CONFLICT AND IMMIGRATION IN NORWAY: BREIVIK AND THE RISE OF THE FAR RIGHT

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Conflict and Immigration in Norway: Breivik and the Rise of the Far Right

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This thesis examines far right discourse in Europe and in Norway, and the increasing stigmatization and antagonism aimed at Muslim immigrants. The focus of this thesis is on Norway. Written a year after the terrorist acts by Anders Behring Breivik, it examines his motives and argues that far from being a product of political deviation confined to the fringes of society, much of his reasoning follows a broader political discourse that has been developing in Europe and also in Norway. The second part of this thesis examines nationalism and societal barriers that immigrants face in Norway, and investigates whether Muslims immigrants face more hostility than other immigrants. The third part focuses on the Norwegian media and its role in framing Muslim immigrants.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Norway was hit by a shock on July 22nd, 2011. 77 people were killed in two separate terrorist attacks, a devastation unparalleled in Norwegian peacetime history. The first attack saw a bomb detonate outside the Norwegian Government building, shattering it and surrounding infrastructure, killing eight people and wounding more than thirty. The second attack came barely two hours later. This time the terrorist targeted the Labor Party’s Youth Division (AUF) at their annual summer camp held at Utøya island. In a shooting spree that lasted about 70 minutes, the killer shot dead youths as they hid or ran away. Some were lured into safety and then shot by the terrorist, who was dressed as a policeman. 69 campers and staff were murdered or died as they tried to swim to the mainland. The youngest victim was 14 years old. The police were not prepared for such acts of terrorism, and the horror shook the Norwegian public to its core.

The shock was exacerbated when the terrorist turned out to be a 32 years old Norwegian man, Anders Behring Breivik. He was a far-right terrorist, on a mission to purge Norway and Europe of Muslims and the ‘cultural Marxists’, that he perceived as traitors. He had been planning the attacks meticulously over many years, and hours before the attacks emailed a 1500 page long manifesto to 1003 perceived supporters, “2083: A European Declaration of Independence”. In it, he claimed to represent an underground
organization, Knights Templar. Its mission was to expel Muslim invaders that had been allowed to settle in Europe, and to transform European cultural values. The new Europe was to be culturally conservative, and united by Christian values. In Breivik’s eyes, he had fired the first shot in what was to be a long, civil war that would eventually see Europe back to its basics.

Breivik was a proponent of Eurabia, a discourse that has developed in the Western world. It holds that Europe is on the brink of cultural extinction that has been allowed to occur due to a large number of Muslim immigrants. In this narrative, Muslim invaders are soon set to take over, helped by a demographic shift working in their favor. The Eurabia discourse is no longer confined to far-right fringe elements, but has rather gained hold in political circles across Europe.

Muslims have come to constitute “the other” in European xenophobic discourse, where culture has replaced race, and Muslims are seen to threaten the ‘European people’. However, a European fear of ethnic contamination has undercurrents reaching back to the 19th century. Post-cold war changes in European societal infrastructure has resulted in alienation amongst parts of the traditional working class. The populist far-right has picked up on this and filled the vacuum, pitting ‘the people’ of the nation up against a leftist elite. The leftist elite is understood to have endangered European nation states with hazardous multicultural immigration politics.
The new European far-right are staunch supporters of Israel, seen as being a crucial ally on the forefront of the struggle against expansionist Islam. Islamic values are understood to be in inherent opposition to European values, and will undermine and destroy them if Islam is allowed to gain foothold in Europe. This discourse has seen defenders of liberal values join the far-right in the battle against an ‘Islamization’ of European nations.

Norway has not been spared the Islamophobic discourse that is occurring across Europe. The Progressive Party has alternately been the second or the third largest political party in Norway since 1997. Its platform has become increasingly ‘Eurabian’.

Norway is a largely homogenous nation, although immigration has increased six-fold since 1980. Immigrants now constitute 13.1% of the total population of 5 million. This number includes Norwegian born children of immigrants. Half of Norway’s immigrants come from non-Western nations.

Norway has never experienced an Islamic terrorist attack. However, Norway was at the receiving end of extensive criticism, protests and threats, following the publication of cartoons deriding the prophet Mohammed in 2006. Norwegian society has been affected by the fear of Islamic terrorism, and polls from 2006 and 2010 show that roughly half of the respondents feared an attack on Norwegian soil.
Norwegian academics have criticized Norwegian society for strongly stressing cultural conformity, hindering the integration and acceptance of immigrants. The focus on sameness poses a societal barrier, and the salience of a perceived in-group and out-group. The main out-group has, as in other European countries, come to constitute Muslim immigrants.

The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) has criticized the Norwegian media for stereotypical reporting that stigmatizes Muslims. Norwegian media focuses on incompatibility between Norwegian and Muslim values, and the reporting of Muslims is largely negative.

The first part of this dissertation examines underlying reasons that are believed to have influenced the motives of Anders Behring Breivik’s acts of terrorism of July 22\textsuperscript{nd} 2011. The second part looks into academic discourse relevant to Norway on issues of national understanding, and acceptance of immigrants. Group identity theories are applied to the findings, followed by a statistical analysis comparing the academic assertions to data. The third part of the dissertation examines Norwegian media discourse in recent years, followed by two media analyses, one comparing a cross-section of media sources, and one comparing media development from 2005 to 2011, conducted by the author of this dissertation.

Carr (2006) examines the concept of Eurabia, and argues that far from confined to the fringes of conspiracy theories it has gathered increasingly intellectual consensus both in the US and in Europe, and has become a dangerous Islamophobic fantasy. What began as a fear promoted by European neo-fascists has moved into increasingly respectable mainstream discourse, advocated by historians such as Niall Fergusson, newspaper columnists and right-wing think tanks in the US.

This discourse depicts Europe as a doomed continent on the brink of cultural extinction as a result of relentless Muslim immigration. In this scenario, Europe is a decadent continent, with a population that has gone astray from the church and stands hapless by as religious hordes of Muslims enter their countries and change the system from within. A demographic warfare is happening, as Europeans have fewer children and are replaced by Muslims who breed at a much quicker rate. This results in the eternal goal of Islamic expansionism being fulfilled, whilst European people commit cultural suicide in their slumber. The threat that Europe faces from Islam is seen as comparable to the threat it faced from Communism and Fascism.
A key Eurabian concept is that Europe is a collaborator in its own downfall. Precisely how is not agreed upon among the advocates. Mark Steyn, a previous theatre critic for the Independent and, at the time of Carr’s report, a writer on foreign policy issues for British and American right-wing press, holds that this is happening because of European laissez-faire, reflected in declining fertility rates, a loss of ‘civilizational confidence’ and a population that is fatally weakened because people have become too soft, too affluent and decadent. In a Wall Street Journal article, he predicts that most European countries as we know them will disappear in our lifetimes. The beneficiaries of the European downfall will be Muslims, who will inherit by default. Knowing they will never win on the battlefield, the Islamists are merely biding their time.\(^1\)

This view is shared by other commentators, such as the late Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci, who wrote two books that became best-sellers in Italy, titled *The Rage and the Pride* and *The Force of Reason*, both critical of what she perceives as ‘Islamofascism’. Fallaci adds another element, though, and that is the role that leftist-controlled governments play in collaborating with ‘Islamic Nazism’. The left is blinded to the true nature of Islam, and tied down by political correctness and a cowed media. She claims that there is a reverse crusade happening, and that leftist controlled governments and municipalities stand idly by whilst Europe is being defiled by Muslim hooligans demonstrating their contempt for European society and culture.

“According to the worst-case Eurabian predictions, by the end of the twenty-first century, most of Europe’s cities will be overrun by Arabic speaking foreign immigrants, much of the continent will be living under Sharia law and Christianity will have ceased to exist or be reduced to a state of ‘dhimmitude’, or subject status –in accordance with the ‘dhimmi’ or treaty enforced on the ‘Peoples of the Book’ during the Islamic caliphate. In the nightmare world of Eurabia, the future will become the past once again and Christians and Jews will become oppressed minorities in a sea of Islam; churches and cathedrals will be replaced by mosques and minarets, the call to prayer will echo from Paris to Rotterdam……. The final triumph of Islamic barbarism will lead inexorably to the obliteration of secular society as homosexuals and adulterers are stoned to death in public, and writers, liberal humanists and multiculturalists find themselves hoist by their political correct petards and subjected to harsh repression.” (Carr, 2006, p.3-4)

Through political correctness, the European elite has betrayed the people. A far-right website, Altermedia UK, warns that Europe is becoming Islamic due to cowed politicians and multiculturalism: “In the name of ‘tolerance’ and ‘multiculturalism’ European politicians have betrayed the people of Europe and the traditions of freedom, democracy
and rationality that hundreds of European people have died fighting for over the centuries.”²

The idea that Europe will become Muslim is not confined to far-right websites. Tony Blankley of the Washington Times claimed that Islamification had already began in the form of ‘Muslim no-go zones’ in European centers, that police dare not enter³. Bernard Lewis, a Bush administration Middle Eastern specialist told Die Welt in 2004 that Europe will become Islamic by the end of the 21st century. The EU Competition Commissioner Fritz Bolkestein picked this up the same year, when he quoted Bernard Lewis as he warned against the admission of Turkey into the EU, thereby risking that Europeans would become a minority in an Islamicized Europe⁴.

The secularization of Europe plays a role in the Eurabian concept. In a 2004 New York Times article called “Eurabia?”, Oxford educated Niall Fergusson holds that the de-Christianization of Europe leaves it weak when confronted with ‘the face of fanaticism’⁵. A 2004 Newsweek article, “The new crusade”, also depicted a secular Europe in peril where “the religious vigor of many of Europe’s 30 million-odd Muslims stands in marked contrast to the apathy of the Christian flock”. In the article, Sorbonne based author Paul

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Willaume applauded the inclusion of Article 51 in the EU constitution, which ensures a special place for the church in dialogues with the EU, noting that the article was a reaction towards the presence of Islam.6

Eurabia fantasies vary in their outlandishness, such as that in the case of Giselle Litmann, who goes under the pseudonym Bat Ye’or, which is Hebrew for ‘Daughter of the Nile’. According to her, the emergence of Eurabia is a deliberate plot by the European political elite. Conspiring with Arabian political leaders, European politicians and civil servants have prepared for the subjugation of Europe in exchange for oil. The Euro-Arab Dialogue was a project intending to forge closer political, cultural and economic links between the Arab world and Europe. A massive influx of Muslim immigrants into Europe was part of that plan.

According to Bat Ye’or, the Euro-Arab Dialogue has imposed a control of minds and thought. The results can be seen in the media and in revised European textbooks, both bowing to Muslim ways of thinking, Arab propaganda and historical misinformation. The project of subjugating Europe to an Arab agenda was further strengthened with the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Foundation on the Dialogue of Culture and Civilizations by the European Commission in 2002.

“In Ye’or’s undeclared totalitarian state, this Islamification of the education system has been enforced by a combination of political apparatus and an Orwellian apparatus of thought control, which has supposedly purged academe and the media of any dissenting voices and created an intellectual climate in which only pro-Arab views can be heard. The results are evident in Europe’s ‘resurgent anti-Americanism’, ‘Judeophobia’ and, most of all, in the ‘cult’ of ‘Palestinianism’ which ‘poisons Europe’.7 “ (Carr, 2006, p.7)

In Bat Ye’or’s opinion, Europe has allowed this suicide to occur due to several reasons. One aspect is access to lucrative Arab markets, another fear and cowardice when confronted with Islam, appeasing the forces of terrorism and jihad. A futile attempt of placating Muslim areas within Europe also plays a part.

Bat Ye’or holds no proofs of her theories, but that has not stopped her gaining admirers. One is Robert Spencer, an author of many hostile books on Islam, jihad and terrorism, and one of many dubious ‘experts’ on Islam that have emerged in the US since the ‘War on Terror’ commenced. Spencer is an avid contributor to websites such as ‘JihadWatch’ and ‘DhimmiWatch’. Spencer is also a fellow of Free Congress Foundation, a conservative US think tank, which describes itself at a ‘culture war’ aiming to preserve America’s Judea-Christian cultural heritage and fight cultural and moral decay resulting from political correctness.

7 Bat Ye’or, Eurabia: the Euro-Arab axis, 2005, Dickson University Press, Fairleigh, p.36, in Carr, M., 2006, You are now entering Eurabia, Race & Class, vol.48, no.1
Carr (2006) holds that seen from a US angle, the claim of an Islamic plot to subjugate Europe is tied to a neocon view of Europe, economics and to the ‘War on Terror’.

“On the one hand, the notion of an Islamic plot to subjugate Europe is part of the creation of the ‘Muslim enemy’ without which the state of permanent war advocated by foreign policy hawks would have no justification. At the same time, the depiction of a corrupt European political class secretly colluding with Islam is a variant on the neocon notion of ‘Old Europe’, whose supposed appeasement of terrorism contrasts with the ‘moral clarity’ emanating from the US. Last but not least, Eurabia also serves to legitimize the broader neocon social and economic agenda, since European population’s fatal addiction to an ‘unsustainable’ social model based on high pensions, early retirement and social security benefits.”
(Carr, 2006, p.10-11)

The view of Europe as a decadent and unsustainable continent dependent on ever increasing flows of immigration, is also shared within Europe, as previously assessed. Proponents of Eurabia hold that this short-sighted model is enabled by multiculturalists, who pave the way for cultural suicide since they do not understand that European and Muslim cultures can not live and coexist together. This is because Europe is tolerant and respects cultural diversity, whereas Islam is temperamentally and theologically incapable
of respecting these values. European multiculturalists will eventually see to that the European people become a minority on their own continent.

Carr (2006) notes that the fear of cultural and ethnic extinction is nothing new in Europe, and has historic roots. There is nothing to indicate an imminent Muslim majority in Europe. Contrary to a soaring Muslim birthrate that will result in demographic change in Europe, Carr (2006) points to the CIA World Fact book of 2005, which states that Algeria’s fertility rate stands at 1.92, and that in Turkey, Lebanon, Tunisia and Iran the figures are barely above replacement levels. The United Nations revised its population forecasts for the Middle East and the Maghreb in 2025 down from a previous estimate of 679 million to 640 million\(^8\). The worst case Eurabian scenarios predict that the Muslim population in Europe will have reached 40% within 20 years, an expansion that Carr (2006) notes is ‘nothing short of miraculous’, given that the percentage at the time of writing stood at 3%.

The demographic scenarios take it as a given that a population expansion in Muslim countries will result in political and cultural advantage for Muslim countries, and in mass movements into Europe. The European people and their culture will effectively be reduced to insignificance. Carr (2006) argues that the fear of cultural and racial extinction can be traced back to the racial Darwinism of the 19\(^{th}\) century. Writers such as Courbage, Y., 1999, *New Demographic Scenarios in the Mediterranean Region*, National Institute of Demographic Studies, in Carr, M., 2006, *You are now entering Eurabia*, Race & Class, vol.48, no.1, p.16

Joseph-Arthur de Gobineau argued that only nations who preserved their racial purity would survive, and there was a fear of ethnic dilution by mass immigration, then by Jews. Another parallel to the present was the perception that Jews were not to be counted on to be loyal to the state. In Victorian Britain Jews were ‘regarded as an alien, Oriental invasion into white, Christian lands, a Semitic people whose loyalty to its own law would always render its loyalty to King and Country dubious’\(^9\). The Jewish aim was to subvert, dominate and possess.

The Eurabia school of thought follows in the same footsteps. The Eurabian fears also echo confrontations of the past that Europe has had with Islamic invasions of the Moors and the Ottomans. Islam is seen as alien and constantly hostile, bent on expanding the zone of Islam, or ‘Dar al Islam’ (House of Islam). Muslims are reduced to stereotypes, where it is in their theology to conquer the lands of the unbelievers. They are incapable of peacefully coexisting with other cultures and religions. This stereotyping ignores nuances and diversity within the various Muslim communities that are in Europe. Carr (2006) points to fifty-three countries of origin and twenty-one languages amongst the Muslim population in France alone. Without underestimating the threat from militant Islamists in Europe, there is an ongoing dialogue in Muslim communities on the relationship between Islam and the state, attitudes towards terrorism, culture and the role of women. This goes unheard in the Eurabian discourse on Islam and Muslims.

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Europe is depicted as possessing cultural values of tolerance, secularism and gender equality. These values are held to be unique to the West, and superior in the face of an inferior, backward Muslim culture that could never replicate them.

“The notion of an irreconcilable conflict between superior and inferior cultures is intrinsic to the Eurabian critique of multiculturalism, with its argument that political correctness and excessive liberal tolerance of ‘Islamic’ cultural practices have paved the way for Europe’s cultural disintegration.” (Carr, 2006, p.14)

The term ‘culture’ has replaced ‘race’. According to Carr (2006) is clear that the fear is racial or ethnic ‘mongrelization’, as it was in the past, but the advocates of Eurabia tend to deny any racial implications.

Most proponents of Eurabia lean towards pessimism and resignation about Europe’s looming fate. Niall Fergusson claims that “Europe is engaged in a terminal ‘dance of death’ which cannot be stopped.” Daniel Pipes, an academic and US counter terrorist commentator, is also pessimistic about Europe’s ability to retain its culture in the face of Muslim onslaught, however predicting that it is a question of time before some European countries react with military force to keep prospective immigrants from entering Europe. Others, such as Melanie Phillips of the Daily Mail and, writer Bruce Bawer, author on While Europe Slept, call on stronger assimilation politics asserting European values. This

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10 Carr, M., 2006, You are now entering Eurabia, Race & Class, vol.48, no.1, p.18
is a policy that is already being pursued in various European countries. Europe’s engagement in the War on Terror has had the effect of mistrusting the ‘alien’ Muslim culture, questioning the allegiance of the adherents. The extent of the cultural and religious values of Muslim immigrants is seen as an indication not just in terms of their willingness to integrate, but also in terms of their loyalty to the state.

In Eurabian discourse, “the only way that Muslims can cease to be a threat is to cease to be Muslims at all”. Carr (2006) holds that the political consequences of this are disastrous. The other way forward is peaceful coexistence between people and creeds, such as existed in Spain during its Muslim rule. This scenario of mutual respect meets an obstacle in the relentless depiction of Muslims as backward threats to Europeans, a threat that can only be diminished through aggressive Europeanization. This, according to Carr (2006), will lead to a self-fulfilling prophesy of a ‘clash of civilizations’.


Oesch (2008) examines the underlying reason for workers’ support for far right populist parties in five European countries, namely Austria, Belgium, France, Switzerland and

11 Carr, M., 2006, You are now entering Eurabia, Race & Class, vol.48, no.1, p.20
Norway. Contrary to the ‘common wisdom’ of class voting for leftist parties, Oesch notes that there has been increasing proletarianization of right-wing electorate, beginning in the 1990s. Oesch (2008) found that the Norwegian working class was four times as likely to vote for the Progressive Party than the middle class. The analysis in this research report focuses on the motivation behind workers’ decisions to back far-right parties.

Drawing on existing literature, Oesch (2008) narrows down three sets of explanations for this phenomenon; economic conflict, cultural conflict and alienation. His below hypothesis were tested empirically using European Social Survey data from 2002/2003. The sample used for Norway constituted 1335 Progressive Party voters.

Economy

Economic conflict theory holds that workers are more inclined to vote for far-right parties because they have relatively more to lose from socioeconomic changes related to modernization. Workers are hardest hit by diminishing manufacturing production in their home countries, and by globalization and resulting international trade. Oesch (2008) argues that populist right-wing parties on the whole take a more protectionist stance. Workers often lack transferrable skills and are less educated and adaptable than more skilled workers. Immigrants are overrepresented in traditional working class roles, and this can lead to a fear of wage dumping from perceived competition. There is also an element of “welfare state chauvinism”, where welfare benefits are seen as rightfully belonging to nationals and to those who have been in the country longest. This is related
to competition for scarce resources, with boundaries drawn along ethnic lines. Oesch (2008) sums this up in two hypotheses and assessments of attitudes to test them:

1) People who hold the opinion that immigrants bring down wages are more likely to vote for an RPP (Right-wing Populist Party) (economic protectionism)

Assessment: “Average wages and salaries are generally brought down by people coming to work and live here.”

2) People who hold the opinion that immigrants take advantage of the welfare state are more likely to vote for an RPP (welfare competition)

Assessment: “People who come to live here take out more in terms of welfare services than they put in in terms of taxes.”

Culture

Cultural conflict entails a perception of immigration constituting a national identity threat, as opposed to a resource threat. The support for right-wing parties is therefore due to their defense of national identities against multiculturalism, and an authoritarian stance against libertarian values and culturally inclusive politics. Workers could be overrepresented in this category since education has a liberalizing effect, resulting in skilled employees displaying greater cultural openness. The unease about cultural challenges arising from an increasing number of immigrants is therefore not evenly distributed amongst the overall population.
Cultural explanations for far-right support can also encompass perceptions of intruders undermining the national culture. This undermining can take form from within, in the case of immigration, and from outside, in the case of supranational institutions such as the European Union and the United Nations. With cultural protectionism comes a more exclusive notion of citizenship based on a cultural or ethnic homogeneity. Less privileged classes are more prone to notions of ‘national preference’. Oesch’s (2008) corresponding hypothesis and methods to assess these relevancies are:

3) People who hold the opinion that a country’s culture is undermined by immigrants are more likely to vote for an RPP (cultural protection)

Assessment: “A country’s cultural life is generally undermined by people coming to live here from other countries.”

