INTERAGENCY INTERACTION: EXPLORING THE FACILITATORS AND INHIBITORS OF INTERAGENCY INTERACTION IN THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM

by

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DEDICATION

This is dedicated to the hardworking middle echelon officers in the U.S. national security system.
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Figures</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Abbreviations</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1. Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2. Literature Review</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1. Organizational Analysis</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.1. Open Systems Theory</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.2. Collaboration</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2. Complexity</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3. Interagency Interaction in the US National Security System</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.1. Ambiguous Concepts</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.2. Evolution of Interagency Interaction within the US NSS</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.3. Adequacy of the Level of Interagency Interaction in the US NSS</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.4. Obstacles to Higher Levels of Interagency Interaction in the US NSS</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.5. Proposals for Overcoming or Removing Obstacles to Higher Levels of Interagency Interaction in the US NSS</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.6. US NSS Reform Initiatives</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4. Conclusion of the Literature Review</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3. Research Design</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1. Origins of the Problem Statement and Research Questions</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.1. US NSS Experiences with Stability Operations</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.2. Interagency Interaction in the US National Security System</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.3. Gaps in the Literature</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2. Problem Statement and Research Questions</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3. Methodological Processes</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3.1. Key Concepts ........................................................................................................... 159
3.3.2. Methodology Selection .......................................................................................... 163
3.3.3. Case Selection and Bounding Criteria ..................................................................... 169
3.3.4. Data Collection ..................................................................................................... 172
3.3.5. Data Analysis ....................................................................................................... 184

Chapter 4: Findings I: Context and Levels of Interagency Interaction ....................... 187
4.1. Findings Context: Prevailing Roles, Tasks, and Processes ...................................... 188
  4.1.1. State and Defense UEOs and MEOs involved in Mission 1 ......................... 189
  4.1.2. State and Defense UEOs and MEOs involved in Mission 2 ......................... 195
  4.1.3. State and Defense UEOs and MEOs involved in Mission 3 ......................... 200
  4.1.4. Prevalent policy development and implementation processes .................... 203
  4.1.5. Conclusion of Findings Context: Prevailing Roles, Tasks, and Processes ... 208
4.2. Levels of Interagency Interaction ........................................................................... 211
  4.2.1. Levels of Interagency Interaction among MEOs involved in MEO Role 2 .. 212
  4.2.2. Levels of Interagency Interaction among MEOs involved in MEO Role 1 .. 217
  4.2.3. Levels of Interagency Interaction among MEOs involved in MEO Role 3 .. 221
  4.2.4. Levels of Interagency Interaction among MEOs involved in MEO Role 4 .. 225
  4.2.5. Comparison of UEO and MEO levels of interagency interaction .............. 228
  4.2.6. Conclusions for Findings Regarding Levels of Interagency Interaction ....... 230

Chapter 5: Findings II: Inhibitors and Facilitators of Higher Levels of Interagency Interaction .......................................................... 234
5.1. Inhibitors of Higher Levels of Interagency Interaction ........................................... 234
  5.1.1. Primary Inhibitor: Lack of UEO Support for Higher Levels of MEO Interagency Interaction ............................................................... 235
  5.1.2. Logistical and Structural Inhibitors .................................................................. 245
  5.1.3. Lack of MEO Interest in Higher Levels of Interagency Interaction .............. 248
  5.1.4. Differences between UEO and MEO Inhibitors of Higher Levels of Interagency Interaction ............................................................... 254
  5.1.5. Conclusions for Findings Regarding Inhibitors of Higher Levels of Interagency Interaction ............................................................... 256
5.2. Facilitators of Higher Levels of Interagency Interaction ........................................ 259
  5.2.1. UEO Support for Higher Levels of MEO Interagency Interaction ............. 260
  5.2.2. Logistical facilitators ....................................................................................... 263
LIST OF TABLES

Table..................................................Page
Table 1 Hierarchy of Interaction.................................12
Table 2 Examples of Inhibitors of Collaboration ......................16
Table 3 Examples of Facilitators of Collaboration....................20
Table 4 State & Defense MEOs involved in U.S. Bosnia Policy between 1993-1998...175
Table 5 State & Defense UEOs involved in U.S. Bosnia Policy between 1993-1998 ...176
Table 6 MEO Role 1 Positions and Numbers..........................194
Table 7 MEO Role 4 Positions and Numbers..........................195
Table 8 MEO Role 2 Positions and Numbers..........................198
Table 9 MEO Role 3 Positions and Numbers..........................202
Table 10 MEO Role 2 Positions, Numbers, and Proportions .............213
Table 11 MEO Role 1 Positions, Numbers, and Proportions .............219
Table 12 MEO Role 3 Positions, Numbers, and Proportions .............223
Table 13 MEO Role 4 Positions, Numbers, and Proportions .............227
Table 14 NSC System Fora and Membership Since 1989 ..................299
Table 15 State Department MEO Interview Respondents ...............306
Table 16 Department of Defense MEO Interview Respondents ...........307
Table 17 State and Defense UEO Interview Respondents ...............308
Table 18 UEO Role 1 Positions, Numbers, and Proportions .............311
Table 19 UEO Role 2 Positions, Numbers, and Proportions .............312
Table 20 UEO Role 3 Positions, Numbers, and Proportions .............312
Table 21 UEO Role 4 Positions, Numbers, and Proportions .............313
# LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1 Average Size of NSC Professional Policy Staff, 1961-2008</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2 Relative Size of National Security Institutions in 2008 (by Personnel)</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CJCS ......................................................... Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
DC ................................................................. [NSC] Deputies Committee
DOD ............................................................. Department of Defense
DOS .................................................................. Department of State
DSOP ........................................... [NCTC’s] Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning
FSO ...................................................................... Foreign Service Officer
GFAP ................................................................. General Framework Agreement for Peace
HASC ..................................................................... House Armed Services Committee
HSC ........................................................................ Homeland Security Council
HVT ........................................................................ High Value Target
IFOR ................................................................. [NATO] Implementation Force
IPC ............................................................................... Interagency Policy Committee
JIACG ......................................................... Joint Interagency Coordination Groups
MEO ................................................................. Middle Echelon Officer
NAC ........................................................................ North Atlantic Council
NCTC ................................................................. National Counterterrorism Center
NMCC ..................................................................... National Military Command Center
NSA ................................................................. National Security Advisor
NSC ........................................................................ National Security Council
NSPD ................................................................. National Security Professional Development
NSS ................................................................. National Security System
ODNI ................................................................. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
OHR ................................................................. Office of the High Representative
OSCE ............................................................... Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe
OSD ................................................................. Office of the Secretary of Defense
PC ................................................................. [NSC] Principals Committee
PNSR ................................................................. Project on National Security Reform
POLAD .............................................................. Political Advisor
PRT ................................................................. Provincial Reconstruction Team
S/CRS ......................................................... State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
SACEUR ........................................................... Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SFOR ................................................................. [NATO] Stabilization Force
SVTC ................................................................. Secure Video Teleconference
UEO ................................................................. Upper Echelon Officer
UNHCR ........................................................ United Nations’ High Commissioner for Refugees
USAID ............................................................. U.S. Agency for International Development
ABSTRACT

INTERAGENCY INTERACTION: EXPLORING THE FACILITATORS AND INHIBITORS OF INTERAGENCY INTERACTION IN THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM

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George Mason University, 2015

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National security experts argue that comprehensive reform of the US national security system (NSS) is required to overcome the low levels of interagency interaction that impede the system’s ability to effectively address complex national security issues. There have been numerous recent efforts to increase the level of interagency interaction in the US NSS. Given the wide range of entrenched obstacles to interagency interaction, it is not surprising that assessments of recent efforts suggest success will require either an unacceptably long time or a unifying catastrophic failure. Most studies of the US NSS, and most efforts to improve the system, have focused on either leadership of the US NSS or individuals in the upper echelons of the national security departments. This study complements those efforts by using a case study of the system’s middle echelon officers to improve understanding of interagency interaction and the challenges of increasing the level of interagency interaction in the US NSS, and to fill a gap in the literature.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

The US government is entrusted by its citizens to provide for the nation’s security. The US national security system (NSS) is the government entity with primary responsibility for fulfilling this function.\(^1\) The US NSS is ill-equipped to effectively address the most critical national security issues—often referred to as “complex” in the national security literature.\(^2\) Since the end of the Cold War, complex national security issues have continued to increase in frequency, scale, and scope. The Project on National Security Reform (PNSR 2008, iii) explains, “What has changed [since the end of the Cold War] is not so much the capacity of the legacy system to manage complex contingencies that demand interagency coordination. What has changed is the frequency of significant challenges that bear such characteristics, and the possibility that they may be of paramount significance to American power, principle, and safety.” To effectively address complex national security issues the US NSS requires the capacity to rapidly integrate the full range of core competencies in the system, as well as the ability to identify and mitigate gaps in cross-organizational core competencies. Adequate

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\(^1\) As described in the Literature Review and Research Design chapters, the study defines the US NSS as the government entities, along with the mechanisms that facilitate interaction within and between those entities, involved in producing the nation’s security strategies and in developing and implementing the policies that contribute to the achievement of the strategies. The primary participants in the US NSS are leadership (i.e., Congress and the president) and the national security bureaucracies (these participants vary by issue, but typically include Defense, State, Homeland Security, and CIA, and may include Justice, Treasury, NGA, DTRA, FBI, Federal Marshal’s Service, Energy, Interior, Agriculture or others).

\(^2\) The Literature Review and Research Design chapters describe what constitutes a complex national security issue.
integration of the system’s core competencies rarely occurs because they are dispersed across parochial bureaucracies that have historically eschewed interagency interaction and remain neither structured nor incentivized to effectively integrate core competencies. There is a robust literature (overviewed in Chapter Two) that highlights a wide range of well entrenched obstacles to the interagency interaction required for effective integration of US NSS core competencies. While an array of parochial bureaucratic behaviors (e.g., turf protection, interagency competition, and hoarding information) top the list of obstacles to interagency interaction in the US NSS, these behavioral obstacles are frequently exacerbated by the following: leadership that sets unclear expectations regarding interagency interaction; management and oversight that provides inadequate guidance, incentives, and authorities for integrated missions; and a dearth of structures, processes, and resources dedicated to facilitating interagency interaction. PNSR (2008b, 15) states, “National security experts in Congress, the federal government, and academia generally agree that the United States has failed to sufficiently integrate diplomatic, military, economic, and other elements of national power, primarily because its various national security organizations are not well incentivized to collaborate.” The low levels of interagency interaction in the US NSS also undermine the system’s ability to identify and develop additional cross-organizational core competencies.

Numerous major post-Cold War studies (Hart-Rudman Commission 2001; Project on National Security Reform 2008a, 2008b, 2009; The 9/11 Commission 2004) conclude that comprehensive reform of the US NSS is required to overcome the low levels of interagency interaction that impede the system’s ability to effectively address complex
national security issues. And since the end of the Cold War, there have been numerous efforts to increase the level of interagency interaction in the US NSS. Given the monumental obstacles to interagency interaction in the US NSS, it comes as no surprise that recent assessments suggest these efforts are likely to require either an unacceptably long period of time or a catastrophic failure before they produce the requisite increases in interagency interaction.\(^3\) The literature offered few, if any, viable alternatives for increasing the ability of the US NSS to integrate the core competencies of the various national security departments and agencies.

Most studies of interagency interaction in the US NSS, and of the obstacles to increasing the system’s level of interagency interaction, have focused on leadership of the US NSS (i.e., Congress and the president) or individuals in the upper echelons of the national security departments and agencies. This study endeavored to complement the rich literature available on interagency interaction of upper echelon officers in the US NSS by improving understanding of interagency interaction of the system’s middle echelon officers, to include inhibitors and facilitators of increasing the level of interagency interaction of middle echelon officers.\(^4\) The study’s focus on interagency interactions of middle echelon officers was driven by several factors. There was very little literature available on the subject even though many studies emphasize the importance of understanding the activities and interactions of an organization or system’s lower level personnel (Desai 2005; Finney and La Porta 2008; Murdock, Flournoy,  

\(^3\) Steps leaders have taken since the end of the Cold War and recent assessments of the US NSS are described in Chapter Two.  

\(^4\) Per the description provided in the Research Design chapter, middle echelon officers consist of personnel in the following grades: foreign service officer grades FS-04 through FS-02; civil service grades GS-12 through GS-14; and military officer grades O-3 through O-5.
Additionally, Maechling highlights the importance lower-level decisions can have on shaping development and implementation of US national security policy. He (1976, 3) states, “For every publicized decision (the president) makes, this second echelon of decision-makers makes a hundred equally important ones. And it is this steady stream of less conspicuous decisions, building on and interlocking with their predecessors, that fixes the directions and contours of foreign policy, just as effectively as the few spectacular decisions that are the result of conscious deliberation at the top.” Admittedly, the “second echelon” personnel Maechling was referring to would be considered upper echelon officers by this study. However, his comment raises the possibility that there is yet another echelon of personnel, middle echelon officers, who are making thousands of policy development and implementation decisions based upon broad guidance provided by their superiors; and that the activities and decisions of these middle echelon officers may also have a tremendous impact on the “directions and contours” of US national security policy. Yet another reason for focusing on interagency interaction of middle echelon officers came from the complexity concept of “emergence.” Emergence is the idea that complex phenomena (such as interagency interaction in the US NSS) emerges from the interaction of three elements: agents, agents’ strategies of action, and agents’ environment. If the strategies of actions of some of the agents in an environment can be altered, that can alter the agents’ shared environment and indirectly lead to a change in incentives and behaviors of other agents in

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5 Emergence is described in the Complexity section (2.2) of the literature review.
the environment. Given that desired increases in interagency interaction are not occurring among upper echelon officers, perhaps there are overlooked opportunities for increasing the system’s level of interagency interaction by altering the interagency incentives and behaviors of the system’s middle echelon officers.

The study progresses from an overview of relevant literature, to an explanation of the study’s research design, to a description of the study’s findings. Literature from the fields of organizational analysis and complexity provided most of the theoretical foundation, as well as many of the analytical tools and concepts, for the study. Literature on the evolution of interagency interaction in the US NSS served several purposes: highlighting some of the conceptual ambiguities in the field, illustrating the system’s tendency to change incrementally over long periods of time, describing factors inhibiting change in the system at the end of the twentieth century, summarizing recommendations for reforming the US NSS, and providing insights into alternative explanations for the relative lack of change in the system since the end of the Cold War.

The Research Design chapter begins with a description of the iterative process of generating questions and reviewing literature that led to the development of the study’s problem statement and research questions. After summarizing the problem statement and research questions, the remainder of the section describes the methodological processes employed to select a research approach, collect data, and analyze collected data. The study’s endeavor to clearly articulate all the procedures used in the research was intended to enhance the study’s objectivity. Berg (2007, 294) asserts, “Objectivity is actually closely linked with reproducibility.” He (2007, 295) continues, “For many researchers,
objectivity rests on the ability of an investigator to articulate what the procedures are so that others can repeat the research if they so choose.”

To gain insights into the interagency interactions of middle echelon officers, an exploratory case study was conducted of the interagency interactions of middle echelon officers from the State Department and the Department of Defense who participated in US processes to develop and implement policies for Bosnia between 1993 and 1998. The primary data for the case study came from interviews of middle and upper echelon officers involved in US policy processes for Bosnia between 1993 and 1998. Additional data came from numerous previous studies of State and Defense activities in Bosnia. Content analysis of the collected data revealed several themes and patterns that were used to address the study’s research questions.

The research findings are arranged by their relevance to the research questions and are provided in two chapters. Findings I presents contextual findings and then describes the findings related to the research questions regarding levels of interagency interaction. Findings II provides the research findings regarding inhibitors and facilitators of interagency interaction. The study concludes with a summary of the theoretical implications of the study’s findings, along with recommendations for additional research and a description of potential policy implications.
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

National security experts claim the US national security system (NSS) is ill-prepared for critical aspects of the post-Cold War security environment. A key change in the post-Cold War security environment is complex national security issues are increasing in frequency, scale, and scope. Complex issues tend to cross traditional departmental and agency boundaries; requiring higher levels of interagency interaction to integrate the elements of national power. The US NSS is neither structured nor incentivized for higher levels of interagency interaction and it has resisted efforts to increase the level of interagency interaction. To provide additional understanding of these issues, the literature from three fields was reviewed: interagency interaction in the US NSS, organizational analysis, and complexity. The review focuses primarily on the literature on interagency interaction, as this field provides the context for the study and the problems the study is designed to address. However, literature from the fields of organizational analysis and complexity are presented first because they provide most of the theoretical foundation, as well as many of the analytical tools and concepts, for the study.

2.1. Organizational Analysis
The literature review of organizational analysis focused upon two sub-fields: open systems theory and collaboration. Open systems theory is included in the literature
review because it provides both conceptual and methodological insights for understanding and analyzing inter-organizational interaction. The literature on collaboration provides several foundational concepts for the research. It describes five levels of interaction between organizations and notes that personnel in different organizational echelons often encounter distinct facilitators and inhibitors of inter-organizational interaction.

2.1.1. Open Systems Theory

The literature on open systems theory describes a wide range of factors influencing the behaviors of organizational actors, highlights the organizational tendency to resist change, and provides the theoretical foundation for developing a definition of the US NSS and analyzing the evolution of the system. Open systems theory challenges the strict rationality of more traditional “goal-oriented” views of organizations and asserts that many factors influence the behavior of organizational actors. Though most open systems theorists accept the premise that organizations are, to varying degrees, oriented towards achieving goals, they argue that goal achievement is only one aspect of organizations, and frequently not the most important aspect. Therefore, proponents of open systems theory are concerned with expanding notions of purposes, roles, and processes of organizations beyond the traditional focus on organizational productive functions. Scott (1998, 10-11) argues, “Although organizations are viewed as a means to accomplishing ends, the means themselves absorb much energy, and in the extreme (but

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6 The methodological insights are described in the Methodological Processes section in Chapter 3 (Research Design).
7 The definition of the US NSS is provided in the Chapter Two section on interagency interaction in the US NSS and in Chapter Three.
perhaps not rare) case, become ends in themselves.” Scott (Ibid., 27) also notes the open systems’ perspective that “individuals have multiple loyalties and identities. They join and leave or engage in ongoing exchanges with the organization depending on the bargains they can strike—the relative advantage to be had from maintaining or ending the relation. . . . [P]articipants cannot be assumed to hold common goals or even to routinely seek the survival of the organization.” March and Simon’s (1993, 54) concept of “bounded rationality” does not undermine the rational perspective, but it does suggest that the rational perspective is insufficient for attaining a thorough understanding of the interactions within and between organizations. Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972, 1) argue that public organizations are frequently better characterized as organized anarchies rather than as rational institutions. Even Weber (1946, 220), widely regarded as the founder of rational theory, acknowledged that power issues resulted in bureaucratic activities in practice being different from their theoretic ideal.

Scott (2001, 44) explains that open systems theory emphasizes the importance of cultural-cognitive elements in organizations, while acknowledging the influence of regulative and normative elements. Scott and Meyer (1994) contend that organizations, and the actions of the people within them, cannot be fully appreciated in isolation from their environment. They further observe that the environment in which organizations form and operate heavily shapes their structures, routines, processes, rules, and culture. Scott (2001, 75) highlights the influence Giddens’ structuration framework has had on examining the interplay between social structure and human agency. Scott claims that Giddens’ work bridges the theoretical divide that has existed among social scientists
between those “who emphasize structural and cultural constraints on action and those
who emphasize the ability of individual actors to ‘make a difference’ in the flow of
events. . . . Giddens’ notion of the ‘duality of social structure’ views current social
structures as the products of previous social actions that will in turn shape future social
actions and social structures.”

The literature notes the influential role cultural factors can have on the behavior
of organizational actors. Schein (2004, 93) asserts that unresolved cultural differences are
often revealed as organizations attempt to operationalize their missions or strategies.
Schein (1992, 26) also contends, “Though the essence of a group’s culture is its pattern of
shared, taken-for-granted basic assumptions, the culture will manifest itself at the levels
of observable artifacts and shared espoused values, norms, and rules of behavior.”
Swidler (1986, 273-278) clarifies that culture does not dictate ends, rather it influences
action by “shaping a repertoire or ‘tool kit’ of habits, skills, and styles from which people
construct ‘strategies of action.’” She (1986, 273-278) also argues that culture’s role is
different in settled and unsettled environments. In the former, culture sustains existing
strategies of actions, while in the latter, culture facilitates and shapes the construction of
new strategies of action.

The literature on open systems theory also highlights organizational resistance to
change. Scott (1998, 23) writes, “To the extent that conditions change and new activities
are called for, the very factors associated with effective performance [e.g., durability,
reliability, and accountability] may prevent organizations from changing their rules and
procedures quickly enough to develop new ways of behaving.” Schein (1992, 27) claims,
“Individuals and groups seek stability and meaning. Once these are achieved, it is easier to distort new data . . . than to change the basic assumptions [i.e., accepted ideas that provide the foundation for the existing stability and meaning].” Schein’s observation implies that some organizational elements may be inclined more towards protecting the status quo than towards optimizing production (i.e., achieving an organization’s functional goals). Scott and Davis (2007, 60) refer to change-inhibiting behavior as pursuing maintenance goals; they claim that such goals may or may not contribute to the overarching goals of the organization and often become ends in themselves.

The literature on open systems theory highlights non-rational elements of organizations, notes that it should not be assumed that participants in an organization share common goals, describes the important role cultural factors have in establishing and reinforcing “strategies of action,” and explains the organizational propensity to resist change through the pursuit of maintenance goals. The next section offers insights into different levels of interaction within and between organizations.

2.1.2. Collaboration

The literature on collaboration provides several definitions of collaboration, clarifies how collaboration differs from other forms of interaction, offers methodological insights, and describes inhibitors and facilitators of collaboration while raising the possibility that these factors may not be uniform across all echelons of an organization.

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8 The elements are viewed as “non-rational” because they do not conform to the rational perspective. However, the elements are not viewed as “irrational” because there is logic to their formation and evolution.

9 The methodological insights are described in the Methodological Processes section in Chapter 3 (Research Design).
Additionally, the literature describes advantages and disadvantages of collaboration and demonstrates that the value of collaboration is dependent upon several conditions.

The literature offers several definitions of collaboration (Bardach 1998, 17; Goman 2010; Gray 1989, 227). Rather than list each of these definitions or develop one for this study, these definitions, along with other elements from the literature on collaboration, were synthesized to produce a Hierarchy of Interaction (see Table 1).\(^{10}\) The Hierarchy of Interaction describes five levels of interaction and highlights key differences between each level. Additionally, Bardach (1998, 20-21) emphasizes, “It is the potential to engage in collaborative activities rather than the activities themselves that is what we really care about when we talk about interagency collaboration. I call this potential interagency collaborative capacity, or ICC.” Gray (1989, xviii) also stresses that collaboration is not an end in itself; rather, it is a process that enables the emergence of mutually determined solutions.

\begin{table}[h]
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\textbf{Coexistence} & occurs when at least two actors are present in a shared environment. Interaction occurring at this level is not conducted for the purpose of facilitating reciprocity among actors.\(^{11}\) Adding to Coexistence the intentional production of information for the potential benefit of others in an environment results in the next higher level of interaction: Communication. \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\(^{10}\) The hierarchy was developed in April of 2010 to represent a synthesis of the ideas contained in the literature on collaboration. Since its construction, similar models have been encountered in fields as vastly different as business and health. Each model contains subtle differences reflecting the specific purposes and views of the originator.

\(^{11}\) Webster’s (1996, 992) defines interaction as “reciprocal action, effect, or influence.” Therefore, by definition, all interaction involves reciprocity. However, interaction in levels I and II is not conducted for the purpose of facilitating reciprocity among actors (i.e., the information producer is intending to neither establish a reciprocal relationship nor follow up on a previously established reciprocal relationship)
Communication occurs when actors use active or passive measures to convey information to others in a shared environment. Although these actions are intentional, such interaction is not considered purposeful interaction because it is not undertaken to facilitate reciprocity among actors. At a minimum, purposeful interaction requires adding awareness, consideration, and the potential for accommodation of the activities of other participants to Communication and results in the next higher level of interaction: Coordination.

Coordination occurs when participants in a shared environment interact in an attempt to arrange their activities based upon some criteria (e.g., time, size, or cost). This is the lowest level of the hierarchy that involves purposeful interaction among actors in a shared environment. The highest purpose of interaction at this level is to increase the orderliness or consistency of the participants’ activities. Adding sharing of skills, resources, or knowledge to Coordination leads to the next higher level of interaction: Cooperation.

Cooperation occurs when work or action is performed jointly with other participants. The highest purpose of interaction at this level is to increase participants’ capacity to achieve their individual goals through use of the skills, resources, or knowledge of other participants. Adding interdependence to Cooperation through the formulation and pursuit of shared goals produces the highest level of interaction: Collaboration.

Collaboration occurs when actors collectively formulate or pursue shared goals; goals of the participants’ parent organizations are subordinate to the shared goals of the collaborative entity.

The literature describes numerous inhibitors and facilitators of collaboration. A few of the primary inhibitors of collaboration are lack of collaborative experiences and institutions, parochial incentives and the protective behaviors they foster, and inefficiencies inherent to collaboration. Gray (1989) argues that lack of collaborative experiences and institutions hinders awareness of organizational interdependencies, limits

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12 The term “highest purpose” is used to acknowledge that while there can be several reasons for interaction (e.g., standard operating procedures, monetary incentives, travel opportunities, prestige, etc.) at any given level, the stated reason represents a rational perspective of the upper-limit of the outcomes an actor engaging in that level of interaction can aspire to without moving to the next higher level of interaction.
knowledge of potential benefits of collaboration, and impedes organizations’ ability to identify collaborative opportunities. Bardach (1998, 306) agrees, “Although there are plenty of opportunities for public sector agencies to create value by working cooperatively with one another, not all of them are taken. Probably only a minority are perceived, and many fewer are acted on. . . . [Some of these opportunities] have to do with being able to conceptualize problems more holistically than each specialized agency is capable of doing alone and to mass resources necessary to solve them.” Gray (1989, 275) notes that the lack of effective interactive mechanisms also undermines collaboration. Bardach (1998, 308) adds that a lack of collaborative experiences and institutions often impedes leaderships’ ability to advance a vision and identify integrating requirements.

Collaboration is also inhibited by hierarchical authorities, structures, and cultures that incentivize protection of organizational resources (e.g., turf, autonomy, budgets, personnel, and information). Schnaubelt (2009, 42) notes that protectionist behavior may not be inherently problematic, but it typically inhibits collaboration. Bardach (1998, 167) writes, “One of the most powerful motives—and rationalizations—for protectionism is fear that an important public mission for which one’s agency is uniquely responsible will suffer if collaboration goes too far. This motive fuses normative commitment to protect the weak, obligation to one’s agency-profession role, fear of blame by superiors and overseers, risk-aversiveness with respect to existing assets, and a realistic theory about the uncertainties inherent in a political environment.” Bardach (1998, 232) adds, “Almost nothing about the bureaucratic ethos makes it hospitable to interagency collaboration.
The collaborative ethos values equality, adaptability, discretion, and results; the bureaucratic ethos venerates hierarchy, stability, obedience, and procedures.” Gray (1989, 247) observes that organizations benefitting from status quo institutions and processes typically resist the uncertainty involved with developing collaborative institutions and processes. Bardach (1998, 278-279) summarizes, “Inertia bars the way [from most collaborative efforts ever getting off the ground]. Inertia is partly a product of skepticism. One kind of skepticism holds that there is really very little latent potential to improve policy or program outcomes through interagency collaboration. Another holds that even if there is such potential, the barriers erected by turf protectiveness, budget constraints, disagreements over appropriate goals, mutual mistrust, and the like are simply too high to overcome.”

Inefficiencies inherent to collaboration are additional factors commonly inhibiting the development of collaborative processes. Collaborative processes often require more time (Bardach 1998, 18; Noblit, Richards, Adkins, and Awsumb 1999, 226) and financial resources (Gray 1989, 11) than noncollaborative processes. Bardach (1998, 172) concludes, “The high costs of achieving some minimum level of collaborative capacity appear to justify only relatively ambitious collaborative efforts.” Sawyer (2007, 65-70) and Gray (1989, 249) agree that collaboration’s inefficiencies make it inappropriate for non-complex issues that can be more effectively handled by a single organization.

Lack of collaborative experiences and institutions, parochial incentives and the protectionist behaviors they foster, and inefficiencies inherent to collaboration are only a few of the inhibitors of collaboration found in the literature. Indeed, the complexity
surrounding collaboration precludes the possibility of assembling a comprehensive list of inhibitors. However, Table 2 provides additional examples of the range of inhibitors described in the literature. The inhibitors in Table 2 are divided into three broad categories: inhibiting factors common across many aspects of collaboration; factors inhibiting guidance and oversight of collaborative activity; and factors inhibiting resource identification, procurement, and development for collaborative activity. Factors were listed more than once if they were applicable for two categories.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2 Examples of Inhibitors of Collaboration</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Common</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of collaborative experiences and institutions</td>
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<tr>
<td>o Hierarchical managerial thinking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Inability to recognize opportunities that would benefit from collaboration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Lack of interagency fora and consensus-building processes</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Leadership and management issues</td>
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<tr>
<td>o Ambiguous guidance (e.g., vision, mission)</td>
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<tr>
<td>o Lack of a shared understanding of a problem</td>
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<td>o Stove piped or disputed responsibility for a problem domain</td>
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<tr>
<td>o Unclear roles and responsibilities within a problem domain</td>
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<tr>
<td>o Lack of initiative among stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Inefficiencies inherent in collaborative efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Participants lacking requisite authority, incentives, time, and skills</td>
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<tr>
<td>o Disputed authority over a problem</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Guidance and Oversight</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Inertia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Satisfaction with the status quo</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Lack of impartial mediators</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Resource Identification, Procurement, Development</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Overarching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Political and financial disincentives to collaborate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Agency cultures discouraging collaboration</td>
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<tr>
<td>o Intra-agency disharmony or heterogeneity</td>
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<tr>
<td>o Distrust among participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Deep and rigid ideological differences</td>
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<tr>
<td>o Exclusion of key stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Risk avoidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Inertia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Satisfaction with the status quo</td>
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<tr>
<td>o Lack of demonstrable progress</td>
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<tr>
<td>o Collaborative efforts that appear likely to fail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Unfavorable view of previous collaborative efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Turf protection</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The primary facilitators of collaboration in the literature are dissatisfaction with noncollaborative approaches, knowledge of organizational interdependencies and the potential benefits of collaboration, expectations and mechanisms for collaboration, and awareness of means for overcoming inhibitors to collaboration. Dissatisfaction with noncollaborative approaches is often brought about by crisis or failure. Bardach (1998, 194-195) writes, “The perception that ‘somehow, things are getting worse’ often underlie
efforts toward ICC development. . . . The perception of ‘crisis’ may further exacerbate this tendency.” He (1998, 279) adds that crises, or other distressing circumstances, provide valuable opportunities for collaboration. Similarly, Bardach (1998, 276) argues effective strategic messaging is important for maintaining momentum of successful collaborative efforts.

Increased awareness of organizational interdependencies and the potential benefits of collaboration are additional factors facilitating collaboration. Gray (1989, 58) argues, “The recognition by stakeholders that their desired outcomes are inextricably linked to the actions of the other stakeholders is the fundamental basis for collaborating.” McGrath (1998, 2) claims that recognition of these interdependencies “can deeply affect the internal structure, management style, identity, and mission of participating institutions.” Katzenbach and Smith (1993, 152) argue that it is “a mistake to try to get people to ‘work together better’ as an end in itself. Instead, the parties involved must identify specific actions they can take together that will require them to ‘get along’ in order to advance performance.” Gray (1989, 270) concludes that a cultural paradigm shift is required “to switch from an image of individual sovereignty over a problem domain to one of shared stewardship.” Gray (1989, 254) adds that bureaucrats must be educated about the potential benefits of collaboration. Bardach (1998, 198) writes “Once [people perceive and begin to articulate the opportunities inherent in interagency collaboration], the ICC is susceptible to a new dynamic. Inertial tugs to remain at rest, one might say, are countered by inertial tugs to remain in motion. The trajectory of the ICC becomes much more hopeful.” He (1998, 123, 306) adds that a critical enabler of this process is
improving people’s—especially members of control agencies—ability to identify opportunities that would benefit from collaboration.

Given a lack of collaborative experiences and institutions, it is important to enact clear expectations and mechanisms for collaboration, such as: providing coherent guidance and oversight, establishing authority over problem domains, and clarifying roles and responsibilities within problem domains. Bardach (1998, 199) writes, “An ICC needs to be able to articulate its vision, define its mission, and choose its concrete goals.” Gray (1989, 254) claims that effective oversight encourages, rather than inhibits, bureaucratic participation in collaborative efforts. She (1989, 277) adds that it is important to clarify authority over problem domains. Bardach (1998, 223) notes that effective leadership impacts virtually all aspects of collaborative capacity. Important functions of leadership include creating an environment conducive to collaboration (Bardach 1998, 268), protecting participants who raise difficult or sensitive issues (Heifetz 1994, 128), and clarifying roles and responsibilities within problem domains (Bardach 1998, 48). Bardach (1998, 184) concludes that perhaps the most valuable facilitator of collaboration is to increase awareness of the range of available means for overcoming the inhibitors of collaboration.

It is no more possible to provide an exhaustive list for facilitators of collaboration than it is for inhibitors of collaboration. However, it is possible to improve understanding of the range of facilitators described in the literature. To that end, Table 3 depicts a range of facilitators of collaboration. The facilitators in Table 3 are divided into three broad categories: facilitating factors common across many aspects of collaborative activity;
factors facilitating guidance and oversight of collaborative activity; and factors facilitating resource identification, procurement, and development for collaborative activity. Factors were listed more than once if they were applicable for two categories.

Table 3 Examples of Facilitators of Collaboration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common</th>
<th>Guidance and Oversight</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Collaborative experiences and institutions</td>
<td>• Momentum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>○ Integrative thinking</td>
<td>• Dissatisfaction with the status quo; due to crisis or perceived failure of noncollaborative efforts (see Kingdon) (Bardach, 194-195, 279)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>○ Ability to recognize opportunities that would benefit from</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>collaboration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>○ Interagency fora and consensus-building processes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Leadership and management issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>○ Clear guidance (e.g., vision, mission, goals)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>○ Shared understanding of the problem</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>○ Shared responsibility for problem domain</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>○ Clear roles and responsibilities within problem domain</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>○ Resource sharing (information, people, materiel, money)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>○ Initiative among stakeholders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>○ Effective strategic messaging (public relations)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Recognition of opportunity costs of noncollaborative efforts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Participants possess requisite authority, incentives, time, and skills</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>○ Clear authority over the problem domain</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>○ A neutral and legitimate convening authority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>○ Representatives empowered to make decisions and share information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Resource Identification, Procurement, and Development

• Overarching
  ○ Political and financial incentives to collaborate
  ○ Agency cultures encouraging collaboration
  ○ Intra-agency harmony or homogeneity
  ○ Trust among participants
  ○ Pragmatic, problem-solving ethos
  ○ Inclusion of key stakeholders

• Organizational advancement
  ○ Momentum
  ○ Dissatisfaction with noncollaborative efforts; often due to crisis or perceived failure
  ○ Quick visible successes
  ○ Collaborative efforts poised for success
  ○ Previous collaborative efforts viewed favorably
  ○ Collaboration perceived as advancing agencies’ equities
  ○ Perceptions of interdependence
  ○ Agency self-perception of high autonomy

• Money
This study’s focus on mid-echelon officers in the US NSS was heavily influenced by the idea that the facilitators and inhibitors of collaboration may not be uniform across all echelons of the national security bureaucracies. Specifically, the literature suggests that the obstacles to collaboration among individuals in the lower echelons of an organization may be less entrenched, and thus easier to overcome, than the obstacles to collaboration among individuals in the upper echelons of an organization. Though several works contain some version of this idea (Bardach 1998, 237; Carafano 2006; Noblit, Richards, Adkins, and Awsumb 1999, 222-224; Schnaubelt 2009, 37), it typically appears as an assumption rather than as the focus of research.

Finally, the literature on collaboration highlights advantages and disadvantages of collaboration. Goman (2010) and Gray (1989, 231-239) note collaboration’s potential for improving problem definition, strategy development, and policy formulation and
implementation. As previously mentioned, a disadvantage of collaboration is it is often less efficient than alternatives; frequently requiring more time and financial resources. However, the literature reveals that the advantages and disadvantages of collaboration are heavily context dependent. Specifically, Gray (1989, 4) argues that collaboration’s advantages over other forms of inter-organizational interaction are most evident in complex environments. Conversely, Gray (1989, 249-256) claims the disadvantages of collaboration will likely make it an inappropriate choice in environments where stakeholder interdependence is unnecessary or unrecognized, or where complexity is lacking.

The literature on organizational analysis provides several relevant concepts for the study. It explains that organizations resist change and “non-rational” elements may have more influence over organizational behavior than “rational” elements. Additionally, it describes collaboration’s potential for improving policy development and implementation, provides the theoretical basis for constructing a hierarchy of interaction, and suggests that personnel in different organizational echelons often encounter distinct facilitators and inhibitors of inter-organizational collaboration. The next section describes how complexity theory offers additional concepts for increasing understanding of behavior within a system.

2.2. Complexity

Complexity theory provides several concepts for increasing understanding of complex issues and the complex systems intended to address such issues. Complexity theory also challenges the utility of employing linear, reductive methodologies for the
study of complex phenomena.\textsuperscript{13} The literature review focuses on the complexity concepts of emergence, positive feedback, and power laws.

Emergence is a foundational concept of complexity. Indeed, complexity has been labeled a “science of emergence” (Waldrop 1992, 88). Complexity deals with phenomena that emerge from the interactions of three elements: agents, agents’ strategies of action, and agents’ environments. Axelrod and Cohen (1999, 15) explain that emergence refers to the “properties of the system that the separate parts do not have.” Epstein and Axtell (1996, 6-16) observe that complex systems emerge from the interactions of sub-elements acting “according to shared and evolving rules of behavior in a shared environment.” Bar-Yam (1997, 786) emphasizes that it is “the interdependence in a complex system that gives rise to emergent behavior.” Arthur, Durlauf, and Lane (1997, 6) note, “The fundamental principle of organization is the idea that units at one level combine to produce units at the next higher level.” Emergence has widespread applicability for the research topic. Many of the key issues of the study are emergent phenomena, such as interagency interaction, the US NSS, and the social structures shaping, and shaped by, the activities of individuals in both the upper and lower echelons of the national security bureaucracies.

Two other relevant concepts of complexity are positive feedback and power laws. Beinhocker (2006, 101) explains that positive feedback exists “when the connections are reinforcing—if I push A, it pushes B even harder, which pushes C even harder, which pushes A harder than my original push.” Jervis (1997, 125) points out that negative

\textsuperscript{13} The methodological insights are described in the Methodological Processes section in Chapter 3 (Research Design).
feedback provides stability in a system by dampening the elements inciting change, while positive feedback promotes change and growth in systems by amplifying the role of change agents.

Phenomena are said to be characterized by power laws if they are significantly more prone to experiencing extreme events than phenomena that follow a normal distribution. The primary difference between power laws and a “normal” distribution is that power laws have significantly wider tails (Miller and Page 2007, 165). The key point is power laws are superior to a normal distribution in accounting for the possibility of extreme events that are inherent in complex systems. Buchanan (2007, 70) claims when analysts use normal distributions to study complex phenomena—a frequent practice in the social sciences—they are unlikely to perceive, and thus inadequately account for, the likelihood of extreme events. Buchanan (Ibid., 177) observes, “Power laws emerge naturally in systems that are decidedly not in equilibrium.” Beinhocker (2006, 179) writes, “Power laws have been discovered in a wide variety of phenomena, including the sizes of biological extinction events, the intensity of solar flares, the ranking of cities by size, traffic jams, cotton prices, the number of fatalities in warfare, and even the distribution of sex partners in social networks.” He adds that though the idea of power

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14 The “normal” distribution, also known as a Gaussian distribution, is based upon the Central Limit Theorem. By contrast, Miller and Page (2007, 165) note that power laws characterize phenomena that follow the formula: \( \text{Prob} [X = x] \sim x^{-k} \). If \( x \) is the number of occurrences of some event of a particular size, then a power law would imply that the likelihood of this event is proportional to the size of the event raised to the \(-k\)th power. Thus, if \( k = 1 \), then events of size 100 are one-hundredth as likely as events of size 1. This implies that power-law-governed systems are characterized by many small events and a few, rare big ones."

15 Page (2009, 160-163) provides the following example to illustrate the difference between phenomena characterized by power laws and those characterized by a normal distribution: If human heights followed a power law and the average man was 69 inches tall, then, given the current world population, there would be 10,000 men 17 feet tall and one man over 1,000 feet tall.
laws is relatively new to social scientists, physicists have significant experience analyzing
power laws that occur in natural systems.

Emergence, positive feedback, and power laws are valuable concepts for
improving understanding of complex phenomena. Chapter three describes how these
concepts helped shaped the study’s problem statement and research questions, as well as
the study’s methodology. The remainder of the literature review is focused on
interagency interaction in the US NSS.

2.3. Interagency Interaction in the US National Security System
The literature on interagency interaction in the US NSS provides the context for
the study and the problems the study is designed to address. The review begins by
highlighting conceptual ambiguities in the field. Next, the review characterizes the
evolution of interaction between system participants and specifies current and
recommended levels of interagency interaction. The review then describes obstacles to
higher levels of interagency interaction and explains the challenges to increasing the level
of interagency interaction. The section concludes with an overview of the status of
numerous post-Cold War efforts to increase the level of interagency interaction.

2.3.1. Ambiguous Concepts
Improved understanding of interagency interaction in the US NSS is hindered by
the lack of common conceptions of “US national security system” and “interagency.”
Prominent conceptualizations found in the literature are detailed first. Then, to minimize
the potential for conceptual ambiguity to negatively impact the research, a description is
provided of how each term is used in this study. The term “national security system” is
rarely found in the literature. Terms found in the literature that sometimes refer to the US
NSS, but more frequently refer to either a subset of the US NSS or to the larger foreign
policy system, are “national security community,” “national security apparatus,” “foreign
policy apparatus,” or simply, the “system.” Two factors that explain much of the
confusion surrounding the concept of the US NSS are broadening notions about national
security and the fluid nature of participation in the system.

There appear to be as many ideas about what constitutes national security as there
are participants in the system; and the range of ideas have expanded over time. Hilsman’s
(1987, 286) view of national security as primarily concerned with defense policy typifies
the more traditional perspective. Destler’s (1972) early research also viewed national
security as a subset of foreign policy that was primarily concerned with defense.
However, Destler (1972, 5) appears to have anticipated the expansion of the concept that
was to come when he noted that foreign and domestic policy “are becoming more
intertwined.” Caudle (2009, 2) writes, “In simpler times, national security was defined as
a matter of protecting against traditional, external military threats.” Though the exact
boundary of what is and is not considered part of national security remains blurred, the
concept has expanded over the last few decades. Boulouta (2007, 48) states that as the
Cold War ended, “‘National security’ was synonymous with ‘defense.’” Rosati (2004)
claims the traditional view of national security faced many challenges in the United
States during the Vietnam War and was overtaken by broader perspectives after the end
of the Cold War. Ikenberry and Slaughter (2006, 17) describe broadening conceptions of
security beyond the military to include political, economic and social elements. Issues as
diverse as drug trafficking, culture, communications (Best 2009, 1; Rosati 2004, 148), human rights, migration (Snyder 1999, 2) and climate change (Burke 2009b) are also included in many modern conceptions of national security. US National Security Strategies of the last twenty years reflect the broader perspective, as they address issues such as poverty, corruption, failed states and “political alienation” (The White House 1996; 2002; 2006; 2010). A noteworthy addition in the 2002 National Security Strategy, that was retained in subsequent versions, was the inclusion of “development” as a third pillar of national security (the other two pillars being diplomacy and defense). It is also worth clarifying that the inclusion of non-defense issues in conceptions of national security is not a new phenomenon. Kennan’s “X” article of 1947, the post-WWII Marshall Plan, and National Security Council (NSC) document 68 of 1950 clearly demonstrate that, even during the Cold War, non-defense issues were considered relevant to US national security (Kennan 1947; National Security Council 1950, 46). The change in recent decades is not the inclusion of non-defense issues in conceptions of national security, but the range of non-defense issues that are being considered and the weight being accorded those issues vis-à-vis traditional defense issues.

A second factor that has contributed to the confusion surrounding the concept of the US NSS is the fluid nature of participation in the system. Not only has the system changed over time along with evolving notions of national security and changes in the international and domestic environment, the system’s participants often fluctuate from issue to issue. Rosati (2004, 103) writes, “Traditional national security bureaucracies were easy to identify, such as the State Department, the military, and the intelligence
community. With the collapse of the foreign policy consensus behind containment during the 1960s and the growth of global interdependence, these distinctions have lost much of their meaning.” Andreas and Price (2001, 52) argue the traditional national security system is being expanded to provide policy makers with a broader array of tools to deal with an increasingly complex international environment. Changing notions of national security and fluid participation in national security issues complicate efforts to define the US NSS.

Though no definition of the US NSS was found in the literature, the following definition was developed to clarify how the term is used in this study. This study views the US NSS as the government entities, along with the mechanisms that facilitate interaction within and between those entities, involved in producing the nation’s security strategies and in developing and implementing policies designed to contribute to successful execution of the strategies. This definition acknowledges the fluid nature of participation in the system and allows for changing conceptions of national security, while enabling greater delineation of the system’s primary participants and coordinating mechanisms than is provided by references to an ambiguous “system.”

The literature also contains differing conceptions of interagency and its purpose. PNSR (2010b, 5) defines the interagency as “the space below the president and above the departments.” Under this conception, interagency interaction in the US NSS occurs almost exclusively in the National Security Council (NSC) system.\textsuperscript{16} The five functions Marcella (2008, 17) ascribes to the interagency (i.e., identifying policy issues and

\textsuperscript{16} The NSC system is described in Appendix A1 and in Chapter Two.
questions, formulating options, raising issues to the appropriate level for decisions, making decisions, and overseeing policy implementation) align well with this top-level conception. Fishel (2008, 409) and Lamb and Marks (2010, 21) offer a broader view of interagency that includes any interaction between two or more organizations in the US NSS. This broader conception appears more in line with how Public Law 110-181 (US Congress 2008) defines the national security interagency system, “the structures, mechanisms, and processes by which the departments, agencies, and elements of the Federal Government that have national security missions coordinate and integrate their policies, capabilities, expertise, and activities to accomplish such missions.” This study uses the broader conceptualization that views all interaction between agencies as interagency interaction.

The study’s concept of interagency was further refined using different levels of interaction described in the collaboration literature. There are five potential levels of interagency interaction (i.e., coexistence, communication, coordination, cooperation, and collaboration) that reflect increasing agency interdependence as the levels move from coexistence towards collaboration. A critical concept in this study is the distinction between within-level improvements in interagency interaction and increases in the level of interagency interaction. The former enable more effective performance at a given level, while the latter enable a quality or quantity of interaction that is not possible at lower levels. Additionally, the study uses the term “purposeful interaction” to refer to interaction above communication, and the term “higher levels of interaction” to refer to the top two levels of interagency interaction (i.e., interagency cooperation and
collaboration). The next section chronicles the evolution of interagency interaction in the US NSS.

2.3.2. Evolution of Interagency Interaction within the US NSS

The literature offers valuable insight into the establishment of the US NSS and the evolution of interagency interaction within the system over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This section is organized according to three time periods: 1790 to 1940, the 1940s, and 1950 to 2000. The dramatic international, domestic, and political changes that occurred in each of these periods altered expectations of the US NSS and challenged the system’s ability to address critical security issues. Changes that occurred in the US NSS during each period are described, with special attention given to changes in the system’s level of interagency interaction.

The focus given to the level of interagency interaction is based upon several factors. Security experts (Chun and Jones 2008, 182; Rockman 1981, 291) state that the level of interagency interaction required for national security issues varies based upon the characteristics of the issues being addressed. Others (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004, 399; Project on National Security Reform 2008b, 2; United States Commission on National Security/21st Century 2001, x) claim that the US NSS has struggled to foster the level of interagency interaction required for complex issues. The potential consequences of inadequate levels of interagency interaction range from wasted resources to mission failure. Chun and Jones (2008, 171) argue that success in the Global War on Terrorism is largely dependent upon there being adequate interagency interaction. Lamb and Munsing (2011, 5) claim that increasing the level of
interagency interaction was a critical factor in turning around the Iraq War in the late 2000s. PNSR (2008b, i) summarizes that US prosperity and security are dependent upon the ability of the US NSS to foster the appropriate level of interagency interaction necessary for any and all national security issues. The review begins with a look at interagency interaction in the US NSS during the country’s first 150 years.

2.3.2.1. Incremental Change during the First 150 Years

Mosher (1975, 71) suggests that the small US NSS established in the late-eighteenth century experienced only minor changes in the level of interagency interaction during its first 150 years. During this time, leadership of the system was shared between Congress and the president, and purposeful interaction between the bureaucracies responsible for developing and implementing most of the nation’s security policies was the exception, rather than the norm. The little coordination occurring in the system was typically between an individual bureaucracy and the president. Using the definitions in Table 1, typical interagency interaction during this period would be classified as coexistence, with rare instances of interagency communication, coordination, cooperation, or collaboration occurring for a small number of unique national security issues. Efforts to increase the level of interagency interaction in the system had little success. Neither changes in the activities the system was expected to perform, nor changes in the domestic or international environments produced more than short-term or incremental increases to interagency interaction within the system. In addition to providing insights into interagency interaction in the US NSS prior to World War II, this section also portrays major changes in the activities the system was expected to perform,
as well as changes in the domestic and international environments. The section concludes
with a description of developments in the first half of the twentieth century that helped
clear the way for a radical increase in the level of interagency interaction in the US NSS
during the 1940s.

Rosati (2004) writes that the “U.S. Constitution produced a central government
with ‘separate institutions sharing powers,’ resulting in an ‘invitation to struggle’
between the executive and legislative branches.” James Madison (Wilson 2000, 28,
paraphrasing Madison 1787) claims in Federalist No. 51 that the tension built into the US
Constitution between the executive and legislative branches was intended to leverage
people’s natural inclination to protect their own prerogatives in order to resist the natural
inclination of others to expand their power. Fisher (2000, 8) argues that the US
Constitution extended this “invitation to struggle” into the US NSS by dividing
leadership of the system between Congress and the president. Fisher (2000, 8) further
notes that a primary concern of the framers, as expressed by George Mason, was that the
“purse and the sword ought never to get into the same hands.” Articles I and II of the US
Constitution provide the basis for the formal authority of the legislative and executive
branches, respectively, over the US NSS.

Article I, Section 8 of the US Constitution provides Congress with a substantial
leadership role in the US NSS. Congress has authority over the national security budget
and the power to declare war and to authorize the use of force for purposes other than
war, unless such force is used “to resist sudden attacks either against the mainland of the

17 The US Constitution when capitalized refers to the United States’ second constitution; completed in 1787
and ratified in 1789. The Articles of Confederation was the nation’s first constitution.
United States or against troops abroad” (that authority was given to the president).
Additionally, Congress has authority over the composition, government, and regulation
of the nation’s armed forces; to include the militias “employed in the service of the
United States,” the Army, and the Navy. Yet another source of power for Congress is the
need for the president to obtain Congressional “advice and consent” on treaties and
appointments.

The president’s leadership role in the US NSS is described in Article II, Section 2
of the US Constitution. The president is designated the Commander in Chief of the armed
forces when such forces are “called into the actual service of the United States.” Other
formal powers of the president include the power to make treaties and appoint certain
government officials; as previously mentioned both of these powers are subject to
Congressional advice and consent.

