

“TO SAVE THE COUNTRY IS PARAMOUNT TO ALL OTHER
CONSIDERATIONS”: THE DEVELOPMENT OF US ARMY SMALL WARS
DOCTRINE FROM THE PLAINS TO THE PHILIPPINES

by

Owen Willis Berger
A Thesis
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of
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DEDICATION

This is dedicated to my mom, Powell, and to my dad, Darrell, for all of their support and encouragement throughout this process.

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ABSTRACT

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Owen Willis Berger

George Mason University, 2015

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This thesis describes the ways in which the United States Army developed a doctrine to fight the imperial “small wars” of the early twentieth century across Latin America and the Pacific. That doctrine was largely based upon decades of experience fighting Native Americans, Confederates, Klansmen, and striking union members, and refined by experience during the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars. Furthermore, the ways army officers discussed and approached their opponents on the imperial frontier often mirrored past discussions of Native Americans and, as often, organized labor in North America. Finally, this doctrine proved remarkably resilient, and formed the foundation for later American counterinsurgency theory, and was even incorporated into some aspects of international military law in the later twentieth century.

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In the weeks leading up to the 1902 midterm elections, United States Secretary of War Elihu Root arrived in Peoria, Illinois, to campaign for a Republican congressional candidate and to celebrate the U.S. Army’s recent declaration of victory in the so-called Philippine Insurrection. When the secretary described the archipelago’s inhabitants as “millions of men of alien races... most of them ignorant, most of them suspicious,” and all needing to be “pacified and reconciled and taught self-government,” he, in a sentence, summarized the fundamental assumptions and goals of American policy towards its new imperial possessions in the early twentieth century. Heralding the army’s work in putting down the insurrection, Root continued that, to accomplish the task, “New experiments in government were to be tried. There were no precedents, and precedents were to be made.”¹ In his official report on the conflict, Root made much the same point as he had on the stump. Describing the “unfamiliar ground” of the creation of civil governments in American possessions, he wrote that the army, “had no precedents, save the simple and meager proceedings under the occupation of California and New Mexico, more than half

¹ Elihu Root, “American Policies in the Philippines: Address of the Secretary of War at Peoria, Illinois, September 24, 1902,” in eds. Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott, *The Military and Colonial Policy of the United States; Addresses and Reports by Elihu Root* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1916), 68-69.

a century ago, and it has been necessary to decide every question upon its own merits and to make our own precedents for the future.”²

In the century since, historians have largely taken Root at his word. When he told a crowd of Peoria Republicans that, in the Philippines, “the principles of American liberty were to be applied to new and strange conditions among peoples who hardly knew the alphabet of freedom,” Root was accurately capturing the mood of his peers in the age of “the White Man’s Burden.” Root’s second assertion, however, deserves greater scrutiny. Was the army’s effort in the Philippines – and in Cuba and in Puerto Rico – truly without “precedent” in American history, beyond the experiences of the Mexican-American War? Prior to 1898, the United States Army’s primary mission had been on the frontier, protecting settlers and subjugating Native Americans. For a period, it had also been in the South, defeating a rebellion and facilitating the process of Reconstruction – another military occupation of a defeated nation. Finally, in the later decades of the nineteenth century, the army became heavily involved in the growing number of incidents of domestic unrest, particularly racial unrest and labor disputes.

These sets of experiences would prove remarkably instructive to military leaders tasked with policing the new American empire. In the Philippines, in the midst of a protracted guerrilla war, commanding general Arthur MacArthur re-issued an order from 1863, General Order 100, or Lieber’s Code after its author, to guide pacification efforts. Likewise, in the Philippines and in Cuba, the army drew from its Indian-fighting

² Elihu Root, “The Beginnings of Civil Government: Extract from the Report of the Secretary of War for 1900,” in eds. Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott; *The Military and Colonial Policy of the United States; Addresses and Reports by Elihu Root* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1916), 286.

experience to wage guerrilla war. The creation of “scout” units, comprised of loyal indigenous soldiers with white American officers, long a tactic in the Indian Wars, was quickly revived across America’s overseas possessions.

Thus, in the two decades between the war with Spain and the American entry into the First World War, the United States military found itself serving across the Caribbean, Central America, and the Pacific in a series of irregular wars, policing actions, and occupations not at all dissimilar to its domestic duties between the Civil War and 1898. Indeed, *contra* Root, throughout those two decades, the American military found plenty of “precedent” for its occupation, pacification, and nation-building duties, and indeed, used that precedent to develop a doctrine of imperial control and small wars. This doctrine proved surprisingly resilient, and was even partially codified into international law with the First and Second Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, traces of which can be found in the Geneva Conventions, and even in today’s counterinsurgency theories.

Nevertheless, military historians have largely agreed that 1898 represented a sharp departure in American military policy and practices. The preeminent historian of the United States Army, Edward Coffman, in fact separates his two-volume history of the institution at 1898, with the second volume’s opening chapter titled “The Army Begins a New Era.”³ Additionally, while American military historians have long emphasized the period from 1898 to 1917 as a crucial one of reform and growth for the American military establishment, the traditional view has been that the reformers of the day looked

³ Edward M. Coffman, *The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784-1898* (Oxford University Press, 1986); Edward M. Coffman, *The Regulars: The American Army, 1898-1941* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2004).

to create a European-style army to fight in large land wars, and that messy irregular conflicts like the Indian Wars or the Philippine Insurrection had little bearing on the reformer's designs. "The service's emphasis," military historian Brian McAllister Linn wrote of the post-Philippine War army, "remained fixed on materiel and tactical issues with no in-depth analysis of guerrilla warfare."⁴ Russell Weigley scarcely mentioned the Philippine Insurrection, the Boxer Rebellion, or the Banana Wars in his classic work *The American Way of War*, and in a later essay wrote that Army leaders of the day were disdainful of an "indefinitely renewed career as a constabulary."⁵

However, recent historians of American empire and irregular warfare have begun to challenge those assumptions. Hailing from a variety of ideological perspectives, these historians have drawn attention to the significant continuities between the frontier wars and urban unrest of the late 1800s with the imperial small wars of the early twentieth century. In his popular history book *The Savage Wars of Peace*, neoconservative pundit Max Boot argued that the Army's success in putting down insurrections in Cuba and the Philippines could easily be "ascribed in some degree to the valuable experience its top commanders had gained in fighting Indians, the finest irregular warriors in the world."⁶

From the other end of the ideological spectrum, Stuart Creighton Miller, in *Benevolent*

⁴ Brian McAllister Linn, "The Impact of the Philippine Wars on the U.S. Army," in Alfred McCoy and Francisco A. Scarano, eds., *Colonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern American State* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 466.

⁵ Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973); Russell F. Weigley, "The Long Death of the Indian-Fighting Army," in *Soldiers and Civilians: The U.S. Army and the American People*, eds. Garry D. Ryan and Timothy K. Nenninger (Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Administration, 1987), 32.

⁶ Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 127-128.

Assimilation, wrote that the American atrocities in the Philippines could be traced back to the Army's history on the frontier, given that "virtually every member of the high command had spent most of his career terrorizing Apaches, Comanches, Kiowas, and the Sioux."⁷ More recently historians have looked at the army's role in the labor disputes – such as the Pullman Strike of 1894 – as a template later drawn upon for imperial service. Scholars such as Priscilla Murolo and Joshua Gedacht have looked to similarities in American military massacres at Wounded Knee, South Dakota to Bud Dajo in the Philippines, and even to Chicago in the Pullman Strike, and pointed out the surprising continuity between military conduct and policy in the cities, on the continental frontier, and out in the extra-continental empire. "Military men expressed remarkably similar understandings of their targets in the three campaigns," concluded Murolo, "and in each case they paired condemnations of the enemy with many of the same positive stereotypes of soldiers like themselves."⁸ Jeremi Suri's recent scholarship on the American experience of nation building also notes the surprising continuities from the Founders to the Civil War to the Philippines.⁹ Finally, Alfred McCoy, a well-established historian of American imperialism, has argued in a recent book on the Philippines that the methods

⁷ Stuart Creighton Miller, *Benevolent Assimilation: The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 195.

⁸ Priscilla Murolo, "Wars of Civilization: The US Army Contemplates Wounded Knee, the Pullman Strike, and the Philippine Insurrection," *International Labor and Working-Class History*, No. 80, Fall 2011, pp. 77-102; Joshua Gedacht, "Mohammedan Religion Made it Necessary to Fire: Massacres on the American Imperial Frontier from South Dakota to the Southern Philippines" in *Colonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern American State*, eds. Alfred W. McCoy and Francisco A. Scarano (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), pp. 397-409.

⁹ Jeremi Suri, *Liberty's Surest Guardian: Rebuilding Nations After War from the Founders to Obama* (New York: Free Press, 2011).

developed to control imperial populations eventually migrated stateside, a legacy of imperialism that in fact continues to this day.¹⁰

This paper argues that in the first two decades of the twentieth century, the United States military developed a doctrine of martial law and military governance designed to legitimate American military and imperial control and suppress anti-imperial agitation. That this doctrine emerged in a time when the United States was calling on its military to perform a new, global mission is no accident, nor is it revelatory to conclude that military officers drew from both international experience and their own history and traditions in their proposals. However, the ways in which these men studied American and European military history and adapted the supposed lessons learned into their own doctrine lends interesting insight into the ways these present and future leaders viewed the world, and the role of American military power in it. The worldview among military officers encouraged by this doctrine consistently blurred the lines between domestic and foreign opposition, and saw the role of the army as essential to nation-building both domestically and abroad.

Built on a foundation of military law and practices from the Civil War, Reconstruction, Indian Wars, and domestic riot duties, this doctrine was altered only slightly for service on the new imperial frontier. From 1898 to 1917, the United States declared martial law and set up military governments in Cuba from 1898-1902 and again from 1906-1909, the Philippine islands from 1898-1900, Vera Cruz in 1914, and the

¹⁰ Alfred W. McCoy, *Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009).