4) People who have an exclusive definition of citizenship are more likely to vote for an RPP (differential nativism)

Assessment: “People who have come to live here should not be given the same rights as everyone else.”

Alienation

The third set of explanation for workers support for right-wing parties lies in alienation. The support originates from political dissatisfaction and frustration for established parties, resulting in protest voting (Lane and Ersson 1994\textsuperscript{12}). Dissatisfied citizens thus

vote for a political party that is an outcast on the political arena. Seen in this light, far-right parties capitalize on popular discontent felt by alienated and dissatisfied voters, which could be connected to unemployment or stagnating real incomes.

With the weakening of traditional party loyalties and trade unions, and political streamlining of left and right political parties, some sectors in society find themselves ignored. Anti-establishment populist right wing parties can seem a ‘natural choice’ for alienated workers, filling in a vacuum left by socialist and communist parties. Oesch (2008) tests this out with the following hypothesis and assessment:

5) People who are dissatisfied with the way their country’s democracy works are more likely to vote for an RPP (protest voting)
   
   Assessment: “Dissatisfied with the way democracy works in my country.”

6) People not integrated into intermediary networks are more likely to vote for an RPP (social disorganization)
   
   Assessment: “Have not been a trade union member in the last 12 months.”

Oesch (2008) found that fear of wage dumping did not play a significant role in explaining support for the Progressive Party in Norway, however welfare competition did. The most decisive factor by far was found in cultural protectionism, and the fear of immigrants undermining Norway’s culture. The cultural factor was a significant

*Parties in Western Europe: Evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland*, International Political Review, vol.29, no.3
explanation for far-right voting in all five countries examined. This does not necessarily reflect itself in the notion that immigrants already present should not enjoy the same right as natives. This was only held in France and Switzerland.

Alongside the fear of culture being undermined by immigration, the other decisive factor for far-right voting in Norway was found in political alienation. The decisive variable was dissatisfaction with the country’s democracy. Although present, not being a trade union member displayed a much weaker link. It was found that almost half of politically dissatisfied male workers (48%) in Norway voted for the Progressive Party, whereas the percentage went down to 24% amongst democratically satisfied male workers. A significant gap also presented itself in the case of fear of cultural undermining, with 41% of pessimistic workers voting for the Progressive Party, versus 19% amongst optimists that were not worried about this. Fear of wage dumping did not result in a large schism, with 38% of pessimists and 26% of optimists voting for the Progressive Party.

Men are significantly more likely to vote for a far-right party than women, and sociocultural professionals, semi-professionals, employers and self-employed professionals are unlikely to vote for a far-right party. According to Oesch (2008) these groups constitute the ‘traditional bourgeoisie’, and the backbone of the New Left.

Pehrson and Green (2010) set out to test the relationship between national identification and prejudice. They argue that civic and ethnic definitions of nationality are related to anti-immigration sentiments. Europe has seen an increase in hostility towards immigrants, as witnessed in the media. Multiculturalism is criticized, also in countries where it has previously been accepted, such as in the UK and the Netherlands. Muslims especially bear the brunt of suspicion.

The nature of immigration poses a challenge to intergroup relations because it involves the crossing of borders, which causes group boundaries to be of a central concern. Contrary to a traditional ‘us’ and ‘them’ demarcation, where groups are seen as separate, immigration blurs the boundaries between the two. The question then arises about who should be accepted by ‘us’ as a group member, and an examination of the in-group identity.

“Who should be allowed to join “us”? And who are “we” anyway? In social psychological terminology these questions translate into who is accepted as an in-group member, whether out-group members can join the in-group under certain circumstances, and how in-group membership is defined. The notion of group
boundary demarcation thus refers to the definition of the frontiers of the in-group and how these frontiers are maintained.” (Pehrson and Green, 2010, p.696)

The frontiers can be maintained by defining national group membership, and by posing entry criteria for immigrants. The immigrant can be seen as ‘good’ and welcomed if he or she ascribes to criteria of skills or qualifications. National group membership, that is the in-group boundary, can be of an ethnic or a civic nature. The prevalence of a civic or an ethnic definition of nationalism holds consequences for prejudice felt towards immigrants. Ethnic nationalism is based upon ethnic belonging as an entry criterion, involving ascribed criteria of ancestry. Nations are understood to be natural entities that need to be represented politically. Civic nationalism, on the other hand, does not depend on ancestry but is based on common citizenship and public participation. Ethnic homogeneity is not necessary to be considered a group member. The distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism is important because ethnic nationalism excludes certain immigrants from being considered fully-fledged members of the nation. As seen from an ethnic nationalistic angle, the acquisition of citizenship is not a satisfying measure of national belonging.

Both civic and ethnic representations of nationalism are found within a nation, resulting in tensions and disagreement about group demarcation. Differences are also found between states, with some holding a more civic definition of national membership than others.
Nationalist resentment arises from a violation of the perceived principle that the state should represent its rightful people. The perception of too high numbers of immigrants in the nation arouses discontent because it deviates from the idea of the ‘natural nation’.

“The nation, or “people”, naturally plays a central role in nationalism, because it is the foremost object of loyalty and the proper locus of political power. In short, the “nation” is a particular form of political community, and the “state” is the bureaucracy through which the sovereignty of this community is supposed to be realized. This idea can be formulated as the principle that nationhood and statehood should be congruent, and nationalist resentment is said to arise from perceived violations of this principle. (Gellner, 1983/2006).” (Pehrson and Green, 2010, p.697)

The evaluation of acceptable numbers of immigrants is dependent on whether immigrants are seen as alien. If this is not the case, immigrants can be seen as co-nationals, and do not cause nationalist resentment. Media holds a role in framing immigrants as alien or as community participants.

People who construe themselves in terms of nationality, and are thus more concerned with the principle of nationhood, are expected to hold more antagonistic views of immigrants. Nationalism entails seeing the world in terms of separate national entities, which are understood to be important for group memberships. This view is representative
of people who hold an ethnic definition of nationality, and less so for people who hold a civic understanding of nationality.

Pehrson and Green (2010) tested this hypothesis on English adolescents, and found a strong correlation between ethnic national identification and negative feelings towards asylum seekers. No reliable correlation between a civic national identification and hostility towards asylum seekers was found.

Variations of national identification are found not only within nations themselves, but also between states, with some defining nationhood along more ethnic or civic lines than others. Pehrson and Green (2010) therefore also sought to conduct comparative testing of different nations, using 31 national samples available from the 2003 wave of the International Social Survey Programme (Central Archive for Empirical Social Research, 2004). They divided the data into ethnic, cultural and civic identifiers. Again, they found a correlation between ethnic identification and prejudice on an individual level when respondents were examined. Paradoxically, on a national level, they also found a correlation between high average levels of national identification and low anti-immigrant prejudices, and low levels of national identification and high levels of anti-immigrant prejudices, illustrating the schism within nations. Pehrson and Green (2010) espouse that this could be because people may see their national group as vulnerable to an identity threat from immigration in countries where they perceive their compatriots as having low national identification in general.
Pehrson and Green (2010) examined entry criteria posed to immigrants, which they call “gatekeeping attitudes”. This is the criteria that determines who is allowed to enter, work and live in the nation. Again, “gatekeeping” attitudes differ both within nations and between them. Citizens do not accept or reject immigrants to the same extent, but judge them by ascribed or acquired entry criteria. The entry criteria echo ethnic or civic definitions of nationalism. An ascribed immigration criterion is dependent upon ethnicity, such as in the case of Israel and its “Law of Return”, where Jews automatically can become citizens. Acquired immigration criteria is a par with civic nationalism in the way that the entry is under individual control, such as meeting expectations of educational qualifications, working skills and adopting the nation’s way of life.

Public support for the prevalent immigration criteria defines who constitutes a desirable immigrant and who does not, and indicates where citizens would like to see their boundary demarcation. Individual and collective threat perceptions influence support for immigration criteria.

“First, on the individual level, fear and anticipation of negative consequences of immigrant presence can motivate support for stricter immigration criteria. Threats are experienced, on the one hand, on a personal level: individuals feel personally threatened and anxious. On the other hand, when individuals fear that their fellow citizens and the nation are threatened by immigration, the threat is experienced on a collective level (Stephan & Renfro, 2003). (Pehrson and Green, 2010, p.704)
Threats can be realistic, as in competition for scarce resources, or symbolic, where immigrants are seen to have too differing values and beliefs that threatens national unity. Symbolic threats can lead to citizens seeking to exclude immigrants who are seen as incompatible to the nation’s values and norms. Social climates, directly or indirectly, shape attitudes towards immigrants.

Pehrson and Green’s (2010) research paper analyzes “gatekeeper” attitudes towards immigrants in 20 European countries, utilizing data derived from the European Social Survey Round 1 Data (2002). The gatekeepers are compartmentalized into “strict”, “lenient” and “individualist”. Respondents indicated how important it was to be “white and Christian” (ascribed criteria), and how important it was for immigrants to have work and language skills, good education and being committed to the nation’s way of life (acquired criteria). A third measure, expulsion criteria, was also added. This allowed the deportation of immigrants who had committed serious crimes or were unemployed for an extended time. The strict gatekeepers supported both ascribed, acquired and expulsion criteria, the lenient gatekeepers rejected all these three measurements, and the individualist gatekeepers supported acquired and expulsion criteria, but not ascribed criteria.

In this study, using data from 2002, Norway was shown to have 30% strict gatekeepers (ascribed values of being white and Christian, and acquired values of good command of Norwegian language and Norwegian norms), 37% lenient gatekeepers (rejecting all entry
measures posed by strict gatekeepers) and 33% individualist gatekeepers (good command of Norwegian language, norms and laws). The distribution is thus quite even. 30% support ethnic definitions of immigration entry criteria, 33% support a civic definition of entry criteria, and 37% hold neither ethnic nor civic requirements for the acceptance of immigrants.

The relationship between national identification and prejudice is mirrored in welfare debates concerning solidarity and diversity. However, in countries where citizens are protected from economic risks through adequate distribution, the competition for scarce resources is diminished, and citizens can be expected to display more egalitarian values and liberal attitudes towards immigration than in countries where the competition over scarce welfare resources is prevalent.

The media influences political discourse. The interpretation of immigration feeds into narratives in media and in political agendas, and is framed as either threatening or nonthreatening in policy announcements, newspaper headlines and debates.

Gullestad (2006) examines the relationship between egalitarianism, nationalism and racism in Norway, and argues that there is a close link between these three. Gullestad argues that there is a reinforcement of ethnic dimensions of nationalism, with a renewed stress on ancestry, origin and a common culture.

There is a stress on sameness in Norwegian, and Nordic, cultures. This is a culturally specific way of solving tensions. The concept and centrality of ‘likhet’, which implies sameness and equality, means that individuals must consider themselves the same in order to feel of equal value. Identities are confirmed by seeking relevant others who recognize them. These others are people who are considered to be similar. Commonalities are emphasized and differences are minimalized.

This societal focus on sameness means that people who are perceived different are also perceived to be a problem. This results in parties avoiding each other. Difference poses a threat to common values. The result of the importance of sameness means that class divides are minimal in Norway, but it also results in tensions when immigrants of different cultures settle down.
Gullestad (2002) holds that many people in Norway feel insecure where their society is heading, despite a lack of economic concerns. The Cold War is over, opinions are split whether Norway should join the European Union, the welfare state has been modernized, and there is opposition towards prevalent neo-liberal ideas and practices. Resistance to change often takes the form of ethnic nationalism. Migration further brings out the ethnic subtext in the imagining of the nation. The imagined sameness and national belonging gives people a feeling of security and continuity.

The result is that immigrants are treated as outsiders, even extending to children of immigrants. “Young people who are born in Norway and are native speakers of Norwegians feel they are not accepted as ‘ordinary Norwegians’. The category ‘second-generation immigrants’ is now reified in official statistics.”13 Public discourse talks about a relationship between ‘immigrants’ and ‘Norwegians’, further constructing a difference and focusing on the need to bridge a difference.

The task of ‘building the country’ is seen as a closed chapter, and with it the ‘culture’ is regarded as completed. Symbolic kinship is important to the imagined sameness of having ‘built the country’. The ones who did not choose Norway are perceived as having a direct and organic relationship to Norway, and the ones who did choose to settle there, are not. The result is a guest and host relationship, where immigrants are accepted on

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Norwegian terms, and are expected to show gratitude, loyalty, appreciation and conformity.

Norway plays a role on the international scene as a peace mediator, and gives a relatively large proportion of its GDP in aid to poorer countries. However, the egalitarian logic means that people on the home turf have to conform to a sameness and minimize differences.

“Immigrants who do not play down their difference are perceived as provoking hostility, and thus to threaten such narratives about Norway as a homogeneous, tolerant, anti-racist, and peace loving society.”
(Gullestad, 2002, p.59)


Yilmaz (2012) argues that there has been a hegemonic shift in Europe, where the far right has succeeded in redrawning the political and social horizon along a discourse of culture. Political and social identities are now being interpreted as being aligned with culture, instead of with class or gender. “A hegemonic project does not…require [the political
subjects’] unequivocal support for its specific demands. It pursues, instead, a far more subtle goal, namely the naturalization of its specific vision of the social order as the social order itself” 14 and renders alternative representation unintelligible.” (Yilmaz, 2012, p.369)

Yilmaz (2012) holds that the far right began to intervene in European public debates in the mid-1980s, linking Muslim immigration to ‘lost’ identities of the ‘people’. In far-right discourse, the ‘people’ constitute the ‘nation’, where the ‘cosmopolitan elites’ are excluded due to their careless attitudes to Muslim immigration and the resulting destruction of the ‘nation’. Immigrant workers were reconstructed as Muslims, or antagonistic ‘other’.

The new identity categories of ‘the people’ and ‘the Muslim’ have become the new common sense in popular discourse, with even those who argue against the far-right falling into this pattern. The sustained attention given to cultural differences, and resulting social division, between Muslims and ‘the people’, or ‘the nation’, reproduces the new hegemony.

Culture has become the new social order in which the world is understood. This prism encompasses citizenship, security and even economy. The category of immigrant has also become culturalized, and the immigrant worker has turned into the Muslim immigrant.

Yilmaz (2012) holds that the most constructive input into the hegemonic shift that has occurred in popular discourse, depicting Muslims against the West, comes not from literature focusing on European demographic changes and its social consequences, but rather from political theory and its analysis of the successes of far-right parties. The gains that far right has made can be attributed to de-alignment of voters from their political parties and the polarization of the political spectrum\(^\text{15}\), political vacuum as a result of diminishing left-right distinctions\(^\text{16} \text{ 17}\), popular resentment with the political system, and the politicization of immigration issues\(^\text{18} \text{ 19}\).

Whereas there is a tendency to attribute antagonism as a backlash to an increasing number of immigrants, Yilmaz points out that the far right usually does well in areas with few immigrants. Rather, the success depends on the salience of immigrant and


\(^\text{17}\) Mouffe, C (2005), *On the Political*, London: Routledge, in Yilmaz, F, *ibid*


immigration related debates in media and in politics, and in the framing of Muslims as an alien threat.

Both the left and the right have bought into using culture as a frame, where the debate centers around the European ‘us’ and the Muslim ‘them’. ‘Our’ values are gender equality and sexual freedom, and ‘they’ are waiting to evolve. ‘They’ oppose ‘our’ values and constitute a cultural threat against ‘our’ achievements.

The traditional divide between capital and labor, has diminished in Europe, and has been replaced by a cultural divide between the ‘people’ on one side and the cosmopolitan cultural elite and Muslim immigrants on the other. Cultural identities have replaced class identities.

“Ideas once considered to be at the extreme right end of the political spectrum (i.e. Islam is incompatible with European values) have moved into the center and have been adopted by both the mainstream right and progressive and leftist groups. The shift is not a simple question of the populist right’s influence on the mainstream political debate on immigration. Rather, what we are witnessing is a new hegemonic displacement.” (Yilmaz, p2012, 373)

With the disappearance of the traditional right versus left class struggle, the ideals behind the fight against oppression, such as gender and sexual equality, have become detached from their historical meaning, that is, as a fight by an equal working class against
oppression. Gender and sexual emancipation has been reinterpreted by the far-right to signify a unified European culture. The implication is that Europe has moved on from dogmatic religion and evolved, whereas Muslims are stuck behind because of their religion. By abandoning religion, Europeans also left discrimination behind. Few feminists or homosexuals would agree that there is unified support within Europe, but these liberal values take on a totalitarian form when they are opposed to Islam.

Due to widespread diversity within societies, hegemonic projects require constant nourishment. In this case, the nourishment comes from the salience of debates related to immigrants and immigration. “Crises and moral panics around particular issues, such as criminality, gang rapes, honor killings and female circumcision, sustain nationalist-racist hegemony through a constant focus on immigrants. Through these moral panics and crises, the focus on immigrants produces them as a category whose cultural values explain these phenomena.” (Yilmaz, 2012, p. 374-375)

The culture prism assumes there is a natural clash with resulting tensions when two cultures meet. Political forces steering discourse are replaced by history and culture as the agents behind strife. Yilmaz (2012) holds that this began in the mid 1980s when social democrats adopted neo-liberal values, leaving class struggles about inequalities behind. This resulted in a political vacuum that was gradually filled with political culturalized discourses, forming a new type of antagonistic struggle between the ‘people’ and the
‘establishment’. In far-right discourse the ‘establishment’ became a treasonous elite who let immigrants, especially Muslim immigrants, take over the country.

The far-right’s sustained focus on the incompatibility of Muslims and their ‘cultural practices’ has resulted in making culture and religion central issues for all political parties. In some cases, parties have adopted the same xenophobic discourse as the far right, such as witnessed in Sarkozy’s election campaign where he promised to ‘purify and protect national identity, purging so-called foreign elements… from membership in the nation.’20 (Yilmaz, 2012, p.376). In other cases, social democrats have joined the chorus in order to prevent their electorate from being attracted to far-right parties.

Culture need not be the only way in which to view and understand the world.

“If society is explained by class struggles, then the history of hitherto existing society becomes the history of class struggles (e.g. Marx and Engels, 1978). Conversely, if society is explained by religious narratives, then the history of hitherto society becomes a phantasmatic tale of divine creation. The history of hitherto society could easily be understood as the history of women’s oppression, or of homophobia, or of culture wars.” (Yilmaz, 2012, p.376)

The cultural narrative we are witnessing in Europe implies a particular understanding of the past, indicating what good existed before the arrival of

different cultures. Yilmaz (2012) stipulates that the point is not whether Europe was less culturally diverse in the past, but rather that culture was not the way social divisions were imagined. Furthermore, Europe was not more harmonious in the past. Struggles that divided people are rife in European history.
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH QUESTION

Research question: Which societal factors in Norway influenced the terrorist attacks on July 22\textsuperscript{nd}, and contribute to anti-Muslim sentiments held in Norway today?

HYPOTHESES

Drawing from the literature, the following hypotheses can be proposed:

1. European and Norwegian societal factors, unrelated to multiculturalism, influenced Anders Behring Breivik.

2. Cultural factors in Norway pose a barrier to acceptance of immigrants due to a focus on conformity, fostering antagonistic sentiments.

3. Norwegian media contributes to Islamophobic public attitudes.
CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY

The research used to test the three hypotheses is quantitative and qualitative in design.

All research relies on secondary data.

Hypothesis 1: “European and Norwegian societal factors, unrelated to multiculturalism, influenced Anders Behring Breivik”

Hypothesis 1 is tested utilizing a qualitative analysis of Breivik’s own manifesto, “2083: A European Declaration of Independence”, focusing on the section “Interview with a Justiciar Knight Commander of the PCCTS, Knights Templar”. The interview, conducted by Breivik himself with himself, provides insight into his own societal concerns that have affected his frame of mind prior to his July 22nd 2011 acts of terrorism.

Hypothesis 1 is also be tested utilizing a quantitative method, examining any correlations between Breivik’s grievances and Norwegian society. Statistics examining societal factors in Norway is taken from Norway Statistics (Statistisk Sentralbyrå /SSB), Eurostat, and the OECD Family Database, produced by the OECD Social Policy Divisions – Directorate of Employment, Labour and Social Affairs.
Hypothesis 2: “Cultural factors in Norway pose a barrier to acceptance of immigrants due to a focus on conformity, fostering antagonistic sentiments”

Hypothesis 2 is tested in a quantitative manner, utilizing data derived from the Directorate of Integration and Diversity (Integrerings–og Mangfoldsdirektoratet / IMDi), utilizing a dataset issued in 2011, named “The Integration barometer – Attitudes towards integration and diversity 2005 – 2010” (Integreringsbarometeret 2005 – 2010). The data in the report was collected by TNS Gallup. The 2010 dataset is utilized in this analysis, with a pool of 1380 respondents.

Data is also taken from Respons Analyse AS (2009), a Norwegian polling institute, using a survey undertaken with a pool of 1003 respondents.

