PEACEMAKING IN CYPRUS: 1955 - 2012

by

Eleftherios A. Michael
A Dissertation
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of
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of
Doctor of Philosophy
Conflict Analysis and Resolution

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Fairfax, VA
Peacemaking in Cyprus: 1955 - 2012

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at George Mason University

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DEDICATION

This is dedicated to my
Parents and Teachers

For
Jenny, Alexi and Thalia
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ABSTRACT

PEACEMAKING IN CYPRUS: 1955-2012

Eleftherios A. Michael, M.A.

George Mason University, 2012

Dissertation Chair: Dr. Dennis J.D. Sandole

In earlier efforts by many researchers to explain the breakdown of peacemaking initiatives to settle the Cyprus question, the focus has been primarily on one or just a few initiatives. This dissertation takes a systematic and holistic approach to examining all 41 peacemaking initiatives to settle the Cyprus question from 1955 onward under the auspices of the United Nations and/or other actors in the international system, including the United States, Canada, the UK, Greece and Turkey. I believe that the qualitative analysis of peacemaking strategies, dynamics and obstacles (and in conjunction with various research literature) fleshes out numerous relationships between: (i) peacemaking processes, dynamics and outcomes, from signaling to post-accord completion and implementation; (ii) the relationship between concessions, constraints and leverage during peacemaking negotiations; and (iii) obstacles to finding an endgame solution that all parties can agree on, and overall obstacles that are detrimental to lasting peace in Cyprus. After concluding 62 interviews with top political leaders in Cyprus (including top tier elected elites and 3rd party mediators) and about 70 more interviews with key informants (including academics, researchers, members of negotiating teams, technical committees and working groups), this dissertation concludes with a plethora of descriptive propositions on how peacemaking processes could lead to more sustainable and implementable peacemaking initiatives in Cyprus and perhaps in similar protracted cases.
CHAPTER 1

Introduction to the Dissertation

“But what they fought each other for, why that I cannot tell”
“The Battle of Blenheim,” Robert Southey

1. What is this Dissertation About?

What is it about some peacemaking processes and their dynamics that at times can produce successful agreements between former enemies, while at other times can lead to mistrust between parties and a perpetual belief that the other side is exploiting their genuine goodwill for peace? In particular, what is it that prevents Greek-speaking and Turkish-speaking top leaders in Cyprus from finding a political settlement to their conflict, and why have 41 peacemaking initiatives between 1955 and onward failed to produce an integrative agreement?

Peacemaking initiatives or “gestures for conciliation” as Mitchell (2000) coined them, are the first signposts to a durable and lasting peace.1 Apparently, peacemaking initiatives / processes do not always lead towards integrative solutions where the aim of the former antagonists is to transform the fabric of their relations and move towards social reconciliation, trauma healing and restoration of mistrusted relationships that once were torn apart by destructive modes of interaction, as this (Cyprus) prototypical case
study reveals.² Peacemaking processes in Cyprus constitute the central theme for analysis in this dissertation, and how very few initiatives have led to a breakthrough towards substantive negotiations. For instances, of the 41 initiatives to settle the political question in Cyprus from 1955 to 2010, only a handful of those outcomes were eventually accepted by the two sides (top elites) as frameworks for a political settlement.³ I was puzzled by that for years, often asking: Is it because top leaders in Cyprus mistrust one another? Or is it because their minds are entrapped into some sort of self-stimulating and self-perpetuating mode of interaction that is stacked with competitive modes of thinking instead of collaborative modes? Does it have to do with the sectarian division of the 1960s and the barbed wire fences that have divided the two larger communities in Cyprus from 1974 and onward? Could the failure to reach a political settlement be attributed to the presence of seemingly incompatible visions as to what the parameters of an endgame solution ought to be? Sometimes, after a few interviewees told me that the “Cyprus issue has already been settled,” I wondered whether that was in fact a reality. Whether it is a problem that has been settled satisfactorily or not is the question that really puzzles top elites the most across the cease-fire line, as I came to learn. Therefore, I started searching for those obstacles en route to a permanent, just and durable peacemaking solution for all in Cyprus.

Before continuing, I find it important to highlight briefly for my readers what this dissertation does not aim to do. Firstly, it does not fall into the blame game that top leaders across the buffer zone in Cyprus orchestrate with the purpose to torpedo each others’ side, a course that they learned to master very well over the years. Secondly, my
approach does not aim to chastise a methodology and approach for a political settlement as right or wrong and allocate blame as to why 41 peacemaking initiatives (currently the 42nd is in the works) have failed to produce a breakthrough at the official track-one (T1) level. Instead, my objective is to develop an in-depth understanding of what are some of the factors and obstacles that led to the collapse of so many initiatives over the course of four consecutive periods from 1955 and onward. Lastly, if one really wants to know what ordinary Cypriots across the divide think and feel about the so-called “Cyprus problem” or their attitudes and behaviors towards each other and their sense as to how it should be settled, then they ought to visit the country because only ordinary Cypriots can provide such information, which they do in a rather peaceful and passionate way. In this dissertation research I can only reveal what I have learned as a result of my analysis and synthesis of:

- A data set (based on archival research) that I compiled of all peacemaking initiatives/processes that occurred in Cyprus which fulfilled the selection criteria for the classification process longitudinally from 1955 and onward;
- several islands of knowledge that derive from the juncture of various literature in the field of conflict analysis, international conflict resolution, leadership studies, international negotiations, comparative peace processes and foreign affairs;
- a dataset (based on survey research) comprising 62 anonymous and confidential interviews with top political leaders representing both communities (Greek-speaking and Turkish-speaking ethnic communities) in Cyprus carried out during the period between 2006-09 with several follow ups between 2009-11 (with the purpose of
clarification and continuation of inter-personal contacts); including UN mediators and foreign diplomats who were directly involved in peacemaking efforts in Cyprus during the period between 1955 and 2009 who I was able to interview.

- knowledge that derives from my interviews and discussions with 67 key informants, including journalists, academics, historians, former elites and political advisers in Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and elsewhere who have followed the politics and peacemaking efforts in Cyprus over the years. These unofficial interviews were conducted between 2004 and 2011, including numerous follow up conversations over the years.

What this dissertation lays out is twofold. First, it explores the characteristics of the peace process in Cyprus with a core emphasis on the peacemaking initiatives (processes, phases, structures, systems, strategies and outcomes) for a political settlement on the island spanning from 1955 to the current period. Second, it constructs a data-set of 41 peacemaking initiatives and conducted the analysis from a number of perspectives: (i) holistically, (ii) longitudinally and (iii) comparatively with the aim to identify parties’ perceived orientations for an endgame solution and identify a number of obstacles en route to sustainable peacemaking in Cyprus. Lastly, this dissertation suggests a number of propositions and recommendations for various audiences, including top leaders in Cyprus, 3rd party interveners and researchers and other peacemakers who are looking for more exploratory insights in this case.

The rest of this introductory chapter is divided into four sections. The first presents some of the arguments that top leaders in Cyprus are very likely to sit around the
negotiation table and express, with very little having been done to study all those initiatives and find out what seems to prevent them from settling their differences satisfactorily. The second section is a literature review that is organized into six approaches that form some of the basic arguments as to how peacemaking has been conceptualized in other studies that serve as departing points for my investigation. In the third section I synthesize the literature into a systemic approach in order to better understand the relationship between peacemaking initiation-process-dynamics-outcomes and how various endogenous and exogenous factors have influenced the inter-party interaction for a political settlement in Cyprus over the course of four chronological periods. The fourth and final section is a brief synopsis of how the rest of the dissertation is organized into chapters.

1.2 Understanding the Puzzle of Peacemaking Initiatives in Cyprus

Starting with some basic figures, between 1955 and 2010 only 11 out of 41 peacemaking initiatives come to a conclusion by producing some sort of an implementable agreement between the two parties in Cyprus (see Figure 1-1).\textsuperscript{4} Looking at this further, three out of the eleven initiatives were partially implemented (or parties took steps towards post-accord implementation). In fact, one of the three peacemaking agreements to settle the Cyprus issue, namely the Zurich-London Agreement (1955-1960) set the pretext, whether directly or indirectly, for the initiation of political intimidation and eventually violent conflict during the post-accord implementation phase of the agreement in the years that followed. The other two agreements, namely the Makarios-Denktash (1977) and
Kyprianou-Denktash (1979) high level agreements, were deemed conclusive by the two sides and the United Nations, but both have remained unimplemented and have served as points for political controversies not only between top elites across the divide but also between political parties and leaders within each side from that time and onward.

Figure 1-1: Percentage of peacemaking initiative that led to an agreed framework for a settlement: 1955-2010

Note: Eleven out of the 41 peacemaking initiatives led to some form of substantive negotiations. Thirty, or 73% percent, of the initiatives collapsed during a stage of pre-negotiations or at an earlier phase of a peacemaking process.
From a slightly similar methodological perspective, figure 1-2 (below) shows that among the 41 peacemaking initiatives, four collapsed at the very early stage of “signaling” (SG); 13 collapsed during the next phase of “preliminary contacts” (PC); seven peacemaking initiatives succeeded in “signaling” and “preliminary talks” and moved towards the “pre-negotiations” (PN) phase but without going as far as substantive negotiations; nine peacemaking initiatives went through all of the previous normative phases but collapsed eventually during “substantive negotiations” (SN); five initiatives collapsed during the stage of drafting / implementing the final agreement (AI); and lastly, three initiatives were accepted by top negotiators and finalized as accord documents – two of which are sitting in government files and one that collapsed during the “Post-Accord Implementation” (PA) phase.
Figure 1-2: Peacemaking Phases: from Signaling to Post-Accord Implementation

Key: Signaling (SG); Preliminary Contacts (PC); Pre-Negotiations (PN); Substantive Negotiations (SN); Accord Implementation (AI); Post-Accord Implementation (PA)
Table 1-1(a): Peacemaking Initiatives / Processes in Cyprus (1955-2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Initiative:</th>
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<td>Eden Initiative (EI)</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Inter-Communal Talks (IC)</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>P. Guellar Initiative (GI)</td>
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<td>1956</td>
<td>Harding Initiative (HI)</td>
<td>1972-74</td>
<td>Inter-Communal Talks (IC)</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Draft Framework (DF)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ball Initiative (BI)</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Denktash-Kyprianou (DK)</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>UN Mediation (UNM)</td>
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<td>Acheson Plan (AP)</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Inter-Communal Talks (ICT)</td>
<td>1998</td>
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<td>Galo P. Initiative (GPI)</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Inter-Communal Talks (ICT)</td>
<td>2001</td>
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| Year | EI | DI | HI | RP | HP | MI | LZ | MP | LC | BI | AP | GP | CV | IC | IC | GC | VT | DM | AC | DK |
|------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 1955 |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| 56   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
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Table 1-1(b): (Cont.)

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A closer examination of the 41 peacemaking initiatives in Cyprus from 1955 to 2010, from both a statistical and a qualitative perspective, shows that getting top leaders to the table does not guarantee they are genuinely in the mood for a just and sustainable peace on the island. Also, by calculating the frequency in which the peacemaking initiatives are introduced in Cyprus as well as the time lapse between every initiative in relation to the previous one, leads to the observation that getting top leaders or their representatives around the table to talk is not very difficult after all. Furthermore, a number of observations or propositions that are derived from the data set suggest that:

Proposition 1-I: Conditions for signaling as well as conditions following the process of signaling in getting Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot top leaders to the table for talks are necessary but not sufficient to settle the Cyprus problem satisfactorily.\

Proposition 1-II: Peacemaking initiatives in Cyprus are very likely to go through the phase of signaling rather successfully, but the greatest difficulties arise during pre-negotiations and substantive negotiations.\

Proposition 1-III: Conditions that appear in literature to encourage pre-negotiations and substantive negotiations are necessary to keep the parties seated across the table facing one another but are not sufficient to produce compromised agreements or even integrative agreements for lasting peace.
Proposition 1-IV: 3rd party mediators and outside interveners in Cyprus are important and necessary agents for keeping the channeling of information open but do not have any contribution in securing and guaranteeing the same flow of communication once peace plans are completed and towards post-accord implementation.

Proposition 1-V: Conditions for stalemate, “mutual hurting stalemate” and the presence of “enticing opportunities” are important factors for bringing mistrusted parties to the table but not sufficient factors in producing a mutual endgame set of solutions or visions for their future.8

Proposition 1-VI: Issues that are linked to the local ethnic identity of each of the two larger groups in Cyprus as well as to their ethno-national identity (linkages to Greece and Turkey) are less likely to be bridged without the consent of the mother lands and/or other political spoilers on the island who deem every concession as a “sell out to the other side.”

Proposition 1-VII: While it is conventional to believe, as some other studies suggest, that the more divisible the issues are from one another the more likely it is for the negotiators to reach a middle ground of acceptable set of options, it is also likely that the linkage of one issue to another could construct a range of trade-off possibilities for negotiators.
To keep the record free of possible ambiguities, I am not arguing that conditions for getting to the table or starting talks are not important. Cypriot leaders and their top negotiators have no chance in settling the Cyprus problem unless they are willing to start genuine negotiations to address the terrain that seems to separate them and address all those grievances, insecurities and fears that are beneath the terrain so that they can find an integrative set of outcomes that leaves everyone with enough peace dividends to exploit which the current sectarian status quo division cannot offer any longer.9

1.3 Literature Review and Theoretical Arguments

The practice and methods for peacemaking, whether direct or through intermediaries, have a very rich history across times and settings from Thucydides’ and Herodotus’ description of virulent wars to the “CODESA conferences” in South Africa, the “Good Friday” agreement in Northern Ireland and of course to the current efforts to settle the Cyprus dispute which spans across four chronological periods and settings from 1955 to 2012.

Period I: (1955 - 1959)
Period II: (1960 - 1974 August)
Period III (1974 - 2004 April)
Period IV: (2004 - Current)

Evidently, there are significant differences in all of those chronological periods, and briefly these have to do with a number of circumstances such as:

(i) the distinctive “situations, attitudes and behaviors” of conflict cycles as well as those of the parties involved;
(ii) conflict processes, dynamics and outcomes;

(iii) the distinctive attributes of the methods, perspectives and approaches used to settle the conflict;

(iv) the roles which particular methods and parties involved play in the actual process of peacemaking and afterwards;

(v) the peacemaking dynamics, processes and other characteristics; and

(vi) the distinctive attributes of endogenous and exogenous factors that might influence the context and processes of a peacemaking initiative from its early phases to its anticipated outcomes.

Whatever its specific characteristics and conditions, which I will describe later on,

peacemaking is a very complex phenomenon to grasp and it entails a number of direct or indirect methods, techniques and structures such as mediation, good offices, conciliation, facilitation and negotiation for opening up and keeping the communication among mistrusted parties open with the purpose to terminate, manage, settle or resolve their differences satisfactorily. In this dissertation I am taking an integrative approach in analyzing and understanding peacemaking as a phenomenon with many start-up conditions as well as a process(-es) of inter-party interactions with some sort of intended and or unintended outcomes. As a starting point, this is done by synthesizing several published accounts into six distinct approaches and categories listed in figure 1-3 below and summarized in table 1-2, also below.
Figure 1-3: Peacemaking: An Integrative Approach

Approach I: Peacemaking as a Process

Peacemaking is defined as a process or a sequence of interactions where moves and countermoves are exchanged (Bartos 1974) or by which contending parties come to an agreement once condition of timing and ripeness are satisfied, Zartman (2002). Within this approach of reasoning, (i) Dupont and Faure (2002); Raiffa (1968) define the
peacemaking as a strategic approach process; (ii) Cross (1977) as a learning process; (iii) Zartman and Berman (1982) as well as Gulliver (1979) as a joint decision-making process; (iv) Pruitt (1981) and Druckman (1977) as a reactive process of concessions and counter-concessions and demands; (v) Rubin (1975) defines it as psychological processes where perceptions and expectations influence the overall characteristics of interaction and outcomes; and (vi) Zeuthen (1930) an adjustment process where issues are affected by the level of concessions made.¹⁰

**Approach II:** Peacemaking as Phases (stages) of Inter-party Interaction

From this island of knowledge, peacemaking is seen as a sequence of interaction that goes through various phases (or stages) according to Douglas (1957) and Guelke (2002); Also, according to Gulliver (1979), Stein (1989), Druckman (1983); Pruitt (1981) and Mitchell (1981), among others, peacemaking includes phases such as (a) pre-talks; (b) secret talks; (c) multilateral talks; (d) negotiating a settlement; (e) gaining endorsement; (f) implementing the provisions; and (g) institutionalization of the new dispensation.

**Approach III:** Peacemaking as a Structure

To look further at this approach, a few studies emphasize the linkage between structure (bilateral, multilateral, etc.) and outcomes. For example, some studies approach peacemaking from a structural point of view such as in Thompson (2001) and Fisher (1986) where various conditions such as stalemate (Zartman 1989) have an impact on the outcomes. Some other researchers’ link peacemaking structures with the use of power
(symmetrical or asymmetrical power) in the domestic and international settings, including Zartman (1974), Dahl (1976), and Axelrod (1970). From a slightly similar perspective some other researchers use parameters to define the structure such as multiple levels of interaction found in Putman (1988), Saunders (1991), and Karras (1970).

**Approach IV: Peacemaking as a System**

From this approach, peacemaking is viewed as a systemic organization of networks or sub-systems in domestic and international settings, as Kremenyuk (2002) argues, incorporating formal / informal talks, direct talks, and/or teams of experts / working groups engaged together in a process and a structure of talks within a larger system. Peacemaking as a system also refers to a systemic approach in exploring alternatives, legitimacy, options, commitments, communication, and relationships, as defined by Fisher and Brown (1988). Peacemaking as a systemic approach also includes in this dissertation the same sub-systemic structures of mediation / negotiations as those found in Bercovitch et al (1996), Mitchell and Banks et al (1988) and Wall (1981).

**Approach V: Peacemaking as Strategies**

From this perspective, a number of approaches are integrated here that regard peacemaking as a decision-making process found in Raiffa (1982) and Brams (1975) where players / antagonists in conflict make strategic choices for moving toward an agreement including: contending, problem-solving, and yielding. Similar modes of interaction are also cited in Thomas (1976), Pruitt and Rubin (1986), Pruitt, Rubin and
Kim (1994) and Kelman (1985) including: competition, collaboration and accommodation. From a slightly similar perspective, I also classify here approaches that do not focus primarily on modes of interaction but methods for lowering mistrust and building relationships for better outcomes including Fisher and Brown’s (1988) “working relationship” approach, Mitchell’s (2000) “gesture of conciliation” approach, and Osgood’s (1962) “gradual and reciprocal tension reduction” approach.

**Approach VI: Peacemaking as Outcomes**

Traditionally, the ultimate purpose of parties who have been involved in a peacemaking process is to reach the desired outcomes they wished for. There are a plethora of approaches that try to understand the scholarly linkage between peacemaking processes and outcomes. In this dissertation, I incorporate literature that will assist me in linking processes with modes of interaction, outcomes and successful implementation of the peace accords. For example, Easton (1965) and Sharkansky (1970) distinguish between decision-making processes that can lead to peace accords and the consequences of implementing and adapting the accords over time. Others talk about types of outcomes such as integrative and compromising outcomes, found in Pruitt and Kim (2004), Zartman and Berman (1982), as well as changes in circumstances during talks that may affect the overall outcomes, cited in Keohane and Nye (1977), Iklé (1964), and eventually impact the behavior of negotiators (and 3rd parties) towards integrative solutions, Fisher and Ury (1981), Bercovitch (1996).
Table 1-2: (Below) Traditional Approaches to Peacemaking

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peacemaking as</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Process</strong></td>
<td>Peacemaking is defined as a process or a sequence of interactions where moves and countermoves are exchanged (Bartos 1974) or by which contending parties come to an agreement (Zartman 2002). Within this avenue of reasoning Dupond and Faure (2002) define the peacemaking process as: (a) a strategic approach process (Raiffa 1982); (b) a learning process (Cross 1977); (c) a joint decision-making process or processes (Zartman and Berman 1982; Gulliver 1979); (d) a reactive process of concessions and counter-concessions and demands (Pruitt 1981; Druckman 1977); (e) psychological processes where perceptions and expectations influence the process and outcomes; and (f) an adjustment process where issues are affected by the level of concessions made.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phases</strong></td>
<td>It separates between time and dynamics in the interparty sequence of interaction. Phases include an approach by Guelke (2002) including seven stages: (a) pre-talks phase; (b) secret talks; (c) multilateral talks; (d) negotiating a settlement; (e) gaining endorsement; (f) implementing the provisions; and (g) institutionalization of the new dispensation. Also see Stein 1989 and Mitchell.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structure</strong></td>
<td>It involves at least two parties seeking to reach a joint outcome. Researchers in this literature link the structural analysis to the bargaining situation for a settlement through real case studies or simulations (Rapoport 1960); Rubin and Brown 1975; Thompson 2001) and some other researchers link structures with power (symmetrical or asymmetrical power) between the antagonists in the domestic and international settings (Zartman 1974, Dahl 1976; Axelrod 1970) or in multiple levels of analysis (Putman (1988); Zartmann (1984); Saunders (1991); Karras (1970); as well as structures of third party intervention / mediation (Mitchell and Webb (1988) Bercovitch (1996).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>System</strong></td>
<td>Peacemaking is viewed as a system of networks or sub-systems (Kremenyuk 2002) incorporating formal / informal talks, direct talks, and/or teams of experts / working groups engaged together in a process and a structure of talks within the system. Peacemaking as a system also refers to a systemic approach of a framework incorporating subsystems on alternatives, interests, legitimacy, options, commitments, communication, and relationships, as defined by Fisher and Brown (1988).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Strategies</strong></td>
<td>Peacemaking as a decision-making process (Raiffa 1982; Brams, 1975) where players make strategic choices for moving toward agreement, including contending, problem-solving and yielding (Pruitt and Rubin 1986; Pruitt, Rubin and Kim 1994) as well as competition and collaboration and accommodation (Thomas 1976). Gestures of Conciliation (Mitchell 2000).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome</strong></td>
<td>One of the ultimate purposes of peacemaking is to reach the desired outcomes aimed for and researchers look to find linkage between process, behaviors, outcomes and successful implementation of the peace accords, most of which are often violated. Researchers distinguish between the product of the decision-making processes – interaction that may lead to an agreed peace accord and the consequences of implementing and adapting the accords over time (Easton 1965; Sharkansky 1970); Others talk about types of outcomes such as integrative and compromising outcomes (Pruitt and Kim 2006); Zartman and Berman 1982) as well as changes in circumstances that may affect outcomes (Kaohane and Nye 1977; Iklé 1964).</td>
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1.4 Approaches to Peacemaking

As part of synthesizing the six approaches, peacemaking is not a static or a uniform process. In Cyprus, peacemaking initiatives have many commonalities but also vary from one to another in terms of their nature, process, dynamics, characteristics, settings, context, structures and outcomes, all of which are influenced by a number of variables including:

(i) political and non-political party roles, positions, characteristics and behaviors;

(ii) intermediary roles, methods, characteristics and behaviors;

(iii) the context and dynamics of the conflict process and/or peace process;

(iv) the process of inter-party interactions;

(v) the process and dynamics of channeling communication between mistrusted parties;

(vi) the number of concessions, types of constraints and use of leverages;

(vii) a plethora of endogenous factors such as:
  a. Intra-party dynamics (group dynamics) and characteristics;
  b. Leadership characteristics;
  c. Psychological factors;
  d. Leadership visions for an endgame solution;
  e. Peace expectations and dividends;
  f. Culture and belief systems of constituents
  g. The composition of civil society

(viii) and a plethora of exogenous factors such as
  a. Bi-lateral and multi-lateral relations with neighbors;
  b. Geopolitical location;
  c. Linkage to other external factors and political spill-overs from Greece-Turkey;
  d. Membership to various regional and international organizations (eg OSCE, NATO, UN);
  e. Politically shocking events.
With all of the above factors in mind as well as the six islands of approaches stated earlier, I am taking a systems approach to peacemaking depicted diagrammatically below in *figure 1-4*. 
Figure 1-4: A Systems Approach to Peacemaking
Starting from the core of the model and moving from the left to the right, horizontally, are clusters of peacemaking phases that a generic peacemaking process is very likely to go through, ranging from signaling (the early phase of peacemaking initiation) to post-accord implementation. My argument here is that peacemaking goes through at least six phases of inter-party interaction (structures of communication), and whether successful or not, its overall dynamic process and outcome are influenced by several clusters of variables within the core system of interaction. Peacemaking is not based on a single cause-effect model and it should be conceptualized as a very dynamic and systemic process where a very large number of reciprocal relationships could take place. Juxtaposing from the case of Cyprus I hope that at the end my approach can lead to a generic theory of peacemaking that can be applicable to other peace processes.

1.5 Peacemaking Paradigms in Cyprus (1955 - 2011)

Like the world order in transition, the conceptual lenses that are needed to understand and interpret the peacemaking process and to take action are going through “paradigm shifts.”\(^{11}\) Over the last six decades peacemaking strategies in Cyprus have overlapped between paradigms. As conflict dynamics change over time (Laue 1991), structural variables in peacemaking such as power, methods, structure, strategies and decision making mechanisms appear in an ever changing frame (Saunders 1990).\(^ {12}\) In this chapter I developed an integrative framework, rather than a single paradigm approach, for understanding peacemaking among multiple levels of analysis. Depicted in *table 1-3*, the five paradigms include (i) the most recent Colonial period in Cyprus 1949-1955; (ii) the
bi-polar structure during the Cold War 1945-1980s; (iii) the realpolitik level 1960-present; (iv) the local bi-communal level 1960-present; and (v) the United Nations paradigm from the 1940s to the present.

The main theme around peacemaking in Cyprus from the 1950s to about 1974 was based on the conceptual understanding that “if you want peace, prepare for war” - a course of action that dominated the interactions on the island and for which some symbolic traces remain today. On a more positive note, Cypriot elites, with the assistance of the United Nations and other conflict resolution practitioners, have managed over the years to change that approach and incorporate more peaceful techniques and methodologies into their local, identity-based peacemaking paradigm.
Table 1-3: Peacemaking Paradigms in Cyprus

|------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
Peacemaking is a very complex phenomenon and it is not only about how we deal with violent conflict, but also the techniques we use to prevent, manage, settle, mitigate, de-escalate, contain, terminate, avoid, ignore, resolve, transform or even escalate conflict. Peacemaking has created a lot of debates about what methods to incorporate and when, who should intervene and under what circumstances and which method could produce the most satisfactory results. The case of Cyprus is very exemplary to the degree that it is congruent to most of the arguments about peacemaking found in Bercovitch (1991), Bercovitch and Wells (1993). From a systemic analysis, peacemaking builds on the following proposition:

*Proposition 1-VIII:* While peacemaking paradigms shift or crisscross over time (thus changing the way roles, context, structure, process, dynamics, behaviors, methods among other internal/external conditions are formed), the deep rooted causes and conditions leading up to and sustaining violent conflict must be addressed and sufficiently satisfied in order to be materialized into accord and post-accord implementation process.

1.6 The Cyprus Peacemaking Syndrome

One of the themes that emerged from the analysis of 41 peacemaking initiatives to settle the “Cyprus problem” is that both sides share a similar sense that a negotiated settlement is within reach. Also, both sides have expressed their willingness to search for that solution for at least 41 times thus far. Periodically, they have come up with seemingly compromised endgame solutions that include a common set of parameters to sustain the
foundation for their final status agreement. Willingness to negotiate is not a self-implementing mechanism; it is a necessary condition for talks to start-up in Cyprus but it also requires the skill of a mediator and the mediation team to assist along the way. In fulfilling this task, the United Nations has been the most reliable locomotive for preparing the ground for talks in Cyprus and for inaugurating and/or maintaining an unobstructed path for communication between the top leaders. Within this paradigm, mediation / negotiation structures are the skeletons of the peacemaking processes in Cyprus and a number of factors can influence the inauguration of the mediation / negotiations process as well as its relevant success as I will demonstrate in chapter 8.\textsuperscript{15}

In addition, there are some structural roadblocks en route to a final settlement in Cyprus such as the elongated search for an integrated endgame solution itself which has exhausted the patience of the UN, mediators and other internationals, but above all it has drained the basin of hope among ordinary citizens in Cyprus who keep on hoping that “this time around there will be a breakthrough,” a course that has been repeated 41 times. The conjuncture of the “prolonged Cyprus problem syndrome,” at the political level, “the syndrome of constant waiting” at the social level, the “prolonged peacemaking search syndrome” at the negotiation table and the persistent sectarian status quo division that continues to perpetuate all forms of interactions in Cyprus have created a number of structural conditions (which I abbreviate below) of what one can or cannot expect from the peacemaking and peace-building processes in Cyprus.\textsuperscript{16}
(i) One group in control of a particular territory resists the position of the other for territorial changes for a greater share;

(ii) One group seeks recognition of its distinct identity for equal participation within local, national and international organizations for greater benefits;

(iii) Both parties seek a great degree of political power, whether that is expressed through separation, power sharing or some form of federalism;

(iv) Both seek to balance out the structural asymmetry of power at the various places of interaction;

(v) Changes in attitudes and behaviors among generations of ordinary Cypriots as time passes create a level of mistrust and fear that working with the “other side” is a great risk.

One of the arguments that derive from the above syndromes is that:

**Proposition 1-IX:** The structure and methods of peacemaking can set the foundation for finding peace agreements but can also provide the script for top leaders to exacerbate mistrust and misperception among ordinary people if needed in order to serve their own self-interests. ¹⁷

In retrospect, for many ordinary Cypriots (based on my own observations) peacemaking represents a battle fatigue. This is attributed to a very large degree to the “endless tit-for-tat syndrome” that top leaders have established through their reciprocal actions that have no obvious solution for creating conditions for lasting peace. In sequence it marginalizes proponents in favor of peace across the barbed wires and the
sectarian fences that give proponents in favor of maximalist positions a new set of drumsticks to keep on marching.

1.7 How the Dissertation is Organized

The next eight chapters examine the peacemaking processes and dynamics in Cyprus, the various peacemaking initiatives are the centerpiece of the overall peace process in Cyprus, and the obstacles that seem to prevent Greek speaking and Turkish speaking top leaders in Cyprus from finding a political settlement to their conflict.

Chapter 2 looks at the methodological approaches that were put in place to complete this dissertation research. Firstly, by constructing an empirical data set of 41 peacemaking initiatives from 1955 and onward, this gives the study a holistic approach as to what it is that prevents top leaders in Cyprus from settling their differences. It also enables me to develop some common themes, propositions and generalizations for further investigation. One example of this analysis in conjunction with interviews depicts the positions and preferred visions of top leaders longitudinally for an endgame solution in Cyprus. Secondly, three comparative analyses of similar and / or dissimilar units are incorporated to give more depth to the understanding of peacemaking as a conceptual tool for peacemakers and diplomats. This includes: (i) a comparative analysis of two peacemaking initiatives in order to identify a number of contextual factors that seem to influence the peacemaking processes, parties’ behaviors, their initial positions and the various obstacles that arose during the mediation / negotiation process; (ii) a comparative analysis that focuses on examining the system of channeling communication between the
two mistrusted sides in Cyprus; and (iii) a comparative analysis of mediation /
negotiation structures and their characteristics in starting up and/or sustaining durable and
integrative peacemaking processes.

Chapter 3 contains a detailed chronology of the peacemaking initiatives in Cyprus
with particular emphasis on the internal and external context at the time when each
initiative was introduced. In addition, Appendix A provides a summary of all
peacemaking initiatives in Cyprus from 1955-2011. While most published chronologies
are focusing on the events that led to conflict between the two sides, the attempt here is to
give more emphasis to the events and developments that were associated with the
context, characteristics and dynamics of each peacemaking process.

Chapter 4 is an introduction to the so-called “Cyprus problem” or “Cyprus
question.” The argument in this chapter is that the Cyprus problem is not only a mere
political concept, as some political leaders have argued, but a deeper social calamity in
need of reconciliation, forgiveness, apology and healing as ordinary Cypriots across the
immortalized fences and barbed wires of a dead zone remain hostages. The process by
which the so-called Cyprus problem is framed and phrased over time, space and
audiences by the two main officialdoms across the divide reflects (i) the positions and
aspirations of leaders and their constituents writ large for an endgame solution, (ii) their
perceptions and behaviors towards each other across the barbed fences of hatred and (iii)
the methodology and strategies top leaders subscribe to with the purpose to reach their
seemingly incompatible goals.
Chapter 5 is an investigation of the Cyprus peace process. Peacemaking is only one of the characteristics of the Cyprus peace process. Through the development of several visual models the aim in this chapter is to depict the structures and settings in which micro, meso and macro processes such as peacekeeping, peace-building and peacemaking are important ingredients for all who wish to master a durable and just settlement in Cyprus. However, for the most part the peace process in Cyprus is primarily dominated by official ‘Track One’ diplomacy that allows very little room for civil society to take its course from the bottom up. The sectarian status quo division has created the so-called demonized “other side,” a dehumanized enemy that is none other than the compatriots who are needed to reunite the island.

Chapter 6 provides an in depth examination of the various endgame strategies in Cyprus, the role of the political parties and leaderships in constructing and maintaining those views. One of the arguments here is that one of the biggest obstacles to settlement is the entrapment and entrenchment of party leaders into arguments and positions that have little flexibility to alter over time. Along the same argument, political parties that participate in coalition governments or oppositions can constrain the likelihood of a peace making process and its outcome. A few initiatives failed or remained inconclusive due to the intra-party dynamic. Furthermore, nine more obstacles are identified by analyzing two similar peacemaking processes known as Boutros Ghali’s “Set of Ideas” (1992) and Kofi Annan’s “Comprehensive Peace Plan” (2004). Appendixes A, B and C are also important to look at in parallel with this chapter. Lastly, the chapter concludes with a number of propositions.
In chapter 7, I examine the obstacles to peacemaking according to the framework that I introduce in Chapter 3. The analysis takes place at two levels: First, I am looking at the data-set of the 41 peacemaking initiatives to identify a number of predominant obstacles in negotiations that hinder any progress from becoming building blocks that could sustain the efforts for peacemaking. The analysis from the database adds a number of themes and factors that have hindered progress towards a breakthrough, as my interviewees understand it from the interviews I completed. Second, I embedded a comparative analysis of two peacemaking initiatives to give a more in-depth understanding of parties’ positions regarding nine significant and seemingly protracted obstacles in negotiations that currently seem to block the road to a breakthrough. The two initiatives are: Boutros-Ghali’s “Set of Ideas” (1992) and Kofi Annan’s “Comprehensive Agreement” or “Annan Plan V” (2004).

Chapter 8 is separated into two sections. In the first one, I examine how channeling of communication takes place in peacemaking that can start up direct / indirect negotiations or can exist as a parallel to formal negotiations as a back channel of communication. To do this analysis I examined five exemplary chains of communication comparatively from the database that I compiled and conclude with some propositions about how channels can start and lead to or complement larger peacemaking frameworks of mediation / negotiation. This is a study that has not been done before or referenced in published accounts about Cyprus. Departing from the first section, I then examine the process of peacemaking in Cyprus from a systemic framework perspective. Methodologically, I reference data from the larger data-set of initiatives and, along with
primary information from my interviews, I assemble two comparative analyses with the purpose of developing a number of propositions about how peacemaking can lead to successful post-accord implementation in Cyprus. The first analysis focuses on peacemaking channels and includes:

a. Christofias - Kalyongou Channel (Secret and Confidential 2004)
b. Clerides - De Sotto - Denktash Channel (Visible and Confidential 2001-02)
c. AKEL - CTP Channel (Unofficial, Direct and Confidential 2004-2006)
d. Greece - Turkey Channel (Parallel, Indirect and Confidential 2004)
e. Christofias – Talat (Direct and Contingent to the Christofias-Talat Initiative 2008)

The second analysis is on peacemaking structures (Mediation / Negotiation) and is based on the following peacemaking initiatives:

a. London-Zurich Processes 1955-60
b. Makarios-Denktash Principles in 1977

Chapter 9 is the concluding chapter and it is separated into two parts. The first one provides a conceptual framework for understanding the ever present trade-off dilemmas in peacemaking by examining the relationship between concessions, constraints and leverages in peacemaking. The second is an attempt to demonstrate the impact of peacemaking efforts in Cyprus on the overall perceived level of peace expectations at the grass roots level. As final conclusion this dissertation offers a number of propositions that are embedded into each chapter. This dissertation is built on the premise that it will be a departing point for further research and practice in the future, with regard to Cyprus and similar conflicts elsewhere.
CHAPTER 2

Methodology

2. Research Methods

There is no single methodological approach to study the phenomenon of peacemaking, as some scholars have argued (Kremenyuk 2002; Zartman 1978). As the literature review suggests in Chapter I, peacemaking has been studied from multiple approaches coming from all disciplines which have contributed to a better understanding of the phenomenon from both a qualitative and quantitative analyses. Each approach generates its own set of questions, answers and methods to obtain the lessons from real life realities that took place in Cyprus nearly half a century ago, up to the present time.

I am confident that as a student of conflict analysis and conflict resolution, the approaches I take in this dissertation produce many insights and an understanding of the peacemaking processes that have been undertaken over the course of a half century to settle the Cyprus problem satisfactorily, as the two larger communities have wished for. I hope the analysis will be useful for practitioners of conflict resolution, 3rd party interveners and negotiators. I also hope that the propositions developed in this dissertation reinforce other studies across disciplines and perhaps can help us understand a bit more the complexities and dynamics of peacemaking and generate additional
scholarly enquiries. This methodology section is separated into four sections: (i) Peacemaking Data Set; (ii) Focused comparisons of similar and dissimilar units of analysis; (iii) data collection / analysis and (iv) triangulation, validity and reliability of data.

2.1 Peacemaking Data-Set

In this dissertation the empirical propositions (propositions that I developed throughout the chapters) are constructed through the utilization of a data set of nearly all of the peacemaking initiatives / processes that took place in Cyprus from 1955 to 2010 to settle the Cyprus problem and are classified longitudinally. With the exception of a very few initiatives that did not fit the selection criteria, the set includes 41 peacemaking processes.\(^{18}\) Actually, it took over the course of nearly three years to compile a qualitative classificatory system with the expectation that it will have a use beyond this dissertation. A very short version of the electronic data-base that I developed is reproduced and re-organized in a reader friendly format in Appendix A. I will be making reference to appendix A in the forthcoming chapters.\(^{19}\) All of the 41 initiatives are classified into a qualitative scaling (see appendix B) and are distributed into a time-series progression of unequal time intervals, due to the conflict dynamics and other characteristics on the ground. Figure 2-1 below is a summary of Appendix B.\(^{20}\)
Figure 2-1: Peacemaking Initiatives by Chronological Periods

Key:

- USA-UK Initiatives
- United Nations Initiatives
- Local Initiatives
As a reflection on Appendixes A and B, Figure 2-1 shows a relationship between a number of ever-changing characteristics of peacemaking initiatives over periods of time including:

(i) **The nature of the initiators** – (a) the United Kingdom (Britain) gets more actively involved during the insurgency period for self-determination by the Greek speaking Cypriots as well as during the post-colonization period as a constitutional guarantor power; (b) the United States gets actively involved during the Cold War period to diffuse a larger confrontation in the Eastern flank of the NATO alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean between Greece and Turkey; (c) local initiatives were also undertaken by Cypriot leaders and under the auspices of the United Nations (Good Offices) to reunite the island or find a compromise settlement.

(ii) **The structure of international politics** (and membership in international organizations such as the UN, EU) – The structure of international politics has changed significantly including (a) from colonial to post-colonial independence setting; (b) from the Cold War bi-polarity to post-Cold War multi-centrism / multi-polarity; (c) from the polarized Greek-Turkish balance of power to a new rapprochement status, and (d) accession to the European Union.
(iii) **The context of domestic conflict** – The dynamic nature of domestic inter and intra-party politics has changed significantly from (a) the paramilitarism of the 50s-60s; (b) the (wars) military interventions in the early 70s; (c) the development of a sectarian status quo division; (d) intra-party talks framework and (e) political rapprochement development to a more friendly state of affairs.\(^{21}\)

(iv) **The context of larger Greek-Turkish relations** – The Greco-Turkish relations went through a rollercoaster of political and social intimidation, low conflict intensity and severe polarization over the Aegean Sea (delineation of continental shelf), the presence of minorities in each country and their status in Cyprus up to the early 1970s. From 1999 and onward the “earthquake” diplomacy, as it has been phrased, has opened a new opportunity for collaboration between the two neighbors who have strong links to both communities in Cyprus.\(^{22}\)

(v) **Structure of Talks** – The structure of talks has also changed over the four chronological periods. In the first period the talks were carried out in secrecy under the auspices of the UK and USA and in consultation with Greece and Turkey. That structure started to change in the late 1960s and early 1970s to a bi-communal structure under the auspices of the United Nations. Following the war of 1974, a number of international conferences failed to reach a common ground, swaying more ground to the UN and the good offices of the Secretary Generals.\(^{23}\)
Another dimension of information that derives from the large data set is the prevalence of mediation / negotiation as a structure of channeling information back and forth between the parties involved. After a closer investigation of each initiative, I classify the peacemaking processes into six methods of communication modes that best fit the efforts for settlement: (a) Unilateral Actions; (b) Indirect Talks; (c) Direct Talks; (d) Shuttle Diplomacy; (e) Secret Talks; and (f) International Conferences. All of these are listed in figure 2-2 below.24
Unilateral Actions  Indirect Talks  Direct Talks  Shuttle Diplomacy  Secret Talks  International Conferences

Figure 2-2: Peacemaking Modes of Inter-party Interactions
Table 2-1: Peacemaking Initiatives and Methods in Cyprus 1955-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timeline</th>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Initiator</th>
<th>Peacemaking Methods</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Period I</strong></td>
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<td>Multilateral Conference</td>
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<td>Dulles Initiative (DI)</td>
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<td>1956</td>
<td>Harding Initiat. (HI)</td>
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<td>Shuttle Diplomacy</td>
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<td>Rackliffe Prop. (RP)</td>
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<td>1957</td>
<td>Hugh Proposals (HP)</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Secret Diplomacy</td>
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<td>MacMillan Init. (MI)</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Secret Diplomacy</td>
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<td>1957-59</td>
<td>London-Zurich A. (LZA)</td>
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<td>Multilateral Conference</td>
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<td><strong>Period II</strong></td>
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<td>1963</td>
<td>Makarios Prop. (MP)</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Unilateral Action</td>
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<td>Ball Initiative (BI)</td>
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<td>USA-UK</td>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>Vienna Talks (VT)</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Indirect Talks</td>
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<td>1977</td>
<td>Denktash-Makarios T.(DM)</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Direct Talks</td>
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<td>1978</td>
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<td>1979</td>
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<td>Working Points (WP)</td>
<td>UN</td>
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<td>1988-90</td>
<td>Vassiliou-Denktash Talks (VD)</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Direct Talks</td>
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<td>1991</td>
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<td>UN</td>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>UN Mediation (UNM)</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Direct Talks</td>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>R. Holbrooke Init. (HI)</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Shuttle Diplomacy</td>
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<td>1999-00</td>
<td>Proximity Talks (PT)</td>
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<td>2001</td>
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<td>2002-04</td>
<td>Annan Peace Plan (AP)</td>
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<td><strong>Period IV</strong></td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>July 6 Agreement (J6)</td>
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<td>2008</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Christofias-Eroglu Talks (in progress)</td>
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Devising an index of all peacemaking initiatives that were undertaken to settle the Cyprus problem (1955-2010) is a very complicated matter. From early on I knew that I had to devise some sort of an analysis of what constitutes an outcome after each episode of peacemaking initiatives in Cyprus ended. This includes 41 episodes with varied interpretations. For example, the one side might refer to one peacemaking outcome as a “failed process” and the other considers it a “framework for future talks,” as in the case of Kofi Annan’s “comprehensive peace plan” in 2004. In another episode, this time initiated by former UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, the one side “rejected” his “set of ideas” and “confidence building measures” completely, whereas the other side labeled it as a “missed opportunity.” Boutros-Ghali, in his report to the Security Council, referred to the same outcome as “inconclusive.”

In this analysis, I refrain from using the normative labeling criteria of “successful” or “unsuccessful” outcomes. Instead, I follow a twofold path in investigating first each one of the 41 initiatives and the processes that followed, via written accounts, archival research and confidential interviews with top leaders and other individuals who have some direct / indirect involvement in those initiatives from both sides in Cyprus. Second, I compare and match the information I collected from the various sources with whether each initiative produced: (i) a considerable change towards an overall political settlement and (ii) if it improved the level of the overall inter-party talks and whether it moved the overall process forward towards a breakthrough, a stagnation point or a breaking point. After a period of further work, I classified the data into the following six categories (Also see figure 2-3 below):
Failed - This category includes all the initiatives that failed very early on in the signaling process. This category includes initiatives that did not start-up any interaction between the parties. In some instances some preliminary form of direct or indirect gesturing did take place but failed to ignite any further communication.

Rejected - This category lists initiatives in which some form of direct or indirect interaction between the parties was started and maintained (at least temporarily) and as a result it produced some form of a blue print such as a set of propositions or a preliminary framework but was rejected (formally or informally) by either the one or both of the parties without making any further reference to the “blue print” again.

Impasse - This includes all those inter-party interactions that have reached a dead end but the process has not been terminated. In the meantime, there were attempts by one or both parties and interveners to try and jump start the process again. This category also includes permanent impasses where the process did not restart again as the parties continued to insist on their “red” and “blue” line of “no no’s.”

Inconclusive - Unlike temporary and permanent impasses, inconclusive initiatives were simply put on hold as talks were interrupted temporarily due to various reasons other than conditions that often lead to impasses. “Talks on hold” are
sometimes attributed to such factors as change in leadership, parliamentary elections, lack of confidence building measures to take the talks to another level, or even lack of credible leverage to keep lines of communication open. Eventually either party walks away from the peacemaking process without necessarily rejecting it and with the possibility of returning back to it later on if negotiations resumed.

(v) \textit{Preventive} - This category includes all the initiatives that did not produce an overall agreement but prevented further escalation of conflict, at least temporarily. Nearly all of these initiatives were leveraged by international organizations or greater political powers outside the island and were perceived to be credible enough by local leaders to implement and safeguard preventive measures, at least temporarily.

(vi) \textit{Agreement} - This is the smallest category and includes just a few initiatives, where the interaction between the primary parties in the talks produced some kind of an agreement to abide with either temporarily or permanently.$^{25}$
Peacemaking Outcomes

- Impasse 27%
- Rejected 27%
- Preventive 13%
- Inconclusive 10%
- Agreement 8%
- Failed 15%

Figure 2-3: Peacemaking Outcomes
### Table: 2-2: Peacemaking Initiatives and Methods and Outcomes - Cyprus 1955-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timeline</th>
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<th>Peacemaking Methods</th>
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</tbody>
</table>
In the meetings and interviews I had in Cyprus over the last few years (formal interviews 2006-2009 and informal interviews 2004-2010) with several political leaders, elites, scholars and journalists, I realized that some had developed a very pessimistic view on the prospects of peacemaking on the island and they deemed all of the efforts as “unsuccessful.” I personally disagree with that perspective because only 15% or less of the initiatives have failed completely to initiate some sort of communicative interaction between the two sides towards a settlement. That is a cluster of six initiatives out of the 41 and longitudinally the distribution depicts that three of those six initiatives were introduced from August of 1974 and onward. I understand that there is perhaps a researcher bias in constructing the data set, but deeming all the initiatives as “failed” attempts because the ‘political problem’ in Cyprus remains unsettled after 41 trials does not allow room for much articulation.26

The data set builds on the premise that Cypriots came to the negotiation table quite often and sometimes the previously failed attempt, though it had some impact on the next one, did not prevent them from continuing to search for a political settlement. The data set provides a strong breadth in the analysis but not an in depth investigation as to what it is that prevents top leaders across the divide from settling their political differences and starting a new chapter in their affairs and one that includes mechanisms that allow for collaboration and problem-solving modes of interactions towards their future.
2.2 Focused Comparisons

The data set or large-N qualitative analysis is not enough to develop all the propositions and recommendations that I am seeking at the end of each chapter and to eventually contribute towards theory development. To reiterate the core question in this dissertation: what is it about the political problem in Cyprus that remains unsettled after nearly 41 attempts by local parties, foreign interveners from the USA and UK and many envoys from the United Nations since 1955?

As an attempt to close that gap further, I incorporate two focus-comparison methods described by several researchers such as Yin (2003); Faure (1994); George (1979); Lijphart (1971); and Mill (1843, 1970) to investigate closely the relationship between peacemaking initiatives, processes, dynamics, obstacles and outcomes as I mentioned earlier in Chapter I. The first investigation involves a comparative method for dealing with differences in similar peacemaking initiatives known as the “Most Similar Systems Design” – (MSSD) and the second for dealing with differences in different peacemaking initiatives known as “Most Different Systems Design” – (MDSD).  

**Most Similar System Design (MSSD):** This methodological design enables me to look at the relationship between two very similar initiatives that were developed into peace plans in order to identify some of the substantive obstacles that led to the rejection of both outcomes by either the one or both sides in Cyprus. This analysis also demonstrates how parties’ positions have changed over the years (from one initiative to the other) and for the most part in ways that actually constrain the chances for a settlement as time passes.
The two initiatives are: (a) Boutros-Ghali’s “Set of Ideas” (1992) and (b) Kofi Annan’s “Comprehensive Peace Plan” (2004). The logic for the selection of the two initiatives is a methodological one and illustrates a number of similarities in both peacemaking processes, including: (i) the chronological period during which both initiatives occurred; (ii) intra-group and inter-group dynamics; (iii) the role of Greece and Turkey in the periphery; (iv) 3rd party characteristics under the auspices of the UN; (v) the end result products which were both comprehensive peace plans; and (vi) the treatment that each plan was given by top elites once they were finalized. The timeline of the two initiatives is summarized in Appendix C and for the analysis see chapters 6 and 7.

Most Different Systems Design (MDSD): In addition to MSSD, I am incorporating a second comparative analysis under the MDSD approach, independent from the first one, with the aim to compare the (a) peacemaking methods and (b) the structures of peacemaking (process of channeling communication back and forth directly or indirectly via 3rd parties, etc.). This analysis renders more understanding as to how three very different peacemaking initiatives have led to the drafting of an agreement that both sides have accepted as a compromise solution. These three initiatives are: (a) the Zurich-London Accords 1959-60; (b) the High Level Agreement between Makarios and Denktash in 1977 and (c) The Kofi Annan “Comprehensive Peace Plan” (2004). To satisfy the methodological criteria for conducting an MDSD study the three initiatives are very different when: (i) it comes to the chronological periods that were covered; (ii) the structure of local and international contexts; (iii) the intensity of the conflict at the bi-
communal level as well as international level; (iv) the behavior of the initiators; (v) sources of initiation and characteristics; and (vi) types of leverages, constraints and concessions offered. The analysis is highlighted in chapters 8 and 9.

2.3 Data Collection and Analysis

Comprehensive data on the peacemaking initiatives in Cyprus have not been published previously except for some exemplary pieces and parts in some scholarly accounts. My data were collected via a number of methods:

(i) archival research and historical documents from previous negotiations;
(ii) private collections (primary individuals who granted me access to their documents and notes) and government documents;
(iii) primary interviews with top leaders, diplomats and members of UN good offices in Cyprus (total of 62 persons);
(iv) key informants such as scholars, journalists, political advisors and others who followed the peacemaking initiatives over the years (total of 67 persons);
(v) direct and informal observations while in Cyprus during longer periods of time and sporadically that enabled me to have an insider’s perspective on the climax and context in which some of the events unfolded from 1999 and forward.

The analysis in this dissertation includes a synthesis of information from all of the above sources during my field trips to Cyprus, Greece and Turkey from the summer of 2004.
when I first started working on my dissertation proposal, through the spring of 2011. The information I collected in regard to peacemaking initiatives is classified into various taxonomies of information about:

(i) the initiator and his/her intentions (time, context and duration);
(ii) nature and characteristics of the initiatives;
(iii) chain of communication (channeling), methods and characteristics;
(iv) domestic and international context of politics;
(v) intra-party rhetoric and positions on various initiatives when possible;
(vi) inter-party positions prior to and following the talks;
(vii) type of talks and the involvement of outside parties;
(viii) type and structure of mediation / negotiation systems;
(ix) parties’ positions and rhetoric after the initiatives came to a conclusion;
(x) intra-party and inter-party views for an endgame and preferred solutions and their situational shifts over the years;
(xi) short-term and long-term impact on the peace process after an initiative came to some sort of a conclusion; and
(xii) gestures of conciliation that top leaders took to convince Cypriots across the barbed wire fences of hatred that next time they will try for a genuine and just settlement for all Cypriots and not only for their respected communities.

Below is a summary of research methods, units of analysis, data collection methods and analysis.
Table 2-3: Methodology, Units of Analysis, Data Collection and Data Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methodology</th>
<th>Units of Analysis</th>
<th>Data collection</th>
<th>Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Construction of Exploratory Data Set (Longitudinal):</td>
<td>41 Peacemaking Initiatives:</td>
<td>[1] Archival Research (From Government Collections and Private Collections);</td>
<td>[1] Qualitative: Common Themes; Construction of Propositions and generic models</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| [1] Peacemaking Initiatives in Cyprus – Tabular classification 
Period 2: 1960 – 1974 (July) 
Period 3: 1974 – 2004 (May) 
| [1] Face-to-face interviews | | | |
| [2] Semi-structured Questionnaire for all interviews with top political leaders and members of mediation teams. [Timeline: 2005-2008] (See Appendix E) | | | |
| [4] Unstructured Questionnaire for all interviews with Key informants | | | |
| Informal follow up meetings (Summer 2009 and April 2010) | | | |
| | | Qualitative Analysis: Scaling (Chapters 1-10) | |

Informal interviews with key informants who follow the peace process in Cyprus including: political advisors to top leaders, journalists, academics
### Table 2-3: (Cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methodology</th>
<th>Units of Analysis</th>
<th>Data collection</th>
<th>Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comparative Case Study of similar peacemaking Initiatives</td>
<td>3 Peacemaking Initiatives</td>
<td>[1] Archival data</td>
<td>Qualitative: Comparative Themes; Obstacles to Peacemaking (Chapters 5 and 6)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Peacemaking Structures of Talks:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[1] Christofias - Kalyongou Channel (Secret and Confidential 2004)</td>
<td>3 Confidential interviews</td>
<td>Qualitative: Dynamics of Channels and Propositions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2-3: (Cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methodology</th>
<th>Units of Analysis</th>
<th>Data collection</th>
<th>Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct (informal) Observation during periods of field research and interviews</td>
<td>Field visit to Cyprus 2005 sporadic; 2006 (6 months) 2007 Spring and Summer including Greece and Turkey 2008 Sporadic (Cyprus-Greece-Turkey) 2009 Sporadic and Summer (Cyprus-Greece-Turkey) 2010 April</td>
<td>[1] Post-peacemaking environment following the collapse of Annan Peace Plan (2004-2008) [2] The start of a new initiative coined as Christofias-Talat initiative</td>
<td>Qualitative: Peace Expectations Analysis (Chapter 9); Collective pro-peace and pro-rejectionists attitudes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.4 Triangulation, Validity and Reliability

Triangulating information across the buffer zone turned out to be nerve breaking points in my dissertation. Sometimes, only a handful of individuals are present at the negotiations and sometimes the information remains confidential for many years. Whenever it was feasible, I triangulated the content of the information from sources on both sides and exposed some of the arguments and viewpoints I gathered from top leaders, without violating anonymity and the source of my information.

Every now and then the information I was after was very contradictory as top leaders employed the blame game as their default option. At one point I lost count of how many times I recognized the verbal and non-verbal nuance: “we are right” and the “others are to be blamed for” even when it was signaled visually with hand gestures and head nods towards the geographical direction of the “other side.” For the most part I was lucky that I had a good network of individuals in Cyprus with whom I was able to have numerous “peer consultations” with for hours and I am very thankful to all.

Below is a summary that I developed for this dissertation regarding triangulation, validity, reliability and their limitations. Tables 2-3(a) and 2-3(b) provide summaries of some data I already made reference to earlier in Chapters 1 and 2.
Table 2-4: Triangulation, Validity and Reliability Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Triangulation</th>
<th>Validity and Limitations</th>
<th>Reliability and Limitations</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data Triangulation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Interview: (i) Top Leaders;</td>
<td>Limited Access to Confidential Documents and Proposals Exchanged during Negotiations</td>
<td>Several replications are needed with other researchers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Key Informants</td>
<td></td>
<td>Some reflexivity Concerns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Direct (informal) Observations*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Archival Records</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Documentations</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Investigator Triangulation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>* Solo Investigator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Discussion with Key</td>
<td>Additional studies are needed from other researchers to triangulate data collection and</td>
<td>Selectivity Bias might be of a concern due to the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>informants about data</td>
<td>results</td>
<td>exploratory orientation of the study</td>
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<tr>
<td>collection and analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>* References to other written</td>
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<tr>
<td>accounts and investigations</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Theory Triangulation</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>* Exploratory data set analysis</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>* Existing theoretical arguments from other accounts</td>
<td>Theoretical perspectives derived from the investigation of literature review and analysis of findings</td>
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<tr>
<td>* Discussions with key</td>
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<td>informants (academics,</td>
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<td>researchers) who focus on</td>
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<td>similar investigations /</td>
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<td>research perspectives</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Methodological Triangulation</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>* Qualitative Methods</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(i) Data Set Tabulations</td>
<td>Validity is based on multiple sources of data collection within the qualitative</td>
<td>Accessibility to some individuals was limited either</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Clusterification</td>
<td>tradition</td>
<td>because they were deceased or rejected the request for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Archival Data</td>
<td>Quantitative methodology can apply in the future for a large-N statistical analysis</td>
<td>an interview.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iv) Content Analysis</td>
<td></td>
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<td>(partial)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(v) Narrative Analysis</td>
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<td>(partial)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(vi) Interviews</td>
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<td>(vii) Direct (informal)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observation</td>
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CHAPTER 3

Cyprus: A Brief Chronology

The peculiar charm possessed by the remnants of the Latin East, that East which knew the rule of Crusading lords and the magnificence of Frankish merchant princes, is of a rare and subtle kind, the offspring of oriental nature and medieval Western art. It lies, if the attempt to define so elusive a thing may be allowed, in Gothic architecture, blending with Saracenic beneath a Mediterranean sky, in the courts of ruined castles overgrown with deep green cypress, in date palms rearing their stately crowns above some abbey’s tracered cloisters, in emblazoned flamboyant mansions of golden sandstone warmed and illumined, as they could never be in the West, by the glow of Eastern sun. (Sir Harry Luke, 1908)

3. Cyprus

Cyprus is an island in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea that spans about 3,752 square miles in a varied, picturesque landscape of mountains, villages and small towns, with many modern urban developments on the rise. Located at a point of geographical convergence, Cyprus has represented a crisscross between Northeastern Mediterranean Africa, the Middle East, and Southeastern Europe, fairly standing up to her century-old reputation as the “jewel of the Mediterranean,” a place where trade and commerce has flourished. During the hot summers, the hot air from the Middle East and Northeast Africa is carried by the sea breeze and scented with the aroma of pine, cypress and wild herbs growing among two large mountain ranges - the Troodos and Pentadactilos.
Cyprus is also known as the island of Aphrodite, according to Homer. I was always amused by the blend of mythical and scientific interpretations that are often used to describe its genealogy, if such a term can be used. The island, according to one explanation, got its shape from volcanic eruptions that piled up massive deposits of hot lava that were then cooled by the sea’s crystal clear waters that gave the costal sandy beaches a calming and soothing shape. In my mind this is a magical place and that is how I want to always think of it. It is also a place where myths become beliefs. Some inhabitants hold the belief that the father of the ancient Greek Gods, Zeus, must have commanded his cosmologists to stir up the earth and build a paradise for the birth of his daughter Aphrodite where she could be cherished and be nurtured in the absence of his “legitimate wife.” But Cypriots could just as well be the descendants of shipwrecked sailors who washed ashore and decided to stay on the island.

The history of Cyprus chronologically spans from the prehistoric times, 7,000 BC, to the latest stone and bronze ages; from the times of Homer, when the foam-born Aphrodite, goddess of unconditional love and beauty, was washed onshore, until the descent of the Mycenaeans (1200 BC), who spread Hellenism in the region, and then to the Assyrians (709 – 660 BC), followed by the Egyptians (560 – 546 BC) and the Phoenicians, the Persians (545 – 333 BC), Alexander the Great and the Ptolemies (332 – 58 BC); the Romans (58 BC – 330 AD); the Byzantines (330 AD – 1191 AB) and in 1192 AD Richard the Lionheart conquered the island, starting the rule of Frankish and Lusignans (1192- 1473); then came the Venetians (1473 - 1570), the Ottomans (1570 -
1878) and the British (1878 - 1960). Finally, from 1960 and onward, the Cypriots have been the masters of their own fate in a pursuit for lasting peace.

Cypriot hospitality has remained abundant on the island for perhaps more than 9,000 years, despite all of the invasions, and remains a prominent trans-generational characteristic among her Greek, Turkish, Armenian, Maronites and Latin (Roman Catholics) dialectic speaking inhabitants.\(^{34}\) I have witnessed this myself behind and across the barbwire fences of sectarian division. But the question that I am more concerned with here is what happened to the Cypriots and why did they start fighting with each other?

To begin with, and without claiming any special wisdom from the faculties of sociology and anthropology, I can stretch my insider’s cultural observation and argue that Cypriots, no matter what dialect or formal mother tongue they use, are very friendly, loving and tender people who will welcome you graciously once you find your way there. Apart from their individual and collective identity characteristics, Cypriots are all hopeful that a just and viable political settlement will be reached one day amid the seemingly incompatible endgame solution each political entity envisions for the so-called ‘Cyprus problem,’ or ‘Cyprus Question.’ This is where this dissertation research starts – by first unfolding the most recent historiography of peacemaking initiatives, departing from the mid-1950s and spanning to 2010. Then I will proceed further to the subsequent chapters by investigating the various official peacemaking initiatives for a political settlement on the island and the overall peace process dynamics. For starters, below is a map of Cyprus.
Table 3-1: Map of Cyprus

Source: CIA Factbook
3.1 Chronology

This chapter is an integrative timeline based on several chronological accounts written by Cypriots, outside analysts, historians, researchers and investigative journalists who together can triangulate and control for manifested prejudices.35

My personal concern with constructing a timeline of the conflict in Cyprus may be summed up with the following question: What, in general terms, can future historians infer from the existing biased records and interpretations of events in their quest to present a genuine and honest analysis of what happened in Cyprus, at least during the last half century, to the future generations of Cypriots and curious investigators of this peace process? I am not a historiographer by training and those who claim the wisdom are very likely to infer some of their subjective biases to the analysis. Therefore, the following chronology should be read cautiously because every timeline of events I have investigated and tried to integrate here has had discrepancies in details, manifested prejudices, partisanship, and other limitations. It is not my intention to project my own biases here but to set the context of what I will be referring to later on as the peacemaking timeline in Cyprus.

I start first by apologizing to Cypriots and other readers for not being able to include all of those events that perhaps a joint committee comprised of historians from all sides could make possible. A detailed acknowledgement of events would certainly contribute towards bringing some closure to victims and their families and help them to better understand their own history. This chronology spans from the mid-1950s to about 2010, with some narrative analysis on the context in which each phase of events took
place on the island. The bibliography at the end of this dissertation provides all of the sources which were used to comprise this timeline. To conclude this introduction with the words of John Reddaway:

“As I recall, the many innocent, peaceful people who were killed, the goodwill and tolerance that were destroyed, the friends and friendships that lost and the many brave young people - Greek, Turkish and British - who laid down their lives in what was, after all, an unnecessary conflict, my mind is filled with a sadness which is tinged with outrage at the folly of it all. There was not even a ‘famous victory.’ Nobody won. Everybody lost by reason of this futile conflict. (2001)”

3.2 Peacemaking Initiatives – Timeline

For the purpose of this dissertation, the peacemaking efforts in Cyprus for a political settlement are separated into the following four sequential periods:

Period I: (1955-1959) - Nationalism
Period II: (1960 - August 1974) – Ethnocentrism
Period III: (September 1974 - 2004) - Sectarianism
Period IV: (May 2004 - Current) – Europientalism

Period I:
Nationalism (1955-1959)

For several centuries, Greek-speaking, Orthodox Christian Cypriots and Turkish-speaking, predominantly secular Muslim Cypriots coexisted together in towns and villages under religious and culturally tolerant conditions. Evidence of this exists in how closely mosques and churches were built to one another in the centers of villages and cities, some even next to Venetian and Medieval Fortresses, creating a religious
cross-cultural spectacle.\textsuperscript{37} During times of peace, church bells were clanging as the calls of prayer vibrated sacred messages through the air to observant believers. But during times of conflict and war, churches and mosques became the first victims of an outwardly projected ethnic hatred.\textsuperscript{38}

On a more positive note, during the British administration (1878-1959), Greek and Turkish-speaking Cypriots formed common trade unions and political and social forums, and organized solidarity movements to bring about social justice and higher wages and salaries to improve working conditions.\textsuperscript{39} That social and political reality changed, however, around 1955 - a year that is considered a turning point in this dissertation, signaling the road to end of British rule in Cyprus. The British governor during those times was not only faced by varied social and political challenges from Cypriots who opposed the direct rule from Britain, but also a paramilitary insurgency that was about to engage the British in a series of ‘tension-raising initiatives.’ Parallel to the beginning of the anti-colonial insurgency in Cyprus and the declining mode of British Colonial rule in the Far East and Eastern Mediterranean, 1955 was also a year that brought to the surface virulent ethno-nationalism sentiments among extremists in both communities on the island, reflecting the larger, virulent Greco-Turkish ethno-nationalism that was revitalized in the 20s, 30s and 40s and eventually intensified, in some locations such as Thessalonica, Istanbul, Asia Minor and Crete, but was contained in some locations.\textsuperscript{40}

Apparently Cyprus was not immune from the rest of the de-colonization process in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. In particular, newly emerging regional powers
were witnessing Britain’s disengagement strategies in various Eastern and Central Asia locations and the Middle East (Middle East Mandates). Greek-Cypriot insurgents learned quickly how to operate in secrecy, coordinating their anti-colonial struggle and advocating for their right to self-determination.\textsuperscript{41} Greece’s diplomatic tactics, under the authoritarian rule of a dictatorship, were escorted parallel by EOKA’s (National Organization for Cypriot Fighters) anti-Colonial struggle to achieve a dual strategy for self-determination and “Enosis” – union of the island with Greece.\textsuperscript{42} In response to this action-reaction sequence, the British administration and army on the island introduced a strategy aimed at containing the anti-colonial struggle on the one level, and opening up secret talks with insurgents in an attempt to persuade key EOKA operatives to change their tactics and course of action. At the bilateral level, Britain proposed several initiatives with Greece and Turkey through open and secret channels of communication. The British Royal constabulary and army in Cyprus successfully introduced several anti-insurgent tactics against EOKA gunmen and their student supporters (intense interrogations, executions through hangings), forcing suspected EOKA organizers to run and seek refuge in underground shelters and home bunkers. Eventually, the elites of EOKA have established more sophisticated ways for organizing themselves through the support of their social and political networks and popular sympathizers.

In the meantime, behind diplomatic scenery, several scenarios developed in Athens, Ankara and London, sometimes in coordination and sometimes in discord for fear of disturbing the balance of power and structure of alliances in the region.\textsuperscript{43} For example, Greek Cypriot nationalists and top leaders in Greece attempted in the 40s and
early 50s to unite the island with mainland Greece. Turkish Cypriot nationalists and Turkey also reexamined reciprocal scenarios. As far as Britain was concerned, her majesty’s strategists were looking for honorary exit strategies, including the option of continuing British interests on the island under a new framework. For example, during most of the second half of the 50s, the British administration and government orchestrated several diplomatic initiatives to crush the insurgency and establish a new state of affairs on the island. Some of these initiatives were channeled directly at the administrations in Athens and Ankara, and others were directed at Cypriot intermediaries and leaders to terminate the violent anti-colonial ‘state of affairs’ and reestablish civil order and stability on the island.