The formal powers granted to the legislative and executive branches by the US
Constitution do not account for all of the activity in the system; they serve more as a
starting point and a guide to the range of institutionalized and informal powers that each
branch accumulated as they have competed for power over the last couple of centuries.
Rosati (2004, 10) summarizes the result of the competition for leadership, “prior to
World War II the continuous struggle for power between the president and Congress in
making U.S. foreign policy usually resulted in Congress dominating in times of peace
and the president dominating in times of war.”

The national security bureaucracies have a large role in developing and
implementing the nation’s security policies. The primary national security bureaucracies
during the nation’s first 150 years were the State Department, War Department, and the
Department of the Navy.\textsuperscript{18} Inderfurth and Johnson (2004, 1) claim the president was
typically the sole coordinator of activities in the executive departments during this time.
May (2004, 8) adds, “diplomatic and military recommendations reached the White House
separately, and the relationships between political aims and military capabilities had to be
gauged, if at all, by the President.” Best (2009, 2) concludes that “until the twentieth
century, policy coordination centered on the President, who was virtually the sole means
of such coordination.” Additionally, the departments had relatively clear understandings
of their respective roles, and they generally avoided one another’s “turf.” PNSR (2008b,
45) clarifies, “The Department of State [argued] during this period that war and peace
were distinct conditions with different institutional requirements. During peacetime, the
predominant condition in American experience, the State Department was in charge. In
wartime, the military departments were. Thus, the State Department discouraged efforts
to include the military in the conduct of peacetime foreign affairs and declined to involve
itself in military affairs.” May (2004, 8) offers an insightful anecdote about the lack of
interagency interaction and the potential consequences: “Although [President] Taft’s
Secretary of State did occasionally ask the fleet to back up his diplomacy, he never
inquired ahead of time about the fleet’s location and make-up. Thus, in May 1912, when
unrest was sweeping Cuba, the Secretary asked for ‘a considerable naval force . . . in the
vicinity of Havana.’ Only by chance . . . did nine warships happen to be handy at Key

\textsuperscript{18} The State Department and Department of War were both established in 1789; the first year of George
Washington’s presidency. The Navy Department was established as a stand-alone department in 1798 after
being split from the War Department. The War Department operated and maintained the US Army.
West.” Rosati (2004, 160) points out that the lack of coordination extended to the two military departments, with each focusing on its own responsibilities and missions. However, Best (2009, 2) argues that the limited coordination of the early US NSS was sufficient given “limited U.S. foreign involvements for the first hundred or so years under the Constitution, the small size of the armed forces, the relative geographic isolation of the Nation, and the absence of any proximate threat.” He (Best 2009, 2) adds that changes in these factors beginning in the late nineteenth century necessitated an increase in the level of interagency interaction (i.e., from coexistence to coordination) in the US NSS.

It is worth noting some of the dramatic changes that occurred between 1790 and 1940 in the activities the US NSS was expected to perform and in the domestic and international environments shaping its activities. Rosati (2004, 20-26) asserts that the expectations of the US NSS changed in the middle of the nineteenth century as US grand strategy expanded from internal nation building and continental expansion to include regional concerns, especially in Latin America and Asia. McDougall (2009) also notes that the US NSS broadened its strategy of preventing “the outside world from shaping America” to include shaping “the outside world.” McDougal differs with Rosati regarding the timing of the change in US grand strategy, arguing that it happened at the end of the nineteenth century with US involvement in the Spanish-American War, rather than in the middle of the nineteenth century as stated by Rosati.

The domestic environment also changed drastically during the nation’s first 150 years. A few observations regarding the size of the nation and the composition of the public and the electorate illustrate the dramatic changes that occurred in the domestic
environment during this time. Rosati (2004, 17) writes that the territorial holdings of the
US government quadrupled in the first 150 years. The US Census Bureau (1990) shows
the US population grew from 4 million to more than 130 million, and the percentage of
the population living in rural communities decreased from 95 percent to less than half,
over the same period. Additionally, the proportion of the population that was eligible to
vote more than doubled with the passage of the fifteenth and nineteenth amendments to
the US Constitution. These examples represent only a portion of the massive territorial,
population, and social changes that occurred in the domestic environment during this
period; other economic, technological, political, and cultural changes of the period were
equally impressive.

The international environment also changed radically between 1790 and 1940. As
with the US NSS and the domestic environment, it is neither possible nor necessary to list
all the changes that occurred in the international environment during this time, but a few
examples help illustrate the magnitude of the changes. O’Rourke (2006, 149) writes that
in the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Napoleonic Wars altered the distribution
of power in Europe—the center of political, economic, and military power at the time.
Additionally, Koda (2005, 11) notes that Japan transformed from a closed nation with
little impact on global events to an active and powerful player in world affairs; as
evidenced by the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and the Russo-Japanese War a decade
later. Stearns (2007) claims that World War I marked the end of “the Long 19th Century;”
with the final collapse of the long-standing Ottoman Empire, and yet another shift in
political, military, and economic power within Europe that affected the rest of the world.
Mead (2001, 315) explains that the US position in the international environment evolved during this time from that of a fledgling state to a nation with the largest economy in the world and a military that few dared to challenge. In the midst of domestic and international upheaval, the US NSS often struggled to meet the heightened expectations placed upon it.

The perception of substandard performance of the US NSS between 1890 and 1940 resulted in numerous efforts to improve the system’s performance through increased interagency interaction. PNSR (2008b, 43) states the need for greater integration of the US NSS became apparent to many as a result of US policy missteps in the Spanish-American War of 1898. Best (2009, 2) notes that the performance of the US NSS during World War I added to awareness of the system’s shortcomings. May (2004, 7-14) describes numerous efforts to increase the level of interaction among the system’s parochial entities. PNSR (2008b, 43-46) writes that Congress considered approximately 50 military reorganization bills between 1921 and 1945. PNSR (2008b, 43-46) further observes that some of the early twentieth century efforts to reform the US NSS resulted in the establishment of interagency coordinating bodies such as the Joint Army-Navy Board, Council of National Defense, or the Standing Liaison Committee. However, PNSR (2008b, 43-46) points out that none of these organizations lasted for more than a few years and as World War II began, “President Roosevelt ‘kept the main strands of national policy in his own hands, and his Cabinet assistants advised him as individuals rather than as a body.’”
Dramatic changes occurred in the expectations of the US NSS and in the domestic and international environments during the nation’s first 150 years. Numerous reform efforts between 1890 and 1940 attempted to correct the system’s shortcomings. Nonetheless, the literature demonstrates that the system’s participants and the system’s standard level of interagency interaction (i.e., coexistence) on the eve of World War II were essentially unchanged from what they had been at the system’s formation in the end of the eighteenth century. However, May (2004, 14) notes that while reform efforts of this period were not immediately successful in permanently altering the level of interagency interaction within the US NSS, they laid much of the groundwork for the radical changes that occurred following World War II.

2.3.2.2. Radical Change during the Late-1940s

The only revolutionary change in interagency interaction in the US NSS during the nation’s first 200 years occurred in the 1940s. Marcella (2008, 6) claims “There is no period in American history like the late 1940s and early 1950s that is so full of national and institutional learning.” The fundamental change in the US NSS during the 1940s was the standard level of interaction between top officials in the system’s departments and agencies jumped from coexistence to coordination. The creation of what is commonly referred to as the National Security Council (NSC) system established expectations and mechanisms for interaction among top officials in the national security bureaucracies to facilitate awareness, consideration, and accommodation of one another’s

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19 This study defines revolutionary change as radical (or comprehensive) change occurring during a short period
20 Instances of interagency cooperation among top department officials, though not the norm, also increased as the changes of the 1940s improved the departments and agencies’ capacity to achieve their individual goals through use of skills, resources, or knowledge of other participants.
activities (i.e., coordination). The President, while retaining decision making authority, was no longer the sole coordinating body in the US NSS. This section first describes revolutionary changes of the 1940s and then reviews factors that facilitated the changes.

Marcella (2008, 5-6) summarizes several changes of the period, “From World War II and the onset of the Cold War emerged a number of institutional and policy innovations. Among them: the modern Department of State, Department of Defense (DoD) (from the old War and Navy Departments), a centralized intelligence system, the Marshall Plan for European reconstruction, the unified military command system, the [Department of the] Air Force, the predecessor of the Agency for International Development (Point Four), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other alliances, military assistance pacts, military advisory groups, and the U.S. Information Agency. In essence, an extensive national security system emerged, whose complexity and size would grow.” The landmark legislation creating and codifying the NSC system was the National Security Act of 1947, along with the 1949 and subsequent amendments to the Act. The 1947 Act (U.S. Congress 1947, Sec. 2 and 102) created several organizations including the NSC, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of the Air Force, and the National Military Establishment. Zegart (1999, 76) writes that the 1947 National Security Act made the NSC [the President; the Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Navy and Air Force; and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board] the “central foreign policy coordinating organization within the
executive branch.” The Act established the expectation of coordination between the national security bureaucracies and provided a forum (i.e., the NSC) for coordination between top officials in the system’s departments and agencies. The Act (1947, Sec. 101) tasks the NSC to advise the president regarding the integration of government policies to enable cooperation across the U.S. government on matters related to national security.

To summarize, the revolutionary changes in the US NSS during the late 1940s changed the participants in the system, the expectations for each participant, and the mechanisms of coordination within the system and between the system and its external environment.

The literature suggests that several factors combined to enable revolutionary change in the US NSS during the 1940s. As described in the previous section, dramatic changes in the international, domestic, and political environments during the mid to late nineteenth century had not produced a commensurate change in the US NSS’s ability to address the increasingly complex security environment. Best (2009, 2) claims that the changes that occurred in the security environment in the early twentieth century “forced new demands on the [US NSS] that the President alone could not meet.” These events came to a head in the 1940s. World War II brought about some of the most significant and abrupt changes the international environment has ever experienced. The dismantling of Europe during World War II left a power gap that was filled by the Soviet Union and the United States. Allitt (2003, 320-321) states the array of international issues

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21 Best (2009, 7) notes that the 1949 amendments to the NSA removed the secretaries of the military services from statutory membership of the NSC and replaced the National Military Establishment with the Department of Defense.

22 Stuart (2008, 75) writes that to ensure the NSC remained an advisory body, rather than a decision-making body, and to protect the President’s freedom of action, Truman successfully pushed to have the function given to the NSC in the Act changed from “. . . integrate our foreign and military policies” to “. . . advise the President with respect to the integration [of national security policies].”
confronting American policy makers in the second half of the 1940s included the spread of communism, an economically devastated Europe and Japan, and dozens of colonies across the globe that European nations were increasingly unable to govern.

Rosati (2004, 219) notes that the American domestic audience quickly transitioned from its anti-fascist focus of World War II to an overwhelmingly anticommunist stance after the war. He (Rosati 2004, 30) argues that “for the first time since independence and the period of continentalism, Americans began to perceive an external threat to their national security: the advance of Soviet communism.” Anticommunist sentiments, combined with the widespread perception that the “appeasement policies” of the 1930s had failed (Neustadt and May (1986, 47) refer to this notion as one of the “lessons of the thirties”), produced a domestic audience that was highly concerned about national security issues. Inderfurth and Johnson (2004, 2-5) add that neither the Democratic president nor the Republican-controlled Congress could afford to be perceived by the public as being “soft on communism.” Rosati (2004, 302) argues that the “anticommunist consensus” that solidified in the late 1940s provided a virtually unchallenged unifying paradigm for evaluating US national security issues until the late-1960s.

The political environment also appears to have been a facilitator of change in the US NSS during the 1940s. Pfiffner (2007, 1) argues that the Roosevelt era that began in 1933 “marked the transformation of the presidency from a small, personalized office to a collection of specialized bureaucracies with hundreds of professional staffers. Pfiffner (2007, 4) also notes that the proposals of the Brownlow Committee resulted in the
creation of the Executive Office of the President in 1939 and provided the president with the tools and authority to centralize power over the executive branch in the White House, thus lessening the power of the Cabinet. Rosati (2004, 296) claims that the expanding power of the presidency relative to Congress, which began under Roosevelt during the 1930s, intensified as the country looked almost exclusively to the executive branch to lead it through World War II, and then the Cold War. Additionally, PNSR (2008b, 50) argues that “the reorganization of Congress was an important preliminary step for the passage of the National Security Act. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 reduced the total number of standing committees from thirty-three to fifteen in the Senate and from forty-eight to nineteen in the House of Representatives.” Though these changes in the broader political environment did not immediately lead to drastic change in the US NSS, they provided the structure that would later enable the most significant reform in the history of the US NSS. Inderfurth and Johnson (2004, 3) suggest that once it became apparent that some form of change to the US NSS was inevitable, the defense bureaucracy switched the focus of its efforts from opposing the changes to attempting to shape the outcome of the changes.

The fundamental change in the US NSS during the 1940s was an increase in the level of interaction between top officials in the system’s departments and agencies — from coexistence to coordination—via the creation of the NSC system. The president was no longer the sole coordinating element in the system. The radical developments improved the system’s ability to coordinate the instruments of national power to address the vast and growing range of national security issues. This revolutionary change—
epitomized by the National Security Act of 1947—occurred amidst extraordinary circumstances: the conclusion of the second global war in thirty years, the threat of a third global war that could include nuclear weapons, an executive branch with vastly expanded powers, and a nation broadly unified both in its fear of communism and its conviction—based upon the “lessons of the thirties”—that appeasement enables tyranny. The literature suggests that apart from the revolutionary change of the 1940s, changes in US NSS interagency interaction have been incremental improvements within a given level of interaction.

2.3.2.3. Stasis in the US NSS in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century

The tumultuous security environment during the second half of the twentieth century resulted in numerous developments in the US NSS. Interestingly, the literature reveals that neither the changing security environment nor the system’s internal developments produced a commensurate increase in the level of interagency interaction within the US NSS. This section begins by providing a broad overview of the changes that occurred in the security environment and listing some of the noteworthy developments in the US NSS during the period. The section concludes with a description of several factors shaping interaction between primary participants in the US NSS in the beginning of the twenty-first century.

The security environment of the second half of the twentieth century was primarily shaped by the peak, descent, and conclusion of the Cold War. Allison and Zelikow (1999, 10) write, “For most of the second half of the twentieth century, containment of expansionist Soviet or Chinese Communism provided the fixed point for
the compass of American engagement in the world.” Rosati (2004, 302) claims that the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal served to “unglue” the anticommunist consensus that had united public sentiment and the activities of the US NSS during the Cold War. He (Rosati 2004, 82) also notes some of the major changes that accompanied the end of the anticommunist consensus: “new and varied interest groups and social movements, more critical media, and a cynical public.” Rosati (2004, 82) observes that issues other than defense—such as foreign economic policy which had been considered “low policy” during the height of the Cold War—began to regain prominence among government officials, as well as in the American public.

During this time, several important developments occurred within the US NSS. Presidential power over the system rose early on and then abated slightly as the security environment became more complex and a resurgent Congress began reasserting its Constitutional authority. Burke (2009a, 309-310) notes that the national security advisor and staff became primary participants in national security decision making processes for every president since Kennedy. And the national security bureaucracies, especially the military and the intelligence community grew to become immense organizations, and increased the number of department and agency officials involved in interagency coordination. These developments are described below and followed by an overview of factors shaping interaction between the system’s primary participants.

Pfiffner (2007, 204) writes that presidential dominance of US foreign policy “accelerated in the post-World War II years of the Cold War.” Inderfurth and Johnson (2004, 22) note that Congress shared the perception that the president was the leader of
the US NSS, and Rosati (2004, 326) claims that many members of Congress were reluctant to even be informed about national security activities. Rosati (2004, 296-300) adds that Congresses’ participation in the US NSS during the Cold War was largely limited to ensuring that other participants in the system were sufficiently organized and equipped to counter the communist threat.

Rosati (2004, 308) argues that the post-Vietnam end of the national consensus on foreign policy resulted in a reassertive Congress. Not only did Congress become more involved in overseeing the activities of the executive branch, it developed a bureaucracy of its own—exceeding 50,000 personnel—that freed it from its dependence upon the executive branch for information. Mann and Ornstein (2006), Fisher (2000), and Pfiffner (2007) are but a few of the many analysts who argue that a reassertive Congress was a necessary and positive development for the US NSS, given that Congress had ceded too much of its authority to the president during the Cold War. Fisher (2005) highlights the War Powers Resolution of 1973 as one of Congresses’ early attempts to reassert its authority in the US NSS. Brown (2008, 40) argues that the post-Vietnam “period transformed Legislative and Executive Branch relations, and the U.S. national security establishment faced a new, powerful (and perhaps justifiable) dynamic: increased congressional distrust of, and involvement in, national security affairs.” Rosati (2004, 266) claims that a natural and important byproduct of both the end of the anticommunist consensus and a reassertive Congress was a decrease in the president’s power over the US NSS. He (Rosati 2004, 82) observes that “every post-Vietnam president has failed to generate a new consensus or sustain much support for his policies for any length of time.”
Rosati (2004, 329) illustrates the increasing diffusion of leadership power in the US NSS by noting that Congressional assertiveness in the run up to the Persian Gulf War “indicates that presidents do not automatically dominate crises and war making as they once did during the cold war years.”

Another important development in the US NSS during the second half of the twentieth century was the increased importance of the President’s National Security Advisor (NSA) and the NSC staff. Destler (2005, 156) notes that the Kennedy administration introduced the National Security Advisor and NSC staff as we know it today. Zegart (1999, 86) writes, “Under Truman and Eisenhower, the NSC staff was limited to overseeing long-term policy planning.” Flournoy and Brimley (2006, 83-84) assert that Kennedy and Bundy shifted the focus of the NSC staff towards personally advising the President and away from facilitating Cabinet-level coordination, thus shrinking the number of voices influencing the president on foreign policy. Inderfurth and Johnson (2004, 65-66) observe that the Kennedy administration also installed the Situation Room in the West Wing of the White House. Zegart (1999, 86) points out that this “gave the president and his aides complete access to CIA, State Department, and Defense Department cables for the first time. This proved critical in controlling the bureaucracy. NSC staffers could find out exactly how, and how much, department officials were implementing the president’s directives.” At the same time, the NSC staff moved from the Executive Office Building, across the street from the White House, into the White House’s West Wing. Destler (2005, 156) claims these changes shifted significant portions of the processes for national security policy formulation and
implementation to the NSC staff and away from the Departments of State and Defense. PNSR (2008b, 66) concludes the importance given to National Security Advisers such as Bundy, Rostow, and Kissinger was the most conspicuous development in the NSC system during the Cold War. Kissinger (1979, 47) suggests, “every president since Kennedy seems to have trusted his White House aides more than his Cabinet.” Inderfurth and Johnson (2004, 65-66) write that critics disparagingly referred to Kennedy’s NSC staff as his “mini-State Department.” Destler (2005, 156) notes that the Johnson administration kept Kennedy’s changes and the Nixon administration institutionalized them. Zegart (1999) concludes, “Three major hallmarks distinguish the modern NSC system from the [system used by Truman and Eisenhower]. . . . First, the national security adviser has evolved from a purely administrative executive secretary servicing the council’s needs to a powerful political presidential adviser. . . . A second feature of the modern [NSC] system follows from the first. The rise of the national security adviser has increased the power, jurisdiction and capabilities of the NSC staff. . . . Third, the modern NSC system is marked by a pronounced decline in the role for the formal National Security Council. . . . Presidents have instead turned to the NSC staff and to a host of informal meetings with relevant Cabinet members to solicit information, analysis, and advice.” Rothkopf (2005, xiv) observes that these developments produce confusion regarding what is meant by the term “NSC.” Officially, the NSC still refers to the council’s statutory members—the president, vice president, and key cabinet secretaries—and a handful of advisors and staff. However, modern users of the term NSC are frequently referring to the National Security Advisor and the NSC staff. PNSR (2008b,
142) provides a chart developed by Gelman, Daalder, and Destler for the Brookings Institution’s NSC Project that tracks the size of the NSC staff as it grew from fifteen during the Kennedy administration to more than one hundred by 2008 (see Figure 2.3.2.3a).

![Figure 1 Average Size of NSC Professional Policy Staff, 1961-2008](image)

The national security bureaucracies, especially the Department of Defense, and the intelligence community experienced tremendous growth during the Cold War. Rosati (2004, 296) writes that the Cold War was the first time in its history that the US “remobilized and remilitarized on a permanent peacetime basis.” He (Rosati 2004, 159,180) adds that the national military establishment and the intelligence community
grew throughout the Cold War in response to a vast increase in the scope of activities the US NSS was expected to perform. Rosati (2004, 159,162) reports that the military became the largest bureaucratic institution in the US, if not the world. He (Rosati 2004, 206) also points out that the size of the US intelligence community and the scope of the activities they were involved increased exponentially during the Cold War. Rosati (2004, 101, 161) notes that by the end of the twentieth century, the national security bureaucracies included more than four million personnel, several major departments, hundreds of other organizations and agencies, and an annual budget in excess of $300 billion. PNSR (2008b, 143) provides Figure 2.3.2.3b depicting the relative size of many organizations in the US NSS in 2008.
Neither drastic changes in the security environment nor numerous developments within the US NSS produced a commensurate increase in the level of interagency interaction within the US NSS during the second half of the twentieth century. In the beginning of the twenty-first century, power over the US NSS remains dispersed between the executive and legislative branches. The parochial pursuits of the immense national security bureaucracies tend to further diffuse power in the system. The literature suggests that the “dispersion” or “diffusion” of power may be the most important factor shaping interagency interaction in the US NSS. Art (1973, 468) argues that “political power is widely dispersed at the national government level. . . . Diffusion of power is thus the structural starting point from which actors and analysts must begin their respective
tasks.” Similarly, the wide range of opinion and activity among interest groups and the American public serve to legitimate and entrench the diffuse power and goals that pervade the US NSS. The remainder of this subsection describes factors shaping interaction between the primary participants in the US NSS: the President, Congress, and the national security bureaucracies.

The immense and complex national security bureaucracies tend to employ their vast array of resources and skills in pursuit of maintenance goals or parochially-derived national security goals. Destler (1972, 47) is one of several analysts who argue that national security bureaucracies often pursue what Scott and Davis (2007, 60) refer to as “maintenance goals.” PNSR (2008b, 84) writes, “Departments and agencies use their resources to support the capabilities they need to carry out their core mandates rather than national missions.” Heclo (1977, xii-xiii) also reports that higher civil servants are not primarily focused on achieving the goals of the American people. He suggests their behavior appears oriented towards self-preservation through alliance building and resisting change. However, Heclo does not interpret their behavior as being an indicator that public officials don’t care about doing a good job. He claims that most appear to believe their behavior is required to get the job done. Halperin, Clapp, and Kanter (2006, 322) state that even when the national security bureaucracies act in support of national missions rather than their own parochial goals, the manner of support provided is primarily driven by the unique cultural perspectives of the individual organizations.

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23 The President includes the EOP; relevant national security bureaucracies vary by issue, but the Departments of State and Defense typically have significant roles.
These huge, complex, parochial, and culturally diverse organizations handle the majority of the nation’s security policies.

Presidents depend upon the national security bureaucracies to formulate and implement most of the nation’s security policies. Destler (1974, 3) notes that this arrangement is more by default than by presidential preference, resulting from the fact that presidents can only personally attend to a handful of the thousands of issues that seek their attention. Art (1973, 479) states that though presidents have significant power over the bureaucracies on the few issues to which presidential attention can be devoted, the bureaucracies have considerable latitude on the bulk of national security policy.

Maechling (1976, 3) clarifies, “For every publicized decision (the president) makes, this second echelon of decision-makers makes a hundred equally important ones. And it is this steady stream of less conspicuous decisions, building on and interlocking with their predecessors, that fixes the directions and contours of foreign policy, just as effectively as the few spectacular decisions that are the result of conscious deliberation at the top.”

Hilsman (1987, 183) notes, “Much of the legislation proposed in a president’s program is actually originated and drafted in the bureaucracies.” He (Hilsman 1987, 122) further asserts that much of a president’s success on national security issues depends upon the extent to which the president is able to lead the national security bureaucracies. However, presidents often find it difficult to control the activities occurring within the national security bureaucracies. Destler (1974, ix) points out, “We tend to forget the often substantial gap between what our Presidents seek and what the bureaucrats officially working for them actually do.”
The NSC system is intended to be the President’s primary means for coordinating the activities of executive departments and agencies. Auger (2004, 109) describes the hierarchical order of the modern NSC system (see Appendix A1 for a description of the origin and evolution of the NSC system). The NSC proper is at the top of the system, followed by the Principals Committee (PC), then the Deputies Committee (DC), and interagency working groups—called Interagency Policy Committees (IPCs) by the Obama administration—are at the bottom. The NSA and the NSC staff coordinate activity in the NSC system. Every President since Truman has issued guidance reaffirming that the purpose of the NSC proper, consistent with the 1947 National Security Act, is to advise the President on integrating national security policy.

Membership of the NSC proper fluctuated slightly for the first couple of decades following passage of the 1947 National Security Act. However, Brown (2008, 80) clarifies that statutory membership of the NSC proper established during the Nixon administration (i.e., President, Vice President, and Secretaries of State and Defense) has persisted, with the sole addition of the Secretary of Energy in 2007. Other participants in the NSC proper include statutory advisors (i.e., Director of National Intelligence and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and non-statutory members (e.g., Secretaries of Homeland Security and Treasury, the US Representative to the United Nations, the Attorney General, the President’s Chief of Staff, and the NSA and Deputy NSA.

Inderfurth and Johnson (2004, 97-106) point out that the structure of the supporting elements of the NSC system also varied within and between Presidential administrations for several decades after 1947, but has remained relatively constant since
the first Bush administration. The PC has essentially the same participants as the NSC
proper, with the primary difference being the PC does not include the President or Vice
President. According to President Obama’s first Presidential Policy Directive (2009), the
purpose of the PC is “to be the senior interagency forum for consideration of policy
issues affecting national security, as it has been since 1989.” The DC is primarily
composed of the deputies of PC members. Auger (2004, 109) writes, “It is at the [DC-
level] that the great bulk of the NSC’s work is done.” Additionally, the PC and DC are
each responsible for resolving issues that do not require higher level attention and
clarifying issues that do go higher. The DC also has responsibility for establishing,
coordinating and overseeing lower level interagency groups. These interagency groups
have enabled more upper echelon officials from the national security departments and
agencies to become involved in interagency coordination.

Lamb and Munsing (2011, 8) point out that NSC committees’ ability to resolve
issues and coordinate and oversee interagency activity is often undermined by inadequate
authority and resources. They write, “Currently, committees are the prevalent cross-
dePARTMENTAL mechanism employed in the national security system. Committees are
distinguished by having little or no authority and few resources. Members of the
committee are not accountable for success or failure, and their main goal tends to be
simple coordination or information-sharing.”

Lower level interagency groups in the NSC system typically focus on either a
specific national security issue or a geographic region. Chun and Jones (2008, 177) write
the “lowest significant level, the name for which has often changed with each
administration, sometimes known as committees and other times as interagency working groups, is designed to serve as the day-to-day focal point for interagency formulation, coordination, and implementation of national security policy. . . . In essence, this level is where policy analysis is conducted. These groups are also responsible for ensuring timely responses to the actions directed by these senior committees as well as the President.”

Whitaker, Smith, and McKune (2008, 146) shed light on the range of participants in these groups. They note that DOD participants in the “lower level interagency groups [include] Assistant Secretaries, Deputy Assistant Secretaries, and GS-15s from [OSD] Policy and one- or two-star flag officers and action officers (O-5s and O-6s) from J-5 [Joint Staff’s Strategy, Plans and Policy Directorate].” Whitaker et al. (2008, 146-147) further note, “It is uncommon for representatives from the unified commands or the individual services to attend interagency meetings. . . . People from the Joint Staff are quite protective of the fact that they work to fulfill the statutory responsibilities of the CJCS [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] as the principal military advisor to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the NSC.”

Presidents look to the NSA and the NSC staff to oversee the NSC system. Each of the last four administrations have adhered to the Tower Board’s (1987) recommendation for the senior-level committees of the NSC to be chaired “by the individual with the greatest stake in making the system work”; hence, the NSA chairs PC meetings and the Deputy NSA chairs DC meetings. The NSA’s primary roles have varied across presidential administrations. The literature (Chun and Jones 2008; Inderfurth and Johnson 2004; Rothkopf 2005) shows that these roles have included: honest broker, policy
advocate, policy coordinator, and crisis manager. However, Lamb and Marks (2010) note that the neither the NSA nor the NSC staff have formal authority in the NSC system. The lack of formal authority often undermines their ability to oversee interagency processes and integrate department and agency activity. Brzezinski (1983; 1987), NSA during the Carter administration, notes that the Departments of State and Defense resist integration efforts and claims the NSC staff’s ability to effectively lead such efforts depends upon the level of backing they receive from the president. Auger (2004, 120) writes, “The value that the Tower Commission and others saw in having the NSA and NSC staff at the center of the process declines immensely if it becomes clear that the national security adviser does not have the ear or the confidence of the president, or if the NSA and the NSC staff are unable to use that central position effectively.” The roles of the NSA and the NSC staff increased as Presidents sought to lessen their dependence upon the national security bureaucracies.

Presidents have increasingly looked outside of the national security bureaucracies as they attempt to exert greater control over key national security policies. Zegart (1999, 76) claims that increasing control over US NSS processes has been a goal of all presidents since the National Security Council was established in 1947. The previously described increase in importance of both the NSA and the NSC staff largely reflect presidential efforts to leverage their limited authority to meet their enormous responsibilities. Pfiffner (2007, 131) explains that since the Kennedy administration, Cabinet secretaries have been overshadowed by the NSA and the NSC staff at the White House—even though the former have independent legal authority and the latter do not—
because of the respective “roles they play in the political system and the need of presidents to control the government.” Best (2009, 26) and PNSR (2008b, 137) point out that despite the fact that most presidents since 1947 viewed the State Department as the agency with primary responsibility for foreign policy issues, most of them ended up relying more on the NSA and the NSC staff after finding State unable or unwilling to satisfactorily fill the role. “Gelb (Inderfurth and Johnson 2004, 284 quoting Gelb, 1980) notes that virtually every serious observer of the way American foreign policy is conducted ends up recommending that the Department of State should be given the leading role as presidential advisor-in-chief. Moreover, virtually every president vows to adopt this approach. ‘Yet,’ Gelb concludes, ‘none ever followed through and did it.’”

PNSR (2008b, 128) states that one reason for the increasing importance of White House staffers (e.g., the NSA and the NSC staff) is Cabinet secretaries are often perceived as having divided loyalties, while White House staffers serve solely the president. For example, Best (2009, 26) notes that Cabinet secretaries and personnel often brief Congress, while White House staff are rarely accountable to Congress. Chun and Jones (2008, 188) add that of the president’s two primary sources of power (i.e., the Cabinet and the NSC staff), the NSC staff has been much more responsive to presidential concerns.

Time is another reason presidents often turn to White House staffers instead of the national security bureaucracies. Chun and Jones (2008, 178-179) note that the White House staff can get things done much quicker than would normally occur if they involved the departments and agencies. Rothkopf (2009) observes, “The general trend in recent
years has been to increase the importance of the NSC [staff] versus individual agencies (notably State), largely because in the modern world virtually all foreign-policy decisions are covered in real time and thus produce political consequences in real time. Since the White House is the only part of the executive branch that can manage the president’s political interests directly, it becomes important to involve it in real time as well.”

Inderfurth and Johnson (2004, 63) offer a quip by President Kennedy that illustrates his perspective of how productivity at the White House differed from productivity at the State Department, “Damn it, Bundy and I get more done in one day at the White House than they do in six months at the State Department.”

There are, however, limitations and problems involved with having the NSA and the NSC staff responsible for national security issues. Root (2008, 42-54) points out that the NSC staff is limited in people and expertise; constraining its ability to effectively address more than a few key issues. Rockman (1981, 290) states that NSC staff limitations include highly specialized expertise and an inadequate grasp of policy nuances resulting from not participating in the detailed day-to-day planning occurring within the departments and agencies. PNSR (2008b, 144) and the 9/11 Commission (2004) argue that the small NSC staff is rarely able to focus on grand strategy or fulfill its role as an “honest broker” within the NSC because it is overburdened by lower level policy development that should be the purview of the national security bureaucracies.

Rourke and Shulman (Durant and Diehl 1989, 183 paraphrasing Rourke and Schulman 1989, 131) argue that presidents also use ad hoc, temporary agencies, such as “czars” and “tiger teams,” to bypass bureaucratic resistance to their policies.
Unfortunately, ad hoc, temporary agencies often have authority, resource and expertise limitations similar to the NSC staff. Additionally, as the number of these agencies increase, overseeing their activities can overwhelm the President. PNSR (2008b, viii) writes, “By one count more than 29 agencies or special groups report directly to the president.” Lamb and Marks (2010, 7) state, “Czars can . . . make headway if the President backs them up consistently, but such persistent Presidential attention is almost as demanding for the President as doing the job directly and tends to defeat the purpose of the czar. Thus, czars are a prominent but not a particularly effective model of presidially delegated authority for integration. Presidents use them but recognize their limitations, as do Cabinet officials.” PNSR (2008b, vii) points out that ad hoc policy development can hamper implementation as national security bureaucracies are often less inclined to support policies that they had little part in developing. PNSR (2008a, 6) summarizes, “No consistently effective mechanism exists for delegating presidential national security authority. The most common formal integration mechanism is the lead agency because departments and agencies are established, work well in their domains, and control resources. Presidents also sometimes designate lead individuals, or ‘czars.’ However, both lead agencies and czars lack authority to direct Cabinet officials or their departments.”

Due to the numerous limitations of White House staff and ad hoc organizations, presidents must currently rely upon parochial national security bureaucracies to address the vast majority of national security issues. And despite the range of management tools available to presidents and the tremendous growth of the presidential staff during the
twentieth century, presidential control over the national security bureaucracies remains weak. Root (2008, 43) surmises that the US NSS provides the president with more responsibility than authority. Rosati (2004, 80) concludes that, given the inherent limits on presidential power, it is rarely appropriate to attribute either success or failure of a national security policy to presidential design. While presidents seek greater control over the US NSS, one of the primary roles of Congress is to check presidential activity in the system. The next few paragraphs consider the impact that increased Congressional involvement in the US NSS has had on presidential influence on the national security bureaucracies.

The Hart-Rudman Commission (2001) describes several of the national security roles of Congress: controlling the budget for all the executive departments, holding hearings on security issues, and passing legislation that influences national security processes. Halperin, Clapp, and Kanter (2006, 314-315) note Congresses’ role in establishing national security structures and processes, “All of the processes and activities involved [in the US NSS] take place within a congressionally determined structure.” These analysts (2006, 314-315) also write that through its legislative authority, Congress is able to “change the players in the executive bureaucracy, change the roles of key players, and rewrite the rules of the game.”

During the first decade of the twenty-first century, Congress was still in the process of reclaiming many of the leadership roles it ceded to the president during the Cold War. Most analysts view the increase of Congressional involvement in the US NSS as a positive development, though several voiced concerns about the specific manner in
which Congress was reasserting its authority. The increase in Congressional involvement in the US NSS further limited the president’s ability to control the national security bureaucracies. Buckton James (1969, 127) is one of several analysts who note that Congress provides the national security bureaucracies with alternative sources of power, thus lessening the bureaucracies’ dependence on the president. Wilson (2000, 274) writes that bureaucrats are well-skilled in seeking from Congress “the money, the autonomy, and the missions that the White House has threatened.” The Hart-Rudman Commission (2001, xvii) asserts that the redundant layers of Congressional oversight of national security issues unnecessarily wastes the little time that the executive and legislative branches are able to commit to such issues. “For example, every major defense program must be voted upon no fewer than eighteen times each year by an array of committees and subcommittees. This represents a very poor use of time for busy members of the Executive and Legislative Branches.” These are just of the few of the means found in the literature by which Congress reduces what Neustadt (Rosati 2004, 83 quoting Neustadt 1960) argues is the essence of presidential power: “the power to persuade.”

Several analysts assert that Congress has little incentive to attempt to fill the leadership gap that results from their efforts to check the president’s power over the US NSS. Rosati (2004, 311) observes that members of Congress are highly attuned to the interests of their constituents and that national security is an important topic to the American public. These factors would appear to incentivize members of Congress to help the president guide the national security bureaucracies towards developing and achieving effective national security policies. However, Root (2008, 42) and Buckton James (1969,
127) note the American public looks almost exclusively to the president on national security issues. Sarkesian, Williams, and Cimbala (2005) argue that members of Congress have therefore chosen to avoid the political risks involved in attempting to lead the US NSS and have instead leveraged their power over the system for political benefit. An oft cited example of Congresses’ reluctance to overtly assert its leadership of the US NSS is its failure to exercise its authority to declare war. Rosati (2004, 314) reports, “Congress has declared war just five times in American history, while presidents have committed military forces abroad in over 200 instances.” It is worth noting that this is not a post-World War II phenomenon. Congress only declared war in four of the 162 pre-World War II uses of the military abroad. Another example of Congressional reluctance to participate in the leadership of the US NSS is described by the Hart-Rudman Commission (2001, xvii), “While Congress has mandated many changes to a host of Executive Branch departments and agencies over the years, it has not fundamentally reviewed its own role in national security policy. Moreover, it has not reformed its own structure since 1949.” Halperin, Clapp, and Kanter (2006, 324) note that though the American public may overlook Congresses’ role in the US NSS, the bureaucracies and the special interest groups do not. Hilsman (1987, 175) claims that members of Congressional committees are often more influenced by the bureaucracies they oversee and the interests groups relevant to their committee than they are by either the public or the president.

A cursory reading of the literature describing changes in the security environment and developments within the US NSS could lead one to conclude that the system changed
radically during the second half of the twentieth century. However, a more thorough reading reveals that such a conclusion overemphasizes the ebbs and flows of power in the system and understates the relative continuity that prevailed during this period. While important developments occurred, such as the tremendous growth of the national security bureaucracies, an increase in the number of department and agency officials involved in interagency coordination, and the expanded role of the NSC advisor and staff, PNSR (2008b, 20) concludes, “the basic system has not changed since 1947.” Indeed, apart from the revolutionary change of the 1940s, the level of interagency interaction in the US NSS changed little in the nation’s first 200 years. And as the first decade of the twenty-first century drew to a close, the system’s baseline level of interaction remained coordination among upper echelon officials in the departments and agencies. Rosati (2004, 36-39) points out that though the external environment changed tremendously, with the collapse of the anticommunist consensus in the 1970s and the later fall of the Soviet Union, the US NSS remains constituted almost exclusively of Cold War organizations that are predominantly guided by Cold War institutions. The next section describes the need to increase the level of interagency interaction in the US NSS to enable it to address complex national security issues.

2.3.3. Adequacy of the Level of Interagency Interaction in the US NSS

There is overwhelming consensus in the literature that current levels of interagency interaction in the US NSS (i.e., coordination) are inadequate for addressing the increasing frequency, scale, and scope of complex issues in the modern security environment. This section explains the idea that while interagency coordination may have
been appropriate for the Cold War, it is insufficient for the increasing complexity in the post-Cold War environment. The literature describes specific interagency requirements, problems stemming from low levels of interagency interaction, and the need for integration resulting from increased complexity.

The literature suggests interagency coordination, despite its numerous limitations, was arguably an adequate level of interagency interaction during the Cold War. Bracken (2007, 73) explains, “The best way to deal with a strategic environment characterized by a relatively low degree of diversity was to build strong departmental silos that specialized in the complexities of a relatively small number of major problems.” He (2007, 73) adds, “Most problems that threatened to fall between the cracks of the bureaucracy could be solved in a single NSC meeting, or at deputy-level interagency meetings. Organizational problems had end-points.” The Project for National Security Reform (PNSR) suggest that, though the system established in 1947 had many shortcomings, it was adequate for an environment dominated by a single, unambiguous threat. PNSR (2008b, ii) concludes, “The failure rate of the 1947 system was not small, but failure encompassed neither the majority of cases nor cases of supreme U.S. national security interest.”

As mentioned previously, interagency coexistence had been the norm for more than a century when passage of the 1947 National Security Act raised the typical level of interaction among top officials in national security departments and agencies from coexistence to coordination. Analysis of the US government’s foreign policy apparatus and calls for reform of the US NSS continued to increase after passage of the 1947 Act. Destler (1974, 16) notes that no less than thirteen major studies were conducted of
“organizing our government for coherent and purposive foreign policy” in the twenty-five years after World War II. Rockman (1981, 292) adds that between 1947 and 1981, there were “at least 65 studies of the U.S. foreign policy machinery.” Rothkopf (2009) opines that quadrennial calls for reform of the US NSS have “become as dependable an occurrence in DC as the blossoming of the cherry trees around the Tidal Basin.” A few of the more important reports produced during the Cold War came from the Jackson Committee (1961), the Murphy Commission (1975), and the Tower Board (1987). The Jackson Committee of the late 1950s and early 1960s criticized the overly rigid NSC system of the Eisenhower administration. The Murphy Commission of the 1970s challenged the expanding role of the National Security Advisor and recommended that the NSC also address international economic issues. Best (2009, 18) notes that the Tower Board of the 1980s assessed “the proper role of the NSC system in the wake of the Iran-Contra revelations.” However, calls for radical reform of the system were muted for most of the Cold War. The frame of defeating the Soviet Union unified most Americans and provided government officials with little incentive to do anything more than tweak a system that was viewed as broadly adequate for the bipolar contest. As such, reform efforts were focused primarily on improving interagency coordination rather than on increasing the system’s capacity for interagency cooperation or collaboration. Of greater concern to current policy makers is whether interagency coordination is adequate for the modern security environment.

There is overwhelming agreement in the literature on the US NSS (Hart-Rudman Commission 2001; Lamb and Marks 2010; Lamb and Munsing 2011; Project on National
Security Reform 2008a, 2008b, 2009; Rice 2001; The White House 2010) that the increasing complexity of the modern security environment makes the shortcomings of interagency coordination unacceptable. The modern security environment is characterized by a vast array of overlapping complex issues that develop rapidly, change frequently, and involve large numbers of diverse participants. Auger (2004, 119) writes, “The loss of ‘the Soviet prism,’ through which events were interpreted and priorities established, left the NSC staff working on a larger number of issues of seemingly equal importance. This diffusion of effort has slowed the policy process and has left the staff scrambling to catch up with events even more than had normally been the case for previous NSC staffs.” Marcella (2008, 7) states, “With the end of bipolar ideological and geopolitical conflict, the foreign policy and defense agenda has been captured by globalization, free trade, democratization, subnational ethnic and religious conflict, failing and failed states, humanitarian contingencies, climate change and ecological deterioration, diseases, terrorism, ungoverned space, contraband, trafficking in humans, international organized crime, drug trafficking, proliferation of small weapons, as well as the technology for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and homeland security.” The Hart-Rudman Commission (i.e., The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century) conducted an extensive analysis of the US NSS and produced three reports between September of 1999 and February of 2001. In their final report, Hart-Rudman (2001, iv) argue, “The dramatic changes in the world since the end of the Cold War have not been accompanied by any major institutional changes in the
Executive Branch of the U.S. government. Serious deficiencies exist that only a significant organizational redesign can remedy.”

The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq provided stark evidence of the increasing complexity of the modern security environment and the shortcomings of interagency coordination; they also increased pressure to radically reform the US NSS (Stuart 2008, 54). PNSR (2008b, 28) notes, “It is widely understood that the security environment of the early 21st century differs significantly from the one the U.S. national security system was created to manage. The character of the actors has changed; the diversity of state capabilities is greater; and the international norms delimiting legitimate behaviors have shifted as well. Exchanges of goods, information, ideas, and people are also far denser and more variable than they were even a dozen years ago, let alone in 1947.” PNSR (2008b, 496) quotes former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates as he compares the modern security environment with previous environments:

I recall Henry Kissinger in 1970. There had been the Syrian invasion of Jordan. I think something was going on in Lebanon. And we had discovered the Soviets were building a submarine base in Cuba. I always thought Kissinger managing two or three crises at the same time was an act of legerdemain. I tell you, that was amateur night compared to the world today.

PNSR (2008b, iii) concludes, “What has changed is not so much the capacity of the legacy system to manage complex contingencies that demand interagency coordination. What has changed is the frequency of significant challenges that bear such
characteristics, and the possibility that they may be of paramount significance to American power, principle, and safety.” Rothkopf (2005, 457) adds, “We are at a watershed not unlike the one we faced at the end of the Second World War, but it is defined by the emergence of an entirely new climate, a transformed geopolitical ecosystem, rather than by the emergence of a new enemy.” Former Secretary of State Rice (Inderfurth and Johnson 2004, 104-105, quoting Rice 2001, 61) states, “In 1947 the challenge was to tame the clashing interests of the State, War, and Navy Departments. In 2001 the challenge is to unite the far-flung concerns of all the agencies that are working across our real and virtual borders.” Finney and La Porta (2008, 315) write, “The days of exclusive ‘military’ and ‘civilian’ spheres of operation are over.” Davis (PNSR 2008b, 85 paraphrasing Davis 2002) observes that “each and every non-governmental and academic commission studying interagency operations—the Gilmore Commission, the Hart-Rudman Commission, the National Commission on Terrorism, and the CSIS Beyond Goldwater-Nichols working group—have arrived at the same conclusion: that historical and existing models of interagency cooperation and integration are wholly inadequate” (emphasis added).

The increasing frequency, scale, and scope of complex national security issues requires that the US NSS be capable of effectively integrating and leveraging all elements of national power (i.e., expertise, capabilities and resources from across the spectrum of organizations in the US NSS) to anticipate and address a vast range of national security issues, and to adjust the system’s mix of expertise, capabilities and resources, when required. PNSR (2008b, 2) clarifies, “While the need for change is becoming more
apparent, the underlying causes of the system’s inadequacies are not new. They can be traced back to a basic shortfall of our national security system: it cannot integrate and resource the elements of power well enough to conduct the full range of national security missions necessary to protect the nation. The current system and the manner in which Congress governs and funds it does not permit the timely, effective integration of the diverse departmental expertise and capabilities required to protect the United States, its interests, and its citizens in an increasingly complex and rapidly changing world.” Lamb and Marks (2010, 27) add, “Virtually all serious observers of national security affairs now recognize that the current structure of the national security system militates against unified problem-solving when the problem is a multiagency issue.”

Higher levels of interagency interaction are required to integrate the elements of national power.\(^\text{24}\) PNSR (2008a, 7) writes, “The system must produce a ‘collaborative government’ approach that can draw on capabilities in any part of the government when necessary.” PNSR (2009, iii) clarifies, “The vision is for a collaborative, agile, and innovative national security system that horizontally and vertically integrates all elements of national power to successfully meet 21st Century challenges and opportunities based on timely, informed decisions and decisive action. . . . A national security system that can develop an overall strategy, a plan to execute it, and the means to provide timely resources and adequate authorities for pursuing the plan in support of national goals.” It is worth clarifying that none of the literature argues that higher levels of interagency interaction are required for every national security problem. It is generally accepted that

\(^{24}\) Higher levels of interagency interaction refer to the top two levels of interaction: cooperation and collaboration.
most problems will continue to fall primarily within the purview of individual departments and agencies; coordination is appropriate for such issues. Higher levels of interagency interaction are necessary only for national security issues that require integration of the expertise, capabilities and resources from across the organizations in the US NSS.

In addition to highlighting the overarching need for increased integration in the US NSS, the literature offers several specific integrating requirements for leadership, integrating entities, and departments and agencies. Integration requires system leadership (i.e., Congress and the President) to give consistent and coherent guidance, provide integrating mechanisms for policy formulation and implementation, incentivize higher levels of interagency interaction, and manage multiple interagency efforts. Hart-Rudman (2001, x) emphasizes the need for system leadership to provide overarching strategy and guidance to drive all activity in the US NSS. PNSR (2009, 143) argues that “the national security system must perform as a unified enterprise” and a “shared vision, purpose, and effort are imperative.”

To aid policy development and implementation, system leadership must also provide integrating mechanisms (e.g., roles, responsibilities, authorities, processes and structures) and incentivize higher levels of interagency interaction. Lamb and Marks (2010, 16) argue that there can be no doubt among interagency entities that their authority is delegated by the president and approved by Congress, and does not flow from the parent organization of the team’s leader. They (2010, 28-30) add, “Improved executive authority for interagency integration below the level of the President and under his
supervision is a critical prerequisite for any meaningful interagency reform and for improved national security performance in complex contingencies more generally.”

Rockman (1981, 293) agrees, “Lack of clarity at the top molds bureaucratic tendencies below.”

PNSR (2009, vii) states that to improve integration, system leadership must also “create mechanisms for the oversight and resourcing of integrated national missions.”

Oversight and resourcing of interagency efforts involves managing the interagency, facilitating strategic planning, identifying issues requiring integration and assigning responsibility for them to entities possessing the requisite authority to effectively address the issues, and providing a means for resolving authority disagreements. Lamb and Marks (2010, 24) claim that Congress and the NSC staff need to oversee the activities of the interagency entities. PNSR (2008a, 8) argues that the NSC staff must become expert at facilitating “effective long-range strategy formulation and strategic planning that articulates objectives, establishes priorities, relates means and ends, and integrates all the tools of hard and soft power into a common framework.”

The literature also describes what is required of interagency entities in order to improve integration in the US NSS. Interagency entities must provide US NSS leadership with integrated decision making support, develop and implement integrated plans, and identify the need for and develop additional integrating expertise, capabilities, and resources. PNSR (2008a, 7) writes, “The system must focus on shaping requirements for meeting a wide range of present and future challenges, not just on those generated by current missions. . . . Where the system cannot find adequate capacity on which to draw,
it must build these capacities.” Gerstein (2005) notes that better technological means are required to integrate US hard and soft power. PNSR (2010a, i) adds that interagency entities require “national security professionals who can work in challenging environments on extremely complex problems characterized by neither simple root causes nor easy solutions. These professionals must know how to seek solutions across departmental lines, work in interagency and intergovernmental teams, and employ U.S. instruments of power in integrated, effective, whole-of-government and whole-of-nation approaches.”

Executive departments and agencies in the US NSS are also key to efforts to increase integration as they are responsible for developing and employing most of the system’s resources and expertise. The literature suggests that departments and agencies must subordinate organizational goals to national goals, prepare to operate in integrated missions, incentivize interagency participation, and develop a broad range of expertise, capabilities and resources. Lamb and Munsing (2011, 22-23) demonstrate the importance of individuals on interagency task forces prioritizing the interagency mission above the mission of their parent organizations. PNSR (2009, 143) writes, “National missions and requirements must take precedence over those of departments and agencies.” PNSR (2008b, 141) adds, “Since resources reside mostly in the departments and agencies, it is these institutions that must be used to execute all missions, even those requiring close integration. Odeen (1980) and Pace (Garamone 2004 paraphrasing Pace) argue that departmental personnel must be better incentivized to work in the interagency. Lamb and Marks (2010, 9) claim that departments and agencies must develop functional expertise,
resources and capabilities that can then be integrated “to accomplish missions that require a multidisciplinary effort.”

The literature reveals that the system’s low levels of interagency interaction preclude it from achieving the integration required to adequately address complex national security issues. In any endeavor, deficient strategy—stemming from a combination of poorly conceived ends, inappropriate ways, and inadequate means—decreases the likelihood of success and increases the likelihood of wasting resources. In the US NSS, the low levels of interagency interaction undermine the development of effective ends, ways, and means for addressing complex national security issues. This strategy deficit decreases the likelihood that the system will develop and achieve effective national security goals, and increases the likelihood of expending unnecessary time, money, materiel, lives, and national prestige pursuing those goals. PNSR (2008b, vi) writes, “Taken together, the basic deficiency of the current national security system is that parochial departmental and agency interests, reinforced by Congress, paralyze interagency cooperation even as the variety, speed, and complexity of emerging security issues prevent the White House from effectively controlling the system.” The literature highlights specific ways that the low levels of interagency interaction undermine the development of integrated ends, ways and means.

