BREEDING THE PHOENIX:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN PEACEBUILDING

by

George F. Oliver III
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Chair of Committee

Graduate Program Director

Dean, School for Conflict
Analysis and Resolution

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George Mason University
Fairfax, VA
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By

George F. Oliver
Master of Arts
Naval War College, 1996
Master of Science
University of South Carolina, 1983
Bachelor of Science
United States Military Academy, 1974

Director: Howon Jeong
School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution

Fall Semester 2012
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA
DEDICATION

This research is dedicated to all the professional people who work world-wide in the interest of peacebuilding. These people include my son, Captain George F. Oliver IV, and my son-in-law, Captain Daniel P. Whitten, who both worked as peacebuilders in Iraq and Afghanistan. This work takes on special meaning since Dan was killed while trying to bring peace to the people of Afghanistan.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are many people who helped me through this research and writing. I would like to thank General Gordon Sullivan who inspired me to keep writing and researching about peacekeeping and peacebuilding. I would also like to thank the Naval War College, and particularly the Chairmen of the Joint Military Operations Department who supported me in my research by providing time and encouragement. This was especially true for the Department Executive Assistant and my teaching partner, Fred Horne. I would also like to acknowledge the help of the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, RI, the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, PA and the U.S. Army Command and Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas for providing me access to military officers attending their schools. I would also like to acknowledge the fantastic faculty at George Mason’s School of Conflict Analysis and Resolution. Their excellent instruction and guidance inspired me to continue my pursuit of this degree and continue to work in the field of conflict resolution. My dissertation committee made up of Dr. Howon Jeong, Dr. Dennis Sandole, Dr. Allison Frendak-Blume and Dr. Solon Simmons helped my immeasurably. I would particularly like to highlight the advice and counsel of Dr. Jeong, who put up with my mistakes and answered my many emails and queries. I especially want to thank my wife, Anne, who put up with my many hours away working on this project.
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>BNA</td>
<td>Basic Human Needs Approach</td>
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<td>CCP</td>
<td>Center for Systemic Peace</td>
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<td>CEEC</td>
<td>Committee on European Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>Central Command</td>
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<td>CERP</td>
<td>Commanders’ Emergency Relief Program</td>
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<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil Military Coordination (NATO term)</td>
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<td>Civ-Mil</td>
<td>Civil – Military (US term)</td>
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<td>CORDS</td>
<td>Civil Operations and Rural Development Support</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Coalition Provisional Authority</td>
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<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Center for Strategic and International Studies</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Depart of Defense (U.S.)</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations – UN</td>
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<td>DSB</td>
<td>Defense Science Board</td>
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<td>ECA</td>
<td>Economic Cooperation Administration</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual (US Army)</td>
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<td>GA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<td>ICISS</td>
<td>International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty</td>
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<td>IGO</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRF</td>
<td>Immediate Response Facility (Peacebuilding Commission)</td>
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<td>ISS</td>
<td>International Institute for Strategic Studies</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>JOC</td>
<td>Joint Operating Concept</td>
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<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force (NATO military force)</td>
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<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
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<td>KVM</td>
<td>Kosovo Verification Mission</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEPSS</td>
<td>new European peace and security sytem</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NSPD</td>
<td>National Security Policy Directive</td>
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<td>MACV</td>
<td>Military Assistance Command - Vietnam</td>
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<td>MOSS</td>
<td>Minimum Operating Standards for Security</td>
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<td>MTA</td>
<td>Military Technical Agreement (Kosovo)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>OOTW</td>
<td>Operations Other than War</td>
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<td>ORHA</td>
<td>Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDD</td>
<td>Presidential Decision Directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKI</td>
<td>U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKSOI</td>
<td>U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute</td>
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<td>PO</td>
<td>Peace Operations</td>
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<td>PRF</td>
<td>Peacebuilding Recovery Fund (Peacebuilding Commission)</td>
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<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/CRS</td>
<td>State, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSTR</td>
<td>Security, Stability, Transition and Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QDDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHAEF</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSTR</td>
<td>Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>USIP</td>
<td>United States Institute of Peace</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>World Health Organization</td>
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ABSTRACT

BREEDING THE PHOENIX: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN PEACEBUILDING

George F. Oliver, PhD

George Mason University, 2012

Dissertation Director: Dr. Ho Won Jeong

There are numerous professional groups and individuals working for world peace. The reality is, however, that wars between nations or within nations still cause untold human deaths and casualties. World peace, a condition where war no longer affects human societies, is a long way off. This research focuses on how to end wars and restore a sustainable, positive peace to those who have experienced the horrors of war.

More specifically, this study focuses on the military’s role in peacebuilding. In the last twenty years, post-war peacebuilding has emerged as a powerful method that helps nations recover from war. Soldiers, whether they are part of an international intervention attempting to end the war or a member of a United Nations peacekeeping mission, have an important role to play. Today, soldiers do more than win their nation’s wars; they also help other nations and their citizens recover from war. In the last few decades, civilians from organizations like the United Nations, other intergovernmental
organizations, other governments and nongovernmental organizations have responded to help nations recover from war or a violent conflict. There is no argument that civilians are better at peacebuilding than the military, yet the military is moving into this realm more and more.

So what are the roles of the military and civilians? This research project answers these questions. The critical factor in determining what the military does and what civilians do is based on security. If security is good, civilians can perform all the aspects of peacebuilding. Conversely, if security is lacking, then the military must step in and take on the various parts of peacebuilding. Security, however, is not like a light switch, on or off, good or bad. It is more like a rheostat with varying degrees of security. This research defines five levels of security and then seeks to find the fine lines where civilians can replace the military in peacebuilding functions.

Current peacebuilding ideas have evolved from practice, but behind that practice are some relevant conflict and conflict resolution theories. These theories are explored and ideas for future peacebuilders are identified. Analysis of real world peacebuilding has led to the creation of various functions that help peacebuilders restore a society after a war. These functional areas are: security, humanitarian assistance, governance, rule of law, infrastructure restoration, economic development and reconciliation. Who performs each of these functional areas is directly related to the security conditions.

This research uses both quantitative and qualitative methods to explore how security impacts the role of the military in peacebuilding. Qualitatively, two case studies are explored, post-World War II Germany and Kosovo. Quantitatively, this research
explored the issue through a questionnaire that was taken by 579 soldiers, civilians and experts in peacebuilding. In the end, the hypothesis was proven that the military’s role in peacebuilding is inversely linked to the level of security. If security is sufficient, civilians do the work; and if security is deficient, then the military’s role is larger.
CHAPTER 1

Introduction

*The United States and our friends and allies have learned that one of the defining challenges in our world, now and for many years to come, will be to deal with weak and poorly governed states – states on the verge of failure, or indeed, states that have already failed. These crises create environments of anarchy, and conflict, and ungoverned space – where violence and oppression can spread, where arms traffickers and other transnational criminals can operate with impunity: and where terrorist and extremists can gather, and plot and train to kill the innocent.*

**Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, July 16, 2008**

Every year a crisis within or between existing states dominates the headlines. *Time* magazine publishes their top ten world news stories each year. In 2008, the Russian invasion into Georgia came in at number six. In 2009, the review of a new U.S. Afghanistan policy and the firing of the top general was number two, while in 2010, Haiti earned the position as the top news story for the year. The Arab Spring with unrest in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt was the number one story of 2011. Each of these news items represents a nation-state struggling for its existence or redefinition. Had *Time* started this analysis earlier, Kosovo would have dominated the headlines in 1999 and the rebuilding of Europe after World War II in 1946. This year, 2012, the unrest in Syria might be the collapsed state du jour and a leading candidate for *Time* magazine’s top international news story.
As of this writing, the situation in Syria is spiraling out of control. Recent reports in July 2012 indicate that over 16,000 people have been killed in this intrastate war. Kofi Annan, the former UN Secretary General, brokered a cease-fire and the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of 300 observers (peacekeepers) to monitor the growing crisis (UN Security Council 2043 of 21 April 2012). Yet despite the political maneuvering, the crisis continues with no end in sight.

Marie Colvin, a renowned journalist, was killed during an attack on Homs on 22 February 2012. Her last article in the Sunday Times of London on February 19, 2012 described the widow’s basement where many women congregated to survive the near constant shelling by the Syrian Army. Colvin described Homs as follows:

It is a city of the cold and hungry, echoing to exploding shells and bursts of gunfire. There are no telephones and the electricity has been cut off. Few homes have diesel for the tin stoves they rely on for heat in the coldest winter that anyone can remember. Freezing rain fills potholes and snow drifts in through windows empty of glass. No shops are open, so families are sharing what they have with relatives and neighbours. Many of the dead and injured are those who risked foraging for food…. [Colvin went on to state,] the scale of human tragedy in the city is immense. The inhabitants are living in terror and almost every family seems to have suffered death or injury to a loved one.

Even before Kofi Annan negotiated the first of his two (as of this writing) attempts to end the civil war in Syria, many nations called for invoking the new norm within the United Nations, the Responsibility to Protect. This concept is aimed at protecting civilians caught up in armed conflict and places the pressure on nations to either protect their citizens or expect international intervention to protect them. In the case of Syria, strong political opposition, mostly from Russia and China, have
prevented such action. In the meantime, the civilians in Syria will have to just survive. The question arises about who will rebuild the city of Homs and other devastated areas and what will happen to the governing structure of Syria. These are the same questions that arise after any war.

Unfortunately, wars are common, even in today’s world. On any given day, dozens of wars rage across the globe in varying degrees of intensity. Wars destroy lives and property and place large numbers of civilians at risk. Many of the violent conflicts emanate from fragile or failed states. Afghanistan, Haiti, both Sudans, Libya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, and now Syria are all failed or failing states struggling to find a form of government, restart an economy, establish a rule of law, and provide basic necessities for their population. On the horizon are two huge challenging fragile states, North Korea and Iran.

Haiti is the second oldest democracy in the Western Hemisphere. For almost the last twenty years, UN peacekeepers have worked tirelessly to rebuild that country. Haiti would have been the top story in 1994 when U.S. soldiers and marines first went into that country to restore order and help rebuild the country. Quickly the mission was turned over to UN peacekeepers, and in short order, the rebuilding of Haiti fell off the headlines. Only a devastating earthquake in 2010 returned it to the forefront of the news and reignited the interest in helping this failed state.

Afghanistan has been a failed state for many decades. Because of its status as one of the world’s most ineffective nations, Al Qaeda was able to use Afghanistan as a
training base for terrorist attacks on the United States and other western nations. American soldiers went into Afghanistan in 2001 with the mission of eliminating Al Qaeda. Policy makers soon realized that if the United States wanted to keep Al Qaeda out of Afghanistan, it needed to rebuild the country and create an effective nation. Europeans saw this as well, and so NATO took over the mission of rebuilding Afghanistan. Now eleven years later, there might be light at the end of the tunnel for American and NATO soldiers to leave Afghanistan and let it manage its own affairs.

The rebuilding of Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan resulted in real-world laboratories for American soldiers, marines and government officials to relearn the lessons of nation building. American military personnel have done this task before. They helped build or rebuild many Latin American countries in the early part of the twentieth century. They were involved in rebuilding Germany and the Philippines after World War I and were highly successful in rebuilding Germany and Japan after World War II. Even in Vietnam, the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) showed much success and promise. Unfortunately, the Cold War focused the American military on the greatest threat, a possible confrontation with the Soviet Union. During the Cold War years of the 1970s and 1980s, the American military lost sight of the role of the American military in nation building.

Nation building by American soldiers was never their primary mission. The armed forces were formed and created to defend America and when necessary fight and win the nation’s wars. Professional soldiers, however, abhor war. Yet the
professional soldier spends his life preparing for war. Ironic, is it not? There was a saying during the American Civil War that when a soldier finally entered battle, he saw the elephant. What the phrase “seeing the elephant” meant was the soldier finally saw the horrors of war. It was a huge, ugly beast that scares all who see it. Raw recruits listened to stories of war and longed for the glory of winning a great battle. Yet, when these new recruits entered battle for the first time, they saw friends and fellow soldiers die and others horribly maimed by the destruction caused by the weapons of war. War is an ugly experience to anyone who sees it up close and personal.

General Gordon Sullivan and Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Coroalles (1995) used the phrase “seeing the elephant,” in a similar fashion. General Sullivan, then Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, and his coauthor wanted to look into the future and try to see the elephant and determine what security challenges the U.S. Army might face as it moved into the twenty-first century. The end of the Cold War changed the dynamics of what soldiers would be required to do to preserve U.S. national security. During his time as Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, General Sullivan saw the value of peacekeeping and endorsed U.S. soldiers’ participation in UN and regional peacekeeping (Haiti, Bosnia, Georgia, Kuwait, and the Western Sahara). He initiated training programs in peacekeeping and created the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute with the purpose of analyzing and studying this new emerging concept.

Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler of the National Defense University (2006) also used the phrase “seeing the elephant,” in the title of their book about the role of the United States in global security issues. According to the authors, many experts
have looked to the future to determine how national security issues might unfold. In the 1990s, with the Cold War relegated to recent history, there was optimism. Neo-Kantian ideas emerged where world peace might be possible. Following the attacks on September 11, 2001, the world, and more specifically U.S. citizens, saw the elephant. According to Binnendijk and Kugler, scholars shifted their tone and ideas to a neo-Hobbesian view of the world. Thomas Hobbes’ book, *Leviathan* (1651), stated in Chapter XIV: “the condition of man is a condition of war of every one against everyone. (146)

**Security Challenges in the Twenty-First Century**

Every year the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) publishes and produces its map of world conflicts. IISS’s armed conflict database (website) listed 54 ongoing conflicts in 2012. The Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) also tracks armed conflicts on a regular basis. CSP stated that, at the end of 2011, there were thirty-one armed conflicts. The chart from their website (figure 1.1) provides a summary of armed conflicts from 1946 through 2011. Interstate wars and internal civil wars (referred to as societal warfare), are the dominant mode of warfare since the

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**Figure 1.1**

Center for Systemic Peace
1990s and comprise the seventy-eight total armed conflicts that occurred in 2011.

There is good news in this analysis. Wars are on the decline. However, there is also evidence that the impact on civilians in these wars is on the rise (UN Secretary General Report, 2010; Oxfam, 2011; and MacFarlane and Khong, 2006). Because of this, the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council passed resolutions with the sole purpose of protecting civilians (UN Security Council Resolution, 1674 of 2006; General Assembly 2005 World Summit Resolution, paragraphs 138 and 139). Since the passing of these resolutions, the concept of Responsibility to Protect (civilians) has grown in importance and meaning. This concept will be discussed in more detail in chapter 3; however, the basic premise is that nations have the responsibility to protect their citizens. Should they fail to do so, the international community will help, including armed intervention.

There are many reasons for the trend in armed conflict declining, but foremost among them is the work of the United Nations, particularly peacekeepers. Peacekeepers have deployed with increasing numbers to many intractable

Figure 1.2
From *UN Peacekeeping Year in Review 2011*
conflicts over the last decade. In 2010, the number of peacekeepers deployed by the UN Security Council reached an all-time high of just over 100,000 (see figure 1.2).

William Durch, a renowned expert on peacekeeping, has authored and edited several books on peacekeeping. His most noteworthy work, however, was as the compiler and author of the famed Brahimi Report (2000), which transformed United Nations peacekeeping. In Durch’s latest book (2006), he describes the debate on defining peacekeeping and how the concept has transformed over the years. Durch goes on to say: “This debate notwithstanding, a consensus has emerged regarding the need for competent and effective security forces to stabilize the local situation. Peacekeepers provide the interim security and stability in a situation that is formally postwar, but actually still in transition from war to peace” (8). In essence, Durch is saying that peacekeeping had a major effect on ending wars since their rise after the Cold War.

Studies in analyzing conflict must look to the future. The most pressing future security challenges, as the twenty-first century unfolds, are still wars, but not large-scale global wars, but intrastate wars. American national security experts came to this conclusion after Al Qaeda attacked the United States in 2001.

The U.S. National Security Strategy of 2002 stated: “The events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states” (iv). President Bush, in his 2006 National Security Strategy, began promoting democracy and helping the growing number of fragile states transition to democratic ideals. In dealing with regional conflicts, the strategy promoted “three levels of engagement: conflict prevention and resolution; conflict intervention; and
post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction” (15). President Obama’s National Security Strategy (2010) toned down the promotion of democracy, but carried on conflict prevention and resolution and stabilization themes by stating: “Where governments are incapable of meeting their citizen’s basic needs and fulfilling their responsibilities to provide security within their borders, the consequences are often global and may directly affect the American people” (26). The whole strategy stressed that the world is more interconnected and violent conflicts in one part of the world, even small ones, affect all. Americans must work with existing institutions like the United Nations to prevent or resolve violent conflicts and help fragile states. President Obama stressed in his National Security Strategy a “whole of government approach” and initiated the 3D concept of defense, diplomacy, and development.

Every four years the U.S. Department of Defense conducts a thorough analysis to prepare for future security challenges. The Quadrennial Defense Review looks forward to national security challenges and tries to design a military force to meet these challenges. In 2010, for the first time, the U.S. Department of State conducted a similar analysis. The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) complemented the Defense review and further articulated the 3D approach outlined in the 2010 National Security Strategy.

The QDDR was a welcome addition to the military’s domination of national security analysis. The review promoted civilian power and stressed the valuable role of both diplomacy and development in dealing with some of the world’s intractable problems. The review also addressed fragile states: “It is more important than ever to
address the problems of fragile states. People, money, and ideas can move around the world so quickly that conflict, even in distant countries, has become a far greater threat to the United States” (QDDR, 2010, xii).

The overall theme of the QDDR was the advancement of civilian power in meeting the U.S. security challenges. The war and the rebuilding of Iraq revealed the lack of trained civilian experts in reconstructing failed states. The Department of Defense ran the initial period of reconstruction for Iraq under the leadership of Ambassador Paul Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority. After one year, the rebuilding of Iraq became a combined effort of the Department of Defense and the Department of State. The rebuilding of Iraq taught the U.S. government a great deal about how to help failed and failing states. In 2004, President Bush approved the formation of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction in the Department of State. The purpose of this organization is to “lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy” (Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, briefing, 2006).

Promotion of civilian power was a message not just from the Secretary of State, but also the Secretary of Defense. Secretary Gates, in a speech at the University of Kansas (2007), promoted a whole of government approach to national security challenges, but stressed the importance of soft power – civilian power. In the speech, Secretary Gates articulated: “One of the most important lessons of the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan is that military success is not sufficient to win: economic development, institution-building and the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications, and more – these, along with security, are essential ingredients for long-term success.” Secretary Gates backed up his support for soft/civilian power by authorizing the transfer of $100 million from the Defense budget to start the Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction.

**Failed, Fragile, and Failing States**

The terrorist attacks in September 2001 opened America’s eyes toward the challenges of failed, failing, and fragile states. The U.S. *National Security Strategies* pointed out that failed and fragile states are a threat not only to America’s national security, but also to security globally. Seth Kaplan in his book, *Fixing Fragile States*, states that “Fragile states have marched from the fringe to the very center of Western security concerns” (2008, 2).

Before any discussion on failed, failing, and fragile states can begin, it is important to understand what states do. The modern state system began in 1648 following the Thirty Years’ War in Europe.
and the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia. The Thirty Years’ War economically destabilized much of Europe and reduced its population by almost half. The dominant power in Europe was France, so French Cardinal Jules Mazarin and his assistant Jean-Baptiste Colbert conducted an economic study of central Europe. Because of the wars among principalities, trade was nonexistent. Europe needed a recovery plan. After almost five years of research, Cardinal Mazarin proposed a treaty that would benefit all and end the many years of war. The Treaty of Westphalia opened up trade on Europe’s most important waterways, established freedom of religion, and defined various states within Europe (Beaudry, 2003).

*The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* provides insight on the impact of the Treaty of Westphalia. “The sovereign states system that came to dominate Europe at Westphalia spread worldwide over the next three centuries, culminating in the decline of the European colonial empires in the mid-20th century, when the state became the only form of polity ever to cover the entire land surface of the globe. Today, norms of sovereignty are enshrined in the *Charter of the United Nations*” (Philpot, 2010).

Since the Treaty of Westphalia, the state system has evolved. Max Weber, the distinguished German philosopher, sociologist and economist, defined a state as having the “monopoly on the use of force” (Weber, 1919, 2). Yet a state is much more than the guarantor of security. According to Francis Fukuyama (2004, 2), the modern state provides “a very attractive package, combining the material prospect of market economies and the political and cultural freedom of liberal democracy.” Fukuyama also recognizes that all states are different and one size does not fit all. Robert Rotberg (2004,
3 and 2007, 83), who has written widely on failing states, describes that the modern state exists to provide goods and services to the citizen within its boundaries. States also act in the interest of their people by establishing national goals and economic policies. When disputes arise, the state provides a mechanism to adjudicate the dispute – in essence, laws. The most important function of a state, according to Rotberg, is to provide security.

Neither Fukuyama nor Rotberg gave a precise definition of a state. That is because there are many types of states in existence in the world. Generally, however, the state is considered a political entity that is defined by the geographical boundaries that have emerged by default, by war, or by agreement. Within those boundaries, the state provides laws that govern the behavior of its people and provide mechanisms for resolving disputes or enforcing the laws. Not all states provide the freedoms of the modern state system. Also, not all states provide services to its citizens. More effective states have methods that provide the following services: power, water, sanitation, roads, telecommunications, health care, and education. In today’s world, there are democracies, monarchies, and even autocracies. It is clear that not all states are the same. Yet in the world today, the state system is paramount.

There is even the idea of a nation-state. What is the difference between a nation and a state? One author attempted to provide a cautious definition of each (Rasmussen, 2001). The distinction of a nation is based on the Latin word for nation: “natio,” meaning birth, tribe, or race. According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary (online version), a nation is defined as “a community of people composed of one or more nationalities and
possessing a more or less defined territory and government.” The same dictionary defines a state as a “politically organized body of people usually occupying a definite territory.”

The differences between states and nations can be particularly important. If a state fails, can an outside power rebuild the state or rebuild the nation? Understanding the differences between states and nations is important. A nation can find its origins from the people who define the state. That could mean an ethnicity, or merely an acceptance of that national identity. Conversely, a state is a legal and political entity and does not connote an identity. An outside power can certainly help in rebuilding the institutions of a state. Interveners, however, cannot establish a national identity. Only the people within that state can rebuild the institutions of the nation and form that national identity. The term nation means the people of that state have accepted the notion that a state exists and have developed pride and respect for that nation. They form an identity from that nation.

Francis Fukuyama’s book, *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century* (2004), offers some distinction between nation building and state building. He argues that the term nation building is an American misnomer based on our cultural heritage. When helping states recover from war, the term better used is state building. Outsiders cannot build nations; they can only provide the mechanism for the organization and establishment of a state. Fukuyama states that outside efforts can help build a state, but “If a nation arises from this, it is more a matter of luck than design” (Fukuyama, 2004, 99).

Fukuyama is wrong. An organization that is helping a state recover or reversing the course of state failure can impart a feeling of nationalism. By promoting a feeling of
nationalism, the organization can promote the identity of a nation. Nations in the postmodern world do not require a blood or race distinction. National identity can be formed from many ethnic groups coming together to form their own national identity. Karina Korostelina (2009, 110) says this well: “The core issue of the national identity concept is the position of the ethnic minorities within a nation: whether the minorities are oppressed by the majority, or have the opportunities for maintaining their ethnic culture.” From this argument, Korostelina says nations can form their identity in several ways – ethnic, multicultural, or civic. The civic concept is the notion that the people of a state have developed an informal contract that accepts state authority; in turn, the state accepts their ethnic identity.

So what if a nation, or call it a state, fails to take care of its people? How does that failed state affect people in other nations? Seth Kaplan, in his book *Fixing Fragile States* (2008), has a chapter titled “Why Fragile States Matter”:

Fragile states are widely recognized as a danger to both international security and the security of their neighbors, as well as to the well-being of their own people. Their lawless environments spread instability across borders; provide havens for terrorists, drug dealers, and weapons smugglers; threaten access to natural resources; and consign millions to poverty. (2)

Kaplan goes on to say that almost two billion people, of the just over seven billion in the world, suffer from states where institutions of the state have collapsed. Almost three-quarters of those two billion people are affected by armed conflict. Paul Collier’s 2007 book, *The Bottom Billion*, looks closely at the bottom 14 percent of the people on the planet, which encompass approximately 60 countries. These people are caught in four traps that keep their state at the bottom. According to Collier, these people are in the
fourteenth century and moving backward. Seventy-three percent of the bottom billion experienced a civil war or are still in one. Collier went on to say that aid and development are not the answer; good governance is. He promotes that the developed nations of the world need to help the failing nations. Otherwise, they will never move into the twenty-first century.

For all these reasons, the United States has opened it eyes to the issue of fragile, failing, and failed states. The United States supports the concept of Responsibility to Protect, has created organizations within the State Department to deal with fragile states, and has developed military doctrine where its soldiers can help in rebuilding nations.

**Purpose of the Study**

This study focuses on the role of the U.S. military in postwar reconstruction and stabilization. It describes what the military should and should not do in rebuilding nations after the outbreak of war.

The title *Breeding the Phoenix* comes from the mythical bird, whose rebirth comes from its ashes. Nations are similar; they must rebuild from the ashes of war, redevelop their national identity, and reform their institutions of governance. The ashes form the basic building blocks of the new nation-state. Embedded in the ashes are the DNA of a nation – its culture, identity, and historical methods of managing the complex nature of governance and economics. Governance and economic policies are the twin helical strands of the DNA that form any nation.

In a similar vein, where the myth of the phoenix originates in many parts of the world, soldiers have always been part of the process of building nations. The Romans had
their proconsuls; the Greeks, under leaders like Alexander the Great, built entire empires through the force of will of their armies. The Chinese leader Mao Zedong used his army to carve out the China following World War II. Throughout history, leaders used their militaries to begin the process of governing and managing societies.

So what is the role of the military in rebuilding societies after war in this postmodern world? The simple answer is that soldiers provide security while civilians provide the “soft power” outlined in the State Department’s Quadrennial Diplomacy Development Review. This is simply not true. At the end of any war, whether it is a war between states or an international intervention in a societal (civil) war, soldiers have a role to play. For the American soldier, this was proven by their activities in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

American strategists planning the wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq thought that soldiers would win the war. When the war was over, civilians would then come into the country and rebuild the society while the military maintained security. Unfortunately, this did not happen. Websites from military units operating in both countries and studies done about the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq described soldiers building schools and police headquarters, training police, working with local leaders to establish the rudimentary forms of governance, and bringing aid to the millions of affected people. There is no argument among soldiers and civilian aid and development workers that civilians are better at these kinds of projects. So why did the military do them? The answer to this question is the basis of this study and research. The simple answer is that someone needed to do it; and because security conditions did not allow civilians to enter the
country, soldiers performed these roles. The determining factor when civilians entered the country was the security conditions. When there was no security, then civilians were not safe to perform their roles. When security conditions were appropriate for civilians, they came in and did their work. Security, however, is not an on/off switch. It is more like a rheostat that dials up and down with activities on the ground.

There is an argument that soldiers engaged in war or intervening in war should only provide security and help build the nation’s own security forces. When security conditions are right, then civilians do the governance, humanitarian assistance, and infrastructure restoration and development. There is no shortage of articles, books, blogs, and commentaries on the militarization of humanitarian aid. When the key phrase “militarization of humanitarian aid” is entered into Proquest, an academic database, 817 articles appear. Google, on the other hand, has over 270,000 entries on the subject. Many NGOs argue that the military is taking over their role.

Pierre Krähenbühl, the director of operations for the International Committee of the Red Cross, stressed this concern. He understands the role of the military in providing aid in times of war. He says the military has an obligation under international humanitarian law. His concern, however, is the military’s new views on counterinsurgency. He states: “When humanitarian action becomes part of strategies aimed at defeating an enemy, the risks for aid agencies in the field grow exponentially. This is when a bright red line must be drawn” (2011).

William Moseley, the Director of African Studies at Macalester College, stated in a Foreign Policy (2009) article that the military is moving inappropriately into the realm
of aid and development. He understands the role of the military in war and specifically the fight against Al Qaeda; however, in his article he mentions that the military is taking over “where there is any whiff of al Qaeda activity.” According to him, the creation of the relatively new U.S. military African Command jeopardizes the role of many aid and development agencies.

Frederik Rosén, in an article in *Prism*, a new journal on complex operations at the National Defense University, argues that civilian and military relations need to have a new focus. Basing his initial arguments on the classic work *The Soldier and the State* by Samuel Huntington, Rosén argues that there is a need for redefinition of civil-military relations. At the heart of his argument are the new ideas on counterinsurgency within the U.S. military. U.S. military doctrine on counterinsurgency promotes the military’s involvement in governance, economic recovery, humanitarian assistance, and the rule of law.

**Definitions – What’s in a Name?**

So far in this study, the terms peacekeeping, peacebuilding, stabilization, and reconstruction and development have been used. Another term that should be explored is peacemaking. In order to proceed further, common definitions must be established. These terms have undergone change in the last six to ten years, and all for the better. Some of these terms might seem synonymous, but there are subtle differences that must be understood and appreciated.

I will expand on each of these terms, with the exception of development, in later chapters, so the sections below will give the most current definition and point out some
aspects of these terms that will help the reader gain a better understanding in later chapters.

*Peacekeeping*

The term “peacekeeping” came into use in the mid-1950s, but the concept emerged immediately after World War II. It is essentially the use of military forces to either monitor a conflict or provide security so that the conflict can be resolved. Monitors and military forces provide security while other actors rebuild societies.

Most people link peacekeeping to the United Nations. In fact, Secretary General Ban ki-Moon (2008), at the ceremony honoring sixty years of UN peacekeeping, called peacekeeping the United Nations “flagship enterprise.” The first UN peacekeeping mission began in 1948, shortly after the signing of the *UN Charter*. Since then definition and activities of peacekeeping have expanded and matured.

This expansion has brought in a new concept called peace enforcement where the military is authorized to use force, when necessary, to establish the conditions that allow the peace process to move forward. The UN defines these two concepts differently, but for most of the world, peacekeepers wearing the blue beret or blue helmet represent the UN peacekeeping efforts regardless of whether the military forces are conducting peacekeeping or peace enforcement.

Many nations and regional organizations, like NATO and the African Union, developed their own definitions, but in recent years, most are coalescing around a common definition established by the UN in their first peacekeeping doctrine.
Peacekeeping, according to the *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* (2008, 18), is defined as “a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing cease-fires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements – military, police and civilian – working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace.”

Peace enforcement, within the same UN doctrine, “involves the application, with the authorization of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. Such actions are authorized to restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression” (18).

The United Nations sees a significant difference in these two types of operations. Peacekeeping, as the UN defines it, derives its authority from the *UN Charter*, specifically Chapter VI, “Pacific Settlements of Disputes.” Peace enforcement, however, links to Chapter VII, “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of Peace and Acts of Aggression.” (Neither term, peacekeeping or peace enforcement, can be found in the *UN Charter.*) This distinction is important when one considers basic principles of UN peacekeeping as outlined in the 2008 doctrine. These principles are
“consent of the parties,” “impartiality,” and “non-use of force, except in self-defence and defence of the mandate” (UN Peacekeeping Operations, 2008, 31–33).

Consent of the parties is a critical factor in determining whether a mission is a peacekeeping mission or peace enforcement (see figure 1.4). If consent to the peace process is high among the warring factions, then the number of peacekeepers providing security is generally low. Military forces can be unarmed and merely observe the peace agreement. However, if consent is low for the peace process, then the military must provide security for both themselves and civilians. This causes an increase in the number of peacekeepers. Consequently, the number of peacekeepers is inversely proportional to the level of consent among the warring parties. When consent is low and the international community is committed to providing peacekeepers, then these peacekeepers normally act under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In reality, however, no peace operation has full consent of all the parties to the conflict. There are many instances when one group or another does not fully support the peace process, which places the mission in the fuzzy area, halfway between peacekeeping
and peace enforcement. Depending on the threat to security, the mission must be sized appropriately to both provide security and accomplish the mission while minimizing costs.

One of the other basic principles of UN peacekeeping is the use of force only in self-defense. In the last several years, a new norm has evolved that authorizes UN peacekeepers to use military force to defend the mandate. The United Nations does not, however, engage in warfighting. If the UN Security Council decides to intervene militarily in a conflict and consent for the peace process is low, then the mission is usually under Chapter VII, peace enforcement. In theory, peace enforcement can come very close to war, which would result in consent approaching zero.

Over the last decade, the UN Security Council has been more apt to approve peace enforcement missions under chapter VII, rather than chapter VI, peacekeeping. Chapter VII missions provide the peace enforcer more latitude in accomplishment of the mandate. As of this writing (2012) eleven of the fifteen UN peacekeeping missions are under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

*Peacebuilding*

The renowned peace scholar Johan Galtung first introduced the term peacebuilding in 1976. The term came into more frequent use when then UN Secretary
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali introduced the term in his *Agenda for Peace* (1992). In more recent years, the term has taken on new meaning and involves all international activities that help a nation recover from war. According to the UN 2008 doctrine: the term is defined as

Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding is a complex, long-term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. It works by addressing the deep-rooted, structural causes of violent conflict in a comprehensive manner. Peacebuilding measures address core issues that affect the functioning of society and the State, and seek to enhance the capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions. (*UN Peacekeeping Operations*, 2008, 18)

The United Nations is finding its footing in the peacebuilding arena. The creation of a Peacebuilding Commission in 2006 and subsequent peacebuilding missions authorized by the UN Security Council are strong indicators of the evolving role of the UN in peacebuilding. In May 2012, the UN Secretary General, stated, “The United Nations is the only organization that can bring all the necessary elements of peacebuilding to bear: political, security, human rights, humanitarian, rule of law and development” (Ban ki-Moon, 2012). The Secretary General is essentially saying that the military forces (UN peacekeepers) work alongside civilians from many UN agencies, non-governmental organizations and civil society. So how might the UN decide what the military does and what civilians do? The premise of this study is that it depends on the security conditions.

The term peacebuilding and its UN definition are accepted around the world. A 2010 report from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), accepted the UN definition of peacebuilding. OECD, with its mission of improving the economic and social well-being of people around the world, has been deeply involved in peacebuilding for several decades. Within the United States, however, the term does not have widespread acceptance. U.S. policies on the topic do not focus on the term peacebuilding, but instead on stabilization and reconstruction.

**Peacemaking**

The term peacemaking was also introduced by Johan Galtung, but the former Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali brought into mainstream diplomatic discussions when he outlined his vision for the UN in his *Agenda for Peace* in 1995. Boutros-Ghali, like is predecessors, called upon the nations of the world to work toward conflict prevention. This called for preventive diplomacy to end violent conflict before the conflict spiraled into violence. He defined preventive diplomacy as “action[s] to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.” (45)

He went on to further define peacemaking as well, but the definition has been further refined and articulated in the UN’s *Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*. The UN doctrine states: “peacemaking generally includes measures to address conflicts in progress and usually involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated settlement.” (2008, 17)

In warfare, political leaders decide when a nation should become engaged in a war and also when that war will end. In post-modern conflicts where intrastate wars dominate the conflicts raging around the world, political leaders can also become
interveners and play a third-party role in ending conflict. These third-party interveners are normally internationally prominent political diplomats who negotiate the terms of a cease fire or peace agreements. These peace agreements often set the stage and agenda for peacekeepers to carry out their work. In that vein, peacemaking is an integral part of peacekeeping.

*Stabilization and Reconstruction/Stability Operations*

During the early part of the twentieth century, the military called its work in postwar environments nation building. The military’s role was generally called military governance. The term military governance went out of vogue after World War II. In its place, the term stability operations entered into Army lexicon during the Vietnam War. The 1967 Army Field Manual on *Stability Operations* provided the U.S. Army “guidance concerning characteristics of developing countries and the problems inherent to transitional societies” (5). The manual was geared toward counterinsurgency and focused the military efforts on internal defense and development. All actions were closely coordinated with the U.S. Embassy. It was interesting to see the manual state, “The policy of the U.S. is to support sound plans developed by the HC [Host Country] rather than to force U.S. prepared plans on another government” (45). The overall tone of the manual was a U.S. whole of government approach with the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development playing key roles and the Defense Department a supporting role.¹

¹ This 1967 manual supports the renewed efforts towards counter insurgency. This Army Field Manual would serve as a good guide to current-day counterinsurgency and nation building efforts.
With the failure of the U.S. military in Vietnam, all the lessons on counterinsurgency and nation building were discarded and forgotten. These lessons did not come to light until America struggled with its efforts towards nation building in Iraq in 2003, 2004, and 2005.

In January 2004, the Under Secretary of Defense initiated a study on “Transitioning to and from Hostilities.” The study was designed to determine how the United States might either prevent war or help a nation recover from war. The Defense Science Board report was released in December 2004 and introduced the terms reconstruction and stabilization. The report stated, in italics in the executive summary, “DOD has not yet embraced S&R [stabilization and reconstruction] operations as an explicit mission with the same seriousness as combat operations. This mind-set must be changed.” The study looked at ten different cases of nation building and concluded that two historical records stand out as a learning base. The U.S. military’s role in postwar Germany stands out as an excellent model for how to rebuild a nation, while the U.S. military’s role in rebuilding Panama after Just Cause (1989–1990) stands out as how not to rebuild a nation.

The Defense Science Board Study did not define stabilization or reconstruction, but merely discussed the importance of stabilization and reconstruction for military officials planning major operations. It did state plainly that stabilization and reconstruction should be a core function for all military personnel. The Defense Science Board’s recommendations were codified a year later in a Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and
Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” published in November 2005. It stated, “Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support” (2).

While the Defense Science Board was conducting its study, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also initiated a study on stabilization and reconstruction. The U.S. Joint Forces Command released *Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations Joint Operating Concept* [JOC] in 2006. This precursor to Joint doctrine defined stabilization as “activities undertaken to manage underlying tensions, to prevent or halt the deterioration of security, economic, and/or political systems, to create stability in the host nation or region, and to establish the preconditions for reconstruction efforts.” Reconstruction, on the other hand, was defined as a “process of rebuilding degraded, damaged, or destroyed political, socioeconomic, and physical infrastructure of a country or territory to create the foundation for longer-term development” (JOC, 2006, 2–3).

Both the new Department of Defense Directive (2005) and the JOC clearly saw the military in a supporting role rather than lead role in stabilization and reconstruction. The lead role would be the responsibility of the Department of State. Neither of these documents helped define the military role, and as such, became the basis for this research and subsequent hypotheses. The idea of a support role changed when the new Obama administration entered office. DOD policy 3000.05 was rewritten and the term “military support for stabilization and reconstruction” was redefined simply as stability operations.
Stability operations were defined in this new directive as “an overarching term encompassing various military [italics placed by author] missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief” (DOD Directive 3000.05, 2009, 2).

Following the failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, the guidance and doctrine for stability operations took a little over five years to solidify. The definition of stability operations has remained constant for the last three years and both service and Joint doctrine were completed to support this new (old) concept. Much like the stability operations defined in the 1967 Army Field manual, current stability operations are a whole of government approach. The State Department still has the lead in stability operations around the globe, but in postwar settings, the U.S. military has integrated stability operations into its war planning construct – something that was not routinely done prior to 2003.

A Presidential Decision Directive (NSPD 44, 2005) created the new agency within the State Department to lead and coordinate reconstruction and stabilization efforts for the U.S. government. In November 2011, that office was renamed and elevated in stature and became the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations. This was the final break from the term stabilization and reconstruction and now the State Department focuses on stability operations, or as the rest of the world calls it, peacebuilding. Peacebuilding is a term with which the new Bureau is familiar. The Bureau’s website quotes the U.S. Institute of Peace’s book, The Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction [(S&R) manual presents], “the first strategic ‘doctrine’ ever produced for
civilians engaged in peacebuilding missions. It is a practical roadmap for helping
countries transition from violent conflict to peace” (Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization
Operations website).

Sustainable Development

The last term that must be defined in this introduction is the term “development.”
There are several forms of development. The United Nations focuses on human
development, while the U.S. Agency for International Development focuses on
sustainable development. There is a broader and less defined term, international
development. The definitions of human development and sustainable development are
relevant to this study and are quite similar, yet different in subtle ways.

The ideas behind helping the disadvantaged people in the world emerged shortly
after the UN was formed. Initially a fund was established to help the needy. Finally in
1965, the General Assembly created the United Nations Development Program (UNDP),
which is an organization within the UN Secretariat.

UNDP is in the forefront of helping the disadvantaged or poor people in the
world. UNDP was the impetus behind the Millennium Development Goals initiated by
the UN Secretary General in 2000 (to be discussed in detail in chapter 3). “UNDP
partners with people at all levels of society to help build nations that can withstand crisis,
and drive and sustain the kind of growth that improves the quality of life for everyone”
(UNDP website, 2012). Annually the organization produces a report detailing what it
accomplished and sets goals for the following year. The UN’s “Human Development
Report of 2011” defines human development as “the expansion of people’s freedoms and
capabilities to lead lives that they value and have reason to value. It is about expanding choices. Freedoms and capabilities are a more expansive notion than basic needs” (1).

The United Nations focuses on development of the individual, whereas the United States focuses on development of the nation. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was created by President John F. Kennedy in 1961 and is the lead U.S. agency for foreign assistance, both emergency humanitarian assistance and sustainable development. “USAID’s mission is to advance broad-based economic growth, democracy and human progress in developing countries” (USAID Annual Financial Report for 2010). In Fiscal Year 2010 (which ended 30 September 2010), USAID distributed $10.4 billion toward relief and development programs (USAID Financial Report, 2010, 21).

As mentioned above, USAID focuses on sustainable development. The recently revised USAID policy letter defines sustainable development as:

continued economic and social progress that rests on four key principles: improved quality of life for both current and future generations; responsible stewardship of the natural resource base; broad-based participation in political and economic life; and effective institutions that are transparent, accountable, responsive, and capable of managing change without relying on continued external support. The ultimate measure of success of sustainable development programs is to reach a point where improvements in the quality of life and environment are such that external assistance is no longer necessary and can be replaced with new forms of diplomacy, cooperation, and commerce. (USAID ADS 101, 2012, 155)

In general, human development and sustainable development are aimed at helping the disadvantaged or poor people of the world and especially focuses on people emerging from war. Included in both the UN and USAID programs are efforts to promote better
food production, education, health care, water distribution, environmental protection, and job growth through industry. These are all long-term programs.

So what is the difference between stability operations, peacebuilding, and development? Again, the differences are subtle. Stability operations take on a more military focus with the armed forces having to provide security, but also, as the Department of Defense definition states, the military might conduct humanitarian assistance, governance support, economic recovery, rule of law, and infrastructure restoration. All stability operations are essentially designed to take care of emergency humanitarian relief and/or help existing or new emerging government functions. Stability operations have a distinct and separate function from sustainable development, which focuses on longer-term programs to get people working to sustain themselves. Stability operations are more short term, lasting perhaps three to five years, while development has a much longer focus.

Peacebuilding, on the other hand, fills the void between stability operations and human or sustainable development. As mentioned earlier, USAID’s programs in development are geared toward helping an existing or new government establish programs with a political or economic focus to help a struggling government sustain itself. USAID programs, however, do help individuals. The UN’s human development is more focused on the individual, its aim to help individuals sustain themselves.
Peacebuilding, like the USAID’s sustainable development, is also geared to helping new or existing government programs. There is a fine line between stability operations, peacebuilding, sustainable development, and human development. Figure 1.5 helps explain this blending of various programs. Stability operations might have a short term focus of 3-5 years, but peacebuilding might last 10 years or more. Some scholars, like John Paul Lederach (1997), think that peacebuilding should last at least 20 years. Both stability operations and peacebuilding must depend on two factors. First, the international community must be committed to helping a fragile or failed state and that state must be willing to accept that help. The second factor is financial obligations. A nation or a group of nations or the UN funds stability operations, which include all forms of peacekeeping. Peacebuilding, like development, requires significant amounts of funding.

Security is another dimension of the blending of stability operations, peacebuilding, and development. Stability operations can occur when security is nonexistent or marginal. If peacekeepers or an international military force is present, peacebuilding can begin; peacekeepers provide the security for the civilian community to do peacebuilding work. Development, on the other hand, can only occur when the local government establishes security conditions.

Civilians generally manage and carry out peacebuilding and development programs. These civilians either come from organizations like USAID, from interested governments, UN agencies, other international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations. Nongovernmental organizations, however, do the lion’s share of the work.
Actors in Peacebuilding

In fragile, failing, and failed states, the number of international actors helping that country can be staggering. Relief workers from the UN or regional organizations, such as the European or African Union, civilians from other governments interested in helping, and nongovernmental organizations all come in to help. The UN agencies and organizations like USAID, the Department of International Development (United Kingdom), Australia Aid, Canada Aid, and many other interested countries generally use nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to perform their work.

The number of NGOs has increased in numbers over the last twenty years. In the late 1980s there were several thousand NGO organizations worldwide. That number has changed considerably. The 2011 Encyclopedia of Associations lists some 31,000 NGOs outside the United States and another 24,000 within the United States (Thompson, 2011; Atterberry, 2011). Of those over 50,000 NGOs worldwide, only about 3,500 are registered with the UN (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs website). Those registered with the UN generally work in the areas of humanitarian relief and development. Their special consultative status allows them to listen to General Assembly discussions and develop goals and programs that meet the needs of the development community. As such, these large NGOs are ready to accept grants from UN agencies, regional organizations, and nations geared to helping fragile and failing states.

Each NGO has its own goals and focus area. Save the Children focuses on children, but this leads their organization into health care, food distribution, and shelter. OXFAM focuses on famine relief, but also has programs in water distribution and
sanitation. World Vision, a Christian-based NGO, responds to large-scale crises with food, shelter, and water, but also works in development by transforming societies. Doctors without Borders focus on medical treatment and boast they have 22,000 workers across the globe on any given day. The list goes on and on. Some of these large NGOs have hefty operating budgets. Doctors without Borders spent over €548 million in 2010, while in 2011, Save the Children’s operating budget was $618 million (both figures taken from their annual reports).

Complicating the organizations helping fragile states are the UN affiliated organizations. Organizations like the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) operate much like NGOs, but take direction from the UN General Assembly and Secretary General. Yet these organizations also have their own board of directors and raise their own funds. Most of the money comes from donations or assessed contributions of member states. The World Food Programme operating budget for 2010 was $1.7 billion and the World Health Organization assessed contributions for 2012 are $474.6 million (figures taken from their websites).

Beyond the military, there are essentially three types of civilian players operating in complex contingencies that respond to crises in failed and failing states. These include civil servants from international organizations, including the UN; national representatives from interested states, and NGOs. The goals and functions of these organizations vary widely. Of the three types of civilian organizations working in the field of peacebuilding, NGOs vary the most. Thomas Weiss, who has written extensively on NGOs and civil-
military relations, reports that about 15,000 NGOs work in three or more countries (1996, 17). That information is a few years old; the current number is probably much higher. Yet the bottom line is these large international NGOs are a tremendous asset in the fields of peacebuilding and development.

**The Way Ahead**

The roles of the military and of civilians in stability operations remain a big question. Some scholars and several practitioners, mostly working with NGOs, have claimed that the military is militarizing aid and stability operations (peacebuilding). Additionally, recent U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have not cleared a path through this maelstrom.

This study hopes to clear up some of these issues and help both the military and civilians know when and where they can accomplish their missions. There is no question, as far as the military goes, that civilians are better at peacebuilding. The military trains for war and only within the last few years has it begun to focus on stability operations. Fortunately-- but in the realm of stability operations it is unfortunate-- the military’s “can do” attitude pushes aside those civilians with the expertise in peacebuilding.

It is not, however, entirely the military’s fault. When the U.S. military is assigned the task of rebuilding a nation, they do not volunteer but obey the orders of the Secretary of Defense. Civilians, on the other hand, do volunteer. Many very professional people step forward, go to some of the most inhospitable places with little or no support, and do great work. The challenge is getting qualified volunteers in the right numbers to work in the fields of governance, rule of law, economic recovery, reconciliation and infrastructure.
restoration. Often NGOs and governmental organizations get whoever they can to fill these roles. These might be very dedicated young people right out of college or semi-retired people looking for rewarding work or a job to supplement their income. In many cases, their expertise is questionable. As the mission drags on from year to year, the number of unqualified civilians grows. When military forces encounter these people, who have less than a full understanding of what to do, the military personnel ignore them and take over their roles.

This study bases the role of the military and civilians on security conditions on the ground. The general hypothesis is that when there is no established functioning security apparatus by the host government and security for all civilians is in question, intervening military forces must undertake the full spectrum of stability operation functions. As security conditions improve, the door opens for more civilians to come into the fragile or failed state and help the local people establish the rudimentary aspects of a functioning society – in other words, rebuild the state.

I began this research before the full evolution of thinking on stability operations was completed (and it is still evolving). In this vein, when security conditions in a fragile or failed state are poor, the military should be ready to perform the following functions: humanitarian relief, governance, rule of law, infrastructure restoration, and economic recovery.

This research will first complete a literature review on several subjects related to peacebuilding. It will describe how peacebuilding became a central issue within the United Nations and the world community. The study will also cover some general
theories of conflict resolution. They include relative deprivation theory, frustration-aggression theory, social identity theory, and basic human needs theory. All these theories have a direct relation to the field of peacebuilding.

The first literature review chapter also includes a section on the philosophy of democracy. It traces the evolution of the state system of governance and liberal democracy. I discuss and analyze the ideas of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Immanuel Kant. Kant’s vision of a League of Peace leads to the modern-day United Nations system, dedicated to global peace.

Chapter 3 continues the literature by discussing how the United Nations evolved since the end of the Cold War. The work of Secretaries General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Kofi Annan, and Ban ki-Moon led to a full understanding of the value of peacebuilding and the evolution of the new UN norm, Responsibility to Protect (R2P). R2P’s goal is to avoid another atrocity like those that occurred in Rwanda (1994) and Srebrenica (1995) and tie directly to helping a nation recover from war.

The chapter continues with a discussion of practitioners’ views on nation building. John Paul Lederach, Ambassador James Dobbins, the U.S. Institute of Peace, the World Bank, and the Organization for Economic Co-operation draw ideas from practitioners in peacebuilding. It was discovered that the European views developed on peacebuilding closely match the U.S. views on stability operations. The conclusion chapter highlights and compares and contrasts these views.

Chapter 4 traces the evolution of American ideas of stability operations, or peacebuilding as the UN and Europeans call it. It traces the role of the military in nation
building and the success achieved in Vietnam under the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support program. These lessons were all but forgotten when the U.S. military started becoming involved in peacekeeping. This lack of knowledge and expertise led to the initial failures by the United States in rebuilding Iraq in 2003. The humiliation of this failure reenergized thinking about how America should approach nation building. In some ways, the roles of civilians and military units were explored, yet much still needs to be learned and applied. Current U.S. military and civilian doctrine has matured since those failures in 2003. The doctrine for stability operations has undergone considerable change since it was first articulated in 2005. Current thinking is that security, humanitarian assistance, economic recovery, governance, and rule of law are the functions that need attention in the next major stability operation. The thinking that led to the articles, books, and doctrine on stability operations also contribute to the literature on peacebuilding. This research, however, concludes that added to these functions should be reconciliation.

In determining the proper role of the military in stability operations, I created and administered a survey to military officers and civilians. The survey was designed to test the hypothesis on security conditions and its effect on the various functions defined in stability operations or peacebuilding. The concluding chapter describes this survey in some detail, and in the end, the hypothesis proved to be correct.

Two case studies where the U.S. military conducted nation building were used in this research – post World War II Germany and post Allied Force (war) in Kosovo. As the Defense Science Board acknowledged, the postwar Germany case is an example of
how the military did it right. Unfortunately, the rebuilding of Germany was mostly a military-run operation. The 1999 to current day case study of Kosovo is a better example of how to do peacebuilding correctly. The military forces worked side-by-side with civilians and helped the Kosovars rebound from war and build a fragile but a marginally stable nation. Other cases were considered. These included the U.S. forces’ role in Haiti, the rebuilding of Panama, and Iraq and Afghanistan. Due to limited research and the availability of lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan, these cases were left for later work in this area.

This study, like many research projects, has its limitations. It will not focus on conflict prevention. Conflict prevention is a key element if the international community is to end wars altogether. Unfortunately, there are not enough willing nations or enough fiscal resources to deal with conflict prevention on a global scale in a meaningful way. I focus this research on how to rebuild societies after the war has already occurred. Conflict prevention might be a topic for someone else to tackle. As of this writing, the international community is a long way from actually preventing warfare.

This study will also not address the important aspect of civil-military relations. Much has been written about civil-military relations. For the last two decades, the military and civilians have worked side by side. Much has been learned, forgotten, and relearned over this period. For the U.S. military, doctrine that first emerged in World War II was resurrected and applied, only to be sidelined by the civilian attitude toward the military’s role in Iraq. Civilian-military relations are critical if success is to be achieved
in the next peacebuilding mission. Relations are better since 2003, but still there are ill
feelings and mistrust on both sides.

Lastly, this study will not address planning for stability operations in any depth.
The U.S. military is noted for its ability to plan. Planning for stability operations has gone
full circle. With the advent of a doctrine on stability operations, the U.S. military has the
tools to plan for the next stability operation. Already, war plans include stability
operations – what happens when major combat operations end. Integrated planning for
peacebuilding still needs considerable attention. In the United States, a whole of
government approach for stability operations (peacebuilding) is still in its infancy. Again,
this topic is ripe for further analysis and research. However, the functions of stability
operations (security, governance, economic recovery, infrastructure restoration,
humanitarian assistance, and rule of law) provide excellent tools to begin the planning
process.

Counterarguments

Any thorough study of a topic should strive to prove a point. This study concludes
that the role of the military is dependent on the security conditions on the ground. If
security is poor, the military does all the functions of stability operations. If security is
good, then civilians should perform more of the functions and leave the development of
indigenous security capabilities with the military.

Any good study should also have a counterargument. In this case the
counterargument is that the military should only focus on the security function of stability

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operations (peacebuilding) while civilians focus on humanitarian assistance, rule of law, governance, economic recovery, and infrastructure repair.

There will be no argument among the military that civilians are more qualified to do this important work. Civilian police are better at training local police. Judges and international lawyers are better at preparing new constitutions and judiciary policies. Likewise, civilians who perform government functions in their home country should advise new governments. Civil engineers are better at rehabilitating infrastructure, and relief workers are better at humanitarian assistance.

If this is true, why did the U.S. military perform these roles in Iraq and Afghanistan? The simple answer is the civilians were not present because security conditions did not allow their presence. It simply was not safe.

I could also argue that if security conditions are poor or nonexistent, then improve the security conditions before civilians come in and help in the other functions of stability operations. This is a novel idea, but when there is an international crisis and military forces intervene, the local people want action as quickly as possible. They need water, food, and medical help immediately. Citizens also need to make decisions on how to distribute these critical resources, so the rudimentary elements of governance must begin.

The bottom line is that all elements of peacebuilding must begin as soon as the military forces arrive in a failed state.

Another novel idea is to fully integrate civilians with the military. This was the idea behind the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) created to allow more civilians to get into the game. In Iraq and Afghanistan, however, these programs were
administered in different ways. In Iraq, the PRTs were managed by the State Department, while in Afghanistan they were managed by the military. In both cases, there were not enough qualified civilians to fill these roles and the military filled the void. Perhaps if concepts like the American Civilian Reserve Corps or the European Union’s, Canada’s, and Australia’s database for civilian experts matures, then civilians can perform these roles. Right now, there are not enough civilian experts ready and willing to leave their homes, jobs, and families to fulfill these roles.

This study was conducted to further the research and ideas toward peacebuilding and stability operations. Perhaps the notion of integrated military and civilian teams working on stability will catch on. This, however, requires a holistic change to the approach of the U.S. Departments of State and Defense to stability operations. The PRTs were ad hoc and generally worked to some degree, but for budgetary reasons the creation of integrated teams within the U.S. government is an idea that needs further research and Congressional support.
CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW ON PEACEBUILDING-

CONFLICT RESOLUTION THEORIES:
UNDERSTANDING THE BREED

*He who loves practice without theory is like the sailor who boards ship without a rudder and compass and never knows where he may cast.*

*Leonardo da Vinci*

As demonstrated in the preceding chapter, peacebuilding concepts have come to the fore since the end of the Cold War. From its very birth, the United Nations was stymied by East-West tensions. Only since the early 1990s has the United Nations begun to undertake what the drafters of the UN Charter envisioned. Peacebuilding activities have emerged as a central role of the UN. Unfortunately, as this world body began performing peacebuilding activities, scholars of conflict analysis and international peacekeeping have stated that peacebuilding has no theoretical foundation. (Jeong, 2002 & 2005) (Paris, 1997) This chapter will attempt to define the theory behind the thinking and practice of modern day peacebuilding.

Dr. Ho-Won Jeong (2005, 1) in one of his several books on the subject states: “[t]he practice of peacebuilding originally evolved out of an institutional adjustment to peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention responding to internal conflict.” Many
scholars on peacekeeping conclude that UN peacekeeping began to evolve following the end of the Cold War. At the end of the Cold War, then Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali outlined the role of peacekeeping in his report, *An Agenda for Peace*. William Durch in his three books (1993, 1996, & 2006) on peacekeeping coined the thoughts on the evolution of UN peacekeeping. Peacekeeping operations evolved from traditional peacekeeping to more complex peacekeeping, which as we now see, includes many aspects of peacebuilding. Other authors like John Hillen (1998), Don Daniel and Brad Hayes (1995), and Bo Huldt (1995) saw the evolution and changing nature of peacekeeping in the mid to late 1990s. Traditional peacekeeping, which was the foundation of peacekeeping from the first United Nations mission in 1948 until the 1990s, placed formed military units between warring factions. Their job was to simply observe and report violations of UN resolutions or breaches to peace and security. Experiences in Namibia (1989-1990), Somalia (1991-1994), Cambodia (1992-1993), Bosnia (1992-2000), Croatia (1995-1996), Sierra Leone (1998-2005), Kosovo (1999-present), East Timor (1999-present), Liberia (2003–present), and Burundi (2004-2006) clearly demonstrated that peacekeepers had a role in rebuilding nations from the ashes of war. As the international community moves further into the 21st Century, peacekeeping missions are more complex and many have peacebuilding components.

Theories in the field of conflict resolution and peacekeeping provide a foundation for those involved in the practice of rebuilding nations. George Mason University’s School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (S-CAR) touts the need to link theory with research and practice. In the School’s seminal book, *Conflict*, Sandra Cheldelin, Daniel
Druckman and Larissa Fast (2003, 10) use the Oxford dictionary’s definition of theory, “contemplation, a speculation, or mental view: a conception or mental scheme of something to be done, or method of doing it; a systematic statement of rule and principles to be followed.” Thus according to S-CAR, theory guides practice. When a problem or conflict is encountered, understanding the conflict may lead to imagining various theories and lead to a unique solution to the conflict. This chapter is focused on the role of theory, mental views, or just a concept on how to approach a solution. With regard to nation building or peacebuilding, these concepts provide a mental guide to practitioners. Dennis Sandole in his book, *Peacebuilding: War and Conflict in the Modern World* (2010) outlined a number of theories or mental checklists that help peacebuilders. There is no panacea or single checklist of mental guide to walk through a violent conflict. All are unique, but the ideas, like those of Sandole and others are helpful.

Three events in the last two decades have sparked international debate and interest in the field of peacebuilding. The first was the role of the UN following the end of the Cold War. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali began his discussion on the role of the UN at the end of the Cold War. His initial work on *Agenda for Peace* (1992) was an attempt to describe to the UN Security Council how to deal with regional and societal wars. After the devastating incidents of genocide in Rwanda (April to June 1994) and Srebrenica (July 1995), Boutros-Ghali refined his *Agenda for Peace* (1995) and introduced the term peacebuilding to international actors who could make a difference in helping nations recover from war.
The second event was the failure of the United States to fully anticipate the requirements for rebuilding Iraq after Saddam Hussein was toppled in 2003. The Bush Administration faced intense criticism for failing to properly plan for the rebuilding of Iraq and thinking that once the regime as toppled, Iraq would coalesce into a viable Middle Eastern democracy. These false assumptions and the following insurgency within Iraq led many scholars and practitioners to outline various concepts and ideas to help guide nation-building efforts. Historical analysis ensued and some good ideas or mental views emerged. Most notably was the role of civilians, not the military, in peacebuilding activities.

The third and final major event that sparked interest in peacebuilding was the founding of the United Nations’ Peace Building Commission in December 2005. Perhaps the Commission’s creation was recognition by many peacekeeping practitioners and scholars that peacekeeping operations were becoming more complex and focused on nation building. These thoughts were a reaction to the failures by the international community to rebuild Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq after major conflict. It is more likely that the UN Secretary General at the time, Kofi Annan, understood that countries would never move out of violent conflict unless programs were created to rebuild a country after war. Kofi Annan put the full weight of his office and experience behind the concept of peacebuilding. The Secretary General’s report on “Larger Freedom” published in March of 2005, a full nine months before UN Security Council Resolution 1645 which established the Peace Building Commission, demonstrated that the UN had a major role in helping nations recover from violent conflict. Kofi Annan,
before becoming the UN’s seventh Secretary General, was the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations. During his years directing UN peacekeeping, Secretary General Annan saw clearly that peacekeeping operations were expanding into the realm of nation building. The failure of the UN to mobilize efforts to rebuild fragile or failing states resulted in the prolonged presence of peacekeepers and the inability to get to the root causes of the conflict.

In his “Larger Freedom” report Secretary General Annan made a pledge to the nations of the world to make the UN more effective. He recognized that “[r]oughly half of all countries that emerge from war lapse back into violence within five years… no part of the United Nations system effectively addresses the challenge of helping countries with the transition from war to lasting peace. I therefore propose to Member States that they create an intergovernmental Peacebuilding Commission, as well as a Peacebuilding Support Office within the UN Secretariat, to achieve this end.” (2005, 31)

Since its establishment in December 2005, the UN Peacebuilding Commission accumulated $418.7 million from 48 donor nations and organizations and is currently working in 22 countries. (UNDP, Fifth Consolidated Annual Progress Report of Peacebuilding Fund, 2012) The process of rebuilding countries after violent conflict is progressing in a positive way. Recent and detailed studies of lessons learned from peacebuilding activities are beginning to spread into many conflict journals.

As mentioned before, many peace scholars contend that the practice of peacebuilding evolved without theoretical foundation… initially. Roland Paris (1997, 56), who agreed with this idea, pointed out that in general peacebuilding was based on
the notions of liberal internationalism and a market economy. Essentially, post conflict peacebuilding would be successful if democratic institutions were installed and a market economy created following an internal civil (or external) war. He went on to argue that such an approach was short sighted and did not envision the years of effort required to rebuild a nation. Paris proposed three options for peacebuilding. First peace builders could continue on the liberal market internationalism path or shift to an authoritarian approach, an approach many nations might better understand. Another approach would be partition. Often civil wars emerge out of ethnic rivalries and hatred. In the end, Paris favored a more relaxed and longer-term approach that does not race to elections and gradually introduces a market based economy and democratic institutions. He called this approach “gradual and controlled democratization.” (1997, 82) Essentially Paris was promoting and encouraging practitioners of peacebuilding to slow down and extend the time devoted to peacebuilding work and increase resources (money and people) devoted to the peacebuilding process.

In an article from *International Peacekeeping*, Stein Eriksen (2009) argues that the UN and the international community, when tasked to rebuild a state, have a particular kind of state in mind – a liberal democratic one. Eriksen is right in that most attempts at state building or peacebuilding are focused on a liberal model that is both democratic and based on a free market economy. He states: “[l]iberal in this context means a state that (a) upholds the rule of law, (b) is democratic and (c) is based on a market economy.” (653) He continues his argument that perhaps not all failing states are destined to be modeled after this concept. Eriksen then goes on to demonstrate how the United Nations’
involvement in the peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has failed to produce an effective state. He further posits that perhaps not all states can be formed around the liberal democracy model, but fails to provide an alternative approach.

**Evolution of Liberal Democracy**

Perhaps Eriksen’s and Paris’s view that all peacebuilding enterprises in the international community are based on the model of a liberal democracy was drawn from Francis Fukuyama’s widely read 1989 article, “The End of History.” Fukuyama argues in his article and subsequent book (1992) that a Western liberal democracy is the final form of human government. Throughout his book, Fukuyama makes many references to influential political philosophers of the past: Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Immanuel Kant, Georg Wilhelm Hegel and Karl Marx. Hobbes, Locke and Kant are the founders of liberal democracy. Their ideas were gradually put into practice leading to effective functioning democracies. It is important to look back into history to see how a liberal democracy emerged.

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) is best known for his book, *Leviathan*. Hobbes lived during a troubled and violent period in history. As a tutor and scholar, Hobbes saw men in a negative sense and regarded them as unfit for life in an open free society. In the *Leviathan* (published in 1651), Hobbes sets out to discuss the laws of nature. In his chapter on “the First and Second Natural Law, and of Contracts,” Hobbes says that the first law of nature for every man is “to seek peace, and follow it.” The second law is “by all means we can, to defend ourselves.” (146) He has long passages on disagreements, justice, compliance and even war. Eventually Hobbes concluded that for men to be part
of a society they must submit to governance by a “great LEVIATHAN,” or a sovereign. (176) He goes on to describe several forms of a commonwealths by which a sovereign governs a society. These included a monarchy, a democracy, or an aristocracy. He clearly favored democratic rule where individuals select their sovereigns.

Hobbes devotes separate chapters to the role of the sovereign, liberties of subjects, civil laws, crimes, and even the dissolution of commonwealths. On the last point, he says “a kingdom divided in itself cannot stand.” (184) Hobbes was clearly outlining the role of states in the modern world. Although he failed to discuss property rights and economics to sustain the state, he was clearly one of the early architects of the modern state system.

Hobbes lived in England, but made several trips to the continent of Europe. At the time of Hobbes’ visits, Europe was embroiled in the Thirty Years’ War. In 1648, the Treaty of Westphalia was signed ending the war. It is a widely accepted fact that the modern state system that is known and respected today, emerged from the Treaty of Westphalia. Hobbes’ view of a Leviathan, a sovereign to rule the people, was certainly influenced by the Treaty of Westphalia.

The creation of a state with a ruler, boundaries, and laws does not constitute a liberal democracy. Cornelia Navari, who traces the evolution of the modern state and cites a number of historical sociologists who develop differing ideas of sovereignty, concludes (as do many sociologists) that “the state is not always and everywhere the same thing.” (2007, 579) Her article masterfully describes the evolution of the modern state system and describes varying forms of states: absolute, cabinet, and democratic.
Her categories of states are remarkably similar to Hobbes’ views on the types of sovereigns.

States, however, have evolved in their own way with varying forms of governance, leading to both successes and failures. The evolution of the liberal democracy was deeply influenced by John Locke. Locke (1632-1704) took the ideas of Hobbes’ Leviathan to another level. He, like Hobbes, grew up with a civil war raging in England. Locke’s most famous work, *Two Treaties of Government*, initially published anonymously in 1689, espouses a political theory of governance. Unlike Hobbes, Locke saw man in a more favorable sense, but like Hobbes, Locke saw the need for laws and methods to control men’s vices. Locke’s essay was in response to and a justification of the English Revolution of the time. (Laslett, 1966)

Locke’s essay was also a response to the religious absolutism of the time, particularly views expressed by Sir Robert Filmer. The *First Treatise* or book attacks many contemporaneous religious maxims. Included in this discussion are the rights of men and their freedoms (all men are created equal). He also attacked the monarchy. According to Locke, there is no divine authority vested in monarchs that come from ancestral lineage. His chapter on “Who is Heir” details the problem of translating the lineage of Adam through the ages. In excruciating biblical and historical detail Locke attacks the rights of the monarchy to claim the throne of England. Locke in Book II (*Second Treatise*) lays out his political theory. He says that men have the right to join a political or civil society, and that society will have a supreme government and the responsibility to create laws for the public good. “For when any number of Men have,
buy consent of every individual, made a *Community*, they have thereby made that
*Community* one Body, with a Power to Act as one Body, which is only by the will and
determination of the *majority.*” (Locke, 96)

Locke picks up in Chapter X of Book II where Hobbes left off. He acknowledges
other forms of commonwealths, but clearly he supports a democratic approach where a
legislature is elected by the people and the legislature has the power to enact laws. Locke
is very careful to avoid a legislature that has absolute power. Absolute power, in his
mind, rests with the people. Likewise, the people have the right to property and that
property cannot be taken without consent. Locke goes on to address the separation of
powers between the Executive and Legislative branches of a government.

Locke’s *Two Treatises of Government* greatly influenced the form of governments
into the 18th Century. The drafters of the United States *Constitution* were influenced by
Locke’s ideas. Likewise the British and the French democracies reflect the influence of
Locke. Locke articulated a democratic form of government that began to take hold
across the globe. “All men are created equal,” “separation of church and state,”
“separation of power,” and “a free market economy” are all adages that can trace their
lineage back to John Locke.

For foreign policy experts, the work of Locke also began the discussions and
ideas on how states relate to one another and form the basis of international relations
theories. However, Richard Cox (1960, 189), whose book on Locke focuses on
international relations and war and peace, criticizes Locke for not going further: “it might
well be asked why he [Locke] did not take the next seeming logical step and advocate a world-state, or at least an international ‘organization’.”

Another influential philosopher, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), did address the issue by advocating a world body. Kant went a step further than Locke in his essay, *Perpetual Peace*, and advocated a “league of peace” whose purpose was to “make an end of all wars forever.” (1795, 18)

Kant, too was a Hobbesian, who thought that men needed some sort of control and direction. Without some sovereign authority (a Leviathan), men would continue to pursue war to meet their demands for power and wealth. The sovereign state would control men’s greed. The opening of the second section of *Perpetual Peace* stated: “[t]he state of peace among men living side by side is not the natural state; the natural state is one of war.” (Kant, 1795, 117) According to Lewis White Beck, in an introduction to Kant’s essay on *Perpetual Peace*, Kant was a Prussian and lived during the establishment of a peace treaty between France and Prussia. Kant recognized the value of a peace treaty, but had a vision to go beyond a peace treaty that ended a war. His view of a perpetual peace required work by many nations to completely eliminate war. Much of his essay is focused on making recommendations to rid nations of armies and end expenditure of national wealth on war making material. Kant also said: “no state shall by force interfere with the Constitution or Government of another state.” (Kant, 1795, 112) Kant makes the lofty proposal that nations work together in a ‘league of peace.’ Since war is the natural state for men, nations must work harder to maintain peace.
Kant advocated democratic states where the nation served the people and the people were endowed with rights and privileges. His third definitive article in *Perpetual Peace* openly promotes a spirit of ‘Universal Hospitality’ among men and nations. Kant was a realist who understood the true nature of nations, that there will be times of disagreement and those disagreements may lead to war. He was also an idealist who had a vision for lasting peace.

Most historians, political scientists, and international relations specialists will trace the origins of the modern United Nations to the League of Nations proposed by the U.S. President Woodrow Wilson in 1918. World War I ushered in a new kind of war – total war where tens of millions died and the entire continent of Europe was redefined. In drafting the Treaty of Versailles, nations came together to propose a League of Nations along the lines envisioned by Immanuel Kant. For many reasons the League of Nations failed, including the non-ratification by the U.S. Senate. The idea of a perpetual peace did not die. Nations working toward a common goal of peace became the foundation of the United Nations Charter – “To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace.” (UN Charter) Kant’s idea of a “league of peace” became a reality with the modern-day United Nations. The United Nations currently fosters peacebuilding where nations are formed from the ashes of war into a liberal democracy with a free market economy.
Peacebuilding Concepts

Many people trace the origin of the term ‘peacebuilding’ to the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his *Agenda for Peace* (1992). In reality, the term originated with Johan Galtung, a peace scholar from Norway’s International Peace Research Institute. Galtung was one of the pioneers in peace and conflict resolution research. Over a period of fifteen years, Galtung authored over one hundred articles and monographs on peace, war, and defense issues. In a 1976 article, Galtung introduced the world to the terms of peacemaking and peacebuilding. Galtung began the article by discussing peacekeeping, an already known concept in 1976, but then outlined a conflict resolution concept called peacemaking. Peacemaking was described as a process whereby the two or more parties to a conflict came together to “resolve incompatibility,” often with the help of a third party. He recognized that peacemaking, where some kind of compromise resulted, was only the beginning of the process he labeled as peacebuilding. According to Galtung, “we have to turn toward deeper-lying factors in the relations between the parties, in order to arrive at some ideas about how a self-supporting conflict resolution can be found. And this is what we refer to as *peacebuilding.*” (1976, 297)

Galtung was also the creator of concepts such as positive and negative peace and direct and structural violence. Each of these concepts has relevance concerning peacebuilding. Although Galtung often said that peace is a much misused and abused word, he spent his life focused on every aspect of peace. Negative peace, according to Galtung, is the “absence of direct, personal violence.” Thus, negative peace can be achieved by parties submitting to some sort of settlement; but nothing more is done
toward resolving the conflict. (Galtung, 1975, 77) Positive peace, on the other hand, is obtained by going beyond a peace settlement and establishing equitable social structures that provide for the basic needs of individuals and allow individuals to live up to their full potential, regardless of race, ethnic background, or social orientation. (Jeong, 2000) Thus the concept of positive peace fits with peacebuilding in that efforts are made beyond peacemaking to reduce, if not eliminate the causes and conditions of violent conflict and move toward a sustainable peace.

Dennis Sandole (2007) described the concepts of negative and positive peace in recounting the situation in Bosnia in 1995, when NATO forces deployed to the region and the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed. Actions toward negative peace began in early in the conflict when the UN was involved, but did not get full traction until the Dayton Peace Agreement. Even as of this writing, Sandole does not believe positive peace has been achieved in Bosnia.

Sandole, in his book *Peace and Security in the Post Modern World*, lays out a three pillar framework for analyzing and helping nations recover from conflict. Pillar 1 calls for an analysis of the characteristics of the conflict. Specifically the model calls for determining the parties to the conflict, the issues and the objectives of the parties. Pillar 2 looks at the causes and conditions in which the conflict emerged and pillar 3 looks at intervention strategies. Pillar 3 uses some of the same tools on conflict resolution outlined previously, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. (28-44)

Dr. Sandole uses the above method to recommend an approach to attaining positive peace in Bosnia. Sandole calls for a new European peace and security system
(NEPSS). At the core of NEPSS is the Organization for the Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), but also includes the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organizations (NATO). According to Sandole, OSCE should take the lead in managing existing or future conflict in Europe. The NEPSS uses the model outlined above, but calls on the various regional organizations to put NEPSS into practice. The ideas of the NEPSS system are still evolving. Sandole states that the idea “calls for making use of, and integrating, existing institutions and mechanisms” (Sandole, 2007, 48) to bring about a sustainable long-lasting peace. In other words, positive peace.

Galtung could not focus only on peace because in his words, “negative peace was the absence of violence.” (1975, 110) Analyzing and describing violence was also included in his research and writing. Galtung’s ‘structural violence’ directly impacts and relates to peacebuilding. Before defining structural violence, the term direct violence must be addressed. Direct violence is an easy concept to understand and grasp. When an individual is threatened or experiences physical harm, he or she is a victim of direct violence.

