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How to Expect the Portuguese Inquisition

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dc.contributor.advisor Nye, John V.C.
dc.contributor.author Anderson, Robert Warren
dc.creator Anderson, Robert Warren
dc.date 2011-04-29
dc.date.accessioned 2011-05-06T21:07:20Z
dc.date.available NO_RESTRICTION en_US
dc.date.available 2011-05-06T21:07:20Z
dc.date.issued 2011-05-06
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/1920/6249
dc.description.abstract The Portuguese Inquisition lasted for centuries, sentenced tens of thousands of people and created a global Diaspora. However, an analytical approach to understanding fluctuations in inquisitorial severity is lacking. I use a Public Choice framework of the inquisition by treating it as a power and wealth seeking bureaucracy. I find that economic conditions affected overall sentencing; as well as political. Anti-inquisitorial lobbying is found to be effective. Inquisitors acted to protect their co-religionists, engaged in systematic rent seeking behavior and shifted their focus when it became politically expedient. Far from being a pious Catholic institution intent on keeping religion pure, the inquisition acted as a bureaucracy like any other modern one complete with rent seeking, lobbying and politics.
dc.language.iso en_US en_US
dc.subject economic history en_US
dc.subject Portugal en_US
dc.title How to Expect the Portuguese Inquisition en_US
dc.type Dissertation en
thesis.degree.name PhD in Economics en_US
thesis.degree.level Doctoral en
thesis.degree.discipline Economics en
thesis.degree.grantor George Mason University en


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