The research aims to test different barriers of acceptance of immigrants in Norway.

Hypothesis 3: “Norwegian media contributes to Islamophobic attitudes”

Hypothesis 3 is tested utilizing both quantitative and qualitative media analysis methods.

An assessment of the Norwegian media in 2009 is conducted utilizing data derived from a survey, “Immigrants in Norwegian Media”, conducted by Retriever, a media analysis
service provider, and commissioned by the Directorate of Integration and Diversity (Integrerings –og Mangfoldsdirektoratet / IMDi). The data utilized in this dissertation is centered on the media coverage on Islam and Muslims.

The datasets in the survey, “Immigrants in Norwegian Media”, are derived from quantitative and qualitative methods of analyses. The quantitative research by Retriever was conducted by archival research from 2009, involving 80 Norwegian newspapers, magazines, journals and internet news services. The qualitative research by Retriever was conducted by using a pool of 8 newspapers, analyzing 10 randomly selected issues by each of the sources.

Hypothesis 3 is also be tested utilizing a qualitative media analysis conducted by the author of this dissertation. The pool consists of a total of 110 issues of Aftenposten, Norway’s largest newspaper. The issues are in their printed format, scanned by Aftenposten. 2 sample years are chosen, 2005 and 2011, each containing 2 sample months, April and May. April and May 2005 is chosen due to being just prior to the 7/7 London bombings and the Mohammed cartoon controversy, acts thought by the researcher to have been relevant in the development of Islamophobic discourse. April and May 2011 is chosen as it was just prior to Breivik’s acts of terrorism.

Two sections of Aftenposten were read per sample day, the main section and the ‘culture’ section. Only content that concerned Muslim immigrants in Norway were taken into the
analysis. Coverage of Muslim immigrants in Norway was classified as ‘positive’, ‘negative’ and ‘neutral’.

A quantitative analysis is utilized to compare a factor of fear, believed to affect the sample years. This data is derived from surveys from Respons Analyse AS (2006) with a pool of 436 respondents, Respons Analyse AS (2010) with a pool of 1000 respondents, and TNS Gallup AS, a market survey provider, utilizing a pool of 954 respondents.
CHAPTER 5: THE EUROPEAN AND NORWEGIAN FAR RIGHT

Anti-Islamic discourse has spread across the Atlantic and found homage in intellectual circles, conservative think-tanks, right-wing blogs and among social commentators. A British cabinet member, Baroness Warsi, warned in early 2011 that anti-Muslim prejudice has gathered increasing acceptability in social circles, and ‘passed the dinner table test’.21 No longer confined to the fringes of society, Islamophobic sentiments have become a unifying rhetoric amongst far right political parties across Europe.

Political parties and national defense leagues

Geert Wilders, of the Dutch anti-Islamic Freedom Party, compared the Quran to Adolph Hitler’s “Mein Kampf”.22 The Freedom Party became the third largest party in the Dutch elections in 2010. Wilders had campaigned on a ‘Stop Islamisation of the Netherlands’ platform, advocating for the Koran to be banned and for the taxation of hijabs.23 The True Finns Party harvested one fifth of the votes at the Finnish elections in 2011.24 A True Finns Party MP, Olli Immonen, stated a year later, that “Islamisation is one of the most

22 Elder, M. and Goldfarb, M., 2011, ‘Spotlight on Europe’s right’, Global Post, 26th July
24 BBC News Europe, 2011, Nationalist True Finns make gains in Finland vote, 18th Apr
significant challenges facing Western culture” 25, this despite the Muslim population constituting 0.8% in Finland 26. Also close to one-fifth of the French electorate voted for the far right Front National, making it the third largest party in France. Its leader, Marine Le Pen, has voiced concerns over the “Islamification” of France 27. The leader of the Belgian Vlaams Belang Party, Filip Dewinter, has called Islamophobia ‘a duty’ and likened multiculturalism with AIDS, weakening the European body 28. The Swiss People’s Party is the largest party in the Swiss Federal Assembly, and has described minarets as a symbol of Islamic power 29. It proposed, and won, a referendum in 2009 on the banning of minarets in Switzerland. The Swedish Democrats entered the Swedish parliament with 20 candidates in 2010 30, running on a platform of defending Sweden against destructive multiculturalism and Muslim immigration onslaught. Its leader, Jimmy Åkesson argued that “Muslims are Sweden’s greatest foreign threat since the Second World War”, and likened mosques and veils to Islamic cultural imperialism 31. The Danish People’s Party won over 15% of the Danish vote in 2009, also arguing that

25 Yle Uutiset, 2012, Yle exposes Finns Party anti-Islamic ties, 10th May
27 The Economist, 2012, Are 18% of French people racist?, 24th Apr
30 BBC News Europe, 2010, Swedish far-right wins first seats in parliament”, 20th September
31 Eliassi, B., 2011, ‘Sweden Democrat’s anti-Muslim hysteria’, Open Democracy, 28th November
multiculturalism had been catastrophic, and singling out Muslims as the greatest threat to Danish values.

A glance at the names of European far-right parties reveals a tendency to name themselves in a manner that evokes their grass root credentials, using terminology such as ‘people’s party’, ‘national’ and ‘freedom’. This is reminiscent of Yilmaz (2012) and Carr’s (2006) observations that in far-right discourse the ‘people’ constitute the ‘nation’, who have been betrayed by the ruling, multiculturalist elites. In nationalist discourse, the ‘nation’ has its people, and should represent the ‘rightful’ inhabitants, that is, the ethnic population of the country (Pehrson and Green, 2010).

The Zionist alliance

The new far right see themselves as staunch defenders of Israel and Judaism. Not only highlighting a shared Judeo-Christian heritage, Israel is perceived as frontline brothers-in-arms against Islam. The English Defense League (EDL) has its own Jewish Division. Geert Wilders, of the Dutch Freedom Party, told the Israeli foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, “If Jerusalem falls, Amsterdam and New York will be next.” The leader of Belgic Vlaams Belang, Filip Dewinter, told Antwerp’s Jewish community that together

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33 Shabi, R., 2011, Far-right Europeans and Israelis: this toxic alliance spells trouble, The Guardian, 6th Jun
they were natural partners “against the main enemy of the moment, the radical Islam, fundamentalism”\textsuperscript{34}.

A Jewish Defense League is established in The United States, Canada, United Kingdom, France, Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and South Africa. Its British division has come out in defense and support of Breivik\textsuperscript{35}. Jewish far right circles focus on an anti-Israeli agenda of the ‘leftist, multicultural elites’ in Europe, who are seen in cahoots with Arabs and Palestinians, who transform themselves in this discourse into ‘the Muslims’.

The European far right have reinvented themselves as defenders of Jews and Judaism, where their shared enemies are Muslims and leftist European elites, respectively failing to support Israel as they should, and betray the European ‘people’ by pursuing multicultural agendas at home.

Non-political groups proclaiming to defend Europe’s Christian-Judeo heritage have sprung up across the continent, in the shape of various national ‘defense leagues’. These ‘defense leagues’ have recently organized themselves under the umbrella organization Stop Islamisation of Europe (SIOE). SIOE encompasses ‘defense leagues’ from Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Denmark, England, Faroe Islands, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Poland, Russia, Serbia and Sweden. The organization is

\textsuperscript{34} Castle, S., 2006, ‘Far-right party calls for Jews to join war on Islam’, The Independent, 5\textsuperscript{th} October
\textsuperscript{35} Jewish Defense League UK, 2012, Anders Breivik, The Kangaroo Court and the Lies of the Left, 17\textsuperscript{th} Apr
twinned with Stop Islamisation of Australia (SIO Australia) and Stop Islamization of America (SIOA), whose leader is Pamela Geller, the author of the far-right blog Atlas Shrugs, which inspired Breivik.

*Liberal Islamophobia*

‘Culture’ has become the new’ common sense’, and the discourse on cultural differences is no longer limited to the far-right (Yilmaz 2012). Mainstream parties have in some cases also adopted concerns over the ‘otherness’ of Muslims populations residing in their countries, as witnessed by Sarkozy’s banning of niqabs in 2011, vowing to fine women who donned the garment up to €150, and when he banned praying in the streets in 201136. Sarkozy promoted himself as ‘tough’ on dangerous radicals, protecting French values and French identity. The attention given to these issues were criticized as a Sarkozy ploy to pander to right-wing voters, however, as Robert Marquand of the Christian Science Monitor notes, it was also “because the identity question is now being tackled by the left, as well as Sarkozy’s own center-right political allies”.37

Yilmaz (2012) asserts that the perception of an Islam that is inherently incompatible with European values and cultures, has moved into liberal discourse in some circles. This can be illustrated with a statement made by leader of the Socialist People’s Party in Denmark, Villy Sovndal, when he told an Islamic leader that socialists have “fought for freedom for

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50 years, and I am so fed up with listening to extremist religious groups like Hizb-ut-Tahir and their rubbish about no freedom… They are a bunch of benighted, reactionary, religious relics of the past.” This statement concurs with Carr’s (2006) assertion that Islam is framed as backward and alien in far-right discourse – also when espoused by liberals - and Yilmaz’s (2012) observation of the underlying meaning that Europe has moved on from all prejudice by abandoning religion.

Carr (2006) notes that terrorist assaults in New York and in Europe have helped foster an atmosphere in which anti-Islamic discourse can flourish. Carl I. Hagen, the former leader of Norway’s Progressive Party, stated in 2011, that “not all Muslims are terrorists, but almost all terrorists are Muslim” According to Europol, however, this statement is factually incorrect, as its 2012 Annual Report proves. In 2011, there were 259 terrorist charges across Europe by separatist actors in 2011, in comparison to 59 by religiously inspired actors. Most of these separatist terrorist charges occurred in Spain, but ETA barely features anymore on the commonly held European “threat map”. This is not to underplay the threat that militant Islamism poses to many European countries. The fear of imminent terrorist assaults has an effect on group mentalities, which will be discussed later in this dissertation.

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38 Marquand, R., 2011, *Denmark’s election a litmus test for Europe’s far-right politics*, The Christian Science Monitor, 14th Nov
39 Honnigsoey, K.H, 2011, ‘*Grotesk utsagn fra Hagen*’, NRK, 14th Aug
Norwegian political climate and the Progressive Party

Norway is an affluent society that enjoys a high level of gender equality. The unemployment rate is low, at 3% as of July 2012. The law mandates that women occupy 40% of board of directors’ positions in public companies, and women receive largely the same amount of pay as men, at 85%. The World Economic Forum ranked Norway the highest in world in 2008 in closing the gender gap. Norway scores also highly in human rights ratings, enjoying a split top three position in the 2009 CIRI Human Rights Data Project. Norway is an egalitarian society that has a relatively low unemployment rate and generous social benefits.

The largest political party in Norway is the Labor Party, which played a major role in the post-war reconstruction, and has harvested between 24.3% and 40.8% of electoral votes since 1981. The Labor Party has governed in fifteen out of twenty-two government since 1945. Norwegian governments are on the whole, but with a few exceptions, coalition governments.

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41 Trading Economics, 2012, Norway Unemployment Rate
43 BBC News, 2008, Norway tops gender equality list, 12th Nov
44 Kirk, M., 2010, Annual International Human Rights Ratings Announced, University of Connecticut
45 Stortinget, Stemmefordeling 1981-2009
46 Norwegian Government, 2012, Norske regjeringer siden 1945
Norway, with a population of roughly 5 million (5.02 million as of 2012\textsuperscript{47}), is a largely homogenous society, although in the past decades immigration has significantly increased. Norway Statistics estimates that 471,000 non-Nordic immigrants have come to Norway since 1990. Whereas there were 60,000 immigrants in 1970, one-third of them from other Nordic countries and the rest mostly from other Western countries, the estimate for 2012 stands at 650,000, half of these from Asia, Africa and Latin-America. The five largest countries of origin are Poland, Sweden, Pakistan, Somalia and Iraq.\textsuperscript{48} Immigrants now constitute roughly 13% of the total population.

The Norwegian Progressive Party has enjoyed steady success in elections over the past decade, and has been the second or third largest political party since 1997.\textsuperscript{49} It is a neoliberal party, advocating lower of taxes and prices, but it has also increasingly made immigration a core issue in its party politics. A survey conducted by TNS Gallup in 2009,\textsuperscript{50} asked respondents to name a single issue that was so important to them that they would not vote for the Progressive Party if they changed their stance. It showed that immigration is the single most important factor of support for the Progressive Party, at 31.4% (followed by “I do not know” at 25.5% and “I would never vote for the Progressive Party at 15.7%).

\textsuperscript{47} Statistics Norway, 2012, \textit{Befolkning}  
\textsuperscript{48} Statistics Norway, 2011, \textit{Innvandring og innvandrere},  
\textsuperscript{49} Stortinget, \textit{Stemmefordeling 1981-2009}  
\textsuperscript{50} TNS Gallup, 2009, “Kan du nevne en enkelt del av Fremskrittpartiets politick some er så viktig for deg at du ville vurdere å ikke stemme på partiet dersom det endret nettopp denne delen av politikken sin?”
It has adopted the same anti-Muslim rhetoric found in other far-right European parties. In true Eurabia style, its current leader, Siv Jensen, has warned against ‘Islamization by stealth’. Citing the Swedish city of Malmö, where Swedish law apparently had been replaced by Sharia laws in no-go zones where police did not dare enter, she vowed to put a stopper to this development in Norway. According to Siv Jensen, this was not fear mongering, but rather a part of an everyday reality that must not reach Oslo.\(^51\)

Due to a mistrust of alien Muslim immigrants and their loyalty to the state, the Progressive Party seeks to introduce a pledge of allegiance to the Norwegian state as part of obtaining citizenship. The Progressive Party also campaigns on a total reform of family reunion politics, championing itself as an upholder of liberal, Western values since ‘the politics of today’ encourage forced and arranged marriages.\(^52\) The Progressive Party’s spokesman on immigration politics, Morten Ørsal Johansen, issued a statement in 2012, demanding that immigrants ‘dress as Norwegians, speak Norwegian, work, respect Norwegian culture and way of being, do not owe child support and have immaculate criminal records’. \(^53\) The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) stated in their 2008 report on Norway, that racist and xenophobic political discourse had continued, often in relation to security concerns, and singled the Progress Party out as the culprit of these transgressions. The report gives the example of a brochure issued by the Progressive Party in the run-up to the 2005 elections, depicting clear links between

\(^{51}\) Dagbladet, 2009, *Siv Jensen advarer mot snikislamisering*, 21st Feb
\(^{52}\) Progressive Party, 2011, *We Believe: Asylum and immigration politics*
\(^{53}\) NTB, 2012, *’Frp sier nei til folk som ikke lever som nordmenn’*, Aftenposten, 20th Jun
security concerns and persons of foreign origin. The ECTI holds that the anti-immigrant views have become more predominant in political and public discourse in ‘recent years’, effectively contributing to the stereotyping and the generalization of Muslim immigrants.

The contrast between the Labor Party and the Progressive Party can be illustrated with a quarrel between the two parties in 2010, when Norway’s foreign minister and Labor Party member, Jonas Gahr Støre, reacted to a demographic prognoses by stating that Norway had to live with and adjust to the fact that within 15-20 years the immigrant population would consist of one million, and that the Norwegian society had to face up to the taboos surrounding this. The Progressive Party reacted angrily to this statement, stating that it was fully possible to stop the set increase in immigration, and accusing the Labor Party for ignoring the will of the majority of the Norwegian people.\textsuperscript{54} Another illustration of the ideological schism between the Labor Party and the Progressive Party occurred in May 2011, when the leader of the Labor party Youth division (AUF), Eskil Pedersen, reported Progressive Party representative Christian Tybring-Gjedde to the police for the breach of the racism paragraph 135a. Gjedde had accused immigrant boys for being more aggressive than Norwegian boys, claiming the difference was to be found in the respective cultures.\textsuperscript{55}

Oesch (2008) found that protest voting played the largest role in support for the Progressive Party. Alongside cultural protectionism, dissatisfaction with the way

\textsuperscript{54} Skevik, E., 2010, \textit{Frp: Fullt mulig å stanse innvandringen}, VG, 9\textsuperscript{th} Jun
\textsuperscript{55} NRK Nyheter, 2011, \textit{AUF-leder anmelder Tybring-Gjedde}, 26\textsuperscript{th} May
Norway’s democracy works was the most important factor in voting for the Progressive Party. An examination of Norway’s coalition governments since 1981\(^{56}\) shows that parties on the right of the political spectrum have rarely been chosen to form part of coalition governments. The exception is 1981-1986 when the Conservative Party formed a government with the Christian People’s Party and the Center party, and 2001-2005 when the Conservative Party governed alongside the Christian People’s Party and the Left Party.\(^{57}^{58}\) This is despite the Conservative party ranking alternatively number 2 or 3 since 1981. The Progressive Party was the second largest party in the elections of 1997, 2005 and 2009, and the third largest party in 2001. It harvested 22.9% of the votes in the 2009 election. The Progressive Party has yet to be included in a coalition government.

Oesch (2008) found that the Norwegian working class was four times as likely to vote for the Progressive Party than the middle class. The issue of welfare was amongst concerns raised. He raises questions as to why workers would wish to vote for right wing parties that do not promote welfare and solidarity as much as left wing parties do, thereby voting against their own interests. Vasta (2010) argues that solidarity amongst workers has diminished alongside the restructuring of the labor market and the lessened role played by labor unions. This has coincided with increased individualization, with an emphasis on self-realization and autonomy.

\(^{56}\) Stortinget, Stemmefordeling 1981-2009,
\(^{57}\) Norwegian Government, 2012, Norske regjeringer siden 1945
\(^{58}\) The Conservative Party was also included in a coalition government briefly in 1989-1990.
One should also keep in mind that left wing parties advocate welfare for everyone, unconfined to ethnicity. Vasta (2010) notes that as a result of increase in immigration and ethnic diversity, there is an “emergence of a dual crisis of the welfare state where, on the one hand, there is a crisis of national identity as European countries become more diverse; and, on the other, through the opening up of economies it has become difficult to sustain the welfare state.” 59

The latter may prove of a lesser importance in Norway than in other European countries, due to Norway’s relative wealth because of the petroleum sector. Norway has not suffered an economic recession as other European countries have in recent years. Nevertheless, taxation, at 42.9% as of 2009, 60 forms a large part of the Norwegian GDP. The OECD average that year was 33.8%. This gives Norwegian taxpayers a relevant stake in how revenues are spent, based on the tax payers’ perceived contribution to the national economy, whilst some inhabitants are seen as a drain on the welfare system. In 2012 Norway Statistics issued a widely publicized report stating that all immigration would run at a loss for the Norwegian economy. Whereas immigrants from Western and Eastern Europe would benefit the economy in the short run, they also age and have children, eventually becoming like Norwegians who generate more expenses than income to the state61. Immigrants from poorer countries cost the Norwegian state great expenses in the short run, improving in the long run, but never generating any income to the

60 Source: OECD StatExtracts, OECD Revenue Statistics –Comparative tables
61 E24, 2012, SSB: Innvandring lønner seg ikke, 24th May
state. Not all parties reacted with alarmist fear. The Center Party and the Labor Party derided the cold, un-nuanced economic forecasts of immigration in the Norway Statistics report. The Progressive Party, however, was quick to capitalize on the report. Ignoring the prognoses on European immigrants and the findings of ethnic Norwegians running at a net loss for the state, the party’s leader, Siv Jensen, exclaimed:

“This proves what we have been saying and have known for a long time. It is a big paradox that Somalis in the USA are well integrated citizens, whereas the same cannot be said in this country. This is because in the USA they have to go to work, they do not in Norway.” (Siv Jensen, 5/24/2012)

Geddes (2003) holds that European welfare states are “more than the sum total of social policies. They are powerful institutional forces embodying ideas and practices associated with inclusion, exclusion, membership, belonging, entitlement and identity.” The statement made by Siv Jensen was factually incorrect, as found by Gaudencia Mutema when she compared Somalis in Norway and the USA, and noted that in both countries

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63 ABC Nyheter, 2012, *Forbannet på SSB*, 26th May
64 E24, *Siv Jensen om prisen på innvandring: -I Norge trenger ikke somalierne å gå på jobb*, 24th May
65 E24, *Siv Jensen om prisen på innvandring: -I Norge trenger ikke somalierne å gå på jobb*, 24th May
Somalis were stuck in a cycle of poverty. However, it played on feelings of who should be included in the share of the resource pie, and who was deserving of Norwegian welfare. By singling out Somalis over other groups, this statement by the Progress Party leader played on the boundary emotions that Geddes (2003) lays out, ascribing an inherent, “cultural” laziness to the “otherness” of the Somali community to the debate of welfare distribution from the nation’s community chest. Somalis are differentiated from the rightful ‘people of the nation’, who have been too generous to the outsider.

**Rightwing Internet in Norway**

Norway has a share of far-right websites. The two notable websites are Human Rights Service (www.rights.no) and Honest Thinking (www.honestthinking.org). Both stress the looming danger of Islam, but have different platforms. Human Rights Service falls into Islamophobic liberal defense discourse, protecting ‘our values’ from Islam. It claims to be driven by a mission to defend human rights values, especially those of women and children. It does not mention anything about Islam in its ‘about us’ section, but its sections are exclusively about Islam and its incompatible culture, focusing on topics such as arranged and forced marriages, polygamy, honor killings, Islam, terrorism, sexual mutilation and hijabs.

