or costs caused by environmental degradation.

In terms of the availability of fish, in 2008, 53% of marine stocks were fully exploited. 32% were overexploited, depleted, or recovering from depletion. This leaves 15% of global marine stocks, 12% of which is moderately exploited while only 3% is considered underexploited.¹⁹⁴ The SOFIA report states that “The increasing trend in the percentage of overexploited, depleted and recovering stocks and the decreasing trend in underexploited and moderately exploited stocks give cause for concern.” The top ten species of fish, accounting for 30% of the world marine capture fisheries, are themselves fully exploited. Those stocks that are underexploited are largely those constituent of those fish species that are less desired on the world market. The World Bank reports that even the fisheries that appear to be biologically sustainable may continue to run at an economic loss due to the fact that increasing fuel subsidies hide the real cost of harvesting, which may be exceeding its value. Despite the decreasing availability of fish,

¹⁹³ (Environmental Justice Foundation 2005)

¹⁹⁴ (FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department 2010)

economics and fisheries experts Arnason, Kelleher, and Willmann note that “The depletion in fish capital resulting from overexploitation is rarely reflected in the reckoning of a nation’s overall capital and GDP growth”¹⁹⁵

Arnason, Kelleher, and Willmann report that state-interference with price setting in the fisheries industry is responsible for creating “perverse incentives for greater investment” which “reinforce the sector’s poverty trap and prevent the creation of economic surplus that can be invested in alternatives, including education and health.”¹⁹⁶

The World Bank has made many suggestions for limiting state interference with the fisheries markets. It has been recorded that, “Successful reforms will require reduction or elimination of pernicious subsidies in the transition to sustainability.” Subsidies should not be permanent or long lasting but should rather “be temporary, as part of a broader strategy to improve fisheries management and enhance productivity.” In place of subsidies it is suggested that governments invest in human security and environmental security as a long term strategy that will better support the sustainability of the fisheries industry. In reference to the weak state of the world’s fisheries, the World Bank concludes that “The alternative to reform - business as usual - is a continued decline in global fish wealth, harvest operations that become increasingly inefficient and growing poverty in fishery-dependent communities. Failure to act implies increased risks of fish

¹⁹⁵ (The World Bank, *Sunken Billions: The Economic Justification for Fisheries Reform* 2009)

¹⁹⁶ (The World Bank, *Sunken Billions: The Economic Justification for Fisheries Reform* 2009)

stock collapses, increasing political pressure for subsidies, and a sector that, rather than being a net contributor to global wealth, is an increasing drain on society.”¹⁹⁷

The declining fish stocks are unsurprising when recognizing that the global fishing fleet, not including IUU fishing, includes over 4.3 million vessels.¹⁹⁸ The mass amount of industrial traffic in the seas adds significant amounts of carbon dioxide pollution. The World Bank makes note of the fisheries’ carbon footprint as further evidence that fisheries require reform. Climate change is a primary threat in the 21st century and the inefficiencies of the fisheries markets perpetuate carbon dioxide pollution.

Climate change is not debated by scientists. The 21st century is clearly witness to environmental changes that threaten human security across the globe. What is debated is the cause of climate change. Many believe that increased anthropogenic (human-caused) carbon dioxide emissions from industrial activities are the cause for raised global temperatures, while others subscribe to the idea that the temperature changes reflect a natural pattern as associated with fluxes of the sun. The debate over atmospheric carbon dioxide levels and humankind’s responsibility over those levels is unfortunately overshadowing a very real threat to the oceans which provide us with food and job security. Regardless of positions within the debates on atmospheric temperature change and increased carbon dioxide levels, countries must continue to advance their efforts on decreasing carbon dioxide emissions due to the fact that the world’s oceans, covering over 70% of all of Earth’s surface, have absorbed approximately one-fourth of all

¹⁹⁷ (The World Bank, *Sunken Billions: The Economic Justification for Fisheries Reform* 2009)

¹⁹⁸ (FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department 2010)

anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions since the industrial revolution.¹⁹⁹ As carbon dioxide is absorbed by the ocean, it decreases the water's pH, in turn making it more acidic. This is the process known as ocean acidification.²⁰⁰ Increased ocean acidity slows the production of calcium carbonate, or the calcification process. A report sponsored by the *National Science Foundation* (NSF), the *National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration* (NOAA), and the *United States Geological Survey* (USGS), in 2006 provided evidence that within the 21st century calcification rates with decrease of up to 60%.²⁰¹ This means that coral reefs, whose structures are built from the production of calcium carbonate, are in danger from ocean acidification. Coral reefs provide a natural break-wall for many shorelines, allowing mangroves to thrive as well as protecting human populations.

