THE STRUGGLE AGAINST NEOLIBERAL GOVERNANCE: ANTI-FTA SOCIAL MOVEMENT IN KOREA IN THE CONTEXT OF NEOLIBERAL ECONOMIC REFORM

by

Shinae Hong
A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of George Mason University in Partial Fulfillment of The Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Conflict Analysis and Resolution

Committee:
_____________________________ Chair of Committee

_____________________________

_____________________________

_____________________________ Graduate Program Director

_____________________________ Dean, School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution

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The Struggle against Neoliberal Governance:
Anti-FTA Social Movement in Korea in the Context of
Neoliberal Economic Reform

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Doctor of Philosophy at George Mason University

By

Shinae Hong
Master of Arts
American University, 2007
Bachelor of Arts
Kon Kuk University, 2002

Director: Ho-Won Jeong, Professor
School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution

Fall Semester 2013
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA
DEDICATION

To
Jesus Christ,
My Lord and Savior
who gave his life as a ransom for many

&

My loving parents
For their endless supports in all these years
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<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAGE</td>
<td>Civil Action for the 2000 General Election</td>
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<td>CAJ</td>
<td>Catholic Priest Association for Justice</td>
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<td>CCEJ</td>
<td>Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CICE</td>
<td>Citizens’ Information Center for Environment</td>
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<td>CIES</td>
<td>Citizen’s Institute for Environmental Studies</td>
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<td>CMCFE</td>
<td>Citizen Movement Council for Fair Elections</td>
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<td>CPAJ</td>
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<td>CSAE</td>
<td>Citizens’ Solidarity for the National Assembly Elections</td>
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<td>DLP</td>
<td>Democratic Labor Party</td>
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<td>Federation of Korean Trade Unions</td>
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<td>GNP</td>
<td>Grand National Party</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>KCCG</td>
<td>Korean Council of Citizen Groups</td>
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<td>KCFTU</td>
<td>Korean Confederation of Free Trade Unions</td>
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<td>KCPF</td>
<td>Korea Council of Professors for Democratization</td>
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<td>KCTU</td>
<td>Korean Confederation of Trade Union</td>
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<td>KCTUR</td>
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<td>NAP</td>
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NAFTA  National Association against FTAs
NCCSR  National Council of College Student Representatives
NDP    New Democratic Party
NDRP   New Democratic Republican Party
NGO    Non-Governmental Organizations
NFDR   National Federation for Democratic Reform
NHJCIMF National Movement Headquarters for Job and Unemployment Strategy, the Conglomerate Reform, and Opposition to IMF
NHPSJMF National Movement Headquarter for People’s Social Rights and Reform, and Opposition to the IMF
NMP    New Millennium Party
PAWTO  People’s Action against Investment Agreement and WTO
PAMCD  People’s Association for Measures against Mad Cow Diseases
PCDR   People’s Coalition for Democracy and Reunification
PCIRR  Presidential Commission on Industrial relation Reform
PSPD   People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy
ROK    Republic of Korea
SMOs   Social Movement Organizations
OECD   Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
OIE    World Organization of Animal and Health (French acronym for Office International des Epizooties)
OUP    Open Uri Party
UDP    United Democratic Party
THE STRUGGLE AGAINST NEOLIBERAL GOVERNANCE: ANTI-FTA SOCIAL MOVEMENT IN KOREA IN THE CONTEXT OF NEOLIBERAL ECONOMIC REFORM

Shinae Hong, P.hD.

George Mason University, 2013

Dissertation Director: Dr. Howon Jeong

The negative impacts of neoliberal globalization have resulted in local mobilizations of civil society around the world resisting the hegemonic forces of the neoliberal imposition. Although civil society has spent tremendous effort in search of alternatives for transforming society impacted by globalism, the power of the hegemonic neoliberal globalization has yet maintained its dominance over civil society. Then, questions arise: Is civil society capable of transforming society? Why was Korean civil society unsuccessful in countering the hegemony established by neoliberal market order in spite of its wide-spread strong resistance to it? The dissertation research seeks to understand the reason why civil society fails to confront the state by examining the case of anti-FTA social movement in Korea.
By building on the theoretical framework in studies of social movement and civil society, the study aims to understand the politics of civil society in the anti-FTA movement. Through archival and observational data, the study documents the characteristics of Korean civil society movement opposed to the Korean-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). The movement has significance because the KORUS FTA is the largest set of neoliberal policies promulgated in Korea since the IMF structural reforms were mandated in the 1997 Asian financial crisis. During the movement, despite unprecedented levels of political opportunities and resources, it failed to effectively address its experiences of social exclusion in a critical and constructive manner. The study’s findings suggest the importance of critical reflection in counter-hegemonic movements of civil society in sustaining movements and in creating social change, a relationship which is further developed in the study from the perspective of cross-academic dialogues between researchers and practitioners learning from social movements, civil society and conflict resolution.
CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

The world today is rapidly becoming one in the realms of economy, politics, and culture as the global transfer of goods, human resources, and symbols increase across borders. The powerful discourse of the “new world order” is most manifest in global economic structure where over the last quarter century, there have been dramatic economic exchanges occurring led by an explosion of goods, services, and financial capital. The startling statistic presented is that the volume of global trade has grown from a mere $296 billion in 1950 to $ 8 trillion in 2005 – a twenty seven fold increase (WTO, 2007). The global exchange of goods and services, nevertheless, has not limited its scope of influence within the boundaries of the economic realm. Neoliberal global order, commanding a deregulation of the capital markets at the macro international level has strongly challenged the traditional spheres of the state, market, and civil society as well as their roles and relationships at micro domestic level.

While globalists claim increasing the affluence has positively contributed to the growth of civil society, in reality, civil society around the globe has suffered from the ill effects unleashed by market forces. In response, civil society today has been actively arming itself in the form of social resistance movements against the hegemonic forces of
global economic liberalization. Global justice movements are visible on every continent in the Americas, Asia, Africa, and Europe including the countries of Brazil, India, Pakistan, Japan, Korea, Kenya, Venezuela, Iceland, Greece, Spain, and United States. Global civil society has formed the World Social Forum (WSF), a transnational organization to advocate for an alternative world to neoliberal globalization. Various social actors of civil society including workers, unionists, environmentalists, intellectuals, scholars, peace activists, non-partisan politicians, and feminists, have been participating in collective movements where their activities have created powerfully influential discourse for an alternative world. Nevertheless, the practice of neoliberalism is still triumphant.

The question then arises; can civil society effectively counter the powerful forces of the neoliberal global order, leading the world onto a new borderless stage? In discussing the resistance of civil society with its complex link to politics and the state, Antonio Gramsci first addresses the power nexus running deeply in civil society affecting its daily life. Gramsci’s notion of power is an ongoing process of ‘becoming’ influential through multiple interactions and mutual exchanges among social actors (1995: 312). His concept of “hegemony” comes from a view of power related to the ability of the state to lead civil society with socially constructed consent formed by a dynamic process of interactions and influenced by a complex nexus of power. In order to bring civil society in conformity the powerful ruling classes configure civil society through the subtle processes of ideological domination of “hegemonization.” This process operates through
the state’s deliberate laws and policies since the ruler cannot solely depend on force in
democratic societies (Gramsci, 1971).

Nevertheless, civil society becomes a terrain of struggle when it perceives that the
state is unrepresentative of its interests, thus failing to gain moral and intellectual
hegemony from society. Civil society wages a counter hegemonic movement against the
authoritarian state to build its own hegemonic power in such a system. Korean civil
society, using political consciousness over the given problems, embarked in a ‘war of
position’ against the new paradigm of a neoliberal authoritarian state constituting new
unwanted structural change of domestic policies affecting the daily life of ordinary
people. In this struggle, the ‘historic bloc’ of the dominant ideology of neoliberal
international order collided in discordant ensemble with the agency of civil society. In
discussing the nature of agency facing social problems Gramsci stresses the importance
of an open condition of civil society which is necessary for fostering critical
consciousness for alternative philosophies to the dominant ideology of the world.

Reflecting on the body of literatures on civil society, social movement, as well as
theoretical assertions made by globalists, this study seeks to understand the nature of
social conflicts experienced in the local community brought by the global dominant
ideology of neoliberalism in Korea. Understanding the nature of social conflict revealing
human conditions of agency in civil society under the new economic governance opens
up the question about the agency facing the ruling ideas of superstructure constituting
new global order in society. The study examines how the counter hegemonic movement
located in the sphere of civil society, critically reflects on the social problems produced
by the hegemonic condition in the world order of our times and analyzes the strategies of their activities by exercising the social power for democratized social relations through collective action. Focusing on the contemporary case of Korean civil society opposed to the Korean-United States’ bilateral free trade agreements, the research attempts to rethink the role and limitations of civil society to confront the hegemony of the global economic governance.

1.1. Subject

On November 24, 2011, approximately 10,000 South Korean citizens gathered in downtown Seoul, South Korea (hereinafter, Korea), to take part in three days of protests against the ratification of the US-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). Despite strong resistance from civil society’s anti-FTA movement, as well as the opposition political parties’ fierce attempts to block the treaty’s final passage, the ruling Grand National Party ratified the agreement at the National Assembly (*Korea Herald, 2011*). The thousands of gathered protestors, largely comprised of students, civic activists, and workers, rallied against President Lee Myung Bak and the Grand National Party, criticizing the government for ‘giving into U.S. demands at the expense of ordinary Korean citizens.’ To halt the protests, upward to 2,000 police were deployed, making use of high-pressure water cannons to force the crowds into submission in below-freezing temperatures (*Hankyoreh, 2011*).

The fervor of the crowds was spurred on by the still fresh bitter memories of the previous neoliberal policies affecting their lives, when in 1997 the structural adjustment
policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were enacted. The advent of the Asian financial crisis—also known as the ‘IMF crisis of 1997’ in Korea—was due to the Korean government’s near default and request for emergency loans from the IMF. However, without critical analysis of the broader issues causing the financial breakdown, IMF technocrats mandated a new paradigm of economic structural reform on Korea under stringent conditionality of ‘financial governance’ (Bagci & Perraudin 1997, Conway, 1994). By replacing traditional Korean norms with the ruling ethos of neoliberal globalization, ‘every man for himself,’ the Korea’s socio-economic structure was fundamentally transformed. Koreans were, in the course of a few months, forced to adapt to fierce competition of global capitalism without adequate social lifelines to make adjustments. As a result, marginalized Koreans experienced high rates of unemployment, bankruptcy, marital strife, homelessness and even suicide, which have continued to linger on in Korean society today causing extended social conflict.

At the direction of the IMF, the Korean state removed price controls and stopped its other efforts to artificially stabilize the economy by managing interest rates, external debt accumulation, inflation, and fiscal deficits (Villalon, 2008). The resulting decline in economic performance was almost immediate. The annual growth rate of Korean GDP plunged to -6.7% in 1998, and the official unemployment rate skyrocketed to 8.6% in 1999, the highest point reached in Korea’s economic history (Cathie, 1998). As indicated, the economic turmoil hit the ordinary citizens first and also hardest. The pro-business element of the economy drastically laid off many workers and reduced salaries for those who survived. No one was safe from the impacts of the reforms; that is, the problematic
consequences of neoliberal reforms went far beyond increased unemployment and poverty. Even after the economy was normalized by standard measures of GNP and employment levels, society suffered from other socio-economic conflicts brought on by lingering impacts resulting from neoliberal policies. Middle class collapsed and domestic violence as well as the suicide rate increased as families broke down due to weight of the financial struggle.

The globalists claim that economic globalization strengthens civil society relative to the state as evidenced by increases in resources and affluence made available to civil society. Civil society is also strengthened by an extension of its social network, enabling it to gather resources and opportunity from global civil society beyond its national territoriality (Clark, 2001; Scholte 2000). As globalists claim, there has been parallel growth of social movement organizations in civil societies across the globe as the ideology of globalization has advanced. Their crucial changes taking place in the nature of social relations brought by the globalization process are most apparent in the changes of conventional norms of nation-states. Particularly, because economic globalization has challenged the traditional principle of sovereignty exercised in the particular territory in the Westphalia system, the power of the neoliberal forces often mitigates the state’s capability to solely govern civil society (Held, 1989). As the massive global flow of finances, goods, and human capital increase, people are no longer solely governed by the decision making of the nation-states, but by global economic governance, which appears to be changing the direction of nation-states (Ömae, 1995). The changed relationship between the economic globalization and the state at this macro-structural level, leads to
changes in the relationship between the state and society comparably at the micro-
structural level. Thus, the human conditions in the local community are increasingly
under the influence of such global structural shift in the world economy.

This dissertation, therefore, aims to understand the nature of social conflict
brought upon Korea by economic globalization by assessing the most recent neoliberal
globalization phenomena of the bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) between the U.S.
and Korea. The global trade policies of economic liberalization promoted by FTAs,
which were responded to with strong reactions from Korean civil society, formed the
anti-FTA social movement. Between signing of the KORUS FTA in 2007 and its
ratification by both nations late in 2012, Korean civil society organizations quickly
mobilized in joint demonstrations against the FTA negotiations. Groups involved in the
movement included a diverse range of NGOs, farmers’ organizations, labor unions, urban
poor, human rights advocates, environmentalists, religious organizations, women’s rights
organizations, college students, youth organizations, as well as oppositional political
parties. The movement activists from the various civic organizations, demanding that the
government call off the new FTA policies, emerged as leaders of the counter hegemonic
social movement of civil society.

Conventional knowledge explaining the nature and the role of civil society takes
two different approaches. While one body of research view the civil society as a space for
deliberating the societal desires for democratic life (Habermas 1996; Elster 1998) others
takes a more critical view toward civil society, characterizing it as the source of
dominance reproduction unless people otherwise adopt critical consciousness (Gramsci
The liberal thought of civil society understands civil society as a subordinate space without institutional power such as law, force, or finance. Nevertheless, it is regarded as an integral source of the state’s power through which the state justifies its legitimacy and maintains social order. In response to such claims, the advocates of global civil society argues that civil society, despite of its lack of institutional power, still significantly exercise its power by challenging the unjust regime through social mobilization (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Chandhoke 2005; Heller, 2013). Such countervailing collective action against the dominant power serves as an effective channel to balance power and overcome institutional constrains imposed by the domination. In this dissertation, the study seeks to rethink of how these two different theoretical assertions are experienced in the real case of social movements of civil society in Korea, thereby understanding the role of civil society within the anti-FTA movement.

1.2. Why Study the anti-FTA Movement in Korea?

My research interest in the social conflict affected by neoliberal globalization in Korea began in 2011 when visiting Seoul, for the first time after eight years of living abroad in the United States. While studying a wide range of social conflicts caused by neoliberal economic reform, a profound incident spurred my research interests. In October 2011, I observed thousands of Koreans mobilized for a massive candlelight vigil in front of the National Assembly, demanding an abrogation of the FTAs with the United States. Armed police blocked the subways and roads in order to disrupt the demonstration; finally they used water cannons to break up what appeared to be a relatively peaceful
protest. Candlelight protests against the Korea-United States (KORUS) FTAs had been ongoing since 2007, and had been disrupting Korean society for several years. Recalling the ill-effects of such neoliberal reforms in Korea caused by the 1997 ‘IMF crisis,’ civil society activists were busy spreading their counter- hegemonic discourse of social change, reminding the public in narratives that if the FTA were ratified, it would create the second round of economic globalization affecting society in Korea. As a conflict analyst, observing the chaotic Korean society torn by a series of unprecedented social movements, I questioned myself for a quite some time, asking, how CAR could make a contribution to resolve such an intense social conflict.

The movement was ultimately subdued after March 2012, when the KORUS FTA was ratified by the National Assembly. Despite its massive scale and enduring, widespread public participation, the movement had not been able to stop the government’s decision for adopting “free” trade policies with United States. The civil society was not able to effectively challenge the dominant force; they rather seemed to accept their social oppression as inevitable. This made me rethink the theoretical positions in the literature on civil society’s movements in context of globalization. Regarding the sphere of civil society, is civil society in practice a realm of emancipation or is it a source of reproduction of dominant power? I believe that the case of the Korean anti-FTA movement will provide insights for new discovery of the reason why counter- hegemonic movements of civil society did not succeed. Such findings will shed light on how the CAR field can better understand and engage the phenomenon by examining a more
complete picture of societal relationships affected by global economic integration in order to offer more appropriate solutions to resulting social conflicts.

1.3. Significance of the Research

While the majority of recent scholarship has addressed various negative impacts resulting from economic liberalizations on society, the question, whether civil society is actually capable of transforming society through collective actions in the context of globalization, still remains obscure within the social literature on civil society, social movements, globalization, and conflict resolution. Considering the two different approaches of conventional wisdom conceptualizing the understanding of civil society, the study will examine whether such claims correspond to the real-world case by examining the most-recent social movement against neoliberal globalization in Korea. To unravel the question, whether the civil society is capable of transforming society by creating social change, the study examines specific narrowed-down queries about the movement’s development, organization, functioning, and decline, by building on the explanatory frameworks in social movement literatures and civil society.

By utilizing the theoretical explanations found in political process, framing, resource mobilization and Gramsci’s counter hegemony framework (Tilly, 1978; McAdam, 1982; Tarrow, 1994; Tilly, 1995; McAdam, 1996; Ingleheart, 1977; Melucci, 1988; Touraine, 1981, Snow & Benford, 1986; Melucci, 1989; Gamson, 1995; and Gramsci, 1971) the study analyze the nature, role, and characteristics of the anti-FTA counter hegemonic movement to neoliberal governance. Through the findings of the
study, understanding is sought on how the field of conflict analysis and resolution can contribute to limitations in theoretical positions where conventional literatures of social movements and civil society cannot explain phenomena. In order for CAR to make such contributions resolving theoretical constraints of other disciplines, the study suggests practical alternatives through engaging in cross disciplinary academic dialogue and joint research. The study concludes with a proposal to speculate on such a possibility.

1.4. Research Methodology

This study is a case study of anti-FTA social movement based in South Korea. To discover whether civil society is able to transform society for greater democracy by effectively opposing ‘neoliberal globalization from above’ the study poses sub-questions for detailed analysis: How did the movement develop, and how was it organized? What opportunities, frames, and resources were available for the movement? What life experiences drove members of civil society into the collective action? In approaching stated questions, while considering the primary goal of the study to understand the nature of social conflicts, as well as meanings, intentions, and values constituting the social practice in Korea, the study employs a qualitative study rather than experimental strategies or survey design, by which the latter would prove too difficult to capture meaningful context. Qualitative research is particularly well suited in this regard because it is “grounded in the assumption featuring the social environment constructed as interpretations by individuals, and these interpretations tend to be transitory and situational” (Gall, Borg, and Gall, 1996: 28).
In accordance with the typology of the case study design as discussed by Robert Yin (2009: 46), I have conducted a longitudinal study of a single case of the anti-FTA social movements in Korea extending from 2006 to 2012. In doing so, I have identified the important units of analysis such as political opportunity, development, frames, resources of the movement, and major organizational activities contained in the primary case. Case study has advantages for addressing the complexity of social phenomenon of the local condition through collecting in-depth, context-rich information (Flyvbjerg, 2006). The closer the case study is to actual life experiences, the higher the levels of conceptual validity essential to discovering new hypotheses and developing applicable theory can be achieved.

Although the case study method has inherent weaknesses, such as selection bias and risk of over-generalization, I chose this approach because I felt I could improve on those weaknesses by being aware of the possible dangers in the selection process of cases and subsequent conclusions drawn from them (George and McKeown, 1985). More importantly, my research questions were designed to understand both the “why” and “how” the community organizes the movement, “within a real life context” (Yin, 2003). Thus with this approach, I conclude the case study framework has proven to be far more helpful and meaningful in measuring the conditions of societal conflict in Korea.

Since the case study seeks to examine a holistic understanding of the phenomenon, I establish the contextual conditions for understanding the primary case. In my study, the political economy of Korea under neoliberal reforms and social conflicts brought by it provide the context of the conditions. I review a large number of primary and secondary
documents relevant to these conditions, published in both Korean and English texts. Through this effort, I am able to update our understanding of how neoliberal globalization was experienced by people in their real social life, leading us an understanding of more complex issues they are attempting to address through participating in social movements opposed to neoliberal reforms.

For data collection, I used the documentary method, which makes use of intensive collection of a wide range of data sources, rather than using interview, or participant observation. The documentary method enables the researcher to understand the phenomenon by analyzing the written texts, disclosing information about it (Baily, 1994). These sources are generated by people reflecting about their lives experiences in their social world with the purpose of addressing their needs (Scott, 1990). This method is as equally good as the alternative methods mentioned above, or even better in some cases, yet more cost-effective and time saving (Baily, 1994).

Although my case is still very current there are already high volumes of available documents and achieves published by indigenous movement organizations’ archives, educational materials, newsletters, internet broadcasts, and rally flyers as well as newspaper articles, capturing the ideology of movement, its development, political opportunity, and available resources. These written texts of primary documents are produced by people who were eye-witnesses and experienced the studied phenomenon (Baily, 1994). This information, therefore, provides more than sufficient sources of data for analysis.
Further, access to these primary and secondary data sources were more easily obtainable; and comparably less expensive than other methods involving interviews and participant observation. Although the documentary method requires rigorous scientific handling for controlling the quality of information for analyzing sources, such as whether the data is reliably authentic, un-distortedly credible, accurately representative, and clear in its meaning (Scott, 1990), acknowledging such principles for quality control in data handling, aided me in holding fast to research standards.

1.5 Analytical Scope of the Study

The study deals with three themes: social movements of civil society, state, neoliberal globalization. While focusing on the counter hegemonic social movement against the dominant force of neoliberal economic globalization the study attempts to rethink about the sphere of civil society and its role and limitations for social change in the context of neoliberal globalization. To understand the context of Korean opposition to globalization arising from civil society, the study briefly examines the prior historical context shaping civil society’s trajectory. Therefore, the study initially reviews the prior socio-economic impacts of neoliberal policies on the local community brought by IMF’s structural adjustment when the effects of the 1997 financial crisis were underway. This chapter describes how such policies were experienced by local people. Local community’s experiences on the effect of first neoliberal structure policies would explain why civil society began developing the latter movement against the second largest neoliberal policies of bilateral free trade agreement between Korea and United States.
Whereas the analytical scope of the dissertation covers the time frame of 1997 to 2012, I focus more critically on the period between 2006 and 2012, the time frame between the start of negotiations of the bilateral treaty and its ratification when the anti-FTA movements were most active. Since the study seeks to understand the nature of social conflict brought by neoliberal reform, the date of 1997 when Korea entered the IMF’s neoliberal reform is the logical beginning point for review of the reverberations in Korea. While such effects are still experienced by ordinary people, shaping their perceptions toward economic liberalization, I pay particular attention to Korean civil society’s most recent collective reaction against the bilateral “free” trade between Korea and United States, the second largest neoliberal economic policies. Civil society, historically and theoretically, encompasses the very broad range of social institutions occupying the social space. Civil society organizations are one component of civil society; yet, they are critical actors, playing essential roles for advocating for certain causes (Salamon, 2004; 56). In my study, I use the term “social movement” referring to any collective action by Korean public actors in civil society. This study regards “counter hegemonic movement” as agencies of social actor reacting in opposition to the power of the state’s authority.

In this dissertation, I pay particular attention to the activities of three social movement organizations (SMOs), including the Korean Alliance against KORUS FTA (KoA), the KCTU and the Korean Peasants League (KPL). These organizations were chosen due to their high level of leading and participation in the movement, as well as their frequent media coverage on their activities. The study analyzes their organizational
goals, frames, features, actors and major movement activities in order to understand the functioning and development of the movements for democratized social relations.

This dissertation takes an interdisciplinary approach. Combined elements of sociology, history, political science, and conflict resolution, and more specifically, studies of civil society, social movements, and the state in the context of globalization, are used to explain the basis for theoretical explanation of counter hegemonic social movements opposed the force of neoliberal economic reforms. The scope of research materials used in the study draws upon relevant literature, including extensive primary sources as well as secondary sources of books, scholarly journals, and magazines. Some study materials contain interviews with leaders and participants working at these selected organizations. Preliminary interviews were also conducted in the summer of 2011 with several organizational leaders to help clarify research questions as well as understand certain aspects of movement not apparent from the literatures.

1.6. Dissertation Overview

The chapters of this dissertation proceed as follows. Chapter 2 critically reviews relevant theoretical perspectives to develop the framework for a better explanation of the phenomenon. Two major pillars of the literatures guiding the analysis of the anti-FTA counter hegemonic movement are social movements and civil society. Social movement literature includes political process model, framing processes, resource mobilization, and new social movement theory, while literature of civil society critically reviews the Gramscian concept of counter hegemonic movement.
Following in Chapter 3 provides a brief history of neoliberalism and South Korea’s experience of this changing environment. This discussion provides a historical background of the neoliberal economic reform and unravels the actual experiences of civil society by such reform. This chapter presents how the process of neoliberal globalization transforms and dominates all spheres of social and private life of civil society in Korea. The process of neoliberal globalization is closely linked with the local element, forming subjectivities of the local people. The dominant force of the powerful creating its social, political, economic and cultural dominance at the expense of depriving human agency of private life.

Chapter 4 presents a brief history of civil society and social movements in Korea as well as a characterization of the relationship between social movements and the state in the context of neoliberal globalization. This chapter provides historical background of the development of Korean civil society’s social movements and examines changing characteristics of Korean social movements and the state in the process of neoliberal globalization. In particular, it examines how civil organizations respond to the economic reform by analyzing the major social movements organized by the movement groups.

Chapter 5 analyzes the politics of civil society by examining the characteristics of the anti-FTA movement in Korea. Responding to whether or not the anti-KORUS FTA counter hegemonic movement is able to transform civil society consistent with literature on counter hegemony argument the chapter analyzes the organizational development, opportunities, framings, characteristics, ideologies, and available resources of the
movement. Through finding of the analysis, I discuss the reason why Gramscian counter-hegemonic movement of civil society fails.

Chapter 6 is the concluding chapter, wherein there is synthesis of the findings of the study and a discussion of the issues remaining for future research. The findings are discussed to recapture the idea, role, and politics of civil society and counter hegemonic movement against the hegemonic force. The theoretical limitations of the existing literatures are assessed by analyzing why the actual counter hegemonic movement in Korea failed. Based on these findings, the study points out that the necessity for further research involving CAR dealing with Gramsci’s silent arguments on the matter of “how” to be critical and “in what setting,” while also emphasizing engagement in the cross-disciplinary dialogue between civil society, social movements, and conflict resolution.
CHAPTER TWO

Global Pressure from Neoliberalism, Social Movements, and State

There is broad consensus among social scholars linking the concept of social movement to social change. In early social movement literature, researchers recognized that movements begin with the demand for social change by the socially marginalized or excluded agency. The ultimate goal of engaging in a social movement for agency is therefore altering the social relations or social reality surrounding them. A social movement is usually regarded as the collective behavior by agency who cannot cope with change (Parsons, 1968). Most of the individuals or groups affected, experience a disconnection between their expectation of entitlement of resources and what is actually obtained due to structural conditions. According to Smelser (1963), “structural strain” can be caused by structural changes involving “the existence of ambiguities, deprivations, tensions, conflicts, and discrepancies in the social order.”(376) These structural conditions include various social shifts, such as economic crisis, technological change, and calamities. Agencies are more likely to choose becoming part of social movement due to their frustration and aggression experienced from structural strains brought on by swift social change. Thus, generated from general belief, they seek to redress the underlying causes of social disorder in order to change the norm (Smelser, 1963).
However, such a view of the proximate cause of social movement due to social strains without reference to power relations structuring the larger political context and social relationships among agencies is deeply problematic. A social movement often emerges from marginalized groups lacking the access to institutional resources of power. If an agency experiences social conflict arising from unbalanced power relations embedded in the structure, analyzing the nature of the conflict without regard to power relations becomes unfruitful. Thus, this study will pay attention to how these power relations are structured in Korean society, while describing the social contention surrounding the issue.

The idea of civil society in ancient Greece is synonymous with the state or political society distinct from in private life (Keane, 1988), a notion which has been transformed over time. The liberal understanding of civil society today, regards it as a separate entity from the system of the modern nation state (Ehrenberg, 1999). Although the state constrains the conflicting elements of civil society, civil society is said to be a creative space where intellectuals and others can coalesce freely (Ehrenberg 1999; Hegel 1991). Such a view separates agency from political structure so that political activity is framed only within the realm of institution. Agency in civil society is rather apolitical; yet it is highly influenced by law making and governance of the state. However, theorists like Gramsci noticed how the dominance of power also runs deeply in civil society affecting its daily life. This process can be subtle through the process of “hegemonization” by which the powerful classes configure the state and civil society using both force and consent (Gramsci, 1971). Hegemony of the dominant power groups actively engages in
hegemonization, promoting their importance to both the state and civil society for their own benefit. Since this process can marginalize the interests of subordinate groups, just as the hegemony of neoliberalism is produced as a mode of global governance at the expense of many by powerful states and institutions, civil society, according to Gramsci, organizes the strength of alliances using political consciousness to counter the neoliberal agenda of hegemony (Gramsci and Forgacs, 1988). The study examines, therefore, how the counter hegemonic social movement which is located in the sphere of civil society, critically reflects on the social problems produced by hegemonic condition presented in the current world order and develops strategies to achieve end goals of democratizing social relations through collective action. In order to better understand the complex phenomenon of the anti-FTA social movement in Korean civil society opposed to global economic liberalization the study deals with theoretical concepts such as social movements of civil society, state, and globalization as well as its dynamic process of interaction (See Figure 1).

Figure 1. Dynamic Interaction of Social Movements in the Age of Global Governance
Each of these theoretical themes has provided significant theoretical merit to elucidate correlations between theoretical assumptions and observed phenomenon as well as showing multifaceted interaction created by unique conditions existing within the anti-FTA movement in Korea. To critically examine the anti-FTA movement and understand the role, and practice of civil society within the movement the study reviews the established theories of social movements including political process, framing process, resource mobilization and Antonio Gramsci’s model of hegemony and war of position. (See Figure 2)

Figure 2. Civil Society’s Social Movements
Using these theoretical lenses, the study poses quiding questions: Is civil society capable of transforming society through counter hegemonic movement? Why, Korean civil society failed in countering the hegemonic domination in spite of its wide-spread public support? These questions are narrowed down to the specific questions: What were the opportunities? How was the movement developed?, What were their ideologies?, What were the resources of the movement? What were their major activities? This theoretical chapter critically reviews the discussions on social movements and civil society for the analysis of the anti-FTA movement case.

2.1. Social Movements, State and Neoliberal Globalization

The term “social movement” was first surfaced by German sociologist Lorenz von Stein, in his 1850 publication of ‘History of the French Social Movement from 1789 to the Present.’ Since then, scholars from different disciplines have engaged in the debate and a number of definitions have emerged in the discussion of social movements. Zald and McCarthy(1987) define social movement as a “set of opinions and beliefs in a population representing preferences for changing some elements of social structure or reward distribution, or both, of a society.”(20) Tarrow (1998) views social movement as “sequences of contentious politics that are based on underlying social networks and resonant collective action frames which develop the capacity to maintain sustained challenges against power opponents” (2). Another scholar, McAdam (1999), defines social movement as “[the] rational attempt by excluded groups to mobilize sufficient political leverage to advance collective interests through non-institutionalized means”
(37). For Tilly (2004), social movements are crucial routes for public participation of politics by engaging in contentious campaigns. The literature on social movement reveals that most definitions consist of key words such as “collective,” “mobilization,” and “change.” Hence, one can assume that social movements have been involved in societies undergoing systemic social changes.

The social movement literature has extended its horizons explaining the causes for social movement and influencing structures, as well as identifying the potential for the political and socio-cultural consequences of movements. While some theorists pay attention to psychological factors (Blumer 1946; Kornhauser 1959; Smelser 1962; Gurr 1970; Chong 1991) others regard material resources, organizations (McCarthy and Zald 1977), and cultural framing (Snow et al 1980; Snow and Benford 1992) as critical factors contributing to the rise of collective action. These theories of political process (opportunity), resource mobilization, and cultural framing have widely used in academic discussion as well as the actual case study; analyzing the emergence, development and decline of collective action. In dealing with the cause, process, and outcomes of social movements in modern nations understanding the role of the state constitutes an essential element of analysis. Social movements have been closely related to interactions with the modern nation state, often becoming the target of social movements in the struggle for social change. In its dealings with social movements, the state sometimes sponsors, but at other times represses movements. Thus, the character and propensity of the state is significant in tracing the movement’s development.
Political process and representation of the state provides opportunity to the movement and, at the same time, the outcome of the general contention affects the national political process of elites. For example, until the 1930s, social movements were mainly ideological and anti-regime in nature, which led to the formation of social democratic parties and socialist-like non-profit organizations in Europe. After the Second World War, newer social movements emerged as society entered into a period of radical change. Social agendas, such as women’s rights, civil rights, abortion, anti-nuclear, and environmental issues, drove social movements in Europe and the United States. During the 1960s and 70s, the character of social movement changed into special interest-based movements such as civil rights, anti-war, feminist movements, and the new left of green parties and environmental organizations.

In particular, the latest movement of the counter hegemonic movements has been associated with the rise of neoliberal global governance, challenging the traditional roles and relationships of both the state and civil society. Neoliberalism has challenged the sovereignty of the nation state through powerful influence of the market and transnational forces over domestic issues and shaped domestic social relations.(Strange 1996; Mittleman 1997; Smith, Solinger and Topik 1999) Under the pressure of neoliberal governance, the primary attributes of state sovereignty, such as the independent decision making process, territorial exclusiveness, monopoly of physical force, the grant of citizenship, and exclusive representation of the nation state, are being threatened by
global norms conditioning entry into the age of the new world order of ‘neoliberal internationalization’ (See Figure 3).

Figure 3. Comparison between Pre- and Post- Neoliberal Globalization

The Figure 3 displays how neoliberal globalization has affected the state, heavily influencing the traditional sphere of the state, including its interaction with civil society and the market. Within this context of neoliberal globalization, civil society, affected by this changing environment mobilizes the anti-(neoliberal) globalization movement globally (Hirst and Thompson 1996; Gilpin 2000). The public protests against the Uruguay Round and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), and the demonstrations opposing the G20 Summit held in Seoul Korea, were carried out in respective movements.
illustrating this fundamental shift in social relations. The state, previously a mediator of civil conflict among various social forces, has now become a target of public contention as it has either voluntarily or involuntarily supported global economic integration (Bright and Harding 1984; Goldstone 2003; Tarrow 1998, 2002) (See Figure 4)

Figure 4. Process of Neoliberal Globalization and Social Movement.

The Figure 4 illustrates that the state is now obliged to not only mediate internal disputes arising from national issues, but also arbitrate the interests of external concerns of powerful transnational institutions and international bodies. The advent of transnational forces, becoming new powerful organizational forms, has heavily influenced into the socio-economic space of nations through their world economic
policies. In doing so, they have also promoted extraneous socio-economic values through the hegemonization process by their partnering with the state, institutional markets, as well as key members of civil society. In response to such force, the state has been rather cooperative rather than conflictive since in the current world order, the state pursues its power by assuring the nation’s economic prosperity and return on investment. Economic power obtained through free trade zones and economic growth determines the strength of the modern state within the world system. Nonetheless, public actors of civil society have suffered from social problems; arising from rapid structural changes in economies in response to global capitalism. Consequently, the nation state has become a primary target for the counter hegemonic movement by anti-globalists because the state still holds judicial, legislative and executive powers, wherein it exercises its power over its citizens' political, economic and social rights (Meyer et al., 1997).

Nevertheless, the response of the state to global economic integration does not suspend its democratic responsibilities to its citizens for addressing social ills. The resulting societal struggles caused by its adaption to the global economic changes can either be resolved by the state through pacification or constraint of the collective movement organized to resist the changes. Thus, the characteristic, propensity, and the environment of the state politic provide social actors within civil society with either political opportunity or restraint to their activities. Therefore, as this study focuses on the counter social movements opposed to neoliberal powers in Korea, it will examine the changing structural conditions and resulting relationships between these actors. What are the relevant factors providing political opportunity and constraints for the national social
movements in Korea? How does the national political system in Korea reshape and affect the social movement? In the next section, the conceptual understanding of political process is critically reviewed identifying critical factors analyzed in the anti-FTA movement case.

