Abstract:
This thesis explores the development and efficacy of international human rights
mechanisms in respect to holding transnational corporations culpable for human rights
violations committed as a direct result of their operations. When it comes to holding
transnational corporations (TNCs) accountable for violating human rights, there appears
to be a gap between rhetoric and reality in international law. What are the international
regulatory mechanisms that have been implemented to ensure transnational corporations
abide by universal human rights as outlined in the UDHR, and how effectively have they
been enforced?
One of the problems with addressing grievances against TNCs is that as non-state
actors they are not legally culpable under existing international treaties. To this day any
preemptive actions taken by TNCs are done so on a voluntary basis. Intergovernmental
organizations are increasingly setting standards to regulate corporate conduct in the area of human rights. Though not legally binding, soft law is “generally understood to
encompass nonbinding norms that govern behavior.” Critics claim that such principles
are too general and ineffective, whereas proponents assert that soft laws often lead to the
establishment of norms and rules, or “hard” laws, set forth by these non-binding codes.
Arguably one of the largest corporate human rights offenders is the oil, gas and
mining industry, also known as the extractive sector. Through the in-depth analysis of
two case studies in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Nigeria, this paper will
determine how existing normative human rights standards and legal mechanisms have
been applied, what the results were in each case and how they differed. I will
comparatively analyze what has been done to hold TNCs accountable for human rights
abuses in the past, what is currently being done—and how. Furthermore, these cases will
help identify deficiencies in the system, and suggest future alternatives.
