GRASS-ROOTS PATHS IN THE LAND OF ONE THOUSAND HILLS:
WHAT RWANDANS ARE DOING TO TAKE PEACEBUILDING AND GENOCIDE
PREVENTION INTO THEIR OWN HANDS AND ITS IMPACT ON CONCEPTS OF
SELF AND OTHER

by

Beth Robin Mandel
A Thesis
Submitted to the
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Committee:

Director

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Grass-roots Paths in the Land of One Thousand Hills: 
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Own Hands and Its Impact on Concepts of Self and Other 

A Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts at George Mason University 

By 

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Graduate Certificate 
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DEDICATION

I have never been a fan of dedications, but I almost always read them as it provides a chance to glimpse something personal about the author. As for me… the people I love the most—who also loved me dearly, who would have done anything for me, and who influenced my life in the most profound ways—are no longer living in this world. What I owe to my grandparents and my parents as positive influences in my life is immense, and dedicating this unfinished work to them seems insufficient. Equally, it doesn’t feel right to dedicate this simple writing attempt to all the people who have perished, endured, or been touched by genocide. They deserve much more, and there is nothing I can ever say or do to properly honor them.

Still, I have a message for the reader and will use this space to convey it. If you are taking the time to read the humble intellectual ramblings of a graduate student, you are most likely really dedicated to studying genocide or peacebuilding. For those who devote their time to learning and thinking about these topics, I express my heart-felt gratitude.

There are not many people willing to think deeply about genocide at great length, and I relish opportunities to talk with those who do. We need to support one another academically, including letting go of ego, being receptive to critical feedback, and having the willingness to not be territorial and build on one another’s work. What is required for genocide prevention is nothing short of this and making space for all those who have something to contribute—whether they be simple students or seasoned and renowned academics. I wish to encourage all those who care about pursuing knowledge, thinking deeply, rethinking, synthesizing, and generating something positive to keep going. Exploring genocide can be a lonely and soul-sucking affair, so it is necessary to take breaks and find balance in one’s life. There is a need for more quality research and dedicated researchers, so if you are interested in genocide prevention, go for it.

Equally, to all those who engage in peacebuilding work, I commend you. This is another place to let go of ego—to make peace, everyone is called upon at every moment. This responsibility is not the sole domain of government officials, religious and communal leaders, NGO workers, nor corporate or private philanthropists. We have to respect and value the contributions of all members of society to contribute positively—even little kids. Looking to a few to maintain peace for many is a dangerous illusion: there is no “bigwig” or “martyr” who, alone, prevents genocide or mass violence. True heroes are those who understand their role in peacemaking as vital without thinking they are “oh so important”—folks who work collectively and naturally see themselves as equal to all others in building a bright future for themselves and those with whom they share the world.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Thank you, Dr. Jeffrey Mantz, Dr. David Haines, and Dr. Patricia Maulden for serving on my thesis committee and providing critical feedback. It was Professor Haines who started me out on this path. Topics selected by Professor Haines for his course on refugees touched on the genocide in Rwanda and related crises in the African Great Lakes Region. Exposure to certain readings during his course –particularly, Philip Gourevitch’s *We Wish To Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families* –were instrumental in cementing interest in this line of study. Professor Haines is credited with cultivating and encouraging my decision to focus on how war and peace impact the lives of people living in Central Africa.

There were many coincidences in my pursuit to study the topics put forth in the present research. However, there was a need for experts in this area who could provide guidance; one by one, they began arriving at George Mason in a most serendipitous way. Shortly after my decision to focus on Rwanda, Professor Mantz arrived at George Mason’s Anthropology Department. His experience conducting fieldwork in the Great Lakes Region was most welcome and helpful. Professor Mantz has also been gracious enough to continue serving as Thesis Chair during his sabbatical from George Mason University.

The same semester I was studying with Professor Haines, an e-mail circulated inviting everyone to a few upcoming Ph.D. defenses. One defense researching the reintegration of former child soldiers in Liberia seemed intriguing –I decided to attend. I never did make it to that defense but, reading the author’s abstract and profile, I learned that there was an Institute for Conflict Analysis & Resolution (ICAR) at Mason. Moreover, ICAR offered Graduate Certificates. For one who wants to study genocide, this was a great place to be and perfect complement to my studies in the Anthropology Department. Wasting no time, my first certificate course began the following semester. On the first day of the introductory class, the professor discussed her dissertation work on former child soldiers. Yes, that Ph.D. student whose defense I missed but led me to the discovery of ICAR wound up being my first teacher there and I among her first students. I so enjoyed studying with Professor Maulden and the many internationally diverse students at ICAR.

Meanwhile, also that same semester, I decided to attend the first Global Conference on the Prevention of Genocide. Two of the speakers there would later be recruited by ICAR and become my future mentors. Dr. Andrea Bartoli, a leading expert in genocide studies and prevention, became Dean shortly after arriving at ICAR. It was my very good fortune to work with Dr. Bartoli and learn from him and the wonderful Engaging
Governments on Genocide Prevention Program that he created and facilitated. In addition, one of Professor Bartoli’s courses on peacebuilding was profoundly influential in expounding my thinking on the nature and dynamics of human relationships.

I got to know Dr. Gregory Stanton while assisting with the International Association of Genocide Scholars conference hosted by ICAR. Like Professor Bartoli, Dr. Stanton is a pioneer in peacebuilding and genocide prevention, and the world is a better place because of their brilliant good works. Besides creating a framework for the stages of genocide, he was most notably instrumental in establishing international criminal tribunals for Cambodia and Rwanda to try their genocide suspects. He is also the founder of Genocide Watch. Professor Stanton has given me much advice and encouragement over the years.

There are so many exceptionally good teachers at Mason in both the Anthropology Department and ICAR, but there are two more that I wish to especially acknowledge here. At the beginning of my studies, there was Dr. Linda Seligmann, whose introductory course on anthropological theory was quite challenging. It was precisely because she demanded good work that I was forced to improve and hone my academic style of writing. Professor Seligmann, along with other professors mentioned here, also encouraged my academic pursuits and endeavors to study abroad and move to Rwanda.

Most notably, Dr. Susan Trencher was extremely supportive during a difficult time. Encountering a situation that almost prevented my ability to study overseas, Professor Trencher saved the day. More importantly, she called from her home one evening to encourage me to never give up and let neither circumstances nor others throw a wrench in the works when it comes to realizing one’s dreams and achieving goals. Whenever difficult days arise, I recall the sage advice she conveyed with the professionalism of a Department Chair but down-to-earth warmth and honesty of a mother-figure.

Another nurturing professor appeared in my life recently. Dr. Andrea Purdeková, a professor in the African Studies Department at Oxford University, has been conducting some interesting research on the politics of reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda. All that I learned about traditional peacemaking in Rwanda is due to her guidance and only a fraction of the knowledge she possesses. Not only is Professor Purdeková truly brilliant and an exceptional writer, she is extremely humble and gracious. She has offered to share information she had gathered over years through her own research about various peacebuilding initiatives in Rwanda—and I will take her up on that in the future. Moreover, I enjoyed our talks immensely and benefitted from her fresh perspectives, challenging me to rethink certain notions while encouraging original ideas. Professor Purdeková always gave me the confidence to hang in there and do my best. I thank her.

Finally, my desire to study anthropology and be an anthropologist—whether I will ever earn that title or not being irrelevant—is due to Catherine “Kitty” Allen. She and Suzanne Simmons are two of my most beloved teachers and their courses ignited my curiosity and passion for learning about people and how they choose to view and experience the world.
Great teachers are like stars falling from the sky to illuminate paths you didn’t even know exist but have always wanted to travel.

Through several setbacks of late, I have persisted. Some days, it is with great reluctance. A Japanese proverb comes to mind: Fall seven times and stand up eight. There are a few particular individuals, whose names are not necessary to reveal here, that were truly helpful in my personal spiritual journey. There is no way I could have had the physical or mental strength to leave the USA and move to Rwanda to pursue my interests without addressing both body and mind. Remaining receptive to challenges, open to knowledge, and flexible but present is easier said than done. Everyday, I look at a quote hanging on my wall from the person I most admire in this world. It says:

NEVER GIVE UP
No matter what is going on
Never give up
Develop the heart
Too much energy in your country
is spent developing the mind
instead of the heart
Develop the heart
Be compassionate
Not just to your friends
but to everyone
Be compassionate
Work for peace
in your heart and in the world
Work for peace
and I say again
Never give up
No matter what is happening
Not matter what is going on around you
Never give up

…H.H. The XIV Dalai Lama

In addition to H.H., there are a few other people that I think about in order to steel myself with the courage to keep on this path. Those people are: Esther Mujawayo, Youk Chhang, Thet Sambath, and Roméo Dallaire. There are no words…
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Front or Front Patriotique Rwandais</td>
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Beth Robin Mandel, MA

George Mason University, 2014

Thesis Director: Dr. Jeffrey Mantz

This thesis calls for the study of traditional peacebuilding in present day Rwanda. In particular, it addresses an existing need for further research on the impact of grass-roots initiatives spearheaded by citizens that are not the design of governments, NGOs, or religious groups. What little research has been done on traditional peacebuilding today takes these entities as the orchestrator and narrator of peaceful ideals, such as unity, forgiveness, and reconciliation. The focus is often on portraying these entities in either a favorable or critical manner, with discussion largely revolving around them and the identities they attempt to construct. Such research absolutely has its merits, however, there is also an equally strong need to place the person and society (not only government, NGOs, or religious institutions) at the center when studying concepts of identity. Human agency can not be overlooked in favor of political, civic, or religious discussion nor reduced to mere acts of accord or resistance. The complexity of how agency intertwines
with these realms must be examined, as they constantly play off and influence one another. Concepts of identity are ultimately held by individuals and must not be lumped together as some static narration by influential entities. Such an examination must also be properly situated across history—not only within political and economic scapes but ever evolving and intersecting cultural spheres influenced by local, regional, and global factors that consider, among many other things, the environment, basic needs, human psychology, and the day to day lived realities of people and their perceived familial and cultural obligations.

This thesis not only calls for the exploration of traditional peacebuilding and examination of concepts of identity, it makes the case for the relevance of such analysis by linking identity to relationships, relationships to peace, and peace to genocide prevention. Therefore, it is believed and hoped that the ideas put forth here be applied to assist in gauging whether or not a society is moving towards or away from peace.
Although it was my intention to do fieldwork for this thesis, as outlined in my proposal, it was not undertaken. In anticipation, I completed all George Mason University Human Subjects Review Board (HSRB) required coursework and drafted interview questions more than a year ago. I decided to wait until I spent a little time among the population in Rwanda before refining and finalizing those questions and submitting to HSRB for approval. However, I made the decision several months prior to this paper’s due date to delay fieldwork and not include it within the scope of this Master’s thesis. There were a variety of reasons, most of which revolve around personal circumstances. As well, there is the desire to respect the serious nature of the proposed work, which merits nothing short of high quality research. I trust that any fieldwork that is meant to be done because it is purposeful will eventually be undertaken by myself and others.

The most important thing is to expound on existing knowledge, consider what still needs to be explored in greater depth, and present an argument that calls for that research. It was always my intention that the meat of this thesis be that call and any on the ground inquiry a novice researcher’s baby step—an important cursory endeavor—to explore the dynamic and reciprocal relationship between theory and findings. Therefore, I always intended to present any results in that light as a first glance and acknowledgment that
more extensive inquiry is warranted. To assume that a few months of research
undertaken by a Master’s student would be substantive and comprehensive enough to
draw any real conclusions about Rwandan concepts of identity would be naive. The
value of the intended fieldwork is to begin to encourage further data gathering. To that
end, this thesis should be looked at as a work in progress. Future in depth fieldwork is
the next stage, though I would have liked to have started it sooner rather than later to
include preliminary findings within this discussion. I look forward to that future
fieldwork being informative, illuminating ideas put forth here and generating new ones.
"It is not the oath that makes us believe the man but the man the oath."

–Aeschylus

TRADITIONAL PEACEBUILDING IN RWANDA

INTRODUCTION

This thesis states that there is a gap in existing research on Rwanda and calls for an exploration of the following: What peacebuilding and genocide prevention initiatives are Rwandans undertaking at the grass-roots level, and how have some of these initiatives impacted Rwandan participants’ conceptions of themselves and other individuals?

The argument underscoring the importance of identity in relation to genocide prevention mechanisms is derived from theories that examine the nature of conflict and methods of conflict resolution. This thesis considers the following premise: As the space with which to see others narrows in one’s mind, relational possibilities also narrow; building relationships that seek peace very often requires reconceptualizing our sense of self in relation to others. In addition to creating a space where tolerance and relationship building has room to take root and grow, avoiding a resurgence of violence requires vigilant awareness with active resistance to manipulative attempts to delineate and divide groups for the purpose of creating discord. Within the specific context of Rwanda, this
researcher posits that a simple call for reconciliation by the present government and its institutions and mechanisms, or pressure from religious leaders to forgive and move on, is admirable; however, it is likely insufficient to prevent a resurgence of violence at some future point if individuals hold steadfast to their old negative perceptions and pass them on to future generations. To this end, it is very important to make a distinction between the rhetoric of unity and reconciliation that is echoed and the actual hidden thoughts and feelings people carry within. There is a need to look at the reality that exists inside the person, because that will heavily influence their actions and the messages they transmit to youth that did not experience war or genocide firsthand. Parroting back words of peace while carrying much resentment in one’s heart will not prevent future violence, but a person who has addressed hurts and transformed their negative beliefs will be better situated to resist it. Peace is not a top-down affair resulting from the seemingly successful inculcation of State or religious narratives; enduring peace begins from within the individual and from there radiates outward.

Identity and concepts of self and other have been explored in understanding genocide in Rwanda –and particular reconciliation and intervention programs may have considered the same in their analysis, efficacy, and impact evaluations –but no study has done the same across the spectrum of grass-roots level initiatives. This thesis argues the need for such field research as part of a more comprehensive frame for analyzing the impact of peacebuilding on Rwandan society. The hope is that such long-term field research in
Rwanda and the Great Lakes Region will yield greater insight into the very nature of genocide and its prevention.

LITERATURE ON TRADITIONAL PEACEBUILDING IN RWANDA

Looking at what research has been done on the use of traditional methods of peacebuilding in present day Rwanda, one notices the literature taking on two tones. It is either limited to superficial descriptions and statistical data concerning existing conflict resolution institutions without probing their efficacy or it is used as a means to praise or criticize the current political regime. None of these approaches take as their primary focus the effectiveness of these peacebuilding mechanisms on individuals at a deeper level that looks at whether or not people come to view themselves and others differently after having participated in these processes. Instead, a majority of the literature either doesn’t address it, is used by the State to make Rwanda appear as a stellar model for post-conflict peace through unity and reconciliation, or the focus is moved away from analyzing impact on the individual in favor of exploring State oppression of groups. Surely, the latter does impact the individual, but the problem with this approach is that it tends to lump all individuals together—as if everyone will have the same experience in response to what critics view as State dominance across all sectors of society, including traditional peacebuilding. There are a few researchers, however, who attempt to transcend this, and their works will be discussed.
First, it would be most helpful at this point to establish a working understanding of traditional peacebuilding as it is utilized within the confines of this thesis. In a broad sense, peacebuilding can be used to describe any actions taken by individuals or groups that strive to promote harmonious relationships. It begins with the individual and expands outward in concentric circles to include all manner of inter-personal relationships, the family, neighbors, community, nation, region, and beyond. One can look at peacebuilding within and across any of these sets of relationships as well as in the context of groups that people choose to define and delineate (i.e. language, culture, ethnicity, religion, politics, social or economic class, occupation, lifestyle, appearance, hobbies, tastes, and so on).

There really is no end to the ways in which people choose to identify themselves in relation to others and the means by which they can find common ground or choose to think in exclusionary terms. Therefore, when looking at the ways in which people cultivate peaceful relationships, it becomes necessary to understand how they situate themselves in relation to others. Taking into account the fluidity of identity and the multitude of ways in which people use them to achieve their goals, it also becomes necessary to look at the values people hold and the underlying assumptions they have about others. While this is not easy to do –especially given the ever changing nature of concepts of identity that influence and are influenced by all the external factors that comprise one’s lived experience –exploring how people identify themselves and others is
a window into the perceptions that influence how people understand and view one another.

This has implications for the way people choose to relate to those around them. Thus, peacebuilding must not only look at the external actions of participants but also the underlying values, beliefs, and views that hold tremendous influence. It is important to note that factors such as unmet human needs (i.e. security, shelter, food, health, education, freedom to speak one’s own language, and ability to practice one’s culture and religion), fear based on the perception that fundamental needs will be unmet or perceived rights violated, and forced coercion can cause one to behave in a manner quite contrary to their values and beliefs. However, it may be possible to glean something about the health of a society based on the positive or negative perceptions individuals hold. Certainly, it is easier to instigate mass violence when negative perceptions abound.

Peacebuilding initiatives can be derived from many sources, for example: governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), communities, schools, or any group of individuals. Traditional peacebuilding as used in this thesis is taken as any peacebuilding initiative that has historical roots in culture and community. In Rwanda today, there is a revived emphasis in employing traditional mechanisms for peacebuilding, which consist of a wide-range of activities designed to heal trauma and restore social order through processes addressing justice, reconciliation, and community solidarity; however, this revival is mainly a product of State aims and not an organic emanation from the
community. When the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) took control of the Rwandan government after the 1994 genocide, it had a nearly impossible task before it; the fabric of society had completely unraveled. It was faced with the enormous challenge of rebuilding and healing a very broken nation. Since then, there have been several initiatives taken by the Rwandan Government of National Unity and its National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) based on traditional custom.

Gacaca, which means “little grass” or “soft grass”, is a traditional community court which the State reframed to try genocide suspects; gacaca is often referred to as “justice on the grass”. The Comite y’abunzi mediates disputes and serves as an alternative to the formal justice system or a mandatory first step to accessing it. Ingando, a kind of education retreat, was reworked as re-education camps to reintegrate ex-combatants, released génocidaires, and others to correct their “misunderstandings” and learn the State’s ideology and goals for reconciliation, unity, and developing the nation. There are also NURC clubs in school that continue the work of ingando. Abakanguramgaba are volunteers that dedicate themselves to promoting peace in the community. Ubusa-bane are festivals designed to promote the nation’s goals as well as community partnerships. Umuganda communal work days have been revived in order to help rebuild the nation. (Purdeková 2008:510) The last Saturday of every month is reserved for umuganda. Beginning around 5:30 or 6:00 am, one can hear the announcement that it is umuganda day. People are forbidden to drive on the roads without good reason, and they may be stopped by the police asking why they are not doing umuganda. Types of activities that
Umuganda engage in are varied, but often linked to agriculture, clearing land, and building infrastructure such as roads. Umuganda has its roots tied to the patron-client relationship of colonialism and to corvée. It was used by colonial powers to co-opt labor for their own ends; the Belgians finally abolished it in 1924. (Breed 2012:29)

There are a number of scholars who question the purpose underlying several of these traditional institutions. So, it is helpful to see how the literature treats that. First, abunzi will be explored followed by a critical look at gacaca. Following what the Rwandan government deemed the success of gacaca trials to try individuals for genocide and crimes against humanity, the State decided to continue using forms of traditional conflict resolution to empower people at the local level. As conflict resolution practitioner Martha Mutisi notes:

In the case of Rwanda, decentralised legal forums and state mandate dispute resolution rituals are considered as ‘sites for social healing’ due to their repetitive, symbolic and stylized nature (Doughty, 2011). Comaroff and Comaroff (1999) argue that such localised legal forums have the capacity to foster creative tension and transformative practice thereby allowing for Rwanda to reshape its future towards a more stable peace. For example, the gacaca and abunzi processes have been conducted over a long period of time in communities, even prior to the colonial era. As a result of their long-evolving nature, traditional methods of conflict resolution in Rwanda have ended up shaping communicative practice and influencing social interactions resulting in mending of broken relations, establishment of new bonds, bridging of social divisions, and ultimately restoring the decimated social fabric. This is made possible because through abunzi mediation, for example, it is the community members who lead such processes, determine the approach, negotiate outcomes, and ultimately determine responses. As a result, such processes eventually pave the way for reconciliation. (Mutisi 2012:43-53)
The State revived abunzi mediation as a hybrid system, bridging the traditional with modern State sponsored justice. It is meant to serve and empower local communities as well as operate as an affordable alternative to the first tier of formal courts.