2.1.1. Political Process Model

The political process model assumes that conflict is inherited in society unless the society resolves the issue of power imbalance. The political process approach considers power as a crucial factor in understanding the nature of grievance. Political process is organized around unequal distribution of power between members with access to institutional resources and those who are excluded from the process (Tilly 1978). People with power use their base of access for defining the rules of the regime, deciding “what, when, and how.” When awarding wealth and power to a smaller number of elite in society, while larger segments remain outside of the decision making process receiving a smaller portion of wealth to compete for, creates societal stress.

Current global structure and its interstate political relationships developed between the North and South are also organized around the division of power. Wealthy and powerful countries often experience economic growth by means of advanced control of labor in underdeveloped nations (Wallerstein 1974, 1989; Wolf 1969). While these nations are benefited from this investment, the economic systems of the weaker states become more dependent on foreign capital to sustain investment in world-dominated
demand for products for which labor is utilized. However, this condition effectively displaces small domestic stakeholders and creates gaps in the domestic labor supply. Furthermore, markets linked to international institutions in affected countries, hire fewer numbers of higher paid employees, further reducing employment and upward mobility in employment opportunities (Evans and Timberlake 1980; London and Williams 1988). Therefore, the weak, periphery states suffer from deeper class polarization and cycles of social inequality produced by economic dependence on foreign capital, which usually provokes dissent or rebellion in the labor force (Wimberly 1990; London and Robinson 1989). Collective action, then, becomes a rational choice for challengers interested in mobilizing social action to bring about social change, especially when meeting more favorable political conditions to alter the rule of the hegemonic order (Eckstein 1980; McAdam 1982, 1996b; Tilly 1978).

When challengers recognize the current status quo lacks legitimacy, sensing that need for change exist to alter the situation by collective action; they break out of their habituated condition of existence and seek to produce the commitment needed for a dramatic shift toward social change (Piven and Cloward 1977, 1988, 1997). McAdam (1982) elaborates more on the psychological transformation for collective mobilization, referring to “cognitive liberation.” Here, McAdam maintains that before collective activity can begin, “people must collectively define their situations as unjust and subject to change through group action” (1982: 51). McAdam’s theory of transformation of consciousness is an important contribution to the social movement field because it portrays what disempowered people believe, and how they begin to change their belief.
Accordingly, while many factors account for the emergence of movements, such as available organizational attributes and the willingness of capable leadership, the social opportunity for resistance is not strategized in vain, but action is taken when there is political opportunity.

The political opportunity structure (POS) is therefore widely used as an analytical framework within the social movement field explaining the development and outcomes of social movements in response to local political environments (Eisinger 1973; Hipsher 1998; Meyer 1993; Migdal, Kohli, and Shue 1994; Noonan 1995; Tilly 1978, 1995). Political opportunity holds that the origins of social protests are explained, not by focusing on the grievances of a people, or on the availability of resources for their mobilization, but rather by explaining the causes directly related to the political opportunities already existing for citizens in a political system that the mobilized participants believe they can make use of. The theory’s assumption, therefore, is that social protests are deeply related to the built-in opportunities available to the collective action found within the political institution. Opportunity in, this context, refers to “options for collective action, with chances and risks attached to them depending on the conditions existing outside the mobilizing group” (Koopmans 1999:97).

When explaining political opportunity, McAdam states that “any event or broad social process serving to undermine the calculations and assumptions on which the political establishment is structured, occasions a shift in political opportunities” (1982: 4). To be more specific, a national protest is affected by the set of available political opportunities and constraints including the: (1) degree of openness or closure of a
political system; (2) presence or absence of political allies; (3) stability or instability of political alignments; and (4) strategies in dealing with the changes (McAdam, 1996; Tilly, 1978; and Tarrow, 1983).

Political opportunity thus implies, as people mobilize their collective effort, they will choose the most feasible option giving them the most preferable outcome. For instance, when South Koreans gathered in massive protests to block a street in the Jong-ro district in Seoul in 2008 to demonstrate against imports, according to the political opportunity model, they were not offered other conventional means for making their claims known within the political system in Korea (BBC News, 2008). In other words, the social protests opposing imports was a political choice more available to them than was finding an alternate legislative route of political opportunity within the system. In terms of discussing movement decline, McAdam (1982) summarizes four factors sustaining a social movement including the level of the: (1) “confluence of expanding political opportunities; (2) indigenous organizational strength; (3) presence of certain shared cognitions within the minority community that is held to facilitate movement emergence; and (4) shifting control response of other groups to the movement” (59).

Nevertheless, the POS theory also has its noted limitations, sometimes involving false assumptions of social actors always coming from grieved social groups —activists in Korea have actually emerged from influential political groups including political entrepreneurs, government officials or state legislators desiring to organize or trigger a movement benefiting their own cause or goal Nonetheless, POS provides an understanding of how collective action is developed around agency’s favorable political
opportunity structure and what political opportunity is accounted for as the preconditions of counter hegemonic movement of social actors.

2.1.2. Collective Action Frames

While the POS theory emphasizes the rationality of movements by looking at organizational variables, such as the changing political context and the role of strategic planning, the work of Benford (1992), McCarthy (1996), and Snow (1986) contribute a great deal to our understanding of the importance of the idea of cultural frame within social movements. The concept of frame is derived from the Goffman’s analysis (1974) interested in how social actors interpret occurrences around them and the meaning of their experience in framing a collective effort. Goffman found that proper framing influences activists “to locate, perceive, identify, and label” experiences in their life and the world around them in order to draw support for movements (Goffman 1974: 21). Hence, frames enable actors to interpret significant events and thereby perform to identify, negotiate and organize occurrences, and guide collective action based on socially constructed perspective of objective phenomena. Mobilizing people to action with proper framing can succeed if the frame resonates the content of the movement’s claims while also proving to be a more truthful and acceptable cause to its audience. Though it is necessary to analyze an event, it is even more necessary to be able to explain why it is important to people in the movement to gain resonance and re-alignment within the movement (Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina 1982; Snow and Benford 1988; Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford 1986).
Actors engaged in the “framing process” are involved in the process of evaluating a shared understanding of problematic situation in need of change, as well as articulating discursive process for possible solutions (Benford 1992; Snow 2000). When social movements emerge based on democratic values affecting a variety of members, an assessment of the problem is needed to reach a generally agreeable definition broad enough to include the diverse set of perspectives. Such definitions of the problem not only “frame” the meanings of the problem, generating and inspiring movement activities, they also regularly define and redefine the boundaries of the movement (Snow and Benford 1988). As the movement actors aim to change perceptions of problematic situations or issues influencing the perception of the problem to observers and constituents, they are also actively engaged in the process of identifying sources of new meanings for their public audience. This process also influences political parties, elites, and media, about which Hall refers to as “the politics of signification” (Hall 1982: 69).

The framing process of individuals occurs as they are forced to make decisions between objective pressures and the social pressures of a political opportunity shaped by structural relations. Framing scholars and researchers trying to understand the social movement, focus on differences in how the state, media, and social movement actors interplay, which influences the interpretative process of individuals’ participating in social movements (Benford and Hunt 1992). They seek answers to questions such as how people interpret the social issues (Gamson 1992; Scheufele 1999); how the media interprets the problem (Ryan 1991; Scheufele 1999); and how state officials interpret political dissent and dismiss frames (Zuo and Benford, 1995).
Among social movement scholars building on Wilson’s (1973) initial study on the three parts of framing ideology, Snow and Benford (1988) are credited with developing the core concepts of framing theory. Their frames are effective in providing strategic interpretation of issues, as well as highlighting the motivating factors for mobilizing people to join movements. Identifying the three primary framing tasks for successful movements as diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational, they further define them as: “(1) diagnosis of some event or aspect of social life as problematic and in need of alteration; (2) proposed solution to the diagnosed problem specifying what needs to be done; and (3) call to arms, or rationale for motivating engaging in ameliorative, corrective action.”

(Snow and Benford 1988: 199) This rationale focus on the cognitive dimension of the collective movement, where social actors use framing tactics describe the problem, similar to a physician diagnosing what is wrong— then suggesting a solution to the problem, related to the prognosis, and then providing reasons for people to join the movement. The success of participant mobilization depends on how well the framers attend such tasks.

These diagnostic, prognostic, and action mobilization frames, have been widely used by scholars in analyzing actual cases of different social movements and social movement organizations involvement (Benford 1993; Johnson 1997; McCarthy 1994; Meyer 1995; Weed 1997). Diagnostic framing is used by Gamson and his colleagues, calling attention to “victims” of an injustice and their victimization as a model for studies of rebellion generation (Benford and Hunt 1992; Hunt et al. 1994; Jasper and Poulsen 1995; Jenness 1995; White 1999). This approach, derived from Gamson (1982)’s notion
of “injustice frames,” explains why collective action is joined by those perceiving that a regime is illegitimate or unjust. Originated from the belief that the structural problem is more critical than the individual element of injustice, the movement organizers seek political or socio-economic change through their collective noncompliance.

Prognostic framing seeks to articulate solutions to the defined problem, and then develop specific remedies for accomplishing goals through collective action. Prognostic framing is concerned with questions about what is to be done for addressing the problem, and what strategies are needed for effective collective action (Benford 1987; Gerhards and Rucht 1992). Under the prognostic frame, the community stresses the negative impacts of the social problem, such as physical deterioration of the community or widespread increase in poverty, in order to develop solutions to these problems. Residences and various civil society actors working together with multi-organizations, such as the movement’s associated industry, governments, businesses, and media, attempt to improve the conditions.

Klandermans (1984) stresses the importance of the use of motivational framing as a critical element for movement participation because identifying the cause and resolution alone without providing ideological support to join the movement, does not provide wide-spread support joining the movement. Snow and Benford (1988: 202) commenting on using this same approach, state that “motivational frames function as prods of action,” providing a persuasive rationale why people must participate in the action. Mobilization frames reflect on the concept of “agency.” Gampson (1995) discussed this idea when describing civil movement organizations attempting to find the
link between the cognitive measures of diagnostic and prognostic frames and motivational frames to convince potential participants to join the collective action. In motivation framing, therefore, it is important to seek out agency sharing similar interests with the organization, and then developing framework of similar aligned values to produce common motives for the movement (Gerhard and Rucht 1992; Snow 1986).

Generally speaking, the collective action frame entails "public discourse, [or] the interface of media discourse and interpersonal interaction; persuasive communication during mobilization campaigns by movement organizations, their opponents and countermovement organizations; and consciousness raising during episodes of collective action” (Klandermans (1997: 45).

However, as in other theory, Snow and Benford’s framing has weaknesses within the very approach it posits. It lacks the organizational attributes and discounts the capability of individuals to come to personal conclusions about social problems. Its applicability rather solely depends on motivational factor, downplaying the role of organizational capability of the movement and its resources. Secondly, although it is true that individuals are heavily influenced by the framing promoted by the state, media, or social movement organizations, individuals are also capable of making personal, practical decisions in interpreting the meanings of the data, normative values, or problematic issues speaking to them. Individual actors are responsible for establishing the cultural supremacy over society by discerning the source of the master frames evoked by these institutions (Tarrow, 1998). Moreover, it is also important to understand that the framing process is evolving and continuous; thus, framings of public opinion are hard to be fully
controlled by social institutions (Johnston and Noakes, 2005). Nevertheless, the framing process provides a critical lens for understanding how people opposed to global capitalism frame the issues of social problems when seeking to address them throughout the course of public discontent. The collective framing theory is thus helpful in analyzing the process of how Koreans articulate social problems guiding the scope of social action. Examining their definitions of the problem and the ongoing processes of reflection will also reveal in the study the construction of ideology and worldview of civil society activists opposing the powerful ideology and global hegemony of neoliberal globalization.

2.1.3. **Resource Mobilization Theory**

The resource mobilization approach asserts that the development of contentious protest can be best explained by the accessibility of external resources enabling the social movement organizations to operate. The perspective of the resource mobilization theory presents a significant shift in the traditional social movement field which previously approaches the phenomena of social movements as irrational (Smelser, 1963), or with shared grievance and generalized values supporting social action (McCarthy 1996; McCarthy and Zald, 1973). These perspectives share the idea that social contention produced by some mixture with structural condition is a necessary precondition for the rise of social movement. A number of empirical research on social movement in 1960s and 70s, however, present ambiguous evidence to this assumption based on close links discovered between structural discontent and generalized belief, which may be possibly influenced by entrepreneurs in explaining the emergence of social uprising (Bowen,
Scholars, hence, began paying attention to the claims of Turner and Killian (1972) that “there is always enough discontent in any society to supply grass roots support for a movement if the movement is effectively organized and has at its disposal the power and resources of some established elite group”(251). Such examples of labor movements in post war America, modern labor conflicts produced by increasing global trade, and senior citizens’ collective actions demanding better Medicare, where all were supported by various types of external resources for their mobilization. Social actors also receive assistance from professional lobbying groups or social movement groups such as the AFL-CIO which offers organizational expertise, property, information networks, financial support to support various movements’ agendas (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1988; McCarthy and Zald 1997; Tilly 1978).

Resource mobilization theory considers social movement organizations are comparable to firms operating within the market society. SMOs are operated on capital, facility, labor, and support to achieve their agenda similar to corporate entities in the economy. In doing so, they have a number of tactical tasks to accomplish such as resource raising, allocation of resources gathered, organizing collective activities, as well as recruiting and mobilizing supporters, and transforming them into activists. These views stimulate a reasonable critique that social movement and organizations with little resources, weak organizational experience, and minimal networking ability with outside
organizers, would soon likely fail in forming an efficient, sustainable movement (Freeman, 1973).

Such ontological supposition of the resource mobilization approach considers that society is composed of rational actors, continually calculating their incentive, cost-benefit or reducing mechanisms when engaging in social action (Oberschall, 1973). Social movements are developed and calculated by rational actors and social groups using market oriented analysis making decisions on bearing the costs involved in collective action to produce a particular desired social change. Scholars along these lines focus their attention on the establishment of organizational goals and strategies to achieve their goals, as well as evaluating the process by which organizers determine whether there are sufficient available resources to enable operations performing functions and activities within the SMO.

The resource mobilization approach, therefore, focuses on evaluating available organizational resources, the nature of the organizational processes, and its effectiveness in allocating and using resources, for the purpose of accounting for a movement’s success or failure (McCarthy and Zald 1973; 1977). With the logic of institutional rationality, McCarthy and Zald attempt to redefine the traditional theory of grievances explaining the rise of movement stating that “the definition of grievance will expand to meet funds and support personnel available” (1973:13). The resource mobilization model therefore appears relevant for social movements involving powerless people having weak organizational resources. Such conditions are similarly presented by Jenkins and Perrow (1977) in their case study of the farm workers movement where outside entrepreneurs
assisted with organizational expertise and resources, critical in the formation of the movement.

The most significant contribution of resource mobilization approach is its emphasis on the external leadership and their organizational involvement as well as the role of institutional resources in contemporary social movements. Previously, analysts presumed that resources came from non-institutional sources such as direct beneficiaries of the change movements targeted. Traditional movement organizations were operated based on an indigenous leadership, volunteer staffs, disorganized memberships, and resources from sporadic supporters as well as direct beneficiaries from the change they pursued. Nonetheless, movements during 1960s and 1970s revealed that many movements derived their resources by building “conscience constituency” among resourceful agencies including the middle class, media, private institutions, businesses, and political elites (McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977).

Major concerns for resource mobilization analysts studying movement organizations are related to understanding how movement organizations gather and manage their resources and what methods are used to develop their networks with outside contributors of resources prior to the start of collective action efforts. According to researchers of resource mobilization, movement organizers face some external constraints on their focus on social change for the sole purpose of altering the “elements of social structure and the reward distribution of society” (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1218). In this regard, researchers have called attention to movement entrepreneurs and external contributors as stakeholders in the movement being more motivated by selective
incentives in exchange for their support, such as career opportunities or new capital resources arising from intuitional change, rather than being morally or ethically driven for public good (Oberschall, 1973).

Despite the ontological assumption of rational choice by actors and organizations regularly assessing costs and benefits of movement actions fitting well with the neoliberal’s pure market logic, the presupposition of rationality is uncertain. First, the rational choice notion, as suggested, tends to ignore the fact that the involvement of movement activists and supporters is mainly determined by their internal values and moral commitment. They often share unique identities among themselves exclusive to outside groups (Tilly, 1978). Their moral commitments, shared identities, interpersonal networks, and group solidarity provides effective grounds for mobilizing collective action (Oberschall, 1973).

Secondly, resource mobilization downplays the importance of complex roles of power and agency as well as the collective grievance process in the development of the movement. This is especially seen motivating when collective grievances are produced by a system whereby power is the central systematizing mechanism and social relationships are in turn systemized by hegemonic social order for their favor. In response, the powerless and marginalized groups exert their counter-hegemonic power by networking with others to articulate the social problems they face. Resource mobilization theory also does not pay proper attention to how agency identity is constructed, or how consciousness arising among the members and supporters of a movement are accommodated, which is essential in building movement activity. Nevertheless, some of
its attributes such as the nature of organizational function and resource allocation, as well as how different resources work as incentives for motivation, are compelling arguments for understanding the operational character of movement organizations.

2.1.4. New Social Movement Theory

New social movement theory, as the name implies, is distinguished from “old” social movement theories, especially centered on resource mobilization theory, analyzing labor movements in the 1960s and 1970s. Critique of the inadequacies of ideas of Marxism based resource mobilization approach, wherein all social action is explained in terms of capitalist market-logic, while considering other grounds for social action as secondary, led scholars turn to “new” social movement theory. Developed from the context of European history, politics and social theories, the new social movement theory provides the framework for analyzing a variety of social movement phenomena, particularly in the post-industrial society. New social movements studies by Cohen (1985), Epstein (1990); Melucci (1985, 1989); Klandermans and Tarrow (1988) are based in politics, culture, and ideology for which conventional social movement theory associated with the resource mobilization paradigm cannot adequately explain. New social movement theory presents core premises explaining the emergence of social movements in response to broad socio-political and historical change, and describes a broad range of perspectives approaching the question why new social movement emerge in the first place. Such as, Cohen (1985) provides detailed analysis exploring how the construction of political identity works in its way into mobilization while as Touraine

Jurgen Habermas is particularly noteworthy in his development of new social movement theory, proposing the critical notion that the lifeworld of civil society is being oppressed and governed by the institutional logic of the state’s power and market domination (Habermas 1989). The modern society not only colonizes the lifeworld of civil society by means of institutional power, but also influences it in the formation of civil society’s identity by regulating the norms and values of lifeworld that are socially associated with it. With the technological advancement and growth of capitalism, power to control the knowledge of society is given into the hands of the political elites and economic experts controlling the social dominion according to their logic. Thus, the social conflict, situated “at the seam between system and lifeworld” (Habermas 1981: 36), provokes ‘new’ social movement generated in the public sphere.

Habermas (1989) discusses the concept of the “public sphere” at the center of his work. In discussing the bourgeois public sphere, he evaluates the state monopolized capitalism of both European fascism and the welfare liberalism in the U.S., as a historical setting a turbulent period marked by clashes between the political and economic sphere and the powerful cultural institutions and individual freedoms. The public sphere is a particular response to the socio-historical development of the European bourgeois society
in the 18\textsuperscript{th} century as it dissolved the representative publicity of medieval feudalism. The era of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution led to emergence of liberal democracy and capitalism in Europe and in the U.S. The emerging capitalist system in Europe was vital to the rise of the public sphere because it required a new structure for the civil society. The new economic structure gradually contributed to the emancipation of the private sphere. The bourgeois public sphere Habermas sketched out was first institutionalized in Britain in the 18\textsuperscript{th} century. Habermas describes it as, “the process of the politically relevant exercise and equilibration of power now takes place directly between the private bureaucracies, special-interest associations, parties, and public administration”(1989:176).

The division between public and private spheres, however, became a critical element for the changes developing in the social, political, and economic structure of society. However, the lines between the bourgeois public sphere and private sphere blurred as they became closely linked to many social structural conditions, to which Habermas refers to as the feudalization of society. Ultimately, the public sphere lost its critical function as a place of significant debate where public opinion develops. Instead, leisure and the rise of advertising, mass media, and manufactured public relations replaced the critical debate in society. He argues that the historical transition to the “welfare state capitalism and mass democracy” opened the door to mass media-dominated publicity. He concludes that mass media corporations negatively influences publicity by replacing the nature of publicity from one of rational discussion to one of passive consumption of manipulative information, and he suggests that media replaces the public sphere of discursive debate
with that of political experts and opinion polls controlled by the media corporations. The end-result, he suggests, is that individuals become passive consumers of media discourse. Habermas concluded by proposing “a critical publicity be brought to life within intra-organizational public spheres” to lead the way to more democratic social interaction, balancing against the domination of the state and non-governmental organizations (1989: 232).

Habermas’ theory of “system-*lifeworld*” is regarded as crucial for understanding the new social movement generated within the public sphere. The fundamental principle applied is that the internal colonization of the *lifeworld*, organized, not by social consensus, but by power and wealth, often creates a source of conflict (1987). Habermas calls attention to a system of the state’s legal, administrative, and economic policy imposing its rationality on agency, thereby causing the affected agency to defend its traditionally held values and lifestyles against the new institution for structural transformation. Habermas’ analysis of economic colonization and its powerful impact on the sphere of people’s daily lives is helpful in explaining the grounds for social critique against domination in more democratic societies today. Such currently developing anti-corporate movements, or movements opposed to international institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, are prime examples of the ‘functional rationality’ of global markets practicing economic colonization of the everyday life. Thus, as Habermas would hold, that as rational action and communication of civil society in Korea have been distorted by the corporate agenda, people build their legitimacy for participating in a new social movement based on practical; as well as moral
grounds of validity against the imposition of the global market while reflecting on how their leisure, culture, and education of their public sphere has been threatened by the imposition.

Other major theorists of the new social movement have also developed their ontology by analyzing a diverse array of new social movements. Building on conventional concepts of Marxism, Manuel Castell (1977) focuses on the ‘urban space’ when analyzing the developments of new social movements in the urban based environmental movement, as well as focusing attention on other new social movements in case studies of anti-imperialist movements emerging globally. To Castell, the role of ‘urban’ is significant in terms of its growing importance for capital consumption in capitalist societies. Urban functions as an economic reproduction of the market by providing consumers of goods, as well as a labor source for manufacturing the supply of goods. In this sense, urban planning is viewed as the restructuring process of the dominant force of the political system to keep the economy viable for the interests of superior social group.

Castell holds that the capitalistic logic and bureaucratic administration has changed, and this has threatened the traditional urban space. The incentive exists, therefore, for urban movements to develop, transforming the system of urban structure based on unequal social relations. Castell regards the urban movement as the true source for bringing social innovation to a society currently organized by the dominant power, the foundational cause of class struggle. Castell’s urban social theory presents three separate themes. First, the urban movement protests emphasize the idea of collective consumption which challenges the logic modeled by capitalistic markets. Second, urban protest focuses on cultural identity, an issue closely interwoven with the concept of territory, thereby opposing the
homogenization process of the system to defend cultural identity of the local community. Lastly, some urban struggle is also focused on the role of non-class based constituencies and their abilities to form political action in opposition to dominant forces, defending their autonomy and strengthening their decision making processes. Overall, while paying attention to the political dynamic influencing social movements, Castell’s study of new social movements is more comprehensive and inclusive. It is accepting of the complicated, but also having mutual interplay between different themes of “political,” “cultural,” “class-based,” and “non-class based” issues presented in many urban movements.

Albert Melucci (1980, 1988), another prominent new social movement theorist, shed light on the cultural process of collective identity as a vital source for collective action in new social movements. Melucci perceives that postindustrial society after World War II has changed, and that modern social movements reflect this change. Melucci argues that postindustrial society is being shaped and controlled by information, symbols, cultural codes, and identities. Thus, postmodern or advanced societies struggle to have more influence over accessing information, symbols, cultural codes, and identities, which can serve to reproduce cultural domination. According to Melucci, “control over the information production, accumulation, and circulation, depends on constructing codes which organize and make information understandable.” He further states, “In complex societies, power consists more and more of operational codes, formal rules, and knowledge organizers. In the operational logic, information is not shared resources accessible to everybody, but it is an empty sign, the key to which is controlled by only few people” (1997: 627). In effect, Melucci is asserting that, in modern society, such information, symbols, and cultural codes become a
hub of power; and thereby a source of social conflict provoking new social movements demanding social recognition of identity.

Melucci views social construction of collective identity as critical in forming collective identity. He defines collective identity as “an interactive and shared definition produced by several interacting individuals who are concerned with the orientations of their action as well as the field of opportunities and constraints in which their action takes place” (1989: 34). He considers contemporary social movements no longer represent “a unified and homogenous reality” (Melucci 1995: 53). In the plural society, different individuals are exposed to diverse sets of values and messages which tend to weaken traditionally held identity. Construction of collective identity, such as “we,” therefore, is crucial in forming collective actions for individuals living with weak identities in postindustrial society. As people share the definition of “we” and develop concern for community issues as “ours,” emotional investment in a collective action system can begin challenging the limits of the structure (Melucci 1988: 825). Demand for social recognition of actors’ identity is therefore, critical in forming the social movement.

Melucci’s work on postindustrial society derives from Alain Touraine’s view of postindustrial society wherein diverse actors emerge as movement participants instead of central actors, such as the proletariat. Touraine (1971) argues that while in industrial society conflict is centered on material resources between material producers and laborers, in a postindustrial or informational society, various characteristics of the economy as well as the polity are represented. He states, “The most widespread characteristic of the programmed society is that economic decisions and struggles no longer possess the autonomy or the
central importance they once had in earlier society which was defined by the effort to accumulate and anticipate profit from directly productive work” (Touraine 1971:4).

To Touraine, the Marxist analysis of market exploitation as a mode of class domination is no longer valid to elucidate social conflict in a postindustrial society. Instead, Touraine views the problem of alienation as a measure of social domination negatively affecting the social fabric of private life of the state and civil society. He writes “alienation presupposes the adoption by the dominated class of social and cultural orientations, and practices that are determined by the interests of the upper class mask the relations between classes by positing the existence of a social and cultural situation recognized as a field common to all the actors and definable without recourse to relations of domination.

Alienation is thus the first place in the “negation of domination” (Touraine 1997: 167). Therefore, the concept of alienation in Touraine’s view is regarded as the lack of consciousness to critique the ideological hegemony of the dominant class and their promoted particular interests as the model of social order. The dominant class of technocrats continuously produces economic exploitation of public actors through distortion of social relations, ultimately leading them into “dependent participation” (Touraine 1971: 8).

Social domination in the highly developed postindustrial society is practiced through competition among political, economic organizations for social control, cultural manipulation of public needs, and imposed social integration by the dominant class. Nevertheless, in highly automated societies, conflicts threatening the rationale of institutional order also exist. Such conflicts can emerge from ongoing struggles between the primary classes of consumers/clients and managers/technocrats to establish social
domination. In such societies, Touraine suggests people have experienced growing capacities for creating and organizing information and technology to exercise agency for their own defense by entering into the historicity of community movements against the dominant class which seeks to increase its influence with leveraged information, power, and wealth (1977).

Nevertheless, other theorists critique the new social movement theoretical constructs of Melucci and Touraine for having been developed solely within the post-industrial context of Europe. In offering such criticisms, David Slater (1991) argues that the new social movement theory may not be well suited for Third World settings such as in the case of Latin America’s social movements seeking to address deepening poverty and social inequality after IMF structural adjustment policies were enacted. As Slater points out, although new social movement frameworks draw conclusions based on the western notions of autonomy, self-determination, and democratic participation against hierarchy and social alienation, the nature of social problems faced in Latin American had little to do with these norms; rather their problems were more impacted by the inability of the state to raise taxes for welfare and social development for marginalized ordinary people (Slater, 1991).

Sidney Tarrow (1991) offers similar criticisms about the lack of “newness” in new social movement theory because as he suggests the theory develops its empirical cases of movements emerging during late 1960s and early 1970s which have little relationship to the structure of more recent highly developed capitalism. Tarrow states protests during those periods were somewhat temporal and periodical in nature, the reason for which he believes the movements will eventually return to more traditional forms when the cycles of protest
are finished. Claus Offe (1990) additionally points out that the internally weak structures of leadership and organizational features in new social movements as well as the lack of organizational cooptation strategies used to oppose the dominant power, affected the analysis and conclusions of the case studies.

While these criticisms provide grounds for reevaluating the applicability of new social movement theory in the Korean social movement case of this study, this research will not examine these criticisms. The criticisms of Slater (1991) and Tarrow (1991), although valid when questioning the applicability of the new social movements beyond European context in Latin America or the historicity of advanced capitalism, are discounted in light of the better explanation given for Korean opposition formed against global capitalism by the critical issues highlighted by Habermas other researchers, such as the materialization of lifeworld, as well as the intrusion of stronger influences of the state bureaucracy upon social life. The latter, mainly mandated by the power of the West projected toward the developing global East and South, is particularly relevant to this case. Highlighted throughout this study is the thought offered by Dussel (1998) asserting that the agenda of the West, including the projection of its neoliberal world view economy and the development of the South, produces exploitive imperialistic relations between societies of the West and the South.

Further, because new social movement locates its position in this ‘historicity’ of advanced capitalism found in the case by addressing unequal balances of power, it is worth considering as an analytical framework for social movements in Korea, and will aid in understanding the complexity of the actual case. In particular, this study questions how the social movement in Korea perceives the idea of power in social relations and in social
actions. Moreover, the study also examines how the perspectives of new social movement theory in Korea provides an analytical framework for understanding other complexities of social movements, including the concepts of hegemony, the nature of civil society, and the opposition to state power. In this regard, the work of new social movement theorists Habermas, Castel, Melucci, and Touraine are particularly useful for understanding the social movement phenomena stirring today and the cultural fabric of social reality of Korean civil society.

2.2 The Idea of Civil Society and Its Brief History

The concept of civil society is rich with a long history developed primarily in Western political thought. In particular, the societies in the third world have more recently begun experiencing the rise of their own civil society after the 1980s when democracies and market economies began to emerge. Because of the long history of civil society its conceptual mutations have occurred over time. The concept of civil society has been contested; its meaning today is much different from that of ancient Greece wherein the concept of civil society centered on the word *polis*, a word referring to an association of a diverse set of people under the rule of the state (Eherenburg, 1999). For Plato, civil society is to be dominated by the state since, in his ontological stance, people are prone to error; thereby, if not regulated by ideas and the knowledge of the state, chaos is created (Plato and Cornford, 1977). However, in contrast to Plato, Aristotle holds that the existence of civil society is necessary for civil expression to fulfill its role in society because the expression of civil society represents interests for the “good life” (Aristotle and Barker, 1965).
With the advancement of capitalism in the modern age, however, liberalism modifies the understanding civil society that had lasted throughout the medieval times. Adam Smith and John Lock view civil society as an independent space for people governing themselves and their properties under the sovereignty of the state. However, Locke does not separate the state political sphere from civil society. For Locke, “a civilized society was not an essentially a systemic entity: it was simply an aggregation of civilized human beings, that is, a society of human beings who had succeeded in disciplining their conduct.” (Khilnani, 2001: 19) Later, other scholars separated civil society from the state, viewing civil society as a “system of interests” (Ehrenberg, 1999). For Hegel, civil society is the sphere of diverse group of individuals in need of the state to mediate its affairs of diversity and competition arising within civil society. While Hegel argues that the state is “the final realization of spirit in history because of its ability to organize rights, freedom, and welfare” (Ehrenberg 1999:128), Karl Marx views that the state is a repressive apparatus, and one which civil society can only serve the interests of the bourgeois in the capitalist society. In the Marxian view, while the state holds its supremacy over civil society, it is not regarded that the state and civil society are in need of one another for existence. For Marx, capitalism operates by its very nature by human labor that is not voluntary in action; rather workers work because work is an essential human activity for existence. Marx views civil society as an unequal sphere, highlighting the unequal class relationships of civil society with the state because the state serves the dominant class rather than mediating the conflicts and diversity of civil society. Marx’s negative outlook for civil society prompted criticisms for discounting its significance by contemporary critical theorists like Habermas and Gramsci.
Today, the consensual idea of civil society has become understood with “voluntariness” of civil association. Larry Diamond (1994) writes a more contemporary definition of civil society as, “the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, self-supporting, and autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules” (4). In Diamond’s view, it is seen as “distinct from society in general [because] it involves [individuals and groups of] citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their [collective] interests, passions, and ideas, exchange information, achieve mutual goals, make demands on the state, and hold state officials accountable. Civil society is thus an intermediary entity standing between the private sphere and the state.” (Diamond 1994: 5) Diamond concludes that civil society is a self-help, autonomous organization, mobilized for representing of public interests. Under this intellectual terrain, civil society has also been referred to as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs), which engage the state in purposive social activities for the development of civil society (Diamond 1994; Ehrenberg 1999; Ndegwa 1994; Schmitter 1997). The term of civil society, locating itself as a voluntary civil association to state authority, indicates the importance of democratic governance for the performance of civil action.

To the view that civil society was prompted by the development of the market (Keane 1988), Gramsci argues that civil society rather occupies the space located between the state and the market, wherein the state builds its hegemony by securing its dominance through its hegemonic alliance with the ruling class, as well as creating political and cultural consensus with members of civil society (Gramsci, 1971). The logic of civil society,
according to Gramsci, actually constitutes the dominance of the state as the state requires its existence through construction of civil society. However, as hegemonic forces are empowered through construction of assimilating ideas of dominant classes in civil society through coalition and consensus, a revolution from below can occur when hegemony stimulates the consciousness of the marginalized (Persaud, 2001). The South Korean counter-global hegemonic movement was developed to limit or tame the interests of the neoliberal market dominance in Korea, and represents the people’s consciousness or interests of the collective community and individuals in opposition to global forces. Thus, this signifies that Korea’s civil society was the space for the struggle against the hegemony of the state and the space used by civil society and the state to influence and shape one another (Persaud, 2001).

2.3. **Gramsci’s Civil Society: Hegemony and War of Position**

Developed from Hegel’s view of civil society, Antonio Gramsci criticizes Marxian philosophy for constructing an “unknown god” of the mechanical economic system (Gramsci and Rosengarten 1994a: 365) while disregarding other significant cultural and ideological dimensions of civil society. Writing his thoughts from a fascist prison was a difficult condition for Gramsci for developing theory in a systematic way, Gramsci’s *Prison Notebooks* (1971) made noteworthy contributions to the Marxist tradition of thinking, particularly in developing the concept of “hegemony.” Gramsci’s concept of hegemony begins with his assumption that people are ruled by ideas rather than by force, a similar idea shared by Marx’s, namely that “the ruling ideas of each age have been the ideas of its ruling
class.” (Marx and Engels 1965:71) Reflecting on how industrial England survived in spite of economic crisis, Gramsci thought it was because of the power of preserving “ideological unity” of entire society (Turin, 1966).

Although Gramsci concurs with Marx about state despotism, he asserts political hegemony differently than Marx. Political rule according to Gramsci requires another form of hegemony that secures the political leadership. Without the consent from the people of all classes in society, the political rulers cannot build hegemony within the nation. Gramsci distinguishes civil society from political society. Gramsci views that civil society is comprised of the plural organizations, such as schools, churches, cultural organizations, clubs, journals, and media; and it is the sphere where people build and exchange socio-political consciousness. However, the political society is the sphere of state government bureaucracy, courts, and police force for implementing direct forms of domination (Gramsci, 1996). In order to secure its rule, the hegemonic leadership of the state requires developing civil society’s intellectual, ideological, and moral consent. According to Gramsci, Hegel’s comprehension of civil society holds that “the political and cultural hegemony of a social group on the whole of society is the ethical consent of the State” (Gramsci 1967: 412). Gramsci concludes that the civil society is not only the space of economic relations, but it is also the sphere where its consent is not manipulated by coercive power of the state, even though it is under domination by the state.

In building hegemonic structure, effective control of ideology and popular culture is critical for public sovereignty. In this regard, Gramsci points out the importance of intellectuals capable of creating the hegemony in civil society by constructing consent
through teaching in the educational system, writing, and explaining worldview and laws made by the ruling elites (Bobbio, 1969). Intellects can also help the state to control administration and justice in society by constructing the free consent of a people subject to the laws of the state. By the same token, to form counter hegemonic movements within civil society, the role of the intellects is also critical because people need to be free from their subordination to the state beginning in their mind, especially when the state becomes repressive. This requires revolutionary consciousness (Christman, 1966). Gramsci writes that “the hegemonic struggle requires the leadership of intellectuals, for, on a mass scale: critical self-consciousness signifies historically and politically the creation of intellectual cadres. A human mass does not “distinguish” itself and does not become independent by itself without organizing itself, and there is no organization without intellectuals, (…) organizers and leaders” (Gramsci 1966: 12).