Perhaps the main problem resulting from the low levels of interagency interaction is the system’s frequent inability to develop integrated ends (e.g., strategic goals). Presidents, along with their NSC staffs, often fail to provide effective strategic guidance largely because they are overwhelmed with managing day-to-day issues and integrating
the activities of parochial departments and agencies. PNSR (2008b, vi) writes, “The need for presidential integration to compensate for the systemic inability to adequately integrate or resource missions overly centralizes issue management and overburdens the White House.” Lamb and Marks (2010, 9) add, “Current practices leave responsibility for integrating the work of multiple departments and agencies far too centralized in the person of the President. Low levels of interagency interaction further hamper the development of effective ends as interagency entities (e.g., tiger teams, task forces, and lead agencies) frequently fail to provide Presidents with integrated decision-making support. PNSR (2009, iv) argues that the low levels of interagency interaction undermine the system’s ability to “leverage and integrate all instruments of national power” for the “development of whole-of-government policy options for presidential consideration.”

The low levels of interagency interaction also undermine the system’s ability to integrate policy implementation. Departments and agencies typically pursue multiple courses of action that are often unsynchronized or worse, conflicting. The disharmony is partly the result of the previously mentioned lack of strategic guidance. The Jackson committee (1959, 55) concludes, “Because the NSC does not really produce strategy, the handling of day-to-day problems is necessarily left to the Departments concerned. Each goes its own way because purposeful, hard-driving, goal-directed strategy, which alone can give a cutting edge to day-to-day tactical operations, is lacking.” However, the low levels of interagency interaction often hinder integrated implementation even when leadership provides adequate strategic goals. Komer (1972, 157) notes that it requires significant effort to overcome parochial implementation procedures. PNSR (2008b, 102)
argues the US NSS provides neither the authority nor the incentives necessary to overcome departmental tendencies to pursue parochial goals.

The low levels of interagency interaction also hinder production of integrating means in that it undermines development of integrated expertise, capabilities, and resources. PNSR (2008a, 6) writes, “Although departments have become proficient at developing capabilities within their mandates, the national security system cannot rapidly develop new capabilities or combine capabilities from multiple departments for new missions. As a consequence, mission-essential capabilities that fall outside the core mandate of a department receive less emphasis and fewer resources.” PNSR (2008b, i) adds, “The national security system of the United States is increasingly misaligned with a rapidly changing global security environment” and lacks the “means to detect and remedy [its] own deficiencies.”

Secondary effects (i.e., results of inadequate ends, ways, or means) from the low levels of interagency interaction include wasted resources, missed opportunities, and unrecognized seams. Several studies (Currey 2003; Lamb and Marks 2010, 28; Project on National Security Reform 2008b, vii) highlight the high costs incurred from wasteful duplication of effort. PNSR (2011) notes, “We have always been able to win ugly by throwing money at a problem, but that is no longer the case. We have lost our margin for error and we are headed for a decade of austerity, when even great programs are being killed. The times call for a national security system that is effective, efficient, participatory, and agile.” PNSR (2008b, vi) writes that the “excessively hierarchical national security system does not ‘know what it knows’ as a whole, it also cannot achieve
the necessary unity of effort and command to exploit opportunities.” The Defense Department’s 2009 Quadrennial Roles and Missions Report (2009) calls for improved interagency integration to reduce seams between agencies.

There was not universal consensus in the literature regarding the need for higher levels of interagency interaction. Olson (2008) argues that attempts to increase interagency interaction are costly and based upon questionable assumptions. He adds that the pace of activity in crisis situations does not typically allow for time consuming interagency interaction. He concludes with a quote from Mencken (Olson 2008, 219 quoting H. L. Mencken) to suggest that calls for increasing interagency interaction are misguided, “For every complex problem, there is a solution: neat, plausible, and wrong.” Rothkopf (2009) and Destler (Lamb and Orton 2009) argue that recommendations to increase interaction are typically overly focused on departments and agencies and fail to appreciate the importance of presidential leadership. Similarly, Auger (2004, 108) and Rothkopf (2009) claim that the quality of the people supporting the President on national security issues matters more than processes for integrating the activities of the departments and agencies. Most of the proponents of higher levels of interagency interaction acknowledge the above concerns, but argue that these critics’ provide inadequate prescriptions for improving integration.

Apart from increasing the level of interagency interaction, the literature offers no viable alternative for fostering the integration necessary to address the increasing frequency, scale, and scope of complex national security issues. Lamb and Orton (2009)
acknowledge Rothkopf and Destler’s focus on presidential leadership, but argue that the current level of interagency interaction fails to provide the President with the support required to make effective decisions. Fishel (2008, 437) describes two means for unifying effort in the US NSS: unity of command or interagency interaction. While Schadlow (2003, 325-326) offers numerous historical examples of integration through unity of command (e.g., the military integrating defense, diplomacy, and development for specific campaigns), she agrees with others (Binnendijk and Cronin 2009, 2-3; Fishel 2008; Holmes 2009; Natsios 2005; Sewall 2007, xxxi) who argue that these arrangements are inadequate for the increasing frequency, scale, and scope of complex national security issues. Lamb and Marks (2010, 3) claim “‘Unity of command’ from the President on down through the functional departments and agencies seems to preclude ‘unity of effort’ for missions that are intrinsically interagency in nature and cut across those same chains of command.”

The literature also highlights potentially dire consequences should the US NSS fail to increase the level of interagency interaction. PNSR (2008b, i) writes, “The U.S. position of world leadership, our country’s prosperity and priceless freedoms, and the safety of our people are challenged not only by a profusion of new and unpredictable threats, but by the now undeniable fact that the national security system of the United States is increasingly misaligned with a rapidly changing global security environment.” Hart-Rudman (2001, iv) concludes, “After more than two years of serious effort, this Commission has concluded that without significant reforms, American power and influence cannot be sustained.” PNSR (2008a, i) argues, “The simple truth is that the
world for which the national security system was designed in 1947 no longer exists.
Today’s challenges require better integration of expertise and capabilities from across the
government. The current national security system cannot provide this. Instead,
departments and agencies are often working against one another, the White House is
unable to make timely and well-informed decisions, and there is an overreliance on
military force. The costs in lives, money, and standing in the world have been
tremendous. Future security of the nation is at risk.”

The literature reveals that the increasing frequency, scale, and scope of complex
national security issues requires that the US NSS be capable of effectively leveraging all
of its expertise, capabilities, and resources to anticipate and address the vast range of
national security issues, and to adjust the system’s mix of resources and core
competencies, when required. Individual departments or agencies should still handle most
national security issues, coordinating with other organizations as necessary. Though
coordination is an appropriate level of interagency interaction for most national security
issues, higher levels of interagency interaction are required for complex national security
issues. Considering the need for higher levels of interagency interaction, the problems
carred by inadequate interagency interaction, the lack of alternatives for improving
interagency integration, and the importance of increasing the level of interagency
interaction, the next section reviews numerous obstacles to higher levels of interagency
interaction in the US NSS.
2.3.4. Obstacles to Higher Levels of Interagency Interaction in the US NSS

The obstacles to higher levels of interagency interaction in the US NSS are numerous, varied, and deeply entrenched. Though it is neither possible nor necessary to describe all of the inhibitors of higher levels of interagency interaction in the US NSS, this section highlights several of the primary obstacles found in the literature. The obstacles are arranged in three broad categories: inhibiting institutions, inadequate leadership and management, and parochial department and agency behavior (e.g., turf protection, interagency competition, and hoarding information). The literature suggests that these institutional, structural, and behavioral obstacles tend to shape and reinforce one another in a manner consistent with Giddens’ notion of the “duality of social structure” and the complexity concepts of “positive feedback” and “emergence.”

Cultural, doctrinal, and structural institutions in the US NSS are typically agency-centric, mutually reinforcing, and inhibit, rather than enable, higher levels of interagency interaction. Chun and Jones (2008, 178) note that each participant in the US NSS has a unique organizational culture. Gorman and Krongard (2005) claim the US NSS incentivizes strong agency cultures. Desai (2005) argues that efforts to increase the level of interagency interaction in the US NSS are heavily dependent on the system’s ability to replace “strong individual agency cultures [with a] strong interagency culture.” Cultural differences produce a range of behaviors that undermine higher levels of interagency interaction, such as suspicion of other agencies’ motives and doubts about their competency. Perhaps the most significant cultural differences in the US NSS are those

25 These concepts are described in the literature review sections on Organizational Analysis and Complexity, respectively.
between the State Department and the Department of Defense. Rife and Hansen (1998), Finney and La Porta (2008, 297), Schake (2012), and Schadlow (2003) are a few of the numerous analysts who note the degrading affects cultural differences between these two departments have on interagency interaction in the US NSS.

Desai (2005) and CSIS (Murdock, Flournoy, Williams, and Campbell 2004) lament the dearth of interagency doctrine in the US NSS available to counter agency-centric doctrines that tend to both reflect and reinforce hierarchical managerial thinking. Agency-centric doctrines often lack appreciation for organizational factors influencing the larger system and decrease awareness of interagency interdependencies. Scott (1998) observes that inadequate appreciation of the importance of organizational factors impedes understanding of how organizations affect, and are affected by, one another and their environment. Lamb and Munsing (2011, 56) point out that even in rare instances when interagency integration occurs, its contribution to mission success is often overlooked or misattributed to good leadership or technical competency. Welken (2008, 464) notes the inability of organizations in the US NSS to “understand the capabilities of other [organizations] and to close the seams between them.”

Addressing the need for doctrinal harmony between the State Department and the Department of Defense, Walker (Finney and La Porta 2008, 298 quoting Walker 1998, 41) writes, “It is important for soldier-diplomats to understand why and how diplomacy operates to win international support and how domestic political considerations constrain the way force is used to achieve military objectives. Diplomat-warriors will need to understand and appreciate why and how the military can be used to achieve diplomatic objectives and what operational
constraints the military faces in trying to achieve those objectives.” Desai (2005) and Pulliam (2005) point out that another manifestation of the lack of interagency doctrine is different geographical structures. Desai (Project on National Security Reform 2008c, 25 paraphrasing Desai 2005) also observes that “organizational structures for dealing with given geographic areas vary from agency to agency, so much so that it is at times impossible to discern counterparts or brother/sister organizations. For example, the National Security Council and State Department regions do not correspond to those of the DOD or CIA.”

PNSR (2008b, vi) notes that structural factors in the US NSS favor “strong departmental capabilities at the expense of integrating mechanisms.” The 9/11 Commission (PNSR 2010, 31 paraphrasing the 9/11 Commission 2004, 400) argues there are “structural challenges within the Executive Branch that not only [inhibit] but intentionally [prevent] unity of effort.” Lamb and Marks (2010, 5) clarify, “Impediments to interagency integration are rooted in the basic structure of the national security system, which is hierarchical and based upon a functional division of labor among powerful departments and agencies with authorities and prerogatives codified in law and often protected by corresponding congressional committees. These departments and agencies resist cooperation with one another.” Lamb and Marks (2010, 16) and PNSR (2008b, 60) point out that parochial cultures, doctrines, and structures are so deeply ingrained that even when integrating authority exists—as in the case of ambassadorial authority over a country—it may not be recognized or respected.
An additional structural factor inhibiting higher levels of interagency interaction is the busy schedules of people in the US NSS. Rast (1999, 456) and Scowcroft (Project on National Security Reform 2008b, 143 quoting Scowcroft) note that it is not unusual for people in the US NSS to work 14 hour days, 6 to 7 days a week, leaving little availability for the additional time typically required for interagency interaction.

Higher levels of interagency interaction in the US NSS are further undermined by leadership and management’s failure to provide requisite vision, oversight and structures. Rast (1999, 648) claims that a primary driver of interagency dynamics is the extent to which “leaders establish strategic vision and define the ‘rules of the game’ for the interagency process.” In the US NSS, leadership’s ability to provide clear vision and rules is challenged by the diffusion of leadership power between Congress and the President (as previously described in the section on evolution of interagency interaction). Hart-Rudman (2001, x) argues that system leadership routinely fails to provide “an overarching strategic framework guiding U.S. national security policymaking and resource allocation. Clear goals and priorities are rarely set.” Obstacles to higher levels of interagency interaction stemming from inadequate leadership are compounded by, and contribute to, management shortcomings.

Management deficiencies in the US NSS also inhibit higher levels of interagency interaction. Management of the US NSS is challenged by split responsibility for the system and overwhelmed executive branch managers.26 The NSC staff is the President’s primary means for managing interagency efforts within the executive branch. A common

26 As described in the section on evolution of interagency interaction, the legislative and executive branches share responsibility for the US NSS.
finding in the literature is the small NSC staff, as virtually the sole integrator and manager of policy in the executive branch, is typically overburdened by day-to-day issues, leaving precious little time to provide guidance and oversight (Jackson 1959, 54; Lamb and Marks 2010, 9; 9/11 Commission 2004, 400; Project on National Security Reform 2008a, 141; Project on National Security Reform 2008b, vi; Project on National Security Reform 2010b, 31). Obstacles to higher levels of interagency interaction resulting from management deficiencies include ineffective guidance and oversight, inadequate authority structures, and weak integrating mechanisms.

The US NSS often fails to provide effective guidance and oversight for interagency efforts. The 9/11 Commission (2004, 400) observes that “no one [is] firmly in charge” of managing the basic elements of interagency interaction in the US NSS, such as coordinating efforts, assigning responsibility, tracking progress, and identifying and resolving obstacles. PNSR II (2009, iv) writes, “The absence of even the most fundamental strategic management of the interagency system typically prevents the development of whole-of-government policy options for presidential consideration and for implementation of decisions throughout the system.”

The obstacles to higher levels of interagency interaction caused by the lack of guidance and oversight for integrating efforts are compounded by guidance and oversight that promote parochial behavior. A primary cause of deficiencies in guidance and oversight is that responsibility for the US NSS is split between the executive and legislative branches. While many of the results of the US Constitution’s “invitation to struggle” are described in previous sections of the literature review, this section
highlights deleterious effects this arrangement has on higher levels of interagency interaction. Olson (2008, 223) claims, “The Framers of the U.S. Constitution did not want an efficient government. . . . [They] deliberately and with intent set about to create a divided government, one in which power was both separate and shared in order to inhibit coordination. Thus, at the beginning and at the very core of the U.S. concept of government are deeply embedded obstacles to coordination that can only be overcome at a significant constitutional and therefore political price.” Given this structure, it is not surprising that PNSR (2008b, vi) finds “Congress provides resources and conducts oversight in ways that reinforce” and amplify the management shortcomings of the executive branch. A report by the US House of Representatives’ Armed Services Committee (2008, 53) acknowledges, “The interagency process is broken, but not just in the executive branch. . . . In many ways, Congress is as ‘stovepiped’ as the agencies and functions we oversee.” PNSR (2009, vii) adds, “Members of Congress presently struggle to see the big-picture interrelationship among all elements of national power. Instead of structuring itself to catalyze interagency approaches, Congress reinforces outdated, department-centric practices. Existing committees examine the activities of individual departments and agencies, but no one committee has a whole-of-government perspective on national security.”

Management of the US NSS has thus far failed to amend, augment, or replace hierarchical authority structures that inhibit higher levels of interagency interaction. Authority in the executive branch flows from the President directly to the heads of functional departments and agencies. Lamb and Marks (2010, 3) point out that though
this authority structure enables effective unity of command over specific functional areas (e.g., diplomacy or defense), it “seems to preclude ‘unity of effort’ for missions that are intrinsically interagency in nature and cut across those same chains of command.” They (2010, 5) add, “The clear line of authority from the President down through the department and agency heads and their subordinates, often referred to as unity of command, comes at the expense of unity of effort because departments refuse to work together, even on missions of national importance, for fear of losing their powers, prerogatives, and budgets.” Marcella (2008, 37) argues, “The principal problem of interagency decisionmaking is lack of decisive authority; there is no one in charge.” Neustadt and Allison (PNSR 2008b, 91 quoting Neustadt and Allison 1971) write, “No one agency, no personnel system is the effective boss of any other; no one staff owes effective loyalty to the others. By and large, the stakes which move men’s loyalties—whether purpose, prestige, power, or promotion—run to one’s own program, one’s own career system, along agency lines, not across them.” PNSR (2008b, 102) concludes, “The individual agencies cannot compel interagency action, while overarching authority in the national security system is often too ambiguous to do so.”

The lack of integrating authority undermines integrative efforts of the NSC staff. The 9/11 Commission (PNSR 2010, 31 paraphrasing the 9/11 Commission 2004, 400) notes that even the President’s primary means for managing interagency efforts (i.e., the NSC staff) lacks “statutory authority to compel departmental and agency action.” Komer (1972, 151) also notes system management’s inability to force parochial departments to support integrative efforts. Brzezinski (1983; 1987) claims that in the absence of formal
authority, the NSC staff’s ability to influence departmental behavior on a given issue is dependent on perceptions of presidential interest in the issue. Stuart (2008, 85) argues that “reliance upon voluntary cooperation to resolve serious institutional differences” is “the pervasive defect” of the US NSS.

Other entities in the executive branch with integrating responsibilities (e.g., interagency working groups, czars, tiger teams, and lead agencies) struggle with the same authority deficit as the NSC staff. Lamb and Marks (2010, 28) write, “Our national security system routinely assigns leaders interagency integration responsibilities without commensurate authority, and the unsatisfactory results repeatedly demonstrate the folly of doing so.” PNSR (2008a, 6) clarifies “both lead agencies and czars lack authority to direct Cabinet officials or their departments.” Lamb and Marks (2010, 8) point out, “The witticism is true: ‘lead agency really means sole agency’ since other organizations will not follow the lead agency if its directions have a negative impact on their perceived organizational equities.” PNSR’s (2010b, 31-38) study of the National Counterterrorism Center’s Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning (DSOP) offers the following example of management’s tendency to undermine integrative efforts by withholding integrative authority.

The 9/11 Commission (2004, 400-406) recommended the creation of a “civilian-led unified joint command for counterterrorism”—named the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)—that would combine strategic intelligence and joint operational planning. To equip the NCTC to fulfill its integrating responsibilities the 9/11 Commission recommended giving the head of the NCTC authority to compel cooperation
from other agencies in the US NSS. The Commission acknowledged that this arrangement would require agencies to “give up some of their existing turf and authority in exchange for a stronger, faster, more efficient government wide joint effort.” Presidential directives and Congressional legislation implemented most of the Commission’s recommendations regarding responsibilities for the NCTC. However, PNSR (2010b, 37) notes that “the authorities given to the director of the NCTC to carry out these functions fell short of what the commission had envisioned.” PNSR (2010b, xiv-xv) concludes that though the NCTC DSOP is one of the most successful interagency efforts in the US NSS, the lack of authority continues to undermine its ability to integrate the efforts of the intelligence and operational communities for counterterrorism issues.

Lamb and Marks (2010, 28) and Schnaubelt (2009) offer similar examples of how the lack of integrating authority undermined US reconstruction efforts in Iraq during the mid-2000s.

Higher levels of interagency interaction in the US NSS are further challenged as a result of management’s failure to establish effective integrating mechanisms. Lamb and Munsing (2011, 8) write, “Currently, committees are the prevalent cross-departmental mechanism employed in the national security system. Committees are distinguished by having little or no authority and few resources. Members of the committee are not accountable for success or failure, and their main goal tends to be simple coordination or information-sharing.” PNSR (2008a, 6) and Lamb and Marks (2010, 7) add that other integrating mechanisms (e.g., czars and tiger teams) also suffer from a lack authority and add to presidential control problems. PNSR (2008b, 102) claims “Interagency decision
mechanisms fail to produce unified strategic guidance in a timely manner and agencies often pursue independent strategies.” Ambassador Ryan Crocker (Lamb and Marks 2010, 26 quoting Crocker) states, “there is still ‘no effective, consistent mechanism that brings a whole interagency team to focus on a particular foreign policy issue.’” Lamb and Marks (2010, 27) assert, “The lack of authoritative decisionmaking below the level of the President makes the interagency coordination system so stultifying that it encourages senior leaders to work around the system to get things done, which in practice can mean even less interagency cooperation.”

Parochial behavior of departments and agencies in the US NSS also tend to inhibit higher levels of interagency interaction. The literature (Destler 1972, 47; Halperin, Clapp, and Kanter 2006, 322; Project on National Security Reform 2008b, vi) clearly demonstrates that departments and agencies in the US NSS engage in a wide range of resource protecting behaviors and typically focus on employing their resources for narrowly defined parochial goals. PNSR (2008b, 91) claims, “Departments and agencies husband their resources (fiscal, material, and personnel) to better execute their core mandates, and all too often do so at the expense of the broader national interest.” Komer (1972, 16) adds, “The way in which an organization will use its existing capabilities is governed largely by its own internal goals, performance standards, and measurement and incentive systems—even when these conflict with the role it is assigned.” Primary forms of resource protecting behavior found in the literature include protecting turf (Lamb and Marks 2010, 5; Project on National Security Reform 2008b, 106), maintaining freedom of action (Project on National Security Reform 2008a, 5-6), defending budgets (Project
Bureaucratic tendencies to engage in resource protecting behavior are exacerbated by numerous intertwined factors, including: competitive incentives, risk avoiding cultures, and power disparities. PNSR (2008b, 91) argues, “Incentives in the current system produce competitive, agency-centric behavior that leads to both ineffectiveness and inefficiency.” Rast (1999, 636) notes that ineffective strategic management increases parochial behavior “as actors [feel] the need to protect their institutional equities and [become] polarized as a result.” Locher (2008, 30) concludes, “It should be understood that when departmental representatives come together under National Security Council or Homeland Security Council auspices, they are there to defend the interests and prerogatives of their departments. Those are their instructions. They are rewarded by success in carrying out those instructions and punished if they fail to do so. This parochial orientation is the largest obstacle that must be overcome. The national need must become supreme.”

The literature reveals that the risk avoiding culture present in most bureaucracies inhibits higher levels of interagency interaction. Former Secretary of State Rusk (Destler quoting Rusk, 1972, 69) claims, “There are those who think that the heart of a bureaucracy is a struggle for power. This is not the case at all. The heart of the bureaucratic problem is the inclination to avoid responsibility.” Ripley (1978,
extrapolating from Heclo 1977) notes that top-level bureaucrats “tend to hunker down, establish reliable allies in the other parts of their sub government, and resist most changes.” Bush (1970, 28) writes, “military organization suffers from a disease that permeates all governmental . . . organizations—the daft belief that if one does nothing one will not make mistakes, and the drab system of seniority and promotions will proceed on its way.” Destler (1972, 160-165) points out that the State Department’s tendency to severely punish mistakes while rewarding doing nothing reinforces a risk-averse culture.

Power disparities among participants in the US NSS are yet another factor exacerbating bureaucratic behavior and potentially inhibiting higher levels of interagency interaction. A frequently referenced disparity is the resource differences between civilian agencies in the US NSS and the military. Marcella (2008, 37) writes, “Asymmetries in resources are another impediment [to interagency interaction].” The literature typically cites inadequate civilian capacity as the source of the disparity (Binnendijk and Cronin 2009, 1; Nigro Jr 2008, 258-260; Schake 2012, xiv, 7). Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 2008, 33 quoting Gates 2007) articulated this point well in the following remarks from a 2007 speech at Kansas State University, “What is clear to me is that there is a need for a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security – diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development. Secretary Rice addressed this need in a speech at Georgetown University nearly two years ago. We must focus our energies beyond the guns and steel of the military, beyond just our brave
soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen. We must also focus our energies on the other
elements of national power that will be so crucial in the coming years.”

The literature reveals that institutional, structural and behavioral factors in the US
NSS are overwhelmingly aligned with inhibitors, rather than facilitators, of higher levels
of interagency interaction. The vast majority of activity in the US NSS occurs within a
few huge bureaucracies (e.g., Department of Defense, State Department, etc.). Consistent
with Bardach’s (1998, 232) claim regarding the friction between the bureaucratic and
collaborative ethos, interagency collaboration in the US NSS is typically obstructed by
bureaucratic institutions, structures, and behaviors. Komer (1972, 65) suggests military
organizations are virtual “archetypes” of bureaucracies that resist the adaptability and
openness required for collaboration. While bureaucratic factors often top the list of
obstacles to interagency collaboration in the US NSS, these obstacles are frequently
exacerbated by unclear or conflicting guidance and management stemming from split
leadership of the system, and by competing demands for limited time, money, personnel,
expertise and material available to address a huge range of often rapidly evolving
national security issues. Additionally, in the six decades since the modern US NSS was
ushered in by the 1947 National Security Act, factors supporting the system’s limited
focus on interagency coordination have been reified in a host of deeply ingrained
cultures, institutions, and structures that are typically not amenable to higher levels of
interagency interaction. Indeed, the paucity of effective integrating institutions,
structures, and behaviors in the US NSS raises fundamental doubts about the system’s
ability to engage in higher levels of interagency interaction. Welken (2008, 474)
observes, “Some claim that the interagency process is broken, but many more state emphatically that the process for interagency collaboration never truly existed.”

2.3.5. Proposals for Overcoming or Removing Obstacles to Higher Levels of Interagency Interaction in the US NSS

The literature offers a wide array of proposals for overcoming or removing obstacles to higher levels of interagency interaction in the US NSS. The proposals range from evolutionary tweaking of certain aspects of the US NSS to revolutionary reform of the entire system. The more evolutionary proposals are identified first, followed by an overview of the more revolutionary proposals favored by recent major studies of the US NSS.

Several analysts conclude that existing policies, processes, and structures in the US NSS are basically sound and that adequate levels of interagency interaction can be achieved if the executive branch modifies certain elements of the system. Recurring recommendations of this sort found in the literature include: improving presidential control of the US NSS (Destler 1972; Rothkopf 2009), increasing the quality of personnel supporting the president (Auger 2004; Rothkopf 2009), clarifying interagency responsibilities (Deutch, Kanter, and Scowcroft 2000; Dobbins 2008), assigning interagency issues to lead agencies or individuals (Jackson 1959; Tucker 2000), and establishing interagency doctrine and culture (Desai 2005; Zaccor 2005).

Other analysts (Chun and Jones 2008, 210; Olson 2008) argue against large scale reform of the US NSS because they are dubious that such measures will actually produce higher levels of interagency interaction. Bardach agrees, claiming that the benefits of reorganization are frequently not worth the costs. He (1998, 16) states, “[Increasing
interagency collaborative capacity] is behavioral and process oriented; it is not structural—that is, it is not looking to formal reorganization. . . . If there is one proposition on which consensus among students of public administration is firm and widespread, it is that reorganization normally produces little of value at a very high cost in time, energy, and personal anxiety.”

PNSR (2008b, ix) agrees with many of the above recommendations and concerns but argues against piecemeal or incremental reform. They (2008b, ix) write, “we caution against an à la carte approach to reform. We have ample recent experience with half-measures and lowest-common-denominator political compromises. Though they may seem pragmatic at first blush, they only delay the emergence of problems or shift them from one place to another; ultimately, they don’t work.” PNSR’s statement reflects the majority position found in the literature of the last two decades. The 9/11 Commission (2004, 399) also calls for radical change of the US NSS, “Americans should not settle for incremental, ad hoc adjustments to a system designed generations ago for a world that no longer exists.” Hart-Rudman (2001, iv) agrees, “After more than two years of serious effort, this Commission has concluded that without significant reforms, American power and influence cannot be sustained.” Locher (2008, 28) adds, “Sweeping reforms of the Executive and Legislative Branches [are required]. Marginal changes will not do.”

Many analysts suggest that “Goldwater-Nichols”-like reforms are needed to increase the level of interagency interaction in the US NSS (Briem 2004; Donley 2005; Iraq Study Group 2006; Lucynski 2005; Murdock, Flournoy, Williams, and Campbell
2004; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004). Roman (2007) explains, “Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 in an effort to improve military advice to civilian leaders, reform defense procurement and budgeting, and enhance the effectiveness of military operations. A key, but not singular, element for achieving these objectives was by strengthening joint military professionalism across the military services. The bipartisan legislation represented the culmination of the defense reform movement that marked the early 1980s. . . . Goldwater-Nichols' successful promotion of joint military professionalism, in both operations and advice, is seen by some as a model for promoting an integrated interagency perspective and operations across national security institutions.” Other analysts argue that higher levels of interagency interaction would require Goldwater-Nichols-like reforms to be pared with an even more comprehensive new national security act (Gorman and Krongard 2005; Naler 2006; Project on National Security Reform 2008b).

The remainder of this section provides a synthesis of ends, ways, and means included in proposals for near-term comprehensive reform of the US NSS. The fundamental goal of comprehensive reform proposals is to overcome or remove obstacles to higher levels of interagency interaction in order to increase the system’s capacity to integrate elements of national power. PNSR (2009, iii) writes, “The vision is for a

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27 The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 is commonly referred to as the Goldwater-Nichols Act after its co-sponsors.
28 This section relies heavily on two major reports produced by PNSR—Forging a New Shield in 2008 and Turning Ideas Into Action in 2009—that provide 1,000-plus pages of detailed analysis that took more than three years and three hundred US security experts to compile. As a synthesis of radical reform proposals found in the literature, the ends, ways, and means presented in this section highlight the general thrust of the ideas found. This brief overview does not attempt to convey the range of disagreements, both large and small, among comprehensive reform proposals.
collaborative, agile, and innovative national security system that horizontally and
vertically integrates all elements of national power to successfully meet 21st Century
challenges and opportunities based on timely, informed decisions and decisive action.”
President Obama’s National Security Strategy (2010, 5) conveys a similar sentiment, “To
succeed, we must balance and integrate all elements of American power and update our
national security capacity for the 21st century.” Obama (2010, 51) concludes, “The
executive branch must do its part by developing integrated plans and approaches that
leverage the capabilities across its departments and agencies to deal with the issues we
confront. Collaboration across the government . . . must guide our actions.”

Recommended ways for overcoming or removing obstacles to higher levels of
interagency interaction can be loosely grouped into four broad categories: increase
coherency of leadership and management; clarify roles, responsibilities, and authorities
for interagency issues; ensure system incentives and resources are closely tied with
national objectives; and improve civilian capacity. PNSR (2008a, 7-8) argues that the US
NSS requires “leadership that generates vision and guidance for effective policy
development and execution; builds a collaborative national security team; incentivizes
and empowers partnerships across government agencies.” They (2008b, x; 2009, 217)
claim that presidents need to clearly convey their expectations for collaboration between
the executive and legislative branches and between executive departments and agencies.
PNSR (2009, Appendix I) writes that these expectations include the following:

1. National missions and requirements must take precedence over those of
departments and agencies.
2. The national security system must perform as a unified enterprise.

3. Shared vision, purpose, and effort are imperative.

4. The Executive Branch and Congress must work as partners.

5. The values and culture of the national security community must build trust and reward collaboration.

Improved management of the US NSS is another prerequisite for increasing the level of interagency interaction in the system. PNSR (2008b, ix; 2009, 143) claims that one of the keys to providing coherent management of the system is to “devise a more constructive relationship” between the executive and legislative branches. Additionally, they (2008a, 8; 2009, vii) assert that the executive branch and Congress need to improve their oversight of “integrated national security missions.” The 9/11 Commission (2004, 419) writes, “Of all our recommendations, strengthening congressional oversight may be among the most difficult and important.”

Several measures are recommended for improving interagency management within the executive branch. The crux of the recommendations involves reducing the NSC and national security staff’s involvement in day-to-day issues so they can focus on more strategic issues. PNSR (2009, 206) states the NSC should focus on providing “the president long-term strategic planning and resource allocation advice.” They (2009, 207) recommend the national security staff “perform strategic management of end-to-end national security interagency system processes. [The staff should perform] four major roles: strategic management of end-to-end national security interagency processes, development of the national security interagency system, crisis management, and
presidential staffing.” Additionally, PNSR (2009, 207-208) envisions the president’s national security advisor having the following responsibilities: advising president on national security issues; “promoting effective performance of the national security interagency system;” collaborating with the intelligence community to identify and/or validate “national security opportunities and threats that require an interagency response . . . and recommending their assignments to appropriate interagency teams, interagency crisis task forces, or lead departments and agencies;” and overseeing performance of the interagency system.

Several recommendations for overcoming or removing obstacles to higher levels of interagency interaction involve clarifying roles, responsibilities, and authorities for specific interagency missions. These measures seek to mitigate the degrading effects stemming from what Stuart (2008, 85) refers to as the system’s “reliance upon volunteer cooperation.” PNSR (2009, v) recommends, “Delegate and unify management of national security issues and missions through empowered interagency and intergovernmental teams and crisis task forces.” Lamb and Marks (2010) argue that small interagency teams, empowered with authority akin to a Chief of Mission (COM), be established and given responsibility for all aspects of specific interagency missions, from policy formulation to implementation. Lamb and Marks (2010, 22) add, “The expanded [COM] model would actually facilitate clear roles and missions rather than complicate them. The heads of departments and agencies would ensure national capabilities in their functional areas and oversee and execute missions that require primarily or exclusively their functional expertise (for example, diplomacy, military, or intelligence). The Mission
Managers, armed with expanded COM authority, would pursue missions that require tight integration of multiple elements of national power to accomplish a well-defined task. They would take an end-to-end look at complex, multifunctional problems, freeing up senior leaders of functional organizations to focus on problems resident within their domains.” PNSR (2009, 198) clarifies, “Interagency Teams are only proposed for high priority, complex issue areas and would not exist for a majority of national missions.”

Additional ways to overcome or remove obstacles to higher levels of interagency interaction involve modifying system incentives to better link personnel, budgetary, and information sharing processes with national, rather than parochial, objectives. PNSR (2010a, Preface, ii) advocates for the creation of an Integrated National Security Professional system that would produce “educated, trained professionals who can operate effectively and collaboratively.” Odeen (1980) and Olson (2008) and Pace (Garamone 2004) argue that proper incentives are key to developing an effective interagency work force. PNSR (2009, vi, 230) recommends, “Align personnel incentives [such as promotional requirements], leader development, personnel preparation, and organizational culture with strategic objectives.”

Budget processes also need to be modified. PNSR (2008b, ix-xii) argues that budgetary processes must also be modified in order to link resources with national goals. They (2009, vii, 291) advocate for the creation of “mechanisms for . . . resourcing of integrated national missions” and for producing “an integrated national security budget.” PNSR (2009, v) clarifies, “National security executives must be able to link resources to strategic goals. In the current system, funding is distributed program by program,
department by department. In theory, this is designed to produce desired mission outcomes. In practice, however, the process focuses on means rather than ends and relies on policy entrepreneurs within the interagency space to work around the bureaucratic impediments to achieve successful mission outcomes.”

Reformers argue that information processes must be changed to enable greater sharing of information. “Bogdanos (PNSR 2008c, 19 paraphrasing Bogdanos 2006) believes that establishing a protocol within individual agencies for sharing of information will not only encourage the necessary communication, but also incentivize other agencies to follow suit.” PNSR (2009, 232-233) offers the following recommendations for establishing expectations and mechanisms for improved information sharing: “reaffirm information sharing as a top priority;” “make government information discoverable and accessible to authorized users;” “transform the information sharing culture with metrics and incentives;” and “hold agencies accountable for reaching specific benchmarks or milestones by using program funding incentives.”

Improving the capacity of civilian departments and agencies in the US NSS is another aspect of comprehensive proposals to overcome or remove obstacles to higher levels of interagency interaction in the system. Numerous analysts (Binnendijk and Cronin 2009; Murdock, Flournoy, Williams, and Campbell 2004; Nigro Jr 2008; Schake 2012) echo Marcella’s (2008, 37) assessment that “asymmetries in resources [between civilian and military departments] are another impediment.” Gray (1989, 250) notes that power disparities can undermine collaboration. Richard Lugar (PNSR 2008b, 134 quoting Lugar) concludes, it can be argued that the disparity in the ratio between investments in
military versus civilian approaches threatens U.S. success [in the war on terror].” Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (U.S. House Armed Services Committee 2008 quoting from a speech Gates gave at Kansas State University on November 26, 2007) argues, “What is clear to me is that there is a need for a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security – diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development. Secretary Rice addressed this need in a speech at Georgetown University nearly two years ago. We must focus our energies beyond the guns and steel of the military, beyond just our brave soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen. We must also focus our energies on the other elements of national power that will be so crucial in the coming years.”

Legislation and presidential directives are the primary means proposed for enacting recommendations to overcome or remove obstacles to higher levels of interagency interaction. PNSR (2008b, 383) writes, “A new national security act should involve the president and Congress agreeing on . . . three categories of roles and responsibilities [i.e., core national security institutions, mission-specific national security roles, and contingency planning and capability for exceptional cases].” They (2009, 95) add, “Passage of this act would signify recognition of the problem of an outdated system as a priority. It would signify that leaders in Congress and the executive branch are prepared to implement reform.” In addition to new legislation, the 9/11 Commission (2004, 419), PNSR (2009, 235), and the House Armed Services Committee (2008) recommend modifying Congressional committees, rules, and procedures to improve oversight of interagency issues.
Reformers argue that new presidential policies would be needed to augment the proposed legislation. PNSR (2008b, 397) writes, “A new national security act that codifies a clear delineation of roles and responsibilities would provide a general depiction, but many details would need to be clarified in executive orders and presidential directives.” PNSR (2009, Appendix I) proposes a combination of presidential statements, executive orders, presidential directives, and other supporting policy instruments to enable higher levels of interagency interaction in the US NSS.\(^{29}\) PNSR (2008b, ix) also recommends that department and agency heads establish clear interagency policies for their respective organizations.

Virtually every major study of the US NSS over the last decade concludes that near-term comprehensive reform is required to overcome or remove systemic obstacles to higher levels of interagency interaction. Comprehensive reform proposals involve a combination of passing sweeping legislation and issuing presidential directives to implement an array of measures that will enable the US NSS to effectively integrate the elements of national power. A few analysts argue against comprehensive reform, either proposing less radical solutions for improving integration or claiming comprehensive measures will not work. The major studies acknowledge the difficulties involved in comprehensive reform, but argue there is no alternative for facilitating the higher levels of interagency interaction required to address the increasing frequency, scale, and scope of complex national security issues. The next section overviews several recent efforts to increase the level of interagency collaboration in the US NSS.

\(^{29}\) PNSR (2009, Appendix I) provides draft versions of each of these documents.
2.3.6. US NSS Reform Initiatives

This section overviews efforts to produce higher levels of interagency interaction in the US NSS since the end of the Cold War and characterizes the impacts they have had on interagency interaction. The section begins by highlighting the critical finding in the literature that the US NSS has made little to no progress in enacting the comprehensive reforms that much of the security community argues is required for producing requisite increases in the level of interagency interaction. The remainder of the section describes several interagency initiatives and mechanisms of the last couple of decades, along with a summary of their collaborative benefits.

Leadership of the US NSS (i.e., Congress and the President) has not enacted the comprehensive interagency reform argued for by most major studies of the last decade. Indeed, apart from studying the problem, there is scant evidence in the literature that indicates leadership is even considering comprehensive reform. Lamb and Munsing (2011, 7) observe, “Virtually every major national security study over the past decade or so agrees and has identified inadequate interagency cooperation as a glaring systemic error. Yet little progress has been made toward correcting this shortcoming.” Lamb and Marks (2010, 6) note, “Congress as well as Democratic and Republican Presidents have implemented a wide range of reforms to improve the horizontal integration capabilities of the executive branch, but so far, all the mechanisms tried have been found wanting.” Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (Lamb and Munsing 2011, 7 quoting Gates 2010) states, ‘Despite improvements in recent years, America’s interagency toolkit is a hodgepodge of jerry-rigged arrangements constrained by a dated and complex patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in resources, and unwieldy processes.” Ambassador
Crocker (Lamb and Munsing 2011, 7 quoting Crocker 2009) claims the system still lacks an “effective, consistent mechanism that brings a whole interagency team to focus on a particular foreign policy issue.” Cerami, Engel, and Pavelka (2009) conclude, “No thoughtful observer disputes the necessity for reform of the national security apparatus. Yet by and large America’s post 9/11 security agencies and institutions retain their Cold War design.” Despite the lack of progress on comprehensive reform of the US NSS during the last decade, the numerous efforts to increase the level of interagency interaction in the system have yielded modest incremental improvements that should not be overlooked.

Participants in the US NSS introduced a wide range of initiatives and mechanisms to increase the level of interagency interaction in the system. Interagency initiatives included legislation, congressionally funded or conducted studies, and executive branch guidance. Interagency mechanisms included an array of innovations developed to facilitate higher levels of interagency interaction.

Over the last decade, Congress passed several pieces of legislation that dramatically altered the US NSS and impacted interagency interaction in the system. Congress also funded and conducted numerous studies to identify and assess interagency shortcomings in the US NSS and provide recommendations for improving the system. A couple of the more important acts passed include the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Protection Act (IRTPA) of 2004. The Homeland Security Act (2002) created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), bringing twenty-two government organizations with a broad range of missions under a single
Marcella (2008, 14) clarifies, “The creation of DHS involved the transfer of responsibilities, people, and resources from existing agencies and departments to the new entity. DHS has over 170,000 employees and a budget of over 40 billion dollars. It constitutes the largest reorganization of the U.S. Government since the creation of the Defense Department. DHS combined 22 agencies ‘specializing in various disciplines,’ such as law enforcement, border security, immigration, biological research, computer security, transportation security, disaster mitigation, and port security.”

IRTPA (2004) attempted to integrate the activities of the numerous intelligence organizations in the US NSS. Shabat (2007) notes that the 2004 Act “creates [the] Director of National Intelligence [DNI] and related Office of the Director of National Intelligence (“ODNI”) to oversee and manage [the] intelligence community, codifies [the National Counterterrorism Center] and places it in the ODNI, [and establishes that the] DNI is the principal intelligence advisor to the President, NSC, and HSC.” Desai (2005) writes, “With the recent enactment of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the president has signed into law what will likely be the most dramatic change in interagency coordination since the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947.” However, Desai (2005) also points out that the act’s focus on the intelligence community limits its ability to impact interagency interaction across functional areas.

Several additional bills for improving interagency interaction were proposed, but were not enacted. Such bills included efforts to codify programs for developing national security professionals (Dale 2011, 25-26) and Rep. Randy Forbes’ proposed “Interagency
Cooperation Commission Act, which would develop legislative and administrative proposals to advance the interagency system (Project on National Security Reform 2009, 35).”

Congress also funded or conducted numerous studies of interagency interaction. Congress funded the 9/11 Commission, the Iraq Study Group, three phases of the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols project, and several reports by the Project on National Security Reform. Some of the interagency studies conducted by the Congressional Research Service include “Building an Interagency Cadre of National Security Professionals” (Dale 2008), “Organizing the U.S. Government for National Security” (Dale, Serafino, and Towell 2008), and “National Security Professionals and Interagency Reform” (Dale 2011).

Executive branch initiatives for increasing the level of interagency interaction included presidential and departmental (or agency) level guidance. Clinton’s (1997) Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56) was one of the first post-Cold War efforts to provide presidential expectations and guidance for interagency operations. PNSR (2008b, 78) writes, “The directive articulated a standard approach, including authorities and structures, to managing complex contingency operations based on lessons learned from Somalia and Haiti. . . . Between 1997 and 2000, the Clinton administration used PDD-56 to guide planning on a number of complex contingencies . . . . Although a notable improvement from previous interagency planning efforts, the departments and agencies still resisted adhering to PDD-56’s approach. A typical Department of State complaint was that the PDD-56 planning template and process were too laborious and detailed to
The lack of support from departments and agencies limited the efficacy of PDD-56, which never fully matured into a standard interagency approach to planning and executing complex contingencies.” Chun and Jones (2008) point out that “PDD-56 was essentially shelved after George W. Bush entered the White House since some senior administration officials had an aversion to U.S. participation in the types of operations that the directive was designed to address.” PDD-56 was officially superseded by National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) in 2005.

President George W. Bush issued numerous directives designed to increase the level of interagency interaction. He issued NSPD-44 (2005) to guide interagency efforts for reconstruction and stabilization operations. PNSR (2008b, 13) writes, “Among other things, the directive designated the secretary of state as the coordinator for all interagency efforts focused on reconstruction and stabilization.” While the guidance was welcomed by the security community, its interagency benefits are limited because other organizations’, most critically the Department of Defense is not obligated to comply with State Department direction. President Bush also issued several Executive Orders (E.O.s) to increase interagency collaboration. E.O. 13354 (2004) established the National Counterterrorism Center (later codified in IRTPA) in order to better integrate intelligence collection and dissemination for counterterrorism efforts. E.O. 13434 (2007) established the National Security Professional Development program. Kichak (2009) states, “The effort to promote national security professional development began in May 2007, with Executive Order 13434, which sought to “promote the education, training, and experience
of current and future professionals in national security positions” in executive branch agencies. . . . The order established an Executive Steering Committee, chaired at the outset by the Director of OPM [Office of Personnel Management], to facilitate the implementation of the national strategy. The Executive Steering Committee comprises officials from 17 Federal agencies and provides strategic direction for national security professional development. Leadership of the Steering Committee shifted to the Office of Management and Budget at the beginning of 2008, and an Integration Office was established a month later to provide program management.” Dale (2011) describes how the program devolved from a US NSS-wide enterprise expected to include 20,000 personnel to a small test case supporting only the National Preparedness mission.

President Obama also issued guidance to increase the system’s capacity for higher levels of interagency interaction. He provided comprehensive guidance in the U.S. National Security Strategy of 2010. In it he describes the need to “balance and integrate all elements of American power,” improve “the integration of skills and capabilities within our military and civilian institutions, so they complement each other and operate seamlessly,” and “more effectively ensuring alignment of resources with our national security strategy, adapting the education and training of national security professionals to equip them to meet modern challenges, reviewing authorities and mechanisms to implement and coordinate assistance programs, and other policies and programs that strengthen coordination.” PNSR (2009, 32) notes that President Obama simplified interagency interaction by issuing a Presidential Statement on May 26, 2009 merging the staffs of the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council. Additionally,
Obama’s National Security Advisor, General James Jones, issued a memorandum on March 18, 2009 expanding on Obama’s Presidential Policy Directive 1 (PPD-1). Jones’ (2009) memorandum establishes general interagency expectations and requests all members designate a senior liaison—a “Director for National Security Affairs”—whose primary responsibility is to ensure their agency maintains good communications with the NSC staff and the NSC.

Departments and agencies within the executive branch issued guidance acknowledging the need for, and recommending improvements to, higher levels of interagency interaction. Recent quadrennial reviews of the Department of Defense (2010), State Department (2010), and Department of Homeland Security (2010) each advocate for increasing the level of interagency interaction. Equally significant is these were the first-ever quadrennial reviews conducted by the State Department and Department of Homeland Security. Although Secretary of State Clinton released the Departments inaugural quadrennial review, her predecessors had also taken steps to increase the State Department’s capacity for higher levels of interaction with other agencies. Nigro (2008, 257) notes, “In 2004, [Secretary of State Powell] created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to coordinate all U.S. Government efforts in the areas of reconstruction and stability in the aftermath of military operations.”

Nigro (2008, 270) also points out that one of Secretary of State Rice’s five pillars of Transformational Diplomacy was “working jointly with other agencies.” Rice (2006) argues, “In this world, it is impossible to draw neat, clear lines

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30 S/CRS was codified in NSPD-44 the following year
between our security interests, our development efforts and our democratic ideals. . . . American diplomacy must integrate and advance all of these goals together."

Department of Defense interagency guidance includes the previously mentioned QDR (2010), DOD Directive 3000.05 (2005), the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Report (2009), and numerous joint and service publications. Binnendijk and Cronin (2009, 2-3) note the ground-breaking aspect of DOD Directive 3000.05 was it “declared that stability operations were a core U.S. military mission to be accorded priority comparable to combat operations.” PNSR (2009, 44) writes, “The Defense Department’s Quadrennial Roles and Missions Report [of] 2009 recommended the institutionalization of whole-of-government approaches to addressing national security challenges, including “an authoritative national-level strategic guidance document that addresses interagency roles and responsibilities, and resolves seam issues between agencies.” CJCS Joint Publications 3-0 (2011a, "Joint Operations"), 3-07 (2011b, "Stability Operations"), 3-08 (2011c, "Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations"), and 3-24 (2009, "Counterinsurgency Operations") are just a few of the numerous joint and service publications guiding interagency activities.

The broad range of interagency initiatives highlights a growing awareness of the need to increase the system’s level of interagency interaction and clarifies leadership’s expectations for integration. From presidential guidance in the US National Security Strategy to departmental directives, system leadership has clearly communicated its expectation for participants in the US NSS to increase their level of interagency interaction. The literature suggest that growing awareness of the need for higher levels of
interagency interaction and leadership communicating these expectations are critical steps towards increasing the level of interagency interaction in the US NSS. However, increasing the level of interagency interaction requires leveraging recent gains in awareness and expectations to change the system’s structures, processes, and cultures.

A number of interagency mechanisms were developed and implemented in the US NSS after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Several of them (i.e., NSPD program, NCTC, and S/CRS) have already been mentioned. Other noteworthy interagency mechanisms of the last decade include provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), high-value target (HVT) teams, joint interagency coordination groups, and integrated DOD adaptive planning. The U.S. House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations (2008, 13) explains, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams vary quite dramatically between Iraq and Afghanistan and even between provinces in each theater of operations. Generally though, PRTs are teams of civilians and military personnel charged with working in areas of conflict with host-country locals and governments below the national level, to build their capacity and their ties to the national government.” In addition to describing how PRTs have facilitated interagency collaboration, the HASC Subcommittee (2008, 13-15) details operational difficulties that have resulted from PRTs’ lack of unity of command, joint doctrine, and agreed upon objectives. PNSR (2008b, 101) writes that cooperation between military and civilian elements of the PRTs “was episodic and only based on the personalities within particular PRTs.” PNSR (2008b, 133) adds, “The Pentagon and State Department cannot
spell out who is in charge of PRTs [in Iraq and Afghanistan], who they answer to and who provides logistical support on the ground.”

Lamb and Munsing (2011) describe the potential benefits, as well as the fragile nature, of interagency HVT teams. They (2011) state that these 8 to 30 person teams are led by mid-level (O-3 or O-4) special operations forces personnel and can include other mid or low level personnel from the “FBI, CIA, NSA [National Security Agency], U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and . . . the Department of State.” Lamb and Munsing (2011, 6) write, “Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward asserts that the interagency teams were at least as important as the surge in American troops in decreasing violence in Iraq between 2007 and 2008, and arguably more so. He contends that the use of such interagency teams is comparable, in military terms, to the invention of the tank or the airplane.”

Joint Interagency Coordination Groups are another interagency innovation of the last decade that has sporadically aided higher levels of interagency interaction. Olson (2008, 221-222) notes, “As a result of NSC direction, DoD instructed combatant commands to establish Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JACG) to [facilitate integration]. The various combatant commands created JIACGs with the intent of improving interagency coordination.” Finney and La Porta (2008, 293) add, “As a new institutional actor, JIACG performance has been mixed, often dependent upon personality of those assigned to it and the willingness of agencies, including the CIA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as well as the State Department, to cooperate.”
PNSR reports that the Defense Department’s adaptive planning processes have become more integrated. They (PNSR 2008b, 589) write, “DoD operational plans, commonly referred to as ‘war plans,’ contained an annex specifically designated for interagency coordination. ‘Annex V,’ produced after the secretary of defense had approved the base plan, seldom involved significant coordination with the very interagency partners named as critical in the annex. Adaptive planning evolved during a time of great interest in interagency coordination and eventually came to emphasize up-front coordination. Plan development begins with a strategic guidance statement, which is coordinated with the Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, and other key interagency partners. In addition, a provision has been made for sharing Annex V with interagency partners. A State Department representative recently noted that the DoD adaptive planning process has improved its degree of State Department involvement.”

