HIDDEN SPOILER ISSUE IN CONFLICT ANALYSIS AND RESOLUTION: A MULTIPLE-CASE STUDY OF STAY-BEHIND ACTIVITIES IN TURKEY

by

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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my father Adil, my mother Mukadder and my sister Canan, my wife Tülay, my daughters Cemre Naz and Azra, my mother in-law Nezaket, and father in-law Celal, brothers in-law Tayfur and Baris, and to all people who devote themselves to the peace and well-being of humanity.
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ABSTRACT

HIDDEN SPOILER ISSUE IN CONFLICT ANALYSIS AND RESOLUTION: A MULTIPLE-CASE STUDY OF STAY-BEHIND ACTIVITIES IN TURKEY

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Despite significant efforts of states, NGOs, and scholars, conflicts, even violent conflicts, are abundant in our recent history. Scholars of international relations and conflict analysis and resolution fields have developed various theories to help us understand the dynamics of conflicts and to offer strategies to end them. However, most of these theories focus solely on two basic approaches: only manifest parties to the conflict are taken into consideration in the analysis and third party intervention is considered as the action of powerful actors for ending specific conflicts.

By emphasizing such limitations this dissertation argues that not all interveners aim to end violence or foster peace, and conflicts do not always formed around the manifest parties. Instead, in many conflicts, there are actors that want to escalate an ongoing conflict or initiate a new one based on their cost-benefit analysis with intend to keep such an intervention secret in order to be able to avoid unwanted occurrences.
Thus, to address these often overlooked, but significant aspects of contemporary conflicts, this dissertation introduces the “hidden spoiler” concept into the conflict analysis and resolution field, and defines this idea as “actors that calculate some sort of benefit from either starting a conflict or engaging in an ongoing conflict by employing several strategies and intending to keep their involvement a secret”.

Therefore this study was designed to explore under what sort of conditions and what kind of intentions hidden spoilers intervene, which types of tactics are utilized in their interventions, and how conflicts are affected by presence of hidden spoiler involvement. To achieve these goals, a comparative case study was conducted on three cases of stay behind activities in Turkey, by applying thematic analysis to examine secondary qualitative dataset utilizing Nvivo.

The results revealed consistent patterns of activity across the three cases that can be considered as symptoms of the hidden spoiler intervention in a given conflict. Thus, scholars and practitioners should focus on these symptoms in efforts to develop better conflict intervention strategies. Second, the existence of such symptoms can also be used as the indicators of an early warning system. Moreover, this study revealed that hidden spoilers are mostly members of a stay behind group (deep state) whose actions are mostly covert, and they have no hesitation to use various disruptive actions including riots, coups, cooperating with terrorist or organized crime groups, and even assassinations. Thus, I have concluded that scholars and policy makers should focus on establishing democratic institutions in order to minimize the potential for hidden spoiling.
KEY WORDS: Conflict, Hidden Spoiling, Intervention, Early Warning, Stay Behind, Deep State, Threat Perception, Covert Action, Accountability.
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

In analyzing conflicts, current conflict analysis and resolution and international relations theories have focused on manifest parties and their actions. Several studies have mentioned “international linkages”, “trans-national affiliations”, and “spoilers” (Azar, 1990; Korostelina, 2007; Moore & Davis, 1998; Stedman, 1997). However, these studies either deal only with manifest parties and/or limit their scope to “peace processes”. However, in some conflicts there are other actors (hidden spoilers) who engage in either triggering a new conflict or escalating an ongoing one, and this form of engagement is commonly not well publicized, and takes place covertly with respect to the parties (either one of them or all) or to the possible interveners, and can play an important role in conflict dynamics.

In this study I tried to explore which motivations and factors lead hidden spoilers to engage in spoiling, which mechanisms (tactics/tools) are being utilized in pursuit of their goals, and how their involvement impacts conflict dynamics using a multiple case study research design.

In this regard, I defined hidden spoiler(s) as:

“Any actor who is expecting benefit(s) from triggering a new conflict and/or escalating an existing one between certain parties through utilizing a variety of actions with the intent to keep its involvement secret.”
This definition underlines a critical, but untouched aspect of research describing conflicting party characteristics, and defines the scope of this study. Like conflicts, parties might also be “latent”, and in such situations identifying the parties is not something that is easy to observe. Therefore, finding an answer to the question of “Who?” regarding involving parties is not applicable to every situation and was certainly not the purpose of this study. In such conflicts though, revealing the existence of hidden spoiler involvement is more critical to being able to implement efficient intervention strategies.

In this regard, the example below will provide the reader with a better understanding of the hidden spoiler concept and purpose of this study. The example chosen took place in 1953, when the Greek-Cypriots declared their will to join Greece (Güven, 2005c). Following this, in 1954, Greece submitted an appeal to the United Nations to demand self-determination for Cyprus, but this was denied (Hür, 2008). Since political efforts appeared to be blocked, Greek Cypriots formed the EOKA\(^1\) and started violent attacks against both the British and Turkish people (Güven, 2005c).

By 1955, the Cyprus issue had become one of the Turkey’s most important issues in terms of its political agenda. Within this political context, on the 6th of September 1955, the Turkish Prime Minister Menderes received an urgent message saying that Atatürk’s house in Greece –where he was born in 1881– had been bombed. He ordered his aide to broadcast this on government radio (Hür, 2008).

\(^1\) Greek for National Organization of Cypriot Fighters.
At 16:00 the daily tabloid “İstanbul Ekspres”, which had an average circulation of 30,000 copies of daily print, published its second print of 300,000 copies with the headline saying “Our father’s house was damaged due to the bomb”. A few minutes later, under the auspices of the organization of Cyprus is Turkish Association (CTA) several riots began in multiple locations in Istanbul and the reaction was outrageous (Güven, 2005b).

The main target of the mob was the Greek minority and their properties, but other minorities’ properties were also damaged. According to Güven (2005a, p. 34,40) 15 people were killed, at least 300 people were injured (including the attackers), 73 churches, 1 synagogue, 2 monasteries, 26 schools, 1 factory, and 5,317 houses/shops/other facilities -3,250 belonged to the Greek minority- had been damaged.

According to a Greek investigation, it was revealed that Turkish Consulate security officer Hasan Uçar threw the bomb and it was given to him by deputy consulate Oktay Engin. Oktay Engin was detained nine months after the arrest and “extracted” from Greece by MAH² before the verdict. Greece requested him to pursue his sentence, but Turkey denied their request. Despite these facts the Turkish courts did not question Oktay Engin and his superiors. Years later he became a governor. Hasan Uçar was detained for nine months and sentenced to two years. (Hür, 2008).

According to martial law court, CTA and the communists were responsible for the pogrom. 5,799 people were detained by the martial law court. A total of 228 people were

---
² Abbreviation for former Turkish National Intelligence Agency.
sentenced. CTA was banned and several members were sentenced. However, among those 228 people there were several “communists”.

At the societal level, the pogrom led to two different consequences. First, a considerable number of minorities –especially the Greek minority- in İstanbul migrated to their motherland. Second, the Cyprus issue increased as a priority in both the societal and governmental agendas. This increased tension further escalated the Cyprus conflict, which had not yet been solved. For years these events remained as a “reaction” to the attack on Ataturk’s house in public opinion, based on the martial law court verdict (Altan, 2010; Atsız, 2010; Hür, 2008).

Unfortunately, the real (manifest) perpetrator had been promoted instead of being prosecuted. However, in 1991, a journalist named Fatih Güllapoğlu conducted an interview with Ret. Gen. Sabri Yirmibeşoğlu, who led the Special War Department in 1971 and also worked to mobilize civilian resistance during Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus in 1974.

Yirmibeşoğlu said:

“...[T]ake the Sept. 6-7 incidents, it also was a Special War [Dept.] job. And it was a magnificent event. Let me ask you; was it not a magnificent event.”(Ergil, 2008)³

Later in another interview he also stated that:

“In Special War, certain acts of sabotage are staged and blamed on the enemy to increase public resistance. We did this on Cyprus; we even burnt down a mosque.” (“Retired general confesses to burning mosque to fire up public,” 2010)

³ Quoted from the original Interview published in the weekly Tempo, June 9-15, 1991, issue 24
Although several allegations have been published in media about who was behind the 6-7 September Pogrom and the events after that, this statement ended the 36 years of secrecy and revealed the real (covert) perpetrators of this aggressive act.

Throughout the history of the modern world, especially after World War II, hidden spoilers have played a role in several conflicts as seen in the 6-7 September Pogrom. If critically examined, in this case there were unusual actions and events that happened at a certain time and place that then lead to certain outcomes. For example, it is quite obvious that broadcasting the attack on government radio and then publishing it in 300.00 copies of second print of a newspaper would cause a great outburst among the public, and could not be explained by defining these as random events. Thus utilizing such events and actions as indicators of hidden spoiling, as stated above, this study tried to explore which motivations and factors lead hidden spoilers to engage in spoiling, which mechanisms (tactics/tools) are utilized in pursuit of their goals, and how their involvement impacts conflict dynamics.

Revealing these dimensions of hidden spoiling will provide a better understanding of conflict dynamics through including hidden spoilers into the analysis of the parties to the conflict. This would also allow me to contribute to broadening existing analytical approaches for understanding this topic and for developing a more holistic conflict analysis framework, which can be used as an early warning mechanism to avoid becoming a victim of possible future hidden spoiling activities. Having such a framework will also help to apply more efficient intervention strategies in dealing with conflict dynamics.
Addressing these purposes required “in depth understanding” (Yin, 2009) of the hidden spoiler concept. Therefore a case study approach was utilized as the research strategy. Since revealing the indicators of hidden spoiling is crucial to optimizing current conflict analysis and resolution approaches, it was clear a single case study would not provide enough substantial support for any theory development. Thus, I conducted a multiple-case study research approach for my analysis and applied the same analytic methods to all cases and sought similarities among them. This raised the question of which cases would be selected for analysis.

As will be discussed in detail below, the nature of the hidden spoiling issue is highly political and considered as a matter of natural security because most of the examples in the literature fall into “covert operations” of the states. Therefore, access to the related data is limited especially to the foreigners. In order to overcome this issue, I studied hidden spoiling activities in Turkey’s recent history. I selected the following cases because they have not only resulted significant changes in Turkey’s socio-political life, but also because archival data indicate evidence that in each case there were hidden spoiling activities involved:

1. 6-7 September Pogrom

2. 28 February 1998 post-modern military coup

3. Operation Ergenekon (major case)

The following section will address the related literature to my study.
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW

In terms of the definition of hidden spoilers provided above, this issue has not yet been addressed in the literature. However, several studies in both conflict resolution and international relations fields are related to the hidden spoiler concept.

Thus, in addressing the hidden spoiler concept here, this theme was analyzed in the context of three dimensions that corresponded to the relevant literature to provide a better conceptualization of the position (position of a conflicting party), behavior (spoiling role of the conflicting party), and nature (hidden/covert⁴ involvement) of the parties involved. Because of the limitations of the existing literature on each of these three dimensions, these fail to help us comprehend the hidden spoiler issue. However, they are useful in providing a theoretical basis for the context of this study.

2.1 Conflict Party Positioning

Most of the existing international relations and conflict analysis and resolution theories and analytical frameworks deal largely with manifest parties in the conflict. This is because manifest parties can easily be identified and this makes it easy to analyze the conflict.

However, some scholars (Azar, 1990; Horowitz, 1985; Moore & Davis, 1998) posit that this simplistic approach would be incapable of comprehending every aspect of

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⁴ In related literature such hidden involvements generally defined as “covert action” or “covert operation”.
today’s complex conflicts. Thus, they raised the concept of external involvement or intervention to the conflict.

Both international relations and conflict analysis and resolution literature have massively addressed the concept of intervention. However, before examining each field's approach, I will provide the definition of intervention as follows.

According to Oxford Dictionary the term intervention is “an interference by a country in another’s affairs” (Oxford, 2010). On the other hand, Merriam-Webster defines intervention as “to interfere usually by force or threat of force in another nation's internal affairs especially to compel or prevent an action” (Merriam-Webster, 2011).

Here, in both definitions the focus on the object (actor) is at the nation/country level. On the other hand, while the Oxford dictionary version taking a more broad approach on subject (area of affairs) Meriam-Webster prefers to limit it to the internal level. Besides that, Merriam-Webster also gets into details of action and purpose that Oxford doesn't provide.

In his famous study on protracted social conflicts (PSCs) Azar (1990) states that PSCs do not exactly fit into these orthodox approaches. He stated “many conflicts currently active in the underdeveloped parts of the world are characterized by a blurred demarcation between internal and external sources and actors [emphasis added]. Moreover, there are multiple causal factors and dynamics, reflected in changing goals, actors and targets. Finally, these conflicts do not show clear starting and terminating points.” (Azar, 1990, p. 6)
According to Azar, in today’s modern world, a state’s capacity and orientation on addressing basic needs are not directly caused by intra-state factors. Instead, they are highly “influenced by the patterns of linkage with the international system.” He focuses on two different models of linkage. The first one is the economic dependency of that specific state which not only weakens its autonomy, but also decreases the variety of policy options for economic development. The second is the existence of a patron-client relationship with strong states. Since a client state is expected to provide its loyalty, it can fall into a situation that requires implementing policies in favor of its patron, but that are “contradictory to needs of its own public.” (Azar, 1990, p. 11,12)

Azar says “when organizational and communication systems breakdown within an environment of mutual distrust between groups, PSCs can began to escalate.” In such a situation even individual victimizations are perceived as collective victimizations which (may) lead to violent or non-violent protests. When these protests encounter “repression or suppression”, the victimized group becomes prone to raise the issues of deprived needs. Moreover, if a group asks for more autonomy and independence, it may face a similar repressive and suppressive response, which leads it to seek the support of “external military and economic support.” Such behavior may also be welcomed by other (especially neighboring) countries in order to use that “patron-client” relation against the state of that communal group. Thus, a domestic conflict can transform into a regional conflict (Azar, 1990, p. 12,14).

He also stated that in many cases, instead of recognizing the demands of a communal group, states chose to apply repressive policies. However, such policies
generally do not diminish the “fears of state authority”, but invite similar “harsh responses” (i.e. terrorist movements). Moreover, in some cases, asking for co-operation can be perceived as “a tactical maneuver” to crush opposition. When this co-operation situation fails, the state tries to control the conflict using both domestic and external support. However, if such attempts do not help to control the conflict, the state takes steps to find “its own external assistance”, which then promotes *direct and/or indirect external involvement* [emphasis added] due to the above mentioned patron-client relationship between the assisted and assisting parties (Azar, 1990, pp. 14–15).

To summarize, Azar argues that the analysis of conflicts requires a broad perspective, because today relations have become much more interdependent at all levels. Thus, not only inter-state, but also intra-state conflicts are considered a matter of interest for both the conflicting parties and others that seem to be unrelated. As a result, external involvement becomes an important dimension of today’s conflicts.

In the same vein, after discussing the different dimensions of globalization in today’s world, Nye stated that globalization is a form of interdependence that occurs at the global level. Here, he says, “interdependence refers to situations in which actors or events in different parts of a system affect each other.” He argues that because of its asymmetric nature, interdependence does not always mean cooperation and peace. On the contrary, it makes hard to clearly distinguish what is domestic and what is foreign. This leads to a complex web of relations between both state and non-state actors internal and external. In such a relationship, interests may demand the use of interdependence as a powerful tool one can apply for one’s own benefit, but for another’s disadvantage, that
finally causes intense, prolonged conflicts involving the above mentioned actors (Nye, 2006, pp. 204–217).

Accordingly, while discussing the war concept in international politics, Holsti (1996) stated that the Clausewitzian understanding of war, which relies on great power conflicts of post 1648 as conflict between armies of two or more states, has shaped many significant analytical concepts of international politics such as hegemony, balance of power, deterrence, alliances, and power projection. However, since World War II, the nature of war has changed to encompass within state conflicts. Thus, such theoretical approaches become inadequate for diagnosing and providing solutions for contemporary conflicts.

This shift in the nature of conflict reveals itself in the characteristics of war. The classic wars of the post Westphalia Era were between armies of the states that were mostly equal of strength and resource, which made them symmetrical in that sense. On the other hand, in contemporary world, not only states, but also groups (ethnic, religious, etc.) can be involved in conflicts. However, since groups cannot possess equal power and resources with states they are fighting against, they utilize unconventional tactics such as terrorism and guerilla warfare. In that sense contemporary wars are mostly asymmetric (Levy, 2007).

Holsti (1996) posits that before World War II, war was an issue of state relations in which maintaining international peace and security was crucial for implementing domestic politics without disturbance. In the contemporary world, on the other hand,
peace and security in the international arena become more dependent within state security, since most conflicts occur at the intrastate level.

After noting this conceptual change in security, Holsti (1996) argued that in order to maintain peace and security at an international level, a form of power, which involves the capacity to achieve goals and defend one’s interests through various means, exertion is required. Wars before the second half of the twentieth century however, have been characterized as great-power activities, since military strength, which plays the primary role in leaders decision making to declare war, was closely linked to the power of the state. On the other hand, contemporary wars cannot be considered as activities of the great powers, since in many of them, great powers do not declare war, but they may be involved with them.

Studies on the role of the state in contemporary wars highlight two situations. First, weak states become the source of wars because they lack legitimacy, infrastructural power, and authority. Having such shortcomings, they fail to establish a functioning political system that provides security and maintains order. Second, states intervene in wars for purpose of eliminating threats and protecting their interests (Holsti, 1996). Corresponding to what Azar states about external involvement in the context of conflicts, Holsti stated that “great powers intervened to protect client-particularly former colonial-regimes against secessionists” (1996, p. 127).

In analyzing the state’s role in contemporary wars, Levy (2007) also paid attention to the concept of external intervention. Unlike Holsti, he argued that classic realist theories do not totally fail in grasping the dynamics of today’s conflicts. For him,
the balance of power theory can be helpful in analyzing regional systems. However, the environment in regional systems cannot be considered as anarchic since outside powers may be inclined to support a regional hegemony in order to maintain its position against others for the sake of its own interests, which blocks the reinstatement of the balance of power within the region. Moreover, states, mostly the great powers, might support adversaries between the states to strengthen their influence. In some instances, states tend to launch preventive wars against rising enemies that are not directly attacking them but it is on interests to undertake such as those by Israel and the U.S. when they attacked Iraq.

Most contemporary conflicts fall into the category of “ethnic wars” or “identity wars” (Levy, 2007). Thus the concept of external involvement in conflicts has also been discussed in the context of ethnic conflicts.

Moore and Davis suggest that if two neighboring countries consist of the same ethnic group in their territories there is an “unstated alliance (a transnational affinity) [Emphasis added] among these people”. According to these authors, this alliance exists because members of the same minority group assume that they share similar beliefs. Thus, sharing the idea of Horowitz (1985), they argue that the existence of ethnic alliances creates opportunities for ethnic groups. Especially in conflict situations, if one of the conflicting parties is an ethnic minority, it tends use its alliance with the same minority in a neighboring country as leverage for its own cause. Similarly, if the neighboring minority in that country has access to political decision mechanisms through its elites, it can use this alliance as a political mobilization tool regarding that country’s s interests (Moore & Davis, 1998, pp. 92–93).
In many cases, these actions for securing external support are not limited to only neighboring countries. In fact their ultimate aim is to gain support from great power(s) by playing along with them and using their own rivalries to gain support (Levy, 2007).

These highly cited studies have taken one step forward out of the conventional party positioning by bringing to bear the concepts of “external involvement” and “transnational affinities” into their discussions for consideration. These studies posit that in contemporary conflicts, transnational affinities and interests sometimes drive the desire to get involved in the conflict. However, they did not analyze the effect and the nature of the involvement. These two aspects have been addressed by the following literature.

2.2) Spoiler Issue

In his pioneering study on the spoiler issue, Stedman (1997) stated that:

“The greatest source of risk comes from spoilers-leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, world view, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it.” (p.5)

In stating that, Stedman pointed towards something different than the conventional party positioning idea in the context of conflicts, and stressed the effect of involvement. According to this author, peace processes provide convenient conditions for spoilers. When there is a war, it is easy to identify different types of combatants like rebels, rogues, or terrorists. On the other hand, spoilers emerge when those manifest parties began to settle the issue(s) between them, since these kinds of efforts are against the spoilers’ interests.
These spoilers’ locations can exist “inside or outside a peace process.” In some situations, inside spoilers, some (one or more) of the parties of a peace process might have signed the agreement but for some (i.e. tactical) reason they decide to maintain their threat to the peace process or try to lengthen the process as long as it is beneficial for them. In other situations, outside spoilers, some parties (i.e. a group or a state) try to undermine the ongoing peace process, because it is contrary to their interests.

Strategies of spoilers differ according to their position. Inside spoilers try to maintain their spoiling efforts hidden, and for that reason, they (generally) do not want to use violent means to reach their goals. However, outside spoilers do not need that kind of stealth, since there is no risk to jeopardize their position. Therefore, they tend to use violent means to achieve their goals.

Stedman (1997) believes that in order to manage the spoiler problem, it is crucial to identify the type of spoiler. He identifies three types of spoilers that are based on their goals and commitments: 1) Limited spoilers are those who have limited goals (i.e. recognition, power share). Although this group does not show low commitment by nature, their demands are subject to negotiation. 2) Total spoilers pursue absolute power and authority. Thus, their demands are not open to negotiation. Generally, these types of spoilers follow radical ideologies and apply violence. 3) Greedy spoilers determine their goals based on their own risk-cost analysis. If they estimate low levels of risk and cost, they have limited goals. Otherwise they pursue total goals.

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5 To him, this positioning based on whether a spoiler is a party to a peace process or not.
After identifying the type of the spoiler, the second task is to analyze the “locus of the spoiler problem”. If spoiling behavior stems from the leader of the group, it is possible to change the type when the leader changes. However, if it comes from the “followers” (i.e. the masses), it is harder to alter the type of spoiler.

To Stedman, a spoilers’ behavior can occur based on three reasons: “1) fear, and demand greater protection; 2) fairness, and demand greater benefits; or 3) justice, and demand legitimation or recognition of their position.”

With regard to question of who will address the spoiler behavior, Stedman (1997) says:

“Scholars who embrace this view believe that spoiler behavior can be addressed only by reducing the spoiler's fears through international guarantees... Custodians of peace processes are defined here as international actors whose task is to oversee the implementation of peace agreements. Implicit in their role is the cultivation and protection of peace and the management of spoilers. International custodians can be international organizations, individual states, or formal or ad hoc groups of concerned third parties.” (pp. 9,12)

These custodians can use different strategies in addressing spoiler behavior. First, they can give whatever they want (“inducement”). Second, they can change their behavior (“socialization”). Finally, they can use force either to weaken the spoiler or to change their behavior (“coercion”).

Based on his typology, Stedman offers “appropriate strategies for managing spoilers”: 
1) Total spoilers ➔ Coercion or “departing train strategy”
2) Limited spoilers ➔ Inducement
3) Greedy spoilers ➔ Socialization

If custodians do not follow these “appropriate strategies”, he says, the situation may become worse.

Finally, he proposed some limitations and uncertainties that custodians might face. Sometimes, the best strategy for dealing with a certain spoiler might not be the best choice (against their interests) for policy makers that have been involved in the peace process. The custodians’ role in that peace process (i.e. United Nations) might prevent them from applying “appropriate strategies”. Also in some situations, one of the parties of the peace process might be the “patron of the spoiler.” They either decline to accept the spoiler or are not willing to accept that the spoilers’ demands are illegal. In addition to these limitations, the following “uncertainties” complicate the correct diagnosis of the spoiler:

➢ The goal of the spoiler
➢ The intent behind acts of noncooperation or aggression
➢ The degree of commitment of the spoiler
➢ The degree of leadership command and control of followers
➢ The degree of unity within the spoiler

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6 It is “legitimizing the parties of peace and delegitimizing the spoiler, by depriving the spoiler of resources—both capital and weapons—that can be used to undermine peace, and by redeploying peacekeepers to protect the parties of peace.” (Stedman, 1997, p. 15)
The likely effects of custodial action on the spoiler's willingness to continue aggression on the other parties to the peace process, and on interested external actors. (Stedman, 1997, p. 17)

Several other scholars examine Stedman’s initial study. Darby modified Stedman’s typology in order to encompass all types of actors that might endanger the peace process. He proposes four types (groups) of spoilers: 1) dealers are ready to make peace; 2) zealots try to spoil the peace process by all means; 3) opportunists can be convinced under certain situations to end the violence and to come to the table; 4) mavericks are those who have interest based motivations for applying violence and spoiling the process (Darby, 2001, pp. 47–48)

Zahar (2003) states that although she agrees with the importance of diagnosing the type of spoiler and applying the appropriate strategy for management, Stedman’s study did not answer the question of “How can we tell who is a spoiler and who is a peacemaker?” However, she also did not answer this question in her article. This question can be answered by Tilly’s analysis on “political entrepreneurs-PE”\(^7\) and “violent specialists-VS”\(^8\). He states that, PE and VS are among the political actors, and there is no easy way to make distinction between “insurgents” and “forces of order”. To me, this argument can be projected on the spoiler problem. There is no simple way to

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\(^7\) “Political entrepreneurs engage in various forms brokerage with creating new connections between previously unconnected social groups. They specialize in activation, connection, coordination, and representation. With doing these they exert significant effect on collective violence.” (Tilly, 2003, p. 34)

\(^8\) “Violent specialists can be seen in every government, who control means of inflicting damage on persons and objects. They include army, police, and judicial officials.” Ibid.
define who is a spoiler and who is not. This duty becomes harder in situations where PE and VS overlap and complement each other (as Tilly says), or a state patrons a spoiler (as Stedman says).

Moreover, Zahar (2003) also posits that Stedman’s typology is problematic in two regards: First, she says, he limits the spoiler issue to peace processes by forging its definition in relation to peace processes. Second, she says, in his typology some types overlap, because for some he chose to define them in relation to the spoilers’ preferences on actions, but for other he defines them according to the spoilers’ preferences over outcome.

Moving on from that point, she suggests that it is crucial to examine the factors that affect a spoiler’s tactics and goals. To determine this, she asks, “why do spoilers emerge?”, and then proposes three factors: 1) ideological, 2) financial, and 3) opportunity related. For ideological reasons, the continuation of conflict is a matter of life and death, since the very existence of spoilers is based on that conflict. Financial reasons posit that ending the conflict basically blocks or significantly reduces the economic revenues of the spoiler. Opportunity related reasons offer the explanation that an ongoing conflict situation can provide chances of increasing power and influence, even for insignificant parties. Surely, these opportunity related reasons stem from detailed analysis of the costs and the benefits of spoiling.