Honest Thinking falls into classic Eurabia discourse. The website is intellectually framed, run by Ole Jørgen Anfindsen, who holds a Ph.D. in computer science. The previous

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editor, Jens Tomas Anfindsen, held a Ph.D. in philosophy. Honest Thinking’s manifesto claims to advocate equal value and cooperation between races and creeds, but its content clearly betrays this claim. The manifesto further stipulates the immorality and betrayal of multicultural politicians; “it is unacceptable…. That political dispositions be made to alter the demographic composition of a state in such a way that its stability, its inner cohesion, and the mutual loyalty of its population be threatened”. 68 Honest Thinking criticizes “the rotten intellectual foundations of postmodernism” that has “many people believe that any world view, religion or cultural practice is just as good as any other”.

According to Honest Thinking, the immigration of people with ‘alien’ cultures, and the resulting diversity in European societies will resort in some groups having foreign cultures, religions and languages forced upon them. This will result in people from different groups moving away from each other, and eventually killing each other. The end result of this civil war will be that Europe will either be dominated by immigrants, split along ethnic lines, or that immigrants will be expelled. 70 A look at the website’s recommended literature reveals a host of anti-Islamic and racist books. Indeed, its editor wrote a book himself in 2010, aptly named “The Suicide paradigm”. 71 It warns of the demise of the Western civilization, and can be bought in every Norwegian bookshop. 72

The book contains contributions from academics from both sides of the Atlantic, and from the blogger Fjordman.

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68 Anfindsen, O.J., and Anfindsen, J.T., Immigration manifesto, honestthinking.org
69 Honest Thinking, HonestThinking is a web based forum dedicated to the art of thinking honestly, honestthinking.org http://www.honestthinking.org/en/manifesto.html
70 Honest Thinking, 2007, “The deep crisis of the West”, Honestthinking.org, 19th May
71 Anfindsen, O.J., Selvmordsparadigmet, 2010, Koloritt Forlag AS, Oslo
72 http://selvmordsparadigmet.no/reaksjoner.html
Fjordman is a Norwegian blogger, who ran the site fjordman.blogspot. Robert Spencer, of JihadWatch, called Fjordman “the great European essayist” and “the superb European writer”\(^73\). Fjordman has been a contributor to other far-right Islamophobic websites bar JihadWatch, such as Gates of Vienna and Atlas Shrugs. Fjordman is a Eurabian proponent, however he is not concerned with the defense of liberal values. He is a “cultural conservative” who exhibits a strong dislike of feminism and the 1968 cultural revolution.\(^74\) Fjordman’s blog musings proved very inspirational to Breivik, who cited Fjordman 111 times in his manifesto.

**Anders Behring Breivik**

This section forms the background of Breivik’s acts of terrorism in July 2011. Breivik was initially diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic by court appointed psychiatrists, who found him to exhibit signs of delusion. The two psychiatrists “concluded that he lives in his own delusional universe where all his thoughts and acts are guided by his delusions”.\(^75\) The findings were widely criticized, and contradicted by a second panel of court appointed psychiatrists. The final verdict was that of sanity, and he was imprisoned for 21 years, the maximum sentence allowed in Norway. He can be held for further years if he is found to still pose a risk to Norwegian society.

\(^73\) [http://litteraturhuset.no/program/2010/05/selvmordsparadigmet.html](http://litteraturhuset.no/program/2010/05/selvmordsparadigmet.html)
\(^74\) Fjordman, 2005, *Confessions of an Ex-Feminist*, fjordman.blogspot.com, 11\(^{th}\) Apr
\(^75\) BBC News, 2011, *Norway massacre: Breivik declared insane*, 29\(^{th}\) Nov
As this dissertation has shown so far, Breivik’s views are widely shared in far-right circles, not only by far-right websites, but also by intellectuals of various standings, ‘defense leagues’ and by political parties. The disagreement with an ideology and failure to understand it, does not necessarily render it insane. Rubenstein (2003) argues that “one may consider terrorist thinking morally obtuse or deformed by bad ideas, but it makes little sense to attribute most terrorist acts to some sort of psychopathology or expressive acting out.”76 There is a tendency to by those assaulted to attribute insanity to the assaulter and thus deprive him of rationality and political significance.

Part of Breivik’s initial diagnoses of insanity was connected to the fact that the existence of the organization that he claimed to belong to, Knights Templar, was doubted and not found credible. Blumenfield (2012) notes that courts in the United States tend to find persons convicted of ‘lone wolf’ jihadist terrorism to be insane. The verdict of insanity to did apply in cases where the defendant belonged to a recognized terrorist network. Blumenfield (2012) argues that rather than being insane, they are radicalized through the internet community.

The same applies to Breivik. His terrorist activities were that of a ‘lone wolf’ since he acted alone, however, he belonged to a school of thought widely shared in the cyber circles in which he travelled, and drew inspiration from published far-right

commentators. Fjordman is cited 111 times Breivik’s manifesto,77 Bat Ye’or 59 times, Robert Spencer of JihadWatch 162 times, Daniel Pipes of the Middle East Forum 16 times and Pamela Geller of Atlas Shrugs 12 times.78

It has been argued that Breivik is a Christian religious terrorist, albeit opening up the fight to agnostic Christians and to atheists who ascribe to a Judeo-Christian European values. Juergensmeyer (2011) likens him to Timothy McVeigh, and holds that Breivik falls within the category of a self proclaimed Christian soldier who is involved in a war against Islam. Juergensmeyer (2011) points out the dates used in Breivik’s manifesto - 2083 A Declaration of Independence. The title celebrates the 400 year anniversary of the Battle of Vienna. The date of the atrocities, July 22nd, was the day when the Kingdom of Jerusalem was established in 1099.

“[Both] were good-looking young Caucasians, self-enlisted soldiers in an imagined cosmic war to save Christendom. Both thought their acts of mass destruction would trigger a great battle to rescue society from the liberal forces of multiculturalism that allowed non-Christians and non-whites positions of acceptability. Both regretted the loss of life but thought their actions were “necessary”. For that they were staunchly unapologetic. And both were Christian terrorists.

77 Verdens Gang (VG), 2011, Breivik’s political idol “Fjordman” emerges from anonymity, 5th Aug
78 Al Jazeera, 2011, Islamophobes distance themselves from Breivik, 26th Jul,
…Behind the conflict was a cosmic war, a battle for Christendom. As the title of Breivik’s manifesto indicates, he thought he was recreating that historical moment in which Christianity was defended against the hordes, and Islam was purged from what he imagined to be the purity of European society.” (Juergensmeyer, 2011, http://www.religiondispatches.org/archive/politics/4910/is_norway’s_suspected_murderer_anders_breivik_a_christian_terrorist/79)

Juergensmeyer (2001) holds that religious militias are responding to an ancient, ongoing war that threatens their way of life. This war takes place not only in this time, but has a continuum to it. The battle is epic and between the forces of good and evil. The absolutism of cosmic war makes conflict resolution difficult, since compromises are seen as impossible to agree to.

Breivik does indeed utilize religious images of crosses, crusaders and past popes and kings. He calls himself a knight, evoking another era in European history. He worries that the Protestant church has become weak, and admires Catholicism for its ‘proper ways’. In his homemade video, Islam is depicted as an ancient evil, and Muslims as historically always threatening Europe in attempts to subjugate it, and have had to be fought off. However, as his war is a cultural war, Breivik opens up the fight to ‘Christian-agnostics’

or ‘Christian-atheists’ who wish to preserve Europe’s Christian heritage. 80 He claims to have chosen the Christian label out of pragmatism. “My choice has nothing to do with the fact that I am not proud of my own traditions and heritage. My choice was based purely (sic) pragmatism. All Europeans are in this boat together so we must choose a more moderate platform that can appeal to a great number of Europeans.” 81 The Judeo-Christian heritage defense discourse is shared in far-right political and far-right intellectual circles, as is the fear of the evaporation of Christianity in Europe and the perceived weakness that prospect brings when faced with the immigration of religious Muslims.

Albeit vehemently denying being a racist, Breivik is concerned over ethnic mongrelization, lamenting the demise of the Nordic blue-eyed gene pool that he understands looming in a future not too far away. He sees northern European gene pools more valuable and worth defending than southern European gene pool. 82 Unsurprisingly, Breivik states that he is “extremely proud of [his] Odinistic / Norse heritage as it is an essential part of [his] culture and [his] identity”. 83

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80 Breivik, A.B., 2011, section 3.153 “Interview with a Justiciar Knight Commander of the PCCTS, Knights Templar, 2083 –A European Declaration of Independence
81 Breivik, A.B., 2011, section 3.153 “Interview with a Justiciar Knight Commander of the PCCTS, Knights Templar, 2083 –A European Declaration of Independence
82 Breivik, A.B., 2011, section 3.84, Knights Templar and ethnocentrism, 2083 –A European Declaration of Independence
Rubenstein (2003) notes that the typical terrorist is politically isolated, and alienated from the state and the ruling class. This certainly seems to hold in the case of Breivik. Having joined, and been active, in the Progressive Party, he left in 2006, disillusioned with politics and democracy.

“It would be better if they [moderate anti-immigration parties] admitted the truth, that the democratic struggle to save Europe has been lost and the only way to proceed is by resisting the establishment by other means. In many ways, they are contributing to pacify the people by giving them false hope.”

(Breivik, “Interview with a Justiciar Knight Commander of the PCCTS, Knights Templar, section 3.153)

Terrorist motives include publicizing a cause and the intensity of the supporters of that cause, and providing exemplary heroic sacrificial violence that can be copied once people ‘wake up from their slumber’, something that the terrorist activity aims to enable (Rubenstein 2003). Breivik expected to be martyred by the police, and was ready to die for his cause. He expected others to pick up from where he had started, calling on people to complete and add to his manifesto, “2083 – A European Declaration of Independence”\(^{84}\), in the duration of the struggle to come. He wished to be a catalyst and to be admired as a hero, fashioning himself as a knight. He provided a biography of himself in his manifesto in the Interview with a Justiciar Knight Commander of the

\(^{84}\) Breivik, A.B., 2011, About the compendium -2083, 2083 –A European Declaration of Independence
PCCTS section, and took flattering pictures of himself in order to control his image. His manifesto is meant to be eye-opening, shaking the European people up to what is going on whilst they idly stand by. The terrorism was his chosen method to make people see how urgent his message is. He is not unrealistic, though, and does not predict immediate effects. In court, he stated that the initial expected effect would be a set-back to his cause, but that in the long run his actions would lead to societal polarization. He does not anticipate a full-scale civil war in Europe, but rather low intensity, but escalating, warfare stretching over many decades, until Europe is purged of Muslims and European traitors.

Terrorist activities’ aim can be to eliminate and incapacitate leaders (Rubenstein 2003). Breivik’s aim was to execute Labor Party politicians. In his seventh court hearing, he explained how, depending on the day and who was present, he would have killed former prime minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, or Norway’s current foreign minister Jonas Gahr Store, or Eskil Pedersen, the leader of the Labor Party youth division (AUF), or Marthe Michelet, an independent socialist journalist. He regretted killing innocent passers-by outside the governmental building, and stated, albeit staunchly and in an unapologetical manner, that the youths at the political camp had been secondary targets that had substituted his primary targets - politicians and journalists - when they were not to be found.

85 Strand, T., 2012, ‘Ser på seg selv som fotsoldat’, ABC Nyheter, 23rd Apr
86 Strand, T., 2012, ‘Ser på seg selv som fotsoldat’, ABC Nyheter, 23rd Apr
Breivik ascribes to classic Eurabia discourse, stressing the imminent disappearance of European societies in the face of uncontrolled, cynical Muslim immigration, warning of dhimmitude and loss of autonomy. In his opinion, Muslims are inherently violent, and he calls on all other creeds to unite against the onslaught brought by Muslims worldwide. Islam has been, and continues to be, the greatest threat to peaceful societies that the world has seen. He also falls into the Judeo civilizational defense camp, stressing the importance of Israel in the fight against Islam, and the cultural heritage that Christians and Jews share.

*Cultural conservatism*

For Breivik, the main culprit is the ‘cultural Marxist’ within European societies. Breivik murdered those he perceived to be Norwegian traitors, and not Muslims. The reason for this can be found in his manifest, paragraph 3.111:

“Do not for the love of God aim your rage and frustrations at Muslims. Muslim or Paki bashing is a sure way to hurt our cause as this is what the cultural Marxist elites WANT you to do. They want you to waste your efforts on fighting Muslims and they will do anything to prevent you from aiming your efforts at them. They want the indigenous Europeans to (sic) busy fighting Muslims as that will guarantee their positions. We will never have a chance at overthrowing the cultural Marxist if we waste our energy and efforts on fighting Muslims.”
This can easily be illustrated: When the pipe in your bathroom springs a leak and the water is flooding the room, what do you do? It’s not very complicated, after all. You go for the source of the problem, the leak itself! You don’t mop up until after you have fixed the actual leak. Needless to say, our regime is the leak, all category A, B and C traitors), the Muslims are the water.”87

Breivik is angry at Norwegian society, and not only because of Muslim immigration that he perceives is set to take over Norway, endangering its cultural identity. In his opinion, Norwegian society is being destroyed by ‘cultural Marxists”, who have infiltrated and indoctrinated every layer of it. Political correctness, multiculturalism and radical feminism are all a result of this. Cultural Marxists aim for full equality of all groups, encouraging a cult of victimhood and causing a feminization of society. This makes European societies weak when faced with a more masculine Islam. Breivik calls himself a ‘cultural conservative’, and vows to fight to rectify this development of Norwegian and European cultures, which he deems suicidal.

Breivik holds that the roots of ‘cultural Marxism’ are to be found in the Frankfurt School. Realizing that communism would never gain hold in Europe unless European societies were purged of national identities, the Frankfurt School deliberately set out to deconstruct Western culture. This, according to the ‘cultural Marxist’ theory, is the real reason behind

87 Breivik, A., 2011, section 3.111, 2083 – A European Declaration of Independence
multiculturalism in Europe\textsuperscript{88}. The process of deconstruction has made Europeans self-loathing, working against own interests in the face of a Muslim take-over.

‘Cultural Marxists’ were left to run the media and the education system after World War 2, and transmitted their cultural deconstruction to the baby boom generation, the results of which are being seen in today’s society\textsuperscript{89}. Whereas ‘economic Marxists’ have lost their power and disappeared, ‘cultural Marxists’ are still at large, and controlling the semantics of European societies. The results are a breakdown of norms and morals, which have resulted in loose sexual relations and a disintegration of the nuclear family. Norwegians, and Europeans, have altered, and abandoned, the church and its teachings. This has caused societal degradation and a diminishing population. Breivik writes:

“I find it terribly sad that my country has been the victim of severe Marxist infiltration leading to political doctrines which have been allowed to destroy all morals and norms, resulting in the complete breakdown of our once great ethical standards.”\textsuperscript{90}

Breivik claims to ascribe to the “Vienna school” of thought instead. The “Vienna school”, named after the 1683 Battle of Vienna, stands for ‘nationalism, pan-European

\textsuperscript{88} Covert Conservatives Blogging, 2011, \textit{Critical Theory, The Frankfurt School, and Cultural Marxism}, Covert Conservatives Blogging

\textsuperscript{89} Lind, W.S., \textit{What is Cultural Marxism?}, Maryland Thursday Meeting, viewed Jun 2012

\textsuperscript{90} Breivik, A.B., 2011, section 3.85, “2083 –A European Declaration of Independence”
nationalism, pan-European crusaderism, Christian identity, cultural conservatism, monoculturism, patriarchy and Israel’. It is against ‘Marxism, globalism / internationalism, jihadism, Islam, imperialism, feminism, pacifism, European Union, matriarchy, racism, fascism, Nazism and totalitarianism’.

His classifies traitors into ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ groups, according to their severity of betrayal. Traitors belonging to groups ‘A’ and ‘B’ are to be executed in the course of the unfolding civil war that he foresees. He holds that European societies are to be purged of the cultural Marxists first, and thereafter the deportation of Muslims can begin. His foremost enemies are cultural Marxists, the destroyers from within, whom he understands to be unified in their ‘deconstruction’ of Europe. Speaking for ‘the people’, he writes:

“"If they continue to defy the will of Europeans for decades to come and force Europe to the brink of catastrophe, they will be shown no mercy. It will be an extremely bloody reckoning and thousands of them will most likely be executed."”

His manifest calls for the mapping of cultural Marxists onto databases to prepare for this. He also envisions a reconstruction of European societies and Christian lands in the Maghreb. His detailed plans for the reconstruction of Europe include zoning according to degrees of liberalism, a ban on abortions that are not a result of rape, a crack-down on

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91 Breivik, A.B., 2011, section 3.153 “Interview with a Justiciar Knight Commander of the PCCTS, Knights Templar, 2083 – A European Declaration of Independence

67
‘cultural Marxist’ media that engenders loose sexual morals and radical feminism, and encouragement for women to cease to hold full time employment and become better home makers.

The societal fabric that concerns Breivik the most is related to family and sexual morals. Breivik estimates that 60-70% of cultural Marxists are women. Radical feminists have destroyed the natural relationship between men and women, and chipped away at society. The result is emasculation of Western culture, which, aside from derogatory impacts on societal fabric, leaves it vulnerable to domination from outside. Feminists “want it all” and as a result society is becoming too feminized and family bonds are broken down.

Norwegian women are not respected by Muslims, who Breivik claims view them as whores, and Norwegian men have become to effeminate to protect them. Breivik could blame Norwegian women directly, and indeed he is disappointed in them, but he is also an ethnic nationalist. The combination of humiliation and ethnic nationalism causes him to look for an outside enemy that has infiltrated and lured people.

Anger and alienation as a result of humiliated masculinity in a democratic and tolerant society is not confined to European parameters. Nussbaum (2008) observes that a persistent theme in the far-right Hindu Right movement in India, is that of humiliated masculinity. The two cases -Breivik and the Eurabia movement and the Hindu Right

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92 Breivik, A.B., 2011, section 3.89, 2083 –A European Declaration of Independence
93 Breivik, A.B., 2011, Section 3.89, 2083 –A European Declaration of Independence
movement- are largely concurrent. In the case of the Hindu Right movement, tolerance and softness is blamed for being the cause of subjugation. The Hindu Right also stresses cultural homogeneity and the need to use force to ensure the supremacy of Hindus. The downfall and subjugation of the Hindu culture is ensured, should this fail. Outsiders need to assimilate if they are to stay with any rights.

The Hindu Right was active at the beginning of the twentieth century, fashioned on fascist ideology, and the movement remains active to this day. It was a Hindu Right activist, Nathuram Godse, who killed Gandhi. Godse’s justification for the murder was that he was acting on behalf of the Hindu greater good, in the face of Muslim oppression and tyranny. Gandhi, he argued, was guiltier of violence through his pacifist stance and Muslim appeasement, which served to expose Hindus to subordination and humiliation. His ‘pro-Muslim’ policies effectively betrayed India and its ‘people’. This view echoes the views held by Breivik with regards to the Norwegian Labor Party.

Nussbaum (2008) argues that “‘the real ‘clash of civilization’ is the clash within every modern society between those who are prepared to live with people who differ, on terms of equal respect, and those who seek the comfort of a single, ‘pure’ ethno-religious ideology.’”94

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Breivik has won support in some far-right activist circles. Members of the English Defense League (EDL) and the National Front have hailed him as a hero and an inspiration, as has the leader of the Jewish EDL division and the founders of Order 777, an organization that advocates global Christian resistance against Islam.\textsuperscript{95} He is also held in high esteem amongst a core of far-right extremists in the US.\textsuperscript{96}

**Analysis of “2083 – A European Declaration of Independence”**

*Hypotheses 1: “European and Norwegian societal factors, unrelated to multiculturalism, influenced Anders Behring Breivik”*

Breivik deviates from the liberal critique on Islam that is found in much of the Eurabia literature. Although he shares much of the same critiques against multiculturalism that is espoused by mainstream Eurabia proponents and sees Muslims as the chief immigration threat to European cultures, the values he proclaims to defend are culturally conservative values. He perceives the real threat to the social fabric as coming from the political and social liberalism that is prevalent in Europe and in Norway. Multiculturalism, albeit despised by Breivik, is merely a symptom of a larger social reconstructuring of European societies.

\textsuperscript{95} Townsend, M, 2012, ‘British far-right extremists voice support for Anders Breivik’, *The Guardian*, 1\textsuperscript{st} Sep
\textsuperscript{96} Sæther, S., 2012, ‘Nynazistisk avhopper: -De mener Breivik er en helt’, *Verdens Gang*, 30\textsuperscript{th} Aug
Breivik’s manifest consists of a little more than 1500 pages, and the bulk of the content is taken from other people’s writings. Issues that are personally dear to Breivik himself come through on matters concerning sexuality and family, where he references his personal life to a large extent, and in the “Interview with a Justiciar Knight” section, where he lets his guard down, as exemplified with the extensive use of internet emoticons.