Several of the integrating mechanisms introduced over the last decade have demonstrated the ability to facilitate higher levels of interagency interaction. Interagency teams (e.g., HVT teams, PRTs, and JIACGs) have already produced pockets of successful interagency collaboration, as have interagency centers or processes (e.g., NCTS and S/CRS). However, PNSR (2010b) and Lamb and Munsing (2011) state that these integrating mechanisms have been inconsistently implemented and their effectiveness has been overly dependent on the personalities of the people involved. For example, Lamb and Munsing (2011) claim that though HVT teams in Iraq demonstrated the phenomenal results possible with effective interagency collaboration, these teams’ collaborative efforts were often undermined by inadequate guidance, authority, resources,
or support. Similar factors were noted to have frequently limited the interagency collaborative capacity of PRTs, JIACGs, NCTS and S/CRS.

The interagency initiatives and mechanisms mentioned above are but a small sampling of the dramatic changes that have occurred in the US NSS since the end of the Cold War, with most of the activity occurring after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Brown (2008, 80) asserts that President George W. Bush “presided over the most extensive reorganization of the national security system since the National Security Act of 1947.” While the remainder of the literature appears to support Brown’s claim, the impacts of the vast majority of the interagency efforts were limited to improving coordination among organizations that remain heavily stovepiped along functional lines. These valuable developments were hard gained and their importance should not be overlooked. However, interagency initiatives and mechanisms have thus far fallen well short of producing the higher levels of interagency interaction that most security experts claim the system requires in order to effectively address the increasing frequency, scale, and scope of complex national security issues. Specifically, with a few noteworthy exceptions, little progress has been made removing or overcoming the formidable obstacles to higher levels of interagency interaction in the US NSS.

Wide ranging and deeply embedded obstacles to higher levels of interagency interaction in the US NSS continue to undermine the system’s ability to integrate the elements of national power. Management of the US NSS still provides guidance, authorities, and resources in a manner that incentivizes parochial behavior and discourages interagency higher levels of interagency interaction. Strategic management
continues to be neglected as the NSC remains overburdened by tactical level issues. Congress has made little to no progress amending its rule systems and committee structures to enable it to provide effective oversight of interagency missions. Additionally, the US NSS still has inadequate structures, processes, and resources dedicated to facilitating higher levels of interagency interaction. Department and agency participation on interagency issues remains largely voluntary, or a “coalition of the willing.”

2.4. Conclusion of the Literature Review

The literature on interagency interaction in the US NSS highlights the system’s need for and obstacles to higher levels of interagency interaction. Literature from the fields of organizational analysis and complexity improved understanding of organizational dynamics and provided many of the analytical tools and concepts employed by the study. The first section of the next chapter overviews how the literature review led to the development of the study’s problem statement and research questions.
CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH DESIGN

This chapter explains the study’s purposes and processes. The first section, Origins of the Problem Statement and Research Questions, describes how an initial interest in the US government’s conduct of stability operations during the first decade of the twenty-first century evolved into the study’s problem statement and research questions.31 The chapter’s second section, Methodological Processes, describes the research methods employed and conveys theoretical and practical considerations that influenced methodology selection and implementation.

3.1. Origins of the Problem Statement and Research Questions
This section describes the origin of the study and summarizes the iterative process of generating questions and reviewing existing literature that culminated in the study’s problem statement and research questions. The section makes frequent reference to concepts in the literature review of chapter two and augments those with ideas from additional literature, as required. The catalyst for the research was a desire to better understand the US NSS’s seemingly dismal conduct of stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan during the first decade of the twenty-first century. The US NSS’s performance of stability operations appears even bleaker when contrasted with the highly successful major combat operations that preceded them. Collins (2008, 2) summarizes a

31 While the initial question involved the performance of the US government, the research narrowed that focus to what this study describes as the US NSS. As such, that term is used to refer to the subset of the US government responsible for national security issues.
sentiment found throughout the literature regarding US operations in Iraq, “After the major combat operation [in 2003], U.S. policy has been insolvent, with inadequate means for pursuing ambitious ends.” Katzman (2008) points out the US has had a similar experience in Afghanistan, with quick and decisive success in its major combat operations and less satisfactory results with stability operations. This apparent disparity in performance produced two questions: What caused the US NSS’s poor performance of stability operations? Was the US NSS’s poor performance of stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan anomalous? To address these questions, the extant literature on the US NSS’s past experiences with stability operations was reviewed. The next subsection highlights relevant ideas from literature on stability operations along with additional questions stemming from the review. The section concludes with the study’s problem statement and research questions.

3.1.1. US NSS Experiences with Stability Operations

The initial round of research involved a review of the extant literature on the US NSS’s experiences with stability operations. The literature reveals that the concept of stability operations has been routinely contested and frequently changed, explains unique challenges these operations present for the US NSS, and describes the need for, and difficulties of, integrating the stability operations’ activities of the parochial national security bureaucracies.

Ambiguity surrounding the concept of stability operations hampers the US NSS’s ability to plan and implement policies for these operations. While debates about definitions may be viewed by some as the purview of irrelevant academics, military
theorist Carl von Clausewitz (1976, 88-89) argues that it is not possible to overstate the importance of clearly understanding the nature of a conflict. He claims, “The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have is to establish by that test [i.e., the political motives and specific circumstances] the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.” Definitional confusion was evident throughout the second Iraq War as the Defense Department struggled to describe the conflict; vacillating between calling it a counter proliferation operation, a counter-terrorism operation, a counterinsurgency, and a civil war (Biddle 2006; Fearon 2007). One indication of the ambiguity surrounding the concept of stability operations is the ongoing debate about what constitutes a stability operation and what to call such activities. Fishel (2008, 410-411) notes the that the military has used several terms over the last hundred years to refer to what are currently called stability operations; from the term “small wars” in the early 20th century, to “counterinsurgency” following World War II, to “stability operations” in the 1970s, to “low-intensity conflict” in the 1980s, to “military operations other than war” in the 1990s, and then back to “stability operations.” He (2008, 411) adds, “What we are talking about are civil-military operations that are conducted in environments where one or more potential adversaries operate in asymmetric relationships with their adversaries.” The definition of stability operations in current military doctrine doesn’t include Fishel’s concern with adversaries operating asymmetrically, though many of the tasks described in military doctrine for stability operations focus on addressing asymmetric threats. CJCS
Joint Publication 3-0 (2011a, GL-16) describes stability operations as, “an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.” Yates (2006, 2) agrees with the notion of stability operations as an overarching term that includes activities as diverse as peace operations, counterinsurgency, security assistance, humanitarian and civic assistance, and combating terrorism. Army doctrine (U.S. Department of the Army 2008, 1-12) summarizes, “Together, reconstruction and stabilization comprise the broad range of activities defined by the Department of Defense as stability operations.” An important point of clarification found throughout the literature (Schadlow 2005, ii; U.S. Department of the Army 2008, 1-4; Yates 2006, 22), yet often overlooked by agencies within the US NSS, is stability operations are an integral part of conventional warfare. Confusion surrounding the concept of stability operations is but one of several factors that have undermined US NSS conduct of these operations.

The literature describes numerous factors that have hindered US NSS conduct of stability operations. These factors generally fall into one of two categories. The first category contains complex characteristics inherent in most stability operations. The second category contains characteristics of the US NSS that have undermined its ability to develop and implement integrated policies for stability operations. A brief comparison of US NSS experience in conventional warfare and stability operations helps highlight
some of the complex characteristics inherent in most stability operations. Although conventional warfare often strains the capabilities of the US NSS, it typically contains several clarifying characteristics that help the US NSS focus its efforts for developing and implementing strategies, goals, and policies. Generally, conventional warfare contains a limited number of clearly distinguishable participants--opposing forces and noncombatants--with relatively few goals and clear objectives. Additionally, there has been broad agreement within the US NSS that the enemy’s fielded forces are the center of gravity in these conflicts. While Clausewitz’s (1976, 87) maxim that war is fought for political objectives is widely accepted throughout the US NSS, the focus on the enemy’s fielded forces left little doubt that the military should be the US NSS lead agency during conventional warfare. Most US stability operations have contained few, if any, of these clarifying factors.

Stability operations often include a wide range of participants and require the performance of vastly diverse tasks. Yates (2006, 31) writes that noncombatants involved in stability operations include “local leaders and citizens, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), various diplomats and other dignitaries.” Several security experts (Kilcullen 2009; Krepinevich 1986, 7-11; Nagl 2005; U.S. Department of the Army 2008) note that in addition to the confusion caused by more participants, it is often difficult to discern combatants from noncombatants in these types of operations. Taw (1994, 223) observes that stability operations frequently involve “shifting operational environments and

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32 This section employs relatively simplistic descriptions of and distinctions between conventional warfare and stability operations that are sufficient for how the terms are used in this study. However, the resources mentioned represent only a small portion of the rich literature addressing nuances within and between numerous levels of conflict.
changing political goals [requiring] concomitant shifts in military objectives, missions, and capabilities.” The wide variety of often difficult to distinguish participants and the commensurate increase in the number of goals involved greatly increase the diversity of tasks required in stability operations. Krepinevich (1986, 10) writes, “In conventional warfare, military action focused on the achievement of the military objectives set by the policymakers assumes priority, while political, social, and economic considerations are consigned to a secondary role. Yet, [in stability operations] these ‘secondary’ considerations must achieve equality with military goals and objectives.”

US Army doctrine (2008, 3-2 - 3-14) lists six primary tasks for stability operations: establish civil security, establish civil control, restore essential services, support to governance, and support to economic and infrastructure development. Each of these primary tasks has between four and ten sub-tasks. Additionally, the doctrine notes the interdependence of many stability operations tasks; the success of each task is often dependent upon the progress being made on other tasks. Davis (1994, 74-75) adds that the fluid environment often requires rapid adaptation of myriad interdependent tasks. Adding greatly to the complexity is the fact that these interdependent tasks often overlap traditional civil-military boundaries.

US NSS efforts to rapidly address the vast range of interdependent tasks involved in stability operations were frequently undermined by shortcomings within the national security bureaucracies and the system’s inability to adequately integrate the policy planning and implementation activities of its bureaucracies. Lamb and Marks (2010, 4) write, “Since 9/11, prestigious national investigations of the invasions of Afghanistan and
Iraq and other priority national security missions have repeatedly found a debilitating lack of interagency cooperation.” While each of the national security bureaucracies possessed expertise in performing tasks that they viewed as part of their core missions, the diverse tasks involved in stability operations typically required employment of a range of core competencies that was not possessed by the individual agencies. The US NSS agencies with the bulk of the expertise for governance and military issues have traditionally been the State Department and the Department of Defense, respectively.

Several factors impeded State and Defense’s ability to effectively develop and implement policy for stability operations.

Five of the six primary tasks for stability operations listed above fall under what have traditionally been considered the purview of State; these governance activities are often referred to as “civilian” tasks. However, State’s ability to develop and implement policy for these tasks was frequently undermined by insufficient resources, an organizational structure and culture non-conducive to stability operations, and dependence upon the military to provide a secure operating environment. Binnendijk and Cronin (2009, 1) argue “The United States today manifestly lacks adequate civilian capacity to conduct complex operations—those operations that require close civil-military planning and cooperation in the field.” Betts (2007) notes that State has the best tools for addressing most of the tasks involved with stability operations (diplomatic and economic), yet it has less than 7% of the budget of DoD. Holmes (2009) went further when asked why civilians do not contribute more. His response, “they do not exist. The number of lawyers at the Defense Department is larger than the entire U.S. diplomatic
corps, there are more musicians in the military bands than there are U.S. diplomats, and
the Defense Department’s 2008 budget was over 24 times as large as the combined
budgets of the State Department and USAID ($750 billion compared with $31 billion).”
He continued, “The staffing situation is even worse at USAID, which houses the
government's few experts in post-conflict reconstruction; the number of [Foreign Service
officers] in the agency's ranks has declined by 75 percent since the 1970s.” Adams (2007,
5-6) clarifies, “While the size of the active duty armed forces has risen and fallen over
time, even today, at its lowest post-1950 level of 1.42 million, the active duty force
makes up over a third of the total federal government work force. With the addition of the
700,000 civil servants working for the DoD, more than half of all federal employees work
for the Department of Defense.” He (2007, 5-6) notes that State’s numbers pale in
comparison, “In terms of personnel and locations, the State Department employs nearly
25,000 people. Just under half of these work overseas, and of the remainder, nearly 90
percent work in the Washington, DC, area or at the US mission to the United Nations in
New York. USAID direct employment is quite small at just over 2,000, compared with a
1968 peak of nearly 18,000, with many of those employees based outside the United
States.” Marcella (2008, 37) points out “The military has more money to conduct
diplomacy than does State.” Patrick and Brown (2007, 53) are among the many security
experts who argue that the imbalance between military and civilian agencies in the U.S.
government severely hampers whole of government efforts.

It is telling that the Department of Defense has been one of the most outspoken
proponents of building up State’s capacity to conduct stability operations. Holmes (2009)
notes that Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates repeatedly calls for increased funding for the State Department and USAID. Secretary Gates (Holmes 2009, quoting Gates) testified to Congress that “the State Department is the proper place to oversee all of the elements of American foreign policy” but that "Congress has not been willing, decade in and decade out, to provide the kind of resources, people and authority that [State] needs to play its proper role in American foreign policy.” Binnendijk and Cronin (2009, 1) observe that DOD’s “2006 Quadrennial Defense review dedicated an entire chapter to ‘building partner capacity.’” However, resource constraints were not the only factors limiting State’s performance of stability operations.

State’s organizational structure and culture was another factor hindering its ability to develop and implement policy for stability operations. Schake (2012, 5) argues that State’s performance has not noticeably improved despite the fact that “Congress has increased funding [for State and US AID] by 155 percent since 2003 and the size of the diplomatic corps has grown by 50 percent.” She (Ibid, xiv) attributes the lack of improvement to State’s culture that “values and promotes description over problem-solving.” Sewall (2007, xxx) agrees “the problem is more than just numbers.” She claims the State Department “often lacks relevant operational competencies.” Colonel Michael Meese (Schake 2012, 84-85 quoting Meese) states, “The State Department culture that focused on observing, reporting, and then conducting diplomacy does not usually have expertise in (and therefore is not very good at) the project management and capacity building actions that are necessary in a post-conflict environment.” Former Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice (Schake 2012, 124 quoting Rice) lamented “. . . we had problems
getting State into the fight, not because people weren’t willing, but because State didn’t have the right structures to support them.” An example of State’s challenges with stability operations occurred in response to the release of major policy changes in 2005.

In 2005, two policy directives were issued that had major implications for the way the US NSS conducts stability operations. National Security Presidential Directive 44 (2005) named State as lead agency for the US government’s overseas stabilization and reconstruction efforts. Additionally, Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 (2005) declared that stability operations were a core U.S. military mission to be accorded priority comparable to combat operations. Binnendijk and Cronin (2009, 2-3) note the divergence in how Defense and State responded to these policy changes, “Army occupational specialties were shifted to this new core mission by the tens of thousands. New joint operational concepts and field manuals were written on stability operations, counterinsurgency, and irregular warfare. . . . Whereas the Department of Defense (DOD) had dedicated tens of thousands of military personnel to these operations, S/CRS had a staff of fewer than 100, most of them detailees. . . . S/CRS made heroic efforts to organize and develop civilian capabilities for complex operations, but the new office was underfunded, understaffed, and unappreciated within the State Department.”

Another factor hindering State during stability operations is their dependence on the military to provide a secure operating environment. Holmes (2009) writes, “[Foreign Service Officers] in Baghdad are required to notify the embassy's security team 48 hours before holding meetings with Iraqis outside the Green Zone, and permission is often denied or revoked at the last minute for security reasons. During the worst of the
violence, from 2004 to 2007, many diplomats realized that showing up in an armored convoy could jeopardize the lives of the Iraqi officials they were meeting with, which further discouraged such contact.” Natsios (2005, 6) observes that reconstruction efforts also were dependent upon the security provided by armed forces.

The lack of civilian capacity (especially in the State Department) frequently resulted in the US military performing “civilian” tasks for stability operations (Binnendijk and Cronin 2009, 2-3; Schadlow 2005, 325-26). Sewall (2007, xxxi) argues there are several problems with the military performing these tasks: it leads civilian agencies to abdicate their responsibilities, it dilutes civil-military balance of authority, and it further isolates political authorities. Schadlow (2005, 318-21) claims that while State has often been unable to effectively perform “civilian” tasks in stability operations, the military has typically been uninterested in getting involved in stability operations.

Defense’s ability to develop and implement policy for stability operations has been undermined by an organizational mindset that often viewed such operations as undesirable distractions from what many considered the organization’s true purpose—fighting and winning the nation’s wars. Krepinevich (1986, 5) claims there is an ‘Army Concept’ that is characterized by “a focus on mid-intensity, or conventional, war and reliance on high volumes of firepower to minimize casualties—in effect, the substitution of material costs at every available opportunity to avoid payment in blood.” This mindset persists despite Army doctrine acknowledging that “the military history of the United States is one characterized by stability operations, interrupted by distinct episodes of major combat” (U.S. Department of the Army 2008, 1-1). Yates (2006, 2) clarifies, “if
America’s armed forces have fought fewer than a dozen major conventional wars in over two centuries, they have, during that same period, engaged in several hundred military undertakings that would today be characterized as stability operations.” The prevalence of stability operations is further attested to in the State Department’s 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (2010) that notes “at least 36 active conflicts worldwide, with the risk of conflict and armed violence growing in resource-rich but governance-poor parts of Africa and Asia. Many of these conflicts are recurrent—of the 39 conflicts that arose in the last decade, 31 of them were part of a repeating cycle of violence.” Contributing to the military’s focus on major combat operations was the notion that forces prepared for conventional warfare could certainly handle the “lesser” tasks involved in stability operations (United States Dept. of the Army and United States Marine Corps 2007, lii). Kugler (1994, 179) counters, “The proverbial ‘lesser included case’ sometimes turns out to be neither lesser nor included. History shows plenty of cases in which military forces that were well prepared for one type of conflict experienced reversals when war came wearing different clothes.” The military’s mindset had numerous implications: it reduced the military’s willingness to get involved in stability operations and limited the tasks it would perform when it did get involved; it contributed to reserve forces, rather than active duty forces, being given primary responsibility for many stability operations functions; and it served to diminish the military’s corporate memory of how to conduct stability operations.

The military’s experience in Korea and Vietnam strengthened its long-standing preference for focusing on conventional warfare and shunning stability operations.
Krepinevich (1986, 269) argues that one of the primary lessons the military took away from Korea and Vietnam was avoiding stability operations is preferable to improving its ability to conduct such operations. Record (2007, 80) notes that the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine is one of the best known and influential attempts by the Vietnam generation to limit the chances of the US military getting bogged down in another unwinnable quagmire. The Weinberger-Powell Doctrine essentially holds that the US will not commit to using military force unless a vital national interest is at stake, victory is definable and attainable, all alternatives to armed conflict have been exhausted, and the American public, to include elected officials, support the effort. Powell (Record 2007, 83) argues that in circumstances where the military is called into action, it should employ overwhelming force in order to achieve its objectives quickly and with limited casualties. A strict interpretation of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine would preclude US military involvement in most stability operations for several reasons: many stability operations do not involve an easily discernible vital national interest; defining and attaining victory in stability operations is rarely as clear cut as it is for combat operations; overwhelming military force can be counterproductive in stability operations; and stability operations frequently last for several years, violating Powell’s maxim to quickly end commitments of forces and raising the likelihood that public support will wane. While the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine has helped limit arbitrary use of the military, it has also reinforced the military’s mindset that eschews preparing for stability operations; a mindset that appears

33 Gompert and Gordon (2008, 354) note that the 89 insurgencies since World War II lasted an average of 10 years, with many lasting 16 to 20 years. Admittedly, these numbers are for insurgencies, a subset of stability operations, and are not limited to US operations.
counterproductive given that stability operations continue to constitute the vast majority of military activity.

The military’s focus on major combat has resulted in an organizational structure oriented towards combat operations. As mentioned previously, the release of Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 in 2005 was the first time that stability operations were codified as a core military mission, ostensibly putting them on equal footing with combat operations (U.S. Department of Defense 2005; U.S. Department of the Army 2008). However, Yates (2006, 22) points out, “many US officers have acknowledged that stability operations are a valid military mission, but only for certain personnel and units, such as [civil affairs] and information operations specialists, [military police], engineers, medics, lawyers, and [special operations forces]. According to this view, stability operations have not been—and should not be—a core mission for conventional combat and combat support units.” He (2006, 40) also notes that “most the majority of the personnel with the skills to support stability operations are in the reserve components, decreasing their ability to become involved on the ground quickly and effectively.”

Yates (2006, 1) highlights another consequence of the military’s preference for major combat operations, “One tradeoff for this preoccupation with conventional warfare has been the military’s general disinclination to study and prepare for what, in current jargon, is referred to as stability operations.” Fishel (2008, 413) claims that as a result of the failure to study stability operations, “It has been necessary for the United States to learn the same lessons again and again, as if each new stability operation were a situation that had never been encountered before.” Yates (2006, 2-3) concludes, “The primary
reason for this is simple enough: throughout most of its history, the Army has regarded stability operations as “someone else’s job,” an unwanted burden, a series of sideshows that soldiers performed either separately from war or in the wake of war. Because the Army did not generally perceive stability operations as integral to war, such operations were belittled for diverting essential resources away from the service’s principal mission of warfighting.” In addition to the shortcomings of individual agencies, the US NSS lacked means for integrating the stability operations efforts of the parochial bureaucracies. The term “unity of effort” was found throughout the literature (Fishel 2008; Krepinevich 1986, 13; Marcella 2008, 37; U.S. Department of the Army 2008) to refer to the concept of integrating policy development and implementation of military and civilian tasks.

Fishel (2008, 413) argues that unity of effort is key to successfully completing the diverse tasks involved in stability operations. Additionally, he (Ibid, 437) describes two means for achieving unity of effort—through unity of command or through “various mechanisms of interagency coordination.” Fishel’s analysis of US stability operations reveals that unity of command has been an effective method for producing unity of effort. However, unity of command has been the exception, rather than the norm for US stability operations. Schadlow (2005, 318-321) writes that due to the perceived civilian nature of most of the tasks involved, there has been great resistance to giving the US military command of stability operations. Conversely, US leadership has been equally resistant to subordinate the US military’s role in stability operations to one of the civilian agencies in the US NSS. For example, Marcella (2008, 26) claims failure to appreciate functional
interdependence between DOD and DOS undermined post-conflict planning for Iraq in 2003. As Fishel (2008, 437) notes, when US stability operations lacked unity of command, interagency interaction has rarely been able to adequately integrate the stability operations’ activities of the agencies within the US NSS. Specifically, without unity of command, the US NSS has struggled to foster the level of interagency interaction necessary to rapidly and cohesively employ cross-organizational core competencies to develop and implement policies for stability operations.

The initial round of research revealed that stability operations—despite being an ambiguous concept that has rarely been embraced by any US agency—have been the predominant form of conflict facing the US NSS. Stability operations are complex phenomena that require the US NSS be able to plan for and perform dozens of interdependent tasks that cross traditional department and agency boundaries in environments characterized by numerous, often difficult to distinguish, participants possessing a wide range of resources, needs, objectives and supporters. Additionally, and perhaps most difficult, the fluid and time compressed environment of most stability operations requires the US NSS to be capable of frequently and rapidly adapting and integrating the vast range of interdependent tasks it is performing. US NSS efforts to meet these challenges have been hindered by shortcomings within the parochial national security bureaucracies and a lack of unity of effort resulting from inadequate interagency interaction. While the initial round of research increased understanding about stability operations, it also revealed a need for a deeper understanding of interagency interaction in US national security policy processes. The research of US NSS experience with
stability operations produced additional questions: Does the US NSS struggle with integration for all mission areas, or is it limited to stability operations? Why isn’t the level of interagency interaction sufficient for integrating effort within the US NSS? These questions led to a review of literature on organizational analysis, complexity and US national security policy processes.

3.1.2. Interagency Interaction in the US National Security System

3.1.2.1. Ambiguous Concepts
Numerous conceptual challenges were encountered while reviewing the literature to address the questions stemming from the research on stability operations. Therefore, it was necessary to address conceptual ambiguities prior to analyzing interagency interaction in the US NSS. Specifically, the literature contains a wide range of conceptions regarding what constitutes national security, who is involved in the national security system, and what is meant by the interagency. To mitigate the potential for conceptual ambiguity to negatively impact the research, the following descriptions are provided for key terms in the study. The literature reveals that conceptions of national security are expanding from being primarily concerned with defense to include diplomatic, development, economic, social, and environmental issues. Although the security community is still debating the appropriate scope for what should and should not be considered a national security issue, the study allows for inclusion of the broadest conceptualizations of national security. The study views the US NSS as the government entities, along with the mechanisms that facilitate interaction within and between those entities, involved in producing the nation’s security strategies and in developing and
implementing policies designed to contribute to successful execution of the strategies.

Additionally, the study adopts the broad view of interagency found in the US NSS literature. The concept of interagency was further refined using different types of interaction described in the literature. Thus, while the study’s concept of interagency interaction includes any interaction between two or more agencies in the US NSS, it differentiates between five potential levels of interagency interaction (i.e., coexistence, communication, coordination, cooperation, and collaboration) that reflect increasing agency interdependence as the levels move from coexistence towards collaboration.

With basic conceptual issues addressed, the study continued reviewing the literature for insights into interagency interaction in the US NSS. The next question asked was “How has interagency interaction in the US NSS changed?

3.1.2.2. Evolution of Interagency Interaction in US National Security System

The literature offers valuable insight into the establishment of the US NSS and the evolution of interagency interaction within the system over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The literature reveals that apart from the radical increase in the level of interagency interaction (i.e., from coexistence to coordination) that occurred in the 1940s, changes in interagency interaction in the US NSS have consisted exclusively of incremental improvements within a given level of interagency interaction; highlights the system’s resistance to change; improves understanding of how system participants have interpreted and attempted to fulfill their roles and responsibilities as described in the US Constitution, US statutes, executive directions, and other guiding documents; sheds light
on the dynamic environment facing the US NSS and provides context for current issues; and reveals that the US NSS has rarely experienced interagency collaboration.

For the first 150 years (i.e., from roughly 1790 to 1940), the US NSS could be considered a system in only the loosest sense of the term. Fisher (2000, 8) points out that the US Constitution split responsibility for national security between the legislative and executive branches; extending to Congress and the President an “invitation to struggle.” May (2004, 8) and Best (2009, 2) clarify that, within the executive branch, the President alone was responsible for coordinating cross-agency activity, as there was little purposeful interaction between the three departments primarily involved with national security issues (i.e., the Departments of State, War, and Navy). The study uses the term coexistence to describe this level of interagency interaction. Best (2009, 2) argues that interagency coexistence among the departments, with the President alone responsible for coordination, was sufficient given “limited U.S. foreign involvements for the first hundred or so years under the Constitution, the small size of the armed forces, the relative geographic isolation of the Nation, and the absence of any proximate threat.” Dramatic changes in the international and domestic environment, beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century, resulted in increased expectations of the US NSS. Despite numerous efforts to produce a commensurate increase in the system’s level of interagency interaction during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, coexistence remained the norm until the late 1940s.

The National Security Act of 1947, along with subsequent amendments to the Act, revolutionized interagency interaction in the US NSS; increasing the standard level
of interaction between top officials in the system’s departments and agencies from coexistence to coordination. The Act changed the participants in the system, the expectations for each participant, and the mechanisms of coordination within the system (e.g., the National Security Council) and between the system and its external environment. The President, while retaining decision making authority, was no longer the sole coordinating body in the US NSS. The literature reveals that a rare confluence of factors enabled the radical increase in interagency interaction. First, the recent conclusion of the second global war in thirty years and the threat of a third global war that could involve nuclear weapons highlighted the inadequacy of the existing system for the given security environment. Second, more than fifty years of change initiatives provided a ready supply of quality analysis and recommendations for those interested in reforming the system. Third, changes in US political processes in the 1930s had greatly expanded the power of the presidency. Fourth, a post-war US public still heavily concerned about national security issues due largely to its fear of communism and its conviction—based upon the “lessons of the thirties”—that appeasement enables tyranny. The first two factors, a US NSS overwhelmed by national security issues and a ready supply of reform recommendations, are common factors in US national security discourse and have not been sufficient to bring about an increase in the system’s level of interagency interaction. The third and fourth factors, a President with tremendous latitude on national security issues and a public demanding action, are much rarer.

International, domestic, and political environments experienced unprecedented changes in the second half of the twentieth century. During this time, the US NSS
experienced numerous improvements in interagency coordination (i.e., the standard level of interaction). However, it did not experience another increase in the standard level of interagency interaction. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, interagency coordination remains the norm. As such, this round of research resulted in the following question: Is the standard level of interagency interaction (i.e., coordination) adequate for the modern security environment?

3.1.2.3. Adequacy of the Level of II in the US NSS

The literature (Hart-Rudman Commission 2001; Lamb and Marks 2010; Lamb and Munsing 2011; Project on National Security Reform 2008a, 2008b, 2009; Rice 2001; The White House 2010) reveals that the standard level of interagency interaction in the US NSS (i.e., coordination) is inadequate for the increasing frequency, scale, and scope of complex issues in the modern security environment. While coordination was arguably adequate for the Cold War, and remains appropriate for issues that fall under the purview of a single department or agency, higher levels of interagency interaction are required for complex issues. The post-Cold War security environment is characterized by an increasing number of overlapping issues that develop rapidly, change frequently, and involve a vast range of diverse participants. The increasing frequency, scale, and scope of these complex national security issues requires that the US NSS be capable of effectively integrating and leveraging all elements of national power (i.e., expertise, capabilities and resources from across the spectrum of organizations in the US NSS) to anticipate and address the vast range of national security issues, and to adjust the system’s mix of expertise, capabilities and resources, when required. The current lack of integration
undermines the development of effective ends, ways, and means for addressing complex national security issues. This strategy deficit decreases the likelihood that the system will develop and achieve effective national security goals, and increases the likelihood of expending unnecessary time, money, materiel, lives, and national prestige pursuing those goals.

Apart from raising the level of interagency interaction, the literature offers no viable alternative for fostering the integration necessary to address the increasing frequency, scale, and scope of complex national security issues. Additionally, several studies (Chun and Jones 2008; Hart-Rudman Commission 2001; Lamb and Munsing 2011; Project on National Security Reform 2008a; Project on National Security Reform 2008b; Project on National Security Reform 2009) claim that failure to increase the level of interagency interaction puts the security of the nation at risk. As a result of these findings, the study turned its focus onto obtaining a better understanding of higher levels of interagency interaction in the US NSS. The first question that emerged was: What are the obstacles to higher levels of interagency interaction in the US NSS?

3.1.2.4. Obstacles to Higher Levels of Interagency Interaction in the US NSS

The study used a two-pronged approach to increase understanding of the obstacles to higher levels of interagency interaction in the US NSS. First, literature on collaboration was reviewed to discern factors that inhibit higher levels of interagency interaction. Then, literature on the US NSS was reviewed to identify inhibiting factors prevalent in the system. Collaboration literature (Bardach 1998; Boulouta 2007; Gray 1989; Heifetz 1994; Katzenbach and Smith 1993; McGrath 1998; Noblit, Richards,
Adkins, and Awsumb 1999) reveals a broad range of inhibitors of higher levels of interagency interaction. A few of the primary inhibitors are a lack of interagency experiences and institutions, parochial incentives and the protective behaviors they foster, and inefficiencies inherent to interagency interaction.

Literature on the US NSS indicates that the obstacles to higher levels of interagency interaction in the US NSS are wide ranging and deeply embedded. In general, higher levels of interagency interaction in the system are inhibited by ingrained cultures, structures, and authorities that incentivize parochial behavior among executive departments and agencies. Over the six decades since the modern US NSS was ushered in by the 1947 National Security Act, the system’s cultures, structures and authorities have come to reify a limited focus on upper echelon coordination of activities of departments and agencies that are stove-piped along functional lines. While an array of parochial bureaucratic behaviors (e.g., turf protection, interagency competition, and hoarding information) top the list of obstacles to higher levels of interagency interaction in the US NSS, these behavioral obstacles are frequently exacerbated by the following: leadership that sets unclear expectations regarding higher levels of interagency interaction; management and oversight that provides inadequate guidance, incentives, and authorities for integrated missions; and a dearth of structures, processes, and resources dedicated to facilitating higher levels of interagency interaction. The literature suggests there is a synergy among the system’s institutional, structural, and behavioral inhibitors of higher levels of interagency interaction. In light of the tremendous obstacles to higher levels of interagency interaction in the US NSS, the study turned its attention to answering a
second question: How do experts in the national security community propose to remove or overcome obstacles to higher levels of interagency interaction in the US NSS?

3.1.2.5. Proposals for Overcoming or Removing Obstacles to Higher Levels of Interagency Interaction in the US NSS

The consensus view of a host of major studies of the US NSS over the last decade (Hart-Rudman Commission 2001; Iraq Study Group 2006; Murdock, Flournoy, Williams, and Campbell 2004; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004; Project on National Security Reform 2008b; Project on National Security Reform 2009) is that near-term comprehensive reform is required to overcome or remove systemic obstacles to higher levels of interagency interaction. These comprehensive reform proposals involve a combination of passing sweeping legislation and issuing presidential directives to implement an array of measures that will enable the US NSS to effectively integrate the elements of national power. The studies claim the measures must establish or improve the system’s ability to perform each of the following for interagency issues: establish expectations; provide sound management and oversight; provide necessary resources, processes, structures, and authorities; and implement appropriate incentives.

A few analysts argue against comprehensive reform, either proposing less radical solutions for improving integration (Auger 2004; Desai 2005; Deutch, Kanter, and Scowcroft 2000; Rothkopf 2009; Zaccor 2005) or claiming comprehensive measures will not work (Chun and Jones 2008; Olson 2008). Proponents of comprehensive reform acknowledge the difficulties involved in implementing their recommendations, but argue
there is no viable alternative for facilitating the higher levels of interagency interaction required to effectively address complex national security issues.

Given the consensus in the literature of the last decade regarding the need for near-term comprehensive reform of interagency processes in the US NSS, the study next looked at recent efforts designed to improve interagency interaction in the system to answer the following questions: Have Congress and the President enacted near-term comprehensive reform of the US NSS? What efforts have been made to improve interagency interaction in the US NSS? What improvements in interagency interaction have resulted from recent reform efforts?

3.1.2.6. Status of Recent Efforts to Improve Interagency Interaction in the US NSS

The literature (Cerami, Engel, and Pavelka 2009; Lamb and Marks 2010, 6; Lamb and Munsing 2011, 7; Locher III 2012) reveals that leadership of the US NSS (i.e., Congress and the President) has not enacted the near-term comprehensive interagency reform argued for by most major studies. Given the monumental obstacles to such reform, the lack of progress is not surprising. More concerning for those advocating such reforms is that, apart from studying the problem, there is scant evidence indicating that leadership is even considering comprehensive reform. No bill has been introduced in Congress for anything resembling a new national security act or a Goldwater-Nichols type restructuring of the interagency. Nor is there any indication that comprehensive reform of interagency authorities, structures, processes and resources is on the agenda of the executive branch.
Despite leadership’s lack of progress on near-term comprehensive reform of the US NSS during the last decade, a wide range of incremental interagency initiatives and mechanisms were introduced. Congress passed several acts, including the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and IRTPA of 2004, containing provisions designed to increase interagency interaction. Congress also funded or conducted dozens of studies to improve understanding of the need for, and identify potential ways to, increase interagency interaction. Executive branch initiatives for increasing interagency collaboration included presidential and departmental (or agency) level guidance. Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama each issued presidential directives establishing expectations for interagency interaction. Executive branch departments and agencies also acknowledged the need for increased interagency interaction and issued guidance establishing integrating procedures.

A number of innovative interagency mechanisms (e.g., HVT teams, PRTs, JIACGs, NCTS and S/CRS) were developed and implemented in the US NSS after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The literature suggests that several of these mechanisms have successfully demonstrated an ability to facilitate interagency collaboration. However, PNSR (2010b) and Lamb and Munsing (2011) point out that these mechanisms have been inconsistently implemented and their effectiveness has been overly dependent on the personalities of the people involved. The efforts have rarely received the guidance, authority, resources, or support required to sustain higher levels of interagency interaction.
Recent efforts to increase interagency interaction in the US NSS have improved awareness of the need for higher levels of interagency interaction, clarified leadership’s expectations for higher levels of interagency interaction, and produced potentially valuable integrating mechanisms. However, the operational impacts of these efforts have been limited to improving coordination among organizations that remain heavily stovepiped along functional lines. Wide ranging and deeply embedded obstacles to higher levels of interagency interaction continue to undermine the system’s ability to integrate the elements of national power. Management of the US NSS still provides guidance, authorities, and resources in a manner that incentivizes parochial behavior and discourages higher levels of interagency interaction. Strategic management continues to be neglected as NSC participants remain overburdened by tactical level issues. Congress has made little to no progress amending its rule systems and committee structures to enable it to provide effective oversight of interagency missions. Additionally, the US NSS still has inadequate structures, processes, and resources dedicated to facilitating higher levels of interagency interaction. Department and agency participation on interagency issues remains largely voluntary, or a “coalition of the willing.”

Equipped with improved understanding of the recent pace and character of interagency reform, the study endeavored to discern insights the literature offers into the potential for further reform. Specifically, the study asked the following questions: What are the prospects for near-term comprehensive reform of interagency interaction in the US NSS? What are the obstacles to enacting the near-term comprehensive reform proposed by security experts to increase the level of interagency interaction in the US
NSS? What are the prospects for higher levels of interagency interaction in the US NSS if near-term comprehensive reform is not enacted?

**3.1.2.7. Prospects for Further Reform**

The literature highlights a wide range of formidable obstacles impeding efforts to increase the level of interagency interaction in the US NSS through near-term comprehensive reform. The study employed Kingdon’s work on agenda setting to help clarify the obstacles to and prospects for increasing the level of interagency interaction in the US NSS through near-term comprehensive reform of the system. Kingdon provides helpful concepts for assessing factors that contribute to an issue’s potential for getting the amount of senior leadership attention required to enact or adapt government policies.

This section begins with an overview of relevant concepts from Kingdon’s work on agenda setting. The section then summarizes findings that resulted from using Kingdon’s concepts to analyze the prospects of near-term comprehensive reform efforts. The section concludes by noting alternative approaches for increasing the level of interagency interaction in the US NSS, in the likely event that near-term comprehensive reform is unsuccessful.

Kingdon’s (2003, 196) work on agenda setting provides helpful concepts for analyzing “why some subjects rise on governmental agendas while other subjects are neglected.” Kingdon (2003) claims that policy analysts need to differentiate between processes for agenda setting and alternative specification because the processes typically involve different patterns and participants. Kingdon (2003, 3) describes the agenda as

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34 Kingdon (2003, 3) refers to these as “predecision public policy processes”
“the list of subjects or problems to which government officials, and people outside of
government closely associated with those officials, are paying some serious attention at
any given time.” Alternatives are the range of potential courses of action identified for
addressing an issue. Durant and Diehl (1989) write that agenda setting and alternative
specification processes are “governed by different dynamics and political actors
according to Kingdon: the former more by discontinuities, sudden agenda changes, and
political actors; the latter by incremental processes of gradual evolution shaped largely by
nonelected members of specialized policy communities.”

Kingdon (2003, 87-88) envisions the agenda setting process not as a cohesive
whole, but as three streams—problem, policy, and political—that “develop and operate
largely independently of one another.” The problem stream contains all issues that have
been identified as problems by at least some members of a given policy community.
Kingdon (2003, 114) notes, “Not every condition is seen as a problem. For a condition to
be a problem, people must become convinced that something must be done to change it.”
He (2003, 113) adds, “Various mechanisms – indicators, focusing events, and feedback –
bring problems to their [government officials] attention.”

The policy stream contains the ideas and proposals being discussed in a given
community. Kingdon (2003, 116) writes that various groups in a policy community (e.g.,
researchers, congressional staffers, people in planning and evaluation offices and in
budget offices, academics, interest group analysts) “try out their ideas on each other by
going to lunch, circulating papers, publishing articles, holding hearings, presenting
testimony, and drafting and pushing legislative proposals.” He (Kingdon 2003, 143) notes that it can take years for a new idea to gain acceptance in a policy community.

The political stream includes organized political forces and perceptions of the “national mood.” Kingdon (2003, 145) employs a narrow conceptualization of the term “political” that focuses on “electoral, partisan, or pressure group factors.” His (2003, 150) conceptualization of organized political forces includes “notions of interest group pressure, political mobilization, and the behavior of political elites.” Kingdon (2003, 163) writes, “Consensus building in the political arena, in contrast to consensus building among policy specialists, takes place through a bargaining process rather than by persuasion. Once participants sense that there is some movement, they leap in to protect their interests. This entry into the game, sometimes sudden entry, contributes to sharp agenda change, both because various interests receive some benefit from their participation, and because a generalized image of movement is created.”

Kingdon (2003, 20) states that the streams “come together at certain times. Solutions become joined to problems, and both of them are joined to favorable political forces. This coupling is most likely to happen when policy windows . . . are open.” Kingdon (2003, 194) explains that “policy windows are opened either by the appearance of compelling problems [problem windows] or by happenings in the political stream [political windows].”

Applying Kingdon’s concepts to the literature on interagency interaction in the US NSS helps clarify obstacles impeding efforts to comprehensively reform the system and suggests that near-term comprehensive reform proposals are unlikely to be acted
upon by system leadership. The following analysis describes the three streams—problem, policy, and political—involved in recent efforts to comprehensively reform the US NSS and highlights the opening of a policy window that appears to be closing.

The literature reveals that the inability to effectively integrate activities within the US NSS was recognized as a problem even before the system’s current structure was established by the National Security Act of 1947 and continued through the Cold War. The issue garnered additional attention in the 1990s as the US NSS adapted to the post-Cold War security environment. The findings of the Hart-Rudman Commission reflect growing recognition of the problem in the 1990s. Numerous events in the first decade of the twenty-first century (e.g., US NSS intelligence failures prior to the terrorist attacks of 2001 and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003; US NSS difficulty with stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan; the US government’s handling of Hurricane Katrina) greatly increased the depth and breadth of awareness of the problem and produced a consensus in the policy community that something needed to be done to change it.

The policy stream of ideas and proposals for increasing the level of interagency interaction also developed slowly in the first decade following the end of the Cold War. During the 2000s, the concept of near-term comprehensive reform to increase the level of interagency interaction in the US NSS benefited from the same events that increased awareness of the integration problem. Several major studies (Iraq Study Group 2006; Murdock, Flournoy, Williams, and Campbell 2004; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004; Project on National Security Reform 2008b) served to galvanize widespread consensus in the policy community regarding the need for
comprehensive reform. In addition to building consensus for near-term comprehensive reform, the policy community offered robust strategies for achieving such reform.35 For example, PNSR (2009, Appendix I) provided draft versions of presidential statements, executive orders, presidential directives, and other supporting policy instruments that they assert would facilitate comprehensive reform of the US NSS. Kingdon (2003, 144) claims that having policies “available for adoption facilitates the high placement of a subject on a governmental agenda, and dramatically increases the chances for placement on a decision agenda.”

The political stream for increasing the level of interagency interaction in the US NSS began in earnest with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and continued to increase throughout most of the first decade of the twenty-first century. The same events that increased activity in the problem and policy streams also served to create what Kingdon would refer to as a “national mood” receptive to near-term comprehensive reform of the US NSS. General consensus between public opinion, interest groups, and government officials resulted in several sweeping reforms of other elements of the US NSS (e.g., Homeland Security Act of 2002 and IRTPA of 2004). The political stream appears to have peaked in 2009 as the Obama administration entered office. Obama’s campaign had focused on changing the way government works and his election was widely viewed as giving him a mandate to implement necessary reforms. Obama enhanced the political factors supporting near-term comprehensive reform by appointing reform-minded individuals to key posts in his administration. Rothkopf (2009) notes that

35 These policy recommendations were addressed in Chapter 2 in the section on “Proposals for Overcoming or Removing Obstacles to Interagency Collaboration”
seven members of PNSR were appointed to “senior positions in the Obama
administration. In addition to National Security adviser Jones and Director of National
Intelligence Blair, these include Deputy Secretary of State Jim Steinberg, Under
Secretaries of Defense Michèle Flournoy and Ashton Carter, and Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense Kathleen Hicks.” Obama also retained Robert Gates, a tireless proponent of
higher levels of interagency interaction, as Secretary of Defense. Additionally, public
dissatisfaction with previous policies contributed to the Democratic Party taking control
of both chambers of Congress, limiting Congressional resistance to presidential policies.

Employing Kingdon’s vernacular, it appears the problem, policy, and political
streams for near-term comprehensive reform of the US NSS came together during the
first year of the Obama administration and a policy window was opened by the presence
of a compelling problem, viable policy solutions, and broad political support. Dorff
(2009) observes, “Prior to last year’s presidential election, many experts thought the next
president—even a Republican—would launch a new national security course for the
United States. This would include a new National Security Strategy and, more
ambitiously, a serious run at organizational reform.” Lamb and Marks (2010, 28) add that
in 2010, “Interest in interagency reform [was] at an all-time high.”

However, as described in the previous section on reform initiatives, leadership
took no action on near-term comprehensive reform of the US NSS during Obama’s first
four years in office. Locher (2012) concludes, “Two principal obstacles blocked needed
changes: denial about the seriousness of shortcomings in the national security system and
lack of political will to fix these shortcomings.” While Locher’s assessment of low levels
of understanding and political will may be accurate, the organization he leads (i.e., PNSR) argues that inadequate bandwidth also played a large role in undermining near-term comprehensive reform efforts. PNSR (2009, ii) explains that bandwidth is “the time and attention needed to focus on the task.” Dorff (2009) notes that Obama’s need to focus on the financial crisis facing his administration as it entered office in 2009 and his choice to “make health care reform the centerpiece of the new administration’s policy agenda” left inadequate time and political capital to provide the presidential support necessary for comprehensive reform of the US NSS. Dorff (2009) adds, “Absent bold and early presidential leadership, change in national security policy and strategy is unlikely, and organizational reform impossible.”

Perhaps of even greater concern than the lack of progress to date, is the sense that the policy window is closing. Kingdon (2003, 169) notes that policy windows rarely remain open for long. The problem stream appears relatively unchanged as there remains general agreement that the current level of interagency interaction in the US NSS results in unacceptable costs and risks. Of course, Locher’s comments about people denying the seriousness of the shortcomings of the US NSS implies that at least a few critical participants in the policy community are not yet convinced of the severity of the problem. The policy stream has changed slightly more than the problem stream. Even though advocates for near-term comprehensive reform remain convinced that anything short of all-encompassing reform presents unacceptable risks, several begrudgingly acknowledge that incremental reform may be the only option. PNSR’s incremental proposals for developing national security professionals (2010a, x-xi) and increasing integration in the
counterterrorism mission (2010b, 13) are implicit acknowledgements that comprehensive
reform is unlikely. Likewise, Lamb and Marks (2010, 27) offer incremental measures for
establishing effective authority mechanisms for interagency missions. PNSR (2012)
concludes, “Although the political environment was not right to implement large-scale
change, PNSR had a variety of incremental successes and significantly influenced the
prevailing narrative on national security reform.”

As the Obama administration completes its second term, the greatest obstacles to
near-term comprehensive reform appear to reside in the political stream. The national
mood is increasingly focused on domestic issues and many of the reform-minded
personnel of the first Obama administration left government, including Secretary Gates
and five of the seven personnel from PNSR. PNSR (2009, ii) claims that additional
obstacles in the political stream include bandwidth, scope, political sensitivities,
ownership, and Cold War paradigms. Although the fiscal crisis of 2008 and 2009 has
passed, a vast range of contentious domestic issues continue to reduce the Obama
administration’s bandwidth available to address reform of the US NSS. The scope of
comprehensive reform can also limit political support. PNSR (2009, ii) notes, “the sheer
size of national security reform is huge and can be daunting unless broken into
manageable pieces.”

PNSR (2009, ii) states that political sensitivities stem from uncertainty about the
potential turf and resource implications of policy proposals. For example, Rogin (2009)
asserts that the Chairman of the House Defense Appropriations Committee was
concerned about how PNSR’s reform proposals might impact his subcommittee’s
jurisdiction. Additionally, in today’s fiscally constrained environment, the upfront costs associated with comprehensive reform proposals may limit some support.

Ownership helps navigate an issue around political obstacles. PNSR (2009, ii) writes, “At this point, the primary owner, or leader, of national security reform is the national security advisor, but he lacks the capacity to transform the system. Although the national security advisor sits at the head of the organization that must integrate the system and give it strategic direction, other stakeholders also must assume ownership, especially in Congress where leadership is needed.”

PNSR (2009, ii) argues that Cold War paradigms continue to undermine support for interagency collaboration. They (2009, ii) write, “. . . the mental model of many is the Cold War system, dominated by defense and intelligence and, to a lesser extent, diplomacy, each in its own separate domain. An integrated, horizontal model that includes non-traditional players is a leap beyond long-held beliefs about what works.”

A couple of examples illustrate changes occurring in the policy and political streams and highlight obstacles to near-term comprehensive reform. The first example is the plight of the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR). PNSR’s original report (2008a, i) states, “[PNSR], a bipartisan, private-public partnership, was established in 2006 to address the urgent need for system reform. A Guiding Coalition of twenty-five former senior officials with extensive national security experience sets its strategic direction and objectives.” PNSR was the primary policy entrepreneur for near-term comprehensive reform of the US NSS from 2008-2011. They were also the largest and most visible organization involved in the effort. Locher (2012) writes, “More than one
hundred organizations and three hundred national security professionals contributed to PNSR’s work.” As mentioned previously, seven members of PNSR’s guiding coalition were appointed to key national security positions in the first Obama administration. PNSR received congressional funding in 2008 and 2009 to study interagency issues. PNSR conducted more than 100 major case studies of the US NSS (2008a) and produced two major reports (2008b; 2009) describing how and why the US NSS should be reformed. After funding dried up in 2010, PNSR vowed to continue its research of and advocacy for comprehensive reform of the US NSS. However, as prospects for near-term comprehensive reform continued to diminish, PNSR ceased operations on December 31, 2011. James Locher III, PNSR’s President and CEO, states in his farewell memo (2012) that the political environment was not conducive to the comprehensive reform sought by PNSR. And as the Obama administration began its second term, only two of the seven personnel from PNSR’s guiding coalition remained in the government.

The second example is the National Security Professional Development (NSPD) program. The NSPD program—enacted on May 17, 2007 by Executive Order (E.O.) 13434—sought to increase interagency collaboration by establishing a cadre of national security professionals that are educated, trained, and experienced in facilitating integration among executive branch agencies. Dale (2011, 10) writes, “In 2008, the NSPD program provided a rough order of magnitude estimate that the program would eventually include approximately 20,000 federal government employees, of whom about 1,500 would be Senior Executive Service members, and the rest GS-13s through GS-15s (and their rank equivalents).” PNSR (2009, 76-77) notes that by the end of 2008, the
NSPD program had: “developed and promulgated the National Strategy for the Development of Security Professionals; provided Office of Personnel Management (OPM) guidance for developing promotion regulations and additional authorizations; created the National Security Professional Development Integration Office; and established a National Security Education and Training Board of Directors.” Dale (2011, 17) describes the changes that occurred in the NSPD program in 2009. She (2011, 17) writes, “Coming into office, the Obama Administration did not rescind the NSPD E.O., but neither did anyone at the White House immediately assume the mantle of leadership for the program. Then-NSPD [Implementation Office] Director Navas reportedly posted a sign in the office: ‘If the boss calls, get his name and number!’ Many referred to this period as a “strategic pause.” Dale (2011) notes that the program received renewed emphasis in 2010 and 2011 with a more narrow focus. The program was eventually relegated to a small test case in the National Preparedness mission to assess the benefits of interagency collaboration.