Structural violence, on the other hand, is a completely different concept. Galtung (1975, 103) begins his discussion of structural violence by discussing the basics of a world order. Societies are built in a hierarchal structure with, as he describes them, “topdogs” and “underdogs.” Whether that is a “lord, vassals or serfs, or big power, smaller powers and workers,” (104) the hierarchal structure is ingrained in any social order.
Before defining structural violence, Galtung defined violence: “violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations.” (1975, 110-111) If one accepts Galtung’s definition of violence then one can conclude that violence does not necessarily have to be physical harm to one’s body, but society by its structure can keep people from realizing their true potential. Structural violence thus exists when classes of people cannot rise to their true potential because of societal structures and policies. According to Galtung, structural violence “kills slowly,” while direct violence “kills quickly.” (1975, 135)

We see these kinds of structural violence all over the world. The ruling class, through societal policies and programs, deters different ethnic or religious groups from realizing their true potential. (Galtung, 1971) In Cambodia, Pol Pot’s communist regime came to power and persecuted those loyal to the American-backed military government. In Kosovo, the Serbs repressed the Muslim Albanians, and in Sri Lanka, the majority Sinhalese created policies and programs against the minority Tamil people, thus leading to a quarter century civil war. In Sudan, the northern Arabs created a social order that denied the Christian blacks rights through the establishment of Sharia Law. Even in the United States, polices and programs in the southern states prevented blacks from achieving their full potential until the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964. Often these social structures move from structural violence to direct violence.

2 The collection of readings by Johan Galtung are a rich source of information about peace and conflict resolution. Any scholar of conflict resolution would be wise to read these five volumes. They form the basic understanding of the conflict resolution field.
Scholars, diplomats, and practitioners of conflict resolution have wrestled for centuries with how to end wars or reduce the destruction caused by war. Starting after the end of World War II and gaining momentum well into this century, the field of conflict analysis and resolution has grown in interest. Initially influenced by the total devastation of war evidenced by the nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6 and 9 August 1945, respectively, and the potential threat posed by the Cold War, the field of conflict analysis and resolution began to grow and take form. It was quickly recognized that the field was not one intellectual discipline, but a combination of disciplines, which include, but are not limited to, international relations, anthropology, psychology, sociology, philosophy, economics, and religious studies. Understanding conflicts with the goal of finding a resolution to the conflict or at least mitigating the turmoil requires analyzing theories in a wide variety of fields and then blending their lessons into solutions. Numerous theories provide some guidance to the practitioner of peacebuilding. Basic human needs theory, frustration-aggression theory, relative deprivation theory, and social identity theory provide insights for practitioners involved in peacebuilding enterprises. No one theory provides a complete answer to the challenges faced in peacebuilding efforts. Peacebuilding, like the conflict resolution field, requires an understanding of several disciplines, yet no one theory provides concrete steps toward a solution(s). Solutions are found by applying a variety of concepts and views simultaneously to get at the root causes of the problem(s).
**Basic Human Needs Theory**

Icons in the field of conflict analysis and resolution, like John Burton (1990a), Johan Galtung (1988), Dennis Sandole (1990) and Chris Mitchell (1990) all point to the basic human needs theory as a way of understanding conflict and finding solutions.


![Figure 2.1](image)

Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs

Maslow was determined to understand human motivation and develop a theory that provided a framework to understand a normal healthy human being. (see figure 2.1) Humans have certain physiological needs that must be met for the organism to survive. These include air, water, sleep, food, and various minerals. Failure to fulfill these physiological needs will cause a normal human to die or become unhealthy.

The next level of need – safety - refers to a broad category that includes security, stability, dependency, protection, freedom from fear, anxiety, chaos, and law and order. Failure to achieve the safety need could also cause the person to perish or lead to an unhealthy life. Without shelter or protection from predators a human life would be in peril.
The belonging need focuses on love, relationships, and affection. Failure to meet these needs will not lead to death (except in the case of infants), but certainly to an emotionally and unhealthy life. The next order of need is esteem. People strive for some meaning in life — something of which they can be proud -- an achievement or an expertise. This can lead to prestige or fame and glory. The last and highest need is that of self-actualization. Here Maslow says that the human must do what he wants to do, or something that he or she is meant to do. In this case he uses examples of musicians, artists, or a poet. Failure to achieve these last two needs does not mean the human will become unhealthy or depressed. He or she may just have a longing to do something else. Maslow states that “the healthy and fortunate adult in our culture is largely satisfied in his safety needs.” (41) Unfortunately, in many regions of the world, especially those described in Paul Collier’s *The Bottom Billion*, the basic needs outlined by Maslow are not met.

Maslow postulated that a person would satisfy the lowest order of need first (physiological) and when that need is met, move up the hierarchy. Most people will never fully achieve self-actualization, but self-actualization varies most from person to person.

Maslow’s hierarchy stimulated some thought among conflict analysts. Would the desire to achieve certain basic human needs help explain why some people use violence to achieve their goals (needs)? John Burton, the pioneer of George Mason’s School for Conflict Analysis, thought so. He analyzed the work of Paul Sites, a sociologist. Sites’ 1973 book, *Control: The Basis of Social Order*, attempted to prove that the most
fundamental component in an individual’s social life is control. The individual will try to
control his own self and others to gain what he wants. In his explanation of control, he,
too, looked to human needs. Later, as he worked with conflict analysts, Sites articulated
the following human needs: stimulation, security, recognition, distributive justice,
meaning, response, rationality, and finally control. Burton generally accepted Sites’s
view of human needs, but wanted to expand the theory to a more general theory of
conflict analysis.

In his book, *Deviance, Terrorism and War*, Burton wrote that to understand
human behavior one needed to explore the society in which humans operated. Analysts
needed a holistic picture of man in conflict. The individual man needed to be viewed in
the context of society and man’s behavior within a society. Consequently, the fields of
international relations, political science, sociology and psychology needed to be melded
together to fully understand human behavior. Burton (1979) felt that there might be
universal needs that people of all societies shared. He later wrote “there were
fundamental issues…touching on personal and group security, identity and recognition,
and especially a sense of control over the political process that affected security, identity
and recognition.” (1990a, xv)

In 1988, Roger Coate and Jerel Rosati published an edited book, *The Power of
Human Needs in World Society*. Their purpose was to “emphasize the importance of a
human needs approach for explaining and understanding the complexities of the world.”
(1) John Burton wrote one of the opening chapters in the book and postulated that the
needs of the individual impact on social organizations. He went on to describe common
needs like food, shelter, sex and reproduction. According to Burton, there were higher orders of needs which included participation and recognition. He referenced Maslow’s hierarchy, but accepted Sites’ human needs construction. Burton went on to say that the individual will do everything to satisfy those needs, and if deprived, he will become a deviant. (37-38) On the other hand, if the needs are met, the individual will become a productive member of society. Burton did not focus on a hierarchy, as did Maslow. He believed needs varied with the situation. He did not, however, dwell on the physiological needs described by Maslow, but on higher order needs.

Johan Galtung (1998), an original pioneer of conflict analysis and peace studies, wrote a succinct chapter in the Coate and Rosati book pointing out many of the problems with human needs theory. He strongly supported the basic needs approach as an “indispensable ingredient of development studies.” “[A] basic needs approach (BNA) is not the approach to social science in general or development studies in particular, but one approach.” (129) He went on to discuss needs versus wants, wishes, desires, and demands. His conclusion was that needs were driven by necessity, but it is often hard to distinguish between a necessary need and a want, desire, or demand. To focus on necessary needs, he looked at security, identity, welfare, and freedom needs.

Attacking the Basic Needs Approach (BNA) as a “Western” view of needs, Galtung criticized many theorists on their views of a hierarchy of needs. He thought it dangerous to assume a hierarchy in the basic needs approach. The hierarchy approach, according to Galtung, limits one’s thinking about the range of needs. Not all societies or cultures face the same needs, and some societies have different needs at different times in
history. He went on to say “[w]e do have goals, some of them take the form of needs of which the individual may be more or less aware.” He also argued that needs are not completely “malleable.” (139) Social customs drive the formation of needs, but once formed they remain fairly consistent. Galtung concluded with:

> In conclusion, basic needs approaches are indispensable in any theory of development that sees development as development of human beings – in other theories BNA becomes unnecessary, even disturbing… Thus instead of letting needs creep up that building from the basement, one may let values creep down, into the basement, insisting that it is all culturally conditioned. (154)

In 1988, Burton hosted, with the help of the U.S. Institute of Peace, the German Marshall Foundation, and George Mason University, a conference focused on ideas about human needs theory. Inviting sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists, and other scholars with interest in conflict resolution, Burton was able to expand basic human needs theory. The book, *Conflict: Human Needs Theory*, emerged from papers presented at that conference. The conference demonstrated the value of the theory, but also its inadequacies.

Dennis Sandole (1990) looked at human needs from a biological approach and translated that to the nation-state, in essence a micro to macro look at the theory. Drawing upon the original works by Katrin Lederer (1980) and ideas presented at a 1978 conference in Berlin, Sandole argued that concept is a theoretical approach, but there are “indirect observables.” Like others, Sandole was saying that needs cannot be observed directly, but there is general acceptance that needs exist in all societies. Studying the work of James C. Davies, who modified Maslow’s approach, Dr. Sandole agreed there

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were four “substantive” needs – the physical, social-affectional, self-esteem, and self-actualization. There are also three closely related implemental needs – security, knowledge and power. (64) Sandole makes an important point-- when needs are routinely satisfied and then denied, violence often ensues. Sandole, like Galtung and others, does not think that humans respond to needs in a hierarchal way. Yet unlike Galtung, Sandole thinks these needs are universal and common to all humankind, across culture and societies.

Ronald Fisher (1988) acknowledges the important work of Maslow and the application of his psychological approach to conflict resolution. Like others, however, he has not seen proof that the needs espoused by Maslow are hierarchal. Fisher takes a slightly different approach to human needs theory in that he says, “[t]he concept of identity, in particular social identity, has the potential of providing the key linkage between Needs Theory and intergroup and international conflict.” (1990, 94) Drawing from the social identity theory (to be discussed later), Fisher concludes that individuals will go to great lengths and bear untold suffering and sacrifice to protect their identity. He identifies four human needs as being important in conflict analysis and resolution: recognition, identity, security and self-determination. He then analyzes each of these needs in low and high intensity conflicts. In a low intensity conflict individuals do not see their fundamental needs threatened, while in high intensity conflict the needs may be denied and high levels of frustration may develop among groups. He says that in some cases, the shift from low intensity to high might happen quickly. Vamik Volkan in his book, *Bloodlines* (1997), demonstrated how quickly Slobodan Milosevic inflamed ethnic
identity to build support for his drive to expel Muslims in both Bosnia and Kosovo. So pinning identity to the human needs theory and its link to conflict resolution has merit.

Christian Bay was a Norwegian political scientist whose fifty-six years in the field added a chapter to the human needs theory. Bay’s last scholarly publication came out in Burton’s edited volume (he died in May of 1990). Bay (1990) approached human needs from a human rights perspective. Humans are individual social beings who have needs based on rights and the international community needs to take human rights more seriously (note he wrote this in 1988). As a supporter of Hobbes’s and Locke’s ideas, he was a liberal democrat. With his liberal view of human rights as his bedrock, Bay proposed several universal needs: survival, safety and health, social identity, and liberty and freedom.

Bay, like many others, felt that the human needs theory has value in providing practitioners ideas for conflict resolution. “This point [political reality of needs], most ably argued by John Burton, is that basic needs are powerful facts, which decision makers in international politics may keep disregarding only at their own peril.” (Bay, 1990, 248) His overall chapter on human needs is clearly written, but has a much broader focus than others.

Another important scholar on conflict resolution, Ed Azar, supported the human needs approach for conflict resolution. Oliver Ramsbotham, whose text-book with Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Mail, Contemporary Conflict Resolution (2006), is the basis of many college courses, did a tribute article to Azar in 2005. Ramsbotham attempted to highlight the importance of Azar’s work from the early 1970s until his death in 1991.
Ramsbotham noted that Azar based his ideas of protracted social conflict on the satisfaction of human needs. Quoting Azar, Ramsbotham (2005, 113) acknowledged: “the prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation,” was the basis for many emerging violent conflicts.

Certainly, the question arises why focus on a theory with so much disagreement? Human needs theorists come at this subject from all angles and none of them agree on a common list of human needs, how to approach these needs, the universality of the approach, and its usefulness in analyzing and resolving conflict. Table 2.1 outlines many of the needs developed by various scholars across multiple disciplines. The value to a practitioner of peacebuilding is to recognize that human needs are important in analyzing a conflict. Looking over the list by the various authors provides a framework for identifying what might be considered a basic human need, not a want, or desire, or demand, but a true need.

We all have wants and desires no matter what socio-economic class, society or culture we come from. Wants, desires, and wishes are not something we will take a stand or risk our lives. Demands, on the other hand, come about when someone wants something in return for something else – a quid pro quo. This is especially true in violent conflicts or as Fisher used, in “high intensity conflicts.” Demands might lead to a peace agreement or a settlement, but is the demand a bonafide human need? That determination is something that must be discovered. Many of the scholars noted that
wants, desires and demands are real and can be measured. A basic human need might be harder to determine.

Thus the burden of determining what human needs are important is placed on practitioners of peacebuilding. No one set of human needs by any of these scholars will tell a practitioner what need to look for in a conflict. Reviewing all these various ideas might spark a thought or a possible approach to conflict resolution strategies or

Table 2.1
Summary of Views on Basic Human Needs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maslow Psychologist</th>
<th>Sites Sociologist</th>
<th>Galtung Sociologist &amp; International Relations</th>
<th>Burton* International Relations &amp; Conflict Resolution</th>
<th>Sandole Political Scientist &amp; Conflict Resolution</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physiological</td>
<td>Stimulus</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Stimulation</td>
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<td>Security</td>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td>Security</td>
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<td>Recognition</td>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>Recognition</td>
<td>Affection</td>
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<td>Distributive</td>
<td>Freedom</td>
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<td>Meaning</td>
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<td>Role Defense</td>
<td>Power</td>
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<tr>
<th>Fisher Psychologist</th>
<th>Davies Psychologist &amp; Political Scientist</th>
<th>Bay Economist</th>
<th>Mitchell Conflict Resolution</th>
<th>Azar International Relations &amp; Conflict Resolution</th>
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<td>Health</td>
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<td>Social Identity</td>
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<td>Control</td>
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<td>Actualization</td>
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<td>Self Actualization</td>
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* Burton reduced his list of needs in 1990 to 1) identity, 2) recognition, 3) participation and 4) security (Burton, 1990)
programs. Peacebuilding activities focused on resolving the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo will develop a different list of needs than those focused on a conflict in the Philippines or North Korea or the Middle East. Practitioners must keep their eyes and ears open to determine the needs. What must be taken away here is that needs are important. Azar had it right, protracted social conflicts are often influenced by peoples’ basic human needs.

John Burton provides another way of determining human needs. In the 1970s and 1980s, Burton and others began a series of seminars in conflict zones. They soon became known as Problem Solving Workshops. While working at the Centre for Analysis of Conflict at University College in London, Burton helped develop the concept for these workshops. (Kelman, 1972) When these workshops were first used, they were an entirely different focus than the normal official governmental diplomacy that dominated the political landscape. Burton’s and others’ work opened the door to multi-track diplomacy processes that are now commonly used.

The problem solving workshops worked with individuals in conflict at multiple levels of society. This was particularly useful in protracted social conflicts. Normally people not in government were selected; for the most part professionals who were close to the issues, but not in decision making positions. Official government parties to the conflict provided consent for the workshops, but did not participate. From there a series of conferences were scheduled. Normally academics, not anyone from any government’s official offices, organized and ran the workshops. Groups of people in conflict were selected and invited to participate in up to three weeks of discussions. On most
occasions, the discussions began with people from one side of the conflict. Then the academics provided some insight into possible theories and ideas toward conflict resolution, and finally the adversarial groups met to discuss the issues, and make recommendations on the way forward. (Burton, 1990b) (Kelman, 1972) (Mitchell, 2000)

The purpose of the conference was not to resolve the conflict. (It would be naïve to think that one or two sessions could resolve issues that took many years to decades to form.) The process merely provided a forum to air grievances and attempt to find the root causes of the conflict. It is hoped, but not always achieved, that the workshops produce mutual understanding and trust among the participants and concrete ideas for creative problem solving. (Kelman, 1976, 80) The workshops did not replace official diplomatic functions, but were often used to prepare for official diplomacy, or to provide input into official diplomatic programs.

The concept of problem solving workshops is fairly simple and might lead to uncovering the necessary human needs that need resolution. Any agency, including military organizations, can sponsor these workshops and ask academics from the ever expanding number of conflict resolution think tanks around the globe to conduct them.

**Frustration-Aggression Theory**

Theories in the field of conflict resolution, which have already been discussed as a relatively new field of study, do not have to be recent, nor do they have to focus on the social level. Individual theories provide valuable insight into the broader international conflict resolution field. Sigmund Freud’s works stand out as some of the most influential on understanding the human psyche. Freud’s ideas on aggression led a team of scholars at
Yale University to expand on Freud’s work and develop the frustration-aggression theory. John Dollard, Neal Miller, Leonard Doob, H.H. Mowrer and Robert Sears (1939) started with the assumption (derived from Freud’s work) that “aggression is always a consequence of frustration.”

Dollard et al. determined that frustration does not always lead to aggression, but certainly the opposite was true – aggression stems from frustration. Human beings set goals and attempt to accomplish those goals. When those efforts are blocked by some reason, frustration ensues. Most often that frustration does not lead to aggressive violent behavior. Frustration is an innate feeling, but aggression may be learned behavior (many scholars would argue, including Freud, Lorenz and possibly Darwin, that aggression is genetically embedded in the human species). However, there is a learning aspect toward how aggression is expressed and aggressive responses can certainly be learned from parents or others and could also be in response to even social norms.

Dollard and his team made a few conclusions from their research. Hypotheses like the intensity of the aggression vary directly from the amount of frustration. Should a goal be blocked multiple times, the strength and intensity of the aggressive behavior increases. Anyone who has dealt with a department of motor vehicles in trying to register an old car will certainly experience frustration. As already mentioned, frustration does not always lead to aggression. Social norms temper or inhibit acts of aggression. Likewise levels of punishment will inhibit acts of aggression. Certainly an employee will not demonstrate aggression toward his/her boss if they become frustrated.
Another hypothesis is that the strongest acts of aggression are directed against the agent perceived to be the source of the frustration. There is probably a lot of pent up frustration exerted on boxes that baby cribs come in or a toy that needs to be assembled before Christmas morning. Similarly, individuals in an ethnic conflict might resort to violent aggressive behavior when faced with meeting one’s needs or achieving a goal that is stymied by structural violence. This theory provides some insight into the various aspects of peacebuilding, in that people become frustrated and may resort to violent aggression when trying to take care of their family or achieve a higher level basic human need.

Leonard Berkowitz (1989) examined Dollard’s et al. frustration-aggression model in some detail in the late 1980s and also reviewed the critiques of the theory up until that point. Overall the theory held up fairly well to a number of criticisms, including Berkowitz’s own -- blocking of attaining a goal does not necessarily lead to aggressive behavior even if the frustration reaches high levels. Berkowitz contends that acts of aggression or violence are higher if those attempting to achieve the goal are thwarted by illegal or intentionally biased rules or procedures, or personally directed actions. In essence he was saying that persons will react more violently if they believe they have been treated unfairly. He goes on to say that these “aversive events frequently give rise to relatively high levels of aggression.” (71)

In applying this theory to current peacebuilding concepts, every effort to bring peace must be seen as fair and open, with fairness being in the eye of the beholder. Peacebuilders must also recognize that high levels of frustration can ensue when people’s
goals are blocked. This might be as simple as obtaining food for the family or finding a place to live or seeking a job. The continuous blocking of goals increases the frustration level, and based on the shared attitudes and behaviors of the society, violence is often a result. Peacebuilders must first understand the goals, which might be related to basic human needs, and then knock down the barriers allowing those goals (needs) to be met.

**Relative Deprivation Theory**

Ted Robert Gurr took frustration-aggression theory to another level when he developed relative deprivation theory. Based on his doctoral dissertation, Gurr wrote the Woodrow Wilson prize winning book, *Why Men Rebel* (1970). In this book Gurr tries to answer the question: are men inherently aggressive or aggressive in response to various situations? He begins his research by stating that in the last 160 years (tracing wars back from 1970), ten of the last thirteen most deadly conflicts were internal wars. This included rebellions, guerilla wars, civil wars, coups d’état, and riots (4) -- the very kinds of wars the international community is facing in the twenty-first century.

Gurr attempted to take frustration-aggression theory, a single factor theory at the individual level, to a higher level and explain political violence. He proposed that the “potential for collective violence is a function of the extent and intensity of shared discontents among members of society.” (8) The theory says essentially that men will respond violently if the difference between (relative deprivation) of what they have (value capabilities, $V_c$) and what they expect (value expectations, $V_e$) changes dramatically. In essence if people expect something, but do not really believe those expectations will be met; then they can accept that the expectation will not be met. On the
other hand, if people strongly expect something to happen and it does not happen, then the level of frustration will increase and often (through group mobilization) lead to collective violence. The key to the theory is the change between what people have ($V_c$) and what they expect ($V_e$). A constant difference is acceptable, but a growing difference is not acceptable. Gurr explains these in value capabilities ($V_c$) (what one has) and value expectations ($V_e$) (what one expects to have). For example, if expectations and capabilities remain the same, then there is no change in people’s perception of what they have and what they expect, therefore, a low deprivation is felt between $V_e$ and $V_c$. If their expectations rise yet what they have remain the same, then this change, over time, can lead to frustration and aggression. Likewise if people expect a certain standard of living and what they have declines, then again the change between expectations and capabilities become larger.

To put this theory in terms of peacebuilding efforts, often the presence of the international community (peacekeepers) raises local expectations. If those expectations are not met, then the likelihood of violence increases. If peacebuilders promise the local people electricity or a safer environment, and those expectations do not become a reality, then the people lose confidence in the peacebuilders. Loss of confidence could lead to violence. The lesson here is be careful what you promise. Do not raise expectations too quickly. Inversely, if a government fails or there is an economic collapse, people’s expectations remain constant while what they have declines. Again, the difference between expectations and capabilities is the key to this theory.
Stephen Brush examined Gurr’s relative deprivation (RD) theory from 1992 to 1993 and published his findings in the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* in 1996. Brush rejected Gurr’s premise that the RD causes collective violence. He cited lack of both empirical and non-empirical evidence. Fifteen years after Gurr’s book was published, the theory received comments in publications 649 times. Of those who commented on the theory, excluding those whose comments were marginal, 181 favored the theory and 192 were unfavorable. According to Brush, “[s]cientists from different disciplines displayed varying responses to the RD theory. Political scientists were initially enthusiastic but less so after 5 or 10 years. Sociologists gave it a rather hostile reception, but psychologists were much more favorable.” (539) The theory, however, found its way into numerous Conflict Resolution books (Conteh-Morgan, 2004; Cheldelin, Durckman and Fast, 2003; Jeong, 1999 and 2000; Sandole 2007, 2010).

The value of the theory is simply that those involved in peacebuilding activities should not promise too much. Be realistic. The theory has merit only in managing expectations, but may not be a direct cause to political violence. On the other hand capabilities and expectations can also be impacted by large events like economic decline, natural disasters and wars. In this case the peacebuilder must be attuned to the situation on the ground.

Peacebuilders must manage what they promise. The mere presence of international peacekeepers and peacebuilders will naturally raise expectations in a failed and failing state. It is the job of the leaders of the peacebuilding effort to be realistic as to what they expect to do, including a realistic timeline. Peacebuilding takes time. This was
the very point that Roland Paris (1997) was trying to make. Patience and controlling expectations are some of the keys to success in peacebuilding efforts.

**Social Identity Theory**

Every person has an identity. Americans, Saudis, and Thais all claim a national identity. Inside these countries are Southerners, Wahhabi, and phu noi. A person’s identity varies with the situation in which a person finds himself. In one situation a person calls himself an American, in another a New Englander, or other times a Bostonian. What is important, particularly to peacebuilders, is how that identity influences group behavior. According to Cheldelin, Druckman and Fast (2003, 138) “[e]thnicity, race, gender, religion, class, kinship, nationalism, caste: all are possible basis for total social identity. Each offers the opportunity for boundaries to be reified and enemies generated. Each may also hold within it possible resources to be used in the resolution of conflict.”

Several scholars and practitioners took the work of Freud and others on individuals and expanded it to an individual’s role in groups. Sumner (1906), Simmel (1955), Coser (1956), Tajfel and Turner (1981), and, Brewer (2001) worked to define an individual’s identity and how it affects groups of individuals. Horowitz (1995) and Eriksen (2001) translated group dynamics into understanding ethnic groups and conflict. Their work opened the door to understanding some of the large scale violence that has occurred in the past – the Nazi holocaust of the Jews, the extermination of the Armenians, the ethnic cleansing of Muslim Bosnians, the genocide in Rwanda, and more recently the Christians in the Sudan.
“Ethnocentrism,” coined by W. G. Sumner, a Yale professor and prominent American sociologist, was a belief that one’s own group is superior to other groups. “Each group nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt on outsiders.” (Sumner, 1906, 12-13) Lewis Coser (1956) believed that groups increase their sense of cohesion through conflict, as well as, develop negative feelings toward a common threat. (1956, 34)

Henri Tajfel undertook some fascinating work regarding identity and group behavior. In 1970, he published an article about his experiments in intergroup discrimination. Tajfel randomly assigned boys, ages 14 and 15, to groups. What he found was astonishing. Regardless of how he grouped the boys, the young men affiliated with the group they were assigned. He asked the boys to reward monetary payments for simple tasks. He found a very high statistical correlation of support for members of the same group and discrimination toward members of another group. Working with a colleague John C. Turner, Tajfel (1979) took these experiments and developed the social identity theory. The theory simply states that group members create an affinity toward “in group” members and discriminate against other groups or “out groups.” By associating with a group, a person takes on the identity of that group and accepts it as his/her own self-image. Others are seen as members of another identity and not as closely linked to the image of self. Consequently, there can be tension, but not necessarily conflict or violence.

Tajfel and Turner continued their research and analysis of group identities. Expanding their research to societies and social groups, individuals gain their identity
from the groups in which they belong. According to Tajfel and Turner (1986, 15-16), “[s]ocial categories are conceived here as cognitive tools that segment, classify, and order the social environment and thus enable the individual to undertake many forms of social action.” The social bonding that occurs in social groups strengthens attitudes toward the “in-group” as well as increases negativity toward “out-groups.”

Marilynn Brewer (2001) took the work of Tajfel and Turner and concluded that aggression may result as a protection mechanism or conflict over scarce resources. Since man is essentially a social animal, then understanding group dynamics can lead to a better understanding of conflict and lead to solutions toward resolution.

Samuel Huntington took a similar line on conflict and the competition for resources. Like Fukuyama, Huntington turned an article into a full book based on the overwhelming response to the article. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (1996) topped the New York Times best seller list and was placed on the professional reading list for U.S. Army officers, among others. Huntington’s premise is that the world is no longer dominated by states competing across the east-west divide, but more along fault lines between civilizations. He defines civilization as the “broadest cultural identity.” (43) “The Cold War division of humanity is over. The more fundamental divisions of humanity in terms of ethnicity, religions and civilizations remain and spawn new conflicts.” (67)

Although the book reads well and timing was good, in the wake of 9/11, and with violent ethnic conflict from the Middle East, Bosnia, Chechnya, Rwanda and Nepal making the headlines; Huntington’s ideas were not accepted well in the academic
scholarly circles. Kevin Avruch, a professor at George Mason’s School for Conflict Analysis would disagree with Huntington’s premise on culture. According to Avruch (1998, 17), “culture consists of derivatives of experience, more or less organized, learned or created by individuals of a population, including those images or encodements and their interpretations (meanings) transmitted from past generations.” Avruch would argue that the term civilization and culture used by Huntington were too broad and did not adequately reflect the main issues of culture – culture is socially constructed and no one population can be described by one culture. Culture varies like identities. Still, Huntington made some good points that the world has fault lines of ethnicity where competition for resources stems violence. These fault lines have existed through the millennia, but because of the collapse of the Cold War, the conflicts seem more prevalent. Likewise, a growing interest in human rights spawns more awareness of these violent conflicts.

**Ethnic Conflict**

In the early 1990s, some American military leaders began to see different kinds of wars facing the military. Lieutenant Colonel Dan Bolger, a young infantry officer, was one of the very first to see a different future for the United States Army. Writing immediately after the victory against Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War of 1991, Bolger (1991) saw that big wars with tanks and armored personnel carriers racing toward a distant objective were a thing of the past. The Army was prepared and ready for the conventional fight, and proved it by racing across the sands from Saudi Arabia to Iraq with the mission to rout the Iraqi Army out of Kuwait. This was done in 100 hours of
combat. Many, including the President of the United States, saw that the legacy of the failed American effort in Vietnam drift away like dust from tanks rolling across the desert. Dan Bolger saw it differently. Falling back on an old paradigm, Bolger said that the American military would be asked to fight in low, mid, and high intensity wars. The Army’s preference was for mid or high intensity wars, but the future would be low intensity work. (33) Bolger went on to say, “the country’s evident skills in conventional fighting can only encourage potential opponents to resort to those other, uncomfortable methods that so challenge American fighting forces.” (38)

Bolger would go on to write *Savage Peace: Americans at War in the 1990s* (1995), which portrayed the very low intensity challenges he articulated in 1991 in *Parameters* (the US Army War College publication). Somalia, Bosnia, Lebanon, and peacekeeping in the Sinai played a central role in this book. He concluded, “[o]perations other than war, [OOTW] [the old military term for stability operations] cannot be avoided or wished away. With millions of American citizens active in countries around the world and billions of U.S. dollars at work in every far corner, some idyllic retreat into the Fortress America is not even worth considering. The pace and scale of OOTW commitments may ebb and flow, but they will not end.” (380)

In November 2009, Major General Dan Bolger was commanding the United States Army’s First Cavalry Division with approximately 20,000 soldiers. The Division was about to complete its tour of duty in Iraq. The unit’s website of November 2009 portrays soldiers near the Iraqi town of Al Taji helping school children open a school, medical teams helping local Iraqis, and hosting of a visit from police out of Austin, Texas
to help the local Iraqi police. In earlier years, the First Cavalry Division was instrumental in controlling the sectarian and ethnic violence in Iraq. General Dan Bolger is living what he predicted almost two decades before, working in low intensity conflicts.

Dan Bolger was one of the first military officers that envisioned the many challenges the United States Army would face after the Cold War ended. Scholars at the United States Army War College took notice and began their analysis. In 1994, the Army War College published a few monographs about the changing nature of conflicts. The Commandant of the War College, Major General William A. Stofft (1994), co-authored a piece on “Ethnic Conflict: Implications for the Army of the Future.” That same year, the Strategic Studies Institute at the War College published a book entitled, *Ethnic Conflict and Regional Instability: Implications for US policy and Army Roles and Missions*. The book was a result of a series of conferences hosted by the United States Army and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. The introduction to the book was penned by the Army Chief of Staff, General Gordon Sullivan. According to Sullivan (1994), “[t]he world today is one in which we find culturally diverse groups in a wide variety of regions attempting to define new political relationships….In an age gone by, these sorts of conflicts may not have been noticed, nor would they necessarily have been of direct threats to the United States. However, that is no longer the case.” (3)

Understanding and analyzing ethnic conflict has grown in interest over the last few decades. That is why Huntington’s book is on the U.S. Army professional reading list. Donald Horowitz’s book on *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* is one of the most prominent books on the subject. “Ethnicity,” for Horowitz (1985, 52), “is based on a myth of
collective ancestry, which usually carries with it traits believed to be innate. Some notion of ascription, however diluted, and affinity deriving from it are inseparable from the concept of ethnicity.”

Ethnicity is an identity one cannot escape. Two groups of ethnicities in conflict do not mean violence is possible. Ethnicity is just another group of people, but the social identity theory again comes into play, that there is an affinity for in group members and possible discrimination toward out group members. Influential leaders can build on ethnicity to rally “their” group to a cause.

For those involved in peacebuilding, it is imperative to understand all the various theories and concepts surrounding ethnic conflict. Ethnic conflicts are at the forefront of active and potential violent conflict areas. The U.S. Army recognized the challenges of ethnic and religious conflict back in the mid-1990s and continues to operate in these types of conflict. Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines, the Horn of Africa and various parts of the Middle East have U.S. military personnel dealing with ethnic and religious problems.

**Protracted Social Conflict**

As the world moves into the second decade of the twenty-first century, the challenges are very similar to what Bolger, Stofft and Sullivan saw in the mid-1990s - a world of instability caused by ethnic and group conflict. The Sunnis, Shi’a and Kurds in Iraq, the competing tribes in Afghanistan, the warlords in Somalia, and the Christians and Muslims in Sudan all find strength and comfort in their groups.
Well before anyone saw that ethnic conflict might lead to national security challenges, one conflict scholar, Ed Azar starting writing and developing ideas about ethnic and religious conflicts. In the late 1970s while most international relations experts were still concerned with the Cold War and interstate conflict, Azar, a professor at the University of Maryland, looked to his homeland, Lebanon, and began to analyze intrastate conflicts. (Ramsbotham, 2005) Azar, after looking at Lebanon, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Northern Ireland and several other existing conflicts, developed his theory of protracted social conflict (1985). Azar further developed and vetted his theory. Drawing on human needs theory and social identity theory, Azar (1990) said “[p]rotracted social conflict originates when communal groups (defined by shared ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other cultural characteristics) are denied their distinct identity or collective development needs.” (viii) He went on to say that these protracted conflicts cannot be solved by normal military or balance of power ideas. Again drawing on the ideas of human needs theory, Azar postulated that “human needs for physical security, access to political and social institutions, and acceptance of communal identity is largely a result of social, political and economic interactions.” (1990, 10) The regulation of these interactions, according to Azar, are the responsibility of the state.

Azar was right. Religious and ethnic conflicts were not at the forefront of international relations and security concerns in the 1990s, but he predicted these types of conflicts would become an important part of international relations. He recognized that the state was the center of a complex network that provided for basic human needs which included a need for communal identity. States can deprive groups of their needs, as
articulated by Galtung, be the cause of structural violence. Thus, state systems have a
role in resolving ethnic and religious conflict. If the state is weak or biased in anyway, the
depprivation of needs could lead to violent conflict.

These are the very types of conflicts that have permeated the international scene
during the first decade of the twenty-first century and will continue to be the focus of
peacebuilding for the remainder of the century. Therefore, theories about identity, group
formation, and human needs help guide practitioners to solutions in protracted social
conflict – the very kind that Generals Sullivan and Bolger highlighted in the 1990s. If
peacebuilding is focused on rebuilding nations from the ashes of war and violent conflict,
then understanding these theories of the early pioneers in conflict resolution are critical.
CHAPTER 3

LITERATURE REVIEW ON PEACEBUILDING:

PRACTITIONERS’ VIEWS ON UNDERSTANDING THE BREED

*These entrenched conflicts [protracted social conflicts] provide the most severe challenge to those concerned with peace-building.*

Edward Azar, 1990, p. 17

The theories of conflict resolution provide a good starting point for practitioners of peacebuilding. Lessons from those who have walked the broken glass-filled road of peacebuilding provide even more valuable insight into what it takes to rebuild a nation from the ravages of war. Practitioners began to unravel the helical strands of DNA of the composition of a nation, and put some practical insights on the table as to how to rebuild a nation after war. No other organization in the world is more suited to peacebuilding than the United Nations, and more specifically the UN Secretaries General.

Several Secretaries General of the United Nations were committed to world peace and helping nations recover from war. A number of Americans also have extensive experience in peacebuilding, and their works are also reflected here. This chapter also looks into the efforts of the World Bank and the European Union. Both organizations have many experienced practitioners committed to peacebuilding or nation building.
Each provides a unique perspective. In the end, this chapter provides a consolidation of thoughts as to how to approach peacebuilding in a comprehensive model.

United Nations’ Secretaries General Pave a Path for Peacebuilding

*Boutros Boutros-Ghali – Agenda for Peace*

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the sixth Secretary General of the United Nations, came to the organization at a particularly difficult time for the UN. The Cold War was over and many believed that the UN could now do what it was designed to do. During Secretary General Boutros-Ghali’s tenure as Secretary General (1992-1996), some very hard lessons were learned. Peacekeeping began to expand, but the international community did not fully comprehend the role of the UN in a new era. During the first four months of his tenure, the Security Council authorized three of the largest and most complex peacekeeping missions ever fielded by the UN. In February 1992, peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Cambodia were launched and in April, the ill-fated first UN mission in Somalia was approved.

Because nations felt that the UN’s primary mission was the maintenance of international peace and security, that mission was hindered by the Cold War. When the Cold War ended, perhaps the UN could do what the drafters of the Charter envisioned. On January 31, 1992, the first United Nations Security Council meeting conducted with the heads of state asked the Secretary General to provide his “analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter and the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping” (Boutros-Ghali, 1995, p. 87).
5). President George H. W. Bush, in his comments during this historic meeting, said:
“[r]ight now, across the globe, the U.N. is working night and day in the cause of peace.
Never before in its four decades have the U.N.’s Blue Helmets and Blue Berets been so
engaged in the noble work of peacekeeping. . . . Democracy, human rights, rule of law –
these are the building blocks of peace and freedom. . . . Today we stand at another
crossroads. Perhaps the first time since that hopeful moment in San Francisco, we can
look to our charter as a living, breathing document” (George H. W. Bush, 1992).

Answering this request, in June 1992, the UN Secretary General, Boutros
Boutros-Ghali, laid out his Agenda for Peace. This historic document outlined changes
that needed to be made to enhance UN peacekeeping and peacemaking, but also went a
step further by fully addressing the concept of preventive diplomacy – how to prevent
states from failing rather than letting them fail and then reacting. He recognized that the
new world order brought about by the end of the Cold War would bring new challenges.
Boutros-Ghali pledged that the United Nations would do its part in preventing state
failure and avoiding hardships for innocent people. The Secretary General also
recognized the unique role of the United Nations in resolving some of the world’s most
intractable conflicts. He came to understand and support the ideas that regional
organizations, coalitions of the willing, and in some cases, individual nations with the
power to do so, can help failed or failing states. Boutros-Ghali went on to say that “[t]he
concept of peace is easy to grasp; that of international security is more complex” (1995,
p. 42).
In this 1992 report to the Security Council, the Secretary General introduced for the first time the term *post-conflict peace-building*. He saw then that peacekeeping and peacemaking cannot be successful unless efforts are made to find the root causes of the conflict within states. The peace agreements made by political leaders would not be enough. Peacebuilding efforts, the disarming of previously warring parties, restoration of order, repatriation of refugees, training of security personnel, monitoring elections, strengthening government institutions, and protection of human rights would also be required (Boutros-Ghali, 1995).

As *An Agenda for Peace* was being penned, the UN was challenged as it had never been before. The next three years (1992-1995), with UN peacekeepers deployed to Somalia, Bosnia, Cambodia, and Rwanda, the Secretary General began to rethink the concepts of peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding. Peacekeepers were authorized to use force to protect civilians – something that had not been done since the peacekeeping mission in the Congo in the early 1960s.

The UN mission in the Congo was an anomaly compared to most other UN peacekeeping missions from 1948 to 1987. During this period there were only 13 UN peacekeeping missions launched by the UN Security Council. Cold War rivalries inside the Council hindered the full employment of the concept of peacekeeping. Dr. Bo Huldt (1995, p. 101), who was an expert on early UN peacekeeping missions, said “[t]hese include small, diverse, low-level observer missions as well as classic peacekeeping operations involving a considerable number of troops.
Peacekeeping here implies the interposition of force between consenting parties to a dispute.” Essentially peacekeepers were deployed in relatively low numbers, to observe and report on the acceptance of the peace agreement between two consenting parties to the conflict. The number of peacekeepers deployed worldwide, with the exception of the three years of the UN mission in the Congo (1960-1963), rarely went above 10,000. Still in all missions, peacekeepers were not authorized to do anything beyond provide security.

In 1988, with the Cold War’s end in sight, the United Nations Security Council began authorizing peacekeeping missions with increased frequency. Not only were there more missions, but the size and scope of the missions began to change. By the end of 1992, Boutros-Ghali’s first year in office, the number of UN peacekeepers had grown four-fold with 4,219 peacekeepers deployed to Somalia, 10,400 in Bosnia, and 15,900 in Cambodia (United Nations, 1996).

These numbers continued to grow and by the end of December 1994, there were 63,504 peacekeepers in seventeen missions (UN Monthly Summary website). Unfortunately deployment of peacekeepers (soldiers) was not enough to achieve peaceful solutions in Bosnia and Somalia. Civil wars raged on amidst the peacekeepers. Hampered by changing and often confusing Security Council Resolutions and the basic premise that peacekeeping only works when there is consent for their presence among the warring factions, the missions failed to bring peace. For the most part, their mission was to relieve human suffering, not to rebuild the failed nation.

In 1994, another relatively small peacekeeping force was deployed to Rwanda. Their mission was to support a very fragile peace process and the Arusha Accord, but the
people were not ready for peace. In April, the Hutus lashed out against their Tutsi brethren and in 100 days 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus died, many hacked to death with machetes. The UN Security Council did not act to stop the bloodshed. The massacres received world attention, but what transpired in this genocide did not become understood until years later. Confidence within the international community that the UN members, especially the United States, could handle the challenges of managing failed states was shattered.

Peacekeepers, however, were only deployed to manage the security situation and provide limited humanitarian aid. Their mission was not to restore legitimacy to governments or to reestablish state functions. The damage, however, was done, the credibility of the UN was questioned, and other nations took a dim view of helping failed nations. Rebuilding nations was a dilemma that was simply too hard to solve.

These events caused the Secretary General to reevaluate his position on peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. In July 1995, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali completed his *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*. He recognized that there was a growing trend that conflicts were within states rather than between states.

Civilians were the main victims of these conflicts and state institutions were failing to protect the rights of individual citizens. When states fail, there is a breakdown of government institutions. Police and judiciary systems no longer function. The total collapse of law and order usually results in looting and indiscriminate killings. With this total collapse of state functions, interveners must respond well beyond the capabilities of the military peacekeepers. Humanitarian assistance, reconciliation, and restoration of
government functions, including law and order, are necessary. The Secretary General (Boutros-Ghali, 1995) concluded from UN experiences in Bosnia and Somalia that the United Nations peacekeepers might not be the best mechanism for rebuilding entire national structures and programs.

Although Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda were watershed events for United Nations peacekeeping, the lessons did not come to full light until years later.³ The immediate aftermath of the UN’s failure to restore peace in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda resulted in UN peacekeepers returning to their traditional role of monitoring and reporting on intrastate conflicts. NATO and an ad hoc organization, called the Office of the High Representative, took over state building activities in Bosnia, while Somalia was left to go without any help beyond a few brave NGOs that remained to help the civilians caught up in the civil war.

As for Rwanda, the Rwandan Patriotic Front, a Tutsi-dominated rebel army, struck into Rwanda from neighboring Uganda, and drove the Hutus from the country. For almost three years, over one million refugees took refuge in neighboring Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Cong) while the international community responded with aid only. America was not willing to intervene in the conflict, but was willing to provide aid to the people who fled the bloodshed. This clearly demonstrated America’s reluctance to become involved in nation building activities in a region of the world that was not a vital national security concern. The American lessons of Somalia loomed large. Particularly

³ Two reports of inquiry on the horrendous events of 1994 (Rwanda) and 1995 (Srebrenica) were not released until December 1999 and November 1999, respectively.
after the incident of “Blackhawk Down” occurred only months before the Rwanda genocide.

The Secretary General, however, reaffirmed his commitment to peacebuilding. He clearly saw that peacekeepers were not enough. If a nation failed, it took more than peacekeepers to bring sustainable peace. Military forces from nations around the world can establish the security necessary for peacebuilding to take hold.

Peacebuilding, as described by Secretary General Boutros-Ghali (1995), was a controversial and misunderstood term that did not gain much attention until years later. *Agenda for Peace* began the process of unraveling the double helical strands of nation building—politics and economic development. Between these two strands are the issues of security, governance, humanitarian assistance, infrastructure repair, and civil administration. Essentially, the Secretary General set the stage for the debate that would grow in importance.

*Kofi Annan – A Legacy of Peacebuilding*

Unfortunately, the perceived failures of the UN in the early 1990s cost Boutros Boutros-Ghali his job. He was not selected for a second five-year term as the head of this international body—a normal tenure in this office is two five-year terms. With U.S. backing, in January 1997, Kofi Annan, who at the time was the head of the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations, took over as Secretary General. Secretary General Annan immediately went to work restoring confidence in the United Nations.

For Secretary General Annan, the UN failures in Bosnia and Rwanda were significant and demanded introspection. Early in his tenure, he spearheaded two
comprehensive investigations on the massacres in both Rwanda and Srebrenica. The *Fall of Srebrenica* and the *Independent Inquiry into Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda* were issued in November and December of 1999, respectively. Both of these reports were candid, thorough, and replete with lessons for future peacekeeping missions.

Immediately following the release of these two reports, Secretary General Annan began a complete review of UN peacekeeping. He selected former Algerian Ambassador and Special Representative for the peacekeeping mission in Haiti, Lakhdar Brahimi, to spearhead the review. In August 2000, the report, commonly known as the Brahimi Report, was released under the careful scrutiny of Kofi Annan. As were the two inquiries on Rwanda and Srebrenica, the report was candid and far reaching. Ambassador Brahimi looked at every aspect of peacekeeping and peacebuilding and made some fifty-six recommendations for improving UN peacekeeping. The Brahimi Report (2000, p. 3) defined peacebuilding as:

> activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war. Thus, peace-building includes but is not limited to reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, strengthening the rule of law; improving respect for human rights through the monitoring, education and investigation of past and existing abuses; providing technical assistance for democratic development; and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques.

One of the recommendations in the Brahimi Report called for an Integrated Mission Task Force to plan and analyze future peacekeeping missions. Ambassador Brahimi recognized that in order to be effective, peacekeepers must also be
peacebuilders. The deployment of soldiers was not enough. Expertise from a variety of civilians was needed. Therefore, the report highlighted the integration of various UN agencies to participate in the planning for new peacekeeping missions. The UN departments that should be involved in integrated mission planning include: the Department of Political Affairs, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the High Commissioner for Refugees, the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, and the Department of Public Information (Brahimi Report, 35). Combining all these elements would help ensure a good start for the mission. Other recommendations, such as quality leaders as Special Representatives of the Secretary General, a doctrine for leaders and peacekeepers to follow, and clearer direction from the UN Security Council should set a course for better peacekeeping. It was clear from the overall tone of this report that peacekeepers were moving into the peacebuilding realm.

William Durch, who wrote several books on UN peacekeeping, remarked on peacebuilding in his 2006 book, “[n]early five years later [after the Brahimi Report], a study by the UN Department of Political Affairs concluded that ‘peacebuilding’ continued to lack a consensus definition both inside and outside the UN system” (Durch, 2006, 9). Thus, despite the unparalleled efforts of the Brahimi Report and Secretary General Kofi Annan, peacebuilding still needed better understanding among the actors who carry out these difficult missions.

The recommendations in the Brahimi Report took years to implement, and some of the recommendations were controversial. The report, however, had a major impact on
peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions deployed from the time of its release through the next decade.

As a tribute to the insight of Kofi Annan on peacekeeping reform, the United Nations General Assembly hosted a special thematic debate on the future of UN Peacekeeping on June 22, 2010 – ten years after the release of the Brahimi Report. Highlighted in this conference was the work of Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi and the committee that redefined UN peacekeeping. The President of the General Assembly, Dr. Ali Abdussalam Treki (2010), made the following comments: “The bulk of UN peacekeeping presence today is in integrated missions, mostly deployed in complex crises and conflicts often having military, political, humanitarian and other dimensions. To build and sustain peace in such complex and fragile situations, we require a broader, holistic strategy that synergizes the peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts to address the interlinked issues of security and development in a comprehensive manner.”

Secretary General Annan continued his quest to bring peacebuilding into focus for the United Nations. After working in the UN system for more than forty years, he knew that redefining the UN and making it more effective would require efforts on multiple fronts. The Brahimi Report was just the beginning of his efforts. The Brahimi Report was released one
Six months earlier Secretary General Annan released his historic, “We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the Twenty-First Century.” This report set the stage for the General Assembly’s Millennium Summit and made many of the recommendations endorsed by the largest-ever gathering of world leaders. His challenge to the world leaders succeeded. At the Millennium Summit 2000, the General Assembly released its report on the Millennium Goals. It was a future looking pledge to accomplish the following:

- By 2015, halve the number of people living on less than one dollar per day, the number of people who suffer from hunger and lack clean water;
- By 2015, improve education worldwide and provide primary schooling for all children;
- By 2015, reduce maternal mortality by three-quarters and under-five child mortality by two-thirds;
- By 2015, reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS; and
- By 2020, improve the lives of 100 million slum dwellers.

Surrounding the creation of the Millennium Goals were discussions on ending wars, strengthening the rule of law, improving development and poverty eradication, protecting the environment, improving respect for human rights and democratic good governance, and finally strengthening the United Nations (GA Resolution 55/2, 2000). Nothing was resolved on how the UN might respond to the next humanitarian catastrophe, but the debate had begun.
Secretary General Annan, having achieved great success in the Millennium Declaration (the GA Assembly Resolution that announced the Millennium Goals), did not look away from the challenge of intervening in failed and failing states. During both his 1999 and 2000 speeches before the General Assembly, he called on the nations of the world to look into humanitarian intervention and how the world should respond to situations like Rwanda and Srebrenica (ICISS, 2001, p. vii). The Canadian government responded by announcing at the Millennium Summit that they would sponsor an International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. The Commission brought together twelve distinguished statesmen and a research team of distinguished scholars and practitioners. The Commission was to complete their work in one year, so as to present their findings to the UN General Assembly in 2001. In drafting the report the Commission held eleven debates around the world with key practitioners and statesmen. The report, entitled *Responsibility to Protect* (R2P), was released on 30 September 2001 (ICISS, 2001).

According to the Commission, state sovereignty was a central issue in the report. State sovereignty stems from the Treaty of Westphalia and provides that all states are equal in rights regardless of wealth or size. It is the state’s responsibility to protect and support its citizens. Should a state be either unable or unwilling to protect its citizens, then the international community has an obligation to intervene militarily. That obligation will only come from authorization by the United Nations Security Council under Chapter VII and in the most extreme circumstances (ICISS, 2001).
As the report unfolded there were three major themes regarding the international community’s responsibility to protect civilians, the “Responsibility to Prevent,” the “Responsibility to React,” and the “Responsibility to Rebuild.” The Commission’s report strengthened and expanded some of the concepts outlined by Secretary General Boutros-Ghali in his *Agenda for Peace*. The section on the Responsibility to Rebuild addressed peacebuilding directly. Similarly to *Agenda for Peace* and the Brahimi Report, the Commission focused on post-conflict peacebuilding. When the international community conducts humanitarian intervention, an integrated strategy must be developed to manage post-conflict peacebuilding. Included in this strategy must be mechanisms to deal with security, justice, reconciliation, and development. Interveners should stay in the affected country long enough to “ensure sustainable reconstruction and rehabilitation.” The Commission also felt strongly that local ownership of the process was important, so interveners must work themselves out of a job (ICISS, 2001, 44-45).

Kofi Annan embraced the R2P concepts, and his effort at setting the stage for the Millennium Declaration earned him and the United Nations the Nobel Peace Prize in 2001. The Nobel Prize citation presented in Oslo on December 10, 2001, stated: “The end of the cold war has at last made it possible for the U.N. to perform more fully the part it was originally intended to play. Today the organization is at the forefront of efforts to achieve peace and security in the world, and of the international mobilization aimed at meeting the world’s economic, social and environmental challenges” (Nobel Prize website).
The tragic events of September 11, 2001 changed the course of world security discussions. Subsequent invasions of Afghanistan in late 2001 and then Iraq in 2003 remained the centerpiece of the debate on international security. These events took much of Kofi Annan’s time, but they did not deter his concern about the protection of civilians caught up in deadly conflict, especially after his closest practitioner in peacebuilding, Sérgio Vieira de Mello, was killed in a terrorist bombing in Baghdad in August 2003.

R2P provided him a forum to continue to protect civilians caught up in war. The eleven debates sponsored by the ICISS leading to the R2P demonstrated that a number of issues remained regarding state sovereignty. Overall, however, the concept of R2P remained intact: that states that do not protect their citizens may face international military intervention. The conditions on when and why to intervene remained a central issue in the debate.

In 2003, Secretary General Annan launched another high-level panel on “Threats, Challenges and Change” for the United Nations headed by the two-time prime minister of Thailand, Anand Panyarachun. The report, entitled “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,” was yet another attempt to focus the UN’s efforts toward the many intractable conflicts raging around the globe. The report, released in 2004, made some additional recommendations that stressed changing the attitude and climate of the United Nations system.

First, the report attempted to address the Millennium Goals, but then went on to look inside the UN system for better ways to strengthen the organization to meet the challenges of international peace and security. As it addressed internal conflict, the report
disclosed that “[s]ince the end of the cold war, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding in civil wars have become the operational face of the United Nations in international peace and security” (“A More Secure World,” 2004, 33).

The report endorsed the concept of preventive deployment first introduced by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in *Agenda for Peace*. This was a clear recognition that peacebuilding can work to prevent violence and avert war, not just efforts to rebuild on the far side of conflict, as the Brahimi Report referred to peacebuilding. Prevention was better than waiting for the conflict to kill thousands before intervention and then intervening.

Using the language of the Responsibility to Protect concept, the report stressed that nations have the responsibility to protect their own citizens, but failing that, the UN Security Council must be more willing to use Chapter VII of the Charter to deploy peacekeepers in an intervention role – something they have done inconsistently. The report defined the terms as to when the UN should intervene – “mass murder and rape, ethnic cleansing by forcible expulsion and terror, and deliberate starvation and exposure to disease” (“A More Secure World,” 2004, 65).

The report also endorsed the Brahimi Report and noted that the need for well-trained, experienced peacekeepers was exceeding the supply. With 60,000 peacekeepers deployed at the end of 2004 in sixteen different missions, there was a growing trend that UN peacekeeping was gaining in acceptance. The report criticized Western nations for not providing enough peacekeepers to meet what was expected to be a growing need (68-69).
There was an entire section on post-conflict peacebuilding. “Resources spent on implementation of peace agreements and peacebuilding are one of the best investments that can be made for conflict prevention – States that experience civil war face a high risk of recurrence” (70). It was clear that peacekeeping missions were expanding in scope and peacekeepers were gradually moving into peacebuilding tasks. Embedded in the report was a recommendation that the UN create a standing peacebuilding commission and initiate a peacebuilding fund to finance peacebuilding ventures (71).

Kofi Annan would not let up in his quest to improve not only the operations of the United Nations peacekeepers, but to improve the organization’s credibility as an international player in peacebuilding. “A More Secure World” highlighted that peacekeepers were becoming peacebuilders and the Secretary General continued his drive to advance peacebuilding efforts. Leading up to the second Millennium Summit in September 2005, Secretary Annan released yet another report, “In Larger Freedom: towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All.” According to the Secretary General, “I have named the present report, ‘In larger freedom’ to stress the enduring relevance of the Charter of the United Nations and to emphasize that its purposes must be advanced in the lives of individual men and women. The notion of larger freedom also encapsulated the idea that development, security and human rights go hand in hand” (“Larger Freedom,” 2005, 5).

The report clearly states that security, rule of law, human rights, governance, and economic development are all linked and one cannot separate one from the other when the time comes to rebuild a country or stem a country’s downward spiral into violent
conflict. The report describes this notion as it discusses the concepts of “Freedom from want,” “Freedom from fear,” and “Freedom to live in dignity.” The section on “Freedom from want” focused on the Millennium Goals and what was achieved five years after their announcement. Secretary General Annan stated that some progress had been achieved, but that increased development funding was necessary if the goals are to be achieved by 2015.

In “Freedom from fear,” the Secretary General addressed the issue of “Responsibility to Protect” directly. When he discussed the willingness of nations to use force to defend international peace and security, he stated, “In recent years, this issue has deeply divided Member States. They have disagreed about whether States have the right to use military force pre-emptively, to defend themselves against imminent threats; whether they have the right to use it preventively to defend themselves against latent or non-imminent threats; and whether they have the right – or perhaps the obligation – to use it protectively to rescue the citizens of other States from genocide or comparable crimes” (“Larger Freedom,” 2005, 33. He went on in the “Rule of Law” section to state, “I believe that we must embrace the responsibility to protect, and when necessary, we must act on it” (35).

Again the Secretary General addressed the issue of peacebuilding and emphasized that the United Nations must do all it can to help countries recover from war, as “roughly half of all countries that emerge from war lapse back into violence within five years”
(Larger Freedom, 31).\(^4\) He again recommended that the United Nations create a Peacebuilding Commission and a Peacebuilding Support Office to manage peacebuilding funds. He laid out the structure of the Peacebuilding Commission, similar to the one recommended in “A More Secure World,” and recommended that the international community initially donate $250 million to get the Peacebuilding Fund started.

When the General Assembly met in September 2005, the Secretary General again pressed forward with his efforts to avoid another genocide or ethnic cleansing. The 60th General Assembly passed its first resolution of the year on September 15, 2005 and supported both the Secretary General’s recommendation for a Peacebuilding Commission and a corresponding support fund. As for the Secretary General’s desire to approve the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), the General Assembly (GA Resolution 60/1, 2005) approved the following wording:

Para 138. Each individual State has the primary responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means.

Para 139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

\(^4\) This quote is repeated from Chapter 1, but readers must reflect on this important point made by the Secretary General if they are to fully embrace peacebuilding.
The Secretary General was winning his effort to incorporate the principal ideas of R2P. The wording of the GA Resolutions had a narrow focus and did not include the international community’s responsibility to help build capacity for those nations that cannot meet their responsibility to protect their citizens. For the next several years, the debate continued on the role of the international community to conduct peacebuilding activities and on whether to intervene in the security of individuals when a state fails to protect them.

Kofi Annan moved quickly, initiating the Peacebuilding Commission and complementary peacebuilding fund. In December 2005, the Security Council and then the General Assembly approved the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission and support fund. Both resolutions had identical wording as to the purpose of the Commission. “To bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery”; and “To focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development” (S/Res/1645, 2005); (GA/Res/60/180).

Secretary General Kofi Annan went to work establishing the Peacebuilding Commission, its complementary Peacebuilding Support Fund, and a Peacebuilding Support Office in the UN headquarters. In 2006, the first step in the process was to set up the Peacebuilding Commission, which followed the recommendations of the Secretary General in his “Larger Freedoms” report. The Peacebuilding Commission came together with
Seven members selected by the Security Council

Seven members selected by the Economic and Social Council

Five members who provided significant financial contributions to the fund

Five members who provide the largest number of peacekeepers

Seven members from the UN General Assembly

(UN Peacebuilding Support website)

Along with establishing the Commission, the Secretary General also solicited peacebuilding funds. His initial goal was to raise $250 million. The Fund exceeded that milestone in August 2007. According to the Secretary General’s report of August 2006, “the Fund will be used for carrying out critical peacebuilding related interventions to facilitate the implementation of peace agreements, strengthen a country’s capacities to promote peaceful resolution of conflicts and respond to threats that might lead to the recurrence of conflict” (A/60/984, 2). The United Nations would accept donations to the fund from member states, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector (A/60/984, 8).

The Terms of Reference for operating the Peacebuilding Commission and the complementary funds were initially established in August 2006, but then revised and reissued in April 2009. As of this writing there are two categories of funding, the Immediate Response Facility (IRF) and the Peacebuilding Recovery Facility (PRF). To receive funding for IRF funds, the Assistant Secretary General in the Peacebuilding Support office of the Secretary General can commit funds for short-term projects with a limitation of $3 million. To receive funding from the PRF, the country must be approved
by the Peacebuilding Commission and submit detailed plans on how it intends to use the money to respond to imminent threats to the peace process, strengthen national capacities, revitalize the economy, and establish essential services (UNDP, 2010).

Burundi and Sierra Leone were the first two countries placed on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission, and as of this writing, there are twelve countries on the agenda. (UNDP, 2012) Countries on the Commission’s agenda receive the bulk of the financial contributions under the Peacebuilding Recovery Fund. Funds are normally distributed to UN agencies and support a general overall plan submitted by the country in need. The overall goal of the fund is to prevent countries from slipping back into conflict and help them become a credible member of the international community.

Kofi Annan’s tenure as the UN Secretary General came to a close on 31 December 2006. His efforts to avoid another Srebrenica or Rwanda and move the UN toward peacebuilding were commendable, but not complete. The UN General Assembly only partially endorsed Responsibility to Protect. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon picked up where Secretary General Annan left off and continues to pursue two objectives: improve the credibility of the United Nations and never let another genocide, ethnic cleansing, or crime against humanity occur.

*Ban Ki-moon*

In 2009, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon followed in his predecessor’s footsteps and released his report on “Implementing Responsibility to Protect.” The Secretary General reminded the international community of the horrors of the twentieth century – “the Holocaust, the Killing Fields of Cambodia, the genocide in Rwanda and the mass
killing in Srebrenica” (A/63/677, 5) and demonstrated his support for the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty report on R2P. The issue of sovereignty and the responsibility of the international community to act continued to be a matter of debate. The report stated, “[p]art of the problem has been conceptual and doctrinal: how do we understand the issue and the policy alternatives. Two distinct approaches emerged during the final years of the twentieth century. Humanitarian interventions posed a false choice between two extremes: either standing by in the face of mounting civilian deaths or deploying coercive military force to protect the vulnerable and threatened populations. State sovereignty and when to act remained at the center of debate” (A/63/677, 6). The report stipulated that should a nation not have the capacity or the willingness to intervene in cases of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, or crimes against humanity, then it is the responsibility of the international community to take action. Therefore, in this report, he redefined paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 Millennium Summit into three pillars for R2P:

Pillar one – the protection responsibilities of the State

Pillar two – international assistance and capacity building

Pillar three – timely and decisive response (A/63/677)

Clearly pillars two and three focused on the international communities’ responsibility to build or rebuild fragile nations, whose capacity to prevent genocide, ethnic cleansing, or crimes against humanity is lacking. The Secretary General did say that international intervention should be a matter of last resort. However, peacebuilding remained a central element in R2P. With the Peacebuilding Commission and fund, the
UN began moving in the direction envisioned by Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and carried on by his successors, Kofi Annan and Ban Ki-moon.

Kofi Annan, in one of his many speeches closing out his tenure as the United Nations Secretary General, gave a speech at the Truman Presidential Museum and Library on December 11, 1996. He outlined four lessons he learned in his 44 years serving with the United Nations. He summarized them as follows: “[f]irst, we are all responsible for each other’s security. Second, we can and must give everyone the chance to benefit from global prosperity. Third, both security and prosperity depend on human rights and the rule of law. Fourth, states must be accountable to each other and to a broad range of non-state actors in their international conduct.”

Secretary Ban Ki-moon continued the work of his predecessor and, following the recommendations of the Brahimi Report, created a UN doctrine for peacekeeping (2008). The doctrine included the following definition of peacebuilding:

Peacebuilding involves the range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding is a complex, long-term process of creating the necessary condition for sustainable peace. It works by addressing the deep-rooted, structural causes of violent conflict in a comprehensive manner. Peacebuilding measures address core issues that effect (sic) the function of society and the State, and seek to enhance the capacity of the States to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions. (UN Peacekeeping Operations, 2008)\(^5\)

In addressing peacebuilding, the doctrine codified certain areas that needed attention in peacebuilding, but stipulated that each situation is unique. Included in the

\(^5\) This definition was covered in Chapter 1, but since this study is based on understanding the meaning of peacebuilding, it is repeated here.
integrated planning for peacekeeping, to which the UN doctrine devoted an entire chapter, should be efforts to restore security sector reform, strengthen the rule of law, support legitimate political process, and promote economic and social development.

Later in a Secretary General Report on “Peacebuilding in the Aftermath of Conflict” (2009), Ban Ki-moon laid out his thoughts on peacebuilding. He stated that, “[w]hile every post-conflict situation is unique, the United Nations has accumulated a broad range of experience, and we have learned many lessons from supporting dozens of countries emerging from conflict” (4). Drawing from the experience of the UN and many other practitioners in peacebuilding, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon stated that international actors must respond to the following priority activities: safety and security, political process, provision of basic services, restoration of government functions, and revitalization of economic stability. According to the report, these categories of action must be carefully analyzed and the right balance of priorities developed, all the while keeping the national actors and leaders involved in the process.

Secretary General Ban Ki-moon makes a number of recommendations in the report, but three stand out among the many. First, there is a need for an integrated strategy for post-conflict peacebuilding. All relevant actors must come together to assess the situation and create a strategic plan. Second, peacebuilding takes time and money. For this reason, the Secretary General highlighted his relationship with the World Bank and asked member states to support the Peacebuilding Fund. Last, the Secretary General focused on effective leadership. He pledged his effort to improve the selection of Special
Representatives of the Secretary General and strengthen the training of all UN personnel involved in peacebuilding.

**Other American Practitioners in Peacebuilding and Nation Building**

*John Paul Lederach – A Scholar-Practitioner*

One scholar and practitioner of conflict resolution, from Eastern Mennonite University and the University of Notre Dame, took up the debate and discussion on peacebuilding. Building on the works of several scholars from George Mason’s School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution and his work in Columbia, Somalia, the Philippines, Nicaragua, and Northern Ireland, John Paul Lederach wrote *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*.

Lederach’s book, published by the U.S. Institute of Peace in 1997, essentially reaffirmed Boutros-Ghali’s ideas that the post–Cold War world was replete with failing or failed states. These failures, according to Lederach, were often the result of ethnic tensions or identity issues. Pulling in concepts by conflict resolution experts Ed Azar and John Burton, Lederach (1997) described that many of the world’s problem states are the result of protracted social conflicts.

Lederach’s (1997) thesis, in the first of his several books on peacebuilding, was that the international community as a whole needed to come together with an integrated strategy for nation building activities. Government leaders, key politicians, and diplomats and other international organizations must join forces with mid-range managers and grassroots organizations to create an integrated approach to manage failed states. This means nations with their aid programs and military forces, international organizations,
nongovernmental organizations, and leaders in the conflict country from the national to the local level must work in harmony to achieve sustainable peace. This lofty goal did not sit well with the realpolitik of the world.

Lederach’s concept of an integrated strategy, however, has a lot of merit. Boutros-Ghali (1995) pointed out that if sustainable peace is to be achieved, nations must be helped by humanitarian programs; restoration of governing functions, including police and justice; disarming warring factions; reconciliation; and eventually elections. Both Lederach and Boutros-Ghali would agree that a process or plan is needed to transform a society from violent conflict to sustainable peace. Such an undertaking requires an integrated plan that allows a nation to transform from one stage to another. Additionally, this process takes time. With the multitude of actors involved in helping a nation recover from violent conflict, a plan keeps the process on track. For those who have orchestrated plans to achieve broad, complex goals, the process is dynamic. Once a plan is written, it needs to be continually reviewed and changed to meet ever-changing needs and situations.

Drawing from conflict resolution theories, Lederach added a dimension that most practitioners either ignore or accept as intuitively obvious. That is that the attitudes and behaviors of the people in the conflict zone must change. A key component in changing people’s attitudes is the process of reconciliation. Wars or violent conflicts within a nation are often extremely personal where civilians are affected more than the military or paramilitary forces. Accordingly, people become callous to the death and destruction and seek revenge. Only through reconciliation can true change take place in a peaceful way.
Behavioral change, however, is much more than reconciling one’s differences. It also includes acceptance of the peace process, the development of a national identity, and buying into new or reformed methods of governance.

Lederach, however, falls short in describing the process of planning for peace building. In neither his initial work nor subsequent works did he provide a good explanation of the process and how to approach peace or nation building on a grand scale—something practitioners can grasp. He devotes a lot of time to reconciliation, but only tangentially discusses the process of rebuilding infrastructure or governing functions. The strength of his work is that an integrated strategy or plan is required; practitioners of peacebuilding need training; and finally the huge task for transforming a society caught up in violent conflict may take one or two decades to change attitudes and behaviors. Lederach (1997, 84) concluded that “a process-structure for peacebuilding transforms a war-system characterized by deeply divided, hostile violent relationships into a peace-system characterized by just and interdependent relationships with the capacity to find non-violent mechanisms for expressing and handling conflict.”

During the late 1990s, the concept of peacebuilding was batted around in mostly academic circles. No nation was willing to take on protracted social conflicts and engage in sustained peacebuilding efforts. The lessons of Somalia and Bosnia were still in the forefront of political thinking. The conflict in Bosnia was struggling along through the Office of the High Representative, but the presence of a NATO peacekeeping force kept the violence in check. When the requirement to respond to the conflicts in Kosovo and East Timor surfaced in 1999, the fifteen nations on the United Nations Security Council
once again gave the nod to a UN-run organization to conduct peacebuilding efforts.

**RAND Studies on Nation Building**

One of the first studies on modern thoughts on nation building was released by the RAND Corporation. A team of analysts was led by former Ambassador James Dobbins, who was one of the most experienced diplomats in America on peacebuilding programs. The team conducted a thorough review of America’s role in nation building. Released within six months after work began on rebuilding Iraq, this book analyzed American postwar policies and programs in Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and finally Iraq. Many good lessons and themes emerged.

The analysis of each case study with the exception of Afghanistan and Iraq were quite extensive. Each case study followed a similar format. After reviewing the facts leading to the conflict and the initial solutions, the authors provided factual evidence that helped explain the various functions of nation building. In each case, the categories of security, humanitarian aid, civil administration, democratization, and reconstruction were reviewed in detail. This study provided insight into the challenges of future nation building activities, and clearly pointed out that many of these issues were not considered in the planning for Iraq.

The strength of the work was chapter 9, “Lessons Learned.” In this chapter the commonalities of the missions were compared and contrasted. It is clear from this chapter that the planning for the reconstruction of Germany following World War II was the standard to which future planners should strive. The RAND Study acknowledged that the Marshall Plan was instrumental in the recovery of Germany, but it also attributed success
in Germany to the early commitment of humanitarian assistance, financial loans, and the leadership and security provided by the military under the command of General Lucius Clay (Dobbins et al., 2003).

The facts outlined in the RAND study showed that both the United States and the international community were getting better at nation building toward the end of the century. For America, that trend was reversed when the Bush administration entered office in 2000. The entire administration was skeptical of the UN and reluctant to engage in nation building. This attitude had a significant impact on the planning and preparation for the tasks faced by the United States in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

As the RAND study conducted by James Dobbins (2003, 150) pointed out, the first key lesson was that nation building requires an extensive number of military personnel to create a stable and secure environment. Only by maintaining a secure environment can other programs function. When military units were committed they must remain in the conflict zone to allow for other programs to take hold. The process takes time, often more time than the U.S. military and the American people are willing to accept.

There was a clear relationship between the success of the nation building efforts and the length of time international military forces remained in the troubled region. Without security, all other efforts will be in vain. The RAND study (2003, 153) also demonstrated that the commitment of overwhelming military power (number and capability of military units) resulted in fewer casualties of both civilians and military personnel.
Another key lesson was the timing of local and national level elections. Local elections should precede national elections by many months, if not years. Local elections allow key national leaders to emerge. It also provides time to heal deep wounds among ethnic groups while providing time for reconciliation activities (Dobbins et al., 2003, 154).

One of the most important lessons focused on the financial requirements for reconstruction activities. By comparing each mission as a function of per capita financial assistance in 2001 U.S. dollars and as a percentage of per capita Gross Domestic Product, Germany clearly stood out as the most financially soluble with Japan a distant second. Modern-day nation building efforts had a much lower financial assistance rate (Dobbins et al., 2003, 156-59).

Dobbins’ RAND study (2003) concluded that the U.S.-led efforts in Germany and Japan stood out as the most successful missions. The authors asked the question, why? They recognized that both Germany and Japan were relatively homogeneous countries where ethnic or group rivalry did not impact on the struggle for power. Additionally, both Germany and Japan were industrial and well-educated nations before the war, so the quality and ability of the people enabled them to recover more quickly. The authors recognized that the conflicts faced by the international community in the last 13 years were different from post–World War II. Ethnic and religious divides add more complexity. They also went on to point out that, following World War II, the United States accounted for 50 percent of the world’s GDP, while in 1992, it amounted to only
22 percent. This demonstrated the challenge of getting the international community to contribute toward nation building efforts (Dobbins et al., 2003, 162).

“Successful nation-building [as this study illustrates], needs time and money” (Dobbins, 2003, 151). In conclusion, the RAND study pointed out that 25 times more money and 50 times more troops were provided to Kosovo than to post-conflict Afghanistan. Although the authors stated that none of these models answers all the questions, much has been learned in the last decade. Kosovo is the best example for modern-day conflicts. The burden sharing worked out by the UN, EU, OSCE, and NATO and many nations and nongovernmental organizations provided the best mix of talent and resources for nation building to be effective (Dobbins et al., 2003, 163).

**Center for Strategic and International Studies – Winning the Peace**

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) released another book on nation building in 2004. *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction* also used a case study approach to analyzing nation building. Much of the work on this book began in 2000 with a project orchestrated by the presidents of both organizations. John Hamre, the CEO of CSIS, and General Gordon Sullivan, President of AUSA, both felt that the U.S. efforts toward postwar reconstruction were “ineffective” (Orr, 2004, i).

In their foreword to the book, Hamre and Sullivan (vii) observe: “Failed states matter. Such states pose not only huge humanitarian challenges, but national security challenges as well.” According to Robert Orr, the editor and one of the primary authors, “[t]he United States is in the nation-building business. . . . The demands on the United
States to rebuild countries – for their good and our own – shows no sign of abating” (2004, x).

Besides a thorough case analysis on post-conflict strategies by the United States by a number of scholar/practitioners, Robert Orr laid out four pillars of post-conflict reconstruction. These pillars were security, governance, social and economic well-being, and justice and reconciliation.

Scott Feil, a retired U.S. Army colonel, outlined the pillar of security. Although all the pillars are linked, none of the pillars can succeed unless a relatively safe and secure environment can be achieved. In basic terms, security is defined as “protecting citizens from violence” (2004, 40). Key to achieving long-term security is the establishment of national security architecture. This might mean a military force to protect one’s national security interests and borders, and an effective system of law and order – police, judicial system, and penal system. Creating such a system takes time. Disarmament of warring factions and organizing and training of a military and police force are necessary to achieve long-term peace. The purpose of foreign soldiers and police as peacekeepers was to fill the security void in a failed state. With these security forces in place, international civil servants helped reestablish the states’ political, economic and other systems.

Again long-term programs were required in most cases to reestablish government functions. States fail because governing bodies can no longer provide for the needs of the people. Outside assistance in rewriting a constitution, forming political parties to
represent the people, and monitoring open and fair elections are necessary in establishing an effective form of government.

