EU-TURKEY RELATIONS: HOW DOES TURKEY’S EU ACCESSION PROCESS AFFECT THE AKP’S POLICIES?

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EU-Turkey Relations: How Does Turkey’s EU Accession Process Affect The AKP’s Policies?

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DEDICATION

This is dedicated to my ever-supportive parents, Maureen and Joseph, as well as my loving cousin Leanne.
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I would like to thank the many friends, relatives, and supporters who have made this happen. My parents for supporting me all the way through, my cousin Leanne without whom I would have not been in sitting for this course, my best friends who were a constant support and driving force behind me getting this done as well as a needed distraction, my supervisor Dr.Derek Lutterbeck, Director of the course Dr.Omar Grech and finally Michael English, whom I cannot thank enough for his patience throughout the course and after.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi ............................................................... AKP
Central and Eastern European Countries ..................................... CEEC
Euro...........................................................................................€
European Economic Community ............................................... EEC
European Parliament ................................................................. EP
European Union ......................................................................... EU
Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance ...................................... IPA
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ............................................ NATO
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ........ OECD
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe ................ OSCE
Turkish Constitutional Court ...................................................... TCC
EU-TURKEY RELATIONS: HOW DOES TURKEY’S EU ACCESSION PROCESS AFFECT THE AKP’S POLICIES?

Michael Calleja, M.S., M.A.

George Mason University, 2014

Dissertation Director: Dr. Derek Lutterbeck

This dissertation analyses the impact that Turkey’s EU accession process talks have on the policies of the ruling AKP party in Turkey. It brings into play various dynamics that are at play in affecting the AKP’s policies, from the relationship between the EU and Turkey; the external governance policies of the EU; domestic factors such as political and civilian stakeholders; as well as the AKP itself. Besides the history of the AKP and EU-Turkey relations this dissertation focusses on the adoption by Turkey and the AKP of EU backed policies and measures to their own advantage, in an attempt to analyze when and why they were adopted while others were not. This looks at giving an insight on the current and possible future policies that the AKP may adopt in respect to their EU accession process.
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

The question of Turkey’s candidacy as a full member of the European Union (EU) has been a controversial topic for many years now. Discussed and written about by many scholars and politicians alike, there is much literature on the topic ranging from the pros and cons for the EU and for Turkey in them becoming a member, as well as the history and reasons why the process has been so difficult. The fluctuations of positivity and negativity to the talks and years of seemingly endless struggle have definitely had an effect on both sides.

This paper intends to specifically study the effects that the negotiation process has had and will have on the Justice and Development Party or Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP)’s policies. In order to do so this paper looks into the various important dimensions that are at play. Each dimension could be looked at individually as a research topic within themselves but for the topic at hand a basic knowledge of each of them is essential. While the main focus shall be on the AKP and the EU accession talks, it is also important to briefly review the history of EU-Turkey relations, the main issues at stake, as well as the domestic situation in Turkey, while keeping in mind the relationship between the negotiations and the AKP’s policies and how these different topics affect that relationship throughout the paper.
The paper is set out to answer the question ‘How do EU-Turkey relations affect the AKP’s policies?’ In order to do so it begins with a brief introduction and background into Turkey’s application and relationship with the EU as well as the role that the AKP has played in that relationship so far. These are the two main overarching issues to the question at hand and are the reason as to why I am studying the subject. The interplay between Turkey’s domestic issues and their relationship with the EU and its Member States is an interesting interplay made up of various factors that have peeked my interest.

The EU has long been seen as a democratizing force with membership as the main reward in enticing countries to sort out their domestic issues. Turkey has long been a country with various issues domestically with followers of various extreme political views along the spectrum, varying from the secularist protectors of the state to the fundamentally religious elements. The AKP have risen to power through a moderate version of policies in between both sets of extremes, adopting certain policies that have helped them gain support from various sections of the electorate. However there continue to be various impinging issues detrimental to the EU process, that was put in motion before the AKP came to power but has since been undertaken by them as a main policy to pursue. Issues such as fundamental freedoms, minority rights and international relations issues with Cyprus and Greece continue to be hurdles in the process. The EU for its part, through its methods of external governance of reinforcement by reward and democratic conditionality have looked to improve and strengthen Turkey’s economic, political and legal aspects of their country.
This topic therefore covers many different aspects and factors that can determine the process, outcome and results of the negotiation process and therefore the stability of Turkey itself. In order to be able to give the paper the justice one must look into the literature behind the main aspects that pertain to the question. Literature into the theoretical approaches of the EU’s external governance policies such as democratic conditionality and reinforcement by reward are a significant part in understanding how the EU manages to transfer its laws and policies onto other countries and what the factors are that make it effective or not. This is an integral part of the study due to Turkey’s and the AKP’s differing amounts of reform that they have adopted over the years and at different periods.

Further literature is looked into to further understand the reasons behind Turkey’s membership to the EU. One must understand the reasons as to why Turkey would like to join as well as why the EU would want Turkey to join. These range from various issues besides the political stability mentioned above. The benefits as well as the costs of Turkey’s membership are discussed in brief to help put one in the picture of the overall situation. It is important to understand these pros and cons due to their ability to affect the process of accession negotiations and their ultimate outcome. It also helps put one into the picture of how such issues unfold and how they may change in the future. Linked with these issues are the topics of the EU’s enlargement policy; the main policy behind the whole process and cause of the issues at hand, as well as the ideas that have come about of enlargement fatigue and reform fatigue that are again theoretical ideas in trying to figure out the reasoning behind the deadlock to further progress in the subject.
After this literature has been reviewed the paper then looks at the two main issues at hand; Turkey’s accession process and current status; and Turkey’s AKP party and the domestic changes that have occurred since they have been in power. While looking into these two main issues the theoretical frameworks and ideas are constantly kept in mind as underlying issues and factors to the current situations. These two chapters will inevitably have a lot of overlapping and interlinking information. This is then brought together in the final chapter in order to come to a conclusion as to how much EU-Turkey relations, specifically Turkey’s EU accession process, affect the AKP’s policies in Turkey.

1.1 Turkey’s EU Application

Despite applying for membership to the EU (then called the European Economic Community) back in April 1987 Turkey was only officially recognized as a candidate in December 1999 at the Helsinki Summit. The process since then has had various setbacks and problems with negotiations being halted and re-opened on different occasions. This is due to various reasons, such as conflicts with current member states like Cyprus and Greece as well as other major European countries’ doubts as to whether it would be beneficial to the EU. The debate that has arisen, mostly in Europe, regarding the EU’s enlargement and whether or not Turkey ‘is European enough’ has stirred a lot of controversy and continues to be a curious talking point among scholars and politicians alike. This can be seen in contrast to other European organizations that Turkey has been a part of for a long time. Besides being an associate member of the EU since 1963 and signing a Customs Union agreement in 1995, Turkey was also one of the first countries to

In order to fulfil the requirements for membership Turkey has had to make many reforms and changes to various domestic and foreign sectors. Over the years we have seen varying degrees of progress and this can be attributed to various factors. Previously most of the stalling seemed to be emanating from the EU side with major nations expressing their doubts in the enlargement process to include Turkey. This negativity itself could possibly be seen as the reason for the lack of progress shown from Turkey. Besides the clear problems such as Turkey’s relationships with member countries such as Greece and Cyprus, there are various other factors which could contribute to a cycle of deterioration in the process. European nations’ doubt towards Turkey’s accession is exasperated by Turkey’s lack of significant progress which in turn hinders Turkey’s will to apply reforms due to the seemingly negative attitude of those nations towards it. The process of accession into the EU is hard enough without such complications and makes it an interesting topic to look into. When such a process is drawn out as long as this one has been, skepticism tends to grow and foster more negative attitudes. There are those that question the EU’s motives. The promise of membership through conditionality is sometimes seen as a method for the EU to maintain its positive relationship with Turkey while keeping her at a safe distance. This allows them to push Turkey into reforms and

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1 The method of reward through conditionality is the process in which the EU rewards countries, in this case with membership, on the condition that they fulfil the requirements set out by the EU. If they do not sufficiently meet the requirements then they are not rewarded with membership. This method as well as others are discussed further in future chapters.
policies that would favor the EU without actually reaching their ultimate goal of membership and therefore not forcing the EU into its commitments and possible negative consequences of that membership. This is an interesting dynamic that adds to the tension between the parties involves and another possibility to consider for this paper.

1.2 The AKP’s Role

One of the most consistent players in the process is that of the AKP in Turkey. Although a very young political party, its rise to office in 2002 and maintenance of its position since then, means that it has overseen the majority of the negotiation process. A controversial party itself, with seemingly contrasting beliefs in pro-Western and EU liberal economic markets on one hand and socially and arguably religiously conservatism policies on the other, the AKP can arguably be studied as a subject on its own.

The AKP has been the ruling party in Turkey for the last twelve years since it won a landslide victory in the 2012 elections. Although party officials reject claims that it is an ‘Islamic’ based party, as it has been called in various media, the party does originate from officials who were part of previous Islamic conservative parties. The interplay of this Islamic background with their pro-Western and pro-American ideals with a liberal market economy is what makes the party such an interesting topic to research. Classifying itself as a conservative democratic party it has been compared and contrasted to the West’s Christian Democratic parties. In Turkey where the military’s influence is strong and protecting the secularism of the state is considered a high priority, the Islamic backgrounds of the AKP have led some to become wary and suspicious of the party.
Despite various issues such as these, as well as human rights records, issues with the Armenian Genocide, Cyprus, Greece and the Kurdish Community, the AKP has maintained its popularity and power in Turkey for a significant amount of years.

One of its main political agendas was that of finally completing Turkey’s accession into the EU as a fully-fledged member. With its pro-Western beliefs, the AKP was seen as the positive choice for talks to deliver. However talks have continued to stall with several issues arising over the years. Recently steps have been taken in order to put negotiations back on track with the launch of the ‘Positive Agenda’ in 2012 and consequent opening of negotiations on Chapter 22 in November 2013. Despite these positive moves recently there are many more chapters that remain ‘provisionally closed’ and the process has a while to go yet. This paper will look at the different stages of the negotiations, both of negative and positive moments, in order to attempt and correlate changes in the AKP’s policies with the different stages of negotiation. Many can see that the negotiations are a strong form of improving certain issues like Human Rights within Turkey and the stagnation of the negotiation process could hinder such reforms. Hopefully this paper can identify certain trends in the AKP’s policies and along with attitudes and trends in Turkey, attempt to come to a reasonable conclusion as to the future direction of the AKP in regards to their polices in Turkey and with the EU and what this could mean for the Turkish people.
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

Considered as the most controversial candidate for membership in the history of the EU, Turkey’s attempts at joining the EU have sparked debate far and wide for many years. A strong ally of the West and Europe, Turkey is a member of all European organizations except the EU. This however did not prevent the controversy and debate that ensued around Europe when the EU began seriously negotiating Turkey’s accession. Questions were raised as to what it was to be a “European” country with regards to the religion, culture and geography of the country. As we shall see in this paper, these were not valid arguments to oppose Turkey’s candidacy due to the fact that the EU does not have a definition as to what makes a country European but states that ‘any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2\(^2\) and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union\(^3\).

