The Role of Hegemonies within African Regional Organizations’ Interventions: A Comparative Study of Nigeria in ECOWAS’ Intervention in Liberia and Ethiopia in IGAD’s Intervention in Somalia

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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my family and friends, particularly my parents, Ossoble and Faduma, for their everlasting love; my aunt, Zeinab Sheikh, for encouraging my mother to send me to school; and my husband, Abdulkadir, and my daughter, Iman, for encouraging tenacity and accepting nothing less than completion from me.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFL...........................................................................Armed Forces of Liberia
AMISOM .......................................................................African Union Mission in Somalia
AMU .............................................................................Arab Maghreb Union
APSA ........................................................................African Union Peace and Security Architecture
ARPC ................................................................. Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism
ARS ................................................................. Alliances for the Re-Liberation of Somalia
AU ..................................................................................African Union
CAR .............................................................................Central African Republic
DRC .............................................................................Democratic Republic of Congo
ECCAS ..................................................................Economic Community of Central Africa
ECOMOG ..........................................................ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group
ECOWAS ...............................................................Economic Community of West African States
ICO .................................................................................Islamic Courts Union
IGAD ................................................................. Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGADADD ........................................................ Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development
IGADSM ..............................................................IGAD Peace Support Mission to Somalia
IGN ................................................................. Interim Government of National Unity
IMF ................................................................................International Monetary Fund
LDF ...............................................................................Lofa Defense Force
LNGO ..........................................................................Liberian National Conference
LNGO ................................................................................Local Nongovernment Organization
INPFL ...................................................................Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia
LPC .............................................................................Liberian Peace Council
LRA .............................................................................Lord’s Resistance Army
NFD ...............................................................................Northern Frontier District
NGO ................................................................................Nongovernmental Organization
NPFL ........................................................................ National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NSA ................................................................................Non State Actors
OAU ................................................................................Organization of African Unity
RSC ...............................................................................Regional Security Complexes
RUF ..............................................................................Revolutionary United Front
SADC ................................................................. South African Development Community
SADCC ...............................................................South African Development Coordination Conference
SMC ................................................................. Standing Mediation Committee
SNM ........................................................................Somali National Movement
SRRC ...............................................................Somali Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Council
SSDF ................................................................. Somali Salvation Democratic Front
TFG .............................................................. Transitional Federal Government
TNG ......................................................................... Transitional National Government
UK .............................................................................. United Kingdom
ULIMO ............................................................... United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy
ULIMO-J ............................................................. United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy
ULIMO-K ............................................................. United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy
UN .............................................................................. United Nations
UNHCR .............................................................. United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNITAF ...................................................................... United Task Force
UNOMIL ...................................................................... United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOSOM ............................................................. United Nations Operation in Somalia
US ............................................................................... United States
USSR ................................................................. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF HEGEMONIES WITHIN AFRICAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS’ INTERVENTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF NIGERIA IN ECOWAS’ INTERVENTION IN LIBERIA AND ETHIOPIA IN IGAD’S INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA

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As part of the “peace dividend” at the conclusion of the Cold War, Western nations largely withdrew their resources from African states that had previously participated as proxies. As a result, many of these African states collapsed, and a number of intractable civil wars ensued. In an attempt to manage and resolve these conflicts, the mandates of nascent African regional organizations shifted to include a focus on securitization; they claimed a mandate to militarily intervene in the internal affairs of failed or failing sovereign member states.

This dissertation is a comparative analysis of two military interventions by African regional organizations in failed states, including ECOWAS in the West African state of Liberia and IGAD in the East African state of Somalia. Rather than supporting the notion of “African solutions to African problems,” this dissertation found that African regional organizations are systemically co-opted by the interests of member state regional
hegemons. Based on these findings, this work concludes that there are systemic limits to the capacity and neutrality of African regional organizations’ military interventions in the internal affairs of sovereign member states. As such, this dissertation urges academicians and policymakers to review their current commitment to military interventions by African regional organizations.
CHAPTER ONE: PEACEBUILDING INTERVENTIONS IN LIBERIA AND SOMALIA

1.1 Introduction

The end of the Cold War world has had a profound effect on political stability across the African continent. First, Africa lost its geopolitical primacy within the key Western states, which reverted their priorities to more conventional interests, such as strengthening trade relations as well as promoting democracy and human rights (Papayoanou 1997). The reassessment by Western interests in Africa led to massive cuts in the international military and economic assistance needed to maintain Africa’s patrimonial regimes. As this funding dried up, many of these Western and Soviet client states simply collapsed. Post-Cold War Western priorities meant that Africa’s internal conflicts increasingly held only marginal interest for Western superstates. African regional organizations — which had emerged in Africa to fill a niche previously held by Western interests — took on an increasingly important role as actors in the areas of peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

These African regional organizations typically range from five to fifteen member states, and often have at least one predominant member state. Thus, when African regional organizations have intervened in violent conflicts in a country within their orbit,

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1 “Superstate” is defined as a state that has the economic capacity to utilize surplus resources to project economic, military, and political influence on other countries.
these interventions have often been led by regional hegemons acting through the regional organization. This has been the case in Nigeria’s role in the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone; South Africa’s role in the conflicts of Burundi and Lesotho; and Ethiopia’s role in the conflict in Somalia.

Many factors determine whether an intervention leads to the ultimate success or failure of durable stabilization and peace. According to recent research, some of the factors that have been identified include: “the strength of the member states, their domestic politics and foreign policies and regional distribution of power and resources” (Nathan 2010; Moller 2009b), and the state reconstruction strategy (Langford 1999).

However, despite the importance of this strong member state, the impact of its role in the peacebuilding process has not been well studied, particularly the impact of regional hegemons that lead these interventions.

This dissertation focuses on how the strategic interests of a hegemon within an African regional organization can significantly influence the outcome of a stabilization and peace process. It compares two case studies: Nigeria’s role in the intervention by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia, and Ethiopia’s role in the intervention by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Somalia.

The comparison between these two case studies is particularly apt for studying the role of regional hegemons in peacekeeping. While the outcome of the conflicts in Liberia

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2 Regional hegemons are defined on the basis of population, size, relative GDP, and military capacity; RSCs in Africa are organized around certain states that possess key assets in terms of geographic proximity, population size, military capability, and political and diplomatic leverage at the regional and international levels.
and Somalia are divergent, they share three important characteristics that make the comparison of these two case studies particularly valuable. First, both have been characterized as models of collapsed states that occurred in the same post-Cold War period. Second, both countries suffered from protracted civil strife that resulted in the emergence of powerful non-state actors (NSAs) competing for political legitimacy and economic power. Finally, both interventions were led by emerging African regional organizations. In spite of these similarities, however, the focus of this research is not on the state’s conflict *per se*, but on the goals of the external intervention and the nature of the particular state that acted as regional hegemon during the peacebuilding process.

Though the particular cultural and historical dynamics within Liberia and Somalia play an important role in the respective interventions, this dissertation argues that the divergent outcomes of these two peace processes were heavily influenced by the role and interests of a regional hegemon in the regional organization’s intervention. Both Nigeria in ECOWAS’ intervention in Liberia and Ethiopia in IGAD’s intervention in Somalia prioritized their own interests and attempted to maintain the prestige associated with their leadership positions in their region and at international forums.

In the case of Liberia, this study shows that Nigeria determined that it ultimately was in its own national and economic security interests to resolve the conflict, and that its interests would be best served by regional stability. Since the conflict in Liberia could have easily spread to its neighbors and threatened regional stability, this dissertation explores how Nigeria — as a regional hegemon in West Africa — evolved its perception
and definition of “Liberian stability” as integral to its own national and regional interest over time.

By contrast, in the case of Somalia, this study shows that the strategic interest of the East African military hegemon, Ethiopia, which has historically dominated IGAD (Moller 2009a), did not identify its national interests with the stabilization and reconstruction of a centralized Somali nation-state (Healy 2008). Thus, Ethiopia, which carries the baggage of hundreds of years of conflict and competition with Somalia, wanted to prevent any hostile regime in Mogadishu. Consequently, Ethiopian and IGAD Somali stabilization policy had a very different outcome from that in Liberia under Nigeria and ECOWAS.

1.2 Organization of the Dissertation

The dissertation is divided into six chapters. This introductory chapter provides an overview of the research and an understanding of the role of powerful regional states. It includes a brief historical background of African regional organizations, how they emerged, and how their role evolved into a peacebuilding template that complemented Western political withdrawal from Africa after the Cold War.

Chapter 2 provides a survey of the literature on peacebuilding and intervention. It explores Barry Buzan’s theory of Regional Security Complexes (RSC) as an analytical framework to explain the security developments and dynamics of African regional organizations in peacebuilding. It reviews the literature on civil wars and state collapse in Africa. It also discusses the thematic debates surrounding African regional organizations,
particularly the role of regional hegemonies in peacebuilding, and it examines “Ripe Theory” and its implications in ending conflicts. It highlights the gap in the existing literature on the role of regional hegemonies in regional organizations’ peacebuilding and peacekeeping efforts.

Chapter 3 presents the first case study, focusing on Nigeria’s role in ECOWAS’ intervention in the conflict in Liberia. It provides an overview of the development of the conflict, the drivers that perpetuated the conflict, particularly the role of Charles Taylor and his NPFL, and the impetus for ECOWAS’ intervention. It also analyzes Nigeria’s role in the Liberian intervention as well as ECOWAS’ capacity to maintain regional peace and stability.

Chapter 4 presents the second case study and examines Ethiopia’s role in IGAD’s intervention in the conflict in Somalia. It provides an overview of the context and development of the conflict, the drivers that facilitated the conflict, and the motivations for IGAD’s intervention. It analyzes Ethiopia’s role in the Somali peace process as well as its impact on IGAD’s role as a viable regional agent for security stabilization.

Chapter 5 provides an in-depth comparative analysis of the two case studies and compares the extent to which the strategic interests of regional hegemons are aligned with the strategic interests of regional organizations in peacebuilding. It compares the motivations of regional hegemons to intervene in failed member states and the impact of regional hegemonic influence on the divergent outcomes of these two interventions. In addition, it analyzes the historical precedent for these two interventions as well as the
build-up and justifications for the interventions, and their outcomes. One of the conclusions of this chapter is that interventions by African regional organizations will continue to provide poor outcomes, if not complete failure.

Finally, Chapter 6 presents the implications of this thesis for collapsed states in Africa as well as for academic research in the field. It then discusses the implications for the regional organizations dominated by regional hegemons, and their interest in peacemaking and peacebuilding. Finally, it concludes with recommendations for African regional organization policy and for future research.

1.3 Historical Background of African Regional Organizations

Across Africa, five regional organizations emerged, primarily as a catalyst for economic cooperation and a loose social integration. To better understand how the roles of regional organizations have evolved, a short background is provided for each of the following five major regional organizations in Africa.

1.3.1 The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

In 1975, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was formally established to promote the free movement of people and goods in the West African region. It currently has fifteen member states: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Senegal, and Togo. In May 1981, six years after ECOWAS was founded, the members met at the Freetown Summit in Sierra Leone and expanded the scope of ECOWAS by establishing a defense pact as an instrument of regional security (Okolo
1983). ECOWAS’ first major intervention was in Liberia (Aning 1999), followed by its intervention in Sierra Leone. In both cases, Nigeria, as the regional hegemon in ECOWAS, led the interventions. These interventions tested the institutional capacity of the organization to respond to violent conflicts in the region and to promote peace.

1.3.2 The South African Development Community (SADC)

Established in 1980, the South African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) first focused on economic integration and development, as well as serving as a political alliance against the apartheid regime in South Africa. Twelve years later, in 1992, SADCC evolved into the South African Development Community (SADC), with an expanded mandate to promote peace, human rights, and democracy. While SADC’s interventions were limited, one of its interventions included the South African-led foray into Lesotho in 1998.

1.3.3 The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

In 1986, the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) was established to serve as a regional mechanism to address the problem of drought and desertification. IGADD’s mandate was to coordinate short- and medium-term efforts and activities of member states to combat the effects of drought and other natural disasters in the Horn of Africa. Its mandate also included establishing a new base for regional development and cooperation. Initially, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda formed IGADD; then Eritrea joined in 1993 and South Sudan in 2011. In 1994, member states recognized that the lack of development in the region was even more
detrimental than drought, and had much more to do with resource competition and conflict. As a result, IGADD began to shift its attention to politics and security, and began its efforts to end the protracted conflict in Sudan (Healy 2009b). In April 1995, in Addis Ababa, member states agreed to expand their role and address peace and security issues in the region. On 21 March 1996, in Nairobi, Kenya, they renamed the organization as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (IGAD 1996).

IGAD’s interventions in conflict were mostly driven by the initiatives of individual member states that were in turn endorsed by IGAD (Healy 2011). These interventions included Kenya’s mediation effort in the Sudan conflict (2001–2005) and disparate Ethiopian, Djiboutian, and Kenyan initiatives in Somalia (1992–2004). Although the Kenyan effort in Sudan generated a Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which eventually led to a referendum and the secession of South Sudan (Waihenya 2006), Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya have all failed with their Somali intervention initiatives.

1.3.4 The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)

Originally established as a customs union in 1983, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) is another African regional organization. It is comprised of Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe (Berman and Sams 2003). ECCAS was mostly dormant until it adopted the Protocol for Mutual Assistance Pact in 2000, with the aim of assisting each other in cases of aggression. Most of the ECCAS member states have suffered from protracted civil war, and the ongoing civil war in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) is considered one of the bloodiest civil wars in African history (Moller 2009b).

1.3.5 The Arab Maghreb Union

Established in 1989, the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) is the weakest of all the regional organizations. It has five members, including Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, and Mauritania (Berman and Sams 2003). Although peace and security is one of its stated objectives, it has never undertaken any such endeavor.

1.3.6 Reflections on “African Solutions to African Problems”

The member states of each of these African regional organizations are largely internally weak and face both internal and external divisions. They face competition from weak national identity and competition from both domestic and international NSAs. In a significant number of instances, they continue to compete amongst themselves, especially at the regional level. An important factor driving these divisions is the historical demarcation of African nation-states along largely arbitrary boundaries that were created in an era of European domination and colonialism. As a result, traditional African nations were divided, establishing the basis of enduring friction — if not conflict — amongst African nation-states that are eager to maintain existing boundaries. In addition, the Anglophone/Francophone competition in the western part of Africa also created client-state alliances that have further divided the nascent African regional organizations.

These divisions and tensions continue to hinder the development of cohesive African Regional Security Complexes (RSCs), which could effectively deal with conflicts
in their regions. While “African Solutions to African Problems” has become a motivating mantra, it is equally important to adhere to the adage of “Do No Harm,” which thus far has been completely ignored when it comes to intervention in failed or failing African states. By allowing neighboring states and others to intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation-state (and advancing their interest at the expense of the state experiencing conflict), it only perpetuates the conflict that it is claiming to resolve.

Most of the regional organizations in Africa emerged primarily for economic cooperation and a loose social integration. Their normative policy agenda was that “internal conflicts and their consequences are primarily matters of internal concern” (Deng et al. 1996). However, the spillover effect of internal domestic conflicts threatened regional peace and stability, and often forced neighboring countries and hegemonies to intervene in conflicts in their regions. While third-party intervention is sometimes helpful, particularly in collapsed states (Zartman 1995a), important questions remain: Why do some interventions succeed while others fail? What is the impact of the regional hegemon in these interventions? How does the interest of hegemons shape the outcome of these interventions?

1.4 The Role of Hegemons in Interventions by Regional Organizations

The concept of hegemony is defined by Antonio Gramsci as how those in leadership control others, either by coercion or consent (Jones 2006). Applied to Regional Organizational theory, it is a power relation between states whereby one state dominates the rules and arrangements of regional and international entities as they relate to the
region. Empirical research suggests that there are four indicators for a regional hegemony: (1) self-perception; (2) regional perceptions; (3) provision of regional public goods; and (4) the influence of preferences and values through projection, socialization, persuasion, or manipulation (Prys 2010, 484). This infers that regional hegemons influence regional interventions through projection and manipulation. In other words, the role of perception and influence in defining the regional hegemon suggests that it can wield power without necessarily using violence.

Hegemonic enterprises have defined epochs historically, and the cycle of such hegemonic epochs has impacted the social contexts of peoples and states. The interplay of Soviet and American hegemonic rivalry was manifested in the form of the Cold War. As these two hegemonic entities were in competition, aggressive political competition and proxy wars were the order of the day. For Africa’s nation-states formed as a result of Western/Soviet hegemonic rivalry, the outcomes have fundamentally reshaped African social groupings. To this day, African nation-states continue to grapple with and evolve in reaction to these Western/Soviet hegemonic conditions.

The Cold War ended with the collapse of the USSR at the end of the 1980s and has resulted in the continuing unipolar hegemony of the United States. The hegemons could no longer afford the level of competition in which they had been engaged. The rise, decline, and collapse of their hegemonic power were mirrored in their hemispheres of influence. On the margins of their influence, where nation-states were poorly formed and where external funding distorted traditional balances of power, hegemonic decline and
collapse had dramatic consequences. As these hegemons declined, emerging regional organizations were able to take on a more independent role, and localized African hegemons were increasingly able to use these entities for their own interests.

An example of this is evident in how South Africa intervened in the conflict in Lesotho in 1998. After an election dispute, the consequent instability was a threat to South Africa’s supply of water from Lesotho (Nathan 2010), and therefore South Africa intervened to restore the overthrown government. However, as Pryse argues, other regional member states must recognize one’s hegemonic status (Pryse 2010). Though South Africa projected the strength of its hegemony, its leadership in the region was contested by its rival Zimbabwe, and therefore in practice, SADC peacebuilding efforts remained negligible in determining a final solution to this impasse (Moller 2009b).

In ECOWAS, Nigeria has both military supremacy and economic capability, and is widely accepted as the regional hegemon. However, Nigeria, as an Anglophone state, has not been able to garner strategic support from the Francophone countries in the region for its broader hegemonic aspirations (Moller 2009b).

In the case of IGAD, the hegemonic role is much more contested than in ECOWAS or SADC, and is weakened by internal domestic conflicts and by other competing inter- and intra-regional interests. Ethiopia, Sudan, and Kenya each project different dimensions of power and aspiration for leading the region. However, none of them is strong enough across the political, economic, and military spheres to project outright domination. Ethiopia had the considerable advantage of being the only state that bordered all of the other states in the region and that Kenya had to divide its attention
between the Horn and East Africa while Sudan had to keep an eye on Egypt, Libya, and
North Africa. Kenya was also more involved in the Sudan conflict, while Ethiopia took
the lead in the Somali conflict. Sudan, despite its aspirations, was not heavily involved
due to its internal conflicts (Darfur, South Sudan, and the Nuba mountains). Moreover,
Sudan’s antagonistic relationship with some of the regional states and Western
superstates has weakened its influence in the regional organization.

ECCAS and AMU lack a clear hegemonic leader in their respective regions.
ECCAS members suffer from divided loyalty to SADC and ECCAS, while AMU has a
long history of conflict between the two major states, Morocco and Algeria, over the
Sahel region (Moller 2009b).

Unfortunately, Africa continues to suffer from a post-Cold War shock that has
brought back the regional security dynamics previously subsumed by the global nature of
bipolar rivalry. The protracted conflicts in Liberia and Somalia also began with the
closure of the Cold War and the concomitant loss of superpower funding, which allowed
NSAs within the two states to overthrow unpopular leaders. As those two states no longer
had the resources to effectively respond to armed opposition, they collapsed and
protracted internal conflict ensued.

Through the 1990s and the first decade and a half of the 21st century, African
regional organizations have been given the lead and encouraged by the United Nations
and the West in peacebuilding and peacekeeping operations within the continent, with
varying outcomes. In exploring the role of Nigeria in ECOWAS’ intervention in Liberia
and Ethiopia in IGAD’s intervention in Somalia, this dissertation compares the contrasting outcomes and argues that the political agenda of regional hegemonic states critically informs and shapes the policies, decisions, and intervention model of regional organizations. The dissertation contributes to an understanding of the role and impact of regional hegemones in relation to peacemaking and peacebuilding in failed and collapsed states. It also contributes to the debates on effective intervention by exploring whether African regional organizations dominated by regional hegemons are indeed the best option for dealing with protracted conflict in Africa.

While Chapter 2 of this dissertation presents an extensive literature review on the viability and effectiveness of interventions by African regional organizations and regional hegemones, a close analysis of the literature indicates that members of regional organizations intervened in conflicts for a number of core reasons. These motivations included national security interests, economic gain, and/or increased regional or international political clout (Nathan 2010). Conflicts have spillover effects for neighbors that threaten their security. Moreover, NSAs and opposition movements often operate from exile and use neighboring countries as launching bases. For example, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), led by Foday Sankoh and supported by Charles Taylor of Liberia, overthrew the Sierra Leone government of Joseph Momoh in 1991. Taylor’s support is said to have been motivated by the lure of Sierra Leone’s significant diamond reserves and other natural resources. In the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo, the ECCAS member states were divided between aiding the rebels or the government. While Rwanda is
cited as supporting rebel movements in order to exploit DRC’s natural resources, other member states came to support the DRC government.

In addition, a closer examination of scholarly debates on peacebuilding operations in Africa reveals two main themes that categorize the argument on interventions in general and particularly by regional organizations:

1) One perspective in this debate circles around “African solutions to African problems.” Advocates insist that African regional organizations are capable of resolving conflicts in their own regions (Mutwol 2009; Ero 1995; Boulden 2003a; Francis 2006; Adibe 2003). The main argument is that regional organizations bring a strong background knowledge and professional network to the process. From this perspective, it is argued that interventions by African regional organizations are more effective and more likely to bring sustainable peace.

2) A second perspective is that interventions by regional organizations exacerbate and prolong the conflict (Mearsheimer 1994; H. Howe 1996; Samatar and Samatar 2003; Dorn 1998; Peck 2005; Healy 2008; Healy 2009b; Moller 2009b; Moller 2009a; Wulf and Debiel 2010; Wulf, Jacome, and Matsuno 2009; Cliffe 1999). Proponents of this side of the debate argue that regional organizations lack the political will and the financial and organizational capacity to intervene in the internal affairs of failed or collapsed states. They generally agree that members of regional organizations intervene in conflicts purely for narrow political interests or the protection of ethnic groups in that region.
Despite these very different views of the effectiveness of African regional organizations, the fact remains that the international community (primarily Western countries and institutions) are not interested in directly intervening in conflicts in Africa (Bellamy and Williams 2005; Berman and Sams 2003; Robert Rotberg 2000; Zartman 1996). After the end of the Cold War, Africa lost its geopolitical primacy, and therefore the West declared that Africans should resolve their own disputes. The debacle of the 1991–1995 UN military intervention in Somalia reinforced the perception of the United Nations and the Western countries that African conflicts were not part of the vital strategic interests of the West.

In the absence of international actors ready and willing to intervene, the default consensus tasked military intervention in African civil wars to emerging African regional organizations and the contiguous neighboring countries of failed states. As cited by Herbst, William Nhara, the Coordinator of Conflict Prevention and Research in the OAU’s Division of Conflict Management, argued that, “Regional organizations should realize that there is a need to take on the primary responsibility for their own problems, especially those relating to issues of peace, security and stability” (Herbst 2002, p. 23). This suggested that intervention by regional organizations in conflict is an option. However, some experts in the field envisioned trouble for regions in Africa that lack the necessary capacity to intervene (Brahimi Report 2000).

Despite such warnings, Western countries have continued to encourage African regional hegemons to project political and military power in order to resolve conflicts in their regions. Clearly, African regional hegemons — for regional peace and security,
economic, and/or military reasons — have seen the advantages in undertaking this role. Various outcomes have ensued.

1.5 Significance of the Research

My interest in this research initially stemmed from my own experiences of the Somali civil war, including the failed international intervention of the early 1990s; the indigenous attempts to create a Somali government out of the Arta, Djibouti, peace process (of which I was part); and my observation of the series of IGAD’s failed interventions in Somalia. While many scholars and policymakers presuppose African regional organizations to be in a better position to deal with conflicts in their region because of their proximity to the conflict and knowledge of the terrain and the conflict dynamics, this has not been my personal experience. As such, I wanted to delve deeper into whether the notion of “African solutions for African problems” had any currency on the wider continent and in connection to regional organizations’ interventions. With the increasing importance of African regional organizations in peace-making and peacebuilding in Africa, I was eager to find out why IGAD had not been successful in Somalia. In my preliminary research, I found that very little research had explored the role of regional hegemons in African regional organizations. Furthermore, there was hardly any focus on the actual outcomes of African regional organizations’ interventions. I was particularly interested to explore whether the interventions by these organizations led by regional hegemons into failed states have greater negative consequences than the ones they claim that they are trying to prevent.
The international community’s lack of interest in resolving African conflicts, and support for the regionalization of security and stabilization operations, has raised the stakes for African regional organizations. This research contributes to the ongoing debate around the role and viability of African regional organizations’ interventions in conflicts, as an African response to African conflicts. By investigating ECOWAS’ intervention in the Liberian conflict and IGAD’s intervention in the Somali conflict, I hope that this research may promote greater understanding of regional organizations with respect to future security stabilization scenarios.

While ECOWAS’ and IGAD’s involvement in the Liberian and Somali conflicts has been previously studied (Ero 1995; Adebajo 2002a; Adebajo 2004a; Sawyer 2005; Adeleke 1995; Adibe 1997; Aning 1999; Francis 2006; H. Howe 1996; H. Howe 2001; Kuna 2005; Mutwol 2009; Olantisakin 2003; Healy 2009b; Healy 2011; Moller 2005; Moller 2009a; Moller 2009b; Nathan 2010; Sharamo and Mesfin 2011), very little research has examined how the political agenda of regional hegemons can shape the policies of a regional organization’s intervention. In adding to our understanding of the impact of regional hegemons on the success or failure of interventions, this research bridges a critical gap in the literature. In addition, it contributes to the literature on regionalization, regional organizations, and regional interventions, as well as to the literature on understanding the success or failure of peace processes in failed and collapsed states.
This research highlights how competing regional and international interests, and lack of common objectives, coordination, and significant investment, often systematically blocks the peacebuilding processes in failed states. It further shows how regional hegemonic states help or hinder peace processes in a failed state.

Overall, this research provides valuable analysis for both academics and policymakers who are concerned with the broader goal of promoting international peace and security, as well as with understanding how regional organizations fit into a global response to conflict in the African context.

1.6 Research Methodology

In order to assess the role of regional organizations in conflict resolution and peacebuilding, I conducted a comparative case study of ECOWAS’ intervention in the Liberian conflict (1990–97) and IGAD’s intervention in Somalia (2002–08). I focused particularly on the impact of regional hegemons acting within regional organizations that were tasked to intervene in these respective conflicts. My methodological choice of case study comparison was informed by the idea that a case study template allows a researcher to use multiple sources and compare variables across countries and cultures (Robson 2002). Since African regional bodies are receiving much more Western support and legitimacy, I decided to conduct a comparative analysis in the African context.

In order to assess which factors within the two interventions more significantly impacted the successes and the failures of these interventions, I conducted a literature review on the role of regional organizations in peacebuilding. Following Yin (1994), who
notes that a case study approach permits an inquiry that investigates a phenomenon within its “real life” context, it was important for me to visit Monrovia, Liberia, and Mogadishu, Somalia, and meet people who were involved with and lived through the reality of state failure and the resulting chaos. I wanted to capture and analyze their experiences in these interventions. Robson (2002) argues that identifying and interviewing the right subjects is critical for obtaining qualitative findings. The main criterion for selecting interviewees for this study was the degree of their involvement in those conflicts and/or interventions.

Adhering to Yin’s recommendations (1994), the data for this research was collected from different sources. For its data-gathering methods, this study relied upon documentation of archival records and interviews. The first method of data collection consisted of an extensive analysis of primary and secondary source materials covering ECOWAS’ and IGAD’s mandates, resolutions, and strategies, with regard to these two interventions. Data was also sourced from existing literature in the field of peacemaking, peacebuilding, and the role of regional organizations in peace and security, as well as archival documents pertinent to these two interventions. By undertaking the literature review, I was able to synthesize and evaluate the existing sum of knowledge on the subject to date, and then place my research to fill a gap in the existing literature on the subject.

Within the literature review process, I analyzed formal documents of peace agreements, minutes of meetings, formal declarations (that sometimes obscured the
underlying contentious politics of the region), and working-level organizational reports (that sometimes revealed partisan accounts from different regional actors). All of the documents had to be carefully assessed and placed in the context of the conflicts.

The second information-gathering technique was an author-constructed, semi-structured interview protocol. The semi-structured interview protocol is a research method that contains a structured and sequenced set of questions that are flexible enough to allow new ideas to be brought out. The qualitative research method requires the development of core questions that can reveal data for the research (Moustakas 1994). To follow these procedures, I designed a comprehensive, semi-structured interview format for key actors in the two conflicts and interventions, particularly politicians, foreign diplomats, and ECOWAS and IGAD officials and representatives of their member states. This resulted in gleaning critical insights not previously borne out in other research. These interviews alone, though, were not sufficient. I also drew on secondary sources, such as archival documentation, UN documents, and written research, to round out the conclusions and findings. This was essential, as both targeted regional organizations — and many of their international allies — continue to present these regional organizations and their interventions in a positive light. The secondary research provided vital balance that was lacking in some of the primary interviews.

To conduct my research on the Liberian intervention, I traveled to Monrovia, Liberia, in 2010. (Liberia was relatively peaceful at the time of the research.) With the help of Liberian civil society activists, I was able interview ten key people in Monrovia,
each of whom was personally involved in the Liberian peace negotiations. These included members of negotiating parties, politicians, civil society members, church leaders, academicians, and a foreign diplomat. It was imperative to understand the domestic and sub-regional factors that helped or hampered the peacemaking efforts in Liberia.

For the Somalia research, I interviewed twenty-five people between 2009 and 2010, including politicians/cabinet ministers, parliamentarians, academicians, and civil society members in Somalia. I was also able to interview IGAD officials, diplomats, and politicians from Kenya, Djibouti, and Ethiopia, as well as Western diplomats who were involved in the Somali peace process.

Since the main objective of the research was to analyze the political agendas of hegemonic states as well as the interplay between regional organizations, regional hegemons, and the indigenous leaders of the failed states, I needed data that would provide an analysis of the degree to which the intervention by regional organizations actually helped end conflicts in Africa. In-depth interviews were critical for understanding the regional politics and their effect on the Liberian and Somali peace processes. They were also indispensable in manifesting the visceral and core issues that drove the conflict forward or impeded progress. Considering the direct role that many of the interviewees played in the peace processes, I explored with the participants how these interventions began, evolved, and ended.
The semi-structured and open-ended question format provided an opportunity for the interviewees to share their experiences in an organic manner so that they might feel comfortable expressing their opinions and views about the research topic. At the beginning of each interview, I explained the purpose of the interview and sought the interviewee’s permission to record it. When permission was granted, I recorded the session. After each interview session, I summarized the main themes that emerged from my interview and highlighted issues that required a follow-up interview. I explained to all my interviewees that the data for the study was confidential. I indicated that their names would not appear in the study unless the interviewee specifically requested that his/her statements be attributed.

I used a qualitative method to analyze the data collected. The main objective of this analysis was to generate answers to the research questions and garner new insights. I first developed the chronology of ECOWAS and IGAD resolutions, peace agreements, documents, reports, and press releases related to their interventions. Issues, events, emerging themes, and relationships were coded and categorized according to their relationship with these interventions. Field notes were reviewed and the data was sorted to discover emergent patterns and themes that were identified across interview responses.