The literature suggest that there is little prospect for implementation of near-term comprehensive reform of the US NSS. Added to the lack of progress on near-term comprehensive reform efforts over the last decade is the system’s historical resistance to efforts to comprehensively alter interagency interaction in the US NSS. As highlighted in the Chapter Two section on the evolution of interagency interaction in the US NSS, the system experienced revolutionary reform (i.e., comprehensive reform in a short time period) of interagency interaction just once in the system’s first two hundred years, amidst extraordinary circumstances in the 1940s.
The above analysis of the literature suggest that a policy window for comprehensive reform may have been open in the late 2000s (arguably for the first time since the 1940s), but the window has since closed. If this analysis is accurate, then there are essentially three potential futures for higher levels of interagency interaction in the US NSS. The first future is no increase in the level of interagency interaction. Given the monumental obstacles to increasing the level of interagency interaction described in the literature, this appears to be the most likely outcome. As previously described, security analysts argue the costs and risks of this situation are unacceptably high and will grow as complex national security issues continue to increase in frequency, scale and scope. The second future is a catastrophic event, or series of events, will once again catalyze support for near-term comprehensive reform of interagency interaction. Komer (1972, 153) writes, “It is almost axiomatic that institutional change tends to be forced in the wake of what is widely perceived as a catastrophe, when accepted patterns of behavior are severely challenged as having failed.” Of course, in this future, the costs of failing to act now will be known only after the catastrophic event(s) occur(s). The third future is that increases in the level of interagency interaction in the US NSS will occur incrementally, similar to most other changes in the system over the last two hundred years. Incremental change often occurs over several decades and the increase in the level of interagency interaction from coexistence to coordination took more than a century. As long as the US NSS is unable to effectively integrate the elements of national power, it remains unacceptably vulnerable to the high costs and mission risks associated with complex national security issues.
3.1.3. Gaps in the Literature

The study next considered whether the concepts of open systems theory, collaboration, and complexity could shed any light on the proposals for increasing the level of interagency interaction in the US NSS. The literatures on open systems theory, collaboration, and complexity emphasize that the opportunities and challenges an organizational actor encounters are heavily influenced by where the actor is situated both in the organization and in the larger environment. Giddens’ notion of the “duality of social structure” and the complexity concept of “emergence” both highlight the importance of the relationships between an organizational actor, the actor’s environment, and the actor’s actions or strategies. Additionally, the collaboration literature suggests that the inhibitors and facilitators of higher levels of interagency interaction vary at different organizational levels.

The study’s attempt to apply these concepts to the literature on the US NSS was undermined by the dearth of information available in the literature regarding interagency interaction among individuals in the lower echelons of the system. The literature review revealed that most studies of the US NSS, as well as most reform recommendations and initiatives, were focused on the upper echelons of organizations in the system. Indeed, PNSR (2009, 10) defines the “interagency space” as “the space above the cabinet level and below the president.” Chun and Jones (2008, 172) add, “Scholars who have studied the interagency process have tended to examine it at the highest level, that is, the

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36 These concepts are described in the literature review sections on Organizational Analysis and Complexity, respectively.
National Security Council (NSC) level, focusing primarily on the presidential
decisionmaking level.”

The dearth of literature available on interagency interaction below the upper
echelons is all the more surprising given the potential importance accorded to lower
echelon workers in a host of studies (Desai 2005; Finney and La Porta 2008; Murdock,
Flournoy, Williams, and Campbell 2004; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon
the United States 2004; Wilson 2000, 33). Several studies of the US NSS (Olson 2008,
235; Project on National Security Reform 2008b, 283; Rast 1999, 573; Skocz 2008, 385)
raise the possibility that inhibitors and facilitators of higher levels of interagency
interaction may vary at different organizational levels. In one of the few studies found
involving interagency interaction among personnel in lower echelons of the US NSS,
Lamb and Munsing’s (2011) description of middle echelon officers on High Value Target
teams shows the potential for beneficial collaboration at this level and the ability to
overcome obstacles to collaboration. These findings add credibility to the notion in the
collaboration literature that obstacles to higher levels of interagency interaction among
individuals in the lower echelons of an organization may be less entrenched, and thus
easier to overcome, than they are among individuals in the upper echelons of an
organization. However, these insights typically appear in the literature as assumptions,
not as the focus of analysis. As such, this study proposes to address this gap in the
literature by examining the issue directly.
3.2. Problem Statement and Research Questions

Complex national security issues are increasing in frequency, scale, and scope. To effectively address complex national security issues the US NSS requires the capacity to rapidly integrate the full range of core competencies in the system, as well as the ability to identify and mitigate gaps in cross-organizational core competencies. Adequate integration of the system’s core competencies rarely occurs because they are dispersed across parochial bureaucracies that have historically eschewed interagency interaction and remain neither structured nor incentivized to effectively integrate core competencies. The system’s inability to adequately integrate its full range of core competencies is often a result of the dearth of higher levels of interagency interaction in the US NSS. The lack of interagency integration in the US NSS also hinders the system’s ability to identify and mitigate gaps in cross-organizational core competencies. It is not surprising that the US NSS struggles with interagency integration, as it has little experience with higher levels of interagency interaction and the system’s ingrained cultures, institutions, structures, and authorities militate against higher levels of interagency interaction. The lack of interagency integration decreases the likelihood that the US NSS will develop and achieve effective national security goals, and increases the likelihood of expending unnecessary time, money, materiel, lives, and national prestige pursuing those goals. Several studies conclude that the inability to integrate the elements of national power puts the nation’s prosperity, freedom, and safety at risk.

A host of post-Cold War studies provide a broad range of recommendations for comprehensively reforming the US NSS to enable it to remove or overcome obstacles to higher levels of interagency interaction. The reform recommendations are widely
supported and minor portions have been implemented. In 2009, the incoming Obama administration appeared poised to adopt many of the key reform recommendations. However, as the Obama administration begins its seventh year in office, few of the recommendations have been enacted, obstacles to higher levels of interagency interaction in the US NSS remain entrenched, and momentum for reform appears to be waning. Based on the lack of progress on recent integration efforts and the system’s long history of eschewing radical change, unless a catastrophic event catalyzes support for comprehensive reform, any increases in the system’s level of interagency interaction are likely to occur incrementally over a prolonged period of time.

The literature also reveals that most studies of the US NSS, as well as most reform recommendations and initiatives, focus on individuals in the upper echelons of the system. Given the potential for bottom-up changes to alter an entire system, as highlighted in the literature on organizational analysis and complexity, the study endeavored to improve understanding of interagency interaction below the top levels of the US NSS and identify overlooked opportunities for raising the level of interagency interaction. Perhaps bottom-up approaches can complement current top-down approaches to expedite raising the system’s level of interagency interaction. The literature review culminated in the development of the following problem statement and research questions.

**Problem Statement**

The problems the research endeavored to address were the low levels of interagency interaction among departments and agencies in the US NSS, the system’s
resistance to efforts to raise the level of interagency interaction, and the dearth of literature available on interagency interaction in the middle echelons of the US NSS.

**Research Questions**

Research Questions 1 and 2: What is the level of interagency interaction among middle echelon officers (MEOs) in the US NSS? How do the levels of MEO interagency interaction compare with the levels of UEO interagency interaction?

Research Questions 3 and 4: What inhibits higher levels of interagency interaction of MEOs in the US NSS? How do the inhibitors of higher levels of MEO interagency interaction differ from the inhibitors of higher levels of UEO interagency interaction?

Research Questions 5 and 6: What facilitates higher levels of interagency interaction of MEOs in the US NSS? How do the facilitators of higher levels of MEO interagency interaction differ from the facilitators of higher levels of UEO interagency interaction?

The next section describes the research methods employed to answer the research questions and conveys theoretical and practical considerations that influenced methodology selection and implementation.

**3.3. Methodological Processes**

This section on methodological processes begins by clarifying several key concepts used in the study. The section then describes the processes (i.e., methodology selection, case selection, data collection, data analysis, and conclusion and verification) employed to develop the study and address the research questions.
3.3.1. Key Concepts
The study’s key concepts can be broadly grouped into three categories: participant, interaction, and complexity. The participant category includes the following concepts: US national security system (NSS), US NSS leadership, president, national security bureaucracies, and echelons within the bureaucracies. The study views the US NSS as \textit{the government entities, along with the mechanisms that facilitate interaction within and between those entities, involved in producing the nation’s security strategies and in developing and implementing policies designed to contribute to successful execution of the strategies.}

The primary participants in the US NSS are leadership and the national security bureaucracies. Leadership refers to Congress and the president. The term “president” is occasionally employed in a broad sense that includes the president and those in the Executive Office of the President (e.g., Chief of Staff, National Security Advisor, and the NSC staff) involved in national security issues. In other locations, the study uses the term “president” to refer solely to the individual occupying the office. The study endeavors to ensure that the context of the sentence would make it clear whether the broader or narrower conception of the term is intended.

The national security bureaucracies consist of the executive departments and agencies involved in national security issues. The participants vary by issue, but typically include Defense, State, Homeland Security, and CIA, and may include Justice, Treasury, Energy, Interior, Agriculture, and others. The study further differentiates between personnel in the upper, middle, and lower echelons of the national security bureaucracies,
referring to them as upper echelon officers (UEOs), middle echelon officers (MEOs), and lower echelon personnel, respectively.

UEOs are the top officials in each national security agency and are typically their organizations’ representatives to NSC Principals and Deputies Committee meetings, and to lower level NSC working groups (currently called interagency policy committees). The minimum grade of individuals leading the routine activities of an interagency policy committee (IPC) is typically an FS-01, GS-15, or O-6. Each of the participants in these national security policy committees are supported by a wide range of personnel in lower grades. These factors led to the study’s use of the following grade criteria as a basic guide for differentiating MEOs from UEOs and lower echelon personnel: MEOs consist of personnel in Foreign Service officer grades FS-04 through FS-02; civil service grades GS-12 through GS-14; and military officer grades O-3 through O-5. UEOs and lower echelon personnel are, respectively, in the echelons above or below MEOs. MEOs are often referred to in the literature as action officers (Olson 2008; Skocz 2008; Whitaker, Smith, and McKune 2008) or front-line workers (Wilson 2000). Lower echelon personnel represent primarily administrative workers or very junior officers going through initial training or learning their trade in their first or second assignment.

The interaction category addresses the study’s concepts for characterizing interagency interaction. The study views interagency interaction as interaction between personnel in the executive branch of government who are not members of the same cabinet-level department. The study’s concept of interagency interaction was further

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37 The official lead of an IPC is typically at least an ambassador, senior executive, or general officer. However, the routine activities of the committee are often handled by lower ranking personnel.
refined using different levels of interaction described in the collaboration literature. The five levels of interagency interaction (i.e., coexistence, communication, coordination, cooperation, and collaboration) reflect increasing agency interdependence as the levels rise from coexistence towards collaboration. The study uses the term “purposeful interagency interaction” to refer to all levels of interaction above communication. The study uses the term “higher levels of interagency interaction” to refer to the top two levels of interagency interaction (i.e., interagency cooperation and collaboration). Three conditions had to be met for interagency interaction to be classified as collaboration. The first condition was the interaction of at least two interagency personnel in an entity distinguishable from the participants’ parent organization. The second condition was the participants in the interagency entity mutually developed the entity’s objectives. The third condition was the participants subordinated the goals of their parent organization to the goals of the interagency entity. A few examples are provided to clarify these distinctions. Example 1: A military security detail is tasked to provide security for State Department personnel attending a diplomatic meeting in a deployed location. This situation would be categorized as cooperation rather than collaboration because military resources were used to facilitate achievement of a State Department objective. Example 2: The NSC tasks the State Department to lead an interagency effort to identify and capture war criminals in a given region. The State Department stands up an interagency task force comprising personnel from State, Defense, and other executive departments. Task force members mutually develop the group’s goals and prioritize those goals over the goals of their parent organizations. This situation would be categorized as collaboration. Example 3: A
political advisor provided by the State Department to a military headquarters provides the military with political advice during the planning of a combat operation. This situation would be considered cooperation because State Department resources were used to facilitate the achievement of a military objective.

A critical concept in this study is the distinction between intra-level and inter-level changes in interagency interaction. Intra-level changes in interagency interaction involve changes in the quality or quantity of interaction within a given level (i.e., changes in degree). Inter-level changes in interagency interaction involve changes in the quality or quantity of interaction that result in a transition up or down the Hierarchy of Interaction depicted in Table 1 (i.e., changes in type). The study focused on increases in inter-level interaction, though intra-level improvements were noted. As such, the study’s use of terms such as “increasing the level of interagency interaction” refer to either inter-level increases in interaction from one of the first four levels of interaction or an intra-level improvements in interaction at the highest level of interaction (i.e., collaboration).

The complexity category addresses the study’s concept of complex national security issues. A strict application of the complexity concept of “emergence” produces the unhelpful result of labeling every national security issue “complex.” The study developed a narrower conception of the term “complex national security issues” to more closely reflect how the term was typically used in the literature. The study views “complex national security issues” as involving at least two elements (e.g., diplomatic, defense, development, economic, etc.) and the primacy of the elements involved is subject to frequent variations across time and locations. For example, during a stability
operation, defense elements would likely have priority in Town A as combat forces are
engaged with insurgents, at the same time that diplomatic elements would have priority in
Town B as US representatives are meeting with town elders to discuss governance issues.
The next day, diplomatic elements may have priority in Town A as US representatives
and elders meet, at the same time that defense elements retake priority in Town B due to
the re-emergence of insurgent forces there. Additionally, complex national security issues
tend to develop more rapidly, change more frequently, and involve larger numbers of
diverse participants than non-complex issues.

3.3.2. Methodology Selection

Given the study’s focus on characterizing interagency interaction between MEOs
in the US NSS and identifying inhibitors and facilitators of higher levels of MEO
interagency interaction, the first methodological process involved selecting a research
approach suitable for exploratory research of complex phenomena. Quantitative,
qualitative and mixed approaches were considered. The next few paragraphs summarize
the methodological literature that was reviewed and describe the rationale for employing
a case study as the primary methodology.

The Complexity literature suggests that traditional reductive methods are of
limited utility for analyzing complex phenomena. Miller and Page (2007, 9) argue,
“Complicated worlds are reducible, whereas complex ones are not.” As such,
complicated phenomena lend themselves to traditional reductive methods of scientific
analysis; in complex systems, however, the importance of the interaction of the parts
drastically reduces the benefits of reductive analysis. To improve understanding of
complex phenomena, Jervis (1997, 13) claims, “Reductionism—seeking to understand the system by looking only at the units and their relations with one another—is not appropriate.” Bar-Yam (1997, 9) observes that the differential equations employed by traditional analytical methods are inappropriate for complex phenomena because they lose critical data due to smoothing. Arthur et al. (1997, 11) note that “nonlinear effects require nonlinear inferential techniques.” Bar-Yam (1997, 11) summarizes, “Emergent properties cannot be studied by physically taking a system apart and looking at the parts (reductionism). They can however, be studied by looking at each of the parts in the context of the system as a whole.”

Saunders-Newton and Axtell (Saunders-Newton and Axtell 2006, 4-5) note that most complex systems are not amenable to prediction, thus complex analytical tools are designed for the purposes of explanation or prescription. Waldrop (1992, 39) challenges critics within the social sciences who assert the superiority of predictive models, “Predictions are nice, if you can make them. But the essence of science lies in explanation, laying bare the fundamental mechanisms of nature. That’s what biologists, geologists, and astronomers do in their fields.” Halperin, Clapp, and Kanter (2006, 4) address the need to improve understanding of how participants deal with, and contribute to, the complexity in policy processes. Their (2006, 4) focus on discovering who is involved, what their interests are, and how their interests affect their actions highlights the importance of understanding the agents, the agents’ strategies of action, and the environments in which the agents interact.
The primary tool used in complexity analyses are computational models. Miller and Page (2007, 26-27) argue that computational models offer a rigorous quantitative complement to the abundance of qualitative methodologies present in the social sciences of sociology, anthropology, and psychology. A particularly powerful computational model that offers analysts the ability “to study the interactions between individuals and institutions” (Epstein and Axtell 1996, 17) and “to trace how individual (micro) rules generate macroscopic regularities” (Epstein 2006) is agent-based modeling. Saunders-Newton and Axtell (2006, 11) note that agent-based models have several features that are more reflective of real-world social phenomena than traditional quantitative models. Unlike traditional models, agent-based models allow for the direct interaction of heterogeneous agents possessing bounded rationality in an environment that doesn’t assume or require equilibrium.

However, computational models are only as good as the starting conditions and assumptions of the model’s developers. Additionally, the results of the models are of little value without experts to interpret the data. To provide a basis of knowledge for building robust computational models and for interpreting outputs of the models, Axelrod and Cohen’s (1999, xii) framework for systematically analyzing complex environments incorporates qualitative methodologies. Applying their framework to social systems results in using methodologies of the social sciences—particularly sociology, anthropology, and psychology—to obtain the basis of knowledge needed for conducting effective agent-based modeling.
The literature on interagency interaction among MEOs in the US NSS reveals that the current level of understanding of this phenomenon provides an inadequate basis for conducting agent-based modeling. Therefore, the study sought to increase understanding of interagency interaction through the use of research methodologies of organizational analysts. Organizational analysts contributing to the reviewed national security literature use a host of primarily qualitative tools to help them better understand their subject. By no means does this represent a rejection of quantitative methods, as several of the reviewed works also employed quantitative techniques. Rather, the methodologies employed to obtain and analyze information appeared primarily influenced by the research question, the perspective of the researcher, and the potential sources of information. The qualitative methodologies employed by organizational analysts include case studies, open-ended interviews, participant observations, ethnomethodologies, network analysis, surveys, and historical and archival analysis. Interviews were the most frequently used method for collecting data, typically as part of historical or comparative cases studies. An example of this approach is PNSR’s (2008a) use of more than 100 case studies to analyze US national security policy processes. Interviews are often augmented by reviews of available primary and secondary data.

After reviewing the methodology literature and considering the characteristics of the phenomena of interest, a case study was selected as the primary methodology for the research. Case studies provide researchers with several valuable tools. Case studies also enable the study of broad and complex environments, capture context better than many other research strategies, are valuable even when little or no theory is available on an
issue, and are suitable for explanatory research, theses building, and theses testing. Yin (2003, 3) asserts that case studies are appropriate for exploratory, descriptive, and explanatory research. Cutler (2004, 367) adds that case studies are preferable for investigating “activities or complex processes that are not easily separated from the social context within which they occur.” The lack of limits on variables under consideration provides the case study researcher an advantage over quantitative researchers for analyzing broad and complex phenomenon. Gummesson (2007, 229) writes, “[Case study research] allows the study of complexity, context, ambiguity and chaos. It allows a holistic, systemic approach with an unlimited number of variables and links.” Cutler (2004, 367) notes that case studies are often preferred in circumstances where understanding context is critical to understanding the phenomena being analyzed. Edwards (1998, 40) states that case-based research enables data to be contextualized. He (1998, 37) adds, “Quantitative multivariate methods have the advantage of allowing researchers to measure and control variables, but they have the disadvantage that the resulting theory often fails to take account of the unique characteristics of individual cases.”

Case studies are well known for their value in exploratory research and theses development. Eisenhardt (1989) writes, “[Case study research] is particularly well-suited to new research areas or research areas for which existing theory seems inadequate.” Stake (1978, 7) observes, “Its best use appears to me to be for adding to existing experience and humanistic understanding.” He (Stake 1978, 5) observes that another valuable characteristic of case studies is they resonate with people’s experiences. Case
study methodologies more closely resemble the experiential nature in which most potential audiences think about their own world. Therefore, the analysis is likely to be better received and understood.

Generalizability and objectivity are important considerations for any research approach. Several researchers addressed concerns regarding the generalizability and objectivity of case study findings and of qualitative research in general. Yin (2003, 10) writes, “Case studies . . . are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes. . . . In doing a case study, your goal will be to expand and generalize theories (analytical generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization).” Berg (2007, 294) asserts, “Objectivity is actually closely linked with reproducibility.” Berg (2007, 295) goes on to describe how researchers endeavor to increase objectivity, “For many researchers, objectivity rests on the ability of an investigator to articulate what the procedures are so that others can repeat the research if they so choose.” This study adopted Berg’s approach and attempted to enhance the study’s objectivity by clarifying all steps taken in the development and use of the study’s methodological processes.

The literature reveals that case studies are often undermined by inadequate methodological rigor. Cutler (2004, 372-373) points out that many case studies fail “to link the choice of methodology to the theoretical issues being investigated” and “to describe a reliable data gathering method, thereby rendering it impossible to build on, or replicate the research.” Dul and Hak (2008, 26-27) note that many case studies do not provide the aim of the research, protocol descriptions, or criteria for case selection,
measurement, and analysis. Another methodological pitfall to be avoided is failing to
clearly delineate the boundaries of the case. A case study allows a researcher significant
freedom for exploring a wide range of phenomena within the defined boundaries.
However, if the boundaries aren’t clearly delineated, the researcher may become
overwhelmed with data or develop a skewed understanding due to including outside data.
Cutler (2004, 368) writes, “If the boundary is vague or porous, the situation is not a
case.” The study took several measures to mitigate the potential for these factors to
undermine the research. The preceding paragraphs describe how the selected
methodology is linked to the theoretical issues of interest. The research design section
explains how the literature review resulted in the study’s research questions. The next
few paragraphs describe case selection and bounding criteria, followed by explanations of
the study’s processes for data collection and analysis.

3.3.3. Case Selection and Bounding Criteria
The specific case study selected was of interagency interaction of middle echelon
officers (MEOs) in the State Department and the Department of Defense who participated
in US processes to develop and implement policies for Bosnia between 1993 and 1998.
The remainder of this subsection explains the rationale for selecting this case and
delineates the boundaries of the case. The search for an appropriate case was guided by
the findings of the literature review and by the study’s research questions. The research
questions dictated that the study focus on interagency interaction between MEOs in the
US NSS. Several factors contributed to the study’s decision to further limit the focus to
interagency interaction of MEOs at State and Defense. The State Department and the
Department of Defense have long been the main bureaucracies involved in US foreign policy. Even under the expanding concepts of national security described in the literature review, these two departments (along with USAID) have primary responsibility for what are commonly referred to as the three “Ds” of national security (i.e., diplomacy, development, and defense). Additionally, the literature review section showed that obstacles to interaction between upper level personnel in these two departments have been singled out in both historical literature and in recent assessments.

The search for an appropriate case study was further limited by considering only armed conflicts occurring after the end of the Cold War. The limitation to armed conflicts was designed to ensure sufficient Defense involvement. The timeframe was primarily driven by a common sentiment found in the literature asserting that the post-Cold War national security environment was increasingly complex. US activities after the terrorists’ attacks of September 11, 2001 were excluded from consideration. Many of these activities were ongoing, and therefore not considered appropriate for research, when this study was designed in 2010. Several conflicts in the 1990s were considered, including US involvement in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The selection of Bosnia was influenced by the existence of several previous studies (sources are listed in the next subsection on data collection) of interagency interaction among individuals in the upper echelons of the US NSS as they developed and implemented US policy for Bosnia.

Designating dates to mark the beginning and end of the case study proved challenging. Potential starting points included the end of the Cold War, the secession of Slovenia or Croatia from Yugoslavia in 1991, Bosnia’s declaration of independence in
1992, or the beginning of the Balkan War. Good arguments can be made that even these events do not mark the beginning of the issue. The death of President Tito in 1980, or the events that brought him to power after World War II, are also logical starting points. However, keeping in mind that this study is not as concerned with the issues occurring in Bosnia as it is with US national security policy processes, it was decided to use President Clinton’s first Presidential Review Directive (PRD) in February of 1993 as the starting point for the case study. As noted by Rast and Lehrke (2008, 392), this PRD “called for an assessment of US policy towards Bosnia” and “generated a draft decision directive in early February 1993 that proposed a ‘lift-and-strike’ strategy (i.e., lifting the arms embargo and using air strikes) for Bosnia.”

Designating an end point for the case study was no less elusive. Contributing to the challenge was the fact that the US still has troops in Bosnia; though it now has a few hundred troops rather than the 20,000 involved during the 1996 peak (Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik 2004, 75; Grimmett 1999; Whitmore 2004). One date considered was 2004, when the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) ended its eight year mission in Bosnia. Ultimately, the date chosen to end the case, December 31, 1998, was based upon a combination of factors: time of US involvement, troop numbers, and the changing geopolitical environment. For the three years from the beginning of 1993 until almost the end of 1995, US policy in Bosnia was focused upon ceasing the hostilities there. The first year after the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) in late
1995, US policy was focused on bringing about the peace agreed to in the treaty. After 1996, US policy transitioned to maintaining the tentative peace. Thus, the main reason for ending the case in 1998 is that it establishes two approximately equal time frames in which the purpose of US national security policy differed substantially; with the first three years focused upon conflict termination and the latter three years focused upon establishing and maintaining peace. Two additional factors influenced the selection of the end date. First, by 1999, US troop levels in Bosnia had dropped to less than a quarter of their 1996 peak (Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik 2004, 124; Grimmett 1999). Second, the war in Kosovo that began in 1999 shifted the focus of most US policy makers away from Bosnia.

3.3.4. Data Collection
This subsection on data collection explains the purpose of the data collected, provides the original plan for collecting data, and describes how data collection actually occurred. The overarching purpose of data collection was to help address the study’s research questions. Ragin (1994, 26) writes, “The choice of data collection technique is in large part shaped by the nature of the research question.” Additionally, Berg (2007, 44) notes that a study’s data collection processes must be intricately tied to its data analysis processes. As such, the study’s data collection processes were designed to produce raw data for use in content analysis.39

To address the research questions, the study required information on the interagency interaction of State and Defense UEOs and MEOs. The study’s plan for

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38 The GFAP for Bosnia and Herzegovina was initially agreed to in Dayton, Ohio in November of 1995 and formally signed in Paris, France in December of 1995.
39 Content analysis is described in the next subsection
collecting this information was centered on semi-structured interviews and secondary sources. The semi-structured interviews were intended to be the main source for insights into the interagency experiences of State and Defense MEOs. Given that there were numerous existing studies that address the interagency interaction of State and Defense UEOs, these were expected to be the primary source of information for UEO interagency interaction. However, both sources were expected to yield some level of insight into the interagency interaction of UEOs and MEOs, alike. Potential interviewees included people who had been State or Defense UEOs or MEOs between 1993 and 1998 and had been involved in US processes to develop or implement US policies for Bosnia.

The original research plan involved several means for identifying and obtaining access to potential interviewees. Secondary sources such as books, journal articles, and government reports were expected to be the primary source for identifying the organizations and positions that State and Defense UEOs and MEOs had been a part of as they engaged in these policy processes, and for identifying specific study participants. The researcher’s access to individual and organizational contacts was anticipated to identify additional participants. Such contacts included George Mason University School of Public Policy’s Peace Operations Policy Program, the Center for a New American Security, and the Project on National Security Reform. Once identified, the plan was to recruit potential participants via email, phone, or face to face interaction.

The plan was to conduct most of the research in the Washington, DC area. Most of the contacts mentioned above where in the area and it was assumed that most of the interviews could therefore be conducted in person, augmented by a few phone interviews.
of individuals outside of the area. With the participants’ permission, interviews were to be recorded and later transcribed. Hand-written notes were to be taken at all interviews. Appendix A2 (Interview Protocol) contains a list of questions that were designed to be tailored to fit the specific circumstances of each participant in the study. The desire was for each interview to produce additional raw data that would be appropriate for content analysis.

The study planned to augment the data obtained from interviews with data from secondary sources. It was anticipated that the secondary sources would include official documentary records (e.g., legislation, presidential statements, etc.) and commercial media accounts (e.g., memoirs, studies, etc.). Secondary source data was expected to facilitate content analysis, to serve as a check on the information received in the interviews, and to provide insights into the interagency interactions of UEOs. Berg (2007, 286) writes, “as [interview] data is being collected, the researcher constantly considers what is being unearthed, making comparisons between information (data) collected and assessments with other researchers (to assure unbiased interpretations and analysis) and the literature.”

The research had just begun when a job-related move from Northern Virginia to California required several adjustments to the data collection plan. The primary impact of the change was that most interviews were conducted via phone instead of in person. Being far from the Washington, DC area also made it more challenging to identify and obtain access to potential participants and limited access to some of the archival data available in the area. As a result, interviewee referrals ended up being the primary means
for identifying additional participants. Apart from those adjustments, data collection proceeded rather closely in line with the original plan.

The remainder of this section describes the sources, processes, and assumptions this study employed to establish the State and Defense positions involved in US policy processes for Bosnia between 1993 and 1998 and the approximate number of personnel in each position (see Tables 4 and 5), and to collect data that would be valuable for content analysis. Tables 4 and 5 were composed using the information generated from content analysis of the interview data and the ten previous studies described in this section.

### Table 4 State & Defense MEOs involved in U.S. Bosnia Policy between 1993-1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positions</th>
<th>Average Number of MEOs</th>
<th>Pre-Dayton</th>
<th>Post-Dayton</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defense Specific Positions</td>
<td>1,540</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Military HQ staff</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Military Operators</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>700</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Embassy Defense Attachés</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs Officers in Bosnia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Military Command Center MEOs</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Specific Positions</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embassy Political Officers</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State MEOs seconded to IOs</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Officers at US Mission to the UN</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positions with State and Defense MEOs</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>290</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State and Defense Country Desk Officers</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State and Defense Functional Desk Officers</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Back-Office State and Defense Staff</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State and Defense MEOs on Department</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Referrals were not anticipated to be a major contributor to the pool of participants. It is not clear whether referrals would have been as widely used if the research was conducted in the Washington, DC area, but they proved very effective at identifying participants.
The data collection process began by gathering and reviewing existing studies of State and Defense involvement in Bosnia. The following studies were used: Operation Deliberate Force (Owen 2000), Joint Task Force Provide Promise (Stewart, Fabbri, and Siegel 1994), Oral History of Operation Joint Endeavor (Raugh Jr. 2010), Oral History of Ambassador Farrand (Farrand 2005), Lessons from Bosnia (Wentz 1997), Armed Peacekeepers in Bosnia (Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik 2004), The Road to Dayton
(Chollet 2005), and Interagency Paralysis: Stagnation in Bosnia and Kosovo (Rast and Lehrke 2008). These studies identified organizations and positions that State and Defense MEOs were involved in as they engaged in US policy processes for Bosnia between 1993 and 1998. Careful review of these studies enabled rough order approximations of the average number of State and Defense MEOs involved in US policy processes for Bosnia between 1993 and 1998. Of course, the average number of State and Defense MEOs varied between 1993 and 1998. In general, the average number of State and Defense MEOs gradually increased from 1993 through 1995, spiked in December of 1995 with the signing of the Dayton Accords and the commitment of US ground troops, and gradually declined through 1998. The largest variation in numbers resulted when the US military committed ground troops in late 1995 and early 1996. For the sake of simplicity, the study used two numbers for military MEOs, the average number across the three years prior to commitment of US ground troops in December 1995 and the average number across the three years after the commitment of ground troops. Due to the fact that there was much less variation in the number of State personnel involved in Bosnia, one average was used for State MEOs for the duration of the case study.

An important note regarding numbers estimates for the study. The study endeavored to not only identify the standard level of interagency interaction among the majority of State and Defense MEOs involved in US policy for Bosnia, but to also provide insights into variations in the levels of interagency interaction among various

41 The study treated US personnel assigned to international organizations (e.g., the Office of the High Representative and NATO’s Implementation Force) as interacting on behalf of their parent US organizations.
MEO sub-groups. As such, the study used approximate numbers of MEOs in various roles, locations, and positions (based on a synthesis of information from previous studies, interview responses, other secondary sources, and assumptions) to gain order of magnitude insights into these MEO sub-groups’ proportionate involvement in different levels of interagency interaction. So, while the study strove to obtain broadly accurate estimates of these MEOs, exact numbers were not a goal of the study and the numbers should not be interpreted as such. This also applies to the data in the UEO tables used to facilitate UEO and MEO comparisons. Similarly, the percentages and proportions used in many of the study’s tables should also be viewed as approximations used to facilitate broad comparisons of sub-group members.

The positions occupied by State and Defense MEOs involved in US policy for Bosnia fell into three broad categories: Defense specific positions, State specific positions, and positions involving both Defense and State MEOs. It is important to note the study treated US personnel assigned to international organizations (e.g., US personnel assigned to the Office of the High Representative or NATO’s Implementation Force) as interacting on behalf of their parent organizations. Although assignment to an international organization could further complicate the factors involved in interagency interaction, the existing studies demonstrate that assignment to an international organization was not a major obstacle to interaction between State and Defense personnel. The literature identified at least five broad positions that were specific to Defense MEOs: overseas military headquarters staff; overseas military operators conducting military air, land, and sea operations; overseas embassy defense attachés;
overseas civil affairs officers; staff officers in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and on the Joint Staff. Buamann, Gawrych, and Kretchik (2004, 61) describe the more than a dozen US and international military headquarters throughout Europe where State and Defense MEOs were involved in developing and implementing policy. Wentz (23) describes how the number of personnel in some of these headquarters swelled in December of 1995. Using the numbers of organization and positions of these sources as a basis, the study approximated that there were an average of 1,000 military MEOs in overseas staff positions prior to December 1995. After December 1995, with the addition of staff to existing overseas headquarters and the standup of new military headquarters in and around Bosnia, the study approximated that the average number of military MEOs in overseas headquarters staff (referred to as HQ staff for the remainder of the study) positions rose to 1,700.

US overseas military operators were involved in numerous operations prior to December 1995: Operation Provide Promise (Stewart, Fabbri, and Siegel 1994, 178), Operation Deny Flight (Wentz 1997, 22-23), Operation Sharp Guard (Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik 2004, 64), and Operation Deliberate Force (Ibid., 66). Based upon the number of ships and air sorties involved in these operations, the study approximated an average of 500 overseas military operators prior to December of 1995. In December 1995, US overseas military operators were primarily involved in Operation Joint Endeavor as part of NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR). US Task Force Eagle comprised the bulk of the US force with approximately 17,500 troops in 1996, 8,500

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42 For the first year, US overseas military operators were part NATO’s implementation force (IFOR). At the end of 1996, IFOR changed to a stabilization force (SFOR).
troops in 1997, and 6,900 in 1998 (Ibid., 120). The study used an average across this period of 11,000 US troops. Assuming that approximately 1 in 20 ground troops was a MEO, and assuming another 150 MEOs were involved in air sortie generation, the study approximated the average number of MEOs post-December 1995 to be 700. The study excluded MEOs who did not have a direct role in developing or implementing US policy. For example, Stewart, Fabbri, and Siegel (1994, 178) note that in June 1993, there were 15,500 sailors and Marines under the operational control of the US military joint task force running Operation Provide Promise for Bosnia. Most of the MEOs who were a part of this contingent were involved in day-to-day ship operations and were not involved in developing or implementing US policy for Bosnia.

The three primary US embassies involved were the US Embassy Sarajevo, US Embassy Belgrade, and US Embassy Croatia. The study assumed a few defense attachés were assigned to each embassy for an estimated total of ten defense attachés. Overseas US civil affairs officers were not involved until after Dayton. Wentz (1997, 31) provided aggregate numbers of overseas civil affair officers. Based upon these estimates, the study approximated that there were an average of 50 overseas civil affairs MEOs post-Dayton. The study assumed that the average number of staff officers in OSD and the Joint Staff would roughly equate to that at a large overseas headquarters; thus it was approximated that 200 Pentagon staff officers were involved for the duration of the case study.

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The literature identified at least three broad positions specific to State MEOs: Embassy political officers; State MEOs seconded to international organizations such as NATO, the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the United Nations’ High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); and staff officers at Foggy Bottom. Based on Rosati’s (2004, 142-143) numbers of oversees embassies and US Foreign Service Officers, the study estimated that an average of ten MEO political officers at each embassy, for a total of 30 MEO embassy political officers. Assuming roughly a dozen State MEOs per international organization, the study approximated 50 State MEOs involved as part of international organizations. Rosati’s (2004, 142-143) numbers on stateside Foreign Service Officers provided the basis for an estimated 100 MEO staff officers at Foggy Bottom.

The literature identified two broad positions involving State and Defense MEOs: MEOs assigned to the NSC staff and MEOs assigned to national working groups.\textsuperscript{44} PNSR (2008b “Forging”, 142) clarified that the number of people on the NSC staff never exceeded 110 during the case study. The study assumed that approximately one-third of the NSC staff were State and Defense MEOs and that just over half of them were involved with Bosnia processes, resulting in an estimated average of 20 State and Defense MEO NSC staff officers. Ambassador Holbrooke (1998, 83) had seven people on his negotiating team. The study assumed that his team had an average of ten State and

\textsuperscript{44} Ambassador Holbrooke’s negotiating team in 1995 or Ambassador Gelbard’s implementation team from 1996 forward.
Defense MEOs directly supporting his team. The study further assumed that the number of State and Defense MEOs was similar on Ambassador Gelbard’s implementation team.

The data collection process then turned to collecting interview data. Interviewees were identified from the existing literature, professional contacts, and references obtained from other interviewees. Thirty-seven interviews were conducted; twenty MEOs and seventeen UEOs (see Appendix A3 for a full listing of interviewees). Most of the interviews were recorded and the recordings were typically transcribed within days. In a few instances where numerous interviews occurred in a week, a couple of weeks passed before interviews were fully transcribed. Notes were also taken of each interview.

This study’s preliminary estimates of State and Defense MEOs’ positions and numbers were refined based on inputs received during interviews and on information from additional studies released while the study was ongoing, such as: How Effective was Civil Affairs in Bosnia (Lescher 2013), Secret Weapon (Lamb and Munsing 2011), and Bosnia Train and Equip Program (Lamb, Arkin, and Scudder 2014). These refinements are reflected in the positions and numbers estimates contained in Table 4. A State MEO clarified that the State Department increased the number of relevant country desks from one desk covering all of the former-Yugoslavia in 1992 to five distinct country desks the next year. A military UEO provided insights into the number of functional desk officers on the Joint Staff. State and Defense each had a Bosnia task force that was primarily constituted of in-house UEOs and MEOs, but also included a few UEOs and MEOs from external agencies. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) ran Defense’s Bosnia task force. A Defense UEO provided the following description of
membership on the OSD Bosnia task force, “We had a State guy, other than that it was all
DOD: some DIA guys, OSD, some uniforms. It was basically a DOD outfit but we did have a State Department representative. We also had a former NGO guy in it. . . . The task force had approximately 15 members.” Another Defense UEO noted that Defense and State’s respective Bosnian task forces were similar in size. Country and functional desk officers were often part of their department’s task force. To account for this overlap, the numbers of State and Defense country and functional officers were reduced in Table 4 to reflect that a few of them were participating on their department’s Bosnia task force. Similarly, the study distinguishes back-office State and Defense staff from the State and Defense MEOs on the department BTFs and the country and functional desk officers. The latter groups of MEOs were specified because they typically were far more involved in interagency interaction then the former groups who were more involved in back-office analysis and planning.

Other positions added to the study based upon interview responses were Defense MEOs in the National Military Command Center (NMCC), political officers at the US Mission to the UN, and State and Defense MEOs who were on exchange or excursion tours with the other agency (e.g., military MEOs assigned to State’s operations center, staff MEOs assigned to the other agency, and overseas civil affairs officers assigned to international organizations run by State personnel). Additionally, interview respondents suggested that there were an average of ten State and Defense MEOs on the NSC staff working on US policy for Bosnia.
Interviews, secondary sources, and assumptions also facilitated the development of similar numbers approximations for UEOs (see Table 5). Interviews continued until a representative cross-section of UEOs and MEOs from the positions in Tables 4 and 5 had been interviewed and the data analysis indicated that category “saturation” had been achieved. The study interviewed at least one individual (MEO or UEO) from every organization represented in Tables 4 and 5, with the exception of POLADs and personnel in the NMCC. Typically, multiple personnel were interviewed for each position: military personnel from multiple levels of overseas HQ staff (from the combatant command headquarters down to battalion-level operations centers), four embassy officers, five personnel assigned to international organizations, five country desk officers, four regional officers, five functional officers, five members of the respective department’s Bosnia task force, and multiple personnel (eleven total) from each of the national working groups.

3.3.5. Data Analysis
Content analysis was the study’s primary method of data analysis. Content analysis was selected due to its value for exploratory research. Berg (2007, 328) notes that content analysis enables analysis of events that span several years and is well-suited to generating theories of cause and effect relationships between variables. He (2007, 303-304) states, “Content analysis is a careful, detailed, systematic examination and interpretation of a particular body of material in an effort to identify patterns, themes, biases, and meanings.” The study employed Berg’s content analysis process to identify patterns, themes, biases, and meanings in the collected data. Berg (304) writes that

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45 Saturation is described in the next section on content analysis
content analysis “is chiefly a coding operation and data interpreting process.” The study undertook the following iterative four-step process based upon Berg’s (2007, 305-306, 325-327) description of the components of content analysis:

Step 1: Identify research question(s)

Step 2: Collect and transcribe data

Step 3: Open Coding

3a: Develop codes (category or concept) deductively and inductively

3b: Develop objective criteria for sorting data into various categories

3c: Sort text into categories (modify categories if appropriate)

Step 4: Analyze and characterize sorted data; explain how findings contribute to research questions

Steps 1 and 2 were addressed in previous sections. The first round of open coding began by using the research questions as deductive categories for coding. Then, interview notes and transcripts were reviewed line-by-line to develop inductive categories. As these categories were established, specific rules were developed for including and excluding themes from the deductive and inductive categories. The process continued as additional interview notes and transcripts were reviewed. Each process began with a line-by-line analysis of the interview notes and transcripts, placing themes within the relevant categories based upon the established rules. Categories were merged, changed, or deleted as patterns emerged or when there was inadequate evidence to support keeping a category. The study adhered to Berg’s (2007, 327) recommendation, “that a minimum of three occurrences of something can be considered a pattern.” By the twenty-fourth
interview, the additional information coming from the interviews essentially conformed to the established categories. The analysis appeared to have reached what Glaser and Strauss (1967, 62) refer to as “saturation.” Although saturation was apparent at that point, more than a dozen additional interviews were conducted, transcribed, and analyzed. Interviewing continued past suspected saturation to ensure the study had considered a representative cross-section of organizations, positions, UEOs, and MEOs, and to confirm that saturation had been achieved.

The categories and themes resulting from the open coding were then arranged by the study’s research question. They were then compared with the information found in the existing case studies. The existing cases studies, along with the robust literature on obstacles to UEO interagency interaction described in the literature review, provided context for several of the findings from the interviews and were especially helpful in facilitating comparisons of the interagency interactions of UEOs and MEOs.
CHAPTER 4. FINDINGS I: CONTEXT AND LEVELS OF INTERAGENCY INTERACTION

The research findings are arranged by their relevance to the research questions and are provided in two chapters. This chapter begins by addressing contextual findings and then describes the findings related to the research questions regarding levels of interagency interaction. The next chapter (Findings II) presents the research findings regarding inhibitors and facilitators of interagency interaction. Prior to addressing the findings for each research question, the study provides the context for the findings by over viewing prevalent State and Defense UEO and MEO roles and tasks in US policy development and implementation processes. Locations, positions, and approximate numbers of State and Defense MEOs involved in each role are described, as well. For ease of presentation, unless otherwise noted, all numbers in this section are post-Dayton numbers. As mentioned previously, the study used broad approximations to gain order of magnitude insights of relevant sub-groups and the proportions of MEOs involved in different tasks was relatively consistent between pre-Dayton and post-Dayton. The context section concludes by introducing four categories of policy decisions and summarizing the prevailing policy development and implementation processes, and how State and Defense UEO and MEO roles and tasks fit within each process.
4.1. Findings Context: Prevailing Roles, Tasks, and Processes

In broad terms, State and Defense MEOs involved in US policy processes for Bosnia between 1993 and 1998 fulfilled one or more of the following roles:

**MEO Role 1.** Participated in department-level development of strategic policies, goals, and plans

**MEO Role 2.** Developed and implemented their respective department’s operational plans for achieving department goals

**MEO Role 3.** Supported development or implementation of the other department’s policies, goals, or plans (via interaction with personnel from that department)

**MEO Role 4.** Participated in national-level development or implementation of national policies, goals, and plans

These MEO roles were part of a larger set of State and Defense department roles in US processes for developing and implementing policy for Bosnia between 1993 and 1998. To better understand the roles of State and Defense MEOs, along with tasks supporting each role, it is helpful to place the roles and tasks within the larger context in which they typically occurred. State and Defense department personnel contributed to the following missions for Bosnia:

**Mission 1.** Developed and implemented strategic security policies, goals, and plans

**Mission 2.** Developed and implemented their respective department’s operational plans
Mission 3. Supported other department’s development and implementation of their operational plans.

The following paragraphs overview roles and tasks State and Defense UEOs and MEOs typically performed as they contributed to each of the above missions. Additionally, locations, positions, and approximate numbers are provided for State and Defense MEOs involved in each role. This section concludes with a summary of the prevailing policy development and implementation processes, and how State and Defense UEO and MEO roles and tasks fit within each process.

4.1.1. State and Defense UEOs and MEOs involved in Mission 1

This subsection first describes primary roles and tasks of State and Defense UEOs involved in this mission (The development and implementation of strategic security policies, goals, and plans). The subsection then describes roles and tasks of State and Defense MEOs, along with locations, positions, and approximate numbers of State and Defense MEOs involved in these roles. State and Defense UEOs had two main roles for this mission:

UEO Role 1. Participated in national and department-level development of strategic security policies, goals, and plans

UEO Role 4. Participated in national-level implementation of US national security policies, goals, and plans

For the first role (UEO Role 1) related to this mission, State and Defense UEOs had tasks specific to the national and department level. At the national level, State and

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46 UEO role numbering is out of order here because they have been synchronized with MEO role numbers.
Defense UEOs decided upon their respective department’s preferred strategic national policy options and interacted with one another, US NSS leadership and management, and other agency UEOs in formal or informal interagency fora to advocate for their respective department’s preferred strategic national policy options. At the department level, State and Defense UEOs decided upon their respective department’s preferred strategic department policy options and shared them with one another, US NSS leadership and management, and other agency UEOs as they felt appropriate. Several interview respondents noted that department UEOs typically decided upon their preferred policy options prior to engaging with interagency counterparts. A State MEO stated, “JCS [the Joint Chiefs of Staff] and OSD [the Office of the Secretary of Defense] would formally agree on Defense’s position before they met with State.” A Defense UEO made a similar observation, “I never once, in the six or seven years that I attended these [NSC] meetings, never once saw the Secretary of Defense and the chairman [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] sit down at the table and have different views, they had coordinated and worked it out ahead of time. Almost every interview respondent, as well as secondary sources (Rast and Lehrke 2008, 403), emphasized that these tasks were common for State and Defense UEOs, and were almost the exclusive purview of UEOs. One State MEO summarized these sentiments by stating, “Policy decisions for Bosnia, and for most other issues for that matter, were top down.” Another State MEO clarified, “We [MEOs] were powerless in policy terms.” Indeed, one of the main functions of the NSC system is to facilitate UEO participation in these tasks.
State and Defense UEOs were rarely involved in the second role (UEO Role 4) related to this mission. When they were involved, their primary task was to interact with interagency counterparts to implement national security policies, goals, and plans as representatives of the US government, rather than as representatives of a specific department. The primary fora for UEOs involved in this task was the national Bosnia working groups (i.e., Ambassador Holbrooke’s negotiating team, Ambassador Gelbard’s implementation team, or Ambassador Pardew’s train and equip team). One Defense UEO who was a part of one these teams summarized the team’s role this way, “The whole purpose of that [interagency team] was not only face-to-face time within the confines of the airplane as we flew over there, but then you could bring a whole of government face whether you're dealing with the international community on the ground, whether you're dealing with the tri-presidency, it was sort of all there.” Another Defense UEO from one of these teams stated, “when [our] team engaged with the international community, our conversations were viewed as US policy and I was the face of the US military.” The top groups in the NSC system (i.e., the NSC proper, the Principal’s Committee, and the Deputies Committee) could get involved in policy implementation, but it was unusual. These groups occasionally got involved in implementation, especially when implementation issues were deemed too important to leave to lower level bodies. A Defense UEO described an instance where the Deputies Committee (DC) involved itself in low level implementation issues, “the DC was acting as the town council of Srebrenica.”

State and Defense MEOs involved in this mission had two main roles:
**MEO Role 1.** Participated in department-level development of strategic policies, goals, and plans

**MEO Role 4.** Participated in national-level development or implementation of national policies, goals, and plans

State and Defense MEOs involved in MEO Role 1 had two sets of tasks, one set of tasks for the development of national strategic options and the other set of tasks for the development of department strategic options. The first set of tasks began with State and Defense MEOs interacting with one another and the NSC staff to clarify details of UEO interagency meetings (e.g., time, location, and participants) and to gather relevant policy papers. State and Defense MEOs then worked with MEOs and UEOs within their respective departments to develop, analyze, and recommend strategic national policy options for department UEOs participating in formal or informal interagency fora.

State and Defense MEOs involved in the second set of tasks for Role 1 worked with MEOs and UEOs within their respective departments to develop, analyze, and recommend strategic department policy options for department UEOs. This was typically an intra-departmental process. However, State and Defense MEOs would occasionally interact with interagency counterparts to obtain policy information or to gauge the other entities’ support for the various strategic policies, goals, or plans being considered by their department. A Defense UEO described the task this way, “In some regards, it was like sending the scouts out. So they would go over and put our position on the table and hear what everyone else had to say and then they would come back and tell us the reaction, and then we might adjust our position.” A State MEO said the following about
his experiences performing this task, “As an action officer, you don’t have [decision-making] authority. But that doesn’t mean you can’t say, ‘here is what we heard from our embassy there,’ or ‘we are considering various courses of action, and these might include X, Y, or Z. If we did X, what would you think of that? If we did Y, what would you think of that?’ Because that is important to factor in. So I think you can share information, without necessarily committing [your organization] to a COA [course of action].”

Table 6 shows the State and Defense MEO positions and numbers involved in department-level development of strategic policies, goals, and plans. The positions and numbers involved in this role (and depicted in the table) are subsets of the overall MEO positions and numbers involved in US policy processes for Bosnia between 1993 and 1998 (depicted earlier in Table 4). As with Table 4, the information in Table 6 resulted from the content analysis of this study’s interview data and the ten previous studies listed in section 3.3.4. Table 6 shows that approximately 10% of all State and Defense MEOs involved in US processes for developing and implementing policy for Bosnia between 1993 and 1998 were involved in MEO Role 1.47 Apart from a small fraction of the overseas military HQ staff (100 of 1,700) who were involved in this role, all of the State and Defense MEO positions involved in Role 1 were within the continental United States (CONUS).48

47 As mentioned previously, all numbers are for the post-Dayton timeframe.
48 No exact number was found for the number of overseas military HQ staff involved in Role 1. The number used was an estimate based on multiple interview respondents and secondary sources suggesting that few overseas military were involved in strategic planning; rather they typically focused on operational planning. Whitaker et al. (2008, 146-147) note, “It is uncommon for representatives from the unified commands or the individual services to attend interagency meetings.”
### Table 6 MEO Role 1 Positions and Numbers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th># of MEOs</th>
<th>% of MEOs in Role</th>
<th>% of Overseas MEOs in Role</th>
<th>% of CONUS MEOs in Role</th>
<th>% of Total MEOs (2,870)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Military HQ staff</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Back-Office S&amp;D Staff</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>52.6%</td>
<td>81.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Reps on Departments' Bosnia Working Groups</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Reps to National Bosnia Working Groups</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROLE OVERSEAS TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROLE CONUS TOTAL</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>64.9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROLE TOTAL</td>
<td>285</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KEY = Overseas**

Internal State and Defense MEOs involved in Role 1 were back-office staff and participants on the respective department’s Bosnia task force. The handful of external State and Defense MEOs involved in Role 1 were from the national Bosnia working groups.\(^{49}\) A Defense UEO on a national team stated that it was expected that members of the team, “were talking with the organizations from which they came.”