**Shamed masculinity**

“My half sister, Elisabeth was infected by chlamydia after having more than 40 sexual partners (more than 15 Chippendales’ strippers who are known to be bearers of various diseases).”

“My mother was infected by genital herpes by her boyfriend (my stepfather), Tore, when she was 48. Tore, who was a captain in the Norwegian Army, had more than 500 sexual partners and my mother knew this but suffered from lack of good judgment and moral due to several factors (media –glorification of certain stereotypes being one).”

Breivik goes on to say that “both my sister and my mother have not only shamed me but they have shamed themselves and our family. A family that was broken in the first place due to secondary effects of the feministic/sexual revolution.”

Breivik holds Norwegian sexual morals in contempt. Alongside his network of male friends, Breivik has composed

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97 Breivik, A.B., 2011, Section 3.86, 2083 –A European Declaration of Independence
98 Breivik, A.B., 2011, Section 3.86, 2083 –A European Declaration of Independence
a list over sexual ethics according to 18 countries they have visited. He ranks Norway at the bottom of the list, alongside the other Nordic countries and the United Kingdom. He estimates that 50% of his female friends can be classified as promiscuous, or ‘female sluts’.  

_Erosion of family values_

Breivik’s parents separated when he was one year old. His father stayed in London and later moved to France, whilst his mother moved back to Norway. His father ceased all contact with Breivik when he was 15 years old.

“I still have contact with Tove (father’s ex-wife) until this day, but have not spoken to my father since he isolated himself when I was 15 (he wasn’t very happy about my graffiti phase from 13-16 😊). He has four children but has cut contact with all of them so it is pretty clear whose fault that was. I don’t carry any grudge but a couple of my half siblings do…. I tried contacting him five years ago but he said he was not mentally prepared for a reunion due to various factors, his poor health being one.”

99 Breivik, A.B., 2011, Section 3.86, 2083 –_A European Declaration of Independence_

100 Breivik, A.B., 2011, section 3.153 “Interview with a Justiciar Knight Commander of the PCCTS, Knights Templar”, 2083 –_A European Declaration of Independence_
He was raised by his mother, who was again abandoned by her new partner six years later. Her new partner now lives in Thailand, where he, according to Breivik, consorts with prostitutes.

“He is a very primitive sexual beast, but at the same time a very likable and good guy. I can’t say I approve of that lifestyle although I can’t really blame him when I see today’s Marxist social structures”. 101

Despite the denial of hurt and upbeat tone, it is evident that Breivik has been let down by the male role models in his life. He refuses to acknowledge the hurt that the young Breivik must have felt, and instead directs his disappointment in his upbringing to societal forces out of his family’s control, namely cultural Marxism, that has brought this on.

“So all in all, I consider myself privileged and I feel I have had a privileged upbringing with responsible and intelligent people around me. I do not approve of the super-liberal, matriarchal upbringing though as it completely lacked discipline and has contributed to feminize me to a certain degree”. 102

101 Breivik, A.B., 2011, section 3.153 “Interview with a Justiciar Knight Commander of the PCCTS, Knights Templar”, 2083 –A European Declaration of Independence
102 Breivik, A.B., 2011, section 3.153 “Interview with a Justiciar Knight Commander of the PCCTS, Knights Templar”, 2083 –A European Declaration of Independence
Breivik feels alone and sane in a world gone awry, and longs for a gone-by age of patriarchy and family stability. This age is before the baby-boom generational changes. He attributes the changes that occurred to the Frankfurt School and the cultural Marxist agenda promoted by them, in particular to Herman Marcuse and a sexual rebellion advocated by him. “His revolutionary efforts would blossom into a full-scale war by revolutionary Marxism against the European white male in the schools and colleges.” 103

Breivik wants the tide to change.

“Most people going [that road] realizes (sic) at one point in life that it’s a pretty shallow existence. They long for something better but are trapped by the unofficial “rules of the game” propagated though every aspect of society. At that point you are 30-40 years+ without a family, without children. It’s the destructive and suicidal “Sex and the City” lifestyle (modern feminism, sexual revolution) which we are taught to refer to as the truth. In that setting, men are not men anymore, but metro sexual and emotional beings that are there to serve the purpose as a never-criticizing soul mate to the new age feminist woman goddess. The perfect matriarchy has now been fulfilled and complete equality has finally been achieved. The fact that mankind will seize to exist within three generations with this type of regime is irrelevant. Long live cultural Marxism!” 104

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104 Breivik, A.B., 2011, section 3.153 “Interview with a Justiciar Knight Commander of the PCCTS, Knights Templar”, 2083 –A European Declaration of Independence
“The idea and illusion of romantic love should be challenged and deconstructed. Excessive sexuality is a kind of addiction resulting in both physical and social effects, and contributes to disrupt relationships and causes people to lie and cheat to achieve the pleasure of sexual gratification. Excessive promiscuity (sexuality) is the cause of many of the problems in our society.”

Behind Breivik’s bravado and societal intellectualization stands a humiliated man as a result of family breakdowns and hurt masculinity. The humiliation is rectified, his shame is cleansed, and his honor is restored by the rebirth of himself as a soldier of honor.

“There are good men and there are individuals who don’t care at all. The person who has nothing for which he is willing to fight, nothing that is more important than his own personal safety, is a miserable creature and has no chance of being free unless made and kept so by the exertions of better men than himself. I chose selflessness, to resist a tyrant oppressor by all means necessary. I couldn’t live my life as a cowardly hypocrite, sticking my head in the sand.”


Breivik expresses anger over the erosion of traditional gender roles and the resulting change in family structures that have taken place, and that he has been affected by. This

105 Breivik, A.B., 2011, Section 3.88, 2083 –A European Declaration of Independence
106 Breivik, A.B., 2011, section 3.153 Interview with a Justiciar Knight Commander of the PCCTS, Knights Templar, 2083 –A European Declaration of Independence
section aims to analyze if the discontent felt by Breivik is a result of a personal misfortune, or if they are a symptom of wider societal factors found in Norway.

The OECD Family Database\textsuperscript{107} is produced by the OECD Social Policy Divisions – Directorate of Employment, Labour and Social Affairs. The database collects information about marriage and divorce rates and trends in OECD countries. Statistics displaying marriage rates and children born out of wedlock are also derived from the OECD Family Database. Statistics displaying children’s households’ compositions are derived from Statistics Norway and from Eurostat.\textsuperscript{108}

\textit{Marriages}

The OECD Family Database stipulates that a noticeable decline in marriages can be seen to have occurred since 1970 in almost all OECD and EU countries. In the case of Norway, there were ca. 5 marriages per 1000 population in 2009, compared to ca. 7.5 per 1000 population in 1970. This is very close to the OECD average, which stands at ca. 5 and ca. 8, respectively.\textsuperscript{109}


\textsuperscript{108} \textit{Statistics Norway, 2011, Ett av fire barn bor med bare en forelder}, viewed Aug 2012, Statistisk Sentralbyrå (SSB)

\textsuperscript{109} OECD statistics obtained from Eurostat, 2011, and United Nations Statistical Division, 2011
Of the marriages that are being entered into, there has been a clear trend in second marriages. Norway, closely followed by Belgium, has the greatest disparity that has occurred between first and second marriage rates in the OECD in the time period 1970-2009. Ca. 93% of marriages entered into in 1970 were first marriages. This had been reduced to ca. 72% in 2009.\textsuperscript{110}

\textit{Divorces}

Divorce rates in Norway more than doubled from 1970 to 2008. There were 0.9 divorces in 1970 per 1000 population to 2.1 per 1000 population in 2008.\textsuperscript{111} The crude divorce rate in the EU-27 followed a similar pattern, at 2.0 in 2010 compared to 1.0 in 1970.\textsuperscript{112}

\textit{Children born out of wedlock}

There has been a steep incline in Norwegian children born out of wedlock. Of 31 surveyed OECD countries, Norway came third in the portion of extramarital births totaling the total number of births, at 55% constituting births out of wedlock in 2008. The average number of children born out of wedlock in the EU-27 was 7.4%, as of 2010.\textsuperscript{113}

\textsuperscript{110} OECD statistics obtained from Eurostat, 2010, and National Statistical Offices, 2010
\textsuperscript{111} OECD statistics obtained from Eurostat, 2010, and National Statistical Offices, 2010
Norway’s 55% is a stark contrast to 1970, where ca. 7% of births were out of wedlock.\textsuperscript{114}

It is not possible to predict the proportion of children born out of wedlock whose parents go onto marry after cohabitation, and who are born into single mother households.\textsuperscript{115}

\textit{Household composition}

Statistics Norway estimates, as of 2011, that 26% of Norwegian children live with only one biological parent. 18\% live with cohabiting parents, and 56\% live in households where their parents are married.\textsuperscript{116} The EU-27 average household composition is stands at 73.8\% consisting of married parents, 11.5\% of cohabiting parents and 13.6 living with one biological parent, as of 2008.\textsuperscript{117}

There has been a marked decrease in Norway in traditional households with married parents over the past two decades. The percentage stood at 77\% in 1989, in contrast to the 56\% of 2010. Only 4\% of parents cohabited in 1989, and 19\% lived with only one biological parent.

\textit{Summary}

The Norwegian family structure has altered significantly from 1970 to current years. Divorce rates have doubled whilst marriage rates have gone down. Of these, in excess of

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{114} OECD statistics obtained from Eurostat, 2011, United Nations Statistical Division, 2011, and National Statistical Offices, 2011. Database
\item \textsuperscript{115} OECD statistics obtained from Eurostat, 2010, and National Statistical Offices, 2010
\item \textsuperscript{116} Statistics Norway, 2011, \textit{Ett av fire barm bor med bare en forelder}, viewed Aug 2012, Statistisk Sentralbyrå (SSB)
\item \textsuperscript{117} European Commission Eurostat, 2011, \textit{Living arrangements in the EU27. Three out of four children in the EU27 lived with married parents in 2008. One child in seven lived in a single parent household}, European Commission Eurostat
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
one fourth of marriages are second marriages in comparison to ca. one-tenth in 1970. More children are now born out of wedlock than in wedlock. This number stood at less than one tenth in 1970. There have also been changes in the household structure. Only a little over half of children live in households where their parents are married. One fourth of children live with one biological parent, and the rest live in households where their parents cohabit.

The divorce and marriage statistics follow an average EU-27 development, where there has been a similar decrease in marriages and increase in divorces. Norwegian children, however, are seven and a half times more likely to be born out of wedlock than an average European Union child, and half as likely to be living with only one biological parent in comparison to an average European Union child.

Norwegian family structure has therefore a) significantly changed since 1970, and b) changed more rapidly amongst Norwegian families with children than the European average.
CHAPTER 6: NORWEGIAN NATIONALISM AND IMMIGRATION

Anderson (1983) defines a nation as an imagined political community, which is limited and sovereign. It is imagined because members of the nation will never know all other co-members of the nation, yet they imagine themselves to be in a community with them. The community is also limited, because beyond its borders lie other nations with other nation members. It is sovereign because the concept of the nation state came during the Enlightenment when dynastic, divine realms were being broken down and replaced by sovereign states.

Citizens of a state thus imagine themselves to be in a community with other members that they believe they have something in common with. Freud (1922)\textsuperscript{118} held that group belonging is connected to the libido, to the forming of loving attachments, and the need to feel harmonious with a group rather than apart of it. Individuals perceive the group as to be seeking to satisfy the same need as they seek to satisfy, and this makes them love and identify with the group (Volkan 1998).

Most nations contain more than one ethnic group. Norway is a largely homogenous nation, although immigration has increased more than six fold since 1980, accounting for

\textsuperscript{118} Freud, S., \textit{Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego}, 1922, Boni and Liveright, New York
13.1% of the population in 2012, at 655,000 persons. A little over half of these originate from countries in Asia, Africa, Middle and South America.\textsuperscript{119} In these statistics from the official statistics agency, Statistics Norway, children of two foreign born immigrants are also included in the immigrant pool. Other reports and statistics, such as that on crime\textsuperscript{120}, geographical and labor distribution\textsuperscript{121} also group Norwegian born children of immigrants onto the immigrant label. In fact, prior to 2008, Statistics Norway only had one classification –“the immigration population”- but this was amended to “immigrants” and “Norwegian born with immigrant parents”\textsuperscript{122}. The Directorate for Integration and Diversity (IMDi) in Norway notes that in media discourse Norwegian-born children of immigrants are frequently described as “immigrant youth” and “immigrant pupils”.\textsuperscript{123}

This deviates from a Norwegian civic national identity. Even if one is born in Norway and has never visited one’s parents’ homeland, one is still considered a version of an immigrant. In his book “Imagined Communities”, Anderson (1983) discusses naturalization, noting how language matters in the process and in the belonging to a nation. A nation’s language connects the citizens to its dead, and is used in the poetry, songs and stories of the nation. It therefore follows that one can be invited into the

\textsuperscript{120} Skardhamar, T., Thorsen, L. and Henriksen, K., 2011, \textit{Kriminalitet og straff blant innvandrere og øvrig befolkning}, Statistics Norway
\textsuperscript{121} Pettersen, S.V., 2009, \textit{Innvandrere I norske kommuner, Demografi, levekår og deltakelse i arbeidsstyrken}, Statistics Norway (SSB),
\textsuperscript{122} Dzamarija, M., 2008, \textit{Hva skal “innvandreren hete?}, Norway Statistics (SSB), 14\textsuperscript{th} Apr
\textsuperscript{123} Directorate of Integration and Diversity (IMDi), 2010, \textit{Innvandrere i norske medier, Årsrapport 2009}, p..14
imagined community through the process of naturalization, by mastering the nation’s language and adopting it as one’s own. Most countries in the world invite foreigners to join their community through naturalization. However, whereas a citizen child of two foreign immigrants in the US would only be classified as an American, the child is classified as a second-generation immigrant in Norway, despite being raised in the country. Norsk Språkråd, the linguistic advisory institution to the Norwegian state, told the weekly newspaper, Ny Tid, that

“A Pakistani who settles in Norway does not become Norwegian, even if he becomes a Norwegian citizen. He still remains Pakistani. The Norwegian belongs to his group, and the Pakistani to his. There is something called ethnicity, and this is not just an empty marker, it is a classification that reflects a reality. Trying to mask reality should be criticized. We are disconcerted over what appears to us as political correctness from Ny Tid, which would veil actual circumstances.”

(Meløy, S., 10/27/2006)\(^\text{124}\)

Similarly, in her article, *Invisible fences: Egalitarianism, Nationalism and Racism*, Gullestad (2002) recounts a conversation between a professor of Nordic languages and an Indian woman who wanted to know if she still had to be classified as an immigrant despite mastering the Norwegian language and ascribing to Norwegian culture. The answer was that she would be an immigrant all her life. The Norwegian term for

\(^{124}\) Meløy, S., 2006, “Norsk, norskere, nordmann”, *Ny Tid*, 27\(^{\text{th}}\) Oct,
immigrant is “innvandrer”, or someone who wanders in. It does not automatically follow that one should always be described as such, or that a child of someone who “wanders in” should be classified as having done the same.

Nationalism in Norway

Civic nationalism does not depend on ancestry. Membership to the nation can be gained through the acquisition of language or citizenship. Ethnic nationalism, on the other hand, does not include non-ethnic nationals in the group community, but is focused on ancestry and not on acquired qualities.

Eriksen (1996) notes that Norwegian nationalism is nostalgic and backward looking. No other European nations celebrate their national day with such enthusiasm as Norwegians do. It is estimated that 94% of the population partake in the 17 May national celebrations\(^{125}\), where children march to band music, flags are waived and people don fine clothes and national dresses. According to Eriksen (1996), the estimated number of national dresses in Norway stood at 1.5 million in 1996, out of a population of barely 5 million. This means that almost every adult woman owns a national dress. National belonging is evoked when the nation stands in front of change, such as when the EU referendum was held in 1994 (Eriksen and Neumann 2011), when Norwegian nationalism was displayed by the opposition through romantic symbolisms of Norwegian agriculture and traditions, signifying a unified nation rooted in history and a shared heritage.

\(^{125}\) According to a survey from 1995, quoted by Eriksen, T.H., 1996, *Utenforlandet (The Outsider Country)*, Moderna Tider
Nylenna (2006) notes that there is a strong focus on the “typical Norwegian” in Norway. “Typical Norwegian” is used about objects, occasions, symbols and actions. The words Norwegian, Norwegians and Norway are among the most used words in the language. There is a neighborly focus of affinity towards nations that share the same heritage. Swedes sometimes referred to as the “sweet brother” (“söta bror”) and Iceland is described as the “saga island” (“sagaøya), evoking the shared Viking era.

The Viking era could be described as a Norwegian chosen glory from times long gone by. Volkan (1998) coins the term “chosen glory” to describe “the mental representation of a historical event that induces feelings of success and triumph” (Volkan, p.81). These “chosen glories” bring members of a large group together, and bolster a group’s self esteem. Chosen glories are a powerful ethnic group marker. The Norwegian contingent in Afghanistan uses the war cry “to Valhalla” before going into battle. Valhalla was the place where Viking warriors went if slain in battle.

Wikan (2001) argues that second generation immigrants are not seen as identical to ethnic Norwegians. This is not necessarily maliciously meant, as her account of a second-generation immigrant girl in need of child protection services, found. In her recount, the child protection services placed too much importance on cultural belonging, “respecting” the differences, that in the end the girl was let down. Wikan (2001) describes her status as

an “as if” citizen. Volkan (1998) describes this Western emphasis on cultures as neo-racism, because there is a stress on the importance of maintaining a cultural separation and the nurturing of cultures, which results in societal segregation. Gullestad (2002) also contends that a focus on culture and ancestry overlaps racism and nationalism in right wing discourse, with ‘culture’ replacing ‘race’ as an irreconcilable difference between people.

*Cultural conformity*

Despite the official categorization and linguistic classifications of what constitutes an immigrant, Pehrson and Green (2010) argue that Norwegians are not particularly focused on ascribed ethnic belonging of the immigrant community. In their survey, the respondents were split at 30% and 33% respectively between caring or not caring about the ascribed value of being “white and Christian”. Both these sets of respondents, however, felt it was important to them that immigrants exhibited “good work and language skills, good education and being committed to the [Norwegian] way of life”. This means that, according to Pehrson and Green’s (2010) findings, that it is important to two thirds of Norwegians that immigrants integrate into Norwegian culture. Erikson (1996) holds that although ethnic nationalism has strength in Norway, the dominating national ideology corresponds to a ‘cultural model’, that is, one that is acquired. He notes that most Norwegians will accept ‘blacks’ in Norway, as long as they behave as Norwegians. Norwegian tolerance does not mean respect for those who are different, but rather an invitation to become Norwegian.
Gullestad (2002) and Grønseth (2011) argue that the demands put on integration resemble that of assimilation. Grønseth (2011) holds that contrary to Norway’s international image, the Norwegian debate on immigration does not reflect ideals of humanitarianism, universalism, equality and individual rights. “Despite belief in tolerance, inclusion and multiculturalism, many Norwegians regard foreigners, especially those with dark faces, as unfamiliar, strange and exotic (Brox 1991).”\textsuperscript{129} This is not to say that Norwegians are hostile to foreigners, but rather that the ‘otherness’ causes distance between the groups. Grønseth (2011) conducted a study of Tamil refugees in Northern Norway, and noted that after initial welcoming and social efforts on the behalf of the municipality and its inhabitants, Norwegians withdrew when the Tamils brought in aspects of their own culture, wishing to hold onto it and share it with Norwegians at social gatherings. Thus, the Tamils were welcomed into Norwegian society, but only on Norwegian terms. A prerequisite of social belonging is conformity to Norwegian values and practices.

Gullestad (2002) argues that whereas Norway is an egalitarian society, the equality is confined in sameness, or ‘imagined sameness’. Within the ‘imagined sameness’ is the assumption of equality. In order to be of equal value, individuals have to perceive themselves to be more or less the same. This emphasis is particularly strong in the Nordic countries. As a result, these societies are characterized by blurred social classes and informality. The feeling of sameness confirms identities and fosters group belonging.

“In order to have their desired identities confirmed, people need relevant others who are able and willing to recognize and support them. According to the logic involved, the relevant supporters are other people who are regarded as similar. This logic often leads to an interaction style in which commonalities are emphasized, while differences are played down.” (Gullestad, p.47)

This approach often implies that differences are problematic and uncomfortable. They can be avoided by steering away from people who are perceived as being ‘too different’. This results in the salience of an ‘us’ and ‘them’ when it comes to ethnic Norwegians and immigrants.

