THE IMPACT OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 ON ANTI-ISLAMIC
HATE CRIMES IN THE U.S.

by

Sarah Merrill
A Thesis
Submitted to the
Graduate Faculty
of
George Mason University
in Partial Fulfillment of
The Requirements for the Degree
of
Master of Arts
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Committee:

_____ Director

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The Impact of September 11, 2001 on Anti-Islamic Hate Crimes in the U.S.

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts at George Mason University

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ABSTRACT

THE IMPACT OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 ON ANTI-ISLAMIC HATE CRIMES IN THE U.S.

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George Mason University, 2013

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The Hate Crime Statistics Act was originally passed in order to gain a better understanding of hate crimes and the extent of their presence in America. Since 1990, this data has also primarily been used to identify trends in hate crimes. The current study examines the data in order to better understand the impact of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in the U.S. on anti-Islamic hate crimes. Initial studies examining anti-Islamic hate crimes only look at the immediate impact of 9/11, with most of the focus on 2000-2001. The present study expands on previous research by using a larger time frame than past studies (from 1996-2010). In order to determine if there was an association between the 9/11 attacks and hate crime incidents in general or if there was an isolated association between the attacks and anti-Islamic hate crimes exclusively, annual and monthly hate crime data were examined through independent samples t-tests. Ten hate crime categories showed an increase in the monthly analysis. In comparison to all of the hate crime categories

listed in the UCR, anti-Islamic hate crimes had the second largest monthly mean difference from pre-2001 to post-2001, after anti-homosexual (both), but also had the second largest percentage increase from pre-2001 to post-2001, after anti-mental disability. Examination of monthly trends also suggests that trends in anti-Islamic hate crimes were uniquely affected by 9/11. Based on these findings, ideas for future research are explored.

1. INTRODUCTION

This study examines how the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) impacted anti-Islamic hate crimes in the United States. On September 11, 2001 members of al-Qaeda, an Islamic extremist group, hijacked four planes as the first step in a planned terrorist attack against the United States. Two of the planes were flown into the World Trade Center towers in New York City, one flew into the Pentagon outside Washington, D.C., and the fourth plane crashed in a field in Pennsylvania, due to an insurrection by the passengers and crew. Ground Zero, where the twin towers once stood in New York, is now a memorial to the victims of 9/11. 9/11 is known as the worst terrorist attack in the U.S. with more than 3,000 people killed (History Education, n.d.). With the events of 9/11 being viewed all over the world, the shock was not only felt by Americans, but worldwide. The events of this day have had a profound effect on American politics, policies and the psychology of America and its citizens (O hEochaidh, 2011).

Within two years after the attacks, the U.S. government increased defense and security spending through the creation of the Patriot Act, the Department of Homeland Security, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the National Counterterrorism Center, and numerous centers and government committees dedicated to keeping the country safe (Kerr & Agiesta, 2011; O hEochaidh, 2011). Due to the inflated

defense and security spending, in addition to the War on Terror, the national debt in 2012 was a reported $16 trillion (Barbieri & Sahadi, 2013; O hEochaidh, 2011).

In addition to the economic impact, the attacks on 9/11 have had a permanent psychological impact on American citizens. Since 9/11, there is a persistent fear of becoming a victim of a terrorist attack (Woods, 2011). This fear has had such an impact on those who witnessed the events of September 11th unfold, that parents' conversations with children which used to primarily focus on stranger danger, now also include discussions of terrorists. Kerr and Agiesta (2011) reported that 55% of parents say they have talked to their children about what happened on September 11th, and 45% say that the topic has just not come up yet.

Immediately following 9/11, there was a spike in interest in the Middle East and Islam. This shift in consciousness came from the fact that Americans wanted a better understanding of the people who attacked them. With this peak in interest also came a way of defining this group in order to know who to fear (Neyfakh, 2011). In hopes of alleviating tension towards Muslims, the White House held a news conference on September 17th at the Islamic Center of Washington, DC to address this fear of Muslims in the U.S. (Wronski, 2002). Despite these efforts, the worry remained that Muslims, followers of Islam, and others associated with the Middle East and India (i.e. Sikhs) would be the target of hate crimes as a result of September 11th. For example, events and activities associated with these groups (such as discussions to build a Mosque near Ground Zero), often inspire anti-Islamic rhetoric (Beirich, 2010; Southern Poverty Law Center, 2012; The White House, 2001).

More generally, since the 1980s, hate crimes have been a topic of increasing concern amongst legislators, law enforcement agencies, minority groups, civil society organizations, and the general public. As hate crimes became more prevalent and in order to improve prevention efforts, the Hate Crime Statistics Act was passed on April 13, 1990 mandating the collection of data pertaining to hate crimes by state law enforcement agencies in order to report their findings to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). In doing so, the FBI attempted to gain a better understanding of hate crimes, as well as to determine the extent of their presence in America (Grattet & Jenness, 2001, 2005; Morsch, 1991). The Hate Crime Statistics Act also offered guidance on the specifications of what constitutes a hate crime. Specifically, the FBI defines hate crimes as an act committed by an offender to a person or property, which is motivated in whole or in part by "his/her bias against a racial, religious, disability, sexual-orientation, or ethnic/national origin group" (FBI, 1999, p.6).

Collecting hate crime data through this national mechanism has importantly facilitated trend analysis on hate crimes in general, as well as helped to determine whether and to what extent specific groups are affected (Greenberg, 1996). To determine trends against any specific group, the FBI has categorized hate crimes into different bias motivated categories which are reported in an annual Uniform Crime Report (UCR). However, there is still much debate over the accuracy of the reports (Nolan & Akiyama, 1999). Despite guidance from the Hate Crime Statistics Act and the FBI, Greenberg (1996) has argued that an adequate, integrated system still needs to be implemented in order to determine the accuracy in which hate crimes are being committed and reported.

Delineating the categories of bias motivation provides greater detail to help better understand the different aspects of hate crimes.

When hate crimes (classified by the bias motivation of the crime) were instituted, violence against Jews, Asians and blacks was of primary concern (Green, McFalls & Smith, 200; Petrosino, 1999). While it is true that these groups have historically been the targets of hate crimes in the United States, negative views towards Islam and Muslims— the focus of this thesis—have also been present and pre-date the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In the weeks following the attacks, anti-Islamic sentiment increased in conjunction with an increased fear of Muslims as a direct result of 9/11 (Byers & Jones, 2007). This fear, termed Islamophobia, was used by researchers and policy groups to describe an exaggerated fear, hatred and hostility toward Islam perpetuated by negative stereotypes resulting in bias, discrimination and the exclusion of Muslims from social, political and civic life (CAIR, 2009). September 11th may have generated increased Islamophobia in the U.S., potentially leading to an increase in hate crimes against Muslims (followers of Islam) and members of the Islamic community (CAIR, 2009; Gallup, 2011). Within the FBI UCR hate crime categories; these are labeled as "anti-Islamic" hate crimes. While the FBI only classifies the category as anti-Islamic, this refers to the religion or community of believers, and also includes Muslims (people of the Islamic faith). For the purpose of this study, Islam will refer to the hate crime category and the religion, whereas Muslim will refer to individuals who follow Islam and victims of hate crimes.

While data collection about Islamophobia and anti-Islamic hate crimes existed prior to 9/11, numerous studies have been conducted since the attacks in an effort to determine the influence of the terrorist attacks on attitudes towards Islam. Two of the most notable studies which provided insight into the short-term impact of 9/11 on anti-Islamic hate crimes were the Byers and Jones (2007) study and the Swahn, Magendra, Paulozzi, Winston, Shelley, Taliano, Frazier and Soul (2003) study. Byers and Jones primarily focused on UCR data from 2000-2001, whereas the Swahn et al. study used the LexisNexis database of newspaper reports to analyze the month after 9/11. While these studies provided the most notable insight on the impact of 9/11 on anti-Islamic hate crimes, there have also been other studies conducted. Some of these studies combined UCR data, newspaper reports and polls; while others focused on the treatment of Muslims in relation to the work force, public opinion, discrimination within airports and hate crimes within various countries worldwide (Disha, Cavendish & King, 2011; Ibish & Stewart, 2003; Johnson, Brazier, Forrest, Ketelhut, Mason & Mitchell, 2011; Suleiman, 1999).

Since 2001, there have been two notable studies which have used the UCR in order to determine the impact of 9/11 on anti-Islamic hate crimes. While the Byers and Jones (2007) study only used UCR data, the Ibish and Stewart (2003) study compiled police reports, media reports, UCR data and personal testimonies. Both of these studies found that within the first eight to nine weeks following September 11, there was a dramatic increase in anti-Islamic hate crimes (Byers & Jones, 2007; Ibish & Stewart, 2003). In reports conducted by the FBI, there was a 1600% increase in anti-Islamic hate

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crimes from 2000-2001, which they solely attribute to the terrorist attacks on 9/11 (FBI, 2000; FBI, 2001).

Media reports suggest that official records are an underrepresentation of actual hate crime rates and that anti-Islamic hate crimes have actually been increasing since 9/11. One study based on newspaper reports found an increase in anti-Islamic hate crimes, however this increase was only within the ten days following 9/11 (Swahn et al., 2003). While studies based on both media reports and national hate crime data find that 9/11 had an impact on anti-Islamic hate crimes, none of the studies provide any indication if anti-Islamic hate crime rates remained consistently higher post-2001 or if, after the nine weeks were over, the rates maintained their pre-2001 trend. Studies based on public polls find paradoxical inclinations.

Despite this spike in hate crimes against Muslims, public opinions towards Islam and the treatment of Muslims following September 11 is contradictory. One public opinion poll (Pew Research Center, 2005) noted that fewer Americans associate Islam with violence (8% decrease from 2003 to 2005), but still see Islam as having less in common with their own religion. The Pew Research Center (2001, 2003, 2005) has found that U.S. attitudes towards Muslim-Americans are much more positive than attitudes toward Islam as a religion. Polls conducted before and after 9/11, as well as polls comparing 2001, 2003, and 2005 found that Americans had a more favorable view of Muslims and that 9/11 had no impact on negative feelings towards this group (Pew Research Center, 2001; Pew Research Center, 2003; Pew Research Center, 2005). In contrast, a Gallup poll found that feelings of prejudice towards Muslims increased by five

percent from 2006 to 2009 and that, despite higher numbers of anti-Jewish hate crimes,

Islam is the most negatively viewed religion (Saad, 2006; Gallup, 2009). More recent

polls conducted from 2010-2012 continue to find these mixed opinions regarding Islam

and the public view of Muslims (Gallup, 2010).