The *International Union for the Conservation of Nature* (IUCN) explained the imperativeness for sustaining the health of the oceans in their 2009 report titled, *The Ocean and Climate Change: Tools and Guidelines for Action*, in which it was written: "The ocean plays a critical role in our climate system and is significantly impacted by climate change and ocean acidification. People around the globe are already observing key alterations to their environment with profound consequences: sea-level rise, increased intensity of storms, changes in ocean productivity and resource availability, disruption of seasonal weather patterns, loss of sea life, altered freshwater supply and

¹⁹⁹ (World Ocean Review 2010)

²⁰⁰ (Herr and Galland 2009)

²⁰¹ (Kleyppas, et al. 2006)

quality. These changes are happening at an unprecedented rate. Issues of food security and human health will affect local livelihoods as well as global economies.”²⁰²

Ocean acidification and decreasing fish stocks are particularly threatening for residents of the region of Oceania in the Pacific Ocean who live on atolls, or low-laying islands formed by reef structures themselves, and who are largely dependent upon the acquisition of fish for their food and security. Atolls are described by anthropologist Robert C. Kiste as “resting on a coral reef that typically encloses a lagoon...Atolls originated as fringing reefs around volcanic peaks that sank beneath the sea millions of years ago.”²⁰³ Michael Renner explains that the risks for indigenous groups all over the world are high: “Within countries, it is minority groups, indigenous peoples, and other vulnerable and impoverished communities such as subsistence peasants or nomadic tribes that often bear the brunt of adverse environmental transformation”²⁰⁴

Indigenous leader in Oceania, Epli Hau’ofa writes that, “Views of the Pacific from the level of macroeconomics and macropolitics often differ markedly from those from the level of ordinary people.” Hau’ofa points out that politicians and economists of larger, stronger, continental states view Oceania as a largely empty sea with scattered human populations. Hau’ofa argues that this sea is not empty, but is instead full of the histories, myths, and traditions of the people of Oceania. He insightfully writes that “There is a

²⁰² (Herr and Galland 2009)

²⁰³ (Barker 2004)

²⁰⁴ (Renner 1997)

world of difference between viewing the Pacific as ‘islands in a far sea’ and as ‘a sea of islands’²⁰⁵

There is no more direct and clear example of the United States’ perception of Oceania and its people than its nuclear testing activities through Operation Crossroads at the end of World War II. The U.S. state-centric national security agenda was pursued at the expense of human security and environmental security in the Marshall Islands at that time. The Marshall Islands were not perceived as a sovereign Westphalian state and thus the rights of the Marshallese were widely ignored. Anthropologist Holly Barker writes that “Despite the destructive capacity of the atomic bomb witnessed in Japan, the United States did not fully understand the effects of atomic bombs on human beings, infrastructure, or the environment...To answer these questions, the United States turned to its newly acquired territory, the Marshall Islands.”²⁰⁶

Operation Crossroads consisted of two nuclear tests: Test Able, an airdrop on the evacuated Bikini Island, and Test Baker, an undersea test that took place within the atoll’s lagoon. Holly Barker’s anthropological account is illuminating: “Despite its promises to care for the people and their land, the United States determined that the strategic designation enabled the United States to use its territory for closed military operations...crushed coral and water mixed with the radioactive particles released in the blast fell to the ground in the form of radioactive fallout. Scientists monitored the movement of radiation from the Marshall Islands as the atmosphere carried it to

²⁰⁵ (Hau'ofa 1993)

²⁰⁶ (Barker 2004)

neighboring countries in the Pacific, and to every continent in the world...When radioactive ash fell on the islands where Marshallese people live, the people inhaled radiation into their lungs. In areas where fallout was severe, radioactive fallout stuck to the coconut oil people use on their skin...children played with and even ate what looked to them like snow. At no time did the U.S. government warn communities about the dangers of fallout...”²⁰⁷

The abuses to the Marshallese people and their environment were eventually met with a 1957 petition to the United Nations. The Marshallese declared: “We, the Marshallese people feel that we must follow the dictates of our consciences to bring forth this urgent plea to the United Nations, which has pledged itself to safeguard the life, liberty, and general well being of the people...”²⁰⁸ Despite their efforts, the petition by indigenous Marshallese was unsuccessful due to the UN legitimization of the United States’ strategic security interests.