Several possible dilemmas, along with the uncertainty of continuing or discontinuing the British rule in Cyprus, puzzled British authorities at the time. For example, how could a post-WWII Churchillian global power disengage herself from a small island, honorably, without allowing grounds for further advancement by the insurgents, and without harming Britain’s long-term interests in the region? How could Britain disengage herself without her actions being interpreted as a weakness by emerging regional powers in an already intensified East-West Cold War confrontation and Soviet expansionism on the horizon? What would the modalities of disengagement from Cyprus be like for London’s party politics and how could a possible disengagement be interpreted by the Cypriot insurgents who were unwilling to terminate their violent course of action to a non-violent one when they strongly believed their insurgency was moving toward victory?
There are long explanations in the literature about the reasons that led the British government to disengage and/or de-commit herself from Cyprus in the second half of the 1950s. Some authors hold the conviction that Britain withdrew from Cyprus to yield to the anti-colonial struggle. Others argue that Britain simply continued her longstanding presence on the island by changing her strategy according to the Cold War realities in the region. It is also argued that the main political forces (parties) in London were indeed divided at the time on the idea about withdrawing from Cyprus, but very much in agreement on the issue of safeguarding long-term British interests on the island if the British government one day decided to withdraw from the island.45

Meanwhile, as EOKA strategists continued their violent campaign, Turkish-speaking Cypriots were not passive to the perceived dangers that were unfolding at the time on the ground (Anonymous Interview 2007). Turkish Cypriot nationalists, along with the support of Turkey, initially aligned themselves with the British strategy to contain the anti-colonial struggle and negotiate a settlement of the troubles between Greece and Turkey, opposing Greece’s and the Greek Cypriot’s aspirations for self-determination and union with Greece. The pawns for a civil conflict were already set forth and EOKA nationalists found themselves as counter players. The Turkish Cypriot insurgent group TMT (Turkish Resistance Organization) was organized in secrecy in the second half of the 1950s and, along with the Greek-Cypriot EOKA gunmen, fought for their separate cause and visions for partition of the island and union with motherland Turkey. Nationalistic propaganda on both sides started polarizing the long-standing peaceful inter-communal relationship. It is worth noting that the most vulnerable targets
in both organizations’ agendas were, among others, pro-peace Greek-speaking and
Turkish-speaking Cypriots who were still holding together in labor unions, working
together in factories and field orchards, and taking evening walks together along the
narrow streets of cities and small villages.\textsuperscript{46} Below is a chronological synopsis of this
period.

\textit{Chronology}

(British Period)

\textbf{1878} Defensive Alliance between Great Britain and Ottoman Empire.

\textbf{1914} Cyprus is annexed by the Ottomans to Britain as part of the defensive
alliance enabling Britain to establish administrative rule on the island.

\hspace{1cm} (Cyprus was ruled by the Ottoman Empire since the fall of Famagusta in
1571 – establishing a system of administration known as \textit{Millet}).

\textbf{1914} Cyprus is annexed by Britain as a consequence of the outbreak of WWI
when the Ottoman administration aligned itself with Germany.

\textbf{1915} An Anglo-Greco agreement to offer Cyprus to Greece in exchange for
Greece’s commitment to assist the allies in WWI. The exchange was not
implemented, despite the outcome of the war.

\textbf{1923} Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the WWI, the
newly established Republic of Turkey relinquishes all rights on Cyprus
under the Treaty of Lausanne. Britain annexes Cyprus.

\textbf{1925} Cyprus is declared a British colony.

\textbf{1931-32} The Greek Cypriot popular uprising for “\textit{Enosis}” (interpreted as: union
with Greece) takes place. Local elections are suspended.

\textbf{1941-45} About 35,000 Greek-speaking Cypriots fight alongside the British Army,
and a small number of Turkish-speaking Cypriots.
1947  US President Truman calls on Congress to provide economic assistance to Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine, followed by the United States’ larger strategy of “containment.”

1948  Lord Winster proposes legislative arrangements and a formation of an Executive Council.

1950  (January) Plebiscite of Greek-speaking Cypriots shows 96 percent in favor of “Enosis.”
      (February) Makarios III is elected Archbishop.


1955  Eden Initiative: A tripartite negotiation conference takes place in London between Britain, Greece and Turkey. Britain aims to stop the insurgency in Cyprus and reexamines the roles and intentions of her other two partners in Cyprus.
      (September-October) Attacks in Salonica, Istanbul and Izmir by Greek and Turkish nationalists intensify the relations between the two NATO allies.

      Dulles Initiative (U.S. Secretary of State) contains possible Greek-Turkish escalation and safeguards NATO’s strategic interest in the Eastern Mediterranean.

      (December) Unofficial negotiations between British Governor of Cyprus Harding and Greek Cypriot leader archbishop Makarios III take place to bring an end to the violent insurgency in Cyprus.

1956  The Harding Plan (Governor of Cyprus) establishes a transitory self-governing administration under British Rule. The plan is rejected.
      (March) Negotiations are interrupted and Makarios is exiled to Seychelles.

      (December) Rackliffe Proposals call for home rule and constitutional arrangements between the two sides in Cyprus. The idea for separate-self determination processes becomes a reality if both sides desire it.

1957  The Turkish Cypriot insurgent organization TMT is established with Ankara’s backing. Its slogan is “Partition or Death.”
Harold McMillan and American President Eisenhower hold talks: Britain expresses its intent to abolish British rule and maintain sovereign bases.

(February) Archbishop Makarios is released from Seychelles but is banned from returning to Cyprus.

(April) Hugh Proposals for a ceasefire and constitutional talks for self-government and safeguarding of British military bases.

(July) Macmillan Initiative to engage Greece and Turkey to work constructively for a political settlement in Cyprus. Secret talks take place between Greek and Turkish intermediaries. EOKA responds with a short leave ceasefire. The Governor launches a new offensive against EOKA and the proposals collapse at the local level.

1958 Inter-communal violence and separate attacks by EOKA and TMT escalate.

(June) Macmillan Plan calls for transitory home rule and a partnership administration between Cyprus-Greece-Turkey and Britain. An administrative system of governors is to be established and monitored by Greece, Turkey and Britain. The plan is rejected. McMillan’s proposition is to frame Cyprus under the influence of the troika: Britain-Greece-Turkey.

(December) A new round of preliminary contacts between Greek, Turkish and British officials is initiated by the latter for an independent self-determination settlement. Cypriots are kept informed through Greek and Turkish channels. The talks lead to the Zurich and London Conferences.

1959 (February) Zurich Talks lead to a tripartite power-sharing agreement between the three regional powers with interests in Cyprus. The talks are a breakthrough and Greece, Turkey and Britain establish the treaties of alliance to safeguard the post-implementation peacemaking process of the treaty. The United States, Britain, Greece and Turkey agree on the independence of Cyprus.

London talks and conference lead to the establishment of the constitution of Cyprus and finalize the treaties of guarantorship, establishment and alliance among the signatories. Cypriot representatives (Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot) are constrained to accept parameters worked out for them by the three regional partners.

1960 (August) Cyprus becomes an independent country following the Zurich-London agreements and Archbishop Makarios becomes the first president
of the Republic. Turkish Cypriot, Dr. Fazil Kuchuk, is elected Vice-President of the Republic. Post-agreement peacemaking and the accord implementation process begin despite the reluctance of Greek and Turkish Cypriots leaders with the process and outcomes of the accords.

**Period II: Ethnocentrism (1960-July 1974)**

Following almost five years of attacks and counterattacks from 1955 to 1959 between British soldiers and EOKA insurgents, the conflict reached a level of stalemate, signaling to both sides that a negotiated settlement could be reached among the troika in London and that the two ethnic communities in Cyprus could be persuaded to politically endorse its planting - thus a few more seeds of Cyprus’ demise were planted during the post-agreement implementation phase. There were several diplomatic initiatives by Britain and the USA (to some degree) to terminate and reach a settlement without bringing members of NATO’s eastern flank into a larger scale confrontation. The first phase of the troubles ended with the signing of the London-Zurich accords in 1959 (a package of three international agreements between Britain, Greece and Turkey that were reluctantly endorsed by the Cypriots representatives). The Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders, Archbishop Makarios III and Dr. Fazil Kuchuk, along with their advising teams signed the agreements (under pressure from the three regional powers) and Cyprus became an independent country but a reluctant republic.

The constitutional and administrative power-sharing entailed in the Accords and post-accord arrangements were soon to become the main sources for contention between Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders, and paramilitaries on both sides who had not been
disarmed since the anti-colonial period, opened the road to new political challenges in the immediate post-Zurich/London peace implementation process. Within the first three years of the newly established Republic, the elected representatives of both communities were far more divided than united in working together to build a functioning democracy. From a slightly similar perspective, bi-communal social interactions were not immune to the intensified political disputes and paramilitaries and the armed police forces that were soon to take sides. This research is not to assess who was right and who was wrong, or who initiated or reciprocated the escalatory chain of events that are known as the Gradual and Reciprocated Tension Rising Initiatives (GRITRs). Almost every account on Cyprus blames somebody or the “other” side for being the initiator of all bad things committed.

Political crises began and reached a steaming level on the streets with the intensification of violence among nationalist/separatist groups on both sides, forcing many Cypriots to leave under fear and uncertainty in their neighborhoods or enclaves. Others saw their dreams dashed away as they were forced to abandon their properties and pack what they owned into one or two suitcases, and begin “a long march toward serfdom,” (Anonymous Interview).

Chronology

(1960 - August 1974)

1960 (August 16) Declaration of the Republic of Cyprus; Cyprus’ sovereignty and territorial integrity are guaranteed by Britain, Greece and Turkey: Treaties of Guarantee, Establishment and Alliance are established – Cyprus joins the UN and the non-aligned movement.
1961  Cyprus joins the Council of Europe and the Commonwealth of Nations.

1963  (November 30) The first President of the reluctant republic (Archbishop) Makarios III submits a proposal for amending the constitution. Dr. Kuchuk asks for time to consider the proposal and reply by the end of December. Turkey rejects both inter-party decisions immediately. The relations between the president and vice-president sour and spill over in all other branches of government.

(December 21) The political and social atmospheres become very intense and bi-communal clashes erupt. Turkish Cypriot representatives withdraw from the administration. The green line in Nicosia (capital city) is established to cease hostilities. Internally displaced Cypriots begin their long marches.

1964  (January) Turkey threatens to intervene militarily in Cyprus to protect TC in enclaves. The UN Security Council Resolution reaffirms Cyprus’ sovereignty and denounces the threat of use of force.

London Conference takes place. This Anglo-American initiative aims to terminate ethnic clashes in Cyprus and contain a possible domino effect in the Greek-Turkish relations, NATO’s eastern flank. The conference also aims to halt possible influences from the Soviet Union in NATO’s Eastern Mediterranean satellite. The initiative fails to de-escalate ethnic violence in Cyprus.

(December 21) The political and social atmospheres become very intense and bi-communal clashes erupt. Turkish Cypriot representatives withdraw from the administration. The green line in Nicosia (capital city) is established to cease hostilities. Internally displaced Cypriots begin their long marches.

(January-February) The USA sponsored Ball initiative (George Ball) focuses on shuttles diplomacy to restore Greco-Turkish relations and prevent their military intervention on Cyprus. A NATO-led peacekeeping force is also introduced as an option. The intensity is defused temporarily.

(March-April) Intense inter-communal fighting occurs. The United States and the UK temporarily examine plans for a “controlled Turkish military intervention.”

(May) UN peacekeeping forces arrive in Cyprus (UNFCYP).

(August) Turkey conducts air attacks on Cyprus; US President Johnson intervenes and warns Turkey against invading Cyprus.

(July-August) Acheson Initiative. A series of substantial negotiations between the US, Britain, Greece and Turkey settles the dispute under the NATO umbrella. The initiative also calls for double union, if desired, or
the creation of self-administering cantons by the two communities, supervised by the guarantor powers of 1960. Other arrangements of give and take between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea are also considered.

Grivas returns to the island and takes command of the National Guard (G.C. members and Greek military personnel / officers).

1965  (March 26) UN Mediator Galo Plaza recommends ways to safeguard Turkish Cypriot minority rights and rejects the idea of separation between the two communities, protection of minority rights and demilitarization. The Turkish government and Turkish Cypriots reject the plan. About one-third of the Turkish Cypriots live in Turkish-protected military enclaves.

1967  (April) A military coup takes place in Greece.

(November) A new phase of inter-communal clashes among extreme nationalists brakes out. Turkey threatens a military intervention (ultimatum) but the crisis is diffused due to the United States’ power mediation role in persuading Athens’ Junta to accept the ultimatum and withdraw Grivas from Cyprus. Following these events, Turkish Cypriots establish a “provisional Turkish Cypriot administration.”

Cyrus Vance Proposals. A US-led mission averts conflict escalation between Greece and Turkey as their visions become far more divergent. The initiative calls for the withdrawal of Greek and Turkish troops from Cyprus that keeps rearming local Cypriot insurgent groups.

1968  (June 68 - September 71) First phase of Inter-communal Talks. Talks between Clerides and Denktash open in Beirut and continue in Nicosia. The two intermediaries set forward a set of proposals and exchange their views on constitutional and power-sharing matters. The outcome of the talks is inconclusive.

1971  EOKA B is now under the lead of Grivas who secretly returns to lead a new round of political destabilization against the government, backed by the Greek Junta.

1972  (June 72 – July 74) Second phase of Inter-communal talks. Talks between Clerides and Denktash resume under the UN Secretary General’s auspices of Good Offices. The two sides helplessly attempt to transform the reluctant republic into a unitary state after a decade long of inter-communal insecurity, fear, suspicion, and the build up of mistrust.
1974 On July 2, following the death of Grivas in January, Makarios requests General Ghizikis withdraw all Greek officers serving in Cyprus and involved with EOKA B who are against his administration.

1974 (July 15) The Greek Junta and the EOKA supporters in Cyprus organize a military coup against Makarios. Nikos Sampson is declared president by the Junta as Makarios escapes an assassination plot. On July 19, Makarios addresses the UN Security Council.

(July 20) Turkish troops land in Kerynia (Kyrne), establishing a control zone of about 6 percent of the Northern Coast of the island. Following the address of Makarios at the UN Security Council on July 22, the Security Council passes a resolution calling for the secession of the hostilities and the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the Republic.

(July 23) The Greek Junta fails in Athens and Greece enters a new road to Democracy. Sampson’s presidency fails as well and Glafcos Clerides takes over as an acting President.

(July 25-30) Geneva Conference (1st round). Peace talks between Great Britain, Greece and Turkey open in Geneva. The accords are signed on July 30, leading to the development of a buffer zone.

(August 14) Geneva Conference (2nd round). Emotions and high suspicion and uncertainty of the other side’s intentions result in the conference collapsing. Fighting continues as Greek and Turkish Cypriots search for safer areas to migrate to.

(August 16) Turkey launches a second assault without any substantial resistance, since the Greek Cypriot National Guard defensive lines break up. Within days Turkey ceases 37 percent of the island under her military control, beginning the status quo sectarian division patrolled by the UNFICYP.

Period III:

On July 15, 1974, the Greek military junta instigated a military coup against the handicapped government of Cyprus, engineering a plan to assassinate the Greek Cypriot president and gain control of the island with the support of a local separatist group EOKA
B’, which had regrouped and organized for a second time under Colonel Grivas (keep in mind that EOKA went through several phases of transformation – an anti-colonial movement in the 1950s; a separatist group in the 1960s; and Junta sympathizers in the early 1970s). Securing support from the authoritarian government in Athens, EOKA B’ Junta organizers succeeded in spreading violence on the island within a couple of days, attacking moderate civilians in both communities (mostly Greek Cypriots) and imposing marshal law. Under the leadership of a puppet gunman, Nicos Sampson, they set up an administration that lasted until the 23rd of July when the Greek Junta in Athens collapsed after civil uprisings. The Athens Junta failed to contain a very strong civil uprising and was soon succeeded by the reestablishment of a Democratic administration.

In the meantime, on July 20th Turkey, under the umbrella vested in her through the treaty of guarantee, took unilateral action to intervene in Cyprus militarily to protect Turkish-speaking Cypriots and to halt the Junta’s aspirations. Following the collapse of the Greek Junta in Athens, on July 23rd the puppet government set up by the EOKA B’ gunman in Cyprus was seized and temporarily replaced by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Glafcos Clerides. Inter-party negotiations for a ceasefire took place under the auspices of the United Nations but collapsed soon after (Geneva Talks). The parties’ real intentions in the negotiations were far more tactical than genuine, including the tactics of gaining time, appealing to intentional organizations, regrouping their forces and using leverages accordingly. The Turkish army completed its intervention plan with a second attack on August 14 when the Greek Cypriots’ front lines collapsed completely.
By August 20th, the Turkish army had secured approximately 37 percent of the island militarily, creating the current status quo sectarian division.

In the aftermath of the 1974 interventions on the island, a new diplomatic war was about to begin. The seeds go far back, even before the political events in the 1960s. International law, for example, gave the parties a new plateau on which to continue their struggle and express their visions for Cyprus. Each side has successfully managed to frame the Cyprus problem or question according to international laws and its perplexing interpretations. While the one side describes the events on July 20 and August 16, 1974 as the “Turkish invasion and occupation,” the other says they were “peace operations and acts of liberation,” (Words in quotations are from Interviews – emphasis added). Both sides, along with the aid of their counterparts (Greece and Turkey) in the establishment of the reluctant democracy, have used their international allies to lobby and to justify the action of the other side as violation of the United Nation charter.

The government of Cyprus in the South recovered and rebuilt itself on the premises of the Zurich-London bi-communal constitution, with emphasis on the mono-communal dimension. Similarly, the Turkish Cypriot federated administration in the North declared itself in 1983 as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), internationally recognized by Turkey only. It remains a functioning administration among Turkish Cypriots and is under the influence of Turkey.

Political visions on both sides felt short in scope and vision. Cyprus and its people were far more divided than united. Today, about one-third of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot populations are internally displaced as refugees in their own country. Members in
both communities are still grieving. They do so for the loss of missing loved ones and the loss of their birthplace and properties that they inherited from their ancestors and have worked hard to establish. Some grieve for the loss of friendships, the work and the dreams they once shared for coexisting and rebuilding the country. Others grieve for ‘an unfinished business’ in getting rid of the so called ‘other’ and the preservation of ethnic blood lines.

**Chronology**

(September 1974 – June 2004)


**Act I: Makarios & Denktash Talks**

**1974** (November 1) The United Nations General Assembly (UN 3212) passes a resolution urging the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Cyprus, but without any echoes. UN processes for passing resolutions on Cyprus becomes part of a very diplomatic game in peacemaking politics. Both sides use their international emissaries and allies to influence the wording and decision of the reports of the UN General Assembly and UN Secretary General to the Security Council.

(December) Makarios returns to Cyprus and resumes his presidential post.

**1975** (January) Greek and Turkish Cypriots initiate the first substantial post-division round of negotiations on the basis for a federal-type political arrangement.

(February) The United States imposes an arm sales embargo on Turkey, but without any substantial pressure for withdrawing her troops from Cyprus. US policy on Cyprus becomes another perplexing game the two sides begin to pull toward their direction. The Greek and Turkish lobbies in Washington DC will initiate new modalities for NATO and US foreign policy in the East Mediterranean.

The areas under the Turkish army’s control are declared the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. About a month later, on March 12, the UN
Security Council approves resolution 367/1975, regretting the proclamation. The UN becomes a checker for diplomatic confrontations searching for ways to deem unjustifiable the actions of the other side.

(April 28 – May 3) First Round of Vienna Talks under the auspices of the UN S-G of “Good Offices.”

(June 5-7) Second round.

(July 31 – August 2) Third round.

(September 8-10 in New York) Fourth round.

1976 (February) a new phase in the inter-communal talks begins in Vienna, but without any significant changes under the auspices of the Greek and Turkish talks in Brussels.

(July) the European Commission and the Council of Europe issue a report finding Turkey guilty for major violations of human rights in Cyprus. The Council of Europe (like the UN) will become part of diplomatic efforts from all sides with interests in Cyprus to leverage, constrain or unconstraint the efforts for a political settlement

1977 (January - February) Makarios and Denktash hold talks. The two leaders agree on the guidelines for a political settlement based on federation principles – a federation that receives two polar opposite interpretations.

(March 31 April 7) A new round of talks opens in Vienna (6th round of Vienna Talks) with the two sides summiting their proposals for a settlement.

(August) Makarios dies.

Act II: Kyprianou & Denktash Talks


1979 (May 18-19) Denktash-Kyprianou Initiative. UN Secretary General de Cuellar invites Spyros Kyprianou and Denktash to a new round of “proximity talks” in Nicosia. The two representatives agree on additional guidelines to those set forth earlier by Makarios and Denktash.
(August 9) First phase of Kyprianou-Denktash inter-communal talks. Three more rounds of talks follow until January 7, 1981.

1981 (October 22) Waldheim Evaluation Proposals and Guidelines. Elements are created for a non-aligned, federal and independent Republic of Cyprus.


1983 (August) Aid Memoir and de Cuellar principles on issues submitted by both sides.

(November 15) the Turkish Cypriot legislative assembly unilaterally calls for the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The “Republic” is recognized by Turkey and condemned by the UN.

1984 (January) Denktash and Kyprianou separate proposals for what they perceive to be a visible solution to the Cyprus problem.

(May) “Five-Point Scenario” – de Cuellar’s efforts to converge the proposals of Kyprianou and Denktash into workable points.

(August) “Working Points” and Hugo Gobbi’s mission to lay the road to a series of working points for the two sides.

(September 10-20) “Proximity Talks.” First round of talks between Kyprianou and Denktash resume in New York with de Cuellar performing shuttle diplomacy between the two. The working points become a framework for this round of talks.

(October 10-26) A 2nd round of proximity talks begin with the points accepted in principle as de Cuellar phrased them during the 1st round.

(November 29 – December 9) A 3rd round of proximity talks in New York. UN produces a preliminary draft for a comprehensive settlement

1985 (January 17-20) High-level meeting (Summitry) takes place between the two leaders, but without a breakthrough.

(April) “Draft Agreement Proposal.” A revised document is presented to the two representatives for a compromised and comprehensive solution.
1986  (March 29) “Draft Framework Agreement.” de Cuellar sets forward a revised draft framework for a comprehensive solution but another impasse occurs.

(June 12) de Cuellar reports to the Security Council: The Cyprus negotiations process has reached a stalemate – a very intractable impasse.

1987  Several attempts by the UN Secretary General to resume talks are unsuccessful.

Act III: Vassiliou & Denktash Talks

1988  George Vassiliou is elected president, replacing Kyprianou who faced internal opposition on the issue of failing to make a breakthrough in the talks after two terms (10 years) in the presidency.

(August) Vassiliou and Denktash meet in Geneva under the supervision of the UN Secretary General who initiated a process of drafting-exchanging-revising proposals/ideas between the two leaders.

(September 16 – November 7) First round of direct talks takes place between the two leaders. UN envoys and intermediaries produce several position papers after the two leaders explain their concerns and exchange their views on various issues to each other.

1989  (December 19 – March 28) Second round of Proximity Talks. The agenda of the talks includes additional issues not discussed during the 1st round, including constitutional issues, violation of freedoms, territorial adjustments, internally displaced refugees and Turkish Nationals (settlers).

(May 5 – June 10) Third round of Proximity Talks. Non-committal discussion and the preparation of “non-papers.”

1990  (February 26 – March 2) “Direct Talks.” A new series of meetings takes place in New York that are based on a structure that includes federation and constitutional aspects, security and guarantees, issues regarding displaced persons, economic development and transitional-period arrangements. The talks collapse as both sides resort to semantics and symbolic language.
Following substantial debates in the House of the Republic, the government of Cyprus submits her application for membership in the EEC.


(March – September) A series of Indirect Talks lays the groundwork for resuming negotiations.

1992 (June 18-22) “Ghali’s Set of Ideas.” First round of Proximity Talks takes place in New York.

(July-August) Second round of Proximity Talks starts with adjustments on the set of ideas and territorial adjustments. Both sides nearly agree on all paragraphs of the comprehensive agreement, giving the impression that they are close to reaching a solution.

(October 28 – November 11) Third round of Proximity Talks starts in New York. The Secretary General assesses that a lack of confidence building is constraining the options of the parties to make concessions and implement a possible agreed upon solution in the future. Political crisis between the two sides leads to a renewed set back.

(November 24) Introduction of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), (SC resolution 789/92). Both sides accept the ideas entailed in the CBMs, but disagree on how to implement them.

Act IV: Clerides & Denktash Talks

1993 (February) Glafcos Clerides is elected president of the Republic after winning the elections by a very small margin over Vassiliou. The OBM’s remain on the table. Clerides opposes Ghali’s set of ideas and begins a campaign to de-commit himself from that process gradually. Denktash rejects the set of ideas as well.

(June) A new round of talks on CBMs begins in New York.

Parallel to the CBMs, the European Commission comments positively on Cyprus’ application for full membership.

1993-94 (December - April) UN 1st Phase of Proximity Talks between Clerides and Denktash in Nicosia.
(March) The Secretary General reexamines the CBMs.

(March) UN Envoy Joe Clark instigates a new Anglo-American initiative to arrange direct meetings between Clerides and Denktash.

(October) Several unofficial meetings between Clerides and Denktash take place under the auspices of the UN, but the impasse remains unaltered.

1994 At the EU summit in Corfu, Greece, the 12 heads of state agree to include Cyprus and Malta in the forthcoming enlargement. The question remains whether a solution is a condition prior to accession.

(November 18) Unofficial talks between Clerides and Denktash in the home of Gustav Feissel in Nicosia.

1994-95 (May – May) Second phase of confidence-building measures leads to an impasse.

1995 Richard Holbrook attempts to re-introduce the CBMs unsuccessfully.

(April) Meeting between PM Tansu Ciller and US President Bill Clinton.

(August) President Clinton sends George Stephanopoulos to Nicosia, Athens and Ankara to unbreak the deadlock.

(December) Richard Beattie conducts exploratory talks in Nicosia.


1997 (August) Second round of talks continues in Switzerland (Glion-sur-Montreux) without any substantial outcome.

1998 The EU accession negotiations process for 10 new candidates is scheduled to take place separately. EU-Cyprus talks begin with the support of Greece.

1999 (December) “Proximity Talks.” First round of UN-sponsor talks begins in New York after nearly two years of stagnation.
1999  (June 20) At the G8 summit, the eight agree to support the UN’s initiative to beginning bi-communal negotiations in the fall of 1999.

(Dec. 3) Proximity talks begin: Both Clerides and Denktash meet at the UN headquarters in New York City.

(Dec. 11) The EU summit (Council) takes place in Helsinki. Greece removes her veto on Turkey’s candidacy to the EU. In exchange, Cyprus’ candidacy to the EU is de-linked from the Cyprus problem. The EU heads of state agree that EU-Cyprus accession negotiations will resume, whether a political solution will be reached or not prior to accession.

2000  (Jan. 31 - Feb. 8) Second round of Proximity Talks begin in Geneva.

(Feb. - Nov.) Sporadic meetings take place between the two sides in Geneva and New York.

(Nov.) Ankara persuades the Turkish-Cypriot representative to withdraw from Proximity Talks. Proximity Talks stop.

Intermediate period between Phases I and II - temporary impasse

2001  (Jan. 12) Turkey approves a new aid package of about $350 million to the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.”

(June) At the EU Summit, the Council approves the successful completion of the EU-Cyprus accession negotiation and Cyprus’ participation in the Euro-parliamentary elections of 2004.

(July) Denktash rejects the invitation by Secretary General Kofi Annan to resume proximity talks. Instead, Denktash sends an unusual “olive branch” to Clerides for the two to meet in Cyprus.

(Dec.) The first meeting of its kind takes place between Denktash and Clerides in the house of the UN ambassador in Nicosia. The two leaders agree to initiate direct talks in January.
(Dec. 5) Denktash hosts Clerides to a dinner at his house in Nicosia, the first of its kind. UN envoy Alvaro De Soto attends the meeting.

(Dec. 29) Clerides reciprocates Denktash’s offer and hosts Denktash to a dinner in his house (not the presidential palace) in Nicosia in the presence of the UN Ambassador to Cyprus.

**Phase II: Direct Talks**

**2002**

(Jan. 11) Meeting between the two leaders in the residence of the UN representative in Nicosia.

(Jan. 16) Direct talks begin between the two leaders.

(Jan. - Jun.) Direct talks continue, with both sides exchanging proposals but without any substantial outcome yet mentioned in the press. In the meantime, the UN receives the proposals from both sides.

(Nov. 11) Kofi Annan incorporates the proposals and delivers the combined document – a framework for a solution.

(Nov. 18) The Greek Cypriot government accepts the initiation of substantial talks on the basis of the Annan peace-settlement framework. The Turkish Cypriot administration agrees as well on November 27.

(Dec. 10) The two sides receive a revised peace plan during the EU summit in Copenhagen. At the Intergovernmental meeting, the 15 EU leaders agree to accept the Republic of Cyprus in the May 2004 enlargement, united or divided. Denktash withdraws from the negotiations.

**2003**

(Jan. 15) Direct talks resume.

**Act VI: Papadopoulos-Denktash-Talat Talks**

**2003**

(Feb.) Tassos Papadopoulos is elected president of the Republic; Kofi Annan visits Turkey, Greece and Cyprus.

(Feb. 26) The two sides receive the revised peace plan.

(Mar. 10) Both sides accept Annan’s invitation to come to the Hague. Negotiations resume at the Hague (and collapse a few days later).
Intermediate period between Phases II and III – temporary impasse

2003  (Apr. 16) Papadopoulos signs the accession treaty of Cyprus to the EU during the Greek Presidency in Athens.

(Apr. 23) With the approval of Ankara and the Turkish army, Denktash relaxes border control; two passages enable the passage of Cypriots on both sides after 29 years of complete division.

(Dec. 14) Mehmet Ali Talat, the leader of a major left wing party, wins the parliamentary elections in the Northern part of Cyprus.

(Dec. 17) Papadopoulos proposes to Kofi Annan to resume negotiations.

2004  US President George Bush sends letters to Papadopoulos and Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan to reconsider the UN Secretary General’s current efforts for a political solution (or peace plan).

(Feb.) the Turkish Council for National Security accepts the Annan plan as a framework for departure and to resume negotiations.

Phase III: Substantial Bargaining - A Comprehensive Peace Settlement Plan

2004  (Feb. 5) Kofi Annan invites Papadopoulos, Denktash and the Prime Minister of Greece, Turkey and Great Britain to multilateral negotiations at the UN.

(Feb. 10) Beginning of multilateral negotiations in New York.

(Feb. 13) The five sides agree to support substantial bi-lateral talks in Nicosia between February 19 and March 22. If the two sides do not agree on a political arrangement by March 22, then Greece and Turkey will enter the negotiations starting on March 29. The UN Secretary-General also declares that if the four fail to reach a negotiated solution, then he is going to complete the comprehensive peace plan and set it forward for two separate referenda on both sides.

(Mar. 22) The bi-lateral negotiations on the content of the 3rd version of the comprehensive “Annan” plan – negotiations are terminated as inconclusive.

(Mar. 24) Quadrilateral negotiations start in Burgenstock, Switzerland.

(Mar. 29) A revised 4th plan is delivered to all parties.
(Mar. 30) The parties submit their changes to Kofi Annan and his team.

(Apr. 1) A final 5th version of the plan is received by all sides. Bilateral/quadrilateral negotiations are terminated.

(Apr. 24) Two separate referenda take place on both sides. Turkish Cypriots accept the plan by a ratio of about two to one and Greek Cypriots reject the plan by a ratio of about three to one.

(May 1) Accession of the Republic to the EU.

Period IV: Europientalism (May 2004 - Current)

The UN-sponsored plan for reunification prior to the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the European Union, supported by the majority of Turkish Cypriot voters and rejected by the majority of Greek Cypriots, represented the collapse of another peace making initiative to settle the political problem. The process forward to break the deadlock remained unclear for nearly four more years. For many Cypriots, Greek-speaking and Turkish-speaking, a comprehensive settlement would benefit them economically, politically and culturally, and could result in potentially sustainable peace in the country rather than continued impairment by the dichotomies and polarizations of the “Cyprus problem.”

Similarly, according to a US foreign diplomat, “a settlement [in Cyprus] would resolve an important dispute between two NATO allies, a dispute that in the past harmed NATO cohesion.” 48

On the contrary, proponents who aligned themselves against the plan, but not necessarily against a solution to the Cyprus problem, saw the plan as another
sell-out to the Turks or Greeks accordingly. While the process and the outcomes of the peace plan will be analyzed in subsequent chapters, it is worth noting that there was a strong desire from all Cypriots to join the European Union and this aspiration became a strong catalyst in driving the negotiation process forward. Parallel to this, the European aspirations of Cyprus and Turkey gave the United Nations and the negotiators a new tool to balance tradeoffs between leverages, constraints and concessions for all parties and bridge most of the gap that separated the parties.49

Additionally, there were two other significant elements that prepared the atmosphere for a settlement. First, according to a member of a mediation team who recalled the Annan plan that was tabled in November 2002, it “represented a unique basis for further negotiations, supported by the UN Security Council, and it carefully addressed the core concerns that were expressed by the representatives of the two communities,” (Anonymous Interview). Second, the prospect for a solution created an overwhelmingly positive atmosphere among pro-peace proponents, after decades of separation behind roadblocks, that political and social reunification was possible. In April 2003, the Turkish Cypriot side took the initiative to relax the crossing restrictions, defying claims that the two sides could not live together. Since 2003, there have been millions of crossings from the one side to the other without any incidents of violence occurring worth reporting in the media.
Lastly, during the period between 2002 and 2004, an unprecedented political platform formed in TRNC that was comprised of many political parties in opposition to Denktash, as well as civil society organizations calling on the authorities to support the plan. A number of pro-peace rallies and demonstrations carried on the campaign from the streets to the referenda ballot box. These events happened along with a change in policy by Ankara and Prime Minister Erdogan to provide his support to the pro-solution parties and safeguard Turkey’s European aspirations, changing Turkey’s mind that “the current status quo is not a lasting solution,” (Interview with a Top Adviser of PM Erdogan in Turkey).

The period between May 1, 2004 and February 2008 led to a significant polarization between the two sides and to the return of a diplomatic war and exchange of blame language. Skepticism rose about what the referenda had left Cyprus with. Was there a way forward? What were the lessons learned that could help break the stalemate?

**Chronology:**

**Renewed Prospects for a Settlement**

2003  (May 1) - Cyprus is one of 10 new states to join the EU, but it does so as a divided island.

(December) Turkey agrees to extend its EU customs union agreement to 10 new member states, including Cyprus. The Turkish prime minister says this does not amount to a formal recognition of Cyprus.

2005  April - Mehmet Ali Talat is elected the Turkish Cypriot president.
(May) UN officials begin exploratory talks on prospects for a new diplomatic peace effort, but without any substantive outcome.

2006 (July 8) UN-sponsored talks take place between Papadopoulos and Talat. The two agree on a series of confidence-building measures and continuation of contacts between the two communities.

(July) Intensive direct talks and indirect consultations take place between Papadopoulos and Talat in the presence of the UN Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs, Ibrahim Gambari. Mr. Gambari holds two separate meetings with the two leaders, and a joint meeting on July 8 that results in an agreement by both sides to the initiation of talks, on a technical level, and to the introduction of Confidence Building Measures.

(August) Representative Tassos Tzionis and Rasit Pertev hold nine meetings during August to assist Papadopoulos and Talat, but without any substantive progress.

2007 (January-March) Greek and Turkish Cypriots demolish sand bag barriers dividing the old city of Nicosia, but talks regarding the day of opening are halted.

New Act: Christofias-Talat

2008 February - Left-wing leader Demetris Christofias wins presidential elections. Promises to work toward reunification in his speech (Feb 2) to the Parliament and a conciliatory message to the Turkish Cypriots, reciprocating Talat’s gesture to begin direct talks. The two men worked together in the past as back channels and in the party politics rapprochement process and are often referred to as comrades.

(March) - President Christofias and Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat agree to start direct negotiations on reunification issues. The two sides agree that both technical committees and working groups need to set the agendas and party positions. Both leaders are accompanied by their advisers, George Iacovou and Ozdil Nami.

(March 26) Mr. Iacovou and Mr. Nami agree during their meeting to establish six working groups and seven technical committees. The titles of the working groups are: “Governance and Power sharing,” “EU Matters,” “Security and Guarantees,” “Territory,” “Property” and “Economic Matters.” The titles of the technical committees are: “Crime and Criminal Matters,” “Economic and Commercial Matters,” “Cultural Heritage,” “Crisis Management,” “Humanitarian Matters,” “Health Matters” and “Environment.”
(April 3) The Ledra Street crossing at the center of Nicosia, between the former Turkish and Greek sectors, reopens for first time since 1964.

(May 23) Christofias-Talat meeting takes place with the UN Secretary General Special Representative in Cyprus - UNFICYP Chief of Mission Taye-Brook Zerihoun. Both sides issue a joint statement that, “reaffirmed their commitment to a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with political equality, as defined by relevant Security Council resolutions. This partnership will have a Federal Government with a single international personality, as well as a Turkish Cypriot Constituent State and a Greek Cypriot Constituent State, which will be of equal status.”

(July) Joint Press conference (1st) and Joint Statement (25th) by Christofias and Talat made to start direct talks, establishing a direct hotline and a set of 19 Confidence Building Measures after reviewing the work of the technical committees and working groups.

(September 3) – First official (direct meeting) between Christofias and Talat with UN Secretary General Special Adviser Alexander Downer and UN Special Representative Taye-Brook Zerihoun.

Meetings continue throughout the year on constitutions and administration matters.

2009

(April) Elections in TRNC and a coalition among center and center-right-wing nationalist parties wins parliamentary elections in northern Cyprus. Some Greek Cypriots fear this may hamper peace talks. Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat remains in office until the 2010 elections.

(May) Direct talks continue between the two leaders.

2010

(April) Talat is replaced by Dr. Dervis Eroglu

(April – August) Negotiation continues on the issue of property between Christofias Eroglu and their top negotiators. Technical committees continue their work

3.3 Concluding Remarks

The expression, “talks on how to begin talks,” characterized the inter-party and intra-party interactions for the entire post-referenda period between May 2004 and
February 2008. Families were divided, political elites were divided, mediators were criticized, pro-peace activists ceased most of their meetings and, most significantly, talks on substantive issues never took place, with the exception of some preliminary contacts between top advisors sporadically.

A grain of optimism is up in the air again elevating the barometer of hope that perhaps this time the leaders in Cyprus will find the right formula for an integrated settlement plan. But, if there is failure again in 2012, how will the ordinary Cypriots across the division fences react this time? What kind of political rhetoric are the top leaders going to adopt to reason their actions? Are the leaders ready for an integrative solution and how are they going to build pro-settlement coalitions to support their decisions if they reach that stage? What is the role of third parties and the European Union this time? Questions can be endless.

Summarizing the chronology of the peacemaking efforts in Cyprus from 1950 to 2010 a number of testable hypotheses arise for future researchers and top leaders in Cyprus and elsewhere to consider. This chapter concludes with the following two sets of propositions:

**Proposition 3-I: Peacemaking Initiatives in Cyprus from 1955 to 2008 collapsed due to:**

(i) the ineffectiveness of the United Nations, Greece, Turkey and Great Britain to guarantee the integrity of the island collaboratively and genuinely;

(ii) the polarized Greek-Turkish relations and the spillover of ethnocentric aspirations in the minds of Cypriot elites;
(iii) the constrains of the international system to recognize and address and apply mechanisms in settling identity-type conflicts;

(iv) the unwillingness of the leadership in Cyprus to develop a set of integrated post-1960 endgame visions;

(v) the absence of mechanisms to settle political disputes via dialogue rather than political intimidation and paramilitarism;

(vi) the intransigence of the parties to accommodate the concerns and fear of the so called ‘other’ side rather than exploiting them;

(vii) Inflexibility of the top elites to change their minds from competitive mode of interaction to a cooperative / accommodative mode of affairs.

(viii) A lack of social and political reconciliation by top elites to address the wrong doings, make things right and work towards unity;

(ix) Entrapment of top leaders into rhetorical arguments that are populist and ethno-centric in nature and scope; and

(x) Lessening commitment of top leaders to take genuine unilateral and bilateral actions to eliminate the roadblocks en route to a lasting and just settlement rather than expanding them.

**Proposition 3-II:** Sustainable peacemaking initiatives in Cyprus are more likely to succeed when:

(i) Greece, Turkey, UK and other powers put aside their selfish interests and help Cypriots to negotiate a framework for a settlement that is not poked by hidden ethno-national agendas;

(ii) the United Nations and the European Union ought to develop a well-orchestrated approach to mediate / negotiate a framework within their auspices that will help GC and TC leaders to build gradually;

(iii) gradual and reciprocal gestures are offered and implemented at social, political, economic and other spheres;
(iv) top leaders develop dual actions of peacemaking and peace-building initiatives with civil society doing the field work of opening up roadblocks and channels of communication;

(v) the priorities and commitment of leadership is directed towards new thinking in GC and TC affairs rather than politics of antagonism;

(vi) when top elites offer collective apologies for what happened in the darkest times of their recent history and start a process of social reconciliation;

(vii) a transparent record of historical facts is embodied to acknowledge the past and eliminate political and social mistrust in the process;

(viii) mechanisms for gradual post-accord implementation are built in to the process to channel disagreements through peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms;

(ix) top leaders bypass the symbolic threshold of self-concern and interest and invest in the collective interest, needs and values across ideological and sectarian fences; and

(x) top leaders take genuine actions to convince members of the so called “other community” that they will work to protect everybody’s dignity and integrity in this process that ordinary Cypriots are hoping for - a lasting, viable and just solution to Cyprus without the emergence of new victims.
CHAPTER 4

Defining and Framing the “Cyprus Problem”

Yurdunu sevmeliyimış insan
“Love your Homeland”
“Την πατρίδα να αγαπάς”

A poem by
Neşe Yaşın

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Turkish</th>
<th>Greek (translation)</th>
<th>English (translation)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yurdunu sevmeliyimış insan</td>
<td>Την πατρίδα να αγαπάς</td>
<td>My father says</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Öyle diyor hep babam</td>
<td>Ετσι λέει και ο πατέρας</td>
<td>Love your homeland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benim yurdum</td>
<td>μου συχνά</td>
<td>My homeland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ikiye bölünmüş ortasından</td>
<td>Η δική μου η πατρίδα</td>
<td>is divided into two</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hangi yarısını</td>
<td>έχει μοίραστει στα δυο</td>
<td>Which part should</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sevmeli insan</td>
<td>Ποιο από τα δυο κομμάτια πρέπει να αγαπώ;</td>
<td>I love?</td>
</tr>
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</table>

We finally made it yesterday! It was May 1, [2003] and we went to Morphou. It is now called Guzelyurt. It was 5:30 in the morning when we began standing in a line moving toward the check-point at Ledra Palace. After three hours, we reached the Turkish Cypriot checkpoint and by the time we registered, it was already 9 a.m. There were nine of us – all of us close family members. We decided to hire a minivan with a driver. We would have preferred to go with our cars but we would have had to wait 6-8 hours in line before crossing over. The route that we took was totally unknown to us since before the invasion we used to take a different route from Morphou to Nicosia. We had a map with us in Turkish and a list of villages in Greek and Turkish on a separate paper. The driver spoke Turkish only.
It is hard to describe my feelings and the feelings of the rest in the bus. We were anxious to see the homes we left behind 29 years ago. We felt like pilgrims rather than refugees returning to the land of our parents and ancestors.

After we were on the road for about 20 minutes, we arrived at the outskirts of Morphou. Initially, we had some trouble recognizing the area. For a moment I thought that my memory was playing games with me. I also felt that the environment was not totally unfamiliar as we went further toward the center of the village. I recognized the road toward my parents’ home, the neighborhood, and the road that I walked every day to my elementary school and back. We reached the last bend in the road. The home on the corner used to belong to my mother’s first cousin. It was not there anymore. It was demolished and in its place was a contemporary two-level building. That home had always been a landmark for me on the way back from school. Its absence and replacement disoriented me and the others as we all tried to direct the driver this way and then that way. We thought we were lost but we knew that we were close by, maybe 20-25 meters. Suddenly, there was a dead silence in the mini-van. I anxiously wondered whether I was going to recognize the house I was born in. After all these years had passed, was it still there?

“This is my house,” my aunt sitting next to me shouted. “Yes, this is our neighborhood.” The others confirmed that we all used to live in a home or two down the road from one another. Ahmet, the driver of the van, parked on the side of the road even though he did not speak or understand Greek or English.

I felt as if my breath was taken away. I was still sitting in the van without comprehending much about the orchestrated movements of the rest. I was disoriented. I remembered that on the left of my parent’s home was the home of a Turkish Cypriot neighbor named Shenai. On the other side, across the road from Shenai’s home, was my aunt’s home and my parent’s home right next to it. I grabbed my camera and exited the van. People in a nearby home looked out at us curiously but cautiously from their window. We rang the bell at Shenai’s home. There was no answer. We then walked toward our home.

I stood on the side of the road in a daze. Yes, there was a home, behind my aunt’s home. Was it my parent’s home? Where was our walnut tree and our orange trees? My mom was quiet. “Dad, is this our home?” I asked him. “Yes,” he answered, “don’t you recognize it?” I didn’t but I said “Yes.” I kept recording with my camera so I could show the rest of the family our home.

I remember my home painted white, with bamboo-type doors and windows. I remember my dad’s garage right next to the home. It wasn’t there anymore. The occupants had painted the doors and the windows. It seemed from the outside that they were taking good care of it. They added a railing to the front veranda. The trees were all cut down. I kept wondering why. My dad stepped up onto the veranda and knocked on the door. There was no answer. A Turkish Cypriot from across the street told us in fluent Greek that there was no one home. The occupants had gone to Paphos to visit their own home. Ahmet, the van driver,
shared part of our anxiety. He did not let us out of his sight for a second. He walked near me as I opened the side gate that led to the backyard as I recorded with the camera my short-lived childhood memories in this home.

The yard did not resemble much from my memories. A fence had been built on the left side and a brick wall on the right, marking new property ownership. I called to my parents. It took them some moments to gain the courage to walk toward me. They stood and looked for a few minutes. “They took care of our home,” was their only comment.

Several Turkish Cypriot women in the neighborhood invited us into their homes for coffee, soft drinks and conversation – a very traditional Cypriot way for welcoming friends and visitors. I can’t recall how many coffees and lemonades I drank that day. I spoke with the grocery lady in the neighborhood for almost a half hour. She told me about the residents in the neighborhood, the ones who live there currently and the ones who had come and left.

My parents, aunt and uncle decided they wanted to see their orange orchards. As they took that direction, the rest of us wanted to wander more around the neighborhoods of Morphou. I walked down a road that stood out in my memory - the road that led to the church of St. Mamas and to the elementary school I attended next to the church. I recall this walk as if it was a fairy tale and as if time had frozen. Some homes looked as they had in 1974. We walked through the farmers’ market. There were very few people around. We soon approached St. Mamas Church. Nothing had changed. The church looked the way I had remembered it and the school across from it was clean and in fair condition.

If you ask me about my feelings, I cannot describe them with words. I did not get emotional maybe it was part of my defense system knowing that, after all, I was a tourist there. I had a deep desire to resurrect my childhood memories but between these and the current reality there was a sectarian division.

We walked back toward the neighborhood and I called my father on my cell phone. He sounded excited because his citrus orchard had been well kept. He picked a few oranges.

Before we left, we saw Shenai as she returned to her home. It had been 29 years since we had last seen her and the moment was indescribable. She welcomed us and treated us well, as Cypriots do. She invited us to her home for coffee and sweets.

We soon wished each other farewell and planned to see each other again soon.
4. Home is Where Your Story Begins

Cypriots, like many others in this world, have a very strong attachment to their home. Aeschylus (525 – 456 BC), a tragic poet, once wrote that there is no greater sorrow on earth than losing one’s home. Home is a little place in the world that we each inhabit and fill with our physical possessions, activities, aspirations, visions and memories. Multiple elements from our physical and emotional lives are kept in this space, as Pulitzer Prize-winning author Alice Steinbach explains (1996). Home is the place we give identity to and that we identify with - “A home inhabits us as much as we inhabit it.”

For 62 top political leaders and other key informants who I interviewed, Cyprus is their home. It is the place where they dream, laugh, cry and make mistakes. It is also a place divided. I go to Cyprus myself very often because it is my birthplace. I grew up in Cyprus in a refugee settlement in the suburbs of Nicosia. Compared to refugees in other places like Rwanda and Bosnia, my family was among the luckier refugees in terms of living conditions. We always had a roof over our heads, food and clean water. We didn’t live in the physiological and psychological fear that Philip Gourevitch describes in his book, “We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families,” which contains stories of the survivors and those who vanished during the genocide in Rwanda.

During the duration of my field research, which included several visits to the island from 2004-2010, I heard the stories of top political leaders in one-on-one interviews. I found myself listening to very detailed narratives that flashed backward in time to describe decade-old events that took place well before my birth, but were
described so vividly it was as if they had happened just the day before. As a visitor and an insider to the peace process in Cyprus, I was treated very well by my interviewees and readily offered Turkish or Greek coffee or herb tea. I was also honored and granted the privilege to have several follow-up meetings with many top leaders, most of whom I remain in contact with. I am also very grateful for the time given to me by nearly 67 key informants, including journalists, academics and peace-builders. Their knowledge helped me to triangulate information and rend more clarity to my arguments.

One insightful theme that emerged from all these interviews is that all elites in Cyprus are advocating for peace. What they envision to be the endgame, however, varies slightly from one narrative to another and, in some cases, varies significantly. What is very profound, though, is that a few leaders are still advocating for a genuine and just peace for all Cypriots under the premise of political equality and sharing of power equally in the various institutions. Of course, you can count these leaders on just one hand.51

To unfold the central theme of this chapter, I will first attempt to set up the background for readers to understand the concept of the “Cyprus problem” (or Cyprus question, as I personally like to refer to it) and, secondly, to unfold some of its characteristics. Thirdly, I will elaborate on the process of framing the Cyprus problem in various contexts and levels of interaction from the mid-1950s and onward. Fourthly, I am going to link the process of framing with the concept of rhetorical entrapment. I will elaborate briefly on its impact on the peacemaking process and explore some of the implications for third party interveners. Lastly, in this chapter I will examine the
relationships between the political doctrine and praxis of the Cyprus problem and how
they are framed by top political leaders to the fragmented Cypriot people across the
buffer zone, as well as the linkage to the overall notion of collective Cypriot-ness.

Overall, this chapter, with the introduction and the various appendixes and models,
sets the stage towards the rest of the analysis where I am going to unfold the relationship
between process-dynamics-outcomes of the peacemaking processes in Cyprus, its
characteristics and some of the main obstacles encountered by elites and third parties in
their efforts to reach a political settlement. But first, what is the Cyprus problem?

4.1 Defining the “Cyprus Problem”

It is very intriguing to ask top leaders in Cyprus to define the Cyprus problem. Inevitably
you get many different answers, depending on which side of the buffer line you stand,
and with what political party or grouping your interviewee identifies. There are also
dozens of different definitions contained in the many published accounts on Cyprus, not
including those in academic journals. As an example, here are two widely mentioned
lexicon triggers: the first, “military invasion and occupation,” as is quoted in the political
rhetoric of Greek-speaking Cypriot elites, and secondly, “military peace operation and
liberation,” as is quoted in the political rhetoric of many, but not all, Turkish-speaking
Cypriot elites. Both interpretations are employed to describe and justify the events
between July and August 1974. Keep in mind that those two phrases are only a small
representation of what the Cyprus problem is about, as Cypriots have come to understand
it.
There is similar disagreement when it comes to defining the term “problem.” For example, for some Cypriot top leaders (I abstain here from attaching the words “Greek Cypriot” or “Turkish Cypriot” on purpose), the “problem” started with EOKA and later on with [Archbishop] Makarios and [George] Grivas…” (anonymous interview). According to some other top leaders, the “problem” started with the “British and the Americans because of their selfish and congruent interests during the Cold War period to establish NATO bases on the island…” (anonymous interview). Then there are other top leaders and elites who define/claim it to be “resolved” and “it was resolved in 1974” according to this interpretation, (anonymous interview). To shorten the list, there are also some claiming that the “no solution” (referring to the status quo division) “is not an acceptable solution,” thus the problem remains unresolved.52

Having reached an understanding of the various interpretations of the so-called “Cyprus problem” used by top leaders in Cyprus, I was then puzzled by some of the arguments and reasoning they used (some of which represented their personal views, as well as those aligned with the philosophy of the political party they represented), which led me to new questions in my meetings with academics, historians and journalists: How have the various interpretations infiltrated the social discourse and socialization of Cypriots? What obstacles are encountered by top leaders and third parties attempting to negotiate a political settlement, considering the disarray of interpretations? How is the power of maintaining a politically divided island (status quo division) related to negotiating a peaceful settlement? To what degree does the Cyprus problem keep Cypriots entrenched in their political rhetoric, and in what ways does it constrain them
from making concessions? If the Cyprus problem contains the seeds to the polarized relations on the island, what is it then that led to the collapse of 41 peacemaking initiatives to settle the problem? What was contained in the initiatives and why did they lead to an impasse? - I am not going to elaborate on all of these question in this chapter, but they aim to unravel the Cyprus problem, not only as a mere concept, but also to examine its characteristics and praxis - an intertwined system of interactions, as I have come to understand them, and attempt to synthesize it, visually and analytically, below in Figure 4-1.

As a starting point, I am providing four interrelated interpretations of the Cyprus question to set the stage and then I will unfold some of their characteristics.

**Interpretation I:** First, the conception of the Cyprus problem refers to the deeply polarized inter-communal relations on the island from the mid-1950s and onward - “a social, political and cultural marriage that was never allowed to grow by nationalists on both sides,” as one top leader characterized it, (anonymous interview). In totality, the Cyprus problem captures most of the political interactions on the island, within or across the sectarian status quo division that continues to hold Greek- and Turkish-speaking Cypriots captive.

**Interpretation II:** Second, the Cyprus problem is not only a political issue in search of a settlement or a solution, but it is also a calamity that has been cultivated deeply inside the core foundation of the collective identity of Cypriots in need for outlets,
and it dominates nearly every discussion, from the dinner table, to the “peace café,” to inter-party interactions. The most common outlets are hatred and mistrust, which almost everyone can become entrapped in - sometimes unintentionally. The Cyprus problem is socially and politically taught, and hatred as an outlet tends to bandage the wounds temporarily. There are remedies for it, but those remain invisible under what I describe here as “veils of political ignorance and collective ahistoricism.” Very few key informants and elites whom I interviewed talked about this reality, and if they did they did so only behind closed doors and they used phrases ranging from “a simple acknowledgement of wrong doings,” to “an official apology,” or “a genuine gesture of forgiveness,” a start-up process for reconciliation, and healing, which does not exist, and the “unspeakable mourning of missing persons” (more than 2,000 people from Greek-speaking and Turkish-speaking families are missing persons buried in unmarked locations). Those interviewees spoke of some sort of restoration of social, cultural and political dignity of collective Cypriot-ness - the identity that once united Cypriots from all ethnic backgrounds whose ancestors came from many civilizations.

Interpretation III: In Cyprus, as in other societies, historical events are deconstructed, reconstructed and reinterpreted into epic schemes selected by virtue of the dominant officialdom (ruling political elite over time) that excludes historical episodes of the significant other in the presence of collective ahistoricism that
profoundly fragments Cypriot collective identity. Simply put, the Cyprus problem is taught to the Cypriots from the cradle to the grave. It is a belief system, a political doctrine if you prefer, that encapsulates the illumination of two separate Cypriot “lifeworlds,” colonized across the sectarian buffer zone by the official paradigms. The Cyprus problem, as well as its process for a political settlement, becomes a daily routinization that is embedded and recreated in a plethora of discourses on the island, including socio-cultural, political, economic and legal (see Figure 3-1). For example: the education systems, the military roadblocks, the armed forces, the buffer zone, the sandbags and barbed wired fences, statues of ethnic heroes, nationalistic symbols, and many of the political rituals are psychological thresholds that are embedded and “routinized” in all aspects of Cypriot “lifeworlds,” cementing a level of consciousness of what the Cyprus problem is really all about in the ears and minds of many audiences. This is by far the most dangerous component of the Cyprus problem because it is holding Cypriots hostage to a seemingly zero-sum stalemated status quo division by constructing a false belief that the other side is always the one to be blamed for all the failures and misfortunes since the disappearance of Aphrodite.

Interpretation IV: Lastly, the Cyprus problem is a psychological war of legalistic words bounded together in search of captive and receptive audiences in Cyprus, the United Nations, the European Union, and elsewhere. It is a continuation of unhealed inter-party relations cultivated from the 1950s and onward. This
legalistic war of words has been stretched out to every possible pawn of interaction in international relations and is carried out by well-trained diplomats and lobbyists.

4.2 Distinguishing Characteristics of the Cyprus Problem

The central theme of figure 4-1 is that the Cyprus problem is more than a mere concept. It is a political doctrine, embedded into a system of multiple discourses that have set the norm and boundaries for inter-party interaction during talks for a settlement. Its praxis sets the parameters around which several political realities have been constructed behind sectarian fences on the island, at least since the 1960s and onward. These realities are transmitted through political and social institutions, and also shape all forms of interactions within each community, across the divide in Cyprus, and beyond, seeking audiences in international settings to adopt norms sympathetic to the interpretation of the Cyprus problem that the officialdoms hold over time. Below are some characteristics of the Cyprus problem:

1. The Cyprus problem is context specific. It means that the process of framing the Cyprus problem by the elites is congruent with the changing circumstances and characteristics found in domestic and international systems over the course of four chronological periods described in the timeline, including: 1955-1960; post-1960 to 1974; post-1974 to 2004; post-2004 to present (see figure 4-1 and Appendix B).

2. Similar to the above point, the rhetoric of framing the Cyprus problem is attributed to individual leaders and/or the collective leadership is ideology. It is
legitimized through the authorities and the power vested in them and determines
the process of interpretation by constituents and party ideology-analysts.

3. The processes of framing and phrasing the Cyprus problem (political rhetoric and
triggers) set the boundaries between perceived causes and the methodology that is
likely to be prescribed by elites, and determines the position negotiators are going
to bring with them to the table.

4. The definitions of the problem, over time, are institutionalized in the political
structures of the two political governments in Cyprus (one with international
recognition and one seeking it), setting the tone and style for communication
within the governmental tracks (legal, economic, political) and other social
discourses that maintain the entire governmental system in the Republic of
Cyprus (RC) and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).

5. The Cyprus problem is instrumental in triggering perceptions from a rich
reservoir of identity-related components to classify Cypriots across and within the
divide into distinct social and political categories. It affects the formation of
Cypriot-ness and its various types of learning and socialization through collective
institutions.

6. The Cyprus problem is constitutionalized (becomes part of functioning laws) and
backed by legal and institutional forms of power, policies and norms favorable to
the elected officialdoms behind separation fences, safeguarding it if anyone dares
to challenge it.
7. The Cyprus problem sets the boundaries for constructing collective realities in the
presence of collective ahistoricism.²⁶

8. The dogma of the Cyprus problem has fragmented collective Cypriot identity in
various ethnic, social and political groupings that demonizes and dehumanizes in-
group/out-group members within and across the ceasefire zone.

9. It is instrumental in negotiating the boundaries of a fragmented Cypriot-ness and
contains a self-perpetuating mechanism for “negotiating hope” – a kind of
psychological “awaiting” that is cultivated deep inside Cypriots that “soon there
will be a settlement” - “a just solution” - as they call it. This is waiting that has
gone on for more than 35 years.

10. In Cyprus, political parties’ positions on the issue of the Cyprus problem are by
far the most important to voters. It sets the alphas and the omegas in a politician’s
career.

Figure 4-1 depicts some of the intertwined dimensions and characteristics of the Cyprus
problem, as I have come to understand them, through the lenses of interpretation and
insightful feedback provided by interviewees and key informants.
**Figure 4-1: Defining the Cyprus Problem**

**Key:**

- Process of interaction/development
- Bi-directional relations
- Internal (local context) / External (international context) influences
- Feedback to Internal / External Influences
- (+)(-) Positive and Negative Stereotypes
4.3 Framing the Cyprus Problem

A critical and often overlooked dimension of the question, “what is the Cyprus problem?” is the intriguing process of embedding elements of structural power in political rhetoric by top leaders in framing and phrasing their arguments for marketing the Cyprus problem (to their domestic audiences and overseas), as well as defining the parameters and methodology for it to be settled.57 One of the conceits of framing is that it transmits the elite’s perceived positions and his or her understanding and explanation of the conflict, its causes and conditions, and the attributed behaviors and attitudes they are fighting against and the tangible/intangible visions they are willing to achieve through a negotiated settlement. In similar terms, King (2007) argues that in practice, “How leaders choose to frame a conflict - and to frame the possibility of peace – matters a great deal in how the conflict is settled.”58 For example:

Proposition 4-I: The dynamic aspects of intergroup relations (prior, during and after violent conflict takes place), and the role groups and group leaders play in actively framing the parameters of the Cyprus “problem” set forward their negotiations approach in achieving the groups’ preferred set of objectives and outcomes. Framing the “Cyprus problem” is therefore contingent on:

(i) The histories of the in/out-groups and their relations with each other.59

(ii) The disparity of power relations between groups within and across the sectarian status quo division line.60
As a departing point, framing is a metaphor for the unfolding communications in which groups stand in various formal and/or informal relations to one another and are receptive to the intrinsically dynamic character of intergroup relations. Therefore, framing is part of both intergroup relations as process and as an outcome. From this perspective, some leaders in Cyprus attribute the root causes of the Cyprus problem and its process for a settlement to the ever present power struggle among sovereign states, and in this case those of Greece, Turkey and Britain and their geo-strategic interests in the region.\textsuperscript{61} The peacemaking strategies during the 1950s, 60s and 70s were mirror images of the realist paradigm to contain the violent bi-communal conflict on the island between paramilitaries so that it would not disturb the larger Greco-Turkish relations - the Eastern flank of NATO, as it is known.\textsuperscript{62} Table 4-1 provides an example of the framing in intergroup communication.
Greek-Cypriot Officialdom | Turkish-Cypriot Officialdom
--- | ---
The political rhetoric phrased by the Greek-Cypriot officialdom for framing the 1974 war lays on the grounds of an “illegal foreign invasion and occupation” of one sovereign state by another in violation of the UN charter and a failure by Turkey to comply with endless UN Security Council Resolutions to withdraw her troops from the island. | The political rhetoric phrased by the Turkish-Cypriot officialdom for framing the same events in 1974 is articulated as a “peace operation” and exercise of a “constitutional and a legitimate right of Turkey as a guarantor power” to safeguard the integrity and safety of Turkish Cypriots on the island due to the instability caused by the intervention of the Greek and Greek-Cypriot military Junta.

For some leaders, the violent cycles of conflict in Cyprus are bi-communal, crafted by the work of Cypriot nationalists and paramilitary spoilers who set the stage for the political and social fragmentations between the two communities in the decade between the early 1960s and early 70s. 63 Conflict resolution practitioner John Burton, who worked in Cyprus in the mid 1960s with his students, framed the Cyprus problem as a case involving a “prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups” to fulfill and guarantee their basic needs, such as security, recognition, and political and fair participation in government affairs. 64
The two theoretical approaches render a lot of value in linking the process of framing the perceived cause of the violent cycles of conflicts in Cyprus to outcomes and methods for managing/settling the same conflict over the passage of time. In this regard, Cypriot top leaders and elites, across the divide and within each side, are very polarized from one another when it comes to defining the Cyprus problem and prescriptively laying out how to begin talks and what kind of talks, when and where to start the talks, the agenda of the talks and its framework and the endgame they are striving for. The next proposition derives from the above analysis:

Proposition 4-II: Over the years, the political rhetoric across and within each side has transmitted the attitude of a zero-sum belief that the one side will only win at the expense of the other, and concessions could render a “sell-out to the Greeks” or a “sell-out to the Turks.”

Below are some examples of rhetoric used by top leaders in the context of this research as part of their efforts to describe the “Cyprus problem.” In their answers, the interviewees referenced the span of the Cyprus problem, beginning in the mid-50s and onward (anonymous interviews):

- “An anti-colonial, anti-imperialist struggle.”
- “A struggle for liberation.”
- “A process for self-determination.”
- “A fight for unity.”
- “A struggle for partition.”
- “An ethnic conflict.”
“Ideological conflict.”
“An international conflict.”
“A sectarian conflict.”
“A foreign invasion and occupation.”
“A liberating operation.”

One party leader phrased it as “a religious conflict,” using the categorical adjectives of “Christians” and “Muslims” interchangeably in his/her narrative, insinuating that the “Cyprus problem” is a religious type war. The above descriptive political phrases have a normative framing characteristic of what top leaders in Cyprus perceive to be the sources of their problem. Below is another normative rhetorical list of phrases in which top leaders elaborated on the kind of “solution” they hoped for (anonymous interviews):

• “Cyprus is Greek.”
• “Cyprus is Turkish.”
• “Return of all refugees to their properties.”
• “Turkish troops out of Cyprus.”
• “All troops out of Cyprus.”
• “A loose federation.”
• “A confederation.”
• “A loose partnership.”
• “Bi-zonal, bi-communal federation.”
• “A just and viable solution according to UN [and SC] Resolutions.”
• “Virgin birth.”
• “Two constituent states.”
• “A federal solution with one sovereignty and international recognition.”
• “Strong federation.”
• “Loose federation.”
• “A united Cyprus.”
• “Current status quo”
• “Separation”

The above are also important rhetorical triggers that were encountered by leaders to market their perspectives and methodology as to what and when and under what circumstance the Cyprus problem is perhaps “ripe enough” for a settlement. Building along the same chain of propositions:

Proposition 4-III: Rhetorical triggers can be very elusive and ambiguous in meaning, substance and interpretation, and can trigger an intertwined chain of thoughts, emotions and aspirations in the minds of ordinary Cypriots.

For example, the term “bi-zonal, bi-communal federation” was drafted in the high level agreements in the Makarios-Denktash talks in 1977, and it has been accepted by many leaders as a framework for a settlement and has become the basis for many peacemaking initiatives since then. However, for a cluster of six leaders (across the divide) whom I quote here, the interpretations and understanding of the terms “bi-zonal” and “bi-communal federation” vary significantly (anonymous interviews):

• “…a loose federation [ala] Belgium style”
• “…with two cantons [ala] Swiss style”
• “[like] … a moderate federation formula for a united Cyprus, as in the case of the EU…”

• “[like] … a USA type federation … or maybe better say like the USA and Puerto Rico”

• “[like] … the two entities in Bosnia with one representation …”

• “[like] … a two-state solution… for example similar to the Israel/Palestine proposals in partnership with one another and perhaps with one representation in international organizations …”

In further unraveling the relationship between the process of framing and its outcome, it is important to lay out some distinguishing features and characteristics of the relationship, as this may be useful for further research in the field of conflict resolution. From my arguments thus far,

• Framing (as a process) in peace and conflict situations is a context-specific process undertaken by influential leaders to manage and carefully label a framework and its rhetorical parameters in which the overall situation (perceived causes and conditions), as well as parties’ attitudes and behaviors towards one another, are explained and transmitted for constituents and other audiences locally and internationally.
Framing (as an outcome) refers to the decoding and interpretation of the intended (and/or unintended) meaning marketed by the sender(s) to the targets (whether ambiguously or not), as well as to the norms and policies adopted as a result of the framing process to produce some tangible or intangible results.

To demonstrate the linkages between the various components of the framing process, at least six characteristics are listed below and incorporated in table 4-2:

1. A very critical dimension in framing is the element of structural and institutional power that elites encompass to manage the process in which the perceived issues of the Cyprus problem (or any other contradiction) are put into norms and laws and marketed to inside and outside audiences.

2. Framing takes place at multiple levels of interaction and draws its energy from the intra/inter-personal, intra/inter-group and international reservoirs of norms, beliefs and laws needed for justification.

3. It makes reference to particular time frames, contexts, events, actions, etc., and the phraseology can be monochromic and/or diachronic.

4. Rhetorical triggers are an important component of framing and are often employed to code and provide snapshot references to the sources of the conflict, the perceived causes and conditions, and the “demonized perpetrators” who can color audiences’ perceptions and belief systems.

5. Framing parameters consists of (i) tangible boundaries (international laws, formal agreements, resolutions), (ii) intangible boundaries (imaginary visions,
elusive promises), and (iii) adjustable or ambiguous boundaries that phrase, shape and transmit codes into self-perceived actions and behaviors and to condemn the adversary.

