TURKEY AND MEDIATION

by

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Turkey And Mediation

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DEDICATION

This study is dedicated to the unknown heroes of Turkish diplomacy.
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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>AKP (AK Party)</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Conflict Analysis and Resolution</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organization of Islamic Cooperation</td>
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ABSTRACT

TURKEY AND MEDIATION

Hasan Akin, M.S.

George Mason University, 2014

Thesis: Prof. Dr. Dennis J.D. Sandole

Turkey’s international relations policy has changed constantly in the past ten years. Based on the motto of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk- the founder of the young Turkish Republic- “peace at home, peace in the world”, Turkey strives to mediate conflicts in its region and internationally. This study describes Turkey’s efforts as an intermediary, with its weaknesses and strengths. Following a comprehensive literature review on mediation and Turkey’s previous mediation efforts, this research focuses on the opinions of Turkish diplomats and Turkish academicians of Turkey’s role as a mediator. The results of the analysis show that Turkey has the potential to continue its mediation efforts in the future, however, it needs to strengthen its human capacity to engage better in conflicts and help the conflicting parties reach sustainable resolution and peace.
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Turkey’s foreign policy has been in constant evolution during the past ten years or more. Even after his death, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the young Turkish Republic, guided the country toward “peace at home, peace in the world.” Until the beginning of the last decade, Turkish foreign policy benefitted from the guidance of Atatürk to reach peace mostly by “non-intervention” in regional and international political and/or humanitarian problems. However, this approach started to change substantially with the ascendancy into power of the AK Party Government (Justice and Development Party). Since November, 2002 (MFA), the AK Party has ruled the country following a period of coalition governments that lasted for more than a decade (Gerçek, 1996). Being the single ruling party without a coalition, and having implemented tough austerity measures (Turkey Profile, 2013), the AK Party Government was able to enhance the stability of the Turkish economy. As a result of the stronger economy and a stable domestic political environment, Turkey started to become an emerging and influential power in the region and globally.
Turkey’s stronger economy and stable domestic political environment increased the self-confidence of the AK Party Government. The political and economic success of an -allegedly- Islamic political party (Taşpınar, 2012) attracted the attention of other international actors, and Turkey began to be mentioned as a role model in the region and elsewhere (Sandole, 2009b).

Being suggested as a role model in its region, and being accepted as an emerging power, added new horizons to Turkish foreign policy. Turkey initiated a new foreign approach, namely zero problems with neighbors (Oğuzlu, 2012a). In a short time, Turkey’s negative political/diplomatic relations with its neighboring countries began to change. Using Johan Galtung’s (1964, p. 1) terminology, Turkey’s foreign policy started to evolve from “negative peace”- absence of violence, absence of war- with its neighbors, and shifted toward “positive peace” - elimination of deep-rooted causes of conflict- in relations with its neighbors such as Syria, Greece, Iran and Iraq.

Turkey established better relations with Syria after the possibility of a war (Demir, 1998) over Syria’s support of the PKK terrorist group (Counterterrorism, 2012). Its relations with Greece and Iran also improved. A new political approach also started towards Armenia. This list of Turkey’s improving bilateral relations with its neighbors can be extended.

In general, Turkey started to take an active role in international politics and improved its relationships and influence with many countries. All these positive regional
and international developments are the outcomes of Turkey’s new proactive diplomatic approach. Against this background, Turkey started to play a role as a mediator in regional and international conflicts.

Accordingly, this study focuses on the role of Turkey as a mediator in regional and international conflicts. There are some articles on Turkey’s mediation efforts by H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, and by other scholars such as Bülent Aras, Nimet Beriker, and Saban Kardas. While those articles discuss Turkey and mediation in general, currently there is no study in the mediation literature on the perspectives of Turkish diplomats about Turkey’s mediation role. As the experts in the field, the views of diplomats are crucial in understanding and evaluating the changing role of Turkey in the region and elsewhere as an emerging international mediator.

Throughout this study, following a brief discussion of mediation with its different aspects, I have attempted to provide information on the place of mediation in Turkish foreign policy, and how it evolved over time, what Turkey does to raise global awareness on mediation, what Turkey’s assets are for being a successful mediator.

Following these information, I have attempted to determine answers to the following questions through examining the views of Turkish diplomats and academics:

- What does Turkey have in its diplomatic toolkit for mediation?

- What is the capacity of Turkey as a mediator?
- What are the future prospects of Turkey’s mediation role?
- What are the obstacles to Turkey’s efforts to act as a mediator?

To facilitate answering these research questions, this study has been designed in terms of Sandole’s “WHAT-WHY-HOW paradigm of Research Design” (Sandole, 2009a).

**Research Design**

**The “What” of the Research Project**

**Summary of the Research Design**

My study aimed to discover the opinions of Turkish diplomats and academicians on Turkey’s mediation capacity, future prospects and obstacles to Turkey for being a successful mediator.

I framed my research at three levels. The first level is a general overview of mediation. In this section, I started from description of mediation and, step by step, continued to discuss different aspects of mediation related to my topic.

At the second level, I focused on Turkey as a mediator. In this regard, I have provided background information of Turkey’s initiatives on mediation in the international arena. I have not discussed these issues in full detail, however, leaving the details for future studies. The first two levels of the study are archival in nature.
The third level of the study is a survey I administered to Turkish diplomats and academicians. Responses by the survey participants helped me to evaluate their views on Turkey and its role as a mediator.

**Units and Levels of the Analysis**

The units of analysis are Turkey, Turkish diplomats, and Turkish academicians. Turkey is the main unit to be discussed in the research. Its foreign policy approach, its role in international relations platforms and its strengths and weaknesses are the issues that were studied in this research project. The units of analysis in the survey part of the project are Turkish diplomats. Their views on Turkey’s foreign policy approach, its role in international relations platforms and its strengths and weaknesses are the issues that will be covered in the survey research. They fulfill the task of implementing the country’s foreign policy. They shape the foreign policy and apply it. Other important units in the research are Turkish academicians, followed by the region. Turkey is a Middle Eastern and a European country. It stands in the region that connects Europe, Asia and even Africa to each other. Turkey both bridges the region and is directly affected by developments in the region.

The research was conducted at two levels: i) regional and ii) international. The region is the first level affected by the role of Turkey. Being one of the most influential countries in the region, Turkey’s role in the region is an indispensable element. Additionally, Turkey’s diplomatic efforts reach beyond its region. In this regard, the international level is the second level of analysis.
Access to Research

a. Literature: There is a good deal of available literature that covers the general themes, concepts and theories of mediation. Furthermore, there is some literature on strategies of mediators, failures and successes of mediation and similar topics. Additionally, some articles are available on the insights of mediating parties. It is also possible to find literature on some case studies, such as Palestine-Israel, and conflicts in South America, Africa or elsewhere in the Middle East. Thus, it can be said there are sufficient resources on mediation to start the research.

In contrast to the literature on mediation, there are only a few articles on “mediation and Turkey”. My literature review demonstrated that I could mostly benefit from media resources on Turkey’s mediation attempts, when they occurred, requests for mediation from Turkey, etc. Additionally, a few articles on Turkey’s mediation efforts authored by H.E. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, and by scholars such as Bülent Aras, Nimet Beriker, and Saban Kardaş are among my basic sources.

Since I could not locate any study conducted on the views of Turkish diplomats on Turkey’s role as a mediator, I believe that my study is the first of its kind. Additionally, there are no previous studies on the views of Turkish academics on the topic. Thus, this study is also the first to reflect the opinions of Turkish academics.
b. **Actual Survey Participants:** I conducted a survey on a limited number of Turkish diplomats and Turkish academics about Turkey’s role as a mediator. The diplomats are based at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey. For the Turkish scholars, I focused on those who are working on international relations, conflict analysis and resolution, and mediation and/or Turkey some of whom are already advisors to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, as well.

**Ethical Considerations**

I paid utmost attention to ethical considerations throughout my research. Thus, I presented necessary information on my research and application forms to the “Office of Research Integrity and Assurance (ORIA)” of George Mason University to seek the approval of the Institutional Review Board (IRB) before establishing contact with any human subject.

I started working with human subjects following the *written approval* from ORIA. Then, I sent an invitation by e-mail to the human subjects to participate in the survey. All the e-mails had the “Informed Consent Form” attached. ORIA waived the requirement to obtain signed “Informed Consent Forms”, instead requiring only confirmation of the consent of the participants. In this regard, the first question of the survey ask for the consent of the participant and only those who accepted could continue with the survey.
Participation in the survey was voluntary. I provided the participants with the Internet link of the survey and invited them to complete the survey. It was their decision whether to join or not to join the survey and some did not participate.

Since the participants were either career diplomats or academicians, it was assumed that they were competent enough to take part in the survey and answer the questions. The survey was in English, which is understood by the participants.

As all the diplomats in the study were staff at Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they were expected to have appropriate information about Turkey and Turkish foreign policy. Furthermore, the diplomats chosen were expected to have some idea about mediation in general and Turkey’s mediation efforts in particular.

The academicians were selected from either the conflict analysis and resolution or international relations fields. Thus, they were expected to have some idea about conflict resolution including mediation and international relations. Among them, were scholars who were believed to be knowledgeable about Turkey and Turkish foreign policy, including its mediation efforts.

All the participants were provided full information about the research project: The theme and purpose of the research, the identity of the researcher, and the link of the
survey web site were shared with all participants. Additionally, if any of the invitees had a question, they were encouraged to directly ask the researcher.

**The “Why” of the Research Project**

The research was conducted to gather information on i) the status of mediation in Turkish foreign policy, and how it had evolved over time, ii) what Turkey does to raise global awareness on mediation, iii) what assets Turkey has to be a successful mediator, and iv) what the record is of Turkey’s international mediation efforts. Additionally, the survey was conducted to determine the views of Turkish diplomats who are expected to shape the future of Turkish foreign policy regionally and internationally. Considering the recent political turmoil in the region - e.g., war in Syria and Israel-Hamas conflict- and that Turkey is one of the few stable countries in it, learning the views of a sample of Turkish diplomats will help to understand what these diplomatic practitioners believe Turkey can do both in its own region and at the international level. This knowledge will help future researchers to understand the future direction of Turkish Foreign policy.

**Theoretical/Scientific/Academic Justification**

As mentioned above, the resources on “mediation and Turkey” are limited in comparison to general mediation topics. There are some internal notes by the Foreign Ministry on Turkey’s previous mediation efforts, some articles by the Minister himself on mediation, and a few scholarly articles. However, I could not locate any study about the views of Turkish diplomats on Turkey’s role as a mediator. Thus, my study is the first on a topic that has never been studied before. As an “exploratory” study, it provides
opportunities to explore the liability/validity of some of the concepts, theories, and approaches addressed in the “Theoretical Settings” and in Chapter 2.

**Practical Justification**

The research project was conducted to determine the views of Turkish diplomats who are expected to shape the future of Turkish foreign policy regionally and internationally. Considering the current political turmoil in the region as evidenced by the crises in Syria and “Gaza”, and that Turkey is one of the few stable countries in the region, learning the views of Turkish diplomats will help to understand what these diplomatic practitioners believe Turkey can do both in its own region and at the international level. This knowledge will likely have impact on Turkey’s future foreign policy.

**The “How” of the Research Project**

**Type of Study**

As already mentioned, this is an exploratory study as there is not a single book-length study on the mediation efforts of Turkey in the literature. My literature review indicates that I can benefit mostly from media resources on Turkey’s mediation attempts, when and why they occurred, requests for mediation from Turkey, etc. Additionally, there are some articles - but again, not books- on Turkey’s mediation efforts by Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, and by scholars such as Drs. Bülent Aras, Nimet Beriker, and Saban Kardas.
Beyond the available but limited archival literature, I could not locate any study on the views of Turkish diplomats regarding Turkey’s role as a mediator. Since, I believe that my study is the first of its kind, it fills a gap in the literature. Further, there is not any previous study on the views of Turkish academics on Turkey’s role as a mediator. Thus, this study will also be the first to reflect on the opinions of Turkish academics.

**Theoretical Settings**

The broad theoretical settings of this project comprise the insights generated in conflict resolution and mediation by Morton Deutsch (2006), and by Louis Kriesberg (2007) on “Constructive Conflict Resolution” and on international diplomacy by Joseph Nye (2004) on “Soft Power” - getting others to want the outcomes that you want. Chapter 2 elaborates on the concepts, theories and approaches relevant to this study.

For the survey portion of my study, initial research hypotheses are; i) “Turkish diplomats are aware of Turkey’s mediation capacity; ii) They see mediation as a new tool of Turkish foreign policy.” Another hypothesis I would like to raise is “Turkey has a rich toolkit for mediation,” and additionally “Turkey has opportunities and challenges on its way to being a successful mediator.”

**Data Sources and Data Collection**

Two different approaches to generating data are employed throughout this research: archival and survey data. Initially, in order to grasp the topic of mediation, I conducted an archival study. As a result of the literature review on mediation, I attempted to determine the related points that can be applied to my case (Turkey, Turkey’s
mediation efforts, the role that Turkish NGOs play, etc.). Following the topic of mediation, I then focused on Turkey and its role as a mediator.

My data collection of archival research was based on books and articles on mediation and third party roles. When it comes to Turkey and its role as a mediator, I could not locate any book published on the topic. So, my only resources were articles and media. There are a few articles authored by Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu alone and together with others such as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway. I have located a few studies on Turkey’s role as a mediator in general terms and on cases in which Turkey has been involved. I scanned all those articles to explore the reality of Turkish mediation, such as parties involved, when and how, continued for how long, etc. I also benefitted from the notes of the related departments of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the issue. In general, the archival study provided necessary information on the background to the topic.

Following my archival study, I conducted a survey with two different groups: Turkish diplomats and Turkish academicians. I selected Turkish diplomats among senior, mid-career, and junior diplomats. ¹

In the survey part of this research project, I conducted a survey on a limited number of Turkish diplomats and academics about Turkey’s role as a mediator. The diplomatic participants are colleagues who are working either abroad or at the HQ of the Ministry, at the offices of the President, the Prime Minister, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

¹ The mid-career and junior diplomats are those deemed to have a bright future in the ranks of the Ministry, and who are already working at critical positions that allow them to contribute to shaping Turkey’s foreign policy.
Affairs of Turkey. They are working at relatively important and/or visible departments or missions abroad. They also serve in relatively high positions. Because of their previous and/or existing career positions, I believe these diplomats have a significant impact in shaping the concepts and future policies of Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, despite the limitations on the size and representativeness of the survey. Keeping in mind the limited number of diplomatic participants, the sampling of the study is clearly nonrepresentative.

As already mentioned, the academic participants in the survey were selected from either the conflict analysis and resolution or international relations fields. Thus, they have some sense about mediation, international relations and Turkish foreign policy, including its mediation efforts. Some of the scholars are working as advisors to the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs. The sampling of academic participants is also nonrepresentative.

The participants were invited to join the survey via e-mail. The survey has only four personal questions about whether the participant is a diplomat or an academician, the educational level of the participant, gender of the participant and job experience. However, the information obtained is not adequate to specifically identify any of the participants.

The survey used to collect data is comprised of about 64 questions (see Appendix I). The survey is divided into 6 parts: i) Background info, ii) Toolkit of Turkey on
Mediation, iii) Capacity Analysis of Turkey’s Mediation, iv) Prospects, v) Challenges for Turkey’s Mediation Efforts, and vi) miscellaneous questions.

Most of the questions can be answered in terms of a “Likert Scale” (Likert, 1932) design with a rating scale of 1 to 5 for: 1. Strongly Disagree, 2. Disagree, 3. Neither Agree nor Disagree, 4. Agree, 5. Strongly Agree. Those questions additionally have N/A and “Other” boxes. The questions are “closed-ended” with an “open-ended” option (King, 1972).

**Thesis Outline**

The second chapter of this study summarizes the literature on mediation with a focus on international conflicts. In that chapter, I start from a description of mediation and, step by step, continue to discuss different aspects of mediation related to my topic. A brief history of mediation, success of mediation, forms and types of mediation, and mediation strategies are among the topics I discuss in Chapter 2.

Chapters 3-5 cover the story of Turkey’s development into an important regional and global actor. Specifically, Chapter 3, on Turkey and Mediation, deals with Turkish foreign policy both before and after 2002, regional and global developments that have had impact on Turkey and the region, and changes in Turkey’s foreign policy approach.

Chapter 4, on raising international awareness and Turkey’s assets of mediation, explains Turkey’s efforts to raise international awareness about mediation. This chapter also touches on Turkey’s assets as a successful mediator, such as political stability, a strong economy, history, geography, and religion. Additionally, academic studies on
CAR, published books on CAR in Turkey, Turkish foreign development aid and international cultural institutions are studied in this chapter.

Chapter 5 briefly explains Turkey`s record of international mediation and other efforts. The purpose of this chapter was to examine, as parts of a coherent whole, Turkey’s mediation and other initiatives in the region and internationally, whether successful or not (which I do not discuss).

Chapter 6 covers the survey conducted on Turkish diplomats and academicians.

Chapter 7 deals with implications of the study for further research, theory, practice, and policy including the orientation that should shape Turkey’s foreign policy in the future.
CHAPTER TWO

THE CONCEPT OF MEDIATION

Strategies used in international conflicts may vary according to the approach of the parties. Beriker (2011) prefers dividing the conflict basically in accordance with being a party of the conflict or being the third party of a conflict in her foreign policy circumplex. According to Beriker (2011), actors in international conflicts play different roles such as: partisan vs. third party, competitive vs. cooperative. Each of these roles can be performed in different disciplinary approaches such as security studies, diplomatic studies, peace studies, and conflict resolution.

She states that “an actor becomes a party when s/he has a direct stake in a relationship with an ‘other’ and takes a series of actions - ranging from mild to aggressive - to achieve his/her goals” (Beriker, 2011, p. 264). She mentions when interests of a party are under direct threat by another party, the actor “adopts a partisan role”. When the actor is a party to a conflict, “bilateral contacts” is the simplest way to deal with the conflict and diplomatic tools are widely used in these situations (Beriker, 2011, p. 264).

On the other hand, international actors or states intervene in conflicts to “influence other actors and shape their environment” as third parties to achieve their foreign policy goals (Beriker, 2011, p. 264). According to Beriker, a conflict resolution
approach can play a critical role in adding the “missing link” between international relations theory and diplomacy (Beriker, 2011, p. 266).

In this research study, therefore, third party involvement with a conflict resolution approach will be studied focusing on mediation as an example of the “missing link” in Turkey`s international relations. We discuss mediation in terms of its history, successes, and types and forms. We also discuss the role of the mediator and mediation strategies.

**Mediation**

Mediation is an important tool that can be used in a wide range of conflicts. Whether interpersonal or international, organizational or structural, mediation can be a useful instrument in resolving conflict (Greig & Diehl, 2012, p. 2).

While Wall, Stark and Standifer (2001, p. 370) describe mediation as “assistance to two or more parties by third parties who (usually) have no authority to impose an outcome”, Zartman (2008, p. 117) describes mediation as “a mode of negotiation in which a third party helps the parties find a solution which they cannot find themselves”. From another perspective, mediation is defined as “a process of conflict management where disputants seek assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state, or organization to settle their conflicts or resolve their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law” (Bercovitch, 1997, p. 130). On the other hand, Kressel defines mediation as “a process in which disputants attempt to resolve their differences with the assistance of an acceptable third party” (2006, p. 726).

