Abstract:
The fragile nature of weak states, with their turbulent power structures and corresponding shortfalls in government capacity, creates natural incentives for host nation governments to intervene with efforts to politicize their security forces and restructure them for personal loyalty to government leaders rather than organizational and institutional effectiveness. However, the patron states providing security force assistance for these weak states also possess significant influence over host nation security forces. This influence comes from their ability to inject extensive resources (both financial and personnel) in numerous ways across the host nation system as well as by the “attractiveness” of their more effective and high performing organizations, which produce a degree of emulation in their host nation partner. This study directly focuses on this dynamic – a field of scholarship that has only received limited coverage. This dissertation argues that two aspects of patron state security assistance: 1) the degree of patron intervention/assistance in host nation organizational practices and 2) the nature of the commitment of patron state combat forces are critical factors impacting the relative professionalization of the host nation’s security force organizational practices (the intervening variable). Politicization by the host nation government of a weak state is considered as a constant – pulling organizational practices towards a “politicized” status. But different strategies in the two patron state security force assistance variables can serve as countervailing forces that stop or reverse such negative trends. The outcome of these competing forces upon host nation organizational practices produces variation along a spectrum of security force effectiveness, which we can measure through demonstrated performance on the battlefield. The dissertation examines the three stages of U.S. security force assistance to South Vietnam from 1955 to 1973 as a critical case to understand this variation. During the advisory period from 1955 to 1964, a steadily increasing U.S commitment of advisors and supporting air and logistics capabilities alongside a massive training and equip effort was unable to balance extensive politicization by the Diem regime. From 1965-1968 the U.S. committed major combat forces to prevent the defeat of South Vietnam but its efforts to improve security force effectiveness were limited. During the final, more “partnered” period from 1969-1973, the U.S. did produce major gains in South Vietnamese effectiveness, but these efforts were still a work in progress when the decision was made to withdraw all forces in 1973.