6. Framing consists of political rhetoric used in this context to refer to a reservoir of populist-type jargon that will serve as the context for rhetorical triggers to describe the event and make them memorable to audiences.
Table 4-2: Process of Framing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels</th>
<th>Setting (Sources)</th>
<th>Framing Parameters (Context / Situation)</th>
<th>Political Rhetoric (Triggers)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Level</td>
<td>Constitution. Bi-communal Relations.</td>
<td>Political; Ethnic Nationalism; National Cause</td>
<td>(left and right ideological divisions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Constitutional Arrangements and Laws.</td>
<td>Bi-communal struggle; Partition; Enosis; Unification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Level</td>
<td>The sphere of Greek-Turkish Relations. (NATO and USA-Containment).</td>
<td>Greco-Turkish Nationalism. Regional (NATO) Stability (containment).</td>
<td>Nationalism; International; Ethnic Identity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The European Union. (Commission; Council; Parliament; Court of Justice).</td>
<td>European Laws and Human Rights; Resolution Opinions and Treaties.</td>
<td>Violation of Human Rights Foreign Intervention (Invasion – Occupation – Liberation).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>European Court of Human Rights.</td>
<td>Human Rights and Judgments.</td>
<td>Violation of Basic Freedoms: Movement, Property, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global and Beyond</td>
<td>The American-Soviet Relations (Cold War).</td>
<td>Ideological / Philosophical.</td>
<td>Anti-imperialism; Anti-communism; Non-allied.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>British Colonialism and Rule.</td>
<td>Defensive Alliance; Direct Rule; Colonialism.</td>
<td>Anti-colonial Struggle; Political Violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The United Nations (Sec. Council)</td>
<td>UN General Assembly Resolutions. UN Security Council Resolutions. International Law.</td>
<td>Foreign Intervention; Occupation; Violation of UN Resolutions; etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Proposition 4-IV: Framing is very important to top leaders in Cyprus and elsewhere because it is a way for them to market their worldviews and, if mastered well in the name and hope for lasting and sustainable peacemaking, it can determine whether genuine intentions for a settlement can be matched. If, on the other hand, the intentions are to intimidate the other side or to simply score political points, one can only expect a collapse or unsuccessful implementation of a peacemaking initiative.65

In conclusion, the political rhetoric embedded into the process of defining the Cyprus problem has some profound implications across the island by being transformed into political dogma. The political rhetoric carries on the characteristics of victimhood, making references to calamities awaiting punishment, and supports an ever-present expectation for unilateral yielding by the perpetrator.66 Victimhood in this dissertation describes the victimization or wrong doings against the group or community and the focus on ‘just’ punishment rather than healing and reconciliation. From this perspective, the Cyprus problem has a deep rooted stem that is at times exploited by top leaders, and symbolizes a constant struggle by a victimhood awaiting justice in the absence of objective historicism.
4.4 Rhetorical Entrapment and Leadership

The peacemaking processes in Cyprus are very puzzling and uncertain. The inconclusiveness of nearly 41 peacemaking initiatives resembles a rollercoaster of highs and lows in hope, fear, insecurity and disappointment among Cypriots, a reality of which all top leaders are aware. Also, for many Cypriots, the road to peace is a prolonged process of waiting for the journey to come to an end. The endgames or post-endgame implementations they hope for vary, and often significantly. For Cypriot refugees (Internally Displaced Persons), this is a journey of return to their homes and properties, making the issue of territorial adjustments and property the most difficult ones on the table awaiting comprehensive solution, thus increasing the gap between what is tangible during talks, and what has been set through maximalist visions and rhetoric in social and political settings. In this realm, to reach a negotiated settlement, a number of contending issues must be settled first at the negotiation table, as many top leaders argue including: (a) the political status and number of Turkish Nationals who will continue to reside under the constituent territories of the Turkish Cypriot state, if not in both states; (b) the territorial adjustments and the percentage of land to be administered under each constituent state if the two sides settle under the premise of a federated-type solution; (c) the type of constitutional arrangements and power sharing at municipal levels (in places where the population will be mixed) and state and federal levels. Additionally, (d) there is the issue of sovereignty and identity; (e) the return of refugees (internally displaced persons) and resettlement assistance, if any, to be paid; (f) various European Union issues and harmonization of laws between the constituent states; (g) the presence of foreign
troops (Greek forces, Turkish forces, National Guard of Cyprus); and (h) the issue of policing, among many other sub issues and technicalities.

From one perspective, all of these issues are tangible at the negotiating table and if one looks closely at the various peacemaking initiatives, there are many formulas that have been proposed and exchanged by the parties over the years. Apparently there is valid truth to the argument that some of the issues are intractable. With each side drawing red lines wider every time, there is a failure to break the impasse and expectations for more concessions when the next process starts again. The issues at the negotiation table are not what make the peacemaking process thorny per se. There are many obstacles and constraints that block the negotiation process for a settlement, as I will argue in forthcoming chapters. For the time being, one constraint to note is the issue of “rhetorical entrapment,” defined in this context as a social and psychological entrenchment of political elites in their own political rhetoric, and occasionally their party positions, which makes them inflexible to the occurrence of changing circumstances (internal and/or external) over time.68

The concept of rhetorical entrapment in this context has a twofold meaning: First, it refers to the entrenchment of elites and their political party positioning within the categorical worldview of the Cyprus problem and its prescription for a settlement.

Proposition 4-V: the process of rhetorical entrapment in Cyprus has often times turned into a self-stimulating and self-perpetuating mechanism that holds the top leader - constituent relationship hostage to the parameters of framed positioning, making
it difficult for them to offer concessions (or even show flexibility) outside the boundaries of the argument they have been marketing for quite sometime.  

Second, many Cypriots have built a level of attachment (or gratification) about what the Cyprus problem is and how it ought to be settled considering the personal views, slogans and perspectives of influential leaders or party politicians. To a great extent, this may challenge leadership roles and their level of flexibility/inflexibility towards redirecting their course of action, especially after they morally identify themselves as the guardians of a worldview, cause or a movement. There are many elites who have lost popularity within parties or their colleagues ousted (marginalized) them for diverting from the party’s course of action or commitment to the moral cause they were all sworn to follow. In this realm, the following proposition is formed:

**Proposition 4-VI:** “reciprocal entrapment” is more visible when leaders look for alternative paths to settlement or deviation from their initial positions (rhetoric) but are faced with strong resistance from their constituents or peers who are already entrenched in maximalist worldviews.

Often, changes in leadership, party divisions and splits between factions of various proponents are among the political costs not uncommon in Cyprus and are present in the history of every Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot political party, and is perhaps a characteristic in every political system.
The roles of leadership in framing the Cyprus problem are very significant and particularly so when it comes to the preservation of leaders and their parties in holding tight to the reins of political power affecting both the position and methodology of top negotiators at the talks. The concept of “symbolic power” (Bourdieu 1999) is coined as power that is transmuted into a symbolic form and thereby endowed with a kind of legitimacy that it would not have otherwise. Its success requires that those subjected to it believe in the legitimacy of those who exercise it and those who exercise it are either the creators of the division in Cyprus or their bi-products. This linkage can be demonstrated in at least four ways:

First, framing the Cyprus problem within the perceived “right context” renders significant importance to the leaders’ worldview, especially if the embedded rhetoric makes reference to leaders’ personal contributions, acts of heroism, or any other scheme that gives direct identification and recognition with a popular cause. Former negotiator and President of the Republic of Cyprus, Glafcos Clerides, who has given nearly 60 years of service to his community, wrote in his “depositions:”

“I belong to the Greek Cypriot community, whose age-long aspirations for union with Greece led to an armed struggle, in which I participated, against British colonial rule, and to violent conflict with the Turkish Cypriot community before the birth of a reluctant Republic of Cyprus.” (Clerides 1989)

Second, the intended outcome of framing holds higher gratification in people’s minds if its rhetoric references formal agreements, international laws, norms, and
resolutions signed by leaders. According to one Cypriot leader, the 1974 Turkish intervention is phrased as,

“an act of foreign invasion and occupation by Turkey that was condemned by the international community and the UN Security Council... and a violation of the Zurich-London agreements and in particular of the Treaty of Guarantee...,” (anonymous interview).

From another perspective, a Cypriot leader phrased the same action by Turkey as

“the legal right and obligation of Turkey, according to the Zurich-London agreements... the ‘Treaty of Guarantee’... to intervene and protect us [Turkish-speaking Cypriots] from the aggression of the Greeks and Greek Cypriot ultranationalists,” (anonymous interview).

Both statements referenced the issue of security or insecurity, as I like to refer to them, and are directly embedded in the “Treaty of Guarantees,” (1960) affecting the process of negotiations on this issue directly. The above quotations also represent the official party lines of the organizations the two interviewees represent. Both leaders made reference to the same agreement of 1960 to justify their arguments, however, the interpretations and prescription for action are polar opposites of one another, with the one referring to a “foreign invasion and occupation,” and the other to a “peace operation and liberation.”

Third, and in conjunction with the previous two approaches, framing is important to leaders for transmitting their personal interests and worldviews on the methodology and the approach they will be adopting regarding resolving the Cyprus problem. The process of framing is directly routinizing the long-term political behavior of Cypriots. Over time and through frequent repetition of the initial long verses of political rhetoric, the messages are then transformed and shortened to distinct rhetorical triggers – they are
short in nature but equally powerful in the longer versions of reasoning and explanation.

According to the first president of the “reluctant Republic of Cyprus,” Archbishop Makarios III:

“I have struggled for the Union of Cyprus with Greece, and Enosis (Union) will always be my deep national aspiration as it is the aspiration of all Greek-Cypriots. My national creed has never changed and my career as a national leader has shown no inconsistency or contradiction. I have accepted independence instead of Enosis because certain external conditions and factors have not allowed a free choice,” (Le Point, February 19, 1973).

Similarly, extracting from one of the written accounts of former negotiator and president of the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Rauf Denktash:

“There is not, and there has never been, a Cypriot nation. That may be the misfortune of Cyprus and indeed the root cause of its problem... what we cannot and will not yield on is our right to independence and to decide our future for ourselves...,” (Denktash 1988).

Both leaders were well known for their particular rhetoric and if one is equipped with the ears of an insider, they would be able to tell, with a strong degree of accuracy, where Cypriots stand in proximity to various leaders by simply bringing to the fore the rhetorical triggers. For example, triggers such as “enosis,” “partition,” and “EOKA bite,” “communist,” “fascist,” “Makariakoi” etc., etc., serve as snapshots for identification writ small of the longer versions of political language where words are deeds and the symbolic use of language is at stake.70 Triggers are like symbols (Bourdieu 1982) with ritual expressions about the Cyprus problem:
Proposition 4-VII: Rhetorical triggers are the mechanisms through which those who speak attest to the authority of the political institutions and political parties echoing across the buffer zone and are sustained by a status quo political division and in part by the worship and gravity of the political paradigm.  

Fourth, framing has a profound impact on the formation of social, ideological and political identities of the group in the context of intra and inter-group relations. For example,

Proposition 4-VIII: Framing can lay bare the idiosyncratic rhetoric, mental neuroses, and vision of charismatic or powerful leaders. These characteristics are then transmitted to constituents in Cyprus and over the years have come to identify the Cyprus problem, as well as how it should be negotiated, by inscribing in the minds of the public the same insecurities and pathologies of the initiator.

In this kind of a situation, leaders and their supporters become inflexible with regard to redirecting their moral commitment and for considering alternatives.  

According to a political party leader:

“The first president of the Republic Makarios was associated with Enosis (union) with Greece. If you were on his side you were considered pro-Makariakos (Makarios sympathizer). The ones opposing his viewpoints were considered anti-Makariako. Similarly, Denktash created a legacy with Taxim (partition), bringing a lot of pro-Denktashies and anti-Denktashies with him. Organized people could stop you on the street and ask you the questions of where you were standing and then take action accordingly,” (anonymous interview).
Another political leader commented:

“Under the recent popular uprisings under the banner ‘this country is ours,’ [December 2002-January 2003] we proved that we no longer approved of Denktash and his handling of the Cyprus problem. His policies and administration and ideology led to the domination of Turkish Cypriots by Turkey. Denktash is happy with the status quo and those who are associated with him are happy too... TRNC is his creation after all is not ours – this country is ours and it belong to us. For all Cypriots that’s why we went to the streets to make that clear to him and to everybody else that we are Turkish Cypriots and not Turkish Nationals ...,” (anonymous interview).

One important question for practitioners of conflict resolution that derives from the above four approaches (and I am not able to address it here due to lack of direct information), is how do third party mediators/negotiators manage to remain impartial and neutral after they have been exposed to the political rhetoric of top leaders on the island? There is no doubt that UN mediators and the Secretary General’s special envoys spend quality time with top leaders in Cyprus, at least to get to know one another and their view points before taking any consultative action in shuttling diplomacy between the two sides.

4.5 Types of Framing and Implications for 3rd Parties

In summary, the framing of the “Cyprus problem” by top elites over time and across party-ideological lines has created a reservoir of arguments and rhetoric that every analyst and researcher should be aware of. A careful and, at times, ambiguous selection of words, along with good skill in phrasing personal and party positions coherently and convincingly, could become a vital process in the future careers of party politicians.
Changes in domestic and international contexts, changes in leadership and tradeoffs at the negotiation table where concessions, leverages and constraints are tested, among other factors, can be a sign as to the direction the framing and phrasing process of any conflict or peace process can flow. It takes a skilled marketer to realize what the terrain entails to reach an endgame and favorable settlement to any struggle. It takes a skilled intervener to untangle the real interests, values and needs of parties and map the terrain toward an integrative agreement and permanent, collaborative post-accord implementation process for all parties involved.

Using the Cyprus peace process as an example, a grave danger occurs when leaders get trapped in their own framing of the Cyprus problem, which in turn entrenches their constituents deep into ethnocentric tunnels of vision, making their options for peace rather inflexible. The insecurity of the mid-50s, the bi-communal violence that followed the formation of the reluctant Republic in the early 60s, and the coup against the legal government in 1974 that was followed by the Turkish interventions and wars of 1974, were not the results of popular hatred but rather the manipulation and exacerbation of ethnic nationalism in the hands of political spoilers who had their own agendas.

On the contrary,

*Proposition 4-IX*: careful un-framing and re-framing of the Cyprus problem by proponents of genuine peace within and across the buffer zone can bring a new understanding of the situation and perhaps remove some of the rhetorical roadblocks en route to peace and open up new ways of undressing,
acknowledging and reconciling the concerns and fears that developed behind barbed wire fences during the years of sectarianism.73

Once in Cyprus, mediators, third parties and foreign diplomats are exposed to a number of contradictions in their consultation with top leaders, including: (i) at least two different sets of historiographies; (ii) two different mappings of the conflict terrain, its sources and causes that led to the troubled inter-party interactions; (iii) several different starting point and turning point references as to when, where and under what circumstances the conflict was started in the first place and by whom; (iv) all the “bitter” or “huge” concessions that have been offered in goodwill to the other side, claiming that these concessions were never reciprocated; and (v) all of the grand gestures of conciliation that were rejected by the other side and the inflexibility shown by the other side to commit to the talks in good faith, and the list goes on.

There is truth to the statement that “Cyprus is the graveyard for many mediators,” as well as for foreign envoys, who have tested their skills to break the seemingly unbridged impasse. Some have been accused of carrying on western colonial and imperialist conspiracies or for violating their neutrality or showing some partiality and sympathy to the other side.74 Similarly, there is no doubt that framing the Cyprus problem and its various issues of contention has been a major obstacle to a successful peacemaking process and leaders have played an important role in this. According to a member of the mediation team during the 2002 talks in Nicosia between Denktash and Clerides (2002-2003):
“The two leaders kept on pulling and pushing the rope [on issues]… regarding sovereignty, etc. The one leader kept on “insisting on a confederate solution or a partnership of two equal entities/states’ and the other leader kept on insisting on ‘a unified and federated government with a bi-zonal, bi-communal system with political equality between the two states’… in the end neither one yielded. As a result the mediation team introduced a new term – ‘constituent states’ and later on a foreign diplomat introduced the term ‘virgin birth’ to bypass wars of words, but that came with a cost at the end.” (anonymous interview).

If leaders genuinely agree to a solution then they have to build new parameters for selling the agreement to their constituents or new proponents in favor of the agreed solution.

Using the above example, consider this for a moment: Would Clerides have been able to convince his constituents (among Greek-Cypriots) to settle for a confederation-type solution (an endgame solution he opposed for decades) where he had he given up his position for a federal solution? How would his constituents and the G.C. community at-large have reacted to that decision? Similarly, if Denktash were to have settled for a strong federation (an endgame solution he opposed for decades), how would his supporters and the at-large T.C. community have reacted? During the period between 2003 and 2004, many leaders considered the Annan peace plan an anathema to their visions for a solution.

It is very challenging for every third party to untangle framing from the real causes and interests of parties (a leader’s self-interest and group-interests) in a peacemaking process. The environment is one in which the physical war is over, but the fight continues among diplomatic pawns, with frames being the barrel and political rhetoric the cannon balls. Third parties need to see through to the endgame and where the peacemaking process will lead them. Similarly, top leaders and elites have a role and
responsibility to inform their constituents about the real expectation of a peacemaking process and the terrain being encountered.

Inflexible and rigid framing can renew polarization and very likely lead to escalation, but more flexible framing parameters can lead toward a settlement without jeopardizing the core of a group’s identity. Third parties in Cyprus, under the leadership of Alvaro de Soto, played a pivotal role in restructuring and rephrasing the parameters of several of the issues that divide the two sides (parties’ positions and arguments). Also, according to one participant during the talks in Nicosia as early as 2003 (UN mediation Team), there were times that the framing of issues constrained the parties’ level of flexibility to “yield an inch,” metaphorically speaking, from their initial positions. Relative to this, de Soto and his team were able to persuade top negotiators to consider alternatives and yield a bit more on issues (anonymous interview). According to another member of the mediation team during the talks at Burgenstock and Nicosia (early 2004 and March-April 2004):

“This was a process de Soto used a lot (from 2003-2004) during the last two versions of the peace plan, and I think in a few occasions it kept the negotiations process moving forward. It was like if ‘you take something’ you “must give something equivalent’ in return… if not on the same issue on another issue… some of the issues were linked together and made it a bit easier, but not always, for ‘logrolling’ and trade offs,” (anonymous interview).

Based on the information I was able to collect from members of the mediation team who were accessible to meet with me and who had participated in the talks between 2002 and 2004 in Cyprus, as well as from comments via secondary individuals, I have constructed the following proposition:
**Proposition 4-X:** Framing in peacemaking has important implications for 3rd party interveners (mediators / negotiators) to understand and perform in order to enhance the chances for a more integrative endgame solution between mistrustful adversaries in Cyprus and perhaps elsewhere, including:

1. familiarity with the process of framing and the use of political rhetoric that is put forward by top leaders and their negotiators to phrase and rephrase their positions, issues and interests over time;

2. knowledge of how parties have framed and phrased their political rhetoric longitudinally and in relation to previous peacemaking attempts / processes;

3. ability to assist parties to identify sets of mutual options apart from their political rhetoric that have previously entrapped them with inflexible positions;

4. ability to search for common ground within or outside the framing parameters for parties to problem-solve;

5. knowledge with the domestic and international institutions that parties seek to find reservoirs of norms, laws, regulations and audiences in order to justify the framing and phrasing of the terrain they seek to settle;

6. ability to understand the (i) social; (ii) psychological; (iii) emotional; (iv) contextual; (v) cultural; and (vi) inter-group and intra-group (among other) dynamics that led parties to frame their arguments and positions over time, and reframe / rephrase the issues in such a way that could lead parties to a deal;

7. assist parties to reframe and rephrase their positions so that they will not become entrapped in their own rhetoric indefinitely once a new array of acceptable options are within reach and convince their constituents about the peace dividends.

In summarizing this section, it is important to note that a peacemaking process is a very dynamic and complex process and any third party has many roles and functions to perform (Zartman and Rasmussen 1997; Moore, 1996; Kriesberg 1996; Mitchell and Webb 1988) in regard to the process of mediation and its relative outcomes. The above
seven characteristics are important dynamics for 3rd parties to consider and perhaps use to influence a peacemaking process positively when parties are entrenched in their positioning frames and rhetoric that at times make it impossible for top leaders to consider alternatives and move towards a compromised or an integrative endgame solution.

4.6 The Cyprus Problem Redefined

In summary, the Cyprus problem is cultivated deep inside the collective identity of Cypriots and contributes to what I call Cypriot-ness. Cypriot-ness is influenced by the sources and causes of the conflict and its dynamics, as well as the separation of the two communities by the sectarian division line that cuts the island almost in half, and is also characterized by mistrust and hatred in the presence of collective ahistorism. Cypriots growing up in the epoch of the Cyprus problem are not neurotic people by nature but rather are victims of a political reality that dominates their worldview from their early education and onward. The Cyprus problem and its political rhetoric produces a self-stimulating/self-perpetuating cycle of socialization – victims in one act of the Cyprus problem became the perpetrators in another and the same story gets exploited in the absence of reflective truth and genuine reconciliation.76

Collective calamities, selective traumas, and selective glories from their recent history have been well articulated rhetorically and institutionalized by the officialdom across the sectarian status quo that has exacerbated identity lines, giving rise to identity-related stereotypes and prejudices by dehumanizing the so-called others who are none
other than Cypriot co-patriots. In the concepts I touch upon and the propositions that I developed in this chapter, I hold the argument that the process of framing and phrasing the Cyprus problem, as well as its expressions, utterances or triggers, can be seen as the product of inter and intra-party relationships between two political doctrines across the divide over the last few decades in search for a seemingly lasting, durable and just settlement. When top leaders deliver their political rhetoric about the Cyprus problem in particular ways, they also deploy their accumulated linguistic resources (derived from the perceived causes of the Cyprus problem) and implicitly adapt their words to the demands of the social discourse at any given time. Hence, the ordinary life-discourse in Cyprus draws from two very complex institutional structures (officialdoms) - one referred to as the Greek Cypriot side and the other as the Turkish Cypriot side.

As of 2010, very little has been done and invested in promoting truth, reconciliation, restorative justice, apology and forgiveness, which is a genuine road block to peace that has rarely been mentioned in history books or in parties’ political agendas that I have reviewed in the context of this dissertation and other research projects and symposia that I am involved with in Cyprus.

(2007) - Four years have passed since the day in 2003 that we took the road to the ‘other side’ for a short visit.

It is now clear, even among the most optimistic of us, that a political solution to the Cyprus problem will not happen in the immediate future. Almost three out of four fellow Greek Cypriots voted against the Annan plan, invoking the spirit of ‘patriotism,’ [Nationalism]. In reality though, many knew that rejecting the plan could mean ‘permanent division,’ not politically recognized though, that would favor the views of many Greek Cypriots, but not necessarily the interests of refugees [Internally Displaced Persons in Cyprus].
Four years ago when we stood in line at the checkpoint to go and see our homes, many fellow Greek Cypriots called us ‘traitors.’ But the hopes and spirits of the refugees, and Cypriots in general, to go visit their homes, even as tourists in their own country, stood strong against the propaganda.

... The dream of returning one day is crushed by the mere reality of the status quo. What country are you talking to me about? What causes are you referring too? We are stuffed with empty promises.
CHAPTER 5

The Cyprus Peace Process

5. Peace Paradigms in Cyprus

The following responses are excerpts from interviews with top political leaders in Cyprus across the buffer zone during one-on-one interviews (2006-08). Interviewees remain anonymous for the purposes of this dissertation research:

Author’s question: “Are there hopes for a new peace process in Cyprus following the collapse of the Annan Plan in 2004?”

Anonymous Leader 1: “There is no peace process in Cyprus anymore… the Cyprus issue is settled, Tassos [Papadopoulos] and Mehmet [Ali Talat] solved it already… the division is now permanent”

Anonymous Leader 2: “The rejection of the referenda by the majority of the Greek Cypriots is blessed by the support of nearly all the political parties and the religious establishment cemented the division.”

Anonymous Leader 3: “There was never a peace process in Cyprus,” but an “effort by the Greeks [perhaps meaning Greek Cypriots] to dominate us and eliminate our voice in the government.” (author’s words in brackets)

Anonymous Leader 4: “The peace process started in 1968 with the Clerides-Denktash talks and ended in 1974 with the coup.”

Anonymous Leader 5: “It started in 1974 with the Vienna talks… and every attempt to settle since then collapsed. The … [other] side does not want a solution.”
Anonymous Leader 6: “The peace process was in the period between 2001 and 2004 and it presented itself as a great momentum for peace… before that it was just talks… in 2003 people from both sides and NGOs came together; that is a peace process. I am not sure if there will be another one after this… It’s all over now. We should be honest with the people.”

Anonymous Leader 7: (describing the same time period, 2001-2004, same as the above leader): “an Anglo-American conspiracy to dismantle the Republic of Cyprus into two so-called ‘constituent communities’… there will be a solution… when the Anglo-Americans, Greece and Turkey allow us to work together.”

Peace is a very elusive and puzzling concept. Mention the word “peace” in Cyprus and you are very likely to hear a plethora of answers and metaphors such as “peace is not free,” “peace is what we have now [absence of war],” “peace will come when the Turkish troops depart,” “peace is an end to the isolation of TRNC,” “peace is when Cypriots, Greeks [Greek Cypriots] and Turks [Turkish Cypriots] eat and dance together,” and the list goes on.

In the literature of peace and conflict studies, the term peace has a twofold meaning, at least for as far as I have come to understand it. First, for many writers and researchers, the term peace has a teleological meaning for action. That is, an individual or a group chooses the appropriate means to realize a perceived goal by overcoming the contradictions that it has set for itself. From this approach, individuals or groups perceive peace by its level of success in bringing about a state of mind, a state of intra-party and inter-party cooperation, or a state of world that fulfills the goal(s) in question. The second meaning is summarized by researchers and authors who come to describe it as a common course of action where a set of non-confrontational processes of interaction take
place between the individuals or groups involved in the presence of mutual understanding and constructive dialogue directed to reaching an agreement.  

Very often we allow ourselves to be convinced of what peace entails, the rightness and parameters for a “just peace,” and the veracity of rhetoric in search for peace. One vivid proposition that derives from the interviews in Cyprus is that:

**Proposition 5-I:** In praxis, convictions can be manipulated by top leaders in the absence or interaction with the so-called “other side.” Furthermore, the rationale from where the validity of the claims is derived may be based on false consciousness, misinterpretations and misconception.

In Cyprus, apparently, and perhaps elsewhere, some top leaders give credibility to the realist approach in their quest for explaining the causes of the Cyprus problem. They attribute significance to the argument that peace is always defined according to the wishes of the powerful player who is always searching to instigate desired behaviors in the “noncompliant” or the so-called “other side” through various means and forms of power. Similarly, in the following proposition I conclude that:

**Proposition 5-II:** many leaders in Cyprus tend to define the Cyprus peace process as a struggle between illusionary and non-illusionary convictions for sharing power - with one side aiming to grasp the lion’s share of the power - rather than the two sides joining efforts to conciliate their seemingly incompatible differences and injustices for an integrated solution that will bind all Cypriots together equally.
Is there such a thing as a “peace process in Cyprus?” One top leader answered my question by redirecting it back to me. Later on, that question triggered a series of questions in my mind that still puzzle me. If there is a peace process in Cyprus, when did it start and under what circumstances? What are some of its visible or invisible characteristics? What are the turning points? How long has it been in the making and what are the signs of a slowdown, acceleration or termination? What is it that at times seems to move the process forward to a breakthrough, and at other times towards an impasse or a breakdown? What is the nature of the process? Finally, to close this set of questions that I put forward here with the aim to set the overall foundation for the rest of the subsequent sections, I will investigate the overall relationship between peacemaking processes and where the 41 peacemaking initiatives fit in the overall peace process in Cyprus.

5.1 The Anatomy of the Peace Process in Cyprus

The overall approach in this chapter is very exploratory and the principal aim is to construct the anatomy of the Cyprus peace process in order to reveal some of its characteristics, common themes and key components. Starting with the literature on peace processes and comparative peace processes, there have been several attempts by researchers, scholars and peacemakers to construct the structure, process and dynamics of a peace process. I select five clusters of approaches as starting points for exploring a more comprehensive perspective:
**Approach I:** Sounders (1999) argues that a peace process is a “human or political, as well as diplomatic and negotiating, process that works simultaneously on multiple levels.” He distinguishes between two congruent components: public (civil society peace process) and official peacemaking processes and then he highlights the necessity of the two processes to complement one another for better success over time. Similar to Sounders, Lederach (1997) offers a vertical approach to a peace process by integrating the interaction between grassroots stakeholders, middle level stakeholders/ elites and top elites/领导们. Lederach also highlights the importance of horizontal communication between clusters of actors and agencies at the three levels, as well as interaction with the equivalent cluster of actors/agencies from the opponent’s side that has the capacity to build proponents in favor of lasting peace.

**Approach II:** Zartman (1986) refers to the “ripe moment” that, under the presence of favorable conditions / factors, can lead to a process of negotiation between antagonists to manage and settle their conflict. For Zartman, a process of negotiation is one of the first building blocks for a peace process to start. Then he identifies a number of objective and subjective characteristics that can lead to the ripe moment or turning point from escalation/ stalemate to what Mitchell (1999) defines as a “threshold for de-escalation and termination.” Along this spectrum, other authors highlight the importance of other turning point conditions such as “enticing opportunity,” “shock event,” “mutual hurting stalemate,” “change in
leadership,” as well as other exploratory ideas as to how a peace process can start and spin off.

**Approach III:** Darby and MacGinty (2004; 2000) identify five features that characterize a peace process by looking at a small number of cases such as South Africa, Northern Ireland, Israel-Palestine, Sri Lanka and the Basque peace process:

1. The protagonists are willing to negotiate in good faith;
2. The key actors are included in the process;
3. The negotiations address the central issues in dispute;
4. The negotiators do not use force to achieve their objectives;
5. The negotiators are committed to a sustained process.

Similar perspectives found in Cynthia Arnson (2000) complement this cluster of variables and perspectives.

**Approach IV:** Azar (1990) and Burton (1993) investigate the dynamics of peace processes and, in particular, preconditions that lead to the reoccurring of conflict within each case again and again. Burton believes that this reoccurrence, or protractiveness of conflicts, is caused by a group of individuals who want to get their basic needs met within the structure they are bounded by voluntarily or involuntarily. Protracted social conflict links the various layers of social and political interactions from the local to the international level of politics and looks to identify pre-conditions that have usually been prevalent for a long period of
time and that would signal a conflict may occur or could be resolved. In addition, Rubenstein (1990; 1999) stresses three virtues of the needs theory that are also departing points for this dissertation. First, the approach by Burton and Azar allows resolution forces to make a distinction between whether a conflict can be solved by force and power tactics, or if it needs another measure other than force to be resolved. With the needs theory, resolvers now have an alternative to power realism (Waltz 1959; North 1990; Lund 2001). Secondly, with an understanding of the needs of individuals, resolvers can begin to implement processes that correspond with the needs of the individuals in conflict, instead of simply negotiating for peace with only top leaders. Thirdly, another virtue of the needs theory is that it begins to understand, where conventional theories do not, that social conflicts are not just caused by bad leaders or by cultural differences (Avruch and Black 1991; 1993). These conflicts are rooted in something much deeper than what is on the surface.

**Approach V:** Parallel with the previous approach, Sandole (1999) offers an integrative three pillar approach of conflict resolution techniques by looking at peace processes as a concert of interventions, from preventive to proactive measures, undertaken by third parties to assist antagonists in conflict to settle their differences. His comprehensive pillar model lists a spectrum of multiple objectives and approaches for third parties to choose from, ranging from “negative peace” to “positive peace” (Galtung 1990). Parallel to the Sandole

The above approaches are not exhaustive but provide a reservoir of embedded structures and tools in order to synthesize an integrative model for analyzing and understating the dynamics and characteristics of a peace process such as the one in Cyprus. In this dissertation, a peace process is not the mere opposite of a conflict process, nor are peace process dynamics mirror images of conflict dynamics, as if parties could step down the escalatory pattern they once built, such as those of conflict initiation, conflict escalation, persist escalation, stalemate, termination, etc. found in Kriesberg (1982), Pruitt and Kim (2004) and other accounts. It is also important to note that a peace process may start at any stage of conflict, if desired by the parties involved, and could lead to a temporary or a permanent termination. It is also conventional to argue that a peace process begins with identifiable “thresholds toward de-escalation” (Mitchell, 1999).
5.1-1 Synthesizing Approaches I-V

In this dissertation a peace process is viewed as a very dynamic process undertaken by parties in conflict, sometimes with the help of 3rd parties, to build structures and a capacity for non-aggressive interactions followed by dividends of what the one side can do for the other to (i) address issues of common concern, (ii) alleviate animosity, (iii) lower mistrust and (iv) restore confidence as starting points en route to sustainable peace, reconciliation and constructive transformation of their future relations.  

**Proposition 5-III:** A peace process consists of at least five spectrums of intertwined structures for interaction orchestrated together by decisions and efforts that derive from all three levels of Lederach’s leadership pyramid (top leaders, elites, ordinary people, civil society and influential interveners), including:

(i) short-term to medium and long-term strategies for sustainable peace;

(ii) a structure of reactive to proactive measures;

(iii) a blend of official and unofficial channels or tracks of channeling communication across and within each side;

(iv) a structure of negative to positive measures of orientation; and

(v) a spectrum of approaches ranging from competitive to transformative ones in the quest for peace.
Figure 5.1 provides a visual / generic interpretation of a peace process and its structure building on a number of donor and other generic models found in the literature of conflict resolution, negotiations and international relations, as mentioned earlier.\textsuperscript{85}
Reactive
(Measures)
Conf. Prevention

Proactive
Conf. Transformation

Short-term
(Timing) Short-term deontological ethics / attempts
Towards Sustainability

Long-Term
Sustainable Peace / Restorative Justice
Teleological Ethics

Official
(Multi-Track Diplomacy)
Civil Society and Grass Roots Efforts

Unofficial
(Track II- IX)
Diplomacy

Contacts)
Diplomacy

Negative Peace
(Absence of Violence)
Coexistence

Positive Peace
Collaborative Efforts, Social Transformation and Equalities

Competitive
Preventive Diplomacy
Peace-making

Transformative
Post-Conflict Reconstruction
Reconciliation

Figure 5-1: Peace Process Structure and Characteristics
Note that figure 5.1 is a framework to build on and not inclusive of the above processes only. Some terms represent very complex processes and very dynamic relationships, as well as sequences of interactions between parties in their efforts to bring an end to their hostilities and in concert with other structural and contextual developments and intra/inter-party strategies towards building positive terms for peace. It is not a normative model because peace processes do not necessarily follow the same path, though I agree with the argument that a peace process always starts with some type of conciliatory gesture (Mitchell 2000) and its negotiation stage often concludes, temporarily or a permanently, with the signing of a formal / informal accord. A rhetorical question, on the contrary, is - why couldn’t a process of reconciliation start first before a formal agreement for conflict termination is signed? What if a “track II” public peace process at the civil level succeeds in building a strong constituency and a context in favor of conflict termination which could perhaps broker a breakthrough at the official “track I” level of interaction? These are just a few questions / arguments that many leaders in Cyprus contemptuously disregard.86

Also, in the context of this dissertation, peace processes such as in the cases of Cyprus, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, South Africa, Israel/Palestine and Colombia are viewed from a holistic perspective. Some authors correctly argue that there are several peace processes in Colombia such as the Pastrana peace process (named after the former president of Colombia Andres Pastrana); the Uribe peace process (named after former president Alvaro Uribe), etc.87 However, overall, I argue that there is one peace process in Colombia and one peace process in Cyprus, but these processes go through multiple
cycles of peacemaking initiatives, among other developments. Following this argument, the peace process in Cyprus (and perhaps elsewhere in juxtaposition) may go through short or extended periods of time depending, but not solely, on a number of processes, dynamics and developments on the ground and behind the scenes, including:

(i) the intractability, protractability and intensity of the conflict cycles and dynamics parallel to or in sequence to any efforts to terminate conflict and jumpstart a peace initiative process. Peacemaking initiatives, for example, may not necessarily stop the hostilities from taking place on the ground;

(ii) various contextual and structural changes that may take place within parties to build necessary structures to support a capacity in favor of talks and conflict termination, including changes in leadership, build-up of coalitions of proponents and civil society in favor of, or against, a settlement;

(iii) the presence of “positive” and/or “negative spoilers” or ex-combatants and their impact on the official peacemaking and unofficial peace-building efforts;

(iv) the persistence of impasses and breakthroughs in the official talks and the time lapses between a current process to overcome impasses/breakdowns and the previous peacemaking initiative;

(v) the involvement and roles of third parties in engaging the parties into a new initiative within an enticing context or climate for a breakthrough;

(vi) the deployment of peacekeeping forces and the establishment of demilitarized areas or “zones of peace”;
(vii) the positive or negative impact of external parties, such as allies and sponsors, that exercise their leverage to trigger or constrain another round of talks;

(viii) the presence of negative incidents, persistent mutual stalemates and/or enticing opportunities;

(ix) the ever present challenges and perceived obstacles, constraints and opportunities leaders are faced with in their preparation for peace from early stages of signaling to the post-accord implementation process; and

(x) the make-up of civil society and level of dividends offered to increase hopes for lasting peace.

The circumstances under which the above factors could produce successful outcomes in peace processes need to be studied closely by comparing similar and/or dissimilar peace processes, which is beyond the scope of this dissertation at the current stage.\textsuperscript{89} That does not mean that a single case study analysis is irrelevant but, on the contrary, the peace process in Cyprus, as a single case, can provide significant insights and an in-depth analysis into its various characteristics and processes – as is done in chapters 6 through 9 - that could offer departing points into further investigations by unfolding the anatomy of the long-standing and seemingly elusive journey of the Cyprus peace process.

5.2 A Snapshot of the Cyprus Peace Process

One of the visible characteristics of the peace process in Cyprus is that it resembles a train that sways through mountains and picturesque villages with multiple depots along a
seemingly endless ride. The final destination is an endgame solution that each side and its respective leaders have strived to reach for decades. It has an original starting point, of course, according to each passenger’s boarding point, and a seemingly unbridgeable destination driven by contractors who keep changing the route, turning from one virulent vision to another at times. Overall, the Cyprus peace process consists of a dynamic choreography of 41 official peacemaking initiatives spanning from 1955 to 2011 (present) and are separated into four chronological periods (summarized in Appendix B), referred to here as peace process cycles.

The peace process in Cyprus is not linear or sequential in the sense that talks begin when conflict (latent or manifest) ends but rather the various peacemaking initiatives and their dynamic developments are parallel, at times, while at other times they are flip-flopped due to a number of triggers, the presence of paramilitaries and a lack of collaborative approaches and political visions between the leaderships within each side and across the division. The overall relationship between the parties largely resembles a dualistic interaction between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots but also, at times, it involves Greece and Turkey, Great Britain and the USA, the UN and its good offices and the Security Council, and the European Union.

In conjunction with Appendix B, figure 5.2 below shows the classification of 41 peacemaking initiatives along the spectrum from reactive to proactive political strategies. The majority of the peacemaking initiatives in Cyprus are located on the reactive side of the spectrum (left hand side), ranging in nature from conflict prevention strategies – aimed at containing the conflict from further escalation – to conflict settlement, which
includes competitive bilateral negotiation sequences of interaction between the two sides. Very few peacemaking initiatives have conflict resolution and *proventive* methodologies imbedded in them to address and resolve the root causes and conditions that led to conflict in the first place and which can eventually guide the parties to reach an integrative solution towards their future. This is partially congruent with the following proposition:

*Proposition 5-IV:* Top leaders in Cyprus have traditionally adopted endgame solutions for what they perceive could lead them to a “just and lasting peace,” which are for the most part divergent from one another rather than convergent, leading the vast majority of the 41 peacemaking initiatives towards a permanent impasse.91
Figure 5-2: Reactive-Proactive Peacemaking Initiatives in Cyprus 1955-2010
All of the above peacemaking initiatives took place at the official track-one table where legalistic words and proposals were exchanged and negotiated. Parallel to this were the unofficial, or track-two “peace cafés,” as some have coined them, in Cyprus and elsewhere where ordinary citizens came together, expressed their concerns and addressed their fears and insecurities to members of the “other” community, or the so-called enemy. One of the strongest components in the anatomy of a peace process is the short-term deontological and long-term teleological integration of approaches for lasting peace such as the peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace-building strategies depicted in figure 4-1 previously and 4-3 below. For example, the introduction of Confidence Building Measures (CBM) by UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar in 1992 to strengthen the talks between Vassiliou and Denktash was an effort to restore official and unofficial channels of communication, lower mistrust, and enhance confidence among political elites and grassroots Cypriots who were following the talks from their radios and TV sets across the divide.

The linkage between official peacemaking and civil society peace-building is getting stronger since the relaxation on the crossings in 2003. The work of many academics and international non-profit agencies to facilitate mono-communal and bi-communal conflict resolution-type workshops over the years behind fences, in Europe and the USA have laid the groundwork for a network of Cypriot peace-builders with links to the political elites and top leaders. On the contrary, there is an increasing level of skepticism on the part of many leaders I spoke with about the work of pro-peace non-
governmental entities and peace-builders in Cyprus, both foreign and local, who tend to question political agendas and leadership intentions on the Cyprus issue.\textsuperscript{92}
Figure 5-3: Competitive-Transformative Efforts (1955-2010) Peacekeeping-Peacebuilding-Peacemaking Processes (Credit: Sandole 1999)
In addition to the integration of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace-building strategies depicted in Figure 5-3, another significant component in the anatomy of a peace process in Cyprus is the integration of horizontal (across the divide) and vertical (across the divide) processes of interaction. These include at least fourteen tracks of interactions.\(^97\) All of these, either alone or in concert with one another, can play a significant role in a peace process, whether in Cyprus or elsewhere, and can foster and rebuild relationships over the long run. Some of the most significant examples include short-term and long-term integration of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace-building strategies as important components in the overall peace process aimed at sustainable peace. For example, the introduction of Confidence Building Measures (CBM) by Christofias and Talat in 2008 at the official level (technical committees) signaled the beginning of new official and, to some degree, unofficial peace-building interaction among political parties, entities and citizens in Cyprus who were vested in the process for restoring communication, eliminating mistrust and rebuilding confidence since the collapse of the Annan Plan in 2004.\(^98\) CBMs and the opening of new crossing points along the buffer zone still play a vital role in the current Christofias-Eroglu talks (Mehmet Ali Talat was replaced by Dervis Eroglu in the April 2010 elections in TRNC). Additional peace-building tools include:

(i) village reunions between GC and TC from mixed villages after 30 years of separation (for example, the Lapethos/Bogazici reunion);

(ii) municipal city cooperation, the “Nicosia Master Plan,” and restoration of cultural heritage sites;

(iii) track one and a half political dialogue sponsored by the Slovak embassy (former Czechoslovakian initiative) ongoing since the late 1980s;

(iv) trade union initiatives and, in particular, labor and teachers unions;

(v) grassroots peace activists across the divide on issues related to truth and historical act findings;
(vi) common symposiums for journalists, educators as well as other associations;
(vii) bi-communal choir, bi-communal radio and bi-communal TV programs;
(viii) academic seminars on various issues at private and state-owned colleges and universities;
(ix) pro-peace civil society (NGOs) projects;
(x) joint committees under local and/or international coordination such as the Committee on Missing Persons.
Figure 5-4: Multi-Track System of Interactions in Cyprus (Credit: Diamond and McDonald 1996)
5.3 Peacemaking in Cyprus

For starters, it is perhaps conventional to believe that the terms “peace process” and “peacemaking” refer to the same phenomenon and dynamics, as I witnessed that in a few of my conversations (interviews) with top leaders in Cyprus. This is the main reason I believe it is important to unfold the term peace process in the first half of this chapter, along with several of its characteristics, before getting to the analysis of peacemaking processes in Cyprus. To summarize this chapter, thus far, I have demonstrated that peacemaking initiatives to settle the Cyprus issue are part of a very large and complex web of relationships between many approaches, perspectives, methods, dynamics, processes and outcomes along the span of several spectrums that all together (in concluding other factors) comprise the overall peace process in Cyprus. Also, it is very important to make the above differentiation between the peace process in Cyprus and the peacemaking initiatives / processes to settle the Cyprus problem from 1955 to the most current process known as the Christofias-Eroglu Talks, because the notion of peacemaking also comprises many dynamics, structures, strategies, approaches and methods for settling or resolving conflicts satisfactorily. In the rest of the chapter, I am going to set the stage known as peacemaking in Cyprus and it’s most distinguishable and important features for the purpose of this dissertation research.
At least four distinguishable features emerge in trying to understand the peace process in Cyprus from 1955 to the present (2010). I am going to introduce them briefly here and in greater detail in the forthcoming chapters.

I. The linkage between peacemaking process, dynamics, phases and outcomes, from signaling to accord implementation and beyond.

II. The structure of “talks” and the channeling of communication between top leaders and their intermediaries.

III. An ever-present interaction between concessions, constraints and leverages during bilateral negotiations in Nicosia and elsewhere.

IV. An ever-present reality of constructed expectations (or perceived expectations) toward a settlement, its assumptions and potential peace dividends.

5.3.1 Feature I: Peacemaking in Cyprus

After four years of field research in Cyprus and literature review, I developed the following proposition:

*Proposition 5-VI:* A peacemaking process (whether in Cyprus or elsewhere) goes through six dynamic phases of inter-party sequences of interaction, referred to in this dissertation as (i) strategies of signaling, (ii) preliminary contacts, (iii) pre-negotiations, (iv) substantive negotiations, (v) finalizing the agreement or accord (pre-implementation) and (vi) ratifying/implementing the agreement or accord (post-Accord implementation).
Extrapolating from the above proposition, a peacemaking process is not a linear progression of inter-party sequences but rather consists of more than a cycle of peacemaking processes that aim to terminate violence or break conditions of stalemate between former/current enemies. The peace process in Cyprus is a very long-term process consisting of 41 peacemaking initiatives/processes (thus far) spanning across four chronological periods (see chronology) with varied and diverse circumstances giving rise to internal and external factors in each period. Figure 5.4 is a visual depiction of the peacemaking process.
Figure 5-5: Peacemaking as a Process

Key:
- Negotiation-Process (Breakthrough)
- Phases of Inter-party Interaction
- Interaction with Internal and External Influences
- Feedback toward Internal and External Influences
- Feedback: (re)Negotiation Process
Peacemaking is a very fragile process for leaders to maneuver in the presence of a plethora of challenges and obstacles en route to peace from within the context of the Cyprus issue and from abroad as part of regional politics. It requires a significant level of commitment among multiple actors to work collaboratively and unconstrained to address the challenges, at least incrementally, along the road from the status quo division to “positive” peace. Among the list of participants are mediators, top leaders and their advisers, representatives of leaders in various negotiating teams, foreign diplomats, special envoys, other political entities (domestic and foreign), and several other audiences such as local and international peace-building organizations and the civil society at large.

5.3.2 Feature II: Structure of Mediation and Channeling of Communication

The second distinguishable feature of a peacemaking process has to do with the structure and channeling of information from the one side of mistrusted leaders to the other side of equally (if not more) mistrusted leaders, with and / or without the use of also mistrusted third parties. This feature gets us a step closer in understanding how peacemaking initiatives are developed into peace plans and how the overall structure of the peacemaking process holds together. Metaphorically speaking, the mediation structure can be viewed as the backbone of a peacemaking process. It is the place where visions for peace are channeled, fears and insecurities are unveiled, risks are discussed, leadership visions are revealed, intentions are manipulated, hopes are raised and tactical games are set in place to entrap the other side(s) further into yielding.
It is also important to note that the structure of mediation in settling the Cyprus problem has changed over the years but its core remains about the same and I will return to this in chapter 8. The process of mediation / negotiation in Cyprus is an intertwined system with sub-structures for channeling communication back and forth when some avenues of interaction are boarded up and difficult to activate. It consists of many actors within the process and on the periphery, as figure 5-6 depicts. Within the mediation/negotiation structure, internal and/or external third parties play a number of roles and perform many tasks to keep up with the flow of information from one side to the other, without necessarily being free of ambiguities. Mediators, whether internal and/or external, are also the first ones to receive the blame resulting from a temporary or permanent breakdown of an initiative, even if they were “just flies sitting on the wall” (an expression that came about during an anonymous interview). Below is one version of a UN mediation structure in Cyprus that I will use as a departing model. Lines represent the flow of communication.¹⁰⁰
Figure 5-6: UN Mediation Structure in Cyprus
At large, the mediation / negotiation structure of interaction is positively and/or negatively affected by how well the structure is maintained by the primary actors, the mediators and significant parties in the periphery, all of whom have an impact on the relative success and or failure of keeping the communication flow from clogging up.

As I will argue later on, the mediation system consists of multiple structures and sub-structures, including a traditional triadic setting of a leading mediator, and two top leaders/ negotiators representing the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities in Cyprus. Within that structure there is at least another triadic sub-structure comprised of technical committees (committees dealing with logistical issues) or teams such as the mediators’ team, and two separate teams advising the top leaders during talks. The mediation/negotiation sub-structure is interconnected, as the arrows show in figure 4-3, linking various agents and agencies together and enabling the flow of information and sequence of peacemaking interaction to move simultaneously at various plateaus among domestic and international agents (representatives, mediators, negotiators, etc.) and agencies (working groups, parties, allies, etc.), constituents and observers.

5.3.3 Feature III: Concessions-Constraints-Leverage

A peacemaking process either shifts forward along the chain of interactions by mutual breakthroughs or remains stagnant and in danger of shifting backwards during impasses. In the meantime, various internal and external factors may positively or negatively affect the interactions - their processes and outcomes (short-term / long-term successes and failures). What emerges as a common comparative theme in all
peacemaking processes in Cyprus, as I will argue in chapter 8, is a triadic relationship between concessions, constraints, and leverage that have a significant role in moving forward or backward any peacemaking initiative for terminating violence or negotiating an agreeable settlement. Along the train of propositions:

**Proposition 5-VII:** In Cyprus, the presence of a self-stimulating/ self-perpetuating cycle of entrenched positions has been constraining both sides from making credible and genuine concessions, thus continuing the sectarian status quo division since August 1974.

A question that kept cropping up in my mind in the early stages of this dissertation was why some peacemaking initiatives collapsed or were rejected in the early stages and others made it as far as becoming peace accords? There is not a straight answer to this question. Part of the process in constructing Appendix A was to look for comparative similarities and differences and I ended up creating an integrated list of internal and external factors cited among dozens of inquiries that list factors affecting the peacemaking process for a political settlement in Cyprus from 1955 to 2010 (see chapters 5 and 6). What comes out of that analysis is the argument that at the core of every sequence in peacemaking interaction (signaling, preliminary contacts, pre-negotiations, etc.), there is a power element that drives the peacemaking process forward or backwards. There is also a triadic relationship between concessions, constraints and leverage that affect the inter-party relations and talks, as well the relative success or failure of the initiative. Furthermore:
**Proposition 5-VIII:** depending on how parties in conflict (leaders/negotiators) and third parties understand and master this power relationship between concessions-constraints-leverage, they may at times shift the peacemaking process either toward a breakthrough, that is, a move forward towards a settlement, or turn the process toward an impasse, characterized by temporary stalemate(s) or a total breakdown of the peacemaking process.\textsuperscript{101}

Figure 5-7 illustrates the triadic relationship between concessions, constraints and leverage as interactions, rather than mere concepts, and consisting of continual taking and giving; the influential and those who are influenced, and the constraining and unconstraining of positions and options during the peacemaking process. I will return to this analysis in more detail in chapter 9.
Figure 5-7: Concessions-Constraints-Leverages

Key:
- Processes / Sequence
- Negotiation Process
- External Influences
5.3.4 Feature IV: Peace Expectations and Dividends

The fourth feature of the peacemaking process in Cyprus has to do with the relationship between real and perceived expectations for a settlement and the way in which top leaders transmit those signals to ordinary Cypriots who are still hoping for and awaiting a just settlement, a “schizophrenic peacemaking process” that has been repeated about 41 times so far.\(^{102}\)

Peacemaking processes are very fragile interactions and require a lot of genuine commitment from top leaders and a lot of faith and support from ordinary citizens (proponents of supporting it) in favor of peace. But peace has multiple meanings to many people in Cyprus and contains a lot of obstacles to endure. Like leaders, people have individual and collective interests and needs vested in both the continuation of the status quo separation or the beginning of “a new adventure,” as some see it. According to the following proposition:

*Proposition 5-IX*: In Cyprus, a peacemaking process always brings to the forefront many “enticing opportunities” (some of which are realistic and some illusionary) as well as many fears and insecurities that can increase and / or decrease the gap between what the current status quo sectarian division brings to the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities respectively and the perceived expectations, or dividends, that both communities could be entitled to if a settlement is reached. (See figure 5-8. \(^{103}\))
Traditionally, it is common to believe that peacemaking initiatives, whether unilateral or via third parties, provide the space for top political leaders to communicate their positions and visions to other mistrusted individuals or enemies. However, every peacemaking initiative in Cyprus from the 1950s onward comes with a package full of expectations including hope, anger, renewed fears and insecurities, keeping nearly every
Cypriot on the threshold of awaiting an endgame settlement that they are not very familiar with. By the same token, the peacemaking process in Cyprus is monopolized by the official track one (T-1) diplomacy orchestrated by top leaders who have the upper hand in “puppeteering” the course on which peace expectations, dividends and hopes en route to a permanent peacemaking are placed. I will reveal this analysis further in chapter 10.

5.4 Conclusion

Whether it is part of a Cypriot exceptionalism or simply part of an existential question, I remain puzzled by the ever-present gap that I have come to observe through my interviews between (a) what the peacemaking talks are about; (b) what the parties’ agendas – within each side and across the divide – prioritize as an endgame solution; (c) what the conflict in Cyprus is about, its causes and conditions and when it “started”; and (d) how each side perceives the obstacles en route to peace. These are conditions that can determine whether a genuine peacemaking process or the overall peace process in Cyprus can lead to a permanent and viable political settlement in the near future. My argument here is that:

**Proposition 5-X:** The sustainability of the status quo division in Cyprus from 1974 onward created a set of contradictions, collective attitudes and behaviors that entrenched top leaders into maximalist positions and projected into the minds of many Cypriots writ large the belief that it might not be worth the risk and
challenge of establishing a new state of realities that compromises initial positions, but rather continue waiting and hoping that the next initiative will be more accommodating of self-interests.

Following the collapse of the Annan Plan in 2004 and up until the end of 2008, the peace process in Cyprus suffered from a collective fatigue. The TC community, which voted in favor of the plan, felt rejected by their GC counterparts, who discarded it as a “sell out to Turkey by Kofi Annan and his envoys,” but without necessarily abandoning the hope for peace. One thing I can say with certainty is that if I were to stack all the paperwork produced from all the peacemaking initiatives in Cyprus from 1974 to 2008, it would easily be about 20,000 pages of very heavy reading containing enough legalistic words and concepts to fill a law school dictionary. However, very little was ever mentioned about what I refer to here as a citizens’ peace process that could nurture and build a momentum for a genuine peacemaking initiative to be implemented satisfactorily. None of the initiatives ever mentioned the terms of restorative justice, restitution, amnesty, apology, healing and reconciliation in Cyprus. And from all I was able to learn and gather about the current process that continues as of the summer of 2011 between Christofias and Eroglu, nothing was ever mentioned about:

- re-writing common history books, without demonizing and dehumanizing the so-called other side;
- integrating schools and starting to teach Greek and Turkish in the primary and secondary curriculum;
- lowering the mistrust that Cypriots have been accustomed to for years;
- addressing collective traumas, insecurities and fears after nearly two decades of turbulent militarism, paramilitarism, fascism, and ethno-nationalism from the mid-1950s to the early 70s, and more than three decades of ethno-centric sectarianism since 1974;

- bringing closure to the families of victims whose identity and circumstances of death are still a mystery;

- restoring truth and paving the road towards social reconciliation;

- meeting the needs for political and social equalities;

- guaranteeing and safeguarding the civil rights, liberties and freedoms of all individuals residing in Cyprus; and/or

- replacing nationalistic monuments with symbols for coexistence.

The list could easily expand in many directions. But one more aspect that I find important to conclude this chapter is the need to integrate conflict resolution and conflict transformation tools in all decision-making mechanisms in Cyprus, so that the next time things get out of control, top leaders can work collaboratively to address the issues from escalating and to proactively abstain from burning the place down, as they did in their most recent past.
CHAPTER 6

Searching for an Endgame Solution in Cyprus

6. Introduction

As the research continued from 2006 to 2011, a number of questions kept puzzling me, two of which are important to highlight here: First, can the minds of top leaders change and thus change their course of action from an entrenched and competitive syndrome of interaction that delineates them from one another to a collaborative one, that is, a course of politics that accepts and respects each others’ humanity, dignity and identity as equal partners with a common future together? Second, what if deep in their hearts they don’t seem to be ready for a collaborative and integrative endgame solution to their long standing political animosity?

A focal lesson learned after seven years of numerous visits to the island and in interviews with top elites and key informants for the purpose of this dissertation, is that the road from a perpetual political conflict to peacemaking is very dynamic and full of roadblocks that need to be identified, addressed and dismantled piece by piece. This needs to be done collaboratively and genuinely by top leaders across the divide, and not for the purpose of simply scoring points on paper that aim to impress the UN audiences and local constituents in the name of lasting peace. For top leaders and those who
participate directly in the peacemaking processes as negotiators, mediators and advisors, the signposts of the mystifying terrain are more visible than what indirect participants hear about daily, including constituents, victims and other ordinary people who keep on hoping that the dividends from a possible peacemaking deal will finally bring to them justice, restoration of their dignity, restitution, return to their properties, or whatever else their self-conceptualized cause for a lasting peace is all about.

A peacemaking deal in Cyprus will not necessarily bring justice to all the victims; it might not call for the return of all the displaced persons to their homes / properties; and it will not automatically guarantee that parties will not return back to violence again as numerous authors have pointed out to be a pattern in many post-conflict situations, (Hampson, Walters, Smith, Sambany). Like similar and/or dissimilar peace processes such as the ones in Northern Ireland, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Israel-Palestine and South Africa, Cyprus is not immune from the obstacles on the road to finding an implementable and sustainable peace accord. In retrospect, the overarching objective in this chapter is to highlight the most conspicuous obstacles that top leaders in Cyprus are faced with in reaching a lasting and a satisfactory endgame solution in Cyprus.

In response to the questions raised earlier, I developed two perspectives for analysis (see figure 6-1 below) that aim to demonstrate the embedded-ness or linkage between peacemaking initiatives (processes / dynamics / outcomes) and endgame solutions:
Perspective I: Endgame Solution and Political Aspirations

From this perspective, I am looking at the large pool of 41 peacemaking initiatives to identify and demonstrate how the parties’ aspirations for an endgame solution have changed chronologically (summarized at table 6.1) and the degree to which this has affected the peacemaking efforts longitudinally in Cyprus since the 1950s.

Perspective II: Endgame Solution and Parties’ Collective Identity

The processes of identity formation and transformation in Cyprus over the last few decades seem to be an impediment, on the one hand, as to what can be achieved towards a political settlement. But on the other hand, the same processes of forming / transforming collective identities in Cyprus can address and transcend certain insecurities that could catalyze the parties towards social and political reconciliation.

The two perspectives are visualized in figure 6 below to show a socially and politically structural connection between the arguments and propositions that I will be making throughout this chapter. Lastly, this chapter becomes a departing point to the forthcoming analyses in chapter 7, where I have embedded a comparative analysis (see Appendixes E and F) of two similar peacemaking initiatives in order to pinpoint parties’ positions (and thus the changes in their positions over time) and to bring to the forefront the dynamic nature and characteristics of what seem to be protracted and intractable obstacles in the Cyprus peace process. The two initiatives are the “Ghalis’ Set of Ideas” (1992) and the “Kofi Annan Peace Plan” (2004).
6.1 Political Perspectives and Endgame Solutions

Starting as early as the 1950s, the politics of antagonism was by far the strongest strategy according to my research in describing the attitudes of most of the political leaders in Cyprus within and across ethnic lines. Looking deep into parties’ political agendas there is a pattern that synthesizes each side’s philosophical methodology for what seems to be a
preferred endgame solution in sharing political power on the island. I summarize this dynamic mode of affairs in the following propositional form:
**Proposition 6-I:** Behind every agenda that each side puts forward on the table, either for tactical or strategic reasons, there are always, first, some contending aspirations (or parallel visions as I will be referring to them interchangeably) for what the endgame solution ought to be from a maximalist perspective, and then what could be offered as a compromised move (concession) to the so-called “other side.”

**Proposition 6-II:** Even at times where both parties across the table seemed to have a common endgame orientation, that is to say a compatible philosophy as to how to address the terrain of their perceived differences, their overall approach to peacemaking kept pulling them away from sustaining an integrative approach to negotiations that could have been conducted otherwise in good faith. This dynamic can be attributed to three factors:

(i) Parties’ strategies and methodologies for peacemaking remained competitive rather than conciliatory in nature, that is, an approach aimed at entrapping the other side into tactical talks – an interaction that eventually forces one of the two parties to withdraw and accumulate the blame for the collapse of the talks;

(ii) Political opponents are always awaiting concessions to be made by their top leaders and their negotiators during talks with the so-called other side, and then to exploit those gestures as the wrong moves towards the wrong direction – most of which is done for political consumption under the
rhetoric that the concessions offered were “a sell out to the other side”; and

(iii) Top leaders are often caught up by their own traps of political and ideological rhetoric that can no longer fulfill their own promises for an endgame solution, resulting in directing the blame to the other side for not being conciliatory enough or for not negotiating in good faith. [See Table 6-1 for a historical analysis: 1950s to 2011.]

Along similar lines:

**Proposition 6-III:** Parallel to the social and cultural repertoire of collective identities in Cyprus are the political behaviors of political parties across the divide that demonstrate a seesawing dynamic between visible and parallel aspirations (invisible) in the social discourse, on the one hand, and the negotiation’s discourse on the other. This level of interaction creates a backstage full of ambiguities as a result, which enables top leaders in power to maintain a puppeteer’s hand in manipulating the public’s level of peace expectations over time.

All of the above propositions are derived from the construction and analysis of data in Table 6-1 below. In order to be more self-explanatory, consider the following example: In February of 2008, a convergent point in inter and intra-party affairs on the island came about with the election of an apparently moderate Greek-speaking Cypriot leader, Mr. Christofias, to the presidency of the Republic of Cyprus (RC). According to some local media opinions, the election of Christofias came as a surprise after the former
and late President Mr. Papadopoulos lost in the first round of the presidential elections (February 17, 2008).

The agenda that led Mr. Christofias to win the elections in the RC matched very closely, at least perceptually, with that of his counterpart and apparently moderate leader Mr. Talat in the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), who replaced former leader Mr. Denktash in 2005. Like Christofias in the RC, Talat in the TRNC had raised hopes and expectations across the divide that his coalition of center and center-left political parties was willing to start genuine negotiations as soon as possible and make concessions that his pre-successor Mr. Denktash would not have considered at all, a course that was similar in the RC since Papadopoulos, like Denktash, was considered to be a “hard liner” according to some accounts.106

Against the background of the above propositions, the Christofias-Talat peacemaking initiative was significant for at least three reasons: Firstly, it represented a slight shift from the previous positions of the two sides that led to the reemergence of a convergence point in the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot peacemaking perspectives for an endgame solution since 1977 (see Table, 6-1). Secondly, the two officialdoms were for the most part at a turning / convergence point in recognizing the feasible reality that “no-solution is not an acceptable solution,” instigating the current stalemate and the persistence of the status quo that the division ought to change soon.107 Lastly, and from a more critical perspective, the overall endgame orientation for the talks was vaguely set along the principle for a “bi-zonal, bi-communal federation” as the preferred option. However, very little has been achieved in filling in the blanks as to what that endgame
accord should look like and how it should be implemented and how the two sides would come to an agreement.

In the meantime, that gap between parties’ preferred negotiating positions and endgame objectives found many of Christofia’s and Talat’s political opponents in disagreement. After two year of talks (spring of 2008 to about spring of 2010) on “how to begin talks” and on “talks on what to talk about,” which were conducted parallel to the “talks on technical matters,” the scenery has changed as Mr. Eroglu managed to win the elections in the TRNC and replace Mr. Talat with a slightly different agenda. This is not to say that Mr. Christofias did not make any changes to his approach and agenda since Mr. Eroglu came to the talks. While the two leaders reaffirmed to the UN envoy, Mr. Alexander Downer, several times that they agreed on the principle for a “bi-zonal bi-communal federation,” they have significantly substantive disagreements on both the interpretation of the previously agreed framework solution as well as how its shape, legality and content should look.\footnote{108}

As an indication, table 6.1 summarizes: (i) the peacemaking strategies of the two sides from the early 1950s to the present based on archival research and confidential interviews and; (ii) it pinpoints the antithetical approach of each side for a lasting peace which becomes a dominant paradigm in the interaction; (iii) it highlights the inter-party interaction and how there were, over time, more points of divergence than convergence for an agreed framework within each side, as well as each side’s parallel aspirations.\footnote{109} Therefore, one of my arguments is that the two sides in Cyprus were not able to reconcile, from the 1950s and onward, both within each side and across the divide for a
common set of endgame dividends such as for: (i) coexistence; (ii) reunification; (iii) political equality; (iv) the need for respect of each other’s dignity and aspirations; (v) the need for sharing all forms of power equally and most importantly to address each other’s fears, concerns and insecurities for a peaceful reconciliation.\textsuperscript{110}
Table 6.1: Searching for an Endgame Solution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GC Peacemaking Strategies – Endgame</th>
<th>Timeline of Peacemaking Initiatives</th>
<th>TC Peacemaking Strategies – Endgame</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic aspirations for Self-determination and Unification with Greece</td>
<td>Early 1950s</td>
<td>Continuation of British Rule in Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parallel Aspirations for Union with Greece</td>
<td>1955 Eden Initiative (EI) Dulles Initiative (DI)</td>
<td>Parallel Aspirations: Union with Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Colonial Struggle for Independence-Unitary State Majority-Minority Rule</td>
<td>1956 Harding Initiative (HI) Rackliffe Prop. (RP)</td>
<td>Partition of Island Between Turkey &amp; Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bi-Communal Republic</td>
<td>1957 Hugh Proposals (HP) MacMillan Init. (MI)</td>
<td>Bi-Communal Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preservation of a Unitary State with new Power Sharing Arrangements</td>
<td>1957-9 London-Zurich (LZA)</td>
<td>Proposals For a Bi-Communal Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1963 Makarios Prop. (MP)</td>
<td>Parallel Aspirations For Partition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1964 London Conference (LC) (BI), (AP)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1965 Galo P. Initiative (GPI)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1967 Cyrus V. Prop. (CVP)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971 Inter-Communal T. (IC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1972-4 Inter-Comm. Talks (IC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1974 Geneva Conference (GC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 6.1: Searching for an Endgame Solution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GC Peacemaking Strategies</th>
<th>Timeline</th>
<th>TC Peacemaking Strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unitary Solution based on Zurich-London</td>
<td>1975 Vienna Talks (VT) 1977 Denktash-Makarios (DM)</td>
<td>Bi-Zonal Bi-communal Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bi-Zonal, Bi-communal Federation</td>
<td>1978 Anglo-Canadian (AC) 1979 Denktash-Kyprianou (DK)</td>
<td>Parallel Aspirations to renegotiate on the 1960 Treaties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parallel aspirations to renegotiate on the 1960 Treaties</td>
<td>1981 Inter-Communal T. (IC) Waldheim Guid. (WG)</td>
<td>Bi-Zonal Bi-communal (Loose) Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bi-Zonal Bi-communal Federation</td>
<td>1984 Inter-Comm. Talks (ICT) Aide Memoir (AM)</td>
<td>Parallel Aspirations for International Recognition &amp; Sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parallel Aspirations For a Unitary State And stronger Bi-zonal Federation Within the EU</td>
<td>1984 Denktash Proposals (DP) (KF), (WP), (PT)</td>
<td>Confederation And the Presence of Two Realities And Two Peoples In Cyprus (Separation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aspirations for Osmosis</td>
<td>1985 P. Guellier Initiative (GI)</td>
<td>Bi-Zonal, Bi-Com. (Loose) Aspirations Fed. For Political Recognition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bi-Zonal, Bi-Com. (compromised) Federation</td>
<td>1986 Draft Framework (DF)</td>
<td>Bi-Zonal Bi-Com. (compromised) Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parallel Aspirations are unclear</td>
<td>1988-90 Vassiliou-Denktash (VD)</td>
<td>April 2010 Eroglu replaces Mehmet Ali Talat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1991 Indirect Talks (ID)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1992 Ghalis Set of Ideas (GSI)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1992-4 Confid. B. M. (CBM)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1997 UN Mediation (UNM)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1998 R. Holbrooke Init. (HI)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1999-00 Proximity Talks (PT)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2001 Clerides-Denktash (CD)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2002-04 Annan Peace Plan (AP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006 July 6 Agreement (J6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008 Christofias-Talat I. (CT) -10 Direct Talks (DT)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(talks continue) Agenda is unclear 2nd Phase Summer 2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Top leaders’ perspectives on “what the endgame solution should look like” vary conceptually across the divide and within each side. From the 1960s onward, establishment of the “Reluctant Cyprus Republic,” Cypriot elites have changed their minds a few times flashing back and forth between various endgame solutions simultaneously. For example, some leaders were advocating for the existence of two separate “peoples” and “realities” on the island and the endgame should be to live side-by-side in two sovereignly separate entities while other leaders were talking at the table about the parameters of a federal endgame. At other times, top leaders were advocating for an endgame solution in which the two communities, Greek-speaking and Turkish-speaking (including all other identity-based groups), could be reunited / reintegrated on the basis of a federal structure that should include: (i) a bi-zonal type territorial structure with two politically equal constituent states under one sovereign government at the center with either a proportionate or equal sharing of powers at all levels. Parallel to this were many visionary endgame solutions as well that included approaches such as “political osmosis” where the ethic-identity marker on the island should get assimilated to those of the mother lands (Greece and Turkey), and further down the list were even more settled endgames such as: (a) the maintenance of the status quo division, revitalization of the 1960 constitutional arrangements with some transitional metamorphosis on power sharing between majority and minority rights; (b) unification with Turkey; and (c) establishment of two independent and sovereign states.
The Integrative Endgame Frontier (IEF) in figure 6-2(a) represents the area in which a mutual set of dividends could become available if a peacemaking deal is likely to be reached and parties collaborate mutually to reach that stage and keep on building constructively on a post-accord implementation stage. The opposite can also occur when parties fail to materialize or capitalize on peace dividends constructively and mutually but rather their actions are guided by capitalizing and materializing on their maximalist options.
Figure 6-2(b): Aspirations of Parties for an Endgame Solution: Maximalist Perspective

Figure 6-2(b) depicts the current status quo division in Cyprus where both sides are entrenched in their preferred positions. The sectarian status quo division (SQ point) limits both sides on what could be mutually exploited as peace dividends. There are, of course, skeptics and clusters of the population across the divide who share similar attitudes, for example, that separation is by far the preferred option under the current circumstances: “some people feel that we are better as we are currently are than being part of a new social engineering program,” - a comment made by a political leader who was asked to
The persistence of the status quo in Cyprus has created a win-lose mindset among many top elites who capitalize on the belief that a compromise solution could risk losing what has already been secured that they feel entitled to, even if this entails continuing to live...
behind separation fences. This misperception has also spread the myth on the island that one side’s expansion of possibility frontier curve on any issue or a set of issues at the negotiation table would constrain the other side from maximizing their self-interests.
6.2 Collective Political Aspirations

It is conventional to believe that political aspirations are set forward by political organizations and their think tanks (core group or party organizers / top leaders or single leadership personalities) and are bound to some generic characteristics that make them look rigid at times as well as transitory as endogenous and exogenous factors that change over time. Some argue that political aspirations emerge through political practices, philosophical orientations, historical discourses and other inter-/intra-party interactions that are reflections of time, space, group and leadership characteristics and practices.

