Abstract:
Local governments have a large impact on the wellbeing of individuals. They are the
providers if not the funders of most public services and they enact and enforce many of
the laws that determine the productivity of individuals within the economy. This
dissertation looks at three aspects of the effect of local governance incentives on public
service provision. The first chapter looks at the relationship between federal funds and
local governance. The analysis suggests that federal aid weakens the competitive
discipline that Tiebout competition enforces on local governance resulting in greater
incentives for corruption. The second chapter examines the effects of urban decline on
disaster response and reconstruction. Cities that have experienced urban decline before a
disaster experience coordination failures that result in slower population recovery. The
final chapter compares the provision of flood protection by a centralized body, the United
States Army Corps of Engineers, with the potential provision by local governments. This
chapter uses the analysis of the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force’s
Performance Evaluation of the New Orleans and Southeast Louisiana Hurricane
Protection System, released March 2007, to identify specific failings of centralized
control.