Gullestad (2002) holds that there is an ethnic nationalism in Norway in the sense that the building of the nation and its modern welfare state is seen to be complete, and that those ‘who built the country’ and their decedents are seen as belonging to the nation, and those whose decedents did not help ‘build the country’, are not. Those who did not ‘choose’ Norway are held to have a more organic relationship to the nation than those who did and came here. There follows a pressure on immigrants to show loyalty to Norway and conformity to its culture in order to prove their appreciation and wish of belonging. This reflects itself in a guest/host relationship, where the host sets the rules and ‘puts the foot down’ if the rules are perceived as broken.
“Many Norwegians now turn to the simultaneous production of differences and call for sameness. In many contexts the ideal of imagined sameness produces a solution (demand for sameness) to a problem it has itself contributed to creating. It is as though an outsider must be created, in order for the internal sameness, unity, and a sense of belonging to be confirmed. History, ancestry, religion, and morality are intertwined in this form of nationalism, ethnicizing [sic] the state as an expression of collective identity. ‘Immigrants’ are asked to ‘become Norwegian’, at the same time as it is tacitly assumed that this is something they can never really achieve.” (Gullestad, 2002 p.59)

Analysis of societal factors connected to nationalism and conformity

Hypothesis 2: “Cultural factors in Norway pose a barrier to acceptance of immigrants due to a focus on conformity, fostering antagonistic sentiments”

This section aims to analyze the distribution between ethnic and civic criteria as a prerequisite for national belonging, and to analyze if Muslims experience discrimination in comparison to other immigrant groups. Except from one Respons Analyse survey on minarets from 2009, all data used in this section is derived from the “Integration

130 Respons Analyse AS, 2009, “If there was a referendum on ban on minarets, what would you vote?”
barometer – Attitudes towards integration and diversity 2005-2010”\textsuperscript{131}, a report commissioned on the behalf of the Directorate of Integration and Diversity (IMDi), and conducted by TNS Gallup. The data utilized in this analysis is collected from the 2010 dataset. The number of respondents surveyed in 2010 was 1380.

\textit{Ethnic nationality}

Ca. 15\% of Norwegians fall into the category of ethnic nationalists, with a focus on Norwegian ethnicity and not wider term ‘white and Christian’. When asked \textit{“All immigrants with long-term residence in Norway should be given the same rights as Norwegians”}, 15.3\% disagreed strongly in 2010. Similarly, when asked to rate the statement \textit{“It is good for Norway that people from different cultures associate with each other”}, 14.9\% disagreed strongly in 2010. When asked whether \textit{“Norwegians should get priority when it comes to access to official welfare goods”}, 13.1\% agreed strongly in 2010.

\textit{Welfare competition}

It is worth noting, that in 2010 all in all 35.9\% of Norwegians asked whether \textit{“Norwegians should get priority when it comes to access to official welfare goods”} agreed to this statement. This correlates to Oesch’s links between high taxation and

stakes at risk regarding welfare distribution. Furthermore, in 2010 47.1% agreed with the statement that “Immigration constitutes a serious threat to the Norwegian Welfare state”.

Cultural conformity

73% were found to agree with the statement “immigrants can fit into Norwegian society whilst keeping their own traditions” in 2010. 21% agreed strongly with this.

The majority of Norwegians were found to be positive to meeting other cultures. 83.4% agreed with the statement, “It is good for Norway that people from different cultures associate with each other”. 32.5% were strongly in favor of this, and 50.9% were somewhat in favor.

81% of respondents in 2010 believed there to exist “a set of foundational values that Norwegians share”. The values Norwegians mostly associated with themselves, per 2010, were Democracy (94.6%), Freedom of Speech (96.2%), Freedom of Religion (92.9%), Gender Equality (92.4%), the Welfare State (92.2%), the Norwegian Constitution (90.9%), Equal Opportunities (83.5%), Sense of Community (78.7%), Solidarity with the Weak (69.5%), Tolerance for Difference (60.9%) and a Christian Education (55.1%).

Almost three out of four (71.8%) respondents in 2010 perceived that foundational Norwegian values were contrast with values held by non-Western immigrants, agreeing
with the statement, “the foundational values in Norwegian society are in stark contrast to the values and way of life amongst immigrants from Africa, Asia, and South and Central America”. At the same time,

Almost half of respondents asked in 2010 perceived Norwegian values to be under threat from immigration. 44.4% agreed that, “immigration constitutes a serious threat to shared Norwegian values”.

“Some animals are more equal than others” (Animal Farm, George Orwell)

The mistrust of non-Western immigrants is not equally distributed. The IMDi survey conducted in 2010, found that 94.5% of Norwegians would be positive to their child marrying a Christian. 70.8% would be positive to their child marrying a Jew, 64% would be positive to their child marrying a Buddhist, and 58.5% would be positive to their child marrying a Hindu. This number drops down to 40% when it comes to their child marrying a Muslim.

Table 1: “I would be positively inclined towards my child marrying a person of the following religion”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christianity</td>
<td>94.5%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judaism</td>
<td>70.8%</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>57.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

91
Despite 92.9% of Norwegians proclaiming freedom of religion to constitute a foundational value, 81.1% do not believe this applies to the freedom to practice Islam. When asked in 2010 “We should make it easier to practice Islam in Norway”, 42.7% of respondents were moderately against his statement and 38.4% were wholly against it, totaling 81.1%.

A little over half were negatively inclined to the construction of mosques in Norway, at 51.2% in 2010. Only 17.6% of respondents were positive to the construction of mosques in Norway. A Respons Analyse survey from 2009 shows that of the 1003 persons asked, 31.4% of the respondents would vote in favor of a ban on minarets in Norway, should a referendum be held on this issue. 16.5% were unsure.

Half of the respondents (52.2%) asked in 2010, admitted to being skeptical towards Muslims.

In addition to 92.9% of Norwegian holding that ‘freedom of religion’ was a fundamental Norwegian value, 60.9% of Norwegians also stated that ‘respect for diversity’ was a fundamental Norwegian value. These values are not entirely applicable to the diversity of Muslim women demonstrating their religion, however.
When asked in 2010 about their opinion of Muslim women wearing a hijab on the street, 78.7% of respondents did indeed either agree or were neutral to the idea. Once the question was posed of hijab-wearing participants in active Norwegian civil society, such as at work or in school, the numbers of people respecting Muslim diversity dropped significantly. Only 42.4% were either positive or neutral to the idea of Muslim women donning hijabs at work, and 56% negative. The matters got worse when it came to school, where 65.4% were against the wearing of hijabs in school, and only .33.3% neutral or positive.

Table 2: “Are you for or against Muslim women wearing the hijab (headscarf covering the hair)”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very much for</th>
<th>Somewhat for</th>
<th>Neither nor</th>
<th>Somewhat against</th>
<th>Very much against</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In the street</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>38.8%</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At work</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In school</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>39.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Directorate for Integration and Diversity / Integrerings- og Mangfoldsdirektoratet (IMDi), 2011

If Norwegians followed the self-proclaimed values of ‘respect for diversity’, let alone ‘freedom of religion’, the respondents declaring themselves positive to the wearing of hijabs should have amounted to 60%.
*The Fear factor*

Fear arising from international terrorism was seen to have made people more skeptical towards immigrants. When the question “*International terrorism makes me skeptical towards immigrants*” was posed in 2010, 60.3% responded that it had.

*Summary*

The findings correspond to Pehrson and Green’s (2010) observations of different types of gatekeepers in Norwegian society. Strict gatekeepers, or ethnic nationalists, required the ascribed cultural criteria of white Christianity in order to be considered part of the nation. Pehrson and Green (2010) found this type of gatekeeper to constitute 30% in Norway. The IMDi statistics show that 30% would not be positively inclined for their child to marry a Jew, even though Jews are commonly understood to share a white skin color and a European heritage.

The analysis of ethnic nationalists has a limitation in the sense that ca.5% did not wish for their child to marry a Christian either, and might therefore be against religion on the whole, and not against any specific religion. The pool of ethnic nationalists might therefore be 25% instead of 30%.

This assumption is further strengthened by 25.6% of respondents disagreeing that immigrants can keep their own cultures and fit into Norwegian society.
Of the pool of ethnic nationalists, ca. 15% are Norwegian ethnic nationalists, who draw a demarcation line at a shared Norwegian heritage and not along a ‘white and Christian’ line.

Norway’s share of 25%, or of 30%, of ethnic / strict gatekeepers is not a particularly large number in comparison to other European countries. Pehrson and Green (2010) studied gatekeeper distributions of other countries, and Norway keeps in line with nations such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Ireland in this matter, all of whom were found to contain 30% or 31% strict gatekeepers in the same study. Only Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland were found to have less.

Pehrson and Green (2010) concluded that 37% of Norwegians were lenient gatekeepers, that is, people who did not require ascribed nor acquired criteria of acceptance. The statistical analysis finds this to be largely concurrent. 4 out of 10 were found not to pose any criteria for societal acceptance. 40% were positively inclined towards their child marrying a Muslim, which was the lowest level of acceptance. Likewise, 42.4% of respondents were either for, or held no opinion, about Muslim women wearing hijabs at work. The statistics regarding the wearing of hijabs in school is not used to assess lenient gatekeepers, as public discourse has framed the issue to be one of female subjugation, and this could have influenced respondents.
If it is concluded that 25% pose ethnic acceptance criteria for acceptance of immigrants, and 40% reject both ascribed and acquired acceptance criteria and welcome difference, 35% should be said to pose acquired acceptance criteria, or constitute civic nationalists. This, according to Pehrson and Green (2010) should consist of speaking the language, working, following national laws, being educated and committed to the nation’s ‘way of life’.

Yet, ca. 45% (44.4%) believed that immigration poses a serious threat to shared values in Norwegian society, or threatening the sameness of Norwegian society (Gullestad, 2002). If we assume that 25% of the respondents would claim this regardless since they are ethnic nationalists, it follows that the remaining 20% are civic nationalists - out of a pool of 35% - who do not feel that immigrants are conforming enough to Norwegian society.

Muslim immigrants were not found to be perceived to having acquired the necessary criteria, and thus to conform to a national ‘sameness’ and cultural conformity. Whereas 6 out of 10 would welcome their child marrying a non-Western Hindu, only 4 out 10 would do the same were their child to marry a Muslim.

Thus, more than half of respondents would welcome a Hindu or a Buddhist into their immediate family, even though almost 3 out of 4 did not believe that non-Western immigrants held comparable foundational values to that of Norwegians. The skepticism appears to be directed at Muslims.
Half of the respondents in 2010 admitted being skeptical towards Muslims (52%), and similarly half of the respondents did not wish to see mosques built in Norway (51.2%). This would constitute all of the ethnic nationalist pool -25%-; as well as nearly 3 out of 4 of civic nationalist pool.

The fear of terrorism appears to be a significant factor, with 60% stating that it had made them more skeptical towards immigrants. Since the instances of international terrorism that come to respondents’ minds concern Islamic terrorism, it would explain the difference of acceptance of Hindu and Muslim immigrants, respectively.

It can be concluded that 4 out of 10 Norwegians place an importance on conformity and sameness, but that more hold an antagonistic view towards Muslims that is unrelated to the notion of ‘fitting in’.
CHAPTER 7: NORWEGIAN MEDIA PORTRAYAL OF MUSLIM IMMIGRANTS

Media reports influence people’s perceptions of the world around them. It is also an important component in the creation of identities. Identities are carried anonymously by public narratives and discourse, that permeate our way of thinking in a manner that is not noticeable, and affect the way in which the world is made sense of. (Brubaker and Cooper (2000). Norwegian media frequently features stories on immigrants, especially Muslims. The discourse is largely focused on contrasting values and mannerisms. The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) fourth report on Norway (2008), states:

“In its third report, ECRI noted that persons of immigrant background had continued to feature in the media predominantly in connection with crime stories or issues of forced marriages and female genital mutilation.

Civil society actors have reported to ECRI that news media have continued to refer to suspects’ national origins and ethnic backgrounds when these do not have any bearing on the case. News coverage of violence between close family members is also reported to often include speculations with regard to cultural or
religious motivations when those involved have ethnic minority backgrounds, while similar episodes involving ethnic Norwegians are portrayed as a result of individual medical or psychological conditions. Furthermore, the sensationalism and sweeping generalizations with which the media has reportedly often addressed the phenomena such as female genital mutilation and family violence regardless of the actual opinions or attitudes towards these phenomena among members of the communities concerned, has continued to contribute to the stigmatization of entire groups."

Muslims are often framed as neither integrating nor conforming to Norwegian values. The media discourse hinders social cohesion, and arouses suspicion that Norwegian society is not compatible with Muslim immigrants. This section outlines some trends and illustrative stories that have featured in Norwegian media over the past few years.

**Liberal values**

Akkermann and Hagelund (2007) assert that that since the turn of the century, Norwegian media began to focus on issues related to honor killings, arranged marriages and genital mutilations. This coincided with a shift in far right discourse, which saw liberal values moving to the center stage. Akkermann and Hagelund (2007) note that prior to September 2001, aspects of multiculturalism, albeit not an official policy in Norway, were accepted and went unquestioned. These included “mother-tongue education,

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132 European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), 2009, *ECRI Report on Norway (fourth monitoring cycle)*, p.28
swimming hours for Muslim women and girls, foreign language instruction and advisory services in the public health, social and penal sectors.”133 This changed during the first decade of the century, when a growing debate started taking place about Muslims and their reconcilability with Norwegian values. The focus shifted to Western liberal values and the protection of and perceived threats to these. This resulted in far right parties joining forces with feminist and social democrats condemning the gender and familial issues within Muslim communities. There has been a focus on female submission, enforced marriages, honor killings and sexual predatory behavior by Muslim men. “The practice of transnational enforced marriages was the subject of several powerful television documentaries: The Norwegian-Somali woman Kadra became a public hero when she secretly filmed imams advising her to be circumcised.”134

This media discourse enforces an image of immigrants as an alien other, prone to use force and violence on women and children. The media engenders an image of, mainly Muslim, immigrants as incompatible and threatening to Norwegian way of life, and brings this image into the reader’s living room. The result of these projections can be found in Norwegian comment fields and in newspaper chat rooms, where derogatory views are all too common.

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Muslim immigrants are uniformly perceived at odds with Norwegian values of tolerance and acceptance of homosexuals. Norway is a largely secular country, albeit with a Protestant state church. This discourse of liberty in not solely confined to Norway, as Yilmaz (2012) notes:

“Emancipatory projects, such as gender equality and sexual freedom, signify a larger European or western cultural totality only when they are opposed to Islam as another totality. Islam, in these kind of narratives, is represented as a system characterized by dogmatic, religious authoritarianism and unquestioning collectivity, which are things the West abandoned long ago. The implication is, by abandoning dogmatic religious authoritarianism, Europeans also leave behind gender discrimination or discrimination against homosexuals. Very few leftists, feminists, or progressive gays would agree with these ideas if uttered in another context. However, in talking about a purported Muslim culture, it becomes possible to embrace this logic.” (Yilmaz, 2012, p.374)

The framing of two incompatible cultures, one embracing and liberal, and one violent and intolerant, is illustrated in Aftenposten’s reporting of an occurrence at the 2012 Gay Parade in Oslo, where a Muslim participant wearing a mask and a hijab was hit by another Muslim man who was a bystander.
“Two participants in the parade ran after the [offending] man. They asked him to explain himself and were shouted at in Arabic. They asked him very clearly to speak Norwegian, but it went unanswered, Hanza says. They both speak Arabic and understood what the [offending] man was saying.”\textsuperscript{135}

By reporting that the culprit was asked to speak Norwegian, even though this was an exchange between three Arabic speakers, the discourse is framed as being between Norwegian and foreign values, discounting the Arabic origin of all persons involved. It is also of interest that the two participants felt it necessary to recount this to Aftenposten’s reporter.

Parallel to the focus on Muslim family affairs and differing values, are social outrages and moral panics about how Muslim values and mannerisms threaten Norwegian and European cultures, and proclaimed values of tolerance and liberty. Bangstad (2011) recounts the media debate that flourished in early 2010 about a supposed Muslim ‘morality police’ patrolling Grønland, a largely ethnically populated area of Oslo. The original article in Aftenposten\textsuperscript{136} featured claims made by Grønland’s current and past inhabitants of social control exercised by the Muslim population on issues such as uncovered immigrant girls who suffered sexual harassment, intolerance over Arab seculars who did not abide by Ramadan, an increased trend in beards, hijabs and niqabs, and harassment and threats towards homosexuals. An element of the ‘contempt for the

\textsuperscript{135} Svarstad, J., 2012, ‘Deltager i homoparade slått i ansiktet’, Aftenposten, 2\textsuperscript{nd} July, Aftenposten, 2010, Moralkontroll i Oslos innvandrergater, 9\textsuperscript{th} Jan
Norwegian’ also featured in the article, as evidenced by the following excerpt on the situation of a secular Moroccan woman,

“Tetouani’s son was to have started in Vahl primary school, with over 95% foreign language pupils. But after a visit she declined. –All the girls were covered, and I felt as if I were in a mosque. My son is not to be bullied because he has a father who eats pork and is not circumcised. She has worked in a daycare, and knows this goes on. A mother from Algeria thought she went unheard when she shouted at her son for having played with Norwegian children. –You know they eat pigs and are going to hell, recalls Tetouani.”

Aftenposten went on to run a series of ‘campaigning reports’ on the aspect of Muslim disrespect and threatening street behavior, and the issue of Muslim ‘morality policing’ taking over the streets of Grønland even reached political levels, with politicians of the Socialist Left Party, the Labor Party as well as the minister for Children, Gender Equality and Integration, Audun Lysbakken, issuing statements condemning Muslim social control in Oslo (Bangstad 2011).

Another social panic was created in October 2011, when reports focused on proposed ‘sharia zones’ in Denmark. The three largest newspapers all featured stories on Islamists wanting to patrol Danish areas on the lookout for alcohol, discos and ‘other grave

137 Aftenposten, 2010, Moralkontroll i Oslos innvandrergater, 9th Jan,
sins’. The call came from a small, extremist fringe group, Kaldet til Islam, which has no political clout and cannot be taken any more seriously than the small, isolated Norwegian neo-Nazi club, Vigrid. Nevertheless, the Islamic Council in Norway felt the need to publicly distance themselves from this Danish group’s demands. Similarly to Owen Jones observation of British public discourse, when he noted: “When do Britain’s whites face the absurdity of being called on to crack down on far-right fanatics supposedly in their ranks?”, one should question the need for the Islamic Council in Norway to undertake such a public stance.

Rapes

Other reportages have focused on rapes of Norwegian women by foreign men. In 2011 there was a media storm about rapes as a result of assaults by strangers in Oslo. 41 articles in Aftenposten focused on the issue that year. The head of the Violence and Sexual Criminality department of Oslo Police, Hanne Kristin Rohde, was quoted as saying that in very few of the 39 reported assault rapes, the culprit was described as Western with white skin. This was not the first time attention had been drawn to this

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139 Aftenposten, 2011, *Islamister vil ha shariasoner i Danmark*, 18th Oct
140 Dagbladet, 2011, *Islamister vil ha shariasoner i Danmark*, 18th Oct
141 Verdens Gang (VG), 2011, *Tar avstand fra «shariasoner» i København*, 18th Oct
143 Archival search in Aftenposten 2011: “overfallsvoldtekt Oslo”
144 “Vold- og sedelighetsseksjonen” in Oslo police district
fact. In 2009 Rohde told Norwegian media that immigrants were behind all reported assault rapes in Oslo in 2006-2008, where most of them committed by Kurds and African men.

“Hanne Kristin Rohde tells NRK\textsuperscript{147} that the culprits are either traumatized or psychologically damaged, or come from a country where violence against women is common. “We note that many of them have a view of women that tells them that they at any time can take control over other people, preferably women”, says Rohde.” (Molstad, K., 4/15/2009)\textsuperscript{148}

It is a fair assumption that the frequency and focus of media reports arouses fear and suspicion amongst Norwegian readers, who read that their capital is unsafe for Norwegian women because of violent men of a different culture that inherently does not respect women. The Progressive Party picked up on these sentiments and capitalized on them in 2012, when Progress Party politician Ulf Leirstein stated on the party’s home webpage, that

\textsuperscript{146} Norwegian statistics include attempted rapes. In 2010 these constituted 14.3% of all reported rapes. Sætre, M. and Grytdal, V., Oslo Politidistrikt. (2011). \textit{Voldtekt i den globale byen – Endringer i anmeldte voldtekter og seksualkultur i Oslo}, Oslo Police District., p.19

\textsuperscript{147} NRK is the Norwegian state television.

\textsuperscript{148} Molstad, K., 2009, ‘Innvandreres bak alle anmeldte overfallsvoldtekter i Oslo’, \textit{Aftenposten}, 15\textsuperscript{th} Apr
“most of the assault rapes are committed by non-Western immigrants. Then it must be allowed to say that one needs stricter rules for who is allowed into the country. And there must be police resources to capture the ones who remain in the country illegally. So that they can be sent out. Neither Norwegians nor law-abiding immigrants are well served with today’s situation. I am not saying all are criminals. But they are overrepresented in the statistics. So a reduction gives us statistically less potential assailters.” (Stie, F.M.M., 7/5/2012)\textsuperscript{149}

The 2011 Oslo Police Report, “Rape in the Global City”\textsuperscript{150}, paints a different picture from this fearful atmosphere, stating that Oslo is the safest capital in Scandinavia when it comes to the risk of rapes. Women in Oslo stand a 0.322\% chance of being raped in social contexts, and a 0.004\% chance of being the victim of an assault rape. Half of the 152 known rapists in 2010 had European ethnicity, mainly Norwegian.