To ensure the validity and reliability of my research, I employed data triangulation. Yin (1994) suggests three overriding principles: “triangulation, creating a case study database and maintaining a chain of evidence.” I followed these principles by using data triangulation, looking at the data from various perspectives, and sharing
interview notes with the respondents for their further input, explanation, and clarification. I also shared the research design, findings, and analysis with scholars and non-academic field practitioners and experts for their input as well.

1.7 Research Limitations and Challenges

The goal of the research was to compare two case studies and focus on the role of hegemons in the regional organization’s interventions in conflict and peacebuilding. However, in order to generalize from the findings of the research, it would require a comparative analysis of multiple cases. While regional hegemons undoubtedly help or hinder these types of interventions, there are other specific historical, socioeconomic, and international factors that influence the outcome of such interventions.

In addition, the literature review identified a baseline group of people who were essential to interview. Interviewing these people, however, presented many challenges at every stage. These ranged from obtaining their contact information, establishing contacts, explaining the purpose of my research, garnering their trust, and interviewing everyone within a specific time frame. Not surprisingly, people were not only busy, but many had moved on in their lives and did not want to talk about the conflicts, or in some cases, were still traumatized by the events that I wanted to discuss, or had strong views one way or the other. Presenting a balanced view of these interviews was quite a challenge.

Finally, there were elements of conducting the research that I found difficult. It was an intimidating task to synthesize the vast amount of information from the literature review and the many open-ended questions, as well as to categorize and prioritize
themes. Finding the time, confidence, and resources to go to the field and interview many esteemed (or infamous) personalities was also at times daunting. Sometimes, having to press on issues that were or continue to be contentious was a challenge.

1.8 Conclusion

Given that African regional organizations only began to gain preeminence when the Cold War wound down, the role of these organizations in regional securitization is a relatively new area of research. It is a topic, however, that has become of utmost significance on the African continent. African regional organizations were encouraged to transform from benign economic development forums and take on a regional securitization mandate that had the legal capacity to intervene in the internal affairs of member states in order to maintain peace and stability in Africa. African regional organizations and their members readily took on this role, as it was seen as an initiation into the “Big League.” Regional hegemons in those organizations saw significant opportunity to not only maintain peace in their region but also to advance their regional hegemonic aspirations.

Overall, this research and dissertation frame a comparative analysis of two regional African organizations, and examine the role of these organizations and their regional hegemons in their interventions in the internal affairs of two failed African states. I have utilized a number of research methods to bring multiple sources of information together to analyze and make conclusions about the impact, effectiveness, and suitability of African regional securitization interventions. My research and thesis
add a useful dimension to the total sum of knowledge in the areas of peace and security, regional organizations, and conflict resolution.
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW OF THE ROLE OF HELEMONS WITHIN AFRICAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS’ INTERVENTIONS IN COLLAPSED STATES

2.1 Introduction

As outlined in the introduction, this dissertation’s theoretical approach centers on how the strategic interests of regional hegemons within African regional organizations influence the outcome of stabilization and peace processes in collapsed states. To better understand the impact of regional hegemons in such interventions, this chapter explores the literature surrounding Barry Buzan’s theory of Regional Security Complexes (RSC) in relation to the development and dynamics of regional organizations in specific contexts in Africa, as well as their intervention praxis in specific African conflicts. It reviews the challenges and the insecurity presented by collapsed states to regional peace and security, and investigates the advantages and disadvantages of a regional approach to conflict resolution and peacebuilding, particularly the opportunity cost of intervention by African hegemons in their relevant regional organizations. It concludes by outlining the factors that have been highlighted in the literature to explain the success or failure of these interventions, and identifies gaps in the literature.

2.2 Regions and Regional Security Complex Theory (RSC)

The study of regional security complexes has grown in the post-Cold War era, with the locus of conflict shifting away from bipolar global politics to a multipolar and regional locus. As bipolar ideology and politics have fallen away — and the justification
for direct superpower intervention with them — regional hegemons and their ideology and concerns have been able to garner more traction. In this context, RSC theory has also gained more currency as a catalyst for a better understanding of conflict and conflict resolution in the post-Cold War era. This intellectual move requires a greater emphasis on geographical regions: their history, culture, religious and political experience, and their interplay. The increased profile and popularity of RSC amongst international relations practitioners has *sui generis* created a reality whereby global hegemons (i.e., the United States, Russia, China, EU member states) have given more room for their regional allies and hegemons to act at a regional level, with regional interests more to the fore.

2.2.1 Regions

In order to understand the regional level of analysis in security studies, many scholars have worked on defining “region.” Fawcett conducted a study on the comparative history of regionalism and came to the conclusion that there is no agreement on the definition of the term. She argues that, “regions are what states and non-state actors make of it” (Fawcett 2004, 7). William Thompson (1973) concludes the opposite. He examined and compared the definitions offered by twenty-two published analysts (1958–71), and found that “proximity and interaction” were agreed-upon criteria for a regional sub-system to exist in a world politics. He argues that a “minimum of two actors” and “internal and external actor recognition” are common sense attributes for a regional sub-system. Vayrynen (2003) also evaluated recent literature on the political, economic, and regionalist literature of scholars like Lake and Morgan (1997); Mansfield and Milner (1997); Scott (1998); Solingen (1998); Baldwin et al. (1999); Hettne, Inotai,
and Sunkel (1999); Hook and Kearns (1999); Mattli (1999); and Page (2000). He posits that the most important dimension in the study of the formation of regions and regionalization is the division of the world by levels of analysis (state or regions) and by “physical-functional” distinctions (Vayrynen 2003, 2–4). He notes that physical regions are mainly territorial, “military and strategic,” while functional regions are non-territorial, such as economic, environmental, and cultural identity (for example, whether it is based on religion or ethnicity). Similarly, Buzan defines a region as a “distinct and significant sub-system of security relations existing among a set of states, whose fate is that they are locked into a geographic proximity with each other” (Buzan 1991, 188). This dissertation employs the Thompson, Vayrynen, and Buzan definition of regions, based on proximity and interaction between member states. It conceptualizes a region as a recognized sub-system of the larger international system and a forum for regional security complexes. According to Buzan, “a security complex is defined as a group of states who[se] primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another” (Buzan 1991, 190). This description indicates that security complexes result from the interaction between individual states within the forum. Therefore, the question is how do regional hegemons influence the decisions of these forums and thereby shape the outcome of a regional organization’s intervention?

2.2.2 Regional Security Complex Theory

To meet the challenges of multipolarity in world politics, RSC theory, advanced by Buzan and Wæver (2007), has become an established feature of regional approaches
to conflict and global security. They claim that the RSC approach to international security structures draws its views from the neorealist and globalist paradigms.

Neorealism holds a state-centric view of security and is concerned with a state’s material power. From this perspective, power is a zero-sum game and is conditioned by a balance-of-power logic. On the other hand, a globalist position argues that the international system consists of both state and non-state actors (NSAs). Non-state actors can be anything from regional entities; sub-state political entities that differentiate their identity in opposition to the nation-state; civil society groups; nodes of economic convergence that manifest organizational unity (unions, business groups or alliances); or political or military factions marginalized and unrecognized by mainstream state actors. In essence, a globalist perspective perceives the nation-state not as a coherent whole, but as a basket of polycentric competing interests, and those interests, at different times and in different spaces, can subsume nation-state narratives and spaces.

The regionalist perspective, as understood by Buzan and Wæver (2007), agrees with the globalist premise that allows for narratives other than solely those of nation-states. While concurring with the neorealist view of competition within a Westphalian state system, they add a layer of regional-level analysis of the international security system by arguing that threats travel more easily over short distances than long ones. Lake and Morgan agree with the regionalization of contemporary security affairs and the importance of regional relations as a venue of “conflict and cooperation” (Lake and Morgan 1997, 6–7).
Conceptually, Buzan and Waever characterize security as relational, in terms of patterns of amity and enmity. These patterns exhibit a constructionist perspective and are derived from the interaction between the actors and the meaning and interpretations they give to their interaction. Within this conceptualization, they claim that the interaction of anarchy and amity and enmity, along with geographic proximity as a delineating factor, creates security interdependency in a security complex. Therefore, RSCs are defined as a “set of units whose major process of securitization, de-securitization, or both, are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another” (Buzan and Waever 2007, 44). The strength of the RSCs is mandated by the type of states (weak/strong), the degree of socio-political cohesion of relational civil society, and their institutions of governance. As further noted, an “RSC does not exist independently of the states and their vulnerabilities, the outcome of their interactions would be different if it were not for the existence of the RSC” (Buzan and Waever 2007, 50-51). A region composed of weak and collapsed states will be structurally different from strong-state systems, and hence impacts the capacity of the regional security complex (Ayoob 1995, 13). RSCs in Africa are organized around certain states that possess key assets in terms of geographic proximity, population size, military capability, and political and diplomatic leverage at the international level (i.e., the regional hegemon). Therefore, RSCs can best be understood by analyzing the patterns of amity and enmity at the regional level, and then extending the analysis to a domestic nation-state’s concerns and interests. For regional hegemons, the regional level of
security dynamics is increasingly crucial in shaping their options and influence within a framework of regional interaction.

**2.2.3 Security and Securitization**

In the RSC paradigm, security is a contested term that has no objective definition (Buzan 1991). RSC scholars define security as an ambiguous symbol, or a security regime (Jervis 1982; Wolfers 1952). Human security is defined at its most basic level by access to protection against existential threat; access to sufficient food, shelter, and water; and access to basic healthcare and education. Realist and neorealist models define human security in relation to nation-state relationships. However, RSC literature breaks down the nation-state paradigm further and allows for human security to include military, political, economic, societal, and environmental factors for nation-state and regional groupings (Buzan 1991). It does this by admitting elements of the globalist and post-structuralism paradigms to filter in. RSC literature focuses on systems and their interactions, both nation-state and regional, that provide stability, security, legitimacy, and the ability to act (via the rule of law) in political, military, economic, cultural, religious, and environmental spheres (Buzan 1991, 19). The ability to act is investigated within the nation-state, regionally, and internationally.

Securitization is about the way in which we designate something as secure or a security threat, whether it be military, political, societal, or environmental (Buzan and Wæver 2007). According to the way our political life is organized, the nation-state demands a *privileged* position in discourse relating to security. Waever says, “Something
is a security problem when the elites declare it to be so” (Wæver 1998). This diffuse
definition works as easily for regional hegemons as it does for international hegemons of
all stripes. The very notions that allowed superstates to control the world since the
Westphalian system came into being are now being utilized by regional hegemons to
justify coercion, action, and intervention in their respective regions.

The fundamental tenet of the Westphalian nation-state system is that nation-states
have an exclusive right in relation to domestic and international security. In this system,
neither the individual nor the group has the right to challenge the nation-state, except
through the prism of individual nation-state rule of law. Within RSC literature, regional
and international entities also have legitimacy and scope to influence the Westphalian
securitization narrative; for example, the African Union and regional economic and
security entities are being increasingly legitimizd and empowered in Africa.

With the decline of a bipolar world and the increasing emergence and importance
of a multipolar world, the scope and influence of African regional organizations is
becoming significant. RSCs are being increasingly perceived as the emerging norm.
Within that paradigm, African regional hegemons have been in a prime position to
heavily influence not only the regional organizations to which they belong, but also the
emerging dynamics between international organizations and their regional counterparts.

The decline of the bipolar world has generated a realignment of regional politics
and priorities. A manifestation of superpower withdrawal has been increased conflict and
structural anarchy within the Westphalian periphery — and within that periphery, conflict
within weak nation-states (Zartman 1996). In that context, international organizations, such as the UN, have been found increasingly wanting, and it has been regional organizations that have been empowered to solve regional problems. UN weakness has resulted in the UN developing a corpus of international agreements devolving its responsibility to regional organizations. Only when perceived core Western interests are involved will the UN invoke its primacy to intervene.

This regionalization of security away from the center, along with the globalization of commerce and information, is undoubtedly marked by spillover, such as refugee influx over international borders, human trafficking, drug trafficking, illicit arms flows, terrorism, and the regionalization of civil wars. Increasingly, these activities are no longer under the purview of traditional superstates. Increasing reliance upon regional hegemons by traditional superpowers, through the filter of regional organizations, is providing regional hegemons and regional organizations with a progressively more effective bargaining tool — even more so when the regional entities become aware of the structural shift and their role in the new order.

2.2.4 Conclusions about Security and Securitization and RSCs in the African Context

The African continent has recorded the highest number of nation-states suffering from civil breakdown and state collapse in the post-WWII era. African RSCs have been marked by domestic dissonance ever since their formation. The weakness of most African states has given room for newly emerging non-state actors to project power, force, and influence beyond the norms of mature Western states. It has become far easier
for such actors to seize and hold geographic territory and material and political power. Most of the conflicts in Africa are fought internally or between states and insurgents. The weakness of central governance in a majority of African nation-states has also made it easier for external actors to interfere in a regional-level conflict, altering the power structures within the regional complexes. The conflicts in Angola (1975–2002), Mozambique (1977–1992), Liberia (1990–1997), Sierra Leone (1991–2002), the Democratic Republic of Congo (1998–2003), and Somalia (1991–present) are classic examples of regional and international interests and interventions distorting and prolonging domestic discord.

Bjorn Hettne (2005) explains that, “regionalism is a political project, created by human actors,” which has the potential to fail. He warns of the long-term implications for the regionalization of conflict and conflict resolution. Within the African context of marginal Westphalian nation-states, and relatively declining superstates, African regional organizations and regional hegemons have been plied with responsibility and a rising level of resources in an attempt to maintain the periphery of the Westphalian nation-state system. Hettne further notes that:

The state, as well as the forces of state making and state destruction, are all at the core of understanding today’s political economy of regionalism. However, there is a need to understand how this so-called national/state interest is formed in the first place. Neither states nor regions can be taken for granted. The national interest is often simply a group-specific interest or even the personal interest of certain political leaders, rather than the public good or national security and development understood in a more comprehensive sense (Hettne 2005, 554).
At a theoretical level, RSC theory offers a deeper level of analysis than a realist or neorealist paradigm and allows for the interplay of various regional variables to operate at the political, social, and military levels. It can also account for variables within the international system and suggests intriguing ways to conceptualize the regionalization of global security. However, without the complex mapping and analysis of NSAs, much of what has happened in modern African history cannot be explained. An example of the relevance of even individual human relationships is illustrated in Chapter 3 of this research, in which the personal relationship between the political leaders of Nigeria and Liberia was what motivated and drove the initial ECOWAS intervention in the Liberian civil war. The very act of trying to force African nation-states to behave and operate as Western nation-states do (including through the development of African regional organizations and the empowerment of regional African hegemons) is a driver for new conflict within the African continent. While RSCs clearly provide an extra layer of analysis that realist or neorealist paradigms lack, RSCs themselves lack sufficient analytical depth to account for both international and local paradigms that globalist paradigms more effectively explain. Though an RSC can effectively account for Ethiopian or Kenyan interplay in Somali political or military affairs (as well as their hegemonic desires and overtures), it does not and cannot effectively elucidate the patchwork of Islamic extremist interplay in Somalia. It cannot account for the multitude of political and ideological variance within this single variable; and this is only one variable amongst a basket of such variables that a globalist paradigm can better account for.
Finally, the RSC tool itself is largely couched in a narrative in which regional hegemons and regional organizations are themselves bereft of political agendas and ambitions. Regional organizations are projected to intervene in securitization issues to provide the “best outcome”; but the reality is that African regional organizations have oozed with narrow self-interest on many occasions, and member states of regional organizations may themselves be involved in undermining the securitization of other members, thus also significantly compromising the RSC level of analysis.

2.3 Defining Weak and Collapsed States and Regional Insecurity

The literature on state failure has received considerable attention and sparked interest in understanding the factors behind political violence, civil war, state failure, and collapsed states. Sovereign states are expected to provide a range of services to their citizens, particularly law and order and security. Scholars continue to be concerned with identifying why states fail to perform their core functions (Zartman 1995b).

Rotberg (2004) classifies states in relation to their performance in delivering political goods to their citizens. He argues that states succeed or fail according to their success in delivering these political goods, and their effectiveness may distinguish between strong, weak, failed, or collapsed states. He contends that strong states control their territory and deliver a high quality of political goods to their citizens, while weak states are those that provide some but not all the necessary political goods, and typically suffer from economic constraints, internal antagonisms, and ethnic conflicts (R. I. Rotberg 2004). He claims that weak states may have a veneer of strength, but they
manifest increased rates of crime and corruption, and neglect the maintenance of physical infrastructure.

States are considered failed when they are unable to deliver political goods to their public (R. I. Rotberg 2004). Failed states cannot control their borders, often confront armed rebellions, and experience civil unrest and some degree of communal conflict. According to Zartman, state failure is “a long-term degenerative disease,” which means it can be predictable and preventable (Zartman 1995b, 8). The seeds of state failure can be found within its political institutions. The extent of failure can be measured by the levels of corruption, crime, murder, breakdown in public services, and the status of state authority over the peripheral towns and districts after dark. All the prominent academic analysis focuses on the success or failure of the nation-state within a Westphalian paradigm. If a state is failed, it is failed in relation to other nation-states. The remedy is to try and make it more like successful nation-states. There is virtually no notable research on post-Westphalian social groupings or securitization. This is troubling in a context in which more — and not fewer — existing nation-states are struggling to conform to the Westphalian criteria for success.

Failed or collapsed states are considered systemically dysfunctional. Characteristics of failed states indicate that they are unable to provide law and order within their boundaries and are unable to effectively protect those boundaries against external penetration. Failed states are unable or unwilling to provide a basic level of public services for their population and have a propensity for marginalizing minorities within the borders of their state. Another indicator is the growth of criminal violence and
murder, and the level of emergence of non-state actors contesting the authority of the central state. Failed states often exhibit flawed institutions; political participation is weak or absent; and the executive branch directs the legislative and judicial branches, thus hindering the independence required to perform their duties (Robert Rotberg 2003). According to Kasfir (2004), state failure certainly creates anarchy, which often leads to state collapse. For example, William Reno (2003) explains how state failure in Sierra Leone was caused by corruption. He claims that the corrupt practices of both the ruling elite and the opposition leaders led to state failure (Reno 2003, 73). State failure allowed neighbors, NSAs, and leaders like Charles Taylor to manipulate business deals for their own advantage. According to Reno (2003), this spiral away from state legitimacy brought Sierra Leone to a complete state collapse. The new power loci that filled the vacuum for traditional state legitimacy and state power were NSAs and even strong individual personalities. The rule of law collapsed and in its place came arbitrary, pernicious, capricious decision-making that gave preference to individuals and factions, rather than a duty of care for the broader population.

Failed states collapse when the political order falls apart. Consequently, states can no longer fulfill their duties and lose the authority and legitimacy to rule in the eyes of their citizens (Zartman 1995b). However, not all failed states collapse. Gerard Prunier and Rachel M. Gisselquist (2003) demonstrate how Sudan has suffered from a state of civil war since its inception as a sovereign nation. It has remained functionally “failed” without falling into complete collapse. Yet in practice, the government was unable, or did
not choose, to govern on behalf of the entire population. Rather, it governed on behalf of
certain ethnicities, factions, and individuals.

2.3.1 Causes of State Failure and State Collapse in Africa and Potential RSC
Intervention

There are many examples of state failure and state collapse in contemporary
Africa. The 2013 Failed States Index indicates that seven out of the ten most troubled
countries are located in Africa. Chad, Central African Republic (CAR), DRC, Somalia,
Sudan, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe all ranked in the top ten. Understanding the causes
of failure is critical to developing long-term solutions and designing contextualized
interventions that are effective and responsive to individual state failure (Deng 1995, 20).
The reasons why Africa is so afflicted by state failure is a thesis of its own; but as a basic
summary, there is a general agreement that nation-state failure in Africa broadly relates to
the arbitrary division of nation-state borders that were created in the halls of power and
commerce in Europe, which took little or no account of historical boundaries in Africa.
One example of this widely held academic agreement on the seemingly arbitrary nation-
state borders is provided by Adekeye Adebajo (2010), who argues that African conflicts
are at least partly caused by a “Bismarckian order” that divided Africa according to the
interests of European colonizers. These European entities were operating in their own
narrow self-interest and had no interest or regard for traditional African “states.” The
European land grab was seeking territory for European states, and only over time, as
these states fell into decline, did they cede the African lands back to the indigenous
inhabitants. Even then, the emerging superstates that grew in the aftermath of WWII
attempted to manipulate these newly formed African states by utilizing the European-imposed borders for their own foreign policy objectives. They regularly fomented discord between and within states using the arbitrarily drawn borders as a catalyst for conflict.

As noted by Zartman (1995b), state collapse in Africa came in waves in the post-WWII era. The first one arrived when poorly functioning civilian governments were replaced by military regimes. The second collapse happened when military regimes were removed from power, mostly by violent means, as witnessed in Liberia and Somalia.

Another factor that has contributed to the process of state failure and collapse in Africa has been the shrinking base of resources under the control of the state, in tandem with poorly developed bases of taxation. In practice, this leaves the nation-state without any capacity to fund governance, the rule of law, or public service delivery (Ng’the 1995, 256). Poorly structured “economic reforms,” introduced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, further eroded the control by African states, as urban riots and social instability accompanied enforced cuts in health care and education and the removal of government subsidies on food and fuel. Moreover, the post-Cold War marginalization of Africa (including the sudden and significant withdrawal of financial and other resources from the African continent) further contributed to the process of state collapse (Gambari 1995). Robert Rosh (1987) supports this contention by arguing that state failure is largely a function of the inability of the state to provide political goods, as well as the withdrawal of outside support to weak states.
In responding to why some states collapse while others do not, Walter Clark and Robert Gosende (2003) explain why Somalia, a culturally and religiously homogeneous nation, imploded. They argue that the post-independence government and the subsequent military regime both failed to build a good foundation for governance and service delivery. There was little to no genuine democratization, and political diversity was actively opposed by the military regime. Cold War rivals sustained the regime for more than two decades for their own international interests, with the majority of the nation’s GDP being generated by external aid and development and military assistance (Terdman 2008).

Since the end of the Cold War, a number of African states have experienced systemic violence stemming from internal conflict. Some of these crises are civil wars and ethnic conflicts, as we have seen in Liberia, Burundi, Rwanda, Somalia, Tanzania, Sudan, Uganda, DRC, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. Many of them have resulted in complex humanitarian emergencies. Though the dynamics may differ in each case, the civil wars that characterize state failure stem from social, economic, and political pressures, as well as an increased level of violence that state institutions were unable or unwilling to manage (R. I. Rotberg 2004, 24–27). Overall, constituencies within these nation-states have felt underrepresented, marginalized, or even completely ignored. The only way they have felt that their grievances could be heard is to oppose the central authority through military means. For example, the conflict between the Hutus and the Tutsis in Rwanda was not about primordial ethnic hatred or competition for scarce resources, but originated in the actions of militant leaders who feared marginalization and loss from new
institutional arrangements (Stein 2005). The lack of a mature political class allowed opportunistic leaders and factions to manipulate constituency disaffection for their own ends.

Scholars in the field argue that conflicts are either caused by greed or grievance. Competition over resources is a frequent cause of destructive social conflict. In his analysis, Michael Brown identifies three economic factors that have fueled the internal wars of the post-Cold War period: (1) General economic problems; (2) discriminatory economic systems on an ethnic or clan basis; and (3) the disruptive impact of economic development and modernization upon communities (Brown 2005, 216). These factors suggest that severe economic decline undermines even the strongest civil societies in Africa. Van de Wall (2004) underlines the effect of predation on weak states and how their tax collection and economic policies contribute to their failure. Paul Collier (2005) also points out that civil war is heavily concentrated in countries with low income and dependent on only a few natural resources. The conflicts in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo are classic examples of these types of wars, in which gold, diamonds, and other mineral resources fueled the conflict. He explains in his article “The Economic Causes of Civil Conflicts and their Implications for Policy” that rebels are motivated by a desire to be economically empowered. He points out, quite correctly, that while nations can finance wars through taxation, rebel organizations require other means to fund their operations.
In contrast, Ted Gurr (2005) argues that civil wars are usually caused by ethnicity. He asserts that rebellions are indeed ethnically and culturally motivated. Rather than using an economic framework in which to explain civil conflicts, Gurr believes that differentials between groups lead to cultural and/or ethnic differences. Then power differentials between the groups lead to legitimate grievances by oppressed parties, which better explains the cause of civil wars. Gurr maintains that the apparent rise of civil conflicts since 1960 is indicative of the forces of modernization. These mechanisms—such as the growth of modern states, the development of a global economic system, and the communications revolution—have not only enhanced methods of forming group solidarity, but have also caused a great degree of displacement and marginalization of ethno-political groups (Gurr 2005). Others caution that identity alone does not cause conflict unless manipulated by leaders and elites. Pruitt and colleagues (2004) argue that there is neither a single cause of conflict, nor any single solution, but that a variety of factors cause the onset and the escalation of violent conflict. Legitimate factors in determining drivers of conflict within nation-states include poor state formation and development; inadequate differentiation and independence of the executive, judicial, and security branches; poor financial management and weak recurrent capacity to pay for government and services; poor political representation and resource sharing amongst all population profiles; external interference by regional and international hegemons, and the weight of their economic and security interests; and historical inequality and enmity between domestic constituencies within nation-states.
Collapsed states in Africa pose threats not only to the integrity of individual states, but also to regional peace and security. They create an environment that triggers wider regional conflict, with significant economic and security costs to neighboring countries. Failed and collapsed states that are unable to manage normal societal conflicts in a stable and consensual fashion create a security vacuum that groups and individuals seek to fill through the use of violence, sometimes in an organized and sustained manner. This constitutes regional instability. Elements like warlords and terrorists emerge and are not only destabilizing internally, but also have the capacity to threaten the stability and growth of neighboring states. Individuals cannot on their own secure national borders from transnational attack, nor can they prevent non-state actors from acquiring weapons and followers within those national borders. Only nation-states have a collective mandate to fulfill those functions. Indeed, this is considered to be a core nation-state primary mission. If it cannot protect its citizens from harm and secure its borders, it fails a fundamental test of sovereign statehood. Besides, many of these conflicts start as intrastate war but often spill over to other countries. A good example would be the Rwanda-Congo experience, which was an intertwined conflict that spread over national boundaries and involved neighboring states. The motives for their involvement vary between defensive intervention, protection of ethnic groups, and opportunistic economic and political meddling. As a result of previous disputes, neighboring countries often take advantage of the situation and fuel the conflict by smuggling more arms into fragile contexts. Therefore, a combination of unscrupulous leaders and self-interested neighbors render an intervention difficult to succeed.
Failed states do not perform well across most tests describing what a sovereign nation-state is supposed to deliver to its citizens and international partners. They fail to provide for basic human needs, such as security, the rule of law, justice, and social services. Political participation is limited and dissidence is summarily punished. Many constituencies are underrepresented and marginalized, and resources are poorly allocated against need and population profile. Such collapsed or failed states pose serious challenges for RSCs in terms of refugee flows (including human trafficking), illicit weapon and drug flows, and other contraband economic flows. Howe (2001) agrees that illicit goods and cheap and available guns exacerbate conflicts. Humanitarian disaster and the loss of trade, development, and investment opportunities intensify crises.

RSCs face a myriad of interconnected complex factors in attempting to deal with a failed state in their region. This is exacerbated by the spillover of influence and interest by regional and international organizations and by regional member states, particularly regional hegemons. Moreover, the generation of a regional intervention, often at the beckoning of regional hegemons and their individual interests, often skews conflict within a collapsed state and produces outcomes with unintended consequences. In reviewing the literature, it is evident that regional intervention is tempting, especially to prevent regional destabilization. Yet the lack of actual understanding of a conflict in a failed state, as well as the lack of neutrality of the entities that would form the basis for an intervention, means that any intervention is likely to perpetuate the conflict or only provide a short-to-medium-term solution, while merely masking unresolved issues and
tensions in the failed state and the RSC. This situation only sets the preconditions for future rounds of conflict once the actors in the intervention withdraw.

2.4 Debating the Role of African Regional Organizations in Conflict Resolution

Multilateral interventions in civil conflicts have been one of the most significant and contentious aspects of contemporary international affairs. The recent increase in the level of intervention has created debate about the legal, moral, and political justifications for and against interventions in civil conflicts (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall 2005). A careful survey of the literature on intervention suggests that most conflicts do not resolve by themselves. They require some form of intervention, depending on the nature and stage of the conflict, the willingness of the parties, and the capacity of the interveners (Crocker 2005). Some conflicts may demand economic or diplomatic intervention while others, military or diplomatic intervention. Economic intervention may come in the form of sanctions, while diplomatic interventions mostly focus on mediation and facilitation. Military intervention is an extreme measure to resolve intractable conflict, and has the potential to cause more death in the course of trying to stop the bloodshed and end the hostilities. Nevertheless, current research shows that while peacekeeping does contribute to maintaining peace in the aftermath of civil war, long-term outcomes are less certain in terms of success (Fortna 2004). Combining both diplomatic and military intervention can pressure the stronger party in an internal conflict to change behavior and come to the negotiating table. It may also make peace more likely to endure (Jeong 2010).
Contemporary debates have focused on the pros and cons of intervention. Hoffmann (2005) reviewed the opinions of international theorists on the permissibility of third-party intervention. He found that liberal theorists like Kant, Mills, Walzer, and Rawls argue for intervention using the moral obligation to stop bloodshed and prevent human suffering and loss. In support of this argument, Axelrod and Keohane (1985) assert that institutions help develop norms and facilitate collective beneficial cooperation. The outcome of this form of “moral imperative” in current RSC debate implies that regional organizations have an increasingly important emerging role as conflict-resolution mediators, which includes the option of internal intervention in the affairs of another sovereign nation-state.

On the other side of the debate, the Realist School has generally rejected this argument, claiming that there is no inherent obligation to intervene in the internal affairs of sovereign nation-states. Mearsheimer contends that international organizations cannot promote peace: “institutions have minimal influence on state behavior” (Mearsheimer 1994, 7). The Realist School argument comes from its state-centric view of the international system. It argues that where interventions do occur, they must be done only in defense of individual state interest and not in the interest of the nation that has suffered state collapse.

In spite of the academic pros and the cons for intervention, Africa has suffered disproportionately from violent civil wars, and interventions by regional organizations have become an increasingly common response to regional security problems. Since the end of the Cold War period, almost all new armed conflicts have occurred within the territories of sovereign states (Boulden 2003b). Military dictators in Africa are no longer able to count on
unconditional assistance from the West or its communist-bloc adversary. The protracted conflicts in Liberia and Somalia also began with the loss of superpower largesse. Opposition movements were able to succeed in overthrowing hated leaders because those two powers no longer had the resources to effectively respond to armed opposition. Repeated civil wars in Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Angola — products of failed peace agreements in Sudan, Somalia, and Liberia — alone resulted in several million casualties in the 1990s (Francis 2006). While intervention is often necessary to maintain the traditional nation-state system, what is the optimal level of intervention? Is there any choice other than regional organization intervention in a post-Cold War era? If regional organization intervention is now perceived as the norm (UN/superstate intervention now being the exception rather than the rule), what is the impact and role of regional hegemons in these interventions? What is their motivation? What is the interplay of the regional hegemon with the regional organization?

