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dc.contributor.author Adams, Mark
dc.creator Adams, Mark
dc.date 2009-07-23
dc.date.accessioned 2009-09-21T19:37:40Z
dc.date.available NO_RESTRICTION en_US
dc.date.available 2009-09-21T19:37:40Z
dc.date.issued 2009-09-21T19:37:40Z
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/1920/5606
dc.description.abstract Societies exist where individuals agree to live together and abide by a common set of rules. These rules seek to limit, but to not eliminate, predation. When a community is struck by a disaster the environment changes but rules frequently do not adapt; discouraging investment and repopulation and hindering recovery. The laws governing private contracts have evolved mechanism for avoiding harmful rigidity during times of crisis. This thesis proposes a means of applying a similar mechanism to the binding constraints in social interactions with the aim of increasing the likelihood of the community surviving and rebuilding.
dc.language.iso en_US en_US
dc.subject public choice en_US
dc.subject Tiebout en_US
dc.subject disaster en_US
dc.subject constitution en_US
dc.subject law en_US
dc.subject crisis en_US
dc.title Rules In Crisis en_US
dc.type Thesis en
thesis.degree.name Master of Arts in Economics en_US
thesis.degree.level Master's en
thesis.degree.discipline Economics en
thesis.degree.grantor George Mason University en


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