In addition to these, she also states that Stedman’s theory limits the scope of spoiler management only to international custodians. However, she states:
“There have also been cases - albeit few of self-enforcing peace agreements that succeeded, cases in which one cannot invoke the presence of an external enforcer as the solution to the commitment problems faced by the factions. South Africa is probably the clearest illustration of such success.” (Zahar, 2003, p. 117)

Another study on spoilers belongs to Greenhill and Major (2006). They share Zahar’s critique of Stedman’s focus on “manifest and identified threats to the peace”, and argue that this approach “ignores the potential (latent) spoilers.”

On the other hand, their major contribution to the spoiler issue comes from their challenge to Stedman’s approach to the reasons behind the spoiler behavior. Here they argue:

“…it is the prevailing opportunity structure⁹, not actors’ intentions, that presents them with the available options, which in turn determines their behavior. Parties to a peace process adjust their goals (but not their preferences) according to the prevailing opportunity structure because the most significant determinant of a peace initiative’s ultimate success is the distribution of power among the

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⁹ Unlike Darby, Greenhill and Major claim that all types of spoilers will decide whether to spoil a peace process or not, based on their perceptions about structural dynamics (similar to what Tilly (2003, pp. 133–136) argued that different levels of government capacity and democracy will offer different levels of possibilities for opportunism ) or calculations about the possible outcome. Although Darby’s modification on Stedman’s typology has shown a better performance on reflecting different spoiler behaviors, Greenhill and Major pulled our attention to the fact that group (or individual) behavior is not pre-determined, rather it is shaped by opportunities and expectations about ongoing or future peace process. Thus, a group can be a total spoiler (zealot), if structure and its perception about the outcome in favor of its success. However, same group can become a dealer in a different structural environment and/or outcome calculation that can be made either in the same conflict or in a different one.
competing factions on the ground and those implementing the peace.” (Greenhill & Major, 2006, p. 9)

Therefore, Greenhill and Major believe that regardless of the spoiler type this behavior has more causal relation with two factors: 1) their expectations about the possibility that they can change the (power) dynamics on the ground; and 2) the level of risk that they can bear. This capacity-based approach is diagramed as follows:

![Figure 1. Probability of Spoiler Emergence and Predicted Level of Greed for a Given Distribution of Power](Greenhill & Major, 2006, p. 15)

This diagram can be projected over to Tilly’s opportunity concept; “governmental capacity clearly affects the prevalence and characteristics of opportunism” (Tilly, 2003, p. 135). Similar to what is seen in the lower right box, the situations where both peace-seeking parties and international custodians are weak creates an opportunity environment for the existing or potential spoilers to exploit the situation for their own interests.
The effectiveness of the spoilers was analyzed by Ayres (2006). He states the focus of his study by asking two questions:

1) *What effects can spoilers are expected to have on internal conflicts?*

2) *Under what conditions will those effects occur?* (p. 3)

By limiting his study to outside spoilers, Ayres tried to answer these questions based on the positioning of social structural layers (i.e. elites, and mass) and utilizing several theories, including rational choice, bounded rationality, prospect theory, and balance theory.

According to his combined theoretical analysis, in a given conflict situation society consists of two portions: elites and masses. Concerning elites, the occurrence and the effects of spoilers rely on certain conditions: levels of power and trust. If spoilers convince (by all means they have) elites (even they are pro-peace) that parties of the process are too weak to stop the violence, or parties of the process are not serious about it for some reason, spoilers are more likely to succeed. Otherwise, if there is some evidence that is perceived by elites showing power to stop violence and intensions to reach peace, spoilers are less likely to succeed.

When it comes to the masses, he says, although in general they may have little or no information about the dynamics of the conflict, they have their own calculations that mostly rely on what they can see: their perceptions about the leaders and the ongoing violence. In this setting, if the masses (civilians) are targeted by spoiler attacks that are high in numbers and/or intense as regards the level of violence, spoilers are more likely to
succeed. Otherwise, if they target the military or police and are either fewer in quantity or weak in terms of violence they are less likely to succeed.

Table 1. Spoiler taxonomy in literature

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locus of Actor</th>
<th>Intention of Actor</th>
<th>Orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Inside spoilers</td>
<td>1) Limited</td>
<td>1) Dealers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1) Ideological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Outside spoilers</td>
<td>2) Total</td>
<td>2) Zealots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2) Financial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) In/Out Collaboration</td>
<td>3) Greedy</td>
<td>3) Opportunists</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3) Opportunists</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4) Mavericks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action Type</th>
<th>Sign of involvement</th>
<th>Power of Actor</th>
<th>Target of Spoilers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Violent</td>
<td>1) Manifest</td>
<td>1) Powerful</td>
<td>1) Elites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Non-violent</td>
<td>2) Potential</td>
<td>2) Weak</td>
<td>2) Mass</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These studies on spoilers addressed the effect of unconventional involvement in the conflict. They also broadened the concept of involvement by addressing not only external parties but also insiders. Although Stedman’s study was further developed through addressing his limitations, the spoiler literature has two important limitations:

a) They only analyze “peace processes”, which prevents them from observing spoiling actions that occur before and after “peace processes” that ultimately affect the efficiency of analysis. Thus, in this study my analysis was not limited only to the “peace process”. I addressed spoiling actions in a more holistic way that included actions
happening before (peace situation) and after (ongoing conflicts or peace processes) conflicts.

b) They also fail to address the nature of the spoiling action. As addressed before, states or groups mostly take part in spoiling actions. Moving from what happened in the Istanbul Pogrom, it is clear that there are certain spoiling actions that are made secretly. Perpetrators of these types of actions are intent to keep their involvement secret to the general public. Without considering the secrecy, which constitutes the very nature of the action, an analysis of spoilers would be limited to the overt actions of the manifest parties.

Since these secret (hidden spoiling) actions play a significant role in conflict situations and have never been addressed in the conflict analysis and resolution literature before, the focus of my study was on this hidden action of spoiling. To understand and analyze this aspect I utilized the covert actions literature of the international relations field in the following section.

2.3) Covert Action (Operation)

The majority of the existing literature on “covert action” is about the U.S. and its activities. Although “covert action” constitutes a large portion of the CIA’s public image (Rudgers, 2000), it was not present in the founding National Security Act of CIA (Treverton, 1987, p. 12). However, the action itself was one of the most important policies of the U.S. during World War II (Rudgers, 2000). After World War II, the U.S. administration had concerns about Soviet activities regarding the spread of communism in both European and South American countries. Having such concerns President Truman
first authorized the Director of National Intelligence in NSC 4-A and its enclosed directive:

“NSC 4-A


PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

REFERENCE

SANACC 304/11/1/

/1/Document 249.

1. The National Security Council at its second meeting referred SANACC 304/11 to the NSC Staff for revision in the light of the comments at the meeting.

2. SANACC 304/11 appears to be designed to accomplish the following two related but separate purposes:

a. **To initiate steps looking toward the conduct of covert psychological operations designed to counteract Soviet and Soviet-inspired activities.**

   [Emphasis added]

b. To ensure that all overt foreign information activities are effectively coordinated.

3. Therefore, in the interest of security and clarity, the Staff of the National Security Council has prepared separate reports to the National Security Council designed to achieve each of the above purposes. This report deals with the purpose described in 1-a, while NSC 4/2/ deals with the purpose stated in 1-b.
4. The enclosed draft directive to the Director of Central Intelligence is believed to be an appropriate and adequate action by the Council with reference to covert psychological operations abroad. This directive contains the following desirable provisions:

a. It specifies the reason and the authority for the Council's action;

b. It grants sufficient authority to the Central Intelligence Agency; while

c. At the same time it ensures that Central Intelligence Agency will conduct such operations in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign policy, overt foreign information activities, and diplomatic and military operations and intentions abroad.

Draft Directive to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter

1. The National Security Council, taking cognizance of the vicious psychological efforts of the USSR, its satellite countries and Communist groups to discredit and defeat the aims and activities of the United States and other western powers, has determined that, in the interests of world peace and U.S. national security, the foreign information activities of the U.S. Government must be supplemented by covert psychological operations.

2. The similarity of operational methods involved in covert psychological and intelligence activities and the need to ensure their secrecy and obviate costly duplication renders the Central Intelligence Agency the logical agency to conduct such operations. Hence, under authority of Section 102 (d) (5) of the
National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council directs the Director of Central Intelligence to initiate and conduct, within the limit of available funds, covert psychological operations designed to counteract Soviet and Soviet-inspired activities which constitute a threat to world peace and security or are designed to discredit and defeat the United States in its endeavors to promote world peace and security. [Emphasis added]

3. In order to insure that such psychological operations are in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign policy, overt foreign information activities, and diplomatic and military operations and intentions abroad, the Director of Central Intelligence is charged with:

a. Obtaining approval of all policy directives and major plans for such operations by a panel to be designated by the National Security Council.

b. Coordination of operations with the senior U.S. diplomatic and military representatives in each area which will be directly affected by such operations.

4. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to require the Central Intelligence Agency to disclose operational details concerning its secret techniques, sources or contacts.” (“NSC-4 COORDINATION OF FOREIGN INFORMATION MEASURES,” 1947)

This was the first legal consent document supporting the conducting of covert operations in sovereign states based on the perception of a communist threat. However, this first official definition was limited to “psychological covert operations”, and it was
not clearly defined what kind of activities this entailed. Thus, the initial practices in this regard received some critiques.

For that reason, on June 18, 1948, a new NSC directive was introduced which superseded NSC 4 and regulated “covert operations” of both war and peacetime situations (“FRUS: Note on U.S. Covert Action Programs,” 2001):

“Therefore, under the authority of Section 102(d)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council hereby directs that in time of peace:

a. A new Office of Special Projects shall be created within the Central Intelligence Agency to plan and conduct covert operations; and in coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to plan and prepare for the conduct of such operations in wartime.

b. A highly qualified person, nominated by the Secretary of State, acceptable to the Director of Central Intelligence and approved by the National Security Council, shall be appointed as Chief of the Office of Special Projects.

c. The Chief of the Office of Special Projects shall report directly to the Director of Central Intelligence. For purposes of security and of flexibility of operations, and to the maximum degree consistent with efficiency, the Office of Special Projects shall operate independently of other components of Central Intelligence Agency.

d. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for:

(1) Ensuring, through designated representatives of the Secretary of State and of the Secretary of Defense, that covert operations are planned and conducted in a
manner consistent with US foreign and military policies and with overt activities. In disagreements arising between the Director of Central Intelligence and the representative of the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense over such plans, the matter shall be referred to the National Security Council for decision.

(2) Ensuring that plans for wartime covert operations are also drawn up with the assistance of a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and are accepted by the latter as being consistent with and complementary to approved plans for wartime military operations.

(3) Informing, through appropriate channels, agencies of the US Government, both at home and abroad (including diplomatic and military representatives in each area), of such operations as will affect them.

e. Covert operations pertaining to economic warfare will be conducted by the Office of Special Projects under the guidance of the departments and agencies responsible for the planning of economic warfare.

f. Supplemental funds for the conduct of the proposed operations for fiscal year 1949 shall be immediately requested. Thereafter operational funds for these purposes shall be included in normal Central Intelligence Agency Budget requests.

4. In time of war, or when the President directs, all plans for covert operations shall be coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In active theaters of war where American forces are engaged, covert operations will be conducted under the direct command of the American Theater Commander and orders therefor will be
transmitted through the Joint Chiefs of Staff unless otherwise directed by the President.

5. As used in this directive, "covert operations" are understood to be all activities (except as noted herein) which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them. Specifically, such operations shall include any covert activities related to: propaganda, economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, and support of indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such operations shall not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations. [Emphasis added]”


The above provided sections of this latter directive were evidence of a significant step forward in the realm of covert operations history, since through the amendment of NSC 10/2, the Office of Special Projects (OSP) was established under the CIA, and became responsible for conducting covert operations. Moreover, looking at the definition in the last article, the concept of “a covert operation” was broadened to consist of
various activities that all were intended to be kept secret. This official definition remained in effect until 1991, and U.S. covert operations were conducted under this directive. In the Intelligence Authorization Act the definition of “covert action” was changed as follows:

“An activity or activities conducted by an element of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad so that the role of the United States Government is not intended to be apparent or acknowledged publicly [emphasis added], but does not include:

(1) activities the primary purpose of which is to acquire intelligence, traditional counterintelligence activities, traditional activities to improve or maintain the operational security of the United States Government programs, or administrative activities;

(2) traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine support to such activities;

(3) traditional law enforcement activities conducted by United States Government law enforcement agencies or routine support to such activities; or

(4) activities to provide routine support to the overt activities (other than activities described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3)) of other United States Government agencies abroad.” (“INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1991,” 1990)

Although this last definition seems to be less detailed, it is broader than the previous one since it covers “any type” of action for influencing the conditions of
targeted groups or states. Similar to this one, there is a more generic covert action definition given by Kim (2002): “the attempt by a government to influence events in another state or territory without revealing its involvement”. In that sense covert actions correspond perfectly with the hidden spoiling concept.

Here the aspect of secrecy in covert actions makes it hard to identify such activities before, after, and at the time of the involvement (Forsythe, 1992), which I believe is the reason why scholars in the conflict analysis and resolution field have not yet addressed the issue of hidden spoiling. However, since the existing literature on covert action is mostly related to U.S. actions, several cases, especially those conducted in the Cold War era, have become public several years later.

The US covert action history\(^\text{10}\) presents certain patterns. First, in concordance with the NSC 10/2’s definition, the majority of target countries of Cold War operations were those under the communist threat. On the other hand, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the focus on communism was changed into a broad interest-based definition of threat, which is reflected in the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991.

Second, since a good understanding of the initial implementations of a certain policy is crucial to determine how it is institutionalized, I believe that an analysis of Cold War era covert operations will provide a better picture of motivations, types, and tactics of US covert operations.

In regards to this point, when I examined the topic of Cold War covert operations, I realized that the majority of the operations were conducted in two different locations:

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\(^{10}\) Studies on US covert operations have two categories based on the time of occurrence: Cold War and Post-Cold War operations. ("Covert Operations," 2012)
South American and European countries. In South American\textsuperscript{11} countries, covert operations mostly relied on CIA agents’ direct interaction with the target country governments, opposition groups, rebels, intelligence agencies, media and business. However, in European countries covert operations were handled indirectly through established “stay-behind” networks.

Each represents a different model of covert involvement as depicted below:

Table 2. Cold war era covert operations by type of involvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1) South American Model</th>
<th>2) European Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Direct Intervention)</td>
<td>(Indirect Intervention-NATO)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The term “stay-behind” was first mentioned in the literature by Treverton (1987, p. 38). He argued that if the Soviet army did enter European countries, the CIA was to establish “stay-behind” networks that would be responsible for organizing uprisings against the occupiers. However, if the Soviets did not attack, these “stay-behind” networks would become responsible for initiating unrest in loosely controlled areas of the Iron Curtain.

On the other hand, the most cited academic study on “stay-behind” networks is the published dissertation\textsuperscript{12} of Daniele Ganser (2005a). According to Ganser, after World

\textsuperscript{11} Iran can be considered with these countries since same tactics used.

\textsuperscript{12} (Liebig & Celani, 2008)
War II, the fear of the communist invasion by Russia or takeover of the political power by its satellite communist parties in the Europe triggered the idea of creating secret armies to prevent such events. Thus, several states participated in the creation of “a clandestine Committee of Western Union-CCWU” by sending their senior military intelligence officers. After the establishment of NATO in 1949, NATO took control of this committee. In addition to European military officers, CIA, MI6, SIS, SAS, and US Green Berets were placed in both trainings and operations. Ganser (2005b) says:

“The clandestine international network covered the European NATO membership, including Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey, as well as the neutral European countries of Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland. The existence of these clandestine NATO armies remained a closely guarded secret throughout the Cold War until 1990, when the first branch of the international network was discovered in Italy.” (p.69)

Although NATO denied the existence of such organizations, the findings of “Operation Gladio”\(^ \text{13} \) created a great tension in nearly every level of European society. Thus, on November 22, 1990, the European Parliament passed a resolution on Gladio that condemned such stay behind organizations.\(^ \text{14} \) According to the resolution, there is a “danger that such [sic, a] clandestine network may have interfered illegally in the internal political affairs of Member States or may still do so.” Therefore, the European Parliament made a call for the member states to take action, “if necessary by establishing

\(^{13}\) Operation named after the code name of the organization in Italy.
parliamentary committees of inquiry”, and the judiciaries to “clarify any action they may have taken to destabilize the democratic structure of the Member States”.

Aside from the ways of involvement, US covert operations comprised wide range of activities (Beitz, 1989):

“Advising foreign leaders and other political influential; propaganda; manipulation of foreign news media; financial support of private organizations such as labor unions; financial and logistical support of political parties; economic and military aid to friendly governments facing internal challenges (or to forces mounting challenges to unfriendly governments); corruption of domestic political processes (rigging elections, bribing public officials paramilitary or counterinsurgency training for friendly forces; participation in assassination plots aimed at foreign leaders; and paramilitary operations designed to subvert or overthrow or alternatively to defend, foreign regimes.” (p.46)

Nutter categorized these activities into five different types (2000, pp. 75–91):

1) Asset Development: Recruiting a certain type of person who can be used in covert operation(s) due to their position in the target country so that involvement could not easily be traced to the source of covert operation.

2) Political Action: Any type of activity including political advice, psychological operations, subsidies, and training that is designed for influencing political systems in part or whole in the target country.

3) Propaganda and Disinformation: Propaganda is the most preferred type of all covert actions (Johnson, 1989). It “is the systematic dissemination of specific doctrines,
viewpoints, or massages to a chosen audience” (Daugherty, 1996, p. 72). A broader
definition would be as follows; any activity that aims to gain support of certain groups or
the whole of the target country so that covert operation can be handled easily and
possible suspicions about the existence of covert operation can be obfuscated. The
information, which is conveyed via propaganda, does not have to be false instead, as soon
as it serves the purpose, it could also be true information. There are three types of
propaganda widely mentioned in the literature based of the source of information. If the
source of information is apparent to the public such as press releases or statements that
come from government officials, it is white propaganda. In grey propaganda, on the other
hand, information comes from a neutral source like a famous credible journalist. At last,
in black propaganda (or disinformation), the information seems to come from another
source. Such information could be in different kinds such as fake documents, videos, or
audios, fake broadcasts, revealed foreign intelligence agents (Eyth, 2002).

4) Economic Warfare: Any activity that aims to negatively influence the
economic situation of the target country will create opportunities for conducting other
types of covert operations or it can be enough to solely reach the goals of the source
country.

5) Paramilitary Action: Consists of several violent and non-violent actions such as
terrorism, intelligence support for an allied country or group, supporting rebel groups,
assassinations, and sponsoring coups d’état.

Calanan states that goals of U.S. covert actions can be grouped into three different
categories (2009, pp. 3–4):
1) Defensive Covert Action: Aims to prevent communist attack or efforts in allied countries.

2) Offensive Covert Action: Aims to overthrow communist regimes in a country of interest.

3) Preventive Covert Action: Aims to stop or neutralize possible communist influence or efforts to control a country of interest.

However, Ganser (2005a) says that neither the Soviet invasion nor the communist revolution never came about, but these stay-behind networks were used for orchestrating operations against sources of danger based on the perceptions of U.S. and British policy makers. He continues:

“The secret armies, as the secondary sources now available suggest, were involved in a whole series of terrorist operations and human rights violations that they wrongly blamed on the Communists in order to discredit the left at the polls. The operations always aimed at spreading maximum fear among the population and ranged from bomb massacres in trains and market squares (Italy), the use of systematic torture of opponents of the regime (Turkey), the support for right-wing coup d’etats (Greece and Turkey), to the smashing of opposition groups (Portugal and Spain).” (p. 2)

Providing a detailed analysis of the stay-behind activities in European countries in his book, he strongly argues that such networks were used as a foreign policy tool, where U.S. and British policy makers believed there was a matter of national interest.
On the other hand, related literature on covert actions indicates that not only Ganser but also other scholars only analyzed the covert actions of governments as a limitation. This is mostly because the majority of the scholarly articles are about U.S. covert operations, as mentioned above. However, Reisman and Baker (1992) stated that:

“Changes in the structure of the international arena have greatly enhanced the ability of non-governmental and non-territorially based actors to use the military and, in some cases, other instruments of strategy transnationally in order to secure their objectives. Many of these activities are, by their nature, covert assassination, sabotage, for example. Governmental responses, whether proactive or reactive, to these activities must often be covert. Operations against narcotics producers and traffickers and organized transnational criminal groups, for example, may be largely conducted covertly. Similarly, operations against independent terrorist groups must sometimes be covert. In circumstances where the non-governmental target is operating within the territory of the state whose own government is ineffective, the success of an operation may preclude cooperation with the host government, if the latter has been infiltrated.” (p.15)

According to these researchers, recent changes in the international system have revealed that non-governmental actors are also utilizing similar tactics either by themselves or in cooperation with states to reach their goals. Therefore, I believe that while analyzing covert operations, only focusing on government actions is a significant limitation that does not fit into today’s social and international texture.
Moreover, in most of the cases detailed above, hidden spoiling activities were not limited to U.S. governmental agencies, instead local opposition groups, media, business entities, and even some governmental agents in the target country were also involved. Accordingly, since hidden spoiling encompasses covert actions, omitting non-governmental actors as a source of hidden spoiling would decrease the efficiency of this type of analysis.

To sum up, the above literature indicates that in today’s globalized world, relations have become highly interdependent. When decision makers of the actors’ (state or non-state) in the political arena believe that there is a threat against their interest, interventions do occur. Although international relations and conflict analysis and resolution literature mostly deals with the interventions that are initiated with peaceful intentions to end a conflict, in certain cases, actors prefer to spoil the peace conditions simply because their calculations show that an ongoing conflict is best for achieving their interest.

The significance of this dissertation concerns this point. I argue that certain conditions create an opportunity for spoilers, but in order to avoid such undesired circumstances as being caught, it is in the best interests of a perpetrator to act as a hidden spoiler. Therefore, I define hidden spoiler as: any actor who is expecting benefit(s) from triggering a new conflict and/or escalating an existing one between certain parties by utilizing a variety of actions with the intent to keep its involvement secret.

Concerning the party, motivation, intention, and tactics dimensions together; this definition brings a whole new concept into the conflict analysis and resolution field.
Since hidden spoiling has the potential to change the dynamics of both peace and conflict situations, it should be analyzed further.

The next chapter covers the stay behind activities that have occurred in Turkey.
The foundations of stay behind activities in Turkey can be traced back to the
Ottoman era. In 1908, Sultan Abdulhamit II, was toppled by the Committee of Union and
Progress (CUP), which comprised young elite military officials who believed that
military intervention was inevitable in order to gain political legitimacy. In 1913, they
established a clandestine organization called “Special Organization” (Teşkilat-ı
Mahsusa) in order to engage ongoing crises. During the First Balkan War, the Special
Organization was used to carry out covert resistance activities against Bulgarians. More
importantly, during the Independence War Special Organization was the focal point of
the Anatolian Resistance in fighting the invaders. (Demiroz & Kapucu, 2012; Gingeras,
2010; Söyler, 2013; Ünver, 2009).

By its very nature, the Special Organization and its activities were located out of
the oversight of political authority (Gingeras, 2010). However, after the foundation of the
Turkish Republic, Ataturk, who already had doubts about such activities, shut down the
Special Organization after an assassination attempt allegedly conveyed by a rogue in the
organization (Söyler, 2013; Ünver, 2009). Later based on an order by Ataturk, the
Chairmanship of National Security (Milli Emniyet Hizmeti Riyaseti) was established as
the official intelligence organization of the new republic, and this became the National
Intelligence Organization (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilati) in 1965 (Ünver, 2009).
Although the Special Organization’s activities were mostly carried out covertly, the emergence of Turkish stay behind organization (army), as in the conceptual meaning mentioned in chapter two, coincided with the establishment of NATO (Grigoriadis & Özer, 2010).

Ganser states that after Gladio was revealed in Italy in 1990, the chief of the Turkish Special Forces officially confirmed the existence of the stay-behind army and said that it was under the command of the Turkish Special Forces and had the task “to organise resistance in case of a communist occupation” (2005b).

Although the official purpose of this army was organizing resistance against a possible Soviet invasion, from the very beginning of its establishment, several plots and killings were attributed to Turkey’s stay behind army (Demiroz & Kapucu, 2012; Grigoriadis & Özer, 2010; Kenes, 2008; O’Neil, 2013; Söyler, 2013). As mentioned in the introduction chapter, organizing the 6-7 September Pogrom was its first known major activity. Accordingly, Ünver says:

“Some of the most important such incidents have been the Taksim Square massacres of 1969 and 1977. The latter massacre saw the killing of 36 trade unionists by unidentified gunmen. In 1978, the Bahçelievler and Kahramanmaraş massacres took place. The Kahramanmaraş massacre saw the killing of 111 Alevis by the secret police. The Başbaşılar massacre of 1993 was another such incident. In addition, stay-behind organizations in Turkey are alleged to have been responsible for the assassinations of numerous journalists and famous public intellectuals including Hrant Dink,UGHur Mumcu, Bahriye Üçok, and Abdi
İpekçi. The military coups of 1971 and, specifically, the 1980 coup have been attributed to the stay-behind networks in Turkey, as the commanding generals of these coups were also active members of the Turkish Counter-guerrilla Branch.” (2009, p. 8)

However, like many others in Europe, its existence and activities remained secret until the declaration of the chief of the Turkish Special Forces. The interventions of the Turkish state behind organization did not end with the 1980 coup though. On 28th of February 1997, Turkey experienced another coup against her elected government. However, unlike other coups in Turkey’s history, this one was called a “post-modern coup” since military intervention galvanized by the organized actions of like-minded media, unions, judiciary, NGOs, politicians, academia, and business chambers (Aydinli, 2011; Demiroz & Kapucu, 2012). Eventually, the so-called Islamist government was forced to step down, and an “acceptable” new government came to power. This coup revealed that stay behind activities in Turkey, mostly relied on the power of the Turkish Armed Forces, but also includes civilian forces, which shared the same worldview and threat perception (Aydinli, 2011).

