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The Political Economy of Epidemiology

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dc.contributor.advisor Coyne, Christopher J Carson, Byron Bernell
dc.creator Carson, Byron Bernell 2018-10-21T19:17:22Z 2018-10-21T19:17:22Z 2017
dc.description.abstract These essays develop an institutional framework to epidemiology that highlights the conditions under which private actors resolve collective action problems associated with the prevention of infectious diseases. This framework is applied to a number of historical and modern cases from the United States and across the world to show that despite the theoretical problems of externalities and free riding, private coordination is more likely than previously thought. This is the case when people can capture the benefits of prevention and lower the cost of coordination. The main conclusion is that private and alternative disease prevention can be important means of mitigating the burden of infectious diseases, especially when people do not have access to functional governmental health institutions.
dc.format.extent 134 pages
dc.language.iso en
dc.rights Copyright 2017 Byron Bernell Carson
dc.subject Economics en_US
dc.subject Epidemiology en_US
dc.subject collective action en_US
dc.subject disease prevention en_US
dc.subject epidemiology en_US
dc.subject incentives en_US
dc.subject Institutions en_US
dc.subject profit en_US
dc.title The Political Economy of Epidemiology
dc.type Dissertation Ph.D. Economics George Mason University

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