The CSIS study included the establishment of an effective form of civil administration for the new governing body. Some studies separate out civil administration from governance. Regardless of whether the civil administration is included in the political process of selecting or reaffirming national, provincial, and local leaders, some form of bureaucratic functions in civil administration are required for any government to function. Many who perform the duties of civil administration are not elected officials, but they play important functions in enforcing the rules and regulations on taxes, banking systems, licenses, medical programs, infrastructure management, and so forth.

Economic and social well-being was another important aspect of a functioning nation. Johanna Mendelson Forman, with experience in nongovernmental organizations, USAID, and the World Bank, penned an important chapter on “Social and Economic Well-Being.” To her, “states emerging from conflict are among the poorest countries in the world.” (2004, 72) She went on to point out that programs to help a failed state economically are the most difficult to achieve. Government structures must be created to provide the mechanisms for economic recovery. Through a legal regulatory system, governments can stimulate the basics of trade in the private sector, stimulate international trade, and effectively manage natural resources. To sustain this economic recovery, education, health, and basic services are the functions of state governments that are necessary (Forman, 2004).
The CSIS study, like other studies before it, recognized that rebuilding state structures requires an integrated strategy – a plan. Since history proved that no one nation was willing to assume responsibility for helping a failed state, then the only answer is to combine the efforts of regional organizations, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and other interested nations and parties. To be successful, an integrated plan is required to progress in an orderly fashion. Robert Orr (2004, 19) wrote: “[c]ooperation among international actors, while important, is not sufficient. Rather a strategic approach that ensures unity of effort is essential to success.”

Dennis Sandole in his book, *Peacebuilding: War and Conflict in the Modern World* (2010) agreed with the concepts espoused by CSIC’s study and the conclusions of Robert Orr. According to Sandole, solutions to state failure in this postmodern world will only be found by combining the efforts of the UN, regional organizations and NGOs. Sandole calls these problems (responding to state failure) “the complex interconnections among elements of the global problemique.” (171) Sandole goes on to say:

This is one of the “elephants in the room” of applied peacebuilding, as global problems and their complex interconnections and independencies tend not to be factored into the peacebuilding design and implementation, even though, paradoxically, they may be driving the situation that peacebuilding is meant to address. In order for peacebuilding to be more effective, therefore, the impact of the global problemique on any given developing, existential, or post-conflict situation must be recognized, analyzed and responded to in some fashion. (171)

The CSIS study helped form the discussion on nation building within the United States. (In Europe, however, this discussion was well underway.) In summary, the CSIS study identified key areas that need attention when a state fails. These areas are security,
governance, economic and social well-being, and justice and reconciliation. Other studies would define the various functions differently.

Both the CSIS and RAND studies pointed out that Kosovo should be considered as the best example of failed state management. In responding to the atrocities committed by the Serbian-dominated government in 1998, the international community responded first with diplomatic efforts to avoid violent conflict. After over a year of negotiations, Serb attacks on Albanians continued unabated. The Albanians, through the Kosovo Liberation Army, responded and the violence escalated. As a last resort, the international community used military force by NATO to drive the Serbs into a negotiated settlement. Finally, the United Nations was placed in charge of rebuilding the governing structures for the region.

*U.S. Institute of Peace – Quest for Viable Peace – Kosovo*

As the previous studies concluded, Kosovo was the best modern-day example of peacebuilding. Several international volunteers who served either in key positions on the UN team that went into Kosovo in 1999 or were members of the U.S. government planning the operation, came together under the sponsorship of the U.S. Institute of Peace and wrote a book on their experience – both successes and failures. *The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation* (Covey, Dziedzic and Hawley, 2005) is a practitioner’s answer to some of the difficult issues facing the international community in rebuilding nations.

According to the Covey, Dziedzic and Hawley (2005), there were four strategies (planning functions) that needed to be addressed by the international community. These
included planning for governance functions, security functions, justice and reconciliation, and social and economic well-being. In approaching a conflict like Kosovo, the authors strongly recommend diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict (Boutros-Ghali’s concept of preventive diplomacy) before resorting to the use of force. The Serb policies and actions resulted in the necessity of using NATO’s military force to bring the parties to the negotiating table. When President Milosevic finally agreed to the terms of the Rambouillet Agreement, NATO, the European Union, the Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the United Nations became involved in nation building.

The first and most important aspect of nation building was to defeat the militant extremists. This required the deployment of an international peace enforcement force. The second important task was to establish a functioning political process. In moving toward viable peace, the political process should lead to an effective government that meets the needs of the people. This included not only elected officials, but the civil administrators that manage electrical power, water, roads, and education and medical programs. Infrastructure that needed immediate attention was restored by the international community. The next task, and one of the more difficult, was to create a functioning system in rule of law – police and a judiciary system. Finally, the most important task was to stimulate an economy (Dziedzic and Hawley, 2005, 17).

Initially loans and grants were necessary from the international community to stimulate the economy and help rebuild damaged infrastructure. The European Union took responsibility for the economic revitalization while the Organization for Security and Cooperation of Europe (OSCE) took on the responsibility for political reform.
Fortunately for Kosovo, the international community responded with a large number of grants for humanitarian assistance. Millions of dollars were spent to provide tents, stoves, blankets, and food to get through the humanitarian crises. Infrastructure repair and long-term economic recovery were more difficult. “The task of assessing and funding essential repairs was left to international donors, which led to an uncoordinated and incomplete response” (Blair, 2005, 227). In essence, the European Union could have learned from the efforts of the Marshall Plan.

The U.S. Institute of Peace book concluded that security, rule of law, governance, and economic recovery are all important tasks that need to be accomplished simultaneously. On the cover of their book, each of these tasks is represented in the form of a gear. Each gear needs to turn in relation to the other. The analogy demonstrates that when one of these functions fails to function or turn, then the overall process of state rebuilding is in jeopardy or comes to a halt (see figure 3.2).

![Figure 3.2 Interdependent Strategies](From Quest for a Viable Peace)
RAND’s Additional Studies on Nation Building

Under the sponsorship of the RAND Corporation, Ambassador James Dobbins headed up another team to develop his third book on nation building. His first book, *America’s Role in Nation-Building*, was summarized earlier. In 2005, Dobbins led another team to analyze the role of the United Nations in nation building. After analyzing over sixteen cases of nation building, in 2007 RAND published *The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building* (listed as Rand 2 in Table 3.1). Dobbins recognized that nation building efforts are complex and demand multi-year engagement. By selecting the title as a “Beginner’s Guide,” Dobbins’s intent was to provide a doctrinal guide to those who aspire to undertake nation building efforts. He recognized that nation building or peacebuilding was growing in importance as a tool to help nations recover from violent and often ethnic conflict.

Dobbins and his team took a different approach in this book. Rather than using a case study approach, the team analyzed the various aspects of nation building – security, humanitarian assistance, governance, economic stabilization, democratization, and development. Drawing on research from a number of sources, Dobbins judged “international military intervention to be the most cost-effective means of promoting sustained peace and economic growth in societies emerging from conflict” (vii).

Dobbins also acknowledged the valuable impact of using military peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations to set the conditions for security while a wide array of civilians did the work of establishing sustainable peace. Security is the sine qua non of nation building, and the military is the only organization to provide this important
function. In his book, Dobbins noted that the United Nations, given its many years of peacekeeping experience, is the best organization in the international system for pursuing the task of nation building (peacebuilding) (7-9).

The book took a slightly different look at the various aspects of nation building. Two new categories emerged, democratization and development. Democratization, according to Dobbins, is different from governance. “Societies emerging from conflict may be able to wait for democracy, but it needs a government immediately if there is to be any law enforcement, education, or public health” (135). His category of governance was essentially the same as other studies that recommended the creation of a civil administration.

When addressing democratization, Dobbins believes that the establishment of a local representative government takes time and is of lesser importance than the bureaucratic functions (civil administration) of a state. The international community, properly organized, can help provide the functions of governance while democratization is the process by which local people are elected to office to represent the needs of all people, regardless of race, ethnicity, or religion.

Dobbins and his team did not outline a vision for democratization. “Democracies come in many shapes and sizes” (xxxiv). The decision as to what form of government to adopt is up to the people. They might prefer a structure that is familiar rather than an imposed replication of some other system. However, Dobbins did promote democracy, and his approach reflects the notions of Hobbes, Locke, and Kant.
As for development, the RAND team resorts to the more common approach to
development – money devoted to rebuilding infrastructure and programs that can achieve
sustainable peace. RAND’s (2007) research concluded that nations recovering from
violent conflict can absorb assistance at the rate of 40 to 70 percent of the country’s
annual Gross National Product (xxxv).

The book devotes an entire chapter to the role of the military in nation building.
According to Dobbins (2007, 19), “[i]nternational military forces can separate contending
parties, disarm and demobilize former combatants, substitute for or supplement local
police, secure borders, deter external interference and reform or create new and
indigenous military forces. Their primary objective should be to establish a secure
environment.” However, beyond the primary security role, Dobbins and his team
recognized that the military not only provides a secure space for aid agencies from
various countries and organizations, but at times must also assist with humanitarian aid,
restoration of infrastructure, and governance. Military forces, according to the RAND
study, must be able to perform the following missions that are not regularly associated
with offensive and defensive combat operations: law enforcement; disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration; assistance in elections; rebuilding infrastructure; and
other civic action programs (26).

One of the most important aspects of the RAND study was a framework on the
number of international military forces needed to conduct peacebuilding activities. In
stable countries, the team stated that a secure environment can be provided by one or less
soldier per one thousand inhabitants. In failing or failed countries that number can grow
to ten or more soldiers per one thousand inhabitants. It is clear that correlating the number of soldiers per historical example to the success rate of that operation, the larger number of international soldiers deployed the better chance of success in the peacebuilding mission. Post–WWII Germany had over 100 soldiers per thousand, while Kosovo had 20 per thousand – both at the peak of deployments. Afghanistan in 2004 had a mere one per thousand. Based on the RAND team’s calculations, Afghanistan with a population of 24.4 million people would need an international military force of 488,000 troops to reach the same level of effort as Kosovo. However, as local security forces become trained, the number of international security forces can be reduced. For example, at the time that General McChrystal made his recommendation in August 2009 to the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the U.S. President for an additional 40,000 troops for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, there were almost 90,000 Afghan National Army forces and 92,000 Afghan National Police (McCaffrey, 2009). The President’s decision to send an additional 30,000 troops would increase U.S. troop strength to 98,000. Combining all these figures with the 35,000 NATO troops in Afghanistan, the total is 315,000 troops, which equates to almost 13 troops per one thousand inhabitants.

These kinds of figures, however, can only be a guide. Other factors must come into play, such as the quality of troops and the decision by national leaders to allow or not allow their troops to use force. The overriding issue is the status of the security situation. Afghanistan in 2004 was much less violent than it was in the fall of 2009. Other factors such as air power, intelligence collection capabilities, and the size of the area for logistics
purposes all play into the determination on the size of the force. A rough estimate of the situation in Afghanistan leading up to the year 2010 and the full increase of an additional 30,000 U.S. forces, Afghanistan would be only marginally successful based on the RAND estimates.

The remainder of the book focuses on best practices for nation building in each of the categories – police, rule of law, humanitarian relief, governance, economic stabilization, democratization, and development. The real strength of the work, however, is in the chapter on “Preparing for Nation-Building.” The chapter discusses transitioning from a one-nation-led peace enforcement force to a UN or regional organization–led peacekeeping force. The study recommends that a wide variety of organizations become involved in the nation building effort. Centermost is the United Nations with all of its associated organizations. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund play a key role, as do interested nations and regional organizations. As an end state, the RAND study is reasonable. “Nation-building missions are not launched to make poor countries prosperous, but rather to make warring ones peaceful.” (13)

**The World Bank on Peacebuilding**

The World Bank was early, compared to most international organizations, to recognize the need for rebuilding nations after the devastation of war. In fact, the World Bank’s charter stems from its role in rebuilding Europe after World War II. The very first paragraph of the *Articles of Agreement* for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank’s proper name), states its primary purpose: “to assist in the reconstruction and development of territories of members by facilitating the
investment of capital for productive purposes, including the restoration of economies
destroyed or disrupted by war.”

U.S. Ambassador Henry Owens (1994), who consults for the World Bank,
attributed the Bretton Woods Institutions (of which the World Bank is one) to the
stabilization of the world economy after World War II. Since its inception, the World
Bank has expanded its role and capabilities to meet the needs of its clients, nation-states.
The World Bank recognized that internal civil wars were having a greater impact on
failing nations than wars between states. According to the World Bank’s website,
shift took place in terms of the Bank’s support for poverty-reduction programs.” In 1998,
Steven Holtzman, Ann Elwan, and Colin Scott wrote a study for the World Bank on post-
conflict reconstruction. The purpose of the study was to redouble the World Bank’s
efforts toward helping nations recover from war. Recognizing that nations recovering
from violent internal conflict have needs beyond which any one nation can provide, and
the expanding role of the United Nations, this report addressed mechanisms by which the
World Bank could help in post-conflict reconstruction.

Holtzman et al. concluded that any response to post-conflict peacebuilding would
fall into four broad areas: political-diplomatic, security, emergency relief, and
reconstruction and development. The authors acknowledged that the United Nations
would play a huge role in the political, emergency relief, and security aspects of
peacebuilding. It also recognized that developed countries, other regional organizations,
and nongovernmental organizations also can play a role. The World Bank’s most useful
role would be in the reconstruction and development area. In 1997, the World Bank created a Post-Conflict Unit to take a proactive role in determining when and how the World Bank can assist in emergency reconstruction and long-term development (Holtzman, Elwan, and Scott, 53).

Since the late 1990s, the World Bank has made a number of adjustments in its organization and policies to help countries emerging from violent conflict. Two trust funds were established, the Post-Conflict Fund and the Low-Income Countries Under Stress fund. According to a World Bank Board paper, “the two funds finance projects that promote economic and social recovery, governance, civil society participation, and human security.” The total funding to nations coming out of conflict from fiscal year 1998 to 2008 was $100.4 million (2008, 3).

On October 24, 2008, the United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and the World Bank President, Robert Zoellick, formally entered into a “Partnership Framework for Crisis and Post-Crisis Situations,” where each of the organizations will work more closely together in finding ways of preventing violent conflict and helping nations recover from violent conflict. The framework outlines where the two organizations can integrate their efforts on conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction.

According to the World Bank’s 2009 Annual Report, the World Bank is very committed to helping nations and people recover from conflict. In total, during 2009, the World Bank, through its Peace-building Fund provided grants for approved projects in Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire, Georgia, Colombia, Guinea Bissau, and Thailand totaling $26.9 million.
European Ideas on Peacebuilding

Having already discussed the role of the United Nations in peacebuilding, no region of the world has done more to support and contribute to the UN’s efforts in peacebuilding than Europe. The European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the North Atlantic Council have all embraced and supported peacebuilding efforts around the globe with most work taking place in Eastern Europe and Africa. Most countries in Europe support the UN’s new Peacebuilding Commission and four of the top five financial contributors are European (UNDP, 2012).

Over the last decade, Europeans have not only contributed monetarily to support peacebuilding efforts, but have provided institutional support to peacebuilding missions in the Balkans, Africa, and Eastern Europe. The EU and OSCE’s commitment to peacebuilding in the Balkans (Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia) stands out as a highlight of the organizations’ work. European countries routinely provided military and civil police peacekeepers to UN missions as well as well-trained and dedicated civilians. Hugh Miall (2007, 31), from the University of Kent, who has authored 13 books and numerous articles on conflict resolution, said “for EU countries, the UN symbolizes multilateralism, legitimacy, and the aspiration for rule-bound international society.” Miall goes on in his article to support the creation of the UN’s Peacebuilding Commission.

Miall recognizes the challenges facing the UN in undertaking peacebuilding efforts. He sees peacebuilding “challenges as fourfold: demilitarizing the conflict and providing a basis for security, steering a course for political transition, reestablishing a
functioning economy and healing the social wounds of war by dealing with the perpetrators, and compensating victims and rebuilding broken relationships” (34).

Miall’s ideas on the framework of peacebuilding, however, do not coincide with some of the European organizations working on peacebuilding. The most comprehensive work on peacebuilding was conducted by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). According to the organization’s history, it evolved from the work of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation, which was created to administer the funds of the Marshall Plan. In 1961, OECD reorganized and changed its name. Its mission is to support sustainable economic growth, boost employment, raise living standards, maintain financial stability, assist other countries’ economic development, and contribute to growth in world trade. Overall its thirty member countries are committed to promoting democracy and a market economy (OECD website).

In 1995, OECD began to redirect its efforts toward helping other nations recover from conflict and achieve some form of sustainable peace. Like other organizations in the late 1990s, OECD recognized that violence within states was causing more concern than conflict between states, and the victims of intrastate wars were mostly civilians. Thus, peacebuilding became a centerpiece of the organization’s work. The Development Assistance Committee of the OECD published its first study of peacebuilding in 1996. The document, Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation, redirected the OECD toward helping other nations prevent deadly conflict and recover from the horrors of war.
The subsequent study by OECD (1997), *DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation*, was a scholarly analysis of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The study drew heavily on the ideas from Johan Galtung’s lifetime work and Boutros-Ghali’s *Agenda for Peace*. In fact, this study reads like a textbook on conflict analysis and resolution. A high priority for the international community, in their view, was early identification of states in conflict and programs for conflict prevention. The study recognized the valuable contribution that the United Nations, regional organizations, and NGOs can make to helping nations recover from violent conflict.

According to the study, “[p]eacebuilding involves both long-term preventive measures and more immediate responses before, during, and after conflict” (37).

When states do fail, the 1997 OECD study focused on “priority areas of support.” These include: restoring internal security and rule of law, legitimizing state institutions, fostering the re-emergence of civil society, improving food security and social services, and building administrative capacity. The ideas from OECD continued to be refined over the next several years.

In 1999, the development ministers of Germany, Norway, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, all of which are members of OECD, met at the Utstein Abbey in Norway to study ideas on peacebuilding. The presenters at the conference were influential groups of practitioners, mostly from OECD countries. The committee evaluated 336 peacebuilding projects and conducted a survey on peacebuilding. Additionally, each of the four governments presented their own ideas on peacebuilding.
Dan Smith in 2004 compiled all the results in a study entitled, “Toward a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together” or more commonly known as the “Joint Utstein Study on Peacebuilding.” The study attributed the ideas of peacebuilding to UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace and further refinement by the Brahimi Report and the Security Council President’s statement on peacebuilding in 2001. The conclusion rejected the notion by Boutros-Ghali that peacebuilding be conducted in post-conflict settings. Instead, Utstein Study accepted a new view on peacebuilding as prescribed by the UN Security Council in 2001.

“Peacebuilding activities are designed to contribute to the ending or avoiding armed conflict and may be carried out during armed conflict, in its wake, or as an attempt to prevent an anticipated armed conflict from starting” (Smith, 2004, 20). Smith concluded that the Utstein Group gathered peacebuilding activities into four categories: to provide security, to establish the socioeconomic foundations of long-term peace, to establish political frameworks, and to generate reconciliation.

After reviewing the reports from the four countries and analyzing over 300 peacebuilding projects, Smith concluded that there was a glaring shortcoming in these peacebuilding activities. According to Smith, the “strategic deficient” in peacebuilding activities was that they were not connected to an overall strategic plan for the affected country. Afghanistan, according to Smith, was considered the prime example of lack of any strategic connections. All four countries that submitted reports to the Utstein Study came to similar conclusions.
Strategic planning is a critical piece of peacebuilding. Smith stated that often the ideas of peacebuilding were in the minds of desk officers, officials on the ground, and lead NGOs and IGOs, but rarely written down. The Utstein study stressed the importance of a formal framework for peacebuilding. The 1997 OECD study laid out a strategic framework, so Smith recommended that countries, regional organizations, and international organizations work together to create and follow a strategic framework. Ms. Hilde F. Johnson, Minister of International Development for Norway, in her keynote speech to the Utstein Group in 2003 said, “I suggest that we extract the most important elements from the UN and OECD documents and create a strategic framework which can structure our thinking as well as our operations. Peace-building interventions must be comprehensive, coherent and co-ordinated, but we need to simplify and clarify in order to arrive at a framework which is helpful in practical situations.”

OECD continued its analysis and expression of ideas on peacebuilding. The Utstein report was accepted as a good starting point and they heeded the recommendations of the report on creating a strategic framework. The Development Assistance Committee of the OECD came together in 2007, and developed the “Principles of Good International Engagement.” These principles recognize that states emerging from bad governance, extreme humanitarian crises, or violence and civil wars must have programs that do no harm, focus on state-building, and require practical coordination among international actors. They also recognize that the international community can only help fragile and failing states, but the solution must come from within – their own leadership and people.
Two reports from OECD in 2008 provide a good overview of peacebuilding and how to develop a strategic framework for planning, undertaking, and evaluating peacebuilding. The OECD report, “Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations,” is particularly useful. The report begins with a discussion that state building and nation building are not synonymous. Nation building activities do more than just rebuild state systems, but also forge a national identity. OECD policies focus on state building with nation building being the responsibility of local leaders. The report goes on to describe a “social contract” between the people and the State. The social contract is described as a method for states to meet the expectations of the people. States provide services, such as security, education, healthcare, and economic policies, while the citizens are expected to pay taxes and accept the state’s monopoly on the use of force. The report concludes, “[a] stable State must effectively deliver services that match a citizen’s expectation; equally important, however, it must be able to manage changes in those expectations and changes that arise either from an increase or decrease in resources” (OECD, 2008a, 22). This concept is eerily similar to the discussion earlier on Ted Robert Gurr’s relative deprivation theory.

In analyzing this OECD report (2008a), it seems clear that the OECD was changing its approach to the model of a liberal democracy for fragile and failing states that seemed prevalent in earlier reports. Nowhere in the report does it promote a democracy. The broader definition of governance is described by the 2008 OECD report as “the exercise of political, economic, and administrative authority to manage a nation’s affairs. It is the complex mechanisms, processes, relationships and institutions through
which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their rights and obligations and mediate their differences” (OECD, 2008a, 35). The report recognizes that a State’s governing structure comes in many forms, to include authoritarian, semi authoritarian and democratic. Drawing from Francis Fukuyama’s book on *State-Building: Governance and the World Order in the 21st Century* (2004), the OECD concludes that “countries need to create their own institutions through processes of contestation and deal making between the State and society. Such processes can take decades” (OECD, 2008a, 36).

Europeans, by and large, have determined that democracy might not be, in Fukuyama’s view, the final form of government. *International Peacekeeping*, a journal aimed at sharing ideas about peacekeeping, devoted a special issue to peacebuilding in November 2009. Several authors in this special edition argue that liberal democracy as a model for helping nations recover from violent conflict is flawed. Lidén (2009), a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Oslo, argues that, through the 1990s the model for peacebuilding efforts in governance was a liberal democracy, or as he calls it, a “liberal peacebuilding.” He argues that a liberal peacebuilding may not be the best model and calls for a “social peacebuilding,” where governments are culturally adapted to the people in turmoil, the resources available to them, and their history. Eriksen (2009), a researcher at the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, argues that a liberal democracy was not the preferable model for peacebuilding in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Phillip Darby (2009), a Professor of Conflict Studies in Melbourne, argues that liberal peacebuilding and international peacekeeping are “cast in the mold of colonialism.” He recommends that the international community, particularly Northern
and Western policy makers, cast off the past colonial ideas and open their ideas to new forms of government that springs from the people. Lidén, along with Roger MacGinty and Oliver Richmond (both from the University of St. Andrews), provides an introduction to the special issue of *International Peacekeeping* (2009). They recognize a growing number of scholars, particularly European, that question the centrality of liberal peacebuilding. Their conclusion is that liberal state-building has been the flawed model used in Afghanistan, Iraq, East Timor, and Kosovo. According to these authors, the credibility of the international system has been weakened, particularly when liberal state building is the centerpiece of peacebuilding in the Third World.

The OECD’s 2008 report *Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities* provides some insight toward developing a strategic framework. Figure 3.3 articulates the OECD thinking. This model, now called the Utstein palette, came from the work of the Utstein countries and the conclusions provided by Dan Smith (2004), discussed earlier. The model provides a starting point in developing a comprehensive strategy. The report, however, acknowledges that no two peacebuilding efforts are the same, so there is no blueprint that works in every situation. The report is not intended to be a planning tool, but a tool for evaluating the planning. The best OECD planning guidance is provided in their 1997 DAC Guidelines. Initially, coordination is required the various international actors to agree on shared objectives. To achieve these objectives requires a detailed situational analysis, a risk assessment, a determination of the goals, and then a definition for success (OECD, 1997). Overall, the OECD documents do not provide a policy maker or program coordinator a good approach toward creating a
strategic framework. The focus of this report is to provide some advice on how to evaluate peacebuilding, an important part of the overall process.

Norway’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, took the issue of a strategic framework head on. In August 2004, the Ministry published its “Strategic Framework – Peacebuilding – A Development Perspective.” In the foreword to the document, the Minister of Foreign Affairs states that, “Norway will use this strategic framework to implement its policy in countries, regions, and organizations, and will promote good donor practices” (3). The document goes on to promote the Utstein palette (figure 3.3) as the model in terms of which Norway will design its future peacebuilding efforts. As for governance, Norway promotes democracy in its efforts to help failed and failing states.

**Conclusions from Literature Review**

In comparing the various studies on how to respond to state failure, there appear to be some common themes emerging. The first and most glaring similarity is that each
study or work recommended an integrated strategy toward responding to state failure. Helping another state generally will not be the work of one organization or nation, but the work of many different organizations. It is clear that in the future, the United Nations, regional organizations, individual nations, and a whole host of nongovernmental organizations will be involved in nation building activities. Typically each comes to the aid of a failing nation for its own reason, and often not synchronized with the overall effort.

The message is clear, however, that an integrated strategy must be created when wading into the dynamic and often difficult context of rebuilding a failed state. Anyone who has tried to create a unity of effort to achieve any goal within the international community understands how difficult such a task can be. Compromise is often required to achieve a consensus on a given approach. When it comes to providing financial assistance to failed states, there are often strings attached. Such is the reality of the real political arena – realpolitik -- if you will.

Many of the studies conducted in the United States point to the fact that the United States needs to get its own house in order before engaging with other nations or taking on tasks such as rebuilding Afghanistan or Iraq. Interagency disagreements within U.S. governmental departments are common. Efforts have been made in recent years to reduce the squabbling, but when real resources, like federal monies, are at stake, the disagreements can lead to the lack of an integrated national strategy. Because of America’s form of government, Congress has a lot say as to how taxpayers’ monies are spent. In the last decade, at least, bipartisan attitudes tend to impact on support for
governmental programs, especially when the sum of financial commitment to countries places like Iraq reaches 10 figures.

Table 3.1 summarizes the functional categories of response to state failure that need to be addressed. Two functions stand out because of their frequency of occurrence. These functions are security and economic recovery. Security can be provided by the presence of international military forces for one to five years. Long-term security programs can be created while international military forces are present. Almost every case study discusses the security dimension of peace building, and the creation of functioning security forces, such as police, fire, and national militaries.

Economic recovery, however, is much more complicated and, as described in several of the studies, is often disjointed and ineffective. The international community can be proud of its responses to humanitarian crises. When large numbers of people are suffering because of either natural or man-made disasters, the international community often responds with supplies, equipment, and money. In 2005, the responses to the Tsunami and earthquakes in Pakistan were impressive by the amount of international aid and assistance provided on short notice. However, once the humanitarian crisis is averted, then the donor nations and organizations are not so ready to continue long-term development programs. The next humanitarian crisis may be just around the corner, and monies set aside for these eventualities are not limitless.

Many of the categories identified by the various studies are similar or grouped in a different manner. For example, rule of law can encompass the justice programs, human rights, and the reconciliation process. Some studies separate the political or governmental
process from civil administration. Others separate them because establishing or refurbishing the political process takes time, while civil servants can get to work immediately providing for the needs of the people. Take Iraq, for example. The Iraqi ministries began functioning right away, while the political process of selecting an interim governing body, writing a new constitution, and electing officials took over three years.

Reconstruction is another process that is defined differently by the various studies. Some understand that after violent conflict, reconstruction of roads, schools, medical clinics, power plants, housing, and water are part of civil administration. These
are the services that states provide its citizens. However, falling back on the discussion of basic human needs, these functions need to be restored quickly – sometimes before the civil administration is functioning. When engaging in nation building, the international community must reconstruct the dilapidated or destroyed services. Otherwise, people in the conflict zone will continue to suffer and conflict entrepreneurs may succeed in mobilizing the parties to resurrect the violent conflict.
CHAPTER 4

U.S. PROGRAMS AND POLICIES

PREPARING THE MIDWIFE

*Warfighting has two important dimensions: winning wars and winning the peace.*
*Brent Scowcroft and Samuel Berger*

The quote above came from two former U.S. National Security Advisors, who penned an article in the fall of 2005 entitled: “In the Wake of War: Getting Serious about Nation-Building.” This was about the time the U.S. government woke up to the reality that helping nations recover from violent conflict or preventing them from spiraling into conflict was important for national security.

The current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Army General Martin Dempsey, admitted that his views have changed: “April 2004 in Iraq is when the lightbulb really went off for me” (Kitfield, 2009, 1). At the time, Major General Dempsey was the commander of the 1st Armored Division and was in charge of winning the peace in Baghdad, Iraq. He was still concerned about winning the war as sectarian violence and attacks by al Qaeda were spinning out of control, but he also was concerned with winning the peace – which was in the minds of the Iraqi people. How were they fed, were they getting enough water and electricity, how effective were their medical facilities, and was the trash being collected? These questions and a host of similar issues became the
concern for this unit of 40,000 troops. The same issues arose in Colonel Gian Gentile’s unit serving in Tikrit, Iraq. In an article in *World Affairs*, Colonel Gentile wrote, “in mid-2003, my unit was already executing counter insurgency operations, rebuilding the area’s economic infrastructure, restoring essential services, and establishing governance projects” (2008, 58).

These two commanders demonstrated that the U.S. Army is a learning organization, but the operation in Iraq did not start off on a winning-the-peace footing. The war in Iraq was an eye-opening experience that changed the American mindset about nation-building. There was very thorough planning to defeat one of the largest armies in the world, but scant planning on rebuilding a nation of 24 million people once the war was won. There are numerous books and articles that depict the narrowness of the planning for rebuilding Iraq. James Rieff’s (2003) “Blueprint for a Mess”; James Fallows’s (2004) “Blind into Baghdad”; Francis Fukuyama’s (2004) “Nation Building 101”; Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor’s (2006) *Cobra II*; and Thomas Ricks’s (2006) *Fiasco* are some of the more prominent accounts that show that the United States did inadequate postwar planning. One of the most recent comprehensive reports on the failure to adequately plan for postwar Iraq came from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. *Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience*, published in January 2009. Stated in its conclusions: “With no established plans to manage the increasing chaos it faced, no developed doctrine of nation building to rely on, and no existing governmental structures through which to carry out contingency relief and reconstruction operations, policymakers struggled to respond to a broken Iraq” (323).
The war in Iraq was the turning point for America’s wake-up call on its role in nation building, or as described in the preceding chapters, peacebuilding. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, opened some eyes, because terrorists that perpetrated the attack planned it from a failed state. In the introductory letter to the *National Security Strategy* of 2002, President George W. Bush stated: “[t]he events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. . . . weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.” The remainder of the strategy demonstrated some concern for weak and failing states, but did not address any programs that would tackle the challenges of failing and failed states.

A few general officers like David Petraeus, Ricardo Sanchez, and Peter Chiarelli learned and applied their experiences in peacekeeping missions in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, but there were not enough senior officers who had experience in peacekeeping and understood some of the aspects of nation building to stem the sectarian violence that started in Iraq during the summer of 2003 and lasted for the better part of five years. General Dempsey demonstrated that the U.S. Army is a learning organization and adapted quickly, but the damage was done. Iraq was a quagmire for five years until the military and national security apparatus got its act together on how to deal with failed and failing states, especially after violent conflict.

**The Warrior Mentality**

The U.S. military has always had a warrior mentality. Soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmen are indoctrinated into the warfighting mentality of the U.S. military. Carl
Builder, whose book, *The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis* (1989), provides a psychological profile of military officers during the Cold War. In his discussion of national security strategy, he says the U.S. military is guided by the culture of the services. Builder conducts a cultural profile of the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force. Each service is highly professional, but the actual execution of the nation’s strategy is tempered by the service culture (5). “The Army sees itself, ultimately, as the essential artisans of war, still divided in their traditional combat arms – the infantry, artillery, and cavalry (armor) – but forged by history and the nature of war” (33). The Army is proud of its history and inculcates that history into its soldiers from their very first day in the service. The history they portray is its exploits in war. Military bases, buildings, rifle ranges, and various educational facilities are named after its warriors who excelled in the art of warfighting. Military doctrine depicts and highlights soldiers in combat – winning the nation’s wars.

Ask any U.S. Army officer the question, “What is the purpose of the U.S. Army,” and the answer will be “To fight and win our nation’s wars.” This was clearly articulated in the Army’s doctrinal manuals. Through the 1980s and 1990s, the Army focused on warfighting and listed the other tasks the Army might perform as low-intensity conflict. Yet, the Vietnam experience in low-intensity warfare put any effort to analyze these kinds of missions on the back burner, if not extirpated from the military mind.

Embedded in the soldier’s psyche is the notion of a warrior mentality. This means that the military prefers a conventional, force-on-force war, rather than the less than glorious low-intensity conflict or as the new doctrine began to call it Operations Other
Than War (OOTW). War colleges throughout the U.S. military education system often have a class on the military culture. Drawing on the classic work by Russell Weigley (1973), war colleges discuss the American way of war as a conventional military force-on-force fight in a strategy of annihilation.

In his book *Decisive Force*, Frank Hoffman (1996) examined a new American way of war for the American military. He described that military actions in Panama in 1989 and Desert Storm in 1991 were the kinds of war the American military preferred. They were force-on-force – great battles. In fact, Desert Storm was the very kind war the American military envisioned soldiers performing in the future. By the end of the twentieth century, the American military had a vision of the kind of war it wanted to fight. Hoffman put it succinctly in 1996: “A ‘new’ version of the American Way of War emerges in the aftermath of Desert Storm. Strategies of annihilation that seek the complete overthrow of its opponent and his government are now accepted anomalies. The preference is now for swift and massed application of overwhelming force for limited means” (94). In essence, the military maintained its focus on fighting and winning its nation’s wars, but doing it quickly and returning home for the victory parade. As the twenty-first century dawned, the American military maintained its warfighting mentality.

**Ignoring the Lessons of the Past**

The penchant for warfighting within the U.S. military was tempered by historical military facts. Throughout history, military leaders understood well that if you break it then you must fix it. So the military found itself undertaking nation building in various places around the world. Many of the early American exploits in nation building are
described in Max Boot’s *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (2002). Following every major war, the American military experienced the challenges of nation building. The Marines were heavily involved in nation building in Haiti from 1915 to 1934 and Nicaragua from 1910 to 1933. The Army performed this task after the Civil War from 1865 to 1872, after the Indian Wars from 1865 to 1880, the Philippines from 1898 to 1935, Mexico 1898 to 1914, Germany 1918 to 1923, Germany 1945 to 1950, Japan 1945 to 1946, and Vietnam 1961 to 1975. The U.S. Marines were so involved in nation building activities in the early part of the twentieth century that in 1940 they published a *Small Wars Manual* that provided instruction to their officers on how to rebuild a nation.

Vietnam, the Cold War, the invasion of Panama in 1989, and Desert Storm set the tone for military preparations for war from the late 1970s through the early 1990s. After losing the Vietnam War in 1975, the military turned its back on the lessons of Vietnam. The highly successful village pacification effort in Vietnam, called the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) program, was run by Robert Komer, a former National Security Council member and Deputy Commander to Military Advisory Command, Vietnam (Howell, 2009). General William Westmoreland admitted that he let Komer run the pacification program while he focused on warfighting (Moyar, 1997). In Panama, the rebuilding of the country after the invasion was based on a plan that the overall commander, General Max Thurman, admitted that he did devote five minutes of his time (Schultz, 1993).
As for the Cold War, there were serious concerns about the Soviet intentions in Europe and elsewhere, so the military did what it does best, plan for a conventional war. The U.S. Army redefined itself through AirLand Battle doctrine and inculcated its officers with planning and preparation for a conventional fight with the Soviets. The warfighting mentality prevailed throughout the 1980s and 1990s.

When the Cold War ended in 1989, the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990 provided the military a chance to prove its doctrine on warfighting. After a six-week air war and a one-hundred-hour ground invasion, the military proved its doctrine was sound. As for rebuilding the country after the war, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, mostly civilians, and a group of Civil Affairs soldiers organized in the Kuwait Task Force worked with the exiled Kuwait government to rebuild the country (Scales, 1994; Barlow, 2010). For the most part, the soldiers who won the war went home and did not help in the rebuilding effort.

The 1990s, however, ushered in new kinds of challenges for the U.S. military. Somalia was the first of many protracted social conflicts that the U.S. military faced. Operation Restore Hope began in December 1992, and over the course of a year and a half, 38,000 soldiers from 23 countries, of which 10,000 were American, were involved in providing humanitarian relief to Somalis. The humanitarian operation was a success (Stewart, 2003), but as the mission shifted to UN peacekeeping, the primary task became establishing an effective government (UNSCR 814, 1993). The United States provided military forces for the UN peacekeeping mission, but also established a separate force to
deal with the many warlords that were preventing the UN from establishing an effective government in Somalia.

The raid on the Olympic Hotel to capture the Somali warlord Muhammed Farah Aideed in October 1993 went terribly wrong. Eighteen U.S. Army special operations soldiers were killed, and in full view of news cameras, the body of a downed helicopter pilot was dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. The lesson of Somalia was that the U.S. military should not get involved in nation building. Colonel Ken Allard of the National Defense University wrote a succinct and widely read lessons learned report on Somalia. One of his conclusions was that in peace operations, peacekeepers have limits. “One of them involves the use of military forces in nation building, a mission for which our forces should not be primarily responsible” (1995, 89). This lesson that U.S. forces should not be involved in nation building efforts echoed through the halls of the Pentagon and Congress.

The Clinton administration, however, did believe that the role of the military was to help nations recover from violent conflict and continued to push the U.S. military into peacekeeping missions. Following the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the peacekeeping mission in Somalia, the Clinton administration became concerned with the unrest in Haiti. General Raoul Cedras seized control of Haiti in 1991 and set aside elections that would bring Jean-Bertrand Aristide to the presidency. After several years of negotiations, a growing humanitarian crisis, and refugees attempting to flee the country for the United States in overflowing unseaworthy boats, the United States decided to intervene in the internal affairs of Haiti. Threatened with an invasion force, Cedras stepped down and the
U.S. military sent in forces to once again provide humanitarian relief and peacekeepers to bring the country back under democratic rule.

Haiti was the second instance in two years that the American military deployed to support UN peacekeeping operations. General Gordon Sullivan, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, saw in the early 1990s that peacekeeping operations were growing in importance. In December 1992, he directed that the U.S. Army create a peacekeeping institute at the U.S. Army War College (Department of the Army memo, 1993). One of the first tasks for this new organization was to create Army doctrine on peace operations. The doctrine recognized that military forces would complement diplomatic, economic, informational, and humanitarian efforts by other elements of the U.S. government and other intergovernmental organizations like the United Nations (US Army FM 100-23, 1994).

The Peace Operations doctrine complemented the latest capstone Army doctrinal manual, Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, which was published by the U.S. Army a year earlier. The U.S. Army is a doctrine-based organization and its field manuals guide the training and education of its soldiers. This new doctrine was the first to recognize that the Cold War was over and stated that the Army must be prepared for full dimension operations. The Army culture and preference for decisive force, however, prevailed. According to FM 100-5, “this doctrine recognizes that the primary purpose of the Army is deterrence, but should deterrence fail, the Army’s purpose is to win the nation’s wars” (1993, vi). In previous Army doctrine the emphasis was on offensive and defensive operations in total war. There was some discussion of the role of the U.S. Army in
operations that were short of all-out war. Chapter 13 of this new manual introduced, for the first time, the term Operations Other Than War (OOTW). The doctrine went on to say, “Army forces have participated in operations other than war in support of national interests throughout its history. They have protected citizens at the edge of frontiers of an expanding America, built roads, bridges and canals; assisted nations abroad and served our nation in a variety of other missions” (FM 100-5, 1993, 13-0). Later in the chapter it stated that OOTW may precede or follow major combat operations or occur during major combat operations. Some of these operations may be of long duration, so the Army must be prepared for full spectrum of operations (13-1).

Operations Other than War (OOTW) was not a popular concept among many combat arms leaders. Even the term, “operations other than war,” communicated a distain for this kind of mission. The culture of the Army – fighting and winning its nation’s wars – remained prevalent (Daalder, 1996). When this manual was first published, many felt that operations like the recent Somalia operation were not what the Army was supposed to do. Critiques of Somalia called it “mission creep.” (Jim Hoogland was the first to use this term in a Washington Post editorial on July 20, 1993.) This term took on new meaning among the military, and many strongly advocated that “mission creep” included nation building. Yet several detailed studies on the results of the military mission in Somalia did not criticize the role of the military in nation building, but strongly recommended that other departments in the U.S. government had roles to play (Allard, 1995; Clark and Herbst, 1997; Hirsch and Oakley, 1995).
President Clinton and members of his administration had a different view of the purpose of the military. Their views on assertive multilateralism envisioned using the military in missions like the ongoing mission in Somalia (Holt and Mackinnon, 2008; Daalder, 1996). Key members of the National Security Council embraced the role of the United Nations and endorsed the growing importance of UN peacekeeping. So in February 1993, one month after President Clinton’s inauguration, the National Security Council initiated a peacekeeping policy review. Included in this review was additional support for UN peacekeeping and participation in UN operations by American service members.

In the spring of 1993, the Somalia mission was just transferring to UN control and was not going well and met resistance in Congress. Additionally, the military headed by General Colin Powel, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was against using American forces in UN peacekeeping missions. As the UN mission in Somalia ran into difficulties, the peacekeeping review met stiff resistance from Congress and the Pentagon (Daalder, 1996). Finally in May 1994, the administration released its peacekeeping review, Presidential Decision Directive 25. Because of resistance in both the Pentagon and Congress, the directive was a watered-down version of the original. In an article in the *New York Times*, Anthony Lake, the National Security Advisor, announcing the new policy, stated: “Let us be clear: peacekeeping is not at the center of our foreign or defense policy. Our armed forces’ primary mission is not to conduct peace operations, but to win wars” (1994). It was clear that the Pentagon’s warrior mentality prevailed.
The Clinton administration saw clearly that territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflict, and civil wars, or in other words, protracted social conflict, might be a threat to national security. It also articulated that the United Nations was the best instrument to tackle these new global issues. Embedded in the policy were programs to reform UN peacekeeping. Also in the policy were certain key questions that needed to be answered before the United States would commit U.S. forces to peace operations (PDD 25, 1994).

On a broader front, UN peacekeeping was taking on new roles that it had not done in the past and missions were not going well. UN peace operations took on tasks beyond their capability in Somalia and Bosnia, yet the Clinton administration continued its pursuit of assertive multilateralism. The conflicts facing the administration were complex and required some new thinking on how the United States might respond to crises that threaten U.S. interests. Confidence in the UN’s ability to manage peace operations came into question and the renewed interest in UN peacekeeping began to decline. The numbers of UN peacekeepers deployed went from a high of 78,000 in 1995 to a new low of just over 20,000 in October 1996 (Oliver, 2008). The number of UN peacekeepers continued to decline for the next few years, but U.S. forces were deeply involved in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions in response to the continuing challenges of ethnic and religious violence in Bosnia, Cambodia, Macedonia, Rwanda, and Haiti. These protracted social conflicts dominated the headlines. To meet these challenges the Clinton administration continued its review of how to counter such threats. It was clear that diplomacy (Department of State) and military forces (Department of Defense) were not the only agencies in the U.S. government that could help resolve these ethnic conflicts.
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Justice Department found themselves heavily involved as well. Other U.S. governmental agencies could also support these efforts; it became clear that more interagency involvement in planning and preparing for complex contingencies was needed.

Lessons from military operations in Haiti and Bosnia demonstrated clearly that more military officers needed guidance on how the other agencies could participate in these operations. Across Washington there were calls for more interagency coordination. To respond to this need, the Joint Chiefs of Staff published in 1996, for the first time, Joint Publication 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*. Its purpose was simple – to expose the military to the other elements of the U.S. government that might be involved in complex contingencies. Before engaging in military operations, the U.S. military has always planned thoroughly. When combatant commands like Central Command, Southern Command, and European Command plan operations, they need to understand the other agencies in the national government and what they might bring to the operation.

The Clinton administration saw the same issue. Planning required interagency coordination and there was no mechanism to accomplish this. The increased use of military forces in peace operations demanded more coordination, so the Clinton administration set forth on a program to improve civilian-military planning. The outcome was Presidential Decision Directive 56, “Managing Complex Contingency Operations,” published in May 1997 (Hamblet and Kline, 2000; Holt and Mackinnon, 2008; U.S. President, PDD 56, 1997).
PDD 56 defined complex contingency operations as peace operations similar to the NATO mission in Bosnia, the humanitarian relief mission in Bangladesh (1991), and Rwanda (1994). The directive went on to describe that nonmilitary assets might be necessary to resolve the underlying issues associated with the crises. It envisioned that there was strong a likelihood that the United States may have to respond to these types of crises in the future, and U.S. agencies must institutionalize the lessons learned from past experiences. It mandated complete review of past operations to garner the lessons necessary to manage future crises (U.S. President, PDD 56, 1997).

More importantly, the directive called for more interagency planning for future contingencies. A political-military plan would be created for U.S. participation in any future complex contingencies. These ideas would funnel from low-level coordination among various departments to policy coordination committees and finally on to a Deputies Committee. The Deputies would then forward key concepts and policy decisions on to the Principles Committee, made up of the head of each U.S. government agency. The Principles Committee would be chaired by the National Security Advisor and when appropriate the President of the United States (U.S. President, PDD 56, 1997). PDD 56 was considered a step in the right direction for planning complex contingencies (Hamblet and Kline, 2000), and it worked fairly well for the remaining three years of the Clinton administration. Political-Military plans were prepared for U.S. participation in the crises in Kosovo and East Timor.

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6 Actually PDD 56 called for the creation of an Executive Committee that would provide guidance to other U.S. agencies and pass issues on to the Deputies Committee. The Executive Committee process was never used and in its place policy coordination committees played this role.
Meanwhile, the UN regained its footing. Planning and managing UN peacekeeping operations improved significantly because the United States and other countries sponsored numerous programs that reformed United Nations peacekeeping operations. By 1999, peacekeeping was again a growth industry. The renewed support for the United Nations sent peacekeepers to East Timor, the Congo, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Central African Republic, and Sierra Leone.

The American military’s dislike for peacekeeping and nation building became an issue in the run-up to presidential elections in 2000. During the presidential debates Vice President Albert Gore and Governor George W. Bush engaged in three nationally televised debates. During the debate in Winston-Salem, North Carolina on October 11, 2000, the moderator raised the question regarding the Clinton administration’s policy of multilateralism and the role of the military in Kosovo, Somalia, Grenada, Haiti, and Panama. Governor Bush stated: “I don’t think our troops ought to be used for what’s called nation-building. I think our troops ought to be used to fight and win war” (Commission on Presidential Debates website).

When President Bush came to office he selected Donald Rumsfeld for his Secretary of Defense. Secretary Rumsfeld held a similar position about not using the U.S. military in nation building efforts. His speech in February 2003, even after U.S. forces were engaged in Afghanistan and on the eve of the Iraq War, supported this. Aboard the U.S. Intrepid Space and Air Museum in New York Harbor, Secretary Rumsfeld stated: “Afghanistan belongs to the Afghans. The objective is not to engage in what some call nation building.” The efforts in Afghanistan were to let the Afghan leadership engage in
nation building, but the American military, with is relatively small force, was focused on finding and killing Al Qaeda leadership and the Taliban. Nation building for U.S. forces was not part of their mission.

Despite the views of the Secretary of Defense, the U.S. Army was already thinking and developing doctrine on nation building, but the doctrinal term was stability operations. Based on years of experience in peacekeeping and low-intensity wars, the U.S. Army undertook a complete review of it capstone operational manual. Shortly after taking over as U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, who was a former commander for the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, initiated a review of the Army’s responsibilities in the new century. In October 1999, General Shinseki outlined his Army Vision in the phrase: “The Army, Soldiers on Point for the Nation, Persuasive in Peace and Invincible in War” (Shinseki, 2000; U.S. Army Vision, 1999). Culminating the review was the publication of the 2001 U.S. Army’s capstone operational manual, Field Manual 3-0, Operations. The manual again reiterated that the purpose of the U.S. Army was to fight and win its nation’s wars; but went on to discuss that the Army must be prepared for full-spectrum operations, which included the resurrected 1967 term, stability operations, at the lower end of the spectrum of war (U.S. Army FM 3-0, 2001, vii, and 1-3).

The field manual went on to discuss the national security challenges that the U.S. Army faced since the end of the Cold War and the last update of this manual in 1993. Experiences in peacekeeping in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia and humanitarian missions in Northern Iraq and Rwanda influenced this new thinking about the role of the U.S. Army.

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7 The 1993 Operations manual was FM 100-5, but the Army changed its numbering system to match the Joint manuals so the follow-on manual was named FM 3-0, Operations.
The manual said that “[t]he presence of Army forces performing these PME [peacetime military engagement] provides a visible sign of US commitment to peace and stability” (FM 3-0, 1-5). “Stability operations promote and protect US national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response crisis” (1-15).

In describing full-spectrum operations, the U.S. Army articulated that soldiers must be prepared to conduct offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations. In essence the U.S. Army saw as early as 2001 that stability operations were at the same level of importance as combat operations and directed that leaders focus their training at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict. Most leaders within the U.S. Army were very comfortable with the combat orientation of offensive and defensive operations, since that is what they did for their whole careers. The majority of Army officers, however, felt very uncomfortable and less knowledgeable with stability operations. General Shinseki correctly predicted that stability operations would become an important requirement for the Army to understand and accomplish.

Two years later, with the help of the U.S. Peacekeeping Institute, the U.S. Army published a subordinate doctrinal manual on stability and support operations (SASO). Field Manual 3-07, Stability and Support Operations, was published in February 2003 (only one month before the invasion of Iraq). The manual cobbled together both stability operations, which were to be conducted outside the continental United States, with support operations, which were conducted inside the United States and supported
domestic disasters or supported foreign humanitarian assistance. The term, *stability operations*, was not well defined. The manual used the same definition of stability operations articulated in FM 3-0 (listed above). Beyond protecting U.S. interests abroad, stability operations included peace operations, foreign internal defense, security assistance, support to insurgencies, combatting terrorism, non-combatant evacuations, arms control, and show of force (1-2).

There was no discussion of nation building or state building. In the chapter on peace operations, the manual did include peacebuilding and defined it as “post conflict actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (4-11). The manual went on to discuss that the Army’s tasks were supporting other agencies—intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations— in peacebuilding. The Army did see that it had a major role in foreign internal defense, which consisted of helping a host country create an effective national armed force. Field Manual 3-07 was a step in the right direction as it had annexes on interagency and intergovernmental coordination, rule of law, negotiations, and refugees and displaced persons.

**Learning the Lessons of Stability Operations the Hard Way**

On the eve of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the attitudes of the senior leadership of the U.S. government were clearly in contradiction to the attitudes of the Clinton administration that orchestrated nation building efforts in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Nation building was not a job for soldiers. When the Iraq War began in March 2003, the
military had done little planning for the aftermath of the war. Plans were not in place for rebuilding the nation when the Saddam Hussein regime was toppled.

Planners at Central Command (CENTCOM) did not look carefully at the rebuilding of the nation. “Major Ray Eiriz of CENTCOM, who had worked on plans to cope with up to 1.1 million refugees, acknowledged that postwar planning did not receive much attention at Frank’s [Commander US CENTCOM] command” (Gordon and Trainor, 2006, 139). In fact, many CENTCOM planners felt that the rebuilding of Iraq would be the responsibility of other organizations within the U.S. government.

The planning for the rebuilding of Iraq was ad hoc and not well orchestrated. Central Command did some planning, but did not think they were responsible for the postwar effort. The assumption taken by Central Command planners was that when the regime fell, new Iraqi leaders would emerge and take on the task of rebuilding their own nation. However, the United States recognized that it had some responsibility to assist this effort. On January 20, 2003, President Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive 24, which created the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). The office would report to the Secretary of Defense. To manage this organization, Secretary Rumsfeld selected retired U.S. Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner. While on active duty, Garner was responsible for protecting the Kurds in Northern Iraq after the Persian Gulf War in 1991.

In January 2003, Garner started creating his team, but by all accounts the planning for rebuilding Iraq came far too late (Gordon and Trainor, 2006; Ricks, 2006). Garner and his team arrived in Kuwait two days prior to the start of the war and traveled to
Baghdad four weeks later. This small team of several hundred people would be responsible for rebuilding a country of 24 million people. Many military commanders anticipated going home as soon as the regime fell and the rebuilding effort turned over to ORHA.

By mid-April 2003, the regime was gone and Saddam Hussein was on the run, but the newfound freedom soon turned to revenge. Reports of looting across Iraq and sectarian violence caused many in Washington to question the postwar effort. Garner was just beginning his work when he was replaced by Ambassador Paul Bremer and ORHA was renamed the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).

Ambassador Bremer arrived in Baghdad in early May 2003 and his small team of advisors assimilated with the ORHA staff, yet with a new focus – administer Iraq until an interim government was established and help Iraq recover from 30 years of a dictator’s rule.

Bremer and his team went to work planning for the rebuilding of Iraq while the military attempted to stymy the sectarian violence. By September, the Coalition Provisional Authority finalized its planning. With help from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the UN, and the World Bank, the Coalition Provisional Authority completed its Vision for Iraq. Included in this document were programs in the following sectors: security, essential services, civil society, economics, strategic communications, and democratic transformation. Money for these programs was assessed by the UN team to cost $56 billion over three years (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction [SIGIR], 2009, 96–97).
In August and September 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority conducted a thorough review of programs necessary for rebuilding Iraq and submitted the request for funding to the U.S. Congress. The U.S. Agency for International Development, which expected to play a large role in rebuilding Iraq, was left out of budgetary planning. The Agency’s Administrator, Andrew Natsios, and the in-country director, Lewis Luck, objected to the programs recommended for funding. They felt the funding left out major development programs like agriculture (SIGIR, 2009, 101). After all the bickering, the administration asked Congress for $85 billion for funding the war in Iraq. Eighteen billion dollars was for reconstruction projects, of which most were large-scale engineering projects like the electrical systems, water and sanitation projects, road building, education, and health care facilities. USAID’s voice, experienced in development programs on how to rebuild a country, was left out of the planning. In essence, now USAID had to compete with the big programs for funding. In November, the U.S. Congress reluctantly passed the supplemental funding bill, which provided $18.4 billion for Iraq reconstruction. Congressman Barney Frank from Massachusetts said: “I’m not comfortable, but I don’t know a way out of it. We went in and invaded this country and now we have some obligation. [Bush’s] rigidity and his incompetence may have left us no way out” (Bauman, 2003). To manage these funds the Congressional Bill created an oversight office, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR).

To meet the additional funding requirements, the CPA went to the international community. In October 2003, a donor conference was held in Madrid, Spain. The Bush
approach to war with Iraq was not popular in many European countries, but the conference did net an additional pledge of $13.5 billion dollars (SIGIR, 2009).

As mentioned earlier, some commanders who participated in peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo understood some aspects of nation building, but they were few and far between. The commanders assigned to Iraq from 2003 to 2007 were adaptive, and like General Dempsey, they learned and changed their focus. It was clear that to win the peace, the U.S. Army needed to change its focus and become good at nation building-stability operations.

Back in Washington the issue of how to win the peace in Iraq and Afghanistan was a topic of much discussion. The initial steps to rebuild Iraq had not gone well, so the Secretary of Defense turned to the Defense Science Board to conduct a study. Their summer report was released in December 2004. One of its insights was revealing:

DOD has not yet embraced S&Rs [stability and reconstruction] operations as an explicit mission with the same seriousness as combat operations. This mind-set must be changed, insofar as S&R operations can consume resources as large as those consumed by major combat operations, and for much longer periods of time. Stabilization and reconstruction operations are not a lesser-included task of a combat mission, but a separate and distinct mission with unique requirements for equipment and training. Thus, S&R requirements should become a major driver for the future force. (Defense Science Board [DSB], 2004, vi)

The study went on to recommend that stability and reconstruction of states after major combat operations should become a core responsibility of the Department of Defense and the Department of State. It also recommended that the U.S. Army be the lead agent within the Department of Defense for stabilization and reconstruction operations (DSB, 2004). The Defense Science Board study focused on the differences
between combat operations, where the military is mostly in charge, and stability operations when the military plays a supporting role. During stabilization and reconstruction operations, it was clear that the Department of State and the Department of Defense have responsibilities, but so do a host of other actors including international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and other countries. There was not a clear line of authority between those responsibilities. Thus, interagency coordination between departments is essential if the United States is expected to develop a comprehensive plan.

The study also recognized that security is a prominent element in any efforts to rebuild a country after violent conflict (DSB, 2004, 14). The study used the recent experiences in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo to draw out some of the lessons that need to be taken into account. The chart in Figure 4.1 demonstrates the various categories of tasks associated with stabilization and reconstruction (peacebuilding) that must be performed. Security, however, takes on a more prominent role, as it is the base for all other activities. (see figure 4.1)

In February 2005, only a few months after the Defense Science Board report, the Department of Defense floated a draft policy letter entitled “Department of Defense...
Capabilities for Stability Operations.” It was the first indication that the U.S. military was changing its focus. In the past, the general categories of military operations were offense and defense. This new directive put stabilization and reconstructions on par with combat operations – offense and defense. Department of Defense Policy 3000.05 was finally published in November 2005, but the title of the document was changed to “Military Support for Security, Stability Transition and Reconstruction Operations (SSTR).” The title was changed to reflect that the Department of Defense did not want to assume full responsibility for stability operations. It also reflected that some within the Department of Defense were not ready to take on duties that were essentially a State Department responsibility.  

Interestingly, the same month that the Department of Defense published this new directive, the White House published its *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq* (National Security Council, 2005). This document came out a full year and a half after the start of hostilities in Iraq. (It was something that should have been published before military forces entered Iraq.) It indicated that the administration was playing catch-up as to how to approach the rebuilding of Iraq after major hostilities. The policy outlined the programs to win the peace. It included eight strategic pillars or strategic objectives to win the peace in Iraq: “defeat terrorists and neutralize the insurgency, transition Iraq to security self-reliance, help Iraqis forge a national compact for democratic government, help Iraq build

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8 The author was involved in the review of this new policy, but when it was finally signed, the name was changed to Military Support to SSTR. When this change came out the author queried a person in the Pentagon as to why the title was changed. The informed source told the author that when the policy came back from the Secretary of Defense’s office, the title was crossed out and changed to “Military Support to SSTR.” No explanation was provided.
government capacity and build essential services, help Iraq strengthen its economy, help Iraq strengthen the rule of law and promote civil rights, increase international support for Iraq and strengthen public understanding of coalition efforts and public isolation of the insurgents” (National Security Council, 2005, 25–26). These pillars closely approximated the emerging pillars associated with rebuilding failed states that other scholarly publications identified.

Once the Department of Defense policy (DOD Policy 3000.05) was signed, the military bureaucracy kicked into gear and began developing doctrine to guide education, training, and the conduct of stability operations. There was an urgency to complete the review and develop some conceptual models to help those engaged in nation building operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Studies by the RAND Corporation, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the U.S. Institute of Peace (all these studies are mentioned and discussed in chapter 3) guided the doctrine developers. Additional reports from the Defense Science Board (2004) and the Council on Foreign Relations (2005) also aided their effort. There was a flurry of reports, articles (Feil, 2004; Chesterman, 2003), and conferences (Flournoy, 2004) held to comprehend America’s role in nation building. Many of those who spoke out and published documents supported or participated in the Clinton administration’s assertive multilateralism policies or came from international organizations, like the United Nations.

The White House led the effort by creating an organization to coordinate any U.S. planning for nation building. It is worth noting that the terms nation building or peacebuilding did not figure into the lexicon of the Bush administration. Nation building
was used in a negative manner during the presidential campaign, so the Bush administration called the effort to rebuild nations after war “reconstruction and stabilization.” Across the river in Virginia, the Pentagon referred to the concept as “military support to security, stability, transition and reconstruction (SSTR).”

On December 7, 2005, eight days after the publication of DOD Policy 3000.05, the White House released National Security Policy Directive 44, “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization.” The purpose of the directive was to “promote the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in or in transition from conflict to civil strife.” (NSPD 44, 2005, 1) The Directive placed the overall responsibility within the U.S. government for rebuilding nations on the shoulders of the State Department. To coordinate these efforts, the Directive solidified the role of the new office in the Department of State, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, which had been established a year and a half earlier. The Directive also stated that the Departments of State and Defense must work closely together to integrate reconstruction and stabilization activities into military operations across the spectrum of conflict. Lastly, the White House established a Policy Coordination Committee to oversee all reconstruction and stabilization efforts (nation building) (NSPD 44, 2005).

**New Ideas on Nation Building**

Before any doctrine is published by any service in the Department of Defense, draft concept papers are normally published and tested. The U.S. Army already had a
manual on *Stability and Support Operations* that complemented its previous views of operations other than war originally outlined in 1993 and carried to a higher level by the 2003 manual. Because of DOD Policy 3000.05, the military needed to develop additional doctrine to guide its soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen in stabilization and reconstruction. The Joint Forces Command was responsible for joint doctrine (doctrine for all military services), so the staff quickly married up with the newly created Office for the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction in the State Department. A planning manual for stabilization and reconstruction was published in December 2005. Key in this document was an in-depth analysis of the possible tasks that might be required for stabilization and reconstruction efforts. These tasks might be carried out by various agencies of the U.S. government. For example, USAID would help in development of schools, medical clinics, and infrastructure projects; the Justice Department would help establish rule of law in fragile states, and the Department of Agriculture might help in improving food production. These tasks came from five broad areas: security, justice and reconciliation, economic stability and infrastructure, humanitarian and social well-being, and governance and participation (U.S. State Department and Joint Forces Command, 2005, 9).

Each of these tasks was broken down into sub-tasks and laid out in what were called the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks. Each of the broad categories listed above was broken out into sub-tasks with initial goals, transformational goals, and sustainable goals. For example, the security category had an initial goal of establishing a safe and secure environment, a transitional goal of developing legitimate and stable
security institutions, and a long-term stabilization goal of consolidating local security
capacity. Sub-tasks included disarmament of warring factions, border security, protection
of civilians, mine clearing, and establishment of a police force (U.S. Office of the
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, 2005).

The “U.S. Government Draft Planning Framework for Stabilization and
Reconstruction” was well received among the many agencies that had a role in nation
building. Since the framework was co-authored by the military headquarters responsible
for writing Joint Doctrine for all the U.S. Armed Forces, the next step for the military
was to write a “Joint Operating Concept” (JOC) paper for the experimentation and
exercises. The JOC was produced in December 2006 and sent out to all agencies in the
Department of Defense for evaluation and testing. The new doctrinal ideas were a direct
response to DOD Policy 3000.05 that mandated all DOD departments to test and evaluate
stability and reconstruction operations.

The JOC was titled, “Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition and
Reconstruction Operations (SSTR),” and reflected the continued notion within the
Department of Defense that the military had only a supporting role in every aspect of
nation building with the exception of security, where DOD assumed it had the primary
role, initially. The document reflected the thinking that was coming out of the new State
Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and
followed the concepts outlined in the President’s National Security Policy Directive, 44.

The JOC was a good approach to understanding stabilization and reconstruction
operations. The concept reflected many of the concepts outlined in the previous draft
planning framework and the studies done by RAND, CSIS, and the U.S. Institute for Peace. The JOC recognized that the military had a role to play, but also reflected the notion that others did, too, including U.S. civilian government agencies, multinational partners, NGOs, and international organizations. The central idea outlined in the JOC stipulated “helping a severely stressed government avoid failure or recover from a devastating natural disaster, or on assisting an emerging host nation government in building a ‘new domestic order’ following internal collapse or defeat in war” (JOC, 2006, iii). The JOC also recognized that state failure has an impact on global security. According to the JOC, “[f]ailed or failing states frequently lead to emergence of ungoverned spaces, which provide opportunities for warlords, crime bosses, tribal leaders, and religious authorities to gain control or compete for power” (2006, 14).

Figure 4.2 depicts this central idea graphically with major mission elements or in military terms: lines of operations, establishing a safe and secure environment, delivering humanitarian assistance, reconstituting infrastructure and essential services, supporting economic development, and establishing a representative and effective government. Surrounding and in support of these major mission elements was strategic communication. Strategic communications reflect the growing importance of information in shaping people’s attitudes and behaviors. Strategic communications supported all the other major mission elements by highlighting the work of the U.S. government’s efforts. Strategic communication is conducted using three principal supporting capabilities: public affairs, information operations, and defense support to public diplomacy (JOC, 2005, 48).
Public affairs are the military version of coordinating news reports and making official announcements. Information operations is a relatively new military concept where the military uses the new and emerging social media to gain support from the local people in achieving its objectives. Support to public diplomacy reflects the military’s role in diplomatic efforts to work with local leaders.

Information operations have a much wider scope than articulated here. The information age has challenged military operations in new ways, and as such, information operations can be both offensive and defensive. Offensive operations include the use of new age technologies to use information to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while defensively, the military protects its own systems (Joint Publications, 3-13, II-1). In stability operations, the military will use information to try to influence and gain support from the local people.
The new Joint Operating Concept for SSTR was well received by the military, because this is what they had been doing in Iraq since 2004. The military doctrine, however, still reflected a supporting role in nation building or peacebuilding. The agency to be supported was the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). Created by the president in December 2004, S/CRS was given the mission to “lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy” (Pascual, 2005a) (S/CRS website).

At the Dwight David Eisenhower conference on National Security held in September 2005, Ambassador Carlos Pascual, the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, laid out his vision on where S/CRS needed to go and how it intended to conduct the business of rebuilding failed or fragile states. He stated that S/CRS is “a coordinating entity, and our job is to help ensure that individual agencies such as the State Department, USAID, Treasury, the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, and the different elements of the Department of Defense, have the capacity to work together in an interoperable way to achieve a unified strategy within a given theatre” (Pascual, 2005c, 159). At his talk that day, Ambassador Pascual referenced a speech given by President George W. Bush to the International Republican Institute in May 2005, where the president endorsed the work of S/CRS and announced the creation of Active Response Teams from across the U.S. government to help fragile nations avoid or recover from war.
The president acknowledged that the United States learned some valuable lessons after creating the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. Civilians can bring unique skills to helping fragile nations recover from war and transition to a stable society. It was clear that the president was changing his mind (since the presidential debates) on the use of the military in nation building. In this speech he said, “America’s Armed Forces are also undertaking a less visible, but increasingly important task: helping these people of these nations build civil societies from the rubble of oppression” (Bush, 2005). Yet the entire effort in creating the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization was to get nation building off the shoulders of the U.S. military.

Although that is not entirely possible, the essence of this research is to determine where the military must carry the main effort in nation building and how might that responsibility transfer to civilian control and organizations like the S/CRS’s Active Response Teams, the United Nations, or other nations’ peacebuilding teams.

The speech by Ambassador Pascual articulated a classic approach to the many challenges facing peacebuilding. It acknowledged that fragile and failing states are breeding grounds for terrorists, criminal activity, and other nefarious activities; that rebuilding nations takes five to ten years to provide the basic programs to ensure a transition to a sustainable society; and that there are many actors involved, so coordination is necessary, but very difficult.

In 2005, the U.S. President and the Secretary of State were developing some good arguments about the creation of the new office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and devising plans as to how to deal with fragile or failed states. The real
thrust of these speeches, however, was to obtain congressional funding for the new office. In a congressional testimony to the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate, Ambassador Pascual thanked Congress for providing $7.7 million the previous year, asked for authority to transfer $200 million from DOD (which DOD was willing to do) and seek an additional $24 million for Fiscal Year 2006 (Pascual, 2005b). At the same congressional hearing, the Principal Deputy of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Director of Strategic Plans and Policy for the Joint Staff, and the Assistant Administrator for the U.S. Agency for International Development all supported the creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and even supported the transfer of funds from the Defense Department to the State Department. Funding was desperately needed to build the Active Response Teams. Creating these teams would take the burden off the U.S. military to conduct stability operations. That budget could only come from the U.S. Congress.

As early as 2004, both Senator Richard Luger and Representative Sam Farr introduced bills to the Senate and House, respectively, to support the creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. The bills were similar in nature and were never seriously debated until 2007. The House Bill passed in March 2008, but the Senate Bill never made it out of committee. While the concept of the Stabilization and Reconstruction Act of 2008, as it was called, was being discussed in the U.S. Congress, there were funds approved to sustain the office of S/CRS. Both the Senate and House approved the transfer of $100 million from DOD to State for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 to help fragile and failing states (Serafino, 2011).
While Congress was debating the central ideas associated with S/CRS, new concepts continued to emerge. The Active Response Teams that would assist other nations gave way to the Civilian Response Corps. Within the Civilian Response Corps would be 250 Active Response Corps members, and 2000 Standby Response Corps members, and finally a 5000-person Reserve Corps. The Active Response Corps would be full-time State Department employees working in the office of the Coordinator. These members of the Response Corps would not only plan stabilization and reconstruction missions around the world, but also participate in executing those plans. Each member would be available for immediate deployment should the situation demand. The Standby Response Corps would also be full-time employees of the U.S. government, but outside the State Department. For example, an employee working for the Department of Agriculture or Health and Human Services would volunteer to undergo some focused training, and when necessary S/CRS would deploy them in as little as 30 days to fulfill a role in a stabilization or reconstruction mission somewhere outside the United States (Herbst, 2010).

The Civilian Reserve Corps was patterned after the concept of the U.S. Army Reserve, where individual citizens could sign up for specific skill sets needed by S/CRS. These could be doctors, lawyers, engineers, farmers, or city workers. These people would volunteer to undergo some specialized training sponsored by S/CRS, and then conduct periodic training. Once trained, the American citizens could be sent as part of the Civilian Response Corps to some troubled region in the world to impart their expertise. They might remain working in another country for six months to a year. Then they would
return home to their normal jobs outside the U.S. government (S/CRS website; Herbst, 2010).

Finally in October 2008, the U.S. Congress included in a Defense Authorization Act the Reconstruction and Stabilization Act of 2008. This Act fully established the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. The Act provided authorization for the entire concept of the Active Response Corps, the Standby Response Corps, and the Civilian Reserve Corps (U.S. Congress, Reconstruction and Stabilization Act of 2008). In the interim S/CRS was funded by transfers from the Department of Defense and some supplemental funding from Congress. Based on the Reconstruction and Stabilization Act of 2008, the president requested funding for S/CRS for two years; however, in fiscal year 2009 only $45 million was appropriated and supported only the 2,250 members of the Active and Standby Corps. In subsequent requests, the president’s budget requests included an annual budget of $248 million to support the entire program (Fonzo-Eberhard and Kugler, 2009). According to a recent S/CRS fact sheet, the office received $210 million for fiscal years 2009 and 2010 (S/CRS fact sheet, 2011). Funding was never enough to support the Civilian Reserve Corps.

Members of the Civilian Response Corps were quickly sent to work helping stabilize fragile nations. Specialists went to twenty-eight nations from 2007 to 2011. Members of both the Active Response Corps and the Standby Response Corps deployed to other countries with the following special skills: planning complex contingencies, security and rule of law, diplomacy and governance, essential services (which include public health, public infrastructure, education, and labor), and economic recovery (which
includes agriculture, rural development, commerce, taxes, and monetary and business policies) (S/CRS fact sheet, 2011). The current Coordinator, Ambassador Robert Loftis, in a message posted on the organization’s website recently said, “This expeditionary diplomacy represents a new approach to fragile, conflict-prone countries. It also represents a view of the future of U.S. foreign policy, using civilian power from the entire U.S. government to assist U.S. embassies in their efforts to help fragile states” (Loftis, 2011).

The battle to approve and appropriate funding for civilians to conduct reconstruction and stabilization was in the end successful, but it took all members of the Bush administration to make this happen. In the 2007 State of the Union Address, President Bush called for the creation of a civilian response corps to ease the pressure on the military and provide some critical civilian expertise that the military does not have. Defense Secretary Gates even supported an increase in funding for the State Department. During a speech at Kansas State University in November 2007, Secretary Gates, a historian, recounted the decrease in numbers of diplomats from the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development from their heyday during the Cold War. He also mentioned the success of the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) program in Vietnam. Secretary Gates went on to say, “The importance of deploying civilian expertise has been relearned – the hard way – through the effort to staff Provincial Reconstruction Teams, first in Afghanistan and more recently in Iraq. The PRTs were designed to bring in civilians experienced in agriculture, governance, and other aspects of development – to work with and alongside the military
to improve the lives of the local population, a key tenet of any counterinsurgency effort. Where they are on the ground – even in small numbers – we have seen tangible and often dramatic changes.”

The creation of a Civilian Response Corps was relatively new thinking about how to help fragile and failing states. The U.S. government saw that the military could not carry the burden of nation building alone. Expertise from the civilian community was needed to help in programs that supported rule of law, economic recovery, governance, rebuilding of essential services, and even humanitarian assistance. During many of the discussions on how S/CRS would function, there were recommendations on placing the Coordinator under the Administrator for U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). There was concern that the new office would overlap functions with USAID, so might be better utilized within the aid agency. The importance of helping fragile and failing nations, however, was a national priority as espoused in the National Security Strategy. Consequently, in November 2011, the State Department elevated the former S/CRS to the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations and making the head of the bureau an Assistant Secretary of State.

A study done at the National Defense University, entitled Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations, proposed that the number of civilians envisioned by S/CRS was far too low. If the United States were to take the task of helping fragile and failed states seriously, then the number of civilians working on reconstruction and stabilization should double if not quadruple. One of the authors of the Civilian Surge, Hans Binnendijk, in late 2003 when the United States was struggling with reconstruction and stabilization in
Iraq, recognized a “stabilization and reconstruction gap” (Binnendijk and Johnson, 2003, 130; Binnendijk and Cronin, 2009, 2). The gap merely highlighted that with the national security challenges of the twenty-first century and the two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, there was a shortage of civilian expertise to assist in reconstruction and stability tasks. Consequently, the military was filling the gap because the work needed to be done. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, civilian advisors guided the military in a variety of areas where the military did not have the expertise, but the numbers were low.