After the coup, the Turkish Armed Forces began to control Turkish political and social life. Aside from ensuring the application of the directives given in the National Security Council meeting on 28 February 1997, the most prominent of its controlling mechanisms was the West Working Group (Batı Çalışma Grubu) (Orakoğlu, 2007; Yavuz, 2005). Taş says:
“…the army also founded a military unit, the West Working Group (BÇG - Batı Çalışma Grubu), for intelligence, recording and investigation. The unit not only initiated a witch-hunt that terrorized society and labeled many as Islamists or separatists, but also engaged in operational activities as part of its psychological warfare to mobilize the secular sentiments, as exemplified in the sudden appearance of Ajzmendis, a marginal subset of the Nurcu community, and several cinci hoca scandals, especially the story of Ali Kalkancı, who was arrested at the end of 1996 based on the statements of his young female follower Fadime Şahin.” (2014, p. 175)

After the 2002 parliamentary elections, the fear of Islamicization of the state maintained the tension between the Turkish Armed Forces and the elected Justice and Development Party -JDP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi –AKP) government. In 2007, Abdullah Gul was nominated by the AKP to become the next president of Turkey, and elected by the Parliament. However, on 27th April 2007, the Turkish Constitutional Court cancelled the election and on the same night a “coup by memorandum” or “e-coup” was posted on the web site of the Turkish Armed Forced General Stuff giving an ultimatum to overthrow to government in order to protect the secularist foundations of the Turkish Republic (Bardakçi, 2013; Secor, 2011).

Occurrences such as killings, coups, and interventions reveal that for many years, Turkey had not only suffered from violence, but also lacked certain elements of development that provided opportunities for exploitation. This situation in Turkey is well
described by Kenes in his column. He explains the reason behind why Turkey’s citizens live with violence rather than peace. He says:

“Turkey is unfortunately a country characterised by an abundance of mysterious murders, shadowy provocations that foment social, ethnic or religious hatred or conflict, terrorist organisations of all manner of ideological disposition, and bloody attacks staged by these organisations. The regime currently in place in this country is still miles away from being a system of peace based on mutual trust and respect between state and society, but gives the impression of an order of repression that seeks to ensure its survival through fabricated fears and inflated threats.

The argument that the true democracy sought by all segments of society, one entailing greater democratic participation, extended rights and freedoms, would make the country an ungovernable one still has buyers among some influential groups. These groups that assume a self-induced responsibility and duty to maintain the survival of the existing regime believe that the only way to prevent Turkey from becoming "an ungovernable country" is to keep popular demands for democracy and freedoms reined in – a situation that, they argue, can only be ensured by keeping fears and concerns over security and stability alive at all times. As activities to nurture these fears and concerns cannot be undertaken openly, they need underground, shadowy terrorist organisations like ERGENEKON [emphasis added].” (Kenes, 2008, para. 3,4)
3.1) What is Ergenekon?

The most widely accepted view on the structure is:

“ERGENEKON [emphasis added] is the name of an alleged\textsuperscript{15} illegal neonationalist organization accused of planning to oust the pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) government through a military coup. The organization, in turn, has been linked to the so-called ”Deep State,”\textsuperscript{16} alleged to be a vast, underground network of secular Turks plotting criminal acts to destabilize the government.”\textsuperscript{17}

Since it points out AKP government, this definition seems to be related to a current secret organization. However, based on its structure and applied tactics, many scholars (Balci, 2010; Baransu & Opçin, 2012; Cengiz, 2013; Demiroz & Kapucu, 2012; Hale & Ozbudun, 2009; Kaya, 2009; Söyler, 2013; TAŞ, 2014; Ünver, 2009; Uslu, 2010) state that this network is a continuum of the clandestine Turkish stay-behind organization.

Up until to the Operation Ergenekon, this organization succeeded on remaining untouched. Even former Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit said that when he had been

\textsuperscript{15} The word “alleged” rooted from court’s declaration that says “until a verdict has been made, the organization in question must be referred as ‘the alleged Ergenekon terrorist organization.’”(Ünver, 2009)

\textsuperscript{16} The term “deep state” first used by Mahir Kaynak, who was an economy professor, a columnist, and a former member of Turkish National Intelligence Agency. After him, the term “deep state” is widely used by academicians, writers, and columnists to refer Turkish version of stay behind organizations.

\textsuperscript{17} Director of National Intelligence Open Source Center Report on Ergenekon. This is a very detailed summary of the operation. http://www.fas.org/irp/world/turkey/ergenekon.pdf.
informed about this underground organization, he decided to try to pursue it, but then he encountered some serious obstacles, and some of these obstacles were “invisible” ones (Ünver, 2009).

3.2) Operation Ergenekon and Hidden Spoiling

Although the Ergenekon trial process started in June 2007, major evidence of the investigation was obtained from another police operation. In 2001, journalist Tuncay Guney was taken into custody and his house and office were searched. Among the documents that were seized, one entitled “Ergenekon Analysis New Structuring Administration and Development Project 29 October Istanbul-Ergenekon Analysis” provided significant information to support initiating the investigation. As stated in the first indictment, this document is like a constitution of the organization and has been of guidance to the organization after 1999, and the organization has performed its activities according to this document.

Until the first indictment accepted by the 13th High Criminal Court on 25 July 2008, several other documents were seized from the house or office searches of arrested people. These documents cover instructions about how to use a variety of tactics

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18 Director of National Intelligence, Open Source Center Report on Ergenekon.
19 Ergenekon operation, not surprisingly, consists several police operations that produce extensive amount of judicial documents (indictments and evidence folders) that take more than 15 GB of data! Although most of the indictments has been published in full text on several online resources, I have gained “all judicial documents in full text” in order to avoid from a possible perish. I provided only indictment number, because all obtained documents are converted to the PDF format in order to maintain consistency of archiving, which might have affected the original pagination. Therefore, although they are in Turkish, I can provide all documents upon request.
including assassination, utilizing “front terror groups”\textsuperscript{20}, military coups, etc. According to the prosecutor, Ergenekon is structured, and engages in its activities based on these instructional guides.\textsuperscript{21}

Through these waves of operations, seized evidence also revealed several coup plans, such as Moonlight, Blondie, Action Plan to Combat Reactionaryism and Operation Cage Action Plan.\textsuperscript{22}

According to the first indictment:

\begin{quote}
"Organization’s near future objective is to plot acts to weaken country’s administration and to establish a chaos environment to maintain disorder in public safety and its ultimate objective is to maintain consent and legitimacy among the public of an illegal attempt towards the administration with the help of the chaos environment and to overthrow the government and take control of the government."
\end{quote}\textsuperscript{23}

The prosecutors claimed that Ergenekon was a terrorist organization that tried to show itself as a patriotic military-governed organization in order to maintain secrecy and gain public trust for pursuing its member’s interests.

\textsuperscript{20} This term is directly taken from “Ergenekon Analysis” document. It refers to terror groups that have been intentionally established by such stay behind groups both for using them in attacks, and to control existing terror groups that ultimately helps their causes.

\textsuperscript{21} See APPENDIX 2 for organizational Chart of Ergenekon.

\textsuperscript{22} Director of National Intelligence, Open Source Center Report on Ergenekon.

\textsuperscript{23} First indictment summary.

Looking at the incidents and groups that have been linked to the Ergenekon terror organization and contents of the revealed coup plans\textsuperscript{24}, since the ‘50s, it is apparent that a state behind organization and its continuum Ergenekon acted as a hidden spoiler that perfectly aligns with the theoretical descriptions above.

In 1960, their enemy was not the communists but the first democratically elected Prime Minister, who was then, executed by a junta with his two other ministers. The military coup and its actions created extensive domination over every public institution and the citizens of Turkey. At that time, the organization was powerful enough to conduct a military coup by utilizing its members in the Turkish Army, and both the economic and democratic capacity of Turkey was too weak to deal with this organization. In other terms, the existing structure was providing an “opportunity” for them to “spoil”. Creating instability was their major tool in reaching their expected benefits.

Until 1980s they made their plans to initiate either political conflicts (right-left) or sectarian conflicts (sunni-alawi) to divide Turkish society. For example, the killing of 111 citizens in Kahramanmaraş in 1978 not only served them by creating conflicts among the Sunni and the Alawi people, but also provided them with enough opportunity to initiate another coup in 1980, which then ultimately increased their relative power. After 1980, they also added an ethnic conflict (Turk-Kurt) into their agenda. Killings on both sides and PKK attacks\textsuperscript{25} helped them to maintain the “opportunity structure”. In addition to

\textsuperscript{24} It is terrifying that even listing the most significant incidents could take pages. Thus, I will not provide them. However, DNI-OSC report covers many of them.

\textsuperscript{25} There are also evidences that show Ergenekon influence over PKK actions, which matches with the contents of “Ergenekon Analysis” document.
that, the 1990s witnessed killings of journalists, politicians, academics, writers, and prosecutors who were trying to overcome Turkey’s problems by addressing them.

Interestingly, even after several Ergenekon operations, such a structure did not stop planning killings or military coups. In this regard the “Action Plan to Combat Reactionaryism” was prepared in 2009 to manipulate public opinion by “utilizing supporter media structures”. Similarly, Operation Cage Action Plan was prepared to carry out assassinations targeting non-Muslims living in Turkey in order to increase domestic and foreign pressure over AKP government26.

The Ergenekon investigation also became a hot point of controversy, because it was stated that the operation was not a judicial process but rather AKP’s rally against secularist strongholds of country to avenge the 28 February Post-Modern Coup. Moreover, it was an attempt to silence and suppress the opposition (Balci & Jacoby, 2012; Bardakçi, 2013; G. H. Jenkins, 2009; Ünver, 2009).

However, not only many scholars (Aydinli, 2011; Balci & Jacoby, 2012; Bardakçi, 2013; Demiroz & Kapucu, 2012; Söyler, 2013) but also several public polls27 stated that the Ergenekon investigation was successful and it became a milestone in the

26 Director of National Intelligence Open Source Center Report on Ergenekon.
path of Turkey’s democratization efforts through shedding light on the stay behind activities in Turkey.

The next chapter will cover the research framework employed for the analysis of hidden spoilers.
CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter describes the research design, methods and steps that were used in this dissertation. It contains sections on: the research questions, research design, delimitations and limitations, grounds for the case selection, data collection, methods of analysis, and research design quality.

4.1) Research Questions

In addressing the hidden spoiler issue my research question is:

“Which motivations and factors lead hidden spoilers to engage in spoiling (either triggering a new conflict or escalating an ongoing one), which mechanisms (tactics, tools) are utilized in pursuit of their goal (triggering or escalating a conflict), and how does their involvement impact conflict dynamics?”

More specifically,

1. What are the motivations of hidden spoilers?
2. Which factors are related to hidden spoiling behavior?
3. What are the tactics of hidden parties in spoiling?
4. What is the relationship between the motivations, factors, and tactics of hidden spoilers? How do they impact conflicts?
This dissertation utilized qualitative research method. In her widely cited article, Morse outlines the characteristics of qualitative research as follows:

“Characteristics of a qualitative research problem are: (a) the concept is “immature” due to conspicuous lack of theory and previous research; (b) a notion that the available theory may be inaccurate, inappropriate, incorrect, or biased; (c) a need exists to explore and describe the phenomena and to develop theory; or (d) the nature of the phenomenon may not be suited to quantitative measures.” (1991, p. 120)
As discussed above, the lack of previous research on the concept of hidden spoilers not only makes this topic “immature” in that sense, but also creates a necessity to explore and describe it.

Accordingly, Yin (2009) states that the structural formation of the research question(s) is the crucial part of a research design since the type of the questions will determine the type of the study. He posits three general types of research: explanatory, descriptive, and exploratory. Regarding the question-type relationship he states that “what” questions are answered through exploratory research. Therefore, my study was an exploratory study. Moreover, my research was also an analytical one because this study aimed to generate an analytical approach that investigates conflicts through a hidden spoiler lens. In this vein, the type of my research questions I generated also suggested to me the utility of using a qualitative research approach.

Furthermore, Auerbach and Silverstein define qualitative research as follows:

“Qualitative research is research that involves analyzing and interpreting texts and interviews in order to discover meaningful patterns descriptive of a particular phenomenon.” (2003, p. 3)

Here their focus is on the nature of the phenomenon, which is shaped by existing or available data sources.

Therefore, if the data is in forms of text and images, which can originate from observations, interviews or documents, it is qualitative in nature (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Consequently, while examining the hidden spoiler concept almost all available data was qualitative in nature and required interpretive analysis. As a result, the
qualitative method was considered more suitable for this study than the quantitative approach.

When choosing among the different qualitative approaches, the nature of the research is also crucial. Because of the lack of previous research on hidden spoiling, there is a gap in the literature. In other words, considering the concept of hidden spoiling, "the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident" (Yin, 2009, p. 18). Moreover, not only "a large variety of factors and relationships are included", but also "no basic laws exist to determine which factors and relationships are important" (Fidel, 1984, p. 273). To overcome these issues, a case study approach was selected, since it is an "approach that uses in-depth investigation of one or more examples of a current social phenomenon, utilizing a variety of sources of data." (Keddle, 2006, p. 20) To provide a more detailed explanation of such an investigation, a case study is a "detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events" (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 5).

Here, in their definition George and Bennett stress the historical aspect of the case study, and think that historical research and case study research are not exclusively distinct approaches. On the other hand, Yin (2009), while stressing the contemporary aspect of the case study, states that case study and historical research might overlap but actually case study is different because its strength comes from the ability to use multiple sources of evidence like observations and interviews that we cannot use in historical research.

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28 Creswell (2007) presents five types of qualitative approaches: Narrative, Phenomenological, Grounded Theory, Ethnographic, and Case Study.
My selection for the George and Bennet’s definition of case study is deliberate because, in my opinion the research topic is not something necessarily all white or all black in nature. On the contrary, as in this study, it might consists of both historical and contemporary elements, but at the same time it could mostly rely on archival data for certain reasons, and still can be considered as a case study.

Case studies can be single or multiple case studies. Despite its cost, time, and effort related disadvantages, multiple case studies are “useful means of capturing the complexity of a phenomenon while revealing rich understandings about the context in which it is based” (Bishop, 2010, p. 589) through use of replication strategy (Yin, 2009).

Yin (2009) states that replication requires a careful selection of cases that leads to either obtaining similar results, “literal replication”, or contrasting results to confirm or deny explored patterns in other cases, “theoretical replication”.

Thus, in this study I utilized a multiple case study design to gather more substantial support for my research.

The following section will explain the case selection rationale.

4.3) Case Selection

In many situations purposive sampling is more suitable for a case study approach (Oliver, 2006). That is because “[p]urposive sampling allows [a researcher] to choose a case because it illustrates some feature or process in which [he/she is] interested” (Silverman & Marvasti, 2008, p. 166). Accordingly, some cases are selected after some investigation has been done in the relevant literature, and findings indicate that selected cases consist of certain attributes related to the research topic (Berg, 2001).
As discussed in chapter 3, stay-behind activities in Turkey, especially the Ergenekon issue, appear to be perfect examples for the analysis of the hidden spoiler phenomenon. Which means this issue met the required criteria for purposive sampling.

Among several events that are related to stay-behind activities, I selected the following three cases in Turkey’s recent history because they not only resulted in significant changes in Turkey’s socio-political life, but also the existing literature on these events indicates evidence that in each case there were hidden spoiling activities involved.

1. 6-7 September Pogrom

2. 28 February 1998 post-modern military coup: In 1997, the Turkish army issued a statement after the National Security Council meeting saying that the ruling party had become a source of Islamic fundamentalist activities in Turkey. In the following days, the military led a psychological war campaign that forced the elected government to resign which then led to great economic and social instability in the country (Alpay, 2012).

3. Operation Ergenekon (major case)

4.4) Data Collection Strategy

When conducting a case study, evidence can come from various sources (Yin, 2009). On the other hand, the assessment of the nature of the research topic is essential in order to decide which sources will be suitable for the purpose of the research (Fidel, 1984).

29 Already explained in the introduction chapter.
30 Already explained in the chapter three.
Data collection started in March 2011. At that time several trials and investigations related with both the 28 February and Ergenekon cases were still ongoing. Although this “live” situation of selected cases makes data collection procedure harder, many documents became publicly available at that time. Thus, the timespan for data collection process was intentionally extended until mid-June 2013\(^{31}\) to gather more evidence for the data analysis.

I collected my data from archival records through examination of newspapers, internet media, polls, documentaries, official documents and reports about stay-behind activities (D. J. D. Sandole, 2009; Yin, 2009). Publicly accessible sources (books, articles, columns, reports, interviews, memoirs, etc.) provide some information about the “stay-behind” activities in Turkey. To retrieve relevant books and scholarly articles, I conducted catalogue and database keyword searches utilizing both Google Scholar and George Mason University Library web page. All findings were converted to PDF file format.

For newspapers, Internet media\(^{32}\), and magazines, I conducted keyword searches via both Google and relevant websites. Similarly, all findings were converted to PDFs. Moreover, I collected some published interviews and memoirs about my cases and converted them into PDFs.

\(^{31}\) The court accepted the indictment for 28 February Post-modern Coup at an earlier time. Since revealed parts of the indictment refer critical evidences about the case, I have decided to wait until it became public in mid-June 2013.

\(^{32}\) By saying that I mean news aggregator websites like Huffington Post. Such websites not only collect data from various sources but also produce their own, and then publish them.
Furthermore, official documents such as indictments, and parliamentary investigative commission reports were also gathered to provide substantial evidence.

Relevant data was collected from both Turkish and English sources.

Regarding all data sources, I found some items that were not in digital formats. For those, first I scanned them and then converted them to PDFs.

4.5) Data Analysis

To analyze my data I utilized thematic analysis. Thematic analysis is an analytic technique for uncovering important concepts in the collected data (L. Ayres, 2008). It was implemented through carefully examining the archival data in order to create various themes related to the research topic. These themes were generated from patterns that either depict observations or elucidate dimensions of the phenomenon (Boyatzis, 1998).

Thus, thematic analysis begins with reading and examining archival data, then all data is “coded and codes are collected into categories until the categories develop some meaning” (Jones, 2007, p. 4). Ryan and Bernard state that “coding is a heart and soul of whole-text analysis” (2000, p. 780). It represents the interpretations of the researcher about the data he or she is investigating. Such interpretations labeled with a code, which can be defined as:

“A code in qualitative inquiry is most often a word or short phrase that symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or evocative attribute for a portion of language-based or visual data” (Saldaña, 2009, p. 3)

Thus, each portion of the research data, which consisted of the same idea, was coded under same code. Once coding is done, similar codes can be grouped under
categories that lead to themes for developing theory. The figure below shows this process.

![A streamlined codes-to-theory model](image)

**Figure 3. A streamlined codes-to-theory model** (Saldaña, 2009, p. 12)

At this point, two issues arose. First, the question how a bilingual dataset should be analyzed needs to be addressed. In literature on cross-cultural research, discussions are generally focused on the translation issues of interview data (Suh, Kagan, & Strumpf, 2009, p. 195). However, in analyzing text:

“interpretation and understanding meanings are central in qualitative research and text is the ‘vehicle’ with which meaning is ultimately transferred to the reader,
language differences generate additional challenges that might hinder the transfer of meaning and might result in loss of meaning and thus loss of the validity of the qualitative study.” (van Nes, Abma, Jonsson, & Deeg, 2010, p. 314).

Moreover, translation of a large amount of textual data is also expensive and time consuming (Smith, Chen, & Liu, 2008). On the other hand, Temple and Young argue that certain situations can provide opportunities to translation issue:

“The situation where the researcher is fluent in the language of communities *sic* [she] is working with is rare. It offers opportunities in terms of research methods that are not open to other researchers in cross language research.” (2004, p. 168)

Since the author is fluent in both Turkish and English “no language differences were present in the data gathering” (van Nes et al, 2010, p. 314) process of this dissertation. Therefore, in order to grasp the correct meanings of the existing concepts in the data, the analysis was conducted in the original language of each source.

Next, the issue of a coding strategy requires attention. Existing literature (Boyatzis, 1998; Gibbs, 2007; Jones, 2007) suggests three different strategies of coding:

1. Theory referenced coding: Here, the researcher creates a code-list based on his/her own theory.

2. Previous research or literature referenced coding: The concept and ideas that codes reflect can come from earlier studies, relevant literature, and impressions of the researcher.
3. Inductive coding: In some cases there is no existing theory or not enough prior research about the research topic, thus researcher creates codes as he/she reads the data.

To me, choosing a coding strategy is something similar to choosing a research methodology, which depends on the very nature of the research topic. As discussed in the literature chapter, given the definition provided, this dissertation is the first study on hidden spoiling concept. However, relevant literature provides information on certain concepts addressed by the research questions. Therefore, I decided to use a hybrid (2 and 3) strategy of coding for two reasons. First, a start list of codes based on relevant literature is useful in grasping the essential concepts of my research. Second, this could be changed and developed during the data analysis procedure in order to reflect important, but unaddressed concepts that corresponded with the research questions.

Accordingly, during the coding process each code needed to be defined clearly so that it would not lead to confusions that would ultimately place the quality of the research in question. In order to avoid such an issue, it was crucial to prepare a codebook that contained clear definitions of the codes (Boyatzis, 1998; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Guest, MacQueen, & Namey, 2011; Mills, Durepos, & Wiebe, 2010; G. W Ryan & Bernard, 2000; Saldaña, 2009). Consequently, the codebook used in this research is shown in Appendix 3. Moreover, codebooks for the attributes are also provided in the following appendixes.
The coding task is followed by looking for the patterns through analyzing the codes and focusing on these to examine existing relations among them. Using a jigsaw puzzle analogy Schensul described this process as follows:

“[It] is something like the middle stages of assembling a jigsaw puzzle; once the player has found all of the orange pieces and all of the blue pieces, for example, or all of the pieces with a particular pattern on them, he or she then can begin to assemble those pieces into a coherent chunk of the design portrayed in the completed puzzle. Furthermore, the player can begin to see how the orange chunks are related to the blue chunks, or where they fit into the overall picture.”

(1999, p. 97,98)

Patterns can be identified by seeking similarities, differences, frequencies/repetitions, sequences, causation, co-occurrence/correspondence, omissions, declarations, corroborations (LeCompte, 2000; Le Compte & Schensul, 1999; G. W Ryan & Bernard, 2000; Saldaña, 2009).

After selecting the coding strategy, and determining the characteristics of the patterns, the third step of thematic analysis is to decide on how to perform the coding and find patterns in the data.

In concordance with the given information in this chapter, performing thematic analysis requires careful examination of a vast amount of data. Moreover, it also needs management of texts in data, codes, and notes. Considering these aspects, thematic analysis is complex enough not to conduct with manual coding. Therefore, use of special software (QDA-Qualitative Data Analysis Software), which meets the requirement of
such a qualitative research, is crucial (Boyatzis, 1998; Gibbs, 2007; Guest et al., 2011; Richards, 2006).

In general, there are three types of QDA software on the market. Some can only retrieve text; others can both retrieve text and apply codes. The last group allows users to retrieve text, code data, and build theory (Jones, 2007). Among the last group ATLAS.ti, MAXQDA, and NVIVO have become popular in recent years. (Creswell, 2007; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Gibbs, 2007; Gibson & Brown, 2009; Guest et al., 2011; Jupp, 2006; Krippendorff, 2012; Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2007; Namey, Guest, Thairy, & Johnson, 2007; Gery W Ryan & Bernard, 2003; Saldaña, 2009; Yin, 2009)

After some preliminary research about their capabilities and design, I bought MAXQDA 10. However, I had no clue how to use MAXQDA. After spending considerable time, as many other researchers did (Jones, 2007), in reading the user manual and practicing on a sample project, I have realized that MAXQDA 10 has significant limitations in its analytical and visualization engines. Those limitations were important since they did not allow me to apply my data analysis design into MAXQDA. Therefore, I decided to stop working with MAXQDA.

Then, I decided to purchase NVivo 9, later upgraded to the latest version NVivo 10. Similarly, I spent significant time with user manual and sample project to learn how

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33 I also spent some effort to overcome those limitations. I sent a detailed (explaining the limitations and their significance in cross-case qualitative designs) support letter to customer support of MAXQDA. In addition to that, I posted on support forum (http://www.maxqda.com/support/forum/viewtopic.php?f=7&t=470&sid=89c73bad84e4f7e11c6526c9e8c4f14b) of MAXQDA. While describing the issue I asked developers to make changes to the program. However, after two months of communication, it turned out that my efforts were futile.
to use Nvivo and implement my analysis design into it. Not surprisingly, I have discovered some issues\textsuperscript{34} in Nvivo too. However, these did not constitute crucial issues that prevented me from implementing my data analysis design.

On the other hand, Nvivo has several useful tools that facilitate thematic analysis. Text and coding management interfaces allow user to import data, put them under groups if desired, establish dynamic hierarchical node\textsuperscript{35} trees, and create dynamic groups of different items in the project. Coding queries and matrix coding queries allow user to discover concepts, relations, and intersections among them. Moreover, relationship nodes can be used to label any type of relations between the concepts of the data with option to indicate direction. Visualization tools like charts, tree maps, graphs, and cluster analysis can be used both for exploring concepts or displaying the relations among them. Finally, with models user can create static or dynamic models for emerging ideas or theories (Hutchison, Johnston, & Breckon, 2010).

As a result I applied my data analysis into Nvivo as follows. First, I imported all data under a folder with a relevant case name. Secondly, I created an initial node structure with the code list that I developed based on the literature and research questions. At this point, it became clear that some nodes were relevant to each other as they represented information in answering certain research question. For example, nodes that represented information about the question about which tactics are utilized by hidden


\textsuperscript{35} Node is the term for code in Nvivo.
spoilers are grouped hierarchically under a “Tactics” node, which is a theme node. Thus, other nodes were also grouped hierarchically under the following theme nodes as child nodes for each corresponding research question: motivations, factors, and conflict.

In this structure, the Motivations theme node represented the sum of different types of motivations that drive certain actors to act as a hidden spoiler. As mentioned above the Cold War Era covert activities of the U.S. stood on the justification logic of a communist threat. This phenomenon had two folds of threat perception: security and ideological. The Cuban Crisis was a clear demonstration of a security threat. However, aside from this military natured conflict, Soviet activities in South American countries were also perceived as threats to American ideology, political influence and even economic interests (Callanan, 2009; Nutter, 2000). Thus, the Threat Perception category (parent) node was created under the Motivations theme node with the following first level (child) nodes: Ideological Threat Perception (TP-Ideological), Political Threat Perception (TP-Political), Financial Threat Perception (TP-Financial), and Security Threat Perception (TP-Security).