In Table 6-2 and Figure 6-2, I classify parties’ political aspirations for an endgame solution on the island longitudinally and teleologically according to the philosophical orientations of the parties that have been expressed through political agendas or through their top leaders in private and public. In propositional terms, another understanding that derives from this dissertation’s analysis thus far is:

Proposition 6-IV: The formation and maintenance of political aspirations in Cyprus since the 1950s onward, whether they are genuine, elusive or imaginary, are the result of intra- and inter-party power politics. Their overall existence has been affected by the political and social in-group / out-group discourses and are either self-centric (single leader aspirations) or group-centric (elitists) in nature.

In my interviews with top elites in Cyprus, I have come to the understanding that political aspirations in peacemaking matters to them significantly in setting the overall
orientation and methodology for an endgame solution and I classify them here in three different categories (i) integrative; (ii) compromising and (iii) competitive.
Table 6-2: Political Aspirations in Cyprus based on Political Orientation (Timeline 1974 to 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Integrated Endgame (Federal)</th>
<th>Compromise Endgame (Unitary State / Consociational)</th>
<th>Competitive Endgame (Two-Sovereign States)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aspirations</td>
<td>TC</td>
<td>GC</td>
<td>TC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durability</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fluidity</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Rigid</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spreadness</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Parties: Left Wing / Liberal and Progressive Parties / Federalists
Unidentified
Center and Liberals
Center Right and Maximalists / Nationalists

Durability: Strong
Fluidity: Moderate
Spreadness: Moderate
Parenthetically, looking at the political aspirations and the search for an endgame settlement in Cyprus sets the stage for understanding how various obstacles to peacemaking come to the surface and why 41 peacemaking initiatives for a settlement have failed to produce a breakthrough in settling the division in Cyprus. To better demonstrate this dynamic, keep in mind the following guiding arguments. First, by understanding how political elites in Cyprus come to form and maintain their political aspirations for an endgame solution, it helps to understand the level of moral commitment that is embedded in the overall peacemaking process and its relative success in producing an integrative outcome. Second, there is a tendency by top leaders to capitalize on the likelihood of a relative failure to direct the attention for blame onto the others who are not ready to adopt / invest in the same course of action. Third, according to my interviews, there is a significant gap between parties’ collective leadership aspirations for an endgame solution, which I define here as a gap between “teleological aspirations” and “deontological aspirations” for an endgame solution.112

My argument here is that teleological and deontological aspirations are the primary driving forces in setting up parties’ political agendas in terms of what they set to be their optimum goals for an endgame outcome. To better demonstrate this, I developed a multi-dimensional scale depicted in Figure 6-2.113 The pick of each isosceles triangle that connects the two equal sides is pointing towards the deontological orientation of each political party, indicative of the preferred endgame solution on the scaling-matrix. The angles apposite the two equal lines of the isosceles triangle are pointing towards the teleological orientations of the parties or parallel to their maximalist visions.114
Figure 6.3: Political Party Perspectives in Cyprus 1999-2012
The political structure and the multi-party system in Cyprus were established after independence in 1959-60, based on ideological and ethnic lines. The latter became an impediment in the post-accord implementation process as it polarized politics on the island across the ethnic divide. For example, following the 1960 constitutional arrangements the two larger communities in Cyprus held two simultaneous but separate elections for the House of Representatives as well as for the presidency. The president was to always be a Greek Cypriot in origin and the vice-president, a Turkish Cypriot by origin who had the right to veto the president’s decisions should those constrict the rights, liberties and freedoms of the Turkish Cypriot community. Following the inter-communal conflict in 1963, the newly independent Republic of Cyprus was transformed into a Greek Cypriot administration after T.C. representatives abstained from taking their seats in the government and the House. This was partially a tactical maneuver to exercise political pressure against the president’s decision to amend the 1960 constitution and soften the veto power of the vice-president. Others argue that it was partially due to the eminent fear of escalated paramilitary violence among extremists from both sides. Shortly after the escalation of bi-communal violence, the Turkish Cypriots reformed a transitory political system without the participation of G.C. representatives by continuing to elect their parliamentarians and a vice-president leader until 1975. Despite several peacemaking initiatives to settle the conflict and restore constitutional order, the two communities ran their political affairs in isolation from one another and with barely any success in getting back together again under the 1960 power sharing arrangements, or even a modified one that could accommodate both sides’ concerns.
Following the violent wars of 1974, the Republic of Cyprus continued her political functioning according to the 1960 constitution by amending some laws and adding provisions to enable the elected representatives to function in the assembly and other governmental bodies. The Turkish Cypriot administration also transformed herself into the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (1975-1983). As is shown on Table 6-1, the peacemaking perspectives of each side for an endgame solution in Cyprus varied significantly from the early 60s forward. Any talks during the period between 1963 and 74 failed significantly and the two sides continued stockpiling mistrust and fear of the other side. For example, the T.C. side felt threatened that their identity was under domination and could easily be assimilated or abused under a Greek-speaking majority. The G.C. side felt omnipotent to run the country without amending the 1960 constitution with the purpose to weaken the power of a counter-part minority to veto presidential and house decisions supported by the majority. In this period, Cyprus became a reluctant democracy and failed to accommodate the needs and address the concerns of both communities and their political elites.

From 1983 to the present, the self-proclaimed Turkish Federated State of Cyprus was renamed the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and unilaterally declared her independence. TRNC follows a parliamentary system with a council of ministers that is headed by a Prime minister (chairing the council of ministers). The president of the TRNC serves as the chief negotiator and representative of the T.C. community to the talks. Mr. Rauf Denktash served as the T.C. leader and president from 1975 until 2003, supported primarily by a center-right coalition of parties. He was replaced by moderate
leader Mehmet Ali Talat, who was supported by a center and center-left coalition of parties.

In the Republic of Cyprus, the first president, Archbishop Makarios III, served from 1959 to 1977 (center-left) and was replaced by Mr. Spyros Kyprianou in 1977 until 1988 (coalition from the center-left and center-right with maximalist approach).

Following Mr. Kyprianou, a more moderate leader, Mr. George Vassiliou, was elected for one term (1988-1993) from a coalition of center-left and leftist parties who adopted a much more compromising approach to peacemaking than his pre-successors. In 1993, he was replaced by Mr. Glafcos Clerides (moderate conservative / center-right coalition) who served for two terms, 1993-2003. During the last phases of negotiations in 2003, Mr. Tassos Papadopoulos (elected by a coalition of center-left and leftist parties) succeeded Mr. Clerides for the next five years. He adopted a maximalist approach until he was replaced in 2008 by Mr. Demetris Christofias (moderate center-left / communist with a seemingly compromising approach).

Any attempts to resume talks between 2004 until 2008 were destined to be fruitless since neither side was willing to stop their blame game and listen to each other. Overall the atmosphere was very distrustful at the social and political levels following the collapse of the Annan Peace Plan in April of 2004. In addition, the polarizing and nihilistic campaign that started prior to the referenda by rejectionists in the Republic of Cyprus dashed away any chances for fair and balanced efforts to explain the pros and cons of the Annan plan to the Greek Cypriot public. At the same time, the T.C. elite, who were in favor of the plan, capitalized on what they perceived at the time to be an enticing
opportunity to internationally recognize TRNC while at the same time missing a precious opportunity to extend a hand across the divide and address the fears and insecurities of their co-patriots to reassure them that they can work together to bypass obstacles en route to lasting peace.

6.3 Endgame Solution and Parties’ Collective Identity

In this dissertation, identity and identification are strongly linked to leadership aspirations and the way agendas for an endgame settlements are set. Evidently, this linkage can be an impediment in the overall success of a peacemaking initiative or a peace process at large towards reaching and implementing a peace accord. The main objective in this section is to demonstrate the linkage between political identities as those that have been defined by top leaders’ association with political parties, and the various options for ending the division in Cyprus. To set the stage for the above linkages, I have developed the following propositions:

**Proposition 6-IV:** Charismatic leaders’ self-interests can often become the guiding focal point to successfully bring a group under a collective set of aspirations and persuade that constituency about the terms for an endgame settlement to the Cyprus division.

**Proposition 6-V:** Collective events from the most resent historiography in Cyprus and in particular, the perceived “struggles for liberation” (a term that each community is
using to describe their victimhood) that have been constructed over the years provides a rigid reservoir of rhetoric for individuals to learn from and if successful to eventually assume leadership positions within the political parties and groupings and in return advocate for those sets of norms in the absence of political dialogue across ethnically defined lines.¹¹⁷

Starting first by examining the linkage between identification and party aspirations for an endgame outcome, there are two important themes that derive from the data analysis in this dissertation:

**Theme I:** As top leaders are elected to office and gain control of the government (executive and / or legislative forms), they have traditionally adopted philosophies and aspirations according to the parameters of party identity and identification which define what seems to be the perceived methodology for signaling to the “other side” that it is time to initiate / resume talks again, at that level of inter-party interaction. This also sets the overall tone for what the general public can expect.¹¹⁸

**Theme II:** The various milestones (inter- and intra-communal conflict, the sectarian division, the wars in 1974, the status quo division, etc.) in the modern historiography of Cyprus from 1955 to the current state of affairs, are strong indicators as to which set of endgame options are more likely to have a wider
acceptance among the public and not necessarily what could be offered during negotiations.

*Theme III:* Since the division of the island in 1974, the main characteristics that seem to objectively define membership to political groups across the divide in Cyprus and in isolation from one another is not necessarily language (Greek, Turkish, Armenian, etc.) or the ethnic marker or even the religious marker, but a normative assertion that is set forth by top leaders to justify the rightness and goodness on the part of in-group / out-group boundaries that share those same views about what they interpret to be real obstacles en route to a lasting peace and a just settlement in Cyprus.

Two questions arise from the above themes: (i) in what ways does identification matter for top leaders in Cyprus? And (ii) is identification an obstacle to peacemaking in Cyprus

– Below are some responses from my interviews with top leaders in Cyprus:

*Interviewee 1:* “Cyprus was never a Nation... you are either a Greek or a Turk; an Orthodox or a Muslim;

*Interviewee 2:* “Turkish Cypriots are Turks ... they came to Cyprus during the Ottoman period and they remained here...they are our visitors for 400 years;”

*Interviewee 3:* “Cyprus is Turkish;”

*Interviewee 4:* “Greek Cypriots are Greeks and we fought for our independence from the Ottomans as Greeks did simultaneously and then the British came and we fought for our Union with Greece;”
Interviewee 5: “Cyprus belongs to its people, of all identities, groupings, etcetera;”

Interviewees 6: “We are Cypriots, I don’t recognize TRNC because that has the word Turkish-ness and it implies a Turkish ownership... Ottomans were not Turkish and I am simply a Cypriot whose first language is Turkish.”

Interviewee 7: “I feel Cypriot first and then as Turkish Cypriot. I never felt as Turk of Cyprus and I believe it is the same for my constituents. We have more commonalities with Cypriots who speak Greek than Turks or Greeks who some claim to be our forefathers.”

Interviewee 8: “The only Cypriot or Cypriot-ness, as you call it, left in this island are the donkeys living in the buffer zone. The rest of us have picked up artificial identities because the wars caused us to do so and since then you are either with this side or the other.

From my perspective, identification of leaders with political groups in Cyprus matters for a number of reasons:

(i) consolidation / mobilization of loyal constituents;
(ii) consolidation / coordination of power;
(iii) monopolizations of power;
(iv) projection of legitimization of blame towards out-groups;
(v) control of state apparatus;
(vi) control of peacemaking processes;
(vii) control over sovereignty and membership in international organizations;
(viii) build-up of alliances internally and externally;
(ix) control of state rhetoric and communicative paradigm; and last but not least, control of endgame paradigm and public level of peace expectations.
Figure 6-3 (a) illustrates most of the identity categorizations in Cyprus on a spectrum with the Cypriot-ness identity placed at the center. After that, Figure 6-3 (b) portrays the various party identifiers for endgame solutions as defined by top leaders and other party organizers in the political groups listed.
External Influences

GREEK-NESS
Hellenism

Greek Cypriot-ism

Greeks of Cyprus

Elusive Boundaries for Identification

Internal Influences

Greek-Cypriots

Turkish-Cypriots

External Influences

Turkish-Cypriot-ism

Turks of Cyprus

Figure 6-4(a): Identity Spectrum: Cypriot-ness
Figure 6-4(b): Party Identifications and Endgame Solutions
6.4 Obstacles to an Endgame Solution

Is identification an obstacle to finding an endgame solution to break the deadlock in Cyprus and, if so, in what ways?

“Together we get along very well. Put Greek and Turkish Cypriots together in a workshop, we eat together, we dance together to the same tunes and sing together, despite the language barrier. Looking to find a solution we have different visions, we have not managed to close the gap yet, even after the talks at Burgenstock” [Talks in Burgenstock, March 2004] (Author’s record: anonymous Interview)

Every Cypriot leader is a proponent in favor of changing the current conditions of the status quo division in Cyprus. For each leader, the purpose and motives for a political settlement differ due to self-interest, group-interests or ethnic / national-interests as well as his/her identification with political groupings across political and ethnic lines. Also, top leaders’ approaches differ as to the dividends an endgame settlement should offer, ranging from: (i) economic benefits; (ii) trade and commerce; (iii) security and guarantees against attacks, (iv) a sense of a homeland; (v) international recognition; (vi) nationality status and (vii) government apparatus, to highlight a few. Furthermore, there is the question of methodological approach, that is, how to go about reaching the desired endgame settlement: should it be a political settlement? An economic one? A cultural one or a social one?

For as far as methodology is concerned, some top leaders prefer a “peace meal” methodological approach, with the first course on the table to be the economic aspect in an ala carte accord that could apparently expand the pie of dividends, at least financially, and allow the “invisible hand” to do its implementation job in the long run via
investments and economic development, a model similar to the European Coal and Steel Production (ECSP) that gave birth to the EEC and eventually the EU. According to one leader:

“Look at the possibilities an economic integration could bring to all ... or as a matter of fact it could have brought if it were to have started a long time ago. First, the Greek Cypriots and Greeks have in front of them a potential market of 70 million people [Turks]. They can establish joint ventures with Turkish-Cypriots to bypass their difference and help them invest in a huge market that western European investors can’t wait to lay their hands on. We are just 50 miles off the coast of Turkey, not to mention other aspects of cooperation that this could bring to all here on the island. This could have led into political cooperation...” (Author’s record: Anonymous interview)

On the other hand, the piece meal approach is condemned by leaders who are in favor of a comprehensive solution or a “full course” with emphasis on all substantive issues such as governance, property, territory, return of displaced persons, military and security issues. Leaders who are in favor of this approach believe that linkages among issues could offer a better set of moves and more favorable trade-offs for their side.

Parallel to track one, many Cypriots that I have interacted with at the grassroots level, who have very little input at the top level of politics but maintain very close contacts with their co-patriots across the sectarian line of division, envision an endgame solution from a slightly different perspective:

“For us, it is a social problem where the fabric of social and cultural interactions on the island have been disturbed, stopped in time, and perpetually have increased the level of mistrust and fear among Cypriots. Top leaders have marginalized civil society, ordinary people like us who interact with one another, participate in bi-communal events, in youth camps, and during rallies and concerts.”

In recapturing, briefly, what I mentioned in chapter 2 of this dissertation, the bi-communal conflict in the first half of the 60s, the polarization of communities in the
second half of the same decade, and the wars in 1974 have caused significant damage to both communities which are undisputed in terms of human losses, psychological traumas and the displacement of a quarter million Greek and Turkish speaking Cypriots from their properties in the North or the South, depending on their ethnic identity. The division of Cyprus has a humanitarian dimension, violating civil liberties and basic freedoms of all Cypriots across the divide, including minorities, and it remains an island were the identities of nearly 2,000 missing persons, who have vanished in the period spanning from the early 60s to 1974, have not been fully established, even though a great deal of work has been done since 2004 by the Committee of Missing Persons (CMP) to find, exhume and identify the victims.122

My argument in this section is that the decision-making elites in Cyprus have built the capacity to organize, secure and embed their positions on peacemaking strategies based on a set of convictions that has been formed behind division fences, barbed wire, road blocks and a dead zone that has prohibited any public discussion at the social level to take place for nearly four decades (early 1963-2003).123 There is a dualistic approach in every conviction that the one side is always right and the other is wrong; or from a similar perspective, the one side brings rightness on the norms and the other does not; the one side is genuine and truthful and the other is not. There are many truths about the calamity of the Cyprus problem, and every Cypriot who been a victim of it or still suffers from its discourse of division can tell you about it over a cup of coffee, or in his/her search for Ithaca, to use a Homeric metaphor. In praxis, Cypriots across the dead zone (UNFICYP controlled buffer zone) have been boxed into elite-driven paradigms or
“desired convictions” (elite-driven attitudes and behaviors) to achieve what their respective leaders perceive to be a part of collective goals.

There are many politically constructed convictions that are presented to audiences as peacemaking perspectives that have been manipulated through the passing of various top political leaders all over Cyprus who have held the reins of power. These are directed towards reaching a seemingly just and viable endgame solution. If you ever find yourself in the land of Aphrodite and Adonis, ask elites what kind of a settlement to the Cyprus problem they seek. How do they go about bridging the gap between perceived methodologies to reach a settlement and perceived endgame solutions (outcome) that they often disagree on between themselves and across the dead zone, in order to reach a negotiable settlement? And if they get that far to reach a seemingly just and viable settlement, as they have kept preaching about for a long time now, are they really going to remain committed to the agreement and nurture it with care or will they change their minds again as they have in the past?

6.5 Concluding Remarks

Successes and/or failures in the overall peacemaking process can be endless and relative to the initiation process, dynamics, nature and characteristics along with a number of changing circumstances at the domestic and international contexts of interaction. Similarly, along the same line of reasoning, challenges and obstacles to peacemaking are not new and unique to the case of Cyprus only. Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland found common ground to stop sectarian violence and proceed further with the
implementation of the Good Friday agreement since 1997 and build up a political infrastructure to share power and address their political differences at the table. Similarly, blacks and whites in South Africa agreed to build a democratic South Africa (CODESA talks) and share power jointly by bringing an end to apartheid. By implication of these two examples, what is it that prevents Cypriots from finding a lasting peace?¹²⁴

There is not a perfect peace initiative or a perfect peacemaking process-outcome and perhaps there will never be one unless it is achieved collaboratively and through shared understanding (Shotter 1993; Garfingel 1967). The road to peace is long, as Nelson Mandela writes in his memoirs (1995), and sometimes leaders don’t know what lies behind every curve or obstacle. Poet Constantine Kavafy writes that once on the road to Ithaca, “you must pray that the way be long, full of adventures and experiences.”¹²⁵ With respect to the wisdom of Kavafy’s writing, has not the road for a settlement been long and tortuous enough for Cypriots so that their elected representatives can finally reach an endgame solution?

A peacemaking deal to end the status quo division in Cyprus is feasible if that is what ordinary Cypriots wish for despite the roadblocks that are currently in place.¹²⁶ Top leaders can prepare the scenery and contribute to cultivating the climate among ordinary citizens. However, unless the two sides change their course of actions from a competitive mode to a compromising / collaborative one, the Cyprus issue will remain unsettled and the politics of polarization will prevail even longer. In the concluding chapter, I will offer some recommendations as to what top leaders and elites can do to convince each other across the divide so that they are ready this time to collaborate in good faith.
Figure 6-5: Decision-making Process Model (Generic) in Peacemaking
Figure 6-6: Factors that Influence Parties’ Decision in Reaching An Integrative Endgame Solution

In Cyprus
According to my study, a simple endgame vision, such as the one that the Cypriot elites have been pulling and pushing for since the second half of the 1970s, that is, a solution based on the vaguely agreed upon principle of a “bi-zonal, bi-communal federation,” is very unlikely to produce a genuine peace in Cyprus. Genuine peace is about transforming civil identity in Cyprus and it requires a strong commitment and effort to transform the structural conditions of long antagonism and violent conflict which are currently carried out as of today but without the use of overt violence – it is a war of words approach.

After 41 peacemaking initiatives (the 42nd one is currently in the making), what is always expected to follow are dangerously rising expectations such as (i) disappointment, (ii) disillusionment, (iii) renewed frustration and blaming and misunderstandings about what has or has not been said or offered at the negotiations table. I am a very optimistic person, but none of this would sound very surprising to members of the civil society in Cyprus and I want to make that clear. The central lessons from this chapter are:

1. There is currently not a shared vision as to what the endgame of the peace process should be or look like other than the elusive statement “bi-zonal, bi-communal federation,” with “one single personality and sovereignty.” But most significantly, there is no agreement on how to get to that state of affairs and almost no word on how to implement such a complex political arrangement.
2. Currently, there are no strong incentives on the table to make significant concessions that could drive the peacemaking process forward.

3. There is a lack of enthusiasm in ordinary citizens who, time after time, don’t get to see any real dividends from the peace process and lack a clear vision as to how things will look once a peace accord is signed.

4. An endgame solution itself has different meanings to different people in Cyprus, from ordinary people to top leaders. Since this dissertation focuses on top leaders and their efforts to reach an endgame solution, there are disagreements not only between parties across the sectarian division in Cyprus, but also within each side, most of which are polemic in nature.

5. There is no peace strategy in Cyprus, (for the time being) a strategy that could synthesize all tracks of interaction together (official peace process and public peace process) that would structurally deepen and widen the magnitude of interaction and address the various perplexities of the past and deal with the multidimensional aspects that a peace deal could likely bring to the surface.

The central obstacle in searching for an endgame outcome in Cyprus is the rivalry among the top leaders themselves. Many top leaders with high and visible stature have tied their fate to resolving the Cyprus question, but they have all failed to produce substantially genuine peace expectations among Cypriots and external actors that under their mandate could work more collaboratively to end the sectarian division in Cyprus. After all, a question that remains unanswered is: are top leaders in Cyprus (and perhaps in other
peace processes) willing to make concessions that are worth the political risk to reach an endgame solution and whatever else is entailed for them to strike a deal, considering it could possibly fail again, as has happened 41 times before, or could their efforts lead to a new disaster like the previous one in 1959-60 that left them with a constitution that they couldn't live with, and that could bring more ambiguities in the future for civil and political reconciliation? What puzzles me most is how are they going to sell such a deal to their constituents who might already be better off living separately under the existing conditions of the sectarian status quo in Cyprus? From a more optimistic perspective, I strongly believe that there is space and a need for top leaders to tell Cypriots that their course of action will change: not in a direction of inventing new labels for old strategies, but towards a genuine direction for a clearly defined peace strategy.\textsuperscript{127}
CHAPTER 7

Obstacles to Peacemaking

7.1 Introduction

The cost of the protracted status quo division in Cyprus is devastating. For example, there is continued political animosity that dominates nearly all official and public discourses on the island; unresolved traumas caused by violent conflict; fear and insecurity of military turmoil; destruction of the rule of law; and disagreeable issues that turn more unsavory every time another peacemaking process falls apart. All of the above have fatigued the perseverance of ordinary citizens who are waiting still for a political settlement. Worst of all is the high level of desperation among proponents of unification that follows every collapse of an initiative to see a glimpse of hope. One could ask – is the status quo division in Cyprus so attractive to both sides that it is more tolerable to stick with it rather than negotiating a compromise or an integrative solution?`

Anytime I step a foot on either side of the buffer zone in Cyprus and start asking questions about peace-building and peacemaking initiatives, all I hear is: “Why did the other side accept / reject the so and so peace plan?” “Why is the other side so intransigent?” “Why do they not want to make peace?” “Why aren’t they willing to talk?” “Why are they inflexible on so and so issue?”…. I use these questions as departing
points. In chapter 6, I looked into the obstacles that prevent top leaders from finding a peace strategy for an endgame solution. Building on that, in this chapter, I am going to unfold the analysis one step further to see what is it in the 42 peacemaking initiatives that makes the Cyprus peace process uneasy to settle and prevent top leaders across the divide from agreeing to a peacemaking deal. In propositional terms, my argument here is:

**Proposition 7-I:** The structural conditions that led to the start-up of the conflict in the first place have not been addressed at all and thus it shifted its course from a protracted conflict into a long and protracted peace process that sustains itself into a fairly peaceful status quo division since all other options have failed to produce a breakthrough.¹²⁸

**Proposition 7-II:** The sectarian division in Cyprus provides a fairly safe environment (absence of violence) along and across the barbed wires. If one complains bitterly about it they risk changing this environment, unless circumstances change over time and the persistence of a stalemate becomes mutually unbearable.

**Proposition 7-III:** The lack of trust between the two communities during the prolonged status quo division has created a set of attitudes and behaviors among younger generations of Cypriots that could handicap the process of building a strong pro-peace civil society to sustain efforts for an integrative outcome.
The following illustration (Figure 7.1) is a visual depiction of the propositions thus far.

![Diagram showing the intensity of sectarian violence, para-militarism, warfare, and status quo division over time with a peak in the 1970s.](image)

**Figure 7-1: Stockpiling of Mistrust**

In this chapter, I examine the obstacles to peacemaking according to the framework that I introduced in Chapter 3. In addition to that, I am looking at the database of 41 peacemaking initiatives to identify a pattern of the predominant obstacles that hinder any progress toward building blocks that could sustain the efforts for
peacemaking. The analysis from the database adds a number of themes and factors that have hindered the progress towards a breakthrough, as my interviewees understand it and which I phrase according to various concepts mentioned in several literature reviews. Furthermore, I embedded a comparative analysis of two peacemaking initiatives to give a more in-depth understanding of parties' positions regarding nine significant and seemingly protracted issues that currently seem to block the road to a breakthrough.\(^{129}\)

The two initiatives are: Boutros-Ghali’s “Set of Ideas” (1992) and Kofi Annan’s “Comprehensive Agreement” or “Annan Plan V” (2004). The two cases are selected according to the following criteria laid out in a comparative methodology approach developed by George (2005) and Yin (2009):\(^{130}\)

(i) Both initiatives represent the most comprehensive peacemaking processes since the war of 1974 to settle the Cyprus division under the UN auspice

(ii) Both emerged after periods of considerable stagnation and deadlock between the two elites across the divide in search of a settlement;

(iii) Both initiatives went through phases of signaling, preliminary contacts, pre-negotiations, and substantive talks before becoming comprehensive accords;

(iv) In both cases the negotiating teams formulated two comprehensive plans that were put forward for approval: political endorsement (Set of Ideas) and simultaneous but separate referenda (Annan Plan);

(v) Both initiatives collapsed after the use of successful campaigns put forward by political elites against the process and/or outcomes of each initiative redeeming them as “sell outs to the other side.”
Following the methodological logic of comparative systems designs of similar and/or dissimilar peace processes (Druckman 2004), the two initiatives are different in the following regard.\textsuperscript{131}

(i) The structural balance / imbalance in negotiations between the two sides in Cyprus has changed significantly and thus the use of concessions, leverages and constraints has changed during talks. (Chapters 8 and 9)

(ii) The structure of good offices and its approach towards mediation / negotiations has changed enabling for slightly different developments to take place under each one despite both initiatives being rejected at the end under different circumstances. (Chapters 8 and 9)

Parallel to this, I am linking the two initiatives to the most recent Christofias-Eroglu efforts (2010 - 11) to demonstrate a longitudinal linkage between the previous two (“Set of Ideas” and “Annan Plan V”) and highlight some of the most important conditions in starting-up each initiative and conditions that led towards a break down and termination.\textsuperscript{132} (For the full historiography of the three initiatives, see Appendixes D and E.)

7.2.1 Ghali’s Set of Ideas

The Set of Ideas represented a well-orchestrated effort by the United Nations (and the mediation team) to break the cycle of deadlock that kept reoccurring between the signing of the 1979 high level agreement - where the two sides agreed for a compromise solution
based on “a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation” - and the early 1990s. Most of the party leaders from the two sides did not seem to have any real intentions on accepting and implementing such an endgame solution for Cyprus for two main reasons. The first reason was the political costs (due to upcoming elections) of moving forward with a compromise solution, which was a departure from the preferred positions (Maximalists) of both sides, with the exception of some left-wing leaders. The second reason was the ambiguities that existed regarding the interpretation of the clauses and their overall anatomy. Some leaders interpreted this as unacceptable.

From 1977 through the late 1980s, the two sides failed to reach a compromise set of parameters on which to gradually build. The Greek Cypriot leadership of Archbishop Makarios and Mr. Kyprianou hoped for a return to a unitary solution based on the 1960 arrangements, with changes that could make the Zurich-London agreement more user friendly for implementation. Mr. Denktash, who represented the Turkish Cypriot side, also changed his mind from federation to confederation as his preferred option. That approach continued for both sides until Boutros-Ghali, who was a good student of the Cyprus problem after having served in Cyprus as a UN diplomat several years earlier, proposed a new methodology to both Vassiliou and Denktash in order to break the deadlock.

In the meantime, with pressure from the USA and the UK, Turkish President Turkut Ozal changed Turkey’s position and looked at the UN peacemaking initiative as a new opportunity to break the deadlock. Along the same line of reasoning, Prime Minister Ozal pressured Denktash to make concessions on a number of issues and, with additional
pressure from the UN and the S-C, the set of ideas was presented as a compromise solution.  

Finally, with the completion of the third round of talks in New York, Boutros-Ghali gave the two leaders a break to discuss the comprehensive settlement (consisting of nearly 100 paragraphs) with their constituent political parties back home prior to moving forward into the final round. However, this turned out to be a fatal move for the process he started. Matters turned sour first because Vassiliou’s efforts to convince the GC constituency for support was outnumbered by a coalition of rejectionists from parties against the “set of ideas” run by the leadership of EDEK, DIKO and DISY (parties that claimed at the time as many as 70% of the voting power among Greek-Cypriots). Things were equally sour on the other side among Turkish Cypriot leaders. In particular, Denktash and his political coalition (center and center-right) also advocated against the “set of ideas.” In retrospect, the period between 1993 and 1999 turned into a tactical game of intimidation and counter-bullying under the façade of what could be phrased as “let’s talk just for the sake of talks,” similar to a Broadway show that both sides mastered well with some sporadic signaling of “good will.”

7.3 Annan Plan V

The first version of the Annan plan was channeled to the two sides in Cyprus officially on November 11, 2002, led by the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, entitled “Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem” (Annan 2003) coined as the “Annan Plan” in short by Cypriots. Placed in the same league with Boutros-
Ghali’s “Set of Ideas,” the “Annan Plan” is by far the most compact peacemaking process ever undertaken to promote a comprehensive political settlement of the “Cyprus problem.” This was under the auspices of the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and his mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, led by Annan’s top advisor Alvaro de Sotto and his mediation team assisted by British, American and EU diplomats and as many as 200 other experts from all over the world who were called in at various stages to offer their expertise and assist the two sides across the table to find common ground on the issues that concerned them the most.\footnote{139}

After two years of direct substantive talks and four versions to build on, the UN finally tabled a fifth version in March 2004 in Burgenstock, Switzerland by taking into consideration the final viewpoints of each side who had already agreed on, mutually, to have two separate but simultaneous referenda across the divide for public approval.\footnote{140} Many words and legalistic documents were exchanged during November 2002 and March 2004 about a framework agreement on: (i) constitutional and other matters about the establishment and apparatus of the new United Cyprus; (ii) sharing power based on political equality at the federal level and between two local constituent state administrations; (iii) the applicability of European and international law under the progressive metamorphosis to a United Republic of Cyprus\footnote{141}; (iv) territorial adjustments under the condition of bi-zonality; (v) gradual return of land and refugees under each constituent state with some proportional restrictions; (vi) a percentage of Turkish nationals (“settlers”) to stay on the island; (vii) the issue of economy and monetary policies; and (viii), demilitarization and the gradual withdrawal of all foreign troops.
among many other issues and provisions that filled nearly 9,000 pages of laws and regulations.

In TRNC, the positive dividends such as European citizenship, end of isolation, economic uplifting, labor opportunities and travel liberalization, provided strong incentives to vote in favor of the plan. In the RC, the negative dividends outnumbered the positive ones demonized by a very effective campaign that was led by Mr. Papadopoulos. In the aftermath of the two separate but simultaneous referenda held in April 26, 2004, the initiative became dust to the wind.\textsuperscript{142} The peace accord was rejected by the majority of the Greek speaking Cypriots in the RC and accepted by the majority of the Turkish speaking Cypriots in TRNC. A week later, on May 1, the Republic of Cyprus entered the European Union as a divided island. The EU accession process was indispensable by increasing the hopes for unification and the beginning of a new chapter in Cyprus, but unfortunately it favored only the one of the two sides.\textsuperscript{143} On the contrary, it affected the triadic balance in negotiation between leverages, concessions and constraints, which I will return to in the next chapter.\textsuperscript{144}

The climate after April 2004 and February of 2008 was distrustful and dominated by fierce politics and ethno-nationalism. At the track two level, the pro-peace civil society became dormant for a while after the disappointment of another failed attempt for unification. The status quo division this time looked like it was going to be cemented as the most viable and realistic solution in Cyprus, rending the proponents in favor of two separate and independent states to be right, at least temporarily, until a new cycle of initiatives took place between Christofias and Talat in February-March of 2008 and
currently the Christofias-Eroglu negotiation process. What this initiative will bring to Cypriots remains to be seen. Below is a snapshot of the three peacemaking processes.
Turkey’s EU orientation is linked to the process
PM Erdogan shifts in favor of Annan Plan
Talat and Serdar Denktash lead the talks
Coordination of UN, US, UK, EU efforts

Changes in party positions from
G-C Moderate leader Vassiliou
Moderate Vassiliou. Turkey’s PM
After the intervention of G. Bush
Followed by Denktash change in positions

UN resolution 649
setting both sides on an equal footing

Introduction of a series of
CBMs by Ghali to lower mistrust and foster a new round of talks

TC pro-peace coalition stands in favor of Annan and EU Accession

Kosovo’s declaration of independence
renewed fears for a status quo partition

Election of center-left pro-peace coalition
led by Talat replaces Denktash

Electio of

moderate Leader
Christofias

Conditions
Leading Towards
Starting-up and
Continuation of PP

Comparative
Peacemaking
Processes

Figure 7-2: Factors contributing to comparative analysis of peacemaking initiatives
7.4 Peacemaking Obstacles

There are many obstacles to peace, some of which are symbolic, psychological, procedural and logistical in negotiations and the peacemaking process. Some obstacles to peacemaking are structural and endogenous to the intra-party and inter-party interaction among antagonists in conflict and potential partners in building peace. In chapter 6, I highlighted some of the obstacles to finding an endgame solution and keeping that course of action that, in good faith and with genuine intentions, is not very easy for parties to do. In this chapter, I begin with a generic approach in highlighting a blend of stumbling blocks to the 41 peacemaking processes. Following the same methodological approach of similar and dissimilar case-study systems design that I introduced earlier in this chapter, I highlight nine obstacles that top leaders in Cyprus mentioned that led me into more in-depth analysis of those issues according to the two peace plans - the “Set of Ideas” and the “Annan Plan V.” Parties’ positions and concerns are also included in the tables listed under every obstacle based on primary sources. Parties in Cyprus often referred to these nine obstacles as “negotiating chapters.”
Figure 7-3: Structural Obstacles to Peacemaking
7.4.1 Sovereignty and “sovereignly states”

The obstacle of sovereignty in Cyprus is similar to a Cordiant knot. Since the late 1950s, the norms and laws of sovereignty have become the script in which political, social, economic and other discourses in Cyprus have been shaped. The concept of sovereignty in Cyprus as it appears in the peacemaking processes has inherited a web of norms spanning from (a) the traditional Westphalian system; (b) the Ottoman and British Empire systems; (c) the Cold War bipolarity and the non-allied movement; (d) the Greco-Turkish balance of power system; (e) the United Nations and its Security Council; (f) and most recently, the European system of common laws.

The topic of sovereignty allegedly brings to the fore an ever present fear of zero-sum power struggle between the two sides which is manifested in all other discourses of life in Cyprus and that of collective identity. Some leaders look at the issue of sovereignty from a traditional perspective that encompasses the elements of self-determination, a defined population and territory, governance, power sharing and international recognition. Some look at it as a transitory concept that should be adjusted according to the existing realities on the island. Some others look at it as a mere conception of a consociation power sharing system between a majority and a minority and a few others see it as a process for group identification and its compromise may take away from the dignity of the collective we-ness.  

A number of questions remain unanswered as the two sides pull at either end of the spectrum: (a) is there a common Cypriot national identity and, if so, how should it be recognized internationally? (b) Does the current Republic of Cyprus represent all
Cypriots? (c) If Cypriots are identified as part of two other sovereign nations, namely Greece and Turkey, what set of collective aspirations are more likely to be pursued within the boundaries of a sovereign Cyprus or a United Cyprus? (d) If Cypriots are recognized as two “peoples,” should they have the same right of self-governance and international recognition as has been the case in other situations historically?

The establishment of the Republic in 1960 was based on the grounds of a “bi-communal consociational democracy,” with majority-minority power sharing and veto rights given to the TC minority to be exercised under certain constitutional conditions. Following the bi-communal conflict in the 1960s, the Greek Cypriots favored a unitary state with minority rights given to the Turkish Cypriot community, but with limited veto powers.146 On the other side of the coin, the TC community (leadership), as an act of protest, withdrew from the government of Cyprus and its institutions, leaving the Republic of Cyprus to continue as a de facto government (internationally) that eventually requested the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force (UNFICYP). Following the Greek Junta and Turkish interventions of 1974, the GC side reframed its position to argue that the Treaty of Guarantee provided the foundation (interpretations varied) for foreign interventions on the island in violation of UN sovereign norms. The Turkish Cypriot position claimed to be an equal partner in the establishment, affairs and recognition of the Republic of Cyprus, with its only safety tool being the Turkish army. Following the bi-communal conflict in the 60s and the de-facto division of 1974, the TC position was readjusted to favor a bi-zonal federation as a compromise solution, moving forward to the 1983 Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) of the “Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus” (TRNC) - a step towards federalism, according to this viewpoint. Despite the collapse of several peacemaking initiatives to settle their issues, in May 2004 the R. of Cyprus gained full accession (entire island) into the European Union without a settlement. The EU has suspended the application of common laws in areas in the Northern part of the island until a settlement is reached. Since 1974, the Republic of Cyprus has been recognized as a de jure state and claims sovereignty over the entire island though it only has a de facto sovereignty of about 63% of the land. The UDI, TRNC government had control of about 37% of the land and has a de facto sovereignty, but, with the exception of Turkey, lacks international recognition. The two sides have agreed numerous times on a compromise settlement according to the principle of “a bi-zonal, bi communal federation,” but their positions are deeply divided in regards to sovereignty:

- What sort of international personality and recognition should Cyprus have?
- Should there be one sovereignty and international personality or two?
- If federalism is accepted as a form of sharing power, how strong should the norms of sovereignty be at the federal level, international level (international representations: UN, EU, etc.) and local level (constituent administrations)?
- What should the norms and governing laws be of the two “sovereign” states (constituent states) in relation to the “federal” one and who should represent Cyprus internationally?
Table 7-1: Sovereignty and “soverignly states”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ghali’s Set of Ideas</th>
<th>Kofi Annan Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TC Concerns</strong></td>
<td>Accession to the EU will prolong settlement and normalize de facto division if a settlement is not reached prior to accession.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A federal sovereignty undermines the role of the TCCS in the partnership. States should have greater powers and the federal government’s role should be diluted.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TC Positions</strong></td>
<td>One Sovereignty with a loose federal structure (confederation) – [Early Position] and then changed to a compromise outcome: Two constituent states and one central government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The federated states are sovereign insofar as their sovereignty is not limited by the sovereignty of the federal state.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United Nations Peace Plan (Final Proposal)</strong></td>
<td>The United Cyprus Republic is an independent state in the form of an indissoluble partnership, with a federal government and two equal constituent states, the GC state and the TC state. Cyprus is a member of the UN and has a single international legal personality and sovereignty. The United Cyprus Republic is organized under its constitution in accordance with the basic principles of rule of law, democracy, representative republican government, political equality, bi-zonality, and the equal status of the constituent states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The overall agreement ensures that the Cyprus settlement is based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and comprising two politically equal communities as defined in paragraph 11 of the Sec.-General’s report of April 3, 1002 (S/23780) in a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation, and that the settlement must exclude union in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or secession.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GC Positions</strong></td>
<td>One Sovereignty and two constituent communities with a strong federation (same as Set of Ideas). [Early Position] and it changed to a compromise outcome to match TC positions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Sovereignty and two constituent communities. The bi-communal and bi-zonal federation will be established freely by the GC and TC communities which together constitute the People of Cyprus.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GC Concerns</strong></td>
<td>Fear for a temporary recognition of “TRNC” while in transition phase and continuation of the right to intervention by Turkey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federation was viewed as a bitter compromise and exploited by the political opposition of president Vassiliou.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.4.2 Power Sharing and Governance

Since the second half of the 1960s, the two sides have been negotiating (directly or indirectly) for a comprehensive settlement on the island and in particular for finding ways to reconcile the strenuous treaties of Zurich-London that they inherited from their motherlands. Briefly, the treaties comprised by the Treaty of Guarantee, Constitutional and Establishment, were a compromise of power between Greece, Turkey and Britain to manage the political affairs on the island between the two communities in the wake of the British rule that was about to end. Building on the knowledge that existed at the time of a “functional federation,” or consociational democracy, the two sides agreed on power sharing between the two communities in the various branches of the government (executive, legislative and judiciary) and to a lesser extent, the local / municipal administrations.147

Power sharing was interpreted as a process of struggle rather than a process of sharing power fairly that could have served the interests and needs of the two communities. It eventually opened up a Pandora’s box on the island of Aphrodite and set the stage for intra- and inter-party conflicts between and within factions in the two communities.148 Since 1960, the two sides have adopted maximalist positions, with the exception of some Marxist – Leninist romanticists. The most significant peacemaking efforts where power was defined as “shared” in less confrontational terms, was set in Ghali’s “Set of Ideas” and Annan’s “Comprehensive Peace Plan” [final version] as a compromise / integrative sharing of power between what was coined as a consociation
federation / confederation settlement with political equality at all federal branches of the government. However, with the two sides being back at their ideological maps again of red and blue lines, their disagreements come to the forefront again on the following points:

- How to share power at the federal and state levels.
- How power can be balanced out between the two communities so that neither side can cause the system to collapse should either decide to overuse it.
- The duration and practicality of power rotation of the executive branch of government.
- Transitional arrangements until sharing of power is established on a permanent basis.
Table 7-2: Power Sharing and Governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TC Concerns</th>
<th>Ghali's Set of Ideas</th>
<th>Kofi Annan Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of trust and fear that TRNC will be dissolved and its apparatus as an administration will be to serve the TC as a minority.</td>
<td>Political and arithmetic equality are needed in order to accept a compromise solution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC Positions</td>
<td>Political rights and sharing of power should be guaranteed through the exercise of veto powers at the various branches of the federal government. Political equality is desired.</td>
<td>Complete governing on geographic administration controlled by TC constituent state with strong degree of autonomy. Political equality at all other levels of governance with the GC side.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Peace Plan (Final Proposal)</td>
<td>Executive: Federal President and Vice-Pres. (political equality). The President or Vice can veto decisions of the Council or/and Legislature: Lower House (70:30 GC/TC ration) and Lower H. (50:50 GC/TC ration) based on a quorum of majority among ethnic groups.</td>
<td>Transitional government (co-presidents - rotation) to represent Cyprus as Head of State – (60 months transition period): 5-year Rotation Federal government: (a) Federal Parliament consisting of Senate (48 members and Chambers of Deputies (48 members); Presidential Council (executive power) consisting of 6 members (4:2 ratio) – elected in the Senate and approved by the Chamber; Executive heads in each Constituent state without the right in casting a vote in Fed. Gov.; Supreme Court: 3 from each community and 3 non-Cypriots.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC Positions</td>
<td>1960 arrangements with Constitutional changes or of a Federal (strong) Consociationalism – Political Equality was considered as a compromise solution.</td>
<td>Strong Federalism with one sovereignty (political equality was accepted as an integrative solution in the Annan III version).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC Concerns</td>
<td>Lack of trust to make compromises on political equality. Concerns on the structure of government between Presidential and vice-presidential veto power.</td>
<td>Loss of the de Jour privileges as a single government and transformation into a constituent status.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.4.3 Security and Guarantees: Insecurities

Cyprus is perhaps one of the most highly militarized countries on Earth considering its population and square miles of territory. The issues of security and guarantees raise a fundamental point of difference between the two communities in Cyprus since the establishment of the constitution in 1960. In particular, the treaties of Guarantee, Alliance and Establishment grant rights to Greece and Turkey to station their militaries on the island and grant the UK sovereign rights for her military garrisons to be stationed there almost indefinitely.\textsuperscript{149} According to the GC side, the Treaty of Guarantee has been viewed as a threat to their collective security and safety since Turkey intervened on the island militarily in 1974 (the same applies for Greece from a TC perspective). Since 1974, the issue of security has turned into an eminent psychological fear, a justifiable insecurity according to the GC perspective and it has to be settled only by eliminating the right of the three guarantor powers to intervene on the island.\textsuperscript{150} On the contrary, TC sees the presence of the Turkish army (nearly 30-40,000 troops) as “a deterrence to GC and Greece nationalistic aspirations” which stirred-up the political and social affairs on the island in the early 1960s and early 70s with the Greek Junta intervention (words in citation: anonymous interview).\textsuperscript{151} The issues of security and guarantees are perhaps the most contentious obstacle that led to the collapse of many peacemaking initiatives and unfolded into various areas of polarization between the parties:
• Should Cyprus be demilitarized before or after a comprehensive settlement is reached and how would this affect the security of each community vis-à-vis each other and from external threats?

• Who should monitor the demilitarization process and what kind of monitoring mechanisms should be in place to make sure that the parties are not rearming themselves secretly?

• Who will have the upper hand in controlling the police and military (lightly armed civilian military)?

• What should the role of Greece and Turkey (and to a lesser extent the UK) be as former guarantor powers?

• Should there be a timetable for the withdrawal (partial, comprehensive or in stages) of foreign militaries (Greek and Turkish) and who will monitor that?

• Who will secure the post-accord implementation process if a comprehensive agreement is accepted considering all the mistrust and insecurity each community has toward the other – bi-communal conflict, military intervention, status quo isolation?

• Is the international community (UN Peacekeeping Force, EU, etc.) going to enforce compliance with the demilitarization and withdrawal of foreign troops?

• Security and Guarantees (right of intervention by Greece, Turkey and the UK) also depend on the decision of Greece and Turkey (and UK) to abolish / replace (them). This dynamic is also affected by the larger geopolitical interests of the three guarantor powers on the island (Treaty of Guarantee 1960).
### Table 7-3: Security and Guarantees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Ghalli’s Set of Ideas</strong></th>
<th><strong>Kofi Annan Plan</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TC Concerns</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear: The Treaty of Guarantee serves as psychological security / safety net / deterrence. The Treaty of Alliance and Guarantees must not be diluted.</td>
<td>Treaty of Guarantee is not negotiable. Some changes can be introduced if Greece and Turkey agree to.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TC Positions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same as above. Treaty of Guarantees must continue to exist according to the 1960 constitution. The Turkish military should remain (in small number) on the island for protection if needed.</td>
<td>Continuation of the Treaty of Guarantees without alterations that may lower security/safety deterrence towards TC and TCCS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United Nations Peace Plan</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Final Proposal)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demilitarization of the island and small security federal force under the command of President and Vice-President: equal number of GC/TC personnel. Establishment of a federal police force.</td>
<td>The treaties of Establishment, Guarantee and Alliance remain in force. Cyprus shall be demilitarized, and all GC and TC forces, including reserve units, shall be dissolved, and their arms removed from the island in phases synchronized with the redeployment and adjustment of Greek and Turkish forces (gradual withdrawal). There shall be a UN peacekeeping operation to monitor the implementation of this agreement and use of its best efforts to maintain a secure environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1920 Treaty of Guarantee (TG) and Treaty of Alliance (TA) remain in effect – TA will allow for the stationing of equal Greek and Turkish contingents in Cyprus. The three Guarantors (UN-GR-TUR) and UNFICYP will monitor the demilitarization and troop reduction.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GC Positions – Contention Point</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC and TC police should be under the supervision of the federal administration and not the constituent state. 3rd countries should not have the right of military intervention – violation of UN Charter.</td>
<td>Modification of the Treaty of Guarantees to eliminate threats from a unilateral military intervention. A multinational force should monitor the security and safety of the United Republic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GC Concerns</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear: Against the continuation of the Treaty of Guarantees. Treaty gives the right for intervention of 3rd powers and can be violated by any 3rd member at any time.</td>
<td>The Turkish military raises the level of insecurity among G-Cypriots and it should be abolished. A small number of Greek and Turkish military personnel could remain according to the % or population, if the two sides agree.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.4.4 Territory and Territorial Adjustments

Territorial adjustments mean concessions by TC and Turkey (as well as military) for the most part and it is one that needs significant reciprocity from the GC side on another issue in return. Territory simply refers to where the bordering of the two “sovereignties” or constituent states should be drawn and primarily involves the return of territory from the TC side to the GC side. This is at about an area of 7 to 10 percentile points on the topographic map along the buffer zone. Topographically this refers to the non-lineal but horizontal adjustment of land that would be returned to the GC side and includes areas (villages) closer to the state line that were highly populated with Greek Speaking Cypriots prior to the 1974 separation. Since the high level agreement in 1977 and 1979, the notion of bi-zonality (bi-zonal federation) was invented / accepted by both parties as a compromise solution to separate the population along ethnic lines. A number of issues divide the parties at the table:

- The actual percentage (numerical figure) of land that will be returned under GC administration (post-agreement arrangement).
- Areas that have been repopulated by TC and Turkish Nationals and relocation may cause a challenge, at least until proper relocations take place.
- Areas that were highly populated by GC IDPs.
- The percentage of land under Federal and Constituent administrations.
- Board to decide requisitions and reinstatement.
**Table 7-4: Territory and Territorial Adjustments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ghali’s Set of Ideas</th>
<th>Kofi Annan Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TC Concerns</strong></td>
<td>Relocation of TC displaced persons should take place gradually based on a time table. Compensations for relocation must be allocated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Relocation of Turkish Cypriots should be minimal and compensation given to all affected families in TRNC.</td>
<td>TCCS to retain 29+% of the land and 59% of coastline as a constituent state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TC Positions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Territory to stay as is, especially the coastal line. Some withdrawal from 37% to about 29+% under the control of the TRNC.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United Nations Peace Plan (Final Proposal)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- A UN map shows the territories under each federated state and it is reflected in the constitutional agreement – about 37,000 TCs were to be relocated (relocation compensation was considered). Residents affected could stay under the federal state administration of their property location or be relocated to their federated state community (some compensations will be covered). The Turkish Cypriot federated state will withdraw from 37% to about 29% of territory.</td>
<td>The boundaries of the constituent states (depicted in the maps attached to the constitution). All areas falling within the boundaries of the constituent states are legally part of the state. The Turkish Cypriot Constituent State withdraws from 37% to about 29.2%; A relocation committee shall oversee the process; Handover of territory to GC will take place in six phases ranging from two weeks after the implementation of the framework agreement to three years with the monitoring of the UN peacekeepers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GC Positions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Marginal changes for functionality and a larger number of IDPs returned to their initial properties – return of the IDPs in the Karpas area, which is not included on the plan. Return of as many IDPs as possible.</td>
<td>Coastline remains at 49% under GCCS; UK offers 116 sq. miles of sovereign bases (90% to GC side) to compensate for the Karpas area. About 10% of territory along the buffer zone should be returned to the GC constituent state – reflection of population proportionality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GC Concerns</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Concern: A census should be completed to find out a more precise number of Cypriots born before 1974 who reside in Cyprus and in the areas controlled by the Turkish Army.</td>
<td>A significant number of IDPs will not be able to return to their properties. Compensation or exchange of properties should be incorporated into laws for those affected.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.4.5 Internally Displaced Persons and Properties

There is no greater sorrow on Earth than among and for those who have lost their native home, Aeschylus wrote once. There were three waves of IDPs in Cyprus. The latter two took place during the 1974 war in Cyprus (July and August), leading to the displacement of nearly 40% of the Greek Cypriot population that fled to the South, and nearly 50% of the Turkish Cypriot population that fled to the North (UNFICYP Estimates vs. UNHCR Estimates). The first wave took place almost a decade earlier in 1963, a few months after the president of Cyprus Archbishop Makarios proposed 13 amendments to the constitution of Cyprus to make it “more workable.” The TC elite opposed the changes and interpreted the effort as an attempt by GC elites to remove the veto powers or safeguards of the TC minority in the government. This political tension led to a violent eruption between nationalists on both sides with significant costs to the TC community that in several mixed areas were voluntarily or forcefully made to flee for safety to areas (enclaves) that were protected by the Turkish military and TC paramilitary forces.

All 41 peacemaking initiatives make a reference to the IDPs and it is a topic that polarizes the two sides when it comes to:

- The number of returnees (IDPs) to their properties (North and South)
- The time lapse between ratifying an agreement and the actual return of the majority of returnees in 3-6, 6-9, 9-12 year phases.
- The emotional attachment on the issue and political entrapment to rhetoric.
- Humanitarian issues and the safe relocation of populations affected who are living in IDPs homes.
• Compensation to persons who will not be permitted to return permanently to their properties and provisions for returnees to areas controlled by either constituent state.

• Property that has already being developed or properties that will be transferred to the federal government, constituent states.

• Expropriation of land and land development.
### Table 7-5: Internally Displaced Persons and Properties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TC Concerns</th>
<th>Kofi Annan Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TCs who owned property in GC areas prior to the events of 1974 should</td>
<td>Bi-zonality is the main concern and returnees should not alter the character</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>be compensated according to current value and not according to 1974</td>
<td>of existing communities or voting rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fair values.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC Positions</td>
<td>Strong restrictions should be applied to and from both sides across the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All GC properties in the TC side have to be legally taken over by the</td>
<td>constituent lines according to bi-zonality. Access to property should also be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC administration. GC non-returnees will be compensated.</td>
<td>subject to restrictions and regulations by the constituent authorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensations will be offered once the people affected will be</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>satisfactorily relocated – areas where land will be returned to the GC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>side only.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Peace Plan</td>
<td>Ceilings are included according to territorial adjustments and non-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Final Proposal)</td>
<td>permitted returnees will be entitled to restitution with some limitations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfactory relocation of IDPs. TCs who were residing in areas that</td>
<td>applying. Property boards will examine the cases and in cases where property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>came under GC administration can remain until a comparable property is</td>
<td>is not reinstated (private land or home – corporate property is not included)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provided to them under TC administration. – All matters and claims</td>
<td>the owners will be compensated with federal bonds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>will be handled by committees. Compensation will be at current value.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC Positions</td>
<td>Like the Right of Return (and right to return) to their properties, all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The right of Return and Right to Property should be fully respected.</td>
<td>IDPs must have the right to return to their properties and be able to take</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensations must be included for all IDPs;</td>
<td>advantage of that according to their constitutional and human rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return of at least 2/3 of all IDPs to their properties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GC Concerns</td>
<td>Internal Dilemma: IDPs and Properties have been of major concern and also a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most GC properties on the TC side have been allocated to TCs and</td>
<td>point of contention between rivalry parties constraining possible compromising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>those allocations are considered legal by TC and not the Republic of</td>
<td>options.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus. All GCs should return to their properties or be compensated.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.4.6 Freedoms and Human Rights

The negotiations regarding the restoration of basic freedoms and human rights were added to the agenda of talks since the Clerides-Denktash talks in late 60s and early 70s but without being the foci of the talks (violations committed during the bi-communal conflict). Those violations (mostly missing persons) are now being investigated by the Committee on Missing Persons.\textsuperscript{154} Since 1974, all peacemaking initiatives have made reference to the restoration of human rights and fundamental freedoms violated in Cyprus by both sides and mostly Turkey. During the course of talks from 1974-present, the two sides use as leverage the various rulings, judgments and resolutions issued by the UN, the Council of Europe, the EU and other international organs to strengthen their negotiating position. The political agendas are set along the following lines prior to any substantive bargaining taking place:

- Return of all refugees to the Turkish Cypriot constituent federal states will significantly change the bi-zonality of the federation.
- Freedom of movement (refugees and non-refugees) is limited until a final and comprehensive status in negotiation is reached with post-agreement restrictions.
- Freedom of settlement and property is restricted to maintain the character of the consociation federation / confederation deal (bi-communality).
- Voting rights and post-agreement restrictions (within time phases) are often proposed but either accepted or rejected by one of the two sides.
• Restrictions on the number of foreign nationals (mostly Turkish and non-EU members).
Table 7-6: Freedoms and Human Rights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chali’s Set of Ideas</th>
<th>Kofi Annan Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TC Concerns</strong></td>
<td>Safeguard measures to ensure and protect social and religious identity from a seemingly influx of Greek-speaking Cypriots.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of movement is accepted. The freedom of Settlement and right to property must be regulated (by individual states) and implemented gradually, taking into account economic interests and preservation of communal identity.</td>
<td>Limitations might be lifted after TUR’s accession to the EU. Restrictions may apply to Greek-speaking Cypriots but not necessarily to European citizens (but not of GC identity).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TC Positions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All universally recognized fundamental rights and freedoms will be included in the federal constitution. The freedom of movement, settlement and the right to property will be safeguarded in the constitution. The freedom of movement will be exercised without any restriction. The freedom of settlement and the right to property will be implemented after the resettlement process arising from the territorial adjustments have been completed. Persons who have had past involvement in or are actively involved in acts of violence or in incitement may be prevented from going to the other federated state.</td>
<td>There will be a single Cypriot citizenship with full protection of minority rights according to the European Convention for the protection of HR and Fundamental freedoms as well as the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that will be an integral part of the constitution of Cyprus. Some limitations on returnees that are contingent on a percentage formula per time intervals. Permanent limitation that returnees over years should be no more than 1.3 of the permanent residents in the hosting constituent state. Political equality applies to all the organs of the Federal government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United Nations Peace Plan (Final Proposal)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GC Positions</strong></td>
<td>Lifting of permanent limitations for all EU members including Greek-speaking Cypriots who wish to reside under TCCS – transitional limitations are accepted for about 19 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A uniform application of all freedoms and rights for all Cypriots at the federal level (included in the constitution and safeguarded by the federation and not the states).</td>
<td>The freedom of movement to both constituent states should be guaranteed to all. IDPs must exercise their right to resettle to their properties in the TC constituent state and stay there permanently if they wish to do so with political representation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GC Concerns</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The due process of law should be federal and not state-determined to prevent violations of human rights and remain in accordance with international laws.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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7.4.7 Turkish Nationals

Turkish Nationals or “settlers” as they are referred to in Cyprus are becoming a significant point of contention at the negotiation table as well as a social, cultural and humanitarian issue in areas under the TRNC. From the 1980s onward (UDI) - TRNC establishment – the issue escalated as the numbers of TNs increased. Some argue that TCs are currently outnumbered and a considerable number of TNs can be accepted as temporary / permanent residents of a proposed TC constituent state, whereas others would have to be relocated to Turkey.

The topic becomes contentious when it reaches the following arguments:

- The actual number of TNs to stay on the island after an agreement is signed (figures change) – the number fluctuates from 30,000 (Set of Ideas) to 45,000 (Annan Plan).
- Humanitarian concerns for children born in Cyprus in mixed marriages.
- Relocation expenses and Human Rights Concerns (illegal immigration / migration).
- Percentage of TNs staying not to exceed a certain number entering / residing in TC Constituent State.
**Table 7-7: Turkish Nationals**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ghali’s Set of Ideas</th>
<th>Kofi Annan Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TC Concerns</strong></td>
<td>Internal Dilemma: Number of Turkish Nationals is larger than local TC electorate vote constraining the options for a compromise option. – Humanitarian concerns were also considered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Rehabilitation might affect Turkish Nationals who reside on the island or are married to a local TC.</td>
<td>All Turkish Nationals residing in the TC constituent part should remain - except illegal workers or seasonal workers from Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC Positions</td>
<td>45,000 persons inclusive of spouses and children to remain among Turkish Nationals. Section for compatibility with Schengen Aquis and immigration laws towards non-EU member states (EU-EU Visa liberalizations). Turkish Nationals to up to 10% of resident TCCS (internal constituent state citizens) shall be given permanent residency upon entry into the Federated United Cyprus. Equal treatment to Greek and Turkish nationals as to entry and residency rights to be negotiated between the EU Commission, Cyprus and Turkey. Other limitations and conditions apply on immigration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Nationals are seasonal workers and this does not affect the reinstatement of properties.</td>
<td>All settlers (Turkish Nationals) should return to their countries of origin and their relocation should be facilitated and assisted when needed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Peace Plan (Final Proposal)</td>
<td>All Turkish Settlers should return to Turkey. Relocation compensation should be incorporated and paid to every family affected. Humanitarian concerns are exempt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Nationals were not considered an obstacle to the Framework Agreement. Relocation of Turkish Nationals will be done in accordance with laws and as humanely as possible. Number of Turkish Nationals was also considered to be much lower at the time and estimated that 20,000 TNs might have been relocated in total.</td>
<td>Violation of International Laws by Turkey and TRNC in populating a land that has been illegally occupied by the use of military force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GC Positions</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All settlers (Turkish Nationals) should return to their countries of origin and their relocation should be facilitated and assisted when needed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GC Concerns</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same as GC positions above.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.4.8 Transitional Arrangements

Peace is in the air, as one verse of a song goes, and before peacemaking can be finalized one obstacle to overcome is how the new state of affairs in Cyprus, the day after an agreement is signed, will be implemented. The syndrome of post-accord implementation is still vivid in the minds of elites who tasted the outcomes of the bi-communal conflict and wars of 1974. Lack of trust (buildup of mistrust) and insecurities prevail in parties in putting their faith in the hands of their co-patriots in the aftermath of an agreed settlement, causing more concerns than enthusiasm for a prosperous future:

- How would the rotating executive office function?
- What would happen to the existing status quo political arrangements?
- What if the other side violates the agreement, as has happened in the past?
- What if the new state of affairs becomes dysfunctional, as happened during the years of the “Repentant Republic?” (Phase of 1960-1974).
- What if the Foreign Troops don’t withdraw according to the time table?
- What will the new United Republic of Cyprus look like the day after and what will happen to the careers of current political leaders, considering all arrangements for sharing power equally?
Table 7-8: Transitional Arrangements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>TC Concerns</strong></th>
<th><strong>Kofi Annan Plan</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transitional arrangements are difficult to be implemented within the short period of 18 months. Constituent or state transitions on some issues should take longer to implement.</td>
<td>Transitional limitations must be subject to the state and limit the number of GC returnees and the withdrawal of Turkish military.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The TC community and federated state will not be bound by the effects of any international agreement entered into by the GC side after December 1993, unless it is approved by the TC legislature.</td>
<td>Transitional arrangements must be aligned with Turkey’s accession to the EU or whichever comes earlier. Some provisions for transition must become permanent (with respect to identity characteristics) or discussed at a moratorium at a later transitional stage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United Nations Peace Plan</strong> (Final Proposal)</td>
<td>All of the federal institutions shall be in place upon entry into force of the Foundation Agreement, including the Supreme Court and the transitional constituent state institutions (Legislature, Executives and Judiciaries). General elections at the constituent, federal and EU levels were to be scheduled on June 13, 2010, and the office of the president, co-president should be in full operation or full capacity and rotate every 10 months during the first term of the presidential council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GC Positions</strong></td>
<td>The transitional arrangements must be contingent on the issues. Withdrawal of militaries should take place first. Quotas limiting the number of returnees and timing of their relocation should be removed in accordance with EU regulations for immediate freedom of movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concern that international affairs will be troublesome and the interim period might not work properly.</td>
<td>Same as above. Restrictions should not apply in the case of elderly and returnees should be able to be resettled in their properties within short periods of time after accord ratifications.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Ghai’s Set of Ideas**
- Final framework agreement to be put to separate referenda. Transition period for 18 months. Establishment of bi-communal committees to put into force the federal constitution and electoral laws, settlement claims, arrangements for territorial adjustments, etc. The committee is composed of representatives of guarantor powers (UK, GR and TUR) and the two communities. Each community will prepare its federated state governmental arrangements, laws and regulations that should come into force once the federal republic is established.
7.5 Concluding Remarks

On one of my most recent visits to Cyprus in 2010, I was fortunate enough to visit, for social reasons, one of the “elders,” as he is known in Cyprus, whose political career has spanned more than half a century. He referred to the two initiatives as “the biggest UN failures in Cyprus.” This is a leader who had had direct involvement in both peacemaking initiatives. His comment got me to thinking about the concerns expressed by other top leaders in their commentaries about the initiatives to their constituents that I rephrase here as rhetorical questions:¹⁵⁵

- Had the Annan plan been accepted on April 26, 2004 in both referenda and ratified politically by elites across the divide, would a United Cyprus have been able to stand firm and be nurtured during the post-accord accord implementation phase?
- Would the foreign troops have withdrawn as the time-table called for?
- Would a post-accord implementation process have been politically and socially viable so that when inevitable political crises occurred, as happened in the past, they could have been resolved collaboratively by political representatives rather than driving matters to the edge?
- Would the displaced persons be guaranteed a safe return to their birth-towns and under what circumstances?
- Would foreign nationals, minorities, and in particular Turkish nationals and their Cyprus-born children be treated equally and given the same opportunities in a “new Cyprus?”
On a more positive note, there were also leaders who for years expressed the opinion that the accession of Cyprus to the European Union as a united country presented an “enticing opportunity,” where many of the underlying and deep-rooted insecurities and dilemmas could be rendered less relevant under the umbrella of a “United Europe.” That ended up being a pipe dream, at least temporarily, in the spirit of Jean Monet and Robert Shuman.156

Cypriots, after all, are the real stakeholders of peace dividends in Cyprus and two prominent columnists, Kyriacos Tziambazis and Hasan Yalkut, perhaps got it right just a few months before the April 2004 referenda took place when they wrote the following:

“We understand the uneasiness expressed by citizens, because we are part of them as well. The uneasiness [or insecurities – author’s word] step out from the fact that from 1963, each community [Greek and Turkish Cypriot] was making decisions and acted on her own and it is hard now, after half a century to get used to the ‘new state of affairs’ and to share the power and the right to make decisions and implement them with the ‘others.’ When we refer to the ‘other,’ we ought to keep in minds that we refer to Cypriots, and we share a common destiny and common country together. For this reason we should dare and trespass predispositions of alienation and nationalism.” (Authors translation)157

There are many similarities and differences between the “Set of Ideas” and the “Annan Plan,” as I highlighted in Appendix E and in the various tables in this chapter earlier on, but one of the biggest structural differences has to do with the opening of the first two check points in April of 2003 that kept the two larger communities of Cypriots in isolation from each other for more than three decades. At the top leadership level, the “Kofi Annan” peacemaking process provided a setting for a political dialogue to start, at least incrementally initially, within the boundaries of the UN good offices. At the inter-party level it enabled a more visible discourse of political dialogue across the divide to
take place to build joint efforts to persuade proponents in favor and/or against the proposed peace plan. At the citizens’ level, the opening of the crossings came as a turning point by enabling academics, journalists, and ordinary people in many spheres of society to sit together in open forums and share their concerns, fears and hopes for the future.  