The 2009 *State of the World’s Indigenous Peoples* Report of the United Nations’ Department of Economic and Social Affairs recognized that the United Nations in the past has not properly upheld the human rights and security of the world’s indigenous populations.²⁰⁹ While the UN asserts that governments are increasingly recognizing the threats to indigenous peoples (including discrimination, poverty, marginalization, dispossession, and etcetera), it also admits that much “work remains to be done in advancing the implementation of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of

²⁰⁷ (Barker 2004)

²⁰⁸ (Barker 2004)

²⁰⁹ (Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *State of the World's Indigenous Peoples* 2009)

Indigenous Peoples.” The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was officially adopted by the UN General Assembly in the year 2007, an unfortunate 12 years after the UNDP invention of human security.

Indigenous struggles for security are ongoing. Reminiscent of the Marshallese plea that originally went unheard, indigenous populations in Brazil are currently fighting for their security and the security of their land against the construction of the government’s Belo Monte mega hydroelectric dam. The indigenous declaration in opposition to the construction of the Belo Monte dam remains on the website of the *International Rivers* network:

“We, the indigenous people of the Xingu, are here fighting for our people, for our lands, but we’re also fighting for the future of the world. . . We do not accept the Belo Monte hydroelectric dam because we understand that it will bring more destruction to our region. . . We ask ourselves: what else does the government want? What good is more energy after so much destruction? . . . We have already spoken personally with President Lula and told him that we do not want this dam, and he promised us that this dam would not be shoved down our throats. . . We already warned the government that if Belo Monte were build, they would have war on their hands. The government did not understand our message and challenged indigenous people once more, saying that they are going to build the dam at any cost. When President Lula said this, he demonstrated that he is not concerned with what indigenous people say, and that he does not know our rights. His lack of respect led him to schedule the auction for Belo Monte during indigenous

peoples' week. . . We are here fighting for our people, for our lands, for our forests, for our rivers, for our children and in honor of our ancestors. We fight also for the future of the world, because we know that these forests bring benefits not only to indigenous people but to the people of Brazil and to the entire world. . . The world must know what is happening here, they must perceive how destroying forests and indigenous people destroys the entire world. Because of this we do not want Belo Monte. Belo Monte represents the destruction of our people.”²¹⁰

In 2007 the government of Brazil initiated its Growth Acceleration Program (PAC) and despite the 2008 financial crisis, the government pushed forward with its plans for enhancing the country's infrastructure, not least of all due to the fact that Brazil will experience an influx of tourists and publicity as it hosts the upcoming 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games. As part of PAC, the federal government has initiated the Belo Monte dam project, which will construct hydroelectric dams on the Xingu River in the Amazon. The government has estimated that Belo Monte will be able to supply energy for 40% of residential Brazil. In reference to the political-centric state-run capitalist decision-making of the government of Brazil, *BusinessWeek* reports that “Brazil is perhaps the best current example of how a state-capitalist system can build innovative industries.”²¹¹ It must not, however, be ignored that the national energy security acquired from the Belo Monte dam project does not come without a cost to human and

²¹⁰ (Kayapó, Kayapó and Juruna 2010)

²¹¹ (Kurlantzick 2012)

environmental security. Six-hundred sixty-eight square kilometers of the Amazon will be flooded, displacing more than 20,000 people from their land.²¹²