According to Bercovitch and Jackson (1997), mediation is essentially characterized by the following;
1- Mediation is an extension and continuation of peaceful conflict resolution.

2- Mediation involves the intervention of an outsider – an individual, a group, or an organization – into a conflict between two or more states or other actors.

3- Mediation is a noncoercive, nonviolent, and, ultimately, nonbinding form of intervention.

4- Mediators enter a conflict, whether internal or international, in order to affect, change, resolve, modify, or influence it in some way. Mediators use personal or structural resources to achieve these objectives.

5- Mediators bring with them, consciously or otherwise, ideas, knowledge, resources, and interests of their own or of the group or organization they represent. Mediators often have their own assumptions and agendas about the conflict in question.

6- Mediation is a voluntary form of conflict management. The actors involved retain control over the outcome (if not always over the process) of their conflict, as well as the freedom to accept or reject mediation or mediators’ proposals.

7- Mediation usually only operates on an ad hoc basis.

Disputants are more likely to decide on mediation when the costs of the conflict exceed the bearable limits of the disputant (Kressel, 2006, p. 734). In such cases, mediation can occur in two ways. Either the relevant parties seek assistance from an outsider party or the outsider party, cognizant of the conflict, offers help to the conflicting parties. In both cases, the idea is to prevent violence and achieving a peaceful solution (Bercovitch, 1986).
History of Mediation

Mediation as an instrument to resolve conflicts and preserve the interests at stake has been used for thousands of years. One of the known early mediation efforts goes back to 209 BC, when a group of emissaries from different Greek city-states mediated between the Aetolian League and Macedonia. Their effort, which was successful for a while, was to prevent a war, in addition to limiting the Macedonian move in the region (Eckstein, 2002).

According to Paul Salem, there is a “rich tradition of tribal conflict management - which- has thousands of years of experience and wisdom behind it” (cited in: Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2011, p. 183). This rich experience was used mostly used by “international organizations and governments” in managing conflicts after the Cold War (Ramsbotham, et al., 2011, p. 183).

Role of the Mediator

Being a mediator bears its own risks. A mediator, while changing the structure of a conflict, becomes part of the conflict (Ramsbotham, et al., 2011, p. 184). Thus, if interests of their own are not at stake, it may seem risky for a third party to intervene into a conflict. However, nation-states can try to benefit from mediation as an instrument to “protect or extend their own spheres of influence” (Kressel, 2006, p. 735). On the other hand, the power of a mediator is critical to “convince (or oblige) the disputants” to make use of their services (Kressel, 2006, p. 735).

The process of mediation is essentially structured and defined by the actions of the mediator. According to Kressel (2006, p. 726), the objective of the mediator is “to
help the parties search for a mutually acceptable solution to their conflict and to counter tendencies toward competitive win-lose strategies and objectives”. In a wider definition, Ramsbotham et al. (2011, p. 181) list the tasks of a mediator as assisting the conflicting parties by: (1) putting them in contact with one another, (2) gaining their trust and confidence, (3) setting agendas, and (4) clarifying issues and formulating agreements.

Mediators can serve their purpose by facilitating meetings, arranging locations, deescalating tensions, finding out root causes and leading the parties to alternative possibilities (Ramsbotham, et al., 2011, p. 181). A mediator is not necessarily a representative of a state. A mediator can also be a representative of an international organization, an NGO or, simply an individual. Mediators can help the disputants by “allowing [them] to present their cases, exploring them in depth, framing and ordering the discussion, and questioning the advantages and disadvantages of different options before the parties have to make a commitment to them” (Ramsbotham, et al., 2011, p. 181). Mediation as a process can be an intermediary step between direct formal negotiations of the disputant parties and the conflict itself. Given the importance of the process, Kressel (2006, p. 735) warns mediators to educate themselves “about the dispute and the disputing parties before the intervention”.

**Success of Mediation**

Naturally, not all mediation efforts result in successful conflict resolution. While it is difficult to predict which mediation efforts will work, research demonstrates that there are some criteria of processes more likely to produce positive results. For example, it is more likely that mediation will succeed if:
- The parties can be identified.
- They are interdependent.
- They have the basic cognitive, interpersonal, and emotional capabilities to represent themselves.
- They have interests that are not entirely incompatible.
- They face alternatives to consensual agreement that are undesirable (for example, a costly confrontation) (Bercovitch, 2011; Kressel, 2006, p. 732).

Previous studies show that third parties mediated about 65% of the international conflicts after the Cold War and the possibility of a solution in mediated crises is double in comparison to conflicts without mediation (Ramsbotham, et al., 2011, p. 183).

Mediation is especially likely to prove useful whenever there are additional obstacles that would make unassisted negotiations likely to fail (Kressel, 2006, p. 732):
- Interpersonal barriers (intense negative feelings, a dysfunctional pattern of communication)
- Substantive barriers (strong disagreement over the issues, perceived incompatibility of interests, serious differences about the “facts” or circumstances)
- Procedural differences (existence of impasse, absence of a forum for negotiation)

The proponents of mediation have argued that it should provide superior outcomes because it is based on a model of cooperative conflict, rather than the win-lose orientation of the adversarial legal system, and because it involves the parties directly and actively in searching for solutions to their differences rather than imposing a solution on
them. This intensive form of interaction, it is argued, should lead to psychological
commitment in whatever agreements are reached, as well as to agreements that are
enduring because it reflects the needs and circumstances of the disputants (Kressel, 2006,
p. 727).

**Forms of Mediation**

Ronald Fisher classifies mediation at four levels: conciliation, consultation, pure
mediation, and power mediation (cited in: Greig & Diehl, 2012, p. 7). In conciliation, the
third party is expected to establish informal communication networks to deescalate the
contlict and prepare the disputants for further negotiations. It is mostly to prepare the
logistical aspects of mediation and let the disputants discuss their problems themselves
without any influence on the process.

Consultation is the second level of mediation between conciliation and pure
mediation and has limited influence on the parties that allows change in the process. On
the other hand, the mediator becomes more active in pure mediation, such as by
persuading the parties to resolve their conlict and offering potential solutions. The third
party has more control -more leverage- in pure mediation efforts (Greig & Diehl, 2012, p.
8).

Power mediation is the level where the mediator has control over the issues and
“actively uses [their] resources to leverage an agreement by the parties” (cited in: Greig
Types of Mediator

The choice of mediation may also hinge on whether a party perceives that the mediator has leverage with the adversary. In the sphere of international mediation, one classic illustration is Egypt’s eagerness to have its 1974 dispute with Israel mediated by the United States because of its known affinities with and strong economic influence over Israel (Kressel, 2006, p. 734).

There are two characteristic types of a potential mediator: contractual and emergent (Kressel, 2006, p. 735).

In contractual mediation, the mediator is an outsider with whom the parties contract for the specific purpose of helping them resolve their dispute (Kressel, 2006, p. 735).

In emergent mediation, the parties and the mediator are part of a continuing relational set with enduring ties to one another. Emergent mediation is also found in international relations. Emergent mediators often have a strong vested interest in the outcome of the dispute and are usually willing and able to mobilize considerable social and other pressure toward resolving the conflict, and maintain ongoing ties with the parties after the mediation effort ends (Kressel, 2006, p. 735).

In emergent mediation, potential mediators may decline to serve even if the parties wish assistance, or the parties themselves may need to be persuaded to mediate (Kressel, 2006, p. 735).
**Concepts of Mediation**

There are different schools of thought and rather distinct conceptualizations in identifying the attributes of a mediator. As mentioned above, the success of mediation depends highly on the role of the mediator.

**The Outsider-Neutral Mediator**

One conceptualization of mediation bases the mediator's effectiveness in externality and neutrality (Wehr & Lederach, 1991, p. 86). In this view, externality refers to the mediator coming from outside into the conflict situation. Neutrality refers to having no connection or commitment to either side in the conflict or any interest in the issue in conflict. The North American school of thought on conflict management usually regards mediation as a rather narrow, formal activity in which an impartial, neutral third party facilitates direct negotiation (Wehr & Lederach, 1991). Ethically based mediator neutrality is assured by the fact that they come from outside the conflict, engage in the settlement process as a facilitator, and then leave (Wehr & Lederach, 1991).

Mediators in this view are referred to as 'third party neutrals' (Wehr & Lederach, 1991, p. 86). This neutrality-based intervener is referred to as the Outsider-Neutral (Wehr & Lederach, 1991, p. 86). The outsider-neutrals maintain distance from the disputants. They are chosen because they have no connection with either side that will affect the outcome and are thereby judged to be unbiased. Outsider-neutrals are connected to disputants through the conflict alone, relating to them only during the mediation process in ways relevant to the function of mediation. Only small parts of the

In accordance with this view, the guarantee of neutrality and/or impartiality in mediation increases mediator legitimacy and assures professionalism and fairness. In order to perform better and in a credible manner, the mediator strives to present a neutral and impartial stance (Goffman, 1959). In this view, the ideal mediator is not connected to either parties of the dispute, is not biased toward any of the sides, has no interest and investment in any consequence except settlement and does not expect any special reward from the disputants (Moore, 1986, pp. 15, 16).

The Insider-Partial Mediator

While the outsider-neutral-impartial model sounds perfect in mediation, the world of international politics is not always so simple. Sometimes because of the complexity of international and intercultural disputes, different kinds of mediators are required. Thus, a wider variety of mediator role is needed. In this regard, neutrality and impartiality of a mediator are not always regarded as fundamental essentials of the process. A biased and connected mediator can also be successful in some mediation initiatives (Wehr & Lederach, 1991, p. 87). Especially in traditional societies, internal and partial mediators can be more effective than external and neutral mediators (Wehr & Lederach, 1991, p. 87).
Mediation Strategies

In analyzing international mediation, a useful taxonomy that can be used as a reference is one that identifies three fundamental mediator strategies along a continuum ranging from low to high levels of intervention. These strategies are (1) communication-facilitation, (2) procedural, and (3) directive strategies (Bercovitch, Anagnostou, & Wille, 1991). These strategies are defined and shaped based on assumptions derived from Sheppard's (1984) taxonomy of mediator behavior that focuses on the content, process, and procedural aspects of conflict management (Bercovitch & Houston, 2000, p. 175).

Communication-facilitation strategies are placed at the low end of the intervention spectrum, since in such strategies the mediator usually assumes a fairly rather passive role by simply directing information to the parties, facilitating cooperation, yet showing minimum control over the more formal processes or the substance of mediation (Bercovitch & Houston, 2000, p. 175).

Procedural strategies enable a mediator to exercise more formal control over the mediation process with respect to the environment of the mediation. The mediator may determine the structural aspects of meetings and control constituency influences, media publicity, the distribution of information, and the situation powers of the parties’ resources and communication processes (Bercovitch & Houston, 2000, p. 175).

Directive strategies are at the highest end of the spectrum as these are the most powerful form of intervention. The mediator is actively involved in the content and substance of the bargaining process by providing incentives for the parties to negotiate or even by issuing ultimatums. These strategies deal directly with and aim to change the
way issues are framed and the behavior associated with them (Bercovitch & Houston, 2000, p. 175).

Analyses of previous mediation efforts have found that communication-facilitation strategies are the most frequently used strategies by international mediators, yet directive strategies appear to be the most successful (Bercovitch & Houston, 2000, p. 175). Research by Bercovitch, et al., demonstrates that 31% of mediation attempts, which use the communication-facilitation strategy, become successful. The overall success of the directive strategy has a 42% success outcome (Bercovitch & Houston, 2000, p. 191).

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have briefly outlined the basics of mediation within the Conflict Analysis and Resolution literature as it relates to international relations and politics. Starting from the definition of mediation, I addressed types of mediator, role of the mediator, success, forms and types of mediation. Furthermore, I discussed mediation strategies.

In order to understand Turkey’s role as an international mediator, both regionally and globally, the following chapter will focus on Turkey, Turkey’s foreign policy and changes in its foreign policy approach that have led Turkey to become an international mediator.
CHAPTER THREE

TURKEY AND MEDIATION

Overview

Turkey, a “secular-Muslim” country, is located “culturally and geographically in, and between, Europe, the Middle East and Asia” (Sandole, 2009b, p. 636) which makes Turkey “the home of multiple identities” (Muzalevsky, 2012). Secularism in state structures, Islam integrated into the society, an imperial history, a population mostly of Turkic origin, a geostrategic location at the cross-roads of Euroasia, Africa, the Middle East and the Euro-Atlantic area, make Turkey a unique country (Muzalevsky, 2012). The founding ideology of Turkey, Kemalism, has led Turkey into a Western direction with the motto “Peace at home, peace in the world.” All these dimensions allow Turkey to have a “complex identity” (Sandole, 2009b, p. 636). Being an important regional power and directly affected by developments in the region, sustainable peace, welfare and stability in the region are of utmost importance for Turkey. All these layers of identities have led Turkey to adopt an overall multidimensional foreign policy approach. As part of this approach, either as a founder, member or observer, Turkey has relations with influential international organizations (see Fig.1 below).
Turkey’s Status | International Organization
--- | ---
**Founding Member** | • United Nations (UN),
• NATO,
• Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),
• Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
• United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO),
• the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO),
• Developing 8 Countries (D8),
• Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC),
• the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building measures in Asia (CICA),
• BLACKSEAFOR,
• Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States, Joint Administration of Turkic Culture and Art (TURKSOY)

**Member** | • Council of Europe
• Organization of Islamic Cooperation

**Observer** | • the African Union
• Organization of American States (OAS)
• Association of Caribbean States (ACS)

*Figure 1: List of International Organizations (IO) with which Turkey has Institutional Relations*

With the 8th strongest army among 106 countries, as of February 13, 2014, according to Global Fire Power (GFP, 2014), Turkey participates in 10 UN peacekeeping operations (MFA, 2014c) around the world, with a significant number of military and civilian personnel.

In this chapter, I focus on Turkey’s foreign policy before and after 2002 (the year that the present ruling government won popular elections for the first time). Discussing regional and global changes, I also address changes in Turkey’s foreign policy approach.
**Turkish Foreign Policy Before 2002**

Turkey’s approach to international relations is based on Atatürk’s motto, “Peace at home, peace in the world”, which emphasizes peaceful relations with its neighbors and other countries in the world. This motto became the key principle in a re-interpretation of Turkey’s international relations as “‘zero problem’ with neighbors” (Perthes, 2010).

It was Turgut Özal\(^2\), who chose “active diplomacy” as a model to reach out to the Turkic-speaking Republics of the Soviet Union (Safrastyan, 2007). Özal’s approach was followed by that of İsmail Cem\(^3\) who worked to improve Turkey’s relations with its neighbors (Perthes, 2010). According to Volker Perthes, it was Cem who laid the foundations of the new “proactive” Turkish foreign policy which the AKP government has continued to build upon. This new approach has been the fundamental foreign policy of the AKP governments since 2002 (Perthes, 2010).

**Turkish Foreign Policy After 2002**

Following the 2002 parliamentary elections, the new lead political actor in Turkey, AKP, started to redefine the concept of security. Influenced in part by Turkey’s long-time membership in the OSCE, the new government sought to create an all inclusive security system based on economic interdependence and common security” (Muzalevsky, 2012). Soft power tools such as trade, economic integration, conflict

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\(^2\) Turgut Özal served as the President of the Republic of Turkey from 9 November 1989 until 17 April 1993, and as Prime Minister of 45\(^{th}\) and 46\(^{th}\) Governments of the Republic of Turkey.  
\(^3\) İsmail Cem served two terms as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey from 30 June 1997 until 11 July 2002.
mediation, and the appeal of its development model, were among the instruments that the AKP government has used to great effect (Muzalevsky, 2012).

Turkey boldly began to improve its democratic, political and legal systems, which enabled it to enhance its image regionally and internationally. The political reform and further democratization of Turkey (Perthes, 2010), together with the economic success story of the “Anatolian tigers” (Muzalevsky, 2012), helped Turkey to “emerge as a peace-promoter in neighboring regions” (Aras, 2009, p. 128).

Under the moderate-Islamic political party, Turkey was regarded as a successful blend of Islamic national identity and secularism (Tank, 2011). Turkey’s complex identity, plus economic initiatives such as “pushing actively for a regional free trade zone” (Muzalevsky, 2012), contributed Turkey’s image as a purveyor.

Starting from the 2002 elections, Turkish foreign policy is living through “an evolution” which is “underpinned by the strategic vision of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, who pledged to establish Turkey as an important player in international diplomacy.” Reconceptualizing Turkey’s identity and international role, desecuritizing its foreign relations, and increasing its strength as a trading state were among the key factors of this new policy (Ülgen, 2010).

Kemal Kirişçi, a senior fellow at Brookings, summarizes the domestic developments in Turkey as:
the political development, economic capabilities, dynamic social forces, and ability to reconcile Islam and democracy at home are the qualities that offer Turkey the possibility to develop and implement” active and influential policies in both neighboring regions and in distant ones like Africa and Asia. (cited in: Aras, 2009, p. 129).

Regional and Global Developments

Turkey’s geographical location in the epicenter of Afro-Eurasia brings both opportunities and risks. The economic, social and cultural wealth of the Afro-Eurasia region is a great potential for the region and the world. On the other hand, this great potential is not far from security risks and conflicts. After the end of the Cold War era, conventional conflicts and asymmetric threats increased threatening the peace and security of the entire world. Globalization and the interdependency of states and nations easily spread the danger of those threats cross borders.

In the environment described above, the political stability brought about by a single, majority party reduced the questions of investors, allowing Turkish economy to develop at a rapid pace. There has been progress not only in the economic but in all fields such as public policy and foreign policy (Esenbel & Atlı, 2013).

The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 triggered serious and rapid geopolitical changes in the Middle East (Perthes, 2010). Weakening Arab nationalism and unsuccessful mediation attempts by U.S. President George W. Bush’s government opened a power vacuum in the region (Perthes, 2010). Additionally, following the Cold War, the world became “multi-centric” or “non-polar” which allowed new state or non-state actors to have their share of the global power balance (Muzalevsky, 2012). Turkey repositioned
itself domestically, regionally and globally in the power vacuum of its region and the new
global power balance. A change of threat assumptions stemming from its neighbors, and
the decision to develop a common security concept, which is built on economic
interdependency with its neighbors, were the outcomes of this new stance of Turkish
foreign policy.

The use of “Turkic identity” to strengthen the ties with the former Turkic Soviet
Republics enriched the means of Turkey to improve its influence. On the other hand,
Turkey improved its relations at the Arab corridor. In 2011, Turkey's profile was greater
than ever in the Middle East (Cook & Gwertzman, 2011). Furthermore, Turkey’s
international relations in general could be viewed at their best in the last decade and
Turkey`s relations with the U.S. were phrased as a “model partnership” by President
Obama on his visit to Turkey.