Traditionally, when disputes arise in the community, there is an attempt to first resolve the conflict at the family level. This is referred to as inama y’umuryango, “family meetings” or “family gatherings”. If not successful, the case proceeds to be addressed by the nyumba kumi, who are trusted community leaders representing ten households. Today’s nyumba kumi leaders have a mandate that permits them to fine guilty parties. Still another option is to handle the matter at the village level, known as the umudugudu. Failing those efforts, parties may take their grievances to the abunzi mediators. Abunzi means “those who reconcile”. (Mutisi 2012:42)

In 2006, the State passed a law making abunzi a mandatory form of mediation for all those who wish to file grievances in the formal court system. Thus, abunzi functions as a means to alleviate the backlog of cases in the formal judicial system, which will only try cases that have first been considered and ruled on by an abunzi mediator. It is also a more efficient and economical means of fact gathering in preparation for formal judicial trials as the abunzi findings are acceptable in Rwandan courts. So, the formal court system is considered an appellate court to abunzi.
Rwanda’s decentralized model of governance allows local governing institutions to implement their own development, conflict resolution, and justice processes. The country divides its 10 million inhabitants into villages, cells, sectors, districts, and provinces. There are 2150 cells within 416 sectors across the 30 districts spanning the five provinces. Abunzi mediators operate at the cell and sector levels and only within the sectors in which they reside. There are about 30,000 mediators trying civil disputes (i.e. over land and other assets valued under 3,000,000 rwf, family issues of paternity and inheritance under 3,000,000 rwf, breach of contract and livestock cases valued under 1,000,000, and business and labor contracts valued under 100,000 rwf) and criminal cases (i.e. under 3,000,000 rwf in damages for boundary disputes, harming crops, and among family members theft, larceny, extortion, killing or wounding without intent). It is worth mentioning that a handful of cases involve sexual assault. In such instances, the abunzi mediators are required to formally report the matter even though they are handling it. While not the usual domain of the abunzi, it is legally permitted in cases where victims are afraid to go to the police. More common are cases involving land disputes; quite often it is disenfranchised women who are complainants. Also common are issues involving disputes between post-genocide returnees and those who settled on the land during their absence. The State addressed this in 1996 by instituting a policy of land sharing and creating clustered resettlement villages called umudugudus. (Mutisi 2012:43-59) Thus, abunzi is a way for those who couldn’t ordinarily afford to access the justice system to have their cases resolved in a timely fashion.
While abunzi is meant to be a local affair, the State has instituted laws and committees to
govern abunzi. Similar to gacaca, the decentralized abunzi is still ultimately bound by a
higher authority. Both Abunzi Mediation Committees, at cell level for initial hearings
and sector level for appellate hearings, fall under the purview of the Ministry of Justice
(MINIJUST) with the Ministry of Local Government (MINALOC) providing
administrative oversight. To avoid corruption or conflict of interest, the mediators must
be residents of the cell they serve but can not have other government positions while
serving. (Mutisi 2012:47)

Elected by the cell council for a two-year (renewable) term, the abunzi is comprised of 12
community volunteers (with 3 substitutes) known for their ethics and excellent mediation
skills; at least 30% of the committee members must be women (this is a goal that applies
to all government institutions in Rwanda). When parties come together for mediation,
they first each elect one abunzi mediator among the dozen. Then, those two mediators
elect a third to join them on the panel to hear the case. Cases are heard where disputes
occurred or the parties live and the whole community is encouraged to attend.

To settle the conflict submitted to them, Mediators shall seek first to conciliate the
two parties. In case of non-conciliation, they take decision consciousness in all
honesty and in accordance with the laws and place’s customs, provided it is not
contrary to the written law. In criminal matters, Mediators shall not pronounce
penalties provided by penal law. (Mutisi 2012:48)

As in the colonial era under Belgian rule, Rwanda continues to engage in a style of
decentralized governance which is somewhat a hybrid of direct and indirect rule,
incorporating civic and customary law. With respect to justice and reconciliation, it has
The creation of the NURC and its subsequent widespread outreach processes in Rwanda are a clear demonstration of the eminence attached to the theme of reconciliation by the Government of Rwanda. The government also tries to prevent any repetition of the 1994 genocide, hence the slogan ‘never again’. In 2007, a national commission to fight against genocide was established through Law No.09/2009, and article 179 of the constitution commits to fight against what the government labelled the ‘genocide ideology’. In addition, schools in Rwanda have been instructed to teach a curriculum that is in line with the narrative of unity and reconciliation. It emphasises the notion of abanyarwanda, which essentially means that Rwandans are one people who have a shared past as opposed to being Hutu, Tutsi or Twa. The abanyarwanda concept facilitates a sense of an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 1983) or a sense of ‘imagined belonging’ (Appadurai, 1989) and ‘imagined worlds’ (Appadurai, 1989). Essentially, abanyarwanda aims to replace ethnicity and other potentially ‘divisive’ sub-state loyalties with an undifferentiating concept of ‘Rwandan-ness’ (Purdeková, 2008).

Despite its stated objective of unifying Rwandans, the concept of abanyarwanda has been given different labels by various scholars. Critics (Reyntjens, 2004; Zorbas, 2004) have labelled abanyarwanda as an ‘abolitionist attempt that attempts to delete identity’, abanyarwanda is also categorised as a form of ‘de-ethnicisation’ in the new nation-building project in Rwanda. Some observers (Reyntjens, 2004; Zorbas, 2004; Purdeková 2008, Lemarchand, 2009; Thomson and Nagry, 2009) have expressed numerous reservations about the concept and practice of abanyarwanda. The present author adds that by hesitating to discuss ethnicity Rwandan society is ultimately avoiding important candid dialogues on ethnic differences, inequality and privileges. Despite these concerns, the concept of abanyarwanda is still heavily advocated by the RPF government. The narrative of reconciliation has become a daily narrative for Rwandan people. It is exhibited everywhere including in sports, the arts and entertainment. (Mutisi 2011:53-54)

The same critiques are echoed in the literature on gacaca. Tracing the origins of gacaca and its development over time to serve different socio-political ends will help situate and contextualize form and function within its most recent incarnation. This, in turn, will
assist in the examination of gacaca as a traditional means of dispute resolution which may or may not be fully equipped to serve the aims of the State and the array of popular expectations. Though nearly all gacaca trials ended in 2010, their impact on individuals persists and is noteworthy.

Gacaca began during pre-colonial times as a traditional means of resolving disputes within the family and community. Based on traditional communal values, gacaca’s primary function was to restore social order. Maintaining social equilibrium was deemed more important than restitution based on clearly defined and universally applied legal principles. Rather than judicial precepts, what was considered best for the family and community guided the decision-making process and final verdict. The purpose was to sanction those who broke the communal rules and foster reconciliation between aggrieved parties.

Gacaca convened whenever necessary, usually near the location of the dispute or incident. Male head of households listened as the claimant stated what happened. The defendant was then permitted to address any accusations. Women also participated, but only if they were a party to the dispute. The gacaca judges, typically respected community elders, would sometimes temporarily banish guilty parties from the village; however, the gacaca process and tone was designed to restore dignity to all parties, including the guilty. Therefore, even separation from the village for more serious crimes was not permanent. Judges would consider the evidence and exact a penalty, which was
usually not too harsh. More emphasis was placed on guilty parties expressing remorse and asking for forgiveness, and this was typically followed by the sharing of food and drink to symbolize a restoration of peace between the parties. (Clark 2010:52)

During the period of Belgian colonization, gacaca continued to function as the primary means of dispute resolution for simple disagreements involving land rights, property, chattel, marriage, and inheritance. The Belgians eventually established a nationwide judicial system but permitted gacaca to exist in tandem, accepting it as a valid legal mechanism by 1943. However, the Belgians had appointed Tutsi administrators who, in turn, appointed certain elders as gacaca judges. Though it remained based on unwritten law, gacaca soon became a weekly sector-wide event under the political influence of the Belgians and Tutsi elite. People were able to choose whether they wanted their cases heard in formal court or gacaca. Complex matters and business involving contracts were typically heard in regular court, but gacaca continued to remain the venue of choice. This was especially true for people in villages. (Clark 2010:52-53)

After the genocide in 1994, Rwanda detained more than 120,000 suspected génocidaires. This was hugely problematic in that the number nearly tripled the nation’s maximum jail capacity. It also cost the State 20,000,000 USD per month, which was funded largely by international donors. (Clark 2010:50) Sensing the need for a solution that would not overwhelm the national courts, the State decided to use gacaca as a more expeditious means to try low-level génocidaires –many of whom were in jail for over a decade –while
also involving the community in the justice process. It was introduced as a pilot in 2001 and retained many of its original traditional characteristics and communal tone. It continued to meet on the grass and there were no legal professionals participating as judges or in any official manner.

As in the past, gacaca judges were elected by their communities, but women were now equal participants and could even serve as judges. More than 250,000 elected judges began holding weekly hearings in 11,000 jurisdictions. By 2005, gacaca became a nationwide institution. (Clark 2010:3) From the State’s perspective, the principle aim of gacaca was to hold hearings for the 120,000 genocide suspects (most of whom were awaiting trial in jail) as well as to serve as a form of transitional justice with the aim of healing society and restoring social order. The idea was centered on communal involvement and decision-making, but the reality turned out to be quite different. To understand why, it is also helpful to consider the State’s view of Rwandan society and how genocide could happen.

Bert Ingelaere looked at the State’s version of the truth via speeches, commemoration ceremonies, and ingando re-education camp materials. He explains that there is emphasis on the concept of “Rwandanicity” or “Rwandanness”, with the belief that there were no ethnic divisions prior to the colonial powers who instituted them in order to rule. Blame is ascribed to the colonial powers for dividing Rwandan society and to the international community for failing to stop the genocide. In contrast, the RPF is believed to be the
heroic liberators of both the Tutsi, for stopping genocide, and the predominantly Hutu refugees, by bringing them back after fleeing Rwanda’s borders. Thus, the State narrative is that the RPF liberated Rwanda from these false divisions, creating one big family ruled by good governance. Further, the State must protect Rwandans from those who wish to return to corrupt governance and genocidal ideology. (Ingelaere 2009:521)

It stands to reason, then, that since the State instituted gacaca, its modern day aims fall more closely in line with the State’s narrative and version of truth than its traditional use.

In a review of the literary critique of gacaca, Phil Clark notes that there are three common viewpoints. In the first instance, there are those who argue gacaca’s primary function is to try genocide suspects. These critics take note of all gacaca’s legal failings, given that it doesn’t follow formal legal rules of procedure to ensure the rights of the accused aren’t violated and that fairness is applied in judgment. (Clark 2010:3-5) Such critiques follow a basic Western mindset based on protecting the rights of the individual, which certainly is important and has merit. However, gacaca as a traditional form of justice is not based on legal standards but communal decision-making under the influence of local culture and politics with the aim of restoring society, so it is not a place where justice adheres to absolute standards based of equanimity and fairness. Thus, there are bound to be differences in terms of who is held accountable and brought forth for trial, who is rightly or wrongly found guilty, and whether or not the guilty receive adequate sentencing that is fair in relation to the sentences of others. So, one could rightfully argue that it should not be the method used to try génocidaires but would be wrong in asserting that the primary
purpose of gacaca is singular. Gacaca has always served a dual role and this is also the manner in which the State intended it—to mete out justice that the community can agree upon and to do so in a way that preserves and benefits social cohesion. (Clark 2010:4-5)

Clark notes that there is a second camp of critics who understand this but chose to focus on the State’s coercive powers and the ways in which they exert influence or even interfere with hearings. Instead of finding fault with the legal short-comings of gacaca, such critics focus on the authoritarian manner of the State in asserting its ideology and dominance over the process by controlling narratives and even outcomes. Some of the ways in which the State is accused of doing this is by exerting influence over the election of judges, controlling the training of the judges and their standards for examining evidence, and having State officials correct judges in errors of process and judgment according to the State guidelines. Most importantly, such critics typically focus on the collectivizing of guilt, which they feel the State ascribes solely to the Hutu community while claiming exclusive victim status for Tutsi. Obviously, this is in stark contrast to the stated goals of the State, which are to create a unified Rwanda free from labeling and derisive divisiveness. (Clark 2010: 4-5)

There are certainly valid points to be made about the State’s exertion of power over all aspects of gacaca. It is the State who has reframed gacaca’s form and function to serve its dual purpose of meting out justice and reuniting a fractured society. It is the State which established the legal statutes and guidelines for the trying of suspected
génocidaires, including the training of judges and establishment of processes and procedures to be followed at each invocation of gacaca. It is the State that puts forth a singular ideology that has a direct impact on gacaca—an ideology in line with more broad national objectives for rebuilding and unifying the nation. It is because of the State’s insistence on certain narratives and forms of chosen amnesia that gacaca has, in many instances, taken on a tone which is not received favorably by many participants and sometimes met with fear, anxiety, hopeless indifference, or acts of resistance by participants. It is the State that benefits from closely monitoring and controlling gacaca, as it maintains political and social stability in a manner that also happens to be favorable to the ruling party; if this requires forced participation, suppression of expression that it feels could instigate a resurgence of violence or genocide, or great dissatisfaction among large swaths of the population, so be it from the State’s perspective. These are some of the criticisms focused on viewing the State as the overlord of a newly co-opted gacaca. Following such critique, one can arrive at the conclusion that gacaca has lost much of its original intent and traditional nature and become a means to implement State goals. (Clark 2010: 4-5)

Finally, Clark discusses a third group of gacaca researchers who argue, as the second camp, that gacaca is designed to punish génocidaires while keeping reconciliation as an equally important objective. These critics analyze the legal statutes that govern gacaca as well as its hybrid socio-legal practice. Instead of focusing on the failings of gacaca in terms of what the State did or did not do, they consider the importance of its communal
nature and the role of the citizen participant. Therefore, they are more interested in examining gacaca as an institution with its pluses and minuses than simply attacking the State. (Clark 2010: 4-5)

Clearly, Clark falls into this last group with a thoughtful look at gacaca based on sound long-term ethnographic data that considers a variety of perspectives. Going beyond the three camps of critics outlined above, Clark addresses gaps in the literature. Clark, rightfully, says there is no focus on the agency of Rwandan citizens with careful attention to popular viewpoints and citizen participation in gacaca as situated in the delimiting but evolving socio-political context within which it operates. To this end, Clark was the first to call for an analysis of gacaca as a “dynamic, lived socio-legal institution”. (Clark 2010:6)

What is particularly novel and innovative about Clark’s research is that there is a great deal of attention towards how people experience gacaca, and this may be far more important for the overall stability and benefit of society than Western notions of legal justice that adhere to strict principles and fair standards. That is not to say that the rights of individuals are to be ignored with respect to due process, but there are mechanisms to appeal unfair legal rulings in gacaca. There will always be abuses or poor decisions within gacaca—for a variety of reasons that involve the motivations and actions or inactions of all parties involved—but the impact on the community has the potential to lead towards or away from conflict and violence. This is crucial, and Clark emphasizes
analyzing the effectiveness of gacaca by examining how it impacts society. He says gacaca needs to be viewed as a “kinetic social institution that is shaped heavily by the population’s perceptions and actions.” (Clark 2010:7)

Max Rettig’s recent fieldwork in Sovu revealed some keen insights with respect to popular perceptions of gacaca. In Sovu, people felt more bonded by their poor economic situation and were less apt to separate along manufactured ethnic lines. Both before and after the genocide, Sovu residents intermarried and forged friendships between Hutu and Tutsi. In fact, during the genocide, there was much resistance on the part of the community to partake in the killings, despite several high profile genocide cases tried at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) where the defendants were from Sovu. Rettig’s surveys, overall, drew positive support for gacaca. This included confirmation that gacaca was bringing justice and peace to Sovu as well as reparations and security. However, during interviews, many residents also indicated that gacaca caused tension within their families in the broader community, especially on the days it convened. (Rettig 2011:194-209)

The majority of interviewees felt gacaca was a forum where many lies were told to serve self-directed ends. There was anxiety and even fear that gacaca was being used to falsely accuse people to settle past or present personal matters. Many of these personal matters were unrelated to the genocide and included land or business disputes, infidelity, etc. Additionally, though gacaca is designed to permit confessions, which would bring about
reduced sentencing or community service in lieu of jail time, many confessions were deemed incomplete by gacaca judges, so people were sentenced to the maximum prison term –25 years in many cases. Therefore, many people felt apprehensive about gacaca and some even fled the area to avoid being called forward and tried through gacaca. There were also brewing resentments about the fact that Hutu deaths were not a focal point for gacaca or the State and that only the suffering and deaths of Tutsi were acknowledged and heard in gacaca and other legal forums. (Rettig 2011:194-209)

For many of the individuals Rettig spoke with, such actions as well as the pervasiveness of lying, partial truths, and personal revenge merely increased the level of distrust about the effectiveness of the gacaca process as well as the community at large. Resentments and fear often lead to silence: silence by survivors to testify due to emotional trauma or fear of retaliation, silence by Hutu who fear they will not be believed whether they stand for or against the accused or that they will be the target of revenge by others making false accusations against them, and silence by Hutu participants and judges because they feel they will not be believed or their concerns will be dismissed because they don’t fall in line with accepted rhetoric echoing the State’s genocide ideology and narrative. Most telling about Rettig’s work, 99% of respondents said they would like gacaca to hurry up and end so they could “move on”. (Rettig 2011:203)

Further research supports the notion that gacaca can cause more stress and less healing among many community members. Karen Brounéus did a study on psychological health
and gacaca. In brief, her research revealed that gacaca witnesses had higher levels of depression and Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) than those who did not witness. From her research, Brounéus concludes that participation in gacaca over time with exposure to “truth telling” has not assisted in recovery from a variety of psychological illnesses including depression and PTSD. She calls for the need to examine the complexity of truth telling and reconciliation in transitional justice initiatives such as gacaca. (Brounéus 2010:409)

It is also worth noting that because of the culture of silence among many participants in gacaca, there is a greater burden placed on survivors to bring génocidaires to justice. However, this puts greater burden on them and the judicial process, as many survivors were hiding during the genocide. Without Hutu to come forward and testify, many culpable parties will not be tried, nor will the wrongly accused have witnesses to help clear them. The fear of retaliation for testifying and being on the receiving ends of retaliatory acts is not only extremely stressful but creates further fissures in the community. Examples of retaliatory acts in Sovu, for example, include the uprooting of crops and poisonings. This leads Rettig to conclude that there must be social trust before using communal trials like gacaca as a legal means to prosecute criminals as well as healing mechanism in restorative justice. (Rettig 2011:204-206)

The work of Ingelaere also supports this notion. Ingelaere engaged in extensive fieldwork in Rwanda and looked at gacaca. As he explains, communication for
Rwandans depends on usefulness rather than truth. Now and in the past, communication has served socio-political means rather than a way to convey truth, reality, or even personal thoughts. Traditionally, Rwandans believed that it is the authorities who hold power and truth. Everyone had to accept the truth emanating from power, especially those who looked to the mwamis (traditional Rwandan kings) or presidents as possessing divinity or at least wisdom. Even if one did not truly believe in the truth, what could they do other than accept the truth told and, perhaps, imposed on them? Thus, people tried to align themselves with the truth of those who ruled over them. This makes communication more complex, as one never truly knows if what is being said is how the person feels or what they believe they should convey. (Ingelaere 2009:519)

This becomes very problematic. Some of the stories reported to Ingelaere reveal that nobody wants to testify against the rich and powerful, as they fear doing so would come back to bite them in business or other ways; therefore, there are cases where no form of justice is meted out or what truth is revealed is bent to preserve individual interests. Witnesses may be swayed to help reduce prison sentences in the form of bribery or other benefit between parties, whether by testifying or keeping silent. (Ingelaere 2009:520)

Ingelaere argues that before gacaca, people often engaged in chosen amnesia as a survival strategy. (Ingelaere 2009:523-524) One such example would be downplaying the long-standing tension between Hutu and Tutsi by believing the State narrative that Rwandans didn’t experience true strife and violence until the colonial powers institutionalized
identity and division through structural violence. The natural process of having to live
together and engage with one another in communal ways fostered and aided that selective
reality. This, Ingelaere says, was a non-discursive means of working through the past
and potentially repairing relationships. However, with gacaca, discursive truth-telling
became important and transparency was called for in the hopes of transitional justice.
This interfered with the non-discursive strategies people had been employing in order to
heal, and it strained communal cohesion. Ingelaere flat out says people habitually lie,
perhaps partly because they are afraid to speak out and are employing both the State
imposed chosen amnesia as well as their own, but also because the truth is meant to serve
their own needs while the factual truth remains suppressed. (Ingelaere 2009:524-525)
Thus, new strategies were employed, such as keeping silent, which paradoxically hinders
the goal of healing through truth-telling. This is in stark contrast to the traditional use of
gacaca where people were encouraged to participate and speak their mind.

Perhaps truth-telling was rubbing against chosen amnesia strategies or the very ideologies
of the State as manifested in their rhetoric and institutions such as ingando and gacaca.
This, in turn, could have brought on another form of top-down chosen amnesia, which
was imposed on the people and reinforced through various forms of pressure or
censorship, so as not to say something contrary to the State’s version of past and truth.
This imposition not only chaffed some but led to great distress and strain on social
harmony. Ingelaere states these unexpressed grievances, now often replaced with silence,
lie under the surface but can be seen in hidden transcripts. Ingelaere calls for a bottom-
up approach to research that considers the voices of ordinary people whose daily lives are highly politicized. In a society where the construction of knowledge is constructed and guarded from the center, it is even more important for researchers to turn their attention to the periphery. (Ingelaere 2010:41-21) Therefore, there is a need to examine these hidden transcripts more deeply to ascertain views of truths unspoken. The lack of a consensus on remembering the experienced past and suppression of varying versions of the truth that are not in line with the State is fomenting problems that will soon catch up with the government if they continue to use their political institutions to suppress the airing of grievances by the population via their genocide laws or the co-opting of a traditional socio-legal tool such as gacaca.