Due to its massive impact upon the essential forest region of the Amazon and its human rights implications, construction of the mega dam project has been extremely controversial. Strings of protests from environmental and human rights organizations caused the Brazilian Supreme Court to suspend construction on 14 August 2012. The court's decision to suspend the project was based on the fact that as a result of the consequences of its construction it failed to uphold the Brazilian constitution as well as the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples. Federal Judge Antonia de Souza Prudente announced the ruling. The following accounts of his statements were made. The Inter Press Service news agency (IPS) reported Prudente as stating, "The Federal Constitution and the ILO Convention state that the national Congress must consult affected traditional peoples before authorising any project for the exploitation of resources on their land...on the contrary, deputies and senators approved the decree that allowed the construction work to begin, providing for a posterior rather than previous consultation...the way dictatorships work...Indigenous people must be listened to and respected".²¹³ CNN reported Prudente as stating that "The legislation requires consultation (by indigenous communities) prior to a decision by congress (on construction of the dam), and what we have is an attempt after the fact...Congress made a mockery and acted as if it were in a dictatorship, putting

²¹² (Amazon Watch 2000-2012)

²¹³ (Frayssinet 2012)

the cart before the horse.”²¹⁴ Finally, BBC reported that Prudente declared that, “A study on the environmental impact of the project was required before, not after, work on the dam started. The legislation is flawed...The Brazilian Congress must take into account the decisions taken by the indigenous communities. Legislators can only give the go-ahead if the indigenous communities agree with the project,”²¹⁵ This suspension seemed short-lived as the Chief Justice of the Brazilian Supreme Court unilaterally overturned the decision to suspend construction on August 27. Much like the unknown ultimate ends of the Arab uprisings, the fate of Belo Monte and of the indigenous people of the Xingu River is yet to be known while national security initiatives continue to put human and environmental security concerns at risk in search for national profits.

²¹⁴ (Castillo 2012)

²¹⁵ (BBC News 2012)

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 The Security Architecture is State-Centric

The security environment is largely made up of threats that are linked to the disintegration of the Westphalian World Order; however, U.S. and EU security agendas and strategies fail to acknowledge a Westphalian/ post-Westphalian distinction of the international state system. Instead, the Cold War/ post-Cold War dialogue is continuously used to represent the new factors that need to be taken into account in analysis of today's security environment. In this context, the paradigm of human security, posited by the UNDP, aimed at addressing the socioeconomic causes of conflicts that were most common in the world. On paper human security represented a paradigm shift due to the fact that its analysis centered on achieving the security of human individuals instead of on ensuring the security of their political entities, states. Due to the fact that the Westphalian state structure hardly exists outside of a few countries, such as the United States, a security paradigm shift away from the Westphalian-state-centric notion of national security would appear appropriate and necessary.

In implementation, human security fails to represent such a shift. It is not surprising that the United States of America, maintaining its Westphalian state structure, maintains a state-centric national security agenda. This framework of the Westphalian-state-centric

analysis in the national security agenda is limited in its ability to address the hybrid and transnational threats that are most prominent in today's 21st century security environment. In fact, the continuous push for ensuring the security of the state, or the pursuit of national security, is occurring at the expense of other forms of security such as the security of humans and the security of the environment on which humans are dependent. Due to the fact that the majority of 21st century threats are developmental in nature, being human-centric and/or environment-centric, the United States' national security strategy will ultimately fail to react to the realities of threats within the security environment with the consequence that the security of the state structure itself, dependent upon the security of humans and the security of the environment, will be greatly threatened.

European security is a slightly different story. The European Union is a post-Westphalian structure itself and European countries during and after the Cold War have engaged in collective security efforts. Europe, then, initially held greater potential in shifting away from the limitations of the traditional paradigm of national security. One year after the UNDP's formulation of human security, the EU engaged in an effort to address the socioeconomic causes of conflicts on a Mediterranean regional-basis, and thus the Barcelona process was born. Unfortunately it became evident that these regional security building efforts were truly efforts of ensuring the collective security of the European states. That is to say, while European security strategies and agendas were not Westphalian-state-centric, they were, in effect, extremely euro-state-centric. The security paradigm implemented by Europe then was not constitutive of a human security agenda

due to the fact that it emphasized solely the security of humans that were citizens of European states.