There is wide consensus that the United Nations, as a universal body, still has the formal legitimacy to intervene in any conflict in the world (Bonyongwe 2000; Boulden 2003b; Francis 2006; Robert Rotberg 2000). However, the United Nations Security Council, as the organ in charge of authorizing such intervention, has increasingly experienced difficulty in convincing its members to support intervention in conflicts they do not perceive as an immediate threat to their individual interests and security, particularly in Africa. As a result, it has encouraged more regionalization of interventions. The framework for a regional organization’s intervention in a civil war is stipulated in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which states that regional organizations may intervene in conflicts only with the
authorization of the Security Council. Francis argues that the UN Charter explicitly recognizes the role of regional organizations in conflict management and notes that Article 33 (1) provides a legal framework for organizations to maintain peace and security in their regions (Francis 2006, 92). In addition, former Secretary-General Boutrous-Ghali’s (1992) “Agenda for Peace” recommended a greater role for regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security. While the mandate for regional organizations appears to be solidifying in the post-Cold War era, some experts in the field envision trouble for continents like Africa that lack the necessary effective capacity to intervene (Berman and Sams 2003). Brahimi’s report of the panel on UN peace operations warned against the regionalization of peace operations, and stressed its detrimental effect on the poorer parts of the world that do not have the resources to intervene in violent conflict (Brahimi Report 2000).

One strand of academic and policy thought theorizes that African regional organizations do have a comparative advantage when it comes to intervening in conflicts in their region. First, they are closer to the conflict and can quickly intervene. Second, they have a better understanding of the conflict and can bring in background knowledge. Third, they have the ability to put pressure on indigenous parties. Fourth, they might have better relations with the parties, and their intervention might be more acceptable to indigenous parties (Boulden 2003b). The problem with this argument is that states in a regional security complex usually have close ethnic, economic, political, and military relations. Proximity can sometimes mean having an ethnic association across state boundaries, which can create mistrust between the intervening state and some of the parties to the conflict. In addition,
background knowledge might be perceived to be biased. Historical competition between neighboring states is quite common and does not necessarily stop because one party has imploded. Such a situation often provides further opportunity for intervening states and regional hegemons to further their own interests at the expense of the state that has collapsed. In this vein, Walter Dorn argues that regional organizations have “harmful regional interests” (Dorn 1998, 1). Research on ECOWAS highlights a similar pattern of member states supporting different Liberian factions, which prolonged the conflict (Adebajo 2002a). Hence, nation-state self-interest is a significant determinant of regional foreign policy, and nation-state support for opposing groups involved in conflicts undermines the ability of regional organizations to successfully resolve intrastate conflicts, as they are not perceived as neutral arbiters.

The African experience in this new role of “regional policeman” has been mixed. As a result of increased superpower reticence to intervene (manifest through the UN), African regional organizations have felt increasingly empowered to intervene in conflicts and conduct peace operations to bring an end to the violence in their respective regions. These interventions have included peace-making, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding operations. However, these interventions have not always led to a successful conclusion of the conflict. ECOWAS and IGAD are among the African organizations that have intervened in conflicts on the African continent. ECOWAS’ intervention in Liberia’s conflict has been classified as a “partial success” (Downs and Stedman 2002, 59), while IGAD’s intervention, that began in 2002, remains ongoing until 2014 without any tangible peace attained.
Although scholars from diverse backgrounds have contributed to the study of the role and the effectiveness of regional organizations’ interventions in civil wars, their efforts have focused on the legal basis for humanitarian, diplomatic, and military (peacekeeping) interventions; United Nations cooperation with regional organizations; peace agreements; and the capacity of regional organizations (Adeleke 1995; Ero 1995; Adibe 2003; Boulden 2003b; Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom 2004; Bellamy and Williams 2005; Peck 2005; Crocker 2005; Hoffmann 2005; Regan and Aydin 2006; Regan, Frank, and Aydin 2009; Francis 2006; Hansen and Nemeth 2008; Healy 2008; Healy 2009a; Healy 2009b; Moller 2009a; Moller 2009b; Wulf, Jacome, and Matsuno 2009; Cunningham 2010; Nathan 2010; Sharamo and Mesfin 2011). There has been little debate about the criteria for regional intervention, the local politics of intervention, or the political deal-making between regional organizations and regional hegemons.

The practical experience of African regional organizations suggests that few of them actually have peace and security as one of their missions (Moller 2005). A majority of them suffer from a lack of organizational capacity, in terms of recurrent internal money, logistics, and command structure (Tavares 2010). Individual member states of a regional organization are often inclined to get involved because they almost inevitably suffer from the consequences of the conflict (e.g., in the form of a flow of refugees or transfers of illegal contraband). They may also see financial or political opportunities from intervention.

The frequency of intervention by a regional organization is said to be provoked by the level of instability caused by a collapsed state. Tavares (2010) posits that collapsed states
cannot resist intervention. They are relatively easy prey for international or regional
hegemons. Often factions within collapsed states have relationships with regional member
states (or even with international superstates). These factions may ask for outside
intervention, thus providing the “legal” justification for regional or international
intervention. A process of obsolescent bargaining then takes place, in which favored factions
or individuals are able, over time, to secure more external resources and thus change the
balance of power in the collapsed state. They may either force a “peace treaty” in favor of
the victorious faction or perpetuate the conflict for years more.

Assessing the contribution and effectiveness of African regional organizations,
Nathan found that, “a rich mixture of historical, geographic, political, security and cultural
factors at domestic, regional and international levels account for the diversity among the
organizations, and for the mandate, orientation and effectiveness of each of them” (Nathan
2010, 19). In support of this argument, Moller (2009b) and Healy (2009a) also found that
the closer states are to the conflict, the more likely that they will become partial, which often
affects the capacity of the regional organization in advancing regional conflict resolution.
According to Connie Peck (2005), regional organizations are more effective in dealing with
the root causes of a conflict and should concentrate their effort on prevention rather than
conflict management.

There is, however, a discrepancy between African regional organizations’ mandate
to intervene and their capacity to implement a military intervention and sustain a peace and
security operation. Even when a security mandate and structures are in place, the operational
capacity of regional organizations is weak (Tavares 2010). The cost of any intervention is significant. Most African regional organizations — even at the African Union (AU) level — lack the financial and human resources to successfully intervene. This often jeopardizes the fulfillment of their obligation under their respective mandates. Dorn (1998) identifies four weaknesses in regional organizations: (1) national or regional self-interest and resulting partiality; (2) power perception and the domination of a member state; (3) a lack of capacity to execute their mandate; and (4) a lack of authority, as only the UN has the “moral authority” to authorize any intervention. The African experience exemplifies Dorn’s analysis and concerns. Both the AU and regional organizations lack the inherent financial or logistical capacity to successfully intervene in the internal affairs of a member state. In reality, these regional organizations continue to be funded by Western states and sometimes operate in the interest of the states that fund them. Western superstates have a predilection to operate in conjunction with regional hegemons, utilizing regional organizations as cover for the interests of international and regional hegemons. This emerging international superstructure can sometimes fuel the conflict it is trying to end, and allows for regional hegemons to have much more influence and control at a regional level. Within this matrix, regional organizations are not benign, beneficent entities operating in a neutral and disinterested manner. Rather, they are institutions largely controlled by one individual regional hegemon and they operate in the interests of that hegemon and the superstates that support it.

Failed and collapsed states pose tremendous challenges for African regional organizations that attempt intervention. First, it is very likely that in weak, centralized
nation-states, NSAs have already established strong indigenous constituencies. Although African regional organizations and their supporters claim that they understand the dynamics within failed states better than does the UN, the reality indicates that African regional organizations and their member states have only a cursory understanding of the internal dynamics of their failed or failing member states. Further, when states fail or collapse, ever more NSAs manifest themselves as the conflict metastasizes, due to grievances and/or for opportunistic reasons.

Second, member states within respective African regional organizations get involved in the conflict due to fear of spill over; concern for specific ethnic groups; for economic reasons; or for political meddling. This automatically challenges the neutrality and impartiality required for an intervention to succeed. In analyzing the actual interventions of African regional organizations, it is evident that the interests of the regional hegemons predominate in the decision-making processes of those regional organizations contemplating intervention. Interventions are often not properly mapped or analyzed; their genesis and evolution are not recognized; external factors and actors are not properly recognized; who should and who should not be involved in an intervention is not addressed; criteria for intervention are not effectively laid out; clearly defined operational parameters are not implemented; a clear exit plan and timeline are not established; and the funding required for the operation is not in place. From the outset, the intervention is skewed in the interests of the regional hegemon, and any claim to impartiality and neutrality is lost. The ramifications for a successful outcome of such interventions could thus be made far worse than if they were not to intervene at all.
2.5 Factors that Explain the Success or Failure of Interventions

A peacebuilding intervention that aims to bring a sustainable peace is a complex and long-term process. It requires the creation of the necessary preconditions and mechanisms that are appropriate to the different stages of an intervention. Zartman (1989) has proposed that “Ripeness” is one such condition that is necessary for an intervention to be successful.

Ripeness Theory stipulates the point at which a conflict is “ripe” for intervention, as well as the structure and form that an intervention should take. Zartman notes “that conflict resolution depends, above all, on the identification of the ripe moment in different patterns of conflict and escalation” (Zartman 1989, 263). A ripe moment can present itself at any time during the devolution of a state toward total collapse. It could be before state collapse occurs, during the process of actual state collapse, or during the aftermath of state collapse (Zartman 1989, 266). He further argues that what makes for ripeness in these patterns of escalation are temporal points of plateau, during which the parties in competition step back for any number of different reasons. These plateaus provide points when all parties are hesitating, or second-guessing, each other. He argues that if the process of conflict is being closely monitored and mapped, then opportunities arise when those parties in competition are susceptible to outside influence and negotiation. At those moments, an external party could provide an alternative to the political and military tracks that the parties in competition would otherwise continue upon. The external mediating party has the chance to provide options and opportunities that the parties in competition have not thought of, or would otherwise not consider. The
external mediating party has the opportunity to fundamentally change the course of events that would otherwise occur (Zartman 1989, 272–273).

Thus, the question becomes who or what is the agency that monitors, maps, and intervenes at the moments of ripeness? For RSCs, the regional organization would be the nominal entity to provide the catalyst for a *modus vivendi* for the nation-state undergoing state collapse. In Africa, do any regional organizations have the actual capacity to proactively monitor, map, and intervene at a moment of ripeness? Are these regional organizations able to use this modality to dispassionately intervene for the regional or global good, and not place the primacy of individual nation-state interests to the fore? While the theory sounds plausible, in the African context the practical process of the implementation of the ripeness theory by regional organizations is questionable at the very least.

Other literature that has some explanatory value as to the success or failure of foreign interventions into collapsed states includes contributions from the following academics. In their analysis of the literature on intervention in civil wars, Downs and Stedman (2002) consider some dozen possible factors that explain why some peace operations succeed while others fail. These factors include the number of parties to the conflict; the presence or absence of a peace agreement before the intervention; the degree of collapse of a state; the viable access to disposable natural resources; and the likelihood of “spoilers.” They further stress that some contexts are more conducive for a successful intervention than others, and argue that peace operations in civil wars differ in two
important ways: the difficulty of the environment in terms of the presence of internal and external spoilers and the spoils of war; and the willingness of international actors to provide the necessary resources and troops, as well as their ability to act impartially.

Moreover, intervention outcomes arise out of a dynamic process, shaped partially by the intervener’s performance. Articulating a framework for successful third-party intervention, Regan (1996) argues that the target and type of intervention affects its likely success. He contends that actors have to examine “factors that contribute to the perception of the intervener” about a particular strategy. These strategies vary from diplomatic initiatives to military interventions.

Mandates are also used as an indicator to measure the success and failure of interventions. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) explain that mandates can be used to measure the degree to which an operation achieved the mandate laid down in its mission and whether peace was attained. Although mandates are useful tools, they are often very ambiguous. Using mandates as a measure can be problematic, since mandates differ in their scope and goals and are not always comparable with each other. Achievement of less ambitious mandates cannot necessarily be translated into success (Downs and Stedman 2002). Moreover, Clapham (2000) argues that for any intervention to be successful, it should have both legal and political mandates. He further claims that legal mandates provide a mission with the legitimacy required to obtain both local and international support for the intervention, while political mandates help sustain political support at all levels. This would translate to political support from the parties in competition in the
collapsed state; regional agreement amongst members of the relevant regional organization; and international agreement within the UN and any superstates that perceive an interest in the collapsed state.

It is also regularly articulated that interventions in civil wars often need a third-party presence to prevent the relapse of violence. Barbara Walter (2002) argues that the contextual security dilemma often makes peace implementation within a collapsed state very problematic. She explains that the successful implementation of peace agreements in civil wars mostly hinges on third-party guarantees, because the parties in competition cannot make credible commitments to disarm their forces or guarantee to each other a significant share of power in a new government. This requires the presence of a third party (or parties) for a considerable amount of time (and money), until there is sufficient trust among the competing groups. In an age when the ability and willingness of third-party interveners is becoming less dependable, reliance on such a strategy for stopping civil wars seems increasingly precarious. Hence, this highlights the need to institutionalize settlements and construct institutions that address the security fears of all groups in divided societies in order for interventions to be more successful. Or military interventions should take place less frequently and other forms of intervention (such as economic or diplomatic interventions) should take preeminence, especially with the ability to utilize new social communication platforms and monitoring tools which are now widely available in Africa. Nevertheless, in the case of military intervention, the short-term presence of a third party could theoretically help the parties build the necessary trust for the peacebuilding process to succeed. Third-party interventions must include a long-term peacebuilding program that
also addresses the deeper sources of the conflict at the time when the intervention is
initially being planned. Such interventions, and the necessary long-term rehabilitation of
collapsed nation-states, need to be fully planned and funded before an intervention takes
place. All too often, the rhetoric of commitment to state building is not matched by the
necessary long-term commitment or funding. The result is that in the medium or long term,
the intervention actually fails. If interventions are not funded beyond the immediate
incursion, then the justification for intervening must be far more seriously questioned, as
such interventions may not only be wasting money, but laying the seeds for a future round
of violence and state collapse. Inconclusive interventions do more harm than good in the
long run.

In measuring the success or failure of third-party interventions, Paris (2004) argues
that an intervention can be labeled successful if it creates conditions that can bring long-
lasting peace after the intervening party or parties have left. Downs and Stedman suggest
that a third-party intervention is successful if “large scale violence is brought to an end and
if the interveners brought the war to close and depart without fear of restarting it in a two
year period” (Downs and Stedman 2002, 50). Critics caution that a lasting peace and
durable state building are long-term goals that can extend beyond the duration of the
intervention and can take decades to achieve ((Lederach 1997).

The success or failure of intervention into failed or collapsed African nation-states
by African regional organizations is dependent upon a myriad of factors, which relate to
the internal and external indigenous dynamics of a conflict; regional politics; the role of a
regional hegemon; the mandate and the capacity of the regional organization; and whether the members of the regional organization truly want the intervention to succeed. Most critically, the African regional organization that decides to intervene needs not only the unanimous support of all other member states, but the financial, logistical, administrative, and political capacity to do so. There is no African regional organization today that has that capacity. Thus, all African regional organizations, if they do decide to intervene, are relying upon either the largesse of a regional hegemon or external superstate funding, or both — and that support always comes with a price that could readily coopt the mission. Unfortunately, the practical experience of many African regional organizations shows that, first, they do not have the capacity or resources to intervene and are often dependent on regional hegemons and/or their international superstate allies, and second, interventions are dominated by the most militarized nation in the regional organization (i.e., a regional hegemon), which has empirically shown a propensity to exert its narrow self-interest above the interests of the region, thus jeopardizing the independence of the mission and systemically impacting its success or failure.

Moreover, the challenge is to know the “ripe moment” for such interventions. Even when the parties to the conflict are ready to negotiate, external parties (like regional hegemons and other neighboring countries) influence the process and sometimes impede its success.
2.6 Conclusions: The Gaps in the Literature

The accumulative research on regional organizations and RSCs highlights some of the factors that influence the outcome of interventions into collapsed states, particularly the presumptive capacity of regional organizations (compared to actual capacity); the status of regional organization and member state impartiality; emerging regional hegemony; and the ongoing lack of understanding when it comes to individual nation-state collapse and the myriad variables that generate and perpetuate such collapse.

While scholars from diverse backgrounds have contributed to the growing corpus of literature on the role of regional organizations, their focus has been on the cause and effect of external intervention in civil wars (MacFarlane 1984; Mutwol 2009; Regan and Aydin 2006; Moller 2009b; Nathan 2010); conflict prevention and early warning; the capacity of regional organizations to intervene; and the success or failure of peace processes (Ero 1995; Peck 2005; Francis 2006; Healy 2009a; Sharamo and Mesfin 2011; Tavares 2010). Beyond this self-evident knowledge, our grasp of the role of regional organizations and regional hegemons, and how they contribute or undermine lasting peace within collapsed states, lacks innovation. Much work and analysis of the recent African experience still needs to be done, and the results need to effectively feed back into the broader debate on the regionalization and management of securitization and conflict. The corpus of literature remains very heavy with “top-down” understanding, processes, and solutions. It continues to lack sophistication, nuance, and complexity when it comes to the actual contexts of collapsed states.
This literature review indicates that the verdict is still out on the effectiveness of the intervention of regional organizations into the internal affairs of other sovereign nation-states, particularly the role of regional hegemons and their capacity and ability to act in the best interests of a region, rather than themselves. There are still very significant questions relating to the role of regional hegemons that need to be examined. How do the strategic interests of hegemons impede or contribute to the regional organization’s interventions and the peacebuilding goal? With the withdrawal of Western superstates after the Cold War, African regional organizations saw an opportunity — and African regional hegemons even more so — and were further encouraged by the UN and the Western superstates to take on a regional securitization role. Does it mean that African nations and their regional organizations are providing African solutions to African problems? Are African regional organizations and regional hegemons part of the problem as much as they are part of the solution regarding interventions into failed or failing African nation-states? With African regional organizations still systemically dependent upon Western largesse, do they have the necessary resources or the legitimacy to take on a regional securitization role

3.1 Introduction

The next two chapters cover two case studies that compare and contrast my thesis. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) were regional economic development agencies that evolved to incorporate a regional securitization mandate in the post-Cold War era. I argue that emerging regional hegemons (defined on the basis of population size, relative GDP, and military capacity) were able to take relatively benign regional economic development hubs and turn them into internationally recognized and supported organizations with a regional securitization mandate — including a mandate to intervene in the internal affairs of other sovereign nations in its region. The justification that evolved for such interventions was regional security stabilization.\(^3\)

The comparative analysis that shapes the argument aims at showing that regional hegemons have been at the heart of transforming regional economic and development organizations into regional security organizations allowed to intervene in the internal

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\(^3\) Interviewee #21 – a Nigerian official – 17 July 2010 (“Liberia was the first state to collapse in Africa”); Interviewee #27 – a notable religious leader in Liberia – 23 July 2010 (“regional stability was at the heart of the Nigerian intervention”); Interviewee #31 – an ambassador involved in the Liberian peace process – 25 July 2010 (“Nigeria’s military intervention provided regional stability”); Interviewee #12 – a former Somali Prime Minister – 27 June 2010 (“the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia was to prevent destabilization within Ethiopia, especially in Eastern Ethiopia, which is primarily ethnic Somali”); Interviewee #8 – non-Somali civil society member who has worked in Somalia for the past 15 years – 6 June 2010 (“intervention in Somalia was to mitigate threats to other regional states”).
affairs of sovereign nation-states. These regional hegemons have done so not in the benign interests of regional security, but instead have shaped regional organizational security mandates for their narrow self-interest. They began transforming regional organizations at a time of superstate retreat in the wake of the Cold War. The synergy between the two processes provided emerging regional hegemons with an opportunity to embed themselves into a newly emerging post-Cold War security architecture. The evolution of regional hegemons and regional organizations is now largely complete. The regional hegemons that took the opportunity to develop new regimes of securitization have now garnered international legitimacy and acceptance for their role, and thus dominate the international system until a new cycle of international architecture begins to assert itself.

What were the processes and outcomes of the interventions that Nigeria and Ethiopia undertook in Liberia and Somalia under the cloak of ECOWAS and IGAD, interventions that paved the way for the legitimacy of the new regional architecture? Do these interventions, and the regional organizations that authorized them, provide a successful new template for conflict resolution in failed or collapsed states?

This chapter focuses on ECOWAS’ intervention in Liberia and draws on case study research conducted in 2010 in Liberia and Kenya. Primary source information and data was collected from interviews with relevant regional officials (both within ECOWAS and regional governments), politicians, civil society members, academicians,

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4 For example, Interviewee #21 (“Nigeria mobilized regional members to take on a mandate to intervene”); and Interviewee #35 – an academic – 22 August 2010 (“IGAD has no autonomy of any sort, no regional power; IGAD is a reflection of the relative weakness of its member states, and the most militarized state within the membership [Ethiopia] became the dominant power in the block”).
and religious leaders, who were directly involved in the conflict and/or the peace process. Secondary source information and data were drawn from scholarly articles and books written on the role of regional organizations in peacebuilding, particularly ECOWAS’ intervention in Liberia.

The chapter describes the precursors for ECOWAS’ decision to intervene in the First Liberian Civil War, and how the Nigerian military government used ECOWAS as a tool for its own political and military ambitions in becoming a regional hegemon. In order to establish the background context, it provides an overview of the root causes of the Liberian civil war, particularly the rise and the fall of Samuel Doe’s regime and the subsequent 1989 NPFL attack on Monrovia. It then discusses the regional politics of the intervention and highlights Nigeria’s key role in relation to the political and military aspects of the intervention and its impact. Next, it elaborates on a list of the challenges faced during the numerous peace agreements to the Liberian conflict and the impact Nigeria had on the peace process, which is a signifier of the evolution of both the domestic conflict and regional and international competition in relation to the conflict, and the factors that led to the end of the violence and brought some stability in Liberia.

3.2 Background

ECOWAS’ intervention into Liberia’s civil war fundamentally impacted one of the core principles of the African Union’s policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. It also gave prominence to the increasingly significant role of

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5 Interviewee #21 (“the rule of AU non-intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states was still the custom at the time of the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia”).
regional organizations in conflict resolution in Africa. According to Howe (H. Howe 1996), ECOWAS was the first sub-regional organization to intervene in an internal conflict of a member state. The lessons learned from ECOWAS’ intervention in Liberia not only strengthened ECOWAS’ mandate for future military intervention, but also fundamentally contributed to the evolution of African regional peace and security architecture as well as international acceptance of African regional organization intervention in the internal affairs of member states.

ECOWAS was established in 1975 as an instrument for West African regional economic integration. Its defense pact, as an instrument of regional security, was established in May of 1981 at the Freetown Summit, Sierra Leone (Okolo 1983). ECOWAS was primarily perceived by its members as an economic union. The regional security element was very much a secondary consideration. Under the accord, ECOWAS member states agreed to act against (a) an aggression from a non-member state, (b) conflict between member states, and (c) internal conflict in a member state.

The union demonstrated the goodwill that existed among the national leaders of the region at its inception. As time progressed, however, regional politics came to the fore and the financial and military capability of ECOWAS as an organization was truncated as member states jockeyed for position against one another. As member states came under financial and social stress, ECOWAS could not meet the objectives of the accord. Member states fell into decay because of economic stress and the political stagnation of governance systems that were not mature enough to move beyond first-generation independence leaders. ECOWAS’ first major military intervention was in
Liberia, when the state collapsed in 1989 at the denouement of the Cold War (Aning 1999). Virtually all interviewees for this research indicated that ECOWAS did not have the administrative or operational capacity to intervene in Liberia at the time. As a Nigerian interviewee pointed out, “at the time of the initial Liberian intervention, ECOWAS was not a security organization.” This intervention tested the institutional capacity of ECOWAS to respond to the state collapse of a member state.

3.3 Causes of the Liberian Civil War

Liberia’s civil war cannot be understood apart from the social and historical structures in which Liberia was formed and ruled. Liberia was one of the only two countries in sub-Saharan Africa that was never fully colonized. From 1821–1847, freed slaves from America were brought to Liberia, where they formed the Republic of Liberia. Though they represented only 5% of the population, the Americo-Liberians, as they were later known, dominated the social and political life of Liberia for over a century (Adebajo 2002a; Ero 1995; Paris 2004). The Americo-Liberians maintained their power through the control of the economy, a key factor in Liberian politics. Through their control of both the economic and political systems of Liberia, the Americo-Liberians were able to oppress the indigenous population by denying them political participation and access to resources. A journalist and a faction leader interviewed for this research indicate that there was a systemic schism between the Americo-Liberians and the indigenous ethnicities, with endemic corruption, nepotism, and witch-hunt campaigns designed to

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6 Interviewee #21
keep the population pliant. Quentin Outram (1999) supports this assessment and claims that President William Tubman’s integration policy was never implemented, and the indigenous Liberians were never given full citizenship with effective voting rights until the 1985 election. He further states that the Liberian socio-political structures created an unhealthy “patron-client” relationship between the Americo-elites and the indigenous constituencies.

3.3.1 The Rise and Fall of Doe’s Regime

In response to a generation of political and economic exclusion, on 12 April 1980, there was a bloody overthrow of the Americo-Liberian government by Sergeant Samuel Doe, a semi-literate non-commissioned officer in the Liberian army and a member of the Krahn ethnic group (Adebajo 2002b; Morgan 2007; H. Howe 1996). Doe promised that he would introduce political and economic reforms and pave the way for democratic elections in five years. The indigenous population initially welcomed Doe’s government, as it signified an end to 133 years of Americo-Liberian political domination. During his presidency, Doe established a close relationship with successive Nigerian military regimes, which monopolized power in Nigeria for an extended period (1966–1979; 1983–1998), and they also saw Doe as a potential ally.

While history has revealed the background of the structural, social, and political injustice in Liberia, the catalyst for the civil war in the wake of the overthrow of the

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7 Interviewee #24 – a journalist – 22 July 2010; Interviewee #32 – a political faction leader – 26 July 2010
8 Interviewee #32
9 Interviewee #30 – a political faction leader – 24 July 2010
10 Ibid.
Americo-Liberian regime can be attributed to the failed promises of Samuel Doe to establish a democratically elected government or introduce the necessary reforms to address the grievances of Liberians (Reno 2004). Two civil society activists that I interviewed indicated that Doe lost support due to ongoing marginalization and government corruption, persecution, and murder — especially targeting specific ethnic groups.\textsuperscript{11} Doe’s promises included the drafting of a new constitution and the return to civilian rule in Liberia by 1984 (Ero 1995). Though he established the National Constitution Commission as promised, Doe disagreed with the commission on some articles in the constitution that limited his presidential powers. As a result, he transformed his government into a transitional caretaker government and subsequently organized a fraudulent election in 1985. This led to his election as a civilian president and “legitimized” his rule. By then, a military regime was back in power in Nigeria, and neither this military regime nor ECOWAS applied any pressure on Doe to conform to his civil agreements to revert military control back to a civil administration through a process of democratic elections (Ero 1995; Reno 2004).

Doe also failed to fulfill his promises to end corruption and create a just society. All key government posts were occupied by people from the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups, although they only represented a small percentage of Liberia’s population (Zartman 1995b). Like his Americo-Liberian predecessors, he established an oligarchical patronage system that benefited one ethnic group while eliminating most of his

\textsuperscript{11} Interviewee #24; Interviewee #27
opposition, including some of his own colleagues. A popular street slogan during his rule was “Same Taxi, Different Driver” (Lowenkopf 1995). As soon as Doe was able to consolidate his power, he began to impose his directives on others by force, disregarding their human rights. Moreover, Doe increasingly eliminated his opponents by incarceration or assassination. Corruption became rampant and the economy spiraled downward. As soon as that happened, public attitudes toward him changed, and the Liberian people started to revolt against his rule (Adebajo 2002a; Adibe 2003).

In November 1985, Thomas Quiwonkpa, a former commander in the army and an ethnic Gio, attempted an unsuccessful coup from Sierra Leone to overthrow Doe’s government. Quiwonkpa and others involved in the failed coup were captured and brutally murdered (Adebajo 2002a; Ero 1995). In retaliation for this failed coup, the Krahn-dominated Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) killed an estimated 3,000 people of the Gio and Mano ethnic groups in Nimba County (H. Howe 1996; Adebajo 2002a). According to William Reno (2004), after this thwarted takeover, Doe’s rule became even more dictatorial and violent toward any dissidence. Quiwonkpa’s attempted coup and the subsequent AFL retaliation triggered the emergence of more dissident groups, including some generated by his close associates like Charles Taylor (Ero 1995; Reno 2004). This was the beginning of the end for Samuel Doe’s regime and the start of the protracted civil war in Liberia. The Nigerian military regime continued to remain silent and ECOWAS was never mobilized against the increasingly failed state in Liberia. Elsewhere, other member states of ECOWAS remained in a condition of malaise, with domestic concerns.

12 Interviewee #30
taking priority. There was also no prevailing worldview that an ECOWAS military intervention was appropriate or sustainable.

3.3.2 National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) Attack on Monrovia and Charles Taylor’s Quest for Power

In December 1989, with financial backing from Libya, Burkina Faso, and Côte d’Ivoire, Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front Liberia (NPFL) launched an attack against Doe’s government from the neighboring country of Côte d’Ivoire (Ero 1995). Taylor, an Americo-Liberian, had been a member of Doe’s regime before being arrested in America for embezzlement during his time as Director General in the General Service Agency in Liberia (Ellis 1995). He had been awaiting extradition to Liberia while serving prison time in the United States when he escaped from jail and returned to West Africa (H. Howe 1996). Taylor formed an alliance with Prince Johnson, a Gio ethnic, who had felt persecuted by Doe’s regime, especially after the massacre in Nimba County (Morgan 2002). With the support of key anti-Doe regional leaders, Taylor formed the NPFL with Johnson. A civil society activist articulated that, “Taylor was able to project himself as a national leader, and someone who was above base ethnic revenge. He is charming, he was a natural spokesman for the group, and he solidified domestic and international support for his group in a very short period of time.”¹³ The NPFL included people from the Mano and Gio ethnic groups who had felt persecuted by Doe’s regime (Ero 1995; Morgan 2007). Burkinabé, Gambian, and Sierra Leonean citizens constituted a majority of the foreign NPFL forces (Adebajo 2002a). There was a broad array of African

¹³ Interviewee #26 – a civil society activist – 23 July 2010
Francophone countries that Taylor was able to galvanize as a funding base for his offensive against the now obviously Nigerian-backed (and Anglophone) regime of Doe.