State and Defense MEOs were rarely directly involved in MEO Role 4. Table 7 shows the few State and Defense MEO positions and numbers involved in national-level development or implementation of national policies, goals, and plans. The positions and numbers involved in this role (and depicted in the table) are subsets of the overall MEO positions and numbers involved in US policy processes for Bosnia between 1993 and 1998 (depicted earlier in Table 4). As with Table 4, the information in Table 7 resulted from the content analysis of this study’s interview data and the ten previous studies listed.

\(^{49}\) MEOs on Ambassador Pardew’s Train and Equip team were not included in these numbers as there was no evidence that they were involved in Role 1.
in section 3.3.4. The few State and Defense MEOs involved in MEO Role 4 interacted with interagency counterparts in national fora to develop and implement national security policies, goals, and plans as representatives of the US government, rather than as representatives of a specific department.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th># of MEOs</th>
<th>% of MEOs</th>
<th>% of Overseas MEOs in Role</th>
<th>% of CONUS MEOs in Role</th>
<th>% of Total MEOs (2,870)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Reps on NSC Staff</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Reps to National Bosnia Working Groups</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROLE OVERSEAS TOTAL</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROLE CONUS TOTAL</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROLE TOTAL</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The two State and Defense MEO positions involved in MEO Role 4 were MEOs on the NSC staff and MEOs assigned to the national Bosnia working groups. Four of the MEOs, and seven of the UEOs, interviewed for this study were involved on these teams and noted the rarity of this form of interagency interaction.

4.1.2. State and Defense UEOs and MEOs involved in Mission 2

This section first describes primary roles and tasks of State and Defense UEOs involved in Mission 2 (The development and implementation of their respective department’s operational plans for Bosnia). The section then describes the role and tasks
of State and Defense MEOs, along with locations, positions, and approximate numbers of State and Defense MEOs involved in these roles. State and Defense UEOs had one primary role for Mission 2:

**UEO Role 2.** Approved, implemented, coordinated, or advocated department’s operational plans

State and Defense UEOs involved in this role performed three main tasks. The first task involved working with MEOs and UEOs within their respective departments to develop, analyze, and recommend operational plans for department superiors. This was typically an intra-departmental process. However, department UEOs and MEOs would occasionally interact with interagency counterparts for information or to gauge the other entities’ support for various operational plans being considered by their department. The second task involved State and Defense UEOs deciding upon their respective department’s operational plans and sharing them with one another, US NSS leadership and management, and other agency UEOs as they felt appropriate. A State MEO provided the following anecdote demonstrating the decision-making role of department UEOs:

It came up [at a meeting in Bosnia of mostly US representatives assigned to international organizations that there were some actions being taken that were going to anger the Bosnian Serbs and we were assessing our options for defusing the situation]. One of the guys who was living in Brcko who was representing the civilians said they will go on strike, all the civil servants in the town will declare a general strike, they will stop working and garbage will start piling up and so on and so forth. So we said to this
general [a US general from Tuzla who commanded the US sector in Bosnia that included Brcko], “Can SFOR replace some of these services, what we don't want is the city to start going into crisis because the Serb civil services are on strike?” He listened and he said, “I understand what you're saying, I'm sympathetic to what you're saying, but I will not order my troops to pick up garbage. I'm just not going to do it. That is beyond what I could ask US soldiers to do.” I think that was not the answer that most of the civilians in the room were hoping he would give us, but we all understood, and no one said anything. That is just one anecdote.

The third task involved State and Defense UEOs and MEOs implementing their respective department’s operational plans.

State and Defense MEOs involved in Mission 2 also had one primary role:

**MEO Role 2.** Developed and implemented their respective department’s operational plans for achieving department goals

State and Defense MEOs involved in this role performed two main tasks. Similar to State and Defense UEOs, the first task was to work with MEOs and UEOs within their respective departments to develop, analyze, and recommend operational plans for department superiors. This was typically an intra-departmental process. However, department UEOs and MEOs would occasionally interact with interagency counterparts for information or to gauge the other entities’ support for various operational plans being considered by their department. The second task involved State and Defense UEOs and MEOs implementing their respective department’s operational plans. A subset of the second task was soliciting and coordinating UEO-approved interagency support for
pursuing department objectives. An example of a department MEO soliciting support came from a State MEO who described an instance of working with Defense MEOs to arrange transport for an FBI team investigating mass grave sites, “We were trying to send in the FBI to do one of the alleged mass grave sites to do a forensic examination. And, we had requested mil-air to support them going in, because there were no commercial flights. . . . The person I was working with at the [NMCC] I believe was a major.

Almost all State and Defense MEOs involved in US policy processes for Bosnia participated in MEO Role 2. Table 8 shows the State and Defense MEO positions and numbers involved in developing and implementing their respective department’s operational plans for achieving department goals. The positions and numbers involved in this role (and depicted in the table) are subsets of the overall MEO positions and numbers involved in US policy processes for Bosnia between 1993 and 1998 (depicted earlier in Table 4). As with Table 4, the information in Table 8 resulted from the content analysis of this study’s interview data and the ten previous studies listed in section 3.3.4. The only State and Defense MEOs not involved in this role were those on exchange to another department, assigned to the NSC staff, or part of Ambassador Pardew’s train and equip team.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th># of MEOs</th>
<th>% of MEOs in Role</th>
<th>% of Overseas MEOs in Role</th>
<th>% of CONUS MEOs in Role</th>
<th>% of Total MEOs (2,870)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Role</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>Overseas %</td>
<td>CONUS %</td>
<td>Total %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Military HQ Staff</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
<td>66.9%</td>
<td>59.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Military Operators</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs Officers in Bosnia</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embassy Defense Attachés</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embassy Political Officers</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Reps to IOs</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Back-Office S&amp;D Staff</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>50.8%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Functional Desk Officers</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Reps on Department Bosnia Working Groups</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMCC MEOs</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Country Desk Officers</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Officer: US Mission to the UN</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Reps to National Bosnia Working Groups</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROLE OVERSEAS TOTAL</td>
<td>2,540</td>
<td>89.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td>88.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROLE CONUS TOTAL</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROLE TOTAL</td>
<td>2,835</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>98.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KEY = Overseas**

It is worth noting that the vast majority of State and Defense MEOs involved in this role (almost 90%) were overseas, and that almost 95% of the overseas MEOs involved in this role were either military HQ staff or military operators. Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik (2004, 71-73) describe overseas military HQ staff MEOs involvement in developing the military’s operational plans for Bosnia and coordinating them with the Joint Staff. They (Ibid., 78) also point out the intra-departmental nature of operational planning, “In truth, there was little ‘national’ about the national support element [for Bosnia], for the [Army] logisticians were supporting primarily US Army forces.” State personnel also noted the primarily internal nature of this role. A State country desk officer remarked, “I would say that 90% of my interactions with people
outside of my office, who were in the US government, were other State Department people.” Regarding policy implementation, implementing Defense policies was the primary task of overseas military operators.

4.1.3. State and Defense UEOs and MEOs involved in Mission 3

This subsection first describes primary roles and tasks of State and Defense UEOs involved in Mission 3 (Supporting other department’s development and implementation of their operational plans). The subsection then describes the role and tasks of State and Defense MEOs, along with locations, positions, and approximate numbers of State and Defense MEOs involved in this role. State and Defense UEOs had one primary role for Mission 3:

**UEO Role 3.** Approved and coordinated the type, amount, and duration of department support to the other department; or participated in providing such support.

State and Defense UEOs involved in this role performed three main tasks. The first task involved State and Defense UEOs approving and coordinating the type, amount, and duration of department support to the other department. The second task involved providing agreed to support to other departments. The third task involved informing superiors of counterpart concerns with provided support and developing and recommending alternative support options.

State and Defense MEOs involved in Mission 3 also had one primary role:

**MEO Role 3.** Supported development or implementation of the other department’s policies, goals, or plans (via interaction with personnel from that department)
State and Defense MEOs performed the same tasks as UEOs involved in this role with the exception that MEOs were not involved in approving the type, amount, and duration of department support to the other department. Less than one-quarter of State and Defense MEOs involved in US processes for developing and implementing policies for Bosnia between 1993 and 1998 were involved in Role 3. Table 9 shows the State and Defense MEO positions and numbers involved in supporting development or implementation of the other department’s policies, goals, or plans. The positions and numbers involved in this role (and depicted in the table) are subsets of the overall MEO positions and numbers involved in US policy processes for Bosnia between 1993 and 1998 (depicted earlier in Table 4). As with Table 4, the information in Table 9 a resulted from the content analysis of this study’s interview data and the ten previous studies listed in section 3.3.4. The primary reason for the low numbers of State and Defense MEOs was the small fraction of overseas military HQ staff and military operators involved in this role. Other positions with less than full participation in Role 3 included State representatives to IOs, State and Defense functional desk officers, back-office State and Defense staff, and State and Defense MEOs on national working groups. MEOs on Ambassador Pardew’s train and equip team were not available to department UEOs to be tasked to support another department. Some examples provided by interview respondents of State and Defense MEOs involved in this role were State MEO country desk officers reviewing military informational leaflets that would be air dropped into Bosnia, NMCC MEOs arranging air transport for a State sponsored civilian team, and military civil
affairs officers assigned to support State personnel who were part of international organizations.

Table 9 MEO Role 3 Positions and Numbers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th># of MEOs</th>
<th>% of MEOs in Role</th>
<th>% of Overseas MEOs in Role</th>
<th>% of CONUS MEOs in Role</th>
<th>% of Total MEOs (2,870)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Military HQ Staff</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>33.9%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Military Operators</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs Officers in Bosnia</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embassy Defense Attachés</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embassy Political Officers</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Reps to IOs</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Exchanges</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Reps on Departments' Bosnia Working Groups</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Functional Desk Officers</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Country Desk Officers</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Back-Office S&amp;D Staff</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Exchanges</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Reps to National Bosnia Working Groups</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMCC</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROLE OVERSEAS TOTAL</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>72.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROLE CONUS TOTAL</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROLE TOTAL</td>
<td>410</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KEY = Overseas
4.1.4. Prevalent policy development and implementation processes

The roles and tasks described above typically occurred in one of several prevailing policy development and implementation processes. Prior to summarizing these processes, and how State and Defense UEO and MEO roles and tasks fit within each process, it is worth clarifying different types of policy decisions that occurred within these processes. A common refrain from UEO and MEO interview respondents was, “MEOs do not make policy decisions; UEOs make policy decisions and MEOs support UEO policy making.” The ostensible clarity of such statements became muddled when the same respondents would later describe MEO activities that appeared to involve making policy decisions. It soon became evident that the term “policy decision” was being used inconsistently, often by the same interview respondent. To address this issue, the study developed four broad categories that appear to cover the different concepts being addressed when people used the term “policy decision.” The following are the study’s four categories of policy decisions:

1. Policy development decision
2. Policy development support decision
3. Policy implementation decision
4. Policy implementation support decision.

UEOs engaged in all four types of policy decisions. They approved their department’s policies (policy development decision). They decided upon the national policies their department would recommend to US NSS leadership (policy development

---

50 It was not unusual for US policy processes for Bosnia to exclude the departments (Rast and Lehrke, 385-386). The processes described were found to be the prevailing processes when departments were involved.
support decision). They approved their department’s plans for achieving department goals (policy implementation decision). And they were involved in making specific implementation decisions that fell within broad policy implementation guidelines. In contrast, MEOs were typically limited to making support decisions. They decided upon the types of information, analysis, and recommendations they would present to UEOs (policy development support decision). And they made lower level implementation decisions based upon broad guidance received from UEOs (policy implementation support decisions). These terms will be used to highlight UEO and MEO roles in each of the prevailing policy processes.

The study identified six prevailing policy processes, three for policy development and three for policy implementation. A summary of each process is provided below, along with State and Defense UEO and MEO roles and task for each process.

4.1.4.1. Prevalent Policy Process 1: Strategic national policy development process

This process began with State and Defense personnel becoming aware that a policy issue was going to be on the agenda of an upcoming interagency meeting. State and Defense MEOs interacted with one another and the NSC staff to clarify meeting time, location, and participants, and to gather relevant policy papers (MEO Role 1). State and Defense MEOs then worked with MEOs and UEOs within their respective departments to develop, analyze, and recommend strategic national policy options for department UEOs participating in formal or informal interagency fora (UEO and MEO Role 1). State and Defense UEOs decided upon their respective department’s preferred strategic national policy options (UEO Role 1). State and Defense UEOs interacted with
one another, US NSS leadership and management, and other agency UEOs in formal or informal interagency fora to advocate for their respective department’s preferred strategic national policy options (UEO Role 1). A Defense UEO described how this process typically unfolded, “Most of the time the briefing paper for the Deputies Meeting that would be attended by the vice chairman [Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] would come out of the NSC. And I am not exaggerating, at eight-thirty or nine o'clock at night I would be standing at the south parking entrance to the Pentagon where [a military O-4 on the NSC staff’s European desk] would pull up in her car, roll down her window and hand me a sealed envelope that had the briefing paper, or the discussion paper, that had been cleared by the NSC for the meeting the next day. . . . This was in 1993 and 1994. I would take it back into our office [JS/J5] where it would be read, analyzed, and then we would prepare our own paper and talking points to go on top of it. That book would then be given to my boss, [a Brigadier General]. He and [an admiral], the two deputies, would look it over and approve it. It would then go to the J5 office. . . . They would then approve it. It would then go to the Director of the Joint Staff, a Navy guy. He would read it. Then the briefing book would make its way into the vice chairman's office. And then there would be a pre-brief for the vice chairman that frankly rarely did anyone from our division go to. That stuff was usually done by the flag officers. I think I got into the chairman's office one time there as a colonel. The flags handled this type of stuff.” To summarize: *UEOs and MEOs involved in this process made policy development support decisions.*
4.1.4.2. Prevalent Policy Process 2: Strategic department policy development process

State and Defense MEOs worked with MEOs and UEOs within their respective departments to develop, analyze, and recommend strategic department policy options for department UEOs. This was typically an intra-departmental process. However, department UEOs and MEOs would occasionally interact with interagency counterparts for information or to gauge the other entities’ support for the various strategic policies, goals, or plans being considered by their department (MEO Role 1; UEO Role 1). State and Defense UEOs decided upon their respective department’s preferred strategic department policy options and shared them with one another, US NSS leadership and management, and other agency UEOs as they felt appropriate (UEO Role 1). To summarize: UEOs involved in this process made policy development decisions and policy development support decisions; MEOs made policy development support decisions.

4.1.4.3. Prevalent Policy Process 3: Department operational plans development process

State and Defense MEOs worked with MEOs and UEOs within their respective departments to develop, analyze, and recommend operational plans for department superiors. This was typically an intra-departmental process. However, department UEOs and MEOs would occasionally interact with interagency counterparts for information or to gauge the other entities’ support for various operational plans being considered by their department (MEO Role 2; UEO Role 2). State and Defense UEOs decided upon their respective department’s operational plans and shared them with one another, US NSS leadership and management, and other agency UEOs as they felt appropriate (UEO Role 2). To summarize: UEOs involved in this process made policy development
decisions and policy development support decisions; MEOs made policy development support decisions.

4.1.4.4. Prevalent Policy Process 4: Department operational plans implementation process
State and Defense UEOs and MEOs implemented their respective department’s operational plans (MEO Role 2; UEO Role 2). This process also involved State and Defense UEOs and MEOs soliciting and coordinating UEO-approved interagency support for pursuing department objectives (MEO Role 2; UEO Role 2). To summarize: UEOs involved in this process made policy implementation decisions and policy implementation support decisions; MEOs made policy implementation support decisions.

4.1.4.5. Prevalent Policy Process 5: Process for departments to support implementation of other department’s operational plans
State and Defense UEOs approved and coordinated the type, amount, and duration of department support to other departments (UEO Role 3). State and Defense UEOs and MEOs provided agreed to support to other departments (MEO Role 3; UEO Role 3). State and Defense UEOs and MEOs informed superiors of counterpart concerns with provided support and developed and recommend alternative support options (MEO Role 3; UEO Role 3). To summarize: UEOs involved in this process made policy implementation decisions and policy implementation support decisions; MEOs made policy implementation support decisions.

4.1.4.6. Prevalent Policy Process 6: National policy implementation process
State and Defense UEOs and MEOs interacted with interagency counterparts to implement national security policies, goals, and plans as representatives of the US government, rather than as representatives of a specific department (MEO Role 4; UEO
Role 4). To summarize: *UEOs involved in this process made policy implementation decisions and policy implementation support decisions; MEOs made policy implementation support decisions.*

### 4.1.5. Conclusion of Findings Context: Prevailing Roles, Tasks, and Processes

In broad terms, State and Defense MEOs involved in US policy processes for Bosnia between 1993 and 1998 fulfilled one or more of the following roles:

- **MEO Role 1.** Participated in department-level development of strategic policies, goals, and plans
- **MEO Role 2.** Developed and implemented their respective department’s operational plans for achieving department goals
- **MEO Role 3.** Supported development or implementation of the other department’s policies, goals, or plans (via interaction with personnel from that department)
- **MEO Role 4.** Participated in national-level development or implementation of national policies, goals, and plans

Almost all State and Defense MEOs involved in US policy processes for Bosnia participated in MEO Role 2. The vast majority of the MEOs involved in this role were stationed overseas, and the overseas MEOs were overwhelmingly military. Approximately two-thirds of the overseas military MEOs were assigned to one of the numerous military headquarters (national and international) throughout Europe and were involved in developing and implementing operational military plans. Most of the remaining overseas military MEOs were operators conducting military air, land, and sea
operations in support of military objectives. Other overseas MEOs involved in Role 2 were military civil affairs officers, State and Defense MEOs at the relevant US embassies, and State MEOs seconded to international organizations (e.g., NATO, OHR, UNHCR, and OSCE). The few hundred stateside State and Defense MEOs involved in this role included country desk officers, functional desk officers, other regional and functional staff officers, State MEOs at the US mission to the UN, and military MEOs in the National Military Command Center. Several MEOs were also assigned to either State or Defense’s Bosnia Task Force. A few of these MEOs were assigned to one of the national Bosnia working groups.

Less than one-fourth of the MEOs who participated in US processes for developing and implementing policies for Bosnia were involved in Roles 1, 3, or 4. The primary factor contributing to the drop in numbers involved in Roles 1, 3, and 4 was less than 10% of overseas military MEOs (the largest sub-groups) participated in these roles. Role 1 involved MEOs who participated in department-level development of strategic policies, goals, and plans. Aside from the participation of a small proportion of military MEOs in overseas headquarters, the MEOs involved in this role primarily worked out of Foggy Bottom or the Pentagon. State and Defense MEOs on the national Bosnia working groups and from each department’s Bosnia Task Force were heavily involved in this role; as were other regional and functional staff officers. The main tasks of most MEOs in MEO Role 1 was preparing their respective department’s UEOs to coordinate and advocate their department’s positions on strategic issues with US NSS leadership and
other department UEOs, and to approve their department’s strategic policies, goals, and plans.

MEOs involved in Role 3 were tasked by their parent department to interact with personnel from the other department to support development or implementation of that department’s policies, goals, or plans. Most sub-groups had at least some proportion of MEOs involved in this role. Most of the MEOs in these groups (e.g., State and Defense MEOs on each department’s Bosnia task force, country desk officers, civil affairs, and embassy MEOs) and all exchange MEOs fulfilled this role. Smaller proportions of MEOs in these sub-groups (State reps to IOs, functional desk officers, State and Defense MEOs on national Bosnia working groups, back-office staff, overseas military HQ staff, and overseas military operators) were involved in this role.

Exceedingly few State and Defense MEOs were involved in Role 4. The few MEOs involved in this role were assigned to national organizations, either the NSC staff or one of the national Bosnia working groups. State and Defense MEOs involved in this role were expected to think beyond the department-level goals of their parent organizations and leverage their functional expertise to analyze, develop, and implement national policies, goals, and plans.

Four categories of policy decisions were introduced and the prevailing policy development and implementation processes were summarized, along with descriptions of how State and Defense UEO and MEO roles and tasks fit within each process. The next section describes the findings on the levels of interagency interaction of State and Defense MEOs involved in US processes to develop and implement policies for Bosnia.
between 1993 and 1998. It also compares the levels of interagency interaction of State and Defense MEOs with the levels of interagency interaction of State and Defense UEOs.

4.2. Levels of Interagency Interaction

The two research questions listed in Section 3.2 relevant to levels of interagency interaction were refined as follows to specifically address the selected case study: Among personnel from the State Department and the Department of Defense who participated in US processes to develop and implement policies for Bosnia between 1993 and 1998, what were the levels of interagency interaction of MEOs? How did the levels of MEO interagency interaction compare with the levels of UEO interagency interaction?

The study found the vast majority of MEOs in the State Department and the Department of Defense who participated in US processes to develop and implement policies for Bosnia between 1993 and 1998 experienced little to no purposeful interagency interaction. There were, however, several State and Defense MEOs who routinely engaged in purposeful interagency interaction; primarily interagency coordination or cooperation. Exceedingly few of these MEOs ever participated in the highest level of purposeful interagency interaction (i.e., collaboration). Of greater interest than the aggregate proportions of State and Defense MEOs involved in each level of interagency interaction were the substantial variations in these proportions that occurred among sub-groups of these MEOs involved in various roles, positions and locations. This section presents the research findings for the levels of interagency interaction of MEOs involved in each of the four MEO roles described in the previous section. The section

51 Unless otherwise noted, interagency interaction refers to interaction between State and Defense personnel.
concludes with a comparison of the levels of interagency interaction of State and Defense MEOs with the levels of interagency interaction of State and Defense UEOs.

4.2.1. Levels of Interagency Interaction among MEOs involved in MEO Role 2

The levels of interagency interaction among MEOs involved in MEO Role 2 (i.e., developed and implemented their respective department’s operational plans for achieving department goals) are addressed first because it was the role with the largest numbers of MEOs involved and the lowest proportion of MEOs engaged in purposeful interagency interaction. As depicted in the previous section on roles, approximately 99% of State and Defense MEOs were involved in MEO Role 2; 10% in MEO Role 1; 15% in MEO Role 3; and 1% in MEO Role 4. Table 10 provides a proportionate representation of the top levels of interagency interaction of State and Defense MEO positions involved in developing and implementing their respective department’s operational plans for achieving department goals. The table also provides proportionate approximations of the amount of time State and Defense MEO positions involved in this role were engaged in each level of interagency interaction. Table 10 builds off of the positions and numbers provided in Table 8. As with Table 8, the information added in Table 10 resulted from the content analysis of this study’s interview data and the ten previous studies listed in section 3.3.4. There was little to no purposeful interagency interaction among approximately 85% of the State and Defense MEOs involved in MEO Role 2 (i.e., among Overseas Military Headquarters Staff and Overseas Military Operators who comprised 60% and 25%, respectively of the State and Defense MEOs involved in Role 2).
By comparison, at least a small proportion of State and Defense MEOs involved in MEO Role 1 were involved in purposeful interaction, all of the MEOs involved in MEO Role 3 engaged in interagency coordination or cooperation, and all of the MEOs involved in MEO Role 4 had at least some experience with interagency collaboration. These results highlight the outsized impact that the low levels of interagency interaction of overseas military MEOs (especially military operators and HQ staff) had on the aggregate results. It is also worth noting that, due to MEO Role 2’s focus on department goals, rather than national goals, the highest possible level of interagency interaction for MEOs involved in this role was interagency cooperation.

Table 10 MEO Role 2 Positions, Numbers, and Proportions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th># of MEOs</th>
<th>% of Overseas MEOs in Role</th>
<th>% of CONUS MEOs in Role</th>
<th>% of Total MEOs (2,870)</th>
<th>Proportion of MEOs in this role for which this was the top level of interagency interaction</th>
<th>Proportion of time MEOs involved in this role and position engaged in:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Military HQ Staff</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
<td>66.9%</td>
<td>59.2%</td>
<td>Very High (VH): 50.8%</td>
<td>Low (L): 5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Military Operators</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>Very High (VH): 47.8%</td>
<td>Low (L): 4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs Officers in Bosnia</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>Very High (VH): 47.0%</td>
<td>Low (L): 3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embassy Defense Attachés</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>Very High (VH): 40.0%</td>
<td>Low (L): 14.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embassy Political Officers</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>Very High (VH): 40.0%</td>
<td>Low (L): 14.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Reps to IOs</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>Very High (VH): 40.0%</td>
<td>Low (L): 14.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Back-Office S&amp;D Staff</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>50.8%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>Low (L): 3.7%</td>
<td>Medium (M): 16.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Functional Desk Officers</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>Low (L): 3.7%</td>
<td>Medium (M): 16.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Reps on Departments’ Bosnia Task Force</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>Low (L): 3.7%</td>
<td>Medium (M): 16.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMCC MEOs</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>Low (L): 3.7%</td>
<td>Medium (M): 16.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Country Desk Officers</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>Low (L): 3.7%</td>
<td>Medium (M): 16.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Officer/US Mission to the UN</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>Low (L): 3.7%</td>
<td>Medium (M): 16.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Reps to National Bosnia Working Groups</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>Low (L): 3.7%</td>
<td>Medium (M): 16.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ROLE OVERSEAS TOTAL 2,540 89.6% 88.5%
ROLE CONUS TOTAL 295 10.4% 10.3%
ROLE TOTAL 2,835 99.8%

Key: Overseas

Key = Overseas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key</th>
<th>Proportion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blank</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Low (VL)</td>
<td>Less than 5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low (L)</td>
<td>5% - 15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium (M)</td>
<td>15% - 35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (H)</td>
<td>35% - 95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very High (VH): Greater than 95%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As depicted in Table 10, there was little to no purposeful interagency interaction among overseas military operators and HQ staff. Several of the State MEOs interviewed attested to the fact that it was exceedingly rare for State MEOs to engage with overseas military (with the exception of embassy political officers engaging with defense attachés and a few State political advisors assigned to the combatant commands). A State MEO explained, “Most of us [State MEOs] do have contact with military guys, but they are usually the defense attaché or someone like that, they are military guys doing kind of a State Department job, and under State Department control and command (of course, I realize they are dual hatted, but they work for the ambassador). What we don't have a lot of experience with is military guys who are in the field, who are doing what most of the guys in the military do and so on.” Military MEOs working in operational staff positions at all levels (from the combatant command headquarters down to the tactical field headquarters) stated that it was very rare to see, let alone work with, State personnel.

The only other sub-group that had relatively low proportions of MEOs engaged in purposeful interagency interaction for MEO Role 2 were back-office analysts and planners in State and Defense’s relevant regional and functional offices. A State MEO remarked, “Most of the time I frankly interacted with people in the State Department in Washington. I did not have very much to do with other parts of the government.” A State country desk officer noted that she was sharing the results of her interaction with Defense MEOs with ten or twenty other staff officers.

Apart from military operators and HQ staff, purposeful interagency interaction was common among overseas State and Defense MEOs involved in MEO Role 2.
Lescher (2013, 62-63) notes that civil affairs officers in Bosnia were instrumental in coordinating the efforts of the numerous military and civilian organizations involved. Political officers and defense attachés in the relevant embassies frequently engaged in interagency coordination or cooperation. However, embassy MEOs interviewed noted that their interagency interactions were primarily with their counterparts within the embassy. State MEOs seconded to international organizations claimed that they frequently coordinated or cooperated with Defense personnel. A State MEO assigned to an international organization stated, “When I was working on missing persons issues, that was absolutely hand in glove with the military. . . . Everything we did, every project we did, every grave we exhumed, every meeting we had had a DoD representative, or two or three. And every place we went, we had at least someone driving by from IFOR. The whole time I was in Bosnia, that was absolutely connected at the hip with DOD.”

Purposeful interagency interaction was also common among most CONUS positions involved in MEO Role 2, with the exception of the previously mentioned back-office staff. State and Defense country and functional desk officers stated that they typically coordinated with one another daily. One particular task that was brought up by five interview respondents was the daily coordination that occurred between State, OSD, and the Joint Staff to clear cable traffic for State to send to US representatives on the North Atlantic Council (NAC). A Defense MEO described the process as follows, “We used to send cables out to US NATO continuously. In order for us to send a cable, which would be guidance for the US ambassador to participate at the NAC, we would have to clear the cable. The cable would emanate from the State Department, but they would not
send it until OSD, the Bosnia Task Force, as well as the Joint Staff cleared on the cable. As you can imagine, we sometimes had very late evenings negotiating the contents of the cable which would result in basically talking points and guidance for the ambassador to State and discuss the US position at the NAC. . . . Clearly, on the diplomatic side, State had the pen. But as it related to political-military, or civil military issues, security assistance type issues, DOD would weigh in on those things and sort of negotiate with the State Department.” Another Defense UEO noted his role in the process, “There were almost always cables that went out to the field. The cables themselves would have to be cleared on an interagency basis. The cable might be initiated in the State Department. They would spend half the day in the State Department getting the thing. They would send it to the Pentagon and the JS would put their take on it and we [OSD] would put our perspective on it. Then we’d try to flesh it out between OSD and the JS, and then we would debate it over the phone on into the night before this thing would get cleared. There were always these cable clearance mechanisms, just a million and one minutia things. . . . Day to day, I would constantly be in [my boss’s] office, letting him know that this is the way they want to phrase this, whether I thought it was good or if we should make a counter offer. I was deeply involved: put these parentheses here, phrase this, take this out, put this in, etc.; very nitty-gritty stuff.” A State MEO remarked that Defense had a vested interest in the process, “We were driven by [the weekly] NAC meetings. If we didn’t get guidance out, and this the Pentagon was very aware of, especially if they were concerned about US and NATO troops on the ground, they knew that they had to put
guidance out there, otherwise that left the permanent US representative making it up [which DOD wanted to avoid].

Personnel on State or Defense’s Bosnia task force coordinated daily via secure video teleconference (SVTC) and frequently followed up with informal phone calls. They also cooperated to develop policy recommendations for department leadership. Cooperation in these instances involved the State member on the Defense Bosnia task force working with Defense members of the task force to develop policy recommendations for Defense leadership, or vice versa for the State Bosnia force. Defense MEOs on the NMCC typically coordinated daily with State personnel. A medium proportion of political officers at the US Mission to the UN engaged in coordination or cooperation with Defense personnel. For MEO Role 2, State and Defense MEOs associated with Ambassador Holbrooke’s negotiating team and Ambassador Gelbard’s implementation team coordinated and cooperated with their interagency counterparts on the team and then passed information back to their respective departments. It is worth noting that for most of the positions involving purposeful interagency interaction for MEO Role 2, interagency interaction was primarily coordination and comprised a small portion of most MEOs’ time.

4.2.2. Levels of Interagency Interaction among MEOs involved in MEO Role 1

State and Defense MEO involvement in MEO Role 1 primarily consisted of preparing department UEOs to make strategic policy decisions and to advocate for their respective department’s preferred policy options in interagency fora with US NSS leadership and other agency UEOs. Due to the department-level focus of MEO activities
in this role, the highest possible level of interagency interaction for MEOs involved in this role was interagency cooperation. Rast and Lehrke (2008, 403) address a common observation of interview respondents when they note that most interagency interaction for the development of strategic policies, goals, and plans occurred among UEOs.

Table 11 provides a proportionate representation of the top levels of interagency interaction of State and Defense MEO positions involved in department-level development of strategic policies, goals, and plans. The table also provides proportionate approximations of the amount of time State and Defense MEO positions involved in this role were engaged in each level of interagency interaction. Table 11 builds off of the positions and numbers provided in Table 6. As with Table 6, the information added in Table 11 resulted from the content analysis of this study’s interview data and the ten previous studies listed in section 3.3.4. Small proportions of MEOs on the overseas military HQ staff and back-office State and Defense staff were involved in purposeful interagency interaction for MEO Role 1; and these positions comprised almost 90% of the State and Defense MEOs involved in this role. As noted previously, Whitaker et al. (2008, 146-147) write, “It is uncommon for representatives from the unified commands or the individual services to attend interagency meetings. . . . People from the Joint Staff are quite protective of the fact that they work to fulfill the statutory responsibilities of the CJCS [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] as the principal military advisor to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the NSC.” And though back-office staff MEOs were involved in this role, department-level interagency interaction for the role was typically the purview of MEOs on the respective department’s Bosnia task force. A
Defense UEO suggested that there were less than three-dozen State and Defense MEOs in Washington, DC who drafted most of the policy papers for Bosnia.

Table 11 MEO Role 1 Positions, Numbers, and Proportions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th># of MEOs</th>
<th>% of Overseas MEOs in Role</th>
<th>% of CONUS MEOs in Role</th>
<th>% of Total MEOs (2,870)</th>
<th>Proportion of MEOs in this role for which this was the top level of interagency interaction</th>
<th>Proportion of time MEOs involved in this role and position engaged in:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Military HQ Staff</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Back-Office S&amp;D Staff</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>52.6%</td>
<td>81.1%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Reps on Departments’ Bosnia Task Force</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Reps to National Bosnia Working Groups</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROLE OVERSEAS TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROLE CONUS TOTAL</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>64.9%</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROLE TOTAL</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key = Overseas

Interagency coordination was the typical level of interagency interaction of State and Defense MEOs on departments’ Bosnia task forces involved in MEO Role 1; though cooperation was also common. The members of the department task forces would coordinate daily via SVTC. Within each department, the members of the task force would cooperate to develop policy recommendations for department leadership preparing in interagency fora. Cooperation in these instances involved the State member on the Defense Bosnia task force working with Defense members of the task force to develop policy recommendations for Defense leadership, or vice versa for the State Bosnia task force. A Defense MEO observed that the main purpose of the Defense Bosnia task force was to prepare department leadership for NSC meetings. A State MEO remarked, “When they [department UEOs] are going into a meeting, you need to know what it is that the
other guy thinks is important to talk about, what his perspective is. The only way you can find that out is by having lower-level contacts. Additionally, those lower-level contacts serve as an early warning system, the things you need to look out for to do your job properly in a country where DOD is engaged.” A Defense UEO described his view of MEOs in this role, and offered the following example, “I had [several MEOs working for me in the Joint Staff Policy Directorate (JS/J5) that I] called the Balkans Bubbas, and they were supposed to be basically in touch with their counterparts at United States’ State Department, in the military commands, and the military services so that they could collect data that might be needed. For example, if the deputies were going to meet about the possibility of doing humanitarian airlift drops of supplies, they would of course, first get the point that this issue would be on the agenda from the NSC or from the State Department, they would then alert everybody that they wanted to talk about this. We would then route an information paper up to the Chairman informing him that we had been alerted that at the next meeting they wanted to talk about this. We would then get feedback from the director of the Joint Staff and the J5, everything from, ‘No, tell them we don't want to talk about it,’ to, ‘Alright, we will be prepared to talk about it.’ A paper would then be prepared with coordination with the J3 [Joint Staff Operations Directorate], and say from the Air Force, and the Army, and at that time the CINC [Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)], and we would prepare an information paper on options on what it might take to do airdrops. And that would be distributed before the deputies meeting.”
For MEO Role 1, State and Defense MEOs associated with Ambassador Holbrooke’s negotiating team and Ambassador Gelbard’s implementation team coordinated and cooperated with their interagency counterparts on the team and then passed information back to their respective departments. It is worth noting that for most of the positions involving purposeful interagency interaction for MEO Role 1, interagency interaction comprised a small portion of most MEOs’ time.

4.2.3. Levels of Interagency Interaction among MEOs involved in MEO Role 3
State and Defense MEOs involved in Role 3 performed two main tasks. The first task involved State and Defense MEOs providing UEO-agreed to support to other departments. The second task involved State and Defense MEOs informing their superiors of counterpart concerns with provided support, and developing and recommending alternative support options. Purposeful interagency interaction was inherent in this role as it focused upon assisting the other department develop and implement their policies, goals, and plans. However, due to the department-level focus of MEO activities in this role, the highest possible level of interagency interaction for MEOs involved in this role was interagency cooperation. As such, interagency interaction for this role was either interagency coordination or cooperation.

Table 12 provides a proportionate representation of the top levels of interagency interaction of State and Defense MEO positions involved in supporting development or implementation of the other department’s policies, goals, or plans. The table also provides proportionate approximations of the amount of time State and Defense MEO positions involved in this role were engaged in each level of interagency interaction.
Table 12 builds off of the positions and numbers provided in Table 9. As with Table 9, the information added in Table 12 resulted from the content analysis of this study’s interview data and the ten previous studies listed in section 3.3.4. The State and Defense MEO positions involved in MEO Role 3 with the highest proportion of MEOs engaged in interagency cooperation were State and Defense MEOs on exchange to the other department (e.g., military MEOs assigned to State’s operations center, staff MEOs assigned to the other department, and overseas civil affairs officers assigned to international organizations run by State personnel). Exchange officers were assigned to the external agency and were typically expected to provide full-time support to the external agency. A State MEO assigned to Defense explained, “My colleagues . . . in the State Department were just baffled, because they sensed [that I did not fully agree with OSD’s policies], but I would never cooperate with them because I represented OSD, I didn’t represent my home agency.”
Multiple State MEOs explained that their primary interaction with military personnel came from interacting with military MEOs that worked in State’s operations center. A State country desk officer stated, “We had a person, typically a colonel or lieutenant colonel, sometimes a major, who was physically there [in the State Ops Center] from the Pentagon all the time. So we worked with them, every day, every shift.” An embassy political officer added, “A lot of the time, I mean I remember, I was on a first name basis with those in the [State Department] ops centers.”

A small portion of the civil affairs officers were assigned to support State personnel in international organizations. Ambassador Farrand (2005, 171), the Supervisor of Brcko and Deputy High Representative in North Bosnia, remarked, “The United States Army has . . . a large organization of persons who are civil affairs officers . . . reservists,
reservists put them into uniform and depending on their expertise and private life, utilize
them as advisors and assist in many, many different ways in a conflict zone. The U.S.
Army in the course of my three and a quarter years there provided me with at least eleven
or maybe twelve of these people. They came with me for ten months [at a time].

The remaining State and Defense MEO positions involved in MEO Role 3 had
medium-to-high proportions of MEOs involved in interagency coordination and
cooperation. However, MEOs in several of these positions averaged higher amounts of
time involved in purposeful interaction than MEOs in some of the other positions. MEO
positions that involved medium-to-high amounts of time involved in purposeful
interagency interaction included civil affairs officers, embassy personnel, State MEOs
seconded to international organizations, Military MEOs at the NMCC, State and Defense
MEOs on the departments’ Bosnia task forces, and State and Defense MEOs on
Ambassador Holbrooke’s negotiating team and Ambassador Gelbard’s implementation
team. Civil affairs officers that were not directly assigned to support State personnel in
international organizations were still heavily involved in supporting accomplishment of
the GFAP’s civilian objectives. Wentz (1997, 122) writes, “[Operations of civil affairs
officers] were instrumental in facilitating a wide variety of activities in support of the
OHR and other organizations such as the OSCE, UNHCR, World Bank, European Union,
International Committee of the Red Cross, and others who were responsible for
implementing the majority of civil actions outlined in the GFAP.

MEO positions involved in MEO Role 3 that typically entailed low amounts of
time included overseas military operators and HQ staff, back-office staff, and country and
functional desk officers who were not part of their department’s Bosnia task force. Interview respondents indicated that country and functional desk officers typically had daily interaction with their interagency counterparts, however they also noted that it typically constituted a small portion of their time. As previously mentioned, a State MEO reflected the sentiments of many respondents by remarking, “I would say that 90% of my interactions with people outside of my office, who were in the US government, were other State Department people. . . . [There were] lots of discussions and frequent disagreements within the State Department, itself. I spent a lot more time dealing with that than I did dealing with anybody from another agency.”

The State and Defense MEO positions involved in MEO Role 3 with the highest proportions of MEOs engaged in interagency cooperation were State and Defense MEOs on exchange to the other department (e.g., military MEOs assigned to State’s operations center, staff MEOs assigned to the other department, and overseas civil affairs officers assigned to support State personnel in international organizations). Exchange officers were typically assigned to the external agency and were expected to provide them with full-time support. A State MEO assigned to Defense explained, “My colleagues . . . in the State Department were just baffled, because they sensed [that I did not fully agree with OSD’s policies], but I would never cooperate with them because I represented OSD, I didn’t represent my home agency.”

4.2.4. Levels of Interagency Interaction among MEOs involved in MEO Role 4

The few State and Defense MEOs involved in MEO Role 4 were the only State and Defense MEOs identified as being engaged in interagency collaboration. Table 13
provides a proportionate representation of the top levels of interagency interaction of State and Defense MEO positions involved in national-level development or implementation of national policies, goals, and plans. The table also provides proportionate approximations of the amount of time State and Defense MEO positions involved in this role were engaged in each level of interagency interaction. Table 13 builds off of the positions and numbers provided in Table 7. As with Table 7, the information added in Table 13 resulted from the content analysis of this study’s interview data and the ten previous studies listed in section 3.3.4. The two State and Defense MEO positions involved in MEO Role 4 were MEOs on the NSC staff and MEOs assigned to the national Bosnia working groups. It is worth noting that interagency collaboration comprised a low proportion of time for most State and Defense MEOs involved in this role. To clarify, the only activities that counted as collaboration between State and Defense personnel is when all of the individuals involved in the interaction subordinated the development or implementation of department goals and plans to the development or implementation of national goals and plans. As such, when State and Defense MEOs involved in MEO Role 4 interacted with personnel within the departments, interagency cooperation would have been the highest possible level of interagency interaction.

Interagency collaboration of State and Defense MEOs engaged in this role typically involved collaboration with personnel from the other department that were members of the same group, members of one of the other national groups, or members of department leadership (top 3 levels) participating in collaborative NSC fora. For example, a State MEO on the NSC staff could collaborate with a Defense UEO or MEO within the NSC
staff, a Defense UEO or MEO on one of the national Bosnia working groups, or a Defense leader representing the department at collaborative NSC fora.

The handful of MEOs on the national Bosnia working groups (i.e., Ambassador Holbrooke’s negotiating team, Ambassador Gelbard’s implementation team, and Ambassador Pardew’s Train and Equip team) had the greatest amount of interagency collaboration. A Defense UEO who was part of Ambassador Gelbard’s implementation team noted that Ambassador Gelbard frequently reminded people that he represented the president (i.e., not just the State Department). A State UEO on Ambassador Gelbard’s team stated, “We each did a bunch of things and worked with our interagency colleagues.”

Ambassador Pardew also felt it important to clarify that neither he nor his team worked for the departments. Lamb, Arkin, and Scudder (2014, 66) write, “In interacting with other senior officials, if push came to shove, Pardew would simply say ‘I report to...”

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### Table 13 MEO Role 4 Positions, Numbers, and Proportions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th># of MEOs</th>
<th>% of MEOs in Role</th>
<th>% of Overseas MEOs in Role</th>
<th>% of CONUS MEOs in Role</th>
<th>% of Total MEOs in Role</th>
<th>Proportion of MEOs in this role for which this was the top level of interagency interaction</th>
<th>Proportion of time MEOs involved in this role and position engaged in:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Reps on NSC Staff</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Reps to National Bosnia Working Groups</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROLE OVERSEAS TOTAL</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>Blank</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROLE CONUS TOTAL</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>Very Low (VL): Less than 5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROLE TOTAL</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>Low (L): 5% - 35%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Medium (M): 35% - 65%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High (H): 65% - 95%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Very High (VH): Greater than 95%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: Blank: None

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the [Deputies Committee].’’ Lamb, Arkin, and Scudder (2014, 62) state, “Members quickly transferred their loyalty to the task force. As Pardew notes, ‘The people on the team were not playing the institutional game.’ Instead they focused on the mission and not pressing for their particular institution’s agenda.” Lamb, Arkin, and Scudder (2014, 76) further observe, “Pardew had the team meet daily and solicited advice from all members on all subjects.”

4.2.5. Comparison of UEO and MEO levels of interagency interaction

Among State and Defense personnel involved in US policy for Bosnia, UEOs averaged higher amounts and levels of interagency interaction than MEOs. However, even among UEOs, interagency coordination was more common than cooperation, and interagency collaboration was rare. The largest difference in interaction between overseas UEOs and MEOs occurred among military operators and HQ staff. Across the range of roles performed by overseas military operators and HQ staff, there was a higher proportion of UEOs than MEOs involved in purposeful interagency interaction. It is worth clarifying that the proportions of UEO military operators and HQ staff involved in purposeful interagency, though high in comparison with MEOs in these positions, were low in comparison to most other UEO positions. A Defense MEO involved in planning air operations in Bosnia noted that the lowest ranking positions involved in interagency coordination of such operations were typically general officers and ambassadors or POLADs. A Defense UEO also noted that the few POLADs in theater usually were assigned to support top military leaders in the uppermost military headquarters. A State

52 Tables depicting UEO position summaries are in Appendix A4.
UEO who traversed the region remarked that his interactions with military MEOs were typically with O-6s and above.

Among the various stateside roles and positions, there were typically a higher proportion of UEOs than MEOs involved in purposeful interagency interaction as most of the UEOs had at least some level of participation in formal interagency fora. A Defense UEO stated, “There was frequent interaction between State and DOD for Bosnia. . . . Interagency interaction for Bosnia was focused at the Principals and Deputies level.” He also noted that responsibility for Bosnia within the departments was often at the MEO-level, while interagency efforts for Bosnia typically occurred among UEOs. A State MEO remarked, “[In the NSC system,] you have the NSC, the PC and the DC, and then there are interagency working groups that are more like Deputy Assistant Secretary or Assistant Secretary level.” He went on to clarify that UEOs were present at almost all formal interagency structures in the US NSS; while MEO participation was minimal in all but the lowest level meetings. Another State MEO agreed, “There were mechanisms at the upper levels, there were interagency meetings. . . . Where there wasn't much contact, and I think there still isn't, is at the lower levels. I think once you get below lieutenant colonel, there was not very much contact between [State MEOs and] the majors and lieutenants and the sergeants and people like that.”

More UEOs than MEOs participated in interagency collaboration. The primary difference between UEO and MEO participation in interagency collaboration, however, occurred in national policy development processes where State and Defense UEOs interacted with one another, US NSS leadership and management, and other agencies’
UEOs to develop national policies, goals, and plans. There was no similar forum for MEOs. Rast and Lehrke (2008, 403) were among many in the literature who argued that department UEOs attending interagency fora typically focused more on defending their department’s positions and equities, and less on collaborating to identify the best solutions for the nation. Many interview respondents echoed these sentiments. A Defense MEO observed that OSD and Joint Staff representatives to all levels of NSC meetings would formally agree on Defense’s position on issues before meeting with interagency counterparts. A Defense UEO similarly remarked, “I never once, in the six or seven years that I attended these [NSC] meetings, never once saw the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] sit down at the table and have different views, they had coordinated and worked it out ahead of time.” Regardless of the actual frequency of collaboration at these meetings, the point here is these meetings provided UEOs with an opportunity for collaboration that MEOs lacked. There was greater parity of interagency collaboration among UEOs and MEOs involved in implementing national level policies. Admittedly, the primary members of Ambassador Holbrooke’s team and Ambassador Gelbard’s team were almost exclusively UEOs. However, a State MEO clarified that each team had a few MEOs who were closely associated with the team and engaged frequently with one another and team members. Lamb, Arkin, and Scudder (2014, 18-19, 90) highlight that Ambassador Pardew’s team had a more balanced mix of UEOs and MEOs.

4.2.6. Conclusions for Findings Regarding Levels of Interagency Interaction
The vast majority of MEOs in the State Department and the Department of Defense who participated in US processes to develop and implement policies for Bosnia between 1993 and 1998 experienced little to no purposeful interagency interaction. There were, however, several State and Defense MEOs who routinely engaged in purposeful interagency interaction; primarily interagency coordination or cooperation. Exceedingly few of these MEOs ever participated in the highest level of purposeful interagency interaction (i.e., collaboration). Of greater interest than the aggregate proportions of State and Defense MEOs involved in each level of interagency interaction were the substantial variations in these proportions that occurred among sub-groups of these MEOs involved in various roles, positions and locations.

There was little to no purposeful interagency interaction among the two largest sub-groups of MEOs (i.e., overseas military operators and HQ staff) involved in MEO Role 2 (Developed and implemented their respective department’s operational plans for achieving department goals). There were small portions of these sub-groups involved in MEO Role 1 (Participated in department-level development of strategic policies, goals, and plans) or MEO Role 3 (Supported development or implementation of the other department’s policies, goals, or plans via interaction with personnel from that department) that had slightly higher proportions of MEOs involved in purposeful interagency interaction; though the proportions were still lower than any other sub-group involved in any other role. The only other sub-groups that had relatively low proportions of MEOs engaged in purposeful interagency interaction were back-office analysts and
planners in State and Defense’s regional and functional offices who were involved in MEO Roles 1 and 2.

The remaining sub-groups of MEOs (each comprising less than one-fourth of all MEOs involved in US policy for Bosnia) had moderate to high proportions of MEOs engaged in interagency coordination or cooperation. Interagency coordination was far more common than interagency cooperation among most of these MEOs. And interagency tasks were typically a small portion of most of these MEOs’ activities. However, a large proportion of the MEOs in the sub-groups involved in MEO Role 3 were involved in interagency cooperation; especially MEOs involved in personnel exchanges, whose full-time activities were involved interagency cooperation. Other positions where MEO interagency cooperation was common regardless of the role being performed included overseas military civil affairs officers, political officers and defense attachés in the relevant embassies, MEOs on State or Defense’s Bosnia task force, and State and Defense MEOs on national Bosnia working groups.

There were exceedingly few State and Defense MEOs involved in interagency collaboration. The handful of MEOs on the national Bosnia working groups (i.e., Ambassador Holbrooke’s negotiating team, Ambassador Gelbard’s implementation team, and Ambassador Pardew’s Train and Equip team) had the greatest amount of interagency collaboration. These small teams—including UEOs and MEOs from State, Defense, and other organizations--interacted constantly to develop and implement national plans. The only other State and Defense MEOs the study identified as being engaged in interagency collaboration were a few MEOs on the NSC staff. Interagency collaboration for these
MEOs was limited to their interactions with other State and Defense members of the NSC staff, State and Defense members of the national Bosnia working groups, and State and Defense leadership (top 3-levels) representing their departments at collaborative NSC fora.

Among State and Defense personnel involved in US policy for Bosnia, UEOs averaged higher amounts and levels of interagency interaction than MEOs. Even among UEOs, however, interagency coordination was more common than cooperation, and interagency collaboration was rare. While interagency coordination was the highest level of interaction among most MEOs involved in purposeful interagency interaction, interagency cooperation was common, even if not the norm, among UEOs involved in purposeful interagency interaction. Additionally, more UEOs than MEOs engaged in interagency collaboration. The primary difference between UEO and MEO interagency collaboration, however, occurred in national policy development processes where State and Defense UEOs within the NSC system ostensibly collaborated with one another, US NSS leadership and management, and other agencies’ UEOs to develop national policies, goals, and plans. The extent to which true collaboration (i.e., development of shared goals that are prioritized above department goals) occurred within those processes is debatable, but the important point for this section is there were opportunities for State and Defense UEOs to collaborate in these for a that MEOs lacked. Among the few dozen State and Defense personnel assigned to national groups involved in implementing national-level policies, there were roughly equal numbers of UEOs and MEOs engaged in interagency collaboration.
CHAPTER 5. FINDINGS II: INHIBITORS AND FACILITATORS OF HIGHER LEVELS OF INTERAGENCY INTERACTION

5.1. Inhibitors of Higher Levels of Interagency Interaction

The two research questions listed in Section 3.2 relevant to inhibitors of higher levels of interagency interaction were refined as follows to specifically address the selected case study: Among personnel from State and Defense who participated in US processes to develop and implement policies for Bosnia between 1993 and 1998, what inhibited higher levels of interagency interaction for MEOs? How did the inhibitors of higher levels of MEO interagency interaction differ from the inhibitors of higher levels of UEO interagency interaction?