Moreover, the agenda of covert activities was not limited to threat perception. Existing literature provides evidence that U.S. support for Britain to overthrow Iranian Government in 1953 was not based on the threat perception. However, the U.S. increased its political influence over Britain and gained economical revenues from Iranian oil companies (Kinzer, 2003; Perry, 2009). Accordingly, a Power Maximization category (parent) node was created under the Motivations theme node with the following first level (child) nodes: Political Power Maximization (PM-Political), Ideological Power
Maximization (PM-Ideological), Economical Power Maximization (PM-Financial), and Opportunistic Power Maximization (PM-Opportunist).

Factors theme node represents the sum of structural circumstances where hidden spoiling occurs. These factors create an environment that facilitates the activities of hidden spoilers. Based on the literature, the following two first level (child) nodes were created under the Factors theme node: Financial Instability (Financial Instability), Political Instability (Political Instability). Moreover two category (parent) nodes were created under the Factors theme node: Tensions (Tensions), and Lack of Democratic Institutions. However, the Tensions category (parent) node contained the following two sub-parent nodes: Case Related and General. Accordingly, Case Related sub-parent node contains following first level (child) nodes: Case Related Economical Tension (CS-Economical), Case Related Ethnic Tension (CS-Ethnic), Case Related Foreign Policy Tension (CS-Foreign Policy), Case Related Ideological Tension (CS-Ideological). Also, General sub-parent node contains following first level (child) nodes: General Economical Tension (G-Economic), General Ethnic Tension (G-Ethnic), and General Ideological Tension (G-Ideological). Moreover, the Lack of Democratic Institutions category (parent) node contained the following first level (child) nodes: Freedom of the Press (Freedom of the Press), Issues with Accountability (Issues with Accountability), Issues with Human Rights (Issues with Human Rights), and Issues with Military Dominance (Issues with Military Dominance).

The “Tactics” theme node represented the sum of different tactics that were planned and/or had applied actions or strategies for carrying out hidden spoiling activity.
Moreover, the literature shows that some tactics are not always directly applied to for purposes of hidden spoiling. On the contrary, they have to be carried out in a sense that like they are orchestrated by certain actor(s) so that real actors (in this case hidden spoilers) could reach their goals. As mentioned before, these types of activities are called as false flag activities. Thus, the following category (parent) nodes were created for tactics and included a false flag dimension: Arson (Arson), Assassination (Assassination), Assault (Assault), Incitement (Incitement), Mafia (Mafia), and Terrorist (Terrorist). These category (parent) nodes contained both direct and false flag nodes: Arson (AR-Direct/AR-False Flag), Assassination (A-Direct/A-False Flag), Assault (S-Direct/S-False Flag), Incitement (I-Direct/I-False Flag), Mafia (M-Direct/M-False Flag), Terrorist (T-Direct/T-False Flag).

Moreover, since propaganda can occur in various forms, the Propaganda sub-theme node contained following nodes: White Propaganda (P-White), Gray Propaganda (P-Gray), and Black Propaganda (P-Black).

Then, the following first level (child) nodes were created under the “Tactics” theme node: Accusation (Accusation), Blackmail (Blackmail), Coup d'état (Coup), Cover-up (Cover Up), Covert Operation (Covert Op), Ignorance (Ignorance), Manipulation (Manipulation), Plot (Plot), Plunder (Plunder), Pogrom (Pogrom), Riot (Riot), Support (Support), Threat (Threat), Vandalism (Vandalism).

Finally, the Conflict theme node represented the sum of either a new conflict that was generated by hidden spoilers or an existing conflict, which was engaged in by hidden spoilers to reach their goals. Two category (parent) nodes were created under the Conflict
theme node: Non-Violent (Non-violent), and Violent (Violent) nodes. The Non-violent category node included the following first level (child) nodes: Economical Issues (Economic), Judicial Violations (Judicial), and Social Issues (Social). Moreover, the Violent category (parent) node has following sub-parent nodes: Injury (Injury), Property damage (Property), and Death (Death). These sub-parent nodes contained first level (child) nodes that represented the scale: Injury (I-Individual/I-Mass), Death (D-Individual/D-Mass), and Property (P-Small/P-Large).

Last, but not the least, descriptive case nodes were created under each specifically named case in order to be able to define the scope of queries during the analysis.

After that, I created a source classification for adding attributes for each imported item so I could provide descriptive information about the data sources. To indicate which type of data (newspaper, internet media, report, official document, etc.) was imported, an “item type” attribute is created. As mentioned before, all data was converted to PDFs. However, a “file type” attribute was created to show whether the original source was a PDF or an image form. Also, a “language” attribute is created to show the language of the source. Finally, a “case name” attribute was created to assign each source to its relevant case.

Third, all data was coded under initial codes and attributes. However, during the coding process new codes and attributes were also added and applied to the data when needed. In this process, coding of information about hidden spoiling appeared to be problematic.
Nvivo, similar to how its competitors like MAXQDA and ATLAS.ti are structured, is mostly designed based on the idea of analyzing qualitative data that comes from interviews or surveys. In such situations, each file contains interview or survey responses of different person or group. Therefore each file represents a different case. In order to add demographic information for each case, Nvivo suggests to code each file with its corresponding case name which can be the name of the person or the group, and then create a node classification to assign an attribute for demographic information such as age, sex, or education.

On the other hand, in my research, each case consisted of several files that were relevant to the same topic. Moreover, some of those files contained information about different hidden spoiling activities and different aspects of these that needed to be assigned with matching values. That means each hidden spoiling activity had its own subject that was affected by its actor who had a role in that hidden spoiling process to create an effect on a specific target, but also carried an identity, and some sort of affiliation.

For that reason it was not possible to use the same node for each case, since a node can only be assigned with one set of values within a classification. To overcome this problem, each hidden spoiling activity was coded with a different alphanumerical node, and then assigned to a node classification named “aspects” which contained the following attributes to provide information about the above mentioned aspects: subject, subject’s centrality, actor, actor’s centrality, actor’s orientation, target, and case name.
After the coding process was completed a within case analysis was done for each case to explore the dynamics of hidden spoiling as regards the research questions. Then, a cross case analysis was carried out across three cases to examine whether they presented certain patterns in answering the research questions posed in this dissertation.

At first, a source descriptive was provided to display the characteristics of the data by utilizing an Excel pie chart. The chart tool allows users to display sources by combining two source attributes with desired values. Thus, item type attribute and page counts\(^{36}\) with all values were combined to show how many pages of each item existed in that case.

Then, for the first research question, the tree map tool\(^{37}\) was utilized to display all nodes under the motivations theme node since this is designed to show hierarchical data in the form of nested rectangles of varying sizes. Here, the hierarchical node structure was toggled into an aggregated mode. In an aggregated mode theme and category nodes (parent nodes) consist data coded directly by these nodes, and data coded by their first-level child nodes. Although it is possible to code data with parent nodes, in this dissertation data was coded only at the first-level child nodes since a category node is just for grouping relevant nodes that fall into same concept. Thus, when one wants to display data for a certain category node, the aggregation mode is turned on to combine all data in

\(^{36}\) Page counts are calculated manually, since Nvivo does not have the capability of showing total page counts of multiple project items.

\(^{37}\) From now on definitions about Nvivo program tools are adapted from its online help file which can be reached through: http://webhelp-nv10.qsrinternational.com/nv10_help.htm
its child nodes. Such a strategy is also useful in preventing confusion, when displaying the results.

In the tree map display, the first level (child) node boxes was placed in their categorical (parent) node box. The size of each rectangular box represented the number of the coding references, and the color of the box displayed the spectrum from the lowest to highest values. Therefore, by creating a tree map it was possible to display which type of motivation played a role in engaging parties to be involved in hidden spoiling in each case and across the cases. The largest box in the tree map shows the most utilized motivational node, which is displayed in a darker red color within the red-yellow-blue spectrum. This process was repeated for the second and third research questions to discover related factors and tactics. However, tactics were only analyzed at the first level of coding since the categorical nodes under the tactics theme node were used simply for grouping different types of same activity like black, gray, and white propaganda.

However, the last research question required multiple analyses to explore the relationship among the above aspects of hidden spoiling and their impact on conflict types. In Nvivo, the matrix-coding query tool is used for such complex analyses since it is designed for discovering patterns among the various items in the data. Accordingly, as a first step, I ran a matrix-coding query comparing the first level (child) factor and motivation nodes to determine whether a pattern existed between them or not. This query searches case content, and tries o find out co-occurrences of defined nodes. In doing so it displays which factors and motivations coincide by providing number of coding references for each node. High numbers mean that it is more common to see that
combination of both aspects of hidden spoiling together. Obviously, there are several co-occurrences displayed on the chart, but for the purpose of this research I decided to pick the five combinations that had the highest number of references. To visualize this query a radar chart was created with combinations marked since it provides a better display of higher values. The anchor that was closest to the edge of the radar web had the highest data value. Although, it is possible to display all data values, only the top five values are displayed to prevent confusion. Then, I re-ran a matrix-coding query using only these top combinations, and saved the results as a node matrix to combine the data in these so that this could be used as a node in further analysis.

The next step involved running a matrix-coding query by placing a factor-motivation node matrix on the row and tactic nodes on the column of the query window in order to display which tactics were mostly utilized when those top combinations were existed. Again, combinations that consisted of the highest number of references represented the most used tactics by the hidden spoilers and where the most common factors and motivations overlapped. While creating the chart, combinations that had a data value of equal to zero were omitted to provide a cleaner display. Similarly, I picked the five most used tactic nodes from the results.

Another part of the last question focused on the relationship between the aspects and conflict type. More clearly, it sought to reveal which type of conflict was most likely to occur when the above mentioned combinations existed. First, I ran a matrix-coding query with the most common factor-motivation combinations on the row entry and the

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38 In such queries same frequencies counted as one.
conflict nodes on the column entry. Second, I repeated the matrix-coding query but this time the top five common tactic nodes were entered on the row entry and the conflict nodes on the column. These results indicated which type of conflict was likely to occur when certain situational aspects existed.

Moreover, a complementary analysis was conducted to explore the relationship between the dynamics and the demographics of hidden spoiling. This analysis revealed information about questions such as “which tactics are used by certain types of actor in hidden spoiling” or “under which factors certain individuals (or groups) became subjects of a hidden spoiling activity”. Since my dissertation aimed to contribute to the studies of early warning mechanisms and analytical frameworks, such information was crucial in providing a list of issues of prime concern for both. Therefore, I ran matrix-coding queries between the above theme nodes and the attributes of hidden spoiling.

4.6) Research Design Quality or Validity and Reliability

In general, validity refers to goodness or quality of the research. A research design is considered valid if it really measures what it meant. Reliability on the other hand, refers to dependability, consistency, and repeatability of a research design (Miller, 2010). If a research study is conducted again by following exactly the same procedures described in that research design, and produces the same findings then reliability can be claimed (Jupp, 2006; King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994; Krippendorff, 2012).

In case study research validity and reliability can be established by applying certain tests to the research design (Yin, 2009). Quoting Kidder and Judd (1986, pp. 26–29) Yin suggests four tests:
“1) Construct validity: identifying correct operational measures for the concepts being studied.
2) Internal validity (for explanatory or causal studies only and not for descriptive or exploratory studies): seeking to establish a causal relationship, whereby certain conditions are believed to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from spurious relationships
3) External validity: defining the domain to which a study’s findings can be generalized
4) Reliability: demonstrating that the operations of a study—such as the data collection procedures—can be repeated, with the same results” (2009, p. 40).

Before applying these tests, one thing should be mentioned. “Each qualitative research project is unique and cumulative in nature” (Saldaña, 2009, p. 38). Which means, “there is no single set of categories waiting to be discovered. There are as many ways of ‘seeing’ the data as one can invent” (Dey, 1993, p. 117). Thus, “there is no ultimate demonstration of validity” (Bernard & Ryan, 2009, p. 71).

However, in order to establish construct validity numerous scholars suggest triangulation (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Berg, 2001; Eisenhardt, 1989; Guest et al., 2011; Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2007; Morse, 1991; Noor, 2008). This refers to using multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 2009).

Considering the nature of the hidden spoiling and the thematic analysis design, data triangulation (that is collecting data from various sources) was specifically targeted in this dissertation. As discussed under the data collection strategies, the scope of data
source is maintained quite wide in an effort to establish data triangulation. The rationale for the absence of methodological triangulation is discussed under the section on limitations.

For external validity, Yin argues that case studies are intended to achieve analytical generalization, by building theories from particular results. However, to make such a generalization, findings should be replicated in more cases. Thus, multiple case designs are useful in building external validity (2009, p. 43, 44). Consequently, this dissertation utilized a multiple-case study design to build external validity.

In order to repeat a research protocol for testing reliability, one should know which procedures were followed and have access to same data source(s). However, for this dissertation, the nature of the research topic heightened the risk of losing access to some of the sources. Therefore, all gathered data were stored in “a case study database” as Yin suggested (2009, pp. 118–122). Moreover, an online backup system for the database was created to avoid possible hardware issues. Accordingly, in the research methodology chapter, followed the research procedures are explained in detail so that reliability can be claimed.

**4.7) Strengths**

As seen in Figure-1 above, the aim of my dissertation was to explore the dynamics of the hidden spoiling phenomenon. Thus, this research was not designed to reveal the identity of the hidden spoiler(s), knowing the fact that this would not be possible in certain cases because of the nature of the phenomenon. However, focusing on
the aspects of hidden spoiling instead of the identity of the hidden spoiler is not something less important in contributing to the conflict analysis and resolution field.

Because, as the first study on the hidden spoiler concept, this dissertation can still provide a better understanding of conflict dynamics by examining an aspect ignored by major analytical frameworks in the conflict analysis and resolution field. By doing that it also furnishes conflict analysis and resolution scholars and practitioners with a more holistic knowledge of conflicts which will not only help them to develop more useful intervention strategies for existing conflicts, but will also help them to establish an early warning and prevention mechanism for possible future hidden spoiling activities.

4.8) Limitations

This research also has following limitations.

Lee (1993) posits that, if findings of a research study have the potential of posing a significant threat to those involved in it can be considered as "sensitive research". This threat could occur at several instances including dealing with highly sensitive political and private areas that might involve certain interests, the possibility of revealing information that might endanger the either the subjects or the researcher. In such situations, threats could occur in different forms such as “a physical threat”, "a political threat", and "threat of sanction".

Looking at the relevant literature, it is clear that activities that fall into the hidden spoiler concept are highly sensitive and political because this sort of activity, is mostly considered as a matter of national security regardless of who is behind it or who is the target, and perpetrators could be subjected to investigation or even imprisonment.
These dynamics lead to limitations in two ways. First, the data collection strategy is affected. Although interview is a widely recognized, powerful and effective approach to data collection, because of the possible threats that could arise with this method, it was not considered an appropriate strategy for my dissertation. Besides, my professional position as a police major also intensified the interview related issues.

Secondly, except for a few well-documented cases like those in Guatemala and Iran, access to relevant data of hidden spoiling activities is limited. This issue becomes even more challenging when data belongs to other countries. Thus, I chose to study the history of stay-behind organizations in Turkey by focusing on the Ergenekon terror organization as my major case in an effort to overcome this type of data access limitation. However, the collected data remained limited to either publicly accessible sources or unclassified archival texts, and the majority of both datasets arise from secondary sources.

There are three other limitations that exist in this study regarding the validity of research design. First, although this dissertation is an exploratory multiple-case design, Owen argues that “one cannot test an argument on the very cases from which it was derived. Such a test would be biased in favor of the argument” (1994, p. 104). Accordingly, purposive sampling is applied based on the availability and representativeness of hidden spoiling concept. Thus, claiming external validity (generalizability) is questionable.

Second, even a codebook is created to support construct validity, coding (thematic analysis) relies on the interpretation of data by the researcher. Adding to this is the
bilingual nature of the data, and it is possible others may not agree on the interpretations that I made during the code creation and data coding processes. However, in order to maintain objectivity I analyzed alternative interpretations and made notes to reflect to reflect these in my interpretations.

The third limitation concerns the data analysis software. QSR International\textsuperscript{39} claims that Nvivo 10 can handle 10 GB data of all kind, text, audio, and video. However, as the project size increased, the coding and analysis processes became slower which caused software crashes. Thus, even though I had collected some video data (political discussion programs, documentaries, etc.), I had to rule these out to maintain software consistency.

\textsuperscript{39} QSR International is the developer of Nvivo.
CHAPTER 5 DATA ANALYSIS

This chapter analyzes the research data. First, descriptive information of the research data is presented. Second, each case is analyzed to explore factors, motivations, tactics, and relations among the dynamics and conflicts. Moreover, the demographics of hidden spoilers is analyzed regarding factors, motivations, tactics, and conflicts. Finally, a cross case analysis was carried out to explore patterns over cases. Computer assisted qualitative data analysis software Nvivo10™ was utilized for all qualitative analyses conducted in this dissertation.
5.1) Description of the Research Data

Figure 4 indicates that most of the research data comes from Turkish indictments, which is followed by newspapers and Internet media. As discussed before, literature suggests that access to information regarding hidden spoiling activities is quite limited.
However, if a contemporary hidden spoiling issue comes to the surface, as we can see in Ergenekon and the 28 February investigations and trials, this can draw significant attention from the newspapers and Internet media.

Although these two cases created awareness and heightened attention about hidden spoiling activities, the 6-7 September Pogrom case appears to have quite a few resources. This is mainly because of its historical nature. It happened nearly sixty years ago and there are very few academic or journalistic studies with some court minutes available to access.

5.2) 6-7 September Pogrom Case

5.2.1) Case Descriptive

Below figure 5 displays the 6-7 September Pogrom case data based on source language and type. It indicates that the majority of the data comes from Turkish books and English (academic) journals following by Turkish newspapers.
5.2.2) Motivations

Figure 6 displays the motivational nodes in aggregated form. Nvivo does not have the ability to display values of categories in its tree map tool. Thus, the value of each node (reference count) is added manually on the picture. Moreover, the percentage value is calculated by dividing each node’s reference count value by the total number of references coded under motivational nodes\(^40\). Sizes of the rectangles demonstrate that power maximization 137 (56.7 %) plays greater role than threat perception 105 (43.3 %). In detail, opportunist power maximization 53 (21.9 %) is the highest motivation in engaging hidden spoiling followed by ideological power maximization 50 (20.7 %) and

\(^{40}\) Same methodology is applied in all figures below.
ideological threat perception 48 (19.8 %). However, percentages indicate no significant difference among the different power maximization motivations.

Figure 6. Motivations compared by number of coding references

5.2.3) Factors

Figure 7 shows factors that exist when hidden spoiling occurs. Tensions 173 (60.5 %) and lack of democratic institutions 98 (34.3 %) are the most commonly seen factors in hidden spoiling. They are followed by political instability 9 (3.1 %), and financial
instability 6 (2.1 %). Regarding the first level codes, the top three factors were: case related ethnic conflict 62 (21.7 %), issues with accountability 39 (13.7 %), and freedom of the press 27 (9.4 %).

Figure 7. Factors compared by number of coding references

5.2.4) Tactics

Tactics of hidden spoilers in the 6-7 September Pogrom are presented in figure 8. Vandalism 62 (14.9 %) is the most applied tactic, as expected in such an event. Plunder 46 (11.1 %), gray propaganda 39 (9.4 %), direct incitement 31 (7.5 %), covert operation 29 (7 %), pogrom 29 (7 %), white propaganda 28 (6.7 %), and false flag assault 27 (6.5 %) are other most frequently utilized tactics.
5.2.5) Relationships

5.2.5.1) Factors and Motivations

Figure 9 displays the factor-motivation matrix. In concordance with the results seen in figure 7, the top combinations occur mostly around case related ethnic factors. Here case related ethnic conflicts and ideological power maximization have the highest (77) number of co-occurrences, which means that in an ethnic conflict environment hidden spoilers are mostly motivated by ideological power maximization intentions. In such an environment opportunist power maximization (72), ideological threat perception (72), and security threat perception (59) are other common intentions.
Next common factor was the issues with accountability. Combinations here occurred as a result of two factors: opportunistic power maximization (69), and ideological threat perception (60). Thus, in situations where the political system suffers from the absence of accountability, hidden spoilers perceive this as an opportunity to increase their power. In addition to that they can also feel ideologically threatened, and act accordingly on this premise.

![Factors and Motivations Matrix](image)

**Figure 9. Factors and Motivations Matrix**

### 5.2.5.2) Top Factors-Motivations and Tactics

Figure 10 shows the tactics of hidden spoilers in situations where top factor-motivations exist. Vandalism 149 (9.3 %) is the most used tactic, which is followed by
plunder 130 (8.1 %), direct-incitement 118 (7.4 %), covert operation 115 (7.2 %), and gray propaganda 104 (6.5 %).

5.2.5.3) Top Factor-Motivations and Conflict

Figure 11 displays which type of conflict is likely to occur when top factors-motivations exist. The most common are large-scale property damage 118 (20.5 %), which is followed by injuries on a massive scale 105 (17.6 %), deaths on an individual scale 99 (17.4 %), and economic issues 76 (13.4 %).
Figure 11. Top Factor-Motivation and Conflict Matrix
5.2.5.4) Top Tactics and Conflict

Figure 12 shows the relationship between the most utilized spoiler tactics and conflict. All five tactics were found highly related to large-scale property damage. Moreover, vandalism appeared to be correlated with different types of conflict at higher frequencies. The main co-occurrences observed as follows: vandalism-large scale property damage (57), vandalism-economic pressure (51), gray propaganda-large scale property damage (52), covert operation-large scale property damage (53), vandalism-social pressure (50), vandalism-deaths at individual level (50), direct incitement-large scale property damage (49), and vandalism-injuries at massive scale (50).
5.2.6) Hidden Spoiling

5.2.6.1) Actors of Hidden Spoiling

Figure 13-1. Actors of 6-7 September Pogrom
According to figure 13.1, government (25%) was the leading actor of hidden spoiling activities in the 6-7 September Pogrom. However, para-military (18%), media (16%), intelligence agency (9%), and legal organization/ngo (8%) appeared to serve as significant actors.

Figure 13.2 highlights the fact that issues with accountability, case related ideological tension, and general ideological tension are factors that influence the government to engage more actively in hidden spoiling activities. Media, on the other hand, mostly play a role in hidden spoiling activities especially where case related ethnic tension, and issues with freedom of the press exist. Para-military forces show a similar inclination in situations where issues with accountability, issues with military dominance,
and case related ethnic conflict exist. Issues with accountability and case related ethnic tension also act as facilitators of engaging hidden spoiling for legal organizations and intelligence agencies.

Regarding motivations, figure 13.3 shows that ideological power maximization, opportunist power maximization, and ideological threat perception play a higher role in motivating government to commit hidden spoiling activities. Media mostly acts on opportunist power maximization and ideological threat perceptions. When it comes to Para-military security threat perception is the strongest motivation, followed by ideological power maximization, and opportunist power maximization. These last two motivations are also valid for legal organization. However, case data does not provide significant evidence about the motivations of intelligence agencies.

![Motivations and Actors of Hidden Spoilers](image)

**Figure 13-3. Motivations and Actors of Hidden Spoiling**
Figure 13.4 represents the tactical preferences of different types of actors that took part in the 6-7 September Pogrom. Data indicates that government mostly utilizes direct incitement and white propaganda in its hidden spoiling activities. Media, as expected, massively used gray propaganda with some direct incitement and accusations. Para-military forces choose covert operation and vandalism. Intelligence agencies conduct covert operations and false flag assaults. Data demonstrates little support concerning the tactics of legal organization.
5.2.6.2) Actor’s Orientation

In figure 14 the case data indicated that a large portion (57 %) of the hidden spoiling activities are conducted by state actors. Non-state actors (19%) are the second most common actors. However, 18 % of the actors remained unknown in the 6-7 September Pogrom.

![Figure 14. Actor’s Orientation of Hidden Spoilers](image)

5.2.6.3) Actor’s Centrality

Figure 15 shows that in the 6-7 September Pogrom, 83 % of the actors were at the core of the hidden spoiling activity, which means they knew what they were doing. 15 % of them were somewhat linked to the hidden spoiling but either they did not know they are in a hidden spoiling activity or data indicates no further information about their
commitment. However, a small portion (2%) of the actor’s centrality (commitment) remained unknown since the data did not yield indicates any information on that issue.

5.2.6.4) Subjects of the 6-7 September Pogrom

As seen in figure 16-1, in this case, hidden spoilers applied their tactics mostly (50%) on minority groups. Other citizens took the second place (18%). Hidden spoilers also aimed at sensitive targets (14%) that had sentimental value for a certain group of citizens or the whole group. Political or ideological opponents (10%) and government (5%) were the other most common subjects of hidden spoiling activities.

Figure 15. Actor’s Centrality of Hidden Spoilers
Below, figure 16-2 indicates that case related ethnic tension, and issues with accountability are the most common factors that create an environment for hidden spoilers to aim at minority groups. Case related ideological tensions, and issues with military dominance are other significant factors regarding the media. Freedom of the press, and issues with accountability appear as influencing factors where citizens became the subject of hidden spoiling. Hidden spoilers choose sensitive targets where case related ethnic tension, and issues with accountability exist. Issues with accountability, case related ideological tensions, and general ideological tensions facilitate hidden spoilers to act against their political or ideological opponents. Government, on the other hand, became the subject of a hidden spoiling in cases of case related foreign policy tension.
Figure 16-2. Factors and Subjects of Hidden Spoiling

Data in figure 16-3 indicates that hidden spoilers massively utilize covert operations, and vandalism over minority groups. Plunder, direct incitement, pogroms, and gray propaganda are also other significant tactics of hidden spoilers against minority groups. Citizens mostly become the victims of gray propaganda. However, direct incitement and false flag assault are also exercised over them. Sensitive targets are mostly affected by false flag assaults and gray propaganda. False flag incitement is the most utilized tactic over political or ideological opponents, which is followed by white propaganda. Hidden spoilers prefer manipulative tactics over government, and this is supported by accusation and white propaganda.
Figure 16-3. Tactics and Subject of Hidden Spoiling

5.2.6.5) Subject’s Centrality of Hidden Spoiling

Figure 17-1 indicates that most (90%) of the subjects appeared to be victims of the hidden spoiling activity. However, 6% of the subjects were somehow linked to the hidden spoiling activity, but either they did not know about their involvement or data indicates no further information about their commitment. On the other hand, 3% of the subjects were involved at the core of the hidden spoiling activity. This shows that in certain situations, hidden spoilers could victimize their colleagues for certain motivational reasons. The next section will present the analysis of these reasons.

