DO NO HARM AND THE CONVERGENCE OF RELIEF DEVELOPMENT &
CONFLICT RESOLUTION:
EXAMINING HOW CONFLICT SENSITIVITY AND PEACE-BUILDING
CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE IN HAITI

by

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Do No Harm and the Convergence of Relief, Development & Conflict Resolution: Examining How Conflict Sensitivity and Peace-building Contribute to Peace in Haiti

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science at George Mason University, and the degree of Master of Arts at the University of Malta

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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>BHA</td>
<td>Benefit–Harms Analysis</td>
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<td>CAF</td>
<td>Conflict Analysis Framework</td>
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<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organization</td>
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<td>CDA</td>
<td>Collaborative for Development Action</td>
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<td>CS</td>
<td>Conflict Sensitivity</td>
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<td>DME</td>
<td>Design, Monitoring &amp; Evaluation</td>
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<td>DNH</td>
<td>Do No Harm</td>
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<td>HAP</td>
<td>Humanitarian Practice Network</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IPIP</td>
<td>Integrating Peace-building Into Programming</td>
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<td>LCP</td>
<td>Local Capacities for Peace</td>
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<td>LEAP</td>
<td>Learning through Evaluation with Accountability &amp; Planning</td>
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<td>MSTC</td>
<td>Making Sense of Turbulent Contexts</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>RD&amp;CR</td>
<td>Relief, Development, &amp; Conflict Resolution</td>
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<td>ROD</td>
<td>Rapid Onset Disaster</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UDHR</td>
<td>Universal Declaration of Human Rights</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>WV</td>
<td>World Vision</td>
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DO NO HARM AND THE CONVERGENCE OF RELIEF DEVELOPMENT & CONFLICT RESOLUTION: EXAMINING HOW CONFLICT SENSITIVITY AND PEACE-BUILDING CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE IN HAITI

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George Mason University, 2012

Thesis Director: Dr. Jamie Price

Much has been said about the negative effects of international aid and for good reason, especially in high conflict contexts. Yet this need not be aid, when done with a conflict sensitive mindset has great potential to be a force for peace. The hypothesis of this thesis is that proper relief and development work (often together referred to as “aid” or “assistance”) has potential to create peace in two ways. First, conflict sensitive practice helps to mitigate conflict in relief and development programs. Second, relief and development help satisfy the underlying causes driving conflict, thus removing one source of fuel from the conflict and contributing to peace.

The frameworks for practical implementation of conflict sensitivity (i.e. “Do No Harm”) are introduced in the first half of this paper. The second section will demonstrate the interconnectivity of peace-building and conflict sensitivity, and will examine how relief and development programs can contribute to peace in their contexts. The third section
will examine the specific case of relief and development in the fragile state of Haiti. It will seek to understand the causes of conflict and then investigate whether the programs of one large international non-governmental organization (NGO), World Vision, helps to satisfy the unmet needs. In doing so, this paper seek to support the hypothesis’ second tenant- that World Vision’s work helps to build peace. This report draws information from a variety of sources including books and publications by humanitarian organizations and consortiums, as well as interviews with practitioners, policy makers, and authors.

The Hypothesis and the Literature Review

The international community has traditionally approached conflict resolution, disaster relief, and community development through independently funded, planed, and implemented programs to meet each category of need in some degree of isolation. Yet all three are intricately linked, and should be planned and implemented as such. This theory examined in Do No Harm and the Convergence of Relief, Development, and Conflict Resolution can be divided into two primary components: the negative and the positive. That is, the two issues form two sides of a coin: 1. Doing No Harm by precluding the potential negative effects of assistance programs, and 2. Enable relief and development programs to contribute to peace in their contexts. It is the hypothesis of this thesis that, when properly implemented, relief and development programs do not have to substantially increase conflict within their contexts, but rather have great capacity to contribute to peace within their area of operations. This thesis will examine the work of World Vision within the context of Haiti to test this theory.
Haiti

Haiti is a proud country with a rich and colorful history and culture. But this contrasts with the crushing poverty, pervasive conflict, and earth shattering disaster that now dominate Port Au Prince, Haiti. Over 3,000 NGOs are working in Haiti to help end poverty and create new opportunities (International Peace Academy, 2002, p.6). But due to a combination of poverty, poor governance, and physical violence, Haiti’s situation is more dire now than it was before international assistance began in large scale decades ago. In 2010 Haiti was showing signs of progress and hope; but the cataclysmic devastation from the January 12, earthquake brought those hopes crashing down again (Moore M. A., 2008-2011). Port Au Prince exemplifies an extremely complex, multifaceted context. The research suggests that the cause of conflict is a confluence of political oppression (structural violence) and perpetuating massive poverty and lack of opportunity, which leads to personal violence (i.e. crime...). This paper suggests that the solutions lie in a comprehensive solution that relies heavily on relief and development NGOs. Haiti needs security and holistic development to continue, along with political will to build good governance and make societal changes. Addressing these foundational needs will reduce some of the primary causes of the high level of conflict in Haiti, and should help build peace.

Findings:
There are several findings: The first is that it is nearly impossible to definitively attribute increased peace or decreased conflict to a specific cause. Second the research seems to support, but fails to conclusively prove the two points about relief and development’s potential to build peace in two ways: that conflict sensitivity practice helps to mitigate conflict in relief and development programs, and that relief and development help to satisfy the underlying causes driving conflict. This analysis suggests that the best practice, especially in fragile contexts, is for all relief and development programs to operate with conflict sensitivity, which will help mitigate potentially negative side effects of assistance programs. Finally, the research also indicates that there is significant synergy between conflict resolution, and relief and development.

This paper will explain the problem statement and then provide a brief research methodology. The next section will be the high level explanation of theory about conflict sensitivity and peace-building. The paper then moves into a brief demonstration of some conflict analysis and resolution tools available in the relief and development fields. Finally, the paper looks at the context of Haiti as an example, and takes a look at a couple of examples of programs implemented by World Vision in Haiti which apply the principles of conflict sensitivity and peace-building examined.
CHAPTER 1: PROBLEM STATEMENT

Overview of Research
This study will examine conflict resolution’s integration into the international humanitarian assistance field at large (specifically emergency disaster relief and long term development) and conflict analysis and resolution frameworks (primarily Do No Harm), and will examine World Vision’s programs in Haiti after the 2010 Port Au Prince Earthquake through early 2012. This study does not primarily focus on the transition between relief and development, nor does it focus specifically on how to integrate relief programming and development programming together, except where it has implications for the integration of conflict analysis, conflict resolution, or peace-building. This study does examine the spectrum of peace building practice (from conflict analysis and Do No Harm to explicit peace-building), but specific peace-building practice how-to is not a central theme of this report. The report will first address the nature of the fields in general, followed by a look at the Haitian context, various causes of the conflict in Haiti, and finally will examine World Vision’s programming in Haiti. The study will then present analysis and conclusions, which should be useful for practitioners at large.

Terms and Definitions
This paper will address these terms in greater detail in the literature review, but will initially define the terms here. Do No Harm (DNH) is a conflict analysis and prevention
framework which is interchangeable with the Local Capacities for Peace framework. The DNH framework is also similar to other constructs which will be described later in this paper, but Do No Harm is the original term, first popularized by Mary B. Anderson.

The framework has evolved over time from an analysis tool to into the general practice of seeking to mitigate the conflict caused by the implementation of a program. The term that encapsulates most of this shift from analytical framework to paradigm for practice is “conflict sensitivity.” Conflict sensitivity (CS) is the broadest and newest term, and refers to the integrated, cross-cutting paradigm by with programs are implemented. However, in what follows, all three terms (conflict sensitivity, Do No Harm, and Local Capacities for Peace) should be understood as generally interchangeable, representing different forms of the same general guiding principle and practice.

Peace-building is the practice of working to diminish the causes of conflict to support peace. Peace-building and conflict sensitivity are highly interconnected and could be considered different points on a common peace and conflict spectrum or a similar field of conflict resolution to peace-building (Scott M., 2012). This relationship between conflict sensitivity and peace-building will be addressed later in the paper. The first section looks at conflict sensitivity, followed by a section which more thoroughly addresses peace-building and contrasts it with conflict sensitivity.
Conflict analysis is needed in any context where the programming has any potential to negatively impact the context; that is, some level of contextual analysis with a conflict analysis component is needed for virtually every relief and development program. Conflict is a broad term, but for the case of this study, “Conflict refers to any situation in which two or more social entities or “parties” perceive that they possess mutually incompatible goals (Rogers, 2010, p.43).” Conflict can be either manifest (overt and resulting in direct confrontational violence) or latent (present and influential; often simmering but not overtly causing violence). Situations with significant conflict, especially manifest conflict and pervasive insecurity, are considered turbulent or complex contexts. According to Matthew Scott, the term “turbulent contexts” refers to “chronically fragile countries or regions that are either suffering from long term [sic], overt violent conflict or are ostensibly at peace but are undermined by hidden violence.” Scott continues by pointing out that “Natural disasters amplify social turbulence. In the aftermath of a disaster, the recovery process often reveals deep fault lines within society.” (Scott M., 2010, p.1) It is also important to highlight the protracted nature of complex, turbulent contexts, which are often political in nature and the population is likely to “experience ongoing cycles of ‘peace’ followed by ‘conflict.’”(Scott M., 2010, p.1) Repeated examples highlighted by CDA and others, (Anderson, 1999, p.1, 12, 14) (Collier, 2007, p.101, 104-106), demonstrate that a program which operates in a context will impact that context and will be impacted by the context. “NGOs, therefore, become more effective by focusing on the long-term, cyclical, and political nature of complex contexts.” (Scott M., 2010, p.1)
Causes of Conflict in Development and Relief Contexts

In order to analyze, mitigate, and resolve conflict at any level, one must address the causes of that conflict. This study will very briefly outline some of the common causes of conflict that afflict communities, countries, and regions in which relief or development programs operate. There are two different but complimentary theories about the causes of conflict at the broadest level. These theories also demonstrate the linkage between conflict resolution, and relief and development.
The first is the Basic Human Needs Theory most notably championed by John Burton. The theory that there are basic human needs is very similar to an earlier and widely published theory by Henry Maslow called the Hierarchy of Needs (Maslow, 1943). This theory begins with the assertion that unmet needs motivate people’s actions more than already met needs. Maslow postulates that there are categories or levels of need, which together form a pyramid. The first and most basic needs are the physiological needs; until those needs are met, they are the driving force in the actor’s decision making; once they are met, they are no longer a driving concern until they are again threatened or deprived. Subsequently, once the first level (physiological needs) are met, the individual’s attention moves towards meeting the next successive level of needs, the safety needs. The individual continually seeks to meet the lowest level of unmet needs (Maslow, 1943, p.370-396).
In a similar vein, Burton suggests that the causes of conflict are deeper than the surface level positions taken by the parties to a conflict. The root causes behind the interests which drive those positions are basic needs that every human shares:

- consistency of response, stimulation, security, and recognition; and derivative needs for justice, meaning, rationality, and control (Rubenstein & Burton, 2001). People will create conflict in their attempts to satisfy those needs. Conflict arises when those needs are unmet by harsh conditions such as extreme poverty, preventable malnutrition,
pervasive poor health, loss of loved ones, or denial of basic education. Burton says of what people want vs. what they need:

“The focus was far less on wants, and far more on inherent needs that would be pursued in all circumstances, except total individual despair and apathy” (Burton, 2001). Burton continues that poverty is not merely physical, but rather an imposed identity forced on the poor: “the problem of inner city violence and unrest can be explained not just by the break-down of family values, not just by unemployment, not just by the absence of educational opportunities, but also by the lack of recognition and identity that these conditions promote.”

A second major school of thought on peace and violence is Galtung’s Structural Violence. While he postulates more about the types of conflict and violence than the causes, his theory is quite relevant as a foundational principle for this research. Galtung suggests that the absence of violence is essentially equivalent to peace (Galtung, Violence, Peace, and Peace Research, 1969, p.180). There are two types of violence: personal and structural. Personal violence is the most commonly recognized, as it involves any kind of harm – physical, actual or threat- from one person(s) to another where “human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations.” Structural violence, on the other hand, refers to violence that is not directly acted by a person(s) but nonetheless causes harm. In this case, structural violence is a system in which “human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential
realizations.” (Galtung, Violence, Peace, and Peace Research, 1969, p.180-183) Galtung postulates that the difference is not so much the impact as who or what is performing the violence or threat thereof; structural is indirect with the actor being a system of any kind. This definition is quite broad and potentially includes a great variety of causes or issues far beyond one person intentionally, physically harming another.

In fact, this concept of violence as anything causing someone’s realization to be below their potential dovetails well with Burton’s theory on human needs; a person deprived of any basic human needs is indeed below their potential somatic or mental realization. Thus structural violence could be linked to a system or society where large portions of the population suffer unnecessarily from the non-provision of the basic needs which leaves people living at below potential realization despite the availability of resources to meet their needs. Further, if peace is the absence of violence, then programs which seeks to provide for basic needs are then linked to peace. It is feasible to postulate that a development or relief program that helps someone achieve their fullest feasible potential through the provision of basic human needs is then working to create peace. Thus, this paper proposes that proper and effective relief and development work should advance peace as a byproduct of the interventions. This concept will be used to examine relief and development in Haiti later in this paper.

While relief and development efforts certainly hold potential to reduce violence or perhaps even create peace, they also hold the potential to do inadvertent harm as a byproduct of their efforts. This study aims to demonstrate the interconnected nature of building peace and the mitigating against harm.
Poverty (and the corresponding lack of opportunity), vulnerability (to market disruptions, disasters, government corruption…) and violence are all closely interrelated. Each of the three components of a turbulent or complex context can serve as both a cause and a symptom of the other components. Johan Galtung postulated a framing of conflict to describe societal structures that are causing or are conducive to violence. Galtung’s term, “structural violence” (Galtung, Violence and its Alternatives : An Interdisciplinary Reader , 1999, p.40, 42) describes what some might best classify as social injustice at large. He argues that because systematic social injustice traps the segment of society (In Haiti it’s the lower classes) in a sub-optimal realization (In Haiti this is inescapable poverty), the oppressed people group is prone to resort to crime and physical violence to achieve their otherwise unattainable aims (Galtung, Violence and its Alternatives : An Interdisciplinary Reader , 1999, p.39-42). This physical violence creates a level of insecurity that impairs economic development and entrenches the wealthy elite’s structural violence.

This inequality serves to maintain itself somewhat differently in every context, but typically shows similar characteristics. An example of a typical cycle of perpetual violence is illustrated in figure 1. Structural violence cranks out extreme inequalities in the opportunities that the lower and upper classes face. This lack of opportunity for the lower class ratchets up motivation for physical violence to accomplish what vulnerable people cannot otherwise accomplish.
While the humanitarian assistance practitioner and the victims of violence have an interest in ending violence, not all parties in a conflict have those same interests (Anderson, 1999, p.14-17). “In many turbulent contexts, economic ‘losers’ have no means and winners have no reason to end the conflict. War can become ‘economics by other means’; instability can become the cover for massive profiteering and economic abuse” (Scott M., 2010, p.2)

Since the downfall of the Soviet Union, the world has seen a shift from nation-states as the primary actors in wars to also include violent non-state actors as common parties to conflicts. This shift reflects the move away from a world where smaller conflicts were overshadowed by a dominant, latent “cold war” into a world plagued by a myriad of
small conflicts across the globe (Williams, 2008, 4, 17). The Journal of Peace-building and Development summarizes today’s conflict context and the humanitarian assistance field’s challenges in their introductory issue: “*The current global context is characterized by high levels of violent protracted conflict and inexcusable and rising levels of poverty and inequality. Together and separately, these phenomena arguably account for humanity’s greatest contemporary challenges. A compelling need to rigorously and routinely examine these issues in an integrated manner with an eye towards developing joint conceptual and practical strategies becomes apparent.*” (Mc Candless & Abu-Nimer, 2002). Mc Candless and Abu-Nimer identify the inextrociable confluence of poverty and conflict but also point us to the imperative to understand the causes behind the complex, conflict laden contexts in which we seek to operate and help.