At that moment, the general atmosphere within the public sphere for an endgame solution could not have been more favorable; for example: (i) the decision of the EU commission (Copenhagen Meeting 2002) to accept the entire island into the EU on May 1, 2004 as a United country; (ii) the assurances by the UN and other top personalities within the Security Council that this time “a settlement is within reach;” (iii) the build-up of a bi-communal civil society for a common endgame solution; (iv) the support by many foreign donors to sustain efforts and provide their expertise when needed; (v) and the parallel support by Greece and Turkey to encourage Cypriots leaders and the public to accept the negotiated accords, increasing the level of confidence and hope among Cypriots that unification was in their hands (Hatzidimitriou 2006).  

All of this is now part of history and everyone in Cyprus has a tale or two of their own to add. What worries me the most after reading and analyzing 41 peacemaking initiatives are what I perceive to be building blocks en route to lasting peace in Cyprus that are not mentioned in any of those initiatives, such as:

- integration of schools and curriculums that can produce the next generation of leaders,
- rebuilding and reestablishing truth and history textbooks,
- re-humanizing the so-called “other,”
• acknowledgement about wrongdoings,
• restoring the identity of innocent victims,
• rebuilding the fabric of social interactions in Cyprus after years of demonization,
• ethnic and national reconciliation,
• guaranteeing and safeguarding the needs, freedoms and civil liberties of all Cypriots, and
• conflict resolution and conflict transformation mechanisms to address grievances and insecurities from the past.

The so-called “Cyprus problem” is not intractable but prolonged. Many methods were tried out, many words were exchanged, and many concepts and approaches were introduced - enough to fill up a contemporary volume in the literature of negotiations and conflict resolution. What is most worrisome is that the prolonged and inconclusive efforts are steadily draining the reservoir of hope among proponents in favor of unification vis-à-vis proponents who are fairly satisfied with the conditions of the current status quo division or prescribed to maximalist approaches. This is perhaps the biggest obstacle of all to peacemaking in Cyprus.
... I would like to help you, but I do not know how to communicate with General Grivas. However, I could make some enquiries from EOKA members I have defended [as a lawyer] and if I succeed in establishing contact, I will let you know. Of course, I cannot guarantee secrecy once the message goes beyond me. I do not think, however, that the message from me saying what you have told me will be sufficient to bring about any responses. It might be different if the General receives a written message from you... (Clerides 1989 - Vol. I)

The above excerpt is from a meeting that took place on April 12, 1957, between Glafkos Clerides and the British governor of Cyprus Sir Hugh Foot when the governor had urgently phoned Clerides confidentially to arrive at the governor’s palace without informing anyone (Clerides 1989). With this incident, Governor Foot communicated his intentions for a possible ceasefire between the British forces in Cyprus and the EOKA leadership. Clerides ended up becoming a key link in this communication, or what soon was about to become the Foot Initiative, starting with the phrase: “Dear Colonel Grivas…” (General Grivas was EOKA’s insurgency leader).

This chapter is separated into two sections. In the first, I examine how channeling of communication takes place in peacemaking that can start up direct / indirect negotiations or can exist parallel with formal negotiations as a back channel of
communication. To do this analysis, I examine five exemplary chains of communication comparatively from the database that I compiled and conclude with some propositions about how channels can start and lead to or complement larger peacemaking frameworks of mediation / negotiation. This is a study that has not been done before or referenced in published accounts about Cyprus. Departing from the first section, I then examine the process of peacemaking in Cyprus from a systemic framework perspective. Methodologically, I reference data from the larger data-set of initiatives and, along with primary information from interviews, I assemble two comparative analyses with the purpose to develop a number of propositions of how peacemaking can lead to successful post-accord implementation in Cyprus. The two analyses are based on:

**Dissimilar Systems Design Analyses (DSDA) of Peacemaking Chains of Communication:**

- b. Clerides - De Sotto - Denktash Channel (Visible and Confidential 2001-02)
- c. AKEL - CTP Channel (Unofficial, Direct and Confidential 2004-2006)
- d. Greece - Turkey Channel (Parallel, Indirect and Confidential 2004)
- e. Christofias – Talat (Direct and Contingent to the Christofias-Talat Initiative 2008)
Dissimilar Systems Design Analyses (DSDA) of Peacemaking Structures (Mediation / Negotiation):

f. London-Zurich Structure 1955-60 (Power Mediation Model)

g. Makarios-Denktash Structure in 1977 (Inter-communal Talks Model)

h. Kofi Annan Structure 2000-04 (Mix Model)

8.1 Peacemaking and Chains of Communication

A number of departing questions arise from the Foot-Clerides Channel, for example: Was the structure of channeling communication between Foot-Clerides-Grivas effective enough to produce favorable results and in what direction? Was there a need for other intermediary links (insider / outsider) other than Clerides? Why was Clerides selected for this task in the first place? What were the intentions, interests and needs of the two sides at the end of the communication and the ones in between and were those intentions genuine or did they simply serve some tactical / strategic purpose? Was the gesture of initiation or reciprocation a sign of weakness by any of the parties involved? Would a different mode of communication between Governor Foot and General Grivas have led to different results? Was the Governor the real initiator of the process or was he acting under the direction of his military general or the British Prime Minister? Why did Governor Foot aim to make a deal with a person who the Queen had called a terrorist? What roles, if any, did others play in Cyprus, Greece and Turkey under the Foot Initiative?
The questions can be endless and each one deserves a chapter of analysis for fairness. My approach here is slightly different and that is to trigger the need for an integrative approach toward what I see as the most important literature about chains of communication in dealing with decision-making and the settlement of protracted social conflicts, including: \(160\)

**Perspective I**: The use of (official) formal / informal (unofficial) channels in decision-making processes and dynamics found in Melcher and Beller 1967. \(161\)

**Perspective II**: Dynamics of channeling communication between organizations found in Adams 1976. \(162\)

**Perspective III**: The analysis and relative success of conciliatory gestures and channels and a taxonomy of channels into open and confidential channels; official and unofficial; direct and indirect developed by Mitchell 2000. \(163\)

**Perspective IV**: Communication chains in negotiation between conflict parties developed by Pruitt 2001. \(164\)

In the context of this dissertation:

**Working Definition**: channels of communication (channeling) within the paradigm of peacemaking is a conflict management method whereby parties in conflict aim to convey a message, directly or indirectly with the help of third parties or an offer from third parties (intermediaries) to start a constructive interaction via some mode of communication to settle their conflict, without resorting to physical violence.
It has been a very difficult, exhausting and frustrating task for the Cypriots to settle their differences due to a number of factors that I eluded to in the previous chapters and that I briefly summarize here: (i) the background of overt political hostility that has not been fully addressed; (ii) the framing of the Cyprus problem that is based on an endless victimization paradigm; (iii) the political fragmentation among political parties across the divide to reach an integrative endgame framework for a solution and agree on the methods that could help them address the roadblocks en route to a lasting and mutually implementable peace accord on the island; (iv) mutual resistance toward each other’s positions on substantive issues that could help them lower the barbed wire that separates them; and (v) the different interpretations of the root causes and conditions of the Cyprus problem. This is the package they carry around on their backs before they even share coffee together.

By synthesizing several islands of theory from the literature and several dozen examples that I analyzed in my investigation, I developed a contingency / systems approach to the analysis of channeling in peacemaking, depicted in Figure 8-1 below. At the heart of this systemic approach are clusters of variables including: initiator’s characteristics, process characteristics and dynamics, intermediary characteristics and the target’s characteristics. Furthermore, channeling outcomes, whether they are relatively successful or not, is contingent on the entire interaction, as well as the behaviors of parties and intermediaries (3rd parties) and the overall process of communication and its dynamics. This contingency approach is not a normative theory but a stepping stone to thinking about chains of communication in peacemaking that can start a process of
interaction between adversaries and lead to larger structures of the mediation / negotiation process.
**Figure 8.1: Channeling as a Structure of Peacemaking**

- **Selection & Channel Characteristics**
- **Context Characteristics**
- **Selection of Methods**
- **Pre-initiation and Initiation Stages**
- **Initiating Chain of Communication**
- **Decision to use 3rd parties / intermediaries**
- **Intermediaries decision to engage or not**
- **Target’s decision to terminate / engage**
- **Other Internal / External Influences**
- **Other Audiences**
- **Decision to Terminate**
- **Initiator’s Behavior**
- **3rd Party Behavior**
- **Targets Response: (Direct)**
- **Decision to Change / Modify Structure-Methods-Nature of Interaction**
- **Intermediary Roles and Characteristics (Indirect)**
- **Other Internal / External Influences**
- **Decision to Continue Communication**
- **Delivering Message to Target(s)**
- **Target’s Evaluation**
- **Initiator’s 3rd Party Behavior**

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8.2.1 Channeling: Processes, Dynamics and Outcomes

The practice of channeling communication among adversaries (directly, or via intermediaries) has a rich history and context not only in Cyprus but also in other cases, for example, the Israeli-Arab peacemaking process (Mitchell 2000), the Northern Irish peace process (O’Malley and Pruitt 2001), and in South Africa (Waldmeir 1997). Looking at the case of Cyprus longitudinally from the mid-1950s to the current peacemaking process in 2011, there are considerable differences in the way parties and intermediaries deal with the process, dynamics and outcomes of channeling. At least four common themes are derived in this analysis:

(1) A recognition by the parties involved (or outsiders) that a conflict spiral has escalated (1950s; mid 1960s and post-1974 in Cyprus) and something has to happen to reverse it, thus opening up some form of direct / indirect communication;

(2) Domestic and external criticism that stubbornness (unwillingness to talk) that has gone on for some time and has been counterproductive for both GC and TC, as well as Greece, Great Britain and Turkey.

(3) The emergence / recognition of an enticing opportunity that enables the parties to engage in formal / informal and direct / indirect communication.

(4) Neither party is willing to accept the risks and costs of a “no solution” or the reality that “the current status quo in Cyprus [could very well be] a permanent solution.”

Below are the examples of five channels from Cyprus and their basic characteristics:
Table 8-1(a): Characteristics of Channel I

Channel I

Characteristics of Channel I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Official and semi-direct with highly trusted intermediaries mandated on the one side of the chain. The channel remained both confidential and was executed in secrecy until an investigative journalist was informed about it and leaked its existence.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Timeline</td>
<td>2004 (2-3 sporadic meetings within a 2 week time period)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process</td>
<td>Official political dialogue to overcome post-Burgenstock impasse and postpone simultaneous referenda, among other issues of contention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context</td>
<td>Kofi Annan Peacemaking Period following final version of the plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chains</td>
<td>Top leaders with direct role as message conveyers (propositions exchange) on GC side. TC representatives kept advisory responsibilities to TRNC president as well as conveyors of Talat’s position.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8-2(a): Chain I: Official; Secret; Semi-Direct; Confidential
Table 8-1(b): Characteristics of Channel II

Channel II  
Characteristics of Channel II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Direct (first) and then Indirect. Confidential chain with advisory team expansions (Advisory Teams: 3–4 persons in each immediate team).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Timeline</td>
<td>2002 (Sporadic Meetings: UN Headquarters, Nicosia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process</td>
<td>Clerides-Denktash Initiative following their exchange of personal letters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context</td>
<td>Pre-text to the Clerides-Denktash Talks in 2002-2003 (Annan Plan I-III)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chains</td>
<td>Alvaro de Soto’s role was initially inactive and consultative based on direct observation via shuttle mission. Eventually it was reversed to a more active facilitative and procedural role. A member in this channel found de Soto’s active behavior inappropriate: “You are like a picture hanging on the wall,” he was told on one occasion, and “a fly on the wall” in another meeting, referring to his mandate to simply listen and take notes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clerides’  
Advisory  
Team

UN Mediator  
A. deSoto

(Advisory Team)  
And Kofi Annan

Party I:  
G.of C. Rep  
G. Clerides

Party II:  
TRNC Rep  
R. Denktash

Denktash’s  
Advisory  
Team

Figure 8-2(b): Chain II: Visible; Direct (first) and then Indirect; Confidential with official Advisory Teams
Table 8-I(c): Characteristics of Channel III

Channel III
Characteristics of Channel III

Structure  Unofficial and Direct: Interactions were Confidential. This is a combined Track “One and a Half” channel with linkages to top party leadership on the AKEL side and the Presidency of the TRNC on the other. Face to face meetings took place in the offices of AKEL and CTP. Parts of the chain are omitted to protect the anonymity and confidentiality of informants.

Timeline  2006-8 (Sporadic Meetings)

Process  Political Dialogue Structure between AKEL and CTP Top Representatives

Context  Post-Annan Peacemaking impasse. Searching to find a common ground to reestablish political relationships after the collapse of Annan V

Chains  Top representatives from AKEL and CTP members of Politburo

Figure 8-2(c): Chain III: Unofficial; Confidential; Indirect
### Table 8.1(d): Characteristics of Channel IV

#### Channel IV

**Characteristics of Channel IV**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Parallel with Direct and Indirect combinations during various phases: Channel was confidential and some of its chains met in secrecy. Expansions with Advisory Teams</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Timeline</td>
<td>March 2004 (Burgenstock, Switzerland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process</td>
<td>Combination of bilateral and multilateral negotiations (UK, EU, USA delegations were also involved during various stages of this channel and at times had advisory roles with UN mediation team).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context</td>
<td>Finalizing the Annan Plan: From Version IV to final V; Burgenstock, 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chains</td>
<td>Kofi Annan, Alvaro De Sotto and Mediation Team. Some expansions of the channel were omitted to protect the anonymity of the individual who participated due to their special role.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Figure 8.2(d): Chain IV: Parallel; Indirect; Confidential

- **National Council**
  - President & Speaker of H. (G of C)
  - Top Negotiator (Team)
- **Advisory Team**
  - Top Mediator/ Negotiator (Team)
  - Top Negotiator (Team)
- **Greek Gov.**
  - Prime Minister & Foreign A. M.
  - Direct and/or via Foreign Affairs Ministers
- **Turkish Gov.**
  - Prime Minister & Foreign A. M.
Table 8.1(e): Characteristics of Channel V

**Channel V**  
*Characteristics of Channel V*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Structure</strong></th>
<th>Contingency channel with sub-systems. Interaction was direct and indirect at various layers of interaction.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Timeline</strong></td>
<td>May-August 2008 (Systematic and Sporadic interactions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Process</strong></td>
<td>Bilateral talks with six working groups (WG) on top issues and 7 technical committees (TCom.) regarding technical and logistical matters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chains</strong></td>
<td>UN Special Envoy Alexander Downer and Mediation Teams – Facilitative Format with Consultative Shuttle Diplomacy. (Parallel Shuttle Diplomacy with Athens and Ankara remains sporadic and is not included on this framework for simplicity)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 8-2(e): Chain V: Contingent; Direct and Indirect Interactions; Visible; Confidential
Channel five (V) is an example of a very complex chain of interaction that progressively developed into a peace making initiative in August of 2008 and is now a peacemaking structure of mediation / negotiation between top leaders in Cyprus. It started with a direct gesture of conciliation with TRNC President Talat when he phoned to congratulate Christofias on his election as president of RC in February of 2008. The public became aware of the phone conversation (visible gesture), but the content remained confidential between the two and a few others perhaps. Talat’s gesture was also regarded as unofficial since it was framed as a congratulating gesture from one left-wing comrade to another and, within a few weeks after a series of communications, it was channeled between a couple of official links (including a direct phone communication between the two leaders) that the comrades’ genuine and reciprocal gestures were transformed into an official peacemaking channel, (Authors Record, Anonymous Interviews).

By May of 2008 and through the fall of the same year, the Christofias-Talat channel became a very synchronous plateau of interactions between top representatives and negotiations from both sides and a number of working groups and technical committees formed to prepare the grounds for pre-negotiations and substantive negotiations. This system is what I refer to in this dissertation as a contingent and embedded framework in mediation / negotiation depicted in tables 8 (a) and 8 (b) below under the presence and consultation of a 3rd party appointed by UN SG Ban Ki-moon.
### Table 8-2(a): Types of Channels I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official</th>
<th>Unofficial</th>
<th>Official then Unofficial</th>
<th>Unofficial then Official</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Open / Public</strong></td>
<td><strong>Confidential</strong></td>
<td><strong>INDIRECT</strong> (With 3rd Parties / Intermediaries)</td>
<td><strong>Confidential</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DIRECT (without 3rd parties)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Boutros Ghali “Set of Ideas” From Vassiliou-Denktash to Clerides-Denktash (1993)</td>
<td>Slovak Embassy Initiative (Inter-Party Social Gatherings)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8.2(b): Types of Channels II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Short Chain</th>
<th>Expanded Chain</th>
<th>Synchronous / Embedded (Normative)</th>
<th>Asynchronous (Teleological)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PARALLEL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CONTINGENT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8.2.2 Themes, Influences and Propositions

A number of themes and propositions derive from the analysis of channels (chains of communication) in this dissertation:

**Theme I:** Channeling comes in different forms and shapes and is the heart of peacemaking mediation / negotiation in Cyprus and it keeps top leaders in communication.

**Theme II:** Channels (chain links) transmit and prepare the groundwork for the first stages of what could turn out to be a peacemaking process navigating through stages of preliminary contacts, pre-negotiations, substantive talks, accord completions and post-accord implementation.

**Theme III:** Channeling of information (direct or indirect) has helped Greek and Turkish Cypriots (including Greece and Turkey) to reduce the risk of escalatory spirals, with the exception of a few sporadic moments of overt violence, and get back to the negotiation table.

**Theme IV:** Both sides have accepted the use of intermediaries in channeling back and forth information in good will and good faith with the prospect that the level of expertise of 3rd party intermediaries (mostly UN-SG special envoys, foreign diplomats, etc.) will favor their positions and perhaps influence the other side to yield more concessions.

**Theme V:** Both sides in Cyprus are very prone to accept channeling via UN intermediaries as a form of communicating their willingness to negotiate in good faith for
strategic and tactical reasons such as scoring more points on the inter-party (local / constituent) board as well as at the international level by showing compliance with the UN norms associated with making peace.

**Theme VI:** GC and TC leaders have initiated and participated for the most part in official and indirect channels under the auspices of the UN good offices with the hope that a new methodology and engagement from the international community will catalyze their efforts for a political settlement and help to eliminate some of their insecurity concerns.

**Theme VII:** Channels provide Cypriot top negotiators and leaders not only the opportunity of a dialogue and a prospect for lasting peace but also a window to escape if things go beyond their expectation or red and blue lines of what can be negotiable or not. Intermediaries are the first to be blamed if the envelope of concessions is pushed or opened at all followed by more blaming directed towards the other and intransigent side.

**Theme VIII:** Greece and Turkey also favor indirect and parallel communication to manage the affairs in Cyprus from spilling over to their own relations. Catalyzing the process in Cyprus towards a settlement can also help them address other bilateral issues.

**Theme IX:** In addition to the above themes, a number of factors (see figure 8? below) are likely to influence the likelihood (relative success or failure) of a chain communication in Cyprus, including:
- Structural and systemic factors found in the conflict / peace processes;
- Timing factors: escalation, stalemate, de-escalation, termination etc.;
- Procedural factors: visibility, openness, confidentiality, etc.;
- Contextual factors of intra- and inter-party interaction;
- Logistical factors associated with the processes of signaling and beyond;
- Role-based factors associated with leadership / intermediary styles of communication;
- Symbolic factors associated with symbolic gestures and actions;
- Psychological factors based on credibility, personal gains, ambiguities, etc.;
- Behavioral factors based on leadership / intermediary attitudes, credibility etc.; and
- External factors based on influences from the external environment of peacemaking.
Figure 8-3: Channels: Processes - Dynamics - Outcomes
Proposition 8-I:

Successful channeling in Cyprus is likely to lead to a credible and genuine peacemaking process when:

1. genuine, credible and durable chains of communication between GC and TC leaders and their top negotiators are established, maintained and are gradually cleared out from tactical ambiguities, mistrust and miscommunications;

2. chains and links remain confidential and uninterrupted from political polarizations;

3. ground rules, psychological insecurities, fear of exploitation if channel is discovered and other concerns between communicators are addressed during the process;

4. credible concessions and genuine reciprocation takes place during the interaction to convince the senders and receivers that a settlement is within reach; and

5. confidence is reestablished and a level of trust assures both sides that they are ready to initiate substantive talks.

Proposition 8-II:

Intermediaries or 3rd parties can contribute towards a successful channeling and jump-start (and / or sustain) a peacemaking process in Cyprus when they:

1. gain the trust, respect and confidence of the parties at either end of the channel (top leaders and negotiators);

2. unconstraint the process of channeling from possible distortions and obstructions in information and convey messages with clarity;

3. assume responsibility when possible distortions or miscommunication or when emotions are high;

4. are enskilled to reframe and rephrase the arguments in a way to convey the message that an integrative solution is within reach;

5. establish further linkages on issues and aspirations of parties to enable them to continue further with substantive talks; and
6. use problem-solving and conflict resolution techniques to unconstrain communication when parties are entrenched behind their intransigent positions.

8.3 Peacemaking Frameworks: Mediation / Negotiations

The reality of third party interventions in Cyprus is immense. The emotions and perceptions about third party interventions among top leaders in Cyprus are truly perplexing to analyze in one dissertation research. I will focus more on the combined techniques of mediation / negotiation which have been the main methods for a settlement since the 1950s onward and everyone on the island refers to both methods / terms interchangeably. Some of the understanding that exists on the ground about these methods includes:

*Perception I:* Third parties have at times intervened in the talks “to protect either the one or the other side in Cyprus” or to “protect their own interest.” (Emphasis Added - Anonymous Interviews)

*Perception II:* Some were “foreign to the dispute” and had very little “understanding of our [parties’] concerns.” (Emphasis Added - Anonymous Interviews)

*Perception III:* The mediators did not seem to possess fair and neutral attributes towards either party. Some “represented the interest of larger powers such as the UK and the USA.” (Emphasis Added - Anonymous Interviews)

*Perception IV:* “The UN good offices [UN Mediation Team] has at times acted according to their UN mandate” and sometimes according to the “mandate of the UK,
Turkey and the USA” in order to “safeguard their own strategic interests” on the island. (Emphasis Added - Anonymous Interviews)

**Perception V:** Mediators have “their own styles” and the same could be argued about the “United Nations Secretary Generals” that over the years have “applied their own methodologies and styles in trying to settle this problem.” (Emphasis Added - Anonymous Interviews)

**Perception VI:** The UN “doesn’t represent us… it represents the Greek side only which claims to have sovereignty on the entire island…” The UN has always been biased: “we as Cypriots must sit together and solve our problem and we will agree, I am sure about that… and then tell the UN about it.” (Emphasis Added - Anonymous Interviews)

The rhetoric that was mentioned by top leaders in Cyprus above is very significant because all points are making references to particular initiatives, contexts, time frames, behaviors and attitudes, methods, approaches and styles (among other variables) that I am going to build on and make some comparisons between three peacemaking initiatives.

As a starting point, the structure of mediation / negotiation in Cyprus from the 1950s onward resembles various models that were developed over the years that reveal a good sense of understanding of what the frameworks look like on the ground. Below are seven perspectives that could apply to describe some activities of mediation / negotiation processes in Cyprus which I integrate in Figure 8-4:
Perspective I: “An intermediary activity undertaken by a third party with the primary intention of achieving some compromise settlement of the issues at stake between the parties, or at least ending disruptive conflict behavior.” (Mitchell 1981)

Perspective II: “The intervention of a third party who first investigates and defines the problem and then usually approaches each group separately with recommendations designed to provide a mutually acceptable solution.” (Blake and Mouton 1985)

Perspective III: “A form of peacemaking in which an outsider to a dispute intervenes on his/her own or accepts the invitation of disputing parties to assist them in reaching an agreement.” (Douglas 1957)

Perspective IV: “An extension and elaboration of the negotiation process; It [mediation] involves the intervention of an acceptable, impartial, and neutral third party who has no authoritative decision making power to assist contending parties in voluntarily reaching their own mutual acceptable settlement.” (Moore 1986)

Perspective V: “A process by which the participants, together with the assistance of a neutral person or persons, systematically isolate disputed issues in order to develop options, consider alternatives, and reach a consensual settlement that will accommodate their needs.” (Folberg and Taylor 1984)

Perspective VI: “The assistance of a third party not involved in the dispute, who may be of a unique statues that gives him or her certain authority with the disputants; or perhaps an outsider who may be regarded by them as a suitable neutral go-between.” (Spencer and Yang 1993).
Perspective VII: “It is a dynamic and complex social process comprising parties in dispute, a social environment or a context, a particular dispute or problem, and a mediating agent.” (Bercovitch 1996).
Figure 8-4: A Systems Approach to Peacemaking: A Contingency Model
Departing from the above perspectives, I am going to unfold a comparative analysis of three peacemaking frameworks in order to unpack the anatomy of the methods used and their characteristics and highlight the relationship between processes and outcomes. I have developed a set of propositions from this enquiry that can be turned into empirical questions for further research in the future. By using the selection criteria found in Dissimilar Systems Design Methodology (DSDM), I have carefully chosen three peacemaking initiatives from the larger data set that are dissimilar in regards to many variables that I identify, listed in Appendix F, except two: (i) all three produced an agreement (and are the only ones that did among the 41 initiatives that I examined) which collapsed during the post-accord implementation stage and (ii) both sides in Cyprus claimed that the proposed agreement did not satisfy the underlying needs, interests, grievances and aspirations of either one. The three initiatives are: (i) Zurich-London Accords (1959-60), (ii) the Makarios-Denktash Four Point Agreement (1977), and the Kofi Annan Comprehensive Settlement Plan (2004). Appendix F provides a summary of various taxonomies of variables that I have eluded to as departing points in the rest of the chapter for a number of theoretical propositions.

8.3.1 Model I: The Zurich-London Framework

It is conventional to believe that peacemaking in Cyprus is very much synonymous with the work of the United Nations.\textsuperscript{167} The UN involvement in Cyprus is traced back to August 1954 (Faustman 2001; Negatigil 1996).\textsuperscript{168} In particular, from the early 1960s
onward, every UN Secretary General has marked the peacemaking efforts for a political settlement in Cyprus with his own approach and methodology under the auspices of their “good offices” (and sometimes in consultation with influential members of the Security Council).169 A political leader stated in an interview: “UN S-Gs come and go but the problem stays unsettled” (Anonymous Interview). Another one stated:

“We lost 10 years with U-Thant, another 10 with Waldheim and then Cuellar... I think another 10 years were lost there... Following [Cuellar] we lost 10 more years with Boutros-Ghali and 10 more with Annan...not to mention a number of other Don Quixotes [envoys, mediators, diplomats...] from other countries... ” (Emphasis added: Anonymous interview).

The first visible peacemaking framework (mediation / negotiation) can be traced back to early 1959, after the collapse of the Macmillan Plan in late 1958. After a number of failed efforts by Britain to terminate EOKA’s violent insurgency in Cyprus, Harold Macmillan, Britain’s foreign minister at the time, called for a partnership solution between Great Britain, Greece and Turkey at the international level as well as partnership at the communal level between the two larger communities in Cyprus to manage their daily affairs. The initiative collapsed at the pre-negotiation stage due to a seeming divergence of interests among the three parties as to what the endgame solution should look like - every side was insisting on its own maximalist position.

From a slightly different perspective, the initiative kept a channel of communication open between Greece and Turkey, with the foreign and prime ministers meeting sporadically from 1958 (UN General Assembly), until February of 1959, when they examined the possibility of establishing an independent Republic of Cyprus. The
leaderships in Greece and Turkey managed to persuade the leadership of each of the two ethnic groups in Cyprus to refrain from their maximalist positions and look towards a compromise endgame, at least temporarily as militant factions were in a standby mode.

On February 11, 1959, the two Prime Ministers Mr. Karamanlis of Greece and Mr. Menderez of Turkey (shuttle diplomacy with indirect talks via confidential and official links) exchanged a set of three draft proposals: (a) basic structure of the Republic of Cyprus, (b) a Treaty of Guarantee that involved the third partner G.B. and (c) the Treaty of Alliance between all entities involved.170 Momentarily, Greece, in consultation with the Greek Cypriot leadership, refrained from the issue of Union with Greece (at least temporarily) and similarly, across the Aegean Sea, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership refrained from the issue of partitioning the island (at least temporarily).

The MacMillan – Karamanlis – Menderez strategy for peace within the realpolitik paradigm led to a tripartite conference in London a few days later in February of 1959. The structure of the peacemaking negotiations is visualized below as a multilevel negotiations system between Great Britain, Greece and Turkey, which were the main parties according to their paradigm, whereas the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot representatives remained on the periphery with indirect involvement during the talks via parallel channels of communication. The talks led to the “basic structure of the Republic of Cyprus” and eventually to the constitution of Cyprus.
Figure 8-5(a): Framework I: Power Mediation
Table 8-3(a): Characteristics of Mediation Framework 1 – (Power Mediation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels:</th>
<th>Interactions:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary System</td>
<td>A post-colonial /realpolitik paradigm. Tripartite Conference – (Closed System). Power mediation is exercised by G.B. towards Greece and Turkey who had equal statuses during talks. Confidential talks between Greek and Turkish top leaders on the status of Cyprus with influences from the larger System and Sub-Structure 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-System 1</td>
<td>A unidirectional consultative model (consultation with muscle) between the primary actors: Greece and Turkey and the representatives (top leaders) of the ethnic groups: Greek-Speaking and Turkish-Speaking Cypriots. USA presence and NATO consultation with G.B. regarding post-accord apparatus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embedded</td>
<td>Power mediation (mediation with muscle) structure in “consultation” with local communities in Cyprus for a political settlement and a constitutional framework. Chain of communication between primary actors and other populations within sub-structures 3.1 and 3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Structure 1</td>
<td>Primary System and Sub-System are within NATO’s sphere of influence in Eastern Mediterranean Sea. Sub-Structural Models: (i) Consultative: USA-G.B. and (ii) Shuttle Diplomacy / Secret and official Diplomacy: USA-G.B.-Greece-Turkey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Structure 2</td>
<td>Unilateral consultations between: (i) Turkey and Turkish Cypriot Top Leaders and (ii) Greece and Greek Cypriot Top Leaders; In-group consultations on technical matters in parallel with unilateral consultations. Establishment of Joint Commission, Transitional Committee and Joint Committee with regard to accord completion; post-accord transition and post-accord implementation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 and 3.2</td>
<td>Parallel and secret talks between top leaders and accompanying teams: (i) Arc. Makarios and his team; and (ii) Dr. Kutchuk and his team. Channeling of communication between teams and respected elites in Cyprus; Channeling of communication between elites and paramilitaries as well as other constituents.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8.3.2 Model II: Inter-Communal Talks Framework

The Zurich-London Accords opened a new chapter in the history of Cyprus after nearly half a decade of anti-colonial struggle and sporadic incidences of sectarian violence between militant groups. Apparently the lack of decommissioning of arms and the ex-combatant leaders remaining underground unraveled a turbulent post-accord implementation era. Parallel to this, top political elites from Cyprus, who were to undertake new leadership roles in a newly established republic and implement the accords, had instead rendered the constitution unworkable and an anathema to their perceived national cause of separate self-determinations. In addition, a collective grievance was built into the political rhetoric that their needs and interests were marginalized by the power mediation process during the Zurich-London talks, providing them with a reality that they were not mature enough politically to live with a compromise solution based on power sharing.171

Two years into the post-accord implementation partnership, the ruling elites redirected their political aspirations towards their pre-agreement maximalist positions, giving ground to a renewed political and paramilitary escalation of violence between separatist extremists from both communities, thus starting to fragment the web of Cypriot-ness identity. By the early to mid-1960s, the UN was invited to take a more active role in Cyprus (deployment of UNFICYP) to prevent any further escalation of violence on the island parallel to the diplomatic efforts by the USA to diffuse any turbulence on the eastern flank of NATO between Greece and Turkey. (See Chapter 3 - Chronology of Events.)172
From 1963 to mid-1974, there were several initiatives to settle the conflict at the political level with the hope to bring the two political elites on the island back to the partnership for which they were signatories, or as one interviewee put it who was present at the time during the Zurich-London conferences: “We were forced to agree to the accords by our motherland” (anonymous interview). In retrospect, from 1963 to about 1968, the role of the UN was secondary next to a more active Anglo-American presence. Those initiatives included the London Conference (1964), George Ball Initiative (1964), Dean Acheson Initiative (1964), and the Cyrus Vance Initiative (1967). The structure of the Anglo-American peacemaking efforts took place within the paradigms of bi-polarity and realpolitik, resembling the Zurich-London structure to a very large degree. The information was channeled to Greece and Turkey indirectly first before reaching the island via direct and confidential diplomatic channels. The elites in Nicosia were kept informed from Athens and Ankara as envoys and diplomats were crisscrossing the Aegean Sea. In a sense the UN was circumscribed from taking any significant role in those initiatives.

The Anglo-American initiatives were successful in preventing any spillover effects that could have ignited an opportunity for the Soviet block to enter that strategic location that they had already spotted on the map since the late 1940s. On the contrary, all the peacemaking processes undertaken by the USA and UK at the time did not address the root causes and conditions that led to the bi-communal conflict in the first place - a discourse left to the United Nations diplomats to deal with and some early pioneers of conflict resolution.
From 1968 to the first half of 1974, the peacemaking paradigm shifted its orientation to an identity-based approach and included a series of inter-communal (bi-communal) talks between Clerides and Denktash in 1968, followed by a series of inter-communal talks in 1971 and 1972 to early 1974. From this period onward, the inter-communal framework of mediation / negotiation for a political settlement on the island remained an active paradigm that the United Nations capitalized on and eventually incorporated into the mission of “good offices.” The most significant outcomes of the inter-communal talks were the Denktash-Makarios (1977) and Denktash-Kyprianou (1979) framework agreements. Because both processes are nearly identical as frameworks, I am only going to examine the former one for simplicity, depicted below in figure 8-5(b).
Figure 8-5(b): Framework II: Inter-Communal Framework
Table 8-3(b): Characteristics of Mediation Framework II – (Inter-communal Talks)

**Characteristics of Mediation Framework II**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framework</th>
<th>Interactions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary System</strong></td>
<td>The U.N. Mediation team (under the auspices of Good Offices) is channeling proposals between the parties indirectly and confidentially (Indirect Format and Visible).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consultative model of interaction with a bare minimum involvement by UN mediator (Consultative Format: Exchange of Proposals).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-System 1</strong></td>
<td>Direct and open talks (visible) between the top negotiators / representatives: GC side: Arc. Makarios; TC side: Mr. Denktash, (Direct Talks Format).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-System 1 Embedded</strong></td>
<td>Indirect consultations between UN and Greece; and UN and Turkey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indirect consultation between UN and Other Audiences / Affected entities who might catalyze the process towards a breakthrough or apply leverages, rewards and constraints towards a positive direction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Structure 1</strong></td>
<td>Direct and confidential consultations between</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• GC negotiators / top representatives and Greece and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• TC negotiators / top representatives and Turkey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Structure 2</strong></td>
<td>Direct and confidential consultations between each side and advisory teams or top advisors on technical issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Structure 3</strong></td>
<td>Direct and confidential interactions between UN top representatives and mediation team and constituents (UN Assembly, UN Security Council, etc.).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8.3.3 Model III: The Kofi Annan Framework

A main pattern that emerged from the UN’s involvement in Cyprus was that every time there was a change in the UN’s leadership, there was also a change in the approach, methodology, strategy and even the level of personal involvement by Secretary Generals to work with the two sides in Cyprus personally and offer good services. According to a UN official who was involved with the UN good offices in Cyprus for quite some time in the late 90s and early 2000s:

“there is a transferability of information, knowledge and lessons learned from the previous UN efforts to the forthcoming one... we knew what was said before by the parties and the format of the talks ... and we knew a lot about the personalities of the leaders and politics on each side ... we studied all that and we always looked to find new ways to assist the leaders to come to an agreement.” (Anonymous Interview)

Building on more than 40 years of knowledge (1960s-1990s), one initiative after another, the UN’s good offices mission contributed positively to the structure of brokering and maintaining inter-communal talks for a political settlement, even when top elites adopted intransigent positions, maximalist aspirations and showed all sorts of inflexibility. This perpetual involvement also came with criticisms of the UN and in particular a torrent of blame on the work of mediators, special envoys as well as the subsequent Secretary Generals for applying the wrong methodology, as some top leaders in Cyprus have claimed.

Historically and more analytically, the UN has played a very fundamental and practical role in Cyprus, with services ranging from peacekeeping (UNFICYP),
peacebuilding (UNDP programs) and peacemaking, which is the main focus here with a very substantive impact on the mediation / negotiation framework, including:

   (a) getting the parties back to the table after periods of short- / long-term impasses;

   (b) assisting the parties to problem-solve while searching for a compromise settlement;

   (c) networking with regional organizations (EU) and other actors to offer positive incentives to parties to come to the table in good faith;

   (d) recommending that the UN Security Council leverage, encourage, reward or use strong language if needed to bring the parties to the table and help them conceptualize the road en route to lasting and just peace;

   (e) offering recommendations to parties to bridge a common ground in which a settlement can be framed and negotiated;

   (f) unblocking channels of communication;

   (g) juggling between multiple roles according to the needs and the circumstances of each peacemaking process: impartial, neutral, trust builder, reconciler, facilitator, mediator, enskiller, agent of reality, even arbitrator when asked; and

   (h) encouraging external actors such as Greece, Turkey to make concessions.

Lastly, the UN has incorporated peace-building techniques and confidence-building measures to build and sustain official and unofficial efforts for eliminating mistrust and enhance confidence between the negotiating parties and civil society. According to Kofi
Annan: “we now have the method and skills necessary to solve this long standing issue” (Annan 2003). Perhaps the best example, which incorporated all of the above skills, roles, methods and processes in the history of the UN involvement in Cyprus since 1960, was the Kofi-Annan framework, which I illustrate below.
Figure 8-5(c): Framework III: Multi-Systems
Table 8-3(c): Characteristics of Mediation Framework III – (Multi-Systems)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels</th>
<th>Interactions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary System</strong></td>
<td>Indirect and Direct talks between UN mediator (Alvaro de Soto) and top leaders in Cyprus (Clerides-Denktash 2000-2001 indirect talks with direct talks sporadically); Direct Talks between Clerides-Denktash, Papadopoulos-Denktash and Papadopoulos-Talat (2002-2204). Facilitative Model: 2000-2002 Arbitration structure, UN-GC-TC (March /April 2004);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-System 1</strong></td>
<td>Official GC negotiation team and TC negotiation Team without top leaders face-to-face participation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary System Extended</strong></td>
<td>Consultative talks and multi-lateral talks between GC and TC top representatives / negotiators, Greece and Turkey under UN facilitation (March 2004) EU, USA and UK representation regarding post-Accord apparatus. EU-Cyprus accession negotiations and EU Commission consultative involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary System Embedded</strong></td>
<td>UN Mediation Structure with Technical Committees (T.Com.) and Working Groups (WG) with Mediation Team.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Structure 1</strong></td>
<td>Negotiations between members of Technical Committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Structure 2</strong></td>
<td>Negotiations between members of Working Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Structure 1 and 2 Embedded</strong></td>
<td>Unilateral consultations between T.Com., WG and Negotiating team; Turkey’s direct involvement with TC negotiation team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-structure 3</strong></td>
<td>Unilateral Consultation with Greece and Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-structure 4</strong></td>
<td>UN shuttle diplomacy with Greece and Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Structure 5</strong></td>
<td>Consultation between UN mediation Team and USA, UK, EU and other constituents (SC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sun-Structure 6</strong></td>
<td>Back-Channels (Unofficial) between UN mediator and Constituents (GC and TC) and other Audiences.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8.4 Propositions on the Peacemaking Framework for Negotiations in Cyprus

In this last section of the chapter, I integrate the knowledge from the large database of initiatives and the comparative analysis of the three frameworks for negotiation in Cyprus in order to refer to them comparatively and then present a number of propositions in conjunction with a number of theories and empirical examples from the literature on peacemaking. The following three tables provide a close look at the three peacemaking frameworks and their characteristics.

8.4.1 Peacemaking Frameworks and Roles

*Hypothesis 8-1*

*Successful peacemaking (Roles) in Cyprus is likely to lead to a lasting peace when mediators / negotiators*: 

1-(a) arbitration procedures are well defined and agreed upon by all parties;\(^{177}\)

1-(b) consultative / advisory roles (Boutros-Ghali Set of Ideas) are maintained throughout the process by mediators to improve relationships and keep the chain of communication flowing when parties’ level of mistrust towards one another in high;

1-(c) directive roles could be used to leverage inflexible leaders or jumpstart the process after periods of impasse;\(^{178}\)

1-(d) Power Mediation or “mediation with muscle” was effective in getting the parties to the table during times of intense intimidation but less successful in getting the parties to successfully adhere to the outcome, especially when post-accord implementation mechanisms are not in place;

1-(e) mediators have a clear understanding of the intra- / inter-group dynamics and are able to manipulate how constituents and external allies can leverage and constrain / unconstrain the process for making unilateral / reciprocal concessions;
1-(f) mediators can incorporate trust-building and confidence-building measures to improve the decision-making process and cultivate a climate towards reconciliation rather than focusing on cutting in half the distance that separates the two sides;

1-(g) mediators start out with indirect talks first until they explore the degree of readiness for direct face-to-face talks and introduce appropriate procedural structures to facilitate/maintain the dialogue between the two sides until they are ready for substantive talks;

1-(h) maintain impartiality throughout the process;

1- (i) roles must be genuine and irreversible in fulfilling the assigned roles in the search for genuine peace rather than self-interests and factional-interests; and

1- (j) leaders are moderate and are not associated with ex-combatants or other groupings that used violent methods against members of other groups.

8.4.2 Peacemaking Frameworks and Context

_Hypothesis 8-2_

**Successful peacemaking (Context) in Cyprus is likely to lead to a lasting peace when mediators and negotiators:**

2-(a) understand the political party context and the direction with which maximalist and moderate political aspirations could change public opinion;

2-(b) are skilled at reframing and rephrasing the issues at the table;

2-(c) are able to foresee how intra- and inter-political electorate processes could replace top leaders and their negotiation teams;

2-(d) have political aspirations for an endgame solution that are compatible with those of their counterparts;

2-(e) can come to a consensus, or an agreement at least, among elites as to what the parameters for a final solution are;

2-(f) form coalitions in government to gain confidence votes from their constituents; and

2-(g) form an intra-party coalition for an integrated solution that is coherent and supportive of the talks with the party across the table.
8.4.3 Peacemaking Framework and Structure

*Hypothesis 8-3*

**Successful peacemaking (structure) in Cyprus is likely to lead to a lasting peace when:**

3-(a) a structure and closed system of core negotiators / leaders agree on the framework for a solution and then expand the structure to include technical committees and working groups to deal with procedures, norms and other logistics;

3-(b) the structure is open and visible and negotiating parties are made aware about who are the audiences, the constituents and other 3rd parties who might have an interest in the process-outcome;

3-(c) the framework contains several sub-systems and sub-structures that enable negotiators to interact together over longer periods of time to reestablish relationships, lower mistrust and understand each side’s concerns rather than looking to find a quick resolution;

3-(d) indirect talks take place first to prepare the ground for direct talks between top leaders;

3-(f) Individuals who are well trusted by the adversary(ies) are engaged in the structure to make sure that communication flows correctly and reaches the intended recipients unambiguously and uninterruptedly as sometimes cultural factors can lead to unintended consequences; and

3-(g) TC and GC negotiators are not accountable to any parties outside the structure that could spoil the framework if interaction occurs to capitalize on the outcome.

8.4.4 Peacemaking Frameworks and Process

*Hypothesis 8-4*

**Successful peacemaking (Process) by mediators /negotiators in Cyprus is likely to lead to a lasting peace when:**

4-(a) symbolic and moral thresholds become less trivial for parties;
4-(b) time constraints such as timetables to meet the agreement are not rigid but flexible if more time is needed to renegotiate;

4-(c) top leaders retain approval and a confidence vote to continue their work;

4-(d) leaders are respected by the constituents of pro-peace coalitions on the adversary’s side;

4-(e) the process and outcome of the talks are not seen as a plateau in continuing or exacerbating the conflict;

4-(f) dividends are visible and symbolic to constituents on all sides to keep on promoting the idea that an integrated settlement is within reach;

4-(g) there is commitment to the process for a mutual course of action to reach an integrated outcome;

4-(h) there is commitment to the genuine implementation of the agreed outcome; and

4-(i) negotiators they are not accountable to parties outside the peacemaking process that could spoil its direction or capitalize on the outcomes.

8.4.5 Peacemaking Frameworks and Dynamics

*Hypothesis 8-5*

**Successful peacemaking (Dynamics) in Cyprus is likely to lead to a lasting peace when:**

5-(a) perceived power configurations are symmetric and reach a level of equilibrium;

5-(b) conditions of ripeness are conjoint;

5-(c) intensity of conflict is low and parties brainstorm for an integrated solution rather than projecting blame across the table;

5-(d) talks remain confidential within the negotiating parties to avoid any media exposure to media about rivalry between political factions that could precipitate bitter concessions;

5- (e) signaling and preliminary contacts is carried out confidentially and is less visible to opposing factions until they reach a level of acceptance and commitment by top
leaders to start pre-negotiations and prepare their constituents for the endgame solution and what the process might look like; and

5-(f) all stages, from signaling to accord implementation, are transparent to negotiating parties and confidential and unambiguous in order to gain the confidence and trust of the adversary to reciprocate and become a partner in the post-accord implementation stage.

8.4.6 Peacemaking Framework and Behaviors / Attitudes

Hypothesis 8-6

Successful peacemaking (behaviors / attitudes) in Cyprus is likely to lead to a lasting peace when:

6-(a) leaders are not trapped in maximalist and ideological positions that could sidetrack the process;

6-(b) issues become less-salient for leaders and they can make concessions that once were considered too painful to consider;

6-(c) top leaders are in control of opposing factions and are able to engage them on the same strategy for peace;

6-(d) both sides share a common vision and aspirations for an endgame solution;

6-(e) leaders are confronted by perceived conditions of the status quo division which could no longer be realistic to maintain;

6-(f) leaders adopt conciliatory rhetoric (visible / symbolic actions) across division lines to persuade all constituents that a mutual peace agreement is within reach;

6-(g) leaders are not constrained by rhetoric or self-interest in making necessary sacrifices in favor of an integrated and lasting solution;

6-(h) parties’ positions represent a genuine shift in their behaviors and attitudes that this time around they will work more collaboratively for an integrated agreement;

6-(i) leaders are able to contest opposing views from spoilers who are against a mutual strategy for peace with the adversary; and
6-(j) parties are willing to make short-term but genuine sacrifices to capitalize on long-term joint peace dividends in social, cultural and economic terms.

8.4.7 Peacemaking Frameworks and Methods

*Hypothesis 8.7*

*Successful peacemaking (Methods) in Cyprus is likely to lead to a lasting peace when mediators / negotiators:*

7-(a) have a clear vision about their strategies / alternatives for peace and possible tools / mechanisms for implementation;

7-(b) use methods that are clear and represent a genuine will to participate;

7-(c) use methods selected by the parties in an intended manner with the support of 3rd parties and the UN;

7-(d) agree to use various methods if needed to unconstrain the talks once they reach an impasse and avoid a complete breakdown;

7-(e) train participants in conflict resolution and problem-solving methodologies to address insecurities and fears of the other and lower mistrust;

7-(f) use exploratory talks at an earlier stage to prepare for mediation later; and

7-(g) parallel peace-building and track-2 initiatives are supportive of the talks and can prepare the ground to sustain and implement an agreement.

8.4.8 Peacemaking Framework and External Conditions (Exogenous Factors)

*Hypothesis 8.8*

*Successful peacemaking (Exogenous Factors) in Cyprus is likely to lead to a lasting peace when:*

8-(a) negotiating parties seek to join outside organizations for mutual benefit;
8-(b) enticing opportunities are within reach and can render some concerns and fears less salient to either one or all sides;

8-(c) Greek – Turkish elites are in favor of constructive dialogue and are ready to assist the parties in Cyprus to unconstrain their road to peace;

8-(d) foreign envoys and diplomats are invited to assist the parties with their expertise on legal and constitutional matters without having a stake at the outcome of the process; and

8-(e) The UN Secretary General and the Security Council encourage and assist both parties genuinely agreeing to a settlement that can be implemented and guaranteed by the Security Council if needed.
CHAPTER 9

Conclusion - The Search for a Peace Strategy: Hypotheses and Propositions

9. Introduction

In this concluding chapter, I highlight some major aspects of the peacemaking efforts in Cyprus in order to exhibit some theoretical propositions worth pursuing in the future. Other researchers might also use them as stepping-stones toward the development of a more comprehensive version of the theory developed in Chapter 8. My attempt here is twofold: First, I am going to begin by illustrating a few of the main obstacles that block the road to peacemaking in Cyprus based on my observations and research. Second, I am going to illustrate some of the potential value of the peacemaking frameworks and their dynamics that I developed in previous chapters to elucidate their credibility as preliminary theoretical models in the field of peacemaking and within overall theory and practice in the field. All the propositions and/or hypotheses formulated in this dissertation do require careful and longitudinal investigation and, by that, I hope I can bring this knowledge to the agendas of conflict analysts, conflict resolution practitioners and other researchers / scholars who share similar interests and passions in other areas of studies.
9.1.1 Peacemaking Model

Negotiations in settling and terminating the sectarian division in Cyprus constitute a very perplexing political theater with hundreds of intermissions and acts. Choreographers, orchestrators and actors have garnished every cornerstone in the setting. Along the way, the channeling of communication back and forth across the sectarian divide between the so-called “North Cyprus” and “South Cyprus” by top negotiators is often lost in the bravado of the political elites who have their own self-motivated, self-stimulated agendas on this seemingly everlasting theatrical play. What the division has meant for ordinary Cypriots is instantly relayed across the sectarian divide and elicits emotionally charged reactions along a spectrum of collaborative and competitive attitudes: collaborative among proponents for lasting peace and competitive among proponents for lasting separation. Along the margins of the spectrum lies the political and social discourses that are motivated by opposing political factions (political and other entities), all of which claimed to have found the right methods for framing and phrasing the rightfully based endgame solution, as well as the methods needed to reach it. Meanwhile, media coverage from left-to-right and north-to-south amplifies constantly the all-around public discourse and confusion with their own interpretations and attributed explanations.

What follows next? – All of the hypotheses formulated in this dissertation with the aid of the peacemaking framework, figure 9-1 below, require a very careful investigation longitudinally with an eye to improving the processes and outcomes of peacemaking in fragile societies that need to be nurtured urgently in the forthcoming decades to prevent
and provent future Cyprus’ Rwandas and Bosnias. The peacemaking framework has a number of multilayered implications, enabling researchers to:

- conceptualize peacemaking as a start-up process for conciliation;
- understand in what ways internal and external factors might play a role in the process of signaling conciliatory gestures across buffer zones until the process eventually reaches a stage towards post-accord implementation development;
- understand and conceptualize peacemaking as a process, structure and a system of multi-level interactions;
- investigate how top elites, negotiators and third parties may play multiple roles in determining the overall endgame solution in a peace process;
- link micro, meso and macro approaches to peacemaking and highlight the interactions between intra-party decisions and inter-party talks;
- elucidate the triadic interaction between concessions, constraints and leverage in moving the process forward to a breakthrough or an impasse; and
- get a fresher look at the relationship between peacemaking and peace expectations at the intra-party, inter-party and social levels;

In this concluding chapter, I focus on illustrating the potential of the peacemaking model for generating new hypotheses / propositions worth investigating in the near future. The
models are not normative, but are constructed to provide leads and stimulating new ideas for further research questions.
Figure 9-1: A Contingency Peace Process Model
9.2 Obstacles to Peacemaking in Cyprus

The coined term: “Cyprus problem” creates a problem itself. It is a basin that overflows with communicative distortions and defects in all directions. The peace process that aims to settle this same “problem” is nothing other than a web of prolonged processes. Outside the boundaries of these processes, which are colored by legalistic terms, the spectators have little knowledge of what has been transported back and forth via back-channels, top leaders and their negotiators, and intermediaries. Therefore:

Hypothesis 9-1

A peacemaking strategy in Cyprus is likely to lead to a successful peacemaking process when leaders:

- identify and address major holistic obstacles collaboratively.

These obstacles include:

(i) a lack of a shared, consistent, widely held and a genuine vision for an endgame solution;

(ii) reluctance to build and maintain a genuine peacemaking strategy throughout the peacemaking process (including methodology) and not one that is adopted for tactical reasons;

(iii) an a-synchronicity between official peacemaking and unofficial peace-building efforts to produce a contingent and multi-layered peace process;

(iv) the presence of collective ahistoricism and colonization of the peace processes at the top tier of the political pyramid – a social and psychological alienation among proponents in favor of coexistence who are desperately needed to build the blocks for a durable peace process in the near future;
(v) the continuation of structural conditions that feed the honey suckle of the sectarian status quo division in Cyprus that has sustained the foundation of separatist attitudes at the social and political levels;

(vi) an unenthusiastic and prolonged peacemaking process that has been constantly undermining the attitudes and behaviors of proponents in favor of an integrative endgame outcome;

(vii) a cyclical process of frustration, disenchantment and misunderstanding of the public peace process about what has been said, exchanged or accepted or not during talks – a process that has been repeated 41 times thus far;

(viii) a lack of social and political reconciliation within and across physical and identity-based buffer zones;

(ix) the presence of weak leaderships and their failure in removing obstacles en route to lasting peace that could instead raise the bar of realistic peace expectations from the entrenched maximalist positions to a mutually and integrative set of peace dividends;

(x) a seemingly ever present schizophrenic fear that a concession is a sell-out to the other side rather than a building block towards a common future for all Cypriots.

Understanding the obstacles en route to peacemaking is very critical in assessing the prospects and durability of any peacemaking effort to settle any protracted and seemingly intractable conflict. All of these obstacles are not surprisingly new and all fall on the shoulders of top leaders who need to address them mutually in a well-orchestrated interaction that could deepen and broaden their efforts towards an integrative, negotiated peace accord. Peacemaking is more than a process and it goes beyond the simplistic “Cypriot led” and “Cypriot own” principles that Christofias and Talat officially coined in March of 2008 to describe their approach to negotiations.
9.3 A Multi-Layered Approach to Peacemaking

One of the central themes that derive from this dissertation is that a multi-layered peace strategy is needed for Cyprus. One that is visible and transparent and capitalizes on sustaining informed dialogues and interactions at the official and civil layers of the two Cypriot societies; it is necessary to address the root causes and conditions that led to the division of Cyprus in the first place, even if that goes back decades and reconstructs a new discourse where the perceptual expectations and tangible dividends for an endgame solution can be grasped and nurtured by the vast majority of Cypriots.

_Hypothesis 9-2_

A peacemaking strategy in Cyprus is likely to lead to a successful peacemaking process when leaders:

- establish and incorporate a multi-layered perspective between peace-making (layer 1), peace-building (layer 2) and peace-restoring / healing (layer 3) - (see figure 9-1);

- enable the public discourse (layer 3) to incorporate peace-restoring and peace-healing elements into the other two layers of interaction;

- enable third parties and mediators to incorporate their level of expertise in facilitating and integrating peace-restoring and peace-healing elements into the official processes of accord-making, accord-completing and accord-implementing strategies.

Figure 9-2, depicts a multi-layer interaction between political and civil layers in peacemaking. The first layer (layer 1) has been the most dominant discourse in Cyprus
with some sporadic influence from the second layer. Furthermore, peace restoring and peace healing require a set of social, political and structural changes by all parties involved in a peace process. In this figure, I also illustrate a number of discourses that are needed to facilitate the likelihood of making and building peace in Cyprus and elsewhere. For example:

(a) Social reconciliation during the peacemaking process as well as post-accord implementation period is highly needed to lower hatred, mistrust, bitterness and demonization of other Cypriots. Reconciliation is also needed to bring opposing intra-party and inter-party factions to a consensus for a mutually agreed strategy.

(b) Collective healing, like reconciliation, is equally important in dealing with collective wrong doings and crimes that were committed in the 1950s through the 60s and early during the 70s that remain unacknowledged and perpetrators held unaccountable.

(c) Civil liberties, freedoms, and all other forms of transformation are equally necessary ingredients for a successful and durable peace process because the past in Cyprus is neither forgotten nor forgiven in the minds of the people on the island.
Figure 9-2: A Multi-Layered Approach to Peacemaking
Hypothesis 9-3

A peace strategy in Cyprus is unlikely to lead to a successful peacemaking process when:

- top leaders colonize the interaction at layer 1;
- leaders control and manipulate most of the discourse at layer 2 and thus do not enable public pro-peace discourse to become the preferred stakeholder in the process;

9.4 A Contingency Approach to Peacemaking

Another central theme that derives from this dissertation is that in Cyprus what seems to fuel the seemingly everlasting status quo division can be turned into a building block towards a solution for as long as there is an integrated pressure from the bottom up for social change. On the other hand, it is conventional to believe that peacemaking initiatives that are accepted by the majority of the constituents and political leaders on the “one side” are likely to be rejected by the respected majority on the so-called “other side.” This endless cycle of the perpetual peace process is highly affected by the framing and phrasing of the peacemaking process by top elites, which flip flops over periods of time. The lesson learned from the above dynamics leads to the construction of inter-party / intra-party phases on the overall cycle of peacemaking.

The contingent approach to peacemaking (see figure 9-3, below) is principally applicable to illustrating a series of contingent phases that is very likely for negotiating parties in Cyprus and perhaps elsewhere to navigate towards. The figure provides a conceptual structure that can help to account for parties’ strategic choices to enter
peacemaking negotiations, engage each other in a series of pre-negotiations and substantive talks, to finally decide as to whether they can adopt and or implement a negotiated accord successfully or reluctantly.

Hypothesis 9-3(a)

A peace strategy in Cyprus is likely to lead to a successful peacemaking process when leaders:

- capitalize on integrative problem-solving approaches starting from genuine signaling to post-accord implementation and beyond, including:

  (i) genuine willingness to talk and not to do so for simple tactical reasons or for the sake of having talks on how to begin talks;

  (ii) establish preliminary talks on the premises that they are serious this time to move the process forward towards pre-negotiations and substantive talks;

  (iii) engage in substantive negotiations that have clear scope, endgame parameters and integrative problem-solving approaches in order to reach mutual endgame goals; and

  (iv) build an accord that addresses and satisfies everyone’s interests, needs and values so that they can implement it successfully in the years to come.
Figure 9-3: Contingency Model in Peacemaking

Key:

- Negotiation-Process (Breakthroughs)
- Phases of Inter-party Interaction
- Negotiation Process (backwards movement / Impasses)
- Internal and External Factors
Hypothesis 9-3(b)

A peace strategy in Cyprus is unlikely to lead to a successful peacemaking process when leaders:

- focus on building a process without a clear vision as to where it can lead;
- build a peacemaking “process” in the absence of genuine gestures for peace;
- see peacemaking as a process rather than a destination or a journey where seemingly intractable obstacles in the present time could be rendered irrelevant in the future;
- allow temporary impasses or setbacks to become points of contention, intimidation and exploitation by either the one or all sides without a point of return forward;
- perceive and interpret accord implementation and post-accord implementation as the terminal point for reaching an endgame solution.

9.4.1 Contingency Model: Internal and External Factors

One of the perplexities of the contingent model in peacemaking is highlighted through the ever present surroundings that influence the process, as well as the level of willingness among top political leaders in Cyprus and elsewhere to either move forward towards a breakthrough or backwards towards a temporary or a permanent impasse or a breakdown in the interaction. Cypriot top leaders have demonstrated in their 41 repertoires a plethora of factors that provide them with the script to use during and on the sidelines of negotiations.
Hypothesis 9-4(a)

A peace strategy in Cyprus is likely to lead to a successful peacemaking process when leaders:

- are aware of how various internal and external factors could affect their negotiation attitudes and behaviors towards one another, the process at large, and the overall perceptions towards lasting peace by incorporating these factors mutually into a more cooperative approach: These factors include:

(i) negotiation and negotiator-specific factors;

(ii) psychological factors;

(iii) contextual / situational factors;

(iv) process-based and structure-specific factors;

(v) intra-party / inter-party and

(vi) external-party factors or conditions (summarized in Tables 9-I and 9-II below).
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal Factors</th>
<th>Psychological</th>
<th>Contextual</th>
<th>Process &amp; Structure</th>
<th>Intra-Party</th>
<th>Inter-Party</th>
<th>Extra-Party</th>
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<td>Political (in)-Stability</td>
<td>Negotiation Structure</td>
<td>Intra-party Hostility</td>
<td>Status Recognition</td>
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<td>Self / Issues / Other</td>
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<td>Personality, Pressures,</td>
<td>Coding of Messages</td>
<td>Strategies; Use of</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Biases, Visions and</td>
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<td>Options; Negotiating</td>
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<td>Structural Conditions</td>
<td>Ext. Mediation</td>
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<td>Collective History</td>
<td>Encouraging Opportunities</td>
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<td>Decision-Making</td>
<td>External Events</td>
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<td>Leadership Changes</td>
<td>Uncertainties, Heroism</td>
<td>Timetables, Conditions</td>
<td>Multi-level interaction</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mechanisms,</td>
<td>Constructive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...etc...</td>
<td>...etc...</td>
<td>Encouraging Reciprocation</td>
<td>Inside / Outside Negot.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pro-Peace Civil</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| ...etc...                            | ...etc...       | Low / High Context | Breakthroughs, | ...etc... | Peace Initiatives | ...etc... |

Table 9-1: Contingency Model - Internal and External Factors
**Table 9-2: Cyprus Peacemaking Processes: Internal and External Factors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Case-Specific Characteristics Impacting the Peacemaking Process and Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Negotiator and Psychological</strong></td>
<td>Moral commitment to maintain “national / ethnic cause;” psychological insecurities and fear of an attack; seeking revenge and punishment; moral recommitment and shift in attitudes; party perceptions and misconceptions; moral commitment to heroism and lost properties; lack of reconciliation and build-up of blame; demonized images of the other; lack of empathy and healing; return of missing persons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contextual and Situational</strong></td>
<td>Escalation of violence prior to independence in 1960 (1955 DI); bi-communal violence in the early-mid 60s (Ball and Acheson Initiatives); Greek Junta and Turkish military interventions in 1974 (Vienna Conference; Vienna Talks); perceived stalemate (1957 HP); local containment (1958 MP); internal incentives; demographic changes – Turkish Nationals residing in TRNC; persistence of status quo separation and impact on younger generations living in separation; disruption of social, cultural and educational relationships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Process / Structure (Mediation - Negotiation)</strong></td>
<td>Tripartite conference without the active participation of Cypriots (1955 EP); secret talks (1956 HP; 1956 RP); confidence-building measures approach (1992-1994); power mediation; consultative mediation; arbitration level of concessions offered; indirect talks and shuttle diplomacy; proximity talks; direct talks; backchannels (Annan Plan); presence of foreign diplomats / experts; genuine vs. tactical strategies for talks; presence of domestic/external constraints; use of negotiations leverage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intra-party Dynamics</strong></td>
<td>Build-up of party constituencies that are in favor of and/or against an initiative; level of dividends offered / promised; changes in party leadership; leadership personality; build-up strategies and tactics for revenge; party politics that are mythicized and are incompatible with existing realities; proponents in favor of nationalistic agendas vs. proponents in favor of moderate agendas; hostile attitudes toward other parties; contentious attitudes towards the other; solidarity and fragmentation towards an endgame solution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inter-party Dynamics</strong></td>
<td>Bi-communal violence (inter-communal talks 68-91; 72-74); changes in leadership (Makarios-Denktash; Kyprianou-Denktash; Vassiliou-Denktash; Clerides-Denktash; Papadopoulos-Denktash; Papadopoulos-Talat; Christophias-Talat Talks); changes in party positions: unitary state, (loose vs. strong) federation, confederation, separation, status quo division (various initiatives); level of inter-party talks behind the scenes and their level of cooperation; hostile attitudes between parties; disruption of political communication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Extra-party Dynamics</strong></td>
<td>De-colonization process; national polarizations and incidents of violence between Greece and Turkey; use of leverages; external incentives: (US support; EU monetary support) aversion of mutual catastrophe between Greece and Turkey (Ball and Vance Initiat.); collapse of bi-polarity; UN Security Council dynamics and UN SC resolutions; international courts for the protection of human rights.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Hypothesis 9-4(b)

A peace strategy in Cyprus is unlikely to lead to a successful peacemaking process when leaders:

- are speculative about how various sets of internal and/or external factors could strengthen their positions, self-interests, negotiation attitudes and behaviors towards the so-called other side, and the process at large;

- elucidate with paroxysm about the presence of catalysts that could otherwise turn the process forward and could be used to build a capacity in favor of an integrative solution;

- recommit themselves from a joint strategy for peace designed by previous top leaders to a more egocentric mode of interaction; and

- have a short-sighted vision on how a joint momentum for peace can be cultivated as circumstances are in constant flux.

Hypothesis 9-4(c)

A peacemaking strategy in Cyprus is likely to lead to a successful peacemaking process when 3rd party mediators/intervenes:

- take impartial stances with regard to the peacemaking process and its outcome and abstain from making comments that could spoil negatively the use of internal and other external factors;

- perform their roles and tasks well by assisting the parties to

  (i) eliminate mistrust and build trust in the process and across layers of interaction

  (ii) establish confidence-building measures;

  (iii) eliminate ambiguities;

  (iv) keep the flow of communication unobstructed.
- Arranging for the use of the best-qualified expertise to examine additional evidence and analyze the needs of the participants about how to move the process forward without jeopardizing the integrated interests and needs of the negotiating parties.

- Informing all the sides in the talks to reconsider the implications of various internal and external variables that could catalyze and/or drive the negotiations process towards a setback or impasse.

- Must use the best-qualified personnel to analyze the functions of screening various sets of internal/external variables and the degree to which they could influence the process of talks and thus maintain:

  (i) Verification of information;

  (ii) Monitoring and observation of what has been agreed upon;

  (iii) Enable discussion of the emergence of new information; and

  (iv) Maintain a collaborative problem-solving approach.