The NPFL grew from 168 to 12,500 as they marched from Côte d’Ivoire through Nimba County toward Monrovia. During the offense they killed many Krahns and Mandingos for their alleged support of Doe’s regime (Adebajo 2002a), thus contributing to the sectarian nature of the conflict. Though Taylor repeatedly claimed that the objective of the offensive was to overthrow Doe’s regime, the fighting degenerated into ethnic violence, claiming the lives of approximately 200,000 individuals and displacing more than 700,000 people (Reno 2004). This phase of Liberian collapse only highlighted the acquiescence of regional and international actors in backing their own factional leaders within Liberia, and allowing those factions and leaders to engage in human rights abuses without any constraint. Regional competition was a higher priority than regional conflict resolution. According to a Liberian political faction leader, “Nigeria hardened its opposition against Taylor and its support for Doe; and this drew Nigeria further into the Liberian conflict, not as a neutral actor, but as an active protagonist.”\footnote{14} Another civil society member agreed, saying that, “Nigeria would do anything to stop Taylor. Nigeria saw any Taylor regime as hostile to Nigerian interests, and was thus prepared to intervene in Liberia to any degree to secure Nigerian regional interests and hegemony.”\footnote{15}

By 1990, the NPFL controlled the majority of Liberian territory and advanced toward Monrovia, the capital city. However, conflict erupted between Taylor and

\footnote{14} Interviewee #32
\footnote{15} Interviewee #26
Johnson, causing internal fighting within the NPFL that led to the formal split of the NPFL (Adebajo 2002a; Ero 1995; H. Howe 1996). With 6,000 fighters, Prince Johnson then formed the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) and fought against both Doe’s AFL and Taylors’ NPFL. This was the beginning of a new paradigm of faction proliferation in Liberia’s civil war.

In September 1990, Prince Johnson and his newly formed INPFL captured and videotaped the torture and killing of Samuel Doe (Adebajo 2002a). Later, Johnson left Liberia and went to Nigeria, while many of his supporters joined other factions (Adebajo 2002a).

As argued by a journalist, Doe’s death was the critical failure of Nigeria and ECOMOG intervention in Liberia. From that point on, Nigeria lost control and had to intervene at a much larger scale to retain control of its interests in the country. He contends that the outcome unnecessarily prolonged the conflict that ultimately cost hundreds of thousands of additional lives. Although this was the end of Doe’s life, it was only the beginning of protracted Liberian civil conflict and the collapse of Doe’s regime.

The NPFL was the largest and most powerful faction that fought against Doe. It controlled large and strategic parts of Liberia, which Taylor called “Greater Liberia,” with Gbarnga as his capital (Adebajo 2004b). However, as the conflict continued, new factions formed, often fighting among themselves over the control of territories and the

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16 *Interviewee #24*

country’s resources. There were at least eight recognized factions at one point, including the NPFL and INPFL (Adebajo 2004b; Olanisakin 2003). Other factions included the AFL, headed by General Hezekiah Bowen, mostly from Doe’s Krahn ethnic group, as well as other remnants from his regime. In 1991, a group called ULIMO was formed by Alhaji Kromah and Roosevelt Johnson (Adebajo 2002a). In 1993, George Boley, a Krahn politician, formed the Liberian Peace Council (LPC). Another faction, the Lofa Defense Force, was led by François Massaquoi. Since any negotiated agreement required the cooperation of all actors in the conflict, the proliferation of factions rendered the conflict intractable. It was now beyond Nigerian control with the existing level of resources that it was supplying. Herbert Howe (1996) argues that:

> The Liberian conflict is symptomatic of a growing number of third-world conflicts in countries where state legitimacy has eroded or disappeared, where poorly disciplined insurgencies of dispossessed and alienated rural youth acquire cheap modern weaponry and, with the aid of foreign business interests, loot the nation and rob it of its chances for development. Liberia’s struggle illustrates the need for, but also the difficulties facing, foreign intervention forces (146).

The metastasization of the conflict highlights the incredibly complex nature of state collapse in addition to the overall folly of external entities attempting to control events within the collapsed state without a very clear vision for that state or funding to implement the vision. Nigeria lost the faction that it had invested in when Doe was killed, while other member states and international actors applied equal or more external resources to Taylor and his NPFL faction. The outcome was greater instability, both
domestically in Liberia and within the region. The external groups were only vying to
spoil the potential success of another.

The drivers of the Liberian conflict were embedded within Liberian history, but were inflamed through the application of external resources and political support. Actors from the neighboring countries and the international community had significantly contributed to the prolongation of the conflict. Adebajo (2002a) argues that overall, Taylor received the most international support and had many friends in the region that supported him militarily and financially. His army received training in Burkinabé and Libyan military camps. Blaise Compaoré, President of Burkina Faso, had introduced Taylor to Muammar Qadaffi, who also helped him. During the war, both countries supplied Taylor with arms and ammunition. The Ivorian President, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, allowed Taylor to use Côte d’Ivoire as a strategic base in order to enter Liberia (Ero 1995; H. Howe 1996). To counter the level of external support that Taylor was receiving, Nigeria’s only option was to up the ante with direct intervention through ECOWAS.

Control of the economy was also a key driver in the Liberian conflict (Aning 1999). Taylor collected about $75 million annually throughout the war from exporting diamonds, gold, timber, rubber, and iron ore (Adebajo 2002a; Reno 2004). According to Emmanuel Aning (1999), Taylor’s NPFL was even able to secure support from France because he portrayed his faction as fighting against the threat of Nigerian (Anglophone)

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18 Interviewees #26, 30, and 32 all indicated that the Nigerian and ECOWAS intervention actually prolonged the conflict.
hegemony. He was also able to gain mutually beneficial support from various European companies, which wanted to exploit Liberian minerals without having to deal with export taxes and other regulations. Even with a blockade in place, many minerals could be exported out of the Ivorian port of San Pedro (Aning 1999). Through the economic and political interest of regional and international states, Taylor and his NPFL were able to secure a modicum of international legitimacy. Within this period, foreign countries and businesses were dealing more and more with the NPFL, rather than the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU), which was formally recognized by ECOWAS and the United Nations, and backed by Nigeria (Sesay 1996). Taylor was also garnering more international support because he continued to control the majority of the country. Indeed, at this point, Taylor had the upper hand against ECOWAS and the other factions in the war. This meant that he only conceded to negotiations when the NPFL was being militarily weakened on the battlefield, so he could have enough time to re-strategize and rearm his militia (Aning 1999).

3.4 The Politics of ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia and the Role of Nigeria

As the conflict in Liberia escalated and began to have a systemic regional impact, Nigeria and ECOWAS increasingly argued that the Liberian conflict was getting out of everyone’s control and that there was a genuine need to intervene militarily. Neighboring countries were feeling the heat, as there was an influx of Liberian refugees into their countries (Sesay 1996). As a result, ECOWAS member states perceived the Liberian conflict as a threat to regional stability and established the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC). The Francophone states believed that this process would keep
Nigerian aspirations in check. The SMC’s first task was to mediate in the Liberian conflict. The ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was also created in August 1990 and deployed its first peace-making contingent to bring an end to the conflict.

3.4.1 ECOWAS Intervention and its Implications for the Peace

Though ECOWAS was originally established for economic cooperation and regional integration for countries in West Africa, its Protocol on Non-Aggression (signed in Lagos on 22 April 1978) and the Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defense (signed in Freetown on 29 May 1981) meant that member states did provide a consensual legal basis for military intervention in the case of state collapse of a member state. Still, the main objective of these protocols was seen in practice as providing a mechanism to settle disputes between states. Actual intervention in the internal affairs of a member state was not seriously contemplated until the late 1980s, when it became clear that the conflict in Liberia was uncontrollable and there was a genuine spillover of the conflict that negatively affected member states and regional stability.

Under the framework of these new protocols for regional peace and security, ECOWAS brokered a series of peace agreements between August 1990 and August 1996, aimed at bringing peace and stability to Liberia. During this period, ECOWAS facilitated at least fourteen peace accords before the 1997 election (Mutwol 2009).

On 30 May 1990, ECOWAS heads of state met in Banjul, Gambia, and among the items on their agenda was the Liberian crisis. During the summit, President Ibrahim
Babangida of Nigeria expressed his concern over the Liberian crisis and proposed the formation of a committee that could mediate between the parties in the conflict (Berman and Sams 2003). In response, the summit called for an immediate ceasefire for all parties in the conflict, and decided to create the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC), composed of Gambia, Ghana, Mali, and Niger, to mediate conflicts within ECOWAS states. The SMC was created as a permanent organ and its first task was to resolve the Liberian conflict (Adeleke 1995; Mutwol 2009). The SMC then established the Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire and Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to prepare for possible intervention in Liberia. The justification for the intervention was based on the Protocol on Mutual Defense Assistance of 1981, which was reinterpreted as providing mutual aid and assistance for defense against any armed threat or aggression to a member state, external or internal.

The September killing of President Doe and the centrifugal devolution of the conflict prompted ECOWAS to organize another meeting. In October 1990, a meeting was organized by the SMC in Banjul, Gambia, to resolve the Liberian crisis. Members from civil society and six political parties participated in the Banjul negotiations. Dr. Amos Sawyer was elected as the President of the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU). Although the IGNU was recognized by the OAU and the UN, Taylor’s NPFL rejected the Banjul Accord and hence the IGNU (Lowenkopf 1995).

Taylor refused to sign the Banjul Agreement for the Cessation of Hostilities and Peaceful Settlement of Conflict in protest of ECOMOG’s presence in Liberia without his
approval, and he demanded its withdrawal (Mutwol 2009). Taylor continued military operations, hoping to capture the whole country and end the war without any negotiation or compromise. At this point in time, Taylor remained confident that regional and international supporters continued to back his actions within Liberia (Sesay 1996).

Nevertheless, ECOMOG troops were deployed without firm guarantees of cooperation from the various factions that were fighting, and without the provision of logistical support (H. Howe 1996). This further angered Taylor and reinforced his opposition to Nigeria’s dominant role in the operation. Taylor continued to appeal to other Francophone regional nations, as well as international actors that saw Nigerian hegemonic aspirations as antithetical to their own interests. He continued to receive positive support from these sources. The first ECOMOG contingent sent to Monrovia met strong resistance from NPFL troops, which continued to receive external financial and military support.

Some of the ECOWAS Francophone member states came out publicly and criticized ECOMOG’s deployment, particularly Burkino Faso and Côte d’Ivoire. They continued to effectively undermine ECOMOG’s operations (Ero 1995).

By November 1990, amid continuing Nigerian maneuvering, ECOWAS called for an extraordinary summit on Liberia in Bamako, Mali, which was attended by most of the ECOWAS heads of state. President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, who was the chairman of the OAU at the time, and the representative of the Secretary-General of United Nations, Trevor Livingston Gordon-Somers, as well as the West African representative of
the UN Commission on Refugees, attended as observers. At the summit, ECOWAS member states agreed to “adopt a region-wide peace plan” based on the decisions of the Standing Mediation Committee adopted in August in Banjul (Mutwol 2009). The Bamako Accord was signed by all the factions to the Liberian conflict. The accord called for a ceasefire monitored by ECOMOG; the formation of an inclusive government within one month; and the setting up of an emergency fund for ECOWAS operations (Mutwol 2009). Taylor initially refused to sign the accord, but was later pressured by President Compaoré and Muammar Qadaffi and acceded to their demands. The Bamako Accord was also welcomed by most of the factions to the conflict and, crucially, was signed by the AFL and the INPFL. To counter criticism from Taylor and others, Nigeria also compromised by transferring the leadership of ECOMOG to Ghana and allowing room for more Francophone member states to take a greater role in the military operations.

In order to secure Taylor’s cooperation for the Bamako Accord, a peace negotiation meeting was held in Banjul, Gambia, in December 1990. Taylor declined to participate and instead sent his Defense Minister, Tom Woewiyu (Mutwol 2009). Nevertheless, the Banjul II Accord called upon all the factions to jointly monitor — with the UN — the seaports and airports (Mutwol 2009).

As a follow-up, another summit was organized by the SMC on the modalities for the ceasefire. The Lome Summit was the fourth meeting organized by the SMC. It was held in Lome, Togo, on 12–13 February 1991, under the chairmanship of President Dawda Jawara of Gambia. During the summit, heads of state from ECOWAS member
states and their designated representatives agreed to expand the ECOMOG contingent and include troops from Francophone countries as well. Dr. Amos Sawyer of IGNU, Charles Taylor of NPFL, General Hezekiah Bowen of AFL, and Prince Johnson of INPFL also attended the summit.

This summit made the ECOWAS intervention a genuine regional intervention for the first time. It was a product of the past political mistakes made by the Nigerian military regime, which allowed the Liberian collapse to get out of control and seriously threaten the development and security of other member ECOWAS states. It showcased a prime example of the arbitrary development of a regional hegemon and African regional security organizations in the post-Cold War era. The metastasization of the conflict over a prolonged period and the entry and increasing competition of other regional members and Western powers (such as France) all meant that a credible solution to the Liberian conflict was required so as to mitigate the potential for sustained regional chaos.¹⁹

The Lome Agreement was designed to enforce the Banjul and Bamako Accords. It also provided a practical framework to monitor the ceasefire. The factions present at the summit agreed on concrete modalities for monitoring the implementation of the ceasefire, reporting violations, and the method and channels for communication. They also agreed to allow ECOMOG to disarm them after the formation of a new government (Mutwol 2009). The Lome Accord ultimately failed, though, because Taylor opposed it and further regionalized the conflict when he attacked an ECOMOG troop contingent,

¹⁹ Interviewee #21; Interviewee #25 – an academic – 22 July 2010
while also continuing his military drive towards Monrovia (Mutwol 2009). This was the beginning of the break between Taylor and his strategic regional and international backers.

The failure of ECOWAS’ numerous attempts to resolve the Liberian conflict stemmed from many factors. The first was Taylor’s refusal to sign and commit to the critical peace agreements brokered by ECOWAS. Taylor refused the Banjul Agreement for the Cessation of Hostilities and Peaceful Settlement of Conflict in protest of the ECOMOG (Nigerian-controlled) presence in Liberia without his approval (Adebajo 2002a; Mutwol 2009). He also rejected the Bamako Accord, calling it “Banjul manufactured” (Mutwol 2009). According to Mutwol, Taylor then refused to disarm as agreed at the Lome Accord, and continued his military incursion toward Monrovia. Considering the fact that Taylor’s NPFL still controlled 90% of Liberian territory at the time of the conference, Taylor refused the results because he was not interested in power-sharing with the Nigerian-backed IGNU and Dr. Amos Sawyer. Though the Yamoussoukro Peace Agreement failed in part because ECOMOG was not able to deploy its troops to all parts of Liberia to disarm the factions (due to financial problems), Taylor also launched the infamous Operation Octopus attack on Monrovia in direct violation of the peace agreement (Adebajo 2002a). The AFL and ULIMO joined ECOMOG to fight against the NPFL, resulting in an estimated 3,000 deaths, and causing the agreement to utterly disintegrate (Adebajo 2002a). Taylor’s sudden success on the battlefield and his unyielding ambition for the presidency encouraged him to undermine the ECOWAS

20 Interviewee #27
(Nigerian) intervention and arrogantly disregard the interests of his regional and international backers.

The second factor that contributed to ECOWAS failure was the formation of new factions and the splintering of existing factions. The spread of the conflict made it very difficult for outside actors to control the parties — or events — in the conflict, and made it all but impossible to bring an ever-increasing number of stakeholders to the bargaining table. As the conflict continued, the NPFL itself splintered, and new factions entered the war. Notably, the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) entered the war at this time. Within Liberia, the dynamics were not static and more factions formed. In late 1993, the Liberian Peace Council (LPC) was also becoming increasingly powerful and attacked NPFL strongholds in southeast Liberia (Ellis 1995). This was in blatant disregard of the ceasefire agreed upon at Cotonou. In March 1994, ULIMO splintered into two factions (ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K), due to ethnic fighting between the Krahn and Mandingo groups (Ellis 1995). The splintering was not only being driven by domestic ethnic pressure, but also by ongoing external interference by those trying to pick winners that would serve their political and strategic interests. For example, Nigeria became angry at one of the leaders of ULIMO, Alhaji Kromah (later head of ULIMO-K), who tried to block food aid going to NPFL-controlled areas in December 1993, in violation of the Cotonou agreement (H. Howe 1996).

The third factor contributing to ECOWAS failure was the ongoing rivalry between Nigeria and the Francophone member states. Although Nigeria had made
concessions to allow Francophone members to participate in ECOMOG operations, ECOWAS and ECOMOG continued to be dominated by Nigeria. A country estimated at 120 million people at the time, and with immense oil wealth, Nigeria had massive financial and military resources at its disposal compared to the other member states. In addition, Nigeria, controlled by a military regime, projected an expansionist vision into the region, wanting to control, by one means or another, the narrative and development of the area. Only when Nigeria lost its surrogate in Liberia, Samuel Doe, and failed to develop a viable alternative did it become more amenable to accepting some of the interests of other regional members. This was amplified when Western nations took a greater interest in the conflict, as regional spillover began to have a negative impact on their own business interests.  

In all probability, the Liberian conflict would have remained a domestic affair of limited duration if it had not been for the external interference by regional member states. First Nigeria and then Francophone states saw opportunities in engaging in proxy war with the expectation of a certain outcome and economic gain in Liberia. The cost of proxy political conflict was some 250,000 Liberian lives. The creation of ECOWAS as a regional security organization was initially opportunistic. It then became institutionalized and developed a strong security mandate through the fierce regional competition that was played out over the future of Liberia.

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21 Interviewee # 21; Interviewee #24  
22 Interviewee #30
3.4.2 What Changed to Allow Nigeria to Accept Taylor?

Nigeria was always the dominant state in ECOWAS’ intervention in Liberia. For the lifespan of the intervention, Nigeria contributed approximately 80% of all the troops (12,000 out of 16,000) and 90% of all finance (Adebajo 2002a). Most of the interviewees for this research confirm this assertion and believe that Nigeria came to help. As a religious leader who was involved in the conflict and negotiations stated, “Nigeria acted when it was time to act; which was in the interests of the Liberian people.”

However, Nigeria’s motivation for the intervention was initially based on the personal relationship between the two leaders, President Babangida and President Doe (Ellis 1995). This strong personal relationship was the basis for Babangida’s military assistance to Doe’s regime, and Nigeria enjoyed a history of influence in Liberia throughout Doe’s rule.

A second motivation for the intervention was the fact that Nigerian business people had significant business investments in Liberia. During one episode, several thousand Nigerians were physically stranded in Liberia, and the Nigerian Embassy was also at one point attacked. These business people consistently urged their government to intervene to protect their lives and investments (Ero 1995; Adibe 1997). In addition, the successful NPFL offensive against Doe meant that Nigeria lost its strategic ally and some of its influence in the region. The need to protect its citizens, as well as the potential

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23 Interviewee #27
24 This was supported by Interviewee #21.
strategic loss of Liberia’s resources and labor market, was sufficient to warrant Nigerian intervention in the conflict in the eyes of the Nigerian junta.\textsuperscript{25}

A third motivation was Nigeria’s hegemonic ambition. As explained by Kuna, Nigeria is “the only power especially in West Africa that can contemplate long-range power projection, and thus about the only country in the region, and one of possibly three in the continent with South Africa and Egypt, capable of sustaining a fairly large military contingent over a long period of time far away from their borders or shores” (Kuna 2005, 5). For Nigeria, this was an opportunity to manifest its ambition. According to William Reno, “It is also likely that Nigerian officials feared that Taylor’s victory over his rivals would weaken their country’s influence in the region” (Reno 2004, 123). Besides, rebel movements like the NPFL were a new phenomenon, and were perceived as threatening the established military regime in Liberia. There was a fear that such rebel movements could spill over into regional countries like Nigeria and potentially destabilize neighboring countries as well. This argument was supported by a civil society activist who argued that Nigeria needed to completely dismantle Taylor’s organization and his regional support so that it would provide a warning to any other actor who might want to challenge Nigeria’s emerging regional hegemonic dominance.\textsuperscript{26} According to Adebajo (2002a), “Historically, Nigeria’s military leaders have been keen to portray their country as the indispensable power in West Africa”(604). As a result, ECOWAS faced political disharmony while member states pursued their individual interests. Some member states

\textsuperscript{25} Interviewee #25 – He was involved in the ECOMOG preparation for the Liberian deployment during the 1990 crisis.
\textsuperscript{26} Interviewee #26
were suspicious of Nigeria’s motives in Liberia and beyond, and were afraid of its emerging hegemonic dominance. Even among the Anglophone nations, such as Ghana and Gambia, there were genuine fears of Nigerian dominance.

A fourth motivation was that the Liberian conflict was becoming a threat to regional peace and security. Nigeria mobilized other member states and eventually forced ECOWAS member states to invoke its Non-Aggression and Mutual Assistance in Defense Protocols in order to provide a legal justification for an intervention into the Liberian conflict.\(^{27}\) Though these protocols provided a legal framework for mutual aid and assistance for defense against any armed threat or aggression on a member state, and also constituted a primary instrument to maintain regional peace and security, their interpretation was problematic for some Francophone countries. For example, President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso argued that the Protocol dealt only with conflicts between member states (Weller 1994). Also, the creation of ECOMOG was \textit{ad hoc} to the Liberian crisis, dominated by Nigeria, and mainly composed of Anglophone countries (Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Gambia). Guinea was the only Francophone member in the committee, thus exacerbating the historic tensions between Anglophone and Francophone ECOWAS member states. Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire initially opposed the intervention and cautioned against it, as neither country had a good relationship with Doe’s regime. In fact, Doe killed A. B. Tolbert, the son of the former President of Liberia, who was also married to the adopted daughter of President Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire (Ellis 1995; Adebajo 2002a). These grievances provided Taylor’s NPFL

\(^{27}\) Interviewee #21
with the support required to enter Liberia in 1989 through Côte d’Ivoire (Adebajo 2002a; Ellis 1995). As a result, ECOMOG member states supported and even proliferated different Liberian factions. Francophone member states, particularly Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire, also criticized ECOMOG’s deployment. They continued to effectively undermine ECOMOG’s operations, as they saw the intervention as acting against their own interests (Ero 1995). As with Nigerian business interests, Ivorian companies also profited from Liberia’s resources due to the NPFL affiliation with Côte d’Ivoire (Adebajo 2002b). Burkina Faso trained NPFL troops in guerilla warfare and supplied them with weaponry (Adebajo 2002a). President Compaoré helped free Taylor from a Ghanaian prison years before the war, and introduced him to future ally Muammar Qadaffi (Adebajo 2002a; Ellis 1995). The blowback from overt Nigerian interest and control of Liberia was that regional Francophone countries combined to provide a “counterpunch.” This was led by Côte d’Ivoire. The Francophone states were apprehensive of Nigeria’s dominant role in Liberia and viewed its hegemony within the ECOMOG operation with suspicion (Mortimer 1996; Adibe 2003; Francis 2006). Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso opposed Nigeria’s bid for the leadership of the regional body (Ero 1995). Taylor was able to take advantage of the divisions between the regional member states and continued to insist on opposition to any intervention until Doe surrendered.

Even though Nigeria was indispensable to the Liberian intervention, as noted by a Liberian politician who was involved in negotiations, its intervention carried political baggage that also hampered a successful outcome. In all probability, it perpetuated the
conflict unnecessarily. According to civil society activists interviewed, Nigeria played a mediation role, but later become the arbitrator. Finally, it became party to the conflict by choosing sides, with the justification that particular rebel groups were brutal, or that certain groups did not comply with the peace agreement. In effect, Nigeria started playing the role of judge and jury, instead of impartially intervening as a neutral force.

Taylor continuously accused Nigeria of taking sides and resented its presence in the country throughout the war. However, after seven years of stalemate, Nigeria realized that without Taylor, there would never be a peace settlement in Liberia. Thus, it decided to come to an accommodation with him. Taylor also came to recognize that his regional and international support was shrinking and without the support of Nigeria, he could not attain his ambition of becoming the undisputed president. President Rawlings of Ghana, who was also the Chairman of ECOWAS at that time, was able to secretly mediate between Abuja and Taylor (Riley and Sesay 1996). According to Mutwol (2009), a number of factors also influenced Nigeria’s decision to end the conflict. First, a new Nigerian president, Abacha, was willing to directly negotiate with Taylor, unlike his predecessor, Babangida. Abacha had no personal animosity toward Taylor, and both of them were willing to end the conflict. Second, Abacha was facing elections at home and not only needed to concentrate on domestic issues but needed to claim that he had stabilized Liberia, thereby providing domestic political capital for his reelection. Third, the spillover of the conflict into Sierra Leone was indisputably threatening regional peace.

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28 Interviewee #32  
29 Interviewee #26
and security. Fourth, Nigeria needed to restore its image in the region and internationally, as there was a growing resentment of its domination in ECOMOG. Furthermore, it needed to show some progress in Liberia and secure a clean exit to what had become a sticky morass that continued to drain Nigerian treasure. These new political developments, particularly within Nigeria, paved the way for the successful agreements in the Abuja I and II negotiations, and eventually led to the 1997 election of Taylor, which was supported by Nigeria.  

3.5 Contributing Factors to the Ultimate Success of the Intervention

Many factors contributed to the final success of the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia. None was more important than when all key regional actors accepted that their own support for domestic Liberian actors had failed, and that spill over into other regional states was a threat to regional stability. Only then did a combination of diplomatic pressure and the military intervention bring the warring Liberian parties to the negotiating table. Factors including the new rapprochement between the ECOWAS member states; the replacement of some of the heads of state; the duration of the conflict and the peace process; and increased interest and support from the international community all contributed to the final success of the intervention.

Nigeria’s military presence and its willingness to commit financial resources and sacrifice its troops were also critical to the success of the operation. The combination of

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30 Interviewee #32  
31 President Samuel Doe was killed; President Babangida left office on 27 August 1993 after the annulment of his election; Houphouët-Boigny died on 7 December 1993.  
32 This was highlighted by Interviewee #25; Interviewee #27; Interviewee #30; and Interviewee #31
the factors above, as well as the loss of confidence and legitimacy in Taylor by his strategic allies, forced Taylor to accept a ceasefire and to negotiate peace, eventually leading to the 1997 election, which he won.\footnote{Interviewee #30}

In an attempt to reduce the perception of its dominance, Nigeria also allowed the transfer of leadership of ECOMOG to Lt. General A. Quainoo of Ghana, which was the first and last time that ECOMOG was led by a non-Nigerian (Adebajo 2004b). NPFL concerns about Nigerian impartiality and command of ECOMOG were being taken seriously by both the Francophone countries as well as former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, who, through his International Negotiation Network, suggested a restructuring of ECOMOG to reduce Nigerian influence. This new dispensation thereby increased ECOMOG acceptability. In summary, both increased international attention (and resources) and the metastasization of the conflict within Liberia changed the strategic dynamics for Taylor and the NPFL.

The emergence of Francophone countries in the mediation process at the Yamoussoukro negotiations was a critical turning point in the overall success of the intervention. For the first time, Francophone countries took the diplomatic lead in the conflict-resolution process. This highlighted a change in the dynamics between Anglophone and Francophone West African states. The Yamoussoukro negotiations were all held in Côte d’Ivoire from June 1991 to October 1991. In 1991, Houphouët-Boigny was the Chairman of the newly-formed Committee of Five, a completely Francophone subcommittee of ECOWAS, consisting of Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau,
Senegal, and Togo. Although Nigeria was still heavily involved in ECOMOG operations, the election of President Abdou Diouf of Senegal as the Chairman of ECOWAS (from 1992–1993) shifted the political momentum toward the Francophone states.

Taylor’s stubborn refusal to negotiate with the IGNU government of Amos Sawyer caused him to increasingly lose the support of West African Francophone states. According to a religious leader who participated in the conference, Taylor refused the results of the All-Liberian Conference, sponsored by ECOWAS, because he would not consider power-sharing with the IGNU and Dr. Sawyer.34 Considering the fact that Taylor’s NPFL still controlled 90% of Liberian territory at the time of the conference, he held the upper hand. Without his support, the interim government would not have much power. In essence, Taylor held all the cards, and it was the quintessential moment for a negotiated settlement on his terms. That Taylor failed to seize the moment sowed the seeds of his later downfall. In response to Taylor’s intransigence, ECOMOG increased its peace-enforcing activities, which included a blockade at the port of Buchanan. This was a strategic move aimed at blocking Taylor’s primary source of funding, which was port business and fees.

As a Liberian political activist who was involved in this negotiation explained, “The Anglophile and Francophone member states were all fearful of this new phenomenon — the emergence of rebel groups as a force to reckon with — which was threatening their power.”35 For instance, Burkina Faso reputedly told the interim Liberian

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34 Interviewee #27
35 Interviewee #26
government that it would not support Taylor to the extent that it had done previously. Houphouët-Boigny was also concerned by Taylor’s refusal to negotiate, as well as his ongoing overt interference in other West African countries, such as Sierra Leone.

Within the NPFL itself, there were divergent views to that of Taylor. Some soldiers from the Gio and Mano ethnic groups were war-weary and wished to stop fighting because the original goal of ousting Doe had been accomplished. Therefore, they believed that the NPFL should stop fighting and start contributing to the establishment of democracy in Liberia. These soldiers, of whom approximately one hundred deserted, were angry that Taylor refused the terms of the All-Liberian Conference and thought he was behaving too “dictatorial” (Mutwol 2009). The NPFL was thus more willing than Taylor to enter into negotiations because the political and military momentum was beginning to move against them, and this loss of power was spawning an ever-increasing number of factions based on smaller and smaller ethnic groups. In particular, the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) entered the war at this juncture, and this had a noticeable impact in weakening the NPFL on the ground.

The Yamoussoukro negotiations were more successful, not only because they were led by Francophone states, but because Taylor came to the negotiating table in a much weakened position. Regional Francophone states had significantly lessened their support for Taylor, and Taylor and the NPFL had lost considerable ground militarily within Liberia. Under these accords, all Liberian factions agreed to disarm to ECOMOG and organize an election within six months (Mutwol 2009). Second, there was much more

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36 Interviewee #27
participation and increased regional and international desire to solve the Liberian conflict. Heads of states from Niger, Togo, and Burkina Faso attended these meetings. Salim Ahmed Salim of OAU and the governments of Guinea and Sierra Leone also attended to garner support for the accord (Mutwol 2009). Third, the accord added 1,500 Senegalese troops to ECOMOG, with the concomitant aim of reducing the Anglophile Nigerian influence. This move helped delegitimize Taylor’s insistence that ECOMOG was Nigerian dominated and thus was a Nigerian proxy. Finally, it paved the way for strangling Côte d’Ivoire’s support for the NPFL, thus contributing to the success of the intervention.