The primary inhibitor of higher levels of interagency interaction for State and Defense MEOs was the lack of support for such increases by department UEOs. To be sure, numerous other factors—within the broad categories of logistical and structural issues, and a lack of MEO interest in higher levels of interagency interaction—presented substantial obstacles to higher levels of MEO interagency interaction. However, State and Defense MEOs demonstrated a willingness and ability to overcome or mitigate most of the other inhibitors of purposeful interagency interaction when they believed doing so was a priority of superiors in their respective organizations. This section describes the study’s finding for each of the inhibitors of higher levels of MEO interagency interaction
and then summarizes the study’s findings of the differences between UEO and MEO inhibitors of higher levels of interagency interaction.

5.1.1. Primary Inhibitor: Lack of UEO Support for Higher Levels of MEO Interagency Interaction

Several factors contributed to the lack of UEO support for higher levels of MEO interagency interaction and to make the lack of UEO support the primary inhibitor of higher levels of MEO interagency interaction. First, State and Defense UEOs had tremendous influence over the amount and level of interagency activities of MEOs in their respective departments. Second, given prevalent policy processes, most State and Defense UEOs did not see a need for higher levels of MEO interagency interaction. Third, given that State and Defense UEOs desired to retain control over the activities of their respective departments, many of these UEOs viewed higher levels of MEO interagency interaction as undesirable. Fourth, State and Defense UEOs tolerated or encouraged limiting their respective department MEOs’ interactions with personnel from the other organization. Fifth, the NSC staff was often unwilling or unable to overcome department resistance to higher levels of interagency interaction.

There was widespread consensus among UEO and MEO interview respondents that the amount and level of interagency activities of State and Defense MEOs were primarily shaped by the needs and preferences of their organizational superiors. A State MEO remarked, “With all due respect to the military, the military is a very top-down organization. When the general says, ‘This is it,’ everyone kind of falls in line whatever their personal opinions are.” Though most respondents agreed that Defense had a more rigid hierarchical structure that was reflected in its MEOs’ involvement in interagency
interaction, several noted that the interagency interaction of State MEOs was also heavily influenced by the concerns of their organizational superiors. A State MEO described the hierarchical nature of information flow to and from his desk, “I would kind of wait for my deputy director, who would get it from the director, who got it from the deputy assistant secretary.” A Defense UEO stated, “State [MEOs] seemed very reticent to share until they got things approved by their boss.” A State MEO assigned to Defense described a situation where a Defense UEO had for some time been exerting informal pressure on him to conform to department expectations for its MEOs, “Now [this general] thought that I was a career OSD civilian, and he couldn’t understand why I wasn’t going along with the program; just do what I’m told. . . . When I was finishing up at the Pentagon, I went on a trip where we ended up at Athens for some reason. We were on an embassy bus full of State, Joint Staff, and OSD people. [The general] turned around and asked, are you a FSO [Foreign Service Officer]? When I said yes, the light went on and I could tell that everything was forgiven because I wasn’t a disloyal OSD civilian; I was a rent-a-diplomat from State.” With the understanding that MEO interagency interaction was primarily influenced by the needs and preferences of organizational UEOs, the investigation shifted towards improving understanding of UEO requirements and desires for MEO interagency interaction.

Most State and Defense UEOs viewed the existing levels of MEO interagency interaction as appropriate given the roles MEOs were expected to perform in the prevalent policy processes. As described in the previous section on levels of MEO interagency interaction, MEOs in different roles often engaged in different levels of
interagency interaction. The main tasks of MEOs involved in policy development processes were to facilitate informed decision-making by UEOs and to prepare UEOs for participation in interagency fora. State and Defense MEOs involved in policy development processes typically engaged in interagency coordination to fulfill these tasks. UEO and MEO interview respondents rejected the notion that higher levels of MEO interagency interaction (i.e., cooperation or collaboration) would have improved MEOs’ ability to perform their roles in prevailing policy development processes. A Defense UEO stated, “They [MEOs on the Joint Staff] were responsible for and expected to ensure that the generals who were participating in the decision-making processes either at the interagency working group, the deputies meeting, or the principals meeting were prepared.” He added that the coordination between his MEOs and their State counterparts provided him and his superiors the information they required to fulfill their roles as department decision makers and position advocates.

In the prevalent policy implementation processes (described in Section 4.1) policy implementation was viewed as the purview of the departments.\(^{53}\) In this perspective, departments implemented parochial operational plans and received implementation support from other departments; with the amount, type, and duration of support agreed to in advance by department UEOs. State and Defense MEOs involved in policy implementation usually engaged in little to no purposeful interagency interaction unless they were responsible for soliciting or providing UEO-approved interagency support; in which cases they engaged in interagency coordination or cooperation, as agreed to by

\(^{53}\) Exceptions to department-focused implementation occurred in the rare national policy implementation processes (see Prevalent Policy Process 6 in section 4.1.4.6)
their department UEOs. A State MEO described getting UEO clarification and backing in instances where military MEOs were not providing the level of support the State MEOs felt was agreed to, “There were a couple of occasions where they [lower level ground commanders] thought it [our mission] was too disruptive . . . and didn’t really want to support it, forcing us to go back to headquarters in Sarajevo to persuade them and then have an instruction go down to the area commander. That was a little more painful. Thankfully, that happened seldom.” While most State and Defense UEOs viewed higher levels of MEO interagency interaction as unnecessary, many viewed it as undesirable.

Many State and Defense MEOs argued that higher levels of MEO interagency interaction were undesirable due to its potential to reduce UEOs’ ability to control the activities of their respective departments. Maximizing organizational freedom of action was a primary concern of most UEOs, and higher levels of MEO interagency interaction were often viewed suspiciously as attempts by one organization to exert control over the activities of another. A Defense UEO claimed, “This building (whether it was OSD or the Joint Staff) didn't want other agencies interacting directly with the [overseas military headquarters].” A State MEO remarked, “I think it was the view on the Defense Department side that the State Department basically wants to use us as their resource bank to pursue things that they haven't really thought through.” This notion was also addressed by a Defense MEO who stated, “You have your bureaucracies that are somewhat insular for various reasons and focused on internal bureaucratic, and even maybe even a proclivity to look suspiciously upon one another as if other agencies may be trying to trick us into doing something that they ought to do.” When informed that
some respondents felt operational military planning might benefit from including State MEOs in the process, a Defense UEO emphatically rejected the idea, “Why would there be [interaction between overseas military planners and State MEOs]? What you run the risk of is State Department guys mucking around in the military chain of command. In my view, there is no need for action officers in the combatant commands and below to have interaction directly with State Department folks, they ought to be working with the Joint Staff.”

The research revealed that UEO resistance to higher levels of MEO interagency interaction often varied by issue and was influenced by several factors: the level of UEO policy consensus on the issue, the level of external interest, and the likelihood of their organization getting committed to undesirable roles or tasks. State and Defense UEO resistance to higher levels of MEO interagency interaction tended to increase as the policy disagreements between interagency UEOs increased. A State UEO claimed, “There was very little going on in terms of implementation of the Dayton Accords, as I’ve said. Some of this was because there was very little interagency cooperation in Washington and that translated into very little cooperation in the field. The US military, and in particular SACEUR [General Joulwan] at the time, were in Bosnia, but they were trying to interpret their mandate in a relatively passive way, emphasizing force protection over almost everything else.” A State MEO argued that UEO agreement was necessary before there would be much support for purposeful MEO interagency interaction. A State MEO working at an international organization commented, “Fundamental policy differences between the senior leaders at State and DoD served to hinder interagency
interaction.” Another State MEO observed, “At the time [1993-1995], one of the things that really struck me [as an FS-03 on State’s NATO desk] was how the military’s reluctance, particularly the uniformed military’s reluctance to put boots on the ground, made everything that needed to be cleared with JCS very, very slow.” A State UEO remarked, “We knew it [interagency interaction among MEOs] was a dead letter until the principals changed policy.”

State and Defense UEO resistance to higher levels of MEO interagency interaction increased as the level of interest from those outside the bureaucracies (e.g., the president, congress, the media, or the general public) increased. A Defense UEO stated that department UEOs would often address important or high visibility issues themselves, rather than let them be handled by lower level groups. As previously mentioned, a Defense UEO noted that at one point issues in Bosnia reached the point where, “the DC [Deputies Committee] was acting as the town council of Srebrenica.” Part of the reason for keeping issues among the UEOs was to attempt to control the information getting out on the issue. A State MEO commented, “Higher ups in the organization want to feel like they are controlling the discussion; they have a chance to make the decisions. They want to get the facts and not be blindsided.” A Defense UEO relayed an anecdote demonstrating the impact continuous news coverage (a relatively new phenomena in the mid-1990s) had on UEOs’ willingness to delegate tasks to lower levels, “We [the US] had made the decision to empower NATO to conduct airstrikes in support of the Bosnian Muslim government against the Bosnian Serbs. And that of course was pushed down; NATO had the authority to conduct the air strikes. We were just in the beginning of the
media days, Wolf Blitzer was on the south lawn [of the White House], Christiane Amanpour was in Sarajevo, they are connected live on CNN, and literally, Christiane says, “Wolfe, I hear airplanes and bombs going off.” And Wolf says, “Yes, Christiane, I'm standing here at the White House waiting for a response to what is going on.” We in the White House didn't even know, because the authority to commit airstrikes had been delegated down and empowered down. So that was kind of the beginning of the role of the media and has only intensified. The people who are dealing with this now, when they make decisions there is an expectation from the press that those in the White House are going to know what is going on. Therefore it is very difficult for them to delegate down decisions that the media could be reporting upon tomorrow.”

Defense UEO resistance to higher levels of MEO interagency interaction increased as the likelihood of getting their organization committed to undesirable roles or tasks increased. A State UEO remarked, “OSD wasn’t very cooperative. I can only conclude that this came from the very top of DoD, but they again didn’t want to be as deeply involved; they didn’t want the US government as deeply involved in Bosnia as certainly the Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, felt we ought to be, and, I believe, as the President wanted us to be. I think the President wanted us to be much more involved. The DASD [Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense leading the effort for OSD] at the time was . . . very negative and very disruptive. He essentially got pulled out. . . . [His replacement] was a much nicer person and I’m sure he was following orders, but again, not enormously cooperative substantively. We had a lot of resistance from OSD in trying to be more forthcoming and more proactive in terms of what we were trying to do in
Bosnia, in particular. I think they feared we were going to get too involved in things and that ranged from, certainly the issue of capturing the war criminals, but then even to things like refuge returns and even political issues that we were involved in.”

When there was a lack of UEO support for higher levels of MEO interagency interaction as described in the preceding paragraphs, State and Defense UEOs often tolerated or encouraged limiting their respective department’s MEOs’ interactions with personnel from the other department. Many State and Defense UEOs and MEOs who participated in interagency meetings indicated that they had received explicit instructions from their superiors to share as little as possible. A Defense UEO said his instructions were clear, “go sit at the head of the table, be on the camera and don't say anything, if they ask you for anything, tell them you will get back to them, then come back and tell the generals what was going on. So we were very much told to sit there and be potted plants. Everything that we wanted fed in to the system would come from the generals, not through the action officers or the colonels in the interagency process.” A State MEO suggested that State often achieved the same result (i.e., share little) with an approach befitting their organization, “[OSD had a reputation of attending interagency meetings with instructions to keep their ears open and their mouths shut, in essence, they were to gather information, but not commit their organization to anything.] . . . They would want to coordinate with their chain, make sure they had their ducks in a row before telling others. And they had a bigger organization to coordinate within. I think we actually had similar instructions, you know: you can go to the SVTC, keep them happy, keep the NSC feeling like they are getting information, but don’t really present any issues for policy
decisions, we are going to do that here at State. Don’t tell them a lot of the inside stuff. I think we just did it by talking more, and covering up what we wanted to cover up. I think the DoD people did it by talking less, and covering up what they wanted to cover up. But, there was a little bit of that sense, you know, we’re working on this and until we have it a little farther along, we aren’t ready for an interagency discussion. . . . So [the NSC staff] was always pushing for more information about what [was] going on. Both State and DOD were trying to, you know, hold back a little bit.” A Defense UEO suggested there was a lot of truth behind a commonly heard joke of that time that said the Pentagon’s three standing instructions for interagency meetings were:

1. Don’t tell them anything
2. Don’t let them interfere with our operations
3. Don’t let them get at our money

The NSC staff was in the unenviable situation of attempting to facilitate higher levels of interagency interaction from these often reluctant departments.

The NSC staff often proved unwilling or unable to overcome department resistance to increased levels of interagency interaction. A State MEO noted, “The NSC was trying desperately to get control of the situation, because they are supposed to be managing the interagency process and this had reached the level of prominence where the President was directly paying attention to it.” Another State MEO observed that the president’s decision to centralize interagency issues for Bosnia under Ambassador Gelbard’s implementation team was a direct result of the inability of the NSC system to produce adequate activity out of the departments. A State UEO suggested that
Ambassador Gelbard was asked in 1996 to become the president’s special representative for the Balkans because, “at the Cabinet level, and by the President, that they saw things as really becalmed, that very little or nothing was going on.” Rast and Lehrke (385-386) found similar results, “. . . the interagency process did not submit policy choices to the president in an effective manner; rather, he received too few options and ones that presented as contradictory. With the weight of the departments already behind their individual plans, it was almost impossible for him or the NSC to manage the policy integration process. This led to an ad hoc, ever-changing approach best characterized by Morton Halperin as ‘muddling through.’ Eventually, the NSC bypassed the interagency process to create a strategy for Balkan intervention.” Rast and Lehrke (2008, 423) note that bypassing the departments decreased pressure on the departments to work together, “According to some observers, the Bosnia operation signaled ‘the triumph of the NSC system over the departments,’ which set a precedent for the Clinton administration. During his second term, the NSC would dominate policy making. A State Department deputy captured the essence of this transition: Paradoxically, the NSC [Staff] now dominates the process. Because it is now dominant, it deals with all the issues, but only episodically. It exacerbates the problem by not paying attention except to the ‘crisis of the day.’ That decreases pressure for State and Defense to work together, so they continue to do their own things. The NSC [Staff] does not do a good job of forcing people to work together.”

Although the NSC staff (as well as the president and the national security advisor) often struggled un成功fully to alter the short-term interagency interaction of the
departments, some interview respondents noted that they had more success over the long run. A Defense UEO noted, “When General Powell’s term was up, they [US NSS leadership] very much went out and sought a Chairman who was a little more forthcoming about wanting to be involved to help find a solution; ergo the General Shalikashvili story started to unfold. So that changed the tone and the guidance. Let's see if we can't be a little more helpful in finding ways to end this war in Bosnia.” In addition to the lack of UEO support for higher levels of MEO interagency interaction, there were several logistical or structural inhibitors.

5.1.2. Logistical and Structural Inhibitors

There were numerous logistical or structural inhibitors to higher levels of MEO interagency interaction. Logistical inhibitors included shortages of time and personnel, geographic limitations, and data classification issues. The dearth of formal mechanisms for MEO interagency interaction was the primary structural inhibitor. State and Defense UEOs and MEOs alike mentioned that most of those involved in US processes for developing and implementing policies for Bosnia were extremely busy and there were rarely enough people available to do the job. A State country desk officer said, “I was insanely busy. . . . We were all working a zillion hours a day.” Many of the military planners related that they also operated in a “time compressed” environment. A State political officer in an overseas embassy remarked, “There were extraordinary demands being made on resources. So it wasn't really a time to be improvising, or to be experimenting with new things that would demand resources.”
Geographical factors also inhibited higher levels of MEO interagency interaction. Several MEOs noted that even the small distance between the Pentagon and Foggy Bottom could be a barrier. A military UEO remarked, “Interaction between OSD and Joint Staff was facilitated by being in the same building. So it was very easy for me to go see my OSD counterpart or him to come to my office and chat. . . . State Department is across the river from the Pentagon, and we don't have the same access to the State Department.” Similarly, a State country desk officer suggested that the time necessary for travel to and from the Pentagon could inhibit interaction, “When you come in [to the position of State country desk officer] you kind of make the rounds, you know. Both in your own building and in the other agencies you meet the people who are your counterparts essentially. . . . I actually didn’t physically go as you normally would, but for both the Pentagon and the CIA it is an all day trip, by the time you get out there and go through all the clearance stuff, you’ve pretty much taken an entire day. Instead I just did it on the phone.” Other geographical issues included the overseas separation of military and State personnel. Interestingly, some of the embassy political officers mentioned they were unable to interact with military MEOs in theater partly due to a restriction that prevented them from going into unstable environments. However, Ambassador Farrand (2005, 147) relates that the opposite was true in his circumstances. While he worked within the contested and occasionally violent city of Breko, the military stayed in their secure base three miles away.

Data classification issues were another inhibitor of higher levels of MEO interagency interaction. This inhibitor is often listed in the literature as an inhibitor. It is
typically asserted that civilian agencies, and even some military organizations, struggle to interact with the numerous military organizations whose members spend much of their times communicating on classified systems. For instance, Baumann, Gawrych, and Kretchik (2004, 195) claim, “Another basic clash in operational cultures stemmed from the classified nature of military planning.” Though several respondents mentioned this inhibitor, only a couple expressed the idea that it was a major factor. Such as the Defense MEO who argued, “In the civilian agencies, one of the main issues hampering intergovernmental cooperation is often an issue of clearances. And the military has a habit of working on the high side [classified systems], whether it’s needed or not.”

The main structural issue inhibiting higher levels of MEO interagency interaction was the lack of formal mechanisms for such interaction. As previously mentioned, the vast majority of MEOs conducting overseas military operations and working as HQ staff had no formal mechanisms for interacting with State personnel. The formal interagency mechanism attended by the largest number of State and Defense MEOs was a daily Bosnia SVTC. The main State and Defense MEOs attending this meeting were members of each department’s Bosnia task force and country and functional desk officers. A State MEO noted, “Beginning in the fall of 1994, there was a daily secure video teleconference (SVTC) between State, DoD, CIA, NSC staff, and others (e.g., staff on the US Mission to the UN). Though this meeting began at the Deputies level (Kornblum hosted the first one), it quickly turned into a forum for mid-tier action officers to coordinate operational level issues.” The main drawback of this mechanism was it rarely facilitated interaction beyond the level of coordination. And with the departments frequently limiting what their
MEOs could share, as previously described, even coordination was sometimes limited.
This limitation was highlighted by a State MEO who lamented, “DOD was very uncooperative. The fact that we had daily meetings only raised the level of irritation. When you're having daily meetings, it is supposed to increase the level of communication, it can work the other way.”

Other interacting mechanisms identified by interview respondents were more conducive to higher levels of interagency interaction but they frequently involved very few MEOs. Some of these mechanisms have already been described: The national Bosnia working groups, each department’s Bosnia task force, and the embassies. A civil affairs officer mentioned that overseas civil affairs officers’ interaction with civilian agencies were mainly facilitated by a non-government entity (the Catholic Relief Agency), but were also coordinated by SFOR’s civil military information cell (CIMIC). He stated, “The main coordination effort in Bosnia was the Catholic Relief Agency. Catholic Relief ran the IO, NGO forum (a weekly meeting); there was also CMOC [civil military operations center], or CIMIC, in Sarajevo that was the meeting hub for all the relief efforts and we tried to coordinate their efforts to have a more synergistic effect.” A Defense UEO concluded, “If you want to have a more effective interagency process at the action officer level, then the action officers need some type of fora to meet their contemporaries.”

5.1.3. Lack of MEO Interest in Higher Levels of Interagency Interaction
Most State and Defense MEOs were not interested in increasing their level of interagency interaction. Most of the reasons for the lack of MEO interest were
exceedingly practical: their superiors typically did not expect higher levels of interagency interaction, their existing levels of interagency interaction seemed adequate for the roles they filled in the prevailing policy processes, and their schedules rarely allowed the time required to overcome the logistical and structural obstacles to higher levels of interagency interaction. In short, the above issues provided busy MEOs with strong incentives to avoid activities that added to their workload or occupied their time unless the anticipated benefits were clear and compelling. Several factors contributed to MEO doubts regarding the anticipated benefits of higher levels of interagency interaction. MEOs frequently had little relevant interagency experience. Many MEOs lacked knowledge and skills necessary to contribute productively to higher levels of interagency interaction. And MEOs often did not respect the views or processes of their interagency counterparts.

The lack of relevant interagency experiences provided most State and Defense MEOs with little basis for expecting benefits from higher levels of interagency interaction. Most Defense MEOs engaged in interagency processes for Bosnia typically had little to no experience interacting with State personnel. Almost none of the Defense MEOs interviewed had interacted with State personnel prior to Bosnia. The lack of interagency experience among Defense MEOs was addressed by a Defense UEO who stated, “There was still [in the mid-1990s] a bit of a bias [among military members] to not interacting with the State Department; I must say it [a proclivity to interact with State] wasn’t the norm. I would say that I was kind of an anomaly in that I reached out to the people in the State Department. You know, I went to the Foreign Service school at Georgetown. I got my masters in International Relations. So I was pretty comfortable
dealing with them. But, most military guys at that point weren’t because we hadn’t worked with the State Department.”

State MEOs typically had more interagency experience than Defense MEOs. However, several State MEOs noted that their interaction with Defense personnel was typically limited to Defense people involved in civilian tasks. Their point was State MEOs rarely had experience interacting with Defense personnel involved in military activities, and were thus unaware of the potential benefits of such interaction. A State MEO noted that the Defense MEOs he engaged with, “were doing things not thought of as typical for military officers.” Another State MEO clarified, “Most of us [State MEOs] do have contact with military guys, but they are usually the defense attaché or someone like that, they are military guys doing kind of a State Department job, and under State Department control and command (of course, I realize they are dual hatted, but they work for the ambassador). What we don't have a lot of experience with is military guys who are in the field, who are doing what most of the guys in the military do and so on.”

Many MEOs often lacked the knowledge and skills necessary to contribute effectively to higher levels of interagency interaction. The main knowledge deficit usually involved MEOs having limited awareness of the positions, capabilities, processes, and activities of their own organization and of their counterparts’ organization. Factors contributing to these knowledge deficits included UEOs failing to keep their subordinates informed of upper level decisions and activities, MEOs having limited visibility into the activities of their own organization that were outside of their own specialty, and lack of experience with their counterparts’ organization. Some of these obstacles were raised by
a State MEO who shared, “I think where we [MEOs] usually had trouble was [varying levels of awareness] as to what [our] bosses had decided, or already discussed. . . . You might be trying to argue your point, that you were directed on something; often as not, your counterpart might not have the read out of what decisions had actually been made. So it might take a while to get to that point. That was the biggest challenge.” Closely related to the knowledge deficit was many MEOs lacked basic interagency skills. A Defense UEO claimed, “MEOs were typically unaware of how they could contribute to interagency efforts.” A Defense MEO argued that few State personnel possessed the skills necessary to interact effectively in operational planning processes. One of the most critical appraisals of the interagency skills of Defense MEOs came from an embassy officer who shared the following, “I interacted constantly with the defense attachés’ office. There were three guys, the chief attaché was Air Force, then there was a Navy guy, and an Army guy. You’ll excuse me, but the Air Force and Navy attachés were idiots. . . . [They] were very poor at assessing the information they got. The Air Force guy was a procurement officer. He had no background for the job. . . . There was a real disconnect between the demands of the job and the preparation and selection of people to fill it.”

MEOs often did not respect the views or processes of their interagency counterparts. In the literature these factors were often attributed to culture (Rife and Hansen (1998), Finney and La Porta (2008, 297), Schake (2012), and Schadlow (2003)), doctrine (Desai (2005) and CSIS (Murdock, Flournoy, Williams, and Campbell 2004)), or some other factor. Rast and Lehrke (2008, 407) write, “The perception of “the other in
the interagency” hindered cooperation.” Interview respondents made it clear that these factors were present among State and Defense MEOs involved in US policy processes for Bosnia in the mid-1990s, and contributed to MEO doubts regarding the value of interacting with their interagency counterparts. The following examples highlight the fact that many State and Defense MEOs believed their counterparts fundamentally misunderstood the situation in Bosnia. A State MEO commented, “I will also say that during the war in Bosnia, I felt that the US military didn't quite understand the dynamics of what was going on in Bosnia, and that they were looking for a winner. . . . Even though we thought it was indefensible that the US military would pick a winner and decide to favor that group versus another, we also thought the analysis was also wrong.” Another State MEO relayed an account where interaction between State and Defense MEOs degenerated into a shouting match, “We were looking, if I recall correctly, we were looking for assistance and engagement [from OSD and international partners] on protecting mass grave sites. And we’re looking for ways to do it and one of the OSD folks, a major if I recall correctly, and I can’t think of his name, though I certainly can picture him, stood up and said, “Well, just go ask the Serbs to do it, they’re in the area.” And that was, since the Serbs had been the perpetrators and the Croats the victims of that crime, that seemed to all of us at State to be really, an incredibly inappropriate suggestion. And I’m afraid that triggered the screaming, on both sides. It degenerated fairly quickly and everybody stomped off.” A Defense UEO offered similar insights, “Our view was that State Department appreciation for what was going on was not shaped by the dynamics and the facts on the ground.” Others shared that State and Defense
MEOs did not have favorable opinions of each other. A Defense MEO claimed that the State MEOs he engaged with seemed to view the military as “Neanderthals” or “barbarians.” A State MEO who spent time in both departments offered the following, “In the State Department, there was considerably more conceit, more elitism. The State Department you know, it’s very competitive to get in, they tended to be very good college students, research types, there was somewhat of a cultural conceit. On the other hand, State Department people didn’t have a full appreciation for how you get things done operationally. It’s not what you write on a page, it’s how you actually make things happen, how you structure things to get from point A to point B. Among the military guys, I think once they picked up on this there was some rolling of the eyeballs.” Another State MEO summarized the issue and emphasized the extent of the discontent among State UEOs and MEOs, “There was tension between mid-level State Department people and mid-level military guys over this [organizational differences over appropriate US policy for Bosnia]. The military thought, here are these civilians who don't know what the hell they're talking about trying to drag us into another Vietnam. The State Department guy was thinking here are these military guys who are coldhearted and just don't care about what is going on in the Balkans and don't understand the damage this is doing to the self-image of the United States. As you might not know, actually more foreign service officers at the mid-to upper-mid levels resigned over Bosnia policy, or asked to be transferred out of Bosnia policy, then over any other issue in the State Department since Vietnam. And that is still true. More FSOs left or resigned in protest over what we were doing, or not doing in the Balkans, then left over Iraq or Afghanistan,
or any of those issues that we're dealing with today. . . . There was a meeting, a bunch of FSOs went up to see the secretary to protest within the State Department, the way the State Department wants dissent to be handled. Obviously, they don't want people to resign and hold press conferences. There might have been 12, I don’t remember how many were involved, and they presented their views to Warren Christopher. He was polite and listened, but he'd didn't do anything. So there was a lot of unhappiness and a lot of the sense that the military just didn't understand what was going on. And the military had similar views of us.”

5.1.4. Differences between UEO and MEO Inhibitors of Higher Levels of Interagency Interaction

For the most part, UEO and MEO inhibitors of higher levels of interagency interaction were very similar. The parochial incentives and behaviors, logistical factors, different organizational perspectives and processes, and weak interagency leadership and management identified in the study as inhibiting higher levels of MEO interagency interaction also inhibited higher levels of UEO interagency interaction. For MEOs, however, these factors were secondary to the primary inhibitor (i.e., lack of UEO support for higher levels of MEO interagency interaction). Other differences between UEO and MEO inhibitors of higher levels of interagency interaction include fewer formal interagency fora for MEOs and the primary inhibitor of interagency collaboration was different for UEOs and MEOs. The lack of formal interagency mechanisms was more of an inhibitor for MEOs than for UEOs. UEOs participated in every level of NSC meetings.

54 Two of the State personnel interviewed shared that they had been part of the group of protesting FSOs known as the “Bosnian 12.” They informed me that they had been reassigned for taking part in the protest.
The only formal NSC meeting that included large numbers of UEOs and MEOs was the daily Bosnia SVTC.

The primary inhibitor of interagency collaboration was different for MEOs and UEOs. For most State and Defense MEOs, the primary inhibitor was a lack of opportunity for interagency collaboration. Apart from the few State and Defense MEOs assigned to the NSC staff or national Bosnia working groups, State and Defense MEOs rarely participated directly in interagency fora where national policy was developed or implemented. The State and Defense MEOs assigned to the national working groups demonstrated the ability to prioritize the group’s concerns over the concerns of the departments from which they came. As previously mentioned, in a study of Ambassador Pardew’s train and equip program, Lamb (62-63) found, “Members quickly transferred their loyalty to the task force. As Pardew notes, ‘The people on the team were not playing the institutional game.’ Instead they focused on the mission and not pressing for their particular institution’s agenda. Agreeing with this assessment, another member [Rabasa] noted that the CIA participant represented the task force and its interests to the agency, and that was true for all members who interacted with their parent organizations. He believed the mark of any successful interagency team is that the members all turn and represent the team to the parent organizations “rather than the other way around.”

In contrast to the few opportunities MEOs had for participation in national policy processes, the NSC system offered State and Defense UEOs multiple venues to participate in the development or implementation of national policies. The main inhibitor of UEO interagency collaboration in these fora was the immense pressure on UEOs to
take a department-centric approach to interagency processes. Rast and Lehrke (2008 385) claim that department representatives to interagency policy processes for Bosnia failed to develop a coherent strategy because they were focused on advocating department “policies centered on protecting institutional equities in light of organizational definitions of national security.” The pressure on UEOs to defend institutional equities was not limited to UEOs attending NSC meetings. A Defense UEO on one of the national groups mentioned that he ensured his contributions to the group were always consistent with his department leadership’s plans and policies. A State MEO suggested that General Clark went outside of the desires of his Defense leadership when he was a member of Ambassador Holbrooke’s team and created enemies in the Pentagon who potentially contributed to an early conclusion to his career. It is worth noting that the UEO leaders of the national groups (i.e., Ambassadors Holbrooke, Gelbard, and Pardew) did not feel beholden to their parent organization, as each of them felt they worked for the president.

5.1.5. Conclusions for Findings Regarding Inhibitors of Higher Levels of Interagency Interaction

The primary inhibitor of higher levels of interagency interaction for State and Defense MEOs was the lack of support for such increases by department UEOs. To be sure, numerous other factors—within the broad categories of logistical and structural issues, and low levels of MEO interest in purposeful interagency interaction—presented substantial obstacles to higher levels of MEO interagency interaction. However, State and Defense MEOs demonstrated a willingness and ability to overcome or mitigate most of the other inhibitors of purposeful interagency interaction when they believed doing so
was a priority of superiors in their respective organizations. State and Defense UEOs rarely made higher levels of MEO interagency interaction a priority.

Within the prevalent processes for developing and implementing US policy, few State and Defense MEOs had roles that were viewed by department UEOs as requiring purposeful interagency interaction. In the prevalent policy development processes, UEO expectations for MEOs involved in purposeful interagency interaction were typically limited to coordination of papers, schedules, and ideas to facilitate department UEOs’ participation in UEO-level interagency meetings. In the prevalent policy implementation processes, policy implementation was usually viewed as the purview of the departments. In this perspective, departments implemented parochial operational plans and received support from other departments; with the amount, type, and duration of support agreed to in advance by department UEOs. In these policy implementation processes, UEOs expected most MEO involvement in purposeful interagency interaction to be limited to coordination of UEO-agreed to interagency support. State and Defense UEOs would also task a small number of MEOs to support development and implementation of the other department’s policies, goals and plans. Given the widespread acceptance of these processes for policy development and implementation, most State and Defense UEOs viewed higher levels of MEO interagency interaction as unnecessary, or even undesirable.

Many State and Defense UEOs viewed higher levels of MEO interagency interaction as undesirable. These UEOs tended to look suspiciously on interagency interaction as attempts by people in one organization to influence the activities of another
organization; and control over organizational activities was a responsibility most UEOs jealously protected. The research identified several factors that often increased UEO resistance to higher levels of MEO interagency interaction for an issue. These factors included an increase in fundamental policy disagreements among interagency UEOs, an increase in the potential for external interest (e.g., from the president, congress, media, or public), and an increase in the likelihood of their organization getting committed to undesirable roles or tasks. Under these circumstances, UEOs frequently tolerated or encouraged limiting their respective department MEOs’ interactions with personnel from other organizations. The NSC staff often proved unwilling or unable to overcome department resistance to increased levels of interagency interaction.

As mentioned above, there were numerous factors other than lack of UEO support that inhibited higher levels of MEO interagency interaction. Several of these factors can be categorized as logistical or structural inhibitors. Logistical inhibitors included shortages of time and personnel, geographic limitations, and data classification issues. The dearth of formal mechanisms for MEO interagency interaction was the primary structural inhibitor.

Another inhibitor of higher levels of MEO interagency interaction was the lack of MEO interest in higher levels of interagency interaction. The primary contributor to the low level of MEO interest was the lack of UEO support. Understandably and appropriately, MEOs tended to prioritize the things that mattered most to their superiors. Logistical and structural inhibitors also contributed to the lack of MEO interest in higher levels of interagency interaction. These issues provided busy MEOs with strong
incentives to avoid activities that added to their workload or occupied their time unless the anticipated benefits were clear and compelling. Several factors contributed to MEO doubts regarding the anticipated benefits of higher levels of interagency interaction. MEOs frequently had little relevant interagency experience. Many MEOs lacked knowledge and skills necessary to contribute productively to higher levels of interagency interaction. And MEOs often did not respect the views or processes of their interagency counterparts.

State and Defense UEOs and MEOs experienced many of the same inhibitors to higher levels of interagency interaction, though there were several important differences. Parochial incentives and behaviors, logistical factors, different perspectives and processes, and weak interagency leadership and management inhibited higher levels of interagency interaction for UEOs and MEOs, alike. For MEOs, however, these factors were secondary to the primary inhibitor (i.e., lack of UEO support for higher levels of MEO interagency interaction). Other differences included fewer formal interagency fora for MEOs, and UEOs and MEOs faced different obstacles to interagency collaboration. For most State and Defense MEOs, the primary inhibitor was a lack of opportunity for interagency collaboration. The evidence from this study and the literature support the notion that the primary inhibitor of UEO interagency collaboration was the immense pressure on UEOs to take a department-centric approach to interagency processes.

5.2. Facilitators of Higher Levels of Interagency Interaction

The two research questions listed in Section 3.2 relevant to facilitators of higher levels of interagency interaction were refined as follows to specifically address the
selected case study: Among personnel from State and Defense who participated in US processes to develop and implement policies for Bosnia between 1993 and 1998, what facilitated higher levels of interagency interaction for MEOs? How did the facilitators of higher levels of MEO interagency interaction differ from the facilitators of higher levels of UEO interagency interaction?

The research revealed three broad categories of facilitators of higher levels of interagency interaction for State and Defense MEOs: UEO support; logistical factors; and MEO interest, initiative, and ability to network. This section explains the research findings for each category of facilitators and then describes differences between UEO and MEO facilitators

5.2.1. UEO Support for Higher Levels of MEO Interagency Interaction

The most important facilitator for higher levels of MEO interagency interaction was UEO support for higher levels. UEO support was the most important facilitator because it was required for MEO participation in interagency interaction and it enabled MEOs to contribute effectively. UEO support came in many forms: UEOs conveying expectations for higher levels of MEO interagency interaction, UEOs clarifying that interagency issues were a top priority, and UEOs providing MEOs with the guidance and information required to effectively engage with interagency counterparts.

State and Defense MEOs rarely engaged in interagency interaction without at least receiving tacit approval from their department superiors. UEO expectations for MEO involvement were conveyed in many forms, from receiving simple instructions to engage with interagency counterparts, to being given responsibility for a task or issue that
traditionally involved interaction with interagency counterparts, to getting assigned to an interagency team. State and Defense MEO interview respondents suggested that though there were few formal mechanisms for overcoming obstacles to interagency interaction among MEOs, MEOs involved in interagency efforts found ways to work with those outside of their organization because their department leadership expected them to do so.

Another way the UEOs supported higher levels of MEO interagency interaction was by conveying that an interagency issue was a top priority. As previously mentioned, MEOs were extremely busy and tended to allocate their time based upon their superiors’ priorities. A Defense UEO stated that one of the ways he managed to get greater State MEO participation in an interagency effort was to ensure their superiors were aware that the outcome of the effort would be briefed to the NSC Deputies Committee. He suggested that this fostered increased interest among State UEOs that translated into increased involvement of State MEOs. Another method MEOs used to gauge the interagency priorities of their superiors was by the level of UEO policy consensus. When there was little policy consensus between State and Defense UEOs, MEOs had fewer incentives to engage in interagency interaction. A common sentiment among interview respondents was that MEO interagency interaction became much more valuable once there was policy consensus among UEOs.

UEOs providing MEOs with clear guidance also supported higher levels of MEO interagency interaction. MEOs representing their department in interagency fora tended to share less rather than more when their department’s UEO intent for an issue was unclear. A Defense MEO explained, “One of the things that is very interesting is when
you are dealing with policy generally, at the AO [action officer] level there can tend to be
too much of a negativity, in so far as you don’t have folks necessarily thinking out of the
box and leaning forward to engage in change management per say, you might have a
tendency for folks to be very protective of what they perceive to be their principal’s
intent or prerogative.” A Defense UEO similarly noted, “Below the GO level, guys keep
their cards close to their chest because they are defending their organizations’ positions.”
UEOs were able to mitigate MEOs’ conservative tendencies by providing them with clear
policy guidance.

An even more practical way that UEOs supported higher levels of MEO
interagency interaction was by providing MEOs involved in such efforts updates as issues
developed and timely and clear responses to requests for information or decisions. As
previously mentioned, MEO interagency efforts were often undermined because MEOs
had an incomplete picture of what was occurring at the upper levels. A Defense UEO
stated, “Ideally they [military MEOs] would get some feedback [on the products and
recommendations they provided their UEOs], which they rarely got. Then they would
prepare for the next meeting.” A previously shared comment from a State MEO also
highlighted this issue, “I think where [MEOs] usually had trouble was [varying levels of
awareness] as to what [our] bosses had decided, or already discussed. . . . You might be
trying to argue your point, that you were directed on something; often as not, your
counterpart might not have the read out of what decisions had actually been made. So it
might take a while to get to that point. That was the biggest challenge.” UEO information
updates and timely responses enabled MEOs to contribute effectively to interagency efforts.

### 5.2.2. Logistical facilitators

Logistical facilitators of higher levels of MEO interagency interaction included technological factors and structural mechanisms. This section begins by describing technologies that facilitated higher levels of MEO interagency interaction and then explains five facilitating structural mechanisms identified by the study.

#### 5.2.2.1. Technological facilitators of higher levels of MEO interagency interaction

The main technological facilitators identified by the study were phone calls (and phone rosters), secure video teleconferences (SVTCs), email, and shuttle buses. Phone calls were the primary means for most MEO interagency interaction. UEO and MEO interview respondents alike explained that due to the lack of formal fora for MEO interagency interaction, and the fact that email use was in its infancy, phone calls were the primary means for MEOs to engage with interagency counterparts. The prevalence and importance of phone calls was highlighted by a State country desk officer who developed a close working relationship with her Defense counterparts despite never meeting them, “I remember there was a Navy guy there who was going off to a submarine after his tour at the Pentagon was over, we threw a party for him at the State Department one afternoon. I’d never met him previously, but we had talked on the phone every single day. We never had a face to face meeting, and this was before email became widespread, so we talked a lot. When you are on the phone with somebody enough you eventually get to know them. He would tell me he would get me something by 3 because
he had to pick up kids and we’d talk about that and pretty soon you’d start to know about him and his family. You’d know when they had a cold because they would sound different. It’s just a different relationship.” Of course, the importance of phone calls also put a premium on phone rosters. A State country desk officer commented, “We [State country desk officers] tried to make sure we always had a pretty good org chart for the CIA, the OSD, JCS, and NSC, and we had a big one for ourselves that we would share with them.” A Defense MEO noted that one of the highly valued services NATO’s CIMIC (Civil-Military Information Center) provided for military and civilian agencies was an in-country contact list, “They had a group of people in there called the ICVA [International Council of Volunteer Agencies], basically they provided the phone book if you will for IGOs and NGOs describing who was in the country, what’s their mission, how many people did they have, what were their contact phone numbers, and they would update that and provide it as a service which was really great.”

A secure video teleconference (SVTC), a relatively recent development at the time, facilitated higher levels of interagency interaction by enabling the sole formal interagency mechanism that included large numbers of State and Defense MEOs. The daily Bosnia SVTC was hosted by NSC staff and attended by personnel from State, Defense, and other agencies in the US NSS. As previously mentioned, the daily Bosnia SVTC began in the fall of 1994 and facilitated coordination of operational issues. Admittedly, several attendees noted that interagency interaction on the SVTC was occasionally strained due to policy disagreements or department reluctance to share information. However, the SVTC provided a forum for MEOs to gather updated
information and identify others involved in similar issues that they could contact outside of the forum.

The final two technological facilitators identified were email and shuttle buses. It is important to qualify the inclusion of these two facilitators because each of them was mentioned by only two MEO interview respondents. The respondents that mentioned email as a facilitator argued that it enabled wider sharing of information and noted that it became more prevalent during the latter part of the case study. The respondents that mentioned the shuttle buses as facilitators were referring to buses going between Foggy Bottom and the Pentagon and suggested that the shuttles helped overcome the geographic barriers between personnel in those locations.

5.2.2.2. Structural mechanisms that facilitated higher levels of MEO interagency interaction

The study identified five structural mechanisms that facilitated higher levels of MEO interagency interaction: Formal interagency fora, MEO personnel exchanges, department-level interagency Bosnia working groups, national organizations (e.g., NSC staff or national Bosnia working groups), and informal networks of MEOs. Given that each of these mechanisms has been described in previous sections, this section will focus on summarizing the facilitating aspects of each mechanism. Additionally, there were some common characteristics among the facilitating structural mechanisms worth noting: participants interacted frequently, participants recognized the interdependence of their respective tasks, and the participants were focused on practical issues.\(^{55}\) As mentioned in

\(^{55}\) The national groups and department-level Bosnia working groups were the only mechanisms that routinely addressed higher level policy issues in addition to focusing on practical issues.
the previous section, the daily Bosnia SVTC was the sole formal interagency forum that was attended by large numbers of State and Defense MEOs, and they enabled MEOs to gather updated operational information and identify interagency counterparts involved in similar issues that they could contact outside of the forum.

MEO personnel exchanges were one of the more successful means of facilitating interagency cooperation. While MEOs were on exchange to the other department, they had far greater latitude to share their skills and knowledge, and were relatively unencumbered by institutional pressure to defend their parent department’s equities. A State MEO who completed an exchange tour with Defense noted that his institutional loyalties were with Defense for the duration of his assignment there and that he believed it provided Defense with skills they were otherwise lacking, “Defense people really wanted a rich mixture [of people involved in policy]. I think they thought, and I think it is true, that I helped enrich, because a lot of the guys assigned there were career operations guys, they weren’t people who wrote position papers or things like that. So they actively sought people from other agencies.”

State and Defense each had a Bosnia task force that was primarily comprised of internal UEOs and MEOs, but included UEO or MEO representatives from external agencies. These structural mechanisms enabled coordination and cooperation among task force participants. The respective task forces benefitted from the knowledge and insights of the external representatives, and the departments benefitted from the information that their representatives brought back from the task forces.
National groups, such as the NSC staff or national Bosnia working groups, provided structural mechanisms for State and Defense MEOs to participate in development and implementation of national policy. As previously mentioned, these groups were the only structures identified that facilitated direct MEO engagement in interagency collaboration. Interagency collaboration of State and Defense MEOs engaged in this role typically involved collaboration with personnel from the other department that were members of the same group, members of one of the other national groups, or members of department leadership (top 3 levels) participating in collaborative NSC fora.

The last structural mechanisms identified were relatively loose structures that facilitated MEO interagency coordination and cooperation. These structures were informal networks of MEOs in positions with well-established interagency relationships. Examples of these informal networks were: State political officers and Defense attachés at US embassies, country desk officers at State and Defense, and NATO desk officers at State and Defense. Department UEOs typically expected the MEOs within each of these networks to interact with one another and many of the MEOs in these positions reported developing close and productive working relationships with their interagency counterparts. The following response from a State MEO was representative of comments made by several of the MEOs in these positions, “I think we had good relationships with our OSD and JCS counterparts on the desk level, at the mid-level. . . . We did talk back and forth constantly with our OSD and JCS colleagues. But again, that was particular to the NATO desk. It was obvious that we had a joint mission at US NATO. We had an awful lot of interaction, mostly positive.”
5.2.3. MEO Interest, Initiative, and Ability to Network

MEO interest, initiative, and ability to network also helped facilitate higher levels of MEO interagency interaction. MEO interest in higher levels of interagency interaction primarily depended upon their superiors supporting such interaction and the belief that higher levels of interagency interaction helped them accomplish their assigned tasks quicker or better. Given the informal nature of the vast majority of MEO interagency interaction of the time, MEO initiative and the ability to network were additional facilitators of higher levels of MEO interagency interaction. A Defense UEO emphasized the need for MEO initiative and the ability to network, “I believe [MEO interagency interaction] was very much personality driven. You could go to the Pentagon and work in your own little office or stovepipe and do your job for your boss and never go out and talk to your contemporaries in other organizations. The more effective action officers were out and about networking and had a broad range of contacts that they could call. You got these five o'clock in the afternoon taskers and you didn't know exactly how to answer it, who did you call? The more people you knew, the greater your ability to be effective in your position. Bringing it down now to the Joint Staff and national policy, a guy likes me reports to the Joint Staff after an [operational] tour and you may not know how the Pentagon works. I had prior experience in the Pentagon so I knew how it worked. It was a function of establishing a network, going to meet the people in J3, going on the coattails of your boss and going to the Deputies Committee meeting and talking with the action officers of the other folks at the meeting, and sharing data. To be effective it could not be a one-way street. It was almost like, ‘I will show you mine if you show me yours.’ . . . There was no formal process at the O-5 or O-6 level. But it [interagency
interaction] was encouraged because your boss expected you to be effective and to be effective [required you] to be a good networker.” Other interview respondents explained that it was through these types of experiences that MEOs gained knowledge and insights critical for effective interagency interaction, such as: knowledge of complementary organizational capabilities; awareness of their parent organization’s positions, processes, and activities; and understanding of organizational differences and means for overcoming them. A State MEO provided the following example of the importance of understanding organizational differences, “You cannot always have a freewheeling conversation with a lieutenant colonel, because his room for maneuver was limited in a way that was not true for a State Department officer. He could not get into an area or venture opinions that were not sanctioned by the colonel or whatever. If you did not understand that, you could think that the person you're dealing with was just being difficult, was being perverse. . . . When you have sufficient experience, then you realize that their system is different. And it is not realistic to think that you're going to have the same kind of open discussion with every military officer who has his own marching orders spelled out explicitly, he's got to stick to them.”

5.2.4. Differences between UEO and MEO Facilitators of Higher Levels of Interagency Interaction

UEOs and MEOs benefited from many of the same facilitators of higher levels of interagency interaction: leadership support, technological factors, structural mechanisms and personnel interest, initiative, and abilities. However, there were a couple of facilitators that primarily benefited UEOs, and one facilitator that favored MEOs. Though both UEOs and MEOs benefited from formal fora for interagency interaction, this
facilitator heavily favored UEOs due to the fact that the vast majority of formal interagency fora were primarily the purview of UEOs. Another facilitator of higher levels of interagency interaction that disproportionately benefited UEOs was higher levels of interagency experience. UEOs typically had higher levels of interagency experience than MEOs, and thus benefited from the interagency knowledge and relationships that often accompanied such experience.

One facilitator that appeared to favor MEOs over UEOs was department support for interagency collaboration. Department support was a facilitator of interagency collaboration for UEOs and MEOs, alike. However, the different manner in which UEOs and MEOs engaged in national policy processes resulted in department support providing MEOs with greater freedom to engage in interagency collaboration. As previously mentioned the few MEOs who had department support to engage in interagency collaboration were assigned to the NSC staff or to one of the national Bosnia working groups. In this capacity, the MEOs were expected to support the leadership of the organization to which they were assigned, thus freeing them from many of the institutional pressures to defend the equities of their parent organizations. By contrast, UEOs participating in national policy processes typically did so as representatives of their departments and thus faced tremendous institutional pressure to advocate department positions and defend department equities.

5.2.5. Conclusions for Findings Regarding Facilitators of Higher Levels of Interagency Interaction

The research revealed three broad categories of facilitators of higher levels of interagency interaction for State and Defense MEOs: UEO support; logistical factors; and
MEO interest, initiative and ability to network. The most important category was UEO support for higher levels of MEO interagency interaction. UEO support came in many forms: UEOs conveying expectations for higher levels of MEO interagency interaction, UEOs clarifying that interagency issues were a top priority, and UEOs providing MEOs with the guidance and information required to effectively engage with interagency counterparts.

Logistical facilitators of higher levels of MEO interagency interaction included technological factors and structural mechanisms. The main technological facilitators of interagency interaction mentioned by interviewees were phone calls (and phone rosters), secure video teleconferences (SVTCs), email, and shuttle buses. Phone calls were the primary means for most MEO interagency interaction. The importance of phone calls also put a premium on phone rosters. The sole formal interagency mechanism that included large numbers of State and Defense MEOs was a daily Bosnia SVTC hosted by NSC staff and attended by personnel from State, Defense, and other agencies in the US NSS. Email was not much of a factor in the first few years, but began to be more widespread towards the end of the period. Interestingly, a couple of MEOs mentioned that shuttle buses between Foggy Bottom and the Pentagon facilitated MEO interaction. Though not anticipated, this facilitator would be understood by anyone who has attempted to park downtown in Washington, D.C. or tried to navigate in or around the Pentagon.

Five types of facilitating structural mechanisms were identified: formal interagency fora, MEO personnel exchanges, department-level interagency Bosnia
working groups, national organizations (e.g., NSC staff or national Bosnia working groups), and informal networks of MEOs. Common characteristics of these facilitating structural mechanisms were frequent interaction, recognized task interdependence, and a focus on practical issues.\(^56\) National-level groups were the only structures found to facilitate direct MEO engagement in interagency collaboration.

MEO interest, initiative, and ability to network also helped facilitate higher levels of MEO interagency interaction. UEO support was the critical prerequisite for MEO interest. Given the informal nature of the vast majority of MEO interagency interaction at the time, MEO initiative and the ability to network were additional facilitators of higher levels of MEO interagency interaction.

UEOs and MEOs benefited from many of the same facilitators of higher levels of interagency interaction: leadership support, technological factors, structural mechanisms and personnel interest, initiative, and abilities. However, there were a couple of facilitators that primarily benefited UEOs, and one facilitator that favored MEOs. UEOs disproportionately benefited from formal interagency fora and higher levels of interagency experience. Due to the different manner in which UEOs and MEOs engaged in national policy processes, department support for interagency collaboration typically provided MEOs greater freedom to collaborate than UEOs.

\(^{56}\) The national groups and department-level Bosnia working groups were the only mechanisms that routinely addressed higher level policy issues in addition to focusing on practical issues.
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION

6.1. Theoretical Implications of the Study’s Findings

Yin (2003, 10) writes, “In doing a case study, your goal will be to expand and generalize theories (analytical generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization).” Following is a summary of the theoretical relationships resulting from this case study. The level of interagency interaction of State and Defense MEOs varies by role, location, and position. Overseas military operators and staff, comprising the majority of MEOs involved in US processes for developing and implementing policies involving armed conflict, typically engage in little to no purposeful interaction with State personnel. Military MEOs involved in planning and conducting military operations almost never interact with State personnel. Among remaining MEOs, purposeful interagency interaction is common, but it is usually a small portion of their activities and is typically limited to coordination. Interagency cooperation is normal among the relatively small number of MEOs tasked to support other departments or assigned to the following positions: overseas military civil affairs officers, political officers and defense attachés at relevant US embassies, participants on State or Defense’s relevant task force, and participants on national working groups. The few State and Defense MEOs engaged in interagency collaboration are found on the NSC staff or national working groups. Among State and Defense personnel who engage in purposeful interagency interaction, UEOs averaged higher amounts and levels of interagency
interaction than MEOs in almost every role, location, and position. However, even among UEOs, interagency coordination is more common than cooperation, and interagency collaboration is exceedingly rare.