There is various literature in different fields pertaining to the debate on whether or not Turkey should join the EU and the advantages and disadvantages it would bring to both parties. These debates range in fields from political science and international relations, to identity theory and what it is to be “European”, as well as practical issues.

\(^2\) The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.

such as the economic effects. It goes without saying that within these fields there are various other avenues of research with different factors that contribute to the question at hand. Issues such as Turkey’s stand on the Cyprus Conflict, the territorial disputes with Greece as well as their refusal to acknowledge the Armenian Genocide.

2.1 The EU’s External Governance Mechanisms

The literature which is of significance to this paper are the works that can provide insight into the linkage between the accession process and its ultimate goal of membership to policies that the AKP adopt. It is generally understood and agreed upon that the EU has been a major force in the world in spreading democratic values and norms. Besides contributing such values internally by adopting and implementing new laws among its members, the EU has also had a significant impact on non-member countries.

There is a significant amount of study on the process in which the EU uses methods of creating ‘external governance’, the idea of transferring rules onto non-member states. In the case of non-member states like Turkey the EU does not have the ability to coerce the country into adopting its rules and laws, let alone enforce them. What they can do however is encourage and entice them into doing so. In order to do this the EU adopts policies that have been considered ‘democratic conditionality’ or ‘reinforcement by reward’. These are carried out in three different main approaches.\(^4\)

In ‘EU rules beyond EU borders: theorizing external governance in European politics’ they discuss what they consider to be the three factors that can account for the differentiated patterns of EU rule adoption in non-EU countries. Although much of the paper concerns other forms of external relations besides accession negotiations and EU enlargement there is a significant amount of work on these three factors and approaches that are relevant to this paper.

The first and foremost approach is that of institutionalism which plays a big role in EU governance. Recently, scholarly work in this field has moved away from EU governance’s effect domestically on member states to external governance on countries in the accession process or candidate countries. The institutionalism approach is similar in that the external governance is shaped by the internal EU modes of governance and rules. In this way rule transfer is carried out through reflecting the already established forms of governance, rules and norms. This can be put down to them acting as effective templates for countries to follow and/or examples of high legitimacy. This legitimacy comes through them having effective and positive solutions for complicated matters, having dealt with similar issues before and/or being legally obliged to externalize their models. As Schimmelfennig agrees, the higher the legitimacy of a rule or system then the higher the effectiveness of it being transferred to a new country. The more precise, binding and enforceable a rule is, then the more that rule will be selected, adopted and

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implemented (Abott et al 2000). This system of institutionalism is considered an ‘older’ form of governance which is hierarchical but is also considered as a more effective method of rule transfer compared to others that are trying to be promoted. In their work Leavenex and Schimmelfennig argue that this approach can be considered changing to a more networked approach but when it comes to accession negotiations such as the one Turkey is in, with democratic conditionality, it is this form of governance and rule transfer that takes priority.

The second factor is the power based approach and looks into the bargaining power that the EU holds over a third country compared to ‘competing’ governance providers. If a country is highly dependent on the EU and does not have a strong alternative governance provider, then the stronger the EU is when negotiating with that country. The more bargaining power that the EU holds, the more effective will the rule transfer be. Once again this is another hierarchical approach which is synonymous with accession negotiations between countries and the EU. Very often candidate countries are already highly dependent on the EU and do not have an alternative body to turn to. This is the case with Turkey who have long established ties with the EU and have a large amount of trade with the EU bloc.

With membership being the ultimate and final goal, accession negotiations also have the highest incentive the EU can offer. This usually leads to extremely fast and massive adoption of EU rules. Some may argue that this was not the case in Turkey with the slow and stagnated progress but when conditions were positive a lot of changes had been made especially in 1999-2005 when negotiations seemed to be moving steadily.
Being involved in the accession negotiations also means that the two are in an advanced stage of the process with a lot riding on the outcome. If a country is in that stage, like Turkey is, then it is safe to say that there is no alternative governance provider that the country can turn to. Not considering all other possibilities, the fact that they are at this stage means that joining the EU is the main goal and that gives the EU a significant amount of power with regards to Turkey. This gives hope to the idea that Turkey will adhere to the EU’s requirements and will adopt the changes.

The third factor discussed is that of domestic structure. The domestic structure of a country plays a significant role in the adoption of EU law for various reasons. The argument holds that if a country has similar domestic rules, traditions and practices then it is easier to relate to the EU rules it needs to adopt and apply. This similarity brings legitimacy and resonance through the rules seeming “normal” to the third country. They argue that possessing a functioning rule of law, strong administration and implementation capacity in the governance sector as well as a high level of economic liberalization for market governance can help in the effectiveness of rule transfer. In the case of Turkey these issues were and are slightly different in different sectors and policies. Whereas in a lot of cases Turkey can be seen as a very ‘European’ system there are some significant issues as well. The judicial system with the Turkish Constitutional Court (TCC) having a strong influence and tradition in upholding Turkey’s military secularism and national sentiments of Kemalism does not help with major pillars of democracy such as checks and balances between the executive, judiciary and legislative powers.
2.2 Democratic Conditionality and Reinforcement by Reward

Through the mechanism of ‘democratic conditionality’ and ‘reinforcement by reward’ the EU encourages governments to reform, build, promote and then sustain democratic values and norms within their country by offering them incentives such as membership that are conditional to those reforms. If the reforms are not maintained then the country does not reap the reward. Despite helping countries achieve these goals there is an understanding that this process provides the EU with a tool where the conditions are clear and that is that. The EU does not try to coerce countries into adhering to them through threats and nor does it offer extra incentives such as monetary gains if the country does not want to accept the terms.

This system works mostly due to its exclusivity and the economic benefits that come with it. Countries want to be a part of the bloc or at the minimum, have a positive relationship with it in order to gain something themselves and not be ‘outside of the loop’. This can be seen through the amount of countries who have joined the EU, current candidates as well as through other external relations programs such as the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). The biggest reward that the EU can offer is that of full membership so therefore it goes without saying that those countries aspiring to be full members, whether they are in the pre-application, application or negotiation phase, are those that are most likely to adopt EU rules. The closer the ties with the EU the greater power the EU has in transferring their democratic values, norms and rules. This is beneficial to the EU as it helps to promote better, more stable countries in and around its own area which can only be positive for itself. Therefore the EU uses these mechanisms
in order to create an all-encompassing positive cost-benefit analysis which includes economic and political aspects.

Not as significant but a clear small example of these mechanisms is the aforementioned ENP. Countries on the borders and periphery have been encouraged to adopt democratic values. These policies extend to various Central Eastern European Countries, Eastern European and North African countries. This is applied with the underlying thought that if the countries on its borders were stable and easy to deal with then the EU would be safer and more stable itself. They achieve this through an agreement on an ENP plan with the partnering countries ‘demonstrating their commitment to democracy, human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development’. This plan brings with it financial support, economic integration and access to EU markets, easier travel to the EU and technical and policy support. They promote democratic reforms in such countries through these agreements while fostering mutually beneficial relationships politically and economically.

Again the benefits of positive relations with the EU are clear for all to see but it is the effectiveness and consistency of such a method that is of more interest here. Schimmelfennig has a few articles and papers where he looks to explain the methods of such external governance, the factors that are required for it to work, as well as the effectiveness of it. Schimmelfennig argues that democratic conditionality mainly uses the reinforcement by reward mechanism but the actual rule transfer from the EU onto the target/candidate countries depends on a few factors. Reinforcement by reward is the
method of providing a target government with an incentive to change their current system. The incentive in the case of the EU is that of membership, the institutional and financial ties that it brings with it, but with the specific conditions set out by the EU. As with all negotiations a cost-benefit analysis is applied. The target government’s status quo is the starting base point of negotiations which the EU attempts to change by offering benefits that come with changing the domestic system. The target government naturally looks at the cost-benefit analysis of adopting the EU rules and is ultimately up to them whether to comply with the conditions. If the government does not comply with the conditions set out then they are not awarded but neither would they be punished for not complying. The EU does not attempt to further affect the cost-benefit analysis whether it is through adding to the benefits on the table or by coercing through punishments if the target government does not comply.

In Schimmelfennig’s paper of 2004 he brings up a few points that are of concern to Turkey. He argues that this bargaining can be done directly through intergovernmental bargaining or indirectly through the differential empowerment of domestic actors. This would be through promoting the position to other political parties or social actors in the domestic political scene who could take the possibility of using pro-EU stances in order to gain political power over their opponents. This can be attributed to the AKP in Turkey with their pro-EU ideas having helped gain them a significant amount of support over the years.

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7 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, “Governance by Conditionality.”
Schimmelfennig goes on to state that besides this indirect effect that this process has, ultimately the final decision and accountability of the cost-benefit analysis is in the hands of the authoritative government and those state actors who can be considered as veto players. Once again this applies to the AKP and the different stages of their accession talks and progress with the EU. Since their victory in 2002, the AKP have had varying degrees of success in adopting EU legislation. This could be linked to this hypothesis if one looks at how the AKP has changed its stance from when it first came to power to other stages of its time in power. The military in Turkey was one of those veto players that have posed a threat to the AKP domestically and creates an interesting interplay in terms of the AKP and EU rules. As shall be explained further later on, the AKP has used EU backed reforms in an attempt to control, or at least reduce, the power of the military over the years. However, later on, with the military under more control there might have been a point in which the AKP then found adoption costs outweighed the benefits due to their stronger position that they found themselves in. As well as the military, the judiciary and TCC are also a strong player in blocking reform that the AKP have had problems overcoming. A hypothesis that could be interesting to look into.

Overall though Schimmelfennig’s point that ‘a state adopts EU rules if the benefits of EU rewards outweigh the domestic adoption costs’ is a pretty straightforward and obvious statement in my mind. Looking into the cost-benefit analysis at different stages of the AKP’s EU accession talks could give us a clearer indication on how and why those talks have changed the AKP’s policies and possibly a view into what the future may hold.
Further to this study Schimmelfennig offers four criteria on which he believes this cost-benefit analysis is based, namely; (i) the determinacy of conditions, (ii) the size and speed of rewards, (iii) the credibility of threats and promises, and (iv) the size of adoption costs. These factors can further help us delve into the AKP’s specific situation and characteristics vis-à-vis the EU.

The determinacy of conditions works effectively in a few ways. The rules need to be set up on the basis as conditions for rewards otherwise target countries would not want to adopt them. Determinacy also applies to the formality and clarity of a rule, the clearer and more ‘legalized’ the rule the better for both parties. It helps adopting countries know exactly what has to be done and that it cannot attempt to manipulate the rule and must adopt it in its entirety. The clearer the rule the easier it is for the country to know how it works and how to adopt it. Finally it also serves as a guard against the EU’s own manipulation of the rule. Once a country adopts it, the clearer the rule the less ability the EU has of claiming the country’s adoption of it was not up to standard. It ultimately acts as a safety clause and method of stringency to both parties in the agreement.