Given these findings in the context of September 11th, this study offers an analysis

of the impact of 9/11 on the frequency of anti-Islamic hate crimes as reported by law

enforcement in the United States. Why might anti-Islamic hate crimes increase after

9/11? A number of "us" versus "them" theories might apply to answer this question,

including: self-categorization theory, conflict theory (Liska & Chamlin, 1984; Oswald,

2005; Parker, Stults & Rice, 2005), social identity theory (Boeckmann & Turpin-

Petrosino, 2002; Oswald, 2005), theory of prejudice (Byers & Jones, 2007), value theory,

and intergroup communication theory (Boeckmann & Turpin-Petrosino, 2002). The

theories most applicable to the hypothesized impact of 9/11 on anti-Islamic hate crimes

are the theory of prejudice and conflict theory. The theory of prejudice would argue that

this increase was a result of individuals' visible differences which implied real

differences. On the other hand, conflict theory states that out-group threat and group

competition increases in-group loyalty and hostility towards the out-group (Oswald,

2005).

Primarily relying on conflict theory, this present study investigates the prevalence

of anti-Islamic hate crimes surrounding the initial September 11 terrorist attacks to

determine if there was an association between the attacks and hate crime incidents in

general or if there was a more specific association between the attacks and anti-Islamic

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hate crimes. This study first analyzes hate crime incidents on a yearly basis for all hate crimes and then for specific categories using the UCR yearly published data. However, because individual hate crime data was also available, aggregates of monthly crimes and by various bias motivation categories were created to gain a more detailed understanding of the effect of 9/11 on anti-Islamic hate crimes. This study contributes to the existing knowledge in this area because most initial studies conducted on this topic examined the immediate impact of 9/11 on anti-Islamic hate crimes from 2000-2001 (Byers & Jones, 2007; Swahn et al., 2003). However, there have been very few research studies conducted that expand beyond this time frame. Many studies noticed that the initial pleas from the government for unity seemed effective in reducing the initial spike; however studies on the long-term effect of 9/11 still need to be addressed by scholars.

This study also outlines the overall problem with hate crime reporting. Some studies have reported an initial increase in anti-Islamic hate crimes with a leveling off shortly after the attacks; other studies find that Muslims have been considered a permanent "out-group" since 9/11. The media has found that there is still a spike in hate crimes around the anniversary of 9/11 as a result of reminiscence and fear of Muslims due to the original September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (Wronski, 2002; Southern Poverty Law Center, 2011). This analysis will uncover any long-term trends since 9/11 through examination of the monthly breakdown of hate crimes from 1996-2010; a larger time frame than that of past studies. Findings from this study will also provide guidance to see if certain types of events (9/11) affect specific hate crime categories more than others.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

The research on the impact of the 9/11 attacks on anti-Islamic hate crimes has been inconsistent. As Figure 1 indicates, although there may have initially been positive responses to pleas for unity, anti-Islamic hate crimes are still more prevalent today than they were prior to 9/11 (Beirich, 2010; Rubenstein, 2003; Swahn et al., 2003). Due to the large spike in anti-Islamic hate crime incidents directly following 9/11, many immigrants and Muslim students felt threatened to the point that they went into hiding or left the United States (Boekmann & Turpin-Petrosino, 2002).

Figure 1. FBI Anti-Islamic Hate Crime Incidents from 1995-2008 (Adapted from Beirich, 2010)

Recording, studying, and explaining hate crimes is an important part of improving democratic criminal justice systems. In addition to being acts of violence which need to be prevented, hate crimes have been found to be more severe and threatening to victims and society than non-hate crimes. One study found that hate crimes are generally more likely to involve excessive violence, serial attacks, greater psychological trauma, and heightened risk of social disorder in comparison to crimes in general (Levin, 1999). Hate crimes are also more likely to involve multiple offenders, attacks against individuals versus property (two times more likely than general crime in 1996; seven times more

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likely than general crime in 1999), and result in hospitalization (four times more likely than general crime) (Greenberg, 1996; Levin, 1999). In general hate crimes are found to cause more psychological trauma to victims that can last as long as five years after their victimization (compared to a two year decline in non-bias crimes) (Levin, 1999).

This chapter reviews the theoretical and empirical literature pertaining to hate crimes, focusing specifically on anti-Islamic hate crimes.

Hate Crimes and Criminological Theory

The FBI (1999) defines a hate crime as a criminal offense (against a person or property) that is motivated by the offenders' bias against race, religion, disability, ethnic/national origin, or sexual orientation. Theoretical explanations usually begin from the perspective that the offender is part of an "in-group" while the victim is a member of the "out-group" (Boeckmann & Turpin-Petrosino, 2002; Byers & Jones, 2007; Nolan & Akiyama, 1999; Oswald, 2005). The motivation behind hate crimes have been explained within criminology through theory of prejudice (Anderson, 2002; Allport, 1979; Boeckmann & Turpin-Petrosino, 2002; Byers & Jones, 2007; Green, McFalls & Smith, 2001; Swahn et al.,2003) , group threat theory (Disha, Cavendish & King, 2011; Hjerm, 2007; King, 2007; Petrosino, 1999), and conflict theory (Boeckmann & Turpin-Petrosino, 2002; Green, McFalls & Smith, 2001; Kabir, 2007; Oswald, 2005; Petrocelli, Piquero & Smith, 2003).

Theory of Prejudice

Byers and Jones (2007) utilized Allport's (1979) theory of prejudice in their analysis of hate crimes. In order for the theory to function there are three vital aspects: 1)

there needs to be a perpetrator who identifies a victim, 2) the perpetrator needs to generate hostility, and 3) the perpetrator needs to become disposed to aggression and violence (Green, McFalls & Smith, 2001). This is further explained by Swahn et al. (2003) through the study of hate crimes within the media. Green, McFalls, and Smith (2001) draw on Allport and state that the "common cognitive shorthand of stereotyping coupled with affective disorders, ranging from frustration to guilt avoidance, projection, and paranoia, pushes individuals to acts of discrimination, ranging from avoidance to insults, assault and extermination" (p.485).

This theory utilizes real and perceived differences in order to determine an out-group. Visible differences, which clearly differentiate group membership, are deemed "real differences", whereas individuals who have different beliefs fall under the "them" category and are perceived to be different from the in-group (Allport, 1979; Boeckmann & Turpin-Petrosino, 2002; Byers & Jones, 2007). Byers and Jones (2007) relate this theory to hate crimes by stating that "the power of social perception along with negative attributions ascribed to those viewed as visibly different is a key element to understanding hate crime in general and hate crimes committed against individuals after 9/11, in particular" (p.45).

Allport's (1979) theory of prejudice addresses one aspect of society that other theories fail to acknowledge: that a common goal can reduce prejudice, particularly in response to a crisis. Immediately following a disaster or tragic event, crime rates tend to drop due to the fact that society develops a sense of group solidarity in order to overcome the issue (Byers & Jones, 2007; Fagan, 2001). Overall, this theory asserts that a shared

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crisis experience makes differences between people which were once seen as important, seem less important (Byers & Jones, 2003). However, because 9/11 was an attack against the in-group from members of the out-group, specifically due to their differences, it would have been expected that only members of the in-group would have come together. Byers and Jones (2003) study found this to be true. Within eight weeks following the attacks, hate crimes, specifically anti-Islamic hate crimes and those who fall under the "other ethnicity" category in the UCR, increased dramatically and eventually leveled off at higher levels than before 9/11 (Anderson, 2002; Byers & Jones, 2003; Shively, 2005; Swahn et al., 2003) . It would seem that while some groups may have had a sense of solidarity, there was also a clear group which was pinpointed as the "out group" (Byers & Jones, 2003).

The theory of prejudice is most useful in explaining why this "out-group" was created as a result of 9/11. Allport's (1954) discussion on common goals and support of authorities, laws or customs can also explain the long-term impact of 9/11 on anti-Islamic hate crimes incidents. As a result of the 9/11 attacks committed by the Islamic extremist group, Americans may have felt that Muslims had less in common with them and that they did not have the same goals. In addition, the attacks against the U.S. were a result of the "in-group" and "out-group" differences. Muslims customs are different, and therefore Americans may generally believe that Muslims are not affiliated with U.S. society. As a result of 9/11, Muslims have been seen as an out-group as a result of their belief systems and their membership within the "out-group." This is why visible differences tend to be perceived as real differences; the belief is that a woman wearing a

hijab affiliates more with Muslims than American society. This theory would provide useful policy suggestions in order to address the increase in anti-Islamic hate crimes. However, theory of prejudice would not provide any insight into how to address the issue if this same increase is seen in other hate crime categories.

Group Threat Theory

"Group threat theory assumes that individuals identify with one or more groups and that the diverse interests of different groups generate conflict that in turn generate negative attitudes" (Hjerm, 2007, p.1254). This theory explains that the U.S. was to be governed by whites; being American was synonymous with being white, and that individuals who were non-white and racially impure were deemed unworthy members of society and were therefore victimized (Petrosino, 1999). Group threat theory is different than other theories by distinguishing that it is not minority groups themselves, but the size of the minority group that is likely to influence hate crimes, because there are more available targets (Disha, Cavendish & King, 2011). One of the major beliefs of this theory is that when minority groups increase, they become a political and economic threat (cheap and expendable labor, increased fear of minorities becoming the dominant group) (King, 2007).

This theory has been applied to many aspects of society to explain the intent and thought process behind prejudice acts. However, the breadth and context in which group threat theory persists is one of its limitations. Prior research primarily utilizes the theory to explain types of social control that disproportionately impact racial minorities (such as arrest rates, incarceration rates, and felon disenfranchisement laws) (King, 2007).

Although group threat has been mentioned within hate crime research, the theory tends to investigate "the association between minority group threat and facets of social control designed to *protect* minority populations, such as hate crime laws" (King, 2007, p.190).