Dominican Republic from 1916-1924.¹¹ The predominantly Muslim island of Mindanao in the Philippines remained under martial law until 1913.¹² All the while, American soldiers were also frequently called upon to suppress domestic disturbances, namely riots and strikes. In 1885, the Army had intervened to stop anti-Chinese rioting in Washington, in 1892 and 1899 the Army stepped in to break up riotous miners in Idaho, and most famously in 1894, when the Army had joined with federal marshals to violently end the Pullman Railway strike.¹³

As American military historian Andrew J. Birtle has argued, prior to the 1940s the United States “lacked an extensive, formal written doctrine for the conduct of small wars” such as those of the early 1900s. However, Birtle writes, it did develop an “informal” doctrine which was “comprised of custom, tradition, and accumulated

¹¹ See Appendix B for a complete list of American overseas military interventions from 1877-1917.

¹² For more on the Philippine-American War, see: Brian McAllister Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899-1902* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); or, Stuart Creighton Miller, *Benevolent Assimilation: The American Conquest of the Philippines* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); for an overview of the “Banana Wars” see Lester D. Langley, *The Banana Wars: United States Intervention in the Caribbean, 1898-1934* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1985); for studies of American interventions in Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic, see, respectively: Mary A. Renda, *Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Michael Gobat, *Confronting the American Dream: Nicaragua Under U.S. Imperial Rule* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005); and Bruce J. Calder, *The Impact of Intervention: The Dominican Republic during the U.S. Occupation of 1916-1924* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984); for an overview of all three of those interventions but from the Latin American perspective, see Alan McPherson, *The Invaded: How Latin Americans and Their Allies Fought and Ended U.S. Occupations* (Oxford University Press, 2014); for a popular but reliable history of the occupation of the Philippine island of Mindanao, see: James R. Arnold, *The Moro War: How America Battled a Muslim Insurgency in the Philippine Jungle, 1902-1913* (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2011).

¹³ See Appendix A for a complete list of domestic federal military interventions from 1877-1917.

experience that was transmitted from one generation of soldiers to the next through a combination of official and unofficial writings, curricular materials, conversations, and individual memories.”¹⁴ This lack of official doctrine has led some historians to discount the importance of small wars to early twentieth century American military thinkers. However, as Birtle’s work demonstrates, it is possible to sift through the work of a number of military leaders, intellectuals, and reformers, in military journals, official studies, and popularly published works, to demonstrate the broad ways of thinking within the American military establishment. This paper will attempt to do just that, for the period immediately following America’s establishment of an extra-continental empire after the Spanish-American War of 1898.

It is important here to remember that the army of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was a much smaller and more intimate outfit than the huge international force it is today. The 1893 Annual Report listed only 2,158 officers on active duty, compared to 238,861 in 2012.¹⁵ These officers were far more likely to be familiar with a large percentage of their brother officers, yet conversely equally likely to spend much of their careers in comparative isolation in frontier and later imperial postings. According to two recent military historians, 70 percent of the army officer corps was posted west of the Mississippi by 1892. The vast majority of them were West Pointers and Civil War veterans, further distancing them from their civilian counterparts as the

¹⁴ Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1998), 5-6.

¹⁵ “Report of the Secretary of War; Being Part of the Message and Documents Communicated to the two Houses of Congress” (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1894); “2012 Demographics: Profile of the Military Community” (Arlington, Virginia: Department of Defense, 2013).

decades passed following Appomattox. “It could be said that the late nineteenth century Army officer corps was relatively unchanging,” concluded those historians, “not only in size and composition, but in all probability in the social and political attitudes of its members.”¹⁶

Insular, isolated, and politically conservative, officers of the post-bellum United States Army were able to maintain communication with one another through private correspondence of course, but also increasingly through a number of professional journals and military publications. The burgeoning professionalization movement within the army led many to actively seek out opportunities to write and engage with one another in an intra-service dialogue through these journals. The *Journal of the Military Service Institution*, open exclusively to officers, was a common forum for such exchanges. The *Journal* hosted essay contests on pressing military issues, for which many junior officers submitted pieces. Despite its relatively modest circulation of 1,500 subscribers – still three-fourths of the officer corps – the *Journal* was the oldest and most respected professional military journal in the country.¹⁷ Likewise, the *Army and Navy Journal and Gazette*, founded in 1863, was a source of officer opinions and commentary. More gifted soldier-writers, and senior officers, were often invited to submit pieces to prestigious national publications, such as the *North American Review*, or published their own works independently. In an era of widespread reform and professionalization, such

¹⁶ Clayton D. Laurie and Ronald H. Cole, *The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders: 1877-1945* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1997), 22-23.

¹⁷ N.W. Ayer, *N.W. Ayer and Son's American Newspaper Annual Directory: A Catalogue of American Newspapers* (Philadelphia: Newspaper Advertising Agents, 1912), 639.

efforts were encouraged and received wide readership from senior military officials. From these collected writings it is possible to discern the general assumptions, concerns, and worldviews of the American officer corps.

Again, contrary to Elihu Root's assertions, there was ample precedent in American military history for the operations in the Pacific and Caribbean under his tenure, and military leaders drew from them readily. Arthur MacArthur, as commanding general of American forces in the Philippines, in 1900 issued in full a set of orders from 1863 known either as General Orders 100 or the "Lieber Code," after its author Francis Lieber. Formally titled "Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field," the Lieber Code would prove an extremely useful tool for the army of occupation in the Philippines.

Francis Lieber's personal background, and the context in which he wrote his code, are important to remember when considering the orders and their later usage at the turn of the century. A German émigré, Lieber was born in Berlin in 1800. As a teenager he enlisted in the Prussian Army in time to fight at the Battle of Waterloo, and later volunteered in the Greek War of Independence, before traveling to the United States in the 1820s and becoming a university professor in South Carolina and New York.¹⁸

Multilingual, and of course fluent in German, Lieber's intellectual lineage on the theories of war included the works of the Prussian scholar Carl von Clausewitz, whose ideas on

¹⁸ For a full biography, see Frank Friedel, *Francis Lieber: Nineteenth Century Liberal* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1947); for a brief biography and a collection of Lieber's writings, including G.O. 100, see Richard Shelly Hartigan, *Lieber's Code and the Law of War* (Chicago: Precedent, 1983).

total war are clearly present in Lieber's scholarship.¹⁹ By the 1860s widely considered an expert on military theory, Lieber was asked by the War Department in 1862 for his views on "the matter of guerrilla war," during a time when Confederate partisans were active across the South and border states, particularly in Missouri and Northern Virginia.²⁰ In 1862, as the Union Army occupied increasingly large stretches of confederate territory and contemplated a strategy of emancipation, Lieber was called upon to draft an extensive code of conduct to govern the armies across the south. The result was a wide-reaching document, entitled "Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field," and issued in 1863 as General Orders No. 100.

Consisting of 157 articles, Lieber's code became the benchmark for Union armies across the occupied south, and, as will be discussed, a key document in the development of American and international military law and strategy into the twentieth and even twenty-first century. Lieber's code called for the fair treatment of prisoners of war and their rights of parole, and for respecting the rights of non-combatants. It would be a mistake, however, to view G.O. 100 as a completely liberal document on human rights in wartime. In the first section Lieber argued, "To save the country is paramount to all considerations," including, presumably, concerns over human rights or the proper treatment of prisoners. This would come to prove problematic as American soldiers

¹⁹ Traditional Civil War military history holds that Clausewitz was a non-entity in both Northern and Southern strategic thought; rather, Generals relied on the works of Baron Antoine Henri-Jomini, a Swiss theorist whose books were required reading at West Point. However, historian John Fabian Witt has pointed out the clear presence of Clausewitz in Lieber's work, and thus in Civil War strategy, in his excellent *Lincoln's Code: The Laws of War in American History* (New York: Free Press, 2012).

²⁰ Hartigan, *Lieber's Code and the Laws of War*, 2.

looked to the code as a template for dealing with Filipino insurgents, Chinese Boxer rebels, and Latin American Revolutionaries in the early 1900s.

MacArthur's decision to resuscitate a 40-year-old order was also based on the code's extensive regulations governing the establishment of martial law and military governments, and the formal right of "retaliation" in occupied territory. While calling for the fair treatment of duly captured prisoners of war, Lieber's Code was less compromising with "spies" and "war-traitors," for whom execution was considered an entirely appropriate punishment. "The common law of war allows even capital punishment for the clandestine or treacherous attempts to injure an enemy." Even local guides forcibly pressed into service, "when it is clearly proven that they have misled intentionally, may be put to death." This section would be utilized frequently, as army military commissions in the Philippines sentenced a number of insurgents to death throughout the conflict.²¹ The establishment of martial law, as the "immediate and direct effect and consequence of occupation or conquest," meant the suspension "by the occupying military authority of the criminal and civil law." American soldiers and their officers, the code stipulated, could not be held accountable in civilian courts, only through military proceedings or courts martial. Additionally, and in a Clausewitz-ian turn of phrase, Lieber argued "the more vigorously wars are pursued the better it is for humanity." Whereas gentlemanly, limited wars may drag on for years, Lieber pithily

²¹ See: *Affairs in the Philippine Islands: Hearings Before the Committee on the Philippines of the United States Senate*, 57th Congress, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902), 1284-1289, for some examples of the types of military tribunals and their outcomes.

determined that “sharp wars are brief,” in an echo of Clausewitz and a forerunner to the tactics of Sherman and Grant.²²

The post-war experience of Reconstruction was, too, a template drawn upon for the military governance of American overseas territories at the turn of the century. Union Army officers served for varying times as military governors for each of the defeated confederate states, and martial law remained in effect across the south well after 1865. The army was also forced to deal with a guerrilla enemy in the form of white terrorist violence against soldiers, carpetbaggers, and most of all freedmen. Of course, white southerners had weapons at their disposal that would prove unavailable to Cubans and Filipinos four decades later, in the form of congressional representation, and in 1878 the Democratic-led House of Representatives passed the *Posse Comitatus* Act, first as an attachment to a military spending bill and later as stand-alone legislation, intended to limit the use of federal troops in domestic law enforcement activity.²³

Perhaps predictably, the army responded to the act’s passage with howls of protest. The Secretary of War objected to the law’s passage in his 1878 official report, and told journalists his opinion that the act “works greatly to the public injury.”²⁴ Jealous of their prerogative as the nation’s frontier police force, officers followed suit in their condemnations. An officer named D.M. Eaton wrote in an 1878 issue of the *Army and*

²² Francis Lieber, “Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, originally issued as General Orders No. 100, Adjutant General’s Office, 1863,” (Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1898).