All relief and development practitioners work in projects which suffer from a propensity to interact with or exacerbate conflicts in which they operate. Rapid onset disasters (ROD) create uniquely challenging ethical conundrums for practitioners. The immediate and impatient nature of relief work cannot be understated; every minute or dollar wisely used can literally save lives. Conflict sensitivity practice and analyses such as Do No Harm (DNH) can be time consuming and can increase project complexity (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2004, p.1). As such, there are times when the DNH framework may be perceived as impractical or impossible to implement despite the clear long term benefits. In recognition of the limited bandwidth to engage in detailed analysis during emergency situations, this thesis will also incorporate guidance on when and to what extent to DNH analysis should be implemented in conflict sensitive practice.
The causes of poverty, conflict, and increased vulnerability are widely recognized as interconnected; in fact in many cases, the causes are one and the same. Yet when pressed with life and death urgency, many relief interventions target only most imminently demanding needs without significant contextual knowledge or conflict mapping, and insufficient consideration of secondary impacts on other parts of that system. As the adage goes, “The squeaky wheel gets the grease”, but that may wheel may not actually be the most urgent need.

Additionally, some organizations have very specific mandates or limited experience in endeavors outside their own narrow specialty. Practitioners often work in desperate, separately funded, managed, and evaluated programs. This specialization can lead to “silo’d” thinking. That is, isolated thinking that fails to see one’s work as affecting and being affected by the other fields and activities. The international community and most humanitarian organizations- local or international- have some level of recognition that there is synergy between relief, development, and conflict resolution. Many professionals agree that there is synergy and significant overlap that could be better integrated in many programs (Rogers, 2010, p.2) (Knorr, 2012).

There are several reasons that assistance programs may struggle with poor integration. The first cause is funding structures of donor agencies and promises to donors (the designated purpose for which the funds were given, such as clean water wells or earthquake disaster relief). These specific designations can lead the implementing organization to align their own structure to that donor or designation’s structure, which leads to silo’d thinking and management within the NGO (Rogers, 2010, p.12).
Another possible cause of isolated management is practitioner specialization. Because each of the lines of work is highly complex and often demands advanced degrees or several years of experience, few practitioners are experts in more than one of these fields. In fact, many practitioners are highly specialized to one aspect of one of these fields—such as, relief procurement or agricultural development programs. One of these practitioners might find that they lacked some of the skills to appropriately implement a peace-building program that teaches conflict resolution skills.

**Introduction to Peace-building**

A comprehensive and holistic look at the application of relief and development would look beyond opportunities to meet objectives with the minimum damage. It would look for ways to develop local capacities for peace—to help individuals, families, communities, and even countries to develop their innate capacities to build healthy, trusting relationships and interactions that result in a positive peace. In addition to mitigating some of the causes of conflict in the context, a small additional effort can build conflict resolution capacity, educate about human rights, or otherwise enable these local capacities for peace within existing assistance programs. The crux of this thesis is to discover these intertwined principles and illustrate these through examples of local capacities for peace which exist in Port-au-Prince.

Research confirms the need for relief and development implementers to understand and practice in a cooperative and integrated manner. The Humanitarian Practice Network
(HAP) writes that the need for conflict sensitivity in the relief and development fields is recognizable at every level of practice:

*Interviews with key informants revealed widespread acceptance of and enthusiasm for the concept of conflict sensitivity among staff at all levels. This was reinforced by a 12-question survey of humanitarian professionals distributed via humanitarian networks, which found that 84% of humanitarian practitioners thought it should be ‘a top priority for the sector’ to better equip aid workers to be conflict sensitive in emergencies. There also seemed to be little debate as to its relevance in rapid-onset emergencies. Interviewees readily recognized the potential of humanitarian aid to exacerbate existing conflict issues, and were easily able to cite examples from their past professional experience. In fact, 85% of those surveyed said that they had been involved with or seen emergency work that inadvertently caused conflict or made existing conflicts worse. Most international staff working for agencies that directly implement humanitarian [programs] named ‘understanding the context’ as one of the top challenges faced by frontline workers during a new emergency response. (Zicherman, Khan, Street, Heyer, & Chevreau, 2011, p6).*

Even beyond DNH and CS, there is recognition of the need for Peace-building. Peace-building and conflict sensitivity are highly interconnected- even different points on a common peace and conflict spectrum. More of the differences and similarities will be
included later in this paper, but the focus is that relief and development are complementary with conflict sensitivity and peace-building. This is recognized in the field, but far more potential for cross-field cooperation exists than is currently implemented globally.

The majority of victims of violent conflict and complex emergencies are civilians, leading to a convergence of conventional development and anti-poverty actions with peace-building and reconstruction efforts. The development community now participates more often in implementing peace agreements and rehabilitation. Different actors from the same [OECD] governments are now working more closely together in peacekeeping and humanitarian activities. Traditionally, this closer coordination was not the case, since the strategic objectives of development and focus tended to be uni-disciplinary.” (OECD, 2001, p.37).

With the level of recognition of the need for convergence of these fields, it becomes important to shift from the “should it be?” question to ask “Are we doing it in practice, and how can we do it better?” This report seeks to answer the latter by examining a combination of theory and a case study of World Vision’s relief and development in Haiti.

The summary of contemporary theory above establishes that conflict resolution should indeed be connected with relief and development programs. But as this is a case study, we must any answer both how this should be done and how it is being done in Haiti. The
question isn’t if these sample programs are impacted by, and are impacting conflict in Haiti; the research proves that all relief and development programs inherently become part of the context in which they operate. The impact on the context’s conflict may be good, bad, or neutral; but interaction in inevitable. It is not reasonable to suggest that assistance practitioners could ever implement activities with zero impact on their context and any associated conflict. The question to ask is how does the program interact with conflict in the context, are the implementer’s aware of it, and what are they doing help avoid conflict and build peace. It is with this lens that this paper will investigate World Vision’s work in Haiti.
CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Operational Definitions

- Harm: The component of the Do No Harm theory which refers to negative secondary effects of assistance caused to any person, group, or system in a relief, development, or peace-building intervention. Several examples are provided in the introduction section of this research report.

- Conflict: “Conflict refers to any situation in which two or more social entities or ‘parties’ perceive that they possess mutually incompatible goals (Rogers, 2010, p.43).” It includes significant disagreement or animosity between parties whether latent (non-violent simmering sentiments or rhetoric) or manifest (overt conflict, usually including violence and malicious actions).

- Displaced Person: Any human forced from their home; often as the result of disaster, conflict, or severe famine. A person displaced from their home to another location in their country is called an internally displaced person (IDP) whereas a person who flees to another country is called a refugee.

- “No” Harm: The goal of or zero or negligible negative secondary impact. In most cases, a very minimal amount of ‘harm’ is considered to be offset by program benefits so long as it doesn’t damage anyone in the context or catalyze conflict.
Disaster: A catastrophic event which disrupts societal services and function, markets, and personal lives. Disasters can be rapid onset (such as an earthquake) or slow onset (such as a famine).

Relief: Assistance (often from international sources) intended to meet immediate needs in a disaster context. Relief often includes provision of food, water, shelter, sanitation, health services, and may require additional security.

Reconstruction: A transitional phase between relief and development. It often meets intermediate-term needs such as rebuilding infrastructure and repairing the market system.

Development: Assistance (often from international sources) intended to improve the living standards of, or empower beneficiaries to improve their long term opportunities. Some common sectors (categories) of development include education, health, economic development, civil society development, agricultural capacity building, WASH (water, sanitation & hygiene) and many others.

Humanitarian Assistance: For this study, humanitarian assistance will define all three professional fields mentioned in this study: relief, development, and conflict resolution.

Peace-building: Programs aimed towards creating peace within a context through dialogue, conflict resolution skills, and addressing the underlying causes of conflict.

Universe of Study

The research will draw examples from the programs of the global NGO World Vision, but also includes examples from other primary and secondary sources. Interviews with
relief, development, conflict resolution, and peace-building program management staff and relevant policy or subject matter experts.

Data Collection Procedure

The two principal methods of data collection have been interviews and literature review.

The topics of research are divided into three categories:

1. Conflict sensitivity theory and best practice
2. Haitian context (governance, socio-economic, cultural, and conflict analysis)
3. Combining the theory and context with examinations of interventions of assistance organizations working in Haiti.

Interviews of practitioners will address practice and macro-level context. Examination will focus on crosscutting themes that overlap the three fields and theories that realize a holistic approach. This research will be supplemented by interview(s) of professionals with working understanding of the confluence of conflict resolution, relief, and development.

Human Subjects & Vulnerable Populations

Human subjects are not the focus of this study – it is a comparison of the causes of conflict against the practice of humanitarian assistance. The research will first look at the secondary sources (program design, monitoring, and evaluation documentation including the published testimony) from World Vision International. The student researcher will also speak in persona or via Skype or email with staff from this NGO or
persons identified by published works demonstrating their knowledge and experience in relevant subjects. The interviews and released information were authorized by World Vision senior leadership for use in this study. All interviewees were informed of the purpose of the research and consented to the use of the shared information in this research.

This researcher previously worked with World Vision as a Program Monitoring Specialist, a role which involved extended contact with beneficiaries and vulnerable populations in Haiti and other countries. This research and draws on that general knowledge, training, and experience as a basis for where and how to perform the research, but this research does not examine, interact with, or name any individual beneficiaries or vulnerable populations. This report does not include information about any specific beneficiary individuals or families.

**Ethical Considerations**

This project has very significant ethical considerations which will require careful adherence to ethical principles in order to assure that the information is presented in a non-harmful manner. The study will seek to understand programs which interact with vulnerable populations under extremely demanding (emergency response) contexts. Categories of ethical risks present in this thesis project are:

Potential loss of trust from community, increased physical security risk, and potential professional repercussions if sensitive or negative information shared by interviewed practitioners is revealed.
Recounting personal experiences can elicit strong emotional reactions. There is a risk of personal emotional trauma in interviewing practitioners about their work.

If the researcher publishes theories that are misleading, incorrect, or ineffective, then future valuable aid resources could be squandered in sub-par or even harmful ways. Improper or negative portrayals of the implementing organization being used as a case study could lead to a negative public image and damaged ability to partner, gain funds and maintain the trust of beneficiaries. For these reasons, it is crucial to explain the context and common challenges in order to provide the reader with an adequate understanding of the data and analysis.

Method of Analysis

The research theme is multidisciplinary, involving several areas of study. The analysis is the fusion of the three pillars of this research- conflict sensitivity theory, the integration of peace-building, and Haitian context. The analysis comes with examining relief and development in general and World Vision’s work in specific to see how the observations align with the theoretical. The findings lead to recommendations, which are intended to help future assistance providers break down the intellectual barriers between the fields of conflict resolution, relief, and development, where appropriate.

Limitations of the Study

This is a “desk study,” meaning it is not performed “in the field.” The largest limitation in this study is that it is performed through the lens and perspective of practitioners. The
research draws from studies which incorporate some interviews of native populations of the interventions, but even those bodies of research acknowledge their limitations in being able to encapsulate all of the potential points of view. While this researcher has personally spent time in Haiti and met with program beneficiaries and partners, that experience was prior to this research. There is limited counterbalancing or external, independent analysis possible with the limited resources and no original interviews with beneficiaries or partners in the field to test these theories. This level of limitation is a major factor in focusing the research conclusions on program theory.

One additional challenge is that peace is difficult to measure. Because the contexts are so complex and conflict is less linear or easily quantifiable than economic or demographic data, the research is limited in what can be quantitatively proven. Examining latent conflict is particularly difficult if small changes or movements are often invisible to outside observers.

**Value of the Work**

By mapping the interconnectivity of the conflict resolution, relief, and development fields, the research enables practitioners to employ an integrated approach and may help to avert the common ‘harm’ that silo’d programs so often commit while also exploiting synergies to better contribute to peace. While the research project will not implement any direct programming, it will help shed light on the timely topic of the convergence of the themes as exemplified in the Haitian context. The recognition of the need for improved conflict sensitivity and peace-building training is undisputed (Rogers, 2010, p.9). This study’s findings can contribute the knowledge and skills of practitioners’ relief programming in this region and around the world. Ultimately, this study can improve the
efforts of relief practitioners who are actively working to save countless lives and prevent untold suffering.
CHAPTER 3: CONFLICT SENSITIVITY & PEACE-BUILDING THEORY

The world of international assistance is increasingly changing and progressing. International Development has existed in some forms, but is growing in funding, reach, and scale (Easterly, 2007). Disaster relief on a large scale is a relatively new phenomenon; until the 1990s most responses were far smaller than the types of disaster response that we see today. Peace-building programming as it is known today has only been recognized in its current form since the early 1990s (Woodrow & Chigas, 2009, p. 3). Each of these fields is changing, but one common struggle is that complexity is high, and while new and innovative theory and programs exist, many practitioners are not well versed in the latest theory and practice. In the last 10 years, a variety of literature including journals, manuals, and books, has emerged to bring these three areas together. The following is a survey of some of these sources.

The first recognition of the convergence of these three fields was “Do No Harm.” The concept was first systematized and fully popularized by Mary B. Anderson and CDA in the early 1990s, later published into the book *Do No Harm; How Aid Can Support Peace-or War* (Anderson, 1999). Do No Harm has gradually developed into a more comprehensive, cross-cutting theme over the last two decades (Woodrow & Chigas, 2009, p. 3) (Rogers, 2010, p.9).
Beyond DNH, there are various theories, frameworks and guides that seek to address the convergence of poverty, disaster, and conflict. For example, the Sphere Guide (Zutphen, 2011) is a practical handbook for relief programming in several sectors. While it’s seen as the current gold standard of relief handbooks, it includes guidance for the transition into reconstruction, which lays common ground for development theory and conflict resolution theory. Another prominent handbook is the Good Enough Guide (Oxfam GB, World Vision International, 2007). It establishes the industry standard technical expectations for the accountability to donors and beneficiaries, but it doesn’t address other types of collateral harm that can potentially occur in relief programming. The Humanitarian Accountability Network (HAP) outlines general standards for accountability of humanitarian organizations to the communities that they are serving which dovetails well with Do No Harm theory, but the principles, while relevant, specifically address the broader concerns of organizational accountability (HAP Int., 2011). The Journal of Peace-building and Development has stepping into the gap to contribute regularly to filling in the gap in theory (Mc Candless & Abu-Nimer, 2002). This project seeks to examine the latest literature and use this lens to examine the post-earthquake Haitian context. It seeks to converge this contextual analysis with the body of conflict sensitivity and peace-building literature.

**Do No Harm**

Do No Harm (DNH) tools help relief and development practitioners learn and apply lessons from the conflict resolution field. (Anderson, 1999, p.67-76) The Do No Harm framework uses conflict mapping and program analysis to identify and mitigate common
pitfalls such as the following generic examples, followed by three real life examples taken from analysis of Haitian (Non-World Vision) programs:

- Governments as donors may have stipulations or restrictions designed to ensure the donor’s self-serving objectives. Examples include requirements to purchase supplies from the donor country or spending on priorities that don’t match the local need. (Collier, 2007, p.104)

- Relief and development programs, especially commodity distribution or commodity monetization programs can harm or destroy local markets. For example, large scale imports of grain may reduce local farmers’ income and ultimately harm the host country’s long term agricultural production capacity.

- Assistance that doesn’t incorporate local systems can undermine existing community structures that help maintain stability and stave off conflict as mentioned in the problem statement. Bypassing tribal court systems is a common example.

- Assistance, especially relief assistance programming, can end abruptly without establishing sustainable alternatives, leaving beneficiaries without alternatives for the services that they were receiving and desperately need. (Zutphen, 2011)

- International support can create dependence on the program for livelihood or provision of services. This can allow the government to abdicate their responsibilities of provision or services while leaving beneficiaries dependent on international assistance for services normally that should be provided by the
domestic government or communities. Examples include schooling, income generation, health services, infrastructure, and other provisions. (Easterly, 2007)

- In challenging contexts such as impoverished rural, slum, or conflict zones, beneficiary selection involves ethical and logistical challenges. Organizations may choose beneficiaries based on convenience (i.e. selecting beneficiaries who speak one language, can read and register themselves for services, or those who live close to roads that are easily reached). This can elevate animosity or conflict and increase inequality. (Easterly, 2007)

- Relief organizations may show preferential treatment one party in a conflict. Assistance organizations typically seek to assist the parties in the most need, which may prioritize the ‘victimized’ party or displaced persons of the conflict. Depending on the level of assistance, this can bring animosity from the non-beneficiaries and further divide the community.