To fill this gap, the U.S. military devised a concept called Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which was mentioned by Secretary Gates in his speech in Kansas. PRTs were the military’s response to getting more civilian expertise to help in nation building (stability operations). The concept emerged out of Afghanistan in 2002 and was later used in Iraq. Essentially PRTs are a team of military and civilians working together to provide essential services, help local and provincial governments become organized, stimulate economic recovery, and assist in rule of law in areas where security is not well established, or in military terms, semi-permission environments (Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2007). The concept evolved from U.S. Army civil affairs soldiers who work with USAID, NGOs, intergovernmental organizations, and other nations’ aid workers. Because security conditions in Afghanistan in 2002 were tenuous and the U.S. military was focused on defeating Al Qaeda and the Taliban, actions needed to be taken to bring stability to areas of the country. Security conditions did not warrant civilians working alone, so the concept of a civilian-military team evolved.
There is no set organization for PRTs. Organization, strength, and missions vary from location to location. In 2008, there were 26 PRTs in Afghanistan, of which 12 were led by U.S. military officers. The others were led by other nations’ militaries working in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). U.S.-led PRTs usually had 50 to 100 personnel of which only three or four individuals were civilians (U.S. House of Representatives, 2008; Dziedzic and Seidl, 2005). Other nations’ PRTs had more civilians. According to a report from the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, “the German and Canadian PRTs have 20 [civilians]. The British PRT in Helmland has 30, divided into different functional cells (stability, development, rule of law, and governance)” (Malkasian and Meyerle, 2009, 6). The military provided the security while the civilians coordinated the stability plans. In Afghanistan, the military dominated the PRTs and civil affairs soldiers often filled the role of civilians when other U.S. government agencies could not provide them. PRTs in Afghanistan were managed by the military chain of command, which coordinated its activities with the Afghan Ministry of Interior. Several reports highlighted the fact that the military, USAID, and the Department of State worked as partners (U.S. House of Representatives, 2008). Many critics complained that the military was “blurring” the civil-military distinction or in other words, militarizing peacebuilding (Dziedzic and Seidl, 2005; Durch, 2006; Perito, 2005).

In Iraq, PRTs were civilian led and mostly staffed with civilians. In contrast to PRTs in Afghanistan, the PRTs in Iraq worked for the State Department and took direction from the U.S. Embassy. The teams worked closely with neighboring military
units who provided the security for the civilians while they coordinated their projects. Some PRTs in Iraq were embedded with military units where the military provided the security while the civilians coordinated projects and programs to support stability operations (U.S. House of Representatives, 2008).

Funding for the projects conducted by PRTs varies. PRT members coordinated for funds from either the Department of Defense under the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program or through the U.S. Agency for International Development. For Iraq, much of this funding came from the Iraq Reconstruction Fund. Other nations that provide PRTs fund the projects through their own funding sources. Hundreds of millions of dollars have been expended on PRT projects over the last several years. Regardless of the project, local community support is essential and must be coordinated with community leaders.

There are multiple opinions about the success of PRTs. Some reports highlight a lack of national coordination and no overall strategy. Other reports show that the lack of established procedures and influence by the sponsoring governments limit the ability of PRTs to be fully effective. On the positive side, PRT leaders have developed good working relationships with the local leaders and have vastly improved living conditions.

Yet other reports indicate that the personality of the leader determines the success of the PRT. From an NGO perspective, PRTs tread on the humanitarian space and compete with them for projects. It is clear from all the reports on PRTs that the teams work closely with local governing bodies to improve everything from water distribution, agriculture, education, and medical care to governance. A report from the Woodrow
Wilson School, which visited PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq, stated, “PRTs with a larger civilian presence tend to balance the military, political and development priorities more effectively than those with a very small civilian presence” (Abbaszadeh et al., 2008, 9).

A U.S. House of Representatives study made a number of findings. Two stand out as particularly important to this research. “Military personnel are performing stability operations in certain instances where the employment of civilians would be appropriate and preferable.” “Non-governmental organizations play a significant role in pre-conflict and post-conflict environments, but currently they do not participate regularly in stability operations” (2008, 51). The bottom line is that PRTs have shown some success in stability operations. The teams that comprise both civilians and military seem to be the most successful in achieving their goal of building capacity in the host nation. Overall, however, lack of coordination, the ad hoc nature of the teams, and the difficulty of measuring success in their activities leads one to suspect whether this concept will continue to be used. It is clear that security is the primary factor in determining whether to employ this approach to stability operations. Without security, NGOs, intergovernmental organizations, and civilians from helping nations cannot conduct business. PRTs provide the security so civilians can do their work.

General David Petraeus supported the work of the PRTs. While he was the commander of Multi-national Forces in Iraq and Commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, he published his guidelines for counterinsurgency. These guidelines, published in Iraq (2008) and Afghanistan (2010) were similar in nature and stressed interagency, intergovernmental, and host nation
coordination to ensure unity of effort – a principle in stability operations. He stressed building strong relationships with the Iraqi and Afghan people. This is what a PRT commander is supposed to do: build good relationships with the local people and leaders. Many of the points in General Petraeus’s counterinsurgency guidance reflect on the work of PRTs.

Shortly after returning from his initial Iraq tour in 2004, General Petraeus was posted as the Commander of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Here he rewrote the U.S. Army’s Counterinsurgency doctrine, Field Manual 3-24, which had languished since Vietnam. The manual was published in December 2006, and it strongly supported the ideas of Field Manual 3-0 and DOD Policy 3000.05 (discussed earlier in the chapter) in that Army forces must be able to conduct offensive, defensive, and stability operations. Army commanders and their soldiers must be able to seamlessly transition from offense to defense to stability operations to counter an insurgency.

One entire chapter was devoted to unity of effort. The chapter states, “[t]he integration of civilian and military efforts is crucial to successful COIN [Counterinsurgency]” (FM 3-24, 2006, 2-10). The manual went on to highlight that Provincial Reconstruction Teams were a “model for civil-military cooperation” (2-12).

Shortly after formulating the ideas for counterinsurgency, General Petraeus was placed in command of all forces in Iraq where he could put the new doctrine to a real-world test. As Commander Multi-National Force–Iraq from February 2007 to May 2008, Petraeus proved that his counterinsurgency doctrine was valid. He emerged from Iraq a hero. The level of violence spiked and then subsided as he predicted. By the end of his
eighteen months as commander in Iraq, violence dropped precipitously and Iraq was progressing toward becoming a stable country in the Middle East. Central to any success in counterinsurgency is the ability to conduct stability operations. Make no mistake, counterinsurgency operations are complex and require in-depth analysis and unique approaches toward managing the operation. No two counterinsurgencies are the same, but one of the basic principles is to work closely with all aspects of the affected people to build capacity to manage their own affairs or, in other words, peacebuilding. The counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan is different from that in Iraq, but the guidelines used by General Petraeus in both theaters were basically the same.

By 2008, the U.S. military was becoming fairly comfortable with stability operations. The U.S. Army published a new capstone operations manual, Field Manual 3-0, in February 2008 and did away with the term, Security, Stability and Transition to Reconstruction (SSTR), and replaced it with the term “stability operations.” The release of the new manual made the front page of the New York Times on February 8, 2008. In essence it rebuffed the initial dislike of the Bush administration for using the U.S. military in nation building. The new Army manual demonstrated a complete change in thinking about the use of the military. Stability Operations were defined as “various military missions, tasks and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief” (FM 3-0, 3-12). Figure 4.3 depicts a unique approach as it demonstrates that the Army will transition these tasks from a purely
military function to a Department of State function. The manual, however, lacks any specificity on when and how the transfer of functions might occur. Still the stability tasks look remarkably similar to the functional areas developed by the think tanks, scholars, and study groups from 2003 to 2008.

In October 2008, the Army followed up with a complementary manual, FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*. This manual went into a little more depth on the concept of stability operations outlined in FM 3-0. It recommended a whole-of-government approach. The framework for an end state for a country ready to transition to its own functioning society included a “safe and secure environment, established a rule of law, social well-being [for its citizens], a stable governance, and a sustainable economy” (FM 3-07, 2008, 1-16.)

Additionally, the tasks listed in Figure 4.3 were expanded. The S/CRS and Joint Forces Command task planning framework, which had undergone significant refinement since it was published initially in 2005, was incorporated into the manual, thereby giving greater depth of understanding on the tasks conducted by military units. The manual did not specifically state how and when tasks would shift between a military and a State Department responsibility. There was one short paragraph on transition from a military
responsibility to a civil one. It merely said that transitions will occur and must be planned as they are inherently risky.

The Department of Defense followed the Army’s lead in changing the name from military support to stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations to just stability operations. In September 2009, the Office of the Secretary of Defense under the Obama administration rewrote DOD Policy 3000.05 and did away with the term SSTR. Stability operations were the new lexicon and stability operations were defined the same way the Army defined them in FM 3-0. The policy articulated that stability operations are a core mission for the U.S. military forces and directed all services not only to train military personnel on stability operations, but also to maintain the capability to conduct stability operations. The focus of the military in an entirely supporting role was gone. The policy instead emphasized strong civilian-military coordination and unity of effort.

The military stressed from its lessons in Afghanistan and Iraq and in its doctrinal manuals that other members of the U.S. government must help in stability operations.

The National Security Policy Directive from President Bush, and accepted by the Obama administration, placed the State Department in the lead to manage the civilians who would help the military and U.S. Ambassadors worldwide conduct stability operations. Yet there was no doctrine to help train civilians or guide them in working with the military.

To remedy this issue, the U.S. Institute of Peace, a congressionally funded think tank, undertook the writing of an interagency doctrine, Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction (2009). The lead for the U.S. Institute of Peace was
Beth Cole, a longtime advocate of peacekeeping and stability operations. With support from the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, the State Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction, and host of experts, the team put together a book that can be used by both civilians and the military. The similarity of the guidelines to military doctrine on stability operations means that both civilians who use the book and the military will approach the stability tasks from the same viewpoint.

The USIP guidelines were written by experts and vetted with experts from all over the world. The opening page discusses the fact that thousands of civilians from more than a dozen agencies have deployed to more than two dozen stabilization and reconstruction operations. It recognizes that the United States (both civilian and military) “is just one player in a complex maze of peacebuilders working in increasingly harsh places.” It goes to say, “[a]s global trends indicate, instability is likely to pose a greater, and perhaps more numerous challenge in the years to come” (USIP, 2009, 1-2).

Guiding Principles developed a number of goals for a nation to transition from violent conflict or war to a stable society. The end states, as they were called, are very similar to some of the tasks and focuses of many other studies. The end states, depicted in figure 4.4, are “a safe and secure environment,
rule of law, stable governance, sustainable economy, and social well-being” (2-9). Key in this document were the cross-cutting principles of host country ownership and unity of effort among all the players. The manual takes each of these end states and describes them in some detail.

The chapter on security says “[a] country’s recovery from violent conflict depends first and foremost on the establishment of security” (6-38). Like so many other studies, security is a sine qua non for all the other end states. Without security, economic development, rule of law and social well-being cannot progress.

The section on social well-being is particularly useful. The document describes “[s]ocial well-being as an end state in which basic human needs are met and people are able to coexist peacefully in communities with opportunities for advancement” (10-162). Such a condition is not something the military can do. Should the situation demand it, the military must be able to provide humanitarian assistance, which is the beginning of the social well-being line of effort. Social well-being also includes basic services like medical care and education, along with food, water, and shelter.

In September 2011, the Joint Chiefs of Staff completed their doctrinal manual on stability operations. Even though it follows the basic ideas in the Army manual, the major mission elements are different. The manual calls these major mission areas functions of stability operations and they are listed as: security, humanitarian assistance, governance and participation, economic stabilization and infrastructure, and rule of law (Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011). This different approach reflects some refined thinking since the Army manual was published in 2008.
Summary and Conclusions on U.S. Approach to Stability Operations

The last two chapters have discussed some theoretical thinking about the various functions that must be performed by the international community to bring a nation-state back from the ashes of war. The functions were slightly modified throughout the three RAND studies. The Center for Strategic and International Studies book on Winning the Peace provided some of the initial thinking and the U.S. Institute of Peace book, Quest for Viable Peace established their functions from practical experience. With these studies setting the tone, doctrines and guidelines were developed. Military doctrine and the USIP guidelines were developed from practitioners’ views and experience. Table 4.1 outlines the various studies and lists the functions.

What is immediately apparent is the wide variety of functions that the various studies identify. Security is present in every study and governance and economic recovery are in almost every approach. As for economic development, the Army saw reconstruction as an important function, which in turn leads to economic recovery. Some studies include civil administration in governance, while others separate it out. Humanitarian assistance plays prominently in the military side of the analysis while civilian-oriented studies focus on social well-being. Justice was one of the initial functions in earlier studies, but that gave way to rule of law in later studies. Earlier studies saw the creation of police as a security issue, but later the analysis has led to an
agreement that rule of law includes establishing police services along with a judicial system and a penal system.

Reconciliation finds its way into some studies as a separate category while others include it in the rule of law function. Both the Utstein study and the CSIS study saw reconciliation as an important component in protracted social conflict. Here the animosities and hate created over centuries must be addressed both inside and outside the judicial system. Inside the judicial system war criminals need to be brought to justice, but work outside the judicial system is also critically important. Outside the judicial system interveners must work to change attitudes, which in turn lead to behavior changes. This might be the work of the military, NGOs, and academics bringing together both groups to sort out their differences and develop a better understanding. It could mean creating multi-ethnic military organizations or even sponsoring sporting teams, all aimed at reducing ethnic and religious tensions. In essence, everyone involved in the

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peacebuilding process must be involved in reconciliation. It will take efforts in every sector to ensure attitude and subsequent behavioral change.

The bottom line is the functions that any peacebuilding effort must undertake vary from situation to situation. In Kosovo, civil administration became important because there was none. In Rwanda, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, reconciliation was important to begin the personal healing from the atrocities committed. In most cases, governance is important. If the international community supplants the local government with an interim administration, then the governance function might take a backseat to issues like rule of law. The Utstein study had it right; the chart in table 4.1 should be considered a palette or menu to begin the analysis of what functions are necessary in a plan for peacebuilding.

Interveners must study and analyze every conflict and determine what might be the best functions on which to focus their efforts. Not every peacebuilding effort will be the same, but the chart is a good starting point. A palette is a better analogy because the designers of a peacebuilding process, after analyzing the situation, can take a little of this function and a little of that function and combine into a new function or define the function to suit the needs of the local people in the conflict. Again, any plan must be based on the needs of the local people.

This study is about the military’s role in peacebuilding. Yet the term peacebuilding does not mean the same thing to all. Peacebuilding is the more globally recognized term. Unfortunately, the U.S. military is focused on stability operations.

From a purely military standpoint, what functions might be the best for the military? Security is the easiest one. All of the studies point to the fact that security is a
sine qua none for the various functions. Without security no other functions can begin. Humanitarian workers cannot begin to deliver aid, governance processes and rule of law cannot start, and economic recovery is virtually impossible.

There are many versions or approaches to the issue of security. There is international security, national security, human security, safety and security, and public security, just to mention some that come to mind when reading about this subject. This study excludes topics like global security, environmental security, and cooperative security. International security focuses on relations between nations or, in broader terms, an integral part of the field of international relations. According to Michael Sheehan (2005), the terms war and peace, disarmament, arms control, arms races, alliances, and coalitions of the willing come to mind when discussing international security. National security, from a nation-state perspective, links that state into the international security arena.

Safety and security are really checklists that international organizations, NGOs, and even nonmilitary national organizations use to determine whether it is safe to send their personnel into the conflict zone. Public security was an old term that was used to address police functions, judicial systems, and penal systems – what we now call rule of law.

Human security emerged as a new perspective and stems from the work of the United Nations. Human security reoriented the common thinking about security. The definition of security went from a state-centric international approach to an individual
approach. This individual human security perspective is what the military must focus on when conducting stability operations (peacebuilding).

Thus, for the purposes of this study, security should focus on the individual, not the state. Taking security from individual perspective means that people need access to the basic necessities of life: food, water and shelter. To achieve this, individual’s need freedom of movement, as do the aid agencies that might provide these necessities.

Additionally, individuals must be free from fear and free to carry out their daily lives. Security also means that police and judicial systems are in effect to protect people from criminal activities and that armed groups are controlled by the state and do not oppress the people. Acts of violence are controlled and those that occur are investigated and dealt with in accordance with the customary laws. So in essence, the military working in peacebuilding must look at security through the eyes of the people they are protecting – an individual focus versus a state focus.

Overall, the government of the United States has come a long way toward understanding stability operations (peacebuilding). Historically, the U.S. military has always been involved in some sort of nation building activities. Since Vietnam, however, many of the lessons of the past were ignored. Efforts in Panama in 1989, Somalia from 1992 to 1994, and the early years in Afghanistan and Iraq were marred by flawed decisions and assumptions. During the Clinton administration, operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor went better. Still, the military was stumbling in the dark as to how to conduct peacekeeping, which plays a large part in peacebuilding. In the end, the U.S. military learned from these experiences and those soldiers who found themselves in
Afghanistan or Iraq applied the lessons they learned. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction said it right: with no established plans and doctrine for nation building, the United States, including the military, struggled to deal with postwar Iraq (SIGIR, 2009, 323).

Policies and programs for Afghanistan and Iraq were flawed, but creative soldiers with experience in peacekeeping did what they could, even with flawed policies. Just as the U.S. military is a learning organization, so is the U.S. government, albeit slowly. In the course of six years, from the invasion of Iraq in 2003, to the creation of the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, to the publication of a whole-of-government doctrinal manual in 2009; the United States has studied, analyzed, and adapted its policy and programs to deal with failed and fragile states. The concepts that have emerged are sound and well-articulated. The concepts are not only written down for new generations of peacebuilders to learn, but are used by practitioners every day in various conflicts around the globe.

With increased populations, the potential for global warming, and man’s propensity for violence to obtain his basic needs, the world will continue to present unique challenges for the more developed world to solve. The United States is better prepared to face these challenges in the years to come. It is only hoped that national policies and decisions to engage in peacebuilding will be a priority for the United States.

After conducting all the research behind peacebuilding, stability operations, and nation building, it is clear from multiple sources that any effort to help fragile or failed states must start with establishing security. In most cases, when nations get to the brink of
failure, their security apparatus is no longer effective or becomes part of the problem. It is only through outside intervention, and sometimes military intervention, that security conditions can be brought to a manageable level so civilians can begin their work.

In the last two chapters, numerous studies have been discussed, all of which establish a list of functions on which to base planning for stability operations (peacebuilding). Table 4.1 depicts these categories. In analyzing all of these approaches, security stands out as the most common and finds its way into every group study. Without security, civilians cannot perform the functions in nation building for which they are better suited. Without security, relief agencies like the U.S. Agency for International Development, the British Department for International Development, the Austrian Aid Agency, the International Committee of Red Cross, UN Agencies, and NGOs like Doctors without Borders or World Relief, cannot even come into the conflict zone. Without security, the other functions -- governance, economic recovery, and rule of law-- cannot be performed either.

It is clear from all the studies conducted over the last eight years that these functions must all occur simultaneously if a country is to recover from war or sectarian or ethnic violence. There are clearly actions that must be taken for every function at multiple stages as the failed state moves toward self-sufficiency. No function can be ignored. All must be addressed from the beginning of the intervention until the last advisors leave. This necessitates careful and detailed planning that goes well beyond the military plan, but also includes the efforts of multiple civilian agencies.
For the military, this means appropriate functions must be selected on which to base its doctrine and training so soldiers can be prepared to undertake nation building. Table 4.1 shows many overlapping functions. Not all studies agree on what are the right functions. For example, in many studies, governance is present in all; however, some studies include civil administration as part of governance. The USIP study on Kosovo listed civil administration separately from governance.

The RAND 2 study, *Beginner’s Guide to Nation Building*, included sections on both governance and democratization. The chapter on governance includes starting early with governing functions, perhaps with an interim administration as was done in Kosovo and Iraq. Later, as the book describes democratization, key leaders are selected and political parties are formed. So in this study, civil administration was included in the governance portion of this work. In the chapter on democratization, Ambassador Dobbins (2007) and his team followed the notions of Francis Fukuyama in that democracy is the final form of governance. They strongly advocated democratic approaches to governance over autocracy, monarchy, or oligarchy. The “Democratization” chapter focused on writing constitutions, organizing for elections, free press, and educating the civil society.

If we examine these two functions, at least from the RAND study’s point of view, they are entirely different. However, if one analyzes what role the military might play, then it certainly cannot ignore governance. The military’s role might be diminished by the fact that a local government exists or an interim administrative authority is appointed.

Perhaps when security is extremely limited, the military might simply find some grassroots leaders with whom to work and establish the initial rudiments of a functioning
administration to get basic services running. From a purely military perspective, governance and democratization can be combined into one function, governance.

Another function is establishing some form of economic recovery. The U.S. Army version of the functions does not include economic recovery, but does include two categories: provision of essential government functions and emergency infrastructure reconstruction. Most governments, either national or local, provide essential services to the people. This includes water, sewage, power generation, road management, and trash removal. Other services include medical, education and, at times, telephone service. At least according to the U.S. Army, the U.S. Congress limits the amount of emergency infrastructure repair the military can perform. Essentially the military engineers can repair a road or electrical system if it supports their mission. However, if the service is exclusively for local civilian use, then guidance and funding must come from outside the military chain of command. Solely civilian use projects must be contracted out through the U.S. Embassy or some type of interim authority. Thus, the Army looks at infrastructure repair with a narrow view. That is why their doctrine calls it emergency infrastructure repair. Just about every other publication, except those of the U.S. Army, sees economic recovery as an important function, including the U.S. Joint doctrine.

Perhaps there are some circumstances where the military will not engage in economic recovery, but this will be very limited. The U.S. Army missed this important function. Economic recovery is critical, especially if one wants to get former warring factions into some sort of work. This could mean creating local contracts to clean up debris from the war, hiring local civilians to do some reconstruction work, or providing a
space where local residents can set up shops to begin selling their wares. General David Petraeus, while commanding the 101st Airborne Division in 2003 in Mosul, put a lot of emphasis on opening new local markets. Visitors who came to his area in Iraq were often given the opportunity to walk with a patrol in downtown Mosul where local vendors were starting the beginnings of a market economy. General Petraeus learned this lesson from his time in Bosnia, where local markets quickly sprang up near military bases. It should be noted that in Bosnia, these vendors located themselves near military bases because security was better.\textsuperscript{10}

The bottom line is the military in peacebuilding will be involved in the following functional areas: security, humanitarian assistance, governance, economic recovery, and the formation of rule of law – police, penal systems, and a judicial system. Which one is more important might be based on the security conditions. These security conditions must be based on the human security definition, which is focused on the individual, not the state systems. Security must provide individuals the freedom to go about their daily business of earning a living, purchasing food and shelter, and sustaining a family. It also means that individuals will be free of fear from oppression by governmental security apparatus, warlords, or roving gangs.

If one were to use an analogy of a rope, where all the strands make up the strength of the rope and the major strength of the rope is based on a core material that is stronger than all the individual strands, then this might approximate the idea of how to build a sustainable society that either is on the verge of collapse or recovering after the collapse.

\textsuperscript{10} The Author visited Bosnia from 1999 to 2002 and in 2003 walked with a patrol through the streets of downtown Mosul.
Security is the center strand that brings strength to the whole rope, while the inner strands of humanitarian assistance, economic recovery and rule of law are also important to the overall strength. Governance is the outer strand that wraps the whole process together and keeps them functioning as a whole. Each of these individual strands adds additional strength to the overall effort. Such an analogy is depicted in figure 4.5.

![Figure 4.5](image)

These functional areas match very closely the draft version of the new U.S. Joint Publication on Stability Operations, JP 3-07. There is one exception, and that is the thin line of reconciliation. Reconciliation is fundamentally a part of the rule of law function, but the military must see this function independently. Under the rubric of rule of law, efficient and effective judicial systems, both locally and nationally, will help adjudicate things like property rights; fair treatment of individuals regardless of race, color or religion; and equitable distribution of goods and services. Reconciliation under the rule of law will also handle issues like human rights abuses, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. Where the military must focus its energy in reconciliation is to
promote equality among people and work to resolve some of the deeper ethnic and religious tensions.

In all, much has been learned by the entire international community over the last ten years on the methods for conducting peacebuilding. Military peacekeepers have learned the importance of integrating their efforts with those of civilians in the peacebuilding process, and the entire international community is beginning to understand that unity of effort is essential among all the various actors in the peacebuilding field. To fully achieve unity of effort, an integrated plan must be developed from the very first intervention and the plan must be modified at each step of the way. Perhaps the best way to define those steps is through the fundamental function of security.

Peacebuilding cannot begin unless there is some semblance of security. Yet, establishing security conditions before beginning humanitarian assistance, governance, economic recovery and infrastructure rehabilitation, rule of law and reconciliation is not the best way to run a peacebuilding effort. All must begin early, probably before security conditions are fully established. This research is focused on the security conditions and the role of the military in the other functions. To uncover what the military should do in humanitarian assistance, governance, economic and infrastructure rehabilitation, rule of law and reconciliation, this study will use security as the independent variable and the other functions will serve as dependent variables. Through case studies and surveys, this research will attempt to determine the role of military forces in stability operations (U.S. term) or more appropriately, peacebuilding.
CHAPTER 5

METHODOLOGY: ANALYZING BREEDING TECHNIQUES

Overview

The primary purpose of this research is to help the U.S. military understand its role in stability operations or the more internationally known term, peacebuilding. As outlined in chapter 4, the entire U.S. government, including the military, is taking a serious look at its role in stability operations. The creation of an agency within the State Department and a new policy issued by the Secretary of Defense demonstrate that the Bush administration found fault with its approach and preparation for postwar Iraq, and consequently is trying to determine a unified national approach to peacebuilding or nation building.

This change in focus comes about despite several U.S. military commitments to peace operations in Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and other UN missions during the late 1990s. These missions pointed a way toward future security challenges in the twenty-first century. Even with this experience, the U.S. military did not alter its singular focus on winning its nation’s wars. Throughout the U.S. Army there was a pervasive attitude that, when called upon, the U.S. Army would deploy to a conflict, defeat any adversary, and then return home within months. The attitude was solidified in lessons from the crises in
Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf–Desert Storm. Many military officers, however, with experience in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, acknowledged that a long-term commitment of forces would be required to bring about sustainable peace in countries like Iraq.\textsuperscript{11} Those who believed this in the late 1990s were in the minority.

Donald Rumsfeld declared victory in Afghanistan in 2001, after special operations forces routed the Taliban, yet nation building was not part of the U.S. military mission in 2001 and through most of 2002. As the U.S. military’s focus shifted to Iraq in early 2003, most military planners thought Operation Iraqi Freedom would be a short war, with troops returning to the States in less than a year. Reconstruction and stabilization would be the work of the Iraqis with assistance from various other U.S. departments and agencies. Quickly, the situation changed and the war became a protracted insurgency. The American military was forced to change its mindset, and began to see that defeating the insurgency would only be possible if they expanded their tasks beyond security and took on more nation building (peace-building) tasks—humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, economic recovery, governance, and management of the Iraqi civil administration.

As the war spiraled out of control in the fall and winter of 2004 and continued unabated through most of 2006 and into 2007, security was not assured. Roadside bombs, sectarian violence, and other terrorist activities prevented many organizations outside the Army from helping in the rebuilding process. Security was the primary reason that NGOs

\textsuperscript{11} General Eric Shinseki, who twice commanded U.S. forces in Bosnia, was essentially fired from his job as Chief of Staff of the Army for advising Congress in February 2003 that more forces for the stability tasks would be required in Iraq than the Secretary of Defense proposed.
and other international organizations played a far less role in Iraq than in other postwar efforts. Consequently, the military had no choice but to take on most of the nation or peacebuilding tasks.

With the signing of DoD Directive 3000.05 in November 2005 (and the similar policy directive in 2009), the military acknowledged that it had a role to play in nation building, but recognized that it was a support role. Just what kind of support was required was not determined. Security certainly was a major task, but what about humanitarian assistance, reconstruction of infrastructure, governance, civil administration, economic recovery, and reconciliation? By December 2006, ideas regarding which tasks the U.S. military might be asked to perform were beginning to emerge. Many outside the military, however, disavowed that the military had any role beyond security.

As mentioned previously, the purpose of this research is to determine the role of the military in stability operations. Stability operations were defined in chapter 4, but for the purposes of my research, stability operations are synonymous with nation building and peacebuilding.

This chapter will outline the thinking and methodology behind this research project. My experience in the field and over a decade of work in these subject areas led to the determination of my hypotheses and the process of proving or disproving them. My research and experience led me to conclude that the role of an external military force in each of the areas—security, humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, economic recovery, civil administration, governance, and reconciliation—may be dependent on the security situation on the ground. Therefore, the hypotheses of this research is based on the
security dimension as the independent variable and humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, governance, civil administration, economic recovery, and reconciliation as the dependent variables. Consequently, the role of an external military force will be inversely proportional to the security achieved in the conflict zone. If security is not assured, then the role of the military is higher. Conversely, if security is good, the role of the military will be much less. As security conditions improve, the role of providing security can shift to local police and military forces, and an external military force can be reduced and eventually withdrawn. Improved security conditions also provide opportunities for NGOs, international organizations (like the UN) and other national agencies, which are more skilled at these tasks, to perform the role of humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, governance, rule of law, economic recovery, and reconciliation.

Selecting a Topic.

Undertaking a dissertation, especially in the field of conflict analysis and resolution, is a daunting task. Picking the topic and then beginning the research stymies many doctoral students; however, the best approach is to review the literature and begin in an area that interests you, the researcher. The research will encompass many areas and a considerable amount of time both in research and reflection. Selecting the right topic is the first step on a long road.

My task was made easier because the subject area chosen was something that I researched, studied, and practiced throughout a decade of work. My time as the Military Advisor to the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations from 1996 to 1999 exposed me to
the growing field of peacekeeping. While advising several ambassadors, I came to know
and understand United Nations peacekeeping in all its aspects. It was a time when UN
peacekeeping seemed to be the solution to many of the world’s failing nations; however,
failures of UN peacekeeping in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda caused the organization to
reevaluate its role in international conflict resolution. As UN peacekeeping found its
footing again, I represented the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute (PKI). From 1999 to
2003, again I was immersed in peacekeeping. With the U.S. Army committed to peace
operations in the Sinai, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, and a variety of UN observer
missions, there was much to study and experience. As the Director of PKI, I taught
peacekeeping in a number of forums and visited many peacekeeping missions. Each year
the organization developed themes or concepts to explore in a conference hosted by the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Those six years influenced my thinking and desire to pursue an advanced degree
in Conflict Analysis and Resolution. There was more to conflict resolution than
peacekeeping; hence, the best plan was to study at one of the premier institutions, George
Mason University’s School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution. After applying for the
doctoral program, I was called upon to use my expertise in helping Iraq recover from war
and the totalitarian regime of Saddam Hussein. Six months in Iraq working for the Office
of Humanitarian Assistance and Reconstruction and then the Coalition Provisional
Authority solidified my desire to learn more. The United States had not performed well in
Iraq, and some key decisions caused the conflict to escalate rather than set a course for
peace. Upon returning to the United States, I soon retired from the Army and began my doctoral program.

Before I began my doctoral program, many colleagues advised me to select a topic early and write all the papers for the program geared toward exploring the topic. At the time I assumed I would write about peacekeeping, but I kept my mind open and looked for the right topic. What plagued me was the feeling that peacekeeping was not enough to resolve violent conflicts. Peacekeepers in the past only provided security, but from what I witnessed in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Eritrea, and Iraq, soldiers were beginning to do more than provide security. The military’s role in peacekeeping was changing, as were the roles of civilians from a variety of organizations.

In the second year of my graduate studies, I participated in a study abroad program supported by George Mason’s Center for Global Education. Focused on conflict analysis and resolution, Professor Yehuda Lukacs took approximately twenty-five graduate students to Northern Ireland, Cyprus, and Israel to study and experience the conflicts in these countries. After spending a month in these conflict areas and analyzing each, I concluded that soldiers needed to do more than just the security dimensions of peacekeeping; yet there are other participants (NGOs and IGOs) in the peacebuilding process. All must work together toward a common purpose. Thus, my topic area for this dissertation became peacebuilding and my focus became the military’s role in peacebuilding.

The time I spent helping to rebuild Iraq was a motivating and influencing factor. As the Deputy Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance, I worked closely with many
nongovernmental agencies, other U.S. agencies, other nations, and the U.S. military. Our
approach was broad and daunting, but the people who volunteered were determined to
succeed. Unfortunately, policy decisions in Washington plagued our process. First, the
team organized from the Department of Defense started too late to really understand the
nature of the problem in rebuilding Iraq. Second, the political infighting between the
Department of Defense and other U.S. governmental agencies stymied our work. The
early decision to replace retired three-star general Jay Garner with Ambassador Paul
Bremer put the whole rebuilding effort in jeopardy, and ultimately led to some bad
decisions on the part of the U.S. government: disbanding the Iraqi armed forces and the
Ba’ath Party. It became my goal to understand why these decisions were made and how
the United States might have performed better.

While I was directing the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, the Institute worked
with the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) to publish a small handbook entitled Guide to
IGOs, NGOs, and the Military in Peace and Relief Operations. This practical guide
focused on three communities: the military, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The purpose of the book was “to make it easier
to establish a good working relationship by giving each group—IGO, NGO, and
military—a better idea of how the other two work” (Aall, Miltenberger, and Weiss, 2000,
ix). The organization of the book was quite simple. There were three sections, each
describing how that organization worked and giving some information about that type of
organization. The book was a huge success and found its way to many people working in
peace and relief operations in the field. In a later discussion with USIP’s Pamela Aall in 2007, I learned that the book was republished many times because of high demand.

Taking from the success of the first USIP book and focusing on the new ideas emerging about stability operations within the U.S. government, Robert Perito, also from the USIP, took the concept a step further in 2007. He edited A Guide for Participants in Peace and Stability and Relief Operations. With the interest in peacebuilding around the world and within the United States, this book became a welcome and useful handbook.

Also throughout my time with the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, I attended many conferences, some sponsored by the military, others by NGOs, and many by think tanks in Washington, D.C. At these conferences, the four communities—the military, NGOs, agencies within the U.S. government, and international organizations—met to discuss various issues surrounding peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and international relations. It was clear that in the area of peacebuilding, the four communities needed a closer working relationship.

From my exposure to NGOs and other U.S. government agencies beyond the Department of Defense, I came to realize that each had its own view of their role in peacebuilding or nation building. At times the four groups -- the U.S. military, NGOs, civilians in the U.S. government, and civilians in international organizations -- were in congruence and at other times totally at odds. Relations in the field were not exactly cordial, but still all four saw a common purpose in their work—helping nations recover from the devastation of war or violent conflict.
The late 1990s was a period of much introspection about the new world order that was emerging, at least from the perspective of those in Washington, D.C. The Cold War was over and there was hope that the United Nations would finally fulfill its charter. Many books were written about the role of the United Nations, how other nations might engage in world affairs, the role of NGOs, and the proper role of the military in peace and relief operations. The general consensus, at least on the part of the various conferences I attended and the books that were published (Oakley, Dziedzic, and Goldberg, 1998; Crocker, Hampson, and Aall, 1996, 1999; Durch, 1996, 2006), was that the world was in a state of chaos, or as Robert Oakley et al. put it, a “world of disorder.” Nations were no longer being pursued by the two superpowers for influence and friendship. Many nations that were still throwing off the yokes of colonialism were now finding their own way in the world, and many of the solutions became violent.

This was also a period of growth for nongovernmental organizations. While pursuing my master’s degree at the Naval War College in 1996, I analyzed the role of the growing number of NGOs. Nongovernmental Organizations, or volunteer nonprofit organizations as some call them, had been around since the turn of the twentieth century when Henry Dunant founded the first Red Cross movement in 1863. By 1914, there were a little over one thousand NGOs, and these numbers remained relatively stable, with only a slight increase until the mid-1970s, when it peaked at about five thousand. By 1985, the number of NGOs doubled and doubled again in the next ten years, reaching 21,780 in 1995. (Oliver, 1996) By 2011, the number of NGOs climbed to over 50,000, according to the Encyclopedia of Associations: International Organizations (Thompson, 2011). This
same period saw an increased role for the United Nations and other regional organizations (NATO, OSCE, AU, ECOWAS, etc.). Many nations were supportive of the United Nations in the years preceding the Cold War, but the United States often saw it as a superfluous organization. This changed when the Cold War ended. On January 31, 1992, at the first and thus far the only meeting of heads of state at a UN Security Council, President George H. W. Bush said:

We meet at a moment of new beginnings for this institution and, really, for every member nation. And for most of its history, the United Nations was caught in a cold-war crossfire. And I think back to my days here in the early seventies as a Permanent Representative, of the way then polemics displaced peacekeeping. And long before I came on the scene and long after I left, the U.N. was all too often paralyzed by cruel ideological divisions and the struggle to contain Soviet expansion. And today, all that’s changed. And the collapse of imperial communism and the end of the cold war breathe new life into the United Nations.

It was the confluence of these communities that sparked my interest in the roles of the military, NGOs, various nations, and international organizations. From 1996 to the time of this writing, I have been actively engaged with these communities either in positions of formulating policy, active in the field, or writing and researching. I came to the conclusion through my years of experience and education that peacekeepers alone could not resolve a conflict. A much deeper understanding and commitment is required to find a road to sustainable peace through peace-building processes. Still, the military had a major role. Since I was a former military officer during much of this time, I naturally gravitated to the military’s role in peacebuilding.
Research Design

The first question any researcher has to ask is why is this research important or valuable? Will it add to a body of knowledge and contribute in some way to practices in the field? The bottom line: is it relevant and useful? Cone and Foster (2006), in their book *Dissertations and Theses from Start to Finish*, devote the better part of an entire chapter to selecting a useful and meaningful topic. After stressing that a dissertation is not the private work of the student, but a collaborative effort among many in the field, Cone and Foster observe that any research topic must contribute to literature or science. In a textbook used by the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, Colin Robson (2002) focuses on real world research, which will be the nature of my research. Real world research, according to Robson, may affect policy as well as contribute to an academic discipline.

The intent of this research is to not only contribute to the literature on the subject of peacebuilding, but to help, in a practical way, in sorting out who does what in the very complicated and convoluted process of rebuilding a nation after it experiences the horrors of war and violent conflict.

For me, selecting a subject came only after a tremendous amount of reading, analysis, and introspection. Ultimately, I hope to influence policy and practices, not only within the U.S. military, but in the U.S. government’s approach to stability and reconstruction, and quite possibly on the entire field of conflict analysis and resolution.

The first task after selecting a topic was to determine my research question. For the better part of a decade (1996–2005), while a U.S. Army officer, I had personally
worked to change the mindset of the U.S. Army and the Department of Defense on the military’s role in peace operations. When DoD Policy 3000.05 was first released in draft in September 2004, it was titled the “Defense Capabilities to Transition to and from Hostilities.” Strategic, operational, and tactical errors in rebuilding Iraq were the impetus for this change.

The Army, in 2004, was already reevaluating its role in stability operations with much of the debate led by General David Petraeus, then the commander of all Army schools and educational institutions. General Petraeus is a unique Army officer who served in two peace operations, Haiti and Bosnia, and has a doctorate from Princeton. His dissertation on the use of military force in Vietnam provided him the insight to rewrite the Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine in 2004, and then put it to use when he was named the commander of the Multinational Force in Iraq in 2007. Prior to 2004, stability operations were a part of U.S. Army doctrine, but little training or education was devoted to understanding the military role.¹²

The U.S. Congress also entered the debate over the role of the United States in stability operations. In March 2004, Senators Richard Lugar and Joseph Biden introduced a bill to the Senate entitled “The Stabilization and Reconstruction Act of 2004.” The intent of the bill was to broaden U.S. government involvement in stabilization and reconstruction activities in countries where it is within U.S. interests to respond quickly to post conflict situations. It was aimed at expanding the capacity of civilians working for the U.S. government to respond quickly to help nations recover from violent conflict.

¹² From 1996 to 2003, I served in a variety of military positions that promoted peace operations and contributed to the development of doctrine on peace and stability operations.
When the second draft of the DoD Directive was released in February 2005, I was quite frankly shocked at the wording of the completely revamped document. It stated that “stability operations are a core military mission.” I had been seeking this for many years, but had met significant resistance. Now, in black and white, the Department of Defense was seriously looking at the role of the military in stability operations. However, there was still some resistance. When the Directive was finally signed on November 28, 2005, the title and scope of the Directive had changed. The title was changed to “Military Support to Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR).”

My first question when I read the final version was, “what does support mean?” More research and discussions with a variety of key DoD staff members led me to believe that the military support role was yet to be defined. In fact, one DoD official who worked on the Directive admitted that she was shocked when the policy came back from the Secretary of Defense’s office with the words “Military Support” inserted into the title and text. For this reason, asking the question; “what does support mean?” became my main research question.

Research conducted up to this point and my own experience in the field concluded that the military had a role in peacebuilding beyond security. It included humanitarian assistance, reconstruction of infrastructure, governance, and assistance in civil administration (including the rule of law). To me, it was obvious that security played a dominant role in influencing what other agencies did in the field of peacebuilding. All of this led to the following research questions:
Since security is an integral component of peacebuilding, can the other aspects of peacebuilding progress without security being fully established? To what degree can humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, governance, and infrastructure repair progress without adequate security, and if so who should provide it?

How should security be defined in the context of peacebuilding? More important, what is the amount and type of security that is necessary before a full international effort (nonmilitary) can take on all aspects of peacebuilding?

Does the military have a role in peacebuilding beyond the security dimension? If security is established in a conflict zone, does the military still have a role in the other aspects of peacebuilding?

Can soldiers make the transition from war fighting to peacebuilding effectively?

As I followed the various debates in Congress, around the Pentagon, and among think tanks regarding the military’s role in stability operations, I was beginning to develop my research strategy and to prepare my dissertation proposal. Additionally, a number of books and articles (Boutros-Ghali, 1995; Dobbins et al.; 2003, 2005, and 2007; Orr, 2004; Covey et al., 2005; Chiarelli, 2005; JFCOM and State CRS, 2004) were beginning to spell out various concepts for nation building or peacebuilding. In late 2006, the most senior military staff in the U.S. Armed Forces, the Joint Staff, released a document entitled “Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction, Joint Operating Concept.” The document supported the DoD Directive by providing some ideas that could be used for experimentation and an initial guide toward the development of more formal military doctrine on SSTR. Many of the ideas were drawn from books recently published on this subject.
None of the publications, books, or articles really defined security, but all indicated that security was very important for all elements to work. Some spelled out various roles of organizations, but not in any detail. What was meant by military support needed a lot of work, as did the role of the military. It became clear that the support provided by the military was dependent on the level of security in the conflict zone. In discussions with my dissertation committee and many experts in the field, I decided that my hypotheses would be as follows:

- **Hypothesis 1 (H₁):** A secure environment is essential for peacebuilding to commence, but this is not a simple requirement. Peacebuilding will progress more effectively the better the security environment.

- **Hypothesis 2 (H₂):** The military has a role in peacebuilding beyond security. This includes all aspects of peacebuilding—humanitarian assistance, infrastructure repair, civil administration, governance, and economic recovery.

- **Hypothesis 3 (H₃):** The military’s role is inversely proportional to the degree of security in the conflict zone; for example, in a conflict zone where there is no security, the military must perform all the roles envisioned by other organizations (nongovernmental organizations, other government agencies, and the international organizations).
  - **Hypothesis 3A (H₃a):** The more security improves, the less the military has to do in peacebuilding and the more other nonmilitary organizations can perform.
Hypothesis 4 ($H_4$): When the requirement for humanitarian assistance toward local populations exists, the military must dedicate significant resources toward humanitarian assistance regardless of the level of security.

Hypothesis 5 ($H_5$): The more junior the officer, the more committed he or she is to the expanded role of the U.S. military in peacebuilding activities.

Hypothesis 6 ($H_6$): Those officers who participated in previous peace operations are more committed to the expanded role of the military in peacebuilding.

With all other aspects of peacebuilding dependent on security, security would be held as an independent variable while humanitarian assistance, civil administration (including rule of law), infrastructure repair, governance, economic recovery, and reconciliation were the dependent variables (see figure 5.1). This distinction would isolate, focus, and limit the research on the security dimension of peacebuilding.

William M. K. Trochim, as well as other research methods authors, recommends that a researcher develop a null hypothesis after the hypothesis is specified. The null hypothesis ($H_0$) for this research project is that the role of the military in peacebuilding is not related to security. In other words, regardless of the level of security, the military would still

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<th>Independent Variable</th>
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**Figure 5.1**
Dependent and Independent Variable for Research
deliver humanitarian assistance, assist in civil administration, conduct infrastructure repair, assist in establishing forms of governments, provide economic assistance, and help reconcile differences among groups.

Another aspect stressed in graduate courses on research design and also covered in Denzen and Lincoln’s *Handbook on Qualitative Research* (1994), is the development of a research model or as Cone and Foster (2006) call it, a concept model. This pictogram helps visualize the research design (see table 5.1). The model helps translate research questions into research projects. In qualitative research, a research model is particularly useful, as it is often hard to visualize complex concepts. The model simplifies one’s thinking. Early on in my research design, the following research model was developed, and refined, to support the research questions and hypotheses. The next step in the process was to define security levels. With security as the independent variable in my research and the basis of the various hypotheses, it was important to understand all dimensions of security. The definition would play a pivotal role in the research, defining security from the standpoint of when various organizations would arrive in a conflict zone and who would do what, and when. None of the books discussed in the literature review defined or described security in a manner that fit the research. Mike Dziedzic (1998), Scott Feil (2004), Robert Perito (2004), and Albrecht Schnabel (2005), all colleagues with whom I became acquainted in my decade of working in this field, provided some insight into the definition of security that was necessary for this study. In fact, Scott Feil was the first reference to indicate that all aspects of peacebuilding are linked. He said “security is the necessary foundation on which progress in other issue areas rest” (2004, 40).
Most of these references described the various problems in the security dimension of peacebuilding, and several provided recommendations on how to resolve those problems with various organizations responding to security challenges—military, constabulary, formed police units, international civilian police, and local police. None, however, developed a definition of good or bad security. The breakdown of law and order (Feil, 2004; Dziedzic, 1998) and the presence of armed gangs, violent demonstrations, and organized crime (Perito, 2004) all contribute to the lack of security. Dziedzic (1998) was the first to introduce the notion of security gaps—a period when local security forces...
no longer function and prior to the arrival of external or international security or military forces. Robert Perito later elaborated on this concept in briefings and writings about the peacebuilding challenges of reestablishing security when local police and judicial systems fail. This eventually led to Perito’s book (2004) on constabulary forces. He felt that military forces were ill-suited to conduct police work but were necessary to fill the security gap before international and local police forces could be present in the failed state.

Since none of the references defined security as my research intended, it was necessary to develop my own definition. Through a review of many references and my experience in the field of peace operations and peacebuilding processes, I was aware of few concepts that would help define security as it applied to my research questions and hypotheses. These included rule of law, freedom of movement, refugees and displaced persons, the presence of international civil servants and NGOs, and lastly spoilers—those who want or intend to disrupt the peace process. These sub-issues would help define various levels of security, so they could be used to support my hypotheses. Defining multiple security levels became a central issue to the research.

The first dimension, rule of law, is covered extensively by a number of scholars and practitioners. An Australian lawyer, Mike Kelly, with whom I would work closely in Iraq in 2003, described in 1998 the concept of public security. Public security incorporates all aspects of the judicial system. Police, judges, and penal systems can be compared to three legs of a stool. As in a stool, public security cannot perform its intended function without all three legs operating properly. The concept of public
security in the late 1990s gradually changed to a more widely known concept—the rule of law. Thomas Carothers in *Foreign Affairs Journal* (1998, 96) outlines a workable and suitable description of rule of law:

> The rule of law can be defined as a system in which the laws are public knowledge, are clear in meaning, and apply equally to everyone. They enshrine and uphold the political and civil liberties that have gained status as universal human rights over the last half-century. In particular, anyone accused of a crime has the right to a fair, prompt hearing and is presumed innocent until proved guilty. The central institutions of the legal system, including courts, prosecutors, and police, are reasonably fair, competent, and efficient. Judges are impartial and independent, not subject to political influence or manipulation. Perhaps most important, the government is embedded in a comprehensive legal framework, its officials accept that the law will be applied to their own conduct, and the government seeks to be law-abiding.

With this definition of the rule of law, the presence of effective police programs and penal systems, and a comprehensible judiciary system became one of the components of a definition of security. As Mike Kelly said in 1998, “[j]ustice reconstruction issues are centrally tied to this objective [a viable functioning state]” (400).

Another component in describing levels of security is freedom of movement. The term “freedom of movement” was first introduced to me during my visits to and research on the conflict in Bosnia, 1991–2004. Freedom of movement was denied to many NGOs, UN workers, and citizens of the country from 1991 to 1995 by the Yugoslav military forces. It was also an issue when U.S. forces were in Somalia from 1991 to 1993. Often NGOs and other relief workers were denied freedom of movement because of threats to their personal security.

Freedom to move about a state is a fundamental right in most countries. It is considered part of the U.S. Constitution under the Fifth Amendment. It is also covered in
the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights. This Charter states that “[e]very
individual shall have the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders
of a State provided he abides by the law.” U.S. Supreme Court Justice William O.
Douglas, in his opinion for the Court regarding the case of Kent v. Douglas in 1958, said
“The right to travel is a part of the ‘liberty’ of which the citizen cannot be deprived
without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. . . . Freedom of movement
across frontiers in either direction, and inside frontiers as well, was a part of our heritage”
(Douglas, 1958).

Lessons learned from the U.S. military’s participation in peace operations in
Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq
have focused on freedom of movement for all people within a country in conflict. The
U.S. Army first introduced the concept of freedom of movement in the late 1990s as one
of the fundamental principles guiding peace operations. These principles of peace
operations were incorporated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in military
doctrinal manuals. The most recent Joint Publication on peace operations, published in
October 2007 (JP 3-07.3, viii), continued with the Army’s thinking on freedom of
movement. This military doctrinal manual states that “Freedom of movement equates to
maintaining the initiative. As amplified in the peace agreement, no restrictions are
allowed against the movement of the PO [peace operation] force. Freedom of movement
for the civilian population may be a necessary condition to maintain and allow the
transition to peace to continue.”
The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the member states of the UN have resisted for many years the development of any doctrinal manuals for peace operations. In 2003, DPKO released a *Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping*. Like the U.S. doctrinal manuals, it includes various fundamentals but freedom of movement is not one of those principles. The 2008 UN peacekeeping doctrine does not mention or address freedom of movement in any way. In both documents, however, under the principle of consent, freedom of movement is an embedded concept. In the context of the definition of security for this research, freedom of movement is a right that citizens (and visiting relief workers) expect in most developing nations. It is the freedom to move about a particular country without fear of attack, robbery, or persecution. Citizens of the state, NGOs, and other nations’ aid and relief workers should have complete freedom of movement around the country. The lack of freedom of movement is an indicator of a lower level of security.

Refugees and displaced persons present another issue that must be included in defining levels of security. The act of fleeing one’s home or city is positively an indicator of lack of security. According to the UN High Commission of Refugees’ 2006 Annual Report, there are over 9.2 million refugees and 5.4 million internally displaced persons worldwide. (The good news is that the number of refugees has been reduced by half since 1992. This is primarily the result of reduced armed conflict around the world.) “Of all the reasons that drive refugees to flee their homes, none is as great as fear. It may be fear of direct physical attack or of a conflict where rape, torture and ethnic cleansing are part of military strategy.” (UNHCR, 2006, 63)
According to the above quote from the UNHCR’s 2006 Report, fear is the strongest motivator causing people to flee their homes and become either refugees or displaced persons.

When security is lower, then the number of refugees and internally displaced persons increases. The conflict that erupted in Kosovo in 1999 is a classic example of what happens when human security is threatened. From April to June 1999, more than 860,000 people fled their homes (Clarke, 2002). Adding the disposition of refugees and displaced persons to the definition of security levels reflects reality.

On August 19, 2003, Iraqi terrorists bombed the UN Headquarters in Baghdad. Three months later the headquarters of the International Committee of Red Cross was also bombed. These two incidents resulted in all UN workers, NGOs, and other international organizations leaving Iraq. The coalition of military forces was left with the task of stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq. As articulated in earlier chapters, the presence of NGOs and international organizations are critical to the peacebuilding process.

The NGO CARE International takes the security of its personnel very seriously—as do many NGOs. With input from a variety of NGOs, CARE developed a very useful handbook. Chapter 2 of the CARE handbook addresses security in some detail and provides a guide for all CARE employees to recognize when increased security
awareness is necessary. Security assessment is a continuous process. CARE also recognized that security conditions are different in various countries, but the handbook does define low, moderate, high, and severe risk conditions. Without stating exactly the conditions that are unacceptable, CARE International, as do most NGOs, evacuate their personnel from conflict areas when the risk to their employees becomes unacceptable.

InterAction, whose goal is to “demonstrate and enhance NGO accountability and impact in development and humanitarian action,” represents 165 U.S.-based NGOs. In 2006, InterAction developed the “Minimum Operating Standards for Security (MOSS).” Although only a basic guide, the MOSS asks its members to develop and implement security plans and procedures, much like CARE’s handbook.

The United Nations used the MOSS principles for many years. Starting in the late 1970s, the UN became concerned with UN employees in conflict zones. By the turn of the twenty-first century, there was renewed interest that led to guidelines, similar to MOSS, for security managers (Phillips, 2007). Until 2004, there were essentially four offices responsible for safety and security of UN employees all over the globe. These included the UN Security Coordinator, the Safety and Security Service, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and security managers in various semi-independent UN agencies, organizations, and programs (UN Report on Safety and Security, 2003).

Following the bombing of the UN Headquarters in Iraq in August 2003, a commission was established to investigate what went wrong with UN security. The commission concluded that the UN’s safety and security policies were “dysfunctional” (UN Report on Safety and Security, 2003). One of its recommendations was to assign
responsibility for security to one individual for all UN workers in a conflict region. In the past, each UN agency used its own judgment in reaching decisions about security. Additionally, the report recommended a complete review of all security systems in the United Nations and the development of “a robust security management system.” These recommendations led to a General Assembly Resolution in February 2005 that advised the Secretary General to revise the security procedures for civilian UN employees. The Secretary General combined all responsibility for managing and training UN employees in safety and security into one department, the UN’s Department of Safety and Security.

Because of my associations within the United Nations, I was able to contact and meet a colleague who worked in the Department of Safety and Security. During the meeting, he provided some information from the UN’s Security Handbook, which is an internal document not normally released to outside organizations.

The UN’s *Handbook of Safety and Security* existed within the UN system for years, but the bombing of the UN’s Headquarters in Iraq gave new emphasis to the safety and security of UN staff in conflict zones. Based on the review of the Independent Panel on Safety and Security in Iraq and internal reviews of all UN security procedures, the UN Secretary General placed more emphasis on safety and security and assigned the bulk of the responsibility to the Department of Safety and Security. Responsibility for security is clearly defined for each UN mission. Additionally, UN staffs are required to adhere to the five-phased security plan, which ranges from caution to total evacuation.

The UN’s Safety and Security *Handbook* does not describe how key security managers are to determine which phase should be implemented. This is done during the
training conducted by the department. The *Handbook* does, however, discuss issues such as crime, detention, and hostage taking.

All of my experience and research led to defining security at multiple levels. These levels would become an integral part of further research. By presenting these levels to various groups of individuals, judgments could be made as to when the military performed various tasks and when other organizations would perform them. Based on the complexity of security and the importance of which organizations should do what, five levels of security were created for conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Anticipating using these levels in a questionnaire, I chose the model of a five-point Likert scale. Three levels would not provide enough differentiation, while seven levels would be cumbersome (see table 5.1).

The next step in my research design was to follow the guidance of Cone and Foster (2006) and not conduct the research in isolation. In June and July 2007, the research design and approach was vetted with several experts in the field of stabilization and reconstruction or nation building. These included think tanks, academic institutions, policy makers, nongovernmental organizations, and finally members of my dissertation committee. In these meetings, they reviewed my research questions, hypotheses, definition of security, and research approach. All agreed that my research was unique and valid. During those meetings I discussed the idea of case studies and questionnaires. Several offered their support in the questionnaire distribution.
Epistemology is a form of philosophy that explores the origin, nature, and acquisition of human knowledge. Any research should be done scientifically with systematic, skeptical, and ethical approaches (Robson, 2002). Yet there is much debate...
on the value of qualitative versus quantitative research. Many sciences lend themselves to experimental research, where conditions can be frozen and analyzed in sterile conditions. Researchers have developed other methods to conduct studies in the qualitative sense.

According to Robson (2002), positivism is often compared to empiricism (yet there is not an agreed-upon definition of either) and results in a quantitative approach to research. In the purely positivist sense, scientific research attempts to control and manipulate subjects to understand the meaning of their behavior. Quantitative research involves reducing all observations to numbers, and where possible, controlling the conditions so as to understand the true meaning of human actions. These numbers can then be statistically analyzed to acquire deeper understanding of a particular topic with regards to trends, differences and relationships.

In contrast, some fields of study cannot be controlled or manipulated. There are times when it is ethically and morally inappropriate or technically impossible to manipulate human beings and the society in which they live. The real world does not stand by to wait for research to be done; it moves on. The challenge then becomes how to conduct research in such a setting without altering the sometimes careful balance of society. This dilemma has given rise to the qualitative approach to research, where more emphasis is placed on analyzing the causal relationship with words and actions. Qualitative research involves gaining knowledge through observation, analysis, or insights into a particular subject.

Denzin and Lincoln provide a good definition of qualitative research. “Qualitative research is multi-method in focus, involving an interpretive, naturalist approach to its
subject matter. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural
settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings
people bring to them” (1994, 2). Denzin and Lincoln go on to say that a qualitative
researcher needs to be a “jack of all trades” employing multiple techniques. Based on the
subject matter, the researcher develops concepts and methods that meet the needs of the
research. In short, there is no single method that suits all studies. Hence, the concept of
“mixed methods” research.

Robson (2006), Barnes and Bloor (1997), and Hollis and Smith (1990) argue that
human research and real-world research do not lend themselves to a strictly positivist
approach and require a more relativist approach, which means that all points of view are
valid. Hollis and Smith (1990), for example, slightly alter the traditional positivist
approach and describe procedures where scientific methods can be used to explain and
understand human behaviors. According to Barnes and Bloor (1997, 21), “knowledge is
said to be relative to persons and places, culture and history . . .”

The qualitative approach to research evolved over the last several decades and is
now accepted by most educated professionals as a scientific method to acquire
knowledge and understanding about a particular topic. Ethnography, phenomenology,
field research, and discourse analysis, just to name a few, are accepted approaches to
qualitative research. Information is gained through observation, structured and
unstructured questionnaires and interviews, and case studies.

Qualitative versus quantitative research was debated for the better part of the
twentieth century with no complete resolution. In The Research Methods Knowledge
Base, a web-based textbook, the author describes the qualitative versus quantitative debate as “much to do about nothing.”

Peacebuilding or nation building is a concept that cannot be isolated and manipulated. The lives and well-being of humans are at stake, and consequently research in this area, as Robson would support, must conform to the situation.

To research social phenomena, social scientists have found a middle ground: the realist approach. Methodological realism emphasizes that things happen whether or not we are aware of them. For example, when a tree falls in the forest, it makes a sound even though no one is there to hear it. Realism also incorporates social objects like human interaction. Robson (2006, 35) says that “Realism accepts that there are fundamental differences between natural and social phenomena. This means that different methods have to be used for different subject matters.” Therefore, realism opens the door to more methods of scientific research in the social world. It allows one to hypothesize and develop theories on issues that occur in the real world. “Realism can provide a model of scientific explanation which avoids both positivism and relativism” (Robson, 2006, 29). In other words, it also avoids the qualitative/quantitative debate.

As a researcher, I consider myself a realist. Although well-grounded in math and science, I soon came to realize that the social world requires a realistic approach to understanding human motivations, behavior, and actions. Consequently, the research for this project will combine both the qualitative and quantitative approaches. Robson (2006) would classify this approach as a combination of fixed and flexible designs. Fixed designs include surveys and statistical analysis of hard facts, while flexible designs
include many of the qualitative methods mentioned earlier. The research will involve surveys, interviews, and case studies to understand the role of the military in peacebuilding. By combining both fixed and flexible approaches to the research, I hope to gain a thorough understanding of the topic. Qualitative and quantitative methods will reinforce each other. In the end, I intend to conduct this research systematically with an open skeptical mind, and with high ethical standards. In essence, I will use mixed methods of research.

Before proceeding further, I must say that I was fortunate in my experience and contacts while developing my research strategy. Over the last ten years in the field of peace operations both inside and outside the military, I have worked with international organizations including the United Nations, several Washington, D.C.–based research institutions, various NGOs, and a multitude of contacts across many U.S. agencies outside the Department of Defense. These contacts in the peacebuilding field became invaluable in many ways. Not only was I able to elicit their insight; I received many offers of help. One senior vice president of an NGO told me that had he not known me, I would not have even gotten my foot through the door.

Quantitative Design-Survey

If one follows politics (as I do), the value of the survey seems to be a credible approach to gaining knowledge about particular subjects. Surveys are a part of our lives. Don Dillman (2007) supports and encourages students to conduct surveys in their research design. Dillman has explored and written about mail and Internet surveys for the better part of two decades. In the 1970s, he did not recommend mail surveys, but with the
advent of technology, he now advocates mail surveys and has even more encouraging views about Internet surveys.

The research design and questions are focused on the role of the military in peacebuilding, so military officers who plan and carry out stability operations are the focal point of my surveys. However, fully recognizing that certain civilian agencies play a prominent role in peacebuilding, they, too, are a source of valuable information. Civilian agencies within the U.S. government and U.S.-based NGOs were also included in the survey population, so as to balance the views of the military.

Surveying U.S. government employees is challenging and difficult. Within the Department of Defense there are many rules and bureaucratic procedures that protect military personnel. The U.S. Army is particularly reluctant to allow surveys of their officers and soldiers.

Many military officers, however, remember post-Vietnam surveys that had a major impact on shaping the future of the U.S. Army. In the early 1970s, when Vietnam was all but a lost cause, U.S. Army officers and senior noncommissioned officers were leading an “army in purgatory” (Scales, 1994). A number of individuals conducted surveys to help the U.S. Army understand its plight. Even as of this writing, senior officers, both active and retired, remember the value those surveys played in rebuilding the U.S. Army.

As a recently retired Army officer, I was fortunate to have colleagues and acquaintances in a number of key positions that might facilitate surveying Army and
Marine officers attending various professional schools. As a former professor at the Army War College, a guest lecturer at the Army Command and General Staff College, and a professor at the Naval War College, I felt confident in obtaining approval to survey officers at these institutions. These schools would provide enough officers in the grades of major, lieutenant colonel, and colonel to closely replicate a respectable sample of Army and Marine officers holding those ranks (see table 5.2). Additionally, many of these officers were fresh from their experiences in either Iraq or Afghanistan. Further, as a professor at the Naval War College, I have access to a smaller population of Army and Marine officers in two different academic years to conduct a pilot test of my survey and to survey new Army and Marine officers who attended this school. In essence, I was an unusual graduate student uniquely positioned to conduct a survey of this design. There are two types of surveys: questionnaires and interviews. Due to the limited amount of available time in completing my dissertation, I chose to use questionnaires and only and conduct interview surveys if the individual decided to commit to an interview.

Ideally, the questionnaire might have been more beneficial had it been administered two or three times, several years apart—1999, 2002, and 2007 for example. This was not possible in this research project.

In the questionnaire, opinions are solicited concerning past issues. Certainly their opinions have changed over time. Dillman (2007) cautions a researcher that gathering beliefs and attitudes about past behaviors is difficult and often not reliable. However,

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13 All U.S. military services send their officers to professional education schools. These schools prepare officers for increased responsibility and expose officers to more senior-level leadership and decision-making practices, update them on their service, and expose them to other services.
since surveys were not conducted in earlier years, this was the only way to analyze and prove hypothesis H5.

Army and Marine officers attending the three military schools were the primary target populations because of their availability. Also attending those schools were Air Force and Navy officers, but because of their limited role in stability operations they were excluded from the research. With the population of students attending these schools, it was possible to survey enough students to gain a fairly accurate opinion of the entire population of Army majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels and a close approximation of Marine majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels.

Dillman (2007, 206) describes a well-known formula for determining sample size, although there are a number of formulas. According to Dillman (2007, 206), a “few completed questionnaires can provide surprising precision at a high level of confidence.” The formula is as follows:

\[
N_s = \frac{(N_p)(p)(1-p)}{(N_p-1)(B/C)^2 + (p)(1-p)}
\]

Where \(N_s\) = completed sample size
\(N_p\) = size of population
\(P\) = proportion of population expected to choose one of the two responses
\(B\) = acceptable amount of sampling error
\(C\) = Z statistic associated with the confidence level (1.96=95% confidence level)

This formula works well for large populations. Unfortunately, as the population becomes smaller, the number of required questionnaires does not decrease significantly. The formula worked well for Army officers with the higher populations. To achieve these
numbers, it was necessary to primarily target Army schools, which have higher populations of Army students. For example, the Army War College has approximately 180 officers in the grades of lieutenant colonel and colonel each year; and 1100 majors attend the Army Command and Staff College. Given the representative Army students in attendance at the two Army schools, the number of respondents to the questionnaire, assuming approximately a 60 percent response rate meant that a respectable number of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Entire population*</th>
<th>95% Confidence level**</th>
<th>Target population assuming 60% completion rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army majors</td>
<td>13,946</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army lieutenant colonels</td>
<td>10,857</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army colonels</td>
<td>4,474</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine majors</td>
<td>3,740</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine lieutenant colonels</td>
<td>1,965</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine colonels</td>
<td>737</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Service Officers (State Department)</td>
<td>6,588</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
<td>2,223</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.-based NGOs</td>
<td>Unknown, estimate 10,000</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.2
Survey Population for Military Officers
questionnaires would be obtained (see table 5.2).

For Marine officers, there are several problems associated with gaining a good representative sample. First, the number of U.S. Marine majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels is much lower than in the U.S. Army, thus requiring larger numbers of completed questionnaires proportionally. Second, the Marine Corps is small. It relies on other service institutions for educating its officers. Although the Marines do provide their own education, it is on an extremely small scale.

Another reason for targeting majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels was a well-founded perception that the Army was changing from the bottom up, not from the top down. While at the Army Peacekeeping Institute, it became obvious to me that the junior officers understood the nature of peacekeeping and peacebuilding better than the general officers, primarily because the junior officers had experience in peace operations and very few general officers did. Consequently, these junior officers came to understand the future security challenges better than their seniors. As the conflict in Iraq unfolded, junior officers began to speak out about the failure of generals. Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling (2007) wrote a balanced article entitled “A Failure in Generalship.” The article, in a professional way, stated that the current general officer corps in the U.S. Army led the Army to a flawed operational design for nation building in Iraq; much like previous general officers led the U.S. Army to a flawed operational design in Vietnam forty years earlier. To reinforce this notion, a November 2007 Washington Post article (Tyson, 2007, 1) stated: “[s]ome junior and midlevel officers who have served in Iraq and Afghanistan have been particularly outspoken in their criticisms, saying the Army’s current leadership
[generals] lacks hands on understanding of today’s conflicts and has not listened to feedback from younger personnel.”

To complement the opinions of Army and Marine officers, it was necessary to also target three other primary populations—State Department Foreign Service officers, officials in the U.S. Agency for International Development, and U.S.-based nongovernmental organizations. These organizations play a role in peacebuilding, and their opinions must also be heard. Although the primary research effort was geared toward military officers, obtaining input from other organizations would balance input and help confirm the hypotheses. During the planning for the research, it was foreseen that the method of obtaining responses from the State Department, USAID, and NGOs would not achieve the requisite number of respondents to reflect the opinions of these groups with a high degree of confidence. For example, it would be very difficult to achieve over 200 responses from USAID officials to represent a 95 percent confidence level (see table 5.2). The purpose of obtaining responses from the State Department, USAID, and NGOs was to compare and contrast them with the responses from Army and Marine officers.

With the target population identified, a questionnaire was created to confirm or disconfirm the hypotheses. Over the course of several weeks (March and April 2007), the survey questions were drafted and considered. Each day brought new ideas to the questionnaire and feedback from many colleagues at the War College helped immensely. Dillman (2007) proved to be an ample guide in the development of questions for the survey. His principles for question development and overall survey design were also an
excellent guide. By following Dillman’s guidelines such as use simple words, be specific, avoid biases, and avoid objectionable questions, the taxing task of developing a workable questionnaire was made easier.

Both Dillman and Robson (2006) recommended “Likert” or scalar concepts where questions were either on a five-point or seven-point scalable answer (e.g., strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, and strongly agree). S-CAR Professor Solon Simon, after reviewing the questions, also recommended that a “no basis to judge” response be added to the questions so as not to confound the “neutral” response. Besides a few demographic questions, the majority of the questionnaire used a version of the Likert scales.

The questions went through several revisions, new ideas being inserted only to be changed at a later review. Development of the initial questionnaire takes time and requires a great deal of thought and reflection. As the questionnaire came together, the use of the security levels played prominently. The concept developed was to first determine people’s opinions about the role of the military and other organizations involved in peacebuilding in a generic sense. Later in the survey, the security levels would be introduced and the questions asked again. This resulted in a fairly long questionnaire. (I was criticized for this, but rejected the criticism.)

I wanted to gain some insight from the experience of my target audience, Army and Marine officers fresh from Iraq and Afghanistan. This necessitated an additional section to ask specifics about their role in peacebuilding. (Note: not all survey
respondents would be able to answer this section.) Again, this made the questionnaire longer.

The process of gaining approval to administer the questionnaire takes time, especially when working with officials in the U.S. government. Months before I began the questionnaire development, I contacted the Army War College in Carlisle, PA, the Naval War College in Newport, RI, and the Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, KS. These were the primary target locations. All these schools had large numbers of officers from all services participating in academic programs. Obtaining institutional approval was necessary to help guide the questionnaire development and the timing of distribution. All begin their ten-month academic programs in August. Thus, my target for distribution of the questionnaires was the fall of 2007.

The time to gain approval from these institutions, with the exception of the Naval War College, took much longer than anticipated. As a serving professor at the Naval War College, the process of obtaining approval was rather easy. I wrote a formal request to the Provost of the College, and his approval came very quickly. The Army War College and Staff College were more problematic. The Army War College required approval from the Army Research Institute (ARI) before considering the request. With approval from ARI, the Army War College would send the request to survey officers to an internal board for review and recommendation.

The Army Command and General Staff College did not require approval from ARI, but had their own internal quality assurance office that managed requests to survey or interview officers attending their courses. After a review by the quality assurance
office, a recommendation would go to the Dean of Academics, who would make the final decision.

Before approaching either institution, approval to conduct surveys and interviews required a review by the George Mason University Human Subjects Review Board. The Office of Research and Subject Protections was very helpful in explaining the process and providing feedback. In all cases, however, the first step in the process was to complete the questionnaire.

Pilot studies are highly recommended approaches for scientific inquiry (Dillman, 2007; Robson, 2002). Once the questionnaire was drafted, a small group of Army and Marine officers at the Naval War College were selected to conduct the pilot study. The Senior Service Advisors for the Army and Marines were asked to recommend officers who would provide reliable input for the pilot study. Eleven Army officers (three colonels, three lieutenant colonels, and five majors) and five Marine officers (one colonel, two lieutenant colonels, and two majors) volunteered to participate in the pilot study. A draft paper copy of the questionnaire was delivered to each person in the pilot group in May 2007.

Respondents in the pilot study were asked to complete the questionnaire and put notes in the margin regarding the appropriateness and clarity of each question.

Additionally, they were asked to time themselves. One week after the officers completed the questionnaire, two meetings were held to discuss it. At these hour-long meetings each question was reviewed; issues such as clarity of questions, motivation to complete the survey, scale understanding, and the levels of security were discussed in
detail. Many useful comments were received. All agreed that the questionnaire took about fifteen minutes to complete. Following the pilot study, many questions were refined, revised, or eliminated.

With the questionnaire drafted and the research well under way, it was time to vet the survey and research design with several experts in the field. Dillman (2007) calls this “pretesting” and recommends that the research design and surveys be reviewed by “knowledgeable colleagues” (140). During June and July 2007, the research design was marketed and discussed with various military offices responsible for stability operations—the State Department, the Foreign Service Institute, the U.S. Institute of Peace, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and two nongovernmental organizations (Refugees International and World Vision). Each provided valuable insight and comments on the research and offered help when data collection was required. The president of Refugees International and the vice president of World Vision (both personal colleagues) agreed to distribute e-mails to their employees. The Foreign Service Institute was particularly helpful because they run a variety of courses for the State Department Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction. They offered assistance in distributing the questionnaire to students attending the courses in the fall of 2007.

While vetting the research design, George Ward, vice president of World Vision, recommended that the survey be done on the Internet and favorably endorsed a company called Survey Monkey. After reviewing several online survey companies, I came to the conclusion that Survey Monkey was a responsible, reliable, and affordable organization.
A contract was drawn up with them for a period of one year, which was extended three times.

Survey Monkey provided several advantages. First, the company provided an easy framework to design an aesthetic survey that respondents would be inclined to complete. Dillman (2007) states that a well-designed survey, which he calls “respondent friendly,” that is aesthetically pleasing and easy to use, would favorably affect completion rates. Also, the Survey Monkey website allowed a survey to be downloaded and used in a paper format. Because of security concerns, Department of Defense regulations do not allow researchers to use open source data collection (i.e., the Internet). This necessitated using paper versions for the Naval War College and Army War College. Survey Monkey also provided a website to distribute the survey and collected the responses in a file format that could easily be translated into SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences) computer program for statistical analysis.

George Mason University required a statement of confidentiality which, according to several researchers (Dillman, 2007; Robson, 2002), improves response rates. Confidentiality assures the respondents that the information obtained will not be traced back to them. Additionally, Dillman recommended a personal letter from the researcher be included in the questionnaire. The personal letter, which could be accommodated within the Survey Monkey design, explained the nature of the questionnaire, its importance for the peacebuilding (stability operations) community, and the fact that this research was part of a Ph.D. dissertation. No incentives were offered to complete the questionnaire (see Appendix B for a final version of questionnaire).
After vetting the research design and questionnaires with a variety of organizations, I requested approval to conduct the surveys from George Mason’s Human Subjects Review Board and the Army Research Institute simultaneously. This was a frustrating process because some questions were changed, altering their meaning and content. The professionals who reviewed the questionnaire were helpful, and in the end, their input and recommendations were valuable.

After the approval of the university’s Human Subjects Review Board (September 2007) and the Army Research Institute (August 2007), I prepared and submitted a packet for requesting approval to administer questionnaires to the Army War College and Command and General Staff College. In October 2007, the Army Command and General Staff College denied the request, as the subject matter was not relevant to the course in which the students were enrolled. That same month, I was scheduled to give a lecture (on the very topic of my research) to students at the Command and General Staff College. Consequently, I requested an appointment with the dean. At a meeting with the associate dean in October 2007, I was told to submit a rebuttal letter. Later that month, the College approved my request to administer the questionnaire to students; however, they shortened the survey. Questions relating to their experiences in stability operations were deleted. The survey was administered to students at the Command and General Staff College in February and March 2008 with a response rate of 35%.