One of the major criticisms of this theory in application to hate crimes lies within the emphasized importance of a growing minority group (Disha, Cavendish & King, 2011). While not everyone agrees with this premise in relation to studies on hate crimes; it receives considerable support within studies on prejudice and punishment (Disha, Cavendish & King, 2011). Group threat theory posits that the greater the minority group, the greater the threat (Hjerm, 2007). While this theory may explain increased hate crime rates against certain groups (ex: blacks, Jews, Asians), this theory does not explain trends in all hate crimes. In the weeks following 9/11, there was not an influx of Muslims to the U.S. that would account for the sudden spike in anti-Islamic hate crimes; nor was there an influx of individuals that would account for the spike in "other ethnicity" hate crimes (Figure 2). In relation to the treatment of Muslims in 2001, there was not an increase in the size of the group that caused the increase in hate crimes, but rather the 9/11 attacks themselves that made this group a target (Beirich, 2010; Khan & Ecklund, 2012).

Figure 2. UCR Hate Crime Incidents from 1991-2002 (Adapted from Shively, 2005)

Conflict Theory

Conflict theory helps further explain hate crimes by stating that members of the majority will wield power to exercise control over the "out-group" when they feel their interests are being infringed (Liska & Chamlin, 1984; Parker, Stults & Rice, 2005). Within conflict theory the role of coercion and power are vital in producing and maintaining social order. In order for social order to be maintained there needs to be a consensus around a common interest. The problem arises when this common interest is in opposition with another group (Liska & Chamlin, 1984).

Petrocelli, Piquero and Smith (2003) discussed this notion of threat which underlies the conflict theory. While this theory has primarily been utilized in studies on policing and racial profiling, this theory has also been used to explain increases in

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religious hate crimes. Kabir (2007) applied this notion of threat to explain an increase in Islamophobia. Kabir (2007) states that "Muslims have become the current enemy due to the perceived international threat of militant Islam" (p. 1277). This study expands on the traditional application of threat within conflict theory to also encompass the notion of security threat as a reason behind the emergence of an "out-group."

A conflict perspective has been invoked in detail by the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC) as well as the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR). Both organizations discuss the harsher treatment of the "other" (Muslim) group since 9/11. Similar to theory of prejudice, conflict theory points out that physical differences, such as traditional attire, reinforce this "other" ideal. This can be further seen through the increased attacks on Sikhs following 9/11. Sikhs are often believed to be Muslim as a result of their turbans; and while the Sikhs and Muslims have different beliefs, because of their joint ties to the Middle East and Asia, they are all considered a cultural "other" and therefore a threat (Kabir, 2007; Singh & Singh, 2012).

The ADC reported that in the weeks directly following the September 11 attacks, there were 27 cases where passengers of Arab ethnicity were banned from airplanes. Since 9/11, officials are not the only ones who have used harsher punishment towards Muslims (and people perceived to be Muslim) (ADC, 2001). The public has also responded in such a manner. This is expressed through the 520 violent attacks directed towards Islam within the weeks following the 9/11 attacks (ADC, 2001).

This notion of threat drives the conflict perspective. Since 9/11, Muslims have been categorized as a subordinate group which is a security threat to the country (Kabir,

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2007; Petrocelli et al.,2003). Culturally dissimilar groups are viewed as threats to the

social order (Petrocelli et al., 2003). While this concept has mainly been applied to racial

hate crimes, religious groups can also become victims when the larger society views the

group as a perceived direct or indirect threat. Muslims have become the most recent

enemy, due to the negative impact of the Islamic terrorist group known as al-Qaeda

(Kabir, 2007). When a dominant group perceives a subordinate group as threatening

economic prosperity and increasing demands, negative attitudes emerge toward the

subordinate group (Oswald, 2005). More evidence of this is expressed through a 2009

Gallup poll. This poll found that Islam is the most negatively viewed religious group

when compared to Christians, Jews, and Buddhists (Gallup, 2009). Not only is Islam the

most negatively viewed, but 43% of Americans admit to feeling some prejudice toward

Muslims - 25% higher than any other religious group (Gallup, 2009). This was a 5%

increase from the same poll taken in 2006 (Saad, 2006). Using conflict theory to

determine the affiliation of individuals can help lead to prevention initiatives and a better

understanding of the perpetrators motives (Boekmann & Turpin-Petrosino, 2002).

Although the initial number of anti-Islamic hate crimes leveled within a few weeks

after the 9/11 attacks (Figure 3), data showed that there was still a sense of unease that

remained within the U.S. (Wronski, 2002). In relation to hate crimes in general, conflict

theory can explain both the short and long-term trends in hate crime incidents. Conflict

theory also provides hypotheses as to why anti-Islamic hate crimes have remained

consistently higher since 9/11. The initial 9/11 attacks sparked a war on terrorism which

still continues today and is a constant reminder that Muslims are a member of the "other" group and a security threat to the U.S. (Kabir, 2007).

Long-term increases in anti-Islamic hate crimes could also be due to the impact of 9/11 itself. 9/11 was viewed all over the world and was an attack on the U.S. as a nation. Since 9/11, there have been numerous attacks which have been widely publicized worldwide and within the media; reminding the public that the threat still exists. It is not only the war on terrorism that reinforces the long-term bias against Muslims, but also terrorist attacks and attempted attacks that reinforce anti-Islamic rhetoric. Since 9/11, Americans have feared Muslims because they have been seen as a security threat to the country. Real attacks and attempted attacks, such as the 2001 shoe bomber, 2002 Bali nightclub bombing, 2004 Madrid bombings, 2005 London bombings, and the 2009 underwear bomber, are real incidents that have reinforced the idea that Muslims are not only a perceived threat, but are indeed a true threat to the U.S. and the world. Since 9/11, when attacks occur, there has been little done by the government and the media in order to alleviate tensions against Islam. Instead of mitigating the impact of these incidents by educating the public about Muslims within the U.S., the media tends to replay videos of the events of 9/11 which further reinforces the perception that Muslims are members of the "out-group".

Figure 3. Hate related violent attacks on Middle Easterners in the U.S. in the
weeks around 9/11 (Adapted from Swahn et al., 2003)

Measuring and Determining Trends of Hate Crimes

      An accurate account of the occurrence of hate crimes is vital to further develop

theory, knowledge and a better understanding about their impact. While the FBI offers

guidelines to classify and report hate crimes in its Uniform Crime Reporting system, it is

not implemented in a consistent manner across different organizations within the

different states. This may be one significant reason why hate crimes are notoriously

underreported. One study of Los Angeles found that more than half of general crimes are

reported to police, while only one-third of hate crimes are reported (Levin, 1999). One

explanation for this underreporting is the victim's fear of being further victimized when

reporting hate motivated crimes. Some victims may suspect police of being biased or that reporting may cause further harm to themselves, their families or community as a result of public disclosure of their victimization which may ultimately lead to further victimization by coworkers and neighbors (Boeckmann & Turpin-Petrosino, 2002). There may also be a lack of knowledge by law enforcement about what constitutes hate crimes and when to report them.

Studies based on media exposure have also tried to measure and shed light on the prevalence of hate crimes. However, these studies also have limitations. First, the potential for bias among reporters and editors needs to be taken into consideration when looking at such studies (Swahn et al., 2003). One study found that newspapers underreport rapes, suicides, and assaults but reported more incidents of homicide (compared to official records). More specifically regarding the present study, there may be a serious undercount of violent hate crimes targeting Islam and people perceived to be Muslim. Further, according to media coverage, officially recorded hate crimes are an inaccurate representation of the true number of hate crimes due to the stringent case definitions (Swahn et al., 2003). This means that in order for a case to be classified as a hate crime there are certain criteria that must be met. At the same time, these stringent case definitions were put in place to prevent over classification of crimes as hate crimes. The media may feel that certain incidents are "hate crimes" when in fact they might not be (e.g., an individual relocates because they feel unwelcome in their workplace due to their religion, ethnicity, race, and/or sexuality). While these events may be considered hate crimes within the media, they are not included in the FBI's definition of hate crimes.

A further complication in measuring and reporting hate crimes is that hate crime incidents must also be clearly classified based on intent. For both criminal cases and cases within the media, it is often difficult to infer the motivation behind an offender's actions. While government agencies must adhere to strict guidelines to classify a crime as a hate crime, the media or participants in surveys and polls may reflect or infer Islamophobic views based on their own perceptions and attitudes.

Public opinion polls are another way to measure hate crime and Islamophobia, but are also limited. Suleiman (1999) found that the specific wording of poll questions can elicit a negative response within the general population irrespective of actual attitudes. In addition, when it comes to questions pertaining to attitudes, the wording of survey questions and the interpretation of survey responses is also a reason for skepticism (Bleich, 2011). Bleich (2011) found that more direct questions offer more reliable inference than less direct questions. Many surveys, however, including those conducted by Gallup, ask questions that can lead to an ambiguous relationship to the underlying phenomenon the poll is studying (Bleich, 2011). The Gallup asks questions pertaining to groups of individuals that are considered undesirable as neighbors and attitudes toward the building of Mosques in their neighborhood (Saad, 2006; Polling Report, 2006; Polling Report 2010). An issue arises when negative responses are perceived to indicate Islamophobia. However, due to the vagueness of the question, the negative answer could be due to other factors such as not wanting a Mosque built in their neighborhood due to traffic, or not wanting a Muslim as a neighbor due to an atheist's desire not live next to

any religious person, or a racist not wanting to live next to any person of color (Bleich, 2011).

Therefore, even though the media and polls may offer a more realistic representation of attitudes towards some groups, they do not actually provide the true number of hate crime incidents (Levin, 1999). The media may deduce prejudice even when it might not be present. However, official records are based on evidence of prejudice, but for many reasons may reflect high levels of underreporting. While this study uses official records of hate crime to analyze anti-Islamic hate crimes post September 11th, these measurement issues are major obstacles in accurately determining the real effects of September 11th on hate crimes against Muslims or those practicing Islam, which could be much more (or less) pronounced than the official data show. Although the FBI data is not without its limitations, the UCR data tends to be more reliable and valid than the media in terms of the frequency and percentage of annual reports by offense and bias motivation (Byers & Jones, 2007). In addition, studies of hate crime using sources from non-governmental organizations (NGO's) have found similar patterns as the Uniform Crime Reports (Byers & Zeller, 2001).