The size and speed of rewards is clearly a strong factor for countries to abide by the conditions and adopt EU rules. With rewards, membership is the biggest award a country can achieve and this needs to be reflected in the agreements, otherwise other strategies such as association agreements or partnerships where less costs could be

8 These are reiterated in another piece of work of Schimmelfennig et al, 2003 where he specifically looks into the conditions in Turkey

9 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, “Governance by Conditionality.”
incurred might become more favorable. The speed of granting awards are also a determining factor. Adoption occurs better closer to dates of enlargements but like in the case of Turkey, the further away accession seems to be the less likely they are to adopt EU rules. This is a significant factor in the research of this paper. Membership, supposedly the biggest reward the EU can offer, is still on the table but seems very far off in the pipeline despite recent attempts to hurry it up. Over the years there might have also been a possibility that membership might not be that enticing to Turkey due to issues such as the financial crisis but overall it is generally argued that it is still the favored result. The bigger issue is that of when it might happen with various opponents among the Member States and a seemingly endless process filled with obstacles standing in their way.

Building on this idea of eventual membership is the third factor, that of the credibility of conditionality. This works on the notion of how credible the candidate countries believe the promise of the rewards to be. If the promise of the reward is deemed to be just that, a promise, whether they fulfil the requirements or not, then the candidate country will not be determined in satisfying the criteria. The strength of the EU and the overall benefit of joining is significant enough to encourage a state to make the reforms in order to not lose out on membership. On the other hand that reward of membership needs to look realistic in the eyes of the candidate country. This can rest on issues such as the EU’s ability to absorb the countries as new member states and afford the payment of those rewards as well as their willingness to do so. This issue is prevalent in the case of Turkey who could be forgiven for feeling a lack of credibility in terms of their
membership to the EU. This has arisen through issues such as the length of time it has taken to get this far, the lack of progress in the negotiations, the economic crisis, member states’ declarations opposing it and the rising idea of ‘enlargement fatigue’ over the last few years.

On a positive note however, being in the accession negotiations means that they are at a very advanced stage of joining despite still having a lot of work to do. This is due to the fact that despite the lack of progress, the negotiations are still ongoing which means that the offer of membership is still on the table. This is down to the idea that the negatives of falling back on negotiations at this stage and not giving a country membership, would have more adverse effects than if they go through with the membership. This is seen due to the negative impact and overall loss of resources and efforts already put into the process, also known as ‘sunk costs’ that they would be unable to recover. An idea also mentioned through Schimmelfennig’s work on the ‘entrapped’ EU\(^\text{10}\). Suffice to say that from Turkey’s point of view, besides the benefits of membership, these ‘sunk costs’ of years of preparation and negotiation also applies to them. In the case of the AKP this applies further through their use of EU membership as part of their electoral manifesto and subsequent involvement in the negotiations.

Finally, the veto players and adoption costs refers to the amount of veto players that are involved, their own adoption costs and that of the country. As mentioned earlier this is an interesting factor due to the AKP’s changing positions over the years due to the

\(^{10}\) Schimmelfennig argues that once Turkey had met the requirements set out for membership in the application process then by their own standards the EU was ‘entrapped’ in adhering to their side of the deal and entering into the accession talks.
political situation in Turkey. Since the AKP have come to power there has been a shift in the political balance and this has definitely had an effect on the veto players within the system. This in turn has definitely affected the ability to adopt EU legislation and can give some insight as to why we have seen differing periods of success. Two of the major veto players over the years have been that of the judiciary and that of the military, as both have had significant amount of power. The AKP and their relationship with these veto players over the years has definitely contributed to the effectiveness or lack of reform in Turkey. As this paper will look into further on, one must consider these different veto players and what they deem to be a positive cost-benefit analysis when implementing changes. A veto player that sees new legislation as a threat to its power in the domestic political structure will attempt to derail, stall and hinder such legislation passing. On the other hand there might be veto players who see the adoption of certain legislation to have a positive cost-benefit analysis, perhaps in gaining them more power domestically, and would use that to their advantage. It has been argued that both these circumstances have surfaced in Turkey with the AKP using EU legislation to improve its foothold domestically but then also hindering reforms for example through the judiciary in order to maintain their power once they had got it. Schimmelfennig et al also find that ‘it is the material bargaining mechanism and the condition of low domestic political costs that ultimately determine the success of EU conditionality’\textsuperscript{11}. I believe this to be a significant factor in Turkey’s case and one that shall be constantly referred back to in this paper.

\textsuperscript{11} Pg 19 Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel, “Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey.” Pg 19
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier do give credence to alternative models such as the social learning (also known as the lesson drawing model) as well as the role of social influence in another work of his\textsuperscript{12}. He states that the social mechanism influences governments through the social rewards such as legitimacy, higher status and/or positive image. This applies to the in-group of government actors and how they see themselves in respect to the EU identity. This factor could be influential if the in-group identifies with the EU community and aspires to be a part of it. Combined with the research into the AKP’s identity and make-up of the party this could be an interesting factor in the research of this work. With the seemingly contrasting policies of being a conservative party with fundamental religious roots and its pro-Western policies it is interesting to see where the AKP stand on this identity grouping.

Schimmelfennig’s work goes on to talk about social factors being used on non-governmental societal actors if the in-group does not comply with their conditions. Working on these actors in society to provide them with a positive cost-benefit analysis could encourage them to put pressure on the government/in-group to make changes or even promote another party with those ideas. This however is dependent on the strength of society within those countries as well as their responsiveness to the EU’s measures. Again this could apply to Turkey’s AKP when looking at its rise to and consolidation of power in Turkey. The Kemalist and coalition government before 2002 had previously been in favour of EU membership. The societal function could be seen with their strong reaction to being shunned by the EU in 1997 by cancelling various negotiations and talks.

\textsuperscript{12} Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, “Governance by Conditionality.”
that had been planned. The shame and anger could have been a sign of their wanting to be part of the European identity for prestige, status and influence but their policies and lack of reform was detrimental to the cause. They did however pick up their act after the 1999 decision to award candidacy status, again proving a few theories with regards what pushes governments to make the necessary changes.

Similarly the AKP used the wave of society’s identification with the EU as an electoral tool, putting pro-Western and EU ideas into its manifesto in order to rise to power with a majority victory in the 2002 elections. Schimmelfennig then poses the alternative argument of Vachudova who argues that societal mechanisms are indeed very important to the process, believing that the electorate and the opposition were more of a force in helping international influence have an effect on domestic policies than the government. I believe this work of Vachudova is highly relevant and works on the shortcomings of Schimmelfennig’s works. The assumption that democratic conditionality and rule transfer is dependent on those four factors, coming down to the material rewards on offer and the willingness of the target government, seemed like too small a piece of the whole picture. With Vachudova’s argument she brings into play issues domestically such as the electorate’s opinions, the opposition’s policies and other opponents they might have which affect the cost-benefit analysis of EU rule adoption. Through this paper I hope to cover most of the issues that the AKP have kept in mind both before and during their tenure as the ‘in-group’ in government. This gives a wider scope of reasons as to why they might have had such differing views and policies over the course of the negotiation process with the EU.
Alternatively there are also the models of Europeanization that are through ‘social learning’ and ‘lesson drawing’ in which non-member countries look to the EU as examples of what can work in their societies and adopt rules irrespective of the incentives that could be offered. These methods though have been considered to only be marginally relevant compared to the rest and do not seem to play a significant role for the purposes of this paper.

The overwhelmingly most effective method of external governance and rule transfer has been found to be that of the highest incentive with a high credibility with favorable domestic factors working in conjunction with these factors. It is common throughout the works that the domestic factors of a country play a significant role, despite how credible, powerful and legitimate the conditions and rewards might be. It is for this reason that the study of the AKP and the political environment in Turkey over the period of the accession negotiations are vital to this paper and its outcomes. The interplay and balancing act that the AKP has and needs to carry out between the international pressures, domestic pressures and societal actors is a significant ask. Despite these various dynamics the AKP has continued to maintain support and power in Turkey, even up till local and presidential elections in 2014.

2.3 Turkey’s Membership: Costs and Benefits

There is no doubting that Turkey’s EU membership has courted a lot of controversy from various areas in Europe. There is a vast amount of literature on the costs and benefits that Turkey’s membership to the EU would bring to both sides with the main arguments being quite clear to many and not specifically important to this paper.
This paper intends to look at the process of accession negotiations and the effects it has had and could have on the AKP’s policies. The democratizing force of the EU through the mechanisms explained above is the key aspect of this paper with important issues such as the role that the domestic structures of the country has to play. For the sake of the argument however it is good to mention the basic arguments that have come up in the controversial topic that is Turkey’s accession. The negotiation process as well as the AKP and Turkey’s political environment will be looked into much more deeply in future chapters of the paper along with the real issues of what is happening with the process.

For this reason I shall only give a brief overview of the main issues that have caused the most debate with Turkey’s membership. With the enlargement policy the EU has always mentioned the ability to absorb new member states and despite having doubled in size with two significant enlargements in 2004 and 2007 Turkey has been a new problem altogether.

The main concern with Turkey is its sheer size, population and economic situation besides the significant cultural and political differences. First of all economically accepting Turkey into the EU would be a huge burden for the Union due to Turkey’s poor and largely agricultural economy. This means that on entry Turkey would benefit from a large amount of structural and agricultural funds from the EU budget as well as cause a big possibility of labour migration (although there is a good argument that this is actually a positive for Europe’s aging population) and divergence of EU living standards. These issues have already caused quite a bit of controversy in Europe when other states were joining, such as the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) where the belief
was that their membership would have a negative cost-benefit analysis outcome to the current member states.

The second issue relates to successfully incorporating Turkey into the political makeup of the EU’s main institutions. The problem here is the sheer size of Turkey’s population which needs to be accounted for. In institutions such as the European Parliament (EP) a country of Turkey’s size will have a significant amount of votes and/or blocking power. Despite there being a cap on the minimum and maximum amount of seats per country Turkey’s representation and power will still be significantly large due to estimations believing that they will have a larger population than Germany (largest current population) by the time they join.

Third, the cultural differences have caused many debates as to whether they can be considered as part of the EU or not mainly due to Turkey being a predominantly Muslim country, and to a lesser extent its geography and history. Turkey is a highly secular society but undeniably Muslim and this has been an issue with certain Europeans who believe that it is not in line with the ‘European Identity’ that they believe to be Christian. Academically and politically however these arguments hold no premise. According to the EU and its Treaties ‘any European country may apply for membership if it respects the democratic values of the EU and is committed to promoting them’\(^\text{13}\), which mentions nothing about culture or religion. The EU itself is a melting pot of different religions, cultures and peoples that it prides itself on with various policies such as

Erasmus exchanges and European City of Culture\textsuperscript{14} initiatives. The argument is further put down through the comments from the then President of the Commission, Walter Hallstein stating that “Turkey is part of Europe” on the signing of the Ankara agreement back in 1963\textsuperscript{15}. For these reasons it is clear that Turkey does fall under the category of European and if not for other reasons would definitely be eligible to be a fully-fledged member.