Nonetheless, gacaca has been an effective tool for many at getting at the truth. People confessed, and kin were able to learn how their loved ones died and find their remains in order to bury them with dignity. Perhaps, this also restored some dignity to those who committed crimes, which would be in line with the traditional use of gacaca. It was only in the later years of gacaca, when it became more and more a reflection of a government initiative with a top-down approach, that people feared testifying and prisoners began to manipulate the truth hoping to influence sentencing. (King 2011:137) Under these circumstances, there is little space for emotions to be expressed adequately. As Regine King notes, genuine apology leaves space for the person confessing to express regret and for both parties to exchange feelings and their pain; however, gacaca doesn’t emphasize
this part and involves sticking to the facts rather than expressing emotion. (King 2011:142) In this context, how can healing occur?

The idea of using gacaca as a peacebuilding institution is a good one, and the State should be commended for attempting to deal with the trying of génocidaires in a way that involves the community and attempts to heal. However, despite these intentions—as well as those that do serve the State’s own ends—the reality of gacaca as it has been implemented in recent times does not allow for full freedom of expression and the airing of grievances in the way its traditional use did. So, gacaca remains a traditional platform that has lost some of its traditional character. Based on the evidence of many researchers, it appears that some individual healing has occurred through gacaca but much of the work has yet to be done. In some cases, gacaca even stirred the pot in ways that forced people to overcome their strategies of chosen amnesia—this often led them to more distress and relived trauma.

The conclusion is that gacaca is traditional in origin, but its present form is not. It has yielded many benefits and achieved some of its stated aims at trying criminals, but it is far from a perfect legal tool. Perhaps trying genocide cases on a massive scale is too much to ask of gacaca, for it is not its originally intended function. Gacaca can heal when parties are able to reveal truths and share feelings in a way that restores dignity and repairs relationships, in accord with the traditional tone of gacaca. Though the gacaca trials trying génocidaires have mostly finished by now, we should still ask an important
question: Is gacaca in its most recent form able to bring about the unity and healing that Rwandans desire and the State intends? Probably not in light of some of the reasons presented here. That is not to say, however, that it is not useful. If gacaca was a more open environment where people felt comfortable revealing truths and sharing pain, it would greatly benefit the healing of individual Rwandans, communities, and the society at large. This would diminish structural and cultural violence in ways that would pave the way for true transitional justice and the healing of broken souls. Thus, gacaca would serve as an important peacebuilding institution.

So, this leaves one to ponder whether or not there are any aspects of traditional peacebuilding that have not been heavily influenced by the State and transformed from their original intent to serve the State’s goal of unity, where the State determines what is best for the community. Thus, there is a tendency towards a singular purposeful narrative. In his book *Re-Imagining Rwanda*, Johan Pottier critiques present oversimplified dominating narratives that account for Rwanda’s social, political, and economic history. Furthermore, he states that more complexly nuanced and contextualized analytical endeavors are often rejected as outsider (i.e. foreigner) opinion. Making use of mediascapes, the simplified story told of an imagined Rwanda by Diaspora scholars is often peddled to novice ‘outsiders’ who reproduce and help give credence to it.

The ‘new generation’ of international post-genocide commentators on Rwanda—a transnational body of experts whose ‘area expertise’ is mostly non-existent—operates predominantly in ways that mimic the relationship of mutual advantage which had developed in colonial times between Alexis Kagame and Jacques
Maquet. The insider offers enlightenment to the outsider; the outsider returns the gift by offering the prospect of international recognition and legitimacy. Moreover, just as the colonial experts synchronized their discursive understandings of colonial situations, so contemporary experts tune into the discourses of their ‘disaster colleagues’ who may, just may, know that little bit more. The result is a chain of ‘interanimated’ adjustments to the utterances and viewpoints of other professionals; positions rarely grounded in sustained empirical research. Political, social and economic landscapes are thus simplified, streamlined and misread: post-war farmers with diverse experiences become ‘famished seed eaters’; the heterogeneous world found in refugee camps becomes ‘the refugees’; those targeted in the social revolution of 1959 become ‘the Tutsi’; that multitude of pre-and early colonial clientship relations becomes ‘the cattle contract’; those who masterminded and carried out the genocide become ‘the Hutu’; the various Tutsi social groupings in eastern Zaire are collapsed into ‘the Banyamulenge’; and so it goes on. (Pottier 2002:205)

Pottier continues by noting that such ‘essentialist categories’ and exclusionary views do not allow for shared accounts of society and history, further dividing the Great Lakes region, and enabling official discourse the means by which to justify violence. (Pottier 2002:205-207)

What is most useful about his commentary is a caution to researchers and analysts. One must not fall prey to skewed visions and rely on dominant discursive re-imaginings. As always, researchers must take care to avoid oversimplification, generalization, and an adherence to dominant narratives. However, this is easier said than done in some settings.

Ethnographic representations may be approached, by way of a working hypothesis, as economies of truth made possible because of powerful ‘lies’ of exclusion and rhetoric (Clifford 1986:7). According to this approach, truth is distorted through the mechanism of exclusion: some data are selected, others discarded. Clifford’s perspective applies to writings colonial and post-colonial, and provides us with a fine tool with which to reflect on conflict scenarios and intellectual warfare. Useful, too, from the same edited volume on writing culture (Clifford and Marcus 1986), is Crapanzano’s take on ‘lies’. Crapanzano likened
the ethnographer to Hermes, Zeus’s messenger, who had ‘promised to tell no lies, but did not promise to tell the whole truth’ (Crapanzano 1986:35). This meant that when the messenger spoke, one needed to ask: how much of what is said excludes, ignores, censors and de-values other spheres of people’s multi-faceted lives?” (Pottier 2002:205)

Clearly, this critique of half-truth representations is frequently leveled at the current power structure controlling official narratives in Rwanda. This is a legitimate concern, and one in which a number of foreign researchers have endeavored to counter through research that has been met with less than great receptivity. While it is normal and healthy to challenge findings, it raises concern when researchers are discredited and met with such hostility that they become persona non grata, lacking official approbation to undertake fieldwork.

So, who and what represents the truth about what is traditional? When one thinks of tradition, what often comes to mind are notions of what is local, grass-roots, communal, and not governmental; however, tradition is not merely a social product that is devoid of political influence or fixed throughout time such that it becomes immune to historical events and circumstances. What is traditional for Rwandans has been shaped over time by the people, by the mwamis, by the colonial rulers, by the regimes after independence and a whole range of factors – social, economic, environmental, political, etc.

One of the biggest aids and simultaneous stumbling blocks towards reconciliation for Rwandans is the State’s approach to using traditional methods of peacebuilding. Perhaps taking on the role of a modern-day mwami, the government has the daunting task of
restoring peace and preventing a resurgence of violence. The way they go about doing that is to do the opposite of what led to genocide; therefore, they formally and even legally suppress anything that can be deemed as potential hate speech or divisive, lest it stir the pot and move society closer to instability and violence. On the one hand, that is a reasonable and smart approach aimed to protect the vulnerable and prevent a resurgence of genocide—especially important given that Rwanda has suffered several cycles of genocide; on the other hand, it doesn’t necessarily enable the airing of grievances or uncomfortable working through of problems to get at the underlying cultural and structural violence that stands in the way of reconciliation and enduring peace. Furthermore, by controlling the narratives woven through traditional forms of peacebuilding and the very methods themselves, the government has restricted the role of human agency as well as co-opted what is considered traditional.

This creates a problem of authenticity for folks participating in various initiatives deemed traditional and touted as unifying. As an example, the Rwandan government tries to place blame with the colonialists for institutionalizing the identities of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa; while that is true, they downplay the existence of manufactured identities existing prior to colonization—but exist, they did. Thus, the idea that Rwandans got along perfectly fine without any division prior to the German and Belgian rule is simply not the case. Since people are aware of this history, it is a source of frustration in that they are being asked to believe a partial, thus, inaccurate truth for the sake of unity and reconciliation. In addition, one can not negate a part of people’s own identity by
eclipsing it in the name of unity. One does not cease being Twa because they are Rwandan; they are both Twa and Rwandan. Even in the case of contested identities such as Hutu and Tutsi, the fact that one can rightly argue they are manufactured ethnicities does not undo years of history and the public’s willing incorporation of these communal terms into their identification of self, family, and group.

No matter how well intentioned or eager one is for reconciliation, denying basic truths about identity can only lead to resentments. If those resentments do not then have a forum for expression, hopelessness or resistance in one form or another is sure to follow suit. This could take the form of acquiescence, debate, seething silence, or something entirely different. Regardless of how it manifests, the key point is that societal pressure will build; without employing culturally accepted methods to release steam, balance cannot be achieved. The primary function of conflict is to address such a build up and restore balance when other means fail. Therefore, conflict in and of itself is not necessarily a bad thing in that it acts as an inevitable fail safe when society becomes too imbalanced; however, imbalances could last for a short time or hundreds of years before conflict transpires. If one looks at history, imbalances of longer duration that are more deeply entrenched and impart great suffering on some segments of the population are more likely to lead towards violent conflict. In the case of Rwanda with a history of cyclical genocide, permitting an imbalance to endure while societal pressure builds is a dangerous game. However, traditional methods of peacebuilding are designed to prevent reaching this point by providing forums that safely release pressure.
To do so, traditional mechanisms need to stay traditional. They can be successfully employed by the State to run in tandem with local justice and other means to address the structural and social violence of a post-conflict society, such as Rwanda. However, they should neither be co-opted by the State or foreign third parties, regardless of claims to expertise and well-meaning intention. Traditional mechanisms of peacebuilding must remain in the hands of the community. They can and should be modified to change with the times and needs of the community. They can be transformed and reshaped as necessary by those communities they serve, but they are not meant to be co-opted by outsiders nor the State, which would render them inauthentic. It is the individual members of society, not the State, who decides on tradition. They are the only experts on the malleability of traditional peacebuilding mechanisms and the only ones who can adapt them to suit their needs. Though different groups may use different methods, so long as the mechanisms provide a measure of inclusivity and respect for all those who are served and are in line with authentic culturally held beliefs, they can be successfully employed in Rwanda and other transitional societies. Traditional methods of peacebuilding are not meant to replace what the State does formally, but they can be used as they have always been in the context of modern nation states, as a supplement or alternative means.

Traditional mechanisms encourage and restore agency to the people, which they might not have as readily in contexts that are governed by powers that are not communal; this is
true whether dealing with formal government at local, state, or international levels as well as in dealing with NGOs and other groups that have their own source funding that permits them to dictate their own agendas. There simply cannot be any kind of co-opting of the traditional without the blessing of the community being served. That is not to say that the State can not have any involvement in making use of the traditional, but authenticity can not be compromised. So, the question is not whether there are any traditional peacebuilding mechanisms that are out of reach of the State, but whether or not the State has removed traditionality from what was once traditional. Any changes or reinventions to traditional peacebuilding must remain authentic and can only be reshaped by the people; otherwise, there is a risk they will not only prove ineffective, but create divisions even where the goal is unity.

This is yet another reason why exploring traditional peace building at the grass-roots level is important. Looking more deeply at notions of self and other affords greater opportunity to escape these pitfalls, placing greater emphasis on individual human agency as opposed to lumping agency into divisive categories. What is more important is to catch a glimpse of how one sees themselves in relation to others. Are people buying into the concept of “Rwandanness” and unity? At the end of the day, do they see themselves as equals with a desire to live harmoniously, as the Rwandan State would wish them to do? Or, are they still seeing themselves as divided in ways that reinforce categories…and if so, what are those labels? Perhaps it is a bit of both, because people can not forget the ways in which they previously identified themselves, even if told to do so. This is
true whether labels are based on ethnicity, locality, class, religion, or status such as survivor, widow, orphan, prisoner, returnee, student, and so on. People will identify themselves in a multitude of ways that change over time and also employ various identities at different times strategically. So, what kind of impact do peace building activities have on how people view themselves and others—have their views transformed in any way over time? If so, how?

These are questions that need to be asked. This has tremendous implications for the future as to whether or not peace will take hold. If people view themselves in the kind of essentialist and reductive categories that kingdoms, colonizers, regimes, religious leaders and researchers alike keep throwing them into, malevolent opportunists will have a much easier time sowing seeds of discord and division. A ripening of the causes and conditions that permit violence to exist is not sufficient to guarantee it. Individuals still have the power to heighten or mitigate situations. So, when a population is easily manipulated by playing on divisive concepts of self and other, there is a great danger. It was in this way that genocide was able to happen, multiple times, in Rwanda.
"At all times, look at the thing itself—the thing behind the appearance."

—Marcus Aurelius

WHY STUDY IDENTITY WITHIN RWANDAN TRADITIONAL PEACEBUILDING?

WHY MAKE THE CASE?

One of the first questions someone unfamiliar with Rwanda might ask is: Why is it so important to focus on genocide prevention in Rwanda—isn’t the genocide over? The majority of Rwandans and people familiar with Rwanda’s history and politics likely understand the importance of properly addressing this seemingly simple question. In responding, one might first note that Rwanda has had multiple genocides within its borders, and its neighbors have also experienced multiple genocides, wide-scale violence, and major civil wars that have affected Rwandans in profound ways. Thus, while this thesis focuses more narrowly on traditional peacebuilding, it can not be undertaken by one unfamiliar with Rwanda’s history and politics, as well as its regional relations amidst the course of history among the African Great Lakes peoples. To that end, a brief presentation of key historical facts is presented here. This is followed by a more in depth look at why there is a need to study identity within traditional peacebuilding, moving beyond the superficial treatment of facts concerning the causes and conditions of genocide with a theoretically grounded analysis that looks at the very nature of genocide in Rwanda. In short, there is a need to study identity as a part of genocide prevention.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO RWANDAN GENOCIDE

The territory that now comprises Rwanda and Burundi was first inhabited by an indigenous hunter-gather tribe known as the Twa. Bantu speaking peoples migrating north and Nilotic peoples migrating south settled in later. The Bantu groups were second to arrive after the Twa and were predominantly farmers. The northern groups arrived last and were predominantly semi-nomadic cattle herders. They also established chieftaincies led by mwamis. Though there were disputes, over time, most inhabitants engaged in a patron-client feudal relationship and respected the mwamis. The term Tutsi began to be used to describe the ruling elite class. In some cases, this referred not only to peoples of Nilotic origin but also of Bantu origin. The term was fluid in that it tended to denote class rather than ethnicity. Though, Tutsi were likely an actual ethnicity early on and viewed as a class later – a class that Hutu could move into depending on wealth or status. Over the years, people came to share the same culture and language, Kinyarwanda in Rwanda and Kirundi in Burundi. They also intermarried, allowing for people to move between classes. However, this would soon change in a way that would have dire consequences for the peoples of Ruanda-Urundi.

In the Great Scramble for Africa, it was the Germans who succeeded in securing Ruanda-Urundi for their colonial project. Since the colonial powers were required to secure and civilize their territories, the Germans made use of the pious. French-speaking Alsacian missionaries were the first to volunteer and began settling in Rwanda in 1900. Two
major ideologies came to influence their views on the local inhabitants. The “Great Chain of Being” theory stated that Europeans were closer to God and the angels, while Africans were closer to animals; this served to justify colonial domination in their minds. In addition, the missionaries believed in the Hamitic Hypothesis which John Hanning Speke popularized. The belief supported the notion that the Tutsi Kingdom were descendants of Noah’s son Ham. Ham and his descendants were cursed and banished to the south of the Promised Land. As part of the myth, it is believed Ham’s descendants had darker skin but still maintained some of their Caucasian features; thus, it was believed by many proponents of the myth that Tutsi were superior to “negroid” Africans. (Taylor 1999a:39) Of course, this neglected to account for the fact that the word Tutsi was mainly used to signify class and included ruling elites that hailed from the so-called "inferior" race. At some point, the term Hutu was introduced to refer to those who were ruled over by the elites. Thus, the Germans conflated Tutsi with a superior race and Hutu with an inferior race, and the ethnicization of these class terms erroneously occurred.

Following the model of indirect rule, the Germans privileged the Tutsi—who were predominantly but not exclusively of Nilotic origin and had physical features that more closely resembled Europeans—and educated them on the natural order of the world, including the Hamitic myth. Since this myth worked out in the Tutsi’s favor, many tacitly accepted it. Race played an important part in colonial rule in Ruanda-Urundu and over time served to divide the population by favoring Tutsi while oppressing Hutu and Twa. Despite the fact that the Twa tribe were the original inhabitants of Ruanda-Urundu,
the colonialists viewed them as highly inferior and child-like since they were traditionally a hunter-gatherer society and were known for making pots as opposed to raising cattle or farming. Though these ideas began with the Germans, they continued when the territory was handed over to the Belgians after World War I. The two colonial rulers believed in the science of eugenics and instilled racism into the population through the practices of governance, religion, and education. In 1930, the Belgians institutionalized this racism through policies that led to class stratification. This culminated with the issuing of national identity cards that transfixed the terms Twa, Hutu, and Tutsi, so even intermarrying would not change a spouse’s identity—though children continued to take the “ethnicity” of their father. These national identity cards would later serve as a death warrant for many people who became victims of genocide.

Rwanda and Burundi were originally one territory—Ruanda-Urundi—prior to gaining their respective independence from Belgium, and the histories of these two countries have somewhat paralleled each other. Under colonialism, Rwanda saw a gradual transition—as did the neighboring countries—from chieftaincies governed by mwamis towards more centralized state power. The Belgians generally favored individuals who were recognized as Tutsi over those regarded as Hutu. In garnering positions of importance, the minority Tutsi population were often resented by the Hutu majority—and, indeed, the latter were sometimes subject to harsh treatment and suffering under Tutsi and colonial rule. This was the case in Rwanda as well as Burundi.
Prior to and during colonial times, one could find Hutu and Tutsi across the socio-economic class spectrum, engaging in farming, herding, and other activities; however, dichotomies would later emerge as a repercussion of indirect rule: ruler and ruled, settler and alien, privileged and oppressed, and superior and inferior. The extent to which these narratives became internalized by Rwandese in the light of past and present socio-economic and political history plays a large role in why genocide took hold in Rwanda and Burundi. Patron-client relationships in Rwanda, which were traditionally mutually beneficial, began to be increasingly exploitative, especially with Belgians instituting courvée labor to pay for the War in Europe. Belgian administrators instituted the courvée but the locally appointed Tutsi administrators had to enforce it. Whereas, traditionally, dissatisfied clients could vote with their feet and secure another patron, under the Belgian system, there was little choice and oppression became a fixed state with growing resentment among the Hutu towards the Tutsi.

It is crucial to note that the Hutu-Tutsi distinction was fluid and somewhat manufactured, as there were no true ethnic distinctions between the two despite the majority of people holding steadfast to these identities. Tutsi were regarded as such either because of their physical features, which were attributed to Nilotic ancestry, or because they raised cattle, or because they were more economically well-off than the Hutu predominantly associated with farming and Bantu ancestry.

The word Hutu means subject or servant and the word Tutsi means those rich in cattle. But the differences were not solely based on wealth or class; there were Hutu and Tutsi in the same class. Tutsi pastoralists were as poor as their Hutu neighbours. (Melvern 2000:8)
However, the distinction was made more insidious.

Following the centuries old Hamitic Myth, the Belgians even sent scientists to measure people’s skulls during the heyday of eugenic “science”. Colonial rule tended to invoke the Hamitic Myth in its preferential treatment of Tutsi, which it institutionalized in its policy of rule. When the Belgians issued identity cards in the 1930’s, the determination to label Rwandans as Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa was made based on whether or not an individual was a farmer or cattle herder with no thought to the individual’s ancestral culture. Thus, the terms Hutu and Tutsi were not used to exclusively define a particular ethnic group; their use was more arbitrary but often political in nature.

Over time, Flemish priests in the Catholic Church began to take notice of the Hutu's plight. Finding similarities between the Hutu narrative and their own, the Flemish began to rally for the Hutu. As well, just prior to the time of independence, there were growing anti-colonial and nationalist sentiments sweeping newly independent –or soon to be – African nations. There was a cry to abolish both the colonial structure and the kingdom. In the end, Belgians decided to hand power over to the Hutu majority prior to the independence of 1962, supporting the idea that they were the rightful settlers of Rwanda. By 1959, political violence erupted between Tutsi and Hutu political parties, with the first instance being initiated by Tutsi. This led to a series of violent reprisals and ultimately a mass flight of Tutsi to neighboring Burundi, Uganda, and Zaire. (Taylor 1999a:43)
In Rwanda and Burundi, violent political strife often mirrored each other. There is also a close connection with the Banyarwanda who inhabit the Kivu region of Eastern Zaire. During the 1920s, tens of thousands of people migrated there, largely to work in the mining industry. Ongoing violence, politics, or periods of famine drove between 600,000 – 700,000 people out of Rwanda from 1959 to 1973. The first wave came shortly before Rwanda gained independence from Belgium in 1960. Belgium made a strategic decision to ally itself with the majority, encouraging Hutu to take power over their country. Approximately 150,000 Tutsi fled to neighboring Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire. While some of the refugees spent several years trying to fight their way back, they eventually gave up by 1964 and resigned themselves to life in exile until 1990. (Ogata 2005:172)

Gregoire Kayibanda was the first President of Rwanda, democratically elected by the Hutu majority in 1961. When his regime came under increasing criticism for favoring southern over northern Hutu, he deflected attention by revisiting the anti-Tutsi narrative. There was a violent attack on Hutu in Burundi in 1972, and Kayibanda used this to play on Hutu fears and resentments. By 1973, he began to target Tutsi wherever they enjoyed a disproportionate number of prominent positions in governance, business, the church, and education. Growing civil unrest made Tutsi nervous and take flight across the borders. It was at this time Juvenile Habyarimana seized power and promised to put an end to Southerners being favored over Northerners and restore Tutsi to their allotted
percentages of government and private sector positions. (Taylor 1999a:45) For a while all seemed well.