Few studies using official data have analyzed the long-term impact of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 on anti-Islamic hate crimes. In addition, no study has yet examined a monthly breakdown of each hate crime category to determine if certain groups were more affected by 9/11 than others. However, from the preliminary information we have, we do know that immediately following 9/11 anti-Islamic hate crimes increased dramatically with a 1600% increase from 2000-2001 (FBI, 2000; FBI,

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2001). However, while some studies found a leveling off period eight to nine weeks following the attacks, there has been a lack of focus on the long-term effects (Beirich, 2010). If conflict theory is correct then it would be expected that anti-Islamic hate crimes would be consistently higher in a post 9/11 world due to fact that there has been an ongoing war between the U.S. and Iraq and Afghanistan since 9/11. Given the literature, I would also expect that while anti-Islamic hate crimes will remain higher post-2001 compared to pre-2001, I would also expect that this would be the only group to be affected by the 9/11 attacks (all other hate crime categories will maintain the same trend pre/post-2001). The goal of this study is to analyze the long-term trends of official hate crime data to better understand the long-term impact of 9/11.

3. METHOD

This study examines whether 9/11 led to a consistently higher number of anti-Islamic hate crimes compared to other hate crime categories. To perform this analysis, Uniform Crime Report (UCR) data from the FBI was used to obtain measures of hate crime incidents from 1996-2010. This particular time period was selected in order to avoid any inadvertent influences on hate crimes, namely the 1993 World Trade Center bombings. To study anti-Islamic hate crime trends, both yearly hate crime data (obtained from the FBI's UCR Crime Statistics) as well as individual hate crime reports (obtained from the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data, or NACJD) aggregated to the month were obtained for this time period.

The Data: Hate Crimes as Recorded by the FBI

On April 23, 1990 Congress passed the Hate Crime Statistics Act in order to mandate the collection of hate crime data within the United States. This Act was created in response to the fact that hate crimes were escalating but not being given their due attention by the authorities (Jacobs & Henry, 1996). In accordance with the Act, hate crime data was to be collected for five years (starting in 1990); however the Church Arson Prevention Act of 1996 made the collection of hate crime data a permanent mandate (FBI, 1999).

The FBI was assigned responsibility for the task of disseminating the hate crime

guidelines to local police departments. Although the data collection methodology varies

from state to state and among different municipalities (Jacobs & Henry, 1996; Shively,

2005) each law enforcement agency is given a standard list of definitions which must be

implemented for hate crime reporting in an attempt to achieve uniformity throughout the

country.

In general, there are four major steps that must be taken in order for a hate crime

to be counted in the UCR statistics (Nolan & Akiyama, 1999).

> "First, the victim must report the crime to the police. Next, the police
>
> officer must record the crime by filing an incident report. Then, the police
>
> department must have a mechanism in place to review the incident to
>
> determine and verify a bias motivation. Finally, the police agency must
>
> participate in the national data collection program" (Nolan & Akiyama,
>
> 1999, p.115).

Table 1 provides a breakdown by year of the participating agencies which report hate

crimes to the FBI.

Table 1: Year and Number breakdown of Participating Agencies Reporting U.S. Hate Crime Incidents to the FBI

Year	Participating States	Participating Agencies	Population Covered	% of US Population Covered	Agencies Submitting Incident Reports	Total Incident Reports	% of Agencies Submitting Incident Reports
1995	46	9,584	198,011,279	79.62%	1,560	7,947	16.28%
1996	50	11,354	223,346,702	79.36%	1,834	8,759	16.15%
1997	49	11,211	222,856,059	79.19%	1,732	8,049	15.45%
1998	47	10,730	216,235,376	76.84%	1,810	7,750	16.87%
1999	49	12,122	232,829,887	82.73%	1,815	7,876	14.97%
2000	49	11,690	236,929,512	84.19%	1,892	8,063	16.18%
2001	50	11,987	2417,99,615	84.82%	2,106	9,730	17.57%
2002	50	12,073	247,246,683	85.91%	1,868	7,462	15.47%
2003	50	11,909	240,906,049	82.98%	1,967	7,489	16.52%
2004	50	12,711	254,193,439	86.74%	2,046	7,649	16.10%
2005	50	12,417	245,006,413	82.84%	2,037	7,163	16.40%
2006	50	12,620	255,086,543	85.43%	2,105	7,722	16.68%
2007	50	13,241	260,229,972	86.29%	2,025	7,624	15.29%
2008	50	13,690	269,382,053	88.50%	2,145	7,783	15.67%
2009	50	14,422	278,948,317	90.86%	2,034	6,604	14.10%
2010	50	14,977	285,001,266	92.31%	1,949	6,628	13.01%

Adapted from Fighting Hatred: Trends in Hate (2010)

The FBI's list of guidelines includes the following criteria which must be met in order to classify a case as a hate crime:

"1. The offender and the victim were of different race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, and/or ethnicity/national origin.

2. Bias-related oral comments, written statements, or gestures were made by the offender which indicate his/her bias.

3. Bias-related drawings, markings, symbols, or graffiti were left at the crime scene.

4. Certain objects, items, or things which indicate bias were used.

5. The victim is a member of a racial, religious, disability, sexual-orientation, or ethnic/national origin group which is overwhelmingly outnumbered by other residents in the neighborhood where the victim lives and the incident took place. This factor loses significance with the passage of time; i.e., it is most significant when the victim first moved into

the neighborhood and becomes less and less significant as time passes without incident.

6. The victim was visiting a neighborhood where previous hate crimes were committed against other members of his/her racial, religious, disability, sexual-orientation, or ethnic/national origin group and where tensions remained high against his/her group.

7. Several incidents occurred in the same locality, at or about the same time, and the victims were all of the same race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or ethnicity/national origin.

8. A substantial portion of the community where the crime occurred perceived that the incident was motivated by bias.

9. The victim was engaged in activities promoting his/her race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or ethnicity/national origin.

10. The incident coincided with a holiday or a date of particular significance relating to a race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or ethnicity/national origin.

11. The offender was previously involved in a similar hate crime or is a hate group member.

12. There were indications that a hate group was involved.

13. A historically established animosity existed between the victim's and the offender's groups.

14. The victim, although not a member of the targeted racial, religious, disability, sexual-orientation, or ethnic/national origin group, was a member of an advocacy group supporting the precepts of the victim group"

(FBI, 1999)

These guidelines were established because the classification criteria listed above, especially when combined with one another, are considered supportive of a bias act. In addition to the list of guidelines, there is also a list of cautions which must be taken into consideration before a hate crime is reported, which include the following:

"1.Need for a case-by-case assessment of the facts

2. Misleading facts

3. Feigned facts

4. Offender's mistaken perception

5. Changes in findings of bias"

(FBI, 1999)

The acts defined by the FBI only refer to criminal acts such as murder, rape, robbery, assault, and intimidation. The FBI also created specific bias motivation classifications, also with guidelines for reporting. These are:

Anti-White

Anti-Black

Anti-American Indian

Anti-Asian

Anti-Multi-Racial

Anti-Jewish

Anti-Catholic

Anti-Protestant

Anti-Islamic

Anti-Other Religion

Anti-Multi-Religious

Anti-Atheism/Agnosticism

Anti-Hispanic

Anti-Other Ethnicity

Anti-Male Homosexual

Anti-Female Homosexual

Anti-Homosexual (both)[1]

Anti-Heterosexual

Anti-Bisexual

Anti-Physical Disability[2]

Anti-Mental Disability[2]

Although the FBI data is not without its limitations (as discussed in Chapter 2),

for the purpose of this study, the FBI is the best source of data due to its availability,

overall reliability and validity, but most importantly because of the classification system

which specifically indicated the bias motivation behind the crime. One of the common

limitations in most studies is the fact that cases of mistaken identity are not classified

appropriately. Since 9/11 there is a common misconception that Sikhs are Muslim;

therefore one of the key elements of this study was to determine which hate crime

category Sikhs fell under. For the purpose of this study, it was beneficial to note that the

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[1]The FBI data collection manual (2012) states that Anti-Homosexual (both) refers to lesbian, gay, bisexual and/or transgender incidents. This category was changed in 2009 from only including gay and lesbian incidents, to include a mixed group of categories of all LGBT incidents.
[2]The anti-Physical Disability and anti-Mental Disability categories were not included in the 1996 UCR data, because these categories were created and encompassed in the UCR until 1997.

FBI tracks hate crimes on the basis of bias motivation, and currently classify all hate

violence against American Sikhs as instances of anti-Islamic hate crime (Nittle, 2012;

Singh & Singh, 2012). Therefore, even though a victim may not be a member of the

targeted group, the bias motivation is classified as such due to the belief that the

individual belonged to that group.

Unit of Analysis

Using this UCR data, this study examines the yearly and monthly frequencies of

hate crimes as its units of analysis. The yearly data was obtained through the UCR[3],

similar to previous research (Byers & Jones, 2007; Beirich, 2010; Shively, 2005). For the

yearly analysis, the FBI UCR data were used because they included data for all bias

motivation categories and the total number of hate crimes in the U.S. for 2001, the year

of the 9/11 attacks; whereas the 2001 individual reports of hate crimes for the monthly

analysis were not obtainable (to be discussed shortly). The hate crimes that were

analyzed by year are anti-Islamic, an aggregated category of all anti-religious incident

reports (excluding Islam), a total of all incident reports (excluding Islam), and an

aggregated category of all racially and ethnically motivated hate crimes.

Additionally, individual incidents of hate crimes were also obtained in order to

create monthly trends of hate crimes and each bias motivation sub group. For the

monthly analyses, the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data (NACJD)[4] was used in

order to obtain detailed UCR reports of each incident from 1996-2010, which was then

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[3] All of the yearly data from the FBI was obtained from http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/crimestats.

