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Modeling Behavior in Public Goods Experiments

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dc.contributor.advisor Levy, David M
dc.contributor.author Bennett, Paul Henry Malcolm
dc.creator Bennett, Paul Henry Malcolm
dc.date.accessioned 2016-09-28T10:20:48Z
dc.date.available 2016-09-28T10:20:48Z
dc.date.issued 2016
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1920/10406
dc.description.abstract This dissertation analyzes the behavior of participants in the class of economics experiments known as public goods games. It is well established that most participants in public goods games do not play the Nash equilibrium of zero contributed to the public good initially. By initially I mean either the first round of a repeated game or the only round in a one-shot game. The goal of this dissertation is to explain the observed behavior and to develop models that predict it.
dc.format.extent 87 pages
dc.language.iso en
dc.rights Copyright 2016 Paul Henry Malcolm Bennett
dc.subject Economics
dc.subject Economic theory
dc.subject Altruism
dc.subject Bet-hedging
dc.subject Experimental Economics
dc.subject Kelly Criterion
dc.subject Public Goods
dc.subject Reciprocity
dc.title Modeling Behavior in Public Goods Experiments
dc.type Dissertation
thesis.degree.level Ph.D.
thesis.degree.discipline Economics
thesis.degree.grantor George Mason University


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