Abstract:
Changes to the formal rules and institutions governing political activity are driven by the
complex interactions between political actors seeking resources from the state. These
changes disrupt the network of competitive-cooperative relationships that given sufficient
time to mature help stabilize and reinforce persistence of the status quo. This thesis
analyzes these dynamics from the perspective of complex systems theory. The principle
finding is that the pressure to change regime characteristics moves through three distinct
phases. Immediately following a change to regime characteristics, system dynamics are
unstable, indicated by rising hazard force. Over time, the political system transitions to a
stabilizing self-reinforcing dynamic. During this period a power law model describes the
survival function and distribution of regime change magnitudes, while the hazard force
decreases nonlinearly. During the final phase a rising hazard force indicates a transition
to back to unstable equilibrium dynamics. These findings indicate that changes to regime
characteristics are the result of system level interdependence that forms as a result of the
development of tactics, strategies and relationships following a previous regime change.
Those cases where regime characteristics survive for decades, even past the century mark
as some autocratic and democratic states have managed are indicative of system success
in developing equilibrium dynamics that effectively resist pressures to change.