- A currency can suffer from “Dutch Disease” whereby large scale inflows of foreign currency and commodities into a country with relatively small exports create a glut of the local currency on global markets leading to currency inflation. (Collier, 2007, p.39-40, 50). This disproportionately impacts poor communities, pushing basic necessities beyond what the poor can afford.

- A local worker making higher wages based on foreign pay scales could find animosity or jealousy from their neighbors or co-workers who are paid a much lower locally fitting wage. (Actual example from Haiti (Pace, 2009, p.41-42)).
• Limited distributions of goods or materials such as tin roofs or electric generators for communities which are most severely impacted by a disaster often leads to conflict from neighbors. (Actual example from Haiti (Pace, 2009, p.46)).

• One of the worst slums in the Port-au-Prince area, Cite Soleil, received a strong livelihoods assistance program. The improved economic opportunity attracted other poor or unemployed Haitians from surrounding communities and rural areas. Competition with the new migrants to the community led to animosity and conflict from the long-term residents. (Actual example from Haiti (Pace, 2009, p.28)).

The DNH or conflict sensitivity framework seeks to mitigate these and other potential negative side effects. The next sections describe these tools and addresses how they function. But can these theories go beyond mitigation to contribute to building peace through a relief and development program. The next two sections will begin to address these questions.

Do No Harm analysis tools were created with the express intention of addressing contexts where conflict is manifest; that is, in situations of war or overt aggression. Yet the analysis tools are useful in any level of conflict, and the usage should be broader than war contexts.

The hypothesis of this thesis is that proper relief and development work has potential to build peace in two ways: First, that conflict sensitivity practice helps to preclude or at least mitigate conflict in relief and development programs. And second, relief and development help satisfy the underlying needs that lead to conflict. The theory behind
the conflict sensitivity frameworks (tenant one) is introduced above with practical steps for integration. The next section will introduce peace-building and contrast it with conflict sensitivity. It will further examine how conflict sensitivity is implemented in programs and where synergy exists for conflict sensitive relief and development programs to venture into peace-building. The following section will examine context of our case study, Haiti. It will seek to understand the background and causes of conflict and then investigate whether the programs of our case study NGO, World Vision, help to satisfy the unmet needs and thereby addresses our hypothesis’ second tenant- that World Vision’s work helps to build peace. The following draws information from a variety of published guides by humanitarian organizations or consortiums of those organizations. This section seeks to encapsulate the best practices in these fields.

**Conflict Sensitivity and Peace-building**

The definitions of where each term (conflict resolution, peace-building, conflict sensitivity…) begins and ends can be confusing. CDA emphasizes the risk of confusing the two concepts: “The distinction between conflict sensitive practice and peace-building matters, because the lack of clarity and prevailing confusion are now weakening many programs. People are uncertain about why their peace efforts are failing. All too often, one reason is that they are working on false assumptions about conflict sensitivity or peace-building or both. Mixing them up leads to flawed program design.” (Woodrow & Chigas, 2009, p. 12) Conflict Sensitivity is a cross-cutting theme that is applied by relief and development programs to ensure that the relief or development projects don’t make
conflict worse. Conflict sensitivity is a paradigm or lens by which other assistance programs are designed, monitored and managed, but conflict sensitivity cannot stand alone. Peace-building, on the other hand, is a sector or field of its own right. It focuses primarily on addressing the root causes of the conflict, and can potentially be a stand-alone project which is not focused relief or other development sectors (economic, education, health…) (Woodrow & Chigas, 2009, p. 11). In other words, conflict sensitivity can be considered conflict mitigation or reduction; peace-building could be called conflict transformation (Rogers, 2010, p.18).

It is also important to recognize that a peace-building program should apply consistent DNH concepts in its design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. Common failings of development programs such as staff selection from only one party in a conflict or implicit messages that reinforce oppression are just as likely to challenge a peace-building program as a relief or development program.

The Collaborative for Development Action (CDA) defines and compares peace-building and conflict sensitivity in this table, (Woodrow & Chigas, 2009, p.9) which is partially derived from definitions by International Alert (International Alert, et al., 2003). As can be seen here, conflict sensitivity lessens the conflict whereas the peace-building seeks to contribute to a Peace Writ Large.
Table 1: (Woodrow & Chigas, 2009, p.10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Sensitivity</th>
<th>Peace-building</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Definition:</strong> Conflict sensitivity refers to the ability of an organization to: Understand the context in which it is operating, particularly intergroup relations; Understand the interactions between its interventions and the context/group relations; and Act upon the understanding of these interactions, in order to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive impacts (International Alert, et al., 2003)</td>
<td><strong>Definition:</strong> Peace-building refers to measures designed to consolidate peaceful relations and strengthen viable political, socio-economic, and cultural institutions capable of handling conflict, and to strengthen other mechanisms that will either create or support the necessary conditions for sustained peace. (International Alert, et al., 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main aim:</strong> Work IN the context of conflict to minimize negative and maximize positive impacts of programming (on conflict, but also on other factors).</td>
<td><strong>Main aim:</strong> Work ON conflict, seeking to reduce key drivers of violent conflict and to contribute to Peace Writ Large (the broader societal-level peace).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Applied to Whom/What Programming:</strong> All programs, of all types, in all sectors, at all stages of conflict (latent, hot, post-war) must be conflict sensitive, including peace-building efforts themselves.</td>
<td><strong>Applied to Whom/What Programming:</strong> Peace-building programs are those that articulate goals or objectives aimed at securing peace. Such goals/objectives can be integrated into other programming modes (development, relief) and sectors—or peace-building can be a standalone effort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Required Analysis:</strong> Requires an adequate understanding of the conflict (e.g., dividers and connectors analysis) to avoid worsening dividers or weakening connectors; to reduce dividers and support or strengthen existing connectors.</td>
<td><strong>Required Analysis:</strong> Requires a deeper understanding of the key drivers of conflict and dynamics among factors and key actors, in order to ensure program relevance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Standard/Measure of Effectiveness:</strong> At a minimum, the program/project does not make the conflict worse—and seeks to make a positive contribution.</td>
<td><strong>Standard/Measure of Effectiveness:</strong> Programme/project reduces the power of key driving factors of conflict, contributing to Peace Writ Large.</td>
</tr>
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It is also important to note that Do No Harm frameworks should be more expansive than merely examining the conflict between parties or populations, and are often integrated with a broader risk assessment for the entire program. Most large programs include a wide-ranging risk assessment that includes potential detrimental impact ranging from environmental to economic. Many public grants require specific checklist style assessments as a component of grant proposals. The focus of this report is most specifically examining the conflict, violence, security aspects but this does not imply that the other areas of harm are any less important.

The peace-building field and the formalized body of theory around conflict sensitivity are relatively new. Thirty years ago, peace-building, conflict sensitivity, and Do No Harm were virtually unknown terms. Yet as of 2012, integrated conflict sensitivity is required by most large organizations and donors and an increasing number of relief and especially development programs are intentionally working to build positive peace. International assistance practitioners have moved through the following paradigms in regards to conflict: (Rogers, 2010, p.17-19)

1. Protect your aid from the conflict
2. Protect the conflict from your aid (DNH framework for manifest conflict contexts)
3. Conflict Sensitivity in all relief and development programs
4. Conflict Transformation (also known as peace-building)
The following chart, a partial reproduction of a chart from Catholic Relief Services’ *Integrating Peace-building in Humanitarian Assistance & Development Programming* shows the progression in several areas of concern (Rogers, 2010, p.18-19).

Table 2: (Rogers, 2010, p. 18-19)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact on Conflict</th>
<th>Level of Conflict Sensitivity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conflict Transformation [peace-building]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impacts on other Communities</td>
<td>Includes participant preferences and priorities in project design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affection of perceptions and relationships</td>
<td>Increases mutual dependency and communication in communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk of violence</td>
<td>Increase communal capacity to abstain from being involved or exposed to violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to decision-making</td>
<td>Sets minimum “floor” for level and scope of access to participation in institutional arenas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource Allocation</td>
<td>Redistributive policies to redress historical wrongs, inequalities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Conflict Sensitivity in Relief versus Development**

In development programming, conflict resolution is considered a major priority whether the conflict is manifest or latent. Development programs are created under the all
important goal of sustainability, with many organizations such as WV planning to eventually transition development projects to community based organizations (CBOs). As such, the very simple framework of DNH can provide the foundation for communities to create positive peace through future peace-building initiatives. DNH in development focuses first on avoiding creating or exacerbating conflict with the initiative, but in development programs DNH skills have enormous potential to create new relationship connectors and enable beneficiaries to personalize the DNH concepts in their own lives, families, and communities.

Development recognizes the importance of integrating the DNH framework in development even if the conflict is latent and not visibly violent.

*Adapting LCP [DNH] analysis to the Development Context means recognizing risks of latent destructive conflict, while giving attention to the effects of “resource transfers” on local power dynamics and to the potential of positive “implicit ethical messages.” Program redesign is linked to community empowerment, because LCP [DNH] requires grassroots community-based organizations (CBOs) to become the drivers of change. In such contexts, LCP [DNH] also tends to surpass its original purpose by fostering personal growth in individuals by laying a foundation for peace-building programming. (Garred, 2006, p.142).*

While development has found tremendous use for the DNH concepts, they actually started in relief. The tools were created with the intention of being a simple and quick tool. One key difference is that DNH in relief rarely intends to go beyond mitigation of
harm. The critical, life and death nature of relief work mandates that DNH be simple, quick, and minimally bureaucratic.

This contrasts with the nature of peace-building. To demonstrate the disparity, the following contrasts how peace-building integrates into programming.

Classic peace-building programs include dialogue efforts (at various levels and engaging a range of different types of stakeholders), negotiations, mediation, transitional justice, peace education, and training in conflict resolution skills. These program modes can be applied in a wide range of sectors—to address key conflict drivers. For example, one might engage in public dialogue to enhance a police reform effort or organize a negotiation process to develop a new constitution. Classic development, human rights, justice reform and other programs can also be critical for peace-building—if they are relevant and address key driving factors of conflict. Economic development programs or education reform can be equally important peace-building efforts, where, for example, horizontal inequalities or unequal access to education (and jobs and political power) are underlying causes of conflict. (Woodrow & Chigas, 2009, p.11)

The conflict analysis and practice of adjusting projects in response to the findings of the conflict analysis is in itself a learning process. Using DNH tools with community leadership helps teach and demonstrate conflict resolution skills and analysis tools. Staff and community leaders have described the new skills as a paradigm shift as they begin to become attuned to how leadership decisions impact everyone—not just their own
interests (Garred, 2006, p.31). In a meeting with community members that this researcher had in rural Haiti about three years before this paper was published, community members proudly pronounced that they had fundamentally altered their way of thinking and their ability to resolve conflicts with neighbors. This was part of the motivation for this researcher to pursue this current line of research. Community members will continue to use these same conflict resolution skills in business, community leadership, and their own families. When the concept is introduced and implemented in a participatory manner, it should permeate the participant’s thinking. (Garred, 2006, p.23).

While conflict analysis can be helpful in teaching conflict resolution skills, DNH processes / conflict sensitivity is not the same as peace-building. In 2010, researcher Lisa Freeman tested the hypothesis that World Vision’s macro context & conflict mapping workshop itself constitutes Interactive Conflict Resolution. She found that the conflict mapping workshop falls short of being Interactive Conflict Resolution. DNH conflict mapping lacks the effectiveness of conflict resolution problem solving workshops, which are gatherings of influential representatives of parties in a conflict. “The MSTC was not designed, nor does it claim, to contribute to conflict resolution or transformation. Its objectives are to produce conflict analysis, enhance conflict-sensitive programming, and train participants to be more conflict-sensitive practitioners” (Freeman, 2010, p.66). This only serves to reaffirm the differentiation between conflict sensitivity and peace-building; while closely related, they are not the same thing.
Integration of Conflict Sensitivity

The above sections have defined conflict sensitivity and contrasted it with peace-building. It also described the need for conflict sensitivity in relief and development. Conflict sensitivity refers to the integration of Do No Harm principles in humanitarian assistance programming. “Local Capacities for Peace” (LCP) is the term used by World Vision to describe the Do No Harm framework as detailed by World Vision. Again, Conflict Sensitivity, Do No Harm, and Local Capacities for Peace are used interchangeably in this study. The next section examines the best practice for how conflict sensitivity theory and the Do No Harm tools are practically implemented into relief and development programs, and how it best fits with more extensive peace-building programming.

Development and humanitarian assistance programs need nonviolent space in which to safely implement their important work but also need to understand how their work affects conflict and peace. Toward that end, two types of integrated programming are becoming commonplace: multi-sector integration that pairs peace-building with other sectors, and conflict sensitivity as a crosscutting consideration. (Rogers, 2010, p. 24-25) A key finding of this research is that best practice is a combination of conflict sensitivity as cross-cutting theme in all programs and dedicated peace-building programming to the extent the need and funding exist.

One timely and potentially effective way to integrate multiple sectors (including peace-building) is to partner with another organization. Most organizations that have embraced conflict sensitivity recognize that a shift in organizational culture is a prerequisite for
proper programming. The challenge in this cultural shift towards conflict sensitivity is that partnerships complicate matters, since said cultural changes must take place in multiple organizations. (Rogers, 2010, p.30) This is particularly challenging in relief operations when partner selection and coordination is under tremendous pressure to move forward quickly.

Integration typically involves including activities designed to build peace, along with other poverty relief or other assistance activities. The objective is to create activities which serve a dual purpose. For example, a strong human rights element integrated into all levels of teaching in schools can emphasize human dignity and the commonality of humanity. This could serve several purposes within a holistic community development program:

- Support initiatives by HIV / AIDs programs to reduce stigmatization among persons living with the disease
- Discourage bullying by school children
- Encourage healthy, gender and family roles and seek to reduce domestic violence
- Encourage youth to view another ethnic group as fellow humans and to consider what they share in common with those individuals
- Encourage youth, who are the leaders of tomorrow, to work towards an inclusive community which respects all people
- Encourage governments to assure basic human rights for minorities, prisoners, and vulnerable populations
These human rights are best taught based on some internationally accepted convention.

One of the best known and most widely accepted bodies of humanitarian law is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Reliance on internationally agreed standards helps bring all organizations’ work towards common high level goals—even if a great variety of opinions exist about how to get there. While this is best practice for international organizations, it can also be problematic when the standards conflict with local culturally accepted customs. For example, if a culturally accepted practice such as female genital mutilation (FGM is not a common practice in Haiti) is practiced by local customs or religion but is considered cruel and unacceptable by international conventions, then the application of human rights can be simultaneously a peace-building tool and a cause of conflict (Rose-Avila, 2012).

Five Capitals: an Alternative Framework

Before addressing practical how-to guidance for DNH, it should be mentioned that there are alternative frameworks to view and evaluate the same basic protections. One such alternative to the DNH and conflict sensitivity framework also addresses environmental and program sustainability. Jules Pretty writes that there are five areas of capital. A sustainable, positive program increases all five points of capital; while some systems can increase one area (i.e. increased financial capital with increased produce sales) it is not sustainable unless it also contributes to the other four spheres of capital. (Pretty, 1999, p. 2-7)

1. **Natural capital:** The naturally occurring resources such as soil, water, and wood.
2. **Social capital**: Relationships and trust that create cohesiveness in society; values, norms.

3. **Human capital**: The status of the individuals, and their skills and knowledge that enables them to perform productively.

4. **Physical capital**: Assets like infrastructure, equipment, and energy supplies.

5. **Financial capital**: The cash, access to credit, and payments such as remittances.

(Pretty, 1999)
This next section seeks to collect best practice in actual implementation of conflict sensitivity for relief and development practitioners. It briefly summarizes information from a variety of reports, professional journals, and training manuals or how-to guides by NGOs, consortiums, and policy think-tanks for various versions of conflict analysis frameworks (CAFs) which are closely based on or derived from the original Do No Harm framework. These reports also explain practical steps for integrating CAF best practices into a program and describe some common challenges in assuring conflict sensitive programming. This section begins with the first tenant of the hypothesis (that conflict sensitivity helps to mitigate conflict caused by relief and development assistance programs) and sets the foundation for the transition into the second tenant (how relief and development work can contribute to peace in their areas of operation). The next sections apply this section to Haiti’s context and highlight some examples ongoing in Haiti.