5.2.6.6) Motivations and Subject’s Centrality

Data in Figure 17-2 displays the variations in the subject’s centrality as regards different motivational factors. Subjects appeared as victims mostly where hidden spoilers
were motivated by ideological power maximization, political power maximization, and ideological threat perception. However, hidden spoilers victimized their own colleagues when they were perceived political threats, or pursued political and/or opportunist power maximization. On the other hand the data do not show a significant relationship between these motivations and the linked subjects.

Figure 17-1. Subject’s Centrality of Hidden Spoiling
5.2.6.7) Targets of the Hidden Spoilers

Below figure 18 shows that in the 6-7 September Pogrom, actors that were engaged in hidden spoiling activities mostly sought to create an effect on the public (mass 86%). Elites (8%) were targeted slightly more than individual (6%) targets. This preference might be intentional because of an elite’s relative power over the general population in creating certain changes.
5.3) 28 February Post-modern Coup Case

5.3.1) Case Descriptive

Below, figure 19 displays the 28 February case data based on source language and type. It indicates that majority of the data came from Turkish indictments, which is followed by Turkish newspapers and Internet media. Among the English sources, journals constituted the highest volume.
5.3.2) Motivations

Figure 20 displays the motivational nodes in aggregated form. Sizes of the rectangles show that threat perception 436 (74.8 %) plays a greater role than power maximization 147 (25.2 %). In detail, political threat perception with a score of 308 (52.8 %) provided the highest motivation for engaging in hidden spoiling, followed by security threat perception 51 (8.7 %) and financial power maximization 50 (8.6 %).
5.3.3) Factors

Figure 20. Motivations compared by number of coding references

Figure 21 shows factors that exist when hidden spoiling occurs. The lack of democratic institutions 1330 (90.4 %) is the most commonly seen factor in hidden spoiling. On the other hand tensions continues only in a limited way of 142 (9.6 %) as a factor that leads or facilitates hidden spoiling. Regarding the first level (child) nodes, issues with military dominance were account for 514 (34.9 %) of the factors. For such a case, which is called a “post-modern military coup”, this high value for military dominance explains how the military could be able to intervene in the political arena. Moreover, values for freedom of the press of 196 (13.3 %), and issues regarding civil society of 153 (10.4 %) show that when a society lacks free media and properly functioning civil society, it is possible to find these actors involved in hidden spoiling.
The 136 (9.2 %) value of issues with accountability indicates that military, media, and civil organizations do not hesitate in engaging hidden spoiling since they have no or little fear of retribution.

**Figure 21. Factors compared by number of coding references**

5.3.4) Tactics

The tactics of hidden spoilers in the 28 February case are presented in figure 22. Accusation 321 (17.2 %) is the most frequently applied tactic. The intense use of accusation in the 28 February case shows itself as blaming government for pursuing a secret agenda to establish an Islamic state. Moreover, many religious people were blacklisted because of their so-called affiliation to government or its agenda. Thus, these
forms of accusation can serve as not only as a tactic, but also as a justification mechanism for hidden spoilers to apply other tactics that might face resistance in both internal and foreign political arenas, such as covert operations 251 (13.5 %), coups 190 (10.2 %), manipulations 179 (9.7 %), and judicial violations 178 (9.6 %).

Figure 22. Tactics compared by number of coding references.

5.3.5) Relationships

5.3.5.1) Factors and Motivations

Figure 23 displays the factor-motivation matrix. In concordance with the results seen in figure 20, the top combinations occur mostly around issues with ideological power maximization motivation. The radar chart displays the fact that issues with military domination and ideological power maximization have the highest (415) number of co-occurrences, which means that in a military dominated political arena hidden
spoilers are mostly motivated by ideological power maximization intention. Ideological power maximization is also highly intended where freedom of the press (177), civil society (171), civil liberties (166), and accountability (161) are problematic.

The second highest combination occurred at where issues with military domination and security threat perception met (152). The next combination involved issues with military domination and opportunist power maximization (131). Here, data refer to the fact that if a political system is under strong military domination, hidden spoilers not only act only for purposes of pursuing ideological power maximization, but also they might also feel that their security is threatened. Besides, such an environment can be perceived as an opportunity to increase their power.
5.3.5.2) Top Factors-Motivations and Tactics

Figure 24 shows the tactics of hidden spoilers in various situations where the top factors-motivations exist. Accusation 514 (12.4%) was the most used tactic, followed by covert operation 383 (9.2%), coup 376 (9.1%), manipulation 340 (8.2%), and gray propaganda (7.8%).
5.3.5.3) Top Factor-Motivations and Conflict

Figure 25 shows which types of conflict are likely to occur when the top factors-motivations were present. The most common types were judicial 157 (43.5 %), followed by social 130 (36 %), and economical (20.5 %).
Figure 25. Top Factor-Motivation and Conflict Matrix
5.3.5.4) Top Tactics and Conflict

Figure 26. Top Tactics and Conflict Matrix

Figure 26 shows the relationship between the most utilized spoiler tactics and conflict. In the 28 February case, data show no evidence regarding any violent conflict. On the other hand, there was a significant relationship between accusation and both judicial (72) and social (68) issues.

Similarly, the application of manipulation caused both judicial (55) and social (45) issues. Not surprisingly, the 28 February post-modern coup led to serious social issues (44) in Turkish society.
5.3.6) Hidden Spoiling

5.3.6.1) Actors of Hidden Spoiling

Figure 27-1. Actors of 28 February Post-modern Coup
According to figure 27-1 the active military 221 (25 %) was the leading actor of hidden spoiling activities in 28 February case, which was to be expected since the whole case was actually a story of how the Turkish Army intervened in the political field. However, media (19 %), business (10%), foreign (9 %), and legal organization/ngo (8 %) also appeared as significant actors.

Figure 27-2 highlights that issues with military dominance, freedom of the press, and issues regarding civil society are important factors in cases where the active military exhibits a great inclination to engage in hidden spoiling activities. On the other hand, interestingly, the media showed greater tendency towards engaging in hidden spoiling when military dominance was present, than situations when issues regarding the freedom of the press exist. This phenomenon can be explained in two ways. First, as the data...

Figure 27-2. Factors and Actors of Hidden Spoiling
indicates, in countries where democratic institutions did not become an essential part of political, social, and economic lives, media has some sort of monopoly on public opinion. Thus, in the 28 February case, the active military massively utilized the media to manipulate public opinion in favor of a military coup. Secondly, owners of the media might expect certain benefits or share threat perceptions with the active military so that they participate in hidden spoiling. Observations of high-level business participation under military dominance and lack of freedom of the press also supports above-mentioned explanation. Moreover, military dominance, and civil society issues act as facilitators of engaging in hidden spoiling for legal organization/NGO.

Regarding motivations, figure 27-3 shows that ideological and security threat perceptions play a higher role in motivating active military to commit hidden spoiling. Media shares the same motivations with the active military. Similarly, business and legal organization/NGO are also highly motivated by ideological threat perception.
Figure 27-3. Motivations and Actors of Hidden Spoiling

Figure 27-4. Tactics and Actors of Hidden Spoiling
Figure 27-4 represents the tactical preferences of different types of actors of hidden spoiling in the 28 February case. According to the data the media and the active military mostly utilized covert operations, accusations, manipulations, and gray propaganda. Considering the motivational data above, this similarity reveals that in the case of 28 February post-modern coup, the hidden spoiling activity mainly orchestrated by active military personnel and the media. In order to ease their threat perception or maximize their power, together they applied a covert action plan to overthrow the elected government and they succeeded. Looking at the highly utilized tactics, businesses, the judiciary, and legal organizations/NGOs followed the footsteps of the active military and the media.

5.3.6.2) Actor’s Orientation

In figure 28, the pie chart shows that a large portion (44 %) of the hidden spoiling activities was conducted by non-state actors. State actors (37 %) were second, in terms of being a common actor, followed by state affiliated actors (9 %). However, (10 %) of the actors remained unknown. These findings also support the previous findings. Even though the Turkish Army appeared to serve as the main actor of the 28 February post-modern coup, the media, the business world, and legal organizations/NGOs carried out most of the hidden spoiling activities.
**5.3.6.3) Actor’s Centrality**

Figure 29 represents the findings that (59\%) of the actors were at the core of the hidden spoiling activity, which means they intentionally participated in hidden spoiling, and (37\%) were somewhat linked to hidden spoiling, but either they did not know they were involved in a hidden spoiling activity or the data indicated no further information about their commitment. On the other hand, a small portion (4\%) of the actors were coded as unknown since the case data provided no evidence regarding their commitment.

**5.3.6.4) Subjects of the 28 February Post-modern Coup**

Figure 30-1 indicates that in the 28 February process, citizens mostly became the subject of a hidden spoiling activity. However, the active military (23\%) took the second
place on this issue. Government (12 %), media (8 %), and politicians (5 %) were the
other most common subjects. This subject selection indicated that hidden spoilers shared
their efforts in a certain way. First, they tried to affect the public’s opinion that the regime
in Turkey was in imminent danger from a threat. Then, they turned their attention to the
Turkish Army. Although, the campaign against the elected government primarily led by
high-ranking officers, the commanding structure is not a homogeneous. Therefore,
hidden spoilers believed that possible hesitancies and doubts about this issue should be
isolated. Government became target in two different ways: 1) By taking side of the
coalition government (Refah Partisi/Welfare Party) was subjected to spoiling because of
their Islamic affiliation. 2) Members of the coalition partner (Dogru Yol Partisi/True Path
Party) were subject to spoiling because this was the easiest way to overcome the “Refah
partisi Sorunu/Welfare party Problem” and dismantle the acting government.
Figure 29. Actor’s Centrality of Hidden Spoilers
Figure 30-1. Subjects of Hidden Spoiling

Below, figure 30-2 shows that the existence of military dominance, and problematic civil society were the most common factors that create an environment for hidden spoilers to subject citizens and active military to their actions. Government and media on the other hand, were subjected to hidden spoiling mostly under military dominance, and then lack of free media.
Data in figure 30-3 indicate that covert operation and coup seem to be applied when citizens become the subject of hidden spoiling. In the 28 February post-modern coup, the active military highly benefitted from getting support on their campaign against government. Not surprisingly, exercise of coup is referred when active military personnel were subjected to hidden spoiling. Covert operation, accusation, manipulation, and gray propaganda were mainly utilized against the government.
5.3.6.5) Subject’s Centrality of Hidden Spoiling

Figure 31-1 indicates that (52%) of the subjects appeared to be the victims of hidden spoiling activities. However, a relatively large portion (27%) of the subjects were at the core of hidden spoiling. Such a high value refers to the fact that hidden spoilers are also subjected to both active military and media, in order to “keep them on track”. Hidden spoilers also place considerable (20%) effort on subjecting people who are somehow linked to their activities to support them and to pull them into the core of hidden spoiling by radicalizing them. Case data reveals no information about the commitment of (1%) of the subjects.

5.3.6.6) Motivations and Subject’s Centrality

Data in Figure 31-2 shows changes in the subject’s centrality under different motivational situations. Subjects appear as victims mostly where hidden spoilers are
motivated by ideological threat perception. However, hidden spoilers victimize their own colleagues when they present with both financial threat perceptions and intentions towards financial power maximization. On the other hand, when hidden spoilers intend to maximize their power from the ongoing situation (opportunist power maximization) subjects are mostly victims.

Figure 31-1. Subject’s Centrality of Hidden Spoiling
5.3.6.7) Targets of the Hidden Spoilers

Figure 32 demonstrates that in 28 February case hidden spoilers mainly aimed to affect elites of the society (49 %). This data clearly reveals the post-modern nature of the coup. Especially high-ranking officers of Turkish military wanted the removal of the Refah Partisi/Welfare Party to be carried out by “silahsız güçler/weaponless powers”. Therefore, hidden spoilers targeted the elites in order to mobilize them in concordance with their own goals. (45 %) of the activities targeted ordinary citizens as a whole. Finally, (9 %) of the activities targeted certain individuals among the ordinary society.
5.4) Ergenekon Case

5.4.1) Case Descriptive

Figure 33 displays the Ergenekon case data based on source language and type. Here, the majority of the data comes from Turkish indictments, which is followed by Turkish Internet media and books. English sources, on the other hand, mostly come from journals and reports/polls.
5.4.2) Motivations

Figure 34 represents the motivations of hidden spoilers in the Ergenekon case. Looking at the rectangle sizes this indicates that power maximization 995 (70.4 %) plays a greater role than threat perception 418 (29.6 %) in motivating parties to engage in hidden spoiling. At the first level (child) node view, political power maximization 343 (24.3 %) is the most common motivation in this case. Ideological power maximization 339 (24 %), ideological threat perception 306 (21.7 %), and opportunist power maximization 285 (20.2 %) emerge as other major motivations.
5.4.3) Factors

Below, Figure 35 shows the factors that exist when hidden spoiling occurs. Lack of democratic institutions (1493 - 73.3 %) appears as the most important factor in engaging hidden spoiling. Tensions (512 - 25.1 %) take second place, which is followed by political instability (26 - 1.3 %), and financial instability (7 - 0.3 %). Focusing on the first level (child) nodes, issues with accountability (371 - 18.2 %), issues with rule of law (359 – 17.6 %), and issues with military dominance (315 – 15.5 %) are other significant factors in the Ergenekon case.

Figure 34. Motivations compared by number of coding references
5.4.4) Tactics

The tree-map of tactics displayed in Figure 36 shows that the hidden spoilers in the Ergenekon case vastly utilized covert operation (586 – 24.2 %) against their targets. This data supports the evidence in the literature. For years, many people, including high level politicians and bureaucrats, suspected there were deep state activities in Turkey. However, until the Ergenekon investigation, very little was known about the deep-state activities because it was crucial for them to stay behind in order to reach their goals. By acting this way, they managed to remain undetected and strong enough to exercise their plans. Plotting (296 – 12.2 %), manipulation (233 – 9.7 %), accusation (205 – 8.5), and gray propaganda (168 – 6.9 %) were other important tactics applied in the Ergenekon case.

Figure 35. Factors compared by number of coding references
5.4.5) Relationships

5.4.5.1) Factors and Motivations

Figure 37 displays the factors and motivations matrix. As shown in figure 35, most of the combinations occurred around political power maximization, ideological power maximization, and opportunist power maximization. Issues with accountability and political power maximization had the highest (330) number of co-occurrences. On the other hand, issues with accountability and ideological power maximization were quite close (329) in value to the highest number of co-occurrences. Thus, when a system lacks mechanisms of accountability, hidden spoilers are inclined to increase their political and ideological powers. Here, the third (325) highest combination occurred where issues with accountability and ideological threat perception were met. Thus, once certain actors feel threatened ideologically, they engage in hidden spoiling to increase their power (political,
ideological) and to eliminate the threat by mostly benefitting from the lack of accountability mechanisms.

5.4.5.2) Top Factors-Motivations and Tactics

Below figure 38 shows the most utilized tactics of hidden spoilers and where the top factor-motivation combinations exist. Covert operation was the most utilized tactic (602), followed by plot (399), manipulation (319), false flag assassination (253), and gray propaganda (231). It can be argued from this intense use of covert operation that hidden spoiling activities in the Ergenekon case were mostly planned and coordinated actions, and other tactics were actually part of covert action plans.

![Figure 37. Factors and Motivations Matrix](image-url)
5.4.5.3) Top Factor-Motivations and Conflict

Below, figure 39 shows variations of conflicts in situations where top factors and motivations exist. The death of individuals (96) is the most common conflict in Ergenekon case that is followed by mass deaths (77), social issues (56), judicial issues (52), and small property damage (43).
5.4.5.4) Top Tactics and Conflict

Figure 40 displays the relationship between conflict types and the most utilized spoiler tactics in the Ergenekon case. Data indicates that when covert operation is used by hidden spoilers individual deaths (102), mass scale deaths (78), and social conflicts (63) are the most common conflict types. Moreover, in situations where these top tactics (false flag assassination, covert operation, manipulation, plot, and gray propaganda) are utilized, covert operation is also likely to cause various types of conflicts such as judicial issues and small property damage. On the other hand, false flag assassination (55) and plot (53) were also highly related to individual deaths.
5.4.6) Hidden Spoiling

5.4.6.1) Actors of Hidden Spoiling

Figure 41-1 shows that hidden spoiling activities in Ergenekon case were majorly handled by Para-military (66 %) and active military (22 %). Although other actors were engaged in hidden spoiling, none of them were responsible individually for more than 2 % of the total hidden spoiling in the Ergenekon case.
Figure 41-1. Actors of Hidden Spoilers in Ergenekon

Figure 41-2 Factors and Actors of Hidden Spoiling
Above figure 41-2 shows that issues with accountability, issues with military
dominance, and case related ideological tension are factors influencing the Para-military
to carry out the hidden spoiling activities. These factors also facilitated hidden spoilers in
the army (active military) to engage in hidden spoiling. However, issues regarding the
rule of law were also another major factor that affected army members’ engagement in
hidden spoiling.

Concerning motivations, below, figure 41-3 indicates that both the Para-military
and active military had very similar motivational instincts in engaging hidden spoiling.
Political, ideological, and opportunist power maximization all have a high-level
relationship with both the Para-military and active military. On the other hand, their
actions are not solely for purposes of power maximization, but they also feel
ideologically threatened.
Figure 41-3. Motivations and Actors of Hidden Spoiling

Figure 41-4. Tactics and Actors of Hidden Spoiling
Figure 41-4 illustrates the tactical choices of different types of actors in the Ergenekon case. According to the data, the Para-military used covert operation as its major tactic, followed by plot, false flag assassination, and false flag terrorism. Covert operation was also utilized by the active military as the most applied tactic. Plot, manipulation, direct arson, gray propaganda, and black propaganda were other tactics of active military in the Ergenekon case.

5.4.6.2) Actor’s Orientation

Below, figure 42 represents the orientation of the actor engaged in hidden spoiling in the Ergenekon case. The majority of the actors were state affiliated (66 %). Actors that were within the state system constituted 25 percent of the hidden spoilers. Results showed a similar pattern with the results of figure 42.1. As discussed in the literature, many killings, bombings, and terrorist actions against important figures were affiliated with deep state (derin devlet) in Turkey. For years, people believed that actors of these actions had some sort of relationship with the state. On the other hand, (7 %) of the actors were non-state actors, (1 %) remained unknown. Data indicated that (1 %) of the actors were rouge which means once they were state actors or controlled by state, but later they came to act on for own purposes.
5.4.6.3) Actor’s Centrality

Figure 43 shows that almost every actor (96%) was at the core of hidden spoiling activity. Moreover, the remaining (4%) of them also somewhat related to the hidden spoiling, but they might have not known they were involved in such an activity.
5.4.6.4) Subjects of Ergenekon

Regarding the hidden spoilers in the Ergenekon case, as shown in figure 44-1, the spoilers mostly applied their tactics over elected government (19 %). In concordance with the above findings, it can be inferred that government seen as the source of an ideological threat and hidden spoilers acted to maximize their political and ideological power over the government. Legal organizations/NGOs (15 %) constituted the second most prominent place in terms of subjects since they were used to mobilize the public against the government. Citizens (9 %), terrorist organizations (8 %), media (8 %), the active military (7 %), and the minority (6 %) were other common subjects of hidden spoiling activities.
According to figure 44-2, issues with military dominance, issues with accountability, issues with civil society, freedom of the press, and case related ideological tension were the most common factors that existed in a system, and which facilitated the hidden spoilers to target the government. Issues regarding civil society, issues with military dominance, issues with accountability, issues with rule of law, and case related ideological tension were notable factors regarding legal organizations/NGOs. As expected, hidden spoilers chose the active military where political system was dominated by the military. Citizens, on the other hand, became subjects of hidden spoiling in situations where issues with accountability, issues with military, and issues with rule of law existed.
Data in figure 44-3 shows that hidden spoilers commonly employed covert operation, accusation, plot, and manipulation against the government. Legal organizations/NGOs become victims of these covert operations, plots, manipulations, and accusations. Terrorist organizations became victims of the covert operations. They exploited the situation by plotting and manipulation to carry out false flag terrorist attacks.

5.4.6.5) Subject’s Centrality of Hidden Spoiling

Below figure 45.1 indicates that (57 %) of the subjects were victims of hidden spoiling activity. On the other hand, (10 %) of the subjects were at the core of hidden spoiling. This value refers to the fact that hidden spoilers also subjected their own
colleagues to their actions in the cause. Hidden spoilers also placed a relatively large (33\%) effort on subjecting people who were somehow linked to their activities in order to pull them into the core of their hidden spoiling activities.

**Figure 44-3 Tactics and Subjects of Hidden Spoiling**

**5.4.6.6) Motivations and Subject’s Centrality**

In figure 45-2, changes in the subject’s centrality under different motivational situations are displayed. As shown subjects became victimized mostly where hidden spoilers were motivated by political power maximization, ideological power maximization, opportunist power maximization, and ideological threat perception. Linked people or groups became subjected under similar pattern of motivational instincts.
Although, hidden spoilers subjected their own colleagues to similar motivations with victims, data represented this as a lower degree of relationship.

Figure 45-1. Subject’s Centrality of Hidden Spoiling
5.4.6.7) Targets of the Hidden Spoiling

Figure 46 exhibits the fact that in the Ergenekon case hidden spoilers tried very earnestly to affect elites of the society (71%). The hidden spoilers targeted elites in order to utilize their soft power over other segments of the Turkish society to be able to maximize their relative power against government. (25%) of the activities targeted ordinary citizens as a whole. Lastly, (4%) of the activities targeted certain individuals among the ordinary society.
5.5) Cross-case Analysis

5.5.1) Motivations

Below, figure 47 does not indicate a pattern of motivations at the parent node level across three cases. However, spoilers in both the 6-7 September Pogrom and the Ergenekon case were mainly motivated by their desire for power maximization.

On the other hand, looking at top five nodes in each case at the child node level, data showed certain patterns existed across three cases. Opportunistic power maximization, ideological threat perception, and security threat perception appeared as the most common motivations.
Figure 47. Motivations of Hidden Spoilers
In can be inferred that in some conflicts, spoilers might feel ideologically threatened. In other cases the threat might be perceived as a security threat, which could provide a stronger motivation for engaging in hidden spoiling in order for the group to regain their security. Moreover, spoilers may also see conflicts as an opportunity for increasing their relative power in that system.

5.5.2) Factors

Below, figure 48 does not indicate a pattern of factors at the parent node level across the cases. However, the lack of democratic institutions was observed to be the most common factor in both the 28 February post-modern coup and the Ergenekon cases.

Regarding the child nodes, issues with accountability appear as the only common factor among the top five nodes across three cases. According to this data, if a system lacks certain mechanisms for maintaining accountability, actors are more likely to engage in hidden spoiling since they know that even if their actions become public it is less likely they will be held responsible for their actions.

Moreover, case related ideological conflicts, military dominance, and issues regarding freedom of the press were other common factors that influenced actors to engage in hidden spoiling.

5.5.3) Tactics

Below, figure 50 shows that covert operation was the most common tactic of hidden spoilers across three cases. As discussed in the literature review, for various reasons hidden spoilers intend to keep their involvement secret. For that reason it was
expected one would find covert action as the most applied tactic. However, accusation, manipulation, and grey propaganda were other common tactics of hidden spoilers.

5.5.4) Relationships

5.5.4.1) Factors and Motivations

Below, figure 50 displays the most common factor and motivation combinations across the three cases. Considering the top five value combinations of each case, cross case data did not indicate a significant pattern of factor-motivation combination. However, combination of ideological threat perception and issues with accountability showed a pattern with the following values for each case: the 6-7 September Pogrom/60, the 28 February Post Modern Coup/161, and the Ergenekon/325 case. Such a pattern shows that actors are more prone to engage in hidden spoiling when they live in a system that lacks mechanisms of accountability, and if they feel ideologically threatened in such an environment.

5.5.4.2) Top Factors-Motivation Combinations and Tactics

Below, figure 51 displays the tactics of hidden spoilers and where the top five factor-motivation combinations exist across three cases. Data reveals a pattern of two tactics: covert operation and gray propaganda. It can be inferred that if a system lacks institutions of accountability and actors feel ideologically threatened for some reason, hidden spoiling is most likely to occur in forms of covert operation and gray propaganda. As discussed above the nature of covert operation matches well with the hidden spoiling since hidden spoilers do not want to be recognized.
Figure 48. Factors of Hidden Spoilers
Figure 49. Tactics of Hidden Spoilers
Figure 50. Factors and Motivations Matrix
Moreover, hidden spoilers prefer gray propaganda to broadcasting certain information in order to strengthen the topics that are in the interest of their cause. Although in gray propaganda both the source and the accuracy of the information is questionable, the lack of mechanisms of accountability provides no tools for tracing back to the real source or authenticating the correctness of this.

5.5.4.3) Top Factor-Motivation Combinations and Conflict

Below, figure 52 displays the type of conflict that is either pre-existing or results from hidden spoiling activities where the top five factor-motivation combinations exist across three cases. The cross data observations demonstrated a pattern for both judicial violation and social conflict. This can occur in two ways. First, if a system suffers from social conflicts and/or judicial violations, it creates a better environment for certain actors to engage in hidden spoiling. Second, benefitting from the lack of accountability, hidden spoilers create social conflicts and/or judicial violations to reach their goals. Moreover, death of individuals is common as in the both the 6-7 September Pogrom and the Ergenekon cases. Similarly, the killings of specific targets creates an environment that facilitates actors to perform hidden spoiling and/or in order to reach their goals hidden spoilers may kill certain targets or have them killed.

5.5.4.4) Top Tactics and Conflict

Below, figure 53 shows the cross case data for conflict types when hidden spoilers applied top (five) tactics in situations and where top factor-motivation combinations exist in each case. The data indicated no pattern across three cases. Although, covert operation
and gray propaganda were common in all cases their associated conflict types were either different or were not significant enough to demonstrate a pattern.

5.5.5) Hidden Spoiling

5.5.5.1) Actors of Hidden Spoiling

Figure 54-1 displays the cross case data of actors of hidden spoiling. Data reveals no significant pattern of actors across three cases. However, considering the top five actors of each case, certain actors can be seen in two different cases: the Para-military (Ergenekon, 6-7 September Pogrom), the active military (Ergenekon, 28 February Post Modern Coup), the media (6-7 September Pogrom, 28 February Post Modern Coup), and legal organizations/NGOs (6-7 September Pogrom, 28 February Post Modern Coup).