“The ethnic profile of the culprits vary within the different crimes and types of rapes, but the differences are at the same time so small that it is the similarities that are noticeable. For the total number of rapes, except in the case of assault rapes, European culprits dominate, the majority of them Norwegian. The assault rapes involve, however, only 5 identified, unique persons. These are of foreign origin, but 2 were very young (under 18) and 2 had serious psychiatric diagnoses

\textsuperscript{149} Stie, F.M.M., “Kampen mot voldtekt, Fremskrittspartiet (Progressive Party), frp.no
and cannot be seen as representing their ethnic culture. The culprits that are not identified in the remaining 16 assault rapes are described as both of Norwegian/European, African/dark skinned and Asian appearance. How many persons this involves is impossible to state, as assault rapists often commit many offenses.” (Sætre, M. and Grytdal, V., 2011, p.86)

The media thus creates an image of danger that is not reflected in reality. The sensationalism of assault rapes committed by foreign men receives far more attention not only in comparison to the danger these assaults pose on women, but also in relation to the far more common type of rape committed in social circumstances. Following the publication of the report, Aftenposten publicized its findings151, but left out any rectifications about the assault rapes, omitting the issue despite having actively reported on it previously. This attention given to foreign men and rapes contributes to the understanding of an “us” and “them”.

**Fear and identity**

Media reports depict Muslims as being in opposition to Norwegian and Western values, and threatening social cohesion. Not only do Muslim men disrespect their own women, who live submissive lives under the watch of their men, but ethnic Norwegians are also disrespected, as are foreign people who have adopted Norwegian values of secularism, tolerance and liberalism.

Norwegian society is seen as superior in its values, as contrasted with Muslim values. De Vos (in Volkan 1998, p. 21) holds that “being unique and special is accompanied by a sense of being distinct from others. One group maintains its ethnic self-esteem, vanity, and superiority in comparison with another ethnic group, usually a neighbor.”\textsuperscript{152} Brubaker and Cooper (2000) espouse that collective identities entail an “emotionally laden sense of belonging to a distinctive, bounded group, involving both a felt solidarity or oneness with fellow group members and a felt difference from or even antipathy to specified outsiders”.\textsuperscript{153} Similarly, Volkan (1998) states that when ethnic groups differentiate themselves, they invariably develop prejudices towards another group. In Norwegian media discourse certain values are largely attributed to Muslims, and certain values largely to Norwegians. The division does not allow for individuality, unless in the case of ‘well integrated’ Muslims ‘exposing the others’.

Feeling threatened enhances the sense of large-group identities, and its members become preoccupied with strengthening the fabric that protects them. (Volkan 1998). Some of the media discourse that takes place would make Norwegians feel threatened, as does a fear of terrorism assaults by Muslim militants. Norwegian Security Services estimated in their 2012 report “Open Threat Evaluation”\textsuperscript{154} that the largest threat to Norway still consisted of “extreme Islamism”, and that extreme Islamist groups were involved in more activities

\textsuperscript{154} Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste. (2012). Åpen Trusselvurdering 2012,
of an operative character than previously, with many of the members travelling abroad for training in terrorism.\textsuperscript{155} The threat arising from Islamist terrorism has not gone unnoticed in Norwegian media. The 2008 ECRI report holds that much of the discourse on Muslim otherness is focused on security issues.\textsuperscript{156} Frequent reports on crime and sexual assaults also foster a climate of fear.

Volkan (1998) holds that “individuals are not usually preoccupied with their large-group identity until it is threatened.”\textsuperscript{157} When members of a group feel under threat, they become preoccupied with strengthening their fabric and seek to shelter together. An atmosphere can be created that allows for a ‘protective’ leader to surface, someone who will put a stop to the threat.

**Analysis of Norwegian media discourses**

*Hypothesis 3: Norwegian media contributes to Islamophobic public attitudes.*

**Norwegian media analysis 2009**

Retriever, a Nordic media analyses service was commissioned by the Directorate of Integration and Diversity (IMDi) to conduct a survey on Norwegian media portrayal of

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\textsuperscript{155} Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste. (2012). *Åpen Trusselvurdering 2012*, p.3

\textsuperscript{156} European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), (2009). *ECRI Report on Norway (fourth monitoring cycle)*, p.27

\textsuperscript{157} Volkan, *ibid*, p.25
immigrants for the year 2009. The survey, “Immigrants in Norwegian Media”, uses both quantitative and qualitative methods of analyses.

Quantitative analysis of Norwegian media 2009

Retriever searched all its available archival Norwegian media sources. The sources contained around 80 newspapers ranging from national, regional and local newspapers, magazines, journals and internet news services. The analysis was conducted using Boolean search methods, and allowed for some misspellings and different tenses.

General topics in the media

The resulting report notes that, although the Norwegian populace claims that the most important aspects of integration are having a good command of Norwegian and being able to provide for one’s family, there was 35 times as much reportage on Islam and Muslims as on Norwegian language education for immigrants. Indeed, the focus on Islam and Muslims was almost as great as the focus on the Norwegian prime minister.

IMDi states that prime minister Jens Stoltenberg was the most discussed persona in Norway in 2009. The largest story in media that year was the swine flu. Other important stories were the Climate Conference in Copenhagen, and Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize. Retriever compared these stories to the mentions of Islam and Muslims, and found that the topics of Islam and Muslims featured very high in Norwegian media discourse in comparison.
Table 3: Most mentioned issues in Norwegian media in 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Mentions in media in 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jens Stoltenberg</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam / Muslim</td>
<td>77,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swine flu</td>
<td>74,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate Conference in Copenhagen</td>
<td>32,574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize</td>
<td>16,279</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Directorate for Integration and Diversity / Integrerings – og Mangfoldsdirektoratet (IMDi), 2010

Topics related to immigration

Norwegian media can therefore be said to have a strong focus on Islam and Muslims. This was also found to be the case when immigration discourse as a whole was analyzed.

Table 4: Most mentioned topics regarding immigration / integration in 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Mentions in media in 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islam / Muslim</td>
<td>77,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>43,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>30,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum seekers</td>
<td>25,631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination / racism</td>
<td>20,747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td>16,890</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From these statistics, it is clear that Norwegian media focuses on Muslims in relation to immigration as a whole. Retriever found that the immigrant group that got the most mentions were Somalis, at 6275, followed by Pakistanis at 2674. Polish immigrants, by far the largest immigrant group¹⁵⁸, received only 1876 mentions.

Qualitative analysis of Norwegian Media 2009

IMDi also commissioned Retriever to conduct a qualitative media analyzes for the year 2009. The pool used was composed by eight Norwegian newspapers: Aftenposten, VG, Dagbladet, Bergens Tidende, Stavanger Aftenblad, Nordlys, Dagens Næringsliv and Klassekampen. Ten issues from each newspaper were analyzed, and random dates were

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selected. The issues did not include Sunday issues, since not all newspapers publish on that day.

Retriever found that six percent of the total number of articles published by these newspapers on the selected days dealt with issues surrounding immigration, or 536 out of a total number of 9811. Amongst the 536 articles that dealt with immigration related material, there was an even split of articles that dealt with immigration as their main story, and of articles that dealt with immigration on the periphery, that is, brought the issue into stories where the main topic was different. IMDi stipulates that six percent is a rather large figure, since the total number of articles encompasses sports and celebrity related material, and that the visibility of immigration in the current affairs sphere is therefore significant.

Topics related to immigration

Retriever analyzed the main focus surrounding immigration in the media picture, and found that religion was the predominant topic. The majority of articles relating to religion were about Islam.

Table 5: Issues that were debated in 2009 (in relation to immigration / integration)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum seekers</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dates examined: 1/5, 2/10, 3/18, 5/28, 6/5, 7/11, 8/17, 9/22, 10/7, 11/19
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor market</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other topics</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Directorate for Integration and Diversity / Integrerings – og Mangfoldsdirektoratet (IMDi), 2010

Retriever notes that some of the themes were predominant at various times during 2009, such as the Progress Party’s statement about ‘Islamification by stealth’ and a debate about hijabs, both occurring early in the year. Much of the discourse about religion and discrimination formed part of political agendas, especially regarding an assertion made by the Norwegian Police Security Service, that extreme Islamism constituted a threat towards Norwegian society.

**Framing**

The qualitative analyzes found that there was a predominance of negatively laden reportage.
Figure 1: Focus of articles (in relation to immigration / integration)

Source: Source: Directorate for Integration and Diversity / Integrerings – og Mangfoldsdirektoratet (IMDi), 2010

Amongst the articles that directly dealt with immigration related issues, the negative framing constituted 71%. 18% were neutral, and 11% positively framed. Amongst the articles that indirectly involved immigration, 40% were negatively framed, 33% neutral and 27% positively framed. IMDi stresses that a negatively focus does not necessarily mean a negative attitude towards immigration and immigrants. A report involving a Muslim immigrant complaining about the difficulty of practicing Islam in Norway, would fall into a ‘negative focus’ category, even though the intention was to create understanding.
The different focuses are unevenly distributed over the types of content. Readers’ letters contain by far the most negatively laden focuses, at 70%, closely followed by editor or contributor comments, at 53%. Only 37% of current affairs reportages were negatively laden, and 11% of special interest stories. The negatively focused readers letters were dominated by the topics of religion and discrimination. Several of the letters contained damning material directed against Muslims, in particular.

Summary

Immigration was a frequent topic in Norwegian media in 2009. This analyzes commissioned by the Directorate of Integration and Diversity, found that religion at 29%, was the most popular topic when compared to other themes related to immigration. The religious focus was mainly related to Islam.

Islam and Muslims were such predominant topics in 2009, that the attention given to it was almost equal to the attention given to Norway’s prime minister, Jens Stoltenberg. Discourse involving Islam and Muslims surpassed that of the Swine flu, the Climate Conference in Copenhagen and Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize, which he received in Oslo that year.

There is an even spread between direct and indirect reports, however the direct reportages have a predominant negative focus. Much of this negative focus stems from readers
letters and editor and commentators columns. This is especially applicable to the themes of Islam and discrimination.

Qualitative analysis of Aftenposten April, May 2005 and April, May 2011

The following qualitative analysis is conducted by the author of this dissertation, Inga H. Nicholas. The analysis compares and contrasts styles of reporting by Aftenposten in 2005 and 2011. The pool consists of a total of 110 issues of Aftenposten, Norway’s largest newspaper. The issues are in their printed format, scanned by Aftenposten. 2 sample years are chosen, 2005 and 2011, each containing 2 sample months, April and May. April and May 2005 is chosen due to being just prior to the 7/7 London bombings and the Mohammed cartoon controversy, acts thought by the researcher to have been relevant in the development of Islamophobic discourse. April and May 2011 is chosen as it was just prior to Breivik’s acts of terrorism.

Two sections of Aftenposten were read per sample day, the main section and the ‘culture’ section. Only content that concerned Muslim immigrants in Norway were taken into the analysis. Coverage of Muslim immigrants in Norway was classified as ‘positive’, ‘negative’ and ‘neutral’.
A quantitative analysis is utilized to compare a factor of fear, believed to affect the sample years. This data will be derived from surveys from Respons Analyse AS (2006) with a pool of 436 respondents, Respons Analyse AS (2010) with a pool of 1000 respondents, and TNS Gallup AS, a market survey provider, utilizing a pool of 954 respondents.

Aftenposten is Norway’s largest newspaper, and is therefore chosen as the analytical source. The pool consists of paper version copies obtained online, in order to capture the paper in its entirety, instead of merely the articles chosen for online publication. The months April and May are picked as representative months and 2005 and 2011 as representative years. 2005 is chosen since both the Mohammed cartoon controversy - which sparked debates in Norway about threats to the freedom of speech -, and the London Al Qaida terrorism bombings occurred after May of 2005. The year 2011 was chosen as it was in the run-up to the July 22nd terrorism attack in Norway.

There were 6 days in each sample year where no paper was published. Aftenposten publishes Sunday editions. Two sections of the paper were read, the main section and the ‘culture’ section. Both are published daily. There are two types of readers’ letters sections: “Debatt” and “Si;D”. Four letters are chosen for publication in “Debatt” every day. “Si;D” is a one page section devoted to letters by adolescent readers.
Only stories that concerned Muslim immigrants in Norway made it to the analytical pool, bar one sample on immigrants and healthcare that was deemed to be illustrative of the schism that was found to have occurred. In addition to the discourse concerning Muslims in Norway, April and May 2011 saw the Libyan war and the Arab spring. There was much reporting on the Libyan war, Norway being an active participant in it. Bin Laden was also killed in May 2011, and an Iranian verdict of blinding by acid was discussed in media. These stories did not make it to the analytical pool, however are worthwhile to mention since they illustrate further discourse in relation to how Muslims and Arabs were prominent in the media. Likewise, April and May 2005 saw the Iraqi war, and reports regarding the Muslim Brotherhood, which was banned from participating in the Egyptian elections. There was also coverage about Berlin fearing Al Qaida terrorism attacks in 2005. None of these stories are included, but influence the image of the Muslim world as a whole.

Direct and indirect content concerning Muslims in Norway was classified as positive, negative or neutral. Positive content depicted Muslims as rational actors in civil society, or defense of Muslim immigrants against discrimination. Negative content depicted Muslims as alien, irrational or cunning and Islam as a threat to civil society. Neutral content included factual reporting on an issue that did not involve negative nor positive semantics.
The criteria for classification can be illustrated with a series of articles concerning a threat of an honor killing by a Kurdish father and brother in May 2005. The first article, “Første dom mot tvangsektaske”\textsuperscript{160} (“First verdict against forced marriages”) reports on a verdict handed to an Iraqi Kurdish father and brother after they threatened to murder the seventeen years old daughter of the house when she wanted a divorce following an arranged marriage. This story was on the front page, and the article explained the concept of honor killings, and reported that both the father and the brother lived off state benefits. This article was classified as negative. The following day a response was published, “Vi kurdere må kjempe mot tvangsektaske”\textsuperscript{161} (“We Kurds must battle forced marriages”). A Kurdish community spokesman and his family explained that most Kurds in Norway were against forced marriages, and that they personally would not advocate for an arranged marriage. The accompanying image depicted a relaxed family in their living room. This story was classified as positive. The day after Aftenposten informed their readers that the father and brother had gone into hiding, and that the girl was being taken care of by child protection services.\textsuperscript{162} This article was classified as neutral.

\textsuperscript{160} Jonassen, A.M., 2005, “Første dom mot tvangsektaske”, Aftenposten, 21\textsuperscript{st} May, p1 and p.6
\textsuperscript{161} Skogstrøm, L., 2005, “Vi kurdere må kjempe mot tvangsektaske”, Aftenposten, 22\textsuperscript{nd} May, p.4
\textsuperscript{162} Bøhm-Pedersen, K. 2005, “Kurdere i søkelyset etter trusler”, Aftenposten, 23\textsuperscript{nd} May, p.9
Findings

There was a marked difference between 2005 and 2011 in the reporting on issues concerning Islam and Muslims in Norway. Not only was there a greater volume in 2011, but the manner in which Islam and Muslims were depicted was significantly more negative. There were 36 stories relating to Islam and Muslim communities in Norway in April and May 2005. Of these, 10 were negative, 12 were positive and 14 were neutral. There were 54 stories in April and May 2011. 37 were negative, 10 were positive and 7 were neutral.

![Classification of media content surrounding Islam and Muslims in Norway](image)

**Figure 2:** Focus of articles in relation to Muslim immigrants, 2005 and 2011, total numbers

Source: Inga H. Nicholas, 2012
Readers’ letters

Much of the increase in media content was due to a larger volume of readers’ letters. There were only three readers’ letters in April and May 2005 involving Islam or Muslims. One was negative, one was positive and one was neutral. In contrast, there were thirteen such readers’ letters in April and May 2011. All were negative bar two. Eight were found in the adult “Debatt” section, and five in the adolescent “Si;D” section. In addition, two adolescent readers letters chosen for publication revealed an astonishing view of the Muslim world.

“It is terrible to think that while we sit in Norway and have it good, others out there are struggling to survive. Like in Afghanistan, where many girls are sold when they are about 12 years old. It is horrible. Imagine what the girls feel. Many become pregnant around the age of 12, and many are beaten. One gets about 50 sheep for a girl, the younger she is, the more sheep. If a couple gets a boy, they can keep the child. Girls are apparently not worth anything. I think it is important that girls and women are taken care of!” Isabel (13), Si;D, Aftenposten, 4/1/2011

While the author of this dissertation is in agreement that gender equality has a long way to go in Afghanistan, the assertion that Afghan girls on the whole get sold to pedophiles for sheep, “the younger the more sheep”, is far-fetched.
Other readers’ letters focused on the ‘ungrateful Muslims in our midst’, concurring to Gullestad’s (2002) notion of the guest/host relationship between ethnic Norwegians and immigrants.

“Can one also be allowed to point out that discrimination means differentiation. This is because when religious groups and persons feel discriminated in today’s Norway it is usually because they do not get the preferential treatment they feel entitled to.” Inge B. Tonholm, Debatt, Aftenposten, 5/23/2011

“Reverse racism should be more dealt with by the media. Parents, who have moved here due to unrest in their home countries, and their children, talk threatening and down to Norwegian girls. If she has a boyfriend or many male friends, she is a whore, if she uses hijab she gets away.”

“If you say anything critical against Islam, you get to hear it. The way they solve conflicts is through violence and fights, this applies as much to girls as to boys.”

Girl who will never move back to the East End (15), Si;D, Aftenposten, 4/24/2011

Yet other readers’ letters contained a fear of destruction of Norwegian society. Critiquing Norwegian anthropologist Thomas Hylland Eriksen, one reader wrote¹⁶³:

¹⁶³ The letter in question, “Refset av antropolog”, is not counted in the pool of media discourse concerning Muslims and Islam.
“[He] has dedicated his whole working life to deconstruction and making fun, instead of taking a position to current dilemmas, such as how a welfare state can survive when it is has become cool to deny a collective identity.” Fredrik Drevon, Debatt, Aftenposten, 5/30/2011

One theme in April 2011 was the matter of Muslim hostility towards Jews in Norway, particularly in the shape of Muslims denying their children visits to the synagogue as part of their school education.\textsuperscript{164,165} The focus of antagonism shown by Muslims towards Norwegian Jews was also picked by the reader below, who rather than having anything new to add to the debate, merely recounted another reader’s letter that had been printed. No statements from the Norwegian Jewish community could be found.

“Her grandmother’s old siblings wished to take a taxi due to ill health. But the taxi chauffeur, originating from the Middle East, refused to take them. The same happened when they tried the next taxi. Herein lies a matter for the Anti-Racism Society.” Finn Otto Arenberg, Debatt, 4/4/2011

Burkas were also discussed in the course of April and May 2011. Five readers’ letters from 2011 concerned the matter of Muslim women wearing burkas. Only one defended Muslim women’s right to choose to wear it, and the rest condemned it.

\textsuperscript{164} Kornmo, T.S., 2011, “La barn være barn”, Debatt, Aftenposten, 29\textsuperscript{th} Apr, p.3
\textsuperscript{165} Aftenposten, 2011, Advarer mot synagogefritak, 1\textsuperscript{st} Apr, p.7
Commentators 2005

Not many commentators chose to write about Islam and Muslims in April and May 2005. There were only two chronicles, and none of them evoked fear. One asked secularist who were advocating the eradication of the state church not to hide themselves behind Muslims, since Muslims had never claimed that the state church was problematic to them, but, on the contrary, were supportive of it. The other article concerned arranged marriages, and was written by A. Raja, a prominent lawyer and current politician. It sought to explain arranged marriages, and why they were not forced.

Commentators 2011

Commentators made a mark on the debate on Muslims and Islam in April and May 2011. Author Håvard Rem wrote a liberal value defense article, calling on secular youth to be on guard against increasing importance of religion:

“You will meet adults who wish to stigmatize the fight against superstition. Politicians and priests who wish to forbid criticism of religion and religious cartoons. Who will label it racism, as something criminal, as something immoral and unsuitable.” (Rem, H., “Det er lov å hate”, Aftenposten, 5/8/2011)

166 Økland, I., 2005, “Hvem er redd for statskirken”, Kultur, Aftenposten, 21st Apr, p.3
The editor of the far-right website, Honest Thinking, wrote two opinion pieces in May 2011, both advocating racism. While they do not directly concern Muslims, they advocate outright racism. In the article “The destructive diversity”, Anfindsen holds that human races have mental and emotional differences as a result of evolution, and that increasing diversity in a society will only end in decay, crime and corruption.

The leader of the Left Party, Trine Skei Grande, wrote a chronicle highlighting the acceptability that Islamophobia had gained in Norway. Noting that this trend was by no means a Norwegian phenomenon and far-right parties had made gains in recent elections, she called for caution:

“We have seen this before. Swap “Muslims” with “Jews” or “Coloreds” and you see a scary parallel to some of Europe’s dark chapters. Imagine a referendum on synagogues, or a parliament.”