**Step 1: Conflict analysis**

CAFs are principally “utilized to inform humanitarian and development interventions, but not intended as interventions themselves.” (Freeman, 2010, p.3). That is, constructing an analysis is only the first step; the benefit comes with the implementation of the program which utilizes the information learned in the analysis. John Burton expressed the crucial
importance that the analysis takes in any conflict. He writes that a facilitation process which begins with analysis “is essentially non-bargaining, non-negotiating, at least until the analysis of the situation is complete, until there is agreement on the nature and sources of the conflict, and until details of options have been discussed.” (Burton, 2001) …“It is these insights that feed back into decision making. It is these insights that enable decision-makers to assess the costs and consequences of their policies in the longer term, thus encouraging them to take those steps that will prevent [sic] conflict.” (Burton, 2001)

When planning to perform a conflict analysis, few items are more important than the participant selection. Practitioners who will be implementing the program should participate, as should representative of implementing partners. In general, the more inclusive the analysis process is, the better; more input helps to empower the beneficiaries, partner organizations, and other local actors. But each situation should be carefully examined before beginning.

Local communities can provide valuable information for conflict analysis and many conflict analysis tools are indeed designed to be participatory processes with local communities. However, in some situations it is too contentious to undertake a shared conflict analysis with a community, especially one where you do not already have established relations or in particularly divided contexts. The risks or constraints to speaking openly for people participating in the process should always be carefully assessed by the team leading the analysis. Other
actors such as local authorities, business and religious leaders should be involved as far as is possible. (Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2012, p.6).

It is also important to assure that any vulnerable populations (women, children, minorities, disabled…) be represented to the extent possible.

Any analysis should have a facilitator or facilitating team. This lead role can be fulfilled by the practitioners or by a non-implementing experienced facilitator.

Conducting conflict analysis using an internal team has a much stronger impact than using consultants, as the conflict analysis process, if done well, will challenge staff assumptions and lead to stronger insights. External conflict analyses are all too often left to gather dust on the shelf, are not fully internalized and are often not read by project implementing staff. (Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2012, p.5)

Conflict analysis and mitigation is an iterative, learning process. As conflict analysis processes are often the first introduction to the concepts of conflict sensitivity for many participants, the process can have a dramatic impact on the participants. The broader the inclusion, the wider the reach of the concepts. Including various local community, political, tribal, or government leaders can help those individuals to learn conflict analysis tools, and to usher in a new conflict sensitivity paradigm for the local leadership. Of course many participants may be experienced in these subjects and not all participants will take in the concepts, but significant potential makes inclusion well worth the investment.
Every project should have at least some conflict assessment. In development projects in areas of minimal latent conflict, a broader contextual analysis will suffice, whereas in more complex contexts a more in-depth analysis of the context, the actors, dividers, and capacities for peace (connectors) is crucial. When organizations are developing a project proposal for submission to a donor, an external desk-based pre-assessment can be “good enough” (Scott M., 2012). Yet if the project is approved for funding, a full conflict analysis should be performed.

**Example Conflict Assessment Tools (CATs)**

Conflict analysis tools have changed significantly since they were first popularized by Mary B Anderson and CDA in the 1990’s. Tools used by different organizations vary in the focus (micro-vs. macro), the scope of the context (whole contextual analysis or just the conflict mapping) and in the level of detail (good enough vs. all inclusive intensive context mapping). This report will examine some of the tools used by World Vision in relief and development projects. World Vision began using DNH for relief work, but immediately realized the need for tools that were better suited to development and varying scopes of focus. Thus, they developed two additional contextual analysis tools which are outlined on the figure below, which is borrowed from World Vision’s book *A Shared Future; Local Capacities for Peace in Community Development* (Garred, 2006).
Local Capacities for Peace

The micro-context tool, LCP, is essentially identical to the original Do No Harm framework, and is summarized in the following chart. It is best used at the project level to assess the impact of one single project on specific conflict at a local level. The tool focuses on specific parties to a conflict, and does not focus on the larger macro context. (Anderson, 1999, p.68-72) The practitioner evaluates the various options for funding/implementing the assistance project in the light of the context’s tensions and its connectors, and then selects or redesigns the approaches to mitigate conflict. This tool is most effective in the initial stages to help integrate the assessment concerns into design to
determine what changes or alterations might be able to mitigate conflict risks or empower connectors.

Figure 4: Do No Harm (Garred, 2006, p. 5)

**Integrated Peace-building in Programs (IPIP)**

The IPID tool (formerly named IPAD, but changed to IPID for copyright reasons) is a mid-level or meso-context tool used by World Vision to bridge the gap between the conflict analyses at a micro program level into a more complete contextual analysis. The framework helps to encourage peace-building integration across multiple project sites for a cohesive program design (Scott M., 2012). The IPID tool addresses five areas which can be impacted (negatively or positively) by the resource transfers, implicit messages, or
other relief and development operations. These items take the place of the individual actors in the standard Do No Harm / Local Capacities for Peace tool.

1. Systems & Institutions
2. Attitudes & Actions
3. Values & Interests [Shared or different]
4. Experiences [Shared or different]
5. Symbols & Occasions

Figure 5: Local Capacities for Peace (Garred, 2006, p. 10)
The IPID tool manages to capture a larger piece of information than the DNH/LCP tool by looking beyond a specific conflict. This bears some resemblance to the earlier mentioned system described by Jules Petty titled “The Five Capitals”, which asserts that a program or project is sustainable if it manages to increase or remain neutral in all five areas of capital.

**Making Sense of Turbulent Contexts**

MSTC is the broadest and most macro tool in the WV conflict sensitivity toolkit. The analysis entailed in the MSTC considers a national or even regional level, looking at and beyond conflict to see a more complete gambit of stability and risks. The MSTC is best implemented with the widest range of participants possible. When possible, World Vision tries to include national or district government leaders and other organizations or leading minds in MSTC workshops whether or not they are direct partners. (Scott M. , 2012) “MSTC analysis is designed to dovetail with the ‘Do No Harm/Local Capacities for Peace (LCP)’ approach to planning aid which many NGOs use to contextualize their development work. [The] MSTC Analysis provides an overview of the wider context, which can be used to enrich and drive a Do No Harm analysis.” (Scott M. , 2010, p.2) The analysis, once complete, is widely published (protecting any sensitive information what was shared in confidentiality), and should be subsequently used by WV and others to “identify strategic priorities and mitigation strategies for programme interventions.” (Midgely, 2012, s.7)
The following basic questions are explored by participants during an MSTC Analysis: (Garred, 2006, p.29-31)

- What phases has the context moved through?
- What are the symptoms of instability?
- What kinds of actors are at play in the midst of turbulence?
- What struggles over resources & power play a role?
- What resentments & stereotypes influence the turbulent context below the surface?
- Can we build a graphic picture of the dynamics of the turbulent context?
- Looking at the context, what trigger events may reasonably be expected to create new scenarios?
- What are the strategic and operational implications of the trends and dynamics of the turbulent context? (Garred, 2006, p.29-31)
Program analysis can also be integrated into a broader contextual monitoring that tracks other concerns such as environmental or economic analysis. Examples of other studies include a Bellmon analysis, which is a study of the economic and agricultural market to help programmers know if direct distribution of food commodities would hurt the local economy (USAID FFP; FINTRAC Inc., 2011). While the research can be done in conjunction with a larger contextual analysis (MSTC, Bellmon…) the specific impacts of the project itself must be considered. This means that even if a full contextual analysis is performed, a smaller DNH analysis may also be beneficial.
There are a myriad of different conflict analysis frameworks, but the preceding examples are illustrative of a range of tools – from micro context to macro, from mitigation of harm to integrating peace-building to understanding risks. There is an abundance of literature guiding and prescribing the practical implementation of these principles, but once the principles are studied, learned, and practiced, they become a lens by which to see programming.

Jerry White is the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Partnerships and Learning in the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations within the US Department of State. Jerry, who was co-awarded a shared Nobel Peace Prize for work to out-law landmines, spoke with this researcher about conflict analysis frameworks. He expressed that in every conflict, there are stated positions, and then there are the causes behind those. But in the end, White finds that every person or party behind a conflict is acting out of a deep-seated fear. Effective conflict transformation is most effective when that fear is accurately assessed and allayed (White, 2012). This theory aligns with Cheryl Picard’s concept of Threats to Cares from insight mediation practice. This theory likewise suggests that conflict is derived from a party’s perceived threat to something that they care about (Picard, 2011, p.2-4). While White’s ideas are about conflict analysis and Picard’s work is intended to help parties in mediation better understand themselves, they both emphasize the importance of understanding the root fears of the parties. White’s point illustrates that common sense and deep understanding are important. No tool can perfectly describe a complex context.
Step 2: Conflict Sensitivity in the Program Cycle

The first step in applying conflict sensitivity is the analysis, as described above. But the analysis only serves its full function when it is actively used to inform decision making. This section explains how to integrate conflict sensitivity into the design, monitoring, and evaluation stages of a program. Because the management timetables and logistical constraints of relief and development vary, this sections will focus first on integration into development programming and then consider relief programming, concluding with best practices applicable to both.

Assistance programs have three primary phases in program management: design, monitoring, and evaluation. Each step of the plan is structured around a logical framework (hierarchy chart) of program goals, outcomes, outputs, and activities. This logical framework (or log-frame) serves as the technical blueprint which the program follows. The objective in the design phase is to integrate the assessment concerns into the log-frame to determine what changes or alterations might be able to mitigate conflict risks or empower connectors. For example, if an analysis identifies risk around beneficiary selection, then the designers could invite the communities of two competing ethnic groups to work together to jointly select beneficiaries for the program. Or it might reveal that most of the implementing staff comes from one religious or linguistic group, and would recommend hiring a minimum quota of people from the other group for implementation.
While some examples are simple, other solutions prove to be more elusive. The Conflict Sensitivity Consortium found that

…*Linking conflict analysis to the project design can be even more difficult, as it requires considering risks and opportunities linked to the conflict context, which are not necessarily linked to the project objectives. For development and humanitarian programming, which use information from broader needs assessments (education, health, livelihoods, sanitation needs etc), there is a need to add an explicit stage for analysis and reflection on conflict issues and their relation to the project during the design phase. Peace-building projects are different as they focus on conflict issues and can therefore use conflict analysis as a direct needs assessment tool for project design.* (Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2012, p.9)

This leads to the monitoring phase of the design, monitoring, and evaluation. Because conflict is very often amorphous, multilayered, and difficult to quantitatively map, it is impossible to predict all interaction, reactions, and impacts of the programming. It is particularly difficult in complex contexts where the specific conflict parties are not easily identifiable, where there are several parties in a conflict, or the conflict is latent but severe. While conflict mapping is a crucial first step, programs must continue to monitor their interaction with their contexts; both watching the context itself (progression of any changes in the context which might impact the program or change the needs of the beneficiaries) and monitoring of how the program is impacting individuals or parties in the area of operation. (Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2012, p.42)
Mainstream relief and development programs rely on monitoring and periodic evaluations to help track progress and inform leadership to make adjustments as needed. In the words of business management guru Peter Drucker, “You manage what you measure.” Program monitoring is typically aligned with stated program goals or objectives like decreasing malaria, increasing incomes, or improving educational opportunities. But it is recommended that conflict sensitive programs have at least minimal contextual monitoring. The Conflict Sensitivity Consortium provides two examples of indicators which would be collected first hand by the project implementing organization: Project staff could monitor the proportion of people in communities A and B who perceive the project as benefiting both communities equally or one community over the other (rarely, often or always). This would be directly collected along with the project progress monitoring. Or, the organization could internally inquire about the number of staff who believes the project has not had any impact on conflict in the target communities / exacerbated some tensions in the target communities / enabled greater cohesion in the target communities. (Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2012, p.14)

Similarly, the individuals who are collecting data for the monitoring should be transparently communicating with those who they are monitoring to assure that the community and individuals do not perceive that the process is extractive or self-serving. Research which does not appear to locals to bring any benefit can in itself create frustrations which lead to tensions or reduced trust for the NGO.

It is also advisable that conflict sensitive program monitoring “consult non-targeted groups as well as direct project participants. This is particularly relevant for context and
interaction indicators, as it will help generate data on changes in the broader context in which the project is taking place and on possible effects of the project on tensions or divisions between targeted and non-targeted groups.” In addition, it may provide a third-party perspective, which could provide helpful and significantly different insights from those obtained from the involved parties and from the project staff. Alternatively, the project could rely on external data if it exists. For example, perhaps a police or government force might track the frequency of incidents of violence between groups A and B in one specific area over a three-month period (Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2012, p.14-15).

Key Challenges for Conflict Sensitive Programming

While the above guidelines may seem somewhat burdensome, once the concepts are well systematized conflict sensitivity can become a seamless part of the processes. Yet even for the seasoned practitioner it is important to pay special attention to some of the most common problem areas: beneficiary targeting, procurement, relationships with communities, government partners, feedback & accountability and sustainability & exit strategies (Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2012). CRS and the Conflict Sensitivity Consortium highlight a few specific best practice recommendations for the integration of conflict sensitivity into the project lifecycle:

- Think creatively about ways that targeted activities can also benefit neighboring communities and build positive relationships (for example, through
communication strategies, exchanges, involvement in some selected activities). (Rogers, 2010, p. 25, 42)

- Develop selection criteria in partnership with communities to ensure that such processes are transparent and inclusive. Involving communities early on should increase ownership and reduce the possibility of targeting causing or exacerbating tensions at the implementation phase. (Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2012, p.8)

- Ensure that all decisions made in relation to targeting are communicated widely and that both targeted and non-targeted groups in an area are involved in information sharing and feedback. It is also good practice to have a good exit strategy and discuss it with the community from the design phase and regularly throughout the program lifecycle. (Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2012, p.8)

- Regular self-assessment of organizational strengths and weaknesses in conflict sensitivity helps the organization be properly prepared for a wide variety of common challenges. (Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2012, p.24-26)

- To the extent possible, limit the program’s reliance on direct handouts that benefit one specific person or family. When direct handouts are necessary, it is best to require beneficiaries to contribute to the cost. For example, food for work programs or school feedings which require the child to be at school to receive the meal are strongly preferential to free, unlinked food handouts. Clear communication and transparency about the conditions of the benefit and costs are crucial (Moore M. A., 2008-2011).
Building organizational capacity is a constant endeavor for NGOs, and conflict sensitivity capacity is no exception. One of the first steps to establishing strong organizational capacity in conflict sensitivity is to demonstrate buy-in at leadership and senior management level. Having senior leadership (at the local, national, and Global/HQ level) participate in trainings demonstrates to the organizational staff the high priority of CS. Conflict Sensitivity and the use of tools such as Do No Harm can be integrated with other training to increase efficiency and participation. For example, gender issues and child protection are other important cross-cutting themes which can be combined with Do No Harm training courses (Rose-Avila, 2012). One challenge with this style of hybrid training is that the CS element would then need to be shortened to accommodate busy schedules, which might reduce the focus on and intensity of DNH training, making it more of an introduction to DNH. The quick overview training may not be sufficient for staff to move from theory to practice. In fact, the staff may feel comfortable with the cursory overview training and may not perceive a need to engage in any deeper training (Scott M., 2012).

**Applying Conflict Sensitivity in Emergency Response**

There is tremendous similarity and overlap between the conflict sensitivity of development work and relief work, yet applying conflict sensitivity is somewhat unique in each of the fields. If you have a development presence before the

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Before [DNH], the understanding in proposals was that projects were for self-help-group members. After [DNH], it is not only for... members. We now consider the future of the whole village.”
emergency, your organization should have a contextual understanding, conflict analysis, and base level training in DNH in development prior to emergencies—especially in emergency prone locations. Because time is of the essence in emergency responses, it may be best to integrate the basic conflict sensitivity learnings into the basic training manuals. In this case, this can help keep processes simple and efficient. “In recognizing that ‘keeping things simple’ is often the key to success for practitioners, there is certainly a danger of over-formalizing CSA in emergency initiatives. Rather, we should support ‘doing no harm’ as an institutional value by building on the many existing examples of implicitly conflict-sensitive practice.” (Zicherman, Khan, Street, Heyer, & Chevreau, 2011, p.2)

Integration of conflict sensitivity in emergency response practice suffers from similar challenges as the development field; there is “widespread understanding of and support for better integration of the principles of conflict sensitivity in humanitarian response. The chief obstacle lies in the practical application of these principles, taking into account the constraints and multiple demands faced by aid agencies in responding to emergencies.” (Zicherman, Khan, Street, Heyer, & Chevreau, 2011, p.1) Yet the priority given to conflict resolution may be lower in relief; “latent conflict is not considered a priority if it poses little risk of escalation into large scale violence.” (Garred, 2006, p.17) Michelle Garred writes that recognizing common ways that relief work can have negative impacts can make practitioners less likely to commit those errors. The primary risks of “harm” in emergency contexts are as follows: (Garred, 2006, p.17-20)
Analyses are important in all disaster responses, particularly ones where manifest conflict is known before the onset. As there is little warning before the onset of many disasters, time may not permit an initial, in-depth analysis that longer term development projects benefit from. As such the analysis may need to take place as part of the design; a prerequisite “good enough” analysis can inform the design, with a more thorough analysis taking place as soon as the opportunity presents itself. Several tools exist for quick “good enough” analyses. For example, the Benefit–Harms Analysis (BHA) framework is one methodology which looks at the micro context and impact of individual project outcomes. The “Good Enough Conflict Analysis”, part of The Good Enough Guide (Oxfam GB, World Vision International, 2007) provides a moderately detailed yet compact conflict assessment questionnaire. While these tools aid thoroughness, it is important to assure that practitioners have the training in conflict sensitivity that allows them to see programs and their contexts through the conflict sensitive lens. This helps
practitioners to make the types of on-the-fly decisions that disaster and humanitarian relief require.