As a follow-up, another conference was held at Cotonou, Benin, on 25 July 1993. The participating factions, the NPFL, AFL and ULIMO, all agreed to a ceasefire. They pledged to cease hostilities within the areas they controlled and to maintain stability and security in those areas (Ellis 1995). Under the Cotonou Agreement, all parties consented to disarmament, which would be handled by ECOMOG and monitored by UN observers. By July 1994, 3,500 fighters had delivered their arms to ECOMOG (Ellis 1995). The Secretary-General of the UN, Boutrous Boutrous-Ghali, recommended the creation of a United Nations Observer Mission (UNOMIL) in order to appease Francophone and NPFL concerns about Nigerian dominance in ECOMOG (Ellis 1995). This was the first time that the UN had worked with a regional peacekeeping organization in Africa (H. Howe 1996). Its mandate was to report to the Secretary-General about Liberia’s peace process, as well as to work with ECOMOG in its monitoring of the ceasefire (Ellis 1995). UN observers were also sent to Liberia as part of UNOMIL’s mission.
In August 1994, President Jerry Rawlings of Ghana was elected head of ECOWAS and he immediately embarked on a mission to resolve the Liberian crisis (Sesay 1996). The 11th and 12th peace accords were held at Akosombo and Accra, Ghana, on 12 September and 21 December 1994, respectively. Trevor Gordon-Somers, Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General in Liberia, attended the meeting as a witness. Taylor (NPFL), Alhaji Kromah (ULIMO), and General Hezekiah Bowen (AFL) were the only individuals who participated in the Akosomba negotiations and signed the accord. The three factions confirmed their commitment to the Cotonou Agreement as a framework for peace in Liberia, and agreed to form a five-member Council of State. This was dramatically different from earlier accords which stipulated that warlords would have to run in democratic elections in order to hold legitimate positions in government, and they would not be allowed to join the transitional government (Adeleke 1995). According to the Akosombo Accord, each of the three parties would appoint one representative to the council, while the other two positions would be selected from unarmed Liberian groups. Though the Rawlings approach had brought in Taylor, it had angered many Liberian groups who felt excluded, or viewed the Akosombo Accord as rewarding warlords, which was later corrected.37

The Accra Accord, or what was later called the “Clarification of the Akosombo Accord,” was able to address some of the grievances of the excluded factions which were not part of the Akosombo Accord. These factions were the Lofa Defense Force (LDF), the Liberian Peace Council (LPC), the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), the

37 Ibid.
Central Revolutionary Council (NPFL-CRC), and ULIMO-J. They were collectively given one seat at the council.38

The Abuja Accord was agreed upon during a meeting of the Committee of Nine held in Abuja, Nigeria, on 16–19 August 1995. An NPFL delegation led by Charles Taylor attended the meeting. The Abuja I negotiations brought together the main factions of the Liberian conflict and civil society representatives. The Abuja I Accord was signed on 26 August 1995 by Taylor (NPFL), Kromah (ULIMO-K), Boley (LPC), Bowen (AFL), Johnson (ULIMO-J), Massaquoi (LDF), Woewiyu (NPFL-CRC), and Cheapoo of the Liberian National Conference (LNC). The main objectives of the Abuja I Accord were to expand the Council of States from five to six members in order to make room for other armed factions, and to agree on a political power-sharing framework (while maintaining all the other provisions of the Cotonou, Akosombo, and Accra accords). Taylor (NPFL), Kromah (ULIMO-K), Boley (LPC), Quiah (LNC), Chief Tamba Taylor, and Mr. Sankawulo (Chairman of the Council) made up the six-member council. Ministerial positions were distributed between different factions. A timeline for the implementation was also decided. This transitional government was to be installed within fourteen days of the signing of the accord. Cabinet posts were also given to leaders of the other factions. A ceasefire was declared as of midnight, 26 August 1995. In support, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1020 on 10 November 1995, thereby increasing UNOMIL to 160 observers to monitor compliance with the accord and also changing their mandate.

38 Interviewee #25; Interviewee #26; Interviewee #27; and Interviewee #32
Unfortunately, the Abuja I Accord failed when Taylor and Kromoh, of the Council of States, decided to arrest one of the signatories of the accord, who was also a member of the cabinet, Mr. Roosevelt Johnson of ULIMO-J (Riley and Sesay 1996). Violence erupted and the ceasefire was violated.

After the Abuja I Accord failed due to violence, another round of talks was held in Abuja, Nigeria, on 17 August 1996, which resulted in the Abuja II Accord. Although the accord affirmed the provisions stipulated in the previous one, it generated a new council to be headed by former Senator Ruth Perry (Adebajo 2002a; Mutwol 2009). The Abuja Summit created a sixteen-member ECOWAS Observer Group and an emergency fund for the Liberian elections. There was also a new clause stating that any person who violated this new agreement could be charged in a tribunal. This final formula largely held, and elections were implemented in July 1997. Taylor took 75% of the presidential vote. He had won, but ironically his chance had passed. He had lost the support of his strategic partners, and a second civil war began in 1999. At this point, the U.S. took a stake in the process, and in 2003, there was a final resolution in which Taylor was exiled to Nigeria, where he was held until 2006. He was then arrested, extradited to The Hague, tried, and convicted of war crimes.³⁹

3.6 Summary and Conclusion

The core factor that led to the collapse of the Liberian nation-state was the historical monopolization of resources and power by one group, the Americo-Liberians,

³⁹ He was convicted in October 2013 to serve fifty years in a U.K. jail.
at the expense of all other ethnic groups in the country. In response to pent-up frustration, elements within the army instigated a coup in 1980, and Samuel Doe came to power. Promises of equitable resource sharing and open elections were not honored, and a further mobilization of ethnically based political and military factions ensued. This mobilization led to civil war.

The Liberian nation-state collapse was an opportunity for the regional hegemon, Nigeria, to try and protect a government that was favorable to its interests (Doe). In response, regional Francophone countries banded together to support Taylor to take over and represent their interests. The regional proxy war aggravated the internal conflict by constantly fracturing existing domestic factions and generating an uncontrollable number of militias in a war in which 250,000 Liberians died and an uncounted number were displaced. The Liberian conflict went beyond the control of the concerned regional actors and the spillover from the conflict began to negatively impact regional security.

Initially, there was little international interest in intervening in the conflict. At the same time, there were conflicting regional interests trying to pick winners from within the montage of Liberian factions. ECOWAS’ military body, ECOMOG, was dominated by Nigeria, and was for many years used as a tool of Nigerian foreign policy. ECOMOG was therefore seen as a political instrument by regional actors and by Taylor. It was perceived as not providing a neutral and unbiased political and security solution for Liberia. ECOWAS was initially driven by Nigeria’s hegemonic interests. In August 1990, at its meeting in Bamako, ECOWAS decided to intervene in the Liberian conflict under
an ECOMOG mandate. This move came as Doe’s faction was all but defeated. At that time, ECOWAS did not have any formalized security mechanisms or platform for regional intervention into the sovereign territory of member states. Nigeria was the only actor that had the funding and military to actually mount such an operation, and saw it as in its best interest to do so. Nigeria used ECOWAS as a front to intervene, developing an ECOWAS mandate and platform for intervention as it went along.

Competing member states within ECOWAS were not initially overly concerned with the Nigerian moves, as no one expected the level of intervention that Nigeria mounted or the level of international interest that eventuated from the Nigerian intervention. In the initial phase, the mission was haphazard. Nigeria supported disparate individual actors in the conflict after Samuel Doe’s murder. This only complicated an already fraught intervention; but once established, it was something that was incrementally built upon. A series of meetings, summits, and accords then followed over the next seven years. The process was plagued by self-interested maneuvering by both regional and Liberian players, all looking for the best outcome for themselves.

Over time, most regional states had come to the conclusion that the Liberian conflict had become intractable, and came to an accommodation on Liberia. After thirteen failed attempts to bring peace to Liberia, the Committee of Nine met in Abuja in August 1996 and produced a revised agreement approved by the regional leaders and signed by all the parties in the conflict. This was the beginning of what seemed to be at

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40 Doe was killed on 9 September 1990.
41 Interviewee #21
42 Ibid.
the time a new chapter for Liberia. ECOWAS had temporarily succeeded in ending the
violence and restoring a degree of order that paved the way for the 1997 election. Charles
Taylor and his NPFL faction won that election. Much of the conflict and its resolution
were dictated by regional actors, including the regional hegemon, Nigeria. These regional
actors operated through warlord proxies within Liberia. Rarely, if ever, were the Liberian
people consulted or empowered in the ECOMOG intervention or ECOWAS conflict-
resolution process.43

Nigeria recognized that it could not win the Liberian conflict outright for its own
interests, which led to a final solution to the conflict. Yet on the international stage,
Nigeria won recognition for its leadership in ECOWAS and ECOMOG. It became
entrenched in the emerging African regional architecture as a regional hegemon with
legitimacy and support from its Western allies and aligned international organizations. In
initiating and developing a securitization mandate within ECOWAS, and implementing
an overwhelmingly “African solution” to the Liberian malaise, Nigeria defined itself as
an emerging regional powerhouse. In addition, it was able to build and solidify
international credibility for its new status and role in regional and international affairs.
Nigeria helped push forward the international narrative that regional hegemons — based
upon population size and relative GDP — were to be the platform for maintaining
international stability in the 21st century through a template of regional organizations that
provided the legal legitimacy for regional hegemons to intervene in the internal affairs of
sovereign nation-states.

43 Interviewee #26

4.1 Introduction

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) began its existence in the Horn of Africa in 1986 as a benign regional development and environmental control hub. Its goals were parallel to the mission of ECOWAS. The intention of the organization was similarly to provide support for countries whose resources were being withdrawn from Africa by the superpowers of the day. As described in previous chapters, in addition to the shift in available resources at this time, the Western world was already defining how it would operate in a post-Cold War context. There was significant pressure within the Western nations to provide a financial “peace dividend.” This resulted in the withdrawal of resources from areas of the world that were not considered vital to their interests. Africa was assessed to be a low priority; and concomitantly, Western resources were significantly reduced from the African continent. In the wake of that assessment, the Western countries decided to invest in and legitimize African regional organizations to deal with conflicts in Africa. Just as ECOWAS took the lead in peace and security issues in West Africa, so IGAD took a similar lead in the Horn of Africa.

The previous chapter illustrates how the West African regional hegemon, Nigeria, played a key role in peace enforcement and conflict resolution in Liberia. It concludes
that since Nigeria’s vested interests were to have a peaceful Liberia, the hegemon ultimately played a key role in the successful resolution of Liberia’s conflict.

In contrast, the case study in this chapter presents an enlightening comparison. It focuses on IGAD’s formal intervention in the Somali conflict, with a predominant focus on the critical 2002–2008 period. It examines Ethiopia’s role in Somali state collapse and the utilization of Ethiopia as a regional hegemon in the evolution of regional securitization in Africa. It argues that since Ethiopia’s vested interests were to prevent having a hostile neighbor, it disrupted efforts to reestablish a strong central Somali government that might have resurgent irredentist ambitions and provide safe haven for opposition movements within Ethiopia.

The intervention in the Somali conflict tested IGAD’s ability and potential as a regional peacemaker. To provide sufficient context for the IGAD intervention and the role of Ethiopia as a hegemon within IGAD, this chapter consists of an overview of Somalia’s tumultuous past, its path to civil war and complete state collapse, and the outcome of the many inconclusive interventions. It argues that Ethiopia’s role in IGAD’s intervention has, in large part, contributed to the ongoing failure of efforts toward peace and security in Somalia.

4.2 Background to the Formation and Evolution of IGAD

In 1996, and in parallel with a stabilized and reemerging Ethiopia, IGAD was restructured with a new mandate that included a regional security objective that allowed

44 “Irredentist” is a term used for a person or group that advocates for the restoration to their country of any territory that formerly belonged to their country.
for intervention to ensure the ongoing stabilization of the region. In line with this new mandate, IGAD’s first attempt at establishing regional peace and security was its intervention in the Sudan conflict in 1996 (Healy 2009a). Sudan has been systemically unstable from its independence in 1955 until the present. The 1996 intervention provided the first test in the Horn for post-Cold War regional strategy.

Historical conflicts within and between regional states in the Horn of Africa have created differing and competing political and security interests among IGAD member states (Healy 2009a). The level of historical baggage and contentious interests of regional member states means that any form of intervention in the internal affairs of another member state is not necessarily done out of the desire to stabilize a country ravaged by state collapse. Member states have become increasingly adept in obsolescence bargaining with superstates that claim an ongoing interest in the Horn of Africa. The evolution of African regional organizations has benefited greatly from Western withdrawal from Africa. Regional hegemons have been able to piggyback on emerging regional organizations, and have been greatly assisted by their emergence. Ethiopia has been a fine example of this symbiotic relationship. However, other member states to IGAD — such as Eritrea, North Sudan, and Somalia — have been stigmatized as failing or failed states, thus effectively increasing Western superstate dependence on Ethiopia in the post-Cold War era.

The strategy of empowering proxies to achieve the political objectives of regional and international states has been a consistent strategy in Africa and has been particularly
apparent in the Horn of Africa (Cliffe 1999). For example, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda supported the South Sudanese rebels against the Sudanese government, while Sudan was accused of supporting the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the north of Uganda. In the Cold War era, both Ethiopia and Somalia funded proxies in the 1970s and 1980s to destabilize each other’s countries; and in the post-Cold War era, Ethiopia has utilized non-state actor (NSA) proxies within Somalia for the nearly two decades of Somali statelessness. Eritrea has also been accused of aiding Al-Shabaab fighters in Somalia to further its own aims and has been labeled as a pariah state. An Ethiopian diplomat to Somalia said that, “Eritrea has longstanding issues with Ethiopia, and wants to hurt Ethiopia through exploiting instability in Somalia.”

Western-aligned international organizations have agreed with Ethiopia, consistently labeling Eritrea as a rogue state and Somalia as systemically stateless and open for business for international extremism. In the 2013 Somali Eritrea Monitoring Groups (SEMG) report, Iran was accused of funneling weapons to Al-Shabaab to further its own objectives and extend its influence in the Horn of Africa. Learning lessons from their Cold War rivalries, regional states in the Horn of Africa have a long history of interfering in the affairs of regional member states through indirect (e.g., NSAs) or even direct action, and such action has never been benign. Instead of member states in IGAD promoting and protecting regional stability, on many occasions, member states have had the goal of destabilizing existing state architecture in neighboring member states. The often toxic relationship between IGAD’s member states has systematically undermined the organization’s capacity to fulfill its

45 Interviewee #19 – Ethiopian Diplomat – 15 July 2010
46 Reporting on the 2012 calendar year.
mandate and maintain peace and security in the region (Healy 2009a). One obvious example is the Ethiopia-Eritrea border conflict over Badme (1998–2000), which remains unresolved.

In the case of Somalia, since the collapse of the Siad Barre government in 1991, there have been more than a dozen international reconciliation conferences aimed at rebuilding a functional state in Somalia (Samatar and Samatar 2003). The majority of these initiatives were facilitated or co-sponsored by IGAD and its members. These interventions included political and military operations, but none achieved a durable peace. The reasons for the failure can be attributed to historical regional nation-state competition as well as historical competition between IGAD and the League of Arab States over Somalia.47 A lack of financial resources for IGAD has also meant that it has virtually exclusively relied on Western superstate largesse for financial support.48 This has meant that IGAD has mirrored Western superstate interests rather than being able to develop a genuinely regional identity and genuinely regional interests.49

4.3 The Root Causes of Somalia’s Political Turmoil

Much of the foundation for two decades of grinding institutional anarchy in Somalia was laid in the colonial period, when European colonizers divided traditional Somali land and communities therein according to arbitrary boundaries that served European interests (Terdman 2008). Somali communities were divided into British

47 Interviewee #3 – an academic – 13 January 2010; Interviewee #15 – IGAD official – 29 June 2010; Interviewee #18 – Kenyan diplomat who was involved in the Embagathi Conference – 13 July 2010
48 Interviewee #10 – a European Ambassador to Somalia – 17 June 2013
49 Interviewee #3; Interviewee #19
Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, French Somaliland, Ethiopian Somaliland (Ogaden, or Haud, currently recognized as part of Ethiopia), and the Northern Frontier District (NFD), which is recognized as part of Kenya at present (Touval 1963; Terdman 2008). British and Italian Somaliland formed the Somali Republic in 1960, and the other three regions were mostly not given a choice to join the Somali Republic. While these arbitrarily marked boundaries of the colonial period are not unique to the Somali context, the division did lay the basis for future regional competition and conflict.

Prior to the arrival of the European colonizers, Ethiopian and Somali communities fought over the Haud lands (present-day eastern Ethiopia). The first major clash was the battle of Wagna Daga, between Emperor Getawdes, who ruled Ethiopia in the 15th century, and Iman Ahmed Gurey, a Somali religious leader who ruled over the Somali-inhabited Haud zone that included Ogaden and part of Somaliland. With the help of the Portuguese, Emperor Getawdes defeated Iman Ahmed Gurey, killing him in February 1543 (Terdman 2008; Touval 1963). Seizing the opportunity presented by the defeat, Ethiopia expanded its territory into land (the Haud area) in which Somali communities still resided.

Britain then played a critical role in further partitioning historical Somalia during the colonization period to suit its purposes at the time. Though Britain signed four agreements with the Somali clans in the Haud in 1886, Britain also signed another treaty. 

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50 A referendum was held in French Somaliland in 1958 to decide whether or not to join the Somali Republic or to remain with France. The referendum confirmed continued association with France, largely due to the combined “yes” vote of the sizable Afar ethnic group and resident Europeans. See Lowell Barrington, *After Independence: Making and Protecting the Nation in Postcolonial and Post-Communist States* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2006), p. 115.
with Ethiopia, recognizing Ethiopia’s claim over the Ogaden (Haud land), and formally handed over Haud territory to Ethiopia as it drew down its empire in the post WWII period (D. J. L. Brown 1956; Terdman 2008; Touval 1963). According to Touval (1963), Somali communities continue to reside on about one-fifth of Ethiopian land, which has been the basis for enduring competition and conflict between the two countries into the present. Britain also decided to formally hand over the Northern Frontier District to Kenya as part of its WWII drawdown of empire, a move that has been a driver for regional tension with Kenya ever since.

In the post-independence period of 1960, Somalia, maneuvering to recover land that it considered to be stolen by regional rivals, had two significant border clashes with Kenya and Ethiopia over the NFD and Haud territories (Terdman 2008). In response to Somalia’s aggression, Ethiopia and Kenya signed a Mutual Defense Treaty against Somalia’s irredentist claims in 1964, and renewed the pact in 1980 and 1987 (Terdman 2008).

IGAD was born into this context, and into an existing web of competition and intrigue. IGAD’s securitization mandate was initially fostered and supported by superstate interests; encouraging traditional Cold War allies (Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti, and Eritrea) to accommodate Western interests in exchange for ongoing financial support and recognition. Ethiopia was favored by the United States as the hub for its policy in the Horn, and Ethiopia readily positioned itself as a regional intelligence and military hegemon. Invested Western superstates were more than happy to turn a blind
eye to internal human rights abuses, the lack of democratic reform, and Ethiopian
hegemonic goals, as long as their own interests converged with those of Ethiopia,
particularly regarding the “war on terror” (“World Report 2013: Ethiopia” 2013).

4.3.1 The Rise and the Fall of the Siad Barre Regime

Somalia’s post-independence governments were mired with accusations of
endemic corruption, weak centralized institutions, a highly controversial multi-party
election process, and an immature political elite (Terdman 2008; A. J. Ahmed 1995). In
response to military failure, financial ineptitude, a partisan judiciary, and corrupt
governance, on 21 October 1969, a group of military officers, who felt alienated from the
political process, staged a coup that brought General Mohamed Siad Barre to power. The
public initially welcomed Barre’s socialist ideology and his promise to fight against
corruption. At Barre’s political rallies, there was also the popular irredentist theme of
reunification of the Somali people, including Somali constituencies in Ethiopia and
Kenya.

Ethiopia also experienced a period of political turmoil and state collapse when
Emperor Haile Selassie was overthrown by an Ethiopian military council known as the
Derg, led by Mengistu Haile Mariam (Healy 2010; Terdman 2008). This instability in
Ethiopia created an opportunity for Barre’s irredentist vision to be expressed via an attack
on Ethiopia.
As a result of the Somali regime’s irredentist vision, Somalia built one of the largest armies in Africa. Against the express advice of the USSR, Somalia’s Cold War ally at the time, Somalia embarked on a full-scale war with Ethiopia in 1977–1978, with the aim of recovering Haud lands (Terdman 2008). The Somali military was able to capture most of the historic Somali lands with little resistance. This success was short lived though, as the USSR switched sides in mid-campaign, and teamed up with Mengistu’s regime in Ethiopia, providing it instead with all the necessary military support. The USSR even brought in Yemeni and Cuban tank formations. The resulting counter-campaign completely routed the Somali army. From that time forward, clan-based opposition to centralized rule in Somalia began to emerge, and included support from the Ethiopian government (A. A. Ahmed 2012). A Somali academic that I interviewed for my thesis argues that, “the collapse of the Somali State was engineered by factions in urban areas that were cosmopolitan and not clannish by nature ─ not from rural areas where clan identity remains strong. Thus, the collapse of the Somali State was not initially clan based. Clan conflict was a product of the conflict, and not a cause of the initial conflict.”

Even though Somalia signed peace treaties with Kenya (1984) and Ethiopia (1988), these historical realities highlight Somalia’s present troubles in the context of its...

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51 Somali nationalism is built on the foundation that Somalia was unfairly divided by the British, French, and Italians. The Somali flag represents the five divided Somali regions: Italian Somalia; British Somaliland; French Djibouti; Ethiopian Zone 5 (Haud or Ogadan); and Kenyan Northeast Region. The Somali irredentist vision of a united Somalia continues to be a strong undercurrent amongst traditional Somali nationalists and poses a concomitant fear by regional neighbors and international states that Somalia, as soon as it is able, will again pursue an expansionist foreign policy.

52 Interviewee #35
long-term relationship with its neighbors (Terdman 2008). They are signifiers of systemic Somali political weakness in a region in which competition better portrays the status of relations between member states than does consensus and cooperation.

4.4 Somalia’s Political Decay and its Path to Civil War

The 1977–1978 military defeat of Somalia by Ethiopia not only destroyed Somalia’s irredentist ambitions but also planted the seeds for Somalia’s political decay and subsequent complete state collapse. President Barre came to power through military coup d’état in 1969. He ruled with popular support through 1977, but gambled everything on a military conquest of Ethiopia to recover Haud territory. By early 1978, he had failed miserably. In response, his own military junta began to challenge his judgment and rule (Healy 2010).

In 1978, a group of senior military officers led by Colonel Mohamed Sheikh Osman (Cirro) participated in a failed coup d’état against the regime. The blowback was that the regime executed seventeen officers and many others were imprisoned (Terdman 2008). Some of these officers, including the late President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed (2004–2008), escaped to Ethiopia and formed the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), an opposition movement to Barre’s regime (Kapteijns 2013). The newly formed SSDF members were mainly drawn from the Majerten sub-clan of Darood.

This unexpected coup attempt shocked Barre and his circle. Consequently, Barre manipulated and politicized clan identity, using a divide-and-rule doctrine. Barre responded to the coup with a pervasive military crackdown. He imprisoned perceived
opponents from across the clan spectrum, and then further targeted those clans that were under suspicion (Kapteijns 2013; Clark 1992). At that point, the thin veneer of Somali clan unity vanished, and many clans began to mobilize militarily to overthrow the regime. The Isaq community, living in northwestern Somalia (Somaliland), saw some of the worst retaliation by the regime. According to Adam, “once Siyad had taken over, and armed opposition to his regime grew, he singled out the northern region, inhabited by the Isaq clan-family, for extraordinary punishment” (Adam 1995, 74). The subsequent widespread killings, imprisonment, and ground and aerial offensives prompted the formation of the Somali National Movement (SNM) in 1980 in London by mainly Isaq dissidents in the Diaspora (Adam 1995; Kapteijns 2013).

In the south, the United Somali Congress (USC) was launched by members of the Hawiye clan. It waged war against the stronghold and capital of the regime, Mogadishu City, which eventually forced Barre to flee to Kenya and then to Nigeria, where he died in 1995 (Terdman 2008).

4.4.1 The Total State Collapse

Somali opposition movements were united in the overthrow of the regime, but had no other common national agenda post the ousting of that regime (Healy 2010). When the government collapsed in January 1991, clan-based opposition groups took over the country. There was a scramble by the clan-based factions for control and the presidency.
The government of Djibouti quickly organized a meeting. During this meeting in Djibouti, Ali Mahdi Mohammed, a businessman from the Hawiye clan, was selected as the President of Somalia, and Omar Arte Ghalib, Somalia’s former Foreign Minister and an Isaq from the northwest region (Somaliland), was selected as Prime Minister, for a two-year interim term, from February 1991 to February 1993 (Kapteijns 2013). This move angered many other Somali clans and personalities who felt that they were not properly consulted and that these appointments were rushed. As a result of this impasse, on 18 May 1991, the northern regions (former British Somaliland) declared their secession and formed their own government of Somaliland (Terdman 2008; Kapteijns 2013).

Tensions also bubbled elsewhere, particularly between the newly selected president, Ali Mahdi Mohamed, and Mohamed Farah Aideed, the USC military head. After a series of failed meetings, Aideed, Abdirahman Tuur (Somaliland), and Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess of the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) all refused to recognize Mahdi’s claim to the presidency. Though both Mahdi and Aideed were from the USC faction, Aideed felt that he was not properly consulted on the selection of Mahdi as president. Numerous clan and religious leaders attempted to mediate, but all failed.

In November 1991, a deadly clash erupted between the supporters of President Ali Mahdi and General Aideed. This permanently split the USC into its respective sub-clan factions: Abgal and Habargidir. The concomitant conflict killed some 30,000 civilians (Clarke 1997). With the whole central state apparatus extinguished, people
reverted to the only operational security matrix available in the country, which was focused on clan identity. What followed was a winner-take-all power struggle among various dominant clans and sub-clans. Politicians, faction leaders, and clan leaders shamelessly manipulated Somalia’s new clan matrix of unstable and ever-shifting clan allegiances. Out of this chaos and anarchy came the rise of Somalia’s warlord era. This era resulted in one of the worst humanitarian disasters in the world, which killed some 300,000 people (Menkhaus 2007).

It is against this background that some Western superstates and some regional countries made humanitarian, political, and military interventions into the morass of Somalia’s state collapse. The complete collapse of the Somali state provided a conundrum for outside intervention by regional and other states, often for selfish reasons.

4.5 Somalia’s Reconciliation Conference: The Role of IGAD and Ethiopia

The first foreign intervention in Somalia began in 1992 as a response to a devastating famine that gripped much of south and south-central Somalia. The deteriorating security context in the country was driven by the proliferation of clan-based factions and warlords. Aid organizations were unable to deliver food to much of the starving population. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 775, of April 1992, authorized the deployment of 3,000 peacekeepers to protect the humanitarian aid distribution process (Clarke 1997; Drysdale 1997; Terdman 2008).

With ever worsening images on American television of Somalis dying of starvation, President George Herbert Walker Bush announced his intention to send U.S.
troops to Somalia in “a coalition of the willing,” to help with the delivery of food aid and stop the dying. On 9 December 1992, the first military elements of the U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) arrived on the beaches of Mogadishu. Their mandate and exit strategy were clear: to secure humanitarian supplies and to provide access and security for those lifesaving humanitarian supplies and services to be delivered safely. This coalition of the willing was largely praised for its success in mitigating the worst effects of the famine (Terdman 2008).

While the U.S.-led UNITAF operation was able to alleviate the worst effects of the famine initially, the United States did not want to be drawn into “mission creep” or a process of “nation-building.” In fact, President Bush had promised skeptical senior State Department and Department of Defense personalities that mission creep would not occur and that once the humanitarian mission was over, he would withdraw the troops from the mission (Clarke and Herbst 1997; Menkhaus 1997; Drysdale 1997; J. Howe 1997).

On the diplomatic front, the U.S. and United Nations Secretary-General Boutrous Boutrous-Ghali organized a conference in Addis Ababa in January and March 1993 for key Somali faction leaders who signed a cease-fire agreement (Menkhaus 1997; Terdman 2008). This came to be known as the Addis Ababa Agreement. The new focus on Ethiopia rather than Djibouti pleased Ethiopia, and gave Ethiopia the opportunity to

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53 UNITAF was a coalition of states mobilized by the U.S. It included the states of Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Republic of Ireland, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe. There were 37,000 troops mobilized for the intervention, with 25,000 coming from the U.S.
become the pivotal player in the reformulation of Somalia going forward. However, the UN was not able to enforce the agreement inside Somalia and the Somali factions within the country continued to ignore it. At this point, historical suspicion of Ethiopia began to be reworked into new narratives about Ethiopian designs and control over a new Somali state.

With the humanitarian mission now placed on a secure footing, the UNITAF contributing nations expressed their desire to hand over the operation to the UN. They did not want to get drawn into mission creep, with no clear exit strategy. The UN Secretary-General saw the reticence of the UNITAF countries as an opportunity for the United Nations to step in and fulfill its mandate as the preeminent international institution regarding international peace, security, and state building. The end of the Cold War meant that a new securitization narrative was “up for grabs,” and the UN wanted to be at the heart of that narrative. Boutrous-Ghali recommended a more robust UN peacekeeping mission, and UNISOM II was born. The mandate included disarmament, restoring law and order, and facilitating the formation of a representative government. On 4 May 1993, UNOSOM II formally took over the operation, but met resistance from one of the faction leaders in Mogadishu, General Aideed, who demanded the withdrawal of the UNOSOM II troops. With the UN taking the lead at this point in time, Aideed and his militia engaged in a skirmish strategy with UNISOM II troops and staged near-daily demonstrations against them.

54 Interviewee #5 – Somali Member of Parliament – 23 April 2010
On 5 June 1993, twenty-four Pakistani troops were killed by a militia loyal to General Aideed while they were inspecting an arms depot. This incident ignited a series of attacks and counterattacks between UNOSOM II troops and General Aideed’s aligned militias. This ultimately led to the death of the eighteen U.S. Marines (with 73 wounded)\textsuperscript{55} in the famous “Black Hawk Down” incident on 3–4 October 1993 (Drysdale 1997; Menkhaus 1997; Johnston and Dagne 1997). At the time, it was the worst loss of life amongst U.S. troops since the Vietnam War. These events shocked the American public, and the newly elected U.S. President, William Clinton, hesitated and then decided to withdraw his troops from Somalia. The U.S. and other superstates saw no ongoing need to expend resources on preventing state collapse in Somalia. The loss of Western superstate support for the Somali mission meant that the UN also withdrew (in March 1995). From that time onward, all appetite for nation-building was lost, and the post-Cold War world dream of a New World Order was gone. Somalia was seen as nonessential to a continuation of the Westphalian nation-state system, and the U.S. and other Western superstates now decided that Somalia’s neighbors and IGAD should deal with the Somali crisis. Scholars and practitioners in the field attribute the U.S./UN intervention failure to the uncompromising attitude of Somali politicians, flawed UN policies, and the U.S. decision to withdraw (Clarke and Herbst 1996; Menkhaus 1997; J. Howe 1997). Ethiopia, as the emerging regional hegemon, saw the opportunity and began to implement its own policy blueprint for Somalia.

\textsuperscript{55} Also, one Malay and one Pakistani soldier were killed in the same incident.
4.5.1 From Djibouti to Embagathi

In the wake of U.S./UN withdrawal from Somalia, IGAD had neither a
securitization mandate nor the capacity to respond to the Somali crisis. According to
Sally Healy, “Until 2001 ─ IGAD played no institutional role in Somali reconciliation
beyond endorsing individual member state initiatives” (Healy 2009a, 10). In 1999,
President Ismail Omar Gheleh of Djibouti (an IGAD member state) announced in his
speech at the UN Security Council his intention to organize a reconciliation conference
for Somalia. This took the initiative away from Ethiopia and the proxy set of Ethiopian-
backed Somali warlords that were increasingly hated within Somalia. After a series of
consultations with Somali civil society activists, businessmen, and politicians, some
1,000 delegates from all walks of Somali society came to Arta, Djibouti, to participate
and deliberate their future. Out of this initiative a transitional charter was drafted, a
transitional parliament was formed, and the Somali Transitional National Government
(TNG) materialized. Abdiqasim Salad Hussein was elected President by the Transitional
National Parliament. Most of the members of this peace process were drawn from Somali
civil society within the country and from the Diaspora. Abdullahi Yusuf (then-President
of Puntland), the Somaliland government, and most of the warlords who were aligned
with Ethiopia refused to participate in this conference. Although Djibouti is a member of
IGAD, the Arta Conference, as it came to be known, was solely under the auspices of the
Djiboutian government. IGAD had no formal role in the conference’s proceedings at all.
On the other hand, Ethiopia was very comfortable with its management of Somalia through its warlord proxy network. It saw no need to stabilize Somalia. The catalyst for IGAD engagement came from the Djiboutian initiative and an Ethiopian desire to maintain control of Somali “peace initiatives.”