On the other hand, negative developments such as the decline of Western
economies and influence in global politics, and Turkey’s slow EU accession process
forced Turkey to search for different policy alternatives and partners (Muzalevsky, 2012).
Other developments in the region such as the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the
humanitarian disaster in the Balkans; wars in Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, wars
between US-Iraq and Georgia-Russia; and Cyprus issues also forced Turkey to deal with
its own problems with neighbors more productively (Muzalevsky, 2012). The “Zero
Problems with Neighbors” policy worked efficiently to normalize Turkey`s relations with
its previously hostile neighbors.
All these developments and power shifts to emerging countries helped Turkey to broaden its area of influence in the region (the Middle East), Eurasia, the Balkans and North Africa.

**Change in Foreign Policy Approach**

Turkey improved its “power capabilities in terms of hard (military and economic), and soft (regime character and the attractiveness of values)” power in the last decade and this led Turkey to have a “broader perspective” toward its national interests, including developments in the Middle East (Oğuzlu, 2012b, p. 8).

Increasing interest in a wider region than the Middle East forced Turkey to re-structure its foreign policy goals. Thus, standing in a sensitive region open to the effect of global changes, Turkey’s new dynamic and visionary foreign policy was key to steer the developments in the beneficial tracks that serve the interests of Turkey.

Spreading economic relations through a broader policy perspective contributed to the expansion of Turkish influence regionally and internationally (Esenbel & Atlı, 2013). Frequent trips abroad of Turkish leadership -such as President Gül, Prime Minister Erdoğan or Foreign Minister Davutoğlu- to different countries also served to develop personal friendships with senior statesmen of those countries and to increase the influence of Turkey (Esenbel & Atlı, 2013). However, Turkey did not re-position itself “just in the economical sphere” but as political leaders of a region that is lacking that kind of leadership” (Cook & Gwertzman, 2011). Not being a member of the European Union
or Asian organizations served Turkey well to play an influential role globally (Esenbel & Atlı, 2013).

Turkey’s foreign policy has been transformed in the last decade. Traditional Turkish diplomacy, while keen on keeping its relations close with the West, was “status-quoist” and had a “reactive stance”. However, this has been transformed into a more proactive, multidimensional, and assertive approach (Esenbel & Atlı, 2013) pursuing cooperation with all possible partners (Muzalevsky, 2012). Figure 2 shows the increase in the variety of Turkey’s trade partners in over a decade after 2000.

Figure 2: Turkey's Trade Partners^4

^4 Data prepared using the data released by Turkish Institute of Statistics. Cited from Esenbel and Atli (2013).
It is clearly visible that Turkey, a regional power with global ambitions, is more active and assertive in its international relations approach (Esenbel & Atlı, 2013). Perthes (2010) interprets Turkey’s new foreign policy approach as a self-confident re-interpretation of Turkey’s geographic role and policies and argues that based on latest developments Turkey is regarded in recent years as a historically conscious regional super power.

As part of its critical approach to foreign policy, Turkey decided to set its sights in the last decade beyond Europe. The continuous disappointments with the EU process forced Turkey to seek other partners, whether with Islamic and/or Turkic identity, or with strong economical relations (Khan, 2012). Turkey always insisted on its intention to have full accession into the EU. The articulation of its soft power in a productive manner would enhance its significance for the European Union and accelerate the process of Turkey's accession to that transnational actor (Safrastyan, 2007) by increasing its power at EU negotiations by bringing with it the overall wealth and influence of the country.

Bülent Aras mentions Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu as “the intellectual architect of the AKP’s foreign policy” and adds that Davutoğlu “changed the rhetoric and practice of Turkish foreign policy, bringing to it a dynamic and multidimensional orientation” by setting the vision and the style of the new foreign policy line and providing a framework for pursuing it (Aras, 2009, p. 127).

Aras (2009, p. 129) further asserts that:
Davutoğlu’s re-defining of Turkey’s role in both neighboring regions and international politics changed the concept of “strategic depth” and expanded the cognitive map in policymakers’ minds beyond the borders of Turkey.

Mediation

With the globalization of the world, threats to peace and security can easily spread beyond the borders of individual countries to broader areas (Sandole, 2009b, p. 641). Furthermore, “there are serious problems in the regional and global systems” such as “ethnic, sectarian and religious clashes and geopolitical conflicts, as well as frozen conflicts, throughout the world” (Davutoğlu, 2013, p. 3). Recent massive terrorist attacks such as 9/11, Bombay, 2005 London, or 2004 Madrid clearly showed the necessity of a model Islamic country which may bring together Islam, secularism, democracy, and liberal economy into a coherent whole (Sandole, 2009b, p. 641). In this respect, Turkey has the potential to play a dynamic role between the Islamic world and the West. Turkish accession to European Union, which is “probably the pre-eminent peace-building project in the history of humankind” (Sandole, 2009b, p. 637), also has implications of Turkey’s struggle to be part of the project. Turkey’s multilayered identity has the potential for Turkey to play a unique role of facilitating transformation of the “clash of civilizations” narrative (Sandole, 2009b, p. 637).

Increasing instability and crises in its region and the world make the need for “effective mediation” obvious in this new era (Davutoğlu, 2013, p. 3). Turkey’s location at the center of the Afro-Eurasian platform and its vulnerability to any developments in its region make this necessity even more clear for its leadership (MFA, 2014a).
Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu (2013, p. 3) mentions the direct effects of some disputes in the region on Turkey as:

When there was a crisis in Bosnia, all those who were suffering tried to escape to Turkey. When there was a crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh, we felt its bitter consequences before anyone else- and a substantial number of refugees escaping from Syria turn to Turkey as a humanitarian safe haven. In times of crisis - as in Tunisia, in Egypt or in Libya last year- Turkey is always among the countries that try to make a significant contribution to its resolution. This is a challenge for Turkey.

These direct impacts on Turkey and increasing challenges emphasize the necessity of mediation for Turkey. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has admitted to this necessity for mediation, putting forward a plan of action as follows:

Pursuing a more dynamic foreign policy in this direction in recent years and exerting great efforts to place cooperation and dialogue on a solid foundation in Afro-Eurasia, Turkey attaches special importance to preventive diplomacy, pioneers a great deal of mediation attempts in a wide geography and endeavors actively for the peaceful settlement of disputes (MFA, 2014a).

Accordingly, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu describes Turkey’s approach as follows:

Turkey has reoriented its foreign policy by means of an active, multidimensional and visionary framework. Mediation is an integral part of this policy. Turkey has assumed for itself a central role in regional and international politics, and mediation is a necessary tool for contributing to peace and stability at various levels. Turkey's dynamic civil society is also active in conflict zones through humanitarian assistance, further supporting the dynamism of Turkey's mediation efforts (Davutoğlu, 2013, p. 7).

Turkey has great potential to become an effective mediator. Sandole (2009b) argues that Turkish influence in the region of Turkic republics of the former Soviet Union
could have profound implications for security and stability there and elsewhere. Jorgen Johansen describes the potential of Turkey in mediation as:

*Turkey is a unique and important country in many respects. Geographically placed in one of the most interesting regions of the world, a fascinating history, member of NATO, a secular state dominated by modern Islam, and playing an important role in many of the conflicts in the region, it is impossible to imagine a better place to study peace and conflicts (U. o. Hacettepe, 2013, p. 4).*

In Turkey’s new foreign policy approach, mediation is the “most efficient and cost-effective way for resolving conflicts” (MFA, 2014a). To support its understanding, in addition to its spearheading different initiatives to increase mediation capacity within the UN, Turkey tries to raise awareness of the importance of mediation to resolve conflicts (MFA, 2014a).

Mediation is a vital instrument for Turkey to “strengthen peace and stability” in its region in the most economical and effective manner. Mediation will ease the “environment of mutually beneficial cooperation” and, while eradicating the necessity of “much more costly and long-term measures”, it will also prevent the possibility of “each conflict to trigger further tension” (MFA, 2014b).

**Conclusion**

Turkish foreign policy is undergoing constant evaluation and the conduct of foreign policy changes over time. In this chapter, I have discussed Turkey’s foreign policy using 2002 as a pivotal point: Turkey’s proactive diplomacy has been mentioned together with the ruling AK Party Government and 2002 is the year that the AK Party
won the popular elections for the first time. Following a brief discussion of regional and
global issues, I touched upon changes in Turkey’s foreign policy approach and the place
of mediation in this new approach.

In the next chapter, I will focus on Turkey’s efforts to increase international
awareness of mediation, and Turkey’s assets for successful mediation.
CHAPTER FOUR

RAISING AWARENESS INTERNATIONALLY AND TURKEY’S ASSETS FOR MEDIATION

Introduction

Part of Turkey’s “Zero Problems with Neighbors” strategy is to increase international awareness of Turkey’s intentions and efforts. Towards that goal, Turkey launched important initiatives such as the Istanbul Conferences on Mediation, Mediation for Peace Initiative and Groups of Friends of Mediation and the Alliance of Civilizations.

In this chapter, those initiatives are explained as part of Turkey’s new mediation integrated foreign policy to raise global awareness of mediation. Additionally, I briefly discuss Turkey’s assets for mediation.

Istanbul Conferences on Mediation

Turkey’s initiative to raise attention on mediation comprises a few dimensions. One of these is the organization of conferences on mediation. Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs started to organize annual conferences on mediation, namely the “Istanbul Conference on Mediation”, beginning on 24-25 February 2012. The second conference was held on 11-12 April, 2013. The third of the conference series occurred recently in June 2014.
Istanbul Conferences on Mediation are designed to bring together international, governmental and civil society actors engaged in conflict prevention and mediation activities to discuss how to enhance the interaction, understanding and cooperation among themselves to increase the effectiveness of the international community’s mediation efforts. The Conference has gradually established itself as an effective platform in the field of mediation and peaceful resolution of conflicts.

The themes of the conferences change each year. The theme of the first conference was “Enhancing Peace Through Mediation: New Actors, Fresh Approaches, Bold Initiatives”. It focused on the theoretical and conceptual aspects of mediation, including the role of the UN, NGOs, regional organizations and the coordination and capacity building problems. The issues analyzed during the conference were later addressed in the UN Guidance for Effective Mediation, published as an annex to the report by the Secretary General on “Strengthening the Role of Mediation in The Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Conflict Prevention and Resolution” (A/66/811).

The UN Guidance for Effective Mediation identifies a number of key fundamentals that should be considered in a mediation effort: preparedness; consent; impartiality, inclusivity; national ownership, international law and normative frameworks; coherence; coordination and complementarity of the mediation effort; and quality peace agreements. The guidance explains each fundamental, outlines some potential challenges and dilemmas facing mediators and offers some guidance (UN, 2012).
The theme of the second conference was “Keys to Successful Mediation: Perspectives from Within.” This conference focused on the practical lessons learned in specific conflicts, which have been prominent on the international agenda. The conference sought to examine issues in the field and practice of mediation by talking to practitioners from different sectors such as government, non-governmental and regional organizations, the UN and academia. The sessions focused on the work of practitioners dealing directly with related issues in a wide array of geographical locations (MFA, 2013).

Turkey aims to transform this forum into an effective platform for discussing issues with regard to mediation and the peaceful resolution of conflicts (MFA, 2014a).

**Mediation for Peace Initiative and Group of Friends of Mediation**

In addition to bilateral and multilateral efforts in the field of mediation, Turkey together with Finland, launched a new initiative, namely, “Mediation for Peace”, during the UN General Assembly in September 2010 in New York.

The visibility of “Mediation for Peace” is increasing not only in the UN platform, but also in other international environments. The Group of Friends of Mediation was founded on 24 September 2010, to promote and advance the use of mediation in the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and resolution, as well as to generate support for the development of mediation (Peacemaker).

According to Foreign Minister Davutoğlu:

*The aim was threefold: to raise awareness within the international community of the importance of mediation as a means of conflict prevention and resolution; to help build mediation capacity both within the United Nations and also in regional...*
organizations, which are often most well-placed to assume such a mediating role in their own area of responsibility; and to enhance the level of coordination among different actors of mediation with a view to minimize unnecessary duplication and complications.

Foreign Minister Davutoğlu describes the necessity of the initiative as:

We found ourselves on many occasions in the midst of different actors trying to serve the same purpose, but without any coordination, thus often leading to duplication and at times to conflict. In this regard, it should also be noted that it is no longer only the states that mediate, but track-II actors such as nongovernmental organizations, civil society institutions and even business communities are also increasingly present in this field, which is a welcome development, but amplifies the need for better coordination (Davutoğlu & Tuomija, 2012).

The Group of Friends of Mediation is co-chaired by Finland and Turkey. The Group meets annually at ministerial level on the margins of the General Assembly. It also holds regular meetings in New York, at the level of Permanent Representatives and Experts. Additionally, a network of focal points in the capitals/headquarters of the Members has been established in order to further coordinate efforts.

During the 65th session of the General Assembly, the Friends of Mediation tabled a draft, which subsequently became General Assembly resolution 65/283 on "Strengthening the role of mediation in the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and resolution".

During the 66th session of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General submitted a report on the implementation of the resolution, annexed with the United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation. The General Assembly also adopted a new resolution (A/RES/66/291) in which it is decided to continue consideration of mediation on a biannual basis.
Since the adoption of General Assembly Resolution 65/283, the Group of Friends has engaged in a number of mediation-related activities and discussions. The main achievement of this initiative so far has been its immediate impact in raising awareness of the importance of mediation in conflict prevention and resolution. Spain and Morocco decided to pursue the same objectives at the sub-regional level through their “Mediation in the Mediterranean” initiative.

Membership in this initiative as of 03.05.2014 is as follows:

**Initiators**
Finland, Turkey.

**United Nations Member States**
Bangladesh, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Costa Rica, Germany, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Montenegro, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania (United Republic of), Uganda, United States of America.

**Regional Organizations**
African Union (AU)
League of Arab States (LAS)
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
European Union (EU)
Organization of American States (OAS)
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
The United Nations is also a member of the Group of Friends of Mediation

**UN Regional Mediation Center in Istanbul**

The Istanbul Conferences on Mediation can be viewed as one of the diplomatic steps taken to make Istanbul a regional mediation center. In this regard, Johan Galtung
(2013) comments that, “I have enormous admiration for what he [Turkey’s Foreign 
Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu] did- catapulting Turkey in a position similar to Finland to 
being a meeting place, in a place above the conflicts of others, coming up with 
solutions”.

Galtung’s statement becomes even more significant in that Turkey is trying to 
host a regional mediation center in Istanbul which can be used by the UN for its 
mediation-related activities (MFA, 2014a). As Foreign Minister Davutoğlu (2012) 
mentions:

*Turkey is situated at the epicenter of a broad geography hosting a great number 
of conflicts. And whatever transpires in this region has direct implications for our 
own stability and welfare. The end of the Cold War in 1991, the 9/11 attacks in 
2001, and finally the current financial crises and the political transformation in 
the Middle East have all changed the regional political landscape in our part of 
the world. And Turkey has found itself in the midst of all these earthquakes, 
feeling directly the energy that was unleashed by their rupture.*

Turkey agreed with UN authorities in principle to host a regional mediation center 
in Istanbul. They are discussing the details of the project. Turkey already hosts some 
meetings between conflicting parties in Istanbul and Ankara such as the P5+1 with Iran 
on nuclear negotiations, two Sudans and some others. However, with the UN Regional 
Mediation Center, not only Turkey’s single mediation initiatives, but also multilateral 
mediation initiatives can be hosted in Turkey.

All these efforts of Turkey help its new image as a country trying to contribute to 
the peaceful resolution of conflicts at the international level. Turkey will spare no effort 
in helping to enhance the international community’s mediation capacity while continuing 
its own mediation activities (MFA, 2014a).
The Alliance of Civilizations

Although not a direct mediation initiative, the Alliance of Civilizations is a crucial step to prevent conflicts led by Turkey. Keeping in mind that differences in cultures and prejudices are among the factors driving conflicts, the Alliance can play an invaluable role for understanding and dialogue among cultures, religions, and people.

The Alliance of Civilizations was launched in 2005 by the Prime Ministers of Turkey and Spain. It was later adopted by the Secretary General of the United Nations as a UN initiative. The Alliance aims at stemming the trend of fear and polarization between Islam and the West by developing a broad coalition to foster greater cross-cultural tolerance and understanding. It promotes the understanding for example, that all countries are interdependent in such areas as development, security, environment and prosperity, and intends to generate political will to counter prejudices, stereotypes and reciprocal misgivings between and among persons and groups belonging to different religions and cultural backgrounds (T. MFA).

A secretariat within the United Nations was established to coordinate the activities of the Alliance. The Alliance, with its four key areas (namely youth, media, education and migration), is represented by a High Representative who is designated by the UN Secretary General. Moreover, a Group of Friends was established to form a culture of international ownership of the Alliance. The Group of Friends, as one of the most welcomed initiatives, has more than 130 countries and international organizations as members (T. MFA).
Starting in 2008, the Alliance organizes annual forums where numerous Heads of State/Government, Ministers and statesmen, as well as representatives of NGOs, various faiths, youth organizations, media and academicians numbering in the thousands, meet to exchange views, experiences and ideas related to the Alliance’s progress and possible future goals (T. MFA).

**Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

The Turkish Foreign Service was founded on the well established traditions and legacy of Ottoman diplomacy with its long history. Until the 19th Century, “Reis-ül Küttap” (Head Secretary) was in charge of foreign affairs as well as other functions, such as maintaining records and administering correspondence of the State (T. MFA).

In 1793, the first permanent Embassy was established in London. The Translation Office was established during the reign of Mahmut II as part of restructuring the “Reis-ül Küttap” system in accordance with the diplomatic requirements and conditions of the time. Later on, in 1836, “Reis-ül-Küttap” was upgraded to Ministry status.

Following the inauguration of the Turkish Grand National Assembly on April 23, 1920, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was officially established on May 2, 1920 as part of the first National Government with the vision and principles of the founder of the Republic of Turkey, Atatürk, including his maxim “peace at home, peace in the world” as the fundamental objective of its policy.

The Republic of Turkey, which had a total of 39 missions abroad in 1924, is now represented by 221 missions throughout the world as of January 1, 2014. These missions comprise 128 Embassies, 12 Permanent Missions to international organizations, 80
Consulate Generals and 1 Trade office. Turkey hosts 123 Embassies, 85 Consulate Generals, 40 representations of international organizations, 9 Consulates, 6 accredited Embassies, 4 military institutions, 3 permanent representations and 415 Honorary Consulates.

The number of diplomats at the Foreign Ministry is 971. However, the number of diplomats serving abroad is 1,124. These figures reach 2,100 as the total number of all diplomats serving with the Turkish Foreign Service. Additionally, the number of female diplomats with the Foreign Service is approximately 620, while the number of male diplomats is 1470. According to these figures, we can see that female diplomats as a proportion of male diplomats is 30%. Furthermore, the total staff of the Ministry reaches up to 6,500 including 1,940 staff at the Ministry and 4,480 staff at the missions abroad, including locally hired staff. While 4,150 of this number are male, the rest-around 2,250-are females. These figures show that the number of females is nearly 54% of male staff at the Turkish Foreign Service. The medium age of the diplomats working at the Turkish Foreign Service is approximately 37.