Between 90 days and one year from the onset of the relief program a more thorough analysis should be considered (as soon as possible in high conflict contexts). This more thorough analysis uses the same tools as the development section above listed. As described above, examples used by World Vision include the Do No Harm (DNH) tool, the Integrating Peace-building into Development (IPID) tool, and the Making Sense of Turbulent Contexts (MSTC) tool. At this stage, the analysis should always integrate partners and local community members to the maximum extent possible, despite the increased coordinative effort required to make the analysis more inclusive.

Analysis of course should address the entire context in which the program is operating or likely to influence directly or indirectly. These analyses should include a broader survey of the impacts on the context at large- economic, environmental, socio-cultural, and political among others.

Monitoring: The Humanitarian Practice Network found that many emergency response manuals are generally weak in the monitoring impact in response programming (Zicherman, Khan, Street, Heyer, & Chevreau, 2011, p.4). One way to improve the design, management, monitoring, and evaluation of programs is to use commonly accepted indicators from the Sphere Guide in the design phase. This also allows for better coordination with partner organizations. According to HPN,

*The ‘Good Enough’ approaches to conflict analysis (rapid, simple, focusing on key questions) were seen to be the most relevant in the immediate post-disaster*
phase. Most informants pointed to the 'redesign' phase that often occurs 6–12 weeks into an emergency response as the time for more thorough and structured conflict analysis” (Zicherman, Khan, Street, Heyer, & Chevreau, 2011, p.7).

Because rapid onset emergency response usually happens at a breakneck pace, full, thorough contextual analysis is usually not possible. This means that proper monitoring and evaluation of the intervention’s impact on conflict is even more crucial than in development projects. Relief and development monitoring and evaluation typically focus on outcomes and impact on the community as a whole in part because that’s what the donors need to see. Evaluation should include tools such as: “complaint mechanisms, public hearings social audits, community reviews and other participatory monitoring tools [which] can help reveal any conflict issues associated with program implementation” (Zicherman, Khan, Street, Heyer, & Chevreau, 2011, p.7). And of course the program managers much change their practice based on the findings.

**Conflict Sensitivity Challenges Specific to Relief:**

Relief and development share some aspects of conflict sensitivity implementation, but in other ways they are quite different. Relief’s ‘every second counts’ urgency demands a more streamlined, ‘get it done’ mentality (Moore M. A., 2008-2011). The following section will expound upon some of some ways in which the CS implementation in relief is differs from implementation of CS in development.

One potential challenge of organizations responding to massive disasters such as the Haiti earthquake is the difficulty in coordinating with other organizations working in parallel.
Many times one organization offers a better relief product (better temporary shelter, for example) than another organization. This can cause beneficiaries to prioritize one relief organization over another, or in some cases, cause beneficiaries to reject one organization’s assistance outright. For example, of one organization provides materials to beneficiaries for them to build their own shelters, but another organization offers better materials and offers small payments to those working to construct their community’s shelters, the beneficiaries may decide that they only want to work if they can get those payments. This can be exacerbated if each organization is working with a different target population (such as two ethnic groups) and there happens to be a conflict between the two groups. The aid organizations, despite meaning well, will be contributing to increased conflict between the groups which by definition does harm.

One way to address these challenges is to standardize benefits provided as much as possible. Documents such as the Sphere Guide (Zutphen, 2011) provide recommended standards for relief operations, allowing each organization to have a baseline for what other organizations are likely to offer beneficiaries. Another way to mitigate this risk is through coordination of all organizations working in each sector. The United Nations Humanitarian Crisis Response cluster system, the United Nations’ globally accepted method for organizing and coordinating response in relief situations creates groups or “clusters” which focus on each specific sector. For example, cluster groups include water & sanitation cluster, a shelter cluster, livelihoods and other groups.

While the necessity of conflict sensitivity in programming is well accepted, competing priorities of various donors and interest groups compete for the attention of relief and
development staff. For example, many donors are encouraging a strong emphasis on gender issues or faith based emphasis. Other professionals might believe that CS as a crosscutting theme takes away attention from other sector priorities such as education, health, or livelihoods. While these can be legitimate concerns, conflict sensitivity is more of a way of thinking than a sector. (This contrasts with peace-building activities, which are more accurately classified as a sector.) As an organization makes the effort to design, monitor, and evaluate their operations in a conflict sensitive manner, they will find that many of the potential pitfalls which commonly derail objectives are less common. As such, efficiency is often increased despite a small increased investment in training and conflict analysis workshops.

**Human Rights vs. the Pursuit of Peace**

Conflict resolution and peace-building practitioners can at times find themselves in potential conflict with human rights activists in conflict and post-conflict contexts. Perpetrators of human rights or international humanitarian law violations (genocide, torture, use of child soldiers, attacks on civilians…) are indeed guilty of breaking international human rights law. Human rights advocates are likely to strongly advocate for prosecution in the International Criminal Court (ICC) or a special tribunal established to prosecute those leaders. But this may drive the leaders of guilty parties to become irreconcilable; that is, they believe that their only choices are to fight and win or die trying. These parties become “spoilers” to a party as they work against any form of peace. (Anderson, 1999, p.17)
A more pragmatic method to ending the fighting is to encourage those militants or leaders to put down their arms, enter peace negotiations, and end the immediate fighting may be to promise amnesty for all parties in the fight. But this often leaves despicable despots unpunished for monstrous crimes against humanity. It may end the immediate fighting, but it may leave the known guilty parties free to engage in violence again in the future, and fails to serve as a deterrent to future crimes against humanity (Grech, 2012, p.8-12). It also fails to bring even token justice to the conflict, leaving many victims or friends and families of victims unable to embrace closure. This lack of perceived justice may lead to reprisal or retributive violence that reignites the conflict in the future (Grech, 2012, p.8-12).

One potential middle-ground option is the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission, which brings the crimes to light, but also provides amnesty for most or all perpetrators. It is helpful in establishing a stepping stone towards closure, but is conducive to parties who will resist any resolution, also known as “spoilers” or “irreconcilables.” (Anderson, 1999, p.17)

The enormously complex and emotionally challenging question of how to deal with crimes against humanity is an ongoing debate in the international community, and will not be answered in the course of this thesis. But, the challenges remain relevant to international relief and development’s integration with peace-building. While recent crimes against humanity are not the leading cause of the instability in Haiti today, human rights violations such as inhumane treatment of prisoners are commonly reported in Haiti. Previous actions by various parties including the Duvalier “Papa Doc” and “Baby Doc”
dictators and the social injustice established through their and other military, political, or criminal leaders makes this a relevant line of inquiry to this case study.

Summary Best Practice as Recommended by the Humanitarian Practice Network

Table 3: (Zicherman, Khan, Street, Heyer, & Chevreau, 2011, p.15)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Best Practice for Conflict-Sensitive Emergency Response</th>
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<tr>
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<th>Understanding the context and the role of local actors</th>
<th>Understanding the context</th>
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<td></td>
<td>• Provide information on context and existing local structures in orientation to new emergency staff, building where possible on existing development programmes’ resources and analysis</td>
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<td><strong>Preventing the exclusion of local actors</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Develop a partnership strategy which takes into account the identity and spread of local partners (most effective as comprehensive strategy designed as part of emergency preparedness plans)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Dedicate time and resources to ensure involvement of local partners during the first phase of the response rather than waiting until a later stage</td>
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<td>• Map and take into account practical barriers (language, gender relations, meeting locations) that could inadvertently exclude local stakeholders from the response effort</td>
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<th>Targeting and beneficiary selection</th>
<th>Targeting methods</th>
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<td></td>
<td>• Use participatory techniques to facilitate community input in determining targeting criteria</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Ensure continual information-sharing with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries on targeting criteria and selection processes</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Mitigating tensions between host and beneficiary communities</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Identify existing social divisions as well as those which are the result of the humanitarian crisis, and map them against the proposed targeting criteria: the greater the overlap, the higher the risk of doing harm and the greater the need for adjustments in targeting plans</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Foster links between host/beneficiary communities where possible: have host community representatives in camp committee meetings or invite participants from the host community to activities organized as part of health promotion, education or psycho-social support</td>
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<th>Power and control over the distribution of resources</th>
<th>Understanding power relations and preventing political manipulation</th>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>• Map key local power relations and actors and use this knowledge to identify possible risks of, and measures to prevent, manipulation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Where possible, use local partner knowledge and community pressure to reduce the influence of powerful actors over the distribution of resources</td>
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**Using community-based structures**
• Involve the community in the management of distributions
• Ensure distribution committees are inclusive and representative of all segments of the population
• Balance the power of committees with robust complaints mechanisms
• Build committees’ capacity in leadership, management and conflict resolution

### Participation, transparency and accountability

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<tr>
<th>Using transparency and accountability measures to reduce conflicts</th>
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<tr>
<td>Invest in solid feedback and complaints mechanisms and clear and transparent communication with disaster-affected communities (e.g. through Community Liaison Officers)</td>
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**Timeliness**

- Foster local participation and ownership from the start of the response so as to avoid the costs and negative impacts of having to adjust programming later on

### Gender relations

| Develop an understanding of gender among programme staff that goes beyond just the need to enhance women’s participation in activities |
| Monitor levels of violence against women within the household |
| Listen and respond to the concerns of men as well as women |

### Staffing

**Managing new recruitment and turnover**

- Hold regular all-staff meetings, open staff foray (?) or similar to foster links between new and existing staff, and between staff from different locations
- Design an orientation package for all staff which includes contextual and cultural understanding for new international staff, as well as humanitarian principles, codes of conduct and community-based programming approaches
- Require longer-term commitments from senior managers

**Managing national staff identity issues**

- Ensure that awareness of national staff identity issues informs staffing decisions and identify possible measures to mitigate tensions: draw staff from other departments or partner agencies to make up appropriate assessment teams; ensure that teams sent to the field are mixed, with at least one person from the local area; monitor the proportion of ‘outsiders’ making up staff

### Inter-agency coordination

- Introduce conflict-sensitivity concepts to UN cluster lead agencies and OCHA
- Support the clusters and advocate with donors at an inter-agency level for the standardization of aid packages, approaches and geographic distribution
- Advocate for cross-sectoral forums for the analysis of conflict and context issues

## Conclusion of Implementation and How-To

In conclusion of the applying conflict sensitivity section of this report, The Humanitarian Practice Network recommends six minimum standards which should help organizations mitigate the potential harm of their emergency response activities and improve the conflict sensitivity of their interventions (Zicherman, Khan, Street, Heyer, & Chevreau, 2011, p.17):
• Long-term emergency response preparedness plans include a regularly updated conflict analysis, as well as conflict-sensitivity training for both senior and operational staff.

• A ‘Good Enough’ conflict analysis is included as part of the rapid emergency assessment phase.

• Partnership strategies (including the selection, identity and spread of partners) are analyzed in relation to potential conflict risks.

• All new staff, both international and local, is given orientation including information on the conflict context.

• Participatory methods are used to foster community engagement in developing targeting criteria and managing distributions, non-beneficiaries are consulted during post-distribution monitoring and conflict-related questions are included in post-distribution monitoring tools.

• Conflict benchmarks are included within Real-Time Evaluations and After Action Reviews.

• As many organizations are already working to mainstream basic conflict sensitivity practice, these recommendations should not require large additional investments in time or resources. “Significant improvements can be achieved through relatively simple steps which complement existing aid agencies’ and sector-wide tools and standards.” (Zicherman, Khan, Street, Heyer, & Chevreau, 2011, p.17)
CHAPTER 5: CASE STUDY: HAITI

This research project examines the convergence of relief, development, and conflict resolution in theory and with a specific focus on Haiti. To understand how to best support peace in Haiti, we must examine and analyze the conflict in order to understand at what the causes of conflict are, and then examine potential solutions. Only then can we extrapolate the theory from integration of relief, development, and conflict resolution into the Haitian context. And in doing so, we can address whether World Vision’s programming in relief and development are, in general, fostering peace.

Haiti is a “fragile state.” While many appreciate Haiti as a beautiful and resilient society (Knorr, 2012), author Terry Buss notes that Haiti has also been described by many others in far harsher terms: “a nightmare, predator, collapsed, failed, failing, parasitic, kleptocratic, phantom, virtual, or pariah state, and, under the transition government, and orphan democracy. In many ways Haiti is all of these things.” (Buss, 2008, p.2).

At the onset, it is crucial to note that Haiti is a unique context. While Haiti is treated by many in the international community as a post-conflict zone, (a country recovering from a recent war) it is NOT a post conflict zone. Marie Pace of CDA wrote in

There may be no aspect of Haitian society that is not in crisis --Royal Canadian Mounted Police Chief Superintendent David Beer (Pace, 2009, p.17)
“Although, most multi-lateral, bi-lateral as well as many non-governmental organizations treat Haiti as a post conflict country, all will agree that Haiti has not been at war with itself, nor with its neighbors.” (Pace, 2009, p.18) Despite many contextual similarities to post-conflict countries, Haiti better fits the definition of a fragile state. Pace defines a fragile government as a context where “the government cannot or will not deliver basic core services to its people, especially its poor.” (Pace, 2009, p.10). This means that Haiti is best compared to non-war, high conflict countries like South Africa, Mexico, or Colombia (Pace, 2009, p.6). Haiti is not accurately likened to warring countries like Rwanda, Sri Lanka, or the former Yugoslavia where full scale war broke out between two or three primary armies with defined membership and leadership. The uniqueness of Haiti’s situation makes it more difficult for observers and humanitarian assistance practitioners to differentiate between what truly counts as peace practice versus what would be general development or relief.

One of the reasons that a fragile state is different from a post-conflict state is that the parties to a conflict are often difficult to identify. Issa Bitang A Tiati, the Haiti Country Program Manager for World Vision US, shared that “It’s difficult to identify the connectors and the spoilers in Haiti conflict analyses” (Tiati, 2012). This report acknowledges that challenge, and relies on external analyses and a variety of interviews as a basis to help create a basis of comparison and to ‘set the scene’ for the analysis of the ongoing work in Haiti, principally that of World Vision.

Several analyses are consulted in this study, but the 2009 report by Marie Pace and Ketty Luzincourt of CDA titled Haiti’s Fragile Peace: A Case Study of the Cumulative Impacts
of Peace Practice best describes arguments for and against various causes of conflict in Haiti. The strength of the report is that it acknowledges that conflict in Haiti is not simply attributed to two warring parties; in fact, the report acknowledges that it is difficult to identify the specific actors of the conflict and their attributable influences on the conflict. Marie Pace focused the analysis on trying to better understand the reasons for the conflict. This section will serve as the basis for evaluation of the context and WV programming’s impact on peace and conflict in Haiti.

Before questioning the causes and actors, the study must make note of several important events in Haitian history. Haiti, the first country formed from a slave revolt against French masters, was a rich and powerful country. France, the United States, and other slave holding countries viewed Haiti with fear. France particularly imposed harmful fees and indemnities under threat of war, which helped to push Haiti towards being a fragile state.