9.4.2 From Signaling to Post-Agreement Implementation

Accord completion and implementation are perhaps the most puzzling aspects of the peacemaking process in Cyprus. At any given time, a peacemaking process can unravel for many reasons. The synopsis of the 10 obstacles that are mentioned at the beginning of this chapter are examples of roads any peace accord could go down rather easily and Cypriots have witnessed this first hand during the post-independence years, including:

- Lack of mechanisms in monitoring the agreement;
- Lack of building conflict resolution mechanisms to address their concerns constitutionally;
- A series of alleged constitutional violations and counter political and paramilitary recriminations;
- Presence of ambiguities;
and counter interpretations of constitutional treaties and communal legal rights; and power structures that were in place from colonial times to the Greek-Turkish confrontational politics.

This section provides a closer look at the peacemaking process and its dynamics, from early signaling to post-accord completion / implementation phases. The three figures, 9-4(a); 9-4(b) and 9-4(c) unpack further the relationship between:

- the starting process of a peacemaking initiative;
- the sequence from signaling to preliminary contacts and beyond, figure 9-4(a);
- the sequence from pre-negotiations to substantive negotiations, figure 9-4(b);
- the sequence from accord completion / implementation to post-accord completion / implementation, figure 9-4(c).

**Hypothesis 9-4.2(a)**

*A peace strategy in Cyprus is likely to lead to a successful peacemaking process when leaders:*

- Accommodate peacemaking initiatives on the basis that a “no solution” to the Cyprus problem is no longer an affordable solution and that they can nurture it until it becomes a robust one;

- enable several well qualified personnel / analysts from within and outside the group to provide their expert opinions about

  (i) the real intentions of the initiative;

  (ii) the sender’s coding and decoding intentions;
(iii) the sources and characteristics of the initiative; and the
(iv) internal / external context of which the initiative is a part.

- Enable backchannels to keep and maintain the chains of communication unobstructed from ambiguities and possible strategic / tactical exploitation from intra- and or inter-party politics;

- Elicit discussion at the in-group and public discourse about how the peacemaking initiative is worth accepting as a framework for further talks and in return:

  (i) make a reassuring commitment to work and contribute collaboratively towards pre-negotiations and beyond;

  (ii) a proposed endgame solution is contingent on a process of direct / indirect and continuous communication between the two sides; and

  (iii) work constructively to address negative consequences that might have been overlooked initially but might eventually arise again to overwhelm the parties and /or the gradual momentum.

**Hypothesis 9-4.2(b)**

A peace strategy in Cyprus is unlikely to lead to a successful peacemaking process when leaders:

- make a unilateral decision to drop a peacemaking initiative from further consideration before it is even proposed to the intra-party ranks of political and legal experts due to the fear of exploitation from their political rivals or the initiator of the initiative;

- expect that the proposed initiative will meet all the objectives that need to be attained in order to get to the table again;

- change the assumptions and expectations under which talks were once started to reflect changes in position and strategies that are not matched or accepted by other local factions or counter-negotiators;
- express skepticism that every initiative is a tactical move to entrap them into a process of no return or of unacceptable contingencies to maneuver across;

- make noticeable the most theoretically detrimental consequences of a peacemaking initiative to convey glowing images of potential “sell-outs” that could possibly result from what they (leaders and constituents) could interpret as endgame outcomes;

- manipulate in-group discussions as to what other options might be viable alternatives to peace;

- are replaced by more intransigent ones and thus the time invested / work committed into a strategy for peace has been abandoned, including:
  
  (i) ripeness and readiness conditions;
  
  (ii) timing and time constraints;
  
  (iii) time / human energy exhaustion;
  
  (iv) organizational and 3rd party resource exhaustion;
  
  (v) overstretching enticing opportunities for a settlement;
  
  (vi) apparent motivations at the political and public spheres; and
  
  (vii) internal / external supporters of previous attempt.

- persistently resist considering alternative propositions and bridging the gap between constructive assumptions from across the table and from what is also taking place at the grassroots level.

- change their apparent motivations as the process moves forward and cooperation diminishes.

_Hypothesis 9-4.2(c)_

_A peacemaking strategy in Cyprus is likely to lead to a successful peacemaking process when 3rd party mediators / interveners:_

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- remain committed and engaged during the process and phases of the talks as well as once the accords are completed and the parties work towards post-accord implementation;

- develop a set of possible alternative propositions to keep the parties exploring new possibilities for a solution;

- facilitate and intermediate the process towards a breakthrough from one phase of interaction to the next;

- amalgamate intra-party divisions that could possibly hinder the inter-party talks and build relationships across division lines;

- facilitate the sequence of interaction within a range of frameworks, functionalities, structures and roles including:

  (i) proximity talks;

  (ii) behind the scenes /secret talks;

  (iii) shuttle diplomacy and back channel diplomacy;

  (iv) facilitated dialogues;

  (v) face-to-face talks;

  (vi) bilateral /multilateral talks; and

  (vii) working group /technical committee chairing, etc.

- monitor the process and bridge the gaps towards finding integrated outcomes; and

- secure and monitor the post-accord implementation process with the ability to use leverage, constraints and other methods to prevent negative attitudes from building up.
Exteral Actors: Functions and Roles

Intra-Party Politicking and Public Preparedness

Other Internal and External Factors

External Context

Source(s)

Mediation Structure: Functions & Roles (Chain of Communication)

Catalysts/ Leverages/ Concessions/ Constraints

Decision to Continue Further

Preliminary Contacts and Talks on How to Begin Talks

Towards Preliminary Talks

Sender: Peacemaking Initiative and Channeling of Signals

Exploring Willingness & Preparedness to Talk: Party Initial Positions

Decision to (Re)examine Current Course of Actions

Decision to Engage in Official (T–T) Meetings Secretly or Openly

Target(s) Evaluation

Decisions to Reject / Modify Initial Proposals

Presence of Backchannels: (i) Official / Unofficial; (ii) Direct / Indirect; (iii) Parallel; (iv) Secret / Visible

Internal Context

Characteristics

Intentions

Type

Internal and External Actors: Functions and Roles

External Actors: Functions and Roles

Internal and External Factors

Figure 9-4(a): Inter-Party Sequence of Interactions
Internal/External Factors: (Foreign Interests); (UN Security Council); (Context); (Greco-Turkish Relations); (Economic Sanctions);

Setting the Agenda (issues...)

Type of Talks

Structure Of Talks

Intentions of Mediators/ Negotiators

Internal / External Factors: (Context; Civil Society; Intra-party Coalitions; Structural Changes in Parties; Public / Social Media; NGOs; Restoring Confidence: Eliminating Mistrust; Psychological Changes in Parties)

Evaluation / Decisions to reject or modify proposals: Structure, Type, Agenda of Talks

Decision to Formulate an Agreed Framework or Basis of an Agreement

Toward Accord Completion

Preparation of Constituents to Accept / Reject Proposed Accord

Unofficial, Multi-Track Peace-Building

Tactical / Strategic Use of Leverages, Concessions and Constraints

Decision to Continue with Substantial Negotiation

Decision to disengage / terminate

Back-Channel Diplomacy

Triggering Events & Enticing Opportunities

Figure 9-4(b): Pre-Negotiations to Substantive Negotiation
Figure 9-4(c): Accord Completion to post-Accord Implementation
9.4.3 Concessions, Constraints and Leverages

Peacemaking in Cyprus is a necessary but a very insufficient process for the inauguration of any phase or sequence of interactions between top leaders whether that is signaling or accord completion / implementation. The initiation and/or existence of a peacemaking process does not guarantee any results by itself, other than if the optimum goal is to establish some sort of a process but without necessarily the peace element in it. Cypriot top elites have demonstrated very well that not every peacemaking initiative is seized and turned into a sequence of interactions.

In retrospect, peacemaking initiatives are predictive by providing indicators at which to identify the elements necessary to either continue further with talks or move backwards to a previously agreed state of affairs. Cypriots do need the assistance of impartial third parties who can develop the necessary conditions to catalyze the process towards an integrative outcome, leverage parties to move forward in the talks, constrain the parties from trying to be inactive, and persuade them to make concessions in order to turn their process into a peacemaking one. This section offers a number of hypotheses / propositions on the triadic relationship between concessions, constraints and leverage as well as the rate at which they can be accelerated, decelerated or even inactivated due to the injection of catalysts into the process.

_Hypothesis 9-4.3_

* A peace strategy in Cyprus is likely to lead to a successful peacemaking process when leaders and 3rd parties:
- understand the ever-present interaction between concessions, constraints and leverage and develop a multi-layer discourse to overcome the obstacles they levy and to set a course towards a lasting peace;

- understand the presence of positive catalysts (peace promoters, enticing circumstances and prospects) and negative catalysts (negative spoilers, possible dangers) and develop a thrust necessary to overcome slow or stagnant momentum towards a sustainable peace process.

Below is a depiction of the revised peacemaking model with the triadic relationship between concessions, constraints and leverage being a core theme that can catalyze the sequence of efforts for a lasting peace.
Table 9-3 below is a 3x3 (matrix) propositional design that can stipulate further investigation in the triadic relationship among concessions, constraints and leverages that extends a bit beyond the scope of this dissertation but is worth mentioning here.
Table 9-3: Types of Concessions, Constraints and Leverages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(Type of Concessions)</th>
<th>Issue-Specific</th>
<th>Process-Specific</th>
<th>Outcome-Specific</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concessions</td>
<td>Tactical, Strategic and Integrative</td>
<td>Tactical, Strategic and Integrative</td>
<td>Tactical, Strategic and Integrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constraints</td>
<td>Intra-party, inter-party and extra-party</td>
<td>Intra-Party, inter-Party and extra-Party</td>
<td>Intra-Party, inter-Party and extra-Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leverages</td>
<td>Normative, Positive and Negative</td>
<td>Normative, Positive and Negative</td>
<td>Normative, Positive and Negative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I: Concessions

**Working Definition**: A concession in this dissertation refers to moves and countermoves parties offer or reciprocate to each other during a reconciliatory process. The intentions of the initiators can be classified as tactical, strategic and integrative moves and can be rated as issue-specific, process-specific and outcome-specific.

**Hypothesis 9-4.3(a)**

A peace strategy in Cyprus is likely to lead to a successful peacemaking process when leaders:

- make / offer concessions to refrain from further intimidation and exasperation and in return interpret the counter moves as steps closer to an integrative Pareto endgame frontier;

- offer concessions that are symbolic, significant, recognizable and reciprocal;
- make concessions in good faith and not only for tactical and strategic purposes; and

- reframe and rephrase the seemingly incompatible and intractable issues that arouse political entrenchment and emotional self-defensiveness and offer their constituents a fresh perspective towards an integrative endgame that will allow for concessions to be made constructively and collaboratively.

**Hypothesis 9-4.3(b)**

*A peace strategy in Cyprus is unlikely to lead to a successful peacemaking process when leaders:*

- perceive and interpret tactical and/or strategic concessions on a spectrum between defeat and victory, a continuation of an ever present defeating mentality; and

- miscalculate the timing of conceding moves and countermoves and could spiral up the intensity of emotional reactions to the overall peacemaking process and spoil the search for an endgame solution.

**Hypothesis 9-4.3(c)**

*A peace strategy in Cyprus is likely to lead to a successful peacemaking process when 3rd party mediators / interveners:*

- are able to provide a clear-cut set of objectives and persuade the negotiating parties that a unilateral concession will not be exploited or even be proved false;

- bring attention to mutually reasonable grounds and not simply empty reassurances that what has been offered will be honored and implemented;

- develop a range of mutually acceptable parameters for an integrative solution and walk the parties step-by-step to reach that without making concessions appear too harsh to promote to their constituents.
II: Constraints

Working Definition: A constraint in this dissertation refers to at least three types of controls that can be exercised within or from outside (intra-party, inter-party, and external) the peacemaking process from the very early stages of pre-signaling and beyond.

Hypothesis 9-4.3(d)

A peace strategy in Cyprus is likely to lead to a successful peacemaking process when leaders:

- eliminate the constraints mutually, gradually and reciprocally by changing the sources, attitudes and conditions that are producing them in the first place and longitudinally;

- apply and accept the use of constraints as necessary conditions to attain other essential objectives on substantive issues that could lead the process towards an integrative solution; and

- are aware of the intended and possibly unintended consequences of persisting constraints and trade them off with substantively reasonable concessions.

Hypothesis 9-4.3(e)

A peace strategy in Cyprus is unlikely to lead to a successful peacemaking process when leaders:

- perceive constraints to be unbalanced, pressuring and unfair;

- use constraints or leverage for their own purpose to attain other objectives without offering alternative trade-off options to their counterparts;
constrain themselves into self- or group-based ideological and other methodological traps that make it impossible for them to develop exit strategies or strategies towards peace.

Hypothesis 9-4.3(f)

A peace strategy in Cyprus is likely to lead to a successful peacemaking process when 3rd party mediators / interveners:

- use constraints to persuade and keep parties focused on the process and make it less likely for them to abandon the process for tactical or strategic reasons;
- use constraints to prevent the visible and/or secret work of negative spoilers from taking the peacemaking process to “six feet” below ground;
- constrain parties from elaborating upon dreadful hesitations evoked by the use of internal and / or external leverage that could make dangers for a relapse of violence, with intimidation appearing more apparent;
- address and eliminate the constraints by altering the objectives and intentions that make it salient in the first place to open up the route to a more sustaining peacemaking process.

III: Leverage

Working Definition: A leverage in this dissertation refers to at least three types of influence: normative, positive and negative that can drive the peacemaking process, and the sequence of interaction towards an integrative momentum for lasting peace or an impasse (temporary or permanent).

Hypothesis 9-4.3(g)

A peace strategy in Cyprus is likely to lead to a successful peacemaking process when leaders:
- have a clear understanding about the presence of inside and outside sources of leverage, their potential use and the influences / pressures they can have on the sequence of integration, the momentum of the talks and the overall peace process;

- avoid the deployment of negative leverage that could easily paralyze the process, the interaction, the outcome and the overall 3rd parties’ level of willingness for continuing to offer their good services;

- capitalize on the use of positive leverage (mutual allies, international / regional organizations, audiences and constituents) to lower the level of action / involvement by negative spoilers from any source that might strike against the overall likelihood of the peace process;

- employ leverage to control factional power struggles that can hinder the prospects of the peacemaking process or the overall peace process; and

- practice leverage wisely to counteract possible use of threats that could derail the process for tactical or strategic reasons.

**Hypothesis 9.4.3(h)**

*A peace strategy in Cyprus is unlikely to lead to a successful peacemaking process when leaders:*

- routinely apply their internal leverage to convince their constituents and audiences that a proposed deal contradicts the mission, philosophy, objectives of the land that they and their ancestors have shed their blood for; and

- activate external leverage to derail the process slowly while searching for an exit strategy from the talks without being the foci for direct blame once termination is reached.

**Hypothesis 9.4.3(i)**

*A peace strategy in Cyprus is likely to lead to a successful peacemaking process when 3rd party mediators / interveners:*

- customize their leverage to provide a reasonable and persuasive spectrum of what could be interpreted as a favorable as well as unfavorable set of endgame
solutions so that the negotiating parties refrain from materializing what could be a worse-case scenario for them;

- make a procedural use of timetables and time pressures to keep parties concentrated on the peacemaking process and at the same time show some degree of time flexibility if needed to buy time and permit parties to bring their constituents and opposing factions onboard towards accepting / endorsing a negotiated deal;

- can restore exaggerated use of leverage and manipulation that is spread / validated by top elites and leaders on the basis that their side has been pushed and battered in the corner or been (re)victimized;

- can provide impartial and sound reasons to the groups that fair use of leverage is more probable for moving the process towards a mutually peaceful arrangement that all agree to implement and live with;

- make salient the presence of sources of positive and/or negative leverage / influence / stress when necessary, and the potentially impacting consequences for the overall peace process;

- deploy leverage and constraints to induce “negative spoilers,” “perpetrators” or even inflexible / intransigent leaders to shift from their persistently unrealistic or conformity demands; and

- permit sources of normative leverage (gradual, contingent or condition application of leverages) to be part of a complementary system that allows for possible rewards and constraints to be implemented.

9.5 Searching for an Integrative Outcome

The phrase “integrative solution” in Cyprus is ambiguous, and many top political leaders find themselves constrained in advocating for it. Searching for an integrative outcome means moving beyond compromise and towards collaboration. It is uncommon in Cyprus for top leaders to cross the divide and address the “so-called other Cypriots” and ask
them some very simple questions, such as: “What can I do to convince you that the next time we try for a political settlement we will not fail you and that we will make your concerns our first priority?” or how about “We have faith in you and you should have faith in us because we try for the best of Cyprus and all of its people.”

Making peace in Cyprus requires moving beyond a compromise set of options and beyond the same story that has been repeated 41 times that goes something like: “You get this village on the map and I get the other one if you also agree to offer XYZ.” This approach divides Cypriots rather than unites them. Figures 9-5(a) and 9-5(b) below depict some of the theoretical and propositional dimensions of the status quo division, the compromise possibility frontier and integrative possibility frontier curves.
Party A
High-Desire
For an Integrative Outcome (Mutual)
# of Issues
Low Self-Desire

Party B
Low Self-Desire
# of Issues
High Desire for an Integrative (Mutual) Outcome

Figure 9-5(a): Pareto Frontier and Peace Dividends
Hypothesis 9-5(a)

A peace strategy in Cyprus is likely to lead to a successful peacemaking process when leaders:

- adjust their course of action from a compromising endgame to an integrative one;
- signal their genuine intentions / desires to work collaboratively with one another and reach a mutual set of peacemaking dividends within the Pareto Frontier;
- are seeking the assistance of internal and external parties to unconstraint their perceived set of self-desires for a one-sided solution;
- mutually and gradually reciprocate each other’s moves and countermoves towards both a self and other high desire set of peacemaking dividends.

Figure 9-5(b): Pareto Frontier and Status Quo Frontier

Figure 9-5(b): Pareto Frontier and Status Quo Frontier

Figure 9-5(b): Pareto Frontier and Status Quo Frontier
Hypothesis 9-5(b)

A peace strategy in Cyprus is unlikely to lead to a successful peacemaking process when leaders:

- are not challenged by the diminishing returns of the status quo division;
- entrench their negotiation strategies into a self-desired mode rather than a mutually-desired approach; and
- constrain each side from a reciprocal interaction of moves and countermoves for an integrative set of peacemaking dividends.

Hypothesis 9-5(c)

A peace strategy in Cyprus is likely to lead to a successful peacemaking process when 3rd party mediators / interveners:

- undertake visionary roles that undertake defensive / defeating arguments by either party in the talks and broaden the visibility of options outside the compromise range and towards an integrative Pareto possibility curve;
- convince parties about the range of mutually satisfactory endgame possibilities and their return rate of increasing dividends towards the stakeholders;
- incorporate resources and secure incentives from credible external and internal patrons that can encourage parties to reexamine their positions and recognize the potentials within a new Pareto frontier range;
- provide reassurances that peace dividends are within reach, realistic and not imaginary, but contingent on a mutual and reciprocal sequence of interaction; and
- redirect the attention of leaders away from seemingly intractable issues (at least temporarily) by shifting to areas where common ground can be achieved and where dividends are more visible and within reach in order to build a positive momentum and tackle the toughest issues incrementally or in linkage with other issues where possible ranges of tradeoffs can be made.
9.6 Endgame Solution

A peacemaking process in Cyprus is nowadays more synonymous with the word “process” than “peace” and metaphorically refers to procedural norms, methods, sequences, dynamics, etc. For example, peacemaking is seen as “a process on how to start a process,” “a process for the sake of process,” “a process on what to include in the process,” and “for how long should the process last,” “what direction should it take,” “who should have control of it,” and so on and so forth. In retrospect, there is more emphasis on the process than on peace as a journey or a destination and for that journey to happen, there are a few deep-rooted impediments that need to be addressed satisfactorily.

![Diagram of Intensity: Inter-communal Violence](image)

**Figure 9-6: Eliminating Mistrust**

(Scale is for Illustrative Purposes)
Hypothesis 9-6(a)

A peace strategy in Cyprus is likely to lead to a successful peacemaking process when leaders and 3rd parties:

- endeavor to lower the level of mistrust throughout the introduction of political and social measures for restoring confidence;

- address political animosity, hatred, and hostility and transcend the political and social discourses; and

- allow civil society to take actions to lower mistrust and unconstrain the challenges that political elites are faced with due to the presence of extremely antagonistic and polarized environments.

Hypothesis 9-6(b)

A peace strategy in Cyprus is unlikely to lead to a successful peace process when leaders:

- fail to incorporate genuine confidence-building measures to lower post-violent conflict thresholds of mistrust;

- continue to stockpile mistrust and fear on the basis that the other side can never be trusted again;

- fail to build social and political conditions where hatred, animosity and demonization of the so-called other are removed from all social and education discourses; and

- prohibit multi-track efforts from taking place freely across the divide.

9.7 Peace Expectations and Dividends

One commonality between top elites across the barbed wire divide in Cyprus is that, after nearly 40 years of talks, they have overestimated their ability to persuade each other to
resume genuine peace talks. The intentions of top leaders within the paradigm of UN
good offices (mediations/ negotiations), predominantly speaking, remain tactical in
nature and serves as a default mechanism. Several analysts of the “troubles” in Cyprus
have characterized the conflict as an “intractable” case and there is a lot of value to that
statement as much as there is value to my argument that the overall peace process is
seemingly “intractable.”

Over the last four decades, both sides have found themselves (i) tangled within
political environments, (ii) nurtured by social, militant and political coalitions and (iii)
challenged by divisions within their respected communities where it is very hard for them
to start engaging in a meaningful conversation. In retrospect, 41 peacemaking initiatives
did not produce the kind of a breakthrough that they envisioned and if for a moment they
had anticipated their real obstacles to lasting peace, they might not have raised peace
expectations so high. Of all the obstacles to lasting peace, the worst is the constant
crushing of collective hope among proponents in favor of an integrative solution. In this
dissertation, I distinguish between four models of peace expectations:

**Model I: Rising Peace Expectations (RPE) Hypothesis**: As the individual and /or
collective level of perceived peace expectations is rising at about a similar rate as the
expected dividends are becoming more detectable, it is very likely that the perceptibility
diminished rate of return that the current status quo division is delivering can be
circumvented. Therefore, the more visible and tangible the dividends are to the pro-peace
stakeholders, the more likely it is for leaders to search for a more integrative endgame solution or vice versa;

![Diagram of Model II: False Expectations (FE) Hypothesis]

*Figure 9-7(a): Rising Peace Expectation*

**Model II: False Expectations (FE) Hypothesis:** Peacemaking processes that fail over time to create a steadily but also rising momentum of collective hope that this time around the process will finally lead to lasting peace, will in return make the current status quo division to be ostensibly persistent. Therefore, it is very unlikely for top leaders to capitalize on peace dividends that are in constant flux, can be exploited by their
opposition parties or counter negotiators and have very little incentive to offer that the current status quo division is no longer tolerable.

Figure 9-7(b): False Expectations
**Model III: Stalled Expectations (SE) Hypothesis**: Peacemaking initiatives / processes that focus more on building a process than conditions for lasting peace are very unlikely to produce any tangible dividends other than imaginary or symbolic ones. From this perspective it is apparent that third parties can play a number of roles and functions to prevent an everlasting and sustainable stalemate unless the negotiating parties agree mutually that the status quo division does indeed create sufficiently acceptable conditions for keeping things as they are at the current stage.

*Figure 9-7(c): Stalled Expectations*
Model IV: Diminishing Expectations (DE) Hypothesis: Peacemaking initiatives / processes that offer better alternatives to the status quo division and at the same time offer some widely accepted dividends from the early phases of interaction and onward are very likely to increase hopes across the divide that this time is the right moment they have been waiting for years. However, if top leaders fail to build on this momentum for obvious reasons, either because they fail to produce a breakthrough in the talks or are bombarded by their opposition for yielding too much to the demands of the so-called other side, they are very likely to start observing diminishing expectations.

Figure 9-7(d): Diminishing Expectations
Hypothesis 9-7(a)

A peace strategy in Cyprus is likely to lead to successful peacemaking process when:

- the overall level of peace expectations and dividends are both genuine and visible to ordinary Cypriots whose lives would be affected if a peacemaking deal was reached between top leaders across the divide;

- the perceived dividends from a peacemaking accord are greater than the current valued dividends of the status quo division;

- the perceived value capabilities of the sectarian status quo division are no longer fulfilling the daily needs of each community behind fences; and

- rising expectations at the civil level for lasting peace are realistically matched and addressed at the official level of the accord implementation process.

Hypothesis 9-7(b)

A peace strategy in Cyprus is unlikely to lead to a successful peacemaking process when:

- false expectations - that is the gap between the perceived status quo division and the overall levels of perceived peace expectations (PPE) and perceived dividends (PD) – are embedded into the political peacemaking rhetoric, framing and phrasing of the parameters for an endgame solution;

- leaders and mediators set the bar for peace expectations high enough to the point that they can no longer deliver or mutually agree to a deal that can deliver;

- perceived dividends are not materialized into genuine gestures of social (re)conciliation, that is, signposts towards lasting peace;

- perceived dividends from the current status quo division outweigh the ambiguously defined peacemaking dividends;

- perceived peace expectations and dividends are stalled or even diminished due to the prolonged and tiring peacemaking process;
- the perceived status quo division can provide better security and satisfaction of daily needs / necessities than a perceived challenging implementation of an ambiguous peacemaking accord and its alleged dividends; and

- leaders overestimate their ability to deliver to their constituents what they have agreed to at the table.

Hypothesis 9-7(c)

A peace strategy in Cyprus is likely to lead to a successful peacemaking process when 3\textsuperscript{rd} party mediators / interveners:

- frame themselves as agents of reality, among other roles, in clarifying between false expectation and real dividends from a proposed deal;

- persuade internal parties about mutually (self and or other) satisfactory peace expectations and dividends in contrast to possible ambiguities and false hopes;

- engage the civil society in a public discourse regarding real peace expectations to foster public support in favor of a lasting peace that satisfies their interests and needs;

- persuade external donors to assist and invest in the future of a peace process, fund post-accord implementation projects and provide additional reward-based incentives and dividends to move beyond the current perceived conditions that feed and maintain an ostensibly sustainable status quo discourse;

- perform post-accord implementation functions and roles to enable parties to reach their mutual range of Pareto outcomes that maximizes their level of expectations and dividends; and

- adopt short-to-long term actions to alter stalling or diminishing expectations, held at large within civil society, and among top leaders who might have already lost faith in trying once more to get things right.
9.8 Conclusion

All of the hypotheses / propositions presented in this concluding chapter were derived from the analysis of the 41 peacemaking initiatives in Cyprus (1955-2011) and appear to be probable in light of existing research findings on peacemaking dynamics, processes and outcomes. There is no doubt, however, that none of them has been sufficiently investigated, hence more empirical research is needed. Nevertheless, I personally regard them as tentative propositions about peacemaking dynamics in starting up and maintaining successful peace processes wherever, according to Edward Azar and John Burton, protracted social conflicts (PSC) are occurring, for example in Cyprus, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland and Israel – Palestine.

There is a degree of skepticism, and the readers must be aware of it surrounding the possible prescriptive inferences from the above propositions as well as the ones mentioned throughout the chapters in this dissertation about what leaders and third parties should do or not do to improve the likelihood of relative success of a peacemaking initiative. There is a very large literature on peacemaking and leadership and some propositional inferences might have some degree of transferability and only through further research and practice can researchers, practitioners, negotiators, policy makers and research students ascertain how necessary and /or sufficient these hypotheses are to render them worth the time and effort to pursue rigorously. Propositions are not immune from malfunctioning and the prescriptive propositions that have proved to be credible or
are in need of some modification and revision can strengthen their applicability and transferability to other peace processes in need of investigation.

The models, figures and propositions developed in this dissertation aim to shed more light on the work of top elites, negotiators, decision-makers and third party mediators / interveners to bring about a marked improvement in the likelihood of success of peacemaking efforts in Cyprus to overcome the deadlocks and eventually eliminate the barbed wire barriers that prevent ordinary Cypriots and their top elites from having genuine discussions as to how their country should look in the near future. A closer understanding of the challenges and obstacles en route to an integrated peacemaking deal in Cyprus can enhance the likelihood of endgame sustainability and post-accord implementation that will not repeat the mistakes of the past. The chances of support by ordinary Cypriots whose lives are going to be affected will also increase.

Peacemaking in Cyprus is not an endgame solution, but a journey and there is no doubt in my mind that Cypriots will one day find the path towards it. After all, they came very close to that a few times. The overall hope is that these propositions might one day contribute in a small way to help top leaders in Cyprus to arrive at an integrated peace accord and break the sectarian status quo division on the island, and that will be the biggest gift to their own children. That remains a wish and, in the meantime, I continue my work as a researcher, educator and a member of a global pro-peace civil society.
CHAPTER 10

Building Peace Blocks

Without the use of mortar, peace blocks cannot be set together towards a solid foundation for peace. Everyone hopes for peace in Cyprus, but without the skills of genuine peacemakers, no one should expect to see those social, political, psychological or other structural conditions transformed as parties move from the bitterness of a compromised peacemaking deal to a more accommodative and collaborative reality. In this epilogue, I synthesize a few recommendations for parties and third party interveners in Cyprus and/or other peace processes as themes for a more comprehensive approach to building sustainable peacemaking processes.

A primary lesson learned from this dissertation is that the collapse of previous peacemaking initiatives and their outcomes has been detrimental on how political leaders subsequently approach future peacemaking initiatives. Failures from the past haunt the likelihood for success of the current or future peace making process. The presence of sticking points, one after another, is the direct result of antagonistic party politics which add a very illusionary expectation for a permanent and an unaltered intractability. Below is a summary of some of the detrimental effects on the overall peace process, followed by some recommendations for strengthening the likelihood for a relative success in the peace process in Cyprus and in similar protracted peace processes:
First, political leaders have become entrapped in rhetoric that makes them less flexible in changing courses of action as internal and external circumstances change.

Second, the baggage of emotional attachment and moral commitment to their recent historical discourses affects the processes of framing and phrasing the Cyprus problem and its calamity (some of which is deep-rooted from the 50s, 60s and 70s), which in turn has constrained the parties from pursuing mutual and integrative endgame solutions outside the asymmetrical paradigm of the majority-minority power sharing.

Thirdly, the status quo division has created social and political discourses within a worldview that division is a default solution, thus constraining the parties from taking risks that could in the long-run enable them to adopt mutual goals.

Fourth, the Cyprus problem has transcended into political dogma, which in turn has dominated every discourse of interaction. Over the years, this has fragmented collective Cypriot identity into social groupings within and across barbed wire fences, which in turn constrains Cypriots from building pro-peace pluralistic coalitions, similar to those seen in Northern Ireland in the aftermath of the Belfast agreement.

Below are a set of recommendations that derive from the analysis in this dissertation and the literature that I refer to in chapters 1 through 9. The main focus is for top leaders, the handicapped bi-communal civil society (proponents who are likely to sustain a bi-
communal peacemaking deal among other stakeholders) and 3rd parties under the United Nations auspices.

A. “Matching Visions”

The power sharing paradigm of the Zurich-London 1960 (agreements), and several subsequent initiatives to settle the Cyprus conflict, did not provide the basis for an integrative solution, but rather polarized the negotiating parties into asymmetric configurations and perceived win-lose patterns of interaction between status quo division and various forms of federalism, including: centralized federalism, decentralized, loose federation, strong, etc.

*Recommendation A-1*: It is necessary for top leaders (party leaders) in Cyprus to work closely together in constructing a common vision for an endgame solution and one they are willing to work collaboratively towards during the peacemaking process and most importantly during the most fragile phase of all, the post-accord implementation period.

This can be achieved by

(i) enhancing cooperation and the frequency of communication via political and other methods of multi-track diplomacy, and

(ii) establishing unofficial and, when necessary, official dialogue (via working groups and teams) between political parties and their civil engagement affiliates.
B. “Converging Frameworks and New Responsibilities”

Recommendation B-1: For a durable and sustainable peace process in Cyprus to succeed it is necessary for top leaders to reach a consensus, from early on in the peacemaking process, on the potential framework for a solution they are seeking, which should include clear parameters and with a shared vision.

On the contrary, the intangibly defined “bi-zonal, bi-communal federation” that came out of the Makarios-Denktash talks in 1977 oversimplifies the need for substantive responsibilities that are necessary ingredients for reaching such a state of affairs.

Recommendation B-2: It is necessary and important for top leaders and elites to understand that building peace comes with:

(i) new responsibilities at the various governmental, executive and judiciary branches that should be based on consensus building mechanisms;

(ii) new roles for leadership and new coalitions to bridge across former division lines;

(iii) new needs for the stakeholders to be met at every level of the society; and

(iv) new risks to take in order to prepare the stakeholders, civil society and grassroots for the changes to come, even if the changes taste bittersweet at first.
C. “Integrating Stakeholders”

The persistence of the status quo and negative conditions of peace on the island have created trans-generational, and trans-generational gaps between (a) the older generations, which coexisted and lived side-by-side with each other in the earlier parts of the 20th century, (b) the mid-century generation that witnessed and, or participated in, insurgency and later on nationalism, and (c) the younger generation of the 1980s and onward which doesn’t know what it is like to coexist or live in mixed villages and towns side-by-side and have been bombarded by ethnocentric worldviews since their time in the cradle.

Recommendation C-1: It is important for top leaders to learn from the South African peace process, which focused on the importance of building grassroots capacities in favor of pluralism rather than ethnic segregation. This is crucial to build and sustain proponents in favor of coexistence from within and across division lines, for example:

(i) the political rhetoric has to change from blaming the so-called other side to becoming more neutral and respectful in the framing and phrasing of key historical events.

(ii) Programs of social uplift and inclusion should be introduced at all tiers in the social and political discourse in order to avoid the example of two schools under one roof in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For example:

a. Religious sites that are currently used as symbols for chastising members of the other community about their barbaric actions should be restored and become symbols for a new Cyprus.
b. There must be incentives for returnees that in the post-agreement period their human rights will be protected as citizens of Cyprus and the EU and not as citizens of the “other constituent side in Cyprus.”

(iii) Village and other community festivals that existed for centuries before the division must be reintroduced at the municipal and national level. The festival of Citrus in Morphou / Guzelgiourt every fall is an example.

D. “Integrating Peace Processes and Reaching Transparency”

Peacemaking processes by themselves are unlikely to produce successful peace accords unless they are integrated or are parallel with peace-building efforts at the grassroots and civil society levels. All 41 peacemaking initiatives are top-down approaches to finding political settlement in Cyprus. Similar lessons from Israel-Palestine (Oslo I and II Processes – Interim Agreements) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Dayton Accords) suggest it is very unlikely to build sustainable peace processes without integrating peoples’ peace processes or civil society peace processes with those of top leaders at the track one level.

*Recommendation D-1*: For sustainable and durable peace processes to succeed, it is necessary for top leaders to integrate proposals and ideas from the public discourse and civil society into the official peacemaking processes. Also,

(i) there needs to be apparatuses and new mechanisms in the proposed structures of mediation / negotiations in place that should encourage feedback and, when needed, participation of genuine bi-communal civil society entities into the negotiation processes;
(ii) there is a necessity for cooperation between civil society groups from within and across division lines to build stronger coalition to promote bottom-up demands to an overly dominate, top-down peacemaking political process; and

(iii) third party mediators/interveners should work on bridging the gap between official and public peace processes via the inclusion of bi-communal back channels into the framework of talks.

Apparently the civil society(-ies) in Cyprus have surrendered to political ideologies or have become segregated along identity spectrums. Political parties have managed, to a large degree, to highjack civil society organizations, or infiltrate them with lower level party members, or even create their own grassroots movements. In Cyprus, only a handful of civil society organizations are nonaligned to some ideology or political party and remain bi-communal.

Recommendation D-2: There should be a demand from the bottom-up that peace processes remain transparent at the negotiation table as communication is transmitted horizontally, as well as when communication is transmitted vertically, from top leaders to all other constituents and audiences.

E. Adopting Peace-tech and Peace-Procedural Mechanisms

One common pattern in the peacemaking cycles is imminent every time a peacemaking initiative collapses and a new one is about to take place (and after a period of reciprocal accusation and counter accusations for attributing the failure to the other side). This
pattern is the lack of technical mechanisms to assess what progress has been made and at what level so that next time when the process is jump started again, parties will not have to go back to point zero.

On the contrary, and for tactical reasons, parties in Cyprus have favored the startup of a new peacemaking process from ground zero based on the tactical calculations that more concessions will be gained this time by starting all over again. This pattern includes the Makarios-Denktash talks, Kyprianou-Denktash talks, Vassiliou-Denktash talks, Clerides-Denktash talks, Papadopoulos-Denktash talks, Christophias-Talat talks, and the most recent Christophias-Eroglu talks.

Recommendation E-1: It is necessary to de-centralize the peacemaking process towards committees and working groups with greater authority to mutually transcend differences and which are more likely to keep channels of communication open from opportunistic or inflexible leaders who might have more interest in promoting personal or party line egocentric ambitions.

Recommendation E-2: The structure of peacemaking (negotiation, mediation, direct talks, etc.) needs constant support by top leaders who can build mutual coalitions towards an integrative solution, and not ones that could undermine it and bring any peacemaking effort to the ground.

Recommendation E-3: In every peace process is important to have procedural and structural incentives in place that are visible, tangible and unambiguous for both sides to exploit and move the processes towards a sustainable end result.
F. Aligning collective peace dividends

The gap that divides the two sides in Cyprus on the various negotiating chapters can be bridged with hard and dedicated work towards sustaining the peace process. What is difficult to change are the constant divisions between proponents of “nothing will change after the peace,” with proponents of “we will be worse off after the peace,” and the more optimistic ones who say “yes, this time the formula will work.”

Recommendaion F-1: In making peace in Cyprus, parties have to realize it is necessary to give sometimes a little more than what was previously considered a bitter concession. For example, technical committees and working groups should be empowered in the negotiation process to bridge middle ground on issues regarding refugees, returnees and territorial adjustments that will in turn free top leaders who have been entrapped and publically criticized.

G. Strengthening Peace Processes

One of the weaknesses of the peace process in Cyprus is the permanent exploitation of peace initiatives and peace incentives by political oppositions. Moderates on both sides are constantly constrained within two multilayered political discourses spreading across many division lines that are often driven by politics of division, ethnic intimidation and ferocious nationalism. This political dynamic averts top leaders from making crucial
decisions towards making a breakthrough in the peace process. The politics of “enosis,” “separation” and “isolation” are still holding strong.

**Recommendation G-1**: There should be priority in reconciling antagonistic viewpoints within each community in Cyprus prior to any new peace initiative taking place.

**Recommendation G-2**: Reconciliation within and across division lines can provide the social context needed in restoring unhealed collective traumas that were caused a few decades back and that have remained unacknowledged. Specifically, regarding both recommendations above, the United Nations and other international donors should support the establishment of civil society organizations who sponsor bi-communal programs such as:

(i) community forums that bring forth historical dialogue and understanding,

(ii) the rewriting of grade school textbooks to include neutral language and exclude ethnocentric biases, and

(iii) conduct unbiased investigations about missing persons from both sides.

**H. Lowering Mistrust and Increasing Confidence**

The collapse of nearly 41 initiatives in Cyprus is a strong indication of the fear that the other side is always exploiting the good will and good faith of the counter partner. Every initiative is based on the perception or misconception that both sides across the divide in Cyprus are mistrusted and thus any breakthrough is anticipated with ostensibly minimal benefits.
**Recommendation H-1:** Concessions must be credible, durable and reciprocal (preferably bilateral). In addition, stable and unambiguous concessions can lower mistrust, increase confidence and build respect as parties go beyond substantive talks and towards accord completion.

**Recommendation H-2:** The establishment of short scale (rather than comprehensive) peacemaking deals and the implementation of confidence-building measures can contribute to starting a reciprocal momentum of interaction and one that increases hope among the most pessimistic that soon there will be more blocks added towards peace.

Some examples of confidence-building measures include:

(i) demilitarization of the buffer zone,

(ii) reopening of more crossings between the two sides (currently only four exist) that will more easily enable people to go back and forth,

(iii) removal of road blocks from Nicosia, the divided capital,

(iv) the entering of buffer zones into UN Economic and Development Zone jurisdiction where former owners of land can cultivate and rebuild properties uninhabited for the last 37 years, and

(v) the easing of crossing regulations, which currently prohibit farmers and other traders from selling their products across the division line.
I. Third Party Roles

In addition to the recommendations / propositions for third party roles mentioned in chapters 8 and 9, it is necessary to add a few lessons from the current involvement of Alexander Downer in Cyprus since 2008.

Recommendation I-1: It is necessary for 3rd party mediators / negotiators to focus on efficiency (time constraints, time tables, type and format of talks, production of proposals, establishment of technical committees, etc.) and accountability of top leaders to their actions, behaviors and attitudes.

Recommendation I-2: They should assist local parties in reconciling the different perceptions of peace from early on in the peacemaking process.

Recommendation I-3: Third parties can assist top leaders in building a strong commitment towards the process and encourage them to take risks towards reaching collective goals despite opportunistic challenges from their respective side and across political and ideological spectrums that could undermine their efforts.

Recommendation I-4: They should have the mandate (UN and other institutions) to exercise internal and/or external leverages to constrain leaders from counterproductive moves, attitudes and behaviors or by undermining any progress towards building peace at any stage of the process.

Recommendation I-5: They should operate or offer their services based on making a stable commitment of engagement rather than sporadic or mandated missions that
could increase the possibilities towards progress after cyclical periods of persistent frustration.

My suggestions are based on the hope of my belief and argument that there will be a united Cyprus one day. Also, I recognize and respect a widely-held belief among many Cypriots that unification based on political and arithmetic equality is not an option at all. I have a personal conviction that a political settlement in Cyprus is within reach. Assuming that the end result is a United Cyprus and not a divided one with privileges given to a selected identity group(s), then it is necessary for top leaders and elites to start making more credible concessions to better accommodate the needs of all and not their electorate groupings. It is also important at this point to ask the questions: Are top leaders in Cyprus prepared to offer concessions that go beyond their “red lines” or “no, no” lines in negotiations? My answer to that is simplistic: Not at all - and that is because top leaders are not ready to do so yet. On the contrary, when top leaders realize that making concessions is about addressing the needs and concerns of their co-patriots and the needs of all Cypriots and not just those of the few, then there is no doubt in my mind that the initiative after this one or perhaps the one after the next one will lead to a more successful outcome, as those would be defined by Cypriots themselves at that point in time. To reiterate from chapters 1 through 9, top leaders and ordinary Cypriots need to work on:

- acknowledging the wrong doings towards each other from the recent past;
- building memorials in honor of all victims and not only the selected heroes;
• lowering their xenophobic attitudes towards the “so-called other” across buffer zones;
• abandoning their entrenched ethnocentric rhetoric,
• offering genuine gestures for rapprochement and reconciliation that will then serve as their ground for building a more forgiven future together;
• reforming their education system and honoring history;
• holding accountable individuals who committed wrong doings in the 60s and 70s;
• building common institutions that are based on political and arithmetic equality and not on ethnic division; and
• accepting new responsibilities for change, desegregation from the sectarian division, and integration into a new constitution of the society that is based on inclusiveness.

Concluding Remarks: A Need for a Paradigm Shift?

A central lesson in this dissertation is that there have been several paradigm shifts from the 1950s to the 2000s. As paradigms shifted, the perceptions of the participants about the sources and deep-rooted causes of the conflict, as well as how the Cyprus question should be settled, changed significantly.

In the 50s, the paradigm was dominated by British colonial power and the perceptions of the two parties in Cyprus as to how a new state of affairs should look. It was dominated by separate aspirations for self-determination. In the 60s, the paradigm
shifted with the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and in the shadow of the Cold War writ large in relation to the polarized Greek-Turkish relations writ small. Militant groups on the island from all sides resorted to the use of violence to achieve their goals to either separate the island across ethnic lines, or unify it with Greece.

Following the division of Cyprus in 1974, the parties in Cyprus developed two separate perceptions as to how an end-game solution should be reached in order to satisfactorily resolve the Cyprus problem. From this time and on, on the Greek Cypriot side of the island, the Cyprus problem became defined as an invasion and occupation by Turkey of the sovereign territory of the Republic of Cyprus in violation of the 1960 Zurich-London Accords and the Treaty of Guarantees, which state that all three – Greece, Turkey and the UK – have the right to intervene in Cyprus to collectively (upon unanimous decision) restore constitutional order when needed. On the Greek Cypriot side, from this perspective, they believe that the framework for a settlement should be within the auspices of the United Nations and, in accordance with the UN resolutions, that Turkey should first withdraw its troops for any negotiations to take place. On the Turkish Cypriot side, the presence of Turkey as a guarantor power has a twofold purpose. First, Turkey’s military presence in the Northern part of Cyprus is viewed as a guarantee and a deterrence if the integrity of the Turkish Cypriots comes under attack.

From 1974 to 2002, the peacemaking processes continually stalled, with the one party arguing with consistent contempt for Turkey’s actions on Cyprus, and the other considering it a precondition for future protection. From 2002 to 2004, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, along with his chief envoy to Cyprus, Alvaro de Soto, introduced a
new paradigm in the peacemaking process that resembled the Dayton Peace Accord in Bosnia. This included a rotation of government at the executive and legislative levels, a rotating presidency at the federal level, and an international council of jurors within the judiciary branch. The insecurity of a possible post accord implementation process led the Greek Cypriot leadership to condemn and eventually reject the peace plan.

After four years of blame and counter blame from 2004 to 2008, the stars finally aligned as two old comrades, Christophias and Talat, were elected by their constituents on the two respective sides to replace the hard liners, Papadopoulous and Denktash. Finally, after 50 years, the two new leaders made a series of reciprocal gestures for conciliation. In 2008, their paradigm was framed as a Cypriot-owned, Cypriot-led peacemaking initiative. For the next two years, a number of technical committees and working groups were able to make some breakthroughs on a number of contentious issues. However, the opposition parties on both sides condemned these efforts as a sellout to the Greeks and a sellout to the Turks, respectively. Mr. Talat lost the election in 2010 to Dr. Eroglu, who built his campaign on the argument that the Cyprus problem was satisfactorily resolved in 1974 and the international community must recognize the international sovereignty of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. In the meantime, the left-wing and center coalition that brought Christophias to the presidency, withdrew from the government in 2010, calling for him to stop negotiating with Eroglu, who is perceived to be the spokesperson for Ankara rather than the Turkish Cypriots who now represent less than one-fifth of the population of Northern Cyprus.
In summary of all of this, one of the reasons why so many processes have failed to produce a breakthrough has to do with the disconnect between a set of perceptions that top political elites construct for their constituents as part of their informational campaign and actual reality that takes place behind closed doors during negotiations. Thus, from 1955 to 2012, paradigms and perceptions have shifted in Cyprus, but the actions and behaviors of the top political elites (with the exception of a few) on the issue of a genuine political settlement has remained unchanged.
APPENDIX A

Peacemaking Initiatives in Cyprus: (1955-2010)