Below, figure 54-2 shows the relationship between factors and actors of hidden spoilers across three cases. The data indicated a pattern over four different factors: issues with military dominance, issues with accountability, case related ideological tension, and freedom of the press. Focusing on these factors, only two combinations showed a slight pattern across three cases: issues with accountability/government, and case related ideological tension and media. Thus, it can be inferred that governments tend to involve in hidden spoiling when the system lacks mechanisms of accountability. Moreover, the media is prone to exploit case related ideological tensions in their hidden spoiling activities.
Ergenekon

Figure 51. Top Factor-Motivation Combinations and Tactics Matrix
6-7 September

28 February

Ergenekon

Figure 52. Top Factor-Motivation Combinations and Conflict Matrix
Figure 53. Top Tactics and Conflict Matrix

6-7 September

28 February

Ergenekon

Figure 53. Top Tactics and Conflict Matrix
Figure 54-1. Actors of Hidden Spoiling

6-7 September

28 February

Ergenekon

Figure 54-1. Actors of Hidden Spoiling
Ergenekon

Figure 54-2. Factors and Actors of Hidden Spoiling
Figure 54-3 displays the relationship between motivations and actors. Regarding ideological threat perception and opportunist power maximization, data indicated a pattern with the media. Although at different magnitudes media seems to be affected by these two motivations in all three cases. On the other hand, ideological power maximization and opportunist power maximization significantly motivated other actors in at least two cases such as: the active military (Ergenekon, 28 February Post Modern Coup), the Para-military (Ergenekon, 6-7 September Pogrom) that is worth considering.

Figure 54-4 shows the relationship between tactics and actors. The data shows several patterns across the three cases. While the Para-military utilized covert operation and accusation, media used gray propaganda along with accusation in their hidden spoiling activities. Moreover, the active military also employed covert operation and accusation in both the Ergenekon case and the 28 February Post Modern Coup.

5.5.5.2) Actor’s Orientation of Hidden Spoiling

Figure 55 shows the cross case data of actor’s orientation of hidden spoiling. Data shows that in all three cases at least 25 % of the actors were state actors, as such reveals a significant pattern. Thus, if the above mentioned factors and motivations exist in a system, its own state takes first place in engaging hidden spoiling activities.

5.5.5.3) Actor’s Centrality of Hidden Spoiling

In figure 56, the cross case data of the actor’s centrality of hidden spoiling is displayed. In all three cases at least 59 % of the actors are seen to be at the core of the hidden spoiling activities. Such a significant pattern tells us that actors are intentionally spoiling the situation just to reach their own goals. On the other hand, there are other
actors who take place in hidden spoiling activities, but data reveals no evidence that they are intentionally doing such actions. At least 4 % of the actors fell into this category and it hits highest level with 37 % in 28 February Post Modern Coup. This implies hidden spoilers might exploit some actors in their activities, and in such an involvement, they might act purely on their exploited perceptions without knowing that they were actually serving the goals of hidden spoilers.

5.5.5.4) Subjects of Hidden Spoiling

Below, figure 57-1 displays the subjects of hidden spoiling across three cases. Data indicated a pattern between government and citizens. It can be inferred that in any sort of hidden spoiling activity, government and citizens both become affected. Besides that, actors of hidden spoilers are prone to target media and minorities as subjects of their activities as seen in at least two cases of research.

Figure 57-2 shows the relationship between factors and subjects of hidden spoiling. The cross case data indicated patterns for the freedom of the press, issues with military dominance, and issues with accountability. Regarding these three factors the following patterns exist: First, citizens and media become affected by hidden spoiling when the concept of freedom of the press is problematic. Second, if there is military dominance in the political system then citizens and government become affected by hidden spoiling. Lastly, if the concept of accountability is problematic then both citizens and the government become affected.

In figure 57-3, cross-case data of the relationship between tactics and the subjects of hidden spoiling is displayed. Covert operation, gray propaganda, manipulation, and
accusation showed a pattern across three cases. Considering these four tactics the following pattern exists: Accusation affects government. Manipulation affects government and political/ideological opponent. Gray propaganda, on the other hand, affects citizens along with the government. Finally, media, citizens, legal organizations/NGOs, and political/ideological opponents are all affected by covert operation.

5.5.5.5) Subject’s Centrality of Hidden Spoiling

Below, figure 58-1 shows subject’s centrality of hidden spoiling across three cases. According to the cross case data at least 52% of subjects were affected by hidden spoiling as victims and that constitutes the majority of the subjects in each case. Besides that, there are some subjects that might be somewhat related to the hidden spoiling activity, and this accounted for at least 6% of the subjects. However, at least 4% of subjects took part in hidden spoiling activities, and this participation was the highest in 28 February Post Modern Coup with 27%. This data shows that if it serves to benefit of the hidden spoilers, they do not hesitate engaging in such activities, even if their own colleagues will be affected.

5.5.5.6) Motivations and Subject’s Centrality

Figure 58-2 shows variations in the subject’s centrality under different motivational situations in all three cases. The data indicated patterns for ideological threat perception, political power maximization, and opportunist power maximization. Under all these motivational situations, subjects appeared as victims. Besides that, if hidden spoilers are motivated by political power maximization their own colleagues become
affected by hidden spoiling. Linked people become subjected in hidden spoiling, which is motivated by ideological threat perception.

5.5.5.7) Targets of Hidden Spoiling

Below, in figure 59, the cross-case data of targets of hidden spoiling activities is displayed. Data shows that ordinary people constituted at least 25% of targets which hit its highest value in the 6-7 September Pogrom with 86%. Furthermore, hidden spoilers targeted elites of the society to be able to utilize their power over either state mechanism or ordinary people, and this accounted for at least 8% and reached the highest value in the Ergenekon case with 71%. Finally, at least 4% of the activities targeted certain individuals among the ordinary society.
**Ergenekon**

Figure 54-3. Motivations and Actors of Hidden Spoiling
Figure 54-4. Tactics and Actors of Hidden Spoiling
Figure 55. Actor’s Orientation of Hidden Spoiling

Ergenekon
Figure 56. Actor’s Centrality of Hidden Spoiling

6-7 September

28 February

Ergenekon

Figure 56. Actor’s Centrality of Hidden Spoiling
Figure 57-1. Subjects of Hidden Spoiling

6-7 September

28 February

Ergenekon
6-7 September

28 February

Ergenekon

Figure 57-2. Factors and Subjects of Hidden Spoiling
Figure 57-3. Tactics and Subjects of Hidden Spoiling
Figure 58-1. Subject’s Centrality of Hidden Spoiling

Ergenekon
Motivations and Subject’s Centrality of Hidden Spoiling

6-7 September

Motivations and Subject’s Centrality of Hidden Spoiling

28 February

Motivations and Subject’s Centrality of Hidden Spoiling

Ergenekon

Figure 58-2. Motivations and Subject’s Centrality of Hidden Spoiling
6-7 September

Ergenekon

Figure 59. Targets of Hidden Spoiling
CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS

The final chapter of this dissertation summarizes the research objectives and findings of the qualitative analysis of the cross case data that was examined. In addition to providing conclusions derived from the thematic analysis of the cross case data, it also elaborates on the theoretical, research, and policy implications of these findings.

6.1) Research Summary

Recent history is full of violent and non-violent conflicts that have occurred at inter-state, intra-state, and inter-group levels. Even today, many people suffer from such conflicts throughout the world. On the other hand, serious effort has been applied to solve these conflicts by different entities like NGOs, international organizations, and sovereign states.

At theoretical level, vast amount of studies has been conducted by scholars in order to understand the dynamics of these conflicts, and to develop adequate strategies to overcome these issues, as well as to find ways of maintaining the peace. At a practical level, both individuals and NGOs working in the conflict analysis and resolution fields have placed their efforts on operationalizing the above-mentioned theoretical grounds into the field. At the policy level, international organizations and sovereign states engage in certain actions in collaboration with conflict analysis and resolution specialists from both the academic and practical fields. Unfortunately, despite these efforts some conflicts
such as the Kurdish issue of Turkey, and the Palestine-Israel conflict have become “protracted social conflicts” as defined by Azar (1990).

In existing theories of international relations and conflict analysis and resolution fields, studies have mainly focused on manifest parties of ongoing conflict, and their actions. In doing so, some of the theoretical approaches argue that sources of conflict cannot be limited to the manifest parties, since in many cases “international linkages”, “trans-national affiliations”, and “spoilers” can play a role in such conflicts (Azar, 1990; Korostelina, 2007; Moore & Davis, 1998; Stedman, 1997). However, while explaining the role of these concepts in conflict, they either focus on the manifest parties (seek linkages or affiliations of it), or limit their analysis to the peace processes.

In this study, I argue that the limited scope of such analytical approaches prevents their ability to understand all dimensions of contemporary conflicts. As a result, their intervention strategies become fruitless as we see in many contemporary cases.

In that sense, I argue that in some contemporary conflicts there are other actors that calculate some sort of benefit from either starting these or engaging in an ongoing conflict by employing several strategies that are designed with the intend to keep their involvement secret. Defining such actors as “hidden spoilers”, I aimed to explore under which motivations and factors hidden spoilers engage in spoiling, what sort of tactics are being used in such spoiling, and how conflict dynamics are affected by the involvement of hidden spoilers. Having these goals, my research questions were:

1. What are the motivations of hidden spoilers?
2. Which factors are related to hidden spoiling behavior?
3. What are the tactics of hidden parties in spoiling?

4. What is the relationship between the hidden spoiling motivations, factors, and tactics? How do they impact conflicts?

As a research strategy, a comparative case study was conducted. In concordance with what Oliver (2006) and Berg (2001) stated on sampling strategies for case studies, three cases were selected based on purposive sampling. For the data analysis, thematic qualitative analysis was applied by utilizing Nvivo, computer assisted qualitative data analysis software, in order to ease the coding process since a multiple-case data consists thousands of pages of data.

To explore the hidden spoiler concept in contemporary conflicts, Chapter 1 of this dissertation began by presenting the nature of current international relations and conflict analysis and resolution conflict analysis approaches and their shortcomings. Positing that such limitations result in ineffective conflict analysis and resolution strategies, I tried to offer the hidden spoiler concept for the consideration in this regard and to do this by expanding on the research problem and providing a case example.

Chapter 2 provides an overview of the theoretical basis of this dissertation by analyzing the position, behavior, and the nature dimensions of the hidden spoiling concept. Since, hidden spoiling has not been addressed before, this analysis was elaborated upon by reviewing the following corresponding topics in the existing literature: conflict party positioning, spoiling, and hidden involvement.

Chapter 3 elaborated on the hidden spoiling activities in Turkey. In order to present a foundational basis for case selection rationale, this chapter provides an
historical background hidden spoiling activities in Turkey by demonstrating the contextual linkage between such activities and literature.

Chapter 4 connects the theoretical background with the research design starting with the formulation of research questions. Accordingly, it provides the grounds for choosing a comparative multiple case study method and qualitative thematic analysis as a research strategy in this dissertation. Moreover, this chapter expands on the design quality, de-limitations and limitations of the research.

Chapter 5 provides the data analysis. First, each case is analyzed based on the research questions in order to explore the motivations, factors, tactics, and relations between these dynamics and conflicts; then a multiple-case comparative analysis is conducted to examine patterns over cases. The amount of processed qualitative data reached 13658 pages in total.

This final chapter of the dissertation outlines the research objectives, and findings of the individual and cross-case data analysis. Moreover, it also provides the theoretical, research, and policy implications of these findings.

6.2) Summary of Findings

This section summarizes the findings of the application of the research questions to each case and cross-case dataset. It also discusses the findings in order to provide basis for research, theoretical and policy implications.

6.2.1) Individual Case Studies

Chapter 5 outlines the analytical results of three individual case studies. The analysis in each case consists of the following six sections to answer the research

6.2.1.1) 6-7 September Pogrom

The analysis of case was conducted by coding of 398 pages of 27 files of qualitative data that mainly consisted of Turkish newspapers and English academic journals. In this case, hidden spoilers were mostly motivated by their opportunist and ideological power maximization desires, and ideological threat perceptions. Since this was an ethnic conflict in nature, data indicated three factors that provided suitable conditions for hidden spoiling. Case related ethnic tension represents the accumulation of historical hatred between the Turks and Greeks, and the ongoing Cyprus issue at the time, which was also amplified by threat perception. At time of the events, even multiple-party democracy was quite new in Turkey’s political life. Thus, lacking the necessary mechanisms to oversee government actions for maintaining accountability was an expected factor to see. Lastly, freedom of the media was highly questionable during the events because of its active role in manipulating public opinion by publishing false news. Vandalism, plunder, gray propaganda, direct incitement, and covert operation were the most common tactics of the hidden spoilers in this case.
Regarding the relationship between the dimensions of hidden spoiling and conflict, the case data indicated that in societies where ethnic tension is a part of life, actors tend to engage hidden spoiling in order to increase their relative ideological power. Such an environment can also be seen as an opportunity by some actors for increasing their relative power via hidden spoiling. Aside from these factors, in such societies, certain actors might also feel that their ideological standing and their security are threatened.

Accordingly, when such factors were coupled with the before mentioned motivations, actors tended to utilize the following tactics in hidden spoiling: vandalism, plunder, direct-incitement, covert-operation, and gray propaganda. As a result, hidden spoiling lead to large-scale property damage, massive-scale injuries, and deaths of individuals. Here data indicated that vandalism, covert-operation, gray propaganda, and direct-incitement had a significant causal relation with large-scale property damage.

According to the case data, government was the leading actor of the hidden spoiling in 6-7 September Pogrom with the participation of the Para-military and the media. The dimensional relationship analysis showed that existing tensions (both case related and general) might push the government to engage in hidden spoiling. Case-related ethnic tension and the lack of the freedom of press concepts were important factors for some actors in the Turkish media as regards in participating in hidden spoiling. Moreover, aside from the existence of case-related ethnic conflicts, the lack of the mechanisms of accountability and existence of military dominance created appropriate conditions for the Para-military.
Political turmoil around the Cyprus issue, and the size of the Greek minority in Istanbul caused the government to feel ideologically threatened. Thus it acted to strengthen its ideological standing in the public sphere by seeing such conditions as an opportunity for power maximization. Although feeling ideologically threatened, the media also saw such an environment as an opportunity to increase their influence in the country. The Para-military, on the other hand, acted on a security threat perception.

In hidden spoiling, government mainly utilized direct-incitement and white-propaganda. However, media participated by publishing gray-propaganda. Not surprisingly, the Para-military engaged in covert-operation and vandalism.

Looking to the actor’s orientation and centrality, which are actors’ affiliation and their role in hidden spoiling respectively, data indicated that a large portion (57%) of the actors were state related, and of all actors 83% intentionally engaged in hidden spoiling.

Regarding the subjects that represented the groups most by from hidden spoiling, minorities (especially the Greek minority) constituted 50% of the affected groups. Citizens, symbolic (sensitive) subject, and opponents were also worth mentioning. According to the data on hidden spoiling, where case related ethnic conflict existed and the political system lacked mechanisms of accountability, this mostly affected minority groups. However, in the presence of case related ideological tension and military dominance, media was most likely to be affected by hidden spoiling. Citizens, on the other hand, became affected when there was no media freedom and no mechanisms for maintaining accountability.
With respect to tactics over subjects, covert-operation and vandalism were the most utilized tactics over minority groups. However, plunder, direct-incitement, pogrom, and gray-propaganda were also employed over minorities. Citizens, on the other hand, mostly became victims of gray-propaganda because perpetrators needed to gain their support. Such gray-propaganda was filled with elements of direct-incitement and false-flag assault. Ataturk’s house revealed itself as a sensitive site because of its sentimental value in the hearts of Turkish people, which became affected by false-flag attack and published gray propaganda about the attack. Lastly, ideological or political opponents became affected by false flag incitements.

The case data showed that 90% of the subjects were the real victims of hidden spoiling. However, 6% were somewhat linked to the hidden spoiling activities but did not know about their involvement (i.e. was used without their intention) or data indicates no further information about their commitment. More importantly, 3% of subjects also participated in hidden spoiling, but at the same time became victims of such actions mostly because other spoilers did not hesitate to victimize them based on their perception of greater good. Here, subjects fell into the victim category when hidden spoilers were motivated by ideological power maximization, political power maximization, and ideological threat perception. Besides, hidden spoilers themselves became victims of hidden spoiling when actors acted on their political threat perceptions.

Finally actors of hidden spoiling in the 6-7 September Pogrom, mostly (86%) targeted masses. They prioritize elites (8%) over ordinary individuals (6%) in targeting to
reach their goals, and this was based on the logical assumption of relative influential positions of elites in social and political sphere.

6.2.1.2) 28 February Post-modern Coup Case

The analysis of the case data performed by the coding of 3975 pages of 483 files of qualitative data mostly consists of Turkish newspapers and Internet media. Academic journals comprise the main portion of the English sources. In this case actors felt that their political positions and security under threat. Thus, having these perceptions they engaged in hidden spoiling to secure their political positions and to guarantee their security. Moreover, increasing their financial power was revealed as another significant reason for their engagement. Even it is called as “post-modern coup” the word “coup” indicates some sort of military interference in the political sphere. Consequently, data indicated that military dominance constituted the most significant factor, followed by freedom of the press, civil society issues, and issues with accountability. Thus, when a country suffers from military dominance over its political and social life together with the lack of free media, properly functioning civil society, and mechanisms for maintaining accountability actors inclined to engage in hidden spoiling activities based on the outcomes of their zero-sum calculations. Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the Turkish Armed Forces have always seen themselves in a position of overseeing the public sphere and guarding the secular foundations of the state (Ahmad, 1993; Bardakçı, 2013; Zurcher, 2004). Having such a mindset, led to several coups in Turkey’s recent history. In many cases, they were not alone in their mission to protect the foundations of the state, instead, they were supported by like-minded non-governmental organizations.
and media. Unfortunately, the fear of accountability was never strong enough to deter these actors from engaging in such activities. In this case, utilization of accusation was common among the hidden spoilers. They were blaming the elected government for having a secret agenda for transforming Turkey to an Islamic state. Covert operation, coup, manipulation, and judicial violations were other hidden spoiler tactics in this case.

In terms of relationships, the case date showed that in an environment where military tutelage maintains its strength (Polat, 2011; Söyler, 2013), hidden spoilers are most likely act on ideological power maximization. Accordingly, the lack of free media, properly functioning civil society, and accountability mechanisms are other factors that led hidden spoilers to act on ideological power maximization.

Hence, when above mentioned factors and motivations are met, actors were inclined to employ the following tactics in hidden spoiling: accusation, covert operation, coup, manipulation, and gray propaganda. Within such an environment, hidden spoiling led to judicial violations, social and economical issues. Accordingly, the 28 February post-modern coup caused severe violations in the public sphere. Hundreds of military, police, and other officials were discharged from their jobs, and some of them were prisoned. Several laws were amended to prevent religious people getting into official jobs. Moreover, it became forbidden to enter university campuses wearing a scarf (Kaya, 2009). In this process accusations and manipulations were used to create the desired perceptions in public opinion through gray propaganda.

The case data indicated that active military was the leading actor of the hidden spoiling activities during the 28 February Process. Also, media and the business world
played an important role in the process. The dimensional analysis showed the existence of military tutelage, lack of free media and properly functioning civil organizations provided suitable conditions for the active military to engage in hidden spoiling. Military tutelage was more important for encouraging the media to participate in the hidden spoiling activities than lack of free media. It can be inferred from the 28 February process that being in a military dominated public sphere instead of sticking to the foundations of freedom of the press, media preferred to side with the Turkish Armed Forces.

Motivational data explains this togetherness by revealing the fact that both active military and media felt that their ideological stands (Kemalist secular worldview) was under threat along with their security. Accordingly, the business world and NGOs shared the same ideological threat at the time. In the hidden spoiling activities of the 28 February post-modern coup covert operation, accusation, manipulation, and gray propaganda were highly utilized by both the active military and media. Looking at the process, we saw these two actors played a significant combined role in manipulating public opinion in order to gain their support to topple down the government in which they ultimately succeeded.

Regarding the actors’ affiliations and their role in hidden spoiling, the case data showed that it was the non-state actors who conducted most of the hidden spoiling activities. State actors, on the other hand, took second place. Among all actors 59% were at the core of the hidden spoiling activities, and 37% were somewhat related with hidden spoiling.
In terms of subjects, citizens took first place among affected groups, followed by the military, government, media, and politicians. Not surprisingly, the hidden spoilers’ initial intention was to gain public support by manipulating their opinion that the foundational basics of the Turkish Republic were under imminent threat. Secondly, even though members of the Turkish Armed Forces shared a strong organizational identity this did not mean that the whole organization was homogenous. By aiming to affect the opinions of the Turkish Armed Forces, hidden spoilers tried to reduce the risk of failure and isolated hesitancies. There was a coalition government during the 28 February process, thus hidden spoiling activities aimed to change the hearts and minds of parliamentary members of True Path Party in order to make them leave the coalition. Here, the existence of military dominance and lack of properly functioning civil society created conditions in which the active military and citizens were affected by the hidden spoiling activities. Consequently, the government and media became affected by the military dominance. In regard to tactics over the subjects, covert operation and coup were utilized over citizens. At the same time, the active military benefitted from support provided by like-minded actors. Government, on the other hand, became affected by covert operation, accusation, manipulation, and gray propaganda.

Case data that shows that 52% of the subjects was real victims of hidden spoiling activities. While 27% actively participated in such activities, %20 of subjects were somewhat linked to hidden spoiling. In the 28 February process, subjects became mostly real victims when hidden spoilers became motivated by an ideological threat perception.
However, when the hidden spoilers felt financial threat and acted to maximize their financial power they did not hesitate victimizing their colleagues.

Finally, hidden spoilers largely aimed to affect elites of Turkish society. This data corresponds with the unique non-violence characteristic of the 28 February process. Instead of employing brute military force, hidden spoilers chose to mobilize “weaponless powers” (i.e. elites) of Turkish society. As expected, overall society was prioritized in targeting right after the elites.

6.2.1.3) Ergenekon Case

The analysis of this case performed by the coding of 9285 pages of 317 files of qualitative data. The majority of the sources were from the Turkish Internet media and newspapers. English sources were mostly newspapers and journal articles. In this case, hidden spoilers were mostly driven by their political and ideological power maximization calculations. Besides, their actions were motivated by an ideological threat perception. In this case, the lack of mechanisms of accountability and proper practice of the rule of law were revealed as the most common factors that facilitated the actors’ decision-making process in engaging in hidden spoiling activities that was followed by military dominance. The analysis of tactics indicates that covert operation was the most commonly utilized tactics of the hidden spoilers. This information supports the evidence presented in the literature review section, since for many years, especially after mysterious killings and coups, high level politicians and bureaucrats, and citizens suspected the possibility of stay behind activities in Turkey. However, Ergenekon network succeeded in remaining hidden and untouched.
In terms of relationships, the case data showed that the lack of the mechanisms of accountability led the hidden spoilers to mobilize political and ideological power maximization intentions. In addition to these, ideological threat perception was also significantly related to the lack of any mechanisms of accountability.

Consequently, when the above mentioned factors and motivations were met in the Ergenekon case, the hidden spoilers preferred to employ covert operations, plots, manipulation, false flag assassination, and gray propaganda respectively. Moreover, the combination of these factors and motivations resulted in deaths of individuals and also in large numbers, accompanied by social and judicial issues. In terms of common tactics and conflict relations, deaths and social conflicts appeared result from the covert operations of hidden spoilers. Here, the false flag assassinations and plots led to the deaths of individuals.

The case data revealed that the leading actor of hidden spoiling in the Ergenekon case was the Para-military, followed by the active military. This data also supports the evidence in the literature. Although, stay behind activities in Turkey can be traced to the Ottoman era, the institutional establishment of such an organization coincided with the creation of similar organizations in different countries of Europe as a U.S. policy to counteract Russian expansionism. As in many other similar organizations, Turkey’s stay behind army was structured as an independent branch under the Turkish Armed Forces. Thus, when investigating the hidden spoiling activities of Turkish stay behind army, data revealed the Para-military and the active military as the most common actors.
The dimensional analysis shows that Turkey’s stay behind army intensified its actions when there was no fear of accountability and they protected by the shield of military tutelage. Existing ideological tensions that were related with the worldview of the members of Ergenekon were also an important factor. As expected, these three factors were also valid for the active military, since in most cases, members of both groups were the same individuals or at least they were acting together. Accordingly, both Para-military and active military showed similar motivational inclinations in engaging hidden spoiling. Living in an environment of the above-mentioned factors, they acted on strengthening their power in political sphere, ideological standings, also seeing this as an opportunity to galvanize their power, in general.

Another important motivation was ideological threat perception. Here, there is a vicious circle of relationships between power maximization and ideological threat perceptions. Pursuing Kemalist secular worldview, members of the Turkish stay behind organization felt threatened by any changes in the activities, organizational capacities, and financial power of the religious groups. Having Iran’s Islamic Revolution as a defining example, they believed that if religious people gain strength in political life they would definitely try to replicate Iran’s revolution to transform Turkey into an Islamic Sharia state in which there would be no space for secular people. Based on this approach, they believed that to prevent such an attempt they must stay strong.

However, in time, it turned out that increasing power became a goal instead of being a tool. In such a mind set, efforts of democratization, and more importantly, even the very existence of religious people became perceived as a threat. Thus, they began to
fabricate threats through hidden spoiling in order to justify their actions (even coups) to gain more power, and crush any possible attempts to transform Turkey to a more democratic country by normalizing the military’s position in the system. Having such an agenda both Para-military and active military relied heavily on covert actions that were supported by plots, false flag assassinations, false flag terrorism, gray propaganda and black propaganda.

As mentioned in the literature, during the long history of coups, killings and terror attacks it was believed that those actions were tied with the deep state in Turkey. Coinciding with this, data shows that 66% of the actors were state affiliated where as 25% were state actors. Regarding the centrality of the actors, almost all (96%) actors were at the core of hidden spoiling, and the remaining number (4%) were somewhat linked.