Haiti is a country of dramatically contrasting distinctions. Colonial Haiti was considered the pearl of the Caribbean, with a vibrant economy that produced half the sugar and coffee in the world. Then, in 1804 Haiti won its independence through the only successful slave revolt in the world’s history. Today’s distinction is that of being the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, with dismal socio-economic indicators and little political and social infrastructure. (Pace, 2009, p.9)
Haiti has seen nearly constant political instability or oppression. There have been, according to CDA, 55 presidents of Haiti since the country’s founding in 1804.

*Of these, three were assassinated or executed, seven died in office (one by suicide), and twenty-three were overthrown by the military or paramilitary groups. Two—Henri Namphy and Jean Bertrand Aristide—were overthrown twice. Only nine completed full presidential terms. Thirty-one held office for two years or less. In 1946 and again in 1988, a military junta ruled without a president. Nearly all presidents either were military officers or were closely affiliated with the military.* (Pace, 2009, p.10)

In 1804 Haiti gained its hard-earned independence from France. It became the world’s first country to begin as a former slave colony. The battle for independence served as a social connector, but the strong racial and economic divisions served to divide society. Indemnity, aggression and isolation from slave owning countries, especially France, left Haiti’s coffer’s empty (British Broadcasting Company, 2012). In the 1820s Haitian President Jean Pierre Boyer unified the entire island of Hispaniola and declared everyone to be Haitian regardless of their economic status. Jean Boyer even went so far as to invite former slaves in North America to immigrate to Haiti, which served to further legitimize the identity of former slaves (Tiati, 2012). Yet despite the openness, the land tenure remained in the plantation system. The masses remained poor while those who owned land rose to become the new elite (British Broadcasting Company, 2012). In 1943 Dumarsais Estime established the influence of “Noirists”, who were darker skinned Haitians who fought to bring the black Haitian population to leadership. This movement
began to create a new black middle class (Pace, 2009, p.10-11). While the movement found populist support, it was opposed by the United States and anti-communist allies (Pace, 2009, p.11).

The Noirist movement was later usurped by the Duvalier dictators. Voodoo physician Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier and his son Jean-Claude, or "Baby Doc" ruled Haiti with an iron first from 1956-1986 (British Broadcasting Company, 2012). In 1990

Much to the horror of Haiti’s elites, Jean Bertrand Aristide was swept to a surprise Presidential victory by massive voter turnout and a landslide of two-thirds of the popular vote. This charismatic priest turned politician had become the de-facto leader of a broad network of pro-democracy, grassroots organizations that he called the Lavalas—the flood—and had captured popular imagination for its commitment to the poor, its outspoken opposition to government repression (Pace, 2009, p.13)

A fear of total societal upheaval seemed to point towards an impending collision with the existing power structure. This led to great fear by existing elites that they were the target of mass rage, so they enlisted power from various sources to harshly to put down the upheaval; chaos ensued. This failed transition can be contrasted with the work of Nelson Mandela of South Africa, who worked hard to discourage vengeful or violent political transition. He instead worked to assure all of South Africa new society would have to guarantee some protections for whites. (Tiati, 2012)

President Aristide was elected in 1990, but he was removed from power in a violent military coup which killed thousands and sent tens of thousands (including Aristide)
fleeing the country. The international community acted resolutely and the military regime capitulated, bringing Aristide back to power in 1994. Yet by the time he returned, he had only a year remaining in his term as president. In 1995 René Préval was elected in what became Haiti’s first peaceful presidential transition. Aristide was later re-elected for a second term, but his new term was marked with weaker governance and higher corruption levels. Haiti descended into economic and political chaos, and Aristides was overthrown a second time.

The United Nations Security Council authorized a peacekeeping mission in 2004 called MINUSTAH (UNSC, 2004). The peacekeeping forces helped to establish a new level of stability by creating a more effective security force than the highly corrupt and underequipped national police force. MINUSTAH worked to disarm gangs which were often illicitly sponsored by politicians and wealthy businessmen. By 2007, the UN crackdown on crime focused on the most insecure neighborhoods around Port Au Prince such as Cite Soleil; the improved security led to levels of peace and optimism which had not been felt in Haiti for many years. But the relative calm didn’t last for long; 4 storms in September of 2008 battered Haiti and caused massive damage to communities, homes, and crops. The destroyed crops, in conjunction with a spike in global commodity prices (the global food crisis of 2008) brought riots.

On a quiet afternoon on January 12, 2012 an already troubled Haiti was brought to its knees by one of the most destructive natural disasters in modern history. The catastrophic earthquake, with a magnitude of 7.0, struck just outside of the densely populated capital of Port au Prince. The quake devastated much of the city due to
makeshift construction techniques, substandard construction materials, and poor building code enforcement. Many of the homes in this poor and very densely populated city had been shoddily assembled one above another, built into the mountains surrounding the city like stair steps. When the earth shook, the damage was compounded by homes crashing down upon each other like dominos (USGS, 2010). Port au Prince descended into chaos. The already fragile government was devastated. Over 200,000 people died, with 250,000 structures destroyed and over one million people initially displaced (International Crisis Group, 2011). As is often the case with rapid onset disasters, there was no warning and no one was prepared for the earthquake. Even the first responders, NGOs and UN peacekeeping forces in the area themselves suffered losses of their own. (World Vision USA, 2011) The Haitian national presidential palace, partially collapsed, became an iconic image worldwide overnight representing how the already fragile state had been shattered by the epic destruction. The already challenging context instantly became the world’s worst disaster zone. This disaster was one of, if not the worst disaster the modern world has seen with horrific destruction (over 2,000,000 affected and around 200,000 killed), concentration (all in one metropolitan area as opposed to tsunamis, famines, or wars which cover wider geographic areas) and isolation (as an island, the access is more challenging). Elisabeth Byrs, spokeswoman of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs explained "This is an historic disaster. We have never been confronted with such a disaster in the UN memory. It is like no other." (Byrs, 2010)
Causes of Conflict

Haiti fell from a country of immense wealth but social injustice, into a country plagued with poverty, inequality, and political and social instability. This research examined the causes of conflict as the basis for assessing the impact of relief and development in building peace.

In order to evaluate the effectiveness of certain interventions in promoting peace, one must begin by understanding the causes of conflict in the context. Haiti has a complex history and remains an extremely complex context. This means that there is no simple answer to the question of what causes the high levels of conflict in Haiti. This report will build on the analysis of the causes of conflict outlined by others.

In every case, explanations of what drives conflict and instability in Haiti point, to one degree or another, to the standard referents for developing countries struggling with poverty and instability: massive unemployment, weak or dysfunctional government institutions, a lack of public infrastructure, and environmental degradation. (Pace, 2009, p.16)

Pace outlines three overarching categories of conflict in Haiti. In the most simplified form, these causes could be described as: 1. Poverty & lack of opportunity, 2. Physical insecurity caused by crime & gangs, and 3. A corrupt and ineffective state.

...some will give more weight to corruption and the failings of the state as the root cause of violence and instability, while others will say that poverty and unemployment are the most to blame. Others still, would offer more nuanced
explanations of what keeps Haiti locked in a negative spiral, calling for the need to mend the fragmented social fabric of Haitian society.” (Pace, 2009, p.18)

A fourth factor that causes strife and challenge in Haiti is seemingly unending barrage of natural disasters that have struck Haiti. Hurricanes, flooding, and the Earthquake of 2010 have killed hundreds of thousands, destroyed countless assets, and taken millions of Haitian families from stable positions into vulnerable and desperate circumstances.

While geological and weather occurrences are not the focus of this report, in the last decade alone disasters have done more damage to the Haitian people than debatably any country in the world. While much of the existing research is pre-earthquake, it is still crucial to consider the destabilizing influence of natural disasters in the analysis of Haiti.

While the 2010 earthquake brought global attention and increased urgency to Haiti’s plight, international assistance organizations have been a huge presence in the country for over 30 years. In fact, even before the earthquake, NGOs were providing such a great portion of the services such as health and education that Haiti is often referred to as the Republic of NGOs (Raymond, 2009). The earthquake response has only increased the presence of international assistance. Yet even after literally billions of dollars of aid, Haiti remains poorer than ever. This is due in part to a series of devastating disasters from hurricanes, to floods, to the 2010 earthquake, but it’s more than just external circumstances that have kept Haiti in poverty.

One of the areas of both angst and hope in Haiti is the international community, but foreign countries may share the Haitian people’s best interests; Donor countries often promote their own interests with their “assistance” to Haiti. Many conferences and UN
gatherings have coalesced the international community to help plan the future for Haiti. The problem is that the plans and designs are externally imposed, and typically not generated by the Haitian beneficiaries and other Haitian stakeholders. Likewise, NGOs often receive donations that are committed for specific purposes which sometimes do not align with the needs the community. If a “beneficiary” community does not feel ownership over the development program, it will likely falter after the donor organization leaves, leaving a potential vacuum for people who were depending on the service. This type of unsustainable programming weakens traditional coping mechanisms and leaves the communities dependent on external assistance.

The International Peace Academy studied the impact of the aid inflows which constitute a huge portion of the nation’s GDP. They found that international assistance in Haiti is very often highly politicized at both the donor government level and the local level. Large inflows of aid can be very appealing for local politicians who demand credit with constituents for the delivery of the services (International Peace Academy, 2002, p.5-6). This often creates ethical dilemmas for local aid practitioners who wish to remain politically neutral but find themselves not permitted to distribute much needed relief or development services unless they are willing to credit the politician in power.

Another challenge of NGOs in the post-earthquake environment is that many organizations raced to the rescue with little or no contextual knowledge. Some had worked emergencies or had experience in the rural areas of Haiti but lacked the Port-au-Prince contextual knowledge necessary to create a strong context map or conflict analysis framework. The Humanitarian Practice Network found that the massive jumble of over
3,000 organizations struggled to work in a coordinated, cooperative manner, especially with local NGOs, CBOS and government actors:

*This lack of contextual knowledge was compounded by the fact that most international NGOs do their own direct implementation, with only a few examples of working with local partners. For those INGOs present before the earthquake, most had only worked outside Port-au-Prince, and had very few existing partners in the capital; those that were based in the capital had little or no experience of humanitarian response. Many civil society organizations lost leaders, staff, and infrastructure in the earthquake and were struggling to recover themselves. There is little evidence that agencies developed or tried to implement a partnership approach as part of their earthquake response programme, and there is still a marked absence of local actors involved in humanitarian leadership and coordination mechanisms such as the clusters and the Humanitarian Country Team.* (Zicherman, Khan, Street, Heyer, & Chevreau, 2011, p.9)

The Humanitarian Practice Network found that local organizations felt highly excluded in the earthquake response.

*Local organizations are very vocal about their initial exclusion from the aid effort in Haiti, identifying very practical issues like the decision to locate the logistics / coordination hub ‘Log Base’ a long way from central Port-au-Prince, making getting there an expensive and time-consuming journey. The extensive UN security measures in place at the base made access at best intimidating and at worst impossible. Particularly during the first six months of the response, the lack
of French- or Creole-speaking international staff led to the almost exclusive use of English in coordination meetings and mechanisms. This was perceived as culturally insensitive and exclusionary by most government officials and Haitian civil society members. Even if the examples cited above represent unanticipated consequences of ‘normal’ security procedures and staffing constraints, local organizations perceived their cumulative effect as a deliberate effort to minimize Haitian participation in and oversight of the aid effort. (Zicherman, Khan, Street, Heyer, & Chevreau, 2011, p.9)

This exclusion of local actors and lack of communication and transparency has exacerbated the tensions both with the local organizations and the people that they serve.

“The bypassing of local structures at the beginning of the response, and a perceived lack of transparency and accountability, has led earthquake-affected people to mistrust the intentions of the NGOs.” (Zicherman, Khan, Street, Heyer, & Chevreau, 2011, p.12)

This leads to decreased accountability and increased latent conflict.

Most organizations responding to the disaster came with a similar mandate to meet immediate and medium-term needs, but many organizations had differing views on what the highest priority needs were and how to meet those needs. The international community was united in wanting to respond to the earthquake, but there wasn’t a full consensus around the who, the what, the where, and the how.

The Humanitarian Protection Network found that despite enormous accomplishments, the responding individuals, organizations, donors, and sector coordination clusters in Haiti
by and large failed to promote inter-agency collaboration, particularly in gaining and ‘enforcing’ consensus on standards of provision across agencies. In Haiti this led to significant disparities in the assistance different agencies provided. This was obvious to affected people as different packages were delivered within the same camp or across neighboring camps within a concentrated urban setting. These disparities caused conflict both between affected populations and aid agencies and among affected populations themselves. (Zicherman, Khan, Street, Heyer, & Chevreau, 2011, p.12)

...the lack of standard approaches and poor coordination among aid actors working in the same or neighboring camps has impeded participation and led to confusion and frustration. (Zicherman, Khan, Street, Heyer, & Chevreau, 2011, p.12)

The Participatory methods may be overlooked in the rush to deliver initial relief supplies, but in Haiti particular agencies have paid a high price for not including communities from the beginning in assessments, targeting and project implementation. Agencies in the camps have found it difficult to obtain the cooperation of beneficiaries and local authorities, have experienced security problems and have ended up providing inappropriate assistance, all of which have required additional time and resources to correct. (Zicherman, Khan, Street, Heyer, & Chevreau, 2011, p.13)

In conclusion, the response by people from around the world was immense and decisive. Yet in many cases, the scale, geographic concentration, and urgency proved to be beyond
the capacity of the global relief community. While millions of people made valiant contributions towards the relief of those affected, shortcomings resulted in significant conflict. For the sake of learning how to best respond in the future, it’s crucial that we recognize where we can do better to mitigate confusion and frustration in future disaster responses. We can begin with better understanding of the problems, but we then have to move towards a solution. The question of how to better apply conflict sensitivity can be described with words of John Burton: “In the light of these political and behavioral realities we have no analytical option but to differentiate between "disputes" that can be "settled" and "conflicts" that arise out of problems that must be "resolved" and to find the means or processes by which those situations that cannot be settled can be analyzed and resolved by the parties concerned.”

Poverty & Lack of Opportunity: Structural Violence

There can be little doubt that Haiti is an economically poor country. About three-fourths of the population lives on less than two dollars a day and more than half live on less than a dollar. Between 1990 and 2007 the GDP per capita growth rate for Haiti averaged -2.1 percent. The richest 20% of the country owns 63.4% of the country’s wealth, while the poorest 20% owns 3.1% of it. This distribution puts Haiti among the top five countries with the highest income inequality in the world. Almost half the population has no access to clean drinking water, one-third has no sanitary facilities, and only ten percent has
electricity. Less than half of the children attend elementary school and more than half the population is illiterate. (Pace, 2009, p.16)

There is also an identity differentiation between the populations living in the greater capitol metropolitan area (Port-au-Prince) and the smaller towns or rural areas. Many of the rural inhabitants perceive the urbanites as the “haves” vs. the rural “have-nots.” While the common perception may underestimate the income and opportunity disparity within Port-au-Prince, the reality is that there is a significant power asymmetry between the capitol city and the rest of the country. (Tiati, 2012)

The extreme poverty and staggering disparity of the Haitian society provides a textbook case of “Structural Violence” as described by Johan Galtung. Despite being a country with enormous potential wealth (demonstrated during the colonial period), over half of the population struggles to survive on less than US $1 per day while a small number of super-rich live in luxury. The preceding statistics demonstrate that the majority of Haitian people exist at a level of realization far below their potential realization – economically, politically, and in quality of life. This issue will be further addressed in the following section. As an aside, it should be noted that environmental degradation also depresses economic and personal wellbeing while contributing to conflict; environmental degradation merits further examination, but the subject deserves review on its own merits and is not the focus of this report.

Insecurity: Violence, Crime, and Gangs

According to CDA,
Haiti has significant crime problems. Before the presence of MINUSTAH, much of Haiti could have been described as lawless. Gangs controlled various neighborhoods such as Carfour and Cite Solei. Many prominent gangs were commonly believed to be funded, armed, and controlled by wealthy politicians or business owners. (Knorr, 2012).

The police, the government and even the private sector have all been implicated with gang violence. This makes for a complex dynamic where it is difficult to know who is who. (Pace, 2009, p.19)

The confluence of business, political, narcotic, and other influences over gangs, organized crime, and thugs for hire makes it very complex to unravel the primary actors or instigators in conflict. Because of the complexity and common dual roles (i.e. police or politicians intertwined with criminal networks), identification of connectors and dividers at the micro or macro level is unusually challenging (Tiati, 2012). In many conflicts there are two or more primary parties competing (two armies in a war) but many instances of conflict in Haitian society lack well defined parties fighting for clearly articulated interests.