The TNG formed in Djibouti was recognized by the Organization of African Unity, the United Nations, and IGAD as the legitimate government of Somalia. When the TNG arrived in Somalia from Djibouti, it was welcomed by the public, but continued to be faced with Ethiopian-backed hostile warlords in Mogadishu and beyond (Samatar and Samatar 2003). Ethiopia publicly accepted the Arta initiative, but undermined it covertly through the use of its proxy warlord network. Ethiopia was wholly unsatisfied with the results of the Arta peace process and organized a conference of its own in March 2001 in Ethiopia, “ostensibly to undermine and remodel the Djibouti initiative in its own image and interests, and to endorse and sanction the network of proxy Somali warlords that it supported.” These Ethiopian-backed warlords then formed an alliance called the Somali Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Council (SRRC) (Samatar and Samatar 2003; Healy 2009a), which provided a counter-structure to the nascent and systematically underfunded TNG.

Without the support of the warlords, regional governments, the U.S., or the UN, the TNG was unable to assert its power throughout the country. It could not secure any funding base to begin the process of rebuilding national institutions, and it was plagued

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56 Interviewee #5
57 Interviewee #4 – Somali politician – 20 January 2010
58 Interviewee#5
by infighting between the president and the prime minister as well as other institutional leaders. This critically weakened its capacity to deliver desperately needed social services and security to the public, as well as secure the legitimacy to rule.\textsuperscript{59}

As notes by a prominent Somali politician, Ethiopia, as neighbor to a failed state had a legitimate concern that spillover from Somalia — refugees, unregulated economic and military material, and ideological flows — could destabilize some or all of Ethiopia. Ethiopia has a large Somali ethnic population\textsuperscript{60}. In fact, one-fifth of Ethiopia is inhabited by Somali-speaking people and it continues to have active opposition movements in the regions that border Somalia. Hence Somalia, a collapsed state that could not control its borders, posed a clear and present danger to Ethiopia’s national security. Furthermore, Somalia became a safe haven for Ethiopian opposition movements and extremist elements. According to Ethiopian Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy, Ethiopia’s strategic interest towards Somalia includes: (1) to eliminate Somalia’s irredentist aspirations; (2) to deny Islamic militants staging areas from which to attack Ethiopia from Somali territory; and (3) to prevent an alliance against Ethiopia between Somalia and other states in the region and beyond (Ethiopian Ministry of Information 2002). To enforce its strategic interests, Ethiopia uses such tools as its military strength; a pervasive intelligence network within Somalia; a patchwork of personality-driven, clan-based alliances within Somalia; and a transnational terror narrative to mobilize and sustain international support. This policy setting allows

\textsuperscript{59} Interviewee #35
\textsuperscript{60} Interviewee # 12, former Somali Prime Minister, June 27,2010
Ethiopia to overwhelmingly maintain control of the evolution of a political and peace process within Somalia. A former Somalia Prime Minister insist that "Somali conflict is fuelled by foreign geopolitical interests".61

As the TNG began to fall apart, the Ethiopian government convinced its fellow member states in IGAD to hold yet another reconciliation conference for the TNG and its opposition.62 According to a Djiboutian diplomat interviewed, his government was apprehensive about the new initiative and expressed Djiboutian resistance to the initiative throughout the Embagathi process, but indicated that Djibouti had to go along with the decision of the Somali government, which accepted the initiative.63

Ethiopia was, and is, the heart of IGAD. Western superstates and IGAD member states were comfortable with Ethiopia’s policy framework on Somalia. The IGAD summit, held in Khartoum in January 2002, agreed to convene a new peace process under the auspices of IGAD. This was the first major intervention by IGAD and largely driven by the Ethiopian agenda to transform the Djiboutian initiative into a matrix that legitimized its own network of proxy warlords into an internationally recognized government.64 This move was seen fundamentally differently by Western observers, who saw IGAD as independent from Ethiopia and providing “coherent support” for the Transitional Federal Government.65 The move was a boon for practical Ethiopian hegemony in the Horn. Furthermore, this action was made in the immediate wake of the

61 Interviewee #9, former Somali Prime Minister, June 10, 2010
62 Interviewee #19
63 Interviewee # 23 – Djiboutian Diplomat – 20 July 2010
64 Interviewee #8
65 Interviewee #10
11 September 2001, Al Qaeda aerial attacks on New York. The United States and European governments were concerned that Somalia might become a safe haven for transnational terrorism so they were willing to fund a process that could provide assurance regarding their security concerns. This led to IGAD initiating a new Somali reconciliation and governance process (Healy 2009a; Terdman 2008; Samatar and Samatar 2003), which would lead to the international endorsement of Ethiopia’s network of proxy warlords.

IGAD leaders assigned the responsibility for the undertaking to a Technical Committee, which was composed of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. Under a lot of international pressure, both the TNG and the factions in the SRRC agreed to participate. Broader Somali civil society was only included as an afterthought when international and Somali civil society groups complained about their exclusion, which facilitated the formation of religious-based opposition groups. 66 Though IGAD members states agreed to jointly facilitate the conference, Kenya was given the lead role in the mediation and provided a neutral venue for the conference (Healy 2009a). This was the beginning of a joint IGAD reconciliation conference for Somalia, twelve years after the Somali state had collapsed. 67

66 Interviewee #3; Interviewee #4 – (“the exclusion of religious groups was another mistake and gave them the moral justification to organize themselves in Somalia and against the TFG initiative”); and Interviewee #35
67 Interviewee #18
4.5.2 From Embagathi to Djibouti

On 15 October 2002, the Somali reconciliation conference began in Eldoret, Kenya, under the leadership of the late Honorable Elijah W. Mwangale, Kenya’s special envoy for Somalia. The initial outcome of this conference was a declaration on the cessation of hostilities and a ceasefire signed by the TNG and most of the major faction leaders (IGAD 2002).68

For logistical reasons, the conference was then moved to Mbagathi, Nairobi, in January 2001 (Samatar and Samatar 2003). Protracted negotiations followed, which lasted for more than two years and produced a transitional charter and transitional federal parliament, with SRRC warlords and their proxies dominating what was established. A Somali politician that I interviewed (in 2010) said that a critical failure of this process was restarting all negotiations from the beginning and completely disregarding everything that had been achieved in the Arta process.69 Ethiopia was able to outmaneuver IGAD member states like Djibouti and utilized superstate hysteria over the Twin Tower attack to become the major winner in this process.70 It had its preferred Somali leadership in place and had significantly deepened Western dependence on Ethiopia through the Mbagathi process (Abdi Samatar 2007). In consultation with pliant

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68 The signatories of the Declaration on Cessation of hostilities were Hassan Abshir (TNG), Abdullahi Y. Ahmed (Puntland), Abdalla D. Isak (Parliament), Hussein F. Aideded (SRRC), Colonel Hassan M. Nur (RRA/SRRC), Mohamed Q. Afrah (USC), Hassan A. Qalad (HPA), Mowlid Ma’ane (SAMO/SRRC), Muse S. Yalahow (USC/SSA/SRRC), Omar M. Mohamud “Finish” (USC/SSA), Osman H. Ali “Atto” (USA/SNA/SRRC), Mohamed S. Aden (SNF/SRRC), Col. Abdirizak I. Bihi (SNF), General Mohamed H. Morgan (SPM), Barre A. Shire (JVA), Mohamed Omar Habej (Jowhar/SRRC), Abdullahi Sh. Ismail (SSNM/BIREM/SRRC), Hilowle Iman (SRRC), Abdiaziz Sh. Yusuf (SSNM/SNA), General Aden A. Nur (SPM), Mohamed A. Wayel (SPM), Dr. Sharif Salah Mohamed (Civil Society).
69 Interviewee #4
70 Interviewee #5 – Somali Member of Parliament who was involved in both the Arta and Embagathi peace processes – 23 April 2010

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traditional leaders, the Ethiopian-backed warlords then selected the parliamentarians who formed the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP). A Somali Member of Parliament said that, “Ninety-five percent of the MPs were controlled by the Ethiopians.” These parliamentarians went on to choose Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed (SRRC member) as the head of the newly formed TFG. After the formation of the government, President Yusuf made an appeal to the African Union in Addis Ababa to support him with 20,000 peacekeeping troops (Healy 2008; Terdman 2008; A. I. Samatar 2007). This proposal was not popular with the parliamentarians and most Somalis, thus almost immediately creating divisions within the parliament. Two groups emerged as part of the schism over the request for AU troops. One supported the President’s proposal, while the other formed an opposition front led by the Speaker of the Parliament, Sharif Hassan (along with some disenfranchised warlords in Mogadishu). The opposition group immediately set up their base of operations in Mogadishu, while the President’s supporters moved to the regional capital of Jowhar in the Middle Shabelle region (Menkhaus 2007; Healy 2008).

In January 2005, IGAD created the IGAD Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM). However, deployment was delayed due to lack of funds and other obstacles (Healy 2008). By this time, the international community had ascertained that indigenous Somali militants posed no transnational threat to their interests since most of them were coopted in the peace process. This overall delay gave the opposition much-needed time to mobilize its own funding (domestic and international). The opposition then began a stabilization program in Mogadishu in partnership with civil society groups, however this

71 Ibid.
eventually failed when they disagreed on the formation of a municipal council
(Menkhaus 2007).

As soon as the Mogadishu group began to rupture, President Ali Abdalla Saleh of
Yemen initiated a reconciliation meeting between President Yusuf and the leader of the
Mogadishu group, Speaker Sherif Sheikh Hassan. Both of them agreed to work together
and move the government seat to Baydhabo, the capital of the Bay region (Menkhaus
2007).

In the meantime, a clan-based religious courts faction was emerging in Mogadishu in
order to fill the vacuum that had emerged with the TFG split, and to address specific
intra-clan disputes and security issues. As the courts’ public support increased, the
warlords were concomitantly losing their clan support base, and perceived the emergence
of the courts as a threat to their power. The courts were also accused by Ethiopia and the
Ethiopian-supported warlords of harboring foreign terrorists. The list of individuals
supposedly being harbored in Somalia included members wanted by the U.S. for the 1998
U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania (Healy 2008). This new terrorism
narrative began to percolate again within the U.S. and began to draw renewed U.S.
interest in Somalia, at least as a counter-terror mission.

A rift was created between the Mogadishu warlords and the emerging Islamic Courts
Union (ICU) when one of the supporters of the ICU and one from the warlords fought
over the ownership of a piece of land (Menkhaus 2007). A group of warlords, including
four government ministers, formed the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and
Counter-Terrorism (ARPC)\textsuperscript{72} to fight against “terrorism” and, in practice, to combat the growing domestic political threat that the ICU posed to the warlord interests (Rice 2006). Though most of the warlords were closely allied with the Ethiopian military and intelligence apparatus, an Ethiopian diplomat to Somalia claims that the ARPC network was not controlled by Ethiopia, but by the United States.\textsuperscript{73} As the fighting intensified, the ARPC was defeated and Somalia’s warlord era came to an abrupt end in the middle of 2006 (Healy 2008).

As Ethiopia scrambled to develop a new policy for Somalia, IGAD facilitated negotiation meetings between the ICU and the TFG in Khartoum, Sudan. Though nothing of substance resulted from these negotiations, it provided Ethiopia with time to convince its international superstate partners that transnational terrorism was emerging within Somalia\textsuperscript{74}. In response to the stalled negotiations, one of the ICU’s demands was the withdrawal of all Ethiopian troops from the country. Also, the hardliners within the ICU indicated that they had no intention of negotiating with the TFG.\textsuperscript{75} This provided very few meaningful options for fruitful negotiations between the TFG and the ICU. As the negotiations were going on, the ICU was continuing to expand its territorial control throughout the country, and the network of warlords continued to lose ground rapidly, as they had lost any semblance of legitimacy from even their sub-clans (Abdi Samatar 2007).

\textsuperscript{72} Interviewee #19 – claimed that the U.S. and not Ethiopia was involved in running the network of Somali warlords. It is highly probable that the U.S. was involved with these warlords, but there is equally overwhelming information that some of these warlords were supported by Ethiopia. 
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{74} Interviewee #8
\textsuperscript{75} Interviewee #35
As the ICU continued to rapidly and seemingly irresistibly expand, IGAD, the African Union, and the Western powers all panicked. IGAD and the AU adopted a resolution authorizing the deployment of AU troops (IGASOM), including troops from the frontline states of Kenya and Ethiopia. To support the IGAD and AU move, the UN Security Council also intervened. It adopted Resolution 1725 in December 2006, authorizing the deployment of African Union troops, but excluding the participation of the frontline states.

Many contended that the ICU leaders were riven by internal divisions exacerbated by fundamental rifts between moderate and radical clerics, on the one hand, and between the different Islamic sects, on the other. Moreover, relations between the ICU and Mogadishu’s powerful businessmen were quickly fading away, as the ICU had not honored its promises and its radical ideology was becoming increasingly obvious to the civil elite in Mogadishu. The civil elite wanted no part of a radical agenda in which their rights and freedoms would again be truncated, as they were under the warlords. The ICU was losing critical support within the elite quite quickly. With the ICU under increasing internal fracturing, the hardline elements within the ICU decided to attack Baydhabo, the Bay region capital and temporary seat of the TFG. This attack was the final spur required to garner U.S. acceptance and acknowledgment that it was facing international terrorism, which had the potential to take over an entire nation-state. In response, Ethiopia formally invaded Somalia to protect the UN-recognized, Transitional Federal Government. The failed Baydhabo attack ultimately led to the collapse of the ICU, as the Ethiopian military quickly occupied key population centers in south and central Somalia, including
Mogadishu in December 2006. Though Ethiopia’s invasion was not authorized by the UN, Ethiopia claimed that it had been invited by the TFG leadership in order to protect the internationally recognized governance structure in Somalia. The commitment not to deploy frontline states to Somalia was broken. When IGAD backed the move, it only further ostracized key Somali players and observers, who saw IGAD as no more than an Ethiopian mouthpiece. A former member of the Kenyan parliament said that, “IGAD in its current form cannot bring peace to Somalia; divorce Ethiopia from Somalia and then maybe IGAD might have a chance.”

The remnants of the ICU then remobilized and implemented a guerilla warfare strategy against the Ethiopian military in and around Mogadishu, while their leaders regrouped and reorganized the ICU in Asmara, Eritrea. Eritrea suspended its membership in IGAD in April 2007 in response to the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia. In September 2007, the ICU formed the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS). Western superstates backed Ethiopia over Eritrea and castigated Eritrea for its involvement in Somalia. Eritrea was accused of sheltering the ICU leadership and assisting them with ammunition. Soon after, the ICU fractured between a hardline faction led by Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, which opposed any dialogue with the TFG, and a more moderate faction led by Sheikh Sherif Sheikh Ahmed, which was willing to negotiate with the

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76 Interviewee #5
77 Interviewee #20 – a former member of the Kenyan Parliament – 16 July 2010
TFG. In June 2008 in Djibouti, the ARS faction signed a peace agreement with the TFG on political power sharing.\textsuperscript{78}

The ongoing failure of IGAD and Ethiopia to effectively stabilize Somalia led interested Western superstates (and their aligned international organizations) to initiate negotiations on a new power-sharing formula between the moderate element of the ICU and the TFG. These were facilitated by the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (May–June 2008). After international pressure to step down, the Ethiopian-backed President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed resigned in December 2008. On 31 January 2009, Sheikh Sherif Ahmed (ARS) was elected as the President of the TFG for a three-year term.

4.6 What Went Wrong?

As summarized in the above background on Somalia and the subsequent international and regional interventions, Somalia’s troubles started long before the collapse of formal government in 1991. They were rooted in a self-interested European colonial legacy and the formation of the state itself, which divided the Somali-speaking people into five different nations/regions. To this day, Somalia has not relinquished its claim over Haud land to Ethiopia and the NFD to Kenya.\textsuperscript{79} These irredentist claims have strained relationships with neighboring states and have fueled a counter-narrative in the region that a strong Somali government might be a threat to regional stability.

\textsuperscript{78} Interviewee #4
\textsuperscript{79} Interviewee #15
Since 2002, IGAD has largely been the vehicle for various externally sponsored peace processes. In parallel with Ethiopian military hegemony, it has become the internationally recognized regional guarantor for stability, security, and development. IGAD, though, as an organization with only eight member states, has no recurrent resources and relies almost exclusively on Western largesse. IGAD is systemically weak, and has only a limited actual capacity to deal with issues of regional peace and security, as stipulated in its charter.\(^80\) To date, it has been manipulated by Ethiopia and its international allies.\(^81\) Its dependency on foreign aid and the lack of cohesion between its member states (in which underlying historical competition and proxy wars have been a legitimate means of achieving foreign policy goals) systemically undermine its ability to benignly intervene in the internal affairs of sovereign member states. In this milieu, Somalia imploded completely and has struggled ever since to navigate among the many domestic, regional, and international actors that have placed personal interest above the interests of the Somali people.

In order to respond to regional peace and security demands, IGAD transformed itself from a regional development organization to a regional security organization. IGAD’s interventions in Somalia were initially the product of Western disinterest in a marginal and inconsequential failed state. Since the securitization of IGAD’s mandate, many interventions have occurred on the basis of initiatives by member states, which IGAD has then endorsed, rather than at the behest of IGAD as a regional organization.\(^82\)

\(^{80}\) Interviewee #15; Interviewee #10; Interviewee #19
\(^{81}\) Interviewee #2 – Member of Somali Parliament – 5 January 2010; Interviewee #8; and Interviewee #35
\(^{82}\) Interviewee #4
Certainly this was the case in Somalia, where Ethiopia countered an initial Djiboutian initiative and took formal system-wide control of an internationally recognized peace process by creating a network of warlords and initiating a completely new reconciliation process.

The lack of sufficient finance to fund a regional securitization mandate is one factor that contributes to the dysfunctionality of IGAD. While IGAD has the regional mandate to act on peace and security issues, it has had no funding to act on its own, and has had to rely on the financial largesse of its member states and their Western allies. This situation has provided member states and their superstate allies with significant latitude to act in their own interest and not necessarily in the broader interests of the region.

The African Union Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) contains a policy of subsidiarity in which Regional Economic Communities (RECs) take the lead in addressing conflicts in their respective regions. This has further entrenched IGAD as the lead organization in the Somali conflict. IGAD also acts as a forum that moderates debates in the region on security and development. In reality, though, with no financial capacity of its own, IGAD and its members cannot, and do not, act on regional security issues without the interest and support of superstates. For example, as described by a diplomat involved in the Embagathi reconciliation conference, despite its inherent
weaknesses, IGAD did unite against the threat of Islamists emerging in the Horn of Africa, which is a threat not only to the region but to the whole world.83

A history of competition over a paucity of perceived resources is another factor in IGAD’s weakness. Socioeconomic, ethnic, and religious differences have also contributed to the lack of solidarity and shared identity within IGAD (Tavares 2010, 47).

Within a region of competing interests, Ethiopia provides a strong basis to project regional hegemonic power. It is the country with the largest standing army in East Africa, the Head of IGAD, and it hosts the African Union. In an effort to expand and strengthen its military and intelligence capacity, Ethiopia developed strategic alliances with Western superstates centered around the war on terrorism. Within this purview, Ethiopia has positioned itself to have a military and intelligence policy that is independent from its regional neighbors. It is able to have the autonomy of action that other regional member states can only dream about. That said, Ethiopia does not possess the internal financial capital to fund external operations in other sovereign states. For this it requires the support of allied Western superstates.

Ethiopia is the key player in IGAD and has chaired the organization uncontested for the last ten years. For various historical reasons, it has remained intensely concerned about security threats (imagined or real) and the nature of the emergent transitional authorities in Somalia. As explained by an IGAD official interviewed for this research, “[I]f Somalia became stable, and the war in Somalia ended, I must be sure that my

83 Interviewee #18
interests will not be jeopardized, which also is a key; and the Somali government thus far doesn’t seem to have come out very openly and strongly in reassuring its regional neighbors that the ‘new Somalia’ will not jeopardize our interests.”

Ethiopian policy is mostly driven by the fear of ongoing Somali irredentism, and Ethiopia continues to use IGAD as a mechanism to push through and legitimize its foreign policy towards that country. Apart from its 2006 formal military incursion and occupation of large parts of Somalia (that lasted for two years), Ethiopia has also acted unilaterally and has regularly intervened in Somalia militarily, often using IGAD’s blessing as a cover to legitimize its actions in the internal affairs of another sovereign state. Much of the negative narrative relating to Somalia and its failure as a nation-state stems from Ethiopia, which has been able to effectively influence the domestic narrative of its superstate partners.

In assessing Somali domestic views and the perspectives of Somali politicians on Ethiopia’s involvement, it must be said that they vary considerably. For example, according to a Somali politician interviewed for this dissertation, “Ethiopia’s short-term strategic interest is to divide Somalis and keep the status-quo, including their own favored warlords to wield power in certain regions of Somalia.” He believes that Ethiopia’s long-term strategic interest is to exert its domination and control of emerging regional authorities in Somalia. In contrast, another politician stated that Ethiopia’s involvement in Somalia is often misunderstood and seen very negatively by most

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84 Interviewee #19
85 Interviewee #3
86 Interviewee #20
87 Interviewee #2
88 Ibid.
Somalis: “Its military operations in Somalia have dismantled the power of hostile groups that threatens the security of Somalis. Ethiopia’s short-term and long-term strategic interests are to contribute to the efforts of rebuilding a stable Somalia which is free from extremists and hostile groups who are also a threat to Ethiopia’s national security.” 89 This dichotomy of views is indicative of an ongoing debate within Somalia about foreign interference in the country; in other words, the push-pull of external actors and their resources.

Despite these divergent political views, the majority of the Somali public views Ethiopia’s involvement negatively. 90 Ethiopia’s role in Somalia has had a tremendous impact on the Somali conflict and peace processes. First, by creating and supporting different warlord-based factions, the policy prolonged the Somali conflict (deliberately or otherwise), which directly killed hundreds of thousands and displaced millions of people. Second, overt Ethiopian interference generated a lot of dissidence throughout Somalia and united both nationalists and Islamists in Somali society. The Ethiopian factor was a rallying cry by the opposition to mobilize the people against an historic enemy, Ethiopia. 91 Third, the Ethiopian military intervention brought overt radical jihadists into the Somali conflict from all over the world. 92 The Ethiopian military presence, sold to its Western allies as a policy to mitigate transnational threats, largely increased the

89 Interviewee #9 – former Somali Prime Minister – 10 June 2010
90 Interviewee #8
91 Interviewee #5
92 Ibid.
radicalization of the public and the rise of both nationalist and internationalist Al-Shabaab narratives.\textsuperscript{93}

It is also worth noting that Ethiopia’s policy toward Somalia has evolved over time. During the 1977 war, the main objective of Ethiopia was to contain what it perceived to be Somalia’s plan to annex the Ogaden region. After the collapse of the state in Somalia, Ethiopia aligned itself with a group of warlords to secure its borders by containing any threats emanating from within Somalia, especially to gather intelligence and target hideouts of Ethiopian armed opposition groups. In the 1990s, Ethiopia became concerned with the rise of extremist Islamists in Somalia.\textsuperscript{94} It began fighting Al Ittihad Islamiya in Ethiopia and across the Somalia border. As previously mentioned, in 2006, it intervened directly to crush the ICU, which it saw as a threat to its national security. In reality, Ethiopia was not very concerned with the ICU, but rather with its armed wing known as Harakat Mujahideen Al Shabaab.

4.7 Summary and Conclusion

The core components of Somalia’s state collapse, protracted conflict, and lack of a final resolution can be traced back to historical precedents. The arbitrary demarcation of nation-state boundaries by the British and other European states in the colonial era generated ongoing competition and friction between member states in the Horn of Africa into modern times. This historical baggage generated suspicion, fear, self-interested opportunism, and claims of injustice amongst regional nation-states in the Horn.

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\textsuperscript{93} Interviewee #1 – Political Faction Leader and member of ARPC – 5 November 2009

\textsuperscript{94} Interviewee #19
The collapse of the Somali nation-state came in the wake of the withdrawal of Cold War largesse and the strategic withdrawal of Western superstates as part of the resulting “peace dividend.” As a country that sits on the very margins of the Westphalian nation-state system, Somalia was assessed to be inconsequential to the security and economic interests of the victorious West. The regime of Siad Barre reacted to the lack of resources caused by the wind-down of the Cold War by initiating a divide-and-rule strategy based on clan identity. The result, in turn, was the generation of opposition clan-based militias that ultimately overthrew his regime and caused the subsequent civil war and famine.

Limited U.S. and Western intervention to mitigate the worst effects of a famine in the early 1990s came to naught when they could not manage the non-state actors that were in play at the time. The ignominious withdrawal of the U.S., UN, and their allies in 1995, in the wake of “Black Hawk Down,” meant that Somalia was practically ungovernable. An emerging Ethiopia took the opportunity to set up its own network of warlords to contain any threat to itself.

In the wake of the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, and the Twin Towers attack of 2001, the U.S. and its Western allies reassessed Somalia as a potential transnational threat. They initiated an anti-terror campaign in the country, utilizing the established network of Ethiopian-allied warlords. These warlords held sway until they were overturned by the ICU in mid-2006, despite ongoing attempts at Arta and Embagathi to provide a durable political formula to stabilize the country.
Ethiopia was able to convince the U.S. and the international community that the ICU was a clear and present danger not only to Ethiopia but to the world, and it unilaterally invaded Somalia on behalf of the TFG. After two years of Ethiopian military occupation (2007–08) and failure to stabilize at minimum Mogadishu, a UN-brokered deal crowned the ICU leaders as the new president and Ethiopian troops withdrew.

From 2002 onward, IGAD was theoretically the regional lead for conflict resolution in Somalia. In reality, it simply endorsed individual member state initiatives, particularly those from Ethiopia. As a regional body, it has neither the mechanisms nor the financial capacity to effectively intercede in Somalia or make a difference to the outcome on the ground. IGAD’s securitization mandate came out only six years after the Somali crisis began, in response to the many conflicts in the region that hampered its original goal of social and economic integration. With no mechanisms to deal with conflict, member states took *ad hoc* individual initiatives to deal with the Somali crisis. The first major intervention that incorporated the mainstream Somali civil elite was the Arta Conference, facilitated by the Djiboutian government in 2000. Though the conference produced a Transitional National Government (TNG) and charter, it failed due to a lack of international support as well as interference from Ethiopia.\(^\text{95}\)

The first IGAD intervention was the 2002–04 reconciliation conference in Kenya that produced the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Unfortunately, this too failed miserably to bring peace to Somalia. This much-drawn-out transition was largely ignored by Western superstates after their initial assessment that Somalia was not host to

\(^{95}\) Interviewee #2
transnational terrorists in the wake of the 2001 Twin Towers attack. Only with the rise of the ICU in 2006 did the Western states again review the Somali debacle and conclude that the threat from the ICU was a danger to regional and worldwide peace and security. The decision was made to intervene militarily.

Ethiopia’s direct military intervention and occupation of large parts of the country on behalf of the TFG also ended in failure. A popular uprising by much of the population against the occupation generated a large number of civilian and Ethiopian casualties. Ethiopia’s incursion provided the emerging non-state actors, specifically Islamic extremist groups, with the perfect recruitment narrative. After two years of occupation, Ethiopia withdrew and its Western allies took a preeminent role in trying to stabilize what was by then a virulent insurgency.

Regional organizations in Africa and their securitization mandates are imperfect. The failed IGAD intervention in Somalia highlights the inherent political competition within the Horn of Africa regional organization. It reveals how the narrow self-interest of member states can perpetuate — even unintentionally — the conflict in a failed state and negatively impact regional security. Ethiopia, as the regional military hegemon, significantly contributed to the failure of ongoing Somali peace processes by supporting an unrepresentative network of Somali warlords from 1995 to 2008. Ethiopia’s domination of IGAD and its belief that a strong, centralized Somali state constitutes a significant threat to Ethiopia’s interests means that Ethiopia has played an ongoing “spoiler” role for conflict resolution and the development of effective governance in
Somalia. Due to this damaging role played by Ethiopia in Somalia, IGAD’s regional legitimacy and its regional securitization mandate have been significantly undermined.

IGAD’s inability to act effectively and independently has been systemically exacerbated by its lack of financial resources and institutional capacity.
CHAPTER FIVE: THE IMPACT OF REGIONAL HEGEMONIES IN INTERVENTIONS CONDUCTED BY REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

5.1 Introduction

Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation each present a case study on the role of regional hegemons in interventions by regional organizations in failed member states. These case studies demonstrate how each of these two hegemons — Nigeria in ECOWAS and Ethiopia in IGAD — became the driving force behind the interventions in Liberia and Somalia, respectively. In each intervention, the case studies highlight how issues of regional-level politics compounded rather than solved the conflicts within failed states.

Many factors contributed to the divergent outcomes of military interventions into Liberia and Somalia. Salient factors include distinctive histories and a different genesis for state collapse, as well as different regional dynamics and the capacity of the respective regional hegemons. However, analysis reveals that the regional hegemons acted with a level of impunity afforded them by their respective regional organizations. In each case, the regional organizations did not act as benign or neutral regional actors, but intervened in their own self-interest. In addition, the momentum for the intervention was similarly motivated. It was due to ongoing operational failure and a spillover of insecurity from the failed nation-state into the wider region, which in turn generated regional insecurity that was not present prior to the intervention. This was particularly the case in
the Liberian conflict and also allowed the AU to become more engaged in the Somali conflict.

It is fair to say that the interests of regional hegemons have dominated the securitization agenda of these two interventions. African regional organizations thus cannot be effective when peace requires actions and decisions that might be contrary to the hegemon’s interests. In fact, this research shows that African regional organizations are intractably intertwined with member state self-interest and are part of the securitization problem in Africa. At this point in time, they are not part of the solution, or at the very least, they have become irrelevant in actual regional security development. Particularly in relation to African regional hegemons, member states have continued to narrowly define and prioritize their self-interest over that of regional interests.

Building on the analysis of the two case studies, Chapter 5 summarizes the major findings of each case study and highlights major emerging themes. It describes how interests of regional hegemons and competing member nation-states (and factions therein) can perpetuate — even unintentionally — the conflict in member countries that have suffered from state collapse, as well as undermine the efforts of regional organizations in developing stability, security, and development throughout the continent.

5.2 Summary of Research Findings: Divergent Outcomes?

Overall, the secondary research conducted for this dissertation proclaims the ECOWAS intervention as a regional success (Downs and Stedman 2002, 59), and the intervention in Somali as a failure. This dissertation shows, however, that “success” in
Liberia is in a very minimal sense of the word. Rather, interventions failed to bring sustainable peace to either Liberia or Somalia, primarily because of the role played by the regional hegemons in the conflict and the instituting peacebuilding processes. According to a former faction leader, Liberian peace remains fragile and there are still grievances despite the stability of the country: “the root cause is not resolved yet and Liberian indigenous people continue to be marginalized.”