With respect to subjects, hidden spoilers in the Ergenekon case mostly aimed to affect government, which revealed itself as Turkish Armed Forces interference in the context of political life. Next, legal organizations and NGOs were affected since they were used to mobilize the public besides the actors. Citizens, terrorist organizations, media, active military, and minorities were also affected by hidden spoiling. Data shows that it was preferable to target the government if military dominance, lack of the mechanisms of accountability, lack of properly functioning media, and tensions regarding the actors’ worldview exist in the system. Similar conditions, with the addition of the lack of rule of law, created fitting environment for hidden spoilers for choosing to affect legal organizations and NGOs. Moreover, the active military were targeted in situations where
military dominance prevailed. In their actions over government, hidden spoilers most commonly employed covert operation. Besides that, accusation, plot, and manipulation were also utilized. The same tactics were also used on legal organizations and NGOs. Ergenekon, on the other hand, exploited terrorist organizations, via covert operation to conduct false flag attacks.

Although most of the subjects appeared as real victims of hidden spoiling, 10% of them were at the core of hidden spoiling, but became victimized by others over the course of hidden spoilers’ interests. People, linked to the hidden spoiling actions were also affected by hidden spoiling. This was either because hidden spoilers would like to pull them to the core of hidden spoiling activities or just wanted to use them. Regarding the motivational dimension, subjects were more likely to be real victims when hidden spoilers acted on political power maximization, ideological power maximization, opportunist power maximization, and ideological threat perception. Similar pattern with lower degrees of relationship were also valid for linked groups and peoples or groups at the core of hidden spoiling.

Finally, the Ergenekon network chose to mostly target (71%) the elites of Turkish society since the Ergenekon structure knew that whatever action (from manipulation to assassination) they exercised over elites, this would affect and amplify their efforts in manipulating society. Accordingly, they spent their remaining efforts on targeting ordinary citizens and individuals.
6.2.2) Cross-case Analysis

Chapter 5 also provides a comparative analysis of the three cases. Through the analysis, in total, 13658 pages of 827 of files of qualitative data were processed. According to the data, there were not only threats against ideological standings and security of the actors, but also existing conditions provided an opportunity for the actors to engage in hidden spoiling. These results show that the motivation behind hidden spoiling is not purely defensive, but also to increase their relative power in the system.

In terms of factors, the only common pattern across three cases was the existence of accountability issues. Thus, even ideologically or physically threatened or the ongoing tensions provide an opportunity to act, the actors would not go beyond unconventional tactics unless they are certain of not being held responsible for their hidden spoiling activities.

In concordance with the literature, covert operation was the most common form of all the tactics employed by hidden spoilers. However, accusation, manipulation, and grey propaganda were also used in order to reach the desired outcomes.

The factor-motivation analysis showed a combination of ideological threat perception and issues with accountability provided a pattern, which means that if a system lacks mechanisms of accountability, and actors feel ideologically threatened they will be more inclined to engage in hidden spoiling activities. In such situations, one is more likely to see hidden spoiling in forms of covert operation and gray propaganda. Moreover, in such an environment, when hidden spoiling is conducted via covert operation and gray propaganda one is more like to see judicial violations and social
conflicts. However, the cross-case data does not provide a significant pattern for linking certain tactics with certain outcomes.

Regarding actors, the analysis does not demonstrate a pattern across three cases. On the other hand, dual occurrences can be seen at significant levels with the following actors: Para-military, active military, media, and NGOs. In terms of factors, the data shows that governments tend to engage in hidden spoiling when it feels no fear of being held responsible for its actions. Moreover, during case related ideological conflicts it is more likely that one will see media acting as a hidden spoiler. Regarding motivations and actors, the data indicated that media would be more prone to engage in hidden spoiling when it feels that its ideological standing is threatened or when the ongoing situation provides an opportunity to expand its relative power in the system.

According to the analysis of tactics, Para-military prioritizes covert operation and accusation, and media does the same for gray propaganda and accusation. Besides, when the Para-military and active military are basically the same people or acting together, as we saw in the 28 February Post-modern Coup and Ergenekon, the active military tends to share same tactics with the Para-military. With respect to the actor’s affiliation and its role in hidden spoiling, data indicated that at least 25% of the actors were state actors. Thus, if a state system lacks functional mechanisms of accountability and its government feels ideologically threatened, it is more likely to see this government involved in hidden spoiling. Moreover, at least 59% of all actors were at the core of hidden spoiling, which means they are intentionally performing such actions.
The data analysis revealed that governments and citizens are affected by hidden spoiling as shown in the three cases studied here. Moreover, dual occurrences were found at significant levels with media and minorities. Regarding dimensional relationships, if a system lacks free media it is more likely to see citizens and media become targeted by hidden spoilers. Besides, if military dominance and accountability issues exist citizens and governments may be more prone to be affected by hidden spoiling.

In terms of tactics, accusation, manipulation, and gray propaganda exercised over government. Manipulation was also employed against political or ideological opponents. Furthermore, gray propaganda was utilized over citizens. Lastly, covert operation frequently used over media, citizens, legal organizations/NGOs, and political/ideological opponents. In terms of all subjects across three cases, at least 52% of them appeared as victims, whereas at least 6% are somewhat related and at least 4% of them are at the core of the hidden spoiling activity. This pattern was really crucial because, in concordance with the given literature, it supports my argument about the nature of hidden spoiling. For whatever motivations and factors they rely on, hidden spoilers intend to keep their involvement secret. Thus, although having some suspicions, in many cases not only parties to the conflict, but also scholars and practitioners can remain unaware of such an involvement for many years. This is the point where the strength of hidden spoiling lies, people cannot counteract something that they do not know about. However, being aware of the factors that facilitate the actor’s engagement in hidden spoiling, knowing what motivate them, and the tactics they employed will definitely help policy makers, practitioners, and scholars to develop more efficient conflict resolution programs.
On the other hand, when actors act on the basis of ideological threat perception, political power maximization, and opportunist power maximization, it is more likely the subjects will be viewed solely as victims of hidden spoiling actions. Also, when hidden spoilers act on the basis of political power maximization, it is more likely to see them targeting their own colleagues. Lastly, in all three cases at least 25% of targets are ordinary people (mass). Moreover, at least 8% of all targets are the elites of society, and at least 4% are individual targets.

6.3) Implications of Findings for Theory

As discussed above, although several studies have been conducted regarding the spoiler issue, this dissertation has addressed the limitations of the existing academic literature in order to provide better analytical and practical approaches in dealing with contemporary conflicts.

First, the existing literature limits the scope of discussions on the spoiling concept solely to peace agreements, which has led to the failure of researchers and others to encompass a clear understanding of the concept. However, this dissertation argues that spoiling should not be considered as something related only with the settlement process, instead it is also an action to destroy or prevent peace. Another significant limitation of the existing literature that it addresses only the manifest parties of the peace process, which requires the identification of spoiler parties. However, this dissertation posits that since spoiling is an action to initiate or broaden the conflict, in many cases it is preferable for spoilers to act in a disguised manner. In this broader sense, this study promotes the “hidden spoiler” concept and defines this as *any actor who is expecting benefit(s) from*
triggering a new conflict and/or from escalating an existing conflict between certain parties by utilizing a variety of actions with the intent to keep its involvement secret. By focusing on the “destructive” nature of spoiling, this definition can be applied not just to states or rebel groups, but also to any actor who engages in spoiling. Besides, it also expands existing definitions beyond violent tactics and overt actions. Contrary to Kim’s (2001) argument, here the intention of acting covertly is not because overt means would be unsuccessful, instead remaining disguised will better serve to reach the actor’s goals and avoid trouble. In that sense, this study supports Clausewitz’s realist idea that war is a continuation of politics by other means (Hoffman, 2009; Levy, 2007). Here, relying on a cost-benefit analysis (Findley, 2007, p. 187), hidden spoiling is just another way of pursuing interests.

Second, being the first study to discuss the concept of hidden spoiling, by analyzing motivations, factors, and tactics of hidden spoiling this dissertation aimed to provide a better conceptualization of conflicts and their resolution challenges. By providing such an analysis, this dissertation also challenges major international relations and conflict analysis and resolution theories regarding their idea that it is necessary to identify parties involved in the conflict in order to determine their goals and develop intervention strategies. However, in many cases identifying the parties is simply not possible, especially when they act in a disguised way, but this does not mean that we cannot develop intervention strategies. I argue that even though a doctor does not know how to define the illness of his patient, it is possible to diagnose symptoms of this illness, and based on this assessment he/she can recommend treatment to isolate the effects of
this very illness. Moreover, in agreement with Reiter (2011), I believe that if someone knows what the symptoms are then spoiling behavior is predictable, and it is possible to develop intervention strategies for preventing or tackling hidden spoiling by addressing the related motivations, factors, and tactics.

Third, findings of this dissertation show that hidden spoiling appears as to take place in form of covert operations by both state and non-state actors, namely by deep state actors. O’Neil (2013) stated that the deep state considers itself the guardian of national values against external and internal threats. Data analysis reveals that being an amalgam of like-minded various state and non-state actors, deep state organizations form an identity that believes their values are above everything, and their actions are justified on this ground (Kilic, 1998). However, according to the data analysis, the actions of a deep state do not rely solely on threat perceptions, but also on power maximization incentives. Therefore, this dissertation argues that on many occasions the line between defending one’s national values (goal) and maintaining control over the system (tool) begins to blur, and the latter becomes a real goal hiding under the initial goal. In that sense, a deep state resembles Lauth’s (2000) informal institutions that act on common survival and welfare interests.

Last, but not least, having said that hidden spoilers act on a cost-benefit analysis for their survival and interests, this dissertation reveals that hidden spoilers act like identity groups in the way that realistic conflict theory suggests, that is, group identity is formed around the defense and achievement of group interests (Korostelina, 2007). Since this dissertation aimed to enhance the analytical approaches in the literature, while
providing an understanding of the dynamics of hidden spoiling for purposes of predicting or detecting hidden spoiler involvement in a given conflict situation, it also contributes to the “early warning” studies in conflict analysis and resolution field.

In her identity-based early warning system, Korostelina (Korostelina, 2007, 2009) states that by looking into certain indicators, an early warning system can help to predict the escalation of identity based conflicts. She depicts five groups of factors: identity characteristics, intergroup relations, nation and minorities, types of culture, and forms and types of identity. To her, it is crucial to collect information about each and every factor and assess its impact.
As discussed before, in conventional theories of both international relations and conflict analysis and resolution fields the very first step of analysis is to identify manifest parties of a conflict, and the remaining steps rely on this identification. This dissertation argues that such an approach is not only mechanical in terms of logistics but is also limited in scope, since in many cases the active parties of a conflict are not limited to the manifest ones. On the contrary, an efficient analysis requires a more holistic approach. Therefore, at the beginning of such and analysis, scholars and practitioners should look for other aspects too, such as critical events in recent history, tactics employed in these
events, and cultural and structural characteristics of concerned societies and states. A combination of such factors and their analysis will also provide information about significant actors in the system of concern.

Therefore, this dissertation suggests that Korostelina’s early warning model should be considered within this context. By doing so, this will become a more effective analytical tool since it will also allow scholars and practitioners to monitor actors that might be/will be engaging in hidden spoiling.

Using such a holistic lens over Korostelina’s early warning model, findings of this dissertation show that people that engage in hidden spoiling are not only satisfied with the social status that comes with their group participation, as we saw in members of the administration body of the Ataturkist Thought Association (ATA), but also proud members of this group. Moreover, rulers of the ATA have a strong identity silence with a belief of “supremacy of ingroup goals and values over individual goals and values” (Korostelina, 2009, p. 105).

Besides, a strong secularist ideology is an essential part of their “identity meaning”. Here, they not only define themselves with the ATA (collective identity) but also form their own intergroup relations based on their perceived comparisons regarding power, status, and position (mobilized form). Having such an “acquired identity” the ATA rulers associated with sharp ultra-nationalism (low axiological balance, high collective generality). Moreover, being fellow members of a “collectivistic” Turkish society, the ATA rulers do not hesitate to confront others for the sake of their ideological standings (Korostelina, 2009, pp. 107–108).
While seeing themselves as the true representatives of a modern-secular Turkey, these people developed negative attitudes towards (intergroup prejudice) others who did not share similar perspectives. They not only shared this common perception of others, but also the same goals and will to fight for them (ingroup support). They believed that the electoral victory of the Islamists (i.e. Welfare Party, Justice and Development Party), which would put them into an advantageous position (relative deprivation) in the ruling system, would be their loss (security dilemma). Having such a worldview, they have become more sensitive to the “outgroup threat”, whether these are real or perceived.

At the beginning of the Turkish Republic a strong, modern-secularist national identity was adopted by Ataturk himself (national identity formation). Although it was presented as a “civic” identity, actually it was an “ethnic” identity (concept of national identity) since the state depicts only its Turkish identity to its citizens. The above mentioned electoral victory also weakened their existence in the contexts of political mechanisms (experience of dominance) and created a new political environment where their ideology became a minority one (majority/minority position and size). Having such a perception, and observing increased diplomatic relations with Iran (transnational affinities), they thought that the Islamists would like to transform Ataturk’s modern secular Turkey into an Islamic state, just like Iran did in 1979.

As a result, findings of this dissertation support the logistic presentation of Korostelina’s early warning model based on its capability of addressing the identity aspects of active and/or potential hidden spoilers. On the other hand, the cross-case data analysis indicates that hidden spoilers not only act on ideological or security (physical)
threat perceptions, but also desire to increase their relative power in the system. Thus, although this model offers certain moderating factors that increase the effects of others, and the role of an “outgroup threat” and a “security dilemma” are already located among those, the significance of these two factors suggests an addition of weight multiplier system for moderating factors of the model in order to assess their effect over other factors more realistically.

Accordingly, Sandole (1998) argued that conflict shows general patterns that are mainly similar in various forms of human relations and animal life. As a result, in the conflict analysis and resolution field it is fruitful to search for “common elements”. In his efforts for discovering such patterns, Sandole developed “Three Pillar Framework” (3PF) for analyzing and resolving conflicts (D. J. Sandole, 2008).
Table 4. A comprehensive mapping of conflict and conflict resolution: A three pillar approach

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<tr>
<th>Pillar 2</th>
<th>Pillar 1</th>
<th>Pillar 3</th>
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<td><strong>Conflict Causes and Conditions</strong></td>
<td><strong>Conflict</strong></td>
<td><strong>Conflict Intervention</strong></td>
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<td>Individual level</td>
<td>[Latent (Pre-MCP)]</td>
<td>3rd-Party Objectives</td>
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<tr>
<td>Societal level</td>
<td>MCP/AMCP</td>
<td>[Violent]</td>
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<td>Int’l level</td>
<td>Parties</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention</td>
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<td>Global/Ecological Level</td>
<td>Issues</td>
<td>Conflict Management</td>
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<td>Conflict environment</td>
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<td>Track I and/or Multitack</td>
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<td>actors and processes</td>
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According to Sandole conflict is:

“a process characterized by origins, escalation, controlled maintenance, de-escalation, and some kind of termination.

...

As a process, conflict may be latent: not yet clear to the potential parties, but on its way to becoming at least a manifest conflict process (MCP). An MCP is a situation characterized by at least two parties pursuing their perceptions of
mutually incompatible goals by undermining each other’s goal-seeking capability.” (D. J. Sandole, 2007, p. 23)

Besides, for him, both scholars and practitioners in the conflict analysis resolution field placed their efforts on preventing the escalation of pre-MCP or MCP into an aggressive manifest conflict process (AMCP), in which parties strive for their perceptions of mutually incompatible goals through either damaging/destroying high value symbols of one another or injuring/killing one another (D. J. Sandole, 2007, 2008).

In the 3PF Sandole places the characteristics of a certain conflict under pillar 1, the causes and conditions under pillar 2, and conflict intervention perspectives under pillar 3 (D. J. Sandole, 2008, p. 42). Pillar 1 of the 3PF coincides with the analytical framework of this dissertation, where “parties” are “actors”, “issues” are “motivations”, “objectives” are “factors”, and “means” are “tactics”. Thus, pillar 1 represents the aspects of conflict that scholars and practitioners in the conflict analysis and resolution field need to observe and understand in order to build better intervention strategies.

Besides, Sandole believes that the 3PF can be used for determining the conceptual grounds of an early warning mechanism, which will become more effective when assisted by a computer (D. J. Sandole, 2007, p. 178; 210). Thus, he argues that an MCP should not be considered as something bad or unwanted, since it might serve as an early warning indicator (D. J. Sandole, 1998). In any given conflict situation, various distinct and measurable indicators can be monitored, such as violent actions, the amount of people killed, and the level of property damage based on its economic value (D. J. Sandole, 2004).
Consequently, this dissertation argues that in many cases it might not be possible to identify the parties of a particular conflict, and even this is not necessary. Since, often some parties (hidden spoilers) cannot be identified, in agreement with Sandole’s early warning indicators concept, this dissertation also suggests that scholars and practitioners in the conflict analysis and resolution field should focus on identifying the “common patterns” of “indicators” in their conflict analysis efforts so that they can build more effective intervention strategies to prevent the emergence of a conflict or de-escalate an ongoing one.

Moreover, findings of this dissertation also support Sandole’s “misattributed conflicts” approach. He states that if there is no enemy to blame, political leaders might invent enemies to utilize their existence as a threat source in order to maintain power or initiate a conflict (D. J. Sandole, 2007, p. 33).

Within this context, this dissertation suggests that even though none of the indicators that are listed by Korostelina and/or Sandole really exist, they can be fabricated by certain actors to mobilize people through utilization of covert operations in situations where calculations of those actors (hidden spoilers) require one to engage a conflict or to start a new one.

6.4) Implications of Findings for Policy

The findings of the cross-case analysis of this dissertation also provide policy implications. First, those attempting to design an intervention to end conflicts should carefully analyze the conflict background, dynamics, and significant events of recent history. While conducting such an investigation, scholars and/or practitioners should
consider integrating the findings of this dissertation to their analytical approach by seeking identified tactics, factors, and motivations of hidden spoilers as indicators of an involvement. If a hidden spoiler involvement exists then better intervention strategies can be develop by implementing strategies to deter, isolate or completely stop hidden spoiling.

Second, cross-case data analysis reveals that although factors might be same in different conflict settings their impact on hidden spoiling could differ. Moreover, it is wrong to assume that in a conflict setting all parties would be seek peace (Newman & Richmond, 2010), instead, as most of the hidden spoilers, some groups might have desires to prolong or escalate conflict. Therefore, policy-makers should know that their strategic analysis should include a consideration of all dimensions and relations among them. By doing so, they can correctly identify the problems and offer solutions.

Third, findings indicate that in all three cases, hidden spoilers were members of a deep state comprised of state and non-state actors that were acting covertly. Moreover, findings also show that the emergence of such groups and possibility of their engagement increases in situations where systems lacks mechanisms of accountability, suffers from conflicts and military dominance. Here, military dominance requires significant attention, since while benefiting from its supra-political positions military acts in complete autonomy as if it is “a state in a state” (G. Jenkins, 2001; Tessler & Altinoglu, 2004). Thus, the deep state may be mostly organized as a covert branch within military in order to utilize its power and network. More importantly, data analysis indicates that even military dominance and threat perception exist actors are not blindly inclined towards
hidden spoiling unless they have no fear of being held accountable from their actions. As a result, policy-makers and practitioners should prioritize intervention strategies regarding establishing mechanisms of accountability in a given conflict setting. Having properly functioning accountability mechanisms will deter existing hidden spoilers from engaging in even more actions while policy-makers and practitioners try to implement strategies for bringing the military under civil democratic control.

Lastly, analysis of the tactical dimensions reveals that hidden spoilers justify the usage of all sorts of actions from organizing riots to killings for the sake of their interests. Accordingly, findings of this dissertation also support findings of several studies (Grigoriadis & Özer, 2010; Söyler, 2012; Yesilgöz & Bovenkerk, 2004) that report that when military autonomy is strong in a system, a deep state either creates its own underworld and/or develop links with existing organized crime groups, the mafia, and terrorist organizations in order to carry out political assassinations or regular crimes to create funds for conducting other hidden spoiling activities. This is a significant contribution of this dissertation to the security studies. Since, in Turkey, several organized crime groups, the mafia, and terrorist organizations have carried out operations for many years by establishing a patron-client relationship with the deep state and by enjoying its support and protection. Moreover, even after the discovery of this linkage perpetrators remained un-judged (Yesilgöz & Bovenkerk, 2004). Therefore, in their counter-terrorism and organized crime prevention efforts, policy makers should be aware of such a relationship and develop their strategies accordingly.
6.5) Implications of Findings for Research

Although this dissertation provides a multiple case analysis of three cases in order to discover motivational, factorial, and tactical aspects of the hidden spoiling issue, it is the first study on the concept and several topics should be explored in future research.

First, the analysis on motivations tries to explore incentives behind the hidden spoiling activities. However, this dissertation did not cover the decision-making mechanism (which includes the logic of a cost-benefit analysis, capabilities, timing, etc.) of hidden spoilers. Thus it will be useful for future researchers to investigate how decision-making works for hidden spoilers.

Second, although some insights are provided in this section, because of the data size and software limitations this dissertation did not include a weight analysis of the hidden spoiling dimensions, which would help prioritizing intervention strategies. Therefore, if technical resources become more capable, future research consisting of a weight analysis of some aspect examined will help in developing more efficient intervention strategies.

Third, one of the major contributions of this dissertation is highlighting the link between hidden spoilers and the underworld, namely organized-crime groups, the mafia, and terrorist organizations. Despite that, future research involving a deeper analysis of the nature of the relation between hidden spoilers and these crime groups will be useful for policy-makers and security forces in their efforts of fighting with such crime.

Forth, this dissertation also did not analyze the aspect of interest regarding hidden spoilers. Since, interests can be relative or absolute their impact on hidden spoiling could
be different for various actors. Thus, future research on hidden spoiler interests will help to develop the concept in a more holistic way.

Last, but not the least, as discussed above, the sensitive nature of the hidden spoiling issue leads to data access problems. Therefore, the author of this dissertation decided to study hidden spoiling activities of Turkey to be able to access sufficient data. However, future research of hidden spoilers that consists of multiple cases, multinational, and contemporary conflict data will definitely provide substantial evidence for building a new analytical approach, which entails hidden spoiling.

6.6) Conclusions

This dissertation contributes to conflict analysis and resolution field by bringing the concept of hidden spoiling to the fore and analyzing some of its aspects. It demonstrates that some actors have no incentive for building peace for certain conflict settings, instead they might be eager to escalate the existing discord or trigger a new conflict as soon as a conflict serves their interests. Moreover, it also argues that such mostly keep their engagements hidden in order to avoid undesired consequences.

Although hidden spoiling has never been studied before, based on its findings this dissertation posits that their role in contemporary conflicts should not be underestimated. In today’s world many things become interdependent and so do the interests of the actors. In such an environment one is more likely to see the clash of interests. Therefore, in pursuit of their goals actors might choose to engage in hidden spoiling. Consequently, peace efforts that ignore an investigation of the existence of hidden spoiler involvement
are doomed to fail, because they cannot anticipate or control the hidden spoiler’s impact over the conflict dynamics.

In that sense, this dissertation states that even though it will not be possible to clearly identify hidden spoilers in every conflict setting, it is possible to investigate and discover their involvement by looking at certain indicators, namely motivations, factors, and tactics. The information gathered from this analysis will help scholars, practitioners, and policy-makers to reach a more comprehensive understanding of conflict dynamics and so build a set of more efficient intervention strategies for establishing a long-lasting stable peace.
Geography: Turkey

Location:
Southeastern Europe and Southwestern Asia (that portion of Turkey west of the Bosporus is geographically part of Europe), bordering the Black Sea, between Bulgaria and Georgia, and bordering the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, between Greece and Syria

Area:
Total: 783,562 sq. km
Country comparison to the world: 37
Land: 769,632 sq. km
Water: 13,930 sq. km

Area - comparative:
Slightly larger than Texas

People and Society: Turkey

Nationality:
Noun: Turk(s) adjective: Turkish

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**Ethnic groups:**
Turkish 70-75%, Kurdish 18%, other minorities 7-12% (2008 est.)

**Languages:**
Turkish (official), Kurdish, other minority languages

**Religions:**
Muslim 99.8% (mostly Sunni), other 0.2% (mostly Christians and Jews)

**Population:**
81,619,392 (July 2014 est.)
Country comparison to the world: 17

**Urbanization:**
Urban population: 71.5% of total population (2011)
Rate of urbanization: 2.4% annual rate of change (2010-15 est.)

**Major urban areas - population:**
Istanbul 10.378 million; ANKARA (capital) 3.846 million; Izmir 2.679 million; Bursa 1.559 million; Adana 1.339 million (2009)

**Government:** Turkey

**Country name:**
Conventional long form: Republic of Turkey
Conventional short form: Turkey local long form: Turkiye Cumhuriyeti
Local short form: Turkiye

**Government type:**
Republican parliamentary democracy
**Capital:**

Name: Ankara

Geographic coordinates: 39 56 N, 32 52 E

Time difference: UTC+2 (7 hours ahead of Washington, DC during Standard Time)

Daylight saving time: +1hr, begins last Sunday in March; ends last Sunday in October

**Administrative divisions:**


**Independence:**

29 October 1923 (successor state to the Ottoman Empire)

**Constitution:**

Legal system:

Civil law system based on various European legal systems notably the Swiss civil code; note - member of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), although Turkey claims limited derogations on the ratified European Convention on Human Rights

Executive branch:

Chief of state: President Recep Tayyip ERDOGAN (since 28 August 2014)⁴²

Head of government: Prime Minister Ahmet DAVUTOGLU (since 29 August 2014)⁴³

Cabinet: Council of Ministers appointed by the president on the nomination of the prime minister

Legislative branch:

Unicameral Grand National Assembly of Turkey or Turkiye Buyuk Millet Meclisi (550 seats; members elected by popular vote to serve four-year terms)

Elections: last held on 12 June 2011 (next likely to be held by June 2015)

Election results: percent of vote by party - AKP 49.8%, CHP 25.9%, MHP 13%, independents 6.6%, other 4.7%; seats by party - AKP 326, CHP 135, MHP 53, independents 36; note - only parties surpassing the 10% threshold are entitled to parliamentary seats

⁴² Original source was outdated. Updated by author on 1/2/2015.
⁴³ Original source was outdated. Updated by author on 1/2/2015.
**Judicial branch:**

**Highest court(s):**

Constitutional Court (consists of 17 members); Supreme Court of Appeals organized into 15 divisions with 38 civil and criminal chambers and consisting of 250 high judges and 440 rapporteur judges).