Eliciting a response from the Army War College took much longer. For a variety of reasons not related to my specific survey, the decision was delayed for several months. Approval to distribute the survey was received in February 2008. One hundred and
seventy-six paper copies of the surveys were then distributed to the students in their official mail boxes. In early April 2008, 29 surveys were returned, indicating a 16.5% response rate.

It was my hope to distribute the surveys in the fall of Academic Year 2007-2008, as the students are more apt to respond quickly and with a higher response rate. The delay in gaining approval for the surveys at both the Army War College and the Army Staff College resulted in the distribution in the winter of 2008, when students were deeply involved in academic work and anticipating their next duty station. For the Army War College, students were also finishing a major research paper at the time the survey was distributed, which severely impacted on their time to take a survey. It might have been better to wait until the following fall and a new group of students to conduct the survey at the Army War College.

Administering the survey to students at the Naval War College, other agencies within the U.S. government, and NGOs began as soon as approval was obtained from George Mason’s Human Subjects Review Board. In September 2007, 117 paper copies of the questionnaire were provided to all Army and Marine students attending the Naval War College. Seventy-one completed the questionnaire, resulting in a 61 percent response rate.

Selecting respondents outside the military bureaucracy was more challenging, and involved more traditional data collection. There are multiple methods for distribution of a research instrument, each providing varying degrees of reliability. The most widely used and most reliable is random sampling. Random sampling works well for some research
designs, but not all. In this research there was no possible way to randomly select individuals from State, USAID, and NGOs. Consequently, another approach was necessary. Trochim (2001) recommends several methods of selecting sample populations including random, cluster, accidental or haphazard, convenience, expert, and snowballing. The only feasible technique for this research design and subject was a combination of the convenience, expert, and snowballing methods. Convenience sampling is contacting individuals who are accessible. Snowballing is a process where people are identified and asked to contact others. Expert sampling targets individuals with “known or demonstrable experience or expertise” in the subject area (Trochim, 2001, 55). Each of these methods has advantages and disadvantages. Snowballing and convenience sampling, for example, reduce external validity and could result in biased responses. Expert sampling may offset that disadvantage.

The U.S. State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and United States based NGOs were the target audiences for non-military questionnaire distribution. All three organizations could be considered hard-to-reach populations. Other than two NGOs, which combined would provide only a small number of respondents, there was no office or agency in any of these organizations to gain approval to survey their employees. The State Department and USAID are multi-tiered organizations with no office coordinating or interested in research of this nature.

As mentioned previously, I have been working in this field for well over a decade. The community of experts in peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and conflict resolution is a relatively small community that is closely networked. Often the same experts see each
other in conferences across the globe. Drawing on my numerous associates, I contacted 122 colleagues in the fields of peacekeeping, peacebuilding (stability operations), and conflict resolution. These included U.S. governmental officials, Washington, D.C.–based research institutions, NGOs, and military officers. All could be considered experts in the field. Through the Internet, I requested each of them to complete the questionnaire and to send it to other colleagues who might be interested (snowballing).

Additionally, since the research was generally focused on U.S.-based NGOs, all NGOs listed in the Guide to IGOs, NGOs and the Military in Peace and Relief Operations were sent a personalized e-mail requesting that their staff complete the questionnaire. Another e-mail was sent a month later. This blind e-mail approach resulted in a very low response rate, with very few e-mail responses indicating that the link to the questionnaire was not forwarded within their organization.

The Foreign Service Institute proved invaluable. The Institute, which teaches courses in reconstruction and stabilization, distributed a letter with an Internet link to the questionnaire. This electronic letter was sent to all students who attended one of four courses on stability and reconstruction offered in the fall of 2007. Additionally, the Foreign Service Institute sent the same electronic letter to all their contacts who took these courses in the prior eighteen months. The U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute also assisted in distributing the questionnaire at their annual conference on Training and Education in Stability Operations.

Essentially, there were two prime contact periods when thousands of e-mails were sent out asking recipients to complete the questionnaire and forward it to friends and
colleagues (snowball effect). The first contact period occurred during the last two weeks in September 2007 and the second took place during the last two weeks of October 2007. Immediately following the first contact period there was a flurry of activity on a daily basis on the Survey Monkey site. The volume dropped off with only a few responses each day. By October 15th, 222 had completed the survey on the Survey Monkey website. In order to obtain more responses, contacts were gently reminded about the questionnaire again at the end of October. This stimulated an increase in responses that dropped off again in early November.

An analysis of the categories of respondents in mid-October determined that there were low numbers of respondents from the State Department and USAID. This demanded another look at the procedures for contacting individuals. Understanding the format of e-mail addresses for the State Department and USAID, with the aid of State Department and USAID websites I was able to send out several hundred more e-mails directly to individuals. This resulted in doubling the response numbers for both State and USAID.

As of December 31, 2007, when the website was terminated, 322 people had opened the website and reviewed the questionnaire, but only 227 actually completed it. This seems to indicate a 70 percent response rate, but to call it a response rate would be misleading. There was no way to determine the actual number of persons contacted. Those who were interested by the introductory e-mail made an effort to open the Internet site. There were countless others who were contacted, but decided not to open the site. Thus, the response rate was most likely much lower.
Statistical analysis of survey responses will be covered in detail in chapter 8 of this research project, but the proposed plan for the statistical analysis will be discussed here. Statistical analysis provides the mechanism to translate survey data from mere numbers to information that is easy to comprehend.

Most survey statistics are presented in a simple manner by computing mean (average) responses and the respondents’ standard deviation from the mean regarding various concepts embedded in the survey questions. Other basic statistical analyses derived from the mean and standard deviation include frequency and percentage distributions, ratios, ranges, rates, and rates of change (Wright, 1979). Through various charts, graphs, and diagrams, the data of the survey come to light. The statistical package SPSS, 11.0 will be used to prepare these statistical charts and graphs.

From the questionnaire designed for this research project, I will be able to determine the mean response to a number of questions that will help explain military officers’ understanding of stability (peacebuilding) operations, their role in various elements of stability operations compared with the level of security (independent variable), the level of education in various aspects of stability operations, how junior officers understand stability operations compared with more senior officers, how military officers understand the role of civilian agencies (within the U.S. government and NGOs), and whether their experience in previous peace operations had an impact on their understanding of stability operations. In essence, the basic statistical analysis will help confirm or disconfirm all six of my hypotheses. The same will be true of civilian responses from NGOs, State Department Foreign Service Officers, and USAID officials,
although the sample size of these populations will be at a low confidence level. Additionally, the standard deviation will help describe how well the question was understood or how divergent the responses are from the mean. This will help determine the reliability and validity of the research.

However, in this research project, I will attempt to go beyond basic statistical analysis and perform some tests to compare means. For example, the data collected in this questionnaire will allow analysis that will compare means among Army and Marine officers who previously participated in peace operations with those who experienced stability operations only in Iraq or Afghanistan or have no experience. Also, I will compare the means between Department of State Foreign Service Officers, USAID officials, and NGOs. The use of analysis of variance (ANOVA) testing, regression, and correlation will allow various means to be compared with one another. Again, the SPSS program provides a fairly easy method to compute these detailed statistical analyses. The results of this statistical analysis are discussed in Chapter 8, but Annex B provides a much more thorough analysis.

Another part of the survey design was to interview those respondents who expressed an interest in participating. The last question in the questionnaire provided the means to contact the researcher for a follow-up interview. Interviews provide a more in-depth understanding of the questions than mere numeric responses do. Interviews allow the researcher to explore particular issues with the respondent to ascertain how the respondent feels about an issue. Robson (2002, 253) says that “the quality of data is likely to be greater than with an impersonal questionnaire.”
There are a variety of interview techniques that include fully structured, semi-structured, and unstructured techniques. Each has its advantages and disadvantages (Robson, 2002). Dillman (2007) comments on “mixed methods” to survey design. Mixed methods might include one group filling out the questionnaire while another group undergoes a structured or semi-structured telephone or face-to-face interview. Dillman, however, cautions against using mixed methods for surveys because sometimes the results are not comparable. Yet, the value of mixed methods is that if different methods produce similar results than there is enhanced validity.

In this research design, it was envisioned that one group would undergo a semi-structured interview while other groups would only take the survey. However, due to the time limitations, it was determined that interviews would be conducted only on a self-select basis. Fourteen people contacted the researcher for follow-up interviews. Sixty-five percent of those were military officers attending the course at the Naval War College and the Army War College. Their motivations for follow-up interviews could be construed as real interest and concern about the subject. However, after conducting the interviews, their motivation was more of an interest to speak with an expert in the field.

**Qualitative Design—Case Studies**

Case studies are a proven method for teaching. Many professors of higher learning use case studies to provide real-world depth to understanding concepts. If a particular issue is explored, putting the issue in a real-world context helps the student better understand the concept. Richard Neustadt and Earnest May (1986), two professors at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, taught a course on the use of
history in decision making. Based on their teachings, their book, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers*, prescribed the notion (but provided no proof) that policy makers like to point to historical examples to make decisions.

My own experiences from thirty years in the military brought me to the same conclusion. In fact, in my counsel to a senior general officer during the crisis in Kosovo in the spring of 1999, I used a previous example of how the United Nations was effective in managing a post-conflict environment in Croatia to prove my point that the United Nations was a credible and acceptable organization to manage Kosovo following the air war against the former Republic of Yugoslavia.

The case study is a valuable qualitative research tool, but according to Robert Yin (2003, xiii), it was often “stereotyped as a weak sibling among social science methods.” The debate on the case study, much like the debate of qualitative versus quantitative research methods, goes back to the beginning of the twentieth century. The Chicago School (from the University of Chicago) believed that knowledge could be obtained through intensive study of people. The Columbia school of thought pioneered by William Ogburn (Hamel et al., 1993) felt that sociology could not claim to be science without scientific and statistical rigor.

Faith in the value of case study research sprung from these debates. Yin (2003), Ragin and Becker (1992), and Hamel et al. (1993) all agree that the case study method of research is a valuable and useful qualitative research tool. John Gerring (2007, 5), a professor at Boston University, states that “case study holds an honored place among methods currently taught and practiced in social sciences.”
The first issue to address when using the case study approach is to determine what constitutes a case. For a doctor, a case is one patient; for a lawyer, a case may be a legal decision. Cases can range from one individual to an entire social situation. In general, however, a case is a detailed presentation of a subject under investigation. It requires the researcher to look at and evaluate writings such as official documents, scholarly writings, personal writings, novels, and literary works (Hamel et al., 1993).

According to Abbott (1992), Stakes (1994), and Gerring (2007), the next step in developing a good case study is to delimit the case. To delimit a case one must first start with a hypothesis—the reason for studying the case. From this hypothesis, the researchers can then look at the world and determine the persons, events, or situations that apply to the hypothesis. Generally, criteria are developed to help define the case. This gives the researcher insight into the entire identified population.

On Friday, December 21, 2007, the United Nations Security Council unanimously agreed to extend the peacebuilding mission in Sierra Leone for a final nine months. Sierra Leone underwent over two decades of unrest, but the commitment of a UN peacekeeping force in 1999 finally led to stability. In 2005, the peacekeeping mission ended and a new peace-building mission took over. Now this mission is about to end successfully.

Sierra Leone certainly could be a case to study and analyze. In fact, there are many peacebuilding missions that could be the basis for case study analysis. These include the most recent UN peace-building missions in Afghanistan and Burundi. It could also include the NATO- and EU-sponsored peacekeeping missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, or
any one of the seventeen ongoing UN peacekeeping missions or many of the twenty-one concluded UN peacekeeping missions.

James Dobbins et al. (2003) in their book, *America’s Role in Nation Building*, uses eight cases to bring out the lessons, while Robert Orr’s *Winning the Peace* (2004) uses five cases to illustrate his ideas. Lieutenant Colonel Richard Scott Moore (USMC, retired), a recent graduate of George Mason’s School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution doctoral program, completed a study on sixty-three military interventions conducted in the twentieth century. Each of these could be a candidate for a case study on the military’s role in peacebuilding.

In fact, there are many cases that could be studied and analyzed to determine the role of the military in peacebuilding, but the first task was to limit the number of cases through a rational process. The first limiting factor chosen was that the case had to involve the U.S. military, not some other military entity such as a UN mission. This reduced the number considerably. Additionally, the case needed to undergo sufficient analysis and reflection. This eliminated two candidates—the ongoing efforts in Afghanistan and the recently terminated actions in Iraq.

The cases also had to have historical significance that would help demonstrate their relevance to decision makers. This left for possible consideration the U.S. military role after the U.S. Civil War, the U.S. role in Germany after World War I and the U.S. role in Japan after World War II. All three of these cases were excellent candidates for inclusion and may result in my exploration of these cases in a later work. Because of the
scope of my research and the fact that the cases were being used to support the quantitative analysis, it was my desire to limit the cases to two.

For these reasons, I chose to analyze the U.S. military’s role in postwar Germany, 1945–1952 and postwar Kosovo from 1999 to the present. Germany provided an example where the United States, in conjunction with three allies, France, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, helped rebuild that country from the ashes of war to one of the most effective and productive nations in the world today. Additionally, research shows that many of the challenges facing the U.S. military today in Iraq are similar to the challenges facing the military prior to World War II. Last, the German case was considered a model for U.S. actions in Iraq.

Kosovo was selected primarily because of the large U.S. commitment of soldiers to the peacekeeping mission. Second, it is a modern-day case that incorporates the roles of prominent international organizations like the United Nations, NATO, the European Union, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as numerous NGOs.

I seriously considered Iraq as a case because Germany and Iraq are the two most recent examples of occupation by U.S. soldiers. Iraq was discounted by the dissertation committee because of the ongoing war there, and the fact that Iraq has not been sufficiently analyzed to determine whether it will be a successful peacebuilding mission. Last, the war in Iraq is a political electrode that elicits strong emotions from many, which affects the ethical analysis of any written products. Using Iraq could have been revisited to my committee because my dissertation took five years to write. I still believe,
however, the political views on Iraq are still too immature to accurately reflect the true nature of what happened, although much was written on this case.

**Reliability, Validity, and Ethics**

Reliability, validity, and ethics were a concern while conducting research. A reliable research product is simply one that can be repeated with similar results. The acid test for reliability is to administer the questionnaire and then later administer it again. If the same results were obtained, the experiment was reliable. Wright (1979) calls this the test, retest method. Wright recognized that it is not feasible to conduct a test again to determine reliability, so she recommends that within the research instrument checks and balances be included by asking the same question in different ways.

Validity refers to gathering the right information to support one’s hypotheses (Wright, 1979; Cone and Foster, 2006; Trochim, 2001). Validity can be broken down into a variety of subcategories. Construct validity refers to research design. According to Trochim, it answers the question, did the research instrument actually measure what the researcher intended? Robson (2002) mentions in *Real World Research* that in order to obtain construct validity, the research must attempt to isolate or eliminate biases. This is not simple; many factors can influence people’s opinions and judgments. Internal validity, on the other hand, focuses on the fact that there is a causal relationship (Trochim) between the variables as predicted in the hypotheses. For example, in this research, does the level of security impact on the missions performed by the military? Finally external validity refers to the generalization of findings. Does the population represent the information being explored?
Ethics in research is placed squarely on the shoulders of the researcher. In this research there was no deceptive measures used; nor were any of the respondents put in danger. They were merely asked their opinions on a survey. A researcher is ethically and morally responsible to safeguard the information obtained from any individual and to protect his or her identity. Likewise the researcher is required to present the findings in a straightforward ethical manner and avoid any personal biases or opinions when presenting the results.

In a broader sense, practitioners in the field of peacebuilding must be concerned with ethical principles. That is the reason for the NGOs’ motto of “do no harm.” Soldiers, statesmen, and relief workers all enter into an arena where they alter the political, social, and structural climate in a foreign country. These are grounds for serious ethical considerations. None of the research in this study will directly affect people or societies undergoing change. The research will be based on reflections of those who participated in peacebuilding missions or who have analyzed various peacebuilding missions. However, as a researcher who intends to influence policy and doctrine within the U.S. military, I make the issue of ethics for practitioners paramount in my work.

**Summary of Design**

The approach to this research was the result of years of work in the field. Experience provides a valuable base of knowledge, but research and reflection adds depth and greater understanding to any topic. Such was the case as I approached my work in the field of peacebuilding.
This research could not have been done by the average doctoral student. My contacts within the military, the U.S. Government, and with many NGOs provided me with access that few people have. It was this access that allowed me first to vet my ideas with experts, then to seek out support and assistance in conducting the research. Additionally, the doctoral program at George Mason University’s School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution provided further insight in the realm of what was possible and impossible. All my experience and studies came together in this research project.

The development of a survey instrument was a new undertaking for me, and one that I am glad I pursued. (See Annex B) The process was time consuming and required an extensive amount of follow up and patience. Had I not had plenty of time to wait for various approvals and the patience to work through many who thought they understand the business better than I, this project could not have been completed.

In the end, the survey data collected, in my opinion, were excellent. (see annex B) Every organization I approached, worked with me to obtain approval to administer the survey. Without the support of the Refugees International, World Vision, the Foreign Service Institute, the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, the Naval and Army War Colleges, the U.S. Army Command and Staff College, and a whole host of friends and colleagues, this research would not have been possible. In the end, 1206 people were contacted and 585 completed the survey in entirety. The end result was a 48.5% response rate, which equates to a respectable response to an important topic.

I must admit, however, that I was a little disappointed on the response rates from the Army War College and Staff College. As I mentioned earlier, I expected a much
higher response rate. The 61% response rate from the Naval War College raised my expectations, but the response rate was certainly affected by the timing of the survey. Both the Army schools mentioned that their schools are routinely approached for surveys, yet students at the Naval War College receive relatively few.

Both case studies selected had a wealth of information available. Research on Germany was facilitated by the declassification of many documents, many of which were obtained at the U.S. Army Military History Institute in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. There were also many books of first-hand accounts as well as a thorough analysis by military historians and scholars. Kosovo is viewed by many as a model for the United Nations to follow. Much has been written about this experience, more so than other peacebuilding missions in Africa. Although Kosovo was still an existing peacebuilding mission, many have written on their experiences and scholars produced numerous articles and books.

It is possible that my approach to this research project could be determined unethical. In gaining survey data, I relied heavily on my acquaintances to pass along the survey. Since many of these people know me, they could have influenced the data collection. I think not. I was careful to tell everyone I contacted to provide their own feelings about the questions and not try to influence my hypothesis (although few if any knew exactly what my hypotheses were). I personally believe the large number of responses received via the internet and the Survey Monkey tool were from people who are generally interested in the subject. Many of the responses came from experts in the field. In the end, however, the real test of my research will be from those who use my work to influence their understanding of the military’s role in peacebuilding.
As I look back on my data collection, I made several mistakes. First, I did not foresee the writing of my dissertation taking so long. Full time work as a professor took up much of my time. Had I foreseen this, I would have collected the survey data from the Naval War College, Army War College and Army Command and Staff College over several years and not just one academic year.

The biggest mistake I made was with George Mason University’s Human Subject Review Board. I made an inadvertent error on the Informed Consent Form that I sent to the U.S. Army War College. Since these surveys were done on paper, and not on-line, I left off the sentence required by the GMU Human Subjects Review Board (HRSB):
“While it is understood that no computer transmission can be perfectly secure, reasonable efforts will be made to protect the confidentiality of your transmissions.” Additionally, I briefed some of the initial results of the survey to one of my classes. This resulted in two individuals asking to take the survey, which were allowed to do so. According to my initial approval letter in 2007, I was only allowed to collect data for one year. Those last two surveys were beyond my one year approval. During my annual review of research in the summer of 2009 by GMU HRSM, these errors were discovered. Both my dissertation chair and I were admonished for MY failures. As punishment for not adhering exactly to HRSB guidance, we were both required to take on line Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative (CITI) Responsible Conduct of Research courses. Additionally, all the surveys from the Army War College were determined invalid and were removed from my data base. It took over a year to come into good graces with HRSB and gain authorization to continue the analysis of my research. The errors were entirely mine and
should not reflect on my dissertation chair. This was a valuable lesson in the conduct of human research. Attention to detail is absolutely necessary when conducting any kind of human research. When questions arise, contact the HRSB immediately.
The U.S. military’s role in peacebuilding and nation building goes back to the founding of the nation. Throughout American history, the military has been an instrument of power and was often called upon to do more than fight the nation’s wars. Soldiers protected settlements in the old west, built the Panama Canal, and rebuilt foreign governments. Studying history provides unique perspectives on when and how a nation should use its various forms of power in carrying out the policies and programs of state. The focus of this chapter is on case studies where the military was used to stabilize the government and rebuild a foreign nation.

Max Boot (2002), in his award-winning and engrossing book, *Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*, describes many small wars undertaken by the U.S. military in the 1800s. Through colorful characters like “Fighting Fred” Funston and Smedley Butler, Boot describes America’s role in China, the Philippines, Nicaragua, and Haiti. Embedded in the story line of these legendary, and yet relatively unknown, American heroes are accounts of how the military undertook nation building tasks. The methods employed might be arcane by today’s standards, but the message was clear: the U.S. military has conducted nation building for most of its history.
Max Boot’s book might have been inspired by a book by Army General Dan Bolger, *Savage Peace: Americans at War in the 1990s* (1995). Bolger, an inspiring and prolific author and a down-to-earth soldier, brings forth more modern-day military heroes as he depicts the American military’s efforts in places like the Sinai desert, northern Iraq, Somalia, and Bosnia. In these peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, the Clinton administration in the 1990s used the military for missions other than just fighting wars. In retrospect, the use of the military in nation building activities by President Clinton compares well with the views of Presidents Monroe, Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson, Hoover, Truman, and Kennedy about the role of the military.

In the 1800s, much of America’s role in nation building stemmed from the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, where President Monroe put Europe and the rest of the world on notice that the American continents were no longer open to European influence. Any attempt by other powers to influence the New World would be considered “dangerous to our peace and safety” (Monroe Doctrine, 1823). Essentially the United States would not interfere in European wars or internal affairs, and expected Europe to stay out of American affairs.

The Monroe Doctrine was carried out by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps; however, the Marines carried the lion’s share of the work. Because of their decades of experience, the Marine Corps in 1935 put their lessons into print—the *Small Wars Manual*. The manual’s purpose was to guide Marines when they intervened in foreign governmental affairs. The introductory chapter defined small wars as “operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with
diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life . . .” (1940, 1). The manual went on to state that: “[i]n small wars, diplomacy has not ceased to function and the State Department exercises a constant and controlling influence over the military operations” (4) and “[t]he motive in small wars is not material destruction. It is usually a project dealing with the social, economic, and political development of the people” (18). There were chapters on creating constabulary (police) forces, civil-military relations, military governments, and elections; as well as military techniques to deal with revolutionary (insurgent) forces.

In 1972, Ronald Schaffer wrote an article for *Military Affairs* about this manual. He called it a “prophetic” manual that was built on years of experience. Marines attending their basic schooling in 1938 received forty-five hours of instruction on the manual. By the beginning of World War II, the manual, according to Schaffer, was all but “forgotten.” After a brief interlude while the American military, particularly the U.S. Army, administered the rebuilding of both Germany and Japan, the U.S. military ignored the lessons of small wars.

During the early days of Vietnam, there was renewed interest in “winning the hearts and minds” of people. In Vietnam there were two wars being conducted at the same time. The first war was against the Communist regular forces from North Vietnam, while the second effort was preventing Communist influence in the villages and hamlets across South Vietnam (Andrade and Willbanks, 2006). The second war required the creation of a pacification program to win the hearts and minds of the South Vietnamese
people. The State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development had the lead in pacification for South Vietnam. In early 1966, President Lyndon Johnson reevaluated the conduct of the war. Many concluded that the pacification program was failing and the military focused too much on the other war. In March 1966, President Johnson selected Robert Komer, a trusted advisor from the National Security Council, to head the pacification program in South Vietnam. After his initial assessment, all U.S. agencies were brought under a single command—Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS). Komer insisted that the CORDS program come under the military because he could quickly get supplies, equipment, and people, unlike the slow process of requesting support from the State Department. Consequently, Komer became General Westmoreland’s deputy in the Military Assistance Command—Vietnam (MACV). According to Mark Moyar (1997, 49), who thoroughly studied the Vietnam War, “Westmoreland seldom exerted his authority over CORDS, which left control to Komer. . . . ‘Westmoreland’s interests always lay in big-unit wars; pacification bored him.’”

The CORDS program was a combined military-civilian effort. At the top was the military general, with Komer as the deputy. At each level of military organization, the same structure was in place: a military commander with a civilian deputy. At its height in 1969, CORDS employed 6,400 soldiers and 1,000 civilians and was located in each of the forty-four South Vietnamese provinces. The end result was a successful counterinsurgency program in the small towns and villages. A Hamlet Evaluation Survey conducted in 1971, concluded that by 1970, 93 percent of the South Vietnamese people
lived in relatively secure areas, an increase of 20 percent since 1968 (Andrade and Willbanks, 2006).

In 1973, Russell Weigley, a distinguished history professor at Temple University, wrote *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*. Weigley’s thesis was that the American military focused on big wars where the militaries of two nations met on the field of battle. Through increased technology and overwhelming military power, America would be victorious. To say Weigley influenced the American military’s thinking would be misleading. Weigley, through his historical examples, pointed out the obvious—what the military already knew and practiced.

Following Vietnam and the continuation of the Cold War, the U.S. military, and particularly the Army, focused its energy, training, and doctrinal development on facing the Soviet Army on the plains of Eastern Europe. Vietnam ended as a failure and throughout the halls of the Pentagon, American civilians and senior military officers quietly dismissed counterinsurgency, irregular warfare, and the lessons of civil-military coordination from Vietnam. This was reflected in the halls of many military academic institutions like West Point, the Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, and the War Colleges in Washington, Newport, and Carlisle.

All military training and education was focused on an “American style of waging war centered primarily on the idea of achieving a crushing military victory over an opponent” (Echevarria, 2004, v). Lieutenant Colonel Echevarria, a researcher at the U.S. Army War College, goes on about Weigley: “[t]he phrase ‘way of war’ as it is used here refers to general trends in the conduct of, and preferred modes of thinking about war.
Specifically, in an American context, it reflects the fundamental ideas and expectations, albeit modified in practice, that the U.S. military profession and the U.S. political leaders have, or have had about war, and their respective roles in it” (1). Echevarria wrote his article about the American way of war in 2004, while Weigley penned his work in the early 1970s. Echevarria did not agree with Weigley and used Max Boot’s cast of characters and the recent American experiences in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq to refute Weigley’s claim that the American military and its leaders were not willing to engage in long-term protracted warfare necessary to win strategic objectives.

The U.S. military’s role in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, slowly changed the American military mindset toward warfare and the proper use of the American military. In fact, when the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, the Clinton administration used the American military in peacekeeping efforts in Haiti (1994), Bosnia (1995), and Kosovo (1999). The American military’s role was moving away from Weigley’s premise. This change was slow and often resisted by many senior military leaders.

After September 11, 2001, the world changed, but that did not change America’s mindset on the role of the military. President George W. Bush and his advisors quickly developed a slightly modified Weigleyan strategy for Afghanistan and then Iraq. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld determined that with the use of high technology and improved mobility, smaller military forces could provide a crushing victory on the battlefield. Early successes in Afghanistan led to a similar approach in Iraq in 2003. It
was soon realized, however, that larger numbers of personnel and a different approach were required to win the peace, not just the war. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the American military found that in order to win the hearts and minds of the people (win the peace), the military must focus on nation building tasks.

Theories about how to approach nation building provide a framework, but case studies put that framework into a real setting. Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, in their 1986 book, *Thinking in Time*, demonstrate that leaders learn better through historical examples. The two cases selected here, Germany after World War II (1945-1952) and Kosovo from 1999 to 2008, provide a unique look at the American military’s role in stabilizing war-torn countries. In both cases, the role of the military was brought into question; yet in both the military was deeply involved in providing security, delivering humanitarian assistance, reconstructing the economy, helping to restore governance and civil administrations, and working to reconcile differences among groups. The lessons from these case studies can help determine a proper course for American military leaders and their civilian counterparts.

The two cases studies are uniquely selected from many possible candidates. Germany provides some interesting lessons with which policy makers in Washington are still struggling today. The role of the State Department versus the Defense Department has been an issue in almost every conflict where the United States committed significant resources—personnel and money—toward nation building. The question of who does what and when still plagues American decision makers. There is greater depth in the Germany case study than in Kosovo, because the role of the military in postwar Germany
is more widely published. On the other hand, less known about Germany among today’s practitioners. Additionally, much of the material from postwar Germany was declassified, while much of the information about Kosovo is still protected.\textsuperscript{14}

Kosovo is a more modern case and demonstrated the growing role of the United Nations after the Cold War. Kosovo, more than Germany, presents some challenges that will be issues the next time the United States commits resources to peace building (nation building) efforts. The United Nations played a key role in Kosovo, and one that is likely to continue in the foreseeable future. The military, on the other hand, had a supporting, albeit important, role. Additionally, the American military worked alongside other nations’ military forces to bring peace to the region. Lastly, Kosovo demonstrates the new niche for nongovernmental organizations in modern-day conflicts.

\textbf{GERMANY- POST WORLD WAR II}

\textit{The Debate: State versus DoD (Department of War)}

As the United States entered World War II, General George C. Marshall, as the Army Chief of Staff, was responsible for guiding the training, manning, and equipping of an Army at war. One of the requirements that surfaced was the training and manning of military personnel who would manage the postwar activities. Visionary leaders, like General Marshall and Secretary of War Henry Stimson, were confident that America would win the wars against Germany and Japan. Both knew that when those wars ended, the military would have a role in helping those nations recover. Marshall and Stimson

\textsuperscript{14} The Military History Institute (MHI) provided much of the declassified information on postwar Germany. MHI has numerous boxes of classified information on Kosovo. These boxes were accessed in this research to gather unclassified information.
were experts in their profession, their expertise developed from years of experience and studying the lessons of the past. The military would have a role in nation building, as it always did. Additionally, the failures of postwar efforts in Germany after World War I loomed large.

Central to planning for postwar occupation duties was the training of military civil affairs officers who could develop a plan for occupied territories and then work with the civilians to bring lasting peace and stability. The School of Military Government was established at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville in April 1942 on the order of the Secretary of War. Brigadier General Cornelius Wickersham was named the new School Commandant.

As the school continued its analysis of what to teach Army civil affairs officers, it developed policy papers to gain support from other governmental agencies. The first issue was the cost of the school. The United States was just becoming engaged in a global war and the cost of training and education was an overriding factor. To fund these costs, the Army needed to determine how many officers were required to rebuild Germany and Japan. Based on results from World War I, where 213 trained military governors were required for one million civilians, the Army determined it needed about 4000 trained civil affairs officers (Ziemke, 1990).

In another paper called the “Synopsis,” a War Department memorandum stated: “[d]uring the first phase, it is the obligation of the armed forces to establish and maintain military government; during the second phase, civilian authority of some type will probably assume the mission then to be surrendered by the Army. Until the second phase
has begun, however, it develops upon the Army to administer the government of any occupied area” (Coles and Weinberg, 1992, 19).

General Marshall, the most respected military man in Washington, understood the need to train officers in military government. He was also very cognizant that other elements of the U.S. government would also play a prominent role in postwar decisions and actions. One such agency was the Board of Economic Warfare, which worked directly for President Roosevelt. According to Earl Ziemke (1990, 9), the official historian for the Army on postwar Germany, “[n]o Army activity fell more completely under the board’s aegis than military government.”

The Board of Economic Warfare visited Charlottesville and supported the Army’s efforts. When newspaper reporters got wind of the fact that the Army was running a school for military governors, they sparked an anti-imperialist attitude. The school in Charlottesville was dubbed a “school for Gauleiters”—a Nazi district official (McCreedy, 2001, 717). Congress subsequently got involved, and the whole issue of a school for military governors was blown out of proportion.

President Roosevelt, although undecided on the role of military governors, came to the conclusion that the military approach was not the best plan. Roosevelt, in a memorandum to Secretary of War Stimson, provided the following guidance: “The governing of occupied territories may be of many kinds but in most instances it is a civilian task and requires absolutely first class men and not second-string men” (Coles and Weinberg, 1992, 23). The Secretaries of the Treasury and the Interior both chimed in and questioned the proper role of the military in governance and occupation.
responsibilities. Consequently, when the time came to make a decision on what U.S. agency would manage the administration of North Africa after the military secured a victory; the State Department was given the lead with the Lend-Lease administration tasked to provide the relief supplies.

Mayor of New York Fiorello La Guardia was asked to coordinate all civilian activities in North Africa, but he turned down the offer (Ziemke, 1990). The task devolved to Minister Robert Murphy, who was the State Department’s representative in the region. Lieutenant General Eisenhower, who led the American military campaign in North Africa, complained to General Marshall that the State Department and the War Department were working at odds with one another. According to Ziemke (1990), thirty thousand tons of civilian supplies were needed and the Lend-Lease program was not able to timely get the supplies on the convoys leaving for North Africa. When these supplies arrived, the Army had to unload them. The end result was a disaster.

Planning for postwar North Africa was the precursor to planning for postwar Europe. The State Department complained that it had no capacity to plan, and few people to carry out the plans. Finally, Secretary Stimson and General Marshall joined forces and convinced senior members of the administration and Congress about the necessity of initial military preeminence in occupation duties. Marshall’s experience from the Philippines, World War I, and China resounded. The military was given the lead for planning postwar efforts.
Marshall’s intervention saved the school and gave direction for postwar planning. The school ramped up its training in the next three years—6000 officers would undergo the twelve-week civil affairs training (Coles and Weinberg, 1992).]

Because of the problems in planning and executing the stabilization of North Africa, Secretary of War Stimson created the Civil Affairs Division in March 1943. The Civil Affairs Division would be responsible for planning the occupation of Germany and Japan. The Division worked directly for the Secretary of War (precursor to the Secretary of Defense) and General John Hilldring became the Director (Ziemke, 1990).

The first class of fifty civil affairs officers began their training in May 1942, but support for the school increased after the invasion of North Africa. Civil Affairs–trained personnel were required for the invasion of Italy, but many more were required for the remainder of Europe. However, before these trained officers could begin their work, there were fundamental issues that needed to be resolved. Would Germany remain a nation or be split up among other nations? If it remained a nation, then how would it be governed? Many Americans advocated dissolving Germany so that Germans would never be able to rise up against their neighbors, as they had done on numerous occasions. Lastly, who would manage Germany—civilians, military governors, other nations, or organizations?

Plans and Policies

“What strategy is to military operations, policy is to civil affairs and military government. Policy lends form and purpose to the government of occupied and liberated territory and is ultimately as much concerned with winning wars as the military strategy itself.” Earl Ziemke’s quote (1990, 34) from his official book on the occupation of
Germany represents the essence of postwar planning. Policy takes precedent over military strategy in winning the peace. In war, the military is given guidance, develops a strategy, and then develops operational plans to carry out that strategy. With guidance from civilian leaders, the military essentially conducts its own planning with little interference from civilian leaders. In stability or peace building operations, diplomatic channels are wide open and functioning. Often the policy decisions involve many countries, resulting in sliding or shifting decisions. Good policy decisions are necessary to establish the right conditions for managing the peace.

The occupation of Europe was not solely a U.S. decision, but the combined decisions of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent (at the time), France. There were a series of conferences and meetings between the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. France entered the discussions and decisions much later.

The first of these political conferences to determine the outcome of the war occurred on two cruiser battleships, USS Augusta and HMS Prince of Wales, on 12 August 1941. From this meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill came the Atlantic Charter. The focus of the conference was the war against Nazi Germany, but the charter also included statements that affected the results when the war was won. The third and sixth principles guided later decisions on postwar Germany. The third principle read: “they [United States and United Kingdom] respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self government restored to those who have been forcibly
deprived of them.” The sixth principle went on to say: “after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want. . . .” (Atlantic Charter, 1941).

While operations were still under way in North Africa in January 1943, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill met in Casablanca. Although Premier Stalin did not attend the Casablanca Conference, the three leaders from the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States kept in contact. In Casablanca, Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Allied Commander for North Africa, had dinner with President Roosevelt. Roosevelt was more concerned with what happened after the war than with the war itself. This confused General Eisenhower with so much fighting still to do (Perret, 1999, 194). The conference, however, focused more on the global war than on conditions following the war. The only key decision regarding Germany from the Casablanca Conference was the decision to seek unconditional surrender from Germany. Roosevelt and Churchill met again in Quebec in August 1943 and September 1944, where there were more discussions and some decisions about postwar activities in Europe. The discussions between these heads of state had two primary purposes: defeat Germany first, then to transition from war to peace in Europe.

Military planners in the Civil Affairs Division in Washington, however, had been hard at work orchestrating the plans for the occupation of Germany. There were strong differences of opinion between Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau and
Secretary of War Henry Stimson. The Morgenthau Plan, as it became known, focused on stripping Germany of its economic base so that it would never again to rise to power in Europe. In essence, Germany would become an agrarian state. Stimson strongly disagreed. He felt that to limit Germans to merely a “pastoral” nation was a crime (Ziemke, 1990, 103). Others in Washington, with much support from the French government in exile, wanted Germany broken up with the land and people distributed among the victors.

The second Quebec Conference, from 11–16 September 1944, between Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt, focused more on postwar Germany. At this conference, Secretary Morgenthau convinced President Roosevelt and subsequently the British Prime Minister that Germany should become only an agrarian state with little or no industry. Also at this meeting the British and Americans discussed the occupation of Germany and which zones each would occupy.

Following the second Quebec meeting, the Joint Chiefs of Staff put the finishing touches on an order on Germany’s occupation. The military directive would be forwarded to General Eisenhower and the newly forming Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). The document, JCS 1067, was a modified version of the Morgenthau Plan.

Also involved in the planning for postwar Europe and Germany was Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy. McCloy, like Stimson, felt that Germany needed to be restored to its industrial base, as he believed that German coal and steel were critical to a
viable Europe. The decisions of the second Quebec Conference remained the focus of postwar planning until the meeting in Yalta.

JCS 1067 was first issued to General Eisenhower in October 1944, but would undergo numerous revisions before it was finally published. Although an important document, JCS 1067 was a military plan intended to give the senior commander guidance to continue his planning for the occupation. JCS 1067 established “a stern, all-powerful military administration of a conquered country, based on unconditional surrender” (Ziemke, 1990, 104). As important as the plan was, it did not provide an adequate program that would cover all aspects of managing an occupied country.

Additionally, the ideas outlined in JCS 1067 needed to be vetted with the Soviets. In January 1945, more political decisions for the defeat and occupation of Germany were outlined between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin in Yalta. The three powers agreed that each nation would occupy separate zones in Germany. The American delegation argued that the French should also have a zone. Also at this conference, the Soviets first announced their intention of demanding $20 billion in reparations from Germany (Clay, 1950b, 12). Roosevelt agreed that the military would have a role to play, but was uncomfortable about splitting up Germany into military zones. He insisted on some sort of council whereby the military governors could meet and make decisions about a unified Germany. Decisions made in Yalta, however, remained the political direction for postwar Germany until the German surrender and the Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945.
In Europe, Eisenhower’s headquarters worked their version of the plan. Even before it was issued, planners in London were familiar with the ideas of JCS 1067. Like all military operations, plans are shared among headquarters to gain ideas and concerns. The original occupation plan for Europe was Operations Plan Rankin, which was developed in 1943. OPLAN Rankin reflected the decisions from the first Quebec Conference, and had three options. The plan, however, ran into major obstacles while Washington debated the value of a State or War Department control.

Immediately after the invasion of France in June 1944, Operations Plan Rankin gave way to Operations Plan Talisman. Talisman was issued to Allied Forces in October 1944 and underwent some changes based upon political decisions at the second Quebec Conference. When the code name “Talisman” was compromised, the plan was issued under a new name, Eclipse (McCreedy, 2001).

The Yalta Conference provided further political decisions for the occupation and administration of Germany (see figure 6.3) after the total defeat of the German Army. The issue of the proper role for the U.S. military was finalized by President Roosevelt, who had changed his mind about the military role in post-conflict programs. Roosevelt
said: “It is quite apparent that if prompt results are to be obtained, the Army will have the initial burden” (McCreedy, 2001, 718).

Operations Plan Eclipse began with the terms of German surrender. Part two of the document called for the disarmament and control of Germany’s military forces, sanctions against Germany, destruction of war materiel, and disclosure of the location of minefields, hazardous obstacles, and chemical weapons. Part three addressed control of the population, restoration or maintenance of communications and transportation infrastructure, repatriation of displaced persons, apprehension of war criminals, establishment of property and financial controls, and preservation or restoration of civil administration. It also stated that Civil Affairs actions were the responsibility of all commanders (SHAEF, 1945) (Ziemke, 1990). In essence, Operation Eclipse was the follow-on plan to Operation Overlord, the invasion of Europe across the English Channel. The U.S. Army War College calls Operations Plan Eclipse “the original phase IV plan” (U.S. Army War College Briefing, 2006).¹⁵

As Allied forces advanced across Europe and the German Army was breaking apart, German soldiers surrendered by the thousands. The United States was ready to take control of Germany and Austria. Almost every staff in the British and American armies now had civil affairs officers who were responsible for planning and advising their commanders on postwar operations. Military forces began carrying out the orders in Operations Plan Eclipse. German prisoners were rounded up and placed in detention

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¹⁵ New U.S. military doctrine published in 2006 outlines six phases for military planning purposes: phase 0, shape; phase I, deter; phase II, seize the initiative; phase III, dominate; phase IV, stabilize; and phase V, enable civil authorities.
facilities, displaced civilians were cared for, and weapons and ammunition were seized or destroyed. Similarly, Soviet armies were moving toward Berlin.

In essence, at least for the Allied armies, Eclipse was like rolling out a carpet (in fact many called it the carpet plan). As Army units occupied German cities, they left behind civil affairs officers to begin the process of military governance. Such was the case when the town of Marburg, in western Germany about 50 miles due north of Frankfurt, was occupied in March 1945. A military government team of six officers and nine enlisted men governed Marburg.

Under Operations Plan Eclipse, the military government teams were organized under the European Civil Affairs Division. The division included three regiments and up to ten companies per regiment. Companies were organized with four types of detachments, each sized according to the size of the city they would occupy. Major cities were assigned to A detachments. B detachments were organized for slightly smaller cities, C detachments for large villages, and finally D detachments for small villages (Ziemke, 1990, 63).

However, until the German High Command surrendered or Eisenhower declared victory, the soldiers were at war and carrying out war plans. The shift between war and postwar is not a finite moment in time, and the occupation of Germany certainly reflected this. As American forces took control of various parts of Germany, Operations Plan Eclipse guided them.

What soldiers found in Germany was appalling. The discovery of German concentration camps and the utter destruction of Germany became embedded in the
memory of many soldiers. Among the ruins, people emerged with little more than the
clothes on their back. Few houses were unscathed by the war, most industries were in
shambles, and there were very few resources available to maintain life. Yet, treasure
troves were uncovered where Nazi leaders had stashed the loot extracted from the
countries the Germans occupied.

In preparation for the occupation, General Lucius Clay was appointed by
President Roosevelt to be the Military Governor of Germany and a
deputy to General Eisenhower. He reported to General Eisenhower in April 1945, and
took command of the U.S. Control Group, which
was being led by the same General Cornelius
Wickersham who organized the Civil Affairs
School in Charlottesville three years earlier. Clay
would carry out Joint Chiefs of Staff Order 1067,
which laid out the role of the U.S. Control Group
as a member of the Allied Control Council.

The Council would be a tripartite body with
representatives from Russia, the United Kingdom,
and the United States, that would decide issues on
the occupation of Germany. Among the decisions
in JCS 1067 was the U.S. view on the dissolution
of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (Eisenhower’s headquarters)
and the role of the multinational control council to administer Germany. Also included in
JCS 1067 (April 1945) was guidance on denazification, control of currency, education, the press, property disposition, demilitarization, the judicial system, police, reparations, standards of living for the German people, essential services, and governance. Several sections dealt with the control of the economy. One section said: “[y]ou will require the Germans to use all means at their disposal to maximize agricultural output. . . .” JCS 1067 went on to provide guidance to the military governor: “on no account propose or approve in the Control Council the establishment of a centralized administration of controls over the German economy” (JCS 1067, para. 27 and 18).

General Lucius Clay (1950b, 17) commented in his book, Decision in Germany, about JCS 1067: “[the] German economy was to be controlled only to the extent necessary to meet the needs of the occupation forces or to produce the goods which would prevent disease and unrest, which might endanger occupying forces.” In essence, JCS 1067 supported Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau’s plan to strip Germany of its economic base.

In the early morning of 7 May 1945, correspondents and military representatives from France, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union assembled in the war room of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force near the town of Reims, France. At 0230 hours, General Alfred Jodl and two other German officers were escorted into the room and took seats at a small table in the center of the room. (Hitler had killed himself one week earlier, so Jodl represented the German High Command.) Jodl signed a military surrender document, thus ending the war. The document, however, was not the “official” surrender document. The surrender document was still being coordinated between the
Soviets, British, and Americans. The paper Jodl signed was a short six-paragraph document that had been written only days before to handle the termination of military operations, but not the overall surrender of German authority. The Soviets vehemently objected to this effort by the American commander (Ziemke, 1990).

The conditions of the surrender began the controversial process of coordinating among the various nations that would eventually sit on the Allied Control Council and direct the future of Germany. On May 8, 1945 in Berlin, General Eisenhower represented the United States while Marshal Grigori Zhukov represented the Soviets, Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery the British, and General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny the French. After the signing ceremony Generals Eisenhower and Clay returned to Frankfurt. Upon departure, General Clay, who would be the U.S. representative on the Allied Control Council, did not know when the Council would first meet and when U.S. troops would occupy their sector in Berlin, an agreement reached in Yalta.

(see figure 6.3)
Over the next few months, General Clay met several times with Marshal Zhukov, who became the Soviet member of the Control Council. The formation of the Council and its responsibilities were beginning to take shape, but Clay quickly realized how difficult negotiating various decisions on the future of Germany would be. “[T]he path ahead would be full of obstacles,” said Clay (1950 b, 29), and it was. The first meeting of the Control Council would not be held until after the Potsdam Conference, which was held between 17 July and 2 August 1945.

The Potsdam Conference would determine the fate of Europe with particular emphasis on Germany. Heads of state for the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom met in the city of the kings of Prussia, the origin of German aggression. The decisions at Potsdam would be critical to the management of Germany. It was essentially a reaffirmation of the decisions elaborated in Yalta and strongly influenced by JCS 1067. The key aspect of these decisions would be that Germany would not be destroyed and split apart, but remain an intact country. Germans would be given the opportunity to rebuild their country through a democratic process, but all economic decisions would be the decision of the Allied Control Council, in which France was now included. The zones of occupation were drawn with the French receiving a portion of the U.S. and British zones that were previously arranged in Yalta with some minor variations (see figure 6.3). Berlin, however, would be occupied by all four countries’ military. The first meeting of the Allied Control Council took place on 10 August 1945. With the French now part of the Council, the four countries would jointly make decisions on all aspects of German governance until such a time as Germany could administer itself.
Quickly committees were formed to address the many issues regarding the German people and the management of the country. According to General Clay, “it looked like, at least on the surface, as if the Allied Control Council had become an effective functioning body to govern Germany and carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Protocol” (1950 b, 46).

There were many issues to work out, including feeding the citizens of Germany, the growing number of displaced people, restoration of services and the economy, and the repositioning of forces. The occupation of Berlin by the British, American, and French military was eventually sorted out. The Council also agreed to quickly restore trains and other essential services in Germany. It was even agreed that elections at the local level would be held in 1946, to allow Germany to start functioning on its own. However, during the fall and into the winter of 1945, each of the zones basically took care of getting themselves organized while the Council did the same.

*Germany Divides—the Beginning of the Cold War*

Soon thorny issues began to arise in the Control Council. The eastern part of Germany was the breadbasket for the country, but that region went to Poland, leaving Germany without the ability to sustain itself. The northern part of Germany, particularly the area around Berlin, was the industrial heartland. The Soviets were uncooperative in sharing with other zones industrial and agricultural products produced in their zone.

By the spring of 1946, decisions were being made, in accordance with Potsdam, to make Germany an economic whole, but the Soviets were insistent on reparations. It was reluctantly agreed upon at Potsdam that the Soviets would get half of the $20 billion
Germany would be charged for initiating the war. Since cash was not a viable option, the Soviets demanded that their portion of reparations be made by dismantling German industry. Entire factories were disassembled and sent to the Soviet Union.

As the three Western powers began coordination between zones, the Soviets refused to share any information about the eastern zone. General Clay soon came to realize that “it was meaningless if the Soviet Government refused to account for capital equipment removed from its zone and to discontinue its utilization of east Germany’s productive capacity to take goods without payment” (Clay, 1950b, 120).

Berlin was another issue. The city was occupied by military forces from all four members of the Allied Control Council, yet Berlin sat in the middle of the Soviet zone. Getting agreement from the Soviets to allow the other nations’ military units to occupy their sector of Berlin was a challenge. Over time, however, the Soviets put more and more controls on the movement of supplies, equipment, and people into and out of Berlin. One rail line and one highway were the only means of conveyance from the western zones to and from Berlin.

The Cold War was beginning and decisions about Germany and other occupied lands were central to the division between the Soviets and the other three western powers. The Soviets installed communist-style governments in the eastern half of Europe while the Western countries promoted democracy. These differences of approach surfaced in the Allied Control Council. Finally in March 1948, the Soviet representative walked out of the meeting and never returned. By June of that same year, the Berlin Airlift resulted from the Soviets blocking the single road and rail line to Berlin.
Military Governance in the American Zone

The combat forces that took control of Germany in 1945 were responsible for occupation activities, but over time, many U.S. forces in the European Theater were sent to the Pacific for the war against Japan. Still, a sizable Army remained. The American Army units that remained worked toward the objectives outlined in Operation Eclipse, JCS 1067, the Potsdam Protocol, and the decisions from the Allied Control Council. The United States Control Group, the name used to represent the American staff of the Allied Control Council, was headed by General Eisenhower, but he delegated most of the duties to General Lucius Clay. The U.S. Control Group was headquartered in Berlin, but General Eisenhower kept his headquarters in Frankfurt.

In September 1945, military officers in the American zone served as military governors in three states in the U.S. southern sector—Bavaria, Württemberg-Baden, and Hesse. In addition, there were American military governors in Bremen (near the strategic port on the North Sea) and Berlin. Each military governor worked closely with German authorities and assisted in establishing local and state governments.

The occupation of Germany would become something larger and more encompassing than anyone imagined when Operations Plan Eclipse was written. Soldiers would administer military control from the Rhineland through central Germany, south through Austria. The soldiers trained at the U.S. Army School of Military Government in Charlottesville, Virginia, would earn their pay.

As mentioned before, between 1942 and 1945 there were over 6000 civil affairs officers trained for this role. The U.S. Army official history on the occupation of
Germany reflected that this “carpet was thin,” meaning there were not enough civil affairs personnel trained to manage the large occupation area (Ziemke, 1990, 310). General Clay took steps to reorganize the European Civil Affairs Division and find more officers and enlisted men to staff the civil affairs detachments. However, the war was still going on in the Pacific and men and materiel were transferred to support that war effort.

Additionally, the soldiers who earned enough points for their time in Europe were shipped home and few replacements came in. Many of the civil affairs soldiers who were trained in Charlottesville and advanced with the Army through Italy earned their right to return home.

Military staffs that remained in Germany began focusing their energies on helping the German people recover from the war. Instructions from Eisenhower were clear. Military governments were to control German authorities, not govern them. German leaders were identified to take up governmental posts. Prior to the war, Germany governed itself through a hierarchical structure from village to state. The Americans patterned their structure along these lines.

There were five state-oriented structures (Stadtkreis) that linked with most senior military governors. Below that were county organizations called Landkreis. The German city governments were headed by a Burgermeister (Gimbel, 1961, 21; Wells, 1951, 57–61). The Nazis took over this traditional form of government and appointed Nazi leaders in each of the positions. According to Roger Wells (1951, 64) when the U.S. military governors came in they also appointed local leaders to these positions, and asked the leaders to appoint others below them, with the approval of the military governing teams.
There was every intention of eventually holding elections at the local level. Local elections were finally held in January 1946 with county or Landkreis elections held later that spring (Clay, 1950b, 88–90).

Compounding the issue was the denazification policy outlined in JCS 1067. The directive from Washington introduced the denazification policy, but the particulars on how to administer the policy were left in the hands of commanders in Europe. Determining who was a member of the Nazi Party was easy as the Germans kept meticulous records. The problem was how to turn over authority to Germans when most of nearly twelve million adult males were Nazi Party members. It was recognized that anyone wanting to hold a job in Germany under the Third Reich had to have been a member of the Nazi Party. After much debate, Clay issued an order in September 1945 that determined that anyone who joined the Nazi Party before 1937 would be not be allowed to hold official government or senior level business positions (Ziemke, 1990, 382).

The denazification policy cut too deep into the political and economic structure of the country. Many senior military officers on the ground in Germany argued that numerous people joined the Nazi party to get ahead, although they did not believe in Nazi policies. The most outspoken of these officers was General George S. Patton, who wanted to slow the denazification policy. JCS 1067 and the Potsdam Protocol were clear: Nazis would not occupy any positions in government or large-scale German businesses. To keep businesses, essential services, and local governments operating, the occupiers had to institute appeals boards to review the decisions on Nazi affiliation.
The denazification policy relegated over 100,000 Nazis to laborers. Those suspected of war crimes were arrested. German prisoners of war were put to work helping clear debris, and over 100,000 were sent to France to help in their cleanup efforts. Prisoners were a burden to hold and feed, so from May to June 1945 four disbandment orders were issued. This essentially disarmed and demobilized the German Army, and only those determined to be war criminals or had the “SS” tattoo were held as Nazi war criminals. By September 1945, 82,000 Nazis were being held in detention camps awaiting trial (Ziemke, 1984, 62).

To control the German population and determine the extent of black market activities, military operations were conducted to verify the status of all people in the occupied zones. One such endeavor, Operation Tallyho, used 163,000 soldiers over four days in July 1945 to check the papers of all Germans and conduct a search of American soldiers. Over five million Germans, 500,000 Allied military personnel, and 250,000 displaced persons were checked. Eighty-three thousand Germans were arrested, 77,000 of which arrests were for nothing more than lack of proper identification; and 310,000 items were confiscated (Ziemke, 1990, 319; Gulgowski, 1983, 247).

The American Army was faced with preventing the starvation of the German people. During the summer of 1945, Germans were encouraged to plant crops and the Americans shipped in tons of farm equipment, fertilizer, and seeds. Production was good, but still not comparable to what the Germans produced in previous years. U.S. Army trucks and soldiers were used to help transport the goods to market. To supplement what was grown; 650,000 tons of wheat was shipped in from the United States (Ziemke, 1984,
General Clay had to balance the distribution of food in the American zone since the quadripartite Food and Agriculture Committee of the Allied Control Council was not functioning. Clay set a varied level of calorie intake based upon individuals’ work. For the average nonindustrial worker, it was 1550 calories per day. Clay had to reduce this figure later, and was concerned with maintaining the health of the German population. According to John Backer, “[f]rom the first days of occupation the American Military Government used all means at its disposal to increase the agricultural self-sufficiency of the American Zone” (1971, 42).

Displaced persons added to the challenge to the military governors. Potsdam encouraged military governors to keep displaced people in their own sectors until conditions improved, but hundreds of thousands of people of German origin fled the eastern zones with total Soviet acquiescence.

Another issue that plagued the occupation troops was the ineffective German police. As more soldiers were transferred to the Pacific Theater or back to the United States, it became increasingly difficult to control the civilians. Additionally, combat soldiers were not trained to be policemen.

In January 1946, General McNarney, who replaced General Eisenhower as the Allied Commander in Europe, ordered the establishment of a Constabulary Force. Major General Ernest N. Harmon was selected to lead this elite force. The Constabulary Force,
better known as the Circle C Cowboys, based on their unique unit patch of a “C” enclosed in a circle with a lightning bolt through it, was modeled after constabulary forces used in the Philippines many years earlier. Their task was to exercise police powers over civilians and soldiers in the U.S. Zone. Harmon was the right man for the job. A stern disciplinarian, he was determined to have his soldiers set an example for American soldiers still in Germany and for the German people. The Constabulary Force was designed to fill the gap on the shortage of police in Germany. To train military personnel to become police, a Constabulary School was set up in Bavaria by March 1946. Harmon sought out mature men to fill his constabulary force. He wanted men of good judgment, sensitive to the state of German affairs, and above all honest—able to withstand bribes (Tevington, 1998).

One of the primary tasks of the Constabulary Force was to create a civilian police force. Prior to the Nazis taking power, there was no federal police force. Each community essentially established its own safety forces. When the Nazis came to power, they absorbed the local police and put them to work for the regime. At its height, almost two million men in the German Elite Guards, more commonly known as the Gestapo, controlled the German people (Kempner, 1953).

Immediately upon occupation of Germany, the Military Governor abolished the German police, and the job of securing and controlling the German people fell to the military commanders. When the Constabulary forces took over, they began working with the local city managers to establish a functioning police system. Later, after the writing of
a German constitution and the election of German leaders, a more formal police system was put in place.

Working through the various military governors in towns and counties, General Clay authorized, after denazification, the formation of voluntary attorney associations. These associations led to a revised criminal law and the formation of local courts. By late 1945, there was even a high court of appeals in the U.S. zone. These courts were given jurisdiction of German citizens only.

The U.S. military commanders and legal advisors patterned the German judicial system along the lines of the American system and provided strict oversight. In January 1948, thanks to the help of Judge William Clark, a former federal judge from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, a complete overhaul of the judicial system was initiated in the American zone. After this renovation, the German courts took all civilian cases (Clay, 1950b, 247).

American soldiers were naturally kind to the civilians. With shipments of food coming in, the military set up camps to house the homeless, distributed food, and treated the sick. Soldiers were particularly fond of kids and handed out candy and routinely played games with them. Youth groups like the one set up by Sergeant Patrick Moriarity in Bremen, took the children’s minds off the misery that was all around them (Clay, 1950b, 64).

From the very outset, General Clay did not like JCS 1067. He felt it was too harsh on the German people. JCS 1067 was slightly modified by the Potsdam Conference, but cooperation within the Allied Control Council was beginning to falter. To help guide a
new direction, Clay visited Washington in October 1945 to provide on-the-ground input into a revision to JCS 1067. His ideas were well received. He was confident that a new, more open policy about creating a united economic unit for Germany would be forthcoming, so he returned to Germany (Clay, 1950b, 72).

By the spring of 1946 no new policy was issued from Washington, so on the one-year anniversary of the occupation, General Clay prepared a message for Secretary of State Byrnes. He was hoping to guide the discussion of the Council of Foreign Ministers that was to meet in Paris in May, June, and July. His message read in part:

After one year of occupation, zones represent airtight territories with almost no free exchange of commodities, persons, and ideas. Germany now consists of four small economic units which can deal with each other only through treaties, in spite of the fact that no one unit can be regarded as self-supporting, although the British and Russian zones could become so. Economic unity can be obtained only through free trade in Germany and a common policy of foreign trade designed to serve Germany as a whole. A common financial policy is equally essential. Runaway inflation accompanied by economic paralysis may develop at any moment. Drastic fiscal reforms to reduce currency and monetary claims, and to deal with debt structure, are essential at the earliest possible date. These can not be obtained by independent action of the several zones. Common policies and nationwide implementation are equally essential for transportation, communications, food and agriculture, industry and foreign trade if economic recovery is to be made possible. (Clay, 1950b, 73–74)

The message, however, never reached Secretary of State Byrnes, so prior to the July 1946 meeting in Paris General Clay met with Secretary Byrnes and recommended that he come to Germany and explain to the German people America’s views on a new Germany. Secretary Byrnes delivered the speech in Stuttgart on 6 September 1946. The speech was broadcast across the western sectors of Germany. Secretary Byrnes, speaking for the United States, strongly supported economic unification, election of a German
government under democratic principles, a new constitution, and a commitment by the United States that the U.S. Armed Forces would remain in Germany as long as it took to complete its task of restoring Germany to a peaceful nation (Department of State, 1950).

This speech gave General Clay a great deal of latitude in casting off the Morgenthau philosophy of transforming Germany into an agrarian state. Industry and a functioning economy were now part of the reconstruction plans for Germany. Additionally, both Potsdam and the new direction by Secretary Byrnes gave Clay the go-ahead not only to begin establishing a German government, but also to work with the other zones to unify Germany.

Finally in July 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a directive to the Commander of U.S. Forces of Occupation, JCS 1779. The new directive replaced JCS 1067, and was more in keeping with the ideas presented by Secretary Byrnes. JCS 1779 stated specifically that: “[i]t is the objective of the United States Government that there should arise in Germany as rapidly as possible a form of political organization and a manner of political life which, resting on substantial basis of economic well-being, will lead to tranquility within Germany and will contribute to the spirit of peace among nations.” (Department of State, 1950) The new directive gave instructions for the Military Governor on denazification, courts and judicial processes, displaced persons, economic development, disarmament, reparations, finance, agriculture, political parties, and education.

All the directives, agreements among the Allies, and speeches called for a united Germany with a functioning economy so that Germany could once again join the family
of nations. The reality, however, was not forthcoming. The Allied Control Council became increasingly desperate. The Soviets controlled their zone and limited any movement of people and economic products between zones. Many studies and reports recognized that as a result of the new boundaries of Germany, the country could not sustain itself. Any hope of a functioning state required the open flow of commerce between zones.

Even prior to Secretary Byrnes’s speech, the American and British zones began opening up the lines of commerce. The industrial region of the British zone needed the agricultural products of the American zone. As General Clay described it, “[e]conomically, the British and American zones complemented each other to a greater degree than any two other zones. The basic industries of Germany were in the Ruhr [British Zone] while the productive capacity in the American Zone was largely devoted to the assembly of finished products” (1950b, 164).

Although it took time, by the summer of 1947, the British and American zones combined efforts. Under the leadership of the two military governors, Germany began to organize itself through bi-zonal committees responsible for the administration of economics, transport, finance, communications, food, and agriculture, as well as the administration of German civil servants. These committees were the precursors to a German government. It was not until 1949 that Germany would elect its own governing body. Until then, the Military Governors were in control.

In late 1948, General Clay, now no longer the Deputy Military Governor, but the Commander of all U.S. Forces in Europe (since March 1947), provided an assessment of
the achievement of the military government throughout 1948. This report included accomplishments in the following fields: legal, economic, railroad, communication, education, government. Clay, not one to promote his own cause or provide exaggerated assessments, was proud of what the Germans and the military government had accomplished together. He was dismayed by the lack of cooperation from the Soviets and the dissolution of the Allied Control Council. He fully recognized that for Europe to shake off the impact of World War II a viable and functioning German state would be required—state that would be devoid of military armaments and focused on lasting peace in Europe. He also called for continued support by America in Europe. Clay was also committed to reducing the costs of postwar occupation to the American taxpayers. He knew that the sooner he could get a German economy functioning, the less the United States would have to pay (Clay, 1950a).

Germany, however, was still struggling to restore its economic capability and to meet the needs of its people. To realize its full potential as a functioning nation, Germany needed more help than the military could provide. In January 1947, George C. Marshall replaced James Byrnes as the U.S. Secretary of State. Marshall, who as the Army Chief of Staff was instrumental in creating the School of Military Government and who directed the Army throughout World War II, was an influential figure who was well respected in Washington and throughout the world.

In March 1947, on his way to a Council of Ministers meeting in Moscow, Secretary of State Marshall visited the new French government in Paris and General Clay in Berlin. Marshall was influenced by what he saw in Germany and his discussions with
Clay. He was also influenced by a report by former President Herbert Hoover on the conditions in Europe (Gimbel, 1976, 185; Hogan, 1987, 34). After a month of dead-end negotiations with the Soviets, Marshall returned home and began work on what would become one of the most dynamic achievements of foreign policy in the twentieth century—the Marshall Plan.

In a speech presented at Harvard in June 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall outlined the genesis of the Marshall Plan. He clearly saw that economic revitalization of America would be closely tied to the European economy, and Germany was a large part of that economy. In the months that followed the speech at Harvard, a group of skilled economists and politicians, including George Kennan and William Clayton, joined forces and developed a program whereby the Marshall Plan could become a reality.

The Marshall Plan was both a reaction to the impending Cold War and an understanding of the impact on the American economy if Europe did not recover quickly. Marshall did not intend to exclude the countries in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In fact, he welcomed their involvement, but the Soviets rejected the plan and guided the countries they occupied into also rejecting Marshall’s proposal.

The European countries quickly answered Marshall’s call for assistance. In July 1947 at a meeting in Paris, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union met to discuss Marshall’s idea. Eventually the Soviets withdrew, but sixteen nations (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey) in western Europe
responded and developed a report by September 1947 on the needs of each country. Generals Clay (U.S.) and Robertson (UK), the two military governors of the bizonal part of Germany, responded for Germany. The meetings in response to Marshall’s offer of help resulted in the formation of the Committee on European Economic Cooperation (CEEC) (Hogan, 1987).


Amazed by the immediate response by sixteen European nations, the Truman administration put together a plan to offer “$6–7 billion of new aid each year over a three year period” (Hogan, 1987, 42). The plan, however, would not go into effect until the spring of 1948 after Congress appropriated the funds. To sell the plan to the American people, Secretary of State Marshall, Deputy Secretary of State Acheson, and George Kennan and Will Clayton spread across the country giving speeches to whomever was interested. In essence they sold the plan to the American people. In April 1948, Congress passed the Economic Cooperation Act and established the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) to oversee the expenditure of U.S. funds.

General Clay welcomed the Marshall Plan as he saw it as a means of getting Germany on its feet. Already by mid-1948, Congress approved the expenditure of
$840,000,000 for food, medicine, and fuel for Germany (Machado, 2007). Germany experienced a bitter winter in 1946 and 1947. That, coupled with runaway inflation and black marketeering, made Clay hope for a miracle to take the burden of supporting Germany off the American taxpayer. The Marshall Plan offered a potential solution. Clay, however, had his own gamble. Early in 1948, discussion began on joining the French zone with that of the British and American zones, thus unifying western Germany. Clay then lifted production ceilings on industry and installed a new currency to control inflation and the black market. With the joining of the French zone, German governments could then begin planning for a national-level structure to govern West Germany (Clay, 1950b). All of this came together in the summer of 1948 when monies from the Marshall Plan began to roll in. The result was a rejuvenated Germany that increased production levels to 51 percent of prewar levels in 1948, 72 percent in 1949, 94 percent in 1950, and 167 percent by 1955 (Machado, 2007).

The trizonal discussion was the final straw that caused the Soviets’ complete withdrawal from the Allied Control Committee and ultimately the Berlin Blockade. Since the initial meeting of the Allied Control Council in August 1945, the four nations could not come to an agreement on reparations, economic unity, production levels of industry, control of displaced persons, or an appropriate currency for Germany. The Soviet walk-out from the Allied Control Council and the Berlin Blockade unified decisions in West Germany.

In April 1949, the negotiations for a combined American, British, and French zone were complete. The negotiations called for the creation of an Allied High
Commissioner for Germany. It also allowed for Germany to govern itself under a constitution that was completed and ratified by the combined German Parliamentary Council in May 1949. President Truman announced the appointment of John J. McCloy as the U.S. representative of the Allied High Commission in June 1949. McCloy, who was previously the Assistant Secretary of War and responsible for much of the postwar planning, knew the challenges well. The duties of the Allied High Commission were to review and approve the decisions of the German government (Department of State, 1950).

General Lucius Clay, who had thrice requested to step down as the Military Governor, was finally permitted to retire from military service. His departure as Commander of U.S. Forces in Germany and Military Governor provided President Truman the opportunity to hand over the duties to a civilian representative, the Allied High Commission for Germany. The military’s role in rebuilding Germany from the ashes of war was complete.

**Conclusion**

The planning and then the actions to create a new German state began in Washington during the summer of 1942, a full three years before they were needed, with the creation of the Military School of Government. The birth of a new nation from the ruins of war was along a road paved with broken glass. Initially there was a fight within Washington as to what agency was best suited for managing the rebirth of Germany. Once the military was selected as the midwife, a plan was developed. Like any military plan, it was modified to suit the changing nature of reality. The political negotiations in
Yalta, London, Moscow, and Potsdam all had an impact on the plan, but the military adapted to the changes. However, the Military Governor, General Lucius Clay, had a major impact in orchestrating the political direction of the German people.

During the postwar rebuilding of Germany, the U.S. military performed all the various responsibilities with regard to peacebuilding or stability operations. General Harmon’s Constabulary Forces provided security for the German people and set the conditions for establishing a rule of law. The German military was completely defeated and accepted total surrender. In the aftermath of the war, there were few security concerns beyond criminal activity. For the most part, German soldiers accepted their defeat and cooperated in the disarmament and reintegration process. To handle criminals, Army courts initially managed civilian cases until a judicial system was established. Military units from the very beginning provided direct humanitarian aid to anyone who needed it. The flood of almost ten million refugees and displaced people from the eastern zones could not have survived without the help of the military. There were no NGOs to help in this process, so military forces were the only source of help.

General Clay and his economic advisors established economic policies on industry production and financial reform and coordinated the exchange of commodities among European neighbors. Finally the Marshall Plan, a civilian-run effort, stimulated the German economy and that of Germany’s neighbors.

In the field of restoration of services, the military played a huge role. Everything—communications, road networks, rail systems, electrical grids, water and sewer systems, and the rebuilding of numerous structures for housing and government
services—was initiated with military resources and touched by the hands of soldiers. Soldiers who were drafted into the military had civilian skills that directly benefited their role as nation builders.

 Civil Affairs soldiers and military commanders also played a large role in reestablishing a government for the German people. Initially military governors appointed local citizens to begin the process of democracy, and then elections from the bottom up formed a West German government. The process took over four years to complete.

 Lastly, the military was directly involved in disarming Germany and capturing and confining suspected war criminals. The Nuremberg Trials were influential in starting the reconciliation process for the German people and the rest of Europe.

 The postwar Germany case study clearly demonstrates that the military has a huge role to play in nation building or peacebuilding efforts. At the time, organizations like the United Nations and the many NGOs that perform valuable services around the world today did not exist. Had they existed then, the military undoubtedly would have still played a major role. The rebuilding of a nation from the ashes of war is a monumental task that requires close coordination among all involved. The rebuilding of Germany clearly demonstrated the challenges. Yet soldiers overcame every adversity.

 It is worth noting that the United States contributed its brightest and best people to the rebuilding of Germany. The selection of General Clay as the Military Governor was only the tip of the iceberg. Below him were a large number of highly qualified people who either came from important positions in the U.S. government or went on to more
significant roles. It was clear that America was committed to the restoration of Germany and Europe.
CHAPTER 7

KOSOVO:
A CASE OF DIPLOMACY, ARMED INTERVENTION, PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEBUILDING

In a visit to Kosovo in the late spring of 2001, walking the streets near the small town of Vitina, an eerie calm was palpable. Children were going to school, farmers were working their fields, and shops were open with fresh oranges, mangoes, bananas, and a variety of canned goods. A bright and airy coffee shop was open for business, and the international police from the nearby station visited regularly to get their regular dose of caffeine. The people of this war torn region were going about their mundane activities. Even the duck swimming in the stream with a brood of ducklings in tow and the little girl walking down the street with a dandelion flower made into a ring, gave one the image that normality was returning to Kosovo. Underneath this serenity, however, was a time bomb ready to explode. Two years after U.S. and allied forces entered the country to conduct peacekeeping, a peaceful and stable Kosovo was still a long way off.¹⁶

In Kosovo, military forces from NATO countries did much more than provide routine security missions. They were directly involved in providing humanitarian assistance, performing the duties of police forces, building roads and bridges, and even

¹⁶ These images are that of the author who visited Kosovo in June 2001.
promoting some economic development. For more than thirteen years, NATO troops have occupied Kosovo. Physical security for the people living there remained the primary mission; but soldiers took on additional responsibilities, when necessary, to achieve the mission of turning Kosovo into a cohesive, stable, and safe society. Kosovo was the first time that the United Nations took on the task of administering a failed state in an executive role. That administration has been a success so far. Time will tell if these endeavors achieve long-term success, but the prognosis looks good.

**Brief Historical Background**

Yugoslavia was never a coherent society in terms of ethnicity and religion, and its peoples (mostly Croats, Serbs, Bosnians, Kosovar Albanians, and Slovenes) did not share a tradition of nationhood. What national unity there was after World War II was due to the crafty yet harsh rule of Josip Broz (“Tito,” as he became known during World War II), a Croatian resistance leader and committed communist. “Marshall” Tito (his postwar title) adeptly orchestrated the rebuilding of Yugoslavia after World War II but refused to join the Warsaw Pact created by the Soviet Union. (West, 1994) The various ethnic and religious Yugoslav minorities
who hated one another revered or feared him. To suppress ethnic and religious antagonism, Tito promoted a brand of Yugoslav Communist nationalism while forbidding any ethnic nationalism. (Vego, 2009)

Yugoslavia prospered under Tito’s rule. His calculating deals with the West, the Soviet Union, and China resulted in some prosperity for people of all ethnic backgrounds. Noel Malcolm and Richard West, both prominent historians of Yugoslavia, agree that Tito offered opportunities to the Kosovars of Albanian descent. Many Kosovar Albanians became educated and several industries were started in their backward, rural region. West said, for example, that “Tito went out of his way to help and develop the backward region of Kosovo, and came to be seen by Albanians there as an ally against the Serbs.” (1994, 342)

The problem was that Serbia claimed Kosovo as a special place—a venerated battlefield that to many Serbs was an emotional symbol of the centuries long struggle of the Orthodox Christian Serbs with the threatening Muslim Turks.

The Breakup of Yugoslavia

After Dictator Tito’s death in 1980, there was the danger that Yugoslavia would fragment into Croatian, Serb, and Muslim enclaves. (West, 1994; Malcolm, 1998) Though Yugoslavia remained intact for almost a decade, which was longer than most European and American observers anticipated, ethnic nationalist rivalries eventually pulled it apart. On June 25, 1991 both Croatia and Slovenia declared independence. To protect Serb citizens in Croatia and attempt to hold the country together, the Serb dominated Yugoslav National Army (JNA) attacked into the Krajina, a Serb enclave in
Croatia. Heavy fighting ensued and casualties mounted. The United Nations and the European Union tried to intervene. The UN special envoy, Cyrus Vance, a former U.S. Secretary of State, negotiated a cease fire by November. To make the cease-fire permanent, the UN Security Council, on November 27, 1991, passed the first in a series of resolutions that justified creating a UN peacekeeping mission in the former Yugoslavia. (Durch, 1996; UN UNPROFOR website)

Macedonia, another former region of Yugoslavia, declared its independence in September 1991, and the Bosnians followed suit by declaring their independence in October 1992. Soon thereafter, a Muslim-Croat majority of Bosnia’s Assembly declared independence after the Serb delegates walked out. (Durch, 1996) Yugoslavia was falling apart piece by piece. The enforced unity maintained by Tito eventually failed to keep the various ethnic and religious groups from splintering the country. Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic, however, was determined to keep as much of Yugoslavia together as possible and under Serbian control.