Finally, and one of the biggest issues with Turkey’s membership, is that of the political system that as of yet does still not satisfy the requirements of possessing stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. Although often praised as being an example for the Muslim world in regards to its secular politics Turkey’s system contains many flaws compared to the system that the EU requires and stands for. This is due to various reasons such as the power of the military and judiciary within the system and the lack of proper democratic checks and balances. Lack of fundamental rights such as freedom of speech, with various people and journalists being imprisoned for voicing their opinions against the state and/or its leaders. Another big issues is that of the lack of minority rights afforded to the Kurdish community in Turkey with whom the ruling party have had years of confrontations with. Some of these issues have been looked at by the AKP with some

\textsuperscript{14} The ERASMUS programme is a European student exchange programme established in 1987 offering university students a possibility of studying or working abroad in another European country for a period of at least 3 months and maximum 12 months.

\textsuperscript{15} “Address by Professor Dr. Walter Hallstein, President of the Commission of the European Economic Community, on the Occasion of the Signature of the Association Agreement with Turkey. Ankara, 12 September 1963 - Archive of European Integration,” accessed September 5, 2014, http://aei.pitt.edu/14311/.
reforms and progress being made over the years. However there is still a lot of work to be done and questions remain as to how far the laws and changes that have been adopted are actually implemented on the ground. These issues and the AKP’s policies towards them will be looked into further on in the paper.

There are however various benefits to the EU of Turkey’s membership which they have highlighted throughout the process. As with all agreements with non-member countries the EU is constantly engaging in external relations policies because it is also beneficial to itself. As mentioned earlier stability within the EU rests largely on the stability of its borders, region as well as the global sphere. Trade and/or political agreements, which usually come hand-in-hand, serve the EU for various reasons. When it comes to another country becoming a member, the EU enjoys the possibilities of expanding not just in terms of the territory of that country but the potential within it. Being part of the single market alone opens the borders to the free movement of goods, capital, services and people which means many more economic opportunities for the current members to exploit and vice-versa. There are also other benefits through increased involvement and cooperation with more countries that can be seen through the years of cooperation between the current members. The underlying basis of which is that with the increased amount of interdependence and cooperation through similar economic and political values then the chances of conflict are smaller. The EU sees this with its various agreements with not only possible future members but with the countries on its borders and beyond. In the case of Turkey the situation gives rise not only to economic benefits and the improvement of political stability on the EU’s border but also in terms of
security and foreign policy due to Turkey’s geostrategic position in terms of the Middle East.

Economically Turkey’s is already a big trading partner due to being part of the Customs Union. The EU is Turkey’s main import and export partner while turkey is the EU’s 5th and 7th biggest partner in terms of exports and imports respectively. With full membership and further integration the opportunities can only increase and not just in terms of goods. One of the major plus points of Turkey’s large population is its makeup and the potential of those people joining the European workforce and slowing down the ageing of the EU’s population. This can be seen due to the population of Turkey being a young and ever growing one compared to that of the EU. This can be seen through the statistics that with a median age of 30.1 years compared to the EU’s 41.9 as well as over 65s accounting for only 7.3% of the population in Turkey compared to 17.9% in the EU. Turkey’s population has a much more positive outlook for the future than that of the EU. This is not only beneficial simply for the statistics but free movement of people the whole of the EU can benefit from a bigger and younger workforce with very little impact of having to cater for the elderly. Although a very simplified version this cost-benefit analysis of the workforce joining the EU is overall positive.

Turkey is also a very important geostrategic partner due to its proximity to various conflict zones in and around the Middle East. As an ally of the West as part of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the OSCE Turkey is a valued partner in

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the security of the region with foreign military bases in the country. An added factor to the West is the fact that Turkey is a Muslim country. As a member of the EU the enhanced relations could provide significant benefits to the EU’s foreign and external relations strategy by using Turkey as a bridge to other countries of the Arab world in the region. On the other hand this does mean that other highly unstable countries such as Syria and Iraq, as well as Iran, would be right on the EU’s border which would increase certain risks of security, an issue which already has problems due to the influx of refugees through Turkey and into the EU. Having unstable countries such as these right on the EU’s border highly increases security risks and has been one of the reasons why some believe that Turkey should not join but instead continue to be used as a sort of buffer zone of a country with amicable relations.

Finally another big benefit is that of Turkey being in a strategic position with regards to energy security, a key policy in recent EU papers and policies. Energy security is becoming increasingly important around the world and the EU is no different. One of the aims was diversify the EU’s gas supply in order to ease its dependency on Russia. Once again due to its geographical position Turkey is in a position to be a strategic link between the EU and major gas suppliers such as Azerbaijan. With Turkey in the EU this could help the EU in reaching its targets.

Another major talking point in a potential cost-benefit analysis to the EU is that of Turkey’s relations with current members Greece and Cyprus. Turkey has ongoing territorial disagreements with Greece as well as a serious involvement in the Cyprus conflict. The matter with Cyprus can be regarded as being the main sticking point
hindering progress in terms of the accession negotiations. On Cyprus’ entry into the EU, Turkey was expected to extend the Additional Protocol of the Ankara Agreement to Cyprus as well. This however did not materialize due to Turkey not recognizing Cyprus as a country. This meant that Cypriot ships, planes and goods were still not welcome in Turkey which strictly goes against the terms of its agreements with the EU. This led to the Council decision of December 2006 to block the opening of 8 Chapters in the negotiating process. Along with these there are another 6 Chapters that are blocked by vetoes from European countries such as Greece and France. This is a significant problem in the process but can also be seen as being a benefit that would come out of Turkey’s membership. If Turkey joins it could well mean that relations with these countries, and the Cyprus conflict especially, might be vastly improved if not settled. In order for the negotiations to continue and then become a member Turkey needs to surmount these obstacles and this can only be possible through dialogue. An attempt at this was already carried out just before Cyprus was accepted as a member to of the EU. Before officially joining the EU, along with the UN and other international players, pushed strongly for a solution to the problem hoping that setting a deadline would push an agreement through. Although it was possibly the closest the situation has come to being resolved the Annan Agreement was rejected in the referendum. Despite Cyprus joining as a full member in 2004 without resolving the situation there is enough evidence to believe that at least

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18 During the accession negotiations the EU and Turkey must open and then close 35 ‘Chapters’ that make up the basis for the EU’s acquis communautaire which make up the legislation, legal acts, and court decisions which constitute the body of European Union law. All candidate countries need to adopt all 35 Chapters before becoming a member.
amicable relations between the two countries would be needed in order for Turkey to join.

Although brief, the knowledge of the pros and cons of Turkey’s membership is important to know for the sake of this paper. Besides giving backing as to why the EU would persevere in negotiations with Turkey they also give credence to the credibility of the offer on the table to Turkey. With regards to Turkey-EU relations, the accession talks and the AKP’s policies, it is important for the AKP to realize that the EU intend on fulfilling their commitments to Turkey and that is more credible when both sides have the potential to gain from the agreement.

2.4 The EU's Enlargement Policy and Enlargement Fatigue

Another relevant idea amongst the literature is that of ‘enlargement fatigue’ being felt by the EU and its Member States. After Croatia was the last country to join in 2013 it raised the number of EU Member States to a total of 28, 13 of those joining in the last 10 years\(^\text{19}\). When such a large concentration of countries and their respective populations join an organization like the EU they need to be catered for and this brings a lot of constraints and pressures along with it. Enlargement is a tiring and arduous process that requires a lot of work and changes. These large enlargements within a few years along with the eurocrisis of recent years would obviously have put a strain on both resources and general feelings of fatigue towards more enlargements. This is ‘feeling’ is talked

about not only in regards to the EU itself but the countries within it and the citizens themselves.

The ‘enlargement policy’, considered the most effective external relations policy of the EU, has done well over the years by continuing to expand and incorporate these countries but it is hard to tell how much further they will be able to push it. Whenever a country joins, the EU needs to take into consideration the absorption capacity of all the main EU structures as well as the cost-benefit analysis to its current member states. New countries joining receive significant amounts of funding and aid from previous members in order to be able to cope and adapt to the new pressures that membership brings to the table. Therefore each new entry into the union takes its toll on each previous Member State, putting pressure onto the EU governing bodies who are expected to ensure that this is not to the detriment of its current members losing too much without gaining anything.

The absorption capacity of the EU in regards to new member states has always been a consideration of the enlargement policy since the European Council meeting in Copenhagen in 1993 but is now called the integration capacity. This integration capacity is defined as ‘the EU’s capacity to integrate new members. While the acceding countries must be ready and able to fully assume the obligations of membership, the Union must be able to function effectively and to develop’. This capacity was seen to be

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brought up in the Council meeting in 2006 as the ‘new rhetoric joker on enlargement’\textsuperscript{22} with EU leaders insisting it was not a new requirement for membership. It was however seen to be important enough to be mentioned and discussed by quite a few of the members. Subsequently the Commission gave its view on the matter with Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn stating that it is based on the following three conditions:

1) Institutional: "The Union needs to ensure that its institutions and decision-making processes remain effective and accountable, for the sake of current member states as well as in view of further enlargement".

2) EU policy impact: "The Union needs to be in a position, as it enlarges, to continue developing and implementing common policies in all areas. Assessment of the impact of enlargement on EU policies will take place at all key stages of the enlargement process."

3) EU budget: "Before any further accession, the EU will need to decide on the overall budgetary means required...The Commission's analysis will take account both of the budgetary aspects and of the increased economic dynamism generated by accessions."\textsuperscript{23}

This ability to integrate further countries has been put into question in recent years following the significant enlargements of 2004 and 2007. These conditions also act


as a warning to Turkey as the EU could potentially find it very difficult to accommodate Turkey within these conditions due to its size and needs.

Further ‘enlargement fatigue’ has come through different European countries’ political parties and their views on matters, as well as from the citizens of Europe themselves. This has especially been seen in countries such as France and Austria where referendums will be held or are being considered to be held with regards to Turkey’s membership as well as other possible future candidates.

Although enlargement fatigue is mentioned consistently and has become a well-used buzzword over the years the EU and its leaders continue to dispel or at the minimum put down the notion. This can be seen through the European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy Steven Fule stating that “enlargement has never been part of the problem; it has always been a part of the solution”24 as well as “I do not believe in so called enlargement fatigue among the Member States and I do not want to start hearing about so called enlargement apathy among candidates and aspirants”25.