Graphical representation of these figures is given in Figure 3, Figure 4 and Figure 5 below.
Figure 3: Number of Staff in the Turkish Foreign Service (1.1.2014)
Figure 4: Gender Distribution of the Staff in the Turkish Foreign Service

Figure 5: Age Groups of the Staff in the Turkish Foreign Service (1.1.2014)

Data taken from Dept. of Human Resources, MFA Turkey
Political Stability

The political stability of Turkey is one of the factors that contribute to Turkey’s increasing influence regionally and globally. As is mentioned in the “Limitations” section of this thesis, until the “Gezi Parkı” events and “17 December Corruption Investigation”, the ruling party had been increasingly popular among Turkish citizens.

The 2002 elections were a turning point for Turkish diplomacy. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) won parliamentary elections held on November 3, 2002 with 34.28% of the votes, while the Republican People’s Party obtained 19.3% of the votes. The local elections held on 28 March, 2004 resulted in nearly 40% increase of the votes for the AKP. The AKP, while obtaining 46.58% of the votes of the 2007 parliamentary elections, succeeded in obtaining 49.67% of the 29 March 2009 local elections. Even though the increase of the votes in those two elections (2007 Parliamentary elections and 2009 local elections) was not as impressive as in the 2004 local elections, the AKP maintained its increase of votes in the elections obtaining 49.83% of the votes in the 12 June 2011 parliamentary elections. These results made the AKP the most successful political party in the history of the Turkish Republic.

Since 2002, the AKP has been the single ruling party. During this period, the problems that were faced by previous coalition governments were not encountered. Three periods of a single party rule have provided for political stability in Turkey. This situation provided an opportunity for the same ruling party to pursue coherent domestic and international policies.
Additionally, the key figure of the last decade of Turkish foreign policy has remained consistent. Ahmet Davutoğlu started to shape the new Turkish foreign policy following the November 2002 elections, when he was appointed as the Chief Advisor to the Prime Minister and Ambassador at large. On May 1, 2009, he was appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, a role in which he is still serving (T. MFA).

Foreign Minister Davutoğlu’s doctrine, known as “strategic depth”, became the guidance for Turkish foreign policy. It is a doctrine that blends Turkey’s historical-cultural identity with its Ottoman legacy and Islamic tradition (Ülgen, 2010).

Both the rule of the AKP and the influence of Foreign Minister Davutoğlu are factors which have contributed to Turkey’s continuous and stable domestic and international policy since 2002. Without interim changes of political leadership and parties, the AKP and Foreign Minister Davutoğlu could pursue their foreign policy goals in an uninterrupted manner. Table 1 shows the popular election results between 2002 and 2013.
Table 1: 2002-2013 Popular Election Results in Turkey*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)</th>
<th>Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 November 2002 Parliamentary Elections*</td>
<td>34.28%</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 March 2004 Local Elections**</td>
<td>48.25%</td>
<td>16.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 July 2007 Parliamentary Elections***</td>
<td>46.58%</td>
<td>20.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 March 2009 Local Elections****</td>
<td>49.67%</td>
<td>17.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 June 2011 Parliamentary Elections*****</td>
<td>49.83%</td>
<td>25.98%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turkish Economy

Turkey’s impressive economic developments are among the reasons that Turkey has pursued a multidimensional and proactive diplomacy. The Turkish economy had a

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* Data retrieved from Higher Election Board of the Republic of Turkey. The related elections results of the table are as follows:
  *
sharp bounce and the per capita GDP figure of US $4,130 per person in 2000, increased to nearly US $11,000 in 2013 (BAKIR, 2013; Economy, 2014).

Turkey`s economic indicators demonstrate an average growth rate of 9% during 2010-2011. The diverse market helped Turkey to get out of the global crises with a relatively low level of damage and the inflation rate decreased to 6.2 percent by the end of 2012 (IMF, 2013, p. 4). Turkey is among the countries that have been least affected by global economical uncertainties. Furthermore, the Turkish economy had a growth rate of 2.2% in 2012. All of these developments carried Turkey one further step to become the 16th strongest economy in the world in 2012 (ISPAT). The growth of the Turkish economy continued in 2013, reaching a growth rate of nearly 4%.

Turkish imports and exports grew in a steady manner. Thus, the stability and security of Turkey`s potential and existing partners became much more important issue. Turkey wants to benefit from economic integration in order to boost the security and cooperation of the countries with which it has bilateral economical ties. Turkey`s economic success has ’provided a convenient platform’ for its ‘zero problems with neighbors’ (Muzalevsky, 2012). Table 2 and Figure 6 show the exports and imports of Turkey between 2002 and 2013.

Conflicts in its region and globally have started to affect Turkey much more severely in comparison to a decade ago. Thus, Turkey`s stake in ongoing and/or new disputes has grown in parallel with its economical growth.
Table 2: Export & Import of Turkey 2002-2013 (Thousand USD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Export</th>
<th>Change%</th>
<th>Import</th>
<th>Change%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>63,167,153</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>97,539,766</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>73,476,408</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>116,774,151</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>85,534,676</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>139,576,715</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>107,271,750</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>170,062,715</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>132,027,196</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>201,963,574</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>102,142,613</td>
<td>-22.6</td>
<td>140,928,421</td>
<td>-30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>113,883,219</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>185,544,332</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>134,906,869</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>240,841,676</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>152,461,737</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>236,545,141</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>151,868,551</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>251,650,560</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6: Export & Import of Turkey 2002-2013 (Thousand USD)

7 Source: TURKSTAT
**Historical Ties**

As a relatively young republic founded in 1923, Turkey has inherited the heritage of the Ottomans. As the heir of the Ottomans, Turkey has strong historical ties within the region in which it stands. Keeping in mind that the Ottomans ruled some of the present day independent states in the Balkans, North Africa and Middle East for more than 400 years, the history of the Ottomans sometimes affects the current relations of Turkey in either a friendly or hostile manner. Friendly or hostile, the influence of Ottoman history on Turkey does not allow the young Republic to give up its relations with the countries it once ruled.

The population is mixed within each of these countries. There are hundreds of thousands of Turks living in these former Ottoman lands and hundreds of thousands of other ethnic or national groups from the former Ottoman lands living in present day Turkey. The nearly 600-year history of the Ottomans in the region impose a heavy burden on the young Turkish Republic, increasing expectations on it. The South Sudan Speaker of Government Barnaba Marial Benjamin describes the history of relations with Turkey as “*Turkey was in South Sudan since 1821***” (Haber5, 2013b).
On the other hand, a politician from Awdal region of Somalia, Ali Abdi states that, since Ottoman rule in Somalia, Turkey “had knowledge to solve the problems of the Somalia people” (Somalia). Even in present day world, some of the buildings from the Ottoman era are still standing as an Ottoman seal. Some hostile critics have focused on “neo-Ottomanism” tendencies in Turkish foreign policy, however, Turkey never accepts such criticism as valid. On the other hand, when Turkey extends its hand to help one of

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8 Retrieved from: http://www.ottomansouvenir.com/img/Maps/Ottoman_Empire_1481-1683_map.jpg
the Ottoman State’s former client states in conflict, one of the critics confronting Turkey has asked “Where have you been for such a long time since your grandfathers left these lands?”

**List of countries under partial or full Ottoman Rule**

Turkey, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, Hungary, Slovakia, Albania, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russian Federation (Caucasus), Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Palestine, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Yemen, Oman, Western Iran, Northern Cyprus Turkish Republic, Republic of Cyprus, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Morocco, eastern Ethiopia, Nigeria, Chad, Kenya, Uganda.

**Religious Ties**

Secularism is among the characteristics of the modern Turkish Republic. It is mentioned in Article II of the Turkish Constitution among the Articles that shall not be amended. In addition, amendment of this article shall not even mentioned (TBMM). Turkey intentionally does not maintain records of the religions of its citizens anymore. On the other hand, the U.S. State Department’s “International Religious Freedom Report for 2102” provides the following statistics:

*The government estimates that 99% of the population is Muslim, the majority of which is Hanafi Sunni. Representatives of religious groups state the actual percentage of Muslims as slightly lower.*

*Academics estimate there are between 15 million and 20 million Alevis, followers of a belief system that incorporates aspects of both Shia and Sunni Islam and draws on the traditions of other*
religious groups indigenous to the region. Alevi foundation leaders state the number at between 20 million and 25 million.

Other religious groups, mostly concentrated in Istanbul and other large cities, together constitute less than 1 percent of the population. While exact figures are not available, these groups include approximately 500,000 Shiite Jaferi Muslims; 90,000 Armenian Orthodox Christians (of which an estimated 60,000 are citizens and an estimated 30,000 are undocumented immigrants from Armenia); 25,000 Roman Catholics (mostly recent immigrants from Africa and the Philippines); 22,000 Jews; 20,000 Syrian Orthodox (Syriac) Christians; 15,000 Russian Orthodox Christians (mostly recent immigrants from Russia who hold residence permits); 10,000 Bahais; 5,000 Yezidis; 5,000 Jehovah’s Witnesses; 7,000 members of other Protestant denominations; 3,000 Iraqi Chaldean Christians; and up to 2,500 Greek Orthodox Christians. There also are small, undetermined numbers of Bulgarian Orthodox, Nestorian, Georgian Orthodox, Syriac Catholic, and Maronite Christians. (U.S. Department of State, p. 2)

Both the conservative tendency of the ruling AKP and the Muslim majority of the population have a crucial impact on Turkey’s foreign policy with serious “friendly” attention given to the Muslim world. Thus, the Turkish government sometimes feels itself under pressure to intervene in conflicts in which Muslims are a party, such as the Israel-Palestine, Israel-Syria, Iran-International community (P5+1) conflicts. Outside the region, it is involved in two conflicts in Southeast Asia: Philippines-MILF, and Buddhist-Muslim in Myanmar. Although religion is never officially used as the reason for
interventions, it may be among the underlying reasons for Turkey to intervene, for either humanitarian, security or economical concerns. Hence, it is difficult to say that religion does not play a role in Turkey’s foreign policy.

![Figure 8: Map of Muslim Populations throughout the World](http://www.muslimpopulation.com/)

Furthermore, although religion is not used as the official reason for interventions, religious sentiments are expressed in the statements of Turkish leaders during their meetings with Muslim parties to conflict. “Religion” in the context of Turkish foreign policy has three dimensions: i) Islam, ii) Sunni-Shia, and iii) other religions.

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Islam

In a broader sense, Muslims as a party to a conflict may have influence on Turkish foreign policy. For example, the conflict between Israel and Palestine may have a religious dimension for Turkey in its decision to intervene or not. Additionally, religion may have an effect in Turkish intervention in Myanmar because of the massacre of Muslims by Buddhists.

Figure 9: Majority Religion, by country

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Sunni-Shia

Turkey has sometimes been criticized for having a “Sunni” sectarian agenda against the Shia (News, 2012; Rubin, 2012); however, Ankara categorically rejects any accusation of ethnic- and sectarian-based political approaches in its foreign policy (MFA, 2012).

Figure 10: Sunni-Shia Distribution

Other Religions

Historically, Muslim populations in the Ottoman State and in the Turkish Republic were always sympathetic to the Jewish community. In 1492, the Jewish population in Spain was transported to the Ottoman State to save them from massacre.

11 Retrieved from: http://www.loc.gov/resource/g5680.ct002605/
(Hadden, 2013). Since then, the Jewish population has lived peacefully in Ottoman lands and subsequently in Turkey. Indeed, the Jewish community in Turkey is “well-embedded” in Turkish society (Sandole, 2009b, p. 636).

Modern Turkey has more gifts in its treasure chest waiting to be used effectively for peaceful purposes across the world, such as the first churches of Christianity, the last remnants of some other religions/sects, and being the epicenter of the Greek Orthodox religion.

As Sandole (2009b, p. 642) argues, Turkey could act as a counterweight to the Wahhabism/Salafism that encourages some young Muslims in Europe to become suicide bombers. Furthermore, Turkey could also assist in the integration of Muslims in their host communities in Europe, thereby deescalating the differences of religious identities on the European Continent (Sandole, 2009b, p. 642).

**Geographical Location**

Turkey has a geostrategic location at the epicenter of Afro-Eurasia. It is located at the axis of north-south and east-west. While the civilizations that the Ottoman State and Turkish Republic were home to meet at the historical capital of Turkey, Istanbul, people also mix and form a blend of different races, ethnicities, cultures, and religions. The two bridges on the Bosporus (Boğazici and Fatih Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror) also connect Europe to Asia. While goods have been reaching the West for centuries through the
historic Silk Road, the new natural gas and oil pipelines into and through Turkey contribute energy security throughout the world. Geographical location does not only attract cultures and goods, but also locates Turkey within a dynamic, multidimensional foreign policy space. These strategic factors of Turkey’s geography all contribute to the shaping of Turkey’s current foreign policy, including decisions as to whether or not to intervene in complex conflicts in the region and elsewhere.

**Academic Studies and Publications on CAR in Turkey**

When Turkey does decide to intervene in a conflict resolution role, it has a number of resources available that it can make effective use of, for instance, appropriate university programs and publications. Some information about such resources are given below.

**Sabancı University**

Sabancı University started its Master’s program in Conflict Analysis and Resolution in Fall, 2000. When this program was launched, it was the only Master’s program of its kind in Southeastern Europe, taking the lead in training a new cadre of conflict resolution specialists and peacemakers from Turkey and countries around the world (Sabancı). The program has 10 faculty members, 26 current students, and 77 alumni (Sabancı). Since the program is offered in English, it appeals to international students.
**Hacettepe University**

Hacettepe University started The Master of Arts in Peace and Conflict Studies program under the Department of International Relations in Istanbul (U. Hacettepe). A certificate in Peace and Conflict Studies is also obtainable in the program which is in English and is open to international students. The department has 10 faculty members (U. Hacettepe).

**Dokuz Eylül [9 September] University**

AÇMER (Conflict Resolution Research Center) of Dokuz Eylül University was established in 2004 (Mevzuatı Geliştirme ve Yayın Genel Müdürlüğü, 2004). The Center offers a Master’s program in Conflict Resolution (ACMER).

**Kadir Has University**

Kadir Has University, in partnership with Coventry University’s The Center for Peace and Reconciliation, conducted a workshop on Conflict Resolution and Peace-Building Skills as a non-credit course (Kadir Has).

The University also conducted Mediator’s Certificate Programs in partnership with “Mediators Beyond Borders” and “Association of Middle East Mediation and Leadership Academy” under the Lifelong Education Center (Kadir Has).
**Yalova University**

Yalova University established, in 2010, a Center for International Conflict Resolution in 2010 (YÜÇAM). The center also started to publish twice a year an academic journal called *Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution* (CICR, 2012).

**Other Academic Institutions**

Other universities, e.g. Gediz University, also offer classes on Conflict Management. Still others, such as Istanbul Kemerburgaz University, offer classes on International Negotiation Processes (Kemerburgaz). Some reputable universities such as Middle East Technical University in Ankara organized conferences on conflict and transformation but these events were held under the supervision of Department of International Relations.

**Books and Publications**

Academic programs in conflict analysis and resolution offered at Turkish Universities are taught in English. Additionally, Turkey’s Higher Education Board requires that all graduate students including those studying CAR are competent in English. In this respect, any doctoral student is expected to earn a satisfactory score from an accredited examination in a foreign language (the Test administered in Turkey is known as ÜDS and the minimum score required from this Test is accepted as the equivalent of 66 on the TOEFL-IBT for English language (ÖSYM, 2013)). However, Turkish Universities, such as Sabancı, offering Master’s program in CAR require higher scores than the minimum requirements of the Higher Education Board, such as 83 from the TEOFL-IBT (Sabancı).
Clearly, students participating in CAR programs in Turkish Universities are not in need of CAR literature in Turkish. This accounts for the limited number of books on international CAR in Turkish.\(^{12}\)

One of the books on CAR in Turkish was authored by Dr. Nimet Beriker, the first international student graduated from George Mason University’s (GMU) doctoral program in CAR. The book, “Çatışmadan Uzlaşmaya (Form Conflict to Reconciliation)”, published in 2011, focuses on the concept of conflict analysis and resolution. Additionally, a book by CAR pioneer, Johan Galtung (Transcend & Transform: An Introduction to Conflict Work) was translated into Turkish by Havva Kök in 2009 under the title of “Çatışmaları Aşarak Dönüşürmek”. Another book in Turkish, by Muzaffer Ercan Yılmaz, is “Uyuşmazlık Analizi ve Çözümü (Conflict Analysis and Resolution)”. The author has another book titled “Ethnic Conflicts in Post Cold War Era”. A book under the title of “Çatışmadan Güvenliğe (From Conflict to Security), focuses on international relations, security and conflict through a compilation of articles selected from the Journal of International Relations by Mustafa Aydın, et al. (Aydın, Brauch, Çelikpala, Spring, & Polat, 2012)

As mentioned above, the Center for International Conflict Resolution at Yalova University publishes a journal called Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution. Some of the

\(^{12}\) There are books in Turkish on ADR, personal or interpersonal conflicts, business and organizational conflicts, but little literature on international conflict.
articles published in this journal focus on issues such as conflict theories, international conflict zones, ethnic conflicts, and human rights violations.

Our research shows that most of the studies conducted on CAR in Turkey deal primarily with organizational, business and interpersonal conflicts, or peer mediation. There are some studies on international conflicts and conflict resolution conducted by different think-tanks or university programs, which are readily accessible as university publications, journals, or conference papers. In general, there are many articles on peace and conflict resolution written by Turkish scholars for international journals, on peace, international relations or conflict analysis and resolution.¹³

One reason for this is that a number of Turkish scholars work at the CAR departments of reputable universities such as, in the Washington D.C. area alone, GMU (Gül Mescioğlu Gür), Georgetown University (Ayşe Kadayıfçi), and American University (Doğa Ulaş Eralp).

**Turkish Foreign Assistance**

Since 1992, the Turkish International Cooperation Agency (TICA) has worked under the Prime Ministry to coordinate Turkey’s foreign assistance program. TICA, with its more than 35 coordination offices abroad, delivers bilateral foreign assistance to many of

¹³ Some Turkish scholars such as Ahmet Davutoğlu (also Turkey’s Minister of Foreign Affairs), Ayşe Kadayıfçi-Öriella, Bülent Aras, Mesut Özcan, Nimet Beriker, Şaban Kardaş have publications in international journals, books or chapters in books.
the countries discussed earlier. Additionally, TICA is responsible for registering and reporting the development aid of other official Turkish institutions and NGOs, such as:

- Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Syrian Guest Coordination,
- Turkish Armed Forces,
- Turkish National Police,
- Ministry of National Education,
- Manas University,
- Undersecretariat of Treasury,
- Directorate General of Higher Education Credit and Hostels Institution,
- Housing Development Administration,
- Disaster and Emergency Management,
- University of Ahmet Yesevi,
- Ministry of Health,
- Turkish Radio Televisions,
- Turkish Red Crescent,
- Department of Turks Abroad and Relative Communities.