Grande received responses that derided her for not understanding the different threats that Islam posed to European societies. A reader retorted:

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168 Anfindsen, O.J., 2011, *Realiteter om raser*, Kultur, Aftenposten, 23rd May, p.3,
“Grande displays a lack of knowledge and naivety, when she compares “Islamophobia” to hatred of Jews and aversion towards colored people. Jews do not force their religion onto anybody. On the contrary -they are isolationists. They do not bother anybody with themselves and their matters.” Dordi Skuggevil Tande, Debatt, Aftenposten, 5/20/2011

A Progressive Party MP and the leader for its Oslo division, Christian Tybring-Gjedde, responded with a chronicle that eerily resembles views held by Breivik and other Eurabia proponents. Warning of a Muslim onslaught that is allowed to take place because of liberal, ‘suicidal humanists’ such as Grande, he wrote:

“Our values of freedom are under increasing pressure. Islamism is on the march. This is our time’s largest ideological challenge. Political leaders across Europe are worried. Trine Skei Grande, on the contrary, goes to bed with the Islamists. She can sleep there for a hundred years, whilst we who love Norway and Europe are going to show the extremism such resistance that it gets pushed into a corner for ever.”

“I will never be silenced. The love for Norway and my passion for freedom are nailed to my spine for ever.” (Tybring-Gjedde, C., “Stueren verdikapitulasjon”, Aftenposten, 5/27/2011)
Tybring-Gjedde also evokes the argument used by Eurabia advocates as well as by Breivik, that the United Nations itself has become under the control of Muslim illuminati.

“Grande is also allying herself to the Muslim states umbrella organization (OIC). OIC works tirelessly in the UN system to equal critique of Islam to racism. OIC has engulfed the entire UN Declaration of Human Rights with barbaric sharia.”

“Perhaps Skei Grande now understands better why Norway’s largest Muslim student organization, IslamNet, fly in extremists who espouse classic sharia, such as the death penalty for homosexuals, men’s right to beat their wives, and death penalty for apostasy. They will continue their work on depriving us of our values of freedom in June.” (Tybring-Gjedde, C., “Stueren verdikapitulasjon”, Aftenposten, 5/27/2011)

Tybring-Gjedde’s chronicle is concluded with the words of a Swedish politician, Jens Örback, “We should be open and generous to Islam and Muslims, because then when we are in minority they will do the same to us”. Both responses to Grande’s article entail an assertion that there is an aggressive Islam whose adherents’ mission is dominance and the eradication of European culture.

Comparative reporting 2005 2011

An increase in negative media content was not only confined to readers’ letters and commentators. The style of reporting was also observed to be different, with a focus on
Muslim otherness in 2011. Two comparative case studies are analyzed in order to illustrate this.

“Arabian slave trade”, 2005 and “Small girls end up as sex slaves for Saudis”, 2011

Two similar stories surfaced in April 2005 and May 2011. Both concerned human rights abuses in Saudi Arabia, with a focus on mistreatment of housekeepers, and minor girls respectively. The 2005 article is accompanied by a picture of a Indonesian woman in hospital. The article examines the problem of abuse that housekeepers in Saudi Arabia face, and interviews an author who says that half of them have been subjected to abuse. The article is nuanced whilst being investigatory. In the case of the Indonesian housekeeper pictured, the report states:

“This disgusting story is causing reactions amongst Arabs, who ask themselves what their own brothers and sisters are capable doing towards other people. Unfortunately, this story is far from unique, apart from one exception, and that exception is that is became publicly known.”

The 2011 report about sex trafficking of young girls to Saudi Arabia examines the traits of sex trafficking in the Gulf, and the problem of trafficked girls getting thrown out by

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their ‘husbands’ when they reach puberty, and end up in prostitution. The only Saudi reactions to this is described in a dull manner:

“At the same time there are some signs that the practice concerning child brides is becoming a discussed theme in Saudi-Arabia’s half official sphere. Many of its citizens distance themselves from the practice.”

The article is illustrated, both on the front page and in the main article, by pictures of adult women in niqabs, even though the article does not involve adult Muslim women. The implication seems to be that this is an Islamic problem, and not a matter of personal depravation.

***Immigrants and diabetes***

Both April 2005 and April 2011 saw articles about immigrants and diabetes. Both related to the fact that Asian immigrants are more susceptible to diabetes than ethnic Norwegians.

The 2005 article\textsuperscript{175} approaches the matter in a compassionate and investigative manner.

“Almost one out of three women in Oslo with a background from Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka are struck by type 2 diabetes.”

\textsuperscript{175} Hafstad, A., “2005, Eksposiv økning av sukkersyke”, Aftenposten, 14\textsuperscript{th} Apr, p.22-23
“Persons from these areas have probably a genetic disposition for type 2 diabetes. It does not show itself in the countryside in their homeland, but blossoms when they arrive as immigrants to the West, says professor in community medicine Bjørgulf Claussen.”

“It simply appears to be that that the Western lifestyle with continuously lessened physical activity and a more sugary diet does not suit people from these countries. They were once active in their homelands. They had physical work. Their diet was lean and contained little sugar.”176

The 2005 article is non-judgmental and does not portray immigrants as ignorant. It mentions challenges faced by the health authorities, since many of the immigrants from the countries in question face language difficulties and are used to doctors being more authoritarian. The article is illustrated by a happy Asian couple chatting as they take a stroll down the street.

The 2005 article does not mention healthcare costs, nor demographics. The 2011 report, *Innvandrerhelse*, is highly focused on these issues.

“Norway’s population has changed significantly over the past 10 years. It has given society many resources, but also a changed pattern when it comes to illness and health.”

“Over half of the patients who belong to the hospitals catchment area have a minority background. –At some point in time we must dare to say that there are big differences. This is not stigmatizing. We know that the minority population faces many challenges, and this is one of them, says Ramin-Osmundsen.”

“The number of immigrants will strongly increase in the years ahead, between 1 and 1.8 million in 2060, estimates Norway Statistics. The number of Norwegian born people with immigrant parents will at the same time increase by 300,000 to 500,000. Together these groups will constitute 1.3 to 2.3 million people, or between 22 and 28 percent of the population in 2060.”

“The hospital spends seven millions every year on translators. Additionally longer consultation times are needed.”

The article dwells on challenges posed by immigration and rapidly changing demographics. It is alarmist. The main illustration shows a Hindu couple administering drugs, who according to the article, did not know until recently that coca cola contains

177 Bakken, A., 2011, Innvandrerhelse, Aftenposten, 16th Apr, p.20-23
much sugar. The capture indicates placidity, stating: “It is tiresome to have to watch so many things, exhales 56 year old Thanaladchumi Thurainanayagam. She and her husband Vairamuthu (61) have to measure their blood sugar every morning.” In contrast, the capture of the illustrative picture in the 2005 article states, that “Nuzhat Khaliq and her husband Saaed try to walk as much as possible, but time poses a constraint”, giving the impression that they are active citizens of Norwegian society.

2011 Additional reportage

As has been shown, there was both an increase in the volume and in general mistrust between 2005 and 2011. Two stories from 2011 are worth a further mention in this media analyzes. One article\textsuperscript{178} concerns a proposal by the Christian People’s Party to increase child support to stay-at-home mothers in order to increase equality across social strata. The article is illustrated with a large picture of two women wearing hijabs, even though the proposal does not seek to single out minority women. The journalist asks the representative of the Christian People’s Party how this will affect integration by women since they will be better taken care of without working, should this proposal go through. Accompanying the main article is a smaller report, “More benefits? Yes please!”\textsuperscript{179}. In it, the journalist has sourced out two women in hijabs with children, and is keen to cast them as ‘out-group’ recipients of Norwegian welfare.

\textsuperscript{178} Ruud, S., 2011, “KrF med gavepakke til hjemmeværende”, Aftenposten, 30\textsuperscript{th} Apr, p.8-9
\textsuperscript{179} Johansen, P.A., 2011, “Mer kontantstøtte? Ja takk!”, Aftenposten, 30\textsuperscript{th} Apr, p.9
“Yes please! Good idea! The sisters Jamila and Sakina Ajghde think that the proposal about a huge increase in child benefits is brilliant.”

“Both arrived Norway ten years ago. Contrary to many immigrant women the sisters are not at all afraid to talk to journalists.”

“-What was the name of the party that suggested this? Can you write it down for me, asks Jamila. Aftenposten’s journalist notes the name down whilst Jamila carefully watches.”

“-But can you as Muslims vote for a Christian party?

-Absolutely. Why not, if they help us then we can support them.

-Could you imagine having more children if child benefits increase this much?”

The sisters responded no to the last question. The journalists sought to portray Muslim immigrants as greedy and uninvolved in civil society. The article also supported the notion of cunning demographic change, where Muslim immigrants seek to have many children in order to fleece the state, instead of working.

Another report in 2011 was a portrait of a True Finn Party MP, Jussi Halla-aho. A personable report, titled “Icon for anti-Muslims”\(^{180}\), it notes that “the blog hero” has read all there is to read by J.R.R. Tolkien, and is keen on astrology books. The portrait mentions the extensive language courses he undertook at university, his childhood, his

father’s occupation and his wife and three children. Islamophobic rhetoric hides between the cozy reportage of the Finn party politician.

“Almost all problems that concern immigration, involve Islam –or not Islam, but Muslims, says Halla-aho.”

“He is probably relieved that the letters in his surname are placed as they are. It would nevertheless be symbolic to call him Allah-aha, since many of his admirers bend down in the dust for this intellectual and rhetorically strong man. Some even call him “the Master”, which “the Master” himself finds a bit embarrassing, and says is a joke.”

“He is preoccupied with imams building mosques on European soil with European money. And therefrom comes a “fanatical robot army without free will and with the destruction of Western societies as a sole goal”, according to the fresh 40-year old.”

The article also informs the reader that Halla-aho was fined for writing on his blog that Mohammed was a pedophile, but that he was not found guilty of ‘hate towards a group’ after writing that robberies of passersby and tax frauds were connected to certain groups’ national and genetic characterizations. The portrait of Halla-aho ends with the statement: “And now the blogger has become a top-politician”.
The article is noteworthy because of its absolute lack of criticism towards a man who uninhibitedly espouses hatred and prejudice towards all Muslims. He talks about ‘robot armies bent on European civilizational destruction. Halla-aho’s views mirror Breivik’s views on Muslims. There was more content a par with this is 2011, by the Progress Party, Honest Thinking editor Anfindsen and Human Rights Service, however, the portrait of Halla-aho stands out because it is not an opinion piece but rather work conducted by an in-house journalist.

Summary

Negative attention given to Muslim significantly increased between 2005 and 2011. The style of reporting was found to have changed, and the volume of content had increased. Muslims were to a larger extent portrayed as rational actors in civil society in 2005, and negative stories was largely transformed into a portrayal of Muslims either as victims, or as individuals and not as community representatives. Few reader letters and social commentators wrote about Muslims.

Media content in 2011 was characterized by mistrust towards Muslims. There was a focus on inherent differences. This was especially reflected in issues involving gender equality, with discourse taking place on niqabs, persecution of Westernized Muslim women, and rapes committed for cultural reasons. There was fear that Muslims wished to stifle Norwegian values, not respecting secularism. Muslims were not seen to be active participants in civil society, but rather trying to take advantage of Norwegian state
benefits. Demographic fears were present, as were fears that Muslims in Norway would become radicalized.

Social commentators and politicians outright espousing Eurabia discourse were given space to air their opinions, without critiques. Several readers’ letters that made it to Aftenposten’s print version were characterized by Islamophobic views.

**Fear of terrorism**

It has been clearly established that Norwegian media holds a strong focus on Islam and Muslims, and that the attention is largely negative. It has also been established that there has been a major shift since 2005.

The chicken and the egg question now begs itself. What came first, the fear or the hostility?

Respons Analyse AS and TNS Gallup AS conducted surveys in 2004, 2006 and 2010, with pools of 954, 435 and 1000 respectively. The surveys all asked “How likely

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182 Respons Analyse AS, 2006, *Variable terroraksjon2: How likely do you think it is that Norway is exposed to acts of terrorism?*, viewed Jul 2012, Meningsmålingsarkivet
do you think it is that Norway is exposed to acts of terrorism?”. Respondents were asked to rank their answer on a scale of 1-4, or “I do not know”. Only 1.4%-2.9% chose to answer “I do not know”, and the answer is therefore deemed to be too minor to be taken into account in the graph below.

**Figure 3**: How likely do you think it is that Norway is exposed to acts of terrorism?


The result shows that a significant increase in the fear of terrorism. The shift occurred between 2004 and 2006. The analysis of media content has confirmed that Aftenposten, Norway’s largest newspaper, exercised balanced reporting in 2005, and did not stoke Islamophobic sentiments in the public.
Nevertheless, the reporting of issues related to Islam and Muslims changed significantly. There was a much stronger, and negative, focus in both 2009 and 2011 compared to the spring of 2005. The Gallup survey shows that Norwegians became noticeable more fearful after 2005. The analysis in chapter 2 shows that fear has translated itself into mistrust, with 60% of respondents claiming to be skeptical towards immigrants as a result of international terrorism. The international terrorism that is relevant to Norway, is Islamic terrorism.

Fear creates antagonism towards the perceived threatening out-group. A shift in fear occurred between 2004 and 2006. It has been established that there was a lack of mistrust against Muslims and Islam in April and May 2005. The change must therefore have occurred between May 2005 and 2006. The summer of 2005 saw the 7/7 London bombings, illustrating the devastation of terrorism on a Northern European city well known to Norwegians, and thus bringing the threat closer to home.

The decision by a Norwegian newspaper, Magazinet, to reprint 12 controversial Danish cartoons depicting Mohammed on January 10th 2006, resulted in attacks on Norwegian and Danish embassies in Syria and Iran. A fatwa was posed on the Danish editor of Jylland-Posten, Kurt Westergaard. Although the Labor-led Norwegian government officially condemned the publishing of the derogatory Mohammed cartoons, the move

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184 “Angry protestors attack Danish, Norwegian embassies in Syria”, ABC News, 2/5/2006
drew criticism from other political parties in Norway\textsuperscript{187} and caused public debate about threats to Norwegian freedom of expression, and threats posed by Islamists.

The result of the fear and threats stemming from July 2005 and January 2006 appears to have created a fearful climate, which has become mirrored in Norwegian media. Norwegian media of today promote anti-Islamic sentiments, as can be witnessed in the quantitative and qualitative analyses conducted by Retriever in 2009, and by the qualitative analyses conducted by the author of this dissertation.

\textsuperscript{187} van Laenen, F., “Norway apologizes over Muhammad Cartoons”, \textit{The Brussels Journal}, 1/27/2006
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION

Antagonistic views towards Muslim immigrants have been developing in certain European circles, resulting in political parties riding on anti-Islamic platforms gaining at election polls, and various national ‘defense leagues’ fashioning themselves at the forefront in a battle to stop an Islamification of Europe. This battle is also joined by academics and social commentators, and by various authors of internet websites. The new European far right is strongly supportive of Israel, understood to be united in the fight against an expansionist Islam and Muslim hostility.

Europe is seen to be threatened by Muslim immigrants, who will inevitably take over European nations by shifting the demographics in their favor, and thereby cause the erosion of European values and societies. Islam is understood as being inherently at odds with European cultures, and Muslims thus incapable of peacefully coexisting within European nations. In this Eurabian narrative, it is only a matter of time before Muslims take over, and Europeans are subjugated minorities in their homelands, living under sharia laws.

The fault is held to lie with leftist European elites, who have allowed this to happen. The degree of elitist complicity varies from circle to circle. Some believe it is due to naivety,
others believe it is due to conspiracy. The result is the same, namely that the multiculturalists of Europe will have caused its death.

The new far-right has captured an alienated working and lower-middle class, and framed itself as the voice of the nations ‘rightful people’. In this scenario, governing elites are understood to having betrayed the indigenous people of Europe. The allure of nationalism is the imagining of a community in which people believe they belong and share with others they perceive they have something in common with.

The allure has been strengthened as a result of the disintegration of a traditional divide between the labor force and capitalists as a result of neoliberal ideas being adopted by leftist parties. Societal changes have made some people feel insecure about their place and belonging, and the notion of cultural and ethnic belonging has filled a vacuum. Political alienation and cultural concerns were found to be the two most significant deciding factors for voting for the Progressive Party in Norway, and workers were four times more likely to vote for the party than the middle and upper class (Oesch 2008).

Many proponents of Eurabia fear the erosion of Western liberal values, and Islamophobic discourse has moved into liberal circles. This is especially prevalent in European political circles, including the Progressive Party. Its current leader, Siv Jensen, has warned against supposed sharia zones in Sweden and ‘against Islamification by stealth’. Other Progressive Party politicians have voiced their opinions of Muslims as violent, intolerant
and at odds with liberal Norwegian values. The Progressive Party has been alternately the second or the third largest political party since 1997, although they have never been part of a coalition government.

Anders Behring Breivik belongs the Eurabian camp, convinced that Europe is rapidly losing the fight against Muslims, who are bent on conquering historically Judeo-Christian lands. He also blames multicultural, leftist elites for allowing this to happen, and thereby betraying indigenous European people. He deviates from most proponents of Eurabia, in that he does not see liberal European values worth defending. Rather, he understands liberalism to be the root cause of European societal erosion, and calls himself a cultural conservative.

Breivik holds that cultural Marxists have infiltrated the fabric of European societies, causing the destruction of traditional family values and norms. Flooding Europe with Muslim immigrants is a deliberate attempt at destroying European nations to make space for a Marxist utopia. By committing the terrorist acts of July 22\textsuperscript{nd} 2011, he hopes to kick-start a low-intensity civil war in Europe that would result in Muslims being expelled, and the continent turn back to its Christian roots and conservative family values and norms. Qualitative analysis of Breivik’s manifesto finds him to be angry over liberal Norwegian sexual norms and the breakdown of traditional family structures, and he perceives himself having been affected by this personally. Quantitative statistical analysis found that Norwegian children were seven and a half times more likely to have unmarried
parents and twice as likely to live with only one biological parent than the European Union average.

Norwegian academics argue that Norwegian society places a high demand on conformity, resulting in hostility towards immigrants that are deemed ‘too different’ (Grønseth 2011, Gullestad 2002, Eriksen 1996) A focus on sameness is prevalent, giving the assumption of equality. The feeling of sameness confirms Norwegian identities, and fosters group belonging, which creates a strong in-group identity (Gullestad 2002). The emotional involvement in the belonging to a distinct group reflects itself in both a felt solidarity to other group members of one’s own group, and a felt difference towards another group. (Brubaker and Cooper (2000). Ethnic self-esteem and superiority is maintained by comparing one’s group up against another, usually to a neighboring group (Volkan 1998).

Different notions of nationalism exist in every nation, resulting in different ‘gatekeeping’ attitudes. Pehrson and Green (2010) found that 30% of Norwegians were ethnic nationalists, and thus ‘gatekeepers’ requiring ascribed values as prerequisite of acceptance into the nation, 33% civic nationalists requiring acquired values, and 37% rejected any form of nationalism. Their findings were largely supported by quantitative analytical research into attitudes held by Norwegians concerning immigrants. However, civic nationalists were found to differentiate between immigrant groups that were perceived as fulfilling necessary acquired criteria.
An analysis commissioned by the Directorate of Integration and Diversity (IMDi) in 2010 of Norwegian attitudes towards immigrants showed that three out of four perceived Norwegian values to be in stark contrast to values held by non-Western immigrants, and almost half of the respondents felt in 2010 that shared Norwegian values were under threat from immigration. Considering the importance that Norwegian civil society places on conformity and sameness, this is not entirely surprising. It is nevertheless important to note that a significant proportion of the Norwegian public fears an erosion of social cohesion.

Muslim immigrants were found to be the least accepted immigrant group. Half of the respondents in 2010 admitted to being skeptical towards Muslims, and ca.60% were against Muslim women wearing hijabs at work. Fear has contributed to antagonistic sentiments towards Muslim immigrants, with ca.60% of respondents stating that fear arising from international terrorism had made them more skeptical towards immigrants.

Islamophobic discourse has moved into mainstream Norwegian media. A media analysis conducted by Retriever of Norwegian media discourse in 2009, found that religion was the main focus point in content surrounding immigration and integration. Islam and Muslims constituted the main topics that year, narrowly beaten by the Norwegian prime minister. An analysis conducted by the author of this thesis found that Norwegian media discourse had significantly changed between the sample years 2005 and 2011, with an
increase in both volume of content and negativity surrounding Muslim immigrants. This was reflected in the style of reporting, in readers’ letters and by commentators.

Media content was not found to be antagonistic towards Muslim immigrants in 2005. This was found to have changed in 2009 and 2011. Surveys conducted by TNS Gallup in 2004 and Respons Analyse AS in 2006 and 2009, show that the fear of terrorist attacks on Norwegian soil increased fourfold between 2004 and 2006, and thereafter remained relatively static in 2009. A fear factor stemming from the London bombings 7/7/2005 and the violent protests against the publication of the prophet Mohammed cartoons in January 2006 are thought to have contributed to this, considering the time frame. Feeling threatened enhances the sense of large-group identities, whose members become preoccupied with strengthening the fabric of their group. (Volkan 1998).

The media analysis also found that anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim views espoused by Breivik were not dissimilar to views espoused by Progressive Party politicians and media commentators in the years leading up to the July 22nd 2011 horrific acts of terrorism.
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