Gramsci’s view of the role of intellects largely comes from his experiences with the “indifferent” masses in revolutionary movements against the state requiring consciousness of the issues and social problems. As a young socialist, Gramsci concluded that intellects played critical roles in forming hegemonic struggles in civil society by building their social consciousness to break the traditional values of the dominant ruler. For the subordinate to succeed in struggles against the domination, the “critical mind of the leadership and ideological elements” necessary to create public opinion are more vital, because civil society is strategically less advantaged than the powerful state possessing superior organizational networks and information to control the masses (Gramsci 1967b: 158). Thus, to embark in
movement based collective actions, subordinates require an ideological element to build up critical social consciousness and create public opinion.

The struggle for hegemony takes place in civil society between two forces: the domination of the ruler and the subjectivity of the private life when consent is either ceded or lost to the state (Bobbio, 1969). The dominant class also actively pursues its dominance in the sphere of civil society by either consent or force although the former is more critical than the latter to gain popular sovereignty. Nevertheless, the subordinated classes can also resist the hegemonization of the ruler. Gramsci calls this struggle of the revolutionary action the ‘war of maneuver’ (Gramsci, 1971). Gramsci distinguishes the ‘war of maneuver’ from the ‘war of position.’

For Gramsci, the ‘war of maneuver’ is an active open armed revolution, whereas the ‘war of position’ is a passive revolution based on ideological grounds preparing for the revolution. The war of position is a slow process waged over long periods of time, requiring engagement with the leadership of various social forces; and it involves progressive development of cultural norms to prepare the ground. Gramsci describes the war of position as “a form of political struggle which alone is possible in periods of relatively stable equilibrium between the fundamental classes, that is, when frontal attack, or war of maneuver, is impossible” (Gramsci 1971: 207). In the fight of war of position, the process unravels the ideology of the dominant class, informing the practices of the subordinated. These subordinated, then, attempt to counter the interests of the hegemony by counter hegemonic action.
The Gramscian view of civil society reveals how people are influenced by the political hierarchy in their established administrations of power. Political institutions exercise their powers through law, media, and policing, to maintain the interests of the ruler. However, individuals under such a society also possess the ability to reflect on the intent and scope of the political leadership. Often, upon realization that they are left out of the decision making processes affecting their ordinary lives, individuals and groups are driven to position themselves in revolutionary opposition to the dominant rationality of the state, proposing participatory political establishment rather than becoming a part of the political leadership. The Gramscian view of counter-hegemonic force of civil society, thus, elucidates the formation of social movements and NGOs such as anti-FTA movement and their internal urge to counter the politics of Korean state power through participatory action.
CHAPTER THREE

Neoliberal Governance and Hegemonic Social Order

“An armed conflict between nations horrifies us. But the economic war is no better than an armed conflict. This is like a surgical operation. An economic war is prolonged torture. And its ravages are no less terrible than those depicted in the literature on war properly so called. We think nothing of the other because we are used to its deadly effects…The movement against war is sound. But I cannot help the gnawing fear that the movement will fail if it does not touch the root of all evil-human greed.” M.K. Gandhi, “Non-Violence: The Greatest Force,” (1926)

3.1. A Brief History of Neo-Liberalization

Recent studies of anti-globalization social movements point out that the emergence of social movement opposing globalism is closely linked to the complex arrangements triggered by the globalism phenomenon and its influence on societies. In order to understand the motivations for organizing into collective action opposing the hegemonic forces of neoliberalism as well as the issues and social problems addressed by the opposition, it is important to first reevaluate how the dominant mode of neoliberalism (re)shapes societies in exercising its dominance (Hamel, Lustinger-Thaler and Pieterse, 2001). In its real space of power, neoliberal globalization is multi-dimensional having various economic, political, cultural, and environmental elements (Chase-Dunn 1999). Until the 1990s, globalization was not a commonly debated topic among scholars and
politicians. However, the term ‘neoliberal globalization’ has spread rapidly throughout the world as the assimilating processes of economic globalization have advanced using multiple sponsoring international organizations such as International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Its spread was particularly enabled by the economic growth of the West during 1960s, as well as the collapse of communist regimes during the Cold War and decolonization of Third World countries (Berger, Berger, and Kellner, 1973).

Over the last quarter century, there have been dramatic economic changes occurring in the world led by an explosion of goods, services, and financial capital, particularly among developing countries. During economic crises, the world has relied on international bodies to modify the economic downturns. Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI)s of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have greatly influenced and shaped the economic development processes of the Global South since the late 1970s through its use of the Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) with programs of coordinated emergency loans. These policies known as the “Washington Consensus,” were first introduced by World Bank economist John Williamson illustrating a set of standard economic reform policies for spurring growth of developing countries when dealing with various forms of economic crisis (Mohan 2000). First implemented in Latin America and other parts of Global South through IMF and World Bank emergency loan agreements, the terms of the SAPs were sealed within the language of loans calling for nations in crisis to implement macroeconomic stabilization. The conditional loans included such provisional conditions as opening borders for financial trade and investments, decreasing tariff measures, and other modifications to the economy such as
labor reform and privatizing state owned institutions and utilities (2000). Each of these measures had a strong orientation toward free market fundamentalism or neoliberalism.

However, the seeds of neoliberal ideas were planted in the aftermath of the Second World War where the primary agenda of post war societies was stimulating business and promoting world trade. The U.S. Marshal Pan enabled Europe and other nations to be established as major trading partners. Although in western nations both welfare states and mixed economies commonly championed protective government roles of Keynesian economics, a new ideology was being constructed with the establishment of Bretton Wood Agreement in 1944. In this period, many world currencies were fixed to the U.S. dollar backed by gold. Economic institutions, such as the IMF and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, the predecessor of the World Bank) were created for assisting nations in regulating the international monetary system and stabilizing international relations (Schifferes, 2008).

Nevertheless, this ‘Golden Age of Capitalism’ ended in the 1970s when the post-war global economic boom came to an end as it was worsened by inflation, slow growth, and high unemployment. As the Bretton-Wood system collapsed, the discredited Keynesianism economic model was replaced by neoliberal economics. Prominent neoliberal economists such as Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, and Michael Polanyi, who had gained prominence touting a ‘minimalist state,’ were the chief proponents of neoliberalism in the United States, as was Margaret Thatcher’s and her advisors in Great Britain. These economists argued that state protectionism hinders markets and that state owned corporations promulgate economic inefficiency. It also shuns state sponsored
interventionism in economic, social, and political affairs, even asserting that although reductions in state expenditures on social programs may afford some citizens with less social protection in economic downturns in the short run, the market forces it energizes, are more efficient in generating recovery than are state interventions. David Harvey (2005) offers an assessment of neoliberalism below:

Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practice that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skill within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights free market, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. The state has to guarantee, for example, the quality and integrity of money. It must also set up those military, defense, police and legal structures and functions required to secure private property rights and to guarantee, by force if need to be, the proper functioning of markets. Furthermore, if markets do not exist then they must be created, by state action if necessary. But beyond these tasks the state should not venture. State interventions in markets must be kept to a bare minimum because, according to the theory, the state cannot possibly possess enough information to second-guess market signals and because powerful interest groups will inevitably distort and bias state interventions for their own benefit. (2005:2)

As Harvey characterizes neoliberalism, it views the state as a set of rent seeking bureaucrats hindering market competition. It argues that the nature of state bureaucracy has built-in inefficiencies, resulting in administrative failures, over-regulation, and exploitation. Neoliberalists maintain that the costs of state policy failing are greater than the costs of markets failing; and that government sponsored solutions prescribed for its own failures are even more costly (Chang, and UNRISD, 2001). Thus, in this model, the small state is preferred over an interventionist state where the primary function of the state is to maintain institutions in ways enabling free market economies to work on their
own. This means, in practice, that governments should abandon ownership of state corporations, eliminate unnecessary tariffs, and free private corporations for operating across national borders while engaged in international trade of goods, services, and capital.

The primary idea behind Margaret Thatcher’s neoliberal doctrine holds that economic efficiency is produced by total competition between nations, companies, and individuals, and is ultimately measured by the resulting distributed resources (George, 1999). Adam Smith’s the *Wealth of Nations* (Smith and Cannan, 2002) is credited for laying the foundations for the efficient market theory with his ‘invisible hand’ of the market analogy adhered to by most classical economists and particularly by neoliberals. The theory holds that society is benefited the most when individuals acting in self-interest profit by creating demand for goods and services, and, in the process, resources are allocated in the most efficient manner.

However, other researchers criticize the neoliberal’s notion of efficient markets and total competition as nonrealistic and unverifiable by studies; and in particular it charges that the idea glorifies the talents of the well-born, the best educated, and strongest, but it is not indebted to the weak that are left behind (Selcuk, 2000). The traditional Marxist critique on the nature of the ‘minimalist state’ views it as a plutocracy in a capitalist society and as a bourgeois institution determined to advance the interests of the bourgeoisie capitalist elites and perpetuates its dominance in society through media (Cole 2004; Michael and Peters, 2001). Marxist tradition further argues that neoliberalism has created an ultimate form of class struggle between the capitalist and the
working class, often characterized by Hegel’s dialects in terms of ‘master and slave’ (Cole, 2004), which he predicts a struggle between the classes will ultimately lead the proletarian revolution.

Silver (1995a, 2003) and Tilly (1995) argue that globalism produces multiple negative consequences involving hypermobility of capital and negative relationships between the powerful Global North on the Global South. Others researchers, including Clawson (2003) and Munck (2002) have characterized such influences resulting from neoliberal structural policies as the dangers inherent in eroding state sovereignty, traditional bargaining power of associations, as well as welfare benefits for impacted workers. Although these researchers focus on the divergent aspects of neoliberal globalization their conclusions share the common perspectives, calling attention to the misuse of power at the center of economic globalization. The neoliberal global economy imposes its principles of market liberalization as hard power on nations of the Global South by mandating reforms, and subsequently integrates the affected nation’s markets into the world’s market for cheaper labor and human capital.

Even though neoliberalism represents an economic superstructure more common in discussion of economic discourse, in order to understand the nature of global capitalism, it is crucial to expand its primacy from technological innovation or economic activities to also include its sponsored impacts on social frameworks and individual experiences during its economic integration into a society. This is particularly relevant to the current study because economic structure shapes the way individuals perceive and interact with their surroundings (Tomlinson 2013). It also helps explain why
neoliberalism as an economic discourse is usually connected to the study of political and social affairs of individual political freedoms and human rights. The modern dominance of neoliberal ideas impacting economic decisions and actions of intellectuals and national leadership, as well as political consensus developed through educational institutions, political parties, media, and various cultural and social institutions, causes it to be broadly studied (Hainsworth, 2000).

Prior to the 1980s, many developing countries including South Korea, had implemented successful populist economic policies conjoined with their own brands of industrialization and infrastructure expansion, while also protecting the social welfare of the majority of its people (Chang, 1994). During its industrial developmental era, Korea’s state-led economic policy helped generate unprecedented rates of economic growth. Nevertheless, in the 1990s, Korea, along with several other fast developing East Asian economies, faced severe economic disruptions forcing them each to reach out for IMF sponsored aid for stabilizing their respective currencies. In exchange for the austerity loans, the economic reform conditions attached to the IMF loans, as indicated earlier, were used as preconditions for financial support.

In the context of globalization, neoliberal capitalism cannot be divorced from the relationship between developed and developing nations; that is, the Global North relies on free markets for its growth, and thus, it supports minimal economic interventions from the local states. In this process, the enacted reform coerces structural changes in the Global South by shifting its priorities from that of the ‘state’ to that of the requirements for developing viable global markets for survival. This in effect encourages domestic
economies of the Global South to open up even more to the North, reshaping their former domestic macroeconomic policies to conform to the economic demands of the more dominant North.

The adoption of the structural adjustment programs were a part of a broader attempt for economic restructuring in the global market economy in East Asia, seen in the West as a necessary step for creating unrestricted markets. The proposed solutions upon acceptance of the loans demanded of the recipient governments to alter the nature and structure of their economy by implementing far-reaching economic policy reforms. The list of IMF reforms enacted in Korea included liberalization of trade and investment policy, corporate reform, financial institution regulation, labor reform, privatization of state-run enterprises, domestic land and natural resource reform, and changes in subsidized quotas and tariffs, each mandating domestic markets more attractive for international corporations and investments (Crotty and Lee, 2004).

However, the changes enacted, placing emphasis on the efficiency of the liberalization and the privatization of the market, by default, effectively forced Korea to become much more reliant on export-led growth, which in turn wholly refocused the Korean business model to one of profit maximization and generating foreign investment demand in order to ‘afford’ repeating the next global business cycle. This pressurized business model has altered the long-relied upon employer-employee relationship in the former Korean economy, creating a large segment of dispensable middle class of employees. The resulting economic turmoil has shaken the social fabric of Korean society, producing multiple social problems.
3.2 “IMF Crisis”: South Korea’s Turn to Neoliberalism

Prior to the mandated economic reforms from the IMF, East Asian countries were already primary recipients of the Global North’s investment demand, fueling their capacity for expanding economic growth by supplying inexpensive human capital. South Korea, known as one of the primary emerging markets of Asia, was identified by the Global North as one of the “four tigers” during this period (Chang, 1994). Korea’s record of post-war economic growth had been cited as an economic miracle as evidenced by growth of real gross domestic product (GDP) averaging 9.3 percent in the 1960s and 1970s, and close to 10 percent between 1980 and 1997 (Burket and Hart-Landsberg, 1998). Korea’s per capita income also more than tripled during this period, and the percentage of the population falling below the poverty line declined to 15 percent from a high of 40 percent just after the Korean War (Chang, 1994). Korea’s economic growth during this time was managed in a state planned economy characterized by a sponsored partnership with the Korean government, banking system, and corporate conglomerates, known as chaebols. Under this economic structure, the state funded financial incentives through the state-controlled banking system for the nation’s economic growth in chosen industrial sectors (Chang 1994; Kim 1993). Societal impacts during economic disruptions were dealt with in this planned state intervention model through welfare payments and employment benefits retained by workers.

However, beginning in the 1980s, transnational corporations and international financial institutions began using immense foreign capital and economic incentives when
bargaining for financial liberalization in Korea. With greater openness to foreign investment and imports, Korean economic and governmental planners developed greater dependency on the new world of globalization. Nonetheless, poor financial regulation, volatility of short-term financing, and additional structural changes in the state led economy, ultimately exposed inherent weaknesses in Korea’s business model. This planted the seeds for the economic and social turmoil coming to fruition in the 1997 Asian financial crisis (Crotty and Lee, 2004).

Among the fundamental flaws in the Korean economy contributing to the economic turbulence were the presence of fixed or semi-fixed exchange rates and a lack of national reserves placing pressure on the Korean currency (The Economist 2007). This instability encouraged highly speculative trading attacks on the Korean won from the outside, driving down its value 34 percent from its previous value within a year. Further damning to the Korean economy was the damage to its highly dependent international trade, causing Korean corporate entities to become more vulnerable to fluctuations in foreign capital and investments for its economic survival. As the state relaxed regulations on finance to entice more foreign investment from abroad, chaebols borrowed more heavily in short-term instruments from foreign banks to leverage their financial position, which caused foreign debts to triple between 1994 and 1996 (2004). This result was triggered in part because of the higher domestic interest rates maintained by the Korean central government prior to the financial crisis, making shorter term foreign notes more attractive to industry. However, in 1997 when foreign debts reached $120 billion and loans became due, foreign investors demanded payment in full for the short-term notes of
Korea’s indebted companies. The local corporations, assuming international bankers would continue to roll over short-term loans at maturity, were not prepared when loans were called, resulting in many major corporate bankruptcies occurring throughout Korea and panic striking the financial markets (2004).

The IMF bailout to Korea solved its liquidity problems stopping the run on the currency’s value; nevertheless, Korea’s 1997 acceptance of the emergency $54 billion loan, including the IMF’s structural reform conditions, also marked fundamental changes in Korea’s socio-economic order. The processes of economic liberalization of Korea had begun earlier in the 1980s, set into motion by the populist desire to end the Korean military dominated style of government after two decades of authoritarian state-led industrialization. Following formal democratization of South Korea in 1987, economic liberalization was actively promoted as the “globalization project” in Korea through the efforts of President Kim Young Sam (1993-98) (Chang, Seok, and Baker, 2008). Kim’s efforts were largely ideologically driven, designed to raise Korea’s international standing. The president sought to gain entry into a number of prestigious international organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) comprised of primarily G-20 nations. Nonetheless, while ‘voluntary,’ globalization and liberalization in the 1980s planted the seeds of structural change in Korea. The economic crisis of 1997 and ensuing IMF bailout, mandated its new direction away from central economic planning to an “all or nothing” role in the global market (Chang, Seok, and Baker, 2008).
As the new economic model for growth and development was directed by the IMF, formalizing Korea’s relationship with free market capitalism in line with the dominant global economy, the new hegemonic social order in Korea was formed (Lu, 2006). However, the shock of the new economic order was not ended there. Initially, until the economy was stabilized and the loan repayments were finalized, the requirements of the structural adjustment policies within the terms of the IMF loans, extended neoliberal rule to other realms of Korean society by altering state policies in social spending so that the role of the state became limited to the areas of infrastructure, defense, law and order (Chung 1999). This in effect strained the ability of the state to provide sufficient systematic safety-nets for marginalized citizens at the close of the financial crisis. The structural inequalities were thereby molded into the community whereby many ordinary citizens were left out of the decision making processes, and were further marginalized by the interests of dominant classes without political protection or recourse.

3.3. Korean Neoliberal Globalization: Development or Catastrophe?

Individuals organize collective movements for addressing social issues and problems they struggle with. Therefore, understanding the nature and goal of the opposition movements in Korea requires the knowledge of social formation of reality surrounding the marginalized and their experiences of structural inequalities introduced in Korea associated with “developmentalism” (McMichael, 2007). In capitalist societies, the processes of social formation occur in both the realm of the economy and culture, and, as Poulantzs (1978) suggests, this is done while the state is consolidating and
drawing its power from the dominant classes. This is often the case when the state becomes a medium for advancing the interests of the dominant power to maintain its political hegemony while also being aided by the dominant classes (1978: 6). Similar to the Korean case, the interests of the dominant classes through hegemonic social order, serve to marginalize the powerless using the logic of the market.

In this context, the 1997 Korean financial crisis has been described as the "perfect storm," for dismantling the Korean economy (Heo and Roehrig, 2010: 80). In the absence of adequate governmental mitigation dealing with market failure and social trauma, many of Korea’s largest corporations slid precipitously into bankruptcy leaving workers jobless and looking for work within a short period. Between November 1997 and the end of 1998, twenty-five major conglomerates declared bankruptcy. Five of some the largest Korean employers, DaeWoo, HanBo, HaeTae, JinRo, and Kia, were forced to into bankruptcies due to the lack of foreign investment interests for their projects. Additionally, a total of 2,103 large construction companies closed down in 1998 alone. During this same period, 3,000, mostly small to medium-sized businesses, closed their doors each month, leading to 1.78 million newly unemployed (Ha and Lee 2001).

The unprecedented corporate shut-down, massive worker layoff, and general depreciation of the nation’s asset value, caused severe public panic and deep social fissures. The rapid shifting of emphasis from the state economy to the market economy was particularly pernicious to Korean society, causing deep frustrations and social unrest for the unwanted changes for ordinary people hit hardest by the economic reforms. This new socio-economic formation imposed on millions of ordinary citizens without their
consent, resulted in many Koreans’ mistrust of global market economies (Mun, Lee, and Yu 1999). Figure 5 below, illustrates the severe economic impact felt by citizens led by markedly high unemployment and a precipitous decline in productivity (GNP). As pictured, the unemployment rate peaked in 1999 to an average rate of nine percent, the highest level recorded since the government’s Bureau of Statistic began measuring.

![Figure 5: Changes in Economic Growth and Unemployment Rates in Korea. Source: The Bank of Korea, Statistical Database 1995-1999](image)

However, in actuality, this number underestimates the real unemployment rate in Korea since the official statistic also tallied part time workers and ‘forced leave’ workers as fully employed. Furthermore, the statistic does not include the contribution to the unemployed from non-paid workers, such as workers employed in family businesses, or those self-employed individuals who constituted approximately 40 percent of the Korean labor market. The unemployment rate of these workers during 1998 alone was recorded
at 17 percent (Choi and Chung, 2002). Moreover, while full-time workers constituted nearly 33 percent of the labor force and 21 percent of the unemployment, temporary and part time workers accounted for 20 percent of the labor force and eight percent of unemployment (Choi and Chung, 2002). Thus, the total unemployment accounted only 60 percent of the labor force, and by doing so, the real unemployment rate experienced by the working age population was drastically much greater.

In relative terms, the Korean economic misery index\(^1\) compared to other Asian nations affected by the 1997 financial crisis, demonstrated that Korea was the second most damaged economy in Asia after Indonesia. Though Thailand’s misery index of 25 percent was higher than that of Korea’s 21 percent, the relative decline (19%) of Korea’s misery index was significantly greater than Thailand’s (14 %), indicating that Koreans suffered more relative economic pain than many of their Asian peers (Shin and Chang 2000: 78). This event was also effectively much more traumatic to Korean citizens because Korea had maintained very low historical unemployment in the range of three percent since its industrialization expansion began in the 1960s.

The economic hardship created in Korea became a severe social and cultural crisis. According to the Korea National Statistical Office, the average monthly reduction of the urban worker’s household income declined 20 percent in the third quarter of 1998 from the same period of 1997, while 90 percent of all Korean households nationwide experienced drastic income reductions. However, although income decreases were

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\(^1\) The “misery index” is widely used to measure and describe economic pain and hardship of the given country. The index is calculated by the sum of a nation’s inflation and unemployment rate less its GDP.
experienced by all levels of Korean income groups, the result was disproportionately concentrated in the lowest level of Korean income earners (see Table 1 below).

Table 1. Income Reduction of Different Income Groups in Korea (1997 – 1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Level</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Lowest 0-20 %</th>
<th>Low 21-40 %</th>
<th>Middle 41-60%</th>
<th>Higher 61-80%</th>
<th>Highest 81-100%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monthly Real Income (KRW)</td>
<td>2,133,100</td>
<td>784,000</td>
<td>1,368,000</td>
<td>1,827,000</td>
<td>2,440,200</td>
<td>4,244,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change (% Lost)</td>
<td>-6.7</td>
<td>-17.2</td>
<td>-11.8</td>
<td>-9.9</td>
<td>-8.0</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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According to the above state statistics documented during 1997 and 1998, twenty percent of the poorest income families experienced the highest wage decrease, or 17.2 percent. The income reduction was unevenly concentrated in the lowest income sector, which not only widened the income disparities between the lowest and highest income groups, it also contributed to the increase in the numbers of individuals falling below the poverty rate. In data summarized by Shin (2011), the absolute poverty rate in Korea expanded rapidly from nine percent in 1997 to 23 percent in 1998. Although the unemployment rate subsided after the financial crisis, a pattern of long-term poverty has lingered in the Korean economy due to the polarization of employment opportunities among wage earners and the creation of a new “working class poor.” Researchers have suggested these workers were formerly middle to lower class workers now forced to
work as contingent and part-time laborers in the Korean economy, which is the likely
source for the noted increases in poverty levels (Shin, 2011; Chang, 1998; Stiglitz, 2006).

As the traditional economic structure was dissolving in Korea, the labor market
polarization became heightened, creating even more oppressive social relations. Because
the government emphasized new economic growth by investing in high-paying
knowledge based or technical fields of employment, many former jobs vanished from the
economy. Alternately, much more investment demand was placed by international
corporations and bankers in Korean companies engaged in advanced computers and
electronics and information technology (IT) as the advancement of computer and
information technology, including the internet based World Wide Web network and rapid
satellite communications, better enabled international trade and the process of
globalization (Dutta and Jain, 2003). Due to the international market, the Korean IT
based sector, including companies like Samsung and LG, grew quickly concentrating 40
percent of Korea’s gross domestic product (Bank of Korea, 2007).

Although the Korean Information Technology (IT) industry gained an edge in
international trade, it also had an impact in changing the nature of the overall domestic
labor market. Because the IT industry is mainly computer based, requiring smaller
numbers of highly paid skilled workers, fewer employment opportunities were made
available to the formerly redundant laborers or manual-skilled workers in the Korea
economy to (re)enter the labor market (Yun, 2004). This shift in employment demand
effectively marginalized Korean workers without globally desired technology skills, and
it also widened the existing wage gap between worker classes. While only a small
percentage of skilled workers, constituting 0.7 percent of the total labor force, earned more income after reforms, the middle and lower level income groups experienced dramatic decreases in pay (2004). Income disparities between the top and lower income earning sectors have since become even wider during the new economic recovery in Korea.

Although small segments of the population enjoyed benefits from the new economic order—the wealthiest 10 percent of Koreans experienced net increases in income, mainly in higher interest payments— as noted the middle class shrank significantly and the numbers of working class poor rose proportionately. These workers were forced to seek lower wage jobs, or else, find non-regular contingent employment, which offered only half of the regular workers’ wages. Many were forced to accept wages less than minimum wage rate of 2,510 won per hour (or $2.13) with monthly wages averaging about 567,000 won (or $480) (Shin, 2011: 23; Kim 2003). The Korea Development Institute (1998) reports that Korean households living below the poverty level increased from four percent in 1997 to 12 percent in 1998, and household debts were doubled during the same period, signaling that the economic turmoil was significantly more severe for the middle and lower income groups.

The problem of post-crisis income disparity of Koreans under the name of the globalized economy remained a serious Korean national debate. Although the Korean government persisted in its commitment to financial reforms, paying off the balance of the bailout loan almost three years ahead of schedule, it also acknowledged the continuing negative domestic impacts created by economic privatization. President Roh
Moo Huyn (2003-2008) recognized the ongoing problems well after the IMF crisis as related to the remaining impacts on the Korean economy during a 2006 briefing stating:

Before the crisis of IMF conditionality, the strength of the unbalanced [economic] growth strategy was more visible, and now its drawbacks, i.e., deepening polarization, have emerged dramatically…Korean society is currently undergoing telescoped development of the polarization problem.
(Roh, Moo Hyun, 2006)

In the post-IMF reform recovery period, although the Korean government was committed to the financial reform and worked together with the corporate community, it acknowledged the negative impacts of privatization of public industries would have on society. As Roh stated, the problems of increasing poverty, income disparities, and social stratification had become detrimental problem in terms of social stability in Korea. Nevertheless, because of the pressure from the IMF to continue to liberalize the economy by maintaining limits on the government expenditures in social welfare payments, the government was discouraged to make concrete policies to address the growing poverty family levels, further worsening economic conditions for ordinary citizens under the whim of global capitalism (Yun, 2004).

Significant structural changes in the crisis and post-crisis employment era in Korea, operating on the logic of market driven policies, quickly spread to other business sectors. In order to survive, growing number of manufacturing, construction, and business sectors chose labor cost saving policies for maintaining price competitiveness to maximize profit. The reform plans of many of these sector companies laid off almost 100 percent of their middle and lower marginalized laborers, and while forced layoffs impacted the educated and highly skilled workers less, the unemployment rate surged
upward to 49 percent for even these workers in some sectors at the beginning of the new recovery (Ha and Lee, 2001). While a large number of the unemployed sought part-time work in sectors such as home services, sales, or temporary construction jobs, others chose to either exit the labor market or borrow funds from banks, opening small retail businesses, shops, and restaurants (Lee, 2001). These displaced workers, nevertheless, experienced serious difficulty for their economic survival in an increasingly competitive, unstable market. In many cases, without adequate personal and public means of support, the majority of the displaced workers were shifted into lower income groups, part of a growing collection of the working poor whose family incomes fell below the poverty line (Yun, 2004).

The difficulties of sudden layoffs, poverty, and extreme economic disparity shattered the values of Korean egalitarianism (Yoo, 2003). In this environment, holding a college degree was no longer considered a guarantee of employment as in earlier years. Diminished personal and public means of support drove many people to live on the streets, where the homeless with college degrees often cruised aimlessly in the Seoul Railway Station (Shin and Chang, 2000). The Seoul Railroad Station was often crowded and filled with the homeless from middle class backgrounds in search of day labor for little wage. This circumstance is particularly notable, because prior to 1997, there were very few homeless on the streets of Korea (Lee, 1999). Table 2 below illustrates the rapid flood of homeless individuals appearing on the streets of Seoul, South Korea during the financial crisis.
Table 2. Number of Homeless in Seoul (February 1998 to February 1999)

<table>
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<tr>
<td>No. of Homeless</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>2,550</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>4,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, 1999

Although the government statistics do not measure the entire scope of the homelessness in Seoul during the IMF crisis, the official record nevertheless documents the sudden increase in homeless within the course of the year. Because of the surge in homelessness appearing in Korea soon after the IMF reforms were felt, the new term “IMF homeless” frequently appeared in the Korean media as a symbolic expression of the structural impacts caused by economic reform on society (Song, 2009). In a survey conducted with the homeless in 1999, sixty percent responded that the reason for their homelessness was due to the loss of a job; and 80 percent of those interviewed also said they would work in trivial day labor jobs if only jobs were available (Yoon, 2006).

The predominant mode of capitalist economic reform policies in Korea also brought about a significant change to Korean corporate culture (Noland, 2002). Prior to the economic crisis, the Korean work place was a familiar, predictable environment, providing seniority based promotions and lifetime employment for employees. Nonetheless, the new market friendly structure was implemented almost overnight after the crisis, restructuring the hierarchy in the corporate culture with the ethic of promoting
models of efficiency, greater productivity, and competition. No longer did supervisors operate under paternalistic dealings with employees to increase profitability; rather, they were said to have developed a coordinated logic akin to commodity exchanges when relating to employees (Lee and McNulty, 2003).

The once seniority based system for promotion, honoring the Confucian ideology of loyalty to the company, had given away quickly to a merit-based contract system. To be cost-efficient, companies began hiring temporary and non-regular workers instead of full-time employees. In fact, the number of non-regular workers continued to grow in job markets well after recovery from the economic crises. From 2001 to 2004, while the total employment increased four percent, the percentage of irregular employment grew to 48.3 percent (Korea Employers Federation, 2002). The labor market had become quickly competitive and the employment culture was changed to one of “merit based survival,” characterized by escalating competition among workers, work overloads, and job insecurity.

Consequently, these dramatic structural changes in employment, income-cuts, job insecurity, and layoffs, caused great emotional stress for most Korean working families, primarily male household heads. For men in Korean society, a job traditionally served as a cultural basis, and was prominently valued within the Confucian patriarchal ideology. A job in Korean culture was more than a place for earning an income; rather, it was considered a critical position in social networking. That is, it often served as an extended family, as well as a means for serving the family needs as the breadwinner and head of household (Kim, 2002). Further, men were challenged by the changing norm of gender
roles. The division of Korean family roles between genders had strongly persisted in Korean culture and society, where men were considered as the primary breadwinners and women as the managers of the household. However, in the face of economic turmoil and the resulting changes of workplace culture, more women were forced to take on roles of breadwinner helping in support of the family. This also became an immediate source of marital stress and emotional strain in Korean marriages, as men were forced to deal with their declining performance as heads of the household (Kim and Finch 2002; Seoul Economic Daily, 2004).

Brutal social conditions, including mounting economic pressures, widening social inequality, growing household debts, and systemized social exclusion of the poor, produced social unrest and especially detrimental impacts to the Korean family. Immediate signs of families breaking down were evidenced in the rate of divorce calculated before and after the financial crisis, jumping from 68,300 in 1995 to 116,700 in 1998, and reaching 145,300 in 2002 (Korea National Statistical Office, 2003). These numbers reflect a 113 percent increase in the divorce rate over six years. Given the ratio of divorce to marriage, Korea’s divorce rate during this time is one of the highest rates ever recorded world-wide (Kim 2004).

Choi and Chung (2002) concluded that the increased unemployment during and after the crisis was the greatest factor resulting in a weakening of formerly strong Korean marriage and family ties. Examining the unemployment structure in terms of householder status during the crisis, they report that 45.6 percent of the unemployed were household heads, and that 40.7 percent of affected households were left with no earned income. This
statistic infers that the trauma imposed on the Korean family by the financial crisis over a few months began a process of “undermining its very roots” (2002: 13). The stress on marriage was also documented in the surveys highlighting 23.9 percent of the unemployed households admitting to a serious marital crisis occurring (i.e., abuse, divorce, separation, or prolonged and severe conflict) due to the economic crisis (13).

According to joint research of the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs and the Korea Labor Institute’s ‘Report on the Welfare Needs of the Unemployed,’ nearly 40 percent of the unemployed experience emotional instability such as depression, anxiety, anger, loss of self-esteem, suicidal ideation, and behavioral problems; while up to 29 percent experience social antipathy (1993). The study concludes that the longer the length of unemployment, the more likely people are to experience psychological problems. A 1998 government survey conducted during the financial crisis in two major Korean cities, including Seoul and Busan, reveals that the cause of divorces and separations among interviewees was due to the financial stress caused by unemployment (Chang, 1999). Other forms of marital problems were related to domestic violence. Even several years after recovery from the financial crisis, many Korean families were forced to separate or divorce marked by ongoing increased incidences of domestic violence. Before 1997, domestic violence in Korean society had decreased; yet, after 1997, according to the 1999 National Police Office record, the rate of domestic violence increased dramatically by 46 percent, where 851 cases were documented in 1997 and 1,243 were confirmed in 1998 (Choi and Chung 2002: 13).
McLoyd (1998) finds that under a stressful family situation parents becoming more violent and abusive toward children can affect the emotional and mental health of their children, who thereafter are often diagnosed with depression, loss self-worth, anger, and feeling of helplessness. Kim and Kim (1997) found similar evidences of Korean children and adolescents at severe emotional disadvantage in families. These impacts were mediated partially by inconsistent and harsh child-rearing and greater exposure to stress. In the study, affected children in these family environments experienced poor academic performance, delinquency, drug abuse, dropping out of school, distorted social relations, and increased suicidal tendency. Among these social problems, the incidences of juvenile delinquencies and teen suicides were found especially rampant in Korean schools and communities, spreading over all regions of Korean society (1997).

The extreme stress placed on families due to unemployment combined with marital stresses, also led to dramatic increases in the number of cases of abandoned Korean children. A 1998 survey conducted by the Korean Ministry of Health and Welfare reports that the number of children in need of state protective services, or social charity organizations such as orphanages, increased 38 percent, or 6,734 in 1997, expanding to 9,292 in 1998. Many of the these deserted children also suffered from the loss of self-esteem, sense of helplessness, depression, and anger, producing other behavioral problems associated with school dropouts, delinquent adolescence, runaways, and suicidal attempts due to the loss of hope for the future (Kim, and Kim, 1997).

Human suffering for the poor, the elderly, youth, and the handicap in Korean society were even more severe after the financial crisis than others segments due to the
fact that these marginalized citizens received very little attention from the government and public support as the entire nation was struggling with the unparalleled unemployment rate and social crises. One of the most the alarming statistics, however, was the rapid rate of increased suicide in Korean society, increasing well after the settlement of the financial crisis (see Figure 6).

![Suicide Growth Rate in Korea (1983-2011)](image)

Note: The figures show the number of suicides per 100,000 population.
Source: Statistics Korea

Figure 6. Suicide Growth Rate in Korea (1983-2011)

The rate of suicide mortality per 100,000 Koreans prior to the financial crisis was relatively constant without displaying abrupt relative change between the 1980s and 1990s. However, as illustrated, there was a sharp rise in suicide mortality at the end of
1997 as the effects of economic crisis began to be felt. It receded in 2000, but then began rising again substantially until most recently. The incidence of suicide among Koreans during and after the economic crisis is documented by Hong, Bae, and Suh (2006) as largely reflective of Koreans folding under the intense pressure of unemployment, mounting debt, poverty, and the breakdown of the family. The *IMF Suicide* story-line dubbed by the media, was repeatedly reported in newspapers and other media between 1997 and 1998. Almost daily there were stories recounting suicide deaths of former CEOs, directors, and managers of bankrupted companies having enormous amount of personal debt.