²³ Charles Doyle and Jennifer K Elsea,, “The Posse Comitatus Act and Related Matters: The Use of the Military to Execute Civilian Law,” *Congressional Research Service*, (August 16, 2012), 20.

²⁴ *The United States Army and Navy Journal and Gazette*, Vol. 16 (September 1878), 221.

Navy Journal of the “injury the ‘posse comitatus clause is doing the frontier settlemente [sic].” In cases of unrest, Eaton wrote, “the military force of this great Government stand idly by, their hands tied by this foolish superogation of fool’s wisdom.”²⁵ Writing in December, an anonymous officer told the *Army and Navy Journal*, “In my judgment it is important either that this provision be repealed, or that the number of cases in which the use of the Army shall be ‘expressly authorized’ be very much enlarged.” Citing the “numerous instances” on the frontier where army intervention was required to end domestic disturbances, the author declared, “I am clearly of the opinion that the President should be left to employ the national forces in aid of the process of the federal courts whenever he shall deem it necessary.”²⁶

While it has long been widely understood as a general check on the military’s powers of law enforcement, historians and legal scholars today are beginning to reinterpret the *Posse Comitatus* Act as more narrowly focused on preventing further federal incursions to protect freedmen’s rights or prop up Republican governments.²⁷ The act also only forbade federal army participation in law enforcement under the control of marshals or state officials; the president and congress retained the authority to call out federal troops, and often did and still do.²⁸ In fact, as one historian has noted, the

²⁵ D.M. Eaton, “The Posse Comitatus Law,” *The United States Army and Navy Journal and Gazette*, Vol. 16 (October 1878), 173.

²⁶ Anonymous, “Troops as Posse Comitatus,” *The United States Army and Navy Journal and Gazette*, Vol. 16 (December 1878), 285.

²⁷ See Gary Felicetti and John Luce, “The Posse Comitatus Act: Setting the Record Straight on 124 Years of Mischief and Misunderstanding Before Any More Damage is Done,” *Military Law Review*, Vol. 175 (2003), pp. 86-183.

²⁸ Sean J. Kealy, “Reexamining the Posse Comitatus Act: Toward a Right to Civil Law Enforcement,” *Yale Law Review*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Spring, 2003), pp. 383-442.

congressional Democrats castigating the McKinley administration for its role in sending troops to break up union unrest in Idaho in 1899 “made absolutely no mention of the Posse Comitatus Act” in their protestations.²⁹

Thus, despite a limited congressional objection, the army emerged from the experiences of Civil War and Reconstruction with ample experience in military government and police actions, experience which was quickly brought to bear on the frontier and in the increasing number of urban labor disputes. Lieber’s Code remained a fundamental component of the U.S. Army’s training manuals and emerging informal doctrine. The next major text on the subject was Major William Birkhimer’s *Military Government and Martial Law*, published in 1892, which incorporated much the basic tenants of the code, updated with the lessons of the intervening years. In his introduction, Birkhimer surveyed the international history of such codes, from the Geneva Conventions in 1864 and 1868, and the St. Petersburg Conference of 1874. In later editions he would add the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 to that lineage. All of these, Birkhimer wrote, “followed the plan marked out in ‘Instructions for Armies in the Field,’ prepared by Dr. Francis Lieber and published in April, 1863.” Lieber’s code, Birkhimer wrote, was the first and “most successful effort” to lay out the “general principles underlying the present laws and customs of war.”

Birkhimer emphasized, as had Lieber, that the code was as much an instrument for waging counter-guerrilla war as it was a protection of human rights. While attempting to “put into official shape the humanity of the land, they [G.O. 100] do not deprive a

²⁹ Felicetti and Luce, “The Posse Comitatus Act: Setting the Record Straight,” 126.

belligerent of all fair and reasonable means of successfully carrying on war,” he reassured his military audience. For the soldier operating under G.O. 100, “His hands are not tied by theories regarding the rights of the other party belligerent, or of the inhabitants of territory militarily occupied.”³⁰ This understanding of Lieber’s Code as a tool, rather than a hindrance, to warfare, was commonplace to military officers serving on deployments across the American empire in the early twentieth century, and makes MacArthur’s decision to utilize it in 1900 all the more understandable.

Birkhimer’s work also demonstrated the ways in which military officers of the time blurred the lines between foreign and domestic opponents, and viewed martial law and the application of military force as appropriate responses to incidents of domestic unrest. When first detailed for the assignment of writing his manual in 1886, Birkhimer wrote that he “found, upon reporting for duty, that the commanding General had but recently, under the President's orders, been assisting the Governor of Washington Territory to put down an uprising against the Chinese.” However, the Governor’s confused proclamation of martial law had left both him and the army general responsible for enforcing that order legally exposed, and ultimately taken to court for alleged “illegal violations of the rights of certain citizens on this occasion.” Birkhimer, an attorney with a degree from the University of Oregon School of Law, was called upon to defend the accused, at which he succeeded. But the experience led the young officer to conclude that, with future disturbances still likely, “it is necessary, not only to avoid confusion of

³⁰ William E. Birkhimer, *Military Government and Martial Law, Third Edition* (Kansas City: Franklin Hudson Publishing Company, 1914), 26-28.

thought, but to protect officers in their just rights.”³¹ Like Lieber’s Code before it, Birkhimer’s work was firstly concerned with the defense of military prerogatives rather than any general human rights.

The army frequently took this framework and applied it in when deployed for domestic service. Two years after the publication of Birkhimer’s book, the Army was again called upon to impose martial law in a domestic disturbance, the Pullman Strike of 1894. Originating in the railway town of Pullman, Chicago, the strike eventually spread across the United States. With much of the nation’s rail service shut down, President Grover Cleveland eventually ordered in the army. Nelson Miles, as Commanding General of the Army, was responsible for organizing the federal troops called in to put down the strike and restore order. After intermittent clashes between soldiers and the strikers, with up to thirty fatalities, the strike was ended. Writing in *The North American Review* a few months later, Miles concluded that “the Lesson of the Recent Strikes” was that “insurrection must be met and overcome in one of two ways.” The first way, Miles asserted, “was by the strong arm of the municipal, State, and Federal governments.” For Miles, the thousands of federal marshals and 12,000 United States soldiers brought in to quell the riot was a wholly appropriate response. “The other method,” the general continued, “is for American manhood to assert its principals.” Miles dismissed the strikers as forces of “anarchy, secret conclaves, mob violence, and universal chaos under

³¹ Birkhimer, “Preface to the First Edition,” in *Military Government and Martial Law*, v-vi; the disturbance mentioned was the anti-immigrant Seattle Riot of 1886, for more on that see Carlos A. Schwantes, “Protest in a Promised Land: Unemployment, Disinheritance, and the Origin of Labor Militancy in the Pacific Northwest, 1885-1886” *The Western Historical Quarterly*, Vol. 13, No. 4, (Oct. 1982).

the red or white flag of socialism.” Of their leader, he concluded, the strikers had sworn full “allegiance to their dictator, Eugene Debs.”³²

Future generals and army officers would utilize similar language to characterize the masses of Filipinos, Cubans, and other sources of agitation that would plague the army at the beginning of the next century. Interestingly, nearly all of the leading generals of army forces in the Philippine Insurrection and Cuban Army of Pacification all had prior experience in domestic riot duty and strike breaking. The aforementioned Miles, having commanded federal forces during the Pullman strike, later led the army in the Cuba campaign, and personally led the subsequent invasion and occupation of Puerto Rico. Wesley Merritt and Elwell Otis, the first and second military governors of the Philippines, respectively, both led troops during the Pullman strike, with Otis seeing further service in later labor unrest in Coeur d’Alene, Idaho.³³ When Miles, in the *North American Review*, characterized his early service in the Civil War and the Indian War as a “war of civilization,” he was expressing the sentiments of many of his fellow senior officers at the time.

Younger army officers, too, learned lessons and indeed precedent from the experiences of the Pullman Strike and urban riot duties. Some were brutally honest in their assessment of their role in those disputes. “I could see no reason for our presence except to overawe the striking miners,” wrote a Lieutenant stationed in Idaho in 1894.³⁴

Responding to criticism of the army and the president, the *Army and Navy Journal*

³² Nelson A. Miles, “The Lesson of the Recent Strikes” *The North American Review*, Vol. 159, Issue 453 (August 1894), pp. 180-188, 187.

³³ Laurie and Cole, *The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders*.

³⁴ Laurie and Cole, *The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders*, 165.

approvingly printed the endorsements of their actions by a number of local papers. The *New York Tribune* concluded “There will be a larger use in future of the Army in centres of population and railway communication like Chicago.” Continuing, the editorial determined that, in the Pullman Strike, “Regulars are found to be almost the only trustworthy resource for the maintenance of order,” an example which would “leave a permanent impression upon the public mind. Never again will the Army be ridiculed as a sham paper organization, serviceable mainly for policing Indian reservations.” The *Tribune* foresaw a future with “a strong public demand” for increasing the size of the army – long a bailiwick of army reformers – “and establishing permanent garrisons in cities like Chicago.” The *New York World*, concurred, and added in defense of President Cleveland’s authorization of military force against the strikers, “An examination of the files of the State Department shows that scores of precedents existed for the President’s course.”³⁵ Of course, some of the perceived lessons learned were more prosaic. One officer, “who speaks from experience,” told the *Journal*, “Of all the many lessons of the strike war none is more clear than the folly of prescribing an undress blouse not designed for field conditions.”³⁶ The officer clearly spoke for a wide audience, as four years later the army ceased issuing dress uniforms, replacing them with field-serviceable khakis, demonstrating, if only by correlation, the impact of these military journals on policy.³⁷

³⁵ “Some Lay Opinions,” *The United States Army and Navy Journal and Gazette*, Vol. 31, (July 14, 1894), 805.