It is evident that in the United States and the European Union, in these liberal democracies with alleged free-market economies, human security fails to represent a paradigm shift. In response to many of the challenges that the state structures face in the post-Westphalian globalized world, a new form of capitalism has arisen as a way of appeasing the desires of citizens while ensuring that security remains state-centric, as the state remains the central authority and power. State-run capitalism, an oxymoron to the assumed meaning of capitalism as exhibiting the free-market, perpetuates the power of states while failing to ensure the security of human individuals or the environment on which they depend. Decisions are made not on an actual economic basis but within a political power-centric agenda. State-run capitalist countries, interfering with the prices of commodities according to a political agenda, will ultimately be blind-sided by the threats of overconsumption and environmental degradation that occurs as a result of the inability for the free-market to represent the true supply and demand of commodities. Human security (job stability, access to goods and resources) will not be achieved due to the increase of economic inefficiencies which will arise as a result of unsustainable development and governance.

The global economy suffers as a result of states' decisions to make economic decisions that are not intended for actual economic gain as much as they are intended for stabilizing the centrality of the state in an increasingly uncertain environment. These

decisions create negative outcomes for human beings and for the natural environment in all too many cases, as demonstrated by the state of the world's oceans and the state of many indigenous populations in the world.

In summation, the UNDP notion of human security fails to represent a security paradigm shift in the world due to the fact that the dominant model of security across the board is state-centric. Whether that state-centrism takes the form in the United States' continued pursuit of global dominance, the European Union's euro-centric collective approach to security, or state-run capitalist countries' state-centric dominance through political control of their economies, none of these approaches exhibit a human (regardless of state affiliation) centered approach to security analysis.

What is the significance of this conclusion? The problem is that this state-centric security architecture is not properly designed to address the challenges within the 21st security environment. In fact, the achievement of national security continuously takes precedence at the literal expense of forms of security on which the state itself is dependent, namely human and environmental security. In a cycle of destruction this poses key threats to the state itself. State-centrism is an unsustainable architecture that is bound to cave in under the long-term stress of transnational, hybrid, and environmental threats. The state structure itself, upon further environmental degradation and lack of fulfillment of socioeconomic basic human needs, is ultimately threatened by a failure to acquire the resources needed to continue its model of development and its peoples' livelihoods. If

they lose faith in their states' abilities to provide security, as history shows, people will eventually delegitimize and aim to unravel the structure of that state.

4.2 The Profit-as-Power Problematic Paradigm within the State-centric Security Architecture

Ultimately, shifting the paradigm away from the traditional conceptualizations of national security is dependent upon the shift in conceptualization of one other paradigm: that of profit. Profit is currently conceptualized in terms of power. As evidenced throughout the history of the state, economic gain is imperative as it is tied to an increase in power. With continued state-centric conceptualizations of security, economic decisions are all too often made for political reasons, enhancing the central power of the state itself. Pursuits of profit-as-power occur at the expense of non-state-centric forms of security. Ironically, these are the forms of security upon which the state itself is most dependent within the security environment of the 21st century.

Profit-as-power is a model that provides for short-term gain. Short-termism does not provide sustainable initiatives. The United States continuously makes poor foreign policy decisions, such as financially and militarily supporting authoritarian rulers, for short-term gain as they choose to ignore the threats of longer term blowback that such misplaced empowerment will cause. A conceptualization of profit-as-sustainability is deeply needed in today's world, especially in light of increasing environmental

degradation. The current model of profit perceives profit and sustainability as belonging to two opposite ends of a polarized continuum. This creates an environment of competition as opposed to one of cooperation. Profit-as-power is in line with the insufficient zero-sum strategies of the competitive Cold War environment. Competition between state and non-state interests, sustained by the imagined polarized separation of profit and sustainability, empowers states to continue to avoid investing in longer-term human-centric and environment-centric development and security efforts. That is to say, within the current model that separates profit from sustainability, the state's interests and the interests within human security and environmental security agendas are largely perceived as mutually incompatible.