The official foreign assistance of other donor countries increased until 2010, but started to decrease in 2011. While foreign assistance of donor countries decreased by 2% in 2011, the decrease of foreign assistance in 2012 doubled and reached 4% in comparison with the previous year. The economical crises of developed countries had an adverse effect on their foreign assistance programs. Additionally, there was a reduction in
assistance from the least developed countries (which decreased by around 12%) to medium income countries. However, Turkey’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) estimates a relative increase in aid for 2013.

While the donations of countries to international organizations fell by more than 7%, the assistance on bilateral projects has increased by 2% (SGDB, 2013, p. 120). Worsening economic conditions have affected all donors such that even the biggest donor country, the USA, decreased its foreign assistance by around 2.8% in 2011 (SGDB, 2013, p. 122). Additionally, the total official development aid of 15 EU countries also decreased by around 7.4% in 2012 in comparison to the previous year.

By contrast, Turkish assistance has increased during the past decade. Furthermore, there was a sudden jump in 2012 by an increase of 96.45%, with the amount spent on official development aid exceeding two billion USD (SGDB, 2013, p. 11). Figure 11 to Figure 19 show the increase of Turkish foreign assistance in the last decade and other aspects of Turkish foreign assistance.
Because one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises has been going on in Syria since 2011, Turkey is operating 21 camps in 10 different cities for the Syrian refugees. The number of Syrian refugees in Turkey reached nearly 500 thousand, living in and outside the camps. Turkey is supplying the daily needs of nearly 300 thousand Syrians in camps (AFAD, 2013) and also providing financial support to the Syrians living outside the camps.\footnote{As of 20 March 2014, we could not find updated figures for Turkish foreign development aid for 2013, thus this discussion is based on the figures for 2012.} Although the figures for 2013 are not available, we can speculate that Turkey’s foreign assistance will experience another sharp increase in 2013.
Total development aid of Turkey reaches up to 3.5 billion USD with the assistance of Turkish NGOs.

Figure 12: Development Aid of Turkish NGOs in 2009-2012 (Million USD)\textsuperscript{14}
Figure 13: Comparison of Turkey’s Total Development Aid in 2005-2012 (Million USD)

Figure 14: Donations of Turkey to International Organizations in 1998-2012 (Million USD)
Figure 15: Country Distribution of Aid of Turkish NGOs (Million USD)

Figure 16: Regional Distribution of Turkish Bilateral Donations in 2012 (Million USD)
Figure 17: Distribution of Bilateral Aids in 2012 (Million USD)

Figure 18: Aid to Least Developed Countries 2008-2012 (Million USD)
Figure 19: Comparative Table of Net Official Assistance of (Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Member Countries in 2012 (Million USD) (SGDB, 2013)

Yunus Emre Institute

The Yunus Emre Institute of Turkey is similar to the UK’s British Council or Germany’s Goethe Institute. However, Turkey established this institute relatively very late -in 2009- in comparison to the British Council or Goethe Institute. The basic focus of the Institute is to teach the Turkish language and some other courses, in addition to cultural and art events. It also supports scientific studies related to culture and language. The Institute, by organizing courses, panels, conferences, symposiums etc., tries to increase the influence of Turkey in the countries in which it operates.
The name “Yunus Emre” is the name of a Turkish poet well-known for his tolerance, dialogue and compassion.

As of March 2014, the Institute has more than 30 cultural centers abroad in Germany, Albania (2 centers), Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina (2 centers), Algeria, Morocco, France, South Africa, Georgia, Holland, England, Iran, Italy, Japan, Montenegro, Kazakhstan, Kosovo (3 centers), Lebanon, Hungary, Macedonia, Egypt (2 centers), Poland, Romania (2 centers), Russian Federation, and Jordan (Yuns Emre, 2014).

**Turkish Airlines**

Turkish Airlines (THY) is one of the country’s most economical assets for exerting Turkey’s influence throughout the world. Indeed, the airline has sometimes initiated the first international flights to countries such as Somalia following many years of deep conflicts. With the high standard of its service, the flag carrier airline of the Republic of Turkey is the only 4 Star airline in all categories in Europe and ranks as the “Best Airline in Europe” by *Skytrax* for the third consecutive year.

The Airline has grown steadily with double-digit growth rates. With the world's 4th largest flight network. As of December 2013, Turkish Airlines flies to 201 international destinations in 105 countries: 8 in the Americas, 36 in Africa, 93 in Europe, 31 in the Far East, 33 in the Middle East. In addition, it flies to 42 domestic destinations.
Remarkably, the airline’s country coverage is greater than any other airline in the world.\textsuperscript{15} In this regard, in the near future, the airline plans to establish 36 new routes: 8 in the Americas, 12 in Africa, 12 in Europe, 2 in the Far East, 2 in the Middle East.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have provided a summary of Turkey’s initiatives to raise global awareness of mediation. Subsequently, I discussed Turkey’s assets as a successful mediator. Among those assets, political stability, the Turkish economy, historical-religious-geographical ties, and academic studies on CAR were discussed throughout the chapter.

Efficiently or not, Turkey has benefitted from these assets in its mediation initiatives. In the following chapter, I discuss Turkey’s previous mediation initiatives and other mediation efforts to establish peace in various conflict contexts.

\textsuperscript{15} In 2013, the Company ordered 117 aircraft from Airbus and 95 aircraft from Boeing, which will all be delivered by 2021.
CHAPTER FIVE

TURKEY’S RECORD OF INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION AND OTHER EFFORTS

As part of its enhanced foreign policy presence regionally and globally during the past ten years, Turkey has initiated many mediation efforts in order to contribute to the resolution of some of the most complex conflicts.\(^\text{16}\) In this regard, Afghanistan-Pakistan-Turkey Trilateral Summits have been quite important for the war against terrorism. Furthermore, even though Turkey is sometimes critiqued for having a “neo-Ottoman” agenda, its efforts in the western Balkans and south Caucasus are among its contributions to global peace. Turkey’s eastern and southern neighbors are also in zones of conflict and, therefore, Turkey has extended its initiatives toward those neighbors as well. In this regard, Turkey tried to mediate for Iran, Iraq and Syria in different conflicts. Turkey’s efforts have not been limited to only its neighbors, but include other international conflicts as well. Thus, in this chapter I briefly discuss these initiatives.

\(^{16}\) This discussion focuses only on the mediation initiatives that Turkey has launched, and not whether they were successful or not.
Afghanistan-Pakistan-Turkey Trilateral Summits

Turkey coordinated a series of annual trilateral summits between Heads of States of Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan since the “Declaration of Ankara” in April 2007 in order to resolve “the strained ties between the neighbors due to Afghan distrust of Pakistan’s support for the Taliban” (Donat, 2013). This mechanism is one of the concrete steps in Turkey’s efforts toward peaceful conflict resolution (MFA, 2014a).

The latest Summit that was held in Ankara on February 12-13, 2014, was the eighth meeting of the series at the level of Heads of States. The delegations focused on political dialogue, security cooperation, and partnership development. Through these Summits, Turkey has been attempting to build trust between parties for sustainable peace and stability.

Foreign Minister Davutoğlu considered the meetings very successful “in bringing about concrete outcomes” (Davutoğlu, 2013). He stated that:

*Beginning with the Ankara Declaration after trilateral meetings in April 2007, we had several meetings as part of this process. It has been the most meaningful platform for easing the tension between the two neighbors and for discussing, developing, implementing and overseeing various cooperation projects. In every meeting, we have referred to the same values and to Turkey’s cultural ties with both countries. These are not directly related to any specific interest, but facilitate Turkey’s access to both countries.*
Turkey & Western Balkans

Historically, the Ottomans ruled the Balkans for more than four hundred years. With reference to this common history, during a visit to Sarajevo in 2009, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu outlined his Balkans policy, stating that "the Ottoman centuries of the Balkans were success stories. Now we have to reinvent this." Today, there are approximately 9 million Turkish citizens with west Balkan backgrounds living in Turkey (cited in: Cain, 2011).

Turkey’s Balkans policy comes together with many assets such as history, religion, diplomacy, economics, education, culture, tourism and media (Cain, 2011). Sandole (2009b) argues that Ottoman rule in the Balkans still has profound implications for relations between Orthodox Christian Serbs and Muslim Albanians and Bosniats, among others. However, there has been some criticism of Turkey’s interest in the Western Balkans, for instance, whether it was part of Turkey’s efforts to enhance its “strategic depth” or “Neo-Ottoman” tendencies (Poulain & Sakellariou, 2011).

Turkey’s intentions -whether neo-Ottomanist or not- are a source of suspicion for many non-Muslims (Sandole, 2009b, p. 642). The fact that the Muslim populations of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo -an estimated 9 million people in the Balkans identifying themselves as Muslims (Poulain & Sakellariou, 2011)- makes it easier for Turkey to increase its presence in the region. Additionally, Turkish broadcast radio have increased their efforts in the Balkans (Cain, 2011), where enhanced cooperation with
religious networks and charities allowed Ankara to reach out to the micro-level of community organizations and grassroots politics (Poulain & Sakellariou, 2011).

Education is another multidimensional asset of Turkey in the Balkans. While the universities established by Turkish businessmen and entrepreneurs are supported by the primary and secondary schools of Gullen’s Hizmet Movement (Poulain & Sakellariou, 2011), several hundred scholarships awarded to Balkan students to study in Turkey also serve as a way to reach the youth in the region (Cain, 2011).

All in all, Turkey’s diplomatic efforts in the region have increased dramatically during the past decade. In addition to Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoğlu’s frequent visits to Sarajevo, Turkish President Abdullah Gul’s visit to Belgrade in October 2009 was the first official visit to the Serbian capital by a Turkish Head of State in 23 years. Further, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has paid many visits – either official or working visits- to Balkan countries to improve relations and to demonstrate Turkey’s support for these countries (Poulain & Sakellariou, 2011).

Turkey’s diplomatic initiatives in the Balkans were not limited only to high level visits. They also include: Turkey’s repeated support for Bosnia’s stability and territorial integrity and successful lobbying efforts for NATO to grant Bosnia a Membership Action Plan (MAP); being among the first countries to recognize Kosovo; strong support for Macedonia in Euro-Atlantic integration process; encouraging the Serbian Parliament to
adopt the Declaration of Srebrenica on March 30, 2010, by which Serbia officially apologized for its role in the 1995 Srebrenica Massacres; and encouraging NATO to invite Macedonia – officially as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) – even without a negotiated solution to the name dispute with Greece (Poulain & Sakellariou, 2011).

Turkey’s visa-free travel agreements – Serbia became the last western Balkan country to enjoy visa-free travel – allow tourists from the Balkans to visit the country, attracting millions of tourists each year from and to the region (Cain, 2011). Additionally, the land route that connects Turkey to the European Union is another factor advancing Turkey’s interests in the region. The Turkish Eximbank, Turkey’s export credit agency, credited Serbia with a substantial share of the capital needed to build roads (Cain, 2011).

Given successful free-trade agreements, trade between Turkey and countries of the Western Balkans increased 84 percent between 2000 and 2008. The first foreign capitalized bank launched in 1997 to operate in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the Turkish Ziraat Bank Bosnia (TZBB). This was followed by the launch of other Turkish capitalized banks such as Turk Ekonomi Bankasi (TEB) and Albania’s Banka Kombetare Tregtare (BKT) (Poulain & Sakellariou, 2011).

Turkish Airlines, serving every country in the Balkan Peninsula, increased its influence in the region by acquiring Bosnia-Herzegovina Airlines. Private Turkish
business investments such as construction and concession management in some airports have been supported by the funds of the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TICA) – Turkey’s equivalent of USAID. These investments “symbolize Turkey’s role as a protector of the region’s Muslim population” (Poulain & Sakellariou, 2011).

**Turkey’s Mediation Initiatives in the Balkans**

Either because of its -allegedly- neo-Ottoman “project” or to increase its influence in the region, Turkey has undertaken multiple projects to broaden the sustainability of security and peace in the Balkans. In this regard, Ankara’s most significant mediation success to date was the *Istanbul Declaration on Peace and Stability in the Balkans*, signed by Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina on April 24, 2010. With the three Balkan countries pledging to improve cooperation toward EU integration, Ankara appeared as a key player in the stability of Southeastern Europe (Poulain & Sakellariou, 2011).

Turkey has continued its mediation efforts in the Balkans in two separate trilateral cooperation processes: i) The Turkey- Bosnia and Herzegovina-Serbia Trilateral Summit (TUR-BiH-SER), and ii) The Turkey- Bosnia and Herzegovina- Croatia Trilateral Summit (TUR-BIH-CRO) (MFA, 2014a).

**Turkey- Bosnia and Herzegovina-Serbia Trilateral Summit (TUR-BiH-SER)**

The process started with the initiative of Foreign Minister Davutoğlu, in 2009. The Third Trilateral Summit of the Presidents of Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Serbia was held in Ankara, on May 14-15, 2013. At the summit, the importance of bilateral cooperation, particularly in the economic field, was underlined. Also, views were exchanged on current issues concerning the three countries and the Balkans. The fourth summit will be held in Sarajevo in late 2014.

In addition to the Summits held among the Presidents of the three states, the Foreign Ministers of the three countries have also met many times as part of the process. According to Foreign Minister Davutoğlu (2013), the mediation initiative was fruitful:

>We had great success in resolving almost all of the pending issues between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, largely owing to the fact that we shared a common vision for the Balkans.

**Turkey- Bosnia and Herzegovina- Croatia Trilateral Summit (TUR-BIH-CRO)**

In 2009, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu facilitated trilateral summits to resolve the conflicts between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. The purpose of the meetings was to reach resolution of the existing problems between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. There have been positive outcomes of those summits both between Heads of States and Ministers of Foreign Affairs. With the mission of the summits accomplished, the summits stopped meeting.

In the view of Foreign Minister Davutoğlu (2013), Turkey’s trilateral dialogue efforts involving Serbia and Bosnia- Herzegovina and Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina
are just another example of Turkey’s overall efforts in its foreign policy of bringing all parties together to address issues in a comprehensive manner.

**Turkey & the South Caucasus**

The South Caucasus has strategic importance for Turkey. In addition to the objective of maintaining positive neighborly relations, “major energy and transport lines of Eurasia” increase the strategic importance of the region for Turkey as it is in constant need of imported energy (T. MFA).

When the Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991 and divided into fifteen successor states, Turkey found itself sharing with Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan (not directly a border with Azerbaijan but through Nakhchivan). Turkey recognized the independence of these new countries and established diplomatic relations which developed to other fields such as economics, culture, etc. The relations are seen to improve steadily (T. MFA).

There are a few “protracted conflicts” in the South Caucasus that constitute serious threats to the security and stability of the region and Eurasia (T. MFA). These conflicts are Nagorno Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Major projects such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipeline (operational since 2006), Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Natural Gas Pipeline (operational since 2007) and
Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railway, contributed significantly to the relative importance of the region (T. MFA).

Turkey is the first state to recognize the independence of Azerbaijan. The relations are so close that the leaders often refer to the situation as “one nation, two states” and Azerbaijan is sometimes referred to as Turkey’s “smaller brother” (Coene, 2010, p. 178).

Georgia was among the countries Turkey recognized immediately on 16 December 1991. The two countries have an exceptional level of relations so that Turkish and Georgian citizens are able to travel across their respective borders for touristic purposes, without a passport, only their national ID cards. Efforts to establish a “one-window model” at the common border gates are underway. Batumi airport is jointly operated by Turkey and Georgia. Ahiska Turks are another bridge between the two countries. Ahiska Turks were exiled from their homes to Central Asia by the Soviet regime in 1944 and Turkey views with great importance the repatriation of Ahiska Turks back to Georgia (T. MFA, Turkey-Georgia).

Turkey has actively supported newly independent Armenia during its difficult period following independence, both for integration within the region, and by providing humanitarian assistance (Coene, 2010; T. MFA, Turkey-Armenia). Events in Khojaly were the breaking point of Turkey’s relations with Armenia and Turkey closed the border
with Armenia as a reaction to the massacre (Cornell, 1998, p. 60; De Waal, 2003, p. 205). Since then, conditions have not been fruitful enough to improve diplomatic relations (T. MFA, Turkey-Armenia).

The Zurich Protocols, the “Protocol on Establishment of Diplomatic Relations” and the “Protocol on development of Relations” signed between two countries are important steps toward normalizing bilateral relations, establishing of diplomatic relations, opening the borders, and developing bilateral trade (T. MFA). Although the protocols have been submitted for ratification in Turkey, Armenia halted the process and suspended the ratification (T. MFA, Turkey-Armenia).

The Zurich Protocols damaged relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan (Shiriyev, 2012). Azerbaijan felt betrayed because the Nagorno Karabakh issue was not mentioned in the agreements, even though it was what led to the closure of the Turkish-Armenian border (Phillips, 2012).

**Mediation Efforts**

Turkey initiated the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP) in 2008 to provide communication channels between the countries in the region – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The purpose of this initiative was to contribute to regional stability and cooperation while providing a dialogue channel for these countries. The proposal was welcomed but was not very effective in terms of outcomes as it was made
just after the eruption of the conflict between Russia and Georgia on the eve of the Beijing Olympics in 2008 (Babacan, 2008).

As already indicated, Turkey has become included in the conflict over Nagorno Karabakh between Azerbaijan and Armenia. At the beginning, Turkey took a neutral stance, but as the conflict went on, Turkey moved to a pro-Azerbaijan position (Cornell, 1998, p. 60). Although Turkey supported Baku’s claim in international fora and trained Azerbaijani troops, it never directly intervened in the war (Cornell, 1998, p. 60).

Turkey still keeps its border with Armenia closed; nevertheless, it seeks a peaceful, just and lasting settlement to the conflict (T. MFA, Turkey-Armenia). Turkey has tried to bring the parties of the conflict together at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, but Armenia rejected the proposal (Katık, 2004). In Georgia’s conflict with South Ossetia, Ankara has attempted to bring the Tblisi government and Ajaria to the negotiation table (Katık, 2004). Additionally, Turkey initiated mediation efforts for the resolution of the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia. Although this attempt was not successful, Turkey has hosted meetings under the auspices of UN (Katık, 2004).

When the crises between Russia and Georgia started over South Ossetia in August 2008, Turkey tried to mediate between the parties for a peaceful resolution. A few days after the start of the war with South Ossetia, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited both Russia and Georgia (Can). Turkey’s general approach throughout
this conflict was focused on maintaining Georgia’s territorial integrity (Can). Although not providing a total solution, Turkey’s efforts had mostly a supplemental effect on the crisis.

**Turkey-Iran**

The Turkish and Iranian relationship dates back to the historical agreement signed on May 17, 1639, known as “Kasr-ı Şirin” that ended the border issues of Ottoman State with Iran. All the border issues between Turkey and Iran have been handled in accordance with this agreement with both parties still respecting the agreement. In 1835 the first permanent Ottoman representative to Iran was appointed as the Ambassador Extraordinary Plenipotentiary (T. MFA, Turkey-Iran). Turkey and Iran are known to have competed for influence not only in Middle East, but also in the Caucasus and Central Asia (Sinkaya, 2005). Both represented two different mainstream sectarian tendencies (Sunni and Shia) and two different imperial legacies. More recently Turkey has been viewed as a “counterweight to Iranian influence on Iraq”. And, while acting as a friend of Turkey, the Iranian leadership sometimes “exhibits a circumspect and skeptical attitude towards Turkey’s in their shared neighborhood” (Perthes, 2010).