³⁶ “Some Lay Opinions,” *The United States Army and Navy Journal and Gazette*, 808.

³⁷ David Cole, *Survey of U.S. Army Uniforms, Weapons, and Accoutrements* (Fort Sam Houston, Texas: Basic Curatorial Methods Training Course, 2007), 37.

The army's top lawyers provided legal cover for the actions of their comrades in the field (or, as commonly, in the streets). In 1896, the army's Judge Advocate General G. Norman Lieber – appropriately enough Francis Lieber's son – concurred with the lessons drawn by Miles and Birkhimer and their more junior counterparts, and provided legal backing. Quoting extensively from his father's work, the younger Lieber argued in a *North American Review Article* that civilian courts had little to no jurisdiction to interfere with military officers executing martial law during domestic disturbances. In a dense and legalistic argument drawing on Supreme Court precedent from the Civil War and Reconstruction era, he concluded “the military officer should not be held to strict accountability” or would be forced to face the “embarrassing and even dangerous dilemma of having to chose between imperiling the public interests with which he is entrusted and the risk of being held personally to account.”³⁸ In an 1898 pamphlet he prepared for the war department, Lieber continued to utilize historical and legal precedents to promote the army's responsibility and utility in quelling domestic disturbances. While noting that the “use of the Army in the execution of the laws on the occasion of the Chicago strikes was commended by both the Senate and House of Representatives,” Lieber also wrote that, in instances where “congress does not prescribe means,” the President “must use such means as the Constitution provides him” – that is to say, the army – for the maintenance of law and public order. Lieber's work also

³⁸ G. Norman Lieber, “What is the Justification of Martial Law?” *The North American Review*, Vol. 163, Issue 480 (November 1896), pp. 549-564, 558-559.

demonstrated the transatlantic nature of the discourse over martial law, comparing an 1892 riot in Idaho to the Lord George Gordon riots in London in 1780.³⁹

Some younger officers of this era took these arguments of their superiors to an even further extreme. In an 1895 edition of the *Journal of the Military Service Institution*, half of the articles of which were devoted to declarations and practice of martial law at home and abroad, Lieutenant William Wallace of the 7th U.S. Infantry stated outright that “the oft-heard charge that the army is an ally of capital as opposed to labor must be regarded as somewhat singular.” In fact, it was an “assertion too apparent to be in need of distinction.”⁴⁰ Surveying the turbulent recent events of strikes and Indian uprisings, and anticipating future aggravations from unionists, anarchists, and the like, Wallace concluded that “when, for whatever reason, the need of stern force arises the army must furnish it.” Nor, he continued, “must there be any doubt of its ability to do so. In the face of any such force as an unprecedented insurrection or domestic upheaval can bring against it, it is all-competent.” This interpretation further held that “in all the governmental projects for the maintenance of law and order there must necessarily be included a provision for the employment of physical force. In this way the army becomes related to any project that may be advanced for society’s protection against the creeds of anarchism.” Additionally, and echoing the arguments of Birkhimer, Miles, and both Lieber, Wallace’s view of the army’s place in civil affairs held little room for civilian legal oversight. For, “what kind of comic opera of an army would it be,” Wallace

³⁹ G. Norman Lieber, *Use of the Army in the Aid of Civil Power* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1898), 54-55, 51.

⁴⁰ William Wallace, “The Army and the Civil Power,” *Journal of the Military Service Institution*, Vol. 17 (July-Dec. 1895), pp. 235-266, 235.

quipped, “that on receipt of orders would sit down, put on its spectacles, pull out musty old law books, and calmly and leisurely proceed to test their legality!”⁴¹ Rather, a declaration of martial law *ipso facto* superseded any civilian jurisdiction.

The army’s role in domestic disturbances of the late nineteenth century heavily influenced the ways army officers viewed their mission and their place within society. For Wallace, and a number of other young army officers, the increasing “frequency with which resistance [to federal law] has risen so high shows the maintenance of this power to be necessary.” Writing in 1895, one year after the Pullman Strike, three years after Wounded Knee, a decade after the Seattle Riots, and with the Indian Wars and the occupation of the South still a living memory, Wallace arrived at a remarkable conclusion. “In reality,” he wrote, “the army is now a gendarmery [sic] – a national police – in its civil relations.” While conceding that this reality “lacks acknowledgement,” Wallace nevertheless urged a national “dissemination” of that fact so that “the nature of an army would become known. There would no longer exist the idea that it is an independent sort of body, floating around somewhere, that occasionally drops in to do some mischief, and then retires, leaving behind it all manner of censure and foul abuse.” Wallace hoped that “instead it would become known for what it is – a stern reality, a power for good in the hands of the good.”

Of the army’s heavy-handed approach to the Pullman strikers in Chicago, Wallace was equally approving. Characterizing the strikers as firmly deserving of their treatment, he wrote:

⁴¹ Wallace, “The Army and the Civil Power,” 241-244, 255.

“They are utterly irresponsible. They have nothing to lose, but all to gain... Their brains have one idea uppermost: ‘In pillage there is wealth.’ There is no moral restraint for them. Prison does not mean infamy. Probably the most disagreeable aspect that confinement presents is an elevation to a tone of morals many planes beyond their comprehension... It is exactly the same character as that which hovers about an army’s march – out of sight by day, but after a battle coming upon the field for the purpose of robbing and stripping the dead and wounded. It is a character beyond ordinary conception. Their strength and minds are brutish, and they have miniature hells for souls. Famine, pestilence, and war, are truly their deities.”

“In view of their character,” the opinionated young Lieutenant concluded, “the law becomes plain and the execution simple.” In the language he used to characterize the strikers, Wallace was mirroring both the rhetoric used previously against Native Americans on the frontier, and, later, against Filipinos and Cubans in the early twentieth century. For Wallace, the solution was self-evident. “No possible twist of the conception can conceive an army as presenting any other face to a mob than that of absolute hostility,” he wrote.⁴² While Wallace’s commanding officer, General Miles, had used more temperate rhetoric, both men drew in their writings from the same ideology and predisposition, and certainly the same view of their army’s role in the domestic civil affairs of the country.

⁴² Wallace, “The Army and the Civil Power,” 251, 254-255.

Wallace's interpretation of the extent of federal military power in domestic disturbances, while maybe an extreme example, demonstrates the American military officers' attitudes towards the role of their institution at the turn of the century. The frontier tamed, these men saw their duty increasingly in terms of state-building, law enforcement, and even the suppression of dissent in the forms of "mobbish behavior," "anarchists," or socialist agitation. This new doctrine and ideology was based off of the military and scholarly works of soldiers like Lieber and Birkhimer, as well as more general societal trends, such as scientific racism and an understanding of America's fulfillment of the "White Man's Burden."⁴³ It was with these attitudes and worldview that these officers were dispatched across the globe to new imperial postings – in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, and later in Panama, Mexico, Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic.

Other officers drew explicit parallels between the United States Army's campaign against Native Americans with the growing number of colonial small wars engaged in by European powers. "Other nations are coming into contact with savages in other parts of the world," a contributor to an 1894 issue of the *Army and Navy Journal* reported, "and apparently contact means conflict as it did in our case." Referencing the Germans in East Africa, the French in Cochin China and Madagascar, and the British in Southern Africa, the author determined that "it is worthy of notice that the constant improvement which is made in the power, precision and rapidity of small-arm fire does not give the European soldier overwhelming and certain superiority against savages that might be expected."

⁴³ Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine*, 101.

While, “the English did bravely with Maxims against the naked Matabele,” when the “barbarian is of type he can still make a defense that is sometimes very effective.”

Presuming that the United States Army would soon find itself engaged in similar conflicts, the author concluded by recommending a “careful study and treatise” upon the subject for wider dissemination.⁴⁴

The experiences of Indian-fighting and strikebreaking, the studied observation of European colonial wars, and the worldview that encouraged, would later manifest itself in America’s new imperial possessions. After the war of 1898 and the assumption of control over Cuba, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, American military officers took this worldview and applied the lessons they had learned from the previous decades into imperial police work. Facing almost immediately a full insurrection in the Philippines, as well as serious protest, agitation, and brigandage in Cuba, these army officers found themselves surprisingly suited for their new task, despite its apparent novelty in American military history. While they had little experience in formal overseas colonial work, quickly, they set up military governments in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, with martial law in full effect.

In the Philippines, where for nearly two years an American military policy that emphasized “attraction” and “benevolent assimilation” had been unsuccessful in ending the insurrection, the military governor and commanding general of American forces in the archipelago General Arthur MacArthur wrote Washington that he would be initiating

⁴⁴ *The United States Army and Navy Journal and Gazette*, Vol. 32 (September 15, 1894), 34.

“a more rigid policy by issue of proclamation” of General Order 100.⁴⁵ In orders to American soldiers, MacArthur wrote, “The utmost severity consistent with G.O. 100 of 1863 is desired.” One of MacArthur’s commanders, Brigadier General Jacob H. Smith, added, “A few killings under G.O. 100 will aid very much.” This new policy encompassed the “sharp war” advocated by Lieber in 1863, and has been at the center of controversy in the historiography of the Philippine-American War since. American soldiers utilized the code to enact “re-concentration” policies, deportation, property destruction, and even executions of captured guerrillas.⁴⁶

Anti-imperialists in the United States seized on such actions as proof of the inhumanity of American colonialism in the Philippines. In a scathing Senate report entitled “Marked Severities,” authors Moorfield Storey and Julian Codman concluded that “destruction of Filipino life during the war has been so frightful, that it cannot be explained as the result of ordinary civilized warfare.”⁴⁷ Discussing allegations of torture and execution, the report added a section entitled “The Policy not Justified by General Order No. 100.” Dismissing the appeal to “military necessity” as the usual “tyrant’s plea,” the report scathingly asked:

⁴⁵ MacArthur to Root, December 25, 1900, *Correspondence Relating to the War With Spain: Including the Insurrection in the Philippines and the China Relief Expedition, April 15 1898, to July 30, 1902* (Washington D.C.: Center for Military History, U.S. Army, 1993), 1237-1238.