Profit and sustainability need not be mutually exclusive or opposing factors. In a long-term model of development, that which is profitable is also that which is sustainable due to the fact that sustainable options are those that inherently maintain a secure environment in the long-term. It makes no logical sense to continue adopting decision-making processes in which short-term profits are chosen over long-term sustainable options. The consequences of profit-as-power short-termism, which are continuously evidenced as the fundamental factors behind state-centric security or development initiatives, are increasingly catching up to humanity. The immediate consequences of this philosophy behind state-centrism are to humans, especially those disenfranchised indigenous and minority populations whose security concerns are largely ignored due to their disassociation with the state. For example, nomadic populations such as pastoral communities who do not lead sedentary lifestyles are unable to fulfill the desires of the

state for them to add to the Gross Domestic Product of the state through production of marketable cash crops. Those communities who have been forced to lead more sedentary lifestyles, in line with the imagined borders of the Westphalian state, have experienced an increase of threats to their human security due to the fact that the reasons behind their nomadic lifestyles are ignored. It is ignored that pastoral communities often have to follow the environment's natural supplies of water as they are often living in arid or semi-arid regions of the world. Forced sedentary lifestyles in line with the state's interests of maintaining a secure border and producing marketable cash crops increase a constant pressure on the environment in one spot, decreasing the water table, increasing soil erosion, and ultimately leading to increased food and water insecurity for the indigenous populations at hand.²¹⁶

If the state-centric conceptualization continues to place humans and the environment at risk, it is only a matter of time before the state's models and agendas come back to threaten its own success. The post-Westphalian 21st century security environment is largely constituent of non-state-centric issues, actors and threats. Failure for the state to adapt its conceptualization of security to shift away from the paradigms of national security, short-termism, and profit-as-power, will ultimately delegitimize the state structure and lead to its failure in today's world.

²¹⁶ (Odhiambo 2003)

4.3 Agenda for the Security of Humanity: The ASH model of Analysis

The Agenda for the Security of Humanity (ASH) is offered as a security conceptualization that acts simultaneously as a working agenda and as a model for security analysis that assists decision-makers with avoiding the state-centric paradigm traps of profit-as-power and short-termism.

Barry Buzan holds that, “international security cannot and should not be reduced to individual security”.²¹⁷ This seems to be one of the main conceptual downfalls of the UNDP’s notion of human security as it includes almost every imaginable threat that could be posed to the human individual. As Roland Paris critiqued, “if human security means almost anything, then it effectively means nothing.”²¹⁸ At the true heart of the matter is that human security, while providing a philosophy, provides no model for analysis or implementation. The human security conceptualization lists different forms of threats to human individuals without sufficiently demonstrating the ways in which those threats are tied to each other or the ways that they are tied to the security of the state or the natural environment. This led to a complex, overlapping, diverse mess of a security debate through the years. Security has become defined in so many divergent ways that security analysis becomes a near impossible job unless that job is broken down to address specific threats to specific forms of security. This narrowed approach is what allows for actual implementation of security initiatives. While a defined and narrowed approach is

²¹⁷ (Buzan, *People, States & Fear* 1991)

²¹⁸ (Paris 2001)

necessary, security analysis must at the same time be widened in so far as to identify the effects that pursuits of one form of security have upon other forms of security. The narrowed approach as it stands alone remains ineffective if it fails to address the interconnected nature of different threats in the world. Fitting security threats into imaginary boxes limits humankind's ability to address those threats when they escape from the traditional borders of our understanding.

While security must be narrowed for its analysis, it must also be analyzed in a manner that demonstrates the interconnected complexity of security concerns that threaten the one main larger goal: survival and prosperity for humankind on Earth. It is not enough for humans to simply survive, but we must prosper by holding true to the rights and dignity that any and all human beings inherently possess. And we must survive and we must prosper within the one environment that we have, Earth. If it goes, humanity goes. The goal of achieving survival and prosperity for humanity on Earth requires a collaboration of expertise working with the same agenda in mind: the agenda for the security of humanity.

The Agenda for the Security of Humanity (ASH) is that which aims for the achievement of the main goal of security and prosperity for humanity on Earth. As a model of analysis, ASH is aimed at organizing and simplifying the concept of security into a comprehensive unit that is able to travel out of the world of theory and into the world of implementation. To do this, ASH sorts through the expansive literature on security to identify the three main referent objects of security that consistently always

matter. These are the environment, humans, and states. These are the only three referent objects that can be respected as sovereign in and of themselves and they constitute the three main pillars within the ASH model of analysis. The role of the pillars is to support the sheltering roof that is the security and prosperity of humanity on Earth. In order to support that roof, to achieve that goal, each of the three pillars need to be equally constructed and supported themselves. A house with no roof fails to fulfill its purpose of providing shelter, as the roof is that which provides said shelter. A house without enough walls fails to fulfill its purpose in holding up that essential roof.