Milosevic had come to power in the late 1980s by appealing to Serbian nationalism. His campaign to promote Serbian power at the expense of the powers claimed by other ethnic and religious groups eventually focused on the Kosovar Albanians. They were the majority in what Milosevic and his supporters proclaimed were the heart of Serbia’s historical homeland. On June 28, 1989, on the very site where
Turkish forces defeated the Serbs 600 years earlier, Milosevic rallied a crowd with blatant appeals for Serb nationalism. Vamik Volkan in his book, Blood Lines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism, quoted Milosevic as saying “never again would Islam subjugate Serbs.” Volkan went on to call this event a “chosen trauma.” (1997, 55) Chosen traumas can be used by shrewd politicians to rally nationalism. This speech inflamed the existing antagonisms that divided Serbs from Muslims and led—as Milosevic intended—to a series of events that fueled a civil war in Bosnia and that was the basis for Serb oppression of Albanian Muslims in Kosovo.

It might seem strange to a European or American that Kosovo was such an important prize to Milosevic. There is nothing economically significant about Kosovo. It is a region about the size of Connecticut with few natural resources. At the end of the 1980s, it was one of the poorest areas of the former Yugoslavia. Kosovo is surrounded by mountains that trapped the heat in summer and the cold in the winter. Most of the population of Kosovo lives in a valley whose center is the capital Pristina. The people still live a largely agrarian life, scratching out a living in the meager soil.

So what mattered to Milosevic? The answer can be found in Kosovo’s population statistics. A 1981 census reported the population of Kosovo was 1,585,000 with 77.5% Albanian, 13.3% Serb, 1.7% Montenegrin, and 7.5% other minorities including Roma (gypsies). By 1991, despite Serbian designs to increase the Serb population, Albanians (Muslims) were 90% of the population. (Sell, 2002, 68) To Serbs, however, Kosovo represented the heart of Yugoslavia. The annual celebrations of the battle of Kosovo in 1389 fueled Serb nationalism and continually reminded Serbs of their historic struggle
against the Muslim Turks. Sell (2002, 72) recounted that “the cult of Kosovo was part of the raw material that Serbian intellectuals and government officials used to create a new Serbian national identity.”

Once Milosevic became president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia he systematically placed Serbs in most government positions. In what had been the autonomous province of Kosovo, Serbs, the minority population, dominated the political structure. Serbs occupied key administrative positions, including those in local police forces, government offices, and courts. Key business were owned and operated by Serbs.

The Kosovar Albanians reacted to Serb political dominance with non-violent protests and with organized violence. Serbian police officials reported that key Kosovar Albanians were instigating separatism, and many so-called “instigators” were rounded up and imprisoned. In March 1989, the Kosovo Assembly, dominated by Serbs, approved amendments to the Serbian Constitution that put all security, financial, judiciary, and social planning in the hands of Serbian officials. (Sell, 2002)

However, the tension within Kosovo between Serbs and ethnic Albanians did not explode right away. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a Kosovar Albanian insurgency, was not well organized or armed in the early 1990s. Additionally Milosevic was focused on retaining a portion of Bosnia. Supported by Western European governments, the United Nations sent a multinational peacekeeping force into Bosnia in 1992 to provide relief to people displaced by the fighting. United Nations peacekeepers were deployed to separate the factions fighting in Bosnia while a number of negotiators tried to find a workable solution to end the violence, especially the brutal ethnic
cleansing. Initially, diplomatic efforts failed to stop the civil war. In 1995, however, American mediator Richard Holbrooke, backed up by military forces from the U.S. and NATO, negotiated the Dayton Accords, which gave independence and NATO protection to Bosnia. Although Kosovo was part of the initial discussions in Dayton, it complicated any solution, so negotiators set aside the issues in Kosovo.

Milosevic, having failed to hold major portions of Bosnia and Croatia with Serbian regular forces and Serb paramilitary units, turned his ethnic hatred toward the Kosovar Albanians. His “excuse” for attacks on the Kosovar Albanians was the Kosovo Liberation Army’s fight for independence. The KLA, watching events in Bosnia and the signing of the Dayton Accords, decided that it was time to attack Serbian government officials and police in Kosovo. Milosevic reacted to this KLA challenge. (Covey, Dzidezic and Hawley, 2005) After all, the KLA represented an insurgency in his country. Milosevic told General Wesley Clark, Supreme Commander Allied Powers Europe, on October 25, 1998: “we know how to handle these Albanians, these murderers, these rapists, these killers of-their-own-kind. We have taken care of them before. In Drenica, in 1946, we killed them. We killed them all.” (Clark, 2001, 152)

Milosevic therefore ordered or sanctioned a campaign of ethnic cleansing. As TV screens across the world focused on the plight of the Kosovar-Albanians, the international community united against Milosevic. The United Nations Security Council passed resolution 1160 on 31 March 1998. It called for the cessation of violence by both the Serbs and the KLA and imposed economic arms sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia until negotiations found a solution. Numerous countries also attempted to
mediate a solution, but Belgrade rebuffed all efforts to negotiate with the Kosovar Albanians. Another Security Council Resolution, 1199, in September 1998, demanded “withdrawal of security units used for civilian repression.”

There was growing concern about the plight of the Albanian people. By mid-September 1998, both NATO and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees reported that over 250,000 Kosovo Albanians had been driven from their homes. (Cordesman, 2001, 11) Delegates to the UN Security Council feared that thousands of homeless people might perish in the coming harsh winter. Moreover, a United Nations Secretary General Report issued on 21 September 1998 warned that the growing number of displaced people might have a “spillover effect” on Macedonia and Albania, harming the fragile economies of those nations and leading to further ethnic violence. It also reported that Serbian forces were laying mines along the border to prevent refugees from fleeing.

**NATO Planning and the Use of Force in Kosovo**

Formal planning for NATO action in Kosovo began in the spring and summer of 1998. General Wesley Clark, the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, directed Allied Forces Southern Europe to begin planning for a possible NATO intervention. Several plans were developed and submitted to the North Atlantic Council (NAC). These included a peace operation, should a negotiated settlement be found, and an offensive combat operation, including a NATO invasion of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, if a settlement was not reached. (Nardulli, Perry, Pirnie, Gordon and McGinn, 2002, 14) Within NATO there was no stomach for an invasion. Only the UK saw this as a viable
option. (Sweeney, 2011) Consequently if negotiations failed, NATO’s planned on an air only offensive operation.

In October 1998, NATO’s political arm, the NAC, approved an activation order (ACTORD) for the use of force, in an air only operation, if the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not comply with UN Security Council resolutions. (Badsey and Latawski, 2004) Once the activation order was issued, there was no need to go back to the North Atlantic Council for approval to begin combat operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The decision to use force was in the hands of the NATO Secretary General and the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

In late October 1998, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) agreed to sponsor a verification mission in Kosovo, and President Milosevic accepted their presence. The Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) called for the compliance of UNSCR 1199 and eventual new elections in Kosovo. (OSCE, 1998) Ambassador William Walker of the United States headed up the KVM. The team of 1500 “verifiers” began their investigations in Kosovo during December 1998. Various NATO manned and unmanned aircraft all focused on monitoring the cease fire and the deployment of Serb military and police forces. The tasks assigned to the KVM were to: verify and report violations of UN Security Council Resolutions; maintain contact with Yugoslav forces, Kosovo authorities, NGOs and international organizations; supervise elections; and make recommendations to the OSCE Permanent Council on issues not covered in the UN resolutions. (OSCE website)
The KVM was only an initial step to keep open the negotiating process to find a solution to this conflict. To facilitate the negotiations, the international contact group of France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States continued to work toward some sort of settlement. Russia’s participation was critical as the Russian government had close ties to Milosevic and the former Yugoslavia.

Unfortunately, the KVM did not stop the ongoing violence in Kosovo. Serb civilians in Kosovo were attacked by the KLA, and, in response, Serbian military and police stepped up their actions toward the KLA. In January 1999, the KVM monitors reported a massacre near the town of Racak. The scene of the 40 Albanian bodies grotesquely sprawled down a dirt road made the front page of most U.S. and European newspapers the next day and sparked renewed interest in a political settlement.

The result was a set of meetings brokered by European diplomats between Albanian Kosovars and a Serb delegation in the French town of Rambouillet in February 1999. The initial agreement between the two sides called for Kosovo to retain its autonomous status, which the province had enjoyed in the 1970s, a continuation of talks for an additional three years to determine the final status of Kosovo, and the deployment of 30,000 NATO troops to monitor the agreement. (Rambouillet Agreement, 1999)

Unfortunately, two points in the settlement were non-negotiable to Milosevic. First, he would not entertain the idea of an independent Kosovo, something that most Kosovar Albanians wanted. The second issue involved the deployment of an international peace force called the Kosovo Force (KFOR). Much of the KFOR forces would come from
NATO countries. Milosevic did not want to lose control of Kosovo as Serb officials had in Bosnia. (Covey, Dzeidzic, and Hawley, 2005)

Meanwhile, back in NATO headquarters the staff was busy planning for several contingencies. The first depended on the possible settlement at Rambouillet. NATO and other nations would send in a peacekeeping force of approximately 30,000 soldiers. They would monitor the withdrawal of Serb military and police units and provide security to the Serb population of Kosovo. Another contingency plan focused on the use of military force to compel Milosevic to withdraw his forces and then allow the peacekeeping force to move forward. (Clark, 2002) Lastly, NATO developed a plan to protect the KVM monitors. Several NATO countries, acting on national orders only, deployed forces to the Macedonian-Serbian border as a reaction force, should the KVM run into trouble. (Sweeney, 2011)

In his book, Waging Modern War, (2002), General Clark noted that planning for the peace operation was the responsibility of British General Michael Jackson, the commander of NATO’s Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. Yet there were still issues that required Clark’s attention. The first was possible U.S. participation in a peace operation. The U.S. government was at first reluctant to send forces to Kosovo, but later agreed to take the quietest sector in the southwest along the Serb border and the major road leading to Former Republic of Macedonia. The British asked for the sector around Pristina, the capital; the French and German governments were “flexible.” The German government, however, was concerned that German forces might not be welcome because of what German forces had done in Yugoslavia in World War II. Germany units quietly asked for
a sector less populated by Serbs. The Italians wanted the sector closest to Albania, so this left the French with the Mitrovica sector, which happened to be the most violent.

The governments of the United States and its NATO allies, however, were reluctant to send ground forces into Kosovo if there was not a pre-existing peace settlement for them to enforce. Only the United Kingdom had the stomach for a fight to protect the Kosovar Albanians without having a peace agreement in place. With large numbers of NATO forces still in Bosnia, the NATO nations were unwilling or hesitant to commit substantial forces to Kosovo. (U.S. DOD, 2000) For example, on March 27, 1999, Ken Bacon, the Pentagon spokesperson, said, “The United States has no intention of sending ground troops to fight in Kosovo, and the Department of Defense is not doing any planning that would enable such a deployment. As President Clinton has said, the United States would only send ground troops to Kosovo as part of a NATO peacekeeping force after an agreement establishing a ceasefire and requiring disarmament by both parties to the conflict in Kosovo.” This public statement, and others like it from NATO governments, unfortunately tied the hands of the military operational commander. Milosevic was no fool and routinely watched CNN to assess both NATO and U.S. resolve. He suspected that if force were to be used, it would only come from the air.

The Air Operation against Serbia

NATO planners developed the initial plan for the air operation against Serbia; however, the detailed planning, including the selection of targets, fell to the U.S. European Command in Stuttgart, Germany and the U.S. Air Forces, Europe at Ramstein Air Force Base, Germany. General John Jumper and his team of planners worked the
various aspects of the plan for submission to NATO Headquarters and approval by the NAC. Once the plan was approved, it would be passed to Admiral James Ellis, the Commander of Allied Forces South in Naples, Italy, and Lieutenant General Michael Short, the air component commander.

The plan for an air operation had several phases. The first phase called for attacking with Allied planes and missiles the air defense systems all over Yugoslavia. Once those were neutralized, the air forces would shift their attacks to Yugoslav forces in Kosovo and military units in southern Serbia. The final phase would strike a wide range of targets across the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. (U.S. DOD, 2000)

While the negotiations were underway in Rambouillet, Milosevic actually stepped up the pace of Serbian attacks on Albanians in Kosovo. Also crafted during the fall of 1998 was Operation Horseshoe, a Serbian plan to eradicate the KLA in Kosovo. (Daalder and O’Hanlon, 2000) By March 19, Operation Horseshoe was in full swing, with a full one third of all Serbian military forces in Kosovo. The Kosovar Albanian delegation was not completely happy with the Rambouillet Agreement, but signed it on March 18, 1999. The United States government made it clear that if a settlement was not reached then force would be used to compel the Serbs to end the repression. Fearing that KVM personnel would be caught in the middle of Serb-Kosovar fighting, or worse yet, that some of the verifiers would be held hostage, Ambassador Walker withdrew the KVM on March 20th. (Covey, et al, 2005)

Ambassador Holbrooke made one more trip to Belgrade on March 22, 1999, to meet Milosevic to find a way out of using force. The negotiations failed, and it was
evident that NATO would have to use force to impose the provisions of the UN Security Council Resolutions on Milosevic and to end the ethnic cleansing occurring in what was still officially the Yugoslav province of Kosovo. Operation Allied Force began at 7pm, London time, on 24 March 1999. NATO assembled 112 U.S. and 102 Allied aircraft for the operation. This was complemented by naval forces in the Adriatic that could deliver cruise missiles. (Cordsman, 2001, 20)

NATO leaders underestimated Milosevic’s will. General Clark thought Milosevic would succumb to international pressure after only a few days of bombing, but the bombing went on for 78 days. During the bombing, Milosevic escalated his Operation Horseshoe plan to cleanse Kosovo of Albanians. The Yugoslav Army continued its burn and slash campaign, destroying anything Albanian. In retaliation for the bombing, Yugoslav forces raped Albanian women and killed the men. Fearing for their lives, Albanians fled Kosovo, heading either for the nearby hills or for the mountain passes to Albania or Macedonia. The numbers were staggering. At one point over one and half million people left their homes (90% of the population of Kosovo). Milosevic even hastened their exodus by herding people like cattle into rail cars and sending the trains to Skopje, the capital of Macedonia. The goal was to destabilize Macedonia and distract NATO forces by giving them another crisis to solve. In the meantime, Serb paramilitary and police units would rid Kosovo of all Albanians. (Sell, 2002, 305) The ethnic cleansing was met by an increasingly stronger KLA, whose members survived on organized crime and weapons and cash from Albania and from Albanians in Europe and the United States.
Throughout the bombing campaign, NATO decision-makers continued to discuss and plan what to do with Kosovo if and when Milosevic conceded. Would a structure like Bosnia be established where an ad-hoc organization would run the country, or would that task be passed to the United Nations? It was clear that whatever was done, NATO would occupy Kosovo with a sizable force. Eventually, a NATO meeting of foreign ministers reached a compromise. NATO would provide the ground forces and the United Nations, with support from the European Union (EU) and the OSCE, would administer the country. Two important issues remained. They were the same issues that were unsolved at Rambouillet: What would be the final status of Kosovo—an autonomous province of Yugoslavia or an independent nation and who would administer the province until these issues were resolved?

Milosevic, throughout the bombing, remained intractable. There were several reasons for him not accepting NATO’s and the international community’s terms. First, Rambouillet would mean he would lose control of an historic province and this was unacceptable to the Serbian people. Secondly, his intelligence experts convinced him that the NATO bombing would be limited in focus and short lived. He also believed that once the bombing started, he could work through Russia to get a better deal than Rambouillet offered. In the end, all those assumptions proved false. (Hosmer, 2001)

The bombing campaign finally achieved its intended purpose, but the real pressure on Milosevic came from the Russians. President Yeltsin appointed Viktor Chernomyrdin, the former Prime Minister, as his special envoy to Kosovo. U.S Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot flew to Moscow in April 1999, and Chernomyrdin came
to the United States in May. Later, Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari joined the final negotiating team. The three crafted a ten point peace plan for an end to the bombing. Yet in the end, it was the pressure from Russia that ended the stalemate and opened the door for the deployment of a peacekeeping force.

Milosevic agreed to a settlement, reluctantly, and arranged for his generals to meet with NATO commanders to work up a plan for the withdrawal of Yugoslav police and military forces from Kosovo. The Military Technical Agreement (MTA) agreed to by the Serbian officers was based on an annex to the Rambouillet Agreement. The MTA acknowledged the ten point plan presented by the President of Finland that was approved by the Serbian Parliament on 3 June. It further laid out the timelines and dates for Serb forces to move out of Kosovo and established a 25 kilometer air and 5 kilometer ground buffer zone between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo province. It also recognized the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR). The MTA made no mention of the United Nations’ role in Kosovo. The UN’s role was defined in the ten principles that had been outlined by President Ahtisaari and accepted by President Milosevic. (MTA, 9 June 1999)

**Peacekeeping in Kosovo: Initial Steps**

The very next day (10 June 1999) the United Nations Security Council, acting under the authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter (breaches to peace and acts of aggression), passed resolution 1244. The resolution authorized “the UN Secretary General, with the assistance of relevant international organization, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration.”
Paragraph 11 of the resolution spelled out the duties of the international civil presence. These instructions included: promoting Kosovar self-government until a final settlement could be reached, performing basic civil administrative functions, reconstructing key infrastructure, humanitarian assistance, maintaining law and order, and protecting human rights. (UNSCR, 1244, 1999)

The resolution made no mention of the NATO KFOR. Instead the resolution referred to KFOR as “an international security presence.” This “international security force” was required to deter any further hostilities, provide security to returning refugees and displaced persons, supervise demining, disarm the KLA, monitor the borders, and cooperate with the international civil administration being sponsored by the UN.

As the Serb Army retreated across the border, over 20,000 NATO troops moved in. The plan for the withdrawal of Serbian forces and the movement of the NATO forces was spelled out in detail in the MTA. Various zones for KFOR units were established across Kosovo and over eleven days Serb forces were replaced by NATO forces. (MTA,

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17 Gaining Russian acceptance of the UN Security Council Resolution was critical. Russia would not acknowledge any reference to NATO forces, so the term “international security presence” was palatable to the Russians who knew that NATO would provide the bulk of the security force.
1999) The plan worked well with few encounters between NATO and Serb forces. However, according to the MTA, bombing did not cease until the Serbs met all the conditions outlined in the agreement.

Even before Serb forces began their withdrawal from Kosovo, the headquarters of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps was in Macedonia planning and preparing for a Serb capitulation. In consultation with NATO Headquarters in Brussels, British General Michael Jackson called this operation “Joint Guardian” and issued the following mission statement once the MTA was signed:

To establish and maintain a secure environment, including public safety and order; monitor, verify and, where necessary, enforce compliance with the MTA and Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Undertaking; and provide assistance to the United Nations Mission in Kosovo including core civil functions until transferred. (ARRC website)

Included in the NATO forces were 1700 U.S. soldiers from the 1st Armored Division and 1900 Marines from the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit. (DOD, 9 June 1999) The American contingent assembled in Macedonia and moved quickly into the American sector, which was 30 kilometers wide and 80 kilometers long, about half the size of the state of Rhode Island. The contingent grew quickly to a force of 5000 soldiers. (U.S. Army Europe, 1999) It became known as Task Force Falcon and its sector was called Multi-National Brigade (East) (MNB (E)).

Across KFOR the situation was the same. French, German, Italian, and British forces, occupied their zones as Serb forces withdrew. By mid-July 1999, 38,000 NATO
soldiers were in their zones. (Dzeidzic, 2006) (Daalder, 2000) Only the British sector
encountered a challenge. Russia agreed to provide a contingent of forces to KFOR.
However, as British forces moved into their sector around Pristina in central Kosovo,
they encountered 200 Russian soldiers occupying the airfield in Pristina. The Russian
force moved from its location in Bosnia without coordinating with the British and took up
positions around the only readily useable airfield in all of Kosovo.

This incident caused some uneasy feelings between General Jackson, the KFOR
Commander, and General Wesley Clark, the overall NATO Commander. Clark feared
the Russians would upset the carefully orchestrated negotiations that specified which
countries would command the brigade sectors. Through diplomatic channels, the
Russians indicated a desire to occupy the northern brigade zone because it represented
the largest Serb population in Kosovo. The French were scheduled to occupy this zone,
and Clark, who worked hard to establish these zones, was against this proposal. (Clark,
2001) Eventually, diplomatic negotiations with the Russians persuaded the Russian
government to move its soldiers to the American Zone, as they had done in Bosnia.

**United Nations Role in Kosovo**

No sooner had NATO forces begun occupying their sectors then the flood gates
opened and Albanians rushed back to their homes and property. Some practitioners who
watched this spectacle unfold likened it to the Oklahoma land rush of 1893. According to
a UN Secretary General Report to the UN Security Council on July 12, 1999, 800,000
Kosovar Albanians sought refuge in neighboring states and another 500,000 were
displaced inside of Kosovo – hiding in the hills and woods. By early July 1999, 650,000
of the refugees had returned to Kosovo and the 500,000 internally displaced persons had rushed back as well.

Many UN agencies worked in Kosovo before NATO initiated Allied Force. During the bombing, the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, asked Ambassador Sergio Vieira de Mello to conduct an assessment of the situation in Kosovo. With bombs still falling, de Mello and his team moved around Kosovo to assess the situation and determine the role the United Nations should play once some sort of settlement was reached. In his report to the UN Security Council on June 2, 1999, de Mello said he saw "a depressing panorama of empty villages, burned houses, looted shops, wandering livestock and unattended farms." (UN Foundation, 1999)

Security Council Resolution 1244 (passed on 10 June 1999) outlined the role of the UN in Kosovo. The resolution “[a]uthorize[d] the Secretary General, with the assistance of relevant international organizations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration…”

This was the first time the United Nations had taken on the role as a transitional administrator. In a report issued two days after the resolution, the Secretary General outlined how the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) would be managed. Ambassador de Mello would take the overall lead as the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). The report also pointed out that the SRSG would be responsible for civil administration, while the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
would manage humanitarian affairs, the OSCE would be responsible for institution building, and the European Union would carry out the reconstruction.

UNMIK ushered in a whole new type of mission for the United Nations. Rather than just monitoring security conditions as UN peacekeepers had done for four decades, the United Nations was now responsible for managing this province of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. For all practical purposes, UNMIK was conducting “nation building” under the guise of “peacebuilding” while NATO troops provided security.

The UN civil administrator was charged with creating an international police force to provide policemen for Kosovo until enough local Kosovars could be recruited and trained. The SRSG recommended that this international police force be comprised of three elements—civilian police officers, special police units, and border guards. The
force would be headed by a police commissioner who would oversee the almost 3000 international police. The UN would eventually accept responsibility for law and order across the province from the military (KFOR) through the implementation of a three-phase plan. In phase one, KFOR soldiers would maintain law and order. Once organized, responsibility would pass to the international police in phase two. Then, when trained in sufficient numbers, the local Kosovo police would take over the rule of law function in phase three. (UN SRSG Report, 12 July 1999) In past peace operations, UN-sponsored international civilian police had monitored local police actions, prevented abuse and favoritism, and helped train police officers. In Kosovo, UN civilian police would, for the first time, have executive authority – the power to arrest and detain suspected criminals.

The American force was not prepared for the level of violence they encountered upon arrival in Kosovo. There were few incidents of violence with the Serb military forces, but the level of violence between the Albanians and the remaining Serb civilians was high. According to lessons learned report from U.S. Army Europe (1999), “Serbs who had not followed the VJ forces [Serbian military forces] out of Kosovo became immediate targets. Their persons, homes, and possessions were in danger from the first day of the Albanians return. Murders, assaults and house burning occurred every day throughout the province, and the Task Force represented the only law in MNB (E) area of operations.” Another part of the report noted that “between 12-25 June [1999] was an especially brutal period.” On one particular day during this period there were eight murders, more than 100 beatings, well over 100 cases of looting, and 130 cases of arson. As a result, many Serbian civilians followed the Serb military forces out of Kosovo, and
those that remained were hostile toward KFOR forces. To maintain law and order,
American soldiers conducted presence patrols, carried out cordon and search operations,
established checkpoints on major roads, and installed curfews. The goal was to stop the
revenge killings by the KLA and try to bring some stability to the region.

The KLA did not disarm immediately, even though that was a requirement set out
in UN Security Council Resolution 1244. To move the process of disarming the KLA
along, the new SRSG, Bernard Kouchner, hosted a meeting with key leaders from both
the Albanian and Serb communities. The group denounced the ongoing violence and
formed a joint crisis task force with representatives from the Albanian and Serb
communities, the UNMIK, and KFOR. (UN Sec Gen Report, 12 July 1999) This and
other meetings eventually led to an agreement in September 1999 by KLA leaders to
disarm and turn in their weapons. In September the KLA handed over 36,000 weapons to
KFOR. (Daalder, 2000, 178)

Not all KLA members agreed to disarm. Those that resisted hid their caches to
avoid the KFOR search and checkpoint operations. One confounding issue was the
buffer zone outlined in the MTA. The MTA called for a 5 kilometer buffer zone between
Kosovo and the remainder of Serbia. No Serb military forces were allowed in the buffer
zone. The Serbs respected the MTA, but this left an area just outside the American sector,
known as the Presevo Valley, as a sanctuary for the KLA. (Dziedzic, 2006) Here the
KLA conducted training and stockpiled supplies for attacks against Serbs. American
forces in MNB (E) had to watch this no man’s land constantly, but the American forces,
fearing an escalation with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, did not cross the border.
Diplomatic efforts to persuade the government in Belgrade to police the area were not successful, and the Presevo Valley plagued the American sector for the first two years. Finally in the summer of 2001, KFOR forces cleared the valley of KLA hardliners. Clearing the valley came about only after President Milosevic was removed from power in peaceful non-violent revolution in October 2001.

Another program created by the United Nations was the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). It was designed to provide employment to young Albanians out of work. Kosovo, by some accounts, had the highest unemployment rate in Europe, estimated in 1999 to be well over 50 percent. To provide some work for unemployed young men and possibly former KLA members, the KPC was supposed to organize them into a 3000-man emergency relief unit. Right after the KLA agreed to disarm, applications for the KPC opened. Each candidate was screened to make sure he had not committed any atrocities. By December 1999 some 1,400 members of the KPC were working on winterization and environmental cleanup projects.

Some human rights groups voiced concerns that the KPC was a cover for the KLA and organized crime. Some of that was true, but the KPC leader, General Agim Ceku, a former KLA leader, strongly condemned any criminal acts by KPC members. (UN Sec Gen Report, 23 December 1999) To make the KPC a viable and respectable force, American military engineers worked with the KPC and taught its members basic engineering skills so they could repair roads and buildings. (Williams, 2005)

The humanitarian crisis was as large as the security problem. Winter comes early to Kosovo and the UN Special Representative, Bernard Kouchner (the founder, organizer
and president of the Nobel Prize winning Medecins sans Frontieres), sought help from the UNHCR (High Commissioner for Refugees), the World Food Programme, the United Nations Children’s Fund, and the World Health Organization. These groups joined forces with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the International Order of Migration, the International Federation of the Red Cross, and some 45 other NGOs. Their overall goal was to provide shelter, water, food, and medical assistance to the Kosovo population through the winter. (UN Sec Gen Report, 12 July 1999)

Civil Affairs soldiers assigned to MNB (E) were work horses who did much to help the people of Kosovo. Civil Military Operations Centers were opened in several cities in the U.S. sector. At these centers, civil affairs soldiers took reports compiled by KFOR patrols and screened them for humanitarian issues. Then they routinely visited sites that needed help and coordinated with NGOs to provide the necessary relief or delivered humanitarian supplies themselves. (Wentz, 2002) At the time of the Kosovo intervention, however, U.S. law forbade the Defense Department to expend appropriated funds directly for humanitarian efforts. Money for humanitarian efforts came from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Commanders managed $5 million of USAID funds. Civil Affairs soldiers could identify projects and coordinate projects with NGOs and UN agencies, however, there were times when it was prudent to put soldiers to work providing humanitarian assistance. These projects were called Commanders’ Emergency Relief Programs (CERP). Civil Affairs soldiers working with soldiers coming off patrols identified numerous humanitarian assistance projects and either coordinated with an NGO or UN agency to work the project or nominated for them
for a CERP. (Wentz, 2000) Military engineers could build roads and repair bridges for military purposes, in accordance with U.S. law, but often this provided NGOs access to Kosovars in need of assistance.

While the infantry soldiers of Task Force Falcon were busy conducting patrols, manning checkpoints and conducting searches, the military engineers were the busiest of all. Their tasks included clearing minefields and unexploded ordnance and teaching young Kosovo children about the dangers of unexploded munitions and minefields. In fact, DC Comics provided specially designed Superman comic books warning children about mines and unexploded ordinance. (Gillert, 1999) Planning for engineer efforts in Kosovo started well before the first military units were allowed in the country by the MTA. During the bombing, Allied Forces South staff engineers analyzed Kosovo and developed a priority list of potential projects. These projects included roads, bridges, rail lines and airfields. (Williams, 2005)

A top priority for American engineers was maintaining and opening the roads. Kosovo’s infrastructure was in poor repair and the military engineers worked tirelessly to fix roads and bridges so military forces could use them. One critical route for the entire KFOR, Route Hawk, was the main, and only, supply route from Macedonia into all of Kosovo. Because it was in the American sector, NATO tasked Task Force Falcon to upgrade the route. Route Hawk also became a major economic route for the Kosovars. Mixed among the military traffic were a wide variety of commercial vehicles bringing goods into Kosovo. In the first year, American military engineers repaired 260 kilometers of road, reconstructed and repaired six major bridges. An Italian military
engineer unit repaired 300 kilometers of rail line and British engineers made the Pristina airfield completely operable, including a control tower and navigational aids. (Williams, 2005, 143)

The most challenging task for US military engineers was the building of base camps to house the American military. The bases had to be built quickly and yet be durable enough to withstand Kosovo’s hard winters. Brown and Root Services received the contract for constructing these camps. Camp Bondsteel, the larger of the two, was built over 900 acres of wheat fields with 175 Seahuts (barracks), headquarters buildings, chapels, motor pools, ammunition holding areas, and bunkers in the design. To help in economic recovery, the Task Force Commander encouraged the hiring of local nationals. Seven thousand Kosovars helped construct these camps. (Williams, 2005) Although the construction lasted over two years, most soldiers were in hardened buildings by October 1999.

**Task Force Falcon**

When elements of the 1st Infantry Division deployed to Kosovo, Brigadier General John Craddock, Assistant Division Commander, was designated as the Commander of Task Force Falcon (TF Falcon). He quickly determined that TF Falcon’s mission had several parts. First, it had to maintain a secure environment in the U.S. sector and monitor and enforce compliance with the MTA. (First Infantry Division, 1999). In a typical week, for example, TF Falcon conducted approximately 2600 small unit patrols (day and night), flew 112 aviation missions, manned 49 check points, and conducted over 70 large scale search operations. Small unit commanders lived in the
sectors their troops patrolled. Soldiers worked with the local Kosovars through Albanian
and Serbian interpreters. They knew all the aspects of their assigned sectors. Key sites
like Serb churches, schools, houses, and police stations were watched by American
peacekeepers. In addition, U.S. soldiers routinely tracked smugglers bringing in alcohol,
cigarettes and sometimes weapons over the mountains from the Former Republic of
Macedonia.

Task Force Falcon also had the mission of helping the people of Kosovo. USAID
provided five million dollars to TF Falcon for humanitarian projects. In the first year of
operations in the American sector, civil affairs soldiers organized village rehabilitation,
spring planting, relief operations, and adopt-a-school programs. Most of the money
dedicated to the task force went to electrical grid repair, housing, medical support, and
school repairs. UNMIK and NGOs provided most of the housing repairs needed to get
the Kosovars through the first winter. (Crouch, 2001)

Once in their sector, U.S. military police units discovered that their role was more
like a civilian police than a military police. There were no civilian police, so they—along
with their infantry, armor and field artillery brethren—were the local police. During their
six month tour of duty, the soldiers of the 793rd MP Battalion apprehended 1,257
detainees for criminal acts, manned police substations in local towns, and ran a detention
facility, a jail, and several impound lots for vehicles and weapons. LTC Richard
Swengros (2000), who led a contingent of MPs in Kosovo in 2000, said later that “[w]ith
no judicial system and no theater-holding facility as you might expect to see in war, we
were left to keep detainees on a long-term basis.” Swengros also reported that disputes
about the proper ownership of houses and land occupied much of his early time in Kosovo. For these reasons and others, the number of military police sent to Kosovo reached battalion strength (500) by early 2001.

Unlike most previous peacekeeping missions that had used international civilian police, the UN civilian police officers in Kosovo were armed and had the power to arrest, detain and interrogate suspected criminals. According to Halvor Hartz, who was a former UN police commissioner in Croatia in the late 1990s, “[t]he United Nations had no strategy [in Kosovo] for executive policing, much less a strategy for how to share this responsibility with an international military force.” (2005, 168) As a result, U.S. soldiers would first call the UN civilian police to investigate crimes. If they could not respond, then the U.S. military police were called. What evidence could be obtained was secured and passed to military lawyers. If a suspect was apprehended, military judge advocate generals would review the case, including the evidence, and decide if the detainee was to be retained or released. Unfortunately, because of lack of initial guidance from UNMIK, each of the five military contingents in Kosovo managed this process differently. (Hartz, 2005)

Establishing rule of law in Kosovo had multiple parts. Simple security was the most pressing need. The military performed that task quite well. The military also provided and staffed detention facilities until the UNMIK could take over. Kosovo’s judicial system was staffed by former judges and prosecutors whom UN officials found in refugee camps. The OSCE, who had responsibility for this task, appointed fifty-five judges and prosecutors. Most of these were Albanian, but a few were Serbs. Sadly,
favoritism and threats toward judges and prosecutors and their families eventually led UNMIK to abandon the program in October 1999. UNMIK then decided to recruit international judges and prosecutors to handle the backlog of criminal cases. As the backlog of cases grew, however, many of the detainees were released. Despite these setbacks, 405 judges and prosecutors were operating in all five sectors of Kosovo by September 2000. (Hartz, 2005)

Basic to the rule of law is a criminal code. The UNMIK carefully analyzed this issue. Many Albanians operated under a customary law which was based on blood feuds and revenge killings. However, the official criminal code was still Serbian law, and, according to Security Council Resolution 1244, Kosovo was still part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In July 1999, the Special Representative of the Secretary General, acting as the administrator of Kosovo, decided that the applicable penal code would be the criminal law used in Yugoslav law prior to March 1989. Through consultation with key Albanian leaders, the Special Representative convinced the people of Kosovo to accept this criminal code. (Hartz, 2005) (Dziedzic, 2006) Of course this necessitated training the recently recruited judges and prosecutors in the applicable law.

Another issue facing military forces in Kosovo was crowd control. U.S. forces stationed in Bosnia routinely managed large crowds that assembled with little notice. Such crowds protested atrocities or demonstrated against political decisions or policies. In Bosnia, the U.S. military labeled this phenomenon as ‘dial a crowd,’ because politically motivated adversaries possessed cell phones and could quickly assemble a crowd. When this happened, the crowds often became unruly and destructive.
Instigators from the back controlled the crowd and often incited them to violence. The U.S. military learned in Bosnia how to handle these crowds by quickly calling out a reaction force with riot batons, shields and face masks. Tactical military leaders learned to search the crowd, cull out instigators, and seize them.

Both the UNMIK and KFOR planned for and deployed forces to manage crowds. In the U.S. sector, a platoon of military police was kept in reserve to quickly respond to crowds. However, even with the increase of military police, the Task Force Falcon commander soon decided that maneuver units of infantry, armor, or artillery could be trained to manage crowds. Quick reaction forces in all five military zones in Kosovo soon stood ready to respond to crowd control. Member states of the UN also provided UNMIK with Special Police Units (SPU). The UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations determined that they needed ten of these special police organizations, each comprised of 115 police officers. The UN also provided vehicles and equipment, but the preparation and training of these units took time. A Pakistani Special Police Unit was the first to arrive in April 2000. Others took as long as two years before they were fully functional. A Romanian SPU arrived in February 2002 that was assigned U.S. sector in southeastern Kosovo. Its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Ioan Ovidiu Bratulescu, was a veteran of recent NATO exercises, and his unit worked well with U.S. soldiers. (Perito, 2004)

International Planning

Over the years of the peace operations in Kosovo, there was much criticism of the UN’s ability to manage the peace process and perform the role of temporary
administrator for Kosovo. To be fair, the decision to involve the United Nations as the overall manager of the peacebuilding mission in Kosovo was not decided until well after the bombing campaign began. Consequently, the UN had a late start in planning for this new mission. Once that decision was made, the UN Secretary General sent his most able senior diplomat to undertake an assessment of what needed to be done in Kosovo while bombs were still falling. This assessment proved valuable and set the stage for initial planning. Several days after Ambassador de Mello’s return from Kosovo, the UN Secretary General released his “concept of operations” to the UN Security Council. (UN Sec Gen Report, 12 June 1999)

The real planning for the mission in Kosovo took place in Washington, London and Bonn. The United States government formed an interagency working group to carefully analyze Kosovo. This working group created a political-military plan which was the basis for the UN’s strategic plan. Jock Covey, an American who became the UN principal deputy to the UN Special Representative, carried this plan with him to Kosovo. According to Colonel (Retired) Michael Dziedzic (2001), who replaced Covey in

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<th>UNMIK Mission</th>
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<td>The mission of UNMIK is to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, namely to provide an interim administration under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institution, to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo. (Taken from First Infantry Division briefing, 2001)</td>
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18 At the time, the author (Colonel Oliver) was the military advisor to the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and was responsible for keeping track of Ambassador Sergio de Mello’s whereabouts. This information was passed to NATO Headquarters on a daily basis. Colonel Oliver was also involved in UN initial planning at the UN Headquarters and with the U.S. planning for Kosovo.
Kosovo, “it [the U.S. plan] proved to be about 80% applicable to what turned out to be required.”

In his *Quest for a Viable Peace*, Covey articulated his thinking: “[w]e aimed not just for [a] willingness to talk; we needed concrete, joint, routine processes for planning objective-driven operations. Our solution was to meld the conventional national security-planning paradigm with the military’s time-driven and sequenced approach to operational planning.” (2005, 82) Covey later stated that the plan was not that important; it was the process. The process brought all the players together and forced them make decisions and plan for the future. (2000)

It took several months to get a complete UN staff up and functioning. Therefore, military forces needed to be ready to react to any and all situations. The relationship between the KFOR Commander, British Lieutenant General Michael Jackson, and the UN SRSG, Bernard Kouchner, was a crucial link. Jackson and Kouchner met daily and worked through a myriad of issues. Generally speaking, the senior representatives from the European Union and the Organization for the Security and Co-operation in Europe also worked well with the SRSG.

**Democracy in Kosovo?**

One of the key provisions of the UNMIK Strategic Plan was to form a Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS). The JIAS was a process to get the people of Kosovo involved in determining their future and thereby begin the process of democratic self-governance. Members of the JIAS included key Albanian and Serbian leaders, the SRSG, a representative from the EU (for reconstruction), a representative from OSCE
(for democratization), and occasionally, the KFOR Commander. (UNMIK JAIS Fact Sheet, 2009) There was a power struggle among the Albanians on who would lead Kosovo into the future. Hashim Thaci, the former leader of the KLA, and Ibrahima Rugova, the head of the League of Democrats, were the prominent candidates. The two took almost opposite approaches toward countering Serb aggression. (Dziedzic, 2006) Thaci used the KLA’s terrorist tactics to fight what he saw as Serb terrorism, while Rugova advocated a peaceful settlement with the Serbs in Kosovo. Both men, however, sought independence and both signed the Rambouillet Agreement. SRSG Kouchner worked hard to get the two to meet. It was not until December 1999 that Kouchner was able to get Thaci and Rugova together. (Dziedzic, 2006) (UN Sec Gen Report of 23 December 1999)

The first meeting of the JAIS occurred in February 2000. This was the beginning of the democratization process which included both elections and the creation of an effective civil administration. Serb participation in the JAIS was problematic, but UN SRSG Kouchner continued to search for a suitable representative who would not be intimidated for participating. In March 2000 twenty-seven municipalities started forming structures to manage the civil administration. (Sec Gen Report of 3 March 2000) Although violence was still high among all the populations of Kosovo, the SRSG was pleased that Serbs joined the JIAS and were now represented in the civil administration. SRSG Kouchner felt that the timing was right for municipal elections and scheduled them for October 2000.
Many soldiers thought, including Major General Ricardo Sanchez, who at the
time commanded Task Force Falcon, felt that Kosovo was not ready for elections. In his
book, *Wiser in Battle* (2008), he was very critical of the UN actions in the spring of 2000.
The UN regional administrator had just arrived and, in Sanchez’s opinion, “the United
Nations was still struggling to develop a feasible strategy for the province, had few
executable plans, and had no way of coordinating operations across the province.” (129)
Elections are generally a time of high tension in a region containing opposing ethnic
groups. Public speaking engagements are perfect opportunities for one party to incite
crowds to attack another ethnic group. Consequently, the soldiers of KFOR were keenly
aware of the tensions arising from the election process. Lessons learned from Bosnia
were passed to the soldiers of Task Force Falcon. For example, security needed special
attention during political rallies. Registration of voters also required some special
attention as voter registration sites were potential sites for retaliation. Finally, election
day was also a time of particularly high tension. As Task Force Falcon reported, “[t]he
elections were of particular import to the people of Kosovo (mostly the Albanian
majority) because it meant one more step towards the determination of their future
(independence).” (DuBrieuil, 2001)

Major General Sanchez reorganized Task Force Falcon in the spring of 2000.
Deployments to the U.S. sector for American forces became routine. A long range
calendar developed by the Department of the Army identified the rotation schedule.
American soldiers would spend three to four months getting ready for their peacekeeping
duties in Kosovo, conduct operations for six months and then return and reset their
training for combat operations. American units would undergo a rehearsal exercise either at the training center in Germany or in the United States before deploying.

Years later in his book, *Wiser in Battle*, General Sanchez would go on to say that “two thirds of our mission resembled that politically taboo phrase ‘nation building.’” (121) and that “the U.S. military was forced to take the lead in the following areas: fighting a low level insurgency; building police and security force capacity; restoring basic utility services; creating an effective intelligence capability in a Third World-type environment; building detention facilities; and reestablishing the social, economic and political base of the Multinational Brigade East sector.” (131-132)

Within the staff, General Sanchez created a deputy commander for civil-military operations. The officer holding this colonel-level position was responsible for coordinating the myriad of events that focused on humanitarian assistance, civil administration, and governance. In a typical week, Task Force Falcon personnel conducted six or seven medical or dental visits to Kosovo villages, worked eight to ten civil affairs or humanitarian projects, made 19 radio and 2 TV appearances, and conducted 50-55 meetings with UNMIK staff and NGOs. (U.S. Army Europe, 2000) Colonel Lawrence Saul, who was the deputy commander for civil-military relations in February 2002, described his relationship with other civilian counterparts as “quite good.” This included the UNMIK regional representative and the OSCE and EU representatives in the American sector. He also worked with many NGOs and described them as generally good, but some were difficult to deal with.
Another lesson learned from Bosnia was the value of information operations. Soldiers of Task Force Falcon routinely participated in live radio and television shows. The purpose of these events was to communicate directly with the citizens of Kosovo. The public affairs officers, working closely with the operations officer and intelligence officer, would meet weekly to craft themes for messages released by the command. These messages would be the basis for the talk shows, but small unit leaders would also carry talking points in their pockets. As they made the rounds of key leaders in villages and towns, the individual unit leaders would use these talking points to convey the command message.

The command briefing in June 2000 related that, at the time, information operations were new, uncoordinated, but “crucial to success.” (U.S. Army Europe, 2000) Major Marc Romanych and Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Krumm in an article in Military Review (2004) noted that “The MNB(E)’s information operations successfully shaped the environment for its day-to-day operations and defused several potentially volatile situations. Success was possible because MNB (E) integrated information operations into the overall mission instead of regarding them as separate, parallel operations.”

The elections in October 2000 turned out to be a success. The Organization for the Security and Co-operation in Europe (lead for democratization) organized the municipal elections, and over one thousand international supervisors came to Kosovo to oversee the election process, from the registration of voters through the election. Five thousand five hundred candidates competed for 920 seats in the various municipalities. Estimates were that 913,179 citizens of Kosovo were eligible to vote. Over 700,000
turned out and voted, but Serbs did not participate in this democratic process. According to the UN Secretary General report of 15 December 2000, “voting proceeded in generally a calm fashion,” but not without some difficulties.

The same report described in detail the results of rebuilding Kosovo from the ravages of war. The UNMIK Trust Fund totaled over 35 billion dollars (US). The monies came from many sources, but mostly from nations willing to help the Kosovars recover. The UNMIK staff and NGOs worked hard in all sectors to rebuild the country. All areas reported significant process, especially housing, infrastructure, rule of law, agriculture, education, telecommunications, and sports. The humanitarian “pillar” of UNMIK was phased out, and in its place UNMIK created a new pillar, rule of law, and took over that responsibility.

**KFOR from 2003 to 2011**

For the last 12 years, soldiers from many NATO and non-NATO members have participated in the KFOR mission. The mission remained basically unchanged, yet the process of building peace has had its successes and failures. Ethnic tensions remain high even as of this writing. Throughout the thirteen years, soldiers have continued to provide security, deliver humanitarian assistance, and support the establishment of an effective government to manage the province of Kosovo.

As security situation improved the number of forces deployed to Kosovo declined. In late 1999, there were 50,000 soldiers assigned to the KFOR peacekeeping mission from 30 countries (16 NATO and 14 non-NATO). In 2003 that number dropped to a little over 26,000; and by 2005 it dwindled to 21,500. (Dziedzic, 2006) Security
conditions improved as the number of ethnic related incidents declined, but the potential for violence erupting any moment was high. According to General Erhard Bühler, the Kosovo Force commander in 2011, the situation in Kosovo remains “tense.” He further stated in an interview with Der Spiegel in August 2011, “Northern Kosovo is actually an area where the law can hardly be enforced. The government in Kosovo has no control over the region.” However, as security conditions continued to improve the force numbers continued to decline. In October 2010, General Bühler, announced the first major restructuring of the mission. Rather than five regional brigade zones, KFOR would restructure itself into five Joint Regional Detachments, with two brigade headquarters managing the detachments. The United States retained command of one of the regional brigades in the eastern sector while Germany commanded the western sector. Troop strength would reduce from 10,000 soldiers to 5,000 soldiers.

In late 2005, six years without an end state in mind, the UN Security Council asked the UN Secretary General to make a recommendation on the future status of Kosovo. The UN Secretary General appointed former Finnish President, Martti Ahtasaari, as a special envoy to help determine how the UN should proceed toward final resolution. Ahtasaari’s report was submitted to the UN Security Council on March 26, 2007. It stated: “Kosovo’s current state of limbo cannot continue. Uncertainty over its future status has become a major obstacle to Kosovo’s democratic development, accountability, economic recovery and inter-ethnic reconciliation. Such uncertainty only leads to further stagnation, polarizing its communities and resulting in social and political
unrest.” (UN Report on Kosovo Status, 2007). President Ahtasaari’s report recommended that the only answer for the future of Kosovo was independence.

Since the mission began, riots, ethnic violence, smuggling and maintaining an effective rule of law have been Kosovo’s biggest challenges. Although violence had tapered off with the presence of an international security force (KFOR), tensions between Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs, as well as between Serbia and Kosovo remain high. Finally in February 2008, Kosovo declared its independence. There were mixed feeling about this announcement. The international community did not come into Kosovo to create a new nation state. From the very beginning the final status of Kosovo was never stated or promulgated. The majority population continued to call for independence, yet Serbia insisted that it remain part of Serbia.

As of November 2011, 85 nations have recognized the Republic of Kosovo as an independent nation. (Note: the United States recognized Kosovo as an independent nation one day after it announced its independence.) Kosovo, however, will not become part of the United Nations any time soon, as both Russia and China, who both have veto power in the Security Council, will not allow Kosovo to become part of the world body. The announcement of independence was expected in many parts of the world, but inside Kosovo, the Kosovar Serbs reacted violently. On the anniversary of the anti-Serb violence in March 2004, the Kosovar Serbs stormed the court house in the northern city of Mitrovica. In the ensuing melee, one UN police officer was killed, 63 UNMIK staff and 54 KFOR soldiers were injured. After this incident, ethnic tension resumed to its normal simmering state. (Harland, 2010)
The UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) remained relatively unchanged from 1999 to 2008. Its mandate outlined in UN Security resolution 1244 was the guiding force for the mission. During that time only two major changes occurred in the structure of UNMIK. First the humanitarian pillar undertaken by the High Commission for Refugees was replaced by a rule of law pillar and that task fell to the UN staff. Later that rule of law mission was passed to the European Union, European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX). Elections were held routinely every few years with the last major election held in December 2010. European monitors from OSCE carefully watched the elections and several complaints were received causing recounts and a review of voting practices. The European Network of Election Monitoring Organization announced that “[a] high number of irregularities during the Kosovo Assembly elections have severely affected the trust in the democratic process in Kosovo.” (2010) The report did, however, report that elections were generally peaceful, but noted that many Serbs, especially those north of the Ibar River, did not participate in the voting. Still, 48% of the 1.6 million registered voters participated. (UN Secretary General Report, January 2011)

The American part of the peacekeeping mission followed a similar pattern of the overall KFOR by reducing in size. Every six months one American unit departed and another arrived in the southwest corner of Kosovo. The commanders of both the outgoing and incoming task forces made sure that soldiers patrolling the streets or flying the air knew the current situation. Information on whom they could trust, what projects were underway, and an assessment of the security situation was passed on to the new unit. The process of becoming “street smart” was a thorough one. The process began
when key leaders visited the American sector months before a unit was scheduled to go
take over the mission. These leaders would return back to their units and begin training,
leading to a large scale training rehearsal exercise. Finally, upon arrival in Kosovo,
leaders at all levels were driven around the various sectors by the outgoing unit.

In 2003, after the invasion of Iraq, the Kosovo mission for the American military
passed primarily to the U.S. Army National Guard. National Guard soldiers prepared for
the mission much like their active duty counter parts. The routine deployment of
American soldiers continues. As the level of violence dropped, the number of soldiers
participating in the peace operation or stability operation in Kosovo also fell. There was
a 20 percent drop in the total number of soldiers in 2001 and another 20 percent drop in
Falcon ended the order that soldiers wear Kevlar helmets and flak jackets when outside
the US compounds, and devoted more time to training. (Phillips, 2007) By January 2009,
the entire KFOR was reduced to 15,453 troops and the U.S. sector was down to 2855.
Task Force Falcon was still headed by the U.S. contingent with 1492 soldiers, while
Greece, Lithuania, Poland, the Ukraine, Romania and Armenia contributed the
remainder. (KFOR Website) As of October 5, 2011, 783 American service members out
of total KFOR strength of 6,240 are working and providing a safe and secure
environment in Kosovo. (KFOR website, 2011)

Conclusion

The question must be asked, why did NATO and other nation’s soldiers remain in
Kosovo for well over thirteen years? If violence tailed off in 2000 after the elections, and
continued to decline, then why is it taking so long to find the elusive sustainable peace?
Certainly part of the answer is the fact that the final status of Kosovo remained uncertain.
Starting with the negotiations in Rambouillet and the Military Technical Agreement, Kosovo was to be an autonomous region of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Discussions about independence would certainly lead to more ethnic related violence, or so the United Nations and key leaders in NATO thought. Although tensions remained high after the independence announcement, they were manageable. Perhaps they were manageable because of the presence of a formidable international security force.

The stability operation in Kosovo by most accounts is quite successful. A powerful and capable peace force from NATO moved quickly to fill the void of the withdrawing Serb forces and remained long enough to set the conditions for peace. Although it took almost a year for the United Nations Mission in Kosovo to become fully functional, once they did, they did a credible job. It was not easy with four different organizations (UN, EU, OSCE, and NATO) to work toward a common goal. The leaders of all those organizations, as well as a whole host of NGOs and relief workers from a variety of nations, can feel proud that peace reigns (it is just negative peace) in Kosovo, at least for now.

American soldiers in Multinational Brigade –East, or more commonly known as Task Force Falcon, performed admirably. They conducted tens of thousands of patrols, humanitarian relief efforts, civil projects, weapons confiscation raids, thousands of arrests and worked closely with the Kosovo people. In the last thirteen years over 60,000 American soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines served in Kosovo conducting security
operations, establishing and maintaining rule of law, assisting in governance, promoting economic stability and providing humanitarian relief.

The future of Kosovo is still uncertain and unpredictable. In November 2011, violence erupted along the border with Serbia. The newly independent government of Kosovo tried to enforce tariffs on goods crossing the border in the far northern part of the country. The border crossings were located in a predominately Kosovar Serb region and bordered Serbia proper. In July 2011, Kosovar officials erected a border post at two separate sites. The local Kosovar Serbs erected barricades of concrete trucks, trucks with gravel and buses to block two border crossings. After several months of negotiating, on the night of November 23, 2011, KFOR soldiers began removing the barricades from both border posts. At midnight local Serb demonstrators moved in on the KFOR soldiers and started throwing rocks and using trucks loaded with gravel to push the soldiers away from the sites. KFOR troops were forced to fire warning shots, shoot rubber bullets and use tear gas to clear the demonstrators. At one border post the German commander in the area and one other soldier were shot and 21 KFOR soldiers from Austria and Germany were injured. At the other border post 23 soldiers from Portugal and Hungary were injured. KFOR opted to withdraw from the sites rather than allow the situation to spiral out of control further. (USA Today, 29 November 2011)
It is likely that Kosovo will eventually become a fully recognized independent nation and the ethnic tensions will subside. These ethnic divides go all the way back to the Battle of Kosovo Polé on June 28, 1389 and were reinforced during World War II and again in the break-up of Yugoslavia in the mid-1990s. It will take the effort of more than military forces to bring positive peace to Kosovo, but the soldiers who worked as part of KFOR have made a difference and provided some breathing space for economic development and the democratic process to take hold.
CHAPTER 8

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ON BREEDING THE PHOENIX

Peacebuilding is a complex and multifaceted undertaking. It requires significant amounts of human, financial and institutional resources.
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, 16 April 2010

The mythical bird, the Phoenix, has its origins in many cultures. Some say it came from India, others Arabia. Stories of the Phoenix are found in Greek, Russian, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Egyptian, and Native American mythology. Some stories go back thousands of years, yet there seems to be a similar storyline. This beautifully feathered bird lives for hundreds of years and at the end of its life, it builds a nest and looks to the sun to set itself ablaze. From the ashes comes the next generation. For many cultures, the Phoenix is a symbol of hope, purity, eternity, immortality, and light. Others see the Phoenix as a rebirth. Greeks use the Phoenix as a symbol of rebirth following the 1821–1832 war of independence. Atlanta, Georgia, likewise used the Phoenix as a symbol representing the rebuilding of its city after the American civil war.

Like the Phoenix, nation-states come in many forms and are based on the culture and society from which they are formed. Like the Phoenix, when a nation faces war, whether internal or against another nation, the rebirth of that nation will come from the
ashes of its former self. Understanding the DNA makeup of that society will lead soldiers to better understand how they might help that nation resurrect itself.

For over 150 years, the American military performed the tasks associated with rebuilding societies in the aftermath of war. American soldiers’ efforts after the U.S. Civil War, the insurrection in the Philippines of 1899, after unrest in Haiti in the early 1900s and again in the mid-1990s; following both World Wars, during the Vietnam War, after the invasion of Panama in 1989, during the peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Kosovo, and most recently in Afghanistan and Iraq, demonstrate that soldiers have a role to play in nation building. The U.S. military’s effort after World War II in both Germany and Japan stand out as examples of the right way. Efforts in Haiti in the early 1900s, World War I, Panama (1989–1990), and Iraq (2003–2010) were examples of how the U.S. military did it wrong. American peacekeeping experience in Haiti in the mid-1990s, Bosnia, and Kosovo were better, but still this topic needs much more exploration. Soldiers need to understand their role – both the extent of what they can do and what they should leave for others to do.

For the American military, the role of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines in nation building is not well understood. Soldiers simply did not understand the basic premise articulated by former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell: ”if you break it, you own it.” That notion is changing. This study has focused on the role of the military in postwar environments. Soldiers who went to war in Iraq in 2003 thought they could march into Iraq, defeat the ninth-largest army in the world, topple Saddam Hussein’s regime, and turn over nation building to the people of Iraq. It
was not the soldiers’ fault for thinking this. Senior leaders who were directing the war planned it that way. The outcome was quite different. Soldiers remained in Iraq for over eight years, attempting to rebuild the country. Unfortunately the war turned into an insurgency and several thousand soldiers and untold thousands of civilians died because of this miscalculation. The U.S. military is a learning organization and quickly adapted, but as James Dobbins (2003) articulated in his book, *America’s Role in Nation-Building*, the golden hour was lost. This research has been an attempt to educate the U.S. military so that that golden hour is not lost again.

The American-led war with Iraq should be considered a watershed event when considering the role of the military in nation rebuilding. Many studies were conducted in the United States following the war, and the American military developed new doctrine. More importantly, the military mindset of understanding its role in nation building was changed. For the first time in history, the Secretary of Defense directed that stability operations become a core mission for the U.S. military. Nation building barely entered into the military lexicon prior to 2003, but as of this writing, it is studied and taught in American military educational institutions.

This study looked at a number of conflict resolution theories and some historical examples to draw out lessons for future military leaders to consider when the U.S. military is called upon again to rebuild a country after a devastating war. These conflict and conflict resolution theories shed light on planning and postwar efforts by military leaders. Similarly, several new developments from practitioners in the field of
peacebuilding can help military leaders better understand their role in the aftermath of war.

Chapter 1 introduced various terms that are used in this study. Already in this chapter nation building, peacebuilding, and stability operations were used interchangeably. For the purposes of this study, all three of these terms are synonymous. Nation building was a term the U.S. military used sparingly. The term went completely out of the military lexicon when President George W. Bush deplored the use of the U.S. military in nation building in his 2000 campaign speeches and debates. Peacebuilding, however, was a term used in U.S. military doctrine even before the Iraq war. It was considered a part of peace operations and was focused on rebuilding societies and resolving the root causes of the conflict. It was, however, primarily a civilian role.

Peacebuilding, on the other hand, is the term used by the United Nations, many regional organizations, and other nations. Only the United States uses the term stability operations. Stability operations, at least for the American military, define what soldiers do to help nations recover from war. Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, all Scandinavian countries, all nations whose soldiers participate in peacekeeping on a regular basis, and NGOs use the term peacebuilding, even calling the soldiers’ work peacebuilding. The term peacebuilding is the more accepted term globally, and since peacebuilding is usually a multinational and a multi-agency effort, all participants should use the same term – peacebuilding, and with the same meaning.

There are many actors and participants in helping a nation recover from war. Certainly, as this study emphasizes, the military has a role to play, but so, too, do
civilians. Chapter 1 introduced the multitude of players involved in peacebuilding. There are diplomats, aid workers, medical specialists, educators, and international civil servants. They come from the United Nations, regional organizations, other nations’ governments, and nongovernmental organizations. The list of actors seems endless, yet they have important roles to play. One nagging question comes to mind when studying and researching peacebuilding. How do you get all these actors moving in the same direction with common goals or ideas? The U.S. Institute of Peace called it “herding cats.” The Institute even produced a book with Herding Cats (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall, 1999) in its title. The book comprises a series of case studies about mediating and resolving conflicts within fragile or failing nations.

With all the actors and participants in peacebuilding, it is a wonder that anything gets done. Certainly all the players have good intentions, but good intentions are not enough to help a nation recover from war. Most of the actors in peacebuilding have a common vision of a stable country able to manage itself. Most also believe that a democratic government is the right form of government, but accept that the type of governing structure should be the decision of the local people. Beyond this, there is little common ground. To solve this problem, the international community responding to a failed state must conduct integrated planning, and this includes the soldiers who provide the security. John Paul Lederach emphasized a strategic plan and the participants rebuilding Kosovo began with a strategic plan. I will discuss planning later in this chapter, but the basic question that comes to mind is, where do you begin the planning
process? As UN Secretary General Ban ki-Moon said, the functions of managing a nation are broad and complex.

Since the war with Iraq, numerous studies divided nation building into sub-tasks or functions. The United Nations and Europeans called it peacebuilding, but their tasks and functions were similar to the U.S. approach. Many functions were included in the various studies. Table 4.1 outlined the eleven identified functions that came from various studies. Because the studies were done with certain audiences in mind, some functions were embedded in other functions. For example, some studies included rule of law as part of the judicial function. Others separated civil administration from governance. Others saw humanitarian assistance as a separate function while still others place the basic needs of people in a social well-being category. This study is no different. Its primary intended audience is military planners for post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization, or as the U.S. military now calls it, stability operations. From this perspective, five functional areas evolved: security, humanitarian assistance, economic recovery and infrastructure restoration, rule of law, and governance. In the course of this study, one more functional area was added – reconciliation. This will makes six functions for stability operations.

Chapters 3 and 4 outlined the various functions on peacebuilding. At the conclusion of chapter 4, the six functions on which the military should focus were identified. The functions intertwine like a rope (see figure 4.5). No one function can be ignored regardless of the security conditions. All functions must be conducted simultaneously, yet without security, no function can begin. The question arose, should
the military focus primarily on security and let others, mostly civilians, deals with the other functions? The answer to that question was the basis of this study.

**Data Analysis**

In analyzing these functions, several basic hypotheses arose from the research. To test the corresponding theories, a survey was developed and administered to military officers and civilians working in the peacebuilding field (see annex B for questionnaire). Embedded in the survey were a number of hypotheses that needed exploration. Chief among them was the impact of the security function. The study of cases and an analysis of the various conflict resolution theories seemed to indicate that, without security, other functions were in jeopardy or unable to be pursued. What was clear, however, was that all these functions needed to start immediately, even if security conditions were not acceptable for civilians to come into the country. Perhaps there was a level of security where civilians could come in and do their peacebuilding work. Security became the centerpiece of the research.

Security in most studies was considered good or bad, yet security is not an on-off switch. It is more like a rheostat. There are varying levels of security. When there is little or no security, it is not safe for unarmed civilians to come into the country. As security improves, some of the more experienced civilians can work alongside the military to conduct the functions of humanitarian assistance, governance, rule of law, and economic and infrastructure recovery. Until attaining that level of security, civilians are not safe in the conflict zone, so the military must be prepared to perform all those functions listed above. In essence, security became the independent variable and the role of the military
in the other functions (humanitarian assistance, economic recovery and infrastructure restoration, rule of law, governance, and reconciliation) became the dependent variable. As security conditions improve, the military would do less in each functional area, including security.

The first hypothesis was that peacebuilding is dependent on security. (see figure 8.1) Without some level of security, peacebuilding activities cannot proceed. However, all the studies on peacebuilding and nation building indicate that all the functions must begin immediately. Therefore, if security does not permit civilians to do their work, then the military must plan and conduct these activities. This led to the second hypothesis: the military must be prepared and willing to undertake all the functions of peacebuilding when security conditions do not allow civilians into the conflict zone. The opposite is

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypotheses</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 1</td>
<td>A secure environment is essential for peacebuilding to commence, but this is not a simple requirement. Peacebuilding will progress more effectively the better the security environment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 2</td>
<td>The military has a role in peacebuilding beyond security. This includes all aspects of peacebuilding—humanitarian assistance, infrastructure repair, civil administration, governance, and economic recovery.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 3</td>
<td>The military’s role is inversely proportional to the degree of security in the conflict zone; for example, in a conflict zone where there is no security, the military must perform all the roles envisioned by other organizations (nongovernmental organizations, other government agencies, and the international organizations).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 3A</td>
<td>The more security improves, the less the military has to do in peacebuilding, and the more other nonmilitary organizations can perform.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 4</td>
<td>When the requirement for humanitarian assistance toward local populations exists, the military must dedicate significant resources toward humanitarian assistance regardless of the level of security.</td>
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also true; as security conditions improve, the military can do less in all the functional areas.

Humanitarian assistance was a function that deserved special attention. For decades, the U.S. military considered the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies an important mission. When countries face large-scale natural disasters or human-made catastrophes, the demand for help is so critical that all available resources should come to bear to help save lives and ease human suffering. Militaries are often called upon to help bring in supplies, especially in remote areas. The military can also provide resources that local community and aid agencies either do not possess or need time to procure. There are numerous examples of the U.S. military assisting aid agencies in natural and manmade disasters. These include large-scale earthquakes, tsunamis, floods, or following open warfare. In the warfare category, there are several clear cases where the U.S. military, and other militaries, responded. These include Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda. Additionally, the U.S. military conducted humanitarian assistance in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Even during peacetime or when there is no catastrophe, the U.S. military conducts humanitarian assistance operations in various parts of the world, e.g. Pakistan and Burma. U.S. Navy hospital ships conduct these kinds of missions a few times a year.

The U.S. military understands that civilian agencies are better trained and equipped to carry out humanitarian assistance. For every twenty relief missions conducted by the U.S. Agency for International Development, the U.S. military can expect to respond to only one or two crises. This translates to perhaps one or two crises
per year that require a military response. Helping in humanitarian assistance provides civilians a positive opinion about military forces. Consequently, the function of humanitarian assistance required some additional focus in this research. Another hypothesis was developed that stated that, regardless of the security conditions, the U.S. military should participate in humanitarian-related projects.

The origin and rationale for the creation of these hypotheses were outlined in chapter 5. The security function occupied the epicenter of these hypotheses (see table 8.1). The focus of these hypotheses was to determine when the military should engage in the various functions and when they should step back and let more qualified individuals, namely civilians, carry out these functions. Military officers, and especially U.S. Army and Marine officers, have a “can do” attitude toward everything they undertake. Told to manage a city, they will push aside the local people, the international aid workers, and even other U.S. government officials, to get the job done.

Military officers must understand that the process of peacebuilding takes time and local ownership is critical to this process. Soldiers will depart at some point in time, and the strength of any program is the ability of the local citizens, perhaps with the help of international civil servants, to manage the functions of the state.

To analyze and attempt to prove these hypotheses, a survey was developed to determine how both the military and civilians viewed some of these ideas (see annex B). The survey was administered to military officers attending courses at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island; the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania; and the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Additional
surveys were administered to civilians and military officers through an online survey tool. In total, 579 surveys were received. Of those surveyed, 388 were military officers (67.4 percent) and 188 (32.6 percent) were civilians working in the U.S. government, NGOs, and others involved in stability operations or peacebuilding programs. The civilians were targeted as experts in the field, while the military officers were simply officers attending the military schools. The surveys were collected in 2007 and 2008, so many of the military officers had experience working in Afghanistan or Iraq. Annex A, Statistical Analysis, breaks out the categories of the people who responded to the surveys. The questions were aimed at determining the role of the military in stability operations (peacebuilding). Questions were asked in various ways to improve overall reliability in the questionnaire. In the remainder of this chapter, I will reveal and discuss various statistics from these surveys.

In equating stability operations to nation building, 52.3 percent of those responding to the survey equated stability operations with nation building. This demonstrates only marginal understanding of the term stability operations. At a 95 percent confidence level, the civilian response showed a significantly lower understanding of the term than the military (civilian (M=3.076, SE .091) and military (3.387, SE .057) t (570) =.017, p< .5). (A Likert scale was used in the survey with 1 being strongly disagree, 2 disagree, 3 neutral, 4 agree and 5 strongly agree.) Yet in another question asked later in the survey, 83 percent of respondents felt comfortable with the term stability operations. Again, civilians and military differed on their opinions. Statistically the difference in means was significant at a 99 percent confidence level.
Civilians had a mean of 3.82 (SE .090) and the military’s mean was 4.17 (SE .043) (t(544)=.000, p<.001).

This demonstrates that civilians understand the term *stability operations* less than the military. This is natural; *stability operations* are a term developed and used mostly by the U.S. military. The term needs to be changed and replaced with peacebuilding. The more universal term *peacebuilding* is better understood globally. The U.S. military is the only organization using the term *stability operations*; therefore, confusion starts from the outset of a mission. Understanding the simple terms is important. If civilians and the military from many nations and organizations are to work side by side in peacebuilding, they must have a common lexicon.

Sixty-seven percent of the military officers responding felt that they had a marginal or lower understanding of stability operations. In responding to the question about understanding the role of the military in stability operations and the need for more education, the survey indicated that more training and education is necessary. Almost 93 percent (42.7 percent agree and 50.2 percent strongly agree) find that the military must do more to educate its personnel on stability operations. Again, civilians and military differed on their opinions. Statistically, the difference in means was significant at a 99 percent confidence level. Civilians had a mean of 3.82 (SE .090) and the military’s mean was 4.17 (SE .043) (t(544)=.000, p<.001). The conclusion drawn from this difference is that civilians in the field of peacebuilding think the military needs slightly less education. Such a conclusion is better understood when 57 percent of the respondents felt that the
military did not focus on stability operations during the Cold War and the decade after the Cold War ended.

Since this study began and the publication of DOD Directive 3000.05, all the U.S. military War Colleges have stability operations in their curricula. The U.S. Naval War College has one lesson specifically devoted to stability operations, but several of its forty lessons in the senior war college curriculum discuss stability operations. The new Military Joint Doctrine now includes stability operations in its phasing construct for planning new operations. The survey reflected this change. A little over 73 percent of the respondents accepted the fact that the military should be planning for and conducting stability operations.

When asked the question whether the military should only focus on fighting and winning the nation’s wars, the results were mixed. Of those responding, 73.2 percent felt the military had a role beyond just war fighting. Yet, 23.6 percent of the respondents agreed that the military should only focus on war fighting. These results demonstrate that respondents had mixed opinions on the military’s role in stability operations or peacebuilding. There was no significant difference between military and civilian responses to this question.

Chapter 4 explained the “warrior mentality” and the American way of war. Perhaps the warrior mentality is changing. American soldiers are ready to accept missions beyond fighting and winning our nation’s wars and see value in stability operations. However, 8.7 percent of the respondents strongly agreed that the military’s role is only on fighting and winning our nation’s wars. There are still outliers who
strongly feel that the military has no role in stability operations and that such missions should be left to the civilians.

Respondents to the survey were asked whether the military had an important role to play in helping nations recover from war. The results were quite positive; 46.5 percent agreed and 30.1 percent strongly agreed the military has a role in nation building. This statistic was interesting in that civilian opinions differed significantly from the military opinions. On a five-point Likert scale, the mean of this question was 3.93. The military mean was 3.96, while the civilian mean was 3.87. Military (M=3.96 SE .0471) and civilians (M=3.87, SE .081) differed significantly ((t (571) =.000, p<.001) at a 99 percent confidence level). The conclusion from this can be construed to mean that civilians accept the role of the military in nation building, but have a significantly different opinion as to how much of a role the military should have. Asked another question about Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, which stated that stability operations are now a core mission for the U.S. military, 73 percent agreed (44.4 percent agree and 28.1 percent strongly agree) with the policy change and only 14.5 percent disagreed with the change (another indicator of the warrior mentality).

Another question focused on negotiations training. Negotiations training proved to be a valuable tool for U.S. military personnel working in peacekeeping in Bosnia and Kosovo. Negotiations with ethnic groups, civil administrators, and even rebel groups were all encountered in these peacekeeping missions. In 2001, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff (senior ranking officer in the U.S. Army), General Eric Shinseki, came to the U.S. Army War College to talk with the students. During the question-and-answer session, he
received a question about Bosnia, since he had previously served as the commander of all peacekeeping forces in Bosnia. His answer reflected the need for all Army officers to be trained in negotiations. He stressed that almost every day during the peacekeeping mission; senior-level officers were engaged in some sort of negotiation. He was surprised that the U.S. Army War College had a course on negotiations. The survey of military officers and civilians engaged in peacebuilding also saw a need for military officers to undergo some sort of negotiations training. Sixty-six percent (30.1 percent agree and 36.1 percent strongly agree) agreed that military personnel should be trained in negotiations.

**From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding**

Like the Phoenix, the nation-state has many origins. For Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant, the nation-state began in Europe, unfolding through the Treaty of Westphalia. Both Hobbes and Kant said that man’s natural state is one of war. Therefore, when men find themselves spiraling downward into war, the nation, like the Phoenix, will find its rebirth from the ashes of its former self. Warfare can destroy a state and put its people on a path of destruction, misery, and despair. Finding a way back to the light can be difficult, if not impossible. Thus, the international community, including military forces, must take on the role of midwife and help a nation in its rebirth. Support must come in the form of money, people, and equipment. More importantly, all must have the willingness and perseverance to commit these resources for an extended period. Without this commitment, fragile and failed nations emerging from war will fall back into despair. Dennis Sandole (2010, 35), citing Hewitt et al., 2010, articulated this concept by stating

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19 The author was in the audience when General Shinseki spoke to the War College class.
“the regrettable fact that thirty-one of the thirty-nine armed conflicts that have occurred in the past ten years have been recurrences – i.e., their deep-rooted causes and conditions have not been effectively addressed.”

Since the turn of the twenty-first century, the United Nations, several regional organizations, and many affluent nations have developed peacebuilding programs to help fragile and failing states. The functions outlined in the previous chapters are focused on bringing failed states back into the community of effective nations, where they can prosper and grow. The United Nations often calls on all its members to work with the local people and local governments of fragile and failing states. More importantly, however, the government structures of troubled states must treat its citizens with dignity and respect. All too often, some governments do not protect their own citizens. Those situations where the nation was either unwilling or unable to protect its citizens became the basis for the new international norm emanating the UN General Assembly, Responsibility to Protect (R2P).

The UN Security Council is charged with the maintenance of international peace and security while the rest of the UN system works on helping struggling countries. The United Nations found new footing after the Cold War, and the last three Secretaries General of the UN were influential in developing programs that prevented war or helped nations recover from war. Peacebuilding and development programs should be centerpieces of actions by United Nations, but unfortunately, the maintenance of peace and security (peacekeeping) remains at center stage, and will for the foreseeable future.
Kofi Annan witnessed failures by the United Nations and the international community to prevent wars and crimes against humanity in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda. His ten-year tenure as the UN Secretary General was aimed at finding ways to prevent genocide, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. His support to the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty initiated the concept of R2P. Now, ten years after the release of the report, the concept of R2P has been refined and accepted by the member states of the UN. This acceptance did not come without debate. At the center of the debate was the issue of state sovereignty. Since the nation-state is the basic building block of the world’s governments, national governments have the responsibility to serve its citizens and protect them from harm – in other words, provide for their security. When national governments either fail or are unwilling to protect their citizens, then the R2P concept stipulates that the international community must step forward and help. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan masterfully combined the R2P concept with the Millennium Development Goals and a redefinition of security. Member States of the UN could see the value of the Millennium Development Goals and realized that in order to achieve these goals, every effort must be made to end war. Wars have always affected civilians. Since the end of World War II, however, civilians have suffered more than the soldiers engaged in the war. Modern wars now account for more civilian casualties than military casualties. Numerous studies and reports (UN Sec Gen Report, 2010) (OXFAM, 2011) have demonstrated that as the twenty-first century unfolded, the number of civilians affected by war has increased. Neil MacFarlane and Yuen Khong (2006, 8) in their book, Human Security and the UN, said, “the proportion
of civilian casualties in war (relative to combat casualties) has risen continually through the twentieth century to a stage where the casualty rate of eight military personnel to one civilian that characterized the early twentieth century has been reversed.”