**Governance & Corruption**

Author Terry Buss looks at the causes of why aid hasn’t managed to create the level of change that would be expected by the massive inflows of aid. He identifies the weak (or in some rural areas virtually non-existent) government service provision as one of the primary contextual factors limiting further stability, security, and development (Buss,
The CDA report lists a series of statistics which serve to underscore the high level of corruption and the ineffectiveness of the Government of Haiti that give Haiti its fragile state status:

In the World Bank’s governance assessment, Haiti ranks in the bottom 8th percentile for government effectiveness and in the bottom 4th percentile for absence of corruption as compared to the rest of the world. Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Haiti as the most corrupt country in the world in 2006. In 2008, it came in fourth. In 2000, a US official estimated that 90 percent of Haitian police superintendents were involved in drug trafficking (Pace, 2009, p.17).

The report continues:

The index used by Fund for Peace gives its lowest numbers to the states that are the worst off. According to this index, in 2008, Haiti ranked fourteenth out of 165 states. The “weak state index”, used by the Brookings Institution, Haiti ranks twelfth from the bottom on a list of 141 developing or transitional countries. The independent Evaluation Group of the World Bank—using different measures—ranks Haiti as one of the twenty-five “Low Income Countries under Stress. (Pace, 2009, p.17)

Buss further tells of the instability of the Haitian national government and the presidency. There are a variety of reasons for the weak governance, but one major reason is brain drain and frequently poor hiring by Haitian government offices. The international non-governmental organizations operating in poor or rural areas around the world often pay
higher wage than many of the local employment opportunities. This brings the best and brightest into the development field, but leaves the governments in poor regions forces to compete or hire the second tier candidates (Buss, 2008), (Moore T., 2012). In many poor rural areas, government ministries of municipal governments lack the resources to provide competitive wages to potential skilled government workers or bureaucrats. Additionally, many of the positions of power are often “purchased” or awarded in patronage to loyal supporters as opposed to a fair, merit based selection process (Moore T., 2012). The government staffs that are hired are frequently underpaid, leaving a strong incentive to resort to corruption, extortion, accepting bribes, or selling favors for kickbacks. The challenge of finding qualified staff, in addition to the corruption and insufficient resources often leaves governments of poor countries unable to fulfill their responsibilities. Finally, Haiti’s system of “Winner take all” presidency (and sometimes local elections) make the political battle for presidency very volatile, as is demonstrated in the above quote from Buss (Pace, 2009, p. 13-15).

Analysis

With three general categorizations for the causes of conflict outlined above, the following section critically analyzes each of the overarching categories with a look at what other conflict theory and other Haiti experts have to say about the respective influence that can actually be attributed to each of these causes both in theory and in practice. In reality, each of the three camps (poverty as the cause of conflict, crime & gangs as the cause of
conflict, and poor governance as a cause of conflict) holds significant validity. It is the conclusion of this author that there are multiple, related causes of the conflict.

**Poverty & Lack of Opportunity: Structural Violence**

Development, opportunity, and poverty reduction are central to reducing conflict in Haiti for those in the poverty & development camp.

“On one end of the spectrum are those that see development—specifically problems of unemployment and poverty—at the root of violence in Haiti. In this view, putting people to work is the most essential element in any violence reduction strategy. For those expressing this [development] view, they see that development could only happen in conditions of stability and security, which is the role that MINUSTAH plays. Past that, development equals peace writ large (Pace, 2009, p.20).”

With two centuries of governance without regard for 80% of the population (Pace, 2009, p.22), Haiti is a striking example of Galtung’s structural violence. It is demonstrated by crushing poverty and inescapable lack of opportunity for the vast majority in a land which was once one of the richest colonies in the Western Hemisphere. Examination of societies in which one small segment of society in power (ostensibly the political leaders, military and upper classes) works to maintain the status quo often brings criticism from domestic political foes and the international community alike. Some of these critics may advocate for changes that provide for a more just society that provides better opportunities for the poorest populations to escape poverty. This change to societal
injustice is described by Johan Galtung as reduction of structural violence. Thus, helping the poorest of the poor escape the injustices which anchor them in poverty is a reduction of structural violence. The work of many NGOs to help advocate for increased opportunity through societal changes that allow persons in poverty to improve their realization can then be, in some cases, a reduction of violence. By Galtung’s definition, reducing violence is building peace, so this advocacy to address social injustice is building peace (Galtung, Violence and its Alternatives : An Interdisciplinary Reader, 1999, p.41).

Finally, a focus on fighting poverty helps to meet some of the basic human needs which Burton identifies as necessary for all people. Burton suggests that when these needs are met, it greatly reduces the motivations for violence at the personal and societal level. As such, it stands to reason that development programming which helps to meet these needs will serve to directly militate against crime.

John Burton also addresses the need of a society to govern in a way which considers all classes and sectors - not just the wealthy, the party in power, or other interest groups.

Political systems, accordingly, have been preoccupied with increasing benefits for only some sections of the community, have been concerned with real income distribution only to the extent that it is politically necessary, and have given little attention to the longer term consequences of policies on the social and environmental future. Currently there is an increasing social demand for political decision-making processes at both national and community levels that will give less attention to special interests, and more attention to longer term societal
concerns... Past neglect of the social future has led in most societies to high levels of violence and to conflicts at all societal levels, national and international (Burton, 2001).

While he speaks of political systems in general, his words ring true in Haiti: “Problems of ethnicity, poverty and exploitation of various kinds are some of the deep rooted problems that are sources of violence.” (Burton, 2001) This theory seems to support both increased poverty reduction and a government which more accurately pursues the best interests of all of its citizens. This has historically not been the case; Haiti has a plethora of examples of political leaders representing only their supporters to the detriment of the general populace (Buss, 2008). Thus, the theories of Burton and Galtung both seem to support a combination of poverty reduction and advocacy for a more just political policy and governance.

**Insecurity: Violence, Crime, and Gangs**

There are some authors and Haiti experts who suggest that crime, gangs, and insecurity is a primary cause of conflict in Haiti. That is, the insecurity drives others to conflict and the violence essentially perpetuates itself (Buss, 2008). While the crime isn’t usually in and of itself the originating cause, most experts agree that it certainly must be addressed if progress is to be made. Advocates of the more forceful action by MINUSTAH in 2004-2007 suggested that arresting the gangs and purging the worst areas such as Cite Soleil of criminals with an ‘iron fist’ was the most effective way to reduce conflict. In the end, MINUSTAH’s actions were more balanced with development projects, social
assistance to help rehabilitate former criminals, and governance capacity building for
national police forces. According to CDA, the result was that MINUSTAH created a
negative peace (absence of manifest violence), but police forces and civil society never
managed to establish the positive peace to overlay that increased security. (Pace, 2009,
p.41) This means that while the UN forces successfully managed to disarm or arrest
many of the gangs in the most insecure areas, physical violence, the underlying causes of
conflict, remained.

One of the major elements of the MINUSTAH mandate was disarmament, a crucial part
of establishing security and combating criminal gangs. This turned out to be particularly
difficult in Haiti as there isn’t always a clear enemy. Gangs may be covertly supplied
and funded by politicians, businesspersons, or merely working in self-interest (Knorr,
2012). In many post-conflict contexts, a cease-fire or peace agreement includes
protections and power sharing plans to help warring parties feel assured that their enemy
is also disarming. Such arrangements would allow each party to feel safer giving up their
arms. But in Haiti’s “non-war” but fragile, high conflict context, arms are held for a
variety of reasons, which may be different from a post-war context (Pace, 2009, p.49)
(Moore M. A., 2008-2011). One possible challenge is that in the poor arms holders view,
a release of arms a loss of potential power against opponents including political
opponents. In a society with a history of vast power asymmetry, the trust of political
process and rule of law necessary for arms holders to voluntarily release their weapons is
elusive. [This of course is different from general criminal elements whose motivations
for owning weapons are more focused on the immediate personal self advancement and
are less likely to willingly surrender weapons.] Most of the MINUSTAH disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs only saw success when they were able to simultaneously “build citizen confidence and trust through quick, visible community-identified small projects.” (Pace, 2009, p.27)

While many proponents of MINUSTAH action support a military solution, some oppose reliance on international security forces. A push for dialogue stands in partial contrast to the more forceful “iron fist” security policies. Some experts say Haiti has culture of violence; they push for dialogue and engagement with all actors, stating that engagement will begin to address the root of the problems (Pace, 2009, p.21). John Burton advocates strongly against exclusive reliance on forceful deterrence or compulsion in seeking security. Crime can be influenced by a strong security apparatus, but that may fail to address the underlying causes of the conflict. With conventional force,

... many disputes cannot be so settled. Despite legal norms, social pressures and deterrent strategies, murders do occur, violence is widespread within nations, and wars between and within countries are frequent. No amount of threat or deterrence prevents this... Deterrence does not deter sane behaviors, and the power political frame was unrealistic because no account was taken of relevant human factors: there are ontological, inherent human needs that cannot be suppressed, (needs of identity and recognition that are the bases of relatedness), which make deterrence sometimes irrelevant at all societal levels. The only option, in politically realistic terms, was to resolve the social and behavioral
problems that led to specific conflicts, and not try merely to suppress them or to settle them by coercion (Burton, 2001).

Burton is here encouraging policy makers to engage the underlying causes – which in this case is the deprivation of basic human needs. It is also equally critical to include dialogue which engages all parties and helps each group to better understand these basic human needs of all parties- not just the positions that they are demanding. Pace notes in her research “[A] person expressed the need for greater compassion among Haitians: ‘Haitians are deeply entrenched in victim hood; and rightfully so, since all Haitians are victims of past and current realities. But, the problem is, Haitians do a poor job of recognizing the victim hood of other Haitians.’ ”

Proponents of dialogue suggest that bringing all parties together to address the issues at hand helps parties to better understand the victimhood of others (Freeman, 2010, p.13-14, 68-69). The need for dialogue can take many forms, but often peace-building dialogue involves bringing together leaders or influential members from each of the stakeholders for talks about the issues and how they can be resolved. This type of dialogue bears significant resemblance to the Do No Harm conflict mapping processes listed above (Freeman, 2010, p.14). Both pull members from various stakeholders, both involve looking frankly and civilly at the issues in the conflicts, and both involve considering how to act based on information learned in the negotiations. So do conflict mapping exercises fit the criteria for dialogue described here? This question will be addressed later in this paper along with an examination of the conflict mapping tools that World Vision implements in Haiti.
Governance & Corruption

The third camp is made up of those who view the true causes of conflict to be the lack of a trustworthy and capable government. As one development practitioner told this researcher, “Haiti will get better when the NGOs stop running the government [of Haiti] and the government starts leading the NGOs.” She strongly believed that the key to progress in Haiti is a government that can effectively provide services for their citizens (Moore T., 2012). Most proponents of poor governance as a cause of conflict would encourage deployments against poverty, but are more focused on building governance capacity.

According to CDA’s research, a

…greater majority of our informants presented a more expanded definition of development, emphasizing the importance of governance, and political leadership to undoing cycles of violence. This is perhaps the most widely embraced perspective, giving shape to such goals as strengthening and reforming the judicial system, building capacity of the Haitian National Police, increasing public services, cracking down on corruption, and so on. Differences were revealed about whether or not these measures are complimentary or more fundamental to efforts aimed to address poverty and unemployment. (Pace, 2009, p.20)

Some critics of international aid argue that if government lack of services is the cause, then perhaps NGOs are making it worse (Anderson, 1999, p.49-50). If an NGO provides
basic services like education or health services, does that make the state less likely to fulfill their responsibility? “In a state that provided virtually no services to its citizens, resources from bilateral and multilateral channels filled a gap. Relieving the state of its duty and doing little to augment the power of the poor, these growing flows of aid played a key role in reinforcing the existing status quo (Pace, 2009, p.12)” Yet, in contrast, local NGOs operating in fragile contexts should be partnering with and building the capacity of local government structures. For example, MINUSTAH observed greatly improved effectiveness of their and the Haitian national police forces’ efforts when they began partnering with and training the Haitian National Police Force. (Pace, 2009, p.20)

**Conclusion of Haiti Conflict Causes:**

These different theories manifest in a variety of perspectives on how to address violence and political instability. This in turn impacts assessments of what is working and not working; what is complimentary and what is at cross purposes. The whole of the research seems to ascribe to a mixture of the above causes of conflict, which of course leads us to believe that the interventions should likewise address as many of the known causes of conflict as possible.

The CDA analysis did not make a clear, singular prescriptive statement about what the exact cause of or solution to conflict is. The CDA’s conclusion seems to be more nuanced: the MINUSTAH response created a window in which domestic an international actors could work. The UN alone made huge gains in security, but didn’t create the needed lasting peace and development. Development is the key to making that lasting
change, but not just poverty alleviation work; it must also include governance and
corruption reduction initiatives. The CDA report and Terry Buss would essentially agree
with the primary tenants of this conclusion, but would place stronger emphasis on the
crucial role that structural violence plays in the conflict; a society where a vast majority
live so far below the potential realization won’t see positive peace until the poverty and
disparity is reduced. And as mentioned above, the theories of both Johan Galtung and
John Burton seem to point to governance and more just societal structures as a crucial
element in reducing conflict.
This research finds that all three of these factors (an impoverish majority, violence &
insecurity, and poor & corrupt governance) are conducive to instability, vulnerability,
poverty, and conflict, with violence as one manifested symptom. But together the
confluence is larger than the sum of the parts. The researcher’s conclusion is that the
cause of conflict is a confluence of political oppression (structural violence) perpetuating
massive poverty and lack of opportunity, which leads to personal violence (i.e. crime...).
This paper suggests that the solution lies in a comprehensive solution that relies heavily
on relief and development NGOs. Haiti needs security and holistic development to
continue, along with political will to build governance and make societal changes.
CHAPTER 6: WORLD VISION’S HAITI PROGRAMMING EXAMPLES:

Who is World Vision?

This report has examined and assessed theory and analyses that others have done. The next step is to look at how this theory fleshes out in real life by comparing the theory to a case study. First, it’s important to note who the case study researches: World Vision is a Federation of Christian, child-focused NGOs which work in relief, development, and advocacy. Their mission and vision statement demonstrate a holistic mission of “life in its fullest” for children.

Our vision for every child, life in all its fullness;

Our prayer for every heart, the will to make it so.

World Vision is a Christian relief, development and advocacy organization dedicated to working with children, families and communities to overcome poverty and injustice.
The hypothesis of this thesis is that relief and development work in Haiti contributes to a peace, in part through the practice of the DNH and other CS frameworks. This section will examine some of the programs that World Vision is implementing in Haiti—both pre-earthquake and post-earthquake. Special attention will be paid to how and where World Vision and its implementing partners perform conflict analysis and what they do based on the conflict analysis.

It’s important to note that World Vision is not a peace-building organization. Word Vision is a relief and development organization which works to integrate peace-building as a cross-cutting theme into other sectors of relief and development (mostly development) and in select conflict contexts, implements some stand-alone peace-building projects. Studying an organization which does not exclusively work with peace-building helps pinpoint the importance and impact of conflict sensitivity within relief and development as well as the synergy with peace-building. It will also provide the opportunity to consider the impact of relief and development on conflict and peace in the context.

World vision has a variety of programs in Haiti which are funded by a variety of sources. Work in rural areas pre-exists the earthquake, whereas the work in the capital area of Port-au-prince is almost exclusively disaster response work. At the time of publishing the relief work has transitioned from immediate emergency response into reconstruction and development work. The work is supported by a combination of private one time gifts, monthly child sponsorships, public grants, and foundations from around the globe.
Note on realistic expectations

It is crucial to examine this and other organizations working in the complex context of a developing country through a realistic lens. It is common for citizens from developed countries to become accustomed to the level of efficiency and effectiveness that comes with strong infrastructure, abundant resources, effective governance, and higher education. Yet while accountability is crucial, one needs to acquire a contextual understanding in order to develop realistic expectations when assessing humanitarian assistance programs. One development practitioner (who asked not to be named) shared a real life experience from rural Haiti as an example of how programs are more vulnerable in the less developed environments such as Haiti.