However, the biggest impact is documented in formerly middle class workers, laid off workers, and even entire families committing suicide together, many of whom were said to be struggling with poverty and massive home mortgages (Chang, Gunnell, Sterne, Lu, and Cheng, 2009). As noted, however, the suicide rate continued to surge in Korea, even after the domestic economy had improved constantly in terms of GDP during the post-economic crisis time period. Since 2005, Korea has endured the highest growth rate of suicide among all developed nations, more than twice the world average (Han, 2012). Table 3 below compares the international suicide rate among the top 30 OCED countries, pre- and post- enactment of the 1997 crisis economic reforms. These data are highlighting the number and rate of increase of suicide per 100,000 in population across both time frames.
Table 3. Annual Increase of Suicide Rate in OECD Countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>22.44 (1982)</td>
<td>24.68(1995)</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>22.68 (1982)</td>
<td>18.59(1994)</td>
<td>-1.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxemburg</td>
<td>19.50 (1982)</td>
<td>17.13(1997)</td>
<td>-0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>19.72(1986)</td>
<td>17.00(1993)</td>
<td>-2.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>17.06(1982)</td>
<td>14.09(1994)</td>
<td>-1.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>14.10(1982)</td>
<td>12.56(1995)</td>
<td>-0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>11.74(1982)</td>
<td>11.50(1995)</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Korea’s highest rate of suicide growth rate across two time periods among 30 OECD countries, constitutes the second most common cause of death among Korean men and women under the age of 40 (Korea National Statistical Office 2004). Factors most commonly triggering suicide mortality during the economic crisis were unemployment, psychological depression, mounting debt, poverty, and breakdown of the family support system (Hong, Bae, and Suh 2006). Between genders, males were more prone to suicide than females. Moreover, the elderly also experienced high rates of suicide among Koreans. These last two trends reflect the conflict between traditional Confucian values of South Korean men, along with their parents, and their sense of self-worth. Beyond their ability to take responsibility for their filial obligations as provider for their families, some men chose to end their lives. In other cases during and after the economic crisis, many dependent parents also chose to end their lives to lessen the burden on their families (Park and Lester, 2008).

The alarming rate of suicide deaths in Korea, doubling in the last two decades, is highly illustrative of Korean society torn by aggressive modernization promoted by the neoliberal project. Economically, culturally and socially, the nation has been impacted. Before the neoliberal developmentalism began its evolution in Korea in the 1980s, the suicide deaths accounted for only 6.6 per 100,000 in population, considerably less than the average 11.1 suicides in OECD countries (Hong, Bae, and Suh, 2006). Many researchers acknowledge the impact of Korea's sharp economic downturn, the gutting of employment in various sectors, credit delinquencies, untold bankruptcies, and the general
struggle to keep families together, as root causes for the disturbing suicide death rate and increase in Korean society.

As discussed, the compulsory ideology of neoliberalism by the transnational forces and the state, promoting their brand of capitalism with its primary focus on restructured market efficiency and maximization of profit, is proven to have produced far reaching societal impacts in Korea. Developmental policies for evolving markets, populations, and cultures, are manifested so that all must conform to the uniform policies of the developed in order to ride on bandwagon of the developed. While poverty, hunger, homelessness, and human suffering each become more severe in the local community, the hegemony marches on occupying all spheres of society. Increasingly, its highly advanced technological world view, characterized by a ‘click for everything’, exerts its cultural hegemony over the agency through all means profitable. The media broadcasts borderless commercials of goods and services directed by dominant corporations throughout the day, carrying no serious thought or analysis about the world or culture the agency lives in. Rather, it constantly advocates for successful life styles, filled with consumption of new advanced phones, laptops, and cars. It promotes people wearing similar fashioned clothing from GAP, H&M, DKNY, and Tommy Hilfiger, regardless of national origin, whether produced in the U.S., Korea, India or Europe. It encourages purchases of the same designer notebooks from Apple, HP, Dell, Sony, and Samsung, while viewing the same Hollywood movies on each.

Implementing the neoliberals’ interests in Korea is also actively supported by prominent think tanks and research institutes, such as the Brookings Institution, Cato
Institute, the National Endowment for Democracy (Heron, 2008), as well as several liberal Korean think tanks and political elites. The large segments of society marginalized by aggressive neoliberal policies and the state’s inadequate social function for the poor often deprives them of the ability to recover from their economic distress, rendering them even more vulnerable to their personal prolonged crises.

Thus, this chapter has documented how the impacts of neoliberal globalization has transformed and dominated spheres of social and the private life of Korean society through mandated restructuring and the willing compliance of state’s leadership desiring at all costs to be a ‘modern nation.’ The processes of this globalization are continual and its successes are closely linked with the local element forming subjectivities of the local people. If the dominant force of the powerful achieves its social, political, economic and cultural dominance, it is at the expense of depriving human agency of its private life and culture. Local people subjected to this dominant structure would thus be regarded as normalized in the mainstream discourse of the powerful North. However, the deprival of agency through such repressive social relations also becomes a precondition for the rise of collective self-determination of the local. This chapter has discussed the strong influence of global hegemony, addressing the various dimensions of the social conditions for the local subjectivities in confronting this process.
CHAPTER FOUR

Global Pressure, the State, and Social Movements in Korea

4.1 The Context of Civil Society in Korea

As discussed in Chapter 2, Antonio Gramsci’s view of civil society is as the societal voice positioning itself in the space between the state and the market, articulating its beliefs and representing its interests; whereas the state builds its hegemony by securing its dominance through alliances with the market as well as creating its political and cultural consensus among the civil society (Gramsci, 1971). In this three-sector view, the members of civil society are referred to “as the intermediary institutions, including professional associations, religious groups, labor unions, and citizen advocacy organizations, giving voice to various sectors of society and enriching public participation in democracies” (Diamond, 1994:5). Under neoliberal globalization which integrates national economies into a global finance system, the nation-states and civil societies experience the powerful group of transnational corporations challenging and influencing the existing social relations. Facing such changing environments, Korean civil society has been actively resisting such structural shift.
The superimposition of the neoliberal ethic of ‘small state’ governance onto the formerly ‘large-state’ governance\(^2\) in Korean society, naturally left many Koreans incensed, and in some instances left little alternative discourse or political opportunity for civil society to respond as outsiders in the decision making process. The movements thusly resorted to radicalized conflicts and demonstrations for voicing their opposition The context of civil society, however, varies by historical, cultural and institutional events, as well as its trajectory affected by the sequencing of events and interaction with social forces (Edwards, 2005; Ehrenberg, 1999). Therefore, to understand Korean opposition to globalization arising from contemporary civil society movements, it is important to also examine how the historical trajectory and particular events have shaped Korean civil society, influencing the current movement. This chapter highlights the rapid rise of Korean civil society in the form of Korean social movements in the 1980s and 1990s where these movements spearheaded contentious democratization efforts against the authoritarian regime, and also opposition to mandated government market reforms.

4.2. A Brief History of Civil Society and Social Movements in Korea

This section of the study therefore begins with a brief historical transition of Korean civil society beginning in the last Korean dynasty ending with the 20th century domination of Korean society by Imperial Japan. Subsequently, Korean social movements are traced in the aftermath of the Korean War, through the era of the

\(^2\) See Tabbush, Civil Society in United Nations Conferences: A Literature Review 2005. In his book, he compares the civil society between the global north and the south where he describes global north has smaller state governance with much bigger business sectors and civil society while as global south has larger state governance with smaller business sectors and civil society.
authoritarian Korean government’s planned economy of the 60s, 70s, and early 80s, and are lastly traced through the democratic and neoliberal market based reforms of the 1990s until most recently. Korean civil society, differing from its Western norms and configuration, has historical meaning and foundation affected by its formulation within the ethical philosophy of the Confucian East, wherein the concepts of self, family, society, and world-view are deeply intertwined with its past (Cho 1997; Chung 1995; Duncan 2002). Inside such ideological framework, it is difficult to separate the concept of self from civil society, as well as that from the state.

Historically, the interactions between the public sphere and civil society in traditional Korea were between the state and autonomous social actors, such as self-governing local community compacts (*hangyak*), informal neighborhood associations (*kye*), private Confucian academies (*sowon*), clans, lineages, and family name associations (*munjung*) (Chong, Tan and Ten 2003; Koo 2007; Tu 1996). In this setting, Korean civil society was regulated within self-governing spheres under the authority of educated local scholars, who did not necessarily assert the local interests over the power of the state, but served the interests of the local community. Their role of sustaining local public affairs was helpful for the state bureaucracy, wherein conciliatory relationships were institutionalized between public state officials and the local elites, rather than becoming confrontational (H. R. Kim, 2000).

Because the traditional Korean civil society placed emphasis on the quality and welfare of the local community, ideas of individualism, private property rights, and materialism-based capitalism were not conceived of as legitimate social agendas (Cho
1997; Chung 1995). Because the local elites did not interfere with the public affairs of state authority, the expansion of community activities sponsored by the local associations maintained local autonomy over local affairs, and effectively, this system created a bottom-up governance restricting the state’s authority. However, early civil society in Korea was later open to the thoughts of neo-Confucianism advocated by scholars such as Yi Yulgok (1536-1584), a Korean civil servant and scholar, teaching that moral cultivations ‘from above’ were the source for transforming society. This view emphasizes such moral cultivation in governance when dealing with political guidelines for state administrations (Ro, 1989).

Near the end of the Korean Chosun Dynasty (1392-1910), was an era of an international struggle known as ‘spheres of influence’ in Asia, which was characterized by powerful nations maintaining their regional autonomy and exclusivity of trade by mutual agreements (Conroy, 2011). Since Korea was unable to defend its borders from its more powerful neighbors of Japan, China, and Russia, as well as colonial powers of the West, it came under Japan’s influence by signing the Japan–Korea Treaty of 1876 (Chung, 2005). Later in 1910, it officially became a colony of Japan as it signed the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty, remaining a Japanese subject until 1945 at the end of the Second World War. During this 35 year interval, the very existence of Korea’s nation was threatened by the domination of Japanese imperial rule wherein the Japanese government, invoking the notion of Japanese nationalism, demanded complete recognition of its sovereignty over the Korean populace (Lee, 1963). For strict social control, the Japanese government instituted extensive and brutal policing systems for
assimilating Koreans into the Japanese culture, penalizing even minor offenses of expression of Korean identity with sentences of extended jail detention, torture, or even execution.

Nevertheless, soon after Korea obtained independence from Japan by the end of the Second World War, its society was again withered by dire socio-economic conditions resulting from the Korean War (1950-1953). Heavy socio-economic burdens were the price paid for the recovery, including a divided nation, losing more than one million South Korean civilians’ lives, extreme poverty, political instability, destruction of 50 percent of its industrial infrastructure, and high national defense spending resulting from the partitioning of the two Koreas (Chang, 1994). In the aftermath of the Korean War, South Korea attempted to institute political democracy and economic growth under Syngman Rhee, the first president of South Korea, serving three terms in office from 1948 to 1960. Although some stability was achieved during his tenure, Rhee was forced out of office in 1960 by a national social movement referred to as the April 19 Revolution (4.19 혁명). The movement was in response to Rhee’s attempt to remain in office for a fourth term by means of a constitutional amendment. Demonstrations led mainly by college students and labor organizations, erupted violently in opposition to Rhee, which was linked to widely perceived voter fraud occurring during the tentative election (Seo, 2007). The protest movement was also sparked by controversy associated with a student protestor’s death, the news of which spread rapidly to catalyze a movement in nationwide demonstrations by ordinary citizens. Ultimately, these events forced President Rhee to resign in exile (Cho, 1998).
However, these mass, unstructured movements diminished in Korea when in 1961 President Park Chung Hee (1961-1979) seized power through military coup. Shortly after taking control, Park created the Economic Planning Board initiating economic development projects in five year plans (Kim, 1991). Seven five-year plans to extend from 1962 to 1996 were formalized to begin industrializing Korea’s export-led expansion. To achieve his vision for Korea’s economic future, Park nationalized the banking system and sponsored state partnerships between state actors, banking institutions, and conglomerates, referred to as chaebols, which the latter received generous economic incentives in exchange for export-manufacturing in selected key industries. Using this model of state defended industries Korea achieved substantial success in the first five-year plan, experiencing an average 7.8 percent increase in GNP, followed by successive 9.7 percent, 10.1 percent, and 5.5 percent increase in the second through fourth plans (1991: 53). The resulting so called “Miracle of the Han River” was instrumental in lifting Korea from the war-torn poverty to the 11th largest world economy. This economic achievement was accomplished through “a continual process of interaction between government and market.” (56) The dealings between government and business were not necessarily in the context of competition over resources, but rather, were “complementarily for economic development” (Whang, 1987: 26).

Like his predecessor, President Park pushed through a constitutional amendment to remain in power for an additional term in office. Despite his economic achievements, students and dissidents, believing that civil society and fundamental human rights were being greatly repressed under Park’s authoritarian governance, launched the
Democratization Movement opposing the government (Oh, 1999). To suppress the
movement, Park enacted martial law revoking the constitution and replacing it with the
Yusin Constitution in 1972. He also directed all governing powers to the executive
branch. Under the new constitution, the president was no longer restricted by term limits
and was given responsibility for appointing and dismissing the prime minister, cabinet
members, and members of the judiciary. Civil liberties and democratic governance in
Korea were thus suspended by an emergency edict. In response to the public criticisms of
his totalitarian rule, President Park asserted the importance of national economic stability
in Korea over that of democracy, stating that “people [ of Korea] today are more
frightened of poverty and hunger than of totalitarianism” (Oh, 1999: 53).

The Yusin Republic dramatically weakened popular support for Park’s economic
achievements. In the socio-political context, his accomplishments were discredited by the
opposition when the revitalized democratization movement began taking root. Shielded
by the support of respected Christian religious groups, student activists and workers
succeeded in convening massive civil uprisings (부마민주항쟁) against Park, protesting the
government’s rule in the two metropolitan cities of Busan and Masan (Heo and Roehrig,
2010). As the civil unrest grew out of control, however, internal conflict within the Park
regime heightened over the issue of how to respond to the social unrest. These intense
disagreements between Park and his advisors led to Park’s assassination by his director of
Korean Central Intelligence Agency. Thus, Park’s 18-year rule came to an end in 1979,
but not entirely his vision for state supported economic development.
Although the public anticipated a democratic transition after Park’s death, another military group led by Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo came to power on May 17, 1980 (Jung, 2002). Declaring martial law and dispatching troops nation-wide to enforce the order, President Chun directed the arrests of many anti-government activists, including politicians, lawyers, professors, journalists, writers, students, and known pro-democracy movement leaders. On May 18, college students protesting the Chun regime at Chonnam National University in Gwangju mobilized demanding an immediate end to martial law and the reinstatement of the constitution. The demonstrations became violent and spread quickly, resulting in students taking control of the city when a young deaf man, Kim Jong Chol, was beaten to death by soldiers while trying to pass by a street demonstration. (Jung, 2002) To suppress the riots, which became known as the Gwangju Democratic Movement (광주 민주화 운동), President Chun deployed tanks and armed soldiers blocking all traffic to and from the city. The suppression turned brutal leading to up to 2,000 civilian deaths and many thousands wounded (Griswold, 2005). The repression of the Gwangju Movement provoked even stronger resistant sentiment against authoritarian rule in Korea paving the way for later democratic civil movements in the 1980s.

In 1987, one of the largest popular movements in Korean history emerged referred to as the June Democracy Movement (6 월 민주항쟁) (Cheng and Brown 2006). The movement, calling for direct presidential elections and other democratic reforms in Korea was sparked by President Chun’s further prohibition of constitutional reform and his arbitrary announcement of Roh Tae Woo as his successor as president. The movement soon spread nation-wide when the public became inflamed when learning of an incident
charging the Chun regime for the torture and murder of a student protestor named Park Jong-Cheol attending Seoul National University. The truth of his murder was initially suppressed by the government, but later became public knowledge through the efforts of the Catholic Priest Association for Justice (CPAJ) (2006).

Resentment toward Chun’s brutality infuriated the public as evidenced by a gathering of over 60,000 Koreans for the “National Memorial Ceremony for Park Chong Chul,” where a constitutional amendment for democracy was demanded. As the June Democratic Movement intensified, another college student’s death, Lee Han Yeol further enraged public sentiment against the regime, resulting in more than 1.6 million people gathered at Lee’s funeral to honor him for his fight for democracy (Park, 2008).

Afterward, the movement became uncontrollable, spreading to 34 other Korean cities, including major metropolitan cities of Seoul, Inchon, Taegu, Pusan and Gwangju. Over 500,000 protestors daily participated in multiple rallies over a 20-day period (Jung, Kim, and Jeong, 2004).

Since President Chun could no longer afford to use military force for containing the movement’s continued growth due to the political discourse being held concurrently with the U.S. Reagan administration, as well as fears of interrupting the approaching 1988 Olympics in Seoul, Chun agreed to popular demands for constitutional reform and direct presidential elections. In the resulting presidential elections, Roh Tae Woo was elected the president of South Korea, splitting the votes of the opposition party. However, shortly after inauguration, President Roh’s administration accepted further public
demands for democratic reforms, including more freedoms of the press and laws forbidding dictatorship and political corruption (Han, 1989).

It was in the aftermath of such reform, however, that advances of the democratization movement expanded the independent civil society in Korea with the emergence of various NGOs and larger civil associations (Cho, 2000). Prior to this period, NGOs remained mainly in subjugation to authoritarian regimes through which the state centric governments exerted most of the political power. Table 4 below highlights the rapid establishment of Korean NGOs in the 1980s, and particularly after 1987; and rising even more so in the 1990s. Their formation illustrates the strength of later democratic reforms signaling the dramatic transitions made toward political democratization because of the political pressure brought by civil society movements.

Table 4: Foundation Rate of Korean NGOs by Decade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>1997 Directory of NGOs (% of Total Number)</th>
<th>2000 Directory of NGOs (% of Total Number)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-1960s</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>80-86 15.0</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>87-89 14.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>90-92 17.7</td>
<td>56.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>93-96 23.7</td>
<td>56.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The success of the democratization movements also marks the beginning of struggles of a variety of other civic organizations in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
particularly those becoming integrated in order to collaborate under unified leadership (Shin, Chang, Lee, and Kim, 2007). An example is the birth of the democratic trade union movement in Korea in 1987, which developed into multiple organizations unified under the National Council of Trade Unions (NCTU) in 1990. Similarly in 1995, the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) integrated with many other trade unions, legal societies, volunteer services organizations, and professional associations unified under one leadership. The formation of such large integrated movements, with various identities working on separate interests under a cohesive leadership amounts to the “pluralization” of the civil social movement in Korea (Cho, 2000)

Representing the state’s interests during the early years of Korean industrial expansion, the authoritarian developmental state under President Park Chung Hee and other administrations following him, had viewed its function as facilitating the growing partnership in economic entrepreneurship, believing strongly that rebuilding the war-torn nation was its modus operandi (Lee, 2005). However, the normative view of the state was no longer regarded solely as the duty to monopolize the decision making process for the nation’s benefit after 1987; rather it also began regulating the interests of social groups involved in civil society. Democracy and civil society in Korea had made considerable development, no longer thwarted by the state’s nationalistic view in decision making (Shin, Chang, Lee, and Kim, 2007).

Thus, the June Democratic Movement of 1987 paved the way for democracy and empowerment of civil society in Korea. Because state power was dramatically reduced, the democratic political party system was established for sustaining a more stable rule of
law. The civil society had gained momentum for autonomy after three decades of authoritarian regimes. Students, laborers, peasants, as well as pro-democracy anti-government political elites, had each played critical roles in democratization, serving on the ‘frontlines’ to increase the autonomy of Korean civil society. In particular, student protests, and the deaths of many students had formed a vital juncture for the people’s support (*minjung undong*) in nation-wide movements. Their seeds of sacrifice bore fruit in resistance, breaking ground for other forms of organized movements such as NGOs and larger social movement organizations, which transitioned into popular agency advocating social justice.

4.3 The Neoliberal Wave, State, and Civil Society

The tight grip of the state on Korean civil society slowly loosened after the mid-1980s when the Korean government was also pressured by the United States to institute political democracy reforms and economic liberalization. The Reagan administration (1981-1989) invited President Chun to the White House to pressure him quietly for such reforms, while also publicly reaffirming the United States’ security commitments to South Korea (Williams, 2004). Yielding to the diplomatic pressure of Reagan’s neoliberal doctrine, Chun opened Korean markets to U.S. companies. The Chun government initiated a series of limited financial liberalizations in Korea, starting with easing financial regulations dealing with cross-border commercial banking, which led to the growth in international financing made available to the *chaebol* conglomerates in Korea (Lim, 2009). The U.S. pressure to open South Korea’s markets to U.S. exports also
continued in the Roh administration in 1992 when President George H. W. Bush visited President Roh in South Korea. While there, the U.S. trade negotiators stressed greater economic access for U.S. financial institutions in Korean markets (Lee, 2006). The U.S. was never relaxed in its intent to open Korean markets to U.S. trade. In 1993, U.S. President Bill Clinton participated in a sponsored trade mission to Seoul. In addition to securing agreements on U.S. intellectual property rights, he pushed for closing Korean import trade barriers for rice and other agricultural products produced in the United States. This represented a volatile issue for Korean farmers where domestic markets had been given protections from foreign production (2006).

Entering these politico-economic processes, President Kim Young Sam (1993-1998) was inaugurated as Korea’s first democratically elected president. Differentiating his ‘civilian government’ from past authoritarian regimes, his expressed vision was for the New Korea (shin hanguk). Nevertheless, Kim was not hesitant in sponsoring financial liberalization in Korea that the United States had been lobbying and pressuring it for. He was convinced that ‘globalization’ (segehwa) was a necessary step in building his vision for a prosperous Korea by liberalizing domestic markets to foreign investment (Connor, 2009). President Kim’s speech about the necessity for globalization in 1995 was revealing of his vision for the New Korea, stating,

Globalization is the shortcut which will lead us to building a first-class country in the 21st century. This is why I revealed my plan for globalization and the government has concentrated all of its energy in forging ahead with it. It is aimed at realizing globalization in all sectors --- politics, foreign affairs, economy, society, education, culture and sports. To this end, it is necessary to enhance our viewpoints, way of thinking, system and practices to the world class level…We have no choice other than this (Korea Times 1995-01-07).
As he had declared his intentions previously when campaigning for office, Kim Young Sam made a series of trade reforms deregulating the international flow of capital as a national developmental strategy for Korea to join the membership in the ‘rich countries club’ of the OECD (Kang 2000). To fulfill President Kim’s political promise for transforming Korea into a first class state, many substantial reforms were enacted in most areas of society— in politics, law, economy, labor, welfare and education (Chang, Seok, and Baker 2008). These reforms were intended to make government smaller, yet more democratic.

Under Kim’s administration, the power of the chaebol had also grown more public due to their independence granted from state tutelage by newly enacted neoliberal policies. As the conglomerates grew stronger in their market domination, the former state-chaebol relationship became more symbiotic, and far more detached from oversight in the partnership (Haggard and Moon, 1993). The increased control of economic resources acquired by the chaebol gave them immense powers, even to the point where they were capable of exerting separate political voice from the state. Chung Ju Young, founder and president of Hyundai had run for President in 1992 at the age of 76. Although Chung had earlier lost the election to Kim Young Sam, he officially visited North Korea, giving their government a thousand head of cattle and also completed a joint venture with North Korea launching the first inter-Korea Mt. Geumgang tourism project, a feat that no other South Korean president had been able to achieve (BBC News, 1998). Kim Dae Jung, South Korea’s next elected president (1998-2003), was similar to his predecessor, forming his political views based on neoliberal ideology (see Table 5.
below). Both of the Kim presidential policies were also closely associated with the political agenda of a recent ‘global Korea,’ heavily persuaded by Anglo-American neoliberal elites (Cho, 2004).

Table 5: Characteristics of Korean Governments (1961-2002)

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<tr>
<td><strong>Regime Types</strong></td>
<td>Authoritarian Military Ruling party</td>
<td>Democratic Military Ruling Party</td>
<td>Democratic Civilian Opposition Party Merged into the Ruling Party</td>
<td>Democratic Civilian Opposition Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideological Stance</strong></td>
<td>Right Conservative</td>
<td>Right Conservative</td>
<td>Right Neoliberal</td>
<td>Nationalist Neoliberal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


When President Kim Dae Jung came into office at the end of 1997, he inherited the burden of the Asian financial crisis. Kim stated that his approach to the crisis would be to pursue his political vision of the “parallel development of democracy and market economy” (minjujeok sijang kyoungje) (Kihl, 2005). Nevertheless, as he began his term in crisis management, Kim was under decisional pressure to accept the neoliberal economic reform measures as proposed by the IMF as Korea’s only option for survival going forward.

Compelled to stabilize Korea’s falling economy in as short a time as possible, President Kim disregarded criticisms of other economists about the structural deficiencies
of the IMF programs, including suggestions of alternative policies to resolve illiquidity problems through enacting tighter controls in banking and financial institutions and to create better transparency of the Chaebol (Crotty and Dymski 1998; Chang 1998, Chang, Park and Yoo 1998). However, by accepting the rescue loans attached to structural adjustment policies of the IMF, President Kim had also decided to pursue ‘reform through globalizing’ the Korean economy as the direction of Korea’s future. He addresses this issue in part within his inaugural below given in February 1998.

The world is now advancing from industrial societies where tangible national resources were the primary factors of economic development into knowledge and information societies where intangible knowledge and information will be the driving power of economic development. The information revolution is transforming the age of many national economies into an age of one world economy, turning the world into a global village... Diplomacy in the age of globalization will require a change in ways of thinking... We must keep expanding trade, investment, tourism and cultural exchanges in order to make our way in the age of boundless competition which will take place against a backdrop of cooperation (Korea Herald 1988-02-25).

Kim Dae Jung’s neoliberal reform policies articulated the necessity of national economic reforms promoted by the hegemonic global North’s Anglo-American’s solution to the problem. The reform leading the political discourse centered on gaining confidence from foreign investors for the inducement of foreign capital (weaja yuchi) to reinvigorate the economy. To accomplish this goal, Korean policy makers would attempt to restructure the economy, including measures recapitalizing the financial sector while ensuring transparent accounting measures, increasing the percentage of foreign ownership of Korean corporations by lifting the cap from 26 to 50 percent, opening
Korea’s domestic markets to trade, and creating flexibilities in the labor market allowing for enormous layoffs of redundant labor to increase margins (Cumings, 1999).

As Kim’s administration regarded inducing foreign capital as the first rational choice to revitalize the domestic economy, members of the media, domestic opinion makers, and middle class pro-neoliberal elites, also became supportive of the state’s policies dependent on the inflow of foreign capital. Widespread support was also generated for making the *chaebol* more transparent and efficient to meet ‘global standard’ for investment. However, in order to entice foreign investment, the main source of conflict in Korean society was ensuring labor market flexibility (Cumings, 1999). Kim’s first liberal reform, nevertheless, increased the domestic economy’s dependency on foreign capital by allocating greater percentages of the Korean domestic market into the hands of Anglo-American companies (Crotty and Lee, 2005).

The foreign share of ownership of the larger Korean companies Samsung Electronics, Hyundai Motor, and SK, were increased significantly from prior respective levels of 24.2 percent, 23.6 percent, and 13.7 percent in 1997 to 59.5 percent, 50.8 percent, and 54.1 percent in 2004. However, this arrangement produced resentment in some sectors of the Korean population as it effectively exchanged ownership of Korean companies, stocks, and real estate by transnational agency in order to gain greater leverage in the government’s accumulation of foreign investment capital to sustain the economy (2005).

Nevertheless, this was not the end game for the Korean *chaebol*. Although they had lost traditional identity performed within the purview of national sovereignty, their
economic logic of business practices based on the profit incentive for shareholders still worked well, creating even more return on investment in the new environment of neoliberal market liberalization during the recovery phase of the post-crisis economy. The idea of transnational shareholder governance of ownership emerging in the neoliberal era without government tutelage resulted in giving more unregulated power to the *chaebols* (Kalinowski, 2009a). Furthermore, backed up by the new corporate governance in the domestic market, medium to small scale businesses were also transformed becoming sub-contractors (*ha cheong*) to *chaebols*, which further concentrated the power of the *chaebol* vertically. Consequently, under the mandated *chaebol* reforms of the Kim Dae Jung administration, the *chaebol* continued expanding their market share of the economy of Korea’s Gross National Products (GNP) as well as their political power and importance in the public sphere.

The hegemonic bloc of global capitalism had unleashed the power of entrepreneurs during the economic recovery phase of Korea’s post-1997 crisis, just as social movements had earlier leveraged civil society’s demand for democratic reforms as a powerful internal force to challenge the state. Moreover, the earlier democratic transition after the Democracy Movement of 1987, civil society had greatly advanced its space in the public platform to oppose state dominance. Kim Young Sam, the first elected civilian president after more than three decades of authoritarian rule, gained popularity from civil society because of his pro-democracy policy initiatives, including prosecuting former presidents Chun and Roh for the Gwangju massacre, campaigning against political corruption, and enacting certain banking reforms (Diamond and Shin, 1999).
However, Kim Young Sam’s significance to the social movement field was primarily the openings he created for political opportunity within the governmental structure to accommodate civic movement groups, which in turn led to Korean civil society’s growth into the new era of progressive movements. Similarly, Kim Dae Jung’s presidency launched unprecedented institutional change with a series of pro-democracy and pro-civic group legislation, assisting many civic movement organizations to flourish during his administration. For this effort, Kim found useful the agendas from many moderate civic organizations, publicizing them in open political platforms. Further, he also recruited individuals from civic organizations, placing them in key political positions as well as allowing civil organizations aimed at monitoring the government to proceed with their activities, an act which had been prohibited since 1963 (S. Kim, 2003).

As Sidney Tarrow (1994) asserts, “the very success of repression can produce a radicalization of collective action” (92). In this sense, both Kims’ democratic reforms changed the character of traditional Korean social movements from being formerly violent and radicalized to becoming more moderated and legalized. Prior to the democratic reforms, protestors conventionally had utilized forceful tactics, attacking police and government facilities with Molotov cocktails, stones, and steel pipes. However, such protests declined considerably in the 1990s under both Kims’ administrations, as did the numbers of imprisoned protesters. In earlier years, the militant social movement, the people’s movement (minjung undong), was led by anti-regime activists, students, blue color laborers, and farmers, who were confrontational to the oppressive military
government (Jung, 1995). The movement required strong solidarity in the membership because they were immediate targets of state repression.

Vicious cycles of state domination met by militant resistance were common for the minjung undong. However, a less radicalized movement emerging in the early 1990s was the citizen’s movement (shimin undong), which distinguished itself from the minjung undong as being more moderate, comprised primarily of political, social actors and middle class citizens, including intellectuals, white color professionals, and religious organization leaders (Seo, 1999). Table 6 below characterizes each of the movement in terms of actors, goals, methods of operation, issues, and typical state responses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Minjung Undong (People’s Movement)</th>
<th>Shimin Undong (Citizen’s Movement)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main Actor</td>
<td>Centered on students, blue collar workers, farmers, &amp; poor urban citizen</td>
<td>Centered on middle class professionals, white collar workers, self-employed shop owners, students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal</td>
<td>Fundamental structural change to eliminate political oppression and economic inequality</td>
<td>Gradual improvement of system to banish corruption, raise public awareness, and establish autonomous and rational economic order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repertoire</td>
<td>Radical direct action such as sit downs, strikes, (sometimes armed and illegal) throwing Molotov cocktails, stone throwing, using steel pipes, Importance mobilizing mass gathering</td>
<td>Moderate and legal action such as campaigns, lectures, and public relations Placed importance on ethics and professionalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issues</td>
<td>Democracy, Class based- inequality created by military regime and ruling class, and unevenly distributed political and economic power</td>
<td>Wide range of common good, including corruption, economic justice, women, and environment. Structured on the struggle between producers and the unemployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Response</td>
<td>Repressive</td>
<td>Tolerant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Revised from Jung (1995) and Seo (1999)
Both of the Kims’ administrative reforms drew leaders from labor and social movement organizations into politics as legitimate representatives of the voice of civil society, thereby repressing radicalism in social movement. Under the more democratic rule, social movements were tamed and compromised, and to some degree, integration between civil society and the state was achieved. Such integration implies, “a shift from state domination or reign over civil society through control, infiltration, mobilization, or proselytizing to a situation where the state’s strength weakens and independence increases as civil society penetrates into the state, articulates its interests, and wields influence over it” (Cho 2000: 28).

Thus, the political environment evolving in democratic reforms transitioning from the 1980s into the 1990s fostered a decline in the more radical Peoples Movement and an increase in the Citizens Movement, as well as an escalation of the numbers of NGOs (Simin undong Danche) established in Korea. The moderate civic organizations and citizen movements led by moderate civic groups prevailed under this environment. The middle class citizens, including intellectuals, white collar professionals, and leaders from religious organizations, emerged as actors for the new type of social movements called citizen movement (Shimin undong) during the 1990s in Korea.

Although both Kims’ administrations made significant contributions to the growth of civil society, the political opportunity for social movements was greatly encouraged under the term of Kim Dae Jung presidency. Kim Dae Jung’s victory achieved the first democratic power alteration between the ruling party and the opposition party in Korean political history as a civilian leader (cheya insa). However, after his election, recognizing
little political support from within the legislature, Kim Dae Jung sought to use the power of civil society organizations by building coalitions with its members, and by promising more democratic reforms (Gray, 2008). To promote his reform ideas, President Kim selected his cabinet ministers from pools of prominent civil society leaders and citizen groups, giving ear to civil society opinion in the political decision making process, encouraging civil participation by the public in politic.

Kim Dae Jung’s democratic reforms were more extensive than that of the Kim Young Sam’s presidency. Along with probing charges of corruption and political fraud, Kim Dae Jung also sponsored laws empowering civil society to monitor government. To improve transparency of government, he led passage of the 1998 Official Information Disclosure Act authorizing individuals and civil groups to petition an access to government proceedings (Kim, 2012). Kim further supported civil society by allocating grants to NGOs. In 1999 alone, 7.5 billion won were awarded to 123 NGOs, with more than half of those submitting grant proposals receiving funding (2012). All of these institutional changes strengthened the power of Korean civil society considerably. As a result, many citizen movements organized by NGOs thrived in the new social space, addressing a variety of social and political issues (See Table 7).
Table 7: Korean NGOs by Activity Type and Decade Established

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity Type</th>
<th>Number of NGOs (%)</th>
<th>Established Prior to 1980s (%)</th>
<th>Established in 1980s (%)</th>
<th>Established in 1990s (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>1,013 (25.2)</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>62.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local community</td>
<td>222 (5.5)</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>86.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social service</td>
<td>743 (18.5)</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>52.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>287 (7.1)</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>87.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art and culture</td>
<td>634 (15.8)</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>50.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>235 (5.8)</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>55.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiously affiliated</td>
<td>107 (2.7)</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor/agriculture/fishery</td>
<td>217 (5.4)</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>501 (12.5)</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>44 (1.1)</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>20 (0.5)</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,023 (100)</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>56.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2000 Directory of Korean NGOs, (Citizen Times, 1999)

As illustrated in Table 7, the numbers of all NGOs established surged sharply in the 1990s, totaling 2,273 (56.5 percent for all activity types) with the one exception of religiously affiliated NGOs, which were established evenly across periods shown. The total number of civil society organizations exceeded all other categories at 25 percent of the total numbers founded, and the majority of these were established after the 1997 financial crisis. The more influential civil organizations founded during the 1990s, including the Citizen’s Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ), the People’s Solidarity
for Participatory Democracy (PSPD), the Korean Federation of Environmental Movements (KFEM), and the Citizens Alliance for General Elections (CAGE) were able to exercise leverage on the formation of political discourse throughout Korea covering various forms of social issues.

Kim Dae Jung, during his administration, particularly engaged civic organizations, such as the Peoples Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) and the Korean Federation for Environmental Movement (KFEM) as well as other professionals in efforts to revise election laws, anti-corruption laws, anti-democratic acts, human rights violation, and tax evasion (Cho, 2000). Encouraged by his policies, civic organizations, such as, the Citizen Movement Council for Fair Elections (CMCFE), gained public support and spread their popular movement to fifty chapter organizations nationally to help facilitate political and public debate and reporting of unfair election processes. Further, socially active organizations, such as the Citizen’s Coalition for the 2000 General Election (CAGE), became powerful movement groups (2000). They used controversial boycott campaigning tactics, including widely publishing blacklists of undemocratic, corrupt candidates on lists distributed in street protests or outdoor concerts. These techniques became influential political tools for educating voters about candidates. Since many considered Kim Dae Jung a democratically elected and legitimate leader, many intellectuals and activists from civil society movements and NGOs joined institutional politics for the first time in Kim’s government.