[4] All of the monthly data from the NAJCD was obtained from
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/content/NACJD/guides/ucr.html#desc_il

aggregated into monthly frequencies. This was necessary, because while the yearly data

reports attacks against Islam in general, the monthly data investigates individual instances

of attacks against Muslims. While the yearly data had all of the specific bias motivations

listed, it also included multiple bias incidents within the yearly count. Multiple bias

incidents are hate crimes in which two or more offense types were committed as a result

of two or more bias motivations (FBI, 1999). The monthly data allowed a more detailed

breakdown of the multiple bias motivations, and in order to make the study more

conservative and allow for the correct categorization of each hate crime incident, only the

first classification was used. While the monthly data is the base data that creates the

UCR annual data, the monthly data is necessary in this study in order to examine a more

detailed breakdown of the hate crime counts and in order to examine any trend changes

from pre-2001 to post-2001.

Unlike the FBI UCR yearly data, the NACJD was missing data from 2001. While

there is no noted reason for this, the specific reason given for this was publishing errors.[5]

When going through the data in order to aggregate the monthly frequencies for each year,

it was noticed that the 2002 data was published under both the 2001 and 2002 reports

(thus making the 2001 data unobtainable). Other than this issue, the NACJD data was

useful for the monthly analyses, because it provided a more detailed breakdown of each

hate crime incident, describing the bias motivation.

Each incident was then aggregated by month and bias motivation. This allowed

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[5] The NACJD was contacted in an attempt to obtain access to the 2001 data. Unfortunately, the reason
behind the reporting error was unknown and the NACJD said they would investigate the matter, but that I
would not get access to the information on time.

for further breakdown of the information, providing insight into an accurate count of the

total number of incidents for each bias motivation category.   Table 2 shows each bias

motivation category, as well as the proportion of each category across the 14 years of

monthly data collected (excluding 2001).

Table 2: Percentage of Total Hate Crimes

Hate Crime Variable	% of Total Hate Crimes
Anti-Black	36
Anti-Jewish	13
Anti-White	10.5
Anti-Male Homosexual	10
Anti-Hispanic	6.8
Anti-Other Ethnicity	5.2
Anti-Asian	3
Anti-Homosexual (both)	3
Anti-Multi-Racial	2.6
Anti-Female Homosexual	2.2
Anti-Other Religion	1.8
Anti-Islamic	1.3
Anti-American Indian	0.78
Anti-Catholic	0.7
Anti-Protestant	0.7
Anti-Multi-Religious	0.6
Anti-Mental Disability	0.4
Anti-Heterosexual	0.3
Anti-Bisexual	0.2
Anti-Physical Disability	0.2
Anti-Atheism/Agnosticism	0.1

Method of Analysis

Basic descriptive analyses were generated for the annual and monthly data. The

utilization of graphs provided a clear visualization of the impact of 9/11. Then, the

monthly and annual data were further analyzed using an independent samples t-test. To analyze the annual data, an independent samples t-test was used to determine whether a significant difference existed in the mean number of anti-Islamic hate crimes annually in comparison to the general categories (total hate crimes, religious hate crimes, and racial/ethnically motivated crimes). An independent samples t-test was also used to analyze the monthly data in order to compare data for all hate crime categories. This test allowed for a pre/post-test to be conducted determining the significance of 9/11 on the various hate crime categories (Jaeger, 1997). More specifically, this method allowed for the comparison of the annual and monthly data in terms of whether the different data used resulted in different findings (perhaps the yearly data was overly aggregated and masked important trends). At the same time, this test permitted a comparison of anti-Islamic hate crimes versus hate crimes committed against all of the remaining categories to determine if certain categories were affected greater than others. The t-test used in this study provided a side by side comparison of the hate crime categories, divulging which bias motivated hate crimes were significantly different post-2001 versus pre-2001.

Limitations

Even though similar hate crime patterns have emerged in other studies, it is still important to consider the impact of problems related to hate crime data collection methods. Some of these problems include defining hate crimes, establishing a reliable means for determining bias intent, and determining which prejudice acts should be categorized as hate crimes (Jacobs & Henry, 1996).

Though the FBI provides guidelines for reporting hate crimes, studies have shown that some law enforcement officers state that they still misidentify or choose not to label a crime as a hate crime (Nolan & Akiyama, 1999; Steen & Cohen, 2004). Certain officers have stated that they believe that labeling a case as a hate crime can sensationalize it by becoming more high profile, and that they disagree with labeling a hate crime as something special (Nolan & Akiyama, 1999). Other studies have found that states vary in the penalties imposed for hate crimes. Some states mandate an additional set amount of time to a sentence motivated by hate, with others doubling or tripling the sentence, and other states increasing the level of seriousness of the crime (Steen & Cohen, 2004). Even though many officers are often reluctant to report crimes as hate crimes to prevent the intense focus that follows, and because hate crimes often carry with them a lengthier sentence, this should not skew the overall data as this would have an impact on all of the hate crime categories equally. While this is a limitation worth noting, it would be presumed that underreporting would affect reporting of all hate crime categories analogously, and would therefore not bias the comparison.

In contrast to the underreporting present in many of the police forces and departments, the treatment of Muslims has been an increased topic of discussion within the media since 9/11. Over reporting (as a result of 9/11) may be another reporting limitation worth noting. As a result of 9/11, there may be over reporting of anti-Islamic hate crimes as a result of increased media pressure, pressure from Islamic groups, or because more victims are reporting hate crimes committed against them. While over reporting can influence the findings, the monthly data does not include the year 2001,

which will make the findings more conservative (the annual data includes 2001, and this information was pertinent to the first part of the study). In the months after the 9/11 attacks a dramatic spike was present in anti-Islamic hate crimes as reported by previous studies, but after eight to nine weeks there was a leveling off period (Byers & Jones, 2007; Swahn et al., 2003). Since the 2001 hate crime incident reports were not included in the monthly analyses, this spike will not be encompassed in the findings, making the findings more accurate of the traditional report rates.

4. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics: Yearly Frequencies of Hate Crime Incident Reports

In order to analyze the yearly data, all of the religions were aggregated together (one category included Islam and another excluded Islam), all of the racial and ethnic categories were aggregated together, and there were two total categories created (one including Islam and one excluding Islam). Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics for the aggregated categories over the 15 years included in the study. This table provides basic information for each category, however it does not provide any insight into yearly trends. Therefore, Figure 4 was created in order to offer a clear depiction of the anti-Islamic hate crimes rates for each year in comparison to all the other religious hate crimes.

Table 3. Yearly Descriptive Statistics of Aggregated Variables

Hate Crime Variable	N (Years)	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation	Sum
Anti-Islamic	15	21	481	123.20	113.399	1848
All Anti-Religious (including Islamic)	15	1227	1828	1417.53	134.226	21263
All Anti-Religious (excluding Islamic)	15	1099	1444	1294.33	101.598	19415
Total of all Hate Crimes (including Islamic)	15	6604	9730	7757.07	767.034	116356
Total of all Hate Crimes (excluding Islamic)	15	6468	9249	7633.87	728.259	114508
All Race and Ethnicity	15	3976	6465	5066.00	679.342	75990

Figure 4. Yearly Hate Crime Values for Islamic and Religion (excluding Islamic)

When comparing anti-Islamic hate crimes to all religious hate crimes (excluding Islam), there is a substantial peak in 2001, and though there is a decrease afterwards, the frequency of hate crimes is consistently higher compared to pre-9/11 (Figure 5). For all the other religious hate crimes there is not as clear a trend. While there is a small peak in 2001, there is a steady decrease until 2005, an increase until 2008 and then a decrease until recently.

Figure 5. Annual Anti-Islamic Hate Crimes

When looking at trends based on year, Figure 6 shows that the trend line of all racial and ethnic incidents of hate crime tend to follow the same pattern as the total. This table shows that both hate crimes in total as well as all racial and ethnic hate crime incidents were decreasing (or remain relatively stable) prior to 2000, with a dramatic increase in 2001, followed by a decrease from 2002-2010. Some studies find that the category "other ethnicity" reported in the UCR was just as highly impacted by 9/11 as the anti-Islamic hate crimes (Shively, 2005). This finding could be attributable to theory of prejudice (real/visible differences of an out-group make them a target of the in-group).

These figures help visually display the impact of 9/11 on the aggregated categories of hate crimes, but they do not show the significance of the before and after impact of 9/11 on the hate crimes. Therefore, independent samples t-tests are necessary in order to determine this impact and compare the categories to one another.

Figure 6: Yearly Hate Crime Values for Aggregated Variables: Total, Total (excluding Islamic), and All Race and Ethnicity

Annual Anti-Islamic Hate Crime Comparison pre-2001 to post-2001

In order to investigate the impact of 9/11 on anti-Islamic hate crimes, an independent samples t-test[6] was used to compare the frequencies of various categories of hate crimes in the annual data. For the t-test, Islamic incidents were excluded from the aggregated categories. In order to examine the direct impact of 2001, each year was coded as "0" if pre-2001, and "1" if post-2001 (2001 was coded as "1" since this is the year of the September 11th attacks which is expected to have caused a shift). Table 4 shows the results of the t-test analysis. The analysis showed that three hate crime categories, anti-Islamic, all anti-religious (excluding Islamic) and total, had a significant difference in terms of the pre and post-2001 mean number of crimes per year. However,

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[6]Levene's F-test for equality of variance was used to guide the t-test selection.

these pre-post mean for anti-Islamic is naturally much smaller compared to the other

aggregate categories of "all anti-religious", "total hate crimes" or "all anti-race and anti-

ethnicity." Therefore, it is important to look at the statistical significance of the pre-post

analysis.

Table 4. Yearly Independent Samples T-test

Hate Crime Variable	Pre 2001 (n=5)/ Post 2001 (n=10)	Mean	t	df	Sig.* (2-tailed)	Mean Difference
Anti-Islamic [a]	Pre	27.2	-15.19	10.06	0.000*	-111.6
	Post	138.8				
All Anti-Religious (excluding Islamic)	Pre	1384.6	3.444	13	0.004*	162.5
	Post	1222.1				
Total (excluding Islamic)	Pre	8073.2	3.48	13	0.004*	977.4
	Post	7095.8				
All Anti-Race and Anti-Ethnicity	Pre	5465.8	3.143	13	0.008	882.5
	Post	4583.3				
* Sig. <.05						
[a] Equal Variance not assumed						

The t-test shows a statistically significant increase (t(10.06)= -15.19, p = .000)

between the pre-2001 yearly mean of anti-Islamic hate crimes (mean=27.20, SD= 3.96)

to the post-2001 yearly mean of anti-Islamic hate crimes (mean= 138.80, SD= 22.55),

which was substantially higher. This result suggests that the terrorist attacks on

September 11, 2001 did have a permanent impact on the anti-Islamic hate crime incidents

for each year after 2001. This cannot be said for the total number of hate crimes

(excluding anti-Islamic), all other religious hate crimes, and all racial and ethnic hate

crimes, since the mean number of hate crimes for these categories decreased after 2001.