Turkey values peace and stability in Iran for many reasons, including the economic and energy fields. Economic ties between the two countries improved nearly tenfold in the last decade. Iran, after Russia, is the most important natural gas supplier of
Turkey. So, even though there is an obvious competition between the two states, Turkey and Iran are “destined to cooperate” (Abbas, 2014).

Turkey brokered a few mediation initiatives including Iran. For example, when Iran captured 15 British Royal Navy sailors in April 2007, Turkey brokered the release of these sailors. Turkey also successfully mediated the release of a French teacher, Clotilde Reiss, who was charged with spying (Economist, 2010).

Turkey has also “endeavored to facilitate a peaceful resolution in Iran’s nuclear program issue through dialogue” (MFA, 2014a). Together with Brazil, Turkey has tried to build confidence between Iran and other nations regarding Iran’s nuclear program. In this regard in 2009, Turkey offered to become a mediator between Iran and the international community over “one of the highest profile disputes in the world” (Ghitis, 2009). According to Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoğlu (2013), the result was the outcome of his strong belief in a resolution and hard work with his Brazilian colleague. As a result of these negotiations, Iran accepted to sign a deal, which is known as the Tehran Declaration on May 17, 2010 (AlJazeera, 2010). Whether by coincidence or not, the dates of the declaration and the Kasr-I Şirin agreement are both on May 17. This declaration has also a symbolic value: Iran accepted to sign a document on limiting its nuclear program for the first time (Üstün, 2013). Thus, this achievement of Turkey and Brazil has significant importance, even though it has not been welcomed by Western powers.
According to the declaration, Iran would, within one year, lend 1200 kg of LEU (low-enriched uranium) in a single shipment to Turkey in exchange for 120 kg. of fuel from the Vienna group (US, Russia, France, and the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]) (AlJazeera, 2010). Turkey had thus achieved what the Vienna group had failed to do a year ago (Ülgen, 2010, p. 5). Turkey not only tried to broker an agreement but also facilitated the “P5+1 (the US, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China plus Germany) and Iran” meetings on the same topic (Davutoğlu, 2013).

**Turkey-Iraq**

Turkey has been affected the most in the region following the US invasion of Iraq. Complex problems from the wars have arisen and adversely affected Turkey. That makes security and stability in Iraq vital for Turkey as well. Iraq is one of the richest countries in the world that has potentially a significant share in the global energy market. The cooperation between Iraq and Turkey grows continuously and Iraq became the second largest export market for Turkey in 2011. Pipelines that transport Iraqi oil and natural gas to world markets make a positive contribution to Europe’s energy security.

Apart from industrial and energy-related importance, the fact that training camps of the PKK terrorist organization are located in Northern Iraq make relations between Iraq and Turkey sensitive as the presence of those camps is a serious threat to Turkey’s own security and stability. However, in 2009, Turkey undertook radical shifts in its policies towards the Kurdish Regional Government, “including the opening of a
consulate in Arbil and ending attempts to use Iraq’s Turkmen minority as a fifth column” (Perthes, 2010).

Turkey initiated “Iraq’s Neighboring Countries Process” in 2003 to coordinate until 2008, the efforts of Iraq’s neighbors and the international community to contribute to the stability of Iraq (T. MFA, Turkey-Iraq).

Foreign Minister Davutoğlu has stated that, “The members of the platform had 12 meetings before and after the war and tried to create at least a minimum consensus in order to have a positive impact on Iraq and its neighbors” (Davutoğlu, 2013, p. 7). Furthermore, Turkey had an active role in convincing different Iraqi sectarian and political groups to participate in elections. According to Minister Davutoğlu:

In 2005, before the elections in Iraq, Sunni resistance groups were refusing to participate in the elections. At the time, as the chief adviser to Prime Minister Erdoğan, I engaged in discreet, confidential diplomacy to bring all the primary resistance leaders to Turkey in order to persuade them to participate in the elections as political parties. For three months, we negotiated, day and night. As these groups were also fighting against each other, they had difficulties in coordinating their positions. …these groups came together and formed what we call “tavafuk”, and they participated in the elections. The important thing is this: If we are mediating between Iraqi people, we should be speaking like Baghdadis (Davutoğlu, 2013, p. 7).

Turkish mediation among Sunni groups in 2005 to convince them to participate in the elections contributed to Iraq’s representative democracy. Turkey played a similar role in the 2010 elections, contributing significantly during the elections as well.
Turkey-Iraq & Syria

Following the massive bombings that targeted government ministries in Iraq’s capital Baghdad, killing around 100 people on August 19, 2009, Iraq accused Damascus of aiding and abetting the suspects. The tension between the two countries escalated on August 25 when the parties withdrew their respective ambassadors.

Turkey then started to mediate between Iraq and Syria to deescalate the tension. Foreign Minister Davutoğlu started a shuttle diplomacy and met with both Iraqi and Syrian Ministers of Foreign Affairs to rebuild the trust between the parties (Ming, 2009).

Turkey-Kyrgyzstan

On December 16, 1991, Turkey became the first country to recognize Kyrgyzstan. Both countries share common linguistic, cultural, and historical ties. Although bilateral trade is lower than expected, cooperation and political relations between the two countries are excellent (T. MFA, Turkey-Kyrgyzstan).

When ethnic disputes in Kyrgyzstan started to shake the balance of the region in 2010, Turkey, at the request of Kyrgyzstan, initiated the “Reconciliation Conference” in October 2010, which included the participation of 150 local leaders. This event was one of the indicators of Turkey’s support to prevent violent conflicts in Kyrgyzstan. Indeed, it contributed to democratization in Kyrgyzstan and to peace and stability in the region (T. MFA, Turkey-Kyrgyzstan).
Turkey-Lebanon

Turkish and Lebanese relations started to improve after the visit of Lebanon’s late Prime Minister Hariri to Turkey in 2004. In parallel with an increase in positive relations, Turkey adopted a proactive stance during the 2006 Lebanon War (the 2006 Israel-Hizbollah War). Additionally, Turkey’s efforts during the political turbulence concluded with the signing of the “Doha Agreement” in November 2008. The subsequent election of President Michel Suleiman and establishment of the government were among other outcomes of these efforts. Turkey also played an active role during 2010-2011, in overcoming political crises (T. MFA, Turkey- Lebanon).

Turkey-Libya

Turkish and Libyan relations during the 1990s were characterized by a wavy path with ups and downs (T. MFA, Turkey-Libya). Turkey led the humanitarian side of the NATO operation during Libya’s civil war (Champion, 2011). In this respect, Turkey “sent hundreds of tons of humanitarian relief goods to Benghazi and had plans to erect a field hospital in the same city to treat the wounded there” (Champion, 2011). Turkey evacuated wounded people from Libya and treated them in Turkey.

Libya requested Turkey to follow the ceasefire and to mediate (Milliyet, 2011), and Turkey invested “much work and prestige into its efforts to find a political solution between Muammar Qaddafi and the Libyan oppositions (Seibart, 2011).
Turkey-Somalia

Turkey initiated a new policy toward Africa in 1998 to improve and develop political, economic, commercial, and cultural relations with the African continent. As part of this effort, Turkey hosted the Fourth United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries during May 9-13, 2011 (T. MFA, Turkey-Africa). Turkey also became the fourth-largest donor in 2012, including the contributions of Turkish NGOs, in the fields of health, education, and capacity building. Turkey’s contribution to Somalia, a country “plagued by continuous warfare, recurrent humanitarian disasters, terrorism and statelessness” (Aynte, 2012), is one of the best examples of the new policy towards the African continent (T. MFA, Turkey-Africa).

Earlier, Turkey helped Somalia during the US-led operation, *Operation Restore Hope* - also infamously known as the *Black Hawk Down Operation* - by deploying a battalion of the Turkish army under the auspices of the UN. Turkey also reestablished cultural and educational facilities in Mogadishu (Aynte, 2012).

The visit of Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan to Somalia in August 2011 was a ground breaking opening for Somalia, which has had relations with Turkey since Ottoman times as far back as 1517. This visit to Somalia was the first at the level of Head of Government since 1992. According to Aynte (2012), this visit was significant for many reasons:
The visit marked an important mission as Erdoğan was the first leader to brave a visit to Mogadishu, arguably among the most dangerous cities over the past two decades, and as an unsafe and no-go-zone, whilst most of the international donors have been on the periphery, unable to make more than a fleeting visit.

Somalia’s Deputy Foreign Minister, J. Mohamed Barrow, says, “people were dying but his [Prime Minister Erdogan’s] visit opened a gate for others to come and support Somalia. At the time, it was a demonstration of political, moral, economic support” (Akpınar, 2013). PM Erdoğan “drove into the city, toured refugee camps, took pictures with underfed kids, which even Ban ki Moon, the UN Secretary-General, who visited Somalia after Erdoğan, failed to do. Hence, PM Erdoğan’s visit had a different dimension, igniting deep feelings between the citizens of both countries” (Aynte, 2012).

Turkey’s peacebuilding efforts in Somalia are viewed as the most comprehensive effort Turkey has ever made in this regard. Turkey does not limit its effort in Somalia only to mediation. Turkey has used other instruments to build peace in the country. Among these efforts are the development of security infrastructure and capacity building of governing institutions; integrating the country in international institutions, as well as mediating to end a civil war that had gone on for generations. Clearly, given these efforts, Turkey’s role in Somalia certainly exceeds mediation.

Turkey also hosted, with the UN, the “Istanbul Conference on Somalia”, on May 21-23, 2010, to contribute to the development and reconstruction of Somalia (T. MFA, Turkey-Somalia). The conference provided an initial step for the “Djibouti Peace
Process” (T. MFA, Turkey-Africa). A declaration was adopted during the Conference, establishing a roadmap for the reconciliation of the parties to the conflicts in Somalia. The second Conference was also held in Istanbul, on May 31-June 1, 2012 with the theme, “Preparing Somalia’s Future: Goals for 2015” (T. MFA, Turkey-Africa). Turkey was the first country to respond to the famine in Somalia which severely affected millions of people.

One of Turkey’s most important contributions to the peacemaking process in Somalia was to pursue reconciliation not between the factions but between the administrations [Somali and Somaliland]. Additionally, Turkey provides support to both parties, thereby contributing to the success of its mediation. Overtime, Turkey is helping the parties to develop their own mechanisms for peacebuilding, reconciliation, negotiation, and mediation. Barrow mentions the importance of this approach as a critical methodology for developing indigenous alternatives to external mechanisms (Akpinar, 2013).

Turkey is rebuilding Somalia’s social fabric by reconstructing roads, airports and hospitals. Barrow describes these projects as the “projects that create employment opportunities for the youth and thus keep them from fighting” (Akpinar, 2013). Turkey’s projects in Somalia are not limited to reconstruction. The Turkish government and NGOs also provide thousands of scholarships to Somalian students for studying in Somalia and Turkey. Dispatching an ambulance plane, Turkey also provided treatment to nearly 100
students who were injured by bomb attacks in Mogadishu while they were waiting to participate in the scholarship exams. Furthermore, Turkey has assisted in building the Somalian national army. Turkish hospitals served millions of sick people, while NGOs served food to the IDPs. Model Turkish schools contribute to enhancing the educational capacity of the country. One NGO in particular opened a primary school, a girl’s high school, two other high schools, and a hospital in Somalia. The students in those schools have already started to compete in international competitions and to win awards in the name of Somalia (Acar, 2013). Further opening the gates of Somalia to the world, Turkish Airlines have initiated direct flights to Mogadishu.

The claim of Ali Abdi, a politician from Somalia’s Awdal region, that *Turkey has sufficient knowledge to solve the problems of the Somalian people*, is based on Turkey’s deep historical connections with Somali (Aynte, 2012).

Having a job and earning money for their work has had a positive effect in preventing Somali youth from fighting. In that regard, Turkey’s projects have contributed to peace in the country. For Somalia’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Jamal Barrow, these projects reflect Turkey’s “*inclusiveness, neutrality, resourcefulness, information sharing, and the crosschecking of information*” (Akpinar, 2013).

Up until now, Turkey’s contribution to Somalia has clearly exceeded mere lip service and attempting to benefit from launching some initiatives and scoring some points
internationally. What Turkey has succeeded in doing is what many international donors have failed to deliver in 20 years - in relief, rebuilding and resettlement efforts (Aynte, 2012). After two decades, Turkey’s projects have produced concrete results and attracted the attention of the international community (Aynte, 2012).

Turkey’s mediation and peacebuilding efforts widened to a broader scope. Given the success of Turkish mediation between Somalia and Somaliland, Turkey has been requested to serve as a mediator in other conflicts involving or affecting Somalia. For example, the Council of Somali Scholars has called on Turkey to serve as a mediator between Al-Shabab and the Somali government (AA, 2013b). Additionally, Turkish mediation initiatives between Somalia and Eritrea have contributed to peace and security in Somalia and indirectly in the Horn of Africa as well.

**Turkey-Sudan & South Sudan**

Turkish interest in the two Sudans (Sudan and South Sudan) has not been driven primarily by economics. Nevertheless, according to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, political relations with the Sudans are “at their very best” (T. MFA, Turkey-Sudan). Much of Turkey’s assistance is of a humanitarian and developmental nature. For example, the Kalakla hospital in Khartoum, which was donated by Turkey to Sudan during the rule of Turgut Özal, was renovated completely by Turkey during the past ten years. Following the independence of South Sudan, Turkey also developed its relations with the new country.
Turkey’s objective in Sudan was to establish and maintain the unity and peace in the country that were threatened by either the South Sudan or Darfur conflicts. Sudan’s peace and stability are important for Turkey; hence, in cooperation with all the relevant parties, Turkey provided its assistance to all parts of Sudan. In this regard, the Turkish Red Crescent operated a field hospital in 2006-2011 in Nyala, the capital of Northern Darfur. The field hospital provided free health services and medicine to the Darfur region. The amount of medicine delivered at no cost to the patients and the hospitals in the Darfur region amounted to 50 tons during this period. Turkey built another 150-bed hospital in Northern Darfur after handing over the field hospital built by the Turkish Red Crescent to the Sudanese Red Crescent. Turkish NGOs have operated “cataract projects”, surgically helping thousands of Sudanese both in Khartoum and Nyala who have cataract problems in their eyes. A Turkish NGO, “Kimse Yok Mu?”, built a village for the people who had to flee their homes and live in IDP camps. The village was planned to be a model village in Darfur and support the Darfurians to return to their homes after the conflict rather than remaining in the IDP camps. Among the facilities built in the village were a mosque, a health care center, a police station and dormitory for the police officers, water wells, a warehouse for the villagers to store their wood and products, a school, a brick construction facility, a marketplace, and a garage for the transportation minibuses. All these facilities were built by this one NGO paying the wages of the villagers who worked on the construction of these facilities. The NGO also provided tons of cement and iron bars to the people who wanted to build their own homes. These materials were all delivered at no cost to the villagers. The objective was to create a sense of new
possibilities for people who had lived in IDP settings for many years who had rejected returning to their homes. The NGO also delivered seeds to the villagers so that they could start agricultural production.

As mentioned above, Turkey’s approach to Sudan was not based on marginalizing any group- it was “all-inclusive”! Again, Turkey did not focus only on Khartoum and Darfur but also on South Sudan. Accordingly, the Turkish Ministry of Health furnished some hospital wards, including a maternity ward, labs and x-ray machines in Juba University Hospital before the secession of the South from the rest of the country. In addition, Turkey trained doctors, nurses and midwives from all parts of Sudan in Turkey.

To contribute to the security of the country, Turkey also trained more than 2500 Sudanese police officers, both in Turkey and Sudan. Turkish police also donated uniforms and equipment to the Sudanese police. Furthermore, in the framework of cooperation with the UNMIS (UN Mission in Sudan), Turkish police officers working with the UN mission conducted riot police training for hundreds of South Sudanese police.

As a diplomat with the Turkish Embassy in Khartoum, I played an active role in all of those projects when they were implemented in Sudan in 2005-2009. In this regard, I coordinated the activities of Turkish government and NGO actors with related official bodies in Khartoum, Darfur, and Juba (South Sudan).
During the delivery of furniture and hospital equipment to Juba Hospital, I had two experiences worthy of mention here. The first one occurred when a Turkish delegation was delivering furniture to the hospital. A patient hesitantly came closer and asked the Turkish group, “Who are you?” When we replied, “We are representatives of Turkey and the Turkish people”, he asked, “Aren’t you Muslim? Why do you help us?” We replied that, “Helping the people in South Sudan was related not to religion but to being a human being.” He nodded and left us. Nearly ten minutes later, during our tour of the hospital, a South Sudanese woman had just delivered her baby boy when we arrived near the operating room. As it is a tradition in Turkey, the delegation collected money among themselves and gave the funds to the mother as a gift for her newborn baby from the Turkish delegation. The mother was totally shocked that people she had never met and most probably would never meet again were giving her newborn child hundreds of dollars. She was so happy that she started to cry. Then she asked for the name of the head of the group, promising that she will name her boy after the name of the head of the Turkish group.

These two events affected me very much as it demonstrated that when we extend our helping hand to people in need, they are ready to clasp it and walk toward the future, hand-in-hand with us without paying attention to our differences of race, color, sex, religion or anything else.
Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize the independence of South Sudan. Subsequently, when conflicts arose between the two Sudans, Turkey was invited to mediate between the parties. When the South Sudanese Speaker of Government declared that “Turkey has been in South Sudan since 1821”, with reference to our historical relations that began during the Ottoman era, it was clear why Turkey was invited to assume the mediator role (Haber5, 2013a). Upon receiving the invitation, Turkey initiated mediation between the parties on economic cooperation to improve ties and to go beyond the already blocked issues of oil transfer and border conflicts (Donat, 2013).

**Turkey-Syria**

Even prior to the current civil war in Syria, Turkish-Syrian relations have been “thorny because of the Syrian regime’s support for the PKK terrorist organization, and the border dispute over Hatay” (T. MFA, Turkey-Syria). The Adana Agreement of 1998 created a new possibility for improved relations, after which bilateral trade, investment and tourism started to flourish. Relations were so good that Turkey and Syria initiated a “one-window” model of a customs arrangement in which they were planning to establish a “Quadripartite High Level Strategic Cooperation Council which aimed to create a zone of free movement of goods and persons among Turkey, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon” (T. MFA, Turkey-Syria).
Turkey first played an “intermediary role between Syria and the modern world” as a counter balance to Iran with the support of the USA (Cook, 2009). When the dynamics of the “Arab Spring” reached Syria, Turkey invested heavily in efforts to convince Syrian President Bashar al-Assad not to use violence against his own people. Indeed, on one occasion Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoğlu spent more than seven hours trying to persuade President Assad to stop the violence against his own people (Akşam, 2013).

**Other Mediation Efforts Undertaken by Turkey**

**Government of Philippines - Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)**

As an active member of the Peace Committee of South Philippines, which was established by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Turkey has contributed to the Mindanao peace talks between the Government of Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Turkey is still involved in this peacemaking process.