Habyarimana and his Mouvement Républicain National pour la Démocratie et le Développement (MRND) party ruled Rwanda from 1973 to 1994. In contrast, Burundi was ruled by a Tutsi minority from independence in 1962 until the first democratic elections in 1993 when elected President Melchior Ndadaye’s Front for Democracy in Burundi party (FRODEBU) replaced Pierre Buyoya and the Union for National Progress (UPRONA). The military, however, was still controlled by Tutsi.

Over the years since independence, Rwanda and Burundi experienced bouts of bloodshed between Hutu and Tutsi. Often, targeted outbursts of violence in one country would lead to retaliation in the other; if Hutu were targeted in one country, Tutsi would be targeted in the other, and vice versa. This also led to a lot of cross-border movement, as people would often move between the two countries to ensure their safety during times of strife. Prior to the horrific events that occurred in Rwanda in the spring of 1994, there were several incidents that could arguably qualify as genocide in which tens of thousands of people were killed with either one or another group targeted. The largest waves of violence came for both countries around the time of independence. Then, the 1972 Burundi genocide occurred; hundreds of thousands of Hutu met their death, and a considerable number of the population fled the country.
The next massive wave of violence for Burundi came in October 1993. A few months after his election, President Ndadaye was assassinated by Tutsi soldiers; this sparked a civil war which led to the mass murder of thousands of Tutsi followed by the mass murder of approximately 50,000 Hutu. Some 700,000 people fled to Rwanda, Tanzania, and Zaire, while another 250,000 remained internally displaced. As a way to end this latest cycle of violence sparked by Ndadaye’s assassination, Burundi’s parliament named a moderate FROBEDU Hutu, Cyprien Ntaryamira, as President and appointed a Tutsi UPRONA Prime Minister. Burundi’s multi-party power-sharing approach ultimately helped to stabilize the country. Nonetheless, the events of 1993 were viewed by the UNHCR as the beginning of the Great Lakes crises of the 1990s. (Cutts 2000:259 and Ogata 2005:174)

The crisis, though, arguably began much earlier. By the 1980’s exiled Rwandan Tutsi living in Uganda—who had fought with Yoweri Museveni, a Ugandan Tutsi, and his National Resistance Army (NRA) to overthrow Milton Obote—had had enough of the Rwandan government’s failure to respect the rights of Tutsi. Those Rwandan Tutsi soldiers, who had became part of the Ugandan army, subsequently formed the Front Patriotique Rwandais (RPF).¹ The RPF advocated for the right of return and citizenship for Rwandan Tutsi in exile. More than a half million Tutsi, who had been living as refugees, remained exiled in the surrounding countries. Many had left Rwanda thirty

¹ As Alison Des Forges noted in her report for Human Rights Watch, the RPF was not exclusively Tutsi. The RPF stressed national identity and actively recruited Hutu leaders and supporters. (Des Forges 1999)
years earlier, after violent reprisals precipitated by the 1962 independence and the
transfer of power to Hutu. The RPF called for an end to Hutu oppression and attacks on
Rwandan Tutsi. Meanwhile, Tutsi in the Diaspora were struggling with citizenship issues
and rights within both Uganda and Zaire. This cuts to the heart of the matter in terms of
people’s perceptions as to who is Rwandan.

Pleas for the exiles to return home from Uganda to Rwanda were denied; Habyarimana
declared that the country could not support any more people, as all available land was
being used. Land shortage and poor soil condition was a severe problem and a point of
contention among people. In 1989, a famine in the South led to many deaths and an
exodus of poor people into other countries. However, the refusal to allow Tutsi living in
exile to return was far more complicated than the shortage of land, but it was a point that
resonated with the citizens in Rwanda. This is because Hutu were predominantly farmers
and Tutsi were predominantly cattle herders, so the increasing shortage of land and
ensuing competition for farmland and grazing area was not a fact to be overlooked as a
source of ongoing tension.

By the 1980’s and into the 1990's severe drought and repeated famine plagued Rwanda.
There was also a decline in global coffee prices, the closing of tin mines in response to
decreased value, and famine. Most subsistence farmers only owned 1-2 acres and had to
produce a two-crop harvest as well as raise animals in order to survive. If not for food
aid, there would have been mass starvation. Meanwhile, imposed structural adjustment
devalued the Rwandan Franc by 40%. As a result, many Rwandans fled to Burundi and Zaire. Favoritism among the regime led to a military-merchant class with class divisions sharpening ever since independence, producing an urban bourgeoisie and a rural aristocracy. In Africa’s most densely populated nation, 17% of the population owned 43% of the land, increasing tensions over arable soil. (Taylor 1999a:36-38) By 1989, the unresolved problems of the Tutsi in exile, land shortage, and economic troubles created problems for the Habyarimana regime. This coupled with the formation of a number of political opposition parties –courtesy of pressure from the West to embrace its notions of pluralism and fair elections –caused Habyarimana and his MRND party to revisit the anti-Tutsi deflection strategies used by his predecessor. (Taylor 1999a:47)

In Uganda, exiled Rwandans who were mostly Tutsi but also Hutu continued to clamor for citizenship and land rights there. In 1986, President Milton Obote instigated violence against them, killing upwards of 80,000 people. When Yoweri Museveni decided to overthrow Obote, many exiled Rwandans in Uganda helped. Once in power, Museveni supported the Diaspora community’s rekindled desire to return to Rwanda, and he helped arm the RPF.

By 1990, the RPF tried to fight their way back into Rwanda after failed negotiations for the right of return. Habyarimana, the MRND, and extremists began to demonize Tutsi. Renewed vigor in ousting Tutsi as foreigners that did not have rights to Rwandan land took center stage in propaganda narratives. Habyarimana was also concerned with
deflecting corruption associated with his regime; his wife, Agathe Kanziga Habyarimana, her brother, Protais Zigiranyirazo (a.k.a. “Mr. Z”), and her relatives’ clan –known as the Akazu (meaning little house) –were a small, powerful group that many Rwandans feared and considered greedy, hateful, and violent. Mr. Z. was known for running the Akazu and its Zero Network death squads.\(^2\) The Akazu needed scapegoats to detract attention from their actions and to help preserve their reign of power. To that end the Akazu’s control and influence of the media (i.e. the Kangura newspaper and RTLM radio) set the wheels of propaganda in motion that stirred up ethnic hatred and ultimately led to the rise of “Hutu Power”. A climate discriminating against Tutsi was increasing, as was violence and murder with impunity.

The media owned by the state, the Akazu, or controlled by other sympathizers began a long-term propaganda campaign to incite hatred among the Hutu for the Tutsi, invoking the Hamitic Myth, as well as uglier times in Rwandan history. They referred to Tutsi as inyenzi (meaning cockroaches) and called for their destruction. Most notably, radio RTLM spread hatred against the minority Tutsi population with its daily speeches. In addition, Kangura magazine run by Hassan Ngeze was infamous for its ongoing series of propaganda cartoons, and its December 1990 publication of the divisive Hutu Ten Commandments. This was a vituperative manifesto that –among other things –called on Hutu to separate from Tutsi in personal and business relationships or be held as traitors. (Temple-Raston 2005:116-117) Those behind RTLM and Kangura’s hate propaganda

\(^2\) The ICTR was prosecuting Mr. Z. for genocide planning, but he was released due to procedural errors. (Karuretwa 2009)
would later be tried by the ICTR for inciting genocide. There were quite a number of
authority figures, intellectuals, and even school teachers and clergy involved in inflaming
the general population, which was being primed for genocide.

In 1990, the RPF crossed the Ugandan border and invaded Rwanda. The fighting ended
with pressure from neighboring countries and the international community. This resulted
in the 1993 Arusha Accords, which established a power-sharing agreement between the
Rwandan government and the RPF. The RPF soldiers were to be integrated into the
national armed forces. Both the RPF and Habyarimana’s regime were stalling in
implementing the terms under the Arusha agreement –several deadlines were missed.
The United Nations sent a peacekeeping force, United Nations Assistance Mission to
Rwanda (UNAMIR), to assist in a smooth transition. Meanwhile, the state was forming
civilian militias, notably the Interahamwe (meaning “those who stand together”) and the
Impuzamugambi (meaning “those who have a single goal”), and Tutsi were periodically
targeted for violence causing deaths and continued cross-border flight. Simultaneously,
Hutu were targeted periodically in Burundi, and many fled to Rwanda. Tragically,
UNAMIR’s mandate was limited and they could neither stop the impending genocide nor
provide any real assistance.

On April 6, 1994 the plane carrying President Habyarimana and President Ntaryamira
was shot down. Responsibility for this event remains a point of contention among many
individuals and even nations who have endeavored to investigate the crash –in fact, this
issue exacerbated existing tensions between the Rwandan and French governments who have traded blame on a variety of issues related to the genocide. Rwanda’s bitterness towards France for its role in exacerbating the 1994 genocide—evacuating some of its architects, providing safe harbor for tens of thousands of génocidaires among the throngs of legitimate refugees via Operation Turquoise, and accusing the RPF of shooting down Habyarimana’s plane and committing war crimes, as well as its harsh criticisms of Paul Kagame’s regime—is, perhaps, one of several reasons why Rwanda has rejected the French language and made English its official working language.\(^3\) Regardless of who was behind the shooting down of the plane, one thing is clear: The assassination of Habyarimana was used by Hutu extremists to incite violence; they blamed the RPF, yet within hours of the crash, road blocks were set up by the military Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR). The FAR and Interahamwe began mobilizing smaller militias, handing out new machetes and giving standby orders to the local communities. Targeted murders of political opponents, Tutsi, and moderate Hutu began immediately with mass murder of the general Tutsi population following within a few days. (Gourevitch 1998:39)

The genocide was systematic and very thorough—it was not simply enough for Tutsi to flee their homes. Wherever they hid—in churches, in hospitals, in Tutsi dominant

\(^3\) Other reasons might be that English is a key aid and development language—the commonwealth population is over two billion with a trade of $2.8 trillion annually (Kagire 2009) –and that the mainly Anglophone RPF might view English as a way to empower their rule while weakening the largely francophone Hutu majority’s ability to vie for top positions in government and business.
communities that had Tutsi leadership—they were hunted and murdered. Most people were hacked to death by machete, and their property, goods, and cattle considered spoils for the taking. When hiding places were exhausted, the génocidaires (mainly FAR, Interahamwe, local militias, and authority figures who willingly and actively participated in the murders) gave specific orders as to which areas of the forest and marshes were to be searched each day in order to hunt and kill Tutsi seeking cover in the wilderness. The ideology of the génocidaires was: If any Tutsi were allowed to escape, they could later pose a threat. Killing every last man, woman, child, and infant solved several problems: it meant there would be no witnesses to report the atrocities—since the killing was a communal effort and frequently obligatory, many génocidaires felt they had either done nothing wrong or could escape individual blame; there would be fewer Tutsi to maintain control of the country; and problems of land shortage and dire poverty (thanks to looting and free meat from the slaughter of Tutsi herds) were temporarily abated. Within three months, at least a half million Tutsi and some moderate Hutu were killed; other experts place the death toll as high as 800,000. The Government of Rwanda suggests the loss of life exceeded one million. Approximately 75% of the Tutsi population was murdered. (Des Forges 1999)

The International Community remained focused on ending the civil war, but had failed to intervene in the genocide. African Union and United Nations troops were deployed on the Uganda/Rwanda frontier to help maintain cease fire agreements. Later, to help smooth the transition to a power-sharing government and integrate the RPF with the
Rwandan army, the UN established a mandate for an assistance mission (UNAMIR). This mandate allowed for peacekeeping only, to help monitor events and aid in ending Rwanda’s civil war with the implementation of the Arusha Agreement. This limited mandate and a lack of political will were to be cited later by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as two of the top reasons why the genocide was not stopped. (Organization of African Unity 2000)

A DISCUSSION OF SELECT LITERATURE ON THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE
The basic facts presented herein are well documented across a large body of literature; however, for a more detailed treatment, one can examine any among a number of good works. There are hundreds of excellent works relevant to understanding the genocide; an annotated summary of some key works is attached as Appendix A. These works cover a variety of theoretical perspectives and approaches towards analysis, all of which attempt to situate their focus with a larger historical frame. Many of the works concentrate on one or more of the following thematic areas: chiefdoms and kingdom, colonialism, types of rule, power, and governance; the environmental impact of natural resources, overpopulation, and land scarcity; poverty, economic conditions, and the role of NGOs and big business; political, economic, and social marginalization; issues of citizenship, migration, immigrants, and refugees; class, ethnicity, race, and identity; extremist ideology and institutionalizing prejudice; hate speech, symbolic hatred, enemy imagery, propaganda, and the role of media in incitement; religion and the positive and negative role of church leaders; the role of the OAU, UN, regional and international state actors,
early warning, and intervention; civil war and regional wars; physical and psychological impacts on human beings; survivor stories and eye-witness testimony; sexual violence, AIDS, and orphans; justice, legal mechanisms, prisons, tribunals, and gacaca; and memory, forgiveness, healing, and reconciliation.

Rather than cover all these themes, specific aspects of particular works in relation to identity and genocide in Rwanda will be discussed. Anthropologist Mahmood Mamdani’s work on identity construction will help reveal why it is important to understand the role of identity in relation to political violence. Use of the body to assert identity, restoration of social order through rituals of purification, and propaganda is analyzed by anthropologist Christopher C. Taylor. Interviews with survivors and génocidaires conducted by journalist Jean Hatzfeld will illustrate the value of individual narratives, which often differ greatly from State and religious constructed narratives calling for unity and reconciliation. Through these narratives, one can catch a glimpse of how interviewees see themselves and others. Across all these discussions, the role of identity will be a central focus but approached from different frames that situate actors in the context of genocide.

It is helpful to note that the working definition of genocide employed throughout this thesis is that coined by Raphael Lemkin and adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 9, 1948 in Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide – a copy of which is attached as Appendix B.

(United Nations 1948)

Furthermore, the findings of Mamdani, Taylor, and Hatzfeld can be viewed within the context of anthropologist, international lawyer, and genocide scholar Gregory Stanton’s *Eight Stages of Genocide*, a document he wrote while working for the United States Department of State in 1996. A widely respected guideline, his work is regularly cited by numerous scholars.

…he writes: “Genocide is a process that develops in eight stages that are unpredictable but not inexorable. At each stage, preventive measures can stop it. The later stages must be preceded by the earlier stages, though earlier stages continue to operate throughout the process in a nonlinear way.” For an explanation of each stage, see http://www.genocidewatch.org/8stages.htm (Totten, Bartrop, and Jacobs 2008:128)

Stanton has since updated his guideline to include two additional stages. Newly revised, *The Ten Stages of Genocide* are as follows: classification, symbolization, discrimination, dehumanization, organization, polarization, preparation, persecution, extermination, and denial. (Stanton 2013) All of Stanton’s stages emerge in the ensuing discussion. A full explanation of Stanton’s stages is attached as Appendix C.

POLARIZED POLITICALLY-CONSTRUCTED IDENTITIES

Genocide may be defined – despite the limitations of definition – and outlined in stages, but it is more difficult to make sense of it. Across the wide spectrum of literature on

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4 Dr. Stanton is also currently a professor at the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University.
genocide in Rwanda, few transcend focusing on the causes and conditions to get at the thing itself—what permits one to pick up a machete and carry out a violent act requires more. In his work, *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda*, Mahmood Mamdani makes genocide “thinkable”. He situates the identity distinction in Rwanda within the larger context of the citizenship crisis in post-colonial Africa. He traces this back to what he considers the criminal construction of political identities by colonial powers that defined who is “native” and who is “alien”—a dialectic he characterizes as emanating from “settler libel” and later morphing into a rallying cry for self-assertion continuing far beyond the colonial era and into the present day. “It is in this context that Tutsi, a group with a privileged relationship to power before colonialism, got constructed as a privileged alien settler presence, first by the great nativist revolution of 1959, and then by Hutu Power propaganda after 1990.” (Mamdani 2001:14)

As such, Mamdani believes the genocide in Rwanda should be viewed as a “natives’ genocide” in which those who considered themselves the rightful inhabitants of the land attempted to remove those they deemed an alien presence—a presence which had controlled and oppressed the native population, causing them great suffering. In forging and institutionalizing identities, Mamdani carefully teases out the contrasting effects of direct and indirect rule. He notes that in the case of Uganda and Congo, the participation of local leadership through indirect rule led to the formation of politically constructed identities along both racial and ethnic lines; Belgian rule in Rwanda was a different mix
of direct and indirect rule which characterized political identities on the basis of race.

The bottom line for Mamdani is to wrest responsibility for negatively politicizing identity in a discriminatory, racist way on the colonial powers and the political elite, post 1959 – the former largely responsible for creating and institutionalizing these identities and the later for continuing to embrace it.

In reviewing history, it is clear that identities in Rwanda were fluid and linked to institutions and client relationships that harken back to the kingdoms; this history reveals both cooperation and exploitation. When the Rwandan state was founded in the 1600s, Tutsi was akin to an ethnicity, whereas Hutu was a term constructed to refer to various ethnic groups who were subjects of the mwami. Later, Tutsi was synonymous with class and power; through intermarriage, individuals were able to change from Hutu to Tutsi or vice versa. Finally, colonial powers denoted Tutsi as a subordinate alien power and Hutu as native subjects. After the 1933 census in Rwanda, identities became fixed. (Mamdani 2001:101-102)

Rather than focus on early formation –though absolutely germane –this thesis will briefly look at political constructions in colonial and post-colonial Rwanda. However, for a deeper look at Rwandan identity across history it is good to consult the works of Jan Vansina on the clans and mwami-led kingdoms; Catherine Newbury has also made significant contributions on clientship. Building on such prior good works, Mahmood Mamdani tries to unravel issues around identity in a way that other scholars trying to
make sense of the genocide simply haven’t. For Mamdani, identity is neither primordial bound up in culture nor instrumental subject to market transactions; rather, it is historically constructed through the evolution of the nation state. Inscribed in law and institutions, identities change and endure over time. Bound up with culture, economics, and politics, identities are multiple, intersecting, and blur together while also influencing one another. Thus, Mamdani tries to make the Rwandan genocide thinkable by “creating a synthesis between history, geography, and politics.” (Mamdani 2001:8)

He begins with a critical look at the assumptions underlying area studies, which predominated the early body of literature on genocide in Rwanda as well as Africa in general. First, it limits boundaries of knowledge to state borders without regional consideration; the result is the limiting of epistemological boundaries to state boundaries. Where area studies does examine the impact of colonial rule, it does so only locally (and imperially) but not regionally between African countries. With respect to Rwanda, this resulted in scholars treating the causes of genocide solely within Rwanda’s boundaries. More than that, Mamdani finds historical writing complicit with imperialism in that it naturalized political identities of Hutu and Tutsi. As well, important early works analyzing Rwanda’s 1959 revolution failed to examine how the post-colonial State continued to reproduce and cement these politically manufactured identities to suit its agenda. Therefore, Mamdani sees the need for an “intellectual decolonization” that breaks away from interpreting the history of former colonies through the very narrow lenses of colonialism and the Cold War.
Mamdani’s second critique of area studies is the tendency of researchers to treat facts on their own. Instead, there is a need to analyze facts in context, grounded and illuminated by theory. The history of political identities has varied—whether couched in terms of race, religion, nationality, etc.—and Rwandan identities must be studied within the logical context of colonialism. This, Mamdani says, led to two murderous impulses: first, the genocide of the native by the settler; and second, the native impulse to eliminate the settler.

The great crime of colonialism went beyond expropriating the native, the name it gave to the indigenous population. The greater crime was to politicize indigeneity in the first place: first negatively, as a settler libel of the native; but then positively, as a native response, as a self-assertion. (Mamdani 2001:14)

While the first impulse seems easy to define as genocide, the second is a bit harder to discern as it is hidden behind political motives to break free from an oppressor.

Because it was derivative of settler violence, the natives’ violence appeared less of an outright aggression and more of a self-defense in the face of continuing aggression. Faced with the violent denial of his humanity by the settler, the native’s violence began as a counter to violence. It even seemed more like the affirmation of the native’s humanity than the brutal extinction of life that it came to be. When the native killed the settler, it was violence by yesterday’s victims. More of a culmination of anticolonial resistance than a direct assault on life and freedom, this violence of victims-turned-perpetrators always provoked a greater moral ambiguity than did the settlers’ violence.

More than any other, two political theorists, Hannah Arendt and Frantz Fanon, have tried to think through these twin horrors of colonialism. We shall later see that when Hannah Arendt set out to understand the Nazi Holocaust, she put it in the context of a history of one kind of genocide: the settlers’ genocide of the native. When Frantz Fanon came face-to-face with native violence, he understood its logic as that of an eye for an eye, a response to a prior violence, and not an invitation to fresh violence. It was for Fanon the violence to end violence, more like a utopian wish to close the chapter on colonial violence in the hope of heralding a new humanism. (Mamdani 2001:9-10)
How did this great crime occur? Mamdani explains that while both the Germans and Belgians racialized the terms Hutu and Tutsi, it was the Belgians who politicized these identities through their system of governance. Over a decade, beginning in the mid-1920s, the Belgians began the process of constructing Hutu identity as Bantus, indigenous to Rwanda, while Tutsi were viewed as Hamites that were not native to the soil. Through the hybrid form of direct and indirect rule instituted by the Belgians, racial difference was legally recognized and politicized through institutions, leading to great structural violence that favored and empowered Tutsi. Mamdani shows how these identities changed across different phases in the formation of the State. Tutsi got constructed as privileged alien settlers by the nativist revolution of 1959 and then again by “Hutu Power” propaganda after 1990.