To conclude, the pro-democracy policies of the Two Kims provided political opportunity for civil society to bring forth social agendas onto the political stage by legal
means. Their liberal political vision provided channels for the social movements to
distance themselves from their prior radical stances. The Korean social movement field
entered into a new era of coalition politics, positioning itself as an active agency in the
political arena as well as in the public sphere. Thus, both the Korean democratization
movement and the neoliberal reforms constructed pathways of political opportunity
structure for advance social movements of civil society in Korea.

4.4 Economic Reform and NGOs

Nevertheless, in contrast to both President Kims’ close alliances developed with
certain civic organizations, promoting democratization and better governance, the full-
scaled neoliberal economic policies of Kim Dae Jung provoked strong resistance from
social movement organizations. The KCTU condemned the Irregular Employment Act of
1998 declaring it an “evil law,” and attempted to discredit its legitimacy by declaring it
would result in brutal economic destitution for all working people (Park, 2001). The
Irregular Employment Act of 1998 impacted all industries and employment practices in
Korea, rapidly increasing irregular workers in the work force, and had a polarizing effect
among income earners. The KCTU and many other civic and religious organizations
ordered street demonstrations and strikes against the IMF labor reform measures, directly
opposing Kim Dae Jung’s administration’s efforts to enact them. People sarcastically
mocked the IMF, wearing T-shirts painted with the slogan ‘IMF = I am Fired’, implying
that the proposed reforms were threats to their employment and livelihoods (Seidman,
2000).
A large number of confrontational strikes and massive demonstrations launched between 1997 and 1998, and again in 2002, were sponsored by more than 124 unions involving 66,000 union members and many other supporters (2000). Protests were in effect objections about the IMF’s mandates, which produced unparalleled layoffs and poverty for ordinary people as well as a critique of the Korean government’s neoliberal policies for having inadequate social safety nets for the marginalized (Malhotra, 2002). Radicalized by their economic plight without proper channels to address dissent, many protestors chose to commit suicide as an extreme method of dissent (Jang, 2004).

Initially, the state began using coercive measures suppressing protests, but later shifted to talks when President Elect Kim Dae Jung actively participated in negotiation with labor unions through the Tripartite Commission. During the meetings scheduled with business, labor representatives from the Federation of Korean Trade Unions, Kim stated that “unlike the previous government, the new government would make a great effort to treat labor in a fair way. The time when the government takes sides with business is over.” (Donga Daily, Dec, 27, 1997) As Kim had declared, negotiations between government business leaders and labor unions were begun for the first time in Korean political history in January of 1998 at the Tripartite Commission meetings. Dialogue took place with stakeholders over several months discussing planned legislation and determining how the burden would be shared for the economic crisis going forward. Table 8 below outlines the various Tripartite Commission meetings.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan 15, 1998</td>
<td>The first Tripartite Commission was launched.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 6, 1998</td>
<td>Tripartite Commission held 6th session and adopted Social Compact to Overcome the Economic Crisis (Agreed upon 90 items including consolidation of employment adjustment related laws, recognition of eligibility of the unemployed for the membership of non-enterprise based trade unions &amp; legalization of teachers’ unions).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 28, 1998</td>
<td>Regulations on the Tripartite Commission were proclaimed. (Presidential Decree No.15746)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 3, 1998</td>
<td>The second Tripartite Commission was launched.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 24, 1999</td>
<td>The KCTU withdrew from the Tripartite Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 24, 1999</td>
<td>The Act on Establishment, Operation of the Tripartite Commission (Legislation No.5,990) was enacted and proclaimed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 1, 1999</td>
<td>The third Tripartite Commission was launched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 8, 2000</td>
<td>The fourth Tripartite Commission was launched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 9, 2002</td>
<td>The fifth Tripartite Commission was launched</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Modified from Kim & Bae, 2004: 119

The first sessions of the Tripartite Commission reached 10 final agreements on the scheduled agenda. Nevertheless, the KCTU and its affiliated leadership were not satisfied with the process. Although the labor unions’ goal was to prevent worker layoffs by accepting decreased wages and hours, the government had other expectations, namely finalizing the IMF mandated cuts in the labor force redundancy. Despite of disappointments in the first Commission session, the union negotiators did not reject the original agreement for which they would be guaranteed rights to participate in political
activities and organize legally in trade and teachers unions (Kim and Bae 2004). As the KCTU leadership was angered in learning the union’s first bargaining position was rejected, they elected new union negotiators, hoping they would create an enhanced bargaining position at the Commission. Nevertheless, the labor mandates were not easily negotiable in the business leader’s or government’s position.

Although the KCTU and its affiliated members withdrew from negotiations when their positions were threatened, the government ultimately enacted the layoff law shortly after the commission concluded its sessions. The government made legitimate efforts to bring the KCTU back into discussions, promising to include in the law certain layoff restrictions, flexible working hours, and prohibitions to unfair employment practices. Despite the fact that the unions were unsuccessful in negotiating their demands, the Tripartite Commission is regarded a meaningful transitional channel in Korean labor-management relations, since it marked initial attempts at settlements through negotiation between the antagonistic parties (2004).

The government by sponsoring the commission meetings was also viewed as a mediator in the eyes of the public with its crisis management ability. Nevertheless, differences in “crisis consciousness, strategic choices, social partnership ideology, mutual trust, and expectations” between parties negatively influenced the performance of the dialogue (2004: 122). The withdrawal from the sessions by labor negotiators also contributed to the broken dialog. The following statements made by the KCTU in 2002 reveal the reasons why they chose to walk away from sessions after realizing the nature of the commission that was strongly influenced by the powerful international institutions
preventing the state from resolving the problem.

The primary concern of the government has been to demonstrate, without, any letup or lapse, its resoluteness to walk the line set out by the global capital authority of the IMF-WB and all powerful ‘international confidence’ of international investors. It meant that the government had no ‘room’ to negotiate with the unions; and the government’s only possible recourse of action in response to the demands of the trade union movement was to try to silence it (KCTU 2002, cited in Kim 2008:14).

Although the government attempted to mediate the dialogue impartially in the Tripartite Commission negotiations, it often received accusations from labor that they were pro-business, while at the same time the business elites referred to them as pro-labor (Lee and Eun, 2009). According to Jessop (1990), the limitations of the capitalist state in sponsoring negotiations between social actors is that the state has a selective effect when supporting political negotiations between social actors; that is; the state often honors the interests of a particular party by “strategic selectivity” depending on the particular stage of politico-economic context (161). The position of the labor negotiators in this case felt that the government was incapable of acting in favor of the union proposals for protecting workers’ rights since the IMF rules provided the government little room for readjusting structural policies. Further, as the weaker party in the negotiations, labor was not given meaningful opportunity to affect the outcome of policymaking to their advantage given the operative restraints of the IMF mandates. Overall, the state-sponsored labor-management negotiations of the Tripartite Commission, bringing stakeholders to an agreement, was a significant political event in Korea providing new channels for political decision making not previously available to labor unions or business. Additionally, the agreements sponsored by the government effectively appeased employees’ feelings that
the government and corporations were at fault for the debt crisis (Rychly, 2009).

However, after the negotiations ended with the enactment of the law in 1998, the unions returned to their previous pattern of popular-based militant collective action, resisting hegemonic neoliberal policies by staging dramatic increases in strikes, violence, protests, and arrests (OECD, 2000). Thus, the workers’ immediate concerns for protecting their rights were once again transformed into more aggressive counter-hegemonic movements against global powers using illegal strikes and protests forcing hundreds of companies to close down. The change in tactics had become the more preferable political opportunity for social change, especially when alternate legislative routes for further political opportunity were not available.

Kim Dae Jung’s neoliberal market policies also promulgated agricultural trade liberalization throughout Korea, which created devastating pressure on the Korean farm sector. The Korean government did not initially opt for lifting protectionist barriers on domestic rice production, though, since the Korean rice crop has always “represented the premier food staple in Korea, and a symbol of its national heritage” (Reinschmidt, 2007: 99). Nevertheless, in terms of rice trade, external pressures continued to intensify on Korea from international economic institutions, including WTO trading partners and the IMF, demanding that Korea honor its prior Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Further, the other FTAs being negotiated with Korea by the United States, China, Pakistan, India, and Thailand, where the costs of rice production were much less than that of Korea’s, were especially forceful in their efforts to negotiate new rice and other agricultural export agreements with Korea (2007).
Initially, opening the door to Korea’s agricultural trade market was done through trade reforms agreed to by the government’s commitment to the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), also known as the Uruguay Round, as well as other bilateral agreements completed with various other nations. These actions were already proving to be overwhelming for Korean family farmers and rural residents dependent upon agriculture, who had no prior experience in the realities of competitive global markets. These trade agreements coincided with higher costs of crop production and substantial increases in Korean farm debt averaging $20,000 in 2000 and $27,000 in 2003. The debt levels were compounded by average annual incomes of less than $10,000 for Korean farmers (Reinschmidt 2007). Debt level increases of Korean farmers were earlier incentivized by government policies encouraging farmers to modernize their farming practices and machinery to prepare for globalized markets. The reality of farm life in Korea was that under the global market, without protective measures, such as subsidies from the government, small farm practices were still outdated making it much harder for Korean farmers to compete domestically against imported agricultural products. Furthermore, domestic food purchases by Korean consumers seeking lower prices began to impact the local farm economy.

Not surprisingly, Korean farmers were among the first activist groups at the forefront of anti-free trade movements. An incident occurring in 2003 drew world-wide attention when Korean farmer Lee Kun Hae committed suicide on the opening day of the WTO negotiations held in Cancun, Mexico. While protesting against negotiations for
rules affecting agricultural trade, witnesses said Lee stood in front of police lines, and, after declaring "the WTO kills farmers," he then committed suicide by slashing himself to death with a knife (Environment News, Sept, 10, 2003). Lee’s suicide portrays the widespread resentment among Korean farmers against the Korean government’s support of the spread of global capitalism over the interests of domestic producers. Before taking his life, Lee had expressed his feelings in a short note later publicized:

I am 56 years old, a farmer from South Korea who has strived to solve our problems with the great hope in the ways to organize farmers' unions. Since [massive importing] we small farmers have never been paid over our production costs... Once I went to a house where a farmer abandoned his life by drinking a toxic chemical because of his uncontrollable debts. I could do nothing but listen to the howling of his wife... my warning goes out to the all citizens that human beings are in an endangered situation that uncontrolled multinational corporations and a small number of bit WTO members officials are leading an undesirable globalization of inhuman, environment-distorting, farmer-killing, and undemocratic. It should be stopped immediately otherwise the false logic of the neoliberal will perish the diversities of agriculture and disastrously to all human being (Kyung Hae Lee; cited in Mittal, 2003).

After graduating from college, Lee began farming his family farm. Then in 1986 becoming a leader in the Korean Peasants League (chun nong), one of Korea’s largest farm peasant organizations, he worked for the rights of Korean small farmers and farm workers. When the Korean government signed the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, negotiated between 1986 and 1994 in the Uruguay Round, it ended the quota and tariff system on several foreign agricultural commodities. Lee, like many other small Korean farmers, had gone into massive debt trying to modernize his production as he was encouraged to do so by the government; ultimately, Lee lost his dairy herd and family
farm to bankruptcy. Radicalized by his bitter experiences, Lee joined a series of demonstrations and hunger strikes focused on opposing the government farm trade policies, but tragically, he ended his life at the Cancun WTO meeting, one week before his daughter’s wedding (Watts, 2003).

As the WTO’s policies were being concretized, Korean peasants along with the urban poor were first in adopting the fight against the neoliberal agenda for agricultural trade. When on December 6, 1993, the Korean government officially announced the partial relaxation of trade restrictions on imported rice negotiated in the Uruguay Round of GAAT, it was met by huge demonstrations by thousands of organized farmers, urban poor, students, and religious groups protesting the negotiations (Broder and Gerstenzang 1993). When the situation became fierce upon receiving harsh criticisms from the opposition party and government bureaucrats, President Kim Young Sam, responded with a televised formal apology to the Korean public over the circumstances stating,

> Until now, I have done my best as President in order to protect our rice market. We have exerted every possible means and method to save our rice, the flesh and blood of our nation... I feel an acute sense of my responsibility for being unable to keep my promise to the people and I express my sincere apologies. (Kim Young Sam, *Daily Report*, 1993-09-29)

In 2003, another farmers’ mobilization took place against the bilateral Korea-Chilean Free Trade Agreement. Immediately after ratification in the Korean National Assembly, thousands of farmers and protestors gathered in the streets of Seoul blocking inter-provincial highways with tractors. In 2005, the year marking the enactment of the WTO agreement for ending some of the import restrictions for rice and beef, large scale
protests erupted with 18,000 activists and farmers gathered for demonstrations in Seoul (Yonhap News Agency, 2005). Protestors also assembled the same week in Busan during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders’ summit with U.S. President George W. Bush in attendance. When union organizers learned WTO agriculture regulation would be the key meeting agenda, they mobilized their membership with farm peasant organizations. The resulting violence in demonstrations left 600 people injured and several dead in conflicts with the police and military (Doucette and Miller, 2005).

With respect to the impacts sponsored by the IMF’s and WTO’s agricultural agreements, Korean farmers, ordinary workers, and the urban poor felt increasingly impacted as the economic hardships of global trade reforms became more severe. In the view of these citizens, the government had abandoned the public interest and represented mostly the interests of the powerful international economic institutions. Thus, in response, the Korean anti-free trade social movement turned away from moderation and called for solidarity among its members to radicalize discontents for countering globalization using violence and physical force. This was in contrast to the previous minjung movement, though, which was led by students serving as surrogates for the populace in the fight for democratic reform. Here, farmers, ordinary workers, and urban poor opposed to agricultural reform, came directly to the conflict as frontline protesters in the movement.

As discussed, the increase in social movement organizations in Korea had come about as a result of the democratization movement, which was prominent in ending the authoritarian rule of government in 1987. Nonetheless, while the democratization reform movements were still being formulated by social movement organizations, activists were
also increasingly forced to fight on the dual track opposing market reform policies promoted by the government. However, after the 1997 financial crisis, when the neoliberal wave was particularly accelerated by the mandated market reforms, these concerted actions created burdening conditions for consolidating Korean social movements opposed to neoliberal globalization.

As in the alliances developed between the farmer groups and the KCTU, many other anti-globalization movements were developed from disjointed coalitions between movements having little former mutual solidarity (Song, 2000). Civil society organizations, such as the Citizen’s Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) and the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) were opposed to the more leftist social movements in Korea, and tended to align with memberships of other moderate movements (Kalinowski, 2009b). However, these organizations had now become open to building solidarity with the more radical movements after the 1997 financial crisis, which had become the catalyst for the formation of many grass roots civic organizations in Korea. Realizing the general contention over economic crises, the PSPD and CCEJ coordinated mass demonstrations, calling for chaebol reform limiting their control of market share as their central agenda (S. Kim, 2003). Figure 7 below illustrates the shift in movement coalitions over time where the percentage of loosely organized groups in Korea declined in the years prior to 1998.
As the chart displays, the period of flat growth of solidarity in formally organized coalitions, followed by the sharp inflection point of their growth at the end of 1997, it is clear that reactions to the financial crisis were likely related to the organizational shift. Many civic organizations affirmed their coalitions during the negotiations of the April 1994 Uruguay Round protests. Representing the growing joint solidarity opposed to neoliberal market reforms, over 70,000 demonstrators, including many political elites from the opposition party, joined together from 194 separate civil organizations to march in 11 Korean cities in protest of the Korean ratification of the Uruguay Round (Donga Daily, 1994). The KCTU was one of the leading organizations sponsoring anti-neoliberal globalization movement activity, and it particularly sought solidarity among the farmer
groups and urban poor. In its 2000 Yearbook, the KCTU states that one of its primary organizational strategies for successful movements was the enhancing solidarity network with popular-based civic organizations (KCTU, 2000).

Linked to the wider opposition to neoliberal globalism, the anti-FTA/WTO fight became a focal point among social movement organizations in Korea because of the government’s commitment to market reforms. Although farmer’s groups were the most vocal group throughout 1994, with the inauguration of the WTO agreements nearing, widespread planned protests of the Uruguay Round discussions dominated the political discourse in South Korea. In this protest, the public was angered over the government’s decision to ratify the negotiations in secret. Similarly, many other civic organizations rooted in the democratization movement were inspired by the farmers’ group opposition and marched with them in solidarity opposed to market liberalism.

Another major, sustained civil movement opposing neoliberal top down policies took place in 2006 in response to the FTA negotiations between and the United States and Korea which stirred far greater social contention than previous anti- FTA negotiations with Chile or Japan in 2003. The FTA bargaining with the U.S. covered a broad range of economic activities and non-tariff barriers, including government procurement, trading goods and services, intellectual properties, as well as cooperative agreements on labor rights and environment protections (Cooper, Manyin, Jurenas, and Platzer, 2013). Discourse on the Korea-United States (KORUS) FTA beginning in the late 1990s between government elites and think tank research institutes brought forth this comprehensive politico- economic agreement between the two countries to foster greater
flow of goods and capital. Korean negotiators, representing a keen interest by the
government to create increased foreign capital for revitalizing the economy, especially
wanted to demonstrate to foreign investors a willingness to liberalize trade by reducing
restrictions.

However, many Korean activists in social movement organizations remained in
opposition to the KORUS FTA negotiation since its beginning. To many Koreans,
including farmers, laborers, and urban poor, the government’s willingness to liberalize
the Korean economy was too detrimental for their livelihood. Not regarding the public’s
general opposition to market reform measures in Korea, President Roh Moo Hyun’s
government (2003-08) continued its negotiations with the U.S. for an agreement. Upon
gaining majority support for the KORUS FTA from both Korea’s national right wing
political parties and corporate businessmen, Korea opened talks in 2006 to clear final
passage of the FTA with the United States. President Roh then made his supporting
remarks for the agreement stating, “[In order to] make Korea an advanced country with
an aggressive strategy to open up, Korea should sign an FTA with the US” (Chuson Ilbo
Jan. 19, 2006).

The KORUS FTA was regarded as a favorable agreement for both governments.
For the United States, the bilateral treaty represented a stepping stone for expanding its
dominant neoliberal economic position in the Asian region. It would also indirectly
pressure other Asian nations, including China and Japan, to negotiate FTAs since Korea
is one of major trading partners with these nations (Hadiz, 2006). In the geopolitical
context, the FTA with Korea would help justify stronger U.S. political and military
presence in East Asia, carrying particular importance in countering a growing Chinese influence in the region (Shorrock, 2007).

For the Korean government, the KORUS-FTA would be supported not only for economic reasons but also for political and security gains since the United States has provided military security for Korea since the end of the Korean War. Although Kim Dae Jung’s administration had made unprecedented efforts toward North Korea using his *Sunshine Policy* to negotiate good will with the North Koreans, which were followed by his successor Roh, North Korea’s withdrawal from the 2003 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) created intense tensions in the Korean peninsula. Under these circumstances, South Korea needed to consolidate its political and military ties with the United States, recognizing that a stronger economic relationship would help ensure greater political security from the North Korean threat.

Acknowledging the Korean government’s stance toward the FTA negotiations, in order to establish the FTA, the U.S. had first demanded that the Korean government lift its ban on American beef imports into Korea. The ban was enacted in 2003 when a dairy cow in Washington State was diagnosed with Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), more popularly recognized as “Mad Cow Disease” (MCD). Since 2003, sixty-four other countries had also enforced either full or partial bans on U.S. beef imports due to their concerns over U.S. inspection standards (Garber, 2008). Nevertheless, the lifting of the ban on U.S. beef imports through the FTA not only angered the Korean public for safety reasons but also stirred resentment due to a perceived stronger American trade dominance in Korea threatening its national food sovereignty (Hong and Cheng, 2007).
More than that, contentious issues in the FTA negotiations included large sectors of other areas including pharmaceuticals, automobiles, agriculture, and foreign film screening quotas.

Regarding the pharmaceutical industry reforms, Korea was also demanded to enforce pharmaceutical patent rights and change its government’s reimbursement system for *negative list* items under which all medicine and medical devices would receive government reimbursements, unless the item was listed on the government’s exception list. The United States proposed to shift to a *positive list* system under which all medical products appearing on the list would be eligible for the government’s reimbursement (Cooper, Manyin, Jurenas, and Platzer, 2010) Under this proposal, although it would increase transparency for patent rights, it would make it more difficult for domestic drug products to be included on the government’s list due to the life of government protection on domestic pharmaceuticals, causing strong opposition from the domestic pharmaceutical industry in Korea (2010).

In automobile trade, Korea was required to abolish discriminatory policies toward U.S. automobile imports and also tighten its export regulations for complying with the U.S. Clean Air Conservation Act upon the implementation of the FTA. However, Korean political elites accepted US position, considering this US position, considering these FTA measures would in the long-run promote their domestic auto industry more competitively in the world market (Cooper et al. 2010). With regard to agricultural products, the U.S. sought increases in its export farm markets to Korea; however, the matter of relaxing domestic protections on rice imports became sensitive enough to become a “make or
break” issue for the final Korean negotiating position. Realizing the internal sensitivity, the United States conceded exceptions for rice imports under the bilateral treaty; however, it recognized that Korea should continue abiding under its existing multilateral trade commitments to increase its foreign rice imports until 2014 (2010). Thereafter, the U.S. reserved the right to re-negotiate rice exports.

The U.S. also bargained for the end of the film screen quota system protecting Korean domestic films upon implementation of the FTA, which had previously limited the number of foreign films aired in Korean theaters. The Korean domestic film industry strongly resisted this measure by participating in mass protests. To try to appease the domestic film industry, the Korean government reached a compromise with the U.S. proposing to reduce by half the prior screening quota. Nonetheless, the U.S. refused to accept this counter proposal. In 2006, President Roh compromised in favor of the U.S. demands by lifting the domestic screen quotas, which angered public sentiment in the domestic film industry and also led to more opposition in the form of organized protests (2010). In February and March 2006, President Roh attempted to hold public hearings to promote and defend the KORUS FTA negotiations. Nevertheless, the sessions lasted less than 20 minutes due to the level of violence encountered.

In the six years leading up to the ratification of the FTA Treaty between the United States and Korea, more than 300 civil organizations gathered in joint protests opposing the KORUS FTA negotiations. The diverse set of social activists included laborers, farmers, students, religious clergy, professionals, young and old, as well as members of the Democratic Labor Party. Organizers staging events nationwide in the
anti-FTA resistance campaigns used several forms of protests, including mass demonstrations, door to door canvassing, meeting forums and speeches, public concerts, and extensive internet petition campaigns (Ha, Joo, Kang, Lah, and Jang, 2009). However, after several years of contentious negotiations, on November 22, 2011, the Korean National Assembly endorsed the KORUS FTA; thereafter the agreement went into effect on March 15, 2012.

This chapter has focused on the history of Korean social movements and their interactions with democratic and neoliberal reforms. Korean civil society began growing rapidly when the Korean government turned away from its authoritarian rule spurred on by the intense popular pursuit of pro-democracy movements. In the context of increasing pressure placed on the nation-state by transnational companies, the Korean social movement also gained political opportunity in its relationship with the state. Thus, the state became weakened by both the results of democratization and the growing presence of neoliberal power. Although such change and political opportunity have given civil society more visibility in the public political discourse, Korean civil society, nevertheless, still remains a weakened party in bargaining with the state and transnational companies. Further, as the state yields to the forces of neoliberal globalization, the logic of the market continues reorganizing civil society and the social relations of society. As is similarly stated by Jürgen Habermas, the *Lifeworld* of civil society becomes colonized by money and power, shrinking the civil society (Habermas, 1987).

Remembering the bitterness and chaotic experiences of the IMF reform a decade earlier, Korean civil society began strongly resisting another neoliberal policy proposed
as a free trade agreement with the United States. Asserting its “people before profit” central organizing theme, the movement grew into a massive scale opposing government’s negotiation with the United States. However, would civil society be able to transform society with a counter-hegemonic movement? What would be the political opportunities, frames, resources used for advancing the counter-hegemonic movement? What were the major activities of civil society to change society through their collective action? In the next chapter, the study will further examine the development of the anti-FTA movement in Korea as a case study, providing for a thorough analysis of political opportunity, the framing process, resource mobilization, and organizational activities of the movement.
CHAPTER FIVE

The Struggle against Global Economic Governance

Figure 8. 2008 US Beef Import Candlelight Protests (Nam. S. Y. 2009)

Candlelight demonstrations by Korean civil society, held in South Korea in 2008, erupted over the government’s position’s on the U.S. beef deal negotiated as part of the KORUS FTAs. See OhmyNews, “Candlelight 2008 and behind the scenes in the beef deal.” (May 10, 2009)
5.1 Anti-Free Trade Agreement Movement

The concept of civil society in this study is consistent with the liberal school’s tradition referring to civil society as an autonomous, voluntary organization composed of individuals and groups aiming at social change in the fight against state domination (Bratton 1989; Diamond 1994; Habermas 1989; Kim 2000a, Steinberg, 1997). In the liberal tradition, while civil society includes a broad range of people positioned between the private and public sphere, it is particularly represented by those refusing to accept the authoritarian system of domination by the state. In the context of the anti-neoliberal globalization movement, civil society is regarded as a collective effort of social actors organized to counter the interests of powerful groups of the state and market (Hadiz, 2006). In discussing civil society within this purview, the nature of civil society is closely associated with the social movements demanding social change and liberation from marginalization.

In this study, I seek to understand whether or not civil society is capable of changing society through counter-hegemonic movements opposed to global market hegemony. My related research questions are: Was the anti-FTA movement a counter-hegemonic of civil society seeking social change in the newly emerging global order? What were the characteristics and roles of actors within the anti-FTA movement? What were the opportunities, ideologies, and resources of the movement? In defining counter hegemonic movements, the study follows the Gramscian notion of counter hegemonic politics grounded in concrete social action and an understanding of the social environments derived from a critical assessment of the reality (Gramsci, 1967). In this
view, instead of staying in the consciousness of the moment, counter-hegemonic actions critically raise questions about the realities of social settings, thereby breaking out of the traditional ontological assumptions that the system is always functional. In this way, critical minded individuals gather to share their consciousness for building more effective solidarities through collective action (Kiros, 1985). Thus, the current case seeks to analyze the Korean anti-FTA movement, which is not well known in North America and Europe by providing updates on the literature of the movement’s political opportunity, development, and framing, as well as the activities of the social movement organizations (SMOs), while developing an understanding the roles and practices of civil society within the movement.

5.2 Political Opportunity of the Movement

Political process theory (PPT) stresses the importance of the roles of political opportunity, framing process, and organizational structures by which a mobilized people can make use of in collective actions opposing powerful groups. Assuming that the built-in availability for social protests lies within the political institution, the theory holds that the success of a social movement largely depends upon the: (1) openness of the political system, (2) existence of political allies, (3) stability of political alignments, and (4) presence of state repression in countering the movement (McAdam 1996; Tarrow 1983; Tilly 1978). Examining a movement and its interaction within a larger political and economic context, PPT uses these combined factors for analyzing the rise, decline, and outcome of contentious politics aiming to reach political agreements for resolving social
grievances. In this context, the amount of political opportunity, power, and the appearance of state repression play important roles in collective behavior. Thus, this section will examine how these opportunity factors characterize the Korean anti-FTA movement.

Korea, when joining the OECD in 1996, became the second Asian nation to join the organization since Japan joined in 1964. It has since been recognized as an active member of the international community following its global standard. President Kim Dae Jung’s award of the 2000 Nobel Peace Prize for advancing human rights and democracy drew much public attention to the human rights issue in Korean society. Further, Ban Ki Moon’s election in 2007 as the Secretary General of UN succeeding Kofi Annan, as well as his unanimous re-election in 2011, also drew significant public attention to Korea’s active participation in international community and its global human rights agenda. Each of these events created political pressure on the Korean government to continue democratic and human rights initiatives; it also provided, however, favorable political opportunity for civil society to expand in this environment.

While the Korean state had made significant progress in becoming a developmental state globally by reforming its authoritative rule after the 1987 June Democracy Movement, the negotiations of the KORUS FTAs did not include many concessions to civil society. The workings within the government still, in many ways, mirrored the legacy of the former authoritarian institutional mechanisms in Korea, exampled by the one-sided policy making decisions of a small number of ruling political elites (Schmidt, 2001). For the ruling structure, neither the opposition party stakeholders
or the interest of social group actors, were viewed as constructive partners for building public consensus; rather, they were treated as a stumbling blocks for the ruling party’s policy making mechanisms.

Over the years leading up to the ratification of the KORUS FTA in November 2011, the anti-FTA movement had gained considerable momentum from the general public in voicing its opposition to the treaty. However, despite strong opposition from both civil society and opposition parties, the ruling party paid little attention to the voice of civil society, continually moving negotiations forward with the United States and pushing for a final agreement, resulting political chaos. On the day of the treaty’s ratification, an opposition law maker from the Democratic Labor Party (DLP) set off tear gas in the chamber, thereby blocking the FTA ratifications just prior to the session’s start (Yonhap News, 2011). Such chaotic controversy had never happened in Korean political history. Discounting the severe disruption created by the opposition, the session was restarted soon after order was restored. The ruling party, occupying the super-majority of seats in the National Assembly, set out to ratify 14 separate sections of the treaty within a 30 minute session.

Such apparent inability of the ruling political party to work out policy disagreement with the opposition parties and civil society in a coordinative manner provoked a strong backlash from civil society throughout all of the FTA negotiations. In 2008, the social conflict was exacerbated by President Lee Myoung Bak’s (2008-2012) concessions to U.S. demands to lift the ban on imports of U.S. beef, a move made in preparation for the ratifying vote of the KORUS FTA. This decision sparked the
country’s largest anti-U.S. beef and anti-government movement in Korean history. Numerous candlelight vigils and protests in opposition to the treaty spread on both the street and online community during this time. The wide-spread use of the Internet enabled a shift from conventional protest practiced on the street, to another form of effective protest. Multiple cyber communities emerged in the opposition movement and created a space for information exchange and discussion between movement activists and protest participants. Cyber space also turned into the another space of struggle where online attacks on the computer servers for the Blue House (Chong Wa Dae) and the National Police Department resulted in web-server outages (Jungang Ilbo, 2008).

As the movement intensified, growing beyond the government’s control, the state began using coercive measures for countering the movement, banning all anti-FTA protests and issuing arrest warrants for movement activists. The government confiscated office desktop computers, documents, as well as protest items from civil organizations. To disperse public demonstrations from protest sites, the government used aggressive tactics against protestors, such as water cannons during freezing winter weather, arresting hundreds for participating in illegal protests.

While human rights initiatives and global economic governance in Korea provided some level of political opportunity for civil society in building confidence and solidarity, taking advantage of the opportunities when opposing the state was another matter. The opportunity proved limited where the state’s power was centralized and in the hands of a small number of political elites. In such society, however, counter hegemonic movements can emerge to challenge the leadership using Gramsci’s ‘war of position’
(1967). By organizing and networking efforts within the anti-FTA movement, the leadership of Korean civil society, envisioning a more inclusive and democratic political mechanism for dealing with the heterogeneous social problems, attempted to build an alternative hegemony to change their marginal status. The following section, then, discusses the development of the anti-FTA movement, illustrating how the movement emerged, transformed and responded to the state, and eventually dwindled.

5.3 Development of the Anti-FTA Movement in Korea

The anti-FTA movement was one of the largest contemporary social movements in Korean history. Its inception was in 2003 when Korean negotiators began pursuing separate FTA negotiations with Chile and Japan. A series of mass demonstrations led by farmers and peasant organizations were carried out almost daily during 2003. However, in January 2006, the opposition movement to the new bilateral FTA negotiations with the United States grew quickly into a national scale far exceeding any previous anti-FTA movement. Realizing that the public sensitivity was growing rapidly, the Korean government sought first to negotiate with the United States without much publicity.

However, when the news was released that the Korean negotiators had conceded to the U.S. on two highly publicized aspects of the free trade agreement involving relaxation of the import ban on U.S. beef and an increase in the percentage of foreign film quotas in Korea, a strong public reaction was triggered, particularly from the stakeholders of trade union bureaucracies, agriculture, the film industry, and other concerned citizens. First, in January 2006, the film industry’s representatives expressed
opposition by holding press conferences criticizing the proposed screen quota system and calling for the Korean government’s withdrawal from the current FTA negotiation. The proposed Korean film quotas effectively would reduce the number of domestic Korean films that could be shown in Korea, down from 146 days per year (40%) to 73 days per year (20%) (Hong, 2006). In February 2006, prominent Korean filmmakers and actors, including Im GunTaek, Ahn Sungki, Choi Minshik, and Chang Donggun, along with other leaders from citizen groups, staged a sit-in protest and also attended a large-scaled outdoor rally with 3,000 protestors. While the issue of cultural diversity was being demanded by the Korean film industry a series of one man demonstrations conducted by public figures and Korean actors were carried out (Noh 2006). These events garnered so much public attention due to the actors’ celebrity status, the KORUS FTA began taking on the appearance of public debate in Korea.

In the meantime, Korean farmers had taken their place in opposition by interrupting a February 2, 2006, public hearing sponsored by the Korean Foreign Ministry with American negotiators in attendance. Soon after the hearing had begun, it was abruptly abandoned by government officials when the farmers’ group staged a sit- in protest shouting their slogans, “We are against the bilateral free trade agreement talks between the United States and South Korea” (Reuters, Feb.2, 2006). Although, a foreign ministry official told the American counterparts in the midst of the protest that they could not continue the sessions as planned, both governments continued to meet in private negotiations. The next day, the Korean Minister for Trade, Kim Hyun Chong, traveled to Washington D.C. to meet the United States trade representative, Robert Portman, and
with Congressional representatives to ‘fast-track’ the agreement through the U.S. Congress.

A significant development in the organized anti-FTA movement occurred in March 2006, when more than 300 allied groups formed the Korean Alliance against the Korea-U.S. FTA (KoA), a large umbrella coalition singly focused on opposing the KORUS FTA. The KoA drew support from a diverse, progressive civic and political sector of Korean civil society, including the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU), the Korean People’s Alliance (KPA), Korean Peasant’s League (KPL), and the Democratic Labor Party (DLP). The alliance was formally developed for the purpose of organizing protest activities not only domestically, but also in the U.S. where it sent protest delegations to Washington, D.C., Seattle, and Montana during each of the earlier rounds of FTA negotiations (KoA 2007). The KoA attempted to also reach out elsewhere internationally by building coalitions with immigrant communities, labor unions, and other anti-neoliberal organizations. The KoA’s protesting delegation on visits to the United States built solidarity with the American-based Korean Americans against War and Neoliberalism (KAWAN), which helped in organizing efforts for lobbying the U.S. Congress and holding anti-FTA protests in Washington.

July 14, 2006, was the last day of the second round of KORUS FTA negotiation. A major protest started a week earlier, had reached its peak Wednesday July 12, when 25,000 demonstrators paralyzed the city of Seoul (KoA, 2006). Protestors coming together from hundreds of movement organizations across Korea in the rallies, including the Korean Alliance against the KorUS FTA (KoA), Korean Confederation of Trade
Unions (KCTU), Federation of Korean Trade Union (FKTU), Korean Teachers and Education Workers Union (KTEWU), Korean Farmers League (KFL) and film industry, were confronted by 20,000 armed police. Despite the severe weather conditions, the protestors publically rallied to urge the Korean government to withdraw from the KORUS FTA, claiming that it threatened their livelihoods and employment opportunities. In December 2006, public polls indicated that a majority of Korean citizens were withdrawing their support of the bilateral treaty with the U.S. (Katsiaficas, 2012). Sixty-two violent protests occurred in 2006 across Korea with thousands of people opposed to the treaty (Chosun Ilbo, 2007). In protests early in 2007, farmers in particular were at the center of increased radicalization of the anti-FTA movement as both the Korean and U.S. governments began focusing on agriculture agreements in the fourth round of FTA negotiations. Mindful of the sensitivities of Korean farmers to the opening trade discussions on agriculture, the Korean government negotiators secured protections for domestic rice production, but conceded on other imports of other United States agricultural commodities, including lettuce, tomatoes, beef, and pork (Song, 2011). Korean farmers continued their activism holding more intensified anti-FTA protests in 13 major Korean cities where they commonly carried outlawed weapons including burning sacks of rice dung at rallies.