**Eritrea-Somali**

Upon the request of the Eritrean party, Turkey’s Minister of Foreign Affairs undertook some initiatives to mediate in the conflict between Eritrea and Somali (Gedap, 2012). Turkey’s efforts in this regard were helpful in rehabilitating Eritrea as a member of the international community after years of suffering from UN sanctions for supporting the Al-Shabab terrorist group and destabilizing the Somali government as well as for refusing to acknowledge its border conflict with Djibouti.
Botswana- Namibia

Turkey received an invitation from Botswana to mediate in a territorial dispute with Namibia (Economist, 2010).

Myanmar Buddhists- Myanmar Muslims

After violence broke out between the Buddhist and Muslim communities in Myanmar, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu visited the country in August 2012 and November 2013. The humanitarian aid that he and the wife of Turkey’s Prime Minister brought with them during their visit in August 2012, was the first foreign support to reach the victims with the exception of food provided by UN programs (Denizli, 2013). Turkey also raised the issue of the conflict in Myanmar in some international organizations, such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, to attract the attention of the international community (Politika, 2013). Turkey extended an invitation to the parties to help bring them together to discuss ways to break the prejudices and understand each other better (AA, 2013a).

Conclusion

As a part of changes in its overall foreign policy approaches, Turkey has started to develop a program of proactive diplomacy in which it used mediation as an instrument of “soft power” (Nye, 2004) to bring parties together in various conflict zones. Existing in a region of protracted conflicts, and using common history as leverage, Turkey has launched many initiatives, including those listed below, to mediate in the conflicts of its neighbors.
Turkey- Bosnia and Herzegovina-Serbia Trilateral Summit (TUR-BiH-SER) is a continuing series of summits that has the potential of contributing to the security and bilateral cooperation in the Balkans. This series of summits presents the leaders of those countries with opportunities to keep their communication channels open. Thus, one can easily claim that these summits are proceeding on the right track to contribute to the resolution and transformation of regional conflicts in the Balkans.

Turkey- Bosnia and Herzegovina- Croatia Trilateral Summit (TUR-BIH-CRO) had positive outcomes and the summits were discontinued following the accomplishment of their mission, which was to resolve then existing problems between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia.

The Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP) initiation of Turkey in 2008 was intended to provide communication channels between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. However, it was not a successful initiative as it was just after the eruption of the conflict between Russia and Georgia. This clearly shows the importance of “timing” in mediation efforts.

Turkey’s efforts to resolve the conflict between Russia and Georgia over South Ossetia could not provide a total solution, however, it had a supplemental effect on the resolution of the crisis.
Turkey’s mediation efforts with Iran were successful on individual issues such as the release of 15 British Royal Navy personnel captured by Iran, and the release of a French teacher charged with spying. Furthermore, Iran signed a document on limiting its nuclear program for the first time (Üstün, 2013) as a result of a joint initiative by Turkey and Brazil. Unfortunately, this successful effort was not welcomed by the international community.

Turkey’s multiple mediation attempts for the resolution of conflicts related to Iraq, such as convincing Iraqi sectarian and political groups to participate in elections in 2005 and 2010, and Iraq-Syria conflict following the bombings in Baghdad in 2009 were mostly successful.

Additionally, Turkey has not limited itself to its immediate region, and has reached out to parties in international conflicts. The Afghanistan-Pakistan-Turkey Trilateral Summits for example, have continued since 2007, demonstrating the intention of the parties to maintain their communication with the support of Turkey. The points discussed in these summits, such as political dialogue, regional security and development of partnership, are all critical for a sustainable peace among the parties. This summit is a successful mediation effort by Turkey.

Turkey secured positive outcomes from its mediation initiatives in Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Sudan, Eritrea, Philippines and Libya. Furthermore, Turkey’s mediation efforts
in Somalia – which is Turkey’s most comprehensive initiative to date - exceeded mediation and transformed into a peace building process.

Contrary to the positive outcomes mentioned above, Turkey’s multiple initiatives regarding the ongoing Syrian conflict did not produce any successful outcomes before the conflict became a civil war. There were multiple factors beyond Turkey’s control, such as Iran’s influence in Syria, Russian-US competition, regional politics, etc. Other mediation attempts initiated by the international community including by United Nations, have also not been successful. The civil war continues as a major regional humanitarian crisis, and a growing extremist challenge.

It is clear from the discussion in this chapter that Turkey has been active as a mediator in regional and international conflicts, building up its expertise accordingly. In the next chapter, I will discuss the methodology of the survey research I conducted to explore the views of Turkish diplomats and scholars on mediation and Turkey’s role as a mediator regionally and globally.
CHAPTER SIX

SURVEY FINDINGS

Thus far, in previous chapters, we have discussed mediation and Turkey as a mediator from different angles: Turkey’s assets for successful mediation, its record of international mediation and related efforts. This chapter focuses on the views of Turkish diplomats and scholars with regard to Turkey as a mediator.

Analysis

The web site that was used to collect the data on the survey instrument described earlier in the research design, provides a list of answers for each question. Based on the data, I have attempted to discover trends, differences and relationships with regard to the opinions of Turkish diplomats and academicians on Turkey’s mediation policies.

Half of the diplomats I invited to participate in the survey responded to the questionnaire. Some of the invited diplomats are working in very critical, busy posts and I believe they could not participate in the survey because of the time limitations imposed on them by my own research circumstances, which did not allow a longer period for those diplomats to respond. The number of diplomats who responded to the survey was
23. However, three of them responded by answering only a few questions. They were not, therefore, taken into account in this analysis.

Of the 13 Turkish academics I invited to participate in the survey, 7 responded. None of 8 invited international academics responded to the invitation.

**Turkish Diplomats**

When we analyze the answers of the Turkish diplomats, we see that nearly half of them have a master’s degree, while the number of those with graduate certificates and PhD degrees is approximately half of those with a master’s degree. Additionally, approximately 80% of the participants had experience in their job for more than a decade.

Seventy percent of Turkish diplomats in my sample agree that Turkey’s Ottoman heritage, together with the new Republic’s overall policy, are assets for Turkey to be an effective and successful mediator. This shows that diplomats do not make a distinction between the new Turkish Republic and the Ottoman State in assessing Turkey’s success as a mediator. This is critically important because Turkish diplomats are sometimes critiqued for rejecting their Ottoman heritage. Our survey shows that they value both the past and post-Ottoman versions of “Turkey” at about the same level.

While 80% of diplomats agree that Turkey’s geography is a key tool of its successful mediation in the region, all of the diplomats believe that geography is a factor
in Turkey’s successful mediation internationally. While at least 80% of the diplomatic respondents believe that Turkey’s geographic position plays a role in the success of its mediation efforts both regionally and internationally, they all believe that it is a key factor in Turkey’s global mediation efforts. This difference of 20% may be due to the fact that when the conflict is in its own region, Turkey may find it difficult not to slip into the role of a party to the conflict, instead of remaining as an “impartial” third party.

Turkey’s political stability was perceived by 100% of the sampled diplomats as an important factor in Turkey’s mediation efforts. Ninety percent of the diplomats agree that Turkey’s increasing humanitarian/development aid and strong economy are factors in Turkey’s effective mediation efforts.

Seventy percent of the diplomats have “mixed feelings” about the role of religion in Turkey’s mediation efforts, responding “Neither Agree or Disagree”. Nevertheless, 30% agree on the importance of religion in Turkey’s effective mediation efforts. By contrast, 75% of diplomats agree that culture is an important factor in Turkey’s mediation efforts.

In addition, Turkish diplomats believe that other factors play a role in Turkey’s successful mediation efforts: charisma of Turkish leaders, its democracy, reputation of the country, level of its integration and interaction with the international community via
different instruments, and its experience of coexisting with many different cultures and nations.

Further, 60% of Turkish diplomats believe that the number of staff trained in mediation and/or conflict analysis and resolution at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not enough. Additionally, 50% of the diplomatic participants think the structure of the Ministry is NOT well-organized to overcome the difficulties encountered in mediation initiatives. The same percentage of diplomats believe that the number of academicians in Turkey is not sufficient to shoulder Turkey’s mediation efforts. The same percentage also agrees that the Foreign Ministry benefits from academicians in its mediation efforts. Ninety percent agree that the “Zero-problem with neighbors” policy of Minister Davutoğlu is a great instrument for legitimacy in the region. While 60% think that Turkey has experience in mediation, 30% disagree with this proposition.

Apropos Turkey’s mediation capacity, 90 to 100% of diplomats agree that Turkey could have used efficiently its culture, history, geography and political stability as tools for effective and successful mediation in its previous mediation efforts. On the other hand, 80% of diplomats believe that Turkey could enhance its humanitarian/developmental aid by more effective use of its economic achievements and religion.

Ninety percent of Turkish diplomats believe in Turkey’s potential to become both a regional and global facilitation and mediation center. In addition, 70% believe Turkey
has not lost its legitimacy in the region, and the opportunity to play the same role as it has before.

Further, 80% of diplomats think that Turkey should enhance its mediation capacity and 90% believe that the number of international conferences and meetings on mediation held in Turkey should be increased.

All of the diplomats believe in the effect of Turkey’s leading roles in important international organizations as a source of influence on parties to conflicts in which the “leader” is acting as a mediator. In this regard, 70-80% of diplomats believe in the effect of Turkey’s membership and/or role in the OSCE, NATO or EU.

While 40% of the diplomats think that recent political developments and changes in the region have damaged Turkey’s potential to continue as a mediator, 30% prefer not to comment and another 20% disagree with the statement.

Apropos the Israel-Palestinian conflict, 20% of diplomats think Turkey has lost its impartiality and took sides. Hence, the same percentage think that Turkey has lost its credentials to be an effective mediator in this conflict. By contrast, 40% of the diplomats preferred not to comment on this issue. Yet, 40% of the diplomats believe that Turkey has maintained its credentials as a mediator in the HAMAS- Al Fatah conflict. On the
other hand, the same percentage think that Turkey has lost its credentials as an effective mediator in the Syrian conflict.

More than 65% of Turkish diplomats think that Turkey’s role as a mediator is NOT a temporary situation. In addition, more that 75% believe that Turkey should continue its mediation efforts in general as it has before. This may be the result of the view that nearly the same percentage of diplomats do not see Turkey’s less-than-successful initiatives as the result of a lack of mediation capacity, but of other developments over which Turkey has had limited, if any, control. Still, 40% think that Turkey sometimes forfeits its objectivity and neutrality, thereby adversely affecting its ability to mediate. In any case, nearly 80% think that mediation is a sustainable component of Turkish foreign policy.

Fifty percent of diplomats believe that the Syrian conflict and military coup in Egypt have had a negative impact on Turkey’s mediation influence in the region. However, 62% believe that the Mavi Marmara Flotilla attack by Israel has had a negative impact.

The percentage of Turkish diplomats who believe that Turkey’s own domestic issues, which got international visibility, do not affect its mediation influence, varies between 50%-70%.
While 50% of diplomats believe that Turkey is active in its mediation efforts, the other half believe that Turkey acts more as a facilitator. This reflects the differentiation between influencing the process and the parties, or just providing service without any influence to shape the process.

**Academicians**

The number of Turkish academicians who responded to the survey was 7 out of 13. However, two of them just answered the first few questions, which gave the implication that just after starting the survey they had to stop and they could not continue responding. The remaining five academicians had mostly contrasting ideas (see Annex III) and it was very difficult to discover trends, differences and relationships with regard to their opinions. In this regard, although I had the intention to include their opinions, I had to leave this for further studies.

**Conclusion**

As mentioned earlier in “Theoretical Settings”, my initial research hypotheses are; i) “Turkish diplomats are aware of Turkey’s mediation capacity; ii) They see mediation as a new tool of Turkish foreign policy.” Another hypothesis I would like to mention is “Turkey has a rich toolkit for mediation,” and additionally “Turkey has opportunities and challenges on its way to being a successful mediator.”

The analysis of the views of Turkish diplomats discussed above provides great insight into the views of the Turkish diplomatic community on mediation and Turkey as a
mediator. I see that Turkish diplomats are aware of Turkey’s mediation capacity and its rich toolkit. The responses of diplomats show that they believe that Turkey’s geography, history, political stability, strong economy, humanitarian/development aid, and culture are among the assets of Turkey that can contribute to Turkey’s overall mediation capacity. Replies to survey questions about the number of trained staff in mediation, the structure of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, and whether the Turkish Foreign Ministry benefits from academicians, shows that Turkish diplomats are also aware of the weak rings of the chain. Additionally, their belief in the necessity of capacity building shows that they have a clear view on Turkey’s mediation capacity.

On the other hand, 90% of responses show that Turkish diplomats believe in Turkey’s potential to become both a regional and global facilitation and mediation center. Furthermore, their positive responses on whether Turkey’s role as a mediator is temporary or not, and the responses to whether Turkey should continue its mediation efforts or not, clearly show that Turkish diplomatic community has a parallel view of my hypothesis. Nearly 80% think that mediation is a sustainable approach in Turkish foreign policy, which supports my hypothesis that “Turkish diplomats see mediation as a new tool of Turkish foreign policy.”

Responses to survey questions about the developments in the Middle East such as the Arab Spring, war in Syria, Israel-Palestine conflict and individual questions such as Mavi Marmara Flotilla attack of Israel and Taksim Gezi Park demonstrations, support
my hypothesis that “Turkey has opportunities and challenges on its way to being a successful mediator”.

I discussed some assets of Turkey in Chapter 4 such as geography, culture, history, economy, political stability, etc. I found out that the opinions of Turkish diplomats support my archival study. The survey findings indicate that Turkish diplomats are aware of their potential to achieve success in their mediation efforts.

Responses of Turkish diplomats also support the view that Turkey sometimes becomes part of the conflict (Ramsbotham, et al., 2011, p. 184). Additionally, responses about Turkey’s potential to be a regional facilitation and mediation center support the view that mediators can serve their purpose by facilitating meetings (Ramsbotham, et al., 2011, p. 181).

In the final chapter, I will discuss the implications of the findings for Turkey as a mediator, including suggestions for how Turkey can be a more successful and effective mediator.
CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSIONS

Summary

In this thesis, I have discussed mediation as a tool of international relations, Turkey`s assets of mediation and its previous mediation initiatives. Following the literature review and discussion of Turkey`s mediation and related initiatives, I concluded an analysis of the views of Turkish diplomats on what they think about Turkey`s mediation role.

Discussion

We see that Turkey uses mediation when its “interests are at stake” (Ramsbotham, et al., 2011, p. 184). Furthermore, mediation became an instrument of Turkish foreign policy to extend its “sphere of influence” (Kressel, 2006, p. 735) in its region and internationally. However, mediation is sometimes “risky” (Kressel, 2006, p. 735) for Turkey. For example, in the nuclear negotiations with Iran, Turkey risked its relations with its western allies for the sake of preventing another war at its doorstep like the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003.
This research also shows that Turkey sometimes becomes a party to the conflict in which it was a third party; for example, its mediation efforts with the opposition forces and Syrian regime in the ongoing Syrian civil war.

Turkey uses different instruments in its mediation efforts to serve its purposes, such as facilitating meetings, arranging locations, deescalating tensions, determining root causes and leading the parties to alternative possibilities (Ramsbotham, et al., 2011, p. 181) in its mediation initiatives. It can also be asserted that Turkey employs “conciliation, consultation and pure mediation” strategies as defined by Ronald Fisher (cited in: Greig & Diehl, 2012, p. 7). On the other hand, Turkey does not employ “power mediation” (cited in: Greig & Diehl, 2012, p. 7). The success of Turkey’s mediation initiatives has not been discussed too much in this study. However, it can be hypothesized that the strategies that Turkey adopts in mediation (communication-facilitation) are not as successful as more directive strategy which Turkey does not employ. Thus, further research on the success of Turkey’s mediation efforts may explore the validity of this proposition.

Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey’s Minister of Foreign Affairs (Davutoğlu, 2013), shares Kressel’s (2006, p. 735) view that a good preliminary study should be done “about the dispute and the disputing parties before the intervention”. A comprehensive mapping of any given conflict, as recommended by Sandole (1998, 2007, 2010), would be an appropriate way to conduct such a preliminary study.
Turkey is sometimes an “outsider-neutral”, sometimes an “insider-partial” mediator (Wehr & Lederach, 1991, p. 87), depending on the conflict in question. In the region in which Turkey is located, societies tend to preserve their “traditional” values. In such cases, insider-partial mediators can be effective (Wehr & Lederach, 1991, p. 87). Accordingly, given Turkey’s social and cultural makeup, it has the potential to become a successful insider-partial mediator in its region.

In this study, we have found that the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs employs university graduates who hold a minimum of a Bachelor’s degree as career diplomats. We have seen that more than 75% of the diplomats who participated in our survey hold further graduate certificates and degrees. It can be inferred, therefore, that Turkish diplomats pay great attention to academic studies to advance their careers. In this regard, while they presented their opinions as diplomats, 75% of them have also held academic positions. Furthermore, since 80% of the diplomats have been working at the Foreign Ministry for more than a decade, the survey reflects the ideas of experienced diplomats.

We have also seen that diplomats consider Turkey’s history, geography, political stability, culture, and its increasing humanitarian/development aid as instruments in Turkey’s toolkit to be an effective mediator. On the other hand, 50% or more of the diplomats believe that the number of staff trained in mediation/conflict analysis and resolution, and the structure of the Foreign Ministry, cannot support Turkey in the role of an effective mediator. We can infer, therefore, that the diplomats believe that more
training and structural changes in the Foreign Ministry which are necessary to strengthen Turkey’s capacity to continue its mediation efforts. I discussed some structural changes in “Recommendations for Turkey” that I believe can be useful.

One of the most important findings of the survey is that 90% of the diplomats believe in the huge potential of Turkey to be a successful mediator, also they believe that it is important for Turkey to continue playing its role as a mediator. This suggests that future Turkish foreign policy would benefit from mediation as a tool for the resolution of conflicts in the region and internationally.

This study concludes that Turkish diplomats have connected with Beriker’s (2011) “missing link” in international relations by discovering the superiority of conflict analysis and resolution approaches in Turkey’s foreign policy over traditional security approaches. In other words, although Turkey has one of the most powerful armed forces in the region, it is clearly prioritizing its “soft power” over its “hard power” in its role as a mediator (see Nye, 2004). It is, in effect, maximizing its potential to be an agent on “constructive conflict resolution (Kriesberg, 2007).

Limitations of the Study

Clearly, our sample of diplomats is not representative of the whole Turkish Foreign Ministry. Nevertheless, because of the relatively important posts that the participants hold, we can assert that the survey findings still provide important findings on the views of Turkish diplomats regarding the role of mediation in Turkey’s foreign
policy. However, as stated in the “Disclaimer”, the views expressed in the thesis do not necessarily reflect the views of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs or any of its staff or personnel, and do not bind the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in any manner to any course of action.