Mamdani explains the genocide was not an ethnic cleansing but a racial one –as the colonialists had racialized the distinction between Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. They asserted Tutsi racial superiority, which they sought to justify by evoking the Hamitic myth, in comparison to Hutu and Twa. Through the system of governance, Tutsi under the mwami were able to rule over Hutu. For Mamdani, the 1959 revolution was a failure in that it maintained these false identities in the name of justice and revenge. The next Rwandan regime fared no better, simply redefining Tutsi from a separate race to an indigenous ethnic minority group. Meanwhile, the regime continued to deny citizenship rights to Tutsi exiles. (Mamdani 2001:16-17)

In its motivation and construction, I argue that the Rwandan genocide needs to be understood as a natives’ genocide. It was a genocide by those who saw
themselves as sons –and daughters –of the soil, and their mission as one of clearing the soil of a threatening alien presence. This was not an “ethnic” but a “racial” cleansing, not a violence against one who is seen as a neighbor but against one who is seen as a foreigner; not a violence that targets a transgression across a boundary into home but one that seeks to eliminate a foreign presence from home soil, literally and physically. From this point of view, we need to distinguish between racial and ethnic violence: ethnic violence can result in massacres, but not genocide. Massacres are about transgressions, excess; genocide questions the very legitimacy of a presence as alien. For the Hutu who killed, the Tutsi was a settler, not a neighbor. (Mamdani 2001:14)

Mamdani compares Rwanda with the Holocaust perpetrated by Nazis who conflated religion with race, portraying Jews as an alien race that required elimination. In both cases, race was embedded institutionally creating structural violence. Mamdani notes that whereas cultural identities can overlap, politicized identities do not and can be easily polarized. In the case of Rwanda, direct rule separated people based on race; indirect rule did the same, plus it divided the natives into various ethnicities –so cultural identities became political ones and were transformed or reinvented to suit colonial aims as well as those of local actors who were able to exert their influence. The non-indigenous were governed by civil law, but the natives were governed by customary law. Furthermore, customary law differed for each ethnicity. This had powerful implications. Belonging to an ethnic group meant one could claim customary rights, such as ethnic citizenship or land rights as a group member of a Native Authority. For Mamdani, the great failure of the postcolonial regimes was that they needed to “deracialize” civic power and “deethnicize” customary power and join them together –they did not; what happened, though, was they accomplished the first but not the second, so citizenship remained bifurcated and continued distinguishing between ethnic indigenous and ethnic strangers. This had dire implications for the right of return of Tutsi exiles. They viewed themselves
as Rwandan, whereas, the political regimes viewed them as outsiders without access to land rights. Eventually, the regime viewed those trying to return as invaders.

Mamdani raises some good points with respect to identity and genocide in Rwanda. However, using the native versus alien distinction as a pretext for genocide only covers a portion of the larger picture. Such a distinction doesn't explain why among those who couched their identity in terms of this racial dialectic between Hutu and Tutsi some participated in the genocide and others not. That is to say that just because an individual strongly viewed themselves as Hutu, bought into the racial dialectic, harbored resentments against Tutsi, and viewed them as foreigners doesn’t mean we can assume they would have been bystanders at best.

Identity is extremely complex, multilayered, and dynamic—we can not reduce it to one mass identity inscribed by state or other actors through propaganda and institutions even though such influence is an essential component to creating conditions of genocide. Mamdani focuses a lot of attention on state inscribed power and also notes that killing Tutsi became a communal project; since the time of the 1990 RPF invasion, there was a deliberate effort to use the “customary” as opposed to the “civic” apparatus of the state. During the genocide, people were told to go to “work”. Mamdani notes that umuganda was code language that derived meaning back in the colonial period to denote customary obligation, thus, used to create a distinction between indigenous and non-indigenous.
Clearing the land of alien men, women, and children, was likened to clearing the bush and uprooting weeds. (Mamdani 2001:193-194)

IDENTITY, SYMBOLISM, EXTRA-LETHAL VIOLENCE, AND PROPAGANDA

While much of genocide theory has been, rightfully, preoccupied with the underlying causes of genocidal thought and violence to which political economic theory is quite helpful, to a much lesser extent has the cultural complexity of violence been teased out to understand the function of violence beyond a reductionist embodiment of hatred towards a perceived enemy, pre-emptive group self-defense, the preservation and restoration of perceived social order, or the physical limitation (i.e. attempted extermination) of a particular group which characterizes the very definition of genocide. A handful of theorists wish to expand on the study of violence and get at its more deeply rooted and intimate meanings to explain its role. Thus, it may be possible to better understand –in conjunction with the understanding of causal conditions –why genocidal violence takes different forms. In particular, it may elucidate why the genocide in Rwanda was carried out so swiftly and why particular forms of violence were made manifest.

Christian Krohn-Hansen calls for new cross-cultural anthropological theories that reflect on and empirically examine violent processes. He repudiates the idea of reducing violence to a natural form of biological aggression. Specifically, he asks for anthropologists to take up the challenge of viewing violence from the lens of the perpetrator as performance “constituting the ‘raw material’ of society.” (Krohn-Hansen
He notes Paul Heelas’s hermeneutic approach calling for a relativistic-comparative framework to examine violence is a natural expansion on the ideas of Max Weber, Clifford Geertz, and Michelle Rosaldo, who regard the interdependence between social relationships, ideas, and perceptions as influenced by lived experience embedded in cultural contexts. Though, Krohn-Hansen cautions against taking relativity too far.

Understanding violence as interaction includes consideration of moral harm. Restoring the importance of human agency, Pierre Bordieu notes that individuals are socialized within a structured domain that consists of roles and relationships which permit (or deny) access to material or social capital. The individual learns how to negotiate their roles and relationships relative to their position in the domain and what is expected of them. Over time, they become habituated, internalizing relationships and expectations. Thus, external structure is internalized in the “habitus” and individual agents externalize human interaction in the social field. In this way, Bordieu reconciles structure with human agency by setting them in a dialectical relationship. One is at once creating and influenced by the habitus in a constant turning; thus, violence should also be understood in this manner. More importantly, by considering the symbolic nature of violence, Bordieu illuminates its existence beyond direct physical harm—an important concept that resonates with Johan Galtung’s ideas on structural and cultural violence. Bordieu, therefore, makes an important contribution with respect to the understanding of violence that expands on and moves beyond notions of hegemony.

By this Bourdieu means an actor's ability to acquire and maintain a permanent hold on another by manipulating moral and emotional commitments based on
practical or economic commitments. Bourdieu further describes symbolic violence as the invisible form of violence, as the violence that is never acknowledged, and as the violation of trust and of loyalty, gifts, hospitality, gratefulness, and piety. (Krohn-Hans 1994:369)

Bordieu's study of symbolic violence is valuable, but it must be taken up within the context of other theories that account for the causes of violence as well as the function of violence. One might characterize the invisible recurring violence Bordieu alludes to as evidence of what Galtung terms negative peace; that is to say, there is a cessation of physical violence without resolving the persistent underlying structural and cultural violence. When all elements are dealt with—direct violence, structural violence, and cultural violence—there can be positive peace, which is a more stable and enduring peace than the mere absence of physical harm. (Galtung 1969 and Galtung 1970)

Krohn-Hans notes David Riches's *The Anthropology of Violence* published in 1986 tries to build a comparative model to uncover the prominence and purpose of violence, which is at once strategic and designed to produce meaning. It does so as perpetrators try to legitimate their violent actions and views as well as preemptively weaken their victim’s ability to retaliate. Riches views violence as a social resource comprised of four universal characteristics: 1) that violent performance is contestable and viewed as legitimate by perpetrators and illegitimate by witnesses and victims; 2) violence is unmistakably and universally understood as a means of physical harm and hurt, and not contestable on that point; 3) violence is highly sensory; and 4) violent performance requires no special knowledge or tools. In this way, violence is both practical and symbolic; it can instigate change and play out key cultural ideas. This idea, however, has
many limitations by focusing on the triangle of perpetrator-witness-victim and notions of legitimacy. (Krohn-Hans 1994:370-371)

Perhaps a better vantage point for examining the role of violence –and genocidal violence in particular –is John Corbin's 1977 *An Anthropological Perspective on Violence*. Here Corbin makes use of the symbolic theories of Edmund Leach, Mary Douglas, and Victor Turner. As Krohn-Hansen explains, Corbin posits that violence is a way of not only harming or destroying but –like all other forms of human action –is driven by the need for coherence. There is a need to fit one’s structural mental maps, which are fixed, with the changing reality of the world. So, there is a constant dialectic going on in which the real world challenges fixed concepts, and either the real world or the fixed concept must be altered. Corbin asserts that when mental maps are threatened, there is a violation of identity. Therefore, violence serves as one way to defend hierarchical conceptual reality, and is proportionate to both the strength of the perceived threat and the importance of the category at risk. (Krohn-Hans 1994:372-373)

Taken in this way, one might be able to account for the speed and ferocity of the Rwandan genocide by invoking Riches’s notion of pre-emptive defensive strategy and Corbin’s threat to identity. Thus, the idea existed that Tutsi were not only a physical threat but one that endangers polluting Rwandan identity –which consisted of autochthonous Hutu and Twa but not an alien supplanted “other”. There was also an element of legitimizing the use of violence through the act of violence in, at least, two
important ways: 1) the need to kill “them” before they kill “us”, and 2) a cohesive need to safeguard a certain perceived cosmology that wishes to restore societal order by purifying and preserving Rwandan identity. That is to say, the belief that Tutsi were only outsiders is one thing... of greater importance is the perceived treacherous nature of Tutsi masquerading as Rwandan but secretly intent on bringing about the ruination of society – this is precisely what “Hutu Power” propagated through hate rhetoric.

From here it is helpful to turn to the works of Arjun Appadurai, Liisa Malkki, and Mary Douglas, before looking at the important work of Charles Taylor on the Rwandan genocide.

In one widely shared perspective, ethnic violence, as a form of collective violence, is partly a product of propaganda, rumor, prejudice, and memory – all forms of knowledge and all usually associated with heightened conviction, conviction capable of producing inhumane degrees of violence. But there is an alternative approach to ethnic violence, with roots traceable to Durkheim’s (1951) work on anomie and Simmel’s (1950) ideas about the stranger. (Appadurai 1998:225)

For Appadurai, doubt, uncertainty, and indeterminacy regarding identity is one of the functions of extra-lethal ethnic violence. Such extreme violent acts serve as “brutal forms of bodily discovery – forms of vivisection; emergent techniques for exploring, marking, classifying, and storing the bodies of those who may be the ‘ethnic’ enemy.” (Appadurai 1998:233)

Anthropology has long known about the ways in which the body is a theater for social performances and productions (Bourdieu 1977; Comaroff 1985; Douglas 1966; Martin 1992; Mauss 1973; van Gennep 1965). Combining Malkki’s material on ethnic violence in Burundi with Geschiere’s study of witchcraft in Cameroon, against the backdrop of Douglas’s pathbreaking work on category confusion, power, and taboo, allows us to see that the killing, torture, and rape
associated with ethnocidal violence is not simply a matter of eliminating the ethnic other. It involves the use of the body to establish the parameters of this otherness, taking the body apart, so to speak, to divine the ‘enemy’ within. (Appadurai 1998:233-234)

There is a sense of investigation to see if a person is really what they claim to be or have been characterized to be. Malkki’s work on the “mythico-histories” of Burundian Hutu’s examines the way violence was carried out against them during massacres in the 1960’s and 1972. She claims Tutsi killers used shared “necrographic” maps to identify Hutu based on the physical differences denoted by colonial taxonomy, but the process was filled with uncertainty. (Appadurai 1998:230)

Malkki (following Feldman 1991) suggests that these maps of bodily difference are themselves delicately poised between acquired knowledge and techniques of detection. These maps “help construct and imagine ethnic difference,” and “through violence, bodies of individual persons become metamorphosed into specimens of the ethnic category for which they are supposed to stand” (Malkki 1995, 88). (Appadurai 1998:233-234)

Appadurai also finds here a connection with the work of Douglas on purity. For Douglas, taboos pertain to “matter out of place” or the mixing of categories that encompass a particular cultural cosmological system, so they are fixed; however, Appadurai notes in examining the evidence presented by Malkki and others that preoccupation of the body and violence inflicted upon it allude to the need to make certain what is uncertain, namely, ethnic differences as revealed by the body. However, ethnic physiological stereotypes are just that—they are not an absolute given. Thus, the body can be used, as Malkki claims, as a way to discover the ethnic other and serve as necrographic maps.

In a word, real bodies in history betray the very cosmologies they are meant to encode. So the ethnic body, both of victim and of killer, is itself potentially deceptive. Far from providing the map for a secure cosmology, a compass from which mixture, indeterminacy, and danger may be discovered, the ethnic body
turns out to be itself unstable and deceptive. It is this reversal of Douglas’s cosmologic that might best explain macabre patterns of violence directed against the body of the ethnic other. The peculiar formality—the specific preoccupation with particular body parts—is an effort to stabilize the body of the ethnic other; to eliminate the flux introduced by somatic variation, by mixture and intermarriage, and to evict the possibility of further somatic change or slippage. (Appadurai 1998:233-234)

This probing and testing violence functions as a means to preserve and stabilize the body of the ethnic other; in this way, they will continue to fit ethnic stereotypes and preserve a separated cosmology. Furthermore, where the other is seen as a trickster or imposter, there is a need to unmask them to see the real person, and often this takes the form of rape or torture. Thus, manifestations of genocidal violence deserve more careful consideration and analysis that helps to situate it in a larger historical, cultural, and political context. We also need to explore the link between such forms of extra-lethal violence and propaganda.

There has been some scholarly debate about the correlation between propaganda and genocidal violence in the context of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Some scholars give great credence to the direct link between propaganda and violence; whereas, others feel it has had little impact. Rather than assume we are left at an impasse where one must decide which more closely reflects the truth, we might consider both views. If you target the masses with effective propaganda, it is likely that a certain percentage of vulnerable people will be swayed if there are negative conditions in their daily lived experience; propaganda plays with reality and takes people's real life economic woes, insecurities, and fears and manipulates them. This is a form of cultural violence that often occurs
tangentially with structural and physical violence, and all three influence one another. So, the impact of propaganda will vary from person to person depending upon how they are situated with respect to various forms of ongoing violence; among other factors, impact may also be tied to one’s cosmology, personal values, religious beliefs, level of ignorance, vulnerability, and ability or lack thereof to engage in critical thinking.

One can imagine that most people don't naturally harbor genocidal thoughts. One of the main functions of genocidal propaganda is to create enemy imagery. However, the average person would likely reject such imagery at first if it wasn’t grounded in a historical and culturally meaningful context. What makes genocidal propaganda effective is its persistence in repeatedly using such negative imagery within narratives that instill a sense of shared injustice and fear. In this way, propaganda plays on people's emotions. Even then, most people will continue to reject extremist views, but propaganda points to the past and present to convince people that lies are truth –it often does this in a subtle manner regardless of whether its expression is mild or extreme. It continues to hammer away at the mind, slowly creating an enemy other and continually alienating and polarizing that other from the rest of society.

A central component of Nazi propaganda, Julius Streicher's newspaper, Der Stürmer, featured anti-semitic narratives from 1923-1945. Most notably, a series of cartoons illustrated by Philipp Rupprecht portrayed Jews as greedy, scheming, manipulative, hypersexualized, lecherous, child-molesting, raping, murderous, diseased vermin that
threatened to violate the purity of good German women and children. Young children were inculcated via Streicher's published series of anti-Semitic children's books –that looked and read like fairytales –including *Der Giftpilz* (“The Toadstool” or “The Poison Mushroom”). (Hiemer and Fips 1938) Written in 1938, it likened the Jew to an enticing but deadly mushroom; children were warned of its dangers.

The symbolism invoked by the Nazis paralleled centuries old blood libel and furthered the narrative that branded Jews as a foreign, insidious cancer and misfortune for the German people. Streicher was eventually convicted of crimes against humanity and executed. Hassan Ngeze, who ran *Kangura* in Rwanda prior to and during the genocide in 1994, is often likened to Streicher for producing dehumanizing enemy imagery against the Tutsi. This occurred in both writings and cartoons that portrayed Tutsi as sneaky, treacherous, vermin… foreigners whose goal was to take over Rwanda and rule over (or kill) the Hutu. As mentioned before, Ngeze was successfully prosecuted by the ICTR for inciting genocide through hate rhetoric in *Kangura*. The rhetoric and cartoons in both *Der Stürmer* and *Kangura* are often compared by genocide scholars examining the role of media and enemy imagery. (Temple-Raston 2005:197)

Linking this to Mamdani’s theory, such enemy imagery can be properly situated and tied to: historically-rooted and institutionalized racism manifesting as physical, structural, and cultural violence; criminal colonial policies, stemming from the hybridization of direct and indirect rule, purposefully constructing politically polarized false ethnic identities as
exclusionary native-settler binaries; the contemporary struggle for Diasporans to obtain citizenship in their lands of exile, and the inevitable fight of Diasporans for the right of return to Rwanda that culminated in civil war. Thus, the fight for exiled Tutsi to claim civic citizenship rights by staking customary rights to land is characterized in genocide propaganda as a continuation of the alien settler trying to dominate the native.

These ideas also played into existing cultural narratives centered on the Hamitic Myth, a history of oppression, and traditional Rwandan customs; thus, attempting to stir feelings of Hutu group victimization by using symbolism. Hidden messages coded by the transmitter, embedded in hate propaganda, are understood by the targeted receiver through shared cultural meanings. It is easy for an outsider who does not possess knowledge of the history and culture to miss these deeper culturally laden messages and simply focus on the more superficial dehumanizing aspects of genocide propaganda. For a more detailed explanation, it would be helpful to turn to the theoretical works of Leach, Douglas, and Turner; unfortunately, if falls beyond the scope of this thesis. However, the work of Taylor will be discussed helping to illuminate the connection between history, politics, culture, symbols, identity, extra-lethal violence, and propaganda.

One of the unique things about genocide propaganda is that it ultimately portends the destruction of one group by another. Since the average person would have a hard time acquiescing to –let alone participating in –the State-sponsored mass murder of their fellow civilians, propaganda helps them “get there”. For many people… murder is
wrong, but self-defense is another story. If the State creates the false perception that an
enemy threatens the existence of the population, it stands to reason that the enemy must
be eliminated. Propaganda is a tool used to shift cognition and perception among a
significant portion of the population (including those that make up the military, law
enforcement, and related militias). In this way, people can assist the State –whether out
of a sense of patriotic duty or fear –in purging the threat. Even if the majority of the
population simply doesn't interfere with the genocidal work of the State, propaganda has
done its service in helping facilitate genocide through acquiescence.

While the role of propaganda in genocide is widely discussed in the scholarly literature,
the use of symbols in propaganda is typically given cursory attention with the same
regurgitated explanations loosely connecting symbols to widely-held cultural beliefs
among its target audiences. The problem lies in the difficulty of a cultural outsider,
which most genocide researchers are, to understand all the hidden meanings symbols
carry; thus, it is easy to analyze the overt while overlooking that which might be readily
understood by most cultural insiders, or perceived by them even at a subconscious level.
Where is the literature devoted to a deep emic analysis of propaganda symbolism with
respect to the Rwandan genocide? It is important to understand how symbols function
within propaganda and analyze how they penetrate the minds of their receivers within a
deeply embedded and highly nuanced cultural system.
One researcher, despite being a cultural outside, has successfully taken on this challenge. Medical anthropologist Christopher C. Taylor has devoted attention to studying cultural concepts of the body and personhood among Rwandese. Naturally, individual perception is unique, but there is a shared understanding of common cultural themes and notions rooted in Rwandan society and tradition. Thus, Taylor tries to tease out the role of symbolism in Rwandan genocide propaganda. He notes that planning and dispatching genocide involves rational and ordered decisions. Even when the State appears to have totally collapsed, there is order in the chaos found among patterns. To examine this requires a knowledge of history, politics, culture, and the socio-economic preconditions leading up to it. Taylor’s analytical approach considers the precursors in historical context and traces the roots of genocide ideology, but he then goes further than most other scholars.