⁴⁶ Linn, *The Philippine War*, 211-212; General Smith, incidentally, would later be court-martialed for crimes against Filipino civilians, see Miller, *Benevolent Assimilation*, 236-238.

⁴⁷ Moorfield Storey and Julian Codman. *Secretary Root’s Record: “Marked Severities” in Philippine Warfare: An Analysis of the Laws and Facts bearing on the Action and Utterances of President Roosevelt and Secretary Root* (Boston: Geo. H. Ellis Co. Publishers, 1902), 94.

“Can any one pretend that it is more necessary to subjugate the Filipinos than it was to save the very life of the nation in the Civil War? Was it not vital then that we should know the enemy's plans? But should we have tolerated for a moment the torture of captured Confederates in order to discover these plans, or the torture of Virginia farmers in order to find where Mosby's guerillas kept their arms? The question answers itself, and answers the plea of necessity.”⁴⁸

Nevertheless officers in the Philippines heralded the “stringent” new policy as an effective military tactic and appropriate response to the necessities of imperial warfare. Major C.J. Crane wrote in the *Journal of the Military Service Institution* that, by failing to adhere to the “modern, civilized methods of warfare,” the Filipinos had “deprived themselves of many rights allowed by the laws of war.” With this logic, and with his conception of the “volatile, treacherous nature of the Filipino,” Crane and his fellow officers felt more than justified in their usage of harsh tactics against suspected *insurrectos*. Furthermore, they overwhelmingly viewed G.O. 100 as a tool, rather than a limit, for such policies: “In the field our army can easily manage the military part of the business, but in our next struggle with the Filipino the question will, as heretofore, have a phase which does not belong to civilized warfare, but General Orders No. 100, defining for us the laws of war, give us all the authority needed to bring to justice and punishment those who abuse our protection and who, with protestations of good will, endeavor to the

⁴⁸ Storey and Codman, *Marked Severities*, 87.

utmost to effect our ruin.”⁴⁹ Remarkably, Crane’s interpretation of G.O. 100 held the code up as the figurative opposite of – rather than an adjunct set of guidelines to – “civilized warfare.”

The code, in fact, provided MacArthur with the legal justification for military tribunals and executions of Filipino insurgents. In January, 1901, reviewing the case of an insurgent Captain de Los Reyes, MacArthur wrote, “The fact stands out with unmistakable clearness that the accused was engaged in an effort to deter native officials from performing the duties of their offices.” Determining that the accused also “exerted himself to recruit men for the insurgent cause and to organize armed resistance to the military forces of the United States,” MacArthur judged Captain Reyes’ fate to be sealed. Quoting directly from Article 83 of the Lieber Code in his judgment, MacArthur concluded: “Persons who arise in arms against an occupying or conquering army and conspire against the authority of the same... are regarded by the law as war-rebels, and if captured may suffer death.”⁵⁰ After the insurrection was put down, MacArthur concluded of G.O. 100, “Rarely in a war has a single document been so instrumental in influencing ultimate results.”⁵¹

The army’s official history of the Philippine Insurrection reached similar conclusions. Discussing the much-criticized “concentration policy,” the report’s author Captain John R.M. Taylor wrote, “The policy of concentrating the people in protected

⁴⁹ C.J. Crane, “The Fighting Tactics of Filipinos,” *Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States*, Vol. 31 (July-Dec. 1902), 496-507.

⁵⁰ “Violating the Laws of War,” *The United States Army and Navy Journal and Gazette*, Vol. 38 (January 19, 1901), 490.

⁵¹ Linn, *The Philippine War*, 214.

zones and destroying the food which was used for the maintenance of guerrilla bands was not new.” Taylor, like many officers previously, noted the Civil War, the Indian Wars, and G.O. 100 as precedents for such actions. In fact, he wrote that in their success at putting down the Philippine Insurrection “The American commanders in the Philippines had adopted no new methods.” But, in implementing General Orders 100, Taylor concluded, “they had, however, effectively employed an old one.” In his analysis, Taylor, like many of his contemporaries, justified American tactics by noting the “temporary reversion to savagery” that is guerrilla warfare. “Guerrilla warfare means a policy of destruction, a policy of terror,” he wrote, and thus demanded a harsh response from the American occupiers. However, in surveying the history of guerrilla warfare, Taylor also concluded that “never yet, however great may have been the injury caused by it, however much it may have prolonged the war in which it has been employed, has it secured a termination favorable to the people who have chosen it.” But, he added, the victory of “civilized people” in such engagements often requires “the greater or less relaxation” of restrictions on military conduct.⁵²

The impact of the renewed usage of General Order 100 extended beyond the Philippines. General Adna Chafee, a Civil War veteran with service on the frontier and the war with Spain, instituted the code as commander of the American occupation zone of Beijing during the Boxer Rebellion of 1900. Under his command and with the code as a guideline, the *Army and Navy Journal* approvingly reported of “General Chafee’s leniency in regards to executions of Boxers.” Whereas other members of the

⁵² John Robert Meigs Taylor, *The Philippine Insurrection Against the United States*, 1906, Box 1, Entry 47, RG 350 Bureau of Insular Affairs, NARAII, 536-537.

multinational coalition resorted to frequent executions, “the American regulations are very strict as to what may or may not be done during military occupations.”⁵³ Here the two sides of Lieber’s code are made plain. At the same time as the code was used in the Philippines to brutally suppress a native uprising, in China, before the eyes of the international community, it was touted as a modern example of civility and restraint in wartime. Unlike foreign troops, the article implied, Americans, “wherever they are occupying conquered territory... observe the strictest rules of justice and mercy.”

Unlike MacArthur in the Philippines or Chafee in China, the succession of American military governors of Cuba – General Leonard Wood from 1899 to 1902 and the civilian Charles Magoon from 1906 to 1909 – were fortunate in not having to deal with a nationwide armed insurrection. However, there too did those American administrators struggle to control an unruly population – overwhelmingly unhappy with their country’s status as an American protectorate under the terms of the Platt Amendment. The burgeoning Cuban labor movement, in particular, proved a headache to American administrators and investors, with a seemingly never-ending series of strikes and labor disputes. To combat labor unrest, The Army of Pacification – sent to Cuba in 1906 – created the “Military Information Division” in large measure to keep tabs on labor unrest. American officers routinely passed along intelligence to Cuban government and

⁵³ *The United States Army and Navy Journal and Gazette*, Vol. 38 (March 23, 1901), 718.

business leaders, and, as a leading historian of Cuba has written, “collaborated with Cuban Army officers in the development of government anti-labor measures.”⁵⁴

Indeed, the records of the Army of Pacification show how American officers facilitated Cuban anti-labor efforts. During a particularly worrisome railway strike in 1907, Captain John Furlong of the Military Intelligence Division relayed to his superiors fears that, without government action, “the strike will continue with greater force, leading to the adoption of violent means to destroy the railroad material entrusted to the engineers and firemen brought from New York.” As Lieutenant Wallace had written a decade earlier, the protection of American capital was always a key concern for the army, and Furlong reported that he had “doubled my vigilance... and shall be able to secure from the men in charge any important occurrences affecting the economic and political situation.”⁵⁵ The next day, he approvingly reported that “The landing of the strike breakers on Saturday was a quiet one,” and ultimately this particular disturbance ended.⁵⁶ For his part, Furlong blamed much of the labor militancy on the Negro and mulatto members of the Cuban working class. “Those of the colored race are the ones who make it their business to spread the news,” he wrote in December, “and prove to be the most

⁵⁴ Louis A. Perez, *Cuba Under the Platt Amendment* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986), 160.

⁵⁵ “Memorandum for the Chief of Staff; Headquarters of the Army of Cuban Pacification,” October 7, 1907, Entry 1013, RG 395 Records of United States Army Overseas Operations and Commands, 1898-1942, NARAII.

⁵⁶ “Memorandum for the Chief of Staff; Headquarters of the Army of Cuban Pacification,” October 8, 1907, Entry 1013, RG 395 Records of United States Army Overseas Operations and Commands, 1898-1942, NARAII.

enthusiastic about creating a disturbances [sic] of the public order.”⁵⁷ Nevertheless, Furlong and his fellow officers viewed the American-trained Cuban Rural Guard generally up to the task of policing strikes. While American military and business leaders often expressed frustration with Cuban authorities’ occasional reluctance to intervene in labor disputes, from the outset the U.S. Army provided essential training and intelligence assistance in early Cuban anti-labor efforts.⁵⁸

Another debate these early encounters prompted was over the use of native troops to police America’s new imperial possessions. Initially, many senior officials within the military establishment opposed such an idea. However, quickly junior officers in the field or with experience in foreign colonial armies began advocating for a change of policy. A series of articles in the *Journal of the Military Service Institution* in 1902 demonstrated the overwhelming support for the idea among officers in the field. “The more the American travels in the Orient,” wrote Captain Charles D. Rhodes in the lead article, “the more he realizes that our country is indeed an amateur in the colonizing business.” Looking around, it was obvious for all who the expert was, and their strategy of using native auxiliaries was certainly proven. “Great Britain, the greatest colonizer the world has ever seen, has made brilliant use of her Indian, Beluchistan [sic], Egyptian, Assyrian,

⁵⁷ “Memorandum for the Chief of Staff; Headquarters of the Army of Cuban Pacification,” December 20, 1907, Entry 1013, RG 395 Records of United States Army Overseas Operations and Commands, 1898-1942, NARAIL.