This can be seen as a clear indication of the threat that such talk could have on the process with the EU realizing the need to talk about it and try to mitigate its effects. The fact that the EU has even spoken about such issues in public statements is proof that there is something to talk about. Another important factor to remember when reading such statements is the theories outlined earlier such as the credibility of the rewards and the impact it would have on a candidate country’s adoption of EU rules. The EU would

25 Ibid.
definitely not want to lose the credibility, determinacy and bargaining power that comes with the enlargement policy as it would put a serious dent into Turkey’s willingness to make the necessary reforms. This theory of enlargement fatigue can also be dispelled through the EU’s Positive Agenda put in place to reignite accession negotiations with Turkey and the recent opening of a new Chapter in the talks. These are positive actions that back up the various speeches and press releases that the EU have given in recent years and gives hope to future progress.

2.5 Reform Fatigue

Whereas enlargement fatigue stems from the EU’s institutions and member states there is a similar idea that emanates from the candidate country’s side, namely ‘reform fatigue’. This can be seen to arise through various circumstances from issues such as the inability to do so at the current moment in time to blatant disregard or refusal to do so in order to maintain the status quo of domestic political structures. Having seemed to adopt various reforms with relative speed from 1999-2005\(^{26}\), the current AKP government seems to have slowed down on the adoption and application of EU rules with interspersed periods of progress. This could be put down to many factors that shall be looked into further, including that of lack of credibility from the EU side (enlargement fatigue contributing), but also the idea of the lack of support within Turkey for further reforms, AKP’s personal interests in the domestic structure depending on circumstances leading to

\(^{26}\) The former coalition government led by Bulent Ecevit of the Democratic Left Party (DSP) was in charge between 1999-2002 before the AKP was elected in 2002 and continued the reforms through to 2005.
reforms in certain areas but not in others (Noutcheva and Duzgit 2012) or due to veto players such as the judiciary or military attempting to hold up progress where they can.

Turkey has also come in for further criticism not only for the lack of reforms but also some of the reforms that have been made. Opponents have criticized the AKP for adopting EU rules and legislations in certain sectors but failing to implement and enforce them where it matters.

2.6 Revised Question

When first starting this paper the intent was to follow the direct link between the EU-Turkey negotiation process in order to determine what effect it had on the AKP’s reform policies. Having looked at the literature however there was a clear indication that the negotiations cannot be looked at as the sole driver for AKP reform or lack thereof. Obviously there is a link but the domestic situation and players that are involved is too great of an issue to ignore. With this in mind the paper looks to study the interplay of EU negotiations as well as domestic factors in determining the AKP’s policies and future intentions. This gives rise to the reviewed question of ‘What does the future hold for the AKP and its policies in Turkey in respect to the EU negotiation process and domestic obstacles?’
CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

In order to do this paper justice one must thoroughly discuss the two main factors, ‘accession negotiations’ and the AKP itself, each coming with a significant amount of work and relevant sub-topics. This was achieved through looking at the previous, as well as the current, situation in the relations between Turkey and the EU, how the accession process began, what it entails, how it has developed over the years and what the next steps are. These sub-factors include a big bulk of literature individually as well, with varying relations between Turkey and the different member states of the EU as well as looking into the promoters and opponents to Turkish membership.

On the side of the AKP and its policies, one needs to delve deeply into the party itself, its make-up, how its run, the roots from where it emerged politically, its current status as well as its future aims and objectives. Another important factor to the AKP and their policies is that of Turkey as a country, the political system within Turkey with its influential military, strong secularization as well as its Muslim population and how the system and its changes have affected Turkey-EU accession talks over the years.

Out of this background one must then decipher the main issues and links at hand. For the sake of this paper the AKP’s policies and reforms need to be studied in respect to the different stages of the negotiation process and EU-Turkey relations. Keeping in mind the main theoretical idea of the credibility of membership, this paper intends to study the
differences in policy and reform progress by the AKP in terms of the negative or positive relations with the EU and subsequent hopes of actually gaining membership. Then fundamentally important is the study of the current status in negotiations and relations and the current state of the AKP in Turkey in order to compare and contrast in an attempt to predict or provide an answer as to what the future holds for the AKP and Turkey.

In order to do this the main method of research will be that of a qualitative one with a lot of analysis on texts and documents, both primary and secondary, on the topic and on the party. My primary sources will include documents such as policy documents, manifests, treaties, negotiations, accession papers, white papers, government documents, and speeches from the different actors involved as well as media outlets and articles on the matter. This can give me first hand views and feelings as to what people are thinking and where they are looking to go from these situations.

Secondary sources such as articles, journals, and books will give me insight to the background of the relations, what scholars think of the current situation and where it might go, as well as different views on the issues at play.

As mentioned earlier a large portion of my research will be on the development of and progress of the negotiations including a background of EU-Turkey relations before the AKP was in power. The AKP itself and its rise to power, the kind of party it is and the changes it has made over the years while in power and looking for answers as to why they changed in those ways will be an important factor in this paper. Most of this will come through my reading of secondary sources on the topics. There is a lot of scholarly literature on the issues involving Turkey and the EU and the relationship between the two
entities. Therefore I believe I will be able to gain a good perspective of past relations as well as the current relationship and how people perceive the direction it might take in the future.

Secondary sources shall also be my first place to go to on the AKP party. A good background of how they have come to power and the policies behind the party are a very important part of their current status in Turkey as well as their future. A good amount of knowledge shall be gained through scholarly articles and journals that both criticize and praise the party. I will look to gain different views on the issue of how conservative the party is and the issues that arise due to this ideology. In order to do so I shall also look into the history of Turkey’s secularization and the worries that they have for this secular state by the rise of a conservative, fundamentalist as some call it, party. On the other hand I believe I will find good secondary sources that will inform me of the pro-western democratic side of the party and what that has meant for the development of Turkey and its relations with the EU. The stance the party has taken in the past as well as its responses to current issues and negotiations are an important factor for this research paper. The feel from such scholarly work will provide good insight on the subject, and due to my interest in the balance of this ‘conservative democratic’ party I believe it is of utmost importance to look at views from both sides.

When it comes to these different factors I believe that primary sources will provide a clear and objective view of the different stances that the sides have taken in the past, currently and will do in the future. Looking back at primary sources like manifestos, progress reports, negotiations, agreements and speeches of relevant parties will give me
the opportunity to analyze the issues without being framed through someone else’s eyes who might have a biased opinion on the matters. Through this process I hope to analyze documents properly and relevantly to the topic I am looking to research and will make them appropriate to both the historical background and the current situation that I am studying. Although secondary sources will help in giving a good idea of the past, these primary sources will give me the ability to know exactly what went on and what was said. Looking at certain material and comparing it to documents at the same time will hopefully provide some kind of relationship between the two factors and contribute in giving an idea of why certain things happened. After conducting the literature review and getting accustomed to the theoretical side of the EU’s democratic conditionality, reinforcement by reward and its mechanisms this should hopefully be made easier in explaining the different attitudes that the AKP has shown towards reform and in which sectors.

I intend to set up the paper by looking into the AKP party, with a brief history and overview of the political environment in Turkey in order to provide a backdrop of what the AKP need to deal with. In order to fully understand the AKP I will then look at where it has come from and its rise to power as well as looking at its manifestos and main policies that have been instrumental in that rise. I will also look at its current position in power, the threats to that power such as the judiciary and the military as well as its opponents and their outlooks on the main issues such as EU membership. This along with secondary sources such as articles and journals, will hopefully provide insight on the reasons behind it making certain moves or only instigating reform in certain sectors.
Hopefully in conjunction with using the theoretical approaches discussed in the literature review and the progress of the accession talks that are hopefully getting back on track then the paper should be able to come to a conclusion as to what direction the AKP is going.
CHAPTER FOUR: THE ACCESSION PROCESS AND TURKEY’S CURRENT STATUS

The accession process to becoming a member of the EU follows an extensive set of negotiations carried out over three main stages. These are the initial pre-application process where a country proves it is ready to be a candidate country, the accession negotiations where formal negotiations towards accession take place, and finally joining through an accession treaty and it being ratified by the Council. The requirements for applying are set out by the Director General for Enlargement as ‘any European country … if it respects the democratic values of the EU and is committed to promoting them’

The legal basis for this can be found in Article 49 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) which refers to the democratic values of the EU found in Article 2. As set out by the European Council summit in Copenhagen in 1993, the country needs to then meet

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27 “EU - Enlargement - Conditions for Membership - European Commission.”
28 Article 49:
Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union. The European Parliament and national Parliaments shall be notified of this application. The applicant State shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the assent of the European Parliament, which shall act by an absolute majority of its component members. The conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the Union is founded, which such admission entails, shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member States and the applicant State. This agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all the contracting States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. The conditions of eligibility agreed upon by the European Council shall be taken into account.
29 Article 2:
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.
what has become known as the ‘Copenhagen Criteria’. Before going into the formal negotiations of implementing such legal documents the candidate country must fulfil the accession criteria, also known as the Copenhagen Criteria, which are;

- Political criteria: stability of the institutions safeguarding democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;
- Economic criteria: existence of a viable market economy, the ability to respond to the pressure of competition and market forces within the EU;
- The ability to assume the obligations of a Member State stemming from the law and policies of the EU (or the acquis), which include subscribing to the Union's political, economic and monetary aims;
- having created conditions for integration by adapting their administrative structures.

Meeting this criteria ensures that a country would be able to meet its duties as a full member by having the sufficient economic, political and administrative set up. Finally and most importantly, once accepted as a candidate country, the country enters into extensive accession negotiations on the 35 Chapters of the acquis which the member states need to accept and then ratify through a Treaty.

This pre-application phase is eased through association agreements where the EU and its Member States provide assistance to the potential candidate countries to fulfil the necessary criteria. This is done through the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA)
which is currently starting its second term as IPA II after the first ran from 2007-2014\textsuperscript{30}. In the case of Turkey an Association Agreement, also known as the Ankara Agreement was signed in 1963. The main goal of the Agreement, as the IPA’s initiatives now, was to improve the standard of living conditions and economic situation in Turkey in order to make it more similar to those within the EU, through increased aid and support. What was most important though was the ‘recognizing that the support given … will facilitate the accession of Turkey into the Community at a later date’\textsuperscript{31}. This was an important quote for the future of Turkey’s accession hopes with a long road ahead.

Following the Ankara Agreement they applied for full membership into what was then the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1987. This application is sent to the Council which requires an opinion from the Commission as well as have the motion passed in the European Parliament (EP) with an absolute majority before coming to a unanimous decision in the Council itself. This process was conducted with Turkey’s eligibility to be a member accepted in the Luxembourg Summit of the Council in 1997 but not officially recognized as a candidate yet. This was finally given at the European Council’s Helsinki Summit in 1999 at which point accession negotiations were allowed to begin.