Secretary General Kofi Annan also stimulated the debate on redefining security. Security traditionally was synonymous with the term national security. In the field of international relations, security was the responsibility of the state and focused on the balance of power with other nations. In the Secretary General’s Millennium Report (2000) he introduced the term “human security,” which Kofi Annan drew from an earlier UN Development Program report (Marczuk, 2007). Human security changed the focus on the definition of security. Rather than looking at the concept of security from a state level, security now had a focus on individuals. The change in focus from state security to human security helped achieve consensus on the issue of R2P. In sum, the introduction of the Millennium Development Goals and a redefinition of security, both stimulated by the UN Secretary General, set in motion the global acceptance of R2P.

Chapter 3 outlined the evolution of the R2P concept, but it is worth repeating the outcome here. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon carried this concept further by pushing through his pillars of R2P. His 2009 Secretary General’s report outlined R2P into three pillars (A/63/677):

Pillar one – the protection responsibilities of the state
Pillar two – international assistance and capacity building
Pillar three – timely and decisive response by the international community

This research is focused on pillars two and three, but more on pillar three. In pillar two, should a state fail to carry out its responsibilities toward protecting its citizens, then
mostly civilians from the international community should reach out and help build
capacity for a fragile state. This could mean anything from helping reestablish a viable
police and military to helping provide basic services to its citizens. In essence, the core of
R2P is to respect sovereignty, but should a nation be unable to provide for its citizens,
then the international community can work through that nation to build capacity.

Pillar three is the more controversial pillar. Some nations felt that the third pillar of
intervention impinged on state sovereignty. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon addressed
this issue directly in a speech in Berlin in July 2008 by stating, “Equally incorrect is the
assumption that the responsibility to protect is in contradiction to sovereignty. Properly
understood, RtoP is an ally of sovereignty, not an adversary. Strong states protect their
people, while weak ones are either unwilling or unable to do so. Protection was one of the
core purposes of the formation of states and the Westphalian system. By helping States
meet one of their core responsibilities, R2P seeks to strengthen sovereignty, not weaken
it.”20

Pillar two of the R2P concept focuses on conflict prevention, something the UN
and the international community do not do well. Pillar three, however, focuses on conflict
after wars have already begun. The reality is that the international community does not
react to wars in a uniform or efficient manner. Most recently in 2011, the United Nations
and the international community reacted to the civil war in Libya under pillar three of the
R2P concept. One year later, as the civil war raged in Syria, where thousands of civilians
were killed in 2011 and 2012, three permanent members of the Security Council called for

20 “R2P” and “RtoP” are interchangeable acronyms for Responsibility to Protect.
intervention under R2P. Russia and China vetoed the resolution, calling for international intervention. China voted down the resolution on the basis of impingement on state sovereignty, while Russia claimed the resolution was “unbalanced” (BBC, February 5, 2012)

Politics aside, the concept of Responsibility to Protect is a norm that is gaining momentum. According to the UN Secretary General Report on “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect” (January 2009), should a nation be unwilling or unable to protect its citizens, then the international community has the responsibility to intervene and provide that protection. Thus, the international community will not only provide protection of civilians, but also help rebuild the capacity of the nation to carry out its functions of the state – security, basic services, economic policies, and governance. The overall goal of the international community should be to rebuild, from the ashes of war, the state systems.

The nature of warfare has changed over the last few decades. Interstate wars are less numerous than in the past and internal wars now dominate the international warfare scene. The Center for Systemic Peace stated that, at the end of 2011, there were thirty-one ongoing armed conflicts with more than 500 deaths attributed to each conflict. Their website also indicated that civil wars are on the rise, while interstate wars are approaching an all-time low. The World Development Report (2011, 2) puts the nature of warfare in the twenty-first century into perspective: “[Twenty-first]-century violence does not fit the 20th-century mold. Interstate war and civil war are still threats in some regions, but they have declined over the last 25 years. Deaths from civil war, while still
exacting an unacceptable toll, are one-quarter of what they were in the 1980s. Violence and conflict have not been banished: one in four people on the planet, more than 1.5 billion, live in fragile and conflict affected states or in countries with very high levels of criminal violence.”

According to Michael Lund (1996) managing these conflicts fits a common mold. (see figure 8.1) As a nation begins to falter in its ability to protect its own citizens, the international community can respond with preventive diplomacy and peacemaking. The international record of accomplishment in preventive action is not good. Often violent conflict escalates into full-scale war that damages every fabric of society. In responding to these violent conflicts, peace enforcement and peacekeeping have been effective at limiting the effects of war. This research is focused on the last half of that cycle, following peacemaking by diplomats. Soldiers conducting peace enforcement and peacekeeping provide the basic security conditions so that a process of building a stable peace can take form.

Chapter 1 outlined that over the last sixty years, peacekeeping operations have evolved from traditional peacekeeping to the third generation of peacekeeping.
Peacekeepers are more involved in peacebuilding efforts than at any time in the history of peacekeeping. Not only do peacekeepers (soldiers) provide security; they are intimately involved in building future security organizations for the host country. For example, peacekeepers train police, while civilian peacebuilders create more effective judicial systems. This is the rule of law function espoused in many peacebuilding and stability operations functions. Peacekeepers are also providing humanitarian assistance, working with local leaders to develop rudimentary forms of governance and establish economic programs that will sustain the country into a period of sustainable peace.

   Peacekeeping and peacebuilding are merging into a complex network of programs where both civilians and soldiers work side by side in restoring order to nations recovering from war. The governing factor on how much soldiers do in peacebuilding is security. As security improves, peacekeepers (soldiers) do less and civilians do more. As security improves to an acceptable level where international civil servants and local people have freedom of movement without fear of attack, civilian-run development programs begin to make the nation more self-reliant. Eventually peacekeepers withdraw and development workers can continue their work. In turn, when the country is operating effectively, development workers can also leave.

**Theories behind Peacebuilding**

Theories are general frameworks that help practitioners understand the tasks they are about to execute. Practitioners of peacebuilding, or any field for that matter, provide some ideas that should guide not only the planning for peacebuilding activities, but also the conduct of peacebuilding. For practitioners of peacebuilding there are a number of
theories that should be internalized; when a situation arises, these theories should provide a mental view that will guide actions and decisions. There is no one theory that helps explain peacebuilding. Perhaps the closest is Johan Galtung’s positive peace. Many prominent scholars on peacebuilding (Lederach, 1997; Jeong, 2005; Eriksen, 2009, and Sandole, 2010) agree that there is no one theory that can guide peacebuilders. A combination of theories is necessary to fully think through and prepare for the complex world of peacebuilding. Some of the relevant theories that might help a peacebuilder were explored in chapter 2; however, this section will discuss why these theories are important to peacebuilders.

Positive Peace and Negative Peace Theory

The term positive peace was introduced in chapter 2 and mentioned in the above paragraph. The term was introduced to the world by the prominent peace scholar, Johan Galtung, in 1969. He expanded on the concept in the mid-1970s. This concept has been the hallmark of peacebuilding in that positive peace focuses on providing the basic needs of people in conflict (Sandole, 2010). Negative peace, as described by Galtung, is the absence of direct violence – merely ending the fighting. Positive peace, therefore, takes the concept further by resolving the root causes of the conflict. Positive peace takes time and resources, while negative peace can be achieved by the presence of peacekeepers or soldiers responding as part of an international intervention.

Galtung (1969 and 1975) could not talk about peace without defining and explaining violence. Peace, in essence, is the absence of violence. Galtung’s discussions of direct and structural violence are important concepts to understand. Direct violence is
the action by someone else that causes bodily harm. Direct violence is often what draws the international community to respond to failed states. It is depicted on the front pages of newspapers and is the reason the international community reacts to world crises. It is the basis for the UN General Assembly’s R2P concept and the Security Council’s resolution on the protection of civilians. If the international community is to respond, soldiers are often called upon to stop the direct violence. Soldiers, however, need to look beyond the direct violence and focus on structural violence once the direct violence subsides.

Galtung explained in 1971 that direct violence kills quickly, while structural violence kills slowly. Structural violence refers to state sponsored policies, laws, and norms that prevent certain groups from attaining their basic needs. Soldiers acting as peacebuilders will find social injustices when intervening in failed states. Certain ethnic or religious groups might be deprived access to food, water, and shelter, medical care, education, and legal programs.

Stopping the direct violence or achieving negative peace is only the first step in resolving the conflict. Intervening in failed states requires military leaders to look beyond the ending of direct violence and understand the structural violence. Only then can positive peace take hold. Dennis Sandole (2010, 10) calls positive peace, the objective of the “maximalist” approach to peacebuilding. Finding all the structural reasons for the deprivations experienced by certain populations requires some careful analysis and a thorough understanding of culture, laws, and norms of the society. Soldiers understand that their role is to stop the direct violence, but they must also focus on the next task of building a sustainable society – positive peace.
Thus, when military units find themselves intervening in a failed state, leaders must ensure that all individuals, regardless of race, religion, ethnic group, or social status, are treated equally. If humanitarian supplies are provided, all must benefit. Similarly, if roads are built or water or electrical systems restored, then all members of the society must benefit from these resources. This is particularly challenging; often, because of structural violence by the previous regime, some of these groups were excluded from the benefits. Additionally, some of the groups might resist the presence of soldiers because they represent a change in the social order that existed prior to the soldiers’ arrival. Soldiers might see these rival groups as the enemy. Care must be taken to separate the enemy combatants while treating the families of these enemy combatants with respect and ensuring that they receive the basic services that all citizens of the country should receive.

**Basic Human Needs Theory**

The discussion on basic human needs in chapter 2 began with a review of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, which most young Americans are exposed to in their high school psychology classes. Maslow’s three initial needs, physiological, safety, and belonging, are particularly relevant to military peacebuilders. The immediate intervention by soldiers will mostly take both the physiological and safety needs into consideration for any population in a failed state. The presence of soldiers will provide for the safety need, and humanitarian assistance will help satiate the physiological needs. Soldiers and their leaders, however, must be attuned to the belonging need. The belonging need deals with issues such as love and affection. In any war-torn region, relatives and family members

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will have been killed in the ensuing violence. Reconciliation of those losses must be at the forefront of any efforts by the military forces to reestablish safety and security. Retribution is often prevalent in these situations; soldiers must deal directly with the population in addressing the reconciliation issues associated with war.

Also part of the belonging need is the issue of identity. All societies in the world develop some sort of identity. It is part of the human makeup. Humans are social animals. This study already explained that many of the wars emerging in the twenty-first century are ethnic or religious based. These ethnicities or religions are part of the fabric of that society. Military leaders who fail to understand the culture and ethnic diversity of the region where their soldiers will work will be unable to achieve any kind of peace – positive or negative.

Many scholars of conflict analysis and resolution took Maslow’s ideas and applied them to conflicts around the globe. There were many views on what constituted the basic needs of human beings. The debate on basic human needs was valuable in that scholars from many academic disciplines saw the needs differently. Chapter 2 discussed ten conflict resolution theorists who provided their expert opinions on what were the basic human needs. In total, sixteen different ideas emerged as to what constitutes the basic needs of people in conflict. Some of the theorists agreed with their colleagues while others refuted their colleagues and developed their own list. In reviewing table 2.1, security stands alone. Every theorist included security (or safety) as a basic human need. The second most identifiable human need was the access to the basic necessities – water, food, medical attention, and shelter. Beyond that some form of identity or belonging to a
group emerged. Some form of justice also emerged as an important need. Several theorists (Sites, Burton, Fisher, Mitchell, and Azar) saw that recognition was important.

One can construe that the failure of scholars to come to an agreement on basic human needs was a failure to find a useful theory for conflict resolution. On the contrary, this extensive and diversified list of ideas provides the peacebuilder a menu on which to be mindful of things that might arise in various conflict environments. No two conflicts are alike, and every conflict will uncover different human needs.

John Burton, whose ideas on basic human needs closely resembled Paul Sites’, took the concept of basic human needs to a different level. Burton’s work on problem solving workshops provides a peacebuilder with a mechanism to determine the basic human needs of a society in conflict. By meeting with grassroots and mid-level leaders of society, peacebuilders, including soldiers conducting peacebuilding, can use this list to help determine the basic needs of the society in conflict. These meetings help the peacebuilder find out what basic human needs are important. The list presented in chapter 2 is not all-inclusive. These meetings might produce an entirely different need.

Perhaps it was basic human needs that stimulated UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to lay out his report on Larger Freedoms. “Freedom from want,” “freedoms from fear,” and “freedom to live in dignity,” find their roots in understanding basic human needs. In this document, the Secretary General laid out his Millennium Development Goals.

Freedom from fear encompasses collective security, but also addresses many human security issues. International relations scholars would look to the collective work
of the United Nations to solve many of the world’s intractable conflicts – from terrorism to managing weapons of mass destruction. The concept of Responsibility to Protect is a collective security approach toward preventing the four crimes of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Likewise, the recommendation by the Secretary General to continue to improve peacekeeping and form a Peacebuilding Commission are collective security efforts by the nations of the world. Freedom from fear also has a human security dimension. The Secretary General focuses much of his freedom from fear discussion on respect for human rights.

Freedom from want speaks to many concepts. These might include the physiological needs of water, food, shelter, and medicine, but it also addresses the equitable distribution of water, electricity, education, and representation in the government. Self-determination, recognition, and political access are all concepts espoused by the various human needs theorists. All of these can be linked directly to the ideas of Kofi Annan’s “freedom from want” and the Millennium Development Goals.

“Freedom to Live in Dignity” picks up the remainder of the categories outlined by human needs theorists. Identity, recognition, justice, and the broader freedom or liberty categories identified by human needs theorists can be included in the freedom to live in dignity. Also embedded in Larger Freedoms are some of the functions of stability operations or peacebuilding, including: rule of law, equitable representation in a democratic form of governance, and economic recovery.
Frustration-Aggression Theory

The frustration-aggression theory outlined by John Dollard, Neal Miller, Leonard Doob, O. H. Mowrer, and Robert Sears in 1939 is an excellent theory for military peacebuilders to keep in mind. The theory simply states that when an individual’s goals are blocked, frustration often results. Repeated blocking of one’s goal achievement often translates frustration into aggression or violence. For a soldier performing peacekeeping or stability operations, this concept can be viewed in many ways. Consider the fathers and mothers trying to support their family. Repeated blocked efforts to find water, food, or shelter can quickly turn to aggression. Similarly, the inequitable distribution of electricity, medical support, or services can also lead to frustration and aggression. When groups of individuals are denied services, collectively, this aggression can turn to many forms of violence. That frustration might manifest itself in demonstrations or protest marches, but those peaceful forms of protest can quickly lead to open violence and widespread destruction.

Military leaders engaged in peacekeeping or stability operations must be attuned to the needs of the people. Understanding the goals and needs of the local populace are important to maintaining a safe and secure environment. If these goals are not understood, then aggression and violence are often the result.

Leonard Berkowitz (1989) added a new dimension to the frustration-aggression theory. His notion is that the intensity of the aggression heightens when those attempting to attain the goal are stymied by illegal or unfair rules and policies. Often in interventions in failed states, former regime policies do not equitably treat various population groups.
Therefore, leaders must understand the framework for previous policies and craft new policies that avoid the stigma of the old policies.

*Social Identity Theory*

Ethnocentrism was the underlying concept of social identity theory. Essentially, ethnocentrism is the notion that the group with whom you, as an individual, identify is superior to other groups. A group does not necessarily mean an ethnic group. Any group in which an individual finds a strong bond will form the basis for group identity (Sumner, 1906). This could be a sports team, a school, a region, or certainly an ethnic or religious group. Tajfel (1970) took the work of Sumner and expanded it to state that when a group identity forms, individuals will favor their own group over those of another group. Marilynn Brewer (2001) placed the social identity theory in the context of conflict. Her work stipulated that when resources are scarce, group dynamics emerge and aggression may result in the distribution of those resources.

Edward Azar’s theory of protracted social conflict (1990) pointed out that many of the conflicts around the world originate from protracted injustices between ethnic, religious, or other cultural groups. Already this study has described that many of the violent conflicts or wars emerging in the twenty-first century are societal wars based on ethnic, religious, or cultural divides. Soldiers will find themselves trying to resolve deep-rooted protracted social conflicts. It behooves military organizations sent to intervene in these types of conflicts to understand the social makeup of the region or country in which they operate. This is no easy task. Even soldiers will experience ethnocentrism. It will be the lens through which they view the conflict. It will be very hard to understand the deep-
rooted issues that were the basis of the conflict. Understanding the conflict will only come through intense study and preparation, as well as an understanding that each group sees the conflict differently. Leaders must listen to both (or all) sides and try to understand how these identity issues frame the conflict.

Distribution of water, food, medicines, or even projects that aid in future development must be divided equitably between groups. Likewise, representation in various committees or focus groups must include an equitable distribution of the ethnic, religious, or cultural makeup of that society. Failure to do so will only extend the protracted social conflict. Additionally, peacebuilders (both soldiers and civilians) must understand that it took decades, if not centuries, for these identities to form. Changing the outlook of the local citizens will take a considerable amount of time. Essentially, peacebuilders are reframing new identities – the same identities that created the conflict.

*Liberal Democracy*

There is no overarching peacebuilding theory, nor is there an existing form of governance that must evolve. Most practitioners in peacebuilding, however, do believe that the best form of government to establish in a failed state is a liberal democracy. Beyond this, there is little agreement on what needs to be accomplished in a failed state. The other theories and the functions of peacebuilding provide a framework on where to begin, but for the governance function, liberal democracy seems to be the basis for all peacebuilding activities.

Soldiers and civilians involved in peacebuilding need not understand the teachings and philosophy of Hobbes, Locke, Kant, Marx, or Weber. Likewise,
peacebuilders need not understand the various forms of democracy; however, all peacebuilders must understand and practice the concept that the rights of every individual need to be protected. Likewise, peacebuilders must understand that all citizens’ voices must be heard, no matter what form of governance or what decisions are made that affect the society.

When the decision is reached to define and form a new government in the failed state, lawyers and other scholars in democratic forms of government are often brought in to help the nation redefine itself. Sometimes military lawyers engage in this endeavor. Such was the case in the rebuilding of Japan and Germany after World War II, where military lawyers were involved in writing new constitutions. Military lawyers and U.S. Department of Defense legal advisors also played a role in drafting and reviewing some of the governing principles for the interim administration in Iraq that took over in 2004 (Special Inspector General Reconstruction, 2009). Overall, however, military leaders do not need to worry about crafting constitutions and legal frameworks for the rule of law. That task is best left to civilian experts.

Military leaders must understand, however, that every citizen is entitled to the services the government provides. This is the basis of liberal democracy. When the intervention begins, services are often disrupted and need to be restarted. Soldiers involved in the rebuilding of Germany and Kosovo faced this issue. Soldiers quickly ascertained which civil agency managed electricity and water distribution, education, judicial systems, trash collection, hospitals, transportation management, and social programs. They encouraged and often helped these local civil administrators to get back
into operation. Some government organization had run these agencies before the war; now that the war had ended, someone needed to manage them again. As the peacebuilding efforts progress, soldiers often find ways to improve civil administration. They must keep in mind that the local administrators must be involved in implementing the changes. Soldiers will eventually leave and those administrators need to continue their work. The overall goal, however, was an understanding of liberal forms of democracy: every citizen is entitled to these services.

Relative Deprivation Theory – The Peacebuilders’ Theory

The relative deprivation theory developed by Ted Robert Gurr (1970) was saved as the last theory to discuss. This theory might be considered the peacebuilders’ theory. Gurr’s theory on relative deprivation can be translated into peacebuilding terms. When peacebuilders arrive, whether they are soldiers or civilians, the local people’s expectations are raised. Gurr’s theory, based on frustration-aggression theory, states that when the difference between what people expect and what they have grows, then frustration and aggression are the likely outcome. When local citizens see soldiers and civilians from other parts of the world in their country, they expect the environment to change to benefit them. Actually, for many, the war decreased what they have, so they expect things to improve. They expect immediate access to water, food, and shelter. Often the international community meets these needs quickly; however, as the peacebuilding efforts begin to take hold and programs are started, the local people expect more. Peacebuilders must be cautious of what they promise; promises increase expectations.
According to Gurr, if the difference between what people have and what they expect to have remains constant, then there is no frustration or aggression. When peacebuilders promise the distribution of water or electricity, and do not follow through in a reasonable time, then frustration erupts among the local people. Peacebuilders must manage these expectations. It behooves peacebuilders to be less than optimistic about restoration of services in a failed state. Explanations, however, have a low half-life. The bottom line is, peacebuilders (both soldiers and civilians) need to understand that the mere presence of people from another nation raises expectations. In sum, peacebuilders must manage the expectations of the local people.

**Peacebuilding Functions**

Chapter 3, “Practitioners’ Views,” discussed several studies conducted in both the United States and Europe. Most of these studies criticized the U.S. nation building efforts in Iraq. The Center for International Strategic Studies, the RAND Corporation, and the U.S. Institute of Peace all contributed to a better understanding of stability operations. Europe was ahead of the American studies. Spearheaded by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, several European countries came together to define and refine peacebuilding efforts. The concluding report, the Utstein Report (discussed in chapter 3), was published just as the United States entered Iraq. They based their analysis on peacebuilding efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo. Their ideas certainly influenced the American studies on stability operations and nation building.

Both the U.S. State Department and Department of Defense analyzed and refined all of these studies. New military doctrinal manuals, specifically the Joint Manual 3-07,
Stability Operations (2011), incorporated these ideas into functions for the military to perform. These functions are security, humanitarian assistance, rule of law, governance, and economic and infrastructure. (Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-0 and 3-07, 2011) The Joint publication differs from other studies with similar ideas. Because this doctrine came later than other studies, it better articulates what the military must be prepared to do in a postwar, stability operations environment. The U.S. Joint doctrine, however, should separate economic recovery from infrastructure restoration and add the concept of reconciliation to their doctrine. Each of these functions is discussed in this section.

Security

As mentioned above, the role of the military in stability operations is dependent on the security conditions. The basis of this research is the definition of human security, security focused on the individual rather than on the nation-state. Security is the sine qua non for peacebuilding. Without security none of the other functions can take place. Violence caused by civil unrest will stifle any type of governance, stymie economic development, destroy infrastructure, and create humanitarian disasters.

This study defined five levels of security (see table 8.2). These security levels ranged from level 0—no security, to level 4—well-established security. Security is not all
Table 8.2
Security Levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels</th>
<th>Description of Security Condition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level 0</td>
<td>Security is not present. Only armed organizations have freedom of movement and few, if any, international organizations and NGOs are present in the conflict zone. Police and judicial systems do not exist. Many local people are either displaced or refugees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 1</td>
<td>Security is highly questionable. There are many violent actions by local militia and armed groups. The national government is not capable of controlling the armed groups. Police and judicial systems may be present but ineffective or just forming. Freedom of movement is only possible when protected by military forces. International organizations and NGOs limit assignment of personnel to more secure locations. Some local middle-class personnel begin to flee to other countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2</td>
<td>Security is marginal. Armed groups resist the existence of the established form of governance. Police and judicial organizations exist but have limited capability. Local people and foreigners have limited freedom of movement but may be subject to robbery. Some international organizations and NGOs are present and functioning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 3</td>
<td>Security is not assured, but its lack does not affect the ability of all people to experience unlimited freedom of movement. Some armed groups resist the existence of the established governing structure and conduct attacks to promote their cause. Police and judicial systems exist and function but lack some capacity to control violence. International organizations are present and functioning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 4</td>
<td>Security is well established, at a level acceptable in most modern developed nations. Crime is the biggest threat to security. Police and judicial systems function. Armed groups do not extend beyond organized crime.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

or nothing; there can be multiple levels. The military might consider using these definitions of security to give some structure to defining security. These definitions of security were based on a number of factors: freedom of movement, presence of armed groups, country’s ability to provide law and order, and the flight of local citizens to avoid insecurity. These factors have a human security perspective rather than one focused on state security. Additionally, these factors are based on many security studies and years of experience working in the field of peacekeeping.
Freedom of movement for civilians plays prominently in both stability operations doctrine and peacekeeping doctrine. Freedom of movement means that civilians, both international peacebuilders and local civilians, have the ability to move around the country. If civilians fear being robbed, attacked, or held hostage, then freedom of movement does not exist. Often rebel and criminal organizations set up roadblocks, thereby inhibiting freedom of movement. As security conditions improve, so will freedom of movement.

Also part of defining security conditions are the presence of armed groups. These armed groups are not affiliated with the national government and are usually some type of rebel or criminal group. Rebel groups usually seek recognition in society. Organized armed criminal elements take advantage of the lawless situation in fragile or failed states.

Certainly eliminating armed groups will enhance the security conditions. Military leaders need to conduct a thorough assessment of these armed groups and try to work with them or eliminate their threat. If the armed group is a rebel organization, then the military commander must work closely with civilian leadership to find a way to fulfill their recognition (a possible human need) into the new government structure. This can be a thorny issue; some of these rebel groups might have committed war crimes or ethnic cleansing. Issues such as amnesty should be considered, but often amnesty programs challenge reconciliation efforts. For criminal organizations, a critical requirement for eliminating the criminal threat is to have a functioning judicial system with police, courts, and jails. In many failed states, the rule of law is not functioning properly. Police, prison guards, and judges are corrupt. Military commanders must work with the civilian leaders,
either international or local, to get the rule of law functioning. Until this system is functioning, military commanders might have to fill the void and use the military forces in a rule of law effort.

Disarmament and demobilization programs have worked very well in peacekeeping and stability operations. Rebel groups must be encouraged to turn in their arms and agree to skills training for eventual placement in jobs so that they can earn a living. Disarmament and demobilization programs, however, require many resources and are usually closely tied with the economic recovery efforts.

Another good tool for military commanders is to conduct a weapons buyback program. These, too, have worked well in peacekeeping and stability operations. Military commanders must conduct a thorough assessment of the local conditions before offering a weapons buyback program. This assessment must consider why the local people retain weapons. In many failed states, citizens retain automatic weapons to provide protection for their families. This analysis will determine what kinds of weapons need to be included in the buyback program and the price paid for weapons. Experience in this kind of effort is mixed. Often, unserviceable weapons surface in these kinds of programs. Rebels are ingenious in finding ways to hide weapons. Commanders might also consider allowing citizens to register their weapons and retain them for personal security.

Both weapons buyback programs and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs need financial resources to support them. They are expensive programs. Thus, members of the international community must provide military commanders the resources to implement the programs effectively. The expensive part of
the program is the rehabilitation. Former soldiers must receive training so that they can enter civilian society with a marketable skill; otherwise, the former rebel soldier will return to using a gun to make a living. Consequently, the reintegration program is closely tied to the economic recovery function.

Military leaders might also consider searches for cached weapons. Patrols by the military and intelligence gathering programs have been successful in the past in locating weapons caches. Often military forces must conduct raids or house-to-house searches to get weapons out of the hands of rebels and criminals. These types of operations must be carefully planned and executed to avoid creating a condition of mistrust toward the military forces. Military commanders must be ingenious in devising methods to reduce the number of weapons in the hands of the people. The bottom line is to get control of the weapons so that armed groups are no longer a threat to the security situation.

Military commanders involved in peacekeeping or stability operations must closely monitor incidents of violence, particularly civilian violence. Killings, looting, arson, and other violent crimes are often part of the security situation. Tracking and analyzing the causes of these types of actions will help determine the causes of the insecurity. Military commanders, however, must react to these incidents of violence. Unfortunately, when the security level is zero, military forces in the early stages of a peacekeeping, stability operation or peacebuilding often fulfill the role of law enforcement. This is not a role that soldiers are routinely trained to perform. Training needs to teach the soldiers how to gather evidence, so that when the judicial system restarts, crimes committed during this initial period can be prosecuted.
In the case studies of both Germany and Kosovo, soldiers performed the role of police until international police arrived or local citizens were trained in police functions. In responding to acts of violence, soldiers gathered evidence in the form of statements and photographs to determine the cause of the crime. Suspected perpetrators were detained and military lawyers reviewed the cases. Those suspected of violent crimes were incarcerated and held for trial.

Often in fragile and failed states, criminal organizations exist or begin to form. American soldiers assigned to the Constabulary Force in Germany after World War II had the primary mission of stopping the black market trade that emerged after the war. Likewise, U.S. soldiers in Kosovo carefully tracked and attempted to stop the illegal trafficking of goods across the Serbian, Macedonian, and Albanian borders.

Another critical factor in the definition of security was the flight of civilians from the conflict itself. Often, when sustained violence breaks out in a country, people affluent enough to leave, do so. Others who cannot leave early are caught up in the violence and either become refugees or internally displaced people. The presence of refugees and internally displaced persons is a good indicator of lack of security.

The survey fully supported the role of the military in stability operations or nation building. Two questions in different parts of the survey tackled this issue directly. An early survey question asked what level of responsibility the military should have in establishing a safe and secure environment. Almost 38 percent of the respondents supported the idea that the military had full responsibility when it came to the security function. Another 53.6 percent indicated that the military should have a major support
role. Later in the survey, respondents were asked whether the military should provide a safe and secure environment. Almost 82 percent of the respondents agreed with the statement (19.2 percent agree and 62.5 percent strongly agree). The civilian mean (4.54, SE .082) and the military mean (4.36, SE .046) were statistically different (t (561) = .000, p<.001 at a 99 percent confidence level). The difference in means between civilians and military respondents indicated that civilians think the military has a larger role in maintaining a safe and secure environment than does the military. Perhaps the difference is in the rule of law function. Military personnel see the rule of law function as establishing a police force, a judicial system, and a penal system. The military does not feel qualified to provide this function, yet civilians saw the military perform these tasks in Iraq and Afghanistan.

When the level of security was entered into the questionnaire, the responses proved the hypothesis (H3) that as security conditions improved, the military role in the other functions is reduced. Figure 8.2 will be used throughout the remainder of this chapter. The figure charts the means (average responses) of the responses to a variety of questions. With security as the independent variable and the other stability functions as dependent variables, questions were asked to determine the role of the military in the five other functions (humanitarian assistance, economic recovery, governance, infrastructure repair, and reconciliation).
It is worth pointing out that the functions identified as important for the military changed since the questionnaire was developed, administered, and analyzed. In 2011, the U.S. military approved the Joint (multi-service) doctrine on stability operations. While this doctrine was under development, the new function, rule of law, entered into the functions with which the military should concern itself. The 2008 version of the Army doctrine subsumed rule of law into their civil security function. Therefore, as the

![Military Levels of Responsibility Compared to Security Levels](image)

**Military Level of responsibility**
See below for definition.

Level of responsibility: 1 – full responsibility, 2 – major support role, 3 – support role, 4 – minor support, 5 – no support

Note: the data for governance and economic development came out very close. Consequently, the lines in this graph overlap (top line).

**Figure 8.2**
Military Levels of Responsibility Compared to Security Levels
questionnaire was devised and administered, rule of law fell into the security function. As ideas matured and further analysis occurred in the conduct of this research, it was determined that rule of law should stand alone as a separate function.

When graphing the means of the security function (bottom blue solid line), the response clearly shows that as security conditions improve from level 0 to level 4, where the level of responsibility for the military in the security function reduces from a mean of 1.45 at level 0 to a mean of 2.79 at level 3 (For a more thorough analysis of this data, readers can review the statistical analysis in Annex A.)

Because the survey did not include the rule of law function, perhaps the respondents saw that the presence of local or international police in the country recovering from war would require less military support to maintain a safe and secure environment. Additionally, in many countries recovering from war, there is a need for an established local military force. External military forces are normally tasked to help build a national military force. Advisors and training programs require the military to remain well beyond security level 3 to train the local military force.

Although not explored in the survey, most respondents probably looked at security with an eye toward human security. The definitions of security led the respondents to think in these terms. Respondents were exposed to the five levels of security as they completed the questionnaire. Human security is taking on new meaning in the twenty-first century. Peacekeepers and peacebuilders think in terms of human security (MacFarlane and Khong, 2006; UN, 2003 and 2005).
American military officers participating in stability operations should, like peacekeepers, alter their views of security to the human security perspective. By taking a human security perspective rather than a state security perspective, military personnel involved in stability operations will create programs that enhance the individual rights of the citizens involved in the conflict.

*Humanitarian Assistance*

In December 2004, an earthquake measuring 9.15 on the Richter scale occurred in the Indian Ocean. The earthquake created a huge tsunami that devastated many countries in the region. Television images of huge waves coming ashore in Thailand demonstrated the power of this geological event. Indonesia’s contentious and often war-torn region of Aceh experienced some of the most devastating effects of the tsunami. The U.S. Pacific Command, based in Honolulu, Hawaii, reacted immediately and formed a military task force to respond with humanitarian assistance. A U.S. aircraft carrier, several American warships, a hospital ship, and a wide variety of aircraft were sent to the region to help in the humanitarian relief. Other nations also responded, as did a number of relief agencies from the United Nations and NGOs (Elleman, 2007).

American military personnel helped for approximately six weeks and then left the remainder of the relief effort to civilian agencies. A report from the U.S. Naval War College Press stressed the importance of this military response to this devastating humanitarian disaster. “Prior to UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, the U.S. government’s image in Indonesia clearly needed a boost. Following the invasion of Iraq, the popularity of the United States in Indonesia sank from 61 percent to only 15 percent within just a year,
according to a poll by the Manhattan based Pew Research Center. However, in one poll conducted after *Abraham Lincoln* and *Mercy* left Indonesia the results were a 39 percent favorable increase in how the Indonesian people view the United States. That’s a significant increase, and this type of mission is wonderful for diplomacy” (Elleman, 2007, 105).

Similar responses were received after the U.S. military began their peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo (Wentz, 2002). Seeing military personnel help in humanitarian assistance reduces the often negative impression about the purpose of military organizations. Often the military has resources that civilian agencies do not possess. Helicopters that can access remote regions and lift heavy equipment to offload planes, and planes to conduct aerial reconnaissance are all welcome. In most humanitarian emergencies, manpower is needed to get supplies loaded onto transports and then delivered to people in need. The military has an abundant supply of the manpower needed when infrastructure is damaged or unusable.

Military leaders, however, must understand that civilian agencies, either aid agencies or NGOs and UN agencies, are better suited to conduct humanitarian relief. These civilian agencies have more expertise in deciding what to deliver and when, but often lack some of the resources listed previously. The military should definitely be in a support role when civilian aid workers are present. If security conditions prohibit their presence, the military must step forward and take on the lead role.

During the postwar recovery in Germany in 1945, there were very few NGOs globally. Additionally, many of the international regional organizations had not yet
formed. This left the military with the responsibility to help in humanitarian relief. In all three zones of western Germany, military units were responsible for providing humanitarian assistance. Tons of food were sent from the United States to Germany and distributed by the soldiers.

In Kosovo, the UN was largely responsible for humanitarian relief; however, as soldiers entered this war-torn region, they found hundreds of thousands of displaced persons and provided assistance. The catastrophe was so large that it took all the efforts of both the UN and the military units to provide this emergency relief. Soldiers delivered food, water, and plastic sheeting to help build shelters as Kosovar Albanians returned home to their burned-out houses.

The survey conducted as part of this research showed similar results. As security conditions improved, the role of the military in humanitarian assistance declines. When asked whether the military should conduct humanitarian assistance, the respondents were generally neutral, with 35.4 percent of the respondents giving an exactly neutral response. Still another 33.5 percent responded that they agreed that the military should conduct these kinds of missions. More importantly, the working relationship between the military and civilian agencies was seen negatively. Almost 38 percent of the respondents felt that the relationship between the military and aid and development workers was not good. Only 24.1 percent felt that the relationship was good.

Many humanitarian workers expressed that the relationship between the military and the civilian has become strained. Relations between these two groups became reasonably good during the 1990s, but the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan reversed this
trend. Erik James in the *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* (2003) stated clearly that the deteriorating security situation in both Afghanistan and Iraq caused the good relationship to take two steps backward.

The peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo put civilian aid workers and military personnel side by side in resolving some very intractable conflicts. Improved working relationships were codified in U.S. military doctrine and practices. Two reasons caused the strained relationship. First, many humanitarian workers were against the war in Iraq. Second, the deteriorating security conditions in both Iraq and Afghanistan created friction between these organizations. This relationship must be repaired; future security challenges will continue to place them side by side in a protracted conflict. By working together they can achieve unity of effort.

The military sees that civilian agencies have an important role. The survey reflected strong opinions that both the UN and agencies like the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have important roles in humanitarian relief. As for the role of USAID, 83.5 percent of the respondents indicated that the agency has a major role in humanitarian assistance. Since 67.4 percent of the respondents were military officers, this indicates a strong understanding of the USAID mission. The survey also indicated that NGOs should begin arriving in a conflict zone as early as security level 0; however, the mean response to this question was security level 2. Civilians and military personnel responding to this question had significantly different responses. Civilian respondents felt that NGOs could arrive slightly earlier than military respondents (civilian (M=2.66, SE=.073); military (M=2.93, SE= 043); t(556)=.001, p<.001 at a 99
percent confidence level). When asked when other agencies in the U.S. government should arrive in the conflict zone, the respondents felt that they should arrive earlier than NGOs – at level 2 security. Again, civilian and military responses were statistically different (civilian \(M=2.67, \text{SE}=.073\) and military \(M=2.93, \text{SE}=.045\) \(t(561)=.001\) at a 95 percent confidence level). Perhaps key to the reason that the respondents felt other elements of the U.S. government should arrive earlier is that they work closely with the military and the military provides for their security. NGOs often turn down offers of security from the military forces working in a conflict zone. NGOs feel their security is provided through their neutrality.

At security level 0, 17.7 percent of the survey respondents stated that the military should undertake full responsibility for humanitarian assistance while 55.7 percent felt the military should have a major support role. This might be an indication that the military is willing and capable of working with agencies like USAID in conflict zones. The chart in figure 8.4 clearly shows that as the security conditions improve, the role of the military in providing humanitarian assistance diminishes.

Military forces can play a very important role in helping other agencies in humanitarian assistance. Hypothesis 4 stated that when the requirement for humanitarian assistance to a local population exists, the military must dedicate significant resources toward the humanitarian effort regardless of the security requirement. The graph in figure 8.4 reflects this notion. It is not hard to comprehend that when security is nonexistent, the military has an important role to play. At security level 2, however, the respondents indicated that the military still performs an important role. Three percent of the
respondents felt that the military had full responsibility, while 29.9 percent felt that the military had a major support role and 44.1 percent said it had just a support role. At security level 3, the role of the military in humanitarian assistance continued to decline.

In the case of the tsunami relief in Japan in 2011, security conditions were excellent, yet the U.S. military responded in Operation Tomodachi ("Friend" in Japanese) with 19 ships, 140 aircraft, and over 18,000 personnel to help in the humanitarian effort (U.S. Pacific Command, 2011). Relations improved between the Japanese people and the U.S. military because of the humanitarian response (Talmadge, 2011).

Resources might mean manpower and equipment, but the U.S. government also provides funds to the military for humanitarian assistance, called Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid appropriations. These funds, earmarked by the U.S. Congress, provide for military activities in support of humanitarian aid. From 2005 to 2010, Congress authorized the expenditure of $328.4 million to the program so the military could support and provide humanitarian assistance (GAO Report, 2012, 6).

*Infrastructure Repair*

Infrastructure repair is as important in war-torn regions as humanitarian assistance. Once the humanitarian emergency has subsided, military leaders must begin to redefine their efforts toward restoring and rebuilding infrastructure. Water and sanitation systems, power or electrical generation, trash collection, transportation systems, and medical services become a priority. Again, civilians are better suited for this type of work, but security conditions will determine whether and when they can begin.
The case studies of Germany and Kosovo demonstrate that early in the intervention, military forces must begin the process of rebuilding infrastructure. One of the key lessons learned from many cases involving reconstruction of infrastructure is to get the local citizens involved in the process. Local people ran the systems before the conflict, and they will run these systems again once the military forces withdraw. Military officers in Germany after World War II worked with the local leaders to get electrical, transportation, and water systems running even before the end of the war. In Kosovo, military combat engineers focused on getting roads and electrical systems operational. Regular infantry units delivered wood and plastic sheeting to the local people to make emergency repairs on their homes. Fortunately, the security conditions in Kosovo allowed further assistance from a wide variety of international workers from the UN and the European Union. Nongovernmental organizations also played a key role in rebuilding the infrastructure. Oxfam is a good example of how NGOs work. This NGO began its work in Kosovo in the mid-1990s, well before the NATO intervention. When the international community came into Kosovo after Operation Allied Force, Oxfam workers quickly returned, and over the next five years did what they do best: restore water and sanitation systems (Oxfam website).

Again resources for rehabilitation come into play. The international community and NGOs have a robust process for obtaining funds for reconstruction of infrastructure. For military forces sometimes using money to rebuild infrastructure can be problematic. For American military forces, regular operations and maintenance funds cannot be used to help restore infrastructure. The American Congress must approve funds for
reconstruction by the military, but commanders have some leeway in the process. Prior to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. military commanders were limited as to what they could spend on infrastructure repair. A lesson learned from Kosovo was that the military could and should help other agencies in rebuilding infrastructure, but monies to perform these functions could not come from the normal operating and maintenance funds allocated by the U.S. Congress. Money for reconstruction needed to come from the U.S. Agency for International Development and the State Department. There were two funding streams: the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid appropriations and the Civil Assistance Program. Military commanders had to track their use of funds and either request these funds from USAID or seek reimbursement.

The reconstruction efforts in Iraq opened the door considerably and allowed military commanders more freedom in helping restore infrastructure. In 2003, shortly taking down the Ba’ath Regime, the Coalition Provisional Authority approved a program called the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP). Initially the program drew on captured or seized Iraqi money, but later the U.S. Congress appropriated funding for the new program (SIGIR, 2009; Martins, 2005). In Iraq, a considerable amount of CERP funds was devoted to reconstruction. Brigadier General Scott Donahue said that between 2003 and 2011, when all American soldiers left Iraq, reconstruction efforts sponsored by the military amounted to 70,000 projects at a cost of $58 billion (Lopez, 2011). However, this kind of figure can be misleading. The vast majority of these funds were expended by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which uses primarily civilian engineers. They work on big projects such as national-level water and electricity
distribution. CERP funds managed by soldiers were much smaller, amounting to $4 billion on over 37,000 projects (Lopez 2011). That equates to about $100,000 per project.

A Special Inspector General Report of 2008 (before the war ended) reflected that most projects sponsored under the CERP were for $25,000 or less. Projects over $500,000 were less than 3 percent of the total number of projects, yet accounted for 37 percent of the funds. Most of those large projects were for water systems. Regardless, when comparing these amounts to the UN Secretary General’s Peacebuilding Support Fund of the $418 million devoted to world peacebuilding, this fund is paltry against the U.S. money spent on rebuilding Iraq alone.

Funding sources and the authority to spend those funds should be a concern for American military commanders conducting humanitarian assistance and infrastructure repair. Department of Defense Directive 5100.46, “Foreign Disaster Relief” states that “Nothing in this Directive should be construed as preventing a military commander at the immediate scene of a foreign disaster from undertaking prompt relief.” This directive allows commanders to use good judgment, but commanders must also seek authorization after the fact.

A recent study by the U.S. Army Center for Lessons Learned (U.S. Army Handbook, 2009, 1) quotes Army General David Petraeus as saying, “Money is my most important ammunition in this war.” Money and the authority to spend it can go a long way in helping nations recover from the devastation of war. The Army Lessons Learned report says that military commanders can use CERF funds to improve water and sanitation, help in food production and irrigation, repair electrical services, reconstruct
hospitals, build roads and bridges, improve telecommunications, and build schools and building for government officials. The report lists twenty-one different projects that military commanders can undertake to help a nation recover from war (U.S. Army Handbook, 2009). Many reports caution military commanders to understand the source of reconstruction monies. If the U.S. military is directed to conduct operations as an intervention force and required to help rebuild the country, then Congress will act to provide those forces with the necessary monies.

It should be noted that the Army Lessons Learned report encouraged military commanders to hire locally. Soldiers often do not do the actual work of reconstruction. More often, the military contracts with local companies to do the work. Such efforts put money in the hands of the local people and help stimulate the economic recovery as well. Some commanders go so far as to hire only locals, rather than contracting some firm in another nation. In Kosovo, the rebels of the Kosovo Liberation Army transformed into the Kosovo Protection Corps and went to work rebuilding their own country. This decision, however, must be based on the security threat. Enemy forces have been known to infiltrate local contractors, gain access to U.S. military compounds, and kill soldiers.

Civilian agencies from international organizations and nongovernmental organizations are better trained and prepared to conduct infrastructure repair. Following World War II, the U.S. government sent thousands of civilians to Germany to help rebuild its infrastructure. The Marshall Plan was the source of the funds to support this effort. In Kosovo, the European Union was responsible for reconstruction; still, soldiers did much to help. Military engineers repaved roads, rebuilt bridges, and were
instrumental in getting the electrical grid operating. One U.S. Army Reserve military unit was even responsible for getting the railroad operating in Kosovo (Williams, 2005).

The survey also asked questions concerning the role of the military in the restoration of infrastructure. The responses to the question in general ranged along the full spectrum, from “the military should not rebuild infrastructure” to strong support for reconstruction. However, when the security conditions entered into the question, the respondents clearly saw that when security conditions were not good, the military had a large role in rebuilding infrastructure. Figure 8.4 demonstrates this point. With security at level 0, 14.7 percent of the respondents felt the military should have full responsibility for infrastructure repair and another 43.9 percent saw the military in a major support role. As the security level improved, the responsibility of the military for infrastructure repair declined. When asked at what level rebuilding infrastructure should begin, 23.3 percent felt that it should begin in level 0, while 41.4 percent felt it should begin at level 1.

Infrastructure restoration is an important function in rebuilding any country. It gets the local people back to work and allows them to move from dependence on humanitarian aid to self-sufficiency. Societies across the world depend on their governments to provide these essential services. Wars destroy these services, and it is necessary to get these services operating quickly. When respondents were asked on what security level efforts should begin on restoring essential services, 24.3 percent said restoring should begin at level 0, while another 41.4 percent said it should begin at level 1. The vast majority of the respondents felt that restoration of essential services should begin early in the intervention regardless of the security level. Consequently, when
security conditions are not good, the military bears the major burden of getting the basic services up and running.

The basic services of water and power cannot get to every member of society all at once. Military commanders must be able to balance the needs of the people carefully. Military commanders might be forced to ration these basic services. In situations like this, the peacebuilders’ theory of relative deprivation comes into play. Be realistic about what is promised to people. Take care to ensure an equitable distribution of these basic services. Military commanders who are helping to provide these services must consult with local leaders to ensure equitable distribution.

Beyond basic services of water, power, trash collection, medical support, and transportation, reconstruction must continue. When building or refurbishing schools, government offices, irrigation systems, and other necessary services; peacebuilders must consider the basic needs of the population. Local leaders must be consulted. Additionally, understanding the ethnic makeup of the society is important. Often peacebuilders can inadvertently upset the balance of power by building wells in certain locations, providing irrigation to another segment of the population. Ethnic tensions may arise from unwise decisions. Problem-solving workshops and negotiations with local leaders are all necessary as the reconstruction moves from the immediate to the longer-term development needs. Beyond the immediate reconstruction, care must be taken to select the right projects at the right time. The spending of $58 billion in Iraq did not come without any conflict among the Sunnis, Shi’a, and Kurds, not to mention other ethnic and religious groups across the country.
Rule of Law

The rule of law function as described in Ambassador James Dobbins’s *The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building* (2007) includes police, courts, judicial processes, correctional facilities, and the laws that govern judicial procedures. The new U.S. military Joint publication, *Stability Operations* (Joint Publication, 3-07, 2011), also includes a section on the rule of law and defines the term the same way as the Dobbins book. The Joint Publication states that the “Rule of law requires laws that are publically promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated, and that are consistent with international human rights principles.” It goes on to say that “The rule of law is fundamental to legitimate governance.” (JP 3-07, 2011, III-41).

Rule of law is an essential element in security. For this reason, earlier military doctrine included rule of law in the security dimension. Only recently has the U.S. military seen the need to highlight and therefore to, separate the rule of law function. When this study began, rule of law was incorporated into the security function, but after more thorough analysis and the opinions of many experts, it was separated from the security function. This was an appropriate and necessary step.

Although this research saw the need for the rule of law function, no questions in the survey dealt with this function. This was merely an oversight; separate questions should have been asked in the survey. It is quite feasible that the results of such a question would have demonstrated that as security conditions improve, the responsibility of the military in carrying out this function would also have declined. (An additional line would have been included in figure 8.4 with similar results.)
In both the cases presented in this research, the commanders in Germany after World War II and in Kosovo saw the importance of the rule of law. In Germany, General Lucius Clay created the constabulary force to manage the police function; soldiers in the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo also performed police functions. Soldiers conducted patrols to replace the police force that General Clay disbanded. The constabulary force also began the process of training new German police forces, and military lawyers helped establish a new criminal code and courts system.

The establishment of a judicial system often cannot begin until there are agreed-upon laws. In any fragile or failed state, the new governing bodies should create or reinstate laws that deal with the judicial process. Accordingly, an effective rule of law cannot begin until the legislature agrees to the applicable laws. Often, however, former laws can be used and judicial systems can begin early in the post-conflict period. Such was the case in both Germany and Kosovo.

In Kosovo, the responsibility for rule of law fell to the UN and the international police commissioner. Later in the peacebuilding process, the European Union established the EULEX, the Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo. Consequently, a regional organization picked up the task of rehabilitating the rule of law function in Kosovo. Civilian experts advised the Kosovars on this function.

The fact that there was a civilian agency managing the rule of law function in Kosovo did not divorce the military from being concerned with this function. When military peacekeepers, including those from the United States, first came into Kosovo in June 1999, it was for all practical purposes a lawless society. Soldiers patrolled the
streets, reacted to crimes, and often detained suspects and gathered evidence. Local commanders established curfews and worked with local leaders to temper the ethnic tensions that existed in the country.

As security conditions improved and international civilian police came into Kosovo, military forces established good working relationships with them. Often the military forces were called upon to back up the police when responding to illegal activities or riots. Riots were quite common in Kosovo. Often riots quickly got out of control and military units were the only force available to control the situation.

In the U.S. zone of responsibility, a major smuggling route came out of Serbia and Macedonia. Military patrols were sent into the Presevo Valley to stop the flow of illegal goods and the human trafficking. Eventually, the Kosovo government, with the help of the international community, was able to create a local border security force to manage the borders and control the smuggling. Only after this occurred did the military get relief from this rule of law function.

**Governance**

The two functions of governance and economic stabilization were saved for the last. Governance and economics are the lifeblood in any society. Mentioned earlier in this chapter, governance and economics are the twin helical strands of DNA of any nation. How a nation manages its wealth or lack of wealth can be a source of unrest. Civilians are better suited to orchestrating policies and programs for both of these functions. Fortunately for the military, these functions come after some sort of stability is achieved in the country. The respondents to the survey stated that economics and governance can
begin at late level 2 security conditions. This does not mean that military leaders in peacebuilding or stability operations can ignore these two functions.

In the previous section on infrastructure restoration, essential services must begin immediately, but the majority of respondents to the survey indicated that restoration of essential services should begin at level 1. Essential services get people back to work rebuilding their own society. In some peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions, level 1 security may not be reached for some time. In Iraq, for example, level 1 security was reached early, but then as sectarian violence escalated in the fall of 2003, security conditions fell back to level 0. Level 1 security conditions were restored in 2004, but did not get to level 2 until the surge of military forces in the fall of 2007. Yet prior to that success, governance and economic functions were a source of much concern. By the time of the surge, Iraq had already held its national referendum for an interim Iraqi governing body and held a vote on its new constitution.

The same was true in both cases in this study. Working within the governance function in Germany, civil affairs soldiers were dropped off in cities across Germany as the combat soldiers rolled across the Rhine River. Civil affairs soldiers began working with city mayors (burgermeister) and county leaders (landkreis) to help govern the areas under Allied control even before the war was over. In Kosovo, similar events happened, but the governance function was largely handled by the United Nation Mission in Kosovo and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Before these organizations were able to get the governance function started, military leaders located the local village elders and began forming the rudimentary aspects of governance.
Captain Lee Fleming, an infantry officer, commanded a company assigned to the security mission in the town of Gnjilane. The town had a population of over 70,000 people and his company was only 150 soldiers strong. Captain Fleming quickly realized that he needed the help of the local leaders. The military commander in the region appointed a Kosovar Albanian mayor and Captain Fleming met with him regularly. Part of his job was to secure the Serb minority in the city, so he met weekly with the Serb population in a church in Gnjilane (Fleming, 2002). He used these meetings to determine the basic needs of the people and distribute information, concerns, and priorities of the military force. Retired General Gordon Sullivan, the former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army and President of the Association of the U.S. Army, visited Gnjilane; when he returned he described the mayor of Gnjilane as a young U.S. Army infantry captain. General Sullivan was, of course, being facetious, but because of the work that Captain Fleming and his soldiers did for the people of Gnjilane, the Serb community began calling Captain Fleming the mayor, not the appointed Kosovar Albanian mayor.

In the early stages of a peacebuilding or stability operation mission, soldiers are often looked to for advice and support, as they represent a source of power. Soldiers at all levels must use this power to begin the process of governance. By working with local leaders and espousing the principles of liberal democracy, they can begin the process of governance. Although they will not normally be involved in the development of governing principles for that country, they must be aware of how the governance function progresses and support the process.
As mentioned earlier, most peacebuilders will encourage failed states to form some sort of democracy. These efforts often lead to elections. Elections are times of high tension among ethnic, religious, or other groups as their leaders attempt to gain power. In almost every peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or military occupation, elections are held and security becomes a critical issue. Soldiers will secure registration sites, political rallies, and polling sites. Often the military is responsible for delivering ballots to remote areas. Soldiers do not run the elections; civilians do. Still, soldiers provide the security that makes the democratic process of elections feasible. Soldiers in both Germany and Kosovo were instrumental in not only providing security for elections, but delivering ballots and helping to set up polling stations.

Respondents to the survey felt fairly strongly that military forces have some responsibility when it comes to establishing a representative government in failed states. At security level 0, 6.9 percent of respondents said the military should assume full responsibility, while most respondents, 59.6 percent, felt the military had a supporting role (26.9 percent major supporting role and 32.7 percent a supporting role). Civilians and military personnel responding to this question had significantly different responses. Civilians felt that the military had a lesser role in governance than the military respondents (civilian (M=3.31, SE=.090); military (M=2.95, SE=.056, t(549) =.006, p<.5 at a 95 percent confidence level). Again, the difference between civilian and military responses was significant, with the civilians seeing less of a role for the military. Figure 8.4 also shows this point. As security levels improve, the responsibility of the military in helping in governance declines.
As the security condition reaches level 3, which equates some freedom of movement for the local people, respondents to the questionnaire clearly show a lesser role for the military. In fact, 31.6 percent of the respondents said that the military has no role in the governance function at level 3 security.

In analyzing these results, it is clear that as security conditions improve, the military takes a distant backseat to anything involving the governance function. However, early in the intervention when security conditions are less assured, the military has a role. This role might be working with local leaders to ensure security, overseeing the equitable distribution of basic services, or monitoring the election process.

When asked the question “At what security level should the function of governance begin?” 19.9 percent of the respondents said the function of governance should begin at level 0, while another 33.6 percent believed it should begin in level 1 and another 33.8 percent felt that it should begin at level 2. There was a significant difference between the military and the civilians in this question. Both the military and civilians felt that the governance functions should begin at level 1, but the military personnel saw it earlier in level 1 than the civilians (civilian (M=2.49, SE .085) and the military (M=2.38, SE .048) t(542) = .014 at a 95 percent confidence level).

Military civil affairs officers are trained in helping a nation in the governance function. In both the cases presented, civil affairs officers were instrumental in working with local leaders to establish a functioning government. Civil affairs officers from the military have the expertise to work with civil administrators to get the government functions of war-torn society operating. The 6,000 civil affairs soldiers trained for
postwar Germany performed this role. In Kosovo, they did the same. Military civil affairs officers were able to get a number of programs for civil administration started. One civil affairs soldier worked with the Task Force Falcon veterinarian to get rabid and diseased dogs off the streets (Mockaitis, 2004). Another civil affairs officer created a board of directors to get telephone systems operational (Priest, 2003). Major Albanese, a schoolteacher in civilian life, was instrumental in starting the Kosovar Albanian school system in the town of Kacanik. By working with the local school director he developed a program where Serb children went to school in the morning and Albanian children used the same school in the afternoon (Wentz, 2002). Similar actions were conducted by U.S. Army civil affairs officers in Panama and Iraq.

**Reconciliation**

Closely tied to governance and rule of law is reconciliation. When considering reconciliation in war-torn societies, most people think of public war crimes trials, truth commissions, and judicial processes that bring justice to those who are wronged. Conflict resolvers, on the other hand, think about how to bridge the gap between ethnic, religious, and other groups affected by the conflict.

The social identity theory discussed in chapter 2 and again in this chapter focuses on relationships or the lack thereof between ethnic, religious, and other groups. Ed Azar’s (1990) theory of protracted social conflict reflects the kinds of conflict in which military forces will find themselves in the twenty-first century. The social identity of Kurds, Sunnis, and Shi’a in Iraq and the Pastun, Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek in Afghanistan became a concern for military leaders and soldiers working in these conflict areas. Like
the current wars, the Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo had long-standing disagreements that were the basis of much of the violence. The same was true for peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo who deal with Luba, Kongo, and Anamongo peoples or the peacekeepers in Sudan who must deal with the religious differences of Christians and Muslims.

Johan Galtung (1969) based his theory of structural violence on government functions that prevent one group from achieving their true potential. Often existing laws favor one group over another. Thus, laws, policies, and programs might create the conditions for structural violence and sow the seeds of unrest and violence.

If the violence is to stop, peacekeepers and military forces involved in stability operations must understand the ethnic and religious makeup of the society in which they work. Peacebuilders (including soldiers) must understand the laws of society to make sure that any continuation of laws does not favor one group over another. Failure to do so will lead to unfair or inequitable distribution of humanitarian aid, infrastructure repair, economic stability, and governance. Ethnic, religious, and other divides among the population must be understood and incorporated into any planned actions.

Dr. Ho-Won Jeong defines reconciliation “as a process of mutual accommodation comprised of acknowledgement of the past wrong doings and contrition from perpetrators in exchange for forgiveness offered by the victims” (2005, 156). He goes on to say that improved relations are necessary to stop the cycle of violence. Embedded in reconciliation is the judicial process, but also there must be efforts to reduce tensions in any way possible.
Military leaders heading to Kosovo were required to read Rebecca West’s *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon* (1941) and Robert Kaplan’s *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History* (1993). Rebecca West’s book was a travelogue of the author’s visit to Yugoslavia just prior to the outbreak of World War II. It spelled out the ethnic diversity of the region and the history of the atrocities committed by both the Muslims and the Serbs. The ethnocentric views West saw in Yugoslavia in 1941 were still very much part of the issues in Kosovo in 1999.

Reconciliation must begin from the very first day soldiers arrive. At every juncture in the peacebuilding process, the social identity of the societies in conflict must be considered. If humanitarian aid is delivered to one group, it must be equitably distributed to other groups as well. Again, as civil administration programs are restarted or set up, equitable distribution must occur. Even the distribution of water, electricity, and other social programs must be impartial.

Military leaders at all levels must also work to reduce ethnic tensions. Soldiers walking the street will have to deal with dysfunctional group dynamics. Failure to do so appropriately may lead to a continuation of violence. Senior military leaders must meet face to face with local leaders and sort out differences of opinion among groups. These are the beginnings of reconciliation. John Paul Lederach put this in context: “Reconciliation must be proactive in seeking to create an encounter where people can focus on their relationship and share their perceptions, feelings and experiences with one another, with the goal of creating new perceptions and a new shared experience” (1997,
30). In essence, military leaders must be proactive and find ways to develop a new shared experience.

The case study on Germany did not really reflect this problem. Germans were a relatively homogeneous group, so the ethnic issues did not arise. Key military leaders, however, had to deal with the French and other groups terrorized by the Germans during the war.

In Kosovo, soldiers and military leaders faced some very deep emotions that went back hundreds of years. Task Force Falcon, the American peacekeeping force in Kosovo, found value in reducing ethnic tensions by going on the radio and the television and talking about the ethnic issues. Leaders at every level received talking points to carry with them as they met with Serb and Kosovar Albanian leaders. Almost everything soldiers did in Kosovo had some aspect of reconciling group differences.

The survey of civilians and military officers did not reflect the importance of the reconciliation issue by military forces. Perhaps the survey should have better defined reconciliation, rather than just asking a question about reconciliation. There are many misconceptions about what reconciliation means. If the questions were reworded toward ethnic differences and methods of dealing with these differences, perhaps the data would have supported an additional hypothesis. The survey was developed long before all the research for this project was completed. The research did, however, demonstrate the importance of reconciliation.

Figure 8.2 does have a line representing reconciliation; it follows a similar pattern of the other functions in that as security conditions improve the role of the military
decreases. Some of the respondents did see the importance of reconciliation at security level 0, when military forces first arrive. Of the respondents, 10.7 percent felt that reconciliation should start immediately and that the military had full responsibility for this function. Most felt that the military had a supporting role in reconciliation (34.2 percent major support role, 31.5 percent support role, and 16.5 percent minor support role). As figure 8.2 demonstrates, as security conditions improved, the role of the military in reconciliation dropped off considerably. Conversely, 41.6 percent of the respondents felt reconciliation should begin at security level 0, while another 32.4 percent felt that it should begin at level 1.

*Economic Development*

Economic restoration is the most difficult task facing any peacebuilder. Economic recovery will move a failed state from a nation dependent on foreign aid to a self-sustaining country. The U.S. Institute of Peace’s *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* (2009, 9-132) defines a sustainable economy as “one in which people can pursue opportunities for livelihoods within a predictable system of economic governance bound by law.” This definition carefully intertwines governance and economic stabilization. The predictable system requires laws that protect the economic process. Laws come only from a functioning government.

The USIP *Guiding Principles* divides economic stabilization into macroeconomics and microeconomics. Macroeconomic stabilization requires laws to create a market economy, a monetary system, and systems to enforce taxes and tariffs. It also says that macroeconomics is often overlooked in the early stages of rebuilding a
country. Macroeconomics must start early in the rebuilding process. The USIP chapter on economics does not expand on microeconomics. Microeconomics focuses on the individuals who start or run a local business and the consumers who buy their goods. This can be anything from the local store to a vendor on the street. Microeconomics starts early, as people who have the money will buy or barter for goods to support their families.

The U.S. Joint doctrine on Stability Operations provides a similar definition. “Economic stabilization consists of restoring employment opportunities, initiating market reform, mobilizing domestic and foreign investment, supervising monetary reform, and rebuilding public structures” (Chairman JCS, 2011, III-27). The manual goes on to say that economic restoration and development are primarily civilian functions, but that the military can help, especially when security conditions do not warrant outside investment. Most of the section on economic recovery also includes infrastructure restoration; these two functions are closely related. Without electricity, water, sanitation programs, and roads to move goods, economic stabilization is almost impossible.

The planners for rebuilding Germany after World War II did not see a role for the military in economic recovery. In fact, JCS 1067 forbade General Clay from establishing economic policies for Germany. General Clay did not agree with this and was able to get the guidance from Washington changed. The new Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1779 allowed the U.S. Control Group to work with the other zones to establish economic policies and open up trade throughout western Germany. This new directive did not come until two years into the occupation by Allied forces. The economic impact was huge all
over Europe. It was for this reason that the new secretary of state, former General George C. Marshall, initiated the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan put not only Germany on a path toward economic stabilization, but most of Europe as well, laying the ground work for establishing the European Union.

In Kosovo microeconomics started immediately after NATO forces moved into the country. Local entrepreneurs started opening businesses and established the rudimentary basis for economic stabilization. Under the sponsorship of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), former Kosovo Liberation Army soldiers were reformed into the Kosovo Protection Corps to begin the cleanup of the country. This program put former rebel soldiers to work, put money in their pockets, and kept them focused on rebuilding the country rather than taking retribution against the Serb population.

The European Union was responsible for economic development in Kosovo. The EU started many programs to revitalize the economy of this mostly agrarian society. American soldiers helped in this regard. Soldiers opened roads, reconstructed bridges, and refurbished existing rail lines. Soldiers also ensured that the microeconomic recovery was able to begin by providing security and ensuring that local businesses were not vandalized. One enterprising American military officer worked a deal to get forty tons of Serbian potatoes sold to the local Albanian population. Before the war, very few businesses crossed ethnic boundaries (Wentz, 2002).

Similar microeconomic actions took place in Iraq. General David Petraeus, while the military commander responsible for the Nineva Province in 2003, encouraged local
businesses to open. One market in Mosul opened soon after the invasion. General Petraeus also orchestrated the selling of Arab wheat raised by local farmers. He denied the harvest of any wheat until ownership of the land was verified and any claims to the wheat resolved. He even opened up trade across the Syrian border and ensured that tariffs were paid to the local government (Broadwell, 2012).

Soldiers involved in peacebuilding cannot start or instigate microeconomics, but they can support economic recovery in many ways. The new Joint Manual on Stability Operation (2011) stresses that military commanders must understand the economic basis of any region in which they operate. There is a whole section on analyzing the economics of the country. It encourages military commanders to conduct a thorough economic analysis and develop an economic plan. Later in the chapter, however, it states, “Civilian agencies have the lead responsibility for this mission, but the joint [military] force may render support, particularly in the conduct of initial response activities of infrastructure restoration” (Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011).

The respondents to the survey also felt that economic development was primarily a civilian function. Even at security level 0, only 6.8 percent of the respondents felt that the military had full responsibility for economic development. Another 27.4 percent felt that the military had a major support role, while 31.1 percent felt that they had a support role and another 21.2 percent said it had a minor support role. Figure 8.4 shows that the military has a much smaller role in economic development as security conditions improve. Similar to governance, the military’s role in economic development is much less than any other function. In fact, the two lines overlap on figure 8.4 almost entirely.
There was strong support among the survey respondents that economic development should begin early. This notion was supported by the U.S. Institute of Peace’s *Guiding Principles*. Just over 13 percent of the respondents felt that economic development should begin when security is nonexistent (level 0). Another 31.1 percent felt it should begin at level 1, while the majority (44.7 percent) felt it should begin at level 2.

**Planning for Peacebuilding/Stability Operations**

General Dwight D. Eisenhower planned the invasion of Europe in World War II and oversaw the creation of Operation Plan Ellipse, the occupation and rebuilding of Germany after The Allies won the war. He was quoted as saying, “I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable.” (taken from CJCS Joint Publication 5-0, 2011, I-1) Certainly he was not saying we should not have a plan for rebuilding a country after war. He understood the real value of planning; it puts together those who will carry out the plan and imparts upon them a full understanding of the issues at hand. The interaction of group members to create a shared vision is essential to the success of any peacebuilding effort. Lederach (1997) saw this important aspect as well in his chapter on a framework for peacebuilding. He stated that it is important for all peacebuilders to develop strong relationships and trust.

Unfortunately, anyone studying, researching, or practicing peacebuilding quickly realizes there are many actors involved in the process. Military forces arrive to stop the bloodshed (negative peace) and begin the process of rebuilding the country (positive peace). Also involved in the positive peace process are international organizations like
the UN, regional organizations, interested third party governments, and a myriad of nongovernmental organizations. Success in a peacebuilding effort requires all the parties to the peacebuilding process to be involved in the planning process.

The first step in any planning is a thorough assessment of the situation. Businesses and government agencies have long admired the U.S. military for its ability to plan. For the last eight years, the U.S. military has used the acronym PMESII to symbolize the assessment process. The acronym simply means Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information and Infrastructure system analysis (Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 5-0, 2011). When planning military operations, planners must look at all of these various categories to get a full understanding of the environment. Peacebuilders can use the same tool in their assessment. With such an assessment, all the functions for peacebuilding will be studied and analyzed.

The United Nations learned this process based on the thorough review of peacekeeping in 2000 by Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi. The UN report, commonly referred to as the Brahimi Report, emphasizes the need for a comprehensive integrated planning effort. Shortly after the publication of the report, the UN began to conduct integrated planning. This planning is outlined in the new UN doctrine, *UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* (2008). The doctrine states: “An integrated mission is one in which there is a shared vision among all United Nations actors as to the strategic objectives of the United Nations presence at the country level” (53). The doctrine goes on to point out that success of a peacebuilding mission is based on this shared vision of objectives.
People, mostly in the United States, who did not understand the culture or the many issues on the ground, conducted planning for the rebuilding of Germany. The Morgenthau Plan was totally off the mark and reflected more retribution than original thinking. Unfortunately, the Morgenthau Plan was the basis for JCS 1067, the guidance with which General Eisenhower began his planning. Germany should be thankful for General Lucius Clay’s role in postwar planning and execution. He thoroughly understood the situation and was instrumental in changing the guidance from Washington. Also, it was unfortunate that the Russians were not part of the planning. Their approach to rebuilding Germany resulted in the peacebuilding process lasting over forty-five years before Germany’s reunification.

The U.S. Institute of Peace book, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*, does not discuss planning for stability operations; however, an earlier U.S. Institute of Peace book on Kosovo discussed the value of planning for peacebuilding. The planners for the rebuilding of Kosovo required a thorough assessment. Once these assessments were completed, they were shared with all parties. NATO planners worked closely with the international drafters of the Rambouillet Peace Agreement. They envisioned a military peacekeeping force and a host of international actors carrying out the plan. Unfortunately, the Kosovo planning was like most other peacebuilding plans; some grand ideas were developed by the international community and then handed over to those who would carry them out. Fortunately for the people of Kosovo, the UN Secretary General appointed two of the most experienced peacebuilders to head the UN Mission in Kosovo. Initially, Sergio Vieira de Mello occupied the
position of Special Representative of the Secretary General. Sergio de Mello conducted a thorough assessment of the situation in Kosovo while bombs were still falling. He shared his assessment with the NATO military planners and the civilian agencies who would conduct the mission. Ambassador de Mello performed this role for only two months and was replaced by another high-profile peacebuilder, Bernard Kouchner, the co-founder of Médecins Sans Frontières. Kouchner quickly assembled his international team and went to work planning the rebuilding of the autonomous region of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia.

The United States also matured in their planning for rebuilding a failed state. A political-military plan was developed in Washington with close cooperation with the UN, NATO, the EU, and OSCE. The key U.S. planner, Jock Covey, was dispatched and assigned to UNMIK to continue the planning process. Covey articulated in his chapter on Kosovo that it was necessary to think like a “little country.” This meant that military and civilian efforts needed careful integration. His was pleased that the KFOR headquarters had several key military officers with experience in peacebuilding in Northern Ireland. Key among them was the commander of the Kosovo Force, General Sir Michael Jackson (Covey, 2005).

Covey would say that the success of the planning was the “little country” approach. They melded “conventional national security planning with military’s time-driven and sequenced approach to operational planning” (Covey, 2005, 82). Later, Jock Covey would relate the importance of the planning. Similar to the Eisenhower quote, the plan was not important; the planning was the important part (Oliver, 2000). The planning
The process brought all the players together to develop a shared vision as to how to proceed in rebuilding the country.

The challenge of any peacebuilder is to get all the players together. This is not easy. With so many actors – military leaders, international civil servants, interested nations, and NGOs, it is next to impossible to get all the players involved in the planning process. Kosovo got as close as any mission to do this. Unfortunately, these various actors rotate out of the country on a regular basis and new ones come in who have not been part of the planning process.

This necessitates that the plan must be continually revised. Perhaps the plan itself is not important for military planners, but a plan is necessary for all actors in peacebuilding. When new personnel arrive to continue the multi-year and multi-actor peacebuilding process, they should read and understand the plan. Additionally, they should be involved in the continual assessment of the plan as actions and programs move forward.

Military leaders involved in peacebuilding or stability operations must be totally integrated into the civilian planning process. A good approach would be to create an integrated political-military plan. This is the basis for the UN’s integrated planning process where the Department of Peacekeeping Operations works closely with the Department of Political Affairs, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, and other possible UN agencies.

Another military maxim comes into play in planning peacebuilding missions. “No plan ever survives the first contact with the enemy.” This quote mostly likely has its roots
from General Helmuth von Moltke, the chief of staff of the Prussian Army in the late 1800s and one of the most prominent military strategists of his time. We could revise this maxim to state that no peacebuilding plan ever survives the first contact with the local citizens. Local citizens must be involved in the planning process as early as is practicable. They will continue to run the country long after the military and international civil servants leave.

This section only briefly discussed planning for peacebuilding and stability operations. This area is ripe for continued research. The U.S. military has a time-honored planning process for war fighting, but lacks a good planning process for rebuilding countries torn apart by war. The new Joint publication 3-7, Stability Operations, the U.S. Institute of Peace’s Guiding Principles, the UN’s Principles and Guidelines, and the Utstein Report are good starting points for planning effective peacebuilding efforts. None, however, incorporates the local citizens into the process. Certainly, because of the unrest, bringing local citizens into the process is difficult. John Paul Lederach (1997) has a good model to consider: Draw people from the top, middle, and grassroots levels into the planning process for peacebuilding.

No two peacebuilding efforts will be the same, but with some careful future analysis, perhaps we can develop a good framework for planning peacebuilding missions. Such an endeavor was beyond the scope of this study, but is certainly a topic that demands further research.
Conclusion

The U.S. military has learned much about peacebuilding through their experiences in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Iraq should be considered a watershed event that opened the eyes of the U.S. military in peacebuilding. Commanders and soldiers adapted their approach and began to realize the proper role of the military in peacebuilding activities.

Doctrine was developed and education programs instituted in military schools. More importantly, the soldiers who performed peacebuilding activities learned that in order to leave and return home, thus ending the war, they must address the root causes of the conflict.

Soldiers were willing and ready to perform the security role and were quite familiar with humanitarian assistance. They also quickly understood the importance of repairing infrastructure, but they learned the hard way on governance, rule of law, economic recovery, and reconciliation. Still, they learned. The DoD policy that put stability operations on the same level with war fighting (offense and defense) reflects this notion. Still, there is much to learn about the proper role of the military in stability operations.

More often than not, military leaders realized that civilians were better at most peacebuilding activities than the military. As security conditions improved, more civilians came into Iraq and Afghanistan and helped in the peacebuilding activities. This merely happened and was not based on an analysis of the security conditions. In the future, military planners must clearly articulate the security conditions they want to
achieve and set goals for bringing civilians, including government officials, international civil servants, and NGOs into the planning process and the conduct of the mission. By integrating them into the planning process, a smooth transition can occur, rather than an ad hoc infiltration.

Much has been learned and explored about peacebuilding in the last fifteen years, but more research and analysis needs to be done. This study focused primarily on the security dimension of peacebuilding and how it impacts on the other functional areas.

The hypothesis, for the most part, was proven to be correct. Hypothesis H\textsubscript{1} was determined to be correct because so many experts believe that peacebuilding cannot and will not commence unless security conditions allow for the process to begin. The survey indicated that even when security conditions are poor (level 0), humanitarians assistance, reconciliation, infrastructure restoration and governance must begin. Only economic recovery can be held until the security conditions improve.