List of Tables

Table A-1: List of Peacemaking Initiatives / Processes in Cyprus (1955-2010)
Table A-2: Basic Characteristics of Peacemaking Initiatives
  (a) Period I: 1955 – 1959
  (b) Period II: 1960 – 1974 (August)
  (c) Period III: 1974 – 2004 (April)
  (d) Period IV: 2004 – Present
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period I</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Initiative</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Eden Initiative (EI)</td>
<td>1971</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dulles Initiative (DI)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Harding Initiative (HI)</td>
<td>1985</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Rackliffe Proposal (RP)</td>
<td>1986</td>
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<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Hugh Proposals (HP)</td>
<td>1988-90 Vassiliou-Denktash Talks (VD)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>MacMillan Initiative (MI)</td>
<td>1991</td>
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<tr>
<td>1957-59</td>
<td>London-Zurich Agreement (LZA)</td>
<td>1992</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>1999-2000 Proximity Talks (PT)</td>
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<td>2002-04 Annan Peace Plan (AP)</td>
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<td>Ball Initiative (BI)</td>
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<td>Acheson Plan (AP)</td>
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<td>1965</td>
<td>Galo P. Initiative (GPI)</td>
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<th>Period III</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Initiative</th>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Geneva Conference (GC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Vienna Talks (VT)</td>
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<td>1977</td>
<td>Denktash-Makarios Talks (DM)</td>
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<td>1978</td>
<td>Anglo-Canadian Initiative (AC)</td>
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<td>1979</td>
<td>Denktash-Kyprianou (DK)</td>
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<td>1981</td>
<td>Inter-Communal Talks (IC)</td>
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<td>Denktash Proposals (DP)</td>
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<td>Kyprianou Framework (KF)</td>
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<td>1985</td>
<td>Working Points (WP)</td>
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<td>1985</td>
<td>Proximity Talks (PT)</td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>July 6 Agreement (J6)</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>Christofias-Talat Initiative (CT)</td>
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Period I: 1955-1959
Table A-2(a): Basic Characteristics of Peacemaking Initiatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peace Initiatives</th>
<th>Contacts (Initiator / Purpose)</th>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Characteristics of Initiative</th>
<th>Impact: (short / long-term) and Party Positions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eden Plan (London Conference) 1955 (September)</td>
<td>British PM Anthony Eden - tripartite conference in London: Britain-Greece-Turkey - USA observers. Safeguarding NATO strategic interests and balance of power in Eastern Mediterr.</td>
<td>Post-WWII and Cold War containment (Marshal Plan) - EOKA (struggle) insurgency for self-determination begins on April 1. Greek Cypriot aspirations for “Enosis” – Union with Greece.</td>
<td>To harmonize British-Greek-Turkish relations and halt the EOKA insurgency; Eden invites Turkey to take a position on the future of Cyprus.</td>
<td>Turkey favors Treaty of Lausanne position; TC claim Cyprus’ sovereignty should revert to Turkey – “Taxim” partition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dulles Initiative (Letters) 1955 (September)</td>
<td>US Secretary of State Dulles signals to Greece and Turkey (Papagos-Menderez) to halt the escalation of violence between them in Aegean Sea. Safeguarding US and NATO interests in the region.</td>
<td>Greek-Turkish deterioration of relations over Cyprus’ position and interests. Social instability during and after the London Conference: Izmir and Istanbul riots. Safeguarding US containment strategy in Eastern Europe.</td>
<td>To settle the Greek-Turkish bilateral relations under the umbrella of NATO. Use of strong diplomatic language and warnings to Greece and Turkey that the US could cut economic assistance if the two don’t comply.</td>
<td>Ethnic tension in Istanbul, Izmir and Nicosia escalates. Short-term dissatisfaction of Greece with Dulles position and temporary withdrawal of Greek forces from NATO exercises. - Cessation of direct hostilities between Greece and Turkey. Long-term NATO solidarity on the Southern flank.</td>
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<td>Peace Initiatives</td>
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<td>Harding Plan 1956</td>
<td>Sir John Harding (Gov. of Cyprus) Inter-party bilateral and behind the scenes talks: Harding-Greece-Turkey aim to stop the insurgency and agree on a settlement plan.</td>
<td>British administration introduces marshal law to contain violence and insurgency at various levels. Interrogation measures / arrests and execution of suspects increases. Ethnarchic Council-Makarios-Padagos channel for self-determination-Enosis is supported in a Greek Cypriot referendum.</td>
<td>Political settlement based on unitary self-determination. A 10-year transitory self governing administration under British rule. Permanent establishment of British sovereign bases. Constitutional proposals for a “home rule” with the right for G.C. and T.C. self determination, separately if desired.</td>
<td>Turkey rejects the plan and renews her interests/position. Makarios and Grivas reject the plan. Makarios is deported to Seychelles. First inter-communal clashes take place alongside community quarters in Nicosia and other towns.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rackliffe Proposals 1956 (December)</td>
<td>Lord Rackliffe initiative/pplan; Inter-party contacts and behind the scenes preliminary meetings.</td>
<td>G.C. uprising following Makarios’ arrest-deportation. International criticism against Britain’s harsh measures and interrogation of suspected EOKA insurgents. Britain loses her military base in the Suez Canal zone.</td>
<td>Idea for partitioning the island to counter EOKA-Enosis ambitions.</td>
<td>G.C. leaders reject proposals and T.C. leaders and Turkey accept them. An all-out offensive (repressive measures) against EOKA (56-57). Turkey proposes partition or continuation of British rule.</td>
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<td>Hugh proposals 1957 (April)</td>
<td>Sir Hugh Foot (Gov. of Cyprus) secretly signals his intentions for a new perspective to restore Britain’s image domestically and internationally. Signaling to EOKA leader General Grivas to cease violence.</td>
<td>A mutually perceived stalemate begins to shape the relationship between the British forces and EOKA insurgents after more than two years of intense attacks and counter-attacks. Persistent escalation affects Britain’s intra-party dynamic between Conservatives and Labor Parties in the House.</td>
<td>Insurgency measures are relaxed in exchange for a ceasefire with EOKA. Termination of the inter-communal violence and opening up constitutional talks with the communities for self-government and establishment of British military bases. Makarios returns to Cyprus.</td>
<td>EOKA leaders turn down offer. Fear of exploitation prevails. Turkey rejects the plan and the TC riot against British police in Nicosia. Inter-communal violence continues.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Macmillan Initiative 1957 (July)</td>
<td>British PM Macmillan signals Britain’s willingness to bring a cease-fire and begin talks for direct rule. Calls for all sides to recall their ambitions for separate self-determination. Calls for the establishment of sovereign bases.</td>
<td>June 16, 1957 the Turkish National Assembly declares partition as a favorable solution in Cyprus. NATO fears a spill-over conflict between Greece and Turkey. Turkey proposes continuing partition and separate self-determination.</td>
<td>Macmillan sends strong message to Karamanlis, Menderez, Makarios and other leaders to appeal publicly for peace and work towards a political settlement. Sir Foot uses the initiative as a tactical reason to soon launch a new offensive against EOKA insurgents.</td>
<td>Leaders successfully appeal for termination of violence. EOKA orders conditional ceasefire, calling Britain to stop provocation; TMT reciprocates cease-fire. Secret talks between Greece and Turkey: independence is a compromised solution and a pretext to Zurich-London.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Macmillan Plan 1958 (June)</td>
<td>Signaling, pre-negotiations and secret negotiations between Britain-Greece-Turkey. Signaling is directed to Cypriot leaders to create an alliance between Britain, Greece and Turkey to jointly manage the affairs in Cyprus.</td>
<td>Ceasefires are short lived - EOKA sabotages and the insurgency against British rule intensifies. Intensification of inter-communal conflict in several towns and villages resumes. Efforts are made to reestablish cooperation for security between Britain-Greece- Turkey.</td>
<td>A transitory home rule for 7 years and partnership-type settlement between Cyprus-Greece-Turkey-Britain. Provisions are set-up for a home constitution and administration. Safeguarding the establishment of sovereign British bases. A system of governors appointed by the UK-GR-TUR.</td>
<td>Turkey and TC leaders accept the plan, calling for a partnership solution. Greece and GC reject it, aiming for an independent unitary-state, self-determination and possibly over time to reach “Enosis.” Britain favors the plan in order to establish order, stop the insurgency and withdraw inside her strategic bases.</td>
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<td>London-Zurich Accords Preliminary contacts: (Dec. 1958)</td>
<td>Secret talks include preliminary and substantive talks between: Averoff-Zorlu and Karamanlis-Menderez from December 1958 to February 1959. The two sides inform GC and TC leaders unilaterally.</td>
<td>Britain makes a series of failed attempts, beginning in 1955, to settle the Cyprus problem based on a number of proposals ranging from British rule to unitary self-determination. Clashes and tension-raising initiatives between gunmen from the two communities in Cyprus gradually escalate.</td>
<td>Greece and Turkey agree to change position and abandon plans for partition of the island (Taxim-Enosis) and work toward the search for a compromised solution: an independent-self-determined Cyprus. Britain brokers the talks and proposes constitutional arrangements.</td>
<td>Messages are channeled down to the local communities in Cyprus and are received with mixed feelings. Ideas do not match the expectations of some GC and TC nationalists who reside on their course of actions for separation and union with motherlands.</td>
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<td>(Continued) Zurich Talks (Feb. 6, 1959)</td>
<td>Britain brokers bilateral talks between Greece and Turkey. Talks are channeled to inform Cypriot leaders as representatives of the two communities but without direct involvement in the talks.</td>
<td>Britain controls the peacemaking process for an independent Cyprus and a tripartite power-sharing between Britain-Greece-Turkey. Political tensions continue on the island and nationalists fear the worst - a compromised solution and power-sharing between GCs and TCs.</td>
<td>Safeguarding the independence of Cyprus and establishing a series of three treaties between GR-TRU-UK for the administration in Cyprus to implement Treaty of Establishment calls for the independence of Cyprus with a bi-communal character and one sovereignty.</td>
<td>The talks, under the supervision of Britain and excluding Greek and Turkish Cypriots, brings Greece and Turkey closer in setting the provisions for an independent Cyprus Republic.</td>
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<td>(Continued) London Talks and Conference (August)</td>
<td>Meetings between the Prime Ministers of Greece-Turkey and Britain. Cypriot leaders are signatories of the agreement without direct involvement in the talks.</td>
<td>Various issues concerning the rights to intervene by the guarantors, unilaterally or multilaterally; the sovereign bases; power-sharing among the constitutional powers lead to intense intra-party debates.</td>
<td>Constitutional Treaty calls for a structure of power-sharing at all levels of government based on majority-minority rule – GC president and TC vice-president and House proportionate representation. Treaty of Guarantee to safeguard the integrity and security of the island during times of rising tensions with trilateral action from GR-TUR-UK.</td>
<td>Despite various points of contention between Greek, Turkish and Cypriot leaders who are present at the talks, the talks finally reach a conclusion based on the three treaties negotiated and signed by all parties. Cypriots, as signatories of the agreement, are supposed to abide by and implement them, whereas GR-TUR and GB will observe, monitor and, if needed, intervene multilaterally to restore order.</td>
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Period II: 1960-1974
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<td>Makarios’ Proposals to amend the Constitution 1963 (December)</td>
<td>Makarios’ initiative includes 13 points to amend the constitution. Signaling and preliminary contacts behind the scenes among political parties in the House.</td>
<td>Post-Accord implementation era; lack of constructive political dialogue to settle municipal elections in 61-63. Failures to reach consensus in the House and government. Pre-accord parallel visions for Enosis and Taxim continue to polarize the political discourse. Post-accord insecurity and lack of mechanisms to monitor the implementation.</td>
<td>13 points (amendments) to resolve political deadlocks on: (i) constitutional issues, (ii) sharing of power in the House of representatives and presidency, (iii) municipal allocation of council representatives and majors, (iv) treaty of guarantee; (v) policing and safety and a number of less prominent issues.</td>
<td>Turkey rejects the G.C. position to abolish the Treaty of Guarantee. TC elected officials withdraw from the House and the government. Political polarization spills over to the local level with paramilitaries on both sides returning to their arms and starting provocations against their co-patriots.</td>
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<td>London Conference 1964 (January)</td>
<td>Substantial negotiations between the three guarantors and two sides in Cyprus to stop the inter-ethnic clashes is brokered by GB and chaired by Duncan Sandys. Purpose is to negotiate a ceasefire and stop inter-ethnic hostilities and open the road to a political settlement.</td>
<td>Inter-party polarization and clashes escalate after lack of political will exists to settle differences at the table. The Turkish army and TC gunmen form TC enclaves around the island to offer protection to TCs. Greece and Turkey actively smuggle troops, arms and other supplies to extremists.</td>
<td>Preventing ethnic violence from further escalating between Greece and Turkey. Purpose is to find a compromised solution and negotiate constitutional changes. Britain, as guarantor, along with the US, attempts to prevent further escalations that could serve as pretext for the USSR to infiltrate to the island.</td>
<td>Inter-ethnic clashes and political polarization leads to TC representatives withdrawing from the government permanently. Greek and Turkish relations deteriorate further. Britain looks for assistance from the US, which can exercise her leverages on Greece and Turkey. GC take control of the Republic and TC form separate institutions.</td>
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<td>Peace Initiatives</td>
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<td><strong>Ball Initiative 1964</strong> (January-February)</td>
<td>George Ball undertakes shuttle diplomacy between Greece and Turkey with US Amb. in Cyprus, F. Wilkins. Aim is to restore Greek, Turkish and Cypriot inter-party relations.</td>
<td>Inter-ethnic clashes intensify and Turkey intervenes from the air to break attack lines. The US fears a Turkish military invasion will trigger a Greco-Turkish war and possible USSR involvement - US President Johnson sends an ultimatum to Turkish PM Inonu to stop actions.</td>
<td>The aim is to restore Greco-Turkish relations to jointly manage the troubles in Cyprus. Offer is made to deploy NATO-led peacekeeping forces to assist British troops patrolling the ceasefire in Nicosia.</td>
<td>US-Greek-Turkish-Cypriot relations sour. NATO-led peacekeeping force is rejected. UNFICYP stations on the island. Inonu calls off Turkey’s intervention plan temporarily.</td>
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<td><strong>Acheson Initiative 1964</strong> (July-August)</td>
<td>Behind the scenes mediation and substantial (secret) negotiations take place in Geneva between the US-Greece-Turkey on the Cyprus problem. Attempt to settle the dispute under the umbrella of NATO.</td>
<td>Escalation of conflict is a threat to US-NATO alliance. Ethnic instability is a pretext for Turkey to intervene and could fracture relations with Greece and the US. Turkish military intervention takes place in Mansura and Kokkina after a GC paramilitary offensive – Town becomes the first symbol for division.</td>
<td>Plan is to avert possible Greco-Turkish war. Calls are made for dissolution of the Republic and double Union with motherlands. Cyprus would be divided under 8 cantons: 2 under TC administrative control. Greece is called to cede Kastellorizon to Turkey in exchange for the 6 cantons.</td>
<td>Plan is accepted by Turkey and rejected by Greece in coordination with Makarios. Long-term fears for ethnic clashes remain uncertain. The Cyprus problem remains under UN auspices, but Acheson ideas remain on the table for the next 10 years.</td>
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<td>Galo Plaza Initiative</td>
<td>UN mediator Galo Plaza submits a report to UN Secretary General after a year of contacts and indirect talks with parties in Cyprus through shuttle diplomacy.</td>
<td>Closer Soviet-Cyprus ties. Deployment of about 6,500 UN blue helmets on the island ease tensions temporarily; Makarios and the Republic of Cyprus move away from Anglo-American influences and gain more ground under UN auspices for a seemingly better outcome.</td>
<td>The Report dooms the 1960 settlement as unworkable for Cyprus. It calls for bi-communal negotiations under UN auspices. Establishment of an independent and unitary Cyprus based on majority rule and protection of minority rights.</td>
<td>GC president is in agreement with the report. Turkey and TC reject the report and criticize UN mediation mandates as biased and outrageous. UN resolutions reaffirm the integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus - bi-communal hostility continues.</td>
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<td>(Report) 1965 (March)</td>
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<td>Cyrus Vance Proposals</td>
<td>US leads an emergency mission to avert a catastrophe between Greece and Turkey. Greece and Turkey exchange proposals via Vance: Pipinellis-Vance-Caglayangil channel.</td>
<td>Greece and Turkey come to the brink of war. Military coup of colonels sees power in Greece. Athens initiative for Enosis comes to surface; Turkey is concerned about safeguarding military bases. National Guard provokes attacks under Grivas’ leadership against TC in villages of Kophinou and Ayios Theodoros.</td>
<td>Aims to alter direct intervention by Turkey and complete unilateral withdrawal of Greek and Turkish troops from Cyprus. UNFICYP is instructed to assist the restructuring of the police and disarming of paramilitary forces and National Guard.</td>
<td>Political turmoil and domestic instability prevents GR and TUR from dealing with their long-term problems and Cyrus Vance succeeds in defusing violence and calls all foreign troops to begin withdrawing, setting the stage for cooperation in Cyprus. Animosity and mistrust prevails over any efforts.</td>
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<td>1967 (November)</td>
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<td>Inter-communal Talks (Phase I) June 1968-September 1971</td>
<td>Inter-communal talks take place between Clerides and Denktash in Beirut and Nicosia. Aim is to stop violence from recurring and begin political dialogues on constitutional and power-sharing issues to re-establish an integral Cyprus.</td>
<td>Following the attacks in the TC village of Kofinou, the TC leadership declares the establishment of the “provisional” Turkish Cypriot Administration. With fears for a permanent disintegration of Cyprus, the UN, US and UK put pressure on the two sides to begin unofficial exploratory talks.</td>
<td>Proposals include: 1. Provisions to amend Makarios’s 13 points. 2. A recognition of partnership status with local TC administration. 3. GC side to abandon its ambition for Enosis with Greece.</td>
<td>Talks collapse and are deemed inconclusive. The talks fail to address most of the non-political concerns of the two sides. The two sides are entrenched in their positions. The GC does not recognize TC autonomy and TC is not ready to compromise for anything less than partnership.</td>
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<td>Inter-communal Talks (Phase II) June 1972-July 1974</td>
<td>UN Secretary General good offices attempts to resume talks after an impasse on an expanded agenda, along with the participation of constitutional experts from Greece and Turkey.</td>
<td>The intensity of violence lowers. Inter- and intra-communal party politics take on new dimensions among the GC side between Makarios and anti-Makarios supporters. Social polarization loosens up, confidence measures are introduced and TC population returns to properties.</td>
<td>Views are exchanged on legislative, judiciary, policing and other issues. Inter-communal agenda remains almost the same as in the first phase of talks. GC side positions herself on constitutional and power sharing matters on a Unitary state; TC side positions herself on regional autonomy and partnership status with substantial guarantees that Union of the Republic with Greece will not happen.</td>
<td>Talks are sporadic and often go through temporary impasses, including two breakdowns in 71 and 74 when a Greek-sponsored junta, along with local GC gunmen, intervene to replace Makarios. Turkey, in response, intervenes militarily to mark a new territorial division between the two communities in Cyprus.</td>
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Period III: 1974 (July) – 2004 (April)
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<tr>
<td><strong>Geneva Conference 1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; Round 1974 (July 25-30)</strong></td>
<td>Geneva Conference: A UN-led initiative based on UNSC resolution 353 &lt;em&gt;inter alia&lt;/em&gt; calls for the three guarantor powers (GR-TUR-UK) to restore peace – based on prior mission by J. Sisco to prevent further escalation through shuttle diplomacy.</td>
<td>June 15 coup and post-coup instability. Turkey’s 1st stage of military intervention on July 20&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; after efforts by undersecretary J. Sisco to mediate. Fear by Turkey that the intentions of Athens and the local junta administration is to unite the Island with Greece.</td>
<td>Restoration of peace based on the 1960 Accords. The talks aim to reach an agreement about re-establishing a constitutional government in Cyprus since its failure in the post-1960 implementation period and to safeguard peace and stability on the island without any further interventions.</td>
<td>Short-term ceasefire. Signing of declaration calling for the establishment of a security zone in various areas and across the island. Violent actions by opposing forces violates ceasefire agreement and the sides regroup. Guarantor powers agree to continue negotiations on constitutional matters.</td>
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<p>| 2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; Round 1974 (Aug. 7-14) | Two constitutional plans are submitted: Denktash’s plan for a bi-zonal federation and division into two entities; and Turkish PM Gunes’ proposal for the creation of 6 autonomous TC cantons. | The selected “president” of the coup “voluntarily” abandons power – Glafkos Clerides presides temporarily over the one half of a divided Cyprus. Failure of all sides to implement conditions of a ceasefire: violence and counter attacks escalate. | The Greek and GC position calls for the withdrawal of Turkish forces prior to any further negotiations. Denktash’s proposal calls for a lineal geographical division from Lefka to Famagusta. Gunes called for 6 autonomous cantons under Turkish territorial control. | All sides fail to reach an agreement since the disruption of affairs in June and July. The ceasefire continues to be violated by all sides. Turkey’s second intervention plan follows after the talks collapse. NATO contains conflict from spilling over to other issues between GR-TUR. |</p>
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<td>Vienna Talks 1975</td>
<td>Based on the UN Security Council resolution 367 (Mar. 12, 1975) authorizing UN Secretary General to undertake a new mission of “Good Offices” in Cyprus.</td>
<td>Failure of Geneva conference to stop the fighting and reach a settlement about safety and security of the Cypriots based on the 1960 arrangements. A second Turkish intervention significantly changes the balance of power and Greece-Turkey prefer not to disturb the cessation of violence following the events between June and August 1974. Greece restores her democracy after overthrowing the Junta administration.</td>
<td>Waldheim mediates a series of inter-communal talks between Makarios and Denktash. Preliminary discussion regarding the constitutional arrangements are exchanged between Clerides and Denktash. Discussions on the geographical arrangements for the future of Cyprus are postponed for the 3rd and 4th round during direct talks. Transitional joint government to reestablish the functioning of a reluctant democracy. Exchange of population according to their wishes to reunite with their families in the north or south.</td>
<td>Substantial issues are not negotiated. The two sides exchange several proposals but the UN Secretary General is unable to bridge the gap on the issue of joint government. A break through is made on the issues of enclave persons following the division of August 1974 to rejoin their families. Both sides agree to allow the UN to control the international airport to distribute humanitarian materials and to host the talks. The two sides agree on five points regarding the movement of populations.</td>
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<td>1st Round April 28 – May 3</td>
<td>Talks between Clerides and Denktash continue in Vienna under the auspices of the S-G Kurt Waldheim</td>
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<td>2nd Round June 5-7</td>
<td>Talks between Clerides and Denktash continue in Vienna under the auspices of the S-G Kurt Waldheim</td>
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<td>3rd Round July 31 – August 2</td>
<td>Direct Talks resume in Nicosia.</td>
<td>The meetings have a twofold perspective to help ease the talks in Cyprus and to provide parallel support on security issues regarding the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee.</td>
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<td>4th Round New York Sept. 8-10</td>
<td>Talks resume in New York.</td>
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<td>5th Round February 1975</td>
<td>Bilateral meetings take place between Greece and Turkey in Brussels.</td>
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<td>Denktash-Makarios Guidelines: 1977</td>
<td>Denktash-Makarios initiative (initiated by Denktash) mediated by G-S Waldheim.</td>
<td>The failure of previous attempts to bridge the gap between the two sides on how to reunite the island and agree on constitutional issues. New attempts by the UNSG on the basis of inter-communal talks to bring the two sides closer and search for a viable solution to the Cyprus problem. A federal system structure for a solution seems to be a preferred framework to continue and sustain future talks. The two sides disagree on the type of federation and the sharing of power and sovereignty. Parties also acknowledge the nature of a bi-zonal and bi-communal arrangement along a “federal” solution.</td>
<td>The Denktash and Makarios proposals are blended together by the UN SG to produce a guideline framework for future talks. The proposals highlight parties’ perceived basis for a solution within a negotiated federal-type framework. TC make proposals on a “federal” solution desired for power partnership between two equal political entities under the spirit of confederation. The GC proposals are more aligned with the classic federal structure (as opposed to a confederation), preserving the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the Republic (see supplement 1).</td>
<td>The two sides agree on four guidelines that later become subject to various interpretations: (i) independent non-aligned bi-communal federal republic. (ii) territory under local administrations (bi-zonality) should be discussed in the light of economic viability, productivity and land ownership. (iii) freedom of movement, settlement, right of property should be discussed under conditions of bi-communal federal system. (iv) sharing of power at the federal level should safeguard the bi-communal character and unity of country.</td>
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<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; meeting (Jan. 27)</td>
<td>The talks mark the beginning of a long search for a “federal” solution to the Cyprus problem.</td>
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<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; meeting (Feb. 12)</td>
<td>The UN SC puts together substantial proposals based on previous talks: proposals are submitted to the S-Gen after the Geneva Conference by the two sides.</td>
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<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt; meeting [6&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; Round of Vienna Talks] (Mar.31-Apr. 7)</td>
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<td>Anglo-Canadian Plan or Nimetz Initiative 1978 (Nov-Dec.)</td>
<td>A British-American-Canadian (ABC) Initiative channels secretly through US State department Counselor Nimetz Matthew. The aim is to persuade the parties to settle for a bi-zonal federation built on the Makarios-Denktash guidelines.</td>
<td>Denktash submits to the UN SG a draft proposals in April 1978 – GC leaders reject the proposal. The guidelines become a framework for a bi-zonal bi-communal federation settlement. Under US president J. Carter, the initiative is channelled secretly between the UK and Canada first (parallel with GR and TUR).</td>
<td>The Nimetz Initiative, or Anglo-American-Canadian plan, is a 12-clause framework building on the Makarios-Denktash guidelines for a bi-zonal federation, bi-cameral federal legislature, a federal constitution, geographic adjustments and withdrawal of foreign troops.</td>
<td>Both sides in Cyprus are not very enthusiastic about the plan which is officially rejected by the GC side under a the new leadership of Spyros Kyprianou. Despite its rejection and cold reception, the 12 clauses remain on the agenda for several subsequent UN-sponsored initiatives.</td>
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<td>Denktash-Kyprianou Ten-Point Agreement 1979 (May 18-19)</td>
<td>Inter-communal talks resume after the intervention of UN SG Waldheim to break the deadlock following the (ABC) initiative. The SG’s efforts are directed to bridge the gap separating the two sides on the constitutional matter.</td>
<td>A deadlock follows the rejection of the (ABC) plan. The UN SG continues his sporadic meetings with the two sides to identify substantive issues they can agree on as a basis to resume talks. Parallel visions on both sides contradict the efforts at the table.</td>
<td>The two sides agree to resume inter-communal talks and reaffirm their support for a federal solution according to the four guidelines and in addition they add an additional 10-points (see Supplement 2).</td>
<td>The agreement leads to a breakthrough and opens the road to further inter-communal talks between the two leaders 1977-83. Both sides agree to abstain from any actions that may jeopardize the outcome of the talks, at least temporarily.</td>
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<td>Peace Initiatives</td>
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<td>Inter-communal Talks:</td>
<td>Inter-communal talks between Denktash-Kyprianou start in Nicosia on August 9 - a UN SG-based initiative outlining the “common ground” from previous talks. UN SG tries to bridge the gaps mediated by Hugo Gobi.</td>
<td>A very supportive momentum builds both domestically and internationally in hopes that substantive talks may lead to a settlement following the two high level agreements. Attempts by the GC side to internationalize the problem and gain additional leverages for their cause against the presence of Turkish troops.</td>
<td>Four main areas are discussed by the two sides: (i) Territorial adjustments. (ii) The issue of Varosha - (Maras) and the opening up of Famagusta to GCs. (iii) Abstention from actions that could jeopardize the process and outcome of talks. (iv) Constitutional matters.</td>
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<td>[4 Rounds] (Aug. 9, 1979 – Jan. 7, 1981)</td>
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<td>The two sides agree on a short recess due to local elections. Under the directions of the UN SG, the two sides prepare comprehensive proposals on constitutional issues, territorial adjustments and the sharing of power at various levels of governments.</td>
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<td>Waldheim Evaluation Proposals - ‘Interim Agreement’ 1981 (Oct. 22)</td>
<td>Waldheim evaluates the positions of the two sides and identifies several “points of coincidence” and “points of equidistance” for a settlement referred to as “interim agreement.”</td>
<td>A positive climate in the talks allows the UN SG to develop an itinerary for substantial talks for a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem. A willingness is required of both sides to submit to him their ideas and positions for a comprehensive settlement.</td>
<td>The main elements are the establishment of a federal, non-aligned and independent republic made up of two provinces - a GC and a TC - as part of a federal administration. The proposal lists the characteristics of local and federal governments.</td>
<td>The first temporary breakthrough for the UN efforts since 1975. On constitutional matters the differences between the two sides are near polar opposite and equidistance grew larger. The GC side accepts the proposals as a basis for further modifications and the TC side as a basis for substantive talks.</td>
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<td>Inter-communal Talks [2nd Phase] (Nov. 1981 - May 1983)</td>
<td>UN SG Perez de Cuellar focuses on his pre-successors set of guidelines, “ideas” and evaluation papers to resume substantive talks. Effort is made to move the talks onto issues less confrontational in order to build confidence.</td>
<td>Unlike Waldheim’s evaluation proposals, the two sides perceive self and other positions to be drifting apart. Polarized Greco-Turkish relations stall negotiations in Cyprus in an effort to internationalize the dimension of the problem.</td>
<td>New UN SG Perez de Cuellar assesses that an overall package deal – a comprehensive solution - can be reached in the future if the two sides undertake substantial political will to negotiate on the interim agreement set forward by Waldheim. A peace meal approach on one issue at a time is introduced.</td>
<td>The peace meal approach fails to produce a breakthrough due to difficulty to make concessions on other issues. Talks are polarized under the open agenda approach in which the parties spend all their time reviewing what the agenda should and should not include on each issue, rather than focusing on substantive matters.</td>
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<td>Aide Memoir: “Cuellar Indicators” 1983 (August)</td>
<td>UN SG de Cuellar puts forth an initiative to identify new parameters on key issues that can resume direct talks. It aims to break the deadlock with a fresh new attempt and perspectives in addressing the issues interchangeably.</td>
<td>UN resolution 37/253 rephrases the Cyprus dispute as one between Cyprus and Turkey, with the latter occupying 37% of her territory, leading to a new polarization in the inter-communal talks. The two sides in Cyprus directly blame each other for failures on the talks and an unwillingness to talk.</td>
<td>First attempt is to resume talks between the two sides. Cuellar introduces a set of “indicators” – key issues that the two sides can use to begin negotiations and agree on issues not too far from their positions. The indicators also contain the negotiations within “acceptable” boundaries on main issues.</td>
<td>The indicators are formed into a peace plan submitted to the two sides by de Cuellar and both sides are invited to a high level summit in NY, a day before the proclamation of TRNC. The two sides are careful enough not to reject the proposals, but without necessarily accepting the indicators set foreword.</td>
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<td>Denktash Proposals 1984 (January)</td>
<td>Initiated by Denktash and channeled to Kyprianou through the UN SG and Mission of Good Offices.</td>
<td>A unilateral declaration of independence establishing the TRNC. Hostile escalation in the Greco-Turkish relations influences the perspectives of the two sides in Cyprus. Military capabilities are built up on both sides with the support of Greece and Turkey.</td>
<td>The proposal includes a series of confidence-building measures so that the two sides can refrain from economic, political and other provocations. It also calls for several measures of good will, including the reopening of the Nicosia airport and the city of Varosha under the UN administration.</td>
<td>The proposals build on previous issues covered in the inter-communal talks and the high level agreements. The GC government dismisses the proposals as Denktash’s propaganda seeking recognition for TRNC and a way out from international isolation.</td>
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<td>Kyprianou Framework 1984 (January 11)</td>
<td>Initiated by Kyprianou and channeled to Denktash through the UN SG. The latter makes several changes.</td>
<td>Following the collapse of the Cuellar indicators, both sides want to save face and signal their willingness to talk for tactical reasons. The two sides enter into a new diplomatic imbroglio with the one trying to gain recognition for a homeland, and the other to condemn it as an illegal, pseudo state.</td>
<td>The proposal includes counter measures for good will and confidence-restoring measures such as demilitarization of the island; the establishment of an international force under the UN to oversee peace and security; a federal solution; several constitutional proposals; human rights issues and power sharing.</td>
<td>The TC side dismisses the proposals as GC propaganda. Elements found in the two proposals are considered by the UN SG as parties position for future talks.</td>
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<td>“Working points” March - 1984 (August)</td>
<td>The working points are based on a series of “ideas” (proposals) submitted and exchanged between the two sides through the UN SG’s special Representative to Cyprus Hugo Gobi.</td>
<td>Several proposals and ideas are channeled through the UN, exploring the possibility for a new round of inter-communal talks. Security Council Resolution 541/83 and 550/84 restates that UN member states cannot recognize TRNC secessionist actions or TRNC ambassadors.</td>
<td>The working points include suggestions on the issues of territorial adjustments; political confidence-building measures; development of government structures; a date to begin proximity talks between the two sides that, if they are successful, will lead to higher level meetings under the auspices of the UN SG in New York.</td>
<td>The UN succeeds in the short term in engaging the parties into communicating their ideas though proposals to the SG. Working points become a framework to reestablish communication through the UN SG’s structure of good offices during the proximity talks.</td>
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<td>“Five-Point Scenario” 1984 (May)</td>
<td>This initiative is taken by UN SG Cuellar (recommendation) as a five-point plan scenario that is based on ideas raised earlier in the proposals of Denktash and Kyprianou.</td>
<td>The UN Good Offices provide the context for the two sides to submit their ideas and proposals directly to the UN SG. US President Reagan proposes a $225 million “Cyprus Peace and Reconstruction Fund” to assist in the efforts.</td>
<td>Same as above, with the only difference being that it include a number of suggestions to reach a compromised solution by cutting the difference between the positions of each side in half and meeting in between.</td>
<td>The parties become engaged in a reciprocal process of exchanging ideas, signaling willingness for resuming talks but without a genuine willingness for a settlement as they often accuse each other. Both side use fear as a leverage that a persistent political and economic stalemate can worsen their long-term positions and goals for a settlement.</td>
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<td>Proximity Talks 1984-1985</td>
<td>Indirect consultations in New York with UN SG Cuellar performing shuttle diplomacy between Kyprianou and Denktash to break the impasse. Cuellar methodology is to bridge the gap on existing differences and lay a groundwork to sustain substantive talks.</td>
<td>Kyprianou refuses to negotiate directly unless the TRNC declaration of independence is withdrawn. The two sides agree to build on the existing high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979 and their proposals. Both sides use their motherlands Greece and Turkey respectively to gain leverages and lobby Security Council members’ opinions on who is reluctant to negotiate.</td>
<td>The Cuellar “working points” serve as the framework to begin talks on more substantive issues. Positions are exchanged on the issues of federal government, legislature, territory, the issue of the return of Varosia and Nicosia airport under the interim UN monitoring force.</td>
<td>At the procedural level, the two sides agree to set up various “working committees” to deal with procedural and legislative components of the main matters, foreign affairs, defense, security, etc. The two sides agree to a second round of proximity talks. Abstaining from such a decision would have been exploited by the other side domestically and internationally.</td>
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<td>1st Round (Sept. 10-20 1984)</td>
<td>Cuellar uses shuttle diplomacy.</td>
<td>Cuellar adds pressure on the “talks” by announcing he will send a report to the Security Council summing up the process, allocating responsibility on the side that is not willing to continue talks in good faith.</td>
<td>The new framework includes “points accepted in principle” and “principles to be agreed upon” during the talks and high-level meetings between the leaders.</td>
<td>The two sides blame each other for not showing flexibility and maintaining uncompromising attitudes / strategies. Both sides agree to continue further with talks to avoid being blamed as intransigent by the UN SG.</td>
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<td>2nd Round (Oct. 10-26 1984)</td>
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<td>Proximity Talks 3rd Round (Nov. 26-28 Dec. 10-12) New York (Recess Nov. 29-Dec. 9)</td>
<td>The SG presents the parties with a preliminary draft by taking into account their positions, ideas and perspectives on core issues for a comprehensive solution.</td>
<td>Kyprianou calls for honorable compromises on the eve of the meetings and shows willingness for a compromised solution. Several GC political parties are already against the framework and positions of parties during the 2nd round.</td>
<td>A preliminary draft is presented to both sides as a basis for a comprehensive solution which is revised by supplementary papers on the executive, legislative and security matters during talks. The UN SG incorporates the parties revisions for federalism.</td>
<td>The preliminary draft is accepted by Denktash and Turkey. Kyprianou visits Athens and Cyprus during the recess. Upon his return to NY, he attempts to amend the draft agreement, listing about 9 unsettled points for revisions prior to any further negotiations.</td>
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<td>High Level Meetings New York (Jan 17-20, 1985) And towards a “Draft Framework” 1986</td>
<td>Cuellar invites both leaders to NY for direct talks. Despite their disagreements, the two sides agree to meet in NY. An effort by Cuellar to add more pressure on the parties in an effort for a compromised solution.</td>
<td>Divergence of vision: Cuellar expects that the two sides are ready to sign a high level agreement. The two sides play a tactical game of showing good will but at the same time are reluctant to make concessions and avoid possible blame from the Security Council. Also they both adopt a mentality that the victims are always hostage to the tactics of the other side as they both try to play the victim’s side.</td>
<td>Kyprianou expects that there will be substantive negotiations on several unsettled issues prior to accepting the framework agreement. Denktash claims that there are not any unsettled issues and the working committees are to complete the blanks and the leaders should move on with substantive talks.</td>
<td>Cuellar concludes that the TC side accepts the draft agreement on the basis for further negotiations for a comprehensive settlement to the Cyprus problem. Kyprianou, under pressure from the political parties, rejects the agreement, but considers it a framework to be further worked on prior to direct talks.</td>
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<td>Vasiliou-Denktash Talks – UN mediation 1988-1990</td>
<td>Cuellar and his special envoy Oscar Camilion propose a new initiative to create a positive climate and restore confidence for a settlement. The SG is able to assess mutual willingness between the two leaders following the election of Vassiliou.</td>
<td>In mid-1986 and late-1987, the inter-party relations are polarized as tense political hostilities intensify between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea. Early 1988 marks a new beginning of Greco-Turkish rapprochement impacting positively the prospects for new inter-communal talks in Cyprus.</td>
<td>Direct talks between the two leaders to explain to each other their views and concerns on a variety of issues. The SG and his envoy prepare several position papers listing the views of each party on the various issues on a non-committal basis.</td>
<td>After about 20 direct meetings, the UN prepares an evaluation document assessing the positions and views of the two sides in a meeting with the SG in New York on Nov 22-23. The first round prove helpful and the parties agree to a second round of talks.</td>
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<td>1st Round Direct Talks (Sept. 16 – Nov. 7)</td>
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<td>2nd Round (Dec. 19 – Mar. 28 1989)</td>
<td>The SG’s assessment is that the parties need to maintain their good working relations. A breakthrough could be reached and built on the constructive aspects of the proximity talks (Draft Framework) in 1985 since Vassiliou is a more moderate leader than Kyprianou.</td>
<td>Greek PM A. Papandreou and Turkish President T. Ozal continue building closer ties between Greece and Turkey. Greece and Turkey participate in common NATO exercises. Positive climate spills over in Cyprus and offers a renewed opportunity for talks.</td>
<td>The issues selected for discussion on the 1st round are picked up by the parties for further talks on round 2. The agenda includes: constitutional issues, the three freedoms, territorial arrangements, refugees and Turkish nationals – “settlers,” security, guarantor powers, judiciary issues, balance of power and demilitarization.</td>
<td>The two sides engage in a constructive process of submitting and exchanging proposals along with their feedback on the other side’s proposals. Cuellar produces a second evaluation paper and invites the two leaders to New York to prepare a “draft outline” for a settlement plan.</td>
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<td>Inter-communal talks</td>
<td>UN SG representatives G. Feissel and O. Camilion prepare the agendas for the 3rd round and the content of the proposals based on the parties’ positions, views and perspectives presented to the UN during the 2nd round.</td>
<td>Women march in Cyprus for unification and withdrawal of Turkish troops, but this does not halt the talks. UN mediators develop a very constructive process for the two parties to present their views and perspectives on issues to each other via direct and behind the scenes meetings between mediators and top leaders.</td>
<td>The UN mediators hold separate discussions and identify the main issues and offer suggestions to cut the distance in half without violating each side’s red lines of nonnegotiable items. The discussions are non-committal and the proposals discussed are described as “non-papers,” which are not available for research.</td>
<td>A third evaluation paper is produced and the SG invites the parties to direct talks in NY on June 29. During joint meetings in NY, the SG states that the two sides are within a compromised range. However, the no paper approach makes it difficult for the two sides to lay out their substantial differences.</td>
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<td>3rd Round 1989 (May 5 – June 10)</td>
<td>The UN SG and his envoys look to find ways to make the talks more substantive and transform the non-paper approach to a “food for thought” type framework by brokering direct meetings between the two leaders.</td>
<td>GC protest against the TC celebrations on the eve of the 19th commemoration of Turkish intervention in Cyprus. GC protestors enter the buffer zone and 103 are arrested, tried and imprisoned for three days in TRNC prisons. Parliamentary elections in Greece, Turkey and the TRNC lead to a temporary setback.</td>
<td>The talks are based on the following structure: (1) Federation aspects: Federal arrangements, bizonality, bi-communality; (2) Constitutional aspects: power-sharing, government structures and guarantee of freedoms; (3) security and guarantees (4) displaced persons (5) economic development (6) transitional period</td>
<td>The talks lead to an impasse. Parties begin using semantic and symbolic language for tactical reasons not acceptable by the other side. In the talks, the two sides focus on discussing preconditions to settlement rather than the real issues and in the end the talks barely produce any substantive outcomes.</td>
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<td>Direct Talks New York (Feb. 26 – Mar. 2)</td>
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<td>Indirect Talks Camilion-Feissel Process</td>
<td>UN SG aides (Camilion and Feissel) take a new initiative under the UN good offices aegis to broker an “over-all framework agreement” through consultation and indirect meetings between the two leaders along with the proposition for a high level quadripartite conference in Sept.</td>
<td>The war in Iraq, the turbulence in the Russian Federation, the round-up of SG Cuellar’s term in the UN, and unforeseen changes in the global context of politics shapes the Greek-Turkish-Cyprus relations. The Ozal-Bush initiative for a quadripartite conference and the Greco-Turkish rapprochement accelerate the momentum for a settlement and a fresh start.</td>
<td>Camilion and Feissel follow shuttle diplomacy between Denktash and Vassiliou without revealing the other side’s views and perspectives to set a basis for substantive talks. The framework proposal includes all the main points listed earlier under the section of proximity talks. This later becomes the structure of Boutros-Ghali’s “set of ideas.”</td>
<td>Short-term skepticism and insecurities are raised due to the secrecy of the format that the two mediators keep. Both sides are afraid of coming face-to-face with a settlement without knowing the other’s position. Both initiatives for a quadripartite conference and an “over-all framework agreement” are not rejected but broken down temporarily.</td>
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<td>Ghalis’ Set of Ideas 1992 1st Round New York (June 18-22)</td>
<td>UN SG Boutros-Ghali, in his mission of good offices, takes a new initiative to foster bi-communal talks by building on where his pre-successor Cuellar left off without spoiling the momentum of the talks.</td>
<td>The United States renews her diplomatic efforts for a settlement and visits the triangle of GR-CYP-TUR. Resolution 649 /90 calls for the two sides / representatives to be treated on equal footing – Denktash shifts from federalism to confederalism.</td>
<td>The 1st round is based on a series of shuttle mediation (proximity talks). The “set of ideas” is thus far the most detailed and comprehensive settlement plan that expands on all the high level agreements and perspectives of the two sides as the talks continue through the last phase.</td>
<td>Very little is achieved in the first phase as major regional and geopolitical changes are taking place. Very little is done to bridge the divergence of visions federalism / confederalism – but they agree to continue further for tactical purposes.</td>
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<td>2nd Round</td>
<td>The same methodology of proximity and direct/indirect talks between the two leaders and their delegations continues. A method is used of opening and finalizing an agreement on one issue at a time before tackling the next one.</td>
<td>Talks are deemed “successful,” at least in moving the process from the first to the second round. However, low confidence and mistrust have not been addressed constructively for decades. Domestic opposition and fears for a bad solution become an obstacle for Vassiliou.</td>
<td>The framework of the proximity talks in 1991 become the core structure on the “set of ideas.” In this round of talks the mediators and the negotiators focus on the issues of territorial adjustments (Ghali Map) and internally displaced persons – refugees (right of return and the right of property).</td>
<td>The two leaders in direct meetings with the SG on Aug. 12-14 reach an agreement on the issues of territory and displaced persons – A map is presented to the UN Security Council. The SG is optimistic that in the third meeting the two sides are likely to reach a comprehensive agreement.</td>
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<td>New York 1992</td>
<td>Boutros-Ghali follows the same perspective outlined above in order to engage the parties in face-to-face talks. In his assessment of the various phases he concludes that confidence between the leaders needs to be restored before moving forward on a final plan.</td>
<td>The UN Security Council adopts resolution 774-92, endorsing the work achieved on the two issues thus far. Pressure is also added that if the talks fail, the SG can adopt alternative methods. The set of ideas are perceived positively by most of the constituent parties in the two communities. Nationalists are outraged by the talks.</td>
<td>As the two issues reach agreeable range, the UN mediator and his team address the rest of the issues on the “ideas,” including: overall objectives, guiding principles, security and guarantee, economic development, transitional arrangements and long-term implementations.</td>
<td>The two sides accept the set of ideas and agree on nearly 90 out of 100 paragraphs that the overall framework agreement is consistent but the SG assesses that the lack of confidence between the two sides could lead to crisis and rejection of the “ideas” and looks for methods to boost confidence between the two leaders.</td>
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<td>(Jul. 15 – Aug. 14)</td>
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<td>3rd Round</td>
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<td>(Oct. 28 – Nov. 11)</td>
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<td>Confidence-Building Measures</td>
<td>Boutros-Ghali introduces a set of confidence building measures in consultation with both sides to go hand-in-hand with his set of ideas and increase the likelihood for a final settlement.</td>
<td>UN mediation team concludes that the lack of confidence is perhaps the main reason that bars the talks for a comprehensive settlement. The GC side runs a successful campaign to internationalize the problem and maintain the embargo on TRNC. US envoy Joe Clark highlights the mutual benefit of the CBMs that could possibly break the deadlock.</td>
<td>CBMs could serve as a catalyst in the negotiations process. The measures include themes ranging from water supplies, education cooperation, cultural exchanges, cooperation in health, environment and various industries, unmanning sections of the buffer zone, and the opening of the city of Varosia under UN control.</td>
<td>The two sides fail to build constituents and party support to accept the CBMs. In Jan-Feb. 1994, both sides signal their acceptance of the CBMs and the negotiations for a comprehensive solution collapse despite local opposition and lack of enthusiasm to implement them collaboratively.</td>
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<td>Introduction 1992 (Nov. 24)</td>
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<td>1st Phase (Dec. 1993 – Apr. 1994)</td>
<td>Attempts to integrate the CBMs by the UN with the “set of ideas” process.</td>
<td>CBMs are used as tactics by each side to gain time, maintain their positions and try to project their longstanding injustices.</td>
<td>Several committees and sub-committees work to lay the groundwork for eliminating mistrust. UN mediators integrate CBMs and set of ideas into a peace plan.</td>
<td>The UN is unable to secure the formal signature of the leaders once they consent verbally that have accepted the CBMs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Phase (May 1994 – May 1995)</td>
<td>Last attempts by Clark to break the deadlock.</td>
<td>International diplomatic efforts are made to gain supporters for their cause, which dooms the other side as intransigent.</td>
<td>The SG puts forth more pressure through the UN SC and threatens to suspend the UN good offices’ role in Cyprus if the talks fail.</td>
<td>The GC side wins the diplomatic battle. The UN SG blames TC for the failure and lack of will to negotiate or yield.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Initiatives</td>
<td>Contacts (Initiator / Purpose)</td>
<td>Context</td>
<td>Characteristics of Initiative</td>
<td>Impact: (short / long-term) and Party Positions</td>
</tr>
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<td>-------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Mediation 1997</td>
<td>UN SG Kofi Annan initiates UN mediation in his search for a breakthrough after the collapse of the CBMs in 1995. Preliminary contacts are coordinated by UN envoy Diego Cordovez.</td>
<td>Vassiliou is replaced by Clerides who condemns the CBMs despite his initial support. Clerides signs a joint defense doctrine with Greece and enters Cyprus into the military defense umbrella of Greece. In March 1995 the EU agrees to open accession talks with Cyprus following the rejection of CBMS and set of ideas by Denktash. Demonstrations by GC in the buffer zone lead to the killing of two GCs. Hopes for talks are suspended and polarized. In January 1997, the R. of Cyprus announces the purchase of a Russian S330 defense missile system and immediately Turkey threatens military intervention if the deal occurs. US is concerned about confrontation between GR-TUR in Aegean.</td>
<td>The initiative is built on UNSC resolutions. TC position calls for (i) international recognition of the TRNC and confederation type solution; and (ii) for the R. of Cyprus to withdraw her application for accession to the EU as a precondition for further talks. GC position insists on a federal, bi-zonal, bi-communal solution with one international recognition, sovereignty and identity with parallel vision to enter the EU and increase her leverage position in talks.</td>
<td>Outcomes are inconclusive – both sides insist on their positions. Gordovez officially claims that the collapse is due to Denktash’s unwillingness to negotiate. TRNC continues efforts for recognition and the R. of Cyprus continues her efforts to enter the EU as a whole island. The two sides come together reluctantly even though many believe that Clerides’ and Denktash’s old friendship could help move things forward but the one tries to entrap the other for more concessions. New York and Geneva mark the end of collective efforts by 5 UN SGs to break the deadlock in Cyprus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Rounds New York (July 9-13) New York</td>
<td>Goal is to break the deadlock and animosity that followed the collapse of CBMs (1995-97). Some of the talks are face-to-face (direct) with preliminary contacts between the two sides’ mediation teams and the UN envoy. US and UK also send their envoys to assist.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2nd Round Glion, Geneva (Aug.11-16)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peace Initiatives</td>
<td>Contacts (Initiator / Purpose)</td>
<td>Context</td>
<td>Characteristics of Initiative</td>
<td>Impact: (short / long-term) and Party Positions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Holbrooke Initiative 1998 (May)</td>
<td>US Ambassadors Richard Holbrooke and Thomas Miller visit the triangle of GR-CYP-TUR for preliminary meetings to link the EU accession process with a settlement. The purpose is to initiate talks without preconditions.</td>
<td>End of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Application for lessons learned from the Dayton Accords and a larger applicability to Cyprus. Linkage of the R. of Cyprus and Turkey’s EU orientations with a settlement.</td>
<td>Exchange of positions: (i) Denktash’s special relationships between TRNC-Turkey and RC-GR based on confederation and a continuation of the 1960 treaty of guarantee. (ii) Clerides’ position favors one federal government full member of the EU.</td>
<td>Initiative collapses within a short time. Holbrook blames Denktash for the deadlock and accuses both parties of holding to their ancient history for so long. Holbrook’s remarks outrage many leaders in Cyprus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proximity Talks New York 1999 (Nov. 14) Continued until April 24, and resumed in Sep. 2000 Geneva Round (Oct 31 – Nov.10)</td>
<td>UN shuttle diplomacy, under the auspices of Kofi Annan (1999) and Alvaro de Soto, mediator – direct talks with the use of “non-papers” and “talking points.” New round of proximity talks (indirect) and involvement of Thomas Weston and Sir David Haney.</td>
<td>The G-8 meeting in June 1999 adopts resolution 1250, calling for the initiation of genuine negotiations. UNSC adopts G-8 resolution. In December, Turkey’s application is accepted by the EU but temporarily revised to an Accession Partnership Protocol, which Turkey rejects. Attempts to break the deadlock on constitutional and security matters.</td>
<td>Exploratory meetings to identify party positions and prepare the ground for a series of exchanges of non-papers between the two sides to avoid collapse of the talks. The UN introduces the term “constituent polities.” Parties’ positions are maintained as in the previous initiative - one state and one sovereignty and two states and two sovereignies.</td>
<td>Parties insist on their positions. Deadlock on constitutional issues but some hopes that some common ground can be achieved on territory, property and security. The UN brokers 5 rounds of proximity talks and they finally collapse after Denktash withdraws from talks because the non-papers approach does not make reference to confederation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Initiatives</td>
<td>Contacts (Initiator / Purpose)</td>
<td>Context</td>
<td>Characteristics of Initiative</td>
<td>Impact: (short / long-term) and Party Positions</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denktash-Clerides Initiative</td>
<td>Denktash’s letter to Clerides for face-to-face talks is reciprocated by Clerides and both meet on the basis of “good will.” Denktash claims that talks should take place without the presence of 3rd parties who have not managed to break the deadlock all these years. In the end he accepts de-Soto.</td>
<td>EU-R of Cyprus accession process comes to a near end and efforts are intensified by the UN to find a solution prior to accession (pressure from the EU). Limited role is given to de Soto during early stages. Turkey claims if the R of Cyprus enters the EU without a solution, it will annex TRNC – Greece is ready to veto entire accession of 10 if Cyprus is excluded.</td>
<td>Denktash approaches face-to-face talks with emphasis on CBMs that he rejected earlier. Clerides insists on issues of substance that are based on the five rounds of proximity talks. Both exchange some agendas on the various issues and agree to discuss the items until a comprehensive settlement is reached on all issues during a series of direct talks.</td>
<td>Both agree on direct talks in Nicosia with top advisers based on the progress of the proximity talks (UN mediation, 1999) to build on issues they agree on and try to bridge the gap on issues they disagree on. The two sides continue talks without bridging common ground on constitutional issues, sovereignty, and sharing of power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Phase Nicisia 2001 (December)</td>
<td>Direct talks between Clerides and Denktash (and their top advisers). De Soto puts together a team of experts to work on aspects of the talks. Negotiating teams are also put together who are experts on technocratic issues.</td>
<td>The TC position read as: establishment of a new state with the consent of two equal sovereign states with limited central sovereignty; equal representation in the central government; rotating presidency; continuation of the treaty of guarantee; exchange of properties.</td>
<td>The GC position calls for a strong federal government with two constituent states; return of property to about 73%; 27% ratio, return of a significant number of GC refugees from Morphou to Varosia, abolishing the treaty of guarantee and demilitarization and return of nearly 50,000 settlers.</td>
<td>The talks are interrupted and remain inconclusive as Denktash undergoes heart surgery and the technical committees do not meet to prepare the ground for further talks; In the meantime, de-Soto’s team compiles the positions of each side into a new document.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Phase Direct Talks Nicosia, Paris and NY 2002 (Jan 6 – Oct 4)</td>
<td>Direct talks between Clerides and Denktash (and their top advisers). De Soto puts together a team of experts to work on aspects of the talks. Negotiating teams are also put together who are experts on technocratic issues.</td>
<td>The TC position read as: establishment of a new state with the consent of two equal sovereign states with limited central sovereignty; equal representation in the central government; rotating presidency; continuation of the treaty of guarantee; exchange of properties.</td>
<td>The GC position calls for a strong federal government with two constituent states; return of property to about 73%; 27% ratio, return of a significant number of GC refugees from Morphou to Varosia, abolishing the treaty of guarantee and demilitarization and return of nearly 50,000 settlers.</td>
<td>The talks are interrupted and remain inconclusive as Denktash undergoes heart surgery and the technical committees do not meet to prepare the ground for further talks; In the meantime, de-Soto’s team compiles the positions of each side into a new document.</td>
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<td>Contacts (Initiator / Purpose)</td>
<td>Context</td>
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<td>Impact: (short / long-term) and Party Positions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Annan Plan 1st Version 2002 (Nov. 11)</td>
<td>The first plan is developed by de-Soto and his team in consultation with Annan – based on the positions of the parties since Cuellar’s set of ideas, UN mediation and the most recent proximity talks. The purpose is to break the deadlock and create a new opportunity to enter the EU as a united country. The mediation team is assisted by US, UK and EU diplomats.</td>
<td>Change in government in Turkey brings to power PM T. Erdogan who hopes to bring Turkey’s European aspirations on the agenda of the EU parallel to the Cyprus accession process. The lack of a solution is counter-productive for Turkey - Erdogan exercises pressure on Denktash to show more flexibility. Parties organize demonstrations in TRNC for a solution and accession in opposition to Denktash and civil organizations, which adds more pressure on the TC side to reexamine her position.</td>
<td>Party positions are similar to those of direct talks, including several changes and adjustments that each side provides de-Soto and his team. Timelines: The UN tries to stay on course with the EU accession deadlines for the enlargement process: EU Summit in Copenhagen (Dec 12-13) and decision for Cyprus to enter the EU with or without a solution; Accession Treaty is scheduled for (April 16, 2003); and full membership to EU (May 1, 2004).</td>
<td>Both sides accept the plan as a framework for further negotiations. Both sides use a tactical approach to demonstrate that they will continue with talks based on good faith. Tactical games also entrap both sides into the process, which allow for very little flexibility in abandoning the process. If parties decide to do so, a report from the UN SG to the Security Council could come with significant consequences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annan Plan 2nd Version (Dec. 10)</td>
<td>Following modification and changes, de-Soto and his team submit a revised plan.</td>
<td>Turkey pressures Denktash to accept the plan and she looks forward to the EU Summit in (Copenhagen) to get a deadline for EU accession talks. (confidential and temporary access to Plan I and II with Author’s consent not to use for publication or reference)</td>
<td>Clerides and Denktash provide their modifications but main issues remain unabridged; They are in favor of direct or indirect talks but not UN arbitration.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Initiatives</td>
<td>Contacts (Initiator / Purpose)</td>
<td>Context</td>
<td>Characteristics of Initiative</td>
<td>Impact: (short / long-terms) and Party Positions</td>
</tr>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annan Plan 3rd Version</td>
<td>UN secretary General –</td>
<td>Parallel meetings between GC political elders and Benktash with top elders in Ankara.</td>
<td>Direct talks on various aspects</td>
<td>UN invites both leaders to meet in the Hague</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicosia (Feb. 22-23)</td>
<td>Direct meetings between Papadopoulos-Dentash</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 10 Hague</td>
<td>UN Secretary General</td>
<td>The EU accession process was near completion. UN efforts to embed two simultaneous but separate referenda</td>
<td>Substantive talks on the work of technical committees. March, 2003 was set as a timeline for parties to deposit their revised positions on various issues.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicosia Round</td>
<td>UN Mediation Team</td>
<td>Changes in TC leadership Talat and Serdar Dentash lead the negotiations</td>
<td>Parties provide suggestions and proposals to revised Annan Version III during the talks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 25, 2004, Lucerne</td>
<td>revised 4th plan to a fifth one during last days of talks</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Initiatives</td>
<td>Contacts (Initiator / Purpose)</td>
<td>Context</td>
<td>Characteristics of Initiative</td>
<td>Impact: (short / long-terms) and Party Positions</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paris Meeting</td>
<td>Face to face talks Annan-Tassos</td>
<td>Election of Christophias</td>
<td>Direct talks on substantive talks: Power Sharing, Property, Economy, EU matters, Security, Territory, Territorial Adjustments and Turkish Nationals</td>
<td>Technical committees and Working groups prepare the ground and agendas for discussion – parties position on issues. Some are bridged some are far apart left to top leaders to discuss during direct talks. Set of Confidence building Measures announced June 20 and July 25 CBM packages. Most of CBMs are stalled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 8</td>
<td>Pergenstock Nicosia Talks</td>
<td>Christophias-Talat Talks</td>
<td>Cypriot Led and Cypriot Own Direct Talks and Parallel talks with Top Advisors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christophias -Talat Initiative Feb., 2008 Present</td>
<td>Reciprocal gestures between Talat and Christophias</td>
<td>2008-2010 more than 50 direct meetings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 22, 2008 Technical Committees and Working Groups</td>
<td>Supported by UNSG good Offices and appointmen of Alexander D as mediator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2010 Present</td>
<td>Direct, face-to-face Talks</td>
<td>Dr. Dervis Eroglu is elected as President of TRNC</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Direct Talks between Christophias and Eroglu</td>
<td>Direct and Indirect meetings with UN Rep. and UN Secretary General in NY.</td>
<td>2012 Impasse after nearly 40 and more direct meetings in Nicosia and NY.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B

Scalogram: Peacemaking Initiatives (1955-2010)

List of Tables

Table B-1: Timeline of Initiatives and Peacemaking Phases / Outcomes
Table B-2: Short-term to long-term peacemaking processes over the span of four chronological periods
Table B-3: Scalogram of Peacemaking Initiatives (Processes and Outcomes)
Table B-1: Timeline of Initiatives and Peacemaking Phases / Outcomes

### Key:

- (SG) Signaling
- (PC) Preliminary Contacts
- (PN) Pre-Negotiations
- (SN) Substantive Negotiations
- (AI) Accord Implementation
- (PA) Post-Accord Implementation

See Table B-2 for abbreviation of Initiatives
Table B-1: (Continues)
Table B-2: Short-term to long-term peacemaking processes over the span of four chronological periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Initiative</th>
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<tr>
<td>Period I</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Eden Initiative (EI)</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Inter-Communal Talks (IC)</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>P. Guellar Initiative (GI)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Harding Initiat. (HI)</td>
<td>1972-74</td>
<td>Inter-Communal Talks (IC)</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Draft Framework (DF)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MacMillan Init. (MI)</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Vienna Talks (VT)</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Indirect Talks (ID)</td>
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<td>1964</td>
<td>London Conference (LC)</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Denktash-Kyprianou (DK)</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>UN Mediation (UNM)</td>
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<td>Ball Initiative (BI)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>R. Holbrooke Init. (HI)</td>
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<td>Acheson Plan (AP)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>1999-00</td>
<td>Proximity Talks (PT)</td>
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<td>1965</td>
<td>Galo P. Initiative (GPI)</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Inter-Communal Talks (IC)</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Clerides-Denktash Talks. (CD)</td>
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<td>1967</td>
<td>Cyrus V. Prop. (CVP)</td>
<td>1983</td>
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<td>Annan Peace Plan (AP)</td>
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<td>Aide Memoir (AM)</td>
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<td>Denktash Proposals (DP)</td>
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<td>Kyprianou Framework. (KF)</td>
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<td>Working Points (WP)</td>
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<td>- (08-09)Direct Talks</td>
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<td>Proximity Talks (PT)</td>
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<td>- (10- current)Christofias-Eroglu</td>
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### Table B-3: Scalogram of Peacemaking Initiatives (Processes and Outcomes)

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<tr>
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<th>Preliminary Contacts (PC)</th>
<th>Pre-Negotiations (PN)</th>
<th>Substantive Negotiations (SN)</th>
<th>Accord Implementation (AI)</th>
<th>Post-Accord Implementation (PAI)</th>
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<td>Rackliffe Prop. (RP)</td>
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<td>1957 Hugh Proposals (HP)</td>
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<td>MacMillan Init. (MI)</td>
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<td>1957-59 London-Zurich A. (LZA)</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>1963 Makarios Prop. (MP)</td>
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<td>1964 London Conference (LC)</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Ball Initiative (BI)</td>
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<td>1974 Geneva Conference (GC)</td>
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Table B-3: Cont.

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<td>Signaling (SG)</td>
<td>Preliminary Contacts (PC)</td>
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<td>Accord Implementation (AI)</td>
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<td>32</td>
<td>1991 Indirect Talks (ID)</td>
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<td>Fram. Proposals</td>
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<td>1992 Ghalis Set of Ideas (GSI)</td>
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<td>1992-94 Confidence B. M. (CBM)</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>1997 UN Mediation (UNM)</td>
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<td>36</td>
<td>1998 R. Holbrooke Init. (HI)</td>
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<td>2001 Clerides-Denktash T (CD)</td>
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<td>2002-04 Annan Peace Plan (AP)</td>
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<td>Partial</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>2008 Christofias-Talat I. (CT) -09 Direct Talks (DT)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>(Present - Impasse)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
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APPENDIX C

Party Positions and Electoral Results: (1990s and 2000s)

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Table C-2: Political Parties: Orientation; Ideology; Endgame Solution
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   (b) Turkish Cypriot
Table C-3: Political Parties and Parliamentary Elections
   (a) Greek Cypriot
   (b) Turkish Cypriot

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[1] Interviews with Top political Leaders in Cyprus 2006-2010
[2] Turkish Cypriot Electoral Commission (TRNC)
Table C-1: Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Political Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Greek Cypriot</th>
<th>Turkish Cypriot</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Rally Δημοκρατικός Συναγερμός (DISY)</td>
<td>Communal Democracy Party Toplumcu Demokrasi Partisi, (TDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Party of Working People Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζόμενου Λαού, AKEL</td>
<td>Communal Liberation Party Toplumcu Kurtuluş Partisi, (TKP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party Δημοκρατικό Κόμμα, (DIKO)</td>
<td>Peace and Democracy Movement Barış ve Demokrasi Hareketi (BDH)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement for Social Democracy Κινήμα Σοσιαλδημοκρατών, (EDEK)</td>
<td>Democratic Party Demokrat Parti, (DP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Ecological and Environmental Movement Κίνημα Οικολόγων Περιβαλλοντιστών; (KOP)</td>
<td>Freedom and Reform Party Özgürlük ve Reform Partisi, (ÖRP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>The European Party Evropaiko Komma, Европаикό Κόμμα, (Evroko) (Merge of New Horizons and European Democracy)</td>
<td>National Unity Party Ulusal Birlik Partisi, (UBP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Democrats Ενωμένοι Δημοκράτες, (EDI)</td>
<td>Republican Turkish Party Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi, (CTP)</td>
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<td>European Democracy Evropaiki Dimokratia, (EvroDi)</td>
<td>New Party Yeni Parti (YP)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>New Cyprus Party Yeni Kıbrıs Partisi (YKP)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Cyprus Justice Party Kıbrıs Adalet Partisi (KAP)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>United Cyprus Party Birleşik Kıbrıs Partisi (BKP)</td>
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**Table C-2 (a): Political Parties: Orientation; Ideology; Endgame Solution**

**Party Agendas based on Endgame Solution**

(Greek Cypriot Parties)

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<th>Party</th>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Endgame Solution</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DISY</td>
<td>Right and Center Right</td>
<td>Conservative; Liberal Conservatism</td>
<td>Bi-Zonal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKEL</td>
<td>Left</td>
<td>Progressive – Euro-communism and Marxist-Leninist</td>
<td>Bi-Zonal (Strong) Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIKO</td>
<td>Centrism (with variance to left and right)</td>
<td>Euro-socialism and Democrats</td>
<td>Maximalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDEK</td>
<td>Center and left</td>
<td>Social Democracy and Democratic Socialism</td>
<td>Maximalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ED</td>
<td>Right-Wing Populist</td>
<td>Neoliberal-conservatism</td>
<td>Maximalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDI</td>
<td>Center and center left</td>
<td>Liberalism</td>
<td>Bi-Zonal</td>
</tr>
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<td>Green</td>
<td>Centrist</td>
<td>Global Green</td>
<td>Bi-Zonal Fed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EvroDi</td>
<td>Right</td>
<td>Liberal populist</td>
<td>Maximalist</td>
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Table C-2 (b): Political Parties: Orientation; Ideology; Endgame Solution

**Party Agendas based on Endgame Solution**

(Turkish Cypriot Parties)

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<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Endgame Solution</th>
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<tr>
<td>CTP</td>
<td>Center-Left</td>
<td>Social Democracy</td>
<td>Bi-Zonal (Fed.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(TDP) – Merge of PDM and CLP</td>
<td>Left</td>
<td>Social Democratic</td>
<td>Bi-Zonal (Fed.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDM</td>
<td>Left</td>
<td>Progressive</td>
<td>Strong Fed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLP</td>
<td>Center right</td>
<td>Liberal Conservative</td>
<td>Status Quo Div.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Center left</td>
<td>Social Liberal</td>
<td>Status Quo – (Loose Federation)</td>
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<td>FRP</td>
<td>Right wing</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Confederation</td>
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<td>Turkish Nationalism</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Social Demcr.</td>
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<td>NUP</td>
<td>Center left</td>
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<td>Confederation</td>
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<td>NP</td>
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<td>Democratic Soc.</td>
<td>Bi-Zonal Federation</td>
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<td>NCP</td>
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<td>UCP</td>
<td>Right</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>Maximalist</td>
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<td>CJP</td>
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<td>Political Parties and Parliamentary Elections</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>Greek Cypriot Leadership Parliamentary Elections</td>
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<tr>
<td>AKEL</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>31.1 %</td>
<td>34.7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISY</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>30.3 %</td>
<td>34 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIKO</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>17.9 %</td>
<td>14.8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDEK</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>8.9 %</td>
<td>6.5 %</td>
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<td>EDY</td>
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<td>1.6 %</td>
<td>2.6 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUROKO</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2.8 %</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
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<td>2.0 %</td>
<td>2.0 %</td>
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### Political Parties and Parliamentary Elections

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<th>Turkish Cypriot Leadership Parliamentary Elections</th>
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<td>CTP-(BG)</td>
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<td>UBP</td>
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<td>ORP</td>
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<td>BKP</td>
<td>2.42%</td>
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<td>YP</td>
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<tr>
<td>HISP (MAP)</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
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<td>TKP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>Less than 0.5%</td>
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</table>
APPENDIX D

Chronology of Three Peacemaking Initiatives

List of Figures

Figure D-1: Factors contributing towards a Deadlock or a start-up of a peacemaking process
Initiative I

Boutros-Ghali’s “Set of Ideas” (1992)

Signaling (1999)

(Jan. 9, 1992) UN S-G Boutros-Ghali sends letters to Vassiliou and Denktash to start talks on the “set of ideas” (that were formulated in the previous initiative in 1991 and could serve as a framework to jump start talks again) for a comprehensive settlement.

(January) US president Bush and Secretary of State James Baker send a special envoy to Cyprus-Greece-Turkey to assess the situation in support of the new initiative by the UN S-G Boutros-Ghali – supported by the UN SC permanent members.

(Jan 20-21) Shuttle diplomacy and meetings in New York between Boutros-Ghali and Vassiliou and Boutros-Ghali and Denktash to assess the willingness of the two leaders to talk or “to get down to business,” and start preliminary talks.

Preliminary Contacts

(Feb 4) UN special envoys visit and start preliminary contact between the two sides. Denktash refuses to meet with them leading to a temporary termination.

(March 17) USA renews her involvement after the request of Greek and GC diplomats, who send their special envoy Letsky. A week later, UK renews her involvement to jump-start the process with a letter from PM John Major to Turkish Foreign Minister Tzetin.

(March 25) Meeting between Boutros-Ghali and Vassiliou.

(March 30) Meeting between Boutros-Ghali and Denktash.

(March 31) US President George Bush urges Turkey to take an initiative towards breaking the impasse.
**Turning Points: Breaking the Deadlock**

(April 3) (UNSC resolution 750) The Security Council expresses its dissatisfaction for the lack of progress in the talks. In the meantime, the application for accession of Cyprus to the EEC is accepted.

(April 4) The President of Turkey, Mr. Ozal, and Prime Minister, Mr. Demirel, agree that Turkey should show some flexibility for talks because Cyprus is an obstacle for Turkey and blocks any diplomatic movement for Turkey. (Translated: Agon Newspaper cited in Vassiliou 2007)

**Preliminary Contacts to Pre-Negotiations: First Round of Talks (May-June)**

(May 5) Letter of UN S-G to Cyprus-Greece-Turkey to start talks on the basis of UNSC Resolution 750 and set of ideas as a framework.

(June 12) Shuttle diplomacy continues with UN, US and UK envoys.

(June 18-23) First round of pre-negotiations - Ghalis Ideas - are circulated along with a map regarding the territorial adjustments.

**Substantive Talks**

(July 13 – August 14) Second round of talks. Indirect format based on the UNSC Resolution 750. Parties begin with Boutros-Ghali’s map regarding territorial adjustments under the control of each ‘constituent state’ and the percentages regarding the return of refugees.

(August 10-11) The two sides continue talks regarding the constitutional arrangements of the agreement and issue of sovereignty (and sovereignly states) – a very difficult issue that divides the parties.

(August 12) Direct talks with leaders and top advisers on substantive issues. The set of ideas becomes a framework to work on and revised based on a compromised approach.

(Oct 28 – Nov 10) Third round of talks with 10 direct meetings between Vasilliou-Denktash.

**Outcomes**
During this time, the UN produces the set of ideas as a compromise approach to the talks. They develop a three columned document for the talks including the GC side on the issues in the one column, the UN in the middle, and the TS position on the third. In his report to the SC, the UN SG claims that the positions of the TS side depart from the set of ideas.

UN SC Resolution 789 (Nov 25, 1992) proposes the two communities adopt a series of CBMs on the ground to restore trust and help overcome the deadlock.

The talks collapse due to a lack of efforts to bridge the gap between the two sides and the blame game starts. Initially, the set of ideas creates momentum for a breakthrough. However, the situation on the ground is much different. Vasiliou faces significant opposition (center / center-right and liberal-conservative parties) on his side to reject the plan. Some GC parties call it a sell out to the Turks. The TC parties, with the exception of the left-wing parties, support Denktash’s view point to abort from the plan.
Initiative II

Kofi Annan Peace Plan (2002-04)

The first version of the Annan plan was officially channeled to the two sides in Cyprus on November 11, 2002 (after a series of proximity and direct talks in 2000 and 2001 between Clerides and Denktash, mediation teams led to an impasse in bridging the gap for an agreed framework), led by the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and entitled “Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem,” (Annan 2003) coined as the “Annan Plan” in short by local Cypriots.180

(June) At the EU Summit, the Council approves the successful completion of the EU-Cyprus accession negotiation and Cyprus’ participation in the Euro-parliamentary elections of 2004.

Signaling (2001)

(July) Denktash rejects the invitation by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to resume proximity talks. Denktash signals to Clerides for the two to meet in Cyprus. The two exchange a series of letters.

(Dec.) The first meeting between Denktash and Clerides takes place in the house of the UN ambassador in Nicosia. The two leaders agree to initiate direct talks in January.

Preliminary Meetings

(Dec. 5) Denktash hosts Clerides (and his family) to a dinner at his house in Nicosia, the first of its kind. UN envoy Alvaro De Soto attends the meeting.

(Dec. 29) Clerides reciprocates Denktash’s offer and hosts Denktash (and close family) to a dinner in his house in Nicosia in the presence of the UN Ambassador to Cyprus.

Pre-Negotiations (2002)
(Jan. 11) Meeting between the two leaders in the residence of the UN representative in Nicosia.

(Jan. 16) Direct talks begin between the two leaders.

(Jan. - Jun.) Direct talks continue between leaders and their top advisors, with both sides exchanging proposals on positions and issues but without any substantial outcome. The UN receives the proposals from both sides without making any suggestions / recommendations.

(Nov. 11) Kofi Annan, Alvaro de Soto and the mediation team incorporate the proposals and deliver the combined document – a framework for a solution (Annan Peace plan version 1)

Substantive Talks

(Nov. 18) Clerides accepts the initiation of substantial talks on the basis of the Annan peace-settlement framework.

(Nov 27) Denktash agrees as well.

(Dec. 10) The two sides receive a revised peace plan (Annan 2) during the EU summit in Copenhagen.

Stagnation point

At the Intergovernmental meeting, the 15 EU leaders agree to accept the Republic of Cyprus in the May 2004 enlargement, united or divided. Denktash withdraws from the negotiations with Clerides as a protest the the EU’s decision.


Turning points

The decision of the EU Commission to accept the republic of Cyprus, (EU Enlargement 2004) with or without a settlement, adds more pressure on TRNC leader Denktash as well as Turkey for concessions. Turkey and TRNC leadership claims that the accession of Cyprus and Turkey should take place simultaneously and the political problem in Cyprus should be settled first. In the meantime, Tasos Papadopoulos is elected president of the Republic of Cyprus on the premise to continue the talks for a
settlement based on a “federal, bi-zonal, bi-communal” basis. He is supported by a coalition of center and center left parties.

2003 (Feb.) Tasos Papadopoulos is elected President of the Republic (He replaced Clerides); Kofi Annan visits Turkey, Greece and Cyprus as an attempt to expedite the talks.

(Feb. 26) The two sides receive the revised peace plan (Annan III).

(Mar. 10) Both sides accept Annan’s invitation to come to the Hague. Substantive negotiations resume at the Hague (and collapse a few days later) after disagreements on issues and fear by the TC side that the GC side is using the EU leverage on her side.181

UN SG introduces the idea of arbitration as a method to “bypass Denktash’s inflexibility” (anonymous interview). Also, the idea for two separate and simultaneous referenda to accept / reject the final version of the plan is flowing on the table.

Intermediate Period Between Phases II and III – Temporary Impasse182

2003 (Apr. 16) Papadopoulos signs the accession treaty of Cyprus to the EU during the Greek Presidency in Athens.

Turkey starts to change her position and PM Erdogan looks for a bargaining option.

(Apr. 23) With the approval of Ankara and the Turkish army, Denktash relaxes border control: the opening of two passages in the capital city enables the crossover of Cypriots from both sides after 29 years of complete division.

(Dec. 14) Mehmet Ali Talat, the leader of a major left wing party (CTP), wins the parliamentary elections in the TRNC.

2004 US President George Bush sends letters to Papadopoulos and Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan to reconsider the UN Secretary-General’s current efforts for a political solution (or peace plan).

(Feb.) The Turkish Council for National Security accepts the Annan plan as a framework for departure and to resume negotiations.

Substantive Talks Resume
2004 (Feb. 5) Kofi Annan invites Papadopoulos, Denktash and the prime ministers of Greece, Turkey and Great Britain to multilateral negotiations at the UN.

(Feb. 10) Beginning of multilateral negotiations in New York.

(Feb. 13) The five sides agree to support substantial bi-lateral talks in Nicosia between February 19 and March 22. If the two sides do not agree on a political arrangement by March 22, then Greece and Turkey will enter the negotiations starting on March 29. The UN Secretary-General also declares that if the four fail to reach a negotiated solution, then he is going to complete the comprehensive peace plan and set it forward for two separate referenda on both sides.

(Mar. 22) The bi-lateral negotiations on the content of the third version of the comprehensive “Annan Plan” negotiations are terminated as inconclusive.

**Substantial Negotiations and Accord Completions / Implementation**

(Mar. 24) Quadrilateral negotiations start in Burgenstock, Switzerland.

(Mar. 29) A revised fourth plan is delivered to all parties.¹⁸³

(Mar. 30) The parties submit their changes to Kofi Annan and his team.

(Apr. 1) A final fifth version of the plan is received by all sides. A UN mediation team completes the documents via arbitration by taking into account the last proposals of the parties. Bilateral/quadrilateral negotiations are terminated.

(Apr. 24) Two separate referenda take place on both sides. Turkish Cypriots accept the plan by a ratio of about two to one and Greek Cypriots reject the plan by a ratio of about three to one.

**Initiative III**

Christophias-Talat (2008-10)

**Signaling** (2008)
(Feb. 24) A personal phone-call from Talat to Christophias - both leaders agree to meet at the earliest possible day (Talat’s Press Office).

(Feb 25) A speech by Christophias the night of his election to his supporters: “We are looking forward to a substantive cooperation that would serve the best interests of both communities… we are working for a just solution… we extend a hand of friendship for cooperation to our Turkish Cypriot compatriots and their leadership. I call on them to work together for our common cause for the best of Cyprus and its people.” (February 25, 2008 – Christophias presidential campaign office: Author’s Translation).

(Feb 25) A press statement issued by Mr. Talat to congratulate his former comrade and express to him his vision that a “new chapter” in Cyprus has started. (Talat’s Press Office)

**Preliminary Contacts**

(The two leaders agree to initiate preliminary meetings between their top advisers during their phone conversation on Feb. 24)

(Mar. 12) First meeting between Mr. George Iacovou (Christophias’ presidential commissioner) and Mr. Ozdil Nami (Talat’s advisor) in the office of Mr. Michael Møller (Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in Cyprus). In coordination with their bosses the two advisors set March 21st as the date for a meeting between Christophias and Talat.

(Mar. 21) First official meeting between Christofias and Talat as leaders of the two communities since the election of the former takes place. The two agree to meet again in three months to review the work of the working groups and technical committees and to start full-fledged negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (Authors Records: Press Statement read by Mr. Møller March 21, 2008).

**Preparatory Work: Decision to Continue Forward with the Meetings**

(Apr. 3) The two G-C and T-C majors of Nicosia, in coordination with Christophias and Talat, open up the historic Ledra Street crossing at the center of Nicosia between the former Turkish and Greek sectors. It had been closed since 1964 when it became one of the first symbols for partition and sectarian division in the relations of the two communities in Cyprus.\(^{184}\)

(Apr. 22) Beginning of the preparatory work of working groups and technical committees consisting of experts and diplomats from the two communities in the presence of UN officials.

(May 23) Second meeting between Christophias and Talat in the presence of Mr. Taye-Brook Zerihoun (UN Secretary General Special Representative in Cyprus UNFICYP Chief of Mission). Both sides agreed to a Joint Statement: “reaffirmed their commitment to a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with political equality, as defined by relevant Security Council resolutions.” “This partnership will have a Federal Government with a single international personality, as well as a Turkish Cypriot Constituent State and a Greek Cypriot Constituent State, which will be of equal status.” (UNFICYP Press Office)

**From Preliminary Contacts to Pre-negotiations**

(Jul. 25) Third meeting between Christophias and Talat. The two issue a joint statement to start direct talks and to establish a direct line of communication. A set of 19 Confidence Building Measures (CBM) are endorsed – the preparation for the CBMs takes place at the level of technical committees and working groups.

**Pre-Negotiations Through Direct Talks: Setting up a Framework**

(Sept. 3) First meeting under the title of direct talks between Christophias and Tatat with Alexander Downer (UN SG Special Adviser / Mediator) and Mr. Taye-Brook Zerihoun.

(Sept 08 – Jun. 2009) Direct talks continue with more than 30 meetings between the two leaders on Constitutions and Administration issues (Sept 2008); Presidency issues (Oct. 08); Federal Structure (Oct. 08); Legislative Structure (Nov.); Property Issues (Jan-Mar 09); European Issues (Mar.-Apr. 09).\(^{185}\)

(June 26, 2010) The two leaders decide to open-up the crossing at Limnitis / Yesilirmak point after a series of reluctant talks on the issue since November 2008. The European commission president, José Manuel Barroso, states the day before during his visit to the island that the opening of the crossing will "send a good signal." "Ordinary Cypriots, they ask themselves how can they [the leaders] achieve a comprehensive settlement if they cannot agree on such a specific issue." The EU Commission also promises funds to
assist in the completion of the construction of the crossing point after four decades of isolation between the two communities in the area. (The Guardian, June 26, 2008)

(July 17) Direct talks continue on issues related to security, guarantees and demilitarization.

(July 23) Direct talks regarding the presence and status of foreign nationals from Turkey and other immigrants.

(Fall 2009 – March ’10) Direct Talks continued but without any substantive outcomes.

(April 2010) Presidential elections in TRNC. Talat is replaced by Dr. Eroglu who reaffirms to continue talks on the basis that his pre-successor, Mr. Talat has left off.

(May 2010 – Summer 2011) Direct Talks between Christophias-Eroglu continue sporadically. Parallel indirect talk between the top advisors take place in between meetings.
Turkey's EU orientation is linked to the process
PM Erdogan shifts in favor of Annan Plan.
Talat and S. Denktash lead the talks.
Coordination of UN, US, UK, EU efforts.

Changes in party positions: from
G-C Moderate leader Vassiliou
Moderate Vassiliou. Turkey’s PM
Followed by Denktash change in positions
G-8 meetings
in Helsinki call
UN and parties to
start talks without
pre-conditions
UN efforts to bypass
Denktash’s rejectionist
approach in talks by adding
referenda and arbitration
Election of center-left
pro-peace coalition
led by Talat replaces
Denktash.