\textsuperscript{30} IPA was designed to provide financial assistance through five channels (known as "components"): transition assistance and institution building, cross-border cooperation (CBC), regional development, human resource development and rural development. IPA II looks to build on the results made by IPA with a further 11.7 billion euros dedicated for the period 2014-2020. Different to IPA, IPAII has a more strategic focus with a Strategy Paper for each beneficiary country as well as a Multi-Country Paper for regional benefits as well as giving more weight to performance indicators to assess improvements being made by those countries.

Accession negotiations are an extensive and complicated process wherein the candidate country needs to apply the EU’s *acquis* which is the entire body of EU law already in place. The *acquis* is approximately 130,000 pages of legal documents grouped into 35 chapters\(^\text{32}\). It forms all the rules, laws and court decisions that all Member States of the EU have to adhere to.

These negotiations are specific to each applicant country depending on their current political and economic structures as well as ability and preparedness in adopting and implementing the *acquis*. The *acquis* come in the form of 35 Chapters that go through a process of discussion prior to being open for negotiation. Once negotiated and agreed upon they are then provisionally closed until all chapters are closed. The ‘provisional’ closing of a Chapter means that it can be reopened if the candidate fails to comply with or maintain the standards that were put into place. In order to assess and open a Chapter the negotiations begin with a preparatory or screening phase by the Commission in order to assess the level of preparedness of the country to that set of rules\(^\text{33}\). This acts as a method for the country to familiarize itself with the *acquis* before working out the benchmarks and targets for that specific Chapter. The Commission then writes a draft proposal on the benchmarks that were agreed upon and the Council decides unanimously to open negotiations on the respective Chapter.

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\(^{33}\) The specific situation and characteristics of the country that are taken into consideration include:

- the aim, namely accession
- the negotiation principles and procedures;
- the points to be negotiated, such as financial aspects, temporary exemptions or safeguard measures in specific areas of the *acquis* (such as free movement of persons, structural policies or agriculture), which may be invoked throughout the negotiations;
- the link between political and economic reform in the applicant country and the negotiations;
- the conclusion of the negotiations, which remains open

46
The unanimity required in order to open negotiations on each Chapter is one of the major stumbling blocks to Turkey’s accession progress. Presently only one Chapter has been provisionally closed (Chapter 25 – Science and Research) while a further 19 are suspended due to vetoes and/or decisions by the European Council. The European Council’s decision of 2006 was one of the major stumbling blocks in Turkey’s accession process. The decision was taken due to the ongoing conflict with Cyprus. Turkey maintains its stance that, despite signing the Additional Protocol extending the Ankara Agreement to the new member states that joined in 2004, ‘did not recognize the “Republic of Cyprus” by any means’ which it says was ‘explicitly stated’ in the declaration\(^\text{34}\). However the EU maintains that Turkey should have extended the protocol to Cyprus and having still to do so, came to the decision to suspend eight Chapters of the negotiation process. As well as these suspensions it was also decided that no other Chapters could be provisionally closed until this was sorted. Besides these 8 Chapters a further five were vetoed by France in 2007\(^\text{35}\) on the grounds that they were directly linked to membership, as well as Cyprus using their veto powers to prevent a further six Chapters from opening following the Council decision. These type of suspensions of the negotiations are possible due to the provisions in the negotiation framework which state that they are carried out ‘in the event of a serious and persistent violation of the principles on which the EU is founded’. The Commission or a third party Member State is able to recommend that negotiations be suspended and recommend conditions for them to be


\(^{35}\) One of which, Chapter 22 Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural Instruments, was recently opened with France lifting the veto in February 2013.
reopened. A list of all 35 Chapters as well as their current status can be found below in figure 1:1:

Table 1:1 Accession Process Chapters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>State of Play: 1 July 2010</strong></td>
<td>Negotiations Opened</td>
<td>Negotiations Closed</td>
<td>Negotiations Suspended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 – Free Movement of Goods</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2 – Freedom of Movement of Workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3 – Right of Est. &amp; Freedom to Provide Services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4 – Free Movement of Capital</td>
<td>19 December 2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5 – Public Procurement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 – Company Law</td>
<td>17 June 2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 – Intellectual Property Rights</td>
<td>17 June 2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 – Competition Policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9 – Financial Services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 – Information Society And Media</td>
<td>19 December 2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11 – Agriculture And Rural Development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>12 – Food Safety, Vet. &amp; Phytosanitary Policy</td>
<td>30 June 2010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>13 – Fisheries</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>14 – Transport Policy</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>15 – Energy</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>16 – Taxation</td>
<td>30 June 2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 – Economic And Monetary Policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>18 – Statistics</td>
<td>26 June 2007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>19 – Social Policy And Employment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>20 – Enterprise And Industrial Policy</td>
<td>29 March 2007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 – Trans-European Networks</td>
<td>19 December 2007</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Once Chapters are successfully opened negotiations begin through bilateral intergovernmental conferences between the Member States and the applicant country. These Chapters are can be closed when the applicant country satisfies the benchmark requirements agreed upon earlier. This is confirmed once the position of the EU has been drawn up by the Commission and subsequently adopted unanimously by the Council. As stated earlier these Chapters are only provisionally closed until all Chapters have been successfully negotiated and completed.

Once all Chapters have been finalized then the accession processes comes to an end and an agreement, called the Accession Treaty, may be concluded between the Member States and the candidate country. Once again the Council has to decide

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Date Opened</th>
<th>Date Closed</th>
<th>Suspended by</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22 – Regional Pol. &amp; Coord. of Structural Instr.</td>
<td>5 November 2013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>23 – Judiciary And Fundamental Rights</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Suspended by Cyprus</td>
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<tr>
<td>24 – Justice, Freedom And Security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Suspended by Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 – Education And Culture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Suspended by Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 – Environment</td>
<td>21 December 2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 – Consumer And Health Protection</td>
<td>19 December 2007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>29 – Customs Union</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Suspended by Council Decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 – External Relations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Suspended by Council Decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 – Foreign, Security And Defence Policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Suspended by Cyprus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 – Financial Control</td>
<td>26 June 2007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33 – Financial And Budgetary Provisions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Suspended by France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34 – Institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Suspended by France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 – Other Issues</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
unanimously for the process to be finalized, after receiving the opinion of the Commission and the acceptance of the European Parliament. The Accession Treaty covers important issues such as:

- the accession date
- the results of the accession negotiations, conditions for accession and the safeguard or transitional measures for areas which the Commission's most recent assessment identifies as needing more intensive work;
- adaptation of the institutions and treaties and the distribution of votes in the Council and European Parliament, the number of European Members of Parliament, members of the Committee of Regions, etc.\(^{37}\)

The Accession Treaty then needs to be ratified by all Member States as well as the acceding Member State before the date of accession set out in the Treaty. The applicant state is then considered as an acceding state but remains under the watchful eye of the Commission in order to improve and conclude on the issues in which it still has progress to be made.

Unfortunately Turkey is a long way away from this process and a realistic time span is unable to be put on the process at this point in time. Considering the length in which Turkey have been applying for membership to the EU the fact that only one chapter has been closed is significant. Although only an official candidate in 1999 and

accession negotiations being opened properly in 2005 one Chapter in 9 years is a very low showing. To put it into perspective (notwithstanding the unique nature of Malta’s history with the EU) the EU recommended that Member States open negotiations with Malta in 1999 and recommended to close them in 2002.

One of the other serious standout points is the amount of Chapters that have not even been opened at the time of writing. Although the Positive Agenda initiative and the opening of Chapter 22 Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural instruments, are a positive sign in moving the process along, it has taken 3 and a half years since the last Chapter was opened. Clearly, with so many Chapters still to go in the process, that timeframe needs to be significantly cut back in order to make membership an achievable target for Turkey. The slow-rate of progress and seemingly hindering tactics of certain EU countries affects the mood in Turkey both within the political elite and the population and could possibly create an atmosphere of apathy which can only be of further detriment towards negotiations and reforms.

The opening of Chapter 22 after France agreed to unblock it was a considered as a positive breakthrough in negotiations. Hollande replacing Sarkozy as France’s premier was also seen as a move that would help Turkey’s bid to have more Chapters opened. This however was not confirmed by Hollande who avoided the question on the other four Chapters blocked by France by putting the onus on Cyprus to open the next Chapter. This can be seen as unfortunate for the negotiations but Hollande’s visit to Turkey, the first by
a French head of state in 22 years\textsuperscript{38}, was a positive sign that negotiations could get back on track at least in regard to some of the Chapters. The issues with Cyprus however do not look like they shall be settled any time soon.

According to the European Commission’s latest progress report in 2013 Turkey have made certain moves towards improvement but a significant push to reignite negotiations is clearly needed. It strongly believes that the accession negotiations are still the most advantageous framework in transferring EU-related reforms in Turkey. It highlights the positive breakthrough of opening the 14\textsuperscript{th} Chapter in negotiations (Chapter 22 Regional Policy) but emphasized the need to communicate the opening benchmarks on Chapters 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights) and 24 (Justice, Freedom and Security) to be agreed upon as soon as possible in order to open the negotiations on these vital Chapters.

Despite reform efforts seemingly being carried out through a judiciary reform package, an announcement of a democratization package and peace talks to curb violence and terrorism in the South East\textsuperscript{39}, there are still various political issues that are still not up to scratch. One issue that has always been a sticking point is that of fundamental human rights and freedoms such as freedom of expression. The Gezi Park protests was a clear example of the lack of such freedoms with police using excessive amounts of force to break up the protests. This was highlighted as a ‘serious cause for concern’ by both the Progress Report as well as in the Enlargement Strategy.


\textsuperscript{39} To be discussed in the next chapter.
Similarly this year, after the writing and publication of the progress report, Turkey and the AKP have been involved in more cases of concern in relation to freedom of expression and speech. Recently in Turkey a new internet law has been passed giving the government the power to monitor and censor online content. This comes at a time when the government also implemented bans on Twitter and Youtube. The Twitter ban was enforced after recordings linking him and his family members with corruption surfaced and spread on the media outlet. Stating that the clips were edited and false and done just to attack him Erdogan had ‘vowed to wipeout Twitter’\(^{40}\). This comes following last year’s comments during the Gezi Park protests where he called all social media ‘the worse menace to society’\(^{41}\). The Twitter ban however was lifted after a court ruling found that it was illegal due to its breach of freedom of expression. Although the court ruling can be seen as a positive move, upholding freedom of expression and going against the governments’ bans it is still a major cause for concern that the government was allowed to implement such a ban that lasted two weeks.

For its part the content posted on Youtube that led to that site being banned as well could have been seen as a more serious threat with leaked recordings of a high-level security meeting about an undercover plot to attack Syria surfaced. Erdogan’s government considered it as a serious threat to Turkey’s security claiming that a cyber attack, infiltrating an important meeting and spreading the criminal content online was just as bad as a military threat. The fact that they moved to ban the site however is still a


cause for concern. The Youtube ban was lifted two months after it came into effect after the TCC ruled it as a breach of freedom of expression as well. This however is the highest legal body in the Turkish system and a previous ruling by a lower court earlier on had largely fallen on deaf ears. This goes to show the deficiencies and lack of freedom of expression still at play in Turkey.