Taylor’s book *Sacrifice as Terror: The Rwandan Genocide of 1994* is both a first-hand account as well as an examination of the cultural dimensions of the Rwandan genocide. The first part of the book deals with Taylor’s own trauma of experiencing the Rwandan genocide, evacuated by the UN with his Tutsi fiancé within the first few days. The second part deals with an analysis of propaganda and symbolism. Taylor’s previous work in Rwanda used cognitive models of anthropology to examine medicine and Rwandan perceptions of the body and illness. After the genocide, he used this model to explore the cultural dimensions of violence tracing it back to the pre-colonial era, where the Tutsi mwami’s job was to ensure communal stability.
The king's responsibility was to keep "the fluids of production, consumption, and fertility in movement" (p. 121) through controlling flowing substances like rainfall, bovine fertility, honey production, and human fertility and, if necessary, through sacrificing his own life to eradicate blockages in the system. Taylor extends this insight to explain how Hutu participants in the 1994 genocide symbolically made sense of their murderous work through the cognitive model of flows and blockages within the body politic. The specific forms of violence (emasculation, impalement, breast oblation, assault at roadblocks, dumping of bodies in flowing river "betrayed a preoccupation with the movement of persons and substances and with canals, arteries, and conduits along which persons and substances flow: rivers, roadways, pathways, and even the conduits of the human body such as the reproductive and digestive systems" (p. 128). The particular forms of bodily violence attacked reproductive flows, but more significantly, the Tutsi, as a category, were symbolically envisioned as obstructing beings whose removal would benefit the national body. (Besteman 2001:468)

Taylor observes genocide violence as manifesting in culturally specific forms following ontological beliefs and, as such, requires symbolic analysis. “We need to understand Rwandan notions of the body, notions of being and personhood, good and evil, orderly and disorderly conduct.” (Taylor 1999a:30)

Taylor draws on the theoretical concepts of Bruce Kapferer as employed in his study of ethno-nationalism and violence as ontology. Taylor also draws on the theories of Pierre Clastres, Pierre Bordieu, and John Gledill, emphasizing the importance of specific ideas and representations of the body in ethno-nationalist violence. For Taylor, the body is the origin of political violence. Taylor states “…the ultimate destination of political violence, the tableau upon which the dictates of oppression are inscribed is also the human body and not all polities write their signature in the same way.” (Taylor 1999a:31) Therefore, decoding the ways violence and torture are inscribed on the body also requires a structural analysis. However, structural analysis implies the existence of an ahistorical
abstract apart from the influence of social actors. While one can argue the structure itself and ideas of ordering or categorization are abstract, the symbols, meanings, and uses are always connected to those who initiate and receive them in time and space, as culture is not static.

Taylor remedies the limitations of an exclusively structural analysis by combining it with Bordieu’s notion of habitus, giving equal attention to human agency in historical context. For example, in his discussion of 19th century sacred kingship, Taylor illustrates how Rwandan concepts and actions manifest continuity with the past while incorporating external influences with purpose. “Rwandans have improvised, innovated, and transformed their ways of thinking and acting, even while tending to reproduce earlier structures. This is most apparent in the iconography of Hutu extremist literature...” (Taylor 1999a:31) This ideology was largely influenced by the racializing of identities that occurred under colonial occupation.

Following John Gledhill's notions of power and constraining the will of others, Michel Foucault on inscribing power and the body, Pierre Bourdieu's habitus, and Bruce Kapferer's notion of ontology, Taylor describes the 1994 genocidal killing of Tutsi as a mass purification ritual to rid “obstructing beings,” where Tutsi were imagined as personally threatening to Hutu and the cosmic order of the state and fitting a structured ontological notion that compared the political system to the human body. (Taylor 2002:138-139) This explanation, which takes on a very Foucauldian analysis with
respect to humoral flows, is interesting; however, it can not be taken as an across-the-board explanation for the manifestation of certain forms of violence. More compelling is Taylor’s comments, that torture is a part of the ritual process designed to inculcate societal norms and values via the body; Taylor cites Pierre Clastres consideration of the cognitive role of the body in ritual as a slate on which knowledge is inscribed, and the body becomes a memory. (Taylor 2002:141)

Taylor devotes attention to the use of symbolism in spoken and printed hate rhetoric. For example, linking certain ritualistic acts of killing to symbolism that invokes the Hamitic Myth, a common rallying cry in “Hutu Power” propaganda called for sending Tutsi back to where they came from, Ethiopia, via the Nyabarongo River.⁵ Indeed, many accounts and evidence from the genocide show that people were tossed in the river after being killed by machete or bound alive and then thrown into the Nyabarongo to drown. In fact, so many people died this way that during the annual national mourning period there are special commemoration ceremonies held in Rwanda to remember those who died by water.

Yet another example of symbolism touching on the Hamitic Myth are documented accounts of Tutsi women’s feet being cut off, ostensibly to make them shorter and less

⁵ Léon Mugesera, former MRND Vice-Chairman for Gisenyi prefecture, awaits deportation to Rwanda after a Canadian court found his hate speech –given before 1,000 party members –calling for Tutsi to be returned to Ethiopia via the Nyabarongwa River a crime against humanity and a clear act of incitement to genocide. (Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 40, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 100)
beautiful—thus reducing their imagined femme fatal powers. Notably, Taylor’s book includes a number of politically explosive and sexualized cartoons from the infamous Kangura magazine—supported by and promoting the agenda of the Akazu. Of particular interest is the connection between the Hamitic Myth and the way Tutsi women were portrayed—as strikingly beautiful, hypersexualized, manipulative, RPF-sympathizing seductress spies… to be deeply desired, yet, feared and loathed.

In looking at the Hutu Ten Commandments, it is interesting to note not only the blatant prejudice and hatred towards Tutsi in light of historical and recent political events but also the role of women. As Taylor notes, since independence, more and more women began to challenge the patriarchal structures of post-colonial society and garnered success in education, business, and politics. Not everyone felt comfortable with the new found freedom many women enjoyed as equals to men. Thus, women, in general, and Tutsi women, specifically, were targeted in such propaganda. Gender and sexual violence played a prominent role in the genocide. Though not taken up in this thesis, it would be helpful to analyze the Hutu Ten Commandments on their own and then consider their impact leading up to and throughout the genocide. As a central piece of propaganda characterizing Hutu and Tutsi, male and female, good and evil, the Hutu Ten Commandments echoes narratives that manifested as physical and sexualized violence, where State and génocidaire power and belief was inscribed on the human body. A copy of the Hutu Ten Commandments is attached as Appendix D.
In *Sacrifice as Terror*, Taylor reproduces and analyzes a number of sexually explicit political cartoons from *Kangura* and other magazines that are laden with symbolism. To an outside observer, the cartoons might simply appear sexually gratuitous, poking fun at Tutsi and attempting to humiliate political enemies; for Rwandans, the symbolism is understood as emic narrative that tells the story of the Hamitic Myth, alienates Tutsi, and dehumanizes through enemy imagery. Thus, the real messages embedded in the cartoons are hidden to those who do not understand the narrative schema within which they are operating. Taylor’s book and his analysis are a tremendous contribution, allowing genocide scholars to study the meaning in such propaganda from an emic perspective and consider the importance of enemy imagery in priming the population for genocide.

This type of scholarship also has larger implications; for example, the ICTR has prosecuted politicians and those in media for hate speech that was considered incitement to genocide – this would have been impossible if not for a strong scholarly body of literature, mainly emanating from Holocaust scholars’ research, on the important role of genocidal propaganda. In addition, analyses such as Taylor’s evidence the value of detecting and tracking propaganda in societies, so hate speech can be monitored and examined to serve as a valuable early warning tool in the prevention of mass violence and genocide. However, propaganda can not be studied in isolation; its mere presence does not signify its reach even when messages transmitted are historically grounded and culturally relevant. This is why it must be cross-referenced and compared with various narratives, with emphasis on both the State and the individual. Failure to do see before a
society is nearing the “organization” stage of genocide (see Appendix C) will certainly lead to the cross-referencing and comparing of genocide propaganda with not only narratives of the State but those crudely labeled bystander, perpetrator, survivor… and the narratives carved into necrographic maps.
“Though the wind blows, the mountain does not move.”

–Japanese Proverb

MAKING GENOCIDE PREVENTION THINKABLE: APPLYING THEORY AND FINDINGS TO EARLY WARNING MONITORING

GENOCIDE PROGRESSES IN STAGES AND IS PREVENTABLE

What is known about genocide is that has historically been implemented through the power of states within the larger context of war—though its evolving nature cannot be discounted, and advancements in modern warfare could make it possible for smaller groups to attempt genocide in the future. Emanating from state power, genocide is planned—even if it is implemented in later stages of war, as was the case in the Holocaust carried out by the Nazis—and tends to escalate or de-escalate through stages that are linear but overlapping, with early stages persisting and compounding on one another to bring about the emergence of later stages. In looking at the 1994 Rwandan genocide, it is clear a variety of causes and conditions culminated in the attempted extermination of the Tutsi population; however, everything must be situated within a larger frame that takes into account not only past events but the historical dynamism of political, economic, and cultural life. This thesis has briefly mentioned all of the above and related them to
Mamdani’s explanation of politicized and institutionalized identity... identity that was racialized, then ethnicized, then polarized through a campaign of fear and propaganda.

This process –details of which have been discussed throughout this thesis –corresponds with Stanton’s *Ten Stages of Genocide* as outlined in Appendix C. (Stanton 2013) The “Classification” and “Symbolization” stages are common to all humanity. In Rwanda, identity during the pre-colonial era and early colonial period was frequently fluid and evolving in meaning. Direct and indirect rule produced racial distinctions and also ethnic divisions. Later in the colonial period, identity was fixed and identity cards issued. Throughout the pre-colonial era, colonial era, and post-independence regimes, the categories of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa took on different meanings and were manipulated through the course of politics in response to domestic woes and unfolding regional crises. Colonial emphasis on the “Great Chain of Being” theory, the practice of eugenics, and embrace of the Hamitic Myth brought forth a host of symbolic distinctions that included physiognomy. As well, periods of tension, oppression, and war, created culturally stereotyped traits of ethnic groups. Later during the genocide, physiognomy and traits were explored via the bodies of ethnic others in an attempt to unmask them and reduce uncertainty about who they really are; as well, identities were inscribed on bodies by killers who wished to make their victims fit genocidal narratives. Malkki, Taylor, and others evidenced this through the symbolic analysis of extra-lethal violence, necrographic maps, and propaganda. Other examples of symbolism just prior to and during the genocide include coded language used in hate rhetoric to incite murder, often couched as
analogy. For example, the tradition of umuganda—obligatory communal work—was employed. People were told to “go to work”—the work of killing—and to clear the land of “weeds”; this was perceived as a patriotic duty for the benefit of the nation, protecting the natives from Tutsi invaders.

“Discrimination” emerged during the pre-colonial era, was legalized and institutionalized through the colonial era, and remains deeply entrenched as structural violence in the post-colonial era—though mitigated and heightened throughout various periods in history. Mamdani cites the failure of the post-colonial regimes to de-ethnicize the criminally constructed identities that the colonists created and cemented in law and administrative practice. Furthermore, the need to deflect attention away from corruption surrounding the Habyarimana regime, as well as economic and environmental problems (especially drought and land shortage) exacerbating tensions, added to the regional political crises over citizenship and right of return. Tutsi became scapegoats for the regime, who justified their policies of discrimination and denial of local customary rights (which would include land access) to Tutsi who had been living in exile since periods of earlier strife and genocide. By characterizing Tutsi in Uganda and elsewhere as invaders who were not Rwandan, exclusionary practices denying citizenship rights were justified. This also helped to feed fear into the population that even local Tutsi were not to be trusted, further supporting practices that discriminated against Tutsi in the spheres of government, employment, education, etc.
“Dehumanization” manifested through a campaign of hate rhetoric spawned by magazines such as Kangura and RTLM radio. Their propaganda invoked earlier times of oppression that extend back to the mwamis, playing on the psychology of people to characterize themselves as victims and stir emotions. It also made extensive use of symbols to promote enemy imagery, portraying Tutsi as aliens, tricksters, and vermin (i.e. inyenzi). The Hutu Ten Commandments illustrated some of these mischaracterizations and informed the population how to handle dealing with Tutsi –basically by not trusting and excluding them. Local media was a forum for long speeches and songs that promoted nationalism while excluding Tutsi from it; indeed, to be patriotic was to loathe and fear Tutsi. Hate rhetoric was used to strip Tutsi of their humanity, making it easier for génocidaires to do their communal work of killing. Here, as in every stage, identity is manipulated and distorted to suit agendas.

The emergence and persistence of these stages ultimately led to the “Organization” of the killing machine. At first, the State justified the training of civilian militias to combat the threat of an RPF invasion from Uganda. However, prior to the genocide, there was evidence that the Interahamwe was being trained to kill civilians –especially since they were being trained with machete, and large numbers of machete were on the military’s imported weapons manifest before the killing of civilians began. In addition, lists were drawn up throughout Rwanda in the military, government, churches, and schools to denote who was a Tutsi –they were death lists used to find and hunt Tutsi when genocide began. The media was also involved in announcing the names of Tutsi and assisted in
revealing their location. “Polarization” led to the silencing of moderate Hutu voices who would wish to stop the killing machine. Propaganda continued to instill fear and thrust a wedge between groups. “Preparation” was the end of organization and involved the mobilizing of militias and setting up of checkpoints and roadblocks. “Persecution” led to the rounding up of moderate Hutu and Tutsi and the separating of Tutsi at roadblocks based on death lists and identity cards. Tutsi also fled to churches and government leaders seeking protection. Perceiving Tutsi as an outsider, as less than human, génocidaires begin the process of “Extermination”.

At every stage there were missed opportunities to stop the genocide –as discussed in parts of this thesis and Appendix C. At every stage identity played a central role in genocide. This is why there can be no genocide prevention without considering identity and the ways people relate to each other. Therefore, while it is necessary to look at the economic, environmental, social, and political causes and conditions underlying genocide –locally, at the State level, throughout the region, and globally –human perception, interaction, and agency must be considered. The post-genocide “Denial” stage is very tricky, because it includes more than the mere negation of genocide or revision of historical facts and events on the part of those who participated in or aligned themselves with the génocidaires.

Denial impacts nearly everyone in one form or another. There is denial on the part of the international community for their failure to take timely action –or any meaningful action
–to stop the killing. There is denial by foreign nations whose historically involvement with Rwanda facilitated the causes and conditions leading to genocide. There is denial among nations who supplied training or weapons used to kill civilians. There is denial that certain humanitarian intervention also aided génocidaires. There is denial by the orchestrators of the genocide and ordinary people who cut down their neighbors –the psychology that places blame elsewhere… justifying genocide as a form of self-defense from a perceived enemy, the following of orders from authority figures, the devil taking over, and a variety of other protective mechanisms designed to keep the self from acknowledging responsibility for heinous crimes. Why? Perhaps because it is difficult for one to face their true nature and consider they are a person capable of suspending morality to engage in acts of killing.

Then there is denial among many survivors that accounts for altered memory, whether it is due to trauma or the need to minimize it, or to co-exist in a society where killers live beside them. Then there is denial by the present regime, which wrests blame for the genocide among the colonial powers and Hutu exclusively, negating the fact that there was a history of strife that extends as far back as pre-colonial times. There is also the denial that violence was only targeted towards Tutsi and moderate Hutu, when in fact there was some killing of Hutu by Tutsi also. There is the denial that simply eliminating ethnicity in laws, institutions, and public discourse, eliminates ethnic identity in the minds of people. There are many more types of denial, but among the most dangerous: that most people are on board with the State’s narratives, that forgiveness and
reconciliation in words equates to the same within a person’s mind and heart, that economic development and social progress is enough for genocide prevention, that there is equality and peace in the nation, and that genocide can not happen again in Rwanda. So, one of the arguments this thesis makes is the need to look at individual narratives – not just State narratives – to see what people think, feel, and are doing in this post-genocide climate. How do they situate themselves and others within Rwanda today, and what are their views on genocide and building peace?

THE IMPORTANCE OF NARRATIVE

Emma, a Tutsi, was married to a Hutu after her father was killed in 1964 for being a spy. The marriage did not work and she returned home to live with her mother, bringing along her five children. During the genocide, her husband came and took away the children and she went off to the forest. The rest of the family stayed behind. The Interahamwe tried to force her mother to have sex with her son. When she refused, they broke all her teeth and killed her. Two sisters were raped and were asked to dig their own graves. They were both killed by machetes. Emma and another sister went to the commune in Tabaa hoping to receive protection from the State. She was proved very wrong. First the authorities separated the intellectual Tutsis from the rest and killed them. Emma and the others had to dig the graves. Then the raping began. She was raped by about 15 men on the premises of the commune. She could hardly move or keep her legs together. She fled into the forest with her sister. Again a group of Interahamwe found her and she and her sister were raped. Her sister was killed after being raped. The perpetrator who killed her sister lives free in Tabaa.

Emma fled toward Zaire but at the military barrier she was raped again – the soldier said he wanted to "taste a Tutsi" – and she was beaten on her genitalia. By that time she had puss coming out of her internal wounds and she was terribly ill. She disappeared into the forest again and wandered, eating grass and berries. Finally the Rwandan Patriotic Front came into her region and she was taken to the hospital. She and her aunt are the only survivors of the genocide from her family. (United Nations 1998)

This is one of thousands of histories gathered from a Rwandan who lived through genocide. There is great value in collecting this type of data to help elucidate what went
on during the genocide and even as potential legal evidence. Very disturbing and moving, it shows how rape was used as a weapon of war and genocide to dehumanize an individual and explore the ethnic other. However, what is missing in this type of narrative is Emma’s voice. It tells us about her past as a series of events but not how she internalized it. Nor does it tell us how she came to view herself and others during that time. We also can’t know her present thoughts and feelings. Over time has she selected to forgot (chosen amnesia) as a way to cope? Has she forgiven or reconciled with those who harmed her or her loved ones? What does she think and feel about herself and others? This type of history is helpful in understanding events and illuminating on the nature of genocide, but it offers little in the way of prevention. Apart from the cessation of physical violence, what does it take (or did it take) for Emma to heal and relate to those who participated in the genocide?

Award-winning journalist and war correspondent Jean Hatzfeld wrote a trilogy dealing with narratives from the 1994 Rwandan genocide: Life Laid Bare: The Survivors in Rwanda Speak is written from the perspective of survivors from the marshes (Hatzfeld 2006); Machete Season: The Killers in Rwanda Speak, which presents the perspective of the killers he interviewed in a Rwandan prison (Hatzfeld 2003); and The Antelope’s Strategy: Living in Rwanda after the Genocide, contains testimonies from some of the genocide survivors of the Kayumba forest massacres –from six thousand people, twenty remained. (Hatzfeld 2009:125)

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6 Also published as Into the Quick of Life: The Rwandan Genocide: The Survivors Speak
Perhaps one of the best works to capture the rawness of individual thoughts, providing
great insight into the psychological motivations and reflections of individual génocidaires
is *Machete Season*. Though one can argue that men who have been jailed, awaiting trial,
or convicted may have motivations for sharing honestly, concealing, or fabricating
responses –and Hatzfeld acknowledges as much –the book shines a light on what is
generally unseen and unspoken… the private thoughts of one’s human failings. *Machete
Season* features Hatzfeld’s interviews with ten Rwandan génocidaires who were friends
living in the hills of Kibungo, Ntarama, and Kanzenze bordering the marshes of
Nyamwiza. They describe life during the genocide and how they received orders from
FAR, Interahamwe, and local leaders to hunt and execute Tutsi hiding in the marshes –
these men admitted to being willing collaborators rather than being coerced like some
others. Under strict orders, they hunted and killed all day, everyday, for nearly three
months. This was the community’s new “work” and replaced all other responsibilities,
including tending to fields and growing crops. It was a time to kill. Their words reveal a
shockingly frank self-reflection of the psychological changes and, in particular,
dissociation which occurred within them during the “killing season”.

IGNACE: At the beginning we were too fired up to think. Later on we were too
used to it. In our condition, it meant nothing to us to think we were busy cutting
up our neighbors down to the last one. It became a goes-without-saying. They
had already stopped being good neighbors of long standing, the ones who handed
around the *urwagwa* can at the *cabaret*, since they wouldn’t be there anymore.
They had become people to throw away, so to speak. They no longer were what
they had been, and neither were we. They did not bother us, and the past did not
bother us, because nothing bothered us.
ÉLIE: We had to put off our good manners at the edge of the muck until we heard the whistle to quit working. Kindness, too, was forbidden in the marshes. The marshes left no room for exceptions. To forget doubt, we had meanness and ruthlessness in killing, and a job to do and do well, that’s all.

Some changed color from hunting. Their limbs were muddy, their clothes were splattered, even their faces were not black in the same way. They became grayish from everything they had done. A little layer of stink covered us, but we didn’t care.

PIO: We no longer saw a human being when we turned up a Tutsi in the swamps. I mean a person like us, sharing similar thoughts and feelings. The hunt was savage, the hunters were savage, the prey was savage—savagery took over the mind.

Not only had we become criminals, we had become a ferocious species in a barbarous world. This truth is not believable to someone who has not lived it in his muscles. Our daily life was unnatural and bloody, and that suited us.

For my part, I offer you an explanation: it is as if I had let another individual take on my own living appearance, and the habits of my heart, without a single pang in my soul. This killer was indeed me, as to the offense he committed and the blood he shed, but he is a stranger to me in his ferocity. I admit and recognize my obedience at that time, my victims, my fault, but I fail to recognize the wickedness of the one who raced through the marshes on my legs, carrying my machete. That wickedness seems to belong to another self with a heavy heart. The most serious changes in my body were my invisible parts, such as the soul or the feelings that go with it. Therefore I alone do not recognize myself in that man. But perhaps someone outside this situation, like you, cannot have an inkling of that strangeness of mind. (Hatzfeld 2003:47-48)

Apart from expressing a few thoughts and questioning a given informant’s honesty or sincerity, Hatzfeld does not attempt to get into any real analysis of these testimonies; he purposefully leaves such interpretations open to readers and merely presents this information more as raw data for the historical record with some insight. While he has been criticized for that, there is some benefit to his approach. These testimonies are raw and not confined to one interpretation—while the lay person might find it hard to make sense without knowledge of the larger context—it is valuable to those who wish to study the psychology of génocidaires.
Ignace describes a temporary condition—a state in which neither killers nor victims were themselves. What does this mean? Is it a kind of psychological dissociation from reality and past identity; there seems to be a suspension of logic and thought that took place during the killing time. According to Ignace, this seemed to function as a form of protection for many killers from focusing on what they were doing—they were self-aware but apathetic. It is also noteworthy here that Ignace uses only we and they, but never I. This is the same as well for Élie. However, it is important to be aware that despite their use of we, they can not speak for others.