⁵⁸ Perez, *Cuba Under the Platt Amendment*, 161.

and Soudanese troops,” wrote Rhodes.⁵⁹ Another officer concurred, “Among the most potent measures to strengthen the tenure of Great Britain in her colonial possessions in India,” wrote Colonel James Powell, “was the organization of Sepoy Battalions.” Ultimately, Colonel Powell concluded that the “very existence” of the British Empire was contingent “upon the native troops.”⁶⁰ Likewise an American army surgeon named Major Louis Livingston Seaman came to a similar conclusion in the pages of *The North American Review* after observing British officers with their local “coolies” in China. “That the yellow and black races make excellent fighting material, when properly officered by whites, has been proven conclusively in innumerable instances,” wrote the doctor in 1900. Citing the recent performance of the Buffalo Soldiers at San Juan Hill in Cuba, and Lord Kitchener’s work with Egyptian soldiers in the Sudan, Seaman overwhelmingly endorsed an increase in the use of local troops. As a physician, Seaman also noted the deleterious health effects of prolonged duty in the tropics on white American soldiers, for which native troops were an ideal solution.⁶¹

As always, the American experience on the frontier remained a valuable precedent. Noting the extensive British use of native troops in quelling colonial insurrections, Captain Rhodes in his paper added, “Nor have we in the past disdained to use native against native.” Referencing the army’s extensive experience in the Indian

⁵⁹ Charles D. Rhodes, “The Utilization of Native Troops in Our Foreign Possessions,” *Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States*, Vol. 30, (Jan.-June 1902), 1-22.

⁶⁰ James W. Powell, “The Utilization of Native Troops in Our Foreign Possessions,” *Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States*, Vol. 30 (Jan.-June 1902), 23-41.

⁶¹ Louis Livingston Seaman, “Native Troops for Our Colonial Possessions,” *The North American Review*, Vol. 171, Issue 529 (December 1900), pp. 847-861.

Wars as a guide for future colonial insurrections, Rhodes continued, “The almost interminable raids of the Apache Indians might have dragged along for years, had we not enlisted the offices of friendly Apache scouts. And likewise, farther north, the wars of the Sioux were brought to a close by utilizing the services of their hereditary enemies, the Crows and the Cheyennes.”⁶²

The higher echelons of the federal government were also deeply concerned with the efficacy of using native troops. In a thousand-page study of other European colonial systems commissioned by the Bureau of Insular Affairs in 1900, the War Department reached the same conclusion as its officers in the field. The study reported, “In British India, for instance, about one-third of the army is European and two-thirds native, and wholly supported by the colonial government.” Additionally, “the army of the Dutch East Indies is purely colonial,” with a few thousand officers leading “22,000 natives.” Weighed as well was the financial cost, for in the French colonies, where “the proportion of troops supplied by the governing country is larger than in the British or Dutch colonies,” there was a much “larger share of the expense [that] is borne by the home government.” This report, commissioned by the War Department and conducted by officials of the Treasury Department, firmly concluded based on the European experience that for both practical military and financial concerns a largely native-trooped force was preferable for the policing and defense of America’s new colonies. Forebodingly, the report also noted that, “Besides the army there must always exist a police force...

⁶² Rhodes, “The Utilization of Native Troops in Our Foreign Possessions,” 3.

charged with obtaining clandestine information regarding and exercise preventive surveillance over evil-minded persons.”⁶³

Through this internal dialogue among officers and administrators, actual policy changed, as the military reversed its position and began readily employing native troops in colonial possessions. Already in Cuba, the locally recruited Rural Guard was organized under the command of Governor General Leonard Wood. In the Philippines in 1901, Governor General William Howard Taft created the Philippine Constabulary, officered by Americans but comprised entirely of enlisted volunteer Filipinos. Like the Cuban Rural Guard, the Philippine Constabulary was also often involved in strikebreaking and labor disputes. In a wave of 1909 labor unrest, the Constabulary was deployed around Manila to protect streetcars and arrest labor leaders.⁶⁴ In later American expeditions to Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic, one of the first acts was always the creation of a local constabulary force with American training and American officers. Unfortunately, although perhaps not surprisingly, these forces later became instrumental tools of government oppression after the Americans left. The *Garde d’Haiti* was involved in the numerous coups and counter-coups that plagued that country throughout the twentieth century. The *Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua* was a vital element of the Somoza dynasty’s four-decade grip on power, and was disbanded in 1979 when the Sandinistas took over. The Philippine Constabulary, after independence renamed the

⁶³ O.P. Austin, *Colonial Administration: 1800-1900; Methods of Government and Development Adopted by the Principal Colonizing Nations in their Control of Tropical and Other Colonies and Dependencies* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1901), NARAI RG 350, 1322-5, Entry 5, Box 186, 1262-1263.

⁶⁴ McCoy, *Policing America’s Empire*, 189-191.

Integrated National Police, was involved in the repression of the Marcos regime and disbanded in 1991 after the restoration of democracy.⁶⁵

The army soon began to formally incorporate these lessons into a cohesive doctrine. With the Root reforms of 1903 creating a General Staff and Army War College, army leaders looked to those institutions for a number of systematic studies of the occupations of Cuba and Philippines, as well as the riot and strikebreaking missions of the 1890s. Clearly, Army leaders anticipated future such campaigns. In a 1904 memorandum anticipating the “most probable cause of war” for future missions, the Army Joint Board recommended a study “based off of the following assumption: That the United States finds itself obliged... to intervene in the affairs of an independent country of the West Indies or on the mainland of Central and South America.” The purpose of such a mission, the memo continued, would be to “restore order,” with or without the interference of a foreign power. The memo set the conditions of the study as incorporating “the Caribbean Sea” and the “Philippine Archipelago” as potential theaters of war.⁶⁶

A number of military historians have argued that the post-Root Reform army was almost entirely preoccupied with planning for a European-style large war, but clearly army leaders also saw imperial policing in Central America, the Caribbean, and Southeast

⁶⁵ Allan R. Millet, “The Rise and Fall of the Cuban Rural Guard, 1898-1912,” *The Americas*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Oct. 1972), pp. 191-213.

⁶⁶ Memorandum for the Secretary, Army War College, October 28, 1904, Box 2, Entry 299, Serial 52, RG 165 Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, NARAII.

Asia as another key duty. The Army War College in its earliest years commissioned a number of official studies focusing on riot control and imperial policing as essential duties for modern officers. Major John C. Gresham, a veteran of the Philippine War and Medal of Honor recipient for his participation at Wounded Knee, wrote in a paper on “Street Fighting and Riot Work,” that it would continue to be “quite necessary to prepare for internal disorder as to guard against external danger, to provide for suppressing mobs as to arrange for protecting our coasts.” Also noting that “among the millions of immigrants coming to America are many professional agitators,” including some with military service in their home countries, Gresham feared mobs led by such men were “likely to prove no mean adversaries” to government forces. However, with the army’s now decades of experience dealing with such adversaries, at home and throughout America’s overseas territories, Gresham held the army as up to the task.

With the acquisition of a colonial empire, disturbances for which the army was responsible now encompassed riots and uprisings in Cuba and the Philippines, as well as in the Midwest or the Dakotas. According to Gresham, the army had always existed for that purpose. “We may remember that there has hardly been a year since the beginning of our government,” he added, “when the army has not been called on to quell disturbances.”⁶⁷ Echoing that concern was Major William H. Johnston of the 16th Infantry, who wrote in a similar paper, “There has been scarcely a year since this government was established in which the army has not been called upon to quell

⁶⁷ John C. Gresham, “Street Fighting and Riot Work, and Methods Best Adapted for the Protection of Public Utilities...,” 1908, Box 2, Entry 299, Serial 35, RG 165 Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, NARAII.

disturbances too serious for state authorities.” Johnston, even more than Gresham, expressly compared domestic agitators with colonial subjects, writing, “It would really seem as if certain elements of our population were as dangerous to our future peace as armed Filipinos.” In such occasions, the supposed lesson learned by Major Johnston was that, “When this occasion arises there should be no hesitation, no indication of timidity, all false sympathy should cease, and the offenders regarded not as American citizens, but as felons and public enemies.”⁶⁸

These lessons learned by the regular army were extended, via various army publications and journals, to the newly created National Guard. Reading of “an account of disorder at Glenn’s Falls, N.Y.” in October 1902, relating to a railroad strike, which resulted in the deployment of National Guard troops who fired their rifles into the air to disperse the rioters, a regular army officer wrote in to the *Army and Navy Journal* to provide his brother officer with some tactical guidance in such situations. “This was decidedly improper,” the regular officer chided. “No troops should fire, unless it is intended to hit some lawbreaker who deserved to be shot.” He continued, warning “no mob is ever intimidated” by such false displays. In the event of a true disturbance of the peace, “sharpshooters should be selected to promptly shoot those seen committing acts of violence, and then all rioting would end.”⁶⁹ A New York Guard officer, Colonel Edward E. Britton, felt compelled to prepare a lecture on the subject of “The Use of Troops in

⁶⁸ William H. Johnston, “The Genesis and Progress of Riots in Large Cities...,” 1908, Box 7, Entry 299, Serial 143, RG 165 Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, NARAII.

⁶⁹ “State Forces,” *The United States Army and Navy Journal and Gazette*, Vol. 50 (October 11, 1902), 143.

Civil Disorders,” which was later distributed to every officer of the National Guard and Naval Militia of New York, and printed in the *Journal of the Military Service Institution*. Recognizing the primacy of civilian over military power in the United States, Britton nevertheless counseled that, “when military power is used, it is by authority of the people and for their own purposes and protection.” Echoing the comments of the disapproving officer in the *Army and Navy Journal*, Britton advised, “Therefore, let no soldier hesitate in the performance of his duty” when deployed domestically during civil disturbances. Referencing incidents like the Pullman strike, Britton was equally in favor of a stern military hand to deal with public disorders. “The terrible severities of martial law, are necessary to the restoration of peace and order,” he wrote. “It is an evil, but it is simply the bitter medicine that effects the cure.” Of the strikers and agitators prompting military intervention, Britton was unforgiving: “the insurgents are public enemies, and are treated as such.”⁷⁰ By 1905, only a few years after its formal creation, the National Guard had fully incorporated the lessons of imperial service into its own doctrine.