**Recommendations for Turkey**

Based on the literature review, and the analyses conducted in this research, and also the ideas and suggestions put forth in my previous research papers written during my graduate studies at S-CAR, I have formulated some recommendations on how Turkey can enhance its capacity as a mediator:

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the most important institution in Turkey for the development and implementation of foreign policy. Thus, using mediation as an instrument of foreign policy should be supported by the organizational structure of the Foreign Ministry and the problem-solving perspectives of Turkish diplomats. In the present structure of the Foreign Ministry, mediation related activities are managed by the “Policy Planning Department”. However, given other responsibilities of the Department, it cannot focus solely on mediation. Hence, there should be appropriate changes in the structure of the Ministry to overcome these difficulties.

Those structural changes should include the establishment of an Office for Coordination in the Ministry to coordinate its mediation activities. Having authority over
political, administrative, consular, cultural and economic departments, this coordination 
office can develop the most effective approach toward fulfilling its mediation objectives. 
The authority of this office should not be limited to only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
but should also have authority of /access to other ministries and institutions that practice 
international relations, such as the Yunus Emre Cultural Foundation, Turkish 
International Cooperation Administration, Ministry of Economy and Finance, etc. This 
office can serve as an inter-institutional connecting body or an umbrella department that 
will coordinate the mediation efforts of all concerned parties.

Furthermore, an appropriate problemsolving worldview for the diplomatic staff of 
the Ministry is very important in developing a contemporary “smart” foreign policy for 
Turkey. Following the end of the Cold War, the necessity of having a more 
comprehensive foreign policy perspective, instead of only security based policies, 
become more important in this research. The new generation of Turkish diplomats should 
be equipped with the necessary resources to compete with their counterparts regionally 
and globally. All junior diplomats participate in a nearly 6 month in-service training 
program following their examinations at the Ministry before they are appointed to various 
departments. This training may be a great opportunity to prepare the minds of junior 
diplomats for contemporary foreign policy approaches such as conflict resolution, 
including mediation and negotiation. Training in mediation can prepare the junior 
diplomats to take an active role in future mediation attempts by the Ministry, building the 
human resources of the Ministry at the same time. Additionally, there should be specific
courses for mid-level and senior diplomats to make them ready to lead Turkey’s mediation initiatives in regional and international conflicts.

The office should also create standard operating procedures and build an institutional memory system. Best practices and reflections of individuals who have had roles in previous mediation efforts should be recorded and made available for other diplomats. Depending on the cumulative experience of the interventions of the Ministry and other international third party interveners, a road map for practitioners should be prepared on the best way to intervene in any conflict.

**Cooperation with Scholars**

For mediation to be effective, it should not be conducted only by diplomats. Given the quality and the amount of literature on different aspects of mediation, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs should develop the means to benefit from the scholars who work in this field. Such cooperation can result in more fruitful mediation outcomes and enhance Turkey’s overall mediation strategies and reputation as a third party.

In addition to building better relations with academicians in the field and benefitting from their scientific studies, hosting conferences, seminars and similar get-togethers on the subject would contribute further to developing Turkey’s mediation capacity. With the participation of NGOs, as well as governmental policy makers and
conflict resolution practitioners, academicians, and stakeholders from all parts of society in the region and globally, such gatherings would help improve the quality and increase the visibility and understanding of mediation.

Scholars from think-tanks and universities should be encouraged to study and evaluate mediation. In this regard, Turkey’s Higher Education Board should support universities in two ways. First, the Board should increase the number of scholarships for academicians to study conflict analysis and resolution abroad. This may increase the number of academicians necessary to establish new conflict analysis and resolution departments in Turkish universities. Second, the Higher Education Board should provide funding to support Turkish universities’ efforts to establish departments that teach mediation and conflict resolution.

Getting public support is critical for risky third party initiatives and these activities can help to establish an understanding of third party intervention among the public.

**Independent Institutions of Mediation**

There should also be other institutions working on mediation to resolve regional and international conflicts. In this regard, although established and funded by the U.S. Government, the U.S. Institute of Peace may serve as a good example. This kind of institution can work independently of the political process. Sometimes, government
policy makers can see what needs to be done, but they cannot do much because of political risks such as losing votes in the next election, etc. Thus, an independent institution can work on the resolution of international conflicts without the worry of losing votes.

Such an institution may have an academy to train people in peace and conflict resolution, as well as practitioners working in the field to resolve conflicts. The academy can also train parties to conflict in communication, mediation, and negotiation skills. It can teach the parties how to resolve conflicts in a non-violent manner. In general, such an academy can build its own human capital by recruiting new practitioners willing to work in the field.

The institution should have practitioners to mediate in international conflicts. It should be open to work in collaboration with similar institutions to promote conflict resolution and peace. In addition to increasing the chances for success, such collaboration may serve as an instrument to raise Turkey’s reputation as a mediator in the international community.

**Benefitting Turkey’s Toolkit Strategically**

Turkey has many different tools in its foreign policy toolkit; however, because of a lack of strategy some of its resources are wasted. As mentioned earlier, I served in Sudan as a diplomat and actively played a role in bilateral cooperation on issues such as
health, culture and security between Turkey and Sudan. At the time, it was obvious that there was a lack of strategy and, while a great deal was invested, Turkey could not benefit in the sense of helping to resolve the conflicts in Sudan such as in Darfur and with South Sudan. Both Sudanese and South Sudanese officials requested Turkey’s assistance in resolving their conflicts, but because of a lack of strategy, Turkey could not contribute a lot to resolution. I believe that if there were a productive strategy, Turkey could use its tools more effectively to contribute to the resolution of the conflicts in Sudan and elsewhere.

Multiple Facilitation/Mediation Centers

Turkey is ready to open a regional mediation center in the country that will operate under the umbrella of the United Nations (UN). However, the process has been moving slow and could not be finished during the last few years. Nevertheless, even if it had been completed, only one center under the umbrella of the UN would not be sufficient to cover the need to conduct effective mediation in multiple conflicts worldwide. Thus, I believe that there should be multiple centers not only in Istanbul or Ankara but also in other Turkish cities. Having multiple facilitation/mediation centers that can be used for international mediation efforts may build a great reputation for Turkey and may attract conflicting parties to conduct their negotiations in Turkey. Additionally, different locations may increase options for logistical aspects as well. For example, if there were a conflict in the eastern part of Turkey, instead of calling the parties to Istanbul occasionally, they can have their facilitation meetings in Gaziantep.
which may be much easier for the parties, making it more likely that they would participate in the process.

**Supporting Turkish NGOs and Religious Organizations to Conduct Mediation**

As was mentioned above, it is not only the representatives of states who can mediate, but also representatives of NGOs and religious organizations who can mediate in a conflict. That is why Turkey should encourage Turkish NGOs and religious organizations to play an active role in mediation attempts. This is especially important when Turkey does not want to be seen as the mediator in a conflict for some diplomatic reasons. NGOs and religious organizations can play a more active role in conflicts and support Turkey in its mediation efforts. But at the present time, there are no Turkish NGOs or religious organizations with a capacity to conduct mediation. Thus, the government should train and support NGOs and religious organizations until they become ready to mediate. This process will more likely succeed with the help of either independent institutions, universities or with the direct help of government. In any case, NGOs and religious organizations should have their capacity built up to the point where they can work collaboratively with the State.

**Improving Turkey’s Toolkit for Mediation**

Although Turkey has a rich toolkit for effective mediation, there are possibilities to improve both the number and effectiveness of Turkey’s mediation tools. First and foremost, attention should focus on increasing the effectiveness of existing tools. Turkish
authorities should determine the best ways to improve the tools. For example, a common Turkic heritage can serve as a positive factor in conflicts between or within former Soviet Turkic Republics such as Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. On the other hand, given the contentious historical connection between Turkey and Armenians, Turkish mediation would probably not be welcomed for the resolution of any conflict in which Armenia is a party.

I would recommend that Turkey should lead multiple regional/international organizations to enhance the prospects for mediation. For example, if two former Soviet Turkic Republics were to have a conflict, TURKSOY (the International Organization for Turkic Culture) could be a platform for addressing it, and Turkey could lead the initiative. In a conflict between two Islamic countries, however, then Turkey could use the Organization of Islamic Cooperation as a platform.

Additionally, increasing foreign development aid to the parties in conflict may allow Turkey to have strong leverage. Keeping in mind that violations of “basic human needs” (Burton, 1997) have significant effect on the initiation and acceleration of conflicts, addressing these needs through development aid may de-escalate and transform the conflicts in question.

Mediation Rapid Response Team

Some violent conflicts may be the result of misunderstanding between parties who are not linked by direct communication channels. In such cases, rapid and timely intervention may de-escalate the conflict. In this regard, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs or another institution or some combination of governmental and NGO actors may
have a “rapid response mediation team” to address erupting violent conflicts. This team
should be ready to deploy to any conflict zone in a very short time. Team members
should be well-trained and experienced mediators who have a deep knowledge about the
conflicts to which they may be deployed. Here, again, Turkish university programs, such
as the MA Program in Conflict Analysis and Resolution at Sabanci University or the MA
Program in Peace and Conflict Studies at Hacettepe University, can play a leading role in
training and monitoring such personnel and in assessing the effectiveness of their
interventions, noting “lessons learned” in the process.

Changes in Mediation Strategy

As mentioned above, Turkey’s tends to use a communication facilitation strategy
in its third party efforts. However, a more directive strategy can, under certain conditions,
be more successful than communication facilitation strategy. Accordingly, when
necessary, Turkey should be ready to change its mediation approach from communication
facilitation to a more directive strategy. For a directive strategy to be successful,
however, Turkey needs leverage that can appropriately influence the parties in conflict. In
this regard, Turkey is rich in both its “soft power” instruments such as humanitarian/
development aid, and its strong economy, and its “hard power”- Turkey has one of the
most powerful armed forces in the world. Thus, Turkey should invest in developing such
capital for the employment of “smart power”.

This study has demonstrated that Turkey has the potential to be an influential and
effective mediator in its region and internationally. In order to maximize this potential,
however, Turkey needs to do the kinds of things we have discussed in this concluding
Overall, this study has demonstrated that changes in Turkish foreign policy, such as Turkey assuming the role of mediator, have occurred in tandem with its political and economical developments. In an important way, this study reflects Burton’s (1997) “basic human needs” or Maslow’s (1943) “human motivation” theories. That is, Turkey started to solve its problems at the base of Maslow’s needs pyramid such as decreasing unemployment, increasing the wealth of its citizens, increasing its domestic security with an ongoing legal reforms process. This allowed Turkey to eventually focus on higher levels of the pyramid such as self-esteem and self-actualization. Feeling itself more stable and strong, Turkey wanted to be recognized as a reputable actor in its region and internationally.

According to our study, Turkey has achieved its objective, but it can go further. The study has also demonstrated that a state’s “soft power” can be successfully employed as an expression of “constructive conflict resolution”. From its shift from the Ottoman Empire- on whose lands one of the earliest known mediation efforts took place (Eckstein, 2002)- to the new Republic, Turkey has pursued this approach to peacebuilding regionally and globally. And this study indicates that this is likely to continue.
APPENDIX

Appendix 1: Survey Questions
Appendix 2: Replies of Turkish Diplomats
Appendix 3: Replies of Turkish Academicians
# Appendix 1: Survey Questions

## BACKGROUND INFORMATION

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<td><strong>2. What is your education level?</strong></td>
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### TOOLKIT OF TURKEY

5. As a country with Ottoman roots, Turkey can be an effective and successful mediator.

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6. As a young Republic, Turkey can be an effective and successful mediator.

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7. Geography of Turkey is a tool of Turkey to be an effective and successful mediator in the region.

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8. Turkey’s geography enables it to be an effective and successful mediator internationally.

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9. Political stability of Turkey is a tool of Turkey to be an effective and successful mediator.

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10. Increasing humanitarian/developmental aid of Turkey is a tool of Turkey to be an effective and successful mediator.

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11. Strong economy of Turkey is a tool of Turkey to be an effective and successful mediator.

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12. Religion of Turkey is a tool of Turkey to be an effective and successful mediator.

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13. Culture of Turkey is a tool of Turkey to be an effective and successful mediator.

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14. Turkey’s strength as a mediator has other features such as:

- [ ] NONE
- [ ] SOME. Please specify below what they are.

Other (please specify)
### CAPACITY ANALYSIS

15. **Number of staff that has training in mediation and/or Conflict Analysis and Resolution at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs is enough to shoulder mediation efforts of Turkey.**

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16. **Number of experienced staff at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs is enough to shoulder mediation efforts of Turkey.**

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17. **The organizational structure of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs is well-organized to overcome the difficulties of mediation initiatives.**

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18. **“Zero-problem with neighbors” policy was a great instrument for Turkey to be a legitimate mediator in the region.**

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19. **Number of academics in Turkey is enough to shoulder mediation efforts of Turkey.**

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20. Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs benefits from academicians in its mediation efforts.

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21. Turkey has experience in mediation.

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22. Turkey could efficiently use its culture as a tool for effective and successful mediation.

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23. Turkey could efficiently use its history as a tool for effective and successful mediation.

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24. Turkey could efficiently use its geography as a tool for effective and successful mediation.

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25. Turkey could efficiently use its political stability as a tool for effective and successful mediation.

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26. Turkey could efficiently use its humanitarian/developmental aid as a tool for effective and successful mediation.

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27. Turkey could efficiently use its economical achievements as a tool for effective and successful mediation.

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28. Turkey could efficiently use its religion/religious richness as a tool for effective and successful mediation.

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Other (please specify)
### PROSPECTS

29. Turkey's being elected to UNSC (United Nations Security Council) as a Temporary Member with a record number of votes shows the expectations from Turkey as an international power.

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Other (please specify)

30. Turkey has a huge potential for becoming a regional facilitation and mediation center for regional conflicts.

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Other (please specify)

31. Turkey has a huge potential for becoming an international facilitation and mediation center for international conflicts.

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Other (please specify)

32. Turkey has more of a chance to be an international mediator than to be a regional mediator.

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Other (please specify)

33. Turkey lost its chance to be a legitimate and influential mediator in the region.

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Other (please specify)
34. It has no chance to play the same role as a mediator as it was before.

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Other (please specify)

35. Turkey should enhance its capacity of mediation.

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Other (please specify)

36. Turkey's membership and/or its leading roles in some initiatives in important international organizations contributes to its influence on parties that it mediates.

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Other (please specify)

37. Turkey should increase the number of international conferences (such as Istanbul Conference on Mediation, etc) and meetings on mediation that are held in Turkey to build its know-how on mediation.

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Other (please specify)

38. Turkey's mediation benefits from its membership and/or its roles in UN (United Nations) contributes to its influence on parties that it mediates.

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Other (please specify)

39. Turkey's mediation benefits from its membership and/or its roles in NATO contributes to its influence on parties that it mediates.

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Other (please specify)
40. Turkey's mediation benefits from its membership and/or its roles in OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) contributes to its influence on parties that it mediates.

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Other (please specify)

41. Turkey's mediation benefits from its accession position to EU (European Union) as a candidate member contributes to its influence on parties that it mediates.

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<tr>
<td><strong>42. Recent political developments and changes in the region have damaged Turkey’s potential to continue as a mediator.</strong></td>
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<td><strong>43. Turkey lost its impartiality and took sides in the Israel-Palestinian conflict.</strong></td>
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<td><strong>44. Turkey lost its credentials to be an effective and successful mediator in the Israel-Palestinian conflict.</strong></td>
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<td><strong>45. Turkey lost its credentials to be an effective and successful mediator in the Hamas-Al Fatah conflict.</strong></td>
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<td><strong>46. Turkey lost its credentials to be an effective and successful mediator in Syrian conflict.</strong></td>
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<td><strong>47. Role of Turkey as a mediator was a temporary situation.</strong></td>
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48. Turkey should not be expected to continue its mediation efforts in general as it was before.

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Other (please specify)

49. Turkey's—arguably—failed efforts of mediation are not a lack of its capacity but the result of other developments that Turkey could not control.

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Other (please specify)

50. Turkey's mediation role has been pushed by only a few leaders.

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Other (please specify)

51. Turkey sometimes loses its objectivity in some conflicts that adversely affects its ability to mediate.

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Other (please specify)

52. Turkey sometimes loses its neutrality in some conflicts that adversely affects its ability to mediate.

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Other (please specify)

53. Mediation is not a sustainable approach in Turkish foreign policy.

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Other (please specify)
### MISCELLANEOUS QUESTIONS

#### 55. Developments such as civil war in Syria adversely affected mediation influence of Turkey in the region.

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Other (please specify)

#### 56. Developments such as Mavi Marmara Flotilla attack of Israel adversely affected mediation influence of Turkey in the region.

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Other (please specify)

#### 57. Developments such as military coup in Egypt adversely affected mediation influence of Turkey in the region.

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Other (please specify)

#### 58. Turkey's efforts to be a regional mediator are undermined by how the Government deals with some of Turkey's own ethnic minorities.

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Other (please specify)

#### 59. Turkey's efforts to be a regional mediator are undermined by Gezi Park/Taksim Square demonstrations.

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Other (please specify)
60. Turkey's efforts to be a mediator are undermined by December 17, 2013 corruption investigations.

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Other (please specify)

61. The mediation strategy of Turkey is fairly passive.

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Other (please specify)

62. The mediation strategy of Turkey is fairly active and sometimes imposing.

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Other (please specify)

63. Turkey can force disputants to take certain actions during the mediation processes it conducts.

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Other (please specify)

64. Turkey's involvement in mediation is like that of an event organizer where Turkey arranges structural and environmental details for successful settlement.

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Other (please specify)
Appendix 2: Replies of Turkish Diplomats

The first 4 questions are about background information of the participants and the replies to these questions are as follows:

- 23 diplomats consented to participate and continue the survey,
- Eight of the diplomats hold BA, two of them hold Graduate Certificate, eight diplomats have Master’s Degree and two diplomats holds PhD degrees,
- Eighteen of the participants are “Male” and two of them are “Female”,
- Four of the diplomats have 0-5 years of experience, 6 of them have 11-15 years of experience, 4 have 15-20 years of experience and the final 6 have 20+ years of experience in their jobs.

Replies of the diplomats for remaining questions are as below:
<table>
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<th>Q. N.</th>
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<th>Disagree</th>
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Turkey's history, especially its former super-power status and reputation at the center of many civilizations can also be an asset in successfully conducting a mediation role.

The historical and cultural connections with the peoples of some countries/regions which Turkey has inherited from the Ottoman period enable it to come up as a well-respected interlocutor/mediator in these regions, e.g. in Africa, Balkans.

1. Democracy 2. Rich history and experience of conducting foreign relations and living together with multitude of different nations and societies with different religion, culture and backgrounds 3. Level of its integration and interaction with the international system.

Ability to empathize with differing positions and to stand equidistant to conflicting parties.

Charisma of its Leaders.
Turkey has a policy on the issue. But, it always behaves impartial and does empathy when it comes to the mediation.
Appendix 3: Replies of Turkish Academicians

The first 4 questions are about background information of the participants and the replies to these questions are as follows:

- Five academicians consented to participate and continue the survey,
- One of them has Master’s Degree and four academicians hold PhD degrees,
- Two of the participants are “Male” and three of them are “Female”,
- Three of the academicians have 6-10 years of experience, 2 of them have 15-20 years of experience.

Replies of the academicians for remaining questions are as below:

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