Descriptive Statistics: Monthly Pre/Post Hate Crime Incident Reports

The annual analysis found that the frequency of anti-Islamic hate crimes was

statistically higher after 2001 compared to before 2001. While this analysis was

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important, a monthly analysis aggregated from the actual hate crime incident reports can allow for comparisons of all of the hate crime bias motivation categories. Further, the monthly analysis also has a larger sample size (168 months over 14 years for the monthly analysis, versus 15 years in the annual analysis) which is necessary in order to run a more detailed analysis of the impact of 9/11 on hate crimes. If conflict theory is correct with regard to anti-Islamic hate crimes, then after 9/11 there should have been a significant increase in anti-Islamic hate crimes compared to the other bias motivation categories.

The sample consisted of all hate crime incidents aggregated monthly from 1996-2010 (excluding 2001 which was missing from the NACJD data). Additionally, monthly time series were created for each of the bias motivation categories provided. Table 5 provides a breakdown of the bias motivations across the 168 months between 1996 and 2010, excluding the 12 months in 2001. The minimum and maximum monthly numbers of crimes are displayed, as are the mean and standard deviations of the monthly frequencies for each bias motivation category per month.

Table 5. Descriptive Statistics of Monthly Sample

Hate Crime Variable	Total Months	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	Sum
Anti-White	168	28	111	66.85	18.149	11230
Anti-Black	168	115	377	229.89	44.480	38622
Anti-American Indian	168	0	16	4.95	2.702	832
Anti-Asian	168	5	43	19.21	7.834	3228
Anti-Multi-Racial	168	4	36	16.90	5.394	2839
Anti-Jewish	168	40	202	82.90	20.095	13927
Anti-Catholic	168	0	18	4.67	2.722	785
Anti-Protestant	168	0	13	4.43	2.201	744
Anti-Islamic	168	0	29	8.14	5.933	1368
Anti-Other Religion	168	2	31	11.57	4.871	1944
Anti-Multi-Religious	168	0	13	3.51	2.583	590
Anti-Atheism/ Agnosticism	168	0	7	.47	.840	79
Anti-Hispanic	168	19	82	42.95	11.052	7216
Anti-Other Ethnicity	168	15	114	33.41	12.293	5613
Anti-Male	168	28	108	64.72	14.195	10873
Anti-Female Homosexual	168	2	25	14.26	4.678	2396
Anti-Homosexual (both)	168	3	49	18.77	7.938	3153
Anti-Heterosexual	168	0	8	1.64	1.564	276
Anti-Bisexual	168	0	7	1.57	1.417	264
Anti-Physical Disability	168	0	8	1.44	1.361	242
Anti-Mental Disability	168	0	10	2.45	2.409	411

Monthly Comparison of all Hate Crime Categories

The annual independent samples t-tests found that there was a significant difference of anti-Islamic hate crimes from pre-9/11 and post-9/11 compared to other large aggregate categories ("anti-religious" or "anti-ethnicity"). In order to more specifically determine if other hate crime categories were also impacted by 9/11, an independent samples t-test was conducted with the monthly data, comparing the means of

all pre January 2001 to all post December 2001 monthly means for each hate crime

category listed in the UCR. Table 6 shows the results of the t-test analysis.

In analyzing the results, with an alpha level of .05, there were a number of

categories which indicate a significant difference from pre-2001 to post-2001. However,

for the purpose of this study, only those categories showing an increase post-2001

compared to pre-2001 are of interest and will be discussed further.

There were ten categories that had a statistically significant increase in hate

crimes post-2001: anti-American Indian, anti-Catholic, anti-Islamic, anti-multi-religious,

anti-Atheism/Agnosticism, anti-other ethnicity, anti-homosexual (both), anti-

heterosexual, anti-physical disability and anti-mental disability. For the category anti-

American Indian $(t(166)= -3.256, p=.001)$, there was a statistically significant increase

from pre-2001 (mean= 4.07, SD= 2.435) to post-2001 (mean= 5.44, SD= 2.729); anti-

Catholic $(t(166)= -3.771, p=.000)$ had a statistically significant increase from pre-2001

(mean= 3.65, SD= 2.773) to post-2001 (mean= 5.24, SD= 2.532); anti-Islamic

$(t(164.54)= -16.891, p=.000)$ had a statistically significant increase from pre-2001

(mean= 2.27, SD= 2.34) to post-2001 (mean= 108, SD= 4.671); anti-multi-religious

$(t(147.241)= -3.192, p=.002)$ had a statistically significant increase from pre-2001

(mean=2.73, SD=2.13) to post-2001 (mean=3.94, SD=2.717); anti-Atheism/Agnosticism

$(t(165.856)=-2.983, p=.003)$ had a statistically significant increase from pre-2001

(mean=.25, SD=.541) to post-2001 (mean=.59, SD=.948); anti-other ethnicity

$(t(165.14)= -4.76, p= .000)$ had a statistically significant increase from pre-2001 (mean=

28.52, SD= 7.02) to post-2001 (mean= 36.13, SD= 13.7); anti-homosexual (both)

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(t(166)= -9.977, p=.000) had a statistically significant increase from pre-2001 (mean= 12.27, SD= 5.443) to post-2001 (mean= 22.38, SD= 6.72); anti-heterosexual (t(166)= -2.463, p=.015) had a statistically significant increase from pre-2001 (mean= 1.25, SD= 1.514) to post-2001 (mean= 1.86, SD= 1.556); anti-physical disability (t(166)= -4.279, p=.000) had a statistically significant increase from pre-2001 (mean= .87, SD= 1.127) to post-2001 (mean= 1.76, SD= 1.38); anti-mental disability (t(153.54)= -10.56, p= .000) had a statistically significant increase from pre-2001 (mean=.67, SD= .951) to post-2001 (mean=3.44, SD= 2.41).

In addition to providing the independent samples t-test results, the percentage change in the mean from pre-2001 to post-2001 was also included in Table 6. Even though ten categories had a statistically significant increase from pre-2001 to post-2001, there was a small mean difference for many of these categories (around 1 or less than 1 for the majority of them). Therefore, examining the percentage change in the mean allowed for further insight into the pre-post findings. In looking at the findings, anti-homosexual (both), anti-Islamic, and anti-other ethnicity had the largest mean differences. However, when looking at the percentage change in the mean, anti-Islamic had the second largest increase (after anti-mental disability[7]) with a 402.6% increase from pre-2001 to post-2001, whereas anti-homosexual (both) had a 82.4% increase and anti-other ethnicity had a 26.7% increase.

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[7] The mean difference percentage may be high in some of the categories because the pre-2001 base rate is low. Therefore, even though anti-mental disability had the highest pre-2001 to post-2001 percentage increase (413%), the pre-2001 mean was 0.67 and the post-2001 mean was 3.44.

Table 6. Monthly Independent Samples T-test

Hate Crime Variable	Pre 2001 (n=60)/ Post 2001 (n=108)	Mean	t	df	Sig.* (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Mean Difference %
Anti-White	Pre Post	75.85 61.84	5.146	166	0.000*	14.007	18.5%
Anti-Black	Pre Post	259.07 213.69	7.249	166	0.000*	45.381	17.5%
Anti-American Indian	Pre Post	4.07 5.44	-3.256	166	0.001*	-1.378	33.7%
Anti-Asian[a]	Pre Post	26.27 15.3	10.992	100.976	0.000*	10.97	41.8%
Anti-Multi-Racial	Pre Post	19.33 15.55	4.618	166	0.000*	3.787	41.8%
Anti-Jewish	Pre Post	91.6 78.06	4.408	166	0.000*	13.535	14.8%
Anti-Catholic	Pre Post	3.65 5.24	-3.771	166	0.000*	-1.591	43.6%
Anti-Protestant	Pre Post	4.9 4.17	2.09	166	0.038*	0.733	14.9%
Anti-Islamic[a]	Pre Post	2.27 11.41	-16.891	164.54	0.000*	-9.141	402.6%
Anti-Other Religion	Pre Post	12.27 11.19	1.383	166	0.169	1.081	8.8%
Anti-Multi-Religious[a]	Pre Post	2.73 3.94	-3.192	147.421	0.002*	-1.211	44.3%
Anti-Atheism/ Agnosticism[a]	Pre Post	0.25 0.59	-2.983	165.856	0.003*	-0.343	136.0%
Anti-Hispanic	Pre Post	42.67 43.11	-0.249	166	0.804	-0.444	1.0%
Anti-Other Ethnicity[a]	Pre Post	28.52 36.13	-4.758	165.136	0.000*	-7.613	26.7%
Anti-Male Homosexual	Pre Post	69.7 61.95	3.501	166	0.001*	7.746	11.1%
Anti-Female Homosexual	Pre Post	15.43 13.61	2.455	166	0.015*	1.822	11.8%
Anti-Homosexual (both)	Pre Post	12.27 22.38	-9.977	166	0.000*	-10.113	82.4%
Anti-Heterosexual	Pre Post	1.25 1.86	-2.463	166	0.015*	-0.611	48.8%
Anti-Bisexual	Pre Post	1.32 1.71	-1.748	166	0.082	-0.396	29.5%
Anti-Physical Disability	Pre Post	0.87 1.76	-4.279	166	0.000*	-0.893	102.3%
Anti-Mental Disability[a]	Pre Post	0.67 3.44	-10.558	153.544	0.000*	-2.769	413.0%

*Sig. <.05
[a] Equal Variance Not Assumed

Out of the categories included in the yearly analysis, anti-Islamic was the only

category that increased pre-2001 to post-2001. In the monthly analysis, anti-Islamic hate

crimes was the only category expected to increase, however, nine other hate crime

categories did in fact increase from pre-2001 to post-2001 (to be discussed further in the

discussion and conclusion section) . While it is important to take note of all of the

categories that increased, this study is primarily focused on the impact of 9/11 on anti-

Islamic hate crimes and therefore Figure 7 was created in order to examine the impact of

9/11 on the pre-2001 and post-2001 anti-Islamic monthly trends. This figure shows the

mean number of incidents per month before and after September 2001 as derived from

the NACJD data.   Figure 7 further shows the permanent impact of 9/11 on the frequency

of anti-Islamic hate crime incidents, but also shows a new seasonal trend in anti-Islamic

hate crimes. Before 2001 there was a spike in May and a slightly smaller spike in

October. After 2001 the spikes have noticeably increased, with a spike in May, July, and

September. While the first spike coincides with the pre-2001 trend, the second spike

suggests a post-2001 summer peak, and the September spike could suggest an increase

due to the anniversary of 9/11. While this cannot be inferred based on the information

provided, future studies could analyze why this shift has occurred.