The second edition of William Birkhimer’s *Military Government and Martial Law* revealed both the changes and continuities in military doctrine in this era, as officers reflected on the lessons learned in the previous decade. Published in 1904, twelve years after the original, Birkhimer wrote in the new preface, “Since this work was published, the military authorities of the United States, and those of Great Britain, have had occasion

⁷⁰ Colonel Edward E. Britton, *The Use of Troops in Civil Disorders: From the Legal and Tactical Standpoints: A Lecture* (New York: Military Service Institution of the United States, 1905), 4-5, 11-12.

to inaugurate and enforce military government on an extensive scale and under varied circumstances;” the United States in “Cuba, Porto Rico [sic], and the Philippine Islands,” and the British in South Africa. Likewise, Birkhimer continued, “During the twelve years last past there have been several conspicuous instances of enforcing martial law within the United States,” such as in Idaho in 1899, Pennsylvania in 1902, and Colorado in 1903-1904. These experiences, according to Birkhimer, “simply confirm previous ones.” That is to say, “the true rule for him who has to enforce military government is to place his justification upon the law of belligerent rights alone without complicating the situation by appeal to civil law.” For Birkhimer, the experience of the past decade of imperial wars and domestic disturbances further confirmed what American soldiers and academics had been arguing since Francis Lieber in 1862, that under martial law military officers must be exempt from civilian judicial oversight. Nor did the incidents requiring the application of martial law, within the United States or its imperial possessions, “vary in principle” from the “condition of affairs in Chicago in 1894.”⁷¹ Here Birkhimer demonstrated yet another direct link between the army’s role of domestic “gendarmery” that Lieutenant Wallace wrote of in 1895 and its new mission as an imperial policing force.

Furthermore, Birkhimer argued that it was unlikely that this part of the army’s mission would subside any time soon. Writing that while “it is not an agreeable fact to reflect upon, yet it is true that the instances are not diminishing in frequency wherein the military... are being put in requisition to preserve order when the civil authorities fail.”

⁷¹ Birkhimer, *Military Government*, viii.

Indeed, he was correct. In the next decade, the American military declared and enforced martial law numerous more times, both at home and overseas. American forces occupied Vera Cruz, Mexico, in 1914, declaring martial law. In 1915 and 1916 American marines occupied and established military governments over Haiti and the Dominican Republic, respectively. Service in the First World War did not end these commitments, as Americans remained in the Dominican Republic until 1924 and Haiti until 1934. A smaller garrison remained in Nicaragua until 1933. Within the United States, troops were called upon to suppress labor disputes in Colorado in 1914 and West Virginia in 1921. For all these missions, American servicemen had by this point a reliable doctrine, based off of years of experience and observation to deal with such situations.

Over the next several decades, this doctrine remained a useful template. The 1940 Marine Corps *Small Wars Manual*, based off the past half-century's worth of fighting, noted: "The history of the United States shows that in spite of the varying trend of the foreign policy of succeeding administrations, this Government has interposed or intervened in the affairs of other states with remarkable regularity, and it may be anticipated that the same general procedure will be followed in the future."⁷² Likewise the army continued to plan for a continued future of occupations and small wars well into the 1920s and 30s. Army officers at the school of infantry, for example, were asked to plan for suppression of revolts in the Dakotas or in the Philippines, or to plan an operation on the Northwest Frontier of British India. Soldiers stationed in Panama or the

⁷² *Small Wars Manual: United States Marine Corps, 1940* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1940), 4.

Philippines planned contingencies in the event of a general uprising.⁷³ Just as the army's leaders in the Philippines and Cuba had earned their stripes in frontier and domestic riot breaking and police actions, army leaders in subsequent decades would draw on those experiences in the course of their own duties. Frederick Funston, commissioned in 1898, had seen service in Cuba and the Philippines, earning a Medal of Honor on Luzon in 1899. Staying in the army, by 1907 he was tasked by President Roosevelt with leading federal forces into Goldfield, Nevada, when some 1,900 miners went on strike against the Goldfield Mine Operators Association. Despite the fact that, before then, the entirety of his active service had been on America's imperial frontier, Funston was quite at ease in Nevada. In his orders, Funston rested on the army's well-established doctrine of mob control, calling for the use of bayonets and gun butts to disperse hostile crowds and, that failing, rifle and cannon fire at the discretion of the unit commander.⁷⁴

Domestically as well, the army continued to be involved in riot breaking and strike duties. During the First World War, the Army was deployed to guard railroads and depots, and, particularly after the Russian Revolution, against organized labor. After the war, the army remained involved in labor disputes and in the racial strife that characterized the twenties and thirties. The historian Alfred McCoy, in his history of the migration of American strategies of imperial control back to the homefront, wrote that, in the interwar period, "U.S. Army commanders applied lessons learned while repressing

⁷³ Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941*, 256.

⁷⁴ Laurie and Cole, *The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 192-197*.

Filipino radical movements to crush a miner's revolt in the West Virginia coalfields.”⁷⁵

In 1934, the army was called upon to defend the Capitol itself, during the march of the “Bonus Army” on Washington D.C. The army, led by Douglas MacArthur, dispersed the marchers with fixed bayonets and tear gas. Like Funston in Nevada, the vast majority of MacArthur's prior service had been overseas, but he nevertheless drew from his own, his father's, and the army's in general experiences over the past century of service domestically and abroad, and the doctrine that emerged from those experiences

In January 2005, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld wrote in a department-wide memo that, “given the new realities of the 21st Century, waging the Global War on Terror is a particularly complex, and difficult task.” Facing two protracted insurgencies and the difficulties inherent in establishing a civil government in occupied territory in Iraq and Afghanistan, Rumsfeld wrote of the wars he was overseeing as secretary:

“It is not a conflict between large armies, navies, or air forces, which both the military and the public would better understand;

The American people, for the most part, do not feel personally engaged in the war, given that there is no need for rationing, no need for a draft, and that the country is not on a wartime footing;

⁷⁵ Alfred McCoy, “Policing the Imperial Periphery,” in McCoy, Alfred W. and Scarano, Francisco A., eds. *Colonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern American State*, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 115.

Even today the war is being conducted under peacetime constraints, regulations and requirements, which restrict the ability to meet the new challenges posed by an enemy completely unrestrained by constraints, laws or mores; and, as such, Public expectations are still largely oriented to peacetime or, at best, a conventional war.”⁷⁶

These all are sentiments with which Rumsfeld’s predecessor a century earlier would have completely agreed. As Elihu Root claimed in 1902 that “There were no precedents, and precedents were to be made,” Rumsfeld urged in 2005 an understanding of the “new realities and uniqueness of the task,” and, like Root, led the military establishment on some of its most consequential reform efforts in decades. Of course, both secretaries were presenting at best a partial version of the truth. The army, and the United States, had at the time of both conflicts a wide range of experience and “precedent” in the type of police work, counterinsurgency, and nation building it was called upon to perform, in the opening decades of both the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

Modern day debates over the use of military force at home and abroad often oddly resemble those of the early twentieth century. The complete American withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 was largely due to a failure to agree on a Status of Forces Agreement that protected American troops from Iraqi civilian courts, an issue of immunity raised by

⁷⁶ Donald Rumsfeld, “A Nation and the Civilized World at War in the 21st Century,” January 18, 2005, The Rumsfeld Papers; [accessed June 28, 2015], <http://papers.rumsfeld.com/>.

Francis Lieber in 1862 and repeated throughout interventions of the early 1900s.⁷⁷

Domestic riots in Los Angeles in 1992, Missouri in 2014, and Baltimore in 2015 all resulted in military interventions from state National Guard units. As pundits and politicians continue to debate these issues, it is incumbent upon historians to look deeper and provide context from the past century of American history.

⁷⁷ Rebecca Santana and Lara Jones, "Iraq Troop Withdrawal: Immunity Issue Scuttled Deal, Says Iraq PM," *Associated Press*, October 22, 2011, accessed May 17, 2014 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/22/iraq-troop-withdrawal-imm_n_1026306.html

APPENDIX A: DOMESTIC USE OF UNITED STATES FEDERAL MILITARY FORCES, 1877-1917

July – September 1877 – The “Great Railway Strike of 1877” is suppressed by federal military forces

June 1878 – The *Posse Comitatus Act* is signed into law by President Hayes, limiting, in theory, the application of federal military force in domestic incidents

October 1878 – Federal troops are used to restore order in Lincoln County, New Mexico, after a series of coach robberies

April 1879 – A company of federal troops are dispatched to Hastings, Nebraska, to prevent disorder during a federal murder trial

May 1882 – Federal troops are dispatched to the Arizona Territory to restore order after a series of Apache raids

July 1885 – February 1886 – Federal infantry and artillery is deployed to Salt Lake City, Utah, to enforce an unpopular federal ban on polygamy

September 1885 – Two companies of the Seventh Infantry Regiment are dispatched to Rock Springs, Wyoming, to put an end to violence against Chinese miners and railway workers

September 1885 – Federal troops are deployed to Tacoma and Seattle, Washington, to prevent anti-Chinese violence

February 1886 – Seattle is briefly placed under martial law during a series of anti-Chinese riots

July 1892 – Federal troops are deployed against rioting miners in Coeur d’Alene, Idaho

March 1894 – Federal troops are deployed to Denver, Colorado, to prevent insurrection after the firing of two municipal officials

May – July 1894 – The Pullman Strike, a national railway workers’ strike, results in the deployment of over 10,000 federal troops under the command of General Nelson Miles

July 1894 – A company of the Fifteenth Infantry Regiment is sent to Hammond, Indiana, to forcibly end a railway workers' work stoppage connected to the national Pullman Strike

July 1894 – Federal forces are deployed along the Northern Pacific Railroad line across North Dakota, Montana, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington; the Union Pacific Railroad line across Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, Nevada, and California; and the Southern Pacific Railroad line in New Mexico, in connection with the national Pullman Strike

July 1894 – A regiment is deployed to Sacramento, California, to put an end to railway worker violence

April – May 1899 – A force of 500 federal troops is sent, again, to Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, in response to further labor unrest

June 1903 – Federal troops are sent to Morenci, Arizona, during a mine strike, but are quickly withdrawn

November – December 1907 – Five companies of federal troops are deployed to Goldfield, Nevada, after a mining strike turned violent

April – December 1914 – Federal troops are deployed to Ludlow, Colorado, following several months of mine worker unrest

November 1914 – Federal troops are deployed to Prarie Creek, Arkansas, after striking workers seized control of a mine⁷⁸

⁷⁸ Dates and incidents compiled from information in: Henry C. Corbin and Frederick T. Wilson, *Federal Aid in Domestic Disturbances, 1787-1903* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1903); and, Clayton D. Laurie and Ronald H. Cole, *The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders: 1877-1945* (Washington DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1997).