The survey and the case studies also proved hypothesis H\textsubscript{2} that the military has a role in peacebuilding beyond security. Hypothesis H\textsubscript{3} was also proved, that the role of the military is inversely related to the level of security. As security improves, the role of the military in all the other peacebuilding functions declines. Figure 8.4, graphically shows this phenomenon.

Hypothesis H\textsubscript{4} was rather intuitive, that the military has a large role in humanitarian assistance regardless of the security conditions. The survey proved this, but more importantly, military units are welcome in almost any humanitarian catastrophe.
Hypotheses $H_5$ and $H_6$, however, were not proven. Some respondents, particularly, military respondents, however, do feel that the military’s purpose is to fight and win our nation’s wars. From that, some conclusions can be drawn that there are still some outliers in the military structure on whether the military should conduct nation building at all. By in large, however, the surveys demonstrated a better understanding and appreciation of peacebuilding/nation building/stability operations than I anticipated. As such, hypothesis, $H_5$, was not proven and the limited data obtained in this area had no significance.

The last hypothesis, $H_6$, tried to prove the those officers who participated in previous peacekeeping missions were more acceptable of peacebuilding. The limiting of the surveys by the U.S. Command and General Staff College impacted on obtaining data that would facilitate proving this. Consequently, this hypothesis was dropped entirely from the conclusions.

**Recommendations**

The purpose of this study was to help military officers and senior noncommissioned officers better understand their role in peacebuilding. This is just one of thousands of studies completed over the last few years on peacebuilding and stability operations. After having completed this research and writing, this work needs to be turned into a book with more case studies. This is something I hope to accomplish in the next few years. Case studies from East Timor, Sierra Leone and Liberia should be added to round out the UN cases. Additionally, cases studies for American experiences include
Germany after World War I, the Dominican Republic in the early 1900s and a full review of the Haiti case that runs from 1913 through to the present.

Other studies also need to be completed. This research only tangentially touched on planning for peacebuilding. This is an area ripe for further research and analysis. Militaries across the globe are noted for their planning abilities, but not civilians in governments. Research and analysis on how to plan peacebuilding would add significantly to the body of literature.

Civilian-military relations are another area that needs further research. Civilian-military relations began to improve, but have deteriorated since the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Much has already been written on this subject and there are many good case studies. Yet the relations are still strained. Civilians and the military personnel working in peacebuilding need to find ways to integrate their efforts so peacebuilding can be more effective. Again, planning for peacebuilding will play into this, but more importantly, these communities need to work to enhance each other’s capability rather than compete with one another.

Lastly more work needs to be done within the international community to recognize that a state is failing and work to prevent war rather than reacting and responding to war. The ideas of Immanuel Kant in *Perpetual Peace* can come to fruition and the UN can find ways to prevent war. It is harder said than done. Still the efforts of the UN over the last 20 years are commendable. The UN is attempting to perform what its drafters envisioned, “saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” This idea needs more study and more emphasis.
As an American, I hope the U.S. government and its people recognize the value of the United Nations and put more financial and political backing behind the organization. It is the only body of its kind in the world, and Americans must learn to work with the UN and not be arrogant and work against it.

Lastly, I hope this study stimulates me to write more on peacebuilding. It is a valuable and important concept that can lead to less suffering in the world. Yet, I am also a realist and understand that wars are human undertaking that will not go away anytime soon (I wish they would). If that is the case, there must be ways to help those who are caught up in this horrible human act. Peacebuilding is the answer.
**ANNEX A**

Statistical Analysis of Survey  
Administered in 2007 and 2008 to civilians and military officers

Analysis as of January 2012  
Statistical Analysis Based on Nov 2010 results  
Data collected October 2007 through June 2008  
Total Survey analyzed 585  
Note, No basis to judge data was replace by a “-“ in all cases except AFF, Rank, Specialty, AFF2, Position, Duties and NGO AFF.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Count</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
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<tr>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGOs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Department of Health and Human Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contractors</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired Military</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other – mostly other nations</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Department of Agriculture</td>
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<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
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Total 576

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<td>Navy</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

432
2 Air Force
2 Civilians
3 International Military
1 Retired Military

Total 317

Rank
5 NCOs
3 LTs
13 CPT
243 MAJ
28 LTC
22 COL
1 GO
1 Civilian

Total 316

Specialty
199 Combat – Fire and Maneuver
24 Ops Support
41 Force Sustainment
34 Combat Service Support
9 Analysts
11 Other

Total 317

Positions
80 Staff
34 Analysts
24 Policy
51 Directors/leaders
40 Senior Leaders
31 Other

Total - 318

Duties
34 Policy
6 Humanitarian Assistance
17 Development
1 Refugees
15 Country/region specialists
51 Other

Total 318

Military – Civilian
388 military 67.4%
188 civilian 32.6%

EQU
I would equate the term stability operations with nation building
4.7% strongly disagree; 28.6% disagree with this statement; 14.3% neutral
38% agree; 14.3% strongly agree
Mean: 3.27
Not normal distribution – split focus with two peaks – demonstrates a misunderstanding of the term stability operations
Civilians (M=3.076 SE .091) and military (M=3.387, SE .057) differed significantly (t (570)= .017) on equating stability operations with nation building at a 95% confidence level.

Opin
In my opinion, most military officers’ knowledge of stability ops is:
(note this question was only given to military officers)
314 responses
1.6% excellent; 30.9% good; 56.1%marginal; 9.2% poor; 2.2% not very much
Only 3 (.9%) responded with no basis to judge
Mean: 2.8 normal distribution

CBTENDs
When combat operations end, the military has an important role to play in helping a nation rebuild.
2.1% strongly disagree; 9.4% disagree; 11.8% neutral; 46.5% agree; 30.1% strongly agree
Mean: 3.93- normal distribution skewed right
Military (M=3.96 SE .0471) and civilians (M=3.87,SE .081) differed significantly, (t (571)= .000) at a 95% confidence level.

MILFOCUS
The military should only focus on fighting and winning our nation’s wars
20.8% strongly disagree; 44.4% disagree; 11.1% neutral; 15.1% agree; 8.5% strongly agree
Mean: 2.46 almost normal distribution skewed left
During the Cold War and prior to Afghanistan and Iraq, the military did not focus on stability operations.

6.1% strongly disagree; 25.1% disagree; 11.7% neutral; 36.8% agree; 20.2% strongly agree
Mean: 3.39
Split distribution with two peaks leaning heavily toward agree

With today’s global problems, the military should be conducting stability operations.

2.1% strongly disagree; 9.4% disagree; 15.3% neutral; 46.6% agree; 26.6% strongly agree
Only 2 (.3%) did not feel qualified to answer this.
Mean: 3.86 normal distribution skewed right

A new DOD policy states that stability operations are a core mission for the military. Do you agree?

3.0% strongly disagree; 11.7% disagree; 12.4% neutral; 44.7% agree; 28.3% strongly agree
Mean: 3.83 normal distribution skewed right

The military must do more to educate its personnel on stability ops

.5% strongly disagree; 2.0% disagree; 4.6% neutral; 42.7% agree; 50.2% strongly agree
14 did not feel qualified to answer (2.3%)
Mean: 4.40 normal distribution skewed right

For the task establish and maintain a safe and secure environment the military should have

33.7% full responsibility; 53.6% major support role; 12.4% support role; .7% minor support role;
.5% no role; .5% no basis to judge
Mean: 1.83 normal distribution skewed left

For the task deliver humanitarian assistance, the military should have;

.9% full responsibility; 31.1% major support role; 50.4% support role; 15.5% minor support role;
2.1% no role; .5% no basis to judge
Mean: 2.87 normal distribution
MILINFRA
For the task reconstitute critical infrastructure and essential services, the military should have:
1.1% full responsibility; 23.2% major support role; 51.9% support role; 20.2% minor support role; 3.7% no role; .5% no role
Mean: 3.02 normal distribution

MILECON
For the task support economic development, the military should have:
.7% full responsibility; 5.1% major support role; 34.5% support role; 42.8% minor support role;
17% no role; .4% no basis to judge
Mean: 3.70 normal distribution

MILGOV
For the task establish a representative effective government, the military should have:
.9% full responsibility; 7.1% major support role; 31.4% support role; 39.6% minor support role;
21% no role; .7% no basis to judge
Mean: 3.73 normal distribution skewed right

MILRECON
For the task conduct negotiations and help in reconciliation, the military should have:
1.2% full responsibility; 13.5% major support role; 35.1% support role; 35.3% minor support role; 14.9% no role; .7% no basis to judge
Mean: 3.49 normal distribution

PS&S
If involved in a stability operation, the military should provide a safe and secure environment
.9% strongly disagree; 1.1% disagree; 16.3% neutral, 19.2% agree; 62.5% strongly agree
Mean 4.41 not normal distribution – skewed heavily right indicating a strong position that providing a safe and secure environment is a military role.
The civilian (M=4.54, SE=.082) and the military (M=4.36, SE=.046) views are significantly different, t(561) = .000 at a 95% confidence level.

PHA
If involved in a stability operation, the military should conduct humanitarian assistance.
2.1% strongly disagree; 13.7% disagree; 35.4% neutral; 33.5% agree; 15.3% strongly agree
Mean: 3.46 normal distribution, but skewed right indicating that this too should be a military role.
The civilian (M=3.46, SE=.082) and the military (M=3.46, SE .047) views are significantly different, t(561) = .002 at a 95% confidence level.

PINFRA
If involved in a stability operation, the military should assist in reconstituting infrastructure and essential services.
2.3% strongly disagree; 11.8% disagree; 34.5% neutral; 38.8% agree; 12.7% strongly agree
Mean: 3.48 normal distribution slightly skewed right. Again this show that the military has a role in helping rebuild infrastructure.

PROECON
If involved in a stability operation, the military should support economic development.
5.9% strongly disagree; 25.2% disagree; 33.6% neutral; 28% agree; 7.3 strongly agree
Mean 3.06 normal distribution. This demonstrates that there is a relatively neutral position on whether the military should provide economic development
The civilian (M=3.11 SE=.083) and the military (M=3.04, SE .051) views are significantly different, t(558) = .001 at a 95% confidence level.

PROGOV
If involved in a stability operation, the military should assist in establishing a representative effective government.
11.4% strongly disagree; 25.7% disagree; 31.1% neutral; 24.8% agree; 7% strongly agree
Mean: 2.90 normal distribution, again showing there is a neutral position on this, but leaning toward disagreeing with the task.
The civilian (M=2.95, SE=.089) and the military (M=2.88, SE .055) views are significantly different, t(558) = .007 at a 95% confidence level.

PRORECON
If involved in a stability operation, the military should try to reconcile the difference among local groups.
5.7% strongly disagree; 18.9% disagree; 36.5% neutral; 28.6% agree; 10.3% strongly agree
Mean: 3.19 normal distribution. This does show that there is some support for the military to reconcile with local groups.
The civilian (M=3.27, SE=.084) and the military (M=3.15, SE .051) views are significantly different, t(560)= .001 at a 95% confidence level.

TNGNEG
Military personnel should be trained in negotiations.
1.6% strongly disagree; 5.0% disagree; 27.2% neutral; 30.1% agree; 36.1% strongly agree
Mean: 3.94 not normally distributed – skewed way right, indicating a strong need for military personnel needing training in negotiations.
The civilian (M=4.08, SE= .067) and the military (M=3.88, SE .052) views are significantly different, t(559)= .000 at a 95% confidence level.

**DECNGO**
Over the last 10 years the military has developed a good working relationship with aid and development agencies (non governmental organizations). 7.7% strongly disagree; 30.1% disagree; 36.1% neutral; 22% agree; 4.1% strongly agree
8.0% no basis to judge
Mean: 2.84 normal distribution and skewed to the disagree side. A large number have no basis to judge. This indicated a strong position that there is not a good working relationship between the military and NGOs.

**FAILSTAT**
The military performs a valuable service in failing states. 2.0% strongly disagree; 7.5% disagree; 32.8% neutral; 29.5% agree; 28.2% strongly agree
Mean: 3.74 normal distribution, but centered around agree skewed right
Strong opinion in favor of the military helping in failed states.

**UNROLE**
To what extent is the United Nations an important global organization in providing humanitarian aid and development in conflict zones?
5.8% not at all; 17.1% slight extent; 29.2% moderate extent; 27.7 great extent; 20.2 very great extent; 4.8 no basis to judge
Mean: 3.39 normal distribution with slight skew right, meaning that there is strong support for the UN’s role in conflict zones.

**DOS**
In helping nations rebuild, the Department of State has a:
82.5% major role; 13.6% some role; 2.7% minor role; .5% very little role; .7% no role
2.3% (13) had no basis to judge
Mean: 1.23 not normal – strongly skewed left meaning that the Department of State has a huge role in helping nations rebuild.
The civilian (M=1.36, SE= .049) and the military (M=1.17, SE ..028) views are significantly different, t(551) = .000 at a 95% confidence level.

**DOJ**
In helping nations rebuild, the Department of Justice has a:
28.7% major role; 51.4% some role; 13.7% minor role; 4.4% very little role; 1.8% no role
3.2% (18) had no basis to judge
Mean: 1.99 normal distribution skewed left meaning that the Dep of Justice has a large role in helping nations rebuild.
The civilian (M=2.37, SE= .089) and the military (M=2.01, SE .054) views are significantly different, t(561) = .001 at a 95% confidence level.

DOA
In helping nations rebuild, the Department of Agriculture has a:
27.4% major role; 54.2% some role; 12.9% minor role; 4.2% very little role; 1.1% no role; 4.6% (22) had no basis to judge
Mean: 2.01 normal distribution skewed left meaning that the Dep of Agriculture has a large role in helping nations rebuild

DOL
In helping nations rebuild, the Department of Labor has a:
16% major role; 47.2% some role; 23.5% minor role; 10.1% very little role; 3.2% no role; 4.6% (26) had no basis to judge
Mean: 2.37 normal distribution, slightly skewed left, which means there is less importance placed on the role of the Dep of Labor in helping nations rebuild.

USAID
In helping nations rebuild, the USAID has a:
83.5% major role; 13.6% some role; 2.0% minor role; .5% very little role; .4% no role; 2% (11) no basis to judge
Mean: 1.21 not normal strongly skewed left meaning USAID has a huge role in helping nations rebuild
The civilian (M=1.14, SE= .031) and the military (M=1.24, SE .029) views are significantly different, t(551) = .000 at a 95% confidence level.

DHHS
In helping nations rebuild, the Department Health and Human Services has a:
26.9% major role; 49.3% some role; 16.3% minor role; 5.7% very little role; 1.9% no role; 4.1% (23) have no basis to judge
Mean: 2.06 normal distribution skewed left meaning the Department of Health and Human Services plays a large role in helping nations rebuild
The civilian (M=2.38, SE= .078) and the military (M=1.91, SE .042) views are significantly different, t(538) = .000 at a 95% confidence level.

DOE
In helping nations rebuild, the Department of Energy has a:
22.8% major role; 46.9% some role; 21.9% minor role; 6.9% very little role; 1.7% no role; 4.1% (23) had no basis to judge
Mean: 2.18 normal distribution skewed left meaning the Department of Energy has a large role to play in helping nations rebuild.
The civilian (M=2.59, SE=.075) and the military (M=1.99, SE .042) views are significantly different, t(538) = .000 at a 95% confidence level.

**DOD**
In helping nations rebuild, the Department of Defense has a:
41.4% major role; 40.1% some role; 12.9% minor role; 4.3% very little role; 1.3% no role
1.84% (6) had no basis to judge
Mean: 1.82 not normal, strongly skewed left meaning that the Department of Defense has a large role in helping nations rebuild.
The civilian (M=1.95, SE=.077) and the military (M=1.78, SE .042) views are significantly different, t(556.) = .030 at a 95% confidence level.

**NGOARR**
At what level (lowest) would you expect Non Governmental agencies to arrive in the conflict zone?
5.4% level zero; 14.9% level one; 35.1% level two; 38.7% level three; 5.9% level four
Mean: 3.25 normal distribution skewed right meaning that NGOs should arrive in the conflict zone around level 2
The civilian (M=2.66, SE=.073) and the military (M=2.93, SE .043) views are significantly different, t(556.) = .001 at a 95% confidence level.

**USGARR**
At what level (lowest) would you expect other U.S. Government agencies to arrive in the conflict zone?
8.1% level zero; 24.8% level one; 42.7% level two; 23.2% level three; 1.3% level four
Mean: 2.85 normal distribution meaning that other U.S. Government agencies can arrive during level 2 – earlier than NGOs arrive.
The civilian (M=2.67, SE=.073) and the military (M=2.93, SE .045) views are significantly different, t(561) = .001 at a 95% confidence level.

**REDEPLOY**
What is the lowest level of security would you expect that the military can begin to redeploy?
15.6% level zero; 4.0% level one; 7.4% level two; 52.8% level three; 20.3% level four
Mean: 3.58 not a normal distribution – two peaks one at level zero and another at level three. There is a strong indicator that military forces can redeploy at level three or higher.
The civilian (M=3.15, SE=.105) and the military (M=3.78, SE .061) views are significantly different, t(551) = .000 at a 95% confidence level.
Security Analysis

LVL0SS – Zero Safety and Security
With the security at level 0, the military’s role in establishing a safe and secure environment should be:
72.3% full responsibility, 23.9% major support role; 2.4% support role; .9% minor support role; .5% no role; 1.1% no basis to judge
Mean: 1.45 not a normal distribution, highly skewed left meaning that the military has a high level of responsibility in safety and security during security level 0.
The civilian (M=1.41, SE= .051) and the military (M=1.30, SE .031) views are significantly different, t(551) = .010 at a 95% confidence level.

LVL0HA – Zero Security Level HA
With the security at level 0, the military’s role in delivering humanitarian assistance should be:
17.7% full responsibility; 55.7% major support role; 17.8% support role; 7.6% minor support role; 1.3% no role, .7% no basis to judge
Mean: 2.19 normal distribution but the meaning is clear, the military plays a large role in humanitarian assistance with a security level of 0.

LVL0INF – Zero security level – infrastructure
With the security at level 0, the military’s role in reconstituting infrastructure and essential services should be:
14.7% full responsibility; 43.9% major support role; 26.5% support role; 9.6% minor support role; 5.3%; 1.2 no basis to judge
Mean: 2.47 normal distribution but skewed slightly in favor of the military having a major role, but less than safety and security.

LVL0ECON – Zero security level – economic development
With the security at level 0, the military’s role in supporting economic development should be: 6.8 full responsibility; 27.4% major support role; 31.1% support role; 21.2% minor support role; 13.5 no role; 1.1% no basis to judge
Mean: 3.07 normal distribution with a slight skew toward a bigger role for the military. This clearly indicates that the military has a role in economic development a level 0.

LVL0GOV – zero security level – governance
With the security at level 0, the military’s role in establishing representative effective governance should be:
6.9% full responsibility; 26.9% major support role; 32.7% support role; 20.3% minor support role; 13.2% no role; 1.1% no basis to judge
Mean: 3.06 normal distribution with a slight skew to a role for the military at level 0. The civilian (M=3.31, SE= .090) and the military (M=2.95, SE .056) views are significantly different, t(549) = .006 at a 95% confidence level.
LVL0RECON – zero security level – reconciliation and negotiation
With the security at level 0, the military’s role in conducting negotiations and reconciliation should be:
10.7% full responsibility; 34.2% major support role; 31.5% support role; 16.5% minor support role; 7.2% no role; .9% no basis to judge
Mean: 2.75 normal distribution skewed toward the military having a role in negotiations and reconciliation at level 0.

LVL1SS one security level – safe and secure
With the security at level 1, the military’s role in establishing a safe and secure environment should be:
54.2% full responsibility; 37.3% major support role; 5.5% support role; 2.4% minor support role; .5% no role and .5 no basis to judge
Mean: 1.58 not normal distribution skewed way left meaning the military still has a high level of responsibility toward safety and security.
The civilian (M=1.73, SE= .068) and the military (M=1.51, SE .035) views are significantly different, t(540) = .036 at a 95% confidence level.

LVL1HA one security level – humanitarian assistance
With the security at level 1, the military’s role in reconstituting critical infrastructure and essential services should be:
9.1% full responsibility; 53% major support role; 25.9% support role; 10.2% minor support role; 1.8% no role; 1.1% no basis to judge
Mean: 2.42 normal distribution skewed slightly toward more responsibility for the military in level 1 security.

LVL1INF- one security level infrastructure
With the security at level 1, the military’s role in reconstituting critical infrastructure and essential services should be:
6.9% full responsibility; 39.8% major support role; 36.5% support role; 12.8% minor support role; 4.1% no role; 1.1% no basis to judge
Mean: 2.67 normal distribution skewed slightly toward more responsibility for the military in level 1 security.

LVL1ECON - one security level economic development
With the security at level 1, the military’s role in supporting economic development should be: 2.8% full responsibility; 26.4% major support role; 36.6% support role; 22.3% minor support role; 11.9% no role; 1.1% no basis to judge
Mean 3.14 normal distribution skewed toward more responsibility for the military at level 1 security. Interestingly there is more responsibility toward economic development than infrastructure.
The civilian (M=3.43, SE= .083) and the military (M=3.02, SE .050) views are significantly different, t(536) = .000 at a 95% confidence level.
**LVL1GOV one security level governance**

With the security at level 1, the military’s role in establishing representative effective governance should be:
- 3.2% full responsibility;
- 26% major support role;
- 36.2% support role;
- 20.8% minor support role;
- 12.8% no role;
- 1.3% no basis to judge

Mean: 3.14 normal distribution meaning the military has a great deal of responsibility toward governance during level 1 and this is also higher than infrastructure at the same level.

The civilian (M=3.36, SE=.086) and the military (M=3.05, SE=.052) views are significantly different, t(536) = .001 at a 95% confidence level.

**LVL1RECON one security level – reconciliation negotiation**

With the security at level 1, the military’s role in conducting negotiations and reconciliation should be:
- 5.4% full responsibility;
- 32.5% major support role;
- 34.5% support role;
- 19.2% minor support role;
- 8.4% no role;
- 11.1% no basis to judge

Mean: 2.92 normal distribution and indicating that the military has quite a bit of responsibility to reconcile and negotiate with the local population.

The civilian (M=3.20 SE=.085) and the military (M=2.81, SE=.053) views are significantly different, t(534) = .030 at a 95% confidence level.

**LVL2SS two security level – safe and secure**

With the security at level 2, the military’s role in establishing a safe and secure environment should be:
- 29% full responsibility;
- 47% major support role;
- 20.1% support role;
- 3% minor support role;
- .9% no role;
- .9% no basis to judge

Mean: 2.00 normal distribution that is highly skewed toward greater responsibility for the military at level 2 security.

The civilian (M=2.23, SE=.070) and the military (M=1.90, SE=.040) views are significantly different, t(540) = .028 at a 95% confidence level.

**LVL2HA two security level humanitarian assistance**

With the security at level 2, the military’s role in delivering humanitarian assistance should be:
- 3.1% full responsibility;
- 29.9% major support role;
- 44.1% support role;
- 18.5% minor support role;
- 4.4% no role;
- .9% no basis to judge

Mean: 2.91 normal distribution indicating a tendency to hand over humanitarian assistance to other actors.

**LVL2INFRA two security level- infrastructure**

With the security at level 2, the military’s role in reconstituting critical infrastructure and essential services should be:
2.2% full responsibility; 23% major support role; 47.2% support role; 21.3% minor support role; 6.3% no role; .9% no basis to judge
Mean: 3.06 normal distribution
The civilian (M=3.19, SE=.075 and the military (M=3.01, SE .043) views are significantly different, t(538) = .002 at a 95% confidence level.

LVL2ECON two security level economic development
With the security at level 2, the military’s role in supporting economic development should be:
1.3% full responsibility; 15.8% major support role; 39.3% support role; 30% minor support role; 13.6% no role; 1.1% no basis to judge
Mean: 3.39 normal distribution indicating the military still has a major responsibility toward economic development at level 2 security –interestingly higher still than infrastructure.

LVL2GOV two security level – governance
With the security at level 2, the military’s role in establishing representative effective governance should be:
1.3% full responsibility; 15.8% major support role; 39.3% support role; 30% minor support role; 13.6% no role; 1.1% no basis to judge
Mean: 3.39 normal distribution but leaning toward the right indicating a lesser degree of responsibility at level two security for governance.

LVL2RECON two security level – reconciliation and negotiation
With the security at level 2, the military’s role in conducting negotiations and reconciliation should be:
2.2% full responsibility; 18.9% major support role; 40.9% support role; 26.4% minor support role; 11.6% no role; 9% no basis to judge
Mean: 3.26 normal distribution but still indicating that the military has a role in reconciliation and negotiation.
The civilian (M=3.54, SE=.078 and the military (M=3.14 SE .047) views are significantly different, t(539) = .011 at a 95% confidence level.

LVL3SS three security level safe and secure
With the security at level 3, the military’s role in establishing a safe and secure environment should be:
9.3% full responsibility; 29.7% major support role; 39.4% support role; 16.7% minor support role; 4.2 % no role; .7% no basis to judge
Mean: 2.79 normal distribution which clearly indicates the military moves to a support role at level 3 letting the security fall to other organizations.

LVL3HA three security level humanitarian assistance
With the security at level 3, the military’s role in delivering humanitarian assistance should be:
.7% full responsibility; 9.6% major support role; 34.1% support role; 41.5 minor support role; 14% no role; .7% no basis to judge
Mean: 3.58 normal distribution skewed right indicating that at level 3 the military role has clearly moved to a minor support role.
The civilian (M=3.75 SE=.076) and the military (M=3.51, SE .041) views are significantly different, t(540) = .016 at a 95% confidence level.

LVL3INFRA three security level – infrastructure
With the security at level 3, the military’s role in reconstituting critical infrastructure and essential services should be:
.6% full responsibility; 8.1% major support role; 29.4% support role; 46.2 minor support role; 15.7% no role; .9% no basis to judge
Mean: 3.68 normal distribution skewed toward the right indicating the military only has a minor support role in infrastructure reconstitution

LVL3ECON three security level economic development
With the security at level 3, the military’s role in supporting economic development should be:
.6% full responsibility; 5.7% major support role; 21.5% support role; 43.3% minor support role; 28.9% no role; .7% no basis to judge
Mean: 3.94 skewed right indicating that at level three the responsibility for economic development has moved well into the minor support role.

LVL3GOV three security level – governance
With the security at level 3, the military’s role in establishing representative and effective governance should be:
.6% full responsibility; 5.9% major support role; 20.6% support role; 41.3% minor support role; 31.6% no role; .9% no basis to judge
Mean: 3.97 skewed right meaning the military responsibility for governance is in a minor support role.

LVL3RECON three security level – reconciliation and negotiation
With the security at level 3, the military’s role in conducting negotiations and reconciliation should be:
.7% full responsibility; 7.6% major support role; 24% support role; 45.3% minor support role; 22.4% no role; .9% no basis to judge
Mean: 3.81 skewed right meaning the military has a minor support role in negotiations and reconciliation at security level 3.

LVLHA
Delivery of humanitarian assistance should begin at level
54.7% at level 0; 31.4% at level 1; 11.3% at level 2; 2.4% at level 3; .2% at level 4
Mean: 1.62 – not a normal distribution strongly skewed toward immediate humanitarian assistance during level 0.
**LVLINFRA**
Reconstituting infrastructure and essential services should begin at level
24.3% at level 0; 41.4% at level 1; 28.3% at level 2; 5.8% at level 3; .2% at level 4
Mean: 2.16 – normal distribution with skewed toward level 1.

**LVLECON**
Support for economic development should begin at level
13.2% at level 0; 31.3% at level 1; 41.7% at level 2; 12.4% at level 3; 1.5% at level 4
Mean: 2.58 normal distribution with a slight lean toward level 2.

**LVLGOV**
Working to establish a representative government should begin at level
19.9% at level 0; 33.6% at level 1; 33.8% at level 2; 10.5% at level 3; 2.2% at level 4
Mean 2.41 normal distribution leaning toward starting governance at level 1 or 2.
The civilian (M=2.49 SE=.085 and the military (M=2.38, SE .048) views are
significantly different, t(542) = .014 at a 95% confidence level.

**LVLNEG**
Negotiating with local and religious leaders should begin at level
50.0% at level 0; 32.1% at level 1; 13.9% at level 2; 3.5% at level 3; .5% at level 4
Mean: 1.72 not a normal distribution with indications that negotiations must begin very
early with regards to security.

**LVLRECON**
Reconciling differences among people and groups should begin at level
41.6% at level 0; 32.8% at level 1; 17.5% at level 2; 7.3% at level 3; .7% at level 4
Mean 1.92 not a normal distribution but indicates that reconciliation should begin very
early in the security situation.

**COMSTAB**
I am comfortable with the term stability operations and understand its meaning
2.9% strongly disagree; 5.1% disagree; 8.8% neutral; 48.7% agree; 34.4% strongly agree
Mean: 4.07 not a normal distribution and strongly skewed right meaning most of the
respondents understood the meaning of stability operations.
The civilian (M=3.82, SE=.090) and the military (M=4.17, SE .043) views are
significantly different, t(544) = .000 at a 95% confidence level.
PART II

What stability operations or nation building effort did you participate in?
A total of 572 participated in this survey with 178 not participating in any stability operations and 394 participating in at least one operation.

Leavenworth survey 90 of 200 participated in at least one stability operation (45%) with 25 participating in more than one (12.5%)

Internet survey
239 responded to this question on the internet survey
69 did not participate in any stability operation (28.8%)
Many participated in more than one stability operation

Civilian survey participation total 195 (66 military; 152 civilians)

| Country                  | Haiti | Croatia | Bosnia | Kosovo | Somalia | Rwanda | Dem Rep of Congo | Liberia | Sierra Leone | Afghanistan | Iraq | Sudan | Kuwait | Vietnam | Panama | El Salvador | East Timor | Columbia | Gaza/Israel | Philippines | Angola | Tajikistan | Ethiopia/Eritrea | Albania | Mozambique | tsunami/Indonesia | Georgia | Military survey - 44 military only |
|-------------------------|-------|---------|--------|--------|---------|--------|------------------|---------|--------------|-------------|------|--------|--------|---------|--------|------------|------------|---------|-------------|----------------|--------|-----------|-----------------------|---------|----------------|
| Haiti                   | 32    |         |        | 0      | 4       | 0      | 0                | 0       | 0            | 0           | 0    | 0      | 0      | 0       | 0      | 0          | 0          | 0       | 0           | 0        | 0      | 0          | 0        |
| Kosovo                  | 38    |         |        | 0      | 0       | 0      | 0                | 0       | 0            | 0           | 0    | 0      | 0      | 0       | 0      | 0          | 0          | 0       | 0           | 0        | 0      | 0          | 0        |
| Dem Rep of Congo        | 15    |         |        | 0      | 0       | 0      | 0                | 0       | 0            | 0           | 0    | 0      | 0      | 0       | 0      | 0          | 0          | 0       | 0           | 0        | 0      | 0          | 0        |
| Afghanistan             | 53    |         |        | 0      | 0       | 0      | 0                | 0       | 0            | 0           | 0    | 0      | 0      | 0       | 0      | 0          | 0          | 0       | 0           | 0        | 0      | 0          | 0        |
| Kosovo                  | 10    | 0       |        | 0      | 0       | 0      | 0                | 0       | 0            | 0           | 0    | 0      | 0      | 0       | 0      | 0          | 0          | 0       | 0           | 0        | 0      | 0          | 0        |
| Dem Rep of Congo        | 1     |         |        | 0      | 0       | 0      | 0                | 0       | 0            | 0           | 0    | 0      | 0      | 0       | 0      | 0          | 0          | 0       | 0           | 0        | 0      | 0          | 0        |
| Afghanistan             | 10    |         |        | 0      | 0       | 0      | 0                | 0       | 0            | 0           | 0    | 0      | 0      | 0       | 0      | 0          | 0          | 0       | 0           | 0        | 0      | 0          | 0        |
| Kuwait                  | 1     |         |        | 0      | 0       | 0      | 0                | 0       | 0            | 0           | 0    | 0      | 0      | 0       | 0      | 0          | 0          | 0       | 0           | 0        | 0      | 0          | 0        |
| Northern Ireland        | 1     |         |        | 0      | 0       | 0      | 0                | 0       | 0            | 0           | 0    | 0      | 0      | 0       | 0      | 0          | 0          | 0       | 0           | 0        | 0      | 0          | 0        |
| Sudan                   | 0     |         |        | 0      | 0       | 0      | 0                | 0       | 0            | 0           | 0    | 0      | 0      | 0       | 0      | 0          | 0          | 0       | 0           | 0        | 0      | 0          | 0        |

Beyond this point many of the numbers drop off considerably. The Command and General Staff College did not respond beyond the participation question. Leavenworth limited the survey to 71 questions at the last minute.

Respondents were asked to think about one stability operation and respond to the next questions.
ESIZE
What was the size of your organization during this stability operation?
11.2% - squad (10-15 people); 14.5% platoon (16-50 people); 25.3% company (51-100 people); 28.9% battalion (201-1000 people); 7.6% brigade (1001-5000 people); 12.4% division (more than 5000 people)
Mean: 3.45 generally a normal distribution, but that means little. It seems that the full range of organizational size was represented with the majority being in middle range of 100 to 1000 people.

EJOB
My job during this operation could be describes as:
8.4% -member of organization; 56.6% leader; 24.3% staff member; 8.8% advisor; .8% other
Mean: 2.41 normal distribution, but that means little – most respondents were leaders.

EORGQUAL
Before participating in this stability operation or nation building effort, in my opinion, my organization was qualified to undertake the tasks assigned to it.
6.3% strongly disagree; 19.0% disagree; 12.6% neutral; 31.6% agree; 28.5% strongly agree; 2.0% no basis to judge
Mean: 3.51 not a normal distribution with two peaks. Most respondents felt their organization was qualified to undertake assigned tasks.

EPLAN
My organization had a good plan for stability operations before we deployed to the conflict zone.
13.9% strongly disagree; 20.2% disagree; 18.7% neutral; 29.4% agree; 13.1% strongly agree; 4.8% no basis to judge
Mean: 2.93 generally a normal distribution, but the mean indicates that most organizations had a good plan but the distribution was wide and varied.

EPLANASS
This stability plan greatly assisted me in the performance of my job.
8.7% strongly disagree; 14.3% disagree; 23.8% neutral; 27.8% agree; 11.9% strongly agree; 13.5% no basis to judge
Mean: 2.79 normal distribution, with the majority rather neutral or supportive of their plans helping their jobs. The high neutral combined with the high agree indicates a rather mediocre feeling about plans and job performance.

EPLANMOD
My organization’s stability operations plan was significantly modified after our arrival in country.8.8%
.8% strongly disagree; 13.2% disagree; 10.8% neutral; 38.0% agree; 28.4% strongly agree; 8.8% (22) no basis to judge
Mean: 3.54 normal distribution, but generally plans were altered significantly after arrival in country – not an unexpected thing and fits with most military plans.

**EHA**
Humanitarian assistance projects were an important part of my organization’s role.
6.8% strongly disagree; 15.1% disagree; 5.2% neutral; 41.0% agree; 27.5% strongly agree; 4.4% no basis to judge
Mean: 3.54 not a normal distribution, but that does not matter. There were strong indications that the respondents played a huge role in humanitarian assistance.

**EINFRA**
Reconstruction projects were an important part of my organization’s role.
6.7% strongly disagree; 15.1% disagree; 6.7% neutral; 33.7% agree; 34.1% strongly agree; 3.6% no basis to judge
Mean: 3.63 not a normal distribution, but that does not matter. There were strong indications that the respondents played a huge role in reconstruction of infrastructure.

**EPOLICE**
Working with local police was an important part of my organization’s role.
5.2% strongly disagree; 15.5% disagree; 12.4% neutral; 32.7% agree; 29.9% strongly agree; 4.4% no basis to judge
Mean: 3.53 not a normal distribution, but that does not matter. There were strong indications that the respondents worked closely with local police throughout the operation.

**ECIVADMIN**
My organization worked closely with local authorities (civil administration) in our region.
3.6% strongly disagree; 7.9% disagree; 7.1% neutral; 31.3% agree; 46.4% strongly agree; 3.6% no basis to judge
Mean: 3.98 normal distribution, but that does not matter. There were strong indications that the respondents worked closely with the local administers during the operation.

**ELEADER**
Our organization worked closely with local tribal and religious leaders.
5.6% strongly disagree; 9.9% disagree; 12.7% neutral; 26.2% agree; 41.3% strongly agree; 4.4% no basis to judge
Mean: 3.75 not a normal distribution and skewed far right, but that does not matter. There were strong indications that the respondents worked closely with local tribal and religious leaders.
ETRAIN
The training I underwent prior to going to the conflict zone helped me understand my job. 16.0% strongly disagree; 16.4% disagree; 14.8% neutral; 32% agree; 15.2% strongly agree; 5.6% no basis to judge
Mean: 2.97 not a normal distribution. This question demonstrates a broad and varied pre deployment training program. Most programs were adequate.

ESTABOPS
Before participating in this operation, I fully understood the term stability operations. 8.8% strongly disagree; 29.9% disagree; 13.1% neutral; 31.9% agree; 12.4% strongly agree; 4.0% no basis to judge
Mean: 2.97 not a normal distribution with two peaks on at disagree and one at agree. This indicates are varied opinion about the term stability operations prior to their participatin.

ESUCCESS
My organization was successful in the tasks assigned to it. 2.0% strongly disagree; 6.4% disagree; 10.4% neutral; 50.2% agree; 28.1% strongly agree; 2.8% no basis to judge
Mean: 3.88 normal distribution, but skewed to the favorable aspects of success. Most were very positive about the success of their organization.

ESECOORD
My organization coordinated with the military on the security situation. 1.3% strongly disagree; 3.2% disagree; 5.8% neutral; 35.1% agree; 45.5% strongly agree; 9.1% no basis to judge
Mean: 3.93 normal distribution, but skewed way right indicating that security was an important part of coordination and the mission.

ENGOCOORD
My organization coordinated closely with non-governmental organizations during this stability operation. 6.4% strongly disagree; 23.4% disagree; 19.1% neutral; 29.8% agree; 17.0% strongly agree; 4.3% no basis to judge
Mean: 3.15 almost a normal distribution, but the data indicated that coordination with NGOs varied from organization to organization. Some did a lot and some did little. Nothing conclusive is here.

ENGOROLE
In my opinion, non-governmental organizations such as Save the Children, Muslim Relief Services other like organizations, contributed to the overall plan in the stability operation.
5.2% strongly disagree; 12.4% disagree; 18.1% neutral; 30.9% agree; 15.7% strongly agree; 17.7% no basis to judge
Mean: 2.86 normal distribution skewed toward agree indicating that NGOs play a large role in stability operations.

**EUSGROLE**
In my opinion, U.S. Government agencies like USAID, the Coalition Provisional Authority or U.S. Embassy, and U.S. Government funded businesses were effective at reconstruction in our area.
9.6% strongly disagree; 21.1% disagree; 20.7% neutral; 25.9% agree; 9.2% strongly agree; 13.5% no basis to judge
Mean: 2.63

**ERESPECT**
I came to respect and admire the local people.
1.2% strongly disagree; 5.2% disagree; 16.4% neutral; 43.2% agree; 27.6% strongly agree; 6.4% no basis to judge
Mean: 3.72

**EFRUSTR**
I became extremely frustrated with the local people.
4.4% strongly disagree; 27.6% disagree; 22.8% neutral; 30.0% agree; 8.8% strongly agree; 6.4% no basis to judge
Mean: 2.92

**EOPINON**
Many people in my organization had a very negative opinion about the local people.
10% strongly disagree; 27.9% disagree; 22.3% neutral; 28.7% agree; 5.6% strongly agree; 5.6% no basis to judge
Mean: 2.75
ANNEX B

MILITARY SURVEY INSTRUMENT

And

INTERNET SURVEY WHICH INCLUDED BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIANS
Military Version

Breeding the Phoenix:
The Military’s Role in Stability Operations

Dear Survey Participant:

Thank you for your support and service to your country. As many of you may know, the Army is attempting to apply the lessons that are now coming out in the latest concepts for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR). A new Department of Defense Policy (DOD Policy 3000.05) directs SSTR operations become a core mission and comparable to combat operations. SSTR should be included in the services’ education and training. The doctrine is just emerging. This project is to help in that development.

This survey will take you about 15 minutes to complete. The survey will be given to military officers, various organizations within the U.S. Government, and several non-governmental organizations. In the end I hope to advance some of the concepts regarding the security dimension emerging from Department of Defense policies and programs.

Please be frank, because your responses will not be tracked back to you. Only persons involved in collecting or preparing the information for analysis will have access to completed survey questionnaires and only group statistics will be reported.

Your responses will remain confidential. If there is an answer you feel unqualified or uncomfortable answering, then please move to the next question and leave it blank. Once completed, fold the survey and staple it. Please it in official distribution to Professor William Flavin at the US Army War College Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. (Note: his address is on the back of the last page.)

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. I can be reached by calling my phone (401) 841-2565 or email: olivergf@hotmail.com. I would be happy to conduct an interview with you or explain my research. If you are interested, please contact me via my email address above. If we do talk privately, our discussions will remain confidential.

George F. Oliver
PhD Candidate
George Mason University
Informed Consent Release Form
For An Analysis of the Military’s Role in Peace Building

George Mason University has a protocol for interviews and surveys, and all university sponsored projects must undergo a review by the Human Subject Review Board. George Mason University policy requires an informed consent to be signed by the participant. Below is that informed consent. Please sign this page at the bottom before you begin this survey.

RESEARCH PROCEDURES:
This research is being conducted to explore the nature of the military’s role in stability, security, transition and reconstruction. If you agree to participate, you will be asked to complete a survey that will take you approximately 15 minutes.

RISKS: The researcher sees no foreseeable risks for participants in this survey.

BENEFITS: There are no benefits to you as a participant other than to further the research on nation building.

CONFIDENTIALITY:
1. The data in this study will be confidential. The researcher, George F. Oliver, will maintain the confidentiality of the data. The researcher will secure all electronic data and paper copies of the data in a safe in his office. Your name will not be included on the surveys and other collected data. While it is understood that no computer transmission can be perfectly secure, reasonable efforts will be made to protect the confidentiality of your transmission.
2. If you would like to be interviewed or discuss my research with you, our discussions will remain confidential and only the researcher will have your personal information. During the interview, with your approval, the session will be audio taped. All data (tapes and transcripts) collected will be secured by the researcher in a safe.

PARTICIPATION:
  a. Your participation is voluntary, and you may withdraw from the study at any time and for any reason.
  b. There are no costs to you for participating in this survey.

CONTACT: This research is being conducted under the sponsorship of George F. Oliver who is being supervised by Dr. Howon Jeong (tel # 703-993-3782) of George Mason’s Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution. You may also contact the George Mason University Office of Research Subject Protections at 703-993-4121 if you have questions or comments regarding your rights as a participant in the research. The Department of Defense is not sponsoring or overseeing this research.

This research has been reviewed according to George Mason University procedures governing your participation in this research.

CONSENT: I have read this form and agree to participate in this study.

Name: ____________________ Signature: ______________________

Date: __________________

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Stability Operations Survey


1. Please indicate your organizational affiliation:

   _____ Army             _____ US Government
   _____ Navy             _____ Non Governmental Organization
   _____ Air Force        _____ United Nations
   _____ Marine           _____ International Organization

2. What is your rank?

   _____ Major      _____ Lieutenant Colonel    _____ Colonel

3. What is your specialty?

   _____ maneuver, fire and effects  _____ operations support  _____ force sustainment

In the next series of questions, please select the answer on a five point scale that most closely approximates your reaction to the statement:


4. I would equate the term stability operations with nation building.

   ____ strongly disagree   ____ disagree   ____ neither agree or disagree   ____ agree   ____ strongly agree   ____ no basis to judge

5. In my opinion, most military officers’ knowledge of stability operations is

   ____ excellent   ____ good   ____ marginal   ____ poor   ____ not very much   ____ no basis to judge

6. When combat operations end, the military has an important role to play in helping that nation rebuild.
7. The military should only focus on fighting and winning our nation’s wars.

8. During the Cold War and prior to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the military did not focus on stability operations – what to do when the shooting stopped.

9. With today’s global problems, the military should be conducting stability operations.

10. A new Department of Defense policy states that stability operations “are a core mission for the U.S. military.” Do you agree with this policy?

11. The military must do more to educate its personnel on stability operations.
As the military develops doctrine and ideas (doctrine) about stability operations, the following tasks (see table below) are emerging. List what you think the military’s role is in the following tasks: (Place a check next to each task in one of the blocks (full, major, minor or none) you think the military should perform.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Full Responsibility</th>
<th>Major Support Role</th>
<th>Support Role</th>
<th>Minor Support Role</th>
<th>No Role</th>
<th>No Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12.  Establish and Maintain a Safe and Secure Environment</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>13.  Deliver Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>14.  Reconstitute Critical Infrastructure and Essential Services</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>15.  Support Economic Development</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>16.  Establish Representative, Effective Governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>17.  Conduct Negotiations and help in Reconciliation</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(Use this for questions 18-23) If involved in a stability operation, the military should:

18. provide a safe and secure environment.
   ___ strongly disagree   ___ disagree   ___ neither agree nor disagree   ___ agree   ___ strongly agree   ___ no basis to judge

19. conduct humanitarian assistance.
   ___ strongly disagree   ___ disagree   ___ neither agree nor disagree   ___ agree   ___ strongly agree   ___ no basis to judge

20. assist in reconstituting infrastructure and essential services.
   ___ strongly disagree   ___ disagree   ___ neither agree nor disagree   ___ agree   ___ strongly agree   ___ no basis to judge

21. support economic development.
   ___ strongly disagree   ___ disagree   ___ neither agree nor disagree   ___ agree   ___ strongly agree   ___ no basis to judge

22. assist in establishing a representative effective government.
23. try to reconcile differences among local groups and individuals.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree Nor Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>No Basis to Judge</th>
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</table>

New series of questions

24. Military personnel should be trained in negotiations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree Nor Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>No Basis to Judge</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

25. Over the last 10 years the military has developed a good working relationship with aid and development agencies (Non Governmental Organizations).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree Nor Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>No Basis to Judge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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</tbody>
</table>

26. Aid and development agencies perform a valuable service in failing states.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neither Agree Nor Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>No Basis to Judge</th>
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</table>

27. To what extent is the United Nations (UN) an important global organization in providing humanitarian aid and development in conflict zones.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not at All</th>
<th>Slight Extent</th>
<th>Moderate Extent</th>
<th>Great Extent</th>
<th>Very Great Extent</th>
<th>No Basis to Judge</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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</tbody>
</table>

458
Many agencies within the U.S. Government have roles to play when helping rebuild nations. Please indicate what agencies and the level of effort they should perform in helping rebuild nations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Major role</th>
<th>Minor Role</th>
<th>No Role</th>
<th>No Basis to Judge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>Department of Justice</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>Department of Agriculture</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td>Department of Labor</td>
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<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>US Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>33.</td>
<td>Dep of Health and Human Services</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>34.</td>
<td>Department of Energy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>35.</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

SEcurity

Security may be the most important factor in the arrival of aid and reconstruction agencies so let us change the conditions and develop levels of security. For the next few questions, use the following definitions of security.

Level 4 – Security is well established and at a level acceptable in most modern developed nations. Crime is the biggest threat to security. Police and judicial systems function and armed groups do not extend beyond organized crime. Commerce operates freely and aid and development agencies have complete freedom of movement.

Level 3 – Security is not assured, but the lack of security does not affect the ability for all people to experience unlimited freedom of movement. Some armed groups resist the existence of the established governing structure or fight among groups for control. Police and judicial systems exist and function, but lack some capacity to control violence. Aid agencies have freedom of movement. (good security)

Level 2 – Security is marginal. Armed groups resist the existence of the established form of governance. Police and judicial organizations exist, but have limited capability. Local people and foreigners have limited freedom of movement, and are subject to looting, and attacks for political purposes.

Level 1 – Security is highly questionable. There many violent actions by local militia and armed groups. The national government is not capable of controlling the armed groups. Police and judicial systems may be present, but are ineffective. Freedom of movement is only possible when protected by armed security. Some local middle class personnel begin to flee to other countries.
Level 0 – Security is **not present**. Only armed organizations have freedom of movement. Police and judicial systems do not exist. Many local people are either displaced or refugees.

At what level (lowest) level would you expect agencies to arrive in the conflict zone

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No security</th>
<th>Questionable</th>
<th>Marginal</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Well established</th>
<th>No basis judge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>36.</td>
<td>Non governmental organizations, such as CARE, Doctors without Border, etc</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37.</td>
<td>Other US Governmental agencies, State, USAID, etc</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38.</td>
<td>United Nations agencies</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

39. What is the lowest level of security would you expect that the military can begin to redeploy?

_____ level 0  _____ level 1  _____ level 2  _____ level 3  _____ level 4  _____ no basis to judge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>0- no security</th>
<th>1- questionable</th>
<th>2- marginal</th>
<th>3- good</th>
<th>4- well established</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

460
The table below was used earlier, now look at this with the **level of security at 0 – security is not present**. Now how would you rate the military’s role?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Full Responsibility</th>
<th>Major Support Role</th>
<th>Support Role</th>
<th>Minor Support Role</th>
<th>No Role</th>
<th>No basis to judge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40. Establish and Maintain a Safe and Secure Environment</td>
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<td>41. Deliver Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>42. Reconstitute Critical Infrastructure and Essential Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>43. Support Economic Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>44. Establish Representative Effective Governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>45. Conduct Negotiations and help in Reconciliation</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Now change the level of security to **level 1, security is questionable**. Now how would you rate the military’s role?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Full Responsibility</th>
<th>Major Support Role</th>
<th>Support Role</th>
<th>Minor Support Role</th>
<th>No Role</th>
<th>No basis to judge</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>46. Establish and Maintain a Safe and Secure Environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>47. Deliver Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>48. Reconstitute Critical Infrastructure and Essential Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>49. Support Economic Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>50. Establish Representative Effective Governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>51. Conduct Negotiations and help in Reconciliation</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

0- no security 1- questionable 2- marginal 3- good 4- well established
Now change the **level of security to 2, security is marginal.** How would you rate the military’s role?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Full Responsibility</th>
<th>Major Support Role</th>
<th>Support Role</th>
<th>Minor Support Role</th>
<th>No Role</th>
<th>No basis to judge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>52. Establish and Maintain a Safe and Secure Environment</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>53. Deliver Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>54. Reconstitute Critical Infrastructure and Essential Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>55. Support Economic Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>56. Establish Representative Effective Governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>57. Conduct Negotiations and help in Reconciliation</td>
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</table>

Now change the **level of security to 3, security is good.** How would you rate the military’s role?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Full Responsibility</th>
<th>Major Support Role</th>
<th>Support Role</th>
<th>Minor Support Role</th>
<th>No Role</th>
<th>No basis to judge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>58. Establish and Maintain a Safe and Secure Environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>59. Deliver Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>60. Reconstitute Critical Infrastructure and Essential Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>61. Support Economic Development</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62. Establish Representative Effective Governance</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>63. Conduct Negotiations and help in Reconciliation</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

0- no security 1- questionable 2- marginal 3- good 4- well established

462
Since security may be the determining factor for beginning various programs. In the next few questions, please put a check in the box where you think this task should **BEGIN** based on security levels assuming we begin at level 0 security with the military deployed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Security Level 0</th>
<th>Security Level 1</th>
<th>Security Level 2</th>
<th>Security Level 3</th>
<th>Security Level 4</th>
<th>No basis to judge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>64. Deliver Humanitarian Assistance</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>65. Reconstitute Infrastructure and Essential Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>66. Support Economic Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>67. Establish Representative Governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>68. Negotiating with local and religious leaders</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>69. Reconcile differences among people and groups</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

70. I am comfortable with the term stability operations and understand its meaning.

___ strongly disagree   ___ disagree   ___ neither agree nor disagree   ___ agree   ___ strongly agree   ____ no basis to judge

71. Please describe your participation in a stability operations mission: Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and/or Iraq? **(Check all that apply)**

- _____ I did not participate in a stability operation
- _____ Croatia
- _____ Rwanda
- _____ Democratic Republic of Congo
- _____ Kosovo
- _____ Liberia
- _____ Sierra Leone
- _____ Iraq
- _____ Other...please explain

briefly__________________________________________________________________________
If you have not participated in any kind of stability operation, this is the end of the survey. THANK YOU for your participation. However, if you have participated, please continue. If you wish to make comments or be interviewed, please go to the last page.

72. In the remaining questions, I will ask you to THINK about ONE of the stability operations in which you participated. Please, in the space below, put that country.

__________________
(country)

73. What best described your organization during this stability operation?

_____ 0-15 people (squad or section)       _____ 16-50 people (platoon)
___ 51-200 people (company)               _____ 201-1000 people (battalion)
_____ 1001 to 5000 people (brigade)      _____ more than 5000 people (division)

74. My job during this operation could be described as:

______ leadership position       _____ staff person       ____ advisory role

___________________________________ other, please specify

75. Before deploying to this stability operation or nation building effort, in my opinion, the organization to which I was assigned was qualified to undertake the security tasks assigned to it.

___ strongly disagree   ___ disagree   ___ neither agree nor disagree   ___ agree   ___ strongly agree   ____
no basis to judge

76. My organization had a good plan for stability operations before we deployed to the conflict zone.

___ strongly disagree   ___ disagree   ___ neither agree nor disagree   ___ agree   ___ strongly agree   ____
no basis to judge

77. This stability operations plan greatly assisted me in the performance of my job.

___ strongly disagree   ___ disagree   ___ neither agree nor disagree   ___ agree   ___ strongly agree   ____
no basis to judge

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78. My organization’s stability operations plan was significantly modified after our arrival in country.

___ strongly disagree   ___ disagree   ___ neither agree nor disagree   ___ agree   ___ strongly agree   ____
no basis to judge

79. Humanitarian assistance projects were an important part of my organization’s role.

___ strongly disagree   ___ disagree   ___ neither agree nor disagree   ___ agree   ___ strongly agree   ____
no basis to judge

80. Reconstruction projects were an important part of my organization’s role.

___ strongly disagree   ___ disagree   ___ neither agree nor disagree   ___ agree   ___ strongly agree   ____
no basis to judge

81. Working with local police was an important part of my organization’s role.

___ strongly disagree   ___ disagree   ___ neither agree nor disagree   ___ agree   ___ strongly agree   ____
no basis to judge

82. My organization worked closely with local authorities (civil administration) in our region.

___ strongly disagree   ___ disagree   ___ neither agree nor disagree   ___ agree   ___ strongly agree   ____
no basis to judge

83. Our organization worked closely with local tribal and or religious leaders.

___ strongly disagree   ___ disagree   ___ neither agree nor disagree   ___ agree   ___ strongly agree   ____
no basis to judge

84. The training I underwent prior to going to the conflict zone helped me understand my job.

___ strongly disagree   ___ disagree   ___ neither agree nor disagree   ___ agree   ___ strongly agree   ____
no basis to judge

85. Before participating in this operation, I fully understood the term stability operations.

___ strongly disagree   ___ disagree   ___ neither agree nor disagree   ___ agree   ___ strongly agree   ____
no basis to judge

86. My organization was successful in the tasks assigned to it.
87. My organization coordinated closely with non-governmental organizations during this stability operation.

88. In my opinion, non-governmental organizations such as Save the Children, Muslim Relief Services and other like organization contributed to the overall plan in the stability operation.

89. In my opinion, U.S. governmental agencies like U.S. Agency for International Development, the Coalition Provisional Authority or US Embassy, and U.S. governmental funded businesses were effective at reconstruction in our area.

90. I came to respect and admire the local people.

91. I became extremely frustrated with the local people.

92. Many people in my organization had a very negative opinion about the local people.
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THIS PROJECT. YOUR ANSWERS WILL HELP IN UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN STABILITY OPERATIONS.

If you would like to provide me any comments, I would appreciate your insight. Also, if you would like to be interviewed, I would very much like to talk with you about this in more detail. Also, after reviewing your questions would you mind if I called you. If the answer is yes to any of these, please put your name and email address below or contact me at olivergf@hotmail.com or 401-841-2565.

_________________________  ______________________

Thank you for your participation

Please fold the questionnaire and return it to Professor William Flavin at the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (address on back of this page) or place the completed questionnaire in the envelop and mail it back to me at

George F. Oliver

Comments (use another sheet of paper if necessary):
Civilian version

Survey on the Security Dimension of Stability Operations

Dear Survey Participant:

Thank you for your support to making this world a safer place. Many of you have served your organization and your country in places far away from home. Thank you for your service. I too have served in many distant lands, but more recently I was involved in helping rebuild Iraq – a final assignment in the U.S. Army. Upon my return from Iraq I began my PhD program at George Mason’s Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution. The program was enriching, and all the while, I watched as the U.S. Government began to revise its policies and programs on how to deal with failed and failing states. Many changes are underway in the U.S. Government to respond to such challenges. This survey is part of my dissertation and will provide the military a better understanding of its role in stability operations.

This survey will take you about 15 minutes to complete. I am administering this survey to military officers, various organizations within the U.S. Government, and several non governmental organizations. My hypothesis is that as security conditions improve, the less the military must do in stabilization and reconstruction and the more other elements of the U.S. Government, NGOs, and Intergovernmental Organizations (UN, AU, EU, ASEAN, etc.) can do. In the end I hope to advance some of the concepts regarding the security dimension emerging Department of Defense policies and new programs on stability and reconstruction in failed or failing states.

I appreciate you taking the time to take this survey. Your responses will remain completely confidential. Please log onto the website provided (insert website) and complete the survey on line.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. I can be reached by calling my phone (401) 841-2565 or email: george.oliver@nwc.navy.mil. I would be happy to conduct an interview with you or explain my research. If you are interested, please contact me via my email address above. If we do talk privately, our discussions will remain confidential.

George F. Oliver
Professor of Joint Military Operations
Naval War College

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Informed Consent Release Form
For An Analysis of the Military’s Role in Peace Building

George Mason University has a protocol for interviews and surveys, and all university sponsored projects must undergo a review by the Human Subject Review Board. George Mason University policy requires an informed consent to be signed by the participant. Below is that informed consent. Please sign this page at the bottom before you begin this survey.

RESEARCH PROCEDURES:
This research is being conducted to explore the nature of the military’s role in stability, security, transition and reconstruction. If you agree to participate, you will be asked to complete a survey that will take you approximately 15 minutes.

RISKS: The researcher sees no foreseeable risks for participants in this survey.

BENEFITS: There are no benefits to you as a participant other than to further the research on nation building.

CONFIDENTIALITY:
3. The data in this study will be confidential. The researcher, George F. Oliver, will maintain the confidentiality of the data. The researcher will secure all electronic data and paper copies of the data in a safe in his office. Your name will not be included on the surveys and other collected data. While it is understood that no computer transmission can be perfectly secure, reasonable efforts will be made to protect the confidentiality of your transmission.
4. If you would like to be interviewed or discuss my research with you, our discussions will remain confidential and only the researcher will have your personal information. During the interview, with your approval, the session will be audio taped. All data (tapes and transcripts) collected will be secured by the researcher in a safe.

PARTICIPATION:
  c. Your participation is voluntary, and you may withdraw from the study at any time and for any reason.
  d. There are no costs to you for participating in this survey.

CONTACT: This research is being conducted under the sponsorship of George F. Oliver who is being supervised by Dr. Howon Jeong (tel # 703-993-3782) of George Mason’s Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution. You may also contact the George Mason University Office of Research Subject Protections at 703-993-4121 if you have questions or comments regarding your rights as a participant in the research. The Department of Defense is not sponsoring or overseeing this research.

This research has been reviewed according to George Mason University procedures governing your participation in this research.

CONSENT: I have read this form and agree to participate in this study.

Name: __________________________ Signature: __________________________

Date: ________________
Stability Operations Survey

1. Please indicate your organizational affiliation (best one):
   _____ State Department  _____ Military
   _____ USAID              _____ Non Governmental Organization
   _____ Justice            _____ United Nations
   _____ Office of Sec Def  _____ International Organization
   _____ Dep of Commerce    Other please specify _______________

2. Please indicate what best describes your position your organization (best one please)?
   _____ staff member       _____ analyst         _____ policy officer
   _____ director/leader    _____ senior director/leader

3. What best describes the focus of your duties? (only one best response please)
   _____ develop US policy  _____ humanitarian assistance  _____ development
   _____ refugees and/or displaced people  _____ country/regional expert

In the next series of questions, please select the answer on a five point scale that most closely approximates your reaction to the statement:

4. I would equate the term stability operations with nation building.
   _____ strongly disagree  _____ disagree  _____ neither agree or disagree  _____ agree  _____ strongly agree  _____ no basis to judge

5. In my opinion, most military officers’ knowledge of stability operations is
   _____ excellent  _____ good  _____ marginal  _____ poor  _____ not very much  _____ no basis to judge
6. When combat operations end, the military has an important role to play in helping that nation rebuild.

___ strongly disagree  ___ disagree  ___ neither agree or disagree  ___ agree  ___ strongly agree  ____
no basis to judge

7. The military should only focus on fighting and winning our nation’s wars.

___ strongly disagree  ___ disagree  ___ neither agree nor disagree  ___ agree  ___ strongly agree  ____
no basis to judge

8. During the Cold War and prior to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the military did not focus on stability operations – what to do when the shooting stopped.

___ strongly disagree  ___ disagree  ___ neither agree nor disagree  ___ agree  ___ strongly agree  ____
no basis to judge

9. With today’s global problems, the military should be conducting stability operations.

___ strongly disagree  ___ disagree  ___ neither agree nor disagree  ___ agree  ___ strongly agree  ____
no basis to judge

10. A new Department of Defense policy states that stability operations “are a core mission for the U.S. military.” Do you agree with this policy?

___ strongly disagree  ___ disagree  ___ neither agree nor disagree  ___ agree  ___ strongly agree  ____
no basis to judge

11. The military must do more to educate its personnel on stability operations.

___ strongly disagree  ___ disagree  ___ neither agree nor disagree  ___ agree  ___ strongly agree  ____
no basis to judge
As the military develops doctrine and ideas (doctrine) about stability operations, the following tasks (see table below) are emerging. List what you think the military’s role is in the following tasks: (Place a check next to each task in one of the blocks (full, major, minor or none) you think the military should perform.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Full Responsibility</th>
<th>Major Support Role</th>
<th>Support Role</th>
<th>Minor Support Role</th>
<th>No Role</th>
<th>No Opinion</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12. Establish and Maintain a Safe and Secure Environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>13. Deliver Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>14. Reconstitute Critical Infrastructure and Essential Services</td>
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<td>15. Support Economic Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>16. Establish Representative, Effective Governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>17. Conduct Negotiations and help in Reconciliation</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(use this for questions 18-23) If involved in a stability operation, the military should:

18. provide a safe and secure environment.

___ strongly disagree ___ disagree ___ neither agree nor disagree ___ agree ___ strongly agree ___ no basis to judge

19. conduct humanitarian assistance.

___ strongly disagree ___ disagree ___ neither agree nor disagree ___ agree ___ strongly agree ___ no basis to judge

20. assist in reconstituting infrastructure and essential services.

___ strongly disagree ___ disagree ___ neither agree nor disagree ___ agree ___ strongly agree ___ no basis to judge

21. support economic development.

___ strongly disagree ___ disagree ___ neither agree nor disagree ___ agree ___ strongly agree ___ no basis to judge

22. assist in establishing a representative effective government.

___ strongly disagree ___ disagree ___ neither agree nor disagree ___ agree ___ strongly agree ___ no basis to judge

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23. try to reconcile differences among local groups and individuals.

___ strongly disagree   ___ disagree   ___ neither agree nor disagree   ___ agree   ___ strongly agree   ___
no basis to judge

**New series of questions**

24. Military personnel should be trained in negotiations.

___ strongly disagree   ___ disagree   ___ neither agree nor disagree   ___ agree   ___ strongly agree   ___
no basis to judge

25. Over the last 10 years the military has developed a good working relationship with aid and development agencies (Non Governmental Organizations).

___ strongly disagree   ___ disagree   ___ neither agree nor disagree   ___ agree   ___ strongly agree   ___
no basis to judge

26. Aid and development agencies perform a valuable service in failing states.

___ strongly disagree   ___ disagree   ___ neither agree nor disagree   ___ agree   ___ strongly agree   ___
no basis to judge

27. To what extent is the United Nations (UN) an important global organization in providing humanitarian aid and development in conflict zones.

___ not at all   ___ slight extent   ___ moderate extent   ___ great extent   ___ very great extent   ___
no basis to judge
Many agencies within the U.S. Government have roles to play when helping rebuild nations. Please indicate what agencies and the level of effort they should perform in helping rebuild nations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major role</th>
<th>Minor Role</th>
<th>No Role</th>
<th>No Basis to Judge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>Department of Justice</td>
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<td>30.</td>
<td>Department of Agriculture</td>
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<td>31.</td>
<td>Department of Labor</td>
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<td>32.</td>
<td>US Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>33.</td>
<td>Dep of Health and Human Services</td>
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<td>34.</td>
<td>Department of Energy</td>
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<tr>
<td>35.</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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</table>

Security may be the most important factor in the arrival of aid and reconstruction agencies so let us change the conditions and develop levels of security. For the next few questions, use the following definitions of security.

Level 4 – Security is well established and at a level acceptable in most modern developed nations. Crime is the biggest threat to security. Police and judicial systems function and armed groups do not extend beyond organized crime. Commerce operates freely and aid and development agencies have complete freedom of movement.

Level 3 – Security is not assured, but the lack of security does not affect the ability for all people to experience unlimited freedom of movement. Some armed groups resist the existence of the established governing structure or fight among groups for control. Police and judicial systems exist and function, but lack some capacity to control violence. Aid agencies have freedom of movement. (good security)

Level 2 – Security is marginal. Armed groups resist the existence of the established form of governance. Police and judicial organizations exist, but have limited capability. Local people and foreigners have limited freedom of movement, and are subject to looting, and attacks for political purposes.

Level 1 – Security is highly questionable. There many violent actions by local militia and armed groups. The national government is not capable of controlling the armed groups. Police and judicial systems may be present, but are ineffective. Freedom of movement is only possible when protected by armed security. Some local middle class personnel begin to flee to other countries.
Level 0 – Security is **not present**. Only armed organizations have freedom of movement. Police and judicial systems do not exist. Many local people are either displaced or refugees.

At what level (lowest) level would you expect agencies to arrive in the conflict zone

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No security 0</th>
<th>Questionable 1</th>
<th>Marginal 2</th>
<th>Good 3</th>
<th>Well established 4</th>
<th>No basis to judge 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>36. Non governmental organizations, such as CARE, Doctors without Border, etc</td>
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<td>37. Other US Governmental agencies, State, USAID, etc</td>
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<td>38. United Nations agencies</td>
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<tr>
<td>39. What is the lowest level of security would you expect that the military can begin to redeploy?</td>
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<tr>
<td>_____ level 0</td>
<td>_____ level 1</td>
<td>_____ level 2</td>
<td>_____ level 3</td>
<td>_____ level 4</td>
<td>_____ no basis to judge</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>0- no security</th>
<th>1- questionable</th>
<th>2- marginal</th>
<th>3- good</th>
<th>4- well established</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
The table below was used earlier, now look at this with the **level of security at 0 – security is not present.** Now how would you rate the military’s role?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Full Responsibility</th>
<th>Major Support Role</th>
<th>Support Role</th>
<th>Minor Support Role</th>
<th>No Role</th>
<th>No basis to judge</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40. Establish and Maintain a Safe and Secure Environment</td>
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<td>41. Deliver Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>42. Reconstitute Critical Infrastructure and Essential Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>43. Support Economic Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>44. Establish Representative Effective Governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>45. Conduct Negotiations and help in Reconciliation</td>
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</table>

Now change the level of security to **level 1, security is questionable.** Now how would you rate the military’s role?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Full Responsibility</th>
<th>Major Support Role</th>
<th>Support Role</th>
<th>Minor Support Role</th>
<th>No Role</th>
<th>No basis to judge</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>46. Establish and Maintain a Safe and Secure Environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>47. Deliver Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>48. Reconstitute Critical Infrastructure and Essential Services</td>
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<td>49. Support Economic Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>50. Establish Representative Effective Governance</td>
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<td>51. Conduct Negotiations and help in Reconciliation</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>0- no security</th>
<th>1- questionable</th>
<th>2- marginal</th>
<th>3- good</th>
<th>4- well established</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Now change the **level of security to 2, security is marginal**. How would you rate the military’s role?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Full Responsibility</th>
<th>Major Support Role</th>
<th>Support Role</th>
<th>Minor Support Role</th>
<th>No Role</th>
<th>No basis to judge</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>52. Establish and Maintain a Safe and Secure Environment</td>
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<td>53. Deliver Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>54. Reconstitute Critical Infrastructure and Essential Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>55. Support Economic Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>56. Establish Representative Effective Governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>57. Conduct Negotiations and help in Reconciliation</td>
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</table>

Now change the **level of security to 3, security is good**. How would you rate the military’s role?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Full Responsibility</th>
<th>Major Support Role</th>
<th>Support Role</th>
<th>Minor Support Role</th>
<th>No Role</th>
<th>No basis to judge</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>58. Establish and Maintain a Safe and Secure Environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>59. Deliver Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>60. Reconstitute Critical Infrastructure and Essential Services</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>61. Support Economic Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>62. Establish Representative Effective Governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>63. Conduct Negotiations and help in Reconciliation</td>
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</table>

| 0- no security | 1- questionable | 2- marginal | 3- good | 4- well established |

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Since security may be the determining factor for beginning various programs. In the next few questions, please put a check in the box where you think this task should **BEGIN** based on security levels assuming we begin at level 0 security with the military deployed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Security Level 0</th>
<th>Security Level 1</th>
<th>Security Level 2</th>
<th>Security Level 3</th>
<th>Security Level 4</th>
<th>No basis to judge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>64. Deliver Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>65. Reconstitute Infrastructure and Essential Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>66. Support Economic Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>67. Establish Representative Governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>68. Negotiating with local and religious leaders</td>
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<tr>
<td>69. Reconcile differences among people and groups</td>
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</table>

70. I am comfortable with the term stability operations and understand its meaning.

___ strongly disagree ___ disagree ___ neither agree nor disagree ___ agree ___ strongly agree ___ no basis to judge

71. Please describe your participation in a stability operations mission: Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and/or Iraq? **(Check all that apply)**

   _____ I did not participate in a stability operation
   _____ Haiti                                          _____ Croatia
   _____ Somalia                                        _____ Rwanda
   _____ Bosnia                                         _____ Democratic Republic of Congo
   _____ Kosovo                                         _____ Liberia
   _____ Afghanistan                                    _____ Sierra Leone
   _____ Iraq                                           _____

   _____ Other...please explain briefly______________________________
If you have not participated in any kind of stability operation, this is the end of the survey. THANK YOU for your participation. However, if you have participated, please continue.
If you wish to make comments or be interviewed, please go to the last page.

72. In the remaining questions, I will ask you to THINK about ONE of the stability operations in which you participated. Please, in the space below, put that country.

__________________
(country)

73. What best described your organization during this stability operation?

___ 0-15 people (squad or section)      ___ 16-50 people (platoon)
___ 51-200 people (company)          ___ 201-1000 people (battalion)
___ 1001 to 5000 people (brigade)    ___ more than 5000 people
(division)

74. My job during this operation could be described as:

____ leadership position    ____ staff person    ____ advisory role

__________________________________ other, please specify

75. Before deploying to this stability operation or nation building effort, in my opinion, the organization to which I was assigned was qualified to undertake the security tasks assigned to it.

___ strongly disagree   ___ disagree   ___ neither agree nor disagree   ___ agree   ___ strongly agree   ___ no basis to judge

76. My organization had a good plan for stability operations before we deployed to the conflict zone.

___ strongly disagree   ___ disagree   ___ neither agree nor disagree   ___ agree   ___ strongly agree   ___ no basis to judge

77. This stability operations plan greatly assisted me in the performance of my job.
78. My organization’s stability operations plan was significantly modified after our arrival in country.

79. Humanitarian assistance projects were an important part of my organization’s role.

80. Reconstruction projects were an important part of my organization’s role.

81. Working with local police was an important part of my organization’s role.

82. My organization worked closely with local authorities (civil administration) in our region.

83. Our organization worked closely with local tribal and or religious leaders.

84. The training I underwent prior to going to the conflict zone helped me understand my job.

85. Before participating in this operation, I fully understood the term stability operations.

86. My organization was successful in the tasks assigned to it.
87. My organization coordinated closely with non-governmental organizations during this stability operation.

88. In my opinion, non-governmental organizations such as Save the Children, Muslim Relief Services and other like organization contributed to the overall plan in the stability operation.

89. In my opinion, U.S. governmental agencies like U.S. Agency for International Development, the Coalition Provisional Authority or US Embassy, and U.S. governmental funded businesses were effective at reconstruction in our area.

90. I came to respect and admire the local people.

91. I became extremely frustrated with the local people.

92. Many people in my organization had a very negative opinion about the local people.
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THIS PROJECT. YOUR ANSWERS WILL HELP IN UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN STABILITY OPERATIONS.

If you would like to provide me any comments, I would appreciate your insight. Also, if you would like to be interviewed, I would very much like to talk with you about this in more detail. Also, after reviewing your questions would you mind if I called you. If the answer is yes to any of these, please put your name and email address below or contact me at olivergf@hotmail.com or 401-841-2565.

_________________________                                            _________________________
Thank you for your participation

Please fold the questionnaire and return it to Professor William Flavin at the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (address on back of this page) or place the completed questionnaire in the envelop and mail it back to me at

George F. Oliver

Comments (use another sheet of paper if necessary):
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CURRICULUM VITAE

George F. Oliver III graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1974 and served 31 years in the U.S. Army. His last military assignment was with the U.S. Army Center of Military History where he was writing the official history of the U.S. Army in peace operations. Before this position, he spent six months in Iraq as the Deputy Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance for the Coalition Provisional Authority. From 1999–2003, Colonel Oliver served as the Director of the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and from 1996–1999, the Military Advisor to the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. George Oliver earned a Master of Science degree in Business Administration from the University of South Carolina (1983) and a Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College (1996). While on active duty, Professor Oliver served in a variety of light infantry, ranger, Special Forces, and airborne units across the globe including service during the 1990–1991 Gulf War and Operation Iraqi Freedom. His interest in peacekeeping and peacebuilding began in 1993, while the Operations Officer for the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana where the first ever U.S. oriented peacekeeping exercise took place. Since then he has been involved in several peacekeeping missions, developed U.S. national policy, and analyzed these roles for U.S. forces. Additionally he has taught, written and lectured in over 20 countries on the role of the military in peace operations and in peacebuilding. This interest and professional focus continued while working at the United Nations and as the Director of the U.S. Peacekeeping Institute. Professor Oliver is also one of the authors on the United States Army’s book on the Gulf War, Certain Victory, and has published several articles. Since 2005, George Oliver is serving as a professor at the U.S. Naval War College and the Coordinator for a program in the Peace Operations Training Institute.