As the demonstrations grew more violent, President Roh Moo Hyun prohibited anti-FTA demonstrations and censored several social movements’ organizational propaganda directed at the FTA. The government began arresting key leaders of the KoA, Oh Jong Ryul and Jung Gwang Hoon, and imprisoned many other activists (Bilaterals,
Although, the police no longer gave permission for KoA rallies, when the Democratic Labor Party (DLP) received a limited permit to stage a non-violent protest, the KoA replaced DLP members as the DLP members were leaving the demonstration site. However, the rally became more radical as demonstrators marched on. When police blocked their venues and confiscated their prohibited protest equipment, the KoA resorted to using guerrilla-style protest tactics, moving from one venue to another without giving notice to the police. On April 1, 2007, one day prior to the final settlement of the proposed FTA negotiations, a 56-year old taxi driver, and member of the KCTU, set fire to himself in front of the Hyatt Hotel in Seoul, the site of the final FTA round of negotiations (Yonhap News, 2007). Despite his death, treaty negotiations were completed the next day, resulting in not only more radicalization of the anti-FTA movement, but also stirring more Korean anti-Americanism and anti-government sentiment.

5.3.1 Transformed Movement: From Anti-FTA to Anti-US Beef and Anti-Government

Although the language of the KORUS FTA treaty was agreed to in 2007, it remained un-ratified by the U.S. and Korean legislative bodies. Prior to reaching the U.S. Congress, by law the FTA had to pass a 90-day of review, and importantly, it had to be approved by the Senate Committee on Finance to be passed on to the Senate for an up or down vote on the entire treaty without amendment. However, subsequent to the first agreement settlement in 2007, the U.S. had accused South Korea of maintaining its beef quarantine standard too high, and it began pressuring Korea to open its beef import market in full. The United States beef producers were not satisfied with the decline in the
demand for beef in Korea, which was once the industry’s third largest beef export market until 2003. In 2003, a rare bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), generally referred to as “Mad Cow Disease,” which was transmitted through specific organs and neurological tissues, or specified risk materials (SRM) of hoofed mammals, was discovered in an animal from the state of Washington (CNN, 2003).

This discovery caused a temporary ban of exported U.S. beef to Korea- one which was partially lifted in 2006. The majority of U.S. Congressional Democrats were not willing to support the George W. Bush administration’s (2000-2008) beef deal with Korea unless Korea opened its market entirely allowing beef imports again. In particular, Senator Max Baucus, a Montana cattle rancher, and Montana’s Democrat Senator said forcefully from his Chairmanship of the U.S. Senate Finance Committee, “I will oppose the Korea Free Trade Agreement; and, in fact, I will not allow it to move through the Senate, unless, and until, Korea completely opens its market to American cattle imports” (Bridges Weekly Trade News, Apr. 4, 2007). Max Baucus’ family has been involved in cattle ranching over several generations, and Montana is one of the primary beef producers in the U.S.

In the midst of such sensitive negotiations, Korea’s meat inspectors reported finding banned bone material in three separate shipments of processed beef shipped from the United States in August, October and again in November, which were considered violations of the beef regulation reinstating imports. Korean officials suspended the quarantine inspection of tons of U.S. beef, resulting in the shipments sitting in dockside warehouses awaiting its return to the U.S. (Yonhap News, 2006). Under the prior
bilateral agreement, U.S. beef processors were required to remove all bones, including spinal cord and brains, from cattle less than 30 months old. As Korea had earlier rejected a large volume of U.S. beef imports, the United States government proposed lowering the standards of Korea’s quarantine procedure, urging an application of the World Organization of Animal and Health (OIE) standards for classifying U.S. cattle as originating from a “controlled risk” country with respect to MCD (Giamalva 2008). According to the OIE protocol, the U.S. could export “boneless” as well as “bone in” cuts of beef from all aged cattle when specified risk materials (SRM) were removed from the beef products (2008: 3)

Due to the concern about MCD in Korea, to some extent generated by the anti-FTA movement, the Korean government insisted on abiding by the beef regulation within the original agreement. Accordingly, the primary standard to deny import of SRM with beef would remain in place, as well as the age import restriction requiring less than 30 month old beef. Kim Chang Sub, a Korean agricultural ministry official, stated, “South Korea will decide whether to ban U.S. beef imports after seeing if Washington takes sufficient measures” (New York Times, Aug. 2. 2007). As the issue became politically contentious between the two governments, the U.S. maintained pressure on Korea by promising Congress would not ratify the KORUS FTA unless Korea fully opened its beef market to the U.S. under the OIE standards (Yonhap News, 2007). Under the political pressure to secure the FTA, the Korean government conceded to the U.S. negotiators’ demands. In January 2008, the newly elected pro-business Korean president, Lee Myung Bak, accepted the OIE safety standards for importing U.S. boneless and bone-in beef,
regardless of the 30 month old age standard, as long as SRM\(^4\) animal parts potentially carrying BSE were removed and other conditions were met for delaying the timing of imports.

The pressure from members of Congress pressed the U.S. negotiators for full, immediate opening of the Korean market, regardless of the gradual reopening of trade that the Korean government had just proposed. During the second round of negotiations, held April 11-18, 2008, both sides held strongly to their positions. Nevertheless, the Korean government again later conceded to U.S. demands, and on April 18, 2008, both governments announced their reaching an agreement for Korea’s full reopening of its beef market to U.S. imports in accordance with the OIE standards for imports of beef. Additionally, the Korean government later agreed to import U.S. beef products regardless of age once the U.S. enhanced feed ban\(^5\) was in place in accordance with the Beef Protocol negotiated between two countries (Clemens, 2009).

The Korean government basically gave in to all U.S. demands over the beef deal, becoming the first nation to completely remove the ban on U.S. beef products irrespective of the age of the beef. The announcement of the government decision angered the public who viewed that the government was being pressured by the United States into accepting the one-sided bilateral agreement, and interpreted the U.S. beef deal as a symbol of a world super power dominating Korea. Newspaper accounts described

\(^4\) According to U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s BSE definition, SRMs includes the brain, skull, eyes, spinal cord, vertebral column and dorsal root ganglia of cow over 30 months of age. Also, it includes the tonsils and distal ileum from cattle, irrespective of any ages. See U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “About BSE,” http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvrd/bse/

\(^5\) According to the Beef Protocol, a U.S. ban on cattle feed would be applied to feeds containing the proteins derived from mammals intended for cattle due to the possibility of cross-contamination that risks BSE infection.
President Lee’s resumption of U.S. imports of beef with lower standards as abandoning Korea’s legitimate rights and health in order to consolidate U.S. political support (Lee 2008; Hankyoreh, 2008). Liberal party members accused Lee of reaching a “secret deal” with President Bush prior to his first summit in the U.S. in order to “kowtow” to Washington (Chang July 10.2008). For them, it was considered “humiliating diplomacy” (Korea Times, 2008). As the public was becoming anxious over health issues related to potential MCD, Korean civil society began developing harsher narratives criticizing Lee Myung Bak’s administration for agreeing to an unequal trade treaty with the U.S. at the expense of public health. Lee’s political approval rating subsequently dropped to a low point, by Korean society, only a few weeks after Lee’s inauguration.

In the midst of the growing public contention over imports of U.S. beef, on April, 29, 2008, the ombudsman television program of PD Notebook (PD suchup) aired a special report entitled, “Is U.S. Beef Really Safe?” Televised nationally on Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (MBC), the program raised controversial questions about safety issues associated with consuming U.S. beef affected by MCD. The program aired what it referred to as “scientific findings,” including information pointing to Koreans being more genetically vulnerable to MCD. It also showed footage of what was purported to be MCD infected American cattle as well as an interview with an American family who had lost their daughter to the disease. The program evoked an immediate, strong reaction from the public at large. The various civil and cyber communities increased their opposition in a coordinated effort pushing for the abandonment of the “beef deal” with the U.S., and also began an effective Internet campaign for the impeachment of President
Lee for “selling out the nation” to win U.S. political support (*Yonhap News*, May 7, 2008). The online blog of the presidential office was also so swamped by complaints about the government’s beef settlement, the server was temporarily shut down due to the series of negative posts updated continuously (*Jungang Daily*, 2008).

The various Internet communities denouncing the decision by the government and supporting President Lee’s impeachment received broad public attention. One of the online communities, the Center of National Movement to Impeach President Lee (www.antimb.net), launched the first anti-U.S. beef candlelight vigil on May 2, 2008, where over 10,000 people gathered at the *Cheonggye* Plaza in Seoul for the demonstration. A varied group of people, including women, laborers, white-collar professionals, and politicians participated in the movement rally, though the majority of these demonstrators were students from middle school to college. Their spontaneous mobilization was coordinated using text messages and communications by online chat. Without breaking into violence, they rallied, chanting, “Impeach the President.” Although President Lee had gained office by earning the largest electoral margin in decades, his popularity by June 2008 had fallen to 17 percent (*Korea Times*, 2008). In only a few days since the start of the petition, over 500,000 signatures solicited from the public were collected for impeaching the president.

The movement during this time sparked other organizations to initiate a series of related coordinated public demonstrations. The next day, on May 3, hundreds of Korean middle and high school students wearing their school uniforms, gathered at *Cheonggyecheon* for a vigil protest (*Chosun Daily*, 2008). Near the Chongro District in
central Seoul, over 6,000 others hearing of the event by text messages, gathered to join the candlelight protest. Protests using the night vigils grew enormously in scope within a short period of time and spread across multiple anti-U.S. beef candlelight vigils in other metropolitan areas of Busan, Gwangju, and Daegu. The government attempted to hold press conferences addressing the public concerns by sending government officials from the Ministry of Health to speak at public forums on issues related to consuming U. S. beef. Additionally, the U.S. Department of Agriculture held similar press conferences in Washington, pointing out the misleading assumptions spread about the safety of consuming U.S. beef.

Nevertheless, the public protests did not subside. Anti-beef and anti-government demonstrations became a daily event in Seoul and other major Korean cities. By May 6, 2008, the online petition campaigning for President Lee’s impeachment had reached 1.2 million signatures (Alicea, 2011). Realizing the movement’s growing influence, the government warned protestors that the anti-FTA demonstrations were now illegal and that subsequently the police would begin detaining demonstrators (Reuter, 2008; Ser, 2008). Despite the government’s warnings, protest grew intensified. During four days of public rallies, several hundred protestors were arrested. Between May 13 and 17, 2008, various civil groups organizing the movement held press conferences and forcefully demanded withdrawal from the FTA agreement. The candlelight vigils became symbolic of the anti-FTA movement, serving as free speech stages for any citizen wishing to voice his or her opinion about the FTA. Participating citizens during these vigils waved their
banners of “Anti-U.S. Beef”, and “Anti-Lee Myoung Bak,” and marched to the U.S.
embassy and to Cheong Wa Dae, shouting their political slogans.

In the meantime, the opposition United Democratic Party (UDP) moved to delay
the ratification of the beef agreement until Seoul and Washington had renegotiated it. As
a minor opposition party, the UDP showed its diplomatic pressure toward the U.S. by
regularly calling international attention to the necessity of “renegotiation.” The UDP held
press conferences with the foreign press corps emphasizing that Korea was the only
Asian country to have fully opened its domestic markets to U.S. beef products of any
aged cattle. It also publicized its efforts of sending Korean lawmaker delegations to the
U.S. House of Representative hearings to clarify its stance (Korea Times, 2008). Fearing
a deadlock on ratification of the FTA domestically, as well as internationally between the
two governments, President Lee’s ruling Grand National Party moved to postpone the
required ministerial notification of the U.S. beef deal for ten days.

The anti- U.S. beef movement, nevertheless, did not become less agitated. Public
events were continually staged as candlelight vigils criticizing President Lee for
oppressing NGO activities by arresting demonstrators and repressing freedom of
assembly and expression of opinions. They claimed the police traced the identities of the
main organizers of the movement during their peaceful protest rallies. As gatherings
continued to grow into mass demonstrations, on May 22, 2008, seventy-eight days after
taking office, President Lee apologized for “lacking [governmental efforts] to seek
sufficient understanding and collect opinions from people.” Lee further mentioned, “I
humbly accept the point that government neglected to fathom the people’s mind.” “I feel
“sorry” (USA Today, May 22.2008). At the end of his speech in the Presidential Office, he bowed to the nation and asked for national cooperation. His attitude appeared unusually humble and straightforward; nevertheless, members of the UDP called his apology “hypocritical,” and challenged thousands of protestors to continue marching in rallies, demanding a nullification of the deal. Lee’s appeasement attempt thus failed to calm public anger.

On June 5, 2008, a three-day continual protest organized by the People’s Association for Measures against Mad Cow Disease (PAMCD) was begun. More than 8,000 protestors rallied in downtown Seoul while holding anti-government signs. A 40 year old man burned himself to death in opposition to the FTA, further fueling the public anger (Associated Press, 2008). On June 10, 2008, the largest public demonstration in Korean history took place in Seoul where estimates of more than one million people gathered to conduct a candle light vigil. Holding candles and shouting “renegotiate!,” the event was also commemorating the 21st anniversary of the June Democratic Movement. A protest organizer, Jang Dae Hyun, in an interview with the AP, said, “President Lee hasn’t listened to the voices of people.” “We still don’t have a genuine democracy in our country” (Associated Press, June 10, 2008). About 20,000 police were deployed at the event blocking the Gwanghwamon Street to the U.S. Embassy and the road to the office of President (MWC News, June 10, 2008). Chung Woon Chun, the Korean Minister of Agriculture, appeared to speak at the protest offering his apology to the people, but to no effect. The President’s entire cabinet offered its resignation, including Prime Minister Han Seung Soo, each taking personal responsibility for the political crisis over the FTA.
negotiations (Reuters, 2008). Since President Lee’s inauguration in February, the transformation of the anti-FTA movement represented a continual political crisis for the new government, as was outwardly evidenced in downtown Seoul where streets were blocked and turned into raucous protest zones daily due to the anti-FTA and anti-government protest activities.

On June 18, 2008, President Lee offered his second apology in less than a month at a news conference where he stated, “Even for an urgent national issue, I should have paid attention to what people want. Sitting on a hill near Cheong Wa Dae on the night of June 10, watching the candlelight vigil, I blamed myself for not serving people better. I and my government should have looked at what the people want regarding food safety more carefully. But we failed to do so and now seriously reflect on the failure” (Hankyoreh, June 20, 2008). He further explained that his administration had no other choice than to pursue the KORUS FTA with the United States fearing that renegotiation of the beef deal would result in a perilous backlash on the Korean economy. President Lee’s apology seemed more serious than the first when he honestly addressed his concerns about a renegotiation of the beef deal would result in risking the KORUS FTA and losing the opportunity to boost exports that the Korean economy was heavily dependent upon. President Lee acknowledged that he did not pay proper attention to the potential risks of the beef deal on public health upon lifting the government restrictions in the quarantine process, even though he admitted that the beef deal in favor of U.S. demands seemed inevitable. He promised the public that he would not import U.S. beef unless the cattle age restriction was renegotiated. Lee was somewhat confident in this
regard because he had discussed the situation with U.S. President George W. Bush over the phone prior to the news conference and Bush had agreed to re-consult over the matter at the next negotiation to calm the Korean public concerns (Yonhap News, 2008).

President Lee also addressed separate environmental concerns taken up by social movements in Korea, which were opposed to the construction of an inland waterway project connecting four of Korea’s largest rivers, as was his election pledge. Environmentalists, who were also in solidarity and supporting the anti-FTA movement, were concerned that by building the waterway it would degrade the drinking water resources providing nearly for two-thirds of the Korean public (Yonhap News, 2008; The Korea Times, 2008). Moreover, because of the tensions related to the beef deal and negotiations for the FTA, all of Lee’s pro-business policies were also challenged by people. Lee in his second apology also addressed the issues related to privatization, which had become a sensitive issue for people participating in the anti-government movement in alliance with the anti-FTA collective movement. He acknowledged the public’s fears about his government’s initiative to privatize water, gas, electricity, and health insurance, each of which was a state-run service. Lee mentioned that although his administration would gradually reform the public sector, the action would not be concluded without consulting public opinions. He also promised he would ensure there would be no rapid increases in rates or layoffs due to privatization.

Despite the president’s second apology on the nationwide broadcast, the public demonstrations did not cease. On the evening of June 20, 2008, another candlelight vigil was organized by the PAMCD, continuing through the next day and into to the evening
of June 22. Although President Lee was not promised better terms by the United States when re-consulting on the beef deal, he was convinced further concessions by the Korean negotiating team would not be necessary. Yet, the U.S. did not accept Korea’s demand on the renegotiation. On June 26, the Korean government was expected to issue the ministerial notification clarifying the terms of U.S. beef imports. The news released that the government’s decision was to remove all age restrictions on beef upon passage of the ‘enhanced feed ban’ provision, which was not accordance with Lee’s earlier promises, resulted in violent protests. Social movement organizers who had gathered for a night protest rally on June 25 renewing its call to nullify the ministerial notification and public enraged. Clashing with the police, demonstrators began shouting “The war has begun!” and throwing stones at police and wielding steel pipes (Bloomberg, June 26, 2008). Kwak No Chung, a spokesperson for the KCTU, said bluntly, “We don’t trust the government’s assurances anymore.” (Bloomberg, 2008) As protestors attempted to climb over and push through the police barricades of buses encircling the Gwangwamoon blocking the protesters’ advance to Cheong Wa Dae, the police repelled the crowds using water cannons (Yonhap News, 2008). More than 100 protestors were arrested during the night and many protestors and policemen were severely injured. Meanwhile, hundreds of other protesters marched to protests held at Young In port in Busan where frozen meats imported from the U.S. were stored at dock-side facilities. The continual demonstrations, taking place between the evening of June 28 and June 29, were the largest protests since the June 10 massive rally in Seoul. Movement organizers estimated that more than 200,000 people participated in these protests (Bloomberg, 2008).
On June 28, 2008, hundreds of protestors marched in the Central City District of Seoul where U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was scheduled to address the Korean public assuring them about the safety of U.S. beef products, as well as to discuss the North Korea nuclear threat (*The New York Times*, 2008). However, just as Secretary Rice shifted her attention to North Korean issues, demonstrators located outside began shouting for “renegotiation” of the beef deals. The next day, the Korean Metal Workers’ Union, representing 230 companies, including Kia and Sang young, stopped work to protest against the FTA negotiations as well as call for improvement in working conditions (*The Financial Times*, 2008). Additionally, during protests of June and July, the religiously based civic organizations, such as the Catholic Priest Association for Justice (CAJ), convened for outdoor masses in support of anti-FTA protestors. More than 18,000 gathered for one event designed to create moral support for the demonstrations. As the rally soon grew out of control with protestors hurling stones at police, the police attempted to seal off major roads with bus blockades. Protestors were beaten down with clubs and shields. All totaled between 300 and 400 marchers were injured with 112 police officers wounded in the incident according to police reports (*The New York Times*, 2008).

As the organized protests transformed their political struggles of an anti-government nature, the movement organizers expanded their rhetoric drawing support from anti-FTA and anti-U.S. beef movement supporters. They drew coalition support from groups in opposition to Lee’s overall pro-business reform policies, which included the privatization of the public sector, national health insurance, and President Lee’s
‘Grand Waterway Project. The movement’s transformation and growth into a strong anti-government campaign became a serious attempt to bring down the Lee government (Munhwa Daily 2008). Responding to the constant violence used in protests, Kim Kyung Han, Minister of Justice, signaled that the government’s patience was over, stating: “We will chase those who instigate violent protests and those who use violence to the end and bring them to justice” (The New York Times, June 29, 2008). He also warned that police would begin using tear gas in the future, a measure which had been prohibited since 1999 to prevent escalation of violent clashes between citizens and the police. As the government had warned of “stern action” against violent protests, on June 27, 2008, the police issued arrest warrants for leaders of the PAMCD and other leading protest organizations for sponsoring protests and violating governing demonstration laws. On June 30, the police raided the social movement organizations of PAMCD, Korea Solidarity for Progressive Movement (KSPM), and the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD), confiscating desktop computers, boxes of documents, slogan placards, and banners, and also detained key leaders for questioning and issued arrest warrants for others for sponsoring illegal protests (International Herald Tribune, 2008).

In response to the state’s actions, religious activist organizations including the Catholic Priests’ Association for Justice (CPAJ) and the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) and Buddhist groups took further control of the protests rallies attempting to establish moral responsibility in containing the intense situation. During the month of July, CPAJ led held outdoor mass demonstrations and other religious based
organizations, such as the YMCA, and Buddhist groups, had participated in other nonviolent marches, criticizing police brutality (Bloomberg, 2008). On July 1, 2008, more than 20,000 people participated in the rally led by CPAJ’s 200 priests, whose presence prevented more clashes between the riot police and the demonstrators. (Bloomberg, 2008) Overall, during the month of July, approximately one million Koreans joined in the peaceful rallies.

Significantly, the KCTU and its 511,000 members staged a controversial short-term strike in opposition to the government’s lifting of the ban on U.S. beef imports, closing down production lines at the Hyundai Motor and Kia plants in several cities across the country (9 News, 2008) Later, the president’s office made a public statement denouncing the illegal strike, calling it damaging to the national economy. The work stoppage did in fact had an immediate panic impact on the Korean economy. As Lee had stated, the disruption had created uncertainty in the Kopsi stock market index causing a 2.6 percent decline over 18 days, which was the biggest decline in months for the index (9 News, 2008). Additionally, the economic instability was reflected in a spike in the consumer price index, the highest since the IMF financial crisis. In reaction to these events, at the direction of President Lee, the Seoul Federal District Courts issued nine arrest warrants against the leadership of the KCTU, including Chairman Lee Seok Heang, Vice Chairman Jin Young Ok, and Secretary-General Lee Yong Sik, charging them with organizing the work stoppage at Hyundai and Kia causing $188 million in manufacturing losses, as well as other economic damages to the economy (Haig, 2008). Because of the crackdown and governmental pressure placed on organizers of the movements, the
PAMCD announced on August 7, 2008, that it would no longer sponsor anti-U.S. beef protests or candlelight vigils after Korea’s Independence Day of August 15, 2008. On August 14, the Korean government ordered the producers of PD Notebook to apologize publicly for causing the earlier widespread panic about the latent risks of MCD, and for exaggerating their claims (Korea Times, 2008).

While the state was receiving criticisms for oppressing the freedom of the press, it decisively began enforcing the public demonstrations against the FTA it had outlawed. By prohibiting any form of anti-government and anti-U.S. beef movement, the government was bidding to reduce its risk of losing the bilateral FTA treaty with the United States. Although the momentum of the anti-U.S. beef and anti-FTA movement eventually dwindled under the intensity of the government pressure, opposition to it did not cease entirely. On March 15, 2012, the KORUS FTA agreement went into effect between Korea and the United States. For five years and eight months, since the beginning of negotiations until the ratification of the agreement, Korean civil society had waged war against the ongoing FTA negotiations. Despite President Lee’s initial popularity, having gained the largest electoral vote margin in decades of Korean presidential elections, his government was faced with intense political hardship and lacked the public support for many of his other initiatives due to the strong resistance of Korean civil society.

The unprecedented mobilization of the civil movement in Korea occurring post-IMF financial crisis, was responsible for forcing the Korean state to break its rapid final shift into a neoliberal economy, returning to its former protectionist system. This study
attempts to understand the nature of the hegemonic system and the counter movement worldview opposing its dominance. To understand the worldview and the practice of civil society activists within the anti-FTA movement, the study will analyze in the next section how the movement framed the social problems in the oppressed community.

5.4 Framing the Issues in the Anti-FTA Movement

Social movements have been understood as the organizational effort made by agency desiring to bring about social change (Jenkins 1983; McAdam and Snow 1997). The success of movements is often dependent upon the effectiveness of the narratives used for explaining the social problems faced by agency. With convincing ideological grounds to kindle public sympathy while utilizing favorable political opportunity successful movement draw public support for the movement. The Korean society, in particular, has prided itself in its strong identity as a homogeneous nation state. Thus, developing effective narratives of social problems, using persuasive and powerful ideology while appealing to national interests, is critical for mobilizing movements in Korean society. Although the link between developing an effective social movement and calling attention to injustices is not always apparent, dissenters regularly reflect and debate on the social problems they face throughout the ongoing process of a social movement. In the social movement field, the process of properly defining meaning, reflecting on, or articulating reasons for collective action, is referred to as framing the problem (Snow and Benford 1988; 1992).
Snow describes framing as “the conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action.” (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996: 6) Through the ongoing processes of defining the social problem, social actors of civil society not only define the scope of collective action, but they also construct the ideology and worldview leading to the movement. This reveals the nature of a hegemonic system and counter movement worldview opposing its dominance. In the next section, the study highlights the articulated concerns of the anti-FTA movement by which activists identified and framed the problems of the free trade agreement issues. These issues reveal their worldview ideology driving them into the collective movement.

5.4.1. Problem of Hurting the Economy and Livelihood of People

To initiate the anti-FTA movement, the activist leaders first looked more deeply into the practical realities of the socioeconomic problems caused by the free trade agreement. To strengthen the movement, the activists chose to increase opposition to the FTA by first identifying specific problems linked to the oppressive nature of the FTA policies, and then, developing related narratives that particular groups and individuals in the general public could recognize as affecting their lives. In the case of the anti-FTA social movement, activists understood that Koreans were already deeply concerned about the potential negative impacts of neoliberal policy on the Korean economy at the expense of exploited Korean lives. Framing the oppressive nature of the FTA policies, activists therefore characterized the treaty as destroying the national economy and every aspect of
the private social and economic lives of ordinary citizens. Following in Box 1 are narrativites contained in the KoA pamphlet entitled “Twelve Reasons Why We Should Oppose the Korea-U.S. FTA” (KoA, 2011). Proving to be very effective in evoking responses, it was typically distributed during candlelight vigils to mobilize widespread support.

**Box 1. Twelve Reasons Why We Oppose the Korea-US FTA**

1. **Skyrocketing prices of medicines and medical fees will threaten the health care system.**

   The Korea-US FTA will extend the patent delaying the introduction of low price generic drugs (approval-paten linkage). Moreover, it will allow multinational pharmaceutical companies to reject the price control by the government (independent review process). As a result, patients’ medical cost will go through the roof jeopardizing the health care budget. With the ratification of the Korea-US FTA, the conditional operation of for-profit hospitals in free economic zones in 20 cities will become permanent. In the end, they will drive the entire medical cost up.

2. **The Investor-State Dispute (ISD) will incapacitate public and welfare policies.**

   According to the Korea-US FTA, multinational corporations can bring the South Korean government to the international arbitration tribunal to demand compensation. The South Korean government has no choice but to be dragged into a costly arbitration process. This is because of the automatic consent clause. The Canadian government was brought to the arbitration tribunal when it banned the disposal of hazardous wastes by designating green-belt zones.

3. **There will be a flood of privatizations and jack up the prices including utility fees.**

   The South Korean government is planning to privatize railroads and gas. Once they are privatized, it is inevitable that the prices will rise. However, the government won’t be able to re-nationalize them once the Korea-US FTA is ratified because of ratchet mechanisms. South Korean ordinary working people are already suffering from high prices. Surely, the Korea-US FTA will further increase the utility fees.

4. **There will be a massacre of local shops.**

   Even today, with one large retailer operated supermarket in the neighborhood most of local shops are forced to close. These so called supermarkets like E-Mart and Homeplus compete with local shops and restaurants with low price products and foods. With the Korea-US FTA, these markets will thrive with less regulations. What was once a dream for ordinary working people who are forced to retire early or lost jobs to opening a local shop or a pizzeria has become a nightmare.
5. Say goodbye to foreign currency control even in a time of foreign currency crisis.

When the 1997 Asian financial crisis hit South Korea foreign capitals quickly withdrew like an outgoing tide. At such a time, a government can respond with financial safeguards like temporary limiting international transfers of foreign capitals. The Korea-US FTA make it clear that the precondition for any financial safeguard is that it will not harm commercial, economical, and financial interests of the US. Once in effect, the Korea-US FTA will make it impossible to control the flow of foreign currency even in a time of foreign currency crisis.

6. The Korea-US FTA will hurt South Korea’ trade balance.

They say that the Korea-US FTA will increase South Korea’s exports to the US. But the US is in an economic crisis. Millions of Americans are out of jobs and many lost their houses. After the NAFTA, the US trade surplus increased but 700,000 jobs in the US were reduced. How about Mexico? Mexico’s exports increased also. But, the economic situations of ordinary working people worsened. Polarization increased to a point. only 13 million out of the 40 million working age population had full-time jobs.


Prices of US and EU agricultural products are the cheapest in the world. Simply, it is because the US and EU governments give the biggest subsidies in the world. The farmers in the US annually receive around 22 billion dollars from the US government in direct subsidies. Such huge subsidies help to keep the prices of US and EU agricultural products low making it impossible for others to follow. While this is the reality, the Korea-US FTA will force the reduction of agricultural tariffs. This will destroy Korean agriculture.

8. The Korea-US FTA destroys environment.

The US government stated four pre-conditions to the signing of the Korea-US FTA demanded. One of them is eliminating the tax levied to automobiles with high carbon dioxide emission. As a result, South Korea is forced to drop the environment protection policy that taxes automobiles with high carbon dioxide emission. This is going against the global efforts to stop global warming. One of the many deregulations is related to GMO foods.

9. The Korea-US FTA is an unfair and unequal agreement.

Article 102 of the US implementing bill on the Korea-US FTA makes it clear that US law comes first in cases where the Korea-US FTA comes into conflict with the former. In contrast, the Korea-US FTA comes first in cases of conflicts with Korean law. The Korea-US FTA is treated as a domestic law in South Korea. The US implementing bill prohibits South Korean companies doing business in the US filing a legal suit in the US court in case of FTA related violation.
**Box 1 Continued**

**10. Integration of South Korea into the US-led world order will increase the regional tension in Northeast Asia.**

The Korea-US FTA will further integrate South Korea into the US-led world order politically and militarily. Northeast Asia is a highly volatile region where China and the US go head to head economically and militarily. The Korea-US FTA will only increase the tension in the region.

**11. This FTA is only for the 1%.**

The Korea-US FTA is an agreement only for the rich 1% and big businesses of both countries. Korean big businesses like jaebeols are welcoming it with open arms and actively promoting it in media advertisements. Why is this? Privatization of the public sector in South Korea would bring huge profits not only to the US big businesses but also to the Korean big businesses. For example, the privatization of healthcare would give profit-making opportunities to not only the US health insurance companies but also the Korean health insurance companies. The Korea-US FTA will deepen the polarization giving more to the rich 1% while taking more from the 99%.

**12. The 99% can stop the Korea-US FTA.**

Should every country accept it unconditionally just because the US government is pushing for the FTA? The answer is no. The US government has already tried to sign an FTA with Latin America (FTAA). But it failed when confronted with the protests from the people of Latin America. Matter of fact, all the FTAs that the US government initiated with countries in the Middle East, Africa and Asia failed or are not going anywhere. There is an exception. It is the Korea-US FTA. It is still alive. South Korea successfully blocked the full lift of the ban on the import of US beefs from cattle aged 30 or more months with the massive candlelight protests. If everyone stands up and say no to FTA, we have the rights to stop the Korea-US FTA. The 99% can stop the Korea-US FTA which is only for the 1%

KoA Statement (Nov.4, 2011). http://occupyfta.nofita.or.kr/search/label/Statement

According to Gerhards and Rucht (1992), the broader the scope of issues framed as problems, the greater the mobilization can become. As the scope of issues becomes wider the numbers of people supporting the movement from different sectors increases the size of the movement. By not limiting the particular interest groups of society appealed to with persuasive narratives, a wide range of issues were identified by the anti-FTA activists, including problems affecting the national economy, healthcare, film
industry, welfare, agriculture, environment, national sovereignty, and regional security. Although a diverse set of problems were posed, the general theme to the framing was that the treaty would hurt the livelihoods of the marginalized and would likely impact and deteriorate the living conditions of ordinarily people in the affected economy. According to their narratives, under such an oppressive structure of the Korea-U.S. FTA, the socially marginalized individuals would experience welfare cutbacks, lack of access to health care due to unaffordable drugs, severe income reductions, inflated prices, chronic poverty, and experience higher unemployment.

Many individual protestors in the movement often spoke about their personal concerns about the consequences of globalizing the Korean markets would have by recalling their own experiences during the 1997 financial crisis. In the understanding of many, the FTA treaty between Korea and the United States would only serve to exacerbate further their current situation. On July 14, 2006, the last day of the second round of FTAs negotiation, a female graduate student traveled to a metro station in Seoul to stage an individual protest by handing out leaflets to commuters. Aware of her own IMF reform experiences, she shared her views in the following statement about the FTAs identifying economic hardship as the foreseeable problematic result of FTAs, both in her private life and in the national economy as a whole:

The reason why I joined the anti-FTA movement is that I became very concerned as I see the process of KorUS FTA. Personally, I am majoring history. Historically speaking, there is a critical moment that people have to make a serious decision. I believe we have reached that moment as we deal with the FTA with US. I remember people like me in our mid-twenty experienced the impact of the IMF crisis on employment opportunity
as we graduated college back then. I saw many of my friends’ families who went to bankruptcies and I barely saw college graduates got a job back then. I believe KorUS FTA will likely bring the same impact on Korean economy. I have learned this as we experienced IMF crisis. *(Pressian, July 4, 2006)*

As she articulated her concerns, many in the movement had shared similar experiences of negative impacts of neoliberal reform, while some more than others suffered the results of diminished living conditions. In particular, those Koreans affected most by bilateral trade agreements were members of the farm peasant community. Since they were directly threatened by U.S. demands for limits on tariffs and opening of Korea’s domestic agricultural markets, liberalization for them was not simply a matter of negative impact or loss of profit, but one of survival.

Compared to the sizable advantage given U.S. agriculture operating on larger acreages with economies of scale, Korean small and medium-sized farmers had become non-competitive in the world market. Given that the average monthly income earned by Korean farmers was $1,400 per month, four times lower than U.S. farmers averaging $7,200 *(KoA 2007)* without government subsidies, these farmers would have few available options, other than giving up farming and becoming part of the increasing number of Korean urban poor. One of the movement’s protesting farmers identified problems with the FTA from his perspective. Calling attention to the government’s reform policies he stated,

*I have been working as a hardworking farmer who has been obedient to government’s new agricultural policies. The outcome is simple. When we have a good year of harvest we get nothing because the prices drop down. But in a bad year, we also get nothing because of cheap agricultural*
products imported from overseas. I have nothing but debts. This is the reality of Korean farmers (*People’s Solidarity for Social Progress News*, Oct. 26, 2006).

Based on his lived experiences, this farmer portrayed his understanding of the dominant discourse of government’s neoliberal policy. The inherent problems of the structure violence in market liberalization placed Korean peasants in economic hardship, constraining their agency to struggle for their very survival. Exerting his agency, he attempts to refute the imposition of the government’s dominant discourse that tells the peasant class that it must endure the hardship of fierce competition in the global food market. He articulates the alternative truth to the government that the Korean family farms are not something sacrificial to trade away in a treaty to a foreign state because the livelihood of farmers and their families are connected.

As economic circumstances similarly affected the marginalized poor in labor and other groups associated with the movement, these groups emerged to help frame collective arguments against the bilateral trade agreement. Criticizing the government, the KCTU identified and framed the interests of labor in terms of poor job security and working conditions as primary arguments for opposing the KORUS FTA:

The KorUS FTA will systematically encourage off-shoring, or global outsourcing. The “Rule-of-Origin” provisions of KorUS FTA allow up to 65% foreign content of the value of vehicles eligible for tariff-free treatment, using the Net-Cost Method. Thus, the agreement will encourage TNCs to outsource their production to neighboring low-wage countries such as China and Mexico. This will eventually result in the breakdown of domestic manufacturing industry and unsecure employment. The KorUS FTA is not a “Job-Creating” FTA, but “Job-Killing” Pact. Moreover, the guarantee of basic labor rights by the two governments is poor and many key international labor standards have not
been observed. Even though stable, decent-wage jobs are replaced with temporary, precarious ones, the governments are overlooking these problems. Workers are being forced to work more with less pay, and many of working families are thrown under the poverty line. Moreover, migrant workers are facing severe exploitation, as they are deprived of their rights (“Why We Oppose FTA,” KCTU, Jan. 2011).