**APPENDIX B: UNITED STATES OVERSEAS MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS,
1877-1917**

“1882 -- *Egypt*. - July 14 to 18. American forces landed to protect American interests during warfare between British and Egyptians and looting of the city of Alexandria by Arabs.

1885 -- *Panama (Colon)*. - January 18 and 19. US forces were used to guard the valuables in transit over the Panama Railroad, and the safes and vaults of the company during revolutionary activity. In March, April, and May in the cities of Colon and Panama, the forces helped reestablish freedom of transit during revolutionary activity.

1888 -- *Korea*. - June. A naval force was sent ashore to protect American residents in Seoul during unsettled political conditions, when an outbreak of the populace was expected.

1888 -- *Haiti*. - December 20. A display of force persuaded the Haitian Government to give up an American steamer which had been seized on the charge of breach of blockade.

1888-89 -- *Samoa*. - November 14, 1888, to March 20, 1889. US forces were landed to protect American citizens and the consulate during a native civil war.

1889 -- *Hawaiian Islands*. - July 30 and 31. US forces protected American interests at Honolulu during a revolution.

1890 -- *Argentina*. A naval party landed to protect US consulate and legation in Buenos Aires.

1891 -- *Haiti*. US forces sought to protect American lives and property on Navassa Island.

1891 -- *Bering Strait*. - July 2 to October 5. Naval forces sought to stop seal poaching.

1891 -- *Chile*. - August 28 to 30. US forces protected the American consulate and the women and children who had taken refuge in it during a revolution in Valparaiso.

1893 -- *Hawaii*. - January 16 to April 1. Marines were landed ostensibly to protect American lives and property, but many believed actually to promote a provisional government under Sanford B. Dole. This action was disavowed by the United States.

1894 -- *Brazil*. - January. A display of naval force sought to protect American commerce and shipping at Rio de Janeiro during a Brazilian civil war.

1894 -- *Nicaragua*. - July 6 to August 7. US forces sought to protect American interests at Bluefields following a revolution.

1894-95 -- *China*. Marines were stationed at Tientsin and penetrated to Peking for protection purposes during the Sino-Japanese War.

1894-95 -- *China*. A naval vessel was beached and used as a fort at Newchwang for protection of American nationals.

1894-96 -- *Korea*. - July 24, 1894 to April 3, 1896. A guard of marines was sent to protect the American legation and American lives and interests at Seoul during and following the Sino-Japanese War.

1895 -- *Colombia*. - March 8 to 9. US forces protected American interests during an attack on the town of Bocas del Toro by a bandit chieftain.

1896 -- *Nicaragua*. - May 2 to 4. US forces protected American interests in Corinto during political unrest.

1898 -- *Nicaragua*. - February 7 and 8. US forces protected American lives and property at San Juan del Sur.

1898 -- The Spanish-American War. On April 25, 1898, the United States declared war with Spain. The war followed a Cuban insurrection against Spanish rule and the sinking of the USS *Maine* in the harbor at Havana.

1898-99 -- *China*. - November 5, 1898 to March 15, 1899. US forces provided a guard for the legation at Peking and the consulate at Tientsin during contest between the Dowager Empress and her son.

1899 -- *Nicaragua*. American and British naval forces were landed to protect national interests at San Juan del Norte, February 22 to March 5, and at Bluefields a few weeks later in connection with the insurrection of Gen. Juan P. Reyes.

1899 -- *Samoa*. - February-May 15. American and British naval forces were landed to protect national interests and to take part in a bloody contention over the succession to the throne.

1899-1901 -- *Philippine Islands*. US forces protected American interests following the war with Spain and conquered the islands by defeating the Filipinos in their war for independence.

1900 -- *China*. - May 24 to September 28. American troops participated in operations to protect foreign lives during the Boxer rising, particularly at Peking. For many years after this experience a permanent legation guard was maintained in Peking, and was strengthened at times as trouble threatened.

1901 -- *Colombia (State of Panama)*. - November 20 to December 4. US forces protected American property on the Isthmus and kept transit lines open during serious revolutionary disturbances.

1902 -- *Colombia*. - April 16 to 23. US forces protected American lives and property at Bocas del Toro during a civil war.

1902 -- *Colombia (State of Panama)*. - September 17 to November 18. The United States placed armed guards on all trains crossing the Isthmus to keep the railroad line open, and stationed ships on both sides of Panama to prevent the landing of Colombian troops.

1903 -- *Honduras*. - March 23 to 30 or 31. US forces protected the American consulate and the steamship wharf at Puerto Cortez during a period of revolutionary activity.

1903 -- *Dominican Republic*. - March 30 to April 21. A detachment of marines was landed to protect American interests in the city of Santo Domingo during a revolutionary outbreak.

1903 -- *Syria*. - September 7 to 12. US forces protected the American consulate in Beirut when a local Moslem uprising was feared.

1903-04 -- *Abyssinia*. Twenty-five marines were sent to Abyssinia to protect the US Consul General while he negotiated a treaty.

1903-14 -- *Panama*. US forces sought to protect American interests and lives during and following the revolution for independence from Colombia over construction of the Isthmian Canal. With brief intermissions, United States Marines were stationed on the Isthmus from November 4, 1903, to January 21, 1914 to guard American interests.

1904 -- *Dominican Republic*. - January 2 to February 11. American and British naval forces established an area in which no fighting would be allowed and protected American interests in Puerto Plata and Sosua and Santo Domingo City during revolutionary fighting.

1904 -- *Tangier, Morocco*. "We want either Perdicaris alive or Raisula dead." A squadron demonstrated to force release of a kidnapped American. Marines were landed to protect the consul general.

1904 -- *Panama*. - November 17 to 24. US forces protected American lives and property at Ancon at the time of a threatened insurrection.

1904-05 -- *Korea*. - January 5, 1904, to November 11, 1905. A guard of Marines was sent to protect the American legation in Seoul during the Russo-Japanese War.

1906-09 -- *Cuba*. - September 1906 to January 23, 1909. US forces sought to restore order, protect foreigners, and establish a stable government after serious revolutionary activity.

1907 -- *Honduras*. - March 18 to June 8. To protect American interests during a war between Honduras and Nicaragua, troops were stationed in Trujillo, Ceiba, Puerto Cortez, San Pedro, Laguna and Choloma.

1910 -- *Nicaragua*. - May 19 to September 4. US forces protected American interests at Bluefields.

1911 -- *Honduras*. - January 26. American naval detachments were landed to protect American lives and interests during a civil war in Honduras.

1911 -- *China*. As the nationalist revolution approached, in October an ensign and 10 men tried to enter Wuchang to rescue missionaries but retired on being warned away, and a small landing force guarded American private property and consulate at Hankow. Marines were deployed in November to guard the cable stations at Shanghai; landing forces were sent for protection in Nanking, Chinkiang, Taku and elsewhere.

1912 -- *Honduras*. A small force landed to prevent seizure by the government of an American-owned railroad at Puerto Cortez. The forces were withdrawn after the United States disapproved the action.

1912 -- *Panama*. Troops, on request of both political parties, supervised elections outside the Canal Zone.

1912 -- *Cuba*. - June 5 to August 5. US forces protected American interests on the Province of Oriente, and in Havana.

1912 -- *China*. - August 24 to 26, on Kentucky Island, and August 26 to 30 at Camp Nicholson. US forces protected Americans and American interests during revolutionary activity.

1912 -- *Turkey*. - November 18 to December 3. US forces guarded the American legation at Constantinople during a Balkan War.

1912-25 -- *Nicaragua*. - August to November 1912. US forces protected American interests during an attempted revolution. A small force, serving as a legation guard and seeking to promote peace and stability, remained until August 5, 1925.

1912-41 -- *China*. The disorders which began with the overthrow of the dynasty during Kuomintang rebellion in 1912, which were redirected by the invasion of China by Japan, led to demonstrations and landing parties for the protection of US interests in China continuously and at many points from 1912 on to 1941. The guard at Peking and along the route to the sea was maintained until 1941. In 1927, the United States had 5,670 troops ashore in China and 44 naval vessels in its waters. In 1933 the United States had 3,027 armed men ashore. The protective action was generally based on treaties with China concluded from 1858 to 1901.

1913 -- *Mexico*. - September 5 to 7. A few marines landed at Ciaris Estero to aid in evacuating American citizens and others from the Yaqui Valley, made dangerous for foreigners by civil strife.

1914 -- *Haiti*.- January 29 to February 9, February 20 to 21, October 19. Intermittently US naval forces protected American nationals in a time of rioting and revolution.

1914 -- *Dominican Republic*. - June and July. During a revolutionary movement, United States naval forces by gunfire stopped the bombardment of Puerto Plata, and by threat of force maintained Santo Domingo City as a neutral zone.

1914-17 -- *Mexico*. Undeclared Mexican--American hostilities followed the *Dolphin* affair and Villa's raids and included capture of Vera Cruz and later Pershing's expedition into northern Mexico.

1915-34 -- *Haiti*. - July 28, 1915, to August 15, 1934. US forces maintained order during a period of chronic political instability.

1916 -- *China*. American forces landed to quell a riot taking place on American property in Nanking.

1916-24 -- *Dominican Republic*. - May 1916 to September 1924. American naval forces maintained order during a period of chronic and threatened insurrection.

1917 -- *China*. American troops were landed at Chungking to protect American lives during a political crisis.

1917-18 -- World War I. On April 6, 1917, the United States declared war with Germany and on December 7, 1917, with Austria-Hungary. Entrance of the United States into the war was precipitated by Germany's submarine warfare against neutral shipping.”⁷⁹

⁷⁹ Dates and incidents taken directly from: Richard F. Grimmett, “Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2004,” *Congressional Research Service* report RL30172 (October 2004).

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