All other forms of security that have been identified throughout the literature are either supporting rods to one of these three pillars or they act as linkages between them, evidencing the interconnected nature of security threats. Each pillar is unable to withstand the weight of securing the needs of the human population on its own, but together a solid foundation is formed. If one pillar falls it is likely that a domino effect would occur.

One may wonder why economic security is not a main pillar that is acknowledged, as it is in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's (OSCE) security conceptualization, for example. This is because economic factors are those that either support or threaten the security of humans, states, and the environment; the economy is meant to serve the interests and needs of the three main referent objects, not the other way around. Money is not a legitimate referent object of security. Similarly, energy security and food security are not main pillars that are acknowledged; energy and

food are valuable only due to the fact that they are essential for the security of humans. Energy security and food security have their bases in the pillar of environmental security. While a state needs resources to support its population and economy, the extraction of these resources causes an inevitable and unavoidable certain amount of environmental degradation. Failure to address energy security from its base in the environmental pillar would mean failure to respond to overexploitation and overconsumption which can lead to irreparable degradation of the environment. The collapse of the environmental pillar would cause the national pillar to in turn collapse as the infrastructure of the state is dependent upon the availability of resources in the environment. If a state's infrastructure is then unable to provide for its citizens they too will suffer as the national pillar falls upon the human pillar. In terms of environmental resource extraction and the threat of the collapse of the environmental pillar, the human pillar, holding its human security initiatives, will collapse either as a direct result of environmental degradation or as an indirect result of the collapse of the state's infrastructure meant to provide individuals with security. The dependent variable here that determines one of these two outcomes is the individual's relationship with the state. Indigenous populations in the world not identifying with a state nor even necessarily solely residing within state borders will be directly affected by environmental degradation. Those depending on the infrastructure of the modern state for their needs and livelihoods will be affected by the collapse of the environmental pillar only as far as the national pillar is affected. When the state makes political decisions to hide the reality of the state of the environment, humans within that state are then blind-sided by the collapse of environmental resources.

The problem with human security is not so much that it is rather all encompassing, but that it provides no model for demonstrating any kind of hierarchy amongst or connection between all the forms of security that it includes. Without a model that provides some form of hierarchy amongst security concerns, security initiatives risk being directionless. Without a model that is able to demonstrate the effects that the pursuit of one form of security has upon other forms of security, there exists a risk that security agendas may be blindly initiated in ways that take place at each other's expenses, limiting their effectiveness.

The definable problem with the state-centric security architecture that is dominant in the 21st century security environment is that it is an architecture designed for self-inflicted degradation as the pursuits of national security occur at the expense of human and environmental security. This architecture is not able to support the security and prosperity of humans in our environment. By mapping the ways in which security is interdependent, the ASH model of security analysis preemptively demonstrates whether the pursuit of a given security agenda is sustainable or ultimately detrimental.

Nassim Nicholas Taleb explains a *black swan* as an event that sneaks upon us in an unpredicted manner. It is massive in its consequence and because of this in hindsight we develop explanations for its occurrence so as to make it appear more predictable than it actually was.²¹⁹ The dominant state-centric security architecture constructs a breeding pond for black swans. Within short-term models based on the pursuit of power, we lack

²¹⁹ (Taleb 2007)

the ability to analyze with foresight and thereby also lack the ability to keep black swans from entering the security environment.

The Agenda for the Security of Humanity, the ASH model of security analysis, is a three-pillared architecture with a design that inherently forces a level of reflection and foresight so as to ensure that the human, national, and environmental pillars are equally weighted in order to support the roof that provides for the security and prosperity of humanity. Security strategies that ensure the stability of one security pillar whilst degrading another are decisions to create self-inflicted risk and open the flood gates for black swans. Such strategies are not considerable options within the ASH model of security analysis due to the inevitable fact that without a sound foundation, ashes to ashes we are sure to all fall down.

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