There was a meeting of community leaders one night in rural Haiti. They gathered in a community meeting building one evening to develop the specific steps in a collective community development project. Unfortunately, the light bulb in the community space had burned out, and they had no light by which to work through the plans. Of course in a developed country, wealthy persons in a similar dilemma would have an arsenal of alternative solutions at their disposal: They could have used another room in the meeting space, gone to another location such as a restaurant or church, could drive to one of their houses, or could work under the light of a flashlight, cell phone light, tablet computer light, laptop, car headlights... They could drive to a 24 hour convenience store and buy a replacement bulb, or might even have a space bulb somewhere in the meeting space. They could have even worked under a street lamp if the need was great
enough. Clearly, one burned out bulb would be unlikely to set back the progress in a developed world because the wealthier community leaders are less vulnerable to small setbacks. But in this particular case in rural Haiti, they had none of the above alternatives. As subsistence farmers living miles from the nearest electrical grid, with no vehicles or street lights, they lacked the simple resources for overcoming this relatively simple challenge.

This development practitioner explained that despite their best efforts, the project was set back; these community leaders had to choose another meeting day when they were all available. Because this coincided with the rainy season, it took weeks for that meeting to take place. The output of the project was significantly delayed; it was not due to negligence or carelessness, but rather to the natural constraints of their complex context.

The moral of this story is that we, as development practitioners, should strive to understand the context before defaulting to harsh critique.

How Programs Integrate Conflict Sensitivity or Peace-building

Matthew Scott is the Director of Peace-building for World Vision International. In addition to writing or contributing to some of the sources cited this report, he spoke with this researcher about how World Vision applies Conflict Sensitivity, uses conflict analysis tools, and works towards peace in Haiti (Scott M., 2012). He began by mentioning a broad overview of how World Vision applies do no harm and peace-building. Because World Vision has a federated structure, World Vision in each country operates with a large degree of autonomy. This helps to allow national directors to be
more flexible in meeting the specific contextual needs of their individual country. This also means that conflict sensitivity, contextual analysis, peace-building, and advocacy all vary somewhat from country to country. Still, many of the procedures, manuals, and DM&E processes are the same across the organization. This means that, for example, World Vision’s “LEAP DM&E Manual” includes the same contextual analysis guidelines and tools across the globe. It is translated into the appropriate languages, but remains globally consistent guidance and process.

World Vision seeks to identify some of the most fragile contexts where they work in order to more appropriately allocate peace-building and conflict sensitivity resources and program designs. World Vision had, at the time of publishing, assessed 6-7 countries, including Haiti, as “fragile contexts.” There are four streams or pillars or increased support for programs in those regions:

1. Funding Guidance
2. Staff [hiring] Guidance
3. Policy Guidance
4. Program Guidance

In all of these streams, Peace-building serves first as an integrated cross-cutting theme, then occasionally as a stand-alone sector where the need and the dedicated funding exist. This is a slight contrast from conflict sensitivity, which is always a cross-cutting method of implementing sector programming and cannot exist independently (Scott M., 2012).
Haiti is not a post-conflict state (as noted in the Haiti context section) but is indeed a fragile state. The World Vision programs in Haiti rely on conflict sensitive programming at every level. Various programs have implemented different levels of conflict or contextual analysis. For example, each of the nearly 20 rural, holistic community development programs begins their 15 year program cycle with an in-depth Do No Harm analysis as part of the program design assessment (Schmitt, 2012). This is required before the program design can be completed. These assessments are performed with various community or local government leaders as well as the program staff which will be opening the new area development program. These assessments look at the local context’s major conflict parties, reasons for conflict, and likely interaction with proposed programming. This early assessment helps to inform the program design to identify and mitigate exacerbating dividers in the community. It also seeks to identify the potential of the community’s capacities for peace- that is, how can the program support those people or institutions which support peace. These analyses also examine the broader contexts with wider SWOR/SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Risk/Threats). It helps not only to identify conflict elements but the larger potential for the community to do harm. These analyses are repeated with the community approximately every five years as part of a regularly scheduled re-evaluation of the program’s impact, effectiveness, and strategic goals. Each consecutive analysis/evaluation draws on consecutively more leadership and input from the community leadership.

These programs are very careful to publicize at every stage that the program is not a permanent presence. World Vision will be in the community for around 15 years as a
support to help strengthen community and government leadership and governance, help alleviate poverty and build health and education capacity—essentially holistic, sustainable community development. But the expectations are set from the onset that the program will leave eventually to try to minimize dependency on external aid. This striving to promote sustainability is a constant challenge for World Vision and NGOs the world over.

These World Vision programs also have an advocacy component. Every area development program’s context is slightly different, so advocacy is always tailored to the specific needs. The long term objective is to assure that people’s rights are respected at all levels (Schmitt, 2012). The programs aren’t political in nature; in fact, World Vision has strong policies on political neutrality and restrictions against endorsing specific candidates. Rather, this sector focuses on teaching rights—especially children and women’s rights. With a long term perspective, the programs help encourage youth and children to recognize their responsibility and rights as individuals, and encourage them to take on leadership roles, speaking out for justice, transparency, and good governance. These youth meet with local leadership to advocate for resources for schools, domestic abuse awareness, and other social rights causes. In several cases, these youth leaders have grown up with the encouragement of youth leadership programming funded by World Vision and have become local mayors, community leaders, and politicians (Moore M. A., 2008-2011). These former youth leaders often go on to be advocates for the poorest and most vulnerable populations in their communities.
World Vision works to teach conflict resolution skills in Haiti. Sometimes these skills are taught primarily for community members, often in partnership with churches or other social institutions. At other times World Vision programs focus on training staff, partners, and volunteers. World Vision Haiti has held two - six day “Training of Trainers” workshops, in order to extensively train staff, partners, and volunteers about conflict sensitivity and DNH tools. The training begins with two days of theory and follows with two days of qualitative research methods training. The qualitative research methods training help practitioners learn how to gather sensitive or subtle information while minimizing influence from their own opinions or assumptions. This helps, for example, practitioners to know how to better interview persons about conflict or the challenges facing the community and teaches how to better synthesize the learned information in the most helpful and understandable wording possible. Finally the six day training allows two days for the trainees to go out into the community and apply what they have learned. They (including staff, volunteers, partners, and community leadership) go to the people of the community and study the context, challenges, and conflict. This is an excellent example of building the capacity of the local leadership to practice conflict analysis which can prove helpful long after the World Vision funding has come and gone. The leaders and volunteers can then apply these analysis of issues skills in future interactions and help teach the concepts to others.

As mentioned earlier in the Haiti context section, “[A] person expressed the need for greater compassion among Haitians: “Haitians are deeply entrenched in victimhood; and rightly so, since all Haitians are victims of past and current realities. But, the
problem is, Haitians do a poor job of recognizing the victimhood of other Haitians.” (Pace, 2009, p.21). Do No Harm training workshops help the participants and those who may eventually learn from them to consider the needs and concerns of others. This seems to address the cause of conflict as expressed by the Haitian quoted in Marie Pace’s CDA Haiti Contextual Analysis. In this way, these trainings, to the extent that they are effective, hold enormous potential to help resolve a weakness which this Haitian identified as a key underlying cause of conflict.

Other programs help to build conflict resolution skills. For example, most of the temporary tent camps established after the earthquake soon found the earthquake survivors and camp leadership were struggling with conflict. In the days following the earthquake international disaster relief was vastly overwhelmed with the challenge of helping two million survivors with most of the already insufficient infrastructure destroyed. Arguments over beneficiary prioritization, resource transfers, lack of communications, and inability to get to some areas with desperately needed relief food, water, sanitation, and temporary shelter were prevalent across Port-au-Prince. In one example, a World Vision tent camp held training for residents. They taught conflict resolution skills including non-confrontational dialogue, how to seek mutually beneficial solutions, and some general communication skills. The result was to help members of the tent camp to be able to interact in healthy ways with each other despite the very tense challenges of distributing very limited resources and various responsibilities (Schmitt, 2012).
This researcher was previously employed by World Vision. During a monitoring visit in 2009, shortly before the earthquake of 2010, this researcher had the opportunity to meet with several communities in the rural Central Plateau region in Haiti. Several members in two of the four visited communities shared how they had, as a community, learned how to better engage with each other in times of conflict. They shared, in their own words, about their improved conflict resolution capacities and how it helped to improve relationships across the community.

World Vision in Haiti also integrates human rights (which leads to recognition of human dignity and indirectly, respect for others…) into their policies and their programs. For example, World Vision’s Child Protection Policy is derived from the Convention on the Rights of the Child, a legally binding, internationally agreed convention “Built on varied legal systems and cultural traditions, the Convention is a universally agreed set of non-negotiable standards and obligations.” (UNICEF, 2005) This helps assure that WV is aligned with other organizations which rely on this and similar conventions.
CHAPTER 7: FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

It is the hypothesis of this thesis that, when properly implemented, relief and development programs do not have to substantially increase conflict within their contexts, but rather have great capacity to contribute to peace within their area of operations. This case study of Haiti seems to indicate that the relief and development work performed by World Vision does in fact contribute to peace in the areas of operation, but the report cannot conclusively prove this. The empirical addition that conflict sensitive relief and development work contribute to peace in their area of operations is identified as an area which merits further study. Nonetheless, it seems logical from the theory and program examples that there is a contribution. This conclusion is drawn from the combination of theoretical arguments and specific data from the World Vision examples presented in this paper. There are significant limitations to what this thesis is able conclude, and while the evidence seems to support the hypothesis, further field studies or more quantitative research would better prove this thesis.

One of the primary challenges remains difficulty in quantitatively assessing developments in peace. While some indicators do exist, most organizations which work in poverty alleviation and disaster relief track only the progress directly related to their specific, stated project goals. As such, groups like World Vision rarely including peace-specific monitoring indicators in their log-frame project management designs. One
recommendation of this report is to encourage all programs or organizations working in holistic humanitarian assistance programs to include at least some indicators of peace and conflict in their areas of operation. As management consultant Peter Drucker said, “You can’t manage what you can’t measure.”

Additionally, where impact is measured, it still remains difficult to know how to assess causation of the any progress observed. Because conflict contexts are often very complex with a myriad of identified and unidentified influences, it’s impossible to say with certainty that progress is indeed to the credit of a specific intervention, project, or program. The development community has created a tool to better monitor impact that is directly attributable as an effect of the project. In development, Randomized Control Trials (RCTs) are based on the concept behind double blind clinical trials used in medical testing. This type of assessment tool chooses a specific question to study (for example, are families more likely to get immunizations for children if the immunization is subsidized, if it is free, or if it is free and a small handout like a bag of rice is given as an incentive). The tests can be adapted to study specific peace-building impacts in communities of intervention, while compared to neighboring communities where the program is not operating. The differences in peace present in participating communities and the non-participating communities could be more accurately attributed to the program. In summary, peace-building elements in relief or development can, and should be monitored.

Do the Conflict Analysis Tools Work?
It is established that relief and development can and in many cases do create and exacerbate conflict (Anderson, 1999, p.1, 7). Even with the very best of conflict sensitive management, limited resources and the changes that the programs bring are inevitably going to stir some level of tensions. But the literature, interviews, and program study all seem to point towards tangible tools which can keep negative side effects at an acceptable minimum.

“It now see differences as a gap to bridge. Being different is normal, but difference no longer makes me feel stiff about it. I am more ready to accept people as they are (Garred, 2006, p.23).”

It appears that the Do No Harm of the micro-context analysis tool is most effective when applied in contexts where there are clear, well defined parties at war or conflict with each other (Garred, 2006, p.11, 21-22). In the sense that Haiti’s conflict is not as clearly defined and involves a plethora of actors who generally seek their own interest without awareness of or with apathy towards the wellbeing of other parties, the Do No Harm tool isn’t as effective as one might hope. That said, the processes seem to show promise for instilling in participants a general mindset of considering the interests of and impacts on others. The limited usefulness can be seen by the fact that most practitioners interviewed stated that the DNH tools are less useful than a training staff to have a conflict sensitive paradigm or ‘lens’ through which they work.

While the Do No Harm tool is most effective in a two party conflict, the broader contextual mapping tools appear to have great relevance in assessing risks and mitigating potential damage of the program against the persons in the contexts. In Conflict Analysis
as Interactive Conflict Resolution, Lisa Freeman studied an MSTC workshop in Cyprus to assess whether conflict analysis is a form of conflict resolution. She concludes that it is not, in and of itself, conflict resolution. But it builds the framework and capacity of participants. The analysis and added capacity can subsequently serve as an effective force for peace. (Freeman, 2010, p.63-63) This would indicate that the conflict analysis tools alone will not fulfill the calls for peace-building dialogue as called for by CDA (Pace, 2009, p. 21)

**Does Relief and Development Contribute to Peace?**

It is likewise difficult to say with certainty that the relief and development work in Haiti has directly decreased conflict or increased peace. CDA found a great deal of interest in this topic, and has written an issue paper on exactly this subject. The paper is titled CLAIMS AND REALITY OF LINKAGES BETWEEN PEACE WRIT LARGE AND peace writ little. (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2010). The paper addresses Peace Writ Large as peace in a country at large, whereas peace writ little refers to “a local or community level of sustainable peace. [peace writ little addresses] interpersonal disputes, land conflicts, issues regarding access or use of natural resources, or cultural and ethnic tensions at a local level.” (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2010, p.1).

The report agrees that relief and development often contribute to peace in the areas where the organizations are directly operating. But CDA finds that most organizations believe that a lot of work at various local levels would inevitably create peace at the macro level (Peace Writ Large). CDA concludes that this is usually not true; through examination of a variety of examples they have concluded that local efforts typically don’t convert to
national or regional peace benefits. The peace efforts at local levels only seem to contribute to peace writ large under certain circumstances:

- When community-level conflict is an important part of the PWL equation
- When the nature of specific communities produces symbolic effects of PWL efforts
- When community processes are connected to larger processes: structural connections, contributions to resistance to provocations to violence (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2010, p.4).

One of the examples that CDA uses to demonstrate this potential for local peace-building to drive a much larger national peace is Haiti. “Certain communities in Haiti were high-profile neighborhoods with elevated levels of violence. Evidence in the case study suggests that a skillful effort by UN forces in controlling violence in some of these areas did have a larger effect, given the prominent symbolic nature of those areas, such as the Cité Soleil neighborhood of Port-au-Prince (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2010, p5).” It is relevant to note that the work performed in the Cité Soleil neighborhood was sprinkled with development projects ranging from infrastructure, to micro-credit, to education and health improvements.

In answering the question “Does relief/development contribute to peace?” it is important to realize that the mandate of many relief and development NGOs- including World Vision in Haiti- is not necessarily to build peace but rather to meet needs and help promote holistic development. The question was never whether relief and development
are the most cost effective methods of peace-building; the question is whether and how they contribute to peace during their relief and development efforts.

The examination of the theory and evidence from past and current activities make a compelling argument that addressing the underlying causes of the conflict in Haiti (meeting basic human needs and fighting against structural injustices) does indeed erode the fuel for conflict. This is, once again, a long term investment in peace, and it remains extremely difficult to quantitatively measure the impact. In conclusion, considering the myriad or sources examined, relief and development work does, generally contribute to peace in Haiti.

**Advocacy has a Positive Impact**

Advocacy does in fact make a difference, although it is typically long-term and nearly impossible to attribute specific impact on individual programs. John Burton speaks to the actors in society who work to encourage conflict resolution in decision making and politics. This seems to address a policy level, but also could be very relevant to NGOs who hold significant influence in the advocacy for better governance. This researcher agrees with Burton when he says

> The task of those who are concerned primarily with conflict resolution and prevention is to articulate alternatives, to set out precisely tested processes and procedures, and generally to provide options to societies desperately in need of them, but which have no clear indications of where to go from here. Then, but only then, is there any prospect of conflict prevention becoming a political system
that can replace what is proving to be destructive of the global environment and of civilizations (Burton, 2001).”

Advocacy plays an important role and has great synergy with peace-building efforts.

**Final Research Conclusion:**

This research supports, but fails to conclusively prove the two points about relief and development’s potential to build peace in two ways:

1. Conflict sensitivity practice helps to mitigate conflict in relief and development programs, and
2. Relief and development programs help satisfy the underlying causes driving conflict.

Best practice in fragile contexts is for all relief and development programs to operate with conflict sensitivity, which will help mitigate potentially negative side effects of assistance programs. And the research indicates that there is significant synergy between conflict resolution and relief & development.
REFERENCES
REFERENCES

Opening page quote taken from Pace, 2009, p.39.


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CURRICULUM VITAE

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