The primary research conducted for this dissertation corroborates the finding that the success of the ECOWAS intervention was limited. The intervention was unable to sustain any positive impact for any extended time period. At one point, ECOWAS member states were, in fact, part of the problem in perpetuating conflict in Liberia. It was only with regional spillover and superstate and UN pressure that ECOWAS member states set their self-interests aside and worked together to mitigate regional spillover and design a collective solution. As stressed in an interview by a former head of state who was intimately involved in the negotiations, “the success had actually more to do with Nigeria, the regional hegemon, and other ECOWAS member states actually working together, rather than actively working to spoil each other’s freedom of action in Liberia.” Success within the failed state of Liberia was largely a mirage. For Liberians, during my research period, the ECOWAS intervention perpetuated conflict and caused untold suffering. For many years, it destabilized regional security.

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96 Interviewee #32
97 Interview conducted in Nairobi, Kenya, 10 June 2011
98 Interviewee #26, 27, 30, and 32
By contrast, the IGAD intervention in Somalia did not manifest the same regional or international acclamation of success that was evident in the literature related to the Liberian intervention (Samatar and Samatar 2003; Healy 2008; Healy 2009b; Moller 2009b; Moller 2009a). Yet IGAD was — and continues to be — internationally legitimized as the regional body tasked with securitization for the Horn of Africa area. Despite the failure of the IGAD intervention in Somalia, the collective literature continues to put a positive spin on the interventions by African regional organizations, including IGAD (Moller 2009b). While IGAD’s lack of success in Somalia can also be tied to Ethiopian intervention and self-interest, the current literature at best glosses over the negative consequences of Ethiopian dominance within IGAD when it comes to Somali issues (Healy 2009a). Instead, the focus has been on the failure of Somalis to make peace, and not on IGAD or Ethiopian policy or performance in Somalia.99

The existential cost for failure is huge: hundreds of thousands of lives lost, millions displaced, and the complete destruction of all state infrastructure and legitimacy. However, it is noteworthy that the collective literature does not analyze the real costs of failed regional interventions or the negative role that regional hegemons may play. While the formal inclusion of Ethiopia in the AMISOM operations in Somalia might have provided a better mechanism for accountability, transparency, and coordination than secret Ethiopian unilateral intervention, many Somali nationalists view the Ethiopian military presence with suspicion. In fact, it has become a rallying cry for Al-Shabaab recruitment and opposition leaders to what is seen domestically as sectarian

99 Interviewee # 4, 5, 8, and 35
occupation\textsuperscript{100}. Western and UN policymakers continue to invest in the narrative that both unilateral Ethiopian involvement and “collective” IGAD action provide a positive policy direction for the reconstitution of the Somali nation-state. In practice, their intervention has not produced any sustainable peace for Somalia or the region.

In sum, these two case studies highlight the importance of adopting a continental approach to conflict management and building a continental security architecture.

5.2.1 Summary of Research Findings: The Case of Nigeria in ECOWAS

In Chapter 3, this research concludes that Nigeria’s core interest in its intervention in the Liberian conflict was to ensure regional stability and support its own hegemonic ambitions. Nigeria’s ultimate motivation to intervene was to support a close friend of President Babangida and a regional ally, President Doe. However, President Babangida’s personal relationships were conflated with Nigeria’s national interests. Thus, when Doe was killed, Nigeria felt that its national interests and esteem were debased. The alternative of Charles Taylor, backed by Francophone ECOWAS member states, threatened Nigeria’s interests. Since the continued violence in Liberia also threatened regional stability, Nigeria viewed this as a threat to its hegemonic ambitions. In fact, Liberian civil society members, religious leaders, and politicians interviewed for this research all affirm that Nigeria wanted an outcome that did not feature Taylor as the president.\textsuperscript{101}

\textsuperscript{100} Interviewee #1, former Somali warlord/politician, Nov.5, 2009

\textsuperscript{101} Interviewee #26, 27, 30, and 32
During the Abuja negotiations, however, Nigeria changed its position toward Taylor and for several reasons finally allowed him to become Liberian president. First, the ongoing inability of Nigeria to achieve its intended outcome for Liberia led to unbearable costs for ongoing intervention, in turn leading to mounting domestic pressure on the government to withdraw. Second, with a change of leadership within Nigeria during the years of intervention, the new leadership did not have the same level of personal animosity toward Taylor as the previous leadership. As a result, it became easier for Nigeria to accede to Taylor’s ambition for the presidency and the Francophone demands for a negotiated settlement. Third, as the conflict spilled over to other parts of the region, it caused increasing regional instability, which placed additional pressure on both Nigeria and the Francophone coalition to come to a consensus. Lastly, Nigeria ultimately needed Taylor to end the war and thus negotiated with him. Taylor also needed Nigeria’s blessing to achieve his ambition and was more willing to strike a deal with Nigeria. The population within Liberia that suffered from the anarchy associated with state collapse had virtually no say during the intervention or in the structure of the reconstituted Liberian state.102 Apart from the non-state actors in which the Nigerian and Francophone opposition chose to invest, virtually no other NSA was empowered to enter into serious dialogue throughout the entire period.

In summary, then, this research has illustrated how Nigeria was constrained by domestic concerns, and ECOWAS member state opposition was able to ultimately balance and broaden narrow hegemonic interests, thus enabling a viable and sustainable

102 Interviewee #32
resolution to the domestic Liberian conflict. Ultimately, due to the financial and human cost of the intervention for Nigeria, and President Sani Abacha’s compromise with Taylor, the reemergence of the Liberian nation-state was allowed to occur. At the same time, other member states and the international community were concerned about the spillover of the conflict into Sierra Leone and its effects on regional stability (Adebajo 2004a). Thus, it was only after the Liberian conflict began to bite Nigeria and have a systemic impact in member countries that these member countries could jointly agree that their individual interests could well be served by having a stable Liberia. It was only at this final stage that a joint plan was agreed upon and implemented.

5.2.2 Summary of Research Findings: The Case of Ethiopia in IGAD

By contrast, the research in Chapter 4 highlights that Ethiopia’s core objective was to prevent Somalia from reconstituting itself as a strong nation-state that could threaten Ethiopia’s strategic interests. A range of people interviewed suggested that Ethiopia feared Somalia would become a safe haven from which Ethiopian opposition groups could launch their attacks. It additionally wanted to ensure that the long-held irredentist Somali dream of a reconstituted “Greater Somalia” did not materialize (Ethiopian Ministry of Information 2002). As this research shows, Ethiopia demanded a core stake in the future leadership of Somalia and in any Somali state restructuring. According to a Somali political faction leader, “only through controlling how Somalia was reconstituted itself did Ethiopia believe that Somali irredentism would be permanently overcome; and the Somalia region of Ethiopia permanently absorbed by

103 Ibid.
According to this interviewee, Ethiopia was able to successfully garner total freedom of action from the UN and Western superstates, which wanted nothing to do with Somalia after the failed 1991–1993 intervention. Ethiopia was able to do this by securing a mandate for the frontline states from the internationally recognized regional organization, IGAD. In the wake of the Al Qaeda attack on the United States in 2001, Ethiopia’s freedom of action in Somalia was only expanded. As noted by a civil society member “IGAD remained a rubber stamp to legitimize Ethiopian action.” Member states of IGAD had little interest in what Ethiopia did in Somalia. In this context, communities within Somalia remained irrelevant to the maneuvers of Ethiopia and its allies in IGAD. The policy was one of containment, with no commitment to genuinely invest in the indigenous reconstitution of the Somalia nation-state.

In the case of Somalia, this research has shown that there was no counterbalance to the military dominance of Ethiopia within IGAD. This resulted in the recurrent, yearly failure of the IGAD intervention in Somalia. Only recently (outside the timeframe of this thesis) has Ethiopia found it more difficult to act alone. From one perspective, it can be argued that Ethiopia has used IGAD as a means to act independently. Kenya, as well, which has also deployed troops in Somalia, can be seen to have acted in the past as “benign diplomatic cover for Ethiopia’s involvement in Somalia”, similarly realizing the opportunities and benefits of acting through IGAD. More recently, IGAD and

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104 Interviewee #1
105 Interviewee #8
106 Ibid
107 Ibid.
108 Interviewee #5
Western powers became more alert to the limits of Ethiopian intelligence and political assessments of Somalia,\textsuperscript{109} and have shifted more emphasis towards the AU. This comes with the compromise that frontline member states of IGAD – and IGAD itself – get to continue with military and political intervention in Somalia.

\textbf{5.3 Primary Themes}

\textbf{5.3.1 Role of History, Relationships, and Perceptions}

Historical regional and internal domestic relationships played a major role in why the Liberian nation-state failed, and how the regional political and military intervention began, evolved, and resolved itself. First, President Doe took power via a coup, using the justification that the previous regime was corrupt and had marginalized most of the ethnic groups in the country. Then he used the historical enmity to mobilize the Liberian indigenous people against Americo-Liberian domination.\textsuperscript{110} Second, Doe’s relationship with his immediate neighbors, Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso, were strained after he killed the son-in-law of President Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire, who was openly supportive of Charles Taylor and his NPFL (Adebajo 2002a). Third, Doe had a personal relationship with President Babangida of Nigeria, which was an important determinant in garnering Nigerian support for his administration as well as Nigerian military intervention.\textsuperscript{111} Fourth, the historic division within ECOWAS member states along the lines of their French and British colonizers also played a role. For example, Nigeria decided that it was in its strategic interest to invest in Doe, who was anti-Francophone.

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{110} Interviewee #26, 27, 28, 29, 30, and 32

\textsuperscript{111} Interviewee #27 and 32
The dichotomy between Francophone (led by Côte d’Ivoire) and Anglophone (Nigerian) interests set up the core dynamics for a long-running proxy conflict in Liberia.

As Nathan (2010) points out, historical relationships at the national, regional, and international levels all contributed to the conflict as well as to the dynamics that combined to provide an ultimate resolution. This research reveals that when war in Liberia finally broke out, Nigeria lobbied ECOWAS members to intervene (Ero 1995). At the very beginning of the conflict, Francophone member states within ECOWAS did not comprehend the magnitude of Nigeria’s vision in terms of direct military intervention. Up until that time, the size and scope of the proposed Nigerian intervention had never been contemplated because the normative practice of ECOWAS had always been diplomatic mediation. Nigeria changed ECOWAS’ dynamics fundamentally when it immediately deployed its troops on a large scale. The Francophone member states, particularly Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso, perceived Nigeria’s intervention as a rescue operation for Doe’s regime, and counter to the agreed-upon conventions established within ECOWAS. Both countries opposed ECOWAS’ intervention and, in response to it, they openly supported Charles Taylor, who was savvy enough to take advantage of the schism between the two groups. Thus, from the beginning, there was no consensus for the ECOWAS intervention.

When Doe was killed, the conflict significantly devolved, with a plethora of factions emerging to fill the vacuum. Both blocs within ECOWAS continued to back indigenous proxies within Liberia. The result was a massive degeneration in the safety and well-being of the average Liberian citizen due to mass killings and displacement,
which spilled over into neighboring states within ECOWAS, particularly Sierra Leone. The regionalization of the conflict made it more difficult for Nigeria to control events on the ground, and it ultimately found that its strategic interests in regional stability outweighed its particular interests within Liberia. As a result, during the Abuja negotiations, Nigeria shifted its position toward Taylor and included him in the peace process. Nigeria also committed itself to work with the rest of the ECOWAS member states to mitigate regional competition and provide the basis for authentic and durable conflict resolution within Liberia.

Similar historical baggage also played a role in the Somali intervention by Ethiopia and IGAD. First, in modern times, the British colonial gift of a considerable amount of traditional Somali land to Ethiopia (D. J. L. Brown 1956) set the scene for ongoing antipathy and outright aggression between the two states. Somalia has never relinquished its claim and irredentist aspiration of recovering the lost colonial lands. The 1977–1978 military invasion of Ethiopia (which came close to occupying Addis Ababa) continues to set the basis for ongoing Ethiopian policy toward Somalia. In fact, since Somalia and Ethiopia have been strategic competitors for at least a thousand years, the mistrust between the two entities is considerable, with both sides involving themselves in wars and meddling in each other’s affairs. Though Somalia does not have an army to threaten Ethiopia’s national security, it has the potential to become a safe haven for Ethiopia’s opposition groups, including ethnic Somalis and radical religious groups. Ethiopia continues to utilize these narratives and intertwine them into the current anti-terror meta-narrative to ensure continued Western superstate sponsorship (political, financial, and in
terms of latitude of action), which is seen within Ethiopia as crucial in maintaining the primacy of its hegemonic military position in the Horn of Africa.

An example of modern-day Ethiopian meddling that caused profound distrust between Somali civil society and Ethiopia was when Ethiopia established and supported a patchwork of warlord fiefdoms that effectively controlled Somalia from as early as 1994 to their ousting by the ICU in 2005. Somali and non-Somali politicians, civil society members, and academicians all concur that overt Ethiopian interference in the development of the Transitional Federal Government, its transitional charter, and its constitution, as well as in the selection process of Somali parliamentarians and government functionaries (including securing ministerial positions for their allies), further infuriated many sectors of Somali society.112 This resulted in a devastating lack of political options for Somali NSAs and civil society, and created the preconditions for overwhelming NSA and civil society support for an Islamist group, the ICU, to take power and provide an alternative to what was perceived domestically as a failed intervention.113 According to a member of the leaders’ committee and the Somali parliament, “the Islamists changed the power equation in the Somali political system, and brought in a completely new entity into the Somali political arena: international jihadism.”114 She suggested that it was chronically poor Ethiopian political and military assessments of indigenous Somali indignation and resistance to its policy of containment by warlord proxies that led to the devolution of conflict in Somalia, and also provided a

112 Interviewee #1, 2, 4, 20, and 35
113 Interviewee #2, 4, 8, 20, and 35
114 Interviewee #5
fertile breeding ground for disaffected youth who saw no hope for any opportunity to better themselves or provide for their families. From the viewpoint of Ethiopia, the UN, and interested Western governments, the emergence of transnational groupings within the ICU (those with an ideology of transnational terrorism) only reinforced Ethiopia’s claim that Somalia was a pariah state. Essentially, hardliners who wanted nothing less than an Islamic state in Somalia continued to drive the ICU’s agenda. This rhetoric only reinforced the Ethiopian narrative when the ICU Defense Minister, General Yusuf Indha Adde, declared jihad against Ethiopia by vowing to take the war to Addis Ababa (Al Jazeera 2006). Instead of examining the preconditions for the successful emergence of the ICU and anti-Ethiopian rhetoric within Somalia, the Western great powers (with the endorsement of the UN Security Council) supported Ethiopia’s argument that punitive military measures were the only solution.

Having secured IGAD and UN acquiescence, Ethiopia responded to the emergence of the ICU by invading Somalia in December of 2006. Its legitimizing narrative was that it was supporting the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zanawi said in an interview that his troops were there at the invitation of the TFG in order to support an internationally recognized government. He rejected the assertion that the military presence emboldened the more radical elements within the ICU (Interview with Meles Zenawi, 2006). Both the Somali political elite and the general public, though, saw the move as a step too far by Ethiopia, and poured increasing financial and human resources into opposition military factions — including

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115 Interviewee #4
the ICU. The Ethiopia military occupation succeeded in dismantling the ICU and reduced the immediate threat toward the TFG and Ethiopia. Yet in the crucible of that conflict, it ignored a new and much more hardline group, Al-Shabaab, which continues to plague the Somali government and the region to this date. In addition, the Ethiopian occupation also failed dismally to win the hearts and minds of the Somalia public and the Somali elite, essentially consigning Somali-Ethiopian relations at the grassroots level to the dustbin for another generation. The occupation came to naught when Ethiopia militarily withdrew in February 2009. Even though AU troops, including forces from IGAD member states, were deployed to Somalia, the presence of Ethiopian troops significantly damaged IGAD’s official efforts to broker a peace in Somalia, even according to many non-Somali analysts active in the region (Healy 2009a).

Also of note is the fact that Ethiopia’s multi-ethnic and multi-religious society of more than ninety million people is significantly constrained in terms of global trade by the fact that it has no direct access to the sea, which is, of course, essential for Ethiopia’s economic development. While Somalia has the longest coast in Africa, Ethiopia has long machinated over how to access Somali ports for Ethiopia’s long-term development. As an historical aside supporting the argument for the historical interest in the Somali coastline by Ethiopia, in 1946, the British government (then the custodian of northwest Somalia) and Ethiopia negotiated about annexing parts of Zeila/Haud so that both parties could benefit from the exchange of land: better grazing rights for the British and a port for Ethiopia (D. J. L. Brown 1956). The idea was scuttled upon British insistence that Ethiopia could not build a railway on the land that was transferred because it would then...
compete with the Addis Ababa/Djibouti railway controlled by the French. Tellingly, British-French relations trumped those between England and Ethiopia. Also, Ethiopia’s National Security Policy document confirms Ethiopia’s concern for sea ports and interest in using Somali ports (Ethiopian Ministry of Information 2002). Though Ethiopia has signed an agreement with the Somaliland Authority for access to the deep-sea Berbera Port, Somaliland’s secession has neither been recognized by the central Somali government nor the international community, which continues to question the long-term validity of the agreement. Moreover, Somaliland is currently in talks with the central Somali government, and much will depend on the outcome of such talks as to which party Ethiopia should negotiate with for access.

This research finds resounding evidence that historical issues between regional member states and the regional hegemon, as well as between the hegemon and indigenous non-state actors, can critically impact the success or failure of any external military intervention in the internal affairs of a failed sovereign nation-state. The strategic interest of a regional hegemon, and the historical relationship between it and the particular failed state, has a profound impact on the outcome of an African regional organization’s intervention. Their impact significantly rebukes the mantra of “African Solutions to African Problems” and the conventional approach to conflict resolution and peacebuilding in failed and collapsed states.

The findings of the thesis indicate that the patterns of amity and enmity at the regional level, and particularly the domestic concerns and interests of the two regional hegemons, Nigeria and Ethiopia, shaped the securitization options and the regional
organizations in these two interventions. For Nigeria, it was about hegemonic ambitions in West Africa and the fear of having a non-allied president in Liberia, an Anglophone country. When the conflict mushroomed, Nigeria found its strategic interests better served if there was regional stability. It thus committed itself to a negotiated resolution with the other member states of ECOWAS, allowing Taylor to become president. In the case of Ethiopia, it was fear — real or perceived — of having Somalia serve as a base for an insurgency in eastern Ethiopia. Consequently, its policy preference was to mitigate any potential threat to Ethiopian territorial integrity by directly intervening in Somalia and directly shaping future Somali political space. It did this through an IGAD interface and was supported in this venture by Western states that were reacting to a transnational anti-terror narrative.

This research demonstrates the importance of perception, particularly the perceptions of the regional hegemons and the way in which they define their security threat, whether military, political, or societal. As argued by Wæver (2007), it is the elites that define security problems, and in the case of regional organizations, it is the relevant regional hegemon that drives the securitization of the RSC and designs the military interventions and their objectives.

For both Nigeria and Ethiopia, historical baggage within the state being intervened in, as well as within regional politics, played a critical role in the motivation for, and outcome of, the intervention. Clearly, in both cases, the primary motivation for the intervention was the self-interest of the regional hegemon rather than the needs of the targeted member state. Existing literature on African regional organizations remains
overwhelmingly quiet on the importance of regional hegemons within regional
securitization matrices. Nor does it analyze the historical baggage carried by regional
member states and how that is factored into decision-making on whether to intervene or
not in a failed or failing sovereign member state. The clear conclusion of my thesis is that
the experiment with African regional organizations as the epicenter for frontline RSCs
has failed — and is doomed to fail, primarily because of the inevitable systemic impact
that regional hegemons have both in the region generally and in the regional organization
tasked with military intervention.

5.3.2 The Role of Regionalization of African Conflict and African Conflict
Resolution

Both the Liberian and Somali conflicts occurred almost concurrently at the end of
the Cold War; and were amongst a basket of states that either collapsed or were imperiled
due to the consequences of the end of the Cold War. For example, when both the Liberian
and Somali states collapsed, the First Gulf War (Kuwait invasion) was also going on, and
a lot of attention and resources were focused on that war, rather than on African conflicts.
While Somalia did hold the attention of the U.S. and UN for several years, the
belligerence of NSAs within Somalia thwarted U.S./UN intervention. The United States
moved on, leaving the stigma of failure in Somalia to resound throughout the African
continent and, in the process, providing the opportunity for the emergence of African
regional organizations. The dissipation of the Cold War also meant that resources and
political support were being distributed from superpowers to peripheral states. Funding
for Africa dried up and many peripheral states that were poorly politically and
economically developed collapsed.

When Liberia imploded, its closest ally, the United States, abandoned it and left it
to the mercy of ECOWAS and the regional hegemon, Nigeria. A notable religious leader
interviewed for this thesis pointed out that, “Liberia’s colonial and traditional friend, the
United States of America, decided that the Liberian conflict was an internal civil crisis,
and they determined that they would have nothing to do with it.” In relation to Somalia,
there were latent attempts by Western superstates to intervene for humanitarian reasons.
In Somalia, one such incident was the humanitarian intervention in 1991—1993 to
mitigate mass starvation, which occurred in the wake of the central state collapse after it
was abandoned at the end of the Cold War. When the Western/UN intervention faltered,
they withdrew. The ripple effect then had a negative consequence for intervention
elsewhere in Africa (such as Rwanda) for another decade, as failed states were just not
considered relevant. This set the stage for the regionalization of conflict, particularly in
Africa.

In the intervening decade, African regional organizations had emerged to fill the
vacuum created by superstate withdrawal. They had garnered legitimacy from the UN
and Western superstates, which had no appetite for intervention in Africa, post the 1993
Somali debacle. This marks the strategic shift to African regional organizations from
large UN or Western-led missions. It is within that context that Nigeria, through
ECOWAS, and Ethiopia, through IGAD, influenced the decisions of their respective

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116 Interviewee #27
regional organizations to intervene in Liberia and Somalia. This research asserts that the two regional hegemons were able to pursue their national interests with little regard to the impact of their actions on regional politics or regional identity, and with no regard for the people and the states in the two countries in which they intervened. This was a comfortable fit between the Western superpowers, which had decided on a strategic withdrawal from Africa, and the emerging African regional organizations, particularly regional hegemons. Now the UN Security Council often authorizes interventions by African regional organizations. Non-Western superstates in Russia’s orbit were still drawing breath at the end of the Cold War, and saw little significance to Western investment in regional African organizations. These regional hegemons were then readily able to justify their actions and their interest in a particular outcome within their respective regional organizations, and further legitimize the actions of ECOWAS and IGAD in intervening in the internal affairs of sovereign nation-states. According to a civil society member interviewed for this research, “Nigeria’s antipathy towards Taylor became an impediment in the Liberian peace process,”\(^{117}\) while Ethiopia was accused of “undermining the Djiboutian-sponsored Arta Peace Process for Somalia by supporting Ethiopian proxy warlords and initiating a completely new peace process at Embagathi in Kenya.”\(^{118}\) Discussing regional organizations and humanitarian intervention, Francis writes, “viable and dominant states often determine or ‘dictate’ the contents, interest and directions of regional ‘collective’ organizations, mostly at the detriment of smaller and weaker regional member” (Francis 2006, 114). Thus, the regionalization of conflict and

\(^{117}\) Interviewee #26
\(^{118}\) Interviewee #2
conflict resolution raises some serious concerns for failed and collapsed states in Africa. As demonstrated throughout the dissertation, both interventions were dictated and shaped by the two regional hegemons, whose actions prolonged the respective conflicts and significantly added to the suffering of the people in the affected states – suffering they claimed to be intervening to stop.

5.3.3. The Role of Dominance of Hegemons in Regional Organizations’ Interventions

African regional organizations have been encouraged by the UN and the international community to take on a securitization mandate, with no regard for their institutional capacity. Their ability to intervene in conflict and sustain long-term operations is, in fact, heavily constrained by their lack of institutional capacity. Initially created to deal with regional economic and disaster-mitigation issues, nominal security mandates were developed largely in reaction to *ad hoc* regional crises. At the time of their interventions, both organizations suffered from the lack of organizational capacity in terms of money, logistics, and command structures (Tavares 2010). In the absence of strong institutional capacity, both organizations were manipulated by their respective regional hegemons. Dorn (1998, 1) argues that regional organizations have “harmful regional interests” that cause further damage through their lack of capacity to follow through with even their narrow self-interests.

When the war broke in Liberia, ECOWAS did not have any effective mechanisms for intervention in the internal affairs of a member state, and none of its sixteen members were able to deploy peacekeeping troops and sustain them, except for Nigeria. In
practice, ECOWAS was singularly dependent on Nigerian military forces and finance to intervene in Liberia.\textsuperscript{119}

In the case of IGAD, as an organization it is younger than ECOWAS. It was composed of six countries in 1991, and at the time, Ethiopia was just emerging from more than a decade of failed-state status associated with the Cold War. IGAD had no effective regional hegemon at the time that could shoulder the burden of intervention. Hence, the United States intervened in 1991–1992 to respond to a massive famine in Somalia. It was in the wake of the U.S./UN failure that IGAD and Ethiopia were chosen to be the “Sheriff” in the Horn of Africa. Other regional member states of IGAD — all systemically dependent upon the financial largesse of Western donors — made no protest to the move. Although Eritrea initially was on board with the IGAD intervention, this changed when a border conflict erupted with Ethiopia over the town of Badme in 1998. From that time onward, Eritrea consistently objected to Ethiopia’s involvement in the Somali peace process.

During the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, Nigeria provided the bulk of the forces and financed the operation.\textsuperscript{120} Though the war broke out in December of 1990, it took until August 1991 for the first forces to be deployed. The overwhelming majority of the force structure was Nigerian, producing a strong Nigerian bias within the military intervention.\textsuperscript{121} Liberian civil society and politicians interviewed for this research

\begin{footnotes}
\item[119] Interviewee #21, 24, 30, and 31
\item[120] Interviewee #21, 26, 30, and 31
\item[121] Interviewee #25
\end{footnotes}
generally expressed their appreciation for Nigeria’s contribution and believe that
Nigerians were sincere about helping Liberia with their “blood and money.”

There was no consensus for the intervention at the regional level, however, and
the intervention went against historical convention within ECOWAS. Therefore, the
proposed intervention immediately generated political schisms amongst member states.
Furthermore, at that time ECOWAS did not have the capacity to deploy forces or finance
such a big offensive.

Certain ECOWAS member states were suspicious of Nigeria’s motivation and
domination, and that suspicion generated a proxy war within Liberia that became the
primary catalyst for sustained insecurity in the country (Adebajo 2002a). Côte d’Ivoire
and Burkina Faso supported Taylor, who opposed Nigeria’s presence in the country.
Nigeria also created and supported alternate factions to prevent Taylor from securing
Liberia’s presidency. According to Clapham (2000), the lack of support from the parties
in conflict and the lack of a common approach amongst member states of the regional
organization often compromise the legitimacy of an intervention. Nigerian dominance
within the ECOWAS intervention, and the resentment from some member states,
perpetuated the conflict until there was stalemate. Only when Nigeria accepted that it
could not win without Taylor and agreed to his participation in the Liberian political
dispensation did the conflict came to end. According to a faction leader interviewed,

122 Interviewee #26, 27, 30, and 32
“there was no success in the intervention, but politically there was a compromise that let Taylor take over democratically when he didn’t even win.”  

In the case of Somalia, IGAD played no institutional role in Somali reconciliation until 2002, beyond endorsing initiatives by different member states. IGAD had no capacity to intervene and instead became a forum in which members manipulated the decisions of the organization to serve their narrow self-interest. The 2002–2004 Embagathi peace process for Somalia was the first to be formally held under the auspices of IGAD. The conference was hosted by Kenya, which also chaired the conference proceedings. However, the dynamics were closely controlled by Ethiopia, with the network of Ethiopian-controlled Somali warlords taking front and center stage through the two years of proceedings. All other Somali NSAs, such as business and religious groups, were excluded from the process. Therefore, power dynamics within IGAD allowed Ethiopia to maximize its national interest, while concomitantly minimizing—and even negating—regional security interests. This can be attested by the ongoing spillover of refugees, criminal syndicates, and contraband weapons and drugs into IGAD member states. As noted by a Somali politician interviewed for this research, “those of us who have closely followed developments at Embagathi in Kenya, from the outset, we were able to witness Ethiopia’s overt and blatant interference in the affairs of Somalia.”

Within IGAD, apart from Djibouti (which had little institutional power within the regional organization due to its size, lack of financial capacity, and systemic reliance on

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123 Interviewee #32
124 Interviewee #2, 4, and 35
125 Interviewee #5
126 Interviewee #2
foreign aid), there was no other member state interest in Somalia. Domestic concerns consumed other member states — even Kenya, which already had a massive displaced Somali population within its borders. Kenya, though, profited greatly from a large-scale UN office in Nairobi, so was more than happy to ignore events within Somalia that seemed very distant. In this context, Ethiopia did not have to bother about the concerns of other IGAD member states. This provided Ethiopia with a veritable carte blanche when it came to action in Somalia and the management of a network of proxy warlords to control its interests in Somalia. In fact, the official 2002 “Ethiopia Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy” document confirms that, “Ethiopia resorted to dismantling Somalia to the extent possible” (Ethiopian Ministry of Information 2002, 73–74). The late Somali President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, one of Ethiopia’s closest allies in Somalia, in his book Struggle and Conspiracy, lamented that Ethiopian policy toward Somalia had never changed. He blamed the Ethiopian government for the demise of his government, and claimed that Meles Zanawi’s policy was no different than that of Mengistu, his predecessor (A. A. Ahmed 2012). As argued by Stedman (1997, 8), there are “inside” and “outside” spoilers in peacebuilding processes. Outside spoilers are those “who are excluded from the peace process or exclude themselves and use violence to attack the peace process.” President Ahmed’s criticism suggests that in his view Ethiopia acted as an outside spoiler. As a general response to Ethiopian ineffectiveness, IGAD and the UN, which were formally responsible for monitoring the Somali conflict, saw Somalia and its population as the problem, and not Ethiopian policy or Ethiopian action.
(or inaction). Ethiopian policy and action were generally accepted as part of the solution and not part of the problem.

A critical and ongoing problem within African regional organizations is the lack of institutional capacity and leadership, as well as a common vision for geographic consensus and unity. Existing weak central states within most ECOWAS and IGAD member states mean that sovereign states are much more focused on internal unity (and threats, actual or otherwise, from within NSAs) than on regional unity. NSAs are still largely seen as a threat to sovereignty in these states, compared to the West and other emerging geographic spaces.

The core problem with member states/African regional organizations is the lack of institutional leadership at the regional level. In both case studies, intervention was driven by the narrow self-interest of the regional hegemons and not by the collective agreement of all the member states. Both regional organizations lacked the institutional capacity or mechanisms to conduct such interventions, and relied mainly on their respective regional hegemons and their Western superstate allies for their operations. Overwhelming domination of the regional organizations by regional hegemons damaged the credibility and the outcome of the interventions.

5.3.4 The Role of Donor Dependency

The independent financial capacity of both ECOWAS and IGAD to intervene in a neutral and unbiased manner in the internal affairs of member sovereign states is compromised by the need to rely on funding from non-member states or from dominant regional hegemons. In the instance of funding from non-member states, the potential for
conflict of interest is obvious. External dependency prioritizes the interest of those states which are external to the region, and distorts regional priorities. Interventions into failed states that are at the behest of a non-regional state carry the structural imperatives of foreign interests, such as “the war on terror.” According to a diplomat interviewed for this thesis, there was a conflict of interest between IGAD and the United States. He says that the U.S. was tracking three individuals who bombed its embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. The U.S. focus was a narrow anti-terror exercise. It made sense to hunt these terrorists through cooperation with local actors. In contrast, IGAD believed that strengthening the Somali government would be a better strategy to fight terrorism.