Figure 7. Mean Anti-Islamic Hate Crimes by Month, Pre-2001 and Post-2001

5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The annual independent samples t-test found that there was a significant difference in anti-Islamic hate crimes from pre-2001 to post-2001. The monthly analysis found that anti-Islamic hate crimes had the second largest monthly mean difference (an increase of -9.141 per month post-2001) and percentage change in the monthly mean (an increase of 402.6% post-2001), in conjunction, compared to all of the other hate crime categories listed in the UCR. In addition to these findings, anti-Islamic hate crimes have remained consistently higher post-2001 in comparison to the pre-2001 rates. The findings of this study add to the limited past research that has examined the impact of 9/11 on anti-Islamic hate crimes.

Previous studies suggested that after eight to nine weeks following the attacks, there was a leveling off period of anti-Islamic hate crimes (Byers & Jones, 2007; Swahn et al., 2003). While this may have been the short term outcome, the present study examined the long-term effects in order to understand the true impact of 9/11 by comparing the pre-2001 and post-2001 hate crimes rates not only for anti-Islamic hate crimes, but also for all of the hate crime categories.

Similar trends were found when comparing pre-2001 to post-2001 annual and monthly data. Specifically, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 appear to have had a long-term

impact on anti-Islamic hate crimes. When examining the annual analysis only anti-Islamic hate crimes (compared to the total number of hate crimes (excluding Islam), all religious hate crimes (excluding Islam), and all racial and ethnic hate crimes), showed a significant increase after 2001 compared to before 2001. Upon further analysis, the monthly t-test showed that anti-Islamic hate crimes were not the only hate crime category to increase post-2001.

While conflict theory would explain why anti-Islamic hate crimes remain steadily higher since 9/11, the theory would not explain why other hate crime categories also increased (Table 7 provides a breakdown of each of the hate crime categories and if they increased or decreased after 2001). This change in the frequency of other hate crime categories could be due to a contagion effect as a result of 9/11, or could be due to media coverage which reinforces prejudiced feelings towards all religious and minority groups. While the 2001 data was not required for the monthly analysis, if this data was available, analysis of these months might not have shown a spike in these other hate crime categories in 2001. Since the monthly data was not available for 2001, line graphs were created in order to briefly investigate the trend lines for all of the categories that showed a post-2001 increase in the monthly analysis (Figures 8, 9 and 10). This will provide insight to see if there is a dramatic increase in 2001 as a result of 9/11, or if the increases are a result of other factors within the environment.

Table 7. Impact of 2001 on Frequency of Hate Crimes

| Hate Crime Variable	Post 2001 Frequency In Comparison to Pre 2001
Anti-White	Decreased
Anti-Black	Decreased
Anti-American Indian*	Increased
Anti-Asian	Decreased
Anti-Multi-Racial	Decreased
Anti-Jewish	Decreased
Anti-Catholic*	Increased
Anti-Protestant	Decreased
Anti-Islamic*	Increased
Anti-Other Religion	Decreased
Anti-Multi-Religious*	Increased
Anti-Atheism/ Agnosticism*	Increased
Anti-Hispanic*	Increased
Anti-Other Ethnicity*	Increased
Anti-Male Homosexual	Decreased
Anti-Female Homosexual	Decreased
Anti-Homosexual (both)*	Increased
Anti-Heterosexual*	Decreased
Anti-Bisexual*	Increased
Anti-Physical Disability*	Increased
Anti-Mental Disability*	Increased
* Increased Post 2001	

Figure 8. Annual Trend for Anti-Islamic, Anti-Other Ethnicity and Anti-Homosexual (both)


Figure 9. Annual Trend for Anti-American Indian, Anti-Catholic and Anti-Multi-Religious

Figure 10. Annual Trend for Anti-Atheism/Agnosticism, Anti-Heterosexual, Anti-Physical Disability and Anti-Mental Disability

All of the categories included in Figures 8, 9 and 10 had a significant increase from pre-2001 to post-2001, but anti-American Indian, anti-Islamic and anti-other ethnicity are the only categories that had a dramatic spike in 2001. The monthly analysis found that anti-homosexual (both) had the largest mean difference from pre-2001 to post-2001, and while this increase was statistically significant, Figure 8 shows that this finding was due to a gradual increase over time. In addition, while anti-American Indian increased in 2001, there was a dramatic increase starting in 1999, but then the rates dropped in 2002, showing that the increase in this category was not due to 9/11. Overall, the figures show that only three categories had a dramatic increase in 2001 as a possible result of 9/11. The rest of the categories either followed their random trend line or have gradually been increasing over time.

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While the 2001 spike in anti-Islamic hate crimes was expected, there is very little explanation for the other two spikes. The increase in anti-other ethnicity and anti-American Indian can perhaps be explained by the fact that these individuals are visibly different from the rest of the population. One explanation for this increase is due to an overall increase in prejudice towards people perceived to be foreigners (American Indians tend to have the same dark hair and skin color as Muslims, so they could be perceived as Muslims or foreigners). However, if this was the case, then it would also be expected that other visibly different groups, such as Asians or Hispanics, would also have increased hate crime rates. Another explanation is that these individuals are perceived to be Muslim. If the suspects are arrested and it is found that they believed the target individuals were Muslim, based on the FBI guidelines, these hate crime instances would have been categorized as anti-Islamic. This would not explain the increase in hate crime incidents in anti-American Indian and anti-other ethnicity; however, if the suspect is not found and the bias motivation behind the crime is not determined, then the group membership of the victim would be used to determine the categorization of the hate crime incident. This is the only explanation provided for the increase in these two other categories, due to the fact that none of the theories discussed in this study are applicable in trying to provide an explanation as to why anti-other ethnicity and anti-American Indian hate crimes increased.

Although these tables provide insight into the annual trend for the these categories, additional research focusing on the potential cause of this increase in the other

hate crime categories would be beneficial in order to further understand the impact of monumental events on hate crime trends.

Theoretical Relevance

Past studies have used the theory of prejudice and group threat theory to explain hate crime trends, and while these theories may explain some trends, they do not explain the long-term impact of 9/11 on anti-Islamic hate crimes. In relation to this study, conflict theory is the most applicable.

The findings of this study suggest that there has been a shift in the societal sentiments towards Islam. Previous studies have suggested that this shift dissipated after a few weeks, whereas the media has maintained their position that anti-Islamic hate crimes have been escalating since 9/11. This study found neither of these to be correct, but rather a combination of these two aspects to be true today. While anti-Islamic hate crimes have decreased from 2001, the numbers still remain consistently higher than pre-2001. Conflict theory provides an explanation of this trend.

Conflict theory states that culturally dissimilar groups are viewed as threats to the social order (Petrocelli et al., 2003). In addition, theory of prejudice would expand on conflict theory by explaining that since 9/11, Muslims are seen as having different common goals as members of the "in-group" and their visible differences reinforce this perception. In conjunction with one another, these theories would explain that Muslims have been the most recent out-group because they are seen as a threat to the social order and a security threat, as a result of their visible differences.

This is also due to the belief that Muslims have a different common goal than the rest of the U.S. 9/11 may have caused this initial shift in anti-Islamic sentiment, however the ongoing war, biased media coverage and, most importantly, continued terrorist attacks and attempted attacks around the world continue to reinforce this idea that Muslims are members of the "out-group" (Kabir, 2007; Petrocelli et al., 2003).

Both conflict theory and theory of prejudice provide explanations as to why anti-Islamic hate crimes have increased post-2001 and remained consistently higher since 9/11. In addition, both of these theories provide policy suggestions in order to address this increase in anti-Islamic hate crimes. However, prejudice theory would only explain why anti-Islamic hate crimes increased. The theory would provide little insight into why anti-other ethnicity and anti-American Indian hate crimes increased beyond the explanation that people within these categories can be misidentified as Muslims.

Future Research

There is great opportunity for future research in this area, as very few studies look at the long-term impact of 9/11 on anti-Islamic hate crimes. At the time of this study 2011 data was not yet available, but further research investigating the impact of the ten year anniversary of 9/11 on anti-Islamic hate crime incidents would be beneficial. Based on the significant increase in anti-Islamic hate crimes post-2001, this is a topic that should not be overlooked.

With the ten year anniversary of 9/11 passing, there was a reported spike in anti-Islamic hate crime as a result. While this has only been covered in the media, the impact of 9/11 on the mean number of September hate crimes for each category (Table 8) was

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briefly investigated. In addition, a monthly breakdown of the frequency of hate crimes

for each category (Table 9) was determine to examine if there was a noticeable increase

in September in comparison to other months.