UN resolution 649
sets both sides on
an equal footing.
Introduction of a series of
CBMs by Ghali to lower
mistrust and foster a new
round of talks.
TC pro-peace coalition
stands in favor of Annan
and EU Accession.
Kosovo’s declaration
of independence
renewed fears for a
status quo partition

Failures from previous
tries to break the
status quo stalemate
Positions of moderate G.C.
Leader Vassiliou are opposed
by maximalist GC Elites
Failure of Ghali to
secure an agreement
upon the completion
of direct talks

The Joint Defense
dogma between
Greece-Cyprus is
perceived as a threat
by Turkey
UN Arbitration
Methodology
and time tables
distresses GC side
Change in GC leadership
and approach: Cleride’s
is replaced by hardliner
Papadopoulos
Build-up of a strong GC
coalition against the peace plan
or any other of the same nature

Figure D-1: Factors contributing towards deadlock or a start-up of a peacemaking process
APPENDIX E

Comparative Analysis of Three Peacemaking Initiatives

List of Tables

Table E-1: Comparative Analysis of three Peacemaking Initiatives: Comparative Variables
Table E-1: Comparative analysis of three peacemaking initiatives (Comparative Variables)

| Variables:                                      | Set of Ideas (April-August 1992)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | Annan Plan (Nov.02 – April 04)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | Christophias-Talat- (Feb.08- Present)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
|------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Initiator(s):                                   | UN S-G Boudros-Ghali                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | Local: Clerides-Denktash and Top Advisers; External: Alvaro de Sotto’s Team                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | Local: Christophias and Talat and top advisers                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| Presence of 3rd Parties and (Roles)             | UN Envoys Feissel and Camilion (Shuttle Diplomacy); SG Boutros-Ghali (Negotiating and Consultative)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | UN Envoys (Consultative / Negotiating and Arbitration)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | UN Envoy and Mediation Team of Alexander Downer (Consultative)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| Peripheral Parties and (Roles)                  | Moderate involvement of foreign diplomats (US, UK and EEC); UNSC (instrumental via resolutions) Greece and Turkey (Influential)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Strong involvement of foreign diplomats: EU, US, UK, Russia (Monitoring and exercise of Leverages); UNSC (Instrumental) Greece and Turkey (Influential)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | EU Commission (Consultative and Monitoring); US and UK (Observant) Greece (Consultative); Turkey (Influential)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| Prior preparatory work to jump-start a process (T-I and T-II) | UN Mission of Good Offices (T-I) Visits with UN SC members (T-I) UN resolutions (716) and Gueller’s Ideas (1985).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | UN Mission of G.O. Clerides-Denktash Talks (1999-2001); Cyprus’s and Turkey’s EU Accession Orientation                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | Efforts by AKEL and CTP to start a new process as soon as possible if Christophias gets elected. (T-II); Local pressure by pro-negotiation proponents (grassroots and elites)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| Enticing Condition in Triggering contacts and process | US involvement pressures Turkey. New approach for a comprehensive settlement vs. peace-meal approach; lack of progress in reaching an agreement since 1979; Ghali’s stronger involvement to produce a comprehensive approach with both sides adopting a compromising style.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | International attention - G-8 meeting (Helsinki) to start talks without pre-conditions; Linkage between Cyprus-Turkey EU accession process; Greek veto to boycott EU enlargement and delink Cyprus accession process from talks over the Cyprus issue; Border crossings are relaxed; EU accession turns enticing for a common vision.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | Persistent stalemate and fear that another failure could lead to a permanent division; pressure from internal proponents in favor of change; International criticism for lack of solution; presence of moderate leadership; Progress Evaluation for EU-Turkish Accession is encouraging.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
Table E-1: (Cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables:</th>
<th>Set of Ideas (April-August 1992)</th>
<th>Annan Plan (Nov.02 – April 04)</th>
<th>Christophias-Talat-(Feb.08- Present)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peacemaking Process:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>(i) <strong>Signaling</strong></td>
<td>Through UN S-G</td>
<td>Prior signaling Clerides-Denktash</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Via UN and USA envoys</td>
<td>Face-to-Face (Negotiation Teams)</td>
<td>Direct and Top Negotiators</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indirect Talks with UN S-G</td>
<td>Indirect and Direct (Technical Cmts.)</td>
<td>Working Groups/ Technical Committees</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Direct (face-to-face) Talks</td>
<td>Direct and Top Negotiating Teams</td>
<td>and negotiators</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Comprehensive Plan (100 pg)</td>
<td>Direct and UN Team of Experts</td>
<td>(Fall 2009)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Rejected by Denktash</td>
<td>Rejected at Referenda (GC side)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) <strong>Preliminary Contacts</strong></td>
<td>UN Security C Resolutions (789); US President Bush Involvement to pressure Turkish PM Demirel</td>
<td>Papadopoulos replaces Clerides; Turkish PM Erdogan changes position; Lifting-up travel</td>
<td>Eletion of Moderate Leadership</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>constraints; Introduction of UN Arbitration</td>
<td>Opening up of two symbolic</td>
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<td>Talat and S. Denktash replaces R. Denktash during negotiations; Signing of the EU Accession</td>
<td>crossing points.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>(iii) <strong>Pre-Negotiations</strong></td>
<td>Tactical reasons – some were bypassed via shuttle and backchannel diplomacy.</td>
<td>Temporary; in between talks; Bypassed by UN Mediation Team</td>
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<td></td>
<td>EU accession process; USA; UNSC; EU</td>
<td>take-and-give and via arbitration</td>
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<tr>
<td>(iv) <strong>Substantive Negotiations</strong></td>
<td>1977 and 1979 high-level agreements; Guellar’s ideas; Ghalis’ framework Agreement</td>
<td>G-9 and UNSC; EU and Greek Veto; USA, UK support TC opposition; Turkey empowers opposition</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>to participate in talks; High-level agreements and UNSC resolutions (several); Set of Ideas</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(v) <strong>Accord Implementation</strong></td>
<td>Significant Turning Points</td>
<td>Signing of the EU Accession Treaty</td>
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<td></td>
<td>during Talks</td>
<td>Temporary; in between talks; Bypassed by UN Mediation Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>(vi) <strong>Post-Accord Implementat.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>take-and-give and via arbitration</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significant stagnation points during talks</td>
<td>G-9 and UNSC; EU and Greek Veto; USA, UK support TC opposition; Turkey empowers opposition</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Use of Leverages to bypass stagnation points</td>
<td>to participate in talks; High-level agreements and UNSC resolutions (several); Set of Ideas</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and CBMs Talks (1992-4)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Relation to previous initiatives</strong></td>
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Table E-1: (Cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Christophias-Talat- (Feb.08- Present)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intraparty proponents</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>in favor of Talks</strong></td>
<td>G.C Side</td>
<td>Vassiliou coalition (center and left)</td>
<td>Clerides coalition (center and center right)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>T.C Side</strong></td>
<td>Left-Wing Political Parties in Opposition to Denktash</td>
<td>Papadopoulos coalition (center and center left)</td>
<td>Talat coalition (center and center-left)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intraparty proponents</strong></td>
<td>G.C Side</td>
<td>Opposed by center-right parties</td>
<td>Denktash coalition and right-wing parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>against the talks</strong></td>
<td>T.C Side</td>
<td>Denktash government and coalition of center-right</td>
<td>Center-left and center-right (partially)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External Proponents:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>(i) in favor of process</td>
<td>Greece; Turkey (partially); USA, UK and EOC (EU)</td>
<td>Accepted by Greece, Turkey, USA, UK, EU, Russia (partially)</td>
<td>Greece, Turkey, EU, USA, UN</td>
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<td>(ii) against the process</td>
<td>Turkey; (Partially)</td>
<td>Some EU diplomats; Turkey (initial stages)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Parallel Peace-building Efforts at grass root level</strong></td>
<td>Invisible: some mono-communal with some bi-communal interaction overseas.</td>
<td>CBMs were introduced during the process but collapsed with the process. Green-line regulations remain in place regarding the movement of people and goods (partial implementation)</td>
<td>Introduction of two sets of CBMs recommended by Working Groups – accepted by Christophias-Talat and are adopted for implementation prior and during direct talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Introduction of Confidence Building Measures</strong></td>
<td>CBMS came after the initiative reached an impasse - recommended by UN S-G to break the deadlock (collapsed)</td>
<td>Possible deal will be put forward for two simultaneous referenda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome and Implementation</strong></td>
<td>Collapsed during intra-party ratification processes in Cyprus</td>
<td>Rejected at Referenda by GS side and center right parties in TRNC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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APPENDIC F

Comparative Analysis of Three Peacemaking Frameworks: Mediation / Negotiation

List of Tables

Table F-1: Comparative Analysis of three Peacemaking Initiatives: Comparative Variables
Table F-1: Comparative Analysis of three Peacemaking Initiatives: Comparative Variables

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paradigm</td>
<td>(See Figures in Chapters 6 and 7 for more details and application of information) – This table is a methodological illustration of the Approach.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Method</td>
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<td>Structure</td>
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<td>Strategy</td>
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<td>Decision Making Process</td>
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<td>Approach</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initiator(s):</td>
<td>Great Britain (MacMillan in Consultation with Athens and Ankara)</td>
<td>TC leader Rauf Denktash and GC leader Archbishop Makarios III</td>
<td>Clerides-Denktash / Papadopoulos Denktash / Papadopoulos - Talat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of 3rd Parties</td>
<td>None – Great Britain (partial)</td>
<td>UN Secretary General Perez de-Guellar</td>
<td>Special Envoy Alvaro de Soto / Mediation Team and UN S-G Kofi Annan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roles of 3rd parties</td>
<td>Direct Negotiator / Participant and Consultative (partial)</td>
<td>UN Envoys via Shuttle Diplomacy and Direct (Consultative)</td>
<td>UN Envoy (Consultative / Peripheral and Arbitrary towards last phase)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Parties and Roles</td>
<td>Great Britain, Greece and Turkey</td>
<td>Greek and Turkish Cypriot Representatives</td>
<td>GC and TC Representatives (GB-GR-TR during multi-party talks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peripheral Parties and Roles</td>
<td>Greek and Turkish Cypriot Teams (Indirect Observation with Sporadic Consultation with motherlands)</td>
<td>Greece (Consultative) and Turkey (direct but unofficial); GB (Indirect Observant)</td>
<td>EU Commission (Consultative and Monitoring); US and UK (varies: Observant and at times Direct Influential); Greece (Consultative); Turkey (Direct and Influential)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure of Talks</td>
<td>Power Negotiations direct and via top level diplomacy</td>
<td>Consultative with UN 3rd party assistance and Procedural; Creative</td>
<td>Consultative structure; Procedural; Problem Solving; Arbitration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of back channels and influence on peacemaking</td>
<td>Direct and Parallel</td>
<td>Partial (among political constituencies)</td>
<td>EU Commission (Consultative and Monitoring); US and UK (varies: Observant and at times Direct Influential); Greece (Consultative); Turkey (Direct and Influential)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Factors influencing the structure</td>
<td>Post-Colonization balance of Power; Cold War confrontation and Greek-Turkish Military alliance</td>
<td>Cold War (partially); Greek-Turkish Confrontations after 1974; UN SC Resolutions</td>
<td>Consultative structure; Procedural; Problem Solving; Arbitration</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Internal Factors influencing the structure</strong></td>
<td>Post-Colonization insurgency, Presence of local violent spoilers; pro-communist / soviet movements; sentiments in favor of Union with Greece and division or union with Turkey</td>
<td>Post-war realities: refugees, lost of property, displacement of population, violation of freedoms, casualties, missing persons</td>
<td>Political divisions, pro-peace coalitions in favor of peace; peace-building movement / and bi-communal civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peacemaking Process:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(vii) <strong>Signaling</strong></td>
<td>Greece – GB – Turkey Direct Talks – Foreign Office</td>
<td>Dentkash-Makarios via de Cuellar Shuttle Diplomacy – UN</td>
<td>Denktash-Clerides Letters</td>
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<tr>
<td>(viii) <strong>Preliminary Contacts</strong></td>
<td>Direct Talks – Prime Ministers Direct Talks – PM and Foreign Min. in Consultations with GC &amp; TC GC and TC elites</td>
<td>Indirect and then Direct</td>
<td>Direct and Shuttle Diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ix) <strong>Pre-Negotiations</strong></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Direct with leaders and top advisors</td>
<td>Direct and via shuttle diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(x) <strong>Substantive Negotiations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Direct - Finalized Never Implemented at its totality</td>
<td>Direct – (GR-TR partial) finalized Collapsed / Referenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(xi) <strong>Accord Implementation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Use of procedural control by mediator de Cuellar to keep parties engaged in talks -</td>
<td>EU Enlargement Team gets involved during last phase - Multi-party talks with GR and TR to finalize plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(xii) <strong>Post-Accord Implementat.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>De-Soto spend hours in getting to know the parties well – good relationship with most negotiators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Significant changes in structure during Talks</strong></td>
<td>Strong relationship between negotiators and parties (GR and GC / Turkey and TC). 3rd parties were also part of conflict dynamic</td>
<td>Strong involvement of Cuellar in Cyprus as a special envoy and UN S-G for more than a decade</td>
<td>De Soto: Problem-Solving and accommodative behavior – a settlement at all costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relationship of Mediator and parties</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Committed to the process. Creative approach</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Behavior of 3rd party</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>In combination with concessions</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome is consequent to 3rd party behavior</strong></td>
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<td>Time pressure from Kofi Annan and determination for an outcome</td>
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<td>Level of Bias / unbiased</td>
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<tr>
<td>Knowledge of issues</td>
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<td>Degree of partiality / impartiality</td>
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<td>Ability to get parties out of their positions for a compromised solution</td>
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<td>Level of Neutrality (insider / outsider)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Did mediator inspire trust?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mediators awareness of cultural norms / differences</td>
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<tr>
<td>3rd party ability to act unobtrusively</td>
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<tr>
<td>Did parties positions behaviors and attitudes changed through the process?</td>
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(See Figures in Chapters 6 and 7 for more details and application of information) – This table is a methodological illustration of the Approach.
Note that all appendices, above, are subjective interpretations by the author and all the information is based exclusively on the materials he had access to during the time frame while this research was ongoing 2006-2012.
Chapter 1

1 For more information about signaling and “gestures of conciliations” see Mitchell (2000) “Gesture of Conciliation.”

2 Cyprus is perhaps among the earliest cases of protracted social conflicts in the post-WWII and post-British Colonial eras.

3 With the term “framework” here meaning the “bases to continue further talks,” or an agreement by the two sides on the parameters for a final settlement.

4 The current initiative by Christofias-Talat (coded as number 41) is currently active. It started in February of 2008 with the election of Demetris Christofias as president of the Republic of Cyprus, a moderate leader succeeding Tassos Papadopoulos. The initiative started with signaling from Mehmet Ali Talat, president of the self proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) by congratulating the election of his former left-wing comrade in office. The two agreed to meet soon after that and set the stage for further talks in September of 2008 after a number of working groups prepared the grounds and positions of each side on a number of issues prior to the September kick off meeting. Preliminary Talks continue currently. Talat was replaced in the April 2010 elections by the newly elected president of TRNC Dr. Dervis Eroglu. This initiative is also included in the analysis by taking into account the current phase of the talks (Summer 2011) between the two leaders at the phase of pre-negotiations with the hope that substantive talks will start-up soon.

5 Mathematically speaking from 1955 to 2008 there is a peacemaking initiative every 15 months approximately and the duration of the initiatives ranges between 2 months and 2.5 years.

6 Only 10 percent of peacemaking initiatives, out of the 41, collapsed during signaling.


9 By genuine negotiations I refer to talks that are conducted in good faith and without tactical or strategic preconditions to entrapping or exploiting negatively the set of concessions in hand.

10 Also see Ikle (1964); Zartman (1994, 1988); Druckman (2000); Dupont and Faure (2002); Faure (2001); Kaufman (1988).

See Laue James (1991) “Contributions of the Emerging Field of Conflict Resolution” in Scott Thompson and Kenneth Jensen “Approaches to Peace” (USIP). Also see Saunders (1990) “An Historic Challenge to Rethink How Nations Relate” an article in which he argues that “seeing relations between nations as a political process of continues interaction between significant elements of whole societies.”

Based on James Laue (1991) proposition that for a peace process to have any chance of success “a joint agreement that sufficiently satisfies the underlying needs and interest of all parties and does not satisfies any key values of the parties.”

Also note that the presence of 3rd parties in Cyprus has always been in question by local elites because their actions have been interpreted to be guided by their own interests (or agency-based interests).

The political imbroglios the early 1960s, the bi-communal conflict in the mid-60s, the wars in the 1974 and the sectarian division since then have entrapped Cypriots into making suboptimal choices because they lack trust towards one another, reflective of the larger Greek-Turkish relations writ small.

Article 2 (3) states: “All member states shall settle their international disputes in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice are not endangered. Article 33 is requesting: “the parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their choice.”

Chapter 2

Some initiatives were secretly channeled between top leaders. Very little information is available about the existence, progress and likelihood of an outcome. Two such initiatives were mentioned in one interview and the existence of the channel was confirmed by the counterpart negotiator a few weeks later. Both initiatives collapsed without initiating direct communication with the top leaders. One was signaled by an American Ambassador and the other by a British envoy. Chronological time is omitted here to avoid direct linkage to the top leaders in the Republic of Cyprus and TRNC at the time of initiation. It is very likely that similar attempts like this took place between 1955 until 2010 for which information was not found.

Several documents that I was given access to, even for a few hours, were the original copies that negotiators used at the time of the talks with notes within margins, sketches, names, even jokes about persons across the table.

The time distribution is contingent to the peacemaking chronology developed in chapter 2. Time intervals are unequal in duration due to the nature of the context of conflict in Cyprus and its characteristics within four chronological periods.

The Greek–Turkish earthquake diplomacy was initiated after successive earthquakes hit both countries in the summer of 1999 and led to an improvement in Greek–Turkish relations generated by an outpouring of sympathy and generous assistance provided by ordinary Greek and Turkish citizens that were encouraged from the top elites and led to a breakthrough in bilateral relations. See Karkatsoulis, (2004) "The Role of Civil Society in Human Crises," The State in Transition, I. Sideris

For more information see: http://www.unficyp.org/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=1606&tt=graphic&lang=l1 After the events of 1974, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to undertake a new mission of good offices with the representatives of the two communities. Since then, successive secretaries-general and their special representatives have tried to find a formula acceptable to both the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. The Security Council has given detailed guidelines to the Secretary-General on the implementation of his mission of good offices. (UNFICYP)

This classification was a very difficult task to do because there is not a perfect fit of initiatives into one or another category. For example some initiatives may start out via secret channels of communication and might end up with an international conference. After a closer examination of each process, the main criterion for classification was based on the method used initially to start up the process. Furthermore, the same initiatives may be analyzed and classified very differently by other analysts.

A seventh category titled “post-agreement,” could have been possible but only one initiative fulfills this criterion. For simplicity, the two categories are merged together under the title “agreements.”

The possibility for researcher bias is likely as in all research studies. Any classification system is based on selection criteria that are available. The time span from 1955 to 2010 is very large and many potential interviewees who participated in earlier attempts are simply not around any longer. In some instances I had to rely on documents alone or published accounts that might also bare the biases of those researchers. As a control method for my biases I discussed all of my findings and models with local scholars and journalists in Cyprus, who followed the developments closely and wrote about and interviewed top leaders in their own investigations. For more on this methodology see Yin (2000).

Two methods were initially described in Mill (1843) that served as the foundation for MSSD known as “Method of Difference” and “Method of Concomitant Variations.” Also see Faure (1994).

The following is my response to the "self-aware" question, (post-defense notes). Susan, you asked me to touch on the importance of the uniqueness of my research and how few other people could have done what I had done: Being from Cyprus myself helped me tremendously in gaining access to top political leaders, negotiators and key informants. I was able to speak to them with an understanding of their cultural and a respect of the toll the long conflict had taken on them. The mutual respect and relationships I was able to build up over the years with nearly all of my interviewees enabled me to gain access to private collections of unpublished documents, monograms and original peace accords, all of which remained confidential with me but that generally enhanced my knowledge and analysis of the peacemaking processes. Some of the comments I often received from top political leaders over the years was that if I had been the negotiator of the Cyprus problem, the problem might have been solved by now. This is evidence of the in-depth conversations I had with many of them and the respect they showed me and vice versa. Even though I am a Cypriot, I am also a student practitioner of conflict resolution and I was able to use my training to be as subjective as possible and to triangulate as much information as I could to build a deeper understanding of some very complex processes such as the peacemaking negotiations in Cyprus that involved top political leaders with very entrenched and polemic viewpoints towards each other.
Two initiatives are not included in the data set because there was not enough information to collect about them. What I discovered is that the gestures at the time of each initiative did not produce any form of inter-party interaction, other than the UN carrier transporting some documents back and forth across the buffer zone until he/she was decommissioned from that duty. Both initiatives remain perhaps as exemplary units for analysis but very little information is available.

According to the United Nations resolutions, Cyprus is considered a case of military intervention of one sovereign nation by another, dividing the island between the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus in the South and the Turkish Republic in the North. All of the interviews conducted with top political leaders in the North and South, as well as key informants in Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, were conducted between 2006 and 2010 in accordance to the George Mason University subject review board, provided in Appendix G. To follow the code of ethics, every interview was conducted using a signed consent form in the language of the interviewee, Greek, Turkish or English. The list of questions asked during these interviews (semi-structure questions) was also done in accordance to the protocol for ethical research content. During my research I encountered two kinds of ethical dilemmas. First, it was evident while I conducted my research that many political leaders realized that I was talking to many participants in the negotiation process. During some of the meetings, interviewees tried to use me to obtain information from the other side. I handled these ethical dilemmas very carefully by not revealing any information from my other sources, and by referring to my interview protocol that all of my interviewees were anonymous and the information they provided was confidential. The second dilemma I encountered was some leaders telling me that they would fill me in on what occurred during back channel diplomacy or during closed door negotiations, but that if I were to publish this information, they would publically deny it. This dissertation, however, does not include any details, names or incidents that could identify the involvement of potential individuals in any such activities.

Direct (informal) Observation was carried out throughout my field visits during formal and informal interviews with top leaders and key informants. Locations included: Republic of Cyprus, TRNC, Greece and Turkey. Visits were spread out between 2003, when I first started working on the proposal for the dissertation, until the summer of 2010 and vary between short periods and longer periods of visits. Observations were made about the general level of attitude among interviewees following the collapse of the ‘Comprehensive Plan’ for a settlement in 2004 and the period that followed until the initiation of the Christofias-Talat Initiative in 2008 and up to the current Christofias-Eroglu negotiation process.

The form of archival data that were used for the purposes of this dissertation research include: (i) government documents obtained from the Republic of Cyprus and TRNC public offices; (ii) Maps of territorial adjustment over time from government and private collections; (iii) personal records from key informants, (iv) position documents on various topics prior to and following the negotiations process.

The following variety of documents were used as part of data collection during this dissertation research including: (i) unclassified letters that were exchanged between participants among other communiqués when available and with the permission of the owner; (ii) Governmental reports from the Republic of Cyprus and TRNC Press and Public Information offices; (iii) written reports of events from primary observers; (iv) some proposals that I was given access to from key informants and top leaders; (v) newspaper articles, commentaries and published documents.
34 Smaller minorities in Cyprus are recognized by the 1960 constitution and have a political representation in the Parliament of Cyprus but without a voting power including the Armenian Minority and the Maronite Christian Minority.

35 Various accounts are available spanning from the ancient historiography of Cyprus to modern political affairs including: Rossides (1954); Durell (1957); Luke (1957 and 1969); Thomas and Cottrell (1968); Xydis (1973); Polyviou (1975); Attalides (1977); Markides (1977); Crawshaw (1978); Ball (1982); Denktash (1988); Clerides (1988-92); Necatigil (1989); Gazioglu (1990); Calotychos (1998); Mirbagheri (1998),… for more information see bibliography.

36 Almost every mix village in Cyprus prior to the conflicts has both religious symbols that were tolerated and respected by the locals. These were characteristics of their cultures as those were embraced on the island over the centuries. Churches and Mosques were built in close proximity to one another and main religious and cultural holidays were celebrated together. For more on cultural identity see Papadakis (2004) and Gaziologlu (1990).

37 This architectural and cultural reality remains visible in any major city in Cyprus such as: Paphos, Larnaca, Kerynia / Kyrne, Lefkosia, Limassol and Famagusta.


39 Interviews with former members of the Pan Cyprian Labor Federation (PEO) in Nicosia (they are also known as the pioneers of the labor movement in Cyprus) - Various interviews with Greek speaking Cypriots and Turkish-speaking Cypriots who were members of the organization (Nicosia 2006-8).

40 See Truman Doctrine; Greece-Turkey NATO membership; Greco-Turkish relations in 50s; (See for example various readings in USA Foreign Policy and “strategies of containment.”); A political analyst in Greece argues that anytime there has been an ethnic or political turbulence in Cyprus there was a polarization in Greco-Turkish relations and vice-versa indicating the close connection and importance of Cyprus in the relationship between Greece and Turkey, (Anonymous Interview 2009). My argument here is that over the years and in particular the last couple of decade the political influence of Greece towards the Republic of Cyprus is weakened, whereas the political link between Turkey and TRNC is becoming stronger. A Greek-Cypriot diplomat argued that it is “nearly impossible for TRNC to make concession during talks with Greek Cypriots negotiators without the approval of Turkey first” on a number of issues (Anonymous Interview - summer 2006).

41 Some of the leaders and members of the Greek Cypriot insurgent group EOKA had already master their techniques in WWI, WWII (trained by British forces) and the Spanish Civil War as volunteers. They had a good knowledge of military techniques.

42 See Adams and Cottrell (1968).

43 Among several accounts see for example Parker Hart (1990); Stephern Larrabee and Ian Lesser (2003).

44 Goldsworthy David (1971)

45 Ibid.

46 Focus Interview with a group of 4 GC and TC friends who were united in 2004 after 30 years of separation. The meeting took place in the cafeteria of a Labor Union in Nicosia 2006 (Writers Notes).
Similarly, Osgood (1962; 1966) develops a strategy of conciliatory initiatives that can be used to deescalate conflicts known as GRIT (Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension Reduction). In the context of Cyprus, ethno-nationalist militants, on both sides, have managed to do the opposite and escalate the conflict spiral via reciprocal initiatives that soon spilled over to the political and social levels.


Public analysis by Michal Klosson in 2003. Klosson stated that the Cyprus’s EU membership was the action-forcing event, which distinguished the Kofi Annan effort from all past attempts. The European Union repeatedly made clear its preference for accession of a reunited Cyprus in 2004, and noted that a settlement would also facilitate Turkey’s own membership aspirations. Greek Cypriots regularly reiterated their desire for a reunited Cyprus to join the EU. Unfortunately, by the time Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot side revised their position on the Annan Plan in 2003-4, the incentives for a compromise settlement on the Greek Cypriot side had substantially weakened because they had already signed the EU Treaty of Accession in 2003 and gained a leverage vis-à-vis Turkey’s set of positions, (Emphasis added).

Chapter 4

This was excerpted and translated (with the permission of the writer) from the diary of a Greek Cypriot residing in Nicosia who visited her home in Morphou for first time after 29 years of division, following the relaxation of travel restrictions in April of 2003.

In some conversations I had with key informants, I threw out the question “Is there a leader on either side who you think is genuinely working for a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem who takes into account the concerns of all people?” There was always a lot of hesitation and occasionally a smile. There were a couple of names though that came up more than once that included current or retired politicians.

In every interview, I started by asking my interviewees to define the concept of the “Cyprus problem.” Similarly, I concluded every interview by asking, “What kind of solution should there be?” Appendix F lists the questions in Greek, English and Turkish.

Term coined by Jürgen Habermas (1981), “Theory of Communicative Action,” Volumes 1 and 2. The meaning in this context represents the ideas introduced by Habermas within the same phenomenological tradition of reasoning used by Max Weber.


“False Consciousness” from Karl Marx’s writing on the subject (various publications / editions). Also see the work of G. W. Friedrich Hegel and Karl Marx on political consciousness (various publications / editions). Here I make reference to Marx’s notion of consciousness, describing a person's political sense of self and his/her understating of the Cyprus problem based on political rhetoric the person has been exposed to. Often the interpretations of the Cyprus problem represent the attributions and understanding of party politicians. Similar to Marx’s logic of authentic consciousness, the true position in history of the Cyprus problem is filtered through the lenses of political elites and to their interpretations via the rhetoric they

56 Unlike Hegel’s “dialectic” dualism and Marx’s “historical materialism,” selective ahistoricism refers, in this context, to the processes of reinterpreting history by deconstructing and reconstructing it in the absence of objective historical reality.

57 It requires the services of a successful marketer, diplomat, or charismatic leader to effectively frame the Cyprus problem, or any other conflict situation, in order to rally together supportive domestic proponents and gain the sympathies of outside friends and allies.

58 See King (2007) and the process of “framing.”

59 This proposition builds on the psychological literature on intergroup relations found in Abrams and Hogg (1990); Austin and Worchel (1979); Brown (1988); Hogg and Abrams (1988); Tajfel (1978, 1982).

60 This proposition builds on the foundation of positioning theory articulated by Tan and Moghaddam, “Positioning in Intergroup Relations” in Harre and Langenhove (1999).

61 See Morgenthau (1948) and Waltz (1979).

62 See for example a number of accounts on this issue by Monteagle Stearns (1992), Clement Dodd (1999) and Douglas Brinkley (1992).

63 See Treaty of Guarantees (1960) – “Constitution of Cyprus”. The foreign troops present in Cyprus inherited a need to eliminate psychological insecurity, as well as to eliminate, if not terminate, the presence foreign troops and demilitarize the island. The needs for equality and political participation are perceived in terms of political equality of either two federal states with one sovereignty, nationality and international recognition, or as two states with a loose central government (ala confederation) with perhaps one or two sovereignties.

64 Edward Azar (1990) coins the phrase “protracted social conflict” to refer to types of conflict that are pursued over long periods of time by the parties involved and are very destructive, emotionally and physically to the parties. These are usually cases such as Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Israel and Palestine, and Colombia. Similarly, John Burton (1990) uses the term “identity-type conflicts” to describe elements that contribute to and are part of “deep-rooted conflicts.” According to his “Human Needs Theory,” deep-rooted conflicts arise when demands are made on individuals or group of individuals to coordinate their behaviors in accordance to a political system, structure and norms, often beyond the tolerance and identity-type discourses of the individuals or identity groups. In other words, the sources of conflict are “deep-rooted, inherent and ontological to all human beings and the denial of those needs, such as the need for identity, recognition and participation at a political system, will inevitably lead to social and identity-type conflict. Also see Azar and Burton (1986), “International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice” and Christopher Mitchell (2000) “Gestures of Conciliation.”

65 On two separate occasions in interviews, key informants (interviewees) within the academic field claimed to have contacts with UN mediator Alvaro de Soto and both referred to his skill for reframing and rephrasing the arguments. Similarly, the term “virgin birth,” referring to the new state of affairs in Cyprus, it was introduced by British diplomat Sir David Haney (2006), brought more anxiety than ease in the minds of the negotiators. Also, Harriet Martin (2004) credits de Soto for his skills in working with two polarized arguments on almost every issue of the peace plan. She refers to him as “the Chess Master”

There are populist slogans from political elites calling for the “return of all refugees [IDPs] to their homes” and the “return of all properties to their lawful owners.” There is of course a legal right to those arguments and every peace plan addresses both issues – return of refugees (IDPs) - and these are properly linked with the issue of territorial adjustments. There is also truth to the argument that not all refugees will return and not all properties will be returned – most of the displaced persons will be compensated according to a negotiated formula. Only a small percentage of territory will be adjusted or returned to the Greek Cypriot state if both sides accept a federal solution. In the meantime, the slogans continue to increase the gap of what is real and possible at the negotiation table and what may be framed here as maximalist rhetoric or ideology proclaimed by some leaders on both sides.

See more on the theory of entrapment in the work of Teger (1980); the impact of entrapment on the decision-making process by Brockner and Rubin (1985); and other factors that affect parties’ decision to maintain and/or terminate a course of action Mitchell (2000); Herman (1995); Whyte (1993); Herman (1990); Staw and Ross (1987); Janis (1989); and Asch (1951).

Similarly, Mitchell (2000) argues, “One of the consistent findings about intractable conflicts is that the elites and decision-makers frequently become trapped in a particular course of action and find escape from there very difficult. Moreover, the problems of escape, of ‘quitting,’ of ‘making a U-turn,’ appear to increase the longer the conflict continues and the more politically and psychologically committed leaders become to achieving an elusive ‘victory.’”

See for example the work of Hannah Arendt, “Communicative Power,” in Lukes (1986) where she argues that a “public–political realm can produce legitimate power only so long as structures of non-distorted communication find their expression within.” Living behind fences of separation limits the communication interaction to the one side of the argument and the various versions within the one side. In praxis, symbols are ritual expressions. See the work of Yiannis Papadakis (2005), “Echoes from the Dead Zone” and how the reality of the dead zone becomes a paradigm in the political, social and cultural interactions on the island.

During the 2004 referenda campaigns, the Greek Cypriot word for rejecting the Annan Plan - oxi (no) - was associated with the Metaxas’ “no” to Mussolini for surrender during WWII. Papadopoulos’ rigorous “no,” is attributed, in part, to the preservation of the national cause. The Turkish Cypriot word for “yes” was represented with a check mark in the center of the circle of stars on the European Union’s blue flag - a “yes” which was attributed to the beginning of a new life within the European family, (Author’s notes and observations, Spring 2004).

During an interview, a top leader recalled the days when two leaders passed away and their rhetoric was commended in eulogies by top party representatives who said, “We will continue your work and defend your vision” (translation), “We will keep the flame of your vision alive and make sure that it shines even brighter” (translation), and “We will continue marching in your footsteps.” These quotes were referring to visions, worldviews and aspirations that were 30 to 50 years old, (Anonymous interview – Author’s Notes and emphasis added).

Below are some general themes that derived from this field research by interviewing top leaders across the divide in Cyprus and might become starting points for other researchers who are interested in this or other similar and/or dissimilar cases:

1 Ahistorical framing (one-sided framing in the absence of truth) influences the perception of constituents and other audiences about the terrain in which they are fighting for peace.

2 Inflexible (or dogmatic framing) may intensify the conflict and entrap elites into ideological trenches that may contribute to the fragmentation of collective identities.
Flexible Constructive framing may be useful in reducing the intensity of conflict towards building up pro-peace proponents who are ready to explore alternatives to violence. Deontological Charismatic framing strengthens the bond between the audiences and elites, making it more likely for constituents to rally along the political rhetoric and message of their leaders.


75 For more on logrolling see Pruitt (2004).


77 See the work of Vamie Volkan (2002; 1997; 1988; 1979) who brings a psychoanalytic perspective to analyzing the sources and symptoms of the Cyprus problem. In this dissertation I do not agree per se with Volkan’s hypothesis regarding the inherent need of Greek and Turkish Cypriots to have enemies and allies, thus rending any efforts for coexistence almost on a contractual basis. Volkan’s work on “chosen traumas” defined as “a collective memory of a calamity that once befall the group’s ancestors - a share mental representation of the event, which include realistic information, fantasized expectations, intense feelings, and defenses against unacceptable thoughts” (1997, p. 48). In this research, the terms “selective traumas” and “selective glories” refer to the institutional aspect in bringing up incidences of collective traumas and glories for political purposes for drafting and chanting popular identity-type slogans.

78 Dennis Sandole (2002) “Virulent Ethnocentrism”

79 See, for example, the work of a political scientist Robert Dahl (ed) (1968), “Political Opposition in Western Democracies.” He argues that there are sets of widely shared political values in the United States. Under the right circumstances, they may develop political significance and be used as vehicles for policy making. Similarly, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1989), in “The Civic Culture Revisited,” set forward the idea of civic culture which citizens are committed to moderate political participation, with the belief in the legitimacy of the officialdom and a mild tendency toward parochialism that ensures a balance between political power and political responsiveness - a healthy balance for a stable democracy. In Cyprus, it is evident that the status quo division has created the formation of very perplexing political cultures that constrained the ideal of a unified civil culture, a civil culture that has been developing for years in reaction to the sectarian status quo and acting as a flame keeper of unofficial peace-building. Political parochialism and officialdom keeps colonizing pro-peace non-governmental spheres at multiple levels of interaction. For a more integrative perspective, see Ernest Gellner (1987), “Culture, Identity and Politics,” in which he examines the relationship among the state, civil society and culture in the context of nationalism, ethno-nationalism and egalitarianism.

Chapter 5

80 The emphasis in this definition is that peace is a holistic process by itself to reach a genuine outcome that safeguards human dignity and universality. See, for example, the work of several peace makers within the tradition of pacifism, religion and non-violence: see for example the work of Colman McCarthy (2008; 1994) and Gene Sharp (2010; 1973).

81 From this approach, peace is interpreted as a strategic process to reach desirable outcomes, with more emphasis on safeguarding individual and collective interests in a social interaction. Relative exercise of authority, influence and power are important components in the process, the interaction of parties involved
and the desired outcomes. From this perspective, the concept of power is an important component in waging peace. – Bertram Russell argues that power is the production of intended effects. Juxtaposing from that, peace is an intended effect. Max Weber defines power as the probability that the actor in a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his/her own will, despite resistance. That also resembles an inter-personal and inter-group struggle within the process to reach peace. Within the perspectives found in Russell, Weber, Dahl, Arendt, Habermas, Parsons, Simmel, Galbraith, Foucault and Lenski, among others, the argument holds that peace is the product of intended and/or unintended processes and striving for peace goes hand-in-hand with the process of exercising power collectively – “collective will.” However, the exercise of power in reaching a peaceful agreement, the use of power to bringing the parties to the table, may lower the chances for reaching an integrated solution - one that parties will work to implement mutually and without reservations or renewed polarization.

82 The title: “The Peace Process in Cyprus” does not yield any results in literature. Very little has been published about the peace-making strategies in Cyprus and its linkage to the overall peace process for a settlement. This attempt is rather exploratory and it was added here as a chapter after consulting with a few academics who have published on similar topics.

83 Galtung introduced the concept that peace may be more than just “the absence of overt violent conflict” or the “absence of war” (negative peace), and will likely include a range of relationships where nations (or any groupings in conflict) might have collaborative and supportive relationships (positive peace).

84 A peace process yielding to some integrative outcomes or being spoiled negatively so that the parties could eventually go back to their default option and resume fighting, are also vivid possibilities. A peace process is not a linear process and could be interrupted at any minute if the parties wish to resume to fighting again, especially if they attribute the actions of the other side as non-genuine or discover a new novelty in causing the other side to yield with the use of force rather than persuasive argumentation. See Hampson (2004) and Walters (2001) - reasons that led several troubled post-agreement implementation processes to make a u-turn towards fighting.

85 For various sources and credits for the models: Pruitt et all (2004); Sandole (2003, 1999); Joeng (2000); Lund (1996); Fisher (1997); Diamond and McDonald (1996); Lederach (1995); Boutros-Ghali (1994; 1992); Kriesberg (1998); Zartman (1989); Mitchell (1981); Galtung (1969); Burton (1969);

86 In Cyprus, the violent hostilities in the 1960s and the status quo separation from 1974 to the present, handicapped the pro-settlement civil societies to work collaboratively. The period followed the relaxation of the borders and, prior to the referenda (April 2003 – April 2004), created a climate for solidarity between non-governmental entities to broaden the efforts of the civil society, but soon were dashed by the failure to secure a settlement after the referenda in Mai of 2004. In 2006, I asked several top leaders whether a process for truth and reconciliation (also mentioned in one paragraph in the Annan Plan) could create a better context / climate for the talks. Some leaders were very skeptical about it and some even feared that it could have a negative impact at the official level, instigating once more that the Cyprus problem is a political agenda and not a social one. After all, why should the families of the missing persons (about 1,500 GC and 500 TC) have to wait for leaders to settle the political issue first at the table to finally allow for a process of truth and reconciliation to start? Some of the victims disappeared in the early 1960s. Is the process of finding truth and restoring relationships that threatening to the negotiation process, which has passed from one breakthrough to the next for more than four decades now? Just a simple question for thought.

See for example the various phases of peace processes. Some authors differentiate between phases, such as the case of South Africa and the process for CODESA I and II (conference for Democratic South Africa), peace processes according to presidencies, including in Colombia – the peace-processes under president Pastrana or the peace-process under president Uribe. Other peace processes are separated by means of turning points, as in Northern Ireland and the 1994 IRA cease-fire and the Downing Street Declaration, the Good Friday or Belfast agreement. Lastly is the case of Israel-Palestine with the Oslo process that was started and ended between the presence of two uprisings and reciprocal u-turns of parties towards offensive strategies. Some were long-lived and some were short-lived processes and with always some linkage between the current and previous processes.

89 See Alexander George and Andrew Bennett (2005) “Case Studies and Theory Development in Social Sciences.” In particular on methodology of similar and/or dissimilar system designs.

90 Is there an endgame in Cyprus? This is a very paradoxical question to ask any leader. Every conversation always begins with the leader explaining what he /she perceives to be the problem in Cyprus and how it should be settled, thus positioning themselves to what seems to be their perception and their strategy of an endgame in Cyprus. A starting point will be to reach a consensus between each side and across the divide of an endgame that has at least some points of convergence, something that has fragmented proponents for peace so far. After all, they all want peace but how they come to define the endgame and its manifestations varies and in some instances significantly.

91 Perhaps the first time that the two communities got together for a common goal since the labor movement of the 40s and early 50s for better wages and benefits was during the period between 2003 when the vast majority of Cypriots’ attitudes across the divide stood in favor for a United Cyprus accession to the European Union. Those hopes were soon dashed away on the GC side during the campaign to reject the Annan peace plan March-April 2004 (Personal Observations – Cyprus: Spring 2004).

92 The image of pro-peace civil society, which is mobilized around the work of non-governmental entities with the support of international donors, is often marginalized by political parties for political reasons. In the RC, the relationship between political parties and civil society is very fragmented while in TRNC the civil society is strongly aligned with leftist political parties. (Author’s Observation)

93 Peace-building Initiatives (sponsored by governmental and non-governmental agencies, through the UN, EU, USA-USAID, Canada, and several subcontractors including AMIDEAST, UNDP-ACT, IMTD, HASNA, and some University).

94 See L. Diamond and J. McDonald work in Cyprus in 1990s (mono-communal and bi-communal workshops): Multiple Locations: Cyprus, UK and USA. (Author’s Notes)

95 See the work of Ronald Fisher and other practitioners. – Lecture Presentation, American University 2008 and 2009 (Washington Semester Program, Peace and Conflict Resolution), (Author’s Notes)

96 See the work of conflict resolution practitioners such as Maria Hadjipavlou (University of Cyprus), Harris Anastasiou (Portland State University), Christopher Mitchell (George Mason University), Dianne Chigas (Harvard University) and Benjamin Broom (Indiana State University) – (Author’s Notes)

97 See Diamond and McDonald (1996) a systems approach to nine tracks in official / unofficial diplomacy.

98 Unofficial peace-building efforts were actually started even before 1992 through the work of many conflict resolution practitioners in Cyprus including John Burton, Ron Fisher, Louise Diamond, John MacDonald. Since 1992 the process has gone through many turbulent times and was interrupted by political turmoil that arose in the 1990s until early 2000.
There were several times, for example, that I was asking my interviewees to talk about the peace process in Cyprus and in response they referred (significant number of interviewees) to particular peacemaking initiatives. For example, the “Annan Peace” plan was usually the one that was mentioned often, or I was asked to specify which “initiative” I was referring to by using the term “peace-process.” Looking back, I find it important in this chapter to differentiate between the overall peace-process in Cyprus and the various peacemaking initiatives from 1955-2010.

Credits for the basics of visual structure see Mitchell (1988) and Wall (1981).


Conflict is the result of a widening gap between a group’s value expectations (VE) – those goods, material or immaterial, to which its members believe they are entitled – and the system’s value capabilities (VC) – the goods actually delivered by existing social institutions. When the gap between a group’s expectations and the system’s delivery capabilities gets wide enough, a rebellion of some sort can be predictable. See Tedd R. Gurr, (1970) “Why Men Rebel” Princeton University Press


The opening of two checkpoints in April of 2003 did not come about because Greek Cypriots leaders chanted “Mr. Denktash, tear down these roadblocks,” to coin the infamous Ronald Reagan chant while standing at the Berlin Wall - “Mr Gorbachev, tear down this wall.” The decision to do so came from people within the political party of Mr. Denktash who were very forward thinking leaders who were able to phrase their arguments persuasively and maneuver their actions in convincing the TRNC coalition government at the time between NUP and DP, as well as the Turkish Army, that such an opening would be very beneficial to the TC and the TRNC administration. (Note that at the time, parties expressed their willingness to the UN Secretary General to continue talks, and considered the 3rd version of “Annan Plan” as the basis for further talks).

Chapter 6

A good example is Northern Ireland since the Good Friday agreement where former enemies came to an understanding that it is important to build up mechanisms that prevent collapse of their peace process and isolate the issues and focus on each one. (Personal interview with Gerry Kelly and Ian Paisley Jr. – Spring 2008 – Arranged by the Northern Irish Bureau, Washington DC – Thanks to Mr. Norman)

The election of Demetris Christofias as president of the RC (formerly Secretary General of the progressive and labor party, AKEL) is based on a partnership coalition government with the center-left socialist party (EDEK) and the centrist party (DIKO). After two years in the coalition government the center left party (EDEK), led by Mr. Yiannakis Omirou, withdrew from the government in part due to a disagreement with Mr. Christofias about his method for handling the negotiation process.

Based on author’s assessment and collection of data from 2010-2011. Confidential interviews were conducted for the purposes of other research with American University, Washington DC.

Parallel aspirations were the subject for discussion with several key informants and interviewees who advised top leaders in various capacities over their careers. Data shown are triangulated via interviews. Several other views were not reflected on the timeline because of either inaccuracy or lack of triangulation with additional sources.

As a side note, there are at least two endgame perspectives in Cyprus for each side to choose from. The one is what is usually presented to various audiences as a “compromised alternative” to highlight the concession and sacrifices each side has made in the name of peace and it is depicted with solid lines in brackets. The second perspective is “aspirational alternatives” which are the real intentions of leaders for how they think the Cyprus problem should be settled in the absence of constraints and concessions. Aspirational alternatives are worded within dashed brackets.

It is important to keep in mind that the political agendas and orientations of parties change over time. I have look at the agendas of all the parties who participated in the political discourse during the period between 1974 and 2010. That does not mean that their agendas are rigid and dogmatic. I selected the use of the isosceles triangle to pinpoint at least three possible directions that each political party’s agenda is synthesized by. Also, note that several political parties in Cyprus were not able to maintain their existence over the years and are excluded from the list. I included only the political parties that were in existence for at least a decade between 1974-2010 and have won seats in the parliaments or have participated in coalition governments in the RC or TRNC.

Teleological aspirations in this dissertation have a “goal-based” orientation. Deontological aspirations have a “duty-based” orientation. Teleological are goal-oriented and groups are committed to their self-centered moral commitment and can defend if needed. For example, “once a Catalanian always a Catalanian,” one teleological aspiration goes. In Cyprus, some prescribe to the aspiration that “Cyprus is Greek and it has always been Greek,” while others prescribe to the aspiration that, “Cyprus is Turkish.” Their most recent history shows that they fought each other in preserving those teleological aspirations. Deontological aspirations are more Universalist in nature and are integrative by taking into account the concerns and fears of all sides involved.

(Also, see Appendix C for more information about the construction of this scale and the list for the abbreviations).

The data are based on party agendas and interviews with top leaders and party representatives. The timeline is based from 1999 to 2011 and includes political parties who participated and won seats in the elections in the RC and TRNC and that took place in the time interval of 1999-2011. Election results are included in published accounts provided by the electoral commissions on the island: RC and TRNC.


Identity and identity formation is not the focus of this dissertation but it builds on some of the theoretical arguments found in theoretical foundations of social psychology by Tajfel (1970).

In Cyprus, the RC and TRNC each have museums dedicated to the discourse of victimhood or “struggle” to honor the heroes who fought to preserve the ethnic characteristics of each group. The museums as well as the pedagogy or victimhood are points of reference in the teaching of history in
primary and secondary education systems on the island. For more on the identity and identification in Cyprus see Papadakis (2005).

Parallel to that is also the presence of “negative spoilers” or “paramilitaries” who did not have control of the officialdom in Cyprus in the 1950s through the early 1970s, but were able to do grievous harm with their actions towards members of other groups.

External influences include: relations with other nations; membership in international organizations; Greek - Turkish relations; external events; the structure of international / regional politics; the European Union; affiliations to other organizations, etcetera.

Internal Influences include: the education systems, family, socialization, civic / political and other cultures on the island, leadership styles, institutions, the media, religious entities, ethnicity, history, the course of violent conflict, the dynamics of the peace process, intra and inter-party politicking, the sectarian status quo division, etcetera. Other factors that might influence the formation and dynamics of this interaction according to various literature reviews include: “level of salience,” and the degree of durability, fluidity, flexibility, cohesiveness, separateness, integration, etcetera.

Many Cypriots I spoke with, including some academics, journalists, middle level leaders and ordinary citizens, feel betrayed by the approach some top leaders take or took over the years in relation to the Cyprus problem and the negotiation process. Some even argue that one of the biggest obstacles to a settlement are the leaders alone who either misrepresent its dynamics or manipulate sentiments among the population who do not understand the dimensions of the Cyprus problem. (Authors Records)

For more on the work of the Committee of Missing Persons (CMP) go to: http://www.cmp-cyprus.org/ncontent.cfm?a_id=1

A systematic process towards sectarianism started around 1963 until 1974. Exchange of populations and complete isolation of the two communities continued until March 2003 when TRNC’s top leadership made the decision to relax the movement of people, with some restrictions, from the one side to the other.

Making reference to John Shotter’s pioneering work on “Conversational Realities” (1993) who offers an interdisciplinary analysis of the imaginary nature of many of the things people talk about in their lives, illuminating the process of their construction. Extrapolating from this, leaders’ rhetorical and argumentative nature of political communication and jargon used to bring along constituents is a prime reality constructed and sustained across the divide in Cyprus. In an interview with a government official at the Cyprus Press and Information Office in Nicosia, an office authorized to translate and deliver the fifth version of the Annan IV to every household in territories under the authority of the government of Cyprus, claimed: “We had a difficult time understanding the text and even translating it, including terms we never encountered before… How could the average person possibly understand it and vote in favor for or against it a week later? … I speculate that perhaps less than 10 people really had a clear picture of the plan in mind and what it really meant…people listened to the arguments of their leaders, weighed the pros and cons as they understood it and voted accordingly…” (Quotes are from notes taken by the writer. The interviewee declined a request to audiotape the conversation in protection of the person’s identity and position in government). A note to the reader: How would you react if the president of your country appeared on national television a few days before a significant referenda was to take place, overwhelmed and in tears, “begging” citizens to vote against a plan put together by Anglo-America to destroy Cyprus as they did in the past and dissolve the precious Cyprus Republic? (Based on author’s analysis and interpretation of President of the Republic Tassos Papadopoulos’ address to Cypriots to reject the Annan plan - 2004).

Excerpt from the poem “Ithaca” of Constantine Peter Cavafy (various publishing houses and editions)
The question that remains is what kind of an endgame deal are top leaders interested in and to what degree is the public opinion taken into account? There are also strong signals that the youth on both sides are not very enthusiastic about unification of the island. Currently there are no accurate polls (representative) conducted on this topic to provide more concrete examples on: (i) what are attitudes of young people in Cyprus towards an endgame settlement and (ii) what kind of a settlement are they in favor of? - For more on Public Opinion see Alexandros Lordos, Erol Kaymak and Nathalie Tocci (2009) “People’s Place in Cyprus: Testing Public Opinion on the Options for a Comprehensive Settlement.”

There is no doubt that some ordinary citizens have lost trust in the practices of their leaders when it comes to the handling of their most important ethnic issue, that is, the Cyprus question. It is always listed on top of every presidential candidate’s electoral campaign and it becomes the main focus among coalition partners in forming the executive branches of their respective governments in the RC and TRNC. Similar arguments are found in Robert Rothstein (1999) “After the Peace” and Neal Kritz (1995) “Transitional Justice: Review Sampler.”

Chapter 7

Similarly, see Sandole 2010

In order to demonstrate the extent to which leaders can constrain a peacemaking initiative it is worth looking at a comparative methodology of similar and dissimilar cases of two of the most significant peacemaking processes (from the list of 41) that bare some similarities but also dissimilarities to give a more in-depth understanding of those dynamics.


In the meantime the European Union, through the office of the president of the commission Jose Mannuel Barosso and commissioner for the enlargement (Oli Ren) would take a more active role in the talks with the request of Christofias and Talat.

The years between 1977 and 1990 were fruitless, “we lost 13 years,” one top leader commented. From my own analysis, any attempts to settle the Cyprus problem during the period between 1974 and 1991 ended up with an entrenchment of parties into their maximalists positions and launched international efforts to blame each other for being inflexible. For the most part the strategy of each side was to entrap the other side into tactical talks with the hope that the other side would withdraw first and take the blame for backing down.

For more on this see Necatigil (1996); Vassiliou, (2007); Hakki (2007).

Some even argue that he never changed his mind since a confederation is a type of federation and he remained firm to this.
Starting with UN resolution 649 the UN and SC introduced a more symmetrical (power) approach in the language and perspective of bringing the two sides on equal ground for talks despite its rejection from some local parties in the RC who called the plan an anathema. In TRNC Mr. Denktash also considered it to be unacceptable while at the same time the Turkish PM, Mr. Ozal, agreed to accept it as a framework for further negotiations which in return could be used as a boost for Turkey's EEC accession, the pre-successor of the European Union.

From 1977 through the late 1980s the two sides failed to build mechanisms to lower their mistrust and raise hopes for coexistence after the devastating conflict of 1974. Both sides refueled their antagonism with the rhetoric of victimization seeking justice. One the one side, the Greek Cypriot leadership led by Archbishop Makarios (1974-77) and then followed by Kyprianou (1977-87) situated their negotiation strategies within the 1960 framework, aiming for a unitary state solution with a majority-minority apparatus reinstating the Zurich-London agreement of 1959-60 but with the implementation of certain amendments. On the other side, the Turkish Cypriot side under the leadership of Mr. Denktash interpreted the same endgame gadget within the auspices of a confederated settlement between the two sides.

The Annan Plan did not emerge for vacuity and also implies here that there is a linkage between current peace initiatives and previous peacemaking processes. For example, there are several similarities between Boutros-Ghali’s “set of ideas” and the 3rd version of the Annan Plan regarding many of the issues and parameters of the ‘Foundation Agreement,’ – known as the constitutional and administrative parameters of the Accord. Also, as I will demonstrate in chapter 6 the positions of the parties during the direct talks in 2001 and 2002 were apparently very similar from where the substantive negotiations were left off in 1995. The Framework agreement of the Annan Plan included a series of non-negotiable provisions that represented points of convergence already reached in previous talks including elements found in the two “high level agreements” (non-binding agreements); the parameters for bi-communalism found in the 1960 agreements; parameters for “bi-communal federal structure” subscribed and accepted during the 1977 and 1979 talks; “bi-zonal federal structure” negotiated during the Vienna talks following the Turkish intervention and territorial separation of 1974 (see Appendix A). Previous peacemaking attempts, whether successful or not, offered points for departure. This UN pattern or style of strategies developed over the years enables UN mediators to have a framework to begin with and one to build on as they undertake a mandate for new peacemaking and a new process for a settlement from the Security Council. Extrapolating from this, one may speculate that the title “Annan Plan” may never be brought up again, but the chances it will serve as a framework for leaders to depart from and/or build upon remains very high, unless a new methodology and/or approach is introduced unilaterally or by third parties to resume talks.

Access to all five original versions of the plans were obtained confidentially from two individuals including: an individual who participated in the negotiations leading to the making of the first three versions and from an individual who participated in the negotiations process that led to the drafting of the fourth and fifth versions. Documents were confidential UN documents, and some versions or parts were published in daily newspapers through information leakage. The final version was officially translated and delivered to the public. Version four was only delivered to top negotiators at Burgenstock and with the changes made since the third version highlighted by the UN. The third and fifth versions are excellent documents for comparisons to show changes in positions and concessions made since the first versions. The first and fifth versions provide concrete examples of how parties shifted their positions since their initial stave on November 11, 2002. See Palley (2004) a mapping of party positions and plans versions III and V. Version three is no longer available on the UN official website. Versions obtained through other non-primary sources may be misleading.
The virgin birth concept was introduced by Hanney to address the beginning or a new approach in constituting a new Cyprus republic that would integrate the older one and TRNC administrations at the state and federal levels. The term became a point of contention for critics of the plan as a process for dissolving the Republic of Cyprus. For more see Hanney (2005) and Hoffmeinster (2005) “Legal Aspects of the Cyprus Problem: Annan Plan and EU accession”. The term brought up fears as it was used by leaders comprising a hard voice against the Annan Plan to convince constituents that “virgin birth” meant dissolution and perhaps destruction of the Cyprus Republic as it is known today.

The first version of the plan numbered 138 pages and consisted of a “Foundation Agreement” as its main text, four articles and five appendixes that became a framework for the parties and mediators to work on and apparently revised four times. It is worth noting that the first version of the Foundation Agreement was separated between “soft lines” and “red lines,” separated in other words between provisions that were subjected to further negotiations (soft lines) and provisions that were not negotiable (red lines). According to the first version of the plan, the overall agreement was to be finalized on February 28, 2003 and to be submitted to two separate and simultaneous referenda across the divide on March 30, 2003. As was agreed upon by the two sides at the time, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan was to include his remarks/suggestions if necessary to conclude/finalize the agreements within some degree of arbitrariness that later on became a point for contention and criticism (Annan 2003; 2004). The negotiations process further proved that 2003 was not the year to settle the Cyprus problem as parties failed to agree on main issues regarding changes on the framework agreement at the summit at the Hague between top leaders Papadopoulos-Clerides and Denktash on March 10-11, 2003.

The fourth version was drafted and had a short life of about 24 hours when it was introduced early on the morning of March 29th and revised again and tabled on March 31. En route to Cyprus, Burgenstock marked the official countdown for the referenda. UN S-G Kofi Annan and his advisor Alvaro de Sotto completed any unabridged gaps between the two top leaders in Cyprus, Papadopoulos and Ali Talat, authorizing the two UN officials to take the roles of arbitrators and finalized the final fifth version by using the method of a compromised or cut in the middle solution on issues and matters not agreed on at the table. Several behind the scenes meetings, some of which were conducted in secrecy, before information was leaked to the media, took place at Burgenstock and continued in Nicosia in March 2004. One of the positions of the Greek Cypriot negotiating team was to postpone the referenda, had all the parties been in agreement. This was a tactical maneuver, as many top leaders interpreted it, to gain time and resume negotiations with the intent to make more changes on the accord. Efforts, however, were not perceived as genuine at the other end of the communication chain, marking the decline of any mutual efforts to address everybody’s concerns.

Note for Example that the entire island is accepted in the EU but the implementation of Aqui Communater, commonly referred to as European law, is currently suspended in territories under the control of the TRNC. The EU Commission since then has approached aid packages to assist toward the economic recovery of TRNC regarding infrastructure projects and vi-communal projects.

Leaders have enforced a veil of political ignorance which may seem absolute credible in the eyes and minds of many Cypriots alleging that any forms of unofficial contacts, persons to persons contacts, renders political and institutional recognition of the so called other’s sovereign’s claim. Also see Constantinou and Papadakis (2001) and Papadakis (2004).

The term ‘concociational democracy’ is used here according to Arend Lijphart (1977) definition to describe power sharing in multiethnic societies that aim to provide accommodations (he also refers to the term as “political accommodation”) and political representation to all groups in the government where ethnic rights and interests are represented. Today there is a credible debate on the topic that make references to successful and failed examples of this type of political accommodation with Belgium and
Canada to be among the most functional states and Cyprus among the least functional ones cited in Donald Horowitz work (1985) “Ethnic Groups in Conflict”

Functional Federation term is used by various authors and writers. In this context the term is credited to Zenon Stavrinides, (1976) “The Cyprus Conflict: National Identity and Statehood”

IN this context the concept of “power sharing” is defined according to the work of Timothy Sisk (1996). He refers to the notion if inclusion of all ethnic groups in multi-ethnic societies that have political representation with the compromise to reconcile their quest for self-determination and territorial sovereignty.

The three treaties (Treaty of Alliance, Treaty of Guarantee and of Establishment allowed for Greece and Turkey to maintain a military balance on the island and granted Britain sovereign bases. Greece and Turkey also exploited the provision for a unilateral intervention rather than an agreed upon multilateral effort to settle possible disputes between the two communities. (See Constitution of Cyprus: Articles 6 and 18) and Macris (2003)

According to exit polls conducted by Mega Television (April 24, 2004) one of the main reasons contributing to the rejection of the Anan Plan by the Greek Cypriots (75%) was attributed to the issue of security and guarantees. Similarly in an article published by Cyprus Mail (September 9, 2008) “Polls Show Little Optimism for a Solution” makes a reference to a non-stratified poll where 83% of the participants believed that all Turkish Troops should leave the island and the rest accepted that some could stay (cited in Ker-Lindsay (2008). Also see the work of Chadjipantelis and Andradis (2007); and Faustmann (2004); and Lordos (2004).

Also see Carkoglu and Rubin (2005).

These areas include small size regions along the buffer-zone from east which is the Famagusta and Karpas region to the west which include the Morphou region. (These are areas where larger number of GC IDPs can return to their properties under GC administration make it easier to increase the number of dividends had a peacemaking deal is accepted.

[UNFICY estimates about 165000 GC and 45,000 TC and UNHCR estimates about 200,000 and 65,000] For more information go to: www.unficyp.org/nqcontent.cfm?a_id1 and http://unhcr-cyprus.blogspot.com/

These were among a plethora of questions that were passed down to the ordinary citizens by their elites to color their minds and perspectives on each plan. Read for example the political positions of each leader in regard to each initiative from public records and government documents available through their party websites, government documents or interviews in local public news agencies.

The accession of Cyprus to the EU as a united member state and without the EU inheriting the Cyprus problem could have provided a political and social context to bring the two communities closer together. The federal government of Cyprus could have been accounted to the European regulations and had to adjust all its rules and procedure according to the European Law and constitution once it get ratified and put into force. For example the accession of Cyprus to the European Monetary Union and Euro-zone in January 2008 could have united the two local economies of the constituent states and perhaps bring them a similar purchasing power parity within a short period of time. The gap in GDP and PPP gave leverage to several leaders to argue that the Republic of Cyprus and the GC tax payers would had brought up many
setbacks to the GC economy. Ironically the Minister of Finance of the Republic in his keynote address at
the conference organized by PRI Cyprus Office highlighted the benefits the accession of the Republic to
the Eurozone will bring to the two sides even though only the one side is a member of the EU.

157 See Kyriacos Tziambazis (2005) “The unveiling of a Myth” in Greek. Exert from the article coauthored
with Hasan Yalkut title “On the Crossroad” (p 158-9) - translated from Greek.

158 This was unique in comparison with the “Set of Ideas” where the process was closed-ended and the flow
of information was kept confidential and controlled as to what could reach the public and in what form.

159 Takis Hatzidimitriou (2006 “The Referenda of April 24, 2004 and the Solution of the Cyprus Problem”
see in particular chapter 6 the author explain the failures of Greek Cypriot elites to grasp how the EU could
become a common destination for Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to settle their political probe
and become citizens of the EU the same time (p.71-95). - Mr. Hatzidimitriou was the Coordinator for
Harmonization of Cyprus to the European Acquis (laws) and resigned from his government position in
protest following President Papadopoulos address against the Annan plan on April 7, 2004.

Chapter 8

160 The first theory by Melcher and Beller (1967) views channels as a pattern of communication between
organizations and develops a system of factors for selecting between official and unofficial channels as
well as other methods for communication. The second theory by Adams (1976) elaborates more on the
organization structure and its functions in setting the agenda prior to reaching the top negotiator that would
represent their side. The third perspective by Mitchell (2000) brings to the forefront the process and
dynamics of how leaders in conflict are going about to signal conciliatory gestures to their adversaries and
the obstacles / hopes that are associated with such processes. Lastly, Pruitt (2001) builds on a framework of
chain theory to demonstrate the passage of information from conflicting parties via a number of
intermediary links.

161 Official channels: “Official or formal channels are defined as those that coincide with the formal chain
of command. Messages follow the hierarchical pattern and cannot bypass any organizational member on
any level.”

Unofficial channels: “Are all communication routes which do not coincide with the formal structure. A
message can go directly or indirectly through any number of intermediaries, some of whom may form a
segment of a formal channel.”

162 Adams develops a conceptual model of chain communication between top negotiators or (Boundary
Role People BRP) who report to constituents. The relationship becomes very complex as constituents and
other people within each chain try to influence one another to establish a favorable set of options for the
BRP’s agenda. The end of this process can create a relatively bureaucratic system of interaction within an
organization.

163 Mitchell provides a more detailed perspective than the three above to the issue of channeling
information between adversaries when formal communication is deteriorated or almost non-existent due to
animosity and protracted violent conflict. He argues that channels of communication are very important
tools in signaling recognizable gestures of conciliation to an adversary when forms of communication between the adversaries are broken down. For example, if conciliatory gestures, he argues, are channeled efficiently back and forth they can be very successful in initiating an accommodating sequence of communicative interaction between the parties involved. Should a conciliatory initiative be conveyed directly to the adversary without the use of any intermediary or should third parties be utilized in an indirect approach? Should the source of the initiative be clearly an official one, or should some kind of unofficial, private exchange be taken first?

164 Pruitt (2001) - building a systemic chain approach, an inter-organizational communication chain system, which consists of multiple participants (three-party and multi-party modules) as chain intermediaries (channel links) in the channel interaction or what he refers to as chain communication theory. He argues that chain theory can shed more light on two important phenomena: The first phenomenon he describes as “summitry,” that is, the interaction between heads of states (top leaders) who are the occupants at the two ends of a long chain of communication/interaction (channeling). In addition, he acknowledges the role of other individuals including advisers to top leaders, ministers, and department secretaries who are also intermediary occupants of the chain (or links) in between the top leaders. The second phenomenon he argues is that chain theory can shed more light on understanding the processes of settling “seemingly intractable international and ethno-political conflicts,” also known as peace processes. Within this framework, third parties or intermediaries can play the role of a liaison or a mediator in the chain when parties are incapable of holding or maintaining formal communication.

Proposition I: chains (channels) usually start out as a short segment or segments that do not link top leaders on the two sides. If this rudimentary chain performs well, optimism will increase, allowing the chain to develop to the point where it provides such a link.

Proposition II: Optimism eventually causes chains to shorten in the middle, keeping people at a distance from each other to talk more directly. When this happens, intermediaries who drop out of the middle usually stay on as advisors, helping the remaining chain members talk across the chasm that still divides them.

c165 Following the impasse in Burgenstock, the GC political leaders and in particular the Speaker of the House Christofias attempted to postpone the referenda and give more time to continue negotiations and efforts to improve the plan in order to build a stronger coalition in favor. At least two face-to-face meetings took place during the existence of this channel that lasted for only a few weeks. It is also known as the Strakka meetings for location of the residency of Tasos Papasopoulos, former president of Cyprus. The meetings were conducted in secrecy until a Turkish Cypriot journalist revealed its existence (information leaked to press). The existence of the channel was also confirmed through confidential interviews with participants. At least two short extensions on the channel took place but are omitted here to protect the identity of the participants who asked to remain anonymous.

c166 The role of the UN Special Envoy Alvaro de Sotto in Cyprus between 2002 and 04 was transformed significantly from the early stages of active listening and shuttle note taking between the two sides to a more active, facilitating style and eventually into a middleman with arbitration power. By January 2004 until April 2004, every procedural aspect of the communication was channeled through de-Soto and his team. Some even accused him of filtering the information and, in the end, making him the Don Quixote of the peacemaking process.

167 See for example the work of Oliver Richmond and James Ker-Lindsay (2001) “The Work of the UN in Cyprus.”
Greek Prime Minister Papagos appealed to the UN demanding the “application, under the auspices of the UN, of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in case of the population of the island of Cyprus” (cited in Faustman 2001).

It is important to note that while all of the 41 peacemaking initiatives were under the principles of the United Nations, not all of them were under the auspices of the Secretary General until the early to mid-1960s when the UN with its Secretary General took a more active role as a third party mediator.

During this time, the UK played a number of roles as the initiator of the process in searching for an exit strategy from Cyprus but in a way that it could give her a permanent geo-strategic presence on the island.

More on power sharing see Sisk (1997) “Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflict” USIP

Some comment here on GR and Turkish relations and possible spill-over effects.

The only initiative taken by the UN during the Anglo-American involvement bared the name of special envoy Galo Plaza who produced a report to the S-G in 1965.

Read the recollection of events by Zenon Rossides (Cypriot Permanent Representative to the UN) cited in James Ker Lindsay and Polyvios Polyviou (1980) “Cyprus, Conflict and Negotiations 1960-1980.”


With the Cold War in the background, the primary aim in those initiatives was to urge Greece and Turkey to come to terms with one another since they represented the Eastern flank of the NATO alliance and could persuade the respected leadership in Cyprus to settle their political disputes peacefully.

Some top GC elites advocated against the Annan Plan (2004 referenda) as they claimed because UN-SG Kofi Annan stretched his role and practiced arbitration on issues that the GC negotiators did not provide their consent for (anonymous interview).

USA special envoy provided a direct role in initiating contacts between Clerides and Denktash in 1998 but both sides rejected his role as being “arrogant and ignorant.” A top leader commented that Holbrook tried to impose his lessons learned from Bosnia to Cyprus without knowing the plateau he was on first.

Conflict ‘Provention’ see John Burton 1997

The Annan plan did not emerge from vacuity. There is a linkage between current peace initiatives and previous peacemaking processes. For example, there are several similarities between Boutros-Ghali’s “set of ideas” and the 3rd version of the Annan plan regarding many of the issues and parameters of the Foundation Agreement – known as the constitutional and administrative parameters of the Accord. Also, as I will demonstrate in chapter 6, the positions of the parties during the direct talks in 2001 and 2002 were
apparently very similar from where the substantive negotiations were left in 1995. The framework agreement of the Annan Plan included a series of non-negotiable provisions that represented points of convergence already reached in previous talks, including elements found in the two “high level agreements” (non-binding agreements); parameters for bi-communalism found in the 1960 agreements; parameters for “bi-communal federal structure” subscribed and accepted during the 1977 and 1979 talks; and the “bi-zonal federal structure” negotiated during the Vienna talks following the Turkish intervention and territorial separation of 1974 (see Appendix A). Previous peacemaking attempts, whether successful or not, offered points for departure. This UN pattern or style of strategies developed over the years enables UN mediators to have a framework to begin with and one to build on as they undertake a mandate from the Security Council to undertake a new process for a settlement. Extrapolating from this, one may speculate that the title “Annan Plan” may never be brought up again, but its chances that it will serve as a framework for leaders to depart and/or build on remains very high unless a new methodology and/or approach is introduced unilaterally or by third parties to resume talks.

181 The first version of the plan numbered 138 pages and consisted of a Foundation Agreement as its main text - four articles and five appendixes - that became a framework for the parties and mediators to work on and was apparently revised four times. It is worth noting that the first version of the Foundation Agreement was separated between “soft lines” and “red lines,” separated in other words between provisions that were subjected to further negotiations (soft lines), and provisions that were not negotiable (red lines). According to the first version of the plan, the overall agreement was to be finalized on February 28, 2003 and scheduled to be submitted to two separate and simultaneous referenda across the divide on March 30, 2003. As it was agreed upon by both sides at the time, the UN Secretary General was to include his remarks/suggestions if necessary to conclude/finalize the agreements within some degree of arbitration that later on became a point for contention and criticism (Annan 2003; 2004). As the negotiations progressed further, the year 2003 proved not to be the year to settle the Cyprus problem, as parties failed to agree on main issues regarding changes on the framework agreement at the summit at the Hague between top leaders Papadopoulos, Clerides and Denktash on March 10-11, 2003.

182 Following a temporary setback, substantive negotiations resumed this time in Cyprus after the consent of both sides and was carried out during two subsequent chronological time periods: from February 19 through March 22, 2004 in Nicosia, Cyprus and in Burgenstock (Switzerland) from March 22-31.

183 The fourth version was drafted and had a short life of just 24 hours after it was introduced on the early morning of March 29th and was revised again and tabled on March 31, the last day at Burgenstock or the “prison,” as on leader referred to it (anonymous interview). En route to Cyprus, Burgenstock marked the official countdown for the referenda. UN S-G Kofi Annan and his advisor Alvaro de Sotto completed any unabridged gaps left by the two top leaders in Cyprus, Papadopoulos and Ali Talat, authorizing the two UN officials to take the roles of arbitrators and finalize it as the fifth version.

184 Ledra is an older name that refers to Nicosia’s downtown center in Greek and in Turkish it is known as the Lokmaci Street, named after the sweet dumplings that were sold in the area. In the 1950s the street, which was parallel to and intersected by a few other streets, was known as the “murder mine” area because of the frequent insurgency against British soldiers during the anti-colonial struggle. The street was divided first in 1958 and patrolled by Turkish Cypriots. It then was reopened in 1960 with the implementation of the Zurich-London Accords. Barricades were put in place again in 1963 as a sectarian division to prevent the movement of paramilitaries between Greek speaking and Turkish speaking neighborhoods, and they remained until a small relaxation of movement was agreed upon during the inter-communal talks in 1968. Some of the barricades stayed in place, beginning in 1963, and were widened after the events in July-August of 1974. The reopening of Ledra Street was interpreted as a gesture towards lasting peace by many leaders in Cyprus (personal interviews with top leaders).
The European Union through the office of Mr. Jose Manuel Barroso, president of the commission, and Mr Oli Ren, commissioner for the enlargement, would take a more active role in the talks particularly in regard to the topics of EU common laws, financial support and post-implementation aspects.
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