Élie focuses on the communal obligation, a job to be done and not to be questioned. Many génocidaires—not only in Rwanda—have hidden behind the concept of group. As such, they deny any personal wrongdoing or responsibility (during and sometimes also post-genocide), feeling as though their actions were acceptable because so many members of the killing group were following orders and obligated to protect themselves from those deemed a threat. Echoing Ignace, he describes a change of state; in this case, he describes inner transformation through the physical.

Élie’s description here echoes of Victor Turner’s concept of a liminal phase (Turner 1969), where killers had entered into a genocide ritual that would transform them from their former state of being as they symbolically and literally transformed society, establishing a new social order by seizing power from and permanently removing their stated enemy. In such a liminal zone, one’s status and—as Pio notes—even self is neither
that which it was prior to the ritual's beginning nor end. And while genocide itself is something that should never be reduced to ritual killings, the narratives of Ignace, Élie, and Pio reveal a kind of physical and mental transformation of self and society, which anthropologists like Turner have analyzed through symbolism and ritual.

A necessary feature of genocide, Pio's words illustrate the results of one who has been conditioned to dehumanize in order to carry out extermination. In his first statement, he dehumanizes only the victims; however, his subsequent statement clearly dehumanizes himself and his fellows, claiming not only criminality but barbarism by a ferocious species. Again, there are psychological processes at work here where Pio distances himself from his actions… at once admitting guilt, but claiming his actions were committed by some other self. Pio offers an explanation, and here his testimony switches from the communal use of we to I. Pio characterizes his actions as being committed by a second, unrecognizable self, comprised of feelings and behaviors that are something other than anything by which Pio normally identifies. Such narratives offer opportunities to explore the thoughts and feelings of those who partook in genocide. Openly and symbolically, they also reveal the dehumanization, polarization, and denial that characterizes the process of genocide. It is the same with survivors.

*The Antelope's Strategy: Living in Rwanda after the Genocide* also discusses the killings and people’s survival strategies. Essentially, those who evaded death were the fastest runners, best strategizers, and the beneficiaries of either grace or sheer dumb luck. The
survivors reflect on their thoughts at the time and discuss all they endured in being hunted like prey. Indeed, many of them express how they lost their dignity or humanity and felt as if they had actually become animals. They discuss the many indignities they endured in living so long unwashed, being covered in lice and scabs, some with festering wounds, eating raw food dug from the ground, drinking water off tree leaves, and having their humanity stripped away by the killers. The women had to tie their dresses around their waist in order to run. Many people ran partially clothed or barefoot. They were in survival mode, and they clung to one another to do so. Most of those who survived ran in groups. Those who had military training or who knew the forest terrain well fared better, but simply tripping over a rock or getting caught between trees usually meant death. The survivors tell how they ran for several hours at a time—as much as six hours without stopping because killers were literally at their heels—and this went on twice a day for five weeks until the RPA came.

EUGÉNIE: The Hutus used to form two very long lines, between a thousand and two thousand killers. They’d come up calmly, no talking. Once they’d reached the flank of the mountain, they began singing to terrorize us, and they certainly did. The most frightened among us would take off first and be the first to be tracked. Everywhere, people were running. (Hatzfeld 2007:147)

There were only three female survivors, one of them never remained in the forest; amidst the chaos, eleven-year-old Médiatrice wound up following the Hutu column to Congo. She spent the next eight years living among Hutu in the heart of Congo’s equatorial forests, passing herself off as one of them.

MÉDIATRICE: Ethnicity—I certainly know something about that now. Being Tutsi, being Hutu, they’re not the same. The Hutu is the Tutsi’s most dangerous enemy. That’s my first thought whenever I go to my land in Mayange. Memory keeps everything, and the most painful memories are right on top. In Congo, I
studied ethnic wickedness, and I also learned to live with absolutely anyone, to be dignified in misfortune, to eat raw food without salt. I got used to wearing rags over my scabbed and dirty skin, to get by with nothing, to endure the hard labor of a field boyeste, to wander in a dark forest full of nasty monkeys.

I spent eight years compelled to say nothing about my Tutsi origins, nothing about my family, nothing about my childhood, nothing about my deepest thoughts—nothing about me. Eight years of living alone, always alone, without ever daring to cry from loneliness, without any chance to call someone I loved by name. There were days when I felt so abandoned that I tried to talk to myself. I used to go off into a little corner and call my own name, softly, gently. I would search for a first word… but I had nothing to say to myself. (Hatzfeld 2007:233-236)

A common theme among many of the interviewees—survivors and perpetrators alike—is financial loss (homes and fields) and complete interruption of life, with emphasis on family, education, and career. Many lament about opportunities lost or the life they expected. In some cases, people married and others not. Some had children and others took care of orphans. Physical and emotional scars took a toll, especially on survivors.

A recurring concern among interviewees is the uncomfortableness between survivors and newly released prisoners. Jails were overflowing and it cost a great deal of money to maintain prisoners; meanwhile, there was the need to avoid an economic and humanitarian catastrophe. With so many men killed or in jail (especially farmers) women were struggling to till the fields… the country was on the verge of famine. So, the release of prisoners was necessary, if not desirable. The State took great steps to reeducate prisoners through ingando and to promote reconciliation among the community. Naturally, this proved difficult. Some of the génocidaires spoke of keeping a low profile or not feeling welcome, despite some token gestures from neighbors.
As for the survivors, there is a persistent theme that is expressed as fear, distrust, resentment, anger, or hopelessness over having to live side by side with the killers who hunted them and exterminated their family and friends. Many feel the killers fared better economically, got away with impunity, and showed little to no remorse. Again and again, the survivors speak about the fact that the killers never came to them to apologize. The génocidaires speak of this as well; most interviewees state that they have done their prison time, so there is no need to stir up anger in people by offering apologies. Furthermore, they express fear of gacaca –either of survivors mistakenly accusing them or falsely accusing them, whether motivated by revenge or the need to hold someone accountable for crimes where it is uncertain who was responsible.

What is also clear through these narratives is that there are many unresolved issues that stand in the way of reconciliation and healing.

JEANETTE: I don’t believe those who say that we have seen the worst of atrocities for the last time. When a genocide has been committed, another one can come, no matter when, no matter where, in Rwanda or anyplace, if the root cause is still there and still unknown. (Hatzfeld 2007:175-176)

EUGÉNIE: God made me African, and I thank God for that. I believe the advantage of Africa lies in its bountiful crops. Agriculture and stockbreeding: those are Africa’s gifts to its people, the chance for a lovely life. Africans work so hard in their fields. When the rains come, when the weather is gentle, everything grows, and they are content. But if the land dries out, they start coveting their neighbors’ supplies, and if enough folks heat up, they go to war. War –that scares people more than all the technological jolts from the Whites. And Whites? You never know what they’re up to. They’re too crafty to show themselves plain. But African leaders—you can hear them breathing anger and hatred into the farmers.
In Africa, you can escape from your family, your country, your religion, but not your ethnic identity. When an African hears danger rumble and takes fright, he clings to his ancestors, to his hill, to what he’s used to, and in the very depths of fear he turns to his ethnic group. That’s really your last hope. When war thunders on the horizon, you run to your own people, and that’s when you can die in great numbers. (Hatzfeld 2007:377-378)

INNOCENT RWILILIZA: I have recovered some of my confidence. I run a school, my new wife gives me children, some people offer me a Primus over which to discuss projects, others invite me to marriages, and I have received three cows as gifts. But I have gained nothing intellectually. Living through that genocide has brought me nothing intellectually, no enriching knowledge about universality and so on. What I have doubtless gained is a bit of hatred, if I may say so. Once I thought Hutus were just like Tutsis. Not anymore… To tell the truth, I find it hard to say out loud just how I see that truth.

Yes, actually… one little thing: I have acquired what I call varied opinions and suspicions about each and every person. On the one hand, you believe you are great friends with someone, with whom you speak as brothers and exchange cows, and at the last minute he chases you with his machete. On the other hand, you see yourself ill-used, in the depths of abandonment, and a woman agrees to marry you even though she knows you’ve been stripped of everything, including courage. She straightens you up and brings you home when you’re unlucky, broke, and lashing out. This is a lesson: a person’s importance is invisible, as is the disappointment or satisfaction this person will bring you in the end. (Hatzfeld 2007:566-567)

BERTHE MWANANKABANDI: Before, like all Rwandan children, I used to think about good and evil. I believed in honorable effort, decent behavior, the strait and narrow path. In the marshes I learned that any belief can vanish on a first morning of machetes: virtue, for example, and its rewards, the attendant or well-deserved advantages and joys. From now on I’m suspicious of moral maxims, of worthy lessons and respectable words.

I know that those killings are unparalleled; unfamiliar with history, I cannot measure their gravity. And they have changed me. I don’t know what else I can say to you since your last visit. What fresh replies do I have to all these new questions you have about the killings? Their memory does not upset me as much. I no longer shelter myself every day in fear. I don’t keep away from the human beings around me anymore. Nonetheless, I do think these memories are dangerous. My former existence stopped dead. It has started up again in a new direction. All the things I expected in my first life – I can’t find them anymore in my second one. (Hatzfeld 2007:578-579)
INNOCENT RWILILIZA: I brought back some habits from Kayumba, and some resolutions, too, many of which I’ve respected, such as never again setting foot inside a church, and others I’ve abandoned. Not speaking to Hutus anymore, for example.

I also returned with quite a keen sense of curiosity. Before, whenever we discussed rumors that a genocide was in the works, we never believed them, thinking that out in the countryside our lives were too deeply rooted for any change. We could believe in a few catastrophes, but not in such utter chaos. That previous naïveté now tears at my heart.

Having lived through the killings, I have revised my theories. Philosophical thoughts don’t in the least sway me as they once did: I distrust time-honored ideas, no longer respect logic as I ought to. I have learned to accept the unbelievable, to be ready for anything, to think on the alert. Behind every thought, I expect betrayal. No explanation satisfies me. Suspicion stimulates my curiosity. I always want to know what’s going on behind what’s going on. (Hatzfeld 2007:569-570)

INNOCENT RWILILIZA: I’ve changed. Two months after the killings, I stepped on a mine. I can’t run anymore; fear sometimes grips me in my own home. During the genocide, my every-man-for-himself defense was to race flat out all day long like the antelope, and now I can’t deal with that threat. Obviously, a second genocide is inconceivable in Rwanda. Obviously, inconceivable –what do these words mean in Africa? Naturally, I agonize over this. (Hatzfeld 2007:561-562)

What is clear here is that, at least for some individuals, healing and reconciliation are not easy things. Changes in identity are noted by interviewees and they do not feel they are the people they once were. By looking at narratives, we can get a sense of where healing is still needed and whether or not people are vested in the reconstruction of a stable and peaceful society. When there is a more narrow space for others, relationships are stifled. Perhaps it is too much to ask survivors to trust those who tried to kill them, their loved ones, and community members; however, what messages are being transmitted to their children and future generations? It seems that there are still very real fears that genocide may happen again.
THE NEED FOR A NEW ANALYTICAL FRAME

John Paul Lederach calls for conflict resolution practitioners to be reflective in their practice and think outside the box. (Lederach 2007) Yet, it is not only in praxis that this applies. In developing theory and carrying out research, there is a need to consider new ways to look at conflict and violence prevention –because there is so much at stake. Not only can peacebuilding practitioners, theorists, and researchers benefit from reflection, but also those involved in policy-making at the State level. In this way, they can learn from theory and listen to practitioners to address the causes and conditions of violence, rather than simply focusing on the cessation of violence. More importantly, the State can benefit by listening to the multitude of voices among their population to see what is needed to create stability, repair relationships, and work towards an enduring peace. In a post-conflict society, there is much work to be done to uncover structural violence embedded within institutions and it takes time to undo its impact. The State can benefit from research that helps to bring out the voices of the people. The State can also benefit by partnering with people to create a better future. At the moment, such partnerships are tightly controlled, so people follow the State’s goals rather than a more organic and equal collaboration of ideas.

The State can benefit by loosening the reigns on public discourse rather than trying so hard to control the narratives surrounding history, identity, the genocide, justice, and the reconciliation process. The State’s desire is to prevent genocide, so it is understandable
that they will do everything they can to ensure that doesn’t happen. However, by co-
 opting traditional mechanisms of peacebuilding, they are making less space for human
agency, which can actually increase the likelihood of violence. The way to restore and repair relationships can not be forced. The same holds true for identity. Abolishing identity cards that delineate people as Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa, and instituting anti-genocide laws that prohibit publicly identifying in that manner does not equal abolishing those identities—nor can they be supplanted by the concept of Rwandanicity.

Finally, people themselves need to be reflective… and they are. This is why it is so important to hear their voices. Researchers need to capture their reflections and their changes. There is a need to see what people are up to and how they are moving towards or away from violence. It is not enough to only consider how they relate with State narratives and co-opted forms of peacebuilding. What kinds of peacebuilding activities are they engaged in that are more organic in nature and less subject to State reach? How do people’s lived experiences and the spheres of society, politics, and economics coalesce to influence how people situate themselves and others within the world? What is the impact of development, local and global events, and technological advancements that permit more sharing and mingling cross-culturally? How do people view themselves and others over time as they live in and interact with the world?

Studying identity within traditional peacebuilding is not the only way to access people’s narratives, but it is a good way. That is because traditional peacebuilding is linked to
history and culture—even when aspects of it are reinvented to meet State aims.

Ultimately, whether or not a society reconciles and heals or regresses towards chaos is not only in the hands of an all powerful state… it is just as much in the hand of the people who can choose to expand their views on self and other or narrow relational possibilities.

At every moment, the choices people make can move a society towards or away from violence or peace. The wind may blow, but if the people are grounded and vested in peacebuilding, they do not need to be stirred; they can remain strong and take measures to address problems long before it reaches the stage of genocide. Where they are disempowered, they can call on help from outside parties, including the international community, who needs to respond timely. It takes everyone to prevent genocide.

This thesis, therefore, calls for a new frame which emphasizes the role of identity, because genocide is not only about preventing physical violence and analyzing structural violence… researchers need to observe and identify cultural violence in order to see how vulnerable a society is to conflict. When cultural violence is high and structural violence is also, it is easy to progress quickly through the early stages of genocide; subject to instigators, it is possible to progress through the later stages. Thus, a part of early warning detection requires looking more deeply at cultural violence—not only grounded in theory and history but the present day, accessible via narratives. It is good to hear voices at all levels, but especially at the local level, and there is a need for more empirical research there. Specifically, it would be helpful to direct this research towards examining traditional peacebuilding and true grass-roots initiatives—especially those that are not co-
opted by the State, religious leaders, and foreign NGOs –to see how people are connecting their transformations with their culture.

Analyzed in conjunction with other tools –such as monitoring the economic and political climate, incidents of violence related to identity, hate speech, and other forms of propaganda –it will be easier to gauge where a society is within the conflict cycle and whether or not they are moving towards or away from peace. This thesis calls for a more intimate and thorough look at the interplay between the State, causal factors and conditions of genocide, and human agency, with great emphasis on the latter. Human agency must not be reduced to a mere dialectic with the State –though it is necessary to analyze that dynamic; individual thought and agency must also be a focal point all on its own. It is necessary to consider individuals as rational beings that can choose to participate in violence or resist it. Among many other possibilities, this is one way to help prevent genocide.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A

Summary of Useful References with Annotations

Background and Analysis: 1) *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*, a series of essays concerning the Rwandan genocide and its aftermath that covers Rwandan refugees and immigrants in Uganda, a historical analysis of the Rwandan Patriotic Front invasion, examines Rwandan extremist elements and hate radio, and the role of the OAU and other nations, and conflict prevention (Adelman and Suhrke 1999); 2) *Natural Resource Scarcity and Violence in Rwanda*, a report by a former Rwandan Minister of Agriculture, Livestock and Environment and Minister of Defense, James Gasana for the Institute for Sustainable Development and The World Conservation Union concludes elites were responsible for fomenting the ethnic hatred that erupted in genocide—it analyzes land shortage, poverty, social, environmental, economic, and political factors causing violence and discusses fluid shifts in hostilities that vacillate between class and ethnicity as ruling elites exploited natural resources and rewarded loyalty by redistributing State wealth until economic collapse prompted Hutu extremists to deflect blame towards Tutsi and moderate Hutu (Gasana 2002); 3) anthropologist Mahmood Mamdani’s *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda* delves into the origins of politically constructed racial and ethnic identities that paved the way for the Rwandan genocide with a theoretical framework that considers identity in relation to power, tracing constructions from the pre-colonial era through policies of colonial rule and post-independence—it also examines the 1959 conflict and Rwandans exiled or living in Uganda and Zaire with relevance to the civil war and genocide (Mamdani 2001); 4) *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide* by Gérard Prunier combines a historical overview of Rwanda with scholarly analysis of the political and economic factors that contributed to the genocide, and like Mamdani, touches on the pre-colonial period, impact of colonization, the Hamitic Myth, and the Hutu Republic from independence through the civil war and genocide, chronicling periods of violence and the refugees produced (Prunier 1995); 5) Josias Semujanga’s *Origins of Rwandan Genocide* examines historical and political antecedents as well as the social and religious discourse that preceded Rwanda’s genocide—it asserts the genocide was planned two years in advance by carefully cultivating the “Hutu Power” ideology and branding all Tutsi as enemies of the Hutu, particularly focusing on the use of hate rhetoric in inciting violence (Semujanga 2003); 6) *Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda* was written by Peter Uvin to illustrate how development assistance provided by international donors played an important role in shaping processes of political exclusion, marginalization, and class division which contributed to violence in
Rwanda—it argues financing and social engineering accompanying development initiatives worked with existing forces of inequality, institutionalized racism, and oppression without question, inadvertently abetting state structures and social mechanisms that laid the groundwork for genocide (Uvin 1998); 7) Peter Uvin’s _Prejudice, Crisis, and Genocide in Rwanda_ which explores the social and psychological processes of the Rwandan genocide, providing an overview of the pre-colonial and colonial history of Rwanda and explaining Rwandan elites’ long tradition of institutionalizing prejudice and employing political psychology to manipulate the general population—it also considers the economic crisis, political changes leading to the genocide, and how prejudice was radicalized to incite mass murder (Uvin 1997); and 8) René Lemarchand, one of the leading experts on the Great Lakes region, has just come out with a new book titled _The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa_, which is series of comparative essays focusing on the cycles of genocide and violence in Burundi, Rwanda, and the DRC (Lemarchand 2009).

Fieldwork Reports: 1) The late Alison Des Forges authored _Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda_, an unparalleled comprehensive study based on Rwandan government records that examines the planning and implementation of the genocide, and actions taken by various parties at the local, national, and international level—it discusses social and political precursors within historical context and considers administrative and military tactics used to carry out the mass murders, as well as discussing survival strategies employed by individuals (Des Forges 1999); 2) anthropologist Nigel Eltringham’s _Accounting for Horror: Post-Genocide Debates in Rwanda_ examines the confluence and divergence of varying first-hand accounts of the Rwandan genocide, debates precipitating historical and ethnic factors, investigates hates speech and the notion of collective guilt and impunity (Eltringham 2004); and 3) _We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families: Stories from Rwanda_ by Philip Gourevitch, details the genocide, precursors, and aftermath, and includes interviews with génocidaires, bystanders, and survivors, as well as heads of state, top political and military leaders, and international organizations—this is one of the best introductions to the Rwandan genocide (Gourevitch 1998).

concerning the refugee crisis that ensued and impacted Zaire and the entire Great Lakes Region (Cutts 2000); and 4) Linda Melvern’s *A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide* begins with an overview of the Rwandan genocide and events leading up to it and then moves through a comprehensive analysis and critique of the United Nations and international community’s failure to intervene in the murders (Melvern 2000).

The Role of Religion: 1) *Genocide in Rwanda: Complicity of the Churches?* is a compilation of essays examining the power of the church, its relations with the Rwandan government, and its role in the genocide—it questions the churches failure to denounce ethnic distinctions, hate rhetoric, and violence as well as considers how changes in authority and teaching can help prevent recurrence of genocide in Rwanda and elsewhere (Rittner, Roth, and Whitworth 2004).

Propaganda and Symbolism: 1) *The Media and the Rwanda Genocide* is a compilation of essays on the media’s role in the Rwandan genocide, exploring hate speech and propaganda in Rwandan radio and print, especially Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) — it also covers the subsequent trials against the media for incitement to genocide and critiques international media coverage of the genocide (Thompson 2007); and 2) anthropologist Christopher C. Taylor’s *Sacrifice as Terror: The Rwandan Genocide of 1994* is essential reading on state power and the use of Rwandan mythology, ritual, and symbolism to incite citizen participation in the genocide—it draws on history, politics, survivor interviews, and the author’s fieldwork to examine media use of propaganda and dialectics of hate invoking ethnicity, the Hamitic Myth, gender and sexuality. I find this book to be very illuminating, taking on the task that many Holocaust scholars have previously done in analyzing anti-Semitic publications and the use of enemy imagery. Taylor analyzes virulent, sexually explicit cartoons published in the Rwandan propaganda paper, *Kangura*, to mock Tutsi, political opponents, and the United Nations. He discusses how metaphors of violence and Hutu extremist ideology were symbolically manifested during the genocide through various humiliating and torturous acts (Taylor 1999a).