**Judge selection and term of office:**

Constitutional Court judges appointed by the president from among candidates submitted by plenary assemblies of other courts, the Higher Education Council, senior government administrators, and lawyers; judges appointed for 12-year, non-renewable terms and with mandatory retirement at age 65; Supreme Court of Appeals judges appointed by the Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors; judge tenure N/A

**Subordinate courts:**

Council of State (Danistay); Court of Accounts (Sayistay); Military High Court of Appeals; Military High Administrative Court

**Economy: Turkey**

GDP (purchasing power parity):

$1.167 trillion (2013 est.)

Country comparison to the world: 17

**Agriculture - products:**

Tobacco, cotton, grain, olives, sugar beets, hazelnuts, pulses, citrus; livestock
Industries:
Textiles, food processing, autos, electronics, mining (coal, chromate, copper, boron),
steel, petroleum, construction, lumber, paper

Unemployment rate:
9.3% (2013 est.)
Country comparison to the world: 101
9.2% (2012 est.)
Note: underemployment amounted to 4% in 2008

Population below poverty line:
16.9% (2010)

Budget:
Revenues: $190.4 billion
Expenditures: $207.9 billion (2013 est.)

Taxes and other revenues:
23.2% of GDP (2013 est.)
Country comparison to the world: 145
Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-): -2.1% of GDP (2013 est.)
Country comparison to the world: 87

Public debt:
36.6% of GDP (2013 est.)
Country comparison to the world: 102
37.6% of GDP (2012 est.)
Inflation rate (consumer prices):
7.6% (2013 est.)
Country comparison to the world: 191
8.9% (2012 est.)

Military: Turkey

Military branches:
Turkish Armed Forces (TSK): Turkish Land Forces (Turk Kara Kuvvetleri), Turkish Naval Forces (Turk Deniz Kuvvetleri; includes naval air and naval infantry), Turkish Air Forces (Turk Hava Kuvvetleri) (2013)

Military expenditures:
2.31% of GDP (2012)
Country comparison to the world: 35
2.28% of GDP (2011)
2.31% of GDP (2010)
APPENDIX 2: ERGENEKON CHART

ERGENEKON LEADER

COMMAND CENTER
Fikret Emek

Isoalted from cell units, reports directly to leader

SIX CELL UNITS UNDER THE LEADER

1. INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT COMMAND
2. INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS COMMAND
3. OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT COMMAND
4. FINANCING ADMINISTRATION (CIVILIAN)
5. INTRA-ORGANIZATION RESEARCH DEPARTMENT COMMAND
6. THEORY DESIGN AND PLANNING DEPARTMENT (CIVILIAN)

THE BRIDGE PERSONNEL
Facilitates coordination between the clandestine units of the organization and the civilian Lobby branch’s units

Veli Küçük
Muzaffer Tekin

THE TOP LEVEL ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ERGENEKON TERRORIST ORGANIZATION
THEORY DESIGN AND PLANNING DEPARTMENT (CIVILIAN)

Kemal Yalçın
Alemdaroğlu
Deputy Chairman

İhan Selçuk
Chairman

Doğu Perincek
Deputy Chairman

Mehmet Fikri
Karadag

Veli Küçük
Bridge personnel

Muzaffer Tekin
Bridge personnel

Seyfi Ernerol

ADMINISTRATORS OF THE CIVILIAN LOBBY GROUP

M. Zekeriyar Özalp
Kemal Kerincişiz
Ismail Yıldız
Erkut Ersoy
APPENDIX 3. CODEBOOK OF NODES

Codebook of Nodes

### CASES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CASES</td>
<td>Theme node for indicating cases.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CASES/28 FEBRUARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28 FEBRUARY</td>
<td>Child node for 28 February 1997 Post-modern Coup case.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CASES/6-7 SEPTEMBER POGROM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6-7 SEPTEMBER POGROM</td>
<td>Child Note for 6-7 September 1955 Istanbul Pogrom case.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Nodes/CASES/ERGENEKON

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ERGENEKON</td>
<td>Child node for Ergenekon case. This is the major case of the research that consist all Ergenekon related trials and investigations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Nodes/CONFLICT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONFLICT</td>
<td>Theme node for indicating either a new conflict that is created by hidden spoiler(s) or an existing conflict, which is engaged in by hidden spoilers to reach their goals.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Nodes/CONFLICT/Non-violent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-violent</td>
<td>Node for indicating non-violent conflicts by aggregating its child nodes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Nodes/CONFLICT/Non-violent/Economical

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economical</td>
<td>Child node for coding conflict situations that cause wealth reduction, un-equal economic opportunity or loss of economical</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Nodes\CONFLICT\Non-violent\Judicial

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Judicial</td>
<td>Child node for coding conflict situations that cause judicial violations (regarding democratic institutions such as human rights, civil liberties and equality before law) for at least one party of the conflict.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Nodes\CONFLICT\Non-violent\Social

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Child node for coding conflict situations that lead alienation, disturbance or pressure on at least one party of the conflict.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Nodes\CONFLICT\Violent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violent</td>
<td>Node for indicating violent conflicts by aggregating its child nodes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death</td>
<td>Node for indicating a violent action that caused death by aggregating its child nodes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D-Individual</td>
<td>Child node for coding the deaths of less than 4 people.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D-Mass</td>
<td>Child node for coding the deaths of more than 3 people.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Injury</td>
<td>Node for indicating a violent action that cause injury by aggregating its child nodes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Nodes \CONFLICT\ Violent\ Injury\ I-Individual

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I-Individual</td>
<td>Child node for coding individual injuries of less than 4 people.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Nodes \CONFLICT\ Violent\ Injury\ I-Mass

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I-Mass</td>
<td>Child node for coding injuries of more than 3 people.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Nodes \CONFLICT\ Violent\ Property

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Property</td>
<td>Node for indicating a violent action against property by aggregating its child nodes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
###Nodes\CONFLICT\Violent\Property\P-Large

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P-Large</td>
<td>Child Node for coding violent actions against property, which is big in number and large in size. Here focus is on the magnitude of damage. Such as burning down several houses and cars.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

###Nodes\CONFLICT\Violent\Property\P-Small

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P-Small</td>
<td>Child Node for coding violent actions against property, which is few in number and small in size. Here focus is on the magnitude of damage. Such as breaking windows of a house or a shop.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

###Nodes\FACTORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FACTORS</td>
<td>Theme node for indicating structural circumstances in where hidden spoiling occurs by aggregating its child nodes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Financial Instability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial Instability</td>
<td>Node for coding a situation of financial instability of the state in where hidden spoiling occurs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Lack of Democratic Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Democratic Institutions</td>
<td>Node for indicating lack of democratic institutions in where hidden spoiling occurs by aggregating its child nodes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Freedom of the Press

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of the Press</td>
<td>Child node for coding an issue with the freedom of the press. This refers to the freedom of communication and expression of thoughts via media without any interference. Such interference may come from either state or any kind of entity, and asks for disseminating information in a way that those</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
want to be known or kept from the public.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Issues regarding Civil Society</td>
<td>Child node for coding issues regarding proper functioning civil society.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Issues with Accountability</td>
<td>Child node coding an issue related with the lack of accountability mechanisms of a state or an organization.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

224
Issues with Civil Liberties

Child node for coding an issue related with civil liberties such as freedom of religion, freedom of conscience, freedom of speech, equal treatment, right to a fair trial, right to defense oneself and property.

---

Nodes\FACTORS\Lack of Democratic Institutions\Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Issues with Human Rights</td>
<td>Child node for coding an issue related with fulfillment or violation of human rights.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

Nodes\FACTORS\Lack of Democratic Institutions\Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Issues with Military Dominance</td>
<td>Child node for coding a situation in which military is able to exert power on state’s policies or public and private entities in a state.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Lack of Democratic Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Issues with Rule of Law</td>
<td>Child node for coding issues related rule of law, which is the principle of all members of the society, including government, are subject to the law.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Political instability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political instability</td>
<td>Node for coding a situation of political instability of the state in where hidden spoiling occurs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Tensions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tensions</td>
<td>Node for indicating issues or conflicts in where hidden spoiling occurs by aggregating its child nodes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Nodes\FACTORS\Tensions\Case Related

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Case Related</td>
<td>Node for indicating tensions where hidden spoiling occurred by aggregating its child nodes. Here case related refers to those that are specifically related with case topic.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nodes\FACTORS\Tensions\Case Related\C-Economical

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C-Economical</td>
<td>Child note for coding an economical tension occurred around the case topic.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nodes\FACTORS\Tensions\Case Related\C-Ethnic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C-Ethnic</td>
<td>Child note for coding an ethnic tension occurred around the case topic.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Nodes\FACTORS\Tensions\Case Related\C-Foreign Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C-Foreign Policy</td>
<td>Child note for coding a foreign policy tension occurred around the case topic.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Nodes\FACTORS\Tensions\Case Related\C-Ideological

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C-Ideological</td>
<td>Child note for coding an ideological tension occurred around the case topic.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Nodes\FACTORS\Tensions\General

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>Node for indicating tensions where hidden spoiling occurred by aggregating its child nodes. Here general refers to those are not related with the case specifically.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### General G-Economical

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G-Economical</td>
<td>Child note for coding a general economical tension. Here economical tension refers to those that are resulted by state's economic and financial policy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### General G-Ethnic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G-Ethnic</td>
<td>Child note for coding a general ethnic tension. Here ethnic tension refers to those that are caused around the ideas and the manner of thinking of the state regarding nationalist ideology.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### General G-Ideological

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
G-Ideological

Child note for coding a general ideological tension. Here ideological tension refers to those that are caused by the ideas and the manner of thinking of the state such as secularism, and liberalism.

---

**Nodes**

**MOTIVATION S**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MOTIVATIONS</td>
<td>Theme node for indicating the reasons for engaging into hidden spoiling by aggregating its child nodes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Nodes**

**MOTIVATION S\Power Maximization**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power Maximization</td>
<td>Node for indicating motivations that derive from desire to maximize power by aggregating its child nodes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### MOTIVATION

#### S\Power\Maximization\PM-Financial

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PM-Financial</td>
<td>Child node for coding a situation in which hidden spoilers act for increasing their economical power or keep it as it is. In order to act in this way it is not necessary to seek an opportunity, instead hidden spoilers can create their own.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

### MOTIVATION

#### S\Power\Maximization\PM-Ideological

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PM-Ideological</td>
<td>Child node for coding a situation in which hidden spoilers act for increasing power of their ideological stand or keep it as it is. In order to act in this way it is not necessary to seek an opportunity, instead hidden spoilers can create their own.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### PM-Opponent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PM-Opponent</td>
<td>Child node for coding a situation in which hidden spoilers act for increasing their power in any sort because current circumstances creates an opportunity to do so.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### PM-Political

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PM-Political</td>
<td>Child node for coding a situation in which hidden spoilers act for increasing their political power or keep it as it is. In order to act in this way it is not necessary to seek an opportunity, instead hidden spoilers can create their own.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### MOTIVATION

**S\Threat Perception**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Threat Perception</td>
<td>Node for indicating motivations that drive from threat perception by aggregating its child nodes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**S\Threat Perception\TP-Financial**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TP-Financial</td>
<td>Child node for coding motivations those drive from hidden spoiler's financial interests.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**S\Threat Perception\TP-Ideological**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TP-Ideological</td>
<td>Child node for coding motivations that drive from hidden spoiler's perception that his ideological stand is under threat.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### MOTIVATION

**S\Threat Perception\TP-Political**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TP-Political</td>
<td>Child node for coding motivations that drive from hidden spoiler’s perception that his political power is under threat.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**S\Threat Perception\TP-Security**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TP-Security</td>
<td>Child node for coding motivations that drive from hidden spoiler’s perception that its physical security is under threat.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TACTICS

**TACTICS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TACTICS</td>
<td>Theme node for indicating types of planned and/or applied actions or strategies for carrying out hidden spoiling by aggregating its child nodes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Nodes\TACTICS\Accusation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accusation</td>
<td>Node for coding the action of blaming someone of doing something bad. Any sort of blacklisting also coded under this node.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Nodes\TACTICS\Arson

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arson</td>
<td>Node for indicating the action of setting fire to property by aggregating its child nodes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Nodes\TACTICS\Arson\AR-Direct

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AR-Direct</td>
<td>Child node for coding the action of setting fire to property by hidden spoilers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Nodes\TACTICS\Arson\AR-False Flag

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

AR-False Flag  Child node for coding the action of setting fire to property by hidden spoilers but it is presented as it is done by others.

**Nodes\TACTICS\Assassination**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assassination</td>
<td>Node for indicating murder of a person by aggregating its child nodes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Nodes\TACTICS\Assassination\A-Direct**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A-Direct</td>
<td>Child node for coding an assassination carried by hidden spoilers. Here direct refers that responsibility of murder is on hidden spoiler.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-False Flag</td>
<td>Child node for coding an assassination carried by hidden spoilers. However, someone else is accused for the murder or hidden spoilers did in the way that as it appears to be done by certain people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
<td>Node for indicating the usage of any form of physical attack, including rape, bombing, and beating by aggregating its child node.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-Direct</td>
<td>Child node for coding the usage of physically attack, which is done by hidden spoilers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Nodes\TACTICS\Assault\S-False Flag

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S-False Flag</td>
<td>Child node for coding the usage of physical attack, which is done by hidden spoilers but it is presented as it is done by others.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nodes\TACTICS\Blackmail

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black mail</td>
<td>Node for coding the use of threat to force someone to do something, especially utilizing secret information about the target.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nodes\TACTICS\Coup

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coup</td>
<td>Child note to code actions of taking power from a government using force. Unsuccessful but revealed attempts are also coded under this node.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Nodes\TACTICS\Cover Up

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cover Up</td>
<td>Node for coding the action of preventing people to learn the truth.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Nodes\TACTICS\Covert-OP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Covert-OP</td>
<td>Node for coding the action which is planned and conducted in a way that the real identity of the perpetrator is kept secret, and intended to change something or create an effect in order to reach specific goals.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Nodes\TACTICS\Economical Pressure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economical Pressure</td>
<td>Node for coding government actions against certain people, group, or organization that result financial loss or unequal economic conditions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Nodes\TACTICS\Exploitation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exploitation</td>
<td>Node for coding the action of using certain circumstances to gain unjust advantage.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Nodes\TACTICS\Ignorance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ignorance</td>
<td>Node for coding the action of disregarding something intentionally as it is not happening.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Nodes\TACTICS\Incitement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incitement</td>
<td>Node for indicating the action of provoking illegal behavior or persuading someone to behave illegally, by aggregating its child nodes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Nodes\TACTICS\Incitement\I-Direct

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I-Direct</td>
<td>Child node for coding the action of indictment, which is done by hidden spoiler.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Nodes\TACTICS\Incitement\I-False Flag

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I-False Flag</td>
<td>Child node for coding the action of indictment, which is done by hidden spoiler but it is presented as done by others.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Nodes\TACTICS\Judicial Violations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Judicial Violations</td>
<td>Node for coding judicial practices that ignores rule of law principle.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Nodes\TACTICS\Mafia
Mafia

Node for indicating a situation where a mafia/organized crime organization is involved by aggregating its child nodes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M-Direct</td>
<td>Child node for coding a situation in which a mafia/organized crime organization carried out actions either within the cooperation of hidden spoiler or under hidden spoilers direct control.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Nodes\TACTICS\Mafia\M-Direct**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M-Direct</td>
<td>Child node for coding a situation in which a mafia/organized crime organization carried out actions either within the cooperation of hidden spoiler or under hidden spoilers direct control.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Nodes\TACTICS\Mafia\M-False Flag**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
**M-False Flag**

Child node for coding a situation in which actions were taken by hidden spoilers in the way that as it appears to be done by a mafia organized crime organization or a mafia/organized crime organization is accused for the actions in consider.

---

### Nodes\TACTICS\Manipulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manipulation</td>
<td>Node for coding the action of managing or affecting a person, a group or a situation without any moral constrains or the sense of fairness.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

### Nodes\TACTICS\Plot

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plot</td>
<td>Node for coding a plan made by hidden spoilers do to something illegal and harmful.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Nodes\textbackslash\textbackslash TACTICS\Plunder

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plunder</td>
<td>Node for coding actions of stealing goods via force in times of civil disorder.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Nodes\textbackslash\textbackslash TACTICS\Pogrom

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pogrom</td>
<td>“Pogrom” is a term commonly used to refer to anti-Jewish riots in Russia. Targeting a minority group is the critical aspect of pogrom, which makes it different from riot. Node for coding a situation in which a pogrom is initiated or orchestrated.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Nodes\textbackslash\textbackslash TACTICS\Political Pressure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Pressure</td>
<td>Node for coding the action of a political actor forcing his subordinates to do or not to do something.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Nodes

#### TACTICS\Propaganda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Propaganda</td>
<td>Node for indicating the dissemination of biased or misleading information by hidden spoilers by aggregating its child nodes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Nodes\TACTICS\Propaganda\P-Black

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P-Black</td>
<td>Child node for coding the dissemination of biased or misleading information by hidden spoiler as it comes from another source.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Nodes\TACTICS\Propaganda\P-Gray

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P-Gray</td>
<td>Child node for coding the dissemination of biased or misleading information by neutral (mostly by highly respected media or a journalist).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Propaganda (P-White)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P-White</td>
<td>Child node for coding the dissemination of biased or misleading information by an apparent (mostly government) source.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Riot

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Riot</td>
<td>Node for coding the situation of violent demonstration.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>Node for coding the action of support someone or something to make them able to do something. Such assistance can be in any form such as financial, political, and social.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Nodes\TACTICS\Terrorist

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist</td>
<td>Node for indicating a situation where a terrorist organization is involved by aggregating its child nodes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Nodes\TACTICS\Terrorist\T-Direct

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T-Direct</td>
<td>Child node for coding a situation in which a terrorist organization carried out actions either within the cooperation of hidden spoilers or under hidden spoilers direct control.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Nodes\TACTICS\Terrorist\T-False Flag

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T-False Flag</td>
<td>Child node for coding a situation in which actions were taken by hidden spoilers in the way that as it appears to be done by a terrorist organization or a terrorist organization is accused for the actions in consider.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# TACTICS: Threat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>Node for coding the action of showing an intention to inflict harm to someone.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

# TACTICS: Vandalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vandalism</td>
<td>Node for coding the action of damaging any kind of property.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

# Top Factor Motivation Combinations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Top Factor Motivation Combinations</td>
<td>A dummy node created for grouping top factor motivations of research data.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

# Top Factor Motivation Combinations\28 February TMFC
Nodes\Top Factor
Motivation
Combinations\6-7
September TMFC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6-7 September TMFC</td>
<td>A node that consists top five (5) combinations of motivations and factors in 6-7 September Pogrom case.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nodes\Top Factor
Motivation
Combinations\Ergenek

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ergenekon TFMC</td>
<td>A node that consists top five (5) combinations of motivations and factors in Ergenek case.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Nodes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total TMFC</td>
<td>A node that consists top five (5) combinations of motivations and factors in 6-7 of research data.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 4. CODEBOOK OF NODE CLASSIFICATION

Codebook of Node Classification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute Value</th>
<th>Attribute Value Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Classification</strong></td>
<td><strong>Aspects</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Node classification for classifying hidden spoiler activity based on</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attribute</strong></td>
<td><strong>Actor</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who did hidden spoiling?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>Attribute value for people in academia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Military</td>
<td>Attribute value for active military personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>Attribute value for people in business world, except media.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens</td>
<td>Attribute value for people that have citizenship affiliation with the state in concern.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>Attribute value for ordinary civilians regardless from their citizenship affiliation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite</td>
<td>Attribute value for a group or people that have power and influence within concerned society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-military</td>
<td>Attribute value for former military personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td>Attribute value for people that have citizenship affiliation with another state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Attribute value for the governing body of concerned state as a whole or in part.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Organization</td>
<td>Attribute value for government affiliated organizations, except intelligence organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal Organization</td>
<td>Attribute value for illegally formed organizations, except terrorist organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Agency</td>
<td>Attribute value for structural body or personnel of an intelligence organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judiciary</td>
<td>Attribute value for judicial body of a state as a whole or in part.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Organization/NGO</td>
<td>Attribute value for legally established non-governmental organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>Attribute value for people in media business.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>Attribute value for group of people that are differing from other citizens of concerned state in race, religion, or language.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-military government official</td>
<td>Attribute value for active government officials, except military personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attribute</td>
<td>Actor's Centrality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location of the actor based on his commitment in hidden spoiling activity.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core</td>
<td>Attribute value for actors that are actively engaged in hidden spoiling with full knowledge of their participation in such activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linked</td>
<td>Attribute value for actors that are somewhat related with hidden spoiling but either data does not indicate enough evidence about their involvement or they do not aware of their involvement in such activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Attribute value for actors that data has no indication about their participation in hidden spoiling.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Actor's Orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relative position of the hidden spoiler based on its affiliation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-state</td>
<td>Attribute value for actors that have no affiliation with the government of concerned state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rouge</td>
<td>Attribute value for actors that were initially affiliated with state or non-state structures but later become unattached and started to act on their own agenda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Attribute value for actors that are part of governing body of concerned state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Affiliated</td>
<td>Attribute value for actors that have somewhat affiliation with the concerned state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Attribute value for actors that data indicates no information regarding their affiliation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Attribute | Case Name
--- | ---
In which case hidden spoiling activity has occurred. |  
28 FEBRUARY | Attribute value for 28 February Post-modern Coup case.  
6-7 SEPTEMBER POGROM | Attribute value for 6-7 September Pogrom case.  
ERGENEKON | Attribute value for Ergenekon case.  

### Attribute | Subject
--- | ---
Who is affected by the hidden spoiling activity? |  
Academic | Attribute value for people in academia.  
Active Military | Attribute value for active military personnel.  
Business | Attribute value for people in business world, except media.  
Citizens | Attribute value for people that have citizenship affiliation with the state in concern.  
Civilian | Attribute value for ordinary civilians regardless from citizenship affiliation.  
Ex-military | Attribute value for former military personnel.  
Foreign | Attribute value for people that have citizenship affiliation with another state  
Government | Attribute value for the governing body of concerned state as a whole or in part.  
Government Organization | Attribute value for government-affiliated organizations.  
illegal Organization | Attribute value for illegally formed organizations, except terrorist organization.  
Infrastructure | Attribute value for any kind of physical structure.  
Intelligence Agency | Attribute value for structural body or personnel of an intelligence organization.  
Judiciary | Attribute value for judicial body of a state as a whole or in part.  
Legal Organization/NGO | Attribute value for legally established non-governmental organizations.  
Media | Attribute value for people in media business.  
Minority | Attribute value for group of people that are differing from other citizens of concerned state in race, religion, or language.  
Non-military Government Official | Attribute value for active government officials, except military personnel.  
Para-military | Attribute value for militarized or semi-militarized organizations that utilize illegal or not officially approved tactics to reach its  
Political/Ideological Opposition | Attribute value for groups or people that are in opposition with the ruling government regarding their political or ideological standing.  
Politician | Attribute value for people that are professionally involved in politics.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>Attribute value for people that are affiliated with a professional job, except media, military, government officials, academicians, and politicians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sensitive</td>
<td>Attribute value for high value cultural or national symbol of concerned state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist Organization</td>
<td>Attribute value for terrorist organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Attribute value for undisclosed subjects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union</td>
<td>Attribute value for an organization of people that are affiliated with the same business structure, and formed to protect their rights and interests.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Attribute Name: Subject's Centrality**

*Location of the subject based on his commitment in hidden spoiling activity.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core</th>
<th>Attribute value for subjects that are actively engaged in hidden spoiling with full knowledge of their participation in such activities.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linked</td>
<td>Attribute value for subjects that are somewhat related with hidden spoiling but either data does not indicate enough evidence about their involvement or they do not aware of their involvement in such activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Attribute value for subjects that data has no indication about their participation in hidden spoiling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim</td>
<td>Attribute value for subjects that are damaged, destroyed, injured, or killed as a result of hidden spoiling activities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Attribute Name: Target**

*Who is ultimately aimed to be affected by hidden spoiling?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elite</th>
<th>Attribute value for a targeted group or people that have power and influence within concerned society.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Attribute value for targeted ordinary individuals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass</td>
<td>Attribute value for targeted people that are more than 3 in numbers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Codebook of Source Classification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute Value Description</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Classification</strong></td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source classification for classifying data in order to provide descriptive information.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attribute Name: Case Name</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attribute for classifying sources based on their relevant case.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>28 FEBRUARY</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attribute value for sources related with 28 February</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attribute value for 28 February Post-modern Coup case.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6-7 SEPTEMBER POGROM</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attribute value for sources related with 6-7 September Pogrom case.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ERGENEKON</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attribute value for sources related with 28 Ergenekon case.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Attribute Name: File Type**
- Attribute for classifying source files based on their type. Although, all files converted to PDF original file can be an image file.
  - **Image**
    - Attribute value for sources in image file format.
**PDF**

Attribute value for sources in PDF file format.

---

**Attribute Name:** Item Type  
**Attribute for classifying sources based on type.**

**Blog**

Attribute value for online blogs.

---

**Book**

Attribute value for books.

---

**Book Excerpt**

Attribute value for excerpt(s) of books.

---

**Diary**

Attribute value for personal diaries.

---

**Image**

Attribute value for images.

---

**Indictment**

Attribute value for prosecutor's indictments.

---

**Internet Media**

Attribute value for online news aggregators.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Journal</td>
<td>Attribute value for academic journals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magazine</td>
<td>Attribute value for printed or online magazines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>Attribute value for printed newspapers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official</td>
<td>Attribute value for official document.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poll/Report</td>
<td>Attribute value for polls or reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statistics</td>
<td>Attribute value for statistical data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thesis</td>
<td>Attribute value for theses and dissertations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transcript</td>
<td>Attribute value for transcripts of audio or video data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twitter</td>
<td>Attribute value for twitter posts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Website</td>
<td>Attribute value for websites that are not affiliated with any professional business.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Attribute Name: Language
Attribute for classifying sources based on their language.

**English**
Attribute value for sources in English.

**Turkish**
Attribute value for sources in Turkish.
REFERENCES


TAŞ, H. (2014). Turkey’s Ergenekon Imbroglio and Academia’s Apathy. Insight Turkey, 16(1).


BIOGRAPHY

Can Arik earned his B.A. from the Turkish Police Academy in 2000. He graduated from the Master of International Service program of the American University in 2008, and started the PhD program at the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution in GMU in the same year. He is currently working for the Turkish National Police as a major.