In relation to relying on the largesse of regional hegemons, member states will always struggle to balance collective regional interests over those of the regional hegemon. Even within regional hegemons there are structural problems that do not allow them to act in the most efficacious manner with other regional member states. For example, the Nigerian military regime that was in power at the time of the ECOWAS intervention meant that Nigeria acted through a militarized political lens. Relations with other member states were seen through military threat analysis, rather than through a traditional diplomatic lens. The Nigerian junta was also overconfident in its belief that it could solve the Liberian crisis in its own favor and with little effort. This hubris cost the lives of countless Liberians. Ethiopia, on the other hand, struggles with internal ethnic division and the notion of a strong national identity. It does not have the financial base to project military power without the assistance of superpower states. These factors

127 Interviewee #19
128 Ibid
truncated Ethiopia’s ability to intervene in an effective manner or generate strong outcomes in short order.

In the case of the intervention in Liberia, Nigeria financed 90% of the operation (Adebajo 2002a) and was able to effectively manipulate ECOWAS policy for years before an effective coalition of other member states was able to bring Nigerian expansive foreign policy to heel. In the context of IGAD, donor dependency within all of its member states made it readily susceptible to external interference and manipulation. According to the Executive Secretary of IGAD, no member state contributes to IGAD’s budget.129 Due to financial weakness and ongoing dependence on donor finance, IGAD member states do not share a common regional identity. In practice, their financial security does not lie within the region, but with Western superstates, the UN, and international financial organizations. Similarly, the focus for regional securitization often lies outside of the region and with those that fund the regional organization and its members. The ties that bind the region together are still largely external to the region. This level of donor dependency continues to undermine the development of an indigenous regional agenda and security complex.

To boil it down, Nigeria had significantly more freedom of action to intervene than did Ethiopia, due to its financial independence. Ethiopia, however, was more successful in maneuvering within an emerging Western anti-terror narrative to secure funds and project a synergy between its own interests and those of Western superstates. Hence, IGAD & Ethiopian intervention in Somalia — with the backing of interested

129 Presentation made by IGAD Executive Director at a conference organized by Rift Valley Institute in Nairobi on 25 October 2013.
Western superstates — prolonged structural anarchy within Somalia at the expense of the Somali population.

Based upon my comparative analysis of the two interventions in failed African states by African regional organizations, I conclude that because the regional organizations continue to have a securitization mandate but no financial or operational capacity, their interventions are going to generate more conflict and suffering than if no intervention was authorized. African regional organizations remain undeveloped, and still have poor regional identity, poor regional financial capacity, poor regional consensus, and a vulnerability to manipulation for self-interest.

5.3.5 The Role of Weak States in Creating Weak Regional Organizations

Ayoob illustrates that weak regional organizations are structurally different from strong state systems, and these structural differences fundamentally impact regional security (Ayoob 1995, 13). As I have previously argued, these regional organizations, whose members are among the poorest in the world, are just as likely to exacerbate regional insecurity as they are to enhance it.

RSCs in Africa are presently organized around a regional hegemon, which possesses one or more of the following key attributes: it constitutes a geographical hub; it has a relatively larger population size; it has stronger military prowess; it has an independent financial capability; and it can exert political and/or diplomatic leverage at the international level. While the issue of overbearing and often deficient regional hegemons is a significant structural impediment to regional development and collective security, the problems generated by regional organization member states that are
individually and collectively weak is just as significant an impediment to collective regional security. It is well beyond the capacity of weak African nation-states, which are themselves just as likely to be in the bottom third of nation-states that are likely to fail, to analyze failed member states, map the patchwork of NSAs operating within the failed state context, deploy intervention forces (even if paid for by external entities), and use those forces constructively to reconstitute the failed member state. In reviewing the literature in the field, it is evident that while regional intervention is tempting — especially to prevent regional destabilization — there are salient reasons to discourage it. The reasons with the most explanatory power include the lack of accurate and detailed understanding of a conflict in a failed state; the lack of neutrality of the entities that would form the basis for an intervention; the lack of military power; and the lack of political and financial capacity within the regional organization and many of its member states. These deficits mean that any intervention is likely to perpetuate the conflict in a failed state, or only provide a short- to medium-term solution, while only masking unresolved issues and tensions in the failed state and the RSC, thus setting the preconditions for future rounds of conflict once the actors in the intervention withdraw.

Along with the Horn of Africa, West Africa is one of the most volatile regions on the continent, experiencing a succession of military coups, civil wars, and state collapse over a long period of time. Within ECOWAS, Nigeria is the clear economic and military regional hegemon (Moller 2009b). The military regime in Nigeria at the time of the Liberian intervention pushed its weight within the region to get a security intervention

\[130\] See FFP web site http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2013-sortable, accessed on 2-11-13
mandate from ECOWAS. Its naked support for Doe, and the complete lack of any credible Nigerian-led parallel negotiation and reconciliation process, drove the Francophone ECOWAS members to join together and back Taylor. The result was a bloodbath that lasted years. Only through mutual recognition (both regional and domestic) that no domestic Liberian faction, or any regional political bloc, could win from the existing intervention, did a balance of power emerge between the Francophone and Anglophone (Nigerian-led) regional blocs. The balance-of-power approach to ECOWAS does not make it a strong organization. In reality, Nigerian economic and military hegemony make ECOWAS a systemically weak political construct, whereby member states have to constantly engage in political competition, political balancing, and political division — centrifugal forces always trying to undermine the needs of centripetal coalition. Within this context, regional union and development will always play second fiddle to member state interests. No serious regional identity can ever form with operational identity entrenched at the nation-state level or with an intractable Anglophone-Francophone dichotomy. While Nigeria is the clear regional hegemon in ECOWAS, it is itself a weak state according to many indicators. It is dominated by military affairs, corruption, and internal conflict, and it is forever opposing other ECOWAS members because of the linguistic and political colonial heritage. If ECOWAS is to develop into a genuinely functional and credible regional African organization, then it needs all member states to develop politically, economically, and socially. Only then will all members feel that they have a credible stake in their regional organization. Until that time, it is my assessment that the African Union should play a greater overarching
role, managing the expectations of Western superstates and their international institutions, and providing a nuanced approach to regional development, securitization, and political integration. This approach also has the benefit of standardizing many of the elements of regional organizations. Though the AU is itself composed of weak states, it has the systemic advantage of always being able to draw on members not directly involved in the regional competition and, therefore, theoretically better able to manage regional hegemons and regional competition. Deferring to the AU also has the benefit of economies of scale because it is better able to utilize scarce resources more effectively to constructively solve long-standing regional enmities.

Within IGAD, Ethiopia is the military hegemon of the region, due to its population size, geographical position, and the political weight it holds by hosting the African Union. IGAD member states are all poorly politically evolved and financially weak. The Fund for Peace (FFP) places IGAD member states in the high risk tier of the “most failed” category. 131 Somalia (1), Sudan (3), South Sudan (4), Kenya (17), Ethiopia (19), Uganda (22), Eritrea (25), and Djibouti (50), all fall within the bottom third of the 178 countries listed in the Failed States Index. 132 All lack the financial basis or political maturity required to effectively support and develop IGAD. All are focused on domestic rather than regional priorities. While Sudan and South Sudan are almost as dysfunctional as Somalia, Somalia falls into a different narrative for Ethiopia, the UN, and certain Western countries due to its historical realities and the interplay of these actors in the country. Can these states manage the façade of a dysfunctional regional organization with

131 Ibid.
132 Note that Nigeria is listed as the 16th most failed state.
a much more ambitious mandate that includes regional security? Under what circumstances should such fragile states be encouraged to intervene in the internal affairs of the most grievously failed state in the world? Yet the UN and the international community continue to commit to the notion that it is a good idea, essentially because the alternative would be a hands-on approach and currently this is taboo.

This study reveals that ECOWAS and IGAD are composed of an overwhelming majority of weak states. These weak states have neither the capacity nor the inclination to seriously develop a regional identity or a regional military capability. First and foremost, they do not have the recurrent financial capacity to do so and, second, because of the threat of cooption from regional hegemons and external influences.

Regional hegemons have their own domestic structural problems and they lack the rounded political and military capacity of Western superstates. Therefore, interventions by regional hegemons tend to be rather blunt instruments that do more damage than repair, despite their claimed mandate. Their size and political immaturity typically put off other member states. The hegemons are very poor coalition builders. All of this structurally impacts the capacity of weak regional organizations to maintain regional security.

5.3.6 The Role of the Lack of Regional Social and Economic Integration

This research has shown that security threats mask the need for broader regional social and economic integration. During the 1990s, in the wake of the superstate withdrawal from Africa after the draw-down of the Cold War, an African securitization narrative was developed. The narrative was further entrenched after the Al Qaeda attacks
on the U.S. in 2001. To take up the mantle that the traditional continent-wide organizations largely discarded, regional economic and political integration was deferred to other emerging regional bodies. The development of a number of regional organizations to deal with a variety of different issues further weakened the effectiveness of any one continental organization. This decentralization of power and purpose, and the lack of economic and social integration or an organized civil society at a regional level, further diffused a common regional agenda and a common regional interest. What remains is only a thin veneer of diplomatic civility that lacks any substance or commitment to a regional agenda.

If African regions are to genuinely develop and address the needs of their civil population, they need to develop effective, inclusive mechanisms to deal with regional securitization issues. Not only do the various regional organizations within a single region need to merge to create efficiencies of scale, but much more space needs to be provided to civil society groups at both the nation-state and the regional level. Overwhelmingly, nation-states in Africa continue to be systematically weak; a genuine threat remains that a state and its resources might be captured by rogue individuals and groups within and beyond nation-states. The development and entrenchment of civil society interests within nation-states, at both the systemic and regional levels, critically needs to occur in order for African national states and their regional bodies to transition away from rogue interests (and corruption) and narrow hegemonic interests. Only then can they begin to represent the interests of the civil populations of states and regions.
Not only are most African member states tepid toward regional identity and the regional organizations themselves enervated because of the lack of commitment by member states, there continues to be little to no internal drive to change regional security dynamics. The overwhelmingly debilitated nature of African regional securitization provides easy opportunity for regional hegemons to use the regional organizations as a rubber stamp for their own interests.

For African regional organizations to escape this suffocating merry-go-round, they must decide if they truly want to invest in a regional organization that has the capacity to represent their interests and not those of a regional hegemon or a superstate. If they conclude that a regional organization is in their best interest, then it is incumbent upon all members to invest their financial and human resources in building a unanimous consensus on what a regional identity should look like and what concrete steps need to occur to make that a reality. Within that process, a regional securitization mandate and matrix — that all members are comfortable with — would be a product of regional identity development. I also maintain that the African Union needs to play a much greater role in the development and oversight of African regional organizations. It must not be a rubber stamp, but an entity that should (and could) provide tiered governance to these regional entities.

5.4. Conclusions

Analysis of the historical precedents surrounding these two interventions, as well as of their build-up, justification, and outcomes, shows that interventions by African regional organizations will continue to provide scant satisfactory outcomes, if not
complete failure. The hard reality is that African nation-states struggle even with coalescing their own national identity, and that there is currently little or no appetite for the projection of national identity into a supra-regional identity. In sum, it has shown that weak states create weak regional organizations, thereby providing ample opportunity for regional hegemons to pursue their narrow self-interest. In so doing, the regional hegemons successfully imprint their interests on the region and have little competition from other member states.

Overall, it is evident from this research that within African regional organizations, their salient features in relation to securitization are twofold. On the one hand, only regional hegemons have the capacity to intervene and often dominate the agenda of the intervention to serve their narrow strategic interests. At the same time, other member states lack military and intelligence capacity, as well as the drive, to intervene in the internal affairs of another member state. Consequently, the identity and neutrality of the respective regional organizations has been subsumed by regional hegemonic interest in the securitization sector.

On the ground, these interventions by African regional organizations — and their dominant hegemons — have had dire consequences for collapsed member states, their respective regions, and the rest of the world. In both Liberia and Somalia, the spillover of refugees and violent opposition and religious groups threatened many regional states. The interventions actually initially decreased regional security rather than improved it and in the case of Somalia, the intervention of frontline states continues to have systemic
spillover effects that further damage regional stability. The impact of their lack of positive results also ultimately proved to be negative for regional hegemons’ strategic interests. Despite the negative outcomes from military interventions by African regional organizations and regional hegemons, the UN and interested Western nation-states continue to support African regional organizations and their regional hegemons, particularly in relation to the ongoing Western preoccupation with transnational terrorism (Healy 2009a).

This dissertation has thus shown that systemic constraints within these organizations critically limit their capacity to effectively intervene in the internal affairs of other member states. It further highlights that regional securitization is dominated by regional hegemons, and that most member states are weak and unable, unwilling, or uninterested in opposing the security interests of those regional hegemons. In the example of the Nigerian intervention in Liberia, it was only coalescence around the colonial Anglophone/Francophone motif through which weak member states in ECOWAS were able to establish a balance-of-power paradigm against Nigeria and its intervention in Liberia. Within IGAD, no member state interest emerged over Ethiopian monopolization of the Somali conflict, and Ethiopian hegemony continued to reign under the official auspices of IGAD.

A clear theme that emerged is the issue of historical baggage and its encumbrance on successful intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states. This chapter challenges the traditional realist/Westphalian perspective that continues to operate at the
member state, regional, and international levels. It examines how simplistic theories continue to work against solutions in failed states. It also stresses the necessity of recognizing, mapping, legitimizing, and effectively factoring non-state actors and civil society groups into intervention strategy. More broadly, the chapter concludes that there is also a need for all member states to recognize NSAs within their domestic constituencies and accept NSAs as a strength within national life, rather than seeing them as constructs of political competition.

In conducting the comparative analysis, this chapter highlights impediments that regional organizations face. With the dominance of regional hegemons within their organizations, there is a lack of counter-balance by vibrant civil society networks working within the region to ensure that nation-state resources and institutional structures are not captured by internal and external actors. The study highlights systemic issues related to member state and regional organizational dependence upon the financial, political, and military support from external Western superstates (which continue to prioritize their own interests over those of regional organizations and their member states). The outcome of this dependency is to generate reflexive circularity, whereby member states and African regional organizations themselves do not develop their own identity or their own priorities. The outcome of this process perpetuates conflict in the failed and collapsed states and creates more regional instability.

In conclusion, it is apparent that member states and their regional organizations must develop regional social, economic, and political identities independent from their
superstate allies. This needs to be coordinated with the African Union, which should take on a greater role in monitoring, nurturing, and standardizing African regional organization activities. With the finding that African regional organizations do not have sufficient maturity or capacity to effectively carry out military interventions in the internal affairs of sovereign nation-states, the African Union clearly must take a greater role in the decision to intervene militarily in failed African states as well as a greater role in directly conducting intervention operations.

Thus, while policymakers, politicians, and scholars have heralded African regional organizations as the means to bring peace to African countries, the case studies highlight the limits of these interventions when dominated by the interests of regional hegemons. Neither of the regional organizations, ECOWAS and IGAD, acted in a neutral and unbiased manner to support the best interests of the citizens in the collapsed states of Liberia and Somalia. Rather, they acted in the interests of the respective regional hegemons and, to a lesser degree, in the interests of other regional member states.

Drawing on this analysis, the final chapter is of a reflective nature. It discusses the implications of these research findings for failed and collapsed states and for RSCs in Africa. Finally, it draws on the insights gleaned from this research to make some policy recommendations.
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS, PROSPECTS, AND POSSIBILITIES FOR AFRICAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

6.1 Introduction

Through a comparative presentation of two case studies, this dissertation has examined how the strategic interests of regional hegemons within two African regional organizations unduly and negatively influenced the stabilization and timely outcome of peace processes in relation to their respective military interventions in failed states.

An overarching question that comes out of this research and the emerging analysis of regional hegemons becomes: Can African regional organizations intervene constructively in the sovereign internal affairs of collapsed member states? Despite the divergent outcomes in Liberia and Somalia, this research suggests that overall, intervention by regional organizations and their hegemons has been detrimental. In fact, it has not only failed in regard to Liberia and Somalia, but even Western superstates have found intractable resistance to this policy in Iraq and Afghanistan. In contrast to the prevailing narrative of intervening militarily and placing one’s chosen ruler in power, military intervention does not mean one can ignore NSAs in failed or failing states. Clearly, military intervention alone does not work. It is only by mapping, recognizing, and acknowledging the competing indigenous interests of failed or failing states that one can actually begin to create the fabric of durable stabilization and development for such states. To date, African regional organizations and their allies have ignored outcomes of community-based peace processes in favor of a desired outcome or anti-terror narrative.
This concluding chapter draws on the major research findings to highlight their implications and the need for future research in the peacebuilding field for failed states and regional organizations dominated by regional hegemons. It then provides policy recommendations for African regional organizations, their member states, and the African Union, to enable them to be more effective in developing regional identities and providing a consensual African security architecture.

6.2 Implications for Failed and Collapsed States and Regional Organizations in Africa

By comparing the divergent outcomes of these two case studies, six common themes become apparent, including: (1) the role of history, relationships, and perceptions; (2) the regionalization of African conflict and conflict resolution; (3) the dominance of hegemons in regional organizations’ interventions; (4) donor dependency; (5) weak states that create weak regional organizations; and (6) lack of regional social and economic integration.

First, the historical relationship between member states — particularly regional hegemons and their leaders versus the other states — was found to be a major hindrance to the success of a regional organization’s intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. Although an African regional organization generally claims strong background knowledge of the conflict as a justification for it to take the lead in intervention, the supposed advantage in reality is largely illusory due to the historic relationships and ongoing member state competition within the region. Within this context, regional hegemons not only dominate regional organizations, but also unduly
dominate interventions into failed or failing member states. They do it on behalf of their own interests, not for the regional good. Regrettably, given the years that it takes for them to recognize that they cannot maintain their own interests and still accomplish a successful intervention, tens of thousands of lives are lost and millions of people are displaced. In the process, the intervention often threatens regional security more than did the initial collapse of the member state.

Secondly, the regionalization of conflict and attempts at conflict resolution has proved to have grave consequences for the reconstitution of failed states, regional stability, and world peace. As elicited from these two case studies, it is clear that African regional organizations do not possess the necessary resources or operational capacity to successfully intervene in conflicts in failed states. As illustrated in this research, regional military hegemons dominate these interventions in order to pursue their narrow, national self-interest at the expense of regional stability.

A third theme is that the dominance of African regional hegemons significantly undermines the success of an African regional organization’s intervention into a failed or failing member state. Despite the divergent outcomes, these two case studies found that both Nigeria in ECOWAS and Ethiopia in IGAD were similarly able to advance their own national interests under the cover of their respective regional organizations, ostensibly on the basis of regional peace and security. False hegemonic solutions are recipes for failure. While Nigeria claimed that the conflict in Liberia threatened its strategic interests in the region, in reality it wanted to prevent Taylor from securing the
presidency in Liberia. In the case of Somalia, Ethiopia claimed that its national security was at stake, as the conflict in Somalia provided a potential safe haven for groups to launch attacks that could possibly destabilize Ethiopia. Nevertheless, many interviewees for this research rejected Ethiopia’s claim and indicated that Ethiopia’s strategic interest was to prevent the reconstitution of a hostile regime in Somalia that might revitalize Somalia’s irredentist aspirations. While Ethiopia’s concerns may have some legitimacy, its policy of containment by proxy warlords has failed miserably. In essence, both Nigeria and Ethiopia wanted to shape the outcome of their interventions for their own strategic interests rather than the interests of the region. In praxis, they were claiming that what was good for them was good for the region. The outcome of their interventions was to unnecessarily prolong the tragic and bloody conflicts within Liberia and Somalia.

The fourth major theme is that African regional organizations are mainly donor dependent and do not have the financial independence or wherewithal necessary to carry on interventions, as was the case in both ECOWAS and IGAD.

A fifth theme is that African regional organizations are mostly composed of weak states. Unfortunately, weak states create weak regional organizations that are then dependent on external funding and/or regional hegemons to intervene in the internal affairs of failed or failing member states. ECOWAS was systemically dependent on Nigeria for both financial and military support to intervene in Liberia, while IGAD’s intervention in Somalia was financed by its Western allies.
A final theme gleaned from this research is that African regional organizations currently lack the foundation for social and economic integration among their members. The current focus on traditional forms of regional securitization has had a debilitating effect on regional social and economic integration, to the point that traditional forms of securitization have themselves become a security threat. Though African regional organizations were initially formed by their members as a mechanism for such social and economic integration, history has shown that these regional organizations have been captured by self-interested regional hegemons. The research has shown that the “good intentions” of African regional organizations and their member states, as outlined in their respective intervention mandates, has produced less than optimal outcomes. If the definition of the success or failure of an intervention comes down to the durable reconstitution of a failed or failing member state, then these two case studies indicate that African regional organizations have monumentally failed in their mandates.

6.3 Policy Recommendations Emerging from the Research

The core questions addressed by this dissertation have focused on military intervention into the internal affairs of failed African sovereign nation-states by African regional organizations. The current securitization narratives of the respective hegemons have had a huge impact on the interventions that have occurred. With the ongoing failure of African regional organizations to intervene effectively in failed or failing member states, this dissertation indicates that the continental body should be reconsidered as the frontline entity for an intervention. If there is not to be a return to direct intervention by the United Nations, then the African Union needs to take the lead, significantly
strengthening its securitization mandate across the continent and becoming much more confident, robust, and effective.

One of the recurring themes emerging overall from this research is that intervention needs to become more timely, relevant, effective, and legitimate to members of regional organizations as well as to the citizens of failed or failing states. More specifically, analysis of the research suggests the following six recommendations.

First, intervention in a failing member state must come before the state collapses. Rather than jumping to a military intervention, a more timely intervention could come in the form of diplomacy, economic support, and recognition and negotiation with all parties that are driving state collapse, even if they are non-state actors.

Second, a mandate for military intervention should not reside with African regional organizations. An African regional organization should only have a mandate to recommend an intervention, which needs to be referred to the African Union. Only then should the AU review and authorize an intervention into the internal affairs of a sovereign African state. As shown by this dissertation, the sole intervention mandate to the AU reduces a regional hegemon’s influence in the intervention as well as the later peace building process. The AU provides a natural continent-wide mechanism that has the capacity to intervene in conflict. It provides continent-wide legitimacy and is of a size that has the capacity to effectively utilize economies of scale and efficiency that no African regional organization can match. Since neither the UN nor Western powers are willing to intervene directly in conflict in Africa in the post-Cold War period, it makes the AU the best and most legitimate body to deal with African conflicts and military
intervention within the continent. The “African solutions to African problems” paradigm should make it easier for the UN and superstates to acknowledge and invest the AU as the preeminent organization on the African continent for these types of interventions.

Third, in order to mitigate the worst effects of competition and self-interest among regional members, any intervention in an African failed state must exclude the frontline member states of regional organizations. Interventions thus need to be led by the African Union and to manage the intentions of regional hegemons. Even when the criteria for intervention have been met, discretion still needs to be exercised in decisions to intervene in conflict. An ongoing failure to effectively manage the ambitions of regional hegemons would lead to the African Union itself losing credibility over securitization in Africa. It is therefore in the African Union’s self-interest to ensure optimal outcomes for military interventions in sovereign African nation-states.

Fourth, any approved intervention must first achieve clearly predefined benchmarks within a revised African Union securitization mandate. In order to develop these benchmarks, it is critical that there are ample opportunities for civil society groups from the failed or failing state to participate in developing those benchmarks.

Fifth, regional organizations that compete within a single region need to overcome their ongoing divisions. A prime example of this deadlock is the competing objectives of IGAD and the East African Community (EAC), which have overlapping member states and objectives, but different aspiring regional hegemons. African member states are still far from rich enough to invest in multiple regional organizations, and to find each to be effective. Rather, all existing regional organizations within a single region
need to be merged into a single entity in order to achieve regional legitimacy and maximize cost efficiency, enabling a single regional identity focus in which citizens invest. Only with this unification can African regional organizations make decisions that actually reflect regional legitimacy and long-term interest that reach beyond the ambitions of hegemonic influence. A failure or unwillingness to do so would delegitimize and invalidate a regional organization’s claims to have a mandate to intervene militarily in the internal affairs of a sovereign member state. Attempts by a regional hegemon and its allies to intervene as “a coalition of the willing” should be internationally discouraged.

Sixth, within any regional organization there needs to be a single consensual securitization mandate, a single regional economic policy, and a single regional judicial and regulatory code. The regional organization should also aspire towards future political and monetary integration, as instituted in Europe. Despite the current cycle of economic downturn in the European Union, such integration can mitigate the worst effects of regional competition and conflict. It should also work towards enhancing and supporting civil society members as legitimate partners of nation-states and regional organizations in developing national regional identity and collective regional security and stability.

While each of these six policy recommendations has been listed individually, they are all interconnected and need to be addressed in an inter-related systemic way.

6.4 Future Research Options

Existing literature on regional organizations and conflict resolution focusing on failed sovereign nation-states in Africa is prescriptive. Analysts tackle questions of state disintegration to better understand how to put things back together and create viable
nation-states (Zartman 1995a; Foltz 1995; Khadiagala 1995; Kasfir 2004; Van de Walle 2004; Clapham 2004; R. I. Rotberg 2004; Francis 2006). This dissertation has attempted to go beyond mere descriptions of state failure and collapse to uncover the emerging role of African regional hegemons and organizations in military interventions. It has dissected the impact that regional hegemons have had on African regional military intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign member state. As the international community largely continues to ignore conflicts in Africa, African regional organizations and the African Union will remain the internationally legitimate determinants for intervention in the internal affairs of member states for at least a generation. How they act will depend upon the economic and military development of individual member states, member state maturity, and member state commitment to develop regional organizations that are genuinely able to promote regional peace and stability, as well as the development of the African Union itself.

The policy recommendations presented above have been based on the comparison of two case studies. While clearly not an exhaustive study of the role of regional hegemons, this dissertation provides a roadmap for much-needed future research options. An important next step is for additional case studies on African regional organizations. From a methodological perspective, more research needs to be conducted using larger sample sizes for case studies; this will help determine strong historical and narrative trends and separate them from historical anomalies.
Further research is needed on emerging African regional hegemons, particularly how their growing partnerships with Western (and other) superstates impact interventions by regional organizations in failed or collapsed states.

Questions that need further research and policy analysis include: the unifying of competing regional organizations within a single African region; the restructuring of individual regional organization securitization, economic, judicial, and regulatory mandates and law; and how African regional organizations would cede existing regional securitization mandates for military intervention over to the African Union. Finally, further research is needed into a reconstituted African Union continental securitization mandate, the funding base for such a mandate, and the development of a permanent standing AU rapid reaction force.

6.5 Concluding Remarks: A Mandate beyond the Interests of Regional Hegemons

Throughout the time I was conducting face-to-face interviews and secondary research and writing up this research, the realities of lives lost and displaced as a result of regional hegemons acting in their own narrow interests were constantly tangible. This became particularly poignant in the divergent outcomes of “partial success” in Liberia and “failure” in Somalia. Bolstered by conducting and analyzing this research, I take this opportunity to propose the following recommendations.

First, the African Union should review each failed or failing state and map, analyze, evaluate, and judge, before any action, that there is no alternative to military intervention to stabilize the failed or failing state. Before intervening, it must further conclude that the only way to reconstitute a political, law and order, and security complex
within the failed or failing state is through military intervention. Any AU review needs to address both the internal and external drivers; fully map the perpetuators of the conflict (internal and external); and engage in a comprehensive and layered negotiated settlement with all actors in the conflict, including external actors. There needs must be a recognition of and focus on both the internal and external drivers of a conflict, particularly those of regional hegemons. This would contribute significantly to the resolution of a conflict in a timely manner and enhance regional peace and security.

In addition, any planned mission must be fully funded before an intervention can take place. Interventions that are not fully funded cut corners, and often perpetuate rather than mitigate conflict within failed and collapsed states. Also, any planned intervention must have clearly stipulated objectives beyond which no mission can go unless a majority of an African Union quorum agrees to changes. Any changes must be fully evaluated and fully funded before they can be endorsed. As such, any intervention must come under the control of the AU, and not any regional organization. This would reduce the influence of hegemons in the conflict and the peace process.

Given the findings of this research, frontline states should be excluded from participation in the intervention in any form. As shown in this dissertation, it is more than likely that frontline states have interests and historical baggage that necessarily prevent them from being impartial and unbiased. Their role would be to advise, but not to determine policy and process for an intervention.

A regional organization needs to be limited to non-military activities in any AU intervention, such as diplomatic mediation and conflict resolution. These should be done
only with the express authority of the AU, in close coordination with it, and recognizing its overarching control.

In order to establish a continental securitization mandate, the African Union needs to develop its own rapid reaction force that is drawn from member states and can intervene in conflicts in a very short time period. Members of a particular state intervention would not be frontline states. The AU needs to develop its own independent criteria for intervention into the affairs of sovereign member states, referencing existing international protocols, but by no means parroting them. Many existing intervention protocols are either ignored, or only implemented by cherry-picking where and when superstates want to intervene. A good example of a recent UN protocol that has been largely generated by singular interests is the UN’s Brahimi report on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) recommendation. While the motivation for the recommendation is undeniably good, the praxis associated with R2P has been selective at best. The AU and its member states need to forge their own future, which will undoubtedly be suitable to the African context. A first step would be to define what African nation-states will look like; when assistance and even interventions are required; and what the criteria should be for interventions. The very differentiation and disentanglement of colonial and African interests will by definition begin to build African identity and African unity.

In sum, reflecting on Nigeria’s role in ECOWAS and Ethiopia’s role in IGAD, it became evident that if recommendations that limit the role of regional hegemons, as outlined above, are not largely implemented and institutionalized, the continued failure of African regional organization military interventions is likely, if not inevitable. And, as
evident throughout this dissertation, the harsh reality is that such continued failure results
in tens of thousands of lives lost, millions of people displaced, and further regional
insecurity. It is only by moving beyond the narrow interests of regional hegemons that
the narrative of “African solutions for African problems” can be rewritten.
## APPENDIX

### List of Interviewees

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<tr>
<th>Number and Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>1) Former Somali Warlord/Minister/Politician</td>
<td>Nov, 5, 2009</td>
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REFERENCES


Nations Conference, organized by the Centre for Democracy Development, Research and Training, Hanwa, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 11 June 2005.


BIOGRAPHY

Khadija Ali holds a Masters of Arts degree from Eastern Mennonite University in conflict transformation. For the past 30 years, Khadija’s has worked both in the humanitarian and the public fields. She is a founding member and former executive director of saacid, a non-governmental organization, Coalition for Grassroots Women Organizations and Peace and Human rights Network in Somalia.

From 2000- 2002, Khadija was a member of parliament and Minister of State at the Prime Minister’s office for the Transitional national Government of Somalia and was in charge of reconciliation and peace building issues. As a representative of the TNG, she liaised with the UN Security Council, UN organizations, IGAD, EU, COMESA and other regional and international organizations.

From 2011 to 2012, Khadija served as a senior presidential advisor for reconciliation and political outreach for the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia on issues related to reconciliation, political outreach, and the preparation of the National Reconciliation Plan.

Khadija is also a mediator on community and political conflicts and frequently contributes to the foreign policy in focus.