Survivors, Perpetrators, Bystanders, and Peacekeepers: 1) anthropologist Villia Jefremovas’ exploration of *Acts of Human Kindness: Tutsi, Hutu and the Genocide* shares the stories of three Tutsi from Butare and one from Kigali whose lives were saved by Hutu during the Rwandan genocide — the author refutes the Hamitic Myth and argues that irreconcilable ethnic hatred does not explain the genocide, discusses acts of solidarity in which Hutu faced death for helping Tutsi or refusing to participate in the killings, and expresses optimism for healing and reconciliation among Rwandans (Jefremovas 1995); 2) *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* is a memoir that provides a first-hand account by the former Force Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), General Roméo Dallaire, and Major Brent Beardsley, who witnessed the atrocities and reflect on UNAMIR’s operations in relation to events prior to and during the genocide, the limitations of UNAMIR’s mandate and
mission, and the indifference and inaction of the international community—it presents a uniquely intimate insider’s knowledge of the daily lives and perspectives of the UNAMIR peacekeepers, Rwandan people, and top Rwandan and international military and political leaders (Dallaire and Beardsley 2003); 3) Jean Hatzfeld’s *Machete Season: The Killers in Rwanda Speak: a Report* includes the first-hand accounts of ten men who admit to willingly participating in the Rwandan genocide, detailing, in their own words, how they spent three months neglecting their farms to instead hunt down hundreds of their neighbors hiding in the forests and swamps and murder them by machete—it is extremely frank and extremely graphic, as the men describe their daily life, actions, thoughts and feelings during that time in intimate detail, as well as their views a decade after the genocide (Hatzfeld 2003); 4) Scott Straus’ work *The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda* is an empirical case study of the Rwandan genocide analyzing data collected from 15 prisons using a random sampling method to interview 210 convicted and confessed génocidaires—it reviews existing literature and theories addressing causes of genocide, and also considers the civil war, political and social manipulation at state and local levels, fear, force, and other dynamics which prompted ordinary individuals to participate in mass murder, and examines patterns of violence and regional instability (Straus 2006); 5) Robert Lyons and Scott Straus’ *Intimate Enemy: Images and Voices of the Rwandan Genocide* interviews Category I and Category II génocidaires in prison, many of whom have been sentenced and await the death penalty for their role in the planning and execution of the Rwandan genocide—farmers, priests, doctors, teachers, businessmen, administrative officials, politicians, judges, women, and children discuss their participation in the killings (Lyons and Straus 2006); 6) The Human Rights Watch report *Rwanda, Lasting Wounds: Consequences of Genocide and War on Rwanda's Children* documents the impact of genocide on Rwanda’s children through hundreds of interviews conducted with child survivors from 1995 to 2002, describing how Hutu extremists targeted them for rape, torture, and execution, and coerced other children into killing—it discusses the 5,000 minors charged with genocide, and estimates 400,000 children lost one or both parents to murder, AIDS, or imprisonment, and that the safe-guards of family, education, and the judicial system were shattered by the genocide as children now face denial of education, labor exploitation, seizure of family property, poverty, street life, and violence (Rakita, Des Forges, and McClintock 2003); 7) Donald Miller and Lorna Touryan Miller’s work *Orphans of the Rwanda Genocide* consists of photographs and selected excerpts from an oral history project documenting the accounts of one hundred orphaned survivors of the Rwandan genocide—interview questions were designed by the authors, but conducted by officers of the Association of Orphan Heads of Households, themselves young adult orphans responsible for the parenting and financial needs of their siblings and other orphaned children—revealing a glimpse of the horrors children witnessed, their experiences before, during, and after the genocide, the effect of widespread AIDS among girls raped during the genocide, how children sustain themselves, emotional healing, relations with other children and members of the community who participated in the genocide, communal support, love, forgiveness, and justice (Miller and Touryan Miller 2004); 8) *Les Blessures du Silence: Témoignages du Génocide au Rwanda* compiles photographs and testimonies
of dozens of killers and survivors, in their own words, as witnesses to the atrocities of the Rwandan genocide, as collected by Yolande Mukagasana—a genocide survivor whose family was murdered—and Alain Kazinierakis (Mukagasana and Kazinierakis 2001); and 9) Binaifer Nowrojee’s report for Human Rights Watch, *Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence During the Rwandan Genocide and Its Aftermath*, presents eye-witness testimony confirming thousands of women were violated in front of their family, gang-raped, sexually enslaved, raped with objects, tortured, mutilated, or immediately killed after being raped during the Rwandan genocide—the report notes propaganda incited mass rape of Tutsi women to humiliate, subjugate, and dehumanize them, and that many Hutu were also victims of indiscriminate sexual violence. This report is also important in that it examines subsequent health issues, such as sexually transmitted diseases, HIV/AIDS, rape-related pregnancies, and complications of self-induced abortions. It also discusses social stigma and economic problems related to rape, cites problems documenting gender-based crimes, and examines laws and means to punish violators (Nowrojee 1996).

Justice and Reconciliation: 1) anthropologist and lawyer Paul Magnarella’s work *Justice in Africa: Rwanda’s Genocide, Its Courts, and the UN Criminal Tribunal* provides an overview of precipitating factors leading to the Rwandan genocide and the United Nations Security Council’s creation of the International Tribunal for Rwanda—it discusses the Tribunals organization, function, jurisdiction, and accomplishments, as well as the criticism and controversy surrounding it, the Tribunal’s contributions to humanitarian law, and Rwanda’s passage of a genocide statute and creation of special genocide courts to handle the more than hundred thousand individuals accused of committing atrocities in 1994 (Magnarella 2000); 2) Susanne Buckley-Zistel’s fieldwork in Nyamata and Gikongoro examines the potential for reconciliation after the 1994 genocide in *Remembering to Forget: Chosen Amnesia As a Strategy for Local Coexistence in Post-Genocide Rwanda*—interviews with bystanders, génocidaires, survivors, and others reveal communal rifts in the way individuals remember and forget their collective past and concludes interviewees’ “chosen amnesia” over root causes of the genocide and Rwanda’s history of conflict may be essential for local coexistence, but argues bridging vastly divergent memories of the genocide is necessary for healing communities and preventing further violence (Buckley-Zistel 2006); 3) Constance F. Morrill’s article *Reconciliation and the Gacaca: The Perceptions and Peace-Building Potential of Rwandan Youth Detainees* published in *The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution* interviews young Rwandan génocidaires held in prison and analyzes their potential for reintegration and reconciliation—it explains the traditional Gacaca justice system and its origins, examines the treatment of youth under Gacaca law and the domestic penal system, discusses evidence illustrating adult manipulation and coercion of children to participate in mass murder, reveals the concerns of detainees and their views on the genocide, and talks about rehabilitation initiatives (Morrill 2004); 4) *Justice on the Grass: Three Rwandan Journalists, Their Trial for War Crimes and a Nation’s Quest for Redemption* by Dina Temple-Raston describes the Gacaca courts in which confessed low-level génocidaires appear before the community and elected judges and are tried by a traditional justice system, and covers the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s
case against the media (RTLM and Kangura) for incitement to genocide, as well as the case of a man wrongly blamed for the deaths of orphaned Tutsi children that he tried to save—in addition, the work includes testimony of women raped during the genocide, many of whom contracted AIDS or struggle to deal with children conceived in rape (Temple-Raston 2005); and 5) Hope for Rwanda: Conversations with Laure Guilbert and Hervé Deguine was written by a Rwandan Catholic priest, journalist, and staunch human rights activist, André Sibomana, who discusses overcoming despair after surviving the genocide, faith, and his hope for reconciliation—the work presents Sibomana’s views of how and why the genocide occurred, the parties responsible, the role of the church, the failure of the international community, and the respective human rights records of the Habyarimana and Kagame regimes, as well as discusses local and state justice, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Prior to his death in 1998, Sibomana continued to speak out against injustice and advocate for reconciliation as editor of Rwanda’s only private newspaper, Kinyamateka, and as the founder of the Rwandan Association for the Defense of Human Rights and Public Liberties (ADL) (Sibomana et al. 1999).

Main Legal Mechanisms for Punishing Genocide in Rwanda: 1) The United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (United Nations 1948); 2) The Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda (United Nations Security Council 1994); 3) and the National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions—the “Justice on the Grass” indigenous court system (National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions); and 4) the Codes and Laws of Rwanda, which the Ministry of Justice has made available online, provides for a number of laws related to genocide prevention and punishment, protecting vulnerable populations, and other relevant legislation (National University of Rwanda).
APPENDIX B

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide


Article 1
The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.

Article 2
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Article 3
The following acts shall be punishable:

- (a) Genocide;
- (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
- (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
- (d) Attempt to commit genocide;
- (e) Complicity in genocide.

Article 4
Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.
Article 5
The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3.

Article 6
Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.

Article 7
Genocide and the other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall not be considered as political crimes for the purpose of extradition. The Contracting Parties pledge themselves in such cases to grant extradition in accordance with their laws and treaties in force.

Article 8
Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3.

Article 9
Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfillment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute.

Article 10
The present Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall bear the date of 9 December 1948.

Article 11
The present Convention shall be open until 31 December 1949 for signature on behalf of any Member of the United Nations and of any non-member State to which an invitation to sign has been addressed by the General Assembly. The present Convention shall be ratified, and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. After 1 January 1950, the present Convention may be acceded to on behalf of any Member of the United Nations and of any non-member State which has received an invitation as aforesaid.
Instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article 12
Any Contracting Party may at any time, by notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, extend the application of the present Convention to all or any of the territories for the conduct of whose foreign relations that Contracting Party is responsible.

Article 13
On the day when the first twenty instruments of ratification or accession have been deposited, the Secretary-General shall draw up a process-verbal and transmit a copy of it to each Member of the United Nations and to each of the non-member States contemplated in Article 11.
The present Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day following the date of deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession.
Any ratification or accession effected subsequent to the latter date shall become effective on the ninetieth day following the deposit of the instrument of ratification or accession.

Article 14
The present Convention shall remain in effect for a period of ten years as from the date of its coming into force.
It shall thereafter remain in force for successive periods of five years for such Contracting Parties as have not denounced it at least six months before the expiration of the current period.
Denunciation shall be effected by a written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article 15
If, as a result of denunciations, the number of Parties to the present Convention should become less than sixteen, the Convention shall cease to be in force as from the date on which the last of these denunciations shall become effective.

Article 16
A request for the revision of the present Convention may be made at any time by any Contracting Party by means of a notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-General.
The General Assembly shall decide upon the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such request.

Article 17
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall notify all Members of the United Nations and the non-member States contemplated in Article 11 of the following:
• (a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions received in accordance with Article 11;
• (b) Notifications received in accordance with Article 12;
• (c) The date upon which the present Convention comes into force in accordance with Article 13;
• (d) Denunciations received in accordance with Article 14;
• (e) The abrogation of the Convention in accordance with Article 15;
• (f) Notifications received in accordance with Article 16.

Article 18
The original of the present Convention shall be deposited in the archives of the United Nations.
A certified copy of the Convention shall be transmitted to all Members of the United Nations and to the non-member States contemplated in Article 11.

Article 19
The present Convention shall be registered by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the date of its coming into force.
APPENDIX C

The Ten Stages of Genocide

By Dr. Gregory H. Stanton

President, Genocide Watch

1. CLASSIFICATION: All cultures have categories to distinguish people into “us and them” by ethnicity, race, religion, or nationality: German and Jew, Hutu and Tutsi. Bipolar societies that lack mixed categories, such as Rwanda and Burundi, are the most likely to have genocide. The main preventive measure at this early stage is to develop universalistic institutions that transcend ethnic or racial divisions, that actively promote tolerance and understanding, and that promote classifications that transcend the divisions. The Catholic church could have played this role in Rwanda, had it not been riven by the same ethnic cleavages as Rwandan society. Promotion of a common language in countries like Tanzania has also promoted transcendent national identity. This search for common ground is vital to early prevention of genocide.

2. SYMBOLIZATION: We give names or other symbols to the classifications. We name people “Jews” or “Gypsies”, or distinguish them by colors or dress; and apply the symbols to members of groups. Classification and symbolization are universally human and do not necessarily result in genocide unless they lead to dehumanization. When combined with hatred, symbols may be forced upon unwilling members of pariah groups: the yellow star for Jews under Nazi rule, the blue scarf for people from the Eastern Zone in Khmer Rouge Cambodia. To combat symbolization, hate symbols can be legally forbidden (swastikas) as can hate speech. Group marking like gang clothing or tribal scarring can be outlawed, as well. The problem is that legal limitations will fail if unsupported by popular cultural enforcement. Though Hutu and Tutsi were forbidden
words in Burundi until the 1980’s, code words replaced them. If widely supported, however, denial of symbolization can be powerful, as it was in Bulgaria, where the government refused to supply enough yellow badges and at least eighty percent of Jews did not wear them, depriving the yellow star of its significance as a Nazi symbol for Jews.

3. DISCRIMINATION: A dominant group uses law, custom, and political power to deny the rights of other groups. The powerless group may not be accorded full civil rights or even citizenship. Examples include the Nuremberg Laws of 1935 in Nazi Germany, which stripped Jews of their German citizenship, and prohibited their employment by the government and by universities. Denial of citizenship to the Rohingya Muslim minority in Burma is another example. Prevention against discrimination means full political empowerment and citizenship rights for all groups in a society. Discrimination on the basis of nationality, ethnicity, race or religion should be outlawed. Individuals should have the right to sue the state, corporations, and other individuals if their rights are violated.

4. DEHUMANIZATION: One group denies the humanity of the other group. Members of it are equated with animals, vermin, insects or diseases. Dehumanization overcomes the normal human revulsion against murder. At this stage, hate propaganda in print and on hate radios is used to vilify the victim group. In combating this dehumanization, incitement to genocide should not be confused with protected speech. Genocidal societies lack constitutional protection for countervailing speech, and should be treated differently than democracies. Local and international leaders should condemn the use of hate speech and make it culturally unacceptable. Leaders who incite genocide should be banned from international travel and have their foreign finances frozen. Hate radio stations should be shut down, and hate propaganda banned. Hate crimes and atrocities should be promptly punished.

5. ORGANIZATION: Genocide is always organized, usually by the state, often using militias to provide deniability of state responsibility (the Janjaweed in Darfur.) Sometimes organization is informal (Hindu mobs led by local RSS militants) or decentralized (terrorist groups.) Special army units or militias are often trained and armed. Plans are made for genocidal killings. To combat this stage, membership in these militias should be outlawed. Their leaders should be denied visas for foreign travel. The U.N. should impose arms embargoes on governments and citizens of countries involved in genocidal massacres, and create commissions to investigate violations, as was done in post-genocide Rwanda.

6. POLARIZATION: Extremists drive the groups apart. Hate groups broadcast polarizing propaganda. Laws may forbid intermarriage or social interaction. Extremist terrorism targets moderates, intimidating and silencing the center. Moderates from the perpetrators’ own group are most able to stop genocide, so are the first to be arrested and killed. Prevention may mean security protection for moderate leaders or assistance to
human rights groups. Assets of extremists may be seized, and visas for international travel denied to them. Coups d’état by extremists should be opposed by international sanctions.

7. PREPARATION: National or perpetrator group leaders plan the “Final Solution” to the Jewish, Armenian, Tutsi or other targeted group “question.” They often use euphemisms to cloak their intentions, such as referring to their goals as “ethnic cleansing,” “purification,” or “counter-terrorism.” They build armies, buy weapons and train their troops and militias. They indoctrinate the populace with fear of the victim group. Leaders often claim that “if we don’t kill them, they will kill us.” Prevention of preparation may include arms embargos and commissions to enforce them. It should include prosecution of incitement and conspiracy to commit genocide, both crimes under Article 3 of the Genocide Convention.

8. PERSECUTION: Victims are identified and separated out because of their ethnic or religious identity. Death lists are drawn up. In state sponsored genocide, members of victim groups may be forced to wear identifying symbols. Their property is often expropriated. Sometimes they are even segregated into ghettos, deported into concentration camps, or confined to a famine-struck region and starved. Genocidal massacres begin. They are acts of genocide because they intentionally destroy part of a group. At this stage, a Genocide Emergency must be declared. If the political will of the great powers, regional alliances, or the U.N. Security Council can be mobilized, armed international intervention should be prepared, or heavy assistance provided to the victim group to prepare for its self-defense. Humanitarian assistance should be organized by the U.N. and private relief groups for the inevitable tide of refugees to come.

9. EXTERMINATION begins, and quickly becomes the mass killing legally called “genocide.” It is “extermination” to the killers because they do not believe their victims to be fully human. When it is sponsored by the state, the armed forces often work with militias to do the killing. Sometimes the genocide results in revenge killings by groups against each other, creating the downward whirlpool-like cycle of bilateral genocide (as in Burundi). At this stage, only rapid and overwhelming armed intervention can stop genocide. Real safe areas or refugee escape corridors should be established with heavily armed international protection. (An unsafe “safe” area is worse than none at all.) The U.N. Standing High Readiness Brigade, EU Rapid Response Force, or regional forces -- should be authorized to act by the U.N. Security Council if the genocide is small. For larger interventions, a multilateral force authorized by the U.N. should intervene. If the U.N. is paralyzed, regional alliances must act. It is time to recognize that the international responsibility to protect transcends the narrow interests of individual nation states. If strong nations will not provide troops to intervene directly, they should provide the airlift, equipment, and financial means necessary for regional states to intervene.

10. DENIAL is the final stage that lasts throughout and always follows a genocide. It is among the surest indicators of further genocidal massacres. The perpetrators of genocide
dig up the mass graves, burn the bodies, try to cover up the evidence and intimidate the witnesses. They deny that they committed any crimes, and often blame what happened on the victims. They block investigations of the crimes, and continue to govern until driven from power by force, when they flee into exile. There they remain with impunity, like Pol Pot or Idi Amin, unless they are captured and a tribunal is established to try them. The response to denial is punishment by an international tribunal or national courts. There the evidence can be heard, and the perpetrators punished. Tribunals like the Yugoslav or Rwanda Tribunals, or an international tribunal to try the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, or an International Criminal Court may not deter the worst genocidal killers. But with the political will to arrest and prosecute them, some may be brought to justice.

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APPENDIX D

*Kangura No. 6*

**Appeal to the Bahutu Conscience**

*(With the Hutu Ten Commandments)*

The Batutsi are bloodthirsty and power-hungry and want to impose their hegemony on the people of Rwanda using armed force.

**The Ten Commandments [of the Bahutu]**

1. Every Hutu male should know that Tutsi women, wherever they may be, are working in the pay of their Tutsi ethnic group. Consequently, shall be deemed a traitor:
   - Any Hutu male who marries a Tutsi woman;
   - Any Hutu male who keeps a Tutsi concubine;
   - Any Hutu male who makes a Tutsi woman his secretary or protégée.
2. Every Hutu male must know that our Hutu daughters are more dignified and conscientious in their role of woman, wife or mother. Are they not pretty, good secretaries and more honest!
3. Hutu women, be vigilant and bring your husbands, brothers and sons back to their senses.
4. Every Hutu male must know that all Tutsi are dishonest in their business dealings. They are only seeking their ethnic supremacy. “Time will tell.” Shall be considered a traitor, any Hutu male: who enters into a business partnership with Tutsis;
   - who invests his money or State money in a Tutsi company;
   - who lends to, or borrows from, a Tutsi;
   - who grants business favors to Tutsis (granting of important licenses, bank loans, building plots, public tenders...) is a traitor.
5. Strategic positions in the political, administrative, economic, military and security domain should, to a large extent, be entrusted to Hutus.
6. In the education sector (pupils, students, teachers) must be in the majority Hutu.
7. The Rwandan Armed Forces should be exclusively Hutu. That is the lesson we learned from the October 1990 war. No soldier must marry a Tutsi woman.
8. Hutus must cease having pity for the Tutsi.
9. The Hutu male, wherever he may be, must be united, in solidarity and be concerned about the fate of their Hutu brothers;
   ◦ The Hutu at home and abroad must constantly seek friends and allies for the Hutu Cause, beginning with our Bantu brothers;
   ◦ They must constantly counteract Tutsi propaganda;
   ◦ The Hutu must be firm and vigilant towards their common Tutsi enemy.
10. The 1959 social revolution, the 1961 referendum and the Hutu ideology must be taught to Hutus at all levels. Every Hutu must propagate the present ideology widely. Any Hutu who persecutes his Hutu brother for having read, disseminated and taught this ideology shall be deemed a traitor.7

REFERENCES
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CURRICULUM VITAE

Beth Mandel received her Bachelor of Arts, majoring in Psychology with a minor in Cross-cultural Communication, from George Washington University in 1992. She then earned a Graduate Certificate in Conflict Analysis and Resolution for Prevention, Reconstruction, and Stabilization Contexts from the Institute for Conflict Analysis & Resolution at George Mason University in 2009. She will graduate with a Master of Arts in Anthropology in 2014. She presently resides in Rwanda.