The KCTU expressed their concerns over the harmful effects of the FTA on the economic position of Korea’s workers and their families. Especially emphasized was job insecurity and worsened livelihoods, which were becoming serious problems for the Korean urban poor. In addressing such issues, the KCTU referenced their research finding that approximately 56 percent of its 700,000 members were already irregular workers receiving less than half of full-time employees’ wages (Grenberg 2007). The KCTU perceives that the FTA ratified treaty would likely further exploit irregular workers and the urban poor with new pro-business policies and used this to generate collective support for the movement.

A blue-collar protestor also expressed a similar concern at a KCTU rally about the KORUS FTA stating, “Since the IMF crisis, millions of people became jobless, bankrupt, and families were torn apart. The KORUS FTA will cause more disastrous impacts on our job market and will also weaken labor rights. We came out for our survival. Our struggles as laborers are legitimate. We, the poor, farmers, workers, and concerned citizens will fight until they abolish the ratification of the FTA” (OhmyNews, Jun. 30, 2007). Despite the government’s propaganda that the KorUS FTAs would enhance the domestic economy and create more jobs by increasing exports to the U.S. in Korean civil society continued to criticize such policies as only squeezing the poor into fierce
competition. These frames proved immediate concerns for driving many Korean workers to participate in the opposition movement.

5.4.2. Identifying Neoliberalism as a Problem

As the movement became more unified in coalitions, activists grew aware that the privatization of public corporations, mass layoffs of workers, foreign takeovers of domestic weak corporations, and impacts to agricultural markets were each part of the same struggle—against neoliberalism (KoA, 2008). In discussing the movement’s agenda and how resistance strategies were derived in meetings, two activist leaders of the Korean Peasant League below describe the focus of the framing within the organization identifying neoliberalism as the most critical problem uniting their collective action.

There aren’t many disagreements among us about our broad ideological and political agenda to oppose neoliberal globalization and to build a more sustainable and just food system […] Peasants know. They know what neoliberal globalization does to them. They may not be familiar with the term, neoliberal globalization, but they know it by living it and by feeling it on their skin. So when we talk about the Korea-US FTA in front of them they actively participate in the discussion and they understand the new information very quickly. People used to think that we protest against the Korea-US FTA only to protect our interests. Solely to protect our rights to survival. This is true, partly. But we go beyond it, because neoliberal globalization connects us to others. […] Now people start seeing that it is not only us, peasants, who fight against the FTA Workers fight, the evicted fight, and students fight. Seeing such uprisings across social sectors help people realize that the peasants are not fighting only for our own interests and that the Korea-US FTA does affect all aspects of our society (Kim 2008: 170,179)

The peasant activist leaders describe how Korean peasants have felt the pressure of neoliberal globalization in their personal lives. By experiencing how their lives are
abandoned, thrown into poverty without governmental support, they construct their own first-hand knowledge about the effects of neoliberal globalization. Their personal experiences of the marginalizing structure of systemic inequalities by dominant neoliberalism were being experienced in other sectors of society, as well. As discussed, thousands of unemployed Korean industrial and trade workers were effectively forced to compete for temporary jobs by adapting to work requirement in multiple jobs and generally feeling as though they must work harder just to survive in their new economy. This shared experience as fellow victims of neoliberal globalization played an important role in building counter-hegemonic identity in Korean society. Capitalizing on the impacts of neoliberalism on peoples’ lives, activists utilized protests against the FTA treaty by linking it to the fight against neoliberalism. This resulted in a powerful tool of resistance against the dominant construction of reality.

On behalf of its growing number of participants, the anti-FTA movement activists framed the issue of the dominance of transnational corporations and the influence had over the state in negotiations, which ultimately, they contended in their framing, led to the oppression experienced by ordinary and marginalized people. The leadership argued, although the state’s role should be aligned with the rights of citizens, the changing role of the state in the neoliberal context was more influenced by the interests of the market forces. They argued that this condition inhibits the state’s ability to safeguard the wellbeing of ordinary citizens. The following comment published by the KoA illustrates their rhetoric on this point:
Without a doubt, the Korea-US FTA is an agreement only for the rich 1% and big businesses.... Once introduced, the Investor-State Dispute settlement (ISD) will prevent public regulators from curbing the corporate greed. The Korea-US FTA will privatize public corporations which will jack up the utility fees. It is a one-way ticket to privatization. There is no turning back for privatized and unregulated public corporations even if prices go out of control. Any [governmental] mechanism to protect small and medium businesses will be in violation of the Korea-US FTA. (KoA, Nov. 4, 2011)

The activists point out that the local elites and politicians take sides with the privileged classes, consisting of only the “1%” of society benefiting from the FTA, rather than representing the interests of ordinary people. Criticizing oppressive social practice, another KoA leader expressed his concerns during a candlelight vigil stating, “Only a handful numbers of people, such as President Roh, the Department of Commerce, and CEOs of Samsung, and Hyundai want the FTA while the majority of the public opposes it” (OhmyNews, June 30, 2007). In accordance with his view used to frame elites and big corporations, he contends that these only worked together for their interests as exploiters of the local resources, which threatens the wellbeing of ordinary people.

Since 1999, the KCTU expressed its opposition to neoliberalism as one of their major agenda items in their annual debate with the state and large local corporations. Forming coalitions with other labor organizations, they actively opposed then various state policies supporting the interests of neoliberalism, including labor rights revisions, privatization of commons, and implementing free trade economic zones in various port cities (KCTU 2008). The KCTU leadership vowed to work to end neoliberal reform in Korea and framed the problem of neoliberalism with strong rhetoric in its monthly newsletters, exampled by the following statement:
Our society has experienced a rapid polarization of the economy from the neoliberal policies instituted after the financial crisis of 1997. President Lee closely adheres to the logic of neo-liberalism as the principle for managing the country. Regarding public enterprises and the public sector in general, his plan is not to raise the quality of services for the people of the country, but to restructure them through marketization. Comments have been made regarding introducing market logic into the social welfare system as well. The Lee Myung-bak government is thus fully prepared to implement and systemize a winner-take-all neo-liberal competition regime. We are deeply concerned that a new age of authoritarianism, based on the sacrifice of the workers, peasants, and the socially dispossessed, may be approaching (KCTU Newsletters, Feb. 25, 2008).

The KCTU activists emphasized in their narratives that the adverse impacts of neoliberal reforms experienced since the 1997 financial crisis were linked to the turmoil in Korea created by the mandated economic restructuring and the socio-economic polarization, income disparities, job insecurities, and the weakened labor rights. The highlighting of such problems by the activists shares their understanding of the common origin of the struggle by the poor, farm peasant activists, laborers, and concerned citizens, was caused by neoliberalism. Cognizant of the common ground in one another’s struggles, the KCTU attempted to build a sense of “us” in the movement by creating a greater solidarity and a network of resistance with other social movement sectors. By connecting with others, they were better able to question the underlying ideology of the causes of structural violence, each group having members separately experiencing them. They were then better able to challenge the sources of the structure of the social oppression with greater understanding and collective knowledge. In addition, domestically, the KCTU sought to form other stronger coalitions against neoliberal policies by mobilizing its own opposition into splinter groups, such as the People’s
Committee to Oppose Neoliberalism (PCON) to focus more directly on neoliberal policies.

Similarly, the same sense of “us” used in connection with domestic communities, identifying the struggle against neoliberalism has potential for building even greater voice in a shared historical context in global communities. The anti-KORUS FTA movement branched out in transnational activism and anti-neoliberal struggle beyond its borders by lobbying the United States Congress and international corporations and organizations such as the WTO and IMF. The KoA attempted to consolidate its network with the Korean Americans against War and Neoliberalism (KWAN), and with the online based transnational network of Bilaterals.Org. The Korean Farmer’s League, in this same effort, networked with La Via Campesina, the transnational organization representing farm peasants fighting for food sovereignty of nations. Likewise, the KCTU and other labor organizations began building ties with the World Social Forum (WSF) sending its members to participate in workshops sponsored by the WSF. Each organization interacting with these transnational groups was benefited by sharing common experiences to fight more effectively against capital and multi-transnational corporations as well as gaining new insight from joint meetings on effective frames for favorable public support.

5.4.3. Loss of National Sovereignty

Another significant framing issue used by the anti-FTA movement was the problem of the loss of national sovereignty in Korea, which helped shift the anti-FTA movement into strong anti-American (anti-U.S. beef) and anti-government movements.
In this movement shift, ordinary Koreans perceived that the U.S. had been using its imperialistic sway with the Korean state by pushing it into unequal trade agreements and promoting its neoliberal ideology behind the scenes politically. America was being regarded as the hegemonic global power concerned more with expanding its own economic agenda than it was with free trade. One peasant activist comments on this issue, illustrating how leaders of the movement framed arguments that the Free Trade Agreement was producing a sense of loss in national economic sovereignty:

Our struggle against neoliberal globalization is yet another fight against the US. The government has always allowed the US to invade our national economy for decades. So our economy has been dependent on that of the US. In this context, our anti-globalization movement at the same time is a movement against the US and their continuing push for so-called free trade. The Korea-US FTA is another Eul-Sa Treaty, another Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty. Signing on the Korea-US FTA means a return to the colonial regime, the regime of the US this time, because the Korea-US FTA implies the economic annexation between two countries (Kim 2008: 209).

The activist makes the point that the U.S. was seen as a hegemonic power pushing FTAs around the world for profit and interprets its drive to open the Korean markets as another colonial practices experienced by Korea under Japan’s colonial rule. Korea’s former presidential secretary for economic affairs was quoted making similar comparisons of the Korea-FTA to a “second Eulsa Treaty of 1905,” symbolic of Korea’s loss of national independence to Imperial Japan (Chosun Daily, July 12, 2006). By conjuring images of the Eulsa Treaty in connection with the U.S. trade negotiations, actors of civil society were generating concern that a ratified FTA treaty would serve as the same legal basis for establishing American institutions in Korea as Japan had done
during its imperial era. Activists with the KoA, by attempting to create such concern were claiming Korean national sovereignty was at stake in the negotiations, and that Koreans had a legitimate right to fight for their independence. The following statement by a KoA speaker used this same problem at a rally in Seoul attempting to generate collective action by evoking a sense of Korean national identity.

[The] FTA means putting national economy, agriculture, education, culture, military, and health care into the mouth of US. This is what, Lee Wan-Young, the national traitor did to Japan a hundred years ago under the Japanese colonial rule. People! You came out to protest against such government are real patriots! (OhmyNews, Jun. 30. 2007)

The meaning of the narratives enflaming national identity in support of the anti-FTA movement was well understood by Koreans. Equating unresolved memories of Japanese past domination of Korean society with the new dominant neoliberal role of the U.S. FTAs was particularly effective in forming the opposition among Koreans against a continuing colonial power in Korea by the United States. Such perceptions were widely reinforced during anti-FTA rallies where demonstrators often voiced strong anti-American sentiment displaying many placards and banners such as “U.S. Imperialism,” “Oppose U.S. Economic Invasion!,” “Cultural Invasion: Out with Hollywood Movies!,” “Fat American Farmers Kill Our Korean Farmers,” and “U.S. Mad Cows Drive Koreans Mad!” (Hankeyreh, 2006, Chosun Daily 2007; 2008, Korea Times, 2008) All of these characterizations cast the United States in the role of invader of the Korean national, economic and cultural sovereignty. Such activity represented the movement’s motivational framing calling people into collective action.
Benford (1993b) and Gamson (1995) classified the effective use of motivational framing by creating *vocabularies of motive*, which evokes a sense of urgency and severity over an issue to compel people into action when adopted. Korean activists in the Anti-FTA movement used socially constructed vocabularies based on an urgent moral duty to act. These attempts involved creating narratives requiring all Koreans to enter the struggle against U.S. colonialism, charging that the U.S.-based multinational corporations would threaten not only Koreans’ private lives, but also their national independence. Reinforcing the urgency, activists warned that it would be too late once the legal system of the FTA had bound Korea to perform under the treaty once it had been institutionalized into law. Movement activists urged people to get involved since any national autonomy remaining would progressively become more eroded as U.S. corporations grew stronger in the Korean domestic market. Addressing such problems as well as emphasizing democracy, human rights, and emotionally appealing to national experience, and by positioning with the marginalized, movement activists emerged as the legitimate civil leadership of counter hegemony against an unresponsive state. Believing that the government could not continue with its policies without support from civil society, the movement’s leadership often used such phrases as the “rights of the people,” calling for citizens to fight against forms of repression by the state by exercising their social power.

The political opposition parties were also closely aligned with the anti-FTA movement during, in both the Lee and the earlier Roh administrations. Each government was challenged by the movement charging that it was deliberately selling out Korean
independence. During President Roh Moo Hyun’s latter tenure in office in 2007, the former chairman of the Uri Party, Kim Geun Tae, went on a well-publicized weeklong hunger strike bringing attention to the KORUS FTA and its impact on Korean independence (*Chosun Ilbo*, 2007). Representative Chun Jung Bae harshly criticized President Roh’s “handing Korea’s economic sovereignty to the U.S. on a platter” (*Chosun Ilbo*, March 30, 2007). He warned that “this act of betrayal of the people and their livelihood and democracy will be judged harshly” (*Chosun Ilbo*, 2007). Using similar rhetoric, Moon Sung Hyun, the leader of Democratic Labor Party, went so far as to declare, “We can no longer recognize Roh as President;” and “we are going to declare the agreement null [when we take power] and stage a civil disobedience campaign” (*Chosun Daily*, March 30, 2007).

By framing the loss of national sovereignty issue, the public discourse of the anti-FTA movement became nationalistic and patriotic, transforming it with an anti-American and anti-government sentiment. The collective public emotions garnered in the movement fought against the idea of a periphery Korea becoming victims of the imperialist United States. This narrative played a significant role in the movement as the activists’ challenge to the dominant discourse of hegemony successfully appealed to the marginalized general public to no longer accept the structural injustice without questioning it.
5.5. **Organizational Characteristics of the Anti-FTA Movement**

New social movements (NSMs) theory provides a framework with which to understand the historical formation of several types of collective actions, albeit, it has emphasized more the ideological formation of movements in advanced postindustrial society. Based in ideology, NSMs theory has typically focused on explaining movement cases involved in human rights, nationalism, anti-globalization, and environmentalism emerging in the 1990s. Activists of social movement organizations, possessing different ideological focus, also collaborated with the anti-FTA movement protest campaign. However, despite the fact that NSM has contributed to broaden our understanding about the internal processes of the anti-FTA movement formed by ideological creation, choosing to examine the case using NSMs would likely result in complex abstractivity.

In order to avoid abstract understanding of the actual case, in this chapter, I utilize social movements (SMs) theory to analyze the concrete structural processes of forming social movements, including organizational activities, membership, and resources after introducing the several key social movement organizations involved in anti-FTA movement. With the broad aim of understanding the role of civil society within the movement, the study seeks to address “why” and “how” a collective action emerges in Korean civil society. In approaching such questions, the SMs theory focuses on the set of real components of the movement’s mobilizing structure, which is essential for understanding the sustainability of the social movement. This attention begins in the current case with the organizational activities, membership, and resources of the movement in its development and sustainability. Thus, with the concrete analysis of the
anti-FTA movement, the next section will examine such organizational characteristics of the movement.

5.6 Social Movement Organizations of the Anti-FTA Movement

The anti-FTA movement would not have persisted unless the SMOs involved in the movement had not initiated, mobilized, and led their respective organizational activities. Then, who were the leading SMOs opposing the Free Trade Agreement? Who were the activists and participants involved in the movement’s formation and growth? What were the characteristics of the movement organizations and their major movement activities? Table 9 below highlights the various interest groups listed as either supportive or opposed to the KORUS FTA, and holding different perspectives toward the role of state, market, and society.
Table 9. Comparison of Different Positions of Interest Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Groups</th>
<th>Supportive of FTA</th>
<th>Opposed to FTA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interest Groups</td>
<td>The Blue House (President), Grand National Party, Uri Party, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Chaebols, Ministry of Finance and Economy, The Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Ministry of Agriculture and Fishery, Research Institutes of KIEP, KITA,</td>
<td>The Korean Alliance Against KORUS FTA (KoA), Korean Confederation of Trade Union (KCTU), Korean Peasants League (KPL), National Farmer’s Association, Korea Health and Medical Workers Union, DLP Party, People’s Association for Measures against Mad Cow Disease (PAMCD), Citizen groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of Nation</td>
<td>Facilitator of strengthening industrial competitiveness, enactor of rules, mediator of different interest groups</td>
<td>Public institution that represents community, which protects social interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>Neoliberal; Pro-business</td>
<td>Anti-neoliberal; Pro-protectionism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Related Ideology</td>
<td>Economic efficiency, technological innovation, productivity, national competitiveness</td>
<td>Diversity, Justice, universality, cultural identity, nationalism, social stability, regionalism, economic equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Related Ideology</td>
<td>(Value material wealth, industrial development)</td>
<td>(Value local community)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Modified from Jang and Rhee (2009:7-8)

As Table 9 describes, supporters were generally the ruling party elite, the market forces of the business and industry circle, and liberal Korean think tanks; whereas, opposition groups included the Korean Alliance against KORUS FTA (KoA), the KCTU, the Korean Peasants League (KPL), People’s Association for Measures against the Mad Cow Diseases (PAMCD), Korea Health and Medical Workers Union, and various smaller
opposition political parties. In this dissertation, the study focuses on three social
movement organizations (SMOs) involved in the anti-FTA movement, including the KoA,
KCTU, and KPL. These organizations opposed to the FTA were the top active participants
leading the fight against the KORUS FTA, and received much of the media attention from
both the mainstream and alternative sources. Although each group vigorously fought
against the free trade agreement, the KoA, established March 28, 2006, was the largest
umbrella organization opposed to the FTA. It was supported by more than three hundred
participating labor groups and civil organizations in demonstrations, including the Korean
Confederation of Trade Union (KCTU), the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU),
Democratic Labor Party (DLP), Korean Peasants’ League (KPL), People’s Solidarity for
Participatory Democracy (PSPD) and many other independent concerned citizen groups.

Claiming that “the KORUS FTA will aggravate the social division and devastate
the Korean economy” (Hankyoreh, March 29, 2006), the KoA’s central theme promoting
its opposition to the KORUS FTA was the resulting social income disparity resulting
from the FTA. In order to draw public support from various affected opposition interest
groups, the KoA established 14 subcommittees to research the FTA related issues,
covering the film industry, agriculture, labor, academic research, education, law,
intellectual property rights, finances, environment, culture, and women’s rights. With
sponsoring support from a broad coalition of civil organizations, the KoA organized the
first national rally protesting the FTA on April 15, 2006. It also consolidated its overseas
network with other social movement organizations fighting neoliberalism by holding the
and 2012, KoA organized a series of candlelight vigils, protest rallies, concerts and press conferences aiming to publicize the implications of FTAs on individual lives, voicing its opinion in opposition to the FTA. Although its activities dwindled after 2008, the KoA continued carrying out comprehensive research on the treaty, sponsoring free public forums with guest lecturers on the FTAs, as well as publishing a series of informational reports entitled ‘National Report on the Korea-U.S. FTA.’

The KCTU is another large umbrella organization highlighted in this study opposing the KORUS FTA. Tens of thousands of its members participated in KoA’s protests, as well as its own nationwide workers’ demonstrations opposed to the treaty’s ratification. Taking over the organizational structure of the former National Council of Trade Unions, the KCTU was founded in 1995 growing rapidly into one of the primary two Korean union umbrella organizations, the other being the FKTU. An alternative to the FKTU, the KCTU membership expanded rapidly to almost 700,000 members. Drawn primarily from heavy industry and service companies, it became widely known after the 1997 economic crisis (KCTU, 2009). The KCTU was ideologically more radical and inclined to use force than was the FKTU. Pursuing democratic unionism based on socialist revolutionary ideology, the KCTU was actively engaged in militant struggles against the government over its new economic restructuring policies (Song 2000). The KCTU primarily focused its opposition to the FTAs’ in terms of labor rights infringement by the growing presence and dictates of various transnational corporations in Korea. With the goal of changing Korean society by liberating and protecting workers’ rights (KCTU

6 The KoA’s official website is retrieved from http://www.nofta.or.kr/
2001), the radical means of resistance employed by the KCTU often included violent strikes, demonstrations, rallies, and even suicide protests when resisting the government’s economic policies. Due to its militant labor stance, the KCTU was more repressed by the government than other labor organizations that used more moderate means of labor negotiations.

Nevertheless, the KCTU continued to grow in size and membership as Korean workers faced multiple threats of unemployment. With large internal support from disadvantaged workers dissatisfied with lower positions and paychecks, the union and movement leadership made efforts to consolidate its network within affiliated unions by providing educational services to build working-class consciousness. The shared group identity was developed as working-class solidarity, which created a critical component for the anti-FTA movement mobilization. In the anti-FTA movement, an overarching goal for the KCTU remained to aggressively tackle all forms of neoliberal restructuration within Korea. Although it remained forceful by engaging in violent rallies and strikes, it also actively sought political alliances with the left-leaning minority parties, such as the Democratic Labor Party (DLP), to help represent the interests of its workers. The KCTU also attempted building international solidarities for social reform in its attempts to provide greater protections for its workers facing uncertain futures posed by neoliberalization of the labor market (Gray, 2008).

The Korean Peasants League (KPL), another highly mobilized SMO representing the interests of Korean farmers and rural residents dependent on agriculture, was at the forefront of the anti-FTA movement. Founded in 1990, the KPL was one of the first civil
organizations to confront neoliberal globalization in Korea. Its focus was mainly related to the opening of domestic agricultural market to imports. The KPL derives from the early roots of the Korean peasant movement going back to the days of resistance during colonial Japanese rule (Chung, 2001). Korean peasants founded the Catholic Farmers Associations during 1970s and 1980s during the state sponsored industrialization period in Korea. They sought to protect the rights of farmers when the government began transforming the agrarian-based Korean economy into an urban-based modernized economy centered on exported goods (Yoon, Song, and Lee, 2013).

The significance of the KPL goes back to the neoliberal pressure applied by the U.S. beginning in the early 1980s attempting open domestic Korean markets for exports of agricultural products, causing severe economic problems for Korean farmers trying to compete with commercialized agricultural (KPL 2012). Since the founding of the KPL, the peasant movement has promoted food sovereignty and gained united support among Korean farmers in their fight against neoliberalism. In the KPL mission statement is listed 20 objectives, which are briefly summarized as: (a) to stop neoliberal trade liberalization and the import of agro-livestock products for the protection of food sovereignty; (b) to promote self-reliant food systems and agriculture while preventing environmental degradation; and (c) to protect farmers’ rights in access to health care, education, welfare, and relief from household debt. 7 The KPL has one national headquarters and nine provincial offices in each of Korea’s provinces to represent the interests of all Korean peasant farmers. The KPL is characterized by organizing and engaging in numerous

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7 See more in the KPL’s website, access http://ijunnong.net/en/article/index.php?pl=2
controversial protests where aggressive, confrontational marches and demonstrations have occurred. These included protests at the WTO Uruguay Round negotiation protests (1993-1994); the anti-WTO demonstrations in Cancun (2003, 2005); the anti-Korea Chile FTA rallies (2004-2005); and the anti-KORUS FTA mass demonstrations (2006-2011) protests (KPL 2005; KPL 2012; Yoon, Song, and Lee, 2013).

Each of these three SMOs played a central role in the formation and development of the anti-FTA movement. Sharing their particular distinct memberships’ experiences in confronting the neoliberal pro-business policies, they were able to build consensus among their memberships, developing robust narratives for proposing an alternative voice to pressure government policies. To create synergetic organizational strength they exchanged information, know-how, resources and jointly monitored the proceedings of the National Assembly. Building strong domestic alliances among organizations in mobilization activities they held various joint demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and protests. The anti-FTA movement was able to sustain over several years due to these organizational efforts in creating, maintaining, and transforming the general public’s perception of the treaty through their activities as well as expanding political opposition to pressure the government. The leadership of social actors and volunteers were especially vital to the movement’s success for generating public support and sustaining the movement. The next section discusses the individuals who led and participated in the KoA, KCTU and KPL to oppose the KORUS FTA.
5.7. Movement Participants: Activist Leaders and Volunteers

The movement could not be organized without activist leaders and volunteers. Then, who were the participants from these three major organizations and what were their backgrounds? The senior director of the Korean Alliance against KORUS FTA (KoA) was Ouh Jeong-Ryul, a former high school teacher between 1965 and 1989 who later served as the chair of the National Association of Teacher’s Union (Jeon Gyo Jo)’s Gwanju District (Kang, 2006). He was then elected as a member of Gwang Ju City Council in 1991, serving on the council for five years. Prior to coming to the KoA in 2006 as a co-senior director he worked as an activist for several civil organizations (KoA, 2007; Kang, 2006). Han Sang Ryul, another co-senior director, came from a Christian educational background after graduating from Hanshin Seminary and then working as a Christian activist during 1970s. He later became a senior pastor in a small church where he was actively involved with civil organizations that were ideologically pro-reunification and anti-American. He later became senior director for the Korean Alliance for Progressive Movement (KAPM) until joining KoA in 2006 (KoA, 2007). Jung Gwang-Hoon was the third co-senior director at KoA coming as the former senior director of Min Jung Solidarity. Moon Kyoung-Sik came to the leadership of KoA during the movement’s development and expansion. Before joining KoA, Moon was the executive director of the National Association of Farmers advocating positions opposed to neoliberalism, WTO imports of foreign agricultural products, and KORUS FTA. Kim Se-Gun joined KoA as an activist leader providing much needed research and ideological advice. He served as a professor from Seoul National University (2007). Of these leaders,
government issued arrest warrants for Jung Gwang Hoon and Ouh Jong Ryul for organizing candlelight vigil protests.

The Korean Confederation of Trade Union (KCTU) elects nine leaders biannually, including the chairperson. The chairperson lead the interim committee and recruits 34 other officials, including three officers from the local unions for managing all of the activities of the multi-coalition organization (KCTU 2012; Choi 2011). Most of the KCTU leadership shared social movement experiences in their background since the 1980s. The leadership tenure in the KCTU during the most active period of the anti-FTA movement was relatively short-lived. Between 2007 and 2012, three chairmen served approximately two years each, including Lee Seok Hang (2007-2009), Im Seong Kyu (2009-2010), and Kim Young Hun (2010-2012) (KCTU, 2012). Fifty year old Lee began his career in 1980 in the local union of Dae-Dong, a heavy industry union (Tong Il News, 2004). Im Seong Kyu and Kim Young Hun, in their 50s and 40s, respectively, were similarly experienced in their local labor unions and labor movement for years prior to being elected to the KCTU chairman positions. All of the chairmen were arrested by the Lee government and imprisoned for leading violent anti-FTA movement during their tenure.

Similar to KCTU, the leadership of the Korean Peasants League (KPL), including the chairperson, vice-president and secretary general, were elected from within the membership. KPL representatives at the headquarters during the movement were Lee Gwang Seok, Han Doo-Suk, Jeong Hyun-Chan, Moon Kyoung-Sik, and Chun Seong-Doo (KPL 2012). Lee Gwang Seok previously served as president of Catholic Farmers’
Association in Jeon Buk District, and came to serve as the chairperson at the KPL headquarters in 2010 (2012).

Other leaders in the KPL, including Moon Kyoung Sik, Han Doo-Suk, Jeong Gwang Hun, who were also actively engaged in local community peasants’ movements in their home provincial districts in charge of administrative duties prior to coming to serve at the national headquarters. Although the livelihoods of KPL members were generally rural based and farming related, many of the leaders at the executive levels did not have farm peasant backgrounds. Most of them were elected into leadership positions in their 50s, and were experienced full-time activists having obtained familiarity of the democratization movements in the 1970s and 1980s while college student activists working for farmers’ causes (Shin, 1996).

Activist leaders of all three organizations were male, well experienced from their respective communities, and first worked in their local based organizations before serving as elected representatives of the executive body. Most of the leaders were in their 50s while some of them were in their 40s. Though many of them were college educated, some had also earned advanced Masters and Ph.D. degrees. The executive leaders in each SMO were full-time activists dedicated to the interests of their respective social groups nationally. To coordinate activities, they regularly met with local representatives for discussing urgent issues. As the executive leaders of the SMOs, they were in charge of developing the agendas, direction for the mobilization, as well as delegating responsibilities. Prior to serving in leadership positions, activists generally gained personal experience within local district movement organizations where less manpower
and support systems were available. In these regional positions, they had performed heavy operational duties in charge of administrative duties, organizational action plans, community meetings, developing local strategies and producing informational materials.

Since the activist leadership could not solely rely on full-time staff members for lack of organizational resources, each SMO recruited volunteers to run various organizational tasks. Volunteers played significant roles necessary for carrying out most functions, such as distributing organization newsletters, assisting group projects, and event preparations. Many volunteers in the anti-FTA movement were inexperienced in the movement, and were typically young people in their twenties, thirties, and even teenagers who willingly gathered to promote event preparations and participate in rallies. Women especially took on active roles in providing support for assisting each organization. While the leadership activists became well-known figures to the public through media exposure, volunteers working behind the scene received little recognition. Nevertheless, they willingly provided indispensable manpower for the organizations by taking on day to day tasks as well as participating in the campaigns.

The KoA received many volunteer applications from citizens wanting to join the movement due to the wide-spread opposition sentiment in Korean society to the KORUS FTA. Who were these volunteers? Among them were Meng Moung Suk (30s, female, free-lance editor), Yoon Dle (20s, female graduate student), Cha En Hae (20s, female, college student), Kim Si Ki, (20s, female college student) (OhmyNews 2006; Pressian 2006). As volunteers, these individuals assisted the movement by providing support for the organizational activities and delivering organizational messages to the public.
Interviewed by a reporter while handing out leaflets to commuters at a metro station, Meng Moung Suk said the main reason she joined the movement as a volunteer was because: “I was stunned when I heard the news that Mexico faced almost economic collapse today due to the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the United States and Canada launched in 1994. To survive, I believe we have the rights to resist neoliberalism” (OhmyNews Jun. 7, 2006). When volunteer Cha En-Hae was asked why she volunteered, she answered, “I was hesitant to join the movement because of lack of courage. However, as I participated in a collegian debate over the KORUS FTA, I learned a lot about the reality of the FTA and its potential impact in agriculture, medical services, and education. I realized the FTA was a total package that impacts every aspect of our lives. As I learned the reality of the FTA, I was also stunned how the major media was biased and only reported the positive side of it without telling the negative side. That’s why I joined the movement.” (Pressian, Jul.14.2006).

The volunteer activism provided effective services in the absence of professional staffs. Volunteer activities providing membership services such as counseling members with difficulties and problems such as human rights violations, injuries, medical issues, delayed payments, overstays, or financial problems were indispensable help for the organization (Hankeyreah, Feb. 14.1999; KCTU 2005; 2012). In this effort, volunteer made valuable contributions by simply making available the necessary information for those people experiencing difficulties. However, the need for movement volunteers was critical not only for performing the daily activities to run the organization, but also for publicizing the organizations’ vision to the public (Kleidman 1994). In increasing public
awareness of the organizational goals and activities in this manner, volunteers generated more public participation in the movement through their various types of community service projects. In this way, volunteer activities provided links from each SMO to strengthen social ties with local communities by their activities. The KCTU’s volunteers participated in cleaning a 2008 oil spill along the Ulsan seashore (KCTU, Jan 27.2008). Similarly, the KPL organized multiple volunteer outreach activities to serve elder homes, orphanages, and community centers (KPL, 2008).

Realizing the importance of volunteer activities to sustain the movement and fill organizational deficiencies, deliberate coalition strategies were developed in each SMO to recruit volunteers from across the nation (Seong Dong Center for Independent Living, 2007). When recruiting volunteers, the KoA went on national tours to over 50 major Korean cities visiting small businesses and colleges (Daily Secu, 2012). While providing free lectures to students about intellectual property rights and giving free PC anti-virus software, recruiters were able to introduce prospective volunteers to their organization. As they recruited students on college campuses, they provided financial assistance to students amounting to 40,000 won ($40) a day for five days during their first volunteer activity (Daily Secu, 2012). Both the KCTU and KPL actively provided motivational materials on their websites soliciting participants for volunteer service projects for the organization. The websites featured scenes of various volunteer opportunities, including administrative, teaching, counseling, cleaning, and cooking and publicized the stipend provided for their projects (KPL, 2011). For some of the recruited volunteers, organizations provided additional support, including necessary educational training and
priority for choosing desired programs in volunteer services, or else, placing individuals
in positions for directing other volunteers on campuses into service (Korean College
Union, 2010; Daily Secu, 2012).

5.8. Organizational Feature: Efficiencies of Internet Communications

Although the activist leaders of the KoA, KCTU and KPL performed various
activities, such as holding press conferences, giving lectures, and planning movement
activities, they remained deficient in allocating other resources to fill organizational
needs. Despite the fact that incredible assistance volunteers provided for organizational
operations of SMO the SMOs could not exclusively depend on the commitments of
activists and support groups of volunteers to run the organizations efficiently. To fill such
insufficiencies, SMO has used the Internet as their effective organizational resource of
communication. Since the 1990s, NGOs have relied on the Internet for advanced
organizational communications systems which were previously carried out by phone, fax,
letter, and radio (Huang 2009). Effectively, the internet has replaced the infrastructure
necessary for communications and has opened up a new sphere for NGOs in the global
era by enabling simultaneous communication between many message givers and
receivers. The revolution in information technology has filled the gap when operating on
limited budgets, providing vital resources for reaching out to people when providing and
receiving organizational resources such as information, funds, and publication materials
(2009). Further, the Internet’s interactive features have given SMOs a critical resource for
building relationships and common identities among distant social movement activists
and participants. Through Internet SMOs build public relations as well as maintain coalition with other organizations when mobilizing event simultaneously.

Another significant aspect of the Internet for operations of the SMOs was its scope of audience reached and the timeliness of information provided. The internet enabled SMOs to access, process, and disseminate relevant information to and from other organizations or individuals in wide or targeted audiences. Such functional efficiency allowed a vision and voice to be created and acted on. The advanced telecommunication system also created a method for rapid decision-making, in real time, generating leverage for organizational moves with phone and online features including online newsletters, email and texting (Lee, Kim and Wainwright, 2010). The organizational websites of the KoA (http://www.nofta.or.kr/), the KCTU (http://www.nodong.org/), and the KPL (http://www.ijunnong.net/ver2010/) were also constantly operating and updating the capabilities of their website in the midst of any ongoing activity of the anti-FTA movement. Each organization webpage included an introduction to the organization highlighting facts about the FTA, group activity notice boards, archives of press conferences, publications, volunteer activities, activity pictures, freeboard, and electronic signature campaigns.

The Internet was also a major resource for each SMO operating on limited budgets to receive volunteered support and online donations from interested individuals. Due to the instant availability of the Internet, individuals interested in the movement activities could simply visit the SMOs’ website, get acquainted with finding different ways to support, or, as they were encouraged, respond by sharing feedback. The Internet
also supplied SMOs with the ability to recruit volunteers easily, build public relations, as well as maintain network with other oversea based other likeminded transnational organizations. With regard to alliances maintained online, the websites of the KCTU, KoA, Eyes on TRADE, Korean American for Fair Trade, Occupy Together maintained active online links to each other’s organizations and provided direct communications with other organizations. This was especially beneficial for planning joint national and international events.8

5.9. Organizational Activities

5.9.1. Protest Campaigns

The primary goal of the anti-FTA movement was to prevent the KORUS FTA agreement. To achieve any measure of success, the movement organizations organized protest campaigns, including candlelight vigils, strikes, and even some violent demonstrations. The candlelight vigils became symbolic of the public resistance to the nation’s leadership pushing for the trade treaty during the height of the movement activities. Hundreds of thousands of citizens on the streets of major cities held candles while public speakers addressed the issues. These protest rallies, swiftly intensified, evolving into a massive scale, and became one of the most influential ways for the movement organizers to exert their social resistance against the dominant hegemonic condition in the country (Scott, 1986). Becoming such a rapidly growing counter-

8 The websites of (http://occupyfta.nofita.or.kr/search/label/ABOUT), (http://kctu.org/), (http://www.ijunnong.net/en/article/index.php) are posted in English versions introducing the organizations, presenting facts about the FTA, including media reports on the candlelight vigils; posting public statements, and updating the SMO activities.
hegemonic social force capable of sponsoring massive, these highly organized urban
protests surprised the political elites. The intensified public protests calling for change at
the head of the government, twice led to public apologies from President Lee as well as
the resignation of members of his cabinet.

