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Legislating “Military Entitlements”: A Challenge to the Congressional Abdication Thesis

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dc.contributor.advisor Pfiffner, James P. Ross, Alexis Lasselle
dc.creator Ross, Alexis Lasselle 2016-04-19T19:29:20Z 2016-04-19T19:29:20Z 2015
dc.description.abstract The field of Congress and national security, with few exceptions, describes Congress in the post-World War II era as a secondary player in the development of defense policy. In fact, some scholars argue that Congress’ approach at times is characterized by deference, ambivalence, and even abdication. However, this dissertation argues that by failing to recognize some of the most influential forms of actual congressional power, scholars do not have a comprehensive understanding of the legislative branch’s participation in defense policymaking. In fact, in some areas of defense policy, such as military personnel policy, Congress actually leads.
dc.format.extent 209 pages
dc.language.iso en
dc.rights Copyright 2015 Alexis Lasselle Ross
dc.subject Public policy
dc.subject Political science
dc.subject Congress
dc.subject Entitlements
dc.subject Legislative-executive struggle for power
dc.subject Military pay and benefits
dc.subject Military personnel
dc.subject National Security
dc.title Legislating “Military Entitlements”: A Challenge to the Congressional Abdication Thesis
dc.type Dissertation en Doctoral en Public Policy en George Mason University en

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