Table 8. Bias Motivation September Mean Pre/Post 2001

Hate Crime Variable	September Mean Pre-2001	September Mean Post-2001	Percentage Difference from Pre-2001 to Post-2001
Anti-White	77.60	73.56	-5.2%
Anti-Black	279.40	234.11	-16.2%
Anti-American Indian	4.40	5.33	21.1%
Anti-Asian	25.20	14.89	-40.9%
Anti-Multi-Racial	18.60	14.00	-24.7%
Anti-Jewish	94.4	80.44	-14.8%
Anti-Catholic	2.40	4.44	85.0%
Anti-Protestant	5.00	3.89	-22.2%
Anti-Islamic	2.40	15.44	543.3%
Anti-Other Religion	17.40	12.44	-28.5%
Anti-Multi-Religious	2.60	4.11	58.1%
Anti-Atheism/ Agnosticism	0.00	0.33	32.0%
Anti-Hispanic	49.80	47.00	-5.6%
Anti-Other Ethnicity	27.00	39.33	45.7%
Anti-Male Homosexual	74.00	76.67	3.6%
Anti-Female Homosexual	14.60	12.78	-12.5%
Anti-Homosexual (both)	13.60	24.67	81.4%
Anti-Heterosexual	0.80	2.44	205.0%
Anti-Bisexual	1.40	1.44	2.9%
Anti-Physical Disability	0.60	2.00	233.3%
Anti-Mental Disability	0.40	4.33	982.5%

Table 9. Bias Motivation Mean by Month

Hate Crime Variable	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December
Anti-White	57.00	57.86	66.57	74.57	79.21	70.43	77.64	71.14	75.00	69.57	58.71	44.43
Anti-Black	199.43	200.36	244.43	246.21	250.43	244.43	249.43	247.21	250.29	259.14	206.36	161.00
Anti-American Indian	3.86	4.86	4.71	4.57	5.29	4.29	5.86	5.93	5.00	6.79	4.50	3.79
Anti-Asian	18.79	16.21	21.71	21.43	20.57	19.86	21.64	19.00	18.57	21.86	16.93	14.00
Anti-Multi-Racial	16.00	15.79	17.57	18.86	20.50	17.29	15.00	18.07	15.64	18.07	16.79	13.21
Anti-Jewish	73.21	71.43	87.50	103.29	93.79	76.71	69.64	77.50	85.43	97.36	84.14	74.79
Anti-Catholic	4.50	4.71	4.43	4.71	4.50	4.57	5.71	5.14	3.71	6.14	2.86	5.07
Anti-Protestant	3.64	3.71	5.00	4.50	4.50	4.00	4.64	5.93	4.29	4.29	4.21	4.43
Anti-Islamic	6.93	6.64	8.36	9.21	11.00	7.43	8.79	7.93	10.79	8.71	6.50	5.43
Anti-Other Religion	12.00	10.71	12.29	13.00	10.57	10.14	12.57	11.07	14.21	12.57	9.14	10.57
Anti-Multi-Religious	3.07	3.57	3.86	3.57	3.00	4.79	3.29	3.21	3.57	3.93	3.00	3.29
Anti-Atheism/ Agnosticism	.71	.36	.57	.50	.43	.71	.36	.43	.21	.79	.43	.14
Anti-Hispanic	37.86	35.00	43.64	46.50	52.36	47.29	48.57	48.07	48.00	43.64	36.79	27.71
Anti-Other Ethnicity	31.07	34.14	38.43	36.64	38.07	34.43	35.00	32.57	34.93	34.64	27.93	23.07
Anti-Male Homosexual	51.86	56.64	65.79	64.86	68.57	69.29	72.71	68.00	75.71	79.64	60.14	43.43
Anti-Female Homosexual	10.86	15.00	15.36	15.14	14.79	15.50	17.14	14.93	13.43	15.93	12.79	10.29
Anti-Homosexual (both)	15.71	18.36	19.21	21.29	18.57	20.50	18.21	18.71	20.71	23.14	18.43	12.36
Anti-Heterosexual	1.07	1.93	1.57	1.71	1.79	2.00	1.79	2.00	1.86	1.79	1.29	.93
Anti-Bisexual	1.36	1.21	1.57	1.71	1.57	1.57	1.64	2.21	1.43	1.93	1.29	1.36
Anti-Physical Disability	1.57	1.07	1.29	1.07	1.79	1.14	1.00	1.50	1.50	2.00	2.07	1.29
Anti-Mental Disability	1.71	1.57	2.79	2.71	2.21	2.50	2.93	2.50	2.93	3.21	2.21	2.07

While this does not provide any definitive answers as to the impact of the annual anniversary of 9/11 on anti-Islamic hate crimes, it shows that September is the second highest month (after May) for anti-Islamic hate crimes. In addition, as noticed in Figure 7, there is a new peak in July which was not present pre-2001. Future studies could see if this peak is focused around the 4th of July, as a result of Americans feeling patriotic, or if it is evenly dispersed throughout the month as a result of overall summer peaks. In addition, future studies would be needed in order to determine if the anniversary truly

impacts anti-Islamic hate crimes. Based on the fact that the monthly t-test analysis found an increase in nine other hate crime categories, it would also be beneficial to see if other hate crime categories are impacted by the anniversary.

Another area that should be explored is the percentage of Sikh attacks which are categorized as anti-Islamic. The FBI currently classifies hate violence based on the bias motivation behind the act, rather than the victim's actual group affiliation. The Sikh Spirit Foundation is currently trying to change this so that anti-Sikh hate crimes are their own category (Singh & Singh, 2012). Until this change is made, hate crimes against Sikhs are categorized as anti-Islamic; it would be interesting to see how many hate crimes classified as anti-Islamic are actually directed towards Sikhs. If this reclassification is achieved, investigating the impact of this change would be useful. Sikhs are often attacked due to mistaken identity, however if they are placed in their own category and the public learns about this, will this change the amount of hate crimes directed at Sikhs?

Importance

After the initial studies were conducted on the short-term impact of 9/11 and found a leveling off period eight to nine weeks following the attacks, there have been very few follow up studies.

> "Collecting hate crime data is extremely important for several
> reasons: (a) it raises the public's awareness of the existence of
> these crimes; (b) it provides baseline information for research and
> program development in this area; (c) it helps support the
> development of local, state, and federal anti-hate crime legislation;

(d) it provides law enforcement professionals with both the

information to prevent hate crimes from occurring in the first

place, and the tools needed to work with communities in dealing

with these crimes when they do occur; and (e) it encourages

victims to come forward and ultimately get the support and

assistance they may need"

(Nolan & Akiyama, 1999, p.112-113).

As Nolan and Akiyama (1999) point out, the collection of data is important for numerous reasons. While this is true, there are many reporting issues which can impact the accuracy of the UCR data which need to be taken into consideration. Reporting can be influenced by public interests and environmental impacts, or shifts in hate crime rates against certain groups could be due to actual increased or decreased levels. While underreporting and over reporting were not believed to have impacted the findings of this study, one notable reporting issue was detected; the inaccurate reporting of the 2002 UCR data in the 2001 report on the NACJD website. While this error was identified, the collection of quality data and accurate reporting needs to be further addressed.

While the collection of hate crime data is useful in determining any trend changes in hate crime categories, the 402.6% increase in anti-Islamic hate crimes from pre-2001 to post-2001 addresses the fact that more than just research needs to be conducted on the topic. Based on previous studies, the media seems to be an important tool in educating the public. The 2011 Gallup poll found that Americans do not consider Muslims loyal to the U.S. due to misinformation provided by other countries media and government.

When cruelty within a country is covered within the media, U.S. citizens tend to feel less in common with that country and start to have prejudice feelings towards individuals from that country (Disha et al., 2011; Gallup, 2011; Swahn et al., 2003). In addition, when politicians openly bash Muslims (which particularly occurred in reference to building a Mosque near Ground Zero), anti-Islamic hate crimes increase (CAIR, 2009; Gallup, 2011). One study found that when triggering events occur, such as publicized terrorist attacks or terrorist attack attempts, there is an increase in anti-Islamic hate crimes. Based on findings and suggestions from numerous studies, the U.S. should anticipate an increase in violent hate crimes shortly after any publicized attack on the U.S. (Disha et al., 2011; Swahn et al., 2003; Gallup, 2011; CAIR, 2009). Therefore, monitoring media coverage, overt discriminatory bashing of any groups, and over publicizing attacks on the U.S. should be counteracted by the government in an attempt to decrease hate crimes.

Instead of publicizing the attacks, interventions that promote tolerance and unity should be implemented (such as the conference held by the White House on September 17, 2001) (Swahn et al., 2003). In addition, businesses owned and operated by minorities are one of the primary locations for violent hate crimes (Swahn et al., 2003; Ibish & Stewart, 2003; CAIR, 2009). Therefore, increased police presence at such locations in combination with an open statement from the government addressing intolerance against hate crimes may be a useful strategy in an attempt to decrease incidents of hate crime (Swahn et al., 2003).

Polls have found that when U.S. citizens have faith in their government, they are less likely to feel prejudice towards Islam (Gallup, 2011; PollingReport 2006-2007). The reason behind this is further investigated in the Polling Report (2006-2007). In 2006, 59% of Americans believed that there was either a very likely or somewhat likely chance that there would be a terrorist attack within a few months, however only 18% of Americans had a great deal of confidence that the U.S. government would protect its citizens from future terrorist attacks; a 17% decrease from 2001 (PollingReport, 2006-2007). Based on these findings, one can infer that since over half of Americans believed that a terrorist attack would occur, but did not believe that they would be protected by the government, they were more likely to be prejudice towards Muslims. Therefore, if confidence in the government increases, then citizens would feel more secure resulting in less prejudice feelings towards Muslims, which could ultimately lead to a decrease in anti-Islamic hate crimes.

The fact that anti-Islamic hate crime rates have remained higher post-2001 is due to a number of factors. Muslims have been categorized as a subordinate group which threatens the security of the U.S., and until the war is over, it is a constant reminder that Muslims are a threat (Kabir, 2007; Petrocelli et al., 2003). This perceived threat is reinforced by continued terrorist attacks or attempts against the U.S., media coverage on minority bashing, and lack of knowledge about different religious and ethnic groups (Gallup, 2011).

Conclusion

      In sum, the events of 9/11 have had a long-term impact on anti-Islamic hate crimes within the U.S. While hate crimes are underreported, the national statistics compiled by the FBI still provide accurate hate crime trends (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2012). While this study found that anti-Islamic hate crimes have remained consistently higher post-2001 compared to pre-2001, further research needs to be conducted in order to determine if these trends will continue once the war is over.

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