Abstract:
When four Blackwater military contractors were brutally murdered in Fallujah,
Iraq, in March 2004, the images shocked American policymakers and citizens.
Their deaths raised critical questions about the roles and activities of
private military contractors operating alongside the military and in active
combat zones. The primary congressional committees responsible for oversight
of defense policy, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) and Senate Armed
Services Committee (SASC), had several opportunities in the weeks following
the murders to ask administration officials about the number and activities
of private military contractors in Iraq. At the same time, the Bush
administration and congressional Republicans were focused on transferring
power to the interim Iraqi government in July 2004. Furthermore, the 2004
presidential election loomed large while congressional Republicans sought to
retain control of both chambers. This paper provides a historical case study
of ineffective congressional oversight with significant policy and military
consequences through analysis of the HASC and SASC’s hearings and
legislation as the committees attempted to conduct its oversight of the DoD
and understand the role and numbers of private military contractors.