The primary inhibitor of higher levels of interagency interaction for State and Defense MEOs is the lack of support for such increases by department UEOs. Within the prevalent processes for developing and implementing US policy, few State and Defense MEOs have roles that are viewed by department UEOs as requiring purposeful interagency interaction. In the prevalent policy development processes, UEO expectations for MEOs involved in purposeful interagency interaction are typically limited to coordination of papers, schedules, and ideas to facilitate department UEOs’ participation in UEO-level interagency meetings. In the prevalent policy implementation processes, policy implementation is usually viewed as the purview of the departments. In this perspective, departments develop and implement parochial implementation plans and receive support from other departments—with the amount, type, and duration of interagency support agreed to in advance by department UEOs. In these policy implementation processes, UEOs expect most MEO involvement in purposeful interagency interaction to be limited to coordination of UEO-agreed to interagency support. State and Defense UEOs also task a smaller number of MEOs to directly provide knowledge, skills, or resources (i.e., cooperation) to improve the other department’s ability to pursue its goals and plans. Given the widespread acceptance of these processes for policy development and implementation, most State and Defense UEOs view higher levels of MEO interagency interaction as unnecessary, or even undesirable. To be sure,
numerous other factors—within the broad categories of logistical and structural issues, and low levels of MEO interest and experience in purposeful interagency interaction—present substantial obstacles to higher levels of MEO interagency interaction. However, when department UEOs support and prioritize MEO involvement in higher levels of interagency interaction, MEOs typically find ways to overcome or mitigate most of the other obstacles to interaction.

State and Defense UEOs and MEOs experience many of the same inhibitors to higher levels of interagency interaction, though there are several important differences. Parochial incentives and behaviors, logistical factors, different perspectives and processes, and weak interagency leadership and management inhibit higher levels of interagency interaction for UEOs and MEOs, alike. For MEOs, however, these factors are secondary to the primary inhibitor (i.e., lack of UEO support for higher levels of MEO interagency interaction). Other differences include fewer formal interagency fora for MEOs, and UEOs and MEOs face different obstacles to interagency collaboration. For most State and Defense MEOs, the primary inhibitor is a lack of opportunity for interagency collaboration. The evidence from this study and the literature support the notion that the primary inhibitor of UEO interagency collaboration is the immense pressure on UEOs to take a department-centric approach to interagency processes.

The primary facilitator of higher levels of interagency interaction for State and Defense MEOs involved in US processes for developing and implementing policies is department UEO support for higher levels of MEO interagency interaction. UEO support comes in many forms: UEOs conveying expectations for higher levels of MEO
interagency interaction, UEOs clarifying that interagency issues are a top priority, and
UEOs providing MEOs with the guidance and information required to effectively engage
with interagency counterparts. Other facilitators include technological factors;
interagency structural mechanisms; and MEO interest, initiative, and ability to network.

Higher levels of State and Defense UEO interagency interaction are facilitated by
many of the same types of factors that facilitate higher levels of MEO interagency
interaction: leadership support, technological factors, structural mechanisms and
personnel interest, initiative, and abilities. However, there are a couple of facilitators that
primarily benefit UEOs, and one facilitator that favors MEOs. UEOs disproportionately
benefit from formal interagency fora and higher levels of interagency experience. Due to
the different manner in which UEOs and MEOs engage in national policy processes,
department support for interagency collaboration typically provides MEOs greater
freedom to collaborate than UEOs.

6.2. Additional Research Opportunities
The case study revealed several opportunities for additional research. One
opportunity would be to apply the same approach used here to other cases. Perhaps
enough time has passed to allow for an analysis of the interagency interaction of State
and Defense MEOs involved in US processes to develop and implement policies for
Afghanistan and Iraq after September 11, 2001. A similar opportunity would be to go in
more depth by analyzing the interagency interactions among some of the sub-groups
revealed in this case study; in the same context or in other contexts. For example, it
would be valuable to understand the different dynamics impacting interagency interaction
of MEOs in various sub-groups, such as those involved in policy development, policy implementation, or assigned to international organizations.

Another opportunity for research is agent-based modeling. This study originally made the argument that agent-based modeling was not yet appropriate due to a lack of understanding of MEOs’ interagency activities and rules of behavior. Given the theoretical insights this study provides on UEOs’ expectations of MEO interagency interaction, UEO and MEO roles in prevalent policy processes, and MEOs’ interagency activities and rules of behavior, agent-based modeling of UEO and MEO interagency interaction may yield valuable insights into the potential benefits of alternative structures and incentives. The study also highlighted unique challenges faced at different levels of interagency interaction. Most of the proposals for comprehensively reforming the US NSS argue that interagency collaboration is required to achieve the interagency integration needed to effectively address complex problems. The literature also suggests that, absent a catalyzing catastrophic event, efforts to facilitate large-scale interagency collaboration are unlikely to succeed in the near to mid-term. However, the study revealed that there might be near-term opportunities for increasing interagency cooperation. As such, it would be valuable for researchers to endeavor to identify opportunities to improve the system’s ability to address complex problems through increases in interagency cooperation, or a mix of increases in cooperation and collaboration.
6.3. Potential Policy Implications

Given the exploratory nature of this research, and the study’s focus on a single case, it would be premature to make policy recommendations based upon the study’s findings. However, if further studies support this study’s findings across broad groups of State and Defense MEOs addressing different issues over time, then there would be several potential policy implications. Though many of the following policy options are oriented towards the interagency activities of MEOs, each of the policies would also be expected to add incentives and pressure for increases in the level of UEO interagency interaction. One policy implication would be further support for the range of existing proposals arguing that the US NSS requires comprehensive reform in order to effectively address the increasingly complex national security environment. The comprehensive reform proposals contain structures, authorities, and expectations required for higher levels of UEO and MEO interagency interaction. Given the low probability of comprehensive reform being implemented in the near term due to the monumental bureaucratic, institutional, and structural obstacles, it is also worth considering more modest policy alternatives.

For modest increases in interagency collaboration, the findings suggest increasing the number of collaborative fora involving MEOs and increasing the number of MEOs involved in collaborative fora. Section 2.3.6 (US NSS Reform Initiatives) describes a few structural mechanisms (e.g., provincial reconstruction teams and high-value target teams) that have successfully fostered interagency collaboration among small groups of State and Defense MEOs. Additionally the study found that State and Defense MEOs on national working groups and part of the NSC staff also engaged in interagency
collaboration. However, there are risks that such groups would circumvent the national security departments. It is worth reiterating Rast and Lehrke’s (2008, 385-386) concern that the departments’ involvement in policy implementation can be negatively impacted if the departments lack “buy in” as a result of not being fully involved in policy development processes.

The findings also highlight opportunities for increasing interagency cooperation, primarily through larger numbers of personnel exchanges. Increasing interagency cooperation provides the departments with a broader range of skills, knowledge, and resources for developing and implementing their respective department’s goals and plans. Vastly expanding the number of State POLADs, and assigning them to lower level military headquarters, would enable State insights into processes where they were largely absent in Bosnia. A Defense MEO suggested that this was already occurring in some locations in Afghanistan where a few POLADs were assigned to O-6 battalion commanders. The Defense MEO highlighted the high value the O-6s gave the POLADs by emphasizing that the commanders had POLAD offices placed adjacent to the commander’s office. The Defense MEO said that on more than one occasion, he heard the commander exclaim, “How did we ever do this without these guys?” Exchanges of State and Defense staff personnel could provide similar benefits to CONUS planning processes. A 2012 memorandum of understanding between State and Defense indicates that the departments are already taking some small steps in these areas. A State Department press release (U.S. Department of State 2012) following the January 2012 signing of the memorandum states that the number of Defense personnel assigned to
positions in State increased from 50 to 98. The press release further states the number of POLADs assigned to senior military commanders doubled to 90 over the previous four years. While these developments are encouraging, the number of POLADs would need to increase further in order to have them available to lower level commanders across the different theaters.

Other policy options could improve the incentives for MEO involvement in interagency interaction. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 provides an incentive for joint activity among military MEOs that could be applied to interagency activity of State and Defense MEOs. Locher (2001, 104) writes that prior to 1986, military officers avoided joint assignments because UEOs did not support such assignments and the assignments were viewed as “career killers.” The Goldwater-Nichols Act effectively changed the incentives with a simple provision stating, “An officer may not be selected for promotion to the grade of brigadier general or rear admiral (lower half) unless the officer has served in a joint duty assignment.” After passage of the act, high-performing military MEOs who aspired to general officer, with the help and support of the senior department officers advising them, sought out opportunities for joint assignments. A similar incentive could be established for State and Defense MEO participation in interagency positions. The Goldwater-Nichols provision requiring joint assignment for military officers seeking senior ranks could be expanded to allow military officers to fulfill the requirement through participation in interagency positions. Similarly, a State provision could be enacted that would preclude State personnel from selection to senior Foreign Service unless they serve in an interagency position.
Given the tremendous influence that UEOs have on MEO interagency interaction, it would be worth considering policy options that could increase UEO support for higher levels of such interaction. One option would be for leadership of the US NSS to factor into their senior State and Defense UEO appointment decisions the extent of policy consensus and relational goodwill among the individuals under consideration; or to change the senior State or Defense UEOs involved if a breakdown in these factors occurs. Such a policy may help prevent the low levels of MEO interagency interaction that occurred between 1993 and 1995 when there were considerable policy disagreements and relational discord between senior State and Defense UEOs.

Another policy option that could incentivize more accommodating UEO behavior would be to establish expectations and structures for MEOs to report parochial department activity to US NSS leadership. This option would involve US NSS leadership providing clear direction to all department members that their loyalties are to the nation first, not to their respective departments. Department members would be reminded that they have an obligation to report department behavior that undermines national goals by placing department concerns above national concerns. In addition to clear expectations, such “whistleblower” policies would require provisions for ensuring that those who report suspected detrimental department behavior are protected from acts of retribution.
APPENDIX 1: ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SYSTEM

This appendix describes the establishment and evolution of the NSC system since passage of the National Security Act in 1947. Establishing the specific structure of the administration’s NSC system has been one of the first acts of all post-WW II presidents, with the notable exception of Ronald Reagan who delayed establishment for almost a full year.

**President Truman**

The National Security Act of 1947, establishing the NSC, was passed during the Truman administration. Zegart (1999, 76) notes that the 1947 National Security Act made the formal National Security Council [the President; the Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Navy and Air Force; and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board] the “central foreign policy coordinating organization within the executive branch.” Best (2009, 7) writes that the 1949 amendments to the Act altered the composition of the NSC: The Vice President was added as a statutory member, the Secretaries of the specific military services were removed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were designated “the principal military advisers to the President.” Locher (2001) claims that having the service chiefs equally responsible for providing military advice resulted in political leaders receiving inadequate military advice. This arrangement lasted until the Goldwater-Nichols Act named the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the principal military advisor in 1986.
Additionally, Best (2009, 7) observes that President Truman directed the Secretary of the Treasury to attend all NSC meetings. Inderfurth and Johnson (2004, 27) state that the Executive Secretary also attended NSC meetings. Brown (2008, 7) notes that the NSC was supported by a small staff (i.e., less than twenty) composed primarily of temporary detailees from participating agencies (e.g., the State Department and the Department of Defense). Falk (2004, 36) points out that though President Truman made frequent use of the NSC, especially after the onset of the Korean War, he took great care to ensure it did not limit presidential freedom of action.

President Eisenhower

Best (2009) writes “Under [Eisenhower’s] Administration, the NSC staff was institutionalized and expanded, with clear lines of responsibility and authority, and it came to closely resemble Eberstadt’s original conception as the President’s principal arm for formulating and coordinating military, international, and internal security affairs.” He (Best Jr. 2009, 8) states “Meetings were held weekly and, in addition to Eisenhower himself and the other statutory members [Vice President, Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board] participants often included the Secretary of the Treasury, the Budget Director, the Chairman of the JCS [CJCS], and the Director of Central Intelligence [DCI].” Best (2009, 9) also notes that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the NSRB were replaced by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, respectively. He (Best Jr. 2009, 8-9) adds “Eisenhower established two important subordinate bodies: the NSC Planning Board, which prepared studies, policy recommendations, and basic drafts
for NSC coordination, and the Operations Coordinating Board, which was the coordinating and integrating arm of the NSC for all aspects of the implementation of national security policy.” Best (2009, 8) writes “Eisenhower created the position of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, who became the supervisory officer of the NSC, including the Executive Secretary. The Special Assistant—initially Robert Cutler, a banker who had served under Stimson during World War II—was intended to be the President’s agent on the NSC, not an independent policymaker in his own right, and to be a source of advice.” Best notes that this position has persisted, though the exact title, as well as its specific roles, has fluctuated. He (2009, 8) writes, “National Security Adviser positions are funded not as part of the NSC but as part of the White House Office, reflecting the incumbent’s status as that of an adviser to the President.”

**President Kennedy**

Best (2009, 10) writes, “President John Kennedy, who did not share Eisenhower’s preference for formal staff procedures, accepted many of the recommendations of the Jackson Committee and proceeded to dismantle much of the NSC structure, reducing it to its statutory base. Staff work was carried out mainly by the various departments and agencies, and personal contacts and ad hoc task forces became the main vehicles for policy discussion and formulation. The NSC was now one among many sources of advice.” He (Best 2009, 11) notes, “The Planning Board and the Operations Control Board were both abolished (by Executive Order 10920) in order to avoid the Eisenhower Administration’s distinction between planning and operations. The NSC staff was reduced, and outside policy experts were brought in. Bundy noted that they were all staff
officers.” Best (2009, 10) points out that a lasting adaptation of the Kennedy administration was giving the national security advisor (NSA) “an active policymaking role.”

**President Johnson**
Best (2009, 12) writes that the structure and membership of the NSC during the Johnson administration remained virtually unchanged from “what they had been under Kennedy (with the Office of Emergency Planning changing title to the Office of Emergency Preparedness in 1968).” However, Johnson issued National Security Action Memorandum No. 341 (1966) creating several new interagency committees. Best (2009, 12) claims “the most important of these was the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG).” He (2009, 12) also notes that “a number of Interdepartmental Regional Groups [IRGs], each headed by the appropriate Assistant Secretary of State,” supported the SIG. Best (2009, 12) argues, “Although this new structure was dominated by the State Department, there was little enthusiasm for the system as a whole on the part of the department’s leadership. The State Department did not provide decisive leadership and settled for a system of consensus opinions. Vagueness as to authority in the SIG/IRG system reduced its effect on the bureaucracies. Moreover, there was an insufficient allocation of resources for staff support for the new organization. By 1969, the NSC existed largely in name. Johnson conferred constantly with a wide number of advisers within and outside government; while he respected institutional responsibilities, his own decisionmaking was an intensely personal process.”
President Nixon

President Nixon established his NSC system via National Security Decision Memorandum-2 (NSDM-2) on his first day in office. NSDM-2 (1969) states, “The [NSC] shall be the principal forum for consideration of policy issues requiring Presidential determination.” NSDM-2 (1969) also provided for a [Senior] Review Group and an Under Secretaries Committee. NSDM-2 (1969) states, “The role of the Review Group shall be to review papers to be discussed by the NSC to assure that: 1) the issue under consideration is worthy of NSC attention; 2) all realistic alternatives are presented; 3) the facts, including cost implications, and all department and agency views are fairly and adequately set out. . . . “The Review Group shall also be empowered to assign action to the NSC Interdepartmental Groups or NSC Ad Hoc Groups, as appropriate.” Membership of the Review Group included the NSA and representatives of the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, DCI, and CJCS. NSDM-2 (1969) further states that the Under Secretaries Committee “Shall consider:

1. Issues which are referred to it by the NSC Review Group

2. Matters pertaining to interdepartmental activities of the US Government overseas:

   a. which are of an operational nature (in distinction to matters involving a substantial security policy question); and

   b. on which NSC Interdepartmental Groups have been unable to reach agreement, or which are of a broader nature than is suitable to any such groups; and

   c. which do not require consideration at Presidential or NSC level; and

286
d. which are then referred to it by the Secretary of State.

3. Other operational matters referred to it jointly by the Under Secretary of State and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.”

Best (2009, 13) claims, “This system had two principal objectives: the retention of control at the top, and the development of clear alternative choices for decisionmakers.” He (2009, 12) also writes, “Wanting to switch White House priorities from current operations and crisis management to long-range planning, Nixon revived the NSC.” Statutory NSC membership (i.e., the President, Vice President, and the Secretaries of State and Defense) established in the Nixon administration persists to today.57 Best (2009, 13) concludes, “While adopting the basic form of the Eisenhower NSC, Nixon streamlined its procedures. NSC meetings were limited to the statutory members, with Kissinger [NSA] and the JCS Chairman also sitting in and the DCI attending for intelligence matters. In January 1973, the Office of Emergency Preparedness was abolished along with the NSC seat that originally had belonged to the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board.”

President Ford

President Ford established his NSC system via NSDM-265 on his first day in office. NSDM-265 (1974) states that the Ford administration would retain the NSC system established by President Nixon in NSDM-2. The Report of the Murphy Commission (1975), published during the Ford administration, provided numerous recommendations for the NSC system. Although none of the major recommendations of

57 With the addition of the Secretary of Energy as a statutory member of the NSC in 2007
the Murphy Commission were enacted during the Ford administration, the recommendations shaped NSC activity for the next quarter century. Best (2009, 14) writes, “Implicitly criticizing the expansive role of the NSC staff under Kissinger, the Commission recommended:

- that only the President should have line responsibility in the White House;
- that staff officials should not themselves issue directives to departmental officials;
- that, in the future, the National Security Adviser have no other official responsibilities;
- that the Secretary of the Treasury be made a statutory member of the NSC and that the NSC’s scope be expanded to include major international economic policy issues; and
- that senior officials concerned with domestic policy be invited to NSC meetings when issues with domestic implications were discussed.”

**President Carter**

President Carter established his NSC system via Presidential Directive NSC No. 2 (PD/NSC-2) on his first day in office. Carter (1977) stated that the structure of his NSC system was intended “to place more responsibility in the departments and agencies while insuring that the NSC, with [the NSA], continues to integrate and facilitate foreign and defense policy decisions.” PD/NSC-2 (1977) directs that the membership and purpose of the NSC proper would be, “as set forth in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.” Statutory members remained the President, Vice President, and the Secretaries
of State and Defense. Statutory advisors were the DCI and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Other senior officials could attend, if appropriate. Carter (1977) wrote, “The [NSC] shall be the principal forum for international security issues requiring Presidential consideration. The NSC shall assist me in analyzing, integrating and facilitating foreign, defense, and intelligence policy decisions. International economic and other interdependence issues which are pertinent to national security shall also be considered by the NSC.”

Best (2009, 15) notes that Carter reduced the number of NSC staff committees from seven to two. The Carter NSC system included, in hierarchical order, the NSC Policy Review Committee (NSC/PRC), the NSC Special Coordination Committee (NSC/SCC), NSC Interdepartmental Groups, and NSC Ad Hoc Groups. PD/NSC-2 (1977) established that the purpose of the NSC/PRC was “to develop national security policy for Presidential decision in those cases where the basic responsibilities fall primarily within a given department but where the subject also has important implications for other departments and agencies. The directive states that the President “shall designate for each meeting the appropriate Chairman of the [NSC/PRC] and attendance, depending on the subject matter being considered. Membership, in addition to the statutory members of the NSC and the [NSA], shall include, as appropriate, other senior officials.”

President Carter (1977) wrote, “A second NSC Committee, the [NSC/SCC], is hereby established to deal with specific cross-cutting issues requiring coordination in the development of options and the implementation of Presidential decisions. The Committee
shall deal with such matters as: the oversight of sensitive intelligence activities, such as covert operations, which are undertaken on Presidential authority; arms control evaluation; and it will assist me in crisis management. . . . “The [NSC/SCC] shall be chaired by the [NSA]. Membership shall include the statutory members of the NSC, or their representatives, and other senior officials, as appropriate.”

PD/NSC-2 (1977) directed “Existing NSC Interdepartmental Groups, chaired by a designated senior departmental official . . . to continue as needed under the direction of the NSC [PRC].” Agencies with members on the NSC/PRC would have a representative on Interdepartmental Groups, along with other agencies invited by the NSC/PRC. Carter (1977) added, “Where appropriate, I intend to appoint NSC Ad Hoc Groups to deal with particular problems, including those which transcend departmental boundaries.”

President Reagan
President Reagan established his NSC system via National Security Decision Directive No. 2 (NSDD-2) on January 12, 1982; almost a full year after taking office. NSDD-2 (1982) states, “The [NSC] shall be the principal forum for consideration of national security policy issues requiring Presidential decision.” The directive also established several supporting groups: Senior Interagency Groups for Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Intelligence, as well as Regional and Functional Interagency Groups.

A unique feature of NSDD-2 is the specific NSC-related roles and responsibilities it assigns to the DCI and the Secretaries of State and Defense. NSDD-2 (1982) states, “The Secretary of State is my principal foreign policy advisor. As such, he is responsible for the formulation of foreign policy and for the execution of approved policy. . . . The
Secretary of Defense is my principal defense policy advisor. As such, he is responsible for the formulation of general defense policy, policy related to all matters of direct and primary concern to the Department of Defense, and for the execution of approved policy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are the principal military advisors to me, the Secretary of Defense, and the NSC. . . . The Director of Central Intelligence is my principal advisor on intelligence matters. As such, he is responsible for the formulation of intelligence activities, policy, and proposals, as set forth in relevant Executive Orders. I have assigned to the Director of Central Intelligence authority and responsibility, to the extent permitted by law and Executive Order, for the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of the interdepartmental activities incident to intelligence matters."

The Tower Commission scrutinized Reagan’s NSC system following the Iran-Contra Affair. The Report of the Tower Commission (1987) recommends that the senior-level committees of the NSC be chaired “by the individual with the greatest stake in making the system work” (i.e., the NSA and the NSC staff). Every presidential administration since Reagan has adhered to this recommendation of the Tower Commission. However, Auger (2004, 120) cautions that the success of this arrangement is dependent upon the level of presidential participation. He states, “The value that the Tower Commission and others saw in having the NSA and NSC staff at the center of the process declines immensely if it becomes clear that the national security adviser does not have the ear or the confidence of the president, or if the NSA and the NSC staff are unable to use that central position effectively.”

291
President Bush I

President Bush established his NSC system via National Security Directive No. 1 (NSD-1) on January 30, 1989, within weeks of entering office. Inderfurth and Johnson (2004, 97-106) note that the NSC system established by the first President Bush has been retained, virtually unchanged, by all subsequent administrations. NSD-1 (1989) states, “The [NSC] shall be the principal forum for consideration of national security policy issues requiring presidential determination. . . . The NSC shall advise and assist me in integrating all aspects of national security policy as it affects the United States—domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and economic.” The Bush NSC system included, in hierarchical order, the NSC Principals Committee (NSC/PC), the NSC Deputies Committee (NSC/DC), and NSC Policy Coordinating Committees (NSC/PCCs).

Scowcroft (1998, 31), Bush’s NSA, describes the rational for adding the NSC/PC, “I was eager to add a ‘principals’ committee’ which would be the NSC without the President and Vice President. I thought this could help clarify issues and positions among the principals before the issues were taken to the President. It could save him considerable time, and time, I believed, was his most valuable commodity.” Bush (1989) wrote that the NSC/PC shall be, “The senior interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security. The NSC/PC shall review, coordinate, and monitor the development and implementation of national security policy.

NSD-1 (1989) states that the NSC/DC shall be “the senior sub-Cabinet interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security. The NSC/DC shall review and monitor the work of the NSC interagency process . . . and make recommendations concerning the development and implementation of national
security policy. Inderfurth and Johnson (2004, 98) note “The Deputies Committee would be chaired by the deputy national security adviser and would include the second- or third-ranking official from each of the departments or agencies represented on the Principals Committee. According to NSD-1, its task was to ‘ensure that all papers to be discussed by the NSC . . . fully analyze the issues, fairly and adequately set out the facts, consider a full range of views and options, and satisfactorily assess the prospects, risks and implications of each.’ As a result of a supplement to the directive, signed by Scowcroft in October 1989, the Deputies Committee took on another formal assignment: crisis management. The ‘DC,’ as the Committee was called, would spend a great deal of its time during the Bush Administration fulfilling this responsibility.” Inderfurth and Johnson (2004, 99) also observe, “The ‘DC’ convened often—almost 160 times in 1990 alone. Remember, this Committee doubled as a policy review group and as a crisis manager. By most accounts, the Deputies Committee was able to be effective for two reasons: first, it included a small group of people senior enough to get things done; and, second, participants in the meetings had immediate and direct access to their principals, so they could either commit to their views at the table or be able to get back quickly to say yes or no. Still, the operation of the ‘DC’ did receive some criticism, especially from those with the view that it became too operational, functioning well in crises but not focusing enough attention on long-range policy development.”

NSD-1 (1989) also states, “Each NSC/PCC shall be the principal interagency forum for the development and implementation of national security policy for that
regional or functional area. The NSC/PCC shall be responsible for identifying and
developing policy issues for consideration by the NSC.”

**President Clinton**

President Clinton established his NSC system via Presidential Decision Directive
NSC No. 2 (PDD/NSC-2) on his first day in office. Clinton (1993) directed, “The [NSC]
shall be the principal forum for consideration of national security policy issues requiring
Presidential determination. . . . The NSC shall advise and assist me in integrating all
aspects of national security policy as it affects the United States -- domestic, foreign,
military, intelligence and economic (in conjunction with the National Economic Council).
Along with its subordinate committees, the NSC shall be my principal means for
coordinating Executive departments and agencies in the development and implementation
of national security policy.” As mentioned previously, Clinton retained Bush’s NSC
committee system (i.e., NSC/PC and NSC/DC). He changed the lower level coordinating
groups from NSC/PCCs to Interagency Working Groups (IWGs).

PDD/NSC-2 (1993) specified the roles of each NSC group. It states, “The
NSC/PC should be a flexible instrument—a forum available for Cabinet-level officials to
meet to discuss and resolve issues not requiring the President’s participation.” PDD/NSC-
2 (1993) gave the NSC/DC responsibility to: “review and monitor the work of the NSC
interagency process;” “focus significant attention on policy implementation;” “ensure
that all papers to be discussed by the NSC or the NSC/PC fully analyze the issues, fairly
and adequately set out the facts, consider a full range of views and options, and
satisfactorily assess the prospects, risks, and implications of each;” and oversee “day-to-day crisis management.”

Clinton (1993) stated, “The IWGs shall convene on a regular basis . . . to review and coordinate the implementation of Presidential decisions in their policy areas.” Auger (2004, 109) adds, “The IWGs are supplemented and backstopped by a large number of ad hoc working alliances among officials, alliances that cut across agencies. According to NSC and State Department staffers, these informal groups of four to six officials are very useful for generating ideas, building consensus across organizations, and hashing out some policy differences before a formal IWG or NSC/DC meeting on an issue.”

There were a couple of noteworthy developments in the NSC system during the Clinton administration. Clinton (1993) added the US Representative to the United Nations as a non-statutory member of the NSC proper and as a permanent member of the NSC/PC. Additionally, Inderfurth and Johnson (2004, 100) note that the Clinton administration established the National Economic Council and added the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy to the NSC as a non-statutory member.

**President Bush II**

President Bush established his NSC system via National Security Presidential Directive No. 1 (NSPD-1) on February 13, 2001, within weeks of entering office. Bush (2001) directed, “The NSC shall advise and assist me in integrating all aspects of national security policy as it affects the United States - domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and economics (in conjunction with the National Economic Council (NEC)).”
Bush maintained the top-level NSC (i.e., the NSC/PC and NSC/DC) committee system enacted by his father and retained by his predecessor. NSPD-1 (2001) states, “The [NSC/PC] will continue to be the senior interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security, as it has since 1989, and “the [NSC/DC] will also continue to serve as the senior sub-Cabinet interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security. The NSC/DC can prescribe and review the work of the NSC interagency groups discussed later in this directive. The NSC/DC shall also help ensure that issues being brought before the NSC/PC or the NSC have been properly analyzed and prepared for decision.”

Bush changed the lower level interagency groups from IWGs to NSC Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCCs). NSPD-1 (2001) states, “Management of the development and implementation of national security policies by multiple agencies of the United States government shall usually be accomplished by the [NSC/PCCs]. The NSC/PCCs shall be the main day-to-day fora for interagency coordination of national security policy. They shall provide policy analysis for consideration by the more senior committees of the NSC system and ensure timely responses to decisions made by the President. Each NSC/PCC shall include representatives from the executive departments, offices, and agencies represented in the NSC/DC.”

Notable adaptations to the NSC system during the second Bush administration included removing the US Representative to the UN from the NSC and enhancing the role of the Vice President by adding the Vice President’s Chief of Staff and NSA to the NSC/PC. Additionally, Bush established the Homeland Security Council and almost
doubled the number of members (from six to eleven) of the NSC/DC by adding the Vice President’s Chief of Staff, the Deputy Attorney General, the Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Deputy Chief of Staff to the President for Policy, the Deputy Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs. Brown (2008, 71) writes that another unique element of NSPD-1 is “it included a definition (or description) of ‘national security’ for what appears to be the first time in the history of presidential directives. It defined ‘national security’ as ‘the defense of the United States of America, protection of our constitutional system of government, and the advancement of United States interests around the globe.’” Brown (2008, 80) adds that in 2007, “Congress quietly amended section 101(a) of the National Security Act for the first time in nearly 60 years when it added the Secretary of Energy as a statutory member of the NSC. Therefore, statutory members of the NSC became the President, Vice President, and the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Energy.”

**President Obama**

President Obama established his NSC system via Presidential Policy Directive No. 1 (PPD-1) on February 13, 2001, within weeks of entering office. Obama (2009) directed, “The [NSC] shall be the principal forum for consideration of national security policy issues requiring Presidential determination. . . . The NSC shall advise and assist me in integrating all aspects of national security policy as it affects the United States—domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and economic (in conjunction with the National Economic Council). Along with its subordinate committees, the NSC shall be my
principal means for coordinating executive departments and agencies in the development and implementation of national security policy.”

Obama retained the top-level NSC committee system (i.e., the NSC/PC and NSC/DC) enacted by the first Bush administration and used by each subsequent administration. PPD-1 (2009) states, “The [NSC/PC] will continue to be the senior interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security, as it has been since 1989. . . . The [NSC/DC] shall review and monitor the work of the NSC interagency process (including Interagency Policy Committees…). The NSC/DC shall also help ensure that issues being brought before the NSC/PC or the NSC have been properly analyzed and prepared for decision. The NSC/DC shall focus significant attention on policy implementation. . . . Finally, the NSC/DC shall be responsible for day-to-day crisis management, reporting to the National Security Council. . . . The NSC/DC shall ensure that all papers to be discussed by the NSC or the NSC/PC fully analyze the issues, fairly and adequately set out the facts, consider a full range of views and options, and satisfactorily assess the prospects, risks, and implications of each.”

Obama changed the lower level interagency groups from NSC/PCCs to Interagency Policy Committees (IPC). PPD-1 (2009) states, “The NSC/IPCs shall be the main day-to-day fora for interagency coordination of national security policy. They shall provide policy analysis for consideration by the more senior committees of the NSC system and ensure timely responses to decisions made by the President.”

Obama doubled the number of non-statutory members of the NSC proper; reinstating the US Representative to the UN and adding the Attorney General, Secretary
for Homeland Security, Counsel to the President, and Deputy National Security Advisor. Obama also expanded membership of the NSC/PC to include the Counsel to the President, Deputy Secretary of State, Attorney General, Secretary of Homeland Security, and Director of Office of Management and Budget.

Table 14 NSC System Fora and Membership Since 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President</th>
<th>Bush I</th>
<th>Clinton</th>
<th>Bush II</th>
<th>Obama</th>
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<td><strong>Statutory Members of Formal NSC¹</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Additional Members of Formal NSC²</strong></td>
<td>NSA Pres Chief of Staff Sec Treasury</td>
<td>NSA Pres Chief of Staff Sec Treasury Pres Asst for Econ Policy US Rep to UN</td>
<td>NSA Pres Chief of Staff Sec Treasury Pres Asst Econ Policy</td>
<td>NSA Pres Chief of Staff Sec Treasury US Rep to UN Attorney General Sec Homeland Security Counsel to President Dep NSA (Secretary)</td>
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<td>Other Executive Dept and Agency Heads Other senior officials Attorney General</td>
<td>Other Executive Dept and Agency Heads Other senior officials Attorney General</td>
<td>Other Executive Dept and Agency Heads Other senior officials Attorney General Counsel to President Director OMB</td>
<td>Other Executive Dept and Agency Heads Other senior officials Sec Commerce US Trade Rep Pres Asst Econ Policy Chair of Council of Economic Advisors Pres Asst for Homeland Security and CT Dir OST Policy</td>
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<td><strong>NSC/PC</strong></td>
<td>NSA (Chair) Sec State Sec Defense Director CIA Chairman JCS Pres Chief of Staff Sec Treasury</td>
<td>NSA (Chair) Sec State Sec Defense Director CIA Chairman JCS US Rep to UN</td>
<td>NSA (Chair) Sec State Sec Defense Pres Chief of Staff Sec Treasury VP’s Chief of Staff VP’s NSA Dep NSA (Secretary)</td>
<td>NSA (Chair) Sec State Sec Defense Dir Natl Intelligence Chairman JCS Pres Chief of Staff Sec Treasury US Rep to UN VP’s NSA</td>
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1. NSC: National Security Council
2. NSC/PC: National Security Council/President’s Committee
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<th>NSC/DC</th>
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<td>Other senior officials</td>
<td>Interagency Working Groups (IWGs) ⁴</td>
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<td>Dep NSA (Chair)</td>
<td>Interagency Policy Committees (IPCs) ⁶</td>
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300
### Notes:

1. As established by each President during the first month in office.
2. Positions listed below dotted lines may be invited to attend based upon the nature of issues under consideration.
3. NSD-1 (1989) states, “Each NSC/PCC shall be the principal interagency forum for the development and implementation of national security policy for that regional or functional area.”
4. PDD/NSC-2 (1993) states, “The IWGs shall convene on a regular basis . . . to review and coordinate the implementation of Presidential decisions in their policy areas. . . . In general, foreign policy and defense issues should be chaired at the Assistant-Secretary level by the Departments of State and Defense, respectively.”
5. NSPD-1 (2001) states, “The NSC/PCCs shall be the main day-to-day fora for interagency coordination of national security policy.”
6. PPD-1 (2009) states, “The NSC/IPCs shall be the main day-to-day fora for interagency coordination of national security policy.”

### Abbreviations & Acronyms:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assoc</td>
<td>Associate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asst</td>
<td>Assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>Counter Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Def</td>
<td>Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dep</td>
<td>Deputy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept</td>
<td>Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dir</td>
<td>Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Econ</td>
<td>Economics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intl</td>
<td>International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natl</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OST</td>
<td>Office of Science &amp; Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pres</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep</td>
<td>Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sec</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP</td>
<td>Vice President</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

Administrative issues
- Interviewees will be asked the following:
  o To sign two copies of the informed consent document, I will keep one and leave one with the interviewee.
  o For permission to audio-tape the interviews and take hand-written notes.
  o If they are open to follow up communication for purposes of clarification or further insight. Contact information will be obtained from each of the front-line workers.
- Interviewees will be advised that their identities will not be revealed in the research. When the study makes references to potentially identifying information (such as job titles or responsibilities), care will be taken to ensure that the information provided does not give away the identity of the front-line worker.
- Questions may include:
  o Demographic questions\(^{58}\)
  o In what capacity were you involved with formulating US policy for Bosnia?
  o What roles and responsibilities came with that position?

\(^{58}\) These questions were designed for interviewing personnel in the State Department. The organizational identifiers were appropriately adjusted for interviews of personnel in the Department of Defense.
- What were the inclusive dates (month/year to month/year) of your participation in that role?
- What was your grade at the time?
- How long had you been with the State Department at that point?
- Did you have any prior experience with DOD?

Experiential questions

- Did you interact with DOD while you were involved in formulating US policy for Bosnia?
- If yes:
  - Were your interactions with DOD part of a formal policy development process or would they be better characterized as ad hoc and informal conversations among peers?
  - Who was involved (numbers, as well as positions and approximate [grades/ranks])?
  - How frequently did these interactions occur?
  - Did you view your interactions with DOD as a central aspect of your responsibilities?
  - Did your departmental supervisor share your perspective on this issue?
  - Would you have preferred more or less interaction with DOD?
  - Why?
  - If more: What prevented that?
Historically, there have been many obstacles to interaction between State and Defense. To what do you attribute the level of interaction that you experienced?

Were you aware beforehand that your position would involve interaction with DoD?

Do you think a typical worker in your organization would have been more or less likely to take on such a position if they were aware that it involved interaction with DOD? Why?

Whose idea was it for you to interact with people from DOD?

Is such interaction mandated or encouraged by your organization? How so?

Were your interactions with DOD ever affected by differences in the priorities or goals of the respective departments? If yes, how were the differences addressed?

Did working with DOD benefit your efforts to formulate US policy for Bosnia? How so?

Are you aware of how DOD may have benefitted from their interactions with you?

What were the drawbacks of working with DOD?

Based upon your experiences, is it realistic to expect personnel in the State Department to pursue national level goals even if that involves undermining their department’s goals?
If no:

- Were you aware of any opportunities for interaction?
- If yes
  - What were they?
  - What prevented them from occurring?
- Do you believe your efforts could have benefitted from interaction with DoD?
- Do you think a typical worker in your organization would have been more or less likely to take on a position if they were aware that it involved interaction with DOD? Why?
- Based upon your experiences, is it realistic to expect personnel in the State Department to pursue national level goals even if that involves undermining their department’s goals?
## APPENDIX A3: INTERVIEW RESPONDENTS

### Table 15 State Department MEO Interview Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Years involved in US policy for Bosnia</th>
<th>Grade range over these years</th>
<th>Position(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sheila Berry</td>
<td>1993-1999</td>
<td>FS-03</td>
<td>1. Assigned to UN Office of the High Representative to work war crime and refugee issues 2. Special assistant to US Ambassador for war crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janet Bogue</td>
<td>1992-1993</td>
<td>FS-02</td>
<td>Former Yugoslavia country desk officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jen Brush</td>
<td>1994-1995</td>
<td>FS-03</td>
<td>Political Officer, US Embassy Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kent Logsdon</td>
<td>1993-1995</td>
<td>FS-03</td>
<td>NATO desk officer in European Bureau’s Office of Regional and Political Military Affairs (EUR/RPM)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 16 Department of Defense MEO Interview Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Years involved in US policy for Bosnia</th>
<th>Grade range over these years</th>
<th>Position(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mike Colón</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Air Force O-3</td>
<td>Weapons Officer in planning cell attached to Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Haack</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Army O-3</td>
<td>Civil Affairs team leader deployed to Bosnia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jackson Harris</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Air Force O-4</td>
<td>Chief of Combat Plans Electronic Warfare section (CAOC support unit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mike Householder</td>
<td>1996-1999</td>
<td>Air Force O-4</td>
<td>Chief of Strategy Division (CAOC support unit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Kramer</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Army O-3</td>
<td>Battle Captain in Aviation Battalion's Tactical Operations Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Kosak</td>
<td>1997-1998</td>
<td>GS-14 – GS-15</td>
<td>OSD NATO officer and rep on OSD’s Bosnia Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mike Lutton</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Air Force O-3</td>
<td>Weapons Officer in planning cell attached to Combined Air Operations Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mike Rollison</td>
<td>1996-1999</td>
<td>Air Force O-5</td>
<td>Chief of Combat Plans (CAOC support unit)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additional insights on Department of Defense MEOs came from oral histories of US Army officers involved in developing and implementing military plans for Bosnia (Stewart, Fabbri, and Siegel 1994)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albert Bryant, Jr.</td>
<td>1993-1996</td>
<td>Army O-5</td>
<td>1. Battalion Commander, 1st Armored Division, responsibilities included a sector in Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Chief of Plans, Operations Directorate, V Corps, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steven Goligowski</td>
<td>1995-1996</td>
<td>Army O-5</td>
<td>Chief of Plans and Operations, Logistics Directorate, V Corps, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Lucynski</td>
<td>1995-1996</td>
<td>Army O-4</td>
<td>Operations Officer, TFV, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arthondo Mardee</td>
<td>1995-1996</td>
<td>Army O-4</td>
<td>Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Directorate, TFV, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenneth McCreedy</td>
<td>1995-1996</td>
<td>Army O-4</td>
<td>Chief of Plans and Exercises, Intelligence Directorate, V Corps, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Milford</td>
<td>1994-1996</td>
<td>Army O-5</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff, Personnel, Task Force Victory (TFV), Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Schifferle</td>
<td>1995-1996</td>
<td>Army O-5</td>
<td>Chief of War Plans, Operations Directorate, V Corps, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Swindell</td>
<td>1995-1996</td>
<td>Army O-5</td>
<td>Executive Officer, 41st Field Artillery Brigade, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Terrell</td>
<td>1995-1996</td>
<td>Army O-5</td>
<td>Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Logistics Directorate, V Corps, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Years involved in US policy for Bosnia</td>
<td>Grade range over these years</td>
<td>Position(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andy Bair</td>
<td>1996-1999 State</td>
<td>GS-15</td>
<td>Member of AMB Gelbard’s Dayton implementation team</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Robert M. Beecroft      | 1996 State AMB                         | 1. Special Bosnia envoy for AMB Holbrooke  
2. Acting US Ambassador for Bosnia and Herzegovina |
2. Assistant Division Commander, 1st Armored Division, Germany  
3. Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs, Joint Staff  
4. Joint Staff (JS) rep on AMB Gelbard’s Dayton implementation team |
| William Farrand         | 1997-2000 State AMB                   | 1. Deputy High Representative in North Bosnia  
2. Supervisor of Brcko |
| Robert Gelbard          | 1996-1999 State AMB                   | President’s Special Representative for the Balkans |
| Len Hawley              | 1995-1999 Defense SES                 | 1. OSD Policy’s Office Director for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance  
2. NSC Staff |
| Michael Hayden          | 1993-1995 Defense Air Force O-6 – O-7 | Director of Intelligence, US European Command |
2. NSC Director of European Affairs  
3. Deputy to the National Security Advisor  
4. NSC rep on AMB Holbrooke’s negotiating team  
5. NSC Chief of Staff |
2. OSD rep to AMB Pardew’s Bosnia Train and Equip team |
| James Locher III        | 1993 Defense OSD SES                  | Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC Acting Undersecretary of Defense for Policy |
| Bear McConnell          | 1997-1999 Defense OSD SES             | 1. Director, OSD’s Bosnian Task Force  
2. OSD rep to AMB Gelbard’s Dayton implementation team |
2. DCM for US Embassy Bosnia and Herzegovina  
3. Ambassador to US Embassy Bosnia and Herzegovina |
2. OSD rep to AMB Holbrooke’s negotiating team  
3. US Special Representative for Military Stabilization in the Balkans (Leader, Bosnia Train and Equip Team) |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ed Rowe</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Defense Army O-6</td>
<td>Assistant for Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense SO/LIC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
                                        2. Director, Central European Division, JS Policy and Plans |
| Gregory Schulte   | 1994-1998   | Defense OSD SES | Director, NATO’s Bosnian Task Force                                   |
APPENDIX A4: UPPER ECHELON OFFICER POSITION SUMMARIES

The following tables depict levels of interagency interaction for various UEO roles, positions, and locations. The information in the tables were used in section 4.2.5 to facilitate a comparison with the levels of MEO interagency interaction described in sections 4.2.1 through 4.2.4. As described in section 3.3.4 (Data Collection), the data in the tables resulted from content analysis of this study’s interviews and secondary sources. The secondary sources include ten studies of State and Defense personnel involvement with US policy for Bosnia between 1993 and 1998 (the studies are listed in section 3.3.4). These sources provided insights into UEO and MEO positions and approximate numbers for each position. The secondary sources were also used to clarify, refine, and augment information obtained from the interviews. As described in section 4.1, the interviews revealed several roles fulfilled by MEOs and UEOs. The interviews were the primary source for establishing the UEO and MEO positions involved in each role and the approximate numbers of UEOs and MEOs per position involved in each role. The interviews were also the primary source for the proportion of UEOs and MEOs involved in each level of interagency interaction and the proportion of time that UEOs and MEOs typically engaged in each level of interagency. As stated in section 3.3.4, the study used approximate numbers to facilitate comparisons and gain order of magnitude insights into the interagency interactions of multiple UEO and MEO subgroups. So, while the study
strove to obtain broadly accurate estimates of these UEOs and MEOs, exact numbers were not a goal of the study and the numbers should not be interpreted as such. Similarly, the percentages and proportions used in these tables should also be viewed as approximations used to facilitate broad comparisons of group members.

Table 18 UEO Role 1 Positions, Numbers, and Proportions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th># of UEOs</th>
<th>% of UEOs in Role</th>
<th>% of Overseas UEOs in Role</th>
<th>% of CONUS UEOs in Role</th>
<th>% of Total UEOs (485)</th>
<th>Proportion of Overseas UEOs in this role for which this was the top level of interagency interaction</th>
<th>Proportion of Overseas UEOs involved in this role and position engaged in:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Military HQ Staff</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
<td>30.3%</td>
<td>Coexist/Comm Coord Coop Collab</td>
<td>Very High (VH)</td>
<td>High (H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs Officers in Bosnia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>L M M M M L L</td>
<td>Very High (VH)</td>
<td>High (H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Advisors</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>VH L M M M</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State and Defense Reps to Civilian IOs</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>M M L M M</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Leadership (Top 3 levels)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>L M M M M L L</td>
<td>Very High (VH)</td>
<td>High (H)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Regional Officers</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>L M M M M</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Functional Officers</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>L M M M M</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Reps on Depts’ Bosnia Task Forces</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>VH L M M M</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Reps on National Bosnia Working Groups</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>L M L L M M</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Reps on NSC Staff</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>L M L L M M</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
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<td>ROLE OVERSEAS TOTAL</td>
<td>90</td>
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<td>18.6%</td>
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<td>ROLE CONUS TOTAL</td>
<td>155</td>
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<td>12.0%</td>
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<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROLE TOTAL</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>50.5%</td>
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</table>

Key

- Blank: None
- Very Low (VL): Less than 5%
- Low (L): 5% - 35%
- Medium (M): 35% - 65%
- High (H): 65% - 95%
- Very High (VH): Greater than 95%
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th># of UEOs</th>
<th>% of UEOs in Role</th>
<th>% of Overseas UEOs in Role</th>
<th>% of CONUS UEOs in Role</th>
<th>% of Total UEOs (485)</th>
<th>Proportion of UEOs for which this was the top level of interagency interaction</th>
<th>Proportion of time UEOs involved in this role and position engaged in:</th>
<th>Coexist/Comm</th>
<th>Coord</th>
<th>Coop</th>
<th>Collab</th>
<th>Coexist/Comm</th>
<th>Coord</th>
<th>Coop</th>
<th>Collab</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Military HQ Staff</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
<td>41.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td>H</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>L</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Military Operators</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td>H</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>L</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs Officers in Bosnia</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td>L</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>L</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Advisors</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>State and Defense Reps to Civilian IOs</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>L</td>
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<td>L</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Leadership (Top 3 levels)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>L</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Regional Officers</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>L</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Functional Officers</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Reps on Depts’ Bosnia Task Forces</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>M</td>
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<td>M</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Reps on National Bosnia Working Groups</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>L</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key**
- Blank: None
- Very Low (VL): Less than 5%
- Low (L): 5% - 35%
- Medium (M): 35% - 65%
- High (H): 65% - 95%
- Very High (VH): Greater than 95%

Table 20 UEO Role 3 Positions, Numbers, and Proportions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th># of UEOs</th>
<th>% of UEOs in Role</th>
<th>% of Overseas UEOs in Role</th>
<th>% of CONUS UEOs in Role</th>
<th>% of Total UEOs (485)</th>
<th>Proportion of UEOs for which this was the top level of interagency interaction</th>
<th>Proportion of time UEOs involved in this role and position engaged in:</th>
<th>Coexist/Comm</th>
<th>Coord</th>
<th>Coop</th>
<th>Collab</th>
<th>Coexist/Comm</th>
<th>Coord</th>
<th>Coop</th>
<th>Collab</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Military HQ Staff</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>L</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Military Operators</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>L</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs Officers in Bosnia</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Advisors</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>State and Defense Reps to Civilian IOs</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Leadership (Top 3 levels)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
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<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>L</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Regional Operators</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Functional Officers</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35.9%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Reps on Depts’ Bosnia Task Forces</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Key**
- Blank: None
- Very Low (VL): Less than 5%
- Low (L): 5% - 35%
- Medium (M): 35% - 65%
- High (H): 65% - 95%
- Very High (VH): Greater than 95%

Table 19 UEO Role 2 Positions, Numbers, and Proportions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th># of UEOs</th>
<th>% of UEOs in Role</th>
<th>% of Overseas UEOs in Role</th>
<th>% of CONUS UEOs in Role</th>
<th>% of Total UEOs (485)</th>
<th>Proportion of UEOs for which this was the top level of interagency interaction</th>
<th>Proportion of time UEOs involved in this role and position engaged in:</th>
<th>Coexist/Comm</th>
<th>Coord</th>
<th>Coop</th>
<th>Collab</th>
<th>Coexist/Comm</th>
<th>Coord</th>
<th>Coop</th>
<th>Collab</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Military HQ Staff</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
<td>41.2%</td>
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<td>H</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>L</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Military Operators</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td>H</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>H</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs Officers in Bosnia</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td>L</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>L</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Advisors</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td></td>
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<td>L</td>
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<tr>
<td>State and Defense Reps to Civilian IOs</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td>15.6%</td>
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<td>L</td>
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<td>S&amp;D Leadership (Top 3 levels)</td>
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<td>15.6%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
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<td>M</td>
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<td>L</td>
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<td>S&amp;D Regional Operators</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
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<td>M</td>
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<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Functional Officers</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>M</td>
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<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Reps on Depts’ Bosnia Task Forces</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td></td>
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<td>L</td>
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**Key**
- Blank: None
- Very Low (VL): Less than 5%
- Low (L): 5% - 35%
- Medium (M): 35% - 65%
- High (H): 65% - 95%
- Very High (VH): Greater than 95%
Table 21 UEO Role 4 Positions, Numbers, and Proportions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th># of UEOs</th>
<th>% of UEOs in Role</th>
<th>% of Overseas UEOs in Role</th>
<th>% of CONUS UEOs in Role</th>
<th>% of Total UEOs (485)</th>
<th>Proportion of UEOs in this role for which this was the top level of interagency interaction</th>
<th>Proportion of time UEOs involved in this role and position engaged in:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Leadership (Top 3 levels)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>L</td>
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<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Reps on National Bosnia Working Groups</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>VH</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S&amp;D Reps on NSC Staff</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
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<td>VH</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROLE OVERSEAS TOTAL</td>
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<td>ROLE CONUS TOTAL</td>
<td>75</td>
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<td>15.5%</td>
<td>Very Low (VL): Less than 5%</td>
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<td>ROLE TOTAL</td>
<td>75</td>
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<td>15.5%</td>
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<td>High (H): 65% - 95%</td>
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<td>Very High (VH): Greater than 95%</td>
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**Key**
- Blank: None
- Very Low (VL): Less than 5%
- Low (L): 5% - 35%
- Medium (M): 35% - 65%
- High (H): 65% - 95%
- Very High (VH): Greater than 95%
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318


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BIOGRAPHY

Keith H. German graduated from Sherwood High School, Sandy Springs, Maryland, in 1989. He received his Bachelor of Science from the University of Delaware in 1993. He received his Master of Business Administration from Colorado State University in 1998.