The SMOs, finding initial success in organizing large scale public displays of
resistance, searched for different ways to appeal to the general public in order to
strategically develop the anti-FTA movement. These included cultural outdoor festivals,
concerts and sporting events. Additionally, the SMOs sought to raise public awareness
and movement support by distributing, leaflets, posters, and CDs as one of their base
activities. A key to their public relations campaign was the active engagement with the
mainstream and alternative media publicizing daily and weekly organizational activities,
thereby regularly bringing to the public’s attention the consequences of neoliberalism and
risks of the KORUS FTA.

Through organizing public protest campaigns, the movement’s leadership focused
successfully on building strong public consensus for opposing the treaty. The success was
also measured by the participation in the rallies by millions of Korean citizens having
legitimate concerns over the socio-economic impacts of the FTAs. The Korean resistance
to prevent the policies of the neoliberal KORUS FTA resulted in countless protests,
strikes, and opposition rallies. People marched tirelessly on the streets of Seoul and other
cities refusing the state’s mandates by engaging in the anti-government movement. As
Gramsci (1971) had suggested, the movement gained moral and intellectual hegemony
from civil society by confronting the state through collective action over this issue.
5.9.2. **Petition Movement**

To influence political discourse for renegotiating or delaying ratification of the treaty, organizers of the anti-FTA movement began a nationwide petition and signature campaign. The principle behind the petition was the movement’s belief that political legitimacy in a democratically led society must be achieved by fundamental principles of moral entitlement as well as public consensus when political decisions are made affecting society. Reflecting this principle, the KoA asserts that a democratic government should be made aware of public interests and be forced to take public opinions seriously before entering into policy-making decisions. The following KOA sample petition was distributed in outdoor and online signature campaigns in petition efforts to collect as many signatures as possible to pressure the government into representing the public’s interest and to exercise their political rights against the state.

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**Box 2. KoA Petition Letter**

1. **FTAs that threaten economic and national sovereignty should be abrogated.**

Under FTAs, the Investor-State Dispute settlement (ISD) will prevent public regulators from curbing the US based corporations. Any mechanism to protect small and medium businesses will be in violation of the Korea-US FTA. This is the same act of selling off the nation for the sake of corporate interests.

2. **We oppose to FTAs that benefits only 1%.**

Destruction of national agriculture, price jack up of medicines, gas, electricity, and increased unemployment, irregular types of work. The Korea-US FTA will deepen the polarization giving more to the rich 1% while taking more from the 99%.
3. We oppose to Hanara Party’s undemocratic way of ratifying FTAs.

President Lee and Hanara Party ratified FTAs without consent from the public. Thereby, we cannot accept the government’s decision.

We, the undersigned, express our opposition to the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, which poses a serious threat to interest of people. We call for abolition of the legislative processes.

To conduct the petition, the KoA organized teams from different organizational departments to collect signatures aiming to gather over one million signatures. To achieve this goal, they ran newspaper ads and sent out activists and volunteers into the streets of major Korean cities (Pressian, Sept 6, 2006). In their street approach, the SMO analyzed the number of people utilizing major metro stations, such as Seoul and Young San, located in Seoul, Busan, and Gwanju and sent out activists to the bus terminals to publicize their activities (KoA 2006). Attracting attention from the public by offering snacks, gas-filled balloons, and exhibits of interesting art works, they generated interest from commuters who were then introduced to the organizations’ positions opposing the FTAs. After supplying additional handouts and presentation CDs, they collected signatures and email addresses of citizens (KoA News 2006). As of January 17, 2011, the KoA had gathered over two million signatures from Korean citizens and used these contacts to generate further public support for opposing government (Seoul News, January 17, 2011). Continuing to press their advantage gained through the signature petition, movement organizers built coalitions with other civil society groups in the
United States and other international locations. Calling attention to overseas support of the signature petition became a major coalition strategy (KoA News 2007). In this effort, the KoA networked with the Korean Americans against War and Neoliberalism (KWAN), conducting the petition movement in both Korea and United States.

5.9.3. Networking with Other SMOs

As Charles Tilly (1984) pointed out, one of the essential components for the success of a social movement depends upon how well the movement mobilizes the consciousness of its constituency. In this process, Tilly suggests that when building networks with other social movement organizations, developing common ground and collective identity can channel force into critical mass for beginning social movements. Thus, large scale movements can grow out of strong social solidarity networks created within social movement organizations. One of the more distinctive features of the anti-FTA movement was the strengthened solidarity developed among separate movement organizations from different constituencies. While the KoA appealed to the general public, including students, women and urban poor, the KCTU mobilized large numbers of industrial and trade workers; and similarly, the KPL, representing the interests of Korean farmers, drew thousands more from the farm based community. As each SMO became unified under similar objectives for opposing the KORUS FTAs, their coalition created a much larger social participation.

Acknowledging the power of the united form of social resistance, each SMO scheduled various joint domestic and international projects for building wider solidarity
and developing opposition to the increasing global trend of FTAs. The central claim of the coalition of SMOs shared the perspective that the KORUS FTA represented an unfair, unilateral negotiation established by elements of neoliberal globalization, which, according to their framing, jeopardized the local economy and society. With this shared understanding, the movement organizations created an affinity and collective identity between organizations during their assemblies. More than three hundred unified SMOs attracted wide-spread public attendance with their cause, orchestrating a series of joint movement activities with leveraged support both domestically and abroad. Their cohesion was strengthened by joint events characterized with candlelight vigils protests, large public speaking rallies, and cultural and festival events.

Further, as the movement began recognizing potential for influencing political discourse domestically through international pressure, they also actively expanded their networks overseas to gain leverage with the new movement strategy. In this effort, the KoA formed coalitions with KWAN and Bilaterals.Org calling attention to global problems related to powerful transnational corporations, employment security, labor protections, and human rights issues (KoA, 2012). The KCTU sought to build solidarity with the International Labor Organization (ILO), the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), and the Asian Pacific American Labor Alliance (APALA) (KoA 2012; KCTU 2012). The KPL also networked with La Via Compensia, which fought for common goals of national food sovereignty impacted by FTAs (KPL 2012; La Via Compensia 2012). Each of these foreign based organizations created cross ties with one another sharing mutual goals for opposing neoliberal capital. Even though their leverage
was premature, their collective identity linked them in a stronger alliance to engage in transnational activities for influencing domestic politics.

5.10. Resource Mobilization

Resource mobilization theory (RMT) emphasizes the accessibility of external resources that must be mobilized in a movement, such as financial resources, linkages of support from other social movement organizations, support of elite authorities, and the media. The access to these resources determines the likelihood of success of the mobilization (McCarthy and Zald 1977). RTM assumes that the social movement organization is analogous to a company operating within the overall market economy. SMOs operating within this structure; use capital, facility, labor, and support when attempting to achieve their agendas. In doing so, the organization’s success depends upon fulfilling a number of tactical responsibilities, such as allocation of gathered resources, organizing collective actions, as well as continually mobilizing supporters and transforming them into activists.

Within the context of the anti-FTA movement, the SMOs enjoyed strong external social capital and internal support from civil society where the movement organizations possessed experienced movement activists and occupational structures. Activists were passionately dedicated to their cause and built up the organizations’ preexisting internal networks. Externally, strong coalition ties were developed between other movement organizations, opposition party political elites, as well as the international network, which contributed to lighten the organizational costs and other burdens of movement. SMOs
also received much attention from both the mainstream and alternative sources of media where news stories were publicized about their projects. Additionally, hundreds of thousands of Korean citizens were members of the movement’s constituent external base helping with financial support and volunteering for sponsored activities.

Moreover, unlike mobilizations of earlier social movements, the SMOs in the anti-FTA movement were enabled with a much more efficient means of communications by using Internet technology. The Internet provided instant communications with other movement organizers, constituents and potential participants. Various cyber communities actively utilized the Internet for updating activities, plans, meetings, notices, and conducting electronic petition drives. The technology especially led to a larger percentage participation in the movement from younger people and students, who were more familiar with cyber space. All of these resources provided powerful resources the SMOs could operate with more efficiently while covering for the lack of other organizational infrastructure.

Nevertheless, the overall strength of the movement organizations was weakened by the loss of strong coalition ties among themselves for maintaining long-term opposition against the government policies. The SMOs became particularly vulnerable when the Korean government began actively hindering massive joint movement activities. By arresting key leadership of the SMOs and declaring illegal the candlelight vigils of the anti-FTA protest campaigns, protests and coordinated actions of coalitions eventually dwindled after 2008. Although the movement responded immediately to the state impediments by replacing jailed leaders, the effectiveness of the organizational
networks and joint activity efforts eventually deteriorated. Accordingly, organizational solidarity and weakened committee leadership decreased the power of mobilization, which demanded strong commitment from experienced leadership.

In terms of the state opposition faced by the SMOs from political elites—although, as noted, civil society had gained significant autonomy to check state power in prior movements in Korea—the anti-FTA movement was ultimately constrained by political conditions remaining from the legacy of prior authoritarian policies in Korea, which were centered in party politics maintained by the ruling party. Within this political environment, the SMOs’ ability to exercise leverage while voicing their political and social rights became limited in the absence of support from the ruling party elites. In this regard, however, the movement activists were lacking in negotiation skills. Although they had a channel to the DLP opposition party for help in advocating their political agenda, they still lacked lobbying skills to engage the ruling political elites to influence their agenda on policy making. This lack of influence within the government led the movement to choose alternative methods of grass roots activities, that is, continuing violent protests in order to achieve their objectives. The civil society activists in the movement, lacking the political skills of problem-solving in dealing with social conflict, failed to establish a legitimate dialogue as a means to gain support from the political elites; therefore, they failed in utilizing their political resources.
5.11. **Summary of Findings**

The analysis of this dissertation aims to comprehend the politics of Korean civil society to understand characteristics of the anti-FTA movement in Korea. Is Korean civil society capable of transforming society through counter-hegemonic anti-FTA movement? Why, was civil society unsuccessful in counteracting the hegemonic domination in spite of its wide-spread public support? What were the movement’s opportunities, development, framings, organizational structure, and resources? Following Gramscian concepts of civil society, the study assumes that the society is not an exclusive sphere of politics; rather, it is an integrated sphere wherein the state cannot simply dictate its will, but derives its consented powers from the social relations developed with civil society (Gramsci, 1971).

Although such social relations are usually influenced by the dominant classes, social relations are not absolutely fixed by the powerful actors, but are open to the general public’s interest. Social movements are thus formed by actors of civil society to address its social exclusion posed by the dominant structure in the social relations. Through collective action, the social movement employs its agency to bring about desired social change. The movement’s action is “political,” as it opposes the imposed political decisions of the ruling elites. In this sense, the anti-KORUS FTA movement embodies the politics of civil society in Korea. During the movement, civil society leaders stressed that their movement stood for the marginalized and socially excluded people. They opposed the policies imposed on their community by the neoliberal state’s mainstream notion of “growth” and “development.” The civil leaders, along with oppressed
communities of people, fought against the exploitation of the capital forces, reproducing the social domination.

The first section of the study analyzed political opportunities and the development of the anti-FTA movement. Several factors contributed to the political opportunities for the emergent anti-FTA social movement in Korea. Neoliberalism provided a stage for the rise of new social movement as the neoliberalism norm had weakened the Korean state’s power. Beginning in the 1980s, it was forced to concede rights initiatives, such universal human rights, women’s rights, labor rights and environmental initiatives. This was done to gain access to international capital and world recognition of Korean state’s economic development. In the era of globalization ‘from above’ sponsored by the liberal market economy, the Korean government had implemented its liberalized policies in favor of civil society when pursuing its new vision of a “globalized Korea” (Shin Han Kuk), which provided ideological and material resources for the formation of various activist groups in the country. Such values encouraged and gave confidence to Korean civil society to enter into the anti-FTA movement to participate in the political debate. As a result, the movement was quickly developed and transformed into the one of the largest contemporary social movements in Korean social movement history.

Nevertheless, as the government did not properly respond to the voice of civil society, the societal resistance in the anti-FTA movement was swiftly transformed into an anti-government and anti-America movement. The Korean government feared the development of the movement when it grew out of control during the FTA negotiations. The state turned to repression in the form of enacting and enforcing laws making illegal
all anti-FTA campaigns and by arresting movement leaders. These actions severely constrained the movement’s political opportunity and denied it of its critical resources. Internally, the movement had to fight against the power-centric ruling party of Korean politic where the power remained centralized in the hands of a small number of elites. Such constrained political structure had motivated the movement activists who had envisioned a new inclusive political mechanism. This counter-hegemonic movement of civil society attempted to build an alternative hegemony to challenge the leadership by ‘war of position.’ By beginning campaigns challenging the current political system, the anti-FTA movement raised enormous public awareness over the issues involved. The influence of the pressurized environment on the government from civil society eventually led the president’s cabinet to resign as well as force the president to apologize to the nation.

The second section analyzes the ideological resources of the mobilization wherein the public sympathy of Koreans was evoked to join the movement. If the movement activists could elaborate socio-economic problems with convincing ideological narratives while utilizing favorable political opportunity, the movement could successfully persuade public opinion to join the movement. Initially, the anti-FTA movement addressed the adverse consequences of the KORUS FTA arguing that the treaty would hurt the national economy as well as the livelihoods of ordinary citizens. Economic problems were proven to be immediate concerns to people. Because new policies inevitably produce both small winning and large losing groups, the activists sought to divide the public on this issue. Highlighting large marginalized citizens in their framing, who would be on the losing
side of change and would likely fare poorly from the new trade policies, organizers pointed to the class divisions suggesting that there would be few winners, with the ones creating the change gaining much more from the new trade agreements. Such framing was powerful enough to stimulate fear and sizable support from the socially and economically marginalized groups of farmers, laborers, and urban poor.

Secondly, the movement sought to frame neoliberalism as a critical problem of the bilateral treaty. The movement actors, including peasants, laborers, and citizen groups, commonly identified neoliberal globalization as a crucial problem with their poor economic condition behind the political scenes. The shared understanding of ‘mindless’ neoliberalism as their primary enemy, created a sense of “us” for those in the movement and a greater solidarity of resistance among themselves. By networking with other social movement sectors, which had identified neoliberalism as a problem, the anti-FTA movement activists were able to strategically frame the issues of neoliberalism as the underlying ideology of the structural violence within the FTAs. Thirdly, the movement identified national sovereignty as a vital issue threatened by the trade agreement. This narrative was the basis of the anti-KORUS FTA movement becoming transformed into a strong anti-government and anti-American movement, which was highlighted by massive protests against U.S. beef imports. Movement activists framed the U.S. as “imperialistic,” and interested only in enforcing its global hegemony upon Korea while expanding its own economic interests. National sovereignty frames aroused the strongest reactions from the Korean general public and caused many Koreans to join the collective action despite the movement’s lack of sufficient organizational resources.
In the third and fourth sections, the organizational characteristics of the movement and its activities were analyzed. The top-tier groups of the three SMOs shouldering the critical leadership roles in the development of the movement, were the KoA, KCTU, and KPL. The study analyzed the profiles of the movement’s leaders and organizational volunteers as well as the organizational features of the movement. All of the activist leaders were middle-aged men in their 40s and 50s, college educated, worked full-time in the organization, and were well-experienced from their respective local based organizations prior to being elected as representatives of the executive body. Many volunteers were comprised of inexperienced younger individuals (more women than men) in their 20s and 30s and even teenagers, willingly supporting organizational tasks and actively participating in events and rallies. The movement organizations also actively utilized the Internet as their critical organizational resources in advancing their communication and information systems, which effectively filled the void left by other organizational weaknesses. Thus, the appearance of cyber communities and their dynamic online activities became one of the most distinctive features of anti-FTA movement.

In the fifth section, the study analyzed three major organizational activities of the anti-FTA movement, including protest campaigns, petition movement, and networking with other SMOs. To impede the KORUS FTA treaty’s enactment and ratification, the movement’s SMOs organized a series of protest campaigns, candlelight vigils, strikes, violent demonstrations, as well as mobilized petition campaigns to exercise their political rights. By 2011, organizers had collected over two million signatures from the Korean
public, which influenced the discourse and alternative direction of society. Networking with other SMOs and strengthened solidarity became a source of power within the movement, thereby creating a vital force used to both sustain the movement and threaten the opposition. Each of the SMOs appealed to their individual constituencies with their cause. The KoA attracted the marginalized general public including students, women, and the urban poor; the KCTU brought to the movement its large number of working class citizens; and the KPL appealed to Korean farmers. As these interest groups became unified under the same goals and similar narratives opposing the KORUS FTAs, their coalition attracted a much larger social participation from the general public and media coverage. The movement organizations expanded their networks overseas, strengthening their voice to overcome internal barriers of a ‘nation-centered’ worldview that Koreans had typically practiced in the past.

In the last section, the effectiveness of the anti-FTA movement was analyzed according to its resource mobilization. This analysis emphasized the accessibility of its external resources, such as financial resources, support from other social movement organizations, authority, and the media. In the anti-FTA movement, organizers enjoyed strong social capital funding and support internally from civil society to sustain their organizations initially. The SMOs possessed experienced movement leaders and occupational structures with passionate activists and volunteers committed to their cause. They also had preexisting networks with other movement groups, which lessened the costs of movement activities. Nevertheless, the SMOs lost strong coalition ties among themselves under pressure from the government, which caused difficulty in maintaining
continuance of the long-term struggle. Moreover, the organizations eventually lost infrastructure within the movement, becoming weakened when leadership was detained by the government. With remaining small numbers of full-time staffs, having relatively weak movement expertise and levels of affluence to sustain the movement activities in full scale, the SMOs were weakened internally. In addition, it was highlighted that movement activists lacked adequate negotiation and problem solving skills to engage properly their political opponents, thereby failing to produce desired social change in the political discourse.

The study demonstrates that the politics of civil society within the anti-FTA movement in the globalized era displayed limitations. In order to provoke large-scaled participation from civil society in the opposition movement, activist leaders effectively framed three issues, including negative economic consequences, neoliberal capitalism, and loss of national sovereignty. Nevertheless, despite the leaders’ successful efforts in framing neoliberalism as a negative social restructuring power in society, most people participating in the protest campaigns were more interested in contesting the ‘life politics’ issues impacting their immediate economic well-being as well as the controversial food safety issue (Hong, 2008). In this sense, the civil society failed to reflect critically on how the hegemonic hierarchical forces affect Korea’s society, although these forces are still in need of drawing their power from civil society. Instead of critically questioning how to “effectively” transform the society where the powerful groups influence the direction of the society, the movement activists took the social hierarchy as a given and narrowly focused on countering the state leadership with the issue of ‘life politics.’
Despite the large scale anti-FTA social movement taking place in Korea over the several years, the movement did not result in desired social change. As Harvey (2005) points out, although neoliberal states are heavily influenced by the higher global institutions controlling the economic realism, the role of the state is not diminished as it is still capable of utilizing aggressive state legislation and policing powers to enforce its policies. Even though the state’s power was much limited by global economic governance, the state was capable of constraining the social movement. The political legacy of the authoritarian political elites in Korean government used coercive measures to remove the movement’s access to its key internal and ultimately external resources. Consequently, the movement was not able to sustain against the state’s countermeasures in its hard power. Moreover, the movement lacked the soft power of “the critical consciousness” – the ability of engaging in political dialogue with the state leaders for desired social change.
CHAPTER SIX

Conclusion: Civil Society, Social Movement, and Conflict Resolution

6.1. Findings from the Anti-FTA Movement Case Study

In this study, I have examined the anti-FTA movement to understand the politics of Korean civil society as well as the characteristics of the contemporary social movements in the global era. According to Antonio Gramsci, civil society is not a harmonious sphere; rather, it is a realm of contestation, challenging the power relations within society. The state functions in society by building its hegemonic dominance through political, moral and intellectual consent gained from civil society (Gill 1993; Morton, 2000). With its realm of both hegemony and resistance, civil society provides sources of social transformation through counter-hegemonic movement. Based on Gramsci’s view of civil society, the massive protests witnessed in the anti-FTA movement illustrates the failure of the Korean government to gain the political, moral, and intellectual consent from civil society. The state’s failure to embrace the voice of civil society, representing the concern of citizens in the political decisions leading up to the FTA’s ratification, triggered strong backlashes from civil society. In an editorial appearing in the Chosun Ilbo newspaper in 2008, a columnist commenting on the lack of consent sought from civil society in the state decision over FTA negotiations and the
resulting intense social conflict, wrote: “The state cannot be sustained only with compelling power. The state [must maintain] cultural hegemony along with compelling power. [The state must win] over middle and high schools, universities, theaters, bookstores, mass media, Internet space… [It] is not enough to take over the administrative and legislative bodies” (Chosun Ilbo, June 9, 2008, cited in Lee, Kim, and Wainwright 2010: 10).

Korean civil society positioned itself in the struggle against the interests of the political hegemony in order to emancipate marginalization. Actively engaging the state in protests opposing the FTAs, and winning the battle over public opinion using the space of the public sphere— street rallies, social networks, media and the internet— the movement waged its ‘war of position.’ The Korean social movement groups were effective in publicizing narratives and ideas for social resistance, ultimately creating a formidable challenge to the Lee administration’s political power. The problematic issues framed by civil society were identified as economic difficulties, neoliberal developmentalism effects on society, and the loss of national sovereignty. Despite the fact that the framing of the problems lacked some critical reflection by movement activists, failing to offer counter-proposals outlining political alternatives for democratizing social relations, the ideological grounds created and publicized by the movement were strong enough to lead one of the largest contemporary social movement in the history of Korean civil society.

Nevertheless, the massive public participation in the movement was more fundamentally triggered by the fear of the negative economic consequences on their
livelihoods than on other grounds. In this regard, Gramsci’s idea of domination through counter-hegemony of collective action proves to be challenged in the case of the anti-KORUS FTA movement to bring about social change. Despite the nationwide movement posing a serious challenge to the state, civil society was not able to forestall or overturn the bilateral KORUS FTA treaty process. Neither was it successful in overpowering the Lee administration politically, which it attempted to do when the movement was radicalized over the controversial U.S. “beef deal.” Although the Lee administration was simultaneously pressured by low popularity and massive anti-government public demonstrations on one side, and tough negotiations with the U.S. on the opposite political spectrum, it remained intact by finally employing coercive legislative and police powers, as did past authoritarian Korean regimes used in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.

Nevertheless, the movement’s inability to bring about social change in the government’s trade policy negotiations does not discount some of its accomplishments. The anti-FTA movement made it possible for ordinary Korean citizens to cultivate reflective consciousness and critically place a check on the government’s policies. It was also successful in blocking some national policies of the neoliberal project, including the privatization of public utilities and putting an end to the Pan Korea Grand Waterway project. Why were then the counter-hegemonic efforts of the civil society not capable of forestalling the KORUS FTA negotiation? What were the concrete behaviors of activism in play within the movement; and how were they organized which limited it in reaching its goals? In responding to these questions, the study examines the discussion in the social movement literature, which offers its theoretical lens to analyze the concrete
behavior of the movement; and its use of political opportunity, ideology, and resources to confront the status quo. By seizing the opportunities in their favor, social movement actors aim to change the norms and practices of social relations becoming marginalizing and excluding to agency. This is accomplished by challenging the hegemonic authority seeking to control and legitimize its social power without civil society’s consent. Thus, the ultimate goal of a social movement is to change the social relations or social reality surrounding them when unable to cope with the imposed social change (Parson 1968).

In the context of neoliberal globalization in Korea, ‘globalization from above’ provided new opportunities for social movements as the state had to conform to liberal global norms. Such new political opportunity, ideological grounds, and resources unleashed a wave of new social movements (NSM) in Korean civil society, expanding the growth of civil society ‘from below.’ Many SMOs were founded based on ideological causes, such as environmental protection, global poverty, women’s rights, labor, and human rights. The global norm of universal human rights provided ideological and material resources for activist groups to articulate their needs throughout a diverse constituency in the country. The anti-FTA was one such social movement. Begun in 2006, it quickly developed into one of the largest contemporary social movements in Korean history.

The three anti-FTA movement SMOs highlighted in this study were the KoA, KCTU, and KPL. These organizations actively led primary opposition to the FTA from the beginning of the negotiations in 2006 until the treaty’s ratification in 2012. The activist leaders of these SMOs developed and publicized their narratives and formed
strong alliances in domestic and international mobilizations. To impede the KORUS FTA agreement, the organizations strengthened the social solidarity with other SMOs to influence the political discourse for their alternative political direction of society. Successfully provoking civil society with persuasive ideological grounds, these SMOs sponsored various demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and protests together in voicing their demands for social change. All of these activities severely threatened the legitimacy of the Korean state, primarily in the course of the first two years of the movement.

However, the movement experienced severe constraints in political opportunity and resources in staging a war of counter-hegemonic revolution to counterattack the state as the state began using its coercive power (Gill 2003; Morton 2000). In order to repress the movement, the government arrested key activist leaders of the SMOs’ and restricted organizational activities by legislation. These strategic moves resulted in partially crippling the decision making capabilities of the SMOs and limited the groups’ effectiveness for maintaining coalitions with other SMOs. The government’s prohibition of anti-FTA protest demonstrations, designed to stifle gatherings through new legislation, closed off popular meeting places for the public such as the Seoul City Hall Plaza for political gatherings. This action was primarily intended to stop the candlelight protests which were receiving daily media coverage. Other fundamental rights of freedom of expression were repressed by the government’s actions of taking legal measures against media and internet communications. In terms of limiting the movement resources, although the SMOs had enjoyed strong social support, including funding and new volunteers to sustain their activities, the losses of essential leadership and subsequent
strong coalition ties between organizations, led to immediate difficulties in maintaining the movement’s trajectory and effectiveness. The organizational infrastructures became weakened by relying on a relatively small numbers of full-time staff having low levels of expertise and affluence. This made it increasingly demanding to divert attention to gathering resources and recruiting volunteers while running the day to day operational activities. Ultimately, the movement organizations became ineffective at staging a war of counter-hegemonic revolution against the domination of the political institution.

Nevertheless, perhaps more critically affecting the movement’s effectiveness and contributing to its failure to achieve social change, was the movement’s lack of negotiation and problem solving skills. The leadership from the start of the movement showed little ability to propose political alternatives and seldom engaged in political negotiation with the government elite. Without negotiating and presenting visible alternatives to the state’s policies, the movement failed at producing meaningful social change. Activists focused on rhetoric for democratizing social relations; yet, by not entering into political negotiations, relying instead on staging protests and rallies, it only succeeded in creating great societal tension and achieving few of its targeted goals for social change. Further, although the movement’s goals appeared to be aimed at blocking the treaty, its narratives were focused on projecting the probable results of socio-economic inequalities brought by the trade policies.
6.2 Concluding Thoughts and Bridging to Conflict Resolution

Given the findings of this study, Gramsci’s notion of hegemony is somewhat problematic in the case of Korean civil society’s anti-FTA social movement. Gramsci’s notion of “hegemony” and “counter-hegemony” does explain the question of why such strong social resistance against the state would break out by examining the (in)abilities of the state to build ‘hegemonic consent’ from civil society. Despite the failure of the state to gain building intellectual, cultural, and moral consent from civil society in regard to the FTA polices the literature fails to explain why the the Korean state would persist in its actions and survived in the same form building legitimate hegemony from civil society.

Then, why did the movement fail? What were the characteristics of the movement’s failure to sustain itself, given this outcome? Although the anti-FTA movement displayed strengths in developing political opportunities, framings, and resources, it was not strong enough to counterattack the regime due to the coercive power used in oppressing the movement. Gramsci concurs with this point that the failure of civil society’s intellectual leadership to sustain a movement is closely linked to the state’s use of power. If the state uses its coercive, controlling powers to pressure civil society’s leadership, civil society can no longer maintain the social condition permitting critical thinking, thereby weakening its countering ability to pose questions about problems of the social inequalities and marginalization. Within this environment, the movement becomes weakened and is no longer capable of leading revolutionary social change.

However, even upon acknowledging the power of the coercive state, Gramsci still believes that the counter-hegemonic movement can lead social change if movement
participants are able to change their consciousness. Gramsci, therefore, places more importance on the internal change of consciousness than on agency’s external environment, which, in his view, is at the heart of social transformation. Such social transformation aiming at democratized relations requires the critical mind of civil society to envision the alternative society. Nevertheless, this is different from traditional leadership in society which reproduces the existing social order. Rather, counter hegemonic movement is led by leaders viewing social problems critically. In this respect, Gramsci again focuses on the importance of civil society’s leadership in sustaining the social movement.

Then, what does “critical thinking” refer to in the Gramscian context of the counter-hegemonic movement? Gramsci points out that such critical thinking is the ability to assess and anticipate problems as well as envision what should be done to solve such problems. The study found that the activist movement leadership in the anti-FTA movement encouraged critical mass consciousness by providing detailed narratives about the likely consequences of the bilateral treaty. Nevertheless, the leadership also took the narrow approach to problem solving, demanding that the state either renegotiate or halt the bilateral treaty negotiations with the U.S. instead of proposing alternative political vision in dealing with the social problems. Therefore, the options remaining for civil society due to the failure of the movement’s leadership to empower society to envision constructive political alternatives, defaulted to either becoming more radicalized in its demands or submitting to the perpetual dominance of the social hegemony. As realism
argues, given no reason to negotiate, in the absence of dialogue, the political elites would likely choose coercive power to subdue the oppositional movement.

Further, Gramsci does not articulate “how” to facilitate such critical thinking in civil society; nor does he define “what kind” of setting is ideal for such critical reflection in conflictive society. This was the case not only for the civil society supporting the anti-FTA movement, but also for the political ruling elites. I believe this is the gap wherein the field of conflict analysis and resolution (CAR) can engage in academic dialogue within the field of social movements and civil society to make contributions with its strengths. Although each field of study is quite distinctive, each is not exclusive of one another (Schmelzl and Fisher, 2009). The scholarship within each discipline is concerned with social conflicts, albeit the focus of the study of social movements is more directed toward understanding the conflicts associated with collective behavior, while the emphasis of CAR is on resolving social conflicts in practice. In their respective studies, social movement scholars wish to (re)construct social justice for the society, whereas practitioners in the field of CAR concentrate on analyzing, developing, and evaluating processes for resolving societal conflicts. Further, the audience of the former resides in academia, while those of the latter are located as practitioners in the field. Although the published literature on (counter-hegemonic) social movements articulates the analytical structure of movements related to the political opportunity, framing, and resource mobilization, it has limitations when attempting to bridge gaps between research and practice. On the other hand, as the literature in the CAR field focuses more on the practices of conflict resolution processes, it generally is lacking in comprehensive
theoretical lenses to understand the social phenomena. Therefore, the interface between these two fields of study is quite complementary (Roy, Burdick, and Kriesberg, 2010).

The field of CAR emerged as a specialized field of study in the late 1950s dealing with questions of conflicts arising from real world international diplomacy (Kriesberg, 2008). Conflict resolution scholars perceive that in order to harmonize conflicts, research and practice should be closely related to interchangeable dialogue linking the two, because what is known about a conflict also directs the path toward resolving the conflict. The field of CAR in the 1970s and 1980s actively participated in the mediations of local social change disputes by applying the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) approach. Since then, the CAR field grew significantly by making efforts in bringing conflictive parties together in dialogue and transforming their conflictive social relations. In the case of the anti-FTA movement, if the conflict had been provided channels to (re)connect civil society activists and the state in committed joint efforts to reflect critically on the specific problem areas identified by civil society and the state, it would have likely empowered both parties to break out of the zero-sum approach. The atmosphere for developing alternative policies with outcomes benefitting both parties would have at least been given a chance to help foster an environment of democratized social relations. The practice of CAR can help contribute to such processes by cultivating positive relations between parties as well as offering constructive criticisms for a more just society in the long run.

As documented earlier in this study, the dialogue approach to conflict resolution and problem solving in Korea was first attempted in the Kim Dae Jung administration when addressing labor-business disputes during Asian financial crisis. This attempt took
place during the Tripartite Commission Meetings held in the 1997-1998 labor negotiations in Korea mediated by the government. Paving the way for such a dialogue, stakeholders from labor unions were invited to engage in dialogue with business interests and political elites, albeit, weaknesses for proper dialogue were evident at these meetings, including errors in facilitating. The state, which had initiated the meetings, did not use third-party facilitators to maintain neutral discussions. Additionally, there was a lack of preparedness in matching opposing sets of negotiation skills between labor and business. Those parities negotiating for labor at the meeting were not knowledgeable or experienced with conflict settlement skills; therefore, the dialogue failed resulting in members representing only the interests of their respective groups rather than engaging in the process for a mutual solution. Nevertheless, the dialogue of the Kim administration opened the doorway to the alternative pathway and political opportunity for the militant labor movements to engage in political dialogue rather than resorting to militant strikes as a strategy for voicing their position. Given these circumstances, Korean civil society possesses the potential for dealing with conflict by engaging in conflict constructive by dialogue with the political elites.

During the KORUS FTA negotiations between the two nations, although the government did host occasional civil forums in attempts to persuade key members of civil society to adopt the new policies of the FTAs there was no commitment to formal dialogue between civil society and the Korean government sponsored by the Lee administration. Instead of engaging civil society in political dialogue to resolve tensions, the government solely focused on addressing the positive benefits of the FTA policies to
the Korean economy, such as increased automobile exports. As the study observes, the Korean state’s choice of adopting the latest neoliberal policies in the KORUS FTA while not respecting the opinions of the opposition to the treaty, caused severe reactions within Korean civil society during negotiations. Though such government policy of integrating the local Korean economy into the globalized economy involved frictional conflict between various actors and stakeholders, including the state, domestic elites, internationals, business interests, the general public, and grass roots civil society, the sectors of the population represented by civil society were the most vulnerable to conflict brought by the structural shift of the neo neoliberal policies. Leaving these sectors out of the decision making process of ‘policies from above’ only served to provoke the anti-government counter-hegemonic movement in Korea.

In dealing with social conflict like the anti-FTA movement, CAR can suggest multiple problem-solving settings to foster progressive social changes in Korean society. By incorporating appropriate workshops and multi-track diplomacy sessions where the parties would engage in joint dialogue to minimize conflict, there would be greater potential for developing mutually adoptable solutions for implementing the social changes. The transforming of negative perceptions about “each other,” would raise awareness about each other’s positions and constraints, and also promote co-productive thought in dealing with conflict. By showing its ability to be willing to deal with resulting conflict, the Korean state could justify its hegemonic legitimacy in the future over the introduction of new policies into the legislative system, ultimately creating less resistance from civil society. Such an apparatus would produce for Korean civil society legitimate
channels for political engagement in their struggles to achieve democratic social change, rather than only being optioned with engaging in violent civil disobedience movements.

The CAR field has done remarkable work in its peace building efforts by introducing new ideas for transforming intractable social conflicts around the globe, including those in Northern Ireland, Israel and Palestine, Sri Lanka, and many other regions. Although efforts to transform conflicts with mutually agreeable solutions are still ongoing in these various locations, the progress made by CAR has been quite praiseworthy. In the face of emerging conflicts of counter-hegemonic social movement brought on by wide-ranging processes of economic globalization, CAR has capacity to deal with such encounters successfully. Similar demand in the future will no doubt increase as the globalized world continuously moves its troops toward a new world economic order wherein new social movements of counter-hegemony of social conflicts will likely respond with similar complicated, dynamic interactions as examined in the current case study. Taken together, the study suggests that there is an opportunity and need for further research for CAR to develop Gramsci’s missing points, those being defining “how” to be critical in terms of offering alternative solutions for social change, and in “what setting” critical thinking should take place when dealing with counter-hegemonic social conflict. Constructive answers to such questions would entail practical inquiry into how best to provide the necessary negotiation and dialogue for realizing practicable resolutions of conflict within social movements. Further, it is imperative that such effort need to be developed from cross-disciplinary research and dialogue, bridging
the study of civil society, social movement, and conflict resolution, having the goal of learning from each other for new discovery and practice.
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Shinae Hong received her Bachelor of Arts from Kon Kuk University in 2002. She worked for the Ministry of Unification of South Korea and received her Master of Arts in Conflict Analysis and Resolution from American University in 2007.