Giving further ammo to their opponents the Turkish parliament also approved a new law on internet monitoring which can be seen as a significant tool of an increasingly authoritarian government in response to increasing criticism circulating on social media. The controversial law allows Turkey’s telecommunications authority (TIB) to block websites without having to first obtain a court order. Similarly all internet providers are required to store data of internet users for up to two years. This information however will require a court order. The government argues that it is not restricting the use of the internet or information but is protecting individual rights through this new law. The criticism however is that the institution in charge is under the government’s control and is much more likely to block criticism of its government rather than look out for individual complaints of its citizens.

With regards to Cyprus Turkey expressed their interest in solving the issue as soon as possible but this can be taken with a pinch of salt. Having made no moves to implement the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement and adhering to the free

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movement of goods with Cyprus the Chapters look like they shall be blocked for the foreseeable future.

In closing, the report stated the need for the readmission agreement signing and visa liberalization talks to get underway as soon as possible. This was agreed and signed on the 16th of December of the same year in exchange for the talks on the visa liberalization for Turkish citizens to be opened. This was a significant step for EU–Turkey relations with it contributing to an almost shared burden of a cost-benefit analysis. The readmission agreement had been under extensive talks since 2011 after negotiations had broken down due to mistrust of one another. Turkey will now accept the return of illegal migrants that entered the EU through Turkish borders but will gain help from the EU to shoulder the burden. In what is less of the democratic conditionality process the EU takes with accession countries this seemed to be a positive mutually networked discussion in which Turkey signed the readmission agreement on the condition that the EU kept on track with its visa liberalization commitments to Turkish citizens. The EU confidently committed that this would be ensured within three years, going back to the theoretical mechanism that a credible reward is effective in applying change to candidate countries44. This breakthrough in talks also serves as a positive sign for the accession talks to gain further momentum in the near future through the continued building of momentum that comes with constant dialogue.

Despite recent accomplishments not many are too positive that negotiations will reach a positive conclusion for Turkey. As recently as 21st September 2013, Turkish

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Minister for European Affairs conceded that “[Turkey] will be at European standards, very closely aligned but not as a member”\textsuperscript{45}. It was a negative outlook that according to opinion polls is shared among most Turkish citizens as well\textsuperscript{46}. This is an important factor that ties in the feeling of how credible Turks feel the reward of membership is and can be used as a reason as to why the necessary reforms have not materialized. The Minister went on to compare Turkey to possibly becoming like Norway with close ties through their free trade agreements. This means that Turkey would still benefit greatly from their relationship with the EU and is a signal that they could be happy with this agreement instead of membership and all the extra work that comes with it. However Turkey still takes the stance that it wants membership and on many occasions has put the onus on the EU and some of its “prejudiced” members to open up further Chapters in the process.

Considering the number of Chapters open for negotiation, the Cyprus situation and recent issues with regards to freedom of expression and Turkey’s dwindling hopes, the overall status of Turkey’s accession process does look bleak. Despite this however, the EU and Turkey’s delegation to seem like they are trying to remain positive and push on with negotiations. Turkey has called for the opening of more Chapters which the Commission supports and it should now only be a matter of time before they push on and do so. This will take convincing of certain countries but with the backing of the Positive Agenda and increased promotion of talks and meetings this could be possible. The


opening of Chapter 22 is hopefully a stepping stone that can give Turkey more reason to believe that membership is possible and work to instigate more domestic reforms.
CHAPTER FIVE: THE AKP AND TURKISH DOMESTIC CHANGES

The big controversy and waves that were caused by the rise of the AKP was due to the notion that it was possibly an Islamic conservative party that could be a threat to the secularism of Turkey. Its roots began with the Welfare Party (WP) that made significant political gains in the 1980-90s. The increasing rise of Islam in society brought about an election victory for the WP in the 1995 elections, making it the first Islamic party ever to do so in Turkey. Turkey’s Constitutional Court banned the party 1998 due to these reasons, charged with trying to disturb the secular order. From this party emerged the Virtue Party which was also eventually banned in 2001. Just two months later however Abdullah Gul and Recep Tayyip Erdogan set up the AKP. Considering themselves a democratic, conservative, non-confessional movement it did not base its credentials on Islamic identity and continues to reject claims that it is one. It does however believe in what it calls the democratization of religion and not its politicization. This gave it significant backing within the electorate who were favouring a non-secular side for Turkey, possibly due to the various coups that the country has endured over the years and the high influence that the military held in the country.

Critics however have reason to believe they are more religiously oriented than they make out to be. Besides the beginnings from which the party was founded, critics point to issues such as the wearing of headscarves by their leaders’ wives including
Erdogan’s, the regulation of alcohol and advertisements of alcohol in public squares as well as Erdogan’s past of being banned from holding office or serving in parliament due to being found guilty of inciting religious hatred in 1998. He referred to mosques as barracks, minarets to bayonets and the followers to an army, through the reciting of a poem. This ban however was removed in December of 2002 due to a constitutional amendment in order for him to take up office. Also many of these accusations such as the wearing of headscarves by some of the members and some members’ wives can barely hold up in a court of law as evidence for religious fundamentalism by the party. It is as much as any Christian in a democratic Christian country would be able to practice their religion like wearing a rosary or having a crucifix in their home.

Besides its non-secular backing from the electorate the AKP also gained a lot of support due to its pro-Western and EU manifesto. These ideas along with a modernizing economic platform on the back of the financial crisis that hit Turkey in 2001⁴⁷ led the AKP to win an absolute majority in the 2002 parliamentary elections. By March 14th after winning a by-election Erdogan was the new Prime Minister of Turkey in the name of the AKP. This was the beginning of the end of flakey coalition governments in Turkey with the AKP gaining a strong foothold as the sole party in power. This sparked a modernization process in Turkey with concrete economic growth and stability and an increased backing from the powers in the EU.

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⁴⁷ Turkey’s high reliance on foreign investment and lack of meaningful economic growth systems led to heavy lending on the part of the Turkish government, already with a high budget deficit. This meant selling a lot of high interest loans to its banks which along with inflation and drops in the market caused the economy to crash.
There are arguments that the AKP used the pro-EU rules to their advantage in order not only to gain popularity but also to implement changes in the system that it felt it needed or wanted to be done. There are those who argue that ‘the AKP came to power with an agenda to reform the Turkish state and came to see EU membership and the processes that surrounded it as a convenient external justification for policies that it desired’\textsuperscript{48}. This could be seen with previous pro-reformist coalitions vis-à-vis the Kemalist and nationalist powers, who used EU incentives as justification to push through domestic reforms.

Similarly the AKP then used these methods to overcome the resistance of veto players in the military, judiciary and bureaucracy in general, and consolidate its power in the state structure over the years. This was done through constitutional amendments that increased the level of accountability of the military as well as decreasing the judiciary’s influence in appointing judges and people to the council. These changes were done under the scope of EU rule adoption in order to contribute to the democratizing process of Turkey. Various opponents however, only saw it as a method of increasing the AKP’s power and decreasing the independence of the military and judiciary, a move which would give them more freedom to implement their ‘fundamentalist’ policies in the future.

One of the major positives that the AKP have introduced over their years in power was that of the constitutional reform package that was passed by referendum in 2010. The proposal brought forward consisted of 27 articles with the purpose of filling various

\textsuperscript{48} \url{http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2012.806027}
accession promises brought about through EU accession talks. Among those was to improve human rights standards, strengthen the rule of law, increase plurality of political parties in the parliament and increase the legitimacy of the judiciary as well as to decrease the role of the military and its ability to stage coups. Opponents and critics of the AKP cited the reforms as ‘the final assault’ on the secular side of Turkey created by Ataturk and warned of the AKP ‘filling the courts with Islamists’\textsuperscript{49}. This is due to the fact that one of the main components of the reforms is a significant transformation of the judiciary. The constitutional court was expanded with the president and parliament given a much bigger role in appointing senior judges and prosecutors.

The West did see the AKP’s rise to power as a positive influence for the accession process. Although having come under some criticism of late as well as a lack of action in certain aspects that needed reforming, the AKP has played a major role in adopting EU rules into its policies and changing the political system in Turkey. This can be seen from the increased amount of reforms, especially economically, from 2002 till 2005, where the AKP can be said to have played a major role in the EU opening accession negotiations with the country. Some of the major reforms carried out by the AKP include the constitutional reform package, the judiciary reform package, an announcement of a democratization package, peace talks to curb violence and terrorism in the South East as well as increases in minority rights and a decrease in the military’s powers.

Although there is significant evidence showing the transformative value of possible EU membership on countries such as Turkey one cannot forget the importance

of issues pertaining to the domestic structure of the applicant country. As Schimmelfennig and Vachudova point out, the domestic players, especially those with veto powers and their own cost-benefit analysis of the circumstances at the time have a major role to play. The unique make-up of Turkey’s political system along with the AKP’s untraditional mix of policies and rise to power leads to some interesting views on why and how they have adopted certain EU policies to suit themselves where and when they please.

As referred to earlier, when it came into power in 2002 the AKP was able to use various political agenda’s to consolidate a large proportion of voters to its party. Promoting a European based reform agenda to move towards EU accession allowed the party to take advantage of moving towards a liberal market economy, a reformed societal based system as well as giving rise to religious freedoms. This allowed the party to gain votes from a wide spectrum of voters that would lean towards them for different reasons. Adopting EU legislation and reforms allowed the AKP to first off modernize and reform the Turkish economy after the financial crisis of 2001. A the same time they used the democratic values of freedom of religion and expression to preserve its base of religious followers who wanted more religious freedoms in the public sphere with less control by the military. Adopting EU legislation, laws and reforms allowed the AKP to consolidate its position once in power. Had it not used the changes it would have been under constant threat from the military into its religious ways and be suspect to bans such as other parties in the past. Between 2002 and 2005 there were many reforms put in place which moved quickly and smoothly towards opening EU accession negotiations. The backing of the EU
provided legitimacy to the AKP’s policies and who therefore continued to consolidate their power.

Although hard to differentiate due to the parallel timing of the two situations, political reform in Turkey significantly dropped after the 2007 elections. One may argue that the case of the lack of credibility of EU membership through the problems with Cyprus, Greece and France leading to many of the Chapters being blocked was the main reason behind Turkey lacking the will power and determination to continue to undergo further democratization domestically. However another way to look at it could be through the domestic situation lens where, after emerging victorious in the 2007 elections as well, the AKP’s power in Turkey was much more consolidated than in the first few years of its first term when a lot of reforms were pushed through. This could be due to the fact that after a second electoral victory and further consolidating their power domestically, they no longer needed further serious reforms in order to safeguard their interests. In fact it can be argued that the reforms that have been carried out since then have been quite selective, such as the continued civilianization of the military, yet maintaining control of the universities. This selective adoption of legislation and reforms can be seen as a method of looking as though they are moving along a positive path towards a full democratic system while at the same time consolidating or maintain their power where it suits them.

Once again, as discussed earlier, the AKP affected more constitutional reforms in 2010. This, as their critics put it at the time, could be seen as more of an electoral ploy in

the wake of the 2011 elections that were coming up the year after. These could all be seen as methods of making big changes close to decisive elections in order to show the electorate that they are getting things done for the people and should continue to be in power.

The situation in 2014 can also be seen to have similar traits. Although once again recognition must be given to the EU and its role in pushing towards breakthroughs in talks, the AKP had a decent year in 2013 with regards to negotiations and reforms although possibly its worst due to the Gezi Park protests and their handling of that situation. On the reform side though it managed to introduce a new Democratization Package, again criticized by many as not enough but praised enough to show that they were on the right track and getting things done.

Within the reform package significant steps have been made towards a more tolerant Turkey with regards to minorities and religious worship. One of those was the introduction of prison sentences for people convicted of hate crimes committed on a racial, ethnical, sexual, religious, or other basis for up to three years. Preventing religious practice through threats or coercion would also be punishable by law with similar sentences. Another significant move was that of allowing public employees to wear headscarves unless they were required to wear specific uniforms such as in the military or courts. These reforms, although democratic in terms of religious freedom, are reforms that could be attributed to the AKP’s selective process in implementing laws that suit their policies of giving religion more of a foothold in society and less power to the secular aspects of Turkey’s political system.
Some of the bigger issues that were hoped for from the Democratic Reform Package were otherwise disappointing however. The 10% threshold for parties to get into parliament has long been seen as a major deterrent to smaller parties of minority groups such as the Kurds and many of the political parties have called for it to be lowered. The reform package however gives no guarantees towards this but has left it open to be discussed in parliament along with a different voting system. This unfortunately has been criticized by political analysts as also discriminately favoring the bigger parties.\(^{51}\)

Another reform aimed at improving the conditions of the Kurds was that of Kurdish being able to be taught in schools. The Package however only allows for this in private schools which highly undermines the reform due to the amount of Kurds in impoverished areas that probably will not be able to afford private schooling. Sticking with education however there was an important sign of improvement with the removal of the morning oath said by children every morning before school which states “I am a Turk, I am correct, I am hard-working.”\(^{52}\). Long seen as a discriminatory oath and method of assimilating other ethnic minorities into Turkey, the oath has been highly controversial for many years.

As well as the Kurds, the Alevi community were also largely disappointed by the package having expected more recognition as a minority by recognizing its places of worship with official status. Being closer to the Shiite Muslims than the Sunni majority in

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Turkey this would have been seen as a significant step towards freedoms but once again shows the lack of reform by the AKP where it does not suit them.

It is for these reasons that political opponents in Turkey such as Gultan Kisanak, one of the leaders of the pro-Kurdish PKK party stated that "This is not a democratization package but an election package". The EU however welcomed the democratization package highlighting it as one of the processes to further democratic reform in Turkey, especially in the midst of continued criticism of the handling of the Gezi Park Protests. Although underlining the importance of continued improvements and more compromise by the government the package was definitely seen by the West as a step in the right direction.

Another big breakthrough for the AKP in 2013 was that of the peace talks with the PKK and its imprisoned leader. The talks are seen as a significant breakthrough and a ray of hope in possibly ending the 30 year conflict. The plan puts forth the following steps: Ceasefire; approval of a judicial reform package that will release thousands of imprisoned Kurdish activists/politicians and the withdrawal of PKK members beyond Turkey's borders; democratization talks; and finally disarmament. The Kurdish problem in Turkey was one of the major issues in regards to EU accession and a possible breakthrough in such an arduous problem that has claimed almost 40,000 lives would be a significant step in changing the whole process. Not only sorting out the domestic problems with terror and violence, an agreement would most likely give the Kurds many

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more rights and recognition as a minority group in Turkey, pluralizing and democratizing the whole political system. This however will still need continuous work as conflicts such as these are hard to overcome after so many years at war. The beginnings towards an agreement are there however which gives hope to the situation both for Turkey and the EU.

This year Turkey’s Prime Minister for more than ten years was elected Turkey’s first popular elected president. This Presidential victory as well as victory in local elections confirmed Erdogan as Turkey’s most influential and powerful leader once again. It was an impressive victory after a tough year in which he faced a lot of criticism from various sectors with allegations of corruption as well as severe criticism for his handling of the Gezi Park protests and his stance on social media, banning Twitter and Youtube leading up to the election.

His opponents are weary of the threat posed by his new position as President as he looks to consolidate it with another parliamentary election victory in 2015. If the AKP gain an absolute majority in that election then it is very likely that the new proposals to afford the president even more powers will soon follow. This has led many to believe that Erdogan is taking advantage of the power he currently has in order to create an even more authoritarian regime with him at the helm.
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

The last two years in Turkey have seen some significantly contrasting practices from the AKP. On one hand there have been vast amount of improvements that have been made through the opening of a new Chapter in the accession negotiations, the Visa liberalizing deal, the Democratization Package and the peace negotiations with the Kurdish community. However on the other hand, one could also argue that the AKP has also endured one of the most critical and negative periods of its time in power due to its handling of the Gezi Park Protests, the banning of Twitter and Youtube, the new Internet laws and its consolidation of power within the political system. Criticisms of an increasingly authoritarian regime with Erdogan at its helm have been levelled at the AKP by its political opponents that have been backed up by the EU’s critical assessment that “the government has tended to rely exclusively on its parliamentary majority to pass laws and decisions, including on socially sensitive issues, without sufficient consultation and dialogue with stakeholders”\textsuperscript{55}.

As one can see from the theories in literature work to date and what has actually transpired is that there are various factors at play. Membership is still the most attractive and therefore powerful tool that the EU has in its possession in order to extend its aims of external governance into Turkey. This can be seen through the successful transition of the CEECs into the EU but has so far failed to near a conclusion in respect to Turkey. The loss of credibility of EU membership over the years due to the various reasons from anti-Turkey sentiments in governments and populations of EU Member States, the ‘enlargement fatigue’, the rise in the issue of ‘absorption/integration capacity’ as well as breakdown and deadlocks in talks due to the Cyprus and Greek conflicts seem to have taken their toll. As Ali Resul Usul states in his work ‘Is There Any Hope on the Revival of EU–Turkey Relations in the “New Era”?’, the EU needs to reinforce and regenerate its efforts and credibility in order to affect the push-pull balance of negotiations back into their favour.

He also argues that the Commission has recently taken matters further into their hands in order for the processes to gain momentum through its Progress Reports and Papers on the matter. Through their opinions and papers they have also tried to push Member States to reconsider their stances on certain issues and help negotiations along. These are positive steps towards gaining more credibility for the process and therefore putting it back on track but another important factor is that of the time it will take to come to fruition and that is certainly an issue at the moment. Despite the EU process starting to have a glimmer of hope once again with the opening of the new Chapter, it is hard to see

the promise of full membership coming to fruition for Turkey any time soon. The renewed positive relations and dialogue can only be welcomed but it could very well be a case of too little too late.

On the other hand this work has also highlighted the impact that domestic structures and situations can have on the process. Over the years there is no question that the AKP have moved Turkey towards an almost perfect economic market which is up to EU standards as well as the implementation of various other democratic reforms helping the other sectors of the Copenhagen Criteria but their intentions could be called into question. As seen through the research the power struggle within the domestic political system between the different veto players has played a large role in how the AKP have adopted EU legislation and in what sectors. This is in line with Schimmelfennig and Vachudova’s work that states that the EU’s legislation adoption will occur only if the cost-benefit analysis of the domestic veto players, in this case the AKP, find it beneficial to undergo the various reforms and changes required by the EU. At the moment the lack of credibility and short-term chances of membership, allied with their significantly improved and consolidated power in the political domestic sphere seems to be enough reason to tip the cost-benefit analysis of serious reforms by the AKP towards the negative side.

Although theoretically this renewed dialogue with the EU should increase the credibility of membership and therefore willingness of Turkey to engage with further positive reforms, Erdogan and the AKP look increasingly as though their main aim is to first and foremost consolidate their power domestically first and pursue the goal of EU
Having undergone a tumultuous year with corruption charges, protests and severe criticisms of their tactics the AKP and Erdogan still managed to emerge victorious in local elections and most importantly in the Presidential election. If this victory is consolidated again in the 2015 elections, as is widely predicted, it will show that despite various opponents’ voices growing Erdogan and the AKP still have significant backing of the electorate and ability to reform the system as they deem fit. If the new constitution drawn up is accepted then as President Erdogan will have even more powers than he has at the moment, with a similar system to that of the United States.

Opponents are very critical of what they are calling an increasingly authoritarian regime that is constantly reducing the powers of the other parts of the system. However it is often hard to tell just how seriously one should take the worries and criticisms of opponents just as much as one cannot take for granted how good everything is just because those in power tell you that it is so. Usually the reality lies somewhere in between but in this case erring on the side of caution might be wise. At the moment what is clear is that reforms are being made in certain sectors and the EU process seems to have gained a slight boost which is definitely a positive for relations but only time will tell just what the AKP’s next move will be domestically or internationally. It could very well continue as it is at the moment with various reforms being made but no real implementation on the ground, in order to seem like they are on the right track to keep the important people with power, such as the EU and the voters at home, happy.

It is clear that there is no main factor in terms of EU-Turkey relations and what affects the candidate country to effect the necessary reforms. The push-pull balance is a
good way of identifying the need for all the various factors to come into play simultaneously for it to have a positive outcome. The period between 2002 and 2005, is a good example of how both the international factors with the EU and the domestic ones politically aligned in order to create a positive period of serious reform. Since the beginning of the deterioration in the process in 2005-06, there has not been a period in which both the domestic situation and international relations with the EU have been at an advantageous position to put the negotiation process back on track indefinitely. The current situation could well turn into such a positive one if the AKP’s and Erdogan’s intentions are as they say they are and continue to pursue reforms for the good of the people in Turkey as well as continued breakthroughs with the EU.

Due to the upcoming elections the next year could be the determining year in the future of Turkey-EU relations and the future of Turkey itself. The AKP’s ability to implement further constitutional reform and consequently hand more power to President Erdogan hinges on the results of the upcoming election. It will not only be another test of the AKP’s support in Turkey but will also be an indicator as to how successful current and future negotiations with the PKK and the EU respectively will turn out. Negotiation breakthroughs in talks with the PKK as well as the EU with countries such as Cyprus, Greece and France will have a significant bearing on whether or not the future of Turkey lies within the EU as well as the future of Turkey’s democratization process that comes with it.
REFERENCES


BIOGRAPHY

Michael Calleja graduated from University of Malta, Msida, Malta and received his Bachelor in European Studies (Hons) from University of Malta in 2012.