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Incentives Matter: Examining the Problematic Nature of Public Aid in the United States

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dc.contributor.advisor Wagner, Richard E.
dc.contributor.author Tuszynski, Meg Patrick
dc.creator Tuszynski, Meg Patrick
dc.date.accessioned 2017-01-29T01:13:05Z
dc.date.available 2017-01-29T01:13:05Z
dc.date.issued 2016
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/1920/10551
dc.description.abstract In chapter 1, I argue that the institutional and constitutional context within which order emerges has a strong impact on the structure of that order. I examine the evolution of public-assistance policy in the United States to understand key dynamics of a perverse emergent order. Traditionally, studies of spontaneous social orders have not examined how order emerges within a framework that includes significant government actors (Hebert and Wagner 2013 is a notable exception). I argue that the public-assistance system as it exists in the United States is a perverse emergent order, with both public and private actors playing key roles in the creation of this system.
dc.format.extent 76 pages
dc.language.iso en
dc.rights Copyright 2016 Meg Patrick Tuszynski
dc.subject Economics en_US
dc.subject Austrian Economics en_US
dc.subject emergent order en_US
dc.subject polycentricity en_US
dc.subject public aid en_US
dc.subject Public Choice en_US
dc.subject redistribution en_US
dc.title Incentives Matter: Examining the Problematic Nature of Public Aid in the United States
dc.type Dissertation
thesis.degree.level Ph.D.
thesis.degree.discipline Economics
